NDI
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

# BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN THE VOTER REGISTRATION PROCESS

## An NDI Monitoring Guide for Political Parties and Civic Organizations

*Richard L. Klein and Patrick Merloe*

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NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (NDI)

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Kenneth D. Wollack
*President, NDI*

# NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is a nonprofit organization working to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide. Calling on a global network of volunteer experts, NDI provides practical assistance to civic and political leaders advancing democratic values, practices and institutions. NDI works with democrats in every region of the world to build political and civic organizations, safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation, openness and accountability in government.

Democracy depends on legislatures that represent citizens and oversee the executive, independent judiciaries that safeguard the rule of law, political parties that are open and accountable, and elections in which voters freely choose their representatives in government. Acting as a catalyst for democratic development, NDI bolsters the institutions and processes that allow democracy to flourish.

**Build Political and Civic Organizations**: NDI helps build the stable, broad-based and well-organized institutions that form the foundation of a strong civic culture. Democracy depends on these mediating institutions – the voice of an informed citizenry, which link citizens to their government and to one another by providing avenues for participation in public policy.

**Safeguard Elections**: NDI promotes open and democratic elections. Political parties and governments have asked NDI to study electoral codes and to recommend improvements. The Institute also provides technical assistance for political parties and civic groups to conduct voter education campaigns and to organize election monitoring programs. NDI is a world leader in election monitoring having organized international delegations to monitor elections in dozens of countries, helping to ensure that polling results reflect the will of the people.

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# FOREWORD

Elections are essential to democracy, and public confidence in the institutions and processes surrounding elections is essential to establishing the basis of authority for any democratic government. NDI's electoral programs promote the integrity of governmental institutions, electoral authorities, news media, civic organizations, political parties and the overall political process of which elections are a part. The Institute's electoral programs also support broad public education and vibrant citizen participation to ensure the genuineness of elections, recognizing that both are powerful instruments for building public confidence, combating electoral fraud and overcoming administrative malfeasance.

This guide addresses ways that political parties and civic organizations can monitor and promote improvements to the voter registration process. International organizations can also make use of the techniques covered in this guide. Voter registration is vital to the public's interest in establishing a government based upon the people's will, and is also vital to those who seek to gain public office. It is a key element for screening ineligible people out of the voting process and for identifying and credentialing eligible individuals so that they may have the opportunity to vote.

Several important public benefits are derived from monitoring voter registration. Monitoring in a nonpartisan manner can help to promote confidence that the electorate will indeed be able to exercise the right to vote. This serves to encourage popular participation in the electoral process. Monitoring by political parties can help ensure that their supporters will be provided a proper opportunity to vote, which is essential to establishing the fairness of elections. This assurance encourages political competitors to participate in the electoral process, rather than to seek power through other means.

It is important to stress that there are many aspects of an electoral process that must be conducted properly for an election to be genuine. Moreover, elections must be considered within a country's broader political context. Publication of this guide recognizes the importance of voter registration but in no way seeks to isolate it from the other factors that must be addressed to ensure democratic elections. *NDI's Handbook on How Domestic Organizations Monitor Elections: An A to Z Guide* and other publications by the Institute outline approaches to monitoring many other elements of the election process.

It is also important to note that competing public interests must be balanced in designing an effort to monitor voter registration. For example, although political parties and civic organizations have a right to verify the integrity of all elements of an election process – including voter registration – in countries where personal security might be jeopardized, certain restrictions on the open publication of particular information on the voters list might be appropriate. In all cases, citizens' right to privacy must be considered. Parties and civic organizations that monitor voter registration therefore must themselves act responsibly with the information they obtain about citizens. Experience around the globe in balancing public interests demonstrates that elections are most successful – and public confidence in the resulting governments is strongest – when electoral processes are transparent and when the "rules of the game" are the result of both inclusive public discussion and broad political agreement.

In addition, political parties and civic organizations must consider that a voter registration process is complex and time-consuming. Not only must the timelines for voter registration set forth in laws and electoral procedures be examined to determine whether there are adequate provisions for various steps in the process, but the monitors themselves must allot sufficient time for their activities so that any shortcomings identified may be corrected. No voter registry is perfect, but if the interests of the electorate and of those who chose to exercise their right to seek public office are to be safeguarded, then monitoring reports and

recommendations for improving the process must be presented in a timely manner.

This guide serves as a roadmap for political parties and civic organizations to monitor the voter registration process. It focuses on issues related to national elections, but most of the information contained within it is also applicable to voter registration processes in sub-national polls.

The guide is divided into four parts. The first part identifies issues that should be considered when approaching the voter registration process. The section includes a discussion of the different requirements to be eligible to vote, as well as a description of the various elements of a voter registration exercise. Techniques for monitoring the voter registration process are presented in the second part, which contains practical information to help political parties and civic organizations undertake monitoring exercises. The third part offers practical suggestions for organizing, planning, recruitment, training, reporting and advocacy. The final part comprises appendices with sample forms that can be useful in monitoring the voter registration process, as well as sample monitoring reports by domestic organizations.

The guide is not intended to be a step-by-step handbook; rather it is intended both to enhance appreciation for the importance of monitoring voter registration and to help identify a number of approaches that could be used in designing a voter registration monitoring effort suitable to a variety of national conditions. As the techniques for voter registration advance, so too will approaches to monitoring the process. As experience in registration monitoring is accumulated, lessons learned will be shared by those around the world who are working to promote democracy.

Readers of this guide are encouraged to contact NDI with comments, suggestions or requests.

Richard L. Klein and Patrick Merloe
*Washington, DC*
*November 2001*

## BACKGROUND

All elections have problems. Unfortunately, on election day some people who are eligible to vote may not be permitted to do so, while some people who are ineligible to vote may be improperly allowed to cast ballots. Such problems may be due to human error or deliberate fraud. In either case, they can undermine the legitimacy of an election.

Consider the following scenarios:

1 An elderly woman has been standing throughout the morning in a queue at a polling station. She has been patiently waiting to vote. However, once at the front, she learns that she will not be able to cast her ballot because she lacks identification documents. No voter registration exercise was conducted prior to the elections, and there is no voters list. Even though there are many people in the line who have known the elderly woman their entire lives, the election officials turn her away.

2 It is election day in a border town. Late in the afternoon, a bus full of men arrives from a neighboring country. The bus stops in a highly populated part of town, and the men go to a nearby polling station. No one, including the election officials, recognizes any of the men, but there are a lot of new people in the area. Voter registration was not conducted before election day so there is no list of eligible voters. Even though the men appear to be ineligible, the election officials permit them to vote.

3 A young man has recently left his childhood home in the countryside and migrated to the city in search of work. It is election day, and he and his new friends go together to vote. His friends have no problems, but the young man is told that his name is not on the voters list. He explains that in the last election he voted in the countryside, but that now he lives in the city. The election official tells him that the only way he can vote is to go back to his home village. The young man, however, lacks the money for the bus, and even if he had money the bus would arrive at his village long after the polling station closed.

4 A young woman shows up at the polls two hours before they close. She has her new voter ID card issued after she registered to vote three months ago. Officials refuse to let her vote because her name is not on the voters list, even though the polling station's number appears on her voter ID card. Afterwards, she takes the time to visit several other polling stations in the area. However, she is unable to find her name on the voters list at any of them, and no one permits her to vote.

These examples illustrate the critical role of voter registration in an election process.

In the first example, voter registration prior to election day could have provided an opportunity for the elderly woman to prove her identity and eligibility to vote, as well as to obtain proper identification. If she has not been permitted to register, then political parties and civic organizations monitoring the process could have helped her. A claim could have been lodged to ensure that her name would have appeared on the final voters list and that she would have been given an ID card for voting.

> Voter registration should ensure that those people who are eligible to vote will be able to do so on election day.

If there had been a voter registration exercise in the second example, election officials could have checked the voters list for the men's names. If their names did not appear on the voters list, the men should have been prevented from voting. Political party pollwatchers or domestic observers could have requested that election

> Voter registration should stop those people who are ineligible to vote from casting ballots.

BACKGROUND

officials check the voters list to ensure that each person's name appeared. If the men had illegally registered, a transparent voter registration exercise and monitoring by political parties and civic organizations could have provided an opportunity to challenge their eligibility and to have their names removed from the voters list prior to election day.

In the third example, if the voters list had been updated periodically, the young man might have been able to vote at his new residence. Depending on the registration process, his particulars could have been updated before election day. An effective voter education campaign might have informed the young man of what he had to do to change his place of registration. By observing the registration process, political parties and civic organizations could have helped identify misplaced persons on the voters lists. The young man could have been informed of the error, and action could have been taken to transfer his name to the correct voters list.

> Inaccurate or outdated registration information can disenfranchise eligible voters.

In the fourth example, publishing a preliminary voters list should have provided an opportunity for the young woman to verify that she had successfully registered and that she would be permitted to vote on election day. If she had known that her name was missing, she could have filed a claim to have her name added to the final voters list.

> Names missing from the voters list can prevent eligible people from exercising their right to vote.

Political parties and civic organizations can help educate voters about the need to verify that their names are included in the voters list, and they can also take steps to help identify people who have been dropped incorrectly. Further, political parties and/or civic organizations could have sought the introduction of procedures by the electoral authorities in order to permit individuals in her predicament to vote. However, even the most elaborate procedures cannot eliminate disenfranchisement entirely or prevent all illegal voting, particularly where fraud is attempted. These scenarios highlight the importance for political parties and civic organizations to monitor the various elements of the voter registration process.

## OVERVIEW

The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, Article 21, states that: "everyone has the right to take part in the government of his [or her] country directly or through freely chosen representatives …" and that "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." This article and similar passages in other international human rights documents, along with provisions of national constitutions, provide the legal foundation for democratic elections. "Universal" suffrage implies that all recognized members of a community have the right to vote. "Equal" suffrage suggests that the vote of each of those members counts the same. Governments, therefore, have an obligation both to ensure that people have an opportunity to choose their representatives by voting and to ensure that illegal voting or other manipulations do not destroy the equality of each person's vote.

Voter registration is an integral part of an electoral process during which individuals eligible to vote are identified and listed. Election officials must identify all eligible voters and create a list of their names and other information relevant to the voting process – a complex task that requires considerable time and organizational skill on the part of the electoral authorities. The voters list is organized into units that correspond to geographical and administrative divisions, such as blocks and districts; it is then typically divided into sub-lists containing only the names of those people designated to vote at each individual polling station.

Voter registration can serve many purposes:

- To guarantee that those legally entitled to vote are able to do so;
- To prohibit ineligible people from voting; and
- To prevent people from voting more than once.

Thus, voter registration brings individuals into an election process and protects the weight of their vote.

The efficacy of the voter registration process is, in part, dependent upon there being consensus within a society about the qualifications to be eligible to vote. Such criteria should be in harmony with the rights recognized in the country's constitution and with obligations defined in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and other applicable human rights instruments.

Voter registration can take many different forms:

- *Periodic* (e.g., prior to each election or every five years) or *Continuous* (all the time);
- *Individual-Initiated* (people must go to registration centers), *State-Initiated* (officials travel door-to-door), or *State-Created/Automatic* (names are taken from a separate database and no contact is required between people and election officials in order to register); and
- *Compulsory* (people must register to vote) or *Voluntary* (people have the choice to register or not).

Further, registration may or may not involve certain elements:

- Providing a receipt or other documentation to people as proof of registration and eligibility;
- Collecting considerable demographic information about each registered voter; or
- Using computers to record and store voter registration information.

Where registration occurs, the voters list ultimately contains the names of all known persons who are eligible to vote in a particular election. During the process of creating the voters list certain procedures may or may not be undertaken:

- Displaying publicly the voters list for inspection;
- Providing the voters list to political parties and civic organizations for scrutiny;
- Making additions, deletions, or corrections to the voters list based on filed claims and objections; and
- Resolving disputes lodged by political parties, civic organizations, or citizens concerning the inclusion or exclusion of particular individuals from the voters list.

In many countries, people who are eligible to vote will not be permitted to cast a ballot on election day if their names do not appear on the voters list, while other countries have procedures that enable such individuals to vote after adding their names to "supplemental lists" on election day or to vote with a "tendered" or "challenged" ballot.[1] In rare situations, elections are even conducted without registering voters.

These factors sketch an outline of the overall voter registration process and point to potential problems that may occur.

Monitoring, therefore, should consider several key issues:

- Whether the criteria for voter eligibility meet national constitutional requirements and international standards;
- Whether the process of identifying who is eligible to vote provides a sufficient opportunity for all people to register to vote without discrimination;
- Whether the procedures for identifying who is eligible to vote are reasonable and conducted properly;
- Whether the voters list contains only the names of people who are eligible to vote and that this information is current and accurate;
- Whether people, political parties and civic organizations are provided a sufficient opportunity to scrutinize the voters list for errors or omissions;
- Whether a sufficient opportunity is provided to people, to political parties and to civic organizations to make claims and objections for names to be added, deleted or corrected on the voters list;
- Whether claims and objections are processed properly and appropriate changes are made to the voters list;
- Whether political parties and civic organizations are provided with copies of the preliminary, revised and final voters list; and
- Whether the voters list used at polling stations is identical to the final voters list, and officials use it properly to permit people to vote.

Monitoring the voter registration process and verifying the quality of the voters list provide mechanisms for political parties to ensure that their interests are respected and for civic organizations to guarantee the rights of individuals. This results in fewer human errors, reduces the likelihood of fraud and builds confidence in the voter registration process, electoral authorities and the overall political system. Monitoring the voter registration process helps prepare political parties and civic organizations to monitor voting, counting and tabulation of results on election day. It also serves to enhance their organizational capacity and further develop their human resource base.

[1] See page 15, "Tendered and Challenged Ballots," for a definition.

# PART ONE

# UNDERSTANDING VOTER REGISTRATION

# PART ONE

## UNDERSTANDING VOTER REGISTRATION



### WHO SHOULD VOTE?

Voting is not a privilege that is given to individuals by governments, but is an inalienable right. However, like all rights, the right to vote is not absolute: all societies place some limits on the right to vote. For example, it is common for countries to limit voting to only their citizens. Every society determines for itself, in accordance with international norms, which of its members has the right to vote. The question, therefore, is not "Do people have the right to vote?", but "Which people have the right to vote in a particular election?"

#### Unacceptable Criteria

Consensus exists that certain criteria to limit who has the right to vote are unacceptable. Based on Article 2 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, and other international human rights instruments, the following criteria cannot be employed to restrict who in a society has the right to vote:

- Race,
- Color,
- Sex,
- Language,
- Religion,
- Political or other opinion,
- National or social origin, or
- Ownership of property.

Similarly, there is agreement that the right to vote cannot be refused to an individual because he or she is illiterate or lacks financial resources. In addition, based on international standards and practices the right to vote should not be denied based on a person's physical disabilities or sexual orientation.

Further, voting rights cannot be arbitrarily denied. There must be clear criteria used to determine who has the right to vote, and the process must be transparent. These requirements derive from the principle that everyone is equal before the law and is entitled without discrimination to equal protection under the law. This includes the right of people to an effective remedy for any violations of their fundamental rights (*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, Articles 7 and 8).

#### Acceptable Criteria

At the same time, there is agreement that it is appropriate to define voter eligibility based upon certain other characteristics:

- Citizenship,
- Residency, and
- Age.

Many countries, but not all, require individuals to be a citizen and/or to reside in the country to be eligible to vote. All countries require voters to have attained a minimum age in order to exercise the right to vote, but that age varies somewhat among countries. Chart 1 (on page 6) illustrates a society where only resident citizens of a minimum age are eligible to vote.

<u>Citizenship</u>

Restricting the right to vote to citizens is based on the rights to national sovereignty and self-determination.

**Chart 1 Only Individuals of Age and who are Resident Citizens have the Right to Vote**




Many countries, such as Canada and Namibia, limit voting rights to their citizens.

Some countries, however, are more inclusive when defining who has the right to vote and extend the right, at least in some elections, to non-citizens who normally reside in the country and have done so for an extended period of time. Malawi, for example, permits non-citizens who have lived in the country for seven years to vote. Chart 2 illustrates such expansion of voter rights to resident non-citizens.

**Chart 2 Only Individuals of Age and who are Citizen or Resident Non-Citizens have the Right to Vote**




Some Commonwealth countries extend the right to vote to citizens of other Commonwealth countries. Australia, Guyana and the United Kingdom all permit citizens from any Commonwealth country to vote in their elections. However, Guyana requires citizens from other Commonwealth countries to have been resident in Guyana for one year before becoming eligible to vote.

Some argue, however, that it is inappropriate for non-citizens to have the right to vote because they ultimately hold allegiance to another country. As a practical matter, in some countries resident non-citizens may not possess documentation that demonstrates they have been a resident in the country for the required number of years to be eligible to vote. These issues are particularly salient in countries that have large immigrant populations or where many people have proof of residence, but few have proof of citizenship.

Residency

In some countries, such as Chile and India, voting rights are limited to those who normally reside there. However, in other countries, such as Argentina and France, citizens who reside outside of the country have the right to vote, at least in some elections. Providing the right to vote to non-resident citizens is illustrated in Chart 3. The extension of the right to

**Chart 3 Only Individuals of Age and who are Resident Citizens or Non-Resident Citizens have the Right to Vote**



vote to citizens living outside of the country, however, can require the creation of rather elaborate administrative procedures to enable them to cast their ballot on election day. This issue can be particularly difficult for countries with large numbers of refugees living outside their borders. A sensitive issue that must be confronted is the designation of an election district within the country to which their votes should be assigned. This decision can have a substantial impact on elections that are constituency-based rather than according to national proportional representation.

Age

All countries set a minimum age for eligibility to vote. This age is often the same age at which individuals are viewed by the state as adults and therefore corresponds to the attainment of other rights. For most countries today, this age is 18 years old.[2] However, some countries have higher or lower minimum voting ages. In Japan and Taiwan, the minimum voting age is 20, while in Brazil the minimum voting age is 16.

**Other Criteria**

Some countries have additional criteria for voter eligibility. In such cases, individuals who meet the country's requirements for citizenship, residency and age may still not be eligible to vote. Such criteria include:

- Mental capacity;
- Criminal record; or
- Military or police service.

Many countries deny the right to vote to individuals who have been legally deemed mentally incompetent. Usually some formal judicial proceeding is required, with procedures established to protect the individual's rights before the person is judged to lack the capacity to make free and informed decisions about a range of matters, including voting. However, some countries, including Canada and Sweden, do not disenfranchise mentally deficient persons.

In some countries, people who have been convicted of serious crimes and/or people who are imprisoned lose the right to vote. Australia, for example, denies the right to vote to people sentenced to five years or more in prison, while they are incarcerated. In the United States, anyone convicted of a felony typically is disenfranchised for life unless their voting rights are restored upon favorable review of a special application. In contrast, Namibia and Poland permit people convicted of crimes to vote.

Some countries do not permit members of the military or police forces to vote. Angola and Turkey, for example, do not allow members of the military to vote, while countries such as Nicaragua and the United States do permit soldiers to vote.

No clear consensus exists on limiting voting rights based on mental competence, criminal record, or military/police service. The internationally recognized fundamental right of universal suffrage, however, fa-

**Voter Registration in the Western Sahara**

Since the end of Spanish rule of the Western Sahara in 1976, control of the territory has been contested by the Government of Morocco, which wants to integrate the territory, and the Frente POLISARIO, which wants to create an independent state (the Government of Mauritania also initially claimed Western Sahara as part of its territory, but renounced those claims in 1979). In 1988, the Government of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO agreed to a referendum in which the Sahrawi people would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. However, the referendum, initially scheduled for January 1992, has yet to be held. A crucial stumbling block has been disagreement over who will be eligible to participate in the referendum - over who should have the right to vote. The Government of Morocco has sought to define as eligible those people currently residing in the Western Sahara, while the Frente POLISARIO has sought to limit the definition to only those people included in the 1974 census. The Frente POLISARIO claims that the Moroccan Government has brought non-Sahrawis into the Western Sahara since 1976 (resident non-citizens) and wants to prevent these people from voting. At the same time, Frente POLISARIO wants to ensure that Sahrawian refugees living in camps in Algeria (non-resident citizens) will be eligible to vote. In 1993, an agreement was reached on the criteria for the right to vote in the referendum. However, the election has still not taken place, in part, because disagreements continue over the interpretation and implementation of those criteria.

Source: *United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Fact Sheet*

[2] A recent study of 63 countries found that in 59 states the minimum voting age was 18 years old. Blais, A., L. Massicotte and A. Yoshinaka. "Deciding who has the right to vote: A comparative analysis of election laws. *Electoral Studies: An International Journal* 20(1): 41-62 (2001).

vors extending, rather than restricting, the franchise.

**Who is Able to Vote?**

Once the question of who should vote has been answered, the practical problems of ensuring that all persons deemed eligible are able to vote, and conversely of ensuring that ineligible people are unable to vote, must be faced.

In any election, some eligible voters may not be able to vote for administrative reasons, such as the lack of necessary identification documents. At the same time, some ineligible individuals may be wrongly permitted to vote because of insufficient administrative safeguards. An election in which a significant number of people who are eligible to vote are turned away from the polls, for whatever reason, is unlikely to be viewed as credible. Similarly, if a substantial number of individuals who are ineligible to vote are able to cast ballots, then the process is also likely to lack legitimacy.

## VOTER REGISTRATION

Voter registration is used in some electoral systems to resolve the practical problem of limiting voting to only those who are eligible. Voter registration first involves identifying all those who meet the criteria to vote in an election prior to election day. Second, voter registration entails making a list of the names and other pertinent information of all the individuals identified as eligible to vote in a particular election (a voters list). These are difficult tasks. Election officials must develop, manage and implement complex plans with multiple and interrelated deadlines to successfully identify and list eligible voters.

A voters list is typically organized on a geographic basis, using discrete "building blocks" that sum to larger and larger units and ultimately to the entire country. The blocks must be small enough so that everyone within a block can vote at a single polling station. The number of voters per polling station varies among

**"Voter Registry" vs. "Voters List" vs. "Voters Lists"**

The terms "voter registry," "voters list" and "voters lists," while not synonymous, are closely related. However, the use of these terms often differs significantly from country to country, which often leads to confusion. The definitions offered below reflect the use of these terms by NDI and many international election experts.

A **voter registry** contains much more than just the names of people eligible to vote. It usually has information such as: voters' names, gender, birth dates, addresses, assigned polling station and unique voter identification numbers. Some voter registries also include voters' photographs and even their fingerprints. In addition, the voter registry may contain information about previously eligible persons who lost their eligibility, or changes in the names or addresses of people eligible to vote. A voter registry may also record activities associated with these events. For example, when a person registers to vote for the first time, a voter registry might contain information about where and when the person registered; who registered the person; when and who entered the person's registration information into a computer; when and who checked the accuracy of the computerized information; when and who produced a voter ID card; and who distributed the voter ID card when and where to the registrant. A voter registry may even contain data on people who have not yet become eligible to vote.

A **voters list** is a snapshot of a voter registry at a particular moment in time. It contains the names, and often other information, such as addresses, dates of birth and genders of only those people in the voter registry who are known to be eligible to vote at that moment. Thus, it excludes the names of people in the voter registry who have ceased to be eligible or who are not yet eligible. Often during the registration process there are preliminary, revised and final voters lists produced from the voter registry at different times. A *preliminary voters list* is typically produced relatively early in the voter registration process and is posted for scrutiny by the public, political parties and civic organizations. A *revised voters list* is at times created after a claims and objections period to verify that any additions, deletions or changes have been made by the election authorities. A *final voters list* is then produced for use on election day to determine who is permitted to vote. The voters list is typically divided by polling station into the corresponding number of voters lists. The **voters lists** for polling stations contain the names and related information for only those people who are designated to vote at each specific polling station.

It is the voters list, and not the voter registry, that the public, political parties and civic organizations typically review. It is the preliminary voters list, usually divided into polling station voters lists, that is posted for inspection. If a name of an eligible voter is missing from the preliminary voters list, that name, and related particulars, must be added to the voter registry. However the person, as well as political parties and civic organizations, will only become aware of the addition when the revised or final voters list is produced. For simplicity, this guide uses the term "voters list" throughout. Readers should, however, keep in mind that any voters list is only a static snapshot of the voter registry and that it is divided into voter lists for use at the polling station level.

countries, typically with 500-800 at the lower range and 1,000-1,200 at the upper range. However, the blocks must not overlap. A person should logically be assigned to one and only one block based on his/her physical address. On election day, geographically subdivided voters lists are usually printed showing only the names of those individuals assigned to vote at each particular polling station. This permits election officials to quickly determine who has the right to vote.

Voter registration accomplishes several critical functions:

- Registration brings eligible people into the election process;
- Registration ensures the equality of the vote;
- Registration prevents ineligible people from voting;
- Registration provides an opportunity for claims and objections about voter eligibility; and
- Registration provides information about how many people are eligible to vote and how they are distributed around the country.

By registering, people know before election day whether they meet the criteria for voting. In some cases, people are given a receipt or are provided with a voter or other ID card that serves as proof of their right to vote.

In electoral systems where people are allowed to vote at one, and only one, designated polling station, election officials can use the voters list to prevent people from voting more than once. The names of eligible people who have voted can be marked in some way on the voters list when they vote. Voters may be required to sign the voters list next to their name, or their names may be somehow crossed out. Only those people whose names appear on the voters list and whose names have not been marked are allowed to receive a ballot. This practice prevents people from returning to a polling station multiple times to vote more than once.

The voters list provides a way to identify people who do not have the right to vote in a particular election. Those individuals whose names do not appear on the voters list at a polling station are assumed to be ineligible to vote and are not issued a ballot. In addition, by providing the voters list to polling station officials and requiring that the identity of individuals who attempt to vote be verified, polling officials, political party agents or others can reduce the possibility of people impersonating others on the voters list. Reconciling the number of persons who signed or who are crossed off the list with the number of ballots in the ballot box can deter or help detect ballot box stuffing.

The voting process can be modified to allow voting by people whose names do not appear on the voters list, but this is usually done through special procedures that include safeguards against ineligible voters and multiple voting by individuals.

Without voter registration, people's eligibility must be determined on election day at a polling station. In that case, if people feel they have wrongly been determined ineligible to vote, they may have little practical recourse. Similarly, if it is believed that someone has been wrongly determined eligible to vote, there is little that can be done to prevent that person from voting. These problems can create delays and confusion and can heighten the potential for conflict at polling stations.

If the eligibility of individuals to vote is determined prior to election day and this information is provided to the public, people have an opportunity to file claims when they feel they have been wrongly determined ineligible to vote. Challenges may also be filed over the eligibility of individuals who were registered, but who are believed to be ineligible. Voter reg-

**Illustrative Voter Registration Process**

Identification of Voters

↓

Data Entry of Information about Voters

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Production of Preliminary Voters List

↓

Verification of Preliminary Voters List

↓

Claims and Objections

↓

Data Entry of Additions, Deletions and Corrections

↓

Production of Revised Voters List

↓

Distribution of Voter ID Cards

↓

Data Entry of Final Changes

↓

Production of Final Voters List

↓

Distribution of Final Voters List to Polling Stations

↓

Use of Final Voters Lists by Election Officials at Polling Station to determine Voter Eligibility

istration, thus, should include a process to resolve such claims and objections with adequate safeguards for voter rights.

If individuals are required to vote at a designated polling station based on where they registered to vote, then election officials will know the maximum number of people who could vote at each polling station. Officials therefore should know the number of ballot papers to print and distribute to polling stations. This reduces the overall number of ballot papers that must be printed and distributed and decreases the possibility that extra ballots may be illegally marked and somehow included in the vote count to manipulate the outcome of an election.

Information about voter registration can also be useful to political parties and civic organizations in other ways. Parties can use voter registration information to direct their campaigning and "get out the vote" activities to prospective supporters. Similarly, civic organizations can use this information to ensure that their voter education activities reach eligible voters.

## IDENTIFYING VOTERS

Voter registration involves first identifying those individuals who are eligible to vote. This process can take one of three general forms:

- Individual-Initiated (people going to designated registration centers);
- State-Initiated (via a census-like enumeration process with election officials going door-to-door to people's homes); or
- State-Created (using a population registry or civil registry).

Some countries are also exploring voter registration via mail, telephone and the Internet. However, these and other strategies to reduce the burden of registering to vote, can potentially increase the risk of fraud.

### Individual-Initiated Process

In an individual-initiated process, registration centers are established, and people must take the initiative to go to these designated sites and register to vote. For example, centers may be set up for a defined period of time at public schools or other locations. Alternatively, individuals may be permitted to go to certain government offices throughout the year and register. In either situation, the responsibility for registering lies with the individual. People who do not take the initiative will not be registered and hence may not be able to vote.

### State-Initiated Process (Enumeration)

With state-initiated voter identification, the public does not go to a designated site to register. Instead, election officials have the responsibility of going to the public in order to identify those individuals who are eligible to vote. This is typically done by trained staff canvassing door-to-door in search of eligible individuals. In some countries, election officials employ a mixture of the two systems. For example, registration centers may be established in some areas that are easy for the public to reach, while in remote areas officials go directly to the residences of potential voters.

### State-Created Process (Population Registry or Civil Registry)

Individuals who are eligible to vote can also be identified using an existing population or civil registry. A population registry contains basic information about all of the citizens of a country and perhaps other residents. It is usually maintained by a specific government body that is separate from the agency responsible for conducting elections. Typically, a population registry includes information such as name, age, gender, marital status and address for every citizen of a country. Births and deaths are also recorded in the registry. Identifying eligible voters requires searching the existing population registry for those individuals who meet the necessary criteria, as well as noting the names of individuals who should be removed from the voters list due to death or other reasons. No contact is required between the public and registration officials. However, using a population registry to identify individuals eligible to vote is only as reliable as the population registry itself. If the registry is outdated or full of errors, many eligible voters will not be identified, and names that should be removed from the voters list will remain.

Computer errors are also possible when names are moved from the population registry to the voters list. This problem is likely to be more pronounced when multiple databases maintained by different government agencies are merged to create the voters list.

## CREATING A VOTERS LIST

Voter registration involves creating a list of those individuals who have been identified as eligible to vote.

### Periodic Voter Registration

In the case of periodic voter registration, election officials create an entirely new voters list for every election, which requires a new effort each time to identify those people who are eligible to vote. An individual-initiated or state-initiated process can be used to identify eligible voters with periodic voter registration. Periodic voter registration is typically conducted at regular intervals, such as every five years, or for a prescribed period of time before each election (e.g., six months prior to the election).

### Continuous Voter Registration

Continuous voter registration, in contrast, is based on an initial voters list that is constantly updated. Throughout the year, election officials must identify newly eligible people and must determine those previously eligible persons who have ceased to be eligible to vote (for example, by death or by being declared legally incompetent). In addition, election officials must update information about people who have moved or who have married and changed their surname. With continuous registration, people register to vote only once under an individual-initiated process, but they must update their registration information when necessary. An individual-initiated or state-centered process can be used to identify eligible individuals with continuous voter registration.

### A Complete, Accurate and Current Voters List

Irrespective of the method used to create a voters list for a particular election, the list must be complete, accurate and current in order to ensure that those eligible to vote are able to do so and those ineligible are barred from doing so.

- If the voters list is incomplete, people who are eligible to vote may not be able to vote because their names do not appear on the list.
- An inaccurate voters list may include the names of people not eligible to vote as well as errors in the information for those who are eligible.
- An out-of-date voters list will miss the names of newly eligible people and may still contain the names of persons who recently have ceased to be eligible. It also may omit information about changes of address or name for those eligible people who have recently moved or married.

Best practices suggest that preliminary, revised and final voters lists should be produced during the regis-

### Types of Voter Registration Systems

Systems for registering people to vote differ from country to country. Most voter registration systems fall into one of four categories:

**Individual-Initiated, Periodic Registration** – People go to specified registration centers during a designated period of time before every election or once every specified number of years.

**Individual-Initiated, Continuous Registration** – People go to specified registration centers that are open year-round.

**State-Initiated, Periodic Registration** – Election officials go door-to-door to locate eligible voters during a designated period of time before every election or once every specified number of years.

**State-Created, Continuous Registration** – A population registry or civil registry is maintained year-round by a government body from which a voters list is extracted.

**Examples of Voter Registration Regimes**

| | Periodic Registration | Continuous Registration |
|---|---|---|
| **Individual-Initiated** | Malawi<br>Guyana | Canada<br>Philippines |
| **State-Initiated** | Albania<br>Nepal | – |
| **State-Created** | – | Sweden<br>Ukraine |

State-Initiated, Continuous Registration does not exist; it is not practical for election officials to be going door-to-door year round. Population registries and civil registries are maintained by their very nature on a continuous, rather than periodic, basis.

tration exercise. These different versions permit the inspection of the voters list by citizens, political parties, and civic organizations. It also allows additions, changes and deletions to be made to the voters list.

#### Issues Concerning the Voters List

Two further issues concerning any voters list are:

- Whether the voters list should be stored electronically (computerized) or manually; and
- Whether photographs or fingerprints should be included on the voters list.

Computerized voters lists are easier to update, and copies can easily be provided to political parties and civic organizations. However, they are expensive and require specialized skills to maintain. Like manually created registries, computerized lists are prone to data-entry errors, and some people may not trust the computers. As countries opt for a computerized voters list, political parties and civic organizations must develop specialized computer skills or hire independent experts to verify computer operations in order to ensure transparency in the voter registration process.

Including photographs of eligible voters with the voters list can improve the integrity of a voter registration process. Photographs can be taken during voter registration, whether individual-initiated or state-initiated. Photographs may also be available through the process of collecting data for a population registry. Photographs can be supplied to the polling station to be checked against the identification documents and faces of prospective voters, and they can also be included directly on the pages of the voters list. The latter practice eliminates problems of transport, storage and loss of photographs. However, the technology for producing such lists is expensive. Cultural and religious factors should also be considered in determining the appropriateness of photographs as part of a voter registration exercise, for example in countries where photographs of women may not be accepted.

Fingerprints are sometimes included on the voters list, which may have a deterrent effect on fraud at polling stations. Difficulties in accurately reproducing fingerprints, however, can present problems for their use as effective identification by polling officials unless relatively expensive digital scanning devices are used in the registration exercise.

### Verifying Who is Registered to Vote

Once a preliminary voters list has been generated, an opportunity for public scrutiny should be provided for several reasons:

- To help ensure that the name of every person who registered to vote does, in fact, appear on the voters list;
- To help guarantee that the information on the voters list for every eligible person is accurate and up-to-date; and
- To help discover individuals who are believed to be ineligible to vote, but whose names appear on the voters list.

As with the registration exercise itself, people must have adequate access to the voters list. The voters list should be posted in easily accessible sites, for example at the locations where polling stations will be on election day. The method of making the list available must ensure adequate access for everyone, including women and groups that traditionally may have limited access to political participation. A preliminary voters list should also be made available to political parties contesting an election, as well as to civic organizations monitoring the process, so that they can verify the quality of the voters list. This removes a major basis for later complaints about an election and can help raise public confidence in the overall election process.

The interests of political contestants and of the public to verify the quality of the voters list must be balanced against the right of citizens to privacy. The public's interest in ensuring the integrity of the elections warrants providing parties and civic organizations access to voters' names and addresses, as well as access to verification procedures conducted by election authorities. Parties and civic groups also must be allowed to conduct their own verification exercises, such as checking lists of supporters or randomly

selected names against the voters list. Nonetheless, where providing unfettered access to names, addresses, photos and other sensitive information, such as ethnicity, would likely create significant risks to public safety, restriction to certain information may be justified. Moreover, political parties and civic groups must act responsibly with the information that they obtain about citizens.

**Claims and Objections**

As part of the verification process, a voter registration exercise should provide procedures for people to challenge mistakes in the voters lists:

- Claims – People who believe that they are eligible to vote, but whose names do not appear accurately on the voters list should have the opportunity to have corrections made; and

- Objections – People should be allowed to question the eligibility of individuals whose names appear on the voters list, but who are believed to be ineligible.

Clear and timely procedures must exist for determining the validity of such claims and objections. In some cases, claims can be resolved in a purely administrative fashion; if an individual has been incorrectly left off the voters list or is included with the wrong particulars, allowing the person to file a correction form may be enough to resolve the problem. However, when removing names from the preliminary voters list or when the addition of new names is controversial, a judicial or quasi-judicial review process may be required. In such cases, judicial or quasi-judicial bodies should be established to hear evidence for and against the removal or addition of names from the preliminary voters list. Such bodies should be established throughout a country so that individuals, political parties and civic organizations have easy access to the claims and objections process. While such bodies should render decisions on all matters brought before them, their decisions should also be open to appeal to a higher authority within the election administration or to a court. After the claims and objections process, a revised voters list can be produced. Best practices require providing the revised voters list to political parties and civic organizations as well as posting and/or publishing it for public information, unless exceptional circumstances exist that create public safety risks.

**Quality of the 1995 Final Voters List in South Africa**

South Africa held its first democratic local government elections in November 1995. A complete voter registration exercise was scheduled from January 28 until April 28 of that year. At the end of the 90-day registration period, however, only 29.9% of the expected eligible voting population had registered to vote. Due to the low registration figures, the Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development and the Local Government Elections Task Group (LGETG) decided to extend registration until June 5. During the extension, door-to-door registration and an extensive media outreach campaign were conducted. In addition, political parties and civic organizations were enlisted to boost registration. By the close of the extension period, registration had increased to 72.5%, which was a significant improvement, but still short of the registration goal. Because of low voter registration rates, Project Vote (a South African voter education initiative) decided to conduct a public opinion poll to determine why South Africans were not registering and what kind of impact this might have on the electoral process. The poll was carried out in the three provinces with the lowest registration rates. The most significant finding of the poll was that 41% of those who had not registered indicated that they intended to vote on November 1. Clearly, a large percentage of South Africans did not realize that by not registering they would not be able to vote. Based on the public opinion poll's findings, an options paper was developed outlining five possible strategies to ensure that those people who had not registered but who intended to vote would not be disenfranchised. The results of the public opinion poll and the options paper were provided to the Ministry and the LGETG. Based on this input, it was decided to hold a supplemental voter registration exercise from September 11 to 25, one month before election day. During this period, nearly 400,000 eligible, but previously unregistered, persons registered to vote.

Source: *Voter Registration in South Africa*, by Project Vote

## PROOF OF REGISTRATION

In many electoral systems, people who successfully register to vote are issued a receipt or card that provides proof of eligibility and registration. Often a receipt is given to individuals that permits them to collect either a voter ID card or national ID card at a later date. A photograph or fingerprint of the individual may be taken to be placed on the final card. Such cards may also contain a sophisticated mark of authentication, such as a hologram, as anti-fraud protection.

Issuing ID cards, either national or voting, requires a second point of contact between election officials and voters, which introduces an additional safeguard into the system. For example, those who have registered successfully but illegally may have to show another election official proof of identity and eligibility in order to collect their ID cards.

The use of receipts or cards as proof of eligibility and registration provides a valuable check on the quality of the voters list. If the name of an eligible individual who has registered to vote is missing from the voters list, that person is able to show evidence that he or she is in fact both eligible and registered to vote. In such a case, the electoral procedures could dictate that the individual should be permitted to vote even though his or her name does not appear on the voters list. Special procedures may be established as safeguards in such cases, for example requiring a court order or voting by tendered ballot.[3]

ID cards, however, are not without problems. In some cases, the ID cards may be printed with the wrong particulars or photograph (if any). This may require several return trips over a long period of time before every voter receives an accurate ID card. For some electoral calendars, there simply may not be enough time to permit the production and distribution of ID cards. Depending on the sophistication and production method for the ID cards, they may be easy to fabricate and may thus create opportunities for illegal voting. On the other hand, elaborate ID cards may be a financial burden on some countries. Even the best voter ID systems do not eliminate all potential voter ID abuses. For example, unscrupulous political parties could, through bribery and intimidation, "purchase" ID cards from individuals who are likely to vote for other political parties in order to disenfranchise them. If other forms of identification are accepted at the polls this problem can be reduced, but opportunities for multiple voting by individuals are increased. This illustrates that vigilance by election officials, political party pollwatchers and election monitors is needed in every system, both inside and outside the polling station.

## Potential Problems with Registration

While voter registration provides benefits to an election process it can raise special problems:

- As ease of registration increases, so does the possibility of fraud;
- Eligible people who do not register to vote may be disenfranchised;
- People underage during registration, but of age on election day, may not be permitted to vote; and
- People who move after registration or who are not located on election day where they earlier registered may be unable to vote.

Procedures designed to make it easier for people to register are also likely to make it easier for ineligible persons to register. Similarly, measures to make it harder for ineligible people to register increase the potential to disenfranchise eligible voters. Any registration system must attempt to find an appropriate balance between these two contending issues.

Many electoral laws permit only those individuals who are eligible and whose names appear on the voters list to vote. It is possible that some people who meet the voting criteria would not be permitted to vote on election day because they have not previously registered. Eligible voters who registered may even be denied the right to vote simply because their names do not appear on the voters list due to human error or manipulation.

In some electoral systems, voter registration is conducted before the election day is set, while in other cases, the election day may shift after voter registration is conducted. In either case, there may be people who were not eligible to register to vote at the time of the registration exercise who subsequently become old enough to vote. This problem can be minimized by registering people who are not yet old enough to vote, but not including their names on the final voters list. This, however, can cause confusion because some people who register to vote will not be permitted to vote on election day.

Another potential problem occurs when voters are not at the same location on election day as they were when they registered to vote; this is often problematic because many electoral systems require people to vote where they registered. In such cases, if people are far away from that location on election day, they will not be able to vote even though they are eligible

[3] See page 15, "Tendered and Challenged Ballots," for a definition.

and registered. Some countries make provisions for absentee or early balloting for such persons. These procedures, while extending the franchise, present risks to electoral integrity. In particular, the voters list should be marked in advance to indicate absentee or early voting to prevent such persons from voting a second time at the polling station on election day. In some countries, people are able to file a form with the election officials in advance of election day indicating where they will be on that day. Officials then issue written permission allowing them to vote at the alternate location. Precautions must also be taken to ensure that such persons are not able to vote more than once.

### Election Day Registration

One way to resolve the problem of eligible people who have not registered to vote before election day is to permit them to register at polling stations on election day. This is often done by inspection of identification documents to establish eligibility; if the person is found eligible, his or her name is added to a supplemental voters list, which may be verified later. The person is then permitted to vote. However, if individuals know that they can vote on election day without previously registering, they may decide not to register in advance. This will likely diminish the benefits provided by a voter registration exercise and will likely create significant opportunities for multiple voting by individuals. The creation of a supplemental voters list on election day, therefore, greatly increases the need to employ safeguards against multiple voting. Multiple voting can be deterred by other safeguards, such as applying indelible ink to the fingers of all voters.

### Tendered or Challenged Ballots

Another procedure that limits disenfranchisement due to names not appearing on the voters list is to allow voting by tendered or challenged ballots. Under these procedures, voters whose names do not appear on the voters list establish their identity and eligibility with the polling officials, then are allowed to fill out a ballot that is not placed directly into the ballot box, but in an unmarked envelope. That envelope is then placed inside a second envelope along with a form containing the voter's identification or with their ID card. A procedure is then followed to verify eligibility, and, if it is established, the secret ballot is included in the vote count immediately after election day.

Best practices favor improving advanced registration systems or adopting tendered ballot procedures, rather than using supplemental voters lists.

### Elections without Registration

Elections can also be held without requiring people to register to vote. This sometimes happens in countries where no reliable system of registration is in place, and where insufficient time, funding or human resources are available to implement voter registration before elections. Voter registration was not conducted, for example, in 1994 prior to the first democratic elections in South Africa. In such cases, people are required to prove their eligibility when they arrive at a polling station. Safeguards against multiple voting by individuals (such as applying indelible ink to the fingers of voters) are particularly important in these circumstances. However, the benefits of a voter registration process, described above, are lost.

### Voter Education and the Registration Process

The success of any voter registration exercises is dependent upon voter education. People must be informed about the importance of registering to vote and how to register:

- If people do not know that they must register in order to vote, they may not do so prior to election day;
- If people do not know when, where and how to register, they may miss their opportunity; and
- If people do not know when, where and how to inspect the voters lists and make corrections, they may lose the opportunity to guarantee that their names appear on the voters list and may lose their chance to vote.

Election authorities, political parties and civic organizations all have central roles to play in informing the public about how the voter registration

process works and why it is important. Election authorities have an obligation to conduct voter education activities to ensure that citizens have a real opportunity to exercise their right to vote. Political parties and candidates need to conduct such education activities in order to ensure that their supporters are able to go to the polls and vote. Civic organizations need to conduct such activities in order to protect citizens rights and public interests as part of their mandates.

All of these sources should provide potential voters with information about where, when and how to initially register to vote; where, when and how to collect voter ID cards (if any); where, when and how to verify the quality of the preliminary voter registry; where, when and how to file a claim or objection to add, update or remove a name from the voters list; and how, if possible, to rectify the problem, should their names not appear on the voters list at their polling station. For political parties and civic organizations, efforts to monitor the process should be coordinated with voter education initiatives and with election day pollwatching and domestic observation efforts.

### Selecting and Training Registration Officials

Who is chosen to serve as a registration official and how he or she is trained has a profound impact on the conduct of voter registration. For continuous registration, whether individual-initiated or state-created, officials are typically full-time employees who work directly for the government or election body responsible for maintaining the voters list. With individual-initiated periodic registration ad-hoc personnel, such as teachers, are employed to work at centers during the voter registration exercise. State-initiated periodic registration also employs temporary workers to conduct door-to-door enumeration. In all circumstances, voter registration officials must accomplish their tasks effectively and impartially. If registration officials are perceived as biased towards a particular party, or are perceived as incompetent, then political parties and the public are unlikely to have confidence in the process.

Four methods are often used to address these issues in the selection of registration officials:

- Requiring literacy and educational criteria;
- Requiring minimum knowledge through the use of standardized tests;
- Requiring political impartiality of officials; or
- Requiring political balance among nominees.

People must be able to read and in some countries must have completed a minimum number of years of education to be eligible to serve as registration officials. Countries, such as Guyana, have also introduced standardized tests to help ensure that the selection of officials is based on skills and knowledge. However, simply using educational criteria does not address the need for political impartiality in voter registration. Additionally, in some societies, people of a particular gender, ethnic, linguistic, religious or other group may have historically had more educational opportunities, which could lead to bias among registration officials. The selection of voter registration officials must take into account such demographics to ensure the integrity of the process.

In addition to ensuring competence, steps must be taken to guarantee political impartiality. For instance, registration officials may be required to pledge to be impartial when carrying out their responsibilities. In addition, political parties may be provided an opportunity to challenge the appointment of officials who they believe are biased.

However, some countries appoint party representatives to be registration officials according to a formula to achieve a political balance rather than individual impartiality. In Mozambique, for instance, government and opposition parties nominate supporters to be election officials. They are then assigned to responsibilities in pairs so that there is always a pro-government and pro-opposition person present. In Albania, politically balanced enumeration teams went door-to-door to conduct voter registration in 2000.

Once officials have been selected they must be properly trained. Training, in itself, is a sizeable and complex task that election authorities must integrate into other registration activities.

# PART TWO

# MONITORING VOTER REGISTRATION

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## WHY MONITOR VOTER REGISTRATION

All phases of an election process warrant observation to reduce human error, deter manipulation, enhance transparency and build confidence in the process – and in the government that results from those elections. Monitoring the voter registration process therefore is important for a variety of reasons to political parties, candidates, civic organizations and the public.

### Ensuring the Rights of Eligible Citizens to Vote

In many electoral systems, people who do not register to vote, even if they are otherwise eligible, will not be permitted to vote on election day. Such electoral systems require that a person's name be on the voters list in order to cast a ballot. Even if this is not required, it often will be left to the discretion of local election officials to decide whether or not to permit an individual to vote who appears eligible, but whose name does not appear on the voters list.

Civic organizations that seek to protect the public interest have a responsibility to help ensure that those who are eligible and who wish to participate in the electoral process have an equal and fair chance to do so. At the same time, political parties and candidates contesting an election must ensure that their supporters are able to vote on election day. If the adherents to a particular party or candidate are not able to register to vote or are not permitted to vote because their names do not appear on the voters list, then that party or candidate may be unfairly denied a victory or may challenge the legitimacy of the electoral outcome. By monitoring voter registration, both civic organizations and political parties can help increase political participation and guarantee that voters have a real opportunity to exercise their right to cast ballots.

### Building Confidence Before Election Day

Electoral institutions in new democracies often have problems establishing their credibility because they are inexperienced, or because they previously failed to conduct truly genuine and meaningful elections. When political parties and civic organizations monitor the voter registration process, they provide an opportunity to build the confidence of contesting parties, their supporters and the broader public in the electoral process. When the efforts of electoral authorities show that the voter registration process is being conducted properly, or that electoral authorities act quickly and effectively to correct identified shortcomings in the voter registry, confidence and trust in the electoral institutions are built.

### Contacting Potential Voters

Monitoring voter registration enables political parties and civic organizations to make direct contact with people who are eligible to vote. Civic organizations also can use monitoring as an opportunity to conduct voter education, which can raise a civic organization's profile and can set the stage for other watchdog and citizen participation activities. Political parties can direct their monitoring to areas where they have strong support and can use these activities as a basis for campaigning, conducting their own voter education, or organizing "get out the vote" (GOTV) efforts. A party that demonstrates that it is well organized and defends the rights of its supporters is likely to attract more votes.

### Preparing for Election Day

Political parties and civic organizations that monitor voter registration may be required to engage in activities that are similar to those they conduct as part of their election day monitoring efforts. By conducting activities several months before election day, political parties and civic organizations can identify important

monitoring strengths and weaknesses. The lessons learned from monitoring the voter registration process can serve to enhance their monitoring of voting, counting and tabulation of results, as well as to strengthen GOTV efforts. The skills and experience acquired will be transferable in many ways, and a volunteer base can be established or expanded.

**Building Institutional Capacity**

Just as monitoring the registration process can help prepare political parties and civic organizations for election day activities, it can also serve to strengthen their overall organizational capacity. A successful monitoring effort requires a political party or civic organization to engage in strategic planning to clearly identify its goals, strengths and weaknesses, in addition to other requirements:

- That existing staff learn new skills;
- That new members are recruited;
- That nationwide structures are activated or created; and
- That new sources of financial and material resources are found.

See Part Three of this guide for a detailed discussion of developing a monitoring strategy.

## CRITERIA FOR VOTER ELIGIBILITY

The criteria for eligibility to vote should be analyzed with respect to local laws as well as international standards. No fixed set of criteria is appropriate for all situations, but, as noted in Part One, consensus does exist that certain restrictions are inappropriate. With the aid of legal and human rights experts, a review of relevant legal documents, such as the country's constitution and electoral code, can be conducted to determine the suitability of the criteria for eligibility to vote. Among the questions to be considered when assessing such criteria are the following:

- ☑ Are the criteria for voting clearly defined, or are they ambiguous or arbitrary?
- ☑ Are the criteria inappropriately discriminatory given the country's constitutional, legal and international human rights obligations?
- ☑ Do these criteria systematically disenfranchise a particular societal group or the supporters of a particular political party?
- ☑ Are individuals required to take a test or pay a fee to be eligible to vote?
- ☑ Are resident non-citizens permitted to vote? Should they be? Are there particular groups, such as internally displaced persons, who are denied the right to vote? Does the inclusion or exclusion of such people disproportionately affect a particular group or supporters of a particular political party?
- ☑ If resident non-citizens are permitted to vote, how many years must they have been a resident of the country in order to be eligible? Is this an appropriate amount of time? As a practical matter, are resident non-citizens likely to have documentation to prove how long they have been in the country?
- ☑ Are non-resident (e.g., out-of-country) citizens permitted to vote? Should they be? Does the inclusion or exclusion of non-resident citizens disproportionately affect a particular group or supporters of a particular political party? Is it financially and logistically feasible for the country to allow non-resident citizens to vote? Is there is a large refugee population? Does the inclusion or exclusion of refugees affect the interests of any particular political party?
- ☑ What is the minimum voting age? Is this age consistent with the age when individuals are considered an adult by the state? Does the minimum voting age disproportionately affect a particular group or supporters of a particular political party?
- ☑ Are people who are deemed legally incompetent by the state permitted to vote? Are there safeguards to ensure that persons who have the capacity to make free and informed

political choices are not declared legally incompetent to vote?

- ☑ Are individuals convicted of a serious crime permitted to vote? Are individuals who are in prison permitted to vote? Are people in pre-trial detention allowed to vote? Is this appropriate? Does this disqualification disproportionately affect a particular group or supporters of a particular political party?

- ☑ Are members of the military and police force permitted to vote? Is this appropriate? Does this disqualification disproportionately affect a particular group or supporters of a particular political party?

- ☑ Are there other requirements that disenfranchise potentially eligible voters?

## VOTER REGISTRATION FRAMEWORK

There is no single correct process for registering voters. However, any method needs to be appropriate for local conditions and consistent with international standards, and it must produce a complete, accurate and current voters list. In reviewing the voter registration framework the following issues should be considered:

- ☑ What is the plan for identifying eligible voters? Does it require individuals to go to centers, will officials travel to the people's homes, or will a population registry be used? Is the method appropriate?

- ☑ Is an entirely new voters list to be created, or will an existing list be updated? Is the method appropriate?

- ☑ Are plans for creating the voters list feasible given available time and resources?

- ☑ When does the identification of voters take place? Is this early enough in the election process to allow for both the production of an accurate voters list and an opportunity for the voters list to be verified? How long does the identification of voters last? Is this enough time for all potential voters to be registered? Are political parties and civic organizations able to monitor this process?

- ☑ Is the voters list computerized? Is there verification of the computer software by independent experts? How are the experts chosen? Is their report public? Are political parties and civic organizations allowed to test the software and, if so, at what points?

- ☑ Are voters given a receipt as proof that they have registered to vote? Does such a receipt enable an individual to vote on election day even if he/she did not receive a new ID card or his/her name is absent from the voters list?

- ☑ Are individuals provided national ID cards or voter ID cards as part of the registration exercise? What steps are taken to ensure timely distribution of ID cards? What steps are taken to ensure that the card cannot be forged? What steps are taken to prevent ID cards that are not distributed by election day from being used for illegal voting?

- ☑ Is a preliminary voters list open to public inspection? Where and when is it displayed? Are copies of the preliminary voters list provided to political parties and civic organizations? Are safeguards required to protect voter privacy interests, and, if so, what measures seem appropriate?

- ☑ Are there clear procedures for filing claims and objections to add, update or remove names from the voters list? Are the procedures known and easily applied by the public? Do the procedures ensure timely decision-making? Do they permit decisions to be appealed? How can political parties and civic groups monitor the claims and objections process?

- ☑ Are political parties and civic organizations provided a copy of the final voters list? Is the final voters list posted for public information?

- ☑ How is the voters list for election day generated and distributed? Does a photograph for

each voter accompany, or appear on, the voters list? Do political parties and civic groups have an opportunity to both observe the production of the final voters list and verify its authenticity? Are they able to monitor the distribution of the final voters lists to the polling stations? Are they provided copies of the final voters list?

☑ Are individuals whose names do not appear on the voters list at a polling station permitted to vote? How do they establish their identity? Are political party pollwatchers or others allowed to challenge a voter's identity on election day? Is there a tendered or challenged ballot procedure? Is there a supplemental voters list procedure? Is there a special election day court procedure to issue orders that allow voting by eligible people who are not on the list?

☑ How are registration officials selected? What steps are taken to ensure that officials are unbiased? What plans are there for training officials to properly conduct voter registration? Do the laws or regulations allow political parties and civic groups to monitor the training of officials?

☑ What plans are there to educate potential voters about why, where, when and how to register to vote and why, where, when and how to correct errors in the voters list? Does the law permit civic organizations to conduct voter education activities?

**Access to Voter Registration in Nicaragua**

In 1996, Grupo Civico Etica y Transparencia 96 (ET 96) monitored Nicaragua's electoral process, including voter registration. For that election, the process of identifying individuals eligible to vote was done on a continuous basis in most of the country. However, in 26 central and northern municipalities that had been at the heart of the former conflict zone, identification was done for two weeks on an "ad hoc" or periodic basis at registration centers. This area of the country at the time of the election was still plagued by violence, making continuous registration hazardous. The ad hoc process was criticized by some as being too short and for requiring people to travel long distances. In addition, it was argued that many people in the former conflict zone did not have proper identification to demonstrate their eligibility and that voter education about the registration process had been insufficient. In response to these concerns, ET 96 recruited volunteers to monitor two weekends during the voter identification process, collecting data from 589 of the 972 registration centers in the 26 municipalities. ET 96 reported that security was sufficient at most registration centers; that people had learned about voter registration from a variety of sources; and that most citizens were successful in their attempt to register. However, it was also discovered that some centers opened late or closed early due to logistical problems; that some political parties were campaigning near centers in violation of legal restrictions; that some people had to walk a great distance to a center; and that some centers lacked adequate supplies. Those people who volunteered to observe voter registration were retained by ET 96 and served as the core for its election day monitoring effort.

Source: *Voter Registration and Domestic Election Observation in Nicaragua*, by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

## Access to Voter Registration

Two issues are critical for analyzing the quality of the process of identifying eligible voters:

- Whether sufficient access is provided to eligible voters; and
- Whether reasonable procedures are uniformly applied.

It is crucial that everyone have an adequate opportunity to register and that procedures are applied effectively and without discrimination.

In the case of individual-initiated registration processes, enough centers must be established at locations that are accessible and convenient to eligible voters. The centers must be open for a sufficient period of time, with adequate supplies, so that the opportunity to register is genuine and the burden to eligible voters is not excessive.

> Do all individuals have adequate access to the voter registration process?

When the identification process is state-initiated, registration teams must travel to all parts of the country and spend sufficient time in each location to ensure that all eligible individuals who wish to register are located and interviewed and that the relevant information for voter registration is recorded. When the voter registration is state-created based on a population registry, all groups within the population must have an

adequate opportunity for inclusion in the population registry without discrimination.

Whether the identification process is individual-initiated, state-initiated or state-created based on a population registry, the procedures by which an individual is registered to vote should not be so onerous as to discourage registration or to present unnecessary obstacles to eligible voters. In all cases, the procedures must ensure accurate recording of voter information. The procedures must also be applied in a consistent manner. If some voters are given preferential treatment, or if some are excluded based on illegal discrimination, the voters list could be used to deny the political will of the people rather than to ensure democratic elections.

> Are reasonable and uniform procedures used to determine whether each individual is eligible to vote?

**Individual-Initiated Process**

Where registration centers are established around a country and individuals are required to go to them in order to register to vote, the common observation practice is to deploy monitors to centers or to include representatives of political parties and/or civic organizations among the registration staff. In either case, monitors serve to collect information about both access to and conduct of the process.

Timing

As noted above, the registration process can be conducted on either a continuous basis, in which centers are open year round, or on a periodic basis, where centers are open for only a short period of time, typically during the run-up to an election or once every specified number of years.

Monitoring is more difficult when identification is continuous because it is not possible to deploy full-time observers to centers throughout the year. In such cases, it may be advantageous for political parties or civic organizations to attempt to have individuals loaned to the staff at registration centers; attention would then need to be given to ensure that the voter registration staff is politically balanced. When it is not possible to include members of political parties and civic organizations as part of registration center staff, monitors can be deployed to "spot-check" centers on random days. In such cases, it is usually best to pay more attention to the period just preceding an election. It may also be more useful in these cases to concentrate on analyzing the quality of the resulting voters list as a measure of access to, and conduct of, the identification process.

With periodic registration, monitoring usually begins when registration centers open. The longer observers can remain at centers, the more information they can collect, and the better they can ensure that the center is open and the identification procedures are being followed correctly and consistently. However, even with periodic registration, it is usually difficult to station observers at registration centers for the entire process because registration may go on for several weeks or longer. It may be possible for political parties and civic organizations to deploy monitors or representatives as registration officials. When party representatives serve as officials, registration staff must be politically balanced.

**Access to Voter Registration in Malawi**

During the run up to the 1999 National Assembly Elections in Malawi, concerns were raised that registration centers, particularly in the north of the country, were not open or lacked the materials and equipment necessary to register voters. Because of these concerns, a coalition of groups, known as the Church/NGO Consortium, deployed observers to registration centers throughout the country in order to collect information to verify or refute these claims. During a two-week period, Church/NGO observers visited 2,361 of 3,622 registration centers. Of the visited centers, 65%, or 1,709, were found to be open. Closed registration centers were evenly distributed across the country, however, 52% of the centers that were found open in the north of the country reported that they had been forced to close at least once due to lack of supplies (typically a lack of film and cameras for producing ID cards). In the central region, only 27% of such centers and 30% in the south reported being forced to close for this reason. Using this information, the Church/NGO Consortium successfully lobbied for a general extension of the identification exercise and for an even longer extension in the northern part of the country to provide an opportunity for all citizens to register to vote. The exercise also demonstrated to the public and to the Church/NGO Consortium that it could successful deploy thousands of observers to all corners of the country. This exercise served to build public and institutional confidence for election day monitoring.

Source: *First Interim Report on Registration*, by the Church/NGO Consortium

Deployment

There are three methods for deploying monitors to registration centers:

- Comprehensive;
- Strategic; or
- Representative.

*Comprehensive Deployment* – In this case, monitors are sent to nearly every registration center. This method provides the greatest level of information and the highest degree of confidence. However, such a deployment plan is obviously very labor-intensive and costly. It may also be organizationally prohibitive, depending on the other activities planned by the political party or civic organization.

*Strategic Deployment* – Rather than attempting to send monitors to all registration centers, monitors may instead be deployed to a selected group of centers. Political parties may deploy most of their monitors to areas where they are concentrating their campaign; civic organizations may deploy monitors to areas where there historically have been problems or are current concerns. This method reduces the organizational effort and cost of the exercise while ensuring that the most sensitive areas of the country are covered. However, for civic organizations, this method introduces a risk that their monitoring will result in a skewed report that highlights problems rather than presenting a truly national perspective.

*Representative Deployment* – It is also possible to draw a statistically representative sample of registration centers on a random basis and to deploy observers to only those selected centers. Because the registration centers are selected at random, it is possible to draw conclusions about access to and conduct of the identification process at all centers, based on the analysis of information collected from the sample. This can significantly reduce the number of monitors required and the cost of the monitoring exercise. However, observers are not necessarily deployed to a large number of registration centers and may not be deployed to centers in all strategic areas.

It is further possible to mix strategies. For example, some monitors could be deployed to a random sample of registration centers (representative deployment) and others could be sent to specific centers in critical areas (strategic deployment).

Methodology

As with election day observation, there are four elements of the observation of access to and conduct of the registration process:

- Presence;
- Documentation;
- Reporting; and
- Analysis.

*Presence* – Deploying registration monitors can reduce human errors, deter manipulation, identify errors and manipulation where they occur, and build public confidence. In addition, the monitoring effort can help build organizational capacity and public awareness of the efforts of the political party or civic organization.

**SADC PF Observes 2001 Voter Registration in Zambia**

In 1996, the Election Commission of Zambia (ECZ) commissioned a private company to compile a new voters list and produce voter ID cards. Opposition parties and civic organizations strongly protested, claiming that many fictitious names were included on the new list and that voter ID cards were printed and issued for ineligible or fictitious voters. In response, the ECZ conducted an entirely new registration exercise for the 2001 elections.

The Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF) – a regional body comprising members of parliaments from 12 African countries that is charged with many tasks, including observing national elections in the region – sent observers to Zambia for 10 days to meet with interested parties and monitor registration. Their monitors witnessed registration at 31 centers chosen from both rural and urban areas. The SADC PF delegation found that, although registration was being conducted properly, the process was administratively burdensome and that few people were registering to vote. The delegation recommended that the voter registration period be extended, that mobile voter registration teams be established and that the use of national voter registration cards be reconsidered.

Source: *Voter Registration Observation Mission Report: Zambia, 12 - 13 July 2001*, by the SADC Parliamentary Forum

*Documentation* – Beyond presence, observers at registration centers should record what they monitor. There should be documentation of what transpired at each registration center, both recording irregularities and noting when procedures were conducted properly. Many questions could be appropriately included on the form:

- ☑ How long has the registration center been open?
- ☑ Have there been any closures or disruptions in the process?
- ☑ Are procedures being followed?
- ☑ How many people have registered there?
- ☑ Does the location of the registration center, its hours of operation, its staffing or other factors create a hindrance for women or any identifiable group that has traditionally had limited political participation?
- ☑ Have people been denied registration for improper reasons? How many?
- ☑ Are people given a receipt as proof of registration (if appropriate)?
- ☑ Are photographs taken of people when they successfully register to vote (if appropriate)?

All these questions should include a method of quantifying the number of problems and indicating the degree of their severity. This will allow credible analysis and reporting. A form should be developed to assist the monitors. (See the Appendices for sample forms.)

*Reporting* – It is not enough for monitors to complete observation forms. While presence alone can have beneficial effects, monitoring reports must be sent in a timely manner to a central location so that an analysis can be developed and remedies sought for shortcomings or irregularities uncovered in the process.

*Analysis* – It may not be possible, however, to read all of the observation reports at the center quickly or to develop a clear understanding of their meaning if hundreds of lengthy reports come in simultaneously. It is therefore advisable to develop concise reporting forms in a format that can be easily tabulated for analysis. It is wise to enter these reports into a computer so that data can be efficiently consolidated for analysis. By using simple database or spreadsheet software to quickly tabulate the results, national and sub-national trends can be identified. This can serve to point out the strengths and weaknesses in the process. Care must be taken to distinguish between minor problems and those that could significantly affect the integrity of the registration process.

**State-Initiated Process**

It is difficult to directly observe the registration process when teams of election officials move around the country identifying individuals who are eligible to vote. Instead, political parties and/or civic organizations may attempt to negotiate with the election authorities to ensure that each registration team has a member chosen from a ruling party, one or more from opposition parties and perhaps one from a nonpartisan civic organization. These individuals would be seconded from their respective organizations to serve as staff for the identification exercise. Again, it is important that political balance be maintained in the teams.

Representatives of political parties and civic organizations seconded to registration teams should complete forms on the process. As with the individual-

**Ability to Verify Voter Registration in Yemen**

In 1997, the Arab Democratic Institute (ADI), a Yemeni nongovernmental organization, conducted a comprehensive nonpartisan domestic election monitoring program for Yemen's parliamentary elections. Part of the effort focused on the voters list, which was to be publicly posted. In each of Yemen's 20 governorates (provinces), ADI monitors checked each day and reported on late posting of the list and the almost immediate tearing down of the list, which impeded the claims and objection process. ADI also noted that the ink on the voters list faded quickly, which also hampered the process. In addition, ADI monitors in a number of locations photographed or videotaped images of the lists and analyzed the images, discovering a significant number of duplicate names and underaged persons on the voters list. Monitors brought these problems to the attention of election authorities, political parties and international observers.

Source: *Final Report on the 1997 Parliamentary Elections in Yemen*, by the Arab Democratic Institute

### Voter Registration by Enumeration in Albania

In May 2000, the Government of Albania adopted a comprehensive Electoral Code that required an enumeration effort to identify and register all eligible voters. The law required mayors or heads of communes to establish three-person enumeration teams for each polling unit within the municipality or commune, who went door-to-door to locate all eligible voters. In accordance with the Electoral Code, each team was composed of one representative from the municipality or commune as well as one representative from the largest governing party and one representative from the largest opposition party in the municipal or commune council. The three-member teams were designed to help promote transparency and to build the confidence of political parties that voter registration was conducted properly. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) deployed 23 observers to monitor the enumeration process, who found that "the aim of conducting a transparent and accurate registration process was achieved." However, the OSCE's final report also noted concerns about the start date of the enumeration exercise (which led to enumeration beginning too early in some areas and then having to be repeated), lack of sufficient training of enumeration staff, an inadequate public awareness campaign about the enumeration exercise and lax diligence by enumerators when checking identity cards.

Source: *Republic of Albania Voter Registration for the Local Elections June – July 2000: Final Observation Report*, by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

initiated process, forms should address whether the composition of registration teams and/or their conduct inhibited the principle of universal and equal suffrage and/or whether the team's work was effective. These forms should be collected and analyzed by their political party or civic organization in the same way as those described for the individual-initiated process. By having individuals who represent the interests of the contesting political parties, as well as civic organizations representing the public's interests, confidence and transparency are built into the process.

Such an arrangement may not always be possible. Even if it is, it may still be valuable to attempt to monitor the efforts of a state-initiated identification process by sending monitoring teams to follow and observe registration and to at least spot-check the process. It may also be wise to analyze the resulting voters list for variance in the percentage of the population registered by age, gender or region or province of the country. It may then be possible to identify groups or areas where insufficient effort was made to locate individuals eligible to vote. Field tests can also be conducted on the resulting voters list to assess its accuracy.

#### State-Created Process (Population Registry)

The monitoring issues for a state-created voter list based on a population registry are very similar to those for a state-initiated identification process. Typically, population registries are maintained on a continuous basis. Government offices are usually open year-round so that people can record births, deaths, marriages and changes in names or addresses. Because the process is ongoing, monitoring is difficult. As discussed above, political parties and civic organizations may attempt to have their members join the staff responsible for the population registry, though this is often not possible, or they may conduct spot checks on the process, particularly just before the election period. Representatives of political parties and civic organizations may also perform field and/or computer tests on the resulting voters list.

## Quality of the Voters List

There are four general issues that need to be given attention in analyzing the quality of the voters list.

1 **Only the names of people who are eligible to vote should be on the voters list**. Two common problems that occur in this respect are the erroneous inclusion of ineligible or fictitious persons and the failure to remove individuals who have died or ceased to be eligible to vote (for example, because they moved out of the country). Anyone who is ineligible to vote but whose name is on the voters list, either due to human error or manipulation of the process, could be permitted to vote on election day. Someone could illegally vote by impersonating another known to be out of the country or deceased, or by posing as a fictitious person. In addition, signatures of such persons could be forged on the voters list to cover up ballot box stuffing. Scrutinizing the voters list can help identify such names so that they can be removed.

> Are there any names on the voters list of people who are not eligible to vote or who do not exist?

2 **The names of all people who are eligible to vote and who registered to vote should be included on the voters list**. If the name of such a person is missing, either due to human error or manipulation, he or she may not be able to vote on election day. It is not easy to scrutinize the voters list to determine whether names of individuals who are eligible to vote and registered to vote are absent. During verification, people should have an opportunity to ensure that their name is on the voters list. This is typically done by preparing a preliminary voters list and posting it in public places so that people can verify that their names are, in fact, on the list. Missing names can then be identified and steps taken to add them to the voters list.

> Are there names missing from the voters list of people who are eligible to vote and who registered?

The voters list can also be published in newspapers for verification and/or made available electronically on the Internet. In some countries, telephone hotlines have been set up for voters to call and verify whether or not their names are on the voters list. Such hotlines have been run by political parties and by civic organizations, as well as by election authorities. In addition, monitors can canvas a random sample of people and check the voters list to determine whether the names of these individuals appear.

3 **Information about each person on the voters list needs to be accurate and up to date**. Election regulations may require individuals to vote at specific polling stations based on their addresses recorded in the voters list. If the information is incorrect, voters may go to the wrong polling station and may not be permitted to vote. Similarly, people who have changed their surnames after marrying may still be included on the voters list under their old name, and they therefore may not be permitted to vote. The voters list can be examined to identify how many and which individuals have incorrect data. Public inspection and a proper claims and objections period may be the best way to identify errors and correct the voters list. A random sample drawn and checked by monitors can also be an effective way to measure the accuracy of entries on the voters list. This technique is discussed below.

> Is the correct information recorded for every person on the voters list?

4 **An election's legitimacy depends in part on the extent to which the public participates**. If a large percentage of the population or a particular subsection does not register to vote, then the credibility of the electoral process can be called into question. Comparing the number of names on the voters list with census data and historical registration figures can reveal under-registration nationally, in specific geographic areas or among particular population groups, such as women and youth. This information can be used to improve the process by adding special registration for targeted groups or areas. This can build confidence that everyone has been given an adequate opportunity to register.

> What percentage of those people eligible to vote is included in the voters list?

**Types of Tests (Audits) of the Voters List**

Field and computer tests can be used to assess the quality of the voters list; they provide complementary information. Depending on the particular issues of concern, a field test, a computer test or both tests may be valuable. Field tests tend to be useful to identify fictitious names, people who have died, people who have changed their name or people who have moved. Computer tests are particularly useful to find duplicate names, individuals with missing or partial data and changes in registration trends.

**Field Tests of the Voters List**

There are two types of field tests:

- List-to-People Tests; and
- People-to-List Tests.

In the first case, the exercise seeks to ensure that every name on the voters list is that of an actual person who is eligible to vote and that his/her particulars, such as address, are correct. This is usually done by attempt-

### Monitoring the Voter Registration Process in Peru

In 1999, the Peruvian civic organization Transparencia entered into an agreement with the electoral body responsible for producing the voters list (RENIEC) to assess the accuracy of the voters list in advance of the April 2000 elections. As part of its program, Transparencia gathered information from volunteers in 75% of Peru's 1,818 electoral districts to verify that the voters list had been posted for public review. In addition, a list-to-people field test was conducted to assess the quality of the voters list. Transparencia selected 1,004 names at random from the voters list and deployed 224 volunteers from December 10 to 29, attempting to locate those individuals. The test showed that 60% of the people selected were located and were living at the address on the voters list. Transparencia, however, raised concerns that a large number of people had incorrect address information recorded in the voters list because they had moved. In part because of the professional work done by Transparencia in 1999, the election authority responsible for the overall conduct of elections (JNE) requested Transparencia to conduct similar activities in advance of the extraordinary April 2001 elections necessitated by the removal of President Fujimori. Transparencia's 2001 monitoring activities indicated that the quality of the voters list had improved, and, Transparencia publicly praised the election authorities for their effort to update the voters list.

Source: *Datos Electorales, No. 18 Newsletter*, by Transparencia

ing to identify and then locate a representative sample of people whose names are selected from the voters list. In a people-to-list test, the objective is to determine if there are people who are eligible to vote and who appear to have attempted to register to vote, but whose names are absent from the voters list. In this case, an effort is made to draw a random sample of eligible individuals in a country who indicate they have registered to vote and to determine whether they are actually included on the voters list.

In either case, field tests are labor, time and financially intensive and require complex organization. However, they provide a wealth of information and serve to build a political party's or civic organization's capacity. Field tests also provide an opportunity to gather information about other aspects of the electoral process from the public. If, for example, people require a national ID card to vote, the field test can be used to determine what percentage of registered voters possess national ID cards. Field tests also provide an opportunity for direct contact with the public.

Timing

Neither type of field test of the voters list can be conducted before the election officials have produced a preliminary voters list. It is important, however, that field tests occur early enough in the overall electoral process to allow sufficient time for electoral authorities, political parties and civic organizations to take action if deficiencies are identified. Often, field tests are conducted during the period when the voters list is publicly displayed in order to provide individuals with an opportunity to verify their registration.

List-to-People Tests: Drawing a Sample

It is neither necessary nor, in most cases, feasible to attempt to locate all of the individuals whose names are included on the voters list; in most countries this will be millions of people. Instead, by working with a statistician and a demographer, a representative sample of individuals can be drawn at random from the voters list. An effort can be made to locate only those persons included in the representative sample. Based on the findings from this representative sample, it will be possible to use statistics to draw conclusions about the quality of the entire voters list.

It is necessary to obtain a copy of the voters list in order to identify individuals to include in a list-to-people field test. If available, the preliminary voters list should be used for the test so that there will be time to make corrections, if any, based on the findings of the field test. Ideally, the voters list should be in electronic format in order to facilitate the random selection of names. This should not be onerous for the electoral authorities. However, if the voters list is only available in hard copy, it is still possible to draw a sample. In order to draw a sample, the name and address information is required for every individual in the voters list. If possible, the voter number and other information for each individual should be obtained.

Large samples are not required for field tests of the voters list because they need less precision than other statistical exercises (such as election day parallel vote tabulations). The goal is to determine broadly whether there are problems; thus field tests do not need as high a degree of statistical confidence. Depending on the demographics of the country, the size of the sample may vary from a few hundred to a few thousand individuals. Often the sample size will be approximately 500 to 1,000 names. To draw a

sample, every "nth" name could be chosen from the voters list. For example, if 4 million names appear on the voter registry and a sample of 1,000 persons is used, then every 4,000th name on the voter registry would be selected for inclusion. Random numbers can also be generated and used to select names. Often, the sample will be stratified by geographic region to ensure that it is representative of the entire country. This method requires that the voters list first be sorted by geographic region before selecting names.

List-to-People Test: Methodology

A uniform methodology must be developed for monitors to find individuals included in the list-to-people test sample. The methodology for monitors should clearly specify when to attempt to find individuals (dates and times of day) and how many attempts should be made to find each person. Guidance should also be provided about leaving messages, contacting neighbors and following leads for individuals who have changed their residence.

A list-to-people field test involves monitors going to the address listed for each name sampled from the voters list. If a person with a name selected lives at that address and is present at the time, the monitor confirms the individual's eligibility to vote and verifies his/her information from the voters list. If the person is not home at the time, but lives at the address, the monitor leaves a message and attempts to return to the address another time. If the address does not exist or if the person has moved, the monitor attempts to determine whether the person lives in the area but at another address; if the current address is nearby, the monitor then attempts to find the person at that address. If the current address is far away, the information can be provided to another monitor so that he/she can attempt to find the individual. A form should be developed to assist the monitors. (See the Appendices for sample forms.) Several questions could be included on the form:

- ☑ Was the address found?
- ☑ Was the individual found at that address?
- ☑ Was the individual found at another address?

**Test of the Voters List in Azerbaijan**

As part of its election monitoring strategy, the Azerbaijan civic organization, For the Sake of Civil Society (FSCS) conducted both a list-to-people and people-to-list field test of the voters list in 2000. This "two-way audit" was designed to provide information about problems concerning removal of voters who were no longer eligible from the list, as well as adding new voters who had recently become eligible. These problems had been identified by opposition parties, nonpartisan domestic monitors and international observers as sources of manipulation in past elections. For the list-to-people field test, approximately 1,500 names were chosen at random from the voters list. Volunteers attempted to locate each selected individual by going to each person's address as recorded in the voter registry. The field test found that 30% of the individuals selected did not live at the address contained on the voter list, and that two-thirds of those not found had moved away at least two years prior to the field test. In the people-to-list field test, 860 individuals were selected at random off the street. Each monitor was asked to interview five men and five women who had turned 18 years old since the most recent election. The names of almost 13% of those interviewed could not be found on the voters list. The two tests suggested that there were significant problems with the quality of the voters list. Because FSCS took great care in documenting and verifying its information, their results were not challenged. The tests provided key information for international and domestic organizations monitoring the overall election process.

Source: *Voter Registration List Audit Report (Azerbaijan)*, by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

- ☑ Has the individual died?
- ☑ Has the person otherwise become ineligible?
- ☑ Has the individual registered to vote?
- ☑ Does the individual have proof of registration?
- ☑ What was the individual's voter ID number?
- ☑ Where was the individual assigned to vote?

People-to-List Test: Drawing a Sample and Methodology

In most countries, drawing a sample for a people-to-list field test is much more difficult than drawing a sample for a list-to-people test. In the latter case, monitors simply use the existing voters list as the basis from which to draw the sample. This is not possible for a people-to-list test. A sample for a people-to-list test should ideally be drawn from a list of all persons of voting age living in the country. However, few countries have a list that even closely approximates this ideal.

### Tests of the Voter List in Guyana

In Guyana, the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB) first conducted field and computer tests to assess the quality of the voters list before general elections in 1991. The EAB determined that over 30% of the names on the preliminary voters list (PVL) could not be found based on a list-to-people field test. A computer test of the PVL discovered that out of the nearly 400,000 names on the PVL, 1,700 sets of names had the same national ID number. From information gathered by monitors during the list-to-people field test, the EAB also calculated that nearly 30,000 registered voters lacked ID cards that were required for voting. After the EAB publicized these concerns, the Guyana Election Commission (GECOM) decided to postpone the elections until the following year to permit time for the PVL to be extensively revised. In 1992, the EAB conducted another set of tests on the new PVL and discovered that the number of errors was greatly reduced. The number of people not found fell to 3.7%, and only 28 sets of names had the same national ID number. However, the EAB continued to express concerns about registered voters who lacked ID cards and urged GECOM to intensify its efforts to produce and distribute ID cards. Since 1992, the EAB has conducted both field and computer tests of the PVL for both the 1997 and 2001 elections.

Source: *The Findings of the Electoral Assistance Bureau on the Preliminary Voters List* by the Electoral Assistance Bureau

The typical first step in drawing a sample for a people-to-list test involves selecting locations within a country at which people will be interviewed. A demographer may be needed to help identify a representative sample of sites within a country. At each of these locations, monitors are then instructed to randomly identify a set number of individuals to interview. Usually there are demographic requirements which the monitors should randomly select. For instance, monitors might be instructed to interview 10 people, of whom 5 are men and 5 are women, who all indicate that they registered to vote. Monitors are often instructed to go to a place where people congregate within a selected locality, such as a market, or to select homes in a neighborhood. Monitors ask the name, identifying information (e.g., address) and whether or not the individual is registered to vote. A form should be developed to assist the monitor. (See the Appendices for sample forms.) Several questions could be included on the form:

- ☑ What is the person's name?
- ☑ What is the person's age?
- ☑ What is the person's address?
- ☑ Did the person register to vote?
- ☑ What is the person's voter ID number (if any)?
- ☑ Where did the person register to vote?
- ☑ Where was the person assigned to vote?

When all of the data has been collected, the voters list is checked to see whether the interviewed individuals are indeed registered.

Such sampling and interviewing techniques introduce risks of bias into the monitoring effort. For example, monitors could ignore instructions and only interview young people or people of a particular ethnic group or social class. Training, therefore, should stress avoiding bias and spot checks of monitors should be conducted. However, even if bias enters the sample, the findings may still be meaningful. If a biased sample uncovers a large number of people who indicate they have registered to vote, but whose names are absent from the voters list, the public should still be concerned about the accuracy of the list.

#### Computer Tests of the Voters List

Computer tests involve using programs to analyze an electronic copy of the voters list for errors and trends. Such tests are often conducted by election authorities or technical consultants. Political parties and civic organizations should also have the right to examine the methodology, conduct and results of such computer tests run by election authorities. Parties and civic organizations should also be allowed to conduct computer tests themselves. (See the Appendices for a sample report on computer tests conducted by a nonpartisan civic organization.)

When analyzing a voters list by computer, each name and its corresponding information (such as address and voter ID number) is referred to as a record. A computer test consists of searching all of the records in the voters list for those that meet a defined set of criteria. Computer tests also can be used to compare records from one voters list against a previous voters list or census data.

An electronic copy of the voters list (or access to the computerized voters list at the offices of the electoral authorities) is needed in order to perform a computer

test, and specialists are required to develop appropriate computer programs. To analyze historic trends it is necessary to have an electronic copy of the voters list from previous elections or, though less useful, a hard copy of the summary figures. Historical census data are also useful. When analyzing the voters list, compared to census data, the assistance of a demographer and/or a statistician may be necessary.

Computer Tests for Errors (Internal Tests)

Computer tests can identify certain types of errors in the voters list:

- Number of records;
- Records with missing data;
- Duplicate records;
- Ineligible records;
- Wrong constituencies; and
- Additions, deletions and corrections.

*Number of Records* – In some cases there is concern that there are more names or fewer names on the voters list than the number reported by the election authorities. A computer program that simply counts the number of records, where each record corresponds to one person, can determine whether there are disparities indicating extra or missing names from the voters list.

*Records with Missing Data* – Records with missing data may cause problems in the production of the final voters list. Records with a missing surname, voter ID number, or date of birth may be particularly problematic. Missing data reflects poor data collection or poor data entry. A simple computer program that searches the voters list for missing data can identify records that are problematic. Monitors might then call for follow-up registration to locate those individuals whose information is incomplete and to obtain the missing data.

*Duplicate Records* – Duplicate records are of concern because they inflate the number of registered voters and may permit individuals to vote more than once. Computer programs can be developed to identify possible duplicate records. It may be necessary to attempt to locate individuals who correspond to duplicate records in order to determine which record is up to date and correct. In countries where the same name is repeated within families and where extended families live together, duplicate searches must include date of birth or a unique identification number.

*Ineligible Records* – It is possible that the voters list may include the names of some individuals who are not old enough to vote. A computer program can be used to analyze date of birth information and to identify individuals who are not of voting age.

*Wrong Constituency* – In electoral systems where members of the legislative branch are elected from geographically defined constituencies or where seats are allocated according to sub-national party lists (e.g., at the regional or provincial level) it is critical that people are assigned to the correct constituency or region/province on the voters list. In some cases, it is possible to design a computer program that compares addresses with constituencies or regions/provinces to identify individuals who have been incorrectly assigned.

*Additions, Deletions and Corrections* – It is also possible to conduct a computer test that compares the preliminary and revised voters lists to determine what records have been added, deleted or updated. This information can be compared with data collected during the claims and objections period to verify that corrections submitted by citizens were, in fact, made.

Computer Tests for Shifts in Trends (External Tests)

Computer programs can also be useful in comparing demographic data from the current voters list with past voters lists and with census data. The usefulness of such tests is, of course, dependent upon the credibility of past voters lists and census data. Not all voters lists will have all of the necessary information to conduct such tests. Such computer tests involve several factors:

- Number of records, by age;

- Number of records, by gender;
- Number of records, by geographic division; and
- Number of records, by language or ethnic group.

*Number of Records by Age* – A computer program can be used to count the number of records by age. This data can be compared with data from past voters lists or with census data to identify discrepancies. In general, a large number of very old individuals indicates that names of people who have died are not being removed from the voters list. At the same time, a small number of young individuals suggests that the names of people who are registering for the first time are not being added to the voters list.

*Number of Records by Gender* – A similar computer program can be used to count the number of records by gender on the voters list. As with age, this data can be compared with past data from voters lists or with census data. If, for example, the percentage of women registered, as compared with men, is significantly lower, additional voter education and registration exercises may be required to ensure the full participation of women in the electoral process.

*Number of Records by Geographic Division* – Often political support follows geographic lines (sometimes based on ethnicity, language or shared history). A computer test can be used to determine the number of records per geographic unit (such as region or province) in the country. Comparing this data with that from a census or from past voters lists can help identify areas of the country where the number of people registered is lower or higher than expected. Numbers lower than expected may indicate that people in some parts of the country have not been given an opportunity to register, or that their names may not have been entered into the voters list. If numbers are higher than anticipated, this may indicate that individuals registered more than once, or that fictitious or ineligible people may have been registered.

*Number of Records by Language or Ethnic Group* – Sometimes information on language or ethnic group is included in a voters list: this is more likely when the voters list is state-created from an existing population registry. If such data is available, it is important to determine whether any language or ethnic group has been under- or over-registered. A simple computer test can be designed to determine the number of records per language or ethnic group. As with tests by geographic area, this information can be compared with data from a census or a previous voters list to identify groups that are under-or over-represented.

## VERIFICATION OF THE VOTERS LIST

Regardless of the identification process, the verification process typically involves posting the voters list at locations around the country where the public has easy access to it. Opportunities must then be provided for people to file claims or objections for additions, deletions or corrections to be made to the list. Monitoring verification typically involves deploying individuals to observe the process and take notes regarding several factors:

- Whether the voters list is posted;
- Whether people have access to the locations were the voters list is posted;
- How many people file claims and objections and for what reasons; and
- Whether procedures for filing and processing claims and objections are properly conducted.

Political parties and civic organizations monitoring the verification of the voters list may also seek to record the names of those individuals who file a claim or objection. When the final voters list is published, it will be possible to confirm whether the names of the individuals who filed claims were added to the voters list and whether objections to the inclusion of names were sustained.

Beyond monitoring this process, political parties and civic organizations should actively encourage people to verify their registration. Political parties often

concentrate on mobilizing their supporters to check whether their names appear correctly on the voters list. Parties also establish systems by which they check the voters list on behalf of their supporters.

Civic organizations are likely to track all problems or to assist citizens more generally with the process. These activities could include conducting public education campaigns to make citizens aware of the need to verify their registration. If it is determined that there are insufficient locations where people can go to verify their registration, informal locations could be established where individuals could go to check for their names. If their names were missing, people could then go to the official verification center to file a claim. For example, some civic organizations have set up tables outside registration centers to help citizens with the verification process.

In countries where the voters list has been made available on CD-ROM and telecommunication technology is widespread and reliable, political parties and civic organizations have publicized telephone numbers for citizens to call in order to verify their registration.

## Production of the Final Voters List

Concerns may be raised about the production of the final voters list that is distributed to polling stations and used on election day. It may be possible, either due to human error or manipulation, that the final version that is printed for distribution is not the same as the "final voters list" published after the verification process. It may be possible for names to have been electronically removed from or added to the voters list distributed to polling stations. This could disenfranchise those individuals whose names have erroneously been removed from the list or permit illegal voting by individuals whose names were incorrectly added to the list. In addition, concern may focus on whether corrections requested were actually incorporated into the list used on election day.

These problems can be countered if monitors at polling stations have copies of the relevant part of the final voters list obtained from the election officials by their political parties or civic organizations prior to election day. Providing a copy of the relevant part of the final voters list to monitors at every polling station can, however, be logistically difficult and can be a financial burden for political parties and civic organizations. Political parties and civic organizations must first obtain a copy of the final voters list, in either electronic or hardcopy format, with polling station information included from the election authorities. The voters list must be received early enough before election day for political or civic organizations to sub-divide the final voters list by polling station and to provide their monitors at each polling station with the relevant portion of the final voters list, unless the list is pre-divided by election authorities.

Party pollwatchers and domestic nonpartisan monitors must be trained specifically on what to do if prospective voters are disenfranchised because their names are not on the voters list. In addition, they should monitor whether prospective voters' identities are verified against the voters list at the polling station and whether the voters list is marked as a safeguard against multiple voting.

In all cases, training for pollwatchers and domestic nonpartisan monitors should cover what remedies can be taken immediately to solve the problem on the spot. In addition, training should cover how to document and quantify the problem, and how to report it so that electoral complaints can be pursued and effective remedies obtained.

**Voter Registration for Local Government Elections in Cambodia**

In 2002, Cambodia will hold local government elections for the first time. Building upon their experience observing voter registration for the 1998 National Assembly elections, three Cambodian umbrella organizations (COMFREL, COFFEL, and NICFEC) deployed monitors in July and August 2001. Their volunteers visited over 10,000 of the approximately 12,000 registration centers. No significant problems were observed at 65% of the registration centers. However, at 34%, monitors discovered technical irregularities. In a press release, the groups raised concerns about inadequate training of registration officials and lack of materials at registration centers. In addition, they argued that more needed to be done to educate the population about the process and the importance of local government elections. When the preliminary voters list was posted across the country, these organizations deployed monitors to interview people who came forward to verify their registration. Both of the exercises were planned as part of preparations for monitoring on election day.

Source: *Joint Statement on the Voter Registration for Commune Council Elections* (Unofficial Translation) by COMFREL, COFFEL and NICFEC

**Discrepancies in the Dominican Republic's Final Voters List**

Early on election day in 1994, party pollwatchers in the Dominican Republic detected eligible voters being turned away from polling stations by election officials without being permitted to vote. It became apparent that the names of many individuals with newly issued voter ID cards were absent from the voters list used by election officials at polling stations. However, shortly before election day pollwatchers had been provided by their parties a copy of the final voters list produced by the election authorities. The names of those people with new voter ID cards who were not permitted to vote, because they did not appear on the voters list used by the election officials, did appear on the copy of the final voters list provided to pollwatchers. International observers, including NDI and the Organization of American States, publicly confirmed that this manipulation of the voters list disproportionately affected opposition supporters and that the number of opposition supporters who were wrongly turned away could have changed the outcome of the election. Investigations confirmed that voters list fraud changed the outcome of the presidential election. A political crisis followed that resulted in changes to the Constitution that ended the declared winner's term after two years and that prevent future presidents from serving two consecutive terms. In addition, changes were made to the voter registration process: photographs, as well as fingerprints, were added to the voters list and ID cards to limit the possibilities for fraud.

Source: *Interim Report: The May 16, 1994 Elections in the Dominican Republic*, by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

## SELECTING AND TRAINING REGISTRATION OFFICIALS

The selection and training of registration officials should be scrutinized by political parties and by civic organizations to ensure that the staff recruited have the necessary skills and are unbiased or politically balanced. In reviewing the process for recruiting registration officials, the following questions should be considered:

- ☑ Is the recruitment process transparent?
- ☑ Does the recruitment process provide supporters of any political party an unfair advantage?
- ☑ Is the recruitment process likely to produce people with the necessary skills and qualifications to serve as registration officials?

The criteria for selecting registration officials should be reviewed to ensure the registration process is politically impartial and does not disproportionately favor or disadvantage any political party, or candidate, nor any particular population group based on ethnicity, language, religion or other status. The actual selection process should be monitored. Names of registration officials should be made public. Parties and civic organizations should make good faith efforts to review them.

Sound training of officials is critical to the proper implementation of voter registration procedures. Parties and civic organizations should therefore seek to monitor the training process by reviewing training materials and by observing training sessions. Gaining access to such materials and sessions may require advocating for inclusion of related transparency provisions in the election law and/or regulations.

A form should be developed for monitoring the training of registration officials. (See the Appendices for sample forms.) Several questions could be included on the form:

- ☑ Were adequate training materials provided to the registration officials?
- ☑ Was adequate time provided for the training?
- ☑ Was attendance by registration officials high?
- ☑ Were any unauthorized individuals at the training? Did they attempt to disrupt or influence the training?
- ☑ Were the trainers knowledgeable?
- ☑ Were the date, time and venue for the training appropriate?
- ☑ Did the training accurately cover registration procedures and respect for the rights of voters, pollwatchers and monitors?
- ☑ Were the registration officials attentive?
- ☑ Did the registration officials seem knowledgeable by the end of the training?
- ☑ Overall, was the training adequate?

# PART THREE

# DEVELOPING A MONITORING STRATEGY

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## DEVELOPING A MONITORING STRATEGY

### OVERALL PLAN

Before engaging in any voter registration monitoring exercise, political parties and civic organizations need to analyze the electoral process and determine what potential threats, if any, exist to the voter registration process. If there is concern that problems may arise or if there is a lack of confidence in voter registration relative to other parts of the election process, then serious consideration should be given to concentrating resources on registration monitoring. The first step in monitoring is to develop a clear plan of action.[4] Ideally, this should be done at least six months or more before voter registration is scheduled to commence if registration is done on a periodic basis, and a year or more before election day if registration is continuous.

In developing a plan, it is important to work in reverse-chronological order. First, determine the final goals of the monitoring effort, then create a timeline by working backward from key dates. Early on, if possible, a series of strategy sessions should be held to discuss the following issues:

- ☑ What concerns might arise during the voter registration process? What monitoring activities might be conducted to alleviate those concerns? How important are these concerns relative to possible problems in other parts of the election process?
- ☑ How do possible efforts to monitor the voter registration process relate to the political party's or civic organization's overall mission or goals?
- ☑ What expectations does the political party or civic organization have for monitoring the voter registration process? What are the public's expectations?
- ☑ What activities are planned for monitoring other phases of the election, and how do those relate to efforts to monitor the voter registration process?
- ☑ What voter education or "Get Out The Vote" (GOTV) activities are also being considered, and how do those relate to efforts to monitor the voter registration process?
- ☑ What human and financial resources are required to conduct different monitoring activities? What resources are already available?
- ☑ What are possible sources for additional human and financial resources if more are required?
- ☑ What steps are required to ensure adequate participation in the effort by women and other traditionally underrepresented groups? What steps are required to ensure gender, ethnic, linguistic balance in the monitoring effort?
- ☑ If problems are identified, what are the steps that are likely to remedy the problems? Who should be approached to take these steps? How should they be approached?
- ☑ Who is likely to resist needed reforms or improvements in the process? How can such opposition be overcome?
- ☑ Who is likely to support reforms or improvements in the process, and how and when should they be approached in order to gain their support?

[4] For an overview of the process of organizing and conducting comprehensive election monitoring, see NDI's Handbook on *How Domestic Organizations Monitor Elections: An A to Z Guide* (NDI: Washington, DC; 1995).

- ☑ How will the public, the election authorities and other political parties or civic organizations be informed about the monitoring effort and about the findings and recommendations that emerge from the exercise?

- ☑ What is the detailed plan for how the monitoring activities will be conducted? Is there a clear work plan for who will do what and when? Is the work plan realistic? Does it provide adequate time to accomplish the necessary tasks?

- ☑ Will monitoring be done throughout the country, or only in particular locations? Is it feasible to monitor throughout the country? Is it politically viable to not monitor throughout the country?

- ☑ Are there other groups with whom a coalition can be formed to monitor the voter registration process? For political parties, are there other parties with which to form an election alliance for monitoring purposes? For civic organizations, are there other nonpartisan groups to include in a monitoring or observation effort?

- ☑ How should the news media be approached to publicize and help achieve the goals of the monitoring effort, and who will be responsible for media relations regarding the effort?

- ☑ What part, if any, might international organizations play in monitoring voter registration? What steps should be taken, if any, to inform representatives of the international community about the monitoring effort?

Beyond these larger issues, the strategic plan must address a variety of practical considerations. From planning sessions, specific proposals need to emerge that address each of the following issues:

Finances – How much money is needed for monitoring voter registration, and where will it come from?

Staff and Volunteers – How many people are needed to organize and implement monitoring activities?

Recruitment and Training – How will staff and volunteers be recruited and trained so that they are able to perform their assigned tasks efficiently and effectively?

Internal Communications and Transport – How will information be shared, and people moved, within the political party or civic organization?

Forms and Computers – How will monitoring information be collected and analyzed?

External Communications – How will information be disseminated to the public?

Reporting and Advocacy – How, in what format, and by whom will analysis be presented to various audiences?

Consolidating Organizational Gains – How will morale be promoted throughout the monitoring effort, information about the monitors be kept, and monitors be integrated into other organizational activities after the monitoring exercise?

## FINANCES

Every effort to monitor voter registration monitoring must have a budget, as well as a plan for securing necessary financing. The type of monitoring activities, the number of staff and volunteers required, travel costs, supplies and equipment purchases, and the amount of time needed must be carefully considered in developing the financial plan. In general, computer tests are the least expensive type of exercise for monitoring the voter registration process because they require only a small staff and, typically, little time. However, they can become costly if computers must be purchased. Monitoring access to the voter registration process and conducting field tests, both list-to-people and people-to-list, can be expensive. However, careful planning can result in creative strategies to conduct effective monitoring with few financial resources. For example, costs can be curtailed by reducing the sample size of a field test of the voters list or by conducting spot checks at only randomly selected registration centers, rather than trying to deploy monitors to every center.

It is important to build safeguards into the monitoring effort in order to maximize limited financial resources while not overspending. The financial aspects of the monitoring exercise should be explained to all involved in the effort, from the project director down to volunteers at the grassroots level. Everyone should have a clear understanding of what financial resources, if any, are available to conduct the tasks assigned to them. Raising necessary funds for monitoring by parties and candidates must be part of a broader campaign finance plan. Civic organizations should consider a variety of possible sources to diversify funding, where possible, and should view reporting as part of gaining credibility and as a means for attracting future funding. Maintaining integrity in raising and expanding funds is integral to establishing credibility for both political parties and civic organizations.

### Staff and Volunteers

Different monitoring activities have different staffing requirements, but all types of monitoring exercises require several key staff:

- A project director who guides the overall effort;
- A legal officer(s) who can seek legal recourse when problems are identified in the registration process;
- A financial officer to oversee the receipt and disbursement of funds;
- A field director(s) to oversee recruitment, training and reporting;
- A data processing team to provide analysis and support in drafting public reports;
- A leadership team to determine how to characterize findings, what improvements to seek and how to advocate for those improvements; and
- A public relations officer to coordinate external communications with the public, election authorities, the media, political parties, domestic observer groups and the international community.

Experience confirms the importance of a balance of men and women in these tasks to guarantee the effectiveness of monitoring efforts. Balance should also be sought between different ethic and linguistic groups for the same reason.

Efforts to assess the criteria for voting, as well as the voter registration framework, essentially require the participation of legal and election experts. These individuals can review the appropriate documents, meet with relevant individuals and institutions and draft a report on their findings and recommendations. An additional network of staff and volunteers is generally not needed for such activities. Similarly, reviewing materials developed for training registration officials and observing training sessions for officials would require relatively few well-trained monitors. Beyond this, staff will need to conduct follow-on activities after the exercise and maintain contact with those at the grassroots level for future monitoring and other efforts.

In contrast, monitoring access to the voter registration process and conducting field tests (list-to-people and people-to-list) require a significant number of staff and volunteers. For these types of monitoring activities, national, regional and local coordinators will need to be identified. These individuals will be responsible for organization, internal communications and management. They will recruit, train and deploy volunteer monitors, and they will establish internal communications and transport networks to distribute monitoring materials and forms, as well as to collect completed reports.

Scrutinizing activities at voter registration centers necessitates recruiting and training monitors. The number of registration centers that are to be observed, the amount of time monitors are to spend at each registration center and the amount of money available will determine how many monitors are required. Ideally, teams of two should spend the entire day at each selected registration center. These monitors will likely need to be paid a small stipend to cover food and, possibly, transport expenses. Often such exer-

cises involve thousands of monitors supported by a large number of national, regional and local coordinators.

Monitoring the enumeration of eligible voters also requires teams of two to observe selected enumeration teams. The number of monitors needed will depend upon the number of enumeration teams to be observed on a given day. Monitors may also be placed at offices from which enumerators are dispatched and to which they submit their reports.

A population's size, density and demographics, as well as the amount of time and money available to the party or organization, will determine the number of monitors that will be required to conduct either a list-to-people or people-to-list field test. In a small country where most of the people live in large cities and where travel is easy, each monitor can seek out several individuals sampled from the voters list. Therefore, field tests will require a relatively small staff. However, in a large country with important sub-populations, where most people live in rural areas and where travel is difficult, each monitor likely will be able to interview only a few individuals from the list. Thus, the exercise will require a larger staff.

If monitors must be paid, this can be done on a daily basis or per form completed. In some cases, the amount paid per form from rural areas should be higher than that paid for a form from an urban area because of the greater ease in collecting the necessary information in urban areas. In general, paying monitors per day is advisable in order to reduce incentives to artificially inflate the number of forms submitted and in order to decrease errors in data recorded due to haste.

In addition to coordinators and monitors, a statistician and/or a demographer may be needed to determine where to deploy and to analyze the data. If data collected are to be entered into a computer for analysis, a computer specialist will be needed to oversee data entry and tabulation. Clerks or typists will also be needed to perform the actual data entry.

Computer tests of the voter registry do not require national, regional or local coordinators or volunteer monitors. Beyond a project manager, legal counsel, financial officer, and public relations officer, computer tests only require computer specialists to design the software necessary to conduct the tests and a demographer to help interpret the data.

## Recruitment and Training

Once the specific monitoring tasks are planned (for example, analyzing legal criteria for voting, monitoring access of voters to the registration process, conducting computer tests of the voters list, mounting list-to-people and/or people-to-list checks, and monitoring claims and objections procedures), the numbers of people needed, as well as their range of skills, language needs and demographic characteristics should be identified.

It is important to consider the role of women in every aspect of the registration monitoring effort. Women should be included in leadership roles, as public spokespersons, and monitors at registration centers. Efforts should be made to ensure that voter education efforts reach female as well as male voters. Language, age and ethnic background should also be considered when recruiting staff and conducting activities.

First, the lead staff of the monitoring effort should be put in place. They usually come from within the party or civic organization or from experienced volunteers. The same is true of legal, statistical, computer and communications specialists. Monitors who watch registration centers during initial registration or during the claims and objections period, as well as monitors who conduct list-to-people and people-to-list checks, must be recruited more broadly. It is usually best to begin such broad recruitment within the party or civic organization if it has a broad membership or volunteer base. Next, it is best to consider places where people are already organized, such as trade unions, religious groups, women's organizations, student associations and other civil society groups. Recruitment may also be done through advertisements to the general public.

No matter where the recruitment activity is directed, it is necessary to present a short and clear message that

conveys the objectives of the monitoring effort and why it is important. The message must also outline the activities monitors will conduct and must make a specific request for the individuals to commit to joining the effort. Sign-up forms and information sheets about training times and locations should be presented. Recruitment exercises should always take specific steps during training sessions to ask monitors to recruit family members, friends and coworkers; once people understand what they are going to do and see its importance, they become natural recruiters.

Everyone involved in the monitoring effort requires an overview of what the project is, why it is being undertaken, what part they will play in the exercise and how the findings and recommendations will be used. In the case of monitoring access to the registration process and conducting field tests of the voters list, both of which require a large number of staff and volunteers, a "training of trainers" program is likely to be needed so that monitors at the grassroots level have a clear understanding of key information:

- Their role;
- The information they need to collect;
- How they are to gather that information; and
- How they are to report about what they have monitored.

Training materials will also need to be drafted, and interactive learning techniques, such as role-play simulation, will need to be developed.

In the case of monitoring access to the voter registration process, monitors need to know several pieces of information:

- Where the registration center(s) is located;
- When it is supposed to be open;
- What materials and equipment the center needs;
- What the criteria for eligibility to vote are;
- What documentation is required in order to demonstrate one's eligibility; and
- The specific procedures for registering to vote.

It is only by knowing what is supposed to happen that monitors will be able to know when something has gone wrong with the process.

It is not the role of monitors to interfere with the registration process. Rather, their responsibility is to be present, observe, document and report back. Political party monitors, however, may have the power to enter objections and seek corrections, depending on the law. Trainers should also discuss ways that prospective voters or political parties may seek remedies for problems in the registration process. In order to ensure that quality data are collected, observers should receive training on how to complete the monitoring forms and when to return them to headquarters for analysis.

For field tests, both list-to-people and people-to-list, monitors will require specific training on how to carry out their tasks. The methodology for collecting data needs to be explained so that all information is gathered in a consistent manner, and monitors need to be given several tools:

- Information on the area of the country for which they are responsible;
- Forms to complete for each person whom they attempt to find;
- Explanations of exactly how to complete the forms; and
- Instructions on how to send their completed forms to a central location for processing.

### Internal Communications and Transport

For efforts to monitor access to the registration process and for list-to-people and people-to-list field tests, a system is required for sending information to the monitors in the field, as well as for receiving completed forms back from them. This network will have to permit the quick

movement of information from a central location to all parts of the country and back again. It may require the use of fax machines, telephones, cell phones, satellite phones, and/or high frequency radios as well as bikes, motorcycles, cars, planes, boats and public transportation. Lines of communication need to be clearly defined and contingency plans in place in the event that the normal means of communication fail.

Systems will have to be developed for moving people as well as information. The monitoring project may require monitors to be deployed at specific registration centers or to interview people in a particular area. Provisions need to be made to move people around the country to meet monitoring requirements.

Often local, regional and national coordinators require some form of transport to be able to manage the monitoring exercise and to perform quality-control activities. These transport systems may rely on personal or public transportation.

It is also important that everyone within the political party or civic organization be informed about the registration monitoring exercise, its priority and how it fits into other organizational activities. This will increase internal cooperation and reduce the potential for confusion about why people, equipment and finances are being assigned to the effort. Such awareness can also assist recruitment efforts.

### Forms and Computers

In the case of efforts to monitor access to the registration process, as well as field tests (list-to-people and people-to-list) of the voters list, forms should be designed to make the task of the monitors easy. Simple, easy-to-read forms will also make the job of data entry quicker and result in fewer data entry errors.

The forms should contain clear instructions. Instead of open-ended, fill-in-the-blank questions, monitors should be given a list of options from which to choose by simply checking a box. When possible yes/no questions should be used. Some space should be provided, however, so that monitors can report in detail any problems or unusual circumstances that they encounter.

When possible, forms should be pre-printed with information to help the monitor identify the correct registration center or individual. Thus, for list-to-people field tests, the forms ideally should be pre-printed with the name and other identifying information for each individual included in the sample. (The Appendices include sample forms for adaptation by political parties and civic organizations monitoring the voter registration process.)

Once completed and received from the field, the forms ideally need to be entered into a computer database or spreadsheet. A specialist should be hired to set up a system for this and to oversee data entry. Computers are required, at least on a rental or borrowed basis, as well as short-term clerks or typists for data entry. A training program should be conducted with simulation exercises for data entry personnel.

Depending on the length and design of the form, one clerk can enter approximately 30 forms per hour into a computer, for up to a total of eight hours a day with necessary rest periods. If, for example, 2000 individuals are included in the sample, it is likely that five clerks each using his or her own computer, could enter all of the data in two days. Ideally, each form should be entered into a computer twice to ensure that any data entry errors can be quickly caught and corrected. This will double the number of clerks and computers required. Data can be tabulated without computers, but this will take considerably longer and is more prone to human error.

### External Communications

Specific thought must be given to external communications. Lines of communication should be established with the election authorities, political parties, domestic monitoring groups and international organizations. A strategy for interacting with each of these groups (and subgroups) should be formulated. A public relations officer should be hired specifically to manage external communications for the monitoring effort.

Beyond this, every monitoring effort should have a media plan. Public confidence cannot be built, nor abuses exposed, if findings are not communicated to the public through the media.

The effort should be explained to the media in advance, in most instances. The methodology should be explained so that media understand the basis of findings when they are presented. Reports on the registration monitoring effort, along with findings and constructive recommendations, should be presented to the media as well as to electoral officials and others. This can help strengthen the role of the media as watchdogs of the electoral process and can attract public attention to the political party or civic organization that is conducting the monitoring project. The resulting publicity will likely help deter attempts to manipulate the process and may minimize mistakes as officials become conscious of the monitoring effort.

It is important to keep in mind that all monitoring reports should be intended to help advance the integrity of the election process. In general, communications should reinforce this message. (See "Reporting and Advocacy".) It is useful to treat all external communication, whether to the media, election officials, political parties, or domestic and international monitors as "on the record." Each group is likely to use information on registration monitoring in keeping with its perspective on the election process. Reports of findings, therefore, should always be impartial, factually accurate and verifiable. At the same time, public relations activities should be conducted professionally, in light of the goals and objectives of the monitoring initiative.

## Reporting and Advocacy

A critical part of any monitoring effort is what is done with the information once it is collected. The sharing of findings and recommendations is the mechanism by which political parties and civic organizations can help reduce uncertainty about the electoral process, build confidence when the process is going well, make constructive suggestions about how the process can be improved when there are concerns, and expose irregularities and fraud when they occur. Thought needs to be given throughout any monitoring exercise to a strategy for reporting and to an advocacy plan for rectifying any problems uncovered.

Reporting should not be seen as a one-time event. Usually, periodic reporting on the many steps of the voter registration process is more useful. Reports should help advance the integrity of the registration process and the overall election. Reports should also be made early enough in the process so that election officials have time to take action to address any problems or concerns identified.

Before a monitoring exercise is conducted, consideration should be given to the range of possible findings. Brainstorming should be done well in advance to determine what action might be taken given different sets of findings. A variety of scenarios should be identified, along with the relative likelihood of each outcome. For each scenario, the steps to be taken and possible recommendations to be made should be discussed. The goal of any action should be to help ensure a credible and meaningful electoral process. By thinking about these issues at the very beginning of a monitoring exercise, and by periodically reviewing strategy and tactics along the way, political parties and civic organizations will be better prepared to effectively use the information they collect.

There are many different ways to report findings and recommendations from a monitoring initiative:

*A Press Statement or Release* is typically issued to briefly summarize the methodology, findings and recommendations of the exercise. Such documents can be useful in quickly informing a large number of people about the quality of the voter registration process.

*A Longer Detailed Report* is drafted, in some cases, to describe the monitoring effort. When there is little trust in the electoral system, and perhaps in the monitoring effort, a detailed report can add credibility to the findings and recommendations of the monitoring exercise. A longer report can also serve as documentation so that the activity can be replicated in future elections.

*Verbal Reports* permit political parties and civic organizations to deliver their findings and recommendations to election authorities and political leaders in a setting that allows an exchange of views, sometimes informally, about how improvements to the process can be achieved. This is sometimes done before or immediately after reports are made public.

Reporting and follow-on advocacy efforts should be designed to promote genuine and meaningful elections. Developing approaches to remedying problems in the voter registration process requires fostering constructive relationships with election officials and with other governmental authorities when possible. It is also necessary to consider developing allies to help achieve improvements or remedies. Allies can be found among other political parties, civic organizations, the international community and other sectors. Reporting, therefore, should be part of a broader monitoring strategy.

It is essential to target advocacy efforts to achieve specific, effective, remedies for particular problems identified in different aspects of the voter registration process. For example:

- Inappropriate discrimination in the definition of voter eligibility requires law reform activities, such as amending legislation, changing regulations, or obtaining court rulings;

- Omissions during the registration of women, of people who have recently attained voting age, or of those who speak a particular language require an extension of the registration exercise and/or an extensive claims and objections effort; and

- An Inflated voters list due to failure to remove deceased persons, those who have moved abroad, or fictitious or duplicate names requires purging the list and re-verification.

## CONSOLIDATING ORGANIZATIONAL GAINS

Every effort at monitoring voter registration and other election and political processes entails developing specific knowledge and skills, as well as furthering organizational structures through recruitment, training and communications. New leaders will emerge, as new party or civic activists are recruited to conduct monitoring. These people and their skills, as well as the monitoring structures built, can be employed to accomplish other goals and activities. For political parties, such activities may include campaigning, organizing a Get Out The Vote (GOTV) program and election day pollwatching. For civic organizations, these activities may include voter education, encouraging citizens to participate in the electoral process and conducting other monitoring, watchdog and advocacy efforts.

As with other campaigns, monitoring registration should include specific steps to maintain high morale throughout the effort and to reward new leaders, activists and volunteers by thanking them for their work; celebrating accomplishments; providing opportunities to share suggestions, lessons learned and ideas for future action; and asking these people to take on new responsibilities once their original task is complete.

Contact information for monitors should be maintained, along with the task they performed. Party or civic organization leaders should actively promote leaders that emerge through monitoring efforts. Parties and civic organizations must have a plan of action beyond the monitoring exercise and a process for integrating organizational gains from the monitoring into such plans.

Consolidation efforts should also include solidifying relationships with allies gained or reinforced through the monitoring effort, such as parties, civic organizations, the news media and the international community. Consolidation efforts should also include meeting with each of these sectors and mapping out future activities where there are common interests in advancing the democratic process. There is nothing that is more appreciated than saying thank you and recognizing a job well done to those who have helped and supported the monitoring effort.

# APPENDICES

# SAMPLE MATERIALS

# Appendices – Sample Materials

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**Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process** **Generic**
Sample Form (Front)

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you are being sent to a registration center to observe the process of registering voters. On [insert date], you should go to the registration center assigned to you. You should arrive there at [insert time] before the registration center opens and remain there throughout the day until [insert time]. On this form you should document your observations. Remember that the registration officials are in charge of the process. Do not disrupt registration. If you are concerned that an individual is wrongly being turned away or wrongly being permitted to register, you should bring this, respectfully, to the attention of the individual in charge of the center. This form will be collected by your supervisor.

*Please write clearly because many people will read this form. Thank you for your assistance.*

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Name of Monitor | | | | | | |
| 2. Registration center's name and location | | | | | | |
| 3. Registration center's number | | | | | | |
| 4. Date you visited the registration center | Time | | Day | | Month | |
| 5. Name of official in charge of the registration center | | | | | | |
| 6. Was the registration center open? | | | | | Yes | No |
| 7. If Yes, what time did the registration center open? | | | | | Time | |
| 8. When was the center originally scheduled to open? | | | Day | | Month | |
| 9. On what date did the registration center first open? | | | Day | | Month | |
| 10. Has the center been forced to close for any reason? | | | | | Yes | No |
| 11. If Yes, why has the center been forced to close? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | | | | |
| 12. If Yes, how long has the center been closed? | | | | | Days | |
| 13. How many people are expected to register at the center? | | | | | | |
| 14. How many people had already registered at the center when you arrived? | | | | | | |
| 15. How many people register during the day you observed registration? | | | | | | |
| 16. Did the election official correctly follow the registration procedures? | | | | | Yes | No |
| 17. If No, what did the election officials do wrong? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | | | | |
| 18. Did you witness any attempt to bribe or intimidate any prospective voter or registration official, in or around the registration center? | | | | | Yes | No |
| 19. If Yes, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | | | | |

SAMPLE FORMS FOR MONITORING ACCESS

**Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process** **Generic**
Sample Form (Back)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20. Was anyone permitted to register who you thought was ineligible? | | Yes | No |
| 21. If Yes, how many? | | | |
| 22. Was anyone not allowed to register who you thought as eligible? | | Yes | No |
| 23. If Yes, how many? | | | |
| 24. Was every individual who was registered given a receipt (if applicable)? | | Yes | No |
| 25. If No, how many? | | | |
| 26. Was a photograph taken of every individual who registered (if applicable)? | | Yes | No |
| 27. Was a finger print taken of every individual who registered to vote (if applicable)? | | Yes | No |
| 28. Were there representatives of political parties or civic organizations present at the registration center? | | Yes | No |
| 29. If Yes, which political parties or civic organizations? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | |
| 30. Were any formal complaints lodged about the registration process? | | Yes | No |
| 31. If Yes, what complaints were filed? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | |
| 32. Monitor Signature and Date | | | |

*Use the rest of this form to write detailed notes about problems that you have witnessed at the registration center. If necessary use additional paper to record your observations.*

**Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process** **Lesotho**
Sample Form used by All Political Parties (Front)

## Form for Political Parties Monitoring Voter Registration
## Lesotho 2001

*Instructions*

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you are being sent by your political party to a registration centre to observe the process of registering voters. On this form you should document your observations. Remember that the registration officials are in charge of the process. Do not disrupt registration. If you have a concern that someone is wrongly being turned away or wrongly being permitted to register you should bring this to the attention of the person in charge of the registration centre. This form will be collected by your party supervisor.

*Please write clearly as many people will read this form. Remember to sign this form.*
*Thank you for your assistance in this monitoring effort.*

1. Name of monitor (your name) _____
2. Your political party _____
3. Registration centre's name and location _____
4. Registration centre's constituency _____
5. Name of official in charge of the registration centre _____
6. Date you visited the registration centre _____
7. What time did you arrive at the registration centre? _____
8. Did the centre open at all today? Yes No

8a. If No, why did the centre <u>not</u> open today?

*If the centre did not open today then you are finished.*

9. Did the centre open on time? Yes No
10. Has the centre been forced to close before today? Yes No

10a. If Yes, for how many days has the centre been forced to close? _____

10b. If Yes, has the centre been forced to close due to a lack of staff? Yes No

10c. If Yes, has the centre been forced to close due to a lack of materials? Yes No

10d. If Yes, which materials were missing?

11. Including today, how many days has the centre been open? _____
12. How many people had registered at the centre <u>before today</u>? _____
13. How many people had registered at the centre <u>today</u>? _____

**Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process Form** **Lesotho**
Sample Form used by All Political Parties (Back)

14. Did the officials correctly follow the registration procedures? Yes No
15. Did the officials conduct themselves impartially and professionally? Yes No

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16. | Was anyone permitted to register who had ultraviolet indelible ink on his/her hands? | Yes | No | If Yes, how many? _____ |
| 17. | Was anyone permitted to register who did not have identification documents or a competent witness who verified his/her identity? | Yes | No | If Yes, how many? _____ |
| 18. | Was anyone permitted to register who was not yet 18 years old? | Yes | No | If Yes, how many? _____ |
| 19. | Was anyone permitted to register who was not a Lesotho citizen? | Yes | No | If Yes, how many? _____ |
| 20. | Was anyone no allowed to register who you thought was eligible? | Yes | No | If Yes, how many? _____ |
| 21. | Was a fingerprint taken of everyone who was permitted to register? | Yes | No | If No, how many? _____ |
| 22. | Was a photograph take of everyone who was permitted to register? | Yes | No | If No, how many? _____ |
| 23. | Was indelible ultraviolet Ink applied to a finger of everyone who registered? | Yes | No | If No, how many? _____ |
| 24. | Was everyone given a slip (receipt) when they registered? | Yes | No | If No, how many? _____ |

25. Did anyone attempt to disrupt registration? Yes No
26. Including today, how many days has the centre been open? _____

*Use the rest of this form and additional paper to write detailed notes about problems that you may have witnessed at the registration centre.*

Signature Date

**Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process** **Malawi**
Sample Form used by the Church/NGO Consortium (Front)

## Malawi Presidential and National Assembly Elections 1999
## Assessing the Voter Registration Process

*Go to the registration centre you are assigned to on the day you get this form. If you can not get the information needed that day, try again every day up to and including Monday, 12 April.*

1. Monitor Name _____
2. District _____
3. Constituency _____
4. Registration Centre _____
5. Name of the person in the Church/NGO Consortium from whom you received this form? _____
6. Date you received this form? _____
7. Date you visited the registration centre and got the information needed to fill in the form? _____
8. Time you arrived at the registration centre? _____
9. Was the registration centre open when you went there? Yes No
   *If the registration centre was not open skip to Question 19.*

10. Name of the person who was in charge of the registration centre when you visited? _____
11. Date the registration centre first opened? _____
12. Has the registration centre been forced to close because of a lack of forms? Yes No
13. Has the registration centre been forced to close because photos could not be taken of those coming to register? Yes No
14. Since the registration centre first opened, how many total days has the centre been forced to close? _____
15. How many people have register to vote at the registration centre? (See the Registration Supervisor or DRAF) _____
16. How many people have not been permitted to register to vote at the registration centre? (See the Registration Supervisor or DRAF) _____
17. Were calendars entitle "Konzani Tsogolo Lanu" at the registration centre? Yes No
18. Were representatives of political parties at the registration centre monitoring the process? Yes No

*Use the back of this form to describe any problems you observed at or near the registration centre.*

Signature Date

**Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process** **Malawi**
Sample Form used by the Church/NGO Consortium (Back)

*Use this space to describe any problems you observed at or near the registration centre.*

**Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process** **Nicaragua**
Sample Form used by Etica y Transparencia 96 (ET 96) (Spanish) (Front)

## Observacion de Inscripcion Ad Hoc
## Desde Afera

Lugar de Observación _____ Número de JRV _____
Municipio _____ Departamento _____
Fecha _____

1. Hora de arribo a JRV _____
2. Número de policias presentes en la JRV _____
3. ¿Cuántos de ellos estaban armadas? _____
4. ¿Cuántas personas hicieron fila (aproximadamente)? _____
5. Tiempo promedio para inscripción por persona _____

**CONTESTE SI O NO. SI LA RESPUESTA ES NO, PROPORCIONE DETALLES AL REVERSO DE LA HOJA.**

6. ¿Había rôtulo visible que indicaba que esa era JRV? Si No
7. ¿Había orden fuera del local? Si No
8. ¿Una vez inscritos, fué entregado a cada ciudadano una libreta cívica? Si No
9. ¿Se permitió la inscripción de todos los que asistieron a la JRV? Si No
10. ¿Fueron cordiales sus relaciones con las autoridades? Si No
11. ¿Era seguro el lugar donde se encontraba la JRV? Si No
12. ¿Estaba ubicada la JRV tal como lo establece la ley? Si No
13. ¿Notó la presencia de algún coordinador o delegado municipal? Si No
14. ¿Fue publicada la lista de ciudadanos inscritos los 2do, 3er y 4to días? Si No
    Detallar número de personas _____

**CONTESTE SI O NO. SI LA RESPUESTA ES SI, PROPORCIONE DETALLES AL REVERSO DE LA HOJA.**

15. ¿Tiene Ud. alguna prueba irrefutable de que la inscripción no se realizó de acuerdo a la ley? Si No
16. ¿Hubo alguién que tardó más de 45 minutos en llegar a la JRV? Si No
17. ¿Hubo evidencia de intimidación? Si No
18. ¿Hubo quejas sobre seguridad? Si No
19. ¿Hubo propaganda de partidos políticos en/alrededor de la JRV? Si No
20. ¿Se presentó algún caso donde los testigos fueron rechazados? Si No
21. ¿Si Usted tuvo la oportunidad de hablar con las personas que se registraban, conocen alguna persona que quedó sin inscribirse y saben porqué? Si No

**Monitoring Access to the Voter Registration Process** **Nicaragua**
Sample Form used by Etica y Transparencia 96 (ET 96) (Spanish) (Back)

**SUBRAYE LA(S) RESPUESTA(S) QUE CORRESPONDAN**

22. Si Usted tuvo la oportunidad de hablar con las personas que se registraban, ¿como supieron ellas que ese era el lugar y la fecha, por qué medios se enteraron?:

a. Radio b. Televisión c. Vista del CSE d. Ong: _____
e. Iglésia: _____ f. Partido Político: _____ g. Otro: _____

Si su respuesta a las preguntas del 6 al 14 fue No, explique en el siguiente párrafo el porque de su respuesta, especifcando el número exacto de la pregunta a la cual se está refiriendo. DETALLE.

Si su respuesta a las preguntas del 15 al 21 fue SI, explique en el siguiente párrafo el porque de su respuesta. Especificando el número exacto de la pregunta a la cual se está refiriendo. DETALLE.

Nombre de Oservador

Firma del Observador

**Monitoring State-Initiated Voter Registration (Enumeration)** **Generic**
Sample Form (Front)

SAMPLE FORM FOR MONITORING ENUMERATION

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you will accompany an enumeration team as it travels door-to-door registering people to vote. For each day you are with the enumeration team you should record your observation on a separate monitoring form. Remember that the enumeration team is in charge of the process. Do not disrupt registration. If you are concerned that people are wrongly being registered to vote or incorrectly not being allowed to register you should, in a respectful manner, bring this to the attention to the person in charge of the enumeration team.

*This form will be collected by your supervisor on [insert day, time and place]. Please write clearly because many people will read this form. Thank you for your assistance with this monitoring effort.*

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Name of Monitor | | | | | |
| 2. Enumeration Team's Number | | | | | |
| 3. Leader of the Enumeration Team | | | | | |
| 4. Names of Other Team Members | | | | | |
| 5. Date you observed the enumeration team | | Day | | Month | |
| 6. Time you joined the enumeration team | | | | Time | |
| 7. Time the enumeration team started work | | | | Time | |
| 8. How many people had the enumeration team registered to vote before today? | | | | | |
| 9. Did the enumeration team go door-to-door to register voters today? | | | | Yes | No |
| 10. How many house/homes did the enumeration team visit today? | | | | | |
| 11. How many people did the enumeration team register to vote today? | | | | | |
| 12. How many people who wanted to register to vote were not permitted to by the enumeration today? | | | | | |
| 13. Was anyone not permitted to register to vote who you thought was eligible? | | | | Yes | No |
| 14. If Yes, how many? | | | | | |
| 15. If Yes, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | | | |
| 16. Was anyone registered to vote by the enumeration team who you thought was ineligible? | | | | Yes | No |
| 17. If Yes, how many? | | | | | |
| 18. If Yes, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | | | |

**Monitoring State-Initiated Voter Registration (Enumeration)** **Generic**
Sample Form (Back)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 19. Did anyone attempt to interfere with the work of the enumeration team? | | Yes | No |
| 20. If Yes, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | |
| 21. Did you witness any attempt to bribe or intimidate any voter or member of the enumeration team? | | Yes | No |
| 22. If Yes, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | |
| 23. Did the members of enumeration team behave in a politically impartial manner? | | Yes | No |
| 24. If No, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | |
| 25. Did the members of the enumeration team follow the registration procedures correctly? | | Days | |
| 26. If No, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | |
| 27. Was everyone who registered to vote given a receipt (if applicable)? | | Yes | No |
| 28. If No, how many? | | | |
| 29. Was a photography taken of everyone who registered to vote (if applicable)? | | | |
| 30. Was a finger print taken of everyone who registered to vote (if applicable)? | | | |
| 31. Were there representatives of political parties or civic organizations present with the enumeration team? | | | |
| 32. If Yes, which political parties or civic organizations? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | |
| 33. Were any formal complaints lodged about the registration process? | | Yes | No |
| 34. If Yes, what complaints were filed? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | |
| 35. Time the enumeration team finished working | | Time | |
| 36. Time you left the enumeration team | | Time | |
| 37. Monitor Signature and Date | | | |

*Use the rest a separate piece of paper to detailed any problems that you have witnessed with the enumeration team.*

**Monitoring Training of Registration Staff** **Generic**
Sample Form (Front)

SAMPLE FORM FOR MONITORING TRAINING OF REGISTRATION STAFF

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you are being sent to observe a training session for registration staff. On [insert date], you should got to the training location you have been assigned and monitor the training of registration staff. You should stay at the training session from start to finish. Document your observations on this form. Do not disrupt the training session.

*This form will be collected by your supervisor on [insert day, time and place]. Please write clearly because many people will read this form. Thank you for your assistance with this monitoring effort.*

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Name of Monitor | | | | | |
| 2. Location of Training Session | | | | | |
| 3. Trainer(s) Name(s) | | | | | |
| 4. Date of the Training Session | | Day | | Month | |
| 5. Were the date, time and venue for the training appropriate? | | | | Yes | No |
| 6. If No, explain? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | | | |
| 7. How long did the training last? | | | | | |
| 8. Was there adequate time provided for the training? | | | | Yes | No |
| 9. Were the trainers knowledgeable? | | | | Yes | No |
| 10. If No, explain? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | | | |
| 11. Were the training materials adequate? | | | | Yes | No |
| 12. If No, explain? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | | | |
| 13. Did the training accurately explain the registration process? | | | | Yes | No |
| 14. If No, explain? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | | | |
| 15. Did the training accurately explain the requirements to be eligible to register to vote? | | | | Yes | No |
| 16. If No, explain? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | | | |

**Monitoring Training of Registration Staff** **Generic**
Sample Form (Back)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17. Did the training accurately explain the rights of voters during the voter registration process? | | Yes | No |
| 18. If No, explain? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | |
| 19. Did the training accurate explain the rights of monitors (from political parties or civic organizations) during the voter registration process? | | Yes | No |
| 20. If No, describe the circumstances? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | |
| 21. Were the registration staff attentive during the training session? | | Yes | No |
| 22. Overall was the training adequate? | | Yes | No |
| 23. Monitor Signature and Date | | | |

*Use the rest of this form to write detailed notes about positive aspects or problems that you witnessed during the training session. If necessary, use additional paper to record your observations.*

**Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test** **Generic**
Sample Form (Front)

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you are being sent to find people whose names appear on the voters list. You have been provided a separate document with the names and address of individuals selected at random from the voters list. You should try at least once every day for [insert number of days, e.g., four] days [insert days, e.g., Friday through Monday] to locate each individual. If you cannot find the address, ask in the area if anyone knows the address of the person. If you find the address, but the person no longer resides there, attempt to discover the individual's new address. In either case, if you learn a new address for the individual, record it, and go to that address to attempt to locate him or her if it is close by. If the address is far away, report the person's name and new address to your supervisor so that someone in that area can attempt to located the individual. If the person lives at the address but is not home, you should leave a message and try to arrange a time to meet. On the morning after this exercise you need to return all of your forms (filled out) to your supervisor.

*Please write clearly because many people will read this form*
*Thank you for your assistance with this monitoring effort?*

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Name of Monitor | | | |
| 2. Name of the person you are attempting to locate as contained in the voters list | | | |
| 3. Address of the person you are attempting to located as contained in the voters list | | | |
| 4. Voter ID number of the person you are attempting to locate as contained in the voters list | | | |
| 5. Were you ultimately able to find the person? | | Yes | No |
| *If Yes, to Question 5, go to Question 6; otherwise, go to Question 16 on the back of this form.* | | | |
| 6. Is the person eligible to vote? | | Yes | No |
| 7. If No, explain why not | | | |
| 8. Did the person live at the address contained in the voters list? | | Yes | No |
| 9. If No, write in the person's correct address | | | |
| 10. Did the person's voter ID number from the voters list match the voter ID number on his/her voter ID card? | | Yes | No |
| 11. If No, write in the voter ID number from the person's voter ID card | | | |
| 10. Was the person's name from the voters list spelled correctly? | | Yes | No |
| 11. If No, write in the correct spelling of the person's name | | | |

**Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test** **Generic**
Sample Form (Back)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 12. Was the person's gender as recorded on the voters list correct? | | Yes | No |
| 13. If No, write in the person's correct gender | | | |
| 14. Was the person's date of birth as recorded on the voters list correct? | | Yes | No |
| 15. If No, write in the person's correct date of birth | | | |
| 16. Which of the following statements best describes what you learned about the address contained in the voters list for the person you were trying to locate? | | | |
| a) The address did not exist.<br>b) The address exists, but the individual never lived there.<br>c) The address exists and the individual used to live there, but the individual moved to another address – which you were able to learn.<br>c) The address exists and the individual used to live there, but the individual moved to another address – which you were unable to learn.<br>d) The address exists, but the person was temporarily away.<br>e) The address exists and the individual was there. | | | |
| 17. Which of the following statements best describes what you learned about the person you were trying to located? | | | |
| a) Nothing was learned about the person.<br>b) The person is eligible and registered to vote.<br>b) The person is eligible to vote, but did not register to vote.<br>d) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she has died.<br>e) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she is too young.<br>f) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she is not a citizen.<br>g) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she does not live in the country.<br>h) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she has been ruled not mentally competent (if applicable).<br>i) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she is in prison (if applicable).<br>j) The person is not eligible to vote because he/she is a member of the military (if applicable). | | | |
| 18. Monitor's Signature & Date | | | |
| 19. Person's Signature & Date | | | |

**Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test** **Azerbaijan**
Sample Form used by For the Sake of Civil Society (Front)

## Voter Registration People-to-List Audit (Test)

District Number _____
District Name _____
Precinct Number _____
Supervisor _____

**I. Case Information**

List Number on the Official List _____
Voter's full name (as it appears on the list) _____
Passport Number _____
Address _____

**II. Voter Is At Address**

Were the particulars correct? Yes No
If yes, how were they verified? _____
What verification? Passport Form 9 Military Ticket Other _____

If particulars were not correct, please describe the problem.

**III. Voter Is Not Living At This Address**

Voter Has Moved? Yes No
Where did the voter move? _____
When did the voter move? _____
Who did you speak with to verify this? Family Member Neighbor Friend Co-worker Other

Please include the name and address of anyone you spoke with to get verification. If possible, include passport number. Be sure you talk to at least two independent people.

Verification #1 (Date, Time, Name, Address and Passport Number)

Verification #2 (Date, Time, Name, Address and Passport Number)

**Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test** **Azerbaijan**
Sample Form used by For the Sake of Civil Society (Back)

**IV. Voter Is Dead – Death Certificate Copy Obtained**

A copy should be made of the Notary Office and attached to this form.

**V. Voter Is Dead – Death Certificate Not Obtained**

How was the death verified? _____

If observer saw death certificate, but was unable to obtain a copy who has verified the death?

Verification #1 (Name, Date, Time and Relations to Deceased)

Verification #2 (Name, Date, Time and Relations to Deceased)

If no death certificate was obtained, what was the date, time and place of the voter's death?

What was the serial number on the death certificate? _____

Which Registry Office has the death certificate? _____

What are the names of the officials who signed the document? _____

**VI. Record of Verification Activities**

Number of attempts made to verify information on this voter. If you have not been able to verify a case after three attempts, call your supervisor or the ACI office.

1. Time and Date _____ Resolved Not Resolved
   What Happend? _____
2. Time and Date _____ Resolved Not Resolved
   What Happend? _____
3. Time and Date _____ Resolved Not Resolved
   What Happend? _____

*Please use this space and additional paper if necessary to describe in detail any problems you had in verifying this case.*

Signature Date

**Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test** **Guyana**
Sample Form used by the Electoral Assistance Bureau (Front)

## Validation of the Voters List

Question No.

Form 1. Work in the field Sample Number: _____ ☐☐☐☐ 1 - 4

Area Type: _____ ☐ 5

Information from the list

Last Name: _____

Other Names: _____

Address: _____

Was the person located: YES/NO ☐ 6

If YES, Complete the following information:

Id Number: _____ ☐ 7

Occupation: _____ ☐ 8

Date of birth: _____ ☐ 9

day month year

Over 18: YES/NO ☐ 10

Was the person visited by an enumerator? YES/NO ☐ 11

Did the person register for the election? YES/NO ☐ 12

Did the person register at a registration centre YES/NO ☐ 13

Any other comments: _____

_____

If answer to question 6 is NO, tick for which reason: ☐☐ 14-15

1. No such address.
2. No reply at the address.
3. Person not at home.
4. No such person resident at given address.
5. Person has migrated.
6. Person temporarily out of the country.
7. Person has migrated.
8. Person has died.
9. Person refused to answer or co-operate.
10. Other reason (please state): _____

_____

Please get signature or mark:

Signature of interviewee: _____

Signature of field worker: _____

---

For Office Use

Information tallies with electoral list: YES/NO ☐ 16

Signature of checker: _____

**Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test** **Guyana**
Sample Form used by the Electoral Assistance Bureau (Back)

[Intentionally Left Blank]

**Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test** **Peru**
Sample Form used by Transparencia (Spanish) (Front)

**Ficha de Verificatción Del Padrón Electoral 2001**
**Asociación Civil Transparencia – Jurado Nacional de Elecciones**

| DEPARTAMENTO | PROVINCIA | DISTRITO |
|---|---|---|
| NOMBRES | APELLIDO PATERNO | APELLIDO MATERNO |

DIRECCION

OCUPACION

| L.E. | D.N.I. | FECHA DE NACIMIENTO | SEXO |
|---|---|---|---|

**En visita que hizo a la dirección indicada se encontró que:**

1. La persona si se encontró en la dirección indicada SI NO
2. Si la respuesta fue NO, marque con una X en las siguientes opciones:

a. La persona se ha mudado ☐
Se mudó a:
Calle/Pasaje
Distrito
Provincia
Departamento
Pais

b. La persona nunca ha vivido en esta dirección. ☐

c. No se encontró en este momento. ☐
Próxima visita:
Fecha Hora

d. La dirección consignada no existe.

e. La persona ha fallecido. ☐
La partida de defunción está registrada en:
Distrito
Provincia
Departamento
Fecha aproximada

f. La persona está encarcelada ☐
Desde:
¿Tiene sentencia condenación?
SI NO

Nombre de la persona que informó (En el caso de no haber encontrado a la persona verif) ☐

Nombre del Voluntario que realizó la verificación

Comité Transparencia:

**Monitoring Form for List-to-People Field Test** **Peru**
Sample Form used by Transparencia (Spanish) (Back)

[Intentionally Left Blank]

**Monitoring Form for People-to-List Field Test** **Generic**
Sample Form (Front)

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you are being sent to find registered people at random. You have been provided with specific methodology and criteria for selecting individuals. It is important that you follow this methodology and criteria exactly. For example, if you have been assigned to collect information from 4 young men, 2 middle aged men, 2 old men, 4 young women, 2 middle aged women and 2 old women, you must collect information from exactly that distribution. You need to collect information from all of the people on [insert day and date]. For each person whom you collect information from you need to complete one of these forms. You should only collect data from people who say they have registered to vote. On [insert day, time and date] after this exercise, your supervisor will collect all of your completed forms at [insert place].

*Please write clearly because many people will read this form. Thank you for your assistance with this monitoring effort.*

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Name of Monitor | | | | | | |
| 2. Name of person chosen at random | | | | | | |
| 3. Person's address | | | | | | |
| 4. Person's gender | | | | | F | M |
| 5. Person's age | | | | | | |
| 6. Person's date of birth | Day | | Month | | Year | |
| 7. Did the person say he/she had registered to vote? | | | | | Yes | No |
| *If No, you should interview another person* | | | | | | |
| 8. Did the person have a voter ID card (if applicable)? | | | Day | | Month | |
| 9. Did the person know his/her voter ID number | | | | | Yes | No |
| 10. If Yes, person's voter ID number | | | | | | |
| 11. Does the person know where he/she is supposed to vote? | | | | | Yes | No |
| 12. If Yes, where | | | | | | |
| 13. Was the person register to vote for the last election? | | | | | Yes | No |
| 14. Did the person vote in the last election? | | | | | Yes | No |
| 15. Has the person moved since the last election? | | | | | Yes | No |
| 16. If Yes, what other addresses has he/she lived at? | | | | | | |

**Monitoring Form for People-to-List Field Test** **Generic**
Sample Form (Back)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17. Has the person's surname changed since the last election? | | Yes | No |
| 18. If Yes, what was the person's former surname? | | | |

| Sample Additional Voter Education Questions | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| A. Had the person heard any radio advertisement informing people why it is important to vote? | | Yes | No |
| B. Did the person know how many ballots he/she had to mark on election day? | | Yes | No |
| The correct answer to Question B is [insert correct answer, e.g., two]. If the person answered something else pleased inform him/her [insert the correct answer, e.g., on ballot for president and one ballot for parliament, and he/she must mark each ballot]. | | | |
| If the person has not registered to vote please tell to him/her that there is still time to register, if applicable. Explain where, how and why to register to vote. | | | |
| 19. Monitor's Signature and Date | | | |
| 20. Person's Signature and Date | | | |

**Monitoring Form for People-to-List Field Test** **Azerbaijan**
Sample Form used by For the Sake of Civil Society (Front)

## Voter Registration People-to-List Audit (Test)

The goal of this people-to-list audit (test) is to select a cross section of voters from the general public (people walking down the street, in a tea shop or other public area) to verify if their names are accurately listed on the voters list.

Of particular interest are voters who may have turned 18 since the last election. This process will help verify how effective the procedure is for adding new names to the list after they have become eligible.

First, make some effort to decided where you will locate voters. Approcach people couteously and explain what you are doing and how their participation will help us verify the accuracy of the voters list. Complete each verification one at a time.

You will verify a total of 10 voters.

You should verify 5 women and 5 men voters. Look for young people who might have turned 18 since the last election.

**Find out the following information:**

Name _____

Date of Birth _____

Passport Number _____

When did you last vote? _____

Where did you vote? _____

Have you moved since the last election? YES NO

If you moved, did you de-register you name? YES NO

*After you have this information, check the voters list to see if the voter's name is there and if the information is correct.*

Voters Name on the Voters List YES NO

*Please describe any additional information on the back of this page.*

**Monitoring Form for People-to-List Field Test** **Azerbaijan**
Sample Form used by For the Sake of Civil Society (Back)

*Use this space to record additional information*

**Monitoring Claims and Objections Form** **Generic**
Sample Form (Front)

As part of an effort to monitor this year's election, you are being sent to a registration/claims and objections center to observe individuals filing claims or objections to make additions, deletions or corrections to the voters list. On [insert date], you should go to the registration/claims and objections center assigned to you. You should arrive there at [insert time] before the center opens and remain there throughout the day until [insert time]. You should document your observations on this form. Remember that the registration/claims and objections officials are in charge of the process. Do not disrupt registration. If you are concerned that an addition, deletion or correction is being made to the voters list improperly, you should, in a respectful manner, bring this to the attention of the person in charge of the center.

*This form will be collected by your supervisor on [insert day, time and place]. Please write clearly because many people will read this form. Thank you for your assistance with this monitoring effort.*

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Name of Monitor | | | | | |
| 2. Registration/claims and objections center's name and location | | | | | |
| 3. Registration/claims and objections center's number | | | | | |
| 4. Name of the official in charge of the center | | | | | |
| 5. On what date was the voters list to be posted or made publicly available? | | Day | | Month | |
| 6. On what date was the voters list actually posted or made publicly available? | | Day | | Month | |
| 7. Has the voters list remained posted or available the entire period required by law or regulation? | | | | Yes | No |
| 8. Has this registration/claims and objections center been closed for any period when it was supposed to be open filing of claims and objections? | | | | Yes | No |
| 9. If yes, for how long and for what reason? (use additional paper if necessary) | | | | | |
| 10. Is the voters list legible? | | | | Yes | No |
| 11. How many names are on the voters list at the center? | | | | | |
| 12. How many claims to add a person's name to the voters list had already been filed when you arrived? | | | | | |

SAMPLE FORMS FOR MONITORING CLAIMS AND OBJECTIONS

**Monitoring Claims and Objections Form** **Generic**
Sample Form (Front)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 13. How many claims to update or correct a person's information on the voters list had already been filed when you arrived? | | | |
| 14. How many objections to remove a person's name from the voters list had already been filed when you arrived? | | | |
| 15. How many claims to add a person's name to the voters list were filed while you were at the center? | | | |
| 16. How many claims to update or correct a person's information on the voters list were filed while you were at the center? | | | |
| 17. How many objections to remove a person's name from the voters list were filed while you were at the center? | | | |
| 18. Did the officials correctly follow the claims and objections procedures? | | Yes | No |
| 19. If not, was the integrity of the process compromised? | | Yes | No |
| 20. Monitors Signature and Date | | | |

*Please explain in detail at the bottom of this form if the officials deviated significantly from the claims and objections procedures. Please quantify as best as possible the extent of the problem.*

**Report on Computer Tests of the Voters List** **Guyana**

Sample Report by the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB)

**Analysis of the 1997 Preliminary Voters List (PVL)**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Three broad types of tests were undertaken by the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB) in analysing the 1997 Preliminary Voters List (PVL). These were field, computer and in-house tests. All tests were completed within three weeks.

Two field tests sought out randomly generated samples among those voters who were photographed and those who were not photographed. In the first field test, 89.17% of a sample of 1754 voters were found at their listed address. Of this number, 93.61% had all their particulars listed correctly. 6.27% of the sample were either out of the country temporarily, had moved, migrated or died. 4.56% could not be found, either because there was no such address as listed or because there had never been such a person at the listed address. This test had an accuracy level of ±l%. Thus, the "not found" figure for the entire PVL lies between 15,926 and 24,873 voters. Additionally, this test revealed that most voters believe a National ID Card is being prepared for them.

The second field test of 78 persons not photographed found that 22% had actually not taken their photo. 18% claimed to have taken their photo. 26% had either died or migrated while 15% had moved or were temporarily out of the country. 19% of the sample could not be found due to there being no such address as listed or no such person ever resident at the listed address.

Several computer tests were undertaken on the PVL. Seven discrepancies demonstrated that modifications to the PVL took place during the printing of the PVL. ID number tests found no errors, as did tests to ensure all voters were of age and that all voters had a surname. Tests for multiple registration yielded 148 possible cases that were not previously identified by the Elections Commission.

In-house tests focused on the legality of polling division names and numbers, and checked for instances of persons with a listed address belonging to a polling division other than that in which the voter was actually found to be listed. The first test found one error in a division name while the second test identified 899 possible cases of persons being listed out of division. The 899 cases represents a relatively low percentage of 0.2%.

**B. COMPUTER TESTS**

The computer tests which EAB wished to execute had been communicated to the Commission prior to the tests. On Monday, June 23, a meeting of the technicians involved in the testing determined the inputs and outputs required. The tests were then executed on Wednesday, June 25.

EAB's computer tests were executed at the Elections Commission on a Personal Computer (PC) which had been detached from the Commission's computer network and relocated to the Commission's Board Room. Copies of the relevant databases and programmes had been earlier transferred to the hard drive of that computer.

The computer used to conduct the tests was a Pentium, 166Mhz machine, equipped with Microsoft Access, a software database programme. All queries and reports used in the testing of the PVL were created by the Commission's technical staff and examined by EAB prior to the commencement of the tests.

The tests were carried out by Commission staff with assistance from EAB. At no time did EAB execute any commands on the PC. Total test time was under 90 minutes, due in large part to the preparedness of the Commission's technical staff and the high quality of the hardware and software being used.

If only as a matter of public record, it must be noted that this Commission's ignoring of the precedent set by earlier Commission's in granting EAB diskette copies of voters lists can only be considered a retrograde step.

EAB found the new arrangement where tests were done at the Elections Commission to have been confining, not only because of the awkwardness of having to coordinate the availability of time for two busy sets of people but because other tests, such as were later thought of, could not be done due to the protocols required and the lateness in the granting of permission to test the PVL. EAB hopes to test the Final Voters List (FVL) under conditions which are more flexible, timely and accommodating than those under which the PVL was tested.

**1. Confirmation of Database**

In order to validate later findings, EAB had to be able to first show that the computer database being tested was the same database from which the PVL was printed.

The PVL data are contained within a larger database of all registrants, which includes all those between the age of 14 and 18. Only those who will be 18 on or before September 30, 1997 are qualified to be included on the PVL. Thus, in printing the PVL, the Commission actually executes commands which allow for all registrants born before a certain date to be extracted from the larger database of all registrants. EAB therefore had to test whether the database under consideration would yield the same printed PVL which had been given to EAB by the Elections Commission.

To begin, a 1-page printed summary of regional and national totals was shared with EAB This summary was date stamped May 20, 1997 - well prior to the beginning of the Claims and Objections period. It was confirmed that, upon extraction of the PVL from the database, the total number of voters corresponded with that indicated on the printout - 466,566.

EAB then compared random samples on 5 printed divisional lists of totals and voter particulars with the information on the computer. No discrepancies were discovered.

Next, EAB was given a printed PVL report that detailed the total number of registrants in each polling division in the country, date-stamped May 21. The computer was then commanded to extract a similar report based on the database being tested. This report was date stamped June 25, 1997, the day the tests were being executed. Later checks by EAB confirmed that the two reports were identical.

A final confirmation test was later conducted at EAB's office. In this test, printed divisional lists - dated as being printed on May 20, 1997 - were checked against the PVL divisional summary report to confirm that the totals corresponded. The results of this test showed 7 discrepancies (see Appendix F). In two polling divisions, the printed list had one voter more than the computer database. In two other divisions the difference was one voter less. In a fifth case the printed list had two voters more than the database.

*Analysis & Recommendations*

The 7 discrepancies are a cause for concern, if only that they demonstrate that the database which EAB tested was not exactly the database from which the PVL was printed. It is also possible that printed PVLs which were shared with the political parties differed from each other and from the database EAB tested. The Commission must therefore investigate the reason for these discrepancies which now cast a shadow on the findings of all subsequent computer tests. While the discrepancies may seem minor, it is clear that the Commission had not preserved the database from which the PVL was printed. In future, the Commission should be sure to extract and keep separate from other work-in-progress databases any information which has a basis in law - such as the PVL and the Final Voters List (FVL).

Outside of this test, EAB found that Computer Test #1 passed all other checks.

**2. ID Numbers**

The ID numbers being used in the database are those found on the Master Registration Card (MRC), which is filled out upon the registration of a voter. The purpose of ID number tests was to ensure that each voter on the PVL had a unique ID number and that the ID number was only composed of digits and not characters.

The programmes which the Commission had used to enter data into the database were examined and

found to have commands that would have prevented duplicate ID numbers or characters from being entered into the ID number field. Tests on the PVL itself confirmed that no errors as described in the previous paragraph existed. By comparison, the 1992 PVL tests turned up 28 pairs of duplicate ID numbers while the 1992 FVL, used as the 1994 PVL, contained over 32,000 voters with no ID number whatsoever.

*Analysis & Recommendations*

The final question to be asked of ID number accuracy is whether the ID numbers on the PVL correspond with the MRC number. This is a test which the Elections Commission should itself execute, if it has not done so already.

EAB considers the question of ID numbers to have been answered positively by the computer tests conducted.

**3. All Voters of Age**

All registrants who will be 18 years of age on or before September 30, 1997, qualify for inclusion on the PVL. The test to ensure that all 466,566 electors on the PVL were of the qualifying age found no instances of underaged persons being included in the PVL.

The Commission's staff conducted an un-requested but useful test to demonstrate that no registrant had an age greater than 120 years. This test demonstrated efforts at quality control in the entry of registrant birth dates.

*Analysis & Recommendations*

EAB found no errors caused by underage voters being on the PVL.

**4. Surnames**

In another Commission-initiated test, it was demonstrated that no person on the database had a blank surname. While it is possible that a registrant might have no first name, *all* registrants must have a surname. The Commission had instituted measures in the entry of surnames to ensure quality control by prohibiting the computer from accepting any voter whose surname had not been entered.

*Analysis & Recommendations*

EAB found no errors caused by the omission of voters' surnames.

**5. Multiple Registrants**

The issue of multiple registration had been raised by several political parties who felt that persons had deliberately registered more than once. The Elections Commission had earlier in June published a list of "persons found to have been registered twice." This list contained over 1500 such persons. The Commission had arrived at this list by asking the computer to identify all voters who shared an identical surname, first name and date of birth. EAB understands that checks were also made of registrant signatures, as found on the voter's MRC, to confirm whether the two signatures matched.

EAB's test for possible multiple registrants excluded first names. The computer was asked to identify all voters who shared an identical surname and date of birth.

Subsequent checks revealed 148 more cases of possible multiple registration. This is in addition to the Commission's printed list of 1500 names.

The multiple registrants test was constrained by the printout information, which did not indicate polling divisions. A request to the Commission for the test results on diskette was, up to the time of preparation of this report, unanswered. Thus, the Bureau was unable to establish whether there were any demographic patterns to the list of possible multiple registrants.

*Analysis & Recommendations*

Multiple Registration as a PVL feature does exist, but for multiple registration involving persons who used the same surname and date-of-birth to register, the number is relatively low - under 1700 cases.

EAB's tests could not detect cases where persons may have used different surnames and/or dates-of-birth in order to register more than once. It may be that such cases have occurred, especially given the 4.56% of "Not founds" in the field test of photographed voters and the 19.2% of "Not Founds" in the test of not photographed voters. The parties and the Elections Commission can do much to reduce such instances.

**Press Release on Voter Registration** **Cambodia**

Sample Press Release by COMFREL, COFFEL and NICFEC (Unofficial Translation)

**COMFREL** **COFFEL** **NICFEC**

**Joint Statement on the Voter Registration for the Commune Council Elections**

(Unofficial Translation by COMFREL)

Phnom Penh, September 07, 2001

According to the News Release of the National Election Committee on August 26, 2001, only 83.06% of about 6 million eligible voters had been registered for the commune council elections throughout the country. Therefore, approximately 1 million potential voters have not been registered. We note that the registration rate for this election is down 10%, if compared to the percentage of voters registered in the 1998 elections that was more than 90%.

However, we would like to acknowledge the NEC in its efforts for extending the voter registration period for an additional three days in some locations, even if this period was not responded to the demand of the three coalitions submitted to the NEC for at least two weeks extension. The number of registered voters during the extension period has increased only 2.2% (80.84% on August 21 and 83.04% on August 26).

**Reason for Low Registration**

Comfrel, Coffel and Nicfec have identified several factors that contributed to the lower voter registration, some clearly violations of the election law, but the majority related to poor organization and training, and a lack of time and materials:

- Inadequate voter education and training of election officials, primarily caused by lack of resources and the lateness of the finalization of regulations governing registration, but in some cases the result of unequal dissemination of information by politically affiliated PEC, CEC and RSO (Registration Station Officers) members;
- Because of confusion about the registration requirements, or for political reasons, many voters were not allowed to register on their normally scheduled registration days or at their local registration station;
- Inadequate quantities or late distribution of registration materials and equipment meant many registration stations opened late or closed early;
- Unanticipated increases in population, and difficult geography meant that in many places inadequate time was allocated for the registration process.;
- Moreover, the commune council election is complex and more different than the national one. The initial requirement that voters had to register at their permanent residences made it difficult for students, workers, monks and others who have moved to the cities to continue and find jobs. Although this requirement was removed midway through the registration process, and NGOs did their best to inform the people of the change, many people did not hear in time, and others could not be bothered to try again;
- Small numbers of voters are not interested in or do not understand fully the importance of commune council election.

SAMPLE MONITORING REPORTS

**Irregularities and Violations**

The report obtained from the nationwide COMFREL networks at 10,647 stations (which is equal to 86.10% of the NEC voter registration stations of 12,378) showed that 65.14% of the monitored voter registration stations (6,936 out of 10,647) ran smoothly, with minimum technical irregularities. (These figures are as of August 21, while the data from the reopened and new stations have not been aggregated yet). COMFREL found unacceptable problems at 29 stations. 7,477 cases of the technical irregularities were reported at 3,711 voter registration stations. (Of these, multiple reported irregularities might have occurred at a single station).

**The technical irregularities and violations observed include:**

- In 2,298 registration stations (21.60%) information for voters about the location and schedule for registration centres and the 1998 voter list were not well publicized;
- At 598 stations (6.22%), 819 cases of threats or intimidation of voters took place;
- 2,754 cases of non-neutral behaviour by PEC, CEC or RSOs and failure of them to comply with correct procedures was reported at 2,558 stations (24.10%);
- There were 1,011 cases of refusal the presence of observers and/or confiscation of observers' accreditation cards;
- 652 ineligible, unidentified, suspect and illegal immigrants were allowed to register at 100 stations;
- In 275 stations, the form no. 1201 and 1202 (refusal and complaint forms) were not provided to voters;
- There were 27 cases of voters who had registered more than once;
- There were 87 cases of confiscation voters' card by local authorities.

Referring to the report obtained from COFFEL networks in 16 provinces and municipalities, eligible voters in 1998 based on the News Release of the NEC are 5,771,635 eligible voters, while 4,846,635 voters were registered which was equal to 84.55%. 11,446 registration stations were operated from July 21 to 27, 2001. COFFEL revealed irregularities of 5,052 cases (in one station the problems could have happened between one and five times), including:

- 1,378 cases related to the shortage of registration materials and equipment;
- 1,722 cases of the improper performance by PEC, CEC and RSOs;
- 1,013 cases of improper performance by local authorities;
- 673 cases concerning the voters' nationality;
- 266 cases of corruption and threats.

According to NICFEC's report from 1,244 communes in 171 districts ,which comprised 7,879 voter registration stations equal 63.66% of the NEC ones (on August 20, 2001), most irregularities had emerged similarly to those findings by COMFREL and COFFEL with additional issues as follows:

- Irregularities in the recruitment of PEC, CEC and RSOs in some areas resulted in corruption;
- The poor performance of many PEC, CEC and RSOs decreased voters overall confidence in the NEC;
- Some local authorities and political party activists interfered in the work of the registration station officers;

- Military and police officials in some areas were allowed to register more than once to increase the turnout of the registered voters.

**The Coming Elections**

Based on our observation of the registration process, Comfrel, Coffel and Nicfec still have serious concerns for the upcoming commune council elections. With the experience of the registration process in mind, we would like to submit some recommendations to NEC for improvement of the election process:

- Expand and intensify public voter education on all of the processes related to the commune council elections;
- Allow enough time and provide a clear schedule for each of the steps in the election process;
- Strengthen the neutrality and independence of NEC, PEC, CEC and RSO officials;
- Effectively resolve citizen's complaints both fairly and transparently;
- Effectively verify the voter list;
- Conduct more training courses for the electoral officers at all levels about their duties and responsibilities.

Finally, Comfrel, Coffel and Nicfec insist that all political parties who participate in the upcoming commune council elections firmly respect the Law, Regulations and Procedures of NEC and do not use the violence and threats to solve their problems, and we appeal to the Royal Government to ensure order, security and safety for every commune council candidate, and for the whole electoral process.

For further information, please contact:

Comfrel: Mr. Thun Saray, Tel: 012 880 509
Coffel: Mrs. Chea Vannath, Tel: 016 831 905
Nicfec: Mrs. Gek Galabru, Tel: 012 902 506

**Press Release on Voter Registration** **Peru**

Sample Press Release by Transparencia (Spanish)

Nota de prensa 2001 - 03

**TRANSPARENCIA PRESENTA CONCLUSIONES**
**DE VERIFICACIÓN MUESTRAL DE LAS LISTAS DEL PADRÓN INICIAL**

Después de concluir la verificación muestral del padrón electoral, en virtud del convenio suscrito con el Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE) el pasado 12 de diciembre de 2000, la Asociación Civil TRANSPARENCIA presentó su informe al JNE y al Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil (Reniec).

Las siguientes son las conclusiones y recomendaciones del informe de TRANSPARENCIA:

**I. CONCLUSIONES**

1. Es de resaltar el esfuerzo realizado por el Reniec y el JNE para la depuración del padrón electoral.
2. Debe también resaltarse que el análisis de los procedimientos utilizados por el Reniec para la formación y depuración del padrón arroja una imagen positiva del padrón y de los esfuerzos realizados por la institución. La cobertura del padrón llega al 90%, valores comparables con los encontrados en otros países de la región. En lo que respecta a los casos de inclusiones indebidas — fallecidos, militares y policías en actividad, personas inhabilitadas por sentencias de penas privativas de la libertad —, los datos globales y el examen de los procedimientos utilizados sugieren que las imperfecciones del padrón son irregularidades de limitada importancia cuantitativa.
3. A diferencia de lo ocurrido en el último proceso electoral, esta vez el JNE realizó tareas concretas de fiscalización electoral. Así, habilitó una línea gratuita para el reporte de irregularidades en el padrón. Además, realizó una masiva campaña de difusión para que los ciudadanos participaran de la depuración del padrón electoral.
4. Los plazos para la exhibición del padrón y la presentación de tachas u observaciones a su contenido de parte de los ciudadanos siguen siendo muy cortos, lo que limita la participación efectiva de los ciudadanos en la depuración del padrón.
5. De la muestra seleccionada por TRANSPARENCIA, no se halló a la persona en los domicilios consignados, ni hubo vecino que pudiera dar información alguna sobre ella, en el 10.1% de los casos. Nuestros voluntarios lograron entrevistar personalmente al 75.9% de la muestra, y del porcentaje restante, la información fue obtenida por familiares o vecinos.
6. Las deficiencias, en términos de personas que figuran en el padrón y no deberían figurar, han disminuido. Así:
   a) El porcentaje de fallecidos presentes en el padrón bajó del 2.39% al 0.44% del total del padrón. Este dato nos permite estimar que el número aproximado de fallecidos indebidamente incluidos en el padrón electoral es de 65,451.
   b) Los peruanos con domicilio legal en el Perú pero que residen en el extranjero representan el 1.7% en comparación con el 2.18% detectado en la misma situación en el estudio del año pasado. Esto significa alrededor de 250,000 personas.
   c) No se halló a policías o miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas en la muestra y tampoco se ha tomado conocimiento de denuncias en el mismo sentido.
   d) No se halló en la muestra a personas condenadas a pena privativa de la libertad.
7. Sin embargo, lo crucial no es que aparezcan fallecidos o que haya un importante número de residentes en

el extranjero con domicilio en el país, sino que no haya suplantaciones y que se realice una adecuada fiscalización del sufragio.

8. La modificación del artículo 315° de la Ley Orgánica de Elecciones es muy importante porque impide que en los cómputos oficiales aparezcan más votos que electores. Sin embargo, esta disposición debe ser complementada con una adecuada fiscalización de parte de las autoridades electorales para asegurar que no haya suplantación de electores fallecidos (0.45%) o de los que se encuentran fuera del país (1.7%) el día de los comicios.
9. El porcentaje de las direcciones que presentan errores y de las que no existen es del 11.91%. A pesar que este porcentaje ha disminuido con relación al año pasado, aún es considerable.

**II. RECOMENDACIONES**

1. Este estudio se completaría introduciendo, como variable adicional de análisis, la verificación de la asistencia a sufragar de los electores de la muestra que no fueron hallados. Esta tarea se puede hacer tomando como referencia las tres últimas elecciones celebradas y la próxima del 8 de abril.
2. Debe crearse un Padrón Pasivo que, de manera provisional y sin que se cancele los registros, esté conformado por aquellos ciudadanos que no hayan sufragado en las tres últimas elecciones. El estudio de este registro proporcionaría elementos útiles para las campañas dirigidas a promover la participación, así como para detectar los registros que deben cancelarse del padrón. Además, el número de registros que conformen ese pasivo debería ser deducido del total que se toma para realizar el cálculo de adherentes a solicitudes de iniciativa legislativa y de referéndum, así como para las nuevas disposiciones que lo exijan.
3. Debe emprenderse estrategias para analizar con mayor profundidad las características de los no inscritos. Esa mejor comprensión permitiría el diseño de estrategias de acción efectivas para disminuir la incidencia de ese fenómeno.
4. TRANSPARENCIA insiste en la necesidad de adoptar todas las medidas legales y presupuestarias para realizar un cambio gratuito y obligatorio de todos los documentos de identidad preexistentes por el DNI. El costo de este cambio debería ser asumido por el Estado. Cuando se realice, el país contará con un padrón actualizado.
5. Los plazos para la exhibición pública del padrón y la presentación de tachas u observaciones de su contenido de parte de los ciudadanos siguen siendo muy cortos, lo que limita la participación efectiva de los ciudadanos en dicho proceso. Deben extenderse para, de esta forma, hacer más efectiva la depuración previa a cada elección.

Lima, 9 de enero de 2001

**DIRECCIÓN DE COMUNICACIONES**

*Para mayor información comunicarse con Daniel Torres, jefe de prensa, al 893-1637 o al 441-3995*

**Press Release on Voter Registration** **Peru**

Sample Press Release by Transparencia (Unofficial English Translation)

Press Release 2001 - 03

**TRANSPARENCIA PRESENTS CONCLUSIONS OF THE INITIAL VOTERS LIST SAMPLE CHECK**

After finishing the sample check of the voter's registration list (*padrón*), in compliance with an agreement entered into with *Jurado Nacional de Elecciones* – JNE (National Electoral Board) on December 12th 2000, the civic organization TRANSPARENCIA submitted its report to the JNE and the *Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil* – RENIEC (National Identification and Civil Status Registry).

The following are the conclusions and recommendations of TRANSPARENCIA's report:

## I. CONCLUSIONS

1. The effort made by RENIEC and JNE to update the voter registration list should be noted.
2. The analysis of the procedures used by RENIEC for the production and updating of the voter registry should also be noted given that it reflects a positive image of the list itself and of the efforts made by the institution. The list coverage [percent registered of the voting age population] is 90%, comparable to other countries in the region. Regarding the cases of improper inclusions (deceased individuals, military personnel, active police officers, those sentenced to imprisonment), overall data and the examination of the procedures used suggest that the list's flaws are non-significant quantitative irregularities.
3. Unlike during the last electoral process, this year the JNE undertook concrete electoral oversight tasks. For example, it established a toll-free number to report irregularities about the list. In addition, it carried out a massive dissemination campaign for citizens to participate in the updating of the voter registry.
4. The time period for the voter registry to be publicly displayed and for citizens to submit challenges or remarks about its content is very short, which limits the effective participation of the citizens in the updating of the list.
5. Out of the sample selected by TRANSPARENCIA, 10.1% of the listed voters could not be found and no neighbors could give information about them. 75.9% of the sample was personally interviewed by our volunteers, and the information of the remaining percentage was obtained either through relatives or neighbors.
6. The number of voters who should not be listed but still are has decreased. Therefore:
   a. The percentage of deceased voters decreased from 2.39% to 0.44% of the entire list. This data enables us to estimate that the approximate number of inappropriately included deceased voters is 65,451.
   b. Peruvians with legal domicile in Peru but living abroad account for 1.7% of the sample as compared to 2.18% with the same situation in last year's study. This accounts for 250,000 voters.
   c. No police officers or members of the Armed Forces were found in the sample. Likewise, no reports or complaints have been received to this effect.
   d. No people sentenced to imprisonment were found in the sample.

7. However, the main problem is not having deceased or a significant number of people living abroad with legal domicile in Peru, but having impersonations, therefore polls should be adequately overseen.
8. Amendment of Article 315° of the Organic Electoral Law is very important given that it prevents the official vote counts from having more votes than voters. However, this provision should be complemented with appropriate oversight by the electoral authorities so that there is no impersonation of deceased voters (0.45%) or of those living abroad (1.7%) on election day.
9. The percentage of mistaken or non-existent addresses is 11.91%, which is still substantial despite the fact that it has decreased in comparison to last year's percentage.

**II. RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. Verifying whether those voters included in the sample who were not located actually vote on election day as an additional analysis would complete this study. This task can be undertaken through using the last three electoral processes and the upcoming April 8th elections as a reference.
2. A Passive Voter's List made up by citizens who have not voted in the past three elections should be provisionally created - without canceling entries. The study of this registry would provide three useful elements to campaigns to promote voter participation as well as to detect entries that should be removed. Likewise, the number of entries that make up the passive list should be subtracted from the total amount taken to calculate those who sign up for legislative initiatives and referendums, as well as for the new provisions that are required.
3. Strategies should be designed to analyze in more depth the characteristics of unregistered citizens. This would help inform the design of an effective action strategy to decrease the incidence of this phenomenon.
4. TRANSPARENCIA insists on the need to adopt every necessary legal and budgetary measure to change in a free and mandatory manner all identification cards to DNI's. The cost of this change should be incurred in by the State. Once this is fully completed, the country will have an updated voter's list.
5. Deadlines for public display of the list and for citizens to submit challenges or remarks about its content are very short, which limits the effective participation of the citizens in this process. These time limits should be extended so that the updating process followed before every election is more effective.

Lima, January 9th 2001

**COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT**

*For further information, please contact Daniel Torres, Head of Press Department, at 893-1637 or 441-3995*

**Newsletter on Voter Registration** **Peru**

Sample Newsletter by Transparencia (Spanish)

TRANSPARENCIA

# DATOS ELECTORALES 18

Lima, martes 11 de enero del 2000

Estimaciones muestrales:

## Cerca de un millón y medio de ciudadanos inscritos irregularmente en el padrón electoral

+ 345 mil fallecidos.
311 mil peruanos en el extranjero registrados en el territorio nacional.

+ Más de 800 mil electores corren peligro de no votar por no haber canjeado aún su Libreta Mecanizada por el DNI.

**Gráfica 1**
**Fallecidos y peruanos en el extranjero**
**que figuran indebidamente en el Padrón Electoral**




| | |
|---|---|
| Fallecidos | 345,651 |
| Peruanos en el extranjero | 311,677 |
| Total de ciudadanos | 14'470,750 |

(1) Peruanos residentes en el extranjero inscritos en el territorio nacional.

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**Gráfica 2**
**Documento con que cuentan los electores**

| | |
|---|---|
| DNI | 4'196,517 |
| LEM | 833,115 |
| LE | 8'827,158 |
| No especificados | 613,960 |
| Total | 14'470,750 |

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En la muestra de 1004 electores, Transparencia encontró 24 fallecidos (2.39%).
A continuación, a modo de ejemplo, se presentan cuatro partidas de defunción.

**Gloria Elsa Atto Mendives**
Fallecida el 27 de julio de 1992
en Jesús María, Lima.



**Eulogio Bustinza Chino**
Fallecido el 8 de abril de 1984
en Tirapata, Puno.

**Raymunda Gómez Pacompia**
Fallecida el 25 de enero de 1988
en Juliaca, San Román.

**Balmir Vásquez Pulpeña**
Fallecido el 25 de febrero de 1989
en Pucacaca, Picota.

El informe completo sobre Verificación del Padrón Electoral puede ser revisado en www.transparencia.org.pe

# Conclusiones del Informe

**PRIMERA:**
La Ley Orgánica del Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil, RENIEC, *(Ley N° 26497)*, en su Segunda Disposición Transitoria, fija un plazo de 6 años para la desaparición de toda referencia a los documentos de identidad actualmente existentes, y su sustitución generalizada por el DNI. Este plazo vencería el 11 de julio del año 2001, un año después de las próximas elecciones. El cambio general de documentos de identidad pudo haberse adelantado para generar confianza en el Padrón Electoral. No se hizo así. El legislador ha querido que las elecciones del 9 de abril del año 2,000 se realicen en base a un Padrón Electoral originado en la reinscripción de 1984, es decir, un Padrón cuya antigüedad es de 16 años.

**SEGUNDA:**
El 23 de agosto de 1999, con más de siete meses de antelación a las próximas elecciones, TRANSPARENCIA propuso que se procediera al cambio obligatorio y gratuito de todos los documentos de identidad pre-existentes, por el DNI, lo que hubiera implicado dotar al país de un Padrón nuevo, completamente actualizado. Según estimaciones públicas del Jefe Nacional de la RENIEC, esta operación hubiera costado 20 millones de soles adicionales *(es decir menos del 10% del costo estimado -a tarifa fría- de la publicidad del Estado en los medios de comunicación de alcance nacional, entre enero y noviembre de 1999[8])*.

**TERCERA:**
En la misma fecha recién citada, y con la explícita finalidad de generar confianza en el sistema electoral, TRANSPARENCIA propuso que se contratara una auditoría internacional al Padrón Electoral, como las que se han efectuado recientemente, con éxito, en otros países de la región, en los que el Padrón podría haber sido motivo de desconfianza, como Guyana, Guatemala, México, Nicaragua, Paraguay y la República Dominicana. Esta auditoría no fue contratada.

**CUARTA:**
En virtud del convenio suscrito el 22 de noviembre de 1999 entre el RENIEC, el Diario EL COMERCIO y TRANSPARENCIA, esta última asumió la doble tarea de: (a) recabar observaciones sobre el padrón de las fuerzas políticas inscritas, de los medios de comunicación y de la ciudadanía en general, incluyendo la concurrencia a los lugares de exhibición del mismo; y (b) extraer una muestra aleatoria de 1,004 ciudadanos, para entrevistar personalmente a quienes la integran, o, en su defecto, recabar de sus vecinos información sobre ellos.

**QUINTA:**
Para el cumplimiento de los cometidos recién señalados,

**a.** Se movilizaron los 194 Comités Provinciales de TRANSPARENCIA y 224 voluntarios, en todo el país;
**b.** Hubo numerosas personas e instituciones que ofrecieron su colaboración voluntaria en materia de transportes (terrestres, fluviales y aéreos) y comunicaciones;
**c.** Se instalaron líneas telefónicas de cobro revertido que funcionaron las 24 horas del día;
**d.** El Diario EL COMERCIO apoyó permanentemente el trabajo y publicó, el viernes 31 de diciembre de 1999, la lista de los 291 ciudadanos de la muestra que no habían sido hallados hasta esa fecha, invitando a quien tuviera información sobre ellos a hacerla llegar a TRANSPARENCIA;
**e.** La Dirección General de Asuntos Consulares del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y los Señores Cónsules del Perú en Córdoba, La Plata y Rosario *(Argentina)*, Miami y San Francisco *(EEUU)*, México D.F., Tokio *(Japón)*, Madrid *(España)*, Génova y Milán *(Italia)* y Ginebra *(Suiza)*, remitieron la información disponible sobre los 12 electores residentes en el extranjero que fueron parte de la muestra;
f. Se consultó la metodología del estudio con los responsables de algunas de las principales empresas de estudios de opinión pública del país *(Apoyo, CPI, Datum e Imasen)*.

**SEXTA:**
La ley establece que el Padrón es un documento público y fija plazos para su publicación. Hemos constatado que estos plazos se han cumplido en lo sustancial y que el padrón ha estado expuesto en más del 95% de los 1,358 distritos en que los voluntarios de TRANSPARENCIA acudieron a revisarlo. Se han reportado algunas diferencias entre las copias expuestas en algunos distritos y las entregadas a TRANSPARENCIA, comprensibles en razón de las fechas de cada versión y de los problemas logísticos que acarreaba la distribución nacional de las copias. También se han reportado dificultades con los horarios de exhibición y con el cumplimiento de las instrucciones del RENIEC por parte del personal de las oficinas locales. La exhibición del Padrón, a pesar de estas lamentables limitaciones, ha sido un paso positivo en la dirección de mejorar la publicidad del Padrón e incrementar la transparencia administrativa en materia electoral.

**SÉTIMA:**
Los plazos establecidos por el RENIEC para la publicación del Padrón y para hacer rectificaciones han sido demasiado cortos *(5 días)*, así como el conjunto del cronograma electoral decidido por el Congreso de la República, que ha merecido observaciones del JNE, la ONPE, TRANSPARENCIA y muchas otras instituciones. La brevedad de este plazo de publicación y la insuficiencia de la campaña de educación ciudadana explican la escasa participación ciudadana en la verificación del padrón, participación que seguirá siendo objetivo prioritario de TRANSPARENCIA en las elecciones venideras.

## DISEÑO MUESTRAL

Luego de consultar con las contrapartes del convenio *(El RENIEC y EL Comercio)*, con los diversos especialistas y con los responsables de algunas empresas de estudio de opinión pública, se optó por tomar una muestra simple al azar del conjunto de electores incluidos en el padrón. Este diseño permite hacer inferencias sobre la totalidad de los electores, a costa de prescindir de cualquier análisis en profundidad de determinados segmentos del universo, como podrían haber sido, por ejemplo, las zonas de emergencia, de mayor alfabetización y pobreza relativa, o de mayor abstención electoral.

Teniendo en cuenta las limitaciones de tiempo y recursos se decidió extraer una muestra aleatoria de 1004 electores *(1 de cada 14,413)*. Este tamaño de muestra, bajo el supuesto más desfavorable de heterogeneidad máxima, permite inferencias con un intervalo inferior a ± 0.05 y una certeza de 99% *(esto es con una probabilidad de error inferior a 1%)*; o, si se prefiere, permite intervalos de ± 0.03 con una certeza de 95% (probabilidad de error de 5%). Ambos modelos estadísticos alternativos trabajan con combinaciones de precisión y certeza más exigentes que los estándares habituales en las ciencias sociales. ***(Anexo 22)***.

Se prefirió una muestra simple al azar a cualquier tipo de estratificación o conglomeración debido a que el diseño escogido es el más potente estadísticamente, o sea, el que permite menores márgenes de error y garantiza un mejor ajuste *("fitness")* o proporcionalidad entre la muestra y el universo. No habiendo ningún indicio de sesgo en el orden de los electores dentro de la base de datos de RENIEC, el método sistemático de selección resultaba el más simple y apropiado.

# de Verificación del Padrón

TRANSPARENCIA

**OCTAVA:**
El Registro Nacional de Ciudadanos no es susceptible de ser revisado por los partidos políticos de forma permanente, como ocurre en España o Chile, o por períodos prolongados *(superiores al mes)*, como ocurre en Uruguay y otros países en los que TRANSPARENCIA ha podido consultar al respecto con las autoridades electorales respectivas.

**NOVENA:**
La publicidad del padrón se ve seriamente limitada desde que las copias entregadas a TRANSPARENCIA y a los partidos habían sido sometidas a innecesarias e injustificables limitaciones logísticas de acceso, que impedían los procedimientos normales de búsqueda en cualquier base de datos convencional. Esta limitación, sin embargo, fue superada, aunque sólo en parte y luego de insistentes gestiones, en la versión entregada a TRANSPARENCIA.

**DÉCIMA:**
TRANSPARENCIA lamenta que los partidos políticos y movimientos




independientes, con una sola excepción *(Somos Perú)*, no hayan entregado sus propias versiones de las deficiencias encontradas en el Padrón o de las dificultades habidas en el proceso de su verificación, pues la responsabilidad por la limpieza de las elecciones corresponde, en primer lugar, a las fuerzas participantes en el proceso electoral.

**UNDÉCIMA:**
TRANSPARENCIA reitera que su ofrecimiento voluntario para realizar la exploración del Padrón correspondió a su voluntad de contribuir a generar confianza en el electorado, disminuyendo las fuentes de controversia y suspicacia. Se trataba, por lo tanto, de ofrecer una estimación del estado del Padrón, a fin de dotar de referentes empíricos concretos a las numerosas preocupaciones expresadas en esta materia.

**DUODÉCIMA:**
El Padrón es obsoleto: no hay vecino que pueda dar información alguna referente al 8.5% de los ciudadanos sorteados en la muestra aleatoria. Sobre dicha muestra, se han reportado errores en el 34.4% de las direcciones consignadas para los electores, cifra que incluye un importante número de emigrantes. Hay además fallecidos y personal castrense.

**DECIMOTERCERA:**
El 61% de nuestros entrevistados votará con la Libreta Electoral y el 29% con el Documento Nacional de Identidad. En la muestra, queda aún un 6% de ciudadanos *(equivalentes aproximadamente a 833,515 electores en el universo)* que, pese a los esfuerzos de RENIEC, sigue en posesión de la Libreta Electoral Mecanizada. Esta proliferación de documentos hubiera podido evitarse si se hubiera atendido a la sugerencias de proceder al cambio obligatorio y gratuito de documentos.
Este estudio no ha considerado la situación de los ciudadanos identificados con el Documento Provisional de Identidad *(DPI)*, dado que ellos no figuran ni podrían figurar en el Padrón Electoral entregado a TRANSPARENCIA.

**DECIMOCUARTA:**
El número de peruanos residentes en el extranjero que figura en el Padrón con direcciones dentro del territorio de la República, puede estimarse, a partir de la muestra, en no menos de 2.18%, lo que significa no menos de 311,677 electores *(entre 289,828 y 333,526, con un certeza estadística de 95%, y su correspondiente probabilidad de error de 5%)*. Se trata de emigrantes que no han registrado su cambio de domicilio en el consulado peruano respectivo. Si bien esta situación no es ilegal, sin duda podría ser fuente de suspicacias respecto a la posibilidad de suplantación de electores, suspicacias que sería importante eliminar.

**DECIMOQUINTA:**
Hay fallecidos en el padrón electoral. El cuerpo de este informe documenta, entre otros, los casos de 194 fallecidos en el distrito de Río Tambo, provincia de Satipo, departamento de Junín; 71 fallecidos en el distrito de San Pedro de Coris, provincia de Churcampa, departamento de Huancavelica; y 21 fallecidos en el distrito de Pachangara, provincia de Oyón, departamento de Lima.
El número mínimo de fallecidos indebidamente incluidos en el padrón puede estimarse, a partir de la muestra, en no menos del 2.39%, lo que significa 345,851 electores (entre 327,417 y 364,285, con una certeza estadística de 95%). Esta seria deficiencia también puede ser fuente de suspicacias sobre la posibilidad de suplantar electores del Padrón.

**DECIMOSEXTA:**
No han aparecido presos en la muestra.

**DECIMOSÉTIMA:**
Hay personal castrense en el padrón electoral. Los efectivos policiales Teniente PNP Juan Martín Ruiz Ríos y el Especialista Técnico de Tercera PNP David Pinedo Torres, que fueron declarados como efectivos en actividad por el Director de la Policía, General Fernando Dianderas Otone, el 05 de diciembre de 1999, figuran en el padrón entregado a TRANSPARENCIA.
Sin embargo, no ha aparecido ningún elector en la muestra, que haya declarado ser militar o policía, o que haya sido reconocido como tal por sus vecinos, a pesar de haberse preguntado expresamente por la ocupación u ocupaciones de los electores.

**DECIMOCTAVA:**
No se ha podido comprobar si los difuntos o los efectivos castrenses detectados han votado o no en los últimos procesos electorales, debido a que no se recibió del RENIEC la información solicitada para este efecto.
Desatendidas las sugerencias hechas en el pasado por TRANSPARENCIA para generar confianza en el padrón electoral, resulta deseable y urgente adoptar medidas prácticas para mejorar las condiciones del actual Padrón Inicial antes de su conversión en Padrón Definitivo.

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[1] *Costo estimado por la empresa Supervisora de Medios y Publicidad S.A.C. en 62'639,571.15 dólares americanos. El Poder Ejecutivo no ha proporcionado una cifra oficial que indique el monto efectivo del gasto publicitario del Estado en este período, aunque ha ofrecido darla.*

# Verificación del Padrón

## RECOMENDACIONES DEL INFORME

### DE PLAZO MEDIATO
***(luego de las elecciones del 9 de abril del año 2000)***

**PRIMERA:** tomar todas las medidas legales, presupuestales y administrativas pertinentes para asegurar el rápido cambio general de documentos, a fin de que todos los ciudadanos peruanos dispongan de su DNI.

**SEGUNDA:** mejorar las formas y plazos de exhibición del Padrón, a fin de que sea efectivamente público El Registro Nacional de Ciudadanos debe ser accesible de forma permanente. Dicho Registro debe ser exhibido por lo menos seis meses antes de cada elección, durante el plazo mínimo de un mes. Con la misma anticipación debe entregarse copias *(sin restricciones de acceso)* a todos los partidos políticos y medios de comunicación social.

### DE PLAZO INMEDIATO
***(antes de las elecciones del 9 de abril del año 2,000)***

**PRIMERA:** Se recomienda al Presidente de la República que, en demostración de la voluntad de celebrar elecciones transparentes y plenamente confiables, convoque a una Legislatura Extraordinaria con el propósito de discutir y aprobar una ley que prolongue el periodo de observaciones y la elaboración definitiva del Padrón Electoral hasta 30 días antes de las elecciones.

**SEGUNDA:** Se recomienda al Jurado Nacional de Elecciones y al RENIEC entregar, a partir de la fecha, a todos los partidos y movimientos inscritos y a todos los medios de comunicación, copias del Padrón Inicial sobre un soporte magnético sin restricciones de acceso, a fin de contribuir a la transparencia y a la confianza en el Padrón.

**TERCERA:** Habida cuenta de que el JNE dispone de sólo diez días para aprobar el Padrón Electoral, y de que hay información que debe mantenerse reservada *(por ejemplo, la relación de efectivos militares y policiales, que tiene implicancias sobre la seguridad nacional)*, se recomienda al JNE que solicite el concurso de la Defensoría del Pueblo para que, dotada de los recursos necesarios y con la aceptación de las instancias castrenses, de las autoridades en materia penal, del RENIEC y de los municipios, contribuya a depurar el Padrón Inicial de manera que:

a) No queden militares ni policías en el padrón definitivo;
b) No haya ningún preso sentenciado;
c) Se elimine al mayor número posible de fallecidos; y
d) Se certifique que no ha habido personal castrense ni presos sentenciados ni difuntos votantes en los últimos procesos electorales, en los que la abstención ha disminuido de manera notable.

Lima, 5 de enero del año 2,000.

## FE DE ERRATAS

**En la gráfica Nº 1 de Datos Electorales 16 figura un porcentaje mal calculado. El siguiente cuadro corrige la información antes proporcionada: el gasto de publicidad estatal creció en 109% *(entre 1997 y 1999)* y no en 52 % como se consignó. Las cifras absolutas y los otros porcentajes son correctos.**

### Gráfica 1. Costos de la publicidad de organismos del Estado
**Sobre lista de primeras seis marcas / Años 1997, 1998 y 1999**

**Costos en millones de dólares EUA por marca y año (1)**

| | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 (2) | +/- 1997/99 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cervezas | 65'989,720.83 | 51'488,722.88 | 39'204,460.18 | -40.59% |
| Bancos | 49'638,101.81 | 44'540,112.98 | 23'737,345.25 | -52.18% |
| Gaseosas | 49'151,456.76 | 40'218,081.57 | 31'244,163.14 | -36.43% |
| Detergentes | 37'833,007.72 | 21'703,239.72 | 23'390,155.28 | -38.18% |
| Champús | 34'311,702.27 | 21'633,244.65 | 19'353,216.38 | -43.60% |
| Org. del Estado | 29'970,328.64 | 38'615,298.46 | 62'639,571.15 | +109.01% |

(1) En base a precios de lista *(tarifa fría)*.
(2) Para el año 1999 se ha considerado el periodo enero/noviembre.

**Porcentaje corregido**

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DATOS ELECTORALES es un material de análisis de coyuntura, producido y difundido por la Dirección de Informaciones de TRANSPARENCIA.

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**WHY IS VOTER REGISTRATION AN IMPORTANT PART OF AN ELECTION PROCESS?**

Voter registration is critical to the integrity of elections. Political parties, civic organizations, news media and others can reduce errors, deter fraud and promote public confidence in an election by monitoring voter registration and other elements of the election process. Monitoring by political parties and candidates helps ensure that their supporters will be provided a proper opportunity to vote. Nonpartisan monitoring by civic organizations builds general confidence that the electorate will be able to exercise voting rights.

**WHAT ARE THE PROCEDURES USED TO REGISTER PEOPLE TO VOTE, AND HOW CAN THEY BE MONITORED TO ENSURE THEY ARE CONDUCTED FAIRLY?**

**HOW ARE A PRELIMINARY, REVISED AND FINAL VOTERS LIST COMPILED AND WHAT TECHNIQUES CAN BE USED TO ASSESS THEIR QUALITY?**

This guide is designed for political and civic leaders who are committed to safeguarding electoral rights. It provides an overview of voter registration and how to monitor the process. The first part of the guide introduces the issues that should be considered during any voter registration process. Specific techniques for monitoring different aspects of voter registration are detailed in the second part. Topics related to organizing a monitoring effort are addressed in the third part. Appendices provide sample monitoring forms and reports used by political parties and civic organizations in different countries around the world.

**HOW CAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS HELP GUARANTEE THE RIGHTS OF THEIR SUPPORTERS AND THE PUBLIC TO REGISTER TO VOTE?**

The guide is intended to help political parties and civic organizations enhance their capacity to monitor the voter registration process. Readers interested in broader election monitoring issues should also refer to *NDI's Handbook on How Domestic Organizations Monitor Elections: An A to Z Guide,* and other NDI publications.

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