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Strategic Conflict Assessment

Consolidated and Zonal Reports Nigeria

Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
The Presidency
Abuja

March 2003

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

**STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT (SCA)
REPORT**

MARCH 2002

BY

**INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
THE PRESIDENCY**

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FOREWORD

The Institute acknowledges with gratitude and respect the attention given by the President to the issue of conflict. He has recognised and asked others to face up to "the deep and persistent concern about the threat which violence poses to our electoral process and indeed to the survival of the democratic system in general and to our unity and oneness". This gives us encouragement in our work and a belief that the way is open for new ideas and for change, if only we can meet the challenge of identifying what needs to be done.

The Institute gratefully acknowledges financial and moral support for this study from DFID, UNDP, USAID, and the World Bank. Particular thanks are due to staff of these institutions who joined Prof. Osita Eze, Mr. Udenta Udenta, The SCA Coordinator, and I in the Advisory Group of the SCA. These include Mr. Dirk Reinermann and Ms Sarah Lyons of the World Bank who, at times, came in from Washington to participate ; Ms Claire Hickson, Governance Officer at DFID; Ms Winnie Wright of USAID; and Dr. Bade Falade of UNDP. I would also like to extend my thanks to other staff of donor institutions who traveled from abroad to participate in the process, notably Ms Wandia Gichuru of UNDP, and Ms Debi Duncan and Mr Roy Trivedy of DFID, London.

The Institute also extends its thanks to the consultants who drafted this report for their good work, notably the Team Leaders- Prof Osita Eze of IPCR, Prof Celestine Basse of the University of Calabar, Mrs Dayo Oluyemi-Kusa of Lagos State University, Mr Imran Abdulrahman of the University of Jos, Dr Fatima Adamu of the Usman Dan Fodio University and Dr Joseph Golwa of IPCR. I would also like to express appreciation to the members of the Advisory Group for their close scrutiny of the Phase Two report.


Thanks are also due to DFID's international consultants. Dr Robin Luckham assisted us in drawing conclusions from the Phase One research. Mr Tony Vaux has conducted a training workshop for the researchers on assessment methodology and has made a particularly valuable contribution to the Phase One and Consolidated Reports.

I commend Dr Oshita O. Oshita, Assistant Director (Research and Policy Analysis) at IPCR for his capable management of this project and also his successor Mr Lanre Obafemi who is now charged with taking the process forward. Mention must also be made of the editorial effort the team comprising of Dr. Joseph Golwa, Mrs. Folasade Abayomi and Lanre Obafemi put in to get this report ready.

I am glad to note that as well as providing an overview of conflicts in Nigeria today, the report has drawn attention to the need for specific action in the fields of early warning and conflict prevention. IPCR will consider these proposals carefully and take appropriate action.

I am also glad to note that the process has also helped position IPCR as an organisation able to analyse conflict in a systematic way, not only in Nigeria but elsewhere and I expect that the experience will enable us to extend our work in Africa.

These will be some small steps towards meeting the President's challenge.




**Dr Sunday Ochoche,
Director General, IPCR
November, 2002**

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STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT

CONSOLIDATED REPORT

BY

INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Consolidated Report

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Methodology

A Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria was carried out by IPCR in collaboration with a group of international donors (DFID, UNDP, USAID and World Bank) between July and October 2002. The work was conducted in two phases. Phase One mapped out the conflicts and made a preliminary analysis of the literature. Phase Two tested and expanded this analysis by fieldwork. The Consolidated Report brings together the findings of eleven reports conducted by nearly thirty researchers.

2. General Findings

The study has focused sharply on the interaction between resource competition and the corruption of the political system. Out of the forty two years since Independence, Nigeria has experienced thirty years of military dictatorship and during this period political and social values have been deeply undermined. Since 1999 Nigeria has turned towards democracy but this does not mean that conflicts will dissolve or be resolved instantly. Instead the immediate effect of democracy, as the Phase Two report concludes, has been to generate more conflict- 'Three years into democratic practice the intense competition for political space has heated up the polity leading to violence, which has continued to threaten the survival of the democratic process.'

Although democracy may allow more conflict to emerge in the short-term, in the long-term it is the only possible solution. Political corruption is the outcome of inter-ethnic group elite rivalry, with the military wing of each

group as a reserve ace. Manifestations of this inter-elite rivalry, and which the elites employ to draft the populace behind them include, the indigene/citizen contention. This, basically, has to do with privileges - political appointments, public service appointments, admission into schools, siting of projects, elections, states creation, siting of headquarters of states and local governments etc. As the Phase One report concludes:

"The consolidation of democracy and even the survival of the Nigerian State have come to depend on the ability of the centre to manage these centrifugal pressures. To date the response has been mainly the use of military force. Root causes have been allowed to persist and in cases have been exacerbated by money-oriented politics. In order to preserve democracy these root causes now need to be addressed and a wider range of policy responses should be considered. Failure to resolve basic issues relating to resource competition and politics will allow the situation to degenerate into violent conflict."

The problem is not democracy in itself, but the fact that democracy has not had time to develop. The danger is that, especially with national elections scheduled for 2003, violent conflict could become a pretext for the resumption of military power (which is the bringing into play of one or a combination of elites' reserve - not hidden - aces).

3. Specific Findings

In the process of this assessment, fourteen reports have been written, including six studies examining conflict in Nigeria zone by zone. It is impossible to capture all these perceptions in this overall report and readers are referred to the individual field studies.

4. Conclusions

The overall conclusions were-

1. There has been a common political experience during the years of military rule.
2. This has led to a political crisis in which political actions are often dominated by self-interest and money ('prebendal politics').
3. The nation's dependence on oil revenues from a relatively small part of the country has exacerbated this crisis. All factions involved in the extant inter-ethnic elites rivalry have their focus on oil revenues. Naturally, the minorities' elites lay first or especial claim to these revenues as a bargaining chip to garner more shares of oil revenues.
4. Violent conflict represents a serious threat to democracy.
5. Until now government's response to conflict has been limited –in practice- almost entirely to suppression by the military.
6. Civil Society (with support from international donors) has been active in research and local peacemaking but lacks strategic vision and engagement.
7. The media have not yet played a constructive role.
8. Business leaders and investors have been ignored, yet are major players in some of the conflicts.
9. The result is that government and civil society work in isolation or even in a spirit of mutual distrust.
10. Closer collaboration between the parties, led by government's strategic vision could unite significant forces to limit violent conflict and support the development of democracy as the best long-term protection against the spread of violence in society.

5. Recommendations

In terms of future responses the Phase Two report concludes with a detailed agenda for change on the wider political stage (See Section Six). With immediate attention on Early Warning and Prevention. Currently, Nigeria lacks early warning systems and there is no systematic provision for preventive responses. The over-reliance on military responses almost always fails to resolve conflict and may in some cases exacerbate it. The military response is a blunt instrument with which to address the many causes and issues analysed in this report.

If problems could be addressed earlier, and through political, economic and social processes, there is a chance that violent conflict could be permanently averted. By addressing the root causes of conflict instead of their symptoms, IPCR and other organisations could assist the evolution of democracy and thereby tackle the very root of the problem. By developing skills in analysis, early warning and prevention IPCR could also develop its capacity to assist other African countries, according to its mandate.

Ideas for the development of early warning and preventive action are still being developed, but a preliminary outline or 'Peace-Building Framework' is attached to the Consolidated Report as an Annex.

In summary the Strategic Conflict Assessment has achieved the following outcomes-

- Developed and applied a methodology for modelling the complexity of conflict;
- Equipped IPCR with a methodology that can be further adapted and applied in its future case studies;
- Equipped IPCR with the capacity to train others in conflict analysis;
- Produced a total of thirteen reports, including many detailed studies of specific conflicts, that will be a resource for the future;

- Produced a set of recommendations for the national response to different manifestations of conflict;
- Identified the strategic limitations of current responses and suggested a strong focus on early warning and prevention;
- Produced an outline plan that is capable of taking those issues forward;
- Produced a close partnership between Nigeria and her international partners to address the peace and development agenda;
- Produced the first multi-donor conflict assessment;
- Produced the first national conflict assessment in Africa;
- Produced the first Strategic Conflict Assessment led by a local (national) organisation.

ACRONYMS

CBO	Community Based Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development (British Government)
EU	European Union
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAPEP	National Poverty Eradication Programme
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NOA	National Orientation Agency
OPC	Odua People's Congress
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (World Bank)
SCA	Strategic Conflict Assessment
UNDP	UN Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation

SECTION ONE

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 Background to the Report

The Federal Government of Nigeria is deeply concerned about the issue of conflict and the threat that it poses to national existence and democracy. The proliferation of violent conflict in West Africa and the prospect of national elections –with widespread fears of violence- in 2003 are two of the major factors driving this concern. Accordingly, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) has undertaken to conduct a Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) to develop a closer understanding of the underlying causes of conflict in Nigeria and to develop new policy responses.

The overall objective is to provide an analysis of conflict in Nigeria at the strategic or policy level in order to inform national and international debates about possible responses. A second key objective is to make specific recommendations to government, the international community, the private sector and to the civil society. Thirdly the study is intended to develop and inform IPCR's own work and capacity.

1.2 Methodology

The methodology has been adapted from a framework that has been developed over the last two years by DFID. Full details of the methodology have been published (see Bibliography) and will not be repeated here. In summary there are three stages in the assessment:

- Analysis of causes, actors and dynamics
- Responses to conflict

- Policy options and strategies

The methodology takes a political economy approach, examining the interests of conflict actors, and focuses strongly on the linkages between underlying causes of conflict. The process began with a workshop on the methodology in July. The field teams and IPCR made a number of modifications to the methodology, especially relating to the analysis of causes –see Section Three.

IPCR has undertaken the SCA in two phases. Phase One was a mapping of the causes, actors and dynamics based on written sources. Phase Two tested the findings of Phase One through fieldwork and focused more on responses and policy options. Many of the same persons were involved in both Phases, ensuring continuity in the approach.

Each team has written a report for each phase and the team leaders also collaborated in writing a summary report of each phase. These reports should be regarded as an integral part of the process. They contain many individual studies of conflicts both by review of written sources and by fieldwork. Professor Celestine Bassey has developed an approach to analysing dynamics, which is presented as Annex 3.

The research was undertaken by teams of IPCR staff and consultants led by:

- Professor Osita Eze (IPCR) . South-East Zone
- Professor Celestine Bassey South-South Zone
- Mrs Dayo Oluyemi-Kusa South-West Zone
- Mr Imran Abdulrahman North-Central Zone
- Dr Fatima Adamu North-West Zone
- Dr Joseph Golwa (IPCR) North-East Zone

For a full list of the teams see Annex 1.

The process of discussion was facilitated by DFID consultants Dr Robin Luckham (Phase One) and Mr Tony Vaux (Phase Two). The Phase Two report was scrutinised in a technical workshop in October and this led to several important improvements, especially relating to the presentation of dynamics. The list of participants in the Panel is given in Annex 2.

SECTION TWO

THE PHYSICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CONFLICT IN NIGERIA

2.1 History

With more than 120 million people divided into nearly 300 ethnic groups, Nigeria inevitably faces major problems of governance. Today, 65% of budgetary revenues derive from oil, located in the south, while the north remains relatively poor. But the north has dominated the political landscape since independence in 1960. Nigeria has opted to balance resources and limit the risk of secession through a federal structure but the tensions have often proved too great and for 30 of its 42 years of existence Nigeria has been subjected to military rule.

These military regimes have used force to control the people, and have done little to address their concerns and grievances. Institutions that make for good and effective governance, especially in a democracy, e.g. judiciary, police, legislature, etc were allowed to decay. The removal of the military yoke in 1999 has left the underlying problems more exposed, and in greater need of attention. Three years into democratic practice the intense competition for political space has heated up the polity leading to violence, which has continued to threaten the survival of the democratic process.

On the positive side it can be said that since the Biafra War more than thirty years ago, Nigeria has been spared conflict on the scale experienced by many other African countries. On the other hand, Nigeria experiences a mass of relatively minor conflicts. Literature review and fieldwork confirm that there are conflicts in all parts of Nigeria, and it appeared to the researchers that they were on the increase. A total number of casualties is not available

due to paucity of data. However, the often publicly quoted number of 10,000 deaths since May, 1999, seems to be an underestimation.

2.2 Geographical Spread and Categorisation of Conflict

There are so many layers and instances of conflict in Nigeria, active and latent, that it has proved impossible to 'map' them all in a geographical sense. The six studies demonstrate that conflict exists as a substantial problem in all the Six Zones. It is by no means easy to decide which are the most significant, nor how far back into history it is appropriate to go. Furthermore it is difficult to measure the geographical spread even of a single conflict. Finally, there are deep tensions in some areas that have not yet erupted into violent conflict. Consequently it is not possible to specify an area of the country on which the attention of conflict managers should be focused. While a prioritisation may be necessary for practical purposes, the country will ultimately have to be considered as a whole. The studies also indicated that despite the huge number of specific conflicts in each Zone, many causes are essentially similar and can be explained within a single national typology of conflict. This reflects the central importance of the role of government institutions in both causation and resolution of conflict.

In Phase Two, the Team Leaders decided to categorise the manifestations of conflicts as ethnic, succession/dethronement or religious. However, over the course of time, their original causes have been lost and the conflicts manifested themselves around a single issue that had become a focus of antagonistic and intractable attitudes. The Ife-Modakeke conflict, for example, began over territorial disputes in 1835, but now has a dynamic of its own based in human behaviour. The Niger Delta struggle has gone from one about the environment, about compensation, to "resource control". The penchant for attacking Nigerians from other parts of the country,

particularly Igbos in northern cities like Kaduna and Kano, over religion that has little or no bearing to those being attacked, defy logic. The consistency with which Jos boils suggests the beginnings of another conflict hot spot.

2.3 The importance of 'Prebendal Politics'

The continuity of causes of conflict in Nigeria is indeed remarkable. A number of recent conflicts have their roots in pre-colonial and colonial history. It is impossible to say whether a conflict that may have occurred in the distant past is 'over' or persists as a problem today.

A second uniting factor is that oil revenue is an all-pervasive national phenomenon. A characteristic of Nigeria is that (except in the oil-producing areas) resources tend to flow from the top downwards rather than the other way.

A number of other common features can be cited. The review of written sources undertaken in Phase One indicates a wealth of studies of individual conflicts (see Bibliography) and many different sources of tension. Analysts have commented on the deep divisions between north and south, Islam and Christianity and so on. Others point to the stresses and strains of modernisation and globalisation, with striking contrasts between the polity of a modern state and the polity of traditional villages.

But the most important common factor today is the phenomenon of political corruption. The concentration of resources in the state makes the possession of political power very lucrative and the competition for political positions very intense. As Richards Joseph has contended- 'Nigeria's present and future depend upon a prior understanding of the nature, extent and persistence of a certain mode of political behaviour, and of its social and economic ramifications' (1991:1). This mode of political behaviour is the

'prebendal culture' which sees politics as the clearing house for jobs, contracts, and official plunder. In Joseph's exposition:

'Democratic politics and prebendal politics are two sides of the same coin in Nigeria; each can be turned over to reveal the other...The system of prebendal politics enables divergent groups and constituencies to seek to accommodate their interest ... The system is often wasteful, unproductive, and contributes to the increasing affluence of the relative few, paltry gains for a larger number, and misery for the great majority of people. Since it is a self-justifying system which grants legitimacy to a pattern of persistent conflict, and since its modus operandi is to politicise ethnic, religious and linguistic differences, it serves to make the Nigerian polity a simmering cauldron of un-resolvable tension over which a lid must regularly be clamped, and just as regularly removed (Joseph, 1991:10).

The pioneer President of Nigeria, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, forewarned: 'with the vice permeating the country, the prestige of our nation will dwindle to the vanishing point, defacing our national image and bringing shame to those who wear the "agbada" of Nigerian citizenship'.

Unfortunately, Dr. Azikiwe's warning went unheeded even by subsequent national leaders (military and civilian) and the consequent damage to the national psyche could be seen in a world outlook where every Nigerian is perceived to be a potential '4-1-9' (criminal). As Karl Maier puts it in his scathing treatise on Nigeria, *This House Has Fallen* (2001), 'to most outsiders, the name Nigeria conjures up images of chaos and confusion, military coups, repression, drug trafficking and business fraud.'

The scale and prevalence of conflict in Nigeria is a matter of the gravest concern and requiring a proactive political response. Nigeria, according to Boer, "appears to be a nation in chaos, a nation on the brink." (USAID/OTI, 2001)

The different factors causing conflict cannot be addressed in a fair and convincing way because of 'prebendal politics' and so they may become deeper and more connected, one with another. Religious factors become dangerous when they are linked to politics, but even more so when linked to ethnicity and north-south divisions. The age-old competition between pastoralists and farmers becomes intense when the political system fails to regulate that competition over resources and may turn to violence if arms are readily available. The Police is both inefficient and corrupt. Policemen are ill-equipped to function effectively and ill-remunerated to be able to resist attempts to corrupt them. The effect is that transgressors are not apprehended either because the Police cannot or are paid to look the other way, thereby breeding the culture of impunity. The Judiciary, which is touted as the common man's last hope, has not lived up to its billing. The wheel of justice grinds slowly and with an unsure gait, which aggrieved parties find both frustrating and expensive. The breakdown of order in society makes people call for extreme solutions such as 'Bakassi Boys' (vigilantes) and military repression. But such 'solutions' may only make things worse by weakening the State and diverting attention from the need to improve basic institutions of governance, notably the police.

In this way all paths turn back towards the need for a functioning democracy, including functioning institutions, and the need to reverse the influence of the long years of military rule. The Police and Judiciary need special and urgent attention if the quest to de-escalate tension, and turn the focus of the nation resolutely toward development are to have realistic chances of success.

SECTION THREE

THE STRUCTURAL CAUSES OF CONFLICT

3.0 Methodological issues

In the DFID methodology, the causes of conflict are categorised as follows:

- Security
- Political
- Economic
- Social

The categories are analysed at different levels:

- International/Regional
- National
- State
- Local

The aim is to explore the overlap and linkages between the different categories and levels in order to identify cases in which a cause may develop into a greater threat. A social issue, for example, may turn out to have economic aspects, and if neglected could progress from local to State or Federal levels. This leads into an analysis of dynamics.

In considering their findings, the Team Leaders found it useful to adopt a typology of conflict manifestations as:

- Political
- Related to Traditional Institutions
- Economic
- Ethnic/communal
- Religious

The Technical Advisory Group questioned this exposition as relatively 'static' and requested greater attention to linkages and dynamics. For example, ethnic conflicts often take on such important political and religious overtones that the term 'ethnic conflict' can be misleading. IPCR has tried to address this issue by referring back to the field reports, placing the conflict typology within the format of the original methodology and bringing out linkages and dynamics.

3.1 Security-related Manifestations of Conflict

3.1.1 Proliferation of Small Arms

The deployment of Nigerian troops elsewhere in West Africa is perceived as a major cause of the 'leakage' of small arms into the hands of unauthorised persons. There is also extensive smuggling and the incidence of mercenary involvement, especially in the conflicts of the ethnic/communal hue notably in the Northern zone and the South West. This poses a political dilemma for the country since the mercenaries are reported to be from neighbouring countries like Chad and Niger, with Nigeria's leadership role in fostering African integration through the African Union and NEPAD. Field reports suggest that in many areas of Nigeria, including the highly volatile South-South, many people —perhaps even a majority —are now in possession of arms.

The retrenchment of soldiers is also cited as a cause of the intensity of conflicts in the society. During the years of military rule there was an excess of soldiers. As they are retrenched they often take their fighting skills back into society.

The manufacture of home-made guns has been cited as an issue in the South-West and North-Central field reports.

3.1.2 Corruption of law-enforcement agents

This was widely cited in field studies as a source of conflict and reason for conflict to escalate. It is not unknown for policemen to become involved directly in crime, or to 'license' criminal activity. The systematic degradation of the police force is partly attributable to the excessive power of the military forces during the years of military rule. It is also caused by low morale, and this in turn arises from poor conditions of service and the influence of political corruption.

3.1.3 Vigilante Groups

Corruption manifests itself in the incapacity of the state to guarantee security. Perpetrators of conflict or conflict entrepreneurs have taken the opportunity of lapses in the political system to run parallel gangster outfits. These unconventional outfits are used for political thuggery, destruction and vandalism of public property, and assaults on the lives of citizens.

In some areas the response to the spread of violent crime and the breakdown of police protection has been to create vigilante groups. The remarkable feature of some of these groups is that they operate with the full sanction of the State and the cooperation, in many cases, of ordinary people. A prominent example was the 'Bakassi Boys' in Abia and Anambra States where they were endorsed as 'Vigilance Services'. A person interviewed in the field studies said that "it is an abnormality in civilized society that ethnic militias like the Bakassi Boys should be used to do the duties of the law enforcement agents, the police and even the judiciary. But this became the case due to high insecurity and wastage of life and properties."

Respondents attested that the crime rate in the States where the Bakassi Boys operated was much lower than the States where they were absent.

But problems have arisen where the Bakassi Boys went beyond what the public expected. Since they have no structure and terms of reference, those of them who were found guilty of getting involved in other things could not be sanctioned or disciplined. In Abia and Anambra States their official endorsement has now been suspended.

Field studies also raised concerns about the links between Transnational Companies, notably the oil companies, and such vigilante groups. By engaging such groups in the protection of oil installations the companies may be undermining the formal security systems and at least potentially, encouraging violence.

3.1.4 Foreign Mercenaries and International Tensions

The involvement of mercenaries from Cameroun and Chad in support of Mambilla militia group has been cited in the SCA field report as a cause of escalating conflict in Taraba State.- Mercenaries from Chad and Niger are also fingered as factors in the conflicts in Plateau, Nasarawa, Bauchi and Kaduna states.

3.1.5 Misuse of Military Responses

The deployment of the military to suppress conflict without addressing underlying issues may exacerbate conflict further. The impunity of military personnel may cause deeper grievances, as in the case in Benue state.

3.2. Political Manifestations of Conflict

3.2.1 'Political Conflicts'

Political conflicts emanate from power struggles within the political class, and often involve the manipulation of the people, who are inevitably

less informed about the essence of the political struggle. The elite and the politicians often influence governmental policies for their own selfish purposes. This is usually done without consultation with the people or civil society. For example, in the creation and location of local government headquarters, community members are often not consulted. The struggle for political position may then be presented along ethnic and religious lines in order to earn the support of the populace and make them the vanguard for the fight of the elite for the latter's ambition. Relevance, or consideration for political appointments and ability to influence contract awards depend on the ability to 'deliver' an area or people (the fact of being able to determine which way a people will respond). No effort is spared to stake claims to ability to 'deliver'. Where others are in doubt, a conflict is created to show that the claimant is in charge, i.e., that the people will file behind him.

In the South-East zone, for example, such directly 'political' conflict manifests itself in the following forms:

1. Conflict between the Governor and his Deputy
2. Conflict between the Governor and the State House of Assembly
3. Conflict between the Governor and the churches
4. Conflict within the political parties (more than between them)
5. Tensions and manipulations between the Federal Government and the State
6. Tensions between politicians and their financial backers

A particular problem is the 'incumbency syndrome', known in the local parlance as 'tazarce' (Hausa word for succession). Political office-holders concentrate their efforts entirely on the issue of retaining their post into a second term. This has created a lot of conflict in Nigeria at the three levels of government. But given the enormous economic interests attached to these offices, there are always political aspirants resolved to contest against

them. While the incumbents strive to maintain the status quo, the opposition is bent on dislodging them from the use of state machinery to perpetuate themselves. Issues are seldom raised. Rather, sentiments on and about geopolitical zones, religion and historical (real or imagined) animosities are dredged up.

It could be added that another form of 'political' conflict is the failure to take action on Commissions of Enquiry, thus allowing the perpetuation and escalation of conflict. Examples are the cases of Warri, Tafawa Balewa and Jos. That kind of conflict, however, is one the government cannot come out of unscathed. Because the issues at stake have to do with the interests, positions and values of different parties, it is a tough call to expect Reports of Commissions of Enquiry and White Papers based on them to satisfy all parties. Such reports and White Papers are based, not so much on "justice", but on what makes sense in terms of political expediency and or legality. As such, implementing such reports and White Papers would be in the interest of one or some of the parties to a conflict. Refusing to implement would also not go down well with those who stand to benefit from the implementation of such reports and White Papers.

3.2.2 'Succession and Dethronement Conflicts'

Conflicts over chieftaincy in the traditional institutions have been on the increase in Nigeria, particularly in the last twenty years. The military found traditional rulers useful in legitimising itself in office, having dismantled the democratic structures. Though the power/influence of traditional rulers have diminished over time, the economic interest attached to those offices and the calibre of persons seeking them have continued to engender stiff competition and rivalry. Attempts to influence the government in favour of one candidate against another have empowered the

government to become active participant in the selection process as against the known traditional methods. This has led to the politicisation of traditional institutions and the proliferation of chieftaincy thrones. Where the interest of the government of the day is perceived as threatened, the occupant of the traditional throne is removed without regard to due process. A classic example is the manipulation of the Sultan's selection and dethronement during the Babangida and Abacha regimes. Similarly in the South West, the fracas that ensued as a result of the contest for the vacant throne of the Olowo of Owo has been politicised with different political parties allying with different contestants.

Field reports also suggest that the flow of State resources through traditional leaders is a cause of widespread concern.

3.2.3 Territorial Disputes

Territorial boundaries are frequently changed, and often without proper reason and consultation. In extreme cases this may result directly in conflict, or it may produce a situation of deep grievance that may simmer for many years:

'Thousands of people from a particular ethnic group associated with Cross River State found themselves suddenly part of Akwa Ibom. Over the last eighteen months or so they have been displaced to Cross River and are effectively living as refugees with little State or local government support. The likelihood of these groups retaliating if nothing is done to resolve their grievances is high.'

3.3 Economic Manifestations of Conflict

Government economic policies have not sufficiently addressed poverty, under-development and unemployment, which are a breeding ground for grievances. Greed has manifested itself in the various strata of the

Nigerian society, paving way for unhealthy economic rivalry and wealth accumulation at the expense of the nation. This interaction of 'Grievance' and 'Greed' is the background against which specific issues play out.

3.3.1 Poverty and Inequality

Nigeria is going through a difficult economic and political transition after 30 years of economic mismanagement and corruption under military rule. According to the UNDP's Human Development Index, Nigeria ranks in the low human development category - 151st out of 174 countries for which UNDP has data, and 22nd out of 45 African countries. The proportion of the population which lives on less than a dollar a day is at least 50% and may be as high as 70%. The fundamental cause of poverty in Nigeria is the economic stagnation that the country has experienced for almost two decades. Persistent low productivity in agriculture has meant that most of the rural population has had limited opportunities to increase income. In addition, stagnation in the non-agricultural economy has meant no growth in formal employment and limited demand for informal activity.

In the late 1980s, the World Bank supported a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) that proved controversial. Reports suggest that the SAP led to increased growth and reduction of poverty, particularly in the rural areas. In the six years prior to the SAP (1980-86), GDP declined by 2%, while in the 5 years after the SAP was instituted (1986-91), GDP grew by 5% per year. However, implementation problems, together with erosion of urban incomes largely caused by erosion of fiscal discipline, made the SAP highly unpopular. These problems also damaged the reputations of the World Bank and IMF, whose policies were seen by ordinary Nigerians to have led to unemployment and labour unrest, thus increasing conflict. In the years since the SAP reforms, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty

has increased steeply. Urban poverty has increased faster than rural poverty due to massive migration from rural to urban areas, with the incidence of urban poverty now matching that of rural poverty.

3.3.2 Resource Competition 1: Dividing the benefits from oil

The allocation of Nigeria's massive income from oil has a deeply pervasive effect on the political system. As stated earlier, many Nigerians see politics as a competition for resources derived mainly from oil. A political appointment or election marks the beginning of all manner of felicitation and celebration. The often unspoken sentiment is: 'our time has come' (it is now the turn of the elected or appointed to benefit maximally from oil revenues alongside his kith, kin, associates and friends).

Oil has had a profound economic effect arising from its dominance of the economy. This effect has been observed in many similar situations and has been given the name 'Dutch Disease'. Internally, oil draws economic activity towards itself, sterilising other sectors of the economy, while the effect is further increased by oil exports leading to an artificially appreciated national currency that undermines other possibilities for export.

By attempting to spread resources evenly, Nigeria has created deep resentments in the oil-producing areas and their attempts to raise the issue have too often been dismissed as separatism and suppressed with violence. The problem manifests itself not only as an ideological issue but also in terms of employment. The Imo and Anambra State governments have cited the reduction of their share of Federal oil income from 13% to 3% as a reason for their inability to pay their workers. The process of enacting a law that will remove the dichotomy between on and off shore oil, and revenues derivable to communities where these are sited, is in progress. This may well soothe frayed nerves for now.

At the local level, people experience constant uncertainty about the benefits of the oil industry. Sudden changes in oil price, the production policy of companies or decisions about the labour force can drastically affect them. Although such matters are supposed to be regulated through open Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between the government and the companies the practice there is widespread suspicion about these 'MOUs'. In one case recorded in the South-South report the issue quickly transformed into an 'ethnic' issue:

'The Okrikans believe that the refinery was employing less of their community than they were entitled to, and as a result youth groups demonstrated violently and set up road blocks to prevent the public (including Elemes) from getting to the refinery. The Elemes reacted to the demonstration and the situation quickly turned into violent conflict with properties destroyed, as well as a number of people killed.'

Shell's list of 'Typical Community Issues with Oil Industry'

- Demand for community assistance/development
- Demand for employment
- Demand for community recognition/attention
- Contractor-related disputes
- Disputes over unfulfilled promises
- Demand for amenities
- Intra and Inter communal disputes
- Ownership claims/disputes
- Perception of Inequity

But there are many interests that would prefer to have disputes over the treatment of labour or damage to the environment considered as 'tribal' or 'ethnic'. Shell's list of issues with local communities focuses on

'demands', refers to 'communal' disputes and omits environmental damage entirely.

3.3.3 Resource Competition 2: Access to Land

Field studies show that the intensification of conflict between pastoralists and cultivators is becoming a matter of concern across the country. The issue seems to be particularly strong in the case of pastoralists from outside Nigeria, notably from Niger, Chad and Cameroun and the issue may be compounded not by any new patterns of migration but by the presence of armed mercenaries from the above named countries.

Elsewhere it has been suggested that competition for farmland may have been exaggerated as a cause of conflict. Tiv farmers, for example, said that the issue was not so much lack of land as a perception of different political and social status as 'indigenes' and 'settlers', and that the significance of this difference lay in access to political power and land.

But as with so many manifestations of conflict listed here, the primary issue in many cases is the politicisation of the problem. The Tiv have often been able to enlist the support of the Fulani against their enemies but:

There is a strong feeling among the farmers across the Zone that the Fulani are able to encroach on farmland annually because the Fulani have the money to buy up government officials (police and judiciary). Consequently the farmers take the law into their own hands by attacking the Fulani whenever there is an encroachment into their farmland.'

3.3.4 Unequal Development

Field reports suggest that strong grievances have arisen around the perception that a particular State or ethnic group has been unfairly treated,

resulting in great differences in the standard of living. Exception was taken by many southern respondents to the fact that the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF), when it held sway under the military government of General Sani Abacha, tarred more roads and provided more infrastructural amenities for the North than for the South; although the petroleum revenues from which it derived its funds is in the South.

3.3.5 Market Competition

In the absence of a proper regulatory framework, competition between traders can go out of hand and turn violent. For example, conflict between Hausa and Egba women in the market over the price of onions and brocades has led to conflict. But the factor that exacerbated the problem was an underlying tension between settlers and indigenes.

3.4 Social Manifestations of Conflict

3.4.1 'Ethnic and Communal Conflicts'

This type of conflict in Nigeria is closely linked to resource competition and contest for political power. In competing for political positions, ethnic differences are sometimes used for selfish interest, leading to heavy casualties among the masses that are not necessarily the beneficiaries of the economic gains of the coveted office. Some of these conflicts emanate from governmental policies, which do not seem to carry the populace along, but are tied to the interest of the elite, particularly the political class. The North-West report concludes that such conflict is often a manifestation of other problems:

'The respondents cited corruption, self-centred leadership, poor implementation of government policies like NAPEP, the glaring gap between the rich and the poor, and the arrogant display of stolen public fund by

government officials etc as the underlying causes of public anger and frustration that needed religious and ethnic disagreements to erupt into violent conflict'. Examples of inter-ethnic conflict are Shagamu crisis between the Hausa and Yoruba in Ogun State(South West), Kano crisis between the Ibo and the Hausa (North West), Taroh/Hausa in Wase and Langtang crisis, Plateau State (North Central), Sayawa/Fulani in Bogoro/Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi State (North East).

Demographic explosion has sometimes been identified as the root cause of some of these conflicts and Western sources may be more readily inclined to give this issue prominence. But the real cause is more likely to be that an ethnic group's population is expanding in relation to the population of another group. Some of these ethnic groups have migrated in search of space for economic activities, thereby triggering the fear of domination by the minority ethnic groups. Examples of this can be seen in the migration of the larger ethnic groups, notably the Tiv, into areas inhabited by smaller minority ethnic groups .

Migration by ethnic groups leads to the development of a common sub-category known in Nigeria as 'indigene/settler' conflict. Examples are: Ife/Modakeke (South west), Jos (Plateau State), Southern senatorial district of Nasarawa State (North Central), Tiv/ Jukun,Taraba State (North East), Hausa/Dakarki , Kebbi State (North West), and Oruku, Enugu State (South East).

A third set of conflicts related to ethnicity are those where disputes and changes in boundaries have caused severe tensions relating to political power and representation manifested along ethnic or communal lines. Examples of intra-state boundary and communal disputes are, Demsa/Numan, Adamawa State (North East) Umuleri/Aguleri, Anambra State (South East), Ugep/Idomi, Cross River State (South South). Examples

of inter-state boundary disputes are Nasarawa/Benue, Benue/Taraba, Akwa Ibom/Cross River, Akwa Ibom/Abia, Cross River/Ebonyi, Benue/Cross River.

3.4.2 'Religious Conflicts'

Most conflicts that end up being classified in the media as religious, when investigated are fundamentally linked to causes other than religion. The tendency to identify some ethnic groups with a particular religion easily gives credence to the use of religion for the manipulation of other differences. Though there have been conflicts described as religious in parts of Nigeria, there has been no national one due to inherent centripetal forces in the country.

The problem is not only tension between different religions but also tensions within the same religious group. In the North-West Zone the struggle for supremacy between the traditional and 'modern' or 'progressive' scholars is noted as a serious problem.

We cannot rule out the role of religious fundamentalism and politicisation of religion in increasing the intensity and magnitudes of the violence recorded in this type of conflict. As the North-West report says:

The respondents view the problem of increasing religious intolerance as a recent development. Substantial number of them did recall, not long ago, how they used to celebrate each other's religious festivals. This practice has disappeared with increasing intolerance and conflict between the Muslims and Christians. A factor that contributed to this development is the politicisation of religion that occurred at both national and local levels'

Examples of 'religious conflicts' are the Kano riot as a result of the coming of Rev. Bunke in 1984, the Kaduna Sharia conflict in 2000, and the Plateau State 2001/2002 crisis. The agitation for (by the Muslims) and

objection (by the non-muslim) to the introduction of Sharia legal system in Kaduna led to heavy casualties with attendant reprisal attacks in other parts of the state. The Sharia legal system is still a subject of discussion/ debate in Nigeria as those objecting to it demand a national position on the issue. Meanwhile, in states such as Zamfara, Kano, Bauchi, Katsina and Sokoto States, Sharia Law is already being implemented based on request by a section of the citizens.

The politicisation of religion could have profound effects. The North-West Report notes that:

There is a definite feeling, especially among Muslim clerics in Kano, that the Zone's identity is mainly religious, particularly Islamic, and that such identity should be protected at all costs. The options are for the acceptance of such identity or the division of the country.'

3.4.3 Unemployed Youth

There is a widespread depression among the youths because of their economic situation and corruption. The alarming rate of unemployment gives them away as willing tools ready to be used for negative actions such as thuggery and armed robbery. There may also be a social factor involved in the issue of youth unemployment. Most youths are in search of white-collar jobs and may be reluctant to accept jobs with lower status even if they are available. The large number of unemployed youths readily provides hands for the perpetration of violence.

But the issue can also be seen from a more positive perspective. Youth may also represent more idealistic views of society and provide the driving force for change. In 1994/5 the late President Abacha invited thousands of youth from around the country to Abuja to try to win their support for his election as a democratic leader:

'For most of these young people from the South-South it was their first time to leave their States and they were infuriated to discover that the much higher level of development in other parts of the country was financed through the oil that came from 'their soil.'

3.4.4 Women

The literature review suggested that stresses in society are putting increasing strains on the family and this commonly takes the form of domestic violence. There are many reported cases of rape in the course of conflicts, and probably many more that are not reported. Arguably, children brought up in a climate of violence may be more likely to tolerate or even promote violence in the future.

3.4.5 Breakdown of social values

Lack of respect for elders and changing patterns of family life have been cited in field reports as factors that undermine the social fabric. The fact that those elders do not comport themselves like those of old is also contributive to such lack of respect. Moral values were handed down from generation to generation. New generations knew that it was bad to steal because older generations so instructed them. Elders that pilfer public funds and display such money brazenly can not claim the same moral high ground as elders of yore. As such, unlike olden days when the appearance of an elder was enough to send conflicting youths scampering, the contemporary elder does not possess such aura and is not a conflict preventor and manager as he used to be.

3.4.6 'Psycho-cultural dispositions'

In their earliest stages conflicts may have obvious structural causes but over the course of time they may take on a fixed character of animosity and hatred that can only be analysed in terms of 'psycho-cultural dispositions'. In these extreme cases it may be that conflict prevention or avoidance may become more important. In such cases the type of conflict mediation that focuses on attitudes may be relevant, but in many cases such approaches fail to address the structural causes.

3.5 Conflict Actors

The following groups/individuals were identified as key actors in the conflicts:

Security Actors

- Security forces
- Ex-servicemen
- Mercenaries (foreign and Nigerian)
- Vigilantes

Political Actors

- Political Elite
- Government/State governors
- Political parties and internal factions
- Political thugs
- Traditional rulers and aspirants

Economic Actors

- Transnational Companies
- Labour organisations
- Herders and farmers

- Multilateral Finance Institutions

Social Actors

- ‘Indigenes and Settlers’
- Ethnic groups
- Religious leaders and organisations
- Youth
- Students (cults)
- Militias
- CBOs, NGOs

Connecting Actors

- The media

These will now be examined in detail.

3.5.1 Security Actors

There is the tendency for the military to over-react and the possibility that funds for security operations can be manipulated and misappropriated, thereby distorting response.

In the case of the police the problem is that they display a degree of incompetence that gives rise to the suspicion that they have an interest in promoting rather than preventing crime. So low is public estimation of the police that members of the public sometimes take the law into their own hands, even against the police:

‘Three days before our visit to a Local Government Area, three notorious armed robbers were picked up by a team of Road Safety Corps and handed over to the police. One of the robbers who had sustained injuries was handcuffed and taken to hospital for treatment. In the hospital bed and under the police guard, the armed robber escaped. As soon as the news reached the town, the people spontaneously responded by attacking the police station

and other police officers present or found on the way. The conflict led to a loss of life and destruction of property worth millions.'

3.5.2 Political Actors

The studies have indicated cases in which the creation or location of local government headquarters has led to conflict (e.g. Ife-Modakeke, Warri). Self-interested behaviour by political opportunists has created an enabling environment for conflict. In the language of the DFID methodology this may be called 'Greed'. It has to be recognised that there are elements in society who are prepared to use violent conflict in a deliberate and well-planned manner in order to achieve their objectives. Such people take advantage of 'Grievances' (feelings of injustice). Conflict can usually be described as an interaction between 'Greed' and 'Grievance'. Conventional mediation activity tends to underestimate the importance of 'Greed' and therefore may be limited in its impact. In practice, control of 'Greed' is more likely to fall within the capacity of government.

The Federal Government has directed Local Government Councils to initiate a Committee on Peace, Security and Welfare with members drawn from civil society, security forces and traditional institutions. But this directive has either been ignored by the local political leaders or simply not happened through inertia. The Federal Government has also initiated a number of interventions such as the Boundary Adjustment Committee that have significantly limited the escalation of conflicts but such efforts have been incomplete, indecisive and inconclusive. This suggests an enormous potential for more vigorous action to address structural causes.

3.5.3 Economic Actors

Trans National Companies (TNCs)

Since they often lack transparency, the activities of these companies would require much deeper study than was possible here. As the South-South report explains:

'Unclear policies regarding the designation of certain communities as 'host communities' has been problematic and a source of contention as there are several other communities impacted by the oil industry (e.g. where petrochemical factories are located, gas-flaring takes place, pipelines cut through land etc) .

Business leaders

Investors have much to lose in case of conflict, and are therefore major stakeholders in conflict resolution. But there are few cases of business leaders working effectively with NGOs and others. Instead the efforts move in different directions, and may therefore be ineffective.

Labour Organisations.

Trade Union levies are reported as a potential source of conflict in Enugu and Anambra States. The gap between the 'haves' and the 'have nots', non-payment of salaries, discrimination in recruitment, dismissals, favouritism etc are cited as possible causes of strike action and violent conflict.

3.5.4 Social Actors

Religious Organisations

Unfortunately, religious organisations are better known for stirring up conflict than resolving it, but one field report concludes that the churches could be a tool for peace-building, and there are in fact many cases of religious leaders from all religions taking a more positive role. The work of Inter-Faith Mediation Centers is noteworthy in this regard. It seems to be the politicisation of religion that is the pernicious element.

Youth

The elite, youth, security forces, religious/traditional leaders, etc., are the key actors in most conflicts in Nigeria. The elite in the various geopolitical zones are usually at the “vanguard” of most of the conflicts. Many times, the masses and other actors are simply tools in the hands of the elite. At the national level, the military elite dictated the pace during the many years of military rule.

In fact, in Nigeria, it has been said that the parties do not have clear-cut ideologies, only elite interests. Over the years, they have articulated their interests and presented same as national interests.

As a result of the increasing rate of unemployment, the youth, which form the bulk of the idle hands, usually fall prey to the manipulation of the elite. The continued involvement of traditional rulers in politics compromises their conventional role as custodians of the culture of the people. This is perceived by their subjects as negation of their primary role and is usually resisted. The role of ex-servicemen in conflict is becoming more and more negative. Instead of mitigating conflict, they actively participate in fuelling and executing violent ones.

Students

The fieldwork cited few cases of radical student politics. Also, especially given the long periods of forced vacations, which the students have to endure (as a result of strike action by lecturers and non-academic staff and students' demonstrations), there is the recent phenomenon of student armed robbers, student hired assassins and student political thugs. The breeding ground for this category of conflict amenable social group are the secret cults in various campuses to whom the use of guns and other small arms is second nature.

Non Government Organisations

The activity of NGOs has been focused mainly on training in mediation and conflict resolution. This is no substitute for involvement of government, and it is remarkable that these efforts often ignore government completely. This may be because of suspicions from pre-democracy days, but both sides are now beginning to engage more closely through such interventions as the IPCR stakeholder workshops.

Women

The study notes the existence of many women's organisations but few examples of their constructive engagement in peace processes. Experience throughout the world suggests that women's concern for their children gives them a particularly strong tendency to resist violence.

3.5.5 Connecting Actors

The Media

The different mass media are important actors that need to be linked into the process and have hitherto been neglected. As the North-Central report notes:

'There were examples of the media trying to promote awareness around conflict in special activities, but there is also some indication that the media is contributing to conflict by feeding into the discourse around it and failing to provide even-handed reporting.'

The media have been too easily persuaded to promote sectarian or selfish political perspectives. They have been irresponsible in relation to the risk of violence. Even today they do not seem to have understood that democracy –including their own freedoms- cannot survive without active commitment.

Table 2: Actors in Conflict

Security

Military

Police

Judiciary

Political Opportunists

Government

IPCR- preventive action

National Orientation Agency

Development projects

Ethnic Militias e.g. Egbesu Boys, OPC

Ethnic Associations

NGOs

Cross-border militants

Almajiris

Politically-motivated religious leaders

CBOs

3.6 Conflict Dynamics

3.6.1 Linking the Causes

A particular conflict locale may exhibit the signs of more than one category (manifestation) of conflict. The conflict in the Niger Delta, for instance, is an economic one (struggle for benefits derivable from being an oil producing community), an ethnic/communal one (the economic benefits mentioned above accrue to communities and the ownership of the land where oil is located is therefore crucial to the enjoyment of benefits), a political one (political authorities must be those sympathetic to the competing claims and all efforts to ensure that each party's candidate carries the day is put in), and one about traditional institution (the Urhobo and Ijaw contest the claim of the Itsekiri to exclusive indigeneity of Warri and even the title of the paramount ruler of the Itsekiris as the Olu of Warri.) Other conflicts in the country exhibit this multiple character trait. Actors in these multiple "battle fronts" are often the same.

In the same vein, it should be pointed out that the causes of conflict in the various geopolitical zones keep shifting and, often, response to a stage of the conflict at hand gives rise to what amounts to causes of other stages of the conflict. Elite greed, for example, which often is at the root of economic conflict, gives rise to political conflict in the quest of different factions to corner resources. Such "privatisation of the state" often leads to

"privatisation of security" which provide ethnic/communal, traditional institution and other manifestations of conflict the armaments with which they prosecute violence. Often, it is the failure of the police to arrest first transgressors that is responsible for wide scale conflict as others attempt to avenge themselves. The Police is under-funded, ill-equipped, and under-motivated. The Judiciary that should serve as a conflict resolution mechanism does not fare better than the Police. Corruption is rife and productivity low in the Judiciary. Injunctions are granted frivolously and with reckless abandon. There is the case of the Judge who readies himself with two judgements, and the one he delivers depends on which party paid higher. Repositioning the Judiciary will have to deal with the issue of proper remuneration of judges. The ability of the State to pay such "proper remuneration" would depend on increased productivity in the economy, which, in turn, is dependent on relative peace. All the factors that could lead to better conflict resolution practices are themselves dependent on other variables.


The establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission, for instance, was a conflict resolution ploy by Government to calm frayed nerves in the Niger Delta whose indigenes had been crying out against the perceived marginalisation of the region. Today, one criticism levelled against the NDDC is that contracts awarded by the Commission have to be passed by the entire Board of Directors of the Commission and that this practice encourages mediocrity as political patronage is enthroned over performance. But given the antecedents of the Commission and the need to ensure that everyone is carried along, how else can the Board execute its programmes?

In the same vein, the policy of "quota system", whereby admission into schools of higher learning and employment are offered in a way to ensure that no part of the country is marginalised, was put in place as a

deliberate conflict management mechanism by Government to manage Nigeria's diversity. Those who feel qualified but can not be offered such admission into schools or employment hold a grievance against the system for discriminating against them.

Conflict in Nigeria may be conceptualised as an interaction between Political Crisis (caused by the politics of money) and Resource Competition taking place against a background of various predisposing factors. Diagrammatically this may be presented as:

Figure 1: Conflict in Nigeria and its background



Note: The term 'political crisis' is used here to refer to corruption or 'prebendal politics'.

Attention is generally focused on the manifestations of conflict rather than the roots in issues of governance. Conflict is caused by inefficiency in institutions of state and threatens the survival of whatever limited democracy exists. As democratic institutions develop they may succeed in managing conflict, but the outcome is finely balanced. As democratic institutions

succeed in controlling political corruption they will inevitably face opposition from those who are beginning to lose out.

The dynamics of conflict can be described in terms of an interaction of 'Greed' and 'Grievance'. Fundamentally this means an opposition between the self-interest of the individual and the interest of the wider community. The excess of 'Greed' lies at the root of much conflict in Nigeria today and the challenge is how to limit it.

But in the short-term the analysis of dynamics suggests that conflicts tend to evolve through stages toward the intractable stage at which only 'psycho-social dispositions' can explain what is happening. At that point it may be impossible to resolve. This implies that it is extremely important to intervene earlier when the linkages between politics, ethnicity, religion and other factors are being formed and to ensure, for example, that a dispute over land does not take on an ethnic dimension.

Also, since those in charge of government offices are individuals who hail from particular communities, there is the perception that they use their offices to further the interests of their communities. In such a situation (e.g., Eleme-Okrika, Isekiri-Urhobo-Ijaw), the state is not perceived as an umpire but a party to the conflict. Our study also brings out clearly the profound limitation of the judiciary as a conflict resolution mechanism. Court processes often result in a win-lose situation, and given that, culturally, Nigerian peoples do not take losing in court in good faith but see it as the beginning of a feud, taking the legal option in determining between protagonists in a conflict may, in reality be fuelling such conflict. Starting in 1913, some thirty-six cases have been decided between Aguleri and Umuleri and both are still embroiled in conflict.

What is referred to as psycho-cultural variables of conflict take their cue from the foregoing. At times, the real causes of conflict may have been

transcended, but because so much animosity and blood had attended the earlier efforts of the protagonists, being in conflict with a particular community simply becomes a fact of life that needs no explanation.

3.6.2 Examples

Youth and Unemployment

The social factor of youth anomie is closely linked to the economic issue of unemployment and this has connections with street violence and the emergence of gangsterism. There is always a danger that organised crime could develop from such groups. Alienated youths are always ready to take advantage of other issues (ethnic, religious etc) for their own immediate gains.

In relation to this fundamental issue of youth alienation, there is evidence that in the absence of a properly functioning regulatory and institutional framework, certain economic policies - including trade reforms - could generate unemployment and labour unrest in some sectors in the short term. It is important that IFIs and other international donors recognise this more fully in their policy dialogue with Government, and help analyse the likely short term employment effects of their economic policies as well as feasible options for redressing any adverse effects during policy design and implementation. This will help avoid creating conditions for conflict through economic policies.

Small Arms

A second set of linkages begins with the proliferation of small arms. This arises both because of greater demand at local level and also because of easy supply of arms at the regional and international levels. License to armed groups such as the Bakassi Boys to carry arms is a political decision with

profound consequences in the security, economic and social sectors. Lack of control of small arms has its causes in inefficiency and corruption of law enforcement agencies. Political clientelism and other affiliations make it difficult to prosecute offenders. But perhaps the major underlying factor is lack of public confidence in the police. If this can be restored the street gangs will disappear.

Indigene/Settler Disputes

Indigene/settler tensions are a widespread source of conflict in Nigeria today, and have a long history. But history indicates that such differences do not inevitably lead to violence. Today, communities that have co-existed for centuries in relative peace are suddenly redefining their relationships and sense of identity in order to justify their (or their leaders') quest for greater control of resources and political institutions. Levels of poverty and the sense of exclusion and injustice have contributed to an increasing sense of grievance. But in many cases conflict is deliberately manipulated and exploited by political leaders. Government has neither restrained such 'Greed' nor taken timely action to implement the findings of enquiries.

Religion

Religious tensions have been exacerbated by politicians who use the issue of Sharia Law as a tool for their own political purposes. They risk violence in order to secure their position, and even as a way to protect themselves against genuine complaints. In the long term, the people may learn to decide whether their enemy is really the other religious group –as they are told- or the politician who exploits religious sentiments. But public

opinion need not be left to develop on its own. Constructive use of the media might ensure that the facts are more widely known.

This implies the need for early warning, and preventive responses.

3.7 Triggers

Conflicts develop through a series of steady progressions punctuated by specific events that may suddenly make matters worse. Professor Bassey has conceptualised this process as a series of variables –see Annex 3. The sudden events can be used as early warning signals and may indicate the need for preventive action.

In the case of Nigeria today, the study found two particularly striking cases of ‘Triggers’ that can lead to serious tensions or even violent conflict, namely: election and boundary dispute.

Elections

The main trigger in the Nigerian polity now is the forthcoming general election, 2003. This is manifest in the self-succession (tazarce) bid of most incumbents at all levels of the government. Politicians spare no efforts to get themselves re-elected, disregarding legal and moral constraints. Another trigger related to this is the event of election itself, which is likely to result in accusation and counter-accusation of rigging, political rascality and vandalism under different guises, viz. religious, ethnic, etc.

Boundary Disputes

A history of internal economic migration, displacement of those affected by conflict and the creation of state boundaries without taking the ethnic reach into full account mean that local conflicts expand to involve a number of states and populations within them. This is particularly the case

with Nasarawa, Benue and Taraba (North Central region). Tensions therefore remain unchecked and can build-up to the point that violent conflict can easily be triggered by individual events or recurrences of previous disputes.

Others

Other triggers identified were:

- Individual political and chieftaincy appointments or challenges to established chieftaincy rights and means of succession by excluded groups
- The use of political thuggery and political assassinations
- Creation of Local Government wards and districts
- Individual disputes over land
- Crop damage or theft or killing of cattle
- Migration, notably concerning displaced persons
- Changes introduced by development projects

Development projects can be a trigger (or even a prime cause) of conflict. The conflict that followed the construction of the Bakolori dam in 1980 is said to have arisen from grievances about compensation and the fate of those displaced. Both the Federal and Sokoto State governments were taken aback to see docile peasants dare the firearms of mobile policemen to protest the fact that compensations routed through traditional rulers by government did not get to them. The loss of life of 24 peasant farmers to police bullets could have been averted if the government had properly factored in conflict of interest and the consequences of such in planning and executing the project.

SECTION FOUR

RESPONSES TO CONFLICT

'The usual response of the government in most conflicts is the deployment of armed forces to the conflict zone. In some circumstances relief packages are sent to the communities. This is then followed by a Commission of Enquiry that is usually given the mandate to look into the causes of the crisis and make recommendations as to its resolution. In most cases, the reports of such Commissions are not made public and the findings are not implemented.' (South West Report Phase Two p14)

Following common international practice responses are divided into three 'Tracks'-

- 'Track One' = Government
- 'Track Two' = Non-government actors and civil society
- 'Track Three' = International responses.

Using this typology the conclusions of this study are as follows:

4.1 'Track One': Government Response

The various levels of government - Federal, State and local government - and their agencies have responded to conflicts in a number of ways. The following are some of the response patterns gathered during the field research:

4.1.1 Security Response

Government often makes a reactive response to conflict relying almost entirely on the use of force. Such deployments fail to address the root

cause of conflict and it is extremely unusual for them to include any attempt to facilitate reconciliation among the warring factions.

The police have attempted to respond at different stages of conflict, but lack the capacity to do so effectively. In many cases they have been overwhelmed by the proliferation of arms in the community. Their lack of capacity to guarantee security has in itself encouraged arms proliferation.

4.1.2 Relief Response

Federal and State governments provide relief to victims of crisis but the management and distribution of the relief materials by the government and its agencies are sometimes poor and disproportionate to the number of people affected.

The Federal government has also provided political and financial support for the return of displaced groups, notably in the case of the Bassa people in Nasarawa State. This example, where the returned population fled once again following further violence, illustrates that such initiatives can fail unless the root causes of the conflict have been addressed to the satisfaction of both communities.

4.1.3 Political Response

Establishing Commissions and panels of inquiry by Federal, State and local governments has been a common means of response. Commissions and panels of enquiry are routine and well-intentioned processes of governance, but in most cases their recommendations are not implemented. In the case of the Cross River/Akwa Ibom and Okrika/Elemé conflicts in the South, for example: 'The recommendations based on results of the enquiries or White Papers were highly contested and had not yet been enforced. Even court rulings are for the most part ignored.' Non-

implementation means that the conflicts remain unresolved and could be a source of grievance, which could lead to another.

A further problem is that the composition and method of such Enquiries do not usually allow for adequate local representation and participation.

The creation of new administrative units (states, local government areas, districts and wards) has also been a historical means of response by the government. However, this is just as likely to be a key cause of conflict as a solution.

Co-operation between State Governors over inter-state conflicts has also been a response. This can have substantial impact on strained relationships. There are other cases where governors have been parties to the conflicts or their negligence has resulted in conflict.

One response to conflict in the past has been the use of quota systems for admission into some levels of education and government employment to reduce the risk of domination. However, it is believed that this system creates resentment among qualified candidates who fall outside the quota. It can also reduce the quality of governance by not prioritising merit.

Peace and Security Committees have been established at the Federal, State and local government levels, forming an important strategic response to conflict. This seems to be a positive development but fieldwork for this study, notably in the South-South, suggests that- few such Committees had actually been created, and those that have are largely ineffective. Clearly this structure could have massive impact and deserves additional attention and support.

The Federal government may seek an agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) as a means of reducing tension between oil companies and

local communities. Issues have been raised about the level of participation of local communities in such arrangements.

The establishment of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), to provide the Government with policy-relevant options on fundamental issues to be taken into full account in designing an effective and durable peace process, is a major response to the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

4.1.4 Economic Response

The possibility that conflict may be reduced by substantial development inputs has not been totally overlooked although such responses have been focused heavily on the oil producing areas. The prime example is the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) which has as one of its objectives to make the area 'politically peaceful'. Fieldwork for this study suggests that there is not yet much to show for the two years' investment so far and this may be largely due to 'the rapid politicisation of the Commission'-

' Any decision on projects or the award of contracts has to pass through the Board. The problem seems to be that the Board members are mostly politicians who are more concerned about who is awarded contracts rather than about the quality, efficiency or speed within which projects are delivered on the ground,'

NDDC is now developing a regional development plan in which Conflict is to be one of the cross-cutting themes. This is at a very early stage, but researchers note that:

'Stakeholders' participation even during the planning process will be critical if there is to be ownership at a later stage.'

The oil companies are becoming increasingly concerned about their image and are engaging more actively in community development and have set aside substantial sums for that purpose. There continues to be some doubt, as with NDDC, whether these large sums have been converted into proportionate benefits, but the companies are tightening up their systems and demanding more results themselves. As the South-South report comments- 'Many will say that they have just become better at 'spinning their story' but if the oil companies are half as committed to change as they claim they are, then they should soon be able to demonstrate this commitment in tangible terms'.

Donors are also starting to support community-driven development projects and other operations intended to spur economic and social development.

4.1.5 Social Response

The government, along with others, has also supported enlightenment campaigns, principally through the National Orientation Agency. The impact of such campaigns is difficult to measure and may not convince those most likely to take part in conflict;

4.1.6 Conclusion

The main thrust of government response is to use the military to suppress conflict. The problem is that this may stop the use of violence in the short term but it does not address genuine underlying problems. As our analysis shows, some of the underlying causes (youth alienation, for example) may even be exacerbated by such a response. Secondly, it has been found that military responses often take place in isolation from other responses, despite opportunities for joint activity and sharing of perspectives.

This is not to say that military responses are no longer required. When the security of the state and its fundamental institutions are threatened there is no alternative to the use of force and it is even possible that the response may need to be of an exemplary character in dealing with conflict entrepreneurs no matter how highly placed (security agencies can help in this direction by investigating the antecedents of 'community leaders' with a view to discrediting those who work in conflict for private benefits). But the strategic focus should shift toward preventive and collaborative approaches, and to the use of public policy as a tool of conflict mitigation.

4.2 'Track Two': Non-Government Response

4.2.1 Political Response

Traditional and religious leaders can play positive roles in the wider political sphere by managing and transforming conflict through interaction with their communities. Some have led peace campaigns and participated in cross-communal/religious peace initiatives. This response is highly dependent on individual motivation and ability to convince their communities.

4.2.2 Non-Government Organisations (NGOs)

Non-Governmental Organisations have been active in providing and coordinating relief, as have religious organisations. These have enjoyed some success, but some organisations have been limited by insufficient capacity and limited experience. Sometimes this can mean relief does not reach those who need it. Religious organisations are more widely established and have a greater following. In addition to the reputation of the Nigerian Red Cross Society in most conflict situations, there are other Non-Governmental

Organisations that have given good account of themselves in facilitating the peace process and providing relief materials to displaced persons.

Civil Society has been active in conducting studies of conflicts and organising workshops on various techniques of conflict resolution. A number of local successes have been recorded. But it cannot be claimed that these initiatives have materially altered Nigeria's underlying problems.

Such organisations remain limited in their scope and connections. Many of their activities have been driven by external donors and funding has been on a project-by-project basis. Donor policies are notoriously fickle, moving from organisation to organisation and area to area. This makes it difficult for such organisations to sustain themselves or even to keep up the involvements that they have begun. Unfortunately, many civil society organisations are just as vulnerable to accusations of 'prebendal' behaviour as the politicians whom they so often criticise. It may be that, without compromising the independence of such organisations, government can assist them to play a more constructive role.

NGOs have also implemented peace-building initiatives in response to individual community conflicts, focused on bringing parties together and encouraging dialogue between them through capacity building and joint problem solving workshops. Some are not reaching relevant parts of the communities they are focused on. Even when they did work directly with the communities, interventions resulting in apparent agreements amongst leading figures subsequently failed because they were short-term. Some of the conflicts require a change in governmental policies, which may be the root cause. The inability of the NGOs to carry intervention project beyond the international donors' grants usually leave the intervention inconclusive. Some of the shortcomings of NGOs can be overcome through effective networking and coalition building. Conflict Resolution Stakeholders

Network (CRESNET), an existing network can serve this purpose if strengthened. The Network of African Peace-builders (NAPS) and West African Network on Peace (WANEP) are initiatives that could also facilitate information sharing and organisational empowerment.

4.2.3 Business and Labour

Transnational Companies have become increasingly involved in the response to conflict. In some cases the oil companies have become associated with security operations in highly controversial ways. Today, the emphasis is more on the display of 'social responsibility'. As the South-South report notes- 'As oil companies are encouraged to support programmes to improve the conditions of host communities, compensate them for environmental damage and institute recruitment policies that favour indigenous people from these communities, this question [tension between communities caused by feelings of injustice] becomes all the more pertinent and has resulted in violent conflict erupting in some cases where it has not been resolved.'

Hitherto, national business organisations have not been much involved in conflict, and this suggests some potential to seek their assistance, as very often the assets of businesses are destroyed when conflict erupts.

Labour organisations have also been involved in enlightenment and sensitisation campaigns to reduce conflict and promote the peaceful return of displaced persons.

4.2.4 Youth

Students have been actors in conflict. In some States, students have been known to respond positively to the plight of IDPs and other victims of conflict near their institutions. At other times, they could also have

destructive effect on conflict situations. For example, student cult members who are known to have sizeable quantities of small arms and light weapons blackmail their way to lead in student union elections. Besides, some of these cultist activities derive support from some Vice-Chancellors and lecturers. Sometimes, some of the cultists use the apparatus of the students' union to further aggravate ongoing conflicts or initiate new ones.

4.2.5 The Media

Field studies indicated that the media do not usually play a constructive role in the management of conflict and may often spread sensational stories and motivated opinions.

On the positive side, radio stations had been involved in promoting peace through jingles and discussion.

4.3 Track Three: International Organisations

In most cases, the impact of the international community and aid donors is not very pronounced with respect to development and conflict situations. But more donor agencies are now showing interest in working on conflicts issues rather than in or around it in the post military era in Nigeria. The efforts of the British Council/BHC in the mid 1990s and that of USAID-OTI with the inception of democratic governance are acknowledged. Recent interventions include the Stakeholders of Peace Workshop and the Strategic Conflict Assessment process jointly sponsored by the World Bank, DFID, UNDP, and USAID.

Donors and the international community's response to development and conflict are limited and agenda-focused. They are usually donor-driven. Support of aid donors to the NGOs is usually not adequate for addressing the root causes of conflicts – making the intervention inconclusive. Field reports

refer to many cases in which good work was started with international funding, only to stop at a crucial moment because that funding has ceased due to changes in donor policy. USAID/OTI funding for CRESNET relating to the Ife-Modakake conflict is an example.

Typically, donor programmes follow universal patterns (e.g. governance, security sector reform, livelihoods, structural adjustment, etc.) without design modification related to conflict. As one field report concludes:

'There was little evidence of development interventions being designed with the explicit intention of building peace between warring communities, nor was there evidence of programmes having set up effective systems for arbitrating any disputes that might arise in the areas affected by the projects.'

It is not unknown for donors to discover that their programmes are causing conflict, and then to pay for a couple of mediation workshops to compensate or bring in consultants to add some activities directly addressing conflict. Such 'bolt on' elements are unlikely to address the fundamental faults of design.

The South-South report indicates that donors assume that by addressing poverty they may (inadvertently) address conflict:

'Whilst none of the programmes seems to address conflict issues explicitly, it is assumed that they will have some impact on reducing conflict simply by reducing poverty at a community level...'

But this study suggests that although poverty is a deep underlying cause of grievance, the causes of conflict are likely to be more immediate, notably in sudden changes in the relative wealth of different groups. By choosing to support one group rather than another donors are likely to have a

negative effect that may counteract any other more positive impacts of their programmes.

As the same report makes clear, there is an in-built tendency for development to benefit better-off communities, not only because of their better political representation but also because:

‘Another question is how these programmes will benefit the poorest communities who may not be able to organise themselves well enough to produce a decent project proposal or, even if they can, will not be able to come up with the necessary counterpart funding.’

Donors should integrate conflict analysis into their strategic thinking so that conflict-sensitive approaches are integrated into individual programmes from the start. It is also important that aid agencies develop better mechanisms to check that specific activities, at the least, do no harm.

4.4 Conclusion (Response)

There exists ample evidence in all the six geo-political zones of Nigeria that violent conflicts do not just occur in the country. More often than not, early warning indicators keep blinking without the necessary actions being taken to avert the bloodshed, anguish and enmity with which the country is saddled today. The conclusion of this study is that an early warning mechanism does not exist yet in Nigeria and there is a need to put one in place. An Early Warning mechanism or system is not such until an early warning has been fed into the system and appropriate responses elicited as a result of such warning.

4.4.1 The Importance of Early Warning Systems

The SCA field study shows that there is an enormous amount of early warning signals and information in the politico-socio-economic landscape in

the country. Indeed, it confirms that all conflicts have a gestation period. What is lacking is proper identification, interpretation and commensurate policy at the level of the different “tracks” of response (to potential conflict). This could prevent conflicts of catastrophic dimension at every level. Clearly, it is cheaper to do so. As the old saying goes- ‘a stitch in time saves nine’. The evidence suggests that Nigeria has a plethora of potential conflicts and that the main tool of response, military force, will neither produce long-term solutions nor strengthen democracy. Democratic solutions will involve a wider range of actors and closer collaboration among all those parties.

4.4.2 Other Preventive Actions

The study also suggests that conflict can be prevented by:

- Training key personnel in conflict analysis, especially those involved in the Peace and Security committees.
- Developing tests to ensure that new policies and development initiatives are conflict-sensitive. This could amount to a ‘Conflict Impact Assessment’ similar to the Environmental Impact Assessment.
- Making linkages between conflict actors to promote sharing of information and analysis.

SECTION FIVE

GENERAL CONCLUSION

5.1 Gaps in the Literature

The Phase One study concluded that the literature extensively covered the structural factors responsible for the variety of conflict in Nigeria. Particularly notable are Anifwose (1982), Okoye (1998), Otite and Albert (1999), Osagae et al (2001), Olowu (Ed) (2001) and Albert (2001). There are also studies on most of the major long-standing conflicts in Nigeria. See Bibliography for further details.

Professor Bassey has divided and listed the literature into three categories -General Texts on Conflict in Nigeria, Zonal Studies, Social Movement Literature and Studies in Conflict Management and Resolution. The only major gap he detects is that 'the psycho-cultural dispositions which determine the escalation of conflict in the zone have been hardly addressed'. The individual Phase One reports contain further reviews of the literature and regional bibliographies. Mrs Oluyemi-Kusa has compiled an important list of newspaper articles, journal articles, and unpublished papers.

5.2. Gaps in the Response

While the study of conflict has been rich and extensive, the range of conflict responses has been distinctly limited. With government hitherto focused on military options and civil society on mediation workshops, there are major gaps notably in:

- Security sector reform relating to the police and judiciary
- Early Warning
- Training in conflict analysis
- Integration of conflict analysis into policy-making
- Developing Conflict Impact Assessment
- Management of information, especially through the media
- Linking up conflict actors

Given that so many of the problems arise from 'prebendal' behaviour –and at the same time there is increasing commitment to the development of democracy- there may be scope for the use of codes of conduct that gradually spread good practice throughout society. But the real issue is not so much 'gaps' as lack of cohesion in the response. This may suggest that the real 'gap' is the lack of a national conflict prevention strategy.

5.3 Defining the problem

Respondents have suggested that a key factor behind all the conflicts is the dependence of the state on a single source of revenue, oil, derived mainly from a single area of the country. The Federal Government's role as 'broker' of the oil wealth is both a source of potential resolution, but too often also a source of conflict. This may be because the struggle for access to the nation's oil wealth has interacted with various political crises, notably very long periods of military rule, to produce a situation in which a large proportion of political activity is simply competition for resources.

Against this, the forces of democracy are now reviving and are challenging the political corruption that has emerged from the past. Conflict is not only a threat to the lives of innocent people in Nigeria, it is also a threat to democracy and even to the concept of the nation. If conflict is controlled, democracy can progress. If the opposite happens, it may be that

military rule and other non-democratic processes will return. Much of this study is concerned with the problem of managing conflict with minimum resort to military force and with the strategic objective of enhancing democracy, which is in turn the best protection against conflict. This study concludes that:

1. There has been a common political experience during the long years of military rule.
2. This has led to a political crisis in which political actions are often driven by self-interest and money (prebendal politics).
3. The nation's dependence on oil revenues from a relatively small part of the country has exacerbated this crisis.
4. Conflict represents a serious threat to democracy.
5. Until now government's response to conflict has been limited to suppression by the military.
6. The media have not yet played a constructive role.
7. Business leaders and investors have been ignored.
8. Civil Society (with support from international donors) has been active in research and local peacemaking but lacks strategic vision.
9. The result is that government and civil society work in isolation or even in a spirit of mutual distrust.
10. Closer collaboration between the parties led by government's strategic vision could unite significant forces to oppose violent conflict and support the development of democracy as the best long-term protection against the spread of violence in society.

SECTION SIX

RECOMMENDATION

6.1 Addressing the different manifestations of conflict along the various tracks

It is a characteristic of conflict that it shifts from one outward form to another, and the same conflict may have many different causes and manifestations. But from the point of view of response it may be useful to separate before coordinating responses for maximum effect. In the following sections we set out the responses proposed to the different tracks. This is not a water-tight compartmentalisation, however. Nothing stops an actor different from the one a recommendation is made to take action recommended if it sees itself in a position to so do, and if it envisages that results will ensue. We also have divided the recommendations into those that need immediate action (delay in these will affect results in other areas and will have dire consequences for the country's democracy and unity); medium term (those that could wait for another couple of years; and, long term (those on which work can start now but on which results are not expected in another eight to ten years).

6.1.1 Recommendations to the Federal Government

Immediate

- Undertake security sector reform relating to the Police and Judiciary
- Develop an early warning and response database and mechanism in the IPCR in conjunction with the relevant security offices
- Train public officers, particularly those responsible for conflict prevention and management at all levels of government (federal, state, and local government) in conflict analysis

- Integrate conflict analysis into policy making by encouraging the Conflict Impact Assessment project being undertaken by IPCR
- Re-orientate and reform the border security forces for enforcement of measures directed towards the control of influx of hired armed mercenaries from neighbouring states
- Control ethnic militias
- Embark upon security sector reform aimed at retraining the police and other security sector agencies
- Create a Peace Fund, to be managed by IPCR, to fund mediation, training, preventive interventions and early warning
- Promote transparency and accountability in combating the pervasive problem of greed and grievances that generates crisis in the system
- Increase the professionalism of security services through training, retraining and acquisition of relevant skills, provision of logistics support and enhancement of staff welfare
- Improve the Judiciary through the full implementation of such Reports as the Justice Kayode Esho Panel's Report on the Judiciary
- Recognise the need for a code of conduct for political parties
Sanctioning of party members who either directly or indirectly ferment conflict
- Redress the imbalance in fiscal allocations and Federal/State sectoral responsibilities. Federal presence in the States should be increasing along functional lines e.g. empowering states to repair "federal roads", etc
- Hold international corporations to their corporate responsibilities
- Enforce existing laws on corruption to ensure transparency and accountability

- Evolve policies directed towards sedentary animal husbandry and the creation of grazing reserves
- Enforce existing laws on corruption to ensure transparency and accountability
- Avoid the creation of a National Council of traditional rulers as this may set in motion a conflict involving historical and other claims of hierarchy. In any case, the establishment of such a Council is not seen to solve any problem
- Ensure prompt payment of salaries to forestall industrial crisis and public disenchantment with democratic governance, which often provide one of the excuses for military interventions
- Reverse the availability of small arms and light weapons in society

Medium-term

- The empowerment of INEC as a truly independent and fair umpire in the electioneering process. INEC should be made up of equal membership of all the political parties
- Prompt implementation of the recommendations of reports of tribunals and commissions to forestall the escalation of conflict
- Abolish the State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIEC)
- De-emphasise the deployment of soldiers in peace enforcement duties where the police would cope
- Develop structures for addressing intra and inter party conflicts at all levels of government
- Place a limit to campaign financing to check 'moneybags' who hold parties to ransom

Long-term

- Consolidate democratic institutions through the creation of enabling environment (e.g. political parties, human rights, etc.)
- Enforce citizen rights in the light of the spread of brutal manifestation of ethnic violence, notably that directed towards communities considered ‘settlers’. Examples are Oruku in Enugu State, Ife-Modakeke in Osun State, Tiv-Jukun in Benue and Taraba States and Ikot Offiong community in Akwa Ibom state
- Encourage networking among NGOs
- Use the IPCR as a bridge between civil society and the government
- Encourage the participation of women and youth in the political process
- Strengthen policies that promote private sector participation in the economy
- Evolve sectoral policies towards employment
- Promote public-private sector partnership so as to generate employment opportunities and general multiplier effect in the economy
- Devolve power and resources so that states would have resources and commensurate roles to allow them realise their development goals

Recommendations to State Governments

Immediate

- Reactivate State conflict management regimes such as Boundary Commissions and Peace Committees
- Empower States Security Council in terms of the necessary resources to cope with conflict flashpoints in their respective jurisdictions
- Promote peace education in schools and the society

- Ensure equitable representation of groups in the State bureaucracy and parastatal organisations as a way of ensuring broad participation in state governance while pursuing merit-based hiring and promotion
- Contribute to the Peace Fund
- Implement the FGN recommendation on setting up the Committee on “Peace, Security and Welfare”, as a means of creating a mechanism for sustainable peace
- Seek training in conflict management and mediation for local government officials
- Guarantee equal access of the opposition parties to state media facilities
- Ensure prompt payment of salaries
- Enforce through appropriate legislation the constitutional provisions on secularity of state and freedom of religion
- Monitor religious vigilantism and control the proliferation of sectarian religious movements.
- State clear and unambiguous rules and procedures for the selection and dethronement of Traditional rulers.

Medium-term

- Encourage networking of NGO and state apparatuses on conflict management;
- Support the abolition of State Electoral Commissions
- Regulate the establishment of autonomous communities (because of fragmentation of the polity and contentiousness).

Long-term

- Invest in development of infrastructure;

- Support alternative industries and employment generating activities through private sector participation
- Respond to basic needs of the local population

Recommendations to Local Governments

Immediate

- Promote peace education in schools and the society
- Contribute to the Peace Fund
- Local governments should ensure compliance with mechanisms that promote transparency and accountability
- Enforce the secularity of the State as provided in the constitution
- Ensure regular consultation between Local Councils and Traditional Institutions for the purpose of peace and security

Long-term

- The councils' apparatus for implementing and monitoring development initiatives should be strengthened by way of augmenting (through screening) the quality of manpower and committee system in the Local Government Councils
- Evolve micro-credit schemes for small-scale industries
- Encourage investment in basic needs of the local population

Recommendations to Civil Society

Immediate

- Develop more capacity in NGOs and CBOs to effectively mediate in community conflict
- Become more involved in programme development and implementation of peace education

- Contribute to the Peace Fund
- Support the expansion and independence of vectors of civil society such as the media, as watchdogs of the democratic process
- Promote community awareness of activities of Government

Long-term

- Become involved in the implementation of poverty alleviation Programmes. (The involvement of religious organisations (such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent and Daughters of Charity of the Catholic church, Federation of Muslim Women's Association in Nigeria) has ensured a very laudable outcome in social welfare administration in some parts of the country)
- Act as pressure groups for good governance and implementation of vocational programmes
- Evolve programmes and activities directed towards religious harmony; and
- Promote inter-religious/inter-faith and ecumenical co-existence

Recommendations to the International Community

Immediate

- Support good governance and the rule of law as a means of conflict prevention and sustainable development
- Support economic and social development
- Support peace building programmes and preventive interventions in conflict
- Encourage the social responsibilities of international companies through MOUs
- Contribute to the Peace Fund

- Engage Interpol in monitoring and controlling the proliferation of small arms, and trafficking in persons and drugs
- Support policies designed to counter tendencies that are inimical to stability and those that seek to address grievances
- Assist Nigeria in repatriating corruptly acquired monies stashed in foreign banks

Long-term

- Improve donor collaboration in the verification and evaluation of programmes and projects
- Support the implementation of MOUs between multinational companies, the host communities and government
- Assist in economic reforms as envisaged in NEPAD
- Assist in the fight against poverty

Recommendations to the International Development Community (South-South Report)

- Support Nigerian-led efforts at tackling the structural causes of conflict
- Introduce conflict assessment into design of strategies and programmes, acknowledging the impact of development interventions on violent conflict, and finding opportunities for peace-building within programmes.
- Improve donor collaboration and co-ordination
- Put pressure on oil companies to introduce conflict prevention measures into their operations, limit exploitation of already fragile communities and to conduct their business in an environmentally sustainable manner.

6.2 Recommendations to IPCR

Among the recommendations listed above there may be many which IPCR will wish to take up, but there are some that are directly related to

IPCR, and suggest areas where IPCR may be able to play a particularly useful role.

6.2.1 The Need to Promote Understanding and Co-operation

The focus of these recommendations in this report is on what needs to be done to tackle the root causes underlying violent conflict in Nigeria. As the analysis has shown, there is a complex multiple interplay of factors contributing to conflict, and by necessity, there needs to be multiple and sometimes complex intervention and approaches to tackling them. Our study reveals that responses have hitherto been piecemeal and non-strategic. Agencies and actors have not collaborated, and too often have competed.

For the most part, these issues must be a Federal government responsibility, not least because she is best placed to do so, but also because foreign development assistance to Nigeria is so negligible, that it is unlikely to have much influence on its own, although it can play a valuable role in supporting this long term but inevitable process.

Perhaps the critical issue is that there should be shared ownership and responsibility between all levels of government as well as civil society (including private sector, the media, community groups, etc.), involving the international community where appropriate. In particular there is a perception that the existing Peace and Security apparatus lacks detailed understanding of the linkages between the manifestations of conflict and the underlying causes.

The SCA process has not only enhanced IPCR's capacity to offer support and training to contribute both to deeper understanding of conflict but also to play a supportive but co-ordinating role to ensure that information and understanding are spread more widely, leading to more effective action.

6.2.2 The Need for Early Warning and Preventive action

The second major issue is the need for a much greater focus on prevention rather than 'cure'. The 'cure' that has so far been offered has been a painful medicine which has damaged the patient as much as it has brought relief. Our analysis shows that once conflict has reached the 'psycho-social' level it may become intractable and endemic. Many of the major conflicts in Nigeria today have their roots in the last century, but there are others that are only just beginning and may offer real opportunities for imaginative intervention provided that it takes place at an early stage.

IPCR should develop its early warning and preventive action, and will deserve support from the Federal Government as well as from the international community.

6.2.3 The Need for Flexibility

Preventive action must happen at the right time and cannot wait for cumbersome bureaucratic procedures for the release of funds. Accordingly we have proposed the establishment of a Trust Fund to be held by IPCR to enable it to make pre-emptive responses, such as deploying teams to identify and implement pre-emptive action. The fund could also be used to support similar actions by civil society organisations where their response might be appropriate, and could also form the basis for funding the proposed early warning system.

6.2.4 Summary of Recommendations to IPCR

- Develop the capacity to promote better understanding of conflict through the Peace and Security Committees;
- Play an active role in disseminating information and promoting common understanding;
- Develop plans for pre-emptive deployment of assessment teams and preventive action;
- Establish a Trust Fund to facilitate rapid and flexible response to conflict, with a focus on prevention.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1

COMPOSITION OF THE RESEARCH TEAMS

(Team Leader's name in bold)

PHASE ONE

South-East	Professor Osita Eze (IPCR)
South-South	Professor Celestine Bassey
South-West	Mrs Dayo Oluyemi-Kusa
North-Central	Mr Imran Abdulrahman
North-West/North East	Dr Fatima Adamu

PHASE TWO

South-East	Professor Osita Eze (IPCR)
	Mrs I.S Nkwazema (IPCR)
	Mrs Akuyoma Chukwusuli (IPCR)
	Lady B.N. Onah (WARO)
	Mr Chom Bagu (USAID)
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	Ms Wandia Gichuru (UNDP)
	Mr M.P. Garba
South-West	Mrs Dayo Oluyemi-Kusa
	Hon Akin Akinteye
	Mr Lanre Obafemi (IPCR)

Mr Onyinye Nzeako
Ms Sarah Lyons (World Bank)

North-Central

Mr Imran Abdulrahman
Mrs Maria E. Ngaji
Mr Agev Demenongu
Ms Claire Hickson (DFID)
Mr Emmanuel B. Mamman

North-West

Dr Fatima Adamu
Mr Barinem Vulasi
Dr Saidu Yakubu
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Ms Shonali Sardesai

North-East

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Dr Suleiman Bogoro (FACE, Bauchi)
Mr Dirk Reinemann (World Bank)
Mrs Martina Kure (CEPID, Jos)
Ms Hepzibah Achanya (IPCR)

ANNEX 2

PARTICIPANTS IN THE TECHNICAL ADVISORY PANEL

Professor Osita C. Eze	Chairman
Professor Celestine Bassey	Consultant
Dr Fatima Adamu	“
Mrs D. Olayemi-Kusa	“
Mr Imran Abdulrahman	“
Dr Joseph Golwa	IPCR
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Dr Okey Ibeanu	Macarthur Foundation
Mr Gabriel Jiya	IPCR
Dr M.J. Kuna	Usman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto
Mr Udentia O. Udentia	IPCR
Ambassador F.O. Iheme	IPCR
Mr Clay Oko-Offoboche	University of Calabar
Mr Joseph Sopade	IDASA/PACE Nigeria
Mr Denich Marco	IDASA South Africa
Ms Sarah Lyons	World Bank
Mr Chom Mbagu	USAID Nigeria
Mrs I.S. Nkwazema	IPCR
Mr Lanre Obafemi	IPCR (Rapporteur)
Dr Oshita O. Oshita	IPCR (SCA Project Coordinator)

ANNEX 3

A THEORETICAL MODEL OF CONFLICT TRIGGERS

Prof Celestine Bassey

Triggers function as intervening variables determining whether a society with predisposing structural factors will actually experience the eruption of violent conflict. In the simplest case this can be represented as follows-

Figure One

A -----(B -----(C


A= Predisposing Variables (underlying situation)

B= Intervening Variables (triggers)

C= Dependent Variables (outcomes)

An example of this relationship is the Warri case where the reversal of the initial location of the local government headquarters at Ogbe-Ijaw led to an unprecedented violent explosion.


Figure Two



D= More Intervening Variables (multiple triggers)

An example of this model is Jos where a number of triggers coincided (appointment of a coordinator for the National Poverty Eradication programme (NAPEP) and PDP Electoral Primaries).

Figure Three



1

In this case the predisposing factors interact with each other without any particular single trigger. Conflict has developed its own internal dynamic and can develop into a larger scale. An example is the case in Lagos, where protracted urban violence has been aggravated by communal tensions between Hausa and Yoruba communities, thus combining to produce conflagration.

ANNEX 4

PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION PAPER –FIRST DRAFT

IPCR: A Peace-Building Framework

1. Background and Purpose of the Paper

Between July and October 2002, IPCR conducted a Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria with the support and involvement of international organisations. The study consisted of two phases: a preliminary study of the existing literature followed by an extensive period of field research conducted by six teams.

The final report highlights a number of areas in which conflict can be addressed by Government, Civil Society and International actors. The most fundamental finding is that conflict in Nigeria is generated primarily from the interaction of resource competition and political corruption –a phenomenon described as ‘prebendal politics’.

In terms of practical outcomes the study drew attention to the way in which responses to conflict, especially during the years of military rule, have been limited to efforts to control violence after it has already developed. Too little attention has been given to root causes and to addressing these through early warning and preventive action.

This paper suggests ways in which IPCR and international organisations can take forward these issues.

2. Summary of the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA)

The SCA process drew on a methodology devised for DFID and based on extensive research over a 2-year period. Essentially it divides into four sections:

- Causes, dynamics and triggers
- Responses
- Policy Options and Solutions

Particular characteristics of the methodology are that it focuses on structural causes and takes a political economy approach.

The conclusions are

1. There has been a common political experience during the years of military rule
2. This has led to a political crisis in which political actions are often driven by self-interest and money ('prebendal politics')
3. The nation's dependence on oil revenues from a relatively small part of the country has exacerbated this crisis
4. Conflict represents a serious threat to democracy
5. Until now government's response to conflict has been limited –in practice- to suppression by the military
6. Civil Society (with support from international donors) has been active in research and local peacemaking but lacks strategic vision and engagement
7. The media have not yet played a constructive role
8. Business leaders and investors have been ignored
9. The result is that government and civil society work in isolation or even in a spirit of mutual distrust
10. Closer collaboration between the parties, led by government's strategic vision could unite significant forces to limit violent conflict and support the development of democracy as the best long-term protection against the spread of violence in society

The study then proceeded to a set of recommendations specific to different types of conflict in which the lack of early warning and preventive action is strongly and explicitly highlighted for IPCR's attention

3. Early Warning

IPCR has already recognised the need for better early warning and has been developing plans. The SCA has given impetus to this process

The immediate problem of early warning systems is to know what information is most relevant; in other words to decide on the 'indicators' that need to be monitored. The first part of the SCA methodology offers a paradigm for early warning systems in its examination of the progression from:

ROOT CAUSES > DYNAMICS > TRIGGERS

This is very similar to the paradigm suggested by Professor Bassey (Annex 3 of the SCA Report) where he envisages a progression from:

Predisposing Variables > Intervening Variables > Dependent Variables

Using the findings of the SCA to establish the main causes, dynamics and triggers we can present a predictive model of conflict in Nigeria as follows:

PREBENDAL POLITICS

The above model could be used to monitor the emergence of new conflicts but long-standing conflicts may have a rather different dynamic in which 'psycho-cultural dispositions might substitute in some cases for the dynamics of 'Prebendal Politics' and where provocative actions by individuals might have greater significance than the corruption of the State.

The SCA reports provide a rich analysis of such ongoing conflicts, enabling IPCR to construct a 'map' of conflict divided into-

- Areas predisposed to conflict
- Vulnerable areas

These areas should then be placed under permanent surveillance using the indicators suggested above.

The system could be made more sophisticated by specifying more exactly the indicators for different conflicts or different areas. Again, the SCA provides rich material for such a process. The North-Central report, for example, identifies the following trigger events:

- Elections
- Political violence and assassinations
- Chieftancy appointments
- New demarcations of government wards and districts
- Individual disputes over land, cattle, theft etc
- Migration and internal displacement

It would be greatly preferable to check such analysis through local workshops in which participants would be invited to work through the analysis of causes, dynamics and triggers for themselves. This would be likely to lead to better sharing of information and a more committed response.

4. Prevention

In the SCA, many cases were cited where it had been widely known that conflict was about to erupt and yet no preventive action has been taken. The main actors in the response are the police and the military. Neither organisation is characteristically oriented towards preventive action, and although Nigeria has an extensive network of Peace and Security Committees, the emphasis has been heavily on last-minute response rather than prevention. One reason for this is their lack of training in the analysis of conflict, and particularly the linkages between causes, dynamics and triggers. IPCR could play a valuable role offering such training.

A second problem is that the participants in these Committees, especially the Security Services, are reluctant to share information. This is not only for valid security reasons but for other reasons as well. There is ample room for improving the flow of information. By developing strong links with these organisations and Committees, IPCR would be able to develop the trust necessary to receive and manage conflict-related information in a systematic and confidential way.

Thirdly, the SCA notes that development and policy initiatives in Nigeria are rarely accompanied by any assessment of their impact on conflict even in areas where conflict is endemic and obvious. This applies both to government and aid agencies. The SCA notes many cases where projects have been initiated on the assumption that the changes envisaged in the project objectives can be achieved without conflict, and that there will be no unintended side-effects. Very often, the project disrupts a delicate social or political balance and sometimes this leads to violent results. The Early Warning system proposed above could also be used as the basis for a

predictive process, assessing what impact new initiatives would be likely to have on conflict.

It is not necessarily being proposed here that IPCR should engage directly in responses (such as mediation etc). Although on occasions this may be entirely appropriate, it may be more appropriate to focus on supporting and developing a preventive system and where necessary, as the SCA recommends, support other organisations engaged in mediation and conflict reduction activity.

In summary, there is a need for IPCR to address:

- Training in conflict analysis
(directed primarily at Police, Military, Security Forces and participants in National Peace and Security Committees at all levels)
- Collecting and disseminating information on conflicts in a discreet manner
- Developing a process for **Conflict Impact Assessment** (see below)

5. **Conflict Impact Assessment**

Further review of international systems may be necessary before a methodology can be fully established, but the Early Warning system derived from the SCA should provide a valid base for this process and offer IPCR the capacity to advise government and international agencies on their projects and policies.

Firstly, a set of questions can be derived from the Table above that could be applied as a general ‘test’ for Nigeria. In effect these could be summarised as:

- Has a Strategic Conflict Assessment been undertaken?

In more detail:

- Has the history of conflict in the area been examined?

- Have actual and potential causes of conflict been examined?
Including:
 - i. Ethnicity
 - ii. Religion
 - iii. Boundary issues
 - iv. Political demarcations and changes
 - v. Unemployment and Youth
- Has the likely impact of ‘prebendal politics’ been realistically assessed?
- Has the project taken into account the impact of critical events?

However, such a ‘national’ test could be made much more sophisticated when applied to a project in a specific location. Indeed, Conflict Impact Assessment would ideally be tailor-made to each situation and the questions derived from a participatory process involving as many stakeholders as possible. The ideal process might be to conduct a ‘Conflict Analysis workshop’ as described above and then turn the discussion to drawing up a set of key questions relevant to the particular intervention being proposed. This process might also lead directly into proposals for modifying the project if risks became immediately apparent.

6. A Conflict Trust Fund

The SCA report concludes that IPCR should have flexible access to a ‘Trust Fund’ that would enable it to:

- Establish and maintain an Early Warning System
- Engage in training as a Preventive process
- Develop an information network
- Support conflict responses by other organisations
- Develop and conduct Conflict Impact Assessments

It is a particular characteristic of preventive action (including training and communication work) that it must take place at the right time and must have flexibility to respond to the unexpected. This implies that adequate resources should be available for deployment in a flexible and efficient manner. Unfortunately it is a characteristic of government finance in Nigeria that funds tend to flow (at best) in arrears. This results in problems for many government departments but in the case of conflict prevention it may deeply undermine the possibility of averting a crisis. The scale of damage caused by conflict is immense and needs no further emphasis. The scale of funding required for Early Warning and Prevention is, relatively, very small

Abuja
March 2002

Endnotes

1. IPCR is established in the office of the President. Its mandate was originally to address conflict elsewhere in Africa but has now been changed to focus more sharply on Nigeria. It is likely to become an independent body in the future. IPCR has around 100 staff. Its main constraint is lack of uncommitted finance; this greatly impairs its ability to respond proactively to conflict.
2. Dr. Adamu also covered North-East Zone in Phase One
3. For a particularly comprehensive survey of conflicts see the North East Report Phase Two.
4. USAID suggests that a prioritisation based on the potential, or otherwise, of a conflict to derail the transition process be effected. See W. Marshall et al, "Future Directions for USAID Support to Conflict Mitigation in Nigeria", USAID Nigeria, Abuja; July 2001. P.4
5. See South-West Report Phase Two pages 108-111.
6. South-East Report Phase Two
7. For more information see Human Rights Watch Report May 2002 '*The Bakassi Boys- The Legitimisation of Murder and Torture*'.
- North East Report Phase Two
8. See South-South report pages 178-182
9. See South-West Report Phase Two pages 111-113.
10. For example, allocation of 5% of local government revenue through the Obas' Council (South West report p 118-119)
11. South-South Phase Two Report p173
12. In 1996, the figure was estimated to be 66% (Nigeria: Poverty in the Midst of Plenty, The World Bank, May 1996)
13. Op cit page 16
14. South-South Phase Two report pp. 193-194
15. North Central Report Phase Two pp. 150-151
16. North-West Phase Two Report p303
17. South West Phase Two Report p116
18. North-West Phase Two Report p298
19. This issue is referred to in both North-Central and North-East Phase Two Reports.
20. Op cit p5
21. Op cit p8
22. South-South Report Phase Two p165-672
23. For exposition of this see South-South report pages 202-203
24. Based on brainstorming at July workshop and subsequent reports
25. North-West Phase Two Report p306

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26. FGN Handbook, November 1999
 27. Op cit p11
 28. In theory the Bakassi Boys are not armed but see Human Right Watch (2002)
 29. e.g. Warri, Ife-Mondakeke, Zango Kataf etc
 30. North West Report Phase One
 31. South-South Phase Two Report p184
 32. As above
 33. Op cit p22
 34. South-South Phase Two Report p183
 35. Op cit p28
 36. Op cit p11
 37. South-South Phase Two Report p188
 38. South-South Phase Two Report p187
 39. Op cit p27
 40. South-South Report Phase One pp171-175
 41. Op cit p10
 42. For a Bibliography of these see South West Report Phase One
 43. For details see *Conducting Conflict Assessments –Guidance Notes*, DFID 2002, available at www.dfid.gov.uk

South-West Zone

**STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT OF SOUTH-
WEST, NIGERIA**

BY

DAYO OLUYEMI-KUSA

HON. AKIN AKINTEYE

LANRE OBAFEMI

ONYINYE NZEAKO

SARAH LYONS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the second phase of a Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) conducted in South-West Nigeria, as part of a national SCA covering all six geopolitical zones of the country. The purpose of this strategic conflict assessment is to inform on the Government of Nigeria and to support donors' thinking on the causes and impact of insecurity on equitable development in the region; and to consider policy and programming options. The ultimate aim is to develop a strategic framework under which the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution may plan and assess conflict prevention and reduction efforts.

The first phase of the SCA involved a desk study to map the causes of conflict in the different zones. The resulting report for the South-West Zone is attached as Annex 1. The six zonal reports were then merged into a national report mapping the causes of conflict in Nigeria, attached as Annex 2. Similarly, this report is one of six, which will be brought together to constitute the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution's (IPCR) final Strategic Conflict Assessment report for Nigeria.

The Phase 1 report served as the background for the second phase of this work, which involved fieldwork to enable deeper conflict analysis. This fieldwork was conducted from 28 August to 9 September 2002, using the DFID strategic conflict assessment methodology.

Section 1 of this document describes the causes and dynamics of conflicts in South-West Nigeria. Although the details of individual conflicts are different, there are a number of common strands. In all six states, conflicts centre around disputes over resource control and cleavages tend to form along ethnic or indigene/settler lines. Alternative mechanisms to

resolve disputes are often ineffective and violent conflict is easily ignited. Violence is also often politicised, as local and national governments are perceived as unrepresentative. Poverty and lack of equitable sharing of development projects also contribute to disaffection, and usually, lead to violent conflict.

In Section 2, there is a review of the policies and responses of different actors to conflict in the region. The report then suggests policy options and recommendations for the Government of Nigeria, civil society and the international community.

SECTION ONE

CONFLICT ANALYSIS: HISTORY AND DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT

1.1 History and Dynamics of Conflict

The south-west geopolitical zone of Nigeria comprises the states of Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo. The predominant Language is Yoruba. Ibadan, the capital of Oyo State is the largest city in Nigeria, with a population of more than 15 million people. Another large and important city in the zone is Lagos and there is an increasing trend of rural-urban migration. The majority of people earn their living from informal economic activities and agricultural production, including yam, plantain, and cocoa.

Since the 1999 elections, that represented the transition from military to civilian rule, violent conflict has been on the increase in Nigeria. For this study, particular attention is paid to four conflict flashpoints in the South-West. A brief overview of the groups and issues involved in these conflicts is given below. Table 1 shows the latent and open causes of conflict for all the flashpoints visited. At the end of this section, common themes that contribute to conflict are explained.

(i) **Idi-Araba, Lagos**

Inter-ethnic conflict and riots in Lagos State have been on the increase since the 1999 election. The Idi-Araba crisis of 2 February, 2002 is the most stark example of this. Lasting three days, this conflict was dubbed by the media as an OPC/Hausa clash and caused mass destruction of life and property. Although there had been clashes before, such as in the aftermath of

the death, in prison, of M.K.O. Abiola (presumed winner of the annulled 1993 presidential elections), the most recent conflict was the most serious.

The Idi-Araba conflict was triggered by a scuffle that ensued when a Hausa man emptied his bowels in a place considered to be too public by some Yoruba in the vicinity. This indicates a common theme in indigene-settler conflict, namely that indigenes claim that settlers fail to respect the cultural values and practices of "host" communities and become too comfortable on "host" land.

The February 2002 Idi-Araba scuffle soon degenerated into large-scale mayhem, with locally made guns, cutlasses, axes, bows and arrows and petrol bombs being the main weapons used. The Seriki (Hausa leader) tried to intervene but failed, and the Yoruba lacked a traditional leader (Baale) at the time. Elders of both communities have expressed their dwindling control over the youth who face high levels of unemployment and are disgruntled.

There has not been any significant effort made towards the resolution of the Idi-Araba crisis either by the local or state governments. The Federal Government pursued its usual track of deploying soldiers to enforce peace. The Area Commander of Police held two meetings with leaders of each community to get to the root of the situation. Both groups expressed willingness to engage each other in dialogue with the Area Commander as mediator. The Yoruba community has initiated community-based organisations (e.g. Elders Council, Women's Group, Town Development Union, Youth Development Union) to promote peace. The Hausa do not have similar groups and the Yoruba community have not yet extended an invitation to the Hausa community to join the CBOs created.

(ii) Sagamu, Ogun State

Over the years, Ogun State, and most especially Sagamu, has enjoyed relative peace among all the states in the south-west. A notable exception to this is the Sagamu mayhem of July 1999. This conflict was triggered at the start of the Oro Festival which is celebrated by the Yoruba annually. Traditionally, women must stay indoors during three nights out of the seven days of the celebration. During those three nights, the Oro procession moves through Sagamu town. Whether the festival started unexpectedly early on the night of 17th July, or whether certain Hausa women stayed outside to intentionally protest against the festival is debatable. A Hausa prostitute, found outside by the Oro procession, was beaten to death by angry Yoruba, sparking what became a three-night violent conflict resulting in massive destruction, injury and loss of lives and property.

Although triggered by perceived or actual defiance of the Oro festival, there are remote causes of the tension between the Yoruba and Hausa communities in Sagamu. These include the perception of lack of respect for the indigenes' cultural values. The Sagamu Yoruba resent the stranglehold the Hausa exercise over the kolanut trade. The Yoruba allege, also, that the Hausa merchants indecently proposition and patronise the wives of the Yoruba kolanut producers. Other sources of grievance include perceived Hausa resentment against power shift from the North to the South, presumptuousness on the part of the Hausa community resulting from the notion of having an exclusive community called Sabo.

(iii) Abeokuta, Ogun State

There also exist a couple of other conflicts in Ogun State. These conflicts have not degenerated into violence like Sagamu, but they carry

within them violent tendencies if not properly and constructively handled. Some of them include Apata/Idi-Emin crisis on local government and ward creation. Idi-Emin is described as a no man's zone in that about three local government areas are struggling to gain control of the town. Another conflict is the one involving the National Union of Road Transport Workers and The Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria over the control of motor parks. This conflict is potentially dangerous if not nipped in the bud if the antecedents of the players are anything to consider.

(iv) Ife-Modakeke, Osun State

The Ife-Modakeke crisis is about the oldest, most protracted and yet unresolved intra-ethnic conflict in the history of South-Western Nigeria. The conflict dates back to 1835, when the issue then was simply enmity between factions waging war during the "great Yoruba wars." Back then, the Modakekes were part of the Oyo army, which was so powerful that she overran the territories of her adversaries. However, the crisis would soon transform into issues ranging from self-determination, indigene/settler to local government creation, etc. This drastic transformation in recent times has been linked to issues modernisation, political and economic development.

The Modakeke argue that one principal source of violent conflict between the two communities has to do with leadership styles adopted by different Oonis at different times. The escalation of the latent conflict between the two communities to the present-day almost regular recurrence of violence can be traced to 1987 when the Modakeke began serious agitation for a local government that would permanently separate them from their Ife landlords. Various political solutions were sought through various political

parties, such as Action Group (AG), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and National Party of Nigeria (NPN), to no avail.

The 1996 local government creation exercise that lumped the Modakeke with the Ife was seen as a complete reversal of the Modakeke's aspirations. This marked the beginning of another dimension in the history of the conflict. The protest of the Modakeke prompted the government to change the headquarters from Enuwa to Oke-Igbo. The Government at the federal and state levels have intervened in the crisis many times. The Mbanefo Panel of 1996 gave birth to Decree 36 of 1996, which stipulated that parts of the Ife Central Local Government and Ife North Local Government should form Ife East Local Government. This did not please the Modakeke. There were also the Abegurin Panels of 1997 and 2000 set up on the matter by the state government which also failed to resolve the problem.

The Olabode George Panel of 1999 was set up as a result of the last Ife-Modakeke mayhem. Ten recommendations were made which are shown in the box below. Most of these recommendations have not been implemented. The Ife believe that if these ten points are implemented to the letter, peace would be restored whilst the Modakeke are not convinced. Till date, it has been one problem or the other in the ancient city.

The Ten-Point Recommendation to Restore Peace to Ife-Modakeke, 1999

- 1) The Ooni (King) of Ife must forgive and forget whatever has been done to undermine him in his domain and play a fatherly role to both communities.
- 2) The Modakeke should never refer to themselves as "Modakeke, Osun State"- Their proper address should be "Modakeke, Ife, Osun State."
- 3) That the Baale (ruler) of Modakeke must stop forthwith to appoint any Baale in any part of Ife-land.
- 4) The present Ife East Local Government as constituted should continue to function as created with an area office created in Modakeke.
- 5) The police should deploy more Mobile Policemen to the area.
- 6) Government should create a new local government with Modakeke wards and some Ife hamlets, with Headquarters at Modakeke. This can be done only when there is manifest peace in the area.
- 7) A special reorientation programme should be mapped out to get the youths on both sides back to normal life.
- 8) A Police Mobile Training College be established in the buffer zone to sustain and maintain peace in the area.
- 9) The Federal Government should request for a list of those who have been killed, missing, maimed, so that compensation can be paid to those who have had property destroyed.
- 10) Both warring factions should surrender all arms.

(v) **Owo Crisis, Ondo State**

The Owo crisis in Ondo State is another volatile intra-ethnic conflict in the south-west revolving around the selection of a successor to the departed king of Owo, Sir Olateru Olagbegi. Historically, only one Ruling House exists in Owo. However, over the years, the many branches of that Ruling House distilled into three families that are eligible to vie for the throne. For a man to be eligible to the throne, his father must have been an Oba in Owo. This particular criterion made the present tussle more fierce and competitive in nature.

Among the three families of Olagbegi, Ogunoye and Ajike, the Ajike family would lose their right to the throne should they fail now. There is now only one surviving male member of the family and he is in his sixties. It then follows that if the man is not made king, the Ajike family faces extinction among the ruling families in Owo.

The current crisis was caused by the selection of the son of the late Sir Olateru Olagbegi as the successor to his father by the kingmakers. This act was seen by the other families as an attempt by the Olagbegi family to make the throne of Olowo their exclusive right. The aftermath of this attempt is the present crisis spanning three years now. Currently, the crisis is ongoing in Owo and many lives and property are being destroyed everyday.

However, many people in the troubled city opined that the issue has been highly politicised. Our team learnt that the issue would have been resolved but for the heavy presence of the "Federal might" in the area. It is alleged that forces close to the Federal Government are supporting one group against the other for political gains. The use of the "palace boys" and policemen by the Olagbegi family and its federal supporters to harass the people of the community is a sore point in the community.

1.2 Sources of Latent and Open Conflict

Table 1 (below) shows the sources of conflict in South-West Nigeria. It details areas of structural vulnerability that make the region susceptible to violent conflict. For the convenience of analysis, in the discussion below, the major causes of conflict have been grouped under four headings: (i) indigene-settler conflict; (ii) political conflict; (iii) conflict and development; and (iv) Chieftaincy conflict. However, it should be noted that issues of resource control, political affiliation, ethnic division, and poverty/exclusion cut across many if not all of the conflicts in the south-west zone.

TABLE 1

	Security	Political	Economic	Social
International/ Regional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Proliferation of small arms and light weapons 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ International Muslim fundamentalism post-September 11
National	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Militarised society ▪ Corruption and criminality of armed forces and police ▪ OPC as ethnic militia group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Weak governance ▪ Money politics and corruption ▪ Perceived lack of justice, law and order ▪ Systems of managing conflict weakly developed ▪ Ethnically-based politics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inequitable division of resources generated at federal level ▪ Elite-controlled economy ▪ Rural-urban migration. Pressure on resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ethnic and linguistic diversity (over 350 ethnic groups) ▪ Social polarisation ▪ High unemployment ▪ Disaffected youth ▪ Increasing cost of living, especially in major cities ▪ Increase in HIV/AIDS - loss of skilled professionals and

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Perceived exclusion of south, especially Yoruba in/by Federal Government ▪ Political manoeuvrings, e.g. impeachment of President ▪ Politicisation of media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increasing cost of living (inflation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ increase in no. of orphans
Local	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Privatisation of security forces (e.g. OPC) ▪ Manufacture of home-made guns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Pressure for secular state ▪ Annulment of 1993 election and death of Abiola in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Corruption and diversion of resources by local government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rivalry and mistrust between ethnic groups ▪ Internal divisions amongst Yoruba ▪ Indigene/settler disputes

		<p>detention in 1998</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Perceived exclusion of minority groups from local government ▪ Creation and location of local governments ▪ Local government corruption and fraud 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Perception that the North is better treated ▪ Heavy dependence on agriculture ▪ Border and land ownership disputes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Perception of discrimination against Southerners in tertiary education (by Joint Admission and Matriculation Board) ▪ Breakdown of family values and respect for elders ▪ Protest, disaffection, religious problems, cultism amongst students
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1.4 Common Themes in Conflict in the South-West

(i) Indigene/Settler Conflict

Indigene/ settler conflict is common in the south-west zone. Although indigene/ settler divisions usually occur between different ethnic groups (e.g. Yoruba/Hausa), they also involve intra-ethnic elements (e.g. the Ife-Modakeke conflict between the Yoruba). Inter-ethnic conflict is undoubtedly one major bane affecting the national unity of Nigeria. A clash between the major ethnic groups (Hausa and Yoruba/Igbo) in a section of the country is usually followed by a crisis in another part of the country.

Indigene-settler conflicts in the south-west usually revolve around political and economic control. Even where a community has been living together in peace for decades, conflict can erupt when one group is perceived to have become more economically or politically powerful.

Conflict between Hausa and Egba Women over Competitive Market Pricing

The Council of Patriotic Nigerian Citizens, an NGO in Abeokuta, mediates many local conflicts. There is often conflict between Hausa and Egba women in the market, as the Hausas undersell the Egbas cutting them out of the market. This has been the case for onions and also for White Guinea Brocade, used for Adire (tie and die). This is an example of the way that settler/indigene and economic conflicts are interwoven.

(ii) Political conflict

Political loyalties are a major source of conflict in the south-west. A majority of the South-West voted against Obasanjo in the 1999 elections

while a majority of the Hausa/Fulani voted for him. Taking opposing sides during political contests create tension between people, especially in an indigene/settler context. This is a particular cause of tension between the Yoruba and Hausa, who are considered to be Northerners even when they have lived in the south for generations. Until ethnicity plays a less significant role in politics, it would be difficult to manage or prevent ethnic conflict.

Prebendal politics is also the norm in Nigeria. Elections are expensive and a winning party will try to recoup funds spent. That the major part of Nigeria's GNP is oil revenue means that it is relatively easy for this to be captured by the elite. Where resources are diverted at every level of government, the poor see little benefit from Nigeria's income.

There is a risk of increased violent conflict in the run-up to the 2003 national elections. This is because there is perceived marginalisation all over the zones of the country. In addition, politicians who are struggling to gain relevance are struggling fiercely to capture votes in their various states for bargaining in the next federal cabinet. Various means are being employed. Some politicians are of the opinion that naira should be matched for naira, some are using thuggery while some have gone to the extreme of using hired assassins to eliminate their adversaries.

Establishing where to locate local government headquarters is a major source of conflict because of the advantages they bring. These are perceived to include employment, development of local social services and infrastructure.

Location of Local Government Headquarters

The Modakeke have been agitating for their own local government for many years in Ife. The Ifes are obstructing this as they believe the Modakeke are tenants on their land. Notably, the Modakeke are more successful agriculturalists and have overtaken the Ife in production and markets. If the Modakeke have their own local government it would increase their self-sufficiency and success further.

There may also be dispute regarding which local government a community may belong to. Communities may want to belong to local governments that have territories bordering their land to retain dominant status in one local government, whilst increasing their access to the resources of another local government. There is a general pattern of lack of formal and representative participation of most citizens at the local level.

The death of Abiola, Winner of the Annulled 1993 Elections

Abiola, a Yoruba, died in prison in 1998. In Ibadan, the Hausa celebrated in the street, in retaliation for the Yoruba's reaction when Abacha died earlier that year. This sparked ethnic conflict in Ibadan, though the destruction was not as serious as in 2002.

(iii) Chieftaincy Matters

This is another major source of conflict in the south-west. The Yoruba see the Obaship institution as an integral part of their cultural heritage, and any conflict arising therefrom is usually seen as value important and is therefore pursued with vigour. However, the Oba is installed on

lineage basis and is not the right of all citizens of a community. It has been argued by some scholars that the Obaship institution should be left to the will of the communities practising it. The establishment of councils of Obas and chiefs at different levels of government is perceived as being at variance with modern practice. The allocation of 5% of Local Government Council revenue to paramount rulers is seen as both arbitrary and a cause of conflict as many who otherwise would not be interested in the traditional rulership institution now vie for it for access to the fund.

(iv) Conflict and Development

Many Nigerians in the South-West feel they do not reap the benefits of development. Revenues from oil production do not reach ordinary people, who feel aggrieved.

The erosion of traditional lifestyles that is a normal occurrence with development contributes to conflict in a number of ways. First, there is the breakdown of family values. This means that elders no longer have control over the youth who are the main actors in conflict. Secondly, traditional community leadership is not respected and traditional forms of dispute resolution tend not to be successful. This societal change is especially prevalent in cities, and rural-urban migration and the growth of cities in south-west Nigeria have all but changed what used to be.

The gap between the elite and the poor is widening everyday. This is because the elite control the resources of government to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of the poor. There is a high rate of unemployment, poverty is written all over the faces of the down-trodden while the elite display affluence.

1. Scenarios and Potential Triggers

As is evident from the above analysis, events and issues that trigger conflict are diverse in south-west Nigeria. They include events that centre around perceived lack of respect for another's culture or beliefs, and disputes over resource control. In the run-up to the local government elections, scheduled for later this year (2002) and the national elections scheduled for 2003, these issues will become particularly pronounced. The antecedents of politicians in the South-West reveal that they cash in on conflict scenarios for political campaigns. For instance, shortly before the 1983 elections, the National Party of Nigeria utilised the conflicts between the Ife and Modakeke to campaign in Modakeke and the aftermath of it was mayhem.

Political Divisions along Ethnic Lines

The Hausas in Sagamu accused the Yoruba of excluding them from the administration of the local council. In return the Yoruba argued that the Hausa have no regard for their culture, which was why the Hausa are more in opposing political parties other than the party of their host community. This is so all over the south-west. All Hausas except a few are usually in the opposing parties of their host community. It is also the same in intra-ethnic conflict. For instance the Modakeke are in the opposing party to the Ife and it is the same in Owo.

Another potential trigger in the south-west is the perceived opposition of the north to the Obasanjo government. The Yoruba are of the opinion that all the conflicts (inter- and intra-ethnic) in the south-west are externally

motivated by the northerners who are not happy that power shifted from the North to the South. The Yoruba now suspect any move by Northerners in their area. And there is a high level of mutual distrust in the country.

Other potential triggers are in the unresolved conflicts all over the zone. Some of these conflicts have been resolved to certain levels but agreements are yet to be implemented. Any provocation from one of the conflicting parties may result into more violent conflicts.

2. Policies and Responses to the Conflicts

This section documents the policies and activities of different stakeholders working towards sustainable peace in South-West Nigeria. For government, civil society and the international community, their current responses are mapped and concrete recommendations are made regarding how to improve these responses.

SECTION TWO

POLICIES AND RESPONSES TO CONFLICT INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS

2.1 Policies and Responses of Government

The usual response of the government in most of these conflicts is the deployment of armed forces to the conflict zone. In other circumstances, relief packages are sent to the communities. This is then followed by a commission of enquiry that is usually given the mandate to look into the causes of the crisis and make recommendations as to its resolution. In about 99% of the time, reports of such commissions or committees are usually not made public and are not implemented.

The local government is supposed to be the first contact during conflict situations. Most of the communities in the south-west where conflicts have occurred have not had any response from the local government towards their resolution. The local government is usually silent about its roles in keeping and maintaining peace in the various communities that make up the council. In the south-west, the Peace and Security Committee made up of members of the Police, SSS, traditional rulers, and community representatives are working. The conflicts that do occur seem to be caused by some innocuous triggers, but in the usual cause of things, the Peace and Security Committee see to peace in the community.

2.2 Policies and Response of Civil Society

The civil society has been very active in the south-west zone. Most of the meaningful activities carried out to maintain peace have largely come

from the civil society groups and non-governmental organisations. There are community based organisations which have embarked on direct intervention in conflicts in the south-west zone. Most of these interventions are geared towards equipping the parties with skills to be able to deal with their conflicts in their own way and in the way that will best resolve their problems.

Another segment of the civil society engage in micro credit facilities to the affected populations in conflicting communities. Some of these organisations engage in redirecting the energies of the youths that have participated in wars in more meaningful activities that will rehabilitate these youths after being combatants.

However, the NGOs, CBOs and other civil society organisations are usually incapacitated by a number of factors. Most funders have scope and their engagement is usually time-bound. For instance, the works of CRESNET south-west zone could not be completed in the Ife/Modakeke conflict due to the exit of USAID/OTI from Nigeria. Most funding are usually for one, or a maximum of two years, which, usually, is the period to consolidate on the gains of the activity. In most cases when funds cease, conflict relapses and when it reoccurs, it is usually serious.

Apart from the above, most conflicts are structurally caused and therefore need the engagement of government in their resolution. In most cases, government is not forthcoming in fulfilling their own aspects of actions negotiated toward resolution by conflicting parties.

It is also important to make reference to the responses of individual communities at keeping the peace. The Idi-Araba and Sagamu communities have created several community organisations each acting individually to achieve the common objective of maintaining the peace. In Sagamu, it was

the Akarigbo, the traditional ruler that headed the committee that resolved the crisis. The Hausa community in Sagamu even praised the Akarigbo for his role in resolving the conflict. The committee was not disbanded after the resolution and the Akarigbo made sure that it transformed into a permanent committee that meets every month to discuss the issue of peace in Sagamu. The Idi-Araba effort is similar to that of Sagamu. The Baale has been working day and night to make sure that there is permanent peace in Idi-Araba. The Hausa in Idi-Araba attested to the fact that they have been enjoying the cooperation of the Baale since he ascended the stool.

2.3 Summary /Recommendations

1. The Federal Government must not be seen to be partisan in any local conflict. Tempers rise quickly in a situation of perceived Federal Government bias, particularly where the community is dominated by a party other than the one in power at the centre.
2. The government should consider withdrawing from funding of the council of Obas and chiefs including the payment of salaries, approval of chiefs for vacant posts and issuing of staff of office. Such should be left to each community that wants a traditional ruler. When this is done, it is expected that Obas and chiefs will play fatherly roles in their domains instead of aggravating tensions.
3. The government should as a matter of urgency regulate the activities of the Odua Peoples Congress (OPC).
4. It is usually alleged that the men of the Nigeria Police take sides with conflicting parties in situations of conflict, which explains the demand for regional police as been championed by South-West

governors. Therefore, police should be retrained in non-partisan conflict management techniques.

5. There has been a rise in the phenomenon of "latch-key children" especially among the middle class. This also explains the high level of involvement of youths in destructive activities during conflict. Hence, civic education for the children in schools and reorientation for their parents is highly recommended.
6. Nigeria's educational system, as it is, is inadequate because it is geared towards white "collar jobs". In recent times, these jobs, either in the private or public sector, have been few and far between. This has led to unemployment resulting in frustration, a very important grievance among the youth. Therefore, our educational system should be geared towards self-employment on graduation.
7. The concept of free education should be reconsidered. With population explosion in schools, infrastructure have become inadequate in the face of dwindling resources from the federal and state government.
8. The Local Government as the third tier of government, at the level nearest to the people should be more alert to her responsibilities. A situation where arms are stockpiled for a long period before actual usage leaves much to be desired.
9. Many local governments in the South-West have very poor infrastructural facilities. It is imperative for the local government functionaries to be awake to their responsibilities.
10. Government at the local and state levels should establish small scale industries that would employ youths. This would make them

unavailable as instruments in the hands of manipulative politicians during conflict.

North-Central Zone

**STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT OF NORTH-
CENTRAL ZONE, NIGERIA**

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List of Conflicts in North-Central by State

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The advent of the new democratic dispensation has paved way for the renewed agitation of the hitherto suppressed human rights during the military era. In the North-Central, like other geopolitical zones in the country, the use of violence is engaged in the search for solutions to their disenchantment. Aggravating this scenario is the socio-political and religious structure of the country, which they believe had often put them at a disadvantage. Today, there is no state in the North-Central that has not experienced a number of violent conflicts in the last three years. This was not the case before in a zone mainly inhabited by a large number of minority ethnic groups with varying cultures and values.

On closer examination of the root causes of the conflicts in the zone, one will uncover the historical dimension to some of them as nested in the search for cultural identity, emanating from fear of domination and administrative cum political independence. Lack of good governance, corruption and political and elite manipulating accounted for quite a number of these conflicts. Some of the causes identified during research include:

- Competition for resources – over land ownership; boundary delineation and adjustment
- Government policies and inadequate responses
- Indigeneship and Citizenship issue/Politicisation of the ethnic/religious divide
- Uneven development/poverty, lack of good governance
- Chieftaincy

The North-Central is central to the unity and survival of the Country and its democratic system of governance. Despite the increasing spate of

violence, it is the only zone with such a high level of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity.

However, one alarming trend is the proliferation of small arms in the various states and their use during the previous conflicts have led to high casualties, thereby increasing the level of insecurity. If the arms are not recovered, any future conflict could be more devastating. The level of security at Nigerian borders must be beefed-up to check the importation of arms.

The issue of Indigeneship, Quota System, Federal Character (belonging to a political unit before having access to national resource) must be addressed from a multi-track dimension. For instance, youth restiveness can be reduced through several poverty reduction schemes, especially the creation of more employment opportunities.

Election is generally acknowledged as a major trigger factor that often re-ignite latent conflicts in most parts of the zone. Imposition of candidates and forcing communities into a political unit through controversial Ward and Local Government delineation are also likely triggers of conflict.

Conclusion

- Conflicts are on the increase across the Zone.
- There is the emergence of vigilante groups which can change form to militia groups in a charged and politically hostile environment.
- The use of small arms is on the increase, thereby increasing the intensity of violent conflicts and the rate of casualties.
- Government's containment strategies such as using force to stop violence and setting up of panels of enquiry without implementing

their recommendation or the White Paper, have contributed to loss of confidence in Government.

- Naturally, such eroded confidence in the state security apparatus is gradually leading to search for self-defence leading to the proliferation of arms in the society.
- The fact that chieftaincy appointment processes are not documented has led to unhealthy competition resulting in violent conflicts in the Zone.

ACRONYMS

DFID	–	Department for International Development
SSS	–	State Security Service
NAPECO	-	Nasarawa State Peace Coalition
NC	-	North-Central Zone
CEPID	-	Centre for Peace Initiative and Development
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development

SECTION ONE

CONFLICTS, THEIR CAUSES, ACTORS AND DYNAMICS

Annex 1 provides a list of the conflicts in North-Central (NC) Zone, state by state. As this list starkly illustrates, NC is the cauldron of numerous conflicts. Some of these have a rather long history, but there has been an escalation and expansion of conflict in recent years. Areas, such as Plateau and its capital Jos, which were previously known for their relative lack of calm now find themselves among the worst affected in the country. Below are the state-by-state conflict summaries of each of the states in the Zone, followed by a table identifying the key causes of conflict in the area; and a list of the key actors. In summary, part one attempt to describe the apparent linkages between the various causes and their dynamics and triggers.

1.1 Background to Conflicts in North-Central

The North-Central zone and most parts of the North East are currently experiencing a number of periodic violent conflicts, which hitherto was not the case. The North-Central, particularly, has witnessed large influx of people from other zones due to availability and fertility of the land in the Zone. States in the North-Central share some similarities and peculiarities such as pockets of small ethnic groups, agrarian occupation and peasantry with States like Taraba, Adamawa and Bauchi in the North East.

The Zone comprises of the following states: Benue, Niger, Nasarawa, Kwara, Kogi, Plateau States and FCT – Abuja, which prior to the division of Nigeria into six geopolitical zones was part of the Northern Nigeria as a political entity. The search for identity and the disenchantment of the minority groups in the North led to the move for a Middle-Belt identity since

the early sixties, shortly after independence. A respondent in Nasarawa has this to say “though the North-Central had worked for the unity and integration of this country during the civil war and has continued to serve as a buffer Zone between the North and the South, poverty is a common denominator in the North-Central”.

The rich and diversified natural endowment of the zone has made it a major center of attraction to migrants from other geopolitical zones of Nigeria. This attribute, in addition to the uneven distribution of the population within the zone, has contributed to a high level of movement in search of larger parcels of land for farming and grazing within its precincts.

The fast growing population of the peoples in the zone, their continuous movement and the seeming low level of development of the zone have all combined to quicken the pace of competition for resources, ethnic rivalry, contest for the control of land, agitation for political offices and appointments among other issues. As a result, the peace that was once identified with the zone has gradually given way to a plethora of conflicts. Conflicts in this zone revolve around several issues, including boundary dispute, ethnicity, perceived marginalisation, delineation of constituencies, ownership and control of farmlands and fishponds as well as the second term phenomenon.

No state in the zone has been spared the unfortunate occurrence of conflict. However, it must be stressed that the extent of these conflicts, varies particularly in terms of the scale and spread of violence and destruction of both lives and property is by no means uniform in all the States of the North-Central Zone. Indeed, the scale of violence spread and destruction of these conflicts have been higher in Benue, Nasarawa and

Plateau, while in Niger, Kwara and Kogi these have been relatively less in magnitude.

Although efforts have been made to resolve the conflicts in the various states within this zone, it is pertinent to point out that none is yet to be fully resolved. It may perhaps be safe to also add that some of these conflicts, which as at the time of this research appeared non-violent, do possess a high potential of eruption at the slightest provocation.

The migration of the (three major ethnic groups Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba) into the Zone and that of the Tivs within the Zone is generating fears of domination due to the large influx. Politics, being a game of numbers, further heightens the fears talked about. This is the case in some states like Nasarawa, Plateau, Taraba and recently too in Niger with the influx of the Tivs to Lapai, Agai and Paiko Local Government areas. While other States were not able to prevent violence from occurring as a result of this economic migration, Niger State was able to take appropriate measures to ensure peaceful co-existence.

1.2 Summary of States

Benue State

Benue State shares local boundaries with Nasarawa, Taraba, Cross River, Kogi, Enugu and Ebonyi States, as well as an international frontier with the Republic of Cameroon. The State is predominantly inhabited by the Tiv and Idoma ethnic groups. Other ethnic groups within its boundaries include the Igede, Etulo, Jukun and Hausa. It is endowed with expansive arable land and most of its inhabitants are farmers and craftsmen. Because of its high degree of food production, it is referred to as the food basket of Nigeria.

Benue State has witnessed several conflicts, one of which is international (Cameroon), while the others are inter-state (with Taraba, Nasarawa, Cross River). These conflicts revolve basically around the issues of land and boundary, ethnicity, chieftaincy, perceived marginalization, political interests etc. While there are several land and boundary disputes within the Tiv speaking areas of the State, the Idoma areas witness more of chieftaincy disputes. These conflicts have left in their wake, enormous destruction of lives and property as most of them were violent with sophisticated arms freely used.

All the respondents during the interview acknowledged the increase in the use of small arms (both locally produced and sophisticated ones). Though many of the respondents denied knowing the source of the arms, the SSS confirmed the recovery of some arms and the arrest of the local producers. Such arms proliferation portends great danger to peaceful co-existence in the State and its neighbourhood.

Kwara State

Kwara State is said to be the state of harmony, with sixteen local governments. It shares boundaries with Kogi, Oyo, Osun, Ekiti and Niger States. Its major tribe is the Yoruba ethnic group, while the others are Nupe, Hausa, Baruba and Fulani ethnic minority groups. Farming appears to be the major occupation of the people in the state, though pockets of craftsmen and artisans could be noticed among the population, particularly the Yoruba ethnic group.

The conflicts in the State revolve around such issues as land and boundary, chieftaincy, political interests, herdsmen and farmers conflicts, ethnicity etc.

Kogi State

Kogi State is described as the Confluence State, with twenty-one Local Government Areas. It shares boundaries with Kwara, Benue, Ondo, Nasarawa, Ekiti, Edo States and FCT.

The conflicts in the state revolve around land and boundary disputes (intra-state), political manipulation, and chieftaincy. The most recent violent conflicts were the aftermath of the creation of new local governments that led to loss of several lives and property. A political face off between the executive and legislature became obvious as a result of the creation of the local governments. Election remains a major trigger of conflict in the State.

Niger State

Niger State is said to be the Power State. It shares boundaries with other States like Kwara, Kaduna, Sokoto, Kebbi and the FCT – Abuja. It comprises three major ethnic groups of Nupe, Gwari and Hausa. Other ethnic groups are the Kamberi, Kamuku, Dukawa, Bissan and the Kadara. The inhabitants are mostly farmers.

Conflicts in the state revolve around land and boundary as is the case of Gbako Vs. Wushishi, Mariga Vs. Mashegu etc; chieftaincy as in the Suleija emirate among others; ethnicity. Actors in these conflicts include traditional rulers, youths, elites and the politicians. Some of the existing conflicts in the state are still in courts awaiting judgement. The Etsu Nupe is currently intervening in Gbako-Wushishi conflict while urging the parties to withdraw their case from court.

The federal and state governments were prompt in responding to the early warning sign of conflict, with the influx of thousands of Tiv that were displaced from the Nasarawa-Benue-Taraba conflicts. At the International

Community level, USAID-OTI supported an intervention project facilitated by the WOLF, and rounded off with a legislative dialogue that was facilitated by CEPID.

Nasarawa State

Nasarawa State is said to be the home of Solid Minerals. It shares boundaries with Benue, Plateau, Kaduna, Taraba States. There were three main conflicts frequently referred to by those we interviewed. Those conflicts include:

- a) Toto Conflict between the Bassa and the Egbira, which has been on for some time now. A number of Government Panels of Inquiry were set up to study the conflict and make recommendations. The recommendations of the several panels and the White Papers were not implemented. The current situation is that the Bassa who have fled are yet to return. They are now spread over five states: Oyo, Niger, Kogi, FCT and Nasarawa.
- b) The Southern Senatorial District experienced communal clashes that led to the destruction of lives and properties between February and July 2001. The Senatorial District itself is made up of five Local Government Areas, namely: Awe, Doma, Keana, Lafia and Obi Local Government Areas. The clashes were violent and destructive and lasted for weeks. The disturbances took the form of communal violence pitching ethnic groups against one another. It appears that the other ethnic groups were severally and collectively pitched against the Tiv. Sophisticated arms were freely used during this conflict.

According to our research, growing tension between the Tiv and other communities over land, damage to crops from cattle grazing and the capture of Fulani cattle in reprisal, access to local political appointments and traditional titles reached its climax following the assassination of the Chief of Azara (Sarkin Azara) on the 12th of June, 2001. His assassination was blamed on the Tiv, though no culprits have been found, and the conflict speedily spread to other parts of the district between the Tivs and other ethnic groups. Of particular note among those that fought the Tiv are the Fulani. Mercenaries were engaged in the fight that finally led to the displacement of the Tiv. Some of the Tiv are already returning back to their areas on negotiated terms.

- c) Ayele Iggah Vs. Iggah-Oyikwa clans headship in Nasarawa Local Government Area. The conflict dates back to 1953 over a fishpond and headship of their clan. The conflict is still on, with sporadic violence leading to the displacement of a group. More sophisticated arms were freely used during the recent clash in June/July 2002 than was ever witnessed in the area.

Plateau State

Until recently, Plateau State enjoyed some relative peace and stability, and for this reason, was referred to as 'a miniature Nigeria and the true home of peace and tourism.' Because of the peaceful and serene nature of the state, coupled with its sometimes temperate-tropical and friendly weather, it had witnessed the influx of different ethnic groups and foreign nationals who, for decades, lived without any fear or victimization. Today, the dictum can rightly be changed from 'Home of Peace and Tourism' to

'Home of violence and conflict', following the recent ugly developments in the state.

The recent crises in Plateau emerged partly because of some political events bordering on the ownership question. These ignited the problem commonly referred to as the indigene-settler question. Other questions and interests now revolve around this central indigene-settler divide.

Before now, Plateau State had witnessed a number of violent conflicts of significance. Worthy of mention are – the Mangu Vs. Bokkos conflict over a farmland/Valley that recorded loss of lives and property; recurring Langtang conflicts between the Taroh Vs. Hausa (Muslims); Aminu Mato crisis of April 12, 1994, and the Gero crisis of 1997 among others.

None of the earlier, and later conflicts, recorded the level of casualties or spread through the length and breath of the State like the September 7, 2001 one. The conflict is now concentrated in the Southern senatorial district with the youths in the area operating as vigilante/militia groups while foreign mercenaries wreak havoc in the villages.

The following governmental agencies and organizations have either responded or are still responding to the conflict. Red Cross provided relief materials during the recent crisis; the Federal Government provided some financial support for the State Security operation; the State Government set-up a number of Panels and Peace Committees and is currently organising a number of Peace Summits for various stakeholders. CEPID carried out a number of peace-building and capacity building activities in the state largely with the support of USAID-OTI and now USAID. In recognition of this contribution, the State Government now engages the NGO as Consultants to its peace summit organising committee.

1.3 Table on Causes

Notes on Table

This table is taken from the first phase report, which broke down causes into International, National, State and Local levels. The team found that this categorisation is of limited value as the majority of issues cut across levels. To reduce repetition, *indicates a factor that is also relevant to all levels below in the table.

TABLE 1: Current Causes of Conflict in the North-Central

	Security	Political	Economic	Social
International/Regional Level	Prevalence of conflicts in the West Africa region and resulting arms proliferation. Foreign mercenaries.			
National Level	1. Arms proliferation – lack of border control.	1. Feelings of exclusion and struggle for recognition.*	1. Poverty and unemployment.*	1. Youth alienation.*
	2. Failure to retrieve weapons from soldiers returning from International Peacekeeping Operations and also retrenched soldiers and police.	2. Fear of domination.*	2. Lack of infrastructure and basic services.*	2. Low level of education, including illiteracy.*

	Security	Political	Economic	Social
National Level (Cont.)	3. Lack of capacity on the part of the Federal Government to police national borders	3. Delineation and contestation of national borders (state formation).	3. Resource control.*	3. Use of quota system in access to education and employment.*
	4. Inadequate capacity on the part of security forces to respond to internal conflict.	4. Access to positions of political power.*	4. Competition for access to and control of resources.*	
	5. Inability of state to guarantee to security (arms proliferation/failure to prosecute).	5. Lack of internal party democracy.*	5. Lack of viable industries.*	
		6. Elite manipulation of the "political process"	6. Economic migration.*	

		and use of "political thuggery".*		
		7. Lack of respect for the rule of law and social justice.*	7. Inequality.*	
		8. Second-term syndrome "tarzarce" (at all levels).*		
		9. Non-implementation of findings from committees and panels of inquiry.*		

	Security	Political	Economic	Social
National Level (Cont.)		10. Government not consultative or responsive to the views/needs/grievances of the public.*		
		11. Judicial system ineffective and corrupt and seen to be bias.*		
State Level	1. Arms proliferation (local and sophisticated).	1. Delineation of state boundaries.	1. Land disputes	1. Ethnic, religious and indigene/settler divisions and limited integration e.g. through inter-marriage.*

	2. Inadequate capacity on part of security forces to respond to internal conflict.	2. The democratic "politics of numbers".*		2. Demographics – relative size of ethnic groups.*
	3. Use of force (military) to respond to conflict, due to inadequate response from police.			3. Increased levels of education in certain communities leading to greater activism.*
	4. Inability of state to guarantee security (arms proliferation/failure to prosecute).			4. Historical enmity.*

	Security	Political	Economic	Social
Local Level	1. Arms proliferation.	1. Delineation of district and ward boundaries	1. Access to grazing Vs. use of land for farming (herder/cultivator).	
	2. Operation at local-level of mercenaries, recruited at the local, foreign and other state level		2. Perceived economic domination by successful "non-native".	
	3. Increase in local production of arms.			
	4. Inability of state to guarantee to security (arms proliferation/failure to prosecute).			

1.4 Dynamics and Triggers

A recurrent theme in the North-Central was how the distribution of political and traditional (i.e. chieftom) positions of authority and which ethnic groups can obtain them is central to conflict.

The fieldwork in the North-Central therefore confirmed the linkage between political and resource competition made in the first phase report, but provides greater detail on how the “outlying factors”, particularly ethnic tensions and indigene-settler issues, interact in complex ways with central linkage. Access to political power has resource implications for ethnic groups and this explains both elite and non-elite motivations for competing so fiercely for political power. Those who personally gain political power can expect economic benefits. For others, having a relationship with a person in power (from your ethnic group) implies actual or perceived access to economic benefits, and exclusion of one’s group from these positions implies exclusion from the benefits. Individuals may not actually receive any economic benefit but operate on the perception that lack of access to political power shuts the door on any potential opportunities. They also feel that grievances, e.g. over land ownership, are more likely to be addressed to their advantage if those in power come from their own ethnic group. It also explains groups’ reluctance to allow dilution of their history of political domination, e.g. the election of a Bassa LGA Chairman in Toto, the appointment of “non-indigene” persons to positions in state and Local Government (e.g. Jos).

Boundary Demarcation (State, Local Government, District and Ward) is therefore a central cause of conflict because groups have historical allegiances to particular administrative units and it can determine a group’s ability to dominate rather than be marginalized – according to the balance of

ethnic groups in that administrative unit. The agenda of the elite is always what determines the outcome of administrative units creation. The cultural affinity or the interest of the larger populace is usually not considered neither are they consulted. The nature of conflicts that emerge from such developments goes beyond inter-ethnic to intra-ethnic conflicts. Actors in these conflicts include the Traditional Leaders as in Niger due to economic interest (tax collection from subjects and reduction in land space); politicians (ploy for electoral success) as in Benue, Nasarawa, Niger and Kogi. Some of the respondents in these states see it as a cause of conflict that is likely to escalate during elections.

Fear of Domination

Frequent references to fears of domination and feelings of marginalisation reflect this situation. Conflicts emerged out of groups without representation mobilising to articulate their claims and grievances at mobilisation. Those that already have such representation appear to find this threatening. In many cases, the group's attempt to legitimise their claims to power through their "indigene" status, negate those of others who are labelled "settlers". High levels of economic migration into and within the region, past and present, have made the indigene/settler issue central to the discourse of politics and conflict. The relative economic and numerical power of some "settler" groups, e.g. Tivs outside Benue and the Hausa in Jos, increases their perceived threat to other groups. Democracy has brought a new dimension to these inter-group tensions. As one respondent puts it: under democracy, "numbers count", making smaller groups feel more threatened (e.g. Toto). In the past, comparative high levels of education on the part of Egbira helped them obtain political power. There is some

evidence that increased access to education within certain groups, e.g. Bassa and Tiv in Nasarawa, has led to increased activism for political power.

Religious Differences

The North-Central is religiously as well as ethnically diverse. However, religious differences in themselves do not appear to be central to conflicts; rather, religious differences in some cases (e.g. Jos) can reinforce ethnic divisions, particularly once a conflict has begun. The religious divide easily sets in because majority of the natives are Christian, traditional worshippers and non-religionists who were simply regarded as Christians, while most of the non-natives are mostly Muslims.

1.4.1 Intra-Ethnic Conflicts

However, ethnic divisions do not go all the way to explain conflicts in the region. There are intra-ethnic conflicts in the North-Central Zone, particularly between clans in the Tiv population in Benue and the Nupe population in Niger States.

Land Ownership

Another frequently mentioned cause of conflict is disputes over land ownership and use, particularly farmland. However, a number of respondents expressed the view that actual pressure on land is reasonably low. The Tiv, as farmers, are frequently involved in conflict with other groups over land in those states where they were perceived to be “settlers” (i.e. outside Benue). Some of these conflicts appear to be resource-based. Such disputes were said to be particularly prevalent during the harvesting season when people would lay alternative claims to land to gain the produce.

However, a key underlying factor behind many of these disputes appears to be indigene-settler tensions and the link between land ownership and political power. “Indigenes” objected to “settler” claims of land ownership to which they were perceived to have no right. At the same time, ownership of substantial amounts of land can support claims to traditional titles. Furthermore, it can also be linked to fears of domination and marginalisation arising from the economic strength of certain groups through land usage and their expanding population through economic migration to exploit opportunities. The reason for disputes appears therefore to be linked to the above factors of struggles for political power.

1.4.2 Pastoralist/Farmers Conflicts

A further and prevalent source of conflict in NC is the clash between nomadic cattle herders and cultivators/farmers over damage to crops by grazing and reprisal attacks on people and livestock. This is a long-standing source of conflict and the NC, as the “food bowl” of Nigeria makes it particularly susceptible to conflict. However, this kind of conflict appears to be on the increase. A respondent links this to the failure to maintain traditional means of reducing these problems through the use of “grazing pathways” that allow herders to avoid farmland. The expansion in the use of land for farming, among other reasons, denying paths for cattle is a major cause of this category of conflict between herders and farmers. This conflict appears to be becoming increasingly violent with the use of sophisticated arms and alleged involvement of foreign mercenaries.

Many of the conflicts therefore have the competition for political power as a strong underlying cause. However, politics is also a more immediate cause and trigger. Respondents frequently blamed the political elite’s manipulation of ethnic sentiment and “political thuggery”. The

prevalence of 'Second-termism' and the desire to maintain power amongst politicians was identified as a key motivation for resort to violence. Many emphasised that the level of poverty, inequality, low levels of education and resulting youth alienation, made "non-elites" susceptible to political manipulation for short-term monetary gain. There appears to be a link between youth alienation, their resort to criminality and their propensity to involve themselves in political violence. However, well-educated youth, e.g. students, as well as less-educated youth are also involved. This was linked by some to lack of opportunities, sometimes exacerbated by the quota system for admissions into higher education institutions and government employment. Political violence can produce a "band-wagon" effect, whereby groups not directly interested in the original dispute seize the opportunity to achieve their own ends. Insufficient internal party democracy produces fierce competition for selection and resentment arising from the imposition of candidates.

Furthermore, the shallowness of democratic politics, poor quality of governance and high levels of corruption were also identified as central factors contributing to the dynamics of conflict. This operates on many levels. Corruption fuels the linkage between political and resource competition by making the attractions of gaining political power even higher. It also reduces trust in government institutions. Corruption, ineffectiveness and perceived bias on the part of the judicial system, meant that it does not fulfill the need for dispute mediation, redress and enforcement of law and order. Other government institutions were also said to be lacking in accountability and closed to the views of the public and unresponsive to their needs and grievances. Therefore, the political system provides few opportunities for grievances to be peacefully articulated and resolved.

The inadequate capacity of the state to guarantee security for communities has encouraged the proliferation in the ownership and use of arms, both locally-made and sophisticated, and the use of vigilantes and mercenaries. The increased presence of arms and reports of the presence of mercenaries (or militias), either foreign or Nigerian and sometimes originating from other states in Nigeria, were recurrent themes throughout the fieldwork. As a result, the state's monopoly on the use of force is being seriously challenged. This has further undermined the ability of the police to respond to conflict, as they were often over-powered. In a number of areas in NC, this has meant that military force is required as a response to crisis. This can further complicate the conflict, bringing the communities and the military into direct conflict (e.g. Benue), with disastrous loss of life and damage to property.

Repeated conflicts and unchecked tensions have resulted in the accumulation of resentment between groups. This, in turn, has produced folklore of conflict and the stereotyping of individual groups by their opponents. This dangerously reinforces divisions and tensions and often ignores mutual interests and experiences of peaceful coexistence. There is some social integration between groups, e.g. through intermarriage, but in many cases this is limited and reinforced by repeated disputes.

There was little reference to international factors, except with reference to arms proliferation. This was strongly linked to insecurity in the rest of the West Africa region and Nigeria's participation in peacekeeping operations. Most respondents blamed failure to collect weapons from returning and retired soldiers and porous borders for the increase in small arms in the region. The team felt that focus of the fieldwork on individual regions meant that international factors would not emerge unless strongly felt

at the local level. Other international factors are not therefore irrelevant, but are difficult to capture.

1.4.3 Triggers

Tensions therefore remain unchecked and can build-up to the point that violent conflict can easily be triggered by individual events or recurrences of previous disputes. The triggers identified were:

- Elections, particularly perceived and actual manipulation of the electoral processes and candidate selection and imposition
- The use of political thuggery and political assassinations
- Individual political and chieftaincy appointments or challenges to established chieftaincy rights and means of succession by excluded groups
- Crop damage or theft or killing of cattle
- Disputes between individuals
- Creation of local governments wards and districts
- Individual disputes over land
- Spillover effects e.g. arrival of IDPs and reprisal attacks
- Return of IDPs without addressing causes and sentiments linked to the initial conflict

A history of internal economic migration, displacement of those affected by conflict and the extension of ethnic boundaries over state boundaries meant local conflicts expand to involve a number of states and populations within them. This is particularly the case with Nasarawa, Benue and Taraba (not in the NC region)

1.4.4 Actors

The following groups/individuals were identified as key actors in the conflicts:

- Ethnic groups. (Religion can reinforce ethnic division as does source of livelihood e.g. trading, farming, cattle herding)
- Religious leaders
- Indigenes Vs. settlers
- Herders and farmers
- Political elites
- Youth (alienated and unemployed)
- Traditional rulers and aspirants
- Mercenaries (foreign and Nigerian)
- Security forces
- Government/State Governors
- Political parties and internal factions
- Students (cults)

1.4.5 Future Scenarios

Expand: Increasing, though sporadic, conflict. The further threats resulting from forthcoming elections, IDPs, further displacement, increased and unchecked arms proliferation and possible food shortages arising from droughts.

SECTION TWO

RESPONSE

2.1 Track One

The various levels of government, federal, state and local government have responded to conflict in a number of ways.

Federal and State Governments have provided relief in response to individual crises. However, there are some indications that such relief have not always reached those it was aimed at and sometimes is too little for the number of people affected.

The Federal Government has also provided political and financial support to the return of displaced groups, particularly of the Bassa people in Toto LGA, Nasarawa. This example, where the returned population fled once again following further violence, illustrates that such initiatives can fail unless the root causes of the conflict have been addressed to the satisfaction of both communities and need to be backed up with long-term support for adequate reintegration.

Federal security agencies, the military and police, have also been involved in responding to conflicts. The NC provides examples of both the disastrous and successful use of military response. In Benue, it resulted in loss of life and severe damage to property, which have been costly to both the communities and the state government. However, in Jos, the military can be seen to have played a positive role in containing the conflict. The police have attempted to respond at different stages of conflicts, but lack the capacity to do so effectively in many cases where they have found themselves overwhelmed by the proliferation of arms in the community. Both military and police personnel are vulnerable to casualties in responding

to conflict. Their lack of capacity to guarantee security has in itself encouraged arms proliferation and the use of vigilantes and mercenaries by communities in order to protect themselves against real or perceived threats. Often these interventions complicate the conflict. Even when interventions by security forces do successfully restore order, they do not address the root causes of the conflict and need to be backed up by other mechanisms to do so.

Establishing committees and panels of inquiry by federal, state and local Governments is also a dominant means of response. Some of these are well intentioned, but in most cases their recommendations are not implemented. Non-implementation means that the conflicts remain unresolved and can breed conflict by not meeting expectations raised by the committees and panels.

The creation of new administrative units (State, Local Government Areas, Districts and Wards) has also been a historical means of response by the government. However, as the above discussion of the causes of conflict illustrates, this is a key cause of the conflicts in the region.

The government, along with others, has also supported enlightenment campaigns, principally through the National Orientation Agency. The impact of such campaigns is difficult to measure and may not convince those most likely to take part in conflict. However, they may raise awareness amongst the general public of conflict issues.

Co-operation between State Governors over inter-state conflicts has also been a response. This can have substantial impact, as can their intervention on internal state conflicts, but its use is dependent on personal and political relationships and motivation. There are other cases where governors have been parties to the conflicts or their negligence has resulted in conflict.

One response to conflict in the past has been the use of a quota system for admission into some levels of education and government employment to reduce the risk of dominance by a single group. However, some respondents felt that this system can create resentment amongst qualified candidates who fall outside the quota and can reduce the quality of governance by not prioritising merit.

2.2 Track Two

Traditional and religious leaders, whilst sometimes actors in the conflicts, can play a positive role in managing and avoiding conflict through interaction with their communities and with such leaders in other groups and we heard of some attempts to do this in the North-Central. Some have led peace campaigns and participated in cross-communal/religious bodies. This response is highly dependent on leaders personal motivation and ability to convince their communities.

2.2.1 Non-Government Organisations

Non-government organisations have been active in providing and coordinating relief, as have religious organisations, these have enjoyed some success, but some organisations have been limited by insufficient capacity and limited experience. Sometimes this can mean relief does not reach those who need it. Religious organizations are more established. The Nigerian Red Cross Society's reputation and capacity aided its activities, as did its practice of directly distributing relief. The latter organisation is also involved in integrating HIV awareness campaigns with its support to IDPs in Benue. The Nasarawa State Government commended the efforts of NAPECO for effective intervention in moving the peace process forward.

They have been able to bring the different warring parties together for dialogue and at other times provided relief materials to IDPs.

NGOs have also implemented peace-building initiatives in response to individual conflicts, focused on bringing parties together and encouraging dialogue between them. Some are not reaching relevant parts of the communities they are focused on – when we spoke to communities they were not aware of projects being implemented. This suggested that some were elitist in character – focusing on those who claimed to represent the communities in urban areas rather than working directly with the community. Some were situated very far away from those communities (e.g. in Abuja). Even when they did work directly with the communities, interventions resulting in apparent agreements amongst leading figures subsequently failed because they were short-term and did not attempt to address the root causes of the conflicts. Some of the conflicts require a change in governmental policies, which may be the root cause in addition to facilitated dialogue among the disputants. The inability of the NGOs to carry intervention project beyond the International donors grants usually leave the intervention inconclusive.

NGOs and labour organisations had also been involved in enlightenment and sensitization campaigns to reduce conflict and promote the peaceful return of IDPs. As in the case of similar government-supported activities, it is hard to measure the impact of these activities, but these do not appear to have reduced conflict in the area.

2.2.2 Media

We had little opportunity to assess the role of media in responding to conflict in NC. Radio stations had been involved in promoting peace through jingles and on-air discussions. It is difficult to assess how successful

these have been, but there is some evidence that inadequate access to impartial information is exacerbating conflict.

2.2.3 Students

Students have been actors in conflicts. However, in NC, they have also been involved in responding to conflict. In particular, students of Benue State University successfully raised awareness, through demonstrations, of the plight of IDPs accumulating outside their campus in Makurdi.

2.3 Track Three

In most cases, respondents were not aware of any response from the international community. One individual referred positively to the presence of UNDP skills generation centres in Nasarawa and another referred to the UK Department for International Development's presence in Benue.

We felt there were a number of reasons for this apparent absence. Donors and international communities do have a limited reach and role in Nigeria. More importantly, as argued in the Phase1 One report, international development agencies' response to conflict tends to be confined to supporting peace-building initiatives through non-governmental intermediaries. The bulk of their activities on development do not make the link to conflict.

SECTION THREE

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In section two we outlined the current responses to conflict in NC, with comments on their effectiveness. In drawing up our conclusions and recommendations, we analysed the entire range of responses in relation to the causes and dynamics of conflict found in the fieldwork to identify gaps. We also have recommendations relating to specific responses.

It also confirms that the causes of conflict in Nigeria are complex and systemic. Conflicts in NC focus largely around ethnic plurality, access to political and traditional positions of authority, land ownership and the clash of herder/cultivator interests. However, underpinning these sources of antagonism and triggers are deeper systemic issues at the centre of which is the relationship between political power and access to economic resources and opportunities. Poverty, unemployment and limited alternative routes to economic gain; governance that is not open or responsive to the needs of the people; and inadequate provision of security and to basic services also contribute to this central relationship. Corruption is an exacerbating factor. Thus, access to resources is strongly linked to ethnic and clan group access to political power with few alternative courses of action. Thus, such divisions like political appointment, claims to chieftaincy rights, and elections, can easily result in high-level violence. In the NC region, this has brought about large numbers of casualties and displacement.

In the light of these findings, we concluded that the North-Central experience illustrates that the Phase1 report was correct in its assertion that current responses to conflict are inadequate. Overall, they are short-term and reactive rather than sustained efforts focused on prevention. They do not

address the root causes and dynamics of conflict but respond only to violent conflict once it erupts.

Improved governance and performance by individual government institutions is essential. Failure to consult with communities, e.g. in the delineation of administrative boundaries, and respond effectively to their grievances increases resentments and reduces the opportunities for conflicts to be resolved through non-violent means. The level of transparency and accountability of all state institutions, reform of and improved capacity of the judicial system to mediate disputes is central to this.

There needs to be effective action at all levels (International, National, State and Local) to prevent and reduce corruption. The perks linked to political office also need to be reduced. “Second-termism” is a key contributing factor to political thuggery. Constitutional reform to limit politicians to one term could be one response.

The use of the military to respond to conflict needs to be reduced in favour of more effective non-military means. At the same time, effective means of guaranteeing security for communities needs to be strongly enhanced. This was the main demand of communities interviewed. The police need to take a stronger role in preventing and managing conflict. In order to do this their capacity needs to be improved through training and logistics, e.g. communications.

However, at present, the capacity of the police is undermined by the proliferation of both locally-made and sophisticated weapons. Action therefore needs to be taken to support disarmament and stem the flow of weapons. As examples in the NC region illustrate, strong relationships and communication between the SSS and State Police forces can assist seizures. Responding effectively to intelligence on the location of weapons can,

however, be impeded by political interference. To stem the flow of weapons, action needs to be taken to ensure retired soldiers and police and soldiers coming back to Nigeria from International Peacekeeping weapons return weapons. Strengthening border controls and customs can reduce illegal shipments from abroad. Local production needs to be effectively eradicated or regulated.

Legislation is necessary but not sufficient to deal with the indigene versus settler tensions. This division is deeply politicised and has economic as well as political aspects. It is reinforced by other legislation and constitutional provisions and practices, e.g. need to belong to a political unit to have access to state resource, the quota system for employment, education admission and appointments to federal institutions. Thus, new legislation on its own would be insufficient.

Many respondents referred to the need to promote “Nigerian” as a shared identity that cuts across ethnic and other divides. Sensitization campaigns are insufficient. A considerable number of government policies, e.g. the quota system, encourage particularistic sentiments. Furthermore, improved provision of basic services, amenities, security and economic policy on the part of government would increase the incentives for people to feel included in and identify themselves with Nigeria.

Civil society peace-building initiatives need to focus on working with relevant actors in the community and achieving solutions that are legitimate in the long-term rather than short-term agreements.

However, these initiatives are not sufficient. Civil society needs to expand engagement in conflict beyond such initiatives to address the root causes of conflict. NGOs that focus on conflict management can play a greater role in using their experience at the community level to articulate

demand for change in relevant policy areas, such as those listed above, and creating linkages with other civil society groups working on those areas.

The media needs to play a more positive role through developing better skills and ethics towards even-handed reporting of conflict and related issues.

The International Community can enhance its impact by integrating conflict prevention and management into their broader programmes to avoid having or causing conflict through these programmes and to improve their role in addressing the root causes of conflict.

Overall, there is a strong case for all the three tracks working together more to tackle conflict and its causes more effectively.

ANNEX

LIST OF CONFLICTS IN NORTH-CENTRAL BY STATE

Benue

Interstate:

- Benue-Nasarawa (Tiv vs. others)
- Benue-Taraba (Tiv vs. Jukun)
- Benue-Cross River (Tiv and Igede vs. Bete)

Intrastate:

- Ushongo LGA vs. Konshisha LGA (Tiv vs. Tiv)
- Ushongo LGA vs. Gboko (Tiv vs. Tiv)
- Kwande LGA vs. Ushongo LGA (Tiv vs. Tiv)
- With Apa LGA (Idoma)
- Ado LGA (Igumale - 2 conflicts)
 - a. Royal lineage vs. non-royal
 - b. The Zi and the Za vs. rest of the LGA
- Guma LGA (Tiv vs. Jukun)
- Buruku LGA
 - a. Ishorov vs. Kusuv
 - b. Etulo vs. Mbagen
- Konshisha LGA (Tiv) vs. Oju LGA (Igede)

Niger

- Gbako LGA vs. Wushishi LGA
- Mariga LGA vs. Mashegu LGA
- Lavum LGA vs. Zugurma LGA
- Lapai and Agaie LGAs vs. Paikoro LGA

- Doko LGA (2 conflicts there)
 - a. Over ownership of fish pond
 - b. Creation of LGA
- Traditional title conflicts
 - a. Borgu Emirate
 - b. Suleija Emirate

Nasarawa

- (Inter-state): Nasarawa vs. Benue
- Southern Senatorial District (Villages + Groups)
- Toto-Bassa vs. Egbura
- Nasarawa (Loko): Ayele Iggah vs. Iggah Oyikwa

Kwara

- Political conflict (Saraki vs. Governor Lawal)
- Land/Boundary dispute – Share vs. Tsaraji in Ifelodun and Edu LGAs respectively
- Offa and Erinle: Offa Community vs. Offa Polytechnic Students
- Ethnic: Fulani herdsmen vs. farmers in Moro, Edu, Pategi LGAs
- Chieftaincy: Afonja vs Alimi descendants in Ilorin Emirate.

Kogi

- Political violence over creation of Local Government, Lokoja, Idah (and one other).

Plateau

- Jos North (Hausa-Fulani Settlers) vs. Berom, Anaguta, Jarawa (Indigene); (LGA Chairmanship): Appointment of Aminu Mato as Chairman crisis of 1997; Appointment of Muktari as Coordinator of NAPEP.
- Plateau: Intra-PDP Governorship conflict
- Jos South: Berom and Hausa
- Shemdan/Qua'npan: Tiv and others
- Wase: Taroh vs. Hausa
- Langtang South and Langtang North: Taroh vs. Hausa-Fulani
- Herder/cultivator (Berom vs. Fulani): Nding in Fan District in Barkin-Ladi LGA
- Riyom/Hoss; Jol and Kwi in Ryom LGA; Heipang
- Kassa (Barkin-Ladi); Miango vs. Fulani (Kassa LGA)
- Vom (Berom and Fulani – Jos South LGA); Bachi LGA (Berom vs. Fulani – Aug. 2000)

South-South Zone

**STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT OF SOUTH-
SOUTH ZONE, NIGERIA**

BY

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INTRODUCTION

The Phase Two of the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) exercise, coordinated by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution in collaboration with the UK Department of International Development (DFID), the World Bank, UNDP and USAID was undertaken in Nigeria between the 24th August and the 9th of September, 2002. The key objective of the exercise is to (i) survey current trends in conflict development in each zone, (ii) analyse responses by state and non-state actors, and (iii) make recommendations to the government and foreign agencies involved in conflict mitigation programmes in Nigeria.

Thus Phase Two of the Strategic Conflict Assessment project essentially represents an empirical investigation of actual conflict developments in the six geo-political zones in Nigeria. The epistemic parameters of this investigation derive from the phase one of the project which involved a survey of extant literature with the aim of establishing the multiple conflict tradition, the structural factors, psycho-cultural dispositions, and responses. The literature findings were summarized in terms of spatial inter-linkages between the conflict type, actors, triggers, and management regimes.

Thus, in effect, phase one of the project represents an exercise in conflict analysis as a background to the investigation and documentation (Phase Two) of the dynamics of these “manifest conflict processes” which in a number of cases have developed both in intensity and scale into a frightening social crisis. The array of conflict in Nigeria, according to one report, “is bewildering; the intensity of the violence often stunning.” In the period of two years since the inauguration of the Fourth Republic, “armed confrontations have erupted throughout the country over such issues as religion, economic power and division of wealth; land; renewable natural

resources, including livestock forage, wood-stocks, and fisheries; environmental damage; labour-management relations; urban disputes among youths gangs; disputes among youths of rural communities and police-related violence” (USAID, 2001).

This Report of SCA phase two in-country field work focuses on conflict development and responses (by state actors, the civil society and the international community) in the six states of the South-South geo-political zone of Nigeria (Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta and Edo). The aim of the study as stated in the IPCR brief is “to reduce conflicts by affecting policy, promote peaceful co-existence and create a development-friendly and secure environment for all Nigerians.” The three conflict clusters studied exhibit extremely high degree of disruptive potentials and collateral damages. These are the Cross River-Akwa Ibom border conflict, the Eleme-Okrika conflict in Rivers State and the protracted social conflict in Warri. The decision to concentrate on three conflict clusters was determined both by time limitation and the threshold of its violent spectrum. By focusing on the analysis of their structures (situation, behaviour, attitudes and perceptions in terms of their complex and multi-dimensional inter-relationship), responses and recommendations of relevant actors, it is hoped that conflict sensitive strategies and relevant mitigating programmes will be generated and implemented. This effort is in line with the initiatives of the conflict assessment strategies of the three key development agencies: USAID, DFID and FEWER.

BACKGROUND TO CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA

The chequered history of the Nigerian social formation and the concomitant periodic systemic violence has been a source of major concern for the great majority of its hapless citizens and the international community alike. The recurrent question in this regard is why a state once considered a “showpiece of decolonizing Africa” could then manage to “plummet from such an apogee of grace” (Kirk-Greene, 1976:7) and come perilously close first to collapse, then to constitutional chaos and a bloody civil war, and finally to a rapid interchange between civilian and military regimes. Various reasons have been cited for this persistent systemic instability and violence in the Nigerian polity (Bassey, 1989). The first resides in the politics of its formative years. It sees Nigeria’s past as “being the stuff from which her present history has been shaped,” it is not “a sudden darkening of the moment” which broke upon Nigeria on 15 January 1966 and after. Thus, Kirk-Greene has trenchantly noted that “judgement of history is likely to set 1967 and 1958 along with 1914, and may be 1946 and 1954, as Nigeria’s constitutional turning points.”

In the above regard, a number of writers and media commentators have proceeded without reservation to identify primal factors in the cumulative progression on “Nigeria’s primrose path to threatened disintegration” in the 1960s, and the near anarchic institutional order in the 1970s through 1990s. Prominent among factors frequently highlighted are: (i) constitutional anomaly of the First Republic; (ii) North-South and ethnic conflicts; (iii) minority group politics; (iv) the structural dilemmas of the Nigerian army; and (v) the chain of immediate political events preceding military coup d’etat (Oyediran, 1979; Anifowose, 1982). A combination of these potentially destabilizing factors, the argument goes, has produced a veritable mix of bedeviling contradictions on the Nigerian state: a “set of

oppositions – generalized stereotype – North vs. South, Islam vs. Christianity, alleged feudalism vs. assumed socialism, have vs. have-nots, each with sinister undertones of tension, irreconcilability and threatened withdrawal” (Kirk-Greene, 1976:5). It is against this backdrop of societal anomaly (of “believed oppositions, of dissent and distrust”), the proponents of this view have argued, that one must direct one’s search for the root causes of instability and violence in Nigeria.

The second reason often advanced for the conflict-prone environment in Nigeria borders on the ineluctable process of societal transformation: violence and instability in Nigeria is a “necessary and inescapable condition in the creation of political order and is thus intimately bound up with the process of modernization and political development” (Dudley, 1985). Such an argument in large part derives from Samuel Huntington’s (1968) institutionalization theory which argues essentially that conflict and violence in the Third World are primarily the inexorable consequence of failure to develop political institutions sufficiently adaptable, complex, autonomous and coherent to cope with the emergence of new and variegated social forces resulting from profound changes in the social system. On this view, the episodic violence in modernizing societies such as Nigeria is inevitable: it is attributed in large part to the “rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions” (Huntington, 1968:4). Phenomenal social and economic changes in post-colonial Nigeria, it has been suggested, manifestly complicate the problems of establishing “new bases of political association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and effectiveness” (Zartman, 1983:9). Since, in such a context, as comparative experiences of other modernizing polities attest, the rate of social mobilization and the expansion and intensification of political activism outstrip political institutionalisation, the inevitable consequence is political instability and disorders.

A third reason often cited both as a source and background to violence in Nigeria is the systemic contradictions between “governmental authority patterns and the patterns in society.” In an insightful and thought-provoking case study of Norway, for instance, Eckstein (1966:60) has argued that the ability and survival of the Norwegian democracy, “in spite of the country’s deep and non-overlapping geographic, economic and cultural cleavages,” is to be accountable for largely by the congruence of governmental and social patterns. In other words, both governmental and social patterns of authority are strongly democratic in Norway and, unlike in Nigeria, the political system has withstood the trials of time in spite of its “astonishingly great, sharp and persistent” divisions.

Thus, Ake (1973) and Dudley (1973), among others, have noted that the problematique posed by fundamental asymmetries in governmental and social patterns of authority, due primarily to inherited and prevailing political culture. From this perspective, it may be inferred that indigenous political culture, as reinforced by colonial socialization and the acculturation process, is quintessentially non-supportive of a democratic political process. On the one hand, “it left with the nascent political elite a role profile of political leadership cast in an elitist mould and created political structures calculated to foster in the elite particularistic values” (Dudley, 1973:37). On the other hand, “while creating institutions whose operating principles demand a participant and responsive political culture; it socialized the local population into a subject and passive behavioural disposition. As an inheritance nothing could be more conflict generating” (Dudley, 1973:39).

A final contextual factor often highlighted relates to the overriding problem of good governance: “stability can only be maintained if the boundary-determining rules are respected.” In this regard, Richard Joseph (1991) has contended that, “Nigeria’s present and future depend upon a prior understanding of the nature, extent and persistence of a certain mode of

political behaviour, and of its social and economic ramifications” (1991:1). This “mode of political behaviour” is the prebendal culture which sees politics as a clearing house for jobs, contract and official plunder. In Joseph’s exposition, “democratic politics and prebendal politics are two sides of the same coin in Nigeria; each can be turned over to reveal the other.”

The system of prebendal politics enables divergent groups and constituencies to seek to accommodate their interest ... the system persists although it seldom satisfies such criteria. It is often wasteful, unproductive, and contributes to the increasing affluence of a relative few, paltry gains for a larger number, and misery for the great majority of the people. Since it is a self-justifying system which grants legitimacy to a pattern of persistent conflict, and since its modus operandi is to politicize ethnic, regional and linguistic differences, it serves to make the Nigerian polity a simmering cauldron of unresolvable tensions over which a lid must regularly be clamped, and just as regularly removed (Joseph, 1991:10).

This entrenchment of political culture, “primitive accumulation,” has been regarded by Nigerians and non-Nigerians alike, as the greatest challenge to democratic consolidation in Nigeria. The resilience and intractability of this syndrome on the Nigerian political process only found its graphic expression in the exposure of the Senate Committee in the current dispensation which indicted a number of its officers, including the Senate President. It has also regrettably been the source of the cankerworm (corruption) and “everything vile, brutal and oppressive” in the Nigerian society. As the pioneer President of Nigeria (Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe) forewarned: “with the vice permeating the country, the prestige of our nation will dwindle to the vanishing point, defacing our national image and bringing shame to those who wear the *agbada* of Nigerian citizenship.”

Unfortunately, Dr. Azikiwe's warning went unheeded even by subsequent national leaders (military and civilian) and the consequent damage to the national psyche could be seen in a world outlook where every

Nigerian is a potential 419 (Criminal). As Karl Maier puts it in his scathing treatise on Nigeria, *This House Has Fallen* (2001), “to most outsiders, the name Nigeria conjures up images of chaos and confusion, military coups, repression, drug trafficking and business fraud.” The system of prebendal politics and the culture of settlement, mediocrity, opportunism and thuggery it promotes now constitute the bane of our societal progress. Against this background of multiple disorder and contradictions, the pervasiveness of violent conflict in the Nigerian social formation is not a subject of dispute. Nigeria, according to USAID/OTI Report, “appears to be a nation in chaos, a nation at the brink. From the religious conflicts in the North and the Middle Belt, to the ethnic violence in the South West, and to what he calls the ‘low level guerrilla warfare’ in the Niger Delta, the defining characteristic of Nigeria over the last decade has been conflict. Nigeria is a country that often seems on the verge of collapse and places like Lagos appears to be little more than managed anarchy, but somehow, the country stays together and keeps forging ahead” (Boer, 2000).

SECTION ONE

1.1 Methodology

This section deals with the research design, scope and sampling procedure. It also discusses the sources and instrument of data collection as well as the assumptions of the study.

1.1.1 Research Design

This study involves field survey in order to obtain relevant data from appropriate opinion strata. In-depth interview and focus group discussion (FGD) are employed to source primary data for this investigation. Key persons to be interviewed are members of governmental organizations, international community, civil society, individuals and groups. The responses are discussed along governmental, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations tracks.

1.1.2 Scope and Sampling Procedure

The study focuses on the South-South geo-political zone of Nigeria that is sometimes referred to as the Niger Delta region. The research adopts a stratified sampling technique, as it is difficult for a survey of the entire conflict population of the zone to be covered. For this reason, three major flash points are selected from the area. These are:

S/No.	Areas Involved	Nature of Conflict	Basis of Conflict
1	Oku Iboku (in Itu Local Government Area, Akwa Ibom State) and Usung Esuk (in Odukpani Local Government Area, Cross River State).	Inter-State boundary dispute	(a) Boundary (b) Economic Resources
2	Eleme and Okrika (both in Rivers State).	Communal Conflict	(a) Boundary (b) Ownership of benefits from oil Refinery and Petrochemical Industries
3	Isekiri, Urhobo and Ijaw (all in Delta State).	Ethnic Conflict	Political Supremacy in Warri City.

These areas are viewed as the boiling points of the South-South zone.

1.1.3 Sources and Instrument of Data Collection

The sensitive nature of the subject-matter limits the sample used only to individuals and groups that are affected, related and/or knowledgeable about the violent conflict in the selected flash points. Due to the differences in the nature of the conflicts and the demographic plurality of the actors, the data for the study are basically derived through responses from unstructured in-depth interview conducted in the affected areas. Interview is considered most suitable in this study since it provides first-hand information and assessment of the subject-matter. However, this is complemented with

information from secondary sources such as government published documents.

1.1.4 Technique of Data Analysis

The study adopts the Actor-Trigger-Conflict (ATC) approach to analyse the conflict spectrum in the area of study. This method, although non-empirical, helps to identify the major causes, actors, and to elucidate the dynamics of violent conflict in the midst of intervening responses. The approach is hypothetically conceptualized as follows:



Where:

- A = Predisposing variables (Actors and Structural Factors)
 B = Intervening variables (Triggers and Dynamics)
 C = Dependent variables (Violent Conflict)

This model is drawn from trivariate hypothesis that explains the differences between patterns of conflict development within similar social systems, in which violent eruption is predicated upon the existence of intervening variables (the triggers and dynamics). However, within this framework, there may also exist some conflict systems in which multiple triggers (B and D) converge to produce violent conflict.

1.1.5 Assumptions of the Study

For the purpose of this research study, the following assumptions are formulated:

- (a) That the sample for this study is a fair representation of the conflict population in the South-South zone;

- (b) That the selected respondents in this study possess a fairly good knowledge of the subject matter of the research;
- (c) That each respondent's opinion is in no way influenced by those of others;
- (d) That the opinions expressed by the respondents sampled are not significantly different from the position of those not covered by the sample.

1.1 Types of Conflict and their structural causes (South-South Zone)

Conflict patterns in the "South-South" zone of Nigeria could be considered a microcosm (a reproduction and condensation) of larger conflict developments in the Nigerian social system. The tremendous diversity presented by the ethnic composition, social-economic structure, and physical characteristics of the country has had far-reaching spatial consequences for the nature and spiral of protracted social conflict in the post-colonial era. These conflicts have varied widely according to the intensity of scale of violence, the character of parties involved and spatial dimensions of the trajectories of each. The unique combination of these features constitutes the spectrum of conflict systems in the South-South zone of Nigeria. However, in analytical terms, a composite understanding of these immanent conflicts requires a conceptual clarification of the structure and process of conflict systems as a framework for possible investigation into the prevailing conflict types in the "South-South" zone of Nigeria. Such a clarification must necessarily examine both the structural conditions and the psycho-cultural dispositions in given conflict system. The former directs attention to forces which can make a society more or less prone than another to particular levels and forms of conflict and violence.

The latter (psycho-cultural dispositions) determines the overall level of conflict in a society in terms of shared assumptions, perceptions and images about “what people in a society value, their definitions of friends and foes, and the means groups and individuals use to pursue their goals” (Ross, 1993:8). As is evident in the three conflict clusters (Cross River-Akwa Ibom Border Conflict; Eleme-Okrika and Warri Crises) in the present SCA study, both set of factors are mutually reinforcing:

Each set of factors explains different aspects of conflict behaviour, making sense of something the other cannot fully explain. The fears and threats identified in the psycho-cultural explanation account for the intensity of feelings involved, but only the structural explanation can speak to why actions are taken in a particular direction (Ross, 1993:9).

It could, thus, be argued that from the standpoint of explanatory theory, that the structural variables provide predisposing factors while psycho-cultural factors constitute intervening variables suggesting the direction of action. Structural conditions “primarily explain who one’s friends and foes will be when conflict develop, whereas psycho-cultural conflict theory best predicts a community’s overall level of conflict.” In other words, as K. Avruch (1991) has noted in a similar context, “structural explanations for conflict, violence and warfare focus on how the organization of society shapes actions, whereas psycho-cultural explanations look to the actors themselves and how they interpret the world.”

The conflation of these two sets of factors provides the basis of an interpretative paradigm for analysis and explanation of the origin and trajectories of conflict development in the South-South zone of Nigeria. This is so because any “culture of conflict has typical patterns of escalation, redefinition, extension to new parties, and termination that have both structural and psycho-cultural components (Rangarajan, 1985). It is only in

this context that it could be understood why, for example, boundary or land dispute in certain parts of the zone has developed into fearsome contest between communities while in other parts the same type of dispute have remained only latent disagreement.

Thus, analysis of any conflict system requires investigation into its dynamic components as expressed in its manifest structure and process. The conflict structure generally comprises: (i) conflict situation; (ii) conflict behaviour; and (iii) conflict attitudes and perceptions in terms of their complex and multi-dimensional inter-relationships. Processes, on the other hand, express changing pattern in the behaviour of the parties as they “alter strategies and react to each other’s actions, making minor escalatory or descaltory moves, or initiating major changes such as adopting coercion instead of conciliation” (Deutsuch, 1969:11).

By focusing on goal incompatibilities (“material” and “positional” goods, to use Hirsch’ categories), a range of psychological conditions and a set of related behaviours, conflict structure provides the best way for classification or taxonomies of conflict (conflict types). In the South-South zone of Nigeria, these conflicts range from bloody communal clashes over land to intra-clan violent disputes over succession to traditional throne. A current of survey of these conflict developments reveals a disturbing pattern of accelerating rise in the intensity or scale of violence arising from dwindling capital resources (land), demographic explosion, social fragmentation and decay, between ethnic groups, economic and political marginalisation and repression, and articulation of class interests.

TABLE 1: Conflict Spectrum: South-South Zone

Conflict Type	Values/Goals	Protagonist	State	Outcome
Ethnic/Communal	Land (Border and Farmland)	Bekwarra, Ishibori,	Cross River	Buffer Zone
		Idomi-Ugep Bete-Tiv	Cross River	
		Iyala – Izu	Cross River	Unresolved
		Eket-Ibeno	Benue	Unresolved
		Ikot Umo Essien	Cross River / Ebonyi	
		Nkawa	Akwa Ibom	Unresolved
		Agbere/Beseni	Akwa Ibom	Buffer Zone
		Odoni/Agbere	Abia	
		Elgiode-Ivu Age	Bayelsa	Buffer Zone
		Edo	Buffer Zone	
Political Conflict	Location of	Ijaw-Itsekiri	Delta	Armed Peace
	Administrative	Political factions in		
	Headquarters (LGA)	Akpabuyo LGA	Cross River	Unresolved
	Control of LGA	Ika LGA	Akwa Ibom	Unresolved

	Chairmanship	Emehua LGA	Rivers	Unresolved
Resource War	Oil Production (Employment, Social Welfare) Timber/Benefits from Infrastructure	Odukpani/Itu LGA Ibena-Eket Ogoni-FGN Eket-Mobil Ogoni-Shell	Cross River/ Akwa Ibom Akwa Ibom Rivers Akwa Ibom Rivers	Judicial Commission of Inquiry Pacification Unresolved Unresolved
Dethronement/ Succession	Clan factions Clan factions	Akpabuyo LGA Akpabuyo LGA	Cross River Cross River	Uncertain Uncertain

These situational conditions have constituted a veritable conflict vortex in the zone under consideration. As could be seen from the above scheme, the character of parties in conflict varies considerably according to the primary basis of group mobilization (ethnic/communal identification, political faction/association, occupational and class interests as well as institutional defenders or detractors). Similarly, the range of issues or values involved varies from “material” resources of positional goods involving exclusive ownership of resources, status and prestige to precedence in traditional institutions and local government headquarters. An elaboration of these structural causes is represented below:

1.3 Structural Causes of Conflict

Security

The states within the region could all be classified to one degree or another as insecure, with levels of violent conflict and crime on the increase. There is grave distrust in the federal security apparatus for numerous reasons including high levels of corrupt practices carried out within and by the institutions, as well as their overall ineffectiveness in bringing any security to the communities. This may be exacerbated by the delays in paying policemen salaries and allowances. Most worrying, however, is the fast growth of “cult” organizations that are alleged to be the personal “thug armies” of local and state government politicians. These vigilante groups of armed men carry out vicious acts of violence with impunity, and there is substantial evidence that their membership extends not only to the universities in the region, but also to secondary schools. This has had a direct impact on the performance of the police, as they often find themselves defenceless and agitated about their own security vis-à-vis these groups.

There is widespread availability of small arms and light weapons throughout the region, many of which are believed to have been brought into the country by Nigerian peace-keeping forces serving in Liberia and/or Sierra Leone through ECOMOG. Smuggling of small arms (and other illegal products) through the ports in the region is also considered to be a major problem. It is anticipated that violence will be on the increase in the run-up to and during local government elections, and there are already indications of thug armies increasing their gun supplies.

Political/Government

Electoral violence is attributed to the unfair and corrupt practices of local politicians. Many perceive that most, if not all, local government elections are rigged, with election monitors often physically attacked and communities frightened from leaving their homes to vote by the intimidation of the vigilante groups. There are other examples of political assassinations that have been carried out. Through such tactics, LGA chairmen are also able to deliver block votes in favour of the candidate they support for Governor.

In addition to the crisis that this results in during and immediately before election periods, there is the additional concern that it creates a vicious cycle of violence. If politicians rely heavily on criminals to get them into office, they will be indebted to them in future and are unlikely to hold them to account for any further acts of violence or crimes committed. One could logically assume that such linkages impact on decision-making at state and federal levels as well, making the likelihood of demobilizing these groups even more remote.

The method of local government authority (LGA) creation has been at the root of several disputes, as communities see the existence of an LGA

as a “ticket to a share of the federal purse” (which comes with both direct and indirect benefits).

The lack of transparency and accountability throughout state and local government spending is also a major source of conflict, as no one agrees on what amount of money is allocated for what purposes, how much is spent or what it is actually used for. It is literally impossible for community or civil society organizations to receive information about state or LGA budgets or development spending, and a number of conflicts have arisen because of perceived misuse of funds. LGA chairmen in some cases do not live anywhere close to their communities and only physically appear to collect the monthly transfer from the federal government. More recently, after local government elections were postponed, a vacuum has been created at the political leadership level in LGAs, and staff in several of the ones visited had not received salary payments for several months (in some cases over a year). It was not surprising therefore that we found virtually empty offices. No one could explain where the money transferred to make civil servant salary payments had actually gone.

The serious corruption that exists at all levels throughout the country has had a direct impact at the local levels as well as people cite example after example of cases where vast sums of money disappeared into the pockets of the political elite. As a result, many believe that the government has no “moral authority” to be in power and no right to expect any better from its citizens. Many also feel that engaging in corrupt activities themselves would only be taking a tiny slice of the “national cake” where others have made hundreds of millions.

Economic

Historical conflicts in the region tended to be over land resources. This has only been exacerbated by the presence of oil and/or other natural resources (e.g. forests), as communities fight bitterly to claim the land that holds the natural wealth. Unclear policies regarding the designation of only certain communities (e.g., where oil is actually drilled) as “host communities” has been problematic and a source of contention, as there are several other communities that are impacted by the oil industry (e.g., where petrochemical factories are located, gas-flaring takes place, pipelines cut through the land, etc.). as oil companies are encouraged to support programmes to improve the conditions of host communities, compensate them for environmental damage and institute recruitment policies that favour indigenous people from these communities, this question becomes all the more pertinent and has resulted in violent conflict erupting in some cases where it has not been resolved.

More recent conflicts, and especially the militant youth phenomenon, are historically attributed to the inequitable distribution of resources throughout the country. Several people cited the incidence in 1994/5 when the late President Abacha invited thousands of youth from around the country, including the South-South region, to Abuja to try and win their support for his election as a democratic leader. For most of these young people, it was the first opportunity to observe at close quarters how oil revenue was being utilised in other parts of the country.

TABLE 2: Structures – Analysis of Long Term and Proximate Factors Underlying Conflict in South-South Zone, Nigeria

	Justice/Security	Political/Government	Economic	Social
International	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arms flows from neighbouring countries and from regional peace-keeping (ECOWAS /ECOMOG) • Drug trade 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International concern about terrorism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smuggling goods from neighbouring countries (drug) • Corruption within international organizations • Pressure on economy from Globalisation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment impact of oil producing practices
National	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corruption and patronage within security forces • Hard handed responses by Federal government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transition to civilian democracy has led to gap between expectation and reality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic disparities between Centre and States • Pressure to open 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dominance of three largest ethnic groups • Several failed community

	<p>on activists</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poorly controlled borders • Lawlessness/lack of independent judiciary 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government legitimacy • Extreme levels of corruption • Lack of transparency and accountability • Impunity of those committing crimes • Disjuncture between policy and practice • Ethnic policies: resource control • Federal/State tension • Weak political parties 	<p>markets/privatize institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unattractive environment for investment (Policies, infrastructure, corruption, high % rates, etc.) • Low purchasing power of the Naira • High cost of living • Import dependency 	<p>projects in the past leading to distrust, cynicism and skepticism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High population growth rate
State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corruption within State Security apparatus 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political marginalisation of the region 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of local economics (dependency on oil 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poor educational facilities • Different

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lawlessness • Large availability of small arms and light weapons • High criminal activities • Ethnic warlords 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Flawed elections/political violence • Inequitable wealth distribution • Border disputes between States • Political disputes over ownership and control of resources • State/LGA tension • Links between politicians and armed cult groups • Lack of popular participation 	<p>industry)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extremely high unemployment level • “Easy-money” syndrome • Compensation culture • Poor infrastructure • Land disputes/Border disputes 	<p>educational/skill levels between States</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Get-rich-quick culture based on uncertainty • low morale
Local	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth militias/cults • Vigilante groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of government capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High poverty levels • Contested division of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth revolt/military

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patronage and corruption throughout government offices and services • Succession/dethrone ment crisis within traditional institutions (discredit of traditional rules) • Disputes over location of LGA Headquarters • Bloated civil service • Unfair election practices • Legal vs. Customary laws 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> royalties from oil • Control over untapped resources • Disputes over what constitutes a “host community” • High levels of LGA debt • Lack of economic independence • Misconceived perceptions/rumours over allocation of resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long history of conflict between ethnic groups (usually over land) • Discredited traditional leaders • Perceived unfair recruitment practices within large institutions • Indigene vs. Settler • Breakdown of social cohesion/values
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As noted in the preamble, the surveys focus on in-depth study of three flashpoints (the Cross River-Akwa Ibom border conflict, Eleme-Okrika and Warri Crises). Apart from the unacceptable degree of fatalities involved, these conflicts have been extremely disruptive of commercial activities, movement of people and fuel supplies in the country. A summary of the actors and dynamics of these protracted social crises will be attempted below.

1.4 Dynamics and Actors

A. Cross River – Akwa Ibom Boundary Disputes

As a release from the Department of State Services (DSS) notes, since the creation of Akwa Ibom State from the Cross River in 1987, several bloody communal clashes, “which left many houses destroyed, lives lost and property worth millions of Naira destroyed” have occurred. The fighting has largely centred on the portion of land adjoining the bridge-head between Oku-Iboku in Itu Local Government Area of Akwa Ibom State and Ikot Offiong/Mbiabo Edere in Odukpani Local Government Area of Cross River State.

i. Actors

- State government (CRS and AKS)
- Local Government Council (CRS and AKS)
- Communities (Oku-Iboku and Ikot Offiong)
- Youth militias.

ii Dynamics

The problem initially surfaced as a result of unilateral boundary demarcation by Akwa Ibom State Government and the retaliatory action of some interest groups in Cross River State who blew up the boundary demarcation notice erected by the Akwa Ibom State government. This

eventually developed into confrontation among ethnic communities in the amorphous boundary region of both states. As of now, Ikot Offiong village (Cross River indigenes) remains a ghost area after being sacked by ethnic militias of Akwa Ibom State origin, with several casualties and the survivors now leave in a refugee camp in Calabar (Ikot Ekpo).

Thus, the struggle for land, as the Station Officer (SO) of Oku Iboku Divisional Police Station argues, has been a major factor in the conflict. Apart from the scarcity of arable land in the area, the widespread suspicion of the existence of petro-carbon deposit in the mangrove belt of the Cross River exacerbated the conflict. The border region remains dangerously tense and periodically erupts into violence. For instance, in February 2002, Usung Esuk was invaded by armed ethnic militias (from Akwa Ibom communities in Itu LGA) for giving refuge to Ikot Offiong people. According to the DCS Report, houses were razed, cars were intercepted on the highway and burnt and a number of unlucky commuters lost their lives.

As in most conflict-affected environments, there are multiple variables and triggers that cut across economic, security, political and social dimensions; these come together to create situations of violent conflict in the South-South zone.

The border problem between Cross River and Akwa Ibom States is primarily over a piece of land that is believed to have oil reserves (although no exploration has yet been carried out). Unclear state and LGA boundary lines cut through ethnic groups, leaving thousands of people from a particular ethnic group mostly associated with Cross River in land that now belongs to Akwa Ibom. Over the last eighteen months or so, they have been displaced to Cross River and are effectively living as refugees with little state or local government support. The likelihood of these groups retaliating if nothing is done to resolve their grievances is very high.

Many believe that the politicians in Akwa Ibom capitalized on the restless, unemployed youth to sponsor violence that will benefit them and their communities both politically and economically. The struggle by Akwa Ibom (where most of its oil is offshore) to control the land that is believed to have oil is all the more urgent now that the Federal Government has ruled that any offshore oil is Federal Government property, meaning that states will no longer receive the 13% derivation for the oil produced off their shores and will no longer be paid for offshore sources of oil.

Examples of Conflict Triggers in South-South Zone

- Elections: If there is increased demand for change without sufficient pressure to control cult groups this could result in a very violent election.
- If the implementation of MOUs with Oil Companies is considered fraudulent, or the recruitment practices of large institutions is considered to be biased towards one ethnic group
- If the drop in revenues derived from offshore oil results in severe budget constraints and job losses at state level.

Local Conflict Actors

- Government/politicians (Federal, State & Local)
- Communities /Groups
- Armed thugs/vigilantes
- Youth militia/youth groups
- Oil Companies
- Military and Police
- Traditional Rulers

The Okrika/Eleme conflict in Rivers State shares many of the same characteristics. Whereas originally a land dispute (dating several decades) has now become a fight over the land on which a federally owned petrochemical refinery is built, and over who should be considered the host community. The Okrika believe that the refinery was employing less of their community than they were entitled to, and as a result youth groups demonstrated violently and set up road-blocks to prevent the public (including Elemes) from getting to the refinery. The Elemes reacted to this demonstration and the situation quickly turned into violent conflict with properties burnt, destroyed, damaged and looted as well as a number of people killed.

Again, in this example, youth groups were used to carry out fighting on behalf of their communities, and there is evidence to show that the community leaders in Okrika were well aware of the planned demonstration but rather than restraining the youth, they actively encouraged it.

TABLE 3: Conflict Scenario in Cross River/Akwa Ibom Conflict

Scenario	Features	Possible Benchmarks or Indicators
Intensified and prolonged conflict	Long periods of fighting and counter attacks across the Cross Rivers/Akwa Ibom border, which worsen as a result of the upcoming LGA elections	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government pushes implementation of favour of Cross River, or • No compensation for IDPs who retaliate by chasing Akwa Ibom people out of Cross River • Increased number of IDPs on both sides • Increasing hard-line statements from both Governors • Federal police and army mobilized to
Conflict protracted conflict	Periods of violent conflict followed by relatively calm periods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inconclusive attempts to resolve disputes through arbitration, court rulings that are not implemented • Little evidence of real commitment to peace from either or both sides
Conciliatory moves	Positive statements made by Governors (and Deputy Governors) from both sides. Evidence that	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of increasing contact between both states • Less reliance on federal security apparatus for security and freer movement across the border by all

	productive dialogue between opinion leaders (including traditional leaders) from both sides is taking place	ethnic groups
Negotiation	Serious participatory negotiations are undertaken involving various stakeholders (including youth groups)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that issues of serious concern are being addressed (e.g., land rights and boundary lines, resource control if/when oil is to be produced) • Growing confidence in a peaceful resolution being reached • IDPs begin to envisage returning to their land
Transition towards a sustainable peace	Peace holds between the states	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing number of IDPs return to their homes • Security in the region returns • Independent verification that IDPs are accepted back into their communities • No/few reports that the minority groups are harassed by the majority ones

B. Eleme-Okrika Conflict

According to the White Paper on Eleme-Okrika conflict issued by the Rivers State Government of Nigeria – “Conclusion of the Government of Rivers State on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Eleme, Ogu and Okrika Communal Conflict,” 7th January, 2000:

- i. The commission considered historical references and judicial decisions and identified the most important factor on the remote causes of the conflict as land ownership and found:

“in the light of the facts, therefore, that it is the refusal of Okrikas to accept the obvious fact that the land areas right down the water edge or coastline, belong to the Elemes, and that even the 1000 feet from the high water mark allowed them by both the Arbitration Panel and Court of competent jurisdiction was given to them by the Elemes for settlement for trading purposes only. That is the crux of the remote causes of the continuing conflict between both parties.”

However, in recent times, the competition for benefits, such as jobs, managerial positions, contracts, compensation from the companies ignited further tension and violence as was the case in October 1999.

i. Actors

- Communities (Okrika and Eleme)
- Youth militias
- Government (State and Local Councils)
- Corporate Management (NNPC Refinery, Petrochemical Industry)
- Traditional Institutions

ii. Dynamics

Although the Eleme-Okrika conflict is rooted in the contentious disagreement of the two communities over land since the 1930s, the triggers of the current crisis involve goal incompatibilities (“material” and “positional goods”) over access to jobs and positions in the NNPC Refinery and

Petrochemical Industries. This led to demonstrations carried out by the Okrika Mainland Youth Development on Monday, 4th October 1999, outside the premises of the Port Harcourt Refining Company. A counter-demonstration by the Eleme Youths resulted in fracas and “eventually to the shooting of guns.” The confrontation paralysed fuel supply in most parts of the Eastern Region and caused extensive destruction of lives and properties. Since the year 2000, there has been periodic outbreak of inter and intra-communal violence that have continued to create an unsettled environment in the area.

TABLE 4: Conflict Scenario in Eleme/Okirika Conflict

Scenario	Features	Possible Benchmarks or Indicators
Intensified and prolonged conflict	Demonstration carried out by youths outside Port Harcourt Refinery Company The involvement of the Elders and Elites in the violent demonstration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youths' show reminiscent of cultism in their mode of dressing • Disturbances and molestation of innocent road users
Protracted conflict	Periodic road blocks along Eleme/Okrika road and violent attack from both sides Forceful stoppage of the implementation of boundary demarcation exercise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government decision on the boundary dispute not implemented • Lack of commitment to peace from either side or both sides.
Conciliatory moves	A White Paper on the conclusion of the Government of Rivers State on the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of increasing presence of security men in the affected area

Negotiation	Participatory Peace-building negotiation undertaken by AAPW involving various stakeholders (including Traditional rulers, youth, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Growing confidence in a peaceful resolution of the conflict• Increasing access through the Eleme/Okrika road
Transition towards a sustainable peace	There exists uneasy calmness in the area	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Government and traditional rulers intervention.

C. Warri Crisis

The recurrent ethnic violence in Warri is a result of a complex mix of historical development and contemporary political and sociological factors. The growth, expansion, and intersection of the three ethnic groups in the past four hundred years and the differential administrative policy of the British colonial power engendered “catastrophic balance” between contending ethnic forces in Warri and shaped the structures of politics in the area. The reciprocal trajectories of communal violence between the Ijaws and Itsekiris and Urhobos since early 1990s have resulted in the phenomenon of violence trap where identity and violence reinforced each other.

In concrete terms, the causes of conflict between the three ethnic groups reside in goals and means incompatibilities, varying from material resources to positional goods involving:

- (a) Disputes over ownership of Warri land and corresponding “settler” designation for migrants;
- (b) Suzerainty of the Olu of Warri. For the Itsekiri, the Olu is a paramount ruler of the “Itsekiri homeland” (Warri): an institution they claim has existed in antecedent Itsekiri Kingdom since 1480 A.D. For the Ijaws and the Urhobos, the Olu’s paramountcy starts and ends within the Itsekiri community. To them, the Itsekiri’s claim is untenable;
- (c) The corresponding dispute over the legitimacy of claim by non-Itsekiri ethnics to separate Local Government Council in Warri metropolis; and
- (d) Royalties from mineral marginalisation arising from either demographic factor (Itsekiri vis-à-vis Urhobo and Ijaw) or hegemonic control and utilization of political apparatuses to advance parochial goals to the detriment of other communities.

These structural conditions, the respondents from each of the ethnic communities generally agree, have set the foundation and context for the violent conflict development in Warri since the early 1990s.

i. Actors

- Communities (Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo)
- Youth militias (Menbatu Group, Agbara)
- Leaders and Elders Forum (Urhobo Progressive Union; Ijaw National Council, Itsekiri Leadership Forum)
- Government (State and Local Councils)
- Multinational Corporations (Shell, Chevron)
- Traditional Institutions
- Security Forces

ii. Dynamics

As noted in the preamble, conflict in Warri metropolis dates back to the colonial era. The current violent trend arose in early 1990s and the more recent bloody exchanges goes back to March 1997. In order to determine the factors sustaining this accelerated scale of violence (dubbed “Mutually Assured Destruction” by the Press following the May-June, 1999 mayhem in Warri), two related questions were posed about: "Why the problem between the three ethnic communities is escalating today"? and, “what do you want to see happen to other ethnic communities other than yours in terms of the control of Warri?”

The general response shows that the undercurrent of violence and adversarial relationship between the Itsekiri and the Urhobo on the one hand, and Itsekiri and Ijaw on the other, hinges on multiple factors arising from perception and misperception of hegemonic intent on the part of contending social forces in each of the communities.

Second, is the widespread perception of failure on the part of the government in terms of its judicial and administrative responsibilities. The

Federal Government, it is asserted, failed to release and implement results of panels set up to look into the Warri crisis – reports whose recommendations are perceived to favour the Ijaws and Urhobos. As a result, they contend that the Itsekiris have much power and influence over the Federal Government.

Finally, the current ward demarcation in the three Local Government Areas (which granted 11 wards to the Itsekiris, 8 wards to the Urhobos and 1 ward to the Ijaws) has been seen by the Itsekiris as a clever exercise in gerrymandering by the Urhobo-dominated state government. Some members of the Itsekiri Leadership Forum interviewed have, therefore, signified the willingness of the Itsekiri youth militias to resist this “imposition” in the coming elections.

TABLE 5: Conflict Scenario in Warri

Scenario	Features	Possible Benchmarks or Indicators
Intensified and prolonged conflict	Conflict tradition dating from the 1920s Escalation in the 1990s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Olu of Itsekiri to Olu of Warri • Damaging stereotypes • Land disputes • Deployment of Army/Police
Protracted conflict	Inflammatory exchanges Arms build-up Electoral violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commission Reports yet to be released and implemented • Breakdown of communications • Contested ward demarcation
Conciliatory moves	Peace network established between communities Exchange of visits between Paramount Rulers Creation of new wards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Channel of communication • Re-orientation of youths through workshops • Development and Employment programmes • Troops withdrawn
Negotiation	Inter-governmental dialogue Periodic meeting of stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of legislative Resolutions • Commitment on the part of the Governor to

	Increasing corporate-host community activities	<p>project Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Freedom of movement
Transition towards sustainable peace	<p>Fairly stable environment</p> <p>Return of Elite to the city</p> <p>Mutual recognition of traditional rulers</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commercial Activities • Social life at night • Respect for law and order • Systematic implementation of Official Report

Synthesis

A synthesis of the analysis of the three conflict flashpoints (AKW/CRS Boundary Conflict; Eleme-Okrika and Warri Conflict) shows that:

- i. Land (and its resources) is the dominant object of contention;
- ii. Ethnic militias are the major instruments of combat;
- iii. In terms of dynamics and outcome, the conflicts are yet to be resolved and these give rise to periodic violence and confrontation.

TABLE 6: In-Country Fieldwork

State	Value/Goals	Protagonist	Creating Conditions of Conflict	Conflict Management
Cross River/ Akwa Ibom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land • Resources 	Youth Militias	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political Elites • Communities • Traditional Institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security Operations • National Boundary Commission • National Emergency Management Agency • Traditional Institutions
Rivers State (Eleme/Okrika)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land • Employment 	Youth Militias	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communities • Political Elites • Traditional Institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security operatives • Judicial commission • NGOs (Academic Associate Peace Work)
Delta State (Warri Crisis)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land • Resources • Control of LGCs 	Youth Militias	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communities • Political Elites • Traditional institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security operatives • Commission of Enquiry • NGOs/CBOs • Corporate Bodies

SECTION TWO

RESPONSES

2.4 TRACK ONE: Government Responses

The fieldwork confirmed that for the most part, violent conflicts in the South-South have been seen by the federal government from a security standpoint, where containment and suppression have been the primary objectives (rather than long term conflict resolution). This is especially true in the strategically important oil-producing areas, where the government has been quick to deploy security forces from outside the conflict areas. In addition to the deployment of security forces, the government has called for the establishment of Committee on Peace, Security and Welfare at local levels – yet our fieldwork indicated that few such committees had been created, and established ones are largely ineffective.

However, there is also evidence of federal government initiatives aimed at addressing some of the identified root causes of conflict at a macro level (e.g., anti-corruption measures taken to bring those involved in scandalous corruption deals to justice, employment generation initiatives, etc.). Perhaps most important for this part of the country is the creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000, which was established to “facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful.” Through the NDDC Act, the Commission is funded through a number of sources including 10% of the federal monthly statutory allocations due to the states within the region, 3% of total budget of oil and gas processing companies, 50% of the Ecological Fund allocations to the states, proceeds from NDDC assets and other

miscellaneous sources (including foreign assistance). Put together, this gives the NDDC a relatively large sum of money to work with.

A number of other high profile development commissions in the past (including the Niger Delta Development Board set up in 1960 and the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission established in 1993) had failed to make any significant impact on the development or sustainability of peace in the region. Therefore, NDDC has been met with a skeptical public who are yet to be convinced that they will fare any differently.

During its less than two years of operation, NDDC has concentrated on two main areas: (i) completing unfinished projects that the region inherited from past governments and commissions, and (ii) developing a regional development plan. There is not yet much to show on the ground and one of the main problems seems to be the rapid politicization of the commission. Any decision on projects or the award of contracts has to be passed through the NDDC Board that is made up of representatives from member states (as well as from the federal government and one representative from the oil companies), and eventually signed off by the federal government. The problem seems to be that the Board members are mostly politicians who are more concerned about who are awarded contracts (presumably as it is a way of winning political favours) than about the quality, efficiency or speed within which projects are delivered on the ground. This manipulation of the system for patronage is likely to become all the more evident in the light of the upcoming elections.

There is also concern that NDDC will duplicate projects that are already budgeted for within the state or LGA budgets, which would not only allow for the misuse of government funds, but in the longer term may undermine efforts at strengthening state/local government performance and accountability. What is urgently required is more participation and transparency in NDDC's operations. Communities need to be part of the

decision-making when it comes to identifying priorities in their area. And once decisions are taken, they need to know exactly what was decided, how much money was allocated and for what purposes. Much of the implementation and monitoring of activities can be done by the communities themselves, but they must have the necessary information to do so. If not, rumours of fraud or corrupt practices may become widespread which could lead to an extremely explosive situation, given the widely held perception that the NDDC has such vast sums of money intended for development purposes.

NDDC's regional development plan is an innovative initiative, and if successful, should provide a framework for all development actors (both local and international) to integrate and coordinate their joint efforts. The process (which will take at least 18 months and is being managed by GTZ) will begin by defining the existing situation (including collection of baseline and demographic data, and using GIS mapping throughout the region), identifying needs, gaps and investigation solutions in various sectors (infrastructure, natural resources, health, education, private sector promotion, social development and agriculture), and using these sectoral studies to develop the eventual regional development plan. What is most interesting from a conflict prevention perspective is that conflict assessment is a cross cutting theme that will be integrated into each sector study as well as be included in the analysis of baseline data (using the GIS mapping tools). The big question is how the plan will eventually be implemented, which will require not just adequate funding, but also the buy-in and ownership of all stakeholders, as well as the political will to see it through. Stakeholder participation even during the planning process will be critical if there is to be ownership at a later stage.

State governments have been involved in a number of measures targeted at resolving conflicts; although there is much skepticism about how

committed they really are to bring about peace. Serious conflicts are often followed by commissions of inquiry or interventions by state boundary commissions. Yet in two of the cases (Cross River/Akwa Ibom and Okrika/Elemé), the recommendations of the government, based on results of the inquiries, or White Paper were highly contested and had not been enforced. Even court rulings are for the most part ignored, as fighting continues and internally displaced people are scared to return to their homes. Part of the problem may lie in the process by which the inquiries take place. In some cases, the teams are made of people from outside the region who visit the area for a limited time period, consult with a very select group of people and reach a verdict – instead of using participatory processes to bring people together and attempt to reach consensus between the conflicting groups. Summary of the responses by government could be stated as follows:

(a) The Federal Government

In line with FGN crisis statecraft, the Federal government responded to the three conflict areas directly (through FGN/State apparatuses) and indirectly:

i. Cross River/Akwa Ibom Boundary Conflict: The Federal Government of Nigeria acted through:

- The National Boundary Commission
- Made an official pronouncement on the recognized boundary (Punch, March 11, 2002)
- Senate Panel on Boundary Disputes, led by Chuba Okadigbo
- Visit by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) to the disputed area
- Deployment of Mobile Police under the AIG Zone 6.

ii. Eleme-Okrika Conflict: The Federal Government of Nigeria:

- Authorised deployment of Mobile Police
- Acted through the Judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court
- Encouraged implementation of the Supreme Court judgement by the State.

iii. The Warri Crisis: The federal Government:

- Authorised deployment of Army and Police contingents
- Set up of Judicial Panel
- Demarcated Local Government Areas/Ward areas
- Boosted Infra-structural development through NDDC

(b) State Governments

i. Cross River/Akwa Ibom Boundary

- Joint Problem Solving/Strategy Building interventions (unsuccessful)
- Refugee settlement programme by Cross River State government
- Rejection of Federal Government of Nigeria official pronouncement on Boundary Demarcation by Akwa Ibom government.

ii. Eleme/Okrika Conflict

- Judicial Commission of Inquiry by the Rivers State Government
- Resuscitation of Rivers State Boundary Commission Law No. 5 of 1991 to implement the Supreme Court decision

- Establishment of cottage industries and vocational centres in collaboration with corporate bodies for the training of idle youths
- Provide the formula for employment of indigenes of Eleme (50%), Okrika (20%), Rivers people (20%), other Nigerians (10%) in the Refinery and Petrochemical industries
- Initiate a joint Community Relations Committee and budgetary contribution to PHRC Ltd for its host community projects.

iv. Warri Conflict

- Judicial Commission of Inquiry
- Restored Warri South Local Government Headquarters to Ogbe-Ijoh
- Warri LGA and Ward demarcation
- Agro-industrial scheme for job creation

2.5 TRACK TWO: Civil Society/Community Group Responses

As alluded to earlier, attempts to involve traditional rulers in conflict prevention/resolution or community development initiatives have been largely unsuccessful, as local chiefs are accused of keeping money intended for community projects for themselves (this is especially true of money given by oil companies). As a result, youth groups have become the power brokers in several communities, taking over community development committees. However, more recently, there have been attempts to bring some credibility back to the traditional leaders and in many areas, elders forums are being set up and given recognition.

A positive example is the case of a paramount chief in Calabar, who established a Peace & Security Council with a wide range of members

(government, security forces, church leaders, schools principals, market women, etc.) that meets every two months to exchange information and ideas and instill a sense of shared ownership and shared solution to the bringing about of peace. However, given the sensitivity of the problem between the two states, it appears that only government officials at the highest levels can speak to the actors on the other side, limiting the effectiveness of the council.

There are also a large number of local NGOs and civil society groups actively engaged in community development/conflict prevention work. Many of these are legitimate, have a grassroots base and are committed to making a difference, but there is also the impression that many “opportunistic” NGOs have been created in the past few years. However, in both the Eleme-Okrika and Warri crises, one NGO (the Academic Associates Peace Works, which has been very active in volatile situations in the country under its dynamic Director, Judith Burdin Asuni) was extensively involved in conducting conflict management workshop and “Joint Problem Solving/Strategy Building” meeting involving such constructive conflict management process as facilitative mediation. AAPW intervention in the Okrika-Eleme conflict was funded by USAID/OTI. The conflict management workshops it organized took place in October, 1999, followed by the Joint “Problem solving/Strategy Building” meetings (16 – 19 April, 2000). During our interview with the Secretary to the State Government (Rivers State), the intervention of the AAPW was highly commended for contributing to the strategy cycle for implementing various agreements and recommendations. As one of the state officials put it, “the workshop brought together for the first time the Elemes and Okrikas to a place without the presence of the police since the hostilities”.

In Warri, the AAPW Peace intervention activities took place between May 1999 and December 2000 under the sponsorship of United States Institute for Peace (USIP). It involved, first a conflict survey of Warri with a

view to identifying the environmental factors sustaining the violence and, to determine the requisite condition for a lasting settlement of the conflict. This was followed by a series of workshops for Mediators, Youth Leaders and Elders directly involved in the conflict (May – November, 1999). Subsequently, conflict management training workshop for Local Government Council members, Youth leaders and Elders in Delta State was mounted from December 1999 to January 2000 (at Warri South, Uvwie, Udu, Warri North and Bomadi). Besides the vital training in facilitative mediation, the workshops resulted in the creation, among others, of Peace Committee (called Bomadi Peace Family), with the goals of:

- creating the machinery for enlightenment programmes at the grassroots,
- attending rotational meetings in different locations,
- organizing monthly meetings of the Committee to identify and deal with conflict issues as they arise, and
- organizing a peace rally at Koko, in Warri.

Several recommendations (such as wards and LGA creation) from these workshops are being implemented under the current Administration of Mr. Ibori.

2.6 TRACK THREE: International Community Responses

There are relatively few international development actors in the South-South zone. USAID through OTI seems to have been the most significant one in the past, and in addition to funding community development initiatives (such as micro-credit programmes) they also sponsored training programmes and joint problem solving/strategy building workshops in partnership with local NGOs across the country. These initiatives were considered useful by some and successful in terms of raising awareness and building capacity of the participants in conflict

management/negotiation techniques. But they failed to have a lasting impact as for resolving the various conflicts, and there was also criticism about the choice of participants in the workshops, as many felt that they were not real decision-makers or true representatives from the warring communities.

UNDP is present in all states throughout the region, and in response to the conflicts has concentrated on working with government to find alternative employment solutions for youth, as a way of getting them off the streets, and less vulnerable to recruitment into cults and thug armies. Several skill centres have been established, and micro-credit schemes created to encourage self-employment for those who are unable to find employment. A major difficulty has been that the programmes are funded through a tripartite arrangement between UNDP, the government and the communities. In theory this should encourage participation and joint ownership, but in practice, teachers salaries are not paid, buildings are not maintained and supplies not provided – leaving programmes non-operational and ineffective. A separately organised UNDP/GTZ programme on community and skill development followed a different model, where larger sums of money were spent on fewer individuals and in-depth training was provided in specialized areas. The programme was implemented directly and did not rely on counterpart funding, which made it easier to deliver on schedule, but it is likely that it did not have the same amount of government or community ownership. The lack of alternative industries in the region will also limit the success of such initiative as there is a limit to how many mechanics, tailors, electricians, or hairdressers the region can absorb.

A number of donor organizations, including UNDP, the World Bank and the EU, have initiated community development programmes. All follow a similar model: using a bottoms-up approach to priority setting and project identification, carrying out needs assessments before programmes are started (providing benchmark welfare indicators and a way of monitoring and

measuring delivery and success) and considering issues of sustainability. Money is held in some sort of trust fund, and the typical requests from the communities are for projects aimed at improving social infrastructure (schools, health facilities, access roads, boreholes, bridges, etc.). Whilst none of the programmes seems to address conflict issues explicitly, it is assumed that they will have some impact on reducing conflict simply by reducing poverty levels at a community-level (through better services, improved infrastructure, and employment generation) and should result in empowerment and capacity building within the communities. This has been the thinking of multinational oil companies such as Shell and Chevron in Warri and the environs, which have been involved in extensive infrastructural development (such as roads) and the provision of potable water, schools and health care centers under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) initiated in the Abubakar-Obasanjo era.

The main difference between the various programmes is whether or not they work through government, and whether they are grant or loan facilities. Both the World Bank and UNDP programmes require state and community counterpart funding whereas the EU only requires community counterpart funding. The World Bank provides its funds through an IDA credit, repayable at concessional rates 35 (?) years, with the UNDP and the EU providing grant funds. The EU approach appears very popular with communities even though the amount of community counterpart funding is higher (25% as opposed to 10% by others) as they are directly accessible to the communities and are able to make quick funding decisions without being held back by government procedures. Their criteria for selecting projects also seem somewhat more flexible.

However, the question for development actors is to what extent this approach undermines attempts at strengthening government accountability and allows governments to shirk their responsibility. Or whether, in

societies with such highly corrupt, inefficient governments, where the failure to deliver services on the ground is fuelling violent conflict, it is more important to ensure effective service-delivery, empowering communities and supporting those that are willing to help themselves. Verifying that funds allocated are used for the purposes intended is absolutely critical, and it is important to decide on how and where this verification will take place. In such diverse societies as within this region, the village setting may be the most appropriate, where people are less likely to get away with claiming they are from a different ethnic group, or being dishonest about how they have used the funds. Another question is how these programmes will benefit the poorest communities who may not be able to organize themselves well enough to produce a decent project proposal or even if they can, will not be able to come up with the counterpart funding. And lastly, with the multitude of actors supporting similar initiatives, donor coordination is vital in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and wastage of resources.

Time constraints did not allow for an in-depth look at all development interventions supported by the international community. However, the overall sense was that the programmes on the ground have not been conceived with the specific intention of contributing to the prevention of conflict. As mentioned earlier, most actors simply assumed that by following good development principles (e.g. participatory decision-making, ownership, transparency, sustainability, etc.), their programmes would translate to preventive efforts.

And while this may well be the case in some instances, there was little evidence of development interventions being designed with the explicit intention of building peace between warring communities, nor was there evidence of programmes having set up effective systems for arbitrating any disputes that might arise in the areas affected by the projects. Mechanisms for preventing the marginalisation of ethnic or minority groups did not

appear to be proactively designed into programmes, nor did we come across any initiatives aimed at strengthening mechanisms of peaceful adjudication or settlement of disputes (such as court systems, legislature or alternative dispute mechanisms) at a regional/state level. There also did not appear to be any programmes to assist the region or states to tackle their security concerns (such as community policing, small arms reduction, strengthening of customs apparatus, etc), or programmes aimed at strengthening the democratic process.

So to a large extent, one could say that until recently the international donor community operating in the region has been working “around” conflict, without fully recognizing the links between their programmes and conflict, and not consciously attempting to design programmes with a primary focus on conflict prevention, management or resolution. The fact that this SCA exercise is being undertaken and supported by a number of donor/development organizations, however, sends a positive signal that their policies and priorities are changing, and hopefully that future programmes will be designed specifically to work “on” conflict.

This situation is somewhat different with the oil companies in the region who have long recognized the links between peace and development – or more crudely put, the adverse effects that violent conflict has had on their production and profits.

In the past they may not have so readily acknowledged, however, the adverse effects that their presence and the rapid generation of capital into a vulnerable economy have on peace and security. The oil companies have come under great criticism for not taking a greater responsibility in developing the surrounding communities and they are accused of throwing money at a few irresponsible individuals rather than ensuring projects that never took off. Much of the worst violent conflicts in the region can to one degree or another be linked to the production of “oil” and the real or perceived benefits that accrue

Typical Community issues with Oil Industry*

- Demand for community assistance/development
- Demand for employment
- Demand for community recognition/attention
- Contractor related disputes
- Disputes over unfulfilled promises
- Demand for amenities
- Intra and inter-communal disputes
- Ownership claims/disputes
- Perception of inequity

***Taken from Shell’s presentation on oil**

The worst critics believe that the behaviour of the oil companies was deliberate, as they benefited from a “divide and rule” approach. Kinder critics attribute it to ignorance within the companies and their lack of understanding of community development/political issues. Either way, their approach (at least according to the oil companies) appears to have changed quite dramatically over the past couple of years.

In addition to their mandatory 3% of budget contributions to NDDC, Shell, for example, now has its own community development/community relations departments and is focusing on improved stakeholder engagement, better communications programmes, relationship building, community development initiatives (based on participatory rural appraisals), the creation of alternative employment opportunities and economic empowerment programmes. They have sought help in developing systems for more effective consultation and have built in measures to ensure accountability and better distribution of their assistance, while limiting the opportunities for fraud and corruption. This has forced them not only to look at the way in which they interact with the external world, but also how they behave internally. Many will say that they have just become better at “spinning their story”, but if the oil companies are half as committed to changing as they claim they are, then they should soon be able to demonstrate this commitment in tangible terms.

SECTION THREE

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

2.1 Recommendations

The focus of these recommendations in this report is on what needs to be done to tackle the root causes underlying violent conflict in Nigeria's South-South zone. As the analysis has shown, there is a complex multiple interplay of factors contributing to conflict, and by necessity, there needs to be multiple and sometimes complex interventions and approaches to tackling them. For the most part these must be Nigerian owned and led, not least because they are best placed to do so and national ownership is critical to success, but also because foreign development assistance to Nigeria is so negligible, compared to the nation's GDP and the needs on the ground, that it is unlikely to have much influence on its own. Having said that, however, there is still a critical role for the international development community to play in supporting this long-term but inevitable process.

The table below summarises the key issues that need to be addressed and provides some suggestions for possible interventions, for which there should be shared ownership and responsibility between all levels of government as well as civil society (including private sector, the media, community groups, etc.).

At the national level, the government needs to build its legitimacy by working more closely with civil society on conflict management programmes and strengthening its efforts to tackle corruption and lawlessness. Without dealing with these problems that have contaminated all levels of Nigerian society, there is never likely to be peace. Tackling corrupt practices head on, and punishing guilty individuals for their crimes is paramount. Systems for ensuring transparency of all government expenditure should be strengthened and/or introduced to reduce the levels of ethnic patronage and political

misuse of funds. This includes the distribution of national resources on a regional basis, taking into account the special needs and development levels of each region. In the South-South zone in particular, lawlessness and the existence of cult groups and thug armies must be tackled before it gets worse, and they turn into syndicates for organized crime. Links between these groups and local politicians should be acknowledged publicly and measures taken to control this.

The political system, including the way in which local elections are conducted, should be strengthened and improved. Although it may be very costly to monitor local government elections, it may be absolutely necessary (combined with other interventions) to begin to instill confidence in the communities that democracy can work, and that their votes count. Several efforts need to be made (at both national and local levels) to improve the economic situation to tackle the high dependence on the oil community and the lack of alternative employment opportunities. Critical to these efforts is the need to build confidence amongst Nigerians themselves, to counter the need to get rich quick because "who knows what tomorrow will bring" attitude, as well as steps taken to constructively engage the youth in the region. Poverty reduction and rural development should continue to be the overarching goals within the region.

The international development community should continue to support genuine efforts to tackle these issues, and to put pressure when efforts are not being made. Despite the relatively small sum of international aid that the country receives, if the various donor organizations work together and collaborate, the leverage of the international community as a whole would be felt, not least because the government still hopes to receive debt relief. The international community can also play a role in pressuring multinationals to operate in a manner more sensitive to the vulnerabilities in the region, and to ensure that their presence does not exacerbate tensions.

All development efforts in the region should be designed with a conflict prevention framework in mind, at both the strategy and the programme levels. NDCC's regional development plan, if successful, should provide such a framework and donor partners should begin to engage now to support this effort, demonstrate the potential use for it, and encourage its speedy implementation. But beyond the plan itself, all development actors in the region must be conscious of the potential role their interventions can play in either supporting peace or fueling conflict. Questions should be raised during the implementation of programmes as well, to determine the factors that are "connectors or dividers", and programmes should be flexible enough to change approaches if need be.

Recommendations to International Development Community

- Support Nigerian-led efforts at tackling the structural causes of conflict, putting pressure where necessary on the government to fight against greed and tackle the sources underlying grievance such as regional imbalance, corruption, lawlessness, patronage, politically motivated violence.
- Introduce conflict assessment into design of strategies and programmes, acknowledging the impact of development interventions on violent conflict, and finding opportunities for peace-building within programmes.
- Improve donor collaboration and coordination, where possible developing shared strategies and approaches, and joint verification of results.
- Put pressure on the oil companies to introduce conflict prevention measures into their operations, limit exploitation of already fragile communities, and to conduct their business in an environmentally sustainable manner.

There will always be perceived winners and losers, and development actors need to be aware of who these are and should build in a system for resolving any disputes that arise as a result of their interventions. Coordination and collaboration between development actors is fundamental; possible assessments should be jointly conducted and programmes jointly designed. Not only will this improve efficiency and avoid duplication, but it will prevent the opportunity for fraud. As far as many are concerned, donors are “happy as long as you give them a good report” and this belief needs to be changed. The use of stakeholder approaches also has to be carefully implemented in practice. While it may never be foolproof, more thought should go into who is included in consultations, with a clearer understanding of who they do (or do not) represent. International actors should also “practice what they preach” and integrate the same governance principles (of transparency, equity, participation, access to information, anti-corruption) that they are encouraging Nigerians to adopt into their own processes and programmes. In situations where donors decide to work directly with communities, which may sometimes be necessary, they should still seek ways to involve local governments (even if money does not pass through government hands) to continue to strengthen government accountability.

Recommendations to Government

- The law should be clear about when a settler stops being transient, and begins to acquire the rights and responsibility of citizenship.
- Special consideration should be given to the Niger Delta region as a development focus, to make up for the neglect of past decades and to prepare the area for sustainable development.
- Conflict monitoring and intervention committees should be established at the village, local and state government levels.
- There should be collaborative efforts by government, companies, and the civil society to break the vicious cycle of exploitation and violence in the Niger Delta. The oil producing areas should be given a fair share of benefits (13%) derived from their oil resource, which must be used for viable development projects.

Recommendations to Civil Society/Local Communities

There should be effective discussion among the youths, women, unions, members of the local traditional council and other civil society groups on the welfare and future prospects of their community.

There should be stringent efforts to ensure that money and other benefits allocated to local communities are not captured by governmental agencies, members of the international organizations or community leaders. Anti-corruption efforts should be greatly intensified, especially in the Niger Delta region where the stakes are so high.

The NGOs AND CBOs in partnership with the residents of the conflict areas should re-orientate the people towards a serious and widespread mindset change. This will help in developing a better understanding of partnering, networking and new approaches in working towards the sustainable development of the Niger Delta. This is because peace is a continuous process.

TABLE 7: Strategies and Options in Nigeria

	Issues to be Addressed	Examples of Macro Level Intervention	Examples of Micro Level Intervention
Justice/Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lawlessness • Political violence (through armed thugs) • Proliferation of small arms • Corruption within security forces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening rule of law and security sector reform • Support to increasing accountability of police • Enforcement of professional standards and codes of conduct • Capacity building support for IPCR • Strengthen customs and border controls • Consider short term federal buffer zones in cases of extreme border hostility and fighting between groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community policing • Informal mechanisms for conflict resolution • Strengthening access to justice at local levels (consider setting up independent public complaints committees) • Raise awareness of human rights at community levels.
Political/Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government legitimacy • Corruption/patronag 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-Corruption efforts • Strengthening of democratic institutions • Strengthening of political parties to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen local governance accountability and

	<p>e</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weak government capacity combined with bloated civil service • Unaccountable politicians/government officials • Political exclusion of minorities • Lack of civic engagement • Rigged/flawed elections 	<p>encourage more participatory political processes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promoting transparency and accountability (ensure access to information on all public expenditure) • Reform of electoral commission/election monitoring • Reduce size/improve efficiency of civil service. 	<p>performance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electoral support (including awareness raising and monitoring of LGA elections) • Strengthen media as a way of promoting transparency • Improve access to information by communities of all government/development expenditure • Strengthen village councils and role of communities in implementing and monitoring development initiatives.
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	Issues to be Addressed	Examples of Macro Level Intervention	Examples of Micro Level Intervention
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uneven regional distribution of resources along ethnic lines • Growth in poverty/unemployment • Reliance on oil industry/lack of alternative industries • Patronage networks and criminalized economies • Land/Border disputes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribute national resources on more equitable basis (taking regional imbalances into account) • Introduce policies that are more conducive to private sector promotion. • Emphasis on poverty reduction, focusing on rural development • Creation of new large scale industries • Encourage public/private partnerships 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve infrastructure (roads, electricity) in rural areas. • Support alternative industries and employment generating activities. • Introduce more participatory approaches to decision-making. • Support entrepreneurship/cottage industries • Better systems to verify and monitor delivery of development initiatives.
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Militant youth • Poor basic services • Unsettled IDPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved social services (health and education) • Emphasis on democracy in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop community programmes that bridge communities and support peace-

		education curricula	building <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Constructively engage youth• Emphasize on peace-building through media and education• Provide sustained assistance to IDPs to help them either return or integrate into new communities.
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3.2 Conclusion

It could be generally noted that these conflicts are sordid symptoms or structural fallouts of the deep and ubiquitous segmentation in the plural polity of the Nigerian state. In this regard, where “catastrophic balance” between ethnic forces shapes the structures of policies in the Nigerian society, as in the South-South zone, the violent trajectories noted above lead to the phenomenon of violence traps where “identities and violence reinforce each other”. In these instances, conflicts become protracted. The form, intensity, and potential effect of these conflict episodes relate directly to the terrain of state power and control. The rapid breakdown in the structure of this control is also associated with their persistence.

Nevertheless, since the character of these conflict types in the South-South zone has changed overtime, it is also pertinent for policy consideration (conflict management) to probe into the dynamic processes of these conflict systems. As one analyst has noted:

It is commonplace that conflicts change overtime... These behaviour patters of the parties in conflict constitute a process that changes overtime as the conflict develop giving rise to questions such as “is the conflict repetitive and cyclical, or characterized by a linear pattern of escalation? Or to what extent is the pattern of interaction between the parties symmetric and to what extent one-sided? (Eckstein, 1964).

The dynamic processes of the above conflict developments in the South-South zone of Nigeria may be seen in the variability of issue, attitudes and behaviour patterns overtime in terms of both escalation and recession. In this regard, three dynamic properties of these conflict systems may be investigated: (i) how factional structures (goals, attitudes, behaviour) alter in response to changes in the adversary or in the environment; (ii) the “differing patterns of communications and interaction” between the factions, and (iii) the structure of the relationship between the parties and their environment. A

knowledge of these issues is no doubt central to conflict diplomacy and it certainly makes a difference whether the “conflict escalates, de-escalates, intensifies or dies down, expands or contracts” in the face of conflict management process.

However, of major interest in the context of this report (and productive of understanding of conflict developments generally) is the crucial question why differences over the same type of values (goals incompatibilities) between communities and factional groups in other parts of the zone have not resulted in violent conflict as in those cases noted above. In explanatory terms, the reason could be located in the *conflict tradition* that had existed between these communities and factions overtime. These are the psycho-cultural dispositions which many analysts have cited for conflict development where structural conditions could be held constant. As Rose (1994:24) aptly summarises:

Conflict is about the concrete interest adversaries pursue and, at the same time, about the interpretations of what is at stake. Conflicts become intense not just because of the value of what is being fought over but because of the psychological importance of winning and losing.

This consideration is arguably a *sine qua non* of the success of any conflict intervention. This is so because interests and perceptions matter and conflict management strategies will “succeed only to the extent to which they pay attention to both.” Indeed, the “intensity of psycho-cultural factors often is so high that until they are addressed, difference in the structurally rooted interests separating adversaries cannot be bridged”.

On this view, whether the value incompatibilities fueling conflict in the South-South zone is land, resources or positional goods such as LGA Chairmanship, the Federal visitation panel should take due cognizance of the conflict tradition (the predisposing factor) in these communities: perceptions

and images of the other side. In other words, the effort should go beyond conflict limiting strategies involving altering incentives, payoffs or the organization of society (derived from structural theory). There is also an imperative need to “alter the dominant metaphors surrounding a dispute or the interpretation of the parties in conflict” which is the focus of psycho-cultural approaches to conflict management procedures: including conflict avoidance, prevention, settlement and resolution. Although for analytical reasons, these strategies are often treated as isolated artifact, in reality, however, it is “often different in practice to tell whether an activity is classifiable as conflict avoidance or prevention. Moreover, in coping with many conflicts, a wide variety of management techniques may be simultaneously employed” (Mitchell, 1981: 279). Alternative conceptualization visualizes the conflict management process as sequences of conflict interventions involving (i) conciliation (assist communication); (ii) consultation (improve relationship); (iii) arbitration (mediation with muscle); and (iv) peacekeeping (control of violence). In operational terms, these phases express the linkages between “peace-keeping and “peace-building”, the overall strategy of which is to “de-escalate the conflict back down through the stages” (Keashy and Fischer, 1990:438).

The conflict management technique generally associated with each phase, also vary according to conflict type and requisite strategy envisaged. That is, the different methods of the conflict management process “differ in the components of conflict they primarily attempt to influence” (1981:277). Indeed, as Perin (1987:89) has argued:

One of the reasons for the failure of a particular third party intervention may be that its application was inappropriate to the stage of escalation at which it was attempted, as identified by changes in relationship, communication and substantive issues. Another reason may be the lack of follow up with other

intervention designed to deal with the other elements not focused upon by the previous intervention.

Unfortunately, in concrete policy terms, conflict developments in the South-South zone as any other part of Nigeria, has been seen by the relevant Federal and State authorities from a purely security standpoint to be ruthlessly contained or suppressed. In the process, the root of the problem remained unaddressed, risking a capricious resurgence as in the current Warri, Ogoni and Odi crises. While in recent times, FGN visitation terms (such as the Boundary Adjustment Committee) as well as state government intervention have significantly reduced escalation of smouldering trouble-spots, such efforts have been incomplete, indecisive, and inconclusive at best. This situation suggests the imperative need for a complementary effort through multiple intervention processes (conciliation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, good offices, etc.) which responsive civil society organizations can bring to bear on conflict flashpoints in Nigeria.

ANNEX A

PERSONS/ORGANISATIONS MET

SSS Headquarters, Cross River

Commissioner of Police, Cross River

MP& Representative of the Security and Intelligence Committee, Cross River

Previous Commissioner and Representative of Women's Organisations, Cross River

Previous Commissioner and Representative of the Private Sector, Cross River

Obong of Calabar, Traditional Ruler & Paramount Chief, Cross River

Local Government Authority (LGA), Odukpani, Cross River

UNDP Cross River State

Community of Internally Displaced Persons from Akwa Ibom now in Cross River State Planning Commission, Cross River

Programme Manager, World Bank funded Community Development Project, Cross River

Project Staff, DFIE funded Forestry Project

Faculty of Humanities, University of Port Harcourt

Center for Advanced Social Science (CASS), Port Harcourt

UNDP, Abia State

Church Leader, Ijaw Community

Ijaw Youth Council

Executive Director, Niger Delta Development Commission

The Ogoni Foundation

Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)

Shell Petroleum Development Corporation, Port Harcourt

Ordinary Citizens (taxi drivers, market vendors, shop assistants, etc.)

University students, Port Harcourt University

Delta State University (Academics of Itsekiri, Urhobo and Ijaw origin)

SPDC, Warri

Peace Committee Members, Warri

Peace Mediators, Warri

State Government, Asaba, Delta State

Traditional Ruler Councils

Local Government Councils, Warri

Human Rights and Environmental Action Groups, Warri

Youth Leaders (Itsekiri, Urhobo, Ijaw).

North East Zone

**STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT OF NORTH-
EAST ZONE, NIGERIA**

BY

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OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT IN NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA

The North-East is made up of six states, namely, Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. Although the zone may be perceived by some people to be a relatively calm area, the presence of two of the five so-called “flashpoints of Conflicts’ in Nigeria in this region suggests otherwise. These two conflicts are the recurrent Tiv/Jukun Conflicts of Wukari Local Government in Taraba State and the Tafawa Balewa/Bogoro Conflict of Bauchi State. These, in addition to the rampant cases of banditry and mercenary attacks, have unfortunately portrayed the picture of insecurity and unfriendly environment of the zone.

Apart from the Tiv-Jukun and Tafawa Balewa/Bogoro Conflicts which formed the focus of the SCA team, there are other conflicts that have equally led to loss of lives and property yet not given the prominence of the other two. These include the Chamba/Jukun-Kutep Conflict, the Mambilla-Fulani (Gembu) in Taraba State; the recurrent violent boundary dispute between Biliri and Kaltungo/Shongom, and lately the anti-Sharia riots in Gombe State. Others are the Demsa/Numan boundary dispute in Adamawa State. Recently, Adamawa State witnessed the assassination of the then Commissioner for Agriculture, Daniel Tayedi, in February, 2002 in his home town Numan, an act believed to be politically motivated.

The relative peace in Borno and Yobe States were recently threatened by reported cases of electoral violence and general state of insecurity and fear arising from incessant attacks/robbery incidents by mercenaries from neighbouring countries. There are also reported cases of latent conflict between the predominantly Moslems (Kanuri) in Northern Borno and the predominantly Christian minority groups (Bura, Margi, Chibog, etc) in Southern Borno.

From the study, it appears that there have been inadequate efforts and sincerity in addressing most of these conflicts especially where they border on resource sharing, boundary or human rights denial, and the high rate of insecurity on the highways despite the presence of the Army/Police. Our findings, however, indicate the willingness of stakeholders in some of the age long conflicts, such as Tiv-Jukun and Tafawa Balewa, to shift positions towards understanding and gradual reconciliation. They accept ‘failure’ and hold the view:” we are tired of fighting. We own it to our children to achieve peace” (from Tafawa Balewa). The initiative of the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) project is therefore very timely. No effort should be spared to secure peace in the region because peace is priceless.

The open invitation by Governor Ahmed Mu’azu of Bauchi State to the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) North Eastern team to suggest for his consideration practical ways of resolving the Tafawa Balewa/Bogoro Conflict is most commendable and indeed a clear evidence that some state chief executives are committed to the cause of peace.

It must however be pointed out that the findings of the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) North Eastern Zone team are inconclusive due to time constraint which did not allow physical visit to Borno and Yobe States. The information on these two States, as mentioned earlier, are based on documented previous studies of the Conflict dynamics of the area conducted by a Bauchi-based NGO, FACE PAM, whose Chairman Board of Trustees is a member of the SCA NE Zone team. It is therefore suggested that these two States be visited at a latter date to physically assess the conflict situation there. Some other conflict areas such as Tukum/Ussa and Gembu in Taraba State equally deserve to be properly assessed through physical visit.

It is hoped that the information contained herein will serve as heuristic guide to our understanding of these conflicts with a view to finding lasting solution to same.

SECTION ONE

RECORDS OF CONFLICTS

Tafawa Balewa/Bogoro Conflict, Bauchi State

The recurrent violent conflict in Tafawa Balewa and Nogoro LGAs is one of the main conflict flashpoints in Nigeria. Available records show that the conflict dates back to 1959 with the ‘Sayawa Riots’ of that year against ‘imposition’ of a non-indigene as District Head in Tafawa Balewa. Since then, there have been three other phases of the conflict – 1991 (triggered by misunderstanding between a Sayawa Christian meat hawker and some Moslems in Tafawa Balewa town; 1995 (triggered by the planned reception by indigenes of Lere for an appointment of a Hausa Moslem as Commissioner; 2001 (caused by anti-Sharia protests by Christians (mainly Sayawa Youths) in Tafawa Balewa town in response to the attempted imposition of Sharia on a predominantly Christian community of Tafawa Balewa.

The ease with which the conflicts in Tafawa Balewa spread to Bogoro LGA can be explained by the shared historical antecedents and geographical contiguity of the two local government areas which are occupied by Sayawas. On the other hand, on grounds of religious sentiments, the Tafawa Balewa Conflict spreads easily to Bauchi town usually with reprisal attacks on Christians, as experienced in 1991.

Other factors that have characterised and shaped the conflict include the controversial removal by the Bauchi Emirate Council of the first indigenous District Head of Lere in 1974 after occupying the office for five years; the creation of Bogoro District in 1976 and the controversial movement of the incumbent District Head to Bogoro. These are believed to

have provoked the Sayawa who are largely also believed to have masterminded the murder of the Hausa District Head Alhaji Bawa, who succeeded the Sayawa District Head, Alhaji Yakubu, in 1977.

Clearly, therefore, political, religious and ethnic sentiments have fuelled and sustained the Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro Conflicts more than any other factors. The age long clamour for self rule which started about the middle of the 20th century later turned to the clamour for a separate Chiefdom for the Sayawas who also felt social exclusion.

The State Government under Alhaji A.A. Muazu who incidentally hails from Tafawa Balewa LGA has embarked on developmental projects in the area and Bogoro LGA in an effort to redress aspects of the grievances. The Governor, the Sayawas, the Hausa/Fulanis and the ethnic groups in Tafawa Balewa have all indicated the desire to have genuine reconciliation and sustainable peace in the area. This positive spirit should be encouraged.

Taraba State

The State presents another 'zone' of conflict in Nigeria with the celebrated and historical Tiv-Jukun Conflict which span over some decades. In addition to its effect on the socio-economic and political dynamics of the area, the conflict has left a legacy of hatred and bitterness between the two ethnic groups.

Of recent, the dimension of active involvement of the Fulani pastoralists in the conflict has become an issue of increasing concern. Their grouse has always been with the Tiv whom they accuse of raiding and indiscriminately killing their cattle or men. The Tiv on the other hand accuse them of destroying their farmlands. The Fulanis have a more negative perception of the Tiv than the Jukun with whom they do not have any known

history of rivalry or Conflict. The 2001 Tiv-Jukun conflict had this element of deep Fulani involvement with loss of lives, cattle and property.

Other conflicts in the area that appear to have been played out are those of Kutep-Chamba/Jukun in Takum/Ussa LG's and Fulani/Mambillas in Gembu. The media may not have given their true picture to public.

Adamawa State

It is reported that all the Local Governments in Adamawa State have experienced one form of conflict or the other but in varying degrees. However, most of them are dormant for now. These Conflicts centre on land, boundary and Chieftaincy issues.

One of the celebrated cases is the Demsa/Numan Conflict, which is being handled by the National Boundary Commission. There have also been reported cases of trans-border banditry attacks by mercenaries from neighbouring countries of Cameroon and Chad, which is indicative of the porous nature of Nigeria's borders. Another issue of concern is the environmental problem arising from the seasonal overflow of the River Gongola whose source is the Lagdo Dam in Cameroon. This, in addition to the boundary and border problems certainly require prompt attention of the Federal Government to address now that the polity is heated with elections coming up soon. This is to avoid abuse and possible manipulation of the boundaries by few for political ends.

Gombe State

Gombe State was carved out of Bauchi State in 1996 after a sustained clamour for self-determination. Since then, the State has passed through challenging times including the difficult days of take-off during military rule between 1996 and 1999. The State is rather polarised along primordial lines

of cleavages dwelling largely on ethnic, clannish and religious sentiments. These sentiments also manifest even in perceptions and interpretations of Government actions.

Some of the conflicts have in the recent past become violent with heavy human and material losses. These include the perennial Biliri-Kaltungo/Shongom Conflict arising from an age long land/boundary dispute. Though both claimants are predominantly Christians, disagreements often lead to violence and loss of lives and property. The Northern part is largely made up of Moslem Fulani population while the Southern half is made up of predominantly Christian minority ethnic groups like the Tangale, Waja, Tula, Cham, etc. The delicate balance in Gombe informed the present political arrangement with the Governor (a Muslim) from the North while the Deputy Governor (a Christian) is from the South. A mechanism of good governance will be required to keep intact this balance on a sustained basis to avoid its being manipulated and consequent escalation.

SECTION TWO

TABLE REPRESENTATION OF CONFLICTS

TABLE 1: Dynamics of the Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro Conflict

	STRUCTURAL DYNAMIC (LONG-TERM TRENDS)	POTENTIAL TRIGGER	EXISTING ACTION	RECOMMENDED ACTION
SECURITY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Perceived partisan involvement and management by security agencies. 2. Mutual distrust between parties leading to perpetual sense of insecurity. 3. Long-term presence of peacekeepers (Police and Army) and attendant social 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Perceived bias arrests and/or prosecution of suspected actors in previous/ongoing conflicts. 2. High-handedness by peace keeping security agencies 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Deployment of Police to trouble spots and subsequent deployment of Soldiers. 2. Enlistment of the support of traditional rulers in security surveillance by State and Local 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Depoliticisation of the command and control of security agencies. 2. Better training and retraining of the Nigeria Police towards more professional management/control

	<p>implications.</p> <p>4. Inadequate equipment and kitting of the Nigeria Police.</p> <p>5. Gradual build-up and proliferation of small arms consequent on perceived threat by parties in the conflict.</p>	<p>in is charging their responsibilities.</p>	<p>Governments.</p> <p>3. The formation of vigilante groups by the threatened communities.</p>	<p>l of conflicts.</p> <p>3. A coordinated National disarmament programme against small arms as well as more effective policing of the country's borders.</p>
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<p>POLITICAL</p>	<p>1. There has been unabating struggle for political supremacy by the contending ethnic groups.</p> <p>2. The two main religious groups (Moslems and Christians) in the area hold grudges against each other on account of perceived unbalanced political patronage and participation.</p> <p>3. The perennial feeling of marginalisation by the Sayawas has partly informed their violent reaction to many political</p>	<p>1. The removal of top political appointees (and possible replacement with a member of the opposition group) from sensitive positions.</p> <p>2. The</p>	<p>1. In the present dispensation in the PDP led Government of Governor Mu'azu, there has been improved political patronage for the Sayawas although the Jarawas appear to be dissatisfied.</p>	<p>1. Government at both state and local levels must ensure transparent balancing in political appointments with respect to ethnic and religious diversity of their areas.</p> <p>2. Political appointments must be fairly graded (or "seeded") among diverse interest groups to minimise</p>
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	decisions and actions.	unrationa lised freezing of the accounts of a local governme nt thus temporari ly depriving thousands of developm ent and contractor s of		conflicts. 3. Balanced rotation of key political appointments must be promoted and practised to remove the fear of marginalisation by groups. 4. All actions by Governments must be done to ensure fair treatment of all citizens.
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		<p>otherwise regular income in the face of glaring poverty.</p> <p>3. Impositio n of leaders of manipulat ed election or appointm ent of persons into</p>		
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		sensitive positions. 4. Unbalanced political appointments in favour of specific ethnic or religious groups.		
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<p>ECONOMIC</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Glaring poverty in the area. 2. Systematic economic marginalisation of the area by past Governments of Bauchi State. 3. Perceived institutionalised of ethnic minority groups (the Sayawas, Jarawas, etc) through conspiracy of the Fulanis and Hausas. 4. The selective award of so-called "Juice" contracts to people of favoured ethnic or religious identities. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political actions which have immediate adverse effect on the people including improverishment and dwindling of liquid cash circulation compared to neighbouring communities. 2. High unemployment and redundancy rate especially among the Youth and 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Although Local Governments have disappointed in their deliveries, the Bauchi State Government of Governor A.A. Mu'azu has significantly improved and provided important infrastructure like roads, electricity, health facilities, school and water, for which the people are appreciative. 2. Governor Mu'azu has 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Government should improve on its present performance by providing even more infrastructure and social amenities. 2. More resources should be channelled for education (through Girl Child and Adult Education). 3. Soft loans should be provided for micro-economic
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		<p>Women.</p> <p>3. Absence of basic infrastructure and social amenities, like electricity, safe drinking water roads, etc.</p>	<p>also introduced special loans and skills acquisition programme for Youth and Women to the appreciation of the people.</p>	<p>activities especially by Youths and Women.</p> <p>4. Skills and acquisition centres should be established and maintained to develop the skills of the Youth and Women towards job creation.</p> <p>5. Government must ensure fairness and equity in the award of contracts to all</p>
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				<p>citizens regardless of social circumstances and identity.</p> <p>6. Corruption and misappropriation of public funds by political leaders must be stopped.</p>
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SOCIAL	<p>1. There is glaring social stratification based on ethnic prejudice exploited by politicians for the marginalisation of opposing ethnic groups.</p> <p>2. The strong ethnocentric tendencies among the various tribal groups is exploited by elites on all sides of the conflict to protect ethnic interests even at the</p>	<p>1. Any social activity of one group perceived as provocative by the other group could trigger off violent reactions like the use of unacceptable language during open air preaching, separation of males from females in public transport in compliance with Sharia, etc.</p> <p>2. The preferential granting of</p>	<p>1. Bauchi State Government started promoting multi-cultural social activities and interactions towards promoting understanding in the area.</p> <p>2. The Bauchi State Government plans to establish Customary Courts to serve as the equivalent of Sharia Courts for non-Moslems, thus</p>	<p>1. All practices that promote social exclusion of sections of society must be stopped.</p> <p>2. Government should regulate ethnic associations to ensure that their activities promote peaceful coexistence not ethnic compartmentalization which invariably leads to mutual mistrust and</p>
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	<p>expense of national interests.</p> <p>3. There is a near absence of close cultural association between the ethnic groups in the area.</p> <p>4. Religious differences are exploited by both the elite and politicians to advance their selfish causes.</p> <p>5. The Bauchi Emirate Council has been imposing non-</p>	<p>permission to one group to stage a function whereas another group could have been denied such privilege in the immediate past.</p> <p>3. Implementation of Sharia without the establishment of Customary Courts to cater for land and other cases between non-Moslems (in non-Moslem dominated</p>	<p>pacifying non-Moslems (mainly Christians, grumbling against the perceived promotion of Islam using public funds.</p>	<p>antagonism.</p> <p>3. Government must ensure that all religious practices are in conformity with the laws of the land and they do not threaten the corporate existence of the country.</p> <p>4. All communities should be allowed to elect their traditional ruler their own way.</p>
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	indigenes as traditional rulers or manipulating election processes for same.	areas). 4. The blatant imposition of traditional ruler by the Bauchi Emirate Council against the wish of the people especially Sayawas.		
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TABLE 2: Actors in the Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro Conflict

TYPE	ARMED ACTORS	POSSIBLE CONFLICT CAUSERS	CURRENT CONFLICT MANAGERS	POTENTIAL CONFLICT MANAGERS
Security	Military, Police	Police, State Security Service	Police, Military	
Political/ Governance		- Political Leaders/ Elite	- The President/ Federal Government - Governor/State Govt. and Local Governments - Judiciary (Tribunals) - Commissioners of Inquiry - NGOs (Mediators)	- The National Assembly - The 19 Northern Governors Forum - Politicians/Political Leaders - Civil Society Organisations - Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF).

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution - (IPCR) - Academic Associate Peace Works (AAPW) - FACE-PAM. 	
Economic/ Resources				Business Leaders
Social/ Ethnic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local Militia (Ethnic) - Retired Soldiers/ Youths/Women. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hausa/Jawara/Fulani Association (HAJAFU). - Hausa Community/ Elite - Fulani Community/ Elite - Jawara Community/ Elite - Zear (Sayawa) Cultural Association 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Bauchi</u> and <u>Dass</u> Emirate Councils. - Ethnic-Based Associations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community-Based Organisations - National Society Committee.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Zear Youth Development Asso. - Zauren Baba Gonto. 		
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Social/ Religious	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local Militia (Religious) - Cross Border Militants/Hired Fighters. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bauchi Emirate Council - Christian Asso. Of Nigeria (CAN) - Jamaatu Nasril Islam (JNI) - Islamic Pupils (Almajiris) - Moslem Youths - CAN Youth Wing. 	<p>CAN JNI</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inter-religious Committee of the Federal Government - Elders.

TABLE 3: Dynamics of the Tiv/Jukun Conflict, Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State

	STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS (LONG-TERM TRENDS)	POTENTIAL TRIGGERS	EXISTING ACTION/CAPACITY FOR MANAGING CONFLICT	RECOMMENDED ACTION
SECURITY	<p>1. Mutual distrust among conflict parties leading to state of fear and insecurity.</p> <p>2. Perceived partisanship after role of security operation (Military and Police) in intervention.</p> <p>3. Inadequate equipment and kitting of the Police.</p>	<p>1. Over-zealousness of security personnel in charge of keeping the peace.</p> <p>2. Perceived biased arrests and or prosecution of suspected actors in the Conflicts.</p> <p>3. Alleged ongoing silent killing of</p>	<p>1. Deployment of security agencies (Military/Police) to trouble spots to contain violence.</p> <p>2. Enlistment of support of traditional authorities by State and Local Government Councils for surveillance.</p> <p>3. Emergence of</p>	<p>1. Better training and equipment of the Police and effectively maintaining them and the Military for their duty posts.</p> <p>2. Effective policing of the porous borders for arms control and general disarmament.</p> <p>3. Constant use of Soldiers in containing</p>

	<p>4. Gradual but sustained build-up and proliferation of small and light weapons as a result of the insecurity of the conflict parties.</p> <p>5. Inadequate security in the conflict area of Wukari division bordering Katsina Ala in Benue State.</p>	<p>Jukun and Tiv in Wukari Local Government Area.</p>	<p>vigilante groups to ensure surveillance.</p>	<p>civil disturbances should be reconsidered as it is not within the purview of their constitutional role.</p>
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POLITICAL	<p>1. Deep rooted mutual bitterness and fears in relations between Tiv/Jukun over land.</p> <p>2. Contest for political space/participation since the beginning of party politics in the 1950s.</p>	<p>1. Increasing Tiv population and their uncontrolled migration into Wukari division, viz-a-vis Jukun for continuous fears of Tiv colonisation.</p> <p>2. Tiv continuous disrespect for Jukun traditional authority and refusal to pay taxes to relevant authorities in Taraba State, where they reside, but to Benue State.</p> <p>3. Indiscriminate</p>	<p>1. Federal Government action through deployment of Police and Military peacekeepers.</p> <p>2. Taraba State Government in setting up of peace committees</p> <p>3. Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) visitation team to assess the situation.</p>	<p>1. Need for Government to continue exploring political processes for negotiated settlement and reconciliation under a common forum for mutual and high level political dialogue.</p> <p>2. Federal Government to be decisive in addressing the issue of citizenship and indigenship constitutionally to void the 'host/settler' Community syndrome.</p> <p>3. Federal Government to be consistent on boundary</p>
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POLITICAL	<p>1. Deep rooted mutual bitterness and fears in relations between Tiv/Jukun over land.</p> <p>2. Contest for political space/participation since the beginning of party politics in the 1950s.</p>	<p>1. Increasing Tiv population and their uncontrolled migration into Wukari division, viz-a-vis Jukun for continuous fears of Tiv colonisation.</p> <p>2. Tiv continuous disrespect for Jukun traditional authority and refusal to pay taxes to relevant authorities in Taraba State, where they reside, but to Benue State.</p> <p>3. Indiscriminate</p>	<p>1. Federal Government action through deployment of Police and Military peacekeepers.</p> <p>2. Taraba State Government in setting up of peace committees</p> <p>3. Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) visitation team to assess the situation.</p>	<p>1. Need for Government to continue exploring political processes for negotiated settlement and reconciliation under a common forum for mutual and high level political dialogue.</p> <p>2. Federal Government to be decisive in addressing the issue of citizenship and indigenship constitutionally to void the 'host/settler' Community syndrome.</p> <p>3. Federal Government to be consistent on boundary</p>
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		<p>changing and renaming of erstwhile Jukun settlements into Tiv language.</p> <p>4. Perceived regular interference of Benue State Government and Tiv in matters affecting Tiv people residing in Tarabe State.</p> <p>5. Perceived support/role of Jukun-Tiv politicians and elite along ethnic lines to the Conflict parties.</p>	<p>4. Fact-finding and assessment team from the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR).</p> <p>5. Civil Society Organization in mediation (e.g. FAcE-PaM, AAPN, OTI/USIAD).</p>	<p>demarcation between Taraba and Benue States as the existing process of ‘circumvention’ is being contested.</p> <p>4. Civil Society Organizations should be encouraged and supported by various Governments and internal agencies in their interventions for the desired peace, confidence and capacity building in the area.</p>
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ECONOMIC	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. High pressure on land control. 2. Denial of source of revenue for Taraba State by Tiv diversion of taxes and investment to Benue State. 3. Restriction on trade movement particularly agricultural products. 4. Loss of bread-winners. 5. Desertion of farmlands and consequence on reduction in agricultural products. 6. Loss of cattle by the Fulanis in the conflict. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Alleged indiscriminate occupation of farmlands by Tiv in Taraba State without regard to constituted authorities or boundaries. 2. Jukun policy of operation 'Patswen' (i.e. claim back your lands) from the Tiv. 3. Unresolved boundary demarcation/adjustment. 4. Continuous dispute over access to land and unhealthy trade relations. 5. Adverse effect on the economic life of the Fulanis whose cattle are killed and most of whom have fled the area. 	National Boundary Commission considering the issue of boundaries in the area.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Efforts at addressing and reviewing the boundary issue should be hastened. 2. Regular visits and discussions by office of Surveyor General and National Boundary Commission should commence demarcation work soonest. 3. Need for Federal Government to establish grazing reserves and routes for the Fulanis.
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<p>SOCIAL</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tension along ethnic lines. 2. Tiv feeling of marginalisation and social exclusion and perceived Tiv colonisation of Jukun. 3. Perceived long-term desire of the Tiv to participate in Jukun Traditional Council and the stool of the AKU UKA in Wakari. 4. The Fulanis perceive Tiv as enemies. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. High rate of school drop-outs. 2. Sustained suspicion of Tiv alleged ambition on the AKU UKA stoolship. 3. Media reports (both local and international) inflame and fuel crisis. 4. High level of tension prevails. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Capacity building training for 3 persons each of Tiv/Jukun as change agents provided by a US based-NGO. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Need to resettle the displaced person urgently to resume life once again. 2. Support is needed by Government and international agencies for the educational development of the displaced children. Regular professional training for the media in conflict reporting is highly required.
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TABLE 4: Conflict Analysis/Structures – Chamba/Jukun /Kutep

	SECURITY	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC	SOCIAL
K U T E P - C H A M B A / K U T E P	<u>Military:</u>	- Lack of stable political culture grievances.	- General dislocation in economic development	- Social exclusion on both sides of conflicting parties, social segregation.
	- High presence of non-State military actors, military raised and maintained by conflict.	- Lingering border disputes over improper demarcation and encroachment.	* Poverty, unemployment, less hours on production, food security.	- Displacement of persons * increased refugee cases in the area.
	- Elites who are retired army Generals are perceived to be sponsoring armed attacks on civil society on each side.	- Culture of total allegiance to the traditional authority of 'AKU UKA', whose word is final on Jukun's welfare.	- Production is low * E.g. Yams, local salt, fishing, etc, are hampered. * Food shortages.	- Physiological trauma - * Living in constant fear * Displacement.
	- State military personnel have been killed on such assumptions.	- Transition from	- Trading activities are strongly	- Legacy of
	- Proliferation of small			

<p>J U K U</p>	<p>arms - Forced withdrawal of military by Government.</p>	<p>military dictatorship to a democracy. Tiv are demanding for recognition and self-actualisation.</p>	<p>affected as people are frightened and scared of conflict.</p>	<p>unresolved conflict. * 1957, 1959 to latest 2001.</p>
<p>N</p>	<p><u>Police:</u> - Lack of capacity (weapons, logistics, communication). - Weak control. - Accused of extortion by both parties.</p>	<p>- Struggle over political power. - Mechanism to manage Conflict ineffective. - Destabilising role of kith and kin from neighbouring States and Local Government.</p>		<p>- Youth development * Unemployment * Social development. - CBOs do not have initiatives in conflict resolution.</p>

	SECURITY	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC	SOCIAL
M A M B I L L A / F U L A	<p><u>Military:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Perceived by Kuteps as favourizing the Chambas. - Poor relationship with civil society. - Legacy of post-conflict on the tradition of the UKWE TAKUM, since 1975. <p><u>NON-State Military (Milicia):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Used by both conflicting parties. - Elites accused of sponsorship. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gerringmandering of boundaries in the creation of USSA from Takum L.G.C. - Exclusion of civil society from input into creation of new L.G.C. - Fear of political domination of the Chambas by Kuteps. - Rejection by Kuteps of the occupation of Chambas of the traditional stool of UKWE TAKUM. - Political exploitation of ethnic differences by the elite. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Total destruction of Takum has left most civil society struggling to rebuild and rehabilitate. - Economic decline is glaring in the area <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Poverty, unemployment, absence of institutions and industries to provide employment. - Increased competition over shared resources, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited social interaction between Conflicting parties. - Legacy of unresolved ethnic conflict over the stool of UKWE TAKUM. - Strong agitation by Kuteps who do not want to be in USSA but rather want to remain in TAKUM. - Distrust of

<p>N I</p>	<p><u>Police:</u> - Conflicting parties do not have confidence in them. - Weak and not well equipped.</p> <p><u>Local Militia:</u> - “Ashana no case to answer” group which defends the Mambilla’s interest.</p> <p><u>Mercenaries:</u> - Hired bandits from across the border of Cameroon by the Fulani cattle rearers.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tampering with the gazetting of the ownership of the traditional stool of TAKUM. - Lack of rule of law and application of Justice. - Disagreement over the occupation of traditional stool by Fulani. - Insistence by Mambilla that stool belongs to them. - Refusal of Mambilla to rotate. - Lack of concrete response by Government to Conflict. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> e.g. Local Government Offices. - Fight over grazing and Farming land. - Non respect of Government demarcation of lands for Conflicting parties. - Decline in economic development and poverty. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government by both parties. - Fear of domination by both parties. - Trans-border relationship with Cameroon. - Non-disbandment of militia. - Youth occupance of violence and non-involvement in meaningful economic ventures. - Decline in social interaction.
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TABLE 5: Dynamics of Chamba/Jukum-Kutep Conflict, Takum/Ussa Local Governments, Taraba State

	STRUCTURED DYNAMICS/ LONG-TERM TRENDS	POTENTIAL TRIGGERS	EXISTING ACTION CAPACITY FOR MANAGING CONFLICT	RECOMMENDED ACTION
SECURITY	1. Mutual distrust leading to state of fear and insecurity in the area. 2. Arms build-up among the conflict parties.	1. Perceived biased arrests of suspected actors. 2. Perceived partisan role of Police intervention against the Kutepts.	1. Deployment of security personnel to the trouble area.	1. The area will require the establishment of military post.
POLITICAL	1. Soured relationship	1. Refusal of Kutepts to participate in the last voter		1. National Boundary Commission and Office

	<p>between the conflict parties.</p> <p>2. Counter for political space and participation.</p> <p>3. Rejection of boundary demarcation exercise of 1997 perceived to have been aimed at reducing Kutep numerical strength from Takum to the</p>	<p>registration exercise and the 1999 election.</p> <p>2. Inability to address the boundary adjustment between Takum and USSA Local Governments.</p> <p>3. Alleged manipulation of a 1975 Government gazette to favour Chamba/Jukun.</p> <p>4. Continuous fear of political domination by each other.</p>		<p>of the Surveyor General to promptly address the boundary issue in view of forthcoming election and another voter registration exercise.</p> <p>2. Federal/State Governments. To initiate political means of resolving the issue through a forum for mutual dialogue.</p>
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	advantage of Chamba/Jukun.			
ECONOMIC	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Restricted trade movement within the area. 2. Less activity on the farms leading to low agricultural output. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Patronage of market products are along ethnic lines. 2. Stunted economic growth resulting to absence of industries. 3. High level of poverty, frustration and unemployment in the area. 		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Federal Government and International Agencies to consider assistance with establishment of industries and addressing the unemployment problem.

SOCIAL	1. Competition over the traditional Chieftaincy stool of the Ukwe Takum, the paramount ruler.	1. Sustained tension and alliances a long ethnic lines. 2. Marriages are a long ethnic lines and some have been adversely affected.		Various tiers of Government to consider as priority provision of social amenities/services to the area.
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FULANI – MAMBILLA (GEMBU CONFLICT SARDAUNA LOCAL GOVERNMENT – TARABA STATE)

SECURITY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mutual distrust and fear. 2. Arms build-up. 	<p>Emergence of militia group of the Mambilla (Ashana no case to answer) and service of mercenaries from Cameroon and Chad to defend their causes hence the Feb. 2002 bloody conflict.</p>		<p>Need for effective policing of international borders.</p>
POLITICAL	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Stained relations between the Fulanis and Mambillas. 2. Contest for political participation and control. 3. Mambillas claim ownership of the land and see Fulanis as strangers. 	<p>Mutual fear of political domination.</p>		<p>Issue of indigeneship should be addressed naturally.</p>
ECONOMIC	<p>Competition for control of land</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Maintenance of 		<p>Grazing reserves and</p>

	for agricultural purposes (by Mambillas) and grazing (by the Fulanis).	claims on land control. 2. Attempts by Mambillas to reclaim lands earlier bought by Fulanis.		cattle routes should be created for the Fulanis, while political means is required for solution.
SOCIAL	Tussle over the vacant Chieftaincy/stool in Gembu, former occupant being Fulani installed in 1960.	1. Relations are along ethnic lines and the sustained stalemate is dangerous. 2. Media reports have been unbalanced.		1. Government to consider providing social amenities to them. 2. Political process should be used to resolve the Chieftaincy issue. 3. Need for balanced media report.

TABLE 6: Muri Chieftaincy Conflict (Jalingo)

SECURITY	Relations between the contesting families are strained.			Government to ensure security watch.
POLITICAL	Both interested parties are influential with the possibility allowing of politicians to interfere. Government appointment of the Emir to replace the deposed one in 1986 was not done in accordance to the right traditional method.	Relations between them and the alliance are equally stained. Rejection of the installed Emir by King makers.	State Government and Emir of Gombe mediated.	Political solution is required by ensuring that only the right traditional method of selection of the Emir is employed in the process.
ECONOMIC				

SOCIAL	The campaign over the Emirship claim is being pursued by children of the late Emir.	They have an uncompromising attitude over the claim.		Government should handle it politically.
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TABLE 6: Demsa-Numan Conflict, Adamawa State

TYPE	ARMED ACTOR	POSSIBLE CONFLICT CAUSES	CURRENT CONFLICT MANAGERS	POTENTIAL CONFLICT MANAGERS
1. SECURITY	Police		Police	
2. POLITICAL/ GOVERNANCE	-	Government action e.g., Local Government, Chieftaincy and District creations and boundary adjustments.	Government (e.g. State and National Boundary Commission).	Boundary Commission. State Govt.
3. ECONOMIC/ RESOURCES	-	Government location of Numan Market and Motor Park.	Demsa Assoc. Numan Assoc.	
4. SOCIAL/ ETHNIC	-	Demsa Assoc. Numan Assoc.	Demsa Assoc. Numan Assoc.	Government/policy makers/Traditional institution.
5. SOCIAL/ RELIGIOUS	-	Kilba/Bachama claims over ownership of Lutheran Church in Numan.	CAN Court	Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) International Headquarters of Lutheran Church.

TABLE 7: Conflict Analysis/Structure Demsa-Numan Conflict, Adamawa State

	SECURITY	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC	SOCIAL
DEMSA/ NUMAN CONFLICT	Armed bandits infiltration from neighbouring Niger, Chad.	Creation of new Local Government (Demsa) from former Numan L.G.C. with a disputed boundary.	Dispute over the control of market and motor park.	Destabilisation and under-development of both Local Government Councils.
	Police not well equipped to handle rampant cases of banditry.	Government non-inclusion of civil society in the creation and demarcation of boundary.	Distorted collection of revenue.	Failure of dispute resolution mechanism.
	Porous border	Political people living around these disputed areas are disenfranchised.	Retarded economic development.	Mutual distrust and suspicion.
		Corruption is encouraged as people do not owe much allegiance to any of the groups.		

TABLE 8: Other Conflict Issues in Adamawa State That Have the Potential of Erupting into Violence

POSSIBLE FLASHPOINTS	SECURITY	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC	SOCIAL
AREAS Guyuk, Numan and Shelleng Hong and Mubi Local Government Areas.	<p>Porous borders which allow for infiltration of armed bandits from Niger and Chad Republic.</p> <p>Government not protecting the borders adequately.</p>	<p>Chieftaincy issues that are unresolved.</p> <p>Recognition and upgrading of stools at Hong.</p> <p>Government seeming inaction on implementation of past white papers and recommendation of panels.</p> <p>Undue interference by Federal agencies in boundary disputes.</p>	<p>Unemployment.</p> <p>Poverty.</p> <p>Little or no investments</p> <p>Environmental problems due to destruction of farmlands by the overflow of River Gongola.</p>	<p>Soured relations between Pastoralists and farmers particularly during harvest season.</p> <p>Poor Youth development.</p>

- Based on the picture above, it is recommended that –
 - (a) Federal Government should ensure effective policing of the porous borders.
 - (b) Adequate equipping of the Police/Immigration.
 - (c) Government action in distrust, Chiefdom or LG. Creation should be done with high sense of caution and sensitivity.
 - (d) Need for Federal Government to liaise with Cameroon on the issue of the Lagbo dam which sources The Gongola River.

TABLE 9: Conflict Analysis/ Structure, Gombe State

SECURITY	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC	SOCIAL
Both Conflicting parties perceive the Police as partisan.	The Undue influence of the Emirate system in creation of Chiefdom and the consequent imbalance in relations is unacceptable TO minority groups.	Legacy of unresolved land/boundary dispute e.g. (Billiri-Kaltungo now Shongom.	Tension and relations are along religious / ethnic divide. Violent reaction over the implementation of Sharia by Non-Muslims leading to loss of human lives and destruction of property.
	Perception by both parties that politicians and the elite fuel crisis to settle personal challenges.	Negative relations among Pastoralists and farmers with consequent low animal and agricultural production.	Relation between Pastoralists and farmers is not cordial.
	Government perceived as insensitive to political interest of other groups.	Inability to actively engage on the disputed farmlands adversely affect agricultural production in the area.	

For peaceful coexistence of the conflicting parties, there is the need for training of the stakeholders in confidence and peace building.

TABLE 10: Responses from Stakeholders and Parties to the Conflict Issues in North-East Region

		RESPONSES	REMARKS
1.	RESPONSES OF GOVERNMENT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Government focuses on creating more districts and chiefdoms as a way of addressing some of the conflict issues. 2. Government is desirous of having a conclusive forum for mutual dialogue and peace to prevail in the policy. 3. Government still enforcing peace using security operatives (e.g. Army/ Police). 	Enforced peace should be followed by political action to sustain it and pave way for gradual withdrawal of the security forces.
2.	RESPONSES OF SECURITY PERSONNEL	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Military not comfortable with its present role because maintenance of internal security and containing civil disturbance is not their constitutional role. 2. Police yearn to be adequately equipped to function effectively in maintaining internal security and combating crime generally especially trans-border 	The army would wish to require from maintenance of internal security if it were possible.

		mercenary activities.	
3.	RESPONSES OF CIVIL SOCIETY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not happy with the manner religion and ethnic identity are being used or manipulated to discriminate against others and to cause confusion/crisis. 2. Critical of Government negative policies that sometimes inflame passions and fuel ethnic nationalism. 3. Concerned about Government inaction concerning non-implementation of Government Reports and White Papers to serve as deterrence to perpetual conflict causers. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Good Government is required at all levels to address issues of development and unity. 2. It is necessary to have in place early warning system for Nigeria.
4.	RESPONSES OF CONFLICT PARTIES	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. They have the strong conviction that Government has the capacity and capability to resolve the conflicts. They thus feel disappointed when violence breaks out. 2. They are eager for peace to be restored in the 	It is important for Government and relevant authorities to heed early warning and act promptly.

		<p>conflict zones.</p> <p>3. They see Government as merely paying lip service in peace promotion in its inability to punish culprits, and discern or heed early warning signals.</p> <p>4. They are critical of Government delayed action in containing Conflict situations.</p>	
5.	RESPONSES OF TRADITIONAL RULERS/ INSTITUTIONS	<p>1. Saddened by the deteriorating social values and norms and would wish that moral instructions are re-introduce in public schools.</p> <p>2. Want Justice and fairplay to be done to all manner of people always.</p>	Need for Government to consider making peace education an integral part of school curricula.
6.	RESPONSES OF NGOs	<p>1. Yearn for empowerment through funding and support to enable them work with civil society in educating citizens of their civil rights and responsibilities.</p> <p>2. Committed to collaborating and networking with</p>	Some NGOs are on ground doing some work on the various conflicts. They need support and encouragement.

		each other and Government agencies in intervention in crises.	
7.	RESPONSES OF YOUTH	<p>1. They feel hurt and frustrated for being abandoned and neglected by Government and society as a result of their lack of employment, good education and sense of belonging.</p> <p>2. See the elite as insincere and responsible for crises.</p>	Employment opportunities should be created in all tiers of Government.
8.	RESPONSES OF ELDERS	Think the Youth who prosecute crises are impatient, unruly and disrespectful, hence elders should be allowed time to use their experience and wisdom to lead.	
9.	RESPONSES OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS	1. CAN (a) Feel threatened about the introduction of Sharia and perceive it as a ploy/means of Islamising other non-Muslims. (b) Unhappy over the unserious posture and lack of her firm position on the Sharia issue which has already led to serious incidents of violence.	<p>1. Government needs to be firm/bold in addressing the Sharia issue constitutionally if the security of the country is to be maintained.</p> <p>2. Mutual fear could lead to</p>

		2. JNI urge Christians to stop expressing fears over Sharia as its implementation would affect only Muslims. (c). Both groups feel strongly about the moral decadence in society and want justice and fairness.	arms race between Christians /Muslims. 3. Need for religious Tolerance.
10.	RESPONSES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS	Express concern over the increased violence which is a threat to democracy and safety of human life. No positive development can occur in the face of incessant conflicts and instability.	They require cooperation from the Government and people for external aid to be meaningfully invested.
11.	RESPONSES OF WOMEN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Concerned that their children are unemployed, and are the ones used to perpetuate atrocities at the end of which many of them get killed. 2. Want permanent solution because the crises have rendered most of them widows prematurely and some homeless. 3. Are concerned that conflicts have contributed to eroding family values resulting in many negative 	It is important to involve Women in Conflict Resolution issues.

		<p>social consequences.</p> <p>4. Complained of gender insensitivity on the part of men who decide on issues of conflicts without involving them or due regard to their feelings.</p>	
12.	RESPONSES OF POLITICIANS	Blame Government for being pretentious about issues of citizenship/indigeneship which they consider responsible for most community conflicts.	The issue of citizenship/ indigeneship should be addressed constitutionally and early too.
13.	RESPONSES OF THE MEDIA	<p>1. Much as they should be concerned over the manner Conflicts have overheated the policy, they deny that they give unbalanced and sensational information to the public.</p> <p>2. Critical of some Government policies which they believe fuel or add to Conflict dynamics.</p>	The media has been criticised but they also should not be denied access to information in crises time.
14.	RESPONSES OF THE BUSINESS CLASS	Believe that conflicts have adversely affected business fortunes in the region.	

TABLE 11: Key Recommendation

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Support job creation and poverty eradication initiatives especially provision of micro-credit skills acquisition, girl-child and adult education, basic education, reproductive and primary health care programmes. These will strengthen the economy towards sustainable development. 2. Assist in strengthening democracy through support for appropriate constitutional and institutional reforms that will promote transparency, justice and accountability. 3. Should build capacity for NGOs/CBOs to enable them play proper intervention roles in development and conflict prevention, management and resolution.
GOVERNMENT: (a) Federal	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Good Governance in all its ramifications must be provided on a sustained basis. (for justice and equitable sharing/allocation of resources and positions. 2. To be bold and decisive on conflict cases that are policy related such as boundary adjustment, grazing reserves for pastoralists, taking deterrent measures on perennial conflicts causers, indigeneship/citizenship rights, youth development and unemployment, Sharia issue, effective border policing and general security concerns such as ensuring professionalism in the Military and Police. 3. Make effective implementation of the moratorium on small arms and light weapons for proper internal control of the seeming arms race in society.

(b) State	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Good Governance is required (same for Federal Government). This will lead to a cycle of development and peaceful coexistence. It will also overshadow the alleged negative posture of some Chief Executives on Governance particularly re-election bid. 2. Involvement of civil society in policies and programmes that affect them, e.g. boundary adjustments, chieftaincy issues, creation of distrust/chiefdoms, etc. 3. Treat with great caution and sensitivity some chieftaincy matters which may have to be addressed by the entire emirate system.
(c. Local	<p>Good Governance is required (same as above) so that essential services are enjoyed by the people at this grassroots level. This will build the people's confidence in the local administration.</p>
CIVIL SOCIETY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Require enlightenment and education on their civic rights and responsibilities. This will enable them participate effectively in the democratic project and Governance generally. A developed civil society will contribute to evolving a responsible Government. 2. Identified persons/stakeholders would require capacity building training to be change agents in conflict situations.
LOCAL COMMUNITIES	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Should be encouraged as of right to benefit from focused awareness and Peace Education Programmes developed by Governments, International Organisations and NGOs/CBOs. 2. Need to be taught skills acquisition for gainful self-employment.

TABLE 12: Actors in the Tiv/Jukun Conflict, Wukari Local Government, Taraba State

S/NO	TYPE	ARMED ACTOR	POSSIBLE CONFLICT CAUSERS	CURRENT CONFLICT MANAGERS	POTENTIAL CONFLICT MANAGERS
1	SECURITY	Military, Police and Local Militia	Local Militia	Military, Police	
2	POLITICAL GOVERNANCE		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Government Policies 2. Fear of disenfranchisement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IPCR - NGO - International Community - Fed. Government - State Government - Local Government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Orientation Agency (NOA) - Government - Media
3	ECONOMIC/ RESOURCES		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tiv action in cutting down of economic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CBOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - International Tugs - Communities - Government

			<p>trees, killing of Fulani cattle and men.</p> <p>2. Destructio n of farms by both</p> <p>3. Fulanis stay into Tiv farms.</p>		<p>(e.g. Boundary Commission).</p> <p>- Business Community</p>
4	SOCIAL/ ETHNIC	Local Militia	<p>Tiv President desire to participate in the Traditional Council of</p>	<p>- Militia</p> <p>- Tiv Association</p> <p>- Jukun Association</p>	<p>- NGOs</p> <p>- Federal Government (Relevant Agencies).</p>

			Wukari Local Government Area.		
5	SOCIAL/ RELIGIOUS	Local Militia		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). - Jama' tu Nasir Islam (JNI) (both religions can mediate by coming together under a forum to dialogue, etc). - Youth Organisations and groups have facilitated the resettlement of some displaced persons and re-engaged some youths in educational programmes including skills acquisition. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IPCR - National Council of Women Societies (NCWS). - NGOs/CBOs - Media

TABLE 13: Conflict Analysis/Structure of the Tiv/Jukun Conflict, Wukari, Taraba State

	SECURITY	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC	SOCIAL
T I V / J U K U N	<p>Military: High presence of non-state military actors- Militia raised and maintained by Conflict. Elites who are retired Army Generals are perceived to be sponsoring armed attacks on civil society on each side. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons Forced withdrawal of military by Government.</p> <p>Police: Lack of capacity (weapons, Logistics, Communication). Weak control Accused of extortion by both parties.</p>	<p>Lack of stable political culture to adequately address grievance. Lingering border disputes over improper demarcation and encroachment. Culture of total allegiance to the traditional authority of 'AKU UKA' whose word is final on Jukun's welfare. Transition from military dictatorship to a democracy. Tiv are demanding for recognition and self-actualization. Struggle over political power. Mechanism to manage Conflict ineffective. Destabilizing role of kith and kins from neighbouring states and local Government. Demand for a Tiv Traditional Institution. Rejection of the Tiv as indigenes in Wakari Local Government.</p>	<p>General dislocation in economic development. Poverty, unemployment, less hours on production, food security. Production is low e.g. Yams, Local Salt, Fishing, etc are hamper. Food Shortages. Trading activities are strongly affected, as people are frightened and scared of Conflict.</p>	<p>Social exclusion on both sides of Conflicting parties, social segregation. Displacement of persons. Physiological trauma * Living in constant fear. * Displacement. Legacy of unresolved Conflict * 1957, 1959, to 2001. Youth development * Unemployment * Social development. CBOs do not have initiatives in Conflict resolution.</p>

CONCLUSION

The North-Eastern Region, like North Central Zone is highly religiously and ethnically heterogeneous. This scenario reflects in the Conflict dynamics of the States visited, whereby they are linked directly or otherwise to struggle for political power, sell rule, control of land and intolerance. Most of these have their roots from colonial days. Unfortunately, religious and ethnic identities have become convenient vehicles to propel these sentiments with effective fervour.

Incidentally also, socio-economic factors such as increased population, fact rate of decent encroachment, illiteracy, unemployment, policies of past military dictatorship, injustice, bad Governance have either promoted Conflicts or led to their escalation. Interestingly too, the role of elites and politicians in manipulating the ethno-religious divides to CREATE Conflicts for their personal gains is a particularly disturbing trend in the zone.

It is noteworthy that most of these Conflicts, which have left a legacy of bitterness, hatred and enmity, would have been prevented or controlled if early warning signs of Conflicts were heeded to. This is a lapse, which Governments should redress by getting in place appropriate early warning mechanism for interpretation of Conflict indicators.

While some NGOs have been on ground with respect to initiating peace promotion programmes, the presence of International Organisations with same focus needs to be more visible in Conflict intervention and post Conflict peace building, particularly in Tafawa Balewa/ Bogoro and Wukari Local Government Areas. This, with good Governance and tolerance of the people can make sustainable peace among Communities of North-Eastern Nigeria achievable.

South East Zone

**REPORT OF STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT
(SOUTH EAST ZONE)**

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Introduction/Background

Causes of Political Conflicts

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND

The South East is a uni-ethnic and a uni-lingual region sharing a lot of socio-economic characteristics. The people are predominantly Christian and even though there is a Muslim population, it is too small to constitute a political or social problem. Conflicts in the Southeast have therefore been more of inter and intra ethnic and communal clashes over land use or land ownership. For instance, the Aguleri/Umuleri conflict in Anambra State, Abia/Cross River State, Abia/Akwa Ibom, Rivers and Imo States border conflicts. In Ebonyi, a similar conflict has been smoldering on the border with Obubra in Cross River State.

Since the coming of civil governance however, new dimensions of conflict have emerged. People interviewed across board perceived political conflicts as most destabilizing and life threatening. These conflicts have taken the forms of intra party and intra governmental, viz between governors and their deputies, governors and their Houses of Assembly, governors and federal legislators and appointees commonly described as governors and Abuja bloc. Added to these are conflicts between the State governments and key stakeholders in the various states like churches, labour, Okada riders, magistrates, moneybags, etc.

The scope of this assessment covers all the five states of the south east zone made up of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo States. Issues assessed include political, economic, social and security factors at international, federal, regional and state levels. To collect data, intimate individual interviews were conducted with randomly selected stakeholders representatives covering traditional rulers, churches, civil servants, Ohanaeze, the socio-cultural organization of the Igbos, political parties and

youths. Others covered include women, civil society organizations and market associations.

Causes of Political Conflicts

In all the southeastern states, political conflicts of all dimensions and levels were identified and analyzed with respondents. So were the different mix of issues and actors to determine the root causes. Discernible from responses are the long reign of the military in the country which destroyed all political institutions and the rather short span of the transition programme that ushered in civilian governance.

These two factors meant that the new democratic regime suffered poor political culture expressed in weak political parties and unregulated political competition that stigmatized opposition and disagreement creating political intolerance. To worsen the situation, because of the general skepticism that welcomed the decision of the military to hand over power to civilians, serious minded and responsible politicians and citizens shied away from partisan politics. This left the political space to either unemployed and idle persons or political associates or beneficiaries of the outgoing regime.

To further compound issues, the newly elected federal government appointed as ministers, advisers, and other appointees people who had contested and lost elections at the state levels setting the stage for a no-holds-barred contest for control of politics in the states. These conflicts that have emanated from these competitions have so preoccupied the state governments that a large portion of state budget, media and political energy have been so diverted to pursuing them to the detriment of development of projects and governance.

Consequently, we have weak political parties that cannot control their members nor provide a vision and policy guidelines to their elected and

appointed members. Hence, those elected on their platforms do as they please rather than implement party programmes using party members. Many state governments are implementing their own private agendas using close friends and relatives.

Another key cause of conflicts is the high monetization of politics, which came to play because the parties that contested the 1999 elections had no clear programmes. Contestants therefore relied on money to win. Those that had none depended on so-called political godfathers or moneybags who, in turn, placed such persons under oath to ensure they would do their biddings when elected. Failure to comply with terms of such arrangements and oaths have been source of conflict in Enugu and Anambra states.

Also responsible for most of the conflict in the southeast, as in most states of the federation is the second term syndrome. At both federal and state levels, elected officials are desperate to have a second term in office. Office holders are so obsessed with this that every means are explored to achieve it. Those considered as obstacles to such ambitions are targeted for reprisals to the extent that assassination has become common place.

As acknowledged above, these conflicts manifest themselves in the following forms:

1. Conflict between the Governor and his Deputy has manifested itself in Abia State. This conflict emanated from competition between the governor, Orji Kalu and Chief Enyinnaya Abaribe over control of resources. The Deputy Governor, who was in control of internal revenue collection, was alleged to be channelling the revenue to his own purposes rather the state treasury. This disagreement has led to ethnic hostility between the people of Ngwa, where the Deputy Governor hails from, and the old Bende people from where the Governor hails. The state has therefore been split into two and because of the conflict between the two groups, the state has been unable to make political progress. The attempt to remove the Deputy Governor from office for alleged corrupt practices failed. The state Congress of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party was stalemated until

recently when the national secretariat of the party recognised one of the factions.

2. Conflict between the Governor and the State House of Assembly is more prominent in Enugu State. Currently, the Enugu State House of Assembly has its fifth Speaker (having impeached four earlier ones), and the House is divided into two factions with the majority of sixteen members sitting in Abuja while the eight loyal to the Governor sit in Enugu. The Abuja legislators have constituted a panel to investigate ten-point grounds for the impeachment of the Governor.
3. In all the states, governments are at loggerheads with one stakeholder group or another. In Enugu state the Governor is in conflict with the Catholic Church over the Adoration Ground massacre, with retrenched workers, with commercial motor cycle (Okada) riders who accuse the Governor of trying to impose his stooges as their leaders, and with labour for non-payment of salaries and pensions. The government is also in conflict with students over increase in school fees. In Anambra, the government is in conflict with churches and the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), which is advocating the impeachment of the governor whom it accuses of assassinating the Onitsha Branch Chairman of the NBA and his pregnant wife. The churches, the labour movement as well as magistrates who have been on strike for the past one year, are grumbling. There is no love lost between the government and Okada riders - who accuse the government of imposing unduly high levies and meddling in their internal politics. In Imo State, the story is the same as the government is in contention with labour over unpaid wages and pensions, and with Okada riders over allegations of meddling in the riders' internal politics. In Abia, the confrontation is between the government and market associations over the disbandment of the vigilante group (Bakassi) and labour for non-payment of wages and pensions.
4. The irony is that in all the South-East States assessed, the major conflicts are not between the ruling PDP and other parties, but within the PDP. This intra-PDP conflict is occasioned by unregulated competition for public office which was described by a respondent as the "true poverty alleviation programme." Most of these intra-party conflicts have roots in the last PDP elections which was allegedly characterized by massive rigging and violence. Presently, the results of that election is yet to be fully accepted in Abia, Ebonyi, Imo and the other two states.
5. A serious issue in the states assessed is the jostling for influence and supremacy between state governors and federal legislators and

appointees. In Ebonyi State, the conflict has taken the form of contention between Senate President Pius Anyim and his bloc, and the State Governor, Dr. Sam Egwu. This conflict has further compounded the competition and division between the Afikpo and the Abakaliki zones in the state. In Imo, the contention was between Achikwe Udenwa, the Governor, and Kema Chikwe, the Minister of Aviation who is alleged to be planning to unseat the governor in the 2003 polls.

Abia State presents another complicated case where the three federal appointees viz- Ojo Maduekwe (Minister of Transport), Vincent Ogbulafor (PDP National Secretary), and Ugochukwu Onyema (Chairman, NDDC) are alleged to have ganged up against Orji Kalu, the state governor. In Enugu State, Senator Jim Nwobodo and Dubem Onyia (Minister of State, Foreign Affairs) are squaring up to Governor Chimaroke Nnamani.

6. Another form of conflict is the one that has pitched the state governors against so-called moneybags. These are monied men who invest on politicians with the hope that when they win, they would be compensated with contracts and have their stooges in key positions in government. In Enugu, Senator Nwobodo claims to have funded the electioneering of Governor Nnamani, while in Anambra, Emeka Offor also claims to have installed Chinwoke Mbadinuju. The alleged failure or refusal of the two governors to honour the terms of the sponsorship has created bad blood and attempts to remove the two governors failed with the next battle slated for the 2003 polls.

ECONOMIC CONFLICTS IN SOUTH EAST STATES

Our findings show interrelationship between political, social and economic conflicts. In all the states covered, the major conflicts were issues of political instability and insecurity which impact heavily on the social life of the citizenry. Although they advanced different reasons for the state of affairs, respondents to our questions expressed similar concerns. The explanations adduced for the present state of affairs include:

- Some of our respondents are surprised at the orders from the Federal Government banning income generating commodities that alleviate poverty. The commodities mentioned include second-hand clothing, re-useable (*tokunbo*) vehicles, stockfish and frozen chicken. The respondents do not seem to understand why these bans are a priority with government.
- Part of the revenue allocation formula attributed to derivation went down from 13% to 3%. This reduction is claimed by Imo and Anambra state governments as responsible for their inability to pay salaries of workers.

- In all the South Eastern states, factories have either closed down or are in the process of doing so. For instance, Nnewi and Aba, which are known for manufacturing enterprise, are no longer vibrant. According to our respondents, the cost of running factories have become unaffordable for private entrepreneurs, while government-owned factories were mismanaged.
- Political instability and insecurity, palpable in all the states, distract governments from development projects and programmes which can enhance economic growth. This state of affairs have resulted in disenchantment with the new democratic order as tangible benefits have been slow in manifesting.
- Prior to the discovery of oil, agriculture was fetching substantial foreign exchange for Nigeria, but at the onset of the oil boom, agriculture returned to its subsistence status.
- The purchasing power of the citizenry is steadily dwindling, especially as a result of irregular payment of salaries.
- Unemployment is on the rise with the attendant consequences that suggests.
- Prostitution is also on the increase with consequences for Nigeria's ability to contain the AIDS scourge. The South-East States do not appear to consider this issue as threatening.

SOCIAL CONFLICTS

The various forms of conflict in the zone are interconnected with each other. People are now prisoners in their homes owing to daily reports of assassinations, thugery and cult activities. All these combine to instill fear into people. Crime rates continue to climb as armed young boys and girls are available for hire. During this study in Enugu and Anambra states, the brutal murders of the Igwes (man and his pregnant wife) and Victor Nwakwo (a publisher) were reported.

Unfortunately, the judiciary is not seen as a viable option by ordinary folks as it is perceived to be in the pocket of the executive arm of government. The police is perceived to be most corrupt and a part of the problem rather than the solution. The disbandment of the 'Bakassi Boys' in Abia and Anambra states has led to perceptible rise in the rate of violent crimes. Primary and secondary schools have been closed for about a year in Anambra State, while in Enugu, a university has been closed since June, 2002. The Imo experience is not dissimilar. In the midst of all these, public officers show off their new wealth, increasing feelings of hopelessness and powerlessness in the people.

SECURITY CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH EASTERN STATES

Of major concern is the palpable insecurity in all the south eastern states epitomised by killing and maiming of political opponents.

Respondents routinely fingered the long stay of the military in government as a major factor in the undue militarisation of civil society. The military, it must be remembered ruled Nigeria for 29 out of its 42 years post-independence history. The military is blamed for virtually destroying every infrastructure in the country, including the educational system and social values.

The civil wars in other West African countries made the intervention of ECOWAS imperative. ECOMOG, the intervention force set up by ECOWAS, had major Nigerian input, including the peace enforcement forces. It is argued that the returnee forces came back home with captured and surplus weapons from the wars and sold them in Nigeria without really bothering about the use to which they would be put. As such, there are surplus arms floating around for the use of conflict entrepreneurs, armed robbers, assassins and the like.

The massive demobilisation of soldiers, occasioned by the decision to hand over power to civilians in 1999, was not done in a sophisticated enough manner. Lacking marketable skills and finding it difficult to cope within civil society, these retrenched military men have resorted to carrying arms as robbers, assassins, and political thugs.

Corruption in the law enforcement agencies, especially the police, is a major factor in the incidence of insecurity in the South-East. The power and material wherewithal to perform was whittled down during the long period of military rule. Added to poor remuneration what we have is a police force that lacks commitment and that is generally disenchanted. Civil society, in turn, is distrustful of the police for the simple reason that it is not efficient in keeping or enforcing law and order.

The urban areas have grown phenomenally in the last decades as a result of the hopelessness in the rural areas. The new entrants soon found that the promise they thought was in the urban areas was a mirage. Some of them invariably joined the army of recruits into violent crime, such as thuggery, armed robbery and mugging. The police got progressively outnumbered with the effect that even if they were well-motivated, they could not effectively cope with the population they were supposed to police. The fact of the police not being efficient in keeping law and order meant that people got their rights and privileges abridged by others without repercussion to the transgressors. The former victims were encouraged, thereby, to rely on their own devices for vengeance and protection. What has ensued is the law of the jungle, an almost total breakdown of law and order.

The situation as described above explains the popular welcome vigilantism received in the south eastern states, which itself gives an inkling to how far values had sunk in those states. Due to inefficiency and distrust of the police and other law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary, the people welcomed the operation of a vigilante outfit that became law unto itself. The *Bakassi Boys* as operated in Anambra and Abia states were police, judiciary and hangman rolled into one. They routinely carried out interrogation by ordeal.

Armed robbery and cult practices are prevalent in states of the South-East. The institutions of higher learning in this zone record one of the most visible presence of secret cults in Nigeria. Members of these cults are routinely into violent crime. When their institutions are shut down, they, together with other able-bodied but unemployed youths, turn the zone into a dreaded area where life and property get wasted.

While the Abia State Vigilance Service and the Anambra Vigilance Service, as the *Bakassi Boys* were officially known, reigned supreme in Abia and Anambra states, the crime rates reduced and were lower than in other south-eastern states. Now that their activities have been suspended, the crime rate has risen again.

Political violence and political assassinations are rife in all the states of the South-East geopolitical zone. Respondents opine that this is happening because politicians are intolerant of opposing views. They employ and arm thugs to kill and maim opponents and their sympathisers. This is the trend in the South-East zone, but Enugu and Anambra states are identified as the worst. While our team was in the zone, Victor Nwakwo, a publisher, was murdered and the Onitsha (in Anambra State) Branch Chairman of the Nigerian Bar Association was murdered with his wife.

The general insecurity in this zone has left a toll on the economic activities of the zone. Respondents argue that both the state and federal governments are apathetic to security and this is so, they claim, because some of these governments are perpetrators of violence.

LOCAL CONFLICT ACTORS

Government:

The provocative display of wealth by public officers serve as a lure for other politicians to covet public office and to try and win it at all cost. Those already in office get carried away by the accompanying luxury and want to retain it perpetually. At the state level, the second-term syndrome is about this contradiction between some who would stop at nothing to get to the position of governor, while the incumbent is not in any mood to create a vacancy. Also, the executive arm of government has been involved in the emasculation of other arms of government. These invariably create tension and grievance which generate conflict.

Youths:

There is widespread depression among the youth owing to hopelessness from unemployment and a feeling that the political leaders are so engrossed in corruption that they do not care about the youth's predicament. Membership of secret cults and involvement in armed robbery, assassinations and thugery mark them out as willing or unwilling tools of violent conflict.

Trade Unions:

The unions, until recently in some states, enjoyed good rapport with governments. In Enugu and Anambra states notably, series of taxes imposed on members of some unions are seen as oppressive by those unions, and this could be a platform for conflict entrepreneurs to exploit.

Religious Fundamentalists:

Some clerics have been quite vocal in their opposition to government policies and some government functionaries to the extent that they are labelled "opposition". The suppression of such clerics and their followers, as is alleged against the Enugu State Governor, could trigger violence in such areas.

Media:

Media practitioners may not be independent as to provide objective information and influence attitudes and behaviours in favour of peace. It becomes necessary, therefore, to develop a framework for peace media to motivate and encourage the media to respond to conflict because they could be a veritable tool of peacemaking.

Labour Unions:

The gap between the haves and have not could lead to grievance, and the inability of government institutions to deal with pressing and fundamental issues like salaries, policy environment etc. could aggravate tension to the extent of engendering conflict.

Traditional Leaders:

At different levels, they have worked on conflict. They are effective in promoting dialogue and if properly motivated could play a mediating role in containing or managing conflict.

Churches:

The Church is helpful in building morals and virtues of tolerance, love etc. in citizens and generally, appear to have solutions to the anxieties and tensions in the society. They could be a tool for peace-building.

CONCLUSION

The conflicts in the south-eastern states were, hitherto, more of inter- and intra- communal clashes over land use and land ownership. But with the advent of democracy in 1999, a new dimension has emerged, political conflict. Political conflict has the potential for generating serious crises that are capable of undermining the security and integrity of the south-eastern states and, indeed, the Nigerian nation.

The political conflict in the states have precipitated other forms of conflict which include the economic, social and security ones. The implications of this multi-conflict situation can not be overemphasised.

There are all types of actors involved in all these conflict situations. Some of them work around, some work in, some work on, some mediating, while some are right in the middle of conflict. Yet, these conflicts seem not to abate.

The essence of government is that of resolution of conflicts among different interests, even among governments. This is against the backdrop that government has a monopoly over the legitimate use of last-resort instruments of conflict resolution in any polity.

In the conflicts in the south-eastern states where the major contenders are people who hold powerful positions in government, it is tempting to conclude that government is powerless to act, yet the Federal Government owes it a duty to resolve the conflicts in the states.

The Federal Government can be a good and final arbiter in the present situation in the South-East. Since all the south-eastern governors are from the Peoples Democratic Party, as President Olusegun Obasanjo, there is ample space and ground for the Federal Government to bring all stakeholders in the South-East political conflict together for purposes of resolution.

If this is done, resources and energy employed in sustaining the present conflicts can be channelled toward the development of the states, and the state governments can squarely face their constitutional duty of developing the states.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Respondents across board were despondent. They saw the political conflict involving powerful politicians, who are well-entrenched and have huge resources, as intractable in the near future. Notwithstanding this despondency, the following recommendations were offered:

- Federal Government intervention. Many felt that the President should call his appointees to order. The PDP, to which all contenders belong, it was suggested, should discipline its members and achieve a negotiated settlement in the various states
- All and sundry should accept the peoples verdict in the 2003 General Elections as the final resolution of the conflicts
- In Ebonyi, the process of reconciliation could start at the grassroots-clan level where people would be mobilised on the basis of their needs and interest. This strategy has the potential of pulling the rug from under the feet of the politicians and force them to make peace
- Ways and means should be found to strengthen the legislative and judicial arms of government so that they, effectively, can act as checks to perceived excesses of the executive arm

- Local and international election monitors should pay close attention to the south-east states to discourage rigging
- Radical and effective poverty eradication strategy/programme should be put in place to improve the living standard of the people
- A clear economic policy should be charted for the country
- Ailing public and private industries should be refurbished and industrialisation encouraged
- The police should be equipped properly and retrained to achieve professionalism
- Government should consult with the people more on all issues;
- Workers salaries should be paid promptly
- Immediate employment opportunities should be created for the youth
- The justice delivery system should be improved
- All and sundry should respect human rights, social justice and the rule of law
- Peace education should be taught in schools at all levels
- Society should be conscientised to achieve a paradigm shift
- Professional conflict mediation should be employed by governments to ameliorate and resolve those conflicts that have erupted
- Activities of *Bakassi Boys* should be strictly limited to crime control.

North-West Zone

**STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT OF NORTH-
WEST ZONE, NIGERIA**

BY

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INTRODUCTION TO THE NORTH-WEST ZONE

The North-West zone comprises seven states: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara. All of these states fall within the former Sokoto Caliphate, an Islamic state and government that existed before the colonial period. Hausa is the dominant ethnic group and Hausa language, the lingua franca in the zone. However, there are other major indigenous ethnic groups, particularly in Kaduna and Kebbi States, which are majority groups in some Local Government Areas by right and, as such, major ethnic groups in their states. Islam is the dominant religion followed by Christianity and Traditional religions.

The heritage of Sokoto Caliphate impact on the nature of relationship between religion and politics and result in the politicisation of religion. Consequently, issues, either local or national, that are economic and political in nature tend to take some religious colouration. Equally relevant is the role of Islam both as an ideology and mobilising force in the zone. It is used by the political elite to mobilise the Muslims in support or in opposition to issues that are perceived to be for or against Islam and Muslims. For instance, many of the revenge killings in Kano against the Igbos, even when the Igbos were not involved, may be interpreted as the response of the Hausas against perceived Igbo's dominance in trading activities in Sabon Gari Market. Similarly, it can also be used to challenge the authority. The issue of the expansion of Sharia in all the states of the zone may be viewed along this line. The ordinary people saw Shariaⁱ as an alternative to the existing system of government that is characterised by corruption and injustice.

The relationship between religion and politics becomes more relevant because of the nature of ethnic division in the zone. The Hausas are

predominantly Muslims and the non-Hausa predominantly Christians and Traditionalists. These two factors: relationship between Islam and politics and the nature of ethnic division directly influence the nature of conflict in the zone. Economic and political sources of conflict are always given religious dimensions. For instance, most of the conflict in Kaduna that are economically motivated (over land or market stall) ended up taking a religious dimension. A similar thing applied to the opposition of Hausa emirate system of government by other ethnic groups in the two states.

The second nature of conflict in the zone is the intra-Islamic groups conflict. This is reflected in the struggle for supremacy between the traditional and 'modern' or 'progressive' scholars. It is this kind of struggle that led to the overthrow of the Hausa Habe and the establishment of Sokoto Caliphate. Similarly, it was the same struggle that led to the emergence of different Islamic sects and groups that clash in the zone.

SECTION ONE

1.1 Methodology

The zone is clustered on the bases of the nature of conflict in the zone and their flashpoints. Hence Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara were identified as flashpoints for political conflict and Kano and Káduna as flashpoints for ethnic and religious conflict. Open Questionnaire technique was used for the collection of information (a copy is attached in Appendix 1). Issues covered in the questionnaire are: Causes of Conflict, Dynamics of Conflict, and Actors of Conflict, Responses to Conflict and Intervention or Recommendations. A wide range of people were interviewed. They are government officials: the police, SSS, state and local government officials, traditional leaders, and University staff; civil society and groups: youth organisations, women's groups, ASUU, SUG, political parties, NAPEP, farmers/the Cattle Rearers Union, students' unions, and religious bodies such as CAN, JNl, MSS, and NACOMYO. There were also individual. We also had traditional leaders, religious leaders, researchers/academics, unemployed youths e.g. Area Boys and Almajirai, indigenes, settlers, ex-servicemen and political leaders.

1.2 Analysis of Data

For many sociologists conflict is inevitable. What depends on a gamut of variables is the transformation of conflict from the latent to the open and destructive stage. What triggers such transformation? Who are the players or actors? How are conflicts transformed, etc. These are the questions that this research sought to answer. To do this, the Strategic Conflict Assessment framework of analysis (as developed by DFID) was adopted to provide us with an understanding of the multi-dimensional nature

and dynamics of conflict and how they interact at different levels. We shall begin with the causes of conflict in the zone.

SECTION TWO

2.1 Causes of Conflict

As presented in Table 1, there are many causes of conflict – some of these causes are security, others are political, economic and social. Some of these causes are general, i.e. apply to all types of conflict, while others are specific to a particular type of conflict. We shall begin with the general causes.

2.1.1 General Causes

From Table 1, the respondents have identified both underlying and immediate causes of conflict. Poverty is acknowledged by most of the respondents as the major factor that is causing all the types of conflict in the zone. Poverty is manifested in such factors as high level of youth unemployment, lack of health and educational services. A popular saying often cited during the fieldwork is that “an idle mind is a devil’s workshop.” Government economic policies, either initiated by the government or international agencies such as World Bank and IMF, are believed to have increased the high level of poverty in the country. The high level of unemployment among the youth render them vulnerable to manipulation in the hands of political, ethnic and religious elites.

Poverty is an important factor in the zone because of its high incidence in the northern region in comparison to other regions in the country. According to Bande (1998:5), “the incidence of poverty, ignorance, disease, squalor, poor diet and poor shelter is more pronounced in this zone than all the other zones of Nigeria.” For instance, in the National Consumer Survey (1997:12), the national average household expenditure was N5,194 and the North-West zone had the least figure of N2,941. A similar picture is

seen in household income and level of poverty with North-East and North-West occupying the bottom scale respectively.

Furthermore, although the population in the northern region is more than that of the south, looking at professional data in Nigeria, the North is said to have only 10 per cent of engineers; 15 per cent of professors; 10 per cent of architects; 25 per cent of lawyers, 8 per cent bank executives and less than 2 per cent of insurance practitioners in the country (Yusuf, 1999). Comparing regional disparity, the UNDP Human Development Report (1998:31) reports life expectancy in Bendel State in the south as 51 years as against 38 years for Borno State in the north. In education, the UNDP data replicates the same picture. In Borno State, the adult literacy rate is 10% while in Bendel it is 62%. In addition, the Registrar of the Nigerian University Admission Board reports that out of the 400,194 candidates who sat for entrance examination into universities in the 1999/2000 session, only 16.24% of the candidates were from the North.

Related to poverty and linked to conflict is the issue of bad governance raised by our respondents. The respondents cited corruption, self-centred leadership, poor implementation of government policies like NAPEP, the glaring gap between the rich and the poor and the arrogant display of stolen public fund by government officials, etc as the underlying causes of public anger and frustration that need religious and ethnic triggers to erupt into violent conflict.

The above situation is made worse with porous borders across the zone that allows easy access to arms and the influx of militants that are available for hire. (as presented in box 1). The presence of youths who are unemployed, illiterate, have easy access to arms and hard drugs further add to the population of restless armed and drugged youth who are ready to engage in violent conflict on minor grounds. Their condition also

predisposes them to easy manipulation and willingness to kill and destroy for small sums of money.

If some of the above mentioned factors are monitored and curtailed properly by effective security services, conflict may not be as intense and widespread as it is. However, the conflict situation is exacerbated by the poor capacity of the police force to detect and address early warning signs that may prevent eruption of conflict. The police can indeed escalate conflicts in a situation where the force is considered biased in its interventions during conflict. The perception of an aggrieved party that justice has not been meted to the perpetrators of previous transgressions was also identified as a cause/escalating factor as the aggrieved group may wait for an opportunity to revenge and inflict maximum damage.

BOX 1: Armed Youth for Hire

In all the states we visited we witnessed an array of youth groups in different locations of the state capitals. These youths are drawn from Almajirai, school dropouts, and black marketers in petroleum products, street boys and even youth from neighbouring countries. These youths are armed and are always under the influence of drugs. These youths are classified into groups for the purpose of hiring at a negotiated price to whoever is interested.

Apart from the general causes of conflict there are specific causes applicable to the types of conflict prevalent in the zone.

2.2 Religious Conflict

There are two types of religious conflicts in the zone. They are the conflict between followers of two different religions and conflict between followers of the same religion, particularly between Muslims. The identifiable causes of inter-religious conflict range from extremism to politicisation of religion. The respondents view the problem of increasing religious intolerance as a recent development. A substantial number of them did recall, not long ago, how they used to celebrate each other's religious festivities. This practice has disappeared with increasing intolerance and conflict between the Muslims and Christians. A factor that contributed to this development is the politicisation of religion that occurred at both national and local levels. The attempt at the national level by the Ibrahim Babangida's administration in the late 80s to enlist Nigeria into the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) had raised the spectre of religious division at the national level. The move was strongly opposed by the Christians and there was mobilisation of Christians across churches to oppose the move. Such actions of the government gave some Christian bodies, especially the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) an element of legitimacy to fight on behalf of Nigerian Christians.

The expansion of Sharia legal system by some State governments further heightened the mistrust between Muslims and Christians, both at the national and local levels. The situation is made worse with the presence of the religious armed group, the Hisbah, responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Shariah legal system at the local level. The activities and proliferation of the new generation Christian churches, in terms of aggressive preaching and indiscriminate construction of churches in residential areas that are dominated by Muslims have the potential of generating conflict in some states in the zone. For instance, the number of

churches in Sokoto increased from less than 10 to almost a hundred in less than a decade. Similarly, verbal attack on other religions by religious leaders during sermons, lack of skills in non-violent resolution of conflict, and high level of illiteracy make the followers easy tools in the hands of religious leaders.

The increase in religious intolerance and the use of religion for political ends was made possible because of the public perception that the Government is failing to provide basic needs to Nigerians. As the Government is increasingly seen to fail to impact positively in the lives of Nigerians, religion provides an alternative. This is more so because the two religions are involved in the provision of social services and welfare. Consequently, strong loyalty towards one's religion rather than Government becomes established in the psyche of Nigerians. This point is very relevant as access to power and resources at the national level become politicized along religious and ethnic lines. The provision of scholarships by different international religious bodies and governments further compounds the problems. Young Nigerians given religious training abroad by both Muslim and Christian bodies and governments come back indoctrinated on extreme views of religion.

BOX 2: Religion versus Nigerian State

There is a definite feeling, especially in Kano, that the zone's identity is mainly religious, particularly Islamic, and that such identity should be protected at all cost. The options are: The acceptance of such identity, or the division of the country. The constitutional means of dividing the country is a preferred option. If otherwise, then Shariah should be applied to Muslims only and the rest of the citizens in the Shariah implementing states should live according to the rules of the majority.

Other factors that escalate religious conflicts are reprisal killings to avenge the killings of fellow brothers in areas where they are a minority and the low capacity of the police in terms of human and material resources to deal with conflict.

The intra-religious tension, especially among Muslims, is another palpable generator of conflict. The zone has had few cases of tension between Muslim groups escalating into conflict. The main cause of such conflict has both international and local dimensions. The overseas training Muslims receive either in the Middle East or Iran introduces them to a particular brand of Islam, and the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran for example come to be played out in Nigeria through the activities of their representatives. For example, the Izala group represents the Saudi brand of Islam and the Muslim Brothers represents Iran's brand of Islam. Related to this is the struggle for legitimacy over the interpretation of Islam and the holy Qur'an between the established traditional Islamic scholars and the young and western educated Muslims.

2.3 Farmers/Pastoralist Conflict

Conflict between farmers and pastoral Fulani is common across the zone and happens during every planting and harvesting season. The main cause of the conflict is lack of demarcation between farming and cattle rearing land. In the past, there was a clearly demarcated grazing route and land on which the pastorals grazed their livestock. These officially gazetted lands and routes were gradually converted for farming purposes either by the farmers or through the government agricultural policies. Government irrigation sites and establishment of state capitals (for example, Dutse after the creation of Jigawa state) were done in the officially gazetted grazing land

and routes. Increased urbanisation and population pressures are additional contributing factors. This situation results in the pastoralists passing through the farmlands of the farmers, and destroying their crops. The farmers usually react to such destruction and conflict ensues.

TABLE 1: Causes of Conflict

Sector	Security	Political	Economic	Social
International /Regional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Middle-east countries (Saudi Arabia, Libya) and Western States (USA, The Vatican) have taken increased interest (funds) in religious activities like religious education, scholarships, training (ideology) * Porous borders * Influx of foreigners who compete for cattle-grazing land 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Accusation that external actors provide funding for elections. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Western governments have helped increase corruption and flight of money. * Policies of IFIs (IMF, WB): stringent conditionalities 	
National	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Poorly-equipped Police & SS * Lack of capacity of Police & SS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Reprisal killings (to avenge killing of kin in other regions) * Reckless leadership * Overbearing and excessive interference. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Endemic corruption. * High poverty levels. * High unemployment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Politicisation of religion. * Ethnic, religious, sectarian, distrust

		* Second-term syndrome (<i>tazarce</i>)	* Govt. economic policies: sharp inequitable distribution	* Poor education health, services.
Local	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Armed foreigners (Niger, Cameroon) competing with locals for land, business. * Presence of local militant groups (Hisbah). * Biased police 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Reprisal Killings (to avenge killing of kin in other regions). * Religion, ethnicity (inter and intra), used as political tool (consciousness of religion, ethnicity). * Corrupt leadership * Imposition of authority. * Lack of good 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * High poverty levels. * High youth unemployment. * Ethnic rivalry over land, business and other economic issues. * Lack of demarcation between farming and cattle-grazing land. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Sharia-related issues: competition for radical interpretation of Islam. * Armed & drugged youth. * Strong religious and ethnic solidarity. * Strong ethnic

		<p>governance.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">* Second-term syndrome (<i>tazarce</i>)		<p>and religious distrust.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">* High levels of illiteracy and poor education.* Religious intolerance.* Ethnic- and political party (or faction)-based mass media.* Lack of communication between religious groups.
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				<p>* New generation of churches engaged in aggressive conversion activities.</p> <p>* Discriminatory practices against non-indigenes.</p>
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The influx of foreigners from neighbouring countries competing for grazing land and passing through farmlands also compounds the problem. Delay in the evacuation of farm produce and early arrival of the pastoralists were also identified as a cause of conflict between farmers and pastoralists. Once the conflict erupts, overreaction from both sides usually escalates the situation.

BOX3: Farmers versus Fulani

There is a strong feeling among the farmers across the zone that the Fulani are able to encroach on the farmland of the farmers annually because the Fulani have the money to buy up government officials (police and the Judiciary). Consequently, the farmers take up laws into their hand by attacking the Fulani whenever there is an encroachment into their farmland.

SECTION THREE

3.1 Actors in Conflict

An analysis of conflict is incomplete without looking at the role of individuals in the generation of conflict. Just as there are causers of conflict, so also are there managers. Two important factors help to explain the role of individuals in conflict in Nigeria. These factors are greed and grievances. There are certain actors who are believed to benefit from the break up of conflict or its continuation. Consequently, they do whatever it takes to engineer and perpetuate conflict. Other actors in conflict are motivated by the sense of grievances resulting from economic and political marginalisation. The very role of some of these actors in conflict reinforces the need for them to be armed. Hence, some of them are armed, others are not. Some of the actors identified in the field are:

1. Ex-service men, military and police. The low moral and low capacity of the police force in terms of equipment, training and pay have made them to vent their frustrations on the civilians whenever they are called upon to maintain law and order. The situation is made worse because of the attitude of the police that is viewed as biased along ethnic lines. Another relevant armed group are ex-servicemen who are increasingly playing an important political role at the local level, particularly in Kebbi state.
2. Another group of armed actors are the religious vigilantes or the Hisbah, who take the responsibility of monitoring the implementation of Sharia. They are operatives at the state and community levels. They occasionally pass judgement on the perceived violators of the Sharia legal system in dehumanising and violent ways. Another related group is the group of religious leaders who use insulting

words against others in religious gatherings. Some of the words preach hatred and incite conflict.

3. **Armed Youth:** There are many types under this broad category. It consists of armed political thugs, Area boys (street urchins), black marketers in petroleum products and armed youth available for hire. These youths are mostly drawn from the unemployed youths roaming the street with little to do. With the return to democracy, some of these youths have been absorbed into the youth wing of the political parties in the country. Their vulnerability exposes them to manipulation by party leaders and they can easily be induced to incite conflict. There are such cases across the zone.

BOX4: From Armed Robbery to Community Conflict

Three days before our visit to a Local Government Area, three notorious armed robbers were picked by a team of Road Safety Corps and handed over to the Police. One of the robbers that sustained injuries was handcuffed and taken to hospital for treatment. In the hospital bed and under the police guard, the armed robber escaped. As soon as the news reached the town, the people spontaneously responded by attacking the police station and other police officers present or found on the way. The conflict led to a loss of life and destruction of properties worth millions.

1. **Armed Robbers:** The menace of armed robbers is not a new phenomenon in the zone. What is new however is the pattern it is taking in a Local Government Area. A gang of youth, dissatisfied with their conditions planned to attack and kill the wealthy members of the Local Government Area. In less than seven days over five

wealthy community members were attacked and killed by this group of youth.

2. Other greed-motivated actors identified in Table 2 are politicians, traditional and religious leaders and government officials. Traditional leaders were reported to incite conflict occasionally because of the gains they make in terms of material rewards they receive from the warring parties as mediators. This is mostly reported in relation to the conflict between Farmers and Pastoralists. Pastoralists are accused of using money to bribe officials (traditional and government) in times of conflict. Corruption and inefficiency by political and government officials during a conflict situation were said to exacerbate conflict in all the states visited.

BOX 5: Politicians as Actors In Conflict

A visit to a Local Government Area by a Governor ended in violent conflict. On the Governor's entourage were fifteen (15) buses filled with armed youth. According to other respondents, the youth were not armed. Whether armed or not, the visit was prematurely stopped because of the violent conflict that erupted between the youths and the police when the police force attempted to control them. Some claimed that the clash took place between the supporters of the two major parties, ANPP and PDP. The conflict resulted in three deaths and tens of injuries and loss of properties. What is apparent in our interview with political leaders of UNPP and PDP as well as religious and community leaders was the role of external actors in inciting clashes between the supporters of the two political parties. All the three political clashes in the LGA in the year 2002 took place during a visit by an 'outside' political leader.

3. There are also other categories of people that play positive roles in managing and controlling conflict. Whenever conflict breaks, the police are called upon to stop the conflict. Such interventions have been instrumental in minimizing the human and material costs associated with conflict. Traditional rulers were also reported to play a vital role in the maintenance of peace, particularly in bringing two conflicting parties to the dialogue table. In many of the states visited religious bodies, civil and professional bodies play a similar role.

3.2 Conflict Managers

While a range of groups are already involved in managing conflict, particularly at the local level, others have the potential of doing so as indicated in Table 2. Security services such as the State Security Service (SSS) and the Police Force have the potential of identifying and responding to early warning signals. In one of the states, the Police Commissioner, Director, SSS and political party leaders meet regularly to identify possible political conflict flash points and likely actors and appropriate responses. A similar approach is also adopted with different religious leaders. Despite the efforts by the security agencies, it was observed that they are incapacitated in terms of morale, equipment and skills.

TABLE 2: Actors in Conflict

Type	Armed Actors	Possible Conflict Causers	Likely Conflict Managers
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Military/Police * Armed civilian groups (Hisbah, Yanbanga) * Armed foreign militants * Ex-servicemen 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * IFIs: enslavement through conditionalities * Armed bandits and foreign militants. * Police/Military * Ex-servicemen 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Military/Police
Political/ Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Politicians * Political youth wings * Armed Political thugs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Self-centered & marginalized politicians * Govt. officials * Traditional rulers * Political youth wings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Government * NGOs * Peace committees
Economic/ Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Unemployed youth (“area boys” and “area girls”) * Armed robbers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Unemployed and underemployed * Poorly educated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Business * APEX farmers association

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Businessmen: flaunt ill-gotten wealth * Farmers * Pastoralists * Armed petroleum black-marketers 	
<p>Social/Ethnic/ Religious</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Armed ethnic groups * Religious fanatics * Al-majirai * Shariah police (Hisbah) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Ethnic youth leaders * Ethnic & traditional rulers * Religious fanatic leaders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * NGOs & CBOs (including women's groups) * Traditional rulers and institutions * Ethnic, religious, & community leaders.

Traditional leaders also manage conflict by bringing all the possible players in conflict to a table. Most of the Emirs visited have peace committees where leaders of the different ethnic groups in the emirate, leaders of all religious groups and sects and different interest groups meet regularly to discuss issues of disagreements and sources of conflict wherever conflict erupts. A case study of a community is presented in the box below.

BOX 6: Community Leaders as Managers of Conflict

A small district in Kaduna is distinct in that it has never experienced violent conflict: the Chief of Barnawa constantly dialogues with religious, traditional, tribal leaders to ensure that problems are addressed before they escalate. Muslims dominate the district but they voted for an Ibo to represent them at the Local Government Council. The community also set up a vigilante committee to ensure that the youth do not turn delinquent. Emphasis on religious and ethnic tolerance and respect is a priority.

Other conflict managers are NGOs and other Civil Society groups. Few religious organisations have helped to abate conflict erupting in their localities. NGOs were also found to be active in passing the peace and dialogue messages among different conflicting groups. Some of these NGOs have had financial assistance from some international agencies. Few respondents raised the potential roles women can play as managers of conflict. However, the socio-cultural constraints they face as women such as the practice of purdah were also noted as a hindrance.

SECTION FOUR

4.1 Responses to Conflict

Responses to conflict differ on the basis of those involved. Some may deal with the conflict directly, other may work around it or decide to ignore it completely. Table 3 below highlights such responses.

Several Government agencies, International communities, groups and individuals do directly work on conflict. The nature of their involvement is presented in Table 3. Such agencies include State Security Service (SSS) and the Nigerian Police force. The international community include The World Bank, DFID, USAID, UNDP, and charity organizations such as Red Cross.

TABLE 3: Working on Conflict

	Working on Conflict	Working in Conflict	Working around Conflict
Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forces to contain conflict • Relief assistance • Peace initiatives such as peace committees and peace treaties • Grant political autonomy along ethnic lines • Clarification of Sharia: applicable to Muslims • Youth education in mosques, churches, sponsored by state 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate response by NGOs 	
International	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assistance (relief materials) from donor agencies • Donor agencies funded peace-building initiatives, mediation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide security guards to its staff 	

<p>CBOs/NGOs</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business community uses the media to sue for peace. • Business community provide aid • NGOs work to bring peace: emergence of inter-faith NGOs • Biased media incites passions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business community used media to call for peace • Inadequate response by some NGOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of response by NGOs
<p>Individuals</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traditional rulers and communities act as peacemakers • Religious, ethnic, traditional leaders jointly make peace appeals 		

How government, organizations and individuals respond to conflict, both positive and negative is presented in table 4.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Involvement of foreigners			sponsored by state <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Biased media incites passions• Inadequate response by NGOs
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SECTION FIVE

5.1 Recommendations

The following recommendations are drawn from the suggestions respondents offered or implied and they are presented on the basis of the role each sector plays. The recommendations are spelt out below and presented in table 5:

5.1.1 Government

1. Abolition of youth wings of political parties
2. Need for an independent Judiciary
3. Collaboration with NGOs
4. Prompt actions on recommendations of tribunals and commissions of inquiry
5. Protection of democracy
6. Tightening of borders & restrictions on arm trade
7. Develop an early warning system on violent conflict
8. Effective training of the Police; providing logistics (adequate communication, transport systems) and their general welfare
9. Eradication of poverty through effective implementation of NAPEP
10. Increased federal aid for youth programs (anti-drugs, education)
11. Boosting of employment opportunities, esp. in agriculture and small-scale industries
12. Focus on bottom-up approach: community driven development and participatory methods
13. Focus on education, esp. development of special skills
14. Peace curriculum in schools & universities

TABLE 5: RECOMMENDATIONS

Sector	Security	Political	Economic	Social
International/ Regional	* Border control (at regional level) to check inflow of arms and people	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IOs and IFIs should support democracy and peace endeavors: focus on anti-corruption activities • Sponsor programs for youth training (e.g. civic activism) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IFI's should focus investment in agriculture, water, education, industry • IFIs should stop the campaign to remove subsidies on agriculture and reduce pressure on govt. to over-privatize • IFIs and IOs should focus on accountability & 	* Donor investment in education, health, youth training.

			transparency	
National	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tightening of borders & restrictions on arms trade. • Develop an early warning system on violent conflict. • Training of police; providing logistics (adequate communication, transport system) & services (living quarters). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abolish youth wings in political parties. • Need for an independent judiciary • Collaboration with NGOs • Prompt action on recommendations of tribunals and commissions of inquiry • Protection of democracy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eradication of poverty: effective implementation of NAPEP • Businesses must invest in peace and have social responsibility • Increased federal aid for youth programs (anti-drugs, education) • Increase of employment opportunities, esp. in agriculture and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on education, esp. development of special skills • Peace curriculum in schools and universities. • Government involvement in religious affairs: monitor activities of religious bodies and religious training.

				rearers • Training in conflict management and peace-building for all actors in the field of conflict resolution
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5.2 Conclusion

If there is any area of consensus among our respondents on the causes of conflict, it is on the role of poverty and the problem of youth crimes in the zone. There is no doubt that dealing with the problem of poverty and other variables such as unemployment and political marginalisation is the best strategy to deal with the problem of conflict in the country. Majority of the respondents are skeptical of government policy on the eradication of poverty. Doubts were raised on the seriousness of government to minimise poverty and ultimately manage conflict.