

REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR ON
IMPROVING A.I.D.'s PROGRAM EVALUATION

JBernstein:A/AID:February 1968



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INTRODUCTION

For many years, and increasingly, AID has been uneasy about the adequacy of its program evaluation work. But the Agency still has not come to grips with this problem, despite a considerable volume of staff work and consultants' reports. A program evaluation SYSTEM has not materialized, fitted into the regular structure of AID organization and operations, with an established methodology and rationale.

However, AID is not as far from this point as is generally believed -- either by outsiders or by its own personnel. Considerable program evaluation work is done, although it tends to be spotty and relatively crude and inefficient. Many types of program evaluations have been tried here and there in the Agency, so that considerable experience is available on which to draw in developing a SYSTEM. Some relevant outside experience also is available. Moreover, a number of consultants reports and internal staff studies have provided sound doctrine for the organization and practices of a SYSTEM.*

What is needed now is to crystallize these elements of AID's potential for good program evaluation work into an effectively operating SYSTEM. This Report will make suggestions on how to do this, and will indicate that it can be done so that the benefits far outweigh the costs--recognizing

* Particularly useful is the comprehensive report of October 1965, "Improving AID Program Evaluation," by Col. George A. Lincoln, who spent about a year with AID developing this report with the help of some staff assistants. The Lincoln Report digested and integrated into its analysis much of the extensive experience with foreign assistance evaluation work up to 1965, both inside and outside AID, and the conclusions of other studies of evaluation needs. The analysis and recommendations in this Report are consistent with the findings of the Lincoln Report and they often repeat, more or less, conclusions or recommendations made by Col. Lincoln. The Booz, Allen & Hamilton Report of February 1965, "The Administration of the Agency for International Development," put considerable stress on the need to develop a good program evaluation SYSTEM, out of a welter of unsatisfactory evaluation practices. It suggested a few broad needs and principles for a SYSTEM. The most thorough source of Congressional attention to this AID management need has been Senator Gale W. McGee. (See his November 29, 1963 Report to the Senate Appropriations Committee, "Personnel Administration and Operations of Agency for International Development.")



Mr. C. Tyler Wood

January 13, 1969

Joel Bernstein

Administrative History

For your request of December 3, 1968, attached are corrected pages for administrative history.

Attached pg. 666 replaces pg. 666
pg. 667 remains the same
Attached pg. 668 replaces pg. 668
Attached pg. 669 replaces pg. 669.

Also attached is material describing the new AID-University-Relations effort: this should be inserted on pg. 117 at the end of the narrative section. Also a note should be added with the following cross-reference:

See Ch. VII, Private Resources, Section C
Pp. 154-155.

Attachments.

Drafted by Joan Silver
1/13/69

~~(CORRECTED)~~~~X-3766~~Program Evaluation

Although it conducted many evaluations as part of regular operations, the Agency lacked a formal evaluation unit from 1961 to 1964. Senator G.W. McGee reported to the Committee on Appropriations on November 29, 1963, that: "One of the most critical needs of the Agency is far more objective and effective evaluation of its programs and projects."^{20/} Subsequently, an Operations Evaluation Staff (OES) was established in the Office of the Administrator on April 21, 1964.^{21/}

The OES staff consisted of a small group of senior officers with field experience in A.I.D. or State. Usually, teams of two officers were assigned to a country program evaluation. Their findings and recommendations were discussed with the USAID Director and in Washington with the Regional Assistant Administrator, the Assistant Administrator for Administration, and the Administrator. This work was not without value to the Administrator, but was not as productive as had been anticipated. Often the findings only corroborated information already known in the field mission and in AID/W; problems noted were already being dealt with.

Searching for a better method of evaluation, the Administrator early in 1965 arranged for a special study (by Colonel George A. Lincoln) of evaluation techniques being performed in field missions and in

AID/W and of the use made of information obtained.^{22/} Colonel Lincoln defined program evaluation as "the examination of experience to provide guidance which can be used to improve program execution and planning." He concluded that generally field missions should be performing evaluation in greater depth and more frequently and using the information to improve program execution and program planning.

Subsequently, in 1965 Administrator Ball directed the missions to increase and improve their evaluation activities and report to AID/W on steps taken.^{23/} Evaluation was given greater emphasis in many missions but not uniformly so, and the work of the OES staff declined and was practically dormant in mid-1967.

In late 1967 Administrator Gaud assigned his Special Assistant, Joel Feinstein, to supervise the design of an evaluation system. Mr. Feinstein's report in February, 1968, pointed out evaluation purposes beyond those defined by Colonel Lincoln: transfer experience between countries, provide in-service training, and improve communication within A.I.D. and with the public.^{24/} Formal external reviews of the OES type should be only part of the total system.

Steps to systematize evaluation were announced by Administrator Gaud on April 13, 1969.^{25/} The main objective was regular critical

analysis of effectiveness (are targets being met?), significance (are U.S. interests being served and country development promoted?), and efficiency (are costs reasonably related to benefits?).

Evaluation for compliance with laws and regulations was purposely kept separate.

Key responsibility was put on the missions. The sixteen largest missions were required to assign an officer full time to program evaluation duties. Seven of these missions (Brazil, Liberia, Turkey, India, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam) already had such positions. The other nine were the missions in Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Korea, Philippines, Nigeria and Tunisia. Smaller missions were to assign a part-time officer. Officers were to plan a regular evaluation program (an annual Mission Evaluation Program which was to be submitted to AID/W), obtain outside resources to help with special evaluations, channel useful information on evaluation techniques and conclusions to users inside and outside the mission, and assure maintenance of an effective library of program evaluation materials.

A new Project Appraisal Report form, which provides a check list on progress and an analytic narrative, will be submitted annually for every non-capital project. This form replaces four other less evaluative status reports.

In AID/W, Program Evaluation Officers were named in each regional bureau to backstop the mission officers. These regional officers, together with central staff members responsible for agency-wide evaluation activity, information management policy, research, management planning, and the War on Hunger form the Program Evaluation Committee to exchange information and develop ways to improve evaluation work throughout the Agency (Manual Circular of April 21, 1968). The Chairman is the Director of Program Evaluation, a new position in the Administrator's Office.

Work began on a "Memory Bank", with task groups organizing evaluative documents on actual field experience into clusters by key subjects for reference reading primarily by professionals going to the field. Information on evaluation techniques, stressing acquisition of baseline data and of objective measurements of changes, was sent to missions. Research programs and special studies in AID/W reinforced mission evaluation work. A.I.D. experimented with a program to "debrief" selected A.I.D. employees at the University of Hawaii, to acquire data for training and for editing into reports for general distribution. By the end of 1968, staff work was underway on another innovation--an annual spring review by top management of key development activities, focusing on the main issues brought forth by comparative analyses of field evaluation studies and research reports.

In 1968 the Congress again expressed its concern about strengthening evaluation as part of an amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act requiring more attention to various aspects of modern management systems.

Strengthening AID-University Working Arrangements

Throughout 1968, A.I.D. and representatives of the universities working in A.I.D. projects conducted an intensive review of the form of contract used between them. This was intended to improve their ability to work together efficiently and to produce greater impact in their joint efforts overseas. The effort culminated in a number of substantial improvements in the standard A.I.D.-university contract, and also in agreement between A.I.D. and the universities to examine together a broader range of possibilities for improving their methods of working together and the results. The latter joint examination was launched in December, 1968. A.I.D. has established a senior staff committee -- the Steering Committee on University Relations -- to review and recommend on A.I.D. work in this area, and work which the universities might present to the Agency, (See memo from Mr. Gaud to Assistant Administrators and Office Heads; November 27, 1968; "Working with Universities.") The Committee is focusing on the possibility of a grant-type relationship as an alternative to the standard contract.

*Clearance: Curt Barker PPL/TA/EHRD
revision cleared by phone 1-13-69*

*Drafted - J. Bernstein 12/17/68
Revised - J. Silver 1/13/69 J.S.*

existing constraints on AID staffing and funds. Our foreign aid administration needs such a SYSTEM, both to do a better job and to help reduce outside criticism.

The Report discusses five questions:

- What is program evaluation?
- What is its purpose?
- Why should we do something about it?
- What should AID's program evaluation SYSTEM look like?
- What action is needed to move from where AID is into the proposed SYSTEM?

The orientation of the Report is primarily operational. Thus, it goes into operating organization, the listing and allocation of specific functions, and specific action requirements to improve the program evaluation SYSTEM. Most of the space is devoted to these subjects--with the necessary supporting argumentation.

PRINCIPAL GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

This listing of the principal general conclusions that emerge throughout this Report also summarizes the contents, except for the specific action recommendations. The latter appear in Section VI (pp. 26-36), supplemented by the detailed recommendations in TAB C on desirable program evaluation functions for Missions, Regional Bureaus and the Administrator's Staff Offices.

1. A.I.D. needs an effectively operating program evaluation SYSTEM --to examine what we have been doing and the actual results of our activities so as to provide valid and significant conclusions that are used, in turn, to improve our programming and implementation decisions. This examination should consider:

- Effectiveness: the extent to which activity goals have been or are being achieved;
- Significance: the importance of doing so, in terms of larger purposes (i.e., so what?);
- Efficiency: cost/return relationships.

Program evaluation, in this sense, is different from inspection and evaluation that is concerned primarily with compliance with U.S. law, Congressional intent, Agency directives, or principles of good administrative practice, or with "trouble shooting." Although the two types of evaluation overlap, they should be handled separately.

2. The program evaluation SYSTEM can and should be geared to serve some other major purposes, as well. It should:

- improve the initial or forward planning of activities, independently of the appraisal of actual project results, by tying together program planning and evaluation planning;
- provide efficient mechanisms for the transfer of experience, within and between country programs;
- provide, to the extent feasible, information needed for purposes other than direct use in programming and implementation, e.g., for reporting and justifying programs inside AID and the USG and externally;

- provide valuable in-service training, particularly for program management functions;
- contribute to improvement of communications and understanding within AID, between AID and other Agencies, and with the public.

3. The stress in all of these overlapping purposes should be on producing practical results, likely to be useable and used. This requires a program evaluation SYSTEM that is tailored to the specific qualities of the job that AID is called on to perform, and also to AID's organization for doing that job. The "SYSTEM," as conceived in this Report includes:

- a set of purposes, stated above;
- motive power, or the incentives that propel the system forward or impede its effective operation;
- structure, including
 - . a range of activities that it carries out, and
 - . a division of responsibilities among organizational units;
- procedures and techniques for operating.

4. It is important that we take some substantial forward steps now to improve AID's program evaluation work because:

- although AID has done more evaluation work to date than is generally believed, its program evaluation still has many deficiencies, which represent a significant weakness in our operations (these deficiencies are described in Section IV);
- much of this weakness could be cured without heavy additional expenditure, because the improvement needs are more qualitative than quantitative in their demands on AID staff time and other management resources;
- the returns in increased program impact from a modest additional investment in program evaluation work could be high;

- there is, in any case, an increasing need to strengthen our program evaluation SYSTEM to help meet Congressional and other criticism, specifically of inadequate AID program evaluation work and also of the overall management of aid resources;
- the time is ripe for a sizeable step forward, that could capitalize on past Agency experience with program evaluation work.

5. In the latter regard:

- considerable staff time is devoted already, one way or another, to program evaluation efforts;
- most of the elements of the recommended program evaluation SYSTEM already exist somewhere in AID, at least in embryo form;
- AID has accumulated considerable experience with a rather wide variety of program evaluation techniques;
- but the failure, considered below, to provide an explicit program evaluation management structure and some key linkages with other functions has vitiated much of the potential benefits from the foregoing efforts.

Thus, the time has now come for a determined effort at a limited re-ordering of what we are doing--operating within existing staffing and expenditure capabilities--so as to establish, on a skeletal basis, the full framework of a suitable program evaluation SYSTEM. This initial effort can then be followed by a progressive development of the SYSTEM in the light of AID's cumulative experience with needs and results.

6. In drawing up plans for a program evaluation SYSTEM, careful and thorough attention must be paid to the personal motivations affecting the quality of AID's program evaluation work. Close examination of past experience and the current situation reveals that a formidable set of negative motivations does exist (Section IV). Considerable progress in eliminating or overcoming these negative motivations is essential if we are to get anywhere. This should be feasible.

(a) The design of the evaluation SYSTEM--its structure and procedures, including its working relationships with the performance of other Agency functions--can and should be geared to help induce recognition by the operating personnel that:

- good program evaluation work will bring them "good marks"
 - . from themselves, in terms of the increased satisfaction and self-assurance that results from greater confidence that they are doing a good job;
 - . from their peers and supervisors, enhancing their prospects of career advancement and increasing their sense of being appreciated;
 - . from outside investigators, insofar as the operators' evaluation work puts them in a better position to handle critical questions and critical comments;
- the demands on their time and effort are not unreasonable in that
 - . they are accompanied by
 - assistance, as needed,
 - compensating reductions in other workload,
 - heavy reliance on their judgement as to what should be done;
 - . it is inherently reasonable to check with some care what effects activities are actually having and to consider the significance of these effects;
 - . significant results of the work are likely to be given good use; and particularly to affect the allocation of funds;
- they will be doing the evaluation themselves (with some outside participation), as a service to themselves and to others, and thus there is little cause for "defensiveness."

(b) The motivational problems should be further reduced as program evaluation becomes more established and the staffs get used to it.

(c) Above all, the motivations of the operating personnel throughout the Agency depend on their perception of the motivations of the top Agency management, particularly the Administrator, Regional Assistant Administrators, and Mission Directors. Top management can do many things to provide positive motivations for program evaluation work and to remove negative ones, by drawing on the foregoing list and by finding opportunities to participate themselves in the reviews of program evaluation work and in the work itself, and to otherwise demonstrate strong interest.

7. In structuring the proposed program evaluation SYSTEM, the Report reflects the following additional conclusions:

(a) The main organizing principle should be the assignment of evaluation responsibility to the units with the main responsibility for decision making on the matters being evaluated. Since most of the programming and implementation decisions or proposals are initiated in our Missions, most (but by no means all) of the responsibility for conducting evaluations should also be placed there. There are two principal reasons for this:

- By far the best way to assure use of evaluation conclusions in AID's programming and implementation decision making, which is the main purpose, is to involve those making these decisions as fully as possible in the reaching of the evaluative conclusions.
- This is also the best way to meet the various needs of relevance, by bringing to bear the best available knowledge of the complex and diverse local factors that are crucial to meaningful evaluation--particularly in assessing the difficult questions of why particular things have or have not occurred, their significance, and what can realistically be done.

(b) However, there are some important deficiencies in an evaluation system that relies on self-evaluation. There are deficiencies:

- in capability, where the particular experience, professional knowledge, or knowledge of evaluation techniques needed for the evaluation in question may not be available in the Mission;
- in perspective, where local knowledge and understanding may need balancing by a more detached outlook;
- in motivation, to do good evaluation.

(c) One of the main evaluation functions of higher headquarters should be to provide these missing elements to Missions, when needed for the Missions' evaluation activities, as distinguished from doing program evaluation for the Missions. Washington offices should also do review work on Mission evaluations, and should do their own evaluations on matters on which the primary responsibility for taking or initiating action was in their hands.

(d) The full distribution of program evaluation responsibilities (shown in Chart I) should be close to the current distribution of such activity. The principal changes proposed in the structure of the SYSTEM are:

- to systematize our program evaluation work more, so as to provide more and better analysis and on a more timely basis, and so as to induce fuller use of available analyses;
- to establish a full-time program evaluation function at each of the three principal levels of command in AID (Mission, Regional Bureau, Administrator), so as to help meet the aforementioned need for a built-in motivating and coordinating force; i.e., to provide an explicit management structure to see to it that the SYSTEM is working as efficiently as possible;
- to strengthen the linkages between program evaluation activities and those activities concerned with programming, implementation, information management, research, training, compliance type evaluation, and personnel management, so as to provide greater mutual support among these activities (and similarly to strengthen the linkages with related evaluation activities of other U.S. and non-U.S. economic assistance and foreign affairs agencies and of the private intellectual community);
- to improve the quality of our program evaluation work by increasing efforts in the "how-to-do-it" area, by providing improved staff services to assist those doing the evaluation work, and by careful attention throughout the design of the SYSTEM to motivational factors.

(e) The SYSTEM should embrace a wide variety of types of evaluations. (Examples in Section V.B.). It should be very permissive regarding the types used and how they are done, leaving the choices


largely up to the organizational unit responsible for the evaluation. But the SYSTEM should build in greater insistence that effective evaluation work be done.

(f) To have real impact, the program evaluation SYSTEM must be intimately interwoven into the total on-going activity of AID's operations. Such a SYSTEM can be compared to a living organism. Like any organism, it cannot function well without efficient linkages between the parts. Thus, an action program to build an evaluation SYSTEM that will really affect what we do needs to bring its various components--evaluation work done in the various AID units and also a series of related functions--into compatible stages of development and to build proper linkages between the components. If this is done, the parts of the SYSTEM, individually and as a whole, can exert much more influence on the course of AID's operations. The key linkages are mentioned above under (d). Efforts to improve these linkages have a potential for quick gains at low cost, because they would result in fuller use of evaluation work already being done.

(g) At present AID has no program evaluation SYSTEM. It only has parts that could be fitted into a SYSTEM. To blow life into the SYSTEM and give it the necessary dynamic and organic qualities, it needs a brain and nervous system in the form of the recommended explicit management structure for program evaluation. This structure would:

- provide key linkage and coordinating functions;
- provide and guide the motivational forces needed to bring good program evaluation work;
- see to it that those doing evaluation have as much as possible of any assistance that they need and want (experts, techniques, or materials);
- in short, see to it that the SYSTEM is operating as it should.

The recommended network of staff officers with full-time responsibility for these functions would not relieve the senior commanders at each AID echelon of their basic responsibility for assuring good program evaluation. On the contrary, it would make it possible for them to discharge this responsibility effectively. One such officer for each Regional Bureau and each large Mission, plus some special staffing at the Administrator's echelon should be adequate to provide a minimal initial management structure




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that could bring a productive SYSTEM into being, providing that the other supporting actions recommended in the Report are taken.

8. An important supporting action is to eliminate a sizeable chunk of AID's lower priority workload, including parts of our reporting and clearance requirements. This weeding out is difficult but necessary:

- to help motivate the key personnel to work harder on program evaluation and support new initiatives in this field;
- as a practical necessity to make room for such efforts in the work schedules of the already overburdened staffs who carry the principal program management responsibilities in Missions and AID/W;
- to meet AID management needs outside the program evaluation sphere, including reductions in total personnel.

9. The action program spelled out in Section VI would make a strong start on an improved program evaluation SYSTEM without great expenditures of additional staff time and other resources. Although there is no adequate basis for quantifying the benefits, which are described in Section III, the sense of the Report is that they would be very substantial and would accrue to most of our activities. A favorable cost/benefit ratio for program evaluation work is sought by building into the proposed program evaluation SYSTEM a series of cost minimizing features, described in Section VI.B. (pp. 33-36). ~~What is involved, in~~ large part, is re-ordering the use of existing resources to obtain the benefits of an improved SYSTEM at little net cost. The requirements for new staff positions--mostly for the management and service structure of the SYSTEM--would cost about 3% of a roughly estimated \$25 million per year of Agency and contract staff time now spent on program evaluation activities. With this management and service component, the proposed SYSTEM should make AID's evaluation work much more productive than it now is. This, in turn, would have a wide multiplier effect in increasing the impact not only of USG assistance, but also of the resources devoted to LDC development by other public and private sources in the U.S. and elsewhere.



SUPPLEMENT

to

Report to the Administrator on Improving AID's Program Evaluation

1. It may help clarify the import of the recommendations in the subject Report to provide an operational description of what would actually happen under the proposed program evaluation SYSTEM. A simplified version of the main events follows.
2. There would be a regular, annual evaluation planning and review cycle, related appropriately to the programming cycle.
 - Agency programming guidelines would include appropriate references to evaluation work to be done and its use.
 - The annual fall program submission would be followed quickly by a submission of the annual Mission evaluation plan; form and content need development, but would probably include specifics of year ahead, tentative plans for following period, and indication of evaluation work done over past year.
 - AID/W would review these submissions and
 - . make comments and suggestions to Missions (including suggestions re use of non-Mission resources),
 - .. advise re AID/W ability to provide needed help for Mission evaluation work.
 - AID/W would, at sometime, settle on two or three activity areas (sectors or more likely sub-sectors) having high priority for Agency review of performance and would plan late Spring review sessions on them, involving the AA's and the Administrator/Deputy Administrator; on each topic, the review would consider some comparative and aggregate analyses of the set of latest evaluations from selected Missions where the activity is important; if not already in the selected Mission evaluation schedules for completion by time of Spring review, AID/W would request inclusion of the missing item.
 - A similar procedure would be followed for submission and review of evaluation plans of Regional Bureaus and other AID/W offices doing their own evaluation work.
 - Conclusions from the central reviews and from the other Agency evaluation work would be considered, as appropriate and feasible, in the regular program reviews throughout the annual cycle.

Although there should be a regular, continuing cycle of evaluation work geared to the programming cycle, obviously the number of individual evaluations and the resources devoted to them need to be geared realistically to what AID can do in any one year. As the Report stresses, something else of lower priority will have to give way, and this question will need to be faced directly.

3. The limited Spring reviews and the materials reviewed are not suggested as a substitute for the broader range of evaluation activity that should be going on in the Missions and AID/W throughout the year, and that the evaluation plans would describe. The results of this activity would be sent to AID/W in a variety of forms (PER's, ad hoc reports, sections of program documents, etc.) for information and for the secondary and comparative reviews described in the Report. At each AID/W echelon, the chief administrator or his deputy and his principal program managers would participate as much as possible in the reviews of evaluation reports.

4. The Evaluation Officers at each echelon (full-time officer for Administrator's level, Regional Bureaus and larger Missions; part-time for smaller Missions) would:

- see that evaluation plans are made, monitor their carrying out, and keep the boss advised;
- see that the evaluating units get the help that they need (as feasible) for evaluation planning and execution;
- see to an appropriate flow of information--up, down and sideways throughout AID--regarding evaluation techniques and specific evaluation results;
- participate in program reviews to help identify
 - . evaluation work that needs doing,
 - . evaluation results that should be considered.

This work by these officers would be facilitated by:

- regular meetings of a standing AID/W committee, chaired by the Special Assistant for Evaluation, and including the Evaluation Officer of each Bureau and representatives of a few staff offices playing key roles in the SYSTEM;
- the AID/W Evaluation Officers making themselves available to Missions for consultations on evaluation planning.

5. Follow-up on evaluation conclusions would be assigned, through regular command channels, to the officers who normally have operational responsibility for the activities and functions involved, i.e., follow-up would not be a function of the program evaluation SYSTEM as such.

6. AID/W technical staffs would play an important role in the SYSTEM as professional participants (on TDY) in Mission evaluations. They would also do secondary comparative analyses of evaluations sent to AID/W. This work would

displace some of the time that they now spend reviewing and clearing all kinds of operational documents in Washington and participating in long distance communications with Missions. Missions would also borrow technical expertise from each other. The chief administrators at each echelon, through their Evaluation Officer, would see to it that the evaluating units in Missions and AID/W were aware of the technical resources available to them and that they made adequate use of appropriate TDY services. If the SYSTEM and the built-in set of motivations work as envisaged in the Report, the Mission requests for help should be ample to keep out technical staffs fully employed, although this may require some "suggestions" from AID/W when evaluation plans are reviewed, especially in the early stages of the SYSTEM's operation. The technical officer's work would have much more and better effect than it now has on what AID actually does in the field.

7. Professional staff from outside AID would play a similar role as consultants.

8. The SYSTEM would be supported further by the other elements proposed in the Report, which would be built into the regular Agency functions. Support would be provided by:

- the "Memory Bank" of carefully selected evaluation materials -- the Evaluation Officers would be aware of its contents and encourage its use. Use would be promoted, also, by establishing standard procedures such as compulsory review of Bank's materials by consultants, technicians, and others going to field;
- AID/W central staff work and outside work on evaluation techniques;
- adjusting Agency research programs to support evaluation needs and evaluation findings re topics needing research;
- building suitable links between program evaluation work and
 - . Agency orientation and training activities,
 - . Performance Evaluation Reports,
 - . debriefing activities;
- improved collection of data to feed evaluation;
- exchanges of evaluation experience with outside organizations.

9. Initially, a minimum basic framework for an operating SYSTEM would be put into place, including a management structure, well defined purposes, and procedures. There would then be a progressive development of the SYSTEM in the light of AID's cumulative experience with needs and results.

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I

I. WHAT IS PROGRAM EVALUATION?

Col. Lincoln has provided a good working definition for AID's program evaluation, viz., "the examination of our experience to provide guidance which can be utilized to improve program execution and to improve program planning."

What is involved is examination of the actual results of our activities and of what we actually have been doing in order to make any of three types of determinations:

- Effectiveness: the extent to which activity goals have been or are being achieved;
- Significance: the importance of doing so, in terms of larger purposes (i.e., so what?);
- Efficiency: cost/return relationships.

These determinations, then, are applied in making programming and implementation decisions. There may be quick feedback into current program decisions, or longer term applications to future operations in the same program or elsewhere.

We shall not review here AID's provisions for making a fourth type of evaluative determination, viz., compliance with U.S. law, Congressional intent, Agency directives, principles of good administrative practice, etc. There already exists a well developed system for making compliance type evaluations. It is now being strengthened. Moreover, it operates largely separately from the mechanisms for the three types of program evaluation cited above and it should continue to do so if each is to be effective. The reasons for this and the handling of overlap are mentioned later (Section V-C, "Compliance Type Evaluation").

People often think of program evaluation as the conducting of formal external reviews of performance. There is a place for such reviews in an evaluation SYSTEM, but they should be the frosting on the cake. We are concerned here with all of the activity of the type defined above that occurs in all parts of AID. Most of this is and should be internal or self evaluation.

We can visualize all purposeful activity, or all activity intended to change things--such as AID programs--as a continuous spiral with three interlocking strands. They are:

- Programming: deciding what and how much to do, and how and why;
 - Implementation: doing it;
 - Evaluation: examining what actually happened, and why, and its significance.
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In examining what has happened, we uncover results and also problems. Usually we think of program evaluation in the sense defined above as being concerned with results or the net output from our efforts. But we need to know both this and what the problems are in order to guide our programming and implementation decisions and improve the processes by which they are made. Thus evaluation is or should be a dimension of all purposeful activity, and should be a universal concern of the activators. However, explicit evaluation may not occur, and specific provision is needed to assure its adequacy.

II. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF PROGRAM EVALUATION?

A program evaluation SYSTEM can be made to serve six major purposes of A.I.D.

1. Reach conclusions about actual performance that are:
 - valid;
 - significant, in providing guidance for important programming and implementation decisions;
 - likely to be actually used in making programming and implementation decisions on the activities being evaluated;
2. Improve the initial or forward planning of activities, independently of the appraisal of actual project results, by tying together program planning and evaluation planning.
3. Provide efficient mechanisms for the transfer of experience, within and between country programs.
4. Provide, to the extent feasible, information needed for purposes other than direct use in programming and implementation, e.g., for reporting and justifying programs inside AID and the USG and externally.
5. Provide valuable in-service training, particularly for program management functions.
6. Contribute to improvement of communications and understanding within AID, between AID and other Agencies, and with the public.

The first of these overlapping purposes is stated in the definition of program evaluation itself, and is of course the primary purpose. If the SYSTEM performs it well, it will also tend to support the other purposes, though the latter also need some special attention.

The stress of these purposes is on producing practical results, likely to be usable and used. This, in turn, puts a premium on gearing AID's program evaluation SYSTEM to the specific qualities of the job that our Agency is called on to perform. These qualities are described in TAB A, excerpted from a paper on AID management problems. What is involved in producing

practical results is not only awareness of the local context, which is usually a critical factor in reaching valid and actionable conclusions, but also awareness of what can be done to serve complex and often ambiguous purposes within the specific and often restrictive legislative, organizational and operational conditions governing AID activity.

Note that AID has both short and longer term uses for evaluation conclusions. We have a most pressing need for appraisals of what has been happening that can be applied immediately, principally for use in the next round of programming and implementation decisions on the activities being evaluated-- a need for quick "feedback". For this purpose, it is most essential to put the primary responsibility for evaluation with the principal users of the results, although they should be encouraged and helped to use outside consultants. We also need more comprehensive analyses of program results, reaching farther back and intended for longer term and sometimes for more generalized applications to other activities, policy making and other uses. Here we can and should make greater use of the talents of "non-responsible" or third party evaluators, from inside and outside AID, although the specific applications of their evaluation conclusions also will require analysis of the specific situations by those responsible for the programs in question. Of course, there are many shadings of short and long term uses of program evaluation results. Another important type of long term and sophisticated evaluation analysis, largely beyond the capabilities of AID's operating units, is needed for the improvement of our indicators of accomplishment, evaluation criteria, and other elements of evaluation technique. These varying needs are considered later in discussing the design of an effective program evaluation SYSTEM.

III. WHY SHOULD WE DO SOMETHING ABOUT PROGRAM EVALUATION?

First, because we know that our present program evaluation work is weak. But this is not a sufficient reason. We also need to know that it is feasible, through a specified set of measures for improving program evaluation, to cause enough improvement in the achievement of AID purposes at a low enough cost to make any proposed efforts worthwhile. Let's look further at these questions.

What is the basis for the belief that AID's program evaluation work is weak? The two principal bases for belief, in general, are the pronouncements of authorities and the personal experience of the believers. To my knowledge, all authoritative studies and also some quick appraisals of AID's operations (indeed, of the economic assistance operations of all agencies worldwide) have concluded that our program evaluation work is deficient. The Lincoln, Booz-Allen-Hamilton, and McGee reports cited at the outset are examples. There are others.

As for personal experience, I have found in dozens of recent conversations with experienced AID personnel, and in many other such conversations over the past years, that they all feel that there are serious deficiencies in our program evaluation work. Although some are skeptical about the value of doing more such work, it usually turns out--in probing their reasons--that their skepticism stems from experience with Agency failures to use or value this work adequately or from other negative motivations discussed in Section IV. Many have shared my own experience of groping desperately for better information on the actual effects of on-going programs as guidance in making programming or implementation decisions, or as material to use in reporting on and justifying program efforts, or the experience of groping for knowledge of the results from solutions tried elsewhere to problems like those facing me.

What specifically is wrong with our program evaluation work? Our provisions for obtaining evaluative facts and analysis in usable form when they are needed for decision making or other purposes are inadequate. Evaluative efforts tend to be sporadic and spotty. Their quality depends much too heavily on the happenstance of the capabilities and personal interests of the individual senior administrators and their key program personnel. Some good evaluations produce results too late for much use. Paradoxically, we have both too little evaluation information--in the sense of not having what we need when we need it--and also too much information--in the sense of a mass of papers and reports that defies sifting to pull out the large amount of useful facts and analysis scattered within it.

The existing motivations for evaluative work are often weak or perverse. Even when they are positive, the extent and quality of such work is often limited severely by attempting to do it under the wrong circumstances, e.g.,

in the midst of hurried efforts to complete programming exercises or to make urgent implementation decisions. The lack of system also results in poor technique. It also aggravates the lack of continuity in evaluation efforts and in knowledge of the purposes that motivated individual program activities, so that the criteria and other grounds for evaluation analyses keep shifting. This in turn produces undesirable vacillation in program efforts, i.e., beyond what is called for by changes in the host country or U.S. situations. The perspective with which evaluation is undertaken is often faulty, being either too defensive and therefore biased against making a suitably critical appraisal, or too uninformed and therefore of little use. There is inadequate coordination between program evaluation work and other functions that should interact with it in important ways. These other functions include not only programming and implementation decision making, but also information management, research, training and personnel management.

Other criticisms could be made. But the case should not be overstated. AID has done much informal program evaluation work, primarily in its Missions, and some formal work, even if we have no full blown SYSTEM. We do have regular progress and accomplishment reporting. These efforts have undoubtedly had very useful results of the types mentioned in listing program evaluation purposes in Section II. The Lincoln Report provides an impressive listing of some of the more formal AID evaluation efforts up to 1964, and there has been an increase in such activity and some interesting new experimentation and staff work since then - partly due to the impetus provided by the Report and its aftermath. AID can take some pride in being well ahead of other assistance organizations in its evaluative efforts. And there is little precedent to guide us. Nor is there ready made assistance available from the intellectual community. The art of evaluation is weak in the Social Sciences generally--particularly when we are dealing on the level not of changes in objective variables like GNP, investment, savings, exports, and the like, but with changes in the minds of men and in their organization and capabilities for doing things. Nevertheless, the deficiencies noted are serious and there can be significant improvement.

What would the benefits be? With a good SYSTEM, there would be improved achievement of all six of the purposes cited in Section II. These are all very important intermediate purposes in seeking successful aid programs. In particular, the span of control and the content of decision making by AID's senior management personnel would be improved because they would be better informed on the actual effects that our programs have been having. They could weigh alternatives more sensibly. They would be able to adjust AID's programs and organization more quickly and effectively in response to comparative results and changing needs. Moreover, a better overview of results would help them to correct distortions of emphasis that creep into programs because of more forceful or convincing presentations of presumed effects by some programming elements than by others. It also would help

AID's senior management to avoid and correct similar distortions that result from their overexposure to the complaint inducing problems and the external criticisms that tend to dominate their attention.

Performance also would benefit from improved organizational morale. This would result from increased self-confidence in and greater understanding of what we are doing and its likely effects. The latter also leads to greater realism in activity planning and less disappointment at results. Parallel to this would be greater outside confidence in what AID is doing, when outsiders can be shown more clearly the positive results and also can see that AID has a SYSTEM for spotting things that are not going well and for making timely adjustments. This increased outside confidence, or even a strengthened AID capacity to meet criticism, should also boost morale and performance.

A rough survey suggests that AID probably spends about 7-8% of its professional staff time on program evaluation activities -- about 5% in Washington and 10% in the field. This staff time involves about \$9 million per year in direct costs. We also spend sizeable amounts for contract and consultant services of a program evaluation type (perhaps \$15-20 million). Our need is to get fuller and better use of the results of this work, and also better work. It is not only a matter of the direct yield. There is a large multiplier effect of any increase in the efficiency of our program evaluation efforts. Not only does it affect the efficiency of virtually all of the rest of AID's work, but it and the results on our programs also affect the work of AID contractors, the host Governments, some of the private research and analytical work on development around the world, and the programs of other entities supplying capital and technical assistance to the LDC's.

We might well ask, "If the potential gains really are as great as is suggested above, why hasn't more or better program evaluation work been done already?"

Probably, the main reason is that, on the one hand, AID and particularly its program management elements operate under tremendous time pressures due to the annual appropriation cycle and other factors while, on the other hand, there is no necessary compulsion to do any particular kind or amount of evaluation work. Up to now, there has been no overriding legislative injunction; no reason why we cannot keep on operating without systematic evaluation. It is not inherently necessary like the programming and implementation dimensions of our activity. And these are cruelly demanding of the scarce time of our program management personnel. If time pressures demand the sacrifice of some activities, evaluation tends to be the first to go even though this may have a more deleterious effect on program impact than the sacrifice of other activities that have a stronger action imperative supporting them (such as reporting). Thus a special effort in self-discipline is needed to create conditions that will cause us to strengthen the evaluation function.

The stultifying effect of time pressures on the will to do careful and systematic program evaluation is accentuated by the relatively short period that most AID staff expect to be in a particular country. When they arrive and through most of their tour, they are in a great hurry to act because they want to produce results before they leave and they know that they do not have much time. So they do not like to slow up their action pace by using their scarce time for evaluation work. As they get close to the end of their tour, their thoughts tend to wander elsewhere and they have less concern with the possible benefits of evaluating their activity as a guide to future action, for which someone else will be responsible.

Given the negative motivations cited, and the other negative motivations cited in the next Section, the most difficult part of the task of creating and maintaining an effective evaluation SYSTEM will be to provide adequate positive motivations to overcome the prevailing negative ones. Improved evaluation organization and techniques are needed, and indeed the mere existence of a SYSTEM will itself provide some positive motivations, but the SYSTEM must be carefully designed to maximize its positive motivational force. These motivational needs are discussed at some length in Section IV below.

Some factors favor an effort to strengthen AID's program evaluation work. One is the common sense agreement on the need for some kind of effective evaluation as a dimension of any purposeful activity. Conscientious workers in such activity are bound to try to do some evaluation in the course of their work. Another factor is the relative complexity and great uncertainties attending our activities (see TAB A), which create a greater need and greater desires for evaluation in order to reduce these uncertainties. An increasingly strong factor is the rising pressure of outside criticism, which should increase our compulsion to do more evaluation in order to (1) increase confidence in what we are doing, (2) help ward off criticism, and (3) help assure that we are not pushed into wrong action through over-sensitivity to criticism. In this connection, we should be mindful of the pressures for better program evaluation work that have been building up in Congress and that were reflected in the proposed new Section 621A. ("Strengthened Management Practices") that was included in the House of Representatives' version of the FAA of 1967 (but not in the final Act).

There remains the question of the costs of proposals for improved program evaluation. We shall consider this later after describing a proposed program evaluation SYSTEM and an action program to put it into effect.

IV. MOTIVATIONAL PROBLEMS

In Section III, it was noted that motivation is the stickiest problem impeding effective program evaluation. It was suggested that the main reason why better evaluation work has not been done thus far is a combination of the fact that there is little compulsion on AID to do program evaluation work that is inherent in our assignment (in comparison to the inherent necessity of programming and implementation work), plus some negative motivations.

What are these negative motivations, and what can we do about them?

There are a variety of reasons why personnel with the responsibility for operating programs tend to resist systematic program evaluation efforts. Various combinations of these reasons apply in particular cases.

- They doubt the practical value or usefulness, for program decision making, of greater evaluation efforts. In this regard, they may:
 - feel that AID already is doing all that is worth doing, as a part of the programming process;
 - not understand the needs and potential benefits of proposed evaluation efforts where these exist, perhaps because they have not tried to think them through, or are unable to envisage AID as a whole and its overall needs;
 - be skeptical or cynical regarding the actual interest and serious intent of AID top management in program evaluation matters, in the light of a past history of interest that appeared to blow hot and cold.
- They do not see sufficient value to themselves, personally, either in greater self-appreciation or confidence that they are doing a good job, or in improving their prospects for good efficiency ratings and career advancement;
- They feel impelled to resist further impositions on their limited time and that of their staffs, particularly when they already are overburdened and cannot readily see what work they can drop.

- They do not understand what is wanted or know how to proceed with program evaluation work, and lack confidence in their ability to do meaningful evaluation.
- They anticipate that doing program evaluation work will involve them in a variety of unpleasant personal relationships.

Where the program evaluations are to be done by outside groups, an additional set of reasons for resistance enters the picture.

- The persons responsible for the programs may feel insecure or threatened.
- They may place little value on judgements from persons they feel are less informed than they are, and they may particularly resent anticipated criticisms or second guessing from such sources.
- They may feel that the evaluation activity has been imposed on them, rather than reflecting their appraisal of their own needs, and this also is a source of resentment.

This is a formidable set of negative motivations. Perhaps there are others. To deal with these negative motivations, we need to recognize that, in some cases, the reasons for resistance may involve a correct or partially correct assessment of the situation. In other cases, they may not. The proposals in this Report seek to organize the program evaluation SYSTEM and related arrangements so as to remove the source of the negative motivations where this is feasible, and to provide sufficient positive motivations to overcome the negative ones that remain.

In sum, these motivational efforts are intended to help induce recognition by the operating personnel that:

- good program evaluation work will bring them "good marks"
 - from themselves, in terms of the increased satisfaction and self-assurance that results from greater confidence that they are doing a good job;
 - from their peers and supervisors, enhancing their prospects of career advancement and increasing their sense of being appreciated;
 - from outside investigators, insofar as the operators' evaluation work puts them in a better position to handle critical questions and critical comments;

- the demands on their time and effort are not unreasonable in that
 - . they are accompanied by
 - assistance, as needed,
 - compensating reductions in other workload,
 - heavy reliance on their judgement as to what should be done,
 - . it is inherently reasonable to check with some care what effects activities are actually having and to consider the significance of these effects;
 - . significant results of the work are likely to be given good use, and particularly to affect the allocation of funds;
- they will be doing the evaluation themselves (with some outside participation), as a service to themselves and to others, and thus there is little cause for "defensiveness."

The motivational problems should be further reduced as program evaluation becomes more established and the staffs get used to it.

Above all, the motivations of the operating personnel throughout the Agency depend on their perception of the motivations of the top Agency management, particularly the Administrator, Regional Assistant Administrators, and Mission Directors. Top management can do many things to provide positive motivations for program evaluation work and to remove negative ones, by drawing on the foregoing list and by finding opportunities to participate themselves in the reviews of program evaluation work and in the work itself, and to otherwise demonstrate strong interest. Some of the needs in this regard are considered further in TAB C's discussion of specific evaluation functions at the three command echelons of AID's structure.

V. WHAT SHOULD AID'S PROGRAM EVALUATION SYSTEM LOOK LIKE?

What is the "SYSTEM" to which we have referred in discussing program evaluation? We can think of it as having:

- purposes, and derived from this specific types of results that it needs to be able to achieve;
- motive power--forces or incentives pushing it on and also forces impeding its effective operation;
- structure, including
 - . a range of activities that it carries out, and
 - . a division of responsibilities among organizational units;
- procedures and techniques for operating.

An effectively functioning program evaluation SYSTEM should be organic in character, in that it needs a rather complex structure of interacting and mutually supporting parts with dynamic capabilities of development and adaptation to its environment. The necessary organic connections are not only between program evaluation functions performed in A.I.D. at various locations and times, but also between program evaluation and a number of other major A.I.D. functions.

It can be said that AID has had many of the parts of a program evaluation SYSTEM, but that there has not yet emerged the living organic structure that we could call a SYSTEM. It has adequate bone and sinew--in AID's present operating structure. It has considerable muscle to perform evaluation work--mainly in its Missions. Its heart or motivating force is too weak to propel the SYSTEM very far, and is subject to excessive palpitations. What it lacks most of all is an adequate brain and nervous system. For this, it needs an explicit management structure of officers with properly defined and separated duties for directing and coordinating the operation of the SYSTEM, plus adequate support from AID's information system. Without a functioning brain and nervous system, the program evaluation SYSTEM cannot be expected to exist as an effective operating entity.

It follows from the foregoing description of an effective program evaluation SYSTEM that it cannot be created simply by prescribing and officially instituting evaluation procedures. This is amply confirmed by our experience to date. We must blow life into the SYSTEM. An adequate brain must be

created, and the heart strengthened to cope adequately with the rigorous conditions that a living SYSTEM must face. And we must have the necessary parallel development of and linkages with the major interdependent functions. To fiddle with a few parts is not likely to achieve much, if the improvements achieved do not have the opportunity to work out their proper effects through an operative SYSTEM. Thus, a minimum effective program must supply whatever is missing and needed to make a SYSTEM live.

The purpose and motive power aspects of a SYSTEM were considered in Sections II and IV. This Section, supplemented by TAB B and TAB C, considers the structural requirements--with the purposes and motivational requirements described earlier very much in mind. Procedures and techniques are only considered incidentally in this Section and elsewhere in this Report, primarily to identify responsibilities for developing them and for deciding which ones to use.

A. Some Criteria of Organization

AID's program evaluation SYSTEM needs to be tailored to the nature of its job, and to its purposes and special needs--as these have been identified in preceding sections. The priority needs may be summed up as follows:

(1) The organization and methods of program evaluation should be designed to stimulate thought by the right people and on the questions that matter in making programming and implementation decisions. We want to know better not only what has actually happened, but also why it has happened and the significance. The "what" is easiest to measure, but the "why" and its significance require interpretation, which is the key to meaningful and useful evaluation.** Even the "what" requires careful selection of the variables about which it is really possible to do something. For effective interpretation of events and meaningful selection of data, we need to rely heavily on judgements by individuals or groups of individuals who are experienced and sophisticated regarding developmental processes, the local situation, and the practical limits on AID activity set by legislative and organizational factors. Quantities are useful indicators of change if there are valid norms and reference points for comparison. But they provide only the first or clue-giving step in making the analytical judgements needed in deciding where to go from there. The value of these policy judgements usually is determined more by the relevant knowledge and capabilities of the analyst than by the amount or even the quality of specific data that is available.

* "Measurement, i.e., concretizing and quantifying phenomena as far as possible, is only one step in evaluation. Contrary to the popular saying, facts seldom 'speak for themselves.' They have to be interpreted, and interpretation is the component that distinguishes evaluation from mere measurement." Evaluating Development Projects, Samuel P. Hayes, Jr. pp. 16.

(2) Related to this need for relevance is the need to have evaluation results available at the right time and place, so as to permit maximum use. We have noted a high AID priority for short-turn-around evaluation efforts, providing quick "feed-back" into the annual programming cycle and into the systems of operational control. We have also noted a high priority need for some more comprehensive and sophisticated types of evaluation intended primarily for longer term and more generalized applications. The SYSTEM should provide both.

(3) The SYSTEM needs to bring implementation problems (largely concerned with the management of resource inputs) forward quickly for management attention, but without causing neglect or overwhelming the analyses of program results and their significance. Problems do tend to surface and to come to management's attention through their own force, though they may come too slowly and in the wrong way. However, program results do not thrust themselves forward so insistently. Our programming attention should not be overdominated by the criterion of problem avoidance, but should rely heavily on the criterion of maximizing net results. Some of the activities with the highest rating by the latter criterion also have the most problems.

(4) The SYSTEM needs a built-in motivating and coordinating force--the "brain and nervous system" referred to above--since the need to do program evaluation and to relate the various evaluation activities appropriately to each other and to related functions is not inherent in AID's operations.

(5) The design of the system needs to foster maximum conservation of the use of AID's scarcest resource--well qualified manpower. Thus it needs to avoid duplication of evaluation responsibilities and to seek maximum complementary support in the evaluation work done by the various AID echelons and parallel offices. It also needs to parlay evaluation and other functions where this can be done so as to increase efficiency, e.g., by having well designed program evaluation work contribute to a variety of important AID purposes as proposed in Section II and substitute for some of the other work now undertaken in pursuit of those purposes.

B. Who Would Do What

With these needs in mind, the proposed program evaluation SYSTEM takes as its main organizing principle the assignment of evaluation responsibility to the units with the main responsibility for decision making on the matters being evaluated. Since most of the programming and implementation decisions or proposals are initiated in our Missions, most (but by no means all) of the responsibility for conducting evaluations should also be placed there. There are two principal reasons for this.

- By far the best way to assure the use of evaluation conclusions in AID's programming and implementation decision making, which is the main purpose, is to involve those making these decisions as fully as possible in the reaching of the evaluative conclusions.
- This is also the best way to meet the various needs of relevance, by bringing to bear the best available knowledge of the complex and diverse local factors that are crucial to meaningful evaluation--particularly in assessing the difficult "why" and significance questions and what can realistically be done.

However, there are some important deficiencies in an evaluation system that relies on self-evaluation. There are deficiencies:

- in capability, where the particular experience, professional knowledge, or knowledge of evaluation techniques needed for the evaluation in question may not be available in the Mission;
- in perspective, where local knowledge and understanding may need balancing by a more detached outlook;
- in motivation to do good evaluation.

One of the main evaluation functions of higher headquarters should be to provide these missing elements to Missions, as needed for the Mission's evaluation activity, as distinguished from doing program evaluation for the Missions. Washington offices should also do review work on Mission evaluations, and should do their own evaluations on matters on which the primary responsibility for taking or initiating action is in their hands. The Operations Evaluation Staff (OES) should have some special functions, described in TAB C:

The recommended structure of assignment of evaluation responsibilities is shown in Chart I. The Chart shows the proposed combinations of the elements in each of three dimensions of program evaluation activity: the subject matter to be evaluated, the organizational unit responsible, and the types of evaluation determinations that would be made extensively and regularly as a major concern of the indicated office. The types of evaluation determinations covered are "significance (S)", "effectiveness (E)", and "efficiency (F)", as defined in Section I above. Of course, any individual program evaluation activity may be concerned with only one or two of these types of determinations.

As it turns out, the distribution of responsibilities is very close to the current distribution of program evaluation activity. This is not an accident, but reflects a realistic assessment of AID's organizational interests and

CHART I

Types of Program Evaluation Determinations, by Subject Matter
and Level of Organization Primarily Responsible 1/

Level of Organization 2/	3. Administrator						
	1. Mission	2. Regional Bureau	a. PPC	b. A-MP, IT, Others	c. WOH	d. PRR	e. Others (OP ENGR, CLAB)
1. Overall Country Program vs. Objectives 3/	S,E,F,	S,E(R), F(R)	S,E(R),F(R)	-	-	-	-
2. Country Program Sectors 4/	S,E,F,	S(R),E(R), F(R)	S(R),E(R), F(R) 9/	-	S,E(R), F(R) 11/	S(R),E(R), F(R) 12/	S(R),E(R), F(R)
3. Country Program Components 5/							
a. CIP	S,E,F	S(R),E(R) F(R)	S(R),E(R), F(R) 9/	-	-	-	-
b. Capital Projects	S,E,F	S(R),E(R), F(R)	-	-	-	-	E(R),F(R) /ENGR/
c. Non-Capital Projects	S,E,F	S(R),E(R), F(R)	S(R),E(R), F(R) 9/	E(R),F(R)/IT for participants/	-	S(R),E(R), F(R) 12/	S(R),E(R), F(R) /OPS, CLAB/
d. PL 480	S,E,F	S(R),E(R), F(R)	S(R),E(R), F(R) 9/	-	S(R),E(R), F(R)	-	-
4. Mission Management 6/	F	F	-	F(R) /MP/	-	-	-
5. Global program concerns 7/	- 8/	S,E,F	S,E,F	S,E,F 10/	S,E,F, 11/	S,E,F, 12/	S,E,F



1/ (a) Table covers evaluation of programs as they operate in the field: it does not indicate responsibility for programming or for participating in the program review and approval process: it excludes the direct evaluation of Washington performance and also excludes evaluation primarily concerned with compliance with U.S. law, Congressional intent, Agency directives, etc. These very important excluded evaluation activities must, of course, be considered in relation to the evaluation work covered by the table.

(b) Types of evaluative determinations included in the table, and the symbols used are:

S - significance, i.e., the importance of achieving activity goals in terms of larger purposes.

E - effectiveness, i.e., extent to which activity goals (planned or unplanned) have been or are being achieved: this has an important timeliness dimension.

F - efficiency, i.e., cost/return relationships.

Table includes each of these types of determinations only where they are usually a major concern of the evaluation activity, and only for organizational units that should do the particular type of evaluation extensively and regularly. (R) indicator after the type of evaluation indicator means that the organizational unit exercises primarily a review function and/or assistance function for the type of evaluation indicated rather than a direct responsibility for this evaluation. Guidance and help (people and techniques) to Missions for the latter's evaluation work should be a major portion of the program evaluation responsibilities of AID/W staff offices.

(c) Table does not identify the fourth dimension of evaluation, viz., purpose. The main purpose throughout is to stimulate better Agency performance in programming and implementation. Other important and overlapping purposes are to obtain information for some other uses (primarily to report on and justify programs within USG and externally); to assist in-service training of staff; to improve communications between the field and Washington; and to improve the public image of AID and its programs.


2/ Level at which responsibility for evaluation is assigned. Assumes chief executive at each level assigns specific evaluation responsibilities to staff offices, though not shown at Mission or Regional Bureau levels.

3/ Suitability of strategy and tactics, overall size, content and balance of components.

4/ Suitability of sector objectives in relation to country program strategy, and same questions about sector content in relation to sector objectives as indicated in 3/.

5/ To simplify table, some miscellaneous components are omitted, e.g., excess property and Vol. Ag. programs. Covers grant and loan financed components.

6/ Quality of management of resource inputs (direct hire personnel, consultants, contractors, commodities), and suitability of organization and procedures.



- 7/ Global aid policies and strategies and special program problem areas of multi-country concern, e.g., population, agro-business, Title IX, private investment, savings, concentration of AID activity by country, operating via multilateral institutions, general techniques for institution building or for exerting influence, general policies re capital assistance, etc. AID/W offices doing evaluation may be concerned with one or more such topics, and may do one or more of the three types of evaluation depending on the topic.
- 8/ To extent such topics are significant for this organizational unit, they are evaluated in the individual country program context.
- 9/ Spot checking rather than fuller review done at Regional Bureau level.
- 10/ IT is concerned with all three types of evaluation determinations for the worldwide participant program: MP with global practices in field management and procedures.
- 11/ For food and population related activities.
- 12/ For private enterprise development activities.

capabilities, which in turn have evolved over the years in response to the felt needs for administration of our programs.

The principal changes in structure proposed in this Report are:

- to systematize our programs evaluation work more, so as to provide more and better analysis and on a more timely basis, and so as to induce fuller use of available analyses;
- to establish a full-time program evaluation function at each of the three principal levels of command in AID (Mission, Regional Bureau, Administrator), so as to help meet the aforementioned need for a built-in motivating and coordinating force; i.e., to provide an explicit management structure to see to it that the SYSTEM is working as efficiently as possible. (The specific elements of this vital function are fully described in TAB C);
- to strengthen the linkages between program evaluation activities and activities concerned with programming, implementation, information management, research, training, compliance type evaluation, and personnel management, so as to provide greater mutual support among these activities (and similarly to strengthen the linkages with related evaluation activities of other U.S. and non-U.S. economic assistance and foreign affairs agencies and of the private intellectual community);
- to improve the quality of our program evaluation work by increasing efforts in the "how-to-do-it" area, by providing improved staff services to assist those doing the evaluation work, and by careful attention throughout the design of the SYSTEM to motivational factors.

An important feature of the proposed SYSTEM is that each organizational unit responsible for initiating program evaluation work would prepare and maintain annual evaluation plans, covering all proposed evaluation activities except those that are part of AID's standard operating procedures (such as the PER, when it is instituted). Each unit should have full freedom to tailor the plan to its needs as it sees them, subject to any guidance or directives that higher headquarters might provide. Normally, the bulk of the content should be determined by the evaluating office. Annual programming of the evaluation work to be undertaken is desirable to help assure that:

- an adequate work load is undertaken and completed;
- data and resources needed for evaluation are available when needed;

- evaluation results are available when they will do the most good;
- the overall use of the limited staff time available is allocated efficiently by the senior management according to well considered priorities;
- evaluation activities are properly coordinated with the performance of other functions.

The SYSTEM should embrace a wide variety of types of evaluations, in terms of what types of people do them, their scope, and how they are organized. Each evaluating office would choose from a wide variety of possibilities, in drawing up its evaluation program. To illustrate the range of possibilities, a few sample types are: regular, periodic evaluations of project progress by the responsible staffs (such as the proposed PER will provide, or by periodic operational review sessions by project or activity, or by various combinations of project scoring systems and progress reviews); quick special evaluations of on-going activities by Mission staff aided by one or more consultants; broader reviews of sector policy and progress by special inter-office Mission teams, aided by consultants from AID/W and other Missions and from outside AID; similar reviews of the effects of particular types of aid; reviews in depth of overall country program policy and progress by selected Mission program management staff in collaboration with outside consulting teams organized by AID/W.

The problem of balancing the perspective of "insiders" with that of suitably experienced outsiders should be met in a variety of ways, e.g., by involving in the evaluation some U.S. in-country staff who are not responsible for the activity undergoing scrutiny, but who can contribute substantially to the particular evaluation (this should include other professional disciplines, program officers, and the Director and Deputy Director, as appropriate), by using suitably experienced U.S. staff from outside the Mission, or by using private experts. The use of well-selected private experts has the added advantage of improving AID's communications with influential segments of the American community to which they belong. There is wide scope for the productive use of well qualified outsiders in sector evaluations, and this potential needs much more active development by AID. Another potential device that we should try in some selected cases is joint evaluation, probably at the sector level, with other assistance organizations that are working alongside AID. This might improve the evaluation, save manpower, and facilitate coordination.

To the fullest extent feasible, host country officials and experts should be involved in appropriate ways in program evaluations, both to gain their insights into the local problems and to assist in getting the conclusions applied.

Another type of evaluative activity is the "debriefing." AID does considerable debriefing--of its own personnel, contractors, participants and others. Some feel it does not do enough, and this seems correct in at least some cases. More importantly, what it does do is largely unused in its programming, implementation and informational work. AID needs to adjust its debriefing activities so as to solicit only the most useful types of evaluative materials, and then channel them so as to facilitate their fullest use where they can do the most good. In this connection, the experience of PA/TD in obtaining and using debriefing materials at the Asia Training Center in Hawaii should be examined for possible broader application.

Each Mission, and Washington offices doing original evaluations should continue to experiment with different types of evaluations and should select and tailor each evaluation activity to the specific needs and possibilities of the moment. Over time, the Agency's cumulative experience will offer an increasing range of possibilities on which to draw. The scattered experience of a number of Missions in recent years already offers a considerable range of possibilities. Particularly important and promising is the start that has been made on sector evaluation. One function of the SYSTEM should be to disseminate widely the available knowledge on "how to do it," and on the results of various evaluation efforts.

C. Building Effective Links Between Evaluation and Other AID Functions

Building effective linkages between AID's program evaluation work and other related functions, between the various sets of evaluation work done in different parts of AID, and between AID's evaluation work and that done outside AID should be a major target for SYSTEM improvement. This area of improvement offers quick gains at low cost. It means getting wider use of what is already being done. Conversely, the absence of adequate linkages tends to cripple the effectiveness of any AID evaluation system, much as the absence of effective linkages cripples the operations of any organism composed of interacting parts. At present, a large amount of evaluative time is spent by AID staffs, particularly at the technical level, that is mostly wasted because little of its results reach the country program policy level, much less other parts of AID. We must mine this pay dirt.

A brief indication of some of the key linkage needs follows. They are explained more fully in TAB B.

Programming

AID's programming work should:

- help to build the framework for evaluation, by identifying

- . the questions that should be addressed in the course of evaluation,
- . the variables to be changed,
- . the criteria to measure results;

- receive and apply the results of evaluation activities.

If both of these are done well, it will improve both programming and evaluation.

However, programming exercises ordinarily do not provide adequate time or the proper circumstances to do much evaluation work. If the latter were done well beforehand, AID would have more grist for its PPBS type efforts to assess the marginal costs and benefits of on-going activities.

The proper melding of program planning and review work with program evaluation planning and the use of evaluation results should be facilitated, substantially, by the efforts of several Regional Bureaus to increase the AID/W program review work done with Missions in the field.

One point deserves great stress. Our evaluation capabilities and the prospects for success of our activities both depend heavily on having a clear and realistic definition of activity goals from the start.

Implementation

Evaluation activities should provide guidance for two types of implementation decision making:

- short term operational decisions to avert and solve current problems,
- selection and adjustment of the operational design of activities.

Both program evaluation and the compliance or trouble scouting types of evaluation have a role to play here. Although their results and uses overlap some, the latter type of evaluation is mainly useful for short term operational management, whereas program evaluation, with its deeper analysis of activity effects, is needed to guide activity design.

AID's current drive to strengthen its program implementation, and especially to forestall compliance failures and other operational mistakes that are the main topic of outside criticism, has led to strong efforts to strengthen

our internal audit and trouble shooting machinery. This is the most suitable machinery for the indicated purpose. However, this type of machinery is not capable of making more than a quite limited contribution to evaluation of project and program effectiveness (by providing some partial data that should be weighed in the program evaluation activities), and its conclusions should not be looked to for this purpose. Conversely, the program evaluation activities should not be distorted by attempting to rely heavily on them for guidance in current trouble shooting. Their results should simply be used, where relevant and as available, in the operational reviews of what to do about current operating problems.

The senior management of Missions should assure coordination of program and compliance type evaluations by their personal participation in reviews of both. This is facilitated by a system of fairly frequent, operationally oriented reviews of the progress and status of individual projects.

Information Management

The program evaluation SYSTEM has two types of information collecting and transmittal needs:

- properly selected information is needed as raw material for evaluation work;
- the results of evaluation need to go to a wide variety of potential users.

While the meeting of these needs should be integrated appropriately into AID's overall information management system, an effective program evaluation SYSTEM must include a separately identified stream of informational materials of both types noted above.

There has been considerable progress in meeting the first need, and more is in prospect.

However, the second need has been badly neglected. This has strong stultifying effects on attempts to induce effective program evaluation. In this connection, AID needs a system for:

- reporting more important and less unimportant program evaluation materials,
- compiling necessary materials in the most useable and least cost fashion,
- getting these materials to the places where they are most likely to be used in time for them to be used.

AID/W needs these program evaluation materials for current use to help:

- transmit Agency experience to potential users in the field and Washington;
- enlighten its program reviews, policy making and formulation of directives;
- improve its staff training and orientation activities and other personnel functions;
- keep its management informed on progress and problems;
- improve its external reporting on program status and accomplishments.

In addition to providing for better current transmission of evaluation results, there is a crying need for development of a good program evaluation "memory"--a "bank" of significant program experience that can be drawn on easily by all those who are facing programming and implementation problems on which the Agency has accumulated relevant experience. Preliminary efforts towards the establishment of such a "memory bank" of significant program evaluation materials are already underway.

Improved storage and recall capabilities for program evaluation materials and for the basic sequence of program documents for each activity will also reduce present tendencies to lose sight of the purposes and criteria that motivated program decisions in prior years. This should be very helpful in guiding current evaluation work and in providing greater stability and continuity to AID's program efforts.

It should be stressed that the suggested improvements in recording, transmitting and storing significant program evaluation materials cannot be achieved without successful prosecution of current Agency efforts to cut down very substantially on the reporting of less essential information and on duplication of reporting (as well as the cutting down of other work throughout AID that is caused by duplication of responsibilities, excessive clearances, and so forth). Senior management will need to take a hand in this effort, if it is to be successful.

Research

There are four important types of interaction and mutual support that should occur, as a regular matter, between research and evaluation activities.

Evaluation work should help to identify the most important topics needing research.

There should be a three-way relationship between programming, research and evaluation in the PPBS process. The systematic analyses of new and old program alternatives, resulting respectively from research and evaluation activities, should be fed into the PPBS cycle at appropriate points to be used together to provide improved bases for the selection and designing of program alternatives most likely to produce the best results at the least cost.

If AID had an effective storage and recall capability for its program evaluation reports, this same experience "bank" could also handle research reports. The combined facility would be more efficient and would provide the richest available mix of materials for those seeking guidance.

Research is badly needed to help AID to develop suitable evaluation techniques, criteria for measuring results, and indicators to help identify progress as it is occurring.

Training

There should be three relationships of mutual support between AID's program evaluation and its training activities.

To develop good staff capabilities for doing both program development and execution work and program evaluation work, and for interrelating these properly, we need improved in-service training in these functions.

Our in-service training programs, generally, should be used as one important channel for transmitting to Agency staffs the lessons that have been learned through program evaluation activities.

Participation in evaluation activities is a particularly effective training device for AID personnel. This is one very good reason for requiring regular evaluation work throughout the Agency. OES assignments are a special case. They should be scheduled with the recognition that they should provide one of the best available training experiences for the handling of senior program management responsibilities--especially for Mission Director assignments.

Compliance Type Evaluation

This refers to the work of AID's auditors, GAO auditors, the Foreign Service Inspection Corps, the Office of the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance, IIS, and the inspection activities of various Congressional committees.

Despite some overlap of subject matter, program evaluation responsibilities should continue to be handled largely separately from compliance type evaluations, even when both are internal AID activities. This is because:

- the subject matter is for the most part different, with comprehensive scope in both cases;
- different types of training and experience are needed to do each type of evaluation well;
- there are important differences in purpose;
- there are and should be critical differences in the psychological overtones accompanying the two types of activities, which in turn require different organization and procedures. Effective program evaluation depends on the establishment of positive motivations among the AID officers responsible for program components to look critically and frankly at what they are doing without fear of damaging themselves or others. To do this, program evaluation must be as devoid as possible of the aura of an inspection or policing operation.

Coordination (including scheduling) and mutual support between these two types of evaluative activities should be provided primarily by continuing to have AID's senior program managers participate in the discussions involved in both and make use of the results of both, as fully as possible.

Personnel Management

The selection and assignment of program management personnel should consider their evaluating capabilities.

The personnel management system can foster good program evaluation work, more specifically, by:

- providing the proper linkages between evaluation and personnel training, as already suggested;
- amending the Performance Evaluation Reports to provide specific recognition to ability and performance in program evaluation work as a significant factor in the ratings and in career potential. The rater should be asked to cross check with the pertinent project or other evaluation reports.

Linkages between Evaluation in Different AID Units

This very important set of linkages should be provided by:

- the measures proposed under "Information Management";

- the staff officers who would be responsible for the evaluation work of the various organizational units, as recommended above.

To facilitate this coordination, AID/W should establish a standing committee of 9 or 10 staff officers representing the key units in the program evaluation SYSTEM.

Taken together, the foregoing components are the "brain and nervous system" of the program evaluation structure referred to at the start of this Section of the Report.

Linkages with Evaluation Work Outside State/AID

Some very important potentials are opening up for the use by AID of program evaluation work done by organizations outside the USG, or of techniques developed by them. The proposed structure of AID staff offices responsible for program evaluation should provide the means of realizing as much of this potential as possible, viz., from the work of:

- United Nations organizations,
- foundations,
- non-American financial and technical assistance agencies,
- other USG Agencies,
- American universities and individual scholars.

The will to cooperate is quite strong. The latter group, in particular, has an excitingly large and varied potential--virtually untapped--for doing work that AID could use. The interest in doing such work is widespread and growing. Much might be available free, or at very low cost, if we worked hard at developing suitable connections.

D. The Distribution of Specific Program Evaluation Functions Among AID's Organizational Units

TAB C fills out the general outlines of the program evaluation SYSTEM recommended in this Section of the Report by describing and explaining the specific program evaluation functions that are proposed for each AID organizational unit involved in the SYSTEM. This operational description of specific duties, and of the rationale of their placement in the organization, provides a much fuller understanding of the intent and effect of the more general prescriptions in the body of this Report. To pass judgement on the desirability of the proposed SYSTEM and its parts, it is important to study the material in TAB C on who would be doing what specific duties, and why. The reader who wishes to study the SYSTEM and its workings is urged to do so.

VI. WHAT ACTION IS NEEDED TO MOVE FROM WHERE A.I.D.
IS INTO THE PROPOSED PROGRAM EVALUATION SYSTEM?

Not so much -- in order to make a strong start. This Report has noted that:

- considerable staff time is devoted already, one way or another, to program evaluation efforts;
- most of the elements of the recommended program evaluation SYSTEM already exist somewhere in AID, at least in embryo form;
- AID has accumulated considerable experience with a rather wide variety of program evaluation techniques;
- but the failure to provide an explicit program evaluation management structure and some key linkages with other functions has vitiated much of the potential benefits from the foregoing efforts.

As the result of these past developments and of pressures for better program evaluation work, the time has now come for a determined effort at a limited re-ordering of what we are now doing--operating within existing staffing and expenditure capabilities--which should establish, at least on a skeletal basis, the full framework of a suitable program evaluation SYSTEM. This initial effort can then be followed by a progressive development of the SYSTEM in the light of AID's cumulative experience with needs and results. The efforts needed to launch a proper SYSTEM are more qualitative than quantitative in their effects on the uses made of AID staff time and other management resources.

Specifically, Sections IV and V have discussed AID's need to improve:

- the motivations for program evaluation work;
- its organization, procedures, and techniques;
- its linkages with other AID functions and the complementary developments needed in these other functions to strengthen the performance and use of program evaluation work.

An action program to these ends should be designed with a strict eye to cost/benefit factors. Stress should be placed on some relatively quick

pay-off efforts, but we also need sufficiently balanced development of an overall SYSTEM so that AID is not caught in the position of being unable to reap the successful harvest of the program evaluation efforts that it is making because of the lack of development of some important links in the SYSTEM (as has already been happening).

It is not anticipated that a full blown SYSTEM will suddenly be fabricated and spring into massive action. What is contemplated is an evolutionary concept. But AID has now reached the stage, in the evolution of its program evaluation work, at which it is feasible and desirable to:

- put an explicit management and service structure for program evaluation into place, in order to weld existing components into an effective organic structure;
- make a series of parallel advances in the various components of the SYSTEM;
- provide more intensive staff support from AID/W for a few selected Missions that we expect to lead the evolution into better program evaluation work.

The stress is on encouraging Missions to strengthen their program evaluation work and on making it possible for them to do so. Clearly, doing the first without the second will do little good and may even have a net negative effect. If we do not take these steps, it is likely not only that past progress in this field will not continue, but that the implied lack of top management attention to and interest in program evaluation will cause the performance of this function to regress.

Attention has been paid to avoiding an unduly burdensome combination of responsibilities for any individual organizational unit.

A. Proposed Actions

1.) The first need is to discuss the proposed program evaluation SYSTEM and the recommended implementation measures thoroughly with the Regional Assistant Administrators, the Assistant Administrators for Program and Policy Coordination and for Administration, and others, to be sure that the principal officers responsible agree as fully as possible with whatever is to be done, and that they understand and accept fully their responsibilities for making the SYSTEM work effectively. To assure this, the proposals should be changed in whatever ways these discussions indicate is desirable. The current provisional

proposals do reflect extensive discussions with officers from all of the Regions who have had experience with program evaluation work, and with the principal central staff officers who carry responsibilities for program evaluation or related functions, and also some brief discussion with most of the senior administrators. They also reflect the recorded consensus of the extensive senior AID/W staff discussions of this subject in 1965. The proposals seem to the drafter to be consistent with most of the views expressed and, in fact, to reflect a rather solid consensus on the major principles underlying the organizational proposals.

2. Throughout the development of the SYSTEM, there will be a parallel need for engaging similarly the minds of the responsible field administrators. However, it should be possible to proceed with the initial steps recommended below without an intervening set of general discussions about the SYSTEM with the field missions since:

- such exchanges did occur throughout 1965;
- the proposals do reflect many opinions and suggestions already received from the field prior to and since 1965, and a sampling of the considerable experience already gained in the field in trying out a variety of program evaluation activities;
- the proposed SYSTEM is very permissive regarding how program evaluation work is done and its composition so long as an effective evaluation program is carried out;
- many of the actions recommended for current approval concern AID/W activities.

Judgements can be made on the desirable extent and form of consultations on specific measures as these are formulated. But, we should take the series of actions recommended below now, in order to encourage and facilitate progress by all Missions in their program evaluation work. Each should then move ahead as best it can within its existing capabilities. Meanwhile, some selected AID/W staff should work as consultants with a few Missions selected by the Regional Bureaus, in order to explore further what can be done, test ideas, assist in planning evaluation work, and so forth. The Office of the Special Assistant should be available to participate in this consulting work and to help plan the similar use of other AID/W resources. I would stress again that this type of effort with individual Missions is unlikely to produce substantial or lasting effects unless it is accompanied by the type of

overall program recommended below, which will provide the necessary framework of a SYSTEM to encourage and support individual efforts by evaluating offices.

3. It is recommended that the Administrator approve the following action program, subject to any adjustments that may be called for by the consultations proposed in paragraph 1 above and to normal clearance of specific action requests on each item. The office symbols in brackets after each action indicate the suggested action offices. The action list would implement the organizational and procedural proposals in Section V, including the establishment in the Missions, Regional Bureaus, and staff offices of the Administrator of the lists of functions described in TAB C. A number of the items listed merely indicate the direction in which effort should proceed: action would occur over a considerable period of time, at whatever pace is feasible.

(1) Prepare circular message on program evaluation from Administrator to Missions /SA, with Regions and PPC: Regional follow-up responsibility, monitored by SA/. The Missions need to know that their efforts since 1965 to improve program evaluation have not been ignored or forgotten by AID/W, what progress other Missions have made in this sphere, the nature of current AID/W interests and action, and how AID/W is prepared to help them to make better progress. This circular would:

- pick up strands from 1965 circulars, noting work and progress made since then;
- set forth rationale of proposed new efforts in light of experience with evaluation needs and results, relating the approach taken to other actions to reduce staff and programs and increase efficiency of program management;
- set forth a series of specific proposals and suggestions, e.g.,
 - . annual evaluation plans,
 - . establishment of Evaluation Officer as staff position and proposed functions (with explanation of parallel AID/W measures),
 - . suggested types of evaluations for inclusion in Mission programs, with accompanying guidance,
 - . offers of assistance (this should be stressed),

. indication of AID/W efforts to reduce less essential workload;

- explain anticipated gains from improved program evaluation SYSTEM (with an eye to the key motivational factors);
- call for progress reports.

(2) Establish Evaluation Officers and work plans in Regional Bureaus, stressing functions of surveillance of and assistance to Mission's evaluation work [Regional Bureaus: SA and PPC available for consultations with Regional Bureaus and Missions]. Regions would decide on selectivity of emphasis given to program evaluation among Missions, whether wish further pilot efforts, etc.

(3) (a) Set up standing AID/W working committee of officers responsible for evaluation work of offices having major role in SYSTEM, under chairmanship of SA [SA]. Committee would review whole set of Agency action plans and decide how it could be most useful; examine coordination problems and needs; mutual assistance; information exchanges; how to upgrade Mission work by educational, training and service efforts; etc.

(b) Set up sub-committee to plan fuller use of AID's technical staff resources in program evaluation work [SA].

(4) Develop Historical and Technical Reference Branch of AS into an effective program evaluation "memory bank" as rapidly as possible: develop specific work plan [PPC, with SA and AS. This is already underway]. Initial efforts should concentrate on what can be done relatively quickly and cheaply to make available and expand the use of evaluation materials that AID already has, as well as launching more systematic handling of future materials.

(5) Establish at the "memory bank" a central Agency file and Regional sub-files of all AID evaluation projects completed, underway and planned [PPC, with Regions and AS].

(6) Push ahead as rapidly as possible with work on evaluation techniques and procedures [PPC, in consultation with Regions, MP and SA: also with WOH/RIG on research aspects]. Work includes:

- completing design of PER and launching (scheduled for 7/1/68);

- development of sector evaluation techniques and models;
- similar work for capital projects and other program segments;
- developing plans for in-house and contract R&D work on criteria, standards, indicators of progress, etc., that are suitable for evaluation of various program elements; also development of "how to proceed" guidance materials, with efforts at simplification to fit limited time and technical capabilities available in Missions;
- developing contacts with university and other researchers to seek assistance and cooperation in foregoing types of efforts;
- completing work on Evaluation Handbook and updating or issuing supplements periodically as the results of "how to do it" analyses accumulate.

(7) (a) Review and improve distribution plans for program evaluation material: /AS, in consultation with Regions, PPC and SA.

(b) Review and make suitable recommendations to Administrator regarding AID tie-ins to State's computerized information management system, with particular attention to potential uses for storage, recall and distribution of important program evaluation materials. Also plan useful tie-ins to present computer efforts of AID to provide information needed for program evaluation. (However, AID's current computer efforts are, and probably should continue to be oriented largely to produce data for fiscal management and for operational reporting and a variety of short term operational control needs.) /MP, in consultation with Regions, PPC and SA.

(8) Plan and execute evaluations of selected aid techniques and strategies, and of overall effectiveness of AID programs in reaching broad goals of Agency /PPC with Regions. (See comparable item in PPC functional list proposed in TAB C. PPC is presently planning such a study of the Program Loan technique and its use in country aid strategies: others are needed.)

(9) Review and institute suitable action on work cutting possibilities to free time for program evaluation: initial stress on cutting reports: also clearances /AA/A with Regions and PPC.

(10) Review Agency debriefing systems and make changes to provide:

(a) most efficient methods of capturing useful experience and evaluative components and making these available where they would do the most good /AA/A with Regions and A/PA/;

(b) elimination of debriefing procedures and workload that have not proven very useful /AA/A with Regions, and A/PA/.

(11) Review programming guidelines, M.O.'s, and other "how to do it" programming guidance, and also programming procedures, in order to strengthen the guidance and instructions given on building evaluation planning into program planning (including implementation planning), and to increase the use of evaluation results in program reviews at appropriate stages of program processing (including operational stages) /PPC with Regions, SA and MP/. This envisages a translation into action form of the broad proposals set forth in the Report's discussion of the relations between Program Evaluation and the Programming and Implementation functions (TAB B).

(12) Revise the Performance Evaluation Report forms and instructions to include effectiveness in doing program evaluation work as a specific factor to be rated /PA/.

(13) Develop plans for fuller coverage in in-service training of program evaluation work, and for drawing training and orientation materials from PPC guidance materials and completed program evaluations /PA, in consultation with PPC and SA/.

(14) Plan procedures to bring improved mutual support between the program evaluation and the research functions of AID, as recommended in the Report, and recommend necessary action. /WOH/ RIG and PPC/.

(15) Review the effectiveness and use made of various types of evaluation techniques in evaluating participant training, and the possible implications for evaluations of other program components; prepare recommendations on improvements needed in evaluation of participant training activities and on suggested applications of experience there to evaluative needs elsewhere /PPC, with IT and SA/.

(16) Explore further the experience of UN agencies, foundations, and other organizations with program evaluation, and arrange useful exchanges of experience /SA and PPC, with Regions and other evaluating offices/.

B. Costs and Returns

Section V indicated, in general terms, a wide range of benefits that could result from improved program evaluation work. There is no adequate basis available for quantifying these. The sense of this Report is that the potential benefits in improved AID performance are very substantial and would accrue to most of our activities. Moreover, there is an evident need to demonstrate that we are doing our best to evaluate intelligently the results of what we are doing.

A practical approach to obtaining the most favorable cost/benefit ratio from our program evaluation activities is to seek methods of carrying out the desired evaluation activities that tend to minimize costs. This is what the proposals in this Report attempt to do, by stressing the following specific cost reducing features:

- heavy reliance on operational units for evaluation of programs in their areas of action responsibility, so that relatively little investment is required to provide evaluators with the knowledge that they need; this also reduces the cost of communicating evaluation results to those who can apply them in programming and implementation activities;
- assigning outside evaluators to work closely with the responsible operating personnel, thereby having similar effects in reducing the costs of informing the evaluators and in communicating their results to the most important potential users;
- putting strong relative emphasis, within the proposed program, on the development of more effective means to distribute, store and recall the evaluative information that is already available to AID, thereby saving the costs of duplication of evaluation efforts and of wrong or unnecessary program efforts that would be avoided if the decision makers knew what others had already found out;
- strengthening coordination machinery, so as to increase the efficiency of program evaluation efforts by providing greater mutual support between these efforts, forestalling duplication, and maximizing the uses made of the results;
- putting further stress on getting better evaluation work done with the same expenditure of staff and funds by--
 - . increased efforts to learn "how to do it" better,

- . greater attention to the provision of positive motivations for doing good evaluation work,
 - . providing a full-time management structure for the program evaluation SYSTEM;
- milking the contributions that can be made to better program evaluation through qualitative improvements all along the line in various related Agency functions;
 - reducing wasteful "make-work" (compiling information for information's sake or simply because it is in standard reporting requirements) and facilitating concentration on the specific evaluation efforts with the highest real "pay-offs," by maintaining a highly permissive and flexible system for deciding the specifics of evaluation programs which leaves these judgments largely to the principal doers and users of the work;
 - increasing the effective use of existing Agency technical staff resources, much of which are now under used and misused, partly because of the scarcity of good vehicles for their use outside of the program evaluation SYSTEM;
 - accelerating Agency efforts at systematic identification of its activities with the lowest "pay-off," so that the work displacement effects of efforts to make room in crowded schedules for somewhat more program evaluation work will not be determined by the happenstance of the moment or skewed by the persistent claims of low priority standard reporting requirements or other low priority work requirements.

From past experience, we know that the last effort listed may be the hardest in which to succeed. It will take determined, direct participation by some top management personnel to get very far. Although the subject matter is grubby, this kind of top management effort could bring a major boost to overall Agency efficiency.

For the most part, the foregoing features of the proposed program to improve AID's program evaluation SYSTEM merely re-order the use of existing AID resources and, in so doing, bring very substantial benefits without any net increase in the Agency's expenditure of time or money. To the extent that this re-ordering of activities involves a cost, it is the value of activities that may be dropped in the process. This cost should be small. However, there is some need for additional expenditures to meet the small additional staffing requirements for a few high priority management and service components of the program evaluation SYSTEM. AID can, as it chooses, offset these costs by reductions in less essential staffing.

It may be tempting to try to implement all of the recommendations involving no additional expenditure or staffing for program evaluation functions, and to drop or defer the others. Unfortunately, the proposed SYSTEM is an organic structure, and the added positions have to do primarily with provision of the directing, coordinating and servicing functions that make the whole structure effective. Consequently, it would be very wasteful to omit these components.

The new positions needed (whose functions are described in TAB C) are, in AID/W:

- 5 staff specialists to provide a Program Evaluation Officer for each of the 5 Regional Bureaus;
- 1 additional senior officer in the Special Assistant's Office, as Associate SA (provisionally approved);
- perhaps 1 or 2 additional staff for the "memory bank" (assuming that the professional staff of 3 now in the Historical and Technical Reference Branch of AS can be used full time, or almost so, for this function);
- 1 or 2 additional man years of PPC staff time (beyond the 2 or 3 man years that I gather is presently intended): it is essential to assign at least 1 or 2 officers full time to PPC's program evaluation functions, in a separate section, or not much is likely to be done to discharge this important set of functions.

For our Missions, 14 to 21 Program Evaluation Officers are needed to provide one full-time staff officer to manage this function in each sizeable Mission. As of November 1967, 14 Missions had over 75 Direct Hire plus PASA personnel, while 21 had over 50 such personnel: if the standard for "sizeable" is raised to 100 DH plus PASA personnel, the number of Missions and of evaluation staff officers is cut to 9. The number of new positions needed may be less than indicated anyway, because some Missions already have an officer assigned full-time or part-time to program evaluation or closely related functions. It is assumed that, given the current need to reduce overall the personnel in the field, Missions would have to be instructed to establish one full-time staff position for program evaluation within their established ceilings.

In sum, these AID/W and Mission staffing requirements are modest, in the context of our overall program and management expenditures, compared to the

large and pervasive improvements in program quality that it seems feasible to attain if a well structured and managed program evaluation SYSTEM is established. It could be argued that the substantial overall staff cuts now required of AID should preclude assignment of additional staff time for any particular functions. In opposition to this, it can be argued that AID's need to perform with fewer people is all the more reason to allocate some additional staff time (within the reduced total available) for the recommended explicit program evaluation responsibilities, in order to increase the efficiency or impact on our goals of the reduced staff time and program funds available to us. The full set of staffing recommendations above would cost about 3% of the estimated \$25 million of staff time now going into evaluation work. It should make that work much more effective than it now is, and have a wide multiplier effect in increasing the impact of USG, other donors and LDC resources devoted to the development of the LDC's.

In closing, it should be noted that, over the years, AID has spent considerable time and money on efforts to decide what to do about program evaluation and in mounting efforts to establish a suitable SYSTEM. But this expenditure has had very little program impact because of failure to set a firm course and follow through. We can recoup some of this loss now, if we take advantage of what was learned in these past efforts by taking firm decisions to proceed with a modest but comprehensive program along the lines recommended in this Report:


THE NATURE OF A.I.D.'s ASSIGNMENT *

The nature of AID's assignment, and of the overseas environment in which it must work, makes its management problems extraordinarily difficult.

We are responsible for an extremely wide spectrum of activities, involving almost all of the major professional, technical, administrative and managerial skills. Almost every type of specialist and experience is needed by AID somewhere. Our personnel must grasp not only economic and technical development matters, but also have the ability to understand country situations in overall foreign policy terms and to see clearly where AID goals and action should fit in.

The range of country situations also is tremendously diverse. A favorite cliché of programmers is "Our country situation is unique". This is true.

Moreover, the country situations in which AID operates are highly changeable, with few if any exceptions. The rate of change tends to be very fast, and the nature of change is frequently unpredictable. We can expect this to be more so in the future. And there are an almost infinite number of variables whose changes can affect significantly the outcome of our efforts. The content and tactics of AID programs needs to keep up with the changing country scenes, if we are to be effective. This puts a premium on our capabilities for quick adjustment and fine tuning to the local frequencies.

The wide range of country situations and their continuous change limits rather severely AID's ability to make effective use of standardization and SOP (although we keep trying), which are the ordinary management devices for coping with large scale and far flung activities. Nor can we simply adopt the management methods of other U.S. Agencies, since none of them face a comparable job requirement.

Another facet of AID's responsibilities is the administration of large amounts of money, material and personnel which must be deployed promptly to thousands of locations all over the globe and used effectively for a wide variety of purposes. Many of these locations are difficult to reach or to operate in. Most of our American staffs are not continuing AID employees, and a large part work for other organizations, so that the potentials of career training and of organizational discipline, as management tools, are limited. Thus, the deployment of our Agency's resources adds a further range of severe management difficulties.

Our task is further complicated by the inherent complexity of our purposes. These go beyond merely administering a flow of physical and financial resources and extend to the much more intricate task of inducing and assisting

* Excerpted from 10/6/67 Memorandum for the Administrator, "Reflections on A.I.D. Management Problems"



basic institutional change. That is the purpose of technical assistance, and is also what is inevitably involved in bringing about adequate self-help. The complexity of this "institution-building" task is increased by the difficulties of communicating effectively across cultural lines, both between Americans and foreigners and among various groups within the countries where we work.

Finally, our management difficulties are greatly compounded by the need to satisfy a Congress and legislation that reflect many, disparate and sometimes inconsistent points of view, and by the need to coordinate our activities with a wide range of non-USG bilateral and multilateral technical and financial assistance activities, from public and private sources.

It is no wonder that AID and its predecessors have always had serious management problems. These are inherently formidable, and may never be susceptible to easy or fully effective solution. Yet the job must be done as well as possible. Certainly, there are better and worse ways to select and organize staff and to operate so as to cope as well as possible with the foregoing difficulties in our assignment. The following papers consider some of the management implications of the nature of our assignment.

LINKING PROGRAM EVALUATION AND OTHER A.I.D. FUNCTIONS

Section V-C. stressed that "Building effective linkages between AID's program evaluation work and other related functions, between the various sets of evaluation done in different parts of AID, and between AID's evaluation work and that done outside AID should be a major target for SYSTEM improvement." Strengthening these linkages promises large dividends in increased effective use of the work done in each of the separate entities.

This annex explains more fully the individual linkage needs with AID's program evaluation work, that were described briefly in Section V.C.

Programming

Our evaluation capabilities and the prospects for success of our activities both depend heavily on having a clear and realistic definition of activity goals from the outset. These will provide criteria to guide action and also to evaluate results. Thus evaluation planning should be linked to activity planning (or programming) from the start, with evaluative type questions being posed along with programming type questions. AID's programming and evaluation work will both be strengthened by this linkage, in which we ask ourselves not only what and how much should we do, but also how will we determine or evaluate, as we go along, the extent of our accomplishment. Attempting to define the bases for subsequent evaluation of a new activity is generally very helpful in sharpening the programmer's vision of his purposes and activity targets. It should help to reduce the prevalent tendency to overoptimistic estimates of results in the programming stage, with the inevitable aftermath of disappointment and of criticism for bad planning and failure to produce anticipated results. Identifying the right questions to be answered for both programming and evaluation purposes is of course the key to getting the right answers. This includes the need to identify questions for deeper or longer term study -- of either an evaluation or research type.

A major motivation for doing good program evaluation work is the expectation that the results will be used in important ways, particularly in making programming decisions. This includes not only use in shaping activities, but also in deciding on the allocation of available funds. The latter linkage has an especially strong motivational effect on the officers responsible for the various activities, who should also bear the principal evaluation responsibility. Thus, by building this usage linkage between programming and evaluation, we build a mutually reinforcing cycle; evaluation results are used in programming, this improves programming and also improves evaluation, which further improves programming on the next round, and so on around and around.

The need to do program evaluation planning and review work in tandem with program planning and review work tends both to frustrate and be frustrated by the lack of adequate evaluation work in between program reviews. But, as Col. Lincoln has stressed, it is also frustrated by the lack of time and the atmosphere of the usual country program review sessions in AID/W. The plans of the NESAs and LA Bureaus to conduct more of their program review work at their Missions (The Vietnam Bureau has also done this, but the circumstances are special.) should be very helpful in alleviating this problem. This should provide:

- more time to examine evaluation plans and results in the course of program reviews, and thus better evaluation work and fuller use of the results;
- a better atmosphere for real discussion and joint working out of ideas regarding problems and solutions;
- better mutual communication and understanding between Missions and AID/W, and more realism on both sides.

This assumes, however, that adequate evaluation work has been accomplished between these program review sessions because such sessions, whether held in the field or in Washington, do not provide the opportunity. Holding more program review sessions in the field would not eliminate or even appreciably reduce the need for something like the present review program in AID/W. But it would be very helpful in filling an existing gap in effective communication between field and Washington elements, and would also make the AID/W reviews more useful.

In sum, AID's programming work should help to build the framework for evaluation by identifying questions to be addressed, variables to be changed and criteria to measure results, and it should receive and apply the results of evaluation activities, but programming exercises ordinarily do not provide adequate time or the proper circumstances to do much evaluation work. If the latter were done well beforehand, AID would have more grist for its PPBS type efforts to assess the marginal costs and benefits of on-going activities.

Implementation

As suggested earlier, evaluation reporting should be designed to sort out problem reporting, of the type needed primarily for short term operational management, from analyses of effectiveness that are needed primarily for programming purposes including implementation planning, i.e., analyses of activity effects and their causes, and of the implications for selection

of the types of activity to be undertaken and their operational design. Evaluation activity should provide guidance for both of these types of implementation decision making. Both program evaluation and compliance oriented evaluation have a role to play here. Although their results and uses overlap some, the latter type of evaluation is mainly useful for short-term operational management, whereas program evaluation is needed to guide activity design.

Why is this?

Compliance type evaluations (audits, inspections and the like) and the associated reporting and operational review structures, tend to produce a considerable volume of data and some analysis on current operational problems, as well as some scattered information on the effectiveness and efficiency of activities in reaching their goals. Given the nature of these evaluations and the background and responsibility of the evaluators, they tend to dwell heavily on statistics, current operating problems and the suitability and effective carrying out of procedures. To the extent that they do deal with effectiveness and efficiency in achieving program results, compliance type evaluations tend to overlap some with program evaluations. The latter should, however, have greater analytical (as distinguished from statistical) content. They should deal more systematically, in the context of program purposes and environmental conditions, with structural defects in the implementation design of projects and their influence on project effectiveness, i.e., the stress is more on results as these are related to implementation planning than on problems for current operational action. The latter may have little or no implications for implementation design or other aspects of programming but merely call for correction of errors, inaction or malfeasance.

Typically, the compliance and operational problem oriented type of evaluation should have a very fast -- virtually immediate -- feed back into AID's operational management activities. Program evaluation type activities, particularly at the project level, should have both a short term feedback through quick adjustments in implementation plans where these are needed, and a slightly longer term effect on implementation through the more formal, periodic revision and review of implementation plans during the course of the annual PPBS cycle. They should also have considerably longer term uses as raw material for systematic analyses of the Agency's past operational experience, to be used in making implementation plans for new activities. Extensive development of the latter type of use requires further progress in AID's storage and recall capabilities for significant evaluative materials.

AID's current drive to strengthen its program implementation, and especially to forestall compliance failures and other operational mistakes that are the main topic of outside criticisms, has led to strong efforts to strengthen our internal audit and trouble shooting machinery. This is

the most suitable machinery for the indicated purpose. However, this type of machinery is not capable of making more than a quite limited contribution to evaluation of project and program effectiveness (by providing some partial data that should be weighed in the program evaluation activities), and its conclusions should not be looked to for this purpose. Conversely, the program evaluation activities should not be distorted by attempting to rely heavily on them for guidance in current trouble shooting. Their results should simply be used, where relevant and as available, in the operational reviews of what to do about current operating problems.

Information Management

There is a strong interdependence between improved program evaluation and improved information management.

AID has major needs and problems in the information management field, and a variety of improvement efforts are underway. Since the management of information connected with program evaluation work is but one part of an overall problem, it needs to be integrated efficiently with procedures developed for information management generally. Nevertheless, this part of the information stream is a particularly critical one, and it can and should be given some separate identification and handling in order to provide an adequate informational component in the program evaluation SYSTEM. Our experience makes it clear that it is not feasible to rely on the general informational stream, or that part oriented to the needs of current operational management, for this purpose.

The program evaluation SYSTEM has two types of information collecting and transmittal needs. We need to generate adequate information on what is actually happening in and around our program operations, as raw material for evaluation. We also need to transmit the evaluation results to a wide variety of potential users.

Considerable attention has already been paid to the first need, as a part of broader efforts to obtain systematic reporting of program operations, country situations and so forth, and also through the planning of procedures to produce information specifically for evaluation purposes (the major example being the work to plan and put into use the Project Evaluation Report or PER).

However, the second need has been largely neglected. AID needs badly better systems and techniques for transmitting program evaluation results to potential users. We have had prodigal waste of the available evaluative work. This, in turn, discourages our staffs from doing evaluation. To reduce this waste, AID needs a system for reporting more important and less unimportant evaluation materials, for compiling necessary materials in the most usable and least cost fashion, and for getting them to the places where they are most likely to be used in time for them to be used.

Washington needs this material for current use to help:

- transmit Agency experience to potential users in the field and Washington;
- enlighten its program reviews, policy making and formulation of directives;
- improve its staff training and orientation activities and other personnel functions;
- keep its management informed on progress and problems;
- improve its external reporting on program status and accomplishments.

Fuller AID/W use of evaluative materials for these purposes will, in turn, help motivate better evaluation work and reporting in Missions and Washington staff units by demonstrating AID/W's interest in and reliance on good evaluation materials.

In addition to providing for better current transmission of evaluation results, there is a crying need for development of a good program evaluation "memory" -- a "bank" of significant program experience that can be drawn on easily by all those who are facing programming and implementation problems on which the Agency has accumulated relevant experience. It has been said innumerable times, by observers inside and outside this Agency, that our programs could profit greatly if we would only stop "rediscovering America" again and again. If we had a good evaluation "bank" -- containing only information that was likely to be of substantial continuing use and on a basis facilitating widespread use -- the information there could be used repeatedly over time for the same purposes as are noted above. Moreover, the accumulation of results could be much more potent, for some purposes, than a mere flow of current evaluative materials, and would also facilitate longer term and more comprehensive types of program evaluations. The latter, in turn, would enrich the "bank."

Some limited and sporadic efforts to build experience "banks" have been made in AID/W and in most Missions. We need badly a much more systematic and efficient effort. Such an effort will take quite a bit of work, but should be quite feasible. It should be a prime action target in developing an improved program evaluation SYSTEM. A modest nucleus for this effort exists in the AID/W reference library begun in the Historical and Technical Reference Branch of the Communications and Records Management Division (A/AS), and in the related planning work of the Program and Technical Information Staff of AA/PPC. The Reference Branch library now includes the materials collected in 1959-62 by the Technical Assistance Study Group, a rich resource that has scarcely been exploited by the Agency.

From a somewhat longer-term point of view, there seems to be opening up a wide range of useful possibilities for achieving substantial improvements in AID's storage, recall and distribution of program evaluation materials (as a by-product of the handling of all written materials) by tying-in to the computerized systems of information handling that are being developed by State. This possibility should be explored actively, as MP is now doing. Early efforts are desirable in order to have maximum impact on the adjusting of the State systems to serve better particular AED needs.

Another place to look for new techniques and experience in providing information to follow and evaluate programs, and in using this information, is in OEO and other components of the Poverty Program. The Peace Corps is another source. PPC may be able to generate a useful interchange of experience.

Improved storage and recall capabilities for both program evaluation materials and the basic sequence of program documents for each activity will reduce present tendencies to lose sight of the purposes and criteria that motivated program decisions in prior years. This should be very helpful in guiding current evaluation work and in providing greater stability and continuity of AID's program efforts. It would reduce some of the serious problems caused by frequent changes of personnel, plus lack of proper documentation of project rationale and intended evaluation criteria, plus lack of storage and recall capability for significant project and activity documents. AID cannot do much about the first factor. But it can alleviate some of its bad effects by reducing deficiencies in the other two.

It should be stressed that the suggested improvements in recording, transmitting and storing significant program evaluation materials cannot be achieved without successful prosecution of current Agency efforts to cut down very substantially on the reporting of less essential information and on duplication of reporting (as well as the cutting down of other work throughout AID that is caused by duplication of responsibilities, excessive clearances, and so forth). The current need to reduce AID staffing puts a premium on this type of management effort, in any case. Missions are now heavily burdened with unproductive reporting and clearance procedures, and these in turn create large and unnecessary requirements for AID/W staff. If this situation is to be corrected, senior management personnel will need to take a direct hand in the effort.

Research

Experience has suggested the desirability of somewhat different emphasis for AID's research activities than for its program evaluation activities, but there should be important points of overlap and of interaction between the two functions.

Evaluation examines what has been done, primarily to determine how well things worked out so as to apply the conclusions to doing it better next time.

Our limited research funds should be concentrated primarily in developing new knowledge that can be applied, along with program evaluation results, in AID's programming and implementation decision making. Although AID commissioned research should bear directly on our current problems (i.e., it should not be "basic" research), it may concern itself with what has not been done--with new departures--rather than with what has been done. It generally attempts to establish cause and effect relationships more rigorously by the use of scientific method, whereas evaluation work leans more heavily on the application of judgement to experience. Research tends to use a different and more sophisticated methodology, and to deal with different (and generally more measurable) types of raw material.

Nevertheless, there have been and should be some exceptions to this differentiation and some overlap. It may be very desirable to apply some research funds to the longer term and more comprehensive types of evaluation analyses, as has been done for the current multi-year study of university assistance to AID's rural development programs and the Taiwan program study by Jacoby. These types of analyses are suitable for university sponsorship and call for the professional depth, continuity of effort, and detachment that is more likely to be available via outside research contracts than via AID staff action. An alternative is to use some country program funds for this type of evaluation study--dollars or local currency. Often, however, this will not be feasible or wise because the main purpose and benefits of such studies tend to fall outside of the country whose program is being evaluated.

There are four important types of interaction and mutual support that should occur, as a regular matter, between research and evaluation activities.

(1) Evaluation work should help to identify the most important topics needing research. To some extent, this relationship is built into the present system of justification and review of research proposals, by virtue of the questions asked and who participates in the review. However, the relationship could and should be strengthened, e.g., by using systematic examination of evaluation (and programming) documents to identify important, recurring problems that are researchable.

(2) There should be a three-way relationship between programming, research and evaluation in the PPBS process. The systematic analyses of new and old program alternatives, resulting respectively from research and evaluation activities, should be fed into the PPBS cycle at appropriate points to be used together to provide improved bases for the selection and designing of program alternatives most likely to produce the best results at the least cost.

(3) If AID had an effective storage and recall capability for its program evaluation reports, this same experience "bank" could also handle

research reports. The combined facility would be more efficient and would provide the richest available mix of materials for those seeking guidance.

(4) Research is badly needed to help AID to develop suitable evaluation techniques, criteria for measuring results, and indicators to help identify progress as it is occurring. This should be a high priority area of attention for the Agency's research program. (The aforementioned study of university assistance to rural development expects to identify some suitable evaluation criteria, and also some measures of the maturity of projects to assist phase-out planning.)

Training

There should be three relationships of mutual support between AID's program evaluation and its training activities.

To develop good staff capabilities for doing both program development and execution work and program evaluation work, and for interrelating these properly, we need improved in-service training in these functions. This should complement a suitable career assignment system for program management personnel. Sending such personnel to universities in mid-career can be very useful, but is not an efficient or sufficient substitute for in-service training programs designed specifically to develop the programming and related skills of our career personnel. No university does this job adequately. We should consider further what arrangements can be made with the Foreign Service Institute for this purpose.

Our in-service training programs, generally, should be used as one important channel for transmitting to Agency staffs the lessons that have been learned through program evaluation activities. This would strengthen both training and the use of evaluation results. The pioneering at the Asia Training Center in Hawaii on the use of debriefing materials in training programs should be extended. We need some systematic method of drawing on evaluation reports to provide training materials. Establishment of an experience "bank", as recommended above, would make this easier to do.

Participation in evaluation activities is a particularly effective training device for AID personnel. This is one very good reason for requiring regular evaluation work throughout the Agency. OES assignments are a special case. They should be scheduled with the recognition that they should provide one of the best available training experiences for the handling of senior program management responsibilities--especially for Mission Director assignments.

Compliance Type Evaluation

This refers to the work of AID's auditors, GAO auditors, the Foreign Service Inspection Corps, the Office of the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance, A/IIS, and the inspection activities of various Congressional committees.

The balance of interests of these organizations between various types of compliance and other investigatory and problem identifying work vary, of course, but the bulk of their activity is not program evaluation work in the sense considered in this memorandum, i.e., the systematic review of what has actually happened in the LDC's in response to our program activities. However, they do produce some program evaluation work, and AID's program evaluation SYSTEM needs to make regular provision for taking account of this work and of the other conclusions of their reports wherever they are pertinent to particular Agency program evaluations. Again, the device of an experience "bank", by including appropriately referenced copies of such compliance type evaluations, could make this inter-relating easier to do. So would a structure of evaluation staff offices, having coordination as one of their functions.

There is a rather sizeable area of overlap between some AID audit activities dealing with implementation problems, and the program evaluation analyses of the implications for implementation planning of their findings about activity results. This overlap and the coordination implications are discussed above under "Implementation".

Despite some overlap of subject matter, program evaluation responsibilities should continue to be handled largely separately from compliance type evaluations, even when both are internal AID activities. This is because:

- the subject matter is for the most part different, with comprehensive scope in both cases;
- different types of training and experience are needed to do each type of evaluation well;
- there are important differences in purpose;
- there are and should be critical differences in the psychological overtones accompanying the two types of activities, which in turn require different organization and procedures. Effective program evaluation depends on the establishment of positive motivations among the AID officers responsible for program components to look critically and frankly at what they are doing without fear of damaging themselves or others. To do this, program evaluation must be as devoid as possible of the aura of an inspection or policing operation.

In sum, mixing program and compliance evaluation is somewhat like mixing oil and water.

Coordination (including scheduling) and mutual support between these two types of evaluative activities should be provided primarily by continuing to have AID's senior program managers participate in the discussions

involved in both and make use of the results of both, as fully as possible. They should be responsible for relating properly the conclusions of the two types of reports. Also, where this is feasible and appropriate, the information management facilities should provide each type of evaluator with the conclusions of the other type of evaluation of the same or similar activities, so that account can be taken of the others' findings. In particular, our program evaluators do need to develop a better awareness of implementation problems as these have been uncovered in various audit and inspection activities.

Personnel Management

Like other AID program related activity, good program evaluation work requires the assignment of good people to the field and the delegation of major responsibility to them, under appropriate policy and procedural instructions and with effective surveillance and command arrangements; The selection and assignment of program management personnel should consider their evaluating capabilities.

The personnel management system can foster good program evaluation work, more specifically, by:

- providing the proper linkages between evaluation and personnel training, as already suggested;
- amending the Performance Evaluation Reports to provide specific recognition to ability and performance in program evaluation work as a significant factor in the ratings and in career potential. The rater should be asked to cross check with the pertinent project or other evaluation reports.

Good evaluation comes from a reflective and analytical state of mind, with a bent for critical appraisal and for identifying significant relationships between events. Our personnel system needs to encourage the development of this state of mind.

Linkages between Evaluation in Different AID Units

Part of the need here has already been indicated under "Information Management."

Beyond this, a major function of the proposed full-time evaluation officer at each of the three major command echelons of AID would be to provide useful linkages between the program evaluation activities of the various offices throughout AID, between these and outside evaluation activities, and between evaluation and other related activities within AID. This would be done through personal contacts and by arranging other exchanges

of information to assure that each element of the program evaluation SYSTEM was aware of what the others were doing and of their results. To facilitate this coordination, AID/W should have a standing committee of the officers responsible for the evaluation work of the various offices that carry substantial program evaluation responsibilities.

Linkages with Evaluation Work Outside State/AID

Some very important potentials are opening up for the use by AID of program evaluation work done by organizations outside the USG. As noted above, the structure of AID staff offices responsible for program evaluation should provide the means of realizing as much of this potential as possible.

The United Nations has been paying increasing attention to program evaluation work over the past year or two, and seems quite serious about it. A new, semi-autonomous United Nations Institute of Training and Research (UNITAR) has been established, reporting to ECOSOC: it will be working on evaluation research techniques and also on the "memory" problem, and doing some evaluation studies. It is also helping to design evaluation systems. Other UN evaluation work is proceeding. The UN groups have solicited cooperation with AID evaluation work, and there is a wide range of obvious common interests in the development of evaluation organization and methods, and in comparing the results of particular program evaluations.

AID has a similar range of common interests with the major U.S. foundations engaged in economic and social assistance work in the LDC's. Again, there is a habit and desire on both sides for mutually beneficial exchanges.

Some more limited possibilities along the same lines might develop with the many non-American financial and technical assistance agencies around the world. While such liaison would probably involve our giving much more than we would receive--because we would have more to give--it would help the important USG purpose of increasing the support given to LDC development by non-USG entities.

Proceeding with some joint program evaluations with other aid organizations, as suggested in Part B above, obviously would help the participating organizations to benefit from each other's evaluation experiences.

By far the greatest unrealized potential for supplementing AID's own program evaluation work rests in the work of American universities and private research supporting organizations. Increasingly, our huge intellectual community is becoming interested in researching, for their own purposes, the problems and situations in the LDC's. Also, the U.S. social science community is becoming increasingly interested in developing more accurate and useful techniques for measuring changes in societies and evaluating cause and effect relationships. Many of these people would prefer to do analyses and research that is relevant to immediate public policy problems and the operational

concerns of the USG. Thus, in the right context, they are likely to welcome from AID indications of the kinds of evaluation research and evaluation studies by outside organizations that we would find useful, and to produce a considerable volume of such work on their own responsibility and for their own purposes. But some of the results could be used by AID. Sometimes there may be nothing more involved than adding a few lines of inquiry of interest to us to a study primarily aimed in other directions. In any case, AID's program evaluation SYSTEM should include provisions for developing as much as possible of this "piggy-back riding" on the evaluation and research work of the private intellectual community. Much might be available free, or at very low cost, if we worked hard at developing suitable connections.

WHAT WOULD THE EVALUATION FUNCTIONS OF
VARIOUS AID OFFICES BE IN THE PROPOSED SYSTEM?

Given the general outlines of a program evaluation SYSTEM described in Section V, what specifically should the various participating organizational units of AID do?

The sub-sections below list and describe the specific program evaluation functions proposed for:

- A. Missions
- B. Regional Bureaus
- C. Administrator's Staff Offices

Special Assistant to the Administrator for Evaluation
Office of Program Coordination
Technical and Management Staff Offices

A. Missions

Program evaluation is a management responsibility, inherent in the responsibility for assuring well selected and effectively operated country programs. The SYSTEM described in Section V puts the main responsibility for program evaluation on AID's field missions, and thus on the Mission Directors. To get good results, the Director must give a strong personal lead to program evaluation work--by participating directly at key points and by other action that makes it clear to his staff that he values and will use good evaluation results and that he will demand such from them as an important part of their performance. He must also involve his senior program review officer actively in evaluation work and responsibility, and also his technical division chiefs, if he is to get good evaluation work and have it applied extensively in Mission programming and implementation decision making.

How he organizes this effort should be up to the individual Mission Director. However, in any sizeable Mission, he should have at least one officer with full-time responsibility for a series of staff functions needed to make the Mission program evaluation SYSTEM work effectively. Without this, and given the overriding competition for time of the heavy range of Mission programming and implementation responsibilities (including representation and reporting), program evaluation work will inevitably be neglected. AID experience to date gives overwhelming support to this conclusion.

There are a number of possibilities for the organizational location of the evaluation staff officer. One solution is to make him a Division Chief in the Mission Program Office, particularly if this is a strong staff office that the Director uses broadly to run Mission programming activities, review and approve programs prior to the Director's approval, and provide operational controls to assure that implementation action is consistent with program approvals. This location puts the Evaluation Officer in a good position to relate his work sensibly to on-going Mission operations, and to assist in assuring application of evaluation conclusions to programming and implementation decisions. It also helps to keep to a minimum the number of staff offices with which the operational offices must cope--a desirable general objective for Mission management. In any case, the Evaluation Officer should be called in frequently by the Mission Director who should keep close track of the status of evaluation work. Wherever the evaluation officer is located, the Director should see to it that he is free of other duties, that he has strong support from the Director, Deputy Director, and principal program officer, and that he is well positioned to be aware of the Mission's operational environment and practical concerns.

Ideally, the evaluation officer should be an up-and-coming program officer with some good field experience. He should have good analytical capabilities, with reflective tendencies and an integrating type of mentality--a mind that is strongly inclined to relate things in significant ways. He should also be adept at inducing the cooperation and confidence of his colleagues, as he faces some rather severe motivational problems in helping the Director and Program Officer to induce good program evaluation work from the Mission staff. Incidentally, there is no better training for senior program management positions than an assignment of this type, if the position is properly established within a functioning Agency SYSTEM.

A list of typical staff duties for the Mission evaluation officer follows. It is also indicative of the program evaluation work that should be carried on throughout the Mission.

- (1) Organize Mission planning of program evaluation activities and pull together an annual Mission Evaluation Plan.
- (2) Help the various Mission elements to plan program evaluations in their areas of responsibility. Planning how much outside help to use and how to use it is an important part of this responsibility.
- (3) Provide the channel for Mission efforts to obtain outside evaluation resources to help with particular evaluations--people, materials, techniques.
- (4) Organize outside evaluation efforts for the Director and Program Officer, and provide liaison for them with outside evaluation efforts, both those initiated by the Mission and those initiated elsewhere.

- (5) Channel useful evaluation materials from inside and outside the Mission to potential user officers inside and outside the Mission.
- (6) Keep the Director and Program Officer posted on the status and results of Mission evaluation work, and of AID's evaluation policies and directives and their application to Mission activities.
- (7) Assure suitable evaluation reporting to AID/W.
- (8) Participate in program reviews to help identify special evaluation needs and possible applications of evaluation results.
- (9) Assure maintenance of an effective library of program evaluation materials, with appropriate links to similar libraries outside the Mission.
- (10) Miscellaneous evaluation-related duties, e.g., identification of useful training materials derived from evaluation work, or arranging cooperative contacts with evaluation work of other organizations (U.S., local, other).

In general, the assignment of the evaluation officer would be to see to the effective working of an evaluation SYSTEM in the Mission, as distinguished from doing evaluations.

There remain the functions of review and application of evaluation results. Mission procedures should provide for:

- review of each individual program evaluation (with the evaluators and the responsible program management staff present, preferably including the Director or Deputy Director), and the reaching of action conclusions;
- re-use of approved evaluation conclusions at each stage of program review and approval (this requires a ready recall mechanism);
- regular status reporting to top Mission management on evaluation follow-up assignments.

While the evaluation officer could be responsible for scheduling the initial review sessions on individual program evaluations, it is desirable:

- to integrate the follow-up on evaluation reports into the regular Mission program management procedures, rather than to operate a separate procedural stream for the handling of these reports;

- to avoid assignment of follow-up responsibilities to the evaluation officer, so as to keep him as free as possible of the aura of a policeman and improve the atmosphere for inducing Mission operating divisions to seek his help and participation in planning evaluation work.

Normally, follow-up responsibility should be assigned to the officers regularly responsible for the activity and function that is involved.

In general, the improvement of the Missions' program evaluation work is not a matter of increasing the local staff time spent on this activity. The latter is considerable in most Missions, especially at the project officer level. The key needs are:

- to improve the quality of this effort by improving the techniques and other support, and by adopting devices to focus it on the key questions;
- to institute systems that enable important evaluative facts and judgements to reach higher program management levels more often, in a more useful form, and at the times when they are most needed and most likely to be used in making programming and implementation decisions and in reporting on and justifying programs to Washington;
- to provide, as a corollary, for allocation of somewhat more time of senior Mission staff to participation in and review of evaluation work, or at least for a more efficient use of this time.

B. Regional Bureaus

The organizational needs in the Bureaus, for assuring good program evaluation work, are similar to those in the Missions.

The key factor is a strong lead from the Regional Assistant Administrator. But the time that he can devote to this function is quite limited. Consequently, he needs a strong staff function to operate on his behalf.

The officer exercising this function should be:

- close to the locus of program review and decision making so that he is aware of what is going on, is encouraged to be realistic in planning evaluation work, and is in the best position to help coordinate program evaluation work with other related activities and to assist in obtaining the fullest use of this work;

- divorced from other responsibilities, for the reasons already indicated;
- consulted and counseled frequently by the Assistant Administrator.

Probably the best way to achieve this is to have a Program Evaluation Division (possibly no more than one very able person) in the regional program office. Other locations are possible--for example as a Special Assistant to the Assistant Administrator--as long as the foregoing conditions are met. I would recommend that the staff functions for program evaluation be separate from the functions of assuring follow-up on audit and inspection reports and of operational trouble shooting. Both are full time. They require different talents and experience. When they are combined, the program evaluation functions are almost certain to take a back seat and to be neglected, not because they are less important to AID's effectiveness but for the reasons suggested in Section V in considering why AID has not done better program evaluation work to date, despite its values.

An illustrative list of staff functions for the regional program evaluation officer is:

- (1) Monitor and help organize the development and maintenance of a Regional Evaluation Program, comprised of the Mission Programs, plus AID/W participation in and review of Mission evaluation work, plus any evaluation activity to be carried out initially by the Regional Bureau or other AID/W units instead of the Missions.
- (2) Serve as the Region's storehouse of knowledge about evaluation techniques and where and how to get consultant or other help, and maintain contact with the Missions regarding their evaluation needs and problems.
- (3) Assure adequate AID/W action on Mission requests for assistance in carrying out particular evaluations. (This should be a very important and active function.)
- (4) Keep the Assistant Administrator and Office Directors informed on the status and results of program evaluation work in the Region.
- (5) Prepare evaluation instructions and guidelines for the signature of the Assistant Administrator and program office director.
- (6) Maintain an inventory of all evaluation projects completed in the Region, underway, and being planned: also a partial inventory, to the extent feasible, of non-AID evaluations of interest to the

Region: provide updated copies of inventories to the "memory bank" for the central Agency list, and to PPC and SA.

(7) Assure suitable dissemination to Missions of evaluation results elsewhere and of other materials that might help them, and help to arrange cooperation between Missions in their evaluation efforts.

(8) Prepare schedules for Regional reviews of evaluation reports and participate in reviews: also participate in program reviews to assist the Assistant Administrator and program office director in bringing about maximum use of evaluation findings and in identifying questions needing new evaluation efforts and the means of pursuing them.

(9) Provide liaison with AID/W offices and outside offices to improve the coordination of the Region's evaluation work with other evaluation work and with related activities, to increase the Region's stock of knowledge on evaluation technique and on the results of others' evaluation work, and to obtain assistance for Regional evaluation work.

(10) Any other related staff functions.

The comments on the evaluation follow-up functions, made in Section A above on "Missions," also apply to the division of responsibilities in the Regional Bureaus. The biggest part of the Regional Evaluation Officer's duties would involve service functions for the Missions.

For the most part, the evaluation work done in the Regional Bureaus themselves is likely to consist of reviews of program evaluations done by the Missions, plus some secondary analysis using Mission developed evaluation reports. The latter would tend to be comparative analysis of different experiences, often dealing with specific program goals or problems found in a number of LDC's in the Region. These secondary evaluations may lead to the posing of new questions to the Missions for further exploration there as well as to transmission of findings. Occasionally, a Regional Bureau may take initial responsibility for evaluating certain types of program impact where relatively heavy responsibilities for program policy formulation rests in AID/W (e.g., the effectiveness of the program loan technique, or of PL 480 Title II work programs, or regional vs. bilateral approaches). This may be done in collaboration with PPC or another Agency-wide staff office with special competence in the subject matter.

C. Administrator's Staff Offices

Unlike the Mission and Regional Bureau echelons of AID, staff functions for program evaluation at the Administrator's echelon should be divided. This is needed to:

- provide the strongest feasible impetus to overall development of the Agency's program evaluation SYSTEM;
- fit into and take advantage of existing organizational arrangements and functional specialization among the Agency-wide staff offices.

The parcelling out of staff responsibilities for program evaluation in the Administrator's echelon implies the creation of coordination needs. But this problem is minimized because:

- the offices concerned are two echelons removed from the field operating level, where the concentration of action authority is the most important and where the use of Washington staff services can be integrated by Mission and Regional Bureau management action;
- the functions at this echelon are largely concerned with providing services to the Regional Bureaus and Missions and with doing some global evaluation work for the Administrator, rather than with the exercise of operational command or control;
- the overall coordinating function of the Administrator for Agency program evaluation work would be vested in a single office (the Special Assistant for Evaluation).

Special Assistant to the Administrator for Evaluation

This is a new function in AID. It would be the Administrator's arm for seeking effective operation of the overall program evaluation SYSTEM of the Agency. A portion of this function was carried out by Colonel Lincoln while he was with AID in 1964/65 as Special Advisor to the Administrator, and his Report recommends regular establishment of the full function (Annex P of the Lincoln Report has a good analysis of this need). But the function was dropped, until its recent re-establishment.

The main rationale for this position is to provide undivided attention, at the Administrator's elbow, to the foregoing function. The other staff offices are necessarily preoccupied with other duties, and are not able to give the function the attention that it should have. The existence of the position can provide the Agency personnel and outsiders with a concrete manifestation of the Administrator's strong personal interest in having good program evaluation work done and used. It also provides the Administrator with the means to increase his awareness of the Agency's evaluation activities and their results, and to participate in these activities from time to time,

as appropriate. Evidence of the Administrator's interest and participation is the most important motivating factor for the whole SYSTEM. The ripple effects will be transmitted through the parallel increase in interest of the Regional and Mission commands, and down through the Agency.

The principal functions of the Special Assistant should be:

- (1) Monitor and evaluate the overall operation of AID's program evaluation SYSTEM, to assist the Agency to identify and put into effect measures that will strengthen the performance and effective use of this function: this surveillance includes the linkages between program evaluation and other related Agency functions (programming, implementation, information management, research, et al) and the developments needed in those functions to improve program evaluation and its uses.
- (2) Keep the Administrator, Deputy Administrator and Assistant Administrators advised on the status of the SYSTEM's operation, recommend improvements needed, and prepare directives in this field for the Administrator.
- (3) Assist other staff offices, Regional Bureaus and Missions in evaluation planning and in developing linkages with non-AID work in this field, and exercise coordinating functions in this regard (e.g., the Special Assistant should chair a standing working committee of the officers responsible for the evaluation work of the AID/W offices having substantial responsibilities in the program evaluation SYSTEM: he may also lead discussions in Missions, or with the top management from groups of Missions, on the strengthening of program evaluation work and its applications).
- (4) Participate in the Administrator's and Deputy Administrator's program review sessions and in Executive Staff meetings to assist in identifying evaluation needs and in obtaining suitable applications of the results of program evaluation work.
- (5) Monitor sessions of AID's senior outside advisory committees to obtain views on Agency program evaluation needs and their own evaluations.

The responsibility for staff work on specific evaluation problems, other than the structure and operation of the overall SYSTEM, should be carried in other staff offices, as indicated below, even though the Special Assistant assists in this work as his time and capabilities permit. This will provide better continuity of effort for these staff services, and also make the best

use of existing staff talents so as to avoid unnecessary duplication of staffing and improve coordination with related functions. In this way, temporary absences of the Special Assistant should not impede the smooth working of the SYSTEM.

Office of Program Coordination

The Office of Program Coordination is the most suitable location for a number of key staff functions for program evaluation because:

- the most important functional relationship of program evaluation is with programming--we could even say that evaluation is a part of programming;
- PPC is the focal point for developing overall Agency program policy, programming guidance and instructions, and program reviews, which puts it in the best position, among the Administrator's staff offices, to identify evaluation needs and apply evaluation conclusions;
- the types of capabilities needed for the staff functions in question are most likely to be present among PPC staff.

In the proposed SYSTEM, PPC would carry the largest staff workload, which would include the difficult and rather time consuming tasks of developing and disseminating suitable evaluation techniques and procedures for the Agency. PPC's staff functions for program evaluation should include the following:

- (1) Develop suitable evaluation procedures and techniques for AID use; supervise the preparation of guidelines, M.O.'s, and technical literature on "how to do it"; and provide advisory services to other elements of the Agency in this field. (This would cover both the development of formal requirements for evaluation work and advice on how to proceed, including such matters as how operating units can make the best use of outside evaluation resources.)
- (2) Help provide centralized Agency contacts with outside organizations and individuals to learn how they conduct program evaluation and related activities and to arrange exchanges of experience.
- (3) Help provide substantive guidance for a central Agency file of all AID evaluation projects completed, underway and planned (fed by reporting from the Regional Bureaus) which would be maintained as part of the central library service for storage and recall of reports having program evaluation content of substantial usefulness to AID, and for the service itself.

(4) Conduct special subject evaluations of overall Agency programming interest (most of these would be secondary evaluations, using original evaluation materials developed by Missions and elsewhere), e.g.,

- sector analyses, using comparative country data, that are not covered by technical staff offices, or proceeding in collaboration with technical offices and Regional Bureaus;
- effectiveness of various types of aid or aid techniques, e.g., sector loans, food-for-work programs, TA for planning, capital project loans, etc.;
- analyses of overall Agency effectiveness in achieving specified goals of FAA and policies of AID, e.g., accelerated economic growth, civic development, increased self-help and self-reliance, etc.;
- research studies or preparatory work for outside research studies needed to develop "how to do it" guidance for the Agency's various program evaluation activities (this would include commissioning of needed outside research support);
- aid systems analyses, considering Agency and other experience with alternative types of aid systems and strategies, and combining these with evaluation of research on new possibilities, to develop aid strategy ideas and concepts.

(5) Develop (in collaboration with MP and AS) Agency information management systems that provide maximum support for improving the quality of program evaluation activities and increasing the effective use of the results.

(6) Develop means of making the fullest feasible use of program evaluation results in Agency programming and program reviews, and using the latter activities to identify further evaluation needs.

Technical and Management Staff Offices

The role of the technical staff offices in the program evaluation SYSTEM has been briefly suggested at various points earlier in this Report. We will not attempt to spell out here a series of functions for each.

The most important general point is that these technical elements of AID (WOH, some PPC elements, PRR, ENGR, OPS, CLAB, MP, IT, and technical units in the Regional Bureaus) are likely to exert more constructive influence on

the actual shape and conduct of AID activities in the field, and to do so at the lowest administrative and "pain" cost to the Agency per unit of technical output, if they substitute individual participation in Mission program evaluation and programming work in the field for a large part of their participation in clearance and review procedures in Washington. This would also improve their professional work.

While they are in the field on TDY, they would, of course, be working for and with Mission management. If this causes any loss of their independence, whatever that might mean, this is likely to be more than compensated for by the practical effects of this type of participation on the acceptance and usage of their advice. Moreover, their advice will be better informed and therefore sounder, more useful, and more welcomed by Mission and host country personnel. A further benefit would be the improved communication and mutual understanding between field units and Washington offices that would result and that would filter up, down and sideways in Washington after the technical personnel returned. Related to this would be an improvement in the motivations of operational officers for seeking participation by technical officers: the latter would be more likely to be regarded as a resource that is available to help solve problems, rather than as a hurdle in the action path that has to be cleared or bypassed.

Application of travel strictures to the type of travel described above would forestall this possibility of making more effective use of AID's technical personnel. This should be avoided. The same applies to the use of outside consultants.

Each of the technical offices could also do some useful program evaluation work of their own in their areas of special interest. This would be primarily secondary evaluation using multi-country materials developed by others, as already described for PPC. Their role would include interpretation of policy in technical terms, and appraisal of the suitability of the technical applications actually made. With the prevalent thinness of staffing in many AID/W technical units, they should seek combined efforts wherever feasible. Another reason for this is that many of our problems are of an interdisciplinary nature. For the most part, however, the limited staff time available to our technical units for program evaluation work is best spent evaluating with rather than for our field organizations.

The Offices of Management Planning and International Training have special roles to play in program evaluation.

Although MP's evaluations and planning of Agency organization and procedures does not directly measure the effect of our program efforts, it does throw light on the efficiency of these efforts and good O&M type work should result in better program performance. Moreover, it is important that our judgements

about organization and procedures reflect analyses of the actual program effectiveness observed for various organizational alternatives and not merely good organizational doctrine and abstract logic. Thus MP's work should use and be used by the program evaluation SYSTEM.

The nature of AID's participant training programs requires a strong, centralized program evaluation function in Washington for these activities. This is because the training takes place in the U.S., much of its specific content is planned here, the programming responsibility for the trainees crosses just about all of the functional lines within AID, Missions typically have very limited training management resources of their own, and the participant program itself is extremely important in furthering several basic AID purposes. In fact, A/IT has probably done more systematic program evaluation work, and has probably done it longer than any other element of AID. Since it has made fuller use of outside contracts for program evaluation work than other offices, its experiences in this regard provide a useful basis for comparative evaluation of this technique, and this should be done. (But with the caution that the conditions affecting evaluation needs for participant training are not typical of most of our program activities.) This should include assessment of the adequacy of evaluation work by Missions on their participant training programs.

Two Summary Comments

Two general points, that pervade the foregoing description of the functions to be carried out throughout AID's program evaluation SYSTEM, deserve some special re-emphasis.

One is that program evaluation is a major responsibility of operational management. As such, it cannot be delegated to someone else and be effective. As the Lincoln Report stressed, it requires continuous staff action that closely reflects operating experience and that is motivated and guided by strong leadership from the principal executives at each of AID's three command echelons.

The Administrator's role is particularly crucial. He must personally show a strong interest and let it be known by his organizational and program actions that he places great importance on good evaluation work. The Special Assistant for Evaluation can be an important instrument for this purpose. But the Administrator must also participate directly in the SYSTEM, from time to time. A well structured SYSTEM will permit him to do this, without making undue demands on his time.

The second point is that program evaluation requires action follow-up. By putting stress on the development of strong personnel and procedural linkages between evaluation and other functions like programming and implementation, the structuring of the program evaluation SYSTEM can facilitate follow-up. Suitable development of parallel functions like information management does the same. But these organizational steps do not assure follow-up. The latter, like evaluation itself, is a management responsibility.

In summary, this Report suggests the following handling of follow-up responsibilities.

- Regional Assistant Administrators assure follow-up called for in their Regions, with responsibility passed to Directors for action needed in their Missions.
- When action is approved by the Administrator as the result of program evaluation work or reviews by his staff offices, the Deputy Administrator should assure follow-up by the responsible offices, which would usually be the Regional Bureaus.
- Generally, the Evaluation Officers (i.e., the staff specialists) at the various echelons should not be responsible for follow-up, as this tends to conflict with their other staff duties and to dilute the action responsibility of the other offices. Follow-up responsibility should be assigned, through regular command channels, to the officers who normally have operational responsibility for the activities and functions involved, i.e., follow-up should not be a function of the program evaluation SYSTEM as such.