



*Working Paper No. 94*

**REJECTING THE DISLOYAL  
OPPOSITION? THE TRUST  
GAP IN MASS ATTITUDES TOWARD  
RULING AND OPPOSITION PARTIES  
IN AFRICA.**

by Carolyn Logan

**A comparative series of national public  
attitude surveys on democracy, markets  
and civil society in Africa.**



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**AFROBAROMETER WORKING PAPERS**

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## AFROBAROMETER WORKING PAPERS

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## **Rejecting the Disloyal Opposition? The Trust Gap in Mass Attitudes Toward Ruling and Opposition Parties in Africa**

### *Abstract*

Analysts of African political party systems frequently assert that political parties and party system development are central to the effective functioning and eventual consolidation of democracy on the continent. Due to both lack of data and elite bias, analysts have overlooked a critical link in the chain of party system evolution: mass attitudes toward political parties generally, and towards opposition parties in particular. Afrobarometer data reveals that there is, on average, a very large (20-percentage point) gap in levels of public trust between ruling and opposition parties. Our findings suggest that African publics may willingly, if unconsciously, collude with their leaders to preserve the status quo. This paper finds evidence to support the claim that oppositions are weak because Africans place especially high social value on respect for their “father-leaders.” It also finds that the combined effects of anti-competitive and deferential attitudes toward power add up to a sizeable disadvantage for opposition parties. Furthermore the paper demonstrates the positive effects, in terms of reducing the trust gap, of party alternations when they do occur. The results support the belief that alternations can have lasting consequences on attitudes toward competition, and hence on the competitiveness of a political system.

## INTRODUCTION

Analysts of African political party systems frequently assert that political parties and party system development are central to the effective functioning and eventual consolidation of democracy on the continent. However, they also point out a number of common features of African party systems, none of which are considered particularly conducive to the advancement of democracy. Most notable among these is a lack of competitiveness, as dominant party systems replace many of the one party systems of the past. African party systems are also characterized by high volatility, with numerous new parties forming as each election approaches, often only to melt away shortly afterward. And even among those parties that last, few develop strong institutional foundations. The salience of ideology and policy programs as factors distinguishing among parties also tends to be very low.

These same analysts focus on a handful of key factors to explain these less-than-ideal outcomes. In particular, they cite historical and institutional legacies, including persistent patterns of presidentialism and clientelism, continuing restrictions on political freedoms that produce an uneven playing field, and the salience of ethnicity, as well as the resources available to, and the strategic choices of, party elites.

But due to both lack of data and elite bias, analysts have overlooked a critical link in the chain of party system evolution: mass attitudes toward political parties generally, and towards opposition parties in particular. The availability of public attitude data from the Afrobarometer allows us to address this shortcoming in the current literature. These data reveal that there is, on average, a very large (20-percentage point) gap in levels of public trust between ruling and opposition parties. The apparent inability of opposition parties to capture the public's trust may play a critical role in producing some of the common features of African party systems cited above.

Yet this gap can be explained far more effectively as an outcome of individuals' attitudes toward competition than as an outcome of the country-level features frequently cited by analysts. In particular, we find that two conventional views about Africans' political attitudes may hold true to at least some extent, with important implications for party competition. First, the common impression that there is a tendency toward deference to the "big man" in Africa's mostly patriarchal political systems is clearly evident, and such deference has strong effects on the trust gap. An over-abundance of respect for Africa's current "father-leaders" may be one key factor inhibiting the development of an effective opposition.

Second, the commonly cited preference for consensus-based rather than competitive or conflict-based decision making in traditional African political systems may also have lingering effects. Many Africans still express doubts about the benefits of competitive party politics relative to the perceived costs, and again, the effects on their attitudes toward opposition political parties are negative, though far less pronounced than the apparent effects of deferential attitudes.

The significance of such findings for African party systems is potentially enormous. Previous analyses of the pathologies of African political systems have focused almost entirely on elites, and in particular, the machinations of rulers intent on preserving their positions of power, or, in the case of many opposition hopefuls, on securing access to state resources. Our findings, however, suggest that African publics may willingly, if unconsciously, collude with their leaders to preserve the status quo. Rather than looking at the ample evidence of their governments' failures – including their own, often very harsh, assessments – and determining to "throw the bums out," time and again African voters opt to return the incumbents to office. It is not entirely possible to distinguish whether these choices reflect innate attitudes of deference and a preference for consensus, or a more pragmatic effort to avert risk. But regardless of the underlying roots, it would appear that African publics have often become willing accomplices in the efforts of their present cadre of leaders to hang on to power.

This is not to say that these individual attitudes are either definitive or immutable, or that factors such as national histories, existing socio-political structures and institutions, or the strategic choices of political elites, do not matter. But at the very least, these attitudes constitute a critical contextual feature that aspiring politicians certainly take into account. The implication is that opposition parties in Africa – even those that sincerely seek to establish a credible, and competitive, foothold – may face especially high hurdles in winning the confidence, and the votes, of a skeptical public. But there is also clear evidence that these obstacles are not necessarily insurmountable. Several countries in our study have voted out their ruling party or, more rarely, even ousted an incumbent leader, and as we shall see, such turnovers can have lasting effects by generating greater balance in public perspectives on competing parties, and significantly reducing the “trust gap.”

## **METHODOLOGY**

This analysis draws on the results of 25,397 face-to-face interviews conducted in 2005-2006 during Round 3 of the Afrobarometer. The data are pooled from 18 country surveys, all of which used a standard survey instrument.<sup>1</sup> Each country is represented by a national probability sample in which every adult citizen had an equal and known chance of inclusion. Sample sizes ranged from 1161 to 2400 respondents per country, although in the statistics reported here, the data are weighted to represent each country equally (n=1200). The margin of sampling error never exceeds 3 percent at a 95 percent level of confidence.<sup>2</sup> The reader should note, however, that Afrobarometer surveys are concentrated in countries that have undergone at least some degree of political and economic liberalization in the last decade. As such, the results represent the continent’s most open societies and cannot be taken as representative of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.<sup>3</sup>

## **PARTY SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: A DISAPPOINTING RECORD**

Analysts of party systems repeatedly note the centrality of parties to the effective functioning of a democracy. Van de Walle (2003) claims that “Parties are arguably the single most important organizations in electoral politics” (298), and LeBas (2006) calls them “the crucial institutions of democracy” (2). Manning observes that “For Huntington and most other modernization theorists, modern mass politics was impossible without political parties” (718). According to democratic theory, parties are viewed as essential institutions for organizing political competition, and they are expected to play critical roles in aggregating societal interests, linking political leaders to their constituents, and recruiting future generations of political leadership.

The re-introduction of multiparty electoral politics into much of Africa since the early 1990s was therefore widely hailed as a promising new beginning after the lost decades of the 1970s and 80s, a period when much of the continent languished politically and economically under authoritarian, military or even dictatorial rule. Starting with Namibia in 1989, country after country succumbed to growing domestic and international demands that the people be given real voice in their political lives, especially the opportunity to select their own leaders via competitive elections (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). By 2007, only a handful of countries on the continent had not held at least one multiparty election (Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia<sup>4</sup> and Swaziland). Van de Walle (2003) thus reflects that the continent has undergone “the routinisation of multiparty elections” (299) (see also Lindberg 2006; Bratton 2007).

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<sup>1</sup> Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

<sup>2</sup> The large size of the pooled sample means that measures of association easily qualify as statistically significant at conventional levels of 0.05 or even 0.01. We therefore use a more rigorous standard for the pooled data by reporting significance only at  $p < 0.001$ .

<sup>3</sup> For more information on the Afrobarometer, visit the website at [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org).

<sup>4</sup> Although the self-declared but still unrecognized Republic of Somaliland in the northwest has held some of the continent’s most competitive elections.

The optimistic assessments of the continent's democratic future initially engendered by these developments have, however, steadily given way to a resurgent pessimism, as country after country has fallen short of the democratic hopes grasped at by reform-minded citizens and international observers alike. The disappointments have taken numerous forms. Most starkly, many of the regimes conducting purportedly liberalizing elections during the 1990s have, in reality, made very little progress toward giving greater voice to citizens. More than a few of the authoritarian rulers succeeded in gaming the system, finding ways to conduct elections that offered the appearance of competitiveness without the reality, thus preserving their control over the levers of power.

But others really did open the door, at least briefly, to greater competition. In a number of countries, ruling parties faced real challenges in transitional elections. Some actually lost control of the state, at times, as in the cases of Zambia and Malawi, to the evident shock of incumbent rulers. And a growing – though still quite short – list of countries have undergone at least one post-transition alternation of ruling party since then, including Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali and Senegal.

Nonetheless, the overall pattern is relatively clear: in the vast majority of countries, the party that won the first post-1989 “founding” or “transitional” election has remained in power ever since. And this pattern of one-party dominance actually replicates the experiences of the handful of countries that have enjoyed democracy before the recent transition period beginning in 1989 – i.e., Botswana, Senegal and (with interruptions) the Gambia – all of which have also exhibited patterns of one-party dominance. Mauritius, which has experienced frequent shifts in the parties comprising the country's ruling coalition, is the only long-standing exception. Among those that have made the transition to multiparty politics more recently, only a handful – led by Benin, Cape Verde and Madagascar – have not displayed clear patterns of one-party dominance. There is no question that in many countries access to political office is more competitive than it used to be, and that parliaments contain greater numbers of opposition politicians than in the past. It nonetheless appears that in many cases, African states have merely shifted from *de jure* one-party systems to *de facto* dominant party systems. In these states, a single large ruling party holds onto power, often with a quite comfortable (even growing) margin, while a large number of highly volatile minor parties compete for a relatively small number of seats (van de Walle 2003; Manning 2005; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005). Van de Walle (2003) notes that “success in the first multiparty election proved to be the key to political dominance in the 1990s” (298), and that the “striking pattern of African transitions has been the absence of alternation” (301).

The evidence suggests that these characteristics, particularly the lack of ruling party alternation, do not bode well for the consolidation of African democracies. Van de Walle (2003) notes that the evolution of parties is an important indicator of “democratic practice in Africa and the changing nature of the links between citizens and the political class” (298). The failure to establish a credible opposition continues to limit the public's real choices, and provides few incentives for the emergence of a truly responsive and representative political system. Under such circumstances, political elites remain largely disconnected from their constituents. Earlier findings of the Afrobarometer also indicate that Africans' commitment to democracy decays in the absence of alternation (Bratton 2004). Similarly, Moehler and Lindberg (2007) argue that “power alternations also appear to *generate* shared understandings between winners and losers” (emphasis in original) and that alternations therefore can have critical moderating effects on the polarization that otherwise may cause losers to question the legitimacy of their political systems (3).

Table 1 provides several indicators of party system characteristics in the 18 countries covered by the Afrobarometer. It is evident that several fit the pattern described above all too well. Tanzania, for example, has one of the least diverse legislatures (ENLP of 1.21), and the president, Jakaya Kikwete, won the last election by an enormous margin (69 points). Meanwhile, orbiting around the overwhelmingly dominant Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), seven of the other nine parties were competing for the first time

in the 2005 election. The same pattern is evident in Nigeria (albeit with significant questions about the PDP's true margin of victory; see footnote 7), South Africa (where of course the only change in leadership came at the founding 1994 election, and there seems little likelihood of another anytime in the near future), Lesotho, Namibia, and Mozambique, among others.

There are exceptions. In Benin, for example, a system has emerged that seems to be highly competitive, with three party transitions since 1991 and a margin of just 12 percent for the victor in the last election. But the system is highly volatile: 8 of the 15 parties were new in 2006, and 26 candidates ran for president! Only a small handful of countries, led by Ghana and Cape Verde, appear to have developed two-party systems that are consistently both more competitive and more stable.

**Table 1: Party System Characteristics**

	Election	Gap between winner and second (points)	Effective Number of Legislative Parties	Number of parties and coalitions competing	Number of candidates for presidency <sup>5</sup>	Number of parties with more than 5% of vote	Number of parties new since previous election	Number of Ruling Party Alternations since 1989 <sup>6</sup>
<b>Namibia</b>	Nov. '04	69	1.66	7	7	3	3	0
<b>Tanzania</b>	Dec. '05	69	1.21	10	10	3	7	0
<b>South Africa</b>	NA elec., Apr. '04	57	2.15	21	--	3	10	1
<b>Mali</b>	April '07	52	1.31	8	8	2	3	1
<b>Nigeria</b>	April '07	51 <sup>7</sup>	1.17	25	25	3	16	0
<b>Madagascar</b>	Dec. '06	43	2.30	7	14	4	5	3
<b>Senegal</b>	Feb. '07	41	2.10	12	15	4	8	1
<b>Mozambique</b>	Dec. '04	32	1.99	5	5	2	3	0
<b>Lesotho</b>	NA elec., Feb. '07	NA <sup>8</sup>	2.16	9	--	NA	4	0
<b>Kenya</b>	Dec. '02	31	3.12	5	5	3	2	1
<b>Botswana</b>	NA elec., Oct. '04	26	1.56	7	--	3	2	0
<b>Uganda</b>	Feb. '06	22	2.05	4	5	2	--	0
<b>Zambia</b>	Sep. '06	14	1.31	5	5	3	1	1
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	Mar. '02	14	1.85	4	5	2	2	0
<b>Benin</b>	1 <sup>st</sup> round, Mar. '06	12 <sup>9</sup>	4.79	15	26	4	8	3
<b>Malawi</b>	May '04	9	2.68	4	5	4	2	1.5 <sup>10</sup>
<b>Ghana</b>	Dec. '04	8	2.17	4	4	2	0	1
<b>Cape Verde</b>	NA elec., Jan '06	2	2.07	2	2	2	0	2

Based on last presidential election or as noted. Source: <http://africanelections.tripod.com/>

Perhaps the most startling indicator of the apparent trend toward one-party dominant political systems, however, is not shown in Table 1. This is the fact that only two (Benin and Kenya)<sup>11</sup> of these 18 countries

<sup>5</sup> Some candidates compete as independents.

<sup>6</sup> Alternations are counted as electorally-induced changes in ruling party since 1989, either in the election introducing the transition to multiparty rule (e.g., Malawi, South Africa and Zambia) or in subsequent elections (e.g., Ghana, Kenya and Senegal), or both (Benin, Cape Verde and Madagascar).

<sup>7</sup> The official gap between the first and second place candidates in Nigeria increased from 30% in 2003 to 51% in 2007. However, many observers raised questions about the quality of the 2007 elections and the reliability of the official figures. The Afrobarometer's own data suggests that the real margin should have been considerably less than this (Afrobarometer Network 2007).

<sup>8</sup> Official election results are not available, but the winner of the election, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won 61 out of 120 seats, while the next closest party, the National Independent Party (NIP), won just 21 seats. In the 2002 election, the gap between the LCD and the next closest party was 32 percentage points, with LCD taking 77 of 120 seats. So the party's majority is much smaller in 2007 than after the previous election, but there is still no close competitor threatening to surpass it. If the party is eventually forced into a coalition, however, the political dynamic in the country could change dramatically.

<sup>9</sup> The gap was 49% in the second round in Benin.

<sup>10</sup> In the 2004 elections in Malawi, the UDF retained the control of the presidency, which it had attained in the transitional 1994 election, but lost control of the National Assembly.

changed ruling party in their most recent national election, and none unseated an incumbent national ruler; 11 incumbents were re-elected to serve another term, and in the remaining countries, incumbents did not run, usually due to term limits, but their parties won with new candidates. And, as shown, more often than not, incumbents were re-elected by seemingly insurmountable margins: the gap was more than 50 percentage points in five countries, and more than 20 percent in all but six. Clearly this does not reflect a pattern of competitiveness, better representation of diverse interests, and enforcement of accountability that many had hoped to see when multipartyism began sweeping across the continent in the 1990s.

## **THE ROOTS OF AFRICA'S DYSFUNCTIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS**

What explains these patterns of non-competitiveness and volatility in African party systems? For starters, the playing field is often still far from level. Ruling parties continue to enjoy much better access to resources, to operate more freely, and to get far more media coverage than the beleaguered opposition, affording incumbents greater opportunity to consolidate their positions (van de Walle 2003). This dominance is further facilitated by the highly presidential systems that predominate in Africa, whereby enormous powers are centralized in the presidency, legislatures are weak, and presidents can often operate with almost no checks on their power. Van de Walle goes so far as to call legislative elections a mere “sideshow,” arguing that “only the apex of the executive really matters” (310; see also Manning 2005).

Pervasive clientelism and corruption add to the mix, combining with presidentialism to produce a powerful set of incentives for individual politicians. Since the president so completely dominates decision making and access to resources, winning his favor frequently becomes the main ambition of so-called “opposition” politicians, who may even seek to join the ruling party once their own value as social mobilizers has been demonstrated. This produces a short-term focus on mobilizing a constituency using the easiest means possible (often ethnicity), and dictates against serious efforts to institutionalize parties or develop real policy platforms (LeBas 2006), or even to build potentially more competitive coalitions (Manning 2005). State control of the economy, as well as other institutional legacies of authoritarian regimes, may further perpetuate ruling party dominance by preventing the development of alternative centers of power (Manning 2005; Widner 1997), especially amidst fragile and shallowly-rooted civil society structures (Mozzafar and Scarritt 2005; LeBas 2006).

Ethno-regional cleavages also play an important role, as they supplant ideological or other potential bases for distinguishing among parties. Van de Walle (2003) argues that although the actual benefits of clientelism and corruption usually only accrue to elites, individuals nonetheless tend to vote for leaders from their own ethnic group, believing that only they can be trusted to defend the interests of the group as a whole (313). Politicians do not hesitate to capitalize on this reality. Posner (2005) notes the “dual strategies” often pursued by political parties, which want to simultaneously make use of their particularist strengths in ethnic strongholds, while elsewhere seeking to form “national” coalitions capable of actually winning elections in a context where no ethnic group holds a majority. But recent analysis suggests that parties’ use of ethnicity may be changing over time, with dominant ruling parties becoming more ethnically representative, while opposition parties narrow their ethnic bases (Cheeseman and Ford 2007). But there is a need to further explore the factors underlying these trends and how they may be linked, at least in some cases, to the consolidation of one-party dominant systems.

These analysts construct a plausible – but perhaps only partial – explanation of the root causes underlying the potentially anti-democratic structure of party systems that seem to be evolving in many African

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<sup>11</sup> See footnote 10, above, regarding Malawi. Since, for reasons discussed below, we will be especially interested in electorally-induced change in the national leader, more so than the ruling party, I do not count this as a party transition here.

countries. But one critical factor has been overlooked. It may be true that opposition parties are only likely to successfully attract voters, mobilize support and develop real institutional roots over the long run if they actually desire to do so, and there are numerous factors and incentives that work against such a choice. But it is also true that to make this happen, voters must be willing to offer their support to opposition parties, given the necessary incentives to do so. This willingness has, for the most part, been taken for granted, at least outside of Africa. But is this a reasonable assumption? Or is it possible that Africans may be attitudinally predisposed toward an anti-opposition bias? Might they, for example, reject opposition parties not because they fail to represent their interests, or their identity, but rather, because they reject the very notion of “opposition,” finding it either culturally unacceptable, or, on a more pragmatic level, politically dangerous? Might they avoid challengers who vie to replace the current president because rejecting the incumbent is viewed as either unacceptably disrespectful of the national “father,” or simply as a potentially very costly defection in a world so totally owned by the “big man”?

Analysts of political culture would certainly recommend caution in taking African acceptance of the concept of a political opposition – especially a loyal one – for granted. Traditional African political cultures have frequently been characterized as valuing consensus over conflict in political decision making. As evidence, analysts cite the institutional presence in many pre-colonial African societies of community-wide (albeit in many cases they were only open to the community of men) discussion fora – *shir*, *kgotla*, *pitso*, *baraza*, etc. – where, it is argued, communities debated decisions until a broad consensus was reached. In his seminal study of Senegalese politics, Schaffer (1998) notes that among the Wolof, for example, traditional approaches to selecting leaders focused much more on achieving a consensus, as opposed to establishing particular procedures or protocols (e.g., voting) to do so (50). Historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo noted that “in many traditional African states, including those of the Wolof, ‘There was not an arithmetic, formalist *démocratie* that posted the yes’s and the no’s in a numerical balance sheet; but a *démocratie* that lived by unending dialogue that lasted until exhaustion.’” (cited by Schaffer, 51, citing *Le Soleil*, July 2, 1985).

Schaffer cautions against romanticizing these councils, noting that the discussions could be quite sharp, and that participants sometimes resorted to force when agreement was not reached.<sup>12</sup> But he also points out that this notion of consensus that dominates Senegalese political thinking may conflict with the very concept of alternation in power (51). Schatzberg (2001) similarly notes that “Institutionalized opposition . . . might well have felt uncomfortable to many who placed a genuine premium on community and consensus” (216-217). Osabu-Kle (2000) takes the issue a considerable step further, arguing not only that partisan politics was non-existent in traditional political systems, but that the very concept of open opposition to recognized authority was anathema: “The only known opposing force was . . . the enemy from outside. In African political culture and vocabulary, therefore, the concepts of opposition and enemy came to mean the same thing” (19).<sup>13</sup>

Another theme running through analyses of political culture in Africa arises from the related concepts of communal unity and solidarity. This theme is evident in the “cultural tendency of infusing political authority with familial images” (Schaffer 1998: 61). In his analysis of political culture in middle Africa, for example, Schatzberg (2001) locates the concept of the “father-chief” at the center of the moral matrix that guides political life and shapes public understandings of legitimate government. And he goes on to note that “the unstated yet potent political logic of this rhetoric is insidious.” The populace is infantilized, and those who speak or act against the “father” of the “family” can be characterized as wayward or misguided children (25). Moreover, fathers should be shown deference and respect, and the idea of

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<sup>12</sup> See also Simuyu (1998), for a more extensive critique of common notions of the nature of African traditional political systems.

<sup>13</sup> The very term “opposition” party implies disloyalty and conflict far more than choice. Perhaps if they were known as “alternative parties” there would be less opposition to them!

challenging their positions as leaders of their families once again, becomes anathema. Karlstrom (1996) likewise finds among the Baganda a preference for regulated rather than total competition, and a belief in the legitimacy of *unitary*, rather than divided or oppositional, authority.

It is important to note that the predispositions that these analysts suggest against oppositional politics and challenges to father-leaders do not necessarily have to be based solely on some pre-existing or traditional political culture. In fact, both Schatzberg and Schaffer offer extensive discussions of the ways in which these themes are utilized and manipulated by African rulers to consolidate their rule. Schaffer cites the “mosque metaphor” frequently referenced in Senegalese political discourse as a means by which Abdou Diouf and the ruling PS deliberately sought to define democracy as incorporating the right to free speech and to form political parties, but deemphasizing – or delegitimizing – actual alternation (38-39). Schatzberg similarly notes the extensive utilization of family and father metaphors in the political speech of leaders in Moi’s Kenya, Mobutu’s Zaire, and many other countries (8-12). There are also numerous examples of deliberate – and perhaps highly effective – efforts on the part of many African leaders to promote the idea that multiparty competition is dangerous, and perhaps “un-African.” Kenya’s former president, Daniel arap Moi, and Uganda’s long-serving Yoweri Museveni, have aggressively promoted a “Pandora’s box theory” of multiparty competition, and similar arguments were used by Julius Nyerere and others to justify the shift to one-party states during Africa’s authoritarian heyday in the 1970s and 80s. Schatzberg notes that the use of these metaphors is frequently part of “carefully orchestrated cults of personality.” But he also makes the case that some cultural resonance must underlie the particular choice of metaphors: “The imagery and language of father and family are pervasive in middle Africa because they strike a resonant and deeply embedded cultural chord. They form part of a culturally valid and mostly implicit comprehension of the limits of political legitimacy. . .” (23).

There are also practical and experience-based grounds for public concern about the potential outcomes of party competition, particularly in a context where ethno-regionalism rather than ideology tends to shape party allegiances. In the early 1960s, for example, Somalia was hailed as a model of African democracy.<sup>14</sup> But beneath this veneer of apparently functional and effective democracy, the multiparty system was rapidly disintegrating: 18 parties competed in the 1964 general elections, while 62 were listed on the ballot by 1969, many representing only a single sub-clan or even sub-sub-clan. The coup that instituted military rule later that year was widely welcomed by the public as a means to restore political stability and accountability. Although Somalia was an extreme case, these same characteristics of fragmentation and volatility that were evident in Somalia’s first attempt at democracy are the defining features of many of Africa’s present-day electoral democracies, raising the concern once again that “democratization, especially the legalization of opposition parties, may induce fragmentation – that it may *destroy nations rather than build them*” (Widner 1997: 65; emphasis added). The violent aftermath of Kenya’s hotly contested – and ethnically divisive – December 2007 elections, in a country that had only recently been hailed as a democratic leader on the continent, offers the most recent example of the potential perils of party competition. Thus, although it is difficult to conceive of an effective and legitimate alternative, there are nonetheless valid reasons to question both the viability and the impacts of the multiparty model in much of Africa.

And on an even more pragmatic basis, voters, like politicians, may offer their support to incumbents to gain or retain access to resources, and avoid penalties for backing a “loser.” This type of voting instrumentality can produce a bandwagon effect that makes it especially difficult for opposition politicians to draw committed supporters to their side, since they are unlikely to be able to deliver the same kind of benefits that incumbents can produce (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 32; van de Walle 2007: 64). However, this type of voting instrumentality is likely to be more evident in the voting booth than in responses to a non-binding interview such as the Afrobarometer.

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<sup>14</sup> See Lewis (2002), 204-8; and Farah (2000), 7.


This analysis, then, sets out to explore and explain popular attitudes toward political parties, considering in particular the extent to which pro-consensus/anti-competitive attitudes and orientations of political deference exist, and the degree to which they shape popular assessments of the main competitors. We will continue with a brief review of the key results concerning popular trust in political parties. We will then turn to an analysis of the gap in party trust that centers on examining the explanatory power of anti-competitive attitudes and deferential orientations.

### THE TRUST GAP

Our analysis derives from a core question about institutional trust asked by the Afrobarometer: “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough to say?” Respondents are asked about their level of trust in a number of public and/or political institutions. The Afrobarometer is distinctive among barometer-type surveys in that it asks respondents to distinguish between their trust in “ruling parties” and in “opposition parties,” rather than asking only about trust in political parties generally.

As shown in Figure 1, many Africans hold political parties in relatively low esteem. Even ruling parties, trusted “somewhat” or “a lot” by 56 percent of respondents, fall well behind presidents and the military, and they even score slightly lower than the police. But what really jumps out from these results is the exceptionally low standing of opposition parties. Just 36 percent report trusting opposition parties at the same level, compared to 57 percent who trust them “not at all” or only “a little bit.” As such, opposition parties fall well below any other key political or governmental organization, and they fall fully 20 points behind ruling parties.

**Figure 1: Trust in Public and Political Institutions Across 18 Countries, 2005-2006**




*How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough to say?*


Figures 2 and 3 break down the trust gap by country. As shown, both overall levels of trust in ruling and opposition parties, as well as the size of the gap, vary substantially across countries. The gap is

particularly stark in Tanzania and Mozambique, where it exceeds 50 percentage points, and it exceeds 20 percentage points in half of all countries. Only in three – Cape Verde, Nigeria and Zambia – do the parties attract roughly equal trust, and this balance is achieved at very low trust levels in both Zambia and especially Nigeria; in these countries, it appears that trust in the ruling party has been brought down to low opposition levels, rather than trust in the opposition rising up to meet typical ruling party levels. Zimbabwe is the stark exception. Here, by 2005 trust in the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was actually considerably higher than that in the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (by 16 percentage points), although for a variety of reasons the MDC had so far failed to capitalize on its position as the more trusted party.

**Figure 2: Trust in Ruling and Opposition Parties, by Country, 2005-2006**




**Figure 3: The Ruling-Opposition Trust Gap, by Country, 2005-2006**



Finally, Figure 4 shows the gap in each country between those who trust (i.e., trust “somewhat” or “a lot”) and those who distrust (i.e., trust “not at all” or “a little bit”) opposition parties. This offers another stark indication of the hurdles that opposition parties face. Distrust outweighs trust in 14 of 18 countries. In 11 of these, strong majorities (56 to 71 percent) distrust the opposition, with distrust outweighing trust by gaps ranging from 21 to 58 points. Only a handful of countries roughly break even between trust and distrust, and only in one – Ghana – is there substantially more trust than distrust (51 to 41 percent). Notably, all four of the countries where trust is greater than distrust (Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali and Senegal) have seen a relatively recent (since 2000) change in ruling party, although three others that have also seen such changes (Benin, Kenya and Madagascar) show some of the widest gaps between trust and distrust.

**Figure 4: Trust and Distrust in the Opposition, by Country, 2005-2006**



### EXPLAINING THE TRUST GAP

What explains the sizeable gap in trust between ruling and opposition parties on the part of so many Africans? Can it be attributed to the same country-level factors that analysts have cited to explain other common features of African party systems, such as historical and institutional legacies, ethno-regional cleavages, and related factors? Or should we be looking more towards individual-level factors? Does the political culture argument hold any water? Do individuals in fact exhibit attitudes and orientations that might pre-dispose them to adopt a negative attitude toward competition, change, or anyone or anything labeled as “opposition”? Or are individual judgments based more pragmatically on performance evaluations, or simply on socio-demographic or cognitive factors such as one’s age, wealth or education? To answer these questions, we develop a model that tests explanatory factors at both the individual and country levels.

Our basic model evaluates four sets of explanatory factors at the individual level. We first test *socio-economic indicators*, including rural or urban habitation, age, gender and wealth.<sup>15</sup> This part of the analysis will reveal whether, for example, rural and elderly voters tend to be more conservative (i.e., “pro-status quo”) – and thus pro-ruling party – than younger urban respondents. We can also assess whether the poor feel more aggrieved about the present state of affairs, and thus have greater desire for change, and perhaps more confidence in the opposition. Or are they instead more averse to the risk of the unknown, preferring a leader they know, no matter how ineffective or unsavory?

Secondly, we include a number of indicators of *cognitive awareness*. How much does an individual’s knowledge and understanding of the political system and its functioning affect his or her attitudes toward government and opposition? In particular, does knowledge and awareness beget more critical citizens willing to challenge the status quo and throw their lot in with the opposition if the government does not perform? We test three indicators of cognitive awareness: level of education, an index of access to media, and a composite measure of political engagement. Each of the indices is described in Appendix A.

The third set of factors focuses on *performance evaluations*. In general, there appear to be strong links between institutional trust and performance evaluations.<sup>16</sup> We therefore assess the extent to which various indicators of performance affect trust in the ruling and opposition parties. We expect higher performance ratings for the government to be linked to greater trust in the ruling party, but will this simultaneously lead to less trust in the opposition? Our model includes four indicators of performance: an index for ratings of government economic management; an index of government performance in social service provision; an index measuring the perceived extent of corruption; and assessments of the quality of political freedoms (see Appendix A for descriptions of indices).

The fourth set of individual-level factors focuses on the *attitudes toward competition* discussed above. It includes indicators of public attitudes toward multipartyism, and of the tendency to be deferential toward authority. These indicators are described in detail below.

The fifth set of explanatory factors tests *country-level explanations*, which are also described in greater detail below.

### ***Attitudes toward Competition***

#### ***A Politics of Consensus?***

Our data suggest that African publics are not, in fact, of one mind on the question of consensus-based versus oppositional politics and the value of competitive multiparty elections. For example, in an earlier round of Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 2002-2003, we asked respondents whether they agreed more with the statement that “In order to make decisions in our community, we should talk until everyone agrees,” or whether “Since we will never agree on everything, we must learn to accept differences of opinion within our community.” Respondents were nearly equally divided on this question: across 16 countries, an average of 50 percent opted for consensus, while 46 percent felt that differences of opinion were acceptable. But there was wide variation across countries, with majorities preferring consensus in Senegal (70 percent) and Mali (66 percent), and majorities opting for accepting differences in Namibia (59 percent), Uganda (59 percent), Kenya (58 percent) and Botswana (57 percent). The consensus-based model that Schaffer and others still see operating in Senegal continues to hold strong sway in some countries, Senegal included, but may have weakened considerably in others.

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
<sup>15</sup> Wealth is tested using a composite indicator of “lived poverty” that averages the frequency with which respondents go without five key necessities: food, water, health care, cooking fuel, and cash. See Mattes, *et al.* (2003) for a full discussion.

<sup>16</sup> For example, Pearson’s *r* for trust in the president and performance of the president is .629, significant at  $p < .001$ .

We also find evidence of public concern about the effects of competition on society. More than half (54 percent) believe that competition among political parties “often” or “always” leads to violent conflict; more than three-quarters of Nigerians and Zimbabweans feel this way (Figure 5). Given this, it is perhaps surprising that support for multiparty competition is nonetheless fairly solid – and growing. Nearly two-thirds of the Africans we interviewed (63 percent) believe that it is necessary to have many political parties to offer voters real choices during elections (Figure 6). This is up 8 percentage points from the 55 percent (across 16 countries – Benin and Madagascar were not included) who felt this way in 2002-2003. However, this still leaves about one-third of the population (ranging from a low of 20 percent in Cape Verde, to highs of more than 40 percent in Uganda and Tanzania) expressing an open aversion to multiparty politics and the presence of an “opposition.” Africans do, nonetheless, resoundingly support elections – an inherently competitive, rather than consensus-based mechanism – as the best means for selecting their leaders: fully 82 percent believe they are the method of choice. And 71 percent reject one-party systems as an alternative form of government.


There is thus no common position among Africans on the value of consensus versus competition. Africans clearly believe in elections and their right to select their own leaders. But many nonetheless have concerns about the implications of unfettered political competition on the unity and stability of their societies. And many do express a preference for consensus, albeit with wide variation across countries. Africans may desire a middle ground, of sorts, between the highly constrained (or non-existent) competition of the one-party state, and the unrestrained and even aggressive competition of the Western liberal model of multiparty democracy. This suggests a preference among at least a sizeable minority of Africans for a model of regulated, rather than total, competition (see e.g., Karlstrom 1996), which could contribute toward the evolution of dominant party systems. The implication for opposition parties is that they may often face higher hurdles than ruling parties in gaining the acceptance and trust – not to mention the votes – of the significant number of Africans who voice these concerns.

**Figure 5: Party Competition and Conflict, by Country**



*In this country, how often does competition between political parties lead to violent conflict?*

**Figure 6: The Need for “Many Political Parties”**




Which of these statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or statement B.

- A. Political parties create division and confusion. It is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in [Kenya].
- B. Many political parties are needed to make sure that [Kenyans] have real choices in who governs them.

**Deference to the “Big Man”?**

At first glance, there does not appear to be much basis for thinking of Africans as being overly deferential toward their presidents (or prime ministers). Rather, they express considerable support for balancing power between the executive branch and both the national legislature and the courts (Figure 7). On average, two-thirds of respondents express the belief that parliament should have superior authority over the president in making laws (65 percent), and that he must defer to the law and the decisions of the nation’s courts (67 percent).

**Figure 7: Balance of Powers?**



- Which of these statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or statement B. (percent selecting “A”)
- A. The members of Parliament represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree..
  - B. Since the President represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what the Parliament thinks.
- Which of these statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or statement B. (percent selecting “B”).
- A. Since the President was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong.
  - B. The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong.

However, we may see stronger evidence of deference to authority in a subtler indicator: presidential performance. Figure 8 shows the ratings of presidential performance across 18 countries. It is evident that African presidents (or prime minister, in the case of Lesotho), tend to get exceptionally positive reviews. Across all countries, an average of two-thirds (66 percent) either “approve” or “strongly approve” of the performance of their top political leader over the past year. And if the four very low scoring leaders are removed, the average climbs to 75 percent. Certainly these are unusually high ratings by global standards. But are they really evidence that Africans are inclined to defer to the political “big man,” as the conventional wisdom often suggests? We believe that Figure 9 offers considerable evidence that this is indeed the case. It compares what we can characterize as positive evaluations or a pro-government stance across a range of indicators, from presidential performance to management of the economy and affiliation with the ruling party.

What is striking about this figure is how much higher the ratings of presidential performance are than any other indicator. On average, presidents score fully 15 percentage points better than MPs and local government councilors; if Africans are deferential, it appears that this deference is especially pronounced with respect to the “Big Man” at the most senior level of leadership.

But it is perhaps even more notable the extent to which evaluations of presidential performance appear to be divorced from evaluations of government performance or the condition of the economy. Sound economic management is clearly one of the highest priorities Africans have for their governments: economic issues, including unemployment, poverty and food shortages, and general management of the economy, dominate the list of “most important problems” identified by respondents.<sup>17</sup> Yet across 18 countries, less than half of respondents (46 percent) say that the government is handling economic management “fairly” or “very well,” and the ratings are far lower for public efforts to keep prices stable (27 percent), create jobs (26 percent), and narrow the income gap between rich and poor (24 percent). Similarly, only about one-quarter (28 percent) rate the current state of the national economy as “fairly” or “very good,” and just 33 percent say the country’s economic situation is “better” or “much better” than one year ago, compared to 38 percent who say the situation has gotten worse. It is especially baffling that fully 55 percent of those who think that the availability of job opportunities has gotten *much worse* in the past few years nonetheless approve of the president’s performance (25 percent strongly approve!) despite the fact that unemployment is the public’s number one concern (identified by 23 percent as their country’s most important problem).

Given these dismal ratings of the economy and of government performance, we might then ask, what explains these very high ratings of presidential performance? Party affiliation, while important, is not the only answer. Only 39 percent claim to be affiliated with the ruling party. Among these it is not surprising that 84 percent approve of the president’s performance. But in a context of dire economic circumstances and public expression of dissatisfaction with government performance in addressing the problems, it is considerably more difficult to explain the fact that 58 percent with no party affiliation approve of their president’s performance, as do 47 percent of those who are affiliated with the opposition. We therefore argue that these high presidential performance ratings are indeed evidence – if of a more subtle form – that African publics offer a considerable degree of deference toward the “big men” who run their countries.


We should note again that it is not necessarily possible here to deconstruct all of the potential reasons for this deference. As discussed above, it may reflect a cultural predisposition. Or it may be that people have internalized the norms – and sometimes laws – against criticizing the president that prevailed during the authoritarian era (and which exist again in modern Zimbabwe). It is likely a combination of both. Deference could also be driven by more pragmatic or instrumental interests, i.e., the desire to stay on the right side of the Big Man to secure access to resources. However, this sorts of instrumental reasoning is likely to play a lesser role in shaping responses to survey questions – for which the respondent will not be directly penalized – than in shaping actual votes.

It is also important to reiterate that these findings should not be taken to suggest that Africans are inclined to write their presidents blank checks. Fully 76 percent reject “strongman” rule, whereby the president abolishes parliament and makes all decisions himself. And as we have seen, sizeable majorities believe that the president’s power must be balanced against that of other branches of government. Thus, deference does not imply a preference for unchecked presidential power; Africans may instead desire a system that embodies unitary (rather than oppositional), but not unrestrained, authority.

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
<sup>17</sup> The categories “management of the economy,” “wages, incomes and salaries,” “unemployment,” “poverty/destitution,” and “food shortage/famine” constituted 55 percent of the first responses to the question “In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?”

**Figure 8: Evaluations of Presidential Performance**



Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough to say: the president / prime minister?

**Figure 9: Deference? – Presidential Performance in Comparison (percent positive evaluations)**



### ***Country-Level Factors***

Finally, drawing on the work of the many analysts who have approached the question of party system evolution from a national rather than an individual perspective, we also include in our analysis several country-level indicators. These include:

- ***Electoral system structure*** – This is a dummy variable that is set to one for first past the post electoral systems, and 0 for mixed or proportional representation systems. Theory suggests that proportional systems, by offering more representation to diverse opposition parties, will increase the level of trust in these parties, while majoritarian or FPTP systems will widen the trust gap.
- ***Status of Freedom*** – The average of the Freedom House ratings for political rights and civil liberties is included to test the effects of leveling the playing field on the trust gap. If, political rights and media freedom are well protected, then the campaigning advantages of ruling parties should be reduced, and the trust gap narrowed.<sup>18</sup>
- ***Ethno-linguistic fractionalization*** – This indicator, which measures the probability that any two randomly selected individuals are not from the same ethnic group, serves as a proxy for the number of competing groups in society, and thus, in theory, the salience of ethnicity (Annett 2001).
- ***Years of independence*** – This serves as one proxy for historical and institutional legacies. We might expect countries with longer post-independence experience to have undergone more political learning, including, for example, about the dangers of Big Man politics, as compared to some of the more newly independent states such as Namibia and South Africa.
- ***Leadership alternations*** – This score counts the number of alternations in ruling party and/or incumbent president that occurred between 1989 and 2005. Note that, consistent with our focus here on “big man” politics, we put greater weight on electoral defeat of an individual (i.e., the incumbent president, along with his party) than on the electoral defeat of a ruling party alone, i.e., when the incumbent is not running (a “partial turnover”<sup>19</sup>). Our presumption is that deference is linked much more to individual leaders than to their parties. As mentioned, electoral ouster of incumbent presidents is much less common than party turnover when the incumbent does not run. For example, both Jerry Rawlings (in Ghana) and Daniel arap Moi (in Kenya) were re-elected every time they ran for office. It was only after each stepped down that *party* turnovers happened in these countries. Only a handful of countries have unseated incumbent leaders at the polls. Six did it during their first transitional multiparty election: Benin, Cape Verde, Madagascar, Malawi, South Africa and Zambia. But only Benin, Madagascar (twice) and Senegal have done it since. Each such unseating of an incumbent counts as one point. When no incumbent is running, but the former ruling party is unseated, this is scored as half a point.

The value for each indicator in each country is shown in Table 2.

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<sup>18</sup> Keep in mind that Freedom House scores rank from a “high” score of 1 (completely free) to a “low” score of 7 (not free).

<sup>19</sup> See Moehler and Lindbert (2007) for a similar definition.

**Table 2: Country-Level Indicators**

	Electoral System	Freedom House Political Rights (2005)	Freedom House Civil Liberties (2005)	Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	Years of Independence (to 2005)	Number of Leadership Alternations (1989 - 2005)
<b>Benin</b>	PR	2	2	.62	46	2
<b>Botswana</b>	FPTP	2	2	.51	40	0
<b>Cape Verde</b>	PR	1	1	.48	31	1.5
<b>Ghana</b>	FPTP	1	2	.71	49	.5
<b>Kenya</b>	FPTP	3	3	.83	43	.5
<b>Lesotho</b>	Mixed	2	3	.22	40	0
<b>Madagascar</b>	FPTP	3	3	.06	46	3
<b>Malawi</b>	FPTP	4	4	.62	42	1.5 <sup>20</sup>
<b>Mali</b>	FPTP	2	2	.78	46	.5
<b>Mozambique</b>	PR	3	4	.65	31	0
<b>Namibia</b>	PR	2	2	.68	16	.5
<b>Nigeria</b>	FPTP	4	4	.87	46	0
<b>Senegal</b>	PR	2	3	.72	46	1
<b>South Africa</b>	PR	1	2	.88	12	1
<b>Tanzania</b>	FPTP	4	3	.93	45	0
<b>Uganda</b>	FPTP	5	4	.90	44	0
<b>Zambia</b>	FPTP	4	4	.82	42	1
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	FPTP	7	6	.54	26	0

Sources for ELF scores are Roeder (2001), and Annett (2001) for Cape Verde.

## RESULTS

We tested the ability of each of these sets of factors to explain the gap in trust between ruling and opposition parties, using ordinary least squares regression. Table 3 shows the results. Note that the model is run three times. The first run uses the *trust gap* – the primary object of our interest – as the dependent variable. The second and third runs use trust in the ruling party, and trust in the opposition party, respectively, as the dependent variables. The latter two will help us to deconstruct the effects of each independent variable on the trust gap itself.

We note first the relative effectiveness of the selected variables in explaining the trust gap: Model 1 achieves an adjusted R squared of .229. Overall, though, it is clear that we can explain much more about trust in the ruling party (adj. R squared of .391) than trust in opposition parties (adj. R squared of .033), so decomposing the latter remains an object of further study. We will consider each set of explanatory factors in turn.

<sup>20</sup> Since its 2004 election, Malawi has been in the relatively unusual position in Africa of having a split government. The incumbent president, Bakili Maluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF), was prohibited by term limits from running for re-election. His party's candidate, Bingu wa Mutharika, won the presidency, but the leading opposition party, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), won control of the National Assembly. We have scored this transition as equivalent to a party change but not an individual incumbent change, i.e., one-half point.

### ***Socioeconomic Indicators***

Overall, the explanatory power of standard socioeconomic indicators is quite small (adj. block R squared of just .017), but it is worth noting the individual effects of several of these variables. For example, from Model 1 we can see that, as predicted, being rural tends to increase the gap. Models 2 and 3 reveal that this is because rural people tend to have greater trust in the ruling party than urban people, while urban-rural differences in attitudes toward the opposition are less pronounced. The same applies to older respondents relative to younger ones: elders are more trusting of the ruling party, but there is no significant difference between young and old with respect to their views of the opposition, so the net effect is an increase in the trust gap with age. In contrast, we can see that being female also tends to increase the trust gap, but in this case the effect derives from differences in attitudes toward the opposition, rather than towards ruling parties: women are less trusting of opposition than men. Perhaps surprisingly, poverty reduces the trust gap, and it does so by increasing the tendency to trust opposition parties. This counters the conventional wisdom that, like rural inhabitants, the elderly and women, the poor tend to be more conservative and deferential – i.e., pro-ruling party. Instead, it appears that those who are suffering the most are most likely to recognize – in fact, to physically feel – the need for a change in policies, and thus governments.

### ***Cognitive Awareness***

It also seems counter-intuitive that the effects of knowledge and awareness on the gap are so slim – even less than those for socioeconomic factors (adj. block R squared = .010). Especially surprising are the limited effects of education on the gap. From models 2 and 3 it is evident that schooling is equally corrosive of trust in both the ruling party and opposition parties, so the effects on the overall gap are essentially nil. Political engagement likewise has no net effect on the gap, but for the opposite reason: it is associated with small increases in trust in both ruling and opposition parties. The net effects of access to media is a reduction in the trust gap, but the effects are very small.

### ***Performance***

Performance indicators demonstrate considerably greater explanatory power (adj. block R squared of .148 for the trust gap, and .294 for trust in the ruling party), but it is again useful to deconstruct what is happening in each case. Positive evaluations of the government's economic management, for example, increase trust in *both* ruling and opposition parties – a rising economic tide apparently lifts all boats – but the effects on ruling party trust are greater, so the gap increases. Strong government performance in providing social services likewise increases trust all around, but in this case the effects on ruling and opposition parties are essentially equal, so there is no net effect on the gap. The flip side of this is evident with respect to the disaffection caused by corruption. Both ruling and opposition parties pay a price in public standing when corruption levels are perceived to be high, but the ruling party receives considerably more of the blame, with the net effect being a sizeable decrease in the trust gap.

The only element of performance that respondents attribute solely to the ruling party is increasing political freedom. Improvement in the protection of individual rights and freedoms has a large and significant positive effect on trust in the ruling party, but it has no effect on attitudes toward opposition parties, so the net effect is a large *increase* in the trust gap. This leads to the seemingly contradictory result that *greater* political freedom might be directly linked to a *less* competitive environment. But on some levels, perhaps this makes a great deal of sense for Africans. When we ask Africans what democracy means to them, they place much more emphasis on protection of political rights and freedoms (35 percent of all substantive responses)<sup>21</sup> than on political competition (9 percent). It therefore may not be surprising, especially given the experiences of the recent past under authoritarian rule, that it is seen as

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<sup>21</sup> We ask respondents “What, if anything does democracy mean to you?” They are allowed to give up to three open-ended responses, which are recorded verbatim, and later coded into core categories. Substantive responses exclude “don’t know” and “no further response”.

more important to *secure* the position of a government that does a good job of protecting civil liberties and political freedoms than to expose it to greater competition. Given the still very limited experience with electoral alternation in most countries, people may be making a very pragmatic decision that a government that is doing at least some things right (i.e., improving political freedoms) even if economic progress is still weak may be better than an unknown and untested government that could conceivably reverse even those basic gains.

### ***Attitudes toward Competition***

While performance evaluations are important, it is evident from Table 3 that, taken alone, attitudes toward competition are the single most powerful set of explanatory factors (adjusted block R squared of .196). To begin with, we see that *negative attitudes toward multipartyism* – which, as discussed, may be at least in part a residual effect of a legacy of consensus-based decision making – have the expected positive effects on the trust gap. Both indicators decrease trust in opposition parties while having only minor effects on trust in the ruling party, thus increasing the overall trust gap. Considering that one-third to one-half of respondents harbor these negative attitudes toward party competition, this suggests that there are significant attitudinal impediments facing opposition parties that are trying to gain a real competitive foothold. However, the size of this pro-consensus/anti-competition effect is relatively modest.

But the explanatory power of *deferential attitudes* appears to be much more profound. The effects of attitudes toward power balance among the branches of government are in the direction expected – those who deferentially cede more power to the president also express greater trust in the ruling party – but again, the effects are only moderately strong. Presidential performance, however, proves to be the single most powerful explanatory factor in Model 1, and by quite a large margin. High ratings of the president are linked to both increased trust in the ruling party, and decreased trust in the opposition, producing large positive effects on the overall trust gap. Thus, the strong tendency among African publics to defer to their national “big man” appears to be seriously undermining opposition standing.

A valid objection can be raised, of course, that positive ratings of presidential performance cannot purely be attributed to deference. Some people, for example, are affiliated with the ruling party – for any of a variety of reasons – and are therefore likely to rate the president positively for reasons other than, or in addition to, deference alone. And of course, some may sincerely believe that the president and his government are doing a great job, and hence fully deserve the high ratings that they receive. So it would be appropriate to test a more strictly defined measure of “deference.”

To do so, we will focus on the gap between the president’s approval ratings, and the government’s performance ratings in various sectors. For example, as shown in Figure 9, 66 percent gave the president high performance ratings. However, when we look at four indicators of the government’s economic performance – its handling of economic management, creating jobs, keeping prices stable, and reducing the income gap between the rich and the poor – an average of just 31 percent give the government positive ratings. A better measure of deference might therefore be support for the president that appears to be “irrational” from the perspective of economic performance ratings. In other words, those who give the president a positive review despite his government’s poor performance on the critical area of economic performance can be described as “deferential.” Thus, a stricter measure of deference would be the gap between presidential performance and economic performance ratings. We have calculated this gap, which I will call “deference 1”. Alternatively, a similar margin can be calculated between ratings of presidential performance and government performance in providing key social services. Since government performance ratings were much higher for social services than for economic performance (an average positive rating of 62 percent), this offers an even narrower definition of deference than “deference 1.” I refer to this indicator as “deference 2.”

Table 4 shows the results when we replace the presidential performance and economic or social services performance indicators with the gap between the two (deference 1 or deference 2). In both Models 4 and 5, the modified deference indicator is still the strongest factor in the model. The main difference between Model 1 and Model 4 is that when presidential performance and economic performance are taken out and replaced by the margin between them, the strength of the performance indicators increases, and in particular, government performance on social services goes from having no significant effect (in Model 1) to having a strong positive effect in Model 4. This is because presidential performance and government performance are strongly linked.<sup>22</sup> Thus, some of the explanatory power that is lost when presidential performance is removed as a stand-alone indicator in the model is made up for by the increasing strength of the performance indicators. But while government performance, especially with respect to political freedoms, does play an important role in shaping evaluations of ruling and opposition parties and thus in creating the trust gap, we also see clear evidence that the quality of government performance alone is not adequate to explain the gap. As demonstrated, the additional factor of deference in fact plays an even larger role in boosting trust in the government and the ruling party, thus widening the trust gap, and undermining the competitiveness of the political system.

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<sup>22</sup> Pearson's  $r$  between presidential performance and the index of economic performance is .456 at  $p \leq .01$ ; between presidential performance and the index of social services performance it is .401 at  $p \leq .01$ ; between presidential performance and the index of corruption it is -.381 at  $p \leq .01$ ; and between presidential performance and the index of political freedoms it is .406 at  $p \leq .01$ . However, it should be noted that one reason for these relatively high correlations could be that the government performance ratings may themselves also reflect some degree of deference. That is, if people defer to the president as their "father-leader," then it is also possible, perhaps probable, that some of this positive affect toward the president will "rub off" on evaluations of the government's performance as well, elevating them above what more objective analyses might indicate. It is, however, not possible to separate out these effects using the current data, so we will focus on the indicators described here as the best available indicators of deference at present.

**Table 3: Explaining Trust and the Trust Gap**

	<b>Model 1: Trust Gap</b>		<b>Model 2: Trust in Ruling Party</b>		<b>Model 3: Trust in Opposition Party</b>	
	<b>Beta</b>	<b>Adj. Block R square</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>Adj. Block R square</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>Adj. Block R square</b>
Constant	(-1.884)		(-.443)		(1.437)	
<b>Socioeconomic</b>		.017		.033		.003
Rural	.029***		.057***		.020*	
Age	.020**		.021**		-.004	
Female	.028***		.004		-.037***	
Lived poverty	-.018*		.011		.038***	
<b>Cognitive Awareness</b>		.010		.041		.007
Education	-.007		-.080***		-.081***	
Political Engagement	-.013		.031***		.053***	
Media Use	-.018*		-.015		.009	
<b>Performance Evaluations</b>		.148		.294		.005
Govt. performance on econ. mgmt (index)	.049***		.123***		.064***	
Govt. performance on social services (index)	.006		.051***		.048***	
Extent of corruption (index)	-.106***		-.161***		-.026**	
Increasing political freedoms (index)	.126***		.154***		-.012	
<b>Attitudes toward Competition</b>		.196		.287		.014
<b>Multipartyism</b>						
Multiple parties not needed	.055***		.011		-.067***	
Party competition → conflict	.039***		-.014*		-.068***	
<b>Deference</b>						
Presidential performance	.312***		.319***		-.095***	
President supercedes parliament	.041***		.019**		-.037***	
President supercedes rule of law	.024**		.010		-.022*	
<b>Country-level factors</b>		.013		.027		.003
FPTP electoral system	-.042***		-.015		.042***	
Status of freedom	.040***		.038***		-.017	
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization	.000		-.002		.000	
Years of independence	.023*		.018*		-.053***	
Leadership alternations	-.032***		-.067***		-.028**	
<b>Adjusted R square</b>	.229		.391		.033	

Cell values are standardized regression coefficients, i.e. beta.  
(Values in parentheses are unstandardized regression coefficients.)

**Table 4: Refining Our Understanding of Deference**

	<b>Model 4: Trust Gap with Deference 1</b>	<b>Model 5: Trust Gap with Deference 2</b>
	<b>Beta</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Constant	(-1.420)	(-1.115)
<b>Socioeconomic</b>		
Rural	.048***	.029***
Age	.016*	.022**
Female	.032***	.028***
Lived poverty	-.029***	-.029***
<b>Cognitive Awareness</b>		
Education	-.016	-.011
Media Use	-.012	-.013
Political Engagement	-.001	-.008
<b>Performance Evaluations</b>		
Govt. performance on econ. mgmt (index)	--	.151***
Govt. performance on social services (index)	.120***	--
Extent of corruption (index)	-.162***	-.132***
Increasing political freedoms (index)	.168***	.176***
<b>Attitudes toward Competition</b>		
<i>Multipartyism</i>		
Multiple parties not needed	.066***	.055***
Party competition → conflict	.026**	.034***
<i>Deference</i>		
Deference1 = Presidential performance – Govt. performance on economy	.185***	--
Deference2 = Presidential performance – Govt. performance on social services	--	.203***
President supercedes parliament	.045***	.042***
President supercedes rule of law	.040***	.028***
<b>Country-level factors</b>		
FPTP electoral system	-.046***	-.032**
Status of freedom	.020	.023*
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization	.023*	-.015
Years of independence	.003	.020
Leadership alternations	-.034***	-.048***
<b>Adjusted R square</b>	.192	.207

Cell values are standardized regression coefficients, i.e. beta.

(Values in parentheses are unstandardized regression coefficients.)

*Deference 1 = Presidential Performance rating (scale of 1 to 5) minus the Index of Government Performance on Economic Management (also on a 5 point scale).*

*Deference 2 = Presidential Performance rating minus the Index of Government Performance on Social Services*

### *Country-Level Factors*

Finally, we turn to country-level effects. We begin by noting that when modeled using country dummies (not shown) the explanatory power of “country” is quite sizeable (adj. block R squared = .114)<sup>23</sup>. However, when utilizing the country-level factors described above, we find that while a number of the indicators are significant, the overall explanatory power of this set is much smaller than that of either performance evaluations or individual attitudes toward competition (adjusted block R squared is .013). We also note that unlike the individual-level factors, which showed quite stable effects across models, there is considerable instability not only in the significance, but even in some cases in the direction of observed effects, depending on which individual- or country-level variables are included.<sup>24</sup> We acknowledge that the selected set of country-level factors is not complete in terms of capturing all of the key national-level explanatory factors identified by other analysts. We do not, for example, have a good indicator of the extent of “presidentialism,” identified by van de Walle (2003) as a key factor shaping party system outcomes, nor have we included indicators of the degree of state control of the economy, as suggested by the work of both Manning (2005) and Widner (1997). But we have also tested a number of other indicators not shown here (e.g., effective number of legislative parties, margins of electoral victory, other measures of ethnic salience<sup>25</sup>), none of which proved to be effective predictors of the trust gap (and these tests again demonstrated the considerable instability of the effects of almost all of the country-level variables).

Thus, overall we find that country-level factors prove to be of only limited value in explaining public perceptions of ruling and opposition parties. This suggests that analysts who have been ignoring the role of mass attitudes in their assessments of party system evolution are, at the least, missing a critical piece of the puzzle.

Across all of the various tests that were run of country level factors, the only two that exhibited consistent significant effects were electoral system and leadership alternations, although in both cases the size of the effects is fairly modest. As expected, proportional representation systems breed slightly more trust in opposition parties, and thus reduces the trust gap somewhat relative to countries with majoritarian systems. And consistent with the findings of Moehler and Lindberg (2007), we find that leadership alternations also consistently reduce the gap. In countries that have experienced at least one alternation, whether during the initial transition to multiparty rule or later,<sup>26</sup> opposition parties (which formerly ruled) actually tend to be viewed slightly more negatively than elsewhere. The former opposition parties that now rule, however, never achieve the high levels of deferential trust seen in other countries. Instead, alternations significantly reduce trust in the ruling party, bringing it more in line with trust in the opposition. The potentially unfortunate aspect of this is that it means that while a country may approach equilibrium in terms of trust in ruling and opposition parties, this balance may be achieved at quite low levels of overall trust. On the other hand, in societies overly inclined toward deference, this low-level equilibrium might actually be a good thing, leading people to be more challenging towards their leaders (Norris 1999).

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<sup>23</sup> If the full model (Model 1) is run replacing the country factors with country dummies (with Ghana as the excluded country), the model adjusted R squared increases slightly to .258.

<sup>24</sup> Note, for example, the differences between Models 1, 4 and 5 with respect to the effects of the Freedom House score (changing significance), years of independence (changing significance) and ethno-linguistic fractionalization (changing sign and significance).

<sup>25</sup> Including Posner’s (2004) Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG) measure, and an Afrobarometer-derived measure of ethnic salience based on questions about how one’s own ethnic group is faring relative to others.

<sup>26</sup> Note that the effects of the “transitions” variable are essentially the same even if a more narrowly defined measure is used that only includes transitions that have occurred subsequent to the initial founding election (i.e., excluding the transitions that occurred during founding elections in Benin, Cape Verde, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia).

## CONCLUSION

Analysts lament the lack of alternation and the increasing trend toward one-party dominant systems in many African states. Van de Walle (2003), for example, directly links the competitiveness of a party system to the quality of democracy that can be achieved: the lower the level of competitiveness, he argues, the higher are the chances that an illiberal democracy will emerge (308). But in a context where opposition parties not only lag 20 percentage points behind ruling parties in trust, but where they are distrusted by 57 percent, compared to just 36 percent who trust them, the prospects for turnovers or alternations seem weak – and this is among some of Africa’s “best performers,” democratically speaking.

Democratic institutions are not being introduced in a vacuum in Africa. Rather, the formal institutions and practices of democracy are shaped and adjusted by a variety of factors, including not only the machinations of political elites, but also a society’s political culture, even as these institutions in turn shape and adjust that culture. Political culture can be difficult to define or pin down, and it is continuously evolving. But historical legacies and indigenous political values exist, and it appears they may be playing a significant role in shaping the adoption of Africa’s new multiparty systems in ways that have not been anticipated or fully understood.

Van de Walle (2003) points out that “observers have long noted that African political systems have not handled political competition well” (308). Analysts of political culture would argue that this “failure,” if indeed that is what it is,<sup>27</sup> has its roots *at least in part*, in the consensus-based politics that have characterized previous political systems. The present analysis finds at least some support for this hypothesis. While acceptance of party competition is gaining a foothold, it is still somewhat tenuous, and many Africans still question the value or appropriateness of open, aggressive opposition. And such attitudes are linked to larger gaps in trust between ruling and opposition parties, although the effects are relatively modest.

We find stronger evidence to support the claim that oppositions are weak because Africans place especially high social value on respect for their “father-leaders.” Deference, measured either as presidential performance ratings, or as the margin between these ratings and government performance ratings in key sectors, consistently proves to be the most powerful explanatory factor in our models of the trust gap. All told, we find that the combined effects of anti-competitive and deferential attitudes add up to a sizeable disadvantage for opposition parties. In fact, they have much more power to explain this gap than far more commonly cited national-level system characteristics. This analysis thus offers strong evidence that popular attitudes toward competition play an important role in determining the prospects for the evolution of an effective, competitive opposition that can truly challenge the dominance of ruling parties.

But note that we do not claim that preferences for consensus or inclinations toward deference are the only factors shaping attitudes toward political parties. Evaluations of government performance play a critical role as well. In sum, the effect of deference may not be to make change impossible, but rather, to raise the threshold of public tolerance, so that leaders and ruling parties have to do a lot worse than outside observers might expect before voters are willing to turn against them at the polls.

It is worth remembering, too, that protection of political rights and freedoms proves an especially potent element of performance. Protection of these rights appears to elicit commitment from voters to the ruling elites even in the absence of significant progress in other key sectors (especially the economy). It may be that Africans value these rights and freedoms so highly that they effectively want to “lock in” these

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<sup>27</sup> One could question whether it is a “failure” for a political system to develop congruently with the political culture in which it is based.

changes by backing the leaders who have brought them about, rather than taking the risk of going backward – even if they simultaneously lose the possibility of making further progress – with the opposition.

These findings offer some answers to the vexing question of why seemingly ineffective leaders are so often re-elected by willing publics. Nonetheless, the possibility that African publics may be, perhaps unconsciously, colluding in their leaders' efforts to hold on to power, sometimes indefinitely, would not appear to bode well for the future consolidation of democracy on the continent. There is also a potential trap for opposition parties. If they believe that the public is not open to their message for reasons beyond their control, their already weak incentives to develop their parties and their platforms to attract what they perceive as unwinnable votes may be limited even further. Their second-class status may thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

But there is reason for some optimism as well. First, attitudes toward competition are of course not the only factor shaping political systems. But more importantly, even to the extent that they do determine opposition prospects, these attitudes can and do change over time. Political learning does occur. And the changes may, at least in some cases, occur quite quickly. We noted, for example, the significant increase in support for multiparty competition between Rounds 2 (2002-2003) and 3 (2005-2006) of the Afrobarometer, from 55 to 63 percent.

Finally, this paper also demonstrates the positive effects, in terms of reducing the trust gap, of party alternations when they do occur. Whether because leaders are term-limited out of office, or because publics finally become fed up with a status quo that has become too untenable, or both (e.g., in Kenya in 2002), transitions have occurred.<sup>28</sup> When they do, they make the opposition more viable, and future alternations more likely. The vital importance of term limits becomes evident, particularly given that voters apparently find it at least somewhat easier to vote a party rather than an individual leader out of office. Term limits may thus alleviate the inclination to defer to current leaders, opening up greater opportunities for real competition and change. Whatever their roots, alternations can have lasting consequences on attitudes toward competition, and hence on the competitiveness of a political system.

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<sup>28</sup> And very well might have occurred elsewhere – notably in Zimbabwe – if the political environment was more open and the playing field more level.

## Appendix A: Indices of Government Performance

**Index of Media Access:** This index combines three items based on the following question: “How often do you get news from the following sources: radio; television; newspapers?” Response options included: every day / a few times a week/ a few times a month / less than once a month / never. A single factor can be extracted that explains 59.7% of variance (Eigenvalue = 1.792, Cronbach’s alpha = .661).

**Index of Political Engagement:** This construct combines the responses to two questions. The first about political interest asked: “How interested would you say you are in public affairs?” Response options included: not at all interested / not very interested / somewhat interested / very interested. The second question asked about engagement in political discussion: “When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters: never / occasionally / frequently?”

**Index of Government Performance on Economic Management:** This index combines four items based on the following question: “How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: managing the economy; creating jobs; keeping prices stable; and narrowing gaps between rich and poor?” Response options include 1= Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very well. Factor analysis indicates that a single factor can be extracted from these four items that explains 65.6% of variance (Eigenvalue = 2.622, Cronbach’s alpha = .824).

**Index of Government Performance on Social Services:** This index combines four items based on the same question: “How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: improving basic health services; addressing educational needs; delivering household water; and combating HIV/AIDS?” Factor analysis indicates that a single factor can be extracted from these four items that explains 56.5% of variance (Eigenvalue = 2.259, Cronbach’s alpha = .734).

**Index of Political Freedoms:** This index combines four items based on the following question: “Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they were a few years ago, or are they about the same: freedom to say what you think; freedom to join any political organization you want; freedom from being arrested when you are innocent; freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured?” Response options included: much worse / worse / same / better / much better. Factor analysis indicates that a single factor can be extracted from these four items that explains 70.0% of variance (Eigenvalue = 2.800, Cronbach’s alpha = .855).

**Index of Corruption:** This index combines three items based on the following question: “How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: the president and officials in his office; members of parliament; local government councilors?” Response options included: none / some of them / most of them / all of them. Factor analysis indicates that a single factor can be extracted from these three items that explains 78.2% of variance (Eigenvalue = 2.346, Cronbach’s alpha = .859).

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