THEORIES OF CHANGE AND INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION

JUNE 2010
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), Office for Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM). It was prepared by Susan Allen Nan, PhD, George Mason University (GMU) with Mary Mulvihill, AED.
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Final Draft

Contracted under DFD-I-00-05-00244-00 Task Order No. 10

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CONTENTS

Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 1

What are Theories of Change? ........................................................................................................... 1

Theories of Change in Conflict Management and Mitigation ......................................................... 2

Distinguishing Conflict Assessment and Theory of Change in Program Design, Implementation, and Evaluation ....................................................................................................................... 4

Indicators of Change .............................................................................................................................. 7

Theories of Change Indicator Development Workshop (December 2009) ..................................... 8

Recommended Next Steps for Theories of Change Initiatives ....................................................... 10

Bibliography........................................................................................................................................... 13

Appendix A: USAID/DCHA/CMM Theories of Change Matrix
Appendix B: Agenda for Theories of Change Indicator Development Workshop
Appendix C: List of Participants for the Theories of Change Indicator Development Workshop
Appendix D: S. Tjip Walker Theories of Change Workshop Presentation
Appendix E: Susan Allen Nan Theories of Change Workshop Presentation
Appendix F: Mark Rogers Theories of Change Workshop Presentation
Appendix G: Diana Chigas Theories of Change Workshop Presentation
Appendix H: Theories of Change Indicator Development Workshop Notes
Introduction

This report presents background information and key content related to the USAID-sponsored workshop on Theories of Change Indicator Development that was held December 14-15, 2009, at George Mason University’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) in collaboration with the Academy for Educational Development (AED). The report opens with a brief review of theories of change and then of the conflict field’s engagement with theories of change thus far, including USAID/DCHA/CMM’s initiative in this area. Next, the theory of change and conflict assessment concepts are differentiated, and the role that theories of change can play for improved conflict program design, monitoring, and evaluation are discussed. The report then summarizes the December 2009 workshop’s sessions and key indicator and theory of change refinement outputs. The report concludes by presenting next research agenda steps to strengthen the theories of change underpinning conflict management and mitigation and the use of indicators for focusing evaluation of these programs.

Appendix A contains the CMM Theories of Change matrix, Appendix B provides the agenda for the Theories of Change Indicator Development Workshop, Appendix C presents the list of workshop participants, and Appendix D, E, F and G provide the presentations made at the December 2009 workshop. Appendix H provides the comments received during the workshop on CMM’s draft Theories of Change matrix.

What are Theories of Change?

“Theories of change” is a simple, powerful concept which can improve design, monitoring and evaluation of programs in conflict-afflicted environments. In general, a theory of change states what expected (changed) result will follow from a particular set of actions. A simple example would be, “if I add more fuel to the fire, then it will burn hotter”. The concept is analogous to a “development hypothesis.”

As applied to the conflict field, theories of change refer to the assumed connections between various actions and the result of reducing conflict or building peace. For example, one of the most popular conflict mitigation strategies entails bringing representatives of belligerent groups together to interact in a safe space. The expectation is that the interactions will put a human face on the “other”, foster trust, and eventually lead to the reduction of tensions. This strategy relies on a theory of change known as the contact hypothesis that can be stated as: “If key actors from belligerent groups are given the opportunity to interact, then they will better understand and appreciate one another, be better able to work with one another, and prefer to resolve conflicts peacefully.”

To give another example, we may have a theory that developing more inclusive democratic structures will lead to more satisfaction with governance and societal conflict management systems. An expanded consideration of this theory may suggest that increased satisfaction with society conflict management systems will lead to less likelihood of violent conflict. By making our theory explicit, we can then consciously shape our program planning and implementation to correspond to it. And, knowing our theory of change allows us to critically examine it, refine it, and, if necessary, dismiss it when evidence suggests it is misguided.

However, theories of change are more useful to the extent that, having identified the changes we expect from an intervention, we can “know it when we see it.” Considering the examples above,
what does increased satisfaction with governance and societal conflict management systems look like in a particular conflict context? What does less likelihood of violent conflict look like there? Are there indicators of these changes that might be relevant in multiple contexts, or flexibly adapted for particular cultures? Articulating our intervention’s theory of change allows us to develop and monitor meaningful change indicators, and enables the evaluation of programs. The search for useful indicators of change, inspired and supported by USAID’s CMM office, gave rise to the December 2009 workshop focused on indicator development and this report.

Theories of Change in Conflict Management and Mitigation

Far beyond evaluation experts, the concept of “theory of change” is gaining greater attention within the conflict studies community (e.g., Shapiro, 2002, 2005 and 2006; Church and Shouldice, 2002 and 2003; Lederach, Neufeldt, and Culbertson, 2007; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008). The concept originated in the theory-based program evaluation literature of the 1970s (Weiss, 1972) and has resonated throughout the social sciences (London, 1996). Donald Schon (1983) focused on the need to name problems in order to bring technical expertise to address them. Schon’s conception of The Reflective Practitioner has strongly influenced the conflict resolution field’s acknowledgement of the unconscious assumptions that guide conflict engagement.

Just as the development community has increasingly moved towards more evidence-based design, monitoring and evaluation of programs, so too has the conflict resolution field gained an interest in making its theories of change explicit so that conscious decisions can be made about the best ways to engage in particular contexts (Nan, 2009). Implicit theories of change constrain our actions by removing the space for conscious choice that explicit theories allow.

Ilana Shapiro (2002), who helped pioneer focused work on theories of change in the conflict resolution field, has delineated multiple ways in which theories of change can advance practice:

“Mapping the core assumptions about conflict and change that guide intervention design can be helpful to conflict resolution and peace-building efforts by:

- Enhancing reflective practice and conscious choice among practitioners that expands the range and creativity of intervention options.
- Fostering stronger links between theory and practice by differentiating the underlying theories that shape practice.
- Recognizing the shared or complimentary elements of programs in order to develop cooperative and coordinated intervention strategies.
- Identifying competing assumptions and theories useful in testing the relative validity of different approaches or in differentiating the conditions under which each is most useful.
- Relating the often-disconnected discourse and knowledge in this field (e.g. between academic disciplines and between international and domestic interventions) in order to better communicate with stakeholders, funders, policymakers, and others.
- Ensuring appropriate use of existing programs and encouraging more informed efforts in the future.” (p. 2)

1 The section on rationale for theories of change draws substantially upon Tjip Walker’s draft paper “Theories of Change for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding” as well as workshop discussions.
Theories of change are already implicitly or explicitly guiding conflict resolution practice, and are essential to engage in evaluation of conflict interventions. Articulating the prevailing theories of change within the conflict field is crucial if we hope to measure performance and ultimately to increase understanding of what works (Ashton, 2007).

Articulating the theories of change is particularly important in a young field like conflict studies where there are many—and untested—approaches, propositions, and programs competing for attention and donor dollars.

Several scholars have begun to assemble helpful analyses of selected theories of change in the field (e.g. Ross, 2000; Mitchell, 2005; Shapiro, 2005). Others utilized theories of change models to illuminate particular areas of conflict resolution practice (e.g. Shapiro, 2002; Addor, et al, 2005). CDA Collaborative Learning Projects demonstrated the utility of summarizing key theories of change and activities related to each of these theories as part of an OECD effort to offer guidance for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2008). The articulation of common theories of change that appears in Appendix 6 of the OECD document provided helpful contributions in the early stages of developing the approaches to theories of change within USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM). Diana Chigas, Peter Woodrow, and others working with CDA Collaborative Learning Projects developed an inventory of theories of change inductively by reviewing the in-depth case studies of the Reflecting on Peace Practices Project.

CMM is building on these efforts in working towards a more comprehensive yet relatively parsimonious cataloguing of the conflict field’s theories of change. CMM worked inductively from reviews of programs and the literature, and deductively from USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, to generate a draft Theories of Change matrix. CMM then circulated the draft matrix within the conflict studies community and USAID for initial feedback. The matrix identifies theories grouped into seven families. For each theory there is a statement of the theory in the standard if/then form, some discussion of how the theory compares to others, and some illustrative activities. The target column identifies where within USAID’s CAF the theory focuses its change efforts.

A slightly revised draft matrix developed by GMU/ICAR, AED, and CMM during the workshop planning phase was issued to all the conflict and M&E experts invited to participate in the 2009 workshop. Pre-workshop feedback on the matrix was collected from invitees and shared and discussed at the workshop. During the workshop, participants worked in small groups to critically review each theory of change statement in the matrix and brainstorm potential indicators for the theories (see “Theories of Change Indicator Development Workshop” section below). Overall, the matrix is intended as a living document, subject to updating and further development.
as the state of the art of theory guiding practice in the conflict field develops. The current version of the CMM Matrix of Theories of Change appears as Appendix A.

The CMM Matrix presents seven clusters of theories of change. Each cluster is labeled as a “family” of related theories. For example, Family 1, Inside-Out Peacebuilding, includes two theories that are based on assumptions that individual changes will lead to societal changes. The first theory in that cluster focuses on individual “shifts in consciousness” such as experienced through an epiphany, deep cognitive dissonance, or psychological development, and the resulting increased capacity for and commitment to peacebuilding. The second theory in that cluster focuses on the development of common complex identities in which individuals share an overarching inclusive group identity that encourages constructive cross-conflict engagement. Each of the other clusters of theories of change similarly includes several distinct approaches that share some common assumptions. These are detailed in current version of the CMM Matrix in Appendix A.

Distinguishing Conflict Assessment and Theory of Change in Program Design, Implementation, and Evaluation

Conflict assessment and theory of change are related but distinct concepts useful to inform conflict resolution interventions and their evaluation. Conflict assessment guided by the USAID Conflict Assessment Framework provides an understanding of the dynamics that may, given particular catalysts, lead to or prevent violent conflict. The conflict assessment identifies a set of problems seen as drivers of conflict, and a set of areas where further strengths in resilience would help mitigate conflict. Thus, the conflict assessment outlines a problem, or, quite often, problems, in need of intervention. This is the problem analysis. What drivers of conflict need to be addressed in order to prevent violent conflict? What areas of resilience need to be strengthened in order to prevent violent conflict?

A conflict assessment sets the stage for a theory of change. Once an assessment describes the conflict, a theory of change suggests how an intervention in that context will change the conflict. For example, an assessment using the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework might point out particular drivers of conflict. A theory of change would then suggest how those drivers of conflict could be addressed in order to prevent violent conflict. If an assessment finds that grievances relating to unequal distribution of resources between ethnic groups is a driver of conflict, a related theory of change would suggest how interventions could bring about changes to that conflict context.

Theories of change play an important role at all phases of conflict programming (Table 1). In program design, theories of change guide the intervention design by suggesting what sorts of interventions in the conflict context are likely to lead to the desired changes. Theories of change are also used to develop meaningful change indicators to monitor program implementation. During program implementation, theories of change guide choices by conflict resolution
practitioners in the moment as they adjust to particular realities in the conflict area during program activities. Evaluation of programs can also usefully be guided by theories of change, including baseline assessments, mid-term formative evaluation, and summative evaluation.

Table 1. Theories of Change in Program Phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Phase</th>
<th>Theory of Change Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>TOC suggests what sorts of interventions in the conflict context are likely to lead to desired changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>TOC suggests useful indicators to monitor program implementation. TOC guides practitioners adjusting to shifts in the conflict context during program implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>TOC focuses evaluation on intended changes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Theory-based evaluation is an approach to evaluation popular in the conflict resolution field. Theory-based evaluation utilizes theories of change to focus evaluation efforts on the intended changes and the expected processes by which an intervention may lead to those changes. The rationale for theory-based evaluation is that by identifying the rationale for a program, the program design, its implementation, and the program evaluation will be more appropriately related to the expected changes (Church and Rogers, 2006).

Monitoring and evaluation in conflict-related programming requires knowing what changes one expects to monitor and how they are expected to develop over the course of a project. The theory of change guides monitoring and evaluation to focus on the particular outputs, outcomes, impacts, and even sustainability of a program. The theory of change can be considered as the reasoning that connects the intervention to these changes it is expected to cause. In Figure 1, this reasoning, or assumed causality, is represented by arrows.

Figure 1. Theory of Change Connecting Program Stages

However, there are challenges to using theories of change to focus evaluations of conflict programs. The conflict field draws from many disciplines, each of which bring their own fundamental theories. For example, clinical psychology focuses on individual change, social psychology on intergroup change, and political psychology on system change (Shapiro 2006, p. 9). Economists working in conflict areas are likely to focus on economic changes, sociologists on social changes, political scientists on political changes, and anthropologists on cultural changes. Pragmatic implementers of development programs in conflict contexts are likely to draw on many theories of change. Some individuals working on a program may emphasize one of the relevant theories of change more than others. And, as Schon (1983) highlights, the espoused theory of practitioners and their theory in use may be different. Thus, in the messiness of applied work in the field, identifying one theory of change may be challenging.
There are also some drawbacks to theory-based evaluation. When theories are incomplete or wrong, theory-based evaluation may miss significant changes. Changes may occur that were not expected, but a highly theory-focused evaluation would only look for those changes expected by the theory. Other evaluation approaches can complement theory-based evaluations to allow for exploration of unexpected outcomes and impacts.

Making theories of change explicit is a core practice within empowerment evaluation. Empowerment evaluation develops local capacity to identify, articulate, and measure progress towards meeting their needs; these local approaches may not follow the program designer’s initial theory of change. Indeed, local theories of change in one context may be different from the theories of change that are dominant in another context. For example, in one area, there may be widespread belief that approval by the ancestors of a program’s innovations will allow broader adoption of the innovation. In another context, the implicit theory of change may be that good ideas will spread and be adopted. In still another location, the predominant theory of change may be that good marketing will allow innovations to take hold. Not all theories of change have been equally validated by rigorous scientific study. But empowerment evaluation places an emphasis on the program beneficiaries identifying their locally-informed theories of change and assessing a program impact according to those locally desired changes.

As our theories develop over time, and as our cultural specificities persist in presenting different understandings of conflict and conflict resolution processes, there will never be one set of universally adopted theories of change in conflict management and mitigation. Still, it is a worthwhile endeavor to systematize theories of change that are frequently employed for conflict management and mitigation worldwide. More systematized understanding of theories of change will help both the practice and theory of conflict resolution.

An organized inventory of popular theories of change will help guide practice. Practitioners may have an intuitive feeling about what they are trying to accomplish and why they are designing and implementing interventions in particular ways. Review of a range of theories of change may help practitioners articulate their own theory of change guiding their work. By providing seven clusters of theories in its Theories of Change matrix (see Appendix A), CMM offers a range of theories for consideration by those engaged in program design, implementation, and evaluation. Also, by highlighting the main theories of change underlying current conflict programming, the Theories of Change matrix offers an opportunity for further developing our ability to monitor progress towards the changes we seek through our interventions.

A systematic review of theories of change can also further the theory base in the conflict resolution field. By grouping interventions according to the central theories of change guiding them, we can more easily compare results across types of interventions. More meta-evaluation
studies will be possible when we have clearer categories of types of interventions. By learning across many interventions, we can develop more certainty in the limits, generalizability, and validity of particular theories of change.

**Indicators of Change**

Indicators are signs that signal that particular changes have or have not occurred. Indicators do not tell us how or why a change occurs (Church and Rogers, 2006). In the “if-then” statement that is central to a theory of change, indicators reflect whether and to what extent the “then” has come about. Indicators may also be used to monitor to what extent the “if” parts of the “if-then” statement are in fact present, as well as monitoring the larger context. Indicators are not the actual changes, but are the ways we can see and measure the changes. An indicator is a, “Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention…” (OECD 2008).

While indicators may also be used to assess program quality, in the context of theories of change and theory-driven evaluation indicators provide ways to assess the output, outcome, impact, and sustainability in comparison with expectations informed by the theory of change guiding the program. In short, indicators provide a means of measuring desired changes connected with an intervention. While theories of change seek to explain how or why changes occur, indicators show the extent to which those changes have occurred.

Evaluation of conflict resolution programming has been hampered by difficulties in developing appropriate indicators. When the desired changes predicted by a theory of change are concrete, tangible, and easily measurable, the task of identifying an appropriate indicator is fairly straightforward. For example, health programs might utilize indicators such as prevalence of a particular mineral deficiency as measured by blood tests in a sample population or prevalence of a particular disease as measured by reviews of hospital records to assess the outcomes of related programs. However, often the desired changes in conflict management programs are more abstract and intangible, such as seeking to improve relationships or increase trust or understanding among belligerents. In such cases, indicators help approximate the change, rather than measuring change precisely. Better indicators are closer approximators of the intangible changes, such as improved relationships, that may be expected.

Components of indicators include what is to be measured, unit of measurement, baseline, size, magnitude or dimension of change (targets), quality or standard of change, target population, and timeframe (Church and Rogers, 2006). Specific characteristics of these components make some indicators more useful:

- Direct indicators are closely related to the changes they are intended to reflect.
- Objective indicators have high internal validity.
- Practical or feasible indicators are not overly complicated to measure.
- A set of adequate indicators, taken together, comprehensively reflect the various aspects of the desired change.
- A mix of qualitative and quantitative indicators is usually useful for creating a more comprehensive picture of development of the desired changes.
- Data collection on indicators is also more helpful when it is disaggregated according to relevant divisions within the target population and context (e.g., tracking if a program is affecting men differently than women, or one village differently than another).

The selection of indicators to focus monitoring and evaluation during conflict management
interventions can be challenging due to several factors. There is a temptation to replace objectives with indicators, for example by counting mediation agreements as the measure of success when the actual outcome expectancy goes beyond mediation agreements (Church and Rogers, 2006).

Moreover, a particularly difficult challenge is the desire in headquarters settings to utilize universal indicators throughout many field contexts, although local realities and cultures make universal indicators problematic. This is often the case in working with social phenomena such as conflicts, in contrast to more objectively measurable physical phenomena such as infant mortality. Rather than seeking universally applicable indicators transferable immediately from one social context to another, where there would be a danger of falling into an overly simplistic fill-in-the-box approach, conflict management experts may strive to develop a toolbox of indicators that can be flexibly adapted, interpreted, modified, or discarded according to local contexts.

A toolbox of indicators provides flexible structure supportive of program design, implementation, and evaluation both informed by experience elsewhere and simultaneously sensitive to the local conflict context. A systematized set of indicators provides practitioners, evaluators, and researchers with a range of reference points and a choice of templates on which to build an appropriate monitoring mechanism for each unique program. Researchers and practitioners may develop new indicators or adapt existing ones as the theories of change and conflict contexts continue to develop.

Theories of Change Indicator Development Workshop (December 2009)
The Theories of Change Indicator Development workshop took place at GMU’s ICAR building on December 14-15, 2009. The workshop was attended by some twenty conflict and M&E experts from mainly USAID/DCHA/CMM; international NGOs (AED, Mercy Corps, CARE International, Search for Common Ground, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, Fund for Peace); and universities (GMU/ICAR, University of Wisconsin/Milwaukee), and also GMU/ICAR graduate assistants serving as recorders and workshop assistants. While a few participants could attend only one day, a core group of conflict experts participated in the both workshop days.

This workshop focused on identifying indicators that could work, in some contexts, to approximate the changes described within each of the seven groups of theories of change that appear in the CMM matrix. The workshop agenda is listed in Appendix B, and the workshop participants in Appendix C. A summary of the workshop sessions and overall workshop outputs is provided below.

Workshop Day One:
S. Tjip Walker (USAID/CMM) opened the workshop by reviewing the history and goals of CMM’s Theories of Change initiative and discussing some potential limitations of the theory of change approach for conflict programs. Susan Allen Nan (GMU/ICAR) then discussed the feedback received about the draft Theories of Change matrix from workshop invitees, and the revisions made to that matrix based on this feedback. A full group discussion took place on the matrix and the theories of change approach to gather more workshop participant feedback.
Next, Mark Rogers (independent consultant, a Conflict M&E expert), presented an iterative process for generating indicators of change for the “if” and “then” parts of a theory of change statement: 1) determine the type of change embedded in the theory (e.g., knowledge, attitude, behavior); 2) determine the level of change (e.g., individual, relational, cultural, institutional); 3) specify the “change from what to what” that occurs in the theory statement; 4) articulate the theory’s assumptions; and 5) brainstorm as many indicators of change (both quantitative and qualitative) for the theory as possible (e.g. 75-200), with a recorder posting all the ideas publicly. He led the workshop participants through a practice run with the process to brainstorm indicators for one theory from CMM’s matrix. In the afternoon, small group teams of workshop experts used the process to generate indicators for three theory families in the matrix (Inside-Out Peacebuilding, Functioning Institutions, and Healthy Relationships), and to tweak the theory statements, as needed.

Day One also included a luncheon presentation by Diana Chigas (CDA) about the characteristics of good and bad theories of change and indicators learned from the Reflective Peace Practice (RPP) initiative, and some observations on challenges of developing peacebuilding indicators of change. She also mapped the theories in CMM’s draft Theories of Change matrix into the different quadrants of the well-known RPP matrix: i.e., reaching more people/key people, and individual-personal/socio-political types of change. Day One closed with a networking session in which Mercy Corps, CARE International, Search for Common Ground, and the Fund for Peace briefed workshop participants on relevant peacebuilding M&E initiatives being implemented by their respective organizations.

**Workshop Day Two:**

Workshop participants met in small groups the first half of Day Two to brainstorm indicators for the remaining four families of theories in CMM’s draft matrix: the Peace Process, Coming to Terms with the Past, Attitudes toward Peace, and Reform the Elite theories. After lunch, a plenary session happened in which each small group reported out recommended changes in the theory statements, examples of indicators, and indicator development challenges they faced. The workshop ended with closing comments by each participant about the theories of change initiative and next steps (see the concluding section of this report for more details).

**Overall Workshop Outputs:**

The workshop contributed rich brainstormed lists of potential indicators for each theory family in CMM’s Theories of Change matrix, with particular indicators selected by the workshop’s small group teams of conflict and M&E experts as most promising for further consideration. Some of the small group teams brainstormed over 100 potential indicators for particular theory families. The workshop participants reported that the process of developing a more refined bank of change indicators for flexible adaptation or modification in particular contexts will require more work and more time (see the next steps discussion below).

In addition, the small group teams and individual experts discussed refinements to some of the matrix’s theories as part of the process of the developing change indicators. These refinements concerned not only the “then” parts of the theory statements, but also the “if” component, which the workshop’s experts examined to identify each theory’s types and levels of change before brainstorming indicators. Appendix H presents the comments received during the workshop on CMM’s draft Theories of Change matrix, particularly the theory statements.
Recommended Next Steps for Theories of Change Initiatives

At the end of the Theories of Change Indicator Development workshop, the participants reflected on the current practical impact of theories of change and indicators, and the appropriate next steps. This concluding section of the report covers the main reflections and recommendations.

Several comments focused specifically on the workshop process and the task of developing indicators related to the theories of change. During the workshop, small groups worked on specific “if-then” statements from a theory of change, develop a more precise statement of the theory. These precise statements then guided the small groups in brainstorming indicators relevant to the changes anticipated by a theory. After brainstorming, the small groups moved towards choosing the most promising indicators or sets of indicators, highlighting those that would be appropriate, reliable, transferable or adaptable, valid, and practical. However, 1.5 hours was not enough time for small groups to complete the selection of most promising indicators.

The workshop experience suggests lessons learned for future indicator development efforts. The utility of working in smaller groups was contrasted with the difficulty of working in a large group for the detailed crafting of very precise statements. Preparation of draft texts by a very small group was suggested as a way of streamlining the workshop process. Furthermore, the interrelationship between the precise wording of the theories of change and the specific indicators that reflect those theories suggests that some adjustments to the matrix of the theories of change is appropriate as indicators are developed. The workshop suggested an iterative process of refining the theory, identifying indicators, and then further refining the theory to further focus in on the most useful indicators. With the CMM matrix of theories as a living document, and a related toolbox of indicators as a work in progress, this conversation between theory and indicator can continue to be mutually enriching.

The workshop experience suggests the Theories of Change Matrix is most useful as a living document that will develop over time. Thus, further refinement as theories guiding practice shift will allow the matrix to reflect current thinking and thus most usefully assist contemporary practitioners. Further fleshing out of the contexts in which particular theories apply will also be helpful, allowing more nuance into the “if- then” statements. However, some stability in the core approaches of the matrix will be helpful in promoting meta-analysis between the various theories of change. Such stability must develop as a manifestation of the maturation of the conflict field, rather than as an order imposed by a donor agency. Further articulation of the matrix of theories of change within the Reflective Peace Practices (RPP) matrix may be helpful.

To the extent that a manageable number of theories of change focus on a similarly manageable number of desired changes, progress together may be possible in identifying more appropriate indicators that can be adapted in various contexts. Workshop participants suggested CMM might require grantees whose work is based largely on the same overall group of theories of change to work together in some way in a learning process that would encourage all grantees to develop more useful indicators together. CMM might pilot that process with the larger group of projects emphasizing people-to-people peacebuilding in the near future.

How to Develop Indicators

1. Refine the Theory of Change.
2. Brainstorm ways to know if the change has occurred.
3. Identify the most useful indicators that are appropriate, reliable, transferable/adaptable, valid, and practical.
4. Remain open to further refinement.
Across all programs, there are innovations in indicator development that should be more broadly shared. Promising approaches to developing indicators include the development of appropriate scales. Use of scales allows more than a binary indication that a change was achieved or not achieved. For example, the theories of change focused on functioning institutions do not lend themselves to indicators of entirely 100% perfectly functioning institutions in contrast with entirely dysfunctional institutions. Rather, institutions may be more or less functional. An indicator of extreme dissatisfaction with an institution may be distinct from an indicator of tolerable dissatisfaction, and both of these will be different than an indicator of accepting the institution even while seeing room for improvement. A set of indicators can be linked together in a scale that suggests a particular ordered development towards the change set out by a theory of change. A theory of change might suggest that in a conflict context in which a particular group is extremely dissatisfied with an institution, there would first be indications of moving to tolerable dissatisfaction, and only later to indicators of accepting the institution. Looking immediately for acceptance of the institution would be misguided. Thus, a scaled set of indicators provides more flexibility to adapt to a variety of conflict contexts.

Some indicators or scaled sets of indicators will be relevant across several theories of change. Workshop participants noted that similar indicators came up while they worked in teams on different groups of theories of change, especially for theories concerning key actors. Thus, continued sharing of indicators across the various theories of change will be useful, too. Indeed, many theories may blend together to inform one particular program, and some indicators will be shared across those theories.

Participants agreed that the search for a broad consensus on key theories of change and useful indicators for adaptation to local contexts is important for donors, practitioners, and theorists. Participants encouraged CMM to take on the role of an incubator and clearinghouse. CMM could become a hub for monitoring and evaluation experts and theory-driven evaluation, linking these experts to CMM projects and offering opportunities for research studying both past and present CMM-funded projects. While NGOs are not typically staffed to do in-depth or long-term research, CMM might serve as a clearinghouse and sponsor of academic-NGO partnerships. If researchers were linked with each CMM-funded program, there could be more robust monitoring and evaluation and, as researchers meet together, more cross-fertilization of theory of change and indicator work across programs. If CMM were to set aside a proportion of all grant awards for funding rigorous evaluation, program implementers would better be able to manage evaluations. For example, proposal instructions could suggest or require that applicants set aside 10% of every budget for evaluation, with details to be worked out during the award process once an evaluation expert has been linked to that particular project. Just as branding strategies are often budgeted for at a set figure and then developed later, the same approach for rigorous evaluations could become the norm.

In sum, next theories of change steps suggested at the workshop include:

- Develop a CMM program to connect researchers or professional evaluators to many or all CMM-funded programs to increase the rigor of monitoring and evaluation from project inception onward and facilitate learning across program contexts. For short-term assistance and long-term capacity building, consider roles for advanced students in these NGO-academic research teams. Consider an evaluation design consultation as mandatory prior to finalizing program awards.
• Develop a guidance document that teaches USAID field staff how to use theories of change. This should be a clear booklet to teach field staff both as part of training programs and also as a stand-alone resource. The booklet should provide a solid theoretical introduction and include boxes to highlight key points, diagrams, and example case studies.

• Develop a culture of learning within USAID funded programs, including expectations of grantees engaging in learning together.

• Conduct and share results of portfolio evaluations of USAID activities in particular countries, and consider what all the programs add up to in terms of the theories of change and indicators of change.

• Develop a community of practice focused on theories of change and indicators to sustain the conversations catalyzed by the workshop. Participants were eager to continue the engagement across the practitioner-academic boundary, which was bridged successfully at the workshop, and to conduct an ongoing iterative process of further indicator development together. Continue to engage individuals involved in related projects overseas, and utilize electronic communication to share innovations would further enrich the network.

• Focus overall next steps on outcome indicators as the more promising area for innovation than output or impact indicators.
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# Inside-Out Peacebuilding

The two theories in this family focus on the construction of inclusive identity at the level of individuals. When this inner transformation takes place among key actors and/or enough individuals, they can influence societal patterns, identity groups, institutional performance, and other key actors toward constructive conflict engagement.

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<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Illustrative Activities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shifts in consciousness</td>
<td>If key actors and/or enough individuals undergo constructive shifts in their consciousness, such as developing more universal identities or awareness of identity formation, then their commitment and capacity for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and for resisting mobilization of conflictual identities, will increase and can influence social change in that area.</td>
<td>This theory focuses on how a transformative experience such as a regular reflection, personal epiphany, deep cognitive dissonance, or psychological development can alter an individual’s deep consciousness structures—understanding of him/herself and relations to others and dynamics of conflict—resulting in a greater individual capacity and commitment to peacebuilding. Enough individuals experiencing this shift can generate social change toward resolving constructive conflict management.</td>
<td>Key actors; Individuals</td>
<td>Personal transformation/consciousness-raising workshops or processes; psychological therapy; meditative activities; educational programs; identity-based training; nonviolent direct action and related acts that challenge assumptions or raise consciousness.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common complex identities</td>
<td>If key actors and/or enough individuals on all sides of the conflict discover shared values and multifaceted complex identities, including constructive in-group self-esteem, then inclusive broader “value identities” that unite groups will form and multiple aspects of identity that provide cross-cutting ties will become salient, providing a basis for constructive conflict engagement together and reducing intergroup conflict.</td>
<td>The theory focuses on the role of inclusive and complex identities across a conflict divide. It suggests groups of individuals celebrate self-esteem and discover values (e.g., peace, justice, ethics) they share, which can generate an inclusive, deep, often spiritual connection and overarching inclusive group identity; and that people revive multifaceted cross-cutting identities that bridge across the conflict divide. These transformations support social change toward constructive conflict engagement and address unconstructive actions by one's own group.</td>
<td>Key actors; Individuals; Identity</td>
<td>Inter-faith and inter-ethnic dialogues and encounter groups; intra-group dialogues on values; faith-based initiatives; cultural preservation and celebration; single-identity work; inter-group gatherings; work together on superordinate goals; women’s groups, youth groups, sports groups, professional organizations; direct personal experience with “the enemy”; media content showing individuals and groups experiencing positive shifts from exclusive to more inclusive identities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2 Attitudes toward Peace

The three theories in this family all target attitudes about a situation. They focus on altering perceptions, attitudes, and social norms concerning the costs of violent conflict and the benefits of tolerance, coexistence, and peaceful resolution of conflicts.

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key actor attitudes</td>
<td>If key actor attitudes change to favor peaceful solutions to the conflict, then they will seek peaceful solutions.</td>
<td>This theory focuses on the crucial role that key actors play in articulating and mobilizing grievances. The aim is to alter the way key actors evaluate the benefits and costs of violence; either persuading them that costs of inciting violence outweigh the benefits or, alternatively, that peaceful means exist to address grievances.</td>
<td>Key actors</td>
<td>Diplomacy or advocacy that focuses on options or alternatives, including potential incentives for choosing peace over violence; media campaigns targeting key actors; training-based programs that introduce new ways to view/evaluate the situation; guarantors; shifts in military capability balance that favor peaceful settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass attitudes</td>
<td>If enough people's attitudes change to favor peaceful solutions to the conflict, then they will prefer that key actors seek peaceful solutions to conflicts and will resist mobilization to adopt violence.</td>
<td>This theory focuses on the perceptions of the mass of people embroiled in a conflict about the relative costs and benefits of violence as a solution. Those judgments are influenced by a number of factors, including perceived depth/seriousness of grievances or perceived power of resilience factors. Changing these perceptions/attitudes is expected to reduce support for violence.</td>
<td>Grievance; Social/institutional resilience</td>
<td>Advocacy campaigns, including the use of mass media, that target perceptions of grievance, tap into social or institutional resilience, or generally promote peaceful resolution of conflict; mobilization of grassroots groups to advocate for peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture of peace</td>
<td>If war-torn societies focus cultural, media, and education resources on changing people’s attitudes and social norms to support the peaceful resolution of conflicts, then a culture of peace will emerge that promotes coexistence and resists mobilization to adopt violence.</td>
<td>This theory focuses on fostering a cultural shift from violent to peaceful approaches to handling conflict throughout society. The aim is to generate a &quot;culture of peace&quot; by leveraging education, mass media, arts, and culture resources in that direction. It is a longer-term process of transforming the attitudes and social norms that supported violent conflict resolution in the past.</td>
<td>Social/institutional resilience</td>
<td>Peace education; advocacy campaigns and socialization processes that stress tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflict; countering domestic violence and gender-based violence; development of common history texts and teaching; establishment of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; peace media capacity building and content; cultural peacebuilding activities (e.g., theatre, music, art).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Healthy Relationships

The theories in this family target attitudes, as do those in the previous family. They differ in expecting that attitudinal change comes from the interactions of belligerent groups and the increased mutual understanding and appreciation that results. The two Healthy Relationships theories differ with respect to whether the setting for interactions is a shared community, or a separate, safe location.

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community-based peacebuilding</td>
<td>If belligerent groups within a community are given the opportunity to interact, then they will better understand and appreciate one another and will prefer to resolve conflicts peacefully.</td>
<td>This theory addresses divisions within a community that may be rooted in such things as ethnicity, religion, or status as a returning ex-combatant, displaced persons, or refugee. The aim is to create opportunities for a series of interactions between belligerent groups in the community to promote mutual understanding and positive attitudes. As the health of the relationship between these groups improves, the likelihood of violence between them declines.</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Negotiation and problem solving to enable returns; intergroup dialogue; ex-combatant-community engagement; processes for handling land claims; joint projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building bridges</td>
<td>If key actors from belligerent groups are given the opportunity to interact, then they will better understand and appreciate one another, be better able to work with one another, and prefer to resolve conflicts peacefully.</td>
<td>This theory addresses the prejudice and demonizing that reinforces the perceived differences between groups by creating opportunities for key groups from the belligerent parties to interact in a safe, neutral location. These interactions, usually limited to a few days or weeks, are expected to change attitudes and begin building bridges between the groups.</td>
<td>Key actors; Identity</td>
<td>Problem solving workshops; peace camps or sporting competitions for youth, joint leadership training for political leaders, joint study tours for military leaders; inter-faith dialogues.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### 4 Peace Process

The theories in this family all focus on establishing and sustaining a process of peace negotiations and agreement implementation. The primary target is process because attitudinal change and substantive solutions will develop within good processes.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ripeness/Mutually Hurting Stalemate</td>
<td>If the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate develops among belligerent parties to a conflict, then the parties are likely to seek a negotiated settlement.</td>
<td>This theory focuses on key actor perceptions and calculations of the costs and benefits of continuing with a military solution to the conflict. The aim is to foster recognition of a &quot;mutually hurting stalemate&quot; in which leaders on all sides question whether violent strategies will serve their interests better than alternative approaches. The situation then becomes &quot;ripe&quot; for a potential negotiated solution.</td>
<td>Key actors</td>
<td>Create stalemates by empowering weaker parties; pre-negotiation dialogue to explore alternatives to violence and provide a &quot;way out&quot; of the violent conflict resolution strategy; pre-negotiation training for Track 1 group leaders and their Track 1 1/2 advisors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediated/ negotiated settlement</td>
<td>If we can establish space, trust, and mechanisms for negotiation between the belligerent parties, then a mediator/facilitator can lead the parties through a series of steps to cease violence and negotiate peace.</td>
<td>This theory targets the quality of the mediator/facilitator and peace negotiations process design. Different types of mediators (strong, neutral) and mediation processes (problem-solving, bargaining) are likely to be more or less successful in different types of conflicts. Process design will affect the perceived justness and sustainability of the resulting peace agreement, and also is a factor influencing peace agreement implementation outcomes.</td>
<td>Key actors; Social/ institutional resilience</td>
<td>Provide technical assistance on peace process design; support a Technical Secretariat to conduct policy option research; provide logistics support to the negotiation sessions; support peace agreement implementation committees and monitoring efforts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY

If formal peace negotiations are complemented by national and grassroots peacebuilding efforts led by private actors, then constructive "cross-track" communication can be generated to make peace negotiations and settlement content more inclusive, multi-faceted, and lasting.

This theory emphasizes the importance of a "public peace process" and "deep diplomacy" for peace negotiations. National-level leaders from civil society, business, religious, academic and other non-governmental sectors (Track 2) and grassroots-level leaders (Track 3) engaged in peacebuilding can contribute constructive ideas to the Track 1 formal peace process, and help consult the public on settlement options. People who are involved in the peace process will serve as a constituency for implementing the eventual peace agreement.

SOCIETAL PATTERNS

Peacebuilding activities implemented by Track 2 and Track 3 actors in their sector (business, religious, youth) across conflict divides; public opinion surveys on peace settlement options; sponsor civil society and victims' representatives to attend negotiation sessions; support peace agreement implementation advocacy and monitoring campaigns led by civil society.

5 FUNCTIONING INSTITUTIONS

The theories in this family focus on a liberal democratic approach to formal and informal institutional performance within government, civil society, and the private sector. They differ in terms of which formal and informal institutions have the most impact on perceived grievances or are the most likely to tap into social and institutional resilience.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>If formal and informal economic institutions produced reasonable livelihoods/quality of life for all, then the extent of core grievance would decline.</td>
<td>Like the other theories in this family, this one focuses on improving the economy and economic institutional performance, either by improving effectiveness, legitimacy or both. This theory prioritizes formal and informal economic institutions because of their link to livelihoods.</td>
<td>Institutional performance; core grievances</td>
<td>Tax or land reform, price liberalization, anti-corruption campaigns, increasing transparency of government procurement, economic development, equitable management of natural resources, employment programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theories of Change</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Institutional Performance</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Additional Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>If formal and informal political institutions operated efficiently, impartially and in the interests of all, then the extent of core grievance would decline.</td>
<td>Institutional performance; core grievances</td>
<td>Elections, constitutions, decentralization, power sharing, legislative support, informal community fora.</td>
<td>This theory focuses on improving institutional performance, either by improving effectiveness, legitimacy or both. This theory prioritizes formal and informal political institutions because of the importance of being able to affect public decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security/Judicial/Human rights</strong></td>
<td>If security and justice institutions protected everyone and enforced laws equitably and protected all human rights, then the extent of core grievance would decline.</td>
<td>Institutional performance; core grievances</td>
<td>Judicial system support, security sector reform, strong police system, human rights awareness and protections, rule of law.</td>
<td>This theory focuses on institutional performance, either by improving effectiveness, legitimacy or both. This theory prioritizes rule of law, human rights, security and justice institutions because of their link to basic survival, rule of law and fairness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social service delivery</strong></td>
<td>If social services, such as health care and education, etc., are delivered in an effective and responsive way for all, then the extent of core grievance would decline.</td>
<td>Institutional performance; core grievances</td>
<td>Strengthening of health care delivery, reproductive rights, expansion of educational access and quality.</td>
<td>This theory focuses on institutional performance, either by improving effectiveness, legitimacy or both. This theory prioritizes social service delivery because the failure of these basic services feeds factors which correlate with violent conflict, including a bulge of unemployed youth, perceptions of grievance, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media</strong></td>
<td>If media institutions are diverse in terms of identity group ownership, management, and staff, then it is more likely that media content will foster social resilience rather than core grievances.</td>
<td>Institutional performance; social resilience</td>
<td>Professional capacity building of minority group journalists and media organizations; inter-group media production support; journalism ethics and diversity training; support for independent media; “new media” initiatives to increase the plurality of viewpoints in the public arena.</td>
<td>This theory focuses on the level of identity group plurality in media institutions (broadcast, print, other) as an overall sector of society. The theory recognizes that the domination of media institutions by one or few identity groups to the exclusion of other identity groups increases the chances of media content being biased, inflammatory, and/or viewed as illegitimate by the excluded identity groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute resolution/Inclusive networks</td>
<td>If dispute resolution function robustly, and all of the formal and informal institutions in society inclusively are equitably shaped by, respond to, and serve all populations in the society through participatory decision making, including women, minorities, youth, and the elderly, then intergroup cooperation, early problem solving around grievances, and social resilience will increase.</td>
<td>This theory focuses on the roles that segments of the population can play in either exacerbating potential for conflict due to core grievances born of exclusion from the formal and informal institutions of society, and on the intergroup and social resilience created by drawing on the strengths of all groups in participating in all of the above institutions, addressing early any grievances that could escalate into violence, and by creating cross-cutting ties within inclusive networks that bridge between social groups.</td>
<td>Institutional performance; social resilience; core grievances</td>
<td>Micro-credit, education, training and advocacy programs focused on historically excluded populations; development of inclusive national identity; dispute resolution systems design.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6 Reform the Elite

The theories in this family focus on the elite as a singular key actor. These theories target, respectively, the motivations and means of key actors rather than their attitudes.

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite motivations</td>
<td>If the incentives facing elites can be changed so that peace becomes more acceptable and violence less so, then the elite will accept peace.</td>
<td>Peace comes when it is in the interest of political (and other) leaders to take the necessary steps. Peacebuilding efforts must change the political calculus of key leaders and groups.</td>
<td>Key actors</td>
<td>Raise the costs and reduce the benefits for political elites of continuing war while increasing the incentives for peace; engage active and influential constituencies in favor of peace; withdraw international support/funding for warring parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite means</td>
<td>If the resources elites have to engage in organized violence are degraded or removed, then they will be more likely to accept peace.</td>
<td>Wars require vast amounts of material (weapons, supplies, transport, etc.) and human capital. If we can interrupt the supply of people and goods to the war-making system, it will collapse and peace will break out. Implementation of peace agreements requires dismantling the war system.</td>
<td>Key actors</td>
<td>Anti-war campaigns to cut off funds/national budgets; security sector reform; DDR; conscientious objection and/or resistance to military service; international arms control; arms (and other) embargoes and boycotts; preventing people from becoming soldiers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### New elite

If a new generation of elites come to power and have the means and motivation to engage more constructively with conflict, they will do so.

Elites may be set in their ways, but new leadership can be developed to eventually take on key actor roles in conflict resolution.

Potential future key actors

Youth development programs; inclusive leadership skills building; visitor exchange programs; conflict resolution training and educational opportunities; study visit programs.

### Coming to Terms with the Past

The theories in this family all focus on acknowledging and accepting the violent past as part of creating healthy selves, relationships, and overall social/institutional resiliency to future violence.

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trauma healing</td>
<td>If individuals and identity groups traumatized by violence are given opportunities and support to express and heal their pain, then the desire for violent revenge will be reduced and unresolved trauma will be removed as a conflict grievance.</td>
<td>This theory addresses the &quot;cycle of aggression&quot;--grief, anger, desire for revenge, aggression against the enemy in the name of revenge and justice--that can emerge in post-conflict societies when individuals and identity groups have not sufficiently expressed and healed their trauma. Unresolved trauma can be passed across generations and become a core identity group grievance. Traumatized individuals and identity groups need healing support.</td>
<td>Grievance/resilience</td>
<td>Strengthen local capacity in trauma healing; psychosocial counseling appropriate to the local culture; art, theatre, and physical exercise &quot;therapy&quot;; storytelling programs; trauma healing information campaign; gender-based violence survivor programs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconciliation</td>
<td>If individuals, elites, and groups from across the conflict divide are engaged in a process of reconciliation, then healthier relationships and shared futures can be generated to increase social resilience to mobilized violence.</td>
<td>The theory acknowledges that reconciliation, or the reconciling of relationships, is a process and is critical to strengthening social resilience to renewed violence. Depending on each society, reconciliation processes may be needed in targeted sectors (e.g., political, religious) as well as in communities and society at large. Acknowledgement and forgiveness between perpetrator and victim, including through local or religious rituals of forgiveness, can play an important role in reconciliation.</td>
<td>Grievance/resilience</td>
<td>Support to community reconciliation ceremonies and forgiveness processes; cultural activities with reconciliation messages; reconciliation-focused media programs; reconciliation initiatives among political parties; reconciliation education programs for children and youth; support to inter-faith religious leader groups working on forgiveness and reconciliation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theories of Change</td>
<td>Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation</td>
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<td>Transitional justice</td>
<td>If war-torn societies publicly account for and address the conflict’s violence and human rights/war crime violations, then social resiliency to violence mobilization will be strengthened and conflict-related grievance among identify groups will decline. Societies that have experienced severe violence, human rights/war crime violations, and social dislocation need public processes to handle grievances; identify what happened; acknowledge the pain of victims; and determine appropriate approaches for accountability and justice. Addressing these issues publicly will raise moral consciousness about past wrongs, and let people move on to constructing a peaceful, just, and prosperous society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grievance/resilience; Institutional performance</td>
<td>Truth and reconciliation commissions; criminal prosecutions and war crimes tribunals; reparations; traditional rites and ceremonies; institutional reforms; memorials and monuments for remembrance; transitional justice media programs; restorative justice initiatives.</td>
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# Agenda

**Theories of Change Indicator Development Workshop**  
December 14-15, 2009

Location: Truland Building, Room 555, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR), George Mason University, Arlington Campus 3330 N. Washington Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22201.

**Monday, December 14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
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| 9:00 am| Opening, Introductions, Agenda Review  
CMM’s Theories of Change Initiative: History, Goals, Limits of the Approach (Tjip Walker)  
Discussion |
| 9:45 am| Feedback Received on Theories of Change Matrix and Contextualizing Indicator Development Effort (Susan Allen Nan)  
Discussion |
| 10:30 am| Break |
| 11:00 am| Developing Useful Indicators of Change (Mark Rogers)  
Exercise: Indicators of Changes Family 3: Healthy Relationships  
Discussion  
Expected Outcomes from Small Group Work (Kirby Reiling) |
| 12:15 pm| Lunch: Accumulating Knowledge of Peace Practices (Diana Chigas) |
| 1:30 pm| Small Groups Identifying Indicators:  
Family 1: Inside-Out Peacebuilding  
Family 5: Functioning Institutions  
Family 3: Healthy Relationships (continued) |
| 3:15 pm| Break |
| 3:30 pm| Reports from Small Groups: Process of Developing Indicators |
| 4:00 pm| Networking: Relevant M&E and Theory of Change Initiatives (Mary Mulvihill)  
CARE International UK (Heidi Ober)  
Conflict Management Group (Jenny Vaughan)  
Others TBD |
| 4:30 pm| Reception: Informal Conversation with Wine and Cheese |
| 5:30 pm| Conclusion |
THEORIES OF CHANGE AND INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION

Appendix B: Agenda for Theories of Change Indicator Development Workshop
List of Participants
Theories of Change Indicator Development Workshop
December 14-15, 2009

Pauline Baker, Fund for Peace
Eleanor Bedford, USAID/OTI
Sharon Benoliol
Diana Chigas, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects
Joshua Fisher, ICAR-GMU
Jerome Helftt
David Hunsicker, USAID/DCHA/CMM
Karina Korostelina, ICAR-GMU
Terrence Lyons, ICAR-GMU
Sharon Morris, Mercy Corps
Mary Mulvihill, AED
Nick Oatley, Search for Common Ground
Heidi Ober, CARE
Tamar Palandjian, ICAR-GMU
Kirby Reiling, USAID/DCHA/CMM
Rob Ricigliano, University of Wisconsin
Mark Rogers, Independent Consultant
Mara Schoeny, ICAR-GMU
Ilana Shapiro, Alliance for Conflict Transformation
Claire Sneed, US Department of State
Jenny Vaughn, Mercy Corps
Tjip Walker, USAID/DCHA/CMM
Leah Werchick, USAID/OTI
Saira Yamin, ICAR-GMU
Appendix D

CMM’s Theories of Change Initiative: History, Goals, Limits of the Approach

Presented by Tjip Walker

on December 14, 2009

Theories of Change

- Where did this work come from?
- Where it’s going?
- And the various other pieces of work that people have contributed to.
- Where we hope to go and issues to consider.
Program Logic Model

- Expectation that a framework would be set-up – inputs, outputs, outcomes
Theory of Change

A statement of the causal process through which change comes about.

If . . . , then . . .

TsOC: The Value-Added

1. Ensure rigor
   - Necessary connection between elements of the program logic model

2. Enable monitoring and evaluation
   - Indicators tailored to expected results

3. Permit learning
   - Comparison of like with like
What’s the value add in focusing on theories of change?

1) Ensure degree of rigor: clearly should indicate what the connections are necessary connection between elements of the program logic model

2) Enable monitoring and evaluation: Indicators developed in isolation of the theory; i.e. F Framework. Need to be tailored to expected results. Process of developing indicators is not difficult once you have identified ToC. By allocating time to develop these processes, then it will be easier to pull together indicators.

3) Permit learning: only when identifying theories do we develop robust systems of M&E
The History

- Reflecting on Peace Practice
  - Original work linking theory to the work
  - How important the work has been in thinking through the process of how to structure theories and laying out a general framework for them.

- John Lederach and others in Reflective Peacebuilding booklet
  - Section on theories of change
  - Emphasis on importance of having theories of change, but the process needs to be rigorous.
  - There doesn’t seem to be any emphasis on looking at complementarities and overlaps between the theories.

- Rogers and Church - Designing for Results
  - Encouraging effective evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities
  - begins to list some of the theories of change and puts names to the theories
  - An important work; there is a huge amount of overlap and some areas not covered; Not the most exhaustive list for theories of change.
Current State-of-the-Art
- Ensures rigor and enables M&E,
- But it still treats each situation/theory as unique
- And thus limits learning

But what if there were a limited number of theories?
- Articulate a menu
- Attach appropriate indicators
- Permit comparisons

Rationale
- Deductive
- Inductive

Three ways to change rational human activity:

**A is for attitudes**
- Change the way an individual understands/evaluates the choices available

**B is for behavior change**
- Change the relative costs/benefits of the choices available

**C is for compulsion**
- Change the ability of individuals to make choices
### RPP Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Key People</th>
<th>More People</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alter Attitudes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alter Institutions (governance, rules, organizations)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Do not expect to find a “unified string theory”: For now, there is an expansionist view that all theories have equal value and equal possible utility. Treat all as equals, develop indicators and allow experience to show which theories work and/or approach. May be necessary to have multiple theories on a particular problem.
2. Remain open to articulation of new theories: Identify theories in the future. Make sure there is completeness
3. Recognize that the particular may trump the general: How important would the particular situation be relevant to the general strategy?
Workshop Focus - on Indicators of Change

Not at the impact level of Peace Writ Large – i.e. what is the ultimate impact.

Need to focus on - What are the output/outcome measures we are looking for?

**Question and Answer Session**

Discussion on 3 ways to change rational human activity

- Understanding of how behaviors change. A component needed on what barriers need to be removed which adds to the complexity of changing people’s behaviors.

- ABC’s: There’s stuff missing…
  - World/Environmental factors to change in peace/war situation.
  - Very elite-focused behaviors and doesn’t talk about what’s going on in the societies on the ground.
  - 4G framework – glory, grievance, governance should also be in there.
  - Tjip’s response: The ABC’s are not intended to be the full palate of all. Not intended as assessment framework as well.
Feedback Received on Theories of Change Matrix and Contextualizing Indicator Development Effort
Presented by Susan Allen Nan
on December 14, 2009

Types of Feedback

• Tweak emphasis, clarify wording
• Alter Theory Family Structure
• Add theories/families
• Collapse theories/families
• Caution about the whole endeavor: Context Matters
Alter Theory Family Structure

• Seek coherence of:
  – levels,
  – phases of conflict,
  – targets of change (ie more/key people + individual/structural change)
Add Theories/Families

- Poverty and conflict
- Natural resource management
- Demographics - especially youth
- Informal institutions
- Inclusive society; women
These are reflected in expanded Family 5, Functioning Institutions.
- Military defeat, power balances, realist analysis, etc in Family 2 Attitudes along with non-violent direct action.

No new additional Families but some were added to Family 5 which includes formal and informal institutions.

Collapse Theories/Families

- Family 1: Inside-Out Peacebuilding is collapsed to two theories rather than more detailed three.

There were shifts made in families as well
THEORIES OF CHANGE AND INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION

Appendix E: Susan Allen Nan Theories of Change Workshop Presentation

Caution about the whole endeavor: Context Matters

- Indicators are context specific.
- Exercise of developing theories of change is a useful multi-stakeholder process of reflective practice.

- What counts as a dispute resolved may look like something else somewhere else
- Structure the conversations with the donors, NGOs, academics and make an analysis of what’s going on is a part of the reflective practice
- Concern to honor general context but also allow for indicators to be adaptable to certain contexts. Need to find a balance in how to move this conversation forward, without having a rigid framework. As well as allow for context/culturally specific theories to fit in as well.

Q&A and Discussion

- What’s the purpose for indicators and how do we want them to be used?
  - Educate people about importance of theories of change. Hope is that better proposals will be written, better PMPs.
  - Serve as the backbone of knowledge management system. CMM can only measure individual success stories, but difficult to assess how success in one place translates into another instance. This is a problem for the field as a whole.
  - Hope to improve reporting by partners
  - Ultimately, leading changes to indicators in the F Framework

- With regards to focusing on outputs/outcomes and steer away from Peace Writ Large. Do we actually know what contributes to what reduces violence and increases stability?
  - What we’re trying to accomplish is Peace writ large. All theories operate under the same objective. If that’s true, then the question is – would we be measuring what that peace writ large is substantially differently than the theory
  - What is it we’re trying to explain? Still critical of the dependent variables
  - If there are other ideas and theories that need to be captured, then need to capture them. For now, need to treat all theories as equals.
- If after having gone through the process we see that the context driven process is what’s necessary, then Tjip says he’s willing to accept that.

- At what level do the theories apply?
  - Not interstate conflicts
  - Many indicators could be adapted at lower levels, but development of indicators are necessary because they currently don’t exist but it could be done.

- How important / desirable we see dynamics of conflict? How particular dynamics of conflict can impact particular indicators?
  - The question of appropriateness of these indicators here. We want to be as attentive at all levels. Is there a theory that is specific to one particular phase? Or did we miss it because we’ve completely missed?

- Clarification on how the framework would be used in terms of the unit of analysis. Whose theories of change are we most interested in?
  - Why would it matter? Different practitioners can be working with different theories of change

- Diana Chigas: lists of theories of change came out of the case studies from RPP – an inductive process. Theories of Change helps in the comparative piece, which is where this originally came from. Where context matters – you can do well for theory of change, but the theory of change could be wrong. Can’t ignore context and need to systemize the theories of change. Do need to interact with context and theory
  - Context helps clarify the theory of assumptions, which is why the indicators need to be very contextualized

- Rogers says he and Church would probably re-write the entire chapter on theories of change.
  - The little arrows from Tjip’s output/outcomes framework are the theories of change – small “t”
  - The big arrow that runs through the entire framework is the Theory of peacebuilding – big “T”
  - Families were Theories of Peacebuilding
  - Looking at the connection in the inner pieces of the logic model
  - When talking about ToC’s, we’re talking about causal relationships; If A, then B.
  - When it comes time to measure the indicators – qualification for indicator is that it’s measurable
    - Is the definition of the indicator including that during this meeting?
    - Rogers will address during his presentation.

- Susan’s question to the participants: Is the theories of Change Matrix for the workshop – good enough for the discussion document during this meeting? Any concerns regarding the document?

Suggestions for changes:
- Functioning institutions – perceptions about functioning of institution but not actual functioning of institution. The types of indicators would be related to perceptions related to access to those institutions.
- Peoples’ perceptions are what would most likely lead to the chance. If you’re working with the institutions, but the people don’t think the institutions are working for them, then that’s not going to lead to the change you want to see.
- Great place to start, still think there’s a huge amount we don’t know. Take the Theories of Change matrix as “a start”
- Stay open and flexible to new theories/hypotheses. There’s still so much we’re learning.
- One concern, would this Theories of Change Matrix be included in the next CMM proposals and that there may be no room for future theories that may add to the theories.
- APS comes out every year, intends to be focused on people-to-people peacebuilding and according to CMM that limits the number of peacebuilding theories you could use. Impose some limits. Utilize theories that would be appropriate to people-to-people theories for the APS funding. On the other hand, there is recognition for people to suggest theories. Always the possibility for custom and additional indicators.

The ToC matrix will be the working document of the meetings for these 2 days.
Developing Useful indicators of Change
Presented by Mark Rogers
on December 14, 2009
THEORIES OF CHANGE AND INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION
Appendix F: S. Mark Rogers Theories of Change Workshop Presentation

Definition of an Indicator

“Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a development actor.”

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Glossary

- Types of change embedded in the indicators:
- How do we create indicators? How to make sure they are a viable
- A nascent field. We have to be creative about indicators – find them and borrow them from other fields e.g. public health which recognizes violence as an issue.

Creating Indicators

- Specify and analyze the change or result sought
- Brainstorm possibilities
- Compare with existing sources
- Pair qualitative & quantitative indicators to deal with complexity

Creating Change indicators:
Process: Look at change, thought analysis and sharpen change, brainstorming possibilities, look at existing sources, qualitative and quantitative indicators, what is the change in the institution and how to perceive that change?

Specify and analyze the intended change or result

- Determine the type of change
- Determine the level of change
- Specify – change from what to what
- Articulate assumptions
- Be ready to revise the intended change or result as needed

- type of change – What do you want to change?
- level of change – spiritual, cultural, social, institutional
- what is it like before and what is it afterwards?
- Be ready to revise the intended change or result as needed – reword and restructure the change - An intuitive process, not linear.
Multiple changes are embedded in theories

Each theory of change contains at least two changes – at least one embedded in the “if” component and at least one in the “then” component.

Proving the theory requires evidence of shifts in both the “if” and the “then” changes.

“If belligerent groups within a community are given the opportunity to interact, then they will better understand and appreciate one another and will prefer to resolve conflict non-violently”

Types of changes embedded in the theory
- Change in understanding (knowledge)
- Change in appreciation (attitude)
- Dispute resolution preference (attitude)

Level of Change – all types are individual level changes
“If belligerent groups within a community are given the opportunity to interact, then they will better understand and appreciate one another and will prefer to resolve conflict non-violently”

- Change for what to what?
  - From misunderstanding to understanding?
  - Misunderstanding about what or of whom?
  - [Enter context…. Or in the absence…]
  - From misunderstanding the interests of the other to understanding the interest of the other

- Assumption – that individual level changes in knowledge and attitude add up to relational level changes
Brainstorming Best Practices

- Use bright, rapidly changing visual stimuli
- Postpone evaluation – all ideas have merit
- Encourage wild and crazy ideas
- Strive for volume – the first 50+ ideas rarely contain innovations (200-250 ideas in five minutes are possible)
- Use a dedicated recorder (or two)
- Post ideas publically as rapidly as possible
- Record apparent repeats (don’t waste time looking for what is there or recording frequency - this in not voting.) The same word may mean different things to different people. Ask for clarification after the storm.

Brainstorm  *(see list on handout)*

Then select promising ideas either single point indicators or create a scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change/Result</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From misunderstanding the interests of the other to understanding the interest of the other</td>
<td>% of participants who publically recognize the legitimacy of the others’ primary interest.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What do you with the data collected in the brainstorming session? Pick the preferences from the ideas listed. It will take time to sort your priorities. Pick something like 40 ideas from a list of 200. Select promising ideas as either single point indicators or create a scale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair qualitative and quantitative indicators to reveal complexity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Quantitative:</em> % of participants who in their own community publically recognize the legitimacy of the others’ primary interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Qualitative:</em> Increase from 15% to 60% the percentage of audience members who believe the others’ primary interests are legitimate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Initial Thresholds

- Direct
- Objective (targeted/specific)
- Useful in decision making
- Practical (feasible)
- Adequate (comprehensive)
- Disaggregated according to context
Initial Thresholds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct</th>
<th>So direct it may merit replacing the target change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Needs definitions of primary interests, audience, legitimate, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>Readiness for negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical</td>
<td>Program has access to sample of relevant audiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Will need complementary indicators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Context, Context, Context

- Intangible concepts, such as trust, are embedded in the local context, meaning and worldview.

- Indicators, too, must be embedded in the local context.

- This is best achieved through the participation of primary stakeholders in indicator development.
Question and Answer:
Q: Practicality: How am I going to collect my data? How are you going to measure public expressions? Is it interviewing people? This really involves thinking through….

Q: Dimension of time: everything may change in 6 months time, to get trend lines, reintegrate into your model changes that may have occurred. Make it a dynamic process, danger of reaching dogmatic conclusion

Mark’s comment: how do you evaluate a program that is emergent/half-baked/unpredictable/ We need to think about evaluating phenomena is how to evaluate changing dynamics
Q: What is the appropriate tool for developing
A: The place to look is not peace writ large. There is a whole level of outcomes below peace writ large: look at the then statements which fall in to six or eight different outcomes

Common resulting changes:
- prefer to resolve conflict non-violently
- resist mobilization to violence
- Increase negotiation/settlement
- Decrease core grievances
- Accept peace
- Different values coexist peacefully
- Closure to conflict episodes
- Mitigation of influence of bad neighborhoods
- Prevention of escalation
• Reduced windows of vulnerability

Missing in the discussion. (Karina) Factors that could change from “if” to “then” e.g. Set of moderators and mediators

Mark: Activities

Q: focus on settling short-term disputes rather than changing long-term perceptions and attitudes e.g prefer to resolve conflict non-violently. Mark: The change in attitude comes before the settlement of dispute – can we create a scale for the components on our brainstormed list to put a value on how important each indicator is and when each might be practically achieved. The list gives us a realm of choice rather than a spot to work on.

Q: Peace writ large? What does it mean? The context is different in each situation. It is a good goal to have not to want peace writ large. Some of these indicators are expensive to measure and many organizations don’t have the resources to do this. How to match organizational resources to measure some of the indicators?

Q: Don’t rely only on perception (which is important) but sometimes there are time constraints. You can improve short-term interventions e.g. how to improve the quality of judges...perceptions will change in the end…and you may not be able to observe that in the short-term. Expensive tools

A: Surveys on attitudes may not always be done. People’s behavior may be monitored independent of attitudes…perceptions are important but not attitudes. Work together, collaborate, each other has something to bring

Q: How are we going to do the definitions of the indicators? How do we promote generalizability and at the same time not lose the context? Brainstorm general indicators but also concrete indicators that are directly related to the context.

A: Take small concepts and make them more generic. Up-chunky in mediator speak.

Q: When this framework is adequate?

A: If we don’t see your context in your evaluation plan then you haven’t done your homework.. We don’t want to see our framework in your plan but the context that you are relating it to?

Presentation: Expected Outcomes from small group discussions
Reflections on Theories of Change and Effectiveness
Presented by Diana Chigas
on December 14, 2009

Case studies- Analyze them comparatively, take out common issues, collective reflection and experience around conflict and peacebuilding

Do no harm was the first project undertaken?

How do we know we are being effective?

Reflections about how are work should be adding up to more and why?
Finding from the field: what are the gaps? Question of adding up all the programs and interventions in a particular place. What should we really learn how to learn better? More case studies (15 from Liberia) and applying theories of change frameworks. Other projects: Listening Project: listening to people about their perspectives about international assistance not just in the field of peacebuilding, but also others such as human rights.
Why theories of change?

- We don’t just want to know whether our program achieved its goal, but also “so what?”

- Programs have less effect on “Peace Writ Large” because their theories are
  - Implicit
  - Incomplete/not well-thought out
  - Untested
  - Inappropriate for the context
Systematizing Theories

- Systematizing and labeling theories facilitates comparison and understanding of effectiveness
  - BUT may be less useful, or insufficient, for program design, implementation, M & E

- Challenge to theories of change
  - How do you look at how the program and theory contributes to the larger whole?
    - Theories are not very systemic
      - Unintended consequences and feedback loops?
  - How do they relate and interact with each other?
    - Cumulative effects and adding up?

Program effectiveness and theories of change

Programs can be ineffective because:

- The theory of change is weak
  - Wrong/inappropriate for the context/inadequate, e.g., improving inter-ethnic relationships may not lead to reduction of violence

- The program theory is weak
  - E.g., contact may not lead to better relationships

- Implementation is weak
  - E.g., interactions do lead to better relationships, but facilitation of the dialogue was not good
Distinguishing Different Kinds of Theories

- Theory of change:
  - How will achieving our goals contribute to Peace Writ Large? If we are successful, how will we address the key driving factors of conflict/peace?

- Program theories:
  - How will our activities lead to the goals?
  - What are our assumptions about WHOM to work with, what ISSUES to focus on and which METHODS to use?
Characteristics of Good Theories of Change

Developed in context and can answer:

1. Which conflict factors will the program affect? If the goal is achieved, which of the factors would be changed? How?
2. What is the "story" of how the change will happen? Activities → changes?
3. What assumptions are being made? What needs to happen in order for the theory of change to work out? Which assumptions are the strongest? Which are weaker – hoped for changes or circumstances, but less certain?

What do we know about elements of good theories of change?

THE RPP MATRIX:
A tool for analyzing program strategies

Key people = Both Positive and Negative

Individual/Personal
Socio-Political

Conflict Analysis: Driving factors
More people: key people (Key people: both positive and negative) The importance of reaching out to relevant numbers and the key people
Individual/personal

Appendix G: Diana Chigas Theories of Change Workshop Presentation
Socio-political change is critical for peacebuilding.

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**Not sufficient to have impact at individual-personal level**

- Peace programs that focus on change at the individual-personal level, and do not link those efforts to change at the socio-political level **will have no discernible impact on peace.**

- Are there “hope lines” that need to be strengthened?
### Types of Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual-Personal Change</th>
<th>Socio-political Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Healing/recovery</td>
<td>Group behavior/relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions</td>
<td>Public opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes</td>
<td>Social norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills</td>
<td>Institutional change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Structural Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Driving Factors of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More people</th>
<th>Key People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes toward peace</td>
<td>Hostility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside/out peacebuilding</td>
<td>Structuredness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy relationships</td>
<td>Complexities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ripeness</td>
<td>Mediated settlements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Social resilience? Social mobilization?

Institutional change

**Peace writ large**
Link “more” and “key” people

More People
Peace needs support and participation of the people.

Key People
Peace cannot be achieved without involvement of certain people important to the peace process.

Appendix G: Diana Chigas Theories of Change Workshop Presentation
THEORIES OF CHANGE AND INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION
Appendix G: Diana Chigas Theories of Change Workshop Presentation
Where theories fall short

- Incomplete/insufficient:
  - “hope” to link from individual-personal to socio-political
  - No strategy to link “more people” and “key people”

- Unclear how address driving factors of conflict

- Vague or too specific goals
Categories of Indicators can be useful

- RPP Criteria of Effectiveness
  - Some reflect categories in the matrix (e.g., institutional change, resistance to violence, inter-group relations), some not explicitly (communities’ own initiatives, sense of security)

- Dialogue categories for OECD/DAC

- DFID Conflict, Justice and Security Indicators
The Indicator Dilemma

Focus on “indicators” of change (impact) carries some dangers:

- that people program to the indicators and miss important opportunities for having an impact
- that they become a substitute for good analysis, design and interpretation—a “fill in the box” exercise (true also of Matrix of theories of change…)
- that quantitative measures are overemphasized
- that they are the focus for accountability, rather than used as a management tool

Developing Indicators of Change: Challenges and Approaches

1. Some hard to measure (on a budget)
   - E.g., relationships, grievance levels
   - Adding disaggregation to some indicators might be a good proxy

2. Important dimensions often missing in indicators
   - Perceptions
   - Relationships: inter-group *and* between an assistance agency, the people receiving support and local intermediaries (local partners and host governments)
   - Unintended impacts/effects
   - Adding up / cumulative effects
Some cautions about indicators

3. Vague goals → bad indicators
   - Within each category of theory, specific, well-defined change goals needed

5. Lack of contextualization
   - Indicators often do not reflect what they are intended to measure, e.g. mobility – security

7. Failure to tie to the conflict
   - Indicators of program effectiveness may not be indicators of effectiveness (or impact) vis-à-vis conflict factors, e.g. SSR, institutional performance
   - What is indicator of worsening conflict may not be indicator of improvement
Question and Answer:
Tjip Walker: Use of the word in three different ways:
Enablers/mediators –
Process of taking general theories of peacebuilding and indicators and adapting them to particular situations

Diana: Context analysis vs. conflict analysis important

- Theories of Change is an assumption – that this intervention will achieve a certain outcome
- Talk about why it didn’t work the first time so that we don’t keep doing it again.
- Who is going to use an indicator for what? Program indicators?
- Helpful to have country level indicators as benchmarks – need to look at the larger picture as well – look at yourself in relationship to the macro pictures (people are coming in with pre-packaged programs that are not good fits for the ground realities). We should be able to learn from across different contexts.
- Difference between developing global indicators for outcomes vs. local indicators for outputs? Is the theory ok are we looking at implementation issues? Is our approach to doing an adequate one? Next level – Is everyone doing their jobs correctly? Relate the program intervention to the larger picture? Is it relevant to the driving factors of conflict?
SECTION I. NGO Practitioners and Theory of Change Initiatives From the Field

“Networking: Relevant M&E and Theory of Change Initiatives”
Facilitated by Mary Mulvihill, AED
On December 14, 2009

Presentations by:

- CARE International UK (Heidi Ober)
- Fund for Peace (Pauline Baker)
- Mercy Corps (Jenny Vaughan)
- Search for Common Ground (Nick Oatley)

CARE International UK (Heidi Ober)

CARE International, through an EC-funded project, has been implementing a project that began 3 months ago. The project is being carried out Nepal, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda and CARE has partners in each country and context. The goal of the program is to help improve the capacity in carrying out peacebuilding projects by looking at Theories of Change – whether implicit or explicit ones – as well as Monitoring and Evaluation efforts as well. Other objectives of the project also including working to help strengthen the network community and tools that could be used regionally as well as cross-regionally. The project includes local research teams of 6-8 members each and in collaboration with local organizations and ministries who are also carrying out peacebuilding projects. Duration of the project is to last 18 months. North Sudan was originally included, but recently CARE was expelled from Sudan.

Fund for Peace (Pauline Baker)

The Fund for Peace has developed CAST, a conflict assessment system tool which seeks to help in mapping a conflict, identifying symptoms or indicators of conflict, indentifying core institutions that constitute the immuable core of the state as well as a series of other actors that are not measurable over time but can influence the analysis of conflict risk. They have developed a set of 12 indicators of conflict with 200 sub-indicators, with the goal of providing quantifiable data and qualitative data. The underlying Theory of Change for the project would be to analyze: As the pressures on the state reduce, and the institutional capacities of the state increase there will be a demonition of conflict. Each year, they plan to include 177 countries, will provide in-country training to local civil society organizations so that they can set up their own assessments and early warning systems. The goal of this project is to try to identify what cluster of factors can help to predict with high confidence that violence can erupt in the near future. The Fund is soon going to publish the early warning program methodology, findings and foreign policy implications.

Mercy Corps (Jenny Vaughan)

Mercy Corps is implementing an 18-month USAID-funded project geared toward strengthening the way practitioners work in a learning network. With four other organizations - Columbia University,
Banyan Global, Iris, and Land O Lakes – Mercy Corps is looking at strengthening the way M&E is done within their economics and peacebuilding programs. The goal is to try to understand which projects are effect and how. They are developing tools, evaluating the impact of the programs and also building internal capacity to better measure the impact of programs through an international Community of practice. They have 3 theories of change underlying the project: 1) building economic relationships across lines of division (ethnic, religious, regional or political) will help promote stability by demonstrating tangible concrete benefits to cooperation; 2) strengthening or diversifying livelihoods opportunities in high-risk regions and/or for high risk populations will help promote stability by reducing competition for scarce economic resources; and 3) building relationship between local communities. The implementation of the program is in Uganda, Ethiopia and Indonesia.

**Search for Common Ground (Nick Oatley)**

Search for Common Ground has been developing an indicator database. The goal of the project is to create a Community of Practice for DM&E for peacebuilding programs through an online portal. They seek to create a space for discussion in which practitioners can discuss and engage. Another objective of the project is to centralize evaluation reports of Peacebuilding and Conflict resolution programs. They envision the process to be consultative and inviting NGO practitioners, donors and academics.

**Mary Mulvihill (AED)**

Other initiatives?
- USIP – AfP and setting up a peer-to-peer learning groups
- CRS is also looking at generally accepted indicators
- DfID – country level work with Diana and Kirby

**Discussion: Where to go from here?**

- USAID and CMM has its own agenda
- Need to reach out to a variety of audiences, practitioners and academics
- Is there some interest and value in thinking about not only practitioner treatments of this but also academic ones that could examine some of the issues that are challenging to the theories
**SECTION II  BRAINSTORMING SESSIONS**

**Family 1 Inside-Out Peacebuilding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Theory:</strong> Shifts in Consciousness</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statement:</strong> If key actors and/or enough individuals undergo constructive shifts in their consciousness, such as developing more universal identities or awareness of identity formation, then their commitment and capacity for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and for resisting mobilization of conflictual identities, will increase and can influence social change in that area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is the type of change (shifts in consciousness)?
- Attitude change and behavioral change don’t follow directly
  - Attitude change is intangible (‘if’ is there, but not easy to identify ‘then’)
    - Demythologization
    - Feelings of empowerment
    - Understanding humanity of other
  - What context are in, what different perspectives

What is the Level of Change?
- Level 1: individuals
- Level 2: more people larger groups

Change from What to What?

What assumptions are made?

If = Internal Awareness of biases, attitudes, motivations
Then =
- Agency (behavior)
- Feelings of empowerment
- Awareness of choices
- Commitment
- Ability to engage constructively
- Respect
- Choices
- Find avenues
- Increased commitment and capacity for peaceful resolution
- Increased capacity to influence social change
- Increased action or engagement
- Resisting mobilization of conflictual identities
Indicators for the theory

- People engaging in civil society/community projects
- Writing in newspapers
- Non-violent protests
- Activism in workplace
- Mentoring young people
- Multi-track diplomacy
- Regular participation in civil processes
- Engage in community dialogues
- Farmer tills his fields, cross conflict trade
- Discourse contesting dominant paradigm for waging war
  - News articles, community meeting dialogues, readiness for conflict, curriculum and teaching in school, history text book change
- Lower levels of stress
- Holistic health
- Psychological health
- Improved family relations
- Less domestic violence
- Civility
- Testimonials questioning dominant paradigm
- Increased volunteering/volunteerism
- Engagement in civic and social activity/activism
- Participate in life affirming activities
- Art and dance
- Sporting events
- Surveys- perception checking
- Observation and ethnography (as methods for measuring)
- Focus groups, town halls,
- human interaction across conflict
- respectful interaction
- intermarriage, cross-conflict marriage
- measure sense of agency and feelings on ability to influence situation
- frequency of engaging
- commitment of (personal) time engaged
- feelings of interrelatedness
- comfort with other (rehumanization, psychological health)
- engagement in common/public interactional space (resumption or increase in interaction publicly)
- dissolution of borders and boundaries
- children’s drawings of other
- children’s description of other (verbal)
- adolescence, youth, and adults
- focused groups of people doing social change (methods for measuring)
- individual interviews with key actors (methods for measuring)
- content analysis of public speeches of key people looking for attitudinal shifts (methods)
- discourse analysis of speeches (methods)
- code strength of anti-enemy speech
- symbolic acts
- return of refugees
- willingness to talk, friendships, communication
- willingness to engage in other’s space
- children playing with each other across conflict
- resistance or resilience against conflict
- decreasing participation in war rallies
- informal networks of resistance to conflict
- satire
- protest movements (against conflict
- street theater
- peace focused vs. conflict focused peace murals
- changes in graffiti
- increase in learning other’s language
- making accommodation for others language
- bi-communal schools
- protecting human rights of all
- doing business (cross conflict transactions)

Discussion

What is constructive vs. unconstructive shift in consciousness?
- Awareness of destructive prejudices
  - Political mobilization vs. own personal attitudes/ moral attitudes and pushing people to challenge own
- Shifts in behaviors (action oriented)
- Theory is a bridge between understanding motivations and behavior change
- These indicators about individual level change

Emphasis in Theory One is on perception
Three elements: Commitment, motivation, and capacity
How can you differentiate between genuine shifts and greed or other motivation?

Key words:
- Commitment
- Capacity
- Behavior
Theory: “Value-Identities”

Statement: If key actors and/or enough individuals on all sides of the conflict are given opportunities to discover shared values, then inclusive “value identities” can form and provide a basis for pursuing constructive conflict engagement together.

Indicators for the theory

- Expansion or growth in women coming together across boundaries
- Multiplicity of identities
- Cross-cutting identities
- Higher salience of particular identities or issues
- Introduction of multiple identities
- Number of groups or organizations with mixed ethnicities
- Participation in multiple groups
- Change from exclusive social group identity to multi-layered identity
  - Media, rhetoric
- People coming together in common spaces, intermarriages, friendships, language treatment etc.
- Language becoming acceptable
- Food from other ethnicity
- Celebrations of each others holidays, traditions,
- Less media coverage for exclusive identities
- Diversity of media consumption
- Increased membership in value groups
- TV, film project involving multiple ethnicities
- Advertising topics, patterns, etc.
- Choice of services
- Choice of doctor
- Choice of president
- Cross-ethnic peacebuilding activities
- Content analysis over time… track changes in content
- Content analysis of beneficiaries (pre-test/post-test)
- Indication of dissolved border
- Number of integrated schools
- Common history projects, commissions, committees
- Textbooks
- Acceptance of grievances
Common sport events
Cross-ethnic participation
Participant interviews (methods)
Self-awareness or ability to articulate own motivation, patterns, and engagements in conflict resolution patterns
Increased agency

What are the top indicators from brainstorming?

Cross-cultural participation
- Self reporting of program participants of increased commitment and capacity for peaceful resolution of conflicts (need baseline and comparison group)
- Self report of participants activities in constructive cross-cutting/ cross-conflict/ cross-boundary groups
- Direct observation of dissolution of borders: integrated groups, markets, public spaces (multiple measures; integrated education, service choices, housing, use of space, mass media,
- Demonstration of knowledge of others concerns
- People individually raising voices; willingness to publicly/openly oppose conflict
- Sunday schools- content analysis of reduction of hate messages, content analysis of political campaigns
- Changes in types of identity: Mobilized identity vs. reflective identity (measured by perception of other groups in survey, self-reporting, etc)
- Level of generality in identity (broad over-arching generalizations vs. specificity)
- Willingness to take leadership in business and institutional shifts

Media (linked to individual change… consumption and production)
Integration of communities

Discussion

Need to differentiate between indicators and measurement of indicators
Difference between long-short, expensive-cheap

Key Words:
- Multicultural society
- Assimilation
- French, Turkish models
- Cross-cutting identities
  - Women coming together, youth coming together
Family 2: Attitudes Towards Peace

**Theory:** Key Actor Attitudes

**Statement:** If key actor attitudes change to favor peaceful solutions to the conflict, then they will seek peaceful solutions.

- Key Actor Attitudes: Description is focused on exclusivity of cost/benefit analysis. And the statement needs to be more open
- Surveys of attitude shifts as ways to measure public opinion – get the ‘if’ measured. Didn’t necessary correlate with Then statement, though
- Statements are too linear, as it doesn’t allow for richness of the complexities in the theory of change.
- Is the theory of change correct?
- Key actors change is made, then behavior change is made
  - Barriers need to be removed for the attitudinal shifts to be made
  - Then how do the key leaders gain the courage to behave differently
- Search indicators – output / outcome is helpful. Incremental pieces.
- Should we focus on the “If” piece? Then also focus on the “then” piece?

**Indicators for the theory**

What would signal an attitude change in key actors?

**Indicators for attitudinal changes for peaceful solutions**

1. considering the unprecedented
2. survey the groups/people
3. expressions of hope
4. new attitudes expressed in speeches
5. expressed support for peace
6. opening the door for negotiations/interaction with other side
7. willingness to speak
8. continuum of attitudes
9. curious to learn about other peace processes – comparative
10. thinking differently
11. changing your mind
12. openness to other opinions
13. inclusive language
14. self-censorship
15. national surveys on views held by leaders
16. expression of trust
17. Pre-Post tests: Measured shift in attitude towards … The other group, the peace solution, one self, the future
18. Use of vignettes with control groups measuring shift in attitudes (people are more honest in vignettes vs. Likert scales)
19. expressed revision of position
20. recognition of own bias
21. change in metaphors
22. change in narratives
23. change in discourse
24. shifting agency – recognizing self as agency and other’s agency. Interdependent agency
25. shift in consciousness (inner awareness)

Group into meta-indicators? Up-chunk? Clusters?

**Indicators for the theory**

If key actor attitudes change to favor peaceful solutions to the conflict…
1. call for meetings
2. reduction in calls for violence
3. speeches will change
4. different vocabulary
5. demobilizing / disarming militias
6. joint speeches
7. authenticity
8. acknowledgement of wrongdoings
9. call for meeting
10. going to the other person’s capital and making speeches with them
11. state controlled media would change
12. call for changes in the law
13. state funds going for integration projects
14. new champions join in
15. call for international community to help
16. actions trying to convince one’s groups members for peace
17. acceptance of international NGOs/ civil society in country
18. silence where there once was belligerence
19. symbolic acts in supporting peace
20. signed common statements
21. changed counsel / advice to youth
22. editorials
23. acceptance/revision of history textbooks
24. publicly stating you’ve changed your mind
25. free political prisoners
26. organizing peace support activities
27. shift in strategies
28. stop domestic arrests/ political prisoners
29. visits to communities
30. meeting with alternative community leaders (cross-borders)
31. engagement of alternative media
32. speaking out against violence
33. personal testimonies
34. call for elections
35. apologies
36. positive personal testimonies
37. calls for reconciliation in society
38. public recognition of peace builders / peace leaders
39. pre-post tests in problem solving workshops
40. seeking conflict resolution training
41. new spending patterns
42. spaces for reflection before action
43. changes in behavior
44. participating in conflict resolution processes
45. organizing conflict resolution processes
46. calling for CR processes
47. allowing the return of refugees / opening the borders for refugees
48. improve conditions for refugees
49. not recruiting youth
50. endorsing previously rejected offers (peaceful)
51. encouragement of commemoration
52. doing the unprecedented
53. peaceful acts not rhetoric
54. breakfast with an enemy
55. political freedoms and opening freedoms of speech
56. call for stop to violence
57. call for peace negotiation
58. ask third parties for mediation
59. participate in mediated discussions
60. keep agreements
61. make proposals
62. freedom of speech
63. calls for civil society in understanding ways of compromise and new ways forward
64. making agreements
65. demobilizing military
66. ceasefire
67. free prisoners
68. focus budget on human development
69. decreased military budget
70. open safe zones
71. safety corridors
72. reduction of discrimination
73. increased social justice
74. explore peaceful options
75. power sharing
76. inclusive summits
77. opening borders
78. forming party of advisors – negotiation
79. prepare civil society for agreement
80. peace agreement
81. business relations resume/ begin
82. involving civil society in peace agreement
83. involving regional players
84. actively seeking communication/links with other side
85. engage spoilers to prevent spoiling
86. imprison all spoilers and free all peacebuilders from prisons
87. seek to understand other sides’ needs and concerns
88. seek to meet the others’ needs and concerns
89. deciding which transitional justice process to choose
90. implementing transitional justice process
91. revisions of history education
92. shuttle diplomacy
93. cultural exchanges
94. mutualizing interests
95. regional incorporation
96. move from positions to interests
97. separate the people from the problem
98. and from interests to needs
99. decide on external criteria
100. develop BATNA
101. WATNA

**Discussion**

If the Independent variable is also using the same indicators as the DV, then how do you measure it?

Behaviors are what matter, but in order to understand intervention and what works then there is a need to measure the attitudinal change.

- Not just about measuring the behaviors.
- What would be indicators of Attitude change?
- When doing the brainstorming, you see many of them are behavior
- How do you do the attitudinal changes?
  - Speeches
  - Metaphors

This list is a combination of the “If” and “Then” statements.

The biggest issue is the “situation”

If the “If” part is not done right, then it’s hard to look at the “then” and to track that result.

In this case, the theory of change, the “if” part is not a program here – it’s the Key actors change.
**Attitudes:**

Attitudes are much more complicated than dislike/like.

Nothing in here about feelings/emotions – is that a part of the attitudes?

- Supportive environment
- Safe space
- Creative space
- Transitional Space
- holding environment

*where attitudes develop into behavior*
Family 3: Healthy Relationships

**Theory:** Building Bridges

**Statement:** If key actors from belligerent groups are given the opportunity to interact, then they will better understand and appreciate one another, be better able to work with one another, and prefer to resolve conflicts peacefully.

(1) What are some of the … and … and … and on contact-hypothesis:
Contact + positive interaction
Contact + relatively symmetric grounds for meeting
Contact + incremental progress. Seldom adequate just to meet and talk

Indicators will also need to address the things that ALSO matter for contact.
So the Contact + factors

- Looking at results without looking at how = big challenge
Is there a place to describe a cumulative readiness? That the “if” part is complete
No need for the “then”

- Where we can push the field is the “then” part
By looking at a much more nuanced approach, with “just the contact”, then the same indicators can still be used to accomplish the “then” in the end.
And the yardstick in the end allows for comparing of different dialogue programs.

- If the theory is not rich enough, indicators will not tell you the why
indicators at various steps/phases gets us closer, but also more qualitative processes may be needed to pick the “why”

These statements in the theories – the “if” — were not intended to be stylized.

Suggestions on the Theory of Change itself:
- Category of Building bridges works
- Statement is a bit more problematic – better categorize by including

Illustrative Activities
- Be better able to work with one another
- Try to develop indicators around that

ToC should be changed to: If key actors from belligerent groups are given the opportunity to interact, then they will be better able to work with one another.

Who are the key actors?
Not necessarily the political leaders, (RPP) and can also be future leaders

Clarifying assumptions:
If the key actors work together, then the same key actors will be better able to work with one another
- cross-group membership

Change from what to what? Proceed generically or context specific?
- Number of ways to think about what does working together mean, and working together on ways that improve the conflict
- Improvement on climate, task, process

**Indicators for the theory**

1. group becomes self-facilitative
2. members of different groups work together on an issue
3. joint communiqués
4. co-ownership of a business
5. open agenda setting
6. meetings, when there were no meetings before
7. meetings in multiple languages
8. rotating leadership
9. collaborative advocacy
10. consensus
11. increased trade
12. humor/lighter environment
13. self-depreciating environment
14. voluntary collaboration outside of program activities
15. spin-off organizations
16. socializing
17. asking for more meetings
18. sharing networks
19. more effective work products
20. joint press conferences
21. get funding together
22. new investment opportunities
23. examples of interdependence
24. increased productivity
25. conflict surfaced within a group
26. rumor mitigation
27. policies/mechanisms for dealing with conflict
28. new actors in peacebuilding initiatives
29. feelings of satisfaction
30. new cross-cutting group identity
31. participant satisfaction with group dynamics
32. increased frequency of interaction
33. "they “weather a storm”" -- higher capacity to deal with internal/external disputes
34. creation of broader platforms
35. joint proposal submission
36. integration into larger institutions
37. greater trust in the other group / decreased negative stereotypes about other group
38. bringing in/mentoring not previously included members
39. investments to a common/shared future (willingness to invest in common activities)
40. practicing affirmative action
41. willing to agree/disagree
42. better constituent relationships
43. participate actively in group activities

**Discussion**

Creating scales to understand where we stand
We’re evaluating OUTCOMES -- not activities. Though some of these are like activities.
You can have an activity that’s an outcome indicator

What makes an indicator a stronger indicator?

For example, if there is even a meeting, it might be a big success in and of itself. How does that fit on the scale?

This change says, collaborate together – doesn’t say develop understanding.

Understand – Appreciate – Collaborate – Resolve

- Scale created to provide benchmark – where are the communities in relation to where they began – and in the end.
- Capture the change, before/after and after “the honeymoon”
  - measure through surveys

Start with understand. Then get to appreciate.
Do you need understanding then, if we just need to appreciate to work together?

**Indicators for the theory**

If key actors from belligerent groups are given the opportunity to interact, then they will better appreciate
1. people say they like each other
2. inquiry and curiosity – seeking clarification
3. respect for other cultural traditions
4. participating in other cultural traditions
5. lack of insults
6. presence of compliments
7. marrying each other
8. use of the word “we”
9. eating each other’s food
10. showing knowledge of the other’s culture
11. willing to make appropriate physical contact – holding hands, hand shakes, not touching
12. acknowledgement
13. affirmation
14. using respectful terms of address
15. using terms of endearment
16. using other’s language
17. hanging out / socializing
18. asking for something from the other
19. gift giving
20. awards
21. using information that had been originally presented by the other side
22. showing knowledge of the other sides’ views
23. giving credit
24. praise
25. taking turns
26. acknowledging (in your own words) the others’ criticisms about your own behavior
27. reflective listening
28. smiling at each other
29. relaxed posture
30. small talk outside the business of the meeting
31. invitations into one’s home
32. stating one’s self-consciousness around your own transformation
33. adequate renumeration
34. equal participation by different groups
35. increased (mutual) accommodation of others’ needs, wants, requests
36. listening when other group talks and not interrupting
37. scheduling ways that makes participation possible
38. appropriate dress
39. holding meeting in location in environment/neutral location
40. seeking to understand others’ concerns
41. asking about other’s family
42. being willing to be under the other’s norms. Submission to different format/authority
43. positive mimicking
44. desire to stay in touch after event
45. frequency of interaction outside organized program events
46. humor
47. providing childcare
48. becoming an “ambassador” outside of the immediate group/forum in which the meeting was happening

Discussion

SCALE
- New conventions and parallel with existing norms
- Public praise/acknowledgement (action)
- Acting as an ambassador
- Accommodation
- Showing knowledge of the other sides’ views
Family 4: Peace Processes

**Theory:** Ripeness/Mutually Hurting Stalemate

**Statement:** If the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate develops among belligerent parties to a conflict, then the parties are likely to seek a negotiated settlement.

**IF’s - What changes are we looking at with reference to ripeness and the mutually hurting stalemate?**

- Zartman: Both sides should see a non violent way out in addition to the perception of mutually hurting stalemate e.g. a negotiated settlement
- If a party perceives a political solution to be more viable than a violent approach (armed group usually consider both approaches/multiple tracks).
- A single actor may be open to alternative/political solutions. A third party may not need to work with both parties to persuade them.
- What causes a shift in value calculus in favor of negotiations? (War economy, lack of confidence governance are impediments) A shift in confidence levels with key people, perceived need for developing negotiation skills among armed groups, unity among rebel groups can be helpful in mobilizing a shift, oscillation

**Indicators for the theory**

**Indicators for the “If”**

Key ingredient: business community, civil society favor negotiations, traditional voices (e.g. clans)

- resilience and consistence in inclination for negotiations
- government: hawks and doves
- public and private recognition by hardliners to find a solution/public statements/informal power structures
- trial balloons, tea leaves (negative and positive)
- regularized processes of negotiation between hawks and doves- backchannel negotiations
  - Examples: Sri Lanka, Nepal, Southern Philippines,
- Public opinion surveys (Lebanon and Kosovo) to demonstrate support of constituencies
- Healthy communication channels within rebel groups and governments, civil society, traditional voices, private sector, track one and a half channels to test potential for collaborative approaches
- Create enough opportunities
- Do parties have a realistic vision of the best and worst scenario?
- Change the calculus for individuals by creating an awareness for the implications of violence and manipulation by elites
- Make it harder for political elites to continue fighting- make it harder for them to recruit by winning over the youth/peer pressure/critical thinking
- Make war option costlier and the political solution more feasible (carrots and sticks)
- Appeals to leadership’s egos
- Dissuading Youth from fighting: alternative livelihood options, tools, protect their families, community service activities, food baskets for widows and orphans,
- Spoilers? Empowering the weaker party can backfire and make the adversary more intransigent
- Facilitating the intra-party processes as opposed to empowerment (peace support, peace negotiations) – strengthening civil society groups, empower traditional voices
- Stages in a peace process: pre-negotiation survey, shifting the calculus, implementation phase, manage the spoilers (violence)
- Spoiler management: pre-negotiated settlement options (e.g. World Bank Jobs and vacation to high profile spoilers); demobilization – disarmament and reintegration DDR (preventative); natural resource management (economic/profit motivated spoilers/war economies) e.g. Sierra Leone; Timber crop management in Liberia; economic strategy for spoilers (in exchange for non-violence); inclusion in peace agreement of natural resource management regimes; involvement of NGOs as watchdogs; engaging the diaspora as spoilers; encourage the channelization of diaspora money for development work through community decision-making mechanisms; Diaspora as financiers of violence; FDI as a measure of perception of legitimacy; giving diaspora incentives to return to their country; Decentralization of peace processes to make them more sustainable (more protection from spoilers)?
- Developing a broader constituency for peace (multi track approaches); leader accountability (how to build?); context important in building peace constituency; grassroots mobilization to connect with elites; creates ripeness and resilience to stay on course; work with constituencies who could be manipulated by elites - How to?;
- Champions as opposed to spoilers: not necessarily elites – having the capacity to mobilize communities; local capacities for peace; should aid be given to champions (risk of undermining credibility)?; make an economic argument to get involved; could come under multi-track diplomacy OR (better) key people to influence social political change OR cross track linkages (e.g. business leaders);
- Number of cross-track linkages (between private actors, decision-making actors); track information flows between actors (mechanism, content, frequency); survey instrument/public opinion surveys; communication across and within tracks (lateral and vertical); map out who is on different tracks to foster communication;
- Organizational shift towards non-violent strategies in community mobilization
- Former leaders to talk about transitions with rebel groups
- Technical assistance for building a political organization; train local elites to reach out to communities using non-violent approaches; observe if people think the process is fair/legitimacy, if they are participating, if they are successful in resolving disputes (number of disputes resolved) using the skills learned; monitor increases in resolution of disputes; have intractable disputes been resolved?; do people like outcomes? Drop in court cases?; cultural context of the resolution of disputes as a sign of progress? Types of disputes? Quality of outcome? Equality of relationships? Revitalization of local structures? Awareness and access of new systems? Talk to trainees and other people;
- Political parties development: awareness campaigns and social mobilization; institution building? Spoiler management – more people moving away from being field commanders and moving into the political arena; number of visits to constituencies to talk to people; change from military organization to a civilian one;
- spoiler reduction through peace councils;
- peace processes have to be decentralized in order to make them sustainable
- local grassroots groups’ need for formal and informal power; engage them;
Indicators for the theory

Indicators for the “Then”

RIPENESS: (indicators may not be always reliable because of changing dynamics, leaders may not be sincere in signaling peace overtures)

If the perception of mutually hurting stalemate develops then:

- young people/key people see political processes as more favorable/less costly than violent processes
- it gets more expensive for elites to recruit and manipulate youth
- business community is not willing to financial support militant elites
- consistency of quality in participation in peace processes; communication with other tracks; consistency of public statements and actions;
- Change in communication strategies (of spoilers)
- Shift in leadership and organizational strategies towards softer approaches
- People’s attitudes, behavior, resource mobilization, statements in favor of peace (survey instruments to observe these factors)
- Adversary response to conciliatory gestures towards the other
- Shift towards working with the other such as joint monitoring mission, joint electoral missions, other civilian initiatives
- Opportunity costs for non-military solutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory: Mediated/ negotiated settlement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statement: If we can establish space, trust, and mechanisms for negotiation between the belligerent parties, then a mediator/facilitator can lead the parties through a series of steps to cease violence and negotiate peace.</td>
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Mediating a negotiated settlement:

- do people feel comfortable with a mediation process
- do they trust each other enough to sit across the table
- are they being proactive
- if there is a quality process design
- desire for mediation – if you establish the necessary pre-requisites for mediation
- mediation milestones reached in the process
Family 5: Functional Institutions

- Poverty as related to conflict?
- Bring together the specific and the general.
- Institutions have relationships with communities they are supposed to serve.

What do we mean by institutions? Different from organizations; habits, processes (trade as an institution with norms and behaviors).
- Organizational institutions and processes have to be measured as two different things
- For this exercise we need to measure? Changes (rather than the “ifs”), informal institutions), How do we get indicators?

What are the “then’s?”
- Reduction in the level of violence as related to economic assets.
- First one missing in economic theory is: equitable access (relative deprivation) - perception of RD, core grievances, communal perceptions and social identity.

Do good institutions take care of core grievances? Or they are better able to manage the competition over economic assets; perception of progress relieves pressure on core grievance.

Institutional performance? Perception of change may not be around the institution but the lack of institutions.

If we strengthen economic institutions to do something we should see the alleviation of core grievances; see improvement in perceptions of equitable access?

Somalia: Violent competition over economic assets owing to scarcity (not necessarily because of inequitable distribution).

Hypothesis: if you diversify resource basis will there be less violent competition?
Congo provides a different context: thriving multi-based economy that only serves a limited number of people

Add a different column to fit the context for recommended indicators
Increasing livelihood choices for at-risk populations will decrease the level of violence
- Risk (if it does not improve the plight of the identity group as a whole who are motivated by greed or communal loyalty).

Structure of society (indigenous rights and perception about their political and economic rights)
Measuring institutional performance.
Theory: Economics

Statement: If formal and informal economic institutions produced reasonable livelihoods/quality of life for all, then the extent of core grievance would decline.

Theory: Economic grievances matter. To what extent would economic performance reduce conflict?

**Indicators for the theory**

Indicators for “Then”
- Core economic grievances
- Recruitability
- Perception of economic inequality
- Competition over economic resources
- Violence (decrease in)
- Illicit/damaging economic activity

Indicators for “If”
- Increases in income
- Services/quality of life indicators, housing, education
- Equity and opportunity
- Transparency
- Capability, accountability, responsiveness
- Perceptions on all of the above
- Incomes for young men
- Household income
- Income for women – what is it spent on? Consumption patterns
- Data on savings?
- Diversification away from damaging livelihoods: labor intensive economic development; growth of industry’ trade with neighbors
- Economic programs that would scale up
- Building trust in economic transactions
- Decrease in economic capture/exclusion
- Reduction in capital flight
- Increase in local investment
- Economic confidence in future
- Number of protests
Theory: Political

Statement: If formal and informal political institutions operated efficiently, impartially and in the interests of all, then the extent of core grievance would decline.

Local governance/community mobilization is related to stability.

Does decentralization reduce conflict (works in some places and does not in others)?

Propositions:
1. If we have more effective local governance then we will have reduced levels of violence owing to better relationships.
2. If we have more effective traditional local governance then we will have reduced levels of violence owing to better relationships (tension between formal and informal institutions)
   o Reconcile the two
   o Eliminate one or the other
3. Traditional and informal governance is repressive and self-serving
Family 6: Reforming the Elite

Theory: Elite motivations

Statement: If the incentives facing elites can be changed so that peace becomes more acceptable and violence less so, then the elite will accept peace.

What kind of elites: singular key actors?
Motivations and attitudes – incentives may not change but behavior might.

Where do elites see their power?
Why do elites want power?

- How do changes in context change their desire for power
- Some chose to pursue violence for political and/or economic objectives
- Impact of discriminatory policies against elites
- Raising the importance of the peace dividend, the costs of war
- Emerging elite in Tajikistan is opposed to the state because its corrupt, authoritarian, radical religious ideology – the lack of political space limits the prospects of a political movement
- To what extent are motivations truly ideological and identity related?
- If the motivations are different do you need different strategies/processes?
- Genuine sectarian dimension to ideological motivation
- Fear-based motivation (what happens if they lose power to them as individuals and their communities
- Short-term existential fear which is security based which may have ideological overtones
- Strategies: CBMs, crisis management mechanisms, security guarantees, peace enforcement
- Potential for a trust-worthy or powerful third party
- Motivations may overlap and may be related to a variety of different areas mentioned above

Theory: Elite Means

Statement: If the resources elites have to engage in organized violence are degraded or removed, then they will be more likely to accept peace.

Indicators for the Theory

Security and Fear
- Economic, political, physical safety, ideological sources
- Possibility of reconciliation can help move elites towards peace and justice
- International security guarantees, external parties
- Engaging with key rebel groups
- Grassroots efforts for reconciliation
- Can we develop a plausible grassroots framework/domestic agreement that provides some guarantees to elites against being tried for war crimes, amnesties, etc
- Preservation of eliteness – it is possible through inclusion in participatory development processes as opposed to violence
- Warlords/stakeholders in war economy – provide opportunities for a say in future exploitation of resources
- Is there a way to accommodate them in a new process that reaffirms their status through alternative income stream or political role or guarantees or external cooptation to remove them from their base
- Starving the access to resources to weaken their power base (e.g. alienation from business community, youth groups)
- Provide them a new role in traditional dispute resolution mechanisms
- Alternative narratives to discredit elite rhetoric/ideological card
- Reframe a problem to undermine the legitimacy of the elite (in effort to interfere with recruitment, money flows, isolation from allies, weapons
- Can you break the clan structure that demands loyalty to elite leaders especially in circumstances of insecurity
- Can you provide alternatives to more radical organizations that may be operating in urban slums to undermine the strategies of those groups: job training skills, economic incentives
- Young people also mobilize to protect their families (not just for economic reason)
- Provide alienated youth a sense of belongingness – can you undercut elite ability to mobilize a broad range of resources? Provide good substitutes, empowering youth – by giving them more opportunities to make decisions about their future, train youth as new elites/leadership,
- Risks of external intervention in local turf – territory issues
- Why should elites prefer a political process?
- Work with the “bad guys” amongst the youth as well as ones who are more receptive to a positive path
- How do new elite who come to power achieve peace simply because of their commitment to peace? Engage people in formal structures and give them the tools to negotiate with existing structures so that they can contribute to positive change. Potential risks of creating a new leadership that is not successful in building peace. Training a new leadership means they are predisposed to peaceful alternatives. New youth leadership could be even more intransigent than the ones before. Create a stake in stability for emergent leadership
- What would make a newer elite more amenable? Socialization. Preserve their eliteness through stabilization, capitalize the inclination for peace among elderly elites
- Preserve the ability of the elite to grow by offering incentives such as scholarships to youth leadership, travel opportunities, dispensing favors to elite, sponsor elites socially and politically
- Promote public profiles of elites as global citizens (public acknowledgement of good)
- Build local and international prestige and glamour as an incentive
- International linkages through journalism, electronic communications and social networks across the world
- Influencing spoilers through international business exchange
- Public opinion polling for future job prospects to see how the generation perceives the future
- How do you create jobs in a desperately poor country: engage in emergency response, community service
- Are you degrading or improving resources? If a war economy is related to a core economy (e.g. bringing diamonds from a black market to the state market?)
- How do you diminish the appeal of war economies? Regularize the shadow economy so the black economy will have a lesser pull, introduce competition in the process, open up neighboring markets and diversify exports.
- How to get leaders to link elite credibility with non-violence? Emergence of alternative narratives, ripeness can shift narratives, emergence of common interests, extent to which spoilers can impact these narratives, resilience of new narratives against attacks by spoilers, price of a Kalashnikov.
- DDR related indicators: voluntary recruitment as opposed to mercenary conscription; elite social networks to observe alliances; relationship mapping (across legitimate institutions); public reactions to statements; are alternative voices earning their way to elite positions; elimination of crosscutting ties as opposed to creating them;
Family 7:  Coming to Terms with the Past

**Theory:** Trauma healing

**Statement:** If individuals and identity groups traumatized by violence are given opportunities and support to express and heal their pain, then the desire for violent revenge will be reduced and unresolved trauma will be removed as a conflict grievance.

Target is not only individuals

Then…
Desire for violent revenge?
Exhibitions, cultural symbols … focus on desire for violent revenge
Feeling of trauma itself is an important issue

**Indicators for the Theory**
Focus on the “Then”
…then the desire for violent revenge will be reduced

Indicators of reduced desire for violent revenge
1. No longer the driving force shaping one’s actions -- A
2. Intergroup or international official acknowledgement of trauma -- L
3. Mass media – L
4. Revised textbooks – L
5. Revenge reframed as justice -- A
6. Reduction in violent acts linked to revenge -- B
7. Reduced use of trauma in public discourse – no trauma in official statements -- L
8. Monuments – acknowledgement of monuments / memorials – M
9. New exhibitions which acknowledge both sides – M
10. Official day in nations of common healing – M
11. Playing soccer together – J
12. Normalization of relationships – J
15. Placing flowers at war memorials –M
16. Joint community events – J
17. Joint community commemorative events – M
18. Sense of safety in self-reports – G
19. Reduction in inflammatory news reports – L
20. Reduction in negative stereotypes of the other in… children’s stories, media, sermons
21. Joint commemoration
22. Number of people reporting their healed
23. Personal testimony
24. Publications and books
25. Psychological indicators … letters to future grandchildren, stories about the past
26. People who have advanced in trauma healing treatment
27. Joint history
28. Psychologists reports of clients’ progress
29. Reducing negative activities / protests
30. Willingness to meet with other
31. Integration into normal activities
32. Trading goods at markets
33. Truces
34. Ceasefires
35. Observed ceasefires
36. Safe zones
37. Zones of peace
38. People who are zoned out
39. Meetings between leaders of opposing factions
40. More rabbits shot than people
41. Reduced murder rate
42. Reduced domestic violence
43. Reduced child abuse
44. Meetings between societies of opposing factions
45. Baby boom
46. More rabbits to eat

47. Breaking the cycle of abuse
48. Respectful relations of multiple areas of society – high self-esteem; sense of agency
49. Declining membership mobilized revenge groups (gangs)
50. No spoilers
51. Declining financial support for gangs
52. Reduction in mob violence
53. Greater observance of rule of law
54. Willingness to prosecute violent acts
55. “Sitting on a bus”

56. Visions of options for nonviolent settlement
57. All of the above for the diaspora
58. Dissolution of borders in everyday life – market for particular group
59. Symbolic acts of healing
60. Symbolic acts of solidarity

61. Acts of solidarity
62. Acts of healing (how the community responds)
63. Reduced hate of street marks, graffiti
64. Reduction of “bad tweeting” aka alternative social media
65. Visions of nonviolent justice
66. Acknowledgement of mutual responsibilities
67. Integrated schools, kindergartens … hospitals
68. Public distancing from individual bad acts
69. Desire for normalization
70. Public outcry after violent acts
71. Appropriate justice
72. Restorative interventions
73. Songs for healing and restoration
74. Art and theater
75. Popular culture
76. Confronting offenders and perpetrators
77. Electing officials who support nonviolent approaches
78. Popularity of more tolerant mass media
79. Decline of nationalist organization in the Diaspora
80. Marketing of products which promote reconciliation – use of history, vodka, other commercial products
81. Rise in life affirming activities
82. Pre and post test of individuals
83. Impressions of staff listing centers
84. Reduced acts of vandalism on memorials and cemeteries
85. Perceptions of trauma healers
86. Psycho therapists
87. Nightmares
88. Sleeping through the night
89. Fewer sleeping pills
90. Improved nutrition
91. Reduction in grievances dealt with by tribal leaders
92. Reduced alcoholism
93. Less asthmatic children (relation with depression)
94. Social engagement
95. Marriage
96. Increased self esteem
97. Less depression
98. Productivity at work
99. Reduction in family abuse
100. Improved anger management
101. Better grades in schools with children
102. Fewer drop outs in school
103. Reduction in abuse of women
104. Reduction in child abuse
105. Less bullying in schools based on identity groups / issues
106. Increased vision of possibilities for future
107. Increased sense of safety
108. Hope
109. Children playing together
110. Investments in the future
111. Willingness to disarm small weapons
112. Less drug use in communities
113. Functioning members of society
114. Reintegration of child soldiers into communities
115. Increased laughter (frequency, duration or pitch?)
116. Increased community organized against hate acts
117. New norming

**Indicators for the Theory**

“Then” -- Effects of trauma will be reduced including:

1. Reduced Desire for revenge
2. Reduced acts of violence around the trauma
3. Mobilization based on victimization ideas
4. Reduced abuse of vulnerable population
5. Reduced depression rate
6. Reduced suicide
7. Improved healthy psychology
8. Improved self-esteem
9. Improved social endeavors
10. Improved group and/or interpersonal relationships
11. Functioning in normal social endeavors
12. Social discourses of trauma healing (education, media, official statements, commemoration)
13. Social acts of trauma healing (monuments, documentaries in society)

Not a scale, these are all different variables.

Suggestion – take the indicators

Discussion
These categories are more reflective of Interpersonal and Intrapersonal. Do we need more categories?

Out of the list of Indicators – which are the ones we should look at more deeply and are more connected to the Theory of Change.

- Indicators which focus on vision of future
- Indicators which focus on acts of trauma healing
- Children and family health are strong indicators (school performance of secondary trauma groups)

Suggestion to revise theory of change:
If individuals and identity groups traumatized by violence are given opportunities and support to express and heal their pain, then the individual and group effects of trauma will be reduced including …

1. Reduced Desire for revenge
2. Reduced acts of violence around the trauma
3. Mobilization based on victimization ideas
4. Reduced abuse of vulnerable population
5. Reduced depression rate
6. Reduced suicide
7. Improved healthy psychology
8. Improved self-esteem
9. Improved social endeavors
10. Improved group and/or interpersonal relationships
11. Functioning in normal social endeavors
12. Social discourses of trauma healing (education, media, official statements, commemoration)
13. Social acts of trauma healing (monuments, documentaries in society)

Discussion
*** LACK OF ATTENTION TO STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE ***
Violence is predominantly characterized by direct violence, less attention given to structural and other forms of violence. More attention needed to -- social violence, structural violence.
Defining the “shared future piece”
Then shared futures can be generated:
- Equitable shared future
- Inclusive future
- Sustainable
- Interdependent
- Integration
- Discrimination (inclusive political processes, multi-party representation)
- Business

Building a share future is building a shared understanding of past and present.
Reframing the past to define the future
New narrative of the past
Space/ vision piece

Is this a Scale?
Not just the mobilized violence

If individuals, elites, and groups from across the conflict divide are engaged in reconciliation processes then constructive engagement with the past will contribute to shared visions of the future, healthier relationships and increased social resilience.

Then healthier relationships and shared futures can be generated to increase social resilience to mobilized violence.

The past doesn’t get in the way of the future – past redefines, presents a different past to the future
Then the past will not get in the way of the future
Dealing with the past, not to stay in the past in a constructive way.

What are the reasons why reconciliation might matter?
Resistance to natural disaster for example, climate changes, economic situations – drought

**Indicators for the Theory**

“Then” constructive engagement with the past will contribute to shared visions of the future

1. Common businesses
2. Investment opportunities
3. Common Community development
4. Development planning
5. Inclusive leadership
6. A new constitution
7. New organizations
8. New political parties
9. Broader networks
10. Common ecological problems addressed
11. Power sharing
12. Common identity as national identity / regional identity
13. Leaders speeches with resonant visions
14. New flag / new political symbols
15. Community dialogues
16. Space for diverse visions
17. Participatory democracy
18. Town hall meetings
19. Revised history books
20. increased access to education
21. more vibrant/diverse civic/public media discussions of future building
22. interest groups that transcend identity
23. children’s club activities bringing children together in communities
24. emphasizing human development
25. affirmative action
26. expressions of a shared vision
27. apology
28. street art devoted to future
29. progressive social policies
30. songs
31. universal health insurance
32. community meeting attendance
33. development of national parks
34. co-authors from across conflict divide
35. socializing
36. university relations across national divide
37. national budgets
38. new classes/courses devoted to human security
39. acts of reunification
40. youth development programs
41. active participation in youth dev programs
42. long-term projects
43. marginalized groups involved in social discourse, policy development
44. more cross-cutting organizations
45. higher voting turnout
46. feelings of regional identity cohesion
47. social optimism (measured by surveys)
48. hopefulness
49. content analysis of visions in mass media
50. aspirations of youth
51. life expectancy
52. interdependence
53. joint projects
54. increased discourse of interdependence
55. public option for health care
56. support for abortion
57. common position in engagement with donors
58. joint security agreements
59. increased international investments
60. common natural resources management
61. shared benefits from natural resources management
62. equitable institutions