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Illicit Power Structures

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Illicit power structures (IPS) pose many challenges to global development and democratization efforts, yet development agendas do not traditionally focus assistance on combating them. Instead, most development assistance is predicated on the thesis that developmental and governance failures result from deficits in formal state institutions or the under-development of traditional civil society. Development programming therefore emphasizes institutional capacity building and civil society strengthening without adequate attention paid to illicit power structures and their activities.

In recent years, the challenges of failed or fragile states have brought increased attention to illicit power structures and advanced a whole-of-government approach to this work. In support of the President’s Freedom Agenda and the National Security Strategy, USAID has initiated efforts to work with the Departments of Defense (DOD), State, and Justice (DOJ) to counter the corrosive forces of illicit power structures. In 2007, USAID’s DCHA/DG Office and DOD’s US Army Corps of Engineers joined forces to sponsor the IPS project.

The IPS project has sought to illuminate the nature and operations of illicit power structures in order to design more effective responses to their subversive impacts. The project first developed a draft framework that analyzed IPS through four prisms—worldview, motivations, actions, and structures—and tested it with two field studies (Nepal and Uganda) and four desk studies (Afghanistan, Mindanao, FARC in Colombia, and paramilitaries in Colombia). Forty participants from the US and UK governments and international and non-government organizations reviewed and critiqued this material at a three day workshop at the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey. The workshop participants recommended splitting the actions prism into two prisms—resources and relationships—and began to devise responses to IPS that used the leverage provided by each of the five analytical prisms.

The project then sought to integrate the IPS perspective into the interagency conflict assessment framework (ICAF) as a way to make a direct linkage between the IPS framework and on-going programs. Using the Senegal sub-region as a test case, the project embedded two persons specializing in the IPS framework with a conflict assessment team. The IPS specialists contributed to the conflict assessment fieldwork, analysis, and report, and also produced a separate report analyzing the utility and compatibility of the IPS framework as a supplement to the ICAF. At the same time, the project explored methodological tools for analyzing data on illicit power structures, and incorporated systems mapping into the field test. The Senegal sub-region field test generated a number of insights into IPS methodology and data collection, which are discussed below.

**IPS METHODOLOGY**

*Complements the ICAF.* The field test showed that the IPS framework was a useful complement to the ICAF. The IPS framework mandates an examination of illicit power structures under the premise that they have an impact on democracy, development, and security. The ICAF, on the other hand, focuses on conflict and examines the mobilizing power of an actor around core grievances and sources of social and institutional resilience. While some illicit power structures, such as insurgent groups, mobilize constituencies around core grievances, it is not clear that others, such as criminal groups, are so engaged. Criminal groups may mobilize constituencies around a grievance of poor security, for example, but they may just as likely mobilize around opportunities for financial gain. However, even when their activities do not respond to a grievance, criminal groups may nonetheless fuel conflict by exacting collateral...
damage on social and institutional sources of resilience or aggravating core grievances. The ICAF would omit such groups from its analysis.

In addition to requiring an examination of these structures, the IPS framework expands on the actor analysis in the ICAF. The IPS framework provides five prisms, some explanatory text, and a list of questions to guide the researcher in the analysis. The IPS specialists who participated in the Senegal sub-region field test affirmed that the IPS questions did push them to dig deeper in their research on the MFDC rebels in the Casamance region.

Validates systems mapping. The field test also provided an opportunity to use systems mapping, which DCHA/CMM had piloted once before with the Cambodia conflict assessment. A systems mapping expert worked with the IPS and conflict assessment team for half a day before and a full day after the field work to help them take the disparate pieces of information gathered in the research and develop a conflict narrative. The work entailed developing a systems map that portrays dynamic relationships among patterns of behavior, deeper structures, events, and decisions. In the sessions after the field work, the team worked with the systems mapping expert to identify causal loops in the data and clarify their story. They found the exercise enlightening, but questioned whether they would be able to generate the same kind of map without expert assistance.

Shelves social network analysis. Work leading up to the field test involved an examination of social network analysis as an alternative method of analyzing qualitative data. Researchers have applied social network analysis to the study of insurgencies in order to examine social relationships among conflict participants. One example from the Naval Postgraduate School focused on 20 insurgency groups in Sudan in order to identify the basis of their operations. Through social network analysis, they concluded that insurgents conducted operations along tribal lines rather than based on their stated objectives or coalitions. Crime researchers have also applied social network analysis to wiretap data to uncover patterns in social relationships. Examples like these illustrate how the computational benefits of social network analysis can discern patterns in datasets with a considerable number of observations.

IPS analysts, however, are unlikely to generate datasets like these during their fieldwork. IPS assessments are designed to elicit information on a discrete number of non-state armed groups and criminal groups directly from interviews and secondary sources. Moreover, where an understanding of illicit networks is warranted, the IPS assessment could focus on each of the main actors in a network, and through the relationships prism, identify the key operational ties among them. In the assessment of the Senegal sub-region, for example, the analysis could examine the Latin American drug cartels, Nigerian criminal groups, corrupt government and military officials, and Lebanese business groups who provide front businesses and money laundering services, and generate a “map” of their operational ties.

Underscores importance of impact, relationships, and means. The Senegal sub-region field test showed more clearly the kind of information that USAID needs to inform its development programming. The primary concern for USAID is the impact of illicit power structures and networks on social and political institutions as well as the population at large. The assessment needs to elucidate the extent to which IPS activities are affecting daily security, preventing economic development, corrupting politicians, violating human rights, eroding government institutions, disturbing traditional social norms, disrupting democracy building, inciting youth violence, etc. This kind of information provides the basis for determining the immediacy of developing a programmatic response to the IPS. The importance of this information merits adding the impact of IPS as a sixth prism to the framework.

An understanding of the relationships connecting state and non-state actors is also important in this work. The subversive impact of illicit groups on institutions and stability is greater where they operate in cooperation with government officials. The relationships prism provides the lens for gathering this kind
of information, but its importance could merit a reordering of the prisms so that the relationships prism is presented second, after the impact prism. Because the way IPS operate in these relationships is key to understanding their ties with other actors, the IPS team recommends emphasizing their coercive, material, social, or ideological sources of power by relabeling the prism “Relationships and Means.”

**IPS DATA COLLECTION**

The Senegal sub-region field test also provided a forum to reach out to the intelligence community (IC) in the data collection effort. In briefings prior to the team’s departure, the transfer of clearances from one agency to another proved problematic, so the team received unclassified briefings. The team noted that consultants working on future conflict assessments might not have a secret clearance anyway. The intelligence analysts clarified that a secret clearance would provide more detail on sources and methods of data collection as well as specific names, and the team postulated that classified information might not be necessary for the purposes of a USAID conflict assessment. In the post-assessment briefing, the IC expressed eagerness to share more information with USAID for conflict assessments, and noted that they would need specific questions and a proposal in order to move forward in the lead up to future assessments. DCHA/DG and DCHA/CMM plan to follow up on that offer.

The field test also provided insights into the methodology of collecting information through interviews. The entrée gained by the team with the MFDC rebels arose from the previous work of one team member. Other interviews were made possible by the personal contacts and reputation of the research assistant. Given the team’s short time in the field, the prior work and relationships of team members greatly improve the team’s ability to collect valuable information through interviews, confirming the importance of this attribute in selecting team members. The sensitive nature of the discussions also underscored the value of holding discussions without translators.

The IPS team identified a number of informants who were able to provide information on illicit power structures. These included elders and community leaders, NGO staff and other civil society leaders, school principals, journalists, current and former government officials, military officials, law enforcement officers, members of rebel groups, villagers who had relatives in rebel groups or were victims of rebel actions, and officials from the US Drug Enforcement Agency and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. In gathering IPS information, they found that conflicting information and rumor appear to be the norm, so triangulating sources was a critical, if time-consuming, step.

The team found data collection on criminal groups much more challenging than on rebel groups. They were able to get information on seizures of trafficked goods, but only an impressionistic view of the internal operations of narco-traffickers in the course of a short conflict assessment. Researchers who focus on criminal groups show that interviews at the lower levels of drug cartels or inmates imprisoned for trafficking are possible, but it is clear that the conflict assessment team would only be able secure such interviews if team members had previous contacts with them. The IPS team concluded that in-depth information on criminal groups is better gathered through on-going intelligence gathering than through a USG interview-based field assessment. The field test showed the limitations of USAID intelligence and actions in regard to criminal groups and networks without significant interest of other USG agencies.

Nevertheless, the team’s difficulty in gathering information on narco-traffickers served as a useful reminder that in-depth knowledge in all prisms may not be required in the IPS assessment. As noted by participants in the IPS workshop at the Naval Postgraduate School, the information needed will vary according to the policy goal. For the Senegal sub-region conflict assessment, the primary information needed was in the relationships prism in order to understand the role of government officials in the drug
trade and the extent to which the illicit power networks are compromising institutions. Even without meeting those involved in trafficking, assessment teams might be able to ascertain the impact of the illicit trafficking on the state and society, and the main points of official involvement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The illicit power structure project has introduced a number of prisms for analyzing illicit actors, and suggested implications for programming based on these prisms. This level of analysis brings greater detail to actor analysis, and serves as a useful complement to the ICAF. As discussed by the larger IPS team in Washington after the field test, the IPS prisms could also help inform the actor analysis in the DG Strategic Assessment Framework (SAF), which is currently under revision. In addition, the IPS framework imposes a focus on illicit actors and their destabilizing impact, which the ICAF and SAF can at times underplay. For both reasons, the IPS project serves as a useful complement and corrective to the ICAF and the SAF.

At the conclusion of this project, the larger IPS team recommends the following:

- Add a sixth prism to the IPS framework that focuses on the impact of illicit power structures.
- Change the heading of the relationships prism to relationships and means.
- Incorporate the prisms into the actor analysis in the ICAF and SAF.
- Incorporate an explicit examination of illicit actors into the ICAF and SAF.
- Continue to explore systems mapping as a tool to prioritize information gathered in field assessments, but consider ways to facilitate training in the methodology.
- Consider the limitations of USAID programming around criminal groups and networks without significant interest of and collaboration with other USG agencies, notably State, DOJ, and DOD.

ATTACHMENTS

Attached to this report are documents generated by the IPS project. These are:

1. IPS Typology Pre-Workshop
2. IPS Monterey Workshop Report
3. Nepal IPS Field Study
4. Uganda IPS Field Study
5. Project Update February 2008
6. IPS Questions for Field Test
7. Systems Thinking Backgrounder
8. IPS Field Test Evaluation
9. Senegal IPS – MFDC
10. MFDC Relationships Map and Key
11. Senegal IPS - Narcotraffickers
12. Senegal ICAF Casamance
Contending with Illicit Power Structures
A Typology

The emergence and proliferation of illicit power structures in developing states poses many unforeseen challenges to global development and democratization efforts. Illicit power structures often referred to as non-state armed groups, strike at the heart of state building by challenging the very state itself, as well as the normative assumptions underlying the contemporary state system. Despite the magnitude of these challenges, there has been little systematic study of illicit power structures, and thus little examination of the tools available to counter their subversive impacts, particularly tools that might be developed within the foreign assistance portfolio. “No taxonomy exists that rigorously addresses these questions, even though armed groups are the subject of increasing attention worldwide.”\(^1\) The principle purpose of this paper is to develop a more precise definition of illicit power structures than currently exists, and an understanding of their types – i.e. a typology – that facilitates effective foreign assistance responses to their malign impact on democratic consolidation in failing and failed states.

Framing the Problem
Of the nearly $2 trillion of Official Development Assistance (ODA) given by the major industrialized states since 1950 the vast majority of those funds and associated efforts to improve the lot of developing country citizens have been directed at the formal governmental institutions of the developing states.\(^2\) Historically the World Bank and regional development banks, as well as many bi-lateral development agencies, being governmental or inter-governmental organizations themselves, have focused on national budget support, debt relief, or building capacity within state institutions. Over the past two decades, some donors having recognized the central role of democracy and good governance in successful development, have increased the emphasis on the rule of law, elections, legislatures, local governments, and local civil society organizations. These approaches were predicated on the thesis that developmental and governance failures result from deficits in the formal state institutions, or the under-development of traditional civil society.

This paper seeks to further a complementary thesis. While institutional and civil society deficits certainly contribute to state failure and the lack of development, there is an additional dimension populated by a rogue’s gallery of organizations – referred to in this paper as “illicit power structures.” These structures inhabit the dark space of the political economy and operate often under the analytic radar. They subvert and impede democratic consolidation and successful development and obstruct the achievement of viable peace in the wake of internal conflict. Private militias, warlords, rogue intelligence networks, and criminal enterprises enrich and sustain themselves through hidden economic transactions and disrupt and even subvert the legitimate processes of governance. This creates an environment in which peace settlements seldom prosper, and democracy and development cannot flourish. Like dark matter in astrophysics illicit power structures are detectable primarily through their impact on the visible processes and structures which they disrupt. This paper seeks to shed some light on illicit power structures by looking closely at their world view, motivations, methods and morphologies. By examining these closely it may be possible to get a better sense of their dispositions, propensities and vulnerabilities, and thence to identify more effective strategies and tactics to counter their subversive impacts.

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These subversive impacts derive from the utter disregard of many illicit power structures for the wider common interest or “public good”, as distinct from the narrow interests of their own identity group. These structures are predatory, and often operate at the expense of the national or common interest as they pursue parochial, non-state and non-public interests; i.e. the specific interests of individual clans, ethnic groups, criminal organizations, etc. Many illicit power structures exploit the seams of weak governance to capture wealth belonging to the common patrimony for private gain as well as enriching themselves through inherently illegal activities such as trafficking in contraband. Wealth belonging to the common patrimony might be in the form of minerals, other natural resources such as timber, or oil. Trafficking in contraband includes, in various locations, narcotics, humans and weapons. Additionally illicit power structures can capture monopoly control over otherwise legal economic activity through various corrupt means, such as timber and diamond exports.

**Working Definition**

The literature on illicit power structures – whether specifically on warlords, mafias, gangs or militias – unanimously laments the absence of analytic precision in the terminology of the subject matter. The imprecision of our current understanding may easily lead to false diagnoses and inappropriate prescriptions. For example Vinci argues that faulty analysis of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) by the Ugandan government resulted in counter-insurgency tactics that only alienated the local population – and essentially misunderstanding the nature of the LRA, which is/was not a popular insurgency, had little impact on its operations. Conversely, improving clarity in the definition and more precise understanding of the characteristics of illicit power structures will help field personnel to react to them more effectively.³

As a short definition the following is proposed; **illicit power structures are sub-national, extralegal entities that seek political power through the use of either actual or threatened coercion, illegal inducement, or charismatic, anti-system leadership.** Often supported by criminal economic activity, the leadership of these structures may be situated within or parallel to the state, or they may constitute an armed opposition to it. Identity groups that benefit from their patronage will typically regard them as legitimate. This definition intentionally excludes two types of structures the inclusion of which, while arguably justifiable, would significantly complicate the analysis, and which in any case are being adequately examined by a plethora of agencies and scholars; namely rogue states and transnational terrorist organizations. Effective responses to such structures will likely require all the elements of national power including substantial and high level diplomatic and military contributions, while this framework focuses on how foreign assistance may be useful in neutralizing illicit power structures.

**Toward a Provisional Typology**

According to Schulz, Farah and Lochard, “If the United States is to develop an effective policy and strategy to counter the threats posed by armed groups today and in the decades ahead, it must have a clear understanding of their characteristics.”⁴ To be effective a typology of illicit power structures must identify the aspects of an illicit power structure that most fully capture its essence while describing those characteristics that distinguish one from another. Numerous authors have proposed typologies of non-state armed groups. The common weakness of these proposed typologies is that they tend to stress only a single aspect or characteristic of the illicit power structure, and thus miss their multi-dimensionality. For example Stedman’s typology of spoilers while path-breaking and still relevant, distinguishes between organizations only on the basis of their stand with regard to a peace process; they are implacably opposed

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to any agreement (“absolute spoilers”), opportunistic negotiators (“greedy spoilers”), or reconcileable
provided their specific demands are met (“limited spoilers”). Shultz, Farah and Lochard propose a
taxonomy consisting of insurgents, terrorists, militias, and organized crime. Vinci criticizes the static
brittleness of such taxonomies, adding in warlords and guerillas, explaining that these labels fail to
adequately define the proliferating armed groups emerging since the end of the Cold War. He then
proceeds to create a typology based on the mobilizing functions of armed groups – which he claims is not
“another taxonomic system.” In fact it does indeed appear to be a taxonomic system, but based on the
mobilization of resources.

The typology proposed in this paper examines illicit power structures through four successive analytic
“prisms” attempting to reach a progressively more granular and multi-dimensional understanding. The
four prisms are 1) their world views, 2) motivations, 3) actions, and 4) structures.

World View

From a field practitioner’s vantage point, be the practitioner a state or international official or a third
country diplomat or aid official, a critical characteristic of an illicit power structure is its “world view.”
By that I mean the view its leaders have of the world and their desired configuration of the world, as well
as their organization’s place in that world. The archetypal contemporary determination with respect to
world view I believe is the acceptance of a rule-based system of democratic states as the fundamental
organizing principle for the global architecture. This reflects the current evolution of the Westphalian
system, governed as it is by the norms of international and domestic behavior embodied in the U.N.
Charter, the Geneva Conventions and the various conventions and agreements pertaining to state
behavior, prerogatives and responsibilities. Competing world views may be characterized by a desire for
the radical re-structuring of the international order, or sizable parts of the world, in a manner that de-
emphasizes the state in favor of other organizing structures such as communities of faith, class or ethnic
identity. Or they may accept the state system but cling to an earlier norm of sovereignty which permits
total latitude by each state with respect to internal governance. Some of these re-structurings may be
supra-national, while others may be sub-national, but they all contest the fundamental legitimacy of the
existing state system with its associated norms of both internal and external behavior, and thus pose a
profound challenge to the core beliefs around which the modern international system is built.

Ultimately what an illicit power structure can be reconciled with depends on the nature of the outcome it
seeks and its determination to achieve that outcome. If its desired outcome is fundamentally incompatible
with the underlying architecture of a rule-based system of democratic states, it would appear unlikely that
an accommodation satisfactory to both the U.S. and the illicit power structure is in the cards. For
example groups seeking to do away with the state system altogether, such as those promoting a global
proletarian revolution, or a global Islamic caliphate cannot be accommodated in a system based on the
fundamental values of the so-called modern or western system.

Pioneering work in analyzing the orientations of illicit power structures to their political environment was
done by Stephen John Stedman, in a paper published in 1997. In his seminal paper Stedman
distinguished three kinds of spoilers; absolute, limited, and “greedy” spoilers. He further distinguished

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pp. 5-53.
8 These proposed analytic “prisms” deconstruct the internal components of illicit power structures in a way similar
to how a glass prism disaggregates white light into its component wavelengths or colors.
9 Although Stedman wrote only about spoilers to peace processes, the same analysis can be applied to so-called
“governance spoilers.”
spoilers according to their degree of commitment to their objectives. Although this paper is not making that argument that illicit power structures and spoilers are coterminous (discussed below), Stedman’s conceptualization is insightful and suggests a similar conceptualization around the prism of world view.

Absolute spoiler behavior as Stedman describes is immutably and irrevocably opposed to the peace process, and absolute spoilers cannot be co-opted or persuaded to participate genuinely by any strategy or tactic. Opposition to both the just peace or to democratic consolidation is absolute in the sense that the “spoilers” are unwilling to engage in the kinds of compromise behaviors necessary to achieve these objectives. In some cases their actions may appear irrational in that no cost seems too high to achieve their own parochial objectives including the ultimate cost of life itself. Therefore cost-benefit calculations are of no use in tempting absolute spoilers to attenuate their demands and requirements and join the process constructively. This analysis can be extended to what I refer to here as absolutist illicit power structures. There is little chance that an organization dedicated to the destruction of the contemporary state system as a whole can be brought into a process of constructive negotiation within the context of that very system.

Limited spoiler behavior in Stedman’s analysis includes holding out for the purpose of leveraging participation for the achievement of specific, limited objectives. Because objectives are limited does not necessarily imply that they are insubstantial or easy to accomplish. Regional autonomy, representational quotas, a new constitution, criminal prosecution of current officials and historical reparations are examples of limited objectives that might be extremely difficult to negotiate. Yet if a compromise can be reached whereby a critical mass of the limited objectives of these spoilers can be achieved, the spoiler can be brought effectively into the peace process and into the democratic consolidation. What is of paramount importance to the limited spoiler is the achievement of the limited objective – not subversion of the process or utter defeat of the adversary let alone destruction of the system itself. Their interests are theoretically compatible with a political solution based on compromise, and with some of the interests of other parties to the just peace. RENAMO’s 1992 signing of a peace agreement with the Government of Mozambique is an example of the successful engagement of a limited spoiler that was prepared to join the peace process and the process of democratic consolidation in exchange for assurance of its security and the recognition of its legitimacy.

What Stedman refers to as “greedy spoilers” are basically positioning themselves to gain as much as possible through the negotiating process without threatening their core identity, security and interests. Greedy, or opportunistic spoilers will hold out until they are convinced that further obstruction of the peace process and democratic consolidation will result in an irreversible net loss to their interests. Unlike limited spoilers however – at least in theory – opportunistic spoilers will not be sated in their hunger for additional gain merely by the accomplishment of specific or limited objectives. They will continually weigh the balance of forces for peace and democracy seeking exploitable opportunities to win additional gains - if necessary at the expense of delay of or risk to the peace process and to democratic consolidation.

Stedman’s typology has some short-comings. For example, an organization may enter, withdraw, and re-enter a peace or democracy process in a given day. Moreover it is generally not crystal clear whether or not participation is genuine, or just a play for time. Although they may change in the process of negotiations, interests, and the demands of an organization, tend to remain more consistent. Can its interests be accommodated within a negotiation process leading to just peace and democratic consolidation? Or do their interests inherently exclude the interests of other parties with no hope of accommodation? Moreover the “greedy” or opportunistic spoiler category is inherently difficult to distinguish from a limited spoiler – all parties to negotiations are opportunistic in that they seek the best possible deal for themselves and will negotiate until the point that further demands or dilatory behavior might compromise the critical mass of gains they require.
The use of the term “spoiler” itself has been debated widely. Some argue that this term embeds a particular and uni-dimensional normative and subjective content into the discussion that is unsuitable for the cold and rational diplomacy and negotiation required to navigate complex peace and stabilization processes.10 For these reasons this paper does not accept “spoilers” and illicit power structures as conterminous. Some spoilers, though not all, are illicit power structures. All illicit power structures can be spoilers, though not all are.

A logic similar to Stedman’s makes sense in analyzing the disposition of an illicit power structure toward its geo-political context. Some illicit power structures can be coaxed to participate in a rule-based system of democratic states, while others cannot. Instead of absolute, greedy and limited spoilers, this framework distinguishes between those power structures whose world view and associated interests can be reconciled within the context of rule-based system of democratic states, and those whose interests challenge the basic premises of that system. They will be referred to as absolutist illicit power structures, and non-absolutist illicit power structures respectively.

Absolutist illicit power structures are dedicated and determined to undermine the state system. As such they are recalcitrant and opposed to any compromise with state or international authorities which sustain the state-centric order. This direct challenge to the prevailing international system is powerful and reminiscent of ages before the current state system took hold and came to dominate the global environment.

Motivation

Motivation constitutes the second “prism” for analyzing the distinctions among illicit power structures. There is a burgeoning literature on economic motivations for civil war, with some arguing that greed is the central motivator, while others argue that grievance or need is the source of conflict. There are also those who argue that conflict may be fueled by creed – i.e. beliefs or ideology.

A common assumption among political scientists and international relations scholars has been that conflict is caused by deprivation; deprivation either of a fair share of the public goods provided by state authorities, or of the recognition of certain elements of identify of sub-state groups. This assumption

10 In a series of workshops organized by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization of the U.S. State Department (S/CRS), January through May 2006, in Washington, D.C., General William Nash (Ret.) argued tirelessly against using the term on the basis that what might seem to be a spoiler today might turn into an ally tomorrow, and that a spoiler from one perspective might be a savior from another.
leads to the conclusion that material or “identity needs” are the root of conflict, and that if satisfied, the conflict might be resolved.

In studying the intra-state conflicts of the 1990s scholars and some practitioners began to examine the causes of intractable conflicts and the motives of belligerents. In a paper published in 1998, British political scientist David Keen argued persuasively that we cannot assume resolution of the conflict, peace, the cessation of hostilities, or by extrapolation democratic consolidation, are objectives shared by all or any of the belligerents in a conflict. Keen’s insight was that some belligerents benefit substantially from conflict and therefore protect their material interests by fueling and sustaining conflict. These are often referred to as “conflict entrepreneurs.” The motivation of so-called conflict entrepreneurs is the same as any other entrepreneur – i.e. profit. This reflects the “greed” motivation which has had some persuasive proponents. Paul Collier of the World Bank and Anke Hoeffler argue that conflict is fueled and sustained by greed and economic considerations, and conclude that opportunity (availability of finance, opportunity cost and risk) is the key explanatory factor in understanding conflict, and thus dismiss as less important motivations based on need.

The work of Collier and Hoeffler engendered a significant counter-literature arguing that identity politics remain a critical motivating factor in civil war, as is relative deprivation. Today the debate over the competing roles of “need,” “greed,” and “creed” in fueling internal conflict appears to have dissipated somewhat as further study and examination has produced more nuanced understanding. Another of Keen’s insights is that motivations are subject to change over the course of a conflict, some conflicts originating from need or grievance evolving into conflict over access to and profit from resources. Zartman argues that trying to attribute motivation exclusively to greed, creed or need is fruitless, while stating that material considerations play a role in all political conflict is banal. His position is that it is the inter-play between greed, creed and need that is of causal interest.

It is assumed here that most conflict is probably motivated by a combination of key factors involving the interplay of greed, need and creed. Nevertheless it still can be useful to attempt to identify the dominant factor at any given point in time in order to understand the dynamics behind an organization’s behavior, and especially to develop mitigating tactics.

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Methods

Whatever the source of the power of an illicit power structure, it can exert that power through violence – or coercion, through inducement or offering material reward, or through normative leadership, sometimes referred to as legitimacy. The sources of its power may determine the degree to which an illicit power structure can obstruct peace and democratic development as well as determining its modality. This is the proposed third analytic “prism” for creating the typology. How does it maintain membership and internal discipline? How does it engage with other political elements in the political process? How does it attempt to intervene in the peace process, or the democratization process? Through violence or the threat of violence? Through bribery or offering economic rewards? Through evangelism for a higher conceptual basis for society, or other-worldly cause?

The power of an illicit power structure – its ability to exert significant influence over the processes of peace and democratic consolidation – may derive from financial sources, weapons, propensity to engage in violent behavior, or the number and quality of fighters at its command. However the methods by which such assets may be applied to exercise power are limited. As early as 1968 the sociologist Amitai Etzioni identified three modalities of the exercise of power by an organization: “Power, analytically, can be exhaustively classified according to the means of control applied. If they are symbolic, such as gestures and signals, we refer to the power as normative. If they are material objects, or cash used to obtain them, we refer to the power as remunerative. If they are physical means which entail contact with the body of those subjected to power, such as inflicting pain, deformity, or death, we refer to coercive power.”15 Although they most frequently will be used in combination he argued that one modality will prevail for any given organization based on its function.

Etzioni distinguished between assets and power. Nonetheless, it appears that the type of assets available to an organization will obviously be related to the way in which it exercises power. For the most part illicit power structures derive their power from financial or paramilitary resources, so we should not be surprised that the most common modalities of exercising power are remunerative and coercive. However for certain specific populations a given illicit power structure may have legitimacy (due to clan, ideological or patronage relationships), and in such cases power may be of a normative nature.

Though not proposed as a fundamental prism of analysis for this typology it is nonetheless worth discussing, if only very briefly, the range of sources of power. Financial revenues are best reported and are discussed in more detail below. There are illicit power structures that do not have or need access to significant financial resources as their behavior and activities are non-capital intensive. For example the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) which has terrorized the rural areas and villages of northern Uganda since the late 1980s has done so with light weapons and low-cost terrorist tactics. Illicit power structures may depend on stolen weapons, or inflict violence and terror with primitive weapons or they may exert influence through possession of especially lethal or feared weapons. They may influence processes of peace and democratic consolidation through the mere threat of violence by their minions.

It should be clear that to the extent that an illicit power structure utilizes coercion to accomplish its political objectives, it challenges the state’s monopoly on the use of force. By challenging the state monopoly on the use of force, an illicit power structure also strikes at the state’s unique capacity to provide the social good of security. Through exercising the use of force illicit power structures create a parallel system of social goods, and social control upon which state legitimacy is based, and thus violate the norm of state legitimacy. According to that norm it is the state alone that can legitimately discipline individuals, and that must protect individuals from coercion or violence applied by other agencies.

**Morphology**

Organizations can also be distinguished by the manner in which they are structured. This constitutes a fourth proposed analytic “prism” for developing the typology of illicit power structures. Hierarchical organizations have a clear and generally linear chain of command, with well-defined superior/subordinate relationships and a series of levels of seniority with declining authority from the top down. Other organizations are radial based on a central command authority with linear relationships with a variety of satellite entities, which do not typically have relationships with each other. Some organizations evolve or devolve as leaderless networks the cells or elements of which operate with a very high degree of autonomy. Each of these has different propensities, operational methods and – perhaps most important – vulnerabilities. Does this small list exhaust the possible generic morphologies of illicit power structures?

The study of organizational structure has recently been applied to the examination of terrorist organizations, and this research sheds important light on the inner workings of illicit power structures.
The importance of their organizational architecture will become evident as strategies for mitigating their influence are explored.

Dishman provides several basic topographies of terrorist organizations that can be usefully applied to illicit power structures, distinguishing between hierarchical, networked and leaderless organizations.\textsuperscript{16}

Hierarchical organizations operate on the basis of top-down leadership and decision-making with authority ultimately devolving from the top of the leadership pyramid. “The hierarchical organization is structured to facilitate top-to-bottom guidance.” The chain of command is generally clear and streamlined. Such organizations often have a fairly well developed division of labor, and are subject to the bureaucratic phenomenon known as “stove-piping.” Only the highest ranks are fully appraised of the extent of the activities, assets, interests, etc. of the organization. At lower levels, personnel are often provided information only on a “need to know” basis. Yet most elements within the organization are aware of the structure and are familiar with both supervisory and subordinate elements, as well as lateral elements.

A networked or decentralized cell organization is loosely structured and can have multiple leaders, “whose functions and responsibilities change depending on circumstances.” Decision making is usually de-centralized encouraging autonomy and local initiative and flexibility. The durability of such a structure however is dependent on the degree to which the cells in the network share goals and objectives and a similar level of commitment.\textsuperscript{17} Arquilla and Ronfeldt describe several variations of networked organizations, including chain, hub, and all-channel networks.

The chain network, as seen in figure 6, connects multiple nodes in a linear pattern which permits communication or inter-action only in a specified manner. Contact between nodes at either end must pass through intermediaries. In a star – or hub or radial – network, cells are each tied by a radial line to the leader, or “hub”, but have little or no connectivity amongst them or familiarity with or awareness of each


\textsuperscript{17} John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, , \textit{The Advent of Netwar (Revisited), w Remittances Sustain Livelihoods in War, Crises, and Transitions to Peace}, 2006, New York.
other. Only the “leader”, or the hub element, is aware of the structure. The radial elements are more or less co-equal in status, but each must go through the hub to communicate with any other. In the all-channel network all nodes are connected to all other nodes. The organizational structure is generally flat, and effectiveness depends on communication-intensive behavior. The all-channel network can be mobilized very rapidly as direction and/or directives are disseminated nearly simultaneously to all cells.

The so-called “leaderless nexus” almost defies the common understanding of structure, as its internal relationships are very vague and often exceedingly fluid. “In a leaderless organization there are no leaders – only perpetrators – involved in an attack.” Such an organization lacks a clear chain of command or fixed hierarchy, and its various cells are self-sufficient and autonomous. They typically operate ignorant of each others’ identities, but with resolute commitment to a common set of beliefs. Current anecdotal observation suggests that such organizations are becoming more common as modern information and communication technology and capability spread widely throughout the world, and the cost barriers to the use of this technology become easily surmountable. For purposes of the proposed model these “leaderless” organizations will be considered networked structures, though the emphasis might be understood as on the “network” rather than on the “structure.”

In addition there are other elements to be considered in describing the morphology of an organization, for example its structural connectivity to external and other internal actors. How does it finance its illicit activity? Is it fueled by remittances from a diaspora? From illegal natural resource exploitation, trafficking in contraband or black-market trading in ordinary commercial items? Is its personnel tribe or clan-based, class-based, geographically localized or dispersed? How is it related to traditional forms of social organization? What kinds of armaments does the illicit power structure have, and from where and how are they obtained? These questions must be examined to fully articulate the morphology.

Conclusion

We are still in the early stages of understanding the phenomenon of illicit power structures. Previous efforts to develop typologies and taxonomies must be considered preliminary, as is the typology proposed here. In the social sciences we tend to fret over the difficulty of accurately describing our subject matter, but this problem is not limited to the social sciences. This was true for centuries in the so-called hard sciences and remains the case in many sub-disciplines of physics, astronomy and biology among others. The four successive analytic steps suggested in the preceding sections lead to a typology consisting of 36 variants or types of illicit power structures. This typology acknowledges the unlikelihood or even impossibility of pure types. No illicit power structure will fit perfectly into any specific category. Each illicit power structure is likely to combine multiple characteristics at each stage of analysis, and change characteristics over time as well.

18 Chris Dishman, Ibid.
Such a typology is most useful if it is used to create a narrative that leads to actionable conclusions and analytically supports specific strategic courses of action and tactics to neutralize the subversive impact of illicit power structures on democracy building efforts and development more generally. The application of the proposed typology maps out an asymptotic approach whereby the analysis of each successive prism brings us ever closer to an accurate description and understanding of the specific illicit power structure, even if we may never reach a perfectly accurate understanding. It is hoped that by examining illicit power structures through this set of prisms field operators will have a better understanding of their propensities, vulnerabilities and capacities, leading to more effective strategies for dealing with them. More granular analysis can certainly elicit additional variants, therefore these categories cannot be considered to be comprehensive.

The effort is meant to compromise comprehensiveness for manageability and yet cover a significant majority of the illicit power structures encountered in the processes of establishing just peace and democratic consolidation.

The 36 variants of illicit power structures derived from this process are theoretical – i.e. according to the model they are logical possibilities. However they must be tested in the field to determine if they indeed describe satisfactorily existing illicit power structures. Some variants may not exist in real life – for example it is difficult to imagine an absolutist illicit power structure whose behavior is intransigent, motivated by greed, whose modus operandi is one of normative leadership structured as a leaderless network. Such an organization doesn’t appear at first glance to make sense – if motivated by greed, compromise with a dose of material reward (opportunism) rather than intransigence would seem more logical. The test will be in the field.

Field testing will also help identify effective strategies for countering the influence, or mitigating the negative impact of illicit power structures on those processes by providing insight into their strengths and vulnerabilities. This is of course the purpose of the typology – to assist in developing more effective responses to the challenges posed by illicit power structures to the establishment of peace and democracy.
The Case of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)  

Nepal is a relatively small, extremely poor state, with a youthful population of approximately 25 million, and a very modest natural economic endowment. The sources of conflict in Nepal are multiple and profound, including an economic resource base that in its current state can support the existing population only at destitute poverty levels; intra-state regional rivalries pitting the north against the south, and both against the center of the country; and a caste system that has historically disadvantaged large segments of the population. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), waged an insurgency beginning in 1996, that by the time of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in November, 2006, had resulted in over 13,000 deaths. Moreover the insurgency hobbled the country by making large swathes of it – as much as 75% of it according to some accounts – effectively ungovernable by national authorities.

Although the CPN(M) has always limited its activities to Nepal, it has participated since its origins in an international movement of revolutionary organizations. It is a member of the so-called RIM (Revolutionary International Movement) which “seeks to unite the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist parties of the world into a single political tendency,” and “believes that the Maoist strategy known as People’s war is the most effective strategy for Marxist revolution in the developing world.” This ideology clearly fits within the parameters of the “absolutist illicit power structures.” Over time however it appears that the ideology driving the CPN(M) has evolved from one fixed on a global Maoist revolution to a more “nationalist” disposition, one that is more conciliatory with the existing international state system.

CPN(M) engaged the so-called Seven Party Alliance (SPA) of traditional Nepali political parties in a negotiation process in April 2006, based on an agreement to marginalize the Nepali monarchy and conduct a Constituent Assembly or national constitutional congress. Arguably this engagement signifies an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of a negotiated compromise outcome within the context of a rule-based, state dominated system.

Some argue that CPN(M)’s agreement to enter negotiations leading to the end of hostilities resulted from a cold calculation that the military struggle had stalled and could not alone yield the outcome CPN(M) wants. They argue forcefully that the shift from armed struggle to negotiation is merely tactical, disguising the ongoing objective of absolute and un-shared Maoist rule of Nepal. Whether or not this is true the CPN(M) has accepted in practice the constraints of a negotiated process situated in a system of states. There is therefore a basis to believe the CPN(M) might be engaged in such a way that it either comes to accept in fact and principle the concept of a rule-based system of democratic states, or finds itself tangled in an institutional web of commitments and relationships that result in behavior consistent with such beliefs.

This has implications for field planners. Importantly the shift in CPN(M) behavior, whether tactical or strategic, marks an improvement in the situation – and the apparently effective Government of Nepal strategy of applying the Nepal Army in a counter-insurgency mode for the past five years should be acknowledged. As successful as the CPN(M) may have been in depriving the Government of Nepal of true sovereignty in much of the country, it was never itself able to hold any significant territory, and the costs of the CPN(M) military approach ultimately became unsustainable. However, now that the

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19 This brief review of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), using the Illicit Power Structures analytic framework, is based on an in-country assessment in Spring, 2007, by the author and Dr. Thomas Marks, Chair, Department of Irregular Warfare of the National Defense University. The analysis presented here is that of the author.


22 CPN(M) described as "nationalist" in its outlook by Dr. Jeffrey Key, at a briefing on 7/13/07 in Washington, D.C.
CPN(M) has essentially abandoned the outright insurgency, the military counter-insurgency approach may well have accomplished all that it can accomplish. An evolution toward further inducement and co-optation should provide positive reinforcement to the CPN(M) leadership for embracing non-violent tactics and legitimate political competition.

What motivates the cadres of the CPN(M)? The question is simpler than the answer. The top leadership of the CPN(M), in particular Prachanda and Battarai, are educated Brahmins, who allegedly feel a strong commitment to the ideological principles of Maoism (whatever this may mean), and therefore may be understood to be driven by their beliefs, or their creed. The CPN(M) foot soldiers on the other hand include a cross section of the deprived within Nepal, including lower castes, ethnic and linguistic minorities, women, uneducated, etc. In a country as poor as Nepal it requires no stretch of the imagination to recognize the widespread experience of grievance and realize the driving power of need. The gap between the haves and have-nots in Nepal is the biggest in Asia, and has been growing faster during the 1990s and 2000s than in any other country in the region. Thus while there is a commitment to a Maoist ideological creed, the conclusion that the CPN(M) insurgency was need or grievance driven is credible. While the insurgency in the Nepali countryside has been brutal and economically devastating, there is little indication that CPN(M) leaders or rank and file members systematically used the insurgency for venal purposes such as personal enrichment, casting doubt on any possible allegations of a widespread greed motivation.

If this thumbnail analysis is correct, and the CPN(M) is driven primarily by need (or grievance), the obvious response is to examine and to the extent possible address the need (or grievance). Political development to create a more equitable dispensation and more participatory and inclusive governance, accompanied by policies to create economic opportunity will both ameliorate the sharpest needs while creating political space to air grievances and modify the social contract. If such policies can be effectively introduced in Nepal they should have potential to lessen the attractiveness of the CPN(M) revolutionary message, resulting in attrition among CPN(M)’s ranks, or adaptation of CPN(M)’s message to reflect a less adversarial disposition.

Throughout the decade of insurgency the CPN(M) effectively brutalized the Nepali countryside, eventually driving the state authorities out of a large part of the country. Their campaign embraced multiple lines of activity, following traditional Maoist doctrine, including the so-called “mass line,” “united front,” “political warfare,” “international action,” and military or armed violence. During the final several years there is no doubt that the predominant line of action was the armed struggle, and CPN(M) utilized both physical coercion and menace (the threat of coercion) as political tools to expand their influence. Since the ceasefire and Comprehensive Peace Agreement of November, 2006, the level of armed violence has significantly decreased – however, armed violence, and particularly the threat of armed violence have not been abandoned by CPN(M) and its affiliates altogether, and this continues to be salient.

The CPN(M) has indicated its intent to compete for positions in the Constituent Assembly election (currently planned for November 2007). Critical questions are whether or not CPN(M) will permit unimpeded campaigning by competitors in areas under its influence, and whether or not CPN(M) will reign in their affiliated Young Communists League (YCL) and other front groups, and stop menacing the local populations with intimidation and the threat of violence. The ongoing use of intimidation leads to the conclusion that coercion remains an important if no longer the predominant method of exerting its

24 Although nominally independent there is little doubt that the YCL responds to the command of the CPN(M) leadership.
influence. However this development is not irreversible and efforts to discourage and raise the costs for
violent and coercive behavior should be sustained. Such efforts might work toward the conversion of the
mind-set of the CPN(M) cadres and leadership, or toward creation of web of institutional and personal
commitments through public statements, legal agreements, etc., that would be difficult or embarrassing to
withdraw from.

Like Maoist parties generally the CPN(M) is a hierarchical organization. Led by its charismatic
Chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal – a.k.a. Comrade Prachanda – “the CPN-M consists of the standing
committee at the top, followed by the politburo, central committee, regional bureaus, sub-regional
bureaus, district committees, area committees, and cell committees. The Politburo issues directives with
the assistance of an approximately 25-member central committee. The main armed component reportedly
consists of six guerrilla battalions, which launches military action in response to instructions relayed
through their individual chief commissars (one per battalion), who are central committee members. The
politburo and standing committee reportedly formulate most of the political and strategic policies. The
standing committee, with approximately ten members, is the most powerfully body in the CPN-M. There
are five regional bureaus: eastern, central, Kathmandu valley, western and international department.”

With the engagement of the CPN(M) leadership in the peace process there has allegedly been a loosening
of the organizational hierarchy. Field cadres are said to be exercising a greater degree of autonomy.
Although this may indeed be the case, most interlocutors agree that CPN(M) remains a “top-down”
hierarchical organization in which major decisions, including those related to the peace process,
organizational matters, overall direction, significant field activities, etc. are the preserve of the senior
leaders.

It is possible that the degree of direct control which those leaders currently have over the day-to-day
behavior of the cadres has diminished. For example it is not clear that the CPN(M) leadership exerted
operational control over Maoist cadres during the March Terai incidents which resulted in substantial
casualties. Such decreased operational control could plausibly be interpreted as a voluntary move on
the part of the leadership for the purpose of claiming plausible denial in cases where CPN(M) cadres
engage in violent behavior, however we cannot know that with certainty. What we do know is that there
is an appearance of significant tension since the initiation of the peace process, with certain CPN(M)
leaders and members dissenting from recent directions and developments. There is also growing
evidence of discord and even “revolt” within the Maoist rank and file, with local violent behavior
contradicting and embarrassing the national Maoist leadership.

The gradual loosening of the hierarchical rigidity of the CPN(M), if it is real, has practical implications.
It should no longer be assumed that any message sent out from the CPN(M) Politburo or even the
Standing Committee will be rapidly transmitted to or rigorously adhered to by the field cadres. They can
no longer be assumed to be under tight control. A strategy aimed at exploiting the widening gaps
between the CPN(M) leadership and the cadres might reinforce organizational attrition and dilute party
discipline and reduce party membership.

25 South Asia Terrorism Portal (07/27/07); http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/satp/index.html
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What can we conclude from this abbreviated review of the current situation of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)? Although originally possessed of a Maoist internationalist revolutionary world view, its recent behavior indicates a possible evolution toward a state-based world view that is not fundamentally in conflict with the prevailing world view of the other political forces within Nepal, the region or the United States. It is motivated primarily by grievance borne of a grossly inequitable national distribution of political and economic power, grievances that have been addressed successfully in other countries and regions. While not eschewing violent and coercive behavior, the CPN(M) can be enticed into participating in a non-violent political process that may change the cost/benefit calculus for violence, and convert those who are not die-hard revolutionaries into more constructive participation in the political process. The apparent loosening of party discipline and top-down control presents opportunities for positive direct interactions with CPN(M) cadres that were foreclosed during the “Peoples’ War” stage.

Without getting into the granularity necessary for actual project planning, this abbreviated analysis of the CPN(M) suggests how a full blown review of the CPN(M) would progress, and how it could be used to design an effective strategy. The indications are that a strategy emphasizing political engagement of the CPN(M) leadership, and addressing the most pressing needs of the Maoist cadres through direct interaction could simultaneously bind the leadership to the democratic political process while detaching them from the cadre base, thus limiting their ability to do systematic mischief.

Is this a significant departure from the current de facto strategy being pursued by the major international powers and donors? While considerable effort has been put into inducing the CPN(M) leadership into the competitive and non-violent political process, less has been done to address the broad socio-political grievances that sustained the insurgency, or to accelerate the weakening of the Maoist party hierarchy. The Constituent Assembly process that is underway could change this dramatically by providing Nepal’s various ethnic, regional and other interest groups more direct and effective means of expressing their political preferences, thus diminishing the attractiveness of confrontational politics associated with the CPN(M).
### “Periodic” Table of Illicit Power Structures

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THE CENTER FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION STUDIES

NOVEMBER 4 - 7, 2007

CLEANING HOUSE:
CONFRONTING ILLICIT POWER STRUCTURES IN THE POST-CONFLICT WORLD

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, MONTEREY, CA
Groups that rely on the illicit use of violence and/or illicit sources of wealth to pursue their goals plague many countries. However, they tend to play a disproportionate role in post-conflict settings where wartime networks or networks forged during the transition from war to peace undermine the institution-building efforts necessary for democratic stability and development. To improve actors’ understanding of this problem and to begin devising remedies, the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) held a workshop entitled “Cleaning House: Confronting Illicit Power Structures in Post-Conflict Settings” in Monterey, CA, from November 4-7, 2007. More than 40 panelists and participants from nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, government civilian agencies, the armed forces, thinktanks, and academic institutions met to review a proposed framework for analyzing the propensities, capacities, and vulnerabilities of illicit power structures and to assess ways in which the framework might guide practitioner responses to this global challenge. The workshop, which built on a number of conferences on the illicit power structure framework sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development, is part of a CSRS series of events addressing the negative impact of corruption and institution building in post-conflict settings.

This report represents the author’s interpretations of the workshop’s primary findings. Participants did not formally endorse the list of findings or recommendations identified in the report.
Executive Summary

Although illicit power structures threaten many fragile states, stabilization and reconstruction actors have yet to take a coordinated, strategic approach towards combating them. Workshop participants sought to refine analytical frameworks to deepen actors’ understanding of these groups and to create new strategies for minimizing their negative effects on the democratic state-building process.

In recent years, the activities of illicit power structures (IPS) have reached stability-threatening proportions in a large number of war-torn states, forcing the issue onto the post-conflict agenda in cases as diverse as Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Although IPS plague many countries, they tend to play a disproportionate role in post-conflict settings where wartime networks or networks forged during the transition from war to peace take advantage of illicit sources of wealth, including the diversion of state resources, and/or an illicit reliance on violence to pursue their goals. Whether located inside or outside of fragile states, these actors undermine states’ ability to provide security for their citizens, the rule of law, and the corruption-free institutions needed for effective democratic governance.

To date, neither development planners, anti-corruption specialists, nor international actors involved in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) work have taken a coordinated, strategic approach towards combating IPS and their negative effects on institution building in post-conflict settings. Most state-building programs focus predictably on institutional capacity building, while anti-corruption programs focus on increasing the transparency of a country’s institutions or strengthening the ability of groups in civil society to monitor corruption. Less attention is paid to the interests and power of the “dark networks” of key players inside and outside of the government, corrupting and subverting the processes of reconstruction, stabilization, and state building. Conversely, while conflict analysts have long been concerned with power structures that may subvert the peace process (i.e., spoilers), they tend to discount the illicit economic activities in which these groups are engaged and the implications of co-opting such groups for future governability and development.

In response, both the S&R and development communities have begun to pay increasing attention to the nexus of IPS with corruption, conflict, and peace-building. As a contribution to this ongoing effort, the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at the Naval Postgraduate School hosted a workshop entitled “Cleaning House: Confronting Illicit Power Structures in Post-Conflict Settings” in Monterey, CA,
Executive Summary

Workshop participants used the USAID framework, case studies, and field experiences to shape discussions, evaluate the effectiveness of actors’ responses to IPS, and create cross-community networks they could leverage in the field.

from November 4-7, 2007. CSRS events convene members of the four primary communities involved in S&R work around the globe: intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), government civilian agencies, and the armed forces to explore timely, relevant issues; brainstorm new strategies; learn best practices; and network with peers. The November 2007 workshop gathered 42 participants from these communities and academia.

On the first day, workshop participants identified necessary modifications to the analytical IPS framework that had been developed at a series of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) workshops over the preceding year. On the second day, subject matter experts applied the framework to a number of case studies: the Communist Party of Nepal, the Lord’s Resistance Army of Uganda (LRA), the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and paramilitaries of Colombia, warlords of Afghanistan, and five IPS in Mindanao. On the third day, participants broke into small groups to examine the usefulness of the revised framework for informing actors’ responses to IPS. (See graphic above for a synopsis of participant accomplishments.)

The following findings and recommendations emerged from the workshop:

IPS are defined as groups or networks whose reliance on violence or illicit economic activities strikes at the heart of the state-building project. (See graphic on page 3.) This revised definition builds on the now widely accepted definition of non-state armed groups as organizations that challenge the state’s core function of monopolizing the use of force. It casts a wider net by including criminal networks whose use of violence may not rise to the level of a general and fundamental threat to human security, but whose reliance on corruption and penetration of the state hollows out those institutions and perverts their very essence. While IPS are present in a wide range of settings, they are particularly prevalent in post-conflict settings where criminalized networks that originally funded conflict now enjoy privileged access to the state and political actors. In many cases, criminal networks proliferate as demobilized combatants channel their skills and networks to new ends.
Executive Summary

**Defining IPS**

Workshop participants defined illicit power structures as entities that:

1. Challenge the state’s core function of providing a monopoly on the use of force; and/or
2. Engage in criminal economic activities; and
3. Threaten the state’s ability to govern effectively.

<table>
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<th>IPS are entities that: (1) challenge the state’s core function of providing a monopoly on the use of force; and/or (2) engage in criminal economic activities; and (3) threaten the state’s ability to govern effectively. This definition includes non-state armed groups (NSAGs) but also draws attention to actors typically excluded, or at least marginalized, from that literature. This includes criminal networks whose use of violence may not rise to the level of “a general and fundamental threat to human security” but whose reliance on corruption and/or penetration of the state hollows out those institutions and perverts their very essence. It also highlights the fact that IPS often are located within the state and are not limited to armed groups in society. However, all IPS share a common trait: their illicit activities strike at the heart of the state-building enterprise.</th>
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<td>Given the importance of labels and definitions in shaping responses to problems, it is essential to add a number of caveats. Including criminals, corrupt networks, and non-state armed groups under the rubric of IPS is not meant to deny potentially important differences between them.³</td>
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In fact, the analytical prisms that comprise the framework highlight these differences where they exist. However, by including all of these entities under one rubric, the IPS framework highlights the links between groups at any given point in time, as well as any shifts that may occur as groups move from one category to another over time. It also suggests that the standard approaches typically employed against each set of actors might benefit from a cross-fertilization of ideas: for example, those who deal with organized crime could benefit from the perspectives of those who typically face non-state armed groups and vice versa.

Finally, labeling the groups as “illicit” is not meant to imply that law enforcement is the only or even the primary mode of addressing IPS. Nor is it to deny the fact that some IPS may be regarded as legitimate by groups in society, a factor which is taken into account in the framework under the relationships prism. It does highlight the fact, however, that the behavior of IPS is illicit from the perspective of the democratic state-building project endorsed by the international community.
The revised framework provides a more robust tool for analyzing the propensities, capacities, and vulnerabilities of different types of IPS.

Workshop participants revised the USAID framework for analyzing IPS to include five prisms that illuminate these groups’ propensities and capacities.

The five prisms are:

1. Worldview
2. Motivations
3. Resources
4. Relationships
5. Internal Structures

The five prisms employed in the framework help practitioners analyze the nature and level of the challenges IPS pose to the state-building project by uncovering the groups’ propensities and capacities. (See graphic on page 5.) They also help actors shape appropriate responses by identifying potential vulnerabilities and suggesting how IPS will react to any given intervention. The five prisms are described below:

- **Worldview** — This prism examines the discourse and behavior of an IPS to determine the extent to which a group is “absolutist” in its rejection of a democratic, rule-based system or is “reconcilable” (i.e., willing to abide by the rules of such a system). The IPS’ placement on this spectrum will help the international community decide whether to pursue a strategy of marginalization or engagement at any given point in time. It also serves as a metric of effectiveness since one objective of policy interventions is to move the IPS along the spectrum from absolutist to reconcilable; both marginalization and engagement strategies might contribute to this goal. While actors’ examination of an IPS’ worldview has most commonly been used to ascertain if a non-state armed group is amenable to peace talks, it can also be used to accomplish a variety of other objectives, including determining ways to garner the adherence of non-state armed groups to human rights standards or decreasing the level of violence employed by criminal gangs.

- **Motivations** — This prism builds on the rich literature inspired by the debate over whether conflict in resource-rich environments is fueled by loot-seeking or justice-seeking motivations. However, it moves beyond the greed or grievance dichotomy to acknowledge the increasing prevalence of hybrid actors and the complex mix of interests within organizations, even those that seem to have a singular motive. Understanding this mix of motives is essential if practitioners are to craft an effective agenda for peace negotiations; tailor disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) strategies to the varying interests of leaders, mid-level commanders, and rank-and-file soldiers; and address the root causes of conflict or crime.

- **Resources** — Financial resources are key to the operation of an IPS,
Mr. Matthew Vaccaro, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, shares his organization’s mission and highlights upcoming workshops.

regardless of the group’s motive, and thus efforts to deprive groups of their funding have been well-developed. In this age of globalization, IPS often boast diversified portfolios of income, ranging from criminal activities to licit trade to donations from diaspora groups to state sponsors. Consequently, the international community has implemented a wide range of control regimes with varying degrees of success. The success of such efforts depends in part on understanding the other funding options open to a given IPS and the broader relationships within which resource exchanges take place.

• Relationships — Although the violence and economic predation of IPS are considered illicit from the perspective of the democratic state-building project, the framework does not presume that all groups in society share this view. This prism seeks to understand the mix of coercive, material, and social or ideological ties that bind the IPS to other key actors, including the general population, business, politicians, the state, and external actors. Understanding the relationship between IPS and the population is important to combat both traditional insurgents that focus on cultivating popular support, as well as more predatory rebel groups and criminal organizations that may both abuse and protect the population. In post-conflict settings particularly, the line between violent gangs and criminal groups and politicians and the state is increasingly blurred. Attention needs to be paid to all of these critical relationships. Finally, most illicit actors benefit greatly from transnational ties that facilitate their violence or criminal activity. Hence, these ties must be studied and combated.

• Internal Structure — Law enforcement and military analysts have long acknowledged the different capabilities and vulnerabilities of hierarchical organizations and networks. This prism builds on these insights, focusing on the ways in which IPS are organized for command and control and the performance of key activities. Understanding these elements helps actors create guidelines for strategies seeking to disarticulate IPS. In addition, this issue is becoming increasingly relevant for engagement strategies, ranging from human rights accords to peace talks to DDR programs.
Participants noted the value of using diverse perspectives and expertise to analyze IPS. Actors can gain a deep cultural understanding of the IPS and its insertion into the society and polity by consulting anthropologists and other experts with a long history of studying the group, as well as by conducting interviews with active group members, demobilized combatants, and internally displaced persons. Assessment teams comprised of members from a range of governmental organizations, IGOs, and NGOs could help provide the diversity of perspectives and expertise needed for accurate analysis. They also could contribute to developing a shared assessment of a given IPS or at least creating a shared language that could facilitate development of comprehensive and coordinated approaches to the problem.

While analysts have devoted a good deal of time to examining the characteristics of IPS, less attention has been paid to the implications of these features on selecting and implementing strategies that successfully mitigate the negative effects of IPS on democratic state-building. Workshop participants stressed the importance of an IPS’ worldview in shaping practitioners’ decisions on whether to engage or marginalize a given group and noted how differences in the nature of IPS shape the effectiveness of various strategies. For example, “kingpin” strategies targeting an organization’s leadership will meet with varying degrees of success depending on whether the organization has a highly centralized charismatic leadership structure, a hierarchical structure with a more bureaucratic form of leadership, or a network form. Similarly, efforts targeting resources may be more effective against greed-based organizations than ideological groups. While the ultimate success of interventions depends on a wide range of factors, inattention to IPS type has contributed to past failures and therefore merits additional study and consideration by policymakers.

Finally, workshop participants noted that efforts to marginalize or engage groups involve trade-offs and may even be counterproductive. An arms embargo, for example, may do little to weaken a group and may instead entrench criminal elements within political structures, as was the case in Bosnia and Kosovo. In many cases, the peace process may result in non-state armed groups laying down their weapons but continuing to rely on illicit wealth and veiled threats of violence to pervert the resulting peace. Creative thinking is needed to avoid these trade-offs. While the transformation of “peace spoilers” into “governance spoilers” may in some cases be unavoidable, the intractable problems posed by warlords who have not made the transition to “peacelords” led workshop participants to explore innovative ways in which conditionality, broadly conceived, might be incorporated into engagement strategies.

This report provides an overview of the revised framework that workshop participants produced and explores its implications for actors seeking to design an effective response to IPS. It begins with a definition of IPS and then discusses each of the five prisms used for analysis. The third section highlights the kind of information that needs to be collected in the field to understand IPS better, while the fourth reviews the implications of the prisms for devising responses to IPS. A fifth and concluding section offers recommendations for the further development of efforts to address IPS.
Prisms of Analysis

Workshop participants revised the IPS framework to develop a more nuanced view of IPS, their propensities, capacities, and critical vulnerabilities to identify leverage points for policy interventions.

Workshop participants made important changes to the IPS framework that had been developed and discussed at previous conferences sponsored by USAID. The revised framework that emerged by the end of the three days examines IPS through five successive analytic prisms designed to give field operators a progressively more detailed and multidimensional understanding of IPS. The five prisms are worldview, motivations, resources, relationships, and internal structure. Each prism offers insight into the level and nature of the challenges posed by IPS, providing an accurate diagnosis that is necessary for policy making.

This section describes how each prism contributes to understanding the propensities, vulnerabilities, and capacities of IPS. A subsequent section (“Devising Responses to IPS”) more fully addresses the implications of each prism for designing effective interventions.

A. Worldview

The original USAID framework included an important but somewhat narrow definition of an IPS worldview as the “endstate” desired by an organization: “the view IPS leaders have of the world and their desired configuration of the world, as well as their organization’s place in that world.” Does the IPS desire a democracy in which the group can participate, a people’s republic in which it is the single party that rules, or the continuation of a conflict situation that allows the pursuit of profitable but illegal activities? Arguably, the archetypal contemporary determination with respect to worldview is the acceptance of a rule-based system of democratic states as the fundamental organizing principle for the global political architecture. IPS that can be coaxed to participate within such a system are judged to be “non-absolutist” or “reconcilable,” while those that cannot are referred to as “absolutist.”

Workshop participants revised this prism in a number of significant ways. Instead of a dichotomy, they agreed that groups should be placed along a continuum, with analysts assessing the extent to which an IPS’ goals and behavior are reconcilable with a rule-based democratic state. A central goal of policy interventions would be to move IPS along this continuum. Second,
participants stressed the importance of constantly reassessing the label assigned to an IPS, to see if policy interventions or other forces have moved the IPS along the continuum. Third, it is possible that leadership factions within the IPS may have different worldviews (with exiled political leadership, for example, sometimes taking a more softline approach than the military leadership actively engaged in the conflict).

In addition to reviewing an IPS’ internal and external discourse to determine its goals, workshop participants recommended examining a range of IPS behaviors as indicators of the group’s worldview. The more that an IPS’ behaviors deviate from those judged acceptable in democratic, rule-based states, the closer the IPS should be placed to the absolutist end of the spectrum. In the case of Afghanistan, warlords who saw themselves as exempt from the authority of the central state (the internal discourse criterion), who engaged in acts of corruption that exceeded culturally acceptable limits, and who maintained their armed networks, were deemed absolutist.6 To offer another example, all drug traffickers would be considered IPS, but those who engage in extensive bribery of public officials and carry out campaigns of violence to intimidate the citizenry and state officials would be closer to the absolutist end of the spectrum than other trafficking groups that engaged in their illicit activity without violence or corruption.

Finally, the workshop participants tentatively endorsed a somewhat broader, more anthropological conception of an IPS’ worldview than that espoused in the original framework. From this perspective, the prism should examine not just the group’s desired endstate; rather, it should develop “a deeper knowing, an awareness of [the IPS’] experiences and perceptions, an understanding of their logic or way of reasoning, and some ability to predict or explain what they do.”7 For example, workshop participants noted that leaders of IPS that have spent 20 or 40 years in the countryside fighting, as is the case with the LRA in Uganda and the FARC in Colombia, are likely to carry out cost-benefit calculations that are rational based on their experience but may be different from what an outside observer would expect. In particular, such groups are likely to have longer time horizons and are less susceptible to being pressured in negotiations.
This broader notion of worldview is essential not only for interpreting IPS behavior but also for understanding how and why the endstate desired by an IPS may change over time and consequently, how policy interventions can help move groups along the continuum from absolutist to reconcilable. For non-state armed groups, the turning point is often linked to the creation of a “mutually hurting stalemate”:

*When the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), they seek an alternative policy or Way Out.*

This stalemate cannot be determined objectively, but rather depends on the perceptions of the warring parties. An IPS’ worldview includes such factors as its level of trust in the state, perceptions about acceptable costs and benefits, expectations of the likelihood of success, and its time horizons — knowledge of which would facilitate the work of a peace mediator, as well as prior efforts of actors to create the mutually hurting stalemate that might lead to peace talks. The FARC, for example, deeply distrusts the government, views time as an unlimited strategic resource, and reacts more sanguinely to setbacks than an organization with greater expectations of victory in the short run — all factors which militate against a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the short run.

In short, an understanding of an IPS’ worldview is key to determining whether and how its behavior may be influenced. These insights would be useful for a wide range of initiatives, from engaging non-state armed groups in peace talks to efforts to transform warlords into peacelords to facilitating truces between gangs.

**B. Motivations – Creed, Need, Greed or Other?**

With the end of the Cold War and superpower funding of intrastate conflict, analysts shifted their attention to the role of natural resources in fueling civil war. The work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler on the prevalence of “loot seeking” in intrastate conflict particularly resonated with
observers of countries where battles for control over oil, diamonds, or the drug trade was a more central feature of conflict than military victories and where armed groups engaged in predatory behavior toward groups in society that insurgents had typically tried to woo. However, the argument that “greed” was the main motivator of conflict soon engendered a significant counter-literature arguing that “need” (political or economic grievances) and “creed” (generalized belief or identify feelings) remain critical motivating factors in civil war.

Today the debate over the competing roles of “greed,” “need,” and “creed” in fueling internal conflict appears to have dissipated somewhat as further study and examination has produced a more nuanced understanding of IPS. While access to resources is seen as an important factor making conflict feasible, the onset of hostilities usually has its basis in grievance. In settings where resources are readily available, conflicts tend to last longer, whether they are motivated by greed or grievance. In the former case, the warring parties often profit economically from ongoing conflict; in the latter case, the deep pockets of armed actors give them the financial wherewithal to wait out strategic setbacks and create reasonable expectations of future successes. It is also widely accepted that motivations are subject to change over time, with conflicts originating from grievance often evolving into conflicts over access to and profit from resources. In short, trying to attribute motivation exclusively to greed, creed, or need is fruitless, while stating that material considerations play a role in all political conflict is banal. Instead, it is the interplay between greed, creed, and need that is of causal interest.11

The revised IPS framework sought to incorporate the notion of the interplay of motives in a number of ways.12 First, it took a disaggregated look at IPS membership to determine if the top leadership, mid-level commanders, and rank-and-file members had different motives. Second, the notion of “interplay” was interpreted to recognize that groups or individuals may have secondary motivations which may come to the fore under changing circumstances or pressure from outside actors. For this reason, rank ordering the importance of motivations for different groups within the organization is
important. Third and relatedly, there is a temporal component to motivations that requires analysis. In terms of individuals, the motives for joining an organization, staying in it, and deciding to leave it may all differ.

Overall, this more nuanced approach to identifying motives helped avoid the fruitless debates that tend to occur when analysts are required to assign a single, reductive motive to a group. In particular, the workshop discussion of motives was most useful when participants had a particular policy goal or program in mind; this goal dictated whose interests needed to be understood and why. In the case of DDR programs, for example, participants stressed the utility of identifying the varying motives and interests of IPS leadership, mid-level leaders, and rank-and-file followers and tailoring programs for each group that addressed these needs. In the case of peace processes, practitioners with experience in Africa highlighted the importance of understanding the greed-based agendas of IPS leaders for shaping successful peace talks.

During the discussion of DDR, workshop participants raised the question of whether the “need, creed, and greed” trilogy exhausted the range of motives of IPS members or if this should be expanded to include, *inter alia*, the basic “livelihood” needs of IPS members. Some participants thought this constituted a new, fourth motivation to be added to the list of “greed, creed, or need,” whereas others thought it could be subsumed under one of these existing categories, although there was disagreement about which category. Some participants referred to a livelihood need as a “greed”-based motive since it involves the pursuit of self-interest, whereas others interpreted it more charitably as a basic “need.” Neither of these approaches, however, comports with existing usage of the greed and need labels in the literature. “Greed” is typically used to evoke personal self-enrichment that goes beyond fulfilling basic livelihood needs, whereas “need” refers to collective political and economic grievances. More importantly, since livelihood concerns transcend the creed, need, and greed categories — during peace talks, all group members are concerned about their future livelihood regardless of the kind of IPS to which they belong — it would be inaccurate to include livelihoods under only one of these labels. In short, livelihood refers to the interests and motives
of individuals; it will include the survival needs of individuals but is also likely to refer to the status and power demands that must be satisfied for each individual to lay down his or her arms. Where greed was a motivating factor, these latter demands are likely to be greater than where individuals fought for collective goals.

One of the biggest challenges posed by this prism is determining what constitutes evidence of greed-based motives. Since at least the 1990s, it has become increasingly common for NSAGs to rely on criminal activities to self-fund their activities, so this clearly cannot be an indicator of motive. Indeed, the literature is careful to note that participation in illicit economic activities (often referred to as “economic motivations”) can be driven by the desire for personal enrichment (greed), the need for survival in the case of individuals (livelihood), or as a means to fund a grievance-based war effort (whether need or creed). It is important to note that an IPS’ obsession with pursuing resources or embracing tactics or strategies that seem from the outside to be irrational or ineffective ways of accomplishing the IPS’ stated goals are not reliable indicators of greed as a primary motive. Instead, these decisions are just as likely to be the product of a process of militarization in which leaders and members may lose touch with their constituents and sacrifice the ultimate goals of the organization on the altar of short-sighted metrics of effectiveness. In Colombia, for example, the FARC has become increasingly willing to pay a high political cost for military victories with minor payoffs. Arguably, this shift has occurred not because greed has displaced politics within the organization, but rather because leaders with military backgrounds and experience became ascendant with the military victories and increased operations tempo of the mid- to late 1990s. As a consequence, a military logic has come to predominate.

Despite these caveats, workshop participants offered some suggestions for discerning motives. Indicators of greed-based motives might be a lavish lifestyle enjoyed by IPS members and/or leadership and a lack of attention within the organization to social or political indoctrination. Collusion with armed rivals to pursue profit-generating activities (e.g., cross-ethnic cooperation in criminal enterprises in Bosnia, the phenomenon of “sobels” in Africa, paramilitary and
FARC collaboration in the drug trade in some parts of Colombia, Northern Alliance warlord sales of weaponry to the Taliban) have all been cited as a sign of the dominance of the greed motive. Conversely, if the IPS engages in high-cost activities unrelated to its economic pursuits, like the political education of new recruits or the employment of stringent selection criteria when recruiting members, one might conclude it is primarily motivated by creed or need. Similarly, if rank-and-file members do not receive a salary and are not allowed to loot as a means to garner compensation, one can assume that they are not motivated by greed.

This prism examines the material resources, such as money, weapons, and space, that are alternately the end or means of IPS activities. From where, and to what extent, does the IPS get its financial resources, be they remittances from a global diaspora, state sponsorships, revenues from legal as well as illegal commerce, the exploitation of natural resources, the corrupt diversion of public funds, or other criminal activities? How easily can an IPS replace a loss of one resource with another? From what sources and by what means does it obtain its weaponry? How does it use geography or other elements of space (e.g., slum areas, lawless borderlands, safe havens) to carry out its activities and how important is this resource?
The use of space is usually the easiest for outside observers to assess, though not necessarily to combat. Given the varied sources of funding and weaponry available and the difficulty of tracking financial and arms flows across borders, it may be difficult to gain a comprehensive overview of these resources, despite an increased attention to these matters in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Similarly, the embedded networks of corruption that plague the state in post-corruption settings are often difficult to document.

D. Relationships

The fourth prism in the framework calls attention to the IPS’ relationships with other actors, both inside and outside its country of operation. Within a country, one of the most significant relationships to examine is that between the IPS and the general population, which might be broken down into subsectors (e.g., rural, urban, business, areas of long-standing versus new activity). This process would include examining the modes of recruitment employed by IPS as well as the material and moral support provided by key groups. Given the critical resources controlled by politicians, the state, and other rival or partner IPS, relationships with these actors also merit special attention. Relationships with external actors, such as the diaspora community, neighboring states, cross-border population groups, and international business, have all received attention in the literature on NSAGs and are relevant more broadly for IPS. A focus on the importance of cross-national ties has long been a mainstay of the literature on transnational crime, while studies of regional conflict complexes have become salient in the conflict literature.

Although the US government has focused on ungoverned spaces as areas in which IPS thrive, this prism highlights the fact that most of these spaces are indeed governed, just not by the state. The relationships and exchanges at the heart of the alternative governance systems where IPS operate and how the IPS fits into them are the focus of this prism. These systems need to be understood on their own terms rather than defined primarily by what they are not (i.e., areas not governed by the rule of law). Toward this end, the prism analyzes...
the extent to which the IPS exercises its power over others through coercion, material inducements, and/or legitimacy (e.g., religious, tribal, ethnic, ideological ties, or appeals). While IPS may abuse the population, they also may provide certain services or access to income and livelihood in the illicit economy. The prism looks not only at what the IPS offers in a relationship, but also at what each actor provides to the IPS and the relative importance of these resources in sustaining the IPS and shaping its behavior.

E. Internal Structure/ Organizational Factors

The final prism in the framework examines the internal organization of the IPS, including the way in which it is structured to carry out its main functions; the manner in which decisions are made, implemented and monitored; and the training and employment of personnel.

Borrowing from the literature on organized crime and terrorism, the framework distinguishes between IPS with hierarchical and decentralized structures. Each of these organizational forms is said to have different propensities, operational methods, and vulnerabilities.

Hierarchical organizations operate on the basis of top-down leadership and decision-making with authority ultimately devolving from the top of the leadership pyramid. The chain of command is generally clear and streamlined. Such organizations often have a fairly well-developed division of labor and are subject to the bureaucratic phenomenon known as “stove-piping.” Only the highest ranks are fully appraised of the extent of the activities, assets, and interests of the organization. At lower levels, personnel are often provided information only on a “need to know” basis. Yet most elements within the organization are aware of the structure and are familiar with supervisory, subordinate, and lateral elements.

In contrast, a networked or decentralized cell organization is loosely structured and can have multiple leaders whose functions and responsibilities change depending on circumstances. Decision making is usually decentralized, encouraging autonomy and local initiative and flexibility. The durability of such a structure, however, is dependent on the degree to which the cells in the network share goals and objectives and a similar level of commitment. This form best describes many criminal organizations which rely on shifting, ad hoc alliances to carry out their illicit activities and to newly formed splinter armed groups in western Africa where fluidity is the norm and external relationships may be as important as internal in driving behavior.

The case studies presented in the workshop suggested that many IPS do not fall neatly into either of these camps; many were close to the hierarchical end of the spectrum but devolved important decision making authorities and functions to regional or middle level leaders. Understanding these internal relationships and detecting the way in which information and resources flow within the organization is crucial. This process involves understanding how the different levels of the organization — leadership, mid-level leaders, and rank-and-file followers — relate, as well as determining how various functions — leadership, recruiting, finances, operations, logistics, technical expertise and training, intelligence and counterintelligence — are carried out. Similarly, understanding the sources of legitimacy of the IPS leadership and their decision-making processes, whether they are driven by committee or a charismatic personality, or operate in the transactional mode of a leaderless group, has important implications for predicting the behavior of IPS as well as identifying their vulnerabilities. The level of adaptability of the organization and its learning capabilities — how resilient and flexible it is — should be examined empirically rather than assuming that networks are highly adaptable and hierarchies are victims of stove-piping.
The Process of Assessing IPS

A key goal of the framework is to create a checklist of questions for assessing IPS (capturing much of what was discussed at the workshop) to guide practitioners’ field inquiries. Given the breadth of knowledge and the diversity of expertise needed to understand the various prisms, workshop participants believed this process should be characterized by the following:

- **Interagency cooperation:** Workshop participants, who came from a diverse range of organizations involved in S&R work, were acutely aware that actors’ views of an IPS are colored by background, training, and the organizational tools at their disposal. Consequently, assessment teams should be composed of representatives from various communities to bring all the necessary analytical perspectives to the table and contribute to developing a shared diagnosis of the challenge posed by an IPS in a given situation. While this process does not guarantee that actors will create a unified, whole-of-government response, it may be a useful first step.

- **Information gathering through interviews:** Workshop participants stressed the importance of conducting intensive interviews to avoid relying on the perspectives of the handful of individuals in a given country who typically interact with the international community. The challenge is that these interviews tend to be best for determining the opinions of different sectors; while this information is useful for assessing the political feasibility of different responses to IPS, it is less likely to yield the kind of solid data necessary for analysis. Interviewees must ask about the logic or evidence behind the opinions and conclusions proffered to ensure that input will be useful. In addition, the interview net should be cast broadly to capture views of those with first-hand contact with IPS, including key interlocutors, internally displaced persons, and demobilized or captured IPS members.

- **Reliance on experts:** Appropriate analysis of the prisms in the framework requires more than just the collection of information: It presumes a deeper, cultural understanding of the group and its place within the society. For this reason, workshop participants highlighted the importance of consulting anthropologists. Workshop presentations by subject matter experts from other academic disciplines and NGOs also demonstrated the value of incorporating the perspectives of analysts and practitioners who have interacted with and studied the views and behavior of a given IPS over time.

- **A measured presentation of findings:** Given the covert, controversial, and sub-national nature of many IPS, analysts are bound to have limited information on various prisms in the framework. The assessment team should provide some indication of the level of certainty in the information they provide on IPS and interpretations thereof. In particular, the team should indicate the extent to which experts diverge in their assessments rather than arriving at an artificial consensus judgment.

While undertaking a full analysis of an IPS may seem like a daunting task, practitioners who can transcend traditional institutional boundaries will find much of the information easily available. In addition, while actors need a passing familiarity with all prisms, in-depth knowledge may not be required. As the section “Devising Responses to IPS” demonstrates, the information needed to conduct this assessment will vary according to the policy goal.
Devising Responses to IPS

Participants discussed the effectiveness of current policy interventions, which have sought to weaken or transform IPS. Transformation efforts include limited efforts to modify IPS behavior as well as more far-reaching initiatives to convert armed antagonists into peaceful participants in the democratic process.

The five prisms draw attention to the propensities, capacities, and vulnerabilities of IPS, an accurate diagnosis of which is a necessary first step for devising effective responses. However, the diagnosis is only a starting point. The ultimate goal of the framework is to “create a narrative that leads to actionable conclusions and analytically supports specific strategic courses of action and tactics to neutralize the subversive impact of illicit power structures on democracy building efforts and development more generally.”21 To accomplish this objective, the framework must also review the effectiveness of historical strategies and tactics for confronting IPS and determine the points of entry each prism offers to policy makers and practitioners.

Although the IPS framework is designed to help actors understand how “soft power” approaches (particularly development assistance) could complement “hard power” strategies for combating IPS, this dichotomy did not gain much traction among workshop participants.22 Instead, the discussion focused on practitioner goals of either weakening IPS or transforming them. The former option of eliminating or at least marginalizing the IPS is typically designed to lessen the ability of this group to engage in undesirable behavior. The latter option of transforming IPS or making them licit is focused on changing IPS interest in engaging in illicit behavior.

The only ways to defeat illicit power structures are to make them licit, separate them from their power, or dismantle their structure.

– Workshop Participant

While much attention has been devoted to peace processes which convert armed antagonists into participants in the democratic process, transformation also includes more limited efforts to modify the behavior of IPS. These processes include efforts by the international community to secure NSAG compliance with international norms of respect for human rights.23 Amnesty International and other NGOs increased their reporting of the human rights violations of these groups in the 1980s and 1990s as part of a “naming and shaming” strategy to deter such behavior. More recently, the NGO Geneva Call has sought the adherence of NSAGs to a protocol banning the use of anti-personnel landmines. In addition, analysts have begun to investigate...
the more ambitious goal of transforming “warlords into peacelords” in post-conflict settings. The challenge here is not just to get IPS to lay down their arms after peace talks, but to transform their behavior even more profoundly so that they contribute to peacebuilding. In many cases, despite the cessation of hostilities, these actors continue to engage in coercion or veiled threats of violence and illicit economic activities that threaten democratic governance. International efforts to transform these actors have been limited, in part out of a fear of derailing the peace process; to the extent that they have occurred, they have been largely unsuccessful. Growing evidence of the many ways in which IPS undermine peacebuilding has led an increasing number of analysts to conclude: if a sustainable peace is sought, rather than a simple shifting of conflict scenarios, legitimacy and recognition extended by the international community must be accompanied by accountability on the part of the armed groups. The question is, then, how do we accomplish that?

This question is becoming increasingly relevant as the scope of humanitarian engagement broadens from NGOs negotiating safety corridors necessary for carrying out their missions to government development agencies exploring whether and when engagement with NSAGs might be advisable. Accordingly, workshop participants debated which kinds of IPS could be transformed; what mix of engagement and marginalization could effect the desired transformation; and the extent to which conditionality could be employed successfully in engagement strategies.

This section reports on this discussion, reviewing each prism of the IPS framework to determine what leverage it offers to the policy maker or field operator in determining whether and how to marginalize or transform IPS.

A. Worldview

For some workshop participants, the classification of an IPS as either reconcilable or absolutist provided clear policy choices. If the IPS is reconcilable to a democratic rule-based state, a peace process would seek to address its concerns through...
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personal security guarantees; limited or potential amnesty; military integration; DDR programs; participation in the political process; and community, local, and economic development. If the IPS is absolutist, interventions would aim to marginalize it through military action, law enforcement, psychological operations, exclusion from the political process, economic sanctions, and the strengthening of other actors.27

Other participants, however, cautioned against employing only exclusionary strategies for dealing with IPS judged to be absolutist. After all, one possible outcome of an effort to weaken an absolutist IPS would be to motivate a change in worldview that would render it amenable to peace talks. With this in mind, interventions to weaken IPS and strategies of transformation may be complementary and should often be undertaken simultaneously. As one participant noted, British Government officials always kept the door open to the IRA behind the scenes, even during the tensest moments.

All participants agreed that moving IPS along the spectrum from absolutist to reconcilable was a desirable goal and that the position of a given group should be constantly reevaluated to determine if interventions are working and/or if a change in policy is warranted, either because the approach is not working or success has changed the IPS and its objectives. Since worldview is understood as a composite of attitudes and behavior, moving IPS along the spectrum entails generating not just IPS’ rhetorical acceptance of peace and participation in politics but motivating behavior consistent with these norms.

Most participants agreed that the prospects for engagement are most positive when it is undertaken with IPS who are closer to the reconcilable end of the spectrum.28 They differ, however, in where the line should be drawn: whether engagement is primarily an option for IPS who are ready for peace talks or whether it is also appropriate for actors closer to the absolutist end of the spectrum.

Determining the prospects of success of a specific transformation strategy requires examining the elements of an IPS’ worldview that are relevant to both the
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Devising effective transformation strategies will depend, in part, upon understanding more about when and why IPS in the real world have moved along the spectrum from absolutist to reconcilable. Case studies presented at the workshop provided some insight into this process. For example, most analysts would place the LRA at the absolutist end of the spectrum, typified by the messianic leadership of Joseph Kony and its relatively free rein in a depopulated Northern Uganda. However, the peace talks of 2007 had more success than ever before, in large part because the Sudanese government’s termination of aid and safe haven shook, at least temporarily, Kony’s belief that he had a real chance of overthrowing the Ugandan government. Although Kony’s worldview and expectations of success are unfathomable to most observers, they are critical for understanding why the resource-targeting strategy had the success it did. Arguably, a messianic movement with continued freedom of movement in northern Uganda would have been much less affected by the loss of aid from a neighbor. Efforts to gain Kony’s trust through contact with his mother and other measures also contributed to a change in his worldview. This example demonstrates the importance for policymakers of taking advantage of the “ripe moment” created when a change of circumstances shocks a group into realizing that the prospect of victory is diminished. If not, the passage of time may give the group time to recover from the psychological shock and reduce the chances for peace, as may be happening now as the LRA substitutes operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for Sudanese assistance and safe haven.

While a good deal is known about the process and circumstances which lead IPS to become amenable to peace talks, much less work has been done on what circumstances, if any, might generate the transformation of warlords to peacelords. Workshop participants stressed the need for creative thinking on this front. As Mark Sedra and others have noted in the case of Afghanistan, relying on bribes to garner the adherence of warlords to the central government, rather than imposing more stringent requirements as a condition for participation, has worked against such a transformation. An examination of the Afghanistan case also led participants to argue that greater consideration should be given to the circumstances under which IPS with illicit wealth might be transformed into legitimate businesses and the desirability of such an option.

B. Motivations

Workshop participants identified a number of instances in which knowing the motivations of IPS members and/or leaders was important for devising responses:

Peace Processes: Practitioners with experience in Africa highlighted the criticality of understanding the greed-based
agendas of IPS leaders to shape successful peace talks. If control over illicit economic activities were simply a means to an end (i.e., a source of funding for the war effort), the issue would not need to be included on the peace agenda. However, when greed motivates the fight over resources, it must be included along with whatever grievance-related issues are negotiated.

**DDR Programs:** In some ways, DDR programs are unaffected by the motives of IPS; regardless of IPS motive, DDR programs must provide security guarantees for demobilizing combatants and address their livelihood concerns. The obstacles to this goal are greater, however, where IPS are engaged in illicit economic activities. If reintegration programs fall short of their mark, the IPS member can turn to the skills and contacts developed during participation in the illicit economy to earn a living. When IPS members are motivated by greed, the challenge of reintegration is even greater, as it is difficult for DDR programs to match the level of compensation and status achieved during the war years.

Participants also stressed the utility of identifying the varying motives and interests of IPS leadership, mid-level commanders, and rank-and-file followers in order to tailor programs for each level that addressed their needs. The interests of the top leadership tend to be addressed during the peace process, with offers of exotic villas, control over resource ministries, or other political positions. At the same time, DDR programs seek to provide for the livelihood interests of the rank-and-file, albeit not always successfully. Despite this objective, workshop participants highlighted the repeated failure of DDR programs to identify and target the special livelihood needs of middle-level commanders, whose demilitarization and economic reintegration may be the key to post-conflict stability. These commanders often have the status and connections to either remobilize the rank-and-file or to forge (or in many cases to maintain) criminal networks. Reintegrating these individuals will be no easy task: given the level of status and power they attained in the IPS, their livelihood demands may be too high and offering them a political role may be undesirable, for reasons ranging from a lack of education to their implication in the worst war atrocities. Nonetheless, participants endorsed an
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approach to DDR that more explicitly considers ways to meet these challenges.

Addressing Root Causes: The working group charged with devising responses to IPS based on this prism argued that:

identifying to what extent need, greed, and/or creed are driving the IPS allows one to respond to the underlying causes of the problem. While law enforcement is required for each category regardless of motivation, other interventions would address the specific motivations:

• Where need is a motivation, interventions would aim to foster social well-being through improving public services, legal and regulatory frameworks, access to capital, and other underpinnings of economic development and opening up the political arena to competitive elections.

• Where creed is a motivation, interventions would focus on education in primary and secondary schools and information campaigns to promote tolerance and pro-state attitudes.

• Where greed is a motivation, interventions would create opportunities for people to compete and advance in licit channels by removing barriers to entry, subsidies, permit requirements, import restrictions, and the like in the economic realm and by opening up the political arena to competitive elections. Transparency and accountability measures would also be important responses to greed-motivated IPS located within the government or those actors who take advantage of the diversion of state resources. 35

Most participants agreed with this approach of exploring IPS motivations as a means to understand and address the structural factors motivating conflict, although they might quibble with the particular measures chosen as remedies. Others, however, questioned the effectiveness of root cause approaches for combating already established groups. While combating the underlying problems motivating IPS may make sense at the pre-conflict stage or when IPS are initially forming, participants wondered whether these measures would actually siphon off popular support for IPS, reduce the number of recruits, or otherwise weaken the organization. For example,
measures targeting poverty might not be very pertinent for challenging a grievance-based organization that forcibly recruits its members and does not rely heavily on popular support for its operation.

In some cases, measures that might be appropriate to prevent the emergence of IPS may be counterproductive when undertaken where IPS already exist. To the extent that greed-based IPS often arise out of grievances rooted in rentier states, where significant amounts of natural resource royalties (rents) accrue directly to the state and only a few are engaged in productive activities, the recommendations of the working group to liberalize the economy may make sense as a preventive measure. However, where IPS are present, economic liberalization and privatization undertaken without the appropriate safeguards and regulations serve only to entrench illicit wartime networks in the postwar economic and social system. Similarly, good governance reforms like decentralization, which is designed to address the “underlying causes” of unrest, may only serve to strengthen existing IPS. In Colombia, for example, decentralization helped enrich IPS by channeling significant state resources (up to half the budget) to subnational governments which were particularly susceptible to IPS pressure.36

C. Resources

Identifying the resources sustaining an IPS allows practitioners to craft responses to reduce or eliminate that source of funding. These efforts may range from military action and sanctions where a state is sponsoring the IPS to financial and legal regulations pertaining to diaspora funding, industry certification in the diamond and logging trade, anti-corruption measures, and eradication, alternative livelihood programs, and efforts to curtail demand in the case of drugs. Introducing increased transparency and accountability in government, particularly in the management of natural resources, would help reduce the diversion of state resources to IPS. Increasing transparency and setting standards in natural resource and other markets would help level the playing field for licit economic actors and reduce the gains to those who use violence in the pursuit of economic gain.
The effectiveness of these interventions has varied greatly, in part because of variations in the nature of the markets they attempt to regulate and in part because of the challenges of implementing sanctions. One of the most effective approaches has been the Kimberly Certification process which was designed to limit the market for so-called “blood diamonds;” the existence of a single buyer in the diamond market was a key factor in the relative success of this approach. In addition, the fact that diamonds are a legal product (as opposed to cocaine, for example) legitimates their inclusion on the peace agenda and provides incentives for IPS to negotiate peace in order to maintain their market share. In other cases, where markets are larger (such as trade in timber or the secondary market for oil) or illegal, regulation poses greater challenges. Self-monitoring by businesses in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative represents an advance, albeit with obvious challenges of implementation and enforcement that are rivaled only by the obstacles the United Nations faces in its implementation of sanctions regimes.37

Although the targeted sanctions regimes used against IPS resources cause less humanitarian suffering than general sanctions, they often produce other unintended consequences. For example, these measures have often been criticized for either creating the smuggling opportunities that IPS can exploit (in the case of embargoes) or increasing the profit to be earned from already illegal activities (such as drug trafficking).38

Even where a given intervention is effective in temporarily reducing the flow of one resource, the overall impact on IPS resources and the course of the conflict is not always clear. Many IPS have diversified portfolios of illicit economic activities and can easily replace the loss of one resource with another. (Though, as the earlier discussion of the LRA suggested, under certain conditions a sudden decline in resources may have a psychological impact on the IPS, creating a “ripe moment” for peace talks that will last until the IPS finds a substitute.) A reduction in resources may lead IPS to engage in even greater economic predation against civilians or to enter into competition with rival IPS over control of territory needed to carry out illicit economic activities, resulting in an increase in violence against civilians and internally displaced persons.
Although the literature on control regimes has little to say on the subject, the impact of a reduction in resources on the course of the conflict may vary depending on the nature of the IPS affected. The cases of Sierra Leone and Angola suggest that reduced resources may bring groups to the peace table not because of the objective decline in power, but rather because of the fallout it created within the group, reducing its coherence. Similarly, IPS motivated by greed may be more pragmatic in the face of threats to their livelihood and hence more willing to negotiate their continued access to resources in a peace treaty than ideologues who remain committed to their cause and see the decline in resources as only a temporary setback. Finally, efforts to combat illicit economic activities or to target financial flows from the diaspora will inevitably affect segments of the population other than the IPS. The extent to which this process favors or undermines IPS will depend upon their broader relationship with the population, an issue which is addressed more fully in the next section.

D. Relationships

Understanding the ties that bind IPS to religious, linguistic, ethnic, political, economic, and diaspora groups allows one to determine whether and how to break these links. While the resources prism includes a focus on the material resources that groups provide to the IPS, this prism takes a broader look at different kinds of support groups lend to IPS and the influence they might exercise over them. It also emphasizes the importance of understanding what the IPS provides to these groups as a means of understanding IPS persistence and identifying the possibilities for transformation or marginalization of the groups.

Workshop participants noted that while IPS can often be abusive toward local populations, in many cases they also provide important services such as the maintenance of order or delivery of social programs. An overemphasis on the illicit behavior of IPS can overshadow factors that may make the groups legitimate with key constituents; the resulting policy will not only fail to break these ties but may even strengthen them. For example, eradication programs have been
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blamed for, at worst, driving growers of illicit crops into the arms of IPS and, at best, being ineffective by failing to address the relationships within which the illicit activity is embedded (e.g., the “coercive credit system controlled by local strongmen” in the case of opium poppy in Afghanistan). Participants strongly advocated using needs assessments to inform the development of programs to help the population and thus reduce support for IPS.

Finally, participants stressed the value of understanding the relationship between IPS and the population in order to devise effective DDR programs. Determining whether home communities would accept IPS members back into the fold, and under what conditions, are important first steps for any program; in cases where communities are receptive, creative campaigns publicizing these efforts could encourage important individual defections or form the basis for the demobilization of groups.

More generally, the terms and outcome of most engagement strategies will depend in part on the population’s views of the IPS. In Uganda, for example, the internally displaced persons most affected by the LRA preferred peace to an international criminal court trial for Kony, whereas in Colombia, key segments of the population rejected the possibility of paramilitary participation in politics as part of the DDR agreement. Some workshop participants noted that the international community has sometimes failed to distinguish between armed groups that preyed on civilians and those with ties to communities who may have engaged in human rights violations in defense of the local populations. Arguably the latter category would be more appropriate candidates for transformation than the former.

Although much of the workshop discussion focused on IPS relationships with the population, this prism also offers insights into how other key relationships affect points of entry for transformation or marginalization of IPS. For example, in the past, states and the international community have sometimes found that they have better access to, and more points of leverage over, external state sponsors and diaspora groups than IPS themselves. On the other hand, IPS ties to politicians and the state apparatus reduce the leverage of the international community, explaining the frequent lack of
political will within host countries to tackle IPS within many countries.

E. Structure
Workshop participants discussed ways in which understanding the internal organization of IPS can be important for both strategies of marginalization and engagement. Law enforcement and military agencies have long scrutinized IPS structures in order to target “critical nodes” in a network, such as bomb makers or financial officers, or to target the group’s leadership as a means of “decapitating” the organization. The latter approach has had some notable successes, primarily in cases of NSAGs where leadership is highly personalized and centralized, as was the case with the Shining Path in Peru under Anibal Guzman. But, for the most part, NSAGs tend to be governed by committee and/or operate with some decentralized autonomy, a structure that allows them to survive the assassination or capture of top leaders (e.g., the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka).

Against criminal groups, in contrast, “kingpin” strategies have been more successful in leading to the fragmentation and decentralization of hierarchical organizations, as was the case with the Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia. These strategies were successful in reducing the direct challenge to the state posed by cartels — the terrorist violence employed by Medellin cartel leader Pablo Escobar and the high-level corruption typical of the Cali cartel — but were less successful in reducing drug trafficking. They also highlight the potential unintended consequences of efforts to target organizations without addressing the illicit activity that sustains them. The weakening and fragmentation of the main cartels in Colombia created a vacuum which the FARC and paramilitaries could exploit; increased involvement in the drug trade augmented the resources available to these IPS and competition between the groups for control of the trade led to an escalation of violence against the rural population. Overall, the case illustrates the importance of considering the impact that successfully targeting an organization will have on the illicit activity of concern.
Participants discussed the effect of IPS on S&R activities.

(e.g., the drug trade, levels of violence, corruption) and on power relationships among IPS.

Understanding organizational structure can also be a vital tool for devising engagement strategies, ranging from human rights accords to peace talks to DDR programs. For example, it is important to know whether a group has a command and control structure that permits the leadership to bring their followers along in any peace accords or human rights convention to which the leaders might consent. The level of internal pluralism also is an important variable for outsiders to monitor, since it shapes the effectiveness of engagement strategies that purport to favor more moderate factions within the organization. When there is little diversity in worldviews within an organization, as is likely the case with the Tamil Tigers, engagement may not favor moderates, as is typically argued; instead, negotiations may serve only to strengthen hardliners vis-à-vis moderates in the broader, but excluded, Tamil community.40

Finally, workshop participants stressed the importance of understanding internal organizations, particularly relationships between leaders and followers, for devising effective DDR programs. In Afghanistan, for example, the failure to understand the patron-client networks within armed groups resulted in DDR programs that not only did little to disarticulate militias, by failing to address the mid-level commanders who were the key to mobilization of the rank and file, but even strengthened the leadership of the groups, by providing cash compensation for weapons which the rank-and-file turned over to their patrons. ••
Ongoing efforts to analyze IPS and devise responses to address them should take into account the following recommendations:

- **Beyond war and peace:** Much of practitioners’ work on IPS and conflict has focused on either defeating non-state armed groups or encouraging their participation in peace processes. Future work should build on and systematize the findings of the conflict resolution and mediation literature, but also go beyond this work to consider whether and how IPS should be engaged outside of a peace process (that is, both before and after the peace). Recent work has explored the challenges of promoting respect for human rights among NSAGs and how development agencies might interact with such groups. Future work would benefit from exploring the costs and benefits of marginalizing or engaging IPS during post-conflict peacebuilding. One key challenge of addressing IPS during peacetime is the need to address their links to political and state actors. In addition, policymakers in a wide array of fields, from security sector reform to economic development, need to consider the extent to which IPS affect their goals and then tailor their programs appropriately.

- **Beyond armed groups:** The broad definition of IPS employed in the framework highlights the threats posed to peacebuilding by actors engaged in criminal activities, many of whom occupy, or have ties to those who occupy, state or political positions. Whatever their provenance, whether common criminals, ex-combatants turned criminals, or warlords who failed the transition to peacelords, these “governance spoilers” can threaten the peace as much as NSAGs. Correspondingly, much of the discussion at the workshop centered on the political economy of DDR and the challenges of transforming illicit economies that formed during conflict. Understanding the varying interests of rank-and-file, mid-level commanders, and the top leadership; the linkages between the levels; and the relationships between these individuals and the communities...
Recommendations

into which they would be reintegrated are all essential for a DDR program that will help prevent both a return to arms and a turn to crime.

Similarly, workshop participants argued that actors needed to develop creative approaches to transform post-conflict economies. At the very least, promoters of economic development need to take into account that their policies are not being implemented on a clean slate but rather face the likelihood of being hijacked by existing local and national-level elites (which, in many cases, are IPS). Efforts to transform the economy might even include programs to make IPS licit (turning “robber barons” into entrepreneurs); such an approach would require a careful mix of sticks and carrots to generate a change in behavior among these actors in return for their acceptance as legitimate businessmen. Overall, more work is needed on ways to promote economic development without strengthening those who continue to engage in violence and other illicit activities.

- **Beyond sticks:** Labeling groups as IPS should not predispose policymakers to rely on law enforcement as a single default response. Workshop participants were quick to stress that “coercive” approaches need to be complemented by positive incentives. For example, while eradication may be a necessary part of any drug control program, it must be accompanied by programs that address the needs of the growers of illicit crops and recognize the power relationships at the local level (between IPS and growers) that drive illicit crop production. At the same time, advocates of alternative development should acknowledge that growers need to have strong incentives to abandon the benefits that illicit crop cultivation brings and law enforcement is important for providing that impetus.

- **Beyond analysis:** Practitioners’ analyses are of little consequence if insights are not converted into programs and action. The workshop discussion revealed a number of different paths to action that can be pursued simultaneously. These paths include:

Mr. Michael Miklaucic presents a case study on the Communist Party of Nepal.
Mapping programs to challenges: Practitioners who are taking a first cut at devising a response should review the challenges identified in the framework and map existing programs, or craft new ones, to meet these challenges. For example, if IPS are fulfilling the needs of certain sectors of the population, practitioners should conduct a needs assessment and implement programs that enable the government or international community can supplant those ties. Where IPS exist, the rule of law is clearly missing and programs to reform the police and judiciary are appropriate, as are programs targeting the sources of funding for IPS. This is the meat-and-potatoes of policymaking and is reflected in many of the participant recommendations discussed in the body of this report. Implicit in these recommendations are judgments about which policies will be effective, but at times these judgments are based more on logic than actual lessons learned. Given this bias, case studies that identify lessons learned both through cross-country case studies and single country studies can serve as informative guides.

The need for case studies: A study of the effectiveness of a single intervention (e.g., targeted sanctions) across a number of cases provides useful guidelines for policymakers. Given the focus of this framework, such a comparison should pay attention to whether the success or failure of the initiative is linked to the nature of the IPS, among other factors. Workshop participants, for example, noted that the “kingpin strategy” targeting the leadership of the IPS is most effective against groups with a highly centralized and personalized leadership. Studies of a single IPS in a given country should address the same issues, but would also provide special insight into the evolution of the IPS over time. Are there particular points in the development of an IPS when it is most vulnerable? What factors account for changes in the behavior or strength of an IPS and what “points of entry” for policymakers can be gleaned from this?

Both types of case studies could provide insights into how the existence of IPS affects the formulation, implementation, and outcome of policies. The comparative
approach might compare a single policy across cases (e.g., how the introduction of elections, or privatization, or decentralization is shaped by the presence of IPS). The single-case approach could consider the ways in which an IPS in a given country affects the implementation of a whole range of government or international community initiatives, from security sector reform to decentralization to development. In both types of case studies, particular attention should be paid to the unintended consequences of interventions.

- **Sharing perspectives across communities:**

  Finally, workshop participants stressed the need for a “whole government” approach to assessing IPS and devising responses. A myriad of actors, ranging from the military to law enforcement to anti-corruption specialists to development agencies, have a stake in addressing IPS but are unaccustomed to communicating with one another. One goal of the workshop was to contribute to cross-community learning and the development of professional networks among participants to facilitate collective problem-solving and to equip individuals to be change agents within their own communities. Workshop participants developed plans to continue refining the IPS framework and to explore the creation of cross-community assessment teams. In so doing, they acknowledged that different agencies and communities, with their emphasis on different intermediate goals and their varying expertise, bring complementary and sometimes competing perspectives to the table on the challenges posed by IPS and the necessary responses to them. These views need to be captured both during the strategic planning and operational phases.

Pictured from left to right: Lieutenant Colonel Michael Lacey; Vice Admiral Daniel Oliver; Mr. Larry Sampler, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, US Department of State; and Ms. Barbara Sotirin, Corps of Engineers Headquarters, US Army.
Ms. Jeanne Giraldo teaches in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, where she is currently heading a multiyear project on fighting corruption in post-conflict settings for the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies. She was a founder and director of the Program for Drug Control Strategy and Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School and is a participant in the Latin American regional program of the Center for Civil-Military Relations. She has traveled widely in Latin America and written on organized crime, civil-military relations, and democratization and political representation. Her most recent publication is *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective* (Stanford University Press, 2007), co-edited with Harold Trinkunas. Other publications include: “Transnational Crime” (with Harold Trinkunas) in Alan Collins, ed. *Contemporary Security Studies*; two chapters – “Legislatures and National Defense: Global Comparisons” and “Defense Budgets, Democratic Civilian Control, and Effective Governance” – in Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*; “Parties, Institutions, and Market Reforms in Constructing Democracies” (with Jorge Domínguez) in Jorge I. Domínguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal, eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s – Themes and Issues*; and “Development and Democracy in Chile: Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley and the Concertación’s Project for the 1990s” in Jorge I. Domínguez, ed., *Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s*. Giraldo received her undergraduate degree in politics and Latin American studies at Princeton University and her master’s degree and doctoral training at Harvard University. ••


Endnotes

1 Corruption in post-conflict settings was a focus of Transparency International’s 2005 annual report. In addition, workshops on the topic were held by CSRS in December 2006, Oxford University in March 2007, and the Fletcher School at Tufts University in April of 2007. USAID inaugurated its project on IPS in 2006 and held a series of conferences on the framework in 2007.

2 This last criterion is somewhat vague and would benefit from greater specification, depending on the goals of the organizations using the framework. For example, a development agency might be primarily concerned with IPS that threaten the state’s ability to provide for the population and ensure economic growth. In general terms, however, it points to the reasons why the international community is concerned with groups that engage in illicit violence and illicit economic activities.

3 Although previous workshops on the IPS framework generated a great deal of debate over the inclusion of illicit economic activity in the definition, this was not the case at the November 2007 meeting. However, participants did insist that IPS refer to a broad range of criminal and armed groups, including criminal networks within the state who pose the greatest threat to the state because of their corrupting effects, rather than their links to violence.

4 These five prisms represent the revised framework that came out of the workshop discussion and, as such, differ from the USAID framework presented in other fora.

5 Miklaucic, 2007.


7 Williams and Ricigliano, 2005.


9 Ortiz, Roman. “The FARC in Colombia,” presentation at the CSRS “Cleaning House” workshop.

10 For an example of the latter, see Anthony A. Braga and Jeffrey L. Brown, “Negotiating Gang Peace,” The Boston Globe, March 31, 2007. An escalation of gang violence in Boston was addressed by a full range of programs, including law enforcement, social service provision, and the facilitation of truces between rival gangs. The initiative worked in large part because “most of the gang members caught up in these cycles of retaliatory violence want peace.” Importantly, the initiative was also viewed as legitimate by the community and did not involve any relaxation of law enforcement efforts.

11 Arnson and Zartman, 2005.

12 In its original version, the IPS framework acknowledged the possibility of a diversity of motives within IPS but nonetheless urged analysts to identify the dominant motivation. As a result, practitioners’ discussions often degenerated into fruitless debates over whether groups were “loot seekers” or “justice seekers.”


14 Although personnel are also a key “resource” of IPS, this section follows the convention in the literature on criminal and terrorism financing by focusing more narrowly on material resources. The recruitment of personnel is addressed under the relationships prism.

15 See Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2007.

16 Relationships internal to the IPS — for example, between leaders and the rank and file — are included under the structure prism, which focuses on how power is exercised within the IPS.

17 Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1998.


19 The following two paragraphs are taken verbatim from Miklaucic’s description of the IPS framework. See Miklaucic, 2007.


22 In part, this may owe to some confusion about what the terms mean. “Soft power,” according to Joseph Nye who coined the term, “is the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals. It differs from hard power, the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will.” (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Soft Power: Propaganda Isn’t the Way,” *International Herald Tribune*, opinion page, January 10, 2003.) In many policy circles (and in the original framework), in contrast, soft power refers both to persuasion and to economic “carrots,” while hard power refers to the “sticks” wielded by the military and law enforcement.


24 Peake et al., 2004.


26 Gravingholt et al., 2007.

27 I thank Phyllis Dininio for this characterization of participant views.

28 This is consistent with the analysis of Williams and Ricigliano (2005) who, despite their general advocacy of engagement (“contact with armed groups as the norm”), note that the prospects of engagement are most positive with armed groups whose behavior essentially places them closest to the reconcilable end of the spectrum. (They do not use this terminology, instead listing a series of “positive indicators” for engagement, including respect for the rule of law, provision of social services, etc.)

29 Holmquist, 2005.


31 Sasha Leshnev cites an interview with a close confidant of Kony who observed, “During my talks with [Kony over a 2 year period], he was convinced that he would be successful in taking over the Government of Uganda. But now he sees there is a stalemate. He is determined at the [peace] talks [sic].” See Leshnev, 2007, p. 7.

32 In his workshop presentation, Mark Sedra highlighted the need for conditionality in the case of Afghanistan. For more on this, see Goodhand and Sedra (2007).

33 For a discussion of some of the issues related to this, see Giustozzi (2007).

34 This resonates with a key conclusion of the war economy literature, spearheaded by a series of International Peace Academy conferences, which stresses the importance of focusing on the political economy of DDR. See Malone and Nitzchke (2005), Nitzchke and Studdard (2005), and Spear (2006).

35 Thanks to Phyllis Dininio for this characterization of workshop participant viewpoints.


37 For more on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, see http://eitransparency.org/

38 Peter Andreas notes that the arms embargo not only enriched smugglers but created a special role for them within the military and then political elite of Bosnia. See Andreas, 2004.


41 On human rights, see Holmquist (2005) and Policzer (2005). For work sponsored by the German development agency, see Gravingholt et al. (2007).

42 The case of Afghanistan provided a basis for much of the discussion of “governance spoilers” at the workshop. Future work on the project would benefit from a focus on the dilemmas of the criminalized state in other post-conflict settings such as Liberia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

43 For example, Daniel Byman (2007) argues that insurgencies might be best targeted at their formative stages (as “proto-insurgencies”) and discusses different approaches that might be used. Arnson and Zartman (2005) argue that insurgencies should also be addressed early, before the resolution of grievances is complicated by the entrance of greed into the calculations of rebels.
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BACKGROUND ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT GAVE RISE TO THE CPN(M) – AND WHAT SUSTAINS THEM.

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), represents the radical wing of Nepali politics and has for more than a decade been planning and implementing “people’s war” in order to create a “people’s democracy” according to the policies of Mao Tse-tung. As might be expected, the CPN(M) leadership is not representative of the party masses, and the “Maoist” solutions, as articulated in the CPN(M)’s ideology, are not explicitly embraced by the mass base. Nevertheless, a hierarchical organizational structure that uses cadre to link the leadership to the masses, with combatants active in both attacks on the state and against internal enemies, has proved effective at engaging in armed politics. That the Maoists speak for alienated elements within the Nepali polity is one side of the movement, emphasized by its supporters; that terror has been essential to the progress of the movement is the other side, emphasized by its opponents.

That there is a potential mass base for any radical movement preaching more equitable distribution of scarce resources stems directly from Nepal’s 25-28 million people having exceeded the carrying capacity of a country physically the land area of Florida, but in reality much less due to topography and geography. The Himalayas in the north give way to hill country in the center, then to a narrow belt of flatlands, or tarai, in the extreme south. Population densities rivaling those of the great Asian river deltas have been reported, with none of the bounty and economies of scale that come with river delta civilization.

Extreme divisions caused by a multiplicity of social factors (especially ethnicity, language, and caste) have led to skewed distribution of resources and claims of exploitation by the have-nots. Increasing incorporation into the global economy, though providing a safety-valve in expatriate employment (overwhelming in basic skills), has also heightened tensions by providing on a continuous basis evidence, visual and actual, of just what a backwater Nepal is. A “normal job” will pay as little as $35 per month, and lack of economic development means that even those positions are increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to come by. In a population where more than half are under 19 years, the result is enormous numbers of rootless young people simply waiting to be mobilized by any organization offering life-chances (or any sort).

It has been the Maoists who have proved most efficient at providing an alternative vision, thus at mobilizing a growing following and a cadre of “true believers.” This effort has been enabled by a lack of state capacity. Though a parliamentary democracy since 1990, the country’s politics have been all but dysfunctional, noteworthy only for inefficiency and corruption. Nonetheless, the state could not objectively be judged predatory, and the widespread use of terror by the people’s war insurgency stemmed overwhelmingly from the subjective factors articulated in the radical ideological vision of the CPN(M). A multitude of agitprop mechanisms and scenarios, therefore, ultimately abandoning Chinese forms in favor of building upon traditional forms of song and dance, proved highly effective at tapping local grievances of marginalized groups and directing their energies against “exploiters” and alleged “enemies” and “spies.”

All human and institutional rallying points were attacked, especially the local gentry. In Nepal’s 3,913 counties, or Village Development Committees (VDC), and 75 districts, these were those who owned
greater resources than others, especially land, and those who held local offices of the state, either elective or bureaucratic. Teachers were a particular target, an irony since teachers and educational figures have comprised key members of the Maoist cadre, to include the top two leadership figures, Pushba Kamal Dahal, “Prachanda” (“Fierce One”), and Baburam Bhattarai.  

Police were a particular target, with the small police stations (normally 15-20 individuals) gradually wiped out, and government presence in 70% of the country reduced by 2003 to the district capitals and major urban centers. The police field force (Armed Police Force, or APF) was too new (created only after the conflict began in earnest) and too small to reverse this trend. When the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) was finally committed in 2001, its efforts to secure the population exposed it to defeat in detail by insurgent main force units. In an illustrative episode, the attack on Jumla district headquarters in November 2002, an RNA independent company (160 men) and three police installations (a total of 300 policemen), was attacked by four Maoist battalions and associated units, numbering 2,000-3,000 personnel. The conduct of the RNA unit concerned resulted in a costly Maoist defeat, even after the three police positions were overrun; but several contrary cases led to the mauling of the security force units involved.

Using “liberated areas” as their counter-state, the Maoists solidified their position and increasingly sought to penetrate the government strongholds, especially the urban areas. Urban partisans engaged in terror actions, particularly bombings and assassinations, while seeking to undermine state will to continue. Manpower was the easiest resource for the Maoists to acquire; and funding was obtained through the traditional insurgent means of kidnapping, extortion, bank robbing, and smuggling. The take was not large, but the millions gained proved adequate to fund purchases of weapons on the Indian black market to augment those captured from the security forces.

29 Both were born in 1954, are Brahmins, and entered politics in their university years. Prachanda earned a graduate degree (MA) in agriculture, Bhattarai in (PhD) urban planning (his wife, Hishila Yemi, now a Cabinet member, is an architect/engineer and also a member of the Maoists). Both have been widely quoted as advocating social transformation through violence – Bhattarai is credited with the intellectual authorship of the “Class Enemy Elimination Campaign” launched in 1996. Asked for personal details by Chitra Tiwari, he replied, “As per your query about my individual background, you can take me as a typical representative of a Third World educated youth of peasant background, who finds the gross inequality, oppression, poverty, underdevelopment and exploitation of the overwhelming majority of the population in a class-divided and imperialism-dominated world just intolerable, and grasps Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as the best scientific tool to change it positively.”

30 No reliable data exists on total CPN(M) funding, but it would seem logical to suggest a high figure of some millions of US dollars. Government statistics for the first several days of the November 2001 Maoist offensive put losses to CPN(M) bank-robberies at some USD 2 million. Field notes, November 2001. Local variations make generalization risky, but extortion, classified by the Maoists as “revolutionary taxation,” was until 2004 apparently “reasonable” in an objective sense. Small shopkeepers in Rolpa in April 2003, for instance, cited payments of NPR 50 per month (about USD 0.66); government personnel remaining in “liberated” areas (e.g., teachers, postmen) paid amounts equal to one day’s wages per month. NPR 100-200 (USD 1.32-2.64) was often cited by teachers who were making approximately NPR 7,500 per month (roughly USD 98). Reports of excess from collecting cadres were comparatively rare. In contrast, kidnapping-for-ransom was common, despite efforts by the Maoist hierarchy to deny such activity, and far more arbitrary. The amounts frequently were steep by the standards of rural Nepal. A case, not atypical, in Rolpa involved a small innkeeper held until ransomed by his family for NPR 30,000, or nearly USD 400. He subsequently fled to India, leaving his family adrift. Field notes, April-May 2003. Equally lucrative for the movement, of course, is extortion from businesses associated with the commercial economy. A typical trekking group of foreigners, for instance, stopped in October 2001, was allowed to proceed once the guide had paid NPR 2,000 (about USD 26), a normal amount and an order of magnitude greater than what can be gained in taxing the impoverished population. In the case just cited, a receipt was issued, and the trek reported no further demands. Field notes, December 2001. It is this activity, extortion, that grew completely out of control by 2004, to the extent that it was forcing the shutdown of even donor-funded projects. Demands as high as 10 percent of contract value were reported. Field notes, June 2004.
It would be incorrect, of course, to focus upon the military aspects of the Maoist campaign, because violence was but one of the five lines of operation by which the CPN(M) – as with all Maoist groups – proceeded to implement its strategic vision of using the countryside to surround the cities (however loosely defined that latter term may be in the Nepali context). Thus, the Maoists proceeded as follows:

(1) **Mass line:** As its principal targets for political mobilization, the party worked in hill tribe areas, especially in the Midwestern Region, and among *dalits* or untouchables (the lowest caste in the Hindu system). There was no shortage of grievances (as well as hopes and aspirations). Prior to being banned, cadre of the CPN(M) functioned as did the representatives of any other party, but they endeavored to use their solutions to local dilemmas to form an embryonic counter-state. In this respect, they functioned very much as had other Maoist groups (e.g., Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, India, and Peru), especially *Sendero Luminoso* prior to its own 1980 declaration of people’s war. During the pre-1996 period, it was the cadre of rival political parties who found themselves engaged in violent confrontations with Maoist cadre as opposed to the security forces.

(2) **United front:** Just as there was no shortage of issues for the mass line, so were there numerous causes about which could be mobilized those who sought activism of a non-Maoist stripe. Issues of education, for instance, allowed mobilization of students who, although apparently not initially CPN(M) members, nevertheless acted as virtual wings of the party. Most prominent was the *Akhil Nepal Rashtriya Swatantra Vidyarthi Union (Krantikari)*, the All Nepal National Independent Students’ Union (Revolutionary), or ANNISU(R). Similarly, tribal fronts, ostensibly seeking more equitable treatment, were also very active.

(3) **Violence:** CPN(M) used terror and guerrilla war to create a counter-state for itself in the Mid-Western Region, subsequently using this as a platform for projection into other areas of the country. Studying other cases of Maoist insurgency, particularly that of Peru, the Nepali Maoists judged that a mistake had been to accept the protracted war as a given rather than exploiting success as it developed. If, in other words, events unfolded in such manner as to present opportunities for shortening the insurgency, then openings should be exploited. Thus the CPN(M) aggressively sought to reinforce success, to enhance the momentum of its campaign. It felt it was entering Phase 2 with its general offensive (November 2001). Main force units were fielded in battalion strength, later in brigades and even “divisions.” Actions led to stalemate and transition to the present Phase 3, driven by united front action.

(4) **Political warfare:** To undermine the will of government units, the CPN(M) emphasized its ostensible desire for a “political solution” to the issues in dispute. The words are deceptive, because what the Maoists mean is that they would prefer not to fight and are quite willing to negotiate the terms whereby the old order will disassemble itself. CPN(M) used its participation in “peace talks” as a cover for military preparations prior to launching its November 2001 general offensive. It did the same with the seven months of talks that ended with unilateral Maoist attacks in August 2003. The present period (see below) has seen the demand for “peace” serve as a cover for coercion that has aggressively sought to neutralize all remaining centers of resistance.

(5) **International action:** The CPN(M) recognized early that in South Asia and within Western society it had allies, Maoist bodies yet committed, whatever the outcome of the Cold War, to radical restructuring along lines advocated by the so-called “Gang of Four,” the key adherents to radical Maoism. To that end, regular coordination was effected in the West with the constituent members of the Maoist umbrella group, RIM. RIM in turn provided a variety of services, such as seeking to block assistance to the Nepalese government. Closer to home, a Coordination
Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) was created in July 2001 after a meeting of nine South Asian Maoist parties in West Bengal.31

As effective as Maoist people’s war strategy was, it essentially delivered up to the Maoists the marginal areas of Nepal. With the RNA expanding to some 80,000 personnel and at least 75 line battalions, enough to place a unit in each district capital; the APF expanded to some 20,000; and the police not only expanded but fielding “Unified” units of growing capacity, CPN(M) efforts to secure victory through emphasis upon the violence line of operation ground to a halt. Royal frustration at the inability of politicians, whether elected or appointed, to make headway in addressing the security issue (or much of anything else), led to proclamation of direct royal rule in February 2005. Though arguably constitutional, the move was nonetheless highly controversial and provided the Maoists with the opening they needed to secure a united front with the marginalized “Seven Party Alliance” (SPA), a union (with the Maoist “M”) that was quickly dubbed SPAM. Combined with political warfare that played upon the desire for peace, the Maoists were able to secure a reversal of reality by dominating the virtual environment: the monarchy became labeled as the source of the conflict, and the security forces became those who refused to yield to the popular desire for “peace.”

The result was a “people power” movement in April 2006 that echoed in many ways the “EDSA Revolution” in February 1986 Manila, when Marcos was ousted. In Nepal, as in the Philippines, the military stood aside and let events take their course. Labeled as “brutal,” and police and armed police in reality were quite restrained, given the circumstances, with the total deaths in the episode numbering perhaps three dozen. The restoration of parliamentary supremacy – with Girija Prasad Koirala back for his fourth stint as prime minister (as of 28 April 2006) – resulted in various interim arrangements, culminating in a Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 21 November 2006 that brought the Maoists into the system and symbolized the effective surrender of the old-order. The monarchy was completely sidelined. After an interim constitution was approved on 15 January 2007, the Maoists formally entered the government on 1 April 2007. They have behaved ever since as befitting the April Fool’s Day entry into the halls of power.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

All political activity is presently directed towards the planned November 2007 election of a Constituent Assembly, whose 480 members are to write a new constitution. The unwieldy number has just been finalized and is derived from a combination of first-past-the-post parliamentary seats augmented by various proportional and sectoral representatives. The likely chaos unfortunately reflects those aspects of the Nepali political system that have hitherto imparted an intractable dimension to Nepal’s economic and

31 From India: Communist Party of India/Marxist-Leninist (People’s War), or CPI/M-L (PW), based in Andhra Pradesh and known generally as “People’s War Group” or PWG; Maoist Communist Centre, or MCC, based in Bihar, the large Indian state on Nepal’s southern border; the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist); and the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Marxist-Leninist). From Bangladesh: Bangladesher Samyabadi Dal (M-L); Purbo Bangla Sarbahara Party (CC); and Purbo Bangla Sarbahara Party (MPK). From Sri Lanka: the Ceylon Communist Party (Maoist). The ninth attendee, of course, was the CPN(M) itself. The most vibrant of these are People’s War Group (PWG) of Andhra Pradesh and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) of Bihar, both CCOMPOSA members, but now united as the Communist Party of India (Maoist), formed in 2005. More recently, a Bhutanese Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) has emerged and called for “people’s war” to overthrow the reigning monarchy. This organization is not yet a CCOMPOSA member but can be expected to seek such status. Field notes, May 2003. It remains unclear whether this hitherto unknown party is an ethnic Bhutanese phenomenon or an outgrow of CPN(M) efforts to penetrate the country’s ethnic Nepali community. The latter has been in a state of turmoil since the late 1980s as a result of official Bhutanese efforts to promote nationalism through a variety of socio-economic-political measures.
social challenges: a zero-sum mentality made lethal by a cultural anathema to compromise by the parts (however defined) for the good of the whole.

The original 20 June 2007 deadline to hold elections proved impossible to meet, both for technical and political reasons. Technically, the necessary steps had simply not been taken, such as passing of the legislation that enabled the polls. Politically, the interim authorities proved better at perpetuating a lack of state capacity than in strengthening the new-order. This should have surprised no one, since it was not just the same parties who had returned to power but, in many cases (e.g., Koirala), the same individuals.

Most crucially, the Maoists simply continued their people’s war by emphasizing the lines of operation other than “violence.” To look backwards at what had transpired leading up to the April 2006 collapse of the old-order: The changing correlation of forces demanded a recognition by the Maoists that the violence line of operation had reached its culmination point. The monarch provided an opening for a shift in emphasis to the “other” four lines of operation. In making the switch, New Delhi, alienated as much by King Gyanendra’s nationalism as by his ham-handed authoritarianism, served as host and mediator for the “secret” meetings that produced SPAM. From the CPN(M) viewpoint, then, what occurred was this:

(1) Mass line – The Maoists had consolidated a political base in the west. It had been achieved by armed political action. Terror, always important, could by 2006 give way to menace. The base areas had been consolidated relatively quickly and at acceptable human cost. Though the numbers were awful enough, what had been lost in the entire conflict in Nepal was well shy of what Sri Lanka lost in either of its two efforts against the Maoist JVP (1971 and 1987-90). Yet the Nepali Maoists had found it increasingly tough going to do anything decisive strategically from those base areas.

(2) United front – February 2005 (i.e., the king’s assumption of direct rule) provided the chance for a strategically decisive shift by delivering the political parties into the Maoist hands. That the political parties made a "mistake" was quite irrelevant to the fact that the mistake was made. A combination of "ceaseless waves" protest inside with armed action outside, all held together by dramatically enhanced use of terror against the state and security forces (especially through Improvised Explosive Devices, or IEDs, and unconventional actions) was seen as an unbeatable combination. The most significant element in Prachanda’s various statements was his advancing the next step in the united front process: he proposed that the political parties jointly form an army with the Maoists, sharing all positions and authority. He further proposed that democratic elements within the RNA join with the Maoists and the parties. He raised the question as to who controlled whom, monarch or RNA. The bottom line was the same: The Maoists recognized that the military was the tactical and operational linchpin. If it could be neutralized, the game was over.

(3) Political warfare -- Here again, developing circumstances delivered up to the Maoists a "blue chip" item, "peace." The longing for peace was so great that the Maoists could use it as a term over and over to undermine the will of all concerned to continue the struggle. It mattered not one whit that "peace" meant nothing tangible. It mattered not that the Maoists had created the situation, or that the political parties were the very ones who enabled their progress. The longing for "peace" could be used at all levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) to neutralize the ability of the government to continue.

(4) International -- What the Maoists saw was a global situation where the trends were in their favor. Even those international elements opposed to the Maoists’ dated, Cold War views were unwilling to grapple with the situation due to their preoccupation with violent radical Islam
(which the Nepalese Maoists claimed to support). As the CPN(M) saw it, everything was flowing its way. At least in part, the Party declared its ceasefire as a tactical gambit to see if it could neutralize government armed action. This did not happen, but strategically the government took a black eye as the entity that refused to "give peace a chance." That the Maoists used the interim to prepare for operations was winked at by many who saw the existing system as irredeemably flawed. India, as the prime offender in this regard, decided that playing its usual version of "the Great Game" was preferable to supporting the Kathmandu government. New Delhi was not totally committed negatively, but, in logic virtually identical to that which had prevailed in its Sri Lanka adventure, seemed to think it could contain the Nepali situation by fostering a "West Bengal solution" (i.e., legal Maoists participating in democratic governance).

What all concerned got instead of a “soft landing” was the fox in the chicken coop. Central to the arrangements to end the conflict was cantonment of insurgent combatants (with RNA, now renamed NA, confined to barracks) and a two-step decommissioning of weapons. As events transpired, the Maoists packed the cantonments with recently recruited manpower (thousands of whom were under-age) and failed to turn in many high-powered firearms. They left in the camps a skeleton chain-of-command to train the new recruits (within the limits imposed by their camp circumstances) and placed a reliable chain-of-command comprised of combatants in a new Young Communist League (YCL). These continued to engage in the violence and criminal activity (particularly kidnapping and extortion) that had characterized the insurgency prior to the peace agreements, with the exception that gang activity now took the place in most cases of overt use of firearms.

The latter were not absent, however, and were often carried in concealed fashion. The result has been a disastrous – and still deteriorating – security situation, enabled both by the presence of Maoist leadership figures in the government and the holding of the key Home Ministry position (thus authority over the only state armed capacity, the police) by a figure variously labeled as either an incompetent or a Maoist fellow-traveller, Krishna Prasad Sitaula, a Nepali Congress (NC) member.

In reality, Sitaula appears to be faithfully following the marching orders given to him by Koirala, who, hobbled by his advanced age (85) and poor health, seems determined press ahead with a “compromise” which has, as per critics, long since become one hand clapping. Most seriously, the continued internal deterioration and inability or unwillingness of the state to provide even the most basic services for the population (e.g., electricity and water) has unleashed a host of centripetal forces. There are at least seven identified separatist movements presently active, with those in the tarai the most serious and powerful. These tarai groups, comprised at least in part of CPN(M) breakaway factions, have proved more than willing to answer Maoist violence in kind. The state has compounded matters by both vacillating and engaging in deceit in its dealings with representatives of the separatist movements.

If the political situation is grim, the economic picture is perhaps worse. Though macro indicators are reasonably stable, the micro situation is such that, if anything, the conditions of unemployment and under-employment, which contributed powerfully to the Maoist ability to recruit manpower, are now worse. The Maoists have contributed to the deterioration of the situation by engaging in violent mobilization of workers into unions, displacing as necessary unions already in place, then engaging in job-actions which betray a well-nigh complete lack of knowledge of fiscal realities.

Socially, the centripetal forces discussed above have led to a demand from virtually all groups, whether of gender, sector, ethnicity, language, or locality, for inclusion in the new-order distribution of rights, resources, and privileges. The key omission, of course, is any consideration of obligations.

If there is one apparent bright spot, it is that – quite contrary to Maoist fears – there appears no sign of military desire to intervene in the political chaos. This brings to the fore consideration of the monarchy,
to whom the military once pledged loyalty (i.e., Royal Nepal Army). Under the old-order, the domination of the formal military chain-of-command by what effectively was a parallel palace structure, a military secretariat, was observed by some analysts. But few were astute enough to notice the degree to which this arrangement increasingly rankled.

Though the inadequate palace leadership that prevailed during the counterinsurgency did not produce either a Young Turks movement (i.e., as in Thailand after the collapse of the old-order in October 1973) or the Reform APF (Armed Forces of the Philippines) Movement, RAM, in the post-Marcos era, it did convince numerous line officers that their interests would be better served in a more “modern” arrangement, such as present in other democracies (e.g., India). Thus, contrary to expectations, there was no resistance to the transfer of command from the palace to the parliament.

Unfortunately, this transfer was done clumsily and inefficiently. Koirala himself maintained the Defence portfolio but failed to oversee creation of mechanisms which could serve as a secretariat for implementing NA transformation. Though the Defence Secretary, Bishnu Dutta Uprety, was a holdover with experience, he was not a security specialist but a line civil servant simply doing a tour of duty.

The new head of NA, General Rookmangud Katawal, who replaced General Pyar Jung Thapa, though an experienced officer, finds himself overseeing an army that is being hollowed out by the inaction inherent to being limited to garrison functions (with some engineer units, involved in mine-clearing and road construction, the exception). The bottom line is that the worst features of the old-order, especially a completely stove-piped chain-of-command, have not only been carried over but actually exacerbated by the new-order.

**MAOIST CENTRAL DEMANDS: CAN THEY BE ADDRESSED IN THE CONTEXT OF A RULE-BASED DEMOCRACY?**

Most disheartening when assessing the present situation is that the Maoists are neither understood nor taken seriously, yet are quite open as to their “ends, ways, and means.” Generally speaking, they are not understood, because the end of the Cold War has led to the demise of the once-substantial analytical capability that was intimately familiar with Maoist vocabulary, analytical framework, and strategies. And because they are not understood, they are not taken seriously. Though often deceptive when viewed from without, the Maoists are internally consistent in stating (publicly and privately) the ways in which they intend to accomplish their goals (i.e., ends), and the means whereby they intend to do so.

The Maoist goal remains the sweeping away of the old-order and its replacement by a new-order that is “Maoist.” The specifics involved are common to Maoist movements throughout South Asia and feature a dreary litany of state intervention in all economic, social, and political facets of existence.

South Asian Marxism remains Stalinist in its basic documents and formulations, though the various Indian communist parties have recently endeavored to move into the second half of the 20th Century (even as the world approached the end of the first decade of the 21st Century). Nepali Marxism is even more odious, colored as it is by the peculiar Nepali cultural framework discussed earlier. Thus the CPN(M) sees no contradiction in claiming to be authentically Nepali even as it meets under pictures of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao. Its economic plans are astonishingly similar to those pushed forward by the Khmer Rouge, highlighting that mobilization of the subjective will can overcome all objective obstacles. Public works projects are given pride of place (e.g., mobilizing the population to cut roads or to build dams), though there appears to be little thought as to how the pieces are to form part of a coherent whole. The integrating factor advanced is always political: the old-order has failed; thus it is time to move to a new-order.
The central demands of this new-order are for social justice and equity in distribution of scarce resources. That there is little understanding of just why resources are scarce (i.e., as already mentioned, a population that has exceeded the carrying capacity of the land) or why there is inequity (there essentially is no economy) has not been given a great deal of thought. If one is to judge by what has occurred thus far in the Maoist-controlled areas, redistribution is the immediate priority: seizing from those who have in order to give to those who have not — though the implementation generally classifies as “have-nots” the same Maoist cadre who are carrying out the redistribution. The truly poor remain just that.32

In order to carry out this vague vision of a utopian future, the Maoists must have power. This, they have stated time and again since coming in from the cold, they will gain “peacefully.” But their understanding of the term “peacefully” boils down to: as long as we get what we want, we will not resort to violence; but when nonviolence does not work, we will reconsider our position. “Nonviolence,” in the Maoist lexicon, means only that firearms are not used as the weapons of first resort. Constant menace, backed up by very real actions, such as kidnappings and near-fatal beatings, are categorized as “nonviolent.”

All actions being taken are designed to bring the Maoists to power. When taken to task by their CCOMPOSA compatriots for having abandoned the revolutionary struggle, the CPN(M) succeeded in placating its critics by outlining just what is set forth here. Put in so many words: our way will deliver power, because we will control the votes. Most especially, by denying the SPA access to the areas it controls, the CPN(M) intends to dominate the Constituent Assembly vote.

The CPN(M), therefore, is simply pursuing its ends by other means using the same way. Its lines of operation have remained consistent. Only the emphasis placed upon any one has changed with time and circumstances. The present means of choice are front organizations (there are several allegedly independent bodies that are in reality Maoist creatures) and the YCL, which dominates the streets and conducts the strong-arm activities against businesses (e.g., forcing through Maoist unionization). Concurrently, the NCP(M) seeks to function as an open political party (the mass line), mobilizing those who will respond to any force that seems to offer them better life-chances.

Maoist calculations have been hobbled by the tarai upheaval, as well as the growing revulsion against Maoist abuses. This reaction has increasingly taken resulted in vigilante action, because the state is seen as failing in its most basic duty, the provision of security to the populace. The regular claims by Koirala that abuses will no longer be tolerated are belied by standing instructions that no police intervention can occur without direct authorization from the Home Minister personally — and he rarely gives such orders.

Internationally, ties to India remain important, though India’s imperial motives have remained almost totally unexamined by any analysis. What India seeks is the soft landing. With its own Maoists gaining in strength and geographic spread,33 New Delhi’s ambition, paradoxically, is to prevent Nepal from becoming a huge Maoist base. It intends to do this by taming the Maoists, by bringing them into a democratic system and then encouraging them to behave responsibly within that system. Based upon the same inaccurate reporting and even more flawed analysis that characterized India’s involvement with the Tamil insurgent groups in the 1980s, it is likely that India’s latest version of the “Indira Doctrine” will misfire every bit as completely as did its disastrous Sri Lanka policy.

32 Maoist mis-steps have been plenty, none more so than the YCL repeating publicly the longstanding NCP(M) intention to ban recruiting for the Gurkha regiments of Britain and India. The UK establishment may well have run down to but some 3,500 men, but the various Indian formations comprise perhaps one-eighth of the country’s infantry battalions and a sizeable slice of certain paramilitary units, between 35,000 and 50,000 in all. The only substitute offered by the YCL is “employment with dignity” in Nepal.
33 At least a dozen Indian states have now experienced Maoist violence, to include West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashta.
WHAT IS THE TRUE MAOIST MOTIVATION: NEED, CREED, OR GREED?

Adept at running an armed political campaign, the Maoists now have struggled to find the proper balance between “the ballot and the Armalite,” as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) strategy put it. The organization is no longer fully in charge. Though the CPN(M) strategy of seizing power from within has been explained up and down the ranks, it is likely that the CPN(M) did not anticipate the reversal of protracted war roles, with time favoring the state. Not only are the Maoist ranks growing increasingly restless (for what do they have to show for a decade of internal war?), but their own misbehavior has mobilized a powerful backlash so pronounced that all attempts at surveys point speak to a Maoist drubbing in a fair election. Of course, it is implementation of a level playing field that the Maoists intend to thwart.

In one key area have CPN(M) designs been denied: the integration of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) into the NA (Nepal Army). General Katawal has been adamant that integration must be a process whereby individual volunteers are screened through the normal processes of induction. In contrast, the Maoists intend that integration should see their units absorbed into NA. This induction would be joined to demands for “democratization” of the military, by which the Maoists mean politicization, better “red” than “expert.”

In contrast, the essence of NA transformation is movement towards a nonpolitical army responding to the dictates of a democratic system. Here again the different conceptions of democracy collide. Koirala – and certainly General Katawal – sees the Maoists as having agreed to participate in the democratic system as defined by (and structured as) parliamentary democracy and the market economy. The Maoists, in contrast, see themselves as having agreed to accept the surrender of the old-order. Their intention remains revolutionary reordering of Nepal to form a people’s republic, as perhaps seen in its modern form in Chavez’s Venezuela or even Islamist Iran.

HOW DO THE MAOISTS INFLUENCE THE POLITICAL SITUATION: THROUGH COERCION, PERSUASION, OR INDUCMENT?

Coercion, persuasion, and inducement are but campaign elements inherent to the Maoist lines of operation. Faced with the refusal of the old-order to go quietly, the Maoists have responded through greater use of coercion, a form of violence. They have increased their level of menace, particularly

34 The basic pattern of Maoist violence may be conceptualized as follows: In Phase 1 (strategic defensive), terror facilitates or establishes the “space” necessary for the insurgent political campaign. It eliminates societal rallying-points, the synapses such as local gentry and minor government officials. Terror further generates demands for protection. Answering this demand, police forces respond. Once they predictably spread out, they are attacked in guerrilla actions, with small patrols and stations overwhelmed. Unable to defend themselves, the police invariably consolidate, thus exposing still larger swaths of the population to insurgent domination. Behind the scenes, certain guerrilla units (i.e., a proportion of guerrilla combatant strength) are “regularized,” to use Mao’s term, turned into mobile warfare units (main force units), copies of government military units. When the government inevitably deploys its military to reclaim “lost” areas, these units (normally the army) find themselves, first, harassed by guerrilla action, which demands small unit saturation patrolling, then, defeated in detail by the mobile warfare units (which fight using “guerrilla tactics”). This realizes Phase 2 and produces strategic stalemate. Only in Phase 3, when mobile warfare gives way to the so-called “war of position,” do insurgents assume the strategic offensive and endeavor to hold ground.

35 In these plans, the “old military” is to be cut back dramatically, and in its place substituted a mass mobilization model. Again, Venezuela and Iran provide useful models, both having increasingly sidelined old-order military power in favor of newly mobilized (and, in the case of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, institutionalized) and ideologically sound formations.
through use of the YCL, which regularly battles the police. This coercion is linked to upping the ante in numerous other ways, from verbal abuse to throwing sand in the machinery of governance. The second round of decommissioning, for instance, has yet to occur due to Maoist demands for salaries for the numerous spurious combatants they have packed into the regroupment camps.

What is significant is that all coercion is linked to inducements and persuasion. Businessmen, for instance, are assured that the market will be allowed to function— but in a more equitable manner. Interest groups are assured that their concerns will finally be addressed once the Maoists are in power.

The trump card, as the Maoists see it, is threatening to bolt, to take to the streets, to launch a new people’s war. Though they quickly clarify that they do not mean “returning to the jungles,” the threat is clear enough: pitched street battles. That plans have been made for such an eventuality is known to the government, but the SPAM coalition government is so tenuous that there is no one to take cognizance of the information.

**HOW ARE THE MAOISTS ORGANIZED (INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS)? HIERARCHICAL? NETWORKED? RIGID DISCIPLINE?**

What is occurring is a battle of mobilization capabilities. Throughout the counterinsurgency, the Maoists had the advantage for the simplest of reasons: the government did not recognize the game being played. To the contrary, all efforts by knowledgeable members of the state, especially within the security forces, to mobilize citizen capacity, whether in local defense forces or even watcher groups, were thwarted by incomprehension, outright opposition, or alliances made with the donor community.

In contrast, the entire thrust of the Maoist effort was to engage in mass mobilization, to form a counter-state that could challenge the state. The Maoists explained their situation in these terms. By 2003, they claimed they were a state (i.e., a counter-state) that existed on equal terms with the existing state and therefore had all the rights and privileges of the state. Just as interesting theoretically was their advancing the claim that sub-state actors had all the rights and privileges afforded in international law only to states. There could be no middle ground: one order had to give way to the other.

In this effort, Maoist organization remained hierarchical, with an effort to overcome centripetal forces and indiscipline. “The revolution” was overwhelmingly an internal phenomenon, with the Nepali expatriate community largely onlookers, except as victimized by Maoist efforts at extortion (e.g., in the Middle East) or seeking to participate in the form of fellow-travelers. Eventually, after April 2006, serious divisions did emerge within the expatriate community, with the debate played out principally through blogs but noteworthy for the increasing consideration in the debate of “Mein Kampf considerations.” That is, what does it mean for the possible future of a country to have potential (and certainly would-be) leadership figures who engage in Cambodian Holocaust denial; who deify (at least several) mass murderers; and who advance ideas that in the 20th Century produced the greatest crimes in the history of humanity?

The decentralized nature of the electronic debate faithfully reflects what has been occurring within Nepal itself as hierarchy, both organizational and societal, has broken down. In one sense, it could be argued that the security forces have maintained a degree of hierarchy even as the Maoists have increasingly become networked. Indeed, one of the problems for the transitional state in dealing with the Maoists is

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36 In meetings to discuss the situation, European donor representatives appeared committed overwhelmingly to a view which saw the Maoists as Robin Hood figures, produced by a hopelessly flawed old-order than had no moral right to defend itself. As such, most appeared to have reached accommodations with the Maoists, and a number apparently worked actively against the state.
the factor of assessing just what the Maoist leadership really controls. How much that is happening is in response to commands, and how much is simply local initiative that the Maoist leadership seeks to exploit?

The most frightening prospect, of course, remains a complete breakdown of law and order beyond anything yet seen. This at times appears to be the way the tarai is headed. Determined not to deploy NA, the weak government would have to be faced with a catastrophic situation before it would act, and by that time, the forces unleashed would probably be uncontrollable.

Therein lies the challenge for the Nepali state. A tenuous old-order, held together as much by tradition as by structure, has seen its glue dissolve. The present effort to achieve a new-order contains a possibly fatal flaw in that a key player, the CPN(M), lacks sincerity.
The Lord’s Resistance Army of Northern Uganda:
Brutal and personalized, but an Insurgency that can be dealt with

Introduction

Seemingly mystical and elusive, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has devastated northern Uganda for the past 20 years with an army of child soldiers and a cult-like leader Joseph Kony. Without popular civilian support, the LRA’s war strategy has been destructive yet straightforward: spread fear through brutal, small-scale attacks on villages, thereby causing people to flee their homes. The mass displacement has allowed LRA fighters to survive in the depopulated areas, loot goods and food from the land, and abduct more child soldiers into their ranks and virgin wives for their high command. Over the LRA’s 20 years of existence, 1.6 million people have been displaced, around 25,000 children have been abducted and forced at gunpoint to kill civilians, and tens of thousands of people have been left dead.37

Yet the LRA’s violence is not mindless, and the insurgency has a set of rational interests underneath the brutality. It bases the achievability of these interests on cost-benefit calculations relating to concrete military, diplomatic, psychological factors. The killings have served the primary interests of its leader Joseph Kony and his top commanders by allowing them to stay in power atop a 3,000-strong rebel group, receive arms supplies from the Government of Sudan, and maintain a lifestyle of 30-plus wives and god-like status in the bush. Apart from personal power and welfare, an equally powerful motive of the group is personal security, with localized spiritual beliefs comprising a secondary motivational factor. These interests are clouded by an extremely high level of distrust for the Government of Uganda. Importantly, the group has a highly personalized command structure centered on Kony and his top commanders. This combination of interests and structure has changed somewhat over time, and is directly influenceable by outside diplomatic, military, and confidence-building initiatives.

Summary of the LRA in the IPS Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IPS CATEGORY</th>
<th>LRA KEY CHARACTERISTICS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>Appears as Creed (messianic religious), in reality a mix of (in order of importance):</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) Needs (personal security and livelihood)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b) Greed (power for top commanders)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) Creed (localized spiritual beliefs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldview</td>
<td>Appears as non-state-centric. In reality, state-centric and influenceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphology</td>
<td>Tightly hierarchical command and control structure, with limited exceptions of few independent commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power modality</td>
<td>a) Coercion (overwhelming factor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Symbols (spirit powers are important, though not nearly as much as Fear)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) Inducement (a third, lesser factor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other key factors</td>
<td>External support from Government of Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Evolution of a warlord group: Brief background on the LRA

Armed rebellions in Northern Uganda: 1986-present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSURGENCY</th>
<th>LEADER</th>
<th>YEARS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA)</td>
<td>Brig. Odong Latek</td>
<td>1986-8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holy Spirit Movement</td>
<td>Alice Auma “Lakwena”</td>
<td>1986-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small unnamed insurgency following the Holy Spirit Movement</td>
<td>Fr. Severino Lukoya (father of Alice Lakwena)</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
<td>Joseph Kony</td>
<td>1987-present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The LRA is one part of a wider northern Uganda conflict that dates back to early 1986. The war was initially a two-pronged popular rebellion by northern Ugandaans against the new regime of Yoweri Museveni, the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M). When then-Head of State Gen. Tito Okello Lutwa, an ethnic Acholi from northern Uganda was overthrown as Head of State in 1986, thousands of the Army troops reorganized themselves in Sudan to form the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) and fight against the new government. Around the same time, another insurgency formed, led by Alice Auma “Lakwena” (the “messenger” in Acholi) and called the Holy Spirit Movement. Both groups – although they did not join forces – were popular among Acholi civilians, many of whom believed Museveni’s regime was controlled by western Ugandans who intended to subdue and extract revenge on northern Ugandaans.  While the UPDA and Holy Spirit Movement ended quickly, in early 1987 a young splinter UPDA commander named Joseph Kony stepped into the power void left by their absence and the LRA was born.

While the other rebellions may have been expressions of popular sentiment, Kony’s LRA has lacked support from northerners from the beginning. This stems from Kony’s earliest days as a UPDA commander, when he tried but failed to win over Lakwena and other leaders in a bid to lead a united Acholi rebellion in 1987. Following these rejections, Kony decided to form his own splinter group in November of that year. Without significant popular support, Kony filled his ranks mainly with UPDA fighters who he had kidnapped a few months earlier.

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38 Specifically, a great many Acholi were angry at the NRA/M for what they believed to be implicity in stealing their cattle (around 98% of cows from the Acholi subregion were raided in the mid-1980s), for breaking the 1985 Nairobi power-sharing agreement, and for saying the “northerners have been in power for too long”. To this day, many still believe that Museveni hates the Acholi. For more information, see Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences, and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda, Refugee Law Project, Kampala, Uganda, February 2004.

39 The UPDA signed a peace agreement with the government in 1988, while the Holy Spirit Movement was defeated in battle in late 1987 at Jinja, eastern Uganda. The original name of the faction was the Lord’s Salvation Army, but was then renamed the United Christian Democratic Army, and finally took the name Lord’s Resistance Army in the early 1990s.

40 He reportedly met Lakwena in early 1987 to seek her support, but she mocked him and told him he should use his limited spiritual powers to become a doctor or a healer, but not to lead a rebellion. Kony reportedly left in silence following Lakwena’s monologue and later allegedly told his followers that he was deeply insulted by her rebuff. She then later sent him a letter to stop fighting in mid-1987. Heike Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits, Fountain Publishers, Kampala (1999): 86.

41 Kony took an entire UPDA division hostage in February 1987. Several commanders joined him voluntarily, including ex-UNLA Lt. Col. Dr. Kweya and Lt. Col. Bazilio Opwonya, but others were forced to join contrary to their will. Kony’s military effectiveness was already evident at the time, as the UPDA was unable to attack Gulu town without him in November 1987. Behrend, 1999: 99, 179-80.
Kony’s band engaged in low-intensity fighting over the 3-4 years following the defeat of the other insurgencies. In 1991, the Ugandan Government took more decisive military action with “Operation North,” a mass military approach in which the Government recruited northern civilians into militias called the “Bow and Arrow” groups. Civilians actively arming themselves against the LRA rather than supporting it angered Kony, who reportedly told his troops that “if the Acholi don’t support us, they must be finished.”

The LRA soon began targeting civilians, most notoriously cutting off people’s ears and lips, and became deeply unpopular in the north. With no ability to recruit, Kony resorted to abducting children, mainly between the ages of seven and eighteen, to form the majority of his force. It is estimated that 75,000 people, including girls used as both commanders’ wives and fighters, have been kidnapped since the LRA began.

Former Ugandan Government Minister Betty Bigombe attempted peace talks with the LRA in 1994 and 2004-5, and a subsequent peace process is currently underway in Juba, southern Sudan, led by the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and supported by European countries and the United Nations (UN).

Motivation: Need and Greed, then Creed

A cursory glance at the LRA suggests a messianic cult insurgency that aims to overthrow the Ugandan Government and rule on the basis of the Ten Commandments. However, careful research based on interviews with ex-LRA combatants and others reveals that this creed-based view is misplaced. The underlying motivations of Kony and his top commanders are based much more squarely on basic needs of security and livelihood, with raw power as a close secondary factor. The spiritual dynamic factors in as a third, lesser issue. These elements have shifted somewhat over time, with the second and third playing more prominent roles earlier in the conflict, and the personal security element becoming more important in the last five years with the increasing military pressure on the group.

Security and welfare for those at the top

The current main driver of LRA behavior is security and welfare for Kony and his top commanders. As one confidant of Kony recalled, “I was talking to him [Kony] for two years. From my personal interaction with him, the number one concern for him really was his security. Number two was how they, his commanders, would get back into the community. This we talked about over and over again.” This overwhelming concern for security has been echoed time and again by ex-combatants, insiders to the peace process with close contact to Kony and his deputy Vincent Otti, diplomatic analysts, and local leaders with cultural knowledge of the LRA.

The urgency of security concerns is due to sustained damage to the LRA organizational ranks. The Ugandan Army, boosted by U.S. intelligence assistance, launched different military incursions include Operations Iron Fist I and II. The former dislodged the LRA from their rear bases in southern Sudan in 2001-2002. Then in 2003-4, the Sudanese and Southern Sudanese governments for the first time allowed Ugandan troops to operate north of the “red line” which the LRA had previously hid behind. These incursions have decimated the ranks of the LRA from around 8,000-10,000 to roughly 800-3,000.

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42 Focus group discussion with ten boys, Gulu, 6 October 2003.
43 This is according to a new report by researchers from the University of California at Berkeley and University of Tulane. “New Study gives huge figure for LRA abductions”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 17 June 2007. Available at www.iwpr.net
44 Interview with insider to the peace process, Kampala, 9 May 2007.
45 The former figures come from Ugandan army estimates. The current figures on the LRA are very rough, from anywhere between 500-1000 armed fighters, and then 1-2,000 abductees. The Ugandan Amnesty Commission,
Consequently, Kony’s group has been on the run for the past five years, and is currently displaced over 1,000 miles from northern Uganda in Garamba, Democratic Republic of Congo.

The sense of pressure only increased with the issuance of International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants for the top five LRA leaders in 2005. Fears for personal security are exacerbated by Kony and Otti’s low-grade paranoia, which psychological experts have observed (see below). Not only does this explain the group’s behavior during the later stages of the conflict, but also its heavy focus on getting the ICC issue resolved during the peace process – far and above other substantive issues. It is a matter of personal safety for those at the top. As one legal advisor revealed, “I spoke with him for four straight hours. His main concern in the peace process was the ICC; it was all about his security.”46 A member of the LRA delegation to the peace talks concurred: “Joseph Kony is most concerned about the ICC issue that is what is most important. The other issues will be a cake-walk.”47

A power-hungry leadership

Raw power for those at the top has also been a high motivational factor for the LRA leadership. As one Ugandan with close contact to the LRA argued, “Kony has so much incredible power. He can say who dies; he can hand pick four women every night; all that. Is he ready to relegate all the power that he’s had? He’s a god. As the commanders tell me, his power [after the LRA] is not just going to be about having a car, but about his ability to control.”48 Such raw power has been a key factor throughout the conflict, from Kony’s first days of a personal power struggle with rival rebel leader Alice Lakwena in 1986-7, to the Government of Sudan’s wining and dining Kony in the mid-1990s.49 Furthermore, Kony has been known to have over 70 wives, “picking and choosing which virgin he can sleep with the next night.”50 One of Kony’s legal advisors pointed out that “He [Kony] was a nobody. Who is he now? He has powers no head of state has, because he can give orders that one else can give.”51 Other high-ranking commanders have felt similar motivations of power and fame, according to insiders: “It was like fame to them. If they didn’t want people to move along a certain road, they didn’t let that vehicle pass. They felt very proud and strong. It made them happy and they felt very famous. Everybody would struggle to get a rank or be famous.”52

Furthermore, according to psychological experts, Kony likely has a low-grade mental illness which further feeds this power drive. As Uganda’s most senior psychiatrist commented:

Even though Kony is [mentally] sick, it doesn’t interfere with his reasoning except during certain time periods when he becomes hyper. This is when he’s overwhelmed by power, when he can

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46 Interview with legal advisor to the peace process, Kampala, 22 May 2007.
47 Interview with member of LRA delegation, Kampala, 23 May 2007.
48 Interview with insider to the peace process, 21 December 2006.
49 Kony tried to take over Alice’s rebellion in 1986 but was mocked by her, which he reportedly found deeply disturbing. In terms of his wining and dining, Kony admitted that he travelled to Khartoum four times between 1997 and 2002, including visits to the Khartoum military officers club. See Heike Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits, Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 1999; “LRA leader breaks his silence”, The Referendum (Nairobi), 14 April 2004. Available at www.iol.co.za
51 Interview with legal advisor to the peace process, 22 May 2007.
52 This information comes from an interview with an ex-LRA combatant as part of the following study: Tim Allen and Mareike Schomerus, “A Hard Homecoming: Lessons Learned from the Reception Center Process in Northern Uganda”, Independent study for USAID, August 2006.
control everything, when he feels he’s Jesus and so on. This feeling of being manic and his continuous low-grade paranoia keep this war going. But [peace] talks are helpful, because it helps them secure their future in their minds.\textsuperscript{53}

According to former insiders, it is precisely during these ‘manic’ episodes that Kony gives his most important battle orders, dictating the LRA’s next moves and instilling fear in the group. The paranoia may contribute to the LRA’s personal security fears, but the manic power element feeds the leadership’s greed for continued personal power.

\textit{Spiritual and political beliefs: a secondary factor}

Spirituality is a secondary motivational factor in the LRA. Along with coercion, local spiritual beliefs are used mainly as a psychological tool to reinforce Kony’s grip on power, but are not a prime motivator in the insurgency. Although it is frequently cited in the western media that the LRA wants to overthrow the Ugandan government on the basis of the Ten Commandments, not one of the over 100 ex-combatants I have interviewed in four years has ever mentioned this as an important motivational factor.\textsuperscript{54} Instead, many point to Kony’s strong spiritual powers of prediction and his use of spirits and customized rituals, which LRA fighters believe in to various degrees. Kony, who is absolutely the center of the LRA’s spiritual activities, acts as a high priest in performing a number of spiritual rituals such as spreading shea-butter on LRA fighters to ‘protect them’ before battle. As described in the psychological analysis above, he also at times becomes possessed by certain spirits, who guide him to give military orders. As an ex-fighter put it, “The spirit knows if you plan to escape. So the holy spirit would immediately talk about you. But this was a way of threatening people.”\textsuperscript{55}

Importantly, spirit possession incorporates a number of elements of local Acholi culture, which leads some LRA fighters to believe in Kony’s spiritual powers.\textsuperscript{56} As a military commander argued, “The Acholi believe in spirits. They have fear of spiritual powers and still respect Kony. Yet Kony and their leaders are exploiting them.”\textsuperscript{57} Supporting this view, there was a distinct difference in interviews with Acholi ex-LRA and those from neighboring regions of Teso or Lango. The former accepted the LRA’s spirituality to some degree, whereas the latter thoroughly rejected the group’s spiritual dimension.\textsuperscript{58} It is unclear what percentage of LRA members believe in the spirit powers. Of those interviewed for this study, approximately half were convinced of Kony’s spiriticism, and half were not.

The spiritual powers – particularly that of prediction, which has been critical to many people’s belief in Kony – are very powerfully reinforced by the LRA’s tight control over information. The group strictly bans possession of radios and newspapers among lower ranks, keeping such tools in the hands of top commanders. With this control over information, Kony’s predictions of events such as Ugandan army advances make him appear clairvoyant to some of his followers. As one local resident put it, “Kony has a spirit which he uses as a psychological power over the people. He has a very good intelligence network,

\textsuperscript{53} Interview with psychological expert on the LRA, Gulu, 17 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{54} The author was also a co-author of the USAID-sponsored study on the conflict by the Refugee Law Project in 2003-4, in which over 600 persons across northern Uganda were interviewed, including nearly 100 ex-LRA combatants.
\textsuperscript{55} Interview with former combatant, Anaka, Northern Uganda, 16 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{56} For a further description of the LRA’s spiritual elements, see Refugee Law Project, \textit{Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences, and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda}, February 2004. Available at \url{www.refugeelawproject.org}
\textsuperscript{57} Interview with military commander, Gulu, 2 May 2004.
\textsuperscript{58} The author has interviewed over 100 former combatants in Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Lira, and Soroti from 2003-2007.
but he tells the people that he got the information from the spirit.” But as one former combatant revealed, many LRA fighters are able to see past the spiritual dimension: “I was there for two years, but I didn’t believe in Kony’s spirit. Some people in the bush believe in the spirit, some don’t.”

Belief in basic political objectives is also a factor for some lower-level fighters in the LRA, though this is of limited importance overall. Critically, the LRA’s military strategy has belied any rhetorical statements that the group plans to overthrow the government. The LRA has always kept its theater of operations north of the Nile; has never targeted towns or cities in Uganda or national infrastructure; only moved out of the limited area of the Acholi districts of northern Uganda for a brief period during 2003-4; and has concentrated its attacks first and foremost on civilian populations in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, not on government forces. For example, in 2005-6, there were 183 civilian-directed attacks and 150 confrontations with the Ugandan army, but according to the UN Department of Safety and Security, “over 90 percent of these confrontations [with the army] were initiated by the UPDF.”

Moreover, the LRA is extremely unpopular among civilians across northern Uganda, as countless interviews show. Most of the northern population – despite its voting tallies of around 90% against the government – questions why the LRA is fighting at all. As a youth leader from the region commented, “They [the LRA] may say they are ‘liberating the people’ or ‘overthrowing the government’, but these are not true. If you look at the innocent people being killed, then you are sure not liberating.”

All of these factors – the vast majority of its attacks concentrated on civilians, battlefield operations never on a national scale, a complete inability to politically engage the civilian population – indicate a sincere lack of will on the part of the LRA to confront the government or engage in long-term guerrilla operations against it.

Nevertheless, some fighters do appear to be initially motivated by the political rhetoric, before being put off later by the clear strategies to the contrary. It appears that Kony uses a limited political rhetoric of “overthrowing Museveni’s dictatorship” primarily to legitimize the LRA to foreign observers and motivate young fighters with limited or no education. As one ex-combatant noted:

I was first of all fighting to be a big person. Because we were told by Kony that even if you don’t have good education, when you overthrow, you’ll be having work. And for me I thought I would be a big boss in Gulu district. … Those people who are educated, you’ll have better jobs than them because of overthrowing the government. Because if you overthrow the government, you have all the rules in your hand.

Both this former fighter and another ex-combatant, however, became disillusioned with the group later in the struggle: “I was happy to be one of the fighters, because I knew we were going to overthrow the government. But only later I saw nothing happened.” Rather than wider political interests, the LRA

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59 Interview with school teacher, Gulu, 16 May 2007.
60 Interview with ex-combatant, Palaro, Northern Uganda, 14 May 2007.
61 The Nile river curves around in Uganda and separates the north and south of the country.
62 The statistics come from the UN Department of Safety and Security in Uganda, compiled from two reports: UNDSS-Uganda, “A brief overview of the security situation in Northern Uganda, 6 Months: July-December 2005” and the same document for January-July 2006. The full quote of the mention in the text is: “Over 90 percent of these confrontations were initiated by UPDF showing that the LRA have for the duration of the period not been much of a fighting force as opposed to the self preservation oriented activities that they have indulged in.” UNDSS, Jan-July 2006, p. 5.
64 Interview with youth leader, Kalongo, June 2004.
overall is much more clearly motivated by the real factors important for those at the top: personal security and security.

**Worldview: State-centric with interests that can be dealt with**

The LRA at first glance appears to be an intransigent, non-state-centric group. However, the reality behind the mask reveals an insurgency with limited interests which are, in fact, susceptible to outside influence. These interests are often clouded by a deep distrust on the part of LRA leaders of the Government of Uganda, which has led some observers to believe the group will never be interested in giving up the fight. This distrust, which borders on paranoia, leads the group to be extremely careful with its leaders’ personal security; to draw out and at times back-track in peace negotiations; and to develop “Plan B” military strategies during peace talks, in case they fail.

Underneath the distrust, the LRA has more concrete interests of security, welfare, and personal power. It bases the negotiability of these interests on rational cost-benefit calculations relating to external support, safe havens, and thawing of the mistrust between their own leaders and the Government of Uganda. Because of the importance of these rational calculations, peace negotiations can be useful in providing an exit strategy for the LRA, if they are coupled with military and diplomatic pressure to change the group’s cost-benefit analysis on power and security. In short, the LRA’s worldview is localized, not universal, and state actors can deal with its interests. I will first analyze why the LRA has limited and not intransigent interests, and then examine the interests themselves.

Six recent strategic and tactical shifts by the LRA during the Juba peace process have revealed the negotiability of several of the LRA’s interests.

**LRA Strategic and Tactical Shifts Around the Juba Peace Process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOW (MID-2007)</th>
<th>ONE YEAR AGO (MID-2006)</th>
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</table>
| • Full ceasefire in effect for all of northern Uganda, September 2006-present; very limited and sporadic attacks, unclear if they are LRA; this has led 30% of the northern population to leave IDP camps | • 333 total attacks from mid-2005 to mid-2006, mainly on civilians. 1.6 million internally displaced persons.  
67                                                                                           |
| • Very limited or no abductions taking place                                        | • 345 civilian abductions from mid-2005 to mid-2006. 68 Higher in previous years.     |
| • All top LRA commanders assembled in one location and no operational LRA groups    | • LRA operating in 9 groupings in northern Uganda, southern Sudan, and eastern DRC69 |
| • First ever face-to-face meetings between Government of Uganda (GOU) and LRA       | • Very limited communication, only through mediator Betty Bigombe.                     |
| • Direct communication with Joseph Kony by the GOU, journalists, and other outside groups | • Fewer than five outsiders ever to meet Kony. Very limited communication with Kony, only through Betty Bigombe. 70 |

67 UNDSS report, op. cit.
68 UNDSS report, op. cit.
69 These include 5 groups in northern Uganda under Col. Kwoyelo, Col. Lapaicho, Col. Smart, and Brig. Ongwen, and Lt. Col. Okuti; 1 group in DRC under Joseph Kony; and 3 groups in Sudan in Yei/Kajo Keji; Yambio, and along the Juba-Nimule road. Interview with western security official, Gulu, 16 April 2006.
### NOW (MID-2007) vs ONE YEAR AGO (MID-2006)

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<tr>
<th>NOW (MID-2007)</th>
<th>ONE YEAR AGO (MID-2006)</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions to the Northern Uganda conflict signed, including provisions on governance, economic and land issues, resettlement of IDPs, and arrangements for security.</td>
<td>• Strong disagreements on the causes and underlying issues of the conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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These fairly significant changes have revealed a group that is, in fact, willing to accommodate at least some state-centric interests. “So many LRA [fighters] have left northern Uganda without firing a shot, and all the key commanders have crossed over [into Kony’s compound in the DRC]. This is a huge achievement of Juba,”71 as one Ugandan observer retold. The GOU has also noted progress with the LRA, as one member of its negotiation team highlighted: “Confidence building is ongoing. We sent them Kony’s mother; the first meeting [between the government and the LRA] happened; and we gave them 5 bulls in each zone as a Christmas gift. All of these have meant a lot.”72 These changes, which were impossible during the strictly military approach to the group in previous years, have shown the utility in peace negotiations in achieving limited objectives with the LRA.

Furthermore, insiders close to the LRA leadership reveal time and again that Kony – the one person who by far matters most in the LRA – is currently pursuing negotiations as his first and foremost strategy, with the military option as a secondary, alternative approach. As a close confidant of Kony observed, “During my talks with him [over a 2 year period], he was convinced that he would be successful in taking over the Government of Uganda. But now he sees there is a stalemate. He is determined at the talks.”73

Some observers have countered that the LRA has no interest in peace and has simply been buying time in the Juba process. Indeed, the group has a history of backing out of peace negotiations when its cost-benefit analysis has been greatly influenced by external Sudanese support. As a western diplomat asserted, “Kony and Otti don’t want peace at all. The talks are a waste of everyone’s time.”74 Such skeptics cite the group’s rearmament by the Sudanese government during the 1994 peace talks, and more recently the reported airdrop that Khartoum made to the LRA in the Central African Republic in January 2007.75

#### Factors behind the shifts

Closer scrutiny, however, shows that the LRA does indeed base its interests on concrete calculations. Four key elements – involving both diplomatic and military leverage points – have played a role in causing the group’s recent shifts. While Sudan’s interest was highly influential in the past – with hundreds of arms, ammunition, and logistics shipments to the LRA from 1994 to 2004 – it has

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70 In fact, Kony is on record saying, “I will communicate with Museveni through the holy spirits and not through the telephone”, for fear of his personal safety. “LRA leader breaks his silence”, The Referendum (Nairobi), 14 April 2004. Available at www.iol.co.za
71 Interview with legal advisor to the peace process, Kampala, 22 May 2007.
73 Interview with Kony confidant, 9 May 2007.
74 Interview with western diplomat, Kampala, 22 May 2007.
75 Skeptics also cite the LRA’s dragging out of the Juba process, and the fact that the group has never really moved to its designated assembly points. In reality, the former can be attributed to the LRA’s paranoia/distrust, which makes any confidence building with the group much slower than usual. Furthermore, peace processes are never concluded in fewer than six months. The Ethiopia-Eritrea accord, for example, despite covering fairly simple issues, lasted over 3 years. The assembly point issue, as nearly all observers admit, is a function of the LRA’s obsession with its personal security. This also relates to the psychological distrust of the GOU.
significantly decreased today. As a northern leader observed, “The LRA I talk to are very disappointed with Sudan. They never made any money during the war. They felt that Khartoum used them and abandoned them. This information comes from the top commanders close to Kony.”

There are four main reasons for the Sudanese decline: the elimination of the “red line” in 2005 so that the Ugandan army could conduct anti-LRA operations throughout Sudanese territory; the signing of the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement; the joining of the Equatorial Defence Forces with the SPLA in southern Sudan in 2004, which eliminated the Government of Sudan’s main vehicle for delivering arms to the LRA; and the branding of the LRA as international criminals by the ICC in 2005, meaning that the international community would look much more unfavorably on groups supporting the LRA. Thus, the recent Sudanese shipment was highly scrutinized internationally and at most included materiel rations and possibly ammunition, not armaments. As a western analyst noted, “The LRA is realizing it’s harder to operate. It’s lost its safe havens, and its resupply lines are far off.”

However, Sudan’s government still has an interest in maintaining instability in southern Sudan before the 2011 referendum in that country. Khartoum’s lessened role is largely due to outside pressure, and international pressure should be ratcheted up on Sudan and other external LRA supporters in order to aid the peace process.

Three other elements have also contributed. The Government of Southern Sudan’s strong statements that the LRA would no longer be allowed to operate on its territory have helped deny the group its safe haven of 13 years. A local cultural leader emphasized the importance of this shift: “Kony realizes that things have gone wrong. The real final factor that has moved the peace talks forward is the involvement of the Government of Southern Sudan. The LRA didn’t want to risk fighting them.” Furthermore, the LRA is not currently abducting new fighters into its ranks, which is due both to Sudan’s lessened support and the insurgency’s own internal changes as a result of the peace process.

Finally, confidence-building measures in the peace process have led to an important psychological development for the LRA. The steady, constant engagement of the Government of Uganda, the visits of Kony’s mother and other LRA relatives to the high command base, and the lack of Ugandan army retaliation during the peace process have all had a positive effect on the leaders’ psychology. These elements are beginning to break down the key barrier of distrust between top LRA leaders and the Government of Uganda as well as other outsiders. As a member of the LRA delegation candidly remarked in a private interview:

> The Government [of Uganda] has done well on the agenda points in the peace process. Museveni is actually very committed [to the peace process]. They [the government] have their representatives still there. This is a change from the past, because the peace process is handled by a government now [the Government of Southern Sudan]. Before, there were too many spoilers, when the peace process was simply under a tree. Now you have important actors in it – the UN is involved, African leaders, the Netherlands, DANIDA, Norway. Both this and Museveni’s changes help our commitment.

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76 Interview with Acholi traditional leader, Kampala, 20 May 2007.
77 Interview with Crisis Group analyst, Kampala, 9 May 2007; interviews with western diplomats, Kampala, 21-23 May 2007.
78 Interview with Crisis Group analyst, Kampala, 9 May 2007.
79 Interview with Acholi traditional leader, Kampala, 20 May 2007.
80 Interview with LRA delegation representative, Kampala, 21 May 2007.
This is a radical change from previous LRA statements, which branded the government as a dictatorship that was unwilling to negotiate and which “torpedoed those attempts [at peace talks].”81 Although military pressure has been effective in some regard, peace negotiations have allowed a certain psychological space which excess pressure was negatively exerting on the group. As a Ugandan analyst noted, “Too much pressure is not necessary with the LRA. They’ve lived in the bush for over 20 years. They behave more like animals. They don’t think like the rest of us, they’re ready to die. If there is too much pressure, they would just go off [and fight again].”82 Furthermore, psychologically, “Joseph Kony… appears to be a man who wishes to have his personal importance… acknowledged.”83 The Juba peace talks have allowed this to some degree and must be further personalized towards Kony and the top leaders, if they are to be more effective.

Key interests of the LRA and policy responses to address them

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTEREST</th>
<th>STRATEGY OPTIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Security and welfare for top LRA commanders (primary)</td>
<td>• Specialized high-level Disarmament – Demobilization – Reintegration (DDR) program for mid-level commanders; • Third-country asylum for top-commanders; • Modification of the ICC indictments to accommodate a national justice solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Personal power for the top LRA leaders (primary)</td>
<td>• Diplomacy toward the DRC to eliminate that country as a safe haven. Make “Plan B” much more difficult • Targeted military strategy toward the top commanders to shift their cost/benefit calculations on safe havens and lifestyle options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government of Sudan’s interest in destabilizing southern Sudan (primary)</td>
<td>• Public/diplomatic pressure on Khartoum to stop supporting the LRA • Diplomatic pressure on Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) to make credible threats against the LRA using southern Sudan as its territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Spiritual beliefs (secondary)</td>
<td>• Use of non-LRA-supporting local spiritual leaders in ceremonies • Increased use of Acholi spiritual leaders in media condemning LRA spiritually justified killings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Blocking factor: deep distrust of GOU and outsiders</td>
<td>• Confidence-building measures targeted at LRA leaders, including Kony family-related initiatives and others • ICC indictment of Ugandan Army officer(s), to convince that ICC is not simply an anti-LRA tool</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is critical to note that the LRA’s interests are limited and based on calculations of factors both within and outside the peace process. These points of leverage – military, psychological, and diplomatic – must be maintained and strengthened as part of a conflict resolution strategy. On the other hand, if they are relaxed and a pure negotiation strategy is pursued, the LRA’s cost-benefit analysis will change and it will likely pursue other avenues to address its core interests. As such, the LRA does appear to be building a backup “Plan B” military option, in case the talks fail. As a civil society leader put it, “Yes, they are building a Plan B, wanting to be prepared for any eventuality. This is a fallback plan. They have gained credibility through the peace process. If it fails, they may form an alliance with another rebel group in the CAR [Central African Republic] or DRC, or they will come back to Uganda as gangsters.”84 As a

81 See, for example, the November 2005 LRA press release available at [http://www.southsudan.net/lord.htm](http://www.southsudan.net/lord.htm)
82 Interview with Kony confidant, Kampala 9 May 2007.
83 Interview with local psychologist, Kampala, June 2004.
84 Interview with northern Ugandan civil society leader, Kampala, 23 May 2007.
Ugandan military analyst argued, “The LRA are still holding out and weighing their options. Kony never saw that Sudan could come to a real peace deal; this has changed his strategy. If the ICC warrants are taken off, he’ll sign the deal. But if not, he’ll rearm through the DRC.”

In short, a combination of pressure that is ratcheted up from the outside and confidence-building from inside the peace process will fully address the LRA’s interests. A key member of the Government of Uganda negotiating team’s take on the peace process is insightful here:

Implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement was not that smooth, and they’ve often just been sitting and watching at Juba. But that’s what we expected. The peace process has got[ten] us to a new point. It is building a lot of confidence, and there are new possibilities to end the war now that we didn’t have before. But we need outside pressure on the LRA and its supporters to negotiate more seriously. At the moment, they’re just sitting and waiting.

Both the military and diplomatic approaches have been successful in getting the LRA to the table, and the peace process has helped reduce one of the key LRA blocking factors: psychological distrust. A more intensified version of this combination would more fully address the group’s worldview. While interests and motivations are important elements in the LRA, the manner in which it projects its power is also critical to understanding the group.

**Power modality: Coercion and limited symbolism**

The LRA bases its power first and foremost on coercion, while symbolic spiritualism and material inducement play a lesser role. The leadership has built up a well-organized system to instill fear throughout its ranks, from deliberately abducting malleable children to forcing its new fighters to massacre their own relatives in order to create a clean break with their past. This coercive system acts as the main glue which has held the organization together for over twenty years. A former LRA insider commented that “Kony is followed by others because of fear. If people try to escape, he knows, and he will kill.” Another ex-combatant seconded this view: “Commanders follow him because they’re afraid to leave. They make you kill.”

Similar to other Illicit Power Structure groups, the LRA deliberately targets children and youth because of the ease of manipulating them. As outlined below, abducted children and youth make up approximately 80-90% of the LRA force. A local teacher observed that “Most of the little ones who stay fighting do not do so because they are discontented with the government but because they have no way of escaping and know little about society. Also, they can easily be indoctrinated. And I think that is why the rebels take young ones.”

Upon abduction, the first thing that is taught to new ‘recruits’ is that they will die a brutal death if they attempt to escape, which is often followed by a live demonstration of a new fighter being forced to kill an attempted escapee. The effect is powerful. As a long-time analyst of the LRA noted, “His [Kony’s] use of violence, including rape and forcing children to kill, often members of their family or other children, has had the effect of ensuring loyalty and obedience.” Violence against civilians then quickly becomes a way of life for LRA members. When asked about how he survived over four years in the bush, an ex-

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85 Interview with Ugandan military analyst, Gulu, 13 May 2007.
87 Interview with ex-combatant, Palaro, 14 May 2007.
89 Interview with school teacher, Gulu, 4 October 2003.
90 Interview with former peace negotiator, Kampala, June 2004.
combatant recalled, “The killing became easy. Because if you don’t do it, they will do it on you.” LRA commanders also create incentives for increased bloodshed, with military rank rewards bestowed upon those who kill more. “When you kill a number of people, many people, you can be given a rank. Killing helps give you a rank,” commented another former fighter.

Finally, LRA atrocities against soft-target civilians spread fear and chaos through the population, a warfare tactic that denies intelligence to the government and leaves the rebels free to loot. A single vicious killing can force hundreds of people to flee from their homes in a particular sub-county, leaving behind their planted crops and numerous possessions for easy looting. Again, numerous testimonies bear this logic out: “We killed people so that people would fear us,” recollected one ex-combatant.

Spiritual symbolism is a secondary power factor within the LRA. The LRA on one level operates like a cult group, carrying out frequent prayer sessions and rituals before battle. As described above, some commanders – particularly those who have been with him since close to the beginning – believe in Kony’s spirit, while a great number of the group’s fighters do not. But a spiritual element is present in the group. A local religious leader argued that “Kony speaks well. He can make you smile; he can listen well and respond, even despite his low education. It’s mostly the spirit which gives him control. I call him a cult leader. … His capacity to motivate the inner being of a person is immense. … People with him believe that Kony has that extra power. That if you don’t move this way or that way, that you’ll die.”

As a local cultural leader noted, “We don’t know how much physical control Kony has over them [his commanders], but he has psychological control. That is certain.”

Importantly, as described above, the LRA’s spiritual elements are secondary to their drive for power and security. “Beliefs in spirits and supernatural forces certainly serve the interests of the LRA,” as an expert in the group’s psychology highlighted. Furthermore, the LRA’s spiritual grip appears to be diminishing over time. This is due to a number of recent developments: a decreased power of prediction; more news and information flowing from the outside world; fewer child fighters because of fewer abductions; and a lack of military successes, with the group unable to roam freely in Sudan as it previously did. As a local civil society leader argued,

Kony’s spiritual power is going down. [With an unprecedented ability to interact outsiders and the media because of the peace process], the commanders are getting an understanding of the outside world and are seeing that Kony is a human being like anyone else. Also, he’s not having the powers of prediction he once had. People really believed that the source of those predictions was the spirit. But now, the LRA is no longer sprinkling water like it did, abductions are way down, he has run so far to Congo. They don’t have very much power, and this has an important effect, too.

Though often overlooked by foreign observers, this dampening is sowing seeds of discontent between those at the top of the LRA and fighters underneath. As a prominent Acholi leader observed, “Kony’s spiritual powers: many at the top really believe it. But now they are possibly believing it less. It’s only that they have little alternative, as they can’t come 1,700 kilometers all the way back to Uganda.”

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91 Interview with ex-combatant, Koch Goma, 13 March 2006.
93 Interview with ex-abductee, Gulu, 6 October 2003.
94 Interview with northern Ugandan religious leader, Gulu, 13 May 2007.
95 Interview with northern Ugandan cultural leader, Kampala, 20 May 2007.
96 Interview with Ugandan psychologist, Kampala, June 2004.
97 Interview with Acholi civil society leader, Kampala, 23 May 2007.
98 Interview with advisor to the peace process, Kampala, 22 May 2007.
increased division between Kony and the commanders could be exploited more fully in the peace process. For example, a strategic Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program specially tailored to mid-level commanders could help induce such fighters to come out more easily.

A final power modality within the LRA is a limited mechanism of material inducement. This comes mostly in the form of field commanders’ ability to steal, rather than receiving material rewards directly from Kony and the high command. The process works as follows: independent field commanders take some of the goods looted from raids – from cash to agricultural produce to household goods – and then work with civilian collaborators to sell the stolen items and retain the proceeds. As a military analyst observed, “Some commanders have buried money in places, after having taken cuts over the years. Some have businesses, buses, etc., and have given money to people to keep. But Kony doesn’t reward people.”

Interviews with nearly all stakeholders suggest that there are a limited number of LRA collaborators across northern Uganda, mainly personal relatives and friends of the individual LRA fighters. These collaborators meet the LRA fighter that they are connected with clandestinely, and then either give them small materials to help them survive in the bush or take stolen proceeds from the fighter and invest them in a local small business. As an ex-combatant retold, “I met collaborators… They used to buy for them [the commanders] things.” This material reward power has influenced some commanders to stay fighting, as they could loot with the LRA and use a portion of the proceeds to build up a small amount of wealth. However, this factor should not be overstated. The relative accumulation that one can build up from taking a cut of looted cassava and goats is fairly small. More importantly, it pales in comparison as a motivating factor to the intense fear driven into LRA fighters by the group’s highly organized command structure.

**Morphology: A distinct two-tiered hierarchy**

Organizationally, the LRA operates with a highly personalized two-tier hierarchical structure. Kony has transformed the group to adapt extremely well to both the dense bush geography and the socio-economic destitution of northern Uganda, as well as the government’s conventional military response. Unlike regular armies or insurgencies concerned with personnel casualties, the LRA’s commander-focused two-tier structure allows it to operate effectively even if the vast majority of its members were to perish. The top tier is made up of Kony and his approximately 15 top brass plus 200-400 core fighters, while the remainder is made up of lower fighters or child porters whom the LRA deems replaceable.

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99 Interview with military analyst, Gulu, 13 May 2007.
100 Interview with ex-combatant, as part of Tim Allen study for USAID, op. cit.
LRA members are well aware of this structure. As one put it, “Only Kony is to blame. It’s Kony that guides everything. Even top commanders like [former Brig.] Sam Kolo are only taking orders.”

Developments in the Juba peace process confirm this structure at the top. “There is Kony and Otti, then three Major Generals, three Brigadiers, and some Colonels. They do have some input in the talks and have been with him [Kony] since the beginning. Only Kony and Otti speak, though.” There also appears to be a smaller group of approximately 100-150 semi-autonomous fighters who are not strictly under Kony’s control and who remain in northern Uganda and Sudan. Based on interviews with intelligence officials and former LRA combatants, the structure is approximately as follows:

This commander-focused organization has allowed the group to thrive in the region, working well until recent years against the largely conventional military approach that the Ugandan government used for years. Despite being portrayed as a rag-tag band of thugs, the LRA is in fact a well-organized and well-disciplined force, as reported by affected civilians and ex-combatants alike. An LRA fighter-turned-teacher commented, “The Ugandan army runs away when Kony comes. Even a small number of LRA fighters can overcome a very large Ugandan army force. For example, once over 2,000 Ugandan army fighters came to attack us, but we repelled them with fewer than 500.” The army’s largely conventional response to the group until late 2003 used large numbers of ground troops and mass firepower through helicopter gunships and artillery fire, i.e. an approach aimed at inflicting significant personnel casualties on the enemy. However, the LRA’s two-tier structure worked well against this strategy, with the vast majority of LRA members killed being recently abducted youth and others peripheral who were to the organization as a whole. According to journalists and civilians based in the region, the large numbers of LRA “rebel casualties” reported daily in the Ugandan newspapers are in fact

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102 Interview with Acholi traditional leader, Kampala, 20 May 2007.
103 Interview with school teacher and ex-abductee, Gulu, 6 October 2003.
104 Interview with senior Ugandan government official, 3 December 2003.
from this lower, disposable tier of the group. As one IDP from a camp that had recently been attacked reported, “When the planes come [Ugandan army helicopter gunships], the rebels change uniforms and give them to the children, and force the new abductees to put on the uniforms. So the planes bomb the children.” The more targeted approach used in subsequent years was somewhat more effective, though it did not eliminate the LRA leadership.

Operationally, the LRA mounts attacks in very small units, which are then multiplied across different areas to create confusion and multiple simultaneous attacks. The larger units of 100 or so fighters are used only in very large-scale attacks, while generally the LRA splits up the group into smaller units of ten or even three, for increased stealth.

### LRA Unit structure

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LRA unit – 100 fighters**

20 LRA

3-10*  3-10  3-10  3-10

*each LRA “cell” of 10 carries out their own individual attacks, sometimes simultaneously
**sometimes entire unit of 100 fighters used for carrying out large-scale attacks
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Breaking up into such small units has made LRA military operations much more effective given the undeveloped, dense forest terrain of northern Uganda and southern Sudan. As a local traditional elder observed, “Southern Sudan is an ideal place for this type of rebellion. It is a vast land without development, no mobile phone network, no huts, just forests and forests. You can’t spot anyone.” Ugandan army helicopters, whether gathering intelligence or conducting air operations, have had a very difficult time pinpointing LRA groups when they are split up into groups of only 3-10 people.

Recent developments have pointed to a smaller contingent of approximately 100-150 autonomous fighters who are not strictly under Kony’s control. While Kony and most of the high command have been based in southern Sudan for the past 5-7 years, a semi-autonomous core of fighters has been continuously operating in northern Uganda. When Kony gave orders in March 2007 for all LRA fighters to reunite with the top brass in eastern DRC, it appears that around five commanders refused the order and continue to roam in Uganda and Sudan, including Col. Smart, Col. Kwoyello, and Cesar Acellam. As a member of the LRA delegation admitted, “Most commanders are under Joseph Kony’s central command, but some are independently commanded.” A further sign of the existence of such commanders was Vincent Otti’s radio announcement in late April that the ICC would indict everyone in the LRA. This signaled a

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105 Confidential interview with four journalists, Lira, 12 November 2003. See also, Refugee Law Project, 2004: 32-3, which quotes a human rights worker as saying, “A ‘rebel’ who is killed in battle may have only just been abducted one hour ago. If you are killed you are a rebel, if you are abandoned or escaped you are an abductee.”


109 Interview with member of LRA delegation, Kampala, 21 May 2007.
desperate attempt to reign in any stray elements within the group, since Kony and Otti are clearly aware of the ICC’s focus on only top commanders.

Finally, there is a notable distinction between the LRA high command and the political delegation which represents the insurgency at the Juba peace talks. In years past, LRA political representatives have had very poor linkages with top commanders in the field, facing death threats several times from Kony after having attempted to negotiate and make public statements on behalf of the group. Most such political representatives are made up of northern Ugandan diaspora living in the UK, Kenya, and the U.S, and have been supplying the LRA with money and logistical support over the past several years. In recent months, this dichotomy appears to have been reversed. As one of Kony’s confidant’s retold, “The delegates make frequent consultations with Kony and Otti. Others have tried to break the two apart, but Kony has denied this. He trusts them.” A Ugandan military expert added: “Kony feels like he owes them because the financed him.”

Conclusion

At first glance, the Lord’s Resistance Army is one of the world’s least comprehensible armed groups. It ostensibly fights in the name of the Ten Commandments yet abducts children and targets violence on civilians. Its leader, Joseph Kony, appears as a cult fanatic, paranoid and possessed by spirits. Yet underneath these appearances, the LRA is a rational group controlled tightly by those at the top and motivated mainly by personal security and power. Its targeted and highly organized use of violence, particularly involving children, is a means to achieving those interests. Developments over recent years have shown that external factors – from military threats to diplomatic maneuverings against its supporters to confidence-building measures in a peace process – can change its leaders’ calculations of how these interests can be achieved. But in designing conflict resolution strategies for the group, it is critical to remember the LRA’s organizational structure as a highly personalized, two-tier insurgency. It is Kony and the top commanders who matter, vastly more than the remainder of the group. Therefore, peace and security initiatives must be aimed precisely at the top, and should be more personally tailored to these particular individuals than is the case in other conflict management processes.

At present, much has been achieved in getting the LRA to the negotiating table, diminishing their external sources of support, lowering their levels of psychological distrust in the Ugandan government and outsiders, and diminishing their military operability. Going forward, a combination of four international policy measures would provide the best chance to fully resolve the conflict.

- First, international pressure must be increased on Sudan and the DRC to fully eliminate the LRA’s support lines and safe haven.
- Second, the Juba peace process should continue, particularly focusing on building psychological confidence with Kony. Personalized initiatives such as allowing Kony’s relatives to visit, direct talks between Kony and top GOU officials, etc. would be particularly beneficial in addressing the LRA’s interests.
- Third, direct talks with Kony should proceed on security and livelihood for himself and the top commanders.
- Fourth, a serious Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiative should be launched to lure non-ICC indicted commanders out of the bush. This should be tailored for the

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110 For example, London-based LRA negotiator James Obita was nearly killed by Kony in the bush after trying to negotiate on behalf of the LRA in the late 1990s.
111 Interview with Ugandan insider to the peace process, 9 May 2007.
112 Interview with Ugandan military expert, Gulu, 13 May 2007.
specific needs of all non-indicted commanders and should be well advertised as an incentive package.

Finally, there is significant room for expanding the U.S. role during the present window, and constructive engagement in five areas would add real value to the conflict resolution strategy:

- Direct participation in confidence-building measures in the peace process;
- Increased diplomatic pressure on the DRC (on eliminating the LRA's current safe haven) and Sudan;
- Military threats against the LRA to put real pressure on its leaders who fear the U.S.;
- Brokering direct negotiations between the GOU and Kony on security arrangements, particularly as a non-ICC signatory country; and
- Offering a low-cost DDR initiative aimed at luring mid-level LRA commanders out of the bush.

While the LRA may appear an elusive group incapable of being dealt with, the reality is that an additional push on a few separate fronts would address its underlying interests. Building on current progress, such an initiative would stand a good chance of ending the northern Uganda conflict once and for all.
Based on Minority Rights Group International's 'Ethnic Groups and Tribes of Uganda', Uganda: The Marginalization of Minorities (2001). Boundaries are not definitive but are intended to show traditionally inhabited areas.
Summary

The emergence and proliferation of illicit power structures in developing states poses many unforeseen challenges to global development and democratization efforts. Illicit power structures often referred to as non-state armed groups, strike at the heart of state building by challenging the very state itself, as well as the normative assumptions underlying the contemporary state system. Despite the magnitude of these challenges, there has been little systematic study of illicit power structures and thus little examination of the tools available to counter their subversive impacts, particularly tools that might be developed within the foreign assistance portfolio.

Most development assistance is predicated on the thesis that developmental and governance failures result from deficits in the formal state institutions, or the under-development of traditional civil society. However an additional dimension populated by a rogue’s gallery of organizations – referred to as “illicit power structures” -- subvert and impede democratic consolidation and successful development and obstruct the achievement of viable peace in the wake of internal conflict.

The Illicit Power Structures (IPS) project seeks to shed light on illicit power structures by developing a framework of analysis that facilitates a closer look at IPS’s world view, motivations, methods and morphologies. It is hoped that this ‘framework’ will facilitate the examination of IPS, provide field practitioners with a better sense of IPS's dispositions, propensities and vulnerabilities, and lead to more effective strategies and tactics to counter their subversive impacts.

To date, the project has developed a draft framework, tested it with two field studies and four preliminary desk studies and ‘experimented’ on it at a three day workshop at the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey. The framework is now being modified to incorporate insights from these case studies and the workshop. In the next two weeks, when this is complete, experts will be asked to modify or complete case studies and provide additional insights into proposed strategies and tactics for countering negative impacts from IPS. The final framework and case studies, strategies and tactics will then be presented in a Washington DC interagency workshop, published in accessible format for field practitioners and possibly integrated into complementary efforts such as the SHAPE. This document provides further detail of work to date and identifies the steps for project completion.

Project Update

Case studies and workshops. To refine and test the draft IPS Framework, the IPS project has conducted case studies a three day workshop in Monterey and two smaller half day workshops in Washington DC. To date, one case study is completed another is in draft format and four other preliminary case studies where conducted as part of the Monterey workshop. A case study on the Lords Resistance Army has been completed by Sasha Lezhnev of Global Witness. Another, done by Tom Marks and Michael Miklaucic of USAID on Nepal, is in draft format (both the Uganda and Nepal case studies are attached). Other experts have done first drafts of case studies for their workshop presentations, these include:

- Angel Rabasa, RAND – Mindanao, Philippines IPS
- Mark Sedra, University of Waterloo – Afghanistan IPS
- Roman Ortiz, Universidad de los Andes – FARC in Columbia
- Douglas Porch, Naval Postgraduate School, Paramilitaries in Colombia
- William Reno – Niger Delta IPS
Further work on case studies has been postponed until feedback from the first case studies and the IPS workshop is incorporated into the framework.

**Monterey IPS workshop – experimentation.** In addition to the case studies, a three day workshop was held in cooperation the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at the Naval Postgraduate School. The workshop had about forty participants from the US and UK governments and international and non-government organizations (see attached participant list). USAID participants included Katherine Liesegang, Michael Miklaucic and Michael Chelius. In addition, Diego Bustamante, who coordinates implementation of USAID stabilization programming for the Government of Columbia, participated. The workshop provided an opportunity to ‘experiment’ with the framework by having participants review and critique the IPS framework.

The three goals of the workshop were:

1. Diagnose the problem and develop a methodology for determining the key characteristics of illicit power structures. The goal was to develop critical falsifiable propositions that will test the validity of the framework and enhance its utility to practitioners working in the field.

2. Develop a collective understanding of how to utilize “soft power” responses to more effectively neutralize illicit power structures

3. Establish networks and facilitate cross-community learning, collective problem-solving and the development of professional networks among participants.

Overall the workshop was highly successful in achieving goals one and three. Participants and presenters provided a robust review and critique of the framework and a number of important insights came are being incorporated into a modified framework. However, there was less success with goal two – development of an understanding of how to utilize “soft power” responses to more effectively neutralize IPS. Though presenters and participants at the workshop began to analyze and describe policy and programming options for dealing with IPS additional work is needed.

A summary document is being prepared by the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction of NPS by Jeanne Giraldo who facilitated the workshop. The document is now in draft format awaiting NPS internal approval before printing and circulation (the draft is attached).

**Next Steps**

**Framework modification** (present - February 28)

Before additional case studies or other project activities are completed, the draft IPS framework needs modification to incorporate feedback from the workshop and case studies completed to date. Jeanne Giraldo of CSRS and project advisor, Michael Miklaucic, plan to modify the framework by February 22.

**Case studies modification and expansion** (March – June 2008)

With the framework being modified, we are now determining which case studies should be further pursued either with or without travel to the field. It is intended that the case studies will match DOD and USAID priorities. Angel Rabasa has just returned from the Philippines and will likely be able to do a desk study without further field travel. Similarly, Sasha Lezhnev can update the Uganda case study to match the modified framework without additional field travel. Other experts may or may not need field travel to complete their case studies. It is estimated that with remaining budget we could fund up to two additional field studies.
Strategies, tactics and programming options (March – June 2008)

Experts modifying or conducting case studies will be asked to also focus on policy and programming options for dealing with IPS and the results will be incorporated into the framework.

Publication and presentation (present – August 2008)

To ensure that the final framework is useful to field practitioners and others it must be available in an accessible format and actively presented to the appropriate groups. Steps include:

1. Greater integration and socialization of the project within USAID including Individual briefings when workshop summary is complete to key USAID office and interagency partners.

2. Possible creation of an informal ‘steering committee’ for the project with USAID, other USG agencies and departments and other partners to increase involvement.

3. Conduct a briefing and workshop in June for Washington with results and case studies and summary of program and policy options.

4. Exploring options for presenting and using the completed IPS material. Options under consideration include seeking assistance from Angel Rabasa and RAND to publish a book in their series on Ungoverned Spaces.

5. Integration with other related projects including SHAPE and USAID/Interagency SSR programs.

Project management, funding and budget

Project personnel

1. Nils Mueller is now the USAID Cognizant Technical Officer, replacing Michael Miklaucic in this role.

2. Michael Chelius, USAID/USIP - Contracted through United States Institute for Peace (USIP) to support the IPS project part time. Michael began work with the IPS project in September 2007. He is also part time field advisor with USAID Office of Transition Initiatives. He recently returned from Colombia, where he conducted a program review of a USAID OTI program support the Government of Colombia efforts to expand government services area newly cleared of armed groups.

3. Michael Miklaucic – As part of the USAID Democracy and Governance Office, he originated the project and drafted the IPS framework. Though, now on Leave from USAID, he remains a voluntary advisor to the project.

4. Jeanne Giraldo, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at the Naval Post Graduate School -- Jeanne co-facilitated and co-organized the Monterey workshop and is providing a summary of the workshop as well as assisting with modification of the framework and case studies.

5. Outside experts – In addition outside experts will continue to be involved in preparation of case studies and revision of the framework.

Funding

Funding for the project is provided through DOD and the USAID DG office and for is split between two implementing partners, USIP and MSI. Remaining funds are about 135,000 that expire at the end of fiscal 2008. MSI has about 120,000 dollars remaining and USIP has about 15,000.
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ATTACHMENT 6 – IPS QUESTIONS FOR FIELD TEST

IPS METHODOLOGY FOR FIELDTEST

I. Comparing the IPS to the ICAF

The interagency conflict assessment framework (ICAF) focuses on violent conflict. The illicit power structures perspective, by contrast, focuses on actors who are engaged in unlawful activities. Some IPS activities, such as insurgencies, add to the level of conflict in a country; others, such as drug trafficking, may not directly entail violent conflict, but may augment drivers of conflict and eviscerate mitigating factors, and thereby increase the risk of conflict.

The IPS perspective offers more detailed guidance for analyzing key actors engaged in illicit activities. This analysis forms a part of step 2 in the ICAF. The ICAF calls for an examination of the motivations and means of key actors. The first two prisms of the IPS perspective--worldview and motivations--inform the ICAF focus on motivations, while the last three IPS prisms--resources, relationships, and internal structure--provide insight into the ICAF focus on means.

It is worth noting that the distinction between licit and illicit pertains to activities and not actors. Actors can participate in both licit and illicit activities.

II. Collecting Data on IPS

The IPS team is likely to find some secondary source data on illicit power structures. Local and international newspapers and magazines are likely to cover specific non-state armed groups or crime groups, and IRIN, UNODC, the International Crisis Group, RAND Corporation, Chatham House, other organizations and academics are likely to provide additional coverage of illicit power structures. The Economist Country Profile, U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report, and USAID assistance strategies and sectoral assessments for the country or region in question may provide additional contextual information.

Key informant interviews will provide a vital source of information. Key informants typically will include:

- U.S. and international military and government officials with focus on illicit power structures in the country (i.e., UNODC, State/INL, Justice/DEA, CIA/DIA, Africom, Defense/OSD, State and USAID desk officers; Embassy and Mission staff including the defense attaché and the regional security officer);
- Bilateral and multilateral donors and implementing partners (i.e., World Bank, UNDP)
- Academics and experts who work on illicit power structures in the country;
- Journalists who track IPS;
- Government officials (interior/police, military, intelligence) and political party representatives;
- Civil society, religious, and business leaders knowledgeable about IPS;
- NGOs working in communities affected by IPS.

Danger to team members or interviewees and hostility to the U.S. may constrain some interviews. Although academics and journalists often succeed in interviewing at least those at the lower level of illicit power structures, U.S. officials and consultants may not gain the same level of access. The team should vet key informant lists with USAID and the Embassy in advance.
Secret level briefings from U.S. intelligence agencies may prove useful in some countries, but in pilot tests to date have not provided significant additional information to the team. A secret level clearance would provide more detail on sources and methods of data collection as well as specific names, but these may be less important to understanding the impact of illicit power structures on institutions and how to devise strategic responses to their operations. Transferring security clearances between agencies in order to receive secret level briefings has also been a problem.

III. Assessing IPS through the Five Prisms

This section contains a list of questions to guide data collection in the assessment. They are illustrative, and not intended to be used without modification. For each interview, the researcher will need to determine the balance of facts, feelings, and forecasts sought, and will need to modify the questions as appropriate to fit the kind of information the interviewee is likely to know and disclose.

Although a handful of the questions below are scattered throughout the ICAF Methodologies questions, much of the overlap is with the questions found under the section, “Understand Key Actors’ Motivations and Means.” The questions listed below are intended to generate more detail on the motivations and means of key actors involved in illicit activities. The questions on worldview and motivations flesh out motivations, while the questions on resources, relationships, and internal structure flesh out the means of these key actors.

Overview

- What are the illicit power structures operating in the country? If multiple groups exist, what links, if any, exist among them?
- Overall, does the government support, use for its own purposes, ignore, or constrain IPS? Is the government a unitary actor in its stance, or are there some parts of the government, such as the security sector, that operate differently than the rest in their relationship with IPS?
- Is the government so corrupt and/or ineffective that it is relatively easy for IPS to carry out their activities?
- Does the activity of IPS add to the level of conflict in the country? If not, does it add to the risk of conflict in the country? In what ways is it destabilizing?
- Has the activity of IPS become more violent or destabilizing recently? Are there worrisome trends?

Worldview

- What is the desired end-state of the IPS? A democracy? A people’s republic in which it is the single party that rules? The continuation of conflict that allows the pursuit of profitable illegal activities?
- On a spectrum of absolutist in its rejection of a democratic, rule-based system to reconcilable toward such a system, where does the IPS fall?
- Do political and military leaders within the IPS have different worldviews (sometimes exiled political leadership can take a more soft-line approach than the military leadership actively engaged in the conflict)?
- Does the behavior of the IPS deviate from those judged acceptable in democratic, rule-based societies (such as engaging in violence and extensive corruption)?
- Does the IPS value time, human life, and money differently than the government, or the rest of the population?
- What are the IPS’ level of trust in the state and expectations of the likelihood of success?
Information on an IPS’s worldview can influence whether the international community pursues a strategy of marginalization or engagement, and can inform ways to garner the adherence of IPS to human rights standards, decrease the level of violence employed by criminal gangs, or encourage non-state armed groups to participate in peace talks.

**Motivations**

- Does greed, need (understood as collective grievance), creed, or basic livelihood needs tend to serve as a primary motivation for the IPS? Are there secondary motivations that come to the fore under changing circumstances or pressure from outside groups?
- Do the top leadership, mid-level commanders, and rank-and-file members of IPS have different motives?
- Are the motives for joining an IPS, staying in it, and deciding to leave it different?
- Related to greed: Do IPS members or leaders enjoy a lavish lifestyle? Do rank-and-file members receive a salary? Are they allowed to loot? Does the IPS collude with armed rivals to pursue profit-generating activities?
- Related to need: What are IPS members’ perceptions concerning their security, identity and recognition? Do they believe their needs are being ignored, frustrated, or satisfied?
- Related to creed: Does the IPS focus attention within the organization on social and political indoctrination? Does the IPS employ stringent selection criteria when recruiting members? If so, what are they?

Understanding the mix of motives is essential if practitioners are to craft an effective agenda for peace negotiations; tailor DDR strategies to the varying interests of leaders, mid-level commanders, and rank-and-file soldiers; and address the root causes of conflict or crime.

**Resources**

- From where, and to what extent, does the IPS get its financial resources, be they remittances from a global diaspora, state sponsorships, revenues from legal as well as illegal commerce, the exploitation of natural resources, the corrupt diversion of public funds, or other criminal activities, such as kidnapping and looting? To what extent do these resources depend on relationships with corrupt officials?
- Does the IPS have a diversified funding portfolio?
- From what sources and by what means does the IPS obtain its weapons? What is the availability of small arms and light weapons in the country/region?
- How does the IPS use geography or other elements of space (e.g., slum areas, lawless borderlands, safe havens) to carry out its activities and how important is this resource?

The success of efforts to deprive groups of their funding through control regimes depends in part on understanding the other funding options open to a given IPS. Efforts targeting resources may be more effective against greed-based organizations than ideological groups.

**Relationships**

- What is the mix of coercive, material, social (e.g., tribal, ethnic), or ideological (e.g., religious, political) ties that bind the IPS to other key actors, including the general population (rural and urban), business, politicians, the state, and external actors (including diaspora community, neighboring states, cross-border population groups, and international business)?
• What are the modes of recruitment employed by the IPS? Is there a population of ready recruits (e.g., unemployed young men, refugees, internally displaced persons, ex-combatants, impoverished groups) available to IPS leaders? Are young people radicalizing? If so, around what issues? If not, what is keeping this from happening?
• Does the IPS provide certain services or access to income and livelihood for segments of the population? Does the IPS abuse segments of the population?
• What are the sources of material and moral support provided by key groups?

Understanding the relationship between the IPS and the population is important to combat both traditional insurgents that focus on cultivating popular support, as well as more predatory rebel groups and criminal organizations that may both abuse and protect the population.

Internal Structure

• Is the IPS a hierarchical or decentralized organization in its command and control structure and the performance of key activities? How does the IPS carry out various functions—leadership, recruiting, finances, operations, logistics, technical expertise and training, intelligence and counterintelligence?
• How are decisions made? Through a committee, charismatic leader, or across a network of cells with multiple leaders?

Kingpin strategies targeting an organization’s leadership will meet with varying degrees of success depending on whether the organization has a highly centralized charismatic leadership structure, a hierarchical structure with a more bureaucratic form of leadership, or a network form. Decentralized organizations may be less able to make agreements and more vulnerable to defection.

IV. Devising Responses to IPS

The ultimate goal of the IPS framework is to devise strategic responses that weaken or transform illicit power structures in order to neutralize their subversive impact on democracy building efforts and development more generally. The summary report from the IPS workshop, “Cleaning House,” contains general guidance on devising responses to illicit power structures, based on their worldview, motivations, resources, relationships, and internal structure (see pp. 17-28).
Peacebuilding and Systems Thinking
(Taken from a working draft of The Technology of Peace, by Robert Ricigliano, and produced for the Illicit Power Structures Workshop, USAID, June 18-19, 2009)

The Current State of Peacebuilding
Some researchers and policy makers point to several positive trends in the effectiveness of peacebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War:

- Since a peak in 1991, the number of civil wars dropped 40% by 2003 (UN, 2004: 33)
- There has also been a dramatic increase in the number of wars ended through a negotiated settlement. During the Cold War, “the number of civil wars ending in military victory (by the government or the rebels) was twice as large as the number that were concluded by negotiated settlements.” (Mason et al, 2007: 3). But, in the 1990s this trend was reversed and almost twice as many wars ended in negotiated settlements than in military victories (Human Security Centre, 2005: 4).
- In 15 years from the late 1980’s to 2003, more wars ended through negotiated settlement than in the previous two centuries. (UN, 2004: 34)

However, other research makes a clear case that the international community is much better at stopping organized violence then it is at consolidating peace, defined using the broader definition of a positive peace. Tempering the impressive statistics cited above is the fact that almost 25% of wars that end in a negotiated settlement relapse into violence within 5 years (Suhrke & Samset, 2007). And, much of this improved peacebuilding “batting average” may be attributed to factors other than increased skill or organizational effectiveness. For example, many of the Cold War conflicts were sustained in large part by military subsidies from one or both superpowers. In some cases, the end of those subsidies after 1989 may have had as big or bigger influence on achieving negotiated settlements than the actions of interveners like the UN, other governments, or the role of NGOs.

Not surprisingly, several studies have concluded that the track record of peacebuilding is “quite mixed” (De Coning, 2007; Lund, 2003.) This is consistent with the findings of Sambanis and Doyle (2000) who looked at 124 peacebuilding initiatives from 1945 to 1997. Their study concludes that peacebuilding initiatives were successful in 43% of the cases, using a lenient definition of peace, and in only 35% of cases using a “stricter” definition of peace. More troubling than the mixed track record of peacebuilding operations are cases where peace processes may have contributed to even greater violence. For example, in Rwanda (1994) and Angola (1993) more people died after peace agreements failed than died in the previous civil wars (Stedman et al, 2002; Stedman 1997)

In addition to the difficulty with consolidating peace, the international community has not necessarily shown a markedly increased ability to prevent the outbreak of wars. In the post-Cold War period, there has not been a reduction in the rate at which new civil wars begin. (Mason et al, 2007: 2) Prevention is a
critical challenge because states that have had one civil war are “far more likely” to experience additional violent conflict (Mason et al, 2007: 6).

The Applicability of Systems Thinking to Improving Peacebuilding

Systems thinking has the potential to greatly improve the effectiveness of peacebuilding. There is a growing consensus that effectiveness in peacebuilding demands that policy makers, donors, and practitioners think and act more systemically as opposed to being bounded by a sectoral focus on linear views of conflict and change (Anderson & Olson, 2003; De Coning, 2007; Smith, 2004; Wils et al, 2006). Peacebuilding practitioners lack a theory, supported by practical analytic and implementation tools, which would create a synergy among their programs and make their collective impact much greater than the sum of their parts. Michael Lund (2003: 21), a leading evaluator of the effectiveness of peacebuilding programs, explains this phenomenon well:

Energies are dispersed in hundreds of different directions but the myriad of activities is not guided by an underlying grounded theory, or overall strategy, only vague assumptions.

The key question is: why do we see many programs across conflict zones, diverse in their nature and particulars, which are successful as measured by their ability to achieve immediate program objectives at the local (micro) level in the midst of conflicts that resist systemic (macro-level) change? This dynamic was captured best by Anderson and Olson (2003: 10) who conclude:

From the vantage point of a broad overview of many activities over many locations over a long period of time one overwhelming conclusion emerges:

All the good peace work being done should be adding up to more than it is. The potential of all these efforts is not being realized.”

When practitioners from various disciplines (conflict resolution, human rights, rule of law, environmental protection, diplomacy, reconciliation, economic development, healthcare, etc.) intervene in a conflict-affected area they tend to think in terms of their own discipline, not about what would help the conflict as a whole. (Anderson and Olson, 2003). The lack of a systemic or holistic approach is also apparent in what is termed a “strategic deficit” on the part of donors and policy makers. After its study of 336 projects implemented by the governments of Norway, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, the Utstein study concludes that 55% of the programmes studied “do not show any link to a broader strategy for the country.” (Smith, 2004: 11). As Cedric De Coning (2007: 1) points out, this “strategic deficit” was identified as the “most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding.”

Lastly, the lack of a systemic approach also hampers the ability of policy makers and practitioners to work in a more integrated way by crossing bureaucratic and disciplinary boundaries. In order to work across disciplines, policy makers, practitioners, donors, and academics are frustrated by different vocabularies, interests, experiences, and organizational cultures. As Michael Lund (2003: 22) observes, “the discourse one hears at public peacebuilding events is largely a Tower of Babel of differing options being hawked in a sprawling policy bazaar.” De Coning (2007: 5) goes on to write that:

There is now broad consensus that inconsistent policies and fragmented programmes entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, ultimately, of a reduced capacity for delivery.

The lack of a systemic approach to peacebuilding has led to structural problems in how the field is organized, which in turn reduce its efficiency and squander resources. As Mike Wessells (USAID, 2003: 38) of Christian Children’s Fund writes:
Constraints on integrated programming arise mainly from the hegemony of specialized expertise and the structural divisions that pervade the humanitarian community… Further, donors organize grants by sector… The net result is that each sector operates as a separate world, having its own norms, values, and culture.

Systems thinking has helped overcome come similar deficits in other field of practice that have tried to make change in complex systems. Perhaps the prime examples of this are in the fields of family therapy and organizational behavior/corporate change management. While peacebuilding and organizational change in the private sector or in a family have little in common on the surface, both can be thought of as attempts to make change in complex systems. Systems theory is uniquely capable of integrating complexity (whether in a corporation, family or conflict-affected country) and producing actionable knowledge for how to act effectively to change the context.

Systems thinking is founded on the ability to see “wholes” as opposed to just pieces; to see patterns of interrelationships instead of just static pictures; and to see causation as dynamic, not linear (Senge, 1990). Systems approaches to organizational change in the corporate world (Burke & Litwin, 1992; Senge, 1990; Kanter, 1992; Pascale & Athos, 1981; Peters, 1982) start from the belief that “attempts to carry out programmatic continuing change through isolated single efforts are likely to fail because of the effects of system context” (Kanter, 1992: 7).” As a result, systemic corporate change approaches do not attempt to change the organization by changing distinct parts of the organization (e.g. marketing, research and development, the “org” chart, etc.). Rather they addressed the interrelationships between its component parts and its external environment (Burke & Litwin, 1992) and identified a set of basic levers they could use to create systemic change in organizations (Peters, 1982).

### Conflict Analysis – Causal Loops

**Linear Analysis:**
- USSR Arms → Threat to US → Need to arm US
- US Arms → Threat to USSR → Need to arm USSR

**Systems Analysis (causal loop):**
- USSR feels threatened → USSR builds more Arms → US feels threatened → US builds more arms → USSR feels threatened (R)

However, moving from linear to systems thinking can be very difficult to do and even a bit scary. Peter Senge explains that this difficulty is rooted in how our brains have been trained to work:
Evidence is overwhelming that human beings have “cognitive limitations.” Cognitive scientists have shown that we can deal with only a small number of separate variables simultaneously. Our conscious information processing circuits get easily overloaded by detail complexity, forcing us to invoke simplifying heuristics to figure things out. (Senge 1990, p.365)

Seeing the whole can be maddening or stultifying – it is just too complex. When I have done systems analysis of conflicts with practitioners working in conflict zones, there is always an initial demoralizing moment when they see their systems diagram of a conflict and realize just how complex it is. Depression sets in when practitioners then realize how insignificant their individual programs seem in the face of this complexity.

A typical response to this complex systemic view, as Senge explains, is find some scheme to order this complexity into understandable parts. The problem arises when those ordering schema are based on linear analysis (even though this is the typical way to do so).

This phenomenon is true for peacebuilding. A good example is the commonly used “conflict cycle” also known as the “conflict wave” or the “stages of conflict” model. (Lund 1996:40, Crocker et al, Herding Cats 1999). The model is a classic attempt to bring order to chaos by positing that conflicts move through a life cycle which starts with low intensity conflict, rises to active (violent) conflict, and then de-escalates through stages of post-conflict settlement and recovery. This typology has been used as the basis for ordering various forms of peacebuilding intervention: conflict prevention strategies could be used at the early low-intensity phases, peace enforcement or armed intervention could be used during phases of peak intensity/violence, and reconstruction and reconciliation efforts could be used as the intensity curve de-escalates. (Ramsbotham 2005, Contemporary conflict resolution). This thinking has informed policy making that distinguishes between conflict prevention, peacemaking and enforcement, and post-conflict reconstruction.

While this provides a neat, linear model, it is out of line with reality. In his statement during the UN Security Council’s open debate on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Sir Emyr Jones Parry, the United Kingdom’s Permanent Representative to the UN, stated flatly that, “There is no regular sequence in which conflict ends, peace is re-established, and stability ensues.” (Statement of 26 May 2005 Sec Council debate). Some have tried to warn against a “too strict” application of the conflict cycle, explaining that conflicts can jump phases or move backwards along the conflict wave. But these authors:

neglect the fact that civil wars and inter-ethnic disputes are made up of a multiplicity of embedded conflicts, which might exhibit properties of several escalation or de-escalation stages simultaneously. (Dudouet p.12 2006)

As a result, many peacebuilding practitioners have chaffed against the conflict wave, and the policies built around it. Therefore the challenge is how to avoid the stultifying effects of being overloaded by complexity and the unhelpful oversimplification of linear models. Enter systems mapping.

Building Systems Maps as an Aid to Analysis
One can think of the contributions of systems mapping to any number of analytical frameworks or situational assessments as like providing doctors with a full-body MRI versus a long list of a patient’s ailments. A systems map provides a way to assimilate lots of different points of data into a coherent story of why something is the way it is (e.g. why is Cambodia the way it is today?) or explain how something works (e.g. how does a thermostat keep a room at a constant temperature?). In turn, this story can be used to make hypotheses about the future of the system (e.g. are components of the system likely to change and, if so, how will this affect the overall workings of the system?) or to make hypotheses about how affecting any one part of the system is likely to affect the other parts of the system.
System maps can be as complex or as simple as the user deems helpful. The technology of systems mapping should serve the user’s needs, not the other way around. Systems maps are tools. They are interpretations of reality, not reality themselves.

The tool of systems mapping has three key parts, which are, simply stated: boxes, connecting arrows, and feedback loops. The boxes capture key features of the situation. George Richardson, a systems thinker from SUNY Albany, defines three types of key information that can be put in these boxes:

- events and decisions
- patterns of behavior (as opposed to discreet actions), and
- deeper structures

For example, if one was doing an analysis of the efficiency and adequacy of a particular office building, you would look at the discreet things that happen in and around the building (events and decisions), longer term trends in how the building is used (patterns of behavior, such as when people came to work, long-term occupancy rates, weekend use, etc.), and the wear and tear on the building’s superstructure (deeper structures).

Various analytic frameworks, like ICAF, IPS or the SAT model (Ricigliano), help analysts sort through billions of bits of information to capture the ones that are likely to be most important (e.g. the key events, patterns and structures). These frameworks are like a doctor’s diagnostic checklist. Doctors don’t check every cell in your body to diagnose illness. Instead they focus on key systems in the body – cardiovascular, renal, skeletal, pulmonary, etc. Similarly, for example, IPS focuses attention on aspects of “illicit power structures” which are defined as “sub-national, extralegal entities that seek political power through the use of either actual or threatened coercion, illegal inducement, or charismatic, anti-system leadership.” As a result the “boxes” in an IPS systems map might include an armed group’s world view and morphology (deeper structures), methods (patterns of behavior), and motivations (events, decisions).

The arrows turn lists of factors into a story. They are the verbs – without which the content of a novel would be an undecipherable list of nouns. Arrows drawn between two “boxes” (e.g. factor “A” and factor “B”) can mean different things:

1. factor “A” is linked to factor “B” (there is a connection between them)
2. factor “A” affects factor “B”
   a. more “A” = more “B”
   b. more “A” = less “B”
   c. etc.
3. factor “A” caused factor “B”

Feedback loops are created by a “completed circuit” of boxes and arrows. For example, a completed circuit is “A affects B which affects C which affects A.” The causal chain that began with A affecting B is completed when C affects A. The initial action of A comes back as feedback through B and C to A. There are two basic types of feedback loops:

1. Balancing (B): each time through the circuit replicates the initial condition – or corrects any change to the original condition of the system. A thermostat is a classic balancing loop. If it is set to 65 degrees, and the room temperature drops to 60, the thermostat will add heat to the room until the temperature of 65 is reached again (hence returning the system to its original condition).
2. Reinforcing (R): each time around the loop intensifies any change to the original condition. For example, the classic “action-reaction” cycle or an arms race is a reinforcing loop. During the US-Soviet Arms race, the Soviet Union built weapons to defend itself, but this was perceived as a threat by the US. In response, the US built arms to defend itself, but these were viewed by the Soviets as a threat. In turn, this perceived threat led the USSR to build even more arms, which the US saw as an even greater threat, etc… Each time around the feedback loop led to an intensification of the initial condition – in this case, higher levels of perceived threat and more weapons.

**Conflict Analysis – Causal Loops**

**Step 3: Consider standard subsystems (archetypes)**

- **“Reinforcing Cycle/Action Reaction Cycle”**

  ![Diagram of Reinforcing Cycle]

  -(R) = each time around the loop the situation intensifies

- **Balancing (B) Causal Loop/Thermostat**:

  ![Diagram of Balancing Causal Loop]

  -(B) = each time around the loop “corrects” the situation

Producing systems maps is a process of combining boxes, connected by arrows into feedback loops:

1. The first step in building a systems map is to start with an identification of important factors (which will be defined differently depending on your analytical purpose and analytical model). For example, take an analysis of the violence in the eastern DRC in the Fall of 2003. This analysis is based on the SAT model. A simplified version of the analysis produced the following key factors that contributed to the violence in the eastern DRC:
Building Causal Loops

Step 1: Identify significant causes ("critical factors") within each category (structural, attitudinal, transactional)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Significant causes (e.g.):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Lack of economic opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. High levels poverty, disease, hunger,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Lack of community decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Lack of actual security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudinal Significant causes (e.g.):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Inter-ethnic tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Dehumanization by one group toward the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Perceived level of insecurity in local villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Trauma from years of war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transactional Significant causes (e.g.):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political elites/war profiteers feed fears of ethnic insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Outside forces send arms to the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Local &quot;warlords&quot; fight to maintain their control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Negotiations among national level leadership, slow and contentious</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As you work with defining key factors and drawing causal loop diagrams, it is important to craft factors as "nouns" that can be scaled up or down, e.g. the difference between framing a variable as "ethnic tensions" (which can become greater or lesser depending on how it is being affected by other factors in the system) instead of "high ethnic tensions."

(2) The second key part of building a systems map is to identify connections between individual factors. Returning to the DRC example, one way to build up a systems map is to look for pairs of key factors that affect each other. The nature of the connection being sought here is a "causal" relationship (as described above). For example, an increase in transactional factor (2) "Outside actors send arms to the region" would seem to cause an increase in transactional factor (3) "Warlords fight to maintain control," as warlords need arms to continue fighting. Connections also exist across categories. For example, an increase in transactional factor (1) "Profiteers/Elites manipulate ethnic insecurities" would lead to an increase in an attitudinal factor (c) "People's perceived level of insecurity." Each factor will probably have many connections to other factors and you should find as many connections for any one factor as you can. For example, an increase in structural factor (D) "Lack of actual security prevents local capacity building" may also lead to an increase in attitudinal factor (c) "People's perceived level of insecurity."

(3) The third step is to look for overlaps that link 3 or more factors. For example, if factor (A) is linked to factor (B), and factor (B) is linked to factor (C), then factors (A), (B) and (C) are linked. Further, these factors affect the central variable we are trying to affect which is the level of sustainable peace (or "fighting" if framed in the negative) in eastern DRC.

Take the relationship between transactional factors (1), (2) and (3): An increase in (1) profiteers/elites manipulated ethnic insecurities, leads to an increase in (2) outside forces sending arms to the region, which leads to an increase in (3) warlords fighting for control, which in turn leads to a decrease in the level of peace in eastern DRC. Further, as the level of peace goes down, it actually leads to a decrease in factor (1) as profiteers/elites feel less threatened that peace will put an end to their illegal business activity. These three transactional factors form a system in relation to the level of peace in eastern DRC.
Conflict Analysis – Causal Loops

Step 3: Draw Subsystems

• Look for overlaps between pairs (e.g. “A” affects “B”, and “B” affects “C”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profiteers manipulate</th>
<th>Arms shipments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms shipments</td>
<td>Warlords fight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Represent the three factors in relationship to a problem variable:

The diagram above uses “+” and “−” signs to indicate the nature of the causal relationship between the factors. In more complex maps, the use of “+” and “−” signs gets cumbersome, but these signs can be replaced with an (R) or a (B) as defined above. For example, the loop described above is a balancing (B) loop. If the initial level of peace could be described as “tense” and then was increased to “hopeful” because of progress in the official peace talks, then each time around the loop the level of peace would be reduced to back to “tense” because of increased fighting in the east.

(4) A systems map can be made as complex as needed and there is no preset level (e.g. there can only be 15 boxes or 25 arrows or 5 feedback loops). Feedback loops can be as complicated as seems both useful and true to your underlying analysis (e.g. be sure to account for all the significant factors indentified in your initial data gathering). Drawing feedback loops can be a way of simplifying how your map works. You can combine feedback loops by looking for intersections, or loops that contain one or more common or “lynchpin” factors. For example, you might construct two feedback loops that both contain the factor “warlords fight.” Graphically you can represent these two loops in one diagram:
In a similar fashion, systems maps can be “scaled up” or complexified to suit your analytic purposes. There is always a final test to apply which is whether the map tells a helpful story: does the map integrate important, but disparate bits of data into a coherent story that helps the analyst better understand the situation at hand and/or make good decisions about what to do in light of the situation (e.g. how to intervene effectively or at least to get some sense of the likely impacts of a particular intervention).
The IPS field test was conducted as part of a conflict assessment, using the ICAF framework, for Senegal and the sub-region. Julie Werbel from USAID’s department of Democracy and Governance and I comprised the IPS team, but also fully participated in the activities of the ICAF. While IPS was intended to be our focus, given the broad nature of the assessment and the geographical distances to be covered, we were also asked to perform the overall conflict assessment for the Casamance region and to assess the potential impact of developments in Guinea Bissau and the Gambia on overall security in the sub-region. These combined tasks did put some competing demands on our time, but seemed important to the larger goals.

As subjects for the IPS analysis we focused on the MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Democratique) rebels in the Casamance region of Southern Senegal and narco-traffickers and related criminal networks in Guinea Bissau and the sub-region. However, a fair amount of our time was also spent gathering information that would be pertinent to the ICAF assessment. There are new developments in the Casamance conflict that have brought a new level of insecurity as well as a window of opportunity, and we felt it important that these been given adequate attention.

In addition to this report I have generated three other products: an ICAF assessment for the Casamance region to be included in the body of the ICAF report; and IPS analysis of the MFDC, with recommendations and a key actors relationships map, to be attached to the report as an annex; and a brief IPS analysis of the narco traffickers, which Julie and I would not recommend including in the report. As I will explain in more detail, we did not have enough time or access to gather adequate evidence for a credible analysis, nor did we find the framework well suited to understanding loosely networked criminal organizations. Julie has offered instead to write a section for the overall report that will include our most important findings about the potential impact of narco-trafficking and the political developments in Guinea on regional security along with relevant recommendations.

I have organized this report to respond to the eight questions I was given. These answers reflect the joint opinions of Julie Werbel and myself.

1. We are not asking you to evaluate the usefulness of the five prisms in the IPS framework. The five prisms of IPS track well with the means and motivations of key actors that are examined in the ICAF, and a evaluation of which dimension is more important than the other would not be meaningful, as the interplay of means and motivations will vary depending on the circumstances.

I will begin with what I was not asked to do, as our field test suggested some strengths and weaknesses of the prisms themselves. All five prisms did lend themselves to a better understanding of the workings of a rebel group such as the MFDC, and I think this is documented in my separate analysis of that group. We did wonder, however, about removal of the “actions” or “methods” prism from the original typology. The prism of “relationships” can reveal pertinent information about actions performed in relation to a variety of other actors, and the “internal structure” prism at the kinds of actions carried out within an IPS structure. However, we wondered if a more focused emphasis on activities or modus operandi wouldn’t give a more dynamic view. Especially in the context of a conflict assessment, it is the impact of IPS actions on social and political institutions as well as the population at large that may require the most in depth understanding to best inform appropriate interventions. For example, it would be useful to highlight the extent to which IPS activities are affecting daily security, preventing economic development, corrupting politicians, violating human rights, disturbing traditional social norms, disrupting democracy-building, inciting youth violence, etc.
In general, we feel that the IPS analysis works best when focused on a specific group with a reasonably clear membership, such as the MFDC. It is not terribly useful in understanding decentralized criminal networks, such as West African narco-traffickers and their partners. An actual IPS analysis of networks with multiple actors would potentially require multiple applications of the five prisms to different actors, operating at different levels and in different cells or nodes, which could become quite cumbersome. The different nodes of these variously inter-related networks might have quite distinct characteristics. Inter-relationships are also constantly shifting to adapt to changing circumstances, and member groups may engage in a spectrum of illicit and licit activities. As their activities and relationships are highly secretive (and largely unknown to most of the players, who only perform specific tasks), they are also very difficult to learn about in a short space of time.

As we applied the IPS framework to narco-traffickers, the first three prisms: worldview, motivation, and resources shed little light. One can assume that worldview and motivation revolve around profit and that narco-traffickers have little interest in contributing to democratic values and rule of law unless they happen to serve their business interests. Some suggested that narco-traffic might have decreased in Guinea Bissau after the assassinations this spring of the President and the Chief of Army, as too much chaos is bad for business. Traffickers prefer a corruptible state to a failed state. However, other sources believe that traffickers simply made the necessary adaptations and that these events had little impact on volume. As high military officers may be less involved since the assassinations, the transit of drugs may have become more discreet. Resources are defined by the particulars of the illicit trade, and the “resources” prism did not seem especially illuminating, though it could be used to determine what kinds of human resources, infrastructure, and environmental conditions are required for trafficking, which could in turn suggest points of possible disruption. Questions around relationships and internal structure could be of interest, but more might be learned through some kind of network analysis better suited to decentralized, horizontally linked nodal networks.

2. We are looking for insights into how you get information on the five prisms. How much conflicting information do you see? Given the elements of fear and rumor involved in illicit activities, are perceptions of those outside the IPS out of line with facts as far as you can establish them? What sources of information seem more reliable, and what seem less so?

With the MFDC, the fact that I had established trust with a core group of ex-combatants and members of the political wing was invaluable. I had worked with them for three years through the USAID-funded AECOM program, Support to the Peace Process, through capacity building workshops and dialogues to bridge their internal divisions. When we convened a focus group, they willingly attended and openly addressed the IPS questions. If they had not known me, I very much doubt that we would have been given frank responses. Ex-combatants had good information and useful analysis, as did members of the population with longstanding relationships. Our research assistant in the Casamance was a highly regarded journalist, who is trusted by the MFDC and respected for his impartiality. He provided invaluable information himself and made critical connections. Though his contacts, we were able to meet with the military leadership of the MFDC in a village close to their base camp in the forests. Hearing from them directly greatly deepened our understanding of current dynamics within the movement and also gave us a more accurate picture of feelings and forecasts. Current circumstances contributed to their willingness to speak. They are threatened with a mutiny by younger combatants, impatient with the lack of progress in negotiations and ready to resume hostility with the Senegalese army. The leadership is worried about their ability to maintain control and was interested in speaking to the “Americans,” hoping for support in moving the peace process forward and for the security guarantees that would enable them to hold an intra-MFDC meeting to prepare for negotiations. Without these circumstances and my prior connection, we may have obtained very little first hand information, especially in such a short period of time. The military leadership invited us to ask what we wished and seemed for the most part to respond
frankly, though we felt they downplayed the extent to which they are loosing control of the rank and file, as they no doubt want to still be regarded as the MFDC’s major interlocutors. The brother of the second in command was murdered in June, and he later called our driver to ask about receiving political asylum in the US, clearly worried about this own safety. They also pleaded total ignorance when we asked questions about narco-trafficking, claiming that their isolated life style left them unaware of modern activities. We were not convinced. (An ex-combatant told one of my colleagues that he had seen cocaine in their camp, but we were unable to confirm this.) The fact that we were able to conduct the meeting in French was also important, as the presence of a translator may have reduced trust.

In gathering IPS information, conflicting information and rumor appears to be the norm; triangulating and confirming takes a significant amount of time. Conducting an IPS is like trying to capture oral history; the more informers the better to get an array of perspectives. Ours included the Army zone commander; the ex-mayor and his deputy; the regional DEA officer; members of the MFDC; community leaders; NGO staff and other civil society leaders; and villagers in a conflict-affected zone who had been victims of recent MFDC banditry and had relatives in the MFDC. We did have to sift through layers of rumor, and many Casamancais also like to boast of their special connections to MFDC leaders; it appears to be a badge of honor or perhaps a way of gaining NGO funding.

As mentioned previously our sources of information on narco-trafficking were limited. We had no access to any members of the IPS groups or to any direct interlocutors. Law enforcement agencies or officials, such as the UNODC in Dakar, DEA in the Casamance, the Director of the Judicial Police in Guinea Bissau, and a legal reformer with access to the court records in the Gambia were able to provide useful information about the volume of trafficking, trade routes, and nationalities of those involved. The Gambian legal reformer was an accidental find and especially valuable. Information in the Gambia is tightly controlled and no government officials were willing to speak with us. We were told that they would have to have permission from the President first. In each of these countries it was very important to have research assistants with good local contacts. However, public information on narco-trafficking is largely based on seizures, which is very limited window into IPS activity. As these IPS organizations are highly adaptive any information obtained may also have time-limited value.

We found the Senegalese office of the International Crisis Group (which also covers Guinea Bissau) to be a very valuable resource, though we found some of the information we were given to be quite speculative. The UNODC office was also helpful, though we sensed that ours was one request too many to learn all they know about narco-trafficking in the region. Their efforts to improve the Senegalese government’s capacity to strengthen law enforcement in this arena have apparently been quite frustrating and seemed to have led to a somewhat jaded attitude.

3. Who in the government is more inclined to discuss IPS? What kind of agenda do they have for doing so?

Law enforcement and security personnel were the most open and their agendas probably varied. In the case of the Casamance, the Zone Commander was very proud of the counterinsurgency strategy he has successfully implemented since last summer. His efforts to prioritize the security of the population, and where possible offer humanitarian assistance, have resulted in greatly improved civilian-military relations. He was eager to speak with us, but also maintained the government party line, suggesting that the conflict was largely over and that ongoing violence was mostly a problem of banditry. The Director of the Judicial Police in Guinea Bissau is tackling trafficking investigations with extraordinarily meager resources. She was clearly interested in increased international support. In general, the fact that we were a team from USAID improved access, as there was no doubt hope for possible financial support.
The Casamance dossier is tightly controlled by President Wade and considered sensitive. The Senegalese Ambassador to Guinea Bissau was surprisingly forthcoming, but our questions about the MFDC and government policy were probably unanticipated. We were also able to get good information from ex-government officials, who seemed to feel freer to speak more openly.

We did not get quite the information or support hoped from the Senegalese US Embassy at the start of our trip, though they were interested in hearing our findings at the end. This may have been a problem of inadequate preparation and/or coordination from the local mission, as the lead-time was very short.

4. Who in the population is more inclined to discuss IPS? What kind of agenda do they have for doing so?

In the case of the Casamance, those who do not feel threatened by either the rebels or the government are most likely to speak. Populations caught in the crossfire would be reluctant. In the 1990’s, villagers, accused of being collaborators, could be killed by either the MFDC or the army. The villagers that we spoke to in a highly conflict affected area chose their words carefully, so as not to appear too sympathetic to either side. When we asked if they supported the MFDC goal of independence, they made it clear that they were not comfortable responding to questions of that nature. Many in the Casamance have very complicated feelings about the MFDC, which may color their perceptions. They resent the banditry, stolen harvests, and other methods by which the MFDC preys upon the population. At the same time, they feel responsible for sending their sons into the bush to fight on their behalf in the first place. They spoke poignantly of the breakdown in communication, finding that their own sons would no longer look them in the eye. Researchers, academics and journalists will speak freely but may not have the facts. Much of what is known about the MFDC is through rumor, as their camps are deep in the bush. They have no written treatises, and press releases are rare and usually represent the views of just one faction.

The population really does not have any substantial information about narco-traffickers other than rumor and/or palace intrigue when it comes to government involvement.

5. What are the constraints in getting information directly from members of IPS? Presumably, it is easier to meet with those in an insurgency where some peace deals have been negotiated than where that has not been the case, and it is difficult to meet with those involved in illicit trafficking. Do certain researchers have access to members of IPS because of personal ties? Are these researchers academics, NGO practitioners, journalists, or others? Does their nationality influence the access they have?

The MFDC is a comparatively benign rebel group, and so we were able to talk with them without fearing for our lives. We would not have the same access to a more militant or hostile group. No peace deals have been reached that are acknowledged by all groups. However, the MFDC is clearly tired of its 27-year old struggle and eager to negotiate.

As mentioned, I had a long-standing relationship with some members of the MFDC, as well as civil society leaders, and former government officials, which made it easier to schedule interviews at short notice and get reasonably in depth information. Journalists respected elders and community leaders, and principals of local lycees (who knew many of the rebels when they were students) seemed to have the most direct access to active MFDC combatants and were critical interviewees. Nationality and/or regional and ethnic affiliation was critical. Northern Senegalese are not trusted by the MFDC, and it was best to be accompanied by someone from the region. Americans have an added advantage in Casamance. They seem to be highly regarded by the MFDC for reasons that are not altogether clear, but may be due in part to the fact that the former Ambassador was very active in advocating for negotiations. USAID also maintained a visible presence in the region when many other donors left the area during the years of conflict.
It is indeed difficult to have any access to key actors engaged in narco-trafficking or other illicit trade. Michael Kinney, the author of *From Pablo to Osama*, found inmates imprisoned for trafficking to be his best sources. However, it took a long time to build trusting relationships.114

6. Is it easier to get information on trafficking in licit goods (e.g., diamonds, timber) than trafficking in illicit goods (narcotics, arms, people) since there are those involved in the legal trade—the legal competition—that have information on the illicit activity and an incentive to disclose it? [I realize you may not have information from the field test to address this.]

We really did not get enough information to address this. However, our understanding is that many groups traffic in both licit and illicit goods. The licit goods include timber, pharmaceuticals, stolen cashew harvests, DVDs, CDs, and cigarettes. As the boundaries between legal and illegal activities are blurred, accurate information may be equally difficult to obtain. Cocaine trafficking has the highest stakes and is probably therefore the most difficult to gather accurate information about. We were struck in speaking to law enforcement officials that all their information is based on seizures, which only tell a small portion of the overall story.

7. How well informed are the international community, including the USG, on IPS in the country?

Like fleas on an elephant; those concerned with IPS groups tend to only concern themselves with the part that is relevant to them. For example, the US Embassy Charge was unaware of the new counterinsurgency strategy of the Senegalese army. USAID focused on the MFDC and its effects within country. However, AECOM staff and USAID had not spoken directly with the military wing of the MFDC, but had relied on work with the more easily accessed political wing and ex-combatants to further the goals of their *Support to the Peace Process* program. This approach may have decreased their effectiveness, as the ex-combatants and political wing have limited influence among combatants.

The INL focuses on institutions to improve law enforcement capacity and legal frameworks or institutional responses, but are not necessarily well informed well informed about IPS structures or groups.

8. Although this question may be rhetorical, it is still worth discussing: does the IPS perspective push the team to examine illicit structures more comprehensively than the ICAF would on its own?

It does, and I think that is its biggest advantage, whether or not this is the most useful framework. Actor analysis in the ICAF looks at the mobilizing power of an actor on a specific identity group, but does not necessarily examine what motivates an IPS, how it sustains its activities, or whether or not it could be constructively engaged. Though at times the IPS questions did not seem quite relevant, they did push us to dig a little deeper, especially in our interviews with the MFDC. As mentioned, the IPS framework is not well suited to understanding complex criminal networks or their impact on democratic institutions. Some type of network analysis might prove more fruitful.

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The interagency conflict assessment framework (ICAF) addresses factors that incite or mitigate violent conflict. The illicit power structures framework (IPS) focuses specifically on actors who engage in unlawful activity, be they rebels or criminal networks, and whose activities may disrupt peace processes or interfere with post-conflict stabilization. IPS uses the following five lenses: worldview, motivations, resources, relationships, and internal structure to gain a more nuanced understanding of the often hidden inner life of these structures and to develop strategies that diminish deleterious effects while (where possible) supporting constructive engagement.

The Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de Casamance (MFDC) began as a political movement for the independence of the Casamance region of southern Senegal. Sandwiched between the Gambia and Guinea Bissau, the area shares more ethnic and linguistic bonds with the neighboring countries than with the rest of Senegal. It has a largely separate colonial history and is geographically linked to northern Senegal only in the remote eastern regions of the country. From the time of Senegalese independence, area leaders have complained of exploitation and discrimination by northerners, including land-grabbing and political marginalization. After several violent crackdowns on political protests, the MFDC developed a guerilla force, known as the “maquis” (also referred to as “attika,” the Diola word for warrior) that trained in the region’s forests in the late 1980’s and began attacks on the Senegalese army in 1990. Originally, the armed movement was widely supported by the Casamance population through financial contributions and sacred rites to empower its warriors. In nearly 20 years of fighting, however, the MFDC has not successfully “liberated” a single village or held any sizeable piece of territory other than their camps deep in the forests. Nevertheless, 2,000-2,500 armed combatants remain in camps scattered throughout the region, creating ongoing insecurity.

From its early years, the movement has suffered from extensive fractionalization in all four of its wings: military, political, civilian, and external (which consists of MFDC members living in the Diaspora). Most factions reject a 2004 peace accord signed between the movement’s founder and General Secretary, Father Diamacoune Senghor, and the government of Senegal (GOS), as they claim they were never consulted. The accord called for demobilization and reintegration of combatants, de-mining, economic reconstruction, and a conference to diagnose and propose solutions for the root causes of the conflict. The peace process has been at a standstill ever since. While violence had been sporadic in recent years, there has been a marked increase in the last few months, reportedly due to the activities of younger combatants who, impatient with the status quo, are threatening mutiny and a return to hostilities with the Senegalese army. Recent incidents have included higher levels of banditry, attacks on Senegalese army convoys, and the assassination of an MFDC officer. Cesar Badiate is now regarded by most as the military commander of both the Northern and Southern Fronts, and his position was apparently confirmed in an “assise” (large meeting) held in May 2008, though it is not clear how many “maquisards” (popular term for members of the maquis) were in attendance. Cesar’s leadership has long been contested by Salif Sadio, the most radical hardliner, who lives in the Gambia under the protection of President Jameh. This internal conflict has led to several fratricidal battles over the years.

**Worldview**

This prism explores the discourse and behavior of an IPS, to determine its end goals and to assess whether it is “absolutist” in its rejection of a democratic rule-based system or “reconcilable” to democratic norms and rights. The only clearly articulated goal of the MFDC has been the independence of the Casamance. The MFDC claims that the region was intended by colonial powers to be a separate country (though despite efforts, it has found no documentary evidence) and that it has suffered unfair domination by “nordistes” (northern Senegalese). While notably lacking in a more specific political agenda, the MFDC...
purports to support democratic values and structures and are quick to describe themselves as separatists not rebels, as they have no wish to overthrow the government of Senegal but simply want to create a separate country. Most actors in both the military and political wings state that an updated political agenda and/or negotiating platform cannot be developed without the election of new political leadership to fill the void left by the 2007 death of Father Diamacoune. Divisions and intense rivalries within the movement have made such elections thus far impossible.

While the movement had peaceful origins, armed struggle was viewed as a legitimate response to government repression and was sanctified by the solemn oaths and rites that took place in the “sacred forests” of the dominant Diola ethnic group. Recruitment has been mostly voluntary, with perhaps some use of persuasion but no reports of forced abductions. Most of the violence has been directed towards the Senegalese army, but villagers have also been punished or executed as collaborators. The worldview and behavior of the movement appear full of contradictions. While demanding independence, the MFDC blames the Senegalese government for not responding to requests for a negotiated settlement and continues to accept government financial support. Armed robbery and harvest seizures are condoned as means of collecting revenue despite harmful effects on the very population the MFDC has fought to liberate.

The MFDC could be considered “reconcilable” given their ultimate support of a democratic means of government. However, they have also condoned and promoted violence as justifiable means to gaining independence. For the current moderate leadership, this demand for independence appears to have become more of an opening negotiating position than an absolute goal. The assistant commander even referred in a recent meeting to “independence or whatever else is arrived at.” Indications suggest that these moderates, tired of the vicissitudes of armed struggle, would be open to a face-saving negotiated solution to the crisis that enables them to leave the maquis having achieved some gains for the Casamance, even if its political status remains essentially unchanged. One member of the political wing, Jean Marie Biagui, has put forward a federalist solution to the crisis, but his legitimacy is rejected by most of the MFDC. In 2008 the commander, Cesar Badiate, released a statement asking the population of the Casamance for forgiveness of MFDC crimes and for a peaceful reconciliation. However, a new radicalism is emerging among more militant younger combatants who seem much less conciliatory or inclined to make concessions. They regard the current leadership, as corrupt and ineffective, complaining that there is no evidence that the GOS is prepared to negotiate. These young dissidents are demanding that the old leadership step down if they are unwilling to resume active fighting for independence. If these dissident elements unite and join forces with Salif Sadio, who has always insisted on independence, worldviews may become more absolutist and negotiations more difficult.

Motivations
This IPS lens looks at need, greed, or creed as possible sources of motivation. The MFDC movement developed out of some combination of need and creed, including grievances over land seizures by northerners, a lack of state services, inadequate political representation, as well as an historic and cultural sense of separateness. Abuses by the Senegalese army in the early years of the conflict also contributed to recruitment. The military wing spokesperson, who became a combatant 19 years ago at the age of 22, told us that originally he had no intention of joining the movement but was headed for university studies. One day, government soldiers pulled him and two friends from a bus, groundlessly accused them of being rebels, and shot and killed the two friends. After being released from prison, he returned to his village to discover that it had been burned by army troops. He joined the rebels that very day and has remained in the bush ever since. Younger combatants may be joining the movement for more varied motives, including economic hardship, frustration, a cover for engaging in criminal behavior, or the romance of being a “maquisard” (the popular term for one who joins the maquis). Significantly, once in the maquis, it is hard to leave. Maquisards take a mystical oath, which can only be undone by the same priestess who performed the initial rite. Unfortunately, most of priestesses who officiated years ago are either dead or
difficult to find. Many maquisards strongly believe that unauthorized departure can result in illness and a particularly painful death, and this in of itself becomes a motive for remaining a combatant.

Maquisards live a challenging and primitive life style in the bush. The temptation to engage in narcotrafficking could cause the MFDC to shift motivation from need and creed to greed. The Casamance has become an important drug corridor for moving South American cocaine from Guinea Bissau to the Gambia and Northern Senegal, from where it is more easily exported to Europe. The MFDC is well acquainted with secluded pathways through bush and marsh and could become a valued partner.

Resources
In its early years, the MFDC was supported through voluntary collections from villages throughout the Casamance, who felt responsible for sons fighting on the region’s behalf. Community support dwindled during the 1990’s, as the Senegalese army began severely punishing suspected collaborators. Arrests were made, houses and crops were burned, the number of disappearances grew, and the population became frightened. Some funds have come in though the Diaspora, though these too appear to have shrunk over time. From the beginning of his administration, President Wade has sent funds to the maquis, supposedly to reduce the need for banditry until a settlement is reached. There has also been state support from neighboring countries in so far at it serves their own political interests. The MFDC was supplied with arms and used as a militia in the Guinea Bissau civil war, and President Jameh of Gambia protects the radical leader, Salif Sadio, presumably as a potential bargaining chip (or weapon) against Senegal.

The MFDC’s “diversified funding portfolio” includes armed robbery, stolen cattle, illegal timbering, marijuana production and trade, seizure of cashew forests, and theft of village harvests. The region is awash in inexpensive small arms. The 12-year liberation war in Guinea Bissau left especially large stockpiles of Soviet weaponry, notably AK47’s and landmines. The MFDC also relies on a lush natural environment, teeming with game, wild fruits, and fish.

Relationships
Over the years the maquis have become more and more isolated from the population on whose behalf they fight. In an anachronistic fashion, they cling to the assumption that the population is still behind them, proud of their sacrifice. In fact, the Casamancais are disillusioned with the struggle, tired of insecurity, and interested in development not independence. Recent surveys of the Casamancais population demonstrate that nearly all have developed a strong Senegalese national identity. They believe that the Casamance should remain a part of Senegal, but would like to see the GOS make the socioeconomic development of the area a higher priority. If progress is made towards negotiations, it will be important to appeal to MFDC’s original idealism and remind them of their commitment to act on the behalf of the population. There does not appear to be active recruitment into the MFDC at this time, though disenfranchised youth still join.

The MFDC has a complex relationship with the state, which funnels its funds to various MFDC factions, seemingly to divide and rule, maintain the status quo, or perhaps to deliberately sow seeds of contention, pushing the movement towards self-destruction. Some of these funds are sent publicly “to support the peace process,” and others wend their way through back channels. The state has ignored recent requests for negotiations, perhaps to avoid political concessions and/or fuel for countrywide interest in decentralization. The MFDC has historically enjoyed mostly supportive relationships with neighboring states (though Salif Sadio’s faction is no longer welcome in Guinea Bissau) and freely crosses borders in areas not patrolled by the GOS army. Alliances with political forces in neighboring countries have been shifting and complex. The new political landscape in Guinea Bissau might lead to new relational dynamics, as the new army chief has an old alliance with Salif Sadio from the days of the Guinea Bissau civil war, and the head of the Northern Command an old friendship with Cesar Badiate. The MFDC is not
affiliated with any international revolutionary movements. Their life in the maquis leaves them quite out of touch with their families, with changing conditions in the Casamance, and with the world at large.

Internal Structure
The MFDC is organized into four wings: military, political, civilian, and external (those in the Diaspora). Internal divisions and rivalries have plagued each of these wings, rendering the overall movement without structure or cohesion. There is considerably confusion as to even the basis for membership in the political wing, whose leadership and organization has been contested right from the start. Major decisions and elections are intended to happen in the large gatherings known as “assises,” but internal splits have made it difficult to gather a sufficient quorum for resolutions or appointments to be generally accepted. All agree that there has been an even greater leadership vacuum since the death in 2007 of the charismatic founder of the movement, Father Diamacoune Senghor. While he was not immune to rifts and rivalries, he maintained a unifying influence.

The military wing was initially created with a hierarchical structure consisting of the following levels of command: military chief, lieutenants, chief of companies, chief of sections, chief of groups, and soldiers. However, splits within the maquis are no doubt creating new command structures.

Recommendations:
The ultimate goal of analyzing an IPS through these five prisms is to develop strategies that neutralize the subversive or harmful effects of IPS actors on a peace process, by reducing the impact of spoilers and promoting constructive engagement.

For the past three years, USAID has funded Support to the Casamance Peace Process, a program designed and implemented by AECOM to support the government, civil society, and the MFDC in coming to a negotiated settlement. AECOM’s work with the MFDC has focused on the creation, capacity building, and guidance of the “Groupe de Contact,” consisting of members of the political wing and ex-combatants. It was formed after the death of Father Diamacoune to bridge internal divisions so that the MFDC can create a common platform for negotiations. Its long-term goal is to facilitate an intra-MFDC assise, in which a new leadership structure can be determined and a negotiating team established. The group itself is made up of rival factions. Over the last two years, its members have made solid efforts to overcome their own differences and to reach out to other ex-combatants as well as disparate elements of the maquis, calling for greater unity in order to move towards negotiations with the State. When MFDC commander, Cesar Badiate, asked the group to bring his request for forgiveness and reconciliation to the Casamancais population, the group held seven regional forums that reportedly led to constructive dialogue and engaged other ex-combatants. Groupe de Contact members have reported changes in their fundamental outlook through their work with AECOM. Notably, they understand that it is essential for the MFDC to re-establish a much closer relationship with the population. Privately, they even admit that an ultimate solution to the crisis will no doubt require modification of MFDC demands for independence. The leader of the group, Louis Tendeng, accompanied the director of a local NGO, AJAC/APRAN to Geneva in June for a meeting of the “Geneva Call” for humanitarian de-mining. Since his return, Tendeng has been speaking in the maquis of the importance of full cooperation in ongoing de-mining efforts to improve the security of returning refugees. All these developments suggest progress in the constructive engagement of at least some elements of the MFDC. AECOM has not worked directly with the military wing.

Our interviews with military commander Cesar Badiate and his entourage, however, point to limitations on the potential role of the Groupe de Contact and to the importance of directly engaging the military wing. In the minds of the maquisards, the ex-combatants in the Groupe de Contact (including the coordinator Mr. Tendeng) are officially deserters and have no right to play a formal role in the MFDC organization. Cesar and his group are very eager to hold an intra-MFDC assise in which all factions can
participate in the elections of a new political leadership that can develop a negotiating platform. They see
the job of the military wing as mostly limited to combat; negotiations should be the responsibility of the
political wing. They recognize that the Groupe de Contact can play a useful role as an ad hoc liaison with
scattered members of the maquis and with the population, but believe they should stop their activities as
soon as the new leadership is chosen.

Threats of mutiny on the part of younger impatient members of the MFDC have created a new degree of
insecurity, but also a ripe moment to work towards negotiations with the moderate leadership. These
moderates are fearful of losing their grip, not to mention their lives. The brother of the second in
command was murdered by dissident elements in June, after being accused of pocketing government
funds directed to the maquis. Cesar and his entourage requested the support of the “Americans” to
guarantee security for an assise, which they deem a necessary precursor to negotiations. They suggest
Guinea Bissau as the venue most accessible and secure for the majority of the maquisards. The GOS has a
price on Salif Sadio’s head, but if he was given permission to attend, he may feel relatively safe in Guinea
Bissau, where the new army chief is a former ally from that country’s civil war. (The old army chief, who
was assassinated in March, had chased him from the country.) The Senegalese ambassador to Guinea
Bissau also expressed willingness to support the effort. All agree that Salif’s attendance would help
secure a durable settlement, and his refusal would provide clear grounds for proceeding without him.

USAID and its implementing partners should make use of the current sense of urgency on the part of the
MFDC as a window of opportunity. Recognizing that the Groupe de Contact does not have the legitimacy
to play a convening role, it will be necessary to work more directly with the military wing to create
favorable conditions for an assise. The challenge will be to promote maximum participation by disparate
elements of the MFDC, a process that could be greatly facilitated by involving respected community
leaders. AECOM is currently devising a plan to engage the civil society network it has created known as
APAC (Alliance pour la Paix en Casamance), a group that so far is well regarded for its neutrality and
could be effective in reaching out to various groups. Given the degree of internal enmity within the
MFDC, it is unlikely that there could be full consensus around new leadership. However, the current
MFDC leadership expressed willingness to involve civil society, and their participation could have a
moderating and unifying influence. A negotiating council could be developed with representatives of
different MFDC factions and community leaders. This format would likely have good support among the
population of the Casamance, and hardliners who refuse to participate would naturally begin to lose
influence.

The approach outlined above could successfully exploit the more moderate, democratically based aspects
of the MFDC worldview. Negotiations should address some of the need-based root causes or motives
behind the conflict, by supporting economic development of the region, improved infrastructure to reduce
geographical isolation, and greater political representation and/or autonomy. The creed-based push for
independence is likely to recede with a face saving settlement. The MFDC military leaders affirmed what
many other Casamancais said: the MFDC is tired of the harsh living conditions of the maquis and eager to
resume civilian life. As mentioned previously, motivation could become one of greed if the MFDC
becomes involved in the lucrative regional narco-trafficking, making the importance of a negotiated
settlement all the more urgent.

The resource analysis suggests that government funding of the MFDC should be actively discouraged, as
this has greatly increased internal dissension, making it more difficult to prepare for negotiations. Other
funding of the movement has been marginal and does not lend itself to interruption by outside
intervention. However, it should be noted that illegal cultivation and trade in marijuana is now rampant in
northern Senegal by both the MFDC and villagers alike. Alternative livelihoods will be an essential
component of an eventual DDR program. Our MFDC relationships analysis notes that the MFDC still
feels beholden to the wishes of the Casamancais population, a fact that can be broadly exploited to modify
demands for independence and to encourage a negotiating platform that actually represents popular interests. The attached map depicts current relationships and conflicts within the MFDC military wing. It can be used to identify strategic points of access to diverse elements and to encourage maximum participation in the anticipated assise, minimizing the number of groups left to become potential spoilers.

President’s Wade’s government has made no visible effort to resume negotiations since the accord of 2004 and has tended to minimize the ongoing impact of the conflict, possibly hoping that the MFDC movement would die a natural death through internal dissension and waning popular support. However, to ignore the ongoing presence of 2,000-2,500 combatants seems dangerous. The conflict could rise to new proportions if the dissidents proceed with their threat to mutiny and resume fighting with the Senegalese army, or if the movement becomes heavily engaged in narco-trafficking. In any case, the rebellion has led to banditry and ongoing insecurity, conditions that discourage economic development. The population no longer wants independence, but the core grievances and sense of neglect that sparked the revolt remain. All efforts should be directed towards a negotiated settlement, especially given that the MFDC appears mostly amenable. All major development projects and DDR programs should wait until such an agreement is reached to avoid removing incentives for negotiations or colluding with government propaganda that peace already prevails.
Key to MFDC Relationships Map

- Strong relationship
- Strong relationship and influence
- Weak relationship
- Weak relationship and influence
- Broken relationship
- Conflict

Names in **black**- MFDC military camps or leaders
Names in **blue**- Government of Senegal
Names in **purple**- Civil Society actors
Names in **brown**- Actors in neighboring countries
Names in **green**- MFDC political, civilian, or external wing actors

Notes:
Generally speaking, the Diakaye and Kasolole camps are still allies, however there are dissidents within each of the two camps that are in communication and have formed an alliance. This is not reflected on the map because they are individuals and not cantonments. Salif Sadio’s chief of operations is believed to have connections with La Deux, and also with Bamba, who has good relations with Diakaye and Boulonguine, making for possible new alliances between Salif and dissident factions.

Members of the Kaureg camp are believed responsible for the murder in June of MFDC commander Yousof Sambou (aka Rambo). He was the younger brother of Lamarana Sambou, chief of Diakaye, and the second in command for Cesar Badiate. The Kaureg and Boulonguine camps are associated with increased acts of banditry, many of whom come from the village of Mlomp.

AJAC/APRAN, and NGO in Ziguinchor, has separate relations with conflicting parties, with La Deux through Lauding Diedhou, and with Kasolole through Demba Keita. They could perhaps be engaged to play a mediating role.

These alliances are constantly shifting, and the map should be continuously revised. It does, however, suggest points of entry for reaching as many disparate elements of the maquis as possible.
ATTACHMENT 11 – IPS ANALYSIS OF NARCOTRAFFICKING AND OTHER CRIMINAL NETWORKS IN THE SENEGALESE SUB-REGION

Note: The analysis was conducted through reading background materials and by conducting a limited number of interviews with government officials, diplomats, UN agencies, and concerned citizens in the cities of Dakar and Ziguinchor, Senegal; Banjul, Gambia; and Bissau, Guinea Bissau. We did not meet with anyone actually involved in illicit activities, and in the time allotted were only able to get somewhat cursory information. Much more extensive interviewing would be required to triangulate verbal reports and to develop a more reliable in-depth analysis. We also found that the widely decentralized, nodal nature of criminal networks, which can include broad portfolios of both illicit and licit financial enterprises, is quite difficult to analyze with an IPS framework. Different groups have different characteristics, and their inter-relationships and modes of operating are constantly shifting to adapt to changes in markets, transport conditions, and law enforcement strategies.

Overview

There is a wide variety of illicit trade in the sub-region, involving a number of different criminal networks. Enterprises include the transport and trade of the following goods: Latin America cocaine on its way to Europe, marijuana grown in northern Casamance, black market pharmaceuticals, illegal timber, synthetic drugs manufactured in China and India to sell in West Africa,115 black market movies, CD’s, cigarettes, and small arms. There does not seem to be much human trafficking, though we did hear some accounts of boys brought from Guinea Bissau to participate in begging networks in Senegal. We heard of a number of groups involved in various aspects of these diverse operations, including Latin American drug cartels, Nigerian criminal networks, corrupt government and military officials, and Lebanese business groups who provide front businesses and money laundering services. Individuals are also recruited as mules to carry cocaine from Guinea Bissau to the Gambia and other parts of Senegal and on planes bound for Europe. According to the DEA in Ziguinchor and court reports in the Gambia, the mules are mostly from the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Nigeria.

For a thorough analysis it would be important to analyze the inter-relationship of all these groups, as their diverse operations and networks appear to be quite interdependent. Given our time constraints, we focused our attention on narcotrafficking, which has become a considerable threat to regional stability.

By all accounts, Europe has become the major market for South American cocaine and West Africa the major transit point. A falling dollar, declining use, and increasing law enforcement have made US markets less attractive. According to a recent UNODC report, between 2005- 2008 at least 46 tons of South American cocaine was seized en route to Europe via West Africa, while in previous years no more than a ton per year was seized in the entire continent.116 Many secluded parts of the West African seacoast as well as abandoned airport strips are used to receive large shipments of cocaine, which are then packaged into smaller units to be carried by boat or human mule to various transit points on the way to Europe. The region is attractive to narco-traffickers for a number of reasons, including proximity to Europe, extensive coastlines, porous borders, established smuggling networks, poverty, government susceptibility to corruption, and a long history of adapting to the exploitive business practices of foreigners. Informants described evidence of trafficking throughout the sub-region, though Guinea Bissau seems to be a major port of entry. Large seizures in Senegal have been few, but this may be due to a lack

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115 A UNODC official told us that these illegal drugs, many of which are largely fake, comprise 60% of pharmaceuticals sold in West Africa

of political will. In 2007, 2.6 tons were discovered near the seaside resort of Saly, after report of suspicious activity to the local gendarmerie. Some suggest that national level officials would have been less vigilant. The successful movement of drugs across borders requires government collusion to various degrees, and large shipments would invariably engage both the transportation sector as well as other corporate enterprises. We were told that the airport of Banjul is a major port of embarkation and airport security officials are easily bribed. Reports from the Gambia also indicate that some banks are directly engaged in money laundering operations. In fact in 2007 a single large deposit caused the value of the Gambian dalasi to double overnight. Real estate has reportedly become a major venue for money laundering in both Senegal and the Gambia where there are a number of new unoccupied luxury apartment buildings with rents exceeding what the local market could possibly bear. In the Gambia there are several recently constructed luxury hotels, which also remain empty. Other reported sources for money laundering include: stores specializing in luxury goods (which are notably plentiful in the Gambia), car dealerships, informal wholesale markets (especially for fish), and foreign remittances.

There have been numerous articles in the popular press proclaiming Guinea Bissau as Africa’s first narco-state. Its numerous islands, poor state control, and corruptible political officials have made it an ideal staging ground. The motives for the recent assassinations of President Nino Viera and Army Chief Tagme Na Wai were apparently related to drug interests. The former chief of the navy, Buba Na Tchuto, was also heavily implicated in facilitating the movement of drugs and became the richest man in the country before he was forced into exile. However, political involvement appears limited to high placed individuals rather than institutions, and the moniker, “narco-state,” may be something of an exaggeration. While drug related violence is apparently growing, the city of Bissau remains quite safe, even after dark. Violence could rise as the market becomes more saturated and competition increases, but as of now, there appears to be room for many players. Some suggest that the volume of cocaine passing through Guinea Bissau may have declined, due to the country’s recent instability. Narco-traffickers prefer a corruptible state to a failed state. However, our informants in Guinea Bissau, including the Director of Judicial police who heads narcotic investigations, believe that trafficking may be less blatantly visible, but remains considerable.

As part of our overall conflict assessment for the sub-region, we were particularly interested in determining whether the MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Démocratique de la Casamance) rebels of the Casamance region of southern Senegal have become engaged in narco-trafficking, as there is ample evidence that drugs pass through the Casamance on their way to Banjul and points north. The MFDC has 2,000-2,500 armed combatants living in forest camps scattered throughout the area. According the Ziguinchor DEA, human mules are paid 300 Euros per trip to carry swallowed capsules from Bissau to Banjul. Twenty-two mules have been arrested on public transportation thus far, and some vehicles have also been seized. However, there is no patrol of paths through the bush, nor along the labyrinth of waterways that meander though vast marshlands. While we heard one report by a member of the MFDC that he had seen cocaine at the Kasolole MFDC camp close to the Guinea Bissau border, we were not able to confirm MFDC involvement. However, the MFDC has the advantage of intimate knowledge of the backcountry. Trafficking would be an extremely lucrative source of revenue for the financially strapped rebellion and could prolong the conflict. A well-known member member of the political/external wing told us that he was approached in France by a member of the Grimaldi crime family and asked to participate in a trafficking operation; he refused.

Worldview
It is next to impossible to delineate a worldview for such a diverse group of actors. For the narco-traffickers themselves we can assume that their goal is maximum profit, that they are fully prepared to engage in a range of illicit means to achieve that end, and that they have no particular interest in the health of democratic institutions in the countries where they operate. To secure trade routes, they often
require the cooperation of government officials. As the potential profits are enormous, bribes can be extremely high and are likely to find at least some takers.

**Motivation**
Greed would appear to be the primary motivation for the prime actors, be they South American cartels or high placed political officials obtaining a substantial commission. Human mules are often recruited from the poor and unemployed and may be mostly motivated by need. If the MFDC rebels were to become involved, creed, need, and greed may become mixed in a rather dangerous brew.

**Resources**
Narco-traffickers deal in an extraordinarily valuable product, which provides ample resources for tackling obstacles and securing optimal business conditions and relationships. They require secluded geographical locations for various staging operations and means of transport that can pass undetected by law enforcement officials or condoned by corrupt officials. They need a variety of human resources and partner organizations for various aspects of the enterprise, including transport, storage, packaging, money laundering, and sales in countries of destination. Front operations are often used at various transit points. We were told that human mules are prepared for their journeys at Nigerian auto parts stores in Bissau and deliver the cocaine at similar stores in Banjul. The number of auto parts stores in both cities outstrips any possible vehicular needs.

**Relationships and Structure**
Michael Kenney in his book, *From Pablo to Osama*,\(^{117}\) argues that the notion of hierarchical drug cartels topped by “kingpins” is largely myth. Most groups operate in a more nodal de-centralized fashion. Groups that succeed are those that can adapt structure and relationships to a continuously changing environment. In the Senegal sub-region, relationships between the traffickers and their assorted partners appear to be similarly multi-faceted and opportunistic, shifting and changing depending on need and circumstance. Groups handling a particular aspect of operations may be semi-autonomous. Minimal coordination supports survival in the case that one node’s activities are disrupted by law enforcement or interference from rival competition. Relationships are based on mutual business interests, and trust is established through financial incentives. Relationships are also trans-border and cross a variety of social classes. South American traffickers apparently came to Guinea Bissau from Columbia, Brazil, and Venezuela, and most left after setting up operations. Lebanese businessmen, who have a long history of operating businesses in West Africa, reportedly finance various aspects of the operation and are especially implicated in money laundering. Nigerian criminal networks appear to be more involved in recruiting and managing human mules.

**Recommendations**
An IPS analysis does not shed much new light on useful interventions. These criminal networks are long established and not easily disrupted. However, they are like to move operations if conditions become less favorable. The government of Guinea Bissau, long dominated by the military, has weak democratic institutions, a dysfunctional judicial system, inadequately trained police, and no prison. Security sector reform, capacity building for drug enforcement, and anti-corruption legislation could make a considerable difference. Coordinated efforts between border officials in Guinea Bissau, Senegal, and the Gambia; better policing of waterways and backcountry routes; and more robust procedures for detection at airports could discourage traffickers by increasing the number of seizures. Programs for poverty reduction and livelihoods creation decrease the likelihood of unemployed youths acting as mules. Most importantly, a strong effort should be made to encourage a negotiated settlement to the Casamance crisis. MFDC rebel involvement in narcotrafficking could be a disaster for the region, as the enormous influx of resources

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could refuel the conflict. A definitive peace settlement, on the other hand, would increase overall security and allow for more rigorous law enforcement.
ATTACHMENT 12 – SENEGAL ICAF CASAMANCE

The Conflict in the Casamance

Background
Though widely considered a “low intensity” conflict, as compared with some of the region’s more lethal wars, the twenty-seven year struggle for the independence of the Casamance by the MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Démocratique de la Casamance) has become West Africa’s oldest unresolved conflict. Deaths from the conflict have been relatively low at 3,000-5,000, but the humanitarian, economic and psychological toll has been considerable. An estimated 2,000-2,500 armed combatants remain in MFDC camps scattered about the region, border villages in the south remain mined, refugees in Guinea Bissau and the Gambia are afraid to return home, banditry persists, and socio-economic development has been stagnant. Over the years, accords have been signed and broken, the process hampered by extreme fractionalization within the MFDC and the lack of a consistent, coherent strategy on the part of the government. The conflict has fueled regional instability as well: notably, MFDC involvement in the 1999 civil war in Guinea Bissau brought the Senegalese army into the fray, and the MFDC’s most radical commander, Salif Sadio, remains in the Gambia under the protection of President Jameh.

President Wade, who had been active in some of the negotiation efforts of the 90’s, began his presidency promising to make definitive peace a hallmark of his administration. An accord was signed in the Casamance capital of Ziguinchor in 2004, calling for demobilization and reintegration of combatants, demining, economic reconstruction, and a conference to diagnose and propose solutions for the root causes of the conflict. Unfortunately, there has been almost no visible progress the agreement’s implementation, and the accord lacks credibility. Most elements of the MFDC claim it was drafted without their participation, and there have been no government responses to overtures from the MFDC to resume negotiations. Nevertheless, from 2004 until this spring relative calm prevailed, and, despite an internecine fight between MFDC factions in 2006 as well as minor skirmishes and some continued banditry, refugees and tourists have begun returning to the area.

In recent months, however, violence in the Casamance has grown significantly, and the level of anxiety among many of those we interviewed—from Ziguinchor elite to rural farmers—was notable. Banditry on roads and in villages has risen markedly, and several attacks have been launched on military patrols and posts, including a rocket-propelled grenade attack that destroyed a military vehicle. In June an MFDC commander was assassinated by rival elements, and young dissidents within the MFDC, impatient with the status quo, are reportedly challenging the MFDC leadership to resume hostilities with the Senegalese army.

Context
The region bears many symptoms of protracted conflict. It is rich in agricultural and marine resources and attractive for tourism, but development has been stymied, and substantial economic investment is unlikely without a definitive peace. Over 6,000 documented refugees remain in the Gambia, and over 5,000 in Guinea Bissau.118 Most live with relatives and, despite some international assistance, strain local resources. International Red Cross assistance to refugees in Gambia will end in December 2009, creating further hardship. Ninety-three border villages in the south remain contaminated by mines, and most

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118 The International Red Cross reports 6,456 registered refugees in Gambia as of June 2009. They have stopped registering to discourage further flows, as their funding ends in December. UNHR reports approximately 5,250 refugees living in Guinea Bissau, and their implementing organization. ADRA (Agence Adventiste pour Resource Assistant), estimates over 1,000 more unregistered refugees. Many live in villages deemed to insecure to visit.
cannot be effectively cleared until the MFDC is fully demobilized. In Ziguinchor, the number of IDPs has pushed youth unemployment to 57% (as compared with 47% in the rest of Senegal). Young people report widespread abuse of cheap cashew wine among their peers as well as rising promiscuity. The HIV/AIDS rate in the Casamance is now the highest in the country. The combination of easy access to arms and general lack of security fosters criminal activity in the region, whether or not it is linked to the MFDC. The vast majority of the population is weary of the conflict, far more interested in development than independence, and frustrated by the “no war-no peace” status quo.

Like many rebel groups, the MFDC has also relied on illegal activity to supplement dwindling support from their families and communities. Rebels engage in cattle rustling, armed robbery, forced appropriation of cashew harvests and other crops, and production and trade in marijuana. By these means, they have preyed upon the very population they swore, with solemn oath and sacred rite, to liberate. Instead, they have created an atmosphere of insecurity and lawlessness that stresses the social fabric and undermines traditional bonds. Marijuana has now become the major cash crop in northern Casamance among MFDC and villagers alike. One local development leader estimates that 60% of refugees in the Gambia fled and fear return, not because of the conflict, but to escape arrest and the mandatory two-year prison sentence for marijuana cultivation. There have been few efforts to introduce viable alternatives.

Grievances and Resiliencies
The Casamancais are suffering from the same cost of living increases as the rest of Senegal and share the perception that the central government is mismanaging its power and failing to provide adequate services or effective policies. In addition, the core grievances that launched the struggle for independence in 1982 (domination and exploitation by the North and blocked access to national resources and power in the government) continue to be felt, exacerbating overall frustration. The perennial problem of “encalvement,” the physical separation of the Casamance from the rest of Senegal, was somewhat eased this past year by renewed ferry service to Dakar, but ticket cost is high and capacity insufficient. The recent collapse of Air Senegal further restricts business and tourist travel, and the long overland routes are once again dangerous after dark. The Casamancais have always felt inadequately represented in the central government, and, in the latest ministerial reshuffle, the only two ministers from the region lost their posts. Division of the Casamance into first two and now three administrative units is perceived as a divide and rule tactic that weakens regional identity. The major hospital in the region is considered grossly inadequate, and the new (and only) university is ill equipped and poorly staffed. The Casamancais continue to feel marginalized. They experience little interest and respect for their rich indigenous cultures and fear “Wolofization,” especially among the young. Most importantly, the population is tired of living with ongoing insecurity and blames the government for lacking the political will to resolve the conflict once and for all.

Despite the deleterious effects of protracted conflict, the resilience of the local population is also evident. The non-hierarchical, loosely networked traditional structures of the Diola (who comprise 65% of the population and more in the conflict affected areas) encourage individual initiative and adaptation. Local NGOs working in border regions report that many refugees self-organize for return, exhibiting considerable resourcefulness and concern for their children’s education and future well being. As the intensity of the conflict has decreased over the last decade, civil society has become actively engaged in peace related activities at both the community and regional levels, though these efforts are hampered by lack of coordination and competitive funding structures. Traditional culture and spiritual practices continue to provide a deep sense of belonging and meaning, and seem remarkably unaffected by the conflict, though some fear waning interest among the younger generation. The robust regional identity that sparked the war remains a strength, anchored in pride of place and culture and buoyed by a sense of promise and potential.

119 The Senegalese Centre National d’Actions Anti Mine reports 751 mine victims to date: 554 civilians and 197 military.
Conflict Drivers
Ironically, the government’s management of the Casamance dossier is widely regarded as a major driver of the conflict by both the population and the MFDC themselves. Many believe the President hoped to avoid political negotiations and possible concessions towards decentralization by attempting to appease Casamancais grievances with infrastructure and development projects. But empty promises have backfired. Wade’s ongoing dispensation of funds to feed the maquis (local term for the guerilla movement) in order to discourage banditry makes little sense in the absence of any concurrent effort to resume negotiations. The Diola culture of equality, self-reliance, and transparency not only renders Wade’s patron-client management style ineffective, but makes it inflammatory. Among the Diola, patron-client financial exchanges are considered polluting; respect and social standing are earned not inherited. Given that there is no mechanism to determine just how government funds are spent or distributed within the maquis, many blame the President for deliberately sowing mistrust and dissent to push the movement towards self-destruction.

The death in 2007 of MFDC founder and ideological leader Abbé Diamacoune opened new space for ongoing contestations of leadership, and a new radicalism has emerged among young combatants who grew up in the maquis. These young dissidents seek a more purist ideology and demand decisive action. They accuse the old guard, led by Cesar Badiate, of ineffective leadership and corruption, of receiving but not fairly distributing government and Diaspora funds. They are believed responsible for the recent attacks on army convoys and for the June murder of Yousof Sambou (aka Rambo, and brother of Cesar’s second in command, Ansoumame Sambou), who was apparently tasked with distributing some of the funds. If these dissidents unite across camps, break from the current leadership, and possibly ally with elements of Salif Sadio’s faction, negotiations will become more difficult and a resumption of hostilities likely. While the population at large has lost its appetite for war, disenfranchised youth may be tempted to join, broadening the MFDC base. Some Peule youth, angered at perceived land encroachment by the Toucouleur, have reportedly also created a new MFDC camp in the eastern part of the region.

Narco-trafficking has also stormed the sub-region and could become a major driver of conflict. Guinea Bissau, now a major transit point for South American cocaine on its way to Europe, has already been deeply affected, as manifested in the recent series of high profile political assassinations believed to be related to drug interests. Broken down into smaller shipping units, cocaine is transported from Guinea Bissau through a variety of routes to ports providing easier access to Europe; ample evidence exists that one such corridor runs through the Casamance to Banjul. According the Ziguinchor DEA, human mules are paid 300 Euros per trip to carry swallowed capsules. Twenty-two mules have been arrested on public transportation thus far, and some vehicles have also been seized. There is no patrol of paths through the bush nor along the labyrinth of waterways that meander though vast marshlands. While we heard one report by a member of the MFDC that he had seen cocaine at the Kasalol MFDC camp, we were not able to confirm MFDC involvement. However, the MFDC has the advantage of intimate knowledge of the backcountry, and trafficking would be an extremely lucrative source of revenue.

Conflict Mitigators
Casamancais communities originally gave the rebellion their blessings; sending their sons into the maquis was a considered a noble sacrifice. Now, many feel responsible for helping to bring about a peaceful resolution. Unfortunately, some of their mitigating influence is loosing its power. Women and elders have calmed tensions in the past, but fractionalization, disidence, and banditry create obstacles to their traditional roles by obfuscating potential entry points. Members of the women’s peace organization, Kobunkator, previously active in the maquis, report that they no longer know who is in charge, while a respected well-known elder, also accustomed to easy access, found that combatants from his own village would no longer receive him. Villagers in one conflict affected region told us they are becoming fearful of their own sons and complained that visiting combatants would no longer look them in the eye. On the
other hand, we heard from a number of people who were encouraged by the increased activity of APAC (Alliance pour la Paix en Casamance), a USAID-supported civil society alliance that has been holding widely attended community forums to strategize approaches for accelerating the peace process. APAC is also sending village delegations into the maquis to encourage MFDC unity and a move towards negotiations. Most importantly, the new Senegalese Army Zone Commander has adopted an effective counterinsurgency strategy, ordering his troops to engage with the population, to prioritize their security, and to help where possible with humanitarian needs. Villagers and local NGOs report that the population feels protected by the army for the first time.

Motivated by fear, the MFDC military leadership is more eager than ever to negotiate. In a meeting with members of the assessment team they indicated some flexibility on the issue of independence and readiness to hold an intra-MFDC assise (large meeting) in which all factions could participate in the election of new political leadership that can develop negotiating platforms. The current leaders still feel beholden to the wishes of the Casamance people and are prepared to have civil society fully participate in the negotiation process. Changed conditions make Guinea Bissau a reasonable venue for such an assise, and the Senegalese Ambassador expressed willingness to support the effort. Salif Sadio was chased from Guinea Bissau and nearly killed by Tagme Na Wai, the former head of the Guinea Bissau army, who was assassinated in March. The new army chief is an old ally of Salif from the days of the Guinea Bissau civil war, raising the possibility that Salif might actually attend such an assise for the first time in years. Hopefully, this could lead to enough resolution of intra-MFDC rivalries to proceed with negotiations.

Windows of Vulnerability and Opportunity

The security and socioeconomic development of the region, return of refugees, and the reintegration of the maquis require a negotiated political settlement. All indications suggest that the moderate leadership of the MFDC, still nominally in control, is looking for a face-saving means of settling the conflict. Various windows of vulnerability and opportunity are currently converging, making this a critical time to act. They can be summarized as follows:

- The prolonged status quo has generated explosive conditions in the maquis.
  - Young combatants, impatient with the progress of negotiations, are challenging the legitimacy of the leadership, whom they deem corrupt and ineffective.
  - Dissidents threaten mutiny and a return to hostilities with the Senegalese Army, as evidenced by the murder of a senior commander (Rambo) and attacks on Army convoys.
  - There is increasing potential for radicalization among these fighters and a more entrenched insistence on independence.
- Potential MFDC permeation by narco-traffickers could destabilize the region, further criminalize the movement, and ignite the conflict through resource enrichment.
- The moderate MFDC leadership, motivated by fear, is highly amenable to negotiations and likely open to face-saving alternatives to independence.
- An increasingly vocal and organized civil society is more actively advocating for a negotiated peace settlement.
- The army counterinsurgency strategy is serving as a confidence-building measure for the population, demonstrating that an organ of the state can be a positive force.
- The Senegalese Ambassador to Guinea Bissau voices support for an intra-MFDC meeting in Guinea Bissau (deemed essential by MFDC leadership as a first step towards negotiations).

Responses

An effective USG response to the current situation could include:

- Demarche to Wade using the discourse of narco-trafficking threat as an entree to discussion about the need for political settlement.
• Diplomatic engagement in a manner non-threatening to Wade with bilateral and multilateral donors to promote plans for post-settlement DDR and development, and with ECOWAS and neighboring countries for regional support for the peace process.
• Advocacy for civil society participation in the negotiations, as anticipated in the 2004 accords.
• Technical assistance to APAC and other potential civil society intermediaries to develop a civilian platform for negotiations in partnership with MFDC.
• Technical assistance to MFDC to help plan intra-MFDC meeting and prepare for negotiations.
• Encouraging the Senegalese military to maintain its counterinsurgency strategy.

USAID Strategy for the Region
Large-scale development activities should await a political settlement of the conflict to avoid collusion with the government’s approach of problem solving through the disbursement of funds. However, ongoing negotiation support, as well as an increased focus on youth, is appropriate. Alternative livelihood development and natural resource management would also be well received and would have the potential for significant impact. Given the current political and economic environment, Casamance youth are at increased risk for involvement in marijuana production, recruitment into the macquis and, potentially, regional cocaine trafficking. Food for work programs that target youth to support community-determined development projects (such as local infrastructure projects, road repair, forest protection, etc.) are already having a positive effect on a small scale. Expanding these would build on community dynamism, engage youth constructively, help the communities meet their own needs, and develop a framework for eventual community-focused reintegration of combatants.