

**INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
SECURITY EVALUATION**

Jamaica

July 14 - August 12, 1972

**OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

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I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Airport security at Montego Bay and Kingston international airports has major limitations in terms of management, organization and personnel. Neither airport has security adequate to deter a reasonably determined hi-jacker, saboteur or smuggler. As constituted, the international airports present a gap in the internal security of Jamaica which should be closed with a mature law enforcement organization under improved management. The large international airport investment is receiving the lowest level of law enforcement attention. Other limitations related to airport security exist in the fields of rescue/fire-fighting, Customs and Immigration. All limitations are susceptible to positive resolution but will demand joint actions and cooperation from concerned Government of Jamaica Ministries: Public Utilities, Communications and Transport; Home Affairs; Finance and Planning.

Listed below are recommendations as extracted from the basic report.

Major Recommendations (Parenthetical additions included for clarity)

a. That Airport Manager's at Montego Bay and Kingston be immediately provided assistants to fill existing positions.

b. That Kingston be provided a fully qualified Airport Manager from existing personnel or by seconding or outside contract for the next 24 months.

c. That a position of Airport Administrative Assistant or Executive Assistant be established for each international Airport Manager to handle daily detailed administrative matters.

d. That Assistant Airport Managers be designated Airport Security Officers with overall security responsibility.

e. That Airport Security Survey's be accomplished at each international airport.

f. That Airport Security Master Plans be developed for each international airport.

g. That Rescue and fire-fighting be separated from facilities security.

h. That Rescue and fire-fighting be responsive to the Airport Manager through his Security Officer.

i. That the GOJ Ministry of Home Affairs be encouraged to establish Airport Security Detachments of approximately 19 mature and qualified constables at each international airport from members of the Jamaica Constabulary Force.

j. That the new Airport Security Detachments be under the operational control of the Airport Managers.

k. That Airport Managers and Deputy, or Assistant, Airport Managers be provided definitive Job Descriptions outlining scope and responsibilities, particularly in the areas of security.

l. That Customs Guards be permanently assigned to each airport on a voluntary basis.

m. That Customs ramp patrol and the requirement to board aircraft and general observation of all persons functioning in ramp and baggage areas be enforced.

n. That a central Immigration index of wanted persons be established and maintained.

o. That Identification Access Lists be developed and placed in the hands of security personnel to insure badges are in proper individual possession for specified areas.

p. That the Airport Managers request permanent assignment of a CID officer for the airport jurisdictions.

q. That specific patrol responsibilities be outlined and implemented (for Customs Guards and Security Personnel).

r. That airport procedures be established for body search of departing passengers in conjunction with passenger profile procedures, document inspection, interview and selective searching.

Additional Recommendations

s. That pay scales be increased for rescue/fire-fighting personnel to develop personnel quality and retention or consideration be given to allocating this function to a commercial contract, the Jamaican Defense Force or Jamaica Constabulary Force.

t. That the GOJ encourage enforcement of existing legislation concerning essential services to assure the presence of fire-fighting and rescue services at international airports as a matter affecting national prestige, safety and public service.

u. That unbalanced security and rescue/fire-fighting shift patterns be established to match airport patterns of operational activity and avoid wastage of manhours during slack night periods.

v. That representation from Immigration and Customs be included in Airport Security Committees.

w. That two supervisory members of the new airport security force and two supervisory members of the rescue fire-fighting organization receive up-grade training in their functions at modern outside airports.

x. That a basic records system of confiscations of significant items be developed with a view toward establishing the scope of the current specific threats and the efficiency of the Customs operation.

y. That Customs personnel be required to secure all residual baggage until claimed by passenger and/or airline personnel.

z. That Customs Guards, ramp security patrols and air carriers be made aware of this problem (slow-offloading) and insure that baggage and cargo offloading is suitably expedited.

aa. Either leave (in-transit) passengers on board if turn around time is less than one hour, or clear all passengers at first point of landing for Customs, Quarantine and Immigration.

bb. That a simplified Customs form be developed to be filled out by passengers in the aircraft. It should omit all extraneous information. It could be included as a perforated bottom segment to the disembarkation form for presentation to Customs officials after clearing Immigration.

cc. That a single (Customs) cashier position to collect all revenues due as determined by each inspector be established.

dd. The Customs Guard should remain or lock the door (in-transit and departure area).

ee. That senior and experienced Customs Inspectors be appointed to expedite (arriving) passenger movement through a Selective Inspection System.

ff. That in conjunction with the previously recommended Selective Inspection System, the Montego Bay inspection counters be re-aligned in aisles with specific provision for a wide central aisle for exiting of those passengers being selectively inspected and moved out.

gg. That the GOJ consider the establishment of an internal affairs office, outside Customs, for the detection and investigation of any corrupt practices within the Customs organization.

hh. That two or three key Customs Guard supervisors be provided up-grade training.

ii. Consider eliminating the departure Immigration positions.

jj. Require air carriers to assemble boarding cards and present the total card deck to a central Immigration Office as part of the aircraft clearance procedure.

kk. Use Immigration departure positions eliminated by this change to man Immigration positions at arrival points where they are badly needed, particularly during peak periods.

ll. Consider passing all inbound passengers through Immigration initially. Immigration officials to query each person on countries of origin and direct only those necessary to Public Health nurse.

mm. That the (identification) badge system be retained as a responsibility of the Airport Managers as an inherent operational/security matter.

nn. That abuses of the (identification) system include immediate withdrawal of badges from the air carrier or individual involved.

oo. That airport and air carrier personnel be required to wear readily identifiable uniforms in lieu of badges.

pp. That air carrier managers be permitted to escort maintenance, VIP and other essential persons without requiring additional badges.

qq. That violators of identification procedures be directed from the limited access areas.

rr. That security personnel be trained to recognize individual and vehicle violations and enforce identification procedures.

ss. That the burden of delivering baggage to passengers be placed on air carriers and some control be established over the actions of terminal porters.

tt. That the airport management establish this (boarding pass check) procedure.

uu. That this practice (students at security posts) be discontinued and qualified security officers man these posts.

vv. That the Airport Managers require arrivals to be announced without reference to gate numbers and outline the need to meet passengers outside the Customs area.

ww. That air carriers be required to provide more ground escort personnel and/or stewardesses to assist in controlling the movement of disembarking passengers.

xx. That domestic passengers be separated from all others in boarding and deplaning.

yy. That doors (to arrival and departure ramps) be equipped with suitable automatic closing devices and be a subject for attention by air carriers, customs and security patrols.

zz. That security coordination (for ramp patrols) be developed between all concerned agencies.

aaa. That this item (ramp patrols) be included in the Master Security Plan and discussed at Airport Security Committee meetings.

bbb. That hand-held and portal type magnetometers be utilized for weapons detection by security personnel at both international airports.

ccc. That the GOJ Ministry of Public Utilities, Communications and Transport be encouraged to provide a suitable electrical engineer for this critical position vacancy (Senior Executive Engineer, Electrical).

ddd. That the GOJ Ministry of Finance and Planning be encouraged to develop an Airport Improvement Trust Fund with revenues derived from airport income, or with allocation of an equivalent amount.

II. INTRODUCTION

The Government of Jamaica (GOJ) requested U. S. assistance to develop an evaluation of security at Kingston and Montego Bay international airports. Specific assistance was requested to outline short-term immediate recommendations on passenger, aircraft and baggage security and longer term recommendations regarding the organization and management of the airport security force, facility security, customs and immigration. In response to the request, the services of Mr. Samuel Pesacreta were made available for two weeks through the Office of Public Safety, AID, Washington and of Mr. Raymond Perez for 30 days through the U. S. Bureau of Customs. Detailed terms of reference were neither provided nor necessary to accomplish the evaluation. Due to the overlap in most functional areas evaluated, a single integrated report was compiled.

Recommendations outlining possible courses of action through U. S. agencies are necessarily being processed separate from this report. In general, recommended U. S. actions are logical outgrowths of GOJ responses to the major aspects of this evaluation particularly in the areas of airport management and security organization.

III. SCOPE OF EVALUATION

The scope of this evaluation is principally limited to the physical airport facilities and airport ground operations at Kingston

(Palisadoes) and Montego Bay (Sangster) International Airports, Jamaica as they influence security. Specific emphasis was placed on the organization and management of airport security forces, facilities security, customs and immigration. Due to the nature of airport security composition in each instance a corollary evaluation developed in the areas of airport rescue and fire-fighting services.

The evaluation could not encompass an overall airport management appraisal since many items and functions unrelated to security would necessarily be involved. Many aspects of management have been exhaustively addressed in a May 1972 report entitled Jamaica Airports Development, Organization and Management Supplemental Report accomplished by a Canadian consultant firm. This is available in Jamaica to concerned U. S./GOJ agencies.

Related to management of Jamaican international airports is the problem of funding for operations, maintenance and construction. This has a bearing on security and commented on briefly.

Within these parameters, the general nature of the evaluation is oriented to security-related matters which can be addressed over the immediate or near-term through implementation of specific courses of action.

IV. GENERAL

There are no factors in this evaluation foreign to concerned agencies of the GOJ. The personnel of involved Ministries and other elements of government discussed problem areas with objective candor

and with the specific view of achieving ultimate resolution in order to improve airport services and security for the benefit of the GOJ and the general public. They were in all instances cooperative and professional in the assistance provided.

The GOJ has expended considerable intelligent effort, funding and personnel in developing international airport facilities at Kingston and Montego Bay. In a relatively brief period of time much has been accomplished to accommodate a rapidly expanding international air traffic with its attendant problems in the areas of security, operations, construction, customs and immigration. These developments have the normal and inevitably concomitant problem areas. These are particularly coalesced in the field of airport management and its relations to security.

The referenced May 1972 development report presages the possible initiation of a commercial Airport Authority for operation of both international and domestic airports. It appears unlikely that this will occur in the immediate future. In passing, it is pertinent to comment that such an Authority, if constituted, can be operated under GOJ auspices. Regardless of the future of such an Authority, the needs to improve airport management and airport security are separate and above such a development and should not be held in abeyance.

In the interest of brevity, descriptive data on airports, size, location, capacities, etc. are omitted except where related to security

and the scope of this evaluation. Included are security-related items, e.g., passenger flow and baggage handling, since these create turbulence and other problems in already overloaded facilities and directly affect the security environment of the airport.

Both airports are well-contained in terms of the security needed. In general, airport facilities are concentrated in relatively small areas, particularly those facilities normally involved in matters of narcotics traffic, smuggling, bomb threats, i.e. terminals, parking areas (both vehicle and aircraft), emergency power, warehousing. This permits adequate security operations with relatively small numbers of personnel. Airport buildings are generally modern and improving. Airport facilities are planned to undergo a variety of improvements and expansions; however, for the immediate or near-term future, the security problem will involve the facilities in being.

V. THREAT ASSESSMENT

Based on comments of knowledgeable and concerned U. S./GOJ personnel the essential threats posed to airport security efforts are an amalgam. As in most nations, the Jamaican civil air transport industry is currently vulnerable to hi-jacking, bomb threats and sabotage. Concern has been expressed on the inability of Air Jamaica to meet any extraordinary extortion demand. Airport and airplane pilferage is a consistent hazard. The infiltration and activities of outside and domestic criminal elements are potential problems with

attendant and undesirable increases in individual firearms. Jamaica is a prime source of marijuana (ganja) smuggling to the U. S. and the island's airports are obviously useful for transshipment of hard narcotics from adjacent nations to the U. S. This has occurred.

The security threat at the international airports relates directly to the economically significant tourist trade and other air traffic. Between 1966 and 1970 passenger arrivals increased by more than 60%. In comparative terms, major indications substantiate future increases in Jamaica's tourist trade. At Montego Bay over 900,000 passengers arrived from foreign airports in 1971 compared with less than 700,000 in 1969. Over 400,000 have arrived through June of 1972, principally via U. S. and other foreign air carriers. At Kingston, 223,628 such arrivals in 1971 are a significant increase over 138,052 in 1967. There were comparable increases in airmail and air cargo.

The threat assessment is pragmatic, being based on real concerns and established evidence. There was one small plane hi-jacking to Cuba from Montego Bay in early 1972 and another from Kingston; two bomb scares developed in Kingston in the three weeks preceding this evaluation. Recent evidence of airport pilferage is available. High quality marijuana production continues to be a low risk, high profit enterprise in many areas of Jamaica. As emphasis in narcotics suppression continues in the mid-East and southeast Asia, much of this at the encouragement of the U. S. to minimize narcotics availability to U. S.

users, all other sources in the western hemisphere will be exploited. These developments tend to increase the value of Jamaican airports for transshipment from southern sources.

VI. SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION

Although absolute airport security is impractical, the Airport Manager should hold the ultimate responsibility for achieving a reasonable level of physical and operational security to benefit all airport users, the government and the public. This is not reasonably or readily achievable with the airport security assets and organizations presently at Montego Bay and Kingston.

Security demands undivided authority. Airport security at both airports is now fragmented in terms of management, organization and responsibility. Airport security has major limitations in terms of management, organization and personnel; minor limitations exist in terms of equipment and procedures. All limitations are susceptible to positive resolution. In general, security functions are better discharged at Montego Bay, largely due to the experience and qualifications of the Airport Manager. Neither Airport has security adequate to deter a reasonably intelligent and determined hi-jacker, saboteur, extortionist, smuggler or thief.

VII. SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

The airport operator for the international airports in Jamaica is the Civil Aviation Department (CAD) within the Ministry of Public

Utilities, Communications and Transport; Airport Managers are directly responsible to the Deputy Director, CAD, Ground. The supervisor of Airport Protection Service (APS) for both Montego Bay and Kingston operates from the Kingston Airport. He is a contract employee, generally equivalent in rank to the Airport Managers. Occupying a national-level office within the Civil Aviation Department, he is not subordinate to the Airport Managers and has direct supervision of the Airport Security Officers (ASO's). His basic background is in the areas of rescue and fire-fighting services; he is a former civil service employee.

The Airport Security Officers, the heads of the local Airport Protection Services, have dual responsibility for two highly specialized tasks: facilities security and crash rescue (including fire-fighting on and immediately adjacent to the airport and small crash boat operations). They also are backgrounded primarily in rescue and fire-fighting.

The Airport Protection Service has its genesis in a former municipal fire-fighting agency. It appears suitably equipped and trained for the rescue and fire-fighting functions. It is not well trained or motivated for the security function. With this structure, excessive versatility is being demanded from a small and relatively youthful group with limited basic qualifications. The security training problem imposed is difficult if not impossible. Security itself has secondary emphasis.

With this organization, both security and rescue are compartmentalized outside the jurisdiction of the Airport Manager although both are operational rather than regulatory functions. The Airport Manager has little to manage in the way of security assets. He is in fact a coordinator of security rather than a manager with security decision making capability.

The existing organizational/operational structure for security and rescue/fire-fighting evolved from a series of former efforts to provide these essential services within the capabilities and assets available. The two functions were formerly divided. At one time the rescue/fire-fighting effort was handled by a local fire-fighting organization; security by the national police organization. For various reasons, these arrangements proved unworkable and the present arrangement was arrived at. The evaluators found no cause to fault these past decisions; they were doubtless considered the best possible for conditions existing at the time. However, the security and rescue/fire-fighting structures have been overtaken by new security threats and operation expansion and have entered a new transition period.

Ideally, the security of an airport should be in the hands of an Airport Security Officer who is directly responsible to the Airport Manager. This officer should be responsible for developing all security plans, coordination with air carriers, other airport users and government agencies and implementation of security efforts to include suitability of equipment.

The Airport Security Officer should conduct an immediate and comprehensive survey of security matters at his airport, including comments, suggestions from all tenants and using organizations. Following this, a Master Security Plan should be drafted and coordinated with the membership of the Airport Security Committee.

Both a Security Survey and Master Security Plan for each airport are extensive and complex undertakings since they must consider a balance between security measures, passenger movements and the conduct of airport operations. In final form the plans require approval by the National Airport Security Committee. The committees exist but other actions have not been taken to any substantive degree. There is no representation on the Airport Security Committees from either Immigration (Ministry of Home Affairs) or Customs (Ministry of Finance). These two organizations participate in airport security.

VIII. CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS

In each instance the Airport Managers do not possess clear mandates for discharge of the security function, or for the position of Airport Manager for that matter. Security instructions were difficult to locate. This has served to cloud the security issue in concert with the awkward organizational structure. There is currently no Assistant Airport Manager at either airport; one may be available in the near future for Kingston. This would be the ideal position in which to focus primary responsibility for all security activities.

The Airport Protection Service at each airport accomplishes security by detailing personnel to this function from each duty shift of 15 persons. These are rotated throughout the day to relieve the tedium of rescue/fire-fighting inactivity. The shifts are balanced and usually the same number assigned to each shift. This arrangement does not match airport security or rescue/fire-fighting needs. An unbalanced shift pattern is needed to insure that security and rescue personnel are available during peak operating periods and kept at a minimum level during the slow period approximately between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.

Kingston utilizes five men for security, Montego Bay four. These few personnel constitute the effective day-to-day security of the airport terminal, ramp operations and other facilities: fuel, tower, communications, emergency power. At night they have a patrolling capability. In the event of rescue or fire-fighting emergencies, personnel in security positions may participate in these operations, leaving certain security positions vacant. Airport Protection Service personnel are vested with arrest authority through deputization as District Constables. This authority is distinctly limited in comparison with the authority of constables in the Jamaica Constabulary Force.

During this evaluation, it was amply evident that this system did not provide a professional collective security capability for the airports, nor did it produce individually mature, professional and

capable security officers in each instance. There is no law enforcement capability or experience to draw on from either the airport management or from within the Airport Protection Service. The Airport Protection personnel on security duty were not highly visible at either airport. Some gates and doors were left unattended during peak traffic periods and only a few timid individuals were seemingly deterred by Airport Protection presence. It was not difficult for unidentified persons to approach aircraft on foot or in vehicles.

Security limitations were obvious. Existing security provided little or no deterrent for a person reasonably determined to perpetrate any illegal action in the fields of sabotage, extortion, bomb threat, smuggling or pilferage.

Under the circumstances of airport operational development, work loads, recruitment difficulties and training, this is not considered an extraordinary development. Although Airport Protection recruitment is on-going, resignations and other removals preclude reaching the authorized levels. Kingston has 66 of its authorized 75 positions; Montego Bay, 63 of 81. Discussions with Airport Protection Officers indicates disenchantment with the dual requirement for security and rescue. Suitably qualified candidates are not readily available, in addition, those who develop some technical capability, e.g., vehicle operators, are much in demand on the local labor market and often leave the service for higher pay. It is unlikely that this

situation will be changed with such a narrow recruitment base. It may be unlikely that pay scales or other job elements can be improved to any major degree.

The APS personnel were observed in one aircraft emergency reaction. Their efforts were reasonably professional, well organized and responsive.

There are some limitations in APS authority to encourage air carriers to properly inspect and service air carrier ramp fire extinguishers. Many extinguishers were in poor condition and seldom inspected. Some operating instruction plates were illegible. Additionally, there was little standardization in this equipment.

APS training in security matters is minimal and generally a portion of that available from local police sources. This is limited to only six weeks of often part-time training and cannot provide anything approaching the scale of law enforcement training demanded to meet existing airport security requirements. Little or no training is provided or available in the specialized items of airport security: relations with both international and domestic passengers, air carrier requirements for security, customs, immigration, narcotics involvements, hi-jacking, weapons detection, bomb threats, etc.

The requirements to continually upgrade individual training, man several types of equipment, (including a crash boat at each airport) and participate in generally unpopular and boring shift duty, does little to create job appeal in the firefighting and rescue portions

of the Airport Protection Service. There are some courses of action which should be considered to assure more consistent viability of this essential service:

- a. Retain the 156 spaces in the Airport Protection Service, but increase the pay scales.
- b. Provide realistic airport rescue exercises on a no-notice basis to sustain job interest.
- c. Consider a contract for fire-fighting and rescue services. This however, is a longer term possibility in view of the qualifications needed for satisfactory performance. Possibly the contract could be limited to drivers or maintenance only.
- d. Assign the function to the Jamaican Defense Force, or the Jamaican Constabulary. This too is not a short term possibility.

For the short term, the first alternative appears the most useful course of action; however, it will still leave the GOJ with the problem of enforcement of its Essential Services legislation, which could retain airport fire-fighting and rescue personnel on duty while labor difficulties are in process of negotiation. This may be a politically unpopular action but should have serious consideration in view of the possible adverse effects on aircraft operations, tourism and the economy if rescue services are interrupted.

As a corollary matter, the 16-foot crash boat at Kingston is mounted on a trailer. It is to be used to proceed to aircraft crash scenes in the local waters with two inflatable rafts. The procedure is sound, but in practice the boat should be in the water at least during periods of peak aircraft operations. The rafts were not in evidence and the boat trailer had one flat tire.

Security should be separated from rescue and fire-fighting since training for and accomplishing both functions within the same organization has basic incompatibilities. Both policemen and firemen are needed in the airport community. Each function can generate an identical priority simultaneously. With only one set of personnel for two tasks, only one function can be accomplished well. This situation does not serve the best interests of the GOJ.

On August 9 it was clearly demonstrated that the rescue function would take priority. At Kingston a labor dispute resulted in only three Airport Protection Service supervisors available for the mid-afternoon shift. (A similar situation developed at Montego Bay on August 10.) These had already completed one tour of shift duty. Two scheduled employees of the mid-afternoon shift made their appearance, these, with the supervisors and six trainees who had participated in training that day, constituted the rescue service available for the airport. Significantly, no security personnel were available for the airport terminal areas or gates, with the exception of a single

Airfield Duty Assistant on one gate. This temporary employee was youthful, inexperienced and ill-equipped to enforce security requirements. A member of the evaluation team was passed through the gate without query.

In this extremity, CAD efforts were successful in acquiring heavy equipment operators from the Jamaican Defense Force to man the fire-fighting and rescue equipment. This expedient by no means assured rescue or fire-fighting effectiveness, since the military personnel had little familiarity with the airport, its environs, aircraft operations, aircraft fire-fighting, rescue and the technical aspects of operating the equipment involved.

These developments, although extraordinary and temporary in nature, represent severe limitations in the existing organization for both the security and rescue/fire-fighting functions. Both functions should be stabilized in organization and management to avoid any possibility of national disrepute in terms of airport management or reflection on considerations of public safety and service by the GOJ.

Approximately 19 personnel, professionally trained, can accomplish the basic facilities security task at each airport. These can be divided to permit two full eight-hour shifts of seven personnel for peak periods and a partial shift of three personnel for slow periods. Shifts of seven to include: 1 shift supervisor; 2 external apron gate guards; 2 ramp patrol and internal patrol; 2 static posts. The

three-man shift for slow periods will be formed of a shift supervisor and two additional men for foot and mobile patrol. Two suitably qualified senior officers are included for overall supervision, training, etc.

Organizationally, this force (appropriately entitled Airport Security Organization or similar) should be immediately responsive to the Airport Security Officer. In turn, the Airport Security Officer should be the designated Assistant Airport Manager. He should have also primary cognizance of the efforts of rescue/fire-fighting personnel, who should bear the title, Airport Rescue and Fire-fighting Service, or similar designation.

The position of Airport Manager and his assistant demand definitive job descriptions clearly outlining job specifications and responsibilities. These are not available. These positions are entirely too significant to function without clear written guidelines. As one result, overlap and confusion result, particularly in the management of security and handling the general operation of the airport terminal (Suitable job specification and qualifications for airport management are partially spelled out in the referenced 1972 Jamaica Airports Development Report).

As one major result of unavailable Assistance Airport Managers, the Managers are excessively occupied in detailed administrative matters better left to a deputy or even more appropriately to an

Administrative Assistant. They can devote little time to serious and well established security matters. This is particularly evident at Kingston where the incumbent manager is a highly intelligent former aircraft controller but unfortunately not well grounded in general airport management or security practices. The absence of a fully qualified manager and an assistant manager at Kingston at this time is crucial and should be addressed expeditiously. With an Airport Manager, Assistant Manager and Administrative Assistant, 24 hour management coverage can be assured. Additionally, the three positions at each airport can constitute a rudimentary training ground in the business of developing future airport management.

Security management of the two airports involved is recognized as important to the GOJ since they are major contributors to the national economic welfare and their security relates directly to overall internal security. Professionalization of airport security is needed; airport security positions should be consistently manned on a priority basis. This is not possible with the existing ad hoc management and personnel arrangement and resultant division of duties and responsibilities. At this point, airport security represents a national internal security gap. The two international airports are in effect open doors.

In the current world environment, any international airport security organization requires specialized training. Its basic training

should approximate that of policemen in the Jamaican Constabulary Force and go beyond. Specialized training will be necessary in the fields of narcotics suppression, public relations, air carrier needs, customs, immigration and other requirements related to its authority to use force, conduct searches, make arrests, apprehensions and investigations.

To develop these skills with new personnel would be partially counter-productive; the need for mature security personnel at Montego Bay and Kingston is immediate. It is doubtful if the personnel required or force capability can ever be developed from the 156 positions presently authorized for Airport Protection. A more realistic approach is allocation of the airport security task to the Jamaica Constabulary Force, the basic internal security element of the GOJ, and the establishment of a Constabulary Airport Security Detachment at each international airport.

There is sound rationale for this approach:

- a. There are police stations already established at each airport.
- b. There are law enforcement and investigative requirements to be met in several aspects of extortion, hi-jacking and sabotage threats.
- c. Constabulary CID personnel (2) are being trained in explosive ordinance disposal.
- d. The Jamaica Constabulary has a recognized national stature and established official presence.

e. The airports are an essential link in the internal security of Jamaica.

f. Mature, trained constables can be assigned immediately.

g. The relatively few positions involved (38) can be consistently filled:

h. Personnel can be rotated out of the detachments when deficiencies in performance develop.

i. The airport security needs to be better tied in with national and international narcotics suppression efforts.

j. The security force can be easily increased by the Constabulary to meet increased airport activity during national holidays or other occasions. This is difficult with existing organization and manpower limitations.

k. The existing security system does not work.

It is recognized that the Constabulary is somewhat undermanned; however, the relatively small number of personnel needed for both airports and the priority of the airport security task would appear to outweigh this consideration.

Placing police under operational control of another element of government is not an impracticable expedient and is common in many countries. Variations exist in the Philippines, Vietnam and the U. S. where various police elements and organizations are made responsive to elected and/or appointed officials.

Alternatively, the GOJ could retain and improve the present security force; however, this is considered a difficult course of action. It would contain most of the limitations of the existing Airport Protection Service due to its small size, relative youth and lack of professionalism. It is extremely doubtful that Airport Protection Service recruitment could be made sufficiently attractive to meet the need for the consistent manning demanded by two important international airports.

In sum, airport security at Kingston and Montego Bay is presently a transitional arrangement in terms of management, supervision personnel and organization. Security practices are not institutionalized or effective. The existing organizational pattern is divisive in terms of responsibility and does not lend itself to the internal security needs of the GOJ. Detailed surveys of security requirements have not been conducted (partial efforts have been made), no Master Security Plans have been developed for these important international facilities. Existing security conditions directly reflect the fact that air operations at international airports have matured rapidly without a corresponding development in airport security efforts. To bridge this security gap, and adequately protect the sizeable investments made and contemplated in the international airports, extraordinary emphasis is demanded on airport management improvement and general airport security matters.

In view of the range of security and security-related problems involved at the international airports and the established lack of

managerial talent for many airport positions, it is doubtful if the GOJ can accomplish an up-grading of the overall airport security conditions without additional outside assistance. This will be particularly needed in conducting security surveys, developing Master Security Plans, upgrading and training security personnel, developing necessary security interactions with other police elements, narcotics suppression, customs guards, and air carrier security and coping with the international problems of aircraft sabotage, extortion efforts and hi-jacking. Additionally, at least two members of the new security organization and two from the existing rescue/fire-fighting organization should receive up-dated participant training in their functions at suitable outside facilities. Collectively these actions will probably take 18 or more months to develop the required security viability.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That Airport Manager's at Montego Bay and Kingston be immediately provided assistants to fill existing positions.
- b. That Kingston be provided a fully qualified Airport Manager from existing qualified personnel or by seconding or outside contract for the next 24 months.
- c. That a position of Airport Administrative Assistant or Executive Assistant be established for each international Airport Manager to handle daily detailed administrative matters.

d. That Assistant Airport Managers be designated Airport Security Officers with overall security responsibility.

e. That Airport Security Survey's be accomplished at each international airport.

f. That Airport Security Master Plans be developed for each international airport.

g. That Rescue and fire-fighting be separated from facilities security.

h. That Rescue and fire-fighting be responsive to the Airport Manager through his Security Officer.

i. That the GOJ Ministry of Home Affairs be encouraged to establish Airport Security Detachments of approximately 19 mature and qualified constables at each international airport from members of the Jamaica Constabulary Force.

j. That pay scales be increased for rescue/fire-fighting personnel to develop quality and personnel retention or consideration be given to allocating this function to a commercial contract, the Jamaican Defense Force or Jamaica Constabulary Force.

k. That the GOJ encourage enforcement of existing legislation concerning essential services to assure the presence of fire-fighting and rescue services at international airports as a matter affecting national prestige, safety and public service.

l. That the new Airport Security Detachments be under the operational control of the Airport Managers.

m. That Airport Managers and Deputy or Assistant Airport Managers be provided definitive Job Descriptions outlining scope and responsibilities, particularly in the areas of security.

n. That unbalanced security and rescue/fire-fighting shift patterns be established to match airport patterns of operational activity and avoid wastage of manhours during slack night periods.

o. That representation from Immigration and Customs be included in Airport Security Committees.

p. That two supervisory members of the new airport security force and two supervisory members of the rescue fire-fighting organization receive up-grade training in their functions at modern outside airports.

IX. RELATED AIRPORT FUNCTIONS

Directly related to and inseparable from airport security is the overall handling of passenger traffic in the airport terminal building, departure and arrival areas, baggage areas and adjacent ramps and aprons. The flow of passengers includes influences from Customs, Immigration, Public Health, the airport management and various commercial interests. At both airports the terminals are excessively over-crowded during peak periods, passengers are loosely controlled and security develops some obvious gaps. Much of this is the result of growing

passenger traffic; some is due to inadequate controls or procedures, limited employee training and some faulty cooperation between government and involved airport users.

(Customs and Immigrations segments of this report are contained independently to permit separation by concerned Ministries.)

X. CUSTOMS

Customs personnel are suitably trained in the inspection phase of their functions and for the most part professional in appearance. They are hampered by limited arrest authority and the lack of investigative capabilities. Customs officials possess the basic national responsibility to enforce Jamaican laws on the import or export of weapons. Although generally mature and effective, lapses in the handling of international passengers have been reported. Customs officers are usefully positioned at both airports. (Evaluation of Customs did not include any consideration of the many seaports. This is an extensive area requiring more time than permitted by this evaluation visit.)

Customs Guards were reportedly assigned to airport customs duties on a rotational basis for approximately two week periods. Successive periods do not repeat for approximately 14 weeks. This system precludes developing familiarity with the airport personnel, operations, passenger characteristics, airport security functions, etc.

RECOMMENDATION: That Customs Guards be permanently assigned to each airport on a voluntary basis.

Basic records on weapons and narcotics confiscations were not available. There was conflicting information on the scope of these problems.

RECOMMENDATION: That a basic records system of confiscation of significant items be developed with a view toward establishing the scope of the current specific threats and the efficiency of the Customs operation.

Residual or unclaimed passenger baggage is left unattended and insecure in the arrival areas of each airport where it can be stolen, pilfered, picked up by illegal claimants, smugglers or others involved in contraband activities.

RECOMMENDATION: That Customs personnel be required to secure all residual baggage until claimed by passenger and/or airline personnel (Suitable holding areas for this purpose are available at both airports.)

There are excessive delays in off-loading incoming baggage from aircraft at Kingston. These delays permit obvious opportunities for pilferage or other illegal activities within the aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: That Customs Guards, ramp security patrols and air carriers be made aware of this problem and insure that baggage and cargo off-loading is suitably expedited.

In-transit passengers landed at both airports are required to disembark and undergo quarantine examination. This procedure is needless and overloads already overcrowded airport facilities. It also permits any passenger with illegal intentions the opportunity to make contacts with cooperating airport or other personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: Either leave passengers on board if turn around time is less than one hour, or clear all passengers at first point of landing for Customs, Quarantine and Immigration.

There was no Customs ramp patrol visible to the evaluation team, nor was there any apparent aircraft boarding by Customs officers. A Customs Patrol is reportedly established. Baggage loading is inadequately observed, baggage trolleys (carts) are not surveilled, persons leaving the ramp not adequately checked. This permits pilferage and/or loss of government revenue. Additionally, it permits air carrier or airport personnel to circumvent Customs and recover items left aboard aircraft by collaborating persons.

RECOMMENDATION: Enforce Customs ramp patrol and the requirement to board aircraft and general observation of all persons functioning in ramp and baggage areas.

The Customs collection form for duties is overlong, cumbersome, and excessively detailed. By its nature it causes delays in processing. Each inspector has the responsibility to collect fees due and is required to be prepared to make change. In some instances this develops a tendency to overlook small charges in the interest of convenience. In time this represents a considerable loss in revenue and delays inspections. If a central cashier is established, Customs inspectors need only indicate charges for collection by the cashier who maintains a single change box. The cashier need have no Customs experience.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That a simplified Customs form be developed to be filled out by passengers in the aircraft. It should omit all extraneous information. It could be included as a perforated bottom segment to the disembarkation form for presentation to Customs officials after clearing Immigration.

b. Establish a single cashier position to collect all revenues due as determined by each inspector.

The Customs Guard leaves the customs area with doors open between flights. Domestic passengers, airport personnel and arriving passengers mix freely, presenting multiple opportunities for illegal operations.

RECOMMENDATION: The Customs Guard should remain or lock the door.

The present system of handling peak loads in Customs creates automatic blockages at baggage inspection areas, develops passenger irritants and permits only cursory examination of most baggage. The large majority of incoming passengers are obviously tourists, most on their first visit to Jamaica. Many are family groups; some with several small children. Experienced Customs Inspectors can readily screen out low-risk persons and direct them to depart the airport terminal without further inspection. Persons considered to require detailed baggage inspection can be directed to inspectors for a thorough inspection.

RECOMMENDATION: That senior and experienced Customs Inspectors be appointed to expedite passenger movement through a Selective Inspection System.

At Montego Bay, Customs inspection counters are arranged in a rectangle. This slows the movement of exiting passenger traffic and creates considerable confusion within the Customs inspection area.

RECOMMENDATION: That in conjunction with the previously recommended Selective Inspection System, the Montego Bay inspection counters be re-aligned in aisles with specific provision for a wide central aisle for exiting of those passengers being selectively inspected and moved out.

Any Customs organization is susceptible to various internal and external pressures to encourage corruption. Opportunities for such corruption exist in Jamaica. There is ample experience in other countries to indicate that internal organizations to cope with such conditions are usually ineffectual since they demand the accusation of contemporaries and associates.

RECOMMENDATION: That the GOJ consider the establishment of an internal affairs office, outside Customs, for the detection and investigation of any corrupt practices within the Customs organization.

Customs Guards at both airports lack suitable levels of training in anti-smuggling methods and other related security functions needed for international airports. If key personnel can receive suitable upgrade training, an in-service training effort can be developed in Jamaica.

RECOMMENDATION: That two or three key Customs Guard supervisors be provided up-grade training.

XI. IMMIGRATION

Departing passengers are required to go through Immigration gates, purportedly to detect the departure of wanted persons. Departure Immigration personnel possess no indices of persons being sought. They are not required to stamp passports of departing persons. The principal observed functions are limited to collecting departure boarding cards and cancelling airport head tax receipts. There appears to be no need for this last action since air carriers will collect the head tax with each new ticket. Additionally, the air carriers can collect the passenger boarding cards. Eliminating the positions will provide badly needed space for other functions.

For departure screening, a single master index of wanted persons should be maintained in a central location by Immigration. Multiple indices of this nature are always difficult to maintain in a current condition. The air carriers can be required to deliver all boarding cards to the central index location prior to having the aircraft cleared for departure.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Consider eliminating the departure Immigration positions.
- b. Require air carriers to assemble boarding cards and present the total card deck to a central Immigration Office as part of the aircraft clearance procedure.
- c. Establish and maintain a central Immigration index of wanted persons.

d. Use Immigration departure positions eliminated by this change to man Immigration positions at arrival points where they are badly needed, particularly during peak periods.

Allied to Immigration inbound processing of inbound passengers is Public Health. Nurses query each arriving passenger as to country of origin and recent passage. The great majority originate, and have travelled, in countries with no public health hazard. A small percentage are from countries with adverse public health conditions. The present system causes processing delays. At Montego Bay on August 7 it caused more than 100 Pan Am 747 passengers to stand outside the terminal building awaiting Public Health clearance.

RECOMMENDATION: Consider passing all inbound passengers through Immigration initially. Immigration officials to query each person on countries of origin and direct only those necessary to Public Health nurses.

XII. IDENTIFICATION

The individual identification system at both airports is inadequate. Unidentified or poorly identified persons or vehicles can easily gain access to apron areas, buildings, aircraft or other places of normally limited access. Some of this is due to the unprofessional nature of security guards, much is due to the established identification system and lack of information and enforcement.

As presently constituted, airport personnel can freely move about airport operating areas in standard uniforms and/or marked vehicles. Other persons must possess an appropriately colored badge for various areas as issued by the Airport Manager. Badge holders are not permitted to escort essential personnel or VIP's on the strength of any badge. Separate identification is required for these purposes. This tends toward inflexibility which in turn breeds violations.

The intent of the identification system is sound; implementation is poor due to a lack of enforcement and abuse by those holding identification badges and other airport personnel. The evaluators readily gained access to all areas desired without any identification or challenge, particularly in the immediate vicinity of the airport terminal. Their use of an unmarked vehicle on the ramp was not questioned. Persons with no readily identifiable uniform were observed frequently on the ramps as were ordinary persons interested in departing passengers on various aircraft.

It can be stated that the identification system is of small value to the security aspects of either airport. There are no Access Lists with badge numbers to enable security personnel to check the validity of badges in individual possession for specific areas. Badges can be handed from persons to person indiscriminately. It was informally understood that the badge system is under review and consideration is being given to issuance of badges from the Director of Civil Aviation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That the badge system be retained as a responsibility of the Airport Managers as an inherent operational/security matter.
- b. That Access Lists be developed and placed in the hands of security personnel to insure badges are in proper individual possession for specified areas.
- c. That abuses of the system include immediate withdrawal of badges from the air carrier or individual involved.
- d. That airport and air carrier personnel be required to wear readily identifiable uniforms in lieu of badges.
- e. That air carrier managers be permitted to escort maintenance, VIP and other essential persons without requiring additional badges.
- f. That violators of identification procedures be directed from the limited access areas.

g. That security personnel be trained to recognize individual and vehicle violations and enforce identification procedures.

XIII. AIRPORT TERMINAL PROCEDURES

This section of the evaluation concerns a miscellany of items principally within the purview of the airport management to address, but not without the assistance of other government agencies, air carriers and concessionaires.

Incoming passengers are permitted, even required, to claim their baggage from trolleys (carts) in Montego Bay. This is a poor procedure from a security standpoint, creates confusion and much passenger discontent. It is an air carrier responsibility to deliver individual baggage to passengers. Porters are inclined to selectively deliver baggage from trolleys as requested by passengers. This is an intimidating procedure to solicit tips.

RECOMMENDATION: That the burden of delivering baggage to passengers be placed on air carriers and some control be established over the actions of terminal porters.

Air carriers are not checking boarding passes of departing passengers prior to entering the departure areas in Kingston. This should be a responsibility of the air carriers.

RECOMMENDATION: That the airport management establish this procedure.

There is no Constabulary CID officer with permanent responsibility for enforcement functions at either airport. When such services are needed, a new officer is usually detailed in each instance. Necessary airport familiarity is not developed.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Airport Managers request permanent assignment of a CID officer for the airport jurisdictions.

College students in part-time employment at the Kingston airport were observed manning security positions, particularly the entrance to departure and in-transit areas. These students do not have the maturity, authority or competence to perform such functions.

RECOMMENDATION: That this practice be discontinued and qualified security officers man these posts.

Aircraft arrivals at both airports are announced by air carriers by gate numbers. Since passengers can be met only outside the Customs area, these announcements cause unnecessary confusion in the terminal.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Airport Manager require arrivals to be announced without reference to gate numbers and outline the need to meet passengers outside the Customs area.

Air carrier personnel at both airports are leading passengers into the airport terminal areas much too quickly, and using too few personnel for adequate control. This results in stringing out passengers,

leaving some in the aircraft and generally confusing the situation on the airport ramps. This procedure permits passengers to wander off and circumvent Customs, meet other personnel for illegal activity in addition to being generally inconvenient for the passengers.

RECOMMENDATION: That air carriers be required to provide more ground escort personnel and/or stewardesses to assist in controlling the movement of deplaning passengers.

At both airports in-transit, domestic and other passengers, in addition to airport employees, are commingled in the in-transit facilities. This is a major security deficiency. It permits improper access to duty-free goods, overloads facilities and tends to encourage various illegal actions in narcotics, weapons, etc. It can be remedied since both airports have areas which can be used to segregate domestic passengers from all others.

RECOMMENDATION: That domestic passengers be separated from all others in boarding and deplaning.

At Kingston, doors at arrival and departure gates to the airport apron are left open, permitting unimpeded entrance and exit. This encourages illegal activity.

RECOMMENDATION: That doors be equipped with suitable automatic closing devices and be a subject for attention by air carriers, customs and security patrols.

Some confusion and/or duplication exists in internal spraying of aircraft. Pan Am Flight 434 from New York (August 1) was sprayed in flight. In-transit passengers were disembarked at Kingston while a Jamaican official again sprayed the aircraft. The passengers were uncomfortably disposed outside the aircraft on a very busy ramp while spraying took place. Similar instances were observed with other arrivals. Unnecessary deplaning of passengers, or lack of control after deplaning, tends to multiply the opportunity for illegal operations, diminishes the effect of established security and requires increased efforts from Customs Guards, airport security and air carrier personnel.

There is inadequate patrolling of the external ramp areas at both airports by Customs patrols and airport security. Security coordination is not satisfactory. Without patrolling and interaction by all available agencies, unsafe and illegal activities are simplified and become major problems. This is a matter for specific attention by the Airport Managers.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That specific patrol responsibilities be outlined and implemented.
- b. That security coordination be developed between all concerned agencies.
- c. That this item be included in the Master Security Plan and discussed at Airport Security Committee meetings.

At both airports ramp telephone communications systems are either inadequate or missing in part. The principal difficulties concern budgetary requirements and contractor performance. Without an effective system, unsafe or illegal conditions are difficult to report. This problem is being addressed by the Director, Civil Aviation.

Purchases of duty free liquor and other purchases at Kingston create baggage overweight conditions. This presently causes passengers to return the length of the terminal to the airline ticket counter, against the flow of outbound passenger traffic, creating considerable reverse passenger movement within the terminal. In Montego Bay this problem is minimized by locating the duty-free counters reasonably adjacent to the air carrier ticket counters. This will be accomplished at Kingston with current plans.

There are no routine or required procedures for baggage and/or body searches for weapons or other contraband items for departing airline passengers. Under "normal" conditions this is acceptable; however, indications now point to an increasing possibility of hi-jacking or other illegal activity involving aircraft and passengers. Additional precautionary measures are necessary; new procedures and supporting equipment are needed.

At present two Constabulary CID officers are undergoing explosive ordinance disposal training to cope with the possibility of bomb

or other sabotage threats. A bomb threat procedure is in its initial draft. There are no magnetometers in use, either hand-held or fixed, for weapons or other metal detection. A single mobile portal type magnetometer, mounted for movement between exit gates, would serve this purpose at each airport. These should be capable of both fixed and active field detection of ferrous and non-ferrous metals. Additionally, hand-held magnetometers with the same detection capabilities should be made available to the GOJ for use in body searches and baggage checks when conditions warrant. Outbound spot checks for weapons should now be conducted by both security and Customs personnel, in conjunction with air carriers and Constabulary CID. A formal, full-scale system of outbound checking should be established for implementation as required. Inbound checks, if implemented, could be without air carrier involvement.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That airport procedures be established for body search of departing passengers in conjunction with passenger profile procedures, document inspection, interview and selective searching.

b. That hand-held and portal type magnetometers be utilized for weapons detection by security personnel at both international airports.

XIV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

A position of Senior Executive Engineer-Electrical has been vacant within the Civil Aviation Department for approximately two years.

There was a partial failure of the Kingston normal electrical system during the evaluation. In view of the many electrical and technical aspects of maintaining and operating modern airport facilities, the security involved and the heavy investment outlay, this position should be filled without delay.

RECOMMENDATION: That the GOJ Ministry of Public Utilities, Communications and Transport be encouraged to provide a suitable electrical engineer for this critical position vacancy.

All airport revenues from landing fees, head tax, concessionaires, etc. are channeled into the national consolidated funds. Budgetary support for overall airport operations and maintenance is not derived directly from these funds, but through an extensive budgetary and programming cycle which hampers the needed expedited attention to a multitude of airport matters. In terms of security, the availability of the funds bear a directly on the pay, vehicles, facilities, training, fuel, maintenance, communications and many other items involving security personnel. A principal complaint voiced by air carriers is that airport revenues are apparently not automatically re-cycled into airport improvements.

If an Airport Improvement Trust Fund, or other fund equivalent to airport revenues, could be established within the Ministry of Public Utilities, Communications and Transport, overall airport improvement, maintenance and operations should show considerable advancement.

RECOMMENDATION: That the GOJ Ministry of Finance and Planning be encouraged to develop an Airport Improvement Trust Fund with revenues derived from airport income, or with allocation of an equivalent amount.

