

BILATERAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

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INTRODUCTION

The United States foreign assistance program has evolved from a series of limited objectives, beginning in 1942, and a global objective enunciated by President Truman in 1949. These were consolidated in 1953, reorganized in 1955, and further consolidated in 1961. In its metamorphosis, foreign aid has become a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy, while retaining in law, concept and practice most of the objectives and folkways of its formative stages. ^{1/} Administrative procedures were devised or improvised to meet emergencies as the program became increasingly complex.

Many studies have been made of U.S. foreign aid programs, resulting in the incorporation of procedures which facilitated operations. ^{2/} However

^{1/} Frank M. Coffin, Witness for AID (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964) pp. 65-74.

^{2/} Ibid, pp. 43, 82-87. The major studies were: Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program (Report No. 300, 85th Congress, 1st. Session); The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program--Economic Assistance Programs and Administration, Wm. A. Draper, Jr., Chairman (1959); President's Task Force on Economic Assistance, Henry R. Labouise, Chairman (1961); Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, Christian A. Herter, Chairman (1962); and the President's Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, Lucius D. Clay, Chairman (1963).

with the exception of the Herter Committee, which studied personnel, most efforts were centered on the administration of capital assistance and on Congressional presentations. Effort to improve the administration of technical assistance was largely neglected until 1963, when the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) commissioned the Syracuse University Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs to make a comprehensive study of the administration of technical assistance, with special reference to agriculture. During the course of the project, June 1963, to December 1966, fifteen major preliminary reports were produced.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the present study was to draw from the preliminary reports of the Maxwell School project and other contemporary sources, apparently significant proposals for the improvement of the administration of technical assistance, with special reference to agriculture, which seem to be applicable to A.I.D.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

1. For this study the purpose of technical assistance is given as nation building and/or socio-economic progress. ^{3/}

^{3/} Milton J. Esmen and Fred C. Bruhns, Institution Building and National Development--An Approach to Induced Social Change in Transitional Societies, Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building (Pittsburgh: GSPIA, University of Pittsburgh, 1965). p.22

2. It may be assumed, and was indeed observed in the Maxwell School studies, that there is no substantive difference between technical assistance in agriculture and technical assistance in general. ^{4/} To hold this exercise to manageable proportions, analysis of technical assistance at the sector level was restricted to agriculture.
3. The study was limited in application to technical assistance fostered by the United States Government.

A Framework for Studying Technical Assistance Administration

Granting that technical assistance is an external effort on the part of the donor and an external resource on the part of the recipient, these major components of the process may be identified:

1. A purpose setting, enabling body. For the United States this is the Congress.
2. The principal agent for the process, who is charged with carrying out the purpose, and his staff and its process.
3. The field agent and his organization.
4. The recipient and its organization.
5. Other sources of technical assistance.

These are the functions of the headquarters unit:

1. Communicate to the policy setting and financing body:
 - a) recommend policy and policy changes

^{4/} John Lindeman, Preliminary /Final/ Report to AID on the Administration of Technical Assistance, with Special Reference to Agriculture (Syracuse: Maxwell School, August, 1965) Hectographed. p.1

- b. request funds
- c. report
- 2. Communicate to the field guiding policy and spending limits.
- 3. Support the field mission, including:
 - a. representing the mission program to the policy setting body
 - b. providing personnel
 - c. technical backstopping
 - d. procurement and forwarding of commodities and supplies
 - e. managing program connected participants and trainees.
- 4. Evaluate the mission program.
- 5. Achieve popular support. ^{5/}

These are the tasks of the field mission:

- 1. Communicate to headquarters a summation of the resources required to achieve the objectives of the donor.
- 2. Organize the resources provided.
- 3. Commit the resources provided.
- 4. Evaluate the effort and report the outcome.

The potential areas of the technical assistance requirement may be deduced from Esman's "task or action oriented model for development assistance" ^{6/} which has the following components:

^{5/} Coffin, op.cit. pp. 75-89.

^{6/} Esman and Bruhns, op.cit., pp.22.

- 1/ "a governing, goal oriented elite which bears the major responsibility for initiating and directing the process of modernizing change;
- 2/ "a doctrine or set of action commitments which establishes, communicates, and legitimizes norms, priorities and styles for operating programs;
- 3/ "a set of action instruments through which communication with the community is maintained and operating programs are implemented, (including)
 - a/ "political organization
 - b/ "the administrative system
 - c/ "associated interest groups
 - d/ "the mass media" 7/

In underdeveloped countries, any one component of Esman's model may be deficient to the extent of limiting national development and/or socio-economic progress; hence, technical assistance for each component must be considered. This determines the framework of the potential technical assistance requirement, which may be show as follows:

1. Advice to governing elite on goals and public policy.
2. Technical assistance in political development.
3. Technical assistance in public administration.
4. Technical assistance in national development planning.

This includes research and aid to research. It includes coordination with the host country's planning unit as well as with aiding it in coordination with line ministries and other aid donors. It includes assistance with program implementation.

7/ Ibid.

5. Technical assistance in developing institutions. These include institutions for research, manpower development, educational services, information, credit, supply and marketing.
6. Technical assistance in conducting campaigns for change.
7. Technical assistance in providing feedback to the development program. This includes measuring and reporting the country's resources, as well as evaluating and reporting the results of their use toward achieving national goals.

First, the functions of the field mission and, second, the functions of the headquarters organization in providing technical assistance in the above seven areas.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ADVISORY TEAM

That a country seeks technical assistance attests to felt deficiencies in its manpower relevant to achieving its desired goals. The very earliest responses of the United States in this field were in the introduction of single crops. ^{8/} Conversely, immediately following World War II, German rocket scientists were eagerly sought by both the United States and Russia. More recently the British economist Barbara Ward served as an advisor to President Johnson. These are cases where the recipient state selectively sought technical assistance in specific endeavors. The cases illustrate that technical assistance may be sought and can be useful at all levels.

To reverse the sequence, let us assume, as policy statements attest, that the United States is interested in the accelerated economic and social development of a number of presently underdeveloped countries. ^{9/}

^{8/} In response to a request from the Sultan in 1846, the U.S. Secretary of State sent Dr. James Bolton Davis of Fairfield County, South Carolina, to Turkey to introduce cotton culture. The venture was a failure for the Turks, but Davis brought back Angora goats. A representative of Great Britain spent a year, in 1853, on the plantation of Richard Barrow, St. Francisville, La., learning cotton and sugar cane culture, which he subsequently established in India. American Brahman Breeders Association, American Brahman Cattle (Houston: ABBA, 1954).

^{9/} U.S. AID, "Program Guidance Manual", AID Manual, (Washington: AID, 1962) M.O. 1001.1, p.1.

Arbitrary, piecemeal assistance cannot be relied upon for such achievement. Rather, it seems that there must be a readiness to provide technical assistance to the undeveloped recipient country at any and all points along the scale of Ezzam's model. The question is how can a mission best be organized to respond to such a wide scope of assistance. It is obvious from the outset that except for rare cases no one donor will in fact provide all of the advice that a government receives. But the fact that by definition it stands in need of advice calls for discussion.

Advising the Chief of State

The Chief of State will seek counsel where and when he chooses. President Johnson was an example. At one time, the late Bernard Fall was an influential advisor to Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. In other countries, the role has been nobly, yet quietly filled by United States ambassadors. It is the task of first order in technical assistance. Regardless of his power role, the Chief of State controls the symbols of state which are so all-important in mobilizing people and governments. It is important that he becomes development-goal oriented. If he should have conflicting values and objectives, the cause of development is greatly handicapped.

Advising the Prime Minister

Prime ministers seek outside advice in making their many knotty decisions, including those concerned with development programs.

It is said that prime ministers prefer not to seek technical advice bilaterally for fear of the "puppet" label. The instances of independent advisors to prime ministers are well known. Again, however, ambassadors may contribute to this role.

The U.S. AID mission director may find himself advising the prime minister. According to protocol, they may be considered "counterparts". It behooves the mission director to make sure that the prime minister is aware of the country's development potentials and the essential steps required to exploit them.

There is room in this relationship for subordinate association, for example, of the executive secretariats of the two offices.

Advice on Planning

Development planning is a new, exceedingly complex process for developing countries, for which few have qualified personnel. Yet, the national plan can be the crucial factor in a national development program. Although a national development program is conceivable without a national plan, a sound program is not likely to flow from an unsound plan.

Richard Duncan found that often times recipient governments hesitated to request bilateral assistance in developing their planning organizations, primarily from fear of foreign political interference. He noted that while bilateral donors, including the United States, provide planning advisors, the United States encourages recipient countries to make direct arrangements with private individuals or organizations. Other sources are the United Nations and the private foundations (primarily Ford). ^{10/}

^{10/} Richard L. Duncan, The Programming of Technical Assistance (Syracuse: Maxwell School, December, 1966) hectographed. p. 87.

Recipient government officials complained that the United Nations did not provide effective support for its planning advisors and that they lacked the "influence to meet and deal with continuous project problems". Short term consultations were criticized for lack of discrimination. 11/

Duncan noted these common complaints by the planning advisors:

"Their most common comment was the difficulty of obtaining adequate and accurate data, the complications of the recipient government's structure, and the lack of adequately trained staff. A number were also critical of the many delays involved in donor action where agreements had already been reached". 12/

These observations imply that the developing countries are in fact not getting the advice on national planning they need. Such problems should be expected, as a definition of underdevelopment. It is the routine job of the advisor to devise ways and means of overcoming such handicaps.

While there are immediate advantages of contracting for private planning advisors, there are serious disadvantages. The chances are that the recipient government will contract for a planning advisor when it is the job of a team and more. Besides assisting the senior officers in getting organized, there is the job of organizing a large technical office and building whole subordinate institutions to collect, feed in and process information. Equally important, there is the job of implementation, which reaches throughout the government and the country. The private contractor is likely to be without the advisory organization to follow the plan through implementation. A comprehensive mission

11/ Ibid.

12/ Ibid.

such as AID is capable of fielding a team that has this reach.

AID should offer planning advisory assistance to countries in which it maintains missions. The nature of the program would vary with the circumstances. It is conceivable that the aid package might include a team of specialists and a quantity of data processing equipment to be located in the planning office proper. Other advisors would be assigned to developing or improving the statistics gathering organization. In-service training would be provided for planning office workers. Key employees would be sent abroad for additional training. Assistance would be provided the line ministries in organizing their planning units. Through linkage with project advisors, the chief planning advisor may extend his efforts to project implementation and feedback.

Advising the Line Minister

In the AID hierarchy the line division chief is responsible for advising line ministers. (This is not to be confused with negotiating project agreements, which is the director's domain).

The division chief should meet the minister at regular intervals, perhaps one hour a week. At these meetings, the division chief should have something substantive to discuss, bearing either on the ministry program or the improvement of operational procedures, of immediate concern to the minister.

The Chief of Cabinet

A large number of ministries include the position of Chief of Cabinet, which is number two to the minister and roughly equivalent to the military position Chief of Staff. It is occupied by the senior civil servant of the ministry. As such, he is extremely influential and relatively permanent. In most cases it is he who commands the chiefs of the functional departments. As likely as not he will be present at the minister's meetings with his advisors. Whether or not this is the practice, the advisor should devote some time to assisting the chief of cabinet in his area of special interests.

Protocol does not permit the advising division chief to maintain formal relations with both the minister and the chief of cabinet. In many cases this may be done by the deputy division chief. However, the astute division chief will maintain a cultivated casual relationship with the number two man in the ministry. Many "casual" opportunities will be presented as the minister is unable to keep his appointments.

Assisting the Line Ministry's Planning Effort

The office of Chief of Cabinet should include a small planning group, whose job is primarily coordinating the functional departments with the national planning authority.

Coordination is given extended meaning here. It includes, a) gathering information requested by the central planning authority, b) assessing domestic demand over the plan period, c) setting production goals, d) determining the nature and location of alternative development investments, e) negotiating

sector proposals with the central planning authority, f) adjusting the sector plan to the outcome of negotiations, g) assisting the functional departments with project planning, and h) assisting the minister with implementation of the plan. For an inexperienced crew to accomplish this requires the full time attention of a development planning advisor.

Advising Department Chiefs

The operations of an agricultural ministry are usually divided into departments according to product or function. They may include, agronomy (field crops, tree crops and vegetables), animal production and veterinary public health, forestry, fisheries (marine and inland), irrigation, research, vocational education, higher education, agricultural and home economics extension, agricultural information, agricultural cooperatives, agricultural credit, marketing, and agricultural economics and statistics. It is in these departments that development projects are conceived, proposed, planned and implemented.

The AID system provides for an advisor, Branch Chief, to assist the chief of each department in which the agency has special interests. The advisor's job is to assist the department chief in planning and implementing projects and programs. In projects requiring capital inputs from the United States, this is where basic negotiations take place. In day-to-day operations the representatives of the two governments literally hammer out project proposals for their chiefs later to approve.

Advising on Project Operations

A ministerial department may foster a number of activities in which the United States is interested. These consist mostly of developing

service institutions, although they may include capital projects. As the magnitude of the project and interest warrants, specialists may be assigned to advise on specific projects or sub-projects. For example, a USAID extension branch may consist of a branch chief, a rural youth advisor, one or more home economics advisors and any number of area extension advisors. An agricultural education branch may consist of an agricultural education advisor and one or more university contract teams.

Advisors operating at this level are concerned with progress in a specific activity without themselves participating in the operation. If advice to the Chief of State and the Prime Minister is important to pave the way for national development, advice at the project implementation level is essential for its achievement.

RELATIONS WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT

The problem of donor-host government relations is so intense that undoubtedly the effectiveness of much aid effort is greatly reduced. In its severest cases (Burma and Cambodia) the United States was asked to discontinue its assistance programs. Nor is the problem unique to the United States. The Ford Foundation and the Asia Foundation were also dismissed from Burma. Soviet missions also have encountered relations friction, in at least one case up to the breaking point.

Neither are multilateral agencies exempt. Ronald Nairn found a United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) project in Thailand so replete with relations friction that progress was all but impossible. Continuously strained relations existed between the experts and counterparts as well as among members of the advisory team, who represented 17 different nationalities. ^{13/}

The reasons for donor-recipient relations friction are manifold. Political policy ranks high in bilateral aid relations. Donor policies in allocating and administering aid contribute to friction. Ineffective communications is a frustrating block in relations.

^{13/} Ronald C. Nairn, International Aid to Thailand: The New Colonialism?
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) pp. 77-92.

If for no other reason, relations friction may be expected from bringing the members of an aggressive social system to bear on the roles of stable systems where the values of each group are almost inconceivable to the other, as is the case with developed countries aiding the less developed. This may be illustrated by the following generalized examples.

The values held by the American technician may be centered in the Protestant Ethic, the contractual agreement and technical achievement within a time frame, while the values of English and French technical assistance experts may center in self respect, scholarship and leisure. East Asian values may be centered in family ritual, status and harmony.

Status and the motivation for holding public office are greatly misunderstood and unappreciated. The definition of roles is a source of friction. The American advisor may see himself as a lone operating prime-mover. It is said that the English and French often display a memory of Colonial Office days. On the other hand the East Asian government official sees himself as the servant of his superior and the master of his subordinates, deriving status from both roles.

It is axiomatic that technical assistance to the developing countries requires bringing peoples of different and strange cultures together under strenuous working relations. Means by which the aid donor may, in pursuit of its objectives, maintain optimal relations with the host government are considered in this chapter.

Role of the Advisor

The job of the foreign advisor is greatly complicated by the circumstances that he is alien to the culture in which he is working, excluded from the social system he is charged with influencing. He has no role in the system--no prestige, no authority, no power. This poses the question, what can the advisor do to most effectively pursue the objective of his presence? It is proposed that he may function in these roles, in the order given: a) research and writing, b) training and c) counseling or advising. These functions will not gain him membership in the social system. However, if he performs these functions in the environment of the system in a manner not antagonistic to it but complementary to the goals of its members, he will be awarded prestige and ultimately status by the system, to the extent that he may influence the actions of its members.

Research and Writing

When a new advisor arrives on the scene he is not the only one aware of his almost bewildering ignorance of the job ahead: the chances are that the people he is to advise have conducted "acquaint myself with the field" trips for many before him. How is he to learn the job at hand? The technical assistance program is oriented to problem solving: why not research the problem? The advisor may enlist the aid of a host government counterpart and teach him to do survey research in the process. They can publish the report under a joint by-line, thereby establishing equality between the two and building prestige for the counterpart.

Cross-cultural conversation is far from perfect communication, regardless of whose language is used. Beyond face-to-face discussion, a government official needs his advice in writing. He can study it and draw his own conclusions. Written recommendations provide a ready reference for implementing change.

During his tour of duty an advisor should be able to write the essentials of his philosophy concerning his area of assignment, as well as his findings, his major recommendations and the progress of the endeavor during his presence. To do this may provide well-grounded, consecutive recommendations to the host government and a record for the succeeding advisor.

It is a common complaint of technical assistance advisors that the host officials they are assigned to advise have many responsibilities other than the one of particular interest to the advisor, that it is difficult to get to see the client. This may be due to high demand placed on the time of people with professional qualifications in developing countries. The practice of writing recommendations greatly reduces the need for face-to-face counterpart relationships.

Training

The notion of technical cooperation expressed in Former President Truman's Point Four speech was based on the principle that technique is indestructible and that it multiplies by communication. Training is the true multiplier of technical assistance.

If the advisor does well with his research and writing, he may be invited to teach, especially if he promotes the opportunity. He will not be invited--should not attempt--to teach his counterpart, or equal, in the

host government hierarchy, technical qualifications notwithstanding. Rather, he may be invited to teach subordinates. He should share the professorial role with the counterpart.

Advising

If the advisor establishes that he is skilled and informed in his field of responsibility and if he has proven predictably safe--that he will not embarrass his counterpart before superior or subordinate--he may be called on for counsel. When it comes the occasion will be private, and it may concern a private matter. It might not. If the meeting enhances the pursuit of the legitimate goals of the host official the foreign visitor has become an advisor. He may expect more visits and weightier consultation.

The reputations of skillful advisors grow rapidly (they were once known as prophets). The successful advisor should expect this. Where possible, he should avoid consultation above his assigned level in the host hierarchy. Rather, he should respond through his counterpart in the host government and through his own superiors on the advisory team.

Environmental Relations

It is a common finding of visiting evaluation teams that the USAID mission establishment is overwhelming in size and that the technical advisors remain isolated behind guarded doors and air conditioners. It is further reported that the American enclave overruns the elite residential sections and sports clubs, that the Americans isolate themselves from the host population, totally indulged in cocktail parties, bridge and golf.

The relevant questions are: 1) In light of the purposes of the mission, are these situations desirable? 2) What are the alternatives? 3) If there are potentially undesirable features, how may they be managed to best further U.S. interests?

Office

Should the foreign advisor have a desk in the host government establishment? The answer lies in the degree of involvement in operations. If the donor agent is operating, he should be centered in the operation. However, the scope of this study rules out operations.

Offices are designed to accommodate hierarchical status. There can be only one number one office in an organization. Foreign technical assistance advisors are assigned to advise chiefs of organizational units. Suppose an advisor is offered a desk in the organization he is assisting. Where would it be located? He cannot share the head office, as this would deprive the chief of status. If he is assigned the number two desk, he announces to the world that he is subordinate, status-wise, to the chief. This is a handicap which must be overcome for effective advice to ensue. Worse, he deprives the number two actor of his rightful station in the system. This could cause annihilation from the foreigner, beginning with the number two man of the organization.

There are political considerations. What degree of visibility should the advisor maintain? It is likely that the host official has callers from other governments who may or may not be sympathetic to the advisor and his government.

To what extent can the organization chief claim control of the organization with the man with the ideas constantly present? To what extent can he claim credit for the success of the operation?

In the course of 16 technical advisory relationships with host government officials, I found an average of one hour a week to be optimal for consultation. This does not include time used in joint activities, such as travel, project planning, training and demonstration, which are products of consultation.

In summary, two points have been advanced: First, for a foreign agent to occupy a desk in a host government establishment creates social and political difficulties which may be counter-productive to the objectives in pursuit. Second, considering the inevitable shortage of office facilities, the amount of face-to-face consultation between the host government official and the foreign advisor is not sufficient to justify a desk in the establishment for the latter. In most instances it is best that he maintain his office apart from the host, where he has adequate support, including secretarial assistance, to prepare for his advisory sessions. Such arrangements in fact facilitate qualifying as advisor to more than one host official.

Housing

The Ugly American is a book of fiction containing serious technical errors, whose authors were not authorities on technical assistance. 14/

14/ William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1958). For example, the old women got bent backs from tuberculosis of the spine, rather than from sweeping with hand brooms, and John's wife did not remedy the maledy by growing long broom handles. Bamboo preceded the couple to the village considerably.

However, it has greatly influenced the American image of Americans overseas. The truth is that Americans demand and come close to achieving living standards (housing and the like) overseas comparable to what they had at home. The problem is that what would be middle class housing in the United States is limited to the wealthiest sections of the capital cities of the developing countries. So that is where the Americans settle.

Politically it is perhaps good disposition, because it locates the enclave in the more spacious, less congested part of the city. That the Americans and other foreigners occupy such quarters portrays the impression that they are "veree peech", which in comparison to host citizens of equal status, they indeed are. Few Americans are aware of it.

Social Relations

Most serious advisors try to establish social equilibrium with people with whom they have professional contact. It is a difficult task, due to vast differences in the culture and in the wealth of the two groups. The following guidelines have proven helpful in establishing equilibrium with host country citizens and officials:

1. The foreigner should avoid socially rushing the host official. He should allow the host the opportunity to make the first move.
2. Reciprocate in near kind. If the host has used a restaurant, it signifies perhaps that his domestic facilities are inadequate for the occasion. It would be proper for the reciprocation to take place in a restaurant, also. A party in the home at this occasion might be interpreted as a slur.
3. When entertaining groups, make sure that host citizens are in the majority. They will be uncomfortable as a minority.
4. If it is desirable to entertain host officials and their wives, entertain them one couple at a time. Otherwise, the wives may not show.

Counting Against the Program Orientation Assistance

The earlier U.S. technical assistance programs were concerned primarily with establishing new institutions in countries having near adequate technical skills. All that was needed, it was believed, was technical orientation. So, for example, the U.S. agency would employ an agricultural extension official from a land grant university, who would organize a national extension service and serve as advisor to the new director, whom the U.S. agent referred to as his "counterpart". In two to four years the orientation was completed and the American moved on. This established a pattern, a mode of operation, which continues.

As the program spread to the less developed countries, the supply of technically trained people sharply diminished. Ralph Gleason found the lack of competent counterpart personnel to be the most seriously limiting factor in the way of success in the case histories of 19 out of 26 agricultural development projects in the Near East-South Asia. ^{15/}

Being employed and assigned by project allotment, American technical advisors generally expect the institutions they are to nurture to have at least seen daylight by the time of their arrival. If not, frustrated, they may be prone to walk it out.

The truth is that personnel may not be available, and it takes a long time to train them to a level approaching Western standards. This may suggest the need for alternative approaches, using institutions already

^{15/} Ralph N. Gleason, Technical Assistance to the Agricultural Sector of Developing Nations (Columbus: Ohio State University, May, 1963) p. 34.

established. It suggests the need for great flexibility in the advisory system. Equipping government officials to perform effectively in institutional roles is the essence of the technical assistance goal. In the absence of "counterparts" the advisors should work with the leadership of the people, whatever their roles. A village chief makes a fine "counterpart". If the people can establish objectives they can make progress toward reaching them, and technical assistance helps.

Joint Operations

The U.S. aid agencies have experimented with three methods of managing technical assistance in recipient countries. One method, the principal practice today, is providing direct assistance to recipient governments on the basis of prior agreements. Two forms of joint operations were employed for divergent purposes. The Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) was established by the United States and the Republic of China to provide China a voice in administering aid funds from the United States. The other system was the servicio, established in Latin America to provide a mechanism whereby the United States might control the spending of its contributed funds.

The JCRR was headed by three commissioners named by the President of China and two named by the President of the United States, who disbursed U.S. and Chinese funds in support of rural development projects. Nineteen years after JCRR was established in Taiwan, the last U.S. AID employee, Commissioner Gerald Huffman, was transferred. John Montgomery found the venture to have been a huge success. Agricultural output increased six

per cent annually over the period and per capita income increased 47 per cent from 1952 to 1962. Montgomery's qualifications for the future use of joint operations were, a) high caliber administration and b) substantial contribution by the donor. 16/

On the other hand Roscoe Martin, recognizing the success of JCRR in the short run, suggests that its existence precluded the formation of an agricultural ministry. Thus he doubts the country's capacity to deal with its agricultural problems in the future. 17/

In the 1940's, joint agricultural development organizations were set up in Central and South American countries, with U. S. Operations Mission (USOM) agriculture division chiefs serving as directors. Brazil's servicio had co-directors, a citizen of each country.

The servicios enjoyed great popularity for the first decade or so of their existence. They were free to pay salaries above the civil service scale. With ready cash they could launch projects instantly. Their monopoly on U.S. aid dollars made them admirably conspicuous for vehicles and other imported hardware.

However, it was noticed as the years passed that the recipient governments never substantially increased their support to the servicios, rarely if ever took over the projects, as was hoped. 18/

16/ John D. Montgomery, Rufus B. Hughes, Jr. and Raymond H. Davis, Rural Improvement and Political Development: The JCRR Model (Washington: AID, June, 1964) pp. 4, 67-78.

17/ Roscoe C. Martin and Mildred E. Martin, Technical Assistance in the Field (Syracuse: Maxwell School, February, 1966) hectographed, pp.73-74

18/ Robert J. Schafer, The Servicio Experience (Syracuse: Maxwell School, June, 1965).

If joint operations are not supported they wither on the vine.

Martin sees them, "if carried very far, lead to the creation of parallel and almost inevitably a competing administrative system". ^{19/}

He concluded:

"In seeking to strengthen the machinery of government, full use should be made of the existing structure before recourse is taken to new organizational forms. The temptation is to circumvent the traditional ministries in favor of new agencies which, it is hoped, will be free of the cobwebs of time and the constraints of entrenched bureaucracy. There may be occasions that warrant this procedure, but they are not as numerous as past practice would suggest. The presumption should be that the existing array of departments is adequate to normal needs. Only after a contrary finding based on a careful assessment of the ministries-in-being should a decision be made to create a new agency". ^{20/}

An appropriate conclusion was suggested by Former U.S. Ambassador Leland Barrows. It is his view that if reform is the primary aim of a technical assistance activity it is best to work with and through the established host government agencies. On the other hand, if quick, new response is wanted it is more reliable to establish new agencies.

^{19/} Martin, op. cit., p. 76.

^{20/} Ibid., p. 100.

PROGRAMMING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Technical assistance programs flow from the donor's interests in recipient countries, in this order, a) global interests, b) regional interests, c) specific country interests, d) goals, e) programs. The AID Manual calls for this procedure. It contains the following global policy statement:

"The major objective of U.S. foreign policy is the development of a community of free nations cooperating on matters of mutual concern, basing their political systems on consent and progressing in economic welfare and social justice. Such a world offers the best prospect of security and peace for the United States". 22/

The Manual Order policy statement was amplified by President Johnson in 1967:

"We Americans are deeply concerned about the recognition of the right to self determination. This is what each of you demands for yourself. So let us help your fellowmen in other parts of the world to enjoy it, too

"We believe that for the peoples of the 122 nations of the world, speaking now of the underdeveloped nations specifically, real self determination only comes when hunger and disease and ignorance and poverty are overcome. We believe that the peoples of all of these nations are entitled to that self-determination. They won't have it until we can conquer those ancient enemies--illiteracy, ignorance, disease and poverty". 23/

22/ U.S., AID, Manual Order 1000.1, op.cit., p.1.

23/ The Washington Post, June 28, 1967. p. A-14.

It is illustrative to characterize the necessary achievements of a given country to satisfy U.S. interests and values, as proclaimed by the President. The principal purpose of the speech was to explain U.S. interests in Vietnam. An internal analysis indicated that to fulfill these principles required the following achievements in the Vietnamese rural sector: 24/

- 1) a total population, including the rural element, that is reasonably well fed in terms of technical nutrition standards
- 2) a progressive land-water development program which has resulted in the efficient utilization of most of the land and water resources, or at least as much as is required for the achievement of other related goals, which continues to function in view of contemporary and future needs
- 3) sustained, equitable, efficient exploitation of the adjacent sea
- 4) national self-sufficiency in forest production on a sustained yield basis
- 5) an equitable, efficient production supply system
- 6) an equitable, efficient agricultural marketing system
- 7) adequate rural communications systems, including roads, water transportation, mail and electronic communication
- 8) national self-sufficiency in food and rough fiber production with an advantageous export surplus equal in value to the foreign exchange requirement
- 9) a family of responsive, government sponsored service institutions manned by professionally skilled people, which are well known to the rural population
- 10) a clear alliance between the rural population and the central government through representation from the village upward

24/ Based on a review of the USAID/Vietnam Country Assistance Program by the author, August, 1967.

- 11) adequate schools, accessible through daily commuting, to qualify rural people for government service
- 12) an efficient, up-to-date agricultural research service of adequate dimension to keep the country's agricultural program reasonably progressive in world terms
- 13) an agricultural education system with adequate dimensions to supply the required number of qualified professional manpower for pertinent educational and service institutions
- 14) individual farm efficiency comparable to contemporaries in (other) modern Asian countries 25/
- 15) enough net income by farmers, fishermen and woodsmen, over and above that required for food, medicine and work clothing, to permit savings for capital formation and the purchase of modest items of comfort and luxury
- 16) multiple means of national identification, including viable farmers' organizations and rural youth organizations; a sustained program of rural youth leadership development.

This is first purely a technical exercise to elucidate the implications of stated global policy in a given setting. Second, if the donor really subscribes to the statement in the expanded application, the resulting document might be presented to the host Head of State in some sort of well-wishing ceremony.

The mission and the host government, cooperatively, might assess the country's resources, and from this, project a kind of feasibility statement for a list of aspirations derived as was the above list, as the World Bank did in Kenya. 26/ This document should become the basic text for development planning and the basic guide for the programming of aid by donors.

25/ The Manual Order policy statement uses the Atlantic Community as the standard. op.cit.

26/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Development Prospects for Kenya (Washington: IBRD, 1963). Kenya's national plan flowed directly from this document and a political document, Sessional Paper No. 10, October 23, 1963 (Nairobi: Government Printing Office, October, 1963).

All of the aspirations in the above list imply long range development activities. Rural development is a long range activity. The AID Manual suggested ten years, but this was for budget forecasting purposes.

The Programming Exercise

The shape of the U.S. foreign aid program in a given country will depend on the needs of that country and its importance to the United States, within the constraints of available resources.^{27/} An annual program analysis is held for each country to reappraise the current activities and to chart programs for future years.^{28/} There are nine steps in the exercise:

1. The country Affairs Office (Desk) in Washington sends a general letter of request to the mission for its annual Country Assistance Strategy Paper (CASP). The letter includes general instructions and a format.
2. Washington sends a second general letter stating U.S. interests and policy pertaining to the country.
3. The U.S. Country Team prepares the CASP.
4. The CASP is reviewed in Washington by all agencies concerned. Conclusions are sent to the meeting.
5. Washington announces a schedule for the submission of a country Program Memorandum (PM). Format, topic suggestions and money levels are supplied.
- 6.- The mission prepares the PM for the subject fiscal year, including alternate objectives, political assessments, sector analyses and growth outlook. A Program Budget Submission (PBS) should accompany the PBM.

^{27/} See Joan M. Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy, (New York: Mac Millan, 1968), Chapter 2.

^{28/} Ibid., Chapter 3.

7. The PM is reviewed in Washington by all agencies concerned. This constitutes program approval, subject to the appropriation of global funds by the Congress.
8. For each new technical assistance project evolving from the FM, a Non-Capital Project Paper (PROP) covering the life of the project, follows from the mission. This is simply a project proposal. At the discretion of the mission a Preliminary Project Proposal (PPP), a statement of less detail, may precede the PROP.
9. For each non-capital project, the Agency requires a Joint Project Implementation Plan (PIP), which is a detailed plan expanded from the PROP. The PIP is to cover the scope of the project for its entire life, including the scheduling of inputs, processes and outputs. It is to be planned jointly with host country officials. It is changable in the mission within the scope of approved country strategy, sector goal plans and project authorization. Washington approval of the PIP is not required.

The Manual Order alone is not sufficient to produce good programming, however. Although instructions are given in detail, the Manual Order still assumes that project advisors are skilled project planners. This is over-optimistic. AID/W should send a project planner trainer to every mission to conduct a workshop on project planning and evaluation.

Technical Assistance Rationales

The projects proposed to fulfill the objectives agreed upon depend to a great extent on the views of the programmers. Their views may be shaded by one or more of four rationales of technical assistance.


One is called the bottleneck theory; the second is the target of opportunity approach; the third is the institution building approach; and the fourth is manpower planning.

Bottleneck Theory

The bottleneck theory assumes that development in a given sector

will be found to be limited by specific internal enabling elements; hence, the removal of these "bottlenecks" will step up the output of the sector.

The bottleneck theory may be applied in the systems analysis of the agricultural sector, as shown in this simple model: ^{28/}



It is a basic assumption that supply equals demand at a price. This classic economic principle states that an increase in demand will result in an increase in price. If the marketing component shares the benefit of the price increase with the producer, production will increase, stabilizing price at some equilibrium point. The marketing element may stimulate consumption by reducing prices to the consumer. It may stimulate production by increasing prices to the producer. The extent to which these options may be exercised are constrained by, a) the actual marketing cost, b) the willingness of the marketing component to share profits with the producer and/or the consumer

^{28/} Milo Cox, chief of the A.I.D. Rural Development Division for Latin America, has developed an extensive model of the agricultural sector in which he is able to illustrate the effects of "bottlenecks" at any point in the system. Saul Katz proposes practically the same process in a purely systems analysis approach. See S.M. Katz, Guide to Modernizing Administration for National Development (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, GSPLA, 1965).

and c) the availability of expansion capital and goods. Systems analysis would identify existing "bottlenecks" at these sensitive points.

The availability and/or the use of inputs can affect the level of production.

Enabling Forces--the government, population and purchasing power-- may affect the system in any one or in combinations of the following ways:

1. Obviously, the size of the population influences national consumer requirements and national consumption.
2. The purchasing power of the consumers will influence their level of consumption.
3. The government may follow a prohibitive or forbidding role in relation to inputs, production, marketing and/or consumption.
4. The government may penalize production-consumption by taxing any or all components of the system.
5. The government may follow a laissez-faire policy.
6. The government may discourage production by enforcing price ceilings for producers. Or consumption may be discouraged by guaranteeing prices at a critical minimum.
7. The government may encourage output by subsidizing one or more components of the system.

There is nothing new about the bottleneck approach, except that it calls for the examination of a complete system of flows, directing attention, diagnostically, to sensitive spots.

Target of Opportunity

The target of opportunity concept grew from the recognition that in development assistance unforeseen opportunities do in fact arise, with the plea for program flexibility to take advantage of such occurrences. In usage, "targets of opportunity" have come to be defined as desirable paths

of action with output leverage, free from roadblocks, with political tie-ins and mutual confidence. Leroy Wehrle, former AID Deputy Assistant Administrator, calls it "the principle of concentration on dynamic growth elements".

Utilizing the "principle" with increase in output as the goal, for example, the programmer searches for or endeavors to create the following conditions for the concentration of his resources:

1. Output leverage. An example may be a large rural population with basic farm skills, coupled with a technological breakthrough, such as the development of I-R-8, a high yielding rice strain recently released by the International Rice Research Institute, Los Baños, Philippines.
2. Freedom from roadblocks. This is a first screening as to whether in the existing setting the success of the undertaking is feasible.
3. Political tie-ins. This is a determination of whether the host leadership wants the activity in question, or whether they could be brought to want it.
4. Confidence. This is an inquiry as to whether the host government and the people have confidence in the prospective venture. Unless there is considered to be a reasonable chance for success, it may be better not to undertake the project.

Institution Building

In contrast to subsistence agriculture, the development of commercial, industrial-age agriculture implies surplus production. It also implies specialization. Thus, it calls for sustained linkages with systems beyond the farm domain. These involve, at a minimum, a) means of creating, testing and delivering technology and other non-indigenous inputs, b) means of enabling the farmer to use these inputs, and c) means of exchanging the resulting surplus for replacement inputs and other valuable goods and services. These are institutional functions which are alien to subsistence societies.

The approach suggests that to create these institutions in viable form will result in socio-economic progress and national development. A large proportion of U.S. technical assistance has gone to develop such institutions. The land grant college and its classical functions of research, teaching and extension, is emphasized, as are credit and cooperative institutions.

Institution is defined as "an organization which incorporates, fosters, and protects normative relationships and action patterns and performs functions and services which are valued in the environment." ^{30/}

Historically, institutions have been created to stabilize and diffuse innovations to the realm of eternal, universal practice. First comes the innovation. Then there is the leader, or champion, who may or may not have been the innovator, who expresses value and prescribes ritual and doctrine. Following the doctrine, the members of the institution take the innovation into the environment.

The "institution building" approach searches for dependable procedures for developing organizations that will systematically seek out, stabilize and diffuse innovations useful to the social environment and at the same time discard institutional practices and outputs which serve no useful purpose to society. This calls for centering institutional doctrine in the welfare of the client society, rather than in the innovation. This itself is an innovation.

^{30/} Esman and Bruhns, op.cit., p. 5.

Manpower Planning

One school of thought holds that the key to national development is a package of manpower, which can be determined as to skill and number by survey and projection. Institutions are required for the development of manpower--granted--but what are institutions but people? Given the skilled, properly oriented people, development institutions spring forth spontaneously. AID has put great emphasis on manpower development, but in terms of the requirements of specific institutions; although, again, many of the institutions are for manpower development. For example, high priority may be given to preparing university professors to train teacher trainers. It follows that the output from this effort would be teachers who would man the public school system. ^{31/}

Obviously, no one of the above rationales is sufficient to build a program on. Rather, each has special merits for particular situations. Viewed together, they reveal the interdependence of each on the others.

Evaluation

The fourth document in the new programming system is a Non-Capital Project Appraisal Report (PAR), which is in lock-step with the PIP. It is an annual report which reviews, a) project purposes and design, b) project outputs in terms of project, sector and U.S. objectives, c) implementation

^{31/} See Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers, Education Manpower and Economic Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964) for a thorough treatment of manpower planning and development

and use of inputs, and d) the role of the host country in implementing the project. The instruments include checklists of criteria, provisions for scaled value judgements, backed by narrative explanation, pre-goal progress evaluation and accounts of relevant events. It is on the basis of this report that funds for the projects are to be continued.

The PAR responds to Lincoln's definition of evaluation, which "...stresses the need to evaluate both the performance of AID activities in terms of specific, planned achievements and also their significance in terms of U.S. objectives" ^{32/}

In May 1968, AID Administrator William Gaud adopted an evaluation system developed by Joel Birnstein, whom Gaud had named his special assistant for evaluation. Gaud revealed the following plan:

"Establishment of a management structure for evaluation, including evaluation officers in missions regional bureaus and certain staff offices and a Special Assistant for Evaluation in the office of the Administrator."

"Year-round evaluation activity by missions and simultaneous submission of evaluation plans with program proposals for each year".

"Introduction by late 1968 of a Project Appraisal Report to be submitted at least once a year on every non-capital project."

"As mission and consulting resources permit, more evaluation of specific economic sectors or sub-sectors, e.g., agriculture, agri-business or agricultural production- education or vocational education; manpower development; savings institutions; power; small and medium industry."

^{32/} George A. Lincoln, Improving A. I. D. Program Evaluation, Report to the Administrator (Washington: AID, October, 1965), p.11.

"An AID/W "memory bank" to make readily available the best evaluative studies in major program fields." 33/

Beyond the new hierarchy for evaluation and the PAR, there may be something yet missing. John Lindeman observed that the major requirement for the improvement of the administration of technical assistance by AID was "attitudinal change". 34/ Although his observation was directed toward central administration in general, it seems fully applicable to mission personnel in relation to evaluation and reporting. Equally important, evaluation and reporting is a professional skill which is far from universal among other professions. It is best acquired through systematic learning experience. This suggests the need for special training.

Coordination of Technical Assistance Among Donors

That there is need to coordinate technical assistance to the developing countries is attested in the diversity of sources, which, even so, stand in obviously short supply. At least 24 countries, including China and the Soviet Union, provide bilateral economic aid; ten UN Regular and Expanded programs and four regional programs provide direct technical assistance; two regional cooperative programs administer technical assistance among their memberships; and there is an unknown number of private organizations in the business throughout the world. 35/ Martin reported that, for example in 1964, the Philippines received aid from 120 sources, including

33/ U.S., AID, Front Lines, Vol. VI, No. 13, May 15, 1968 (Washington: AID) p.2.

34/ Lindeman, op. cit., p.3

35/ Technical Assistance Research Project, The Magnitude and Complexity of Technical Assistance (Syracuse: Maxwell School, February, 1965), Hectographed, pp. 1-115.

"...6 United Nations agencies, 18 bilateral assistance countries (excluding the United States), 4 United States agencies, 3 regional cooperative groups, 3 financial institutions, 7 voluntary associations registered with AID for operations in the Philippines, and 79 private agencies, foundations and organizations". 36/

These organizations have highly divergent motives for their presence.

Each independent and bilateral agency holds it's own professional view, and each multinational organization holds many.

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has reported progress in coordinating capital assistance in recent years. This started with reviews of the flow of funds (including terms of flow) to the developing countries, as well as the suggestion of lending standards by DAC. Subsequently, DAC has encouraged its members to hold discussions on the aid needs of specific countries in which there existed common bilateral interests. Discussions have been initiated in Thailand, Liberia, Ceylon and Sierra Leone. 37/

Consortia have been used to muster financial aid for specific countries. More recently, the World Bank has advocated "consultative groups" having development interests in specific countries. The Bank proposes to provide the organizational effort, chairmanship and executive secretariat for such groups.

Martin observed succinctly, "The organization at the headquarters level sets the tone for coordination or non-coordination of efforts and

36/ Martin, op.cit., pp. 16-17

37/ Development Assistance Committee, Development Assistance Efforts and Policies, 1967 Review, Draft Report of the Chairman (Paris: OECD, July 10, 1967), Chapter VIII.

activities throughout the hierarchy". ^{38/} The opportunity to coordinate technical assistance at the top are limited, however. As for AID, its Multilateral Assistance Staff works closely with the U. N. technical assistance agencies. The trouble is, according to Martin, "...the specialized agencies of the United Nations are not themselves well coordinated". ^{39/}

John White found that in the majority of 40 aid recipient countries surveyed, U.N. Resident Representatives reported informal coordination to be either adequate or the best arrangement that could be hoped for under the circumstances. Host governments clearly resent closed-door consortia on their soil, while donor representatives feel that they can accomplish little in the way of coordination in the presence of the hosts. ^{40/}

Beyond informal relations, the hope for in-country coordination of donor effort seems to rest with the host government. It can be achieved through the central planning and aid coordinating facility. This rests on the proposition that if the national plan is good, all resources, including foreign aid, are drawn to their proper places—hence coordinated. It follows that the major effort toward coordination should be devoted to improving the plan and its implementation.

^{38/} Martin, op.cit., p. 126

^{39/} Ibid., p. 129

^{40/} John P. White, Technical Assistance Administration and Coordination by Underdeveloped Countries: Analysis of Responses to a Questionnaire (Syracuse: LeMayne College, 1967)

Coordination by the host country may be achieved at the sector level by the Minister holding periodic meetings of his staff and donor representatives.

INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS

The task remains to examine the institutional functions considered to be requisite to adequate performance of agriculture in a commercial, industrial society. It is the purpose here to suggest the major institutional services required, not to prescribe how they are to be provided.

In accounting for almost equal success in agricultural development in Greece, Mexico and Taiwan, Wade Gregory found that the farm policies of all three governments included "...economic incentives, improvements in supply conditions of new inputs, and education of how to apply the new technology as well as the economic consequences of using it." ^{41/}

A policy setting apparatus is implicit in the central government establishment. What is important from the standpoint of "nation building and socio-economic progress" is the existence of a reference system (pressure groups) to orient the establishment to such a course, which includes the rural sector. The rural sector may be represented through national political parties, to be sure. In addition, a national farmer's organization can be helpful in articulating their interests.

^{41/} Wade F Gregory Agricultural Development in Greece, Mexico and Taiwan (Washington, USDA, ERS) 1967. The role of government policy in development is discussed under the bottleneck theory, above.

Research

A primary requisite for agricultural development is a research system addressed to current production and marketing problems. Research is necessary in low income countries to assure a continued supply of food. The first research required is collecting and comparing the performance of indigenous and foreign strains of crops which respond to national needs. Later the process advances to phenotypic selection of plants, then cross-breeding, selection and hybridizing. Performance testing and selection of livestock and poultry follows, as does the analysis of the farm enterprise and the marketing system.

Mannpower Development

The administration of development requires a multitude of special skills. More, as Esman pointed out, it requires an attitude favoring the process.^{42/} This is an abbreviated list of personnel categories proposed by Donald Stone as essential for development administration:

"General leaders--political and administrative--who must know something about the strategy and processes required to foster rapid development and to develop citizen participation.

"Personnel for central planning, programming, budgetary, and other central policy offices; economic development ministries; development and central banks; and other agencies concerned with major development policies and programs.

"Program planners and supervisors in ministries or departments concerned with development in specific sectors, such as public works, agriculture, education, health, industrial development

^{42/} Esman and Bruhn, op. cit., p. 22.

"Personnel in ministries and central organs who deal not only with design and evaluation of projects, but especially with scheduling, management, control and operation

"Professional and technical personnel...having supervisory roles in ministries, departments, and agencies who also need training in, management and operations, and administrative problem-solving

"Personnel concerned with community development and rural action

"Statisticians, agronomists, and other specialized persons who engaged in some particular aspect of development and need also general or special training in the application of their technical skills

"Instructors for schools and institutes which focus on the training of the above categories of personnel". 43/

AID and its predecessors have assisted with training in nearly all of these categories with varying degrees of success (no case of negative results from in-country training is known). In Gleason's 26 case studies of technical assistance projects, workshops and on-the-job training were rated second among 15 factors contributing to the success of the projects. 44/ No one method of training may be rated above another, as there are places and times for all. In countries already possessing corps of technical personnel the obvious starting point would be to establish temporary centers to provide pre-service training for whatever institutional innovations that are to be introduced. Agricultural extension is an example. This is often necessary, because the inherent resistance to change in the established institutions precludes the use of its resources for such training in the beginning.

43/ Donald C. Stone, Education and Development Administration, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, (GSPIA, 1964), mimeographed, pp. 17-18.

Gleason, op. cit., p. 33.

Where no corps of professional personnel exists the first step is to develop academic training for the preparation of agricultural administrators, researchers and extension workers.

The following principles, which embrace the Inter-University Institution Building model, are proposed as guides to developing both short courses and longer academic programs for professional personnel in the developing countries:

1. Approach the task with dominant impact.
2. Articulate and teach a single doctrine centered in the client society.
3. Teach practical skills in "packages".
4. Teach self-confidence and confidence in the system.

Foreign study is widely used in manpower development. The practice has proven valuable at all personnel levels, from farmer to President, under favorable circumstances. The advantages lie in the exposure to institutions, ideas and skills which do not exist at home.

There are certain disadvantages attributable to the participant training program. Among these, often because of differences in customs and goals, the foreign training received is to varying degrees not applicable to the problems at home. Due to cultural difference, students in foreign setting have fewer references with which to relate their learning experiences to problem situations than do domestic students. Further, to train an individual does not change the structure of the employing organization. Katz and Kahn affirm that it is necessary to change organizational structure and roles to get organizational change. llh/

Groups studying abroad in preparation for common, associated activities appear to profit from mutual reinforcement, both during training and later in operation.

An advantage claimed for developing domestic training institutions is that they grow in competence through the accumulation of experience and they take on additional innovations as the years pass; hence, they become capital growth assets.

Finance

The most important aspect of agricultural development is the supplementation of the farm enterprise with production inputs. The greatest bottleneck to the expansion of the use of technological inputs is the lack of availability and the high cost of credit. Farmers need

llh/ Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966) Chapter 11. A former participant in the AID training program reported that as head of government agency he was unable to institute innovations he had learned in foreign study, due to uniform resistance to change exerted by clerks and others under his command (Jamal Jreisat, Lecture, University of Pittsburgh, GSPIA, April 11, 1968).

credit to finance production inputs and to finance their consumer needs (food deficit and other necessities) between harvests. Farmers are widely dispersed from the financial centers; unknown to institutional lenders, and their unit requirements are small. Hence, the management of farm credit is costly.

An adequate farm credit system seems to require the following elements:

1. A supra financial organization with widely decentralized outlets and widely decentralized lending authority, with minimal leakage.
2. A system of mobilizing funds equal to the demand for credit.
3. A tradition in farm credit operations: ^{45/}
4. Timeliness in delivery of credit at relatively low cost.
5. An efficient, relatively low cost collection system.

^{45/} It is obvious that tradition is not born full-grown. It may be enhanced by indoctrination, however. The Kenya agricultural credit program ran into serious difficulties in 1965-1966 from a general lack of experience on the part of both local credit administrators and borrowers. R.H. Clough, "Some Notes on a Recent Economic Survey of Land Settlement in Kenya," East African Economic Review, Vol. I., New Series, No. 3, December, 1965 (Nairobi: The Oxford University Press) pp. 78-83; J. Meyer, "Kenya's Agricultural Development Policy", East African Economic Review, Vol. II, New Series, No. 3, December, 1966, op.cit., p. 36.

To achieve a combination of relatively low cost credit and timeliness of delivery, farmers must assume most if not all of the responsibility for approving loans and collecting debts among themselves. This means cooperative credit organizations. In commending cooperatives for the administration of farm credit, Horace Belshaw stated,

"In most underdeveloped countries, however, these are potentialities rather than achievements... However Co-operatives must be judged in terms of the alternative situation without them, rather than condemned because they do not measure up to the co-operative ideals accepted in more developed societies." 46/

Farm Supply

The question of agricultural production supply in the developing countries is largely one of national policy:

1. Should farm production supply items be imported?
2. Should they be taxed, left duty-free or subsidized? What promise of benefit-cost ratio does the farmer require to risk the purchase?
3. Should a domestic source be developed? Should it be of state, private or mixed ownership? Should it be taxed, tax exempt, or subsidized?

The type of distribution system is also a matter of national policy. The key factors are timeliness and cost. Generally, private merchants are timely, but unless they are forced by the threat of competition their margins may be excessive.

46/ Horace Belshaw, Agricultural Credit in Economically Under-Developed Countries (Rome: FAO, 1959), pp. 147-148.

There may have been a tendency on the part of AID to push highly desirable imported supplies (fertilizer, for example) through cooperatives as a means of gaining patronage for those fledgling organizations. Although the strategy is understandable, it often has the disadvantage of taking away from timeliness in delivery. Generally, government officials, who are in charge of cooperatives in most developing countries, do not hustle to the tune of private entrepreneurs in delivering commodities, for the simple reason that the former are paid fixed civil service salaries with vacation time and holidays, while the latter are remunerated on the basis price times volume. It appears that for a long time to come the developing countries will need multiple means of distributing farm supplies. The important role of the cooperative may be to hold the entrepreneur in line by providing competitive pressure.

Marketing

The need for an efficient, effective agricultural marketing system may be shown with this partial rural development model: A subsistence farmer achieves a surplus in production, due to a fortuitous season or first-round technological inputs (health promoter, improved seed, insecticides, fertilizer). He takes his surplus to the port city and exchanges it for additional production inputs and/or consumer goods. Part of the surplus goes to support an industrial labor force in the port city, while part is exchanged for imports to support both domestic industry and the farmer's accelerating production program.

There seem to be three goal areas in the development of agricultural

marketing systems in the underdeveloped countries. One is efficiency, measured in terms of labor, actual cost, intermediate spread and return to the producer. The second is an awareness of market demand and effective capacity to respond in terms of production. The third is the availability of options in the market and freedom to respond to them.

It has been estimated that small farmers in the low income countries lose up to half their crops in harvesting, drying, storage and transportation.

In the early stages of market development, if the farmer is free to act independently, typically, he (or she) takes the surplus to the city by foot or by bus if the service is available. There he (or she) sleeps in the street by the commodity by night and sits by it by day until it is sold. Then the farmer divides the proceeds between commercial purchases and the fare home. Oftentimes that net revenue from the marketing activity may amount to no more than prevailing wages in the farmer's own village for the time consumed in the exercise, had jobs been available. To this extent, the goods marketed would be true surpluses, representing neither cost nor value on the farm, hence, the marketing activity must be regarded as supplementary employment.

What is needed, obviously, is scale operations to gain efficiency in transportation and market representation. With an increase in net return from increased efficiency the farmer should be expected to respond to improved techniques of harvesting and protection on the farm.

Farmers need awareness of market demands in order to gain and hold customers and maximize the return for their efforts. Consumers have

peculiar tastes, they have quality preferences, and their needs are distributed over time. Awareness of these conditions may be supplied in part by market information systems. However, in the early stages of development it requires market oriented production guidance.

A cardinal element of the market is an option to choose a purchaser among many-- "A gathering of people for buying and selling things, especially provisions and livestock." ^{47/} In many developing countries farmers make advanced pledges to deliver their crops in return for credit extended in the form of cash and/or merchandise. Thus, they sacrifice their role in the market. When an outside force, such as a government agency, attempts to intervene in the system there must be a readiness to provide the same services as did the village credit merchant. Clifton Wharton concluded that there is,

"...the need to recognize the multiple service or function which is performed by the marketer-moneylender-merchants, when undertaking governmental programs to eradicate monopsony exploitation. For example, governmental policies and programs which aim at eliminating a multiple-function dealer's socially undesirable monopsonistic gains, but which fail to realize or take account of the multiple and interrelated aspects of his operation are doomed to failure. The small farmer will not transfer his custom or allegiance to a governmental operation which only markets his product but does not provide credit. Nor will the smallholder be able to shift if he is still in debt to the dealer as merchant. Thus, any governmental program which attacks only one facet of the monopsonist's power is inadequate". ^{48/}

^{47/} Webster

^{48/} C.R. Wharton, Jr., Marketing, Marketing, Merchandising and Moneylending: A note on Middleman Monopsony in Malaya, Reprinted from the Malayan Economic Review, Vol. VII, No. 2, October 1962 (pp.24-44) (New York: The Agricultural Development Council) p.22.

Again, it seems that if efficient, equitable agricultural markets are to be developed in the low income countries the farmers themselves must do it, at least to the extent of providing alternatives among intermediate purchasers. Although central governments must be depended upon for favorable policy, government administered marketing programs, such as government sponsored cooperatives, so far have exhibited limited capabilities. This is perhaps due to the general inexperience of the civil servant in the market place, an absence of decentralization of decision making, and the honesty factor.

Formal Education

It is appropriate to ask what traditionally school-learned skills are required for contemporary, industrial-age, commercial agriculture.

Illiterate farmers are able to manage first level, stable, technological inputs with no difficulty. These include self-pollinated seed, premixed fertilizer and improved types of livestock. The next level of inputs, which includes credit transactions, insecticides and specially formulated animal rations, requires functional literacy and the ability to do simple arithmetic. This is an absolute requisites for handling insecticides.

It is not absolutely necessary for the operator of a farm to possess these skills, but it is necessary that he have access to them. This was illustrated in a case where an illiterate farmer felt forced to abandon a hog project when his literate son, who had been mixing the feed and keeping records, was drafted into military service. In another case, however, the illiteracy obstacle was circumvented by a group of poultry growers forming a cooperative and delegating all exercises in literacy to the secretary-manager.

The above observations, as well as observations in the United States, suggest that a science oriented primary school education with emphasis on reading and problem solving is minimally adequate academic training for contemporary farming.

The achievement of literacy is one thing, while to maintain it is another. A survey in a rural area in Uruguay in 1962 indicated that 82 percent of adults who had spent five years in school lapsed back into functional illiteracy.^{49/} This suggests the need to provide rural people with meaningful useful, literature after they leave school.

Vocational agricultural education is offered in the United States at the secondary level. Whether such training would fit into a primary school program, or the extent of its effectiveness if it did, remains undetermined. It does not fit the curricula of most secondary schools in the developing countries, where few rural students reach secondary school, and if they do they never return to the farm.

Extension

While it is the role of agricultural research to expand the possibilities of production through devising and testing hypotheses, the need remains to formulate and implement action programs, incorporating research conclusions with other resources, to achieve the expansion of production and rural social development. This function may be performed by a U.S. type Extension Service, or a similar organization, or a combination of organizations.

^{49/} Ladislav Cerych, Problems of Aid to Education in Developing Countries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p.85.

Extension is a means of two-way linkage between the farmer and the experiment station. Classically, extension peddles observed farm problems to the experiment station for study, takes the answers back to the farm and reports the follow-up of the solution back to the experiment station.

Extension may provide the same kind of linkage between farmers and the central planning authority. Ideally, the process begins with regular village meetings, where the needs and aspirations of the rural population are fed into the national planning apparatus through the extension service and/or other linkages.

Conversely, it may be an extension activity to mobilize the rural population, as well as a number of input resources, to respond to the national plan, once it is formulated.

The job of formulating implementation strategy fits the extension role. This includes translating research results into simple technology. It also includes designing and activating implementation programs. Rural campaigns are in the domain of extension.

The extension program is pursued through three groups--men, women and youth. Following the American tradition, efforts among the men are centered on the improvement of farming methods. Women's programs deal mostly with the improvement of family living, including home comfort, child care and nutrition. The fact that in many countries farming and finances are managed by women, rather than by men, generally has not been recognized by this institution.

The rural youth programs are patterned after the U.S. 4-H Club, and like its early version, emphasizes production technology. This program seems to be the logical supplement to primary school training for developing modern farmers and rural leaders. It can provide skill-development for rural youth between daily and seasonal school sessions as well as between termination of school and entry into the labor force--times which are very boring for rural youth. The program can provide leadership training and contribute to national integration. The institutional ritual is loaded with national symbols, including a national uniform, a flag ceremony, a pledge of national allegiance, an oath to do good for the common weal, and the overt following of government officials.

Information

Among the requisites for rural development are, a) the forces that control the resources must want it, and b) the rural population must be involved in the process. This requires programmed mass information.

The development program must be promoted among the elite influence groups. Secondly, the national enabling body (legislature) must be provided with adequate information about the program to justify their rational approval of it. Third, action leaders at all levels must be provided adequate, timely information to decisively defend and implement the program. Fourth, the program must be promoted among the rural masses. An effort should be made to get the idea across that no person is excluded from participation. Fifth, but not last in rank, the technology of the program must be written in understandable language of the user and made available to him.

Involvement

A fact of which there is limited awareness among Western technical assistance personnel is that the rural societies of most underdeveloped countries are highly organized. Sidney Sufrin reported, "Village societies in underdeveloped countries have been highly successful; the great problems are in the cities".^{50/} The strength of the Chinese rural social system, for example, is shown in the testimony that it has survived in its present form for over 4000 years.^{51/} After 20 years of effort expended, Mao Tse-tung abandoned an all-out attempt to destroy the system.

The role of internal social system leadership in relation to innovation in the rural Chinese culture syndrome may be shown as follows:

The collective value of the system is survival with ranked status. Status rank is achieved through service to the system through familyhood, wealth, wisdom, aid to authority and authority--each, in the order listed, commanding progressively higher status value. The status values of roles are cumulative. The rural social system endeavors to adopt innovations which promise to contribute to its survival-status goal. It tends to resist innovations that violate norms or threaten the status hierarchy. The village leadership, for example, must be entrusted with managing innovations within its domain. Village leaders control the legitimation powers and procedures and the communication systems. To a large extent they can control the unemployed time of the village members.^{52/}

^{50/} Sidney C. Sufrin, Technical Assistance: A Problem in Management (Syracuse: Maxwell School, January, 1965) hectographed, p.20

^{51/} The rural Chinese social system is described by Francis L.K. Hsu in Societies Around the World, Vol. II, Erwin T. Sanders, Editor (New York: Dryden Press, 1953), pp. 25-193.

^{52/} Based on comparative village-level observations in Siem Reap and Kampot Provinces, Cambodia, 1962-1963, and Thua Thien and Quang Tin Provinces Vietnam, 1964-1966. It is corroborated in Sufrin's generalization. op. cit.

It was proposed above that farmers should have a part in national planning. It is suggested that this can best be accomplished through regular (monthly) village meetings presided over by the village chief (in village societies--the head man in any case). From the standpoint of scope, four types of problems may be voiced at these meetings. There is the irrational category, which should be disposed on the spot. Second, there is the local self-help category, for which the local leadership, with the assistance of government outsiders, should organize to implement in proper sequence of season and priorities. Third, there is the regional cooperative category which requires action beyond the jurisdiction of the assembly present. These problems must be referred for coordination and joint planning. Fourth, there are problems of national scope which have bearing on the welfare of the local entity. These must be forwarded to the central planning authority through government channels.

A federation of farmers' organizations, reaching from the village to the national capital, independent of government, can provide added assurance that the farmers are actually represented in the national process.

Coming down the hierarchy ladder, the same system can contribute to the implementation of the national plan by mobilizing the rural masses. The spirit of action should optimize conditions for the development of institutions (cooperatives, for example) to perform the functions necessary for rural development.

Feedback

The greatest inhibitor to national planning in the developing countries, it is universally claimed, is the lack of reliable information on which to make decisions. Statistics gathering and processing require highly sophisticated skills and procedures. Data accumulate meaning over time. Much data gathered in the former colonies over the past century have been stored in European capitals and forgotten about.^{53/} In many developing countries a culture gap has developed between the elite of the central government and the rural population to the extent that it is difficult for the former to extract accurate information from the latter.^{54/} As for the rural sector specifically, a large proportion of agricultural production is never submitted to standard weights, measures or exchange media.

The following categories of information contribute markedly to national planning for rural social and economic progress:

1. Inventory of natural resources.
 - a. A standard reconnaissance soil survey.
 - b. A standard pot-test survey of soil nutritional adequacies for crop production.
 - c. An underground water survey, including estimates of depth, quantity and quality for agricultural use.

^{53/} De Vries, Institutional and Organizational Aspects of International Transfer of Knowledge and Capital, op.cit., p. 7.

^{54/} U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rural Development in Asia, Hearings, before the Sub-committee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, Part I, Statement by Kenneth T. Young, Jr. (Ninetyeth Congress, First Session, March, 1967), pp. 49-50.

- d. Mineral surveys, including limestone, phosphate, potash and petroleum.
 - e. A forest survey, where market timber exists.
2. Cumulative data on natural phenomena, including rainfall temperature and major stream flows.
 3. Catalogue of agricultural predators.
 - a. Catalogue of crop and livestock feeding insects and other parasites and predators.
 - b. Catalogue of crop and domestic animal diseases.
 4. A conventional population and agricultural census every ten years.
 5. An annual crop and livestock reporting system.
 - a. Area and purpose of land use and its yield.
 - b. Types, volume and value of commodities marketed.
 - c. Types, volume and value of commodities exported.
 - d. Types, volume and value of commodities imported.
 6. Special studies.
 - a. Orientation studies to acquaint planners and change agents with social and economic phenomena relevant to development.
 - b. Special studies in support of special projects.

To be contributive, the accumulated information must be combined, processed, published and distributed to those who have need for it in the pursuit of national purpose, when they need it.

CENTRAL ORGANIZATION

Legislation

At least once a year since 1949, the President of the United States has stated that the foreign aid program had a major role in U.S. foreign policy. After these annual proclamations and after much testimony before Congressional committees, the program has been extended, in whole or in part, for another year. This seasonal uncertainty, on top of all-too-frequent administrative crises, has unquestionably reduced the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. foreign assistance effort.^{55/} After 20 years of study, it seems appropriate for Congress to affirm, once and for all, that foreign aid is a continuing function and authorize the President to form a permanent agency to implement the program.

Analysis of experience in development assistance to date suggests the following advantages for a permanent organization: Under the most favorable circumstances, it cannot be hoped to advance low income countries to industrial society status in less than 20 years. It is not appropriate from the standpoint of available resources and priorities to undertake a program of accelerated development assistance of every low income country

^{55/} Crises include the changes of administrations in 1953 and 1961, the AID Act for 1962, the personnel freeze of 1964, the foreign exchange crisis of 1968, and the prospective reorganization for 1969.

in the world at once; thus the problem is likely to continue for a long time. The achievements scored by the U.S. aid agencies have been made by shaping annual Congressional authorizations, one after another, into long range programs. This was done on faith that Congress would continue the programs, but at a much higher cost than would have been required by legitimate long range programs. There was considerable loss between appropriations. Technical assistance had to be carried out by either temporary personnel or contract personnel, at a higher cost per man year of comparable service than would have been the case with career personnel. ^{56/}

Frank Coffin proposed a cooperative effort by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and AID to re-examine the propriety of the U.S. foreign aid program, in an exercise completely apart from the annual hearings on authorization and appropriation. If it should be decided that new legislation is needed, a task force drawn from these three entities would draft a proposal clarifying "...the principal objectives, secondary objectives, the standards, and procedures of aid operations...". ^{57/}

^{56/} Added costs result from bringing temporary personnel aboard, first-tour break-in, elimination of misfits, contract start-up, contract administrative overhead and loss of the experience factor, and the loss of income tax from contract personnel.

^{57/} Coffin, op. cit., p.243.

There is an underlying plea in Coffin's book for improvement in communications between Congress and the Executive Branch--" ... an atmosphere of shared responsibility..." ^{57/} He said this

"...implies two commitments; the commitment of such Foreign Affairs Committee/Congressmen and Foreign Relations Committee/ Senators to invest time, to dig deeply, and to maintain their interest in a subject which has only the national interest to recommend it; and the commitment by the executive branch to consult frequently and seriously with such persons on the same basis of confidence as if they were administration colleagues. This consultation would be a continuing one, with special attention being given to the planning for the coming year. ^{59/}

Such intensity of joint participation is reminiscent of the Truman Administration, when Senate Foreign Relations Committee leaders played prominent roles in foreign affairs, including the formation of the United Nations.

Organizing for Technical Assistance

Systems analysts hold that the system structure of complex organizations may be best evaluated, as a set of substructures. These are identified by Saul Katz as transformation, maintenance, adaptation and guidance. He states,

"The transformation substructure, sometimes called technical or conversion or production subsystem, is a major and central substructure in the system. It encompasses the system relationships concerned with the transformation of inputs into the system's performance-outputs

"Clearly the absence of substructures to carry on internal system activities mean a lack of structural capability". ^{60/}

^{57/} Ibid., p.246.

^{59/} Ibid., pp. 245-246.

^{60/} Saul N. Katz, A Methodological Note on Appraising Administrative Capability for Development, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, GSPFA, 1968), pp. 18, 22.

The Congressional Act for International Development, 1961, placed central emphasis on guidance. The senior office below the Agency Administrator was to be the Program Review and Coordination Staff, later called the Office of Program and Policy Coordination. The Act provided for

" 1) The Office of Development Financing, responsible for advising the Administrator on the providing of capital assistance...; 2) The Office of Development Research and Assistance, which will formulate research requirements and arrange for the conduct of research projects ...; 3) The Office of Commodity Assistance, which will be responsible for formulating the policies for the distribution of commodities, both project and non-project, both agricultural and nonagricultural." 61/

Although elements of the substructures for maintenance and adaptation are evident in the new organization, the substructure for performance in the area of technical assistance was not provided for. Most technical offices, including Food and Agriculture, were excluded from the new organization, although the Office of Public Safety was continued.

The central administration was divided into four bureaus (later five, including Vietnam), each headed by an Assistant Administrator. The program and capital assistance offices held the same relative positions in the bureaus as in the central structure. Each bureau included a technical assistance staff which held advisory roles. As advisors, the incumbents were obligated to advise everybody who consulted them, but they had no essential role in the implementation of the program.

The complete rejection of administration by process is said to be a revolt against an enviable power position enjoyed by the Office of Food and Agriculture in ICA and predecessor agencies. In that era the technical

61/ U.S., International Cooperation Administration, An Act for International Development, Fiscal Year 1962, A Summary Presentation (Washington: Department of State, ICA, June, 1961) pp.xvii-xviii.

offices held rank equal to that of the program office. This resulted in a constant fight over programming, in which the Administrator, or his deputy, was forced to intervene all too often.

Dismantling the professional-technical linkage in the central administration had these disadvantages: First, it removed the technical assistance professional from the program review process and denied the Agency that internal capability. Second, it left the technical programs in the field without coordination. In the ICA days there was a number of regional training functions, for example, that were not continued in AID, simply because the positions of persons in the central office who programmed and implemented the activities were abolished. Third, no provisions were made to continue the technical backstopping for mission personnel when the central technical staffs were disbanded. This could have been expected to result in AID technical assistance personnel, isolated from current innovations, to lapse into antiquity. Fourth, it precluded the development of a professional improvement program.

Professor Lindeman advocates separating the administration of technical assistance from the administration of capital assistance. In his view, the great imbalance of cost between the two instruments causes technical assistance to go neglected. This proposal infers organization by subsystem, or process, including technical assistance, capital assistance, supporting assistance and food aid. The ICA organization, which provided for specialized staffs grouped in offices of major functions, seems appropriate for technical assistance.

Organization by subsystem provides for adding professional staffs as they are needed and dispensing with them when they are no longer useful--

a measure of flexibility abundantly practiced by AID and its predecessors. The current AID organization reveals these major technical assistance flows: a) agriculture and rural development, b) public health, c) manpower and human resources development, d) public administration, e) public works, and f) public safety. 62/

The Office of Human Resources Development, created by AID in 1961 and later discontinued, should be reestablished. This Office should be given responsibility for assistance in manpower planning, education and participant training.

Institutional Development, provided for in the organization structure, may be seen as either a rationale for technical assistance or a technology for the nurturing of public institutions. Philosophy, as in the former case, has no place in internal organic structure, for to be effective, the whole organization must be subservient to the philosophy. If the latter view is accepted, the technical assistance role of institutional development must be seen as a specialized technical activity. As such, it fits best in the human resources development group.

Attention to labor, which is recognized in AID at the central office level and at the regional technical staff level, may be viewed as human resources development, political development, or both. If the primary interest lies in the former, this function, also, belongs to the human resources group.

62/ U.S., Department of State, Agency for International Development, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Telephone Directory, February 1968 (Washington: Department of State).

There remains the necessity of dominant consideration of guidance in the organization scheme. This may be provided by the present Office of Program and Policy Coordination placed between the performance group and the Administrator. The major roles of this office would be, as it is today, a) to elucidate to the Administrator, his effective alternatives in policy and program, and, b) coordinate the resources and the programs in terms of policy and objectives.

For the Office of Program and Policy Coordination to be fully effective, its ranks must remain open to in-house recruitment of process professionals. A sample of the incumbents of senior positions indicated that the Office is presently dominated by the economics discipline. Eleven of 23 positions reviewed were occupied by economists, while only six positions implied such requirement. The information available indicated that the professional backgrounds of 12 of the 23 incumbents matched the technical titles of their positions.

Functions of the Central Office Technical Assistance Group

The central technical assistance office should have the broad concern for the contribution of the functions under its jurisdiction to the total program. This begins with the recommendation of global and regional policy.

Program Review

The central technical assistance office should be responsible for monitoring the technical assistance programs in the field. This should begin with processing Project Proposals. Similarly, the technical assistance office should make the first analysis of incoming PAR's.

Consultation

The internal consultative capacity provided in the AID regional technical offices is essential for the representation and advancement of the technical programs in the field. The present regional staffs appear to be of the proper composition--i.e., former division chiefs and other experienced personnel with outstanding records of performance--provided that the central technical offices have adequate information staffs to respond to internal, congressional and public demands. The regional officers should continue to serve as they do now in effect, as combination administrative-research assistants, program advocates and expeditors to everybody concerned with the respective technical assistance programs.

In the role of concern for the progress of mission programs, the technical offices should provide special consultative assistance to the personnel office in its effort to fill technical assistance positions with capable people.

The regional technical staff, with the assistance of the central office staff, would monitor the purchase of technical support commodities. Technical consultation is one matter, while expediting is another. Gleason reported that six out of 26 technical assistance projects he examined suffered from the unavailability of late arrival of technical support commodities. 63/

Contract Monitoring

The technical assistance office should represent the Agency in negotiating and monitoring technical assistance contracts.

63/ Gleason, op.cit., p. 34

Backstopping

It has been asserted that AID (with special reference to agriculture) has tended not to innovate, or has tended not to keep pace with current technical innovations. There are three possible reasons for this assertion. First, AID/Agriculture has never been adequately staffed to monitor innovative research. In its heyday the ICA Office of Food and Agriculture was staffed at the rate of about one man for fifteen covering comparable areas of technical interests in the land grant universities. Second, most of the funds spent by the Agency for research in technical assistance were devoted to the study of methods, and not to physical inputs.

Third, although uncounted, an impressive list of agricultural innovations have been introduced to low income countries by AID and its predecessors, and universally accepted, with their source either taken for granted or forgotten. These include completely new crops (onions in South-east Asia, for example) as well as species that out-yielded the traditional strains by as much as 250 percent. AID contributed 35 such innovations to Cambodia from 1957 to 1963, and approximately the same number to Vietnam, up to 1968. 64/

It is not unreasonable to speculate that in most countries where the United States has had continuous programs for 15 years, the production and

64/ One of the latest innovations introduced in Vietnam was a high volume, low-lift water pump designed by the University of Florida under a contract to provide preservice training for AID agricultural advisors. Another was an adaptation of a "henless chick" program appearing in a University of Georgia Extension Service bulletin, published in 1925. Each fitted local needs in Vietnam, resulting in spectacular increases in production and income.

unit yield of commercial vegetables, pork, chickens and eggs has doubled. This is attested in part in the fact that the supply of these commodities has kept pace with demand without unreasonable increases in prices, in spite of spectacular urban expansion.

Fourth, crop improvement innovations by the foundations have recently been brought to the attention of those outside the technical field, through the popular news media. The latest innovations announced have been particularly interesting, because they promise to increase the staff grains, wheat and rice. AID agronomists have not been able to conduct long range crop breeding programs, because the Agency has been "temporary". However, they have systematically tested all new strains from all sources that they could test with the resources available to them. These include Guatemala Golden Flint corn, bred by the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1950's, as well as the new strains that annually emerge from the state experiment stations. The current releases by the Rockefeller Foundation are undergoing intensive tests around the world.

This does not refute the fact that neither AID nor its predecessors have provided adequate technical backstopping for its field programs. It is proposed that this can best be accomplished through open-end contracts with land grant universities. The contract would provide for reimbursing the university for maintaining a special institutional interest in the development of agriculture and the rural sector in a particular country, through backstopping the AID personnel located there.

This would call for pairing key personnel--dean with division chief, head of department with branch chief, professor with advisor--who would maintain dialogues through the exchange of program documents and other materials. Each key university person would spend up to 30 days in the recipient country each year. The University would supply personnel for longer terms upon negotiation.

Managing Participant Trainees

The management of AID participants is handled in two ways, generally. Where a university contract is involved, the student is sent directly from the recipient country to the contracting university in the United States. Where there is no contract, the participant is forwarded to Washington by AID. There the planning and monitoring of his program is farmed out to a U.S. Government Department, which performs the service on a reimbursable basis. The advantages claimed for this procedure are, a) the Departments have special expertise in curriculum planning and, b) they have special acquaintances with the admissions officers of the universities. After 20 years in the business, the latter claim is beyond question.

On the other hand, three disadvantages may be cited for the procedure. First, the procedure introduces an additional bureaucratic entity, which often adds to the confusion of the participant. Second, domestic agency personnel have no claim to special acquaintance with the needs of government officials of the low income countries. Third, the system does not provide the participants with interim counsel.

AID should assume complete management of its participant program. This should start by placing the Office of International Training in the proposed Office of Human Resources Development. This office would manage the programming, funding, forwarding, orientation and placement of participants.

It is proposed that an additional step be taken. In a rotation program of its technical advisors, the Office of Human Resources Development would maintain an AID counselor-in-residence at least at the state land grant universities. ^{65/} AID participants need counseling on their curricula in relation to their future responsibilities, as well as counseling concerning their private problems, ^{of} neither which is provided in the present system.

Information

Over and above the information on non-capital projects provided by the central evaluation and memory system, the technical assistance offices must stand ready to provide higher management and Congress with comprehensive information on the progress of all projects for which they are responsible. The central information office, by itself, cannot provide this information alone. Out of necessity, it must concentrate on the "big picture", and it cannot keep in touch with the sources.

Also, the technical assistance offices should bear their share of the burden of assisting the press in collecting timely information about technical assistance activities.

^{65/} The precedent was set by the U.S. Veteran's Administration after World War II.

PERSONNEL FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The foreign technical assistance job calls for almost unattainable qualifications. It drags the incumbent to some of the most uncomfortable spots on the globe, without much special remuneration and with no employment security at all. It is obvious that those who follow the profession do so because they like it.

Qualifications

Lists of qualifications for technical assistance service have been said to add up to the ideal man. Although the perfect specimen is hardly available, Etzioni suggests that the concentration of ideal characteristics may be enhanced by selective recruitment. 66/

Etzioni's personality requirements of the "organization man" appear applicable to technical assistance personnel. They include instant lateral social mobility or "...accustomed to shuttling back and forth between social units ... , a high tolerance for frustration... , the ability to defer gratification...," and" ... achievement orientation."67/

66/ Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964) p.110

67/ Ibid., 109

Professor Iversen noted, "There has been little improvement on the list enunciated in The Overseas American in 1960: 1) technical skill, 2) belief in Mission, 3) cultural empathy, 4) a sense of politics, and e) organizational ability". ^{68/}

The Herter Committee list included, 1) zeal for creative accomplishment, 2) deep understanding of life and culture at home, 3) ability to communicate effectively across cultural barriers and to develop a sympathetic understanding for other peoples and their cultural heritages, 4) adaptability and flexibility, 5) executive ability and 6) specialized competences. ^{69/}

Professional Competence

It seems obvious that technical skill is the first requisite of technical assistance personnel, as the very lives and livelihoods of large numbers of people, not to mention the political success of projects, may rest on their recommendations. The frequently voiced observation that U.S. projects do not fail for lack of technical competence is not fully convincing. Such observations have been made either by technical personnel, who could be suspected of bias, or by generalists, not

^{68/}Iversen, op.cit., p.88, from Harlan Cleveland, et. al., The Overseas American (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

Robert W. Iversen, Personnel for Technical Assistance (Syracuse: Maxwell School, March 1966). Mimeographed.

^{69/} Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, op.cit., pp.48-54.

qualified to judge. Eleven per cent of the foreign technicians surveyed by Hyman and associates reported major technical mistakes in their latest projects. This was corroborated by 12 per cent of recipient officials responding to the same questionnaire. ^{70/} These were confessions of commission. Errors in omission may be much higher.

The tough question is, technically competent at what? Does the job call for a rice breeder, for example, or does it call for a person proficient at nurturing agronomic research institutions? The answer is that both skills and more would likely be needed in the one person. For whatever assignment, the technical assistance advisor needs a relatively broad academic and professional background which has been kept current. Further, he needs to be able to do creditable, independent, problem-solving research. Without this capability, he is not likely to accurately diagnose the problems he faces or design their solutions. The capability of written expression is important. The technical advisor should also be professionally capable of teaching.

Cross-Cultural Empathy and Communication

Professor Sufrin maintains "...that technical aid is essentially a managerial exercise undertaken under difficult considerations because the manager cannot exercise the usual managerial controls over the environment he is attempting to influence. ^{71/} Although the environment

^{70/} Herbert H. Hyman, et.al, Inducing Social Change in developing Countries (General: UN - Research Institute for Social Development, 1957) p.152

^{71/} Op. cit., p.16

is natural, social and political, it is also cultural. Empathy is essential for significant technical assistance to take place. Not much empathy can develop without communication.

Cultural empathy is not to be confused with the "missionary spirit", or the "do-gooder" stance. Stanley Andrews explicitly warns against hiring the "do-gooder" for technical assistance work. It is his observation that the "do-gooder" tends to assume a paternalistic stance, which seriously impedes empathetic flow.^{72/}

Representative of the Donor Government and Country

Every person outside the bounds of his homeland is a representative of his country, whether he is aware of it or not. Technical assistance personnel need the "deep understanding of life and culture at home", prescribed by the Herter Committee.^{73/} To this must be added a general awareness of U.S. interests and policy.

Political Awareness

It was Professor Martin's conclusion that,

"... to foreign technical assistance personnel, to repeat, the pervading presence of politics is perhaps the greatest single deterrent to the successful practice of technical assistance in underdeveloped countries".^{74/}

The Martins indicated that a seriously significant number of technicians they interviewed were found to be naive of the political process of decision

^{72/} Stanley Andrews, An Off-Shoulder Look at Foreign Aid and its Administration (Washington: Johns Hopkins University, 1963) Mimeographed, pp.21-24

^{73/} Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel op.cit., p.49

^{74/} Martin, op.cit., p.41

making. Being unaware of the political facts of life at home, they held in disdain the identical process which became visible to them in their roles as government advisors.

National Perspective and Action Orientation

Technical assistance personnel need to be self-starters who have the capacity to recognize national problems and the initiative to organize resources in pursuit of solutions.

Supplying Personnel for Technical Assistance

The management of technical assistance personnel has been difficult for the U.S. foreign aid program at least since the beginning of ICA, in 1955. It has often been difficult to get personnel of the proper technical qualifications when they were needed. Six out of the 26 projects in Gleason's study suffered from this problem.^{75/} On the other hand, there has been an administrative problem of placing excess personnel as the Agency has gone into periodic retractions. Since personnel have been drawn from diverse professions, states and even countries, there has often been a great variation in the notions of technical assistance requirements in specific countries.

U.S. foreign aid personnel have been judged by some as ranking below the top of their professional disciplines.^{76/} A "temporary" agency such as AID might be expected to attract more than its share of institutional misfits. Nevertheless, in 1963, the Civil Service Commission found AID

^{75/}Gleason, op.cit., p. 34

^{76/}Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, op.cit., p.114

personnel to be "... a dedicated, competent work force"^{77/}

The first of the Herter Committee's Recommendation for the provision of technical assistance personnel, was to devise a development assistance policy for each country and, for this, project U.S. technical assistance personnel requirements for some time in the future.^{78/}

The second substantial recommendation was to take into the ranks of the regular Foreign Service the personnel required as development planners and managers. This group would include "... mission directors, deputies, administrative officers, program officers, comptrollers, and a small group of specialists in such major professional fields as education, public health, and agriculture."^{79/}

The remainder would be either hired through terminal contracts or procured through intermediate contractors.

The first argument for depriving technical advisors of career rewards was that technical assistance requirements are too uncertain to staff for. Another reason had to do with the administrative inconvenience of placing specialists. Responsibility for career employment could be avoided through the use of temporary personnel or contractors.^{80/}

The big argument for excluding technical personnel from the career group was that

... "better personnel will be obtained by hiring persons for temporary tours of duty"

^{77/}Coffin, op.cit., p.223

^{78/}Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel op.cit. pp 113-120

^{79/}Ibid.

^{80/}Ibid

"...the career context and career loyalties of the best professionals lie with their professions and the whole range of activities with which those professions are associated. An association with AID, even if it could be made permanent, would not attract very many of the best professionals to spend most of their working lives overseas, far from their professional colleagues and the stimulus of professional association". 81/

This argument is usually advanced in support of university contracts. But are the people with the proven capabilities to manage the tasks at hand really available? For example, the person wanted to head a contract team assigned to assist in the development of a new university is, at the minimum, a dean in the contracting institution. But is rare indeed that a university contract team is headed by such a person, except in cases of retirement. Professor Martin noted "...considerable vigorous criticism of the practice of sending "old men" out to do what is considered to be young men's work... Many of these oldsters are status-conscious...." 82/

In the final analysis the Agency should be concerned more with progress toward meeting its objectives than with the standard quality measure of its instruments. The Herter Committee argument does not

81/ Ibid

82/ Martin, op.cit., p.44

consider the merits of a profession of cross-cultural development assistance, which might be interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary.

The Herter Committee recommendation may be likened to a conservative but elevated version of the ICA concept of a career service, launched in 1957. In that plan technical assistance personnel were changed from the Foreign Service Staff (FSS) classification to Foreign Service Reserve (FSR), a category established during World War II to accommodate lateral entrance to the Foreign Service. Those with less than two years service, -- hence, unproven -- and those with specialities so narrow that the agency could not foresee a continued demand for their services were placed in the Foreign Service Reserve-Limited (FSR-L) classification.

The Agency would profit by a program somewhere between the Herter Committee recommendation and the ICA career plan. The Committee's proposal should be liberalized to include development advisors or branch chiefs. Personnel of this group are in the daily thick of development planning and management. The services they render cannot be easily delegated to temporary or contract personnel.

In actuality, approximately half of AID technical assistance personnel have adopted the Agency for their career. It is doubtful that changes in the employment program could be expected to reduce the attrition rate of either desirables or low producers. It could be expected to increase the level of productivity from the total effort through the improvement of morale.

Regional Advisors

The use of regional technical advisors was advocated in the 1961 Act presentation. This proposal saw the spreading of single, highly specialized professionals -- veterinary public health advisor, for example -- over a number of countries. However, to date there have been few cases of outstanding success of these endeavors reported. ^{83/} The inhibitor seems to be that the technician is never able to establish rapport with the people he is supposed to influence, and if he does, he is unable to stay in one place long enough to assist in carrying through the first activity, in all-important function of technical assistance.

Short Term Services

Echoing the Herter Committee, Professor Iversen advocated increased use of short term personnel. This is to be commended for short term activities, including participating in special surveys, short courses and conventions. To be effective, such projects require intensive preparation and prolonged follow-up. Although such activities may be highly complementary to a full-time advisory team, they may not be considered as substitutes for full time technical advice.

Balanced Team

ICA subscribed to the "balanced team" concept of technical assistance on the grounds that, on balance, all underdeveloped countries would be found deficient in a distinct group of critical technical

^{83/} A regional soil fertility survey in the Andean Countries of South of South America, conducted by North Carolina State University under AFD contract, appears to be an exception.

capabilities. Hence, U.S. missions followed a general pattern of composition throughout the underdeveloped world. A typical agriculture division was staffed by a food and agriculture officer, a deputy food and agriculture officer, and agricultural research advisor, an agricultural extension advisor, an agricultural education advisor, an agricultural credit and cooperatives advisor, an animal husbandry advisor and a crops advisor. Each of these advisors was provided assistants as the magnitude of the program in terms of geographic diversity and intensity of effort dictated.

The "balanced team" approach was opposed by the Herter Committee on the ground that it often left important development functions untouched. The Committee's observation of the effect was valid. ^{84/} However, the cause was not the "balanced team", but narrow-based, inflexible technical assistance projects. Although project agreements may serve the useful function of defining areas of technical assistance activity and in exacting self-help commitments from the recipient country, they can prohibit technical assistance in non-project areas.

The solution to the problem is not to reduce the general capability to respond to the development needs of recipient countries but to broaden the bases of technical assistance projects and provide for amendment flexibility to respond to "targets of opportunity".

^{84/} Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, op.cit.

Institutional Contract Services

The question of when best to provide technical assistance through the services of direct hire personnel and when to contract the services from outside institutions was not treated in depth in the Maxwell School project. Nor can it be resolved in this study. Based on foregone experience, however, these generalizations are proposed as guidelines; First, the Agency must be responsible for its own commitments and its own program; hence, the people responsible for these programs should be direct hire personnel, serving under oath. This includes personnel through the branch chief level. Secondly, team functions directed toward institution building can probably best be provided by institutions under long term contracts. Stable institutions -- universities, for example -- are advantageously qualified to provide singular, team approaches to institutional development. This requires a resolve on the part of the contracting institution to put forth a single doctrine and a continuous, dynamic effort.

Pre-service Orientation and Training

The prospects of finding a person meeting the above qualifications for service in technical assistance seems clearly unlikely, but as long as the need remains the ideal should be pursued. The Herter Committee recommended that, "New professional personnel, prior to assignment overseas, should receive fundamental orientation with regard to AID, its mission, its organization, its administrative practices, and the region and the country of assignment. ^{85/} This is needed and much more.

85/ Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, op.cit. p.121

National Policy

A fundamental grounding in the national interests and policy of the donor country is necessary knowledge for the bilateral technical assistance advisor. With such orientation he can interpret national policy in terms of technical pursuits in his own realm. Without such awareness the chances for a favorable contribution are likely to be greatly reduced.

Many technicians need orientation as to how to keep up with what is national policy. This calls for guidance in current reading.

Political Awareness

It was Professor Martin's Observations that technical people tend to discover politics in government administration after arriving on foreign assignment. Far from being able to use politics in the pursuit of their objectives, it tends to frustrate them he concluded. Many are almost equally frustrated from living with the political processes of their own government for the first time. Martin states, "The difference between developed and underdeveloped countries lie in the manner of practice of politics, not in its presence or absence."⁸⁶

Foreign technical assistance advisors should be given an introduction to political awareness as part of their preservice orientation. This could best be done, perhaps by non-government personnel.

Cultural Awareness

As a person leaves his own cultural environment he must become aware of, appreciative of, the new culture in order to maintain emotional

⁸⁶/Martin, op.cit., p.41

stability. ^{87/} This begins with developing an awareness of one's native culture, personal values, norms and subconscious reasons for routine actions. Then, there is the need for a simple method of understanding other countries. This is a preservice orientation task.

Language

The pervading fiber of culture is communication, and the broad core of communication is language. Without the capability of direct conversation, the development of empathy and easy rapport between members of widely differing cultures seems remote. Even to make a sincere effort to learn the host's language breeds empathy. This is an exercise in which the host official can be clearly superior in a helpful role. It dispels the feeling of inequality and paves the way for profitable exchange in technical assistance.

The use of interpreters is far from satisfactory communication. Those who possess a technical, action vocabulary are rare. In many countries, interpreters come from the clerical class and since the chances are that they are overpaid by the donor agency, they may be resented by host government officials. Since they are employed by a foreign entity they are suspect. Finally, if they become proficient, interpreters tend to usurp the roles of the foreign advisors by giving advice to their countrymen in areas beyond their competence.

^{87/} Kalerwo Oberg, "Culture Shock and the Problem of Adjustment to New Cultural Environment", Papers in Applied Anthropology (Rio de Janeiro: USOM, 1957) pp.92-99.

There can be no easy solution, because the many cultural references that supplement language in communication, and because technical assistance personnel move so frequently. But as an approach, the study of languages is recommended. This should begin, if possible, with an intensive course in the prevailing language of the country or location before arriving for the first assignment. After arriving at this post of duty the advisor should continue language drills until he has achieved professional conversational proficiency. In the course of a career of studying languages they tend to become cumulative and easier to learn.

Program

Technical assistance personnel destined for service at far-flung locations need the Agency's official program orientation, perhaps more than any other group.

AID technical assistance personnel require special indoctrination and training to manage its program documentation and reporting system. These procedures are sufficiently complicated to demand practice training under the supervision of persons thoroughly familiar with the system. Whether this can be accomplished best in a pre-service orientation program or in field training has not been determined. The latter approach seems the more desirable.

Technical Orientation

Agricultural advisors need orientation which adapts their basic and applied skills to, generally, tropical agriculture. There has been observed a tendency among agricultural experts from the developed countries to ignore tropical crops and thus overemphasize crops grown in the temperate zones. This can be overcome by providing brief orientation and skill training

in the propagation and culture of the major tropical crops. This training should be done by universities that have tropical agricultural programs.

Professional Development

Until the drive for budget reduction in 1968, at least, AID had a comprehensive career development program. This began with three weeks pre-service orientation and up to 16 weeks of language training. Technical personnel destined for service in East Asia were provided political and technical orientation, as well.

Every AID mission receives the current release of publications by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. On the other hand, mission personnel generally do not have access to good libraries. They tend to be isolated from their colleagues in their institutional disciplines, although AID does finance their travel to professional society meetings, especially when such trips can be worked in with home leave.

The Agency has fostered a formal career development program, which includes correspondence courses, mid-career executive training and sabbatical training. In addition, a program has been encouraged in which AID and the universities would exchange personnel on sabbatical. 88/

In summary, in spite of the overwhelming professional requirements of technical assistance advisors, it appears that AID employees, at least, can go a long way toward keeping up with development progress.

88/ Such an exchange was successfully initiated at the University of Florida in 1967. The University requested AID Agronomy Advisor James M. Dempsey to teach a course in hard fibers. After this he spent several months doing research at the U.S. Department of Agriculture for a book on the subject, which was to be published by AID.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Legislation. U.S. aid administrators have long urged Congress to recognize the long range nature of development and thus permit long range programming of technical assistance. This would likely increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the program, both materially and politically.

It would be to the advantage of the U.S. Government, as well as the cooperating recipient countries, for the United States to administer all of its technical assistance efforts through a single agency. This would make possible the development and maintenance of unified purpose, doctrine and approach, which is not possible to achieve through multiple autonomous agencies. A single program would result in maximum administrative efficiency, with minimum dollar outlays and the greatest representation efficiency.

2. Organization by process. Technical assistance should be recognized by the headquarters organization as a development aid process, and central organizational arrangements should be made to provide technically oriented administration of this process.

3. Personnel for technical assistance. It has been argued in this report that technical assistance is a long range process and that the requirement will continue for a long time. The employers of technical assistance personnel should be concerned with employing highly competent people, developing in them the extra requirements for their new roles, and keeping them professionally current and on the job as long as the need persists. The Hertz Committee

recommendation should be expanded to include in Foreign Service career ranks technical assistance personnel through the branch chief level.^{88/}

4. Balanced team The balanced team approach to technical assistance should be readopted. The argument that it does not provide flexibility is an indictment of the management of the system and not of the system itself. The balance can be flexible.

5. University roles. U.S. universities have been engaged in institution building activities under U.S. government sponsorship since 1951. This role should be continued where multiple-member teams are required over lengthy periods.

The task of providing preservice technical adaptation training should be contracted to universities.

The practice of contracting with qualified universities to provide technical backstopping for AID mission agricultural programs is recommended.

6. Program. The long range interests and objectives which the United States may hold for each low income country should be formulated to serve as guidelines for current programming. The present AID programming system for non-capital projects fits the long range approach.

^{88/}

Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, op. cit., pp. 114, 118

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