

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION BULLETIN

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DIVISION USAID - SAIGON

NO.

No. 27

DATE:

May 1, 1966

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. RECENT DECREES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND DOCUMENTS ON MAJOR PROGRAMS	
<u>Central Government:</u> the Constituent Assembly...	3
<u>Local Government and Rural Construction</u>	4
increased allowances for village and hamlet officials--the 1966 program of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development	
II. ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONNEL	
<u>Local government officials</u> :.....	13
recent appointments in Provinces, Districts, and cities--organization chart of the Ministry of Interior	
III. TRENDS, ISSUES, AND TECHNIQUES IN GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION	16
the Second Administration Conference--the role of revolutionary cadre in pacification-- <u>the Cadre</u> <u>Guide Book</u> --the Communist Party in South Vietnam-- how to sample opinion--Viet Cong Cadre--	

The Public Administration Division (PAD) of USAID:

PAD's address is 85 Le van Duyet, 3rd floor.

PAD's BULLETIN will appear monthly from now on.

PAD is interested in what in its BULLETIN is useful to its readers. It is interested in what its readers think it should publish. Your opinions are welcome. New readers are welcome. Persons wishing to receive the BULLETIN have only to let us know (telephone 25492/6, Ext. 547.)

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT: the Constituent Assembly:

Decree-Law governing election
of the Constituent Assembly

Chairman of the National Directory,

- Considering the provisional Convention of June 19, 1965;
- Considering the Decision No. 3-QLVNCH/QD dated June 19, 1965 of the RVN Armed Forces Congress establishing and fixing the composition of the National Directory;
- Considering Decree No. 001-a/CT/LDQG/SL dated June 19, 1965 and subsequent documents fixing the composition of the Central Executive Committee;
- Considering the needs of the nation;
- Considering the resolution of the National Directory dated April 6, 1966;

Decree-Law

Art. 1 - In accordance with the aspirations of the whole people, a Constituent Assembly will be elected and invested with the function of drafting and voting the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam.

Art. 2 - The Constituent Assembly mentioned in Article 1 above will be elected within a period from 3 to 5 months after the signing date of this Decree-Law through universal and direct suffrage with secret ballot throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

Art. 3 - Election day, number of representatives, election regulations, status of representatives, organization and operation of the Assembly will be fixed later by a Decree-Law.

Art. 4 - The Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, Commissioners general and Commissioners are charged, each as to that which concerns him with the execution of this Decree-Law.

This Decree-Law will be published in the RVN Official Journal through emergency procedure.

Saigon, April 14, 1966

s/ Lt. Gen. Nguyen van Thieu

LOCAL GOVERNMENT: allowances for village and hamlet officials:

I. Recipients

At present, the minimum allowances paid to Village and Hamlet officials are fixed as follows:

Village level (Village Adm. Committee - Village Pacification Committee)

Chairman	1,700\$
Vice Chairman	1,600\$
Members	1,500\$

Hamlet level

Hamlet Chief	1,500\$
Deputy Hamlet Chief or Assistant	1,400\$

As most of village budgets are insufficient, the Ministry of Interior provides monthly allowances to:

Village level: chairman, Village Adm. Committee or Village Pacification Committee

Vice-chairman, Village Adm. Committee or Village Pacification Committee

Finance/Economic member

Hamlet level: Hamlet Chiefs

Other members at Village level such as Information and propaganda members, Youth and civil defense members, Police and Security members are paid respectively by the Ministry of Information/Open Arms, Ministry of Youth and the Directorate General of Police and Security.

At Hamlet level, the deputy Hamlet Chief in charge of Information/Propaganda, and assistant in charge of Youth and civil defense are all paid by the Ministry of Information/Open Arms and the Ministry of Youth.

II. Allowance rate

The Ministry of Interior provides standard allowances to every official cited above, each month 1,650\$ (1,500\$ plus 10% increase as of Nov. 1, 1964). If the monthly allowances of these officials exceed 1,650\$, the Village budget will pay the difference.

III. Procedure relative to allocation of funds

To settle the allowances paid to Village/Hamlet officials, the Ministry of Interior allocates funds to provinces every quarter, based on the proposal for expenditures by the Provinces. As a rule, the table of allocation of funds are sent to Provinces the first week of January, April, July and October every year.

Provinces effect the payment of allowances by issuing administrative checks to the provincial cashier.

Every month, the provinces forward to the Ministry of Interior the status of allocated expenditures authorized bearing the certification of the Chief of Treasury as well as the copies of expenditures supporting documents (lists of village/hamlet officials with the letters of nominations) to allow this Ministry to easily follow up and control the amount of funds allocated.

Presently, the total amount of funds allocated for the 1st quarter 1966, to be paid to 6,013 village officials and to 9,295 Hamlet chiefs is 75,774.600\$.

.....

LOCAL GOVERNMENT: probable increases in allowances for village and hamlet officials:

Ministry of Interior

TABLE OF ASSESSMENT

Plan to increase allowances

According to the project for reorganization of village/hamlet administration to be submitted to the office of the Chairman of Central Executive Committee, the rate of allowances for these officials will be increased as follows:

1. Village People's Council (6 members)

	<u>Old Statute</u>	<u>New Statute</u>
- Special allowance of the Chairman	no	1,500\$
- Special allowance of Secretary	no	1,000\$
- Per diem/each day of meeting	80\$	100\$
- Per diem/attending meeting at district consultant Committee (each day)	no	200\$

2. Village Adm. Committee

	<u>Allowances</u>	<u>Subvention from National Budget</u>	
- Chairman	1,870\$	1,650\$	4,000\$
- Deputy Chairman	1,760\$	1,650\$	no
- Secretary			3,800\$
- Deputy Secretary	no	no	3,500\$
- Members (except Police and Security Members)	1,650\$	1,650\$	3,000\$

3. Hamlet Officials

- Hamlet Chiefs	1,650\$	1,650\$	2,800\$
- Deputy Hamlet Chiefs and Assistants	1,540\$	1,400\$	2,500\$

RURAL CONSTRUCTION: the program of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development during 1966:

1. GENERAL

a. On 1 Dec. 1965, the Prime Minister and concurrently Chairman, Central Rural Construction Council, signed a directive prescribing rural construction policies.

This directive explained that:

"The eventual purpose of our people and Armed Forces is a unified democratic and powerful Fatherland of Vietnam;

Our practical essential short-range purposes are Security, Freedom, Democracy and Happiness for the people of South Vietnam."

To accomplish these purposes, the National Directory and the Central Executive Committee have outlined the following three main policies: military attacks to defeat the VC, rural construction and building of democracy."

The directive also defined: "Construction of an area is to restore public security and to carry out the policies of the Government in order to improve the living conditions of the inhabitants in that area in political, economic and social fields, etc..." and the following three fundamentals are established:

(1) Fundamental 1

Rural Construction can only be achieved through the unity of military, administrative and civil personnel.

The important and deciding element for the success of rural construction is the People. Military and administrative personnel only have the responsibility to assist, provide guidance and motivate the people so that the people will recognize the necessity and importance and carry out rural construction by themselves as their initiated work.

(2) Fundamental 2:

The Government must formulate a well-defined and practical new life development policy in rural areas and publicize this policy to the people. When carrying out this policy in rural areas, cadres must know the honest aspirations of the people so that their work not only fit the policy of the Government, but they also

meet the legitimate aspirations of the people.

(3) Fundamental 3

Rural Construction will only obtain everlasting results, if the enemy's infrastructures are destroyed and constantly followed up and our infrastructures, that is our regional administrative agencies and people's defense groups created and supported by the people, must be constantly protected and controlled. The follow-up of our infrastructures on the infrastructures of the enemy must be indefinitely carried out. In other words, rural construction will only produce everlasting results, if VC underground cadres and cruel rural officials are eliminated and democratic, uncorrupted and effective administrative agencies are activated.

The Directive also prescribed: "The construction of an area consists of two phases: Peace restoration phase and new life development phase."

The peace restoration phase will be carried out through two periods: clearing and securing.

The clearing period will aim at annihilating or driving VC regional and main forces from the areas to be constructed.

The purposes of the securing period will be to destroy VC military-political infrastructures and consolidate or construct our infrastructures, that is to liberate the people from VC control, and instill a sense of responsibility among the people to maintain the restored security by themselves.

During the new life development phase, the policy of the Government will be carried out to meet the honest and legitimate requirements and aspirations of most people residing in peace restored areas in political, economic and social fields etc.."

The Ministry of National Defense will be responsible for carrying out the clearing phase. The Ministry of Interior and Rural Construction will carry out the securing phase. New life development phase requires the efforts of all ministries. The Central Rural Construction Council will closely coordinate the activities of these ministries. Similar Rural Construction Councils have been activated in CTZ's, DTA's, provinces and districts.

The Central Rural Construction Council has:

- Published Directive No. 1535/UBHP/CT/M dated 11 Dec. 1965 prescribing the initial concepts on Rural Construction.

- Published Directive No. 1382/UBHP/CT/M dated 6 Nov. 1965 prescribing the rural construction control system from central to district levels.

- Published Order No. 2164/XDNT dated 10 Dec. 1965 prescribing the regulations for Rural Construction Cadres.

- Outlined criteria to direct all provinces in the preparation of 1966 Rural Construction Plans, and approved these 46 plans and provided an appropriation of 1,558,049,000\$.

The Central Rural Construction Council has reminded all provinces to prepare practical plans, that is, these plans must be based on actual capabilities of low level cadres, capabilities of the enemy, military support capabilities of DTA's and honest and legitimate aspirations of the people. The policy of the Central Rural Construction Council is that works must be slowly carried out, but they must be successful. Once an area is pacified, it must be able to defend itself. Pacification must be gradually and continuously carried out from secure areas to insecure areas, from densely populated, developed areas to thinly populated under-developed areas. Security in an area must be restored before work will be carried out in another area.

The plan of the province must be practical in order that at least 75% of the programs can be realized at the end of the year.

Below is a recapitulation of the vital missions of the Rural Construction Ministry in 1966.

2. VITAL MISSIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN 1966

PURPOSE	MISSION
1. Have a uniform and appropriate conception on rural construction	It is requested to coordinate with the Ministries concerned to: a. Publish the initial conception of the Central Rural Construction Council, concerning the construction of rural areas, to the people, the cadres, the government and the armed forces in order that they all will have a thorough knowledge of it. b. Organize four seminars for the military and civil cadres to discuss and exchange their views and experiences on rural construction.

- c. Submit to the Central Rural Construction Council a digest of the suggestions from the people and the experiences of cadres, with a view to amending initial rural construction concepts to meet the actual situation in rural areas.

2. Have an effective group of rural construction cadre

It is requested to:

- a. Urge the Provincial Rural Construction Councils to recruit about 200 Rural Construction Cadre, including:
 - (1) voluntary, local and new cadres
 - (2) a variety of non-specialized, voluntary and qualified cadres
- b. Build and consolidate the three Rural Construction Training Centers at GiaDinh, Vung Tau and Pleiku.
- c. Train and re-train about 130 rural construction cadres.
- d. Exploit the experiences of cadres, improve continuously the techniques from the rural construction training centers, concerning the construction of rural areas.
- e. Publish a magazine, using it as a means for technical development, and as means of communication between the cadres of the nation. Radio broadcasting and television can be used for the same purpose.

3. Have an effective system of directing rural construction

It is requested to coordinate with the ministries concerned of the government to:

- a. Assume the missions as Executive Agency, Central Rural Construction Council. Guide, promote and support the activities of the Provincial Rural Construction Councils.
- b. Provide additional activity facilities to general sections, CTZ Rural Construction Councils, DTA Rural Reconstruction Councils, Provincial Rural Construction Councils, and District Rural Construction Councils, especially in priority areas.
- c. Make a digest of and submit to the Central Rural Construction Council, the recommendations of the provinces relating to the reorganization of the administrative and popular elected

agencies in rural areas, in order that appropriate actions can be taken to direct, support and promote rural construction.

- d. Set up an effective rural construction inspection team at the Central Rural Construction Council and in each CTZ.

4. Have a short range, but practical program

It is requested to coordinate with the ministries of the government concerned to: Promote and support the execution of the provincial rural construction programs in 1966. These programs are to be prepared by the provinces in compliance with the standards from the Central Rural Construction Council and the CTZ's, and based on the actual situation of the area concerned.

The CTZ's, the DTA's and the provinces have contracted with the Government to realize 75% of the Rural Construction program prior to 1 Jan. 1967.

- (1) They will pacify 969 hamlets with 2,304,000 inhabitants who have just been concentrated there (16% of the population of the nation). They will consolidate 1,083 hamlets with 1,161,000 inhabitants (8% of the population of the nation) by setting up self-defense civilian groups, Hamlet Executive Boards through election, Village Administrative Councils, and by organizing the new life. They will continue to develop the construction of 3,620 newly pacified hamlets and the town areas with 7,842,000 inhabitants (53% of the population of the nation).
- (2) They will resettle 25,000 families who have left VC controlled areas.
- (3) They will realize 1,800 hamlets self-help programs.
- (4) They will construct 1,493 classrooms and recruit 1,700 teachers for hamlets.
- (5) They will construct 613km of roads. They will construct 13 bridges which cost over 1,000,000\$VN each. They will construct 79 bridges which cost under 1,000,000\$VN each.

- (6) They will construct 11 dams which cost over 1,000,000\$VN each.
They will construct 26 dams which cost under 1,000,000\$VN each.
They will dredge or excavate canals, 66km long.
They will promote the establishment of 20 power plants in priority areas.
They will support the priority areas to be pacified in every aspect, especially in manpower and military matters.
-

3. RURAL CONSTRUCTION FUNDS TO BE ALLOCATED TO THE PROVINCES
IN 1966

The estimated obligation for rural construction is 2.5 billion.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL: recent changes in Provinces,
Districts, and cities: (as of May 1, 1966)

<u>PROVINCE & DISTRICTS</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
An Giang Chau Thanh Hue Duc	Maj. Nguyen van THUU Capt. Le Phuoc AN Capt. Tran quang HAU	Dep. Prov. Chief (Security) District Chief District Chief
Bac Lieu	Capt. Kim EM Tran duc TRONG	Dep. Prov. Chief (Cambodian Affairs) Dep. Prov. Chief (Admin.)
Bien Hoa	Nguyen dinh LANG	Dep. Prov. Chief (Admin.)
Binh Duong Phu Hoa Tri Tam	Maj. Tran ngoc THOI Capt. Cao Minh DIEN Capt. Tran Quoc LINH	Dep. Prov. Chief (Security) District Chief District Chief
Binh Tuy	Maj. Nguyen huu KIEM	Dep. Prov. Chief (Security)
Chau Doc An Phu Chau Phu	Le van HUAN Capt. Nguyen van TUOI Capt. Dang huu BINH	Dep. Prov. Chief (Security) District Chief District Chief
Khanh Hoa	Maj. Le KHANH	Prov. Chief
Kien Giang Kien Binh	Capt. Pham van BEN Capt. Danh DO	Dep. Prov. Chief (Security) District Chief
Kien Hoa Mo Cay	Lt. Nguyen van HIEU	District Chief
Kontum Dakto	Capt. Hoang ba TAT	District Chief

<u>PROVINCE & DISTRICTS</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
Lam Dong Bao Loc	Capt. Dan Ba LOC	District Chief
Phuoc Long	Lt. Col. Nguyen Duong HUY	Prov. Chief
Quang Duc Duc Lap Khiem Duc	Capt. Vu Quy TIEN Capt. Nguyen Quang BA	District Chief District Chief
Quang Nam Dien Ban Duy Xuyen Hieu Duc	Maj. Le Ngoc UYEN Capt. Hoang TRUNG Capt. Tran THUC Capt. Tran Van HUYEN	Prov. Chief District Chief District Chief District Chief
Quang Ngai Minh Long Binh Son	Maj. Dinh NGO Capt. Bui van HIEC	District Chief District Chief
Quang Tri Gio Linh Huong Hoa Trieu Phong	Lt. Vu the MAN Lt. Tinh A NHI Capt. Tran CONG	District Chief District Chief District Chief
Thua Thien Huong Tra Phong Dien	Capt. Nguyen van TU Capt. Bui van THAP	District Chief District Chief
Vinh Long Tam Binh	Capt. Tran quoc TRU	District Chief
<u>AUTONOMOUS CITY</u>		
Dalat	Maj. Le van HOI	Dep. for Security
Danang	Nguyen xuan HIEU	Deputy for Admin.

TRENDS, ISSUES, AND TECHNIQUES IN GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION IN VIETNAM: the 2nd Administrative Conference of Province Chiefs, members of Provincial Councils, and central government officials:

Copies of translations of the main speeches and summary of conclusions at the Second Administrative Conference (of Province Chiefs, members of Provincial Councils, and representatives of various Ministries) in Saigon during the 1st week of March, are available from the Public Administration Division (PAD) of USAID.

.....

THE ROLE OF REVOLUTIONARY CADRE IN PACIFICATION:

The Vietnamese word for cadre, Can Bo, came into the language from the Chinese during World War II. It was used in Vietnam initially by the Viet Minh to designate those voluntary, highly motivated, and courageous individuals who operated clandestinely in French controlled areas to first indoctrinate and then to organize the population to support the resistance to French colonial rule.

Because of the position of honor and respect these Can Bo occupied in what became a historic and successful revolution, the emerging governments of both North and South Vietnam attempted to capitalize on the goodwill associated with the Can Bo and so designated those lower level government employees who worked at the village and hamlet levels. Unfortunately, the proliferation of personnel designated as Can Bo by the government of South Vietnam resulted in a diminution of the quality of cadre performance and a subsequent loss of respect from the population. The current consolidation of the several types of cadre involved in pacification into a single classification as Revolutionary Development Cadre is the first of several planned actions to reestablish the previously honored status of cadre in the minds of the people.

The question arises, "Why cadre?". "Why not regular civil service status for personnel performing pacification functions?" The answer is to be found in a comparison of the systems of administration, law and justice in a developed country with those in an undeveloped one. Particularly in Vietnam, where the rural areas are ravaged by war, there is neither the system of administration nor the trained personnel necessary to cope with the vicissitudes of economic, social, and military strife. Nor, for that matter, is there a felt need for the immediate substitution of modern adminis-

tration for the traditional system revolving around a sentimental and philosophical attachment to the ways of the ancestors. In this environment the less formally organized and trained cadre, indigenous to the area in which they work, can often be more effective by doing a few simple things well than could more sophisticated personnel whose imagination and performance might greatly exceed the bounds of what is understood and acceptable to the population.

In recognition that properly trained and motivated cadre can establish a vital link between the government and its people, GVN has initiated the Revolutionary Development Cadre program wherein all personnel are given an intensive 13-week course of instruction at the Vung Tau National Training Center and are then returned to their home province to work under the direction and control of the Province and District Chiefs. The first 9 weeks of the Vung Tau course give all personnel basic training in military skills and an equal amount of political indoctrination and motivational training. Those who successfully pass this phase are then given three weeks of specialized training as Leaders, or as Census-Grievance, Civil Affairs and New Life Development Cadre. Personnel not designated for one of these specialized courses are given advanced training as People's Action Teams and form the nucleus of the 59-member Revolutionary Development Cadre Group.

On graduation from Vung Tau the cadre return to their province and immediately receive a 2-3 week provincially conducted course of instruction wherein they are acquainted with the specific problems and objectives in the area(s) in which they are to be deployed. On completion of this training, the cadre, members of either a People's Action or Specialized Team, are called upon to play their roles as representatives of the GVN at the lowest - and most important - levels of government.

It is a difficult role, calling for the utmost in dedication and self-sacrifice. Faced with a multitude of problems, not the least of which is the constant threat of a Viet Cong attack, the cadre are required to muster their courage, their physical and psychological strengths, their recently acquired skills, and all available government backing so as to provide security, motivation, and leadership to a war-scared population. Each cadre has to become a tower of strength, an example of kindness and consideration, a government representative who is the living proof of the falseness of the enemy's propaganda. His personal conduct and standards must be above reproach, and he must display the interest, initiative and know-how that will stimulate the population to seek self-improvement through self-help. He is successful only if he can convince

the population to identify with the government he represents. To do this he must make the government aware of the people's reactions and their aspirations. He must also be the impenetrable shield that protects the people from the terror of the Viet Cong and the exploitation of the corrupt. Finally, his is the task of opening the door to a new life wherein security and opportunity permit the attainment of independence, satisfactory living standards, and political self-determination.

This, then, is the vital role that the cadre of Vietnam must play if the government is to remain viable. As important as this role is, it is but one of several, all of which must be well performed before a successful conclusion of the current conflict can be reached. The Army of Vietnam, as well as the Regional and Popular Forces, must achieve a level of security that will permit a continuity of cadre operations. The technical ministries, the police, and the hamlet and village officials must be prepared to follow the cadre into the rural areas, to expand and build upon the base that the cadre construct. Finally, the people must participate in both their own defense and in their own development. Working together, assisted and encouraged by the Free World Forces, the government, the cadre, and the people can - and will - build a free, independent, and self-sufficient nation.

(prepared by USAID, Saigon)

THE CADRE GUIDE BOOK:

The Ministry of Revolutionary Development and the inter-agency staff which assists them have produced a Training Program Outline and Cadre Guide Book, to provide guidance and direction to Revolutionary Development Cadre and their supervisors. This has been produced in English by JUSPAO.

.....

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOUTH VIETNAM:

A STUDY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOUTH VIETNAM, a pamphlet of 27 pages, has been produced, in English, by USAID, Saigon, under date of March, 1966. It consists of (1) an organizational chart of the Communist Party in South Vietnam; (2) a brief description of their organization and purposes; (3) biographical sketches of their leaders; and (4) a comparison of the "People's Revolutionary Party" and the "Lao Dong" by-laws.

It is distributed by the Planning Division of JUSPAO.

.....

HOW TO SAMPLE OPINION:

I. Introduction

1. Population attitudes toward issues are the psychological operators' stock in trade. Attitudes are the fundamental ingredients in psyop planning. They significantly influence policy strategy and, properly assessed, contribute to the successful outcome of the entire spectrum of United States/GVN activity in the Republic of Vietnam. The critically important matter of attitude assessment is neither new nor novel. It has always been a concern of decision makers to be able to judge the impact of programs and operations past, present and future.
2. There are a number of ways to assess attitudes, ranging from the sophisticated, elaborate polling methods which have been undertaken recently, to the visceral judgments of trained observers among whom are numbered the military and civilian field representatives of the several US agencies in Vietnam.

3. This memorandum describes in some detail one time-proved method for attitude assessment which can be undertaken with a minimum of resources. It lends itself readily to the austere conditions of the field. And, where it has been used it has produced results dramatically better than where not used. It is called the Panel Reporting System since it is especially adaptable to the reporting of attitudes. However, its use is not limited to reporting.

II. The Panel Reporting System

1. Formation of the Panel: There should be no difficulty recognizing people who appear to be more than ordinarily dispassionate and objective concerning the world around them. Obviously, these are the sort of people that are particularly desired in an informant system. They are the sort of people who tend to be influenced by events and not merely by their own feelings and emotions. However, while it is presumptuous to attempt to spell out the exact criteria for selection of informants, it is desirable on the basis of historically proven experience to give some guide lines in this regard.
 - a. In general, GVN officials and military people should be avoided. Even here, of course, there are exceptions; some officials appear to possess the very qualities we are calling for.
 - b. The True Believers, the highly committed, these too should be avoided.
 - c. Obviously, intelligence and sensitivity are at a premium for an activity like this. Conversely, the stupid and the insensitive should be avoided.
 - d. People with a great deal at stake, for example wealthy landlords, should be avoided or, at least, should be tempered by people drawn from other groups.
 - e. The panel should include some who by the nature of their work are exposed to people in circumstances which encourage conversation such as barbers, bartenders, clergy, and school teachers.
2. Employment of the Panel: Supposing such a panel of informants were set up, how would the group be used? In a British panel that was most effective during WW II, the informants were called upon to make regular written reports on a number of attitudinal

questions. For Vietnam, only a slight modification would seem in order: rather than relying on written reporting, the representative should check with his informants personally - perhaps on a monthly or bimonthly basis. As to the sorts of questions he should be concerned with, no attempt will be made here to define these explicitly. At the most general level, however, they will be concerned with such matters as attitudes toward the government, the VC, the Americans, the war, government programs, corruption; in short, with the same things which are of concern to US Mission and the GVN plus the local issues of concern to the operator/field representative and his commander/supervisor.

One other point: it is not necessary that these interviews should be conducted in any formalized way. An informal conversational approach is called for. But, of course, caution has to be exercised in using such a method. If not used properly, such informal approaches are as likely to produce as to elicit attitudes.

Without resort to an elaborate filing system the operator should record the attitudes for future reference and use, and to serve as a basis for subsequent questionings.

Members of the panel may not or perhaps should not be mutually known.

("Panel Reporting System,"
April 11, 1966, by JUSPAO)

VIET CONG CADRE:

The Vietcong have lost the close identification with the people that marked their earlier days. The ranks of the older Vietcong cadres (roughly equivalent to officers, but loosely used to set full-time trained professionals apart from local supporters) have been thinned. There is now a dated quality and an inadequacy about their efforts. The idealistic attraction has faded. Vietcong supporters now mutter guardedly about the "revolution betrayed," and splinter groups call themselves "true Communist revolutionaries." Individual cadre complain in reports that the villagers have "lost their revolutionary vigor" or have become "mere bourgeois revolutionaries content only with gains in land reform".

.....

The cadre has been the workhorse of the Vietcong effort since its inception. The cadre is told, and it is true, that "On your shoulders rests the entire burden of the revolution." Even after years of sifting through captured cadre reports, one is still impressed by the incredibly heavy loads which the cadres are expected to carry.

For example, a recent central committee directive to district cadres informed them that during the following month they were to: "(1) Increase recruitment into the Liberation Army by twenty-five per cent; (2) Increase tax revenues in the district by ten per cent., (5) Develop an intensive Hate America campaign in your area...; (7) Eliminate all spies and reactionary (i.e. pro-government) persons in your area"; - and so on, the listing continuing for a total of seventeen items, any one of which would have occupied the full attention of a cadre for a month. At the end of the month, back goes the cadre's report, packed with statistics and evaluation. Then, a short time later, back down the line comes the "criticism memo": "Although you achieved your norms in Items 1, 4, 7, 9, 11, and 17," it reads, "you were deficient and therefore must rectify... Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6..."

The ideal Vietcong cadre is a person who can go into a Vietnamese village and deliver an impassioned speech that will bring the villagers to their feet shouting, an ability as rare in Vietnam as anywhere else. He must also be skilled in guerrilla tactics, especially, the ambush. In the hands of the Vietcong, this basic tactical unit has become far more than simply two machine guns pointing down a road. It has emerged as a rather sophisticated form

of warfare, involving many elements: a frontal force, a closing force, a reinforcement ambush force, and a pursuit ambush force, all employed according to terrain, weather, size of the enemy force, etc. An ambush becomes a deadly chess game, successful only if you outthink your enemy. It calls for a high order of skill, intelligence, and experience in leaders, again rare qualities anywhere.

Thus the cadre can be the strength and weakness of the Vietcong. And while the principle that by developing good lower-level leadership an organization can become efficient and powerful is correct, it also follows that such an organization is extremely vulnerable if anything happens to its cadre structure. And this precisely is what has happened.

Over the past five years the Vietcong has lost, chiefly through battle attrition, about six thousand cadres. This may not be excessive considering the magnitude of the Vietcong effort, but it represents an incalculable loss to the organization. Rank-and-file soldiers can be replaced, but loss of a cadre permanently damages the system. In fact, the genesis of Hanoi's deep involvement in the South can be traced to the cadre shortage. At first these were the so-called "regrouped Southerners," Vietnamese who had gone north during Operation Exodus in 1954-1955. Soon this relatively small reservoir was exhausted, and by mid 1964 the "pure" northern cadre started appearing in numbers in the South.

But the supply from the North could not keep pace with the rank-and-file buildup in 1965, when the Vietcong's strength was increased by some twenty per cent. The overall quality of the cadre has continued to decline, damaging the effectiveness and efficiency of the entire movement. Unskilled, poorly trained leaders have been thrown into the breach, especially in the Mekong Delta. Being unequal to the task they face, they have increasingly alienated the people by what strikes the observer as unnecessary brutality in conscription and taxation.

Cadre morale itself is low, as is the morale of the Vietcong rank and file....

(from "How Strong is the NLF?" by Douglas Pike, in The Reporter, Feb. 24, 1966)