

# AFRO BAROMETER

**Working Paper No. 33**

**A NEW DAWN? POPULAR OPTIMISM  
IN KENYA AFTER THE TRANSITION**

by Thomas P. Wolf, Carolyn Logan, and  
Jeremiah Owiti

with Paul Kiage

**A comparative series of national public  
attitude surveys on democracy, markets  
and civil society in Africa.**



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**March 2004**

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## Executive Summary: A New Dawn? Popular Optimism in Kenya After the Transition

The first Kenya Afrobarometer survey was conducted at a most unusual time. In December 2002, Kenyans went to the polls in what proved to be the beginning of a historic transition: the first electoral transfer of power in the country's history. The shift was greeted with an outpouring of optimism and euphoria, as the vast majority of Kenyans clearly hoped that the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition's (NARC) promises to reform and revitalize the government would lead them to prosperity and a fully realised democracy.

Eight months after the new government took office, interviewers took to the field to conduct the country's first Afrobarometer survey. This national sample survey included 2398 interviews in all eight provinces of the country, yielding overall results that are accurate to within +/- 2 percent at a 95 percent confidence level. This report presents the findings of this survey with respect to the social, political and economic atmosphere in Kenya, and the implications for democratic consolidation and governance. Results are also placed in comparative perspective with 14 other Afrobarometer countries.

Overall, the survey findings clearly capture the palpable sense of almost unbounded optimism and hope that permeated Kenya in the days and months following the election. On item after item, Kenyans give some of the most positive assessments of their government's performance, the quality of their democracy, and even the condition of the national economy, of any of the countries included in the Afrobarometer so far. They also stand out as having one of the highest levels of commitment to democracy and democratic institutions, and their confidence in a more bountiful future is overwhelming.

But the obvious question is whether the goodwill and optimism measured in this survey, including especially the commitment to democracy as a system of rule (in contrast to mere support for the current government), demonstrate lasting, deeply-rooted democratic values along with careful assessments of the new government's performance, or merely reflect a much more transient, post-transition euphoria.

The extent and nature of the poverty affecting a large majority of Kenyans is also quite evident. Grasping its magnitude and various manifestations is necessary in order to appreciate the expectations – or at least hopes – that most people have regarding the promises the new government has made to them, and upon which its performance will in large part be judged.

### Economic Hardship Amidst Optimism

While Kenyans report a considerable degree of hardship, their overall ratings of the economy are relatively good in comparative perspective; especially notable are their high hopes for the future.

- **Many go without:** More than half of respondents report going without food (56 percent) or medical care (68 percent) at least occasionally during the past year, and nearly as many have gone without water (45 percent) and cooking fuel (44 percent).
- **North Easterners suffer the most:** Poverty clearly strikes hardest in North Eastern Province, where one-third (33 percent) went without food frequently, more than four in ten (43 percent) did without water on a regular basis, and two-thirds (68 percent) frequently failed to obtain adequate medical care.
- **Surprisingly positive economic assessments:** Despite widespread reports of economic mismanagement over the past two decades, a plurality (45 percent) rate the country's economic situation as "fairly" or "very good," while only about one-third (31 percent) offer a negative assessment. Despite having one of the lowest average annual GDP growth rates in the 1990s, this is one of the most positive assessments among 15 Afrobarometer countries.
- **High hopes for the future:** More than three-quarters expect both the national economic situation (79 percent) and their personal living conditions (77 percent) to improve over the next year.

## Widespread Commitment to Democracy

Kenyans consistently express some of the highest levels of commitment to democratic principles and institutions across 15 countries, and they rate the quality of their own democracy quite highly as well.

- **High support for democracy:** Fully 80 percent agree that democracy is the only acceptable system of government, one of the highest levels across 15 countries.
- **Strong support for democratic institutions and practices:** Kenyans rate highest or among the highest in commitment to elections as the best system for selecting a government (89 percent), the need for multiple political parties to offer them choice (74 percent), the requirement for the president to obey the constitution and term limits (80 percent), and the recognition of the critical role of parliament in making the nation's laws (76 percent).
- **Towards achieving a full democracy:** Kenyans rate their country's democratic achievements more highly than any other country. Three-quarters (76 percent) see their country as a "full" democracy or as a "democracy, but with minor problems," compared to a 15-country mean of 55 percent. Just 15 percent regard it as "a democracy with major problems", and a mere 2 percent consider the country to be "not a democracy at all."
- **A satisfied citizenry:** Fully 79 percent of Kenyans are either "fairly" or "very satisfied" with the way democracy works in their country, yet again, the highest rating within the Afrobarometer (15-country mean of 56 percent).

## Uncertain Attitudes toward Economic Reform

As in a number of other countries, we find that Kenyans appear to be somewhat uncertain or ambivalent about economic reform. On the one hand, they soundly reject a number of specific reform policies. On the other, they appear to accept the need for reform of some kind in order to set the country on a better economic path.

- **Ambivalence towards a market economy:** When asked whether they prefer a free-market or a government-run economy, Kenyans are nearly evenly divided: 43 percent prefer the market, while 48 percent opt for government control.
- **Rejection of specific economic adjustment policies:** Kenyans reject a number of key components of the standard adjustment package. Over half (54 percent) prefer free schooling rather than paying user fees, even if quality is adversely affected. A larger majority (63 percent) prefer government rather than private control of agricultural marketing. And still larger majorities prefer import controls to protect producers rather than open markets (75 percent), and protecting civil service jobs as opposed to retrenchment (75 percent).
- **Accepting hardships of reform:** Although two-thirds (67 percent) believe that, thus far, economic reform measures have hurt more people than they have helped, fully 78 percent nevertheless agree that in order for the economy to get better, the public must accept some of the hardships of economic reform in the short term.

## Social and National Identity

Contrary to conventional wisdom, Kenyans' self-defined identities do not derive primarily from their ethnic membership, nor does ethnic identity appear to be a significant source of grievance, at least in the abstract. In fact, Kenyans demonstrate strong commitment to their national identity.

- **Diverse sources of identity:** When asked how they identify themselves, other than being Kenyan, a plurality (39 percent) cite their occupation, well above the 15-country mean of 25 percent. Another 28 percent simply refuse to identify themselves as anything other than Kenyan, followed by just 13 percent who depict themselves in terms of their language or ethnic group (compared to a 15-country mean of 23 percent).
- **Allegiance to national identity:** Not only did 28 percent of respondents refuse to identify themselves as anything other than Kenyan, but when the rest were asked if they had to choose between being a Kenyan and being a member of their selected identity group, fully 70 percent chose their Kenyan identity. In other words, 79 percent of all respondents consider themselves Kenyan first and

foremost. This places Kenyans near the top with respect to national allegiance among the 15 countries surveyed.

- **Political affiliation:** Asked whether they feel close to any political party, one-third (31 percent) of respondents reported that they do not. Half (52 percent) link themselves with the ruling NARC party, and the remainder (15 percent) claim allegiance to one of ten opposition parties. Just 4 percent now prefer to associate themselves with KANU, the former ruling party.

### Positive Ratings of the New Government's Performance

Although it had only been in office for eight months at the time of the survey, Kenyans are already giving the government considerable credit for its management of the country.

- **President Kibaki rated most highly:** President Mwai Kibaki gets an approval rating of 92 percent, the highest for any president across 15 survey countries. Two-thirds (65 percent) approve of their own MP's performance, and 64 percent are happy with the work of their local government councilors.
- **Expanding political rights:** When comparing the new government with the previous Moi administration, resounding majorities cite improvements with regard to both respect for political rights, and overall government effectiveness. For example, 84 percent say they now have more freedom to say what they think, and 81 percent feel freer to join any political organisation they want, and to vote as they choose. Three-quarters (77 percent) say the ability of ordinary citizens to influence government has improved, and 64 percent say there have been improvements in the government's treatment of all citizens in terms of equality and fairness.
- **Improved governance:** Comparisons of the current and former government also reveal that 74 percent believe the current government is less corrupt, while 80 percent think it is more effective in service delivery, and 86 percent believe it is better able to enforce the law.
- **Even KANU supporters join in:** While the handful of respondents affiliated with KANU are considerably less generous in making these comparisons, it is noteworthy that in many cases a majority, and in all cases a plurality, also agree that the provision of political rights and other aspects of government performance have improved since NARC took office.

### Splits on the NARC Reform Agenda

Two particular challenges facing NARC when it entered office were fulfilling its campaign promise to complete the constitutional reform process, and in particular deciding whether a prime ministerial position will indeed be created, and deciding how to handle the possible crimes of the previous KANU government(s). On some of these issues the public gives clear guidance on its wishes; on others, a divided public leaves the government in a potentially awkward position as it decides how to proceed.

- **Unified in support of constitutional reform:** Even with a new government in power, 81 percent agree that constitutional reform is still necessary to strengthen democracy in Kenya.
- **Divided over a prime minister:** While 21 percent reject the establishment of a premiership, nearly twice as many (39 percent) opt for a prime minister with limited powers, while 32 percent support the creation of such a post that is strong and independent. Given the negotiations among parties (and, in effect, ethnic groups) over this post, it is not surprising that opinions vary enormously across ethno-linguistic communities. Among the Luo, whose leader had earlier been publicly promised the position, 78 percent support a strong and independent premier. Among the Kikuyu, one of whom now occupies the powerful presidency, support for a strong prime minister is far weaker, at just 10 percent.
- **Widespread demand for investigations:** Fully 82 percent of respondents support investigating the possible crimes of past governments, but they are evenly divided with regard to investigating only the Moi era (40 percent), or investigating the entire independence era (42 percent).
- **Amnesty rather than punishment:** For those found guilty of such crimes, two-thirds (65 percent) prefer amnesty for those who confess and repay, as opposed to either full prosecution and punishment (23 percent), or unconditional amnesty (8 percent).

## Two Kenyas?

It has long been argued that there are in fact two Kenyas: an “up-Kenya” comprised of the northern and northeastern pastoral zones, and a “down-Kenya” covering the rest of the country. How distinctive are the pastoral zones of the country? It appears that neither information nor euphoria have permeated the northern regions to the same extent that they have in “down-Kenya.” On many questions, respondents from up-Kenya give lower positive ratings to the government and the economy. There are two distinct reasons for this: a much higher level of “don’t know” responses on many questions, reflecting in part the more limited access to news sources, and, in some cases, higher negative ratings. To cite a few examples:

- **Management of the economy:** While 85 percent of southern Kenyans rate the government handling of the economy as “fairly” or “very good,” 12 percent rate it poorly, and 3 percent don’t know, among pastoralists in up-Kenya just 56 percent give the government good ratings. While this is still a majority, it is offset by the fact that 22 percent rate the government’s handling as “fairly” or “very bad”, and another 21 percent do not know enough about it to offer an opinion.
- **Basic health services:** Similarly, 77 percent of down-Kenya residents rate government handling of basic health services positively, compared to a much narrower majority of 54 percent in up-Kenya. Among the latter, 42 percent offer a negative assessment (compared to 22 percent in down-Kenya), and just 3 percent don’t know (compared to 1 percent in down-Kenya).

Another possible national cleavage is religion. In general, similar, but somewhat more muted, trends are evident in distinguishing between the views of Christians and Muslims. One example:

- **Muslim views differ on handling of terrorism:** Among Christians, 74 percent give the government positive ratings for its handling of the terrorism threat, 10 percent offer a negative rating, and 16 percent don’t know. Among Muslims, a much slimmer majority of 52 percent still bestow support, but more than twice as many Muslims (24 percent) rate the government’s efforts in this area as “fairly” or “very bad,” and 24 percent “don’t know”.

## Conclusion

Given the often overwhelmingly positive assessments Kenyans give of the state of their country, their economy, their political system, and their government, particularly in comparison to respondents in other Afrobarometer countries, it is virtually undeniable that the evident public euphoria that filled the air after the election of Mwai Kibaki and his NARC coalition in December 2002 was having an inflationary effect on the public’s judgments at the time of the survey. In such a context, it is virtually inevitable that some “coming down to earth” must occur. But the question for the NARC government, at least in part, is whether, for Kenyans, it will be a hard landing, or a soft one. Will Kenyans merely have to modify their expectations, putting them more in tune with the difficult realities the country faces? Or will their hopes simply be dashed, and the public find itself back (or at best close to) where it started before all the excitement of the “new dawn” took hold?

Unfortunately, the debates of the last few months since survey fieldwork was completed increasingly suggest that a hard landing may be in the offing. As ever-wider slits have appeared in the NARC umbrella, and much attention already appears to be focused on jockeying for position with a view toward the next election, rather than on producing results now, the public mood has altered considerably. For many, 2004 was greeted much more soberly than was the previous year.

It might be argued that these are still very early days; after working so hard to get into power, and having found the “ship-of-state” in such disrepair, it would undoubtedly take considerable time to right things even in the absence of the kind of discord emanating from within the new government itself. And a convincing argument can yet be made that many positive changes have indeed occurred. Nevertheless, it is clear that the government will have to do more to come to grips with the daunting challenges it confronts over the course of the next few years if public support for the present administration is to persist at anything like the levels observed in this first Afrobarometer survey.

# A NEW DAWN? POPULAR OPTIMISM IN KENYA AFTER THE TRANSITION

## 1.0 Introduction

The first Kenya Afrobarometer survey was conducted at a most unusual time. In December 2002, Kenyans went to the polls in what proved to be the beginning of a historic transition: the first electoral transfer of power in the country's history. After more than two decades under the much-maligned rule of President Daniel arap Moi, Kenyans voted the long-ruling Kenyan African National Union (KANU) party out of office, and elevated Mwai Kibaki and his National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) to power. The shift was greeted with euphoria and an outpouring of optimism, as Kenyans hoped that NARC's promises to reform and revitalize the government – and the country – would lead them down the path of prosperity and a fully realised democracy.<sup>1</sup>

Eight months after Kibaki took the oath of office, interviewers took to the field to conduct the country's first Afrobarometer survey, with the aim of measuring Kenyans' attitudes and opinions about the state of their country in the aftermath of this momentous transition. In just over a month, from mid-August to mid-September 2003, the views of 2398 randomly selected adult Kenyans – representing all eight provinces of the country and hailing from some of its farthest corners – were collected on issues ranging from attitudes toward democracy to assessments of the national economy and evaluations of current constitutional reform efforts.

Afrobarometer survey findings are a valuable tool for understanding the social, political and economic atmosphere in Kenya, and the implications for democratic consolidation and governance. With this first survey in Kenya, the country joins what is known as Round 2 of the Afrobarometer. Round 1 surveys were conducted in 12 countries (Kenya was not included) between 1999 and 2001. Round 2 includes surveys in 15 countries conducted between June 2002 and October 2003.<sup>2</sup> Thus, these Afrobarometer survey results allow us not only to assess attitudes within Kenya, but also to place it in comparative perspective with a number of other countries undergoing similar processes of democratisation and economic reform, while also providing a baseline for comparison in possible future surveys.

### 1.1 Key Themes of the Report

Overall, the survey findings clearly capture the palpable sense of almost unbounded optimism and hope that permeated Kenya in the days and months following the election. On item after item, Kenyans give some of the most positive assessments of their government's performance, the quality of their democracy, and even the condition of the national economy, of any of the countries included in the survey. They also stand out as having one of the highest levels of commitment to democracy and democratic institutions, and their confidence in a more bountiful future is overwhelming.

But the obvious question is whether the goodwill and optimism measured in this survey, including especially the commitment to democracy as a system of rule (in contrast to mere support for the current government), demonstrate lasting, deeply-rooted democratic values along with careful assessments of the new government's performance, or merely reflect a much more transient, post-transition euphoria. Only in Nigeria has a survey been conducted so soon after such a significant transition. That survey showed similarly positive assessments almost across the board. But in two succeeding surveys, public assessments of the quality of democracy and governance in the country have plummeted, although *commitment* to a democratic system appears to have held up much more strongly than support for the current government. It remains to be seen whether Kenyan attitudes will follow a similar trajectory, or whether the NARC government will instead prove more successful at managing and meeting popular expectations for change and renewal. Some of the coming down-to-earth seen in Nigeria is perhaps inevitable in Kenya as well, but whether that landing is "soft" or "hard" may depend in large part on the

extent to which the NARC government fulfills its promises to put the country on a new path, and retains at least a semblance of the internal political unity that it offered to voters during the 2002 campaign.

Another related theme running throughout this report is the extent and nature of the poverty affecting a large majority of Kenyans. Grasping its magnitude and various manifestations is necessary in order to appreciate the expectations – or at least hopes – that most people have regarding the promises the new government has made to them, and upon which its performance will in large part be judged.

Taken together, this report stresses the rather unique historical moment during which this survey was conducted, and raises the broader question as to what level of government (and private sector) performance will be necessary to begin to satisfy, or at least to manage, such expectations. The likely implications of its success – or failure – in doing so must be left to our readers.

## **2.0 Background to a Dramatic Transition: The Context for the Kenya Afrobarometer Survey**

On December 30, 2002, all Kenyan eyes were on Uhuru Park where the inauguration of the new president took place. Many of us sat in the mud under an unforgiving sun, oblivious of discomfort, transported by possibilities: the possibility that a new and noble era had dawned in Kenya; the possibility that we could leave tribalism, plunder and ineptitude behind us; and the possibility that our politics would now be progressive and our development progressive. We sat united, our hopes welded together by sheer joy.<sup>3</sup>

The sense of a “burden” being lifted was widely shared. People suddenly felt they were free to think bigger and better about their future. The election revived a long-dormant notion of a collective interest – indeed of a Kenyan national purpose. The prior regime was inept, parts of the bureaucracy were all but paralyzed, many bureaucratic offices were “privatized,” corruption was routine, impunity was all but certain, poverty and crime were spreading, basic social services were eroding, the economy was barely growing...

The election changed all this. It also unleashed a powerful optimism, even euphoria, among Kenyans, including many supporters of the Moi regime. Overnight the global image of Kenya was transformed from rogue to righteous...<sup>4</sup>

### **2.1 KANU’s Governance Legacy...**

Notwithstanding several notable political assassinations and the failed coup attempt of 1982, Kenya’s entire post-colonial experience has been notable for the absence of major disruptions to the constitutional order.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, multiple amendments to the independence constitution effected a significant “shrinking of the political arena”<sup>6</sup> in terms of civil liberties and the actual political choices available to Kenyans.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, Moi’s incumbency, which particularly during its last 10 years was driven by the country’s return to multiparty competition, was characterised by what has been described as a marked “decline in the governance realm.”<sup>8</sup> This was manifested in escalating corruption (establishing, according to some, a rampaging “lootocracy”<sup>9</sup>), state-sponsored (or at least tolerated) ethnic violence associated especially with elections,<sup>10</sup> as well as increasing crime and insecurity, capricious mal-administration of justice,<sup>11</sup> widespread economic decline,<sup>12</sup> and a marked deterioration in infrastructure. These failures exacerbated a major loss of donor confidence, leading to a precipitous decline in multilateral and bilateral aid levels, including a freezing of IMF lending in 1997. All this contributed to unprecedented material deprivation – a decline in per capita income between 1990 and 2002 from \$271 to \$239, and a rise in the percentage of Kenyans living in poverty to 56 percent<sup>13</sup> – even if the conditions for many people in countries that border Kenya were often far worse (a fact that Kenyans were frequently reminded of by

KANU leaders). In addition, the unresolved murders of several prominent public figures and frequent human rights abuses further undermined the regime's credibility and legitimacy.<sup>14</sup>

Other factors negatively affecting the quality of life in Kenya, and thus also citizens' perception of state performance, had less to do with the Moi government per se. Continuing population growth, which, even within the context of a steady decline in the fertility rate, resulted in increasing competition for jobs and natural resources, especially land, but also water.<sup>15</sup> Likewise, the spreading AIDS scourge has driven down per capita annual income levels over recent years, as well as reducing the life expectancy of the average Kenyan by some six to ten years. Meanwhile, the instability in several neighboring countries fueled an influx of both arms and refugees, especially in northern areas and extending along the coast as far south as Mombasa. These flows have severely taxed the government's security apparatus, while placing additional stress on public services. Similarly, terrorist attacks in 1998 and 2002 both revealed the nation's vulnerability to outside penetration, and caused still further damage to a tourism industry already suffering from state-sponsored ethnic violence that had erupted at the Coast prior to the 1997 elections. These attacks, and the often rather heavy-handed responses to them, have also constituted an additional irritant to Christian-Muslim relations within the country.

At the same time, the unending impediments Moi had placed in the way of constitutional reform – initially a civil society initiative that was later co-opted by the Opposition, and finally got underway as the product of a broader political compromise during 2001<sup>16</sup> – added to the groundswell of desire for change among Kenyans of almost all political stripes, as the clock ticked away on his second and final five year term.<sup>17</sup>

There were also deep suspicions in some quarters that the President would somehow find a mechanism that would allow him to remain in office despite the constitutional two-term limit. To this end, on several occasions during the 8<sup>th</sup> Parliament KANU die-hards proposed measures that would have extended Moi's rule. None was formalized as an actual legislative proposal or brought to a vote, however.<sup>18</sup> Others feared, based in part on past experience, that violence or other extra-constitutional mechanisms might be employed to make it possible to either abort the election, or at least skew the results.<sup>19</sup>

## ***2.2 ...And Its Pre-Election Implosion***

Meanwhile, struggles over the Moi succession contributed significantly to the erosion of the ruling party's internal cohesion, and hence, its eventual electoral clout. The merger between the National Development Party (NDP), led by Raila Odinga, the leader of the Luo community, and KANU in March 2002 played a critical role in this disintegration, as it effectively marginalised several of Moi's most loyal lieutenants. Apart from replacing the party's long-serving Secretary-General, Joseph Kamotho, with Odinga, the merger created multiple vice-chair positions, bringing in four prominent cabinet ministers to fill the posts, but excluding the lone incumbent, Vice-President George Saitoti. In retrospect, these changes can be seen as part of Moi's private plan to control the party's presidential nomination process. In the event, however, they set the stage for the unintended destabilization of the ruling party from within.

Odinga's ascent appeared to convince his Luo community that its "favorite son," if not actually destined to receive Moi's blessing as KANU's presidential candidate, would at least be given a fair shot at the nomination. Meanwhile, the expansion of the party's second-tier slot to four raised similar expectations among three of the major ethnic communities represented: the Luhya of Western Province, the Kamba of Eastern Province, and the Mijikenda of Coast Province. Indeed, although the beneficiary of the fourth slot, a newcomer to KANU's higher ranks, Uhuru Kenyatta, is himself a Kikuyu, most observers initially perceived Saitoti's departure as Moi's way of ensuring that the party's eventual nominee would be "ABK" (i.e., "Anyone But a Kikuyu"). Against this background, Moi's surprise announcement in July, that the youthful Kenyatta, son of the country's first president, was his personal choice to succeed him, effectively splintered the ruling party.<sup>20</sup>

This eventually led to a significant exit of prominent KANU leaders in mid-October into the waiting arms of an Opposition coalition that had already achieved considerable electoral potential.<sup>21</sup> The fact that a number of these individuals had been long-serving members of a regime whose legacy the voters now appeared ready to reject seemed to matter little; what counted was that the ranks of those opposing Moi's designs continued to swell.<sup>22</sup> Such opposition unity appeared to be cemented by the subsequent signing, on 22 October, of a "Memorandum of Understanding" (MoU) that was widely publicised.<sup>23</sup> Among other things, it identified coalition leaders with specific offices, beginning with the president and vice-president, which the present constitution provides for, as well others for which it does not, especially an executive prime minister.<sup>24</sup> Thus, the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK), an amalgam of various Opposition parties, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a previously unknown entity that was energized by its new "owners," the KANU rebels, came together in the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC).<sup>25</sup>

### ***2.3 NARC's Ascendancy***

Indeed, efforts to achieve this Opposition unity had been underway for several years. Opposition leaders needed no reminding that the last two elections had been lost largely due to their own internal divisions, producing a failure to agree on a single presidential candidate, and thus allowing Moi and KANU to remain in power with just 36 percent of the vote in 1992,<sup>26</sup> and 41 percent in 1997.<sup>27</sup> This was especially true for NARC's presidential candidate, Mwai Kibaki, who had represented his Democratic Party in both of these contests.<sup>28</sup> At the same time, pressure for such unity was coming as much from below as from these leaders themselves.<sup>29</sup>

As the election neared, NARC's campaign tapped directly into most Kenyans' deep desire for change. On the one hand, its main leaders, untainted by the economic failures and allegations of corruption associated with the later Moi years, had considerably more credibility in offering solutions to the country's many woes.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, the specific campaign promises it offered resonated extremely well with the Kenyan public. These included: free primary education; a new, more democratic constitution "within one hundred days"; and an end to corruption, as well as the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for past looting of public coffers and the return of illegally appropriated public property. Other campaign pledges addressed the restoration of fruitful relations with the country's main donors, starting with the World Bank and the IMF; compensation for victims of past human rights abuses and punishment for those responsible; the creation of "half a million jobs a year for the next five years"; annual construction of 150,000 housing units; and implementation of the previous government's broken promise of a massive pay rise for teachers, as well as similar rises for others, such as the grossly underpaid police. KANU's pledges – including many of a similar nature – rang hollow by comparison, in light of the incumbent party's 40-year run. Even dressed up in the guise of a more youthful group of "Young Turks,"<sup>31</sup> it became increasingly clear (and was confirmed in several opinion polls) that KANU's prospects were their weakest since the country's return to multiparty politics.<sup>32</sup>

### ***2.4 The NARC Sweep: A New Dawn?***

In the absence of any significant disruption of the voting exercise, it therefore came as no great surprise that on 27 December 2002, encouraged by a large scale domestic and diplomatic election observation effort, Kenyan voters gave 62 percent of their votes to NARC. This put Mwai Kibaki into State House with a hefty majority (125 out of 210 elected seats) in the National Assembly. Only in rather remote North Eastern Province and Moi's own Rift Valley did the young Kenyatta collect a majority of the votes, as shown in Table 1.<sup>33</sup>

In contrast to the two previous multiparty elections, observers reported that this result was almost universally fraud-free and thus an accurate reflection of the voters' wishes. The high quality of the election was offset, however, by a decidedly lower turnout than in 1997, and several individual races would later be challenged in the courts.<sup>34</sup>

**Table 1: Provincial Distribution of Presidential Vote**

Province	Kibaki	Kenyatta	Other <sup>35</sup>
Nairobi	77	21	3
Central	69	30	1
Eastern	73	25	2
North Eastern	37	62	0
Coast	64	32	4
Rift Valley	43	53	4
Western	75	22	4
Nyanza	59	8	33

(percent) Source: “Preliminary Results: 2002 Presidential Election,” Nairobi, Electoral Commission of Kenya, January 2003.

Notwithstanding their expectations, however, Kenyans, still in a state of near shock at this decimation of the party that had claimed to be the “Father and Mother” for the vast majority of the population since birth, then held their collective breaths to witness a smooth, peaceful transfer of power that some had doubted would be allowed to occur. Among the various factors that may have contributed to this was the significant presence in the new government of former KANU elements (whom Moi and his closest allies could count on to at least moderate any “revenge” agenda) and strong international interest in the country’s continuing stability.

In the event, it was only President Kibaki’s poor health (together with his age of 71) following a serious road accident during the campaign that sent him into hospital in Britain,<sup>36</sup> and complications that followed his swearing-in (including rumours of one or more strokes) that required an additional local hospital stay, that diluted the public’s euphoria. The new government, meanwhile, confronted the budgetary and political challenges of implementing its promises, and of holding its own disparate coalition together.

Messy realities surfaced almost immediately.<sup>37</sup> Cracks in the NARC coalition began to appear with complaints about ethnic favouritism in appointments to senior positions.<sup>38</sup> Critics claimed that key parts of the MoU – starting with those stipulating that the LDP wing of NARC was entitled to 50 percent of top appointments, and that the position of prime minister (whenever it appeared<sup>39</sup>) was earmarked for Odinga – were being ignored. Differences of opinion also quickly emerged as to how to handle the possible criminal liability of ex-President Moi, as well as over proposed provisions of the draft constitution, and even over the very need for the constitutional review effort to continue.<sup>40</sup> In addition, the dramatic deaths of several key members of the government, including the Vice-President, Michael Wamalwa, who died in a London hospital in August 2003, and two other cabinet ministers, cast a shadow of tragic gloom over the new team.<sup>41</sup> As for its core economic agenda, during the government’s first eight months in power, only the promise of free primary education was implemented. Even if this move won almost universal support, it had serious national budgetary implications, although these would remain invisible to most Kenyans, at least for the near future.<sup>42</sup>

### **2.5 Assessing the Public’s Mood**

Notwithstanding the profound obstacles in the way of achieving visible economic recovery, the public mood was still one of great hope and expectation when the Afrobarometer survey exercise began in August 2003. At the same time, there was a growing realisation that the promise of the NARC government’s post-election unity might very well prove illusory, and that even with the best of intentions, most of its campaign pledges would require, at best, much longer to implement than its campaign oratory had suggested. Still, the exit of the previous KANU regime – long associated with resistance both to economic reform and to the expansion of civic freedoms – appears to have engendered an atmosphere of openness and frankness that made it an opportune time to undertake a survey of this sort.

At the same time, given that Kenyan politics continues to be primarily an elite-driven enterprise, questions may be raised about the role of public opinion, and the extent to which the current government's fate is linked to public attitudes. Whatever the case, the December 2002 election may have taught both politicians and ordinary citizens several profound civic education lessons. For leaders, it showed the value – if not the necessity – of building coalitions across parties and ethnic groups in recognition that no single community has anything close to an electoral majority on its own. For citizens, it showed that if politicians organize themselves so as to give voters a clear choice, the ballot can constitute a powerful tool for peaceful change, at least in terms of the identity of those who occupy the highest offices in the land. Whether such a change can be translated into any discernible improvement in their own lives remains to be seen.

The immediate post-election period was thus deemed an opportune time to begin illuminating the conditions currently affecting Kenyans, to reveal their attitudes toward and evaluations of their political and economic systems, and to capture their expectations and aspirations for the future.

### **3.0 Survey Methodology**

#### ***3.1 Sampling***

The Afrobarometer survey is designed as a nationally representative sample survey. Respondents were randomly selected so that every adult Kenyan had an equal chance of being included in the sample. The sample of 2398 individuals therefore provides results that should closely mirror those of the national population; the margin of sampling error is plus or minus 2.0 percent, with a 95 percent confidence level.<sup>43</sup>

A random, stratified, multi-stage area probability sample method was used. Using a sampling frame developed from the Kenya Government's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 1999 Population and Housing Census, Enumeration Areas (EAs) were stratified according to province and type of location (urban or rural). EAs were then randomly selected using the probability proportional to population size method. A total of 300 EAs were selected, representing all eight of the country's provinces, and some 55 of its 71 districts. Provinces were represented in the sample in proportion to their share of the national population with the exception that a disproportionate oversample was drawn in North Eastern Province to ensure sufficient numbers of cases for analysis; interviews were post-weighted to correct for this oversample in the calculation of the national sample statistics presented here. A gender quota was also introduced to ensure that every other interview was conducted with a female. Further details on the sampling methodology can be found in Appendix A.

#### ***3.2 Survey Methods and Constraints***

The Afrobarometer uses a standardized questionnaire in all countries, which allows comparability of results both within and between countries. In addition, a limited number of country-specific questions were included to capture opinions on key governance issues presently facing Kenya for current and future tracking. The questionnaire was translated into nine local languages in addition to English and Swahili versions, and respondents were allowed to select the interview language of their choice.<sup>44</sup>

Notwithstanding these standardized procedures and careful oversight, several factors may have had small effects on the reliability of the data obtained. These include the following:

- Nearly all of the interviews were conducted during the day, and they were also generally conducted at residences, not places of work,<sup>45</sup> so those who hold regular full-time jobs may be slightly underrepresented in the sample. However, about one-third of all interviews in Nairobi were conducted on a Sunday.

- The selection methodology requires that an equal number of men and women were interviewed in each EA. Limited local bias may arise from the fact while some urban areas have a predominance of men in the adult population, many (though not all) rural areas have a corresponding predominance of women.
- Most of those who opted for Swahili as the interview language, and nearly all who chose English, do not speak either of these as their first language. As a consequence, several of (the few) more nuanced questions may not have been understood in precisely the same way by all respondents.
- Despite disclaimers at the start of the interview introducing the interviewer as coming from a private research company and having no affiliation to the government or any political party, when respondents were asked at the end of the interview who they thought sent the interviewer, a large proportion (61 percent) identified either the government in general, or specific government institutions. This could have had some effect on the results (e.g., by reducing the willingness to speak freely or critically about government), particularly on some of the more sensitive questions. However, disaggregation of results on key questions concerning government performance between those who thought the interviewer was associated with the government and those who did not does not show significant differences in responses between the two groups.
- Finally, due to the length of the questionnaire, it often required an hour or more to complete an interview. As a result of fatigue, respondents may have put less care into their responses to questions towards the end of the interview. However, in recognition of this fact, the concluding sets of questions are mainly factual, requiring little if any contemplation. As a result, the effects of any such “fatigue factor” should be minimal.

### ***3.3 Sample Demographics***

The basic demographic and other characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 2. As noted, the 2398 respondents were equally divided in terms of gender, with an urban-rural breakdown of 20-80 percent. Further, over 99 percent were Africans, in itself an indication that those selected were indeed representative of the country’s population, based on the 1999 census. As the income and ethnicity data indicate, this is clearly not a survey of elite opinion; those in the upper income brackets, as well as in minority racial groups that hold major stakes in the economy (members of the country’s Asian community, for example, were recently found to own some 80 percent of Kenya’s larger manufacturing enterprises<sup>46</sup>), have an extremely slender profile in the sample. But the purpose of public opinion surveys such as this is precisely to offset the elite bias that so often dominates current analysis and debate.

The data confirm the extent of poverty in Kenya, as well as the gross mal-distribution of cash income. With an exchange rate of about KSh75 = US\$1 at the time of the survey, the income figures show that nearly half (44 percent) of the sample generally earn less than US\$20 a month, or \$240 annually (including nearly one-quarter who remain entirely outside the cash economy). On the other hand, only 6 percent of respondents report a monthly income above \$200 (KSh 15,000), and not even 1 percent earn \$666 (KSh 50,000) and above. Altogether, then, these data reflect the overall reality of both poverty and inequality in Kenya, confirmed by other sources. For example, according to the UNDP, while the lowest 20 percent of the working population in Kenya take home just 2.5 percent of total income, the top 20 percent receive over 50 percent.<sup>47</sup>

The distribution of the survey respondents among Kenya’s ethno-linguistic groups also matches quite closely with other estimates.<sup>48</sup> The breakdown of the sample according to occupation and self-reported income likewise appears to be a fairly accurate representation of the country’s working population.

**Table 2: Sample Demographics (weighted)**

<b>Number of respondents</b>	2398	<b>Province</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Male : Female ratio</b>	50:50	Central	13
<b>Median age</b>	32	Coast	9
<b>Urban : Rural ratio</b>	20:80	Eastern	16
		Nairobi	7
<b>Education</b>	<b>Percent</b>	North Eastern	3
No formal education/informal only	12	Nyanza	15
Primary only	38	Rift Valley	24
Secondary only	36	Western	12
Post-secondary	13		
		<b>First Language</b>	
<b>Household Income<sup>49</sup></b>		Kikuyu	20
None	24	Luhya	15
Less than KSh 1000/month	15	Luo	12
KSh 1001-2500/month	14	Kalenjin	12
KSh 2501-5000/month	12	Kamba	11
KSh 5001-15,000/month	14	Kisii	6
Over KSh 15,000/month	6	Meru	6
Don't know/refused to answer	15	Mijikenda*	4
		Somali	3
<b>Occupation</b>		Maasai/Samburu*	2
Farmer (home consumption only)	24	Swahili	2
Farmer (home and sales)	14	Turkana	2
Businessperson	10	Other	5
Housewife	6		
Student	5	<b>Religion</b>	
Teacher	4	Catholic	31
Trader/hawker/vendor	4	Protestant (Mainstream)	27
Professional worker	4	Protestant (Evangelical)	23
Skilled artisan/informal sector	4	Other Christian	7
Unskilled worker/informal sector	3	Muslim	8
Jobless/Never had a job	10	None	2
Other	12	Traditional/other	2

*\*As noted, these are not survey languages.*

The proportion of Muslims in the sample (8 percent) is notable. Some estimates (including those by Muslims themselves) have placed their share of the Kenyan population considerably higher (while at times acknowledging the unreliability of the estimates), although others tend to confirm our finding.<sup>50</sup> The close correspondence between the sample distribution and national statistics in terms of ethnicity and other items suggest that the 8 percent figure is credible. It is often argued that several regions, such as North Eastern Province (which is almost entirely Muslim), have been undercounted in the national census, in which case they would be similarly underrepresented in our weighted sample. However, the total population of North Eastern Province is such a small share of the national total (under 4 percent) that even if the province was significantly undercounted, the effects on the distribution figures for religious affiliation would be minimal.

## 4.0 Economic Conditions

### 4.1 Socio-Economic Status

Before discussing the most important attitudinal and behavioural findings, it is appropriate to further elaborate the socio-economic status of those included in the survey as respondents. Who are the nearly two-and-a-half thousand Kenyans appearing in the sample?

We begin with employment status, a key indicator of economic position (Table 3). Fully two-thirds of all respondents (65 percent) report that they are jobless, and more than half of these (38 percent) are not looking for work. Of course, some of these may simply have given up after repeated disappointments. Others may actually be engaged either partly or fully in subsistence agricultural (or pastoralist) activities. Likewise, in urban areas, much work is casual (i.e., temporary, and often for days rather than for weeks or months), lacking any security or benefits, and usually at the lowest wages.

**Table 3: Employment Status**

	Percent
Jobless, Not Looking For Work	38
Jobless, Looking for Work	27
Employed Part-Time, Not Looking for a Regular Job	4
Employed Part-Time, Looking for a Regular Job	11
Employed Full-Time, Not Looking for Another Job	13
Employed Full-Time, Looking for Another Job	8

*Do you have a job that pays a cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)?*

A more detailed picture of respondents' degree of integration into the cash economy can be derived from the extent to which they depend on various activities and sources of income. Fully 60 percent claim not to be engaged in wage labour activities at all, while 22 percent do so "a little," and just 18 percent "a lot." At the same time, 60 percent report working five or more hours per day to earn money (a somewhat broader category, as many do so in an informal, "casual" sense, rather than through regular wage employment). In addition, 35 percent report spending five or more hours per day growing their own food. Only 5 percent use hired labour "often" (with another 20 percent using it "a little," and 75 percent not at all).

As shown in Table 4, Kenyans must frequently look to sources other than their own individual efforts to secure their livelihoods. The fact that three times more use is made of social capital (a total of 48 percent borrow from family and/or friends) than of formal institutions (15 percent borrow from banks) is further evidence that the majority of Kenyans reside at the periphery of the modern, cash-based economy.<sup>51</sup>

**Table 4: Sources of Capital**

	Not At All	A Little	A Lot
Borrowing from family/friends	51	41	7
Borrowing from a bank	85	12	3
Remittances from family working elsewhere in Kenya	71	23	5
Remittances from family working outside Kenya	93	5	2

*Considering ALL the activities you engage in to secure a livelihood, how much do you depend on: (percent)*

The survey also provides several more practical indicators of the breadth and depth of the experience of poverty among Kenyans. Respondents were asked how often they had had to do without a number of basic needs during the course of the past year (Table 5). More than half have gone without food (56 percent) and/or medical care (57 percent), and 45 percent have gone without water, suggesting a substantial level of hardship in everyday life. In addition, we found that fully 80 percent of respondents have no access to electricity (and interviewers report the absence of any electrical grid in 64 percent of the sampling areas).<sup>52</sup>

**Table 5: Going Without Basic Needs**

	<b>Many Times/ Always</b>	<b>Just Once or Twice/ Several Times</b>	<b>Never</b>
Food	14	42	44
Cooking Fuel	8	36	56
Water	15	30	55
Medical Care	15	42	32
Cash Income	33	52	15

*Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your family gone without: (percent)*

Considerable regional disparities in the experience of everyday hardships are also evident (Table 6). Kenyans in North Eastern Province go without basic necessities far more often than those elsewhere in the country. Fully one in three struggles nearly constantly with shortages of food, while two out of three have little or no access to medical care, compared to an average of just 15 percent who face this level of difficulty nationwide.

**Table 6: Going Without Basic Needs, by Province**

	<b>Central</b>	<b>Coast</b>	<b>Eastern</b>	<b>Nairobi</b>	<b>North Eastern</b>	<b>Nyanza</b>	<b>Rift Valley</b>	<b>Western</b>
Food	8	24	15	13	<b>33</b>	14	14	8
Cooking Fuel	<b>11</b>	6	10	<b>11</b>	7	6	10	4
Water	14	23	20	15	<b>43</b>	11	11	4
Medical Care	22	21	15	13	<b>68</b>	20	15	10
Cash Income	34	32	29	23	<b>63</b>	37	33	32

*(percent "many times"/"always")*

Taken together, these responses shed further light on the poverty of the vast majority of Kenyans, a finding that corresponds with national economic statistics.<sup>53</sup>

#### **4.2 Economic Evaluations**

How do Kenyans subjectively assess their own economic well-being? Respondents were first asked to rate the country's present economic condition. Given widespread lamentation about the country's precipitous economic slide over the past two decades, it is perhaps surprising that a strong plurality (45 percent) rate the national economic situation as fairly or very good. In fact, this places Kenyans near the top among 15 African countries in their assessment of the overall state of the national economy (Table 7). Only Namibians (57 percent) and Mozambicans (51 percent) give a more positive assessment, while Botswana and Ugandans are equally positive.


**Table 7: Ratings of National Economic Situation, Across Countries**

	Fairly Good/ Very Good	Neither Good nor Bad	Fairly Bad/ Very Bad
Namibia	57	26	15
Mozambique	51	23	20
<b>Kenya</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>31</b>
Uganda	45	10	43
Botswana	45	24	26
Tanzania	33	22	42
Zambia	32	6	62
Ghana	31	7	59
Nigeria	31	8	61
South Africa	30	12	56
Mali	25	10	65
Senegal	22	27	50
Malawi	19	4	74
Lesotho	11	5	82
Cape Verde	10	45	40

*In general, how would you describe the present economic condition of this country? (percent)*

Such perceived economic performance may be compared with actual GDP growth rates during the 1990s (Figure 1). These national comparative figures appear to constitute initial evidence of what we suspect are overly positive – perhaps euphoric, and not necessarily well-grounded – attitudes among Kenyans in the early post-transition environment, at least with regard to national economic well-being.

**Figure 1: Annual GDP Growth Rates, 1990-99**



Source: World Development Report, 2000/2001

Respondents are more evenly divided in assessments of their personal living conditions between those who see them as bad (35 percent) and those who give their situation a positive rating (39 percent). But

again, this affirms Kenyans as the most positive in their assessments across all countries; only South Africans, Mozambicans and Ugandans come close, at 37, 36 and 35 percent positive ratings, respectively.

We then asked respondents to compare themselves with other Kenyans, and with citizens of neighboring countries (Table 8). Again, they reveal relatively positive assessments, with roughly two-thirds rating both their personal conditions as being equal to or better than other Kenyans (70 percent), and their national conditions as being equal or superior to those of their neighbours (66 percent).<sup>54</sup>

**Table 8: Comparative Economic Conditions**

	<b>Worse/Much Worse</b>	<b>Same</b>	<b>Better/Much Better</b>
Country's economic condition compared to neighbours'	17	18	48
Your living condition compared to other Kenyans	24	37	33

*In general, how do you rate: a) the economic conditions in this country compared to those in neighbouring countries; b) your living conditions compared to those of other Kenyans? (percent)*

It is striking that despite what appeared prior to the election to be widespread dissatisfaction with the dismal state of national and personal economic conditions, many Kenyans still regard themselves as better off in comparison to others. Of course, Kenya shares borders not only with a fairly robust Uganda, but also with a still largely anarchic Somalia; the country's relative position depends considerably upon which direction one is looking.

We also asked respondents to look backwards – comparing conditions at the time of the survey with those 12 months earlier – and forward, one year into the future (Table 9). Once again, we see relatively strong positive ratings, with a slim majority (51 percent) claiming to see improvement in the national situation compared to a year previously, and 44 percent reporting improvement in their personal condition. This finding is also a bit curious. To be sure, the elimination of primary school fees during 2003 will have had a positive impact on many households, but aside from this, there was little hard evidence to suggest that general economic improvement had already occurred.

**Table 9: Perspectives on the Economic Past and Future**

	<b>Worse/Much Worse</b>	<b>Same</b>	<b>Better/Much Better</b>
National economy now compared to one year ago	23	24	51
National economy in one year	4	7	79
Personal living conditions now compared to one year ago	21	35	44
Personal living conditions in one year	4	9	77

*Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: a) economic conditions in this country; b) your living conditions. (percent)*

*Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: a) economic conditions in this country in twelve months time; b) your living conditions in twelve months time. (percent)*

Kenyans also stand out as extremely positive in their assessments in comparative terms. Among 15 countries, on average just 37 percent of Afrobarometer respondents report improvements in national economic conditions, and 35 percent rate their personal living conditions as improved. Only Namibians

(47 percent) and Mozambicans (45 percent) are similarly positive about the national situation, while Nigerians (45 percent), Malians and Zambians (both 42 percent) are among the most positive about their personal conditions.

The degree of optimism expressed by most Kenyans is even more striking with regard to their expectations for the future. More than three out of four predict that both their own economic lives and the economic life of their country will have improved in one year's time (77 and 79 percent, respectively). While in other Afrobarometer countries it has not been unusual to find a considerable degree of optimism about the future, only Cape Verdians (80 and 84 percent, respectively), Nigerians (74 and 60 percent), and Namibians (65 and 76 percent) display comparable levels.

Finally, respondents were asked to rate themselves, their parents ten years ago, and their children in the future, on a scale from 0 ("poor") to 10 ("rich"). In this case Kenyans again appear to significantly understate the country's economic decline of the past decade. They give themselves a mean rating of 3.8 on the scale, while their parents 10 years earlier achieve a mean rating of 4.1. In fact, Kenyans are not alone in observing economic decline between their parents' generation and their own; this is true in 12 out of 15 countries in Round 2. Looking to the future, however, Kenyans' optimism rebounds: they expect their children to attain a mean score of 7.6, with more than one in four (28 percent) expecting their children to achieve the "maximum" level of wealth – a rating of 10 (as if simply hoping could make it so!). In fact, respondents in every country expect that their children will be considerably better off than they or their parents. Thus, notwithstanding their experiences of economic hardship and decline, Kenyans join most other Africans in remaining extraordinarily optimistic about the future that awaits their children.

In sum, these results paint a somewhat puzzling picture of a society experiencing considerable economic hardship, yet with a citizenry that remains quite positive in their assessment of their situation, particularly in comparison to respondents in other Afrobarometer countries. It may be that the euphoria many Kenyans feel about their recent political accomplishments and their hopes for the new government shape not only their expectations of the future, but even their assessments of their still largely unchanged present. The public's hugely optimistic expectations are, however, likely to be significant for the future standing of the new government. While on their own, even a very large number of disappointed people may have little political clout, such unrealised hopes may easily attract political "entrepreneurs" only too ready to tap into such grievances, if they eventually do materialise.

## **5.0 Democracy in Principle and in Practice**


Although the country's politics became much more competitive following the return to multipartyism in 1992, many Kenyans feel as if "democracy" – in terms of locating real power in the people via the ballot – has only truly been achieved with the December 2002 election and the deposing of KANU. This uncertainty about when democracy really began in Kenya,<sup>55</sup> and the relatively long struggle over the last decade to achieve what is seen as a more fully realised democracy, may have had some role in shaping Kenyan attitudes toward this system of government.

But electoral choice is only one aspect of full, liberal democratic practice.<sup>56</sup> To more thoroughly assess Kenyans' commitment to democracy, a series of questions probed various aspects of their attitudes toward different political systems, including not only their expressed support for democracy, but their willingness to reject other systems of government, as well as their understanding of and adherence to an array of fundamental democratic principles.<sup>57</sup>

### 5.1 Support for Democracy

We began with a standard question that has been asked in many countries to assess support for democracy. Respondents are asked to choose which of three statements is closest to their own views. As shown in Figure 2, an overwhelming 80 percent of Kenyans agree that “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government,” while fewer than one in ten (8 percent) agree that “In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.” An even smaller share (5 percent) feel that “it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.”

**Figure 2: Support for Democracy**




*Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion: A: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”; B: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable”; C: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have. (percent)*

This strong support holds fairly steadily across all eight provinces, ranging from a low of 73 percent in Coast and Western Provinces, to a high of 88 percent in Eastern Province. Seventy-six percent in North Eastern Province likewise express support for democracy, even if a full 17 percent cannot offer any response to this question; only 3 percent are willing to accept non-democratic systems, a rate of rejection of alternative systems topped only by Eastern Province at 2 percent.

These strong levels of support also hold regardless of political party affiliation.<sup>58</sup> Among the small proportion of respondents who indicate that they remain close to KANU, 80 percent express support for democracy, while among NARC supporters, 84 percent favor this system of government.

It is particularly notable that across 15 African countries surveyed in Round 2 of the Afrobarometer, Kenya registers one of the highest levels of support for democracy, falling substantially above the 15-country mean of 64 percent (Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Support for Democracy, Across Countries**



But it is relatively easy to express simple support for democracy in this way.<sup>59</sup> Are these high levels of support actually reflecting a deeply rooted commitment to a democratic system of governance, or merely expressions of a relatively superficial attachment? To evaluate this, we probe attitudes further by soliciting opinions on some of the specific institutional features of democracy, and by asking about levels of support for – or rejection of – a number of alternative systems of government.

Overall Kenyans position themselves as the staunchest defenders of democratic institutions and practices among the 15 countries surveyed (Table 10). Across all 15 countries, a mean of 79 percent always support selecting leaders through elections, and 74 percent insist that their president observe term limits, compared to 89 and 80 percent, respectively, in Kenya. Across all Afrobarometer countries, only a slim majority (55 percent) agree that it is indeed necessary to have multiple political parties to ensure that the people have choices about who governs them, while in Kenya fully three-quarters support parties (74 percent), the highest level in any country (Figure 4). And while three-quarters of Kenyans (76 percent) recognize the paramount role of parliament in making laws, the 15-country mean is just 62 percent. In fact, Kenya ranks highest among all 15 countries in terms of the mean number who support all four of these principles (80 percent, compared to a 15-country mean of 68 percent).


It is perhaps a cause for concern that nearly one in four Kenyans (23 percent) is not convinced of the need for multiple political parties. Such views may emanate from post-defeat KANU die-hards, simply expressing dismay at the loss of their power and privilege. In fact, individuals who identify themselves as being close to KANU are somewhat more likely to reject the need for multiple political parties (33 percent) than either NARC supporters (22 percent) or supporters of other political parties (16 percent). But more generally, as long as Kenya’s parties are perceived more as personal or ethnic vote-seeking vehicles than as policy-choice alternatives, they are likely to continue to have a somewhat pejorative connotation.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, given the considerable political violence the country has experienced in the last decade, the view that party competition “often” or “always” leads to conflict, expressed by 54 percent of respondents (compared to 43 percent who say it “rarely” or “never” does so), is not without foundation.

**Table 10: Attitudes toward Democratic Institutions and Practices**

Choose Statement A or B:	Percent
A. We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections.	89
B. Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.	10
A. Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Kenya.	23
B. Many political parties are needed to make sure that Kenyans have real choices in who governs them.	74
A. The President of Kenya should be able to serve as many terms in office as he wishes. <sup>61</sup>	17
B. In Kenya, the President must obey the law, including the constitution, for example by serving no more than two terms in office.	80
A. The members of parliament represent the people; therefore, they should make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree.	76
B. Since the President represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying what the parliament thinks.	12

For the following questions, please tell me which of the statements is closest to your view. Choose statement A or statement B.

**Figure 4: Parties Needed for Choice, Across Countries**



Percent "agree" or "strongly agree" with Statement B: "Many political parties are needed to make sure that Kenyans have real choices in who governs them."

Kenyans' expression of willingness to be patient with democracy even if it takes a long time to solve their problems offers still further evidence of a relatively deeply-rooted commitment to democracy (Table 11).

**Table 11: Patience with Elected Government**

<b>Choose Statement A or B:</b>	<b>Percent</b>
A. Our present system of elected government should be given more time to deal with inherited problems.	83
B. If our present system cannot produce results soon, we should try another form of government.	14

*For the following questions, please tell me which of the statements is closest to your view. Choose statement A or statement B.*

The depth of commitment to democracy is further revealed by popular attitudes to various alternative systems for governing the country. As shown in Table 12, Kenyans resoundingly reject military rule as an option, with fully 92 percent – the highest level observed in any country except Zambia – disapproving of this alternative. One-man rule, whereby a strong president abolishes parliament and elections and makes all decisions himself, is similarly rejected by 90 percent, compared to a mean of just 76 percent across 15 countries. Consistent with the above findings concerning attitudes toward multipartyism, we find that one-party rule is somewhat less intolerable to many Kenyans, with the rejection rate dropping to 75 percent, and one in five (21 percent) expressing support for this system of government. While Kenyans fall slightly behind several other countries in their willingness to reject a one-party state, however, they nevertheless have one of the highest rejection rates, and are considerably above the 15-country mean of 67 percent.

**Table 12: Rejection of Regime Alternatives, Across Countries**

	<b>Reject Military Rule</b>	<b>Reject Traditional Rule</b>	<b>Reject Strongman Rule</b>	<b>Reject One-Party Rule</b>
Botswana	79	50	85	68
Cape Verde	75	--	67	79
Ghana	83	69	82	79
<b>Kenya</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>75</b>
Lesotho	85	50	82	61
Malawi	84	49	78	66
Mali	65	44	66	71
Mozambique	54	32	41	47
Namibia	52	46	58	55
Nigeria	68	61	71	79
Senegal	75	45	77	76
South Africa	77	63	73	67
Tanzania	87	73	86	63
Uganda	85	48	90	53
Zambia	95	72	90	72
<b>15-country Mean</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>67</b>

*There are many ways to govern a country. Would you approve or disapprove of the following alternatives? (percent “disapprove”/“strongly disapprove”)*

As in a number of other countries, a considerably lower proportion (59 percent, 15-country mean of 50 percent) reject a system of traditional rule where “all decisions are made by a council of elders.” Given the fact that most of Kenya’s pre-colonial societies were generally acephalous, with quite fluid and varying authority structures, as well as the long history of more centralised rule beginning early in the colonial era, it seems more likely that respondents were thinking of a greater *role* for such elders in governing the state, rather than granting them an actual monopoly of state authority. Whatever the case, there is considerable and plausible variation in responses across provinces; the rejection rate ranges from


74 percent in Central Province, to 45 percent in Nyanza, and just 35 percent in North Eastern Province, where elders still play a central role in daily life, and the central government may be, in the eyes of many, both remote and unresponsive to local needs.

### 5.2 The Quality of Kenyan Democracy

Kenyans thus appear to consistently demonstrate a relatively high level of commitment to a democratic system of government measured in a variety of ways. In light of this, how do they rate the quality of their own democracy? Is it meeting the standards that they have set for it?

As shown in Figure 5, there seems to be considerable consensus that Kenya can, at present, best be regarded as a “democracy, but with minor problems,” with nearly two out of three Kenyans rating it this way. Roughly equal numbers regard it as either a full democracy (12 percent), or a “democracy, but with major problems” (15 percent). Just 2 percent contend that the country is not a democracy. Just 7 percent contend that the country is not a democracy. Just 2 percent contend that the country is not a democracy. Just 7 percent contend that the country is not a democracy.

**Figure 5: Extent of Democracy**



*How much of a democracy is Kenya today?*

These ratings hold fairly consistently across all provinces, although considerably higher numbers of respondents in North Eastern Province either believe their country is a full democracy (26 percent), or that it is not a democracy at all (9 percent), while a substantial 20 percent do not know. Also, residents of Western Province are more concerned than other Kenyans about major problems with Kenya’s democracy (Table 13), perhaps because of the social tensions and development constraints resulting from the area’s intense demographic pressure.

**Table 13: Extent of Democracy, by Province**

	Central	Coast	Eastern	Nairobi	North Eastern	Nyanza	Rift Valley	Western
A full democracy	7	18	7	11	26	14	13	15
A democracy, but with minor problems	75	63	69	66	33	67	61	52
A democracy, but with major problems	11	8	15	17	13	16	15	26
Not a democracy	1	2	1	3	9	1	1	3
Don't know/Don't understand the question	5	10	8	2	20	3	10	5

(percent)

Some variation is also evident relative to political affiliation, although there is a general consensus across all groups that the country is largely democratic (Table 14). But while 80 percent of those identifying themselves with NARC rate it this highly (as do 79 percent of those affiliated with other Opposition parties), a much slimmer majority of 61 percent of those professing loyalty to KANU rate it so.


**Table 14: Extent of Democracy, by Party Affiliation**

	KANU	Other Opposition	Neutral	NARC
A full democracy	10	8	13	13
A democracy, but with minor problems	51	71	59	67
A democracy, but with major problems	26	15	16	14
Not a democracy	4	3	2	1
Don't know/Don't understand the question	10	3	10	6

(percent)

But despite these internal differences, yet again we see that Kenyans lead among the 15 survey countries (Figure 6). When we combine those who think that the country is either a full democracy or a democracy with minor problems – those who think they are receiving a relatively good “supply” of democratic rule – Kenya, at 76 percent, scores well above the 15-country mean of 55 percent.


**Figure 6: Extent of Democracy, Across Countries**



(percent "full democracy" or "a democracy, but with minor problems")

Finally, how satisfied are Kenyans with the democracy that they believe is being supplied to them? An extraordinary eight out of ten (79 percent) profess themselves to be either fairly or very satisfied with their current democracy (Figure 7).

**Figure 7: Satisfaction with Democracy**




Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Kenya?

These high levels of satisfaction hold relatively steadily across regions, with a low of 71 percent who are “fairly” or “very satisfied” in North Eastern Province and Nairobi, and a high of 85 percent in Coast and Nyanza Provinces. Even KANU supporters are quite satisfied with the present state of democracy in their country, with 72 percent expressing some level of satisfaction, compared to 81 percent for those affiliated with NARC.

We should not, at this point, be surprised to observe that again, Kenyans far surpass their counterparts elsewhere in their assessments of the quality of their present political system (Figure 8) (15-country mean of 56 percent). Nigeria provides a cautionary tale, however, to any in the present government who might see these positive assessments as cause for complacency. In the first Afrobarometer survey in Nigeria, conducted six months after an extremely popular, internationally hailed transition from military rule to multiparty politics in 1999, Nigerians likewise positioned themselves at the top in terms of their satisfaction with their democracy (84 percent). As is evident in Figure 8, however, by 2003 the country had plummeted nearly to the bottom. However, in sharp contrast to Kenyans, even in 1999 Nigerians were much more cautious in rating the extent of democracy in their country; just 50 percent rated it as either a full democracy or as one having only minor problems, while a nearly equal number, 46 percent, saw it as a “democracy, but with major problems.” Despite their euphoria, Nigerians perhaps foresaw the difficulties that lay ahead. Nonetheless, the Nigeria case clearly demonstrates that post-transition euphoria may well wear off, and governments cannot rely on this alone to sustain themselves without producing real, positive change. Only time will tell whether Kenya will follow the same path, but both Kenya in general and the new Kibaki government in particular will be doing well indeed if these high ratings persist at anywhere near their current levels.

**Figure 8: Satisfaction with Democracy, Across Countries**



## 6.0 Attitudes Toward Economic Reform


Structural adjustment has been on the policy agenda of many sub-Saharan African governments over recent years, and has often been the subject of considerable political contestation.<sup>62</sup> A reduced role for the government in economic affairs has been a key condition of international donor – especially IMF – support. The general logic is that the private sector (whether local or foreign) is more efficient, and that much of the experienced inefficiency in the state sector stems from the corrupt practices of public officials. At the same time, however, in Kenya, as in many countries, the direct involvement of the state in the economy provides resources to ruling elites, critical for both personal enrichment and the maintenance of popularity – and power – via patronage networks. The appetite for such reforms among these elites, therefore, has often been half-hearted, at best.

The Moi government had an on-again, off-again relationship with the IMF, the World Bank, and a host of bilateral donors.<sup>63</sup> Indeed, at the time the survey was conducted, the IMF's lending program had been in suspension for three years, stemming from the previous government's failure to address rigorous lending requirements. Among these were civil service reform, privatisation of certain key parastatals, and concrete measures to punish past and prevent future corruption. While very energetic negotiations aimed at resurrecting the lending program began almost immediately after the Kibaki team's arrival, their outcome – including the specific conditions that would be attached to any new agreements – was still unknown at the time the survey was conducted.<sup>64</sup> This uneven record of implementing reform policies under the previous government, and the current uncertainty about the status of reform, may well have left many respondents somewhat confused about what the actual meaning and/or impact of what real “economic reform” might be.

### *6.1 The Market versus the State in Economic Management*

To assess public attitudes toward such economic reforms, we first asked respondents about their preference for a free-market or a government-run economy. As shown in Figure 9, Kenyans are nearly evenly divided on this issue, with a slim plurality expressing a preference for a government-run economic system, despite the bad reputation that the state mismanagement of the Moi era might be expected to have given to such a system.

**Figure 9: Preference for Market vs. Non-Market Economy**



Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion: A: A free market economy is preferable to an economy run by the government. B: A government-run economy is preferable to a free market economy. C: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of economic system we have. If necessary, interviewers could explain: "In a free market economy, individuals decide for themselves which goods to produce and what to buy and sell. In a government-run economy, the government decides these things."

In comparative terms, Kenyans occupy a middle ground between the apparently anti-market publics in Botswana and Lesotho, and their considerably more pro-market neighbours in Uganda and Tanzania (Table 15).

**Table 15: Preference for Market vs. Non-Market Economy, Across Countries**

	Prefer Free-Market Economy	Prefer Government-Run Economy
Uganda	57	33
Tanzania	54	26
Malawi	54	32
Ghana	51	31
Nigeria	51	32
Zambia	46	41
Mozambique	44	24
Cape Verde	43	24
<b>Kenya</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>48</b>
Senegal	42	44
Mali	41	44
Namibia	39	29
South Africa	37	28
Lesotho	26	55
Botswana	24	58

(percent)

This ambivalence regarding the state-versus-market dichotomy is further revealed by several other results. A clear majority of respondents (62 percent) say they approve of an economy in which the government plans the production and distribution of all goods and services (Table 16); this includes most of those who prefer a government-run economy, but also nearly half (45 percent) of those who claim to prefer a free-market economy. At the same time, a similarly healthy majority (64 percent) approves of an economy in which individuals should “decide for themselves what to produce and what to buy and sell.” In this case, most free-market supporters adopt this view, but they are joined by more than half (52 percent) of those who claim to prefer a government-run economy!

**Table 16: Approval of Different Systems of Economic Management**

	Percent “Approve”/“Strongly Approve”		
	Total	Prefer Free Market Economy	Prefer Government-Run Economy
Government plans the production and distribution of all goods and services.	62	44	81
Individuals decide for themselves what to produce and what to buy and sell.	64	80	52

*There are many ways to manage an economy. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives?*

Meanwhile, considerable attachment to the idea of a welfare state seems to be demonstrated by the fact that a majority (57 percent) of respondents agree with the statement that “government should bear the main responsibility for the well-being of people,” compared to just 41 percent who instead feel that “people should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life.”

These contradictions may indeed suggest some confusion among respondents about the economic principles being investigated. But they may also reflect an ideological tug-of-war within respondents themselves. On the one hand, a belief in “reform” that may eventually bestow concrete benefits, particularly as an alternative to the widespread corruption and inefficiency of the previous government, appears to be contesting with a vibrant egalitarian preference for state-supported welfarism, on the other.

### **6.2 Support for Economic Adjustment Policies**

We further explored Kenyans’ attitudes toward some specific components of the adjustment package (Table 17). To begin with, a fee-for-service policy in sectors such as health and education has been one of its key elements. In Kenya the fee-for-service principle is rejected by a slim majority in the education sector; 54 percent express a preference for free education, even if it is of lower quality, compared to 43 percent willing to pay for better quality education. Of course, this question was asked in a context where an extremely popular free primary education program had only recently been introduced. While concerns about the effects on class size and quality of education were already being discussed, Kenyans will need more time to judge the long-term impact of the program.

But these anti-reform preferences are also revealed with respect to a number of other adjustment policies. Respondents prefer government control of agricultural marketing (63 percent), rather than privatisation of this service (27 percent), and fully three out of four (75 percent) support tariffs to protect local producers rather than fully opening markets to cheap imports (20 percent).

**Table 17: Attitudes toward Economic Adjustment Policies**

<b>Choose Statement A or B:</b>	<b>Percent</b>
A. It is better to have free schooling for our children, even if the quality of education is low.	54
B. It is better to raise educational standards, even if we have to pay school fees.	43
A. It is better for private traders to handle agricultural marketing, even if some farmers get left out.	27
B. It is better for government to buy and sell crops, even if some farmers are served late.	63
A. It is a good idea to import affordable goods from other countries, even if some of our own producers are forced out of business.	20
B. We must protect producers within our own country by imposing tariffs that make imported goods more expensive.	75
A. All civil servants should keep their jobs, even if paying their salaries is costly to the country.	75
B. The government cannot afford so many public employees, and should lay some of them off.	20
A. It is better for everyone to have a job even if this means that average wages are low.	86
B. It is better to have higher wages, even if this means that some people go without a job.	11

*For the following questions, please tell me which of the statements is closest to your view. Choose statement A or statement B.*

An equally strong majority emerges in favor of retaining all civil servants (75 percent) as opposed to cutting jobs to reduce government expenditure (20 percent). The vital importance of jobs to Kenyans is also evident from the strong preference for an economy that provides more jobs with lower wages (86 percent), rather than fewer jobs with higher wages (11 percent).

Thus, in matters that directly and personally affect Kenyans' economic situation, there is strong and consistent support for government protection and provision. Any inclination toward market reforms seems to be abandoned when immediate material standing is at stake. Such views appear to reflect the "have-not" (or "have-little") personal situation of the vast majority of respondents, so that self-interest drowns out any abstract preference for economic reform in most cases.

These negative attitudes toward adjustment policies and their effects are reflected again when assessing the broad impact of reform (Table 18). Respondents were asked whether they agree more with the statement that, "The economic reform policies in this country have helped most people; only a few have suffered," or with the statement that, "The economic reform policies in this country have hurt most people and only benefited a few." Fully two out of three (67 percent) choose the latter statement.

Overall, then, the combination of these negative attitudes toward adjustment with the slim preference expressed for a government-run economy suggests an anti-reform, anti-free market disposition among a majority of Kenyans. This tendency may simply reflect a still strongly held notion of government as the welfare provider of last (if not first) resort, notwithstanding the high levels of corruption and mismanagement associated with the previous regime. As such, given factors such as the threat to local industries from cheap imports and the control of much of the modern commercial sector by non-Africans, it is not necessarily surprising to see such reluctance regarding these fundamental structural reforms. It should be recalled here, however, that even among well-informed analysts there is a continuing and

vigorous debate as to the pros and cons – including especially the long-term impact on sustainable development – of such reforms.<sup>65</sup>

**Table 18: Attitudes Toward Economic Reform**

<b>Choose Statement A or B:</b>	<b>Percent</b>
A. The economic reform policies in this country have helped most people; only a few have suffered.	23
B. The economic reform policies in this country have hurt most people and only benefited a few.	67
A. The costs of reforming the economy are too high; the government should therefore abandon its current economic policies.	13
B. In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardships now.	78

*For the following questions, please tell me which of the statements is closest to your view. Choose statement A or statement B.*

But then we encounter another apparent contradiction when addressing the long-term value of reform. When asked whether they agree that, “The costs of reforming the economy are too high; the government should therefore abandon its current economic policies,” or that, “In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardships now,” more than three-quarters (78 percent) chose the latter response, indicating a strong willingness to tolerate the high costs of reform. Given the historically uneven implementation of reform policies in Kenya and the likely uncertainty about what “reform” really means, it is possible that this support for *undefined* reform may in fact reflect little more than a widespread belief in the need for change and improved economic management. Nonetheless, respondents do express a willingness to tolerate hardships in the interest of achieving these improvements; but it may be much easier to agree to tolerate abstract and seemingly undefined hardships than to accept a specific set of bitter-pill measures that might further raise poverty levels, at least in the short term.

Looking to the future, in late November 2003 (after the survey had been completed), the IMF announced that a major lending program had finally been agreed with the new Kibaki government. This should trigger not just the disbursement of \$250 million to assist the Treasury to reschedule debt and attend to other fiscal tasks, but also the subsequent release of substantial bilateral project funding. Ministry of Finance officials trumpeted their success with predictions of a growth rate of 3.9 percent by 2005-6, in contrast to the current rate of just 1.2 percent.<sup>66</sup> For its part, the IMF stressed that it would conduct semi-annual reviews to ensure that the Kenyans were adhering to the entire package of agreed conditions.

Future assessments of attitudes toward reform – and of the government’s popularity – may be critically affected by the conditions this package reportedly entails. They include the retrenchment of civil servants (to begin in March 2004), and a freeze on public officers’ salaries by the end of 2003 (at a time when all university staff were out on strike seeking massive pay increases). These measures, if implemented, will both directly – and negatively – affect much of the wider public. But given the enormous size of the government’s current wage bill – at 9 percent of GDP, one of Africa’s highest<sup>67</sup> – it has little choice in the matter. Aside from undermining one of the NARC government’s key campaign promises to create 500,000 jobs a year – a burden which now must be placed primarily on the private sector – wage bill reductions of this magnitude are also bound to cut domestic demand, which “contradicts the IMF’s own stated goal of helping the poor,” according to one Bretton Woods Project analyst.<sup>68</sup> Other key requirements, including the selling-off of many more state corporations, restructuring of the National Bank, and the finalisation of audits and settlement of pending bills for the last three financial years, will be much less visible. But they may be equally important in determining whether the government continues to receive promised debt relief and development assistance, and will, therefore, profoundly

impact the country's population, nevertheless. If the public does indeed experience the impact of a well-managed reform program implemented in a more coherent way – which of course remains to be seen – future surveys may be much more revealing about the popular assessment of the real trade-off between economic liberalisation and the economic standing of the many individual Kenyans who will be directly affected.

## **7.0 Social Identity**

Even in the course of an average day, people take on various roles, and may see themselves in terms of a variety of sometimes competing social categories. These include membership in families, occupational groupings, religious denominations, political organisations, and ethnic and/or regional communities, in addition to their nationality. Patterns in how people identify themselves may have significance for their attitudes and behaviour with respect to a variety of public issues, and are therefore of interest for comparative Afrobarometer analyses.

### **7.1 Self-Identity**


To explore respondents' self-identification and its implications, we asked them, "Besides being Kenyan, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?" Given the widely held perception (among both outsiders and Kenyans themselves) of the prominence of ethnicity in the country's social and political life, it is perhaps surprising that only 13 percent mention their language or ethnic group as their primary locus of identity after their national one (Figure 10). Indeed, the results fall considerably below the 15-country Round 2 mean of 23 percent (Table 19), with Kenya falling well behind countries such as Nigeria (48 percent), Ghana (37 percent), Mali (36 percent) and Senegal (32 percent), though roughly comparable to its neighbors (19 and 16 percent for Uganda and Tanzania, respectively) and to a number of Southern African countries.

By contrast, 39 percent of Kenyans offer their occupational group, while another 28 percent refuse to suggest any alternative whatsoever, both among the highest levels for these categories across all 15 countries.

What explains the low level of ethno-linguistic identification expressed by respondents? While the role of ethnic identity may have been exaggerated by some analysts of Kenyan society, it may be that it plays a small enough role in the daily lives of most people that this does not become a significant source of identification in a survey of this type, whatever their actual political orientation or behaviour. This is especially true since most Kenyans (outside urban areas) live and interact in mono-ethnic environments, so that most overtly ethnic politics usually occurs at the elite level (especially during the election season), and in urban areas.<sup>69</sup>

Still another explanation may be that because of the very widespread acknowledgment – and condemnation – of "tribalism" in public discourse, even many rather unsophisticated rural people prefer to avoid an open admission of such strong communal attachments.

**Figure 10: Self-Identity**



We have spoken to many Kenyans and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, ethnic group, race, religion, or gender and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or a farmer. Besides being Kenyan, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost? (percent)

**Table 19: Self-Identity, Across Countries**

	Bot	CV	Gha	Ken	Les	Mlw	Mali	Moz	Nam	Nig	Sen	S.Af.	Tan	Uga	Zam	TOT
Ethnic/lang.	27	1	37	<b>13</b>	49	14	36	14	18	48	32	10	16	19	10	23
Race	-	1	1	-	-	6	-	1	6	0	1	12	-	-	0	2
Religion	8	7	32	<b>6</b>	12	8	24	4	3	19	45	6	7	8	18	14
Occupation	6	14	19	<b>39</b>	13	38	32	18	17	17	12	29	36	52	29	25
Class	6	11	2	<b>6</b>	10	20	3	2	7	4	6	13	2	6	14	7
Gender	2	3	3	<b>2</b>	0	4	3	2	29	3	1	6	2	6	2	5
None	42	43	1	<b>28</b>	12	7	1	17	10	5	1	7	24	4	0	14

(percent)

One way of exploring self-identification further is to look at differences in how certain sub-groups of the population, as captured in the sample, identify themselves. Pursuing this question, the following results were found:

- Those with a reported monthly income of KSh 500 or less were nearly twice as likely to identify with an ethnic group as those with an income of KSh 15,000 or over (15 to 8 percent), but less than one-third as likely to identify themselves according to class (5 to 19 percent), and somewhat less likely to identify themselves according to occupation (38 to 46 percent).
- Those with little or no formal schooling are more likely to identify themselves by ethno-linguistic group than those with post-secondary education (19 to 9 percent), and less likely to identify

themselves according to class (5 to 14 percent); there are only slight differences in the level of occupational identity (36 compared to 41 percent).

- Men are only slightly more likely than women (41 to 36 percent) to identify themselves according to occupation, and show few other differences.
- Rural dwellers are only slightly more disposed than urban residents to identify themselves by occupation (40 to 34 percent), but much less likely to choose class (4 to 14 percent).
- Christians and Muslims do not differ in the extent to which they identify themselves by faith; in fact, there are few differences between these two groups in terms of their self-identification, except that Christians are very slightly more likely to identify with their ethnic or language group (14 percent) than Muslims (8 percent).
- Members of different age categories (18-35, 36-60, and 60 and over) show few contrasts, although those over 60 are somewhat more likely to identify with an ethno-linguistic group (14, 11 and 21 percent for the three groups, respectively), and also somewhat more likely to refuse to differentiate themselves at all (26, 30, and 33 percent, respectively).

In sum, then, there is modest support for the argument that the higher one's level of education and subsequent incorporation into the modern, cash (and more urban-oriented, occupationally-specialized) economy, the more one tends to identify oneself in class or occupational terms as opposed to ethnic group. Such a finding puts Kenya firmly in the mainstream of similar results found elsewhere.

Breaking down the results according to ethno-linguistic groups (Table 20) reveals that the Kikuyu are the least likely to identify themselves according to ethno-linguistic group and one of the most likely to choose occupation, although the Meru far surpass all others in their attachment to their occupational identity. The Kisii and members of pastoralist communities (including Maasai/Samburu, Turkana, Somali, and Borana) show the opposite trend. The Luo also show a relatively high level of ethnic identification, perhaps a reflection of their self-perception of political marginality (and victimisation) throughout much of Kenya's post-colonial history. The Kisii also stand out as the group most likely to profess attachment only to national identity.

**Table 20: Self-Identity, by Ethno-Linguistic Group**

	<b>Kalenjin</b>	<b>Kamba</b>	<b>Kikuyu</b>	<b>Kisii</b>	<b>Luhya</b>	<b>Luo</b>	<b>Meru</b>	<b>Miji-kenda</b>	<b>Pastoralists</b>
Lang./tribe/ethnic group	11	17	7	20	12	18	11	11	22
Religion	6	8	9	1	6	7	5	5	5
Occupation	40	33	49	20	34	36	61	39	30
Class	5	5	8	3	4	8	6	5	4
Won't differentiate	33	34	21	51	32	21	13	15	34


(percent)

## 7.2 Allegiance to National Identity

Among the 69 percent of respondents who identify with some sub-group, perceptions of the status and treatment of one’s own group relative to others are mixed. Fifty-seven percent say that their group’s conditions are the same as or better than those of other groups, but at the same time, only 14 percent say that their group is “never treated unfairly” by the government, while nearly one-third (30 percent) think that their group is “often” or “always” treated thus. Interestingly, those who identify themselves according to ethnic group are no more likely to see themselves as worse off than others, and they are very slightly less likely (26 percent) to think that their group is mistreated on a regular basis. Clearly, ethnic self-perception is not very salient as a source of grievance, at least in the abstract.

Finally, not only does Kenya have one of the highest proportions of respondents who are unwilling to identify with any group other than being “Kenyan,” even among those who are, a large majority profess stronger allegiance to their national identity. We asked respondents, if they had to choose between being a Kenyan and being a member of their sub-national identity group, which they would select. Fully 70 percent of those who identified with a group nevertheless put their national identity first; in other words, a total of 79 percent of all respondents consider themselves Kenyans first and foremost (a figure that, interestingly, reaches a high of 96 percent in North Eastern Province). This places Kenya near the top among 15 Round 2 countries with respect to the expressed level of allegiance to national identity (Figure 11).

**Figure 11: Allegiance to National Identity, Across Countries**



*Percentage reported combines those who would not give any sub-group identity, and those who did give a sub-group identity, but answered the following question with “Kenyan”: Let us suppose you had to choose between being a Kenyan and being a (member of your identity group). Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?*

Kenyans further demonstrate their commitment to the national political community when 95 percent agree with the statement, “Even if there are conflicts among different groups, Kenya should remain united as one country”; a mere 4 percent feel that, on the contrary, “The differences among Kenyans are too

strong; for the sake of peace, the country should be broken apart.” This high level of support for the national unit is comparable to those seen in most (though not all) other Afrobarometer countries.<sup>70</sup>

## 8.0 Social and Political Engagement

An active and engaged society is one hallmark of a consolidating democracy. What is the extent of engagement among Kenyans in civil society and the political arena? Are they interested or apathetic? Informed or ignorant? Active or passive in the politics and daily goings-on in their country?

### 8.1 Access to Information

Access to information is interactive; it serves as both a cause and effect of a citizen’s engagement in society and interest in and awareness of politics. To some extent it is a measure of the ease or difficulty of access, but at the same time it is a reflection of an individual’s own efforts to seek out information. Access to media news is also a key element in opinion formation regarding such issues as the performance of public officials and institutions, and even attitudes toward the political class as a whole.

As shown in Table 21, for a majority of Kenyans, access to news and information is limited to radio broadcasts. However, for this source coverage is quite widespread: more than nine out of ten respondents (91 percent) listen to radio news at least a few times per week. However, while radio has the widest reach, in most parts of the country it also offers a fairly narrow scope of news and opinion. While FM stations have proliferated in Nairobi and some other urban centres, most of the country has access only to government-controlled Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) broadcasts or, for far fewer listeners with short-wave receivers (and who know enough Swahili, Somali or English), to the BBC, the VOA, or other international stations.<sup>71</sup> A much more diverse range of news and opinion can be found in Kenya’s mainstream independent press, and even more so in the “alternative” press. But given the extent of poverty in Kenya, it is not surprising that regular access to both print and television news (the latter also much narrower in its scope and diversity) is limited to just over one-third of the population (36 percent for television, 38 percent for newspapers<sup>72</sup>).

**Table 21: Access to Media**

	<b>Never/Less Than Once per Month</b>	<b>A Few Times per Month</b>	<b>A Few Times per Week</b>	<b>Daily</b>
Radio News	6	3	14	77
Television News	53	10	14	22
Newspapers	47	15	23	15

*How often do you get news from the following sources? (percent)*

More than eight out of ten respondents indicate at least a moderate level of interest in public affairs (Table 22). As shown, while the level of interest varies somewhat with income, it varies a great deal with education. In addition, men are much more likely (51 percent) than women (31 percent) to say they are “very interested” in public affairs, and half as likely (11 percent versus 22 percent) to say they are “not interested,” but rural and urban residents show approximately equal levels of interest.

**Table 22: Level of Interest in Public Affairs by Income and Education**

	All Kenyans	Income			Education			
		Less than KSh500	KSh500 – 15,000	More than KSh15,000	None	Primary Only	Secondary Only	Post-Secondary
Not interested	17	20	14	9	32	21	11	6
Somewhat interested	41	41	43	32	36	45	42	34
Very interested	41	39	43	59	27	34	47	59

*How interested are you in public affairs? (percent)*

A strong correlation between interest in public affairs and access to media is indeed evident. Among those who are “very interested”, 51 percent report getting news from newspapers at least a few times per week, and 45 percent from television, compared to just 19 and 22 percent, respectively, for those who are “not interested” in public affairs. But to the extent that interest at least in part reflects the ability to indulge that interest, greater access to news will likely raise the public’s appetite for information. One key criticism of the Moi regime was its persistent reluctance to liberalise the broadcast media, especially Medium Wave radio. Based on NARC campaign promises, expectations are now high that the new government will actively facilitate the expansion of access to various media outlets.<sup>73</sup>

Another indicator of political engagement is political awareness. One measure comes from a question that asked respondents to rate the performance of a number of international organizations, including the IMF and the World Bank, both of which have been quite visible players on the Kenyan scene in the last several years as they have periodically suspended their funding in response to the Moi government’s poor governance record. Respondents were also given the option of saying they “hadn’t heard enough” to make a judgment. In total, about one out of three Kenyans could not offer opinions on the performance of either the IMF (33 percent), or the World Bank (32 percent). While substantial, these figures in fact demonstrate a much higher level of awareness of these institutions than is found in most other countries; the 15-country mean for “hadn’t heard enough” was 54 percent for the IMF, and 48 percent for the World Bank. They suggest that many Kenyans are indeed paying attention to – and learning about – the goings-on in the national political arena.<sup>74</sup>

## **8.2 Level of Public Participation**

To what extent do the relatively high levels of interest in public affairs translate into active involvement in community and public affairs? As in most Afrobarometer countries, religious groups clearly provide ordinary citizens with the most opportunities to engage with others – and to take on leadership roles – followed by community development associations and ethnic or home welfare associations (Table 23). The importance of religious activities is further confirmed by reported attendance at religious services. Over one-quarter (27 percent) of Kenyans report attending such services more than once per week, while just over half (54 percent) are weekly participants.

**Table 23: Associational Life**

	<b>Leader/Active Member</b>
Religious group	70
Trade union or farmers' association	19
Professional or business association	13
Community development association	37
Ethnic or home welfare association	33
Music or sports group	19

*Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member. (percent)*

Kenyans are in fact among the most active participants in associational life of any Afrobarometer country. Only Tanzanians (77 percent) and Malawians and Zambians (both 74 percent) are more active in religious organizations, and only Malians and Tanzanians (both 23 percent) and Malawians (20 percent) participate in trade unions and farmers' associations at similar rates. Kenyans are far more active in community development groups than citizens of any other country surveyed (15-country mean of 18 percent); only Malawians come close (34 percent). While it is not possible to verify the reason for such rates here, two related factors may contribute to this level of participation in community groups: Kenya's long history of local, self-help *harambee* organizations, and the substantial re-direction of donor funds away from the state and into NGOs during the last decade, reflecting the Moi government's soured relations with its traditional development partners.<sup>75</sup>

Kenyans also engage in political action and activities at much higher rates than those observed in most other Afrobarometer countries (Table 24). Three-quarters have discussed politics (74 percent) and attended community meetings (76 percent) in the past year, while fully two-thirds (67 percent) have joined with others to raise an issue with political authorities.

**Table 24: Engagement in Political Actions and Activities**

	<b>Once or Twice</b>	<b>Several Times</b>	<b>Often</b>	<b>Total (Once or More in Last Year)</b>	<b>15-Country Mean</b>
Discussed politics with friends or neighbours	19	35	20	74	59
Attended a community meeting	24	39	13	76	65
Got together with others to raise and issue	24	33	10	67	50
Attended a demonstration or protest march	9	6	2	17	14
Used force or violence for a political cause <sup>76</sup>	2	1	1	4	4

*Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. (percent)*

Only Ugandans (78 percent) and Nigerians (76 percent) report discussing politics with equal frequency, and Kenyans fall above the 15-country mean on all other activities except for using force or violence for a political cause, where their low level of participation is comparable to other countries. These relatively high levels of participation likely reflect the rather tumultuous political decade the country has just completed, including, as noted, a continuing, and contentious, constitutional reform process and a major transition election.

Finally, we turn to participation in the December 2002 election. Such participation has two formal components: registering to vote, and actually voting on election day. According to the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), there were 10,451,150 registered voters, or about 70 percent of eligible adults.<sup>77</sup> Of these, 5,985,016, or 57 percent, voted in parliamentary contests. This is similar to the turnout for the 1992 election (58 percent), but substantially lower than the 65 percent in who went to the polls in 1997.<sup>78</sup>

In our sample, 81 percent of respondents report that they were registered to vote in the 2002 election, a figure that considerably exceeds those estimated by the ECK. More surprising is the fact that 92 percent of these respondents claim that they actually voted, far above the official national figure.<sup>79</sup>

What could explain this large discrepancy? On the one hand, at least a small part of it is likely to stem from errors in the official registration and turnout figures. To begin with, an indeterminate number of deceased persons whose names remained on the voters' rolls could not cast ballots.<sup>80</sup> Further, some people reportedly accepted bribes to register more than once, but may have then failed to actually vote more than once (or at all), which is much more difficult and of greater legal risk.<sup>81</sup> The resulting inflated registration figures would thus reduce apparent turnout. But again, according to the ECK, these could account for at most 2 to 3 percent;<sup>82</sup> it appears that a considerable number of survey respondents were dishonest regarding their participation in the voting process.

Another relevant finding from the registration and voting figures is that rural respondents report actually voting at a considerably higher rate (76 percent of all respondents) than urbanites, particularly those who live in Nairobi and Mombasa (where 63 percent report voting). This lends credence to the widely held assumption that holding national elections at year's end when many city workers return to their rural homes for the holidays effectively disenfranchises them.

Based on these findings, and given NARC's supposed commitment to improved governance, several measures for increasing registration and turnout and improving the reliability of the figures are indicated. These include: speedier issuance of national ID cards to those turning 18; allowing voters to transfer their registration so as not to lose their vote if they travel; periodic updating of voters' rolls; heightened punishment of those who violate registration and election laws; and increased security in areas experiencing political tensions during campaigning and on polling day. One additional change – holding national elections outside the annual holiday period – has already been proposed (and appears in various drafts of the proposed new constitution).

### **8.3 Political Affiliation**

Affiliation with a political party can serve as another indicator of political engagement. Respondents were asked whether they “feel close to any particular political party,” and if so, which one. Just over half (52 percent) profess ties to the newly-formed governing party, NARC. Another one-third (31 percent) say they are not close to any party, while most of the remaining respondents (15 percent) identify themselves with one of ten other parties.

Particularly striking is the fact that while one-third of the electorate voted for KANU in the December 2002 election, only about 4 percent of respondents now identify themselves as close to it. Clearly, many respondents who now declare themselves to be either unaligned or affiliated with one of the other parties (and even with NARC) must have voted for the country's former ruling party. Their disinclination now to align themselves with it may reflect shyness or even fear about expressing such attachment. Given the decade of selective discrimination the country has witnessed, whereby regions and individuals thought to be pro-Opposition frequently incurred financial, legal, or even physical penalties for adopting an anti-government stance, such a perspective is not entirely irrational.<sup>83</sup>

Others may only have voted for KANU because they were paid or even coerced to do so, and never felt any genuine attachment to the party. Still others may simply have switched loyalties post-election, preferring to align themselves with the winning side – now perceived as a more direct conduit to state resources. Given the combination of widespread poverty and the largely non-ideological basis of partisan divisions in Kenyan politics, many people probably assume they have very little to gain, and potentially much to lose, by expressing allegiance to a recently defeated opposition political force.<sup>84</sup>

Table 25 disaggregates party affiliations based on “home language” as a proxy for ethno-linguistic group. It is apparent that NARC draws its support from across all ethnic groups roughly in proportion to the share of each in the national population. Those affiliated with KANU, on the other hand, not surprisingly come disproportionately from among the Kalenjin (Moi’s ethnic group), and the small pastoralist communities, a long-standing base of KANU support. But KANU still drew 14 percent of its support from the Kikuyu, perhaps not a surprising finding given that KANU’s presidential candidate in 2002, Uhuru Kenyatta, is (like Kibaki) from this community. Note though that this 14 percent of KANU supporters represents only 3 percent of all Kikuyu respondents. Returns from the 2002 election suggest that 24 percent of KANU’s presidential vote came from the districts inhabited primarily by Kikuyu, along with the Embu and Meru people. Taking into account that some voters have in effect abandoned the party, the 14 percent finding thus appears very credible.

**Table 25: Party Affiliation, by Ethnic Group**

<b>Home Language/Ethnic Group</b> (share in sample)	<b>NARC</b> <b>(52 percent)</b>	<b>KANU</b> <b>(4 percent)</b>	<b>LDP</b> <b>(5 percent)</b>	<b>Unaffiliated</b> <b>(31 percent)</b>
Kalenjin (12 percent)	10	47	10	11
Kamba (11 percent)	16	5	11	6
Kisii (6 percent)	4	0	1	4
Pastoralists* (9 percent)	7	21	8	7
Luhya (15 percent)	15	7	7	19
Luo (12 percent)	10	1	60	13
Mijikenda (4 percent)	4	2	1	7
Kikuyu (20 percent)	21	14	1	19
Meru (6 percent)	7	2	0	5
Other	6	1	1	9

*Do you feel close to any particular political party? If so, which party is that? (percent)*

*\*Includes Maasai/Samburu, Turkana, Somali and Borana.*

Party ties in Kenya have, however, been quite fluid since the return of multiparty politics. While key players in all major parties continue to jockey for position as they calculate their long-term interests (while others eventually retire), allegiances (among both politicians and ordinary people) are likely to continue shifting.

## **9.0 NARC’S Governance Achievements**

As discussed, the NARC government came to power following a long period of poor governance and economic mismanagement, and after making extensive promises to the electorate, including not only the clean-up of government, but massive job creation, restoration of donor relations, promulgation of a long-awaited new constitution, and pay increases for teachers and police, to name a few. How do the public rate the new administration’s performance to date?


### 9.1 Confidence in Institutions of Leadership

One key indicator of the effectiveness of a government is the level of trust individuals have in the various individuals and institutions that run it. As shown in Figure 12, Kenyans' level of trust in these key individuals and institutions, as well as some non-governmental entities, varies widely.

Among several conclusions to be drawn from these rankings, a few appear to stand out. The goodwill associated with the new national leadership is clearly evident in the high marks given to the president and the new ruling party, and conversely, the almost embarrassingly low rating given to those parties, led by KANU, now finding themselves in the Opposition. Opposition parties also received by far the most negative ratings – 42 percent say they do not trust them at all. Further, it seems likely that the almost equally positive views held of the military and the Electoral Commission stem at least in part from their respective roles in the recent, momentous transfer of power: that the military (some fears to the contrary) stayed out, while the Electoral Commission oversaw the successful process.<sup>85</sup> Parliament, too, gets fairly high marks, likewise suggesting the hope that the new members will work in tandem with the government to help implement its campaign promises.

Why independent broadcast media should rank no higher than those of the government is unclear, though the fact that the outreach of independent media remains quite limited in Kenya may have given many respondents a fairly slim basis on which to make a judgment.

**Figure 12: Trust in Selected Individuals and Institutions**



*How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?*

Moving deeper into negative territory, it may come as no surprise that local government authorities, the District Administration, and the police all score very badly. As the institutions that ordinary Kenyans interact with most frequently, their ills, including any tendency to exploit their “customers”, are likely to be well known to average Kenyans.

Looking at the differences in levels of trust between those who link themselves to different political parties (Table 26), some perhaps surprising results emerge. First, even among those affiliated with KANU and other Opposition parties, a solid majority have considerable trust in President Kibaki (57 and 58 percent, respectively). More startling are the ratings for NARC as the ruling party versus Opposition parties. Although, as expected, those close to KANU have considerably lower trust in NARC (42 percent) than NARC supporters (72 percent), the fact that KANU supporters express lower levels of trust in Opposition parties (36 percent) of which they are now a part, is unexpected.<sup>86</sup> And those who link themselves with one of Kenya's other Opposition parties express only marginally higher trust in the Opposition (17 percent) than those with NARC links (13 percent). This raises questions about what comes to mind when people think about the Opposition, especially given the very recent nature of the transition. It is possible that given the significant number of opposition parties, even those linked with one of them focus their distrust on the others when they offer their ratings. More particularly, those linked with Opposition parties other than KANU may see KANU as the main Opposition party, and base their ratings primarily on their feelings toward KANU. But why the handful of respondents who are apparently closest to KANU should rate the ruling party above their own seems most likely to be a reflection, yet again, of the sweep of euphoria across the country's political landscape, which seems to have raised NARC's standing to unusual – and perhaps unsustainable – heights.

**Table 26: Trust in Selected Individuals and Institutions, by Party Affiliation**

	NARC	KANU	Other Opposition	Neutral
The President	76	57	58	66
Parliament	59	48	47	48
The Ruling Party (NARC)	72	42	55	61
Opposition Parties	13	36	17	17
Electoral Commission of Kenya	54	43	52	47

(percent trust "a lot" or "a very great deal")

Perceptions of the extent of corruption among both state and non-state actors were also explored. While interpretation of this question in Kenya may have been complicated by the recent transition and the fact that the question did not specify a time frame, the generally quite positive ratings for the president, elected leaders, and government officials (Table 27) – which are considerably above the 15-country mean in all three cases despite Kenya's long-term reputation as one of the most corrupt countries in Africa – suggests that, once again, the post-transition glow and its positive impact on public assessments may be affecting results here. In fact, the only group that scores worse in Kenya than the 15-country mean are the police (about whom see also below).

Fully 77 percent report that none or only some officials in the Office of the President are corrupt, the lowest level of perceived corruption in this arm of government across 15 countries in Round 2, matched only by Namibia (76 percent). The same holds true for MPs and other elected leaders. It seems clear that the experiences of the Moi era have already been discounted, but with little actual experience of the Kibaki government, these relatively positive responses may again largely reflect hopeful expectations rather than actual experience. But Kibaki's early appointment of a Permanent Secretary for Ethics and Governance in his office likely had an important impact on these perceptions as well.

More generally, most other ratings appear to reflect the frequency of interaction people have with the officials in question. It is not surprising to find the police occupying the low end of the scale, with 59 percent reporting a belief that most or all of them are corrupt. This is consistent both with the conventional wisdom in Kenya, and with Transparency International - Kenya's repeated findings as well.<sup>87</sup>

**Table 27: Perceptions of Corruption**


	None/Some of Them	Most/All of Them	Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough	15-Country Mean - None/Some of Them
Religious Leaders	88	7	6	71
Teachers and School Administrators	81	13	6	67
The President and Officials in his Office	77	8	16	56
Elected Leaders (MPs, Local Councilors)	75	15	10	55
Local Businessmen	73	21	6	54
NGO and CBO Leaders	68	13	19	55
Government Officials	62	30	8	51
Foreign Businessmen	61	20	20	48
Judges and Magistrates	60	28	12	51
Customs and Immigration (i.e., Border) Officials	40	36	24	39
Police	37	59	4	43

*How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (percent)*

More surprising is the relatively positive rating accorded to judges and magistrates, who are also frequently accused of corruption in media reports, and who were targeted by a major anti-corruption effort by the new government shortly after the survey that resulted in the departure of nearly half of the judicial branch's most senior (23 High Court and Court of Appeal judges) and a substantial number of lower-tier (82 out of over 300 magistrates) personnel.<sup>88</sup> The very high public confidence in religious leaders is also somewhat curious given the periodic publicity concerning corruption in this sector. Ultimately, though, it may be the relative rankings of different categories of leaders, rather than the specific figures, that are most relevant.

Finally, respondents rated the performance of some of their leaders over the previous eight months since the new government had taken office (Figure 13). Kibaki is clearly riding high in the early days of his presidency, with an overwhelming 92 percent offering a positive assessment of his performance to date. Even among those who report that they are close to KANU, 83 percent say he is doing a good job! It is also clear from these results, however, that not all officials have benefited from the wave of good feelings that currently carries Kibaki and NARC. Those officials who are closer and more familiar to the people – MPs, councilors, and DCs – receive considerably fewer plaudits than the more remote president.

**Figure 13: Performance of Leaders**



*Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs since the new government took office, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?*

Yet again, Kenya ranks first across 15 Afrobarometer countries with regard to the president's performance rating, matched only by Namibia (Table 28). And from this perspective, MPs also appear to benefit from the current goodwill toward politicians; although they do not receive the highest score across countries, they fall only slightly below the top.

**Table 28: Performance of Leader, Across Countries**

	President	MP	Regional Government Official <sup>89</sup>	Local Government Representative
<b>Kenya</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>64</b>
Namibia	91	61	54	20
Tanzania	84	57	76	67
Mali	82	69	65	67
Uganda	81	63	74	92
Mozambique	80	62	74	51
Ghana	75	57	54	53
Senegal	71	44	54	54
Zambia	71	35	25	31
Lesotho	68	50	35	16
Malawi	65	41	--	43
Botswana	64	56	--	54
South Africa	51	45	43	33
Nigeria	38	30	50	38
Cape Verde	37	40	--	39

*(percent "approve"/"strongly approve")*

Finally, we asked respondents about the quality of the new government's appointments to senior positions in the new administration. Do they believe that patronage and personal-ethnic connections continue to

determine appointments, or that merit and ability now have the upper hand? As shown in Table 29, the public is divided on this issue. While 43 percent believe that skills and qualifications have played a major role in the selection process, a slightly greater share (47 percent) believe that such criteria have played only a moderate or even an insignificant role, and another 10 percent are uncertain. Even among those identifying with NARC, only 48 percent give the government credit for making primarily meritocratic appointments, while just one in three (33 percent) of KANU's backers do so. Differences across regions are also stark; whereas 61 percent in Central and Eastern Provinces regard merit as a key factor, only about one-third of respondents in Nairobi (35 percent), Nyanza (35 percent) and Western Provinces (32 percent) agree. In North Eastern Province, just 16 percent agree, but nearly half of respondents (44 percent) lacked sufficient information to hazard an opinion on the subject.

**Table 29: Importance of Merit and Ability**

	<b>Percent</b>
Very important	43
Somewhat important	36
Not very important	11

*How important do you believe considerations of merit and ability have been in the appointments to senior government positions under the new government?*

### **9.2 Performance of the New Government**

We now shift from assessments of leadership performance to respondents' evaluations of the government's performance on a range of particular issues. Once again, of course, the short tenure of the current government must be taken into consideration in interpreting results. In some sectors, such as education, concrete shifts in policy were almost immediate and are well known to the public. In others, however, the changes may be less obvious or still pending, and respondents may be basing their judgments as much on expectations – or hopes – as on actual experience of change. Overall, though, given the highly positive assessments already seen in many other evaluations (e.g., the quality of Kenya's democracy, the performance of top leadership), it would not be surprising to see similar results here.

Respondents were first asked to compare their political rights and freedoms under the new Kibaki government and under the departed Moi administration. As expected, the views expressed capture the almost palpable optimism of the times (Table 30). From these results, eight months after its swearing in, the NARC “honeymoon” appears far from over. Although the positive ratings are considerably lower for safety and security and equal treatment than for basic political freedoms, solid majorities see improvements in all areas. The relatively lower rating for freedom from unjust arrest may reflect the fact that the local police are, for most Kenyans, the branch of government machinery with which they have the most direct interaction (and among the most resistant to substantial change).

**Table 30: Governance Atmosphere: Kibaki Government vs. Moi Government**

	<b>Better/ Much Better</b>	<b>Same</b>	<b>Worse/ Much Worse</b>
Freedom to say what you think	84	12	2
Freedom to join any political organization you want	81	13	2
Freedom from being arrested when you are innocent	68	20	7
Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured	81	15	2
Ability of ordinary people to influence what government does	77	21	6
Safety from crime and violence	63	25	10
Equal and fair treatment for all people by government	64	25	6

*We are going to compare our new government under President Kibaki with the former government under President Moi. Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same. (percent)*

The sweep of positive feelings appears to be so widespread that even among the small proportion who still associate themselves with KANU, majorities or substantial pluralities likewise report improvements, as shown in Table 31, and many of the remainder report no change. In no case do more than 20 percent of these KANU supporters contend that things have gotten worse. While they are clearly less enthusiastic about the achievements of the new government than their NARC-aligned counterparts, their responses suggest that the upbeat attitude with which many Kenyans have greeted the new government extends even to many of those who voted against it.

**Table 31: Governance Atmosphere: Kibaki Government vs. Moi Government, by Party Affiliation**

	<b>KANU Supporters</b>	<b>Supporters of Other Opposition Parties</b>	<b>NARC Supporters</b>	<b>Unaffiliated</b>
Free to say what you think	58	89	87	77
Free to join any political organization	66	85	86	74
Fear of unjust arrest	49	69	75	59
Voting freedom	68	80	85	75
Ability to influence government	48	59	74	58
Safety from crime and violence	46	58	68	59
Equal/fair treatment of all by govt.	42	60	70	58

*(percent "better"/"much better")*

Respondents also compared the two governments on a number of more specific governance issues. Once again, the new Kibaki team receives very impressive scores (Table 32).

**Table 32: Governance Performance: Kibaki Government vs. Moi Government**

	<b>More/ Much More</b>	<b>Same</b>	<b>Less/ Much Less</b>
Able to enforce the law	86	11	2
Effective in service delivery	80	14	3
Corrupt	12	11	74
Trustworthy	78	15	4
Obedient to the Constitution	66	22	5

*Comparing the new government under President Kibaki with the former government under President Moi, would you say that the one we have now is more or less: (percent)*

When disaggregated according to party identification, it is again clear that adherents of the former ruling party are considerably less positive about the new government's capacity and commitment in these areas (Table 33). But overall, the fact that across most issues a solid majority of KANU supporters agree that the governance environment has improved since their preferred party was thrown out is quite striking evidence of just how deeply the euphoria in Kenya penetrates.


**Table 33: Governance Performance: Kibaki Government vs. Moi Government, by Party Affiliation**

	<b>KANU Supporters</b>	<b>Supporters of Other Opposition Parties</b>	<b>NARC Supporters</b>	<b>Unaffiliated</b>
Able to enforce the law (more/much more)	66	89	89	82
Effective in service delivery (more/much more)	56	78	84	76
Corrupt (less/much less)	60	72	76	72
Trustworthy (more/much more)	57	74	83	73
Obedient to the Constitution (more/much more)	44	60	70	63

*(percent)*

Moving to a more specific set of issues, Kenyans face a wide array of pragmatic concerns that they must contend with daily. How do they prioritize them, and how well is the government doing in addressing those that they rate as most important? We asked respondents what the most important problems are that the government should be addressing. They were allowed up to three responses, which were recorded verbatim and later coded into broad categories. Reflecting the low economic status of the majority of respondents, overwhelming concern is predictably directed at poverty and income-related issues (Figure 14). Unemployment is cited most frequently (18 percent of all valid responses), while poverty and management of the economy are each identified in 8 percent of cases; food shortage or famine is mentioned in another 4 percent. But social issues are by no means ignored. Health, including AIDS (13 percent), and education (9 percent) are the second and third most commonly named concerns, and crime and security problems are raised 6 percent of the time. Other key concerns include farming and agriculture problems (8 percent), provision of services such as water and electricity (6 percent), and transportation and roads (6 percent). Despite the focus on corruption by much of the local media and many in the international community, and the emphasis on this issue in the NARC platform, it is mentioned just 4 percent of the time. And Kenyans appear to have put some of their past problems behind them: just 1 percent mention political instability and violence, while concerns about terrorism barely register at all.

**Figure 14: Most Important Problems**




*In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? (up to three responses accepted)*

After identifying these critical problems, respondents were then given the opportunity to rate government performance with regard to these and related issues (Figure 15).

Having already abolished nearly all fees in primary schools (aside from costs associated with uniforms and examinations), a campaign pledge of which the public was almost universally aware, the highest rating goes to government performance in this sector. Other high ratings, such as those for fighting corruption,<sup>90</sup> economic management, and combating malaria, may, on the other hand, stem more from publicity and promises than from actual gains. This may also be the case when it comes to the government's efforts to address what Kenyans identified as the nation's most pressing problem: job creation. Creating 500,000 new jobs per year was one of NARC's key campaign promises, but as of the time of the survey, there had been little reported progress in achieving this goal. Nevertheless, while respondents were less overwhelming in their support of the government's efforts here than in many other sectors, a slim majority is still willing to give it the benefit of the doubt – for the time being.

Overall, these ratings appear to be still further evidence of the public's relatively uncritical post-transition optimism. This seems particularly likely when considering the quite positive score (75 percent) for the "reduction of crime," given that no significant decline in its frequency has been reported since the change of government.<sup>91</sup> Nonetheless, the public is much more critical of government in several areas, including many of those that most closely touch on the hardships of their daily lives, such as water supply, stabilizing prices, and ensuring that everyone has enough to eat.

**Figure 15: Government Performance on Key Issues**



*How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?*

Another measure of government performance is the ease or difficulty of obtaining various government goods (e.g., identity documents, voter registration cards) or services (water or telephone, police assistance) (Table 34). Among other things, the shortage of such “goods,” whether arising by accident, necessity or design, engenders opportunities for corruption.

**Table 34: Ease or Difficulty of Obtaining Government Services**

	Difficult/ Very Difficult	Easy/ Very Easy	Never Tried
Identity Document	60	33	6
Primary School Placement	15	79	6
Voter Registration Card	8	87	4
Household Services (water, electric, telephone)	60	10	28
A loan or payment from government	54	6	35
Help from the police	63	23	12

*Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services? Or do you never try to get these services from government? (percent)*

Only voter registration cards and primary school placements are considered relatively easy to obtain.<sup>92</sup> Large majorities of those who have sought to obtain other goods or services have encountered difficulties. Clearly the assessments here are less euphoric than many of the others already reported, probably in large part because they are based entirely on individuals’ actual experiences. But in many cases (though by no

means all) these difficulties may have been encountered under the previous government. Therefore, these ratings cannot be read so much as an assessment of the current government's performance, but as an overall indicator of how difficult actual encounters with government officials have been – and perhaps still continue to be. These data also reinforce the “user-unfriendly” reputations of local authorities, the Kenya Power and Lighting Company, and the Registrar of Persons, in contrast to the Electoral Commission of Kenya and primary school administrators.

## **10.0 The NARC Reform Agenda**

Finally, we sought to illuminate public aspirations regarding several key NARC campaign promises. Given the highly disparate nature of the new party, these promises, and the extent to which they are fulfilled, will have a direct bearing not just on the new government's credibility, but on its shorter-term internal cohesion – and thus on its longer-term electoral viability – as well.

### ***10.1 Constitutional Reform***

During the election campaign, constitutional reform had not only been promised to the public at large, but was also overtly identified as the reward for particular individuals should the party it be victorious at the polls.<sup>93</sup> Quite early on, however, it emerged that once in office, many leading members of the new government who had led the call for sweeping constitutional reform over the past decade became much more equivocal regarding this goal.<sup>94</sup> Such reluctance was especially apparent with regard to following through on those provisions that would dilute executive power, long considered to be too highly concentrated and largely unaccountable; both of the country's two previous presidents were seen to have seriously abused it. In addition, the fact that the NARC ticket was headed by Kibaki, a member of the country's largest and most economically muscular ethnic community (the Kikuyu), also contributed to calls for some means of power sharing among top leadership. As such, prominent leaders of other communities had agreed to join the NARC team with their own ethnic followings solidly behind them only with the understanding that such a downsizing of executive authority would be at the top of the new government's agenda.<sup>95</sup> The outcome of the constitutional review process, therefore, has profound implications for both short-term political relations and longer-term governance reform.<sup>96</sup>

A number of provisions under consideration at the National Constitutional Conference, which began in Nairobi shortly after the election, have been particularly contentious. For example, certain prominent NARC officials began to warn of the “recipe for chaos” that the division of executive authority between State House and parliament – via the creation of an independent prime minister – would represent, just as certain top KANU officials had argued when they were in power. In September, President Kibaki himself went so far as to suggest that anyone unhappy with the current constitution as it relates to executive power “should wait for five years and then try to get elected yourself so that you can enjoy these powers.”<sup>97</sup> This position served to isolate cabinet minister Raila Odinga,<sup>98</sup> given that (as mentioned above) he had been repeatedly designated the prime minister-to-be during the campaign.

In taking up the constitutional reform issue, we first assessed respondents' perceptions of the current constitution by asking whether or not they agree that, “Our Constitution expresses the values and hopes of the Kenyan people.” Two-thirds (64 percent) of respondents agree that it does, while 20 percent do not. We then asked respondents whether they thought that the constitutional review process ever had been, and still was, necessary. As shown in Table 35, an overwhelming majority believe that this task is still necessary to strengthen the country's democracy; only a handful think that it either was never necessary, or that it no longer is, now that power has changed hands. Clearly, many people who believe that the Constitution does represent Kenyan's values and hopes nonetheless feel that there is a need to improve, or even totally replace, this document.

**Table 35: Desire for Constitutional Reform**

<b>Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
A. Constitutional reform was never necessary to strengthen democracy in Kenya.	5
B. Now that we have a new government, constitutional reform is no longer necessary to strengthen democracy in Kenya.	5
C. Even with a new government, constitutional reform is still necessary to strengthen democracy in Kenya.	81
Don't know	9

These high levels of support for constitutional reform hold up across all of Kenya's provinces, although in North Eastern a much slimmer majority (54 percent) agree that it is still needed, while fully 41 percent of respondents in the region could not offer an opinion, an indicator of the remoteness and political marginalisation of the region (as explored in more detail below). Support for reform also varies only slightly with political affiliation (77 percent among those affiliated with KANU, 83 percent by those with NARC), and with ethno-linguistic group (with the exception that pastoralists generally, like those from North Eastern Province, have a much higher rate of "don't know" responses).

In contrast to the broad agreement on the need for constitutional reform, there is no consensus at all on the position of prime minister (Table 36). While nearly three-quarters (71 percent) of respondents do agree that this post is necessary, only 32 percent support a "strong and independent" premier in any new constitution. The remainder (39 percent) prefer a non-executive prime minister (e.g., as a designated presidential appointee, which is actually already allowable under the current constitution<sup>99</sup>). Twenty-one percent reject the post altogether.

**Table 36: Position of Prime Minister in the New Constitution**

<b>If there is a new constitution, which of the following do you think it should include:</b>	<b>Percent</b>
No prime minister	21
A prime minister with limited powers	39
A strong and independent prime minister	32
Don't know	8

As noted, plans to introduce a prime ministerial post arose out of both long-term efforts to reduce the unchecked power of the executive, and short-term efforts at coalition building and ethnic power sharing during the election campaign. The intention was to strike a balance between the power of the Kikuyu presidential candidate, and the undisputed leader of the Luo community (and with it the LDP), Raila Odinga. The current efforts of certain leaders to distance themselves from a position they had taken when they were in the Opposition has thus come to be seen as a twin-betrayal: of the promise to tame unchecked presidential power, and the promise to the Luo in particular to share power. (Whether creating such a position would have longer-term governance benefits must be considered separately.)

These dynamics are evident in Table 37. In fact, probably no other single issue captures the current atmosphere in the country's ethnicity-based politics so clearly. A majority of the Kikuyu, support a prime minister with restricted power, while a sizeable minority reject the post all together); just 10 percent support a strong prime minister. Among the Luo, on the other hand, fully 78 percent desire true power sharing (if not outright legislative dominance) via such a post with fully independent powers.

**Table 37: Position of Prime Minister in the New Constitution, by Ethno-linguistic Group**

	No Prime Minister	A Prime Minister with Limited Powers	A Strong and Independent Prime Minister
Kalenjin	15	26	50
Kamba	22	52	17
Kikuyu	33	54	10
Kisii	18	38	36
Luhya	25	41	26
Luo	4	14	78
Meru	35	46	7
Mijikenda	12	32	50
Pastoralists*	18	31	17
Other	13	40	41

(percent)

\*34 percent of pastoralists responded “don’t know.”

For their part, the fairly strong support for a strong prime minister (50 percent) among the Mijikenda and Kalenjin communities – both of which were solid supporters of KANU throughout the last multiparty decade – probably reflects a concern with the perceived re-establishment of Kikuyu hegemony. The Luhya, who have also historically viewed strong, centralised executive power with some trepidation, might have been more positive regarding an independent prime minister had not one of their own (i.e., the now deceased Michael Wamalwa) been vice-president. To what extent their views would have changed if his untimely death had occurred earlier can only be surmised. The overall point, however, is that personal-ethnic allegiance, rather than governance issues per se, appear to have been the primary influence on the great majority of responses to this question.

Looking to the future, the position the government’s core leadership ultimately takes on this issue as the constitutional review process enters its final phase is certain to have a significant impact not just on the process itself, but also on the entire shape and direction of national politics.<sup>100</sup> It would appear that the intermediate position of creating a prime ministerial post with limited powers might be the most viable option politically, though whether any major LDP-NARC figure would accept such a diminished position is open to question.

### **10.2 Investigation of Past Crimes**

Another critical issue facing the country is whether the alleged economic and human rights crimes of the Moi era will be handled via prosecution and punishment, or through forgiveness with amnesty.<sup>101</sup> NARC may, at one level, be concerned with how those communities that continue to proclaim their loyalty to the former president might respond if legal action were to be taken against him. At the same time, the new government is undoubtedly aware of the potential impact of such a legal course on its own internal cohesion, given the large contingent of formerly long-serving Moi associates who now find themselves on the NARC benches in parliament, and even in the cabinet. At the time of the survey, while various investigations had begun or been re-opened, no cases had been prepared for actual prosecution.<sup>102</sup> The government did undertake to collect public views regarding a “Truth and Justice Commission,” and found overwhelming support for this approach.<sup>103</sup>

We explored popular attitudes concerning these issues by first asking whether or not the possible crimes of previous governments should be investigated at all. Consistent with the attitudes toward the creation of a Truth and Justice Commission, we likewise found that a resounding majority – 82 percent – believe that past crimes should be investigated (Table 38). Differences arise, however, over the question of whether

only the Moi era should be investigated, or whether both of the post-independence governments must be subjected to such scrutiny.

**Table 38: Investigation of Past Crimes**

	<b>Percent</b>
No	16
Yes, investigate Moi era only	40
Yes, investigate entire independence era	42
Don't know	2

*Should the possible crimes of past governments be investigated, and if so, how far back should the investigations go?*

Again, attitudes toward this issue may be explored through the prism of ethnicity, as shown in Table 39. Not surprisingly, the Kalenjin and the pastoralists – KANU's strongest bases of support – are least interested in investigations that are limited to the Moi era. More surprising is the fact that a majority of the former and a plurality of the latter do support investigations as long as they cover the entire independence era, thus subjecting the Kikuyu-dominated Kenyatta government to investigation as well.

By contrast, the Kikuyu, and their neighbours in the Mt. Kenya region, the Meru, join the Luhya in being the least enthusiastic about such an inclusive undertaking. Why members of this latter community should be so, or why the Kisii should be most supportive of investigations generally, is unclear; the fact that no major figures from the Kisii are assumed to be implicated may have something to do with this, however.<sup>104</sup>

**Table 39: Investigation of Past Crimes, by Ethno-Linguistic Group**

	<b>None</b>	<b>Yes, Moi Era Only</b>	<b>Yes, Entire Independence Era</b>
Kalenjin	30	16	54
Kamba	9	54	42
Kikuyu	15	45	39
Kisii	4	54	42
Luhya	20	41	36
Luo	12	37	50
Meru	12	55	30
Mijikenda	12	45	41
Pastoralists	23	22	47
Other	12	46	41

*(percent)*

We next explored respondents' views about what should be done to those found guilty of such past crimes. As shown in Table 40, nearly two-thirds (65 percent) of respondents believe in amnesty rather than full prosecution and punishment, but only for those who confess to their crimes and repay or return stolen assets to the public.

**Table 40: Prosecution and Punishment for Past Crimes**

<b>If investigations are conducted, and those investigated are found to be guilty, should there be:</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Full prosecution and punishment	23
Amnesty for those who confess and repay	65
Unconditional amnesty	8
Do not agree with any of the above	3
Don't know	1

We went on to ask specifically about how the former president should be handled if he is found guilty of any crimes (Table 41). In this case, an equally large majority believe in conditional amnesty, but there is some shift away from preference for application of the full force of the law and towards unconditional amnesty, although both are still small minority positions. Whether the lower level of support for prosecuting the former president derives from respect for the office, or is a reflection of gratitude for his willingness to peacefully hand over power, or arises out of fear that prosecution would trigger a divisive reaction (including, possibly, destructive violence), is, likewise, unclear.<sup>105</sup>

**Table 41: Prosecution and Punishment for Past Crimes for Former President Moi**

<b>What about former President Moi? What should be done if he is found to be guilty of any crimes:</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Full prosecution and punishment	16
Amnesty if he confesses and repays	64
Unconditional amnesty	16
Do not agree with any of the above	2
Don't know	1

As with constitutional reform, just how the NARC government ultimately decides to handle this issue is likely to have major political as well as governance implications. As noted, a number of prominent former KANU leaders now sit within the NARC government, and their positions could become untenable should investigations dig too deep. The major donors, too, are said to be watching to see how committed the government is to fighting corruption, beginning with taking action against past transgressors, but including the recovery of stolen and expatriated assets, said to be very substantial.<sup>106</sup>

## **11.0 Insecurity and Violent Conflict**

Although the country has not suffered the ravages of civil war as have so many of its neighbours, many Kenyans, over the course of the past decade, have been victims of crime or banditry, struggles for land and livestock, and of politically-instigated violence. On the one hand, conflict has been deliberately used as a political tool, particularly during the 1992 and 1997 election cycles. At the same time, increasing corruption, especially within the ranks of the police forces, and an overall decline in governance alongside increasing levels of poverty, resulted in escalating crime rates. Moreover, some parts of the country, particularly in the arid north and northeastern parts of the country inhabited primarily by pastoralist communities, have long had reputations as virtual no-go areas, at least without benefit of a security escort, a factor that has contributed substantially to the economic, social and political marginalisation of these regions.

To assess the overall extent to which Kenyans have been victims of or witnesses to such crime and conflict, we first asked respondents about their perceived and actual personal vulnerability to criminal activity (Table 42).

**Table 42: Experience of Crime**

	<b>Never</b>	<b>Once or Twice/ Several Times</b>	<b>Many Times/Always</b>
Feared crime in your own home	41	38	21
Had something stolen from house	60	36	4
Had crops or livestock stolen	61	33	7
Been physically attacked	82	16	2

*Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your family: (percent)*

Given the considerable frequency with which the average Kenyan experiences criminal activity first hand, it is notable that this issue does not rank higher (ninth, see Figure 14) among Kenyans priorities for government action. This can only be seen as a testament to just how serious the other problems that the public grapples with daily actually are.

There are significant, and perhaps surprising, variations across regions. In particular, respondents in North Eastern Province, with the worst reputation for insecurity, actually fear crime and suffer as victims of it far less frequently than their counterparts in other regions of the country, and especially Nairobi. For example, three-quarters (73 percent) of North Easterners say they never fear crime in their own homes, while fewer than one in three can say this in Central (29 percent), Eastern (31 percent) and Nairobi Provinces (27 percent). And fewer respondents in North Eastern Province have actually been victimised by crime than in any other region. Just 19 percent had something stolen from their home, compared to a high of 57 percent in Nairobi and 45 percent in Western Province. Similarly, just 21 percent had crops or livestock stolen, compared to a high of 51 percent in Nyanza. Only Nairobi residents suffered slightly less from this problem, at 19 percent, for obvious reasons.

We then shifted from a focus on the individual to the family, community, and country. Respondents were asked how often violent conflicts arise: a) within their families; b) within their own communities; and c) between different groups in the country (Table 43). Kenyans clearly see inter-group conflict within the country as the most frequent locus of conflict, with one in five (21 percent) identifying such conflicts as being very frequent.

**Table 43: Incidence of Violent Conflict**

	<b>Never/Rarely</b>	<b>Sometimes</b>	<b>Often/Always</b>
Within your own family	74	21	5
Within the community where you live	51	39	10
Between different groups in this country	34	42	21

*In your experience, how often do violent conflicts arise... (percent)*

It is perhaps not surprising that these assessments again vary considerably across regions (Table 44), with those in North Eastern and Eastern Provinces aware of far fewer problems with such conflict than are residents of Nairobi and Central Provinces. Interestingly, residents of Rift Valley Province, where many of these conflicts have occurred, rated their occurrence as less frequent than did residents of Nairobi, Central and Nyanza Provinces. It may be that with a new government in place, concern over ordinary (economic) crime is now much greater than with political violence; as such, the Rift Valley may now seem considerably safer to its residents than do the far more congested and economic crime-prone areas of the latter three provinces.

**Table 44: Incidence of Violent Conflict between Different Groups, by Province**

	<b>Percent “Often”/”Always”</b>
Nairobi	36
Central	33
Nyanza	31
Rift Valley	21
Coast	19
Western	14
North Eastern	6
Eastern	5

This result, in combination with those concerning personal security, belies the reputation of North Eastern Province as highly insecure and unsafe. Its own residents, at least, feel far more secure than do residents of any other region.

Respondents were next asked to identify the most common causes of violent conflicts between different groups in the country. Respondents could give up to three responses, which were recorded verbatim, and later coded into broad categories. Those cited most frequently are listed in Table 45.

**Table 45: Causes of Violent Conflicts Between Different Groups**

	<b>Percent</b>
Boundary or land disputes	26
Politics, political issues, leadership disputes	17
Problems over animals/livestock	14
Ethnic/tribal differences	9
Economic problems/social deprivation	8
Personal attitudes and behaviors – envy, jealousy, etc.	3
Problems over water and other natural resources	2
Crime	2
Corruption	2
Problems over personal properties, inheritance	2
Poor communication, misunderstandings	2

*Over what sort of problems do violent conflicts most often arise between different groups in this country?*

It must first be recognized, of course, that these categories are not mutually exclusive. Ethnic identities have, for example, frequently been mobilised in the waging of political leadership battles, and conflicts over livestock and animals often have ethnic, political and economic dimensions as well. It is clear, however, that in their own assessments, Kenyans focus on the more concrete, resource-based aspects of disputes, such as land shortages or livestock controversies, or on the political roots of conflict, and are much less inclined to characterise disputes as ethnic in nature. Given that the survey followed a hotly contested election, it is perhaps notable that politics was not noted even more frequently as a cause of conflict, particularly given the extent to which this connection was evident in many of the 1992 and 1997 campaigns. This reflects the reality that the 2002 election was much less troubled by violence than the earlier contests, at least once nominations were completed.

These results also help demonstrate, albeit indirectly, the extent to which Kenya benefits from its particular communal mix, despite its reputation for suffering from relatively deep ethnic cleavages. As noted above, the country’s largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, constitute only about one-fifth of the total population; even the entire “Mt. Kenya cluster” of ethnic groups (Kikuyu, Embu and Meru) are equal to

only just over a quarter of the country's population. As such, Kenya is largely immune from the kind of polarised bi-ethnic competition and tension associated with some of the violent – and in several cases, state-threatening – conflicts experienced elsewhere in Africa, including in several neighbouring countries. Especially under majoritarian election rules, political elites from the Mt. Kenya area, as elsewhere, must acknowledge the necessity of forging wider alliances with leaders from other communities in order to advance their agenda. Thus, while it is true that localised conflict, even of an inter-ethnic nature, may occur, it generally does so without taking on national proportions, let alone threatening state security.<sup>107</sup> The country's ethnic arithmetic thus places clear limits on how useful such strategies are for those seeking national electoral success.

## 12.0 Two Kenyas?

It has long been argued that there are in fact two Kenyas: an “up-Kenya,” and a “down-Kenya.”<sup>108</sup> This dichotomy reflects the general division in Kenya Colony between the Northern Frontier District (i.e., “up-Kenya”), covering most of the country's pastoralist areas (aside from the central and southern Rift Valley), and the entire remainder of the country.<sup>109</sup> In terms of total land area they are roughly equal, even if the north and northeast house only about 8 percent of the nation's population.

How distinctive are the pastoral zones of the country? Is this dichotomy an accurate one? While there is some variability depending on the issues being discussed, in general, it appears that neither information nor euphoria have permeated these northern regions to the same extent that they have “down-Kenya.” On many (though not all) questions, the clear trend when comparing the two groups is one of lower positive ratings among respondents from up-Kenya. But there are two distinct reasons for this. One is the much higher level of “don't know” responses frequently recorded in the region. In addition to sheer remoteness, this lack of information can also be attributed to the somewhat lower levels of interest in public affairs in the region (69 percent “somewhat” or “very interested” in the north, compared to 83 percent in the south), and the closely related lower levels of access to news from various media sources. Only about half as many respondents in pastoralist zones reported having access to television (19 percent) and newspapers (22 percent) compared to others (38 and 40 percent, respectively). Nonetheless, three-quarters (77 percent) have access to radio news, but this is still well below the 92 percent who access this news medium in the rest of the country.

The second source of difference is that northerners often tend to give higher negative ratings, whether in evaluating the state of the economy, or assessing the government's performance on key issues. Perhaps the euphoria that seems to be affecting much of the country simply has not reached this remote region – another reflection of the limited access to media sources, among other things. On the other hand, given their history of marginalisation, and their generally inhospitable (and unpredictable) physical environment, it may be that despite the hopefulness and high expectations elsewhere, pastoralists themselves have still seen no reason to believe that benefits are likely to trickle their way; whatever progress the country may achieve in broader, “GDP” terms, they may well assume that, as in the past, it will pass them by. The history of KANU support in the region (12 percent still link themselves with KANU there, three times the level down-country) may be yet another reason that there are lower expectations of improvement in the region. Thus, while we have suspected that euphoria may have inflated assessments of economic and governance issues in the country as a whole, it would appear that it has not swept away northerners to the same extent; they emerge as much more cautious in their assessments of how their world is likely to change.

These trends become evident when comparing economic conditions and assessments of personal and national economic situations between the two regions. Table 46 indicates that, as is widely known, up-Kenya pastoralists face some of the harshest economic circumstances in the country. Nearly one-quarter

have had to go without food and water frequently over the past year, compared to about one in six of their down-Kenya compatriots.

**Table 46: Going Without Basic Needs, Up-Kenya vs. Down-Kenya**

	<b>Up-Kenya (Pastoralists)</b>	<b>Down-Kenya (Others)</b>
Food	23	13
Water	24	14
Medical care	36	17
Cooking fuel	5	9
Cash income	46	32

*Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your family gone without: (percent going without “many times” or “always”)*

It is therefore not surprising that in their assessments of the condition of the national economy and of their own personal economic situation, pastoralists are somewhat more negative than other Kenyans. Whereas 46 percent of down-country Kenyans rate the country’s economic situation as “fairly” or “very good,” and 30 as “fairly” or “very bad,” the numbers are essentially reversed among the northern populations, with 43 rating the national economy as bad, and 35 percent as good.

But even larger differences emerge in rating changes in economic conditions over time (Table 47). Pastoralists are far less sanguine in their ratings of the national economy over the last year compared to others (38 percent better versus 53 percent), and also less inclined to see improvement in their personal situation during that time (36 percent versus 45 percent). The contrast becomes even sharper with regard to future expectations. While roughly 8 out of 10 (83 percent) expect things to be better in one year in the south, fewer than half (46 percent) expect the same in the north. The difference, however, is not so much that the northern pastoralists expect things to get worse, or even to stay the same; nearly four out of 10 simply say they don’t know what the future holds on both questions.

**Table 47: Perspectives on the Economic Past and Future, Up-Kenya vs. Down-Kenya**

	<b>Up-Kenya (Pastoralists)</b>	<b>Down-Kenya (others)</b>
Economic conditions in this country compared to 12 months ago		
Better/much better	38	53
Don’t know	8	1
Your living conditions compared to 12 months ago		
Better/much better	36	45
Don’t know	3	1
Economic conditions in this country in 12 months time		
Better/much better	46	83
Don’t know	37	6
Your living conditions in 12 months time		
Better/much better	48	79
Don’t know	36	8

*Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: a) economic conditions in this country; b) your living conditions. (percent)*

*Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: a) economic conditions in this country in twelve months time; b) your living conditions in twelve months time. (percent)*

Similar trends hold in many cases with respect to political attitudes and assessments. We find that positive assessments are often lower. Again, in some cases, this can be explained almost entirely by higher “don’t know” responses. In others, it is explained by both higher “don’t know” and higher negative ratings. For example, support for democracy is 67 percent among pastoralists, compared to 81 percent in the rest of the population. But in this case most of the difference is explained by the 24 percent who said they don’t know (compared to just 5 percent in the south). Likewise, when asked how much of a democracy Kenya is, just 57 percent in the north say it is fully democratic or has only minor problems, compared to 78 percent in down-country Kenya; again, the difference is almost entirely accounted for by the fact that 26 percent of northerners could not rate the political system (compared to 6 percent elsewhere); negative ratings of the system were not higher. And finally, the same pattern holds for satisfaction with democracy: in the north, 63 percent are satisfied, while 19 percent don’t know, while in the south, 80 percent are satisfied, and just 4 percent don’t know. In all three cases, negative ratings (e.g., unsatisfied, not a democracy, etc.) are roughly equal in both regions.

Turning to assessments of government performance, for example in comparing the Kibaki government to that of ex-President Moi, we again see lower positive ratings and higher uncommitted responses (e.g., “don’t know”). But in some cases, we also see an increase in neutral or negative assessments as well (Table 48). Overall, it is clear that northern Kenyans are decidedly less ecstatic (although in these examples, solid majorities nonetheless see improvement) about the new political situation than their down-country counterparts; they are also in all cases less sure of what to think about the situation, and at least occasionally, more negative about it, than southerners.


**Table 48: Governance Atmosphere, Up-Kenya vs. Down-Kenya**

	Up-Kenya (Pastoralists)	Down-Kenya (Others)
Compare present vs. past: freedom to say what you think		
Better/Much better	62	86
Same	22	11
Worse/Much Worse	8	2
Don’t know	9	1
Compare present vs. past: freedom to vote as you choose		
Better/Much better	58	83
Same	25	14
Worse/Much Worse	3	2
Don’t know	13	1

*We are going to compare our new government under President Kibaki with the former government under President Moi. Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same. (percent)*

Similar findings are apparent when Kenyans assess government performance on a number of key issues (Figure 16). Note that in every case, the government rates less highly among pastoralists than among others, and at times the difference is as great as 30 percent or more. However, as shown in Table 49, this gap is in some cases due to differences in the level of “don’t know” responses, in others to much higher negative ratings, and in still others, to both factors.

**Figure 16: Government Performance on Key Issues, Up-Kenya vs. Down-Kenya**



*How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?*

It is revealing, however, that on certain key issues, opinions in the north seem to be just as well formed as those in the south. This is true (as in the last question on Table 49) on questions relating to everyday services that directly affect pastoralists' lives, such as water supply and health and education services. But it also shows up at other interesting times as well. For example, while we have seen that pastoralists are much less certain of their views about democracy in general, they are, nonetheless, completely confident that elections are the only acceptable way to choose their leaders. When asked to choose whether "We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections," or whether, "Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders", 91 percent agree with the first statement, with just 3 percent saying they don't know (compared to 88 and 0 percent, respectively, in the southern half of the country).

**Table 49: Government Handling of Key Issues, Up-Kenya vs. Down-Kenya**

	<b>Up-Kenya (Pastoralists)</b>	<b>Down-Kenya (Others)</b>
Government handling of: management of the economy		
Fairly/Very well	56	85
Fairly/Very bad	22	12
Don't know	21	3
Government handling of: creating jobs		
Fairly/Very well	33	54
Fairly/Very bad	47	42
Don't know	20	4
Government handling of: improving basic health services		
Fairly/Very well	54	77
Fairly/Very bad	42	22
Don't know	3	1

(percent)

When asked about a number of issues specifically related to the transition, a particularly interesting distinction comes out. On questions about the need for a new constitution, the type of prime minister needed, or the quality of government appointments, one-third or more of up-Kenya respondents cannot offer an opinion. But when asked about investigations of past crimes, and the choice of prosecution and punishment versus amnesty for those found guilty, the views of pastoralists are virtually as fully formed as those of their southern counterparts; 5 percent or fewer respond with “don't know” on each of these questions. As shown in Table 50, pastoralists are somewhat less likely than others to favor investigations, but somewhat more inclined toward investigating the entire independence era. This is not surprising, given that the pastoral communities had long been aligned with the Moi/KANU regime. There are few appreciable differences between up-Kenya and down-Kenya respondents on the question of how to handle those who are found to have committed crimes, with the small exception that in the case of the former president, northerners are somewhat more inclined toward unconditional amnesty, as opposed to amnesty if he were to confess and make restitution.

**Table 50: Investigation of Past Crimes, Up-Kenya vs. Down-Kenya**

	<b>Up-Kenya (Pastoralists)</b>	<b>Down-Kenya (Others)</b>
No, they should not be investigated	23	15
Yes, they should be investigated during the Moi era only	22	42
Yes, they should be investigated during the entire independence era	47	42
Don't know	5	1

*Should the possible crimes of past governments be investigated, and if so, how far back should the investigations go? (percent)*

Finally, before closing this discussion, let us take a moment to consider another possible national fault line: religion. Particularly since the terrorist strikes in the country and in the wake of the government's

halting efforts to respond to external pressure to crack down on potential threats, are Muslim Kenyans feeling alienated or marginalised? Do they have fundamentally different views about the political and economic future of their country, or substantially different assessments of the quality of government performance?<sup>110</sup>


First, in terms of demographics, it is important to note that Muslim Kenyans, who make up about 8 percent of our sample, overlap significantly with the up-Kenya population discussed above. About half of all Kenyan Muslims are northern/northeast pastoralists, and about half of the up-country pastoralists are Muslims (both groups are about 8 percent of the population). This in part explains why the levels of economic hardship among Muslims, relative to Christians, closely mirror the differences between up-Kenya and down-Kenya respondents described above. In these terms, Muslims are thus about twice as likely as Christians to have experienced severe shortages (gone without “many times” or “always” in the past year) of food (25 versus 13 percent), water (28 versus 13 percent), and medical care (38 versus 16 percent).

This also helps to explain the finding of somewhat similar, but generally less pronounced, trends when the responses of Muslims and Christians are compared on a variety of political and policy issues.<sup>111</sup> That is, Muslims tend to offer somewhat lower positive ratings – i.e., there is less evidence of unabashed euphoria within this group – accounted for by higher levels of “don’t know” responses and, in some cases, higher levels of negative responses.

For example, Muslims are slightly less likely to agree that “democracy is always preferable” than are Christians (73 percent versus 83 percent; “don’t know” is 10 percent versus 6 percent). They are also slightly less inclined to rate the country as relatively democratic (either a “full democracy”, or “a democracy with only minor problems”; 70 versus 78 percent; “don’t know”: 8 versus 3 percent). But there is no notable difference in levels of satisfaction between the two groups (76 percent versus 79 percent “somewhat or very satisfied”; “don’t know” 9 percent versus 4 percent).

The differences are more remarkable when assessing government performance (Figure 17). On most issues, Muslims give the government consistently lower positive ratings, accounted for by both higher negative ratings and higher don’t know ratings (Table 51). On several others, however, such as water supply, education, health, and crime, there is no significant difference in “don’t know” responses; the bulk of the difference is due to higher negative ratings. Thus, like the pastoralist groups, we find that the while overall a majority of Muslims give the government positive ratings on most key issues, they do so in nearly all cases by a much slimmer margin. Only with respect to reducing crime are the responses of Christians and Muslims indistinguishable.

**Figure 17: Government Performance on Key Issues, Muslims and Christians**



How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

**Table 51: Government Handling of Key Issues, Muslims and Christians**

	Muslim	Christian
Government handling of: management of the economy		
Fairly/Very well	67	85
Fairly/Very bad	21	11
Don't know	12	4
Government handling of: improving basic health services		
Fairly/Very well	59	77
Fairly/Very bad	40	22
Don't know	1	1
Government handling of: the terrorism threat		
Fairly/Very well	52	74
Fairly/Very bad	24	10
Don't know	24	16

(percent)

Of particular interest are the ratings with respect to handling the terrorism threat. Whereas only 10 percent of non-Muslims feel this issue is being handled badly or very badly, nearly one-quarter (24 percent) of Muslims think so.

Given the fact that Muslims (nearly – but certainly not all – it appears, from outside the country) were involved in the terrorist attacks that Kenya has suffered, the most aggressive investigative and police operations by government (and Western) security personnel have been undertaken in areas of the country where members of this religion are concentrated (the Coast, North Eastern Province).<sup>112</sup> A less supportive attitude to government policy and practice (under both Moi and Kibaki) on this issue from this section of the population is thus of no surprise.

Although we do not know how many respondents in the entire sample are aware of the Suppression of Terrorism bill that was published in mid-year, it seems likely that at least some of the negative sentiment may arise out of this proposed legislation. The bill was immediately subject to scathing criticism by the Law Society of Kenya and other human rights groups. Kenya's umbrella Muslim body, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, was just as vehement in its denunciation, and several Muslims MPs added their own voices.<sup>113</sup> As such, it may be expected that on such sensitive issues as this, the gap between Muslims and other Kenyans may continue to widen, failing some degree of policy reversal.

### **13.0 Conclusion: From "Dawn" to "Mid-Day"? – The 2003 Kenya Afrobarometer Survey, and Beyond**

Given the often overwhelmingly positive assessments Kenyans give of the state of their country, their economy, their political system, and their government, particularly in comparison to respondents in other Afrobarometer countries, it is virtually undeniable that the evident public euphoria that filled the air after the election of Mwai Kibaki and his NARC party in December 2002 was having an inflationary effect on the public's judgments at the time of the first Kenya survey in August-September 2003. On item after item – ratings of their president's performance, assessments of the state of the economy, satisfaction with their democracy, and commitment to a democratic system of government, to name but a few – Kenyans score at or near the top among the 15 countries surveyed in Afrobarometer Round 2. Even the handful of respondents who identified themselves as close to the ousted KANU party appear to have been caught up in the giddiness; in many cases a majority rate the situation under Kibaki/NARC to be better than under the Moi/KANU government, hardly a normal state of mind for presumed supporters of the ousted leaders.

But it is equally clear that the Kibaki government best not become complacent about public support for its incumbency. Cautionary tales are plentiful. Within the Afrobarometer experience, the last few years in Nigeria provide ample evidence of the potentially fleeting nature of euphoria-induced support. As discussed earlier, Nigerians were similarly positive in their assessments in the first Afrobarometer survey conducted shortly after the transition from military rule to multiparty politics in 1999. By late 2003, however, Nigerians were giving their president and the state of their democracy some of the lowest scores across 15 countries.

And this sort of let-down after major transitions appears to be the rule elsewhere as well. Old ways die hard, it seems. As Ndegwa urged:

Experience...cautions against too much optimism. In general, African countries that have ushered long-reigning dictators out of power have tended to fall short of achieving truly transformative (or in some cases, even significant) change. The cases of Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi all feature an electoral triumph that begins with inspiring

promise and yields disappointing or even dismal results. The jury is still out on Madagascar while Senegal – admittedly an outlier but only slightly so – is no better. Most have backslid into the same old types of malaise, especially as new incumbents fight to keep their grip on power (for example, Zambia and Malawi), or as problems once identified with out-going rulers (as in Nigeria and Senegal) prove to be deeply ingrained agonies that will take far more to resolve than a change of personnel at the top. Other polities have simply found themselves overwhelmed by the complexities of navigating multifaceted reforms and populist demands (for example, Benin...).<sup>114</sup>

Based on this comparative review, he finds the likelihood of the new government in Kenya moving from a successful “transition” to longer term, more lasting “transformation” uncertain, at best:

The extent to which the recent electoral transition sets the stage for deeper changes in the state (and its role in society and the economy) like the extent to which the NARC holds up under the demands of governance and in the shadow of a more prominent parliament, will go a long way toward determining whether democracy in Kenya can stand its ground and deliver on its promise.<sup>115</sup>

In addition to grappling with entrenched ways of doing business, some of the other challenges the new government faces have also been discussed, including high public expectations alongside a nearly moribund public sector, and dependence on external actors,<sup>116</sup> among others. Kibaki’s age and uncertain health, along with what has been described as a “hands-off” management style, exacerbate this situation.<sup>117</sup> The government currently faces serious issues over how to (or indeed, whether it can) manage the constitutional review process, and to what end; whether one or more cabinet members should resign or be sacked for showing “disloyalty” to the President; what to do with the perpetrators and for the victims of Moi-era transgressions; how to bolster investor confidence; and whether NARC’s constituent parties should be dissolved as this new umbrella party attempts to establish itself independently of its diverse and quite conflicting origins.

In such a context, it is virtually inevitable that some “coming down-to-earth” must occur. But the question for the NARC government, at least in part, is whether, for Kenyans, it will be a hard landing or a soft one. Will Kenyans merely have to modify their expectations, putting them more in tune with the difficult realities the country faces? Or will their hopes simply be dashed, and the public find itself back where it started before all the excitement of the “new dawn” took hold?

Unfortunately, the debates of the last few months since survey fieldwork was completed increasingly suggest a hard landing may be in the offing. As ever-deeper cracks have appeared in NARC, and much attention already appears to be focused on jockeying for position in the next election, rather than on producing results now, the public mood has altered considerably. For many, 2004 was greeted much more soberly than the previous year had been. According to one observer:

Unlike the dawn of 2003, which was characterised by overwhelming enthusiasm for a new era following the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) victory over KANU, Kenyans have entered 2004 with considerable trepidation in light of the persistent wrangles within the ruling coalition that threaten to shatter their dream of better delivery of services...

It is not lost on both local and international observers that the continued wrangles in NARC could significantly erode the goodwill the party earned a year ago and reduce the coalition to a bunch of self-seekers that nobody can trust by the end of the year.<sup>118</sup>

And another lamented that:

Kenya ushers in the New Year with a mixture of gratitude, disappointment at dashed hopes, guarded optimism, anxiety and uncertainty...

The optimistic celebratory mood that characterised election day on December 27, 2002 is clearly lacking. A nation's dreams and hopes appear to be hanging on [sic] a balance...NARC can be given the benefit of doubt for the year, 2003, but 2004 will surely define whether it is a coalition of substance or not...<sup>119</sup>

Indeed, while a local Gallup-Steadman Research poll found Kenyans to be the "most optimistic people in the world" in March 2003, a follow-up poll conducted in October found a marked decline.<sup>120</sup> In the first survey, 87 percent of those interviewed expected 2003 to be better economically than 2002, whereas just seven months later only 47 percent thought this would be so. Ratings of government performance in several areas also dropped considerably (Table 48). Such results, while far from nationally representative, do suggest the change that appears to have occurred in the public atmosphere during the course of the new government's first year in office.<sup>121</sup>

**Table 52: Gallup-Steadman 2003 Ratings of Government Performance, Selected Issues**

	<b>March</b>	<b>October</b>
The Economy	75	57
Employment	50	39
Public Sector Corruption	77	54
Insecurity	65	55

percent "approve" Source: Gallup-Steadman 2003.

As if to suggest such declining approval, a lobby group active in recent years in mobilising support for constitutional reform lamented:

...The Government has managed within the short period of one year to waste massive public support and lock itself in tight corners from where it is waging a losing battle against its people.<sup>122</sup>

In response to all of the concerns and criticisms the government now faces, it might be argued that these are still very early days; after working so hard to get into power, and having found the "ship-of-state" in such disrepair, it would undoubtedly take considerable time to right things even in the absence of the kind of discord emanating from within the new government itself.

And a convincing argument can yet be made that many positive changes have indeed occurred. These include: an expanded freedom of expression (starting with the government's own KBC itself), greater accountability in public expenditure, an increased and strategically useful emphasis on the HIV/AIDS crisis, and the general self-empowerment of ordinary citizens in dealing with authority, across the board. And all this in just one year.<sup>123</sup>

Nevertheless, it is clear that the government will have to do more to come to grips with the daunting challenges it confronts over the course of the next few years if public support for the present administration is to persist at anything like the levels observed in this first Afrobarometer survey. On this score, our results suggest that to meet even a significant fraction of the public's high expectations, two distinct conditions must be met. One is that economic growth must occur, and at a rapid enough pace to outstrip the per capita barrier of continuing population growth. Secondly, both this growth and the pain

that will likely be incurred in the meantime must be seen to be distributed in a reasonably equitable way over the country's highly diverse regional and ethnic landscape. As Holmquist recently argued:

...[T]wentieth-century Kenyan experience suggests that an ethnic group's prominence in State House triggers biased flows of resources and policy benefits in its direction – white settlers during colonial rule, the Kikuyu under Jomo Kenyatta, Kalenjins in the Moi period, or, some now fear, the Kikuyu under the Kibaki administration. This perception suggests that the presidency, and not just the cabinet and high-level civil servants, must be seen as multiethnic if it is to gain and retain broad legitimacy.<sup>124</sup>

As such, it may well be the combined score card in terms of both of these criteria that largely determine what the next Afrobarometer survey – and perhaps also the next election – reveals.

But of even greater import for the country's long-term democratic prospects will be trends over time not in the government's performance ratings, but in the more deeply rooted level of commitment to democracy as a system of government. Kenyans outscored all others on this account, too, and it is likely that this also, in part, reflects the euphoria. But a key question for the long-term stability and consolidation of the more fully democratic system ushered in with the 2002 elections will be whether this commitment persists at relatively high levels *regardless* of whether or not the performance of the government of the day continues to generate positive ratings, or whether, on the contrary, Ake's decidedly instrumental characterisation, that “ordinary Africans do not separate democracy ... from economic well-being,” will instead prove correct.<sup>125</sup>

Finally, we close by noting that to the extent that Kenyan voters consider that promises and performance do matter, and to the extent that they increasingly perceive themselves as citizens whose opinions are important – and who can demand accountability of their government – their government leaders should find it in their interest to pay increasing attention to their views. In this sense, it is hoped that while this survey's primary function is to “measure the weather” of Kenya's evolving democracy, it may also, at the same time, contribute to it.

## **Appendix A: Sampling Methodology**

### ***Sampling Frame***

Kenya is a highly heterogeneous country, with over three-dozen ethnic groups distributed across its eight provinces. The sample universe for the Afrobarometer Round 2 survey in Kenya included all Kenyan citizens of voting age (18 years and above), who, according to the latest (1999) census number 14,023,328 out of a total population of 28,686,607. With an estimated population growth rate of 2.5 percent, the adult population is now likely to be closer to 15.5 million. Institutional populations, such as students in dormitories or people in prisons or hospitals, are excluded.

The target sample size was 2400 respondents. With a sample of this size, inferences to the national adult population can be made with a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 2 percent, with a 95 percent confidence level. A total of 2398 interviews were actually completed.

The updated national master sampling frame, the National Sample Survey Evaluation Programme (NASSEP IV), constituted the sampling frame for the Afrobarometer Round 2 survey in Kenya. This frame, developed and maintained by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), has well-defined Enumeration Areas (EAs), which are the smallest well-defined geographical units for which population and household data are available. These serve as the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs).

All districts and provinces were included in the frame from which the sample was drawn, including regions that are often excluded from such surveys because they are thought to present security risks, including Turkana District in the north rift, and North Eastern Province. Data gathering in all of these regions was undertaken without incident. A few EA substitutions were ultimately made due to extreme remoteness and inaccessibility, or localised security concerns, but these amounted to less than 5 percent of the total sample.

The sample design was a stratified, clustered, multi-stage, area probability sample. To ensure every adult citizen had an equal chance of being included in the sample, methods of random selection are used at every stage of the sampling.

### ***Stratification***

The sample frame was stratified based on two factors: administrative province, and residential classification (urban or rural) (Table A.1). The area stratification increases the likelihood that distinctive ethnic or language groups are not left out of the sample. The urban/rural stratification is a means to make sure that these localities are represented in their correct proportions.

In Kenya, the stratification was adjusted to ensure that there were enough cases in each province to make generalizations about its population. This required increasing the sample in North Eastern Province from its proportional share of 76 respondents up to 120 respondents, with compensating reductions made in more populous provinces. Weighting factors are applied during data analysis to correct for this deliberate oversampling.

### ***Selection of Primary Sampling Units***

EAs were selected from each strata using the probability proportional to population size (PPPS) method. In this method, the more densely populated geographical units have a proportionally greater probability of being selected into the sample. Eight interviews were conducted in each EA, so a total of 300 EAs were selected from throughout the country. The use of EA maps facilitated easy identification of areas assigned to the researchers.

**Table A1: Distribution of the Population and Sample, by Province**

Province	Population	Proportion	Selected Number of EAs (with NE oversample)			Number of Respondents
			Urban	Rural	Total EAs	
Nairobi	2,143,254	7.5	22	0	22	176
Central	3,724,159	13.0	5	32	37	296
Coast	2,487,264	8.7	9	17	26	208
Eastern	4,631,779	16.1	3	46	49	392
North Eastern	962,143	3.4	2	13	15	120
Nyanza	4,392,196	15.3	4	40	44	352
Rift Valley	6,987,036	24.4	10	63	73	584
Western	3,358,776	11.7	3	31	34	272
<b>Kenya</b>	<b>28,686,607</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>2400</b>

Source for total population and urban-rural breakdown: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999 Population and Housing Census.

Each EA is expected to contain approximately 100 households. However, their actual sizes differ from one area to another depending on population density. For example, in the Arid and Semi-Arid areas such as North Eastern Province, the research team experienced difficulties achieving the sample target of 8 respondents in several EAs due to sparse distribution of the population (stemming from the local nomadic lifestyle); consequently, they often had to walk and/or drive long distances in search of eligible respondents to meet the EA target.

### **Household Selection**

Interviewers worked in teams of four, with one supervisor. Thus, in each EA, each interviewer conducted two interviews. Before traveling to an EA, teams were equipped with EA maps, and given a randomly selected Sampling Start Point (SSP) within the EA from which to begin their work.

From this point, the four interviewers used a walk pattern (setting off in the four compass directions), and a day code to count off and select households. For the purposes of the Afrobarometer, a household is defined as a group of people who presently eat together from the same pot. By this definition, a household does not include persons who are currently living elsewhere for purposes of studies or work. Nor does a household include domestic workers or temporary visitors (even if they eat from the same pot or slept there on the previous night). And, in practice, respondents are selected from among persons in the household who will be available for interview on that same day.

### **Respondent Selection**

To ensure that gender balance is achieved, the Afrobarometer sets a gender quota of an equal number of men and women in the sample. To achieve this quota, the gender of the respondent is alternated for each interview. Upon reaching a household, and having determined from the previous interview whether a male or female would be interviewed, the interviewer then compiled the list of first names of all household members of that particular gender aged 18 years or older. Members who were not at home but who were likely to return later in the day were also listed. Each name corresponded with a number ID on the list.<sup>126</sup> The interviewer selected the household respondent randomly by asking a household member to choose from a deck of numbered cards. Only the person whose number was selected was interviewed for that household. Where the selected respondent refused or was unavailable to be interviewed, the entire household was substituted. For Afrobarometer surveys, only households are substituted, not respondents.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> David M. Anderson offers an early post-election account of the events leading up to this dramatic transition and its immediate aftermath: “Briefing: Kenya’s Elections 2002 – The Dawning of a New Era?” *African Affairs*, Vol. 102, 2003, pp. 331-342. For the just-departed US Ambassador’s take, including a summary of the key challenges facing the new government, see Johnnie Carson, “From Moi to Kibaki: An Assessment of the Kenyan Transition,” Africa Program Occasional Paper Series No. 1, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 2003. For a more scholarly though equally sober discussion, see Stephen N. Ndegwa, “Kenya: Third Time Lucky?,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2003. Joel D. Barkan, though touching on election dynamics, puts his emphasis on the new government’s governance challenges, including certain foreign policy pressures: “Kenya After Moi,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 1, pp. 87-101.

<sup>2</sup> Round 1 surveys were conducted in Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Round 2 surveys were conducted in all of these countries except Zimbabwe, as well as in Cape Verde, Kenya and Senegal. For further information on the Afrobarometer, including a complete publication list, see, [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org).

<sup>3</sup> Sunny Bindra, “NARC a problem child for its voter parents,” *Sunday Nation*, 28 December 2003, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Frank Holmquist, “Kenya’s Postelection Euphoria – and Reality,” *Current History*, Vol. 102, No. 664, May 2003, p. 200.

<sup>5</sup> Such continuity has also been perceived as characterising its economy; see, Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political-Economy of Neo-Colonialism* (London: Heinemann), 1975; for a more general discussion, see, Oginga Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru* (Nairobi: Heinemann), 1967. An account of the various machinations (including a para-military option) attributed to those determined to prevent Moi from succeeding Kenyatta is found in Joseph Karimi and Philip Ochieng, *The Kenyatta Succession* (Nairobi: Transafrica Book Distributors), 1980. For an analysis of the coup attempt, see, Katie Currie and Larry Ray, “The Pambana of August 1 – Kenya’s Abortive Coup,” *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 1, 1986, pp. 47-59.

<sup>6</sup> The phrase is from Nelson Kasfir, *The Shrinking Political Arena* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1976.

<sup>7</sup> See H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, “The Politics of Constitutional Change in Kenya Since Independence, 1963-69,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 287, 1972, pp. 9-34. An account of how the last Opposition party of Kenya’s first multiparty era was hounded out of existence is provided by Susanne D. Mueller, “Government and Opposition in Kenya, 1966-69,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1984, pp. 399-427; also, Leys, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-253. For a more general discussion of the period, see, Henry Bienen, *Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1974.

<sup>8</sup> Joel D. Barkan, “The Rise and Fall of a Governance Realm in Kenya,” in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds., *Governance and Politics in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 1992, pp. 167-192.

<sup>9</sup> At the time of the election, out of 102 countries ranked, Kenya held sixth place in the world corruption league; see, Transparency International, “Annual Report, 2002,” p. 16. For a concise description of the Moi regime’s most notorious scam, Goldenberg, see, “Fool’s Gold: The Abuse of Export Compensation Schemes in Kenya and Argentina,” Nairobi, Transparency International-Kenya, 2003. A more general discussion can be found in, “Public Resources, Private Purposes,” Transparency International-Kenya, Nairobi, 2002.

<sup>10</sup> For example, see Peter M. Kagwanja, “Killing the Vote: State-Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya,” Nairobi, Kenya Human Rights Commission, 1998; also, “Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya,” New York, Africa Watch/Human Rights Watch, 1993.

<sup>11</sup> For example, see, *Kenya: Taking Liberties*, New York, Africa Watch/Human Rights Watch, 1991.

<sup>12</sup> By 2000, Kenya’s growth rate had fallen to -0.3 percent; UNDP, *Kenya Human Development Report 2001*, pp. XIX-XX.

<sup>13</sup> Barkan, “Kenya After Moi,” p. 89. One graphic consequence was a 30 percent increase in child mortality between 1989 and 2003; “Child deaths rise as life gets harder,” *Daily Nation*, 9 January 2004, pp. 1, 4.

<sup>14</sup> The most notable was that of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko early in 1990. The deaths of Anglican Bishop A. Muge in a 1989 road “accident,” and of American Catholic priest Father John Kaiser in 2001 by “suicide,” both remain highly suspect in the eyes of many Kenyans. Former US Ambassador Smith Hempstone provides up-close descriptions of the first two of these tragic events in, *Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoire* (Sewanee, University of the South Press), 1997.

<sup>15</sup> Population growth rates have been projected to decline from 3.2 percent annually between 1975 and 2001, to a projected average rate of 1.2 percent annually between 2001 and 2015. UNDP, *Human Development Report 2003*, p. 250.

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<sup>16</sup> Several papers on this issue can be found in, Joseph Oloka-Onyango, Kivutha Kibwana, and Chris Maina Peter, *Law and the Struggle for Democracy in East Africa* (Nairobi: Claripress), 1996; Willy Mutunga provides an exhaustive account of the process in Kenya through 1997; *Constitution-Making From the Middle: Civil Society and Transition Politics in Kenya, 1992-1997* (Nairobi: Sareat), 1999.

<sup>17</sup> Moi, vice-president since 1967, succeeded Jomo Kenyatta upon latter's death in 1978; competitive elections for the presidency were instituted from 1992.

<sup>18</sup> Among these was a proposal made towards the end of 2000 by Hon. David Kombe (KANU, Magarini), to have presidential term limits as specified in Section 9 (2) of the Constitution removed. While it reportedly attracted considerable interest from certain members of Moi's inner circle, by mid-2001 the President himself had quashed the idea. For the full range of options that were supposedly being considered from an early stage, see, Otsieno Namwaya, "2002: Moi's Plans to Stay On," *Expression Today*, No. 22, October-November 2000, pp. 1, 7. Key players in the international community also made it clear that any such move would be unacceptable; Barkan, "Kenya After Moi." Ironically, it was Moi's KANU, then holding a total parliamentary monopoly, that enacted this two-term limitation in 1992, evidently as a means of countering the clamor for change at that time by ensuring, *ipso facto*, that Moi could not remain in office "for life."

<sup>19</sup> See "Warlord Democracy: The Proliferation of Militias, the Moi Succession, and Pre-Election Violence in Kenya, 1999-2002," Nairobi, Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2002.

<sup>20</sup> The fact that the party had, despite repeated promises, failed to hold its national grassroots elections since 1988 so as to finally help democratize the party from within, simply added to the bitterness associated with this move.

<sup>21</sup> In the end, only one of the party's four vice-chairman, Kalonzo Musyoka, left for NARC, along with Odinga and a number of other cabinet ministers; Kenyatta, as well as Ronald Ngala and Musalia Mudavadi remained, with the latter subsequently being appointed Kenya's vice-president during the regime's dying hours to bolster his clout and prevent a mass exit of his Luhya people from the ruling party. In the event, both lost their parliamentary seats. Mudavadi defected to LDP/NARC towards the end of 2003.

<sup>22</sup> It was also said that a number of these former KANU stalwarts brought considerable financial resources to NARC's campaign effort as well.

<sup>23</sup> In fact, there were two such documents, both signed on behalf of the coalition's constituent political parties and lobby groups. The first, signed without any publicity, was reportedly not specific about the offices to be rewarded post-election. Its precise text has never been made public. See, Mwenda Njoka, "NARC crisis: The story behind the intrigues," *Sunday Standard*, 23 March 2003, pp. 10-11. Note here, too, that while much less overtly advertised, a reported "internal agreement" among senior NAK (and later, NARC) leaders restricted Kibaki to a single term, should he win.

<sup>24</sup> This position had been specified in the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission's Draft Constitution, however, based on the "collected and collated views of Kenyan"; see Chapter III, The Draft Constitution, in "The People's Choice: Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission," 18 September 2002.

<sup>25</sup> NARC itself came into being with a change-of-name lodged with the Registrar of Societies of one of NAK coalition members, the National Party of Kenya.

<sup>26</sup> In the 29 African elections that took place during the five years between 1989 and 1994, this was the lowest winning figure. Incumbents lost in eleven of these, and in three others, did not run. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 1997, p. 208.

<sup>27</sup> KANU also benefited from various forms of intimidation, violence, electoral corruption, and outright fraud, however. For the 1992 election, see especially, "Why KANU Won," in David W. Throup and Charles Hornsby, *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: the Kenyatta and Moi States and the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election* (Oxford: James Currey), 1998, pp. 453-532. For the 1997 contests, see the collection by Marcel Rutten, Alamin Mazrui, and Francois Grignon, eds., *Out For The Count: The 1997 General Elections and Prospects for Democracy in Kenya* (Kampala: Fountain), 2001.

<sup>28</sup> He came in third in 1992 with about 19 percent of the total presidential vote, and second in 1997, with 31 percent. Several other NARC leaders (Charity Ngilu, Raila Odinga, and Michael Wamalwa) had also stood in the 1997 contest; Odinga's father (and Kenyan first vice-president), Jaramogi, had likewise failed in 1992.

<sup>29</sup> Former cabinet minister Simeon Nyachae's FORD-People remained aloof, reportedly in reaction to broken promises about the mode of the merger process.

<sup>30</sup> There was some (mainly KANU-fostered) disagreement, however, over whether Kibaki himself deserved to be in this category. Kibaki served as KANU's first Executive Officer in 1960, then an MP and cabinet minister in

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Kenyatta's government. He went on to serve as Moi's vice-president from 1978-88, as well as finance minister for several years, and health minister after 1988. He was thus saddled with at least some of the blame for the country's declining economic performance during the Moi years. He left KANU with the return to multipartyism in 1992 to head the Democratic Party (DP).

<sup>31</sup> Use of the term, "Young Turks," was itself not without irony, given its association with the younger, more radical leaders in the original Opposition assemblage, The Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), in 1992.

<sup>32</sup> With this dawning realization, and amidst still simmering resentment at Moi's imposition of the party's candidate, stories circulated of not inconsiderable "looting" of the campaign's resources by KANU activists (as well as some candidates) themselves.

<sup>33</sup> To win the presidency, a candidate must obtain not just a plurality of all votes, but also at least 25 percent in at least five of the country's eight provinces, failing which a run-off contest is held between the top two contenders. Both Kibaki and Kenyatta fulfilled the latter of these two requirements.

<sup>34</sup> No result had been overturned by the time this report was completed.

<sup>35</sup> Simeon Nyachae, FORD-People's presidential candidate, took 30 percent of the vote in his home province of Nyanza, where his own Kisii people make up about one-third of the population.

<sup>36</sup> The fact that Moi visited Kibaki in London during this period of hospitalization led some observers to wonder whether any understanding had been reached between them as to how close to the ex-President the law would reach, should Kibaki win, and implement his anti-corruption and "transitional justice" human rights pledges.

<sup>37</sup> Or, more correctly, even before the election: over the distribution of nominations for Nairobi parliamentary seats between NARC's constituent factions and parties, for example.

<sup>38</sup> This outcry led to the coining of the term "the Mt. Kenya Mafia," to refer to the perceived ethno-regional concentration of both the inner-group making critical decisions at State House and the beneficiaries of such favouritism.

<sup>39</sup> It was widely recognised that only a constitutional amendment could create this position in such a way that it would have genuine independence of State House. Nevertheless, a "prime minister" as a first-among-equals post in the cabinet was certainly within presidential purview, as was overt support for the required constitutional amendment. Neither was forthcoming. For their part, those opposing the creation of this post (and by implication, Odinga) argued that once members of the cabinet had taken the oath of office (and thus sworn allegiance to the current Constitution), the MOU "died."

<sup>40</sup> This was so even if throughout 2003 Kibaki himself (on the rare occasions when he mentioned it at all) continued to maintain that he would keep to the promise of a new constitution for Kenyans by mid-2004; see, for example, "President reassures on review," *The People Daily*, 13 December 2003, pp. 1-2.

<sup>41</sup> The appointment of a member of the LDP-faction, Moody Awori (also a Luhya, but from the Samia rather than the Bukusu sub-group) to replace Wamalwa also ruffled some feathers – given that the MOU had stipulated that this position was the "property" of FORD-Kenya – notwithstanding his widely appreciated avuncular and non-abrasive demeanour.

<sup>42</sup> Enrollment soon ballooned by an additional 1.3 million pupils, greatly exacerbating the already serious shortage of teachers, and - some said - drastically lowering the quality of education in many schools. The resulting increase in the budget deficit was ameliorated somewhat by donor support for the measure, however. But no such assistance was forthcoming for the teachers' promised pay raise, nor was any likely to support another Kibaki promise: a big salary increase for the grossly underpaid police, who are also expected to double in number to counter mounting crime.

<sup>43</sup> This means that if the survey was repeated with other randomly selected samples of 2400 individuals, 95 percent of the time the results on any given question would be within +/-2 percent of those reported here.

<sup>44</sup> These are: Kikuyu, Meru, Luhya, Luo, Kalenjin, Kamba, Kisii, Somali, and Turkana. Members of other communities (or anyone else) could choose either English or Swahili, if they were not more conversant with any of these vernacular languages. Note, however, that the level of linguistic competence in the population as a whole varies considerably. Moreover, most of those who opted for Swahili as the interview language, and nearly all who chose English, do not speak either of these as their first language. As a consequence, several of the more nuanced questions may not have been understood in precisely the same way by all respondents.

<sup>45</sup> Although interviewers could go to a selected respondent's place of work for an interview if it was practical.

<sup>46</sup> Reported in, Paul Vandenberg, "Ethnic-sectoral cleavages and economic development: reflections of the second Kenya debate," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2003, pp. 437-455.

<sup>47</sup> Kenya Human Development Report 2002, p. vii.

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<sup>48</sup> For example, the Kenya Demographic and Health Survey found the following: 22 percent Kikuyu, 14 percent Luhya, 12 percent Kamba, 12 percent Kalenjin, 11 percent Luo, 6 percent Kisii, 5 percent Meru, 5 percent Mijikenda/Swahili, 4 percent Somali, 3 percent Maasai, 1 percent Embu and 1 percent Taita/Taveta; “Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2003: Preliminary Report,” Central Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Health Kenya Medical Research Institute, Nairobi, Kenya, p. 8.

<sup>49</sup> Nearly 7 percent of respondents declined to answer this question, and 9 percent stated “don’t know.”

<sup>50</sup> The Kenya Demographic and Health Survey found 7.6 percent; *Ibid.* In addition, Donal B. Cruise O’Brien (in 1987) estimated it at between 5 and 8 percent; see, “Coping with the Christians: The Muslim Predicament in Kenya,” in Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle, eds., *Religion and Politics in East Africa* (London, James Currey), 1995, pp. 200-219. On the other hand, a recent US State Department report put this figure at 10 to 20 percent; “Mungiki: US Says Kenya ‘Harasses’ Sect”, *The East African*, 22-28 December, 2003, pp. 1-2.

<sup>51</sup> It is recognised that especially in rural areas, labour contributions (for example, in agricultural activities, house-building and repair, etc.) may be as important as cash-assistance.

<sup>52</sup> This is actually a slightly higher level of access than figures reported by Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC). According to KPLC, only 5 percent of rural dwellers and 40 percent of urbanites use electricity, which accounts for about 15 percent of the total population (based on a distribution of 80 percent rural, 20 percent urban); “Broke KPLC to Lose Monopoly Next Year,” *The East African*, 8-14 December 2003, p. 19. Other figures also indicate that about 14 percent of Kenyan households use electricity, though only half of these use it for lighting; Dennis Kabaara, “It is the next 40 years that count,” *Sunday Standard*, 14 December 2003, p. 7.

<sup>53</sup> Using the government’s Welfare Monitoring Surveys as well as its own household expenditure data, one recent study put 56 percent of all Kenyan households below the basic-necessities poverty line; see, *The Little Fact Book: The Socio-Economic and Political Profiles of Kenya’s Districts*, Nairobi, Institute of Economic Affairs, 2002, pp. x-xi. This figure is in agreement with that cited above by Barkan.

<sup>54</sup> Regarding the comparison with other Kenyans, recall that the sample itself contains respondents/households across a range of material well-being, so that this distribution may reflect less differences of opinion than the actual variation within the sample; indeed, the rather high-median, balanced results here bolster its overall credibility.

<sup>55</sup> Indeed, former Presidents Kenyatta and Moi, among many other continental apologists, had repeatedly argued that elections within a single-party framework were themselves fully democratic, as long as voters could choose between more than one candidate.

<sup>56</sup> A useful summary of this argument can be found in a review of four recent books by Tom Young, “Democracy in Africa?”, *Africa*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 2002, pp. 484-496. A similarly sober assessment is offered by Stephen N. Ndegwa, “A Decade of Democracy in Africa,” *The Journal of African and Asian Studies*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, 2003, pp. 1-16. For his part, van de Walle cites “the illiberal nature of most of the new African democracies, their characteristic centralisation of power around the presidency, and the pervasive clientelism that structures the relationship between the state and the citizenry”; see, “Presidentialism and clientelism in Africa’s emerging party systems,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 41, No.2, 2003, p. 297.

<sup>57</sup> The Afrobarometer Round I questionnaire, which was not implemented in Kenya, specifically asked respondents what the term “democracy” means to them. Across 12 countries, the most frequently cited meanings related to civil liberties and personal freedoms (40 percent), government by the people (14 percent), voting, electoral choice, and/or multiparty competition (10 percent), and peace, unity, or power sharing (8 percent). For a complete summary of results to this question from the 12 countries included in Round 1, see Afrobarometer Network, “Afrobarometer Round 1: Compendium of Comparative Data from a Twelve-Nation Survey,” Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 11, Michigan State University, March 2002 (available at [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org)).

<sup>58</sup> Respondents were asked: “Do you feel close to any particular political party? If so, which party is that?” Nearly one in three (31 percent) say they are not close to any party, while half (52 percent) linked themselves to the ruling NARC coalition. A mere 4 percent claimed affiliation with KANU, and 11 percent identify themselves with some other party. Results will be disaggregated according to party affiliation frequently throughout the course of this report. Further analysis of the responses specifically to the party affiliation question is found in section 8.3.

<sup>59</sup> Indeed, what Bratton and van de Walle have pointed out for leaders may also be relevant for ordinary people: “In an international context where liberal ideas are hegemonic, all political leaders - regardless of their true beliefs and objectives - will attempt to cloak themselves in the legitimating mantle of democracy...”; *op. cit.*, p. 32. Ordinary citizens may also have learned to unquestioningly profess preference for democracy as well.

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<sup>60</sup> Such lack of unanimous support for political pluralism may also stem from certain practices within many (most?) parties, starting with local government and parliamentary nominations, exercises that are often all-too-visible in their violations of democratic practice.

<sup>61</sup> Note that this is a slightly different question from asking whether the constitution should contain such a two-term limit.

<sup>62</sup> One comprehensive assessment of the policy record is David E. Sahn, Paul A. Dhorosh, and Stephen D. Younger, *Structural Adjustment Reconsidered: Economic Policy and Poverty in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1997. Another that puts more emphasis on local political responses is Jennifer A. Widner ed., *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 1994.

<sup>63</sup> For one analytical chronology of this “tango,” see Stephen Brown, “Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa: How Donors Help to Keep Kenya’s Daniel arap Moi in Power,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 5, 2001, pp. 725-739.

<sup>64</sup> For example, in his June Budget Speech, David Mwiraria, the Minister of Finance referred to his proposal to cap bank interest rates, “a move hailed by many,” but later rescinded, it was reported, “thanks to the IMF”; “Why banks have to woo borrowers,” *Sunday Nation*, 21 December 2003, p. 7.

<sup>65</sup> This remedy-package is also not without its critics within IFI-circles themselves; see, Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, New York, W. W. Norton, 2002, and one critical review by Barry Eichengreen, “The Globalization Wars,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 4, 2002, pp. 157-164. Charles Harvey’s critique captures both political and technocratic factors; “Constraints on Sustained Recovery from Economic Disaster in Africa”, in Charles Harvey, ed., *Constraints on the Success of Structural Adjustment Programmes in Africa* (Houndmills: Macmillan Press Ltd.), 1996, pp. 130-151.

<sup>66</sup> See, “IMF, thanks a billion”, *Sunday Nation*, 23 November, 2003, pp. 1-3. A subsequent estimate by the Economic Intelligence Unit put this year’s predicted growth rate at 1.7 percent. At the same time, the EIU is in apparent agreement with (or simply used) the IMF’s prediction of a 3.9 percent growth rate for 2005, along with a 3 percent figure for next year, provided that the required macro-economic management is maintained, and that the country receives normal rainfall, among other factors; “Kenya Country Report”, *Economic Intelligence Unit*, August, 2003.

<sup>67</sup> Barkan, *op. cit.*, p. 95. The author calls this burden “unsustainable.”

<sup>68</sup> “IMF Terms ‘Will Leave Thousands Jobless,’” *The East African*, 15-21 December 2003, p. 44. For example, the Teachers’ Service Commission was adamant that it would refuse to retire some 18,000 teachers, when schools were also deeply hurting over staff shortages (estimated at 60,000) following the massive increase in primary school enrollment (cited above). As the Commission’s Chairman argued, “Let us not talk of donor conditions. It is common knowledge that the country needs more teachers...”; “Teachers Commission say no to intended retrenchment,” *The People Daily*, 17 December 2003, p. 5.

<sup>69</sup> Recall here, too, that during the recent election, the fact that the top two presidential contenders were both Kikuyu did much to soften the rougher edges of ethnic polarization in the country, at least at the national level.

<sup>70</sup> Given the sensitive nature of the latter statement, it is possible that these figures underestimate the true support for this view.

<sup>71</sup> Radio Citizen, a recently (in 2002, after a long battle) licensed independent station, also operates in major towns and parts of the central section of the country, and is continuing to increase its coverage.

<sup>72</sup> A local daily newspaper in costs nearly US50 cents.

<sup>73</sup> Nation TV was set to begin broadcasting in Mombasa at the end of 2003. In addition, some reports suggest that KBC’s TV news coverage has become decidedly more objective since the election.

<sup>74</sup> Such awareness may also have been heightened by NARC’s stress on the need to restore relations with Kenya’s main donors as a central element of its 2002 election campaign.

<sup>75</sup> Kenyan NGOs reportedly received KSh 212b from donors between 1997 and 2000 (though of the 1634 registered after 1992, only 516 filed annual returns with the GOK. “NGOs got Sh 212b from donors in four years,” and “Week in Parliament: Colossal sums and ‘a very huge minister,’” *Sunday Nation*, 20 July 2003, p. 15.

<sup>76</sup> As is likely the case for other Afrobarometer surveys, such “illegal” behaviour may be somewhat under-reported.

<sup>77</sup> According to staff at Kenya’s Institute for Education in Democracy, the ECK estimated that 14.5 to 15 million Kenyans were in possession of the necessary national identification documents by October 2002 when the registration exercise was completed. A registration figure of about 10.5 million therefore amounts to just around 70 percent of eligible adults.

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<sup>78</sup> These figures are for the National Assembly contests. Just why, given the momentous nature of the 2002 election, the turn-out was not higher (at least as high as that of 1997) is uncertain, though the possibility that there was considerable manipulation of the registration figures in both of the previous elections cannot be ruled out.

<sup>79</sup> Respondents were drawn from just 136 of the country's 210 constituencies, but the turnout for this sub-group of constituencies was the same as the turnout reported nationally.

<sup>80</sup> The ECK did undertake some 'cleansing' of the rolls in this regard prior to the election, however.

<sup>81</sup> This is so even if at least some of those who registered more than once and were discovered had their names removed from the rolls before voting day; those who promptly came forward to confess were reportedly allowed to vote at one polling station, however.

<sup>82</sup> Interview with officials at the Electoral Commission of Kenya offices, 12 February 2004.

<sup>83</sup> For such punishment at the local level, see, Thomas P. Wolf, "Paying the Price: The Personal Gains and Losses of Local Government Contestants in the 1992 Kenya General Election", Paper presented at the African Studies Association Annual Meetings, Toronto, 1994.

<sup>84</sup> At the very least, this analysis suggests that those who do claim affiliation to KANU are certainly a very loyal lot!

<sup>85</sup> Most of the acrimony over deviations from "free and fair" electoral practice was associated with party nominations, for which the Electoral Commission had no responsibility.

<sup>86</sup> Is it possible that after 40 years in power, at least some steadfast-KANU respondents have yet to realise their party is now "Opposition"?!

<sup>87</sup> Although they had a "significantly improved aggregate index score" for 2003, this was the third year in which the police took first place. See, "The Kenya Bribery Index 2003," Nairobi, Transparency International-Kenya, 2004, and the same publication for 2003. It is also possible that TI's own dissemination activities have had an impact on public perceptions.

<sup>88</sup> Barkan, "Kenya After Moi," p. 23; "Integrity Check 2003: A Survey of Public Opinion Regarding Integrity in the NARC Government and the Judiciary, September 10-15, 2003," Nairobi, Transparency International – Kenya, 2003. These senior judicial personnel were first named in an investigative report; 18 chose "early retirement" rather than face a tribunal to determine their future fitness for office. For a more general discussion in the aftermath of this development, see, "In whose image will the judiciary be recreated?," *Sunday Standard*, 12 October, 2003, pp. 10-11.

<sup>89</sup> The reference point for "regional government official" varies considerably across countries. In Kenya, we asked about appointed district commissioners. Where possible, we asked about elected officials, but in countries such as Kenya where there is no elected official at a "regional" (e.g., district, state, province, etc.) level, we asked about appointed officials. In still other countries, there is no "regional" level of government between the central and local authorities.

<sup>90</sup> In addition to the appointment of the Ethics and Governance Permanent Secretary, these included the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Authority (that lacks prosecutorial power), and the launch of an investigation into the biggest financial scam that occurred during the Moi years, the Goldenberg Scandal (see above reference), that is said to have cost Kenyans nearly \$1b.

<sup>91</sup> Officials responsible for achieving this goal have, however, repeatedly stated their determination to do so.

<sup>92</sup> In this regard, a distinction should be made between getting one's child into *any* primary school (especially now that fees have been eliminated), as opposed to getting a place in a *particular* school. Schools are ranked according to national examination results, making the competition for admission for those who cannot afford costly private education, especially in major urban areas, extreme.

<sup>93</sup> Ndegwa makes the same point; "Kenya: Third Time Lucky?," p. 154.

<sup>94</sup> As Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs argued, "We cannot create two centres of power. It would lead to a national catastrophe"; see, "PM: How Kibaki moved goal posts", *East African Standard*, 15 September, 2003, pp. 1-2. Further background to this issue is available in a series of articles offered by this newspaper issue of 10 August, 2003, including its lead story: "PM: The inside Story", pp. 1, 10.

<sup>95</sup> In addition to (as mentioned above) a single term for their presidential candidate.

<sup>96</sup> As 2003 unfolded, it remained unclear, and a subject of considerable debate, as to whether particular constitutional provisions, if enacted, would take effect immediately, or only after the next election in 2007. Indeed, this issue has become a central point in the reform debate. Another broader question that became a particularly contentious issue of national debate during and after the period of the survey is whether the proposals to be agreed upon at the National Constitutional Conference should be put to a national referendum, or just subjected to parliamentary ratification.

<sup>97</sup> He spoke in Swahili; see, "Kibaki's strong No to an executive premier," *Daily Nation*, 8 September 2003, pp. 1-2.

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<sup>98</sup> This is so even if late in the year, Odinga himself, in a kind of “tactical retreat” (perhaps seeing the writing on the wall and wanting to save face), announced that he was “not interested” in becoming prime minister, and that the entire “Memorandum of Understanding” had “outlived its usefulness”; “NARC’s MoU out of date, says Raila,” *The People Daily*, 27 October 2003, pp. 1-2. Whether making such a statement prior to the survey would have significantly affected responses to this question must remain a matter of speculation.

<sup>99</sup> The president may appoint ministers as he so chooses; there is, therefore, no reason he cannot simply call one of them his “prime minister,” even if that person would serve entirely at the president’s pleasure, for the most part (presumably) as the Leader of Government Business in parliament.

<sup>100</sup> For example, the coming together first, of KANU and FORD-People in a “Coalition of National Unity” (or “CNU”), and then discussions between this group and NAK elements in the government, have led some to believe a major reshuffle was imminent in which key LDP elements would be replaced by those from the CNU; see, “Kanu-Ford People Alliance: Moi Behind Move to Salvage Party,” *The East African*, 22-28 December 2003, p. 8; “Kibaki Succession Main Factor in Nak-LDP Constitution Row,” *The East African*, 12-18 January 2004, p. 10; and “Government Cabinet reshuffle within a week,” *Kenya Confidential*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 14 January 2004, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>101</sup> Various perspectives on these issues can be found in, “Dealing with the Past: Economic Crimes and the Transition,” Transparency International - Kenya/Law Society of Kenya, Nairobi, 2002.

<sup>102</sup> This is so even if two Asian businessmen with close links to the former regime (Ketan Somaia and Kamlesh Pattni) were in court (and in police custody) for much of 2003 (and Pattni, into 2004) in connection with various corruption cases.

<sup>103</sup> The task force appointed by Kibaki to assess the views of Kenyans regarding a truth, justice and reconciliation commission submitted its report on October 15. It stated that 90 percent of Kenyans favour such a commission “...and warned that failure to bow to their wishes would imperil the local and international credibility of National [sic] Rainbow Coalition’s pretensions at [sic] political reform”; see, “Truth team hands in its report,” *The People Daily*, 16 October 2003, pp. 1-2.

<sup>104</sup> But the same consideration applies to several other groups slightly more inclined to dispense with such proceedings. For the people of Kisii, however, both the coffee industry’s decline, at least partly due to regime-related corruption, politically-instigated ethnic attacks from their Maasai neighbours, may at least partly explain this.

<sup>105</sup> How the government’s recent announcement that it has no intention of prosecuting Moi himself – primarily because he allowed such a peaceful power-transfer to occur - will affect its level of popular support remains to be seen. The donors, too, were said to be concerned that such premature “forgiveness” could undermine the government’s overall anti-corruption effort. See, “Moi Pardon: NARC’s Anti-Graft War Queried,” *The East African*, 5-11 January 2004, pp. 1, 4.

<sup>106</sup> Late last year, Kroll Inc., based in London and hired by the government for the purpose, indicated it had traced the first quarter of up to \$4b (equivalent to roughly a third of the nation’s annual GDP) stolen and stashed in various bank accounts and other investment outlets abroad; see, “Found: Sh75b stashed abroad by Kanu looters,” *Daily Nation*, 17 December, 2003, pp. 1, 11-12.

<sup>107</sup> Perhaps the closest near-tragic exception to this generalisation occurred following Mboya’s assassination in 1969, noted above. Pitting his Luo community against the Kikuyu, it eventually reached a level at which many members of other communities came under pressure to choose sides; see, Goldsworthy, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-283.

<sup>108</sup> Note that this particular terminology (especially the former term) is not commonly used in Kenya.

<sup>109</sup> Other analysts, especially aware of the urban-rural dichotomy in lifestyles and values, tend to stress a “three Kenya” division comprised of urban areas, rural areas, and more remote pastoral zones.

<sup>110</sup> For a recent survey of Muslim society and key issues, see, Arye Oded, *Islam & Politics in Kenya* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 2000.

<sup>111</sup> Future analysis could allow for comparisons between the generally northern, pastoralist section of this religious community with that of the more urban, coastal region.

<sup>112</sup> Joint US-Kenya military training operations, including the provision of material assistance to local public service (education, health and veterinary) projects in both North Eastern and Coast Provinces during the last half year, met with mixed reaction.

<sup>113</sup> See, Billow Kerrow, “NARC a traitor over terrorism bill,” *Sunday Nation*, 7 December 2003, p. 9). The US State Department’s “2003 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom” also notes the local hostile reaction to the bill; see, “Mungiki: US Says Kenya ‘Harasses’ Sect”, *op. cit.*

<sup>114</sup> Ndegwa, “Kenya: Third Time Lucky?,” p. 155.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid*, p. 158.

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<sup>116</sup> For example, see, “Kenya’s Political Squabbles Worry British Investors,” and “German Investors Wary of Kenya’s Insecurity,” in *The East African*, 26 January – 1 February 2004, p. 11 and p. 36, respectively; see also “Winners and losers in changing donor tides”, *Sunday Standard*, 9 November, 2003, pp. 14-15, and, “Paris Club: Kenya Cannot Defer Debt,” *The East African*, 9-15 February 2004, p. 5.

<sup>117</sup> See, for example, David Makali, “Time for Kibaki to show the way”, *Saturday Nation*, 20 September, 2003, p. 8.

<sup>118</sup> “High Cost of Narc Wrangles,” *The East African*, 5-11 January 2004, p. 12.

<sup>119</sup> Michael M. Kamau, “Narc govt faces important litmus test this time round,” *PeopleSpeak, The People Daily*, 8 January 2004, p. 7.

<sup>120</sup> In contrast to the Afrobarometer, this survey comprised just 1006 respondents and was limited to urban centers. Thus, what is significant is the direction of change (i.e., the decline), not the absolute figures.

<sup>121</sup> See “Poll a wake-up call for the Government,” *Sunday Standard*, 2 November 2003, p.6.

<sup>122</sup> Part of a National Convention Executive Council (NCEC) statement quoted in, “Lobby criticises bid to scuttle Bomas III,” *East African Standard*, 31 December 2003, p. 40.

<sup>123</sup> These points were made by Robert Shaw; “Kenya is a very different place from what it was,” *Sunday Standard*, 4 January 2004, p. 14.

<sup>124</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 205.

<sup>125</sup> Quoted in Bratton and van de Walle, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>126</sup> This was an ID assigned by the survey exercise; no reference to or use of Kenya national identification documents/numbers was made.