

AFRO BAROMETER

Working Paper No. 80

**POLITICAL RIGHTS VERSUS PUBLIC
GOODS: UNCOVERING THE
DETERMINANTS OF SATISFACTION
WITH DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA**

by Leonard Wantchekon and
Gwendolyn Taylor

**A comparative series of national public
attitude surveys on democracy, markets
and civil society in Africa.**



The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA)
6 Spin Street, Church Square
Cape Town 8001, South Africa
27 21 461 2559 • fax: 27 21 461 2589
Mattes (bob@idasact.org.za)

Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana)
14 West Airport Residential Area
P.O. Box 404, Legon-Accra, Ghana
233 21 776 142 • fax: 233 21 763 028
Gyimah-Boadi (cdd@ghana.com)

Michigan State University (MSU)
Department of Political Science
East Lansing, Michigan 48824
517 353 3377 • fax: 517 432 1091
Bratton (mbratton@msu.edu)

afrobarometer.org

AFROBAROMETER WORKING PAPERS

Working Paper No. 80

**POLITICAL RIGHTS VERSUS PUBLIC
GOODS: UNCOVERING THE
DETERMINANTS OF SATISFACTION
WITH DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA**

by Leonard Wantchekon and
Gwendolyn Taylor

December 2007

Leonard Wantchekon is a Professor in the Politics department at New York University and the founder and director of the Institut de Recherche Empirique en Economic Politique (IREEP).

Gwendolyn Taylor is a Ph.D. student in the Politics department at New York University.



AFROBAROMETER WORKING PAPERS

Editors: Michael Bratton, E. Gyimah-Boadi, and Robert Mattes

Managing Editor: Carolyn Logan

Afrobarometer publications report the results of national sample surveys on the attitudes of citizens in selected African countries towards democracy, markets, civil society, and other aspects of development. The Afrobarometer is a collaborative enterprise of Michigan State University (MSU), the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), and the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD, Ghana). Afrobarometer papers are simultaneously co-published by these partner institutions and the Globalbarometer.

Working Papers and Briefings Papers can be downloaded in Adobe Acrobat format from www.afrobarometer.org.

Printed copies of Working Papers are available for \$15.00 each plus applicable tax, shipping and handling charges. Orders may be directed to:

IDASA POS
6 Spin Street, Church Square
Cape Town 8001 SOUTH AFRICA
(phone: 27 21 461 5229, fax: 27 21 461 2589, e-mail: msibanyoni@idasa.org.za)

An invoice will be sent



Idasa



co-published with:

GLOBALBAROMETER™



Political Rights versus Public Goods:
Uncovering the Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in Africa

Abstract

In democracies there is a trade-off between efficiency in the provision of public goods and the extent of political representation. Our paper shows how this trade-off plays out in translating intrinsic versus instrumental understandings of democracy into different levels of satisfaction with democratic outcomes. We use public opinion data in eighteen African countries to demonstrate that citizens who value democracy instrumentally report lower levels of satisfaction when fractionalization is high. However, citizens who value democracy intrinsically report higher levels of satisfaction under the same circumstance. In addition, we find that more educated citizens tend to value democracy intrinsically, as opposed to instrumentally. Other potential indicators, such as wealth, age and gender, have no predictive power. Finally, we discuss the contribution our findings make to debates about such issues as ethnic fractionalization, electoral systems, political institutions and economic development.



INTRODUCTION

Somewhere between Aristotle and Churchill, global public opinion seemed to tend towards the idea that democracy is, in fact, the best form of government. New evidence provided by the Afrobarometer surveys show that most Africans agree. Afrobarometer survey results show widespread support for democracy as the superior form of government: 66% of respondents say that democracy is the preferable form of government, while only 12% of respondents would opt for a non-democratic system. These same survey results, however, show a wide range of levels of satisfaction with democracy. Though all 18 countries in the Afrobarometer are ostensibly democratic, over 35% of respondents reported that their country is either not a democracy at all or is a democracy with major problems. At minimum, this evidence indicates that expectations about democracy have not been met.

Public opinion polls like these should be taken seriously because expectations are vastly important in determining country-level outcomes. The expectations of the public about the management of government in their own country influence leader behavior. Bratton et al (2005) offer a striking comparison that highlights the significance of public expectations: in Namibia, where only 57% of the population claimed they would reject a system in which only the president retained political power, President Nujoma was able to push through constitutional reforms that allowed him to retain office for a third term. In Zambia, however, where 91% of the population said they would reject such a system, President Chiluba was unable to make a similar constitutional change.

This paper seeks to explain the divergence between preference for democracy and satisfaction with its outcome. We focus the way political fragmentation, a distinguishing characteristic of democratic regimes, interacts with different understandings of the meaning of democracy.

We consider two competing interpretations of democracy: intrinsic versus instrumental. In its traditional liberal sense, democracy is a system characterized by many normatively appealing characteristics like individual freedom, civil liberties and electoral competition. On the other hand, democracy is also thought by many citizens and academics alike to have instrumental value. In this context democracy is a mechanism leading to increased better provision of public goods and enhanced public services based on the incentive structure linking citizen approval with tenure in office.¹ Political fractionalization can be both a blessing and a burden depending on one's point of view: a blessing for the liberalist, in that a highly fractionalized government means lively competition and intra-party negotiation, but a burden for the instrumentalist, in that fractionalization can lead to policy gridlock. As a result, in the presence of political fragmentation, divergent understandings of democracy lead to varying levels of satisfaction.

The representation of many parties in government means that many different political views have voices. In the case where the parties have relatively equal weight, each party has not only a presence but also potentially the power to veto and to force negotiations. Thus, for those who see democracy as a way to promote widespread participation and influence in government, fractionalization can seem quite positive.

These competition-enhancing attributes, however, can also have negative effects on the speed of policy formation. In a situation with multiple veto players, there is a higher probability that one party will take negotiations hostage in an effort to provide more for their constituency. Coalitions of evenly-matched parties can also find themselves in a prisoners' dilemma, in which everyone wants a compromise policy to pass, but would do better by abandoning the agreement in favor of providing more for their party members.² The outcome of this incentive structure can be policy gridlock and distortion, excessive pork barrel politics and increased levels of corruption. For those citizens that see democracy an instrument for

¹ For a discussion of intrinsic versus instrumental purposes of democracy, see Sen 1999.

² See Roubini and Sachs 1989.

economic development, political fractionalization could be a cause for dissatisfaction with democracy.

Further, we investigate the determinants of a propensity to view democracy instrumentally versus instrumentally. Though it seems plausible that factors such as age, gender or wealth might contribute to one point of view over the other, we find that only education emerges as a significant covariate.

CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE

Determinants of satisfaction with democracy have been analyzed before, though most efforts have centered on Europe, where data is abundant. Anderson and Guillory (1997) examine the link between democratic satisfaction and political systems. They conclude that as expected, those who voted for the winner are happier after he wins. Moreover, in a purely majoritarian system, the gap in satisfaction between the winners and losers is wider than in consensual systems. Our paper seeks to take the analysis a step further - we will also analyze the extent to which satisfaction with democracy is influenced by institutional factors, but those factors will be considered in light of the expectations the individual has about the nature of democracy.

The paper contributes to several current debates in both comparative politics and development economics. There exists lively debate about public good provision as an engine for economic development and poverty alleviation. Devarajan and Reinikka (2003) advise that in order to improve human development in impoverished and highly unequal countries, poor people need to have greater control over public services. In their argument, if the poor have equal influence in determining the nature of the provision of public services, delivery can actually be made more efficient. Our findings suggest that public goods provision could also contribute to satisfaction with democracy, which could promote democratic consolidation and increased political participation.

We also speak to the literature on ethnic diversity and economic performance. Easterly and Levine (1997) find that in sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic fragmentation is correlated with lower public good provision, due to higher levels of patronage, corruption, instability, underdevelopment and a host of other unfavorable economic outcomes. By focusing exclusively on economic performance, this literature might have neglected ethnic diversity's impact on political fragmentation, and thus interparty competition.

The literature on electoral institutions has stressed the efficiency of majoritarian electoral systems. Proportional representation, on the other hand, promotes political inclusiveness, potentially at the expense of efficiency. The evidence of this trade-off had been limited to results found using macro cross-country data, which obscures the micro-level foundations. By using individual-level data we are able to uncover individual opinions of this trade-off.

The literature on electoral institutions has stressed the efficiency of majoritarian electoral systems, which are able to implement platforms directly. Proportional representation, on the other hand, promotes political inclusiveness, potentially at the expense of efficiency. It is the system of decision-making within the government that leads to the difference in policy expediency. Majoritarian systems are characterized by concentration of power that eliminates the need for complex debate and bargaining. They are decisive and lay the foundation for majority control over policy decisions. Proportional systems, however, involve bargaining and consideration of minority opinions and thus are considerably less decisive than their majoritarian counterparts. While including more parties in the government may increase representation, it also increases the number of decision-makers involved.³

Thus far, evidence for this trade-off has been largely anecdotal. There is, however, reason to believe that

³ For further discussion on the tradeoff between decisiveness and representation, see Powell 2000, Quade 1991, Norris 1997.

popular opinion about policy efficiency affects satisfaction with a democratic system, not just the current government. The 1993 electoral reform in Italy was driven in part by a popular association between policy gridlock and the PR form of government. Italy's senate, which had operated under proportional representation, moved to a system in which 75% of the seats were elected using a majoritarian system. The reform was in part driven by the desire to consolidate smaller parties, which would end the massive fragmentation that had frequently paralyzed the Italian government.⁴

By using individual-level data we are able to uncover individual opinions on the trade-off between efficiency and inclusiveness, based on how individuals respond to fractionalization in their government.

Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) find that human capital, rather than institutions, is the foundation for economic growth. In their view, efficient growth-promoting policies, such as emphasis on education, lift countries out of poverty, after which those countries establish institutions that emphasize equality and widespread representation. We find that increased education levels are correlated with a propensity to view democracy intrinsically as opposed to instrumentally. This result supports the hypothesis that education promotes a tolerance of diverse views, interest in political participation and desire for freedom of expression.

Our paper will be organized as follows. We first present the context in which the Afrobarometer data were collected. We then discuss our variables and our estimation strategy, followed by a presentation and interpretation of our results. The final section concludes.

CONTEXT

The Afrobarometer surveys⁵ are based on interviews conducted in local languages of a random sample of at a minimum 1200 people per country. The minimum sample of 1200 people gives a margin of error of 3% and a degree of confidence of 95%. Afrobarometer covers 18 countries as of 2005. While these countries are in many ways a representative sample of African nations, there are a few key dimensions on which they systematically differ from excluded countries. First, and most obvious, is the exclusion of non-democracies. It is possible that there exists a latent country characteristic that both propels a country toward democracy and affects average citizen satisfaction once it is in place. If that is true, we cannot use the results from this paper to draw conclusions about the reactions that citizens under autocratic regimes would have to democracy were it instituted in their countries. The most severe selection problem, however, is that Afrobarometer does not survey countries experiencing active conflict. There is good reason to think that conflict would affect both expectations of what democracy should provide and satisfaction levels were it in place.

In terms of basic country characteristics, our data set does a fairly good job of approximating Africa as a whole. Table 1 gives a snapshot of the in-sample countries. Our average GDP per capita is \$2,988, while the average for all of sub-Saharan Africa is \$2,566⁶ - only slightly lower, especially given the \$2897 standard deviation. The countries in Afrobarometer sample represent a variety of levels of freedom. Some, like Benin and Ghana, are by most objective measures total democracies. Others, like Uganda, are

⁴ For further details consult Donovan 1995.

⁵ Afrobarometer is an independent and non-partisan research project conducted by CDD, IDASA and MSU. Implemented by national partners, Afrobarometer measures economic conditions and the political atmosphere in African countries. The questionnaire is standardized to facilitate comparison between the covered countries. The countries covered in the 2005 survey are: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

⁶ Average excludes Equatorial Guinea, which, with a GDP per capita of \$50,200, is a significant outlier.

arguably much less free.⁷ Our sample manages to represent all of the major colonial powers save Belgium (as nearly every former Belgian colony has experienced recent severe armed conflict.) Our sample has an average population size that is, in both mean and median, slightly higher than that of Africa as a whole, due to our inclusion of Nigeria, Africa’s largest country.⁸

Table 1: Basic Country Information

| Country | Population | Infant Mortality ¹ | Literacy ² | Year of Independence | Former Colonial Power | GDP per Capita ³ |
|--------------|-------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| Botswana | 1,639,833 | 53.70 | 79.8% | 1966 | UK | \$10,000 |
| Lesotho | 2,022,331 | 87.24 | 84.8% | 1966 | UK | \$3,000 |
| Madagascar | 18,595,469 | 75.21 | 68.9% | 1960 | France | \$900 |
| Mali | 11,716,829 | 107.58 | 46.4% | 1960 | France | \$1,000 |
| Senegal | 11,987,121 | 52.94 | 40.2% | 1960 | France | \$1,700 |
| Benin | 7,862,944 | 79.56 | 33.6% | 1960 | France | \$1,100 |
| Mozambique | 19,686,505 | 129.24 | 47.8% | 1975 | Portugal | \$1,300 |
| Ghana | 22,409,572 | 55.02 | 74.8% | 1957 | UK | \$2,400 |
| South Africa | 44,187,637 | 60.66 | 86.4% | 1910 | UK | \$12,100 |
| Malawi | 13,013,926 | 94.37 | 62.7% | 1964 | UK | \$600 |
| Namibia | 2,044,147 | 43.39 | 84% | 1990 | South Africa | \$8,200 |
| Kenya | 34,707,817 | 59.26 | 85.1% | 1963 | UK ⁴ | \$1,200 |
| Tanzania | 37,445,392 | 96.48 | 78.2% | 1961 | UK ⁵ | \$700 |
| Uganda | 28,195,754 | 66.15 | 69.9% | 1962 | UK | \$1,700 |
| Nigeria | 131,859,731 | 97.14 | 68% | 1960 | UK | \$1,000 |
| Zambia | 11,502,010 | 86.84 | 80.6% | 1964 | UK | \$900 |

¹deaths/1,000 births

²% 15 and over that can read and write.

³\$ 2005 estimate

⁴from South African mandate.

⁵from UK-administered UN trusteeship.

Information taken from the CIA World Factbook, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Definitions of Independent Variables

Definitions of Democracy

The Afrobarometer survey asks subjects to give a verbal description of what democracy means to them. These verbal responses were subsequently coded into the eighteen possible categories. These categories are listed below, grouped into three categories: intrinsic, instrumental or neither.

⁷ According to Freedom House, Benin, Ghana and Senegal are ranked high on the list of political rights and civil liberties, while Madagascar, Kenya and Nigeria are considered only “partly free”. Uganda is the lowest on the list of political freedom.

⁸ Our sample has a mean population of 24,929,814 and a median of 15,804,698, while all of sub-Saharan Africa has a mean of 15,944,163 and a median of 9,690,222.

Table 2: Intrinsic versus instrumental value of democracy

| Intrinsic | Instrumental | Neither |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|
| Freedom & Civil Liberties | Peace & unity | No meaning |
| Government for or by the people | Development | Poverty |
| Voting, elections and parties | Togetherness & cooperation | Oppression |
| Majority rule | Good governance | Other |
| Justice, equality & fairness | Autonomy or independence | Responsiveness |
| | Respect & human rights | Civilian rule |

Legislative Fractionalization

The number of parties holding seats in the legislature, however, might not give a full and accurate picture of power fractionalization. Imagine a scenario in which a legislature is composed of members from four parties, where parties A, B and C hold 10% each of the seats, while party D enjoys the remaining 60%. Even if parties A, B and C formed a coalition against party D, they still could not present a legitimate challenge to party D. In fact, given this distribution of seats, there is no system of alliance formation that would allow for policy gridlock: in all cases, one combination of parties (or party D alone) would win with a simple majority. Now consider the same four parties, but with a different distribution of seats, such that each party holds exactly 25%. While it is possible for a coalition of three parties to steer legislation, or even a coalition of two parties if the remaining two remain unallied, it is also possible for a stalemate to occur. In order to account for the meaningful differences between the possible distributions of seats among the total number of parties, a fractionalization index computed using a Herfindahl concentration formula:

$$FRAC = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2$$

where *i* is each political party, and *p* is the percent of legislative seats they occupy.

Recall the two scenarios presented above. In the first scenario, in which parties A, B, and C had 10% each and D had the remaining 40%. The fractionalization index, calculated as follows, produces a score of .61:

$$1 - (.01 + .01 + .01 + .36) = .61$$

On the other hand, if each party has 25% of the seats, the calculation (below) produces a higher fractionalization score, indicating a greater potential for legislative gridlock.

$$1 - (.0625 + .0625 + .0625 + .0625) = .75$$

Malawi and Zambia are have the highest legislative fractionalization scores. This is intuitive, given the high level of ethnic fractionalization and regional tension in these countries. These are the countries, then, in which we would expect to see policy slowdown due to gridlock, and subsequent discontent among the citizens. Botswana and Mali, on the other hand, have the lowest fractionalization scores, indicating a low potential for gridlock.

Electoral System

In the analysis we will control for the electoral system. The preponderance of the countries have majoritarian systems, though several also use proportional representation. It is possible that proportional representation systems could be correlated with greater fractionalization, given the greater range of choice among candidates. The electoral systems used by the countries in the data set are listed below:

Majoritarian: Kenya, Botswana, Nigeria, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Ghana, Uganda, Madagascar.

Proportional Representation: South Africa, Benin, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Namibia. **Parallel Party**

Block Vote: Senegal

Mixed Member Proportional: Lesotho

Two-round Run-off: Mali

Ethnic Fractionalization

Finally, the analysis will control for ethnic fractionalization, which could quite plausibly be correlated with legislative fractionalization. The ELF (Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization) index has been the workhorse as far as quantification of ethnic diversity in political science goes, but this analysis will use Daniel Posner's index of Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG). PREG scores for the sample countries are listed in Table 3. Botswana, Lesotho and Madagascar both receive a fractionalization score of 0, according to Posner's PREG score system. Zambia, Nigeria and Uganda, on the other hand, are the most ethnically fractionalized countries in this analysis.

Though Posner uses the ELF index as the basis for the PREG scores, PREG has several advantages over the ELF index. It updates the list of groups relevant to African politics, including groups that have proven important but were not mentioned in the Atlas Narodov Mira. It also addresses what Posner terms the "grouping" problem: politically distinct groups are often lumped together in one large category by the Atlas. The PREG index was specifically developed to accurately represent the groups that try to influence macroeconomic policy, and though Posner recommends that other spheres of analysis would best be addressed using an index specific to the mechanism, the development of macroeconomic policy is a subset of the topics under examination here, as democratic leaders are responsible for policymaking.

Education

In order to determine the probable cause of adoption of an instrumental or intrinsic vision of democracy, we examine the relationship between the respondent's definition of democracy and level of education. Afrobarometer asks respondents their education level. Education is measured by time spent in school, using ten ordinal categories beginning with no formal education and ending with post-graduate.

- No formal education
- Informal education
- Some primary school
- Primary school
- Some secondary school
- Secondary school
- Post-secondary school
- Some university
- University
- Post-graduate

These categories have been collapsed into four education categories for the purposes of the regression analysis: no or only informal education, some or all of primary school, some or all of secondary school, and beyond secondary school.

Poverty

In order to explain an instrumental versus intrinsic conception of democracy, we also include variables measuring the respondent's economic condition. Afrobarometer offers multiple definitions of material well-being. One measure is relational, asking respondents to compare their standard of living versus others. Respondents choose between much worse, worse, same, better and much better. The list of summary statistics records the percentage of respondents by country that reported feeling as though they were much worse or worse off than their peers.

Our other measure of poverty is more objective: respondents were asked how often they have gone without food, with five answer options ranging from never to always. The list of summary statistics

shows the percentage of respondents per country that reported going without food several times, many times or always - that is, those respondents that were objectively quite poor.

DEFINITIONS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Our first suite of regressions analyze respondents' perception of the level of democracy in their countries and their overall satisfaction with democracy. Our second suite of regressions explore the reasons respondents develop intrinsic versus instrumental definitions of democracy. The dependent variable in all second-suite regressions is simply one's definition of democracy, as described in the "Independent Variables" section above.

Level of Democracy

Afrobarometer asked its respondents about the extent of democracy in their country, allowing one of the following responses:

How democratic is your country?

- Not a democracy
- A democracy, with major problems
- A democracy, but with minor problems
- A full democracy

The percentage of responses per country that were either "A full democracy" or "A democracy with minor problems" are given in the summary statistics table below. Tanzania finishes first, with nearly half of the respondents reporting that they consider their country to very democratic. It's not obvious that this would be the case: ethnic fractionalization, political science's preferred scapegoat for all socio-political ills, is relatively high in Tanzania (.59). Our theory, however, does seem to explain the Tanzanian case: the percentage of people that value democracy instrumentally is above average, at 27%, while the legislative fractionalization score is quite low, at 23%. The same pattern holds in Namibia, where 44% of citizens surveyed reportedly consider Namibia at least nearly a full democracy. The legislative fractionalization score is 33%, considerably lower than the 50% average across all included countries - but the percent defining democracy instrumentally is quite high, at 31%.

Satisfaction with Democracy

A related question in the Afrobarometer survey asks about citizens' actual satisfaction with democracy. The question "How satisfied are you with democracy?" allows the following responses:

- Country is not a democracy
- Not at all satisfied
- Not very satisfied
- Fairly satisfied
- Very satisfied

Though the questions seem similar *prima facie*, they are actually tapping into two distinct opinions. It is easy to imagine a citizen acknowledging that their country is democratically run, but feeling as though democracy is less effective or efficient than other forms of government. On the other hand, one can also imagine a person feeling that their country is only somewhat democratically run, but expressing happiness with the improvements that have been made since its inception.

One such case is Madagascar. A full 35% of respondents consider their country a democracy – well above the average of 27% - yet comparatively few respondents seem to feel satisfied with democracy: only 38%,

well within the first quartile of countries. We find the opposite puzzle in Kenya, where remarkably few respondents are willing to call their country a democracy with less than minor problems (only 13%), yet strangely a full 61% report being happy with whatever sort of democracy Kenya has.

Table 3: Summary Statistics

| | Instrumental | Parliamentary fractionalization | PREG score | Satisfaction with democracy | Level of democracy | Percent urban |
|--------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| Botswana | 29 | 0.36 | 0 | 0.64 | 0.32 | 0.43 |
| Ghana | 17 | 0.52 | 0.44 | 0.82 | 0.40 | 0.47 |
| Lesotho | 16 | 0.55 | 0.44 | 0.46 | 0.18 | 0.34 |
| Malawi | 16 | 0.76 | 0.55 | 0.28 | 0.13 | 0.14 |
| Mali | 32 | 0.63 | 0.13 | 0.60 | 0.34 | 0.27 |
| Namibia | 31 | 0.33 | 0.55 | 0.74 | 0.44 | 0.40 |
| Nigeria | 21 | 0.53 | 0.66 | 0.25 | 0.06 | 0.49 |
| South Africa | 28 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.67 | 0.29 | 0.61 |
| Tanzania | 27 | 0.23 | 0.59 | 0.88 | 0.49 | 0.23 |
| Uganda | 33 | 0.51 | 0.63 | 0.67 | 0.19 | 0.30 |
| Zambia | 17 | 0.67 | 0.71 | 0.32 | 0.12 | 0.37 |
| Cape Verde | 13 | 0.52 | n/a | 0.53 | 0.18 | 0.47 |
| Kenya | 22 | 0.55 | 0.57 | 0.61 | 0.13 | 0.29 |
| Mozambique | 35 | 0.46 | 0.36 | 0.70 | 0.44 | 0.43 |
| Senegal | 27 | 0.43 | 0.14 | 0.62 | 0.35 | 0.41 |
| Benin | 35 | 0.47 | 0.3 | 0.57 | 0.25 | 0.42 |
| Madagascar | 25 | 0.55 | 0 | 0.38 | 0.35 | 0.24 |
| | No/Informal school | Primary school | Secondary school | Post-secondary school | Frequency gone without food | Comparative wealth |
| Botswana | 0.17 | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0.09 | 0.32 | 0.49 |
| Ghana | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0.08 | 0.21 | 0.51 |
| Lesotho | 0.12 | 0.60 | 0.24 | 0.04 | 0.37 | 0.43 |
| Malawi | 0.20 | 0.59 | 0.20 | 0.02 | 0.60 | 0.70 |
| Mali | 0.65 | 0.25 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.34 | 0.29 |
| Namibia | 0.08 | 0.24 | 0.55 | 0.12 | 0.31 | 0.25 |
| Nigeria | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.44 | 0.23 | 0.33 | 0.36 |
| South Africa | 0.06 | 0.20 | 0.57 | 0.16 | 0.22 | 0.26 |
| Tanzania | 0.11 | 0.73 | 0.14 | 0.02 | 0.37 | 0.43 |
| Uganda | 0.09 | 0.42 | 0.37 | 0.12 | 0.41 | 0.50 |
| Zambia | 0.04 | 0.28 | 0.48 | 0.20 | 0.37 | 0.43 |
| Cape Verde | 0.18 | 0.44 | 0.31 | 0.06 | 0.16 | 0.26 |
| Kenya | 0.10 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.15 | 0.35 | 0.37 |
| Mozambique | 0.26 | 0.48 | 0.21 | 0.03 | 0.47 | 0.40 |
| Senegal | 0.49 | 0.20 | 0.21 | 0.08 | 0.39 | 0.20 |
| Benin | 0.53 | 0.25 | 0.17 | 0.03 | 0.36 | 0.46 |
| Madagascar | 0.13 | 0.47 | 0.34 | 0.06 | 0.54 | 0.21 |

Regression Results

Each dependent variable will be presented in two models. There will be only one difference between the

models throughout: the first will use robust standard errors alone, while the second will incorporate robust clustered standard errors. The data set on which this analysis is based requires that we consider potential autocorrelation across certain observations. While there are observations for over 20,000 individuals, many of those surveyed were, of course, from the same country. One concern is that responses from citizens living in the same country will have correlated outcomes. Clustered standard errors are an appropriate adjustment with which to address this concern. This adjustment to the standard errors assumes members of different groups have residuals that are un-correlated with one another, but allows for members of the same group to have correlated residuals. In order to account for this possibility, results are presented with standard errors that have been clustered on the country of residence.⁹ All coefficients are reported with robust standard errors.

Democracy Regressions

The following table reports the results of a logistic regression with the variable “level of democracy” as the dependent variable. Our independent variable of interest is the interaction between legislative fractionalization and an instrumental definition of democracy. Our objective is to show that as fractionalization increases, those with an instrumental view of democracy will be less satisfied. Results follow:

Results fall into line with our theory. The coefficient on the interaction test is, in fact, significant (as proven by a Wald test - is that right?) in both models and in the correct direction: if respondents report having an instrumental view of democracy, as fractionalization goes up, the extent to which they are willing to define their government as a democracy decreases.

Table 4: How democratic is your country?

| Variable | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| | Coefficient | SE | Coefficient | SE |
| <i>DV: Level of Democracy</i> | | | | |
| Parliamentary fractionalization | -3.72*** | (0.14) | -3.72*** | (0.69) |
| Instrumental | 0.54*** | (0.16) | 0.54*** | (0.23) |
| Fractionalization*Instrumental | -0.86*** | (0.30) | -0.86** | (0.40) |
| FPTP System | -0.32*** | (0.03) | -0.32 | (0.24) |
| Ethnic fractionalization | -0.81*** | (0.07) | -0.81 | (0.54) |
| N | 15819 | | 15819 | |
| Log-likelihood | -19150 | | -19150 | |

Both Model 1 and Model 2 cutpoints significant at 1%

⁹Zorn (2003) describes the mechanics behind robust clustered standard errors. The variance estimator is reported as $VC = V \sum_{j=1}^{N_C} [(\sum_{i=1}^{n_j} u_{ij})' (\sum_{i=1}^{n_j} u_{ij})] V$, where each of the N_C clusters $j = 1; 2; \dots N_C$ consists of n_j observations $i = 1, 2, \dots n_j$. Additional discussion of robust clustered standard errors can be found in Wooldridge 2002, pg 496.

Table 5: How satisfied are you with democracy?

| Variable | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|--|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| | Coefficient | SE | Coefficient | SE |
| <i>DV: Satisfaction with Democracy</i> | | | | |
| Parliamentary fractionalization | -3.56*** | (0.15) | -3.56*** | (0.70) |
| Instrumental | 0.53*** | (0.17) | 0.53* | (0.29) |
| Fractionalization*Instrumental | -0.83** | (0.32) | -0.83 | (0.59) |
| FPTP System | -0.39*** | (0.03) | -0.39 | (0.27) |
| Ethnic fractionalization | -0.05 | (0.06) | -0.05 | (0.56) |
| N | 15957 | | 15957 | |
| Log-likelihood | -21687 | | -21687 | |

Model 1 cutpoint significant at 1%; Model 2 at 5%.

DETERMINING INSTRUMENTAL VERSUS INTRINSIC VALUE OF DEMOCRACY

Regardless of how liberal a definition one uses for an “instrumental” definition of democracy, it is clear that the preponderance of respondents value democracy intrinsically. Thus far, analyses of definitions of democracy have stopped with this discovery. However, despite the small number of people defining democracy instrumentally, it is still possible to find individual characteristics that can predict a respondent's perception towards democracy.

One characteristic is wealth. A reliable income that can provide more than the bare necessities gives individuals the luxury of considering issues that do not pertain only to their survival, such as the role and nature of democracy. Those that are constantly struggling to provide themselves and their families with food, water and shelter, however, could be more inclined to see democracy as a vehicle to a better life rather than a philosophical construct.

Another characteristic is education. A significant component of education is socialization, in particular emphasizing social values and civic duty. It is in school that children typically learn about the relative merits of different forms of government (albeit not always the same lessons across different countries and cultures), but the effect of education on the perception of democracy can run even deeper than that. In primary school children are ideally introduced to concepts of justice and fairness, working with others, and considering the thoughts and feelings of their peers. These lessons translate into a greater appreciation for the intrinsic value of democracy.

While it is true that education and wealth levels are often correlated, the mechanisms we are engaging to explain individual definitions of democracy are complementary rather than redundant. We intend to show that wealth and education both play their own unique roles in driving an individual's perception of democracy.

Model 1 evaluates the hypotheses about education and wealth; using the objective proxy for poverty: whether a respondent has gone without food. Control variables are those that might be correlated with wealth (age) or education (gender). Model 2 employs the same measure of education and controls, but also uses the relational measure of wealth, asking respondents to rate their living conditions versus others. We present each covariate with robust standard errors first and country-clustered standard errors underneath. Results follow:

In both models, education comes very close to being significant - p-scores are between .11 and .15 using robust standard errors. The coefficient is in the expected direction: as education increases, propensity to

use and instrumental definition of democracy decreases. There is strong evidence that poverty plays a role in defining democracy. While our measure of comparative wealth is completely insignificant (and in the wrong direction), the more often one has gone without food, the more likely a person is to consider democracy a means to an end rather than an end itself. The strongest conclusion we can make from this regression, however, is that urban residents are far more likely to see democracy intrinsically.

Table 6: Instrumental vs. Intrinsic Value of Democracy

| Variable | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|---|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| | Coefficient | SE | Coefficient | SE |
| <i>DV: Instrumental definition of democracy</i> | | | | |
| Education Level | -0.03 | (0.02) | -0.03 | (0.02) |
| | -0.03 | (0.03) | -0.03 | (0.03) |
| Age | 0.00 | (0.00) | 0.00 | (0.00) |
| | 0.00 | (0.00) | 0.00 | (0.00) |
| Gender | 0.11*** | (0.04) | 0.10*** | (0.04) |
| | 0.11*** | (0.03) | 0.10** | (0.04) |
| Comparative Wealth | | | 0.01 | (0.02) |
| | | | 0.01 | (0.04) |
| How often gone without food | 0.08*** | (0.02) | | |
| | 0.08** | (0.02) | | |
| Urban | -0.28*** | (0.04) | -0.28*** | (0.04) |
| | -0.28*** | (0.06) | -0.28*** | (0.07) |
| Intercept | -1.14*** | (0.08) | -1.05*** | (0.09) |
| | -1.14*** | (0.19) | -1.05*** | (0.24) |
| N | 16931 | | 16399 | |
| Log-likelihood | -9168.41 | | -9193.86 | |

Thus far in this paper we have defined instrumentality broadly, including any answer that might count as an end for which democracy is the means. Some respondents, however, specifically equated democracy with development, which is the definition that speaks best to our theory. Because both a broad and a narrow interpretation of instrumentality can be valid, we present results for the regressions above using a much narrower, development-based definition of instrumentality.

Table 7: Development vs. Intrinsic Value of Democracy

| Variable | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
|---|----------------------|------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | Coefficient | SE | Coefficient | SE |
| <i>DV: Development-oriented definition of democracy</i> | | | | |
| Education Level | -0.12*** -0.12** | (0.02) (0.05) | -0.13*** -0.13*** | (0.02) (0.05) |
| Age | 0.00 0.00 | (0.00) (0.00) | 0.00 0.00 | (0.00) (0.00) |
| Gender | 0.25*** 0.25*** | (0.07) (0.08) | 0.22*** 0.22** | (0.07) (0.08) |
| Comparative Wealth | | | 0.12*** 0.12* | (0.04) (0.06) |
| How often gone without food | 0.06** 0.06 | (0.03) (0.05) | | |
| Urban | -0.28*** -0.28*** | (0.08) (0.11) | -0.29*** -0.29*** | (0.08) (0.10) |
| Intercept | -2.76*** -2.76*** | (0.14) (0.24) | -2.93*** -2.93*** | (0.17) (0.32) |
| N | 15730 | | 15236 | |
| Log-likelihood | -3265.14 | | -3153.49 | |

There is a significant difference between the development and instrumental regressions. When considering whether someone will give definition of democracy that is oriented exclusively towards development, education emerges as a strong predictor. The less educated a person is, the more likely they are to look at democracy as a means for growth.

The wealth results are unexpected and contradictory. The objective measure of wealth supports our theory - those that have often gone without food are more likely to want democracy to provide for them materially. Those that feel richer than their peers, however, seem to expect the same thing. Reconciling those results will require further investigation.

CONCLUSION

The Afrobarometer project has provided the academic community with a rich dataset. Unfortunately, that data has too often been used to make tables of summary statistics that, due to inadequate analysis, mislead rather than illuminate. For example, the Afrobarometer global press release announces the following: “Contrary to conventional wisdom, Africans define democracy not in terms of economic/material goods. They largely define democracy in terms of political goods.” While this statement is superficially true: this paper will show that indeed, the majority of Africans do report valuing democracy for its intrinsic properties. More important, however, is the fact that though instrumental definitions are reported infrequently, they are not unpredictable outliers. On the contrary, they are highly correlated with education and play a substantial role in explaining democratic satisfaction under an assortment of political conditions.

In this paper, the central role is played by these divergent perceptions of democracy, which are shaped by education in looking at attitudes about democracy. Education to perceptions to evaluations.

Just as theorists will give different definitions of democracy, individuals will as well. There should not be one criterion to judge whether people understand democracy or not - democracy can have a number of equally valid definitions, which are simply reflections of the diversity of perceptions on the part of ordinary citizens. These perceptions are shaped by their social conditions. Because the spectrum of

possible definitions could not possibly be exhausted in a short list after a survey question, it is advantageous to have the question of democracy's meaning open-ended. This paper successfully used these open answers to produce statistically meaningful conclusions. We believe that this paper's results vindicate the use of open-ended questions in survey research to draw out the wide variety of interpretations and opinions that exist in a population.

We have left many avenues open for future work on this topic. We chose legislative fractionalization to illustrate trade-off between efficiency and representation that interacts with expectations to affect individuals' satisfaction with democracy. There are, however, other aspects of democracy that require the very same trade off; for example, executive term limits or multi-stage voting systems. Future research could use these features of democratic systems as a trade-off proxy to see if they also have predictive power when combined with knowledge about intrinsic versus instrumental expectations.

Future work should also look more closely at how representative Afrobarometer data are. Many countries are still excluded, and since many of the excluded countries share common characteristics, such as having been engulfed in conflict, there need to be a rigorous check to see how representative our data is.

In this paper we hope to have generated interest in using individual-level data to answer attitudinal questions in political science. Scholars in American politics have been using the National Election Survey (NES) for decades to analyze the perceptions, opinions and behaviors of the American voter, and it is time that the field of Comparative politics follow suit. Individual-level attitudinal analysis is not only of academic interest, but is also the only way to properly evaluate the many policy and development initiatives that seek to foster attitudinal change. Community-Driven Development programs, for example, try to spread norms of democracy, inclusion and social cohesion by linking community participation to fund disbursement. Individual-level data allow us to rigorously evaluate efforts to change individual attitudes.

References

- Anderson, Christopher J. and Christine A. Guillory. (1997). "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, pp. 66-81.
- Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi. (2005). *Public Opinion, Democracy and Market Reform in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Devarajan, Shantayanan and Ritva Reinikka. "World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People (A World Bank Publication)." The World Bank and Oxford University Press: Washington, DC.
- Donovan, Mark. (1995). "The Politics of Electoral Reform in Italy." *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1: 47-64.
- Easterly, William and Ross Levine. (1997) "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 112, pp. 1203-1250.
- Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer. (2004). "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth*. Vol 9, pp. 271-303.
- Linz, Juan J. (1990) "The Perils of Presidentialism". *Journal of Democracy*, Vol 1, pp. 51-69.
- Mainwaring, Scott. (1993) "Presidentialism, Multipartyism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination." *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 26, pp. 198-228.
- Norris, Pippa. 1997. "Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems." *International Political Science Review*, Vol., No. 3: 297-312.
- Posner, Daniel N. (2004) "Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, pp. 849-863.
- Powell, G. Bingham. (2000) *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*. Yale University Press: New Haven, Connecticut.
- Quade, Quentin. 1991. "PR and Democratic Statecraft." *The Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 2, No. 3: 36-41.
- Roubini, Nouriel; Jeffrey Sachs; Seppo Honkapohja; Daniel Cohen. (1989). "Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Countries." *Economic Policy*, Vol. 4, pp. 99-113.
- Sen, Amartya. (1999). *Development as Freedom*. Anchor Books: New York, New York.

Publications List

AFROBAROMETER WORKING PAPERS

- No.80 Wantchekon, Leonard and Gwendolyn Taylor. "Political Rights versus Public Goods: Uncovering the Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in Africa." 2007.
- No. 79 Chang, Eric. "Political Transition, Corruption, and Income Inequality in Third Wave Democracies." 2007.
- No.78 Battle, Martin and Seely, Jennifer C. "It's All Relative: Competing Models of Vote Choice in Benin." 2007.
- No.77 Wantchekon, Leonard, Paul-Aarons Ngomo, Babaly Sall and Mohamadou Sall. "Support for Competitive Politics and Government Performance: Public Perceptions of Democracy in Senegal." 2007.
- No.76 Graham, Carol and Matthew Hoover. "Optimism and Poverty in Africa: Adaptation or a Means to Survival?" 2007.
- No.75 Evans, Geoffrey and Pauline Rose. "Education and Support for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Testing Mechanisms of Influence." 2007.
- No.74 Levi, Margaret and Audrey Sacks. "Legitimizing Beliefs: Sources and Indicators." 2007.
- No.73 McLean, Lauren Morris. "The Micro-Dynamics of Welfare State Retrenchment and the Implications for Citizenship in Africa." 2007.
- No.72 Ferree, Karen and Jeremy Horowitz. "Identity Voting and the Regional Census in Malawi." 2007.
- No.71 Cho, Wonbin and Matthew F. Kirwin. "A Vicious Circle of Corruption and Mistrust in Institutions in sub-Saharan Africa: A Micro-level Analysis." 2007.
- No.70 Logan, Carolyn, Thomas P. Wolf and Robert Sentamu. "Kenyans and Democracy: What Do They Really Want From It Anyway?" 2007.
- No.69 Uslaner, Eric. "Corruption and the Inequality Trap in Africa." 2007.
- No.68 Lewis, Peter. "Identity, Institutions and Democracy in Nigeria." 2007.
- No.67 Mattes, Robert. "Public Opinion Research in Emerging Democracies: Are the Processes Different?" 2007.
- No.66 Cho, Wonbin. "Ethnic Fractionalization, Electoral Institutions, and Africans' Political Attitudes." 2007.
- No.65 Bratton, Michael. "Are You Being Served? Popular Satisfaction with Health and Education Services in Africa." 2006.
- No.64 Fernandez, Kenneth E. and Michelle Kuenzi. "Crime and Support for Democracy: Revisiting Modernization Theory." 2006.
- No.63 Bratton, Michael and Carolyn Logan. "Voters But Not Yet Citizens: The Weak Demand for Vertical Accountability in Africa's Unclaimed Democracies." 2006.
- No.62 Bratton, Michael and Mxolisi Sibanyoni. "Delivery or Responsiveness? A Popular Scorecard of Local Government Performance in South Africa." 2006.
- No.61 The Afrobarometer Network. "Citizens and the State in Africa: New Results From Afrobarometer Round

- 3.” 2006.
- No.60 The Afrobarometer Network. “Where is Africa going? Views From Below: A Compendium of Trends in Public Opinion in 12 African Countries, 1999-2006.” 2006.
- No.59 Bratton, Michael and Eldred Masunungure. “Popular Reactions to State Repression: Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe.” 2006.
- No.58 Logan, Carolyn and Michael Bratton. “The Political Gender Gap in Africa: Similar Attitudes, Different Behaviors.” 2006.
- No.57 Evans, Geoffrey and Pauline Rose. “Support for Democracy in Malawi: Does Schooling Matter?” 2006.
- No.56 Bratton, Michael. “Poor People and Democratic Citizenship in Africa.” 2006.
- No.55 Moehler, Devra C. “Free and Fair or Fraudulent and Forged: Elections and Legitimacy in Africa.” 2005.
- No.54 Stasavage, David. “Democracy and Primary School Attendance: Aggregate and Individual Level Evidence from Africa.” 2005.
- No. 53 Reis, Deolinda, Francisco Rodrigues and Jose Semedo. “Atitudes em Relação à Qualidade da Democracia em Cabo Verde.” 2005.
- No. 52 Lewis, Peter and Etannibi Alemika. “Seeking the Democratic Dividend: Public Attitudes and Attempted Reform in Nigeria.” 2005.
- No. 51 Kuenzi, Michelle and Gina Lambright. “Who Votes in Africa? An Examination of Electoral Turnout in 10 African Countries.” 2005.
- No.50 Mattes, Robert and Doh Chull Shin. “The Democratic Impact of Cultural Values in Africa and Asia: The Cases of South Korea and South Africa.” 2005.
- No.49 Cho, Wonbin and Michael Bratton. “Electoral Institutions, Partisan Status, and Political Support: A Natural Experiment from Lesotho.” 2005.
- No.48 Bratton, Michael and Peter Lewis. “The Durability of Political Goods? Evidence from Nigeria’s New Democracy.” 2005.
- No.47 Keulder, Christiaan and Tania Wiese. “Democracy Without Democrats? Results from the 2003 Afrobarometer Survey in Namibia.” 2005.
- No.46 Khaila, Stanley and Catherine Chibwana. “Ten Years of Democracy in Malawi: Are Malawians Getting What They Voted For?” 2005.
- No.45 Schedler, Andreas and Rodolfo Sarsfield. “Democrats with Adjectives: Linking Direct and Indirect Measures of Democratic Support.” 2004.
- No.44 Bannon, Alicia, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner. “Sources of Ethnic Identification in Africa.” 2004.
- No.43 Bratton, Michael. “State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Together?” 2004.
- No.42 Chikwanha, Annie, Tulani Sithole, and Michael Bratton. “The Power of Propaganda: Public Opinion in Zimbabwe, 2004.” 2004.
- No.41 Mulenga, Chileshe L., Annie Barbara Chikwanha, and Mbiko Msoni. “Satisfaction with

- Democracy and Performance of the New Deal Government: Attitudes and Perceptions of Zambians.” 2004.
- No.40 Ferree, Karen E. “The Micro-Foundations of Ethnic Voting: Evidence from South Africa.” 2004.
- No.39 Cho, Wonbin. “Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.” 2004.
- No.38 Mattes, Robert. “Understanding Identity in Africa: A First Cut.” 2004.
- No.37 Leysens, Anthony J. “Marginalisation in Southern Africa: Transformation from Below?” 2004.
- No.36 Sall, Babaly and Zeric Kay Smith, with Mady Dansokho. “Libéralisme, Patrimonialisme ou Autoritarisme Atténué : Variations autour de la Démocratie Sénégalaise.” 2004.
- No.35 Coulibaly, Massa and Amadou Diarra. “Démocratie et légitimation du marché: Rapport d’enquête Afrobaromètre au Mali, décembre 2002.” 2004.
- No.34 The Afrobarometer Network. “Afrobarometer Round 2: Compendium of Results from a 15-Country Survey.” 2004.
- No.33 Wolf, Thomas P., Carolyn Logan, and Jeremiah Owiti. “A New Dawn? Popular Optimism in Kenya After the Transition.” 2004.
- No.32 Gay, John and Robert Mattes. “The State of Democracy in Lesotho.” 2004.
- No.31 Mattes, Robert and Michael Bratton. “Learning about Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, and Experience.” 2003
- No.30 Pereira, Joao, Ines Raimundo, Annie Chikwanha, Alda Saute, and Robert Mattes. “Eight Years of Multiparty Democracy in Mozambique: The Public’s View.” 2003
- No.29 Gay, John. “Development as Freedom: A Virtuous Circle?” 2003.
- No.28 Gyimah-Boadi, E. and Kwabena Amoah Awuah Mensah. “The Growth of Democracy in Ghana. Despite Economic Dissatisfaction: A Power Alternation Bonus?” 2003.
- No.27 Logan, Carolyn J., Nansozi Muwanga, Robert Sentamu, and Michael Bratton. “Insiders and Outsiders: Varying Perceptions of Democracy and Governance in Uganda.” 2003.
- No.26 Norris, Pippa and Robert Mattes. “Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing Party?” 2003.
- No.25 Ames, Barry, Lucio Renno and Francisco Rodrigues. “Democracy, Market Reform, and Social Peace in Cape Verde.” 2003.
- No.24 Mattes, Robert, Christiaan Keulder, Annie B. Chikwana, Cherrel Africa and Yul Derek Davids. “Democratic Governance in South Africa: The People’s View.” 2003.
- No.23 Mattes, Robert, Michael Bratton and Yul Derek Davids. “Poverty, Survival, and Democracy in Southern Africa.” 2003.
- No.22 Pereira, Joao C. G., Yul Derek Davids and Robert Mattes. “Mozambicans’ Views of Democracy and Political Reform: A Comparative Perspective.” 2003.
- No.21 Whiteside, Alan, Robert Mattes, Samantha Willan and Ryann Manning. “Examining HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa Through the Eyes of Ordinary Southern Africans.” 2002.

- No.20 Lewis, Peter, Etannibi Alemika and Michael Bratton. "Down to Earth: Changes in Attitudes Towards Democracy and Markets in Nigeria." 2002.
- No.19 Bratton, Michael. "Wide but Shallow: Popular Support for Democracy in Africa." 2002.
- No.18 Chaligha, Amon, Robert Mattes, Michael Bratton and Yul Derek Davids. "Uncritical Citizens and Patient Trustees? Tanzanians' Views of Political and Economic Reform." 2002.
- No.17 Simutanyi, Neo. "Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Zambia: Public Attitudes to Democracy and the Economy." 2002.
- No.16 Tsoka, Maxton Grant. "Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Malawi." 2002.
- No.15 Keulder, Christiaan. "Public Opinion and Consolidation of Democracy in Namibia." 2002.
- No.14 Lekorwe, Mogopodi, Mpho Molomo, Wilford Molefe, and Kabelo Moseki. "Public Attitudes Toward Democracy, Governance, and Economic Development in Botswana." 2001.
- No.13 Gay, John and Thuso Green. "Citizen Perceptions of Democracy, Governance, and Political Crisis in Lesotho." 2001.
- No.12 Chikwanha-Dzenga, Annie Barbara, Eldred Masunungure, and Nyasha Madingira. "Democracy and National Governance in Zimbabwe: A Country Survey Report." 2001.
- No. 11 The Afrobarometer Network. "Afrobarometer Round I: Compendium of Comparative Data from a Twelve-Nation Survey." 2002
- No.10 Bratton, Michael and Robert Mattes. "Popular Economic Values and Economic Reform in Southern Africa." 2001.
- No. 9 Bratton, Michael, Massa Coulibaly, and Fabiana Machado. "Popular Perceptions of Good Governance in Mali." March 2000.
- No.8 Mattes, Robert, Yul Derek Davids, and Cherrel Africa. "Views of Democracy in South Africa and the Region: Trends and Comparisons." October 2000.
- No.7 Mattes, Robert, Yul Derek Davids, Cherrel Africa, and Michael Bratton. "Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Southern Africa." July 2000.
- No.6 Bratton, Michael and Gina Lambright. "Uganda's Referendum 2000: The Silent Boycott." 2001.
- No.5 Bratton, Michael and Robert Mattes. "Democratic and Market Reforms in Africa: What 'the People' Say." 2000.
- No.4 Bratton, Michael, Gina Lambright, and Robert Sentamu. "Democracy and Economy in Uganda: A Public Opinion Perspective." 2000.
- No.3 Lewis, Peter M. and Michael Bratton. "Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria." 2000.
- No.2 Bratton, Michael, Peter Lewis, and E. Gyimah-Boadi. "Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Ghana." 1999.
- No.1 Bratton, Michael and Robert Mattes. "Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental?" 1999.