DEMOCRACY INTERNATIONAL

Democracy International
U.S. Election Observation Mission to Pakistan
General Elections 2008

Final Report

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DEMOCRACY INTERNATIONAL

Democracy International, Inc. (www.democracyinternational.us) designs, evaluates, implements and provides technical assistance for democracy and governance programs worldwide. Founded in 2003 by leading experts in international democracy assistance, DI offers expertise in election processes and election monitoring, political party development, legislative strengthening, local government and decentralization, civil society development, voter and civic education, strategic communications, and rule of law programming. The firm has extensive experience with assessments, evaluations, project designs and survey (public opinion) research. Over the past 20 years, DI and its principals have worked with civil society and election monitoring organizations, election commissions, government agencies and others in more than 50 countries and in every region of the world. DI has worked extensively with USAID as well as with other donor agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international NGOs and consulting firms.

The founding principals of Democracy International are among the world's leading experts on international and domestic election monitoring and elections in emerging democracies. DI's principals have helped launch and advised nonpartisan domestic election monitoring organizations around the world and have directed long-term monitoring programs and international observer delegations. In the late 1980s, Glenn Cowan invented the path-breaking, sample-based Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) election-monitoring methodology. Eric Bjornlund wrote a comprehensive study of election monitoring, *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy* (Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004). By designing and implementing specialized monitoring programs and innovative techniques focused on voter registration, vote counting, media access and fairness, campaign finance, election violence, and other election-related issues, DI's principals have significantly influenced the practice of international election observation.

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MAP OF PAKISTAN

Source: University of Texas, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report is based on information gathered by Democracy International over a year of work in support of democracy in Pakistan. It draws in particular on the findings of DI's election observation delegation for the February 2008 elections and DI's postelection mission in April 2008 as well as on DI's political party assistance evaluation in December 2007 and its work with domestic monitoring organizations over the past year. While we believe this report reflects the views of the participants in the election and postelection missions, DI assumes full responsibility for its contents.

We would like to express our sincere appreciation for the excellent work and commitment of all the intrepid members of Democracy International's international election observation delegation, listed below. Biographical sketches of the delegation members are included as Appendix D. Each of them agreed to participate in this important and potentially difficult mission on extremely short notice and despite the potential security risks involved. An experienced and impressive group, they volunteered their time and offered their professional contributions solely to support democratic development in Pakistan. We are especially grateful to former Congressman Jim Moody for his strong leadership and good judgment as delegation leader. We also want to thank Rick Barton of the Center for Strategic and International Studies for his important advice and for joining the postelection mission. Omar Kader of Pal-Tech provided the invaluable support of his office and also contributed substantially as a member of the delegation in Pakistan.

We deeply appreciate as well the outstanding contributions of our core staff in organizing and executing this project. For the election observation mission, Bill Gallery directed all aspects of logistics, finances and Election Day planning in the U.S. and in Pakistan. Greg Minjack coordinated the observation mission in the country. Evan Smith and Miki Wilkins ably managed delegate recruitment, liaised with delegates, prepared comprehensive briefing materials, and accompanied the delegates to Islamabad. Kristin Garcia, Rodney Washington and Josh Roberts handled logistical preparations in Islamabad and, joined by Mr. Smith and Ms. Wilkins, coordinated regional teams in other cities in Pakistan. Brian Katulis managed media relations and participated as well in DI's pre- and postelection missions. Zia ur Rehman was invaluable in providing logistical assistance for each of DI's missions—before, during and after the elections—and liaising with Pakistani media organizations. Wayne Hermanson, Mark Hermanson, Hannes Uys, Stephen Bleeker and Iain Hall from Physical Risk Consultancy made critically important security preparations and oversaw the security teams that accompanied observers on Election Day. Blair Cowan and Gina Bjornlund handled travel and other logistical preparations at DI's offices in Bethesda. Erin Perry, Noel Sandberg, Logan Jensen and Reed Barksdale—all interns from Pal-Tech—provided tireless, timely assistance in Bethesda in organizing the mission. We would also like to thank the Pakistani facilitators who advised observation teams on local conditions and accompanied them on Election Day.

A number of DI staff members and delegates contributed to the drafting and editing of this report, including Bill Gallery, Evan Smith, Miki Wilkins, Blair Cowan, Kristin Garcia, Brian Katulis, Caroline Wadhams and Barak Hoffman. Each of these individuals participated in one or more of DI's missions to Pakistan, and each contributed significantly to the success of DI's election monitoring project in the country.

We would like to thank the Election Commission and the Government of Pakistan for their cooperation, especially Election Commission Secretary Kunwar Muhammad Dilshan and Joint Secretary R. B. Jan Wahidi. We would also like to acknowledge and commend the work of the domestic election monitoring coalition Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), under the impressive leadership of Secretary General Sarwar Bari, National Coordinator Muddassir Rizvi and others. We appreciate the cooperation we received from the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) to Pakistan and the Election Observation Mission of the European Parliament, and note especially the professionalism of Hannah Roberts and her colleagues at the EUEOM. We also want to thank David Avery of the UNDP. And we greatly appreciate the opportunity The Asia Foundation has given DI over the past year to work with FAFEN on its election monitoring program and wish to thank in particular Jon Summers, Country Representative, and Ashley Barr for their support.

In addition, we are grateful to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Freedom House, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Center for National Policy and the College of William & Mary for providing valuable opportunities for representatives of the DI delegation to share our findings.

Finally, we wish to thank the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. State Department, including the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, for the confidence they have shown in Democracy International and for making this project possible. We appreciate the support and assistance of U.S. Ambassador Anne W. Patterson and of Mission Director Anne Aarnes, Michael Hryshchyshyn, Patrick Fn'Pierre, Barbara Smith, Blair King, Josh Kaufman, Dale Lewis and Humaira Ashraf Kiani of USAID as well as Elizabeth Colton and Candace Putnam of the U.S. Embassy.

Democracy International was pleased to have the opportunity to organize this important election monitoring project. We hope this effort has contributed to democratic development in Pakistan.

Glenn Cowan Eric Bjornlund

May 2008

DELEGATION MEMBERS

Pakistan Election Observation Mission

February 2008

Jim Moody
Former Member of U.S. Congress

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Pakistan Post-Election Mission

April 2008

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Frederick Barton
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Pakistan Political Party Assistance Evaluation

December 2007

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On February 18, 2008, Pakistan held critically important elections for its National Assembly and its four provincial assemblies. These elections were a major test of the country's prospects for democracy and political stability, offering Pakistan an important opportunity to establish a new basis for democratization. The elections occurred within a context of widespread uncertainty, controversy and political turmoil, including significant preelection violence. Despite this seriously flawed environment, the elections provided a genuine opportunity for Pakistani voters to express their will. At the same time, the election process suffered numerous failings that take away from its success and, if not addressed, could undermine elections and democracy in Pakistan in the future.

Democracy International Election Observation Program

At the request of the U.S. government and with a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Democracy International organized a U.S. election observation mission for the February 2008 elections. The purpose of DI's observation mission was to support the electorate and democracy in Pakistan by providing an expanded international presence to observe and report on the electoral process and, to the extent possible, to evaluate the degree to which the elections conformed to international standards. The mission built on DI's recent work in Pakistan, including a political party assistance evaluation in December 2007 and work with the Free and Fair Elections Network (FAFEN), the principal domestic election monitoring coalition. It also drew heavily on the extensive experience, expertise and knowledge of DI's staff and delegates, as well as other observation groups. In particular, DI drew on the findings of FAFEN and benefited greatly from its coordination with other international observers.

For the elections, DI deployed a total of 38 short-term international observers, supplemented by a team of Pakistani facilitators. Regional teams of between four and 10 delegates traveled to Lahore, Multan, Karachi and Peshawar before Election Day. A team also remained in Islamabad. On Election Day, the regional teams divided further into teams of two, each of which visited between eight and 20 polling stations. DI held a press conference in Islamabad formally issuing its preliminary statement on February 20.

In mid-April, DI sent a team of three experts to assess the postelection process. The postelection team met with representatives of the Election Commission of Pakistan, the European Union Election Observation Mission, the major parties and various other stakeholders. Members of the team visited Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Quetta.

Preelection Context

Legal Environment

The 1973 Constitution and a number of laws, regulations and policies form the complex legal framework for elections in Pakistan. The judiciary plays a large role in electoral administration and oversight. Unfortunately, while the judiciary traditionally was a check on executive authority, following the declaration of emergency rule most senior judges were replaced by allies of President Musharraf, compromising their ability to provide real oversight of the elections. In addition, the expansion of executive power during Musharraf's tenure gave undue authority over the election process to the executive and diminished the independence of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP).

Security Situation

Violence in the lead-up to the 2008 elections raised the level of concern about the viability of the election process. It severely constrained campaigning, with candidates and political leaders restricting their public appearances, or not campaigning in public at all. Most visibly, the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto greatly increased concerns about the possibility of violence disrupting or influencing the outcome of the elections.

Media Environment

Freedom of the press was drastically curtailed in the months immediately preceding the elections. The declaration of emergency rule in November led to the temporary suspension of all independent media broadcasts and sharp restrictions on the Urdu-language press. Even the end of emergency rule on December 15 did not see the removal of all media restrictions, as media outlets were required to adhere to a Code of Conduct restricting criticism of the government.

Election Administration

Election Commission

The Constitution of Pakistan grants the Election Commission far-reaching authority over the administration of elections. The DI delegation found the ECP to be competent and professional in carrying out most of its technical preparations. Unfortunately, excessive interference from the executive branch significantly diminished its ability to fulfill its role as an independent body. Pakistan needs to ensure that the ECP is independent and transparent.

Voter Registration and Voter Roll

Creating an accurate and comprehensive voter registry for the 2008 elections posed a major challenge in Pakistan. The ECP conducted a door-to-door enumeration of eligible voters in 2006 and 2007, but audits showed that while the information collected was

generally accurate, it was far from comprehensive. Unfortunately, the procedures for amending the preliminary list during the display period failed to correct this, resulting in a final list that FAFEN found was missing millions of eligible voters, including a disproportionate number of women. Attempts to address these problems instead produced a final voter roll that included many invalid names and was still incomplete.

Candidate Registration

The candidate registration process for these elections produced a large number of candidates and a high level of competition across constituencies. Despite this, the overly restrictive and vague set of candidate qualifications precluded a vast majority of the population from running for office and allowed election officials excessive discretion in approving or rejecting individual candidates' nomination papers. Still, there is little evidence that officials intentionally interfered with the process on a large scale.

Election Day Observations

Overall, the balloting and counting processes that DI's delegation observed on Election Day were conducted in a manner that met minimum standards for democratic elections, and DI's team did not witness significant evidence of fraud or error. However, significant procedural irregularities and a lack of consistency in election administration across polling stations did not instill confidence that the election was entirely free of error or manipulation. There were also serious allegations about manipulation in specific locations. Despite the relative success of Election Day, significant overarching problems remain, including inaccurate voter lists, relatively low voter turnout and low participation of women.

Election Day Procedures

In most polling places visited by DI observers, the administration of the process went smoothly, which was consistent with the findings of other domestic and international observers. In some locations, however, polling officials failed to follow administrative procedures. In a few polling stations, inconsistent application of eligibility and identification requirements may have allowed for significant errors.

Counting Procedures

In most cases, domestic and international observers were able to witness counting at polling stations. In some cases, however, Returning Officers denied observers the opportunity to view the official counting of the ballots at constituency aggregation centers, in violation of ECP rules. In addition, not all local election officials followed ECP instructions to post Statements of the Count. Counting procedures in polling stations observed by DI were generally professional and thorough, though in some stations observers witnessed casual application of procedures. Although these irregularities did not appear to

be deliberate or systematic efforts to manipulate the count, they contain the potential for abuse and should be addressed in the future.

Voter Registration Issues

It is difficult to measure the effect that voter registration failures had on voter participation. On Election Day itself, DI's observers did not find significant numbers of voters being turned away either because they were not on the voter roll or because they lacked the necessary identification documents. There are, however, obvious problems with the voter roll that need to be corrected to improve the quality of future elections in Pakistan.

Security and Election Day Violence

The threat of widespread Election Day violence, widely anticipated in the lead up to the polls, fortunately did not materialize. Although some deaths were reported, voters in most locations were able to cast their ballots without any serious incident. There were no high-profile attacks and most violence seemed to be localized and personal. This does, however, indicate that Pakistan is still dealing with fundamental problems of violence and intimidation in politics.

Turnout

Voter turnout was surprising, given the concerns about the possibility of violence. Still, the preelection environment, particularly the uncertain security situation, almost certainly dampened turnout. In addition the flawed voter registration process certainly disenfranchised some voters.

Participation of Women

The delegation noted that the participation of women in many locations was significantly lower than that of men. Before the elections, the media reported serious efforts to discourage women from voting in certain places, including direct threats from armed groups in parts of the NWFP and FATA. In some locations DI observers found particular obstacles to the voting process that seemed to affect women more than men, including delayed openings, insufficient provision of materials and inadequate polling station facilities.

Domestic Election Observers and Political Party Agents

Domestic observation efforts for these elections were very ambitious. After initial delays, the ECP eventually accredited more than 25,000 domestic observers, permitting them to directly observe the process and contribute to the transparency of the election. But domestic groups were still unable to get all of their observers accredited, and many received credentials only in the last days before the elections. Other problems, including intimidation and other difficulties in accessing polling stations, also contributed to difficulties in observing the elections. On the whole, however, domestic observers and political party agents contributed substantially to the success of the election process.

Parallel Vote Tabulation

On Election Day, FAFEN conducted a Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) of nearly 8,000 randomly selected polling stations. FAFEN deployed about 16,000 observers to witness the vote count in sample polling stations and compared these results with the official ECP count as a check on potential counting or tabulation fraud. The PVT data suggest a number of possible irregularities in the ECP results, but FAFEN found no apparent partisan pattern to these disparities and concluded that the PVT results do not suggest intentional, systematic efforts to alter the vote count to the benefit or detriment of any given party.

Postelection Observations

Complaint Resolution

According to many analysts, the complaint resolution procedure in place during the General Elections largely failed in the fair and timely redress of complaints. Pakistani political leaders and the international community called the independence of appellate tribunals into question after the declaration of emergency rule, because the pool of eligible tribunal judges was limited to those willing to swear an oath of allegiance to the President. Unfortunately, because the ECP has not been forthcoming with information regarding the resolution of the many complaints it received, there is no way to fully evaluate the criticisms made by opposition parties about the complaint process.

Postelection Environment

DI's postelection mission found that addressing election-related problems is a low-priority concern for a range of political party leaders and civil society activists. In the aftermath of elections that many Pakistanis viewed as less violent and marred by fewer irregularities than expected, there is little impetus for electoral reform. But the new government must include much-needed electoral reforms in its broader agenda for political change to ensure that that the process of democratization continues and that future elections will reflect the will of the people.

Toward Electoral and Institutional Reform in Pakistan

This report identifies a number of significant weaknesses and deficiencies in Pakistan's election system and processes. Most glaring among these are the flaws in the voter registration system, obstacles to women's participation, and an electoral environment that restricts the independence of the media and the judiciary and limits the ability of parties, candidates and civil society actors to criticize the government. While these problems have not negated the legitimacy of the 2008 elections, they leave open the possibility of fraud and error that could undermine future polls. Pakistan must work to address these issues if it is to successfully move toward meaningful democracy.

Of course, resolving Pakistan's electoral problems will not by itself be sufficient to create a democratic political system. The recent political and popular unrest has shown that the country faces a broader set of democracy and governance challenges. A fair electoral system can help to alleviate these problems, and indeed is necessary to do so. Pakistan seems to have made some progress in recent years in achieving effective electoral reform, but without further reform the country will not be able to produce the accountable political system it needs to consolidate democratic gains.

INTRODUCTION

On February 18, 2008, Pakistan held critically important elections for its National Assembly and its four provincial assemblies. These elections were a major test of the country's prospects for democracy and political stability, offering Pakistan an important opportunity to establish a new basis for democratization and to mitigate the entrenched polarization of its politics.

Past elections in Pakistan have not contributed to the development of a democratic political system. Flawed and controversial contests as well as recurring shifts of power between civilian politicians and the military over the decades demonstrate the longstanding failure of political elites to agree on the rules of the game and to forge a truly democratic political system. Extreme polarization, politically motivated violence, and accusations of manipulation and cheating have long plagued elections and have created widespread public cynicism about the legitimacy and value of the electoral process.

The deficiencies in the Pakistani political system go deeper than elections, however. A number of institutional problems impede democratic development in the country. Electoral reform is necessary but insufficient for the development of a democratic system. In the absence of political institutions that are truly representative and in the face of independent centers of authority that are not accountable to Pakistani citizens, free and fair elections do not amount to a solution on their own. These persistent issues include a fragile security environment, the continuation of a political role for the military, intermittent government restrictions on the freedom of the media, obstacles to women's participation in the political process, the freedom of the judiciary from executive influence, and a personality-driven political party system that leads to the selection of candidates who do not truly represent their constituents. Not until these and other issues are resolved can Pakistan develop into a genuinely democratic state.

In addition to these concerns, Pakistan's leadership has not demonstrated the political will to implement electoral reform, especially given the context of widespread economic uncertainty and major security issues. However, electoral reform is inextricably linked to these economic and security problems; electoral reform makes up an integral part of the overall political reform and development processes in Pakistan that are needed to strengthen the very institutions necessary to address the widening economic and security crises themselves.

General Elections of 2008

The February 2008 elections in Pakistan occurred within a context of widespread uncertainty, controversy and political turmoil. On October 6, 2007, in a vote boycotted by opposition parties, an assembly of Pakistan's national and provincial legislatures re-elected Musharraf as President. On October 18, after eight years in exile, opposition leader and

former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto returned to the country after reaching an understanding with President Musharraf that included an amnesty for pending corruption cases. On November 3, citing continued threats from Islamist militants and interference from the judiciary, President Musharraf declared a state of emergency and suspended the constitution. Under emergency rule, Musharraf ordered the dismissal and detention of a majority of judges from the Supreme Court, including Chief Judge Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry. Pakistan's Supreme Court had been expected to rule within days on the legality of General Musharraf's re-election as president. Ostensibly in reaction to the worsening security situation in the country, Musharraf also placed new restrictions on the media, including shutting down television and radio stations across the country.

Amid increasing tensions and protests, Benazir Bhutto had emerged as a voice of opposition to military rule until she was assassinated in a suicide attack at a public rally on December 27, 2007. Circumstances surrounding the assassination have generated substantial controversy. In the aftermath of Bhutto's assassination, riots left a number of people dead, and the government postponed the elections, which had been scheduled for January 8, 2008.

Despite this seriously flawed preelection environment, as this report details, the elections provided a genuine opportunity for Pakistani voters to express their will. A relatively peaceful Election Day defied widespread expectations of violence, and the potential for systematic manipulation appears to have been avoided. In the National Assembly elections, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of the late Benazir Bhutto gained the greatest number of seats, with the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif finishing second. Musharraf's Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q), formerly the ruling party, gained only the third largest number of seats. To date, there appears to be broad acceptance within Pakistan and the international community of these results and of the conduct of the elections in general. But the election process suffered numerous failings that take away from its success and that, if not addressed, could undermine elections and democracy in Pakistan in the future.

Democracy International Election Observation Program

At the request of the U.S. government and with a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Democracy International organized a U.S. election observation mission for the February 18 national elections in Pakistan. The purpose of DI's observation mission was to support the electorate and democracy in Pakistan by providing an expanded international presence to observe and report on the electoral process and, to the extent possible, to evaluate the degree to which the elections conformed to international standards. The project demonstrated the continued commitment of the United States to supporting a free and democratic Pakistan and complemented ongoing efforts supported by the U.S. government and others to strengthen the election process in Pakistan to help build a more participatory, representative and accountable democracy.

Thus, this election monitoring project was a critical part of the effort to enhance the integrity of the electoral process in Pakistan. As DI principals wrote recently, "In fragile states the international community has a far greater role in determining the legitimacy of elections than it does in more stable transitional or established democracies."[1] Because of the extreme polarization and threat of violence in Pakistani politics and because the risk of controversy about election results was high, international election monitoring had the potential to make a significant contribution to stability and future democratization.

DI's election monitoring project built on its recent work in Pakistan. Beginning in early 2007, working through The Asia Foundation, DI advised the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), a coalition of civil society groups. FAFEN conducted a sample-based voter registration audit in mid-2007 and organized for the elections the world's largest parallel vote tabulation (PVT), using results from nearly 8,000 randomly selected polling stations, as discussed below. In December 2007, DI representatives Glenn Cowan, William Gallery and Brian Katulis conducted extensive interviews over three weeks with key political party leaders, civil society representatives and others in Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore.

USAID first approached Democracy International on Wednesday, January 30, 2008, about the feasibility of organizing an international election observer delegation to the Pakistan elections, then less than three weeks away. Drawing on its ongoing work and existing contacts in Pakistan, DI began immediately to explore the logistical, security, legal and political challenges involved and then to plan the proposed observation mission. After further discussions, three DI staff members departed for Pakistan from the U.S. on Wednesday, February 6, and USAID and DI entered into a cooperative agreement to carry out the project on February 7. Over the following week, DI recruited and deployed a 38-member delegation, including noted experts in election administration, election monitoring and Pakistani politics. Most delegates departed from the U.S. on February 13, and the mission began in Islamabad on Friday, February 15.

This Election Monitoring Report

This report presents Democracy International's findings and provides recommendations for improving the electoral process in Pakistan in the future. Following a description of DI's observation methodology, the report outlines the preelection context, including historical background and political developments. The next section describes election preparations leading up to Election Day. The report then presents the election results and the delegation's observations from Election Day and the postelection period. Finally, the report offers recommendations for electoral and political reforms.

[1] Eric Bjornlund, Glenn Cowan and William Gallery, "Election Systems and Political Parties in Post-Conflict and Fragile States" in Derick W. Brinkerhoff (ed.), *Rebuilding Governance in Post-Conflict Societies and Fragile States: Emerging Perspectives, Actors, and Approaches* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

The information in this report comes from a variety of sources, including primarily the findings of DI's election observation mission and its preelection and postelection missions as well as its previous work in the country. DI relied heavily on the extensive experience, expertise and knowledge of its staff and delegates. DI's missions drew on credible local sources of information, including political leaders, candidates, party activists, governmental officials, nonpartisan election monitors and journalists at both national and subnational levels. In particular, DI drew on the findings of FAFEN and benefited greatly from its coordination with other international observers, especially the European Union Election Observation Mission and the Election Observation Mission of the European Parliament. This enabled DI to assess how experiences or impressions varied in different locations across Pakistan.

OBSERVATION METHODOLOGY

Experience throughout the world over the past two decades has shown that international election observation can have a positive impact on a country's successful transition to democracy. By increasing transparency, election observation helps to deter fraud and reduce irregularities in election administration, especially in transitional environments with the potential for instability and violence, such as Pakistan. Properly conceived and implemented, comprehensive international election observation not only provides an objective assessment of a given country's electoral process but can also promote the integrity of the elections and related institutions, encourage public participation and reinforce domestic commitment to democratic politics.

In accordance with the international consensus that election monitoring should assess the entire election period, DI's election monitoring project in Pakistan had a broad scope, considering the periods both before and after the vote, as well as Election Day itself. Although this project was initiated too late to allow for formal long-term monitoring, DI was able to draw on its programs in Pakistan throughout 2007, including an extended political party assistance evaluation mission in December. For the elections, the DI observation mission covered three of the four provinces and the Islamabad Capital Territory. DI also conducted a postelection assessment of the impact of the elections on the political climate in Pakistan and has closely monitored postelection developments.

Democracy International's election observation mission to Pakistan assessed a broad range of substantive issues, including: (a) the administration of the elections, including the processes of voter registration, balloting, counting and complaint resolution; (b) the legal and institutional framework for the elections, including the election law and procedures and the credibility and neutrality of electoral authorities; and (c) the political context and environment in which the elections took place, including the extent of freedoms of speech, movement and association, the freedom of the media, the opportunities for the opposition to compete, and the nature of the campaign.

DI's team began its observation for the elections in early February 2008. The team included six DI staff observers supported by Pakistani staff members and security personnel. While the limited timeframe for preparation and the uncertain security situation restricted DI's ability to widely deploy preelection observers, DI's team in country was able to gather valuable information through meetings with government officials, including the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and the Interior Ministry; political party agents, including representatives of the PPP, PML-N and PML-Q; civil society organizations, including domestic monitoring groups; and other international organizations providing technical assistance in Pakistan or observing the elections, including the European Union Election Observation Mission to Pakistan, the UNDP, The Asia Foundation and IFES.

For the Election Day observation phase, Democracy International deployed a total of 38 short-term international observers, including core staff members, supplemented by a team of Pakistani facilitators. The delegation convened for two days of briefings in Islamabad with candidates and representatives of political parties, members of the Election Commission of Pakistan, the EU Election Observation Mission, civil society activists, leaders of nonpartisan domestic election monitoring organizations such as FAFEN, political observers and journalists, as well as the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne W. Patterson, and the USAID Mission Director, Anne Aarnes. These briefings covered the current political situation in Pakistan, the relevant electoral laws and procedures, the fairness of the campaign period, the activities of other monitoring organizations, and other information relevant to effective and informed observation of the process. DI also provided training on pollwatching techniques and accepted international observation standards and explained the deployment plan and methodology for the mission. In addition, the briefings included information on security procedures and on acceptable conduct for election observers, including relevant regulations and policies of the Pakistani government, the ECP and the U.S. government. In accordance with international standards, DI instructed its delegates to restrict themselves to observing the electoral process and to avoid any action that could be interpreted as interference in the process.

Following the briefings in Islamabad, regional teams of between four and 10 delegates traveled to Lahore, Multan, Karachi and Peshawar to observe on Election Day. A team also remained in Islamabad to manage the deployment of the observer teams, collect information, and monitor the political and security situations. The regional teams arrived in their cities the day before the election to meet with local and regional political party representatives, local election administration officials, and representatives of other domestic and international monitoring groups to collect information on the local context and security situation.

On Election Day, the regional teams divided further into teams of two, and each team visited between eight and 20 polling stations. The stations were chosen in consultation with the Pakistani facilitators and security personnel. Following Election Day observa-

tion, the delegates returned to Islamabad for debriefing, discussion of observations and findings, and the drafting of a preliminary observation statement. Democracy International held a press conference formally issuing its preliminary statement on February 20.

DI sent a postelection observation mission to Pakistan in mid-April. DI Principal Glenn Cowan led a team of three experts, including Rick Barton of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brian Katulis of the Center for American Progress, to assess the postelection process. The team investigated the status of problems identified by Election Day observers, the integrity of the consolidation of results, the extent of postelection intimidation and retribution, and the process leading to the seating of the new National Assembly in accordance with the election results. In addition, the team examined the implications of the elections for the future political climate in Pakistan and for its potential transition to democracy. The postelection mission arrived in Islamabad on April 10 and held a series of meetings with the ECP, EU, representatives of the major parties and various other stakeholders. Members of the team visited Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Quetta. DI staff members in the U.S. have also continued to closely monitor political developments in Pakistan since the elections.

PREELECTION CONTEXT

Historical Background

Pakistan was founded as a democratic republic for the Muslim inhabitants of British India following independence in 1947. While the Muslim League political movement, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, succeeded in winning British support for the creation of a new state in the Muslim-majority territories that became East and West Pakistan, conflict over the Islamic character of the new state and the distribution of power between the provinces and the central government prevented the nation's first constitution from being established until 1956. This constitution lasted only two years before President Iskander Mirza abrogated the document. Mirza was overthrown shortly afterwards in the first of what has become a series of military coups.

Throughout the country's history, a structural imbalance between the military and civil institutions has plagued Pakistan, with the military emerging as the country's dominant institution and a major political and economic actor. This has been due to a number of factors, including the fact that West Pakistan inherited much of the military but little of the economic and civilian infrastructure of British India; that Pakistani leaders perceived an existential threat from neighboring India and have therefore poured resources into the military to defend the country; and that the political parties have largely been dysfunctional and thereby do not provide a meaningful check on the military. The military has intervened when it believes the political parties have not upheld the country's national security interests, as defined by the military, and since 1958 it has conducted at least four

coups d'etat as well as subtler manipulation, including through the powerful domestic military intelligence services.[2]

The country underwent one of its most tumultuous periods in 1971, when an electoral split between East and West Pakistan-based parties resulted in a military crackdown against Bengali nationalists in East Pakistan. The Bengali nationalists fought back and with Indian support forced West Pakistani forces to surrender, and Bangladesh thus gained independence. In the wake of this split, a new, populist civilian leadership under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) took power in the new (formerly West) Pakistan. Bhutto continued to rule under the previous military-imposed martial law order until introducing a new constitution in 1973, but economic stagnation, mismanagement and allegations of serious electoral fraud in 1977 led to his arrest and subsequent execution. Army Chief of Staff General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq then assumed the presidency.

Following General Zia's death in a plane crash in 1988, Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Zulifkar Ali Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML, later to split into the PML-N and PML-Q factions), alternated control of the prime minister's office in four successive governments. Each of these governments broke down and was dismissed before completing its term under allegations of corruption and mismanagement by the serving presidents at the time. Elections held in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 each featured allegations of fraud in varying degrees as well as problems in election administration, inaccurate voter lists, preelection violence and media bias. The 1988 elections brought Benazir Bhutto's PPP to power, and international observers from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) found that they were conducted in a "relatively fair and orderly manner," although they highlighted some potentially serious problems.[3] Similarly, NDI observers for the 1990 elections that brought Nawaz Sharif's PML-N to power determined that "notwithstanding serious irregularities . . . the results in most constituencies reflect the will of the people."[4] The 1993 elections saw the PPP return to power after years of conflict and deadlock between Sharif and then-president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. International observers noted that the limited choices of candidates and frequency of elections over the previous five-year period led to widespread apathy.[5] Continuing the trend of limited choice and voter disaffection, the 1997 elections saw Sharif return to power after Bhutto and her government were again accused of corruption.

In 1999, then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attempted to remove then-Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf from command. Musharraf deposed Sharif in a coup and took

[2] See Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan Between Mosque and Military* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).
[3] National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, "Pakistan Elections: Foundation for Democracy," Report on the 1988 Elections (1989).
[4] National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, "The October 1990 Elections in Pakistan" (1991).
[5] National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, "The 1993 Elections in Pakistan" (1994).

control of the government. Pakistan's Supreme Court validated the coup in May 2000, and Musharraf appointed himself president in June 2001. A referendum in April 2002, although the process was subject to much criticism, reaffirmed his position as President for a full five-year term, though despite earlier promises he retained his position as Army Chief of Staff. Widely disputed parliamentary elections held in October 2002 elected a parliament dominated by the Musharraf-loyalist PML-Q party.

Recent Political Developments

In the summer of 2007, Benazir Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party and twice-former Prime Minister of Pakistan, announced her intention to return to Pakistan and compete in the 2008 parliamentary elections. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, leader of the PML-N before being deposed from power and exiled by President Musharraf in his 1999 coup d'etat, also attempted to return to Pakistan during this time, but was turned back at the Islamabad airport on September 10.

In 2007, President Pervez Musharraf announced his intention to run for a second five-year term as President. Musharraf retained his position as Army Chief of Staff during this time, but again indicated he would resign from that position after winning the presidential election. Citing a violation of constitutional prohibitions on active military officers competing in elections, opposition lawyers filed petitions seeking to block Musharraf's reelection. The Supreme Court of Pakistan initially dismissed these petitions, allowing the election to take place, and the outgoing parliament and provincial assemblies elected Musharraf to a second term on October 6, 2007.

On October 5, one day before the presidential elections, President Musharraf signed a National Reconciliation Ordinance, formally granting amnesty from standing corruption charges to Bhutto and other political leaders—with the notable exception of Sharif. In exchange, ministers from Bhutto's party abstained from voting, but did not boycott, the presidential elections, which Musharraf won by a large margin. Because of the outstanding challenges to his legal legitimacy as a candidate, however, the Supreme Court did not certify his reelection, initially maintaining that a ruling on its legality would be issued within the next few weeks. Meanwhile, Bhutto's return to Pakistan on October 18 was marred by two large explosions targeting her convoy in Karachi, killing at least 130 people and wounding many more in the crowd.

On November 3, 2007, President Musharraf declared a period of emergency rule and suspended the constitution of Pakistan, replacing it with a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO).[6] Musharraf justified his actions to the public as necessary to continue the fight against terrorism in Pakistan, but many analysts suggest that he took action because

[6] For the text, see "Provisional Constitutional Order," *Dawn* (November 4, 2007), http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/04/top15.htm.

he suspected that the Supreme Court was going to rule against him regarding the validity of his reelection.[7]

Following the November declaration of emergency rule, more than 60 justices were dismissed from their positions and replaced with new judges sworn in under the PCO, who subsequently affirmed Musharraf's reelection as President. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Iftikhar Chaudhry, was placed under house arrest; he had previously been dismissed in the spring of 2007 and then subsequently reinstated in the face of heavy protest from the Pakistani legal community. Members of mainstream opposition political parties, including Ms. Bhutto, were also early targets for arrest.[8]

During this period, Prime Minister Sharif returned to Pakistan and filed papers on November 26 to contest the upcoming parliamentary elections. In a December 3 ruling, the ECP barred Sharif from competing in the elections on the basis of the outstanding criminal charges against him; Sharif did not appeal the ruling, maintaining that he did not recognize the legitimacy of the sitting Supreme Court.

After being sworn into office as President and formally retiring as Chief of Army Staff in late November, Musharraf officially ended the state of emergency on December 15. Many restrictions on media and political activities remained in place, however, and Chief Justice Chaudhry remained under house arrest. Parliamentary elections were at the time scheduled to take place on January 8, 2008. Opposition parties, including the PPP, PML-N, and the Awami National Party (ANP), discussed boycotting the elections, but ultimately all but a few smaller parties chose to participate. On December 27, 2007, Prime Minister Bhutto was assassinated in a suicide bombing in Rawalpindi. The ensuing widespread violence led Musharraf's government to postpone elections until February 18, 2008.

The Electoral System

Pakistan has a bicameral parliamentary system, with a President as Chief of State and Prime Minister as Head of Government. The President is elected indirectly through a vote by members of the Senate, the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies. The National Assembly chooses the Prime Minister. The presidency had historically been limited in scope (though several Presidents have dismissed parliamentary governments), but under President Musharraf's eight-year rule, considerable power amassed in the office, and the parliament under the PML-Q routinely endorsed policies promulgated and enacted by the President.

The parliament of Pakistan (the *Majlis-e-Shoora*) consists of a Senate of 100 seats and a National Assembly of 342 seats. On February 18, elections were conducted for both the

[7] E.g., David Rohde, "Pakistani Sets Emergency Rule, Defying the U.S.," *New York Times* (November 4, 2007).
[8] K. Alan Krondstadt, "Pakistan's Political Crises" (Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34240.pdf.

national and provincial assemblies. Indirect elections for the Senate are scheduled for March 2009. National assembly by-elections are expected to take place June 26 for empty seats and for votes postponed due to the death of a candidate or due to security situations that prevented a vote from being previously held.[9]

For the National Assembly, 272 members are elected directly from single-member constituencies under a First-Past-the-Post-System. Voting is conducted under universal adult suffrage, although historically women have faced obstacles to voting. Because of the existence of a number of significant political parties, the most successful candidate frequently gains only a plurality rather than a majority of votes. The party and electoral systems can also produce large discrepancies between the number of votes for a party nationwide and the number of seats won, particularly if a party has a moderate level of support that is geographically dispersed. The First-Past-the-Post, single-member constituency system may also dampen voter participation in constituencies that are perceived as uncompetitive.

Pakistani election law allows candidates to compete simultaneously in more than one constituency. This questionable practice exists in part to provide the opportunity for leaders to present themselves for elections in multiple provinces and build national parties, but it also weakens the connection between voters and their representatives, since candidates are less tied to a given geographic area. By-elections are then necessary when a candidate wins in more than one location, increasing the financial and administrative burden on the ECP.[10]

The 272 National Assembly constituencies are distributed across the provinces roughly according to population. The size of the constituencies, however, varies dramatically. The average constituency should contain approximately 300,000 registered voters. In practice, however, constituencies vary from fewer than 100,000 to more than 600,000 voters, with the largest deviations in the remote areas of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan and the tribal areas. Even within Punjab and Sindh, constituency sizes regularly vary by 20 to 30 percent of the average.

Sixty seats in the National Assembly are reserved for female candidates. Each competing party draws up slates in order to select these candidates and distributes them on the basis of proportional representation according to the seats won by the parties in each province. Ten seats are reserved for non-Muslims; parties draw up slates and distribute these seats on the basis of proportional representation according to the parties' nationwide showings.

[9] As reported by the ECP on May 13, 2008. The Election Commission of Pakistan, http://www.ecp.gov.pk/content/press/May2008/7.htm.

[10] See comments by Staffan Darnolf, IFES Pakistan Country Director, "Pakistan Preelection Analysis," *Center for Strategic and International Studies Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project* (February 15, 2008), http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject/?p=241.

Similarly, Pakistan directly elects members of the provincial assemblies in single-member districts. Seats are also reserved and distributed proportionately for women and non-Muslims on the basis of each party's showing in each provincial assembly election. Of these assemblies, Punjab has by far the largest, with 371 seats, while Balochistan has the smallest assembly.

Provincial Assembly Structure				
Province	**Elected Seats**	**Reserved Seats**		**Total**
		Women	Non-Muslims	
Balochistan	51	11	3	65
NWFP	99	22	3	124
Punjab	297	66	8	371
Sindh	130	29	9	168

Source: Election Commission of Pakistan

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is a territory within Pakistan directly administered by agents of the Governor of the North West Frontier Province. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor (although President Musharraf selected all appointees during his rule). FATA does not have a provincial assembly but does elect representatives to the National Assembly. Because of ongoing violence, however, voting was not conducted in February in several districts within FATA. Elections in FATA are subject to additional regulations, in particular a ban on political party participation. As a result, all members of the National Assembly elected from FATA are nominally independents, though many are unofficially affiliated with a political party.

Members of the Senate, who serve six-year terms, are elected indirectly through proportional representation by each of the four provincial assemblies (who select a total of 88 senators), the National Assembly representatives of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (who choose eight senators), and the National Assembly itself (which selects four senators for the Federal Capital district). Seventeen Senate seats are reserved for women and 17 for members of the *ulema* (religious scholars).

Legal Environment

The 1973 Constitution and a number of laws, regulations and policies form the complex legal framework for elections in Pakistan. These laws include the Delimitation of Constituencies Act of 1974, the Electoral Rolls Rules of 1974, the Representation of People Act of 1976 and the Electoral Rolls Act of 1977. In addition, the Election Commission of Pakistan established various rules and regulations during the year leading up to the elections. Unfortunately, these laws and regulations contain inconsistencies that create ambiguity about what the law requires. The lack of a coherent legal framework for elections in Pakistan has allowed for uncertainty in the process and has opened the door to uneven application of the law, based on interpretations of individual election officials.

The ECP has the primary responsibility for running elections in Pakistan, but its members and supervising officials at lower levels are principally judges. The judiciary plays a large role in electoral administration and oversight and forms a crucial part of the election framework. Moreover, the Supreme Court and the High Court both hold the power of judicial review over ECP decisions. The Supreme Court also makes the final decision in cases regarding election misconduct. The judiciary thus has significant control over how elections in the country are conducted.

Unfortunately, in the year leading up to the elections President Musharraf repeatedly attempted to interfere with the independence of the judiciary. In March 2007, Musharraf removed Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry for "misuse of authority."[11] The ensuing popular unrest forced Musharaff to reinstate Chaudry, but upon declaring emergency rule in November Musharraf removed him again, along with numerous other senior judges, and replaced them with those willing to sign a new oath under the PCO. This resulted in the significant compromise of the electoral oversight responsibilities of the judiciary.

The actions of President Musharraf during the length of his tenure and especially during the last few months of 2007 created a compromised legal environment that left the possibility for free and fair parliamentary elections in doubt. Musharraf's extraconstitutional manipulations of the judiciary during 2007, unlawful detention of lawyers and jurists, and suspension of the Pakistani Constitution all contributed to the highly problematic legal environment. In particular, the replacement of a majority of the Supreme Court and a large number of members of the High Court effectively eliminated the potential for genuine oversight with which the judiciary is constitutionally charged.

In addition, the expansion of executive power during Musharraf's tenure gave undue authority to the executive over the electoral process as a whole and diminished the independence of the ECP. The President appoints the Chief Electoral Commissioner and the remaining four members of the Commission. As members of the judiciary, these officers traditionally provided a check on executive authority, but following the declaration of emergency rule most senior judges were considered to be Musharraf allies. Furthermore, during his tenure Musharraf frequently used his position to amend the legal framework of the country by decree. He promulgated several executive orders in 2007 that affected the elections, such as the Electoral Rolls (Amendment) Ordinance, which extended the period for reviewing the draft electoral rolls, and the National Reconciliation Ordinance discussed above, which permitted Benazir Bhutto to return to Pakistan and compete in the elections.

[11] "Pakistan's CJ Replaced: Justice Javed Iqbal Takes Oath of Acting CJ," *Pakistan Times*, http://www.pakistantimes.net/2007/03/10/top.htm.

Security Situation

In recent years, Pakistan has seen a dramatic increase in violence within the country. Much if not most of it is attributed to militants from the tribal areas, who have been engaged in an escalating conflict with the Pakistani military as Pakistan has increased its cooperation with the United States on antiterrorism efforts. Until recently, attacks primarily targeted the military or others affiliated with the Musharraf government. Violence increased throughout 2007, with dramatic events such as the siege of the Red Mosque in Islamabad and militants overrunning the Swat valley in NWFP highlighting an increasingly tense situation.

The increasing violence in the lead-up to the 2008 elections raised the level of concern, both in Pakistan and in the international community, about the viability of the election process. The threat of violence severely constrained campaigning, with candidates and political leaders restricting their public appearances or not campaigning in public at all. Most visibly, the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, which led to the postponement of the elections, greatly increased concerns over the preelection security situation and the possibility of violence disrupting or influencing the outcome of the elections. This followed the attack on Bhutto's convoy in Karachi immediately after her return to the country. In addition to Bhutto, three other candidates and more than 100 other people were killed in politically related violence during the preelection period.[12]

During the final weeks of the campaign, a series of attacks and bombings exacerbated the already tense environment. Many of these attacks specifically targeted election meetings and campaign rallies. In early February, two suicide bomb attacks on election rallies in northwest Pakistan killed at least 22 people and wounded more than 30.[13] On February 16, just two days before the election, 47 people were killed and more than 150 wounded in a blast in Parachinar in FATA aimed at supporters of an independent candidate affiliated with the PPP, forcing the postponement of the vote in that district.[14]

Media Environment

President Musharraf relaxed restrictions on press freedoms during his first years in office, which saw the emergence of numerous independent cable and satellite channels and radio outlets. This freedom was drastically curtailed in the months immediately preceding the elections. The declaration of emergency rule in November led to the temporary suspension of all independent media broadcasts and sharp restrictions on the Urdu-language press. Stations were only allowed to return to the air after agreeing to comply with a

[12] Pakistan Vote: 'Credible' at Best?; On Eve of Election, International Observers Note Myriad Flaws. *The International Herald Tribune*. February 18, 2008.
[13] "Pakistan Vote Violence Continues," *Aljazeer.net*, February 13, 2008.
[14] "Blast toll reaches 47: Polls postponed in Parachinar." *Daily Times* http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\02\18\story_18-2-2008_pg7_5, February 18, 2008

Code of Conduct, which limited criticisms of the state or the ruling government and resulted in self-censorship on the part of many outlets.[15]

More than 150 Pakistani journalists were arrested in Karachi on November 20 during a protest over the continued closure of Geo News, one of Pakistan's most popular channels.[16] Concluded Reporters Without Borders in January 2008, "Pakistan's media are not free to provide proper coverage of the legislative elections . . . because of a climate of censorship that is sustained by the permanent threat of fines, closures of news media and arrests of journalists."[17]

The end of emergency rule on December 15 did not see the removal of all media restrictions. Geo News was only permitted to resume broadcasting on January 20, less than a month before elections, and even then, two of its investigative news shows remained banned.[18] Prohibitions against "defamation" of the head of state and members of the executive, legislative or judicial bodies limited the ability of opposition parties to articulate their campaign messages for fear of arrest. The state-run news channels, which remain the principal broadcasters in rural areas where cable and satellite access is limited, overwhelmingly devoted their coverage to the activities of President Musharraf and the PML-Q, giving only minimal airtime to opposition candidates.[19]

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

Election Commission

The Pakistani Constitution grants the Election Commission of Pakistan far-reaching authority over the administration of National and Provincial Assembly elections. The ECP is responsible for the conduct of elections, including supervising the polling and counting processes, managing voter registration and appointing election tribunals for the adjudication of electoral offenses.

The President appoints all five members of the ECP, which is composed of a Chief Election Commissioner and four other members, one chosen from each of the provin-

[15] PBS Online NewsHour, "Pakistan's Media Struggles to Cope with Emergency Rule", November 21, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec07/pakistan_11-21.html; for text of the ordinance see "PEMRA (Third Amendment) Ordinance 2007", Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority, November 3, 2007, http://www.pemra.gov.pk/pdf/ord031107.pdf

[16] Reporters Without Borders, "At least 160 journalists arrested during press freedom rally in Sindh province", November 11, 2007, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=24466

[17] Reporters Without Borders, "Five key problems for media coverage of February's legislative elections", January 9, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=24976

[18] Salman Masood, "In Pakistan, TV Network Loses Bite in Its Return", *New York Times*, January 22, 2008

[19] "PML-Q gets most air time on PTV." *Dawn*. February 16, 2008

cial High Courts. Justice Qazi Muhammad Farooq served as the Chief Election Commissioner for the 2008 General Elections.[20]

The Secretariat, or executive body, of the ECP is located in Islamabad, with regional offices in each of the four provinces. Provincial offices, each with their own administrative staffs, are headed by Provincial Election Commissioners. At the local level, District Returning Officers, Returning Officers and Assistant Returning Officers are charged with accepting or rejecting candidate nomination papers, investigating complaints and aggregating district-level vote counts. The ECP appoints these officials, who are mainly drawn from among the judiciary, except in FATA where they are selected from among the executive officers. They are formally subordinate to the ECP chain of command, but their position within the judiciary raises questions about where their institutional loyalties lie. Moreover, when the independence of the judiciary as a whole is in question, the use of judges as election officials is problematic.

The DI delegation found the ECP to be competent and professional in carrying out most of its technical preparations. Significant improvements were made to the election materials, including voting screens and translucent ballot boxes, which helped to ensure the secrecy of the ballot and reduce the potential for fraud. Many of these improvements were made through significant assistance from the international community, most notably USAID and the United Nations Development Program. USAID provided many necessary commodities, including more than 200,000 translucent ballot boxes and 6 million numbered security seals, as well as technical assistance for the voter registration process. In a comprehensive technical assistance program, the UNDP provided material support in the form of 300,000 new voter screens, developed training materials and handbooks for election officials, and conducted training sessions in many parts of the country. These donor efforts allowed the ECP to promote greater voter confidence through improved ballot secrecy and consistency of the elections process.[21]

Unfortunately, excessive interference from the executive branch significantly diminished the ECP's ability to fulfill its role as an independent body. The President's authority to appoint members of the commission as well as his extraconstitutional interference in the judiciary, from which ECP members are appointed, effectively ensured that the commission was sympathetic to the President and his party. Opposition parties also suggested that the new appointees were too closely aligned with President Musharraf, and they complained that Musharraf did not consult with them when making these appointments. DI is not in a position to determine definitively whether this resulted in biased administration of these elections. The high level of executive interference and control of the ECP, however, allows for its politicization in a way that threatens the prospects for fair

[20] For more information on the composition and duties of the ECP, see "A Brief for National/International Observers: General Elections 2007-08," Election Commission of Pakistan, http://ecp.gov.pk/brief.pdf.
[21] See http://www.usaid.gov/pk/governance/index.htm and http://www.undp.org.pk/images/documents/Elections-Project%20Document2.pdf for more information on USAID's and UNDP's programs.

elections in the future. Such executive influence points to the need to make the ECP more independent and transparent.

In additional, the ECP seems to lack the political will or de facto authority within the bureaucracy to prevent other government agencies and officials from actively working for the benefit of particular candidates or parties. Opposition party leaders reported widespread misuse of government resources at the local level by ostensibly nonpartisan *nazims*, or mayors, and police allegedly using their positions to promote local PML-Q candidates. While it is difficult to determine the extent to which these accusations are true, the ECP reported that 35 percent of the complaints it received during the campaign period had to do with the conduct of government officials or the misuse of government resources.[22] The large number of complaints filed with the ECP and the widespread allegations by opposition parties that many officials were acting inappropriately suggest that the ECP was unwilling or unable to fully address these concerns.

Voter Registration and Voter List

As in many developing countries, creating an accurate and comprehensive voter registry for the 2008 elections posed a major challenge in Pakistan. As a mechanism for verifying voter eligibility, an accurate voter list is a fundamental component of a democratic election system. But Pakistan's last effort to create a comprehensive national voter registry in 2002 was based on outdated and questionable 1998 census data, which critics charged contained duplicate entries, missing registrants and incorrect information. It was therefore generally agreed that a new registry was a necessity for the 2008 General Elections, and this became a priority for both donor agencies and the ECP. The UNDP and USAID, with technical assistance provided by IFES, supported the ECP in designing and implementing a new registration system to meet this need.

The ECP conducted a door-to-door enumeration of eligible voters in 2006 and 2007, resulting in a preliminary list of approximately 56 million registrants. Audits conducted by FAFEN during the public display period for the new voter roll showed that the information collected by the ECP was generally accurate, but far from comprehensive. FAFEN estimated that the registration process completely missed more than 5 million households, as well as numerous eligible voters within the households it included. Unfortunately, the procedures for amending the preliminary list during the display period failed to provide a reasonable opportunity for additions and corrections to the list, resulting in a final list that may have been missing as many as a quarter of the estimated 80 million eligible voters in Pakistan, including a disproportionate number of women. [23]

[22] "Election Complaints Summary," *Election Commission of Pakistan*, http://www.ecp.gov.pk/content/complaints.pdf.
[23] FAFEN, "Draft Electoral Roll 2007: Flawed but Fixable" (August 2007), http://www.fafen.org/admin/products/p4729d6fb5a19e.pdf

In an August 2007 decision, the Supreme Court ordered the ECP to recognize the voter registration issues and ensure that all of Pakistan's eligible voters would be included in the Final Electoral Roll. Rather than conduct a supplementary enumeration, the ECP chose to augment the 2007 Preliminary Roll by adding names from the discredited 2002 roll. The effect of this was to add approximately 20 million unverified names to the registry. What had been a largely accurate but incomplete list became an inaccurate set of Final and Supplementary Rolls. FAFEN estimated that as many as 7.5 million invalid names were included and that the list was still missing 15 million people.[24]

In the same August decision, the Supreme Court ordered the ECP to allow otherwise eligible voters without a Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) to be added to the voter registry. Despite this decision, the ECP maintained its requirement that registered voters would not be permitted to cast ballots without National Identity Cards. In theory the Supreme Court decision should have allowed voters without proper identification to procure a CNIC between the registration period and the election. However, a lack of coordination between the ECP and the National Database and Registration Authority, the agency responsible for issuing the CNICs, limited voters' opportunities to procure the proper identification in a timely manner. The CNIC application process is complex and lengthy; it requires voters to make two separate trips to a CNIC center and takes up to three weeks. It is also too expensive for many. By requiring CNICs at the polling station but failing to negotiate a free, expedited option with the National Database and Registration Authority for voters seeking identification for the election, the ECP placed a large burden on many potential voters.

Candidate Registration

Generally, the candidate registration process for these elections produced a large number of candidates and a high level of competition across constituencies. Despite this, the overly restrictive and vague set of candidate qualifications precluded a vast majority of the population from running for office and allowed the Returning Officers an excessive level of discretion in approving or rejecting individual candidates' nomination papers. By the November 26, 2007, registration deadline, 4,565 National Assembly candidates and 10,460 Provincial Assembly candidates had submitted nomination papers. After a period of scrutiny and the withdrawal of more than 5,000 candidates in national and provincial assembly constituencies, the ECP announced that 2,438 National Assembly candidates and 5,511 Provincial Assembly candidates were qualified to seek office.[25]

In addition to a number of other requirements, candidates had to meet certain economic and educational requirements. They needed to hold at least a bachelor's degree or its equivalent, an extremely stringent requirement put in place by President Musharraf in

[24] FAFEN, "Missing and Duplicate Voters on the Final Electoral Roll" (February 13, 2008), http://www.fafen.org/admin/products/p47b3114b6e197.pdf

[25] Data on candidates, complaints and appeals available on the ECP website, http://www.ecp.gov.pk/content/GE2008.htm.

2002. Candidates were also required to provide extensive personal and financial information, including their past three income tax statements and a land revenue statement, and must have made timely payment on their loans, tax payments and utility bills. Failure to provide this information, or evidence indicating that a potential candidate did not meet the above requirements, was grounds for rejecting a candidate's nomination.[26]

Because only a small percentage of the population in Pakistan holds a bachelor degree, the education requirement severely limited the number of eligible candidates. Indeed, in April 2008, two months after the General Elections, the Pakistan Supreme Court struck down the provision on the basis that it discriminated against a large segment of the Pakistani population.[27]

The highly subjective nature of many of these candidate eligibility requirements created an environment in which Returning Officers had excessive discretion over the nomination process. Still, there is little evidence that they intentionally interfered with the process on a large scale. Only about 7 percent of nomination papers were ultimately rejected, and out of the 2,237 preelection complaints officially registered with the ECP, only 12 addressed the nomination process. These numbers seem to suggest that, while the opportunity for abuse existed, the process allowed for a competitive candidate pool.

A special set of appellate tribunals, consisting of judges from the High Courts of each province, was constituted to adjudicate complaints arising from the candidate registration process. Out of 476 appeals protesting the acceptance or rejection of a nominated candidate, 178 were accepted and 298 were rejected.

Election Day Security

Due to the widespread violence of the campaign period, there was an expectation that attacks would likely escalate on Election Day. In response to this threat, President Musharraf deployed 81,000 troops to protect voters at polling stations. Polling stations were assigned one of three classifications, ranging from "normal" to "most sensitive," and security personnel were deployed accordingly. Of the approximately 64,000 polling stations on Election Day, 8,923 were declared most sensitive.[28]

Each of the provinces received security forces to maintain a secure election environment. While the vast majority of security forces were deployed to the major population centers

[26] To be eligible, candidates also had to certify that they were at least 25 years of age at the time of filing their nomination; that they were enrolled as voters in the relevant electoral area; that they were of sound mind and had not committed a crime within the past five years; that they were not currently in the service of any government agency; that they refrained from speaking out against the country of Pakistan; and that they had not previously been removed from public service. Muslim candidates also had to declare that they had "true [Muslim] faith."

[27] "Pakistan Supreme Court strikes down bachelor's degree requirement for lawmakers," *The International Herald Tribune* (April 21, 2008), http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/04/21/asia/AS-GEN-Pakistan-Politics.php

[28] Army Chief Seeks Support for Peaceful Polls:81,00 Troops Deployed. *Dawn: The Internet Edition.* http://www.dawn.com/2008/02/16/top2/htm. February 16, 2008.

of Punjab, large numbers were also allocated to Balochistan and NWFP, where the threat of violence was the largest. According to FAFEN, about a third of polling stations had either army or paramilitary personnel stationed inside or outside the premises on Election Day. FAFEN reported that the security presence was most visible in Sindh, followed by Balochistan, NWFP and Punjab.[29]

ELECTION DAY OBSERVATIONS

Overall, the balloting and counting processes that DI's delegation observed on Election Day were conducted in a manner that met minimum standards for a democratic election, and DI's team did not witness significant evidence of fraud or error. However, significant procedural irregularities and a lack of consistency in election administration across polling stations did not instill confidence that the election was entirely free of error or manipulation. There were also serious allegations about manipulation in specific locations. Despite the relative success of Election Day, significant overarching problems remain, including inaccurate voter lists, relatively low voter turnout and low participation of women.

Election Day Procedures

In most polling places visited by DI observers, the administration of the process went smoothly, which was consistent with the findings of other domestic and international observers. Polling officers opened most stations on time, and new, translucent ballot boxes provided confidence that they were empty when polls opened. In most stations, election officials checked voters' names off the rolls, brushed their thumbs with indelible ink, and issued appropriately stamped ballots. In addition, in most polling stations they set up cardboard voting screens effectively to improve voter confidentiality.

In some locations, however, polling officials failed to follow administrative procedures. Approximately 16 percent of stations in FAFEN's sample did not open on time. This problem was most severe in Balochistan and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), where 31 and 32 percent of stations opened late, respectively.[30] In some stations, polling officers failed to mark the thumbs of many voters with indelible ink, removing a key safeguard against double voting. In a few stations, arguments broke out regarding voter eligibility and appropriate identification. DI delegation members reported inconsistent decisions as to what constituted appropriate identification, and to what extent information on the voter roll had to match that on CNIC cards in order for a voter to be eligible. The inconsistent application of the eligibility and identification requirements may have allowed for significant errors.

[29] Free and Fair Elections Network. "FAFEN Election Day Observation Update 2," February 18, 2008, http://www.fafen.org/admin/products/p47b99de606f9a.pdf
[30] FAFEN, "Election Day Observation Update 2" (February 18, 2008), http://www.fafen.org/admin/products/p47b99de606f9a.pdf

Another source of concern was the involvement of party officials in directing voters to polling stations. Before voting, most voters first approach a political party information booth to obtain a slip providing their voter registration information, including what polling booth they were assigned to and their serial number on the voter roll. While not officially part of the Election Day procedures, this process eases the burden on election officials by allowing them to quickly locate voters on the voter roll when they enter the polling station. Having the parties so actively involved, while accepted as part of the electoral process in Pakistan, could potentially compromise the secrecy of the ballot for voters and lead to intimidation in some circumstances.

Counting Procedures

In most cases, domestic and international observers were able to witness counting at the polling stations. According to reports from FAFEN and other international delegations, however, in some cases Returning Officers denied observers the opportunity to view the official counting of the ballots at constituency aggregation centers, in violation of ECP rules. Observing this step in the counting process is crucial to ensure a transparent vote count, particularly because the ECP does not otherwise release polling station results. This means that observers and political parties cannot compare the vote counts released from individual polling stations with the aggregated results published by the ECP. In addition, while the ECP instructed election officials to post Statements of the Count at individual polling stations, this directive was not uniformly followed. Publishing this information at polling stations and at the national level would be ideal, but observers should also have the opportunity to observe the aggregation of results to provide an additional check on potential fraud.

Counting procedures in polling stations observed by DI observers were generally professional and thorough. In some stations, however, observers witnessed casual application of procedures, including party agent participation in the counting process, the use of cell phones by both party agents and polling officials during the count, the presence of unauthorized persons, direct engagement by security forces, and movement of party agents into and out of the polling station during all stages of the count. Although these irregularities did not appear to be deliberate or systematic efforts to manipulate the count, they contain the potential for abuse and should be addressed in the future through additional training of election officials.

Additional Observations

As discussed in the preceding sections, DI delegation members observed the relatively successful implementation of opening, balloting and counting procedures in most of the polling stations they visited. Some of the areas of greater concern, such as security, also went much better than expected. In addition, there were fewer potential voters turned away than feared. Election Day performance in other areas, however, was more mixed.

Serious questions remain regarding voter turnout, with women's participation remaining a particularly acute problem.

Voter Registration Issues

Problems with the voter list before Election Day are discussed in detail above. The new electoral roll developed by the ECP was accurate but incomplete, and the solution mandated by the Supreme Court produced a roll that was highly flawed, and still incomplete. The missing names on the voter roll allowed for massive disenfranchisement, while the duplicate names created the potential for fraud.

It is difficult to measure the effect on voter participation of this failure to provide an accurate and comprehensive voter registry. On Election Day itself, DI's observers did not find significant numbers of voters being turned away either because they were not on the list or because they lacked the necessary identification documents. Domestic observers and political parties, however, did raise concerns about such constraints to voting.

Furthermore, the absence of voters being turned away from polling stations could mask problems with the voter registration system. As discussed above, before entering the polling station most voters first approach a political party information booth to obtain a slip identifying their location on the voter roll. It is possible that this step would filter out unregistered voters before they entered the polling station. More fundamentally, those individuals most likely to be missed by the voter registration process are also more likely to be disengaged from the political process and less likely to vote. As a result, a significant segment of the population could perhaps have been left off the voter rolls without a visible effect on the balloting on Election Day.

In sum, there are obvious problems with the voter list that need to be corrected to improve the quality of future elections in Pakistan. With as many as 15 million voters left off the rolls, regardless of the reasons, disenfranchisement remains a real concern. In a higher-turnout election in the future, the flaws in the voter list might become more prominent as more and more voters may find themselves turned away from the polls.

Turnout

The level of voter participation in Pakistan is difficult to assess, but many analysts believe that voter turnout historically has been low in parliamentary elections. In the 2002 parliamentary elections, for example, turnout was reported as 41.8 percent,[31] though turnout numbers in Pakistan are unreliable due to chronically flawed voter rolls. Relatively low turnout stems from a political culture in which corruption is rampant and from the fact that voters have little faith in the ability of political parties to deliver effective governance. For the 2008 elections, the possibility of terrorist attacks and other violence exac-

[31] Adam Carr Electoral Archive, http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/p/pakistan/pakistan2002.txt

erbated these problems. Many analysts feared low levels of participation would undermine the credibility of the elections in general.

The ECP did not publish a national turnout calculation, but other sources have aggregated the ECP's data and calculated an average turnout of around 44.6 percent.[32] FAFEN gives a national turnout of 48.2 percent within its sample, based on the 174 constituencies for which it has released data. FAFEN also found that one or more polling stations in 23 percent of constituencies reported turnout greater than 100 percent, indicating a high likelihood of fraud or some other anomaly.[33] Despite these anomalies, this level of voter turnout was thought to be remarkable, given security concerns.

Constituency-level turnout figures published by the ECP, however, are based on the total number of registrants as calculated from the flawed Final Electoral Roll and therefore do not accurately reflect the percentage of eligible voters casting ballots. Because we cannot know the actual number of eligible voters in Pakistan, it is impossible to calculate the actual voter turnout with any degree of confidence. It is also difficult to compare participation in this election to previous ones, as previous electoral rolls were similarly flawed.

We can, however, make some comparisons between turnout levels in different provinces. According to the data released by the ECP, turnout was highest in Punjab (48.8 percent) and Sindh (44.8 percent) as well as the Islamabad Capital Territory (50.1 percent). It was significantly lower in NWFP (33.5 percent) and Balochistan (31.3 percent) and lowest in FATA (26.4 percent).[34] FAFEN's analysis revealed similar differences among provinces. These results are not surprising; the violence leading up to the elections was concentrated in the NWFP and FATA. Moreover, boycotts by several nationalist parties may have affected in Balochistan. This variation is worrisome, though, suggesting disenchantment with the political process or widespread disenfranchisement in some parts of the country.

Overall, the preelection environment described above, particularly the uncertain security situation, almost certainly dampened voter turnout. In addition, although it is impossible to quantify, the flawed voter registration process certainly disenfranchised some voters. Many names were missing from the voter rolls, and the new CNIC, which was required for voting, was difficult to obtain for many people.

Participation of Women

The delegation noted that the participation of women in many locations was significantly lower than that of men. Before the elections, the media reported serious efforts to discourage women from voting in certain places, including the NWFP and some rural parts

[32] EU Election Observation Mission to Pakistan, "Final Report: National and Provincial Assembly Elections 18 February 2008" (April 16, 2008), p. 57.
[33] FAFEN, "Election Results Analysis-II," <http://www.fafen.org/admin/products/p480d90f33e5cb.pdf>
[34] These numbers from Adam Carr election archive; should double check – respectable to cite?

of Punjab and Sindh. This included direct threats from armed groups in parts of the NWFP and FATA. In other cases, the interference of family or community members reportedly kept women from the polls.[35]

In some locations DI observers found particular obstacles to access to the voting process that seemed to affect women more than men, including delayed openings, insufficient provision of materials and inadequate polling station facilities. In other cases, the listing of women in the voter roll by both married name and father's name led to confusion and raised questions about eligibility.

According to FAFEN's postelection analysis, turnout varied significantly by gender and type of polling station (single gender versus combined stations). Within FAFEN's sample, excluding polling stations with turnout of 100 percent or more, the average turnout was 49.8 percent in male polling stations, compared to 39.7 percent in female ones. This included strikingly low rates of female turnout in FATA and NWFP.[36] Interestingly, turnout in combined polling stations was higher than in single-gender polling stations.

The low voter turnout for women in Pakistani elections corresponded with lower participation in other aspects of political life, including election to public office. Only 25 women were elected as candidates to general, as opposed to reserved, seats in the national or provincial assemblies. Further, besides a few high-profile examples, women are largely absent from the senior leadership of political parties. They are also largely excluded from senior roles in the government.

Security and Relative Absence of Election Day Violence

As discussed above, in the three months before the elections, there were nearly 100 violent, election-related attacks, including the assassination of former Prime Minister and PPP leader Benazir Bhutto. On the weekend before the election alone, approximately 60 people died in bombings at election rallies. The threat of widespread Election Day violence, extensively anticipated in the domestic and international media in the lead up to the polls, fortunately did not materialize. Particularly when compared to the terrorist attacks in the days before the election, the day of the elections was relatively calm and polling stations were generally secure. Voters in most locations were able to cast their ballots without any serious incident.

Yet, even with the presence of security forces at various polling stations across the region, there were still some incidents of violence on Election Day. Several deaths were reported in the Punjab with at least one from a gun fight near a polling station. In addition, multiple bombs rocked the city of Quetta in Balochistan province with at least one person reported dead. Militants also blew up a polling booth in the Swat region of

[35] MSNBC, "Women barred from voting in parts of Pakistan," <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23224831/>
[36] FAFEN, "Election Results Analysis-II" (March 2008).

North-West Frontier Province, and there were reports of violence in the provincial capital of Peshawar. FAFEN reported witnessing violent clashes between rival political groups at 30 polling stations, leading to the closing of 14 stations. In addition, 13 stations were believed to have been "captured," some by local Taliban forces.[37]

Election officials and observers feared that a series of visible terrorist attacks early in the day would convince voters to stay away from the polls, undermining the legitimacy of the results. Fortunately, there were no high-profile terrorist incidents and most of the deaths on Election Day resulted from fighting between supporters of different parties in or near polling stations.[38] The scope of these killings seemed to be localized and personal, mostly involving shootings rather than the large bomb attacks that had marred the preelection environment. This does suggest that Pakistan is still dealing with fundamental problems in a political system that does not successfully curtail a certain level of violence and intimidation in politics.

Security fears might have dampened turnout, yet the military and other security services provided effective security on Election Day and likely deterred broader violence. The deployment of security forces discussed above was highly publicized before the election and clearly visible on Election Day itself.

Perhaps because predictions of electoral fraud were frequently coupled with predictions of electoral violence, the absence of widespread violence likely lent a greater sense of legitimacy to the election results. Thus, many people likely assumed that the relative calm signaled the relative fairness of the process. This perception may obscure the need for necessary reforms.

Domestic Election Observers and Political Party Agents

Past experiences in Pakistan and elsewhere have demonstrated the significant contribution that effective political party agents and nonpartisan domestic election observers can make to the credibility and integrity of the election process. Domestic observation efforts for these elections were very ambitious.

Domestic observer groups had some difficulty obtaining credentials from local election authorities. After initial delays, however, the ECP eventually accredited more than 25,000 domestic observers, permitting them to directly observe the process and contribute to transparency of the elections. But domestic groups were still unable to get all of their observers accredited, and many received credentials only in the last days before the elec-

[37] FAFEN, "FAFEN Election Day Observation Update -2," (February 18, 2008). http://www.fafen.org/admin/products/p47b99de606f9a.pdf. Captured polling stations are those that have come under the control of partisan forces either from within the polling station staff or by outside influence.
[38] "US Policy Options in Postelection Pakistan" U.S. Department of State, (February 28, 2008). http://www.state.gov/s/d/2008/101616.htm

tions. This made it much more difficult to plan the observation effort, as organizers could not be sure where they would be able to position observers on Election Day.

For FAFEN in particular, accreditation delays presented large problems. The coalition conducted the world's largest Parallel Vote Tabulation using results from 7,778 randomly selected polling stations in 256 National Assembly constituencies. The slow credentialing process led to some gaps in the sample, which weakened the data in some constituencies. Intimidation and other impediments to accessing polling stations also contributed to difficulties in collecting all of the data for the PVT.

The DI delegation noted the presence of FAFEN observers in many polling stations. FAFEN reported that it deployed nearly 16,000 polling station observers on Election Day, including mobile observers who visited more than 3,500 polling stations in 256 of the country's 272 constituencies.[39]

In addition, political party agents were present in all polling stations visited by DI observers, and they played an important role in the successful administration of elections. In many locations, as discussed, party representatives outside polling stations acted as de facto election officials, looking up voters on a copy of the electoral roll and directing them to the correct voting booth. Some party agents also acted as voter advocates when polling officers were unable to find a voter's name on the electoral roll or if a voter's CNIC information failed to match that on the voter list. Although trained election officials rather than agents of particular political parties should carry out these functions, the presence of agents from multiple parties at each polling station provided a further check on potential fraud.

Political parties themselves were subject to a Code of Conduct established by the ECP in November 2007.[40] This document, drafted ostensibly with the input of the parties themselves, placed a number of restrictions on their activities, including undue limitations on freedom of speech and assembly. Moreover, some observers claimed the Code of Conduct was weakly enforced and questioned its usefulness.

On the whole, domestic observers and party agents contributed hugely to the success of the election process. FAFEN in particular collected data that had the potential to identify fraud in many constituencies and polling stations and will inform recommendations for how to improve future elections. Its presence, which was well publicized, may have also deterred fraud in some areas. In addition, domestic observers collected and publicized useful information before Election Day, helping to identify problems and to have them addressed in advance.

[39] FAFEN, "Election Results Analysis-I" (March 8, 2008).
[40] See http://ecp.gov.pk/COCFinal.pdf for full text.

Parallel Vote Tabulation

On Election Day, FAFEN conducted a PVT of 7,778 randomly selected polling stations or approximately 12 percent of the polling stations in the country. The results produced a statistically representative sample for 256 of the 272 National Assembly constituencies. FAFEN deployed nearly 16,000 observers to witness the vote count in the sample polling stations and compared these results with the official ECP count as a check on potential counting or tabulation fraud.

Despite widespread fears of fraud, voters and parties generally accepted the results released by the ECP. Nevertheless, FAFEN's PVT data suggest a number of possible irregularities in the ECP results. Out of 174 constituencies for which FAFEN has released data, the PVT and ECP results were statistically equivalent in 141. FAFEN found a statistically significant difference in the results in 29 constituencies, which they determined could have affected the outcome of the election in at least five. For the 111 constituencies for which robust qualitative data has been released, FAFEN reported that in 55 constituencies where the contests were close, widespread polling station problems were serious enough to have possibly affected the outcome. Further, in about 23 percent of constituencies, at least one polling station had a voter turnout rate of greater than 100 percent.[41]

FAFEN found no apparent partisan pattern to these disparities and concluded that the PVT results do not suggest intentional, systematic efforts by the ECP or others to alter the vote count to the benefit or detriment of a specific party. Unfortunately, as of the date of this report, the ECP has yet to release results at the polling station level, information that is critical to a comprehensive investigation of the inconsistencies between FAFEN's data and the official results.

ELECTION RESULTS

Shortly after the polls closed, media outlets began projecting major victories for the opposition parties in the National and Provincial Assemblies. In the National Assembly election, including reserved seats the PPP received 122 seats with 30.6 percent of the votes, the PML-N received 91 seats with 19.6 percent of the votes, and the PML-Q received 54 seats with 23 percent of the votes. The nature of Pakistan's single-member-district electoral system allowed the PML-Q to receive more votes than the PML-N, but win fewer National Assembly seats.

Other secular parties, including the ANP and the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), won an additional 46 seats, while independents won in 18 National Assembly constituencies. The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a coalition of Islamist parties that won 42 National Assembly seats in the 2002 elections, fared poorly, winning only six seats.

[41]FAFEN, "Election Results Analysis–II" (March 2008), http://www.fafen.org/admin/products/p480d90f33e5cb.pdf.

The Provincial Assembly elections resulted in a similar repudiation of the ruling PLM-Q, with the PPP winning large shares of seats in all four provinces and the PML-N winning a plurality of 164 seats in Punjab. With an outright majority of 90 seats in Sindh province and the second most seats in the three other provinces, the PPP was well positioned to control the agenda in Sindh and to be included in the ruling coalitions of the remaining three provinces. The PML-N's victory in the Punjab, the country's most populous province, cemented it as a powerful player at both the national and regional levels. The PML-Q won the most seats in the Balochistan Provincial Assembly, but allegations of fraud were widespread there and the leading Balochi and Pashtun nationalist parties in that province boycotted the vote. Other parties also fared well in provincial elections, with the ANP winning a plurality in NWFP and the MQM winning 51 seats in Sindh.

Election Results - National Assembly

Party	**Elected Seats**		**Reserved Seats**		**Total**
	Party Candidates	Independents*	Women	Non-Muslims	
PPP	88	7	23	4	122
PML-N	67	4	17	3	91
PML-Q	42	0	10	2	54
MQM	19	0	5	1	25
ANP	10	0	3	0	13
MMA	5	0	1	0	6
PML-F	4	0	1	0	5
BNP-A	1	0	0	0	1
PPP-S	1	0	0	0	1
NPP	1	0	0	0	1
Independents	18	N/A	N/A	N/A	18
Total					**337**

Source: Election Commission of Pakistan

** Independents are allowed to switch to a party within three days of being notified they have been elected.*

These victories for the opposition at both the national and regional levels generally conformed to common perceptions leading up to the vote of the relative popularities of the major parties. Many analysts believed that the PML-Q's popularity was suffering from the declaration of emergency rule by President Musharraf, while the return of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif was expected to raise the fortunes of the PPP and PML-N. Public opinion polling released in December 2007 showed the PPP narrowly beating out the PML-N in a hypothetical election, with the PML-Q finishing a close third.[42]

[42] International Republican Institute Poll, (released December 13, 2007), http://www.iri.org/mena/pakistan/pdfs/2007-12-12-pakistan-poll-index.pdf.

At the same time, there was widespread concern that the PML-Q might claim victory in the polls through widespread manipulation, given the party's perceived control of the electoral administration. Under these circumstances, election results clearly favoring the PPP and the PML-N surprised some.

The opposition's victory led to immediate postelection speculation in the domestic media as to whether the new government would challenge the President's authority, especially given repeated calls from the PML-N for President Musharraf to step down. Despite the potential threat to his rule, Musharraf accepted the results and said he would be willing to work with an opposition-dominated coalition government. The PML-Q also decided not to contest the results.

POSTELECTION CONTEXT AND OBSERVATIONS

Postelection Events

Despite multiple preelection problems and irregularities and violence on Election Day, the February 2008 elections offered an opportunity for Pakistani voters to express their will. The resounding electoral defeat of the PML-Q, the party most closely aligned with President Musharraf, was interpreted as a referendum on Musharraf's presidency. PML-Q leaders accepted the legitimacy of the electoral results and conceded defeat. PML-Q spokesman Tariq Azeem said, "The voters have delivered their verdict, and as democrats we accept their verdict."[43] Given Pakistan's tumultuous political history, this concession of electoral defeat was especially significant because it allowed for a smooth transfer of power to a new elected government.

In the immediate aftermath of the elections, Pakistan's opposition parties began intensive negotiations to discuss the formation of a government. On March 9, nearly three weeks after the elections, the chairmen of the two leading opposition parties, Asif Zaradari of the PPP and Nawaz Sharif of the PML-N, agreed to share power in a coalition government.[44] Despite the sizeable victories of both the PPP and PLM-N, neither party's leader ran for office in the National Assembly. Election officials ruled that former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, chairman of the PML-N, remained legally ineligible to run due to his criminal convictions following the 1999 coup, while Asif Zardari, widower of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and new leader of the PPP, chose not to run. As party chairmen, however, both men were actively involved in coalition negotiations and government decisions, and both plan to compete in upcoming by-elections.

Two more weeks of discussions resulted in the election of Yousaf Raza Gilani—a PPP leader, former aide to Benazir Bhutto, and former Speaker of the National Assembly—as Pakistan's new Prime Minister. Gilani received 264 votes in the 342-seat National As-

[43] AFP, "Musharraf allies face defeat in Pakistan vote" (February 18, 2008).
[44] Saeed Shah, "Pakistan's victors form government, vow reforms," *McClatchy Newspapers* (March 9, 2008).

sembly, decisively defeating a candidate from the PML-Q, who received only 42 votes. By late spring, a number of disputes over results from the February elections remained outstanding, however, and by-elections for unfilled seats in the national and provincial assemblies were postponed several times, most recently to June 26, 2008.[45]

The February 2008 elections in Pakistan left a fractured political landscape. As discussed, the PPP won a plurality of the seats in the National Assembly and the Sindh Provincial Assembly, while other parties were victorious in the other three provincial assemblies. Each of the victorious parties has its own priorities, many of which have been constructed for political reasons to set them apart from their rivals. This leaves little room for cooperation and the creation of lasting coalitions. One of the unifying forces among this diverse set of parties, however, was opposition to President Musharraf's continued rule, with some parties calling for Musharraf's impeachment and removal from office and others calling for a diminution of the powers of the presidency.

In a major setback, which significantly diminished the gains from the elections, the coalition between the PPP and the PML-N parties split on May 12, just over two months after the coalition was actually formed. The PML-N under party leader Nawaz Sharif initiated the split, citing disagreements with the PPP over the restoration of the judges originally dismissed by Musharraf. Despite these disagreements, however, Sharif pledged continue to support the government and approach each policy issue on its own terms. Zardari, in turn, pledged to work toward the restoration of Sharif's party and cabinet members to their positions, reuniting the coalition. It remains to be seen, however, how long this tenuous relationship will last.

Complaint Resolution

Under Pakistani election law, complaints about the process are filed either with the ECP or specially appointed appellate tribunals for resolution. The ECP handles all administrative complaints, while the appellate tribunals hear complaints relating to the candidate registration process and those contesting election results. These appellate tribunals consist of High Court judges approved by the President and appointed by the CEC. Pakistani political leaders and the international community called the independence of the appellate tribunals into question after the declaration of emergency rule because the pool of eligible tribunal judges was limited to those willing to swear an oath of allegiance to the President.

The ECP complaints process was outlined in a Complaints Handbook released before the February elections.[46] To facilitate handling of administrative complaints, the ECP implemented a computerized Complaints Registry designed to increase the efficiency and transparency of the process. While the creation of this registry is laudable, it lacked criti-

[45] ECP Website, http://www.ecp.gov.pk/.
[46] See http://www.ecp.gov.pk/content/ECPCManual.pdf

cal information about many complaints and was not integrated into the complaints process at the provincial and district levels, making it difficult to use effectively.

According to many analysts, the complaint resolution procedure in place during the General Elections largely failed in the fair and timely redress of complaints. Of the 2,237 complaints filed in the preelection period, the ECP has not released information regarding the number that have been dismissed, have been forwarded to enforcement authorities, or remain unresolved.[47] In addition, before the election political parties repeatedly complained that the ECP was unwilling or unable to address their concerns about the administration of the elections or campaign activities of competing parties in a timely manner. Because the ECP has not been forthcoming with information regarding the ultimate resolution of the many complaints it received, either about particular complaints or in the aggregate, there is no way to independently evaluate the claims made by opposition parties that complaints were rarely resolved.

While the ECP has official jurisdiction over most election-related complaints, including the power to officially dismiss complaints it finds lack sufficient evidence, it asserts that it has only limited power to apply sanctions to individuals or parties found to be in violation of election laws or procedures. Instead, when the ECP finds that a particular complaint is valid and has sufficient supporting evidence, it refers it to the appropriate governmental authority for follow-up. Thus, the ECP has limited ability to ensure that valid complaints are appropriately prosecuted.

It appears that the ECP failed to devote sufficient resources to handling election complaints and did not make it a priority to clearly communicate its findings regarding specific complaints to parties, candidates or the media. Several parties, including the PPP and PML-N, construed the ECP's lack of urgency in responding to complaints during the campaign period as a deliberate attempt to disadvantage opposition party candidates. The ECP denied all allegations of impropriety, deliberate or otherwise. It argued that the slow turnaround time was instead caused by the large volume of complaints and the ECP's own commitment to conduct thorough and impartial investigations on every complaint received.

The overall lack of transparency in the administration of the complaint-resolution process makes it impossible to determine whether the ECP showed intentional bias. Regardless, the complexities of the process and the lack of resources devoted to it cast considerable doubt on the ability of the ECP to ensure the fairness of the preelection campaign environment for all candidates and political parties.

The same lack of transparency and inadequate attention to complaint resolution found in the preelection period appeared to plague the postelection period as well. In order to seek the redress of a postelection appeal, an individual candidate must petition the CEC

[47] See http://www.ecp.gov.pk/content/complaints.pdf for data on complaints filed.

and satisfy a number of procedural requirements, including the payment of a fee.[48] The CEC then rules on the appeals in closed meetings. An ECP press release dated February 24 reported that the ECP dismissed approximately 100 petitions for recounting or voiding the results.[49] The ECP did not provide any further information about the nature of these appeals or justification of its actions. Such a lack of transparency coupled with a great degree of discretion over the complaint resolution process raise questions about whether these decisions have been biased or arbitrary.

Postelection Environment

DI's postelection observation mission found that addressing the problems in electoral administration is a low-priority concern for a range of political party leaders, candidates and civil society activists. By mid-April, most of the leaders in the newly elected Pakistani government had moved beyond the February elections and were focused on two main concerns: addressing the structural imbalances of power and developing quick policy responses to the pressing demands of the public, particularly on the security and economic fronts. Relative to the challenges posed by restoring the judiciary, redefining the powers of the presidency, restoring a balance of power between the legislative and executive authorities, dealing with the relationship between national and provincial authorities, and addressing economic development and security, the question of election reform seems of low importance. In the aftermath of elections that many Pakistanis viewed as less violent and marred by fewer irregularities than expected, there seems to be little impetus for electoral reform.

The new national government quickly took steps to address the imbalances of power created under Musharraf's tenure, particularly during the imposition of emergency rule in November and December 2007. After taking the oath of office, Prime Minister Gilani ordered the immediate release of all judges who were detained under emergency rule. The leaders of the governing coalition, the PPP and PML-N, began lengthy deliberations over the restoration of the judiciary. As of April, as interviews conducted during the postelection observation mission demonstrated, clear tensions existed within the governing coalition over the restoration of the judges, PPP representatives were more reluctant than PML-N representatives to insist on a full and unconditional restoration of the judges. More than two and a half months after the elections, the two leading parties in the coalition were still negotiating the details of how to restore the judiciary.

The new government also moved quickly to introduce legislation in parliament to lift curbs on the independent media imposed by President Musharraf in 2007. The new Information Minister, Sherry Rehman of the PPP, introduced legislation on April 11 to overturn an emergency decree that Musharraf had imposed allowing government au-

[48] Election Commission of Pakistan, *Election Laws: General Elections, 2007-08*, pp. 62-63.
[49] Election Commission of Pakistan, "PRESS RELEASE: Election Commission of Pakistan disposed of about 100 Applications" (February 24, 2008).

thorities to close independent television networks, revoke licenses, and impose heavy fines and jail time for broadcasting anything deemed to defame the head of state or army.[50]

In addition to correcting the imbalances of power within the national government and addressing shortcomings in political rights and civil liberties, another priority was addressing the balance of power between the national and provincial governments. In DI interviews with leaders of the MQM in Karachi in December, for example, a top official in the party stressed the view that the Sindh province was the "economic engine" of the country yet did not receive the level of backing from the national government in terms of services and support commensurate with the tax revenues it was contributing. In April, ANP leaders with positions in the national and provincial government expressed similar concerns and stressed the need for greater provincial autonomy on a range of issues, particularly resource allocation. Though the question of the balance between national and provincial authorities does not loom as immediate as the concerns over the judiciary and the powers of the presidency, the issue of provincial autonomy is of concern for key leaders of provincial authorities and is likely to emerge as a central issue in the continued debates over political reform in Pakistan.

The long-standing concerns about civil-military relations also remain an issue in Pakistan, with leaders in political parties and members of the National Assembly raising concerns about the role that the security establishment continues to play in Pakistani politics. A number of elected officials expressed a desire to institute a system of greater transparency and oversight over the budget and activities of the military, but few offered concrete examples of how such an initiative would be implemented.

Another dominant concern expressed to the DI postelection mission was the need to address growing economic challenges such as food inflation and problems with basic services such as electricity. Economic development and the government's ability to respond to the population's basic needs dominated interviews that were originally aimed at eliciting views on the February elections and electoral and political reforms. "We need the international community's economic development assistance so that we can fight terrorism the right way," said one ANP leader.[51] "Our area needs a great deal of economic development—we need a Marshall Plan for Pakistan in order to build confidence with the people who elected us," said a leader in PML-N.[52]

A PPP member of the national assembly echoed the priority of focusing on basic needs, saying, "The United States can help us build infrastructure like schools, hospitals, and roads…if I fail this time, the mullahs are going to take over."[53] This emphasis on basic needs and economic concerns is understandable. On the eve of the February elections,

[50] Salman Masood, "Pakistan Government Proposes Lifting Media Restrictions," *The New York Times* (April 12, 2008).
[51] DI interview in Islamabad (April 2008).
[52] *Ibid*.
[53] DI interview in Peshawar (April 2008).

public opinion polling found that inflation was the top concern in the elections, with 55 percent of the Pakistani adults citing it as the most important issue. Additional concerns included unemployment (cited by 15 percent), terrorism (12 percent), poverty (6 percent), and law and order (6 percent).[54] With electricity shortages leading to violence and concerns about the impact of double-digit food inflation on Pakistan's poor, addressing basic needs has the potential to overshadow the debate over much-needed political reforms.

Restoring stability and addressing internal security challenges was another policy priority among the interviewees in the meetings during the postelection observation mission. This reflects a growing concern among Pakistanis about the rise of extremism and terrorist attacks in their country. From 2006 to 2007, the number of terrorist attacks inside of Pakistan doubled and fatalities from those attacks quadrupled.[55] Since the election, terrorist violence has continued against government and civilian targets alike.

There is a strong consensus within the political elite that the new Pakistani government needs to take the lead in developing a new approach to address the threats posed by terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan—one in which Pakistanis, and not external actors, are the ones leading the effort against terrorist groups. "As long as Pakistan is seen to be acting at the behest of the United States," said one retired Pakistani security official, "it will not work…we are not going to get anywhere [in reducing the violence]."[56]

Pakistan's new government faces numerous daunting challenges in the postelection environment: the fragility of the government mandate; continued questions about the relationship between the civilian governing authorities and the military and intelligence establishment; debates over addressing the imbalances of power that exist between the legislative, judicial and executive branches of government; and looming public policy challenges such as law and order, rule of law, economic development, and a growing crisis in food and energy inflation. But the new government must include much needed electoral reforms in its broader agenda for political change in order to ensure that that the process of democratization continues and that future elections continue to reflect the will of the people.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings and analysis of this report, Democracy International makes the following recommendations about elections and political institutions in Pakistan. DI urges consideration of these recommendations by the Government and Election Com-

[54] International Republican Institute Index, Pakistan Public Opinion Survey conducted January 19-29, 2008 with 3,485 adult residents of Pakistan.
[55] Eric Schmitt, "Attacks in Pakistan Rising, State Department Reports," *The New York Times* (May 1, 2008), citing statistics compiled by the National Counterterrorism Center in the United States and released in a recent State Department report.
[56] DI interview in Rawalpindi (April 2008).

mission of Pakistan, the National Assembly and political party leaders, and the international community. Such reforms will be necessary to rebuild trust in Pakistan's electoral and political institutions.

Institutional Framework

1. **Make the ECP more independent and accountable.** Critics have questioned the independence and transparency of the ECP and have accused it of being unresponsive. Members of the ECP in the future must be, and must be perceived to be, fully independent of the executive and all political parties. Alternative models for election management bodies should be studied and debated.

2. **Improve transparency of the ECP.** The ECP is a public body and should conduct itself in a transparent and deliberative manner. With only limited exceptions, meetings should be open to the public and decisions should be made public. In conducting its deliberations and making decisions, the ECP should form and consult with public advisory panels composed of political party and civil society participants. This should help improve public confidence in the electoral process.

3. **Recodify the election laws.** The current panoply of constitutional provisions, election laws, ECP regulations, court decisions and other advisory notices makes it difficult if not impossible to know what the law requires. This leads to uneven application of the law and reliance on individual interpretation and ad hoc decisions. As part of a broader election reform agenda, an effort to rationalize and recodify the laws governing elections is much needed.

Voter Registration

4. **Improve the accuracy of electoral rolls by instituting continuous voter registration based on the Computerized National Identity Card.** Despite the availability of extraordinary donor resources to assist in the production of an accurate and comprehensive electoral roll, audits conducted by FAFEN and direct observation of problems with the Final and Supplementary Electoral Rolls point to the need for a better system. The ECP should implement a continuous voter registration process as the principal means of maintaining an accurate electoral roll. Registration should be based on the CNIC and updated on a regular basis. Voters should be provided easy access to these records so that the information can be verified and changes made easily when necessary. The electoral rolls should be a barrier to electoral fraud—not to voting.

5. **Reduce barriers to obtaining a Computerized National Identity Card.** Current regulations require voters to show a valid CNIC or an older National Identity Card in order to cast a ballot, even if the voter's name is on the electoral roll. But obtaining a CNIC can be extremely difficult, particularly for rural voters and women, leading to

the potential disenfranchisement of large numbers of voters. The CNIC should be available without cost, and the National Database and Registration Authority should provide rural voters better access to the process of obtaining the CNIC.

Election Procedures

6. **Uphold the rights of party agents and domestic election observers and expedite the issuance of observer credentials.** Domestic election observers and political party and candidate agents in polling stations should be permitted full access to the electoral process under the law, subject to reasonable limitations. The requirement for credentials should be designed to ensure that observation does not unreasonably burden the electoral process, not to prevent or hinder the observation itself.

7. **Improve staff training.** The administration of the balloting and counting procedures and other aspects of the elections was inconsistent. In too many polling stations, the procedures were misapplied in ways that disadvantaged voters. A first step in better management would be to more thoroughly train all election officials. Personnel and hiring policies should be reviewed to ensure that those hired meet the job requirements.

8. **Make the locations of polling stations as accessible as possible and publicize their locations.** Voters have to know where they vote and cannot be expected to travel long distances to reach polling stations. This information should be released to voters well in advance of an election.

9. **Post Statements of the Count at the polling stations, as required.** Polling station officials did not always post the required Statements of the Count. But this information it essential for transparency and for enabling voters and monitoring organizations to verify the accuracy of the counting process.

10. **Make polling station results readily available from the ECP.** The ECP has the capability to collect and make accessible the Statement of the Count from every polling station. It should do so quickly after the completion of the count, and the manner of public disclosure should facilitate ease of access and data analysis. Rapid public disclosure of individual polling stations results at the national level is a crucial component of the public right and ability to verify the accuracy of the vote count. The ECP should make this information available in a timely manner.

11. **Ensure the transparency of the vote count at the constituency level by Returning Officers.** The aggregation of polling stations results for constituencies by Returning Officers should be transparent and easily accessible. Returning Officers should not have the power to restrict access to the tabulation process beyond what is mandated by the election law or the ECP.

12. **Expedite and make transparent the ECP process for addressing complaints.** The ECP has a database for the collection of complaints but has not adopted a satisfactory system for acting on them in a reasonable and timely manner. The ECP should investigate and respond to all complaints within a reasonable time and should make available information on how it has responded to each complaint.

13. **Expedite the appeals process.** When candidates or others file appeals, the courts or relevant electoral authorities must act promptly on those appeals, subject to the practicalities of the situation. The adjudication of appeals months or years after an election is unacceptable and renders them less relevant to the process than they otherwise would have been.

Electoral System

14. **Study the impact of the single-member First Past the Post (FPTP) system.** FPTP systems tend to reinforce some of the political and electoral problems observed in Pakistan. They can hinder the development of cohesive, disciplined parties; they can produce substantially disproportionate results between votes and seats; and they can discourage voter participation, particularly in uncompetitive constituencies. This is a highly political issue and many democracies use such systems, but the implications of the current system and its alternatives should be discussed and publicly debated. A modified system might mitigate some of the historical weaknesses of the Pakistani political system.

15. **Eliminate multiple candidacies.** Candidates should not be permitted to run for office in more than one constituency. This practice allows parties to manipulate the system by running prominent party leaders in multiple competitive constituencies. It reduces the connection between voters and their representatives, since candidates are less attached to a geographical area, and produces frequent by-elections that are often uncontested and impose an undue financial and administrative burden on the ECP.

16. **Review the drawing of constituency boundaries.** Constituencies should be modified to produce greater equality in population sizes. All constituencies should have close to the same population to produce roughly equal representation of voters. Constituency delimitation is a process that is vulnerable to manipulation, so steps must be taken to ensure fair redrawing of constituency borders by ensuring the process is open and transparent.

17. **Integrate FATA into the electoral system.** Current law discriminates against citizens of FATA by placing additional restrictions on elections and candidates in those regions, including barring political party participation. FATA should be fully integrated into the national electoral system.

Women's Participation

18. **Ensure equitable provision of materials and resources for female voters.** Polling places serving women, whether in mixed or female-only stations, sometimes suffer from inequitable distribution of resources—including less well-trained staff, inadequate physical space and insufficient election materials as well as intimidating behavior by security and elections staff members—which hinders female participation. The ECP must ensure that polling places for women have sufficient materials and resources. Notwithstanding local culture and religion, women must have the same opportunities for political participation as men.

19. **Address intimidation of female voters.** The Government of Pakistan should make a serious effort to prevent intimidation of female voters in all parts of the country. It should enforce existing laws on voter protection and consider whether stricter laws are necessary.

20. **Conduct voter and civic education efforts to encourage political participation of women.** Recognizing that low participation of women in Pakistani politics is an issue with deep cultural roots, the ECP should target education campaigns at men and women that emphasize the right of women to vote and the benefits of women's participation in the political process. Although overcoming cultural barriers to participation will take time, an immediate commitment to these efforts by the ECP and the Government is critically important to the prospects for genuine democracy in Pakistan.

CONCLUSION

This report identifies a number of significant weaknesses and deficiencies in Pakistan's election system and processes. Most glaring among these are the flaws in the voter registration system, obstacles to women's participation, and an electoral environment that restricts the independence of the media and the judiciary and limits the ability of parties, candidates and civil society actors to criticize the government. While these problems have not negated the legitimacy of the 2008 elections, they leave open the possibility of fraud and error that could undermine future polls. Pakistan must work to address these issues if it is to successfully move toward meaningful democracy.

Effective electoral reform should be a high priority for Pakistan's leaders, but it appears for the most part that they have relegated it to a lesser status. As discussed above, economic and security issues are currently the paramount concerns for the country's new government. But even beyond the current economic and security crises, Pakistan's political leaders have not given electoral reform the prominence it deserves. Either the relevant individuals and institutions do not recognize the importance of well-executed elections to the broader political health of the country, or they do not possess the political will to take the steps necessary to improve them. As a result, even relatively simple

procedural problems affecting Pakistan's electoral system remain unaddressed, and the kinds of flaws that afflicted the 2008 elections will persist. In part because the country's electoral problems are never sufficiently addressed, elections in Pakistan have failed to produce a truly accountable political system.

Resolving Pakistan's electoral problems, of course, will not by itself be sufficient to create a democratic political system. The recent political and popular unrest has shown that the country faces a broader set of democracy and governance challenges. President Musharraf's actions in suspending the constitution and imposing emergency rule highlighted fundamental weaknesses in the rule of law, particularly regarding the independence of the judiciary. Pakistan's political parties are chronically undemocratic institutions that are personality-driven, lack any real ideological grounding, and often do not provide genuine representation to their constituencies. Perhaps most important, the Pakistani military still maintains a strong presence in the political and economic spheres that gives it an effective veto over any reforms it does not support.

Fairer elections can help to alleviate these problems, however, and indeed are necessary to do so. Even though the country seems to have made some progress in recent years in achieving effective electoral reform, many problems remain. Without further electoral and other institutional reforms, Pakistan will not be able to produce the political system it needs to consolidate democratic gains.

APPENDIX A: PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Preliminary Statement of the Democracy International U.S. Election Observation Mission to the 2008 General Elections in Pakistan

Islamabad, Pakistan – February 20, 2008

OVERVIEW

Despite a seriously flawed and difficult pre-election environment, the February 18, 2008, general elections in Pakistan have provided a genuine opportunity for Pakistani voters to express their will. A relatively peaceful Election Day defied widespread expectations of violence, and fears of systematic manipulation appear to have been blunted. To date, there appears to be broad acceptance of the results.

Overall, these elections represent a potentially historic step forward in the democratic process. However, the serious assault on Pakistan's constitutional order and fundamental flaws in the pre-election environment prevented the election from meeting international standards and must be addressed if progress toward a democratic Pakistan is to continue.

Democracy International fielded a 38-person U.S. election observation mission to the February 18 elections that included noted experts in election administration, election monitoring and Pakistani politics. In addition to its own short-term observation, the delegation drew upon the work of Democracy International in Pakistan over the past year as well as on the findings of domestic observers. The mission complemented ongoing international and domestic efforts to strengthen democratic electoral systems and processes in Pakistan to help build a more participatory, representative and accountable democracy.

The delegation commends those candidates, voters, election officials and domestic observers who participated in the elections in spite of the real potential for violence. We urge the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), the new government and the international community to address the serious problems in the election process.

I. PRE-ELECTION CONTEXT

The political environment in which the run up to any election takes place, including the extent of freedoms of speech, movement and association, the fairness of the media, the opportunities for the opposition to compete, the independence of the judiciary and the nature of the pre-election period are critically important.

Political Environment

Based on Democracy International's engagement with the political process in Pakistan over the past year and the findings of other international and domestic observers, the delegation concluded that the political environment leading up to the election presented

serious obstacles to a fully democratic election. The political environment in the year preceding the election, including restrictions on lawyers and judges and on fundamental rights, has not been conducive to an open and robust democratic election. The declaration of emergency rule by President Musharraf on November 3—only two months before the scheduled vote—severely constrained political activities, banned political rallies, shut down media outlets, removed and detained judges, and jailed thousands of lawyers and civil society activists and effectively suspended some of Pakistan's constitution. The state of emergency hindered the freedom of movement and assembly necessary for an open, competitive campaign. The government cracked down harshly on protesters and arrested activists. The two leading opposition figures, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, were only recently allowed to return to the country, Sharif only on the second attempt.

Within the electoral context, Emergency Rule combined with a trend of increasing government pressure on the legal community and the judiciary compromised the impartiality of the institutions tasked to resolve electoral complaints. Emergency Rule also severely restricted media activities. The government compelled media outlets to agree to a new and restrictive Code of Conduct before they could resume broadcasting, and media restrictions were promulgated even in the days leading up to the election. At the same time, after the lifting of emergency rule, the vibrant media that have emerged over the last few years were able to report on party platforms, candidates, and broader political and economic issues important to voters.

Violence also strongly tainted the pre-election environment. The assassination of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto was only the most visible and dramatic example of this. Suicide bombings at political rallies and deadly inter-party clashes marred the weeks and months leading up to Election Day. Only two days before Election Day, a bomb at a political gathering in NWFP killed dozens of innocent people. Such violence almost certainly deterred some voters from participating and constrained candidate activities.

Local government officials reportedly misused government resources for partisan purposes. Ostensibly elected on a nonpartisan basis, many such officials actively campaigned for candidates in their areas, appearing in campaign advertisements and using their control over local government resources in campaign activities.

Opposition parties and the media criticized the ECP for a lack of independence from the president and the government. Because the judiciary plays such an important role in the administration of the elections and the adjudication of election-related complaints, the wholesale replacement of judges raised questions about the independence of the ECP. Insulating all facets of election administration from potential political influence should be a priority for future reform of the Pakistani electoral system.

Voter Registration

An ambitious effort to completely rebuild Pakistan's electoral rolls before these elections met with mixed results. Statistically valid audits of the 2007 Final Electoral Roll per-

formed by the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) showed that as many as 15 to 20 million eligible voters had been omitted during the enumeration process. To address this problem the ECP added names from the deeply flawed 2002 lists, but this change reportedly still failed to account for many eligible voters and served to add duplicates and other inaccurate entries into the lists. In addition, the voter registration process, including the administrative and financial burden of obtaining a National Identity Card, made it harder for women and economically disadvantaged groups to exercise their right to vote.

II. ELECTION DAY

The balloting and counting processes on Election Day were largely conducted in accordance with established procedures. The Election Day process was executed smoothly in observed polling stations relative to previous Pakistani elections. Despite the relative success of Election Day, the delegation noted some significant systemic problems, including inaccurate voter lists, limited voter turnout and low participation of women. In addition, observers noted procedural irregularities that should be resolved to improve the overall process.

Turnout

Despite reports of high voter participation, the pre-election environment described above almost certainly dampened voter turnout. In addition, although impossible to quantify, the flawed voter registration process disenfranchised some voters. Participation would have been higher had the new Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) been more widely available and the lists been more accurate and inclusive.

Participation of Women

Problems with voting lists seemed to affect women disproportionately, an observation backed up by FAFEN's registration audit. The delegation noted that participation of women in many locations was significantly lower than that of men. In some locations our observers found particular obstacles to women's access to the voting process, including delayed openings and insufficient provision of materials. Media sources in advance of the elections reported serious efforts to prevent women from voting in certain locations. In other cases, listings by both married name and father's name raised questions about eligibility. In other instances, the interference of family or community members kept women from the polls.

Security and Absence of Election Day Violence

The threat of widespread Election Day violence, extensively anticipated in the domestic and international media in the lead up to the polls, fortunately did not materialize. Voters in most locations we observed were able to cast their ballots without any serious incident. We observed a significant security presence, which seemed to reassure many voters. Although some deaths were reported, election-related violence was less than what many expected and there were no reported terrorist attacks on polling stations or voters.

Election Day Procedures

In most polling places visited by our observers, the administration of the process went smoothly. New, translucent ballot boxes provided confidence that boxes were empty at the beginning of the balloting, and new cardboard voting screens improved voter confidentiality.

However, in some locations we observed, polling officials failed to follow prescribed administrative procedures, which could have compromised the secrecy of the ballot and permitted unauthorized involvement of party agents in the administration of the balloting process. Nevertheless, these irregularities seemed to be the result of a lack of training rather than intentional malfeasance.

Domestic Election Observers and Political Party Agents

Past experience in Pakistan and elsewhere has demonstrated the significant contribution that effective political party agents and nonpartisan domestic election observers can make to the credibility and integrity of the election process. Despite initial delays, the ECP eventually accredited more than 25,000 domestic observers, which permitted them to directly observe the process and contributed to transparency of the election. Our observers noted the presence of party agents from multiple parties in every polling station they visited, and many saw FAFEN observers in polling stations.

Election Day Counting

Counting procedures in polling stations we observed were generally professional and thorough. In some districts, however, observers witnessed casual application of procedures, including party agent participation in the process, the use of cell phones by both party agents and polling officials during the count, the presence of unauthorized persons, direct engagement by security forces, and passage of party agents into and out of the polling station during all stages of the count. Although these irregularities did not appear to be deliberate or systematic efforts to manipulate the count, they contain a potential for abuses and should be addressed in the future.

CONCLUSION

Ten of millions of Pakistani voters defied security threats and a seriously flawed pre-election environment to elect their national and provincial representatives on February 18, 2008. The final outcome of these elections remains unclear. Before the election, substantial obstacles threatened to derail the democratic process. Emergency rule, curbs on fundamental freedoms and political violence created a hostile and dangerous environment not conducive to an open, accountable political process. Lack of independence and impartiality of some officials at the national and local level created a perception that government officials could improperly influence the process.

On Election Day, our observers witnessed disenfranchisement of some of the population due to deeply problematic voter roles, apparent fear of violence and gender exclusion. In

some locations, poorly trained poll workers failed to scrupulously follow election procedures, potentially compromising confidence in the outcome. Overall, however, we witnessed a balloting process that allowed most voters to cast a secret ballot, unmolested by political or procedural problems. In addition to our efforts, hundreds of other international observers and, most important, tens of thousands of Pakistani observers were present to witness the integrity of these elections.

Ultimately, it is for the people of Pakistan and their political representatives to determine whether these elections are sufficiently credible to satisfy the aspirations of the nation. We believe that there are serious problems to be addressed in the electoral system in order to create a robust democratic order and the rule of law in Pakistan. However, given dire predictions of violence and manipulation in advance of the elections, we concur with most Pakistani political leaders and media outlets that the relatively peaceful process is a potentially dramatic step forward for democracy in Pakistan.

ABOUT THE DELEGATION

The purpose of this observation mission was to show support for the Pakistani electorate by providing an expanded international presence to observe and report on the conduct of the elections. The mission complemented ongoing efforts supported by the U.S. government and others to strengthen democratic electoral systems and processes in Pakistan to help build a more participatory, representative and accountable democracy. The delegation benefited from the work of the Free and Fair Election Network, a nonpartisan coalition of Pakistani civil society organizations established to observe the election process, educate voters, and advocate for electoral and democratic reform. We have coordinated our efforts with the European Union Election Observation Mission and other international observers.

The Democracy International delegation met with representatives of political parties and candidates, the Election Commission of Pakistan, leaders of nonpartisan domestic election monitoring organizations, political observers, journalists, and others.

The delegation convened in Islamabad the week before the election to meet with electoral authorities, representatives of Pakistani political parties and civil society, and other international and domestic election observers. Before Election Day, delegation members deployed to Karachi, Lahore, Multan and Peshawar in addition to Islamabad to meet with local political actors. On Election Day, February 18, delegates divided into teams of two and observed the opening and closing of polling stations, the conduct of balloting throughout Election Day, and the counting and reporting of votes. Collectively, Democracy International's observer teams visited more than 200 polling stations around the country. Delegates reconvened in Islamabad on February 19 to share their findings and prepare this preliminary statement.

The observer mission has conducted its activities in a nonpartisan, professional manner, in accordance with the law of Pakistan and the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.

Because the tabulation and verification of final results are ongoing, it is too early to conclusively evaluate the election process as a whole. Democracy International will monitor the processing of election complaints and challenges, the investigation of problems identified by election-day observers, the integrity of the consolidation of results, the extent of any post-election intimidation and retribution, and the process leading to the seating of the new parliament in accordance with the election results. We will organize a post-election mission and conduct post-election analysis that will offer lessons learned and recommendations. Democracy International will issue a comprehensive report on the entire election process in the coming weeks.

DEMOCRACY INTERNATIONAL

Democracy International (DI), based in Bethesda, Maryland, designs, evaluates, implements, and provides technical assistance for democracy and governance programs worldwide. Founded by leading experts in international democracy assistance, DI offers expertise in election processes and election monitoring, political party development, legislative strengthening, local government and decentralization, civil society development, and strategic communications programming. Over the past 20 years, DI and its principals have worked with civil society and election monitoring organizations, election commissions, government agencies and others in more than 50 countries and in every region of the world. DI principal Eric Bjornlund is author of Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy *(Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).*

Working with The Asia Foundation, Democracy International has provided technical assistance for election observation efforts in Pakistan over the last year. DI principal Glenn Cowan visited Pakistan five times in 2007. In addition, for three weeks in December 2007, Mr. Cowan led a DI team, which also included delegation member Brian Katulis and DI Program Officer Bill Gallery, that conducted interviews with political parties, civil society organizations, election authorities, and the international community in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi.

APPENDIX B: MAP OF ELECTION RESULTS



Source: Dawn News Network, Pakistan

APPENDIX C: SAMPLE ELECTION DAY MATERIALS

Sample Observer Deployment Map



Sample List of Candidates (Urdu)

Instructions for Voters (Urdu)

Sample Statement of the Count

FORM XIV
(See rule 24)
THE STATEMENT OF THE COUNT

Polling Station 67 IBD

*National Assembly
Provincial Assembly of the Punjab
Sindh
North-West Frontier Province
Baluchistan

Constituency NA 48

	Sl. No.	Name of the contesting candidate	Number of votes polled by each contesting candidate	Number of challenged votes polled by each contesting candidate	Total votes polled by each contesting candidate Cols. (3) + (4)	Remarks
	1	2	3	4	5	6
	1.	Arshad Bhatti	01			
	2.	Ashfaq Ahmed Cheema	NIL			
PML-(N)	3.	Anjum Aqeel Khan	70			
MQM	4.	Ch. Hamid Ali Ulla	01			
	5.	Khalid Solehri	NIL			
	6.	Khurshid Anwar	NIL			
PPP	7.	Dr. Israr Shah	182			
	8.	Dr. Rafiq Ahmed	03			
MMA	9.	Dr. Abid Rouf	06			
	10.	Dr. M. Shahid Aziz	NIL			

(i) Total number of votes polled by the contesting candidates (including challenged votes) 689

(ii) Total number of doubtful votes excluded from the count (including the doubtful challenged votes) 03

(iii) Aggregate of (i) and (ii) 692

Signature of the Presiding Officer

Name Masood Ahmed

Designation A/P

Thumb Impression of the Presiding Officer

Place ISLAMABAD.

Date 18 Feb, 2008.

*Strike off the words not applicable.

PCPPI 3604(07) I C P 20-11-2007 16,00000

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APPENDIX D: DELEGATE BIOS

INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION AND POST-ELECTION MISSION TO PAKISTAN

PARTICIPANTS

The Hon. Jim Moody, Ph.D. – Delegation Leader

Jim Moody served five terms as a Member of the U.S. Congress from Wisconsin from 1983 to 1993, where he served on the Ways and Means Committee and authored measures on taxes, health and international trade. He is currently a Senior Financial Advisor at a major brokerage firm.

From 1998 to 2000, Dr. Moody served as President and CEO of InterAction, an association of 165 American NGOs working overseas in economic development, environment protection, disaster relief and refugee assistance. From 1995 to 1998, he was Vice President and CFO of the International Fund for Agricultural Development, a UN agency based in Rome. Between 1993 and 1995, he taught at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and the Medical College of Wisconsin.

Earlier in his career, Dr. Moody served as Country Director for the Peace Corps in Pakistan and Bangladesh and as Field Representative for CARE in Yugoslavia and Iran. He also served as an economist for the federal government. He was an assistant professor of economics at the University of Wisconsin and served as a State Senator in the Wisconsin State Legislature. Dr. Moody received a B.A. from Haverford College, an M.P.A. from Harvard University, and a Ph.D from the University of California, Berkeley.

Glenn Cowan – DI Principal and Project Director

Glenn Cowan is a co-founder and principal of Democracy International. For nearly 25 years, he has advised on election monitoring, vote count verification, public opinion research, and political organizing in 35 countries around the world on behalf of USAID, the State Department, the United Nations, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, The Carter Center, The Asia Foundation, and the Organization of American States. He has observed elections and led or advised election observation missions in dozens of countries around the world, including Pakistan. In the late 1980s, Mr. Cowan invented the path-breaking parallel vote tabulation (PVT) election-monitoring methodology. He is a co-author of The Quick Count and Election Observation, an NDI manual on vote count verification. For the past year, working through The Asia Foundation, Mr. Cowan has provided technical assistance to the Free and Fair Election Network in Pakistan on its election monitoring methodology, including its ambitious and critically important plans for a national PVT.

Before founding DI, Mr. Cowan served as Vice President and Washington Director of Opinion Dynamics Corporation, a national survey research firm, and as Managing Director of Public Strategies, Inc., a public affairs and public relations firm. He served as Asia Regional Director at NDI from 1999 to 2000. Mr. Cowan managed a public affairs firm, the FMR Group (later Beckel Cowan, a Cassidy Company), from 1984 to 1998. He was a senior national staff member in the 1980 Carter and 1984 Mondale presidential campaigns and advised numerous U.S. Senate and House campaigns in the 1980s. He has served as an elected city commissioner in Lambertville, NJ, and as an elected member of the town council of Kensington, Maryland.

Mr. Cowan received a B.A. in political science from Rutgers College and did graduate work at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. He served with the U.S. Army as an infantry officer and an advisor to USAID (CORDS) in Vietnam in 1971-72.

Eric Bjornlund, J.D. – DI Principal, Senior Legal and Election Monitoring Advisor

Eric Bjornlund, a co-founder and principal of Democracy International, has designed and directed democracy and governance programs over the last two decades in 30 countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. A lawyer and development professional, Mr. Bjornlund has extensive experience in international and domestic election monitoring, election systems and administration, political party building, legislative development, constitutional and legal reform, and civic and voter education; he has managed or participated in more than 20 election observation missions, including in Pakistan. From 1989 to 2000, Mr. Bjornlund worked for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) in various senior positions in Washington and overseas, including Senior Associate and Asia Director and Country Director in Indonesia and Palestine. From 2000 to 2001, he was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. In 2004, he served as Field Office Director for The Carter Center in Indonesia.

Mr. Bjornlund is author of Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy (Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004) as well as book chapters, articles, essays and reports about transitional and postconflict elections, democratization, legal reform and international democracy promotion. He has testified on many occasions before the U.S. Congress and before the United Nations and has spoken at conferences and universities and appeared on television and radio throughout the world.

Earlier in his career, Mr. Bjornlund practiced corporate and international law at Ropes & Gray in Boston, Massachusetts, one of the largest law firms in the United States. He holds a Juris Doctor from Columbia University, a Master in Public Administration from John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and a Bachelor of Arts magna cum laude from Williams College.

David Aasen

David Aasen is an expert in managing development programs in postconflict and transitional countries. His 20-year career has included work on conflict mitigation, postconflict demobilization and reintegration, refugee repatriation, humanitarian assistance, media development, and civil society and legislative strengthening. He has managed technical assistance projects in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burundi, Kyrgyzstan and Bosnia for USAID, UNDP and the OSCE as well as UN missions in Mozambique and South Africa and various international NGOs in such countries as Albania, Afghanistan, Burundi, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mr. Aasen also has served as Washington representative for a legal reform organization and as a congressional aide. He has presented papers and lectures to the Middle East Studies Association, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and other academic forums.

Andrew Albertson

Andrew Albertson is executive director of the Project for Middle East Democracy. He served as a Congressional Fellow in the office of Congressman Steve Israel and directed the Membership program at the Truman National Security Project. Previously, he worked on Capitol Hill for Congresswoman Shelly Berkley and Congressman Tim Ryan. Mr. Albertson spent two years as a technical advisor on Guatemala working on municipal governance and decentralization. While in Guatemala, he organized an election observation mission of international volunteers to observe the 2003 presidential elections in 2003. Mr. Albertson received a B.A. form Taylor University and is currently a student in the Master of Science Foreign Service Program at Georgetown University.

Frederick Barton

Frederick (Rick) Barton is a senior adviser in the International Security Program and Co-Director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. A member of the CSIS Commission on Smart Power and a supporting expert to the Iraq Study Group and the Task Force on the United Nations, Mr. Barton is a regular writer, commentator and contributor to global public discussions. For the past five years, he was also a visiting lecturer at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, where he was the Frederick H. Schultz Professor of Economic Policy and lecturer on public and international affairs. His work is informed by 12 years of experience in nearly 30 global hot spots, including serving as UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva (1999–2001) and as the first director of the Office of Transition Initiatives at the U.S. Agency for International Development (1994–1999). A graduate of Harvard College (1971), Mr. Barton earned his M.B.A. from Boston University (1982), with an emphasis on public management, and received an honorary doctorate of humane letters from Wheaton College of Massachusetts (2001).

Blair Cowan

Blair Cowan is a Program Assistant at Democracy International. She graduated from the College of Charleston in May of 2006 with a B.A. in Political Science and a concentra-

tion in political theory. She is a member of the Pi Sigma Alpha National Political Science Honor Society. In the summer of 2005 Ms. Cowan worked at the consulting firm BearingPoint, where she assisted the international development team with projects in Eastern Europe and Iraq. In the summers of 2004 and 2003, she worked on the Asia Team at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI).

Xenia Dormandy

Xenia Dormandy is currently the Director of the Project on India and the Subcontinent at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. She has worked with the U.S. government as a foreign affairs specialist with the State Department and as the Director for South Asia on the National Security Council. Mr. Dormandy has previously worked in the nonprofit and private sector in the United States, United Kingdom and Israel. She received a Masters in Public Policy from the Kennedy School at Harvard University.

Travis Elliot

Travis Elliot is a research associate with the Hills Program on Governance at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) where he works on issues related to economic globalization, governance and rule of law development. Before joining CSIS in August 2006, he served as an intern with the United States Department of Justice, CSIS-Global Strategy Institute and CSIS-Europe Program. Mr. Elliott completed his B.A. in sociology from Washington College, and a MSc in policy studies from the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. While a graduate student, he was selected to serve as the first editor and project assistant for Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations (Routledge 2006).

Moana Erickson, J.D.

Moana Erickson is deputy director and fellow of the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she directs its overall operations and works toward building its substantive agenda in economic and international governance issues. Before assuming her current position, Ms. Erickson served as Executive Director of the CSIS Governance Program from 2005-2007. Before joining CSIS, she worked in law and public policy for the European Union, the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Department of Justice.

Ms. Erickson has authored articles on international policy issues for CSIS, Hong Kong Law Journal, Centre for Comparative and Public Law's Policy Paper Series, and World Bank's Development Outreach publication. She represents CSIS on international panels and conferences which analyze issues of international development and governance reform. She currently serves as an expert to the CSIS Smart Power Commission and sits on the board of the World Bank's Global Integrity Alliance.

Ms. Erickson is a graduate of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and holds a J.D. from the University of Chicago Law School, where she concentrated in

international law, policy and business. She was awarded a Henry Luce Foundation Fellowship to the University of Hong Kong's Centre for Comparative and Public Law.

C. Christine Fair

C. Christine Fair is a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation. She has also served as a political officer for the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul and as a senior research associate in USIP's Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. Her research focuses upon the security competition between India and Pakistan, Pakistan's internal security, the causes of terrorism in South Asia, and U.S. strategic relations with India and Pakistan. Ms Fair has authored and co-authored several books including The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan (USIP, 2008), Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance (USIP, 2006); The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (RAND, 2004); and Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan (RAND, 2004) and has written numerous peer-reviewed articles covering a range of security issues in Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. She is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London.

Paul Freeman

Paul Freeman is a consultant in Orange County, California who works on public policy, business development, and dispute resolution. His clients have included the University of California and the Dalai Lama of Tibet. He was previously mayor of Laguna Beach, California. Following his graduation from the University of Virginia, Mr. Freeman worked for U.S. Senator Gary Hart and he later worked on Senator Hart's successful New Hampshire primary campaign in 1984.

Bill Gallery

Bill Gallery is a Program Officer for Democracy International. He was a team member for DI's evaluation of U.S.-supported political party assistance in Pakistan in December 2007, and he participated on behalf of DI in the Carter Center's election-monitoring program in Venezuela in December 2006. Mr. Gallery also serves as an analyst for DI's survey research program in Indonesia and for a major vote count verification study DI is conducting for USAID, and he organized an international conference on vote count verification for Democracy International and The Carter Center in March 2007. Mr. Gallery co-authored a book chapter on "Election Systems and Political Parties in Post-Conflict and Fragile States," in Derick W. Brinkerhoff (ed.), Rebuilding Governance in Post-Conflict Societies and Fragile States: Emerging Perspectives, Actors, and Approaches (Routledge, 2007). He also provides logistical, administrative, and technical support for overseas programs and home office and business development operations, and conducts research on democracy and elections assistance.

Before joining DI in 2005, Mr. Gallery worked as a field organizer for the Florida Democratic Party in the 2004 presidential campaign. He graduated in 2004 from Harvard

College, with a degree in Environmental Science and Public Policy, where he was an active member of the International Relations Council. He is proficient in Spanish and has a working knowledge of Chinese (Mandarin).

Kristin M. Garcia

Kristin García is currently a community organizer with the Greater Boston Interfaith Organization. She has organized for expanded health care in Massachusetts, which has resulted in the expansion of coverage for 300,000 previously uninsured people in the state. Upon graduating from Harvard College in 2005 with a degree in Social Studies, she received the Benjamin A. Trustman fellowship to spend a year of purposeful travel in Mexico. Ms. Garcia worked at Sin Fronteras, a Mexican NGO, to develop a qualitative tool to measure immigrant assimilation into Mexican society. She also worked as a research assistant for Fundación Idea, researching educational access and quality across Mexican states. Ms. Garcia served as the Assistant Project Coordinator for The Carter Center's Study Mission during the 2006 Presidential Elections in Venezuela, where she coordinated all logistical and administrative aspects of a technical observation mission on electronic voting for that election.

Philip-Michael Gary

Philip-Michael Gary is a Senior Director with Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International's International Development Group and is currently Director of the Conflict Management, Mitigation and Reconstruction (CMMR) Program. Before RTI International, Mr. Gary served as a USAID Foreign Service Officer for more than20 years. He has worked in more than 60 countries and provided senior leadership to large U.S. Government multi-million dollar programs worldwide. He has conceptualized, designed, and managed banking and finance, urban design, development, education, governance, and economic growth programs across the Middle East and Asia. Mr. Gary has led conflict management and reconstruction efforts in various countries, including Rwanda and Kenya. As Chief of Staff for USAID in Afghanistan and for RTI's USAID-funded Local Governance Program (LGP) in Iraq, Mr. Gary successfully provided leadership and programmatic oversight (including Provincial reconstruction teams, PRTs), advised on highly sensitive issues, and effectively liaised among the U.S. ambassador, Chief of Military Operations, USAID's Mission Director, NATO and other international and local stakeholders. In addition, Mr. Gary chaired, managed, and initiated university programs, designed courses and lectured at the National Defense University and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Mr. Gary's areas of expertise include international development, civil-military relationship, international strategic policy formulation, and conflict management and local governance.

Mr. Gary undertook graduate studies in National Security Strategy at the National War College, in Political Theory at the University of Poznam, Poland, and in Architecture and Political Science at the University of Kansas. He has a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Cincinnati.

Andrew Green, Ph.D.

Andrew Green is an independent consultant in democracy and governance. As a Democracy Fellow in USAID's Office of Democracy & Governance, he designed and implemented empirical analysis of the impact of USAID democracy assistance for 1990-2004; trained USAID and other personnel on the Strategic Assessment Framework; provided expertise on research methodology and indicators; and organized expert workshops of donor agencies on democracy research. Dr. Green assessed the new NGO legislation in Russia utilizing a survey and focus groups; oversaw development of new indicators and tools for measuring the rule of law; and conducted empirical analysis of democracy assistance by all types of foreign assistance donors in post-communist Europe. His current projects include a multi-faceted process for assessing electoral administration as well as indicators of nonprofit legislation, trade union rights, and access to information. Dr. Green teaches a course on democracy promotion for Georgetown's M.A. in Democracy Studies program. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois.

Jean Jensen

Jean Jensen is a former chief election official and longtime Democratic Party activist in Virginia. In 2003, Governor Mark Warner appointed Ms. Jensen to the position of Secretary of the Virginia State Board of Elections, a post she held until June 2007. As Secretary, Jensen served as the chief election administration official for the State of Virginia and was responsible for all aspects of agency operations. From 2001 to 2003, she served as Deputy Secretary. Prior to these appointments, Ms. Jensen held numerous leadership positions including Executive Director of the Democratic Party of Virginia, President and Executive Director of a national women's political organization, and Legislative Aide to two members of the General Assembly. She also has worked on Congressional, House of Delegates and State Senate campaigns, and she frequently lectures on campaign management and fundraising at the University of Virginia's Sorensen Institute for Political Leadership. Ms. Jensen received a B.A. in Speech and Audiology from Miami University in Oxford, Ohio.

Kathleen Mary Johnson, J.D.

Kathleen Johnson is an extremely experienced international election supervisor, election observer and rule of law advisor. She is currently a partner at the law firm of Gespass & Johnson in Birmingham, Alabama. In 2006-07, Ms. Johnson worked for the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, formerly Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (CEELI), in Tajikistan. In 1999-2000, she served as Human Rights and Legal Advisor and Acting Chief of Staff for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Mission to Croatia. Before she was International Legal Advisor for the Humanitarian Law Documentation Project of the International Crisis Group in Albania and Kosovo, served as Senior Human Rights Officer for the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was a United Nations Volunteer in Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Yugoslavia. Ms. Johnson served as a long-term observer for the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) election obser-

vation missions to Moldova (2003), Ukraine (2002) and Estonia (1999) and as a short-term election observer in Moldova (2005) and Macedonia (2002). She was an election supervisor for the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sokolac (1998), Mostar (1998), Bugujno (1997) and Visegrad (1997).

Ms. Johnson holds an L.L.M., International Law (Human Rights) and a J.D. from the Washington College of Law at American University and a B.A. and M.P.A. from the School of Government and Public Administration at American University. She is a member of the Bar of the United States Supreme Court.

Edward P. Joseph, J.D.

Edward P. Joseph is Visiting Fellow and Professorial Lecturer in International Relations at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. From 2005 to 2006, he served for IFES as Chief Observer and Long-Term Observer for an election observation mission in Haiti and as Program Manager for Africa, including on-site presence for elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 2004, he served as Governance Coordinator for the National Democratic Institute in Washington and Baghdad, Iraq. Between 1999 and 2003, he directed the Macedonia Project at the International Crisis Group; worked as Deputy Municipal Administrator in Mitrovica for the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK); served as a Senior Manager for Catholic Relief Services, Stenkovec-I Camp for Kosovar Refugees; and advised the Presiding Arbitrator of Brcko, Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding implementation of the Dayton Agreement. As Director of the OSCE Brcko Center and the OSCE Regional Center in Mostar in 1997-98, he oversaw elections and led efforts to develop multiethnic government in divided Mostar and Brcko. Previously, he held other positions for the OSCE, UNHCR and UNPROFOR in Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, including serving as a U.S. Army officer on active duty in Sarajevo in 1996.

Mr. Joseph has a J.D. from the University of Virginia and a B.A. and M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He received a Pilot Rating as a U.S. Army Aviator (UH-1 Helicopters), and he speaks Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian, French, Italian and Spanish.

Barak Hoffman, Ph.D.

Barak Hoffman is the Director of the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University. Previously, he was a Post Doctoral Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. He has also worked for the Federal Reserve, the United States Agency for International Development, and the United States Department of the Treasury. Dr. Hoffman received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, San Diego, and his M.A. and B.A. in Economics from Michigan State University and Brandeis University.

David Hoffman, Ph.D.

David Hoffman is a civil society specialist with over 15 years' experience in strategizing, designing and implementing democracy promotion programs in developing countries. He currently directs global democracy and governance programs for Pact, Inc., an international civil society capacity-building NGO (www.pactworld.org). Previously, he served as the Director of the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance in Afghanistan and in the USAID Regional Mission to Central Asia. Dr. Hoffman has served on numerous election observation missions throughout South and Central Asia, the Caucasus and the former Soviet Union. He holds undergraduate degrees in International Relations and Physics from Stanford University, and a Masters and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley.

Susan Hyde, Ph.D.

Susan Hyde is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International and Area Studies at Yale University, and is also affiliated with the MacMillan Center and the Institution for Social and Policy Studies at Yale. She earned her Ph.D. from the University of California, San Diego in 2006. Her dissertation was awarded the Juan Linz Prize for the best dissertation in the comparative study of democracy in 2007 and was the runner up for the 2007 Helen Dwight Reid Award for the best dissertation in international relations, law and politics. Before joining the faculty at Yale, Dr. Hyde was a Research Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. Her research interests include international influences on domestic politics, elections in developing countries, international norm creation, and the use of natural and field experimental research methods. Her current research explores the effects of international democracy promotion efforts, with a particular focus on international election observation. Dr. Hyde has served as an international observer with The Carter Center and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe for elections in Albania, Indonesia, Nicaragua and Venezuela, and has worked for the Democracy Program at The Carter Center. She teaches courses on international organizations, democracy promotion, the global spread of elections, and the role of non-state actors in world politics.

Omar M. Kader, Ph.D.

Omar Kader is the Chairman and owner of Planning and Learning Technology, a consulting firm that specializes in training, evaluation, technical assistance, and the integration of appropriate technological tools, performance measures and information systems to improve management operations and learning. He served has as the Executive Director of the United Palestinian Appeal and Executive Director of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee. Dr. Kader a board member of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and the Middle East Policy Council. He has served as an official international election observer in Palestine, Yemen and Indonesia. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Southern California.

Brian Katulis

Brian Katulis is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. His work examines U.S. national security policy in Middle East with a focus on Iraq. He is also a Senior Advisor to the Center's Middle East Progress project. Mr. Katulis lived and worked in the Middle East for the National Democratic Institute and Freedom House, including projects in Egypt, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories. In addition to participating in the election observation mission, he participated in Democracy International's evaluation of political party assistance in Pakistan in December 2007 and in DI's postelection mission in April 2008.

From 2000 to 2003, Mr. Katulis worked as a senior associate at Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research. He has published articles in The Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, and The Christian Science Monitor, among other publications. Katulis received a graduate degree from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs.

Rachel Kleinfeld

Rachel Kleinfeld is the Executive Director of the Truman National Security Project, an organization dedicated to reviving progressive leadership in national security. She previously served as a Senior Consultant to Booz Allen Hamilton, where she worked on information-sharing across the military, intelligence and law enforcement communities, homeland security, and trade and security issues. She has also been a consultant to the Center for Security and International Studies on biosecurity and bioterrorism response issues.

Ms. Kleinfeld maintains a strong interest in efforts to strengthen weak states through the rule of law, human rights, security and development. She has consulted for numerous private, public, nonprofit and international organizations regarding rule of law promotion and implementation, including the World Bank, the U.S. Department of State and the Open Society Institute. She has worked in India, Israel and Eastern Europe for human rights, economic development and rule-of-law-building nonprofit organizations. Her commentary has appeared in radio, television, and in multiple books, journals, and newspapers, including The Washington Post, the LA Times, and the Wall Street Journal. A Rhodes Scholar and a Truman Scholar, Ms. Kleinfeld received her B.A. from Yale University

Scott Lansell

Through January of 2008, Mr. Lansell was the senior Director of Programs at IFES (formerly, the International Foundation for Election Systems). At IFES, Mr. Lansell developed, managed and participated in dozens of on–site technical assistance efforts, civic advocacy programs and civic education efforts. With IFES, he has traveled throughout the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean and Asia promoting democracy and governance initiatives.

Before working at IFES, Mr. Lansell served at USAID as an International Cooperation Specialist for the Baltic Republics and Bulgaria and served as USAID's Interim Representative in Lithuania and Albania. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Miami University in Ohio and a master's in business administration from George Mason University in Virginia.

Greg Minjack

Greg Minjack has honed a wide range of strategic and tactical skills during his 25-year career as a political campaign manager, grassroots organizer, federal lobbyist, congressional staffer, direct marketing executive, and international political consultant.

In 1992, drawing on his experience in U.S.-based legislative, campaign and party politics, Mr. Minjack launched the initial operations of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) in Russia by opening NDI's Moscow office and serving as its first residential program officer. While residing in Moscow, he traveled to more than 35 cities in the former Soviet Union conducting seminars, training sessions, and consultations on political party organization, campaigns and election strategy, message development, and tactical plan implementation. He was also a member of NDI's monitoring delegation to the 1992 election in the Republic of Georgia when Eduard Shevradnadze was first elected to national office.

Based on his work in Russia, Mr. Minjack has built an international political practice that has included campaign consulting for political parties and civic groups in Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, the Bosnian entity of Republika Srpska, Republic of Georgia, Indonesia, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine. He serves as a Washington representative for many of his international clients and works closely with democracy-focused nongovernmental organizations and "think tanks." Mr. Minjack currently serves on the board of directors of The Supporters of Civil Society in Russia (SCSR), the chairman of which is former Ambassador to Russia, Thomas Pickering.

Mr. Minjack worked for President Carter's 1980 re-election campaign and for Congressman Bob Carr, who served on the House Committee on Appropriations. His other U.S.-based political and campaign activities have included Mondale for President; Paul Kanjorski for Congress; Bob Carr for Congress; referenda in the states of Maine, Massachusetts, and Oregon; and Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's Incumbent Retention Director. He is a graduate of the College of William and Mary in Virginia.

Paula Newberg, Ph.D.

A longtime international consultant, Paula Newberg is a specialist in governance, development and democracy. For the past three decades, she has worked across the transition states of east and central Europe and south and central Asia, as well as in a host of countries caught in the web of complex political change and humanitarian crisis, including Afghanistan, Kosovo, Palestine, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Turkey and Yemen. Dr. Newberg was Peace Corps Director in the Kyrgyz Republic and Special Advisor to the United Na-

tions from 1996 to 2005 and to the United Nations Foundation from 2001 through 2003 and continues in similar capacities for many other multilateral and nongovernmental organizations. Dr. Newberg has served on more than 15 election and pre-election delegations, including missions to Afghanistan, Croatia, Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Dr. Newberg taught for many years in the graduate faculties at Columbia, Rutgers and Johns Hopkins universities and was a foundation executive through the 1980s. She was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in the 1990s and a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution from 2004 to 2005. A frequent radio and television commentator, lecturer and columnist, Dr. Newberg is also the author of books and monographs on the politics of assistance to Afghanistan (Politics at the Heart: The Architecture of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan), human rights and conflict in Kashmir (Double Betrayal: Human Rights and Insurgency in Kashmir), justice and politics in Pakistan (Judge the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan), and a wide range of publications on human rights and democracy. She is a graduate of Oberlin College and received her doctorate in politics from the University of Chicago.

Joshua Roberts

Joshua Roberts worked for The Carter Center from 2004 to 2007. From 2006 to 2007, he served in South Sudan as Technical Advisor for Guinea Worm eradication efforts. Mr. Roberts worked for The Carter Center and NDI in Ramallah and Jerusalem on Palestinian elections from 2004 to 2006. He joined the NDI short-term observation team for the January 2005 Palestinian Presidential elections and continued with The Carter Center as a Long-Term Observer and Field Office Coordinator through the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006, while working with NDI on multiple rounds of municipal elections across the West Bank and Gaza. Previously, he worked as a Research Assistant with The Carter Center's Conflict Resolution Program, where he researched Middle East and Central Asia issues and served as the assistant to the director of Educational Programs. Mr. Roberts has a B.A. in International Affairs from the University of Colorado and has also studied at Lebanese American University in Beirut, Lebanon, and at the American University in Cairo, where he was a Boren Scholar in the National Security Education Program. He speaks intermediate Spanish, French and Arabic.

Bruce Carlisle Robertson, Ph.D.

Bruce Carlisle Robertson is Chair of Advanced South Asia Area Studies at the Foreign Service Institute, Department of State. He is an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, and Professor of Interfaith Studies at the Ecumenical Institute of St. Mary's Seminary and University, a Pontifical Institute. Among his publications are Raja Rammohan Ray, The Father of Modern India (OUP, 1995) and The Essential Writings of Raja Rammohan Ray (OUP, 1999), as well as chapters in other books and numerous published articles on such topics as critical study of the thought and political reforms of Raja Rammohan Ray, the 19th century Indian reformer and his generation;

literary criticism; translations from modern and classical Indian languages; U.S. foreign policy; human rights; and religious freedom. In 1997 he lectured in the Asia Society Texas Centris Amoco Distinguished Lecture Series commemorating the 50th anniversary of Indian independence.

Born, raised and educated in India through high school, Mr. Robertson has been a columnist focusing on anecdotal cross-cultural human experience for The Hindu, one of India's leading international newspapers. He has written a film script for a forthcoming feature film. Mr. Robertson received a B.D. (M. Div.) from the Princeton Theological Seminary, did graduate research at Mansfield College, Oxford, and earned his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania.

Evan B. Smith

Evan B. Smith is a Program Assistant at Democracy International and a second-year Masters candidate in Democracy and Governance at Georgetown University and President of the Forum for the Study of Democracy and Autocracy, the student association for the D&G Masters program. His interests include elections and election administration, the international democracy promotion community, and issues of transitional justice and postconflict reconstruction. Prior to joining DI, Mr. Smith served as an election administrator at the local and state levels, where he worked on issues relating to voting technology, election law, pollworker training and recruitment, voter information management, and public relations. He recently worked as a graduate intern with the Pew Charitable Trusts' electionline.org project, a nonpartisan, non-advocacy website providing up-to-the-minute news and analysis on election administration and reform. Evan received his B.A. from the University of Virginia, where he studied Foreign Affairs and History, focusing on political transitions, elections and voting, and Japanese history.

J. Alexander Their, J.D.

J. Alexander Thier is Senior Rule of Law Adviser at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He is co-chair of the Afghanistan Working Group, director of the project on constitution making, peacebuilding, and national reconciliation, and expert group lead for the newly formed Genocide Prevention Task Force. Mr. Thier is also responsible for several rule of law programs in Afghanistan, including a project on establishing relations between Afghanistan's formal and informal justice systems, and is co-founder of the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law.

Before joining USIP, Mr. Thier was the director of the Project on Failed States at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. From 2002 to 2004, he was legal adviser to Afghanistan's Constitutional and Judicial Reform Commissions in Kabul, where he assisted in the development of a new constitution and judicial system. Mr. Thier has worked as a senior analyst for the International Crisis Group, as a legal and constitutional expert to the British Department for International Development, and as an adviser to the Constitutional Commissions of Iraq and Southern Sudan. He worked as a UN and nongovernmental organization official in Afghanistan and Paki-

stan from 1993 to 1996, where he was the officer-in-charge of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan in Kabul. He also served as coordination officer for the UN Iraq Program in New York.

Mr. Thier has written extensively on Afghanistan, Pakistan and U.S. policy in the region, appearing regularly as a commentator in international media including the BBC, CNN, and the New York Times, among others. He has a B.A. from Brown University, a master's in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and a J.D. from Stanford Law School.

Jacqueline L. Tuszynski

Jackie Tusznski has worked on a number of elections in postconflict and fragile political environments, from Afghanistan to Bosnia and Herzegovina to Iraq. She currently manages a private employment agency in Montana. As a member of the United States Air Force, while deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, Ms. Tuszynski worked with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). After separating from the Air Force in 1997, she went to work as a civilian for the OSCE in Bosnia and later in Kosovo, where she was responsible for recruiting thousands of registration and polling station supervisors. She worked on four elections in Bosnia and three in Kosovo.

After subsequently completing a degree in Political Science, Ms. Tuszynski went to Iraq in 2004 to assist the newly formed Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq with initial operations and logistics needs. In early 2005, she assisted with Out-of-Country Voting (OCV) for Iraq in the United Arab Emirates. She next went to Afghanistan as an Operations Project Manager for The Asia Foundation, where she worked closely with the Kroll Election Team to provide operations and logistics support to the United Nations. In December 2005, she coordinated U.S. observers of OCV for the Iraq election for the International Mission for Iraq Elections (IMIE).

Caroline Wadhams

Caroline Wadhams is a Senior Policy Analyst for National Security at the Center for American Progress, where she focuses on Afghanistan, Pakistan and U.S. national security. Before joining the Center, she served as a Legislative Assistant for Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) on foreign-policy issues. Ms. Wadhams also worked at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C., as the Assistant Director for the Meetings Program and in New York as a Research Associate on national security issues. Her overseas experience includes work with the International Rescue Committee in Sierra Leone and two years in Ecuador and Chile. She received a master's degree in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

Rodney L. Washington

Rodney Washington has 14 years of diversified experience with high-profile Washington D.C. and New York-based for-profit, public, and nonprofit organizations, which includes

demographic research, public opinion polling and Fortune 500 client relations. He spent three years managing and participating in international projects supporting emerging democracies in Angola, Bulgaria, Haiti, Mozambique, Namibia, Romania, South Africa and Zambia. These programs included parliamentary training, political party platform development and voter education.

Marvin G. Weinbaum, Ph.D.

Marvin G. Weinbaum is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is currently a scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. He served as analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1999 to 2003.

Professor Weinbaum earned his doctorate from Columbia University in 1965, and he joined the Illinois faculty in the same year. At Illinois, he served for fifteen years as the director of the Program in South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. Professor Weinbaum was awarded Fulbright Research Fellowships for Egypt in 1981–82 and Afghanistan in 1989–90, and was a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in 1996–97. Dr. Weinbaum has been the recipient of research awards from the Social Science Research Council, the Ford Foundation, the Hewlett Foundation, IREX, the American Political Science Association, and other granting agencies.

Since retiring at Illinois, Professor Weinbaum has held adjunct professorships at Georgetown and George Washington universities and lectures regularly at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute. At the State Department he was a recipient of its Superior Honors Award. Since leaving the Department, he has assumed numerous consultancies, both with government agencies and the private sector.

Professor Weinbaum's research, teaching and consultancies have focused on the issues of national security, state building, democratization and political economy. He is the author or editor of six books, including South Asia Approaches the Millennium: Reexamining National Security, co-edited with Chetan Kumar in 1995, and Afghanistan and Pakistan: Resistance and Reconstruction in 1994. In all, Professor Weinbaum has written more than 90 journal articles and book chapters, mostly about Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, but also on Egypt and Turkey. Among his recent publications are book chapters for edited volumes dealing with the U.S.-Pakistan partnership in counterterrorism, Pakistan's political culture, state building and security in Afghanistan, and the politics of human rights in Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

Joshua T. White

Joshua T. White is a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, and a Research Fellow with the Council on Faith & International Affairs. His research focuses on Islamic politics and political stability in Pakistan. Mr. White lived for nearly a year in Peshawar in 2005-06 and returned to Pakistan in 2007 as a Visiting Research Associate at the Lahore University of

Management Sciences, where he conducted fieldwork on Pakistan's Islamist parties. Mr. White graduated magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa from Williams College in Massachusetts with a double major in History and Mathematics.

Andrew Wilder, Ph.D.

Andrew Wilder is Research Director for Politics and Policy at the Feinstein Center at Tufts University, where he leads the Center's research on Politics and Policy in countries affected by conflict. His areas of interest include state-building, governance, and aid-effectiveness, with a specialization on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Before joining the Center, Dr. Wilder worked in Afghanistan, where he established and was the first Director of Afghanistan's first independent policy research institution, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). Between 1986 and 2001, Dr. Wilder worked for several different international NGOs managing humanitarian and development programs in Pakistan and Afghanistan, including for six years as the Director of the Pakistan/Afghanistan program of Save the Children (US). He is the author of The Pakistani Voter (Oxford University Press, 1999), a co-author of A Guide to Government in Afghanistan (AREU, 2004), and the author of several book chapters, journal articles and briefing papers. His recent research and publications have looked at police reform policies in Afghanistan, Afghan refugee education policy in Pakistan, the politics of civil service reform in Pakistan, electoral politics and policies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the politics of sub-national administration in Afghanistan. Dr. Wilder has a BSFS degree from Georgetown University and a MALD and Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

Miki Wilkins

Miki Wilkins is a Program Assistant at Democracy International and is completing an M.A. in Democracy and Governance at Georgetown University where she focuses on the politics, society, and culture of the Middle East and North Africa region. In particular, she is interested in the accommodation of religion within politics and the ways in which social networking at the grassroots level supports politics. During the summer of 2007, Ms. Wilkins lived and studied in Damascus, Syria, and in the fall of 2006, she worked at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs on programs aimed at improving the strength of political institutions in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria.

Ms. Wilkins is a 2001 graduate of Georgetown University where she majored in government with a concentration in political theory. She is fluent in Modern Greek, proficient in Arabic and Spanish, and has a reading knowledge of French. She is a native of Austin, Texas.

APPENDIX E: DEMOCRACY INTERNATIONAL

Democracy International, Inc. (www.democracyinternational.us) designs, evaluates, implements and provides technical assistance for democracy and governance programs worldwide. Founded in 2003 by leading experts in international democracy assistance, DI offers expertise in election processes and election monitoring, political party development, legislative strengthening, local government and decentralization, civil society development, voter and civic education, strategic communications, and rule of law programming. The firm has extensive experience with assessments, evaluations, project designs and survey (public opinion) research. Over the past 20 years, DI and its principals have worked with civil society and election monitoring organizations, election commissions, government agencies and others in more than 50 countries and in every region of the world. DI has worked extensively with USAID as well as with other donor agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international NGOs, and consulting firms.

The founding principals of Democracy International are among the world's leading experts on international and domestic election monitoring and elections in emerging democracies. DI's principals have helped launch and advised nonpartisan domestic election monitoring organizations around the world and have directed long-term monitoring programs and international observer delegations. In the late 1980s, Glenn Cowan invented the path-breaking, sample-based Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) election-monitoring methodology. Eric Bjornlund wrote a comprehensive study of election monitoring, *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building* Democracy (Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004). By designing and implementing specialized monitoring programs and innovative techniques focused on voter registration, vote counting, media access and fairness, campaign finance, election violence, and other election-related issues, DI's principals have significantly influenced the practice of international election observation.

Democracy International has broad experience working on democracy and governance programs with USAID. The firm holds two Indefinite Quantity Contracts (IQCs) from USAID as a prime contractor: **Elections and Political Processes** and **Democracy and Governance Analytical Services**. DI is the only holder of both of these two IQCs. DI has advised election management bodies on election management and administration, election laws and regulations, and election processes and systems in **Guyana**, **Haiti** and **Indonesia** (including at the local level and for separate, postconflict elections in **Aceh**).

The U.S. government has recognized DI's election-monitoring expertise. At the invitation of USAID's DG office, DI Principal Eric Bjornlund participated in a study and conference as an expert on **elections and security**. For the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Mr. Bjornlund served as an expert participant in a working group on **elections and political parties in stabilization and reconstruction operations**. The State Department hired DI to prepare an overview **es-**

say on "free and fair elections" for its worldwide Democracy Dialogues initiative as well as to participate in on-line forums on **election monitoring**. Mr. Bjornlund spoke on role of election commissions for an audience of election officials and civic leaders in **Cameroon** for the U.S. embassy there. DI has also advised The Carter Center on the Center's project to improve **international election monitoring**; DI has advised on election standards, prepared a major working paper on international monitoring methodology, and participated in working group meetings on developing a methodology for monitoring electronic voting.

Democracy International has extensive experience with assessments, evaluations and studies of democracy and governance. Since 2005, DI has conducted comprehensive democracy and governance assessments to help guide USAID strategic planning in **Albania**, **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, **Burundi**, **Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo**, **Indonesia** and **Zimbabwe**. In the past three years, DI has also conducted the following DG analytical services projects: **Albania** Rule of Law and Local Government Project Design, **Armenia** Legislative Program Evaluation, **Indonesia** Local Government Program Evaluation, **Indonesia** Public Opinion Surveys, **Jamaica** Democracy Project Evaluation, **Kosovo** Civil Society Evaluation, **Kosovo** Media Evaluation, **Moldova** Anticorruption Assessment, **Pakistan** Political Party Assistance Evaluation, **Romania** Civil Society Program Evaluation, **Serbia** Separation of Powers Program Design, **Timor-Leste** Quantitative Research Training, **Ukraine** Local Government Program Evaluation, **Ukraine** Threshold Country Plan/Civil Society Evaluation, and **West Bank and Gaza** Political Parties Assessment. DI also conducted a major study of **political party programs in Europe and Eurasia** that included extensive field work in **Georgia**, **Kyrgyzstan**, **Romania** and **Serbia**. DI is currently undertaking a comprehensive review and assessment of **vote count verification** techniques for transitional and postconflict elections, including Parallel Vote Tabulations (Quick Counts), exit polls, public opinion surveys and postelection statistical analyses.

DI Regional Experience

In **Pakistan**, beginning in mid-2007, DI advised FAFEN, a civil society domestic election monitoring coalition, on election monitoring methodologies, including a voter registration audit and a nationwide parallel vote tabulation for the February 2008 elections. DI also conducted an evaluation of political party assistance in Pakistan; DI Principal Glenn Cowan, Program Officer Bill Gallery, and Political Parties Expert Brian Katulis conducted interviews and gathered information in Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore in December 2007. Previously, Mr. Bjornlund served as legal advisor to the principal U.S. election monitoring effort in 1990, and he led a pre-election mission and oversaw election monitoring efforts for the elections in 1997. Mr. Cowan conducted a pre-election assessment, including consulting extensively with the election commission, in Pakistan in 1992. He provided short-term technical assistance to political parties on election monitoring in 1993.

DI and its principals have worked elsewhere in South Asia and other Muslim-majority countries. In 2005 DI worked on a program to engage political parties in the process of local governance reform in **Sri Lanka**. In **Bangladesh**, Mr. Bjornlund and Mr. Cowan worked for years, beginning in 1989-90, with domestic election monitoring groups and organized international election monitoring, legislative development and political party building programs. In **Nepal**, working for NDI in the late 1990s, they oversaw projects in support of domestic election monitoring and women's political empowerment. As a firm, DI has worked extensively and continues to work in **Indonesia**, the world's largest Muslim-majority country.

DEMOCRACY INTERNATIONAL

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