


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**Police Survey Mission
to the
REPUBLIC OF RWANDA**



May 1964

REVIEWED AND DECLASSIFIED by Lauren J. Goin, Director, OPS, January, 1975

**Office of Public Safety
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Washington, D.C.**

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FOREWORD

In July 1963, the Government of Rwanda requested United States assistance for its internal security forces, both military and police. This request took the form of detailed lists of equipment and local construction requirements for the two services.

In late December 1963, a marked adverse change in the internal security situation of Rwanda occurred. Armed Tutsi refugee incursions from Burundi, Uganda and the Congo made deep penetrations into the country. These invasions were repulsed, but there were subsequent reprisals and mass killings of indigenous Tutsi civilians in Rwanda by some elements of the Hutu majority.

This change in the internal security situation resulted in a joint State/AID proposal for a two-man AID Public Safety survey team, to evaluate the Government of Rwanda request for assistance to its civil police forces. This proposal made on April 17, 1964, included the assignment of Public Safety Advisors John Manopoli and Adolphe Bonnefil. The carrying out of this survey was contingent upon the approval of the Government of Rwanda. This approval was granted on April 24, 1964.

Mr. Manopoli arrived at Kigali, Rwanda, on May 4, 1964, and Mr. Bonnefil arrived on May 9, 1964. The survey was completed on May 21, 1964. All the functions of the survey team were conducted under the policy and administrative direction of the American Ambassador, in accordance with the following State/AID terms of reference:

- A. The purpose of the survey would be to evaluate the GOR request for U. S. assistance to its civil police forces.
- B. The survey would cover those GOR civil police forces responsible for maintaining internal security with a view toward determining the capabilities of all divisions and the activities of these forces, to include inter ali, mission, organization, administration, budget, personnel strength, deployment, records system, training and equipment.
- C. Survey team would expect to consult with U. N. and Belgian police advisors presently assisting Rwanda.
- D. Following a comprehensive survey, the team would prepare a draft report at the post and submit a copy to the Ambassador for comment.

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E. GOR would not be advised of recommendations, it is imperative that the GOR understand that the U.S. will make no firm commitment concerning any eventual program until the survey findings have been reviewed and approved by AID/W.

F. Upon review and approval of the report, AID/W would be prepared to provide appropriately sanitized version to the GOR for its information.

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SUMMARY

The salient points presented in this report are as follows:

1. The present Rwandan Government through its laws and actions has exhibited until now a pro-Western attitude. There is no firm assurance that it will remain so.
2. Since its previous unrealistic requests for military and police commodity assistance were rejected by the United States, the United Nations and other donors, the Rwandan Government has become critical and suspicious of all current efforts to assist them in these fields.
3. There is marked negative political reaction to the alleged failure of the United States Government to assist the Government of Rwanda before and during their internal security crisis.
4. The depressed economic picture, together with a lack of a national infrastructure dictates that any technical or commodity assistance provided by the United States to the internal security forces should have a low incidence of recurring costs and be simple of comprehension, operation and maintenance.
5. The major internal security problem is the Tutsi minority effort to re-gain political control of Rwanda. This effort has the less than neutral blessing of the Tutsi-controlled Government of Burundi; and the clandestine assistance of Burundi based Chinese Communists.
6. Except for smuggling, there are no abnormal amounts of common criminal activity that pose an additional threat to the internal security of Rwanda. The Hutu and Tutsi population is normally law abiding.
7. A contemplated merger of the military and the uniformed police services under the Presidency obscures any realistic appraisal of future training, technical or commodity assistance in the civil internal security sector. The impetus for this merger stems from political maneuvering within the ruling Parmehutu party. The demonstrated inefficiency of the police during the recent Tutsi incursion and their susceptibility to prefectural pressure are alleged to be additional reasons for this merger.
8. The Belgian, United Nations, West German and French efforts in the police assistance field have to this date been uncoordinated and ineffective.

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9. The United Nations police assistance program has been discontinued. It consisted of an abortive attempt at police training and raising and then dashing Rwandan hopes with unimplemented promises of commodity assistance.

10. The French Government is undertaking to provide three police training officers to the National Police School. Two of these three advisors are scheduled to arrive before the end of May 1964.

11. The Belgian Government is furnishing substantial amounts of financial and technical assistance to the Rwandan military and police services. A major training effort by Belgian military advisors is constructing a sound base for the Rwandan National Guard.

12. Belgian technical advisors to the National Police and Surete are not highly qualified and are too few in number. As a result both services are drifting toward further inefficiency. Improved Belgian police advisory assistance to these police forces should be encouraged. Belgian commodity assistance to the National Police has taken the form of uniforms and a small amount of arms and ammunition.

13. The National Police as constituted, and the Surete, require intensive training, organizational and administrative assistance.

14. U.S. overall participation should be minimal at this time, and should not attempt to duplicate or supplant any existing or planned Belgian or French technical assistance.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

1. The most vital internal security problem faced by the Rwandan Government is the threat of Tutsi subversion. GOR officials have demonstrated a marked lack of comprehension of the ways and means best suited to cope with this problem. They believe that the solution lies only in commodity assistance to their internal security forces. They fail to recognize that the civil police forces lack training, organization and planning for the future. In their impatient quest for training, technical and commodity assistance from donor countries they exhibit a shotgun approach.

2. The civil police forces of Rwanda, as presently constituted do not have the minimum professional ability or the required facilities to absorb readily the amounts of commodity assistance that their internal security functions would normally call for. The National Police grew from 300 to 1,000 men in the course of approximately two years. No additional buildings, offices or lodgings for this additional personnel were provided. This needed construction, together with the budgetary support required for large amounts of commodity assistance would unduly strain the national budget.

3. Belgian police technical assistance has been reduced from 50 prior to Independence to two. This reduction resulted in part from austerity measures taken by the Government. Rwanda pays RF 9,000 per month plus lodging for each Belgian technician. By early 1963 only four Belgian technicians remained. Two of these who were instructors at the police training school were eliminated later in that year. Only two Belgian police technicians remain, neither is well qualified.

4. In February 1963, the Rwandan Government accepted the services of a United Nations police advisor, heavily experienced in French Surete operations. He was assigned to the National Police School. In February 1964, the GOR abruptly declared this U.N. police advisor persona non grata. The U.N. thereupon cancelled its police assistance program.

5. The French Government under a bi-lateral assistance accord is furnishing three police advisors as instructors for the National Police School. The terms of the accord limit the operations of these technicians to instructing recruit, non-commissioned officer and senior officer classes. Two of these three technicians are scheduled to arrive in Rwanda prior to the end of May 1964. Presumably, the Belgian police advisors will concern themselves with organizational, administrative and operational procedures.

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6. The Federal Government of Germany recently donated six motorcycles to the National Police. Because of the lack of proper roads, the utilization of this equipment will be minimal. This is another example of uncoordinated commodity assistance.

7. The National Police now have a fleet of ten small International pickup trucks that are in good condition. In addition they have two light Chevrolet trucks in good condition. The 1964 police budget provides for an additional fifteen International Scout cars. Ten of these fifteen have been ordered, of which five are scheduled for delivery in late June 1964. The remaining five will be ordered as soon as the GOR has foreign exchange available.

8. The National Police are well uniformed in colors distinct from the military. Belgian bugetary support is used to purchase uniform items not manufactured in Rwanda.

9. The Belgian Government has furnished all the armament now being used by the National Police.

10. The major commodity deficiency of the Police services is in communications. Long distance telephone communications is non-existent. The antiquated radio network made of obsolete AM-voice stations now installed in prefectural buildings is shared by the Surete, the National Police, the Judicial Police and the prefectural administration. The system is under the control of the Prefects and priority is given to administrative messages. Only six of the thirteen stations in this network are in current operation.

11. The Surete is undermanned, under-organized and under equipped. The present Belgian advisor to this organization is a military officer of the parachute command. He is hard working, cooperative and well intentioned, but does not have the required administrative or investigative experience to properly advise a Surete Intelligence operation.

12. The President of the GOR is planning to absorb the National Police Force into the military structure of the National Army. Belgian military advisors and the Commandant of the National Army are proposing that the Rwandan military exert logistical and disciplinary control over a Gendarmerie type police force under a joint Chief of Staff. It appears that neither the French Government nor the Belgian police advisors are aware of the plan for the formation of a Gendarmerie-type police organization.

Recommendations

13. In view of the positive pro-Western attitude of the GOR and its location in an area where Chinese Communists are actively engaged in subversive activities, it would serve U.S. interests to assist this country in fending off the leftist oriented Tutsi subversion efforts. This can be done by increasing the capabilities of the internal security forces.

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14. Prompt U.S. commodity assistance in amounts capable of being readily absorbed by the civil police forces would have considerable impact value in view of the fact that the GOR has been unable to obtain such assistance from the U.N. and that Belgian commodity assistance is minimal.

15. Because of the political tension that exists between Rwanda and Burundi, utmost care should be exercised by the U.S. so as not to appear to favor one country over the other. For this reason, particularly, it is recommended that commodity assistance granted to either country be clearly of a non-offensive nature.

16. It is recommended that for the present the U.S. forego any assistance in the training, organizational, administrative and operational sectors of the civil police forces, except in direct support of the recommended commodity assistance. While not adequate nor effective, it is apparent that French and Belgian technical assistance has pre-empted these fields. Any U.S. attempt to inject police technicians into these areas under existing circumstances would only add further to an already confused situation.

17. Because of the likely absorption of the National Police by the military, the eventual police fleet of 27 vehicles should be sufficient for the force as now constituted. The U.S. should not furnish any commodity assistance other than that recommended until a decision is made by the GOR as to the future organization of the National Police.

18. The GOR request of May 1963 for U.S. support of the construction of police buildings and camps should be rejected. Because of the absence of AID generated local currency, U.S. dollars would be needed for the importing of all the required construction material.

19. It is recommended that no arms or ammunition be furnished to the civil police forces of Rwanda.

20. The most pressing need of the civil police forces is communications facilities. Immediate assistance in this field would be of a definite value and create a beneficial impact. An adequate communications network would improve the intelligence and defensive capability of the internal security forces in deterring future Tutsi refugee attempts to subvert the Government.

21. It is recommended that a 15 fixed station (13 actual, 2 reserve) single sideband, non transistor, 50 watt voice and CW (code) radio network be provided. This system would provide for a communications capability between the capital (Kigali), the nine prefectural police units, the Judicial Police and the two important border posts of Cyanika and Kakitumba. In addition, gasoline driven generators, a two year supply of spare parts and testing equipment should be programmed. The equipment should be as simple as possible, with no deviations from manufacturer's regularly produced models. Installation can be made by Belgian technicians of the PTT, with the assistance and supervision of a Public Safety Communications advisor. The PTT continually conducts courses in CW operation and these would be made available to train civil police force personnel. This equipment should be placed under the operational control of the Ministry of the Interior and used and

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operated primarily for police service. In addition it should also be available for prefectural administration needs. In the event of the absorption of the uniformed police into the Gendarmerie type unit, this equipment would be compatible with the police requirements of the Gendarmerie and the Surete. Refer to an Annex to this report for a map of the recommended communications system.

22. It is recommended that a TDY communications Public Safety advisor complete the required documentation in consultation with the Belgian PTT technicians, who have already made the needed site and wave propagation studies. The long lead times required for documentation, contract award and ocean and overland delivery to Rwanda would be counterproductive to any U.S. effort. It would further aggravate the GOR attitude toward slow performance by prospective donors. It is recommended that equipment delivery be by air freight, phased in to arrive two months before a full-tour French speaking Public Safety Communications Advisor.

23. It is recommended that a full tour technician, Public Safety Advisor Communications be assigned this program. He should finalize site preparations for the installation of the equipment, assist and supervise the installation of the equipment, prepare and conduct basic operators course at the police school, prepare and conduct a course in administrative and operational control of a police communications system for superior officers, prepare a radio operators manual and the operational forms required for a communications system, install an inventory system for equipment and spare parts, select, orient and document participant trainees and oversee the continued maintenance and operation of the system by the PTT.

24. It is recommended that a one year third country participant training course in radio maintenance be provided for two Rwandan police officers. This course should be in French and the commodity specifications should require the availability of this type of training through the manufacturer.

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INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Rwanda is a landlocked country located in the East Central African highlands. It is bordered by Uganda, Tanganyika, Burundi and the Republic of the Congo. It is slightly larger than the State of Vermont, having an area of 10,169 square miles. It lies east of the Congo, astride the mountain range that divides the Congo and Nile watersheds. About 2/3 of the area is mountainous. The eastern 1/3 is a gradual rolling descent to the Kagera river border with Tanganyika. Nearly half of the country lies above 5,000 feet in altitude. Rwanda has an equatorial climate, tempered altitude. The rains (50 to 60 inches per year) fall principally from February to May, with a lighter season from October to December.

The population of Rwanda is nearly 3,000,000 and the population density is about 290 per square mile. This is the highest of any country in sub-Saharan Africa. The population growth is estimated at 3.0% per year, indicating a doubling of the population of 6,000,000 in 25 years. People and livestock are already pressing on the available arable land. In spite of the dense population, there is no village life on Rwanda's hillsides. Kigali, the capital city, has an estimated population of only 5,000. The two main ethnic groups are the Hutu, who comprise 84% of the population and the Tutsi, who comprised 15% of the population prior to 1959. Over the centuries, the Tutsi have spread themselves throughout the country. One finds them in greater concentration in the South Central region, adjacent to Burundi. This region was classically the seat of the Mwami (king). Inversely, the north has always been the seat of Hutu resistance to the Tutsi monarchy. Four centuries of Tutsi rule and the later Belgian regime have made the Hutu innately suspicious of the outside world.

From 1924 until Independence Rwanda, as part of the territory of Ruanda-Urundi was administered by Belgium under a mandate of the League of Nations and subsequently under a trusteeship regime of the United Nations. Belgium was responsible for the maintenance of peace and order and the defense of the territory. It was granted full powers of legislation and administration. Until June 1960, it was administered jointly with the Belgian Congo. In 1959, after bloody rioting the Hutu majority deposed the ancient Tutsi royalty. King Kigeri V fled the country and is presently in exile in Uganda. In 1961, a republic with an elected government was established and Gregoire Kayibanda was elected President. Complete independence was achieved on July 1, 1962, and a constitution was promulgated on December 12, 1962. It is to be noted that the Constitution specifically prohibits all Communist activity and propaganda. The Constitution gives strong executive power to the President, who is also Commander in Chief of the Garde Nationale. The country is divided into 10 prefectures, each administered by a Prefect appointed by the President. According to its size, each Prefecture is divided into a number of communes. These communes, which total 141, are administered by communally elected Bourgmestres.

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Shortly after Independence, Rwanda became the first and only country not formerly a French colony to join the UAM (Afro-Malagasy Union). Upon dissolution of the UAM, Rwanda remained in the UAMCE (Afro-Malagasy Union for Economic Cooperation). Rwanda has developed into a virtual one-party state, the Hutu party (Parmehutu) having received 97% of the votes in the 1963 communal elections.

A deep-rooted ethnic antagonism exists between the Hutus and Tutsis, and complicated the work of the government. Since the overthrow of the better educated Tutsi minority, the level of administration has deteriorated by a rapid influx of inexperienced and poorly educated Hutus in the civil service. The government is now being assisted by 250 Belgian Technical Advisors in the various fields of government, including the Military, the Police and the Surete. The Belgian-Rwanda technical assistance agreements call only for technicians and some financial support but no commodity support, except for small amounts of light military equipment. The United Nations program in Rwanda is conducted by 20 technicians, none of whom are assigned to the internal security forces.

The per capita income in Rwanda is between \$40 and \$50 dollars U.S., the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa. The economy is almost 100% agricultural and pastoral. All farming is done by hand tools and no beasts of burden are used. It is a highly overpopulated country in relation to its ability to rise above a subsistence economy which fortunately provides an ample but not nutritional food supply. In previous years, coffee as the principal crop, accounted for 65% of the country's exports. In 1963 this fell to 25% of the total exports. This important portion of the economy has suffered from the failure of the Government to persuade the Hutus to voluntarily keep up the high standards of coffee cultivation that the Belgians had maintained by compulsion. Cotton, cattle, and hides are also produced. A substantial amount of tin is mined. In 1963 this accounted for 62% of the total exports. Cattle are considered a sign of wealth and are not ordinarily raised for beef. The labor force is almost entirely pastoral or agricultural. Technical and professional workers are rare. The limited means of production, transportation and marketing are controlled by foreigners. Foreign exchange resources are exhausted and the balance of payments deficit is steadily rising. The Rwanda budget is supported by a small Belgian subsidy for recurring expenditures. Private investment has dwindled and government funds allocated for development have been spent on the military. The economic effects caused by the threats of Tutsi invasion and the breakup of the customs and monetary union with Burundi are hitting hard. The Rwandan franc slipped to 1/2 of its official value of 50 to the U.S. dollar. This unofficial but legal rate has been constant for the past year. A brief analysis of the Rwandan national budget indicated the following; in relation to internal security expenditures.

(in 000 Rwandan Francs)

	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964 (proposed)</u>
Total	604,000	650,000	729,000
*Total for Internal Security	89,000	122,000	177,000
% of Total for Internal Security	14.75%	18.75%	24.25%

* Includes Army, Police and Surete.

The national language of Rwanda is Kinyarawanda, a Bantu tongue. The official languages are Kinyarawanda and French. A dialect of Swahili is also spoken. Although elementary education is compulsory and free, the great majority of students do not complete primary school. It is estimated that 90 percent of the population is illiterate. There are no native doctors in Rwanda, only one lawyer and one civil engineer, who is a Tutsi. Practically all education is conducted by either Catholic or Protestant religious groups partially subsidized by the Government. The Rwanda National University, with a student body of 50, was opened in October 1963. The total number of students in secondary schools is about 4000 (2800 boys and 1200 girls).

The road network, urban and rural totals about 3700 miles, of which only 35 miles are paved. This road network is fairly well kept but continually suffers from landslides and erosion caused by heavy rains. Travel by road is time consuming, arduous and, during the rainy season, often impossible. There are no railroads in Rwanda. All equipment and supplies come into Rwanda via combinations of railroad, waterways and roads from the ports of Mombasa, Kenya, or Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika, both of which are 1,100 miles from Kigali. There was a total of 1,973 vehicles of all types registered in 1963. A government-owned public transportation system using eight buses was opened in March 1964. This system connects the 10 prefectural capitals. There are four airports in Rwanda. The Kamembe and Kigali airports can receive up to DC-4 size aircraft. Kamembe is the only airport that is asphalted and which has refueling facilities. The Kigali airport is being remodeled to enlarge the landing strip to accept up to DC-7 size aircraft. It is also being asphalted and refueling facilities are being installed. The airports at Butare and Namba can only accommodate small passenger craft. A number of small mostly unused landing strips are scattered throughout the country.

Electrical power supply in Rwanda is limited to several prefectures and is uncertain. It is 220 volt, 50 cycle. It is supplied through the Regideso, a parastatal authority. Regideso supplies power to the cities of Kigali, Gisenyi and Cyangugu and several tin mines through small Belgian-owned hydroelectric plants. The cities of Butare and Nyabisindu are supplied by diesel power plants. The city of Rehengeri is directly supplied by a privately owned (Belgian) power company. All other electrical power for the operation of mission, mines, etc., is privately produced.

The Ministry of Posts, Telegraph and Telecommunications (PTT) operates and maintains a commercial teleprinter and voice connections between Brussels and Kigali. Kigali, in turn, is connected with eight prefectural capitals (all but Gikongoro) and with Nyabisindu, the seat of the Supreme Court and the former royal capital of Rwanda. The interior commercial connections are AM voice only. A telecommunications project has been submitted for government consideration by the Belgian PTT advisor. This envisions the installation of teleprinter and voice connections from all the prefectural capitals to Kigali.

The telephone system in Rwanda is also controlled by the PTT and consists of manually operated telephones, located in the following cities: Kigali - 325, Gitarama - 20, Butare - 200, Gisenyi - 200 and Cyangugu - 200. The telephone service within and to these cities can be classified as very erratic. AID/W has agreed to a feasibility study for the improvement of the Kigali telephone system.

INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS

1. The major internal security threat to Rwanda is the serious inter-tribal and political conflict between Hutu and Tutsi. The first violent outbreak of this nature occurred late in 1959. The Tutsi king was overthrown in the bloody revolution. A government was established in October 1960, dominated by the concentration of Hutu political power in the Parmehutu party. A minor Hutu party, the Aprosoma, cooperated in the first government but has since virtually disappeared from the scene. The Tutsi political party called UNAR (Rwandan National Union) was formed in September 1959. At that time it was composed of both Tutsi and Hutu nationalists. Its overt activities for independence led to Belgian disfavor. After the 1959 revolution the party became almost uniquely a Tutsi party. A United Nations supervised national election in September 1961 resulted in the election of seven UNAR deputies out of a total of forty-four. At the time of the Tutsi incursions of late 1963, four of these UNAR deputies were in exile. Two of the remaining three deputies, one a Hutu, were executed by the authorities, along with a reported additional twenty UNAR leaders and suspected sympathizers. This occurred during the height of the Hutu reaction to the December 20, 1963, invasion by the Tutsi. These executions took place at the Ruhengeri prison. The Government of Rwanda has never admitted them, but has let it be known that the courts-martial and executions resulted from an incriminating list found on the attacking Tutsi. This list allegedly indicated that the slain leaders were implicated in an attempt to overthrow the government and re-install the Tutsi monarchy.

There now exist three Tutsi political groups; the UNAR-Interior, the UNAR-Exterior and the Inyenzi. Following the events of December, UNAR-Interior is to all intents and purposes nonexistent. UNAR-Exterior is most active in Burundi, with slighter activities in Uganda, Tanganyika and the Congo. Representatives of this UNAR-Exterior group attended the Bloc oriented Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in Algiers during April 1964. A resolution was adopted at this conference condemning the genocide of Tutsi by Hutu, and inviting Afro-Asian countries to break diplomatic relations with the Republic of Rwanda.

The Inyenzi, a Tutsi terrorist organization has been active in the across-the-border invasions. UNAR-Exterior is said to be its spokesman, but the nebulous nature of this Inyenzi group clouds the association between the two groups. Rwanda Surete and other Belgian sources claim that the Inyenzi have received, and are still receiving Chinese Communist aid in their efforts to pressure and incite the 150,000 Tutsi refugees to violence. During the period of this survey, a Belgian source advised the American Embassy that ten Rwandan Tutsis had returned to Africa after training at Peking. Eight of these were alleged to have returned to Burundi and two to Uganda. This Belgian source further supplied the Embassy with two of the names of the Burundi contingent. The avowed ultimate goal of the two Tutsi organizations abroad is the restoration of the Mwami (king) in Rwanda. The crossing of the Rwandan

borders in December 1963 by the Tutsi and their advance to within 15 miles of Kigali caused panic in government circles. They estimated that Rwanda's army of about 1000 men and the National Police numbering about 900 men would not be able to cope with the invaders. The Government dispatched cabinet ministers to each Prefecture to mobilize the Hutu civilian population to resist the incursion. They did their job too well. The Hutu fear of the re-establishment of Tutsi supremacy resulted in vicious reprisals against the indigenous Tutsi and against many Hutus as well.

The National Police under operational control of the Prefects were allegedly involved in these reprisal killings. The National Army, which turned back the Tutsi march on Kigali likewise is reported to have indulged in some atrocities. There are substantial indications that reasons of personal gain and settling of old scores prompted many Prefectural and communal leaders to incite the civilian populace against the Tutsi.

The Congo, Uganda and Tanganyika are using their limited resources to hold in check the Tutsi refugees in their respective countries. Burundi, still under control of its Tutsi minority, is the haven of about 50,000 Rwandan Tutsis. Burundi claims to have followed Uganda's example of sealing its Rwandan borders to Tutsi refugees bent on returning to Rwanda. At the same time, it officially complained of Western diplomatic pressures in what it declared to be a purely internal affairs. The best figures available indicate that about 150,000 emigre Tutsis are located in the surrounding countries and that about 200,000 remain in Rwanda. The Rwandan government is apprehensive of its ability to contain any reprisals by the Hutu in the event of future attacks by the Tutsis. Further, the government is fearful that Government of Burundi and Bloc aid to the UNAR and Inyenzi might result in the achievement of the avowed UNAR and Inyenzi purpose.

2. Early in April 1964 both Mr. Hans Karl Frey, Swiss counselor to President Kayibanda, and Mr. G. C. Senn of the International Committee of the Red Cross recommended to the President that all internal security forces be placed under the Presidency. They both cited as reasons the misuse of both organizations during the Tutsi incursions. They presented evidence that political pressure by the Prefects had influenced the National Guard and the National Police to take part in the retaliations against resident Tutsi. Presumably, this merger would remove the military and the police forces from the influence of various Parmehutu politicians. The President replied that he would consider bringing this force under his control only if he felt that such action would be desirable in terms of his political needs. For reasons which follow, the President seems to have "bought" this concept. However, this decision has been kept from all government leaders, including the present Minister of the National Guard. The preliminary planning of this concept was entrusted to Major Habyarimana, Commandant of the National Guard, and Commandant Frans, Chief Belgian military advisor. Major Habyarimana, although only 28 years of age, is considered by the Belgian military advisors to be an excellent officer. The President regards him as loyal and capable. The Minister of the National Guard, Calliope Mulin-dahabi, is barely on speaking terms with Major Habyarimana.

It is envisaged that the new National Guard of 3,000 men will be under a Chief of Staff directly responsible to the President, and that the present office of Minister of the National Guard will be abolished. Responsible to the Chief of Staff would be two commandants. One would head a 1,500-man unit of the military and the

other a new unit of 1,500 Gendarmerie. Major Frans indicated that the new Gendarmerie would assume all the powers of the National Police, which would be disbanded. Acceptable elements of the National Police would be absorbed into the Gendarmerie after additional training. It will be proposed that the Gendarmerie unit depend upon the military for disciplinary and logistical support. It is planned that the National Police would remain in existence until this new police force is organized, trained and prepared to take over its police functions. An estimated time of from one to two years was given for the complete implementation of this plan. It is proposed to have Belgian Gendarmerie officers as advisors to organize and train this Gendarmerie unit. Commandant Frans commented that the present Belgian police advisors, while holding the rank of Commissaire of Police in Rwanda, were both Sergeants in the Belgian Gendarmerie. He indicated that they did not have the required experience and training to train the proposed Gendarmerie unit properly. Commandant Frans expressed the strong feeling that any substantial commodity aid to the National Police at this time would be premature. He felt that the training and equipment requirements of the proposed Gendarmerie unit would be entirely different from the requirements of what he characterized as the present "communal police." He was certain that the National Police would be replaced. He indicated that the commodity assistance of the United States could be put to a more intelligent use in the Gendarmerie. Belgian Ambassador Standhart advised the Embassy that Major Frans had recently been to Brussels to expedite the shipping of needed arms for the National Guard of Rwanda. Frans had at that time received the promise of the Belgian Foreign Office that Gendarmerie Officers would be made available for the proposed formation of the Gendarmerie unit.

3. Smuggling is the only common criminal activity that has an internal security implication. It has increased to alarming proportions. It is adversely affecting the economy of the country by sorely reducing accruable taxes and foreign exchange. The government recently gave a Belgian company, Agence Maritime Internationale, a virtual monopoly on the truck transport of goods into and out of Rwanda. This presumably was to put a stop to any attempts at large-scale smuggling. Most of this smuggling is now being conducted by loosely organized bands of individuals, who personally carry the contraband across into Uganda and Tanganyika and sell it for shillings. The price received in Uganda and Tanganyika is double that received locally. The difference in the rate of the Rwandan franc is: official rate paid to producers 50 to the US \$ versus the free market (unofficial but legally used) 100 to the US \$. The wildness of the border area makes it almost impossible for customs authorities to control this individual type of smuggling operation.

An inter-ministerial study completed in April 1964 indicates that the tin available to the smugglers is obtained from illegal exploitation of mines and thefts from State-granted concessions. The officially published increase in tin production in Uganda (36 tons in 1959 versus 144 tons in 1963) and Tanganyika (69 tons in 1959 versus 225 tons in 1963) is attributed in some part to Rwandan tin smuggled over the border. It is estimated that 400 tons of tin are lost per year through smuggling. Valued at 40 francs per kilo, this represents a loss of 35,000,000 francs or some \$700,000 in foreign exchange earnings.

Available figures on coffee production indicate an annual crop sold in Rwanda of about 6,000 tons. It is estimated that in addition 2,000 tons of coffee are smuggled out of the country each year. Taken at 40 francs per kilo, this represents a loss to Rwanda of about 80,000,000 francs or nearly 1-1/2 million dollars per year.

This commission has recommended the elimination of the double rate of exchange and the development of a special brigade of the National Police to suppress smuggling activity.

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

Despite its approval by President Kayibanda for a survey of the civil police force, the co-operation of Rwandan Government authorities was less than acceptable. The natural scepticism, suspicion and distrust of the Hutu people is no less evident in its government officials.

The one meeting held with the Minister of the National Guard resulted in a statement that no information could be given until the United States showed its good faith by supplying equipment to the military.

Another single meeting was held with the Minister of the Interior. While not as blunt, the same inferences for commodity assistance were expressed. No further discussions with Rwandan Government officials were held. Paradoxically, the Minister of Interior gave permission to his Belgian legal advisor Mr. Alain Chermiset and to Police Commissaire Pilate to discuss fully with the survey team, the National Police organization and its problems. He also consented to field trips by the survey team with Commissaire Pilate. Permission for discussion of the organization and problems of the National Surete with the survey team was given to Major Tulpin.

The following analysis of the internal security forces is based on numerous meetings with Belgian advisors to the Military, Police, Surete, Judicial, Communications and Public Utility Services of the Government of Rwanda; copies of confidential reports of the U.N. police advisor (which the survey team left on file at the Embassy); examination of Embassy files; and field survey trips. These field survey trips included the Judiciary Police at Nyabisindu, Surete headquarters at Kigali, the National Police School at Ruhengeri, prefectural police detachments at Kibungo, Butare, Gitarama, Ruhengeri and Byumba, border camps near Karama, and National Police Headquarters at Kigali. Field survey trips also included communal police locations at Kabarundo, Ruhengeri and Byumba.

Throughout the course of this survey, the Belgian advisors, both military and civil police, stressed the difficulty encountered in having the higher ministerial officials accept any organizational and administrative suggestions. They alluded that this difficulty was a combination of lack of ability and a distrust of the alleged ulterior motives of any assistance effort.

It would be well at this time to summarize the Rwandan Government's request for commodity assistance to the military and police forces made to the American Embassy in a letter dated July 22, 1963, from the Minister of Planning, Cooperation and Technical Assistance:

	<u>In 000 RF</u>
Construction and Equipment for the National Guard	375,361
Construction and Equipment for the Youth Corps	20,582
Construction and Equipment for the National Police	25,005
Construction for the National Police School	5,000
*Total	425,948 RF

* \$8,500,000 at the rate of 50 to 1

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INTERNAL SECURITY FORCESNATIONAL POLICE1. History and Background:

Prior to Independence on July 1, 1962, the Belgian Government maintained a Gendarmerie type force of approximately 800 men. This force known as the "Force Publique" was comprised mostly of Congolese enlisted men and Belgian officers. In September of 1960 Sergeant Henri Pilate, present Belgian advisor to the National Police, was assigned to Rwanda with 50 Belgian Gendarmes. This assignment was for the organization of the Rwandan portion of a territorial police headquartered at Bujumbura. The Congolese members of the Force Publique were gradually repatriated and replaced by the new force. This new force was predominantly Tutsi in character, with officer rank reserved for the Belgian contingent. The highest rank to which indigenous personnel could aspire was that of Premier Brigadier Chef (NCO). The force was almost totally illiterate, barefoot and poorly equipped. All the administrative and operational records were maintained in Bujumbura, where they remained after Independence. A police school was established at Ruhengeri late in 1960, where a six months' basic course was given to selected Tutsi policemen.

Shortly after Independence, the existing Rwanda portion of the Territorial Police was reorganized into a National Police Force, with the 50 Belgian technicians remaining. To preserve the aura of complete independence, the Belgian detachment commanders were placed under the operational control of the Prefects. Although all detachments are now commanded by Rwandan commissaires, this situation has continued. The Tutsi policemen who formed most of the noncommissioned category and school-trained personnel were released and replaced by hurriedly recruited Hutu. A few Tutsi policemen remained in the new organization, and in spite of tribal strife they do not seem to create a personnel problem.

On June 22, 1962, Presidential decree No. 105/04 formally instituted a National Police Force of Rwanda. On the same date, Decree No. 136/04 of the Minister of Interior set forth the standards of recruitment, allowances, salaries and uniform regulations. These documents are considered as representing an ideal to be attained and have been changed in practice to correspond with the educational and other limitations of the available candidates.

2. Belgian Assistance:

The Government of Rwanda recently appointed Commissaire 3rd Class M. Mubiligi to be Director General of the National Police. The then Inspector General Pilate was designated as his technical advisor, although in reality he still commands the National Police. Of the original 50 Belgian police advisors, all but five were

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repatriated during 1963 as a result of an austerity drive by the Rwandan Government. Early in 1964, three Belgian advisors, who had been instructors at the police school, left the country. Two "resigned" and the other was sent home at the request of the Belgian Government. This is a very touchy subject with the two remaining Belgian advisors. They have knowledge of a United Nations report submitted by Jean Prigent, UN police advisor. This report states that the GOR Minister of the Interior has positively decided to terminate as soon as possible all Belgian assistance to the National Police. Pilate accuses the UN advisor of having maneuvered to discredit Belgian advisors in order to have them replaced by French police technicians. These two advisors are operational in the National Police.

Outside of some antiquated guns and ammunition left behind by the former territorial police and 200 Enfield rifles given by Belgium in 1963, there is no evidence of any direct Belgian commodity grant to the police services. The survey team has been informed by the Belgian advisor that on occasion the Belgian Government has reimbursed the Rwandan Government for expenditures for police uniform equipment, and part of the cost for motor equipment. This has amounted to approximately RF 2,000,000.

3. United Nations Assistance:

U.N. assistance to the Rwandan police was limited to the assignment of a French Surete trained police advisor, Jean Rene Prigent, who served from February 1963 to February 1964. Mr. Prigent was assigned as an advisor to the Minister of the Interior but his work was limited to instructing at the National Police School. The survey team had access to several documents in which the U.N., the GOR and Belgian officials alike, praised Mr. Prigent's tact and competence. On February 5, 1964, he was abruptly declared persona non grata and left the country on February 19, 1964. This was done in spite of the fact that several months previously the GOR had approved a U.N. project to assign two more instructors to the school. With Mr. Prigent's dismissal, the U.N. closed out their police assistance program. Officials in Kigali are at a loss to explain this GOR action. Some suggest that Mr. Prigent might have appeared indifferent to the GOR plight during the Tutsi incursion of December 20, 1963. He gave a party that same evening to celebrate his receiving the French Legion of Honor medal.

Police equipment requested from the U.N. by Mr. Prigent has never been granted to the Rwandan Government. A police survey under U.N. auspices was made by two Canadian Mounted Police officers prior to the arrival of Mr. Prigent. They never submitted a report to the U.N., nor to the Rwandan Government as requested. This explains in part the lack of cooperation shown to the U.S. survey team by GOR officials. They do not hide their weariness of survey groups which do not produce any material results.

4. French Assistance:

In June of 1963 the Rwandan Government requested commodity assistance from the Government of France. This request was for eleven radio stations for the police services, 1,000 carbines, 400,000 rounds of ammunition and photographic equipment. This request was presented by the Minister of Interior during a meeting in Paris of the UAM Ministers of Interior. No action has been taken on this request

for commodities. A request for three French police advisors was made on the same occasion. This request was approved, and two of these three advisors are due in Kigali before the end of May 1964. They will be assigned to the National Police School and will have no operational functions. This indication of a desire to supplant Belgian advisors with French advisors is not being well received in Belgian quarters, at least on the police advisory level.

5. German Assistance:

The West German Embassy has donated six NSU motorcycles to the National Police. This was not done with any coordinating effort or inquiry as to the practical use of such equipment by the police.

6. Mission:

Intelligence activities are reserved for the National Surete, and investigative powers are assigned to the Judicial police of the Ministry of Justice. The following responsibilities of the National Police are primarily of a security nature:

- a. Re-inforcing the National Guard in the event of Tutsi incursion
- b. Maintenance of order and control of civil disturbances
- c. Patrol of sensitive border points
- d. Guarding of prisons and escorting transferred prisoners
- e. Guarding public buildings and VIP residences
- f. Maintaining order at courts and during ceremonies
- g. Enforcing traffic and prefectural regulations

7. Organization and Administration:

The National Police Force has been organized by the Belgian advisors as a simplified version of a Belgian Gendarmerie police force. Completely omitted were the headquarters and support bureaus that make for a smooth functioning police organization. Every unit is operational and has no administrative backing for its operations. The force now numbers 60 officers, 64 NCO's and 867 enlisted men, a total of 991 effectives. The target strength for the National Police is 1500 officers and men. The present effectives are divided into one Headquarters detachment, ten prefectural detachments, five border posts, one road patrol detail and one school detail. Personnel for the border posts, at Bugarama, Cyangugu, Gisenyi and Butare (2), are drawn from the nearest prefectural detachment. The distribution of personnel is shown in an annex to this report.

The National Police are directly under the Secretary General to the Minister of the Interior for all matters concerning administration, recruitment, salary and allowances, discipline, housing, equipment, armament and transportation. The Director General does not hold any substantial operational authority. From the Minister through the Secretary General, the line of operational command goes to the Prefects. In each prefecture there is stationed a detachment of police commanded by a Commissaire. This gives rise to conflicts between the Commissaires and the Prefects with the resultant political overtones.

The Commissaires of Police may also exercise judicial duties. As Officers of Judicial Police by virtue of their rank, they are empowered to conduct investigations within the limits of their assigned prefectures. The results of their investigations must be forwarded for further study to the Inspectors of Judicial Police at the Ministry of Justice. These Judicial Inspectors are not members of the National Police Force, but form a special investigative section of the Ministry of Justice.

8. Personnel:

The pay scales and education requirements are shown in an annex to this report. A yearly pay step increase of 2, 3 and 3-1/2% respectively is given to members of the force who are rated Good, Very Good or Outstanding. Members of the force are also supplied housing and are given a cash indemnity for dependent allowance and food rations. The overall earnings of the police compare favorably with those of equivalent rank and grade in the National Guard. However, the immense difference which exists between officer and enlisted man's pay is worthy of note. The education requirements indicated in the appropriate annex cannot be applied at this time. They must be considerably reduced in practice to conform with the background of the average candidate. The conditions of recruitment according to the national statute are:

- a. Rwandan citizenship
- b. Of good moral character
- c. Physically apt
- d. Meet the educational requirements
- e. Age from 18 to 35 years
- f. Not polygamous

9. Training:

The National Police Force is actually in its infancy. Although it is claimed that 90% of the force attended some sort of accelerated training at the National Police School, it should be rated as low in efficiency. The average rate of illiteracy is 50%. In December of 1963, 161 applicants for the rank of Sous/Commissaire took the entrance examination for the superior officers session of the National Police School. It should be noted that under Belgian civil service rules which are still applicable in Rwanda, 50% of the applicants for police civil service positions may be accepted from civilian life if they meet the educational and/or professional qualifications for the position. Only 27 of these applicants succeeded in obtaining a passing grade of 50%. This examination consisted of elementary arithmetic, basic French diction and a short written review on a simple subject.

All training activities are concentrated in the Police School at Ruhengeri. There are no technical or in-service courses either at the school or in the detachments. The school is housed at the site of a former medical aid training center. Its more than adequate physical facilities include: four dormitories with a total capacity of 100 beds, two classrooms each accommodating 40 students, a communal bathroom, kitchen, mess hall and snack bar. Training at the school is not continuous. Classes are organized periodically as instructors become available. There is a class of 24 Sous/Commissaires in session at the moment. They are marking time pending the arrival of the

two French police instructors. In the meantime, the Rwandan Director of the School is giving instruction on traffic regulations and internal police administration. A Rwandan NCO is instructing in close order drill and discipline. The survey team was furnished with curricula previously given at the school. These curricula included very basic lectures on the following subjects: Penal Code and Court Procedure, Special Legislation, Administration of Police Detachments, Traffic Regulations, Close Order Drill, Manual of Arms, Self-defense, and First Aid. (Copies on file at the Embassy.)

The duration of the courses for officers varies from 8 to 10 months. A shorter course of six months is given to the enlisted men and covers the same subjects with the exception of Police Administration. Plans to train the communal police at this school have not yet materialized. The scanty curriculum and the sporadic holding of sessions indicate the low caliber of the training effort. It is hoped that with the arrival of the French instructors and regularization of the school operation important subjects such as field training, patrol techniques, criminal investigation procedures, jail duties and procedures, police ethics, etc., will be included in the course of study.

10. Records and Identification:

Prior to Independence all police records were centralized in Bujumbura. Whatever records, both criminal and personnel that were left in Kigali rapidly disappeared or were lost in the transition. The only records maintained at the National Police headquarters are personnel, general correspondence and administrative files. All criminal arrest and investigation records are forwarded to the Judiciary Police at Nyabisindu. Reports on traffic accidents and minor violations are retained at the police detachment headquarters. Recommendations submitted by the U.N. police advisor for the reorganization and installation of a police records system has not been implemented. On May 4, 1964, the Minister of the Interior ordered the starting of an identification card file for all persons wanted, or who are arrested and remanded to the courts. This file is to be maintained at National Police Headquarters. It was also ordered that a wanted persons list be regularly circulated to all police detachments in the country. The National Police Headquarters has primitive equipment for the taking of fingerprints. There is no personnel capable of classifying or filing these prints. The fingerprint cards are forwarded with the crime dossier to the Judicial Police in Nyabasindu.

11. Traffic:

The latest report (1963) indicates that there are 1973 vehicles in operation in Rwanda: 1236 passenger cars, 347 trucks, 385 light trucks and 5 tractors. Consequently, there is no street traffic control. Road traffic control is supposedly maintained by two three-man road patrol details operating from National Police Headquarters. It is apparent that the number of cars in circulation throughout the country does not warrant a larger more specialized traffic division.

12. Communications:

The telephone system in Rwanda is highly erratic and long-distance telephone lines are nonexistent. Where local telephone service is available in the prefectural capitals, police detachments are supplied with service. Police communications are almost entirely by use of the mail, or with car patrols that deliver correspondence and information to Police headquarters in Kigali. The antiquated prefectural radio communications network is used in locations where it is operative.

Refer to the Communications section on the National Surete for the details on this network.

13. Detention:

The National Police is charged with the responsibility of guarding the twelve prisons throughout the country. There is one jail in each of the ten prefectures, one in Nyabisindu and a special prison in Ruhengeri for long-term and dangerous prisoners. Political prisoners are confined mostly in Nyabisindu and Ruhengeri. A detail of each prefectural police detachment is assigned to guard these prisons, which are nominally under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. Prison detachments vary with the size of the prison, the minimum assignment being six (two policemen, each on eight-hour tours). With few exceptions, the prisons are located immediately next to the headquarters of the police detachment. In most detachments, there is also a small detention cell where prisoners are kept a maximum of 24 hours prior to their arraignment before the local court.

14. Buildings:

The police are in dire need of a construction program for its detachment headquarters and camps. In spite of the numerous requests to donor countries for assistance in such a program, no progress has been made. The Minister of the Interior is attempting to secure special funds from the President for this needed construction. The problem is further complicated by the fact that under the terms of their recruitment, the GOR is obliged to furnish housing to the members of the police force and their families. Near each detachment headquarters one finds a village of small brick or mud huts for the police and their families. Sanitary conditions in these so-called police camps leave much to be desired.

The commissariats proper consist generally of a one- or two-room post of masonry construction. They are all generally located in a prefectural compound which holds the prefectural offices, the court, the prison and the police headquarters. The communications equipment is generally housed in a small adequately built office close to the rear of the prefectural office. Border posts are small buildings which serve both as office and dormitory. There are no garage or vehicle storage facilities at any of the police detachments.

15. Transportation:

The present motor fleet of the National Police consists of ten International pick-up type trucks purchased in 1963, two Chevrolet trucks, and six NSU motorcycles. All of this motor equipment is in good condition. By the end of 1964, the motor fleet should consist of the above and an additional fifteen International scout cars. The 1964 budget provided for these fifteen additional vehicles. Ten of these have been ordered, five delivered, and five are expected in June 1964. The remaining five will be ordered as soon as the Government releases the foreign exchange for their purchase.

The Belgian advisors estimate that 20 additional vehicles are required. An additional 16 scout cars and four light trucks, a total fleet of 47 vehicles, would be sufficient to maintain contact with the 154 points in the country where police are stationed. Five jeeps of pre-independence vintage are now out of commission and have

been junked. The police do not have their own repair or maintenance facilities. All Government vehicles are supposed to be serviced and repaired at the Ministry of Public Works garage. Past experience has shown that these facilities are unreliable and result in too much down time for the vehicles. The police utilize the facilities of the International representative in Kigali. The workmanship is fair, although relatively expensive. All vehicles are required to have a 1500 kilometer check (grease, oil, battery, etc.) at a private garage in the prefectural location. Every 3000 kilometers the vehicle is brought into Kigali for a complete check at the garage of the International representative.

16. Armament:

The armament of the National Police consists of the following equipment:

- 400 Mauser rifles (Belgian pre-war stock)
- 200 Enfield rifles obtained from the Belgian Government in 1963
- 50 Sten Minerva sub-machine guns (with small amounts of ammunition)
- 32 FALL automatic rifles (with small amounts of ammunition)
- 20,000 rounds for Mauser rifle (dated 1940)
- 20,000 rounds for Enfield rifle (dated 1953)

The Belgian advisor is conscious of the low fire power of the police force and states its improvement is hampered by a lack of funds. A large number of the rifles are unreliable, the ammunition is obsolete, and police personnel have had very few range practice or weapons familiarization courses. While the survey team was in Kigali, a policeman seriously wounded three other policemen by accidentally firing a Sten gun. Upon investigation it was revealed that he had never been trained in the use of this type of weapon.

17. Uniforms:

All the force is in uniform, and there is no permanent plainclothes or detective detail. Uniforms are made locally of slate gray twill, obtained from Belgium. A small but adequate shop has been set up at the Kicukero Technical School (operated by a religious order) for the manufacture of the uniforms. These tailors have been recruited by the police and are supplied sewing machines purchased by the Ministry of the Interior. Leather parts of the uniform issue are purchased with foreign exchange. A leather shop for the making and repairing of shoes, Sam Browne belts and holsters is now in the planning stage at this school. The police wear grey overseas caps, dress caps and white helmet liners defined by the regulations as "U.S. style". The men are issued one fatigue uniform, one service uniform and one dress uniform upon recruitment; and one each year thereafter. The Force presents a comparatively neat appearance, which in Rwanda represents a major effort.

18. Budget:

The budget figures for the National Police as published in the Official Government documents are as follows:

	<u>In 000 RF</u>		
	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>
Salaries and Allowances	18,856	20,714	26,042
Traveling Expenses	610	2,424	4,000
Equipment	3,959	4,638	10,000
Total	23,425	27,775	40,042

It will be noted that the amount earmarked for equipment has increased by approximately 5-1/2 million RF over previous years. This has been accomplished in spite of an austerity program put into effect by the Government. The survey team feels that the purchase of equipment such as motor vehicles, with their attendant high recurring costs, should remain a responsibility of the Rwandan Government.

NATIONAL SURETE

1. History and Background

Prior to the independence of Rwanda on July 1, 1963, there existed no Surete organization, office or personnel in Rwanda, which was then a part of Ruanda-Urundi. All Surete activity emanated from Bujumbura and was under the control of Belgian personnel. With independence, all administrative and investigative records pertaining to Rwanda remained in Bujumbura. The formation and organization of a National Surete was begun in January 1963 and was entrusted to the present Belgian Surete Advisor, Major Camille Tulpin.

2. Belgian and Other Assistance

Major Camille Tulpin, a Belgian Military Officer, on detached duty from the parachute service is the advisor to the Surete. He volunteered the statement that at one time he was assigned to Belgian Military Intelligence. Major Tulpin organized the Surete such as it is today. He is a sincere, hard-working advisor, whose activities have become more operational than advisory. He expresses a violent antipathy to Communism. There has been no Belgian commodity assistance to the Surete since its inception. Mr. Jean Rene Prigent, a French Surete officer, spent one year in Rwanda as a United Nations police advisor to the Ministry of the Interior. Although he was assigned to assist all internal security forces, his services were limited to the supervision of training at the National police school. His only effort in the Surete field was to submit a report to the Ministry of the Interior indicating that the Surete was undermanned and was in need of better training. He may or may not have been influential in having three commissaires of police, who were assigned to the Surete, attend a three-month intelligence course given by France in Dakar, Senegal. Subsequent to his departure in February 1964, the United Nations received a request from the Ministry of the Interior for the assignment of four scholarship positions to the Surete. This request, after being negatively commented upon by the U.N. resident representative for Rwanda and Burundi at Bujumbura, was forwarded to the United Nations, New York, on April 4, 1964.

3. Mission

There is no Rwandan law or statute covering the duties of the National Surete. The present Rwandan Constitution states in the absence of specific Rwandan Government laws or statutes, previous Belgian statutes for the territory of Ruanda-Urundi apply. Major Tulpin advised that a statute is now being prepared for the Minister's signature. This proposed statute is substantially the same as the Belgian statute it will supplant. The present statute charges the National Surete with the following responsibilities:

- a. Investigation and control of subversive activities
- b. Counterespionage
- c. Immigration and border control
- d. Control of firearms

- e. Control of the press
- f. Smuggling investigations
- g. Narcotics control
- h. Counterfeiting
- i. Prostitution

The Surete is the only intelligence gathering service in the civil police sector. The major emphasis of the Surete's operational staff is being placed on the internal and external subversive threat of the UNAR and Inyenzi groups. The Surete alleges to have positive proof of Chinese Communist support of these groups. Major Tulpin states that the external intelligence capability of the Surete is poor but its internal capability is adequate. The volume of investigation fields activity of the Surete in other than subversion is insignificant. This stems from its pre-occupation with this threat, and the normal lack of violations in any of the other fields, with the exception of smuggling.

4. Organization:

The Surete reports to the Minister of Interior, through the Secretary General, who also receive reports to the Minister for the National Police. The Surete is headed by a Director-General, with an assistant. The position of assistant is presently occupied by Major Tulpin. The Investigations Branch has two Bureaus each headed by a secretary, a first secretary for external intelligence and a second secretary for internal intelligence. There appears to be no unit specifically charged with the investigation of statutory crimes other than subversion. There are three agents and one clerk assigned to the investigative division. These three agents were appointed to the Surete in March 1964. Also under the Director General of the Surete is an Immigration Branch consisting of a Chief of Immigration, and 12 agents.

5. Administration and Budget:

All agents of the Surete are assigned to the Surete headquarters in Kigali, which is their only office. They are assigned investigations by the sectional heads on a "when" and "who" available basis. This results in a shuttling back and forth in their performance of duties of varying nature.

There exist no proper span of control or the required specialization in this important service. The only administrative leadership comes from Major Tulpin, who appears to be pre-occupied with operational duties. The agents do their own typing. Information on agent case loads is not available. Requests for investigations of crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the Surete are ordinarily received from the office of the Attorney General. Major Tulpin states that an excellent cooperation exists with the military and the police. A small informers fund is available to the Surete.

The Immigration Branch is assigned to the following locations: Kigali airport, Kamembe airport, Butare and the northern frontier posts of Gisenyi, Gatuna,

Kigatumba and Cyanika. Since the December 1963 Tutsi incursions, the border posts of Nemba, Kibingo and Gurgarama along the Burundi border are now supervised by the military.

The following are the budget figures for the Surete:

	<u>Thousands of RF</u>		
	<u>1964</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1962</u>
Salaries - Personnel under statute	1,479	1,660	829
Travel expenses	728	898	332
Salaries - Personnel under contract	87	59	4
Equipment	650	129	120
Representation allowance	<u>1,000</u>	<u>930</u>	<u>710</u>
Total	4,044	3,676	1,995

Salary grades in the National Surete are similar to those for equivalent grade in the National Police.

6. Personnel and Training:

There is no available information on the criteria used for the recruitment, eligibility standards, personnel evaluation or promotion selection for members of this service. The present Director-General has the equivalent of a 12th grade education and graduated from the Officers School of the National Guard. The two Secretaries and the Chief of Immigration were former commissaires of the National Police and have the equivalent of 10 years of grade school education. The three new agents were also recruited from the commissaire ranks of the National Police. These five members of the Surete and the Chief of Immigration are all graduates of the commissaire section of the National Police Training School. In addition, the three recently appointed agents completed a three-month intelligence course at Dakar. This course was given through the French Technical Assistance Program. Major Tulpin states that a good spirit and willingness to work exists among the members of the Surete.

During the survey team's inspection of the Surete headquarters and again during one of its interviews with Major Tulpin, Director General Ubalijoro stated that he had requested seven additional agents and ten additional immigration personnel for his services.

7. Records and Identification:

The only records maintained by the Surete are investigation dossiers with index cards, firearm permit records and immigration records. The investigation dossiers are kept in filing cabinets stored in a vault type safe. The quality and quantity of these records are unknown. The surete has no fingerprint or laboratory capability. There are no qualified personnel in the Surete for the classifying or filing of fingerprints. The taking of fingerprints is done at the local commissariat of the National Police, and is forwarded unclassified, along with a copy of the investigation to the Attorney General. Any photographic work is done by the Major Tulpin with his personally owned equipment.

8. Communications:

There exists a 13-fix station communication system, presumably under the control of the Surete. There are no mobile units associated with this radio system. The system is actually under the operational control of the ten Prefects. The radio operators are employed and paid for by the Prefects. The system is available for use by the National Police and the Surete and the Attorney General and for the administrative purposes of the Prefects and the Minister of the Interior. The only stations under the control of a police service is the master station located at the Surete headquarters in Kigali and the two frontier posts by the National Police. All other stations are located in the administrative buildings of the various prefectures or the Attorney General. Only six of thirteen sets are in operating condition.

The radio communications equipment, all of 1957 Belgian M.B.L.E. manufacture, is AM-voice and is distributed as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Condition</u>
Kigali (Surete)	50 Watt	Operating
Kibuye (Prefecture)	15 Watt	"
Butare "	"	"
Cyangugu "	"	"
Ruhengeri "	"	Not operating
Gikongoro "	"	"
Byumba "	"	"
Gitarama "	"	"
Kibungo "	"	"
Gisenyi "	"	"
Nyabisindu (Attorney General)	"	Operating
Kagitumba (Frontier Post)	"	"
Cyanika "	"	Not operating

The only communication post maintaining 24-hour duty is that in the Surete Headquarters. Seven of the radio sets belong to the Ministry of the Interior and six to the Ministry of Posts, Telegraph and Telecommunications. The PTT installed their six sets at the time of the National elections in 1961, and have made no effort to retrieve them. Due to the lack of electric power and the fluctuation in current in most locations, each radio unit has an emergency gas-driven generator. Due to the lack of spare parts, neglect on the part of prefectural officials and poor operating practices, both radio units and generators are in very poor condition.

All repairs and maintenance are performed by the three Belgian technicians assigned to the PTT. They are also responsible for the maintenance of the telex and radio-telephone systems connecting Kigali to Brussels and a separate internal commercial PTT system. This PTT commercial system is of the same

manufacture and type as the system used by the Surete and Police. There are no spare parts available for either system. Ten thousand dollars worth of spare parts was ordered for both the commercial and governmental systems late in 1962. These spare parts have been held up at Belgian customs in Brussels for more than a year. The shipment has been delayed by the failure of Rwanda and Burundi to agree on the release of credits for payment before the break-up of the Rwanda-Burundi economic and customs union in January of 1964. It appears that the governmental communications systems is suffering at the expense of the commercial system, which still is 100% operational.

If replaced, the obsolescent AM system could be used by the PTT as a reserve and back-up for the present commercial system. An SSB system is recommended because of the topographical conditions of the country. VHF-FM would require repeater locations that are vulnerable to damage or destruction.

9. Buildings:

The Surete presently occupied several small offices located in the rear of the building which houses the Presidential offices. The Surete is now attempting to rent a nearby building, which the Russians have also been considering for their Embassy. These new quarters should give the Surete four times more space than they presently occupy. Their present quarters consist of a room 20 x 20 feet for the entire staff. The Director General shares a 10 x 10 foot office with his Belgian advisor. Entrance to a small radio room is by way of the Director's office. Attached to the general office is a small walk-in vault for storage of records. A small office for the immigration office is located in a room adjacent to the Surete offices.

10. Transportation:

The Surete has two recently purchased 1964 Volkswagen passenger cars. All maintenance is done in Kigali by the local Volkswagen garage. Major Tulpin stated that the Public Works garage in Kigali, where government cars are ordinarily repaired and maintained, is inefficient.

11. Other Equipment:

Office equipment consists of six desks, five typewriters, one old Verifax copying machine and five filing cabinets. Paper supplies for the Verifax copier are available locally. Four filing cabinets are used to file dossiers in the vault room. All personnel are armed with 9-mm Belgian type revolvers.

COMMUNAL POLICE

1. History and Background

The communal police system is a vestigial remnant of the former police des chefferies under the Tutsi rule. The communes were ruled, as recently as 1961, by Tutsi chiefs who employed and paid other Tutsi guards to protect their persons and to enforce their rule. With the overthrow of the Tutsi rule, a similar type organization was retained by the local Bourgmestres. There are 141 communes in Rwanda. Rwanda lacks towns and villages and habitations are spread evenly over the tillable land. Communes are subdivided geographically into hillside units or collines.

2. Mission

No national, prefectural or communal statutes exist for the communal police. By a sort of common law their functions are as follows:

- a. Guard the persons and administrative buildings of the communal governments.
- b. Act as messengers in the communal administrative system.
- c. Maintain order in the public markets.
- d. Guardians of the peace in the hinterland (various collines.)

3. Organization and Administration

Members of this auxiliary police force are selected from the communal population on the basis of nepotism. Their average salary is 600 RF per month for full-time employment. The average number in each commune is seven. The salaries and other incidental expenses are paid from the communal budget. The National Police have assigned one policeman to each commune. He is assigned from the prefectural detachment and acts as an unofficial chief of the communal police. There is no technical assistance given to this organization. Belgian advisors have stated that the over-riding problem of properly forming the National Police has the priority.

4. Personnel and Training

It is estimated that 90% of the communal police are illiterate. They have never received any training for their duties. The Belgian advisors have recommended a project to train one auxiliary policeman from each commune at an accelerated three months' course at the Ruhengeri school. This project is intended to develop observers in the communes who could act as sources of intelligence to the police services. No Governmental action has been taken on this suggestion. However, in practice the Communal Police, politically appointed by elected Bourgmestres, do not furnish the National Police with information that might incriminate the local population.

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5. Equipment, etc.

The communal police are dressed in khaki uniforms purchased by the communal government. No firearms are issued, and these police carry some type of native weapon such as clubs, lances or bows and arrows. The communal police have no communication or transportaion ability.

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JUDICIARY POLICE1. History and Background

The investigative functions which in a European police system are normally the responsibility of the National Police are performed in Rwanda by a special group called "Inspectors of Judiciary Police". Not to be confused with these Inspectors are the members of the National Police, holding the rank of Commissaire or higher, members of the Surete, and officers of the National Guard. These officers, acting as "Officers of the Judiciary Police" must forward their findings to the Inspectors for further study. This system has been inspired by the Belgian changes in the usual European police system. Due to the unsettled local conditions, this system causes innumerable conflicts in jurisdiction.

2. Belgian Assistance:

A Belgian advisor to the Inspectors of Judiciary Police, after service of one year, resigned in early 1964 and returned to Belgium. A Mr. Frans Vandebek-Marres, a Belgian attorney, and advisor to the Ministry of Justice presently assists these Inspectors in the review and examination of cases. His assistance does not extend into the technical and investigative field.

3. Mission and Organization:

This group of quasi-police officers are responsible to the Ministry of Justice. The primary responsibility of this organization is to investigate all crimes and violations brought to their attention either through the Ministry or Justice direct, or through the submission of reports by the various officers of the Judicial Police in the various branches of Government. They are empowered to subpoena witnesses and suspects and take any action necessary to the proper conduct of investigations. They also act as prosecutors in the lower courts. These inspectors are totally independent of the National Police and the Surete.

By statute they are charged with the following functions:

- a. Maintenance of a Central Criminal Record System
- b. Maintenance of a Central Fingerprint File
- c. Maintenance of a Central Police Laboratory
- d. Investigation of all crimes of a serious nature
- e. Review of all criminal cases presented for prosecution.

4. Administration and Personnel:

The central office of the Judiciary Police is located in Nyabisindu at the office of the Ministry of Justice. This unit is comprised of a Chief Inspector and fifteen Inspectors. Six of these Inspectors comprise the central brigade assigned to the National Court at Nyabisindu, the remainder are assigned one each to the nine prefectural courts. The central office also has two clerks. In addition to its

investigative functions, the central office is charged with the maintenance of a criminal record system and fingerprint identification system.

5. Training:

The only training received by these Inspectors has been a six months' course given at the Ministry of Justice in 1961. This course did not include training in fingerprint identification or records system operation.

6. Records, Identification and Equipment:

The records system of this organization is in a deplorable state. Criminal dossiers are difficult to locate. Persons arrested for crimes may languish in prisons for long periods of time awaiting trial. Either the dossier never arrives at the office of the Judiciary Police, or due to inefficiency and inability the records of the case are not reviewed for presentation to the court. There exists no fingerprint filing system, nor are there any technicians capable of classifying or filing fingerprint cards. The function of a crime laboratory is a paper one only. There are neither agents capable of operating a crime laboratory, nor any existent equipment. In addition to office equipment such as desks, typewriters and filing cabinets, the only equipment in the possession of this organization is one Willys Jeep. Inspectors in the prefectures must depend on the prefectural cars for transportation. Communications equipment is limited to that described in the National Surete portion of this report.

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INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

NATIONAL GUARD

The military organization of the Government of Rwanda, known as the National Guard, was not included within the purview of the survey team mission. However, in light of the proposed incorporation of the uniformed police force into this organization and the important role of the military in the internal security threat posed by the Tutsi, an appointment was requested with Minister of the National Guard Mulindahabi.

Prior conversations with Commander Frans revealed the plan for the formation of a Gendarmerie unit. The survey team was requested to keep this information in confidence and not to discuss it with the Minister of the National Guard. Present at the meeting were the Minister, Major Habyarimana and Commandant Frans. It was explained to the Minister that the purpose of our talk with him was to obtain information on the correlation of the military and the police services in the maintenance of internal order. It was further indicated that the survey mission was concerned with a study of the civil police forces only. The response from the Minister was a phonographic monologue repeating the list of equipment needs for the military furnished to the American Embassy in May of 1963. He wanted to know why the United States had not helped Rwanda in its time of need. The meeting closed with the statement by the Minister that there was no need for further discussion until the United States demonstrated its good will by supplying some of the equipment previously demanded.

Prior to Independence, Rwanda had no military organization of its own. The military force was the Force Publique, comprised mainly of Congolese troops and Belgian officers. Preparatory to Independence, Belgian military advisors organized a National Guard of 1,000 effectives from the ground up. This was the National Army that existed on July 1, 1962. A condensation of a USARMA report, dated March 15, 1963, indicates the following:

Organization

Headquarters and General Staff located at Kigali; one battalion of infantry, of two rifle companies and one support company stationed at Kigali as an intervention unit; three rifle companies, one each at Mutara, Gisenyi and Cyangugu; eight rifle platoons, one each at Butare, Byumba, Gitarama, Kibungo, Kibuye, Nayabisindu and Ruhengeri. The Officers School and logistical base are located at Kigali, and the NCO School is located at Butare.

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Effective Strength

Rwandan officers - 15, Belgian military advisors - 43, Rwandan NCO's - 74, Rwandan corporals and enlisted men - 1073, civilian employees - 290. This is a total of 1162 officers and men.

Weapons

2,000 rifles, 318 automatic rifles, 93 pistols, 121 submachine guns, 3 machine guns, 20 mortars and 2 37-mm guns.

The present strength and the budget for the National Guard are indicated in the following figures taken from the official Government publications:

	<u>In 000 RF</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>
Bureau of the Minister				
Salaries, statutory personnel		865	568	462
Travel Expenses		307	134	360
Salaries, contract personnel		0	76	36
Materiel		0	0	30
Representation Allowance		10	32	10
Garde Nationale				
Salaries, statutory personnel		52,341	7,316	5,546
Travel Expenses		1,264	1,315	1,022
Salaries, contract personnel		00	55,850	88,898
Materiel		500	849	570
Youth Corps		00	00	5,500
Other Expenses		<u>8,723</u>	<u>24,098</u>	<u>30,000</u>
Total		64,010	89,968	132,434
Total Personnel			1,490	*2,744

*Authorized

The present National Guard consists of about 1,500 officers and men. They are uniformed in Khaki. The number of Belgian military advisors has been reduced from 43 to its present total of 17 because of Rwandan austerity measures. It is now planned to increase this number by six. Two of these will be pilots for a six-place Dornier aircraft to be supplied under Belgian military assistance. Since the creation of the National Guard, 24 Rwandan officers and 15 Rwandan NCO's have completed military training in Belgium. The minimum educational requirements for military personnel are 4 years grade school for recruits; eight years of grade school and one year of

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high school for NCO's; and high school completion for officers. The National Guard is considered an elite group by Rwandan standards because of their youth, higher educational requirements and better training. However, Commandant Frans has stated that its discipline and behavior suffers from the fact that Commandant Habyarimana is being professionally thwarted by Minister Mulindahabi. It was learned that a border intelligence unit of the National Guard was created after the December 1963 difficulties.

After the Tutsi invasion attempt, the military found themselves woefully short of arms and ammunition. In February 1964, Belgium supplied the National Guard, by air shipment, 200 rifles, 50 automatic rifles, 10 light machine guns, and 50,000 rounds of ammunition. This was followed by an ocean freight shipment of 800 rifles, 500,000 rounds of ammunition, 10 mortars with 2,000 rounds of shells, 2,000 rifle grenades and 20 field radio transmitters. The total cost of this military aid amounts to \$100,000.

The 1964 budget item for the Youth Corps is a result of legislation passed in 1963 and not yet implemented. Rwanda has compulsory military service, starting at age eighteen. It is estimated that 30,000 Rwandan youths reach the required age each year of which 20,000 would be physically fit. It is planned to enlist all physically able youths into this Youth Corps for one year's service. They will be provided three months of military training. The remaining nine months will be spent working on civic action projects, such as reconstruction of roads and culverts, reclaiming of land, replanting of forest areas, digging of wells, etc. The military would then accept or retain the more capable in the National Guard. The remainder would be discharged after one year's service and retained on the reserve lists.

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TIMING OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

CHART 1

	1st Month	2nd Month	3rd Month	4th Month	5th Month	6th Month	7th Month	8th Month	9th Month to End of Project
Communication Equipment	Program Approval AID/W	Pro/Ag Signed PIO/C Prepared	Procurement Process		Priority A-Air Freight		Arrival & Installation Equipment completed.		
Technician	Arrival TDY Technician	Depart TDY Technician	Arrival full-tour technician, finalize site preparation and installation plans with PTT, supervise installation of system, prepare and conduct basic courses for police school and operators; prepare radio operating manual and administrative and operational forms for use of system, install inventory system for equipment and spare parts, assist in selection, orientation and document of participant trainees, supervise continued maintenance by PTT.						
Participants						Selected, and given orientation training in programmed communications equipment and documented for one-year radio maintenance course.			

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ESTIMATED PROJECT COSTS

15 - Single Side Band fixed stations, 50 Watt, voice and CW, 4 channel 220 volt AC 50 cycle with antenna and 10% spare parts at \$1600 each	\$24,800
15 - 1-1/2 KW gasoline-driven generators at \$500 each	7,500
1 - Complete set testing equipment	2,000
*Air freight and insurance	<u>8,000</u>
Total commodities	\$42,300
* Based on 2,000 kilos at \$3.57 per kilo	


TOTAL PROJECT COST U.S.

Commodities	\$42,300
TDY Technician for 60 days	2,500
Full-tour Technician (2 years)	40,000
Participants (two for 1 year)	<u>10,000</u>
Total	\$94,800

PROJECT COST HOST GOVERNMENT

Travel expenses for PTT technicians- installation	200,000 RF
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DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

NATIONAL POLICE

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
Headquarters, Ministry of the Interior, Kigali	2	-	4	6
Road Patrol, Kigali	2	-	4	6
Detachments in Prefectures:				
Kigali	4	14	166	184
Butare	4	10	156	170
Gitarama	3	7	55	65
Kigongoro	1	2	59	62
Shangugu	3	3	88	94
Kibuye	2	4	64	70
Kisenyi	4	9	68	81
Ruhengeri	3	6	53	62
Biumba	3	4	63	70
Kibungo	3	3	82	88
Police School, Ruhengeri	2	2	5	11
Students/Sous Commissairs				24
	60	64	867	991

PAY SCALES AND EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS BY STATUTE

NATIONAL POLICE

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Education Requirements</u>	<u>Salary per annum (\$1=50 RF)</u>
Director General	4 years college	\$2,640
Chief Commissaire	4 years college	2,160
Commissaire Principal	2 years college	1,800
Commissaire 1st class	2 years college	1,390
Commissaire 2nd class	2 years college	1,290
Commissaire 3rd class	High School graduate	1,170
Sous/Commissaire 1st class	High School graduate	1,070
Sous/Commissaire 2nd class	High School graduate	1,030
Sous/Commissaire 3rd class	High School graduate	960
Premier Brigadier Chef	High School graduate	860
Brigadier Chef	High School graduate	700
Brigadier 1st class	High School graduate	600
Brigadier 2nd class	10th grade	475
Sous/Brigadier 1st class	9th grade	275
Sous/Brigadier 2nd class	8th grade	270
Policier 1st class	7th grade	210
Policier 2nd class	6th grade	150

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Map 2

MILITARY & POLICE DETACHMENT LOCATIONS


Rwanda

Note: Immigration posts

Kibuye (open) - National Police

Kibingo (closed) - National Guard

Nemba (closed) - National Guard



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
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Map 3
RECOMMENDED
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Rwanda

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- Prefectural capital
- Other sites proposed equipment
- $\frac{26}{73}$ Milage from KIGALI $\frac{\text{air}}{\text{road}}$
- ~~~~~ Prefectural boundary

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND PERSONS INTERVIEWED

The Police Survey team is indebted to the guidance of Ambassador Withers and for the assistance and excellent cooperation extended by him and all the members of his staff.

Representatives of the United Nations, Belgian and French Embassies and Belgian technical advisors to the National Guard, National Police, National Surete, Ministries of the Interior, Justice and Posts, Telegraph and Telecommunications, cooperated fully with the survey team and were the principal sources of information.

The following persons were interviewed during the course of this survey:

United States Embassy

Ambassador Charles Withers, Kigali
 Mr. David Manbey, DCM, Kigali
 Mr. William Mithoefer, Jr., Administrative Officer, Kigali
 Mr. Edward Lollis, FSO General, Kigali
 Col. Arnold Alexander, ARMA, Rwanda and Burundi
 Col. Averill Holman, AIRA, Rwanda and Burundi
 Mr. Martin Bergin, Political Officer, Burundi (also covers Rwanda)

Belgian

Ambassador Felix Standaert, Kigali
 Mr. Alain Chermiset, Legal Advisor, Ministry of the Interior, GOR
 Mr. Henri Hocque, Advisor, Minister of the PTT
 Mr. Franz Vandebeek-Marres, Advisor, Ministry of Justice
 Major Camille Tulpin, Advisor, National Surete
 Commandant Eugene Frans, Chief Advisor, National Guard
 Commissaire Henri Pilate, Advisor, National Police
 Commissaire Emile Cornu, Advisor, National Police
 Mr. Marc Saegerman, Advisor, Regideso (Electric Power Authority)

French

Ambassador Marc Barbey, Rwanda and Burundi

Mr. Jean Grapin, 1st Secretary, French Embassy, Kigali

United Nations

Mr. Vojislav Jerkovic, Asst. Representative, United Nations Technical Assistance Board and Special Fund, Kigali.

GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA

Mr. Balthazar Bicamumpaka, Minister of Interior and Labor

Mr. Calliope Mulindahabi, Minister of the National Guard.

Due to the restrictions placed on the survey team by the Rwandan Ministers of the Interior and the National Guard, the following important officials concerned with internal security were not interviewed:

Mr. Maximilien Nyonzima, Secretary General, Ministry of the Interior

Mr. Francois Mubilgi, Director General, National Police

Mr. Bonaventure Ubalijoro, Director General, National Surete

Mr. Deogratias Nsengiyumua, Chief, Immigration Service

Major Juvenal Habyarimana, Commandant, National Guard