

# PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION BULLETIN

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DIVISION U.S.O.M. - SAIGON

NO. 16

DATE: Sept. 30, 1964

## HIGHLIGHTS

- Chronology of Recent Major Political Events
- New Decrees Issued
- Revised List of Province, Deputy Province, and District Chiefs
- Flow Chart: GVN Approval of Budget Estimates from Provinces
- P.A. Pilot Orientation Seminar
- "The Key to Self-Help" A new article by David S. Brown (Attached)

## Chronology of Recent Political Events (August 16 - Present)

- August 16
  - Military Revolutionary Council (MRC), meeting at Cap St. Jacques, elected Khanh President of the Republic of Vietnam.
  - MRC promulgated a new Charter for Vietnam, replacing the Constitution proclaimed after the November 1963 revolution.
  - New Charter provides for an appointed Provisional National Assembly.
- 21-24
  - Student demonstrations throughout Vietnam.
- 25
  - Khanh resigned Presidency.
- 25-26
  - MRC failed to elect a successor.
- 27
  - Provisional Steering Committee appointed by MRC composed of Generals Minh (Chairman), Khiem (Defense Minister) and Khanh (Premier and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces).

- 27 - MRC instructed Prime Minister Khanh to convene a national convention within 2 months.
- MRC dissolved.
- General Minh announced abolition of the August 16 Charter.
- 29 - Nguyen xuan Oanh became Acting Premier.
- September 1 - Oanh met with Khanh in Dalat.
- 4 - Khanh returned to Saigon.
- Khanh announced that all generals and officers serving as Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers or Secretaries of State have submitted their resignations.
- 8 - Minh elected Chairman (Chief of State) of Provisional Leadership Council.
- Minh to convene a High Council of the Nation that will draft a provisional constitution.
- 13 - Attempted coup led by Maj. Gen. Duc, Brig. Gens. Phat and Lam, and Col. Ton and Nghiem.
- 15 - Khanh returned to Saigon from Cap St. Jacques.
- 16 - Khanh ordered investigation of the September 13 coup.
- 17 - Attempted coup leaders arrested.
- 24 - General Minh announced appointment of the 17-member High Council of the Nations (Arrete printed below).
- 28 - Montagnards rebellion settled.

Following the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, PAD will update its organization chart of the national government and distribute the chart among USOM divisions.

New Decrees Issued

Since publication of Bulletin No. 15, six decrees have been promulgated by the GVN that will be of general interest.

These decrees:

- (1) fix the minimum monthly allowance rates paid to commissioners of Village Administrative Committees, Pacification Committees, and Hamlet Officials holding temporary positions during "the pacification phase."
- (2) establish the National Supreme Council.
- (3) appoint members to the National Supreme Council.
- (4) re-create the provinces Bac Lieu and Chau Doc (in two separate arretes); and
- (5) organize Vung Tau district (Phuoc Tuy Province) into an autonomous municipality.

The first three decrees noted above are reprinted in this bulletin. Additional copies of these decrees and the remaining three arretes can be obtained at PAD's office.

Arrete No. 1062-BNV/HC/ND dated August 29, 1964:

The Minister of Interior:

ENACTS

Art. 1 - During the pacification phase, the minimum monthly allowance rates to be paid to Commissioners of Village Administrative Committees, Pacification Committees and Hamlet Officials holding temporary positions are as follows:

Position	Minimum Monthly Allowance Rate
Village Level - (Administrative Committee and Pacification Committee)	
chairman	1,700\$
vice chairman	1,600\$
commissioners	1,500\$
Hamlet Level	
hamlet chief	1,500\$
deputy hamlet chief	1,400\$

Art. 2 - The minimum monthly allowance rate stated above is applicable:

1. as of June 1, 1964, for the following provinces:  
Binh Duong, Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh, Phu Bon, Dinh Tuong,  
Kien Hoa, Long An, Go Cong, Phong Dinh, Vinh Binh, Quang Nam,  
Quang Tin, Phu Yen.
2. as of July 1, 1964, for all remaining provinces.

Art. 3 - Civil servants or military personnel assuming functions of commissioners or hamlet officials shall receive a monthly allowance equal to one-fourth of corresponding allowance rate (article 1), which shall be in addition to their regular salary as civil servants or military personnel.

Art. 4 - All provisions governing monthly allowance rates of village commissioners and hamlet officials which contradict this arrete are repealed.

Art. 5 - The Director of Cabinet of Ministry of Interior, and province chiefs are charged, each as to that which concerns him, with the carrying out of this arrete.

/s/Nguyen Khanh

Decree No. 7/BLDLTQGQL dated Sept. 8, 1964

The Provisional Leadership Committee of the Nation and Armed Forces:

Considering the proclamation of the MRC on 27 August, 1964;

Considering the decision of the MRC dated 27 August, 1964, on the establishment of the Provisional Leadership Committee of the Nation and Armed Forces;

ENACTS

Art. 1 - There is hereby established a Nation Supreme Council entirely independent of the Executive and vested with the following functions:

1. to convene the National Assembly;
2. to prepare and promulgate the Provisional Charter in cooperation with lawyers selected by the Leadership Committee;
3. to establish the national governmental institutions planned in the Provisional Charter;

4. to act as advisor to the Provisional Leadership Committee and the Government in the materialization of Revolution and Democracy during the period of 2-month transition.

Art. 2 - The Nation Supreme Council is composed of 10 to 20 members selected from representatives of religions, venerable personalities and really revolutionary components of the nation.

Art. 3 - The Council shall determine its own organization and operation.

Art. 4 - The Provisional Leadership Committee of the Nation and Armed Forces will dissolve itself as soon as national governmental institution proposed in the Provisional Charter are set up.

Art. 5 - Depending on the Provisional Charter, the composition of the Nation Supreme Council may be narrowed and transformed into a Supreme Organism to supervise and advise the national governmental institutions (Executive, Legislative and Judiciary) during the interim period, and until a permanent constitution is approved by the nation.

Art. 6 - This decree is promulgated through emergency procedures.

Maj. Gen. Duong van Minh  
Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh  
Lt. Gen. Tran thien Khiem

Decree No. 004/CT/LDQGQL/SL dated September 24, 1964

The President of the Provisional Leadership Committee of the Nation and Armed Forces:

Considering the proclamation of the MRC on 27 August 1964;

Considering the Decision of the MRC dated 27 August, 1964, on the establishment of the Provisional Leadership Committee of the Nation and Armed Forces;

Considering the Decision No. 2-BLDTQGQL of the Provisional Leadership Committee dated 7 September, 1964, on the election of Major General Duong van Minh as President of the Provisional Leadership Committee;

Considering the Decision No. 3-BLDTQGQL of the Provisional Leadership Committee dated 8 September, 1964, on assignment to Major General Duong van Minh to convene the Nation Supreme Council;

Considering the Decision No. 7-BLDTQGQL of the Provisional Leadership Committee on the establishment of the Nation Supreme Council.

Decree

Art. 1 - The Nation Supreme Council established by Decision No. 7 cited above is composed of:

Messrs. Nguyen xuan Chu  
Tran dinh Nam  
Phan khac Suu  
Ton that Hanh  
Nguyen van Huyen  
Ngo Gia Hy  
Nguyen dinh Luyen  
Nguyen van Luc  
Ho van Nhut  
Tran van Que  
Le khac Quyen  
Luong trong Tuong  
Ho dac Thang  
Le van Thu  
Mai tho Truyen  
Tran van Van  
Tran quang Vinh

Art. 2 - This Decree is promulgated through emergency procedures.

/s/ Maj. Gen. Duong van Minh

Revised List of Province, Deputy Province, and District Chiefs

In the July 30 Bulletin, PAD printed a "List of Province Chiefs, Deputy Province Chiefs, and District Chiefs." Since that publication, however, there have been numerous changes in personnel for these offices as well as a reshuffling of several districts with the establishment of two former provinces. Consequently, PAD has revised and updated its "List" to reflect these changes and has attached the "List" to this bulletin for your reference.


Flow Chart: GVN Approval of Budget Estimates from Provinces

The foldout chart illustrates the principal steps in the budget formulation process for the three general types of GVN budgets from the provincial level. The "Regular Provincial Budget" refers to those activities financed from local provincial revenues, plus any grants that may be made from the National Government.

The second type shows steps applicable for those provincial activities financed from allocations from national ministries and agencies. The procedure may vary slightly on special budgets or for unusual activities.

# PRINCIPAL STEPS IN OBTAINING APPROVAL OF GVN BUDGET ESTIMATES FROM PROVINCIAL LEVEL

AS OF AUG. 13, 1964  
PREPARED BY  
USOM PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DIVISION



. SPECIAL BUDGET DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE PACIFICATION AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORTS (EX. PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM; PICA) WOULD VARY SLIGHTLY FROM PROCEDURAL STEPS SHOWN.

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The third type refers to NRLH activities financed pursuant to agreements approved by GVN and mission officials.

P.A. Pilot Orientation Seminar

On September 24-25, the National Institute of Administration (NIA) played host while PAD represented a new orientation program designed to acquaint USOM provincial representatives with the operation and structure of the GVN.

Topical areas discussed included organization and functions of the central government; provincial, district, village, and hamlet administration; concepts and trends of political parties; Region III organization; duties and responsibilities of local officials; fiscal, tax, and personnel administration; mobile action and administrative cadres; and, the role of provincial representatives re: civil administration. Discussions were conducted by knowledgeable persons from various GVN ministries, NIA, PAD, Office of Operations, and the US Embassy.

During the next several weeks, an evaluation of the orientation seminar will be made to ascertain its effectiveness, and the value of conducting similar future seminars for provincial representatives and other U.S. representatives.

Source: Ministry of Interior  
September 24th, 1964

Prepared by USOM/PAD

LIST OF  
PROVINCE CHIEFS - DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEFS  
DISTRICT CHIEFS

REGION I

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Quang Tri	Maj Phan van Khoa	Maj Dang Quang Su	Bao Loc

Quang Tri District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Trieu Phong	Capt Pham Ba Phuoc	Trung Luong	Le Huu Nghi
Hai Lang	Capt Nguyen Van Diem	Cam Lo	Lt Ngo Huu Dinh
Huong Hoa	Capt Nguyen Xuan Loc	Ba Long	Capt Nguyen Thua Dzu
Gio Linh	Lt Nguyen Dang Yen		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Thua Thien	Lt Col Vo Huu Thu	Maj Truong Dinh Cau	Nguyen Ho

Thua Thien District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Huong Tra	Capt Nguyen Huu De	Phu Loc	Lt Nguyen Van Tang
Huong Thuy	Capt Phan Dinh Cao	Phong Dien	Lt Nguyen van Sanh
Quang Dien	Capt Vinh Phong	Huong Dien	Lt Nguyen Ky
Vinh Loc	Lt Nguyen van Tu	Nam Hoa	Lt Pham Khac Dat
Phu Vang	Lt Nguyen ngoc Nghia		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Quang Nam	Maj Nguyen Dinh Thiep	Maj Tran phuoc Xang	Pham Quang Vang

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Dien Ban	Capt. Phan the Vinh	Duy Xuyen	Capt Buu Tuong
Hoa Vang	Lt Nguyen Hong Son	Dai Loc	Capt Do van Thi
Hien Duc	Lt Vuong Ba Thuan	Hieu Nhon	Capt Than Trong Sinh
Duc Duc	Capt Vu duc Chinh	Que Son	Capt Doan Thanh Van
Thuong Duc	Lt Pham Van Pho		

REGION I

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Quang Tin	Maj Tran Huu Minh	Capt Ton that Cang	Bui trong Tieu

Quang Tin District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Tam Ky	Capt Pham duc Loc	Tien Phuoc	Capt Tran chieu Duong
Thang Binh	Capt Nguyen ngoc Nghia	Hau Duc	Capt Bui van Soan
Hiep Duc	Lt Chu Quyen	Ly Tin	Capt Vo van Tich

REGION II

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Binh Dinh	Maj Nguyen ba Thinh	Maj Nguyen van Luan	Nguyen cong Hieu

Binh Dinh District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
An Tuc	Lt Thai Doan An	Tuy Phuoc	Pham gia Tung
An Nhon	Capt Pham Quang Tan	Hoai Nhon	Capt Nguyen Ba Nhu
Binh Khe	Lt Nguyen van Vuong	Phu My	Capt Cao van Chon
Hoai An	Capt Pham duc Du	Phu Cat	Lt Nguyen Dinh Dau
An Lao	Capt Le Thuong	Van Canh	Capt Hoang van Dong
Vinh Thanh	Capt Nguyen van Tuan		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Darlac	Maj Bui Huy Gia	Capt Kha vang Huy	Ho di Sat Y Bham Enuol

Darlac District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Banmethuot	Capt Truong Tien Hoat	Lac Thien	Capt Nguyen khac Thanh
Buon Ho	Capt Nay Honh	Phuoc An	Capt Y Nip

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Khanh Hoa	Maj Nguyen tho Lap	Maj Nguyen Tu Hieu	Hoang Dinh Giang

Khanh Hoa District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Ninh Hoa..	Capt Duong Duc Mai	Dien Khanh	Capt Ho Dac Nguyen
Vinh Xuong	Capt Phan tan Hy	Van Ninh	Capt Nguyen Hop
Cam Lam	Capt Nguyen Xuan Phung	Khanh Duong	Capt Nguyen phuc Nghiep

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Kontum.	Maj Nguyen van Be	Capt Cao van Khanh	Ngo van Trinh Paul Nur

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Daksut	Capt Huynh ngoc Vinh	Darto	Lt Pham van Nghi
Chuong Nghia	Capt Doan ky Long	Kontum	Capt Phung van Quang
TouMorong	Lt Pham van Thanh		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Ninh Thuan	Maj Dinh viet Lang	Maj Hoang cong Duan	Nguyen trung Thoai

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
An Phuoc	Capt Duong Tan So	Thanh Hai	Lt Au quynh Chut
Buu Son	Lt Nguyen Ty	Du Long	Capt Nguyen van Tien

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Phu Bon	Maj Pham dinh Chi	Capt Truong van Tan	Nguyen van Tien Nay Moul

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Phu Thien	Capt Tu huu Thom	Thuan Man	Capt Nguyen cao Dinh
Phu Tuc	Lt Nguyen dinh Dinh		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Phu Yen	Maj Tran van Hai	Maj Duong ngoc Bao	Tran van Bang

Phu Yen District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Tuy Hoa	Capt Pham van Len	Tuy An	Capt Luong van Nhut
Dong Xuan	Capt Tran chi Thien	Son Hoa	Lt Nguyen ba Thang
Song Cau	Lt Ton that Phong	Phu Duc	Lt Nguyen tan Tien
Hieu Xuong	Lt Pham van Ngon		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Pleiku	Maj Vo van Ba	Capt. Le van Cu	Nguyen ngọc Thang

Pleiku District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Le Trung	Capt Le van Ta	Le Thanh	Capt Nguyen van Can
Phu Non	Lt Sin Nay		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Quang Duc	Lt Col Dang huu Hong	Maj Deo van Dung	Le quang Qui

Quang Duc District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Kien Duc	Lt Pham van Dau	Duc Lap	Capt Nguyen phi Thanh
Khien Duc	Capt Phan van Ton		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Quang Ngai	Maj Le Khắc Ly	Capt Le ba Phien	Tran huynh Chau

Quang Ngai District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Binh Son	Capt Nguyen Xuan Phong	Son Tinh	Capt Nguyen dinh Trung
Tu Nghia	Capt Ho van Hung	Nghia Thanh	Capt Nguyen van Trong
Mo Duc	Lt Tran Thanh Tuu	Duc Pho	Capt Dang Dieu
Tra Bong	Capt Tran Thuc	Son Ha	Capt Nguyen ngọc Giao
Minh Long	Capt Nguyen Thanh Thong	Ba To	Capt Thai phi Long

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Tuyen Duc	Lt Col Dinh van De	Maj Ta van Kiet	Nguyen van Dai

Tuyen Duc District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Don Duong	Capt Nguyen Huy Quy	Duc	Capt Tran van Anh
Lac Duong	Capt Truong van Hoa		

REGION III

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov. Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Bien Hoa	Lt Col Pham dang Tan	Maj Do cao Thanh	Do thanh Nhon

Bien Hoa District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Duc Tu	Lt Cao van Cua	Can Gio	Lt Trinh ngoc Chuc
Nhon Trach	Capt Duong Trieu Thanh	Long Thanh	Maj Nguyen hai Dang
Di An	Lt Truong hau Nhan	Cong Thanh	Capt Le Cong Thien
Quang Xuyen	Capt Le Cong Chinh		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Binh Duong	Maj Lo Cong Danh	Capt Nong viet Ngoc	Le van Hoi

Binh Duong District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Chau Thanh	Capt Nguyen van Bang	Lai Thieu	Capt Nguyen Nhu Trong
Ben Cat	Capt Le nguyen Vy	Tri Tam	Capt Doan van Nga

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D.Prov Ch Admin</u>
Binh Long	Maj Duong van Thuy	Capt Thai Cong Lac	Nguyen van Khanh

Binh Long District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
An Loc	Lt Duong van No	Loc Ninh	Capt Nguyen xuan Sang
Chau Thanh	Capt Phan van Xa		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Binh Thuan	Lt Col Dam van Quy	Capt Do van Sau	Dinh dinh Hôe

Binh Thuan District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Tuy Phong	Capt Tran trung Nghia	Hoa Da	Lt Pham ngoc Ha
Hai Ninh	Lt Ly thieu Quang	Phan Ly Cham	Capt Luong Vang
Thien Giao	Capt Huynh Trong	Ham Thuan	Lt Ho van Trach
		Hai Long	Capt Vo van Thanh

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Binh Tuy	Maj Lu Mong Chi	Capt Tran ngoc Tuyen	Nguyen van Tuyen

Binh Tuy District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Tanh Linh	Capt Nguyen van Tieng	Hoai Duc	Capt Lam thanh Liem
Ham Tan	Capt Cao Thien		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Chief Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Gia Dinh	Lt Col Co minh Chau		Nguyen thon Do

Gia Dinh District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Tan Binh	Maj Nguyen van Loi	Thu Duc	Capt Nguyen van Phat
Hoc Mon	Maj Le Tri Vi	Go Vap	Capt Nguyen van Binh
Binh Chanh	Maj Train Trong Nghia	Nha Be	Capt Tran Quang Truong

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Hau Nghia	Lt Col Le van Tu	Capt Dao Mong Xuan	Nguyen huu Dau

Hau Nghia District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Duc Hoa	Maj Tran Dac	Duc Hue	Lt Le dang Si
Cu Chi	Capt Phan van Huon	Phu Duc	Capt Phan van Ke

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Lam Dong	Maj Phan Phien	Maj Nguyen Thanh Van	Dinh van Thanh

Lam Dong District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Di Linh	Lt Vi van Giang	Bao Loc	Capt Vo thanh Nhan

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Long Khanh	Maj Tran van Do	Capt Tran Dinh Vi	Huynh thanh Danh

Long Khanh District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Xuan Loc	Lt Vo van Sang	Dinh Quan	Lt Nguyen Vu tu Thuc

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Chief Admin</u>
Phuoc Long	Maj Do dinh Luy	Capt Le hoang Thanh	Deo van Ngay

Phuoc Long District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Phuoc Binh	Capt Pham van Tu	Bo Duc	Maj Le van Phu
Don Luan	Maj Pham van Tuy	Duc Phong	Lt Nguyen dac Dan

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Phuoc Thanh	Maj Nguyen huu Man	Maj Tran buu Chau	Huynh dinh Trong

Phuoc Thanh District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Tan Uyen	Maj Nguyen Duc Giam	Phu Giao	Capt Tran ngoc Hue
Hieu Lam	Capt Nguyen Trang		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Phuoc Tuy	Maj Le duc Dat	Maj Tran vinh Huyen	Ly huong Huy

Phuoc Tuy District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Dat Do	Capt Nguyen van Dong	Duc Thanh	Lt Nguyen van Be
Chau Thanh	Capt Nguyen tan Hieu	Vung Tau	Capt Huynh van Ton
Long Dien	Lt Bui Thuong	Xuyen Moc	Capt Tran thanh Long

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Tay Ninh	Brig Gen Le van Tat	Maj Nguyen van Nha	Le Phu Nhan

Tay Ninh District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Phu Khuong	Lt Nguyen van De	Hieu Thien	Capt Ngo thien Phuoc
Khiem Hanh	Capt Nguyen van Manh	Phuoc Ninh	Capt Vu van Tuyen

REGION IV

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
An Giang	Lt Col Tran van Tuoi	Maj Nguyen van Thon	Truong van Nam

An Giang District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Chau Thanh Hua Duc	Lt Nguyen Lien Lt Truong van ta tu Thieu	Cho Moi	Capt Lam hong Thoi
Thot Not	Capt Nguyen Hong Lien		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
An Xuyen	Maj Chau van Tien	Maj Nguyen Thoi Le	Do xuan Giong

An Xuyen District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Cai Nuoc Quan Long Thoi Binh	Capt Huynh van Nen Lt Nguyen Hoang Khanh Lt Ngo huu Phuoc	Nam Can Song Ong Doc Dam Doi	Capt Nguyen van Quyet Lt Trinh Minh Man Capt Truong van Chan

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Ba Xuyen	Maj Dao ngoc Diep	Capt Tran van Nguyen	Tran dac Thanh

Ba Xuyen District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
My Xuyen Thanh Tri	Capt Nguyen van Nguu Lt Nguyen huu Si	Long Phu Ke Sach	Capt Lac Thai Thuan Capt Le ngoc Dinh

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Bac Lieu	Maj Vo quoc Su		Nguyen chuc Sac

Bac Lieu District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Vinh Loi Vinh Chau	Capt Kim En	Gia Rai Phuoc Long	Capt Pham van Le Capt Pham thanh Binh

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Chau Doc	Lt Col Le ba Pham		Le van Huan

Chau Doc District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Chau Phu	Capt Nguyen dang Phuong	An Phu	Capt Nguyen van Tuoi
Tinh Bien		Tri Ton	Capt Chau Sokan
Tan Chau	Maj Huynh van Kien		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Chuong Thien	LtCol Nguyen ngoc Diep	Maj Trinh huu Nghia	Le van Them

Chuong Thien District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Kien Hung	Lt Le minh Khem	Duc Long	Capt Vo van Dam
Kien Long	Lt Nguyen van Trung	Kien Thien	Lt Le van Dat
Long My	Lt Nguyen ngoc Lau		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Kien Giang	LtCol Dang dinh Thuy	Maj Luong van Thom	Pham van Minh

Kien Giang District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Kien Thanh	Lt Bui quang Man	Kien An	Lt Tran van Tu
Ha Tien	Lt Bau Chi	Kien Luong	Capt Tran huu Gia
Kien Tan	Capt Vu Quang Nghinh	Kien Binh	Lt Nguyen van Huynh
Hieu Le	Capt Truong Quoi	Phu Quoc	Capt Tran trung Ai

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Kien Phong	Maj Doan van Cuong	Capt Nguyen cao Thang	Pham van Kha

Kien Phong District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Cao Lanh	Capt Bui van Xuan	Hong Ngu	Capt Duong Thanh Nghe
Thanh Binh	Capt Huynh Dai Khai	My An	Lt Nguyen tan Phuoc
Kien Van	Lt Bach Hong Ung		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Phong Dinh	LtCol Tran ba Di	Capt Le cong Thuong	Buu Vien

Phong Dinh District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Phong Phu	Capt Vo vang Tu	Chau Thanh	Capt Phan van Bon
Phung Hiep	Capt Nguyen Thac Tu	Thuan Nhon	Maj Le van Niem
Thuan Trung	Capt Nguyen Hong Xang		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Vinh Binh	LtCol Nguyen van Thanh	Maj Son ngoc Quang	Huynh chi Cong

Vinh Binh District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Chau Thanh	Capt Phan cong Nam	Cang Long	Capt Le van Sau
Cau Ngang	Capt Nguyen huu Ky	Cau Ke	Capt Ly El
Long Toan	Lt Vo thanh Ha	Tieu Can	Capt Lam van Bien
Tra Cu	Capt Thach Huyen	Vung Liem	Capt Nguyen Phuc Tran
Tra On	Capt Ly Duc		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Vinh Long	LtCol Nguyen khac Tuan	Maj Tran van Hue	Nguyen van Dang

Vinh Long District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Chau Thanh	Nguyen van Dang	Cho Lach	Capt Pham van Hai
Binh Minh	Lt Nguyen Huu Don	Lap Vo	Lt Nguyen Hoan Minh
Minh Duc	Maj Vo van Hoa	Duc Thanh	Maj Nguyen Minh Tam
Duc Ton	Capt Le van My	Tam Binh	Capt Do van Tam
Sadec	Capt Le minh Duc		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Con Son	Maj Tang Tu tu Sao		

CIS-BASSAC SZ

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Dinh Tuong	LtCol Do kien Nhieu	Maj Tran van Phuc	Le quy Ky

Dinh Tuong District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Long Dinh	Maj Bui van Hai	Khiem Ich	Capt Pham van Kiet
Giao Duc	Capt Truong tan Trinh	Cho Gao	Capt Truong quang An
Ben Tranh	Capt Nguyen huu Liem	Sung Hieu	Maj Nguyen duc Thuan
Chau Thanh	Capt Nguyen van Minh		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Go Cong	LtCol Nguyen viet Thanh	Maj Hoang duc Ninh	Chau van Bay

Go Cong District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Go Cong		Hoa Dong	Capt Nguyen van Tien

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Kien Hoa	LtCol Tran ngoc Chau	Maj Tran van Thi	Nguyen duy Phuoc

Kien Hoa District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Truc Giang	Capt Nguyen nhu Sang	Ham Long	Capt Tran huynh Hoi
Mo Cay	Capt Tran van Luu	Thanh Phu	Capt Dang Xanh
Ba Tri	Capt Bui thanh Nam	Huong My	Lt Le van Son
Binh Dai	Capt Bui tan Bui	Giong Trom	Lt Le van Thanh
Don Nhon	Lt Vu hoang Dien		

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Kien Tuong	Maj Pham viet Hung	Maj Tran tien Khang	Ho tu Long

Kien Tuong District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Chau Thanh	Lt Nguyen van Khanh	Tuyen Binh	Capt Tran hung Ngu
Kien Binh	Capt Cao van Ba	Tuyen Nhon	Lt Khuu Chanh

<u>Province</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Security</u>	<u>D/Prov Ch Admin</u>
Long An	LtCol Pham Anh	Maj Nguyen van Khanh	Nguyen ba Can

Long An District Chiefs

<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Chief</u>
Thu Thua	Capt Dinh van Xuong	Binh Phuoc	Capt Huynh Khuong An
Thanh Duc	Capt Bui van Ba	Can Duc	Capt Le van Thien
Ben Luc	Capt Kieu cong Bi	Tan Tru	Capt Truong ngoc Thanh

PAD  
9/14/64

The Key to Self-Help:  
Improving the Administrative  
Capabilities of the Aid-Receiving Countries

By DAVID S. BROWN

The George Washington University

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Excerpt from  
Public Administration Review

June 1964

Volume XXIV Number 2

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Capabilities of the Aid-Receiving Countries

By DAVID S. BROWN  
The George Washington University

There are few more troublesome questions facing the American people today than those involving the foreign aid program. Not only is there substantial disagreement over the amount of aid, but there are wide differences of opinion also on how it should be provided.

The purpose of this paper is not to dwell on these differences. Rather, it attempts to suggest an approach holding long-range hope for reducing not only American responsibilities in the foreign aid area but assistance from other sources as well. Consisely stated, this is the development of a lasting local capacity for self-help.

This, of course, is no new idea. The importance of self-development has long been recognized. What has been less well understood and, as a result, given only indifferent support, is the fact that a country's ability to undertake successfully a self-improvement effort, whether in the technical, economic, or military areas, depends in large part upon the ability of its governmental machinery to sustain these programs. Thus, the development of administrative capability should proceed concurrently with, if not prior to, efforts in other directions.

In advancing this proposition, the author recognizes the variety and complexities of current aid efforts and the dangers involved in suggesting what may seem to some as a single, albeit broad, course of action. Professor Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago has, for example, identified six basic types of foreign aid, each of which calls for a different formula or approach: humanitarian foreign aid, subsistence foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid, and foreign aid for economic development.<sup>1</sup> At least four of these, however - excluding only bribery and prestige foreign aid, which is really a kind of national bribery - have an element in common to which this paper is applicable. To achieve their objectives, they depend on the willingness and ability of the aid recipient to help himself.

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<sup>1</sup> Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,"  
The American Political Science Review, June 1962, p. 301.

"The most important ingredient in the development of a nation is neither the amount nor the nature of foreign assistance. It is the will and commitment of the Government and people directly involved." These are the words with which President Johnson opened his recent foreign aid message. The author elaborates on this theme and suggests that one important manifestation of this "will and commitment" is the correcting of structural flaws in the bureaucracy of host countries and the filling of the administrative void that hampers assistance efforts.

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### The Administrative Void

Unfortunately, much of the assistance, private as well as public, which has been dispensed abroad over the last 15 years, has failed to produce what was hoped for or needed of it because the means for making effective use of it simply did not exist. Nowhere is this more evident than in the so-called developing countries.<sup>2</sup> The weakness, ineptitude and general inefficiency of their governmental systems are obstacles of massive proportions not only to their self-development but even to their survival.

Badly needed seed and fertilizer provided by the aid programs have been known to sit for days and weeks in storage centers, often spoiling in the process, waiting for a piece of paper to be signed. Months have been lost because files have been lost. Equipment and facilities have lain idle and deteriorating because the host government had neither the ability to repair it, nor the knowledge to use what had been provided. Highly qualified technicians sent abroad to help others help themselves have had to spend large chunks of their time in the most basic kinds of work, literally moving goods themselves, installing equipment, operating it, doing their own clerical support work, and the like, much of which their host country had pledged itself to do. Local officials have many times not even been able to produce the persons the visitors were hired to train.<sup>3</sup>

We talk blandly of "technical assistance" as if it were limited to advice-giving when in reality our technicians have had to act as messengers, instigators, catalysts, planners, and wire-pullers as well as doers. They have had to remind, cajole, wheedle, help, and nudge their hosts to get them to carry out their parts in the agreements they have signed. Still, there is usually only partial fulfillment. Aid technicians have provided the linkage

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<sup>2</sup> This paper is concerned primarily with direct U. S. governmental assistance to the underdeveloped countries. Marshall Plan aid was assistance of a different nature; the comments and criticisms offered here are generally not applicable to it.

<sup>3</sup> This, incidentally, had been one of the most common complaints of American technicians going overseas - a failure to fulfill expectations concerning what they were hired to do.

between separate elements of the host government. They have drawn up budgets and plans, prepared performance standards, supplied shortfalls, hired recruits and supervised production, and personnel. When a foundation gave needed equipment to one government institution, the government could not accept receipt since it could not pay the customs duties - customs, literally, to itself. So the foundation obligingly forked over. The aid programs would not even have worked at all had things like this not been done.

The Common Denominator:  
Administrative Capability

Such evidence underlines clearly the administrative deficiencies of the host countries. These deficiencies plague all our aid efforts, national, international, and private. They keep the vast flood of money, talent, and materials from achieving its objectives. They are major roadblocks to self-development.

This point has been recognized in many quarters. It has been made repeatedly by various organs of the United Nations. As early as 1950, the Secretary-General pointed out that "any systematic effort towards economic development must be preceded by, or coupled with, efforts to make more effective the functioning of governmental machinery."<sup>4</sup> The following year, a team of experts working out of the Economic and Social Council reported that "economic progress depends to a large extent upon the adoption by Governments of appropriate administrative and legislative action" to support it. The 1956 report of the Technical Assistance Board emphasized that "the development of public administration remains an essential prerequisite for successful economic development."<sup>5</sup>

From the beginning, public administration has been a part of the American technical assistance program. The Manual of Orders of the current aid organization, the U. S. Agency for International Development (AID) states:

Many of the major needs of countries desiring to strengthen their economies and to raise their standards of living lie in the area of public administration. The serious lack of managerial skills and appropriate government experience is a critical barrier to economic development and a potential threat to political stability. Until deficiencies in management are reduced or eliminated, much will continue to be wasted in terms of manpower and resources.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Official Records of The Economic and Social Council, Eleventh Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 10, Document E/1708, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> See United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, A Handbook of Public Administration, 1961, p. 109.

<sup>6</sup> Order No. 2651.1, July 13, 1960.

Many of those in the underdeveloped areas have reached the same conclusions. The Planning Board of Pakistan, in its first Five Year Plan, had this to say:

It is the considered judgment of the Planning Board, based on the experience of other countries and our own, that the shortcomings of public administration which include technical organizations will be a greater impediment to the fulfillment of Plans than the availability of financial resources. Even the scarcity of foreign exchange need not be such a severe limiting factor as the inadequacies of administration.<sup>7</sup>

The Chairman of the National Economic Council of the Philippines speaks of the "first order of (aid) business" as being that of "the development of certain critical planning and management capabilities."<sup>8</sup> A similar point of view is put forward in an analysis of the Indian economic development program:

A quantitatively inadequate or qualitatively defective system of public administration will not merely retard the development process but may defeat the entire development effort in an even more decisive manner than any temporary shortage of capital or inadequate technical skills or an unfavorable monsoon.<sup>9</sup>

Let us examine for a moment why these statements are so. Country A needs badly to increase its agricultural production in order to raise its standards of living. While increased agricultural production depends basically upon the farmer, a number of steps must be taken before he is either able or willing to do what is wanted. He must be assured an adequate supply of seed, fertilizer, and water. He must have know-how. There must also be the means for the sale, storage and transport of the crops which have been raised and the likelihood of a fair return for his labor. All of these are government-provided, government-assisted, or government-guaranteed services even in the most advanced countries. They cannot be satisfactorily provided - as evidence in a dozen different countries has demonstrated - by a system which is marked by haphazard planning, inadequate budgets, lack of qualified manpower, improper facilities, and lack of intelligent leadership and direction. Such, of course, are manifestations of administrative incapability.

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<sup>7</sup>Draft Five Year Plan: Planning for Prosperity, Planning Board, Government of Pakistan, Dec. 1956, pp. 7-8.

<sup>8</sup>Sixto K. Roxas, in an address in Manila to a meeting of U. S. Agency for International Development mission chiefs, Nov. 6, 1963, p. 4.

<sup>9</sup>K. William Kapp, "Economic Development, National Planning and Public Administration," *Kyklos: International Review of Social Sciences*, Verlag Basel, Switzerland, Vol. XIII, fasc. 2, 1960.

Let us return to Country A. The following are illustrative of the kinds of problems it faces:

- There is no real knowledge of what is happening. Crop statistics are always unreliable, literally being revised by administrative officials without reference to the facts.
- There is a vital shortage of trained agricultural workers in government posts although the country's colleges produce more than the government uses.
- There is no real agreement between central and regional officials on who should do what. This includes the responsibility for providing needed agricultural equipment and storage facilities. The result is that, often, neither does it.
- Even the most routine administrative actions may require several endorsements at various levels and geographic locations and may even have to go to the capital for final approval. For example, the process of obtaining financing for needed agricultural experiment station equipment (sometimes only a few dollars in value) often takes so long that the stations prefer to go without rather than undertake the bureaucratic labor involved.
- Because of the possibility of legal suits being brought against them personally, government representatives often find that inaction is safer than action.
- Bribes must be paid to local officials to get action on any of a variety of licenses, permits, or requests.

The results of such a situation are clearly predictable. Food is unavailable when and as needed. The standard of living is lowered; people may even starve. Confidence in the government itself is seriously undermined.

It is not enough to say that Country A needs greater agricultural know-how. It does, of course, but the existence of know-how cannot be separated from the men and the methods by which it is to be provided. Little can be done in Country A until some way is found out of the bureaucratic morass in which it is laboring. This calls for administrative experts along with the agricultural ones.

The improvement of agricultural production is cited here by way of illustration. A dozen other activities important to national development might be listed: health programs, education, public works, irrigation, industrialization - in short, the gamut of technical assistance, and much that is involved. An other aid efforts as well. Each is equally dependent upon the government's ability to make use of the aid available to it. Each had a common denominator need: the improvement of its administrative processes...

As a health specialist has put it, "the conduct of a DDT program... is 90 per cent administrative and 10 per cent knowing how to spray."

This point needs all the emphasis that can be given it. Unlike the advanced countries, the underdeveloped ones must depend on government for even the most modest of social and economic achievements. Government is not only the most powerful single force, it is the only one with an organizing and unifying purpose.

#### Public Administration Improvement Efforts

The situation described above is not one that has been newly discovered. It is known to every professional in the aid agencies, and to every Foreign Service officer as well. To counter it, to help improve the administrative capability of the host country, public administration divisions were created within the aid agency. Likewise, the United Nations and the various foundations also concerned themselves with public administration improvement.

This is done in a variety of ways. One of the most common is the creation of a school of public administration at a leading university in the host country. Another is the establishment of institutes of public administration, usually as part of the host government, which are used for the training of public servants and the undertaking of administrative research.<sup>10</sup> Administrative technicians frequently serve as advisors to the host country. These may include a variety of professionals whose aim, either individually or en masse, is the improvement of bureaucratic capability: tax experts, budget and fiscal specialists, auditors, accountants, personnel men, organization and methods people, statisticians, police professionals, purchasing and supply experts, and the like. Selected officers and students are sent for special training to the United States and other countries - largely the U.S. because of our leadership in the area of management improvement. These training programs may extend anywhere from a few weeks to three years, in the case of doctorate candidates.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Currently, institutes or centers for public administration have been established and are functioning in Thailand, Brazil, Iran, Korea, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, The Philippines, Salvador, Turkey, Guatemala, Egypt, Vietnam, Ecuador, Spain, and Paraguay, although not all of these were under AID auspices. Others are being undertaken elsewhere.

<sup>11</sup> Nearly 5000 officials of other governments and students of public administration have received training in the United States. Among them have been many senior persons; some, like President Macapagal of the Philippines, have gone on to much higher office. There is no question of the long range benefits from such efforts.

Surveys are sometimes made of the host country's public administration capability in an effort to point up needs and deficiencies. Consulting firms may be engaged to undertake specific administrative improvements. Now and then, professional associations of civil servants have been formed and professional journals of administration published.

Such efforts, however, are not large when compared with other technical assistance undertakings. Rarely are there more than three or four such administrative specialists in a single country at a time and a number have none at all. In 1962, there was a total of only 300, including personnel on contract, available to the 80 or so countries with which AID has some kind of association. Since World War II, only a little over \$130 million has been spent in public administration, or less than eight per cent of our total technical assistance aid, although the proportion is increasing. Considering the enormity of the problem and the size of the investment we are making in it, this is far short of what is needed.

Why have we not done more - or better? Why, of the improvement of the capability of the host government to provide for itself is so important to successful technical assistance have we not long ago addressed ourselves more effectively to it? What is holding us back now? These are pertinent questions.

To understand why more has not been done, it is necessary to know more about the nature of the problem and also what has been happening in the aid agency. Why, in short, is AID what it is?

#### The Agency Background

It was unfortunate that the agency which administered the enormously successful European Recovery Program should be asked to provide aid to the under-developed countries. The two tasks actually have very little in common. The Marshall Plan, as its agency title, Economic Cooperation Administration, suggested, was created to provide dollar aid to modern but temporarily dislocated economies. AID, on the other hand, is concerned with development, much of it of the most elemental kind. In the one case, the recipient countries could themselves take on the responsibilities for the use of funds; in the other the aid giver must exercise the dominant judgmental role of determining what is to be done, and how. Economists were the major policy makers in the ECA. Technical assistance, on the other hand, calls for a quite different kind of expertise.

Because ECA melded into what is currently AID, there is still in the agency's current behavior a carry-over from the old days of massive financial assistance. One still notes thinking which runs

along economic rather than developmental lines.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, despite the lip service which is given, one finds little real support for administrative improvement among other than the public administration professionals.

There is also general agreement that the current calibre of personnel in the higher AID positions is hardly that of Marshall Plan days. This would seem to be borne out by Administrator Bell's recent request for legislation to permit him to make changes among headquarters personnel. ECA was staffed by a group of unusually creative and energetic men and women. Since 1950, however, there have been two major "reorganizations" (under Harold Stassen and Fowler Hamilton) and several lesser ones. There has also been the continuing indifference, and in some cases outright hostility, of many in the State Department (now the parent agency), towards foreign aid. Such incidents and events have, of course, had a major influence on what has happened within the agency.

#### Congressional and Public Attitudes

Of enormous importance also in determining what the agency does is the attitude of the Congress and the public. In recent years the Congressional hearings have become increasingly protracted and difficult. Those who testify for the agency have been subjected to a kind of grilling which has been both enervating and humiliating. In 1962, for example, a massive 4812 printed pages of testimony were published as hearings ran on for weeks. One witness alone was on the stand for over 100 hours.<sup>13</sup> Representative Passman, Dem., La., has taken the lead in the assault on the aid program but other legislators and members of the public have seemed eager to join him.

Such an environment is hardly conducive to clear thinking, creativity, or the delicacy of approach that programs as complex and as vital as these would seem to call for. Indeed, a reading of the testimony before Congress leaves one with the impression that administration witnesses feel they are "damned if they do and damned if they don't." Programs which "justify" more easily are likely, therefore, to be put before others more important in the long run, and getting through the hearings alive becomes the most pressing objective.

<sup>12</sup> The 1964 conference of the Society for International Development, a private organization founded by Marshall Plan "alumni" and containing many "old aid hands," provides a case in point. Although these meetings were given over to "Human Factors in International Development," not a single one of the 18 workshop sessions was concerned with governmental administration as such.

<sup>13</sup> A vivid account of the acrimony which attended these hearings is provided by Joseph Kraft in "Foreign Aid: Saved by the Bell?" (Harper's Magazine, February 1963, pp. 73-81).

## Host Country Views

Involvement with someone else's government is always a tricky business, regardless of the purity of one's motives or the vastness of one's largesse. Administrative reform, as one observer has commented, is "hitting them where they live." Another puts it this way:

A nation in the process of development will not hesitate to borrow chromium, plastic, or even nuclear embellishments from a more advanced neighbor yet will stiffen with wounded dignity at the mere mention of deficiencies in its government-operated civil service or higher educational systems.<sup>14</sup>

Change is difficult in any circumstance, whether it involves a change in agricultural methods or in community mores. It is doubly difficult where the status relationships of already powerful (and, quite often, satisfied) persons are involved. Inevitably, status relationships have to be revised, and while there may be ultimate advantage to all concerned - except, of course, those who live by venality - this is by no means apparent at the start.

In many of the underdeveloped areas, the government official - not the politician, but the civil servant - occupies the highest power/status position in the community. Technical assistance threatens this eminence by opening to question in numerous ways his methods of doing things. This is obvious to him and obvious also to his subordinates who have been suffering his inadequacies, as well as the inadequacies of the system, over a long period of time.

So, aid efforts to change bureaucratic patterns are more likely to be avoided than welcomed by many in the aid-receiving countries. The pattern may vary from point blank opposition on a variety of grounds to surface acceptance followed by inertia, but it is there all the same and is an important and time-consuming deterrent to any really effective aid program. Mission personnel know this only too well. It is much easier to go on with the same old programs than to face up to the design, development, and administration of new ones.

## Problems of Internal Leadership

To the difficulties already noted should be added those of agency organization and management. Running the AID agency, along with running the Defense and State Departments and the Internal Revenue Service, is one of the most formidable jobs in Washington. In point of fact, there is no such thing as "control." This has been underlined by the break up of AID into regions ("little AID's") and the decentralization of many functions to the missions. The missions themselves have in effect gone a step further: the basic decisions there are made by the

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<sup>14</sup> William F. Larson; "Public Administration Technical Assistance: Planning Notes," International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 314.

technical divisions - agriculture, education, industry, public health, and the like. Those who hold these positions are hardly "administration minded" although there is a growing recognition that administrative failures are holding their programs back. Still, integrated programs - agricultural and administrative technical assistance, for example - are the exception rather than the rule.

#### The P.A. Divisions Themselves

What of the public administration divisions which are charged with improving the administrative processes of the host government? If the educators, the public health specialists and the industrial advisers see no point in prodding sleeping bureaucracies, what of these men and women whose business it is?

In the first place, progress has been made and can be reported. The fact that the total public administration aid has been small when compared to other kinds of assistance, or that it has been concentrated in limited numbers and types of projects often of an unimpressive nature, should blind no one to its accomplishments. That more has not been done can be attributed to a number of factors. The first of these is a matter of perspective. The P.A. focus has been primarily upon specific projects, such as that of supplying advisers, making studies, helping to solve particular problems, rounding up suitable candidates for training in the United States, and the like. Rarely has there been the opportunity to attack the larger problem, that of general public administration improvement.

A second factor is the tendency in the missions, as well as in AID as a whole, to see the P.A. role as that of another specialist division - and a not very significant one at that. In a number of areas, it has become a catch-all unit which may include a variety of miscellaneous functions such as police improvement, the collection of statistics, customs administration, and, once even, the encouragement of atomic energy development. This role has been underlined by the type of professionals who have been recruited for public administration work; many of them specialists in the housekeeping areas. In only a few instances, although the number is increasing, has public administration been seen as the partner of all technical assistance.

#### Lack of Knowledge of What To Do

One final but important reason for the failure to do more to improve the administrative capability of the aid-receiving countries has been uncertainty with respect to what to do or how to do it. This is a large statement but, the evidence suggests, an accurate one. It applies, of course, to the private and United Nations programs as well as to our national ones.

This is not to depreciate what has been done by the men and women who have carried the major burdens in these programs over so many years. Many of them have had substantial influence in the countries where they serve; many of their contributions have become, as we have seen, a permanent part of the governments to which they have been accredited. Rather, we should emphasize the need for research to assist the practitioners in the difficult business in which they are engaged. How does one country, for example, go about providing assistance to another - particularly one which is not sure it wants it? Is administrative expertise transferrable? Are American methods really applicable elsewhere? What are the basic building blocks of a public administration technical assistance program? What strategies are the most effective?

The U.S. aid program has been studied many times - by Congressional committees, by Presidential commissions, by professional consultants, and by internal work groups. Still, there is little in these efforts that focuses on this kind of a problem. A search of the literature of development is hardly more rewarding. While most of the treatises talk about planning - national planning, in particular, is a popular term - little or no attention is given to creating administrative capability.

Even among those who should have been most concerned with it, the teachers and researchers of public administration, not nearly enough has been done, and often the wrong things. We have spent far more time, for example, with the tactics of public administration than we have with the strategies, with techniques rather than with constructs. We have concerned ourselves more with what we think ought to be done - usually in the American image - rather than with learning why some of the things we have done have not worked. All too often we have permitted our hopes to influence our judgment. Now, belatedly, we must face the fact that we do not really know what we need to know about public administration technical assistance.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> The situation, however, is improving. More and more, the universities, aided by the foundations, are exploring basic aspects of cultural change. Students of administration are seeking to discover whether our learnings in public administration can be transferred elsewhere. They are seeking ways by which the capacity of indigenous institutions can be improved. The work of Riggs, Pye, Siffin, Hagan, Heady, Diamant and others is worthy of mention. So also are the institutional contributions of such universities as Syracuse, Michigan State, Southern California, Pittsburgh, and Indiana. A Comparative Administration Group has been created, thanks largely to the enterprise of Riggs, as part of the American Society for Public Administration. Answers are still wanting, but one can feel encouraged.

### A Suggested Course of Action

It is always easier to be critical of what has happened, or has failed to happen, than it is to suggest a new course of action. Nevertheless, what needs now to be done is to find ways and means by which the aid-receiving countries can be helped to improve their administrative capabilities on a larger scale than has thus far been attempted. The very future of their development efforts requires this.

The course this paper recommends is a dual one, involving research and study as well as action. It does not require new legislation and there is no reason why its multiple aspects cannot proceed concurrently. It will involve basically the following:

1. A self-appraisal - an assessment of what has already been done
2. Greater support for research and study into the nature and processes of administrative change
3. The development of suitable strategies and of plans of action
4. The integration of public administration and other technical assistance activities within AID
5. A reorientation of internal agency administrative machinery

#### A Self-Appraisal

AID should bring together and assess what it already knows about public administration technical assistance. This is long overdue. The agency's experience is richer by far than that of any other single source. Its staff has worked in over 50 countries. It has experienced and observed both successes and failures.

What has been done? Why was it done? Has it succeeded? Why or why not? What should have been done? How? A saying currently popular in AID is that "the agency has no memory" - meaning that reliable data do not exist in collected, usable form on either its successes or its failures. By using a variety of methods designed to reveal previous experience the agency may well discover that its memory is not as bad as it had feared. What is essential is that it direct its attention, as it has not really done before, to the experience it has had and what may be learned from it. This will take time, much time; but our involvement in foreign aid has already been longer than many thought, and the end is not in sight.

#### Sponsored Research and Study

The reservoirs of talent outside of government should also be tapped. Conferences of knowledgeable people should be assembled, and their recommendations published. A study commission, such as the privately supported Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, might well be invoked. AID already has the authority, and probably

the funds, for further efforts in this direction. Should it be so inclined, it might apply a variety of university and research expertise via the contract method to such promising areas of exploration and study.

In particular, the role of the universities needs to be examined. As Dean Reining has pointed out:

Despite appearances, we were rarely if ever presented with the original problem.... We were instead, presented with defined problems, with specific time limits for their solution, specified resources that would be available to us, and then asked if we would participate out of a concern for the foreign policy of our government and the welfare of the emerging nation.

The new role of the university, as he sees it, should be concerned with "over-all development plans and problems" in the nations we are aiding, not just with operations.<sup>16</sup>

Such studies should seek to discover ways of understanding the other fellow's governmental system and how it has developed. While our objective is to make it work more effectively, we will need to know more of its history; its objectives, the value systems of those who man it, and the roles they see for themselves. This calls for administrative technicians - personnel officers, organization and methods specialists, budgeteers and the like - but it should also involve sociologists, social psychologists, and others capable of gauging the mores of the community.

The study of cross cultural administrative improvement should take into account the experience of other countries in similar ventures. It should include also a study of private undertakings (perhaps religious as well as lay) and military aid. Some of these may prove of exceptional value.

#### Strategies and Plans for Administrative Change

From the wisdom of experience, approaches can and must be developed to the problem of helping others to change. These will need to be done on a country-by-country basis but many of the concepts thus achieved will be broadly applicable.

There is no dearth of policy statements in AID on the importance of public administration improvement, but little attention has been given over the years to the development of specific strategies by which improvement is to be effected. This demands attention.

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<sup>16</sup> Henry Reining, Jr., "The Fourth Dimension: The Administration of Development and the University's Role," from Papers in Comparative Public Administration, Special Series: No. 3 (Chicago, Ill., American Society for Public Administration, 1964), p. 4.

This kind of planning involves more than methods, more than tactics. It calls for clear and precise thinking, for an understanding both of objectives and the resources available to them, and for deep knowledge and insight of the country to which it is addressed. It requires also the involvement in the process of those who will ultimately be concerned with carrying it out. These will include key people in the host country as well as the visitors. Important issues, not the least of which have to do with program priorities, need to be resolved in the process. There can be no real self-development until this has been done.

#### An Integrated Approach

For much too long a time the improvement of the host bureaucracy has been the sole concern of the public administration divisions in both the missions and in Washington. Public administration improvement should be an all-mission responsibility. It should be shared by the country team, supported by the ambassador, and backed by Washington.

Administrative specialists should work closely with those in other divisions of the country mission - public health, education, irrigation, public works, agriculture, industry, and the like. A pool of specialists should be available within the mission for consultation and encouragement of the efforts of others. An administrative program officer, to work with and at the same level as the current mission program officer, has also been suggested.<sup>17</sup> It may also be possible to arrange the assignment of administrative specialists to the appropriate aid-receiving institutions within the host government as a condition of the aid being granted. A number of proposals such as these have been made. They all have merit and should be explored.

The idea of the integrated approach is argued forcefully by an outsider - an aid recipient - Sixto Roxas, Chairman of the National Economic Council of The Philippines in an address to a meeting of AID Mission Chiefs in Manila:

The development of a local planning and management capability invariably demands foreign assistance on a wide range of fronts simultaneously, and it is well for the AID to think in terms of integrated assistance in many areas together. The provision of separate, isolated, individual types of assistance here and there are usually futile, particularly where one type of change is meaningless unless accompanied by other changes together. Thus, the improvement of the ability of the public works ministry to develop projects consistent with the national plan can be rendered useless by bottlenecks in budgeting procedures, or bottlenecks in the administration of tax collection. Unless these problem areas are attacked together, the foreign assistance programs may continuously indulge in innume-

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<sup>17</sup> Dean Donald C. Stone of the University of Pittsburgh is among those who have put forward this idea.

rable separate activities without yielding any substantial returns.<sup>18</sup>  
(Emphasis added)

The teacher might well listen to the student. AID officials, please note.

#### Making the Agency "Work"

The foreign aid agency has been reorganized so many times that, like a professional boxer, it is hardly recognizable for the scar tissue. The Presidential Commission under Under-Secretary of State Ball which recently concluded the latest examination was wise in not attempting another face-lifting.

Nevertheless, AID's organization and methods of administration need to be carefully examined. This should not be a "study" in the usual sense, nor even a "management survey," but rather an "administrative overview" of what is really taking place and what can be done to remedy it.

The division of the agency into regional areas, and the further decentralization to the missions of much of the decision-making authority once held in Washington, has created a new headquarters role. It is no longer sufficient to rely on manual orders and cabled instructions to obtain mission compliance. The headquarters role must be a more positive one. AID must be prepared to supply broad agency leadership, guidance and support to its missions with all the implications this contains.

Headquarters must find ways of keeping itself well informed concerning what is actually occurring in the country areas. In developing its policies, it must keep in mind not only what needs to be done, but also what the missions, as they are organized, are likely to do. It must concern itself with ways of influencing those in the operating units who are likely to be preoccupied with day-to-day issues and pressures. Instructions and orders are important, but more important is an approach which helps others to understand what is needed, and why, and then attempts to provide the support to bring it about. These are difficult, but by no means impossible assignments. They call for a variety of approaches as well as tools. One such means is through training, but training on a broader, more substantial scale than has been conceived heretofore. Another is the enlarged use of conferences and other problem-focusing devices. A third is the development of additional policy guides and directives and the use of high calibre program evaluation people to see that policy is being followed. The purpose here is not to recommend any single course of action so much as to suggest the availability of a variety.

People at mission levels have a lonely function to fulfill. They must face not only the criticism of their own countrymen, but

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<sup>18</sup> Op. cit., p. 5.

often that of the people with whom they reside. They earnestly want to do the right thing. Their failures are usually due to not really knowing what is right or not having the administrative machinery for getting it done. Anything that can help them find this direction and give them support in achieving it will over the long run be welcomed.

#### A Matter of Emphasis

There is one more point which needs to be made. This has to do with the manner in which those in the AID agency, particularly those in leadership positions, see the problem, and what they are willing to do about it. It is, in fact, the starting point in any real attack upon the problem.

Before we go to other countries, there must be an understanding among our own people, specifically those in the Agency for International Development, that every activity we support abroad involves directly or indirectly the administrative capability of a local agency of government; if we really expect the aid burden to lessen, a higher priority must be placed on the importance of public administration improvement to a country's development. No one expects major changes overnight. No one intends or wants a "hard line" to develop. But it is high time that we recognized throughout the agency, by our action as well as our words, that there can be no real progress without professionally qualified personnel and effective institutions in the aid-receiving countries to bear the difficult new burdens of development.

Agreement with such a thesis, however, is still a far cry from carrying it out. Two years ago, for example, the country program submissions for 21 countries listed public administration improvement as the No. 1 requirement. It is doubtful that five actually gave it this kind of priority. Support by the Congress and the President, or by the Secretary of State and the Director of AID, while essential, does not by itself assure it. There must be a combination of intent and method on the part of the aid giver, - and this includes the directors of the geographic divisions, the mission leadership, and the other technical services as well as those in public administration.

More specifically, this means, within the agency:

- Clear and straightforward policy statements indicating the priority that is being given public administration assistance
- Conferences and meetings to explain, encourage and discuss it
- Organizational arrangements designed to support it.
- Positive support of those who actually try to carry it out
- Non-preferential treatment for those who do not
- Study and evaluation of both successes and failures

As for the recipient government, our efforts must be directed in such a way that what we propose does not constitute a threat. Hopefully, its officials will understand our purposes; hopefully also, our discussions will involve them in the process of determining what is to be done, how and why.

It need not always be assumed because the governmental processes are sensitive ones, that efforts of an improvement nature will be resisted. Some, of course, will be, and some people will resist everything. On the other hand, there are always those within a country who will welcome the beginnings of a change for the better if it can be seen in this light and can be undertaken in a non-threatening way. Among these, many times, are key political figures (sometimes at the ministerial levels) who have been disturbed by their own inability to make good on their promises; highly placed members of the civil service who, for one reason or another, are disappointed with the progress that is being made; a larger number at the middle levels; and many of the younger ones, including those in the lesser services, who have yet to make their mark. Indeed, the signing of the agreement which brings technical assistance to their country in the first place is an indication that there are those who seriously want it. Whatever their reasons, a foothold for change is usually possible if we really seek to find it.

Where the aid-receiving country is reluctant to accept outside assistance the giver faces his greatest challenge. His imaginativeness will be tested by the manner in which he approaches his assignment, the consideration he gives to a wide-range of ecological factors, the manner in which his host is involved, the use he makes of third parties and international institutions. To quote Senor Roxas once more, this demands "the cultivation of a refined art in human relations, and the utmost tact and subtlety on the part of the AID staff."<sup>19</sup>

As in all technical assistance agreements, there will and should be conditions to be met. These are what Secretary Rusk calls the "insistent string" in our aid efforts. Those with understanding of the kinds of issues involved in the administering of aid know, however, that the setting of such conditions is rarely an either/or proposition. Some countries will undoubtedly not understand at first what we are suggesting that they do, any more than some political jurisdictions or individuals in this country understand the values of reform. At the start, they may resist our assistance, or have difficulty adjusting themselves to receive it. Some, even, may reject it. Some we may have to reject. But most will surely appreciate an intelligent, moderate, and constructive concern for the manner in which the resources we make available are used. Our image must surely deteriorate when we seem not to know or care.

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<sup>19</sup> Op. cit., p. 6.

### In Conclusion

Professor Morgenthau suggests that "as military policy is too important a matter to be left to the generals, so is foreign aid too important to be left to the economists."<sup>20</sup> Now is the time for others to take a larger hand in what has become a very costly undertaking. Economists are needed, of course; but so are administrative experts - planners, organizers, trainers, budgetary and personnel specialists - and the social scientists who can help to make them more effective.

The legislation on which the aid effort rests requires the President to take into account "the extent to which the recipient country is showing a responsiveness to the vital economic, political, and social concerns of its people and demonstrating a clear determination to take effective self-measures."<sup>21</sup> This self-help, which is so much at the heart of our own national progress, cannot really occur until there is improvement in the administrative capability of the developing countries. Helping others to achieve it is a long-range objective, but one which offers hope to Congress and the American people that the generosity and good sense which lie behind our willingness to give aid to others less fortunate than ourselves will at long last be fulfilled.

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<sup>20</sup> Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 309.

<sup>21</sup> Public Law 87-195, Sept. 4, 1961. Ch. 2, Sec. 211, Title II.