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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Civil Security Force Development Plan

September 13, 1965

REVIEWED AND RECLASSIFIED by Lauren
J. Goin, Director, OPS, Jan. 1975

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Civil Security Force Development Plan

As instructed, Mr. William Broe and Mr. L. T. Shannon ~~and~~ and Mr. Lauren Goin of the Office of Public Safety, AID, traveled to the Dominican Republic in order to explore measures that should be taken to strengthen the civil security force capabilities in carrying out its mission, particularly as this relates the present and potential threats to internal security posed by subversive elements. The team arrived on September 8 and departed September 12 after discussing pertinent aspects of the subject with some National Police personnel and with various members of the Country Team.

GENERAL INFORMATION

The Dominican Republic is comprised of some 38,000 square miles and has a population of nearly 3.3 million people. The capital, Santo Domingo, is a major port on the south coast and has a population of about 300,000. The Republic occupies about one-half of an island which is shared with Haiti. The terrain is mountainous, with major ranges running in a northwest to southeast direction. The greatest percentage of the population (1.5-2.0 million) lives in the fertile Cibao Valley region which extends from Santo Domingo to the northwest tip of the country. To the west and, to a lesser extent, to the east, the land is less arable and less populated.

The Cibao Valley roads are excellent and all-weather roads exist to the east and west as well. However, large areas in the mountains are not accessible by road.

The government is provisional and is led by Sr. Hector Garcia-Godoy. After months of strife, the government will attempt to restore order, rejuvenate the economy and prepare the country for elections in nine months. Playing a major role in this effort will be the National Police, whose abilities to perform the policing functions have been weakened in recent months and have other deficiencies which prevent them from effective performance.

THE NATURE OF THE THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY

On August 13, 1965, an assessment of the threat to the Republic's internal security was prepared and is attached as Annex A.

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Since then there have been further developments, facts have been determined and more recent estimates made. Based on these reports and personal visits to the Dominican Republic, facts bearing on the nature and extent of the threat are:

a. The rebels have announced that they have trained 2,000 of their numbers in the techniques of insurgent combat. There is some confirming evidence to support this figure. An incident indicating the seriousness of this training is the recently reported statement of one of the trainees that he is now returning to his village to start an insurgent training school there.

b. An estimated 7,000 weapons, mostly small arms but including some machine guns of .30 and .50 calibre, have disappeared from civil police and military inventories. It is not possible to estimate the number of additional weapons which found their way into rebel hands through other sources prior to the overthrow of the Bosch and succeeding junta governments. There were undoubtedly some, and

c. Recent queries to police chiefs in several interior towns and cities elicited opinions that, while their areas of responsibility are currently quiet and under control and that returnees from the rebel area in Santo Domingo are not now misbehaving, they believe that both a potential and at least a latent threat for violent insurgent action definitely exists.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXPANDING THE POLICE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

To prepare the civil security force for effective performance in the maintenance of internal security, an AID public safety program was established in May 1962 (see Tab A). Much has been done with a modest program, though project momentum has been impeded by a coup and revolutions. At this time, certain inabilities exist which prevent the police from maximum performance.

To strengthen the National Police, it is proposed that the AID public safety program be expanded. The expanded program should have as its objectives, to improve:

a. the administrative abilities of senior officers in order that they can manage their resources more effectively and economically,

b. effectiveness of the riot control force, of which 475 men remain,

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- c. police capabilities in the provision of police services in rural areas,
- d. facilities and capabilities for maintaining motor vehicles,
- e. methods of police training in order to train up to 600 men per year,
- f. police records collection and keeping facilities and methods,
- g. criminal investigation capabilities throughout the country,
- h. capabilities for collecting, storing and reporting police intelligence.

In order to reach these objectives, it is proposed that the activities of the public safety program be as follows, in the order of priority based upon urgency and police needs:

a) Riot Control Force. Retrain and equip the riot control force and increase the force strength to 800 from its present level of 475. This force was at a strength of about 1,100 prior to the insurrection. The addition would be absorbed from within the present force strength of 8,131.

b) Police Intelligence (Special Branch). Improve the records and collection of intelligence procedures concerning subversive elements posing a threat to the government.

c) Rural Police Improvement. This should be brought about by an increase in the number of police assigned to the rural area by 1,000. The present deployment is 5,386 in the National District (Santo Domingo) and 2,745 throughout the rest of the country. This increase should not result in an increase in the overall force strength, but the 1,000 men should be drawn from those now in the Santo Domingo area. Appropriate vehicles should be provided for patrol purposes, communications equipment should be provided for the vehicles and a modification of the existing police country-wide network should be made to allow mobile patrol operations. Essential training should be given to all police personnel in the rural areas at each police province headquarters in basic police subjects, first aid and countersubversion.

d) Police Records, Investigation. Improvement must be made of the central records files and establishing elementary and essential records taking and keeping facilities in the areas outside of the capital. Improvement of criminal investigation capabilities and the provision of essential investigative equipment is required.

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e) Automotive Maintenance. By means of a study in depth to define specifics in order to provide training, technical assistance and commodities necessary to (1) repair 98 deadlines vehicles, (2) evaluate the feasibility of the police utilizing a fourth or fifth echelon garage being developed through the MAP for the joint use of the military services, and (3) develop two or more second and third echelon shops in strategic points in the rural area.

f) Police Training. Continue to influence the police to develop a five to six week training period for the police in basic subjects of law enforcement. Upwards to 90% of the police have never had any police training. It is proposed that approximately 3500-4000 police in the Santo Domingo area should be given this training at the Boca Chica school. This program would complement the training in rural areas proposed above.

g) Administration, Management. Continue to influence senior staff officers in the employment of modern practices in order to use the police resources most effectively and economically.

The Team also examined the feasibility of developing a mobile police, quick-reacting group within the National Police, which would (1) operate in small units and be especially trained in counter-guerrilla activities, (2) be transportable by air, if necessary, (3) engage in civic action work as a means of gaining support of the population, and (4) actively engage in intelligence collection. It is expected that the development of this unit would cost approximately \$2 million and involve the employment of six additional advisors. After discussing this part of the preliminary plan with elements of the Country Team, it was found that there exists a 300 man, parachute equipped, counter-guerrilla unit in the Air Force and that some elements of the Army have a counter-guerrilla capability. The survey team recommends, therefore, that if presently formed and equipped military units are, or can be, prepared and able to serve the purpose of countering guerrilla insurgency in its earliest stages, such a unit not be developed as a part of the National Police. Essential factors bearing on the utilization of the 300 man Air Force unit are: (1) a willingness and capability to commit forces in a strength appropriate to the need and at the proper time, (2) small unit dispersions in the dangerous or potentially dangerous rural area to maintain contact with the people and to engage in civic action projects, and (3) essential coordination between the intelligence community and the military forces in order that intelligence can be acted upon promptly.

It was determined advisable that an intelligence service responsible to the President should be established. It is expected that this service will assume modest proportions, and concern itself mostly with loyalty investigation. The exact dimensions of this unit will have to be determined.

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PROGRAM COSTS

The expanded program, as proposed, requires an additional \$451,600 for FY 66 and calls for two additional public safety advisors (Rural, and Investigations), 25 additional participants and \$346,000 worth of commodities. For FY 66, the expanded program would take the following form:

	<u>Present Program</u>	<u>Additions</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Technicians</u>	3	2	5
Cost	\$94,000	\$40,000	\$134,000
<u>Participants</u>			
Number	50	25	75
Cost	\$107,000	\$56,000	\$163,000
<u>Commodities</u>			
Cost	\$22,000	\$345,600	\$367,600
<u>Other costs</u>	\$7,000	\$10,000	\$17,000
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>\$230,000</u>	<u>\$451,600</u>	<u>\$681,600</u>

Detailed commodity requirements are set forth in Tab B by activity as described above. Cost estimates for FY 67 are also given in the tabular presentation on the following page.

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Technicians Added (2)</u>	<u>Participants (25)</u>	<u>FY 66 Commodities \$M (345.6)</u>	<u>Participants (16)</u>	<u>FY 67 Commodities \$M (137.1)</u>
1. <u>Administration</u> Participants	0	10	20	10	20
2. <u>Rural Police Development</u>					
Technicians			20		
Participants	1	0		0	
Commodities			201.1		75.1
3. <u>Automotive Maintenance</u>					
Technician (TDY)	0			0	
Participants		6	18	0	
Commodities			79.4		-
4. <u>Police Training</u>					
Technicians	0				
Participants		6	12	6	12
Commodities			5		5
5. <u>Records-Investigation</u>					
Technicians	1		20		20
Participants		3	6	0	
Commodities			17.3		5
6. <u>Riot Control</u>					
Technicians	0			0	
Participants		0			
Commodities			10		-
7. <u>Police Intelligence</u>					
Technicians (\$194.7M	0				
Participants local/op.		0		0	
Commodities costs)			32.6		-
8. <u>Mobile Police Group</u>					
Calls for 6 technicians and TDY personnel.					
Total cost \$2 million.					

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Annex A

The Outlook for Insurgency in
the Dominican Republic

SUMMARY

The pro-Chinese Communist Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) will probably initiate a program of terrorist activity in the Santo Domingo area and an elementary form of guerrilla warfare at one or more points in the interior. The pro-Castro 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) is divided on whether or not to launch a major guerrilla effort in the interior, but it is better prepared and enjoys greater capabilities than the MPD for this type of insurgency. Because Communist affiliated groups lack popular support in the Dominican Republic, the Dominican military and police could probably severely limit such insurgent activity to a degree where it would not pose a serious threat. If however, harsh repressive measures are carried out indiscriminately and the economic situation does not improve, the leftist extremists might then gain enough support from non-Communist groups to threaten the provisional government.

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1. The capabilities of the Communist extremists to promote insurgency have been augmented substantially since the insurrection of 24 April 1965. An undetermined, but large number of weapons, including .30 and .50 caliber machine guns, ammunition and explosives were distributed to, or seized by, the rebel forces during the first week of the rebellion. The extremist groups associated with the rebels attained practically unlimited access to this materiel by virtue of their control of many rebel commands and the indiscriminate issue of weapons in the early chaotic days of the rebellion. A concerted effort has been made by these extremists to cache arms and ammunition both inside and outside the rebel zone in Santo Domingo.

2. The Communist cause, when openly professed, has never enjoyed widespread support or prestige among the Dominican people. However, during the fighting there was a surge of sympathy and admiration for Caamano and those "who fought for the Constitution and the People." The inherent advantage of an appeal to nationalism represented by the issue of a "foreign invader" has been seized upon by these extremists with full recognition that it provides a much broader basis for attracting adherents or sympathizers than would any straight Marxist-Leninist polemics. In short, the Communists find themselves in a better position now to resort to terrorist and guerrilla warfare violence than at any time in recent years.

3. Extremist Political Organizations:

a. The Dominican Popular Movement (MPD)

The exact strength of the MPD, the hardline, pro-Chinese Communist Party, is not known but is estimated as high as some 700 to 900 members drawn largely from poorer urban groups. The party existed prior to the assassination of Trujillo. The MPD for a short while enjoyed a popular following based on its opposition to Trujillo, but its prestige and strength slipped considerably when its true political outlook became apparent. By far the greatest percentage of its following is centered in Santo Domingo. In addition, it does have very small nuclei of members in most of the larger interior towns such as Barahona, Santiago, La Vega, San Francisco de Macoris and San Pedro de Macoris. The party is not believed to have any significant following elsewhere in the country. During the rebellion, the MPD did not have more than 300 members involved in the fighting. In comparison to other recognized parties, this was a relatively small contribution.

b. The 14th of June Political Group (APCJ)

The strength of the APCJ, a pro-Castro party, is estimated at some 2,500 members, supplemented by a much larger number

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of sympathizers. It was founded as an anti-Trujillo movement in 1959 by middle and upper class elements. Since early 1962, APCJ leadership has had a strong Communist orientation and many of its leaders have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. By consciously concealing its Communist proclivities insofar from the general public, the APCJ has maintained a public image of a nationalist party. This is also a by-product of its disastrous attempts in 1959 to invade the Dominican Republic from Cuba and in late 1963 to wage a guerrilla campaign in the interior. Prior to the recent rebellion, the APCJ was split, with the so-called "soft-liners" advocating a legalistic and less militant approach, and the "hard-liners" favoring revolutionary militancy on the order of Fidel Castro and Mao Tse-tung. The organization operates through a system of regional committees which supervise various types of grass-roots units. Its major problem as an effective political movement is its inability to produce a charismatic leader and settle the issue of whether to pursue a militant Communist tack based on armed revolution, or to project a nationalistic and legalistic image.

c. The Dominican Communist Party (PCD); formerly the Dominican Popular Socialist Party (PSPD)

The PCD, which changed its name from the Dominican Popular Socialist Party on 9 August, has an estimated strength of between 700 and 1,000 members, as the orthodox, Moscow-oriented Communist party of the country; it has advocated for tactical reasons the moderate approach to an ultimate Communist victory. While there have been scattered reports of the PCD sponsoring weapons and guerrilla warfare training for some of its members, it seems unlikely that the PCD would underwrite any serious guerrilla warfare or terrorist campaign in the immediate future. However, should the MPD and the APCJ be able to mount such a campaign with prospects of success, the PCD could be expected to reconsider its position.

4. The number of weapons and the quantity of ammunition which the extremists manage to retain after the settlement of the current impasse are likely to exceed the number of trained personnel available for guerrilla and terrorist activity. Some and perhaps most of the 66 Dominican extremists who have visited Cuba in recent years have received guerrilla warfare training there. Fifteen have also traveled to Communist China during the past several years. Most of these travelers are APCJ members, though some belong to the MPD. The trained leaders are at present taking advantage of their sanctuary in the rebel zone to train additional personnel and give them political indoctrination. The MPD has for some weeks been training groups of persons especially recruited for the purpose in the techniques of guerrilla warfare. It is reported to have exfiltrated into the interior two 25-man groups of persons who

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have received such training. The MPD could probably not count on sending out more than another 25 to 50 men for guerrilla duty in the near future. The APCJ has a greater reservoir of manpower and is also conducting its own guerrilla training program in the rebel zone. It could probably also count on some 50 veterans of its late 1963 guerrilla effort. Most of the latter are now believed to be located in some of the larger towns of the interior.

5. Insurgency operations could be initiated almost anywhere in the country, including urban areas. Choice of a location would presumably be dictated by the would-be guerrilla leader's assessment of a variety of factors. These would include: a relatively secure base of operations that is at the same time within reasonable range of populated areas and important targets; the location of party strengths; and the receptivity of the local populace. The area that would probably best suit the needs of the MPD is (probably) Santo Domingo itself. That is where the MPD has its greatest strength and its greatest potential source of additional recruits. If the MPD should attempt to launch a guerrilla effort in the interior, it would probably choose a location near one of the larger cities in the important Cibao Valley area. Such a location could provide access to important target areas while at the same time permitting access to the cover of mountainous terrain.

6. If the APCJ, or a significant segment of the organization, should decide to launch a guerrilla effort it would probably choose the general area of Santiago for at least one try. Two leading APCJ members, both of whom have received guerrilla warfare training abroad, have been located in the Santiago area throughout the period of the insurrection. Also, the APCJ has some membership strength and a reservoir of sympathizers in the area.

7. It is possible, of course, that the MPD and elements from the APCJ may collaborate in a guerrilla effort, as they did during the terrorist raid on the city of San Francisco de Macoris on 25 June of this year. The disastrous results of that joint effort--prominent members of both organizations were killed--has led to recriminations between the two groups and may have reduced the chances of a collaborative effort.

Prospects for Mass Support for Insurgency

8. MPD and APCJ leaders failed in their late 1963 guerrilla effort largely because they lacked even the passive support of the people in the area of operations. The Dominican campesinos, who are traditionally conservative and law abiding, were quick to inform the authorities of the guerrillas' movements and hiding places. Similarly,

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the terrorists who raided the city of San Francisco de Macoris on 25 June of this year were hunted down outside the city through the assistance of the local campesinos. It is possible, though by no means certain, that APCJ and MPD leaders have learned from these lessons. Teams of extremist leaders have in recent weeks gone out into the countryside to assess the prospects for guerrilla warfare in various areas, perhaps with the purpose of assessing the attitudes of the local citizenry. The town of San Jose de Ocoa east of Santo Domingo has been a particular point of extremist interest.

9. Whatever the extremists have concluded as to their prospects for obtaining the support or the toleration of elements of the population at various points in the country, it is probable that their actual prospects for insurgency would be greatest in the cities, particularly in Santo Domingo. Further, the anonymity of a larger city tends to make more difficult the identification, isolation, and control of terrorist activities.

10. The attitude of the vast majority of the Dominican people toward the recent era of turmoil is conditioned largely by personal and not ideological considerations. This is particularly true of that large percentage of the populace limited by illiteracy, rising unemployment, low wages, disease, and lack of opportunity to a submarginal existence. Most of these people are peasants located either on the land or in small rural communities dependent on the land. In spite of their bleak past, most remain conservative by virtue of tradition and anti-Communist by virtue of religion. They believe that during 1964 their standard of living and opportunity declined; there is little doubt that there has been some deterioration in their situation since 24 April 1965. The predominant inclination among the people today is to accept almost any political solution which will permit the country to return to some semblance of order and stability. This attitude is deeply rooted in the knowledge that they cannot hope to improve their personal situation so long as disorder prevails. Thus, a program calculated to provoke and prolong unrest would generate little, if any, support from the mass of Dominican people. Should their situation continue to decline, however, they might consider forcing a change as the only way out of the dilemma.

Outlook

11. The MPD, in spite of its limitations, will probably attempt to conduct an insurgency campaign in two distinct areas: Santo Domingo for tactical reasons, and somewhere in the interior for ideological and prestige factors. MPD leaders recognize that

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a heroic gesture involving great sacrifice is required to provide the party with a mystique to capture the imagination of the people. The MPD is committed to the thesis of armed revolution and probably cannot much longer delay some concrete indication of its serious devotion to this ideal. In the aftermath of the rebel defense of Santo Domingo, with U. S. troops on Dominican soil and economic conditions chaotic, the MPD has better prospects now for creating a nationalistic image than it has had for some time. It is expected that an anti-U. S. propaganda line will be used as the rationale for its conduct of terrorist and guerrilla operations. Insurgent activity will probably be specifically targeted against the U. S. presence and local military and police as "instruments of the U. S." There is little likelihood that MPD activity will seriously endanger the stability of the country, since its operations in the interior will probably be unsuccessful and those in Santo Domingo solely of a terroristic and harassing nature.

12. The APCJ remains divided over whether to undertake large scale insurgency operations. It has the best capability to do so in terms of membership, training, and experience. If the "hard-line" faction gains ascendancy, the APCJ will represent a much greater threat than would the MPD. In combination with the MPD, the APCJ could cause disruptions which could seriously impair the effectiveness of the provisional government, though it probably could not bring the government down.

13. Insurgent activities by these extremist groups could pose other, related dangers. Insurgency would divert energies and funds necessary for the task of restoring peace and reconstructing the shattered economy. They would give the military an excuse for demanding a continued large share of the national budget. Insurgency might also cause the military to carry out excessive repressive measures against the populace, and these would probably drive many into the arms of the extremists.

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FACT SHEET - Dominican Republic PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

1. Date project initiated: May 1962
 Date pre-project survey was made: April 1962
 By: Herbert O. Hardin
2. Date project scheduled to terminate: FY 1968
3. Forces aided: (Prior to the 1965 Revolution)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Security Role</u>
Dominican National Police	10,400	Maintenance of law and order and internal security. Has nationwide responsibility. <u>Responsible to the Ministry of Interior and Police.</u>
Investigations Police	50	Subversive investigations nationwide. <u>Responsible to the Ministry of Interior and Police.</u>
Total strength	10,450	

4. Nature of AID assistance: The program consists of providing technical advice and assistance, participant training in the U. S. and in-country training of police personnel and supplying limited types of police equipment.
5. Funding approved for FY 1965: \$197,000
 - (a) Date field authorized to obligate: IAD approved, November 13, 1964
 - (b) Technicians \$95,000
 - (c) Participants \$69,000
 - (d) Commodities \$26,000
 - (e) Contract costs ---
 - (f) Other costs \$7,000
 - (g) GODR contribution Unknown

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6. Congressional Presentation for FY 1966: \$230,000

- (a) Technicians \$94,000
- (b) Participants \$107,000
- (c) Commodities \$22,000
- (d) Contract costs ---
- (e) Other costs \$7,000
- (f) GODR contribution Unknown

7. AID support through FY 1965: \$636,000

8. Program objectives: (prior to the 1965 Revolution)

Reorganize the Dominican National Police as a first line of defense and an effective police force capable of preserving internal security and maintaining law and order with a minimum use of force.

9. Specific goals:

The activity in the Public Safety field was directed toward molding the police into an efficient and competent organization through increased riot control capability, firearms training, instruction in criminal investigation, modern police administration and the establishment of a modern police communications system.

10. Accomplishments: (prior to the 1965 Revolution)

Progress had been made in the National Police riot control training techniques, and riot control capabilities in Santo Domingo were good. The members of the Fortaleza Ozama riot control element effectively controlled several riots in the past and were widely respected.

The National Police Academy, completed in January 1964 at Boca Chica, had made a good start but needed better organization. It had graduated one 76-man class from its 5-month curriculum and had started another 85-man class. The instructor staff had several IAPA graduates.

A radio telecommunications network had been established, with a 41-station network installed and operating. National coverage was excellent and maintenance skills and procedures appeared adequate.

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A radio patrol service was established in March 1963 and was in operation in Santo Domingo; however, patrol operations were not fully developed.

A modest records and identification division facility had been prepared.

The investigative section under the National Police conducted criminal investigations in the capital and other urban centers utilizing AID-trained investigators.

Subversive investigations were performed by the National Security Service responsible to the triumvirate. An FBI-trained participant was deputy director and was attempting to develop an elite, sophisticated intelligence service.

The National Police had 334 vehicles, many of which were new. Repair facilities, parts did not exist although mechanics with moderate capabilities were assigned to the garage in Santo Domingo. Disabled vehicles were frequently deadlined and cannibalized.

Police-public relations were generally good. Trujillo had rarely used the uniformed police as instruments of terror and oppression. They were never the object of public hatred. As the force grew in size and effectiveness in proper handling of crowds and riots, it gained considerable respect.

11. Staffing:

<u>Position Title</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Incumbent</u>	<u>HLE</u>
Chief Public Safety Advisor	FSR-3	Anthony A. Ruiz	July 1967
Public Safety Advisor, Criminalistics	FSR-3	Lee Echols	September 1967
Public Safety Advisor, Training	FSR-5	David de la Torre	December 1966

12. Comments:

Prior to the April 1965 revolution, the National Police with 10,450 personnel had more than half of its strength assigned to Santo Domingo and the remainder deployed in nine districts covering 26 provinces. There were three major elements: (1) services, (2) administration, and (3) operations, each commanded by a

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sub-chief of police who reported to the chief of police. Administration and organization procedures were weak. Senior officials often failed to set out the responsibilities of subordinate units and delegate authority.

On January 18, 1965, Brig. Gen. Hernan Jose Francisco Despradel Brache, former Deputy Chief and Aide to General Belisario Peguero Guerrero, was named Chief of the National Police. He had quietly worked his way up through the ranks since enlisting in the Army in 1938. He attended U. S. schools in Puerto Rico, and the Chilean Army Cavalry School. As Chief of the Police, he had been weeding out the officer corps. He demoted a number of well-known grafters and cronies of General Peguero and gave them rural assignments.

The Chief Public Safety Advisor in the Dominican Republic reported that General Despradel's manner and statements indicated a dedicated, qualified, competent officer who would make an excellent Chief of Police. It appeared that a new esprit de corps and dedication would be developed in the Police by their new leader, when the revolution occurred in April 1965.

Upon the restoration of a recognized government in the Dominican Republic, an effective police system will be needed to provide proper law and order and a police internal security service to the Dominican people.

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Tab B

U. S. Resource Requirements

A. Riot Control

FY 66

Technicians - 0
Participants - 0
Commodities - \$10 M

Commodities

Helmets - 500 @5	2,500
Riot shotguns - 20 @70	1,400
Tear gas	5,000
Gas guns - 15 @70	1,050

FY 67 - 0

B. Police Intelligence

FY 66

Technicians - 0
Participants - 0
Commodities - \$32.6 M
*Local costs - \$12 M
*Operational expenses - \$182.7 M

Commodities

Vehicles - 8 sedans @2,500	20 M
Radios - base (1)	800
mobiles (8)	8,000
walkie-talkies- 3 @600	1,800
Revolvers - 35 @50	1,750
Holsters - 35 @8	280

*To be provided by CIA

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C. Rural Police Development

FY 66

Technicians - 1 full-tour PSA Rural - \$20 M

Participants - none

Commodities - total - \$201.1M

Commodities

Vehicles - +15% spares

Jeep 4 x 4, CJ6 - 20 @2,500

Jeep 2 x 4, CJ6 - 20 @2,500

Jeep station wagon - 23 @3,000

(3 wagons for
project use)

Total - \$169,000

Communications

FM-5 - 80 @232 - \$18,860

Recrystal network - 41 stations @200 - \$8,200

Training - provincial

Training aids - misc. - \$5,000

(projectors, films, etc.)

FY 67

Technicians - \$20 M

Participants - 0

Commodities - \$75.1 M

Commodities

Vehicles

Jeep 4 x 4 - 10 \$25,000

Jeep trailers - 20 @1,000 \$20,000

House trailers - 3 @2,000 \$6,000

Pick-up trucks - 3 @2,500 \$7,500

Communications

FM-5 - 50 @232 - \$11,600

Spares - \$5,000

Training - 0

D. Police Records - Investigation

FY 66

Technician - 1 - \$20 M
Participants - 3 at IPA - \$6 M
Commodities - total - \$17.3 M

Commodities

Photographic equipment for provinces
35 mm camera - 30 @150 \$4,500
w/flash @50 \$1,500
Dev-printing equipment
tanks - 30 @5 \$150
Trays - 90 @3 \$270
Enlarger - 30 @150 \$4,500
Tripod - 30 @25 \$750
Fingerprint taking - 30 @50 \$1,500
Latent F.P. kits - 10 @100 \$1,000
Misc. kits - (U.V. - general
investigations - 2 @150 \$300
Records - index guides, etc. \$2,500

FY 67

Technician - 1 - \$20 M
Participants - 0
Commodities - misc. - \$5 M

E. Automotive Maintenance

FY 66

Technician - TDY 30 days - \$1,500
Participants - 6 (6 mo.) - \$18,000
Commodities - \$79,000

Commodities

Two 3rd echelon shops for rural
areas - \$25 M each - \$50,000
Spare parts for deadlined
vehicles - est. 98 vehicles
at \$300 each - \$29,400

FY 67 - None

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F. Police Training

FY 66

Technician - (no additional)
Participants - 6 Gen. Course IPA - \$12,000
Commodities - misc. - \$5,000

FY 67

Participants - 6 Gen. Course IPA - \$12,000
Commodities - \$5,000

G. Administration

FY 66

Participants - 10 Gen. Course IPA - \$20,000

FY 67

Participants - 10 Gen. Course IPA - \$20,000

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET