

**INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CENTER FOR ELECTORAL PROMOTION AND ASSISTANCE
IIHR/CAPEL**

**Project to identify possible collaboration
to improve participation, transparency
and accountability within the
Salvadoran political party system**

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CONTENTS

Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUES

1.1 Methodology

2. DIAGNOSTIC ASSESSMENT FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF POLITICAL PARTIES

2.1 Some previous findings

2.2 Importance of parties to the democratic system

2.3 Crisis of the political parties in El Salvador

2.4 Strengthening of political parties in El Salvador

2.4.1 Ranking of the impact factors by importance

2.4.2 Organization of the impact factors

2.4.3 Measures, reinforcing elements and sources of resistance for democratization/participation, transparency and accountability

3. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL VIABILITY

3.1 Expected results and strategy

3.1.1 Proposed Results Democratization/Participation

3.1.2 Proposed Results Transparency

3.1.3 Proposed Results Accountability

3.2 Strategy

3.3 Matters of interest and concerns

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusions

4.2 Recommendations

5. ANNEXES

6. TABLES

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

El Salvador's political party system permits little democratic participation within parties and by the citizenry, and is devoid of transparency and accountability. Concern at the situation has been growing among various sectors of society, as they try to fathom the causes and come up with possible solutions, adopting approaches that will help them understand and, hopefully, reverse the situation in the years ahead.

As part of this concern, USAID/El Salvador asked the IIHR/CAPEL to commission a group of consultants to prepare this document, entitled *Project to identify possible collaboration for improving participation, transparency and accountability within the Salvadoran political party system*, with a view to stepping up cooperation in this field.

Given the tight timeframe for preparing the document, the consultants drew on a set of academic inputs containing processed information. The veracity of the information was tested by making a visit to El Salvador. The consultants talked directly with political, social and academic stakeholders, to learn of their specific concerns, observations and ideas for possible solutions. The perceptions of the interviewees varied greatly, as reflected in the results. However, there was general agreement that this is a timely, positive moment to address certain specific issues. The interviewees also highlighted the need to create an enabling environment, generate ideas and support proposals to strengthen the political system, in particular aspects related to democratization, transparency and the accountability of political actors within institutions and political parties.

In this document, the group of consultants presents the findings of its study -the inputs that were obtained and systematized- and endeavors to interpret concisely the diagnostic assessment, the specific proposals, the conclusions and the recommendations made regarding potential future actions and the actual possibilities of implementing them.

1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUES

As already mentioned, El Salvador's political party system permits little democratic participation within parties and by the citizenry, and is devoid of transparency and accountability. This mix of problems -little democracy within parties, citizen involvement, transparency and accountability- manifests itself in three related areas: within the political parties themselves; within the party electoral system; and within the system of representation. Within the political parties, power is concentrated in the hands of the party leaders, and the participation of party militants is minimal. Furthermore, the parties operate with considerable impunity, particularly where political financing is concerned. It is neither regulated nor transparent. In the case of elections, centralized party control over nominations and slates of candidates give rise to a system of representation in which members of Congress are elected more by the party leaderships than the voters.¹ Congress appoints most senior public officials, including the members of the Supreme Court of

¹ J. Carey, "Political Institutions in El Salvador: Proposals for reform to improve elections, transparency, and accountability," pp. 10-11. Study prepared for the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES).

Justice, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the National Court of Accounts, As a result, the posts are politicized and shared out among the parties like booty.

At the local level, a winner-takes-all system means that even political parties that obtain a significant number of votes are not represented, making the system less inclusive. At present, there is relatively strong pressure for campaign financing to be regulated, and in 2003 the Supreme Court of Justice declared the current geographic distribution of congressional districts to be unconstitutional. This provides an opportunity to enact much-needed reform to improve representation and increase the accountability of political parties.

Although mistrust of political parties has been growing throughout Latin America, it is especially worrying in Central America, where El Salvador and Honduras top the table of nations where confidence in the political parties has declined the most. Furthermore, the negative change in three of the six countries in the region (El Salvador (-34), Honduras (-28), and Nicaragua (-22)) is considerably larger than the regional average (-17). When parties do not enjoy the trust of the citizenry, it is very difficult for a political system to operate properly, especially if the country is engaged in a process of democratic transition, which is the case of most Central American nations.²

Generally speaking, much of the dissatisfaction with the parties would seem to stem from their failure to perform their most important roles in the democratic process,³ especially those they should perform as institutions or organizations.⁴ The political parties appear to be suffering from a functional weakness or, as Gomáriz Moraga puts it, a “functional crisis.”⁵

1.1 Methodology

A team comprising IIHR/CAPEL consultants Andrés Araya Montezuma and Álvaro Artiga González, and Catherine Niarchos, of USAID/ Washington, was in San Salvador 12-25 September 2004 to conduct this study, the “**Project to identify possible collaboration to improve participation, transparency, and accountability within the Salvadoran political party system.**” The team interviewed 36 people representing different stakeholders in the Salvadoran political system: the business, social and academic sectors,

² F. Sánchez, “Partidos políticos en América Central: transformaciones y líneas para su fortalecimiento”, in IIHR-CAPEL, *Democratización interna de partidos políticos en Centroamérica*, San Jose, IIHR-CAPEL, 2004, pp. 459-486.

³ See, for example, Lawson, Kay, and Peter H. Merkl, eds. 1988. *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1988.

⁴ Political parties perform their main functions on three fronts: 1) *as organizations* (they recruit new leaders, train their members, and represent, coordinate and take on the interests and demands of society); 2) *with the electorate* (they simplify options for the voters, inform and educate the voters, generate symbols of identification and loyalty, and mobilize citizens to participate in politics); and, 3) *in the government* (they are members of, and organize the government, implement public policies, organize the opposition, and ensure the existence of political control and that the government is stable). For more details see, Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b, pp. 5-10.

⁵ Gomáriz Moraga 2001, p. 17. Quoted by F. Sánchez, in IIHR-CAPEL, *Democratización interna de partidos políticos en Centroamérica*, San Jose, IIHR-CAPEL, 2004.

the media, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Supreme Court of Justice, political analysts, and politicians representing different ideological positions. (See list in Annex 1).

A basic questionnaire was used for the interviewees that contained four questions and focused on three core topics. During the course of the interviews, the questionnaire was enhanced and expanded to the extent that the time, knowledge and willingness of each interviewee permitted, to adjust it to their interests (the questionnaire is included in Annex 2). The core topics around which the structured interviews revolved were as follows:

- Importance of political parties in the democratic system
- Crisis of political parties
- Strengthening of political parties

The third topic, the strengthening of political parties, was addressed more meticulously. The interviewees were asked to rank in importance a set of impact factors, and suggest possible measures, reinforcing elements and sources of resistance to the strengthening of political parties.

In the questionnaire, the interviewees were asked to: a) assign relative values to each of the eighteen impact factors cited as strengths of the political parties; suggest “measures” for implementing the three factors or objectives they regarded as most important; and, c) pinpoint current considerations that would make the implementation of such measures more or less likely to succeed.⁶ The data collected was initially analyzed in terms of the three related areas already mentioned: the party electoral system, the system of representation, and the organization of political parties. An overview of the information gathered is presented in the “Diagnostic Assessment” section of this document. The complete information is to be found in the annexes. In addition to the data compiled in the interviews, previous documents on the subject were studied to make the proposals systematic.

As is common in such cases, some interviewees either could not, or would not, answer points raised in the basic questionnaire. The following Diagnostic Assessment is based on the data collected. It includes proposals for strengthening political parties, and evaluates their political viability and technical relevance.

2. DIAGNOSTIC ASSESSMENT FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF POLITICAL PARTIES

This section contains an analysis of the interviewees’ replies concerning three elements: the importance of the parties, the crisis of political parties and the factors that could have a positive impact in strengthening political parties. However, a brief overview of previous studies of the problems of political parties is included as background information for this diagnostic assessment.

⁶ The IIHR/CAPEL developed the activities and objectives in advance in field work in Central America. For more details, see the IIHR/CAPEL study.

2.1 Some previous findings

A recent survey by the University Public Opinion Institute (IUDOP) of José Simeón Cañas Central American University (UCA),⁷ financed by USAID, suggests that lawmakers and politicians are the officials viewed most negatively as far as transparency is concerned: on a scale of 1 to 10, they received average scores of 4.84 and 4.76, respectively (IUDOP, 2004:76). Furthermore, the 2003 Latinobarómetro survey found that 85% of El Salvador's urban dwellers had little or no faith in political parties. They accuse them of being corrupt, of making promises and not keeping them, of being incompetent, and of putting their own interests before those of the people. This climate of opinion could foster the emergence of non-democratic extra-party or party leaderships. The problems and criticisms of the parties could spread to other political institutions (Congress, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, etc.). There is a real possibility of political instability, and political leaders are largely to blame.

The business sector has expressed similar concerns. For example, the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES) is worried about the operation of the Salvadoran political system. It has put forward the first systematic proposal for political reform,⁸ which includes changes to the electoral system, the structure of electoral districts and the ballot paper, the right to vote, campaign financing, municipal governments, voting in congress and the appointment of officials to senior government posts. These proposals were also presented at the Fourth National Meeting of Private Enterprise, held in November 2003.

Civil society organizations have also spoken out. In 2003, OXFAM-El Salvador presented a study and analysis of the progress of governance in El Salvador twelve years after the signing of the Peace Accords. The document suggests an action strategy for strengthening democratic governance in El Salvador, with emphasis on strengthening the democratic institutional fabric and citizen participation. The Congressional Committee on Electoral Affairs is also considering several proposed reforms to the electoral system, including four bills proposed by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), drafted with financial assistance from USAID. These bills are as follows:

- a) Electoral Procedures Act
- b) Electoral Code
- c) General Law on Political Parties
- d) Organizational Law of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal

Finally, during the first half of 2003, IIHR-CAPEL research on political parties in Central America⁹ identified a series of variables in the day-to-day operation of the parties that could

⁷ Cf. IUDOP, "La percepción sobre la corrupción en las instituciones de El Salvador," San Salvador, IUDOP-UCA, 2004, p.76.

⁸ Cf. J. Carey, "Propuesta de reforma para mejorar el sistema electoral, la transparencia y la responsabilidad," San Salvador, photocopy, 2004.

⁹ IIHR-CAPEL, "Democratización interna de partidos políticos en Centroamérica: Avances y tareas pendientes", San Jose, Costa Rica, IIHR-CAPEL, 2004, p.14.

have a positive impact on their internal democratization.¹⁰ These variables, referred to as “impact factors,” are:

- a) Information on active members (militants)
- b) Involvement of the rank and file in party decision-making
- c) Activity in non-election periods
- d) Ties with other organizations
- e) Training programs
- f) Inclusion (incorporation of quotas–affirmative action, existence of fronts or sectors–parallel organizations–attitude of the organization)
- g) Internal accountability (internal tribunals, elections, ethics, appeals)
- h) Party financing

The IIHR-CAPEL’s research also identified a series of lines of action grouped under two headings called “sensitization” and “institution building.” The tasks included in these groups reflect the demands and aspirations not only of the IIHR-CAPEL researchers but also of the key informants who took part in the research. **Table 1** shows the lines of action that, in the IIHR-CAPEL’s opinion, would help strengthen political parties in Central America.

For external organizations to have a bigger impact on the Central American countries and parties, the IIHR-CAPEL believes that work should be carried out simultaneously on both fronts, but “...recognizing national specificities, the historical context, the characteristics of the political situation at the moment when the support is provided, and especially taking into account the active participation of the ‘target population’ in the joint construction of support processes, the definition of timeframes and the priority issues to be addressed. In short, recognizing that realizing the aspiration of internal democracy within the political parties is, first and foremost, an educational task and, as such, a process, with steps, and mutual learning.”¹¹ The proposal thus acknowledges that the democratization of political parties will not be achieved by the parties working alone. It is necessary to involve other stakeholders, such as civil society organizations and international cooperation agencies.

¹⁰ Internal democratization is understood here to mean inclusion, respect for diversity and the decentralization of decisions.

¹¹ Op. cit., p. 23.

Table 1
Lines of action proposed by the IIHR-CAPEL for strengthening political parties in Central America

<u>Institutions</u> (Improvement of procedures)	<u>Sensitization</u> (Training of citizenry)
Strengthen mutual support-oversight between the electoral bodies and the parties	Create mechanisms for interaction between peers of different parties, first at the national level and then at the regional level (electoral, ethics and disciplinary tribunals, internally elected bodies, governing bodies, bodies in charge of finances, etc.)
Monitor procedures and their evolution	Create mechanisms for contact between citizens and parties (participation-representation)
Create or improve minimum national regulations governing the operation of parties	Campaigns to disseminate the rules of game for participating in electoral processes, in public consultations, in declarations on the orientation of public policies
Regulate parties internally (regulations and internal procedures)	Educate militants at the local level (administration of sessions of bodies, development of democratic skills and practices, conflict resolution, democratic leadership, project preparation and monitoring)

Source: IIHR-CAPEL¹²

2.2 Importance of parties to the democratic system

Article 85 of El Salvador's Political Constitution states that the political system is pluralistic and operates via political parties, which are the only legitimate representatives of the people within the Government.¹³ Most of the interviewees responded positively to the idea of a system based on stronger political parties.

With regard to the importance of political parties in the Salvadoran context, a majority (66.6%) of the interviewees "agree" or "strongly agree" that there can be no democracy without political parties. This favorable view of political parties underscores how important it is for the democratic system that they be strengthened. It is not surprising, then, that nearly all (97.2%) "agree" or "strongly agree" that measures are needed to strengthen the political parties.

The 22.2% who "disagree" or "strongly disagree" believe that representative democracy can be achieved in other ways, and in the existence/coexistence of other options (community associations with political participation, especially at the local level). Finally, only 8.30% of the interviewees failed to answer the question concerning the importance of parties for democracy.

¹² Op. cit., p.22.

¹³ This means that the parties' monopoly of political representation is enshrined in El Salvador's Constitution. The provision on political parties appears in Article 85, which defines the country's form of government. It is unlikely that this provision can be reformed under the current Constitution, because Article 248 states that the articles referring to the form and system of government cannot be amended. Another way to reform Article 85 would be by reforming the Constitution first. It could also be considered a question of the correct interpretation of the provision, of course.

Table 2 shows a breakdown of the replies to this question by sector. It is extremely important that 24 of the 36 interviewees (66.6%) who “agree” or “strongly agree” that parties are necessary for democracy represent all the sectors. The eight (22.3%) who “strongly disagree” and five (13.9%) who “disagree” belong to civil society organizations, the private sector or the mass media. As already noted, this resistance from the “private” sectors is less important when the question of the need to strengthen the parties is raised.

Table 2
Interviewees’ opinion as to whether political parties
are necessary for democracy, according to the
sectors of society they represented

Sector to which the interviewees belonged	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that “there can be no democracy without political parties?”					NA	Total
	SD	D	N	A	SA		
Political parties	0	1	1	6	1	1	10
Political training institutes	0	1	0	0	1	1	3
Civil society organizations	0	1	0	2	3	0	6
Supreme Electoral Tribunal	0	1	0	3	3	1	8
Private sector	1	0	0	1	1	0	3
Media	1	2	0	0	1	0	4
Political analysts	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Supreme Court of Justice	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Total	2	6	1	12	12	3	36

SD = Strongly disagree. D = Disagree. N = Neither agree nor disagree. A = Agree. SA = Strongly agree. NA = Did not answer

Source: prepared by the team.

2.3 Crisis of the political parties in El Salvador

An interesting point that emerged from the interviews is that almost everyone agrees that Salvadoran political parties are experiencing a crisis that is in some ways unique but also similar to what is happening to parties in other parts of the world. When asked how this crisis manifested itself, the interviewees gave a wide range of answers. These can be grouped under three basic headings, in the following order of importance, namely: the functions, characteristics, and mechanisms of the political parties. Parties:

- no longer perform their key role of representing the different sectors of society and coordinating the interests of the citizenry and the State in accordance with the new conditions
- fall short where accountability, transparency, legitimacy, trust, representativeness, leadership, and credibility are concerned
- do not have mechanisms for settling internal disputes and allowing new political leaderships to emerge

Without a doubt, the point on which there was most agreement was that the political parties have failed to tackle the new issues that have emerged over the last twenty years: the disappearance of the agricultural sector, urbanization, migration, unemployment, the role of women and economic problems. As a result, the parties have lost their legitimacy and credibility, and citizens mistrust their leaders and the political parties, especially the party leaders, who do not have the capacity to resolve their differences through integrating, democratic internal mechanisms. The traditional leaderships that remain in place are incapable of constructing a new party organizational structure.

It is interesting to note that a small percentage of the sample (8.30%) said there was no crisis of political parties. They blame the media for giving the parties a bad name. There seems to be a desire to disseminate that bad image in some quarters. It harms the parties, echoing the anti-political and anti-party arguments that are to be heard in many parts of the world.

2.4 Strengthening political parties in El Salvador

Following extensive research on 62 Latin American political parties,¹⁴ it is possible to examine the Salvadoran parties based on their different fields of activity. These may be internal (i.e., within the parties themselves) or external (their activities within the political system). The external sphere of activity can be divided into three scenarios, or “party faces”: the party’s face in elections, in Congress and when in government. The internal sphere of activity comprises two “faces”: the party as a bureaucratic organization and as an organization of volunteers. The IIHR-CAPEL study on Central America’s political parties also adopted this approach in some cases, and this gave rise to the “impact factors” for the internal democratization of parties.

In conducting this diagnostic assessment, the team studied these “faces” of the parties. It developed a matrix of fields and crosscutting issues on which action was needed, and the questionnaire that was used for the interviews on which the assessment is based. However, the “faces” had to be modified to adapt them to the requirements of USAID-El Salvador for this consultancy. Firstly, the “face in elections” does not refer to any party in particular, but to “competition [among the parties] in elections.” That is why there are references to the “system of electoral parties.” Secondly, the “face in Congress” does not refer to any particular party either. Instead, the focus is on political representation. In other words, it includes an analysis of the institutions whose members are elected by popular vote – i.e., Congress, the Presidency, and municipal councils. As a result, “the face when in government” was included in what appears in the matrix as the “system of parliamentary parties.” Finally, the “bureaucratic” and “organization of volunteers” faces were included in a single sphere of activity: that of parties as organizations, where the focus is on internal activities.

¹⁴ Cf. M. Alcántara and F. Freidenberg. “Partidos políticos de América Latina” (3 volumes). Salamanca, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2000. One volume is devoted to the political parties of Mexico, Central America, and Panama. In the case of El Salvador, the parties discussed were ARENA, FMLN, and PCN.

2.4.1 Ranking of the impact factors by importance

The central element of the interviews with the key informants concerned the importance they attributed to a series of impact factors that could strengthen the political parties (internal democratization, transparency, and accountability). These factors were identified in the IIHR-CAPEL research on the democratization of political parties in Central America and Panama that has already been mentioned.¹⁵ The team of consultants decided to revamp and adapt them, to obtain more detailed information by considering 18 impact factors instead of eight.

The team had two objectives in asking the interviewees to rank the proposed impact factors by importance. Firstly, to validate the factors, i.e., to ascertain whether the interviewees regarded them as elements that could be used to strengthen the parties. Secondly, the original research did not rank the factors in order of importance. Given the limited resources available for actions to improve these factors, however, it was felt important to rank them in some sort of order. This problem was solved by asking the interviewees to rank the factors in importance on a scale of 1 to 6, to pinpoint those they regarded as most important. The results are summarized in **Table 3**. The factors are divided into three groups, according to the importance attributed to them. The figure in the third column refers to the percentage of interviewees who gave the factor a 6 (most important). In other words, the importance that the interviewees attributed to a given factor varied. While some gave it a 2 or 3, others rated its importance as 5 or 6. Table 3 shows which factors received the highest number of “6s.”

¹⁵ IIHR-CAPEL, *Democratización interna de partidos políticos en Centroamérica*, San Jose, IIHR-CAPEL, 2004.

Table 3
Ranking of impact factors by importance (*)

N° of factor	Impact factor	Percentage
<u>Tier 1: Over 80%</u>		
14	Better management of public resources	94.4
12	Respect for electoral laws	83.3
15	Transparency in party finances	83.3
16	Control over the use of public monies allocated for campaign expenses	80.6
<u>Tier 2: Between 50% and 80%</u>		
13	Transparency in campaign financing	77.8
3	Participation of rank and file in decision-making	72.2
2	Equal opportunities for being selected as candidates	69.4
18	Promote political participation at local level	69.4
7	Political education and training programs for rank and file	66.7
17	Reform of the electoral system	61.1
10	Prevent leadership from exerting tight control over internal supervisory bodies	52.8
11	Make internal bodies and statutes more effective	50.0
6	Create mechanisms (forums, etc.) for interaction with other civil society organizations	50.0
<u>Tier 3: Less than 50%</u>		
8	Affirmative action (sex, age, disability) for elected positions	30.6
1	Maintain an electoral register	33.3
4	Activities in support of lawmakers and municipal councilors	30.6
5	Activities in non-election periods	30.6
9	Affirmative action in party structures	27.8

(*) To show the importance of the impact factors, only those given a 6 were taken into account (the highest score possible on a scale of 1 to 6).

The interviewees' replies do not reflect the lack of laws or institutions responsible for democracy as a part of the causes or solutions of the crisis of the political parties.

- As can be seen clearly in Table 3, most of the interviewees rated efforts to strengthen the political parties as extremely important (the factors that appear under Tier 1). This could be achieved: a) if the parties obeyed the law (i.e., the interviewees agreed that the parties would be strengthened if they adhered, voluntarily or otherwise, to the legal framework and the rule of law); and, b) by implementing stricter measures to control the source, use and management of campaign financing, and increase accountability regarding public resources and the funds of political parties.
- Under Tier 2 of Table 3, the impact factors are those linked to: a) the participation of the rank and file and involvement at the local level; b) training; and, c) the

implementation of specific activities. The factors included in this group are more practical in nature and related to measures that would permit competition, assuming that party leaders would be open to such change. This group also includes the factor linked to electoral reforms, a longstanding, long-term proposal for which the Salvadoran political class has demonstrated little enthusiasm.

- The impact factors under Tier 3 in Table 3 have to do with: a) affirmative action; b) activities in support of lawmakers and municipal councilors; and, c) improvements to bodies and statutes. All these are related to the internal workings of political parties or their work in Congress and the municipalities.

2.4.2 Organization of the impact factors

The impact factors that the interviewees related closely with the political party system were arranged in a matrix that takes into account both the “faces” of the parties and the crosscutting issues proposed by USAID. This matrix, entitled “Matrix of fields and crosscutting issues,” is included as **Table 4**. The aim in undertaking an analysis based on a matrix was to identify not only the field of activity (face) of the parties that would require action, but also to pinpoint the crosscutting issue that the action would impact, and in which USAID is interested. Some of the impact factors appear in more than one cell, and even in all the cells, of the matrix (e.g., “promote political participation at local level” and “sweeping electoral reform”). Therefore, the way that the impact factors are arranged in **Table 4** provides a second criterion for channeling resources to help strengthen Salvadoran political parties. In other words, cross-referencing the variables between the fields and the crosscutting issues makes it possible to determine which impact factors the interviewees believe would have a better chance of working in the Salvadoran political context.

It is worth noting that the impact factors generally regarded as being most important for strengthening the parties are not related to the crosscutting issue of democratization.¹⁶ Rather, they have to do with transparency and accountability.¹⁷ In terms of the fields of activity, the impact factors that appear under Tier 1 in **Table 3** - i.e., factors 12, 14, 15 and 16 - correspond to the three “faces” considered (in elections, in political representation, and parties as organizations).

¹⁶ Factors 12, 14, 15 and 16 are highlighted in the matrix in **bold**

¹⁷ Factor 12, “Respect for electoral laws,” could be regarded as an element of all three crosscutting issues in the electoral field. However, it was placed only under “accountability” because that is where the problem becomes visible when the parties infringe the electoral regulations. For example, in 2003 the ARENA and FMLN parties ignored the rule that advertising for presidential elections cannot be published or broadcast more than four months before voting day. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal was powerless to put a stop to the advertising and, to date, no one has been brought to book for breaking the rules.

Table 4
Matrix of fields and crosscutting issues

FIELD	CROSSCUTTING ISSUES		
	Democratization	Transparency	Accountability
Political party system and elections	2. Equal opportunities 6. Mechanisms for interaction 8. Affirmative action regarding representation 17. Sweeping electoral reform 18. Participation at local level	10. Prevent leadership from exerting tight control 13. Transparency in campaign financing 17. Sweeping electoral reform 18. Participation at local level	6. Opportunities for interaction 12. Respect for electoral laws 16. Control over the use of public monies allocated for campaign expenses 17. Sweeping electoral reform 18. Participation at local level
Political party system and Congress	4. Activities in support of the work of lawmakers and municipal councilors 17. Sweeping electoral reform 18. Participation at local level	6. Opportunities for interaction 14. Transparent management of public resources 17. Sweeping electoral reform 18. Participation at local level	6. Opportunities for interaction 14. Transparent management of public resources 17. Sweeping electoral reform 18. Participation at local level
Political parties as organizations	3. Participation in decision-making 5. Activities in non-election periods 7. Training programs 9. Affirmative action in party structures 17. Sweeping electoral reform 18. Participation at local level	1. Register of rank and file members 10. Prevent leadership from exerting tight control 15. Transparency in party finances 17. Sweeping electoral reform 18. Participation at local level	10. Prevent leadership from exerting tight control 11. Efficacy of internal bodies and statutes 17. Sweeping electoral reform 18. Participation at local level

Factors 17 (electoral reform) and 18 (local participation) did not make it into the group regarded as most important (Tier 1), despite appearing in all the cells of the matrix. This shows that there are impact factors that could play a multiplier role, even though not all the interviewees rate them as the most important. Finally, the most important factors appear under transparency and accountability, with the interviewees attributing the greatest importance to accountability. This should be borne in mind when deciding the focus of the efforts to strengthen the parties. The emphasis on accountability ties in with some of the causes of the crisis of the political parties highlighted by the interviewees, particularly the fact that the political parties do not represent the interests of the voters but their own interests, or those of the leadership. In other words, the parties do not represent their constituents and accountability is limited or non-existent, which permits the political parties and their leaders to act behind voters' backs.¹⁸

¹⁸ The fact that no impact factors for the crosscutting issue of “democratization” appear under Tier 1 does not mean that no action should be taken. It is just that it does not seem to be the number one priority.

2.4.3 Measures, reinforcing elements and sources of resistance to democratization/participation, transparency, and the accountability of Salvadoran political parties

This section contains an analysis of the measures, reinforcing elements and sources of resistance proposed by the interviewees, taking into account the matrix of impact factors. During the interviews, the matrix of measures, reinforcing elements and sources of resistance (**Table 5**) was used for the most important impact factors. The data presented in this section is not exhaustive, given the large number of measures proposed by the interviewees (at least 108 suggestions).¹⁹ This diagnostic assessment presents only the measures, reinforcing elements and sources of resistance suggested for the factors that appear under Tier 1.²⁰ The data shown in **Table 5** is not exhaustive for the impact factors selected either, but all the proposals and reinforcing elements and sources of resistance identified do give some idea of the interviewees' thoughts regarding what should be done to strengthen the parties. As none of these factors have to do with "democratization," the impact factor for this crosscutting issue rated as the most important (participation of the rank and file in decision-making) was included in **Table 5**.

Table 5
Measures, Reinforcing Elements and Sources of Resistance
for the impact factors under Tier 1

FACTOR	MEASURES	REINFORCING ELEMENTS	SOURCES OF RESISTANCE
Respect for electoral laws	Depoliticize the TSE	Existing civil society initiatives	Lawmakers and parties, especially PCN
Transparent management of public resources	Strengthen the Supreme Courts' Probity Unit	Pressure from international organizations	The "political class"
	Train civil servants in resource management	Control that can be exercised by the media	Conservatism of civil servants, who prefer to continue doing things as they have until now
	Depoliticize the Court of Accounts	Climate of opinion favorable for the sound use of public resources	The parties that benefit by exerting control over the Court of Accounts
	Foster general access to information about how public funds are spent	International Cooperation	
	Generate social auditing	Investigative reporting by the media	

¹⁹ This is the smallest possible number of proposed measures because the interviewees were asked to select three of the factors to which they had given a 6. They were then asked to suggest a measure for each factor that would improve the performance of the impact factor. Hence, the smallest possible number of measures is 3 factors x 36 interviewees = 108. However, some interviewees suggested more than one measure for some factors. Something similar occurred with regard to reinforcing elements and sources of resistance.

²⁰ A complete list of the proposals is to be found in the annexes.

	Control not only of probity but of efficiency in achieving objectives Create bodies to supervise transparency, made up of respected public figures, to pressure institutions to perform their duties	Current trials of senior officials in Central America	The culture of bribery and deception
Transparency in party finances	Enactment of a law on party financing Promote public access to information Publicize the source and size of contributions	A favorable climate of opinion Fiscal incentives that already apply to non-profit organizations	Those who “finance” the parties The parties’ limited ability to manage their finances Party leadership reluctant to give information
Control over the use that parties make of public funds allocated to cover campaign expenses	Auditing of accounts	Auditing and clearing of accounts to which other (non-profit) organizations are subject	Party leaderships The media organizations that benefit from these funds
Participation of the rank and file in decision-making	Enactment of a Parties Act that includes this issue Establishment of a system of primary elections for candidates and leaders for all parties Inform grassroots party members of what the leadership intends to do Establish bodies to supervise the activities of party leaders	Society’s demand that political parties be more open to the participation of the rank and file in decision-making Existence of participatory practices at the municipal level When one party begins to do it, it has an effect on others Clear regulations promoting stable leadership	Party leaderships Leaderships Authoritarian political culture of leaderships and political affiliation Prostituted vision of democracy as something minimal

The measures proposed by the interviewees for factors 12 (respect for electoral laws), 14 (transparency regarding resources), 15 (transparency regarding party finances) and 16 (control of the public funds allocated for campaign expenses), and summarized in **Table 5**, are of two kinds, and coincide with the areas of intervention suggested by IIHR-CAPEL for the internal democratization of political parties.

For example, the following measures fall under the heading of “**improvement of procedures**,” and concern institution building: depoliticize the TSE; strengthen the SCJ’s Probity Unit; train civil servants in resource management; depoliticize the Court of

Accounts; control not only of probity but of efficiency in achieving objectives; enactment of a law on party financing; enactment of a Parties Act that includes the participation of the rank and file in decision-making; establishment of a system of primary elections for candidates and leaders for all parties; and establish bodies to supervise the activities of party leaders. The following are the measures aimed at **“the promotion or training of the citizenry”** (i.e., they have to do with sensitization): foster general access to information about how public funds are spent, generate social auditing; create bodies to supervise transparency made up of respected public figures, to pressure institutions to perform their duties; promote public access to information; and, publicize the source and size of contributions.

In implementing this series of measures, and others for the other factors, situations may be encountered in El Salvador that could be a help or a hindrance. Advantage should be taken of the positive, or reinforcing, elements in two ways: **firstly**, to foster implementation of the improvements suggested; and, **secondly**, to reduce or eliminate sources of resistance. Once again, it is possible to pinpoint both the reinforcing elements and sources of resistance related to institution building or sensitization. There are situations in the environment that would act as reinforcing elements in the area of institution building, such as the requirements of international cooperation, the (fiscal) incentives that already apply to non-profit organizations, the auditing and clearing of accounts to which other organizations are already subject, and the existence of participatory practices at the municipal level. On the other hand, almost all the sources of resistance have to do with the area of sensitization. This difference could impact the planning of interventions in the fields of activity or crosscutting issues proposed by, and for, USAID. Some interventions would target institutional improvements, taking advantage of already existing situations in the institutional environment and regarding sensitization. Other interventions would have to be directed at reducing sources of resistance by means of sensitization campaigns.

One point that became clear in the interviews is that both the reinforcing elements and the sources of resistance could involve institutions and individuals. Institutional resistance would have to be dealt with differently from individual resistance. Institutional reforms would be needed to tackle institutional resistance, while efforts to overcome individual resistance would have to focus on the “cultural” aspect. Since cultural resistance may derail the efforts to overcome institutional resistance, the efforts should be focused on the former. Elected officials, civil servants, and the people and firms that finance the parties and their leaderships may accept the need for institutional improvement as long as they have nothing to lose. If the institutional reforms proposed by various national and international actors have not been approved, or have not yielded the expected results, this is largely because officials, people and firms, and the upper echelons of the parties are not willing to alter their behavior to bring it into line with the proposed institutional design. This problem was identified clearly in the interviews. Nearly all the sources of resistance to the impact factors would come from the officials who finance the parties and the party leaderships.

Although in this section we have considered only the impact factors that appear under Tier 1, the comments made are equally valid for the other factors. As can be seen in the matrix of measures, reinforcing elements and sources of resistance, the general distinction between the “institutional” and “sensitization” measures fits all of the factors perfectly.

3. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING THE POLITICAL PARTIES, AND THEIR POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL VIABILITY

In preparing this section, the team drew on the diagnostic assessment based on the interviews and USAID's interests as set out in its El Salvador Country Plan for 2004-2008. For this reason, specific measures are outlined for the three crosscutting issues that require action, and not only for the factors to which the interviewees attributed most importance. It should be noted that the measures proposed below are not organized in any particular order of importance. The idea is simply to give an idea of what should or could be done. The consultants recommend that these and other measures be adopted following the strategy derived from the diagnostic assessment, combining actions aimed at "institutional" improvement (improvement of procedures) and sensitization (to educate the citizenry), endeavoring, first of all, to eliminate or reduce "cultural" resistance. In doing so, the reinforcing elements in the environment could have a key role to play. Finally, the objectives, results, and activities that are proposed should help overcome the obstacles described and underpin the existing reinforcing elements.

3.1 Expected results and strategy

This project related to the Salvadoran political party system proposes activities in various areas. These activities take into account the Country Plan for El Salvador of the Regional Strategy for Central America and Mexico. Specifically, they will help achieve Intermediate Results 1.2 (IR 1.2), entitled "Greater transparency and Accountability of Governments" and Sub-IR 1.2.4, entitled "Accountability of Elected and Appointed Officials improved" (for example, electoral reform). The activities proposed will also help achieve Sub-IR 1.2.3, entitled "More opportunities for citizen participation in and oversight of national and local decision-making."

3.1.1 Low-level results proposed for Democratization/Participation

- More internal democracy within the political parties

The project will help the political parties apply the principles of "internal democracy," including the relevant mechanisms, instruments, and practices, for the 2006 and 2009 elections.

Indicator 1: guarantees of equality among party members and protection of fundamental rights in the exercise of freedom of opinion

Indicator 2: mechanisms for selecting candidates for competitive representative positions (internal or external)

Indicator 3: participation of party members in governing bodies, with the various groups that make up the organization represented

Indicator 4: the various groups are actively involved in the discussion and development of the party's programmatic positions and the drafting of proposals, and in the decisions that the party takes

Indicator 5: respect for the principle of majority decision-making (decisions are taken based on the will of a majority of the individuals involved, with guarantees for the minority)

Indicator 6: the rank and file exercise effective control over the party leadership by means of processes that punish or reward those who take the decisions

- Increase in the institutional structure of the political system

Support for the institutionalization of party systems and monitoring of progress in the process of legislative reform

Indicator 1: monitoring of the initiatives of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Executive Branch, and the Legislative Assembly regarding laws related to the political party system and the financing of political parties, and the approval of partial reforms by 2006, and complete reforms by 2009

Indicator 2: creation of inter-party networks of underrepresented sectors (e.g., women, young people), as mechanisms for developing a political identity, based on the implementation of political training processes

Indicator 3: dialogue among the political parties, CSOs, entrepreneurs, and the mass media, to develop new forms of interaction and linkages between parties and society

Indicator 4: creation of a permanent body of political parties to promote the reform of the political party system and a reduction in the power wielded by party leaderships, on their own initiative

- Support for academic output

Research to determine the progress achieved with the internal democratization of Salvadoran political parties between 2005 and 2009, ascertaining whether a series of processes exist within the parties, and, if so, how they function. This research will be carried out by academic centers that will focus on the causes and on the preparation of proposals to help improve the Salvadoran “political culture.” This research will include the production of didactic texts and other modern learning and dissemination tools.

Indicator 1: Identify trends that reflect *progress* in the area of “internal democracy” by the political parties

3.1.2 Low-level results proposed for transparency

- Promotion of citizen involvement in political control

Help civil society organizations (CSOs) create and implement a carefully coordinated plan to enable citizens, rank-and-file party members, and voters to exercise greater political control, developing efficient procedures, mechanisms, and skills for overseeing the activities of institutions and their civil servants, and election campaigns. Mobilize the citizenry in support of concrete demands and inform public opinion. Drive home to government agencies the importance of the reforms.

Indicator 1: consistent plan, carefully coordinated and carried out by USAID’s CSO partners, for the training of “citizen auditors” and multiplier agents for the 2006 and 2009 election campaigns

Indicator 2: creation of an annual “citizen’s report” on the government’s work

Indicator 3: responsible pressure from CSOs to bring about changes to the electoral code, the Probity Act of the Supreme Court of Justice, and the unit for the control of political financing of the Court of Accounts

Indicator 3: public campaigns in the media to ensure implementation of the government ethics act, the honesty act and support for the control units of the Court of Accounts, the TSE’s Oversight Board and the Probity Unit of the Supreme Court of Justice, to increase the transparency and accountability of public representatives at the national, regional and local levels.

- Strive for transparency in the implementation of public actions

Support the participation of civil society, to develop the monitoring of the actions of government institutions at three levels (national, regional, and local), strengthening oversight by two key actors: citizen organizations (CSOs) and the media.

Indicator 1: a carefully coordinated plan of the CSOs that contains activities, mechanisms, and efficient skills for overseeing the activities of civil servants and public institutions, and election campaigns

Indicator 2: network of CSOs, private enterprise, and media organizations, to discuss the implementation of public actions with civil servants

- Support for academic output

Research to determine the progress achieved with the transparency of government agencies and political parties between 2005 and 2009, ascertaining whether a series of processes exist within the parties, and, if so, how they function. This research will be carried out by academic centers that will focus on the causes and the preparation of proposals to help improve Salvadoran transparency. This research will include the production of didactic texts and other modern learning and dissemination tools.

Indicator 1: Identify trends that reflect *progress* in the area of the transparency by the Salvadoran political system

3.1.3 Low-level results proposed for accountability

- Enhance the capabilities and procedures of the bodies responsible for the accountability of political parties

Support improvements to the internal statutes and bodies of the political parties responsible for accountability and disciplinary matters (tribunals that resolve issues related to ethics, appeals, elections, etc.), so that they perform their duties efficiently and independently

Indicator 1: more internal bodies for accountability: monitoring, oversight, and control within political parties

Indicator 2: more respect for internal party rules by members

Indicator 3: more accountability by political leaders without rank-and-file members and voters having to demand it of them

Indicator 4: oversight and control bodies have more “preactive capacity” and less “reactive activity”

- Improve the capabilities and procedures of the bodies in charge of accountability in government institutions

Support improvements to legislation and regulations and the internal bodies of government institutions responsible for accountability and disciplinary matters (e.g., the TSE's Oversight Board, the Probitry Unit of the Supreme Court of Justice, and the Court of Accounts), to ensure efficient and independent control over the public monies allocated to cover election expenses. Equip the control units with technological resources for the control of public financial resources.

Indicator 1: citizen auditing of the use of financial resources for the 2006 and 2009 election campaigns, by the CSOs and private enterprise

Indicator 2: training workshops for the staff of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Court of Accounts, and the Probitry Unit, on efficient control methods

Indicator 3: technology and computer programs that make it possible to monitor and generate reports on campaign financing

Indicator 4: financial control units of the political parties submit reports on the monies spent on the 2006 and 2009 campaigns

Indicator 5: promote the enactment of the ethics act for civil servants

Indicator 6: oversight and control bodies have more “preactive capacity” and less “reactive activity”

- Support for academic output

Research to determine the progress achieved with the accountability of Salvadoran officials, institutions, and political parties between 2005 and 2009, ascertaining whether a series of processes exist within the parties, and, if so, how they function.

This research will be carried out by academic centers that will focus on the causes and the preparation of proposals to help improve Salvadoran accountability. This research will include the production of didactic texts and other modern learning and dissemination tools.

Indicator 1: Identify trends that reflect *progress* in the area of accountability by the Salvadoran political system

3.2 Strategy

- Prioritize intervention on the impact factors related to transparency and accountability
- Undertake actions related to the impact factors for democratization, to support the actions with respect to the other two crosscutting issues. Democratization should be seen as a means of promoting transparency and accountability, not as an end in itself
- The resources allocated should consider the potential individual/group resistance that the measure will encounter. It is recommended that resources be allocated to reduce resistance. Sensitization measures should be prioritized

- Consider as strategic partners civil society organizations with interests similar to those of USAID regarding the promotion of democracy, transparency and accountability
- Support the creation and implementation of the Foundation to Strengthen Political Parties called for in the 1992 Peace Accords, making it a strategic ally from the outset. USAID should join forces with other cooperation agencies
- Provide financial support for the work of civil society organizations in the areas of transparency and accountability
- With other cooperation agencies, help bring about sweeping electoral reform based on the four bills already submitted by the TSE and other civil society organizations. The first half of 2005 is of key importance in this regard, given the election calendar. After the 2006 elections, there will be no more elections for two years. That could be the ideal moment for the more substantial reforms of the electoral system, and even for constitutional reform
- For the actions related to democratization, USAID should consider as strategic partners the party rank and file and even middle-ranking leaders. It is important and desirable that a new generation of party leaders take control before 2009, because that year there will be presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections
- Through third parties, such as universities or other educational institutions, and with training programs, USAID should contribute to the development of broader participation within the political parties

3.3 Matters of interest and concerns

Some of the concerns identified with regard to the expected results have to do with party leaderships and lawmakers, who are directly linked to the leaderships. Specifically, any attempt to reform the method used to determine authorities elected according to the respective districts could meet with resistance primarily from the PCN. The political parties may show little enthusiasm for greater participation by civil society in aspects of public control, as they would forfeit their leading role as intermediaries with civil society. Nor do the CSOs have the strong leaders needed to facilitate the reforms and exert pressure. The fact that there is currently no spirited debate about the electoral and political reforms that the country needs is another concern.

The efforts to train rank-and-file members and leaders may be opposed by the current leaders, as they constitute potential generational agents of change.

With regard to political and campaign financing, the parties' reluctance to publish information about the source of campaign funds and political financing is due, in part, to pressure from private contributors who do not wish it to be published for fear of reprisals,

fears for their personal safety, or other reasons. The efforts to reform political financing (and particularly the publication of information) will encounter resistance from both the political parties and the private sector.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusions

- a) Eighteen impact factors were identified for strengthening the political parties in the areas of democratization, transparency, and accountability. Some factors are considered more important than others, particularly those related to transparency and accountability.
- b) The factors can be grouped under the headings “improvement of procedures or institutional development” and “citizenship training or sensitization.”
- c) All actions related to any of these crosscutting issues, designed to make the parties more internally democratic, transparent, and accountable, will encounter reinforcing elements and sources of resistance.
- d) The reinforcing elements and sources of resistance may be institutional or involve individuals/groups.
- e) Efforts related to the factors whose reinforcing elements are institutional and involve individuals/groups will have a greater likelihood of success.
- f) Efforts related to the factors whose sources of resistance involve individuals/groups, including those of a cultural nature, will be less likely to meet with success.
- g) Any intervention strategy should take into consideration the fact that some measures will have short- and medium-term effects, while others will only yield results in the long run. This is especially true of those measures whose sources of resistance involve individuals/groups rather than institutions, and those designed to impact cultural aspects.
- h) As society in general appears to want to see the parties strengthened, the intervention strategy should take into account what other national and international actors are already doing.

4.2 Recommendations

To achieve the results proposed, the Program should include simultaneous work under the following lines of action:

- **With regard to the legal framework legal and the rule of law, support:**
 - a) The congressional committee that is studying the bills on political parties and electoral matters presented by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; and,
 - b) The electoral body’s decision to promote these bills again and thus enjoy greater jurisdiction and distribute seats pursuant to the Constitution.

Also needed is effective monitoring of:

- a) Decision-makers: lawmakers, parliamentary parties and party leaders, to ensure that the goals are translated into affirmative actions in the legislation enacted;
- b) The President’s proposed discussion forums; and,

- c) Adherence to existing regulations by the political parties and civil servants, to make their activities more democratic, transparent, and accountable.
- **With regard to civil society**, to foster:
talks involving MIRE, COCIVICA and FUSADES, among others, as interest groups that support the electoral reforms and the reforms of political parties, so that they develop a shared agenda, strategy and concrete actions to help and pressure Congress to pass the bills on political parties and electoral matters. In addition, to support a sustained campaign in the media to create an enabling environment, generate public opinion matrixes, discuss, and explain the merits of the reforms.
 - **With regard to institution building**, strengthen:
 - a) the financial control efforts of the Probity Unit of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Court of Accounts, by broadening the units' brief, providing staff training based on the experiences of other countries, and establishing financial controls in three specific areas (government spending, public financing of election campaigns, and the political parties' other sources of financing). Accountability must be improved by publishing details of income received, the use to which it is put and the activities carried out; and,
 - b) the control exerted over political activities by the supervisory units of the political parties, the Oversight Board of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the units of the Court of Accounts that audit the operations of central and local governments. The strategy should include the possibility of harnessing "effective (national and foreign) practices."
 - **With regard to training**, the Program should focus on human resource training to develop a political culture that emphasizes positive values such as ethics, responsibility, and efficacy, in specific sectors:
 - a) The middle-ranking leaders of existing political parties and of those in the process of being formed;
 - b) The officials of political and control institutions linked to the practical exercise of democracy (the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Court of Accounts, Congress, local governments, etc.); and,
 - c) The political training institutes of political parties and the Fundación Ungo, Fundación Siglo XXI, etc. As part of the overall strategy, the training should be conducted in academic centers of recognized excellence (e.g., the UCA), include a module on the role of gender and be inclusive and comprehensive.

5. ANNEXES

Annex 1 List of people interviewed

No.	NAME	INSTITUTION	ADDRESS
1	Héctor Vidal	ANEP	Col Escalón, 1a. Cl Pte y 71 av. Nte. #204
2	Oscar Anaya	Ebert Foundation	Universidad Fco. Gavidia, edif. Financiero, 3a. Planta. Av. Olímpica
3	Héctor Silva	CDU	Legislative Assembly, 6 th Floor
4	Walter Araujo	Supreme Electoral Tribunal	15 calle pte. #4223, Col Escalón
5	Julio Moreno Niño	Supreme Electoral Tribunal	15 calle pte. #4223, Col Escalón
6	Eduardo Urquilla	Supreme Electoral Tribunal	15 calle pte. #4223, Col Escalón
7	Mario Salamanca	Supreme Electoral Tribunal	15 calle pte. #4223, Col Escalón
8	Rolando Alvarenga	ARENA	Legislative Assembly
9	Eugenio Chicas	Supreme Electoral Tribunal	15 calle pte. #4223, Col Escalón
10	Ramón Villalta	CO CIVICA	Calle Sisimiles, Av Jacaranda #173, Col. Miramonte
11	Rubén Zamora	CDU	Av. Maquilishuat #204, Col. Vista Hermosa (sobre calle principal frente al triángulo, portones verdes)
12	Kirio Waldo Salgado	Fundación Cívica	Av. Vista Hermosa No. 140, col. Vista Hermosa
13	Juan José Martel	Former judge	Calle Dinamarca #19, Col. Escandia, Ayutuxtepeque. (final calle Zacamil a la derecha, portón verde claro)
14	Francisco Merino	PCN	Legislative Assembly
15	Rafael Alemán	FMLN political training institute	73 Av. Nte. y pasaje Itsmania #319, Col Escalón
16	Jaime López	PROBIDAD	Calle el Ejeo #39, Col. Jardines de Guadalupe
17	Rodolfo Parker	PDC	3a. Calle Pte. #3689, Col. Escalón
18	Orlando Kocar	ARENA political training institute	Prolongación Calle Arce #2426, Col. Flor Blanca
19	Rómulo Rivas Blanco	MIRE	Hotel Princesa
20	Rafael Machuca	PCN	Legislative Assembly
21	Ricardo Chacón	El Mundo (newspaper)	15 Calle pte. y 7a. Av. Nte. #521

22	Julio Hernández	Former judge	27 Calle pte. #1316, San Salvador
23	Sergio Mena	Former judge	Hotel Princesa
24	Facundo Guardado	Fundación Siglo XXI	Calle Morocros #1, Residencial Montemira
25	Narciso Castillo	Channel 33	Pasaje Itsmania, Col. Escalón
26	William Meléndez	Channel 12	Boulevard Santa Elena
27	Roberto Turcios	National Development Commission	83 av. Norte y 13 calle pte. #801. Atrás Colegio Sagrado Corazón
28	José Luis Sanz	La Prensa Gráfica	Boulevard Santa Elena
29	Roberto Alvarado Flores	Legislative Assembly	2 nd Floor, Legislative Assembly
30	Francisco Jovel	Legislative Assembly	4 th Floor, Legislative Assembly
31	Medardo González	FMLN	27 Calle pte. #16, San Salvador
32	Carlos Pinto	COMURES	Calle Estadio #33, Col. Flor Blanca
33	Lilian Díaz Sol	ASPALEXPAL	Calle del Cantábrico #23-b, Jardines de Guadalupe
34	Gloria Salguero	Presidential Commissioner	Av. Las Palmas N° 225 Col S. Benito
35	Carlos Quintanilla	FUSADES	Boulevard Santa Elena
36	Eduardo Tenorio	Supreme Court of Justice	Av. Universitaria, Centro de Gobierno

Annex 2
QUESTIONNAIRE

**DEMOCRATIZATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
OF POLITICAL PARTIES**

Dear friend:

The aim of this questionnaire is to identify measures that would strengthen political parties in the areas of democratization, transparency, and accountability. The questions asked follow on from previous work by the IHR-CAPEL regarding the democratization of political parties in Central America and Panama.

I. VALIDATION OF IMPACT FACTORS

Q1. Do you agree or disagree with the assertion that: “There can be no democracy without political parties?”

1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly agree.

Q2. When people talk about the “crisis of the political parties,” what do you understand this to mean?”

Q3. Are you in favor or against the idea of implementing measures to strengthen political parties?

1. Strongly against. 2. Against. 3. Neither for nor against 4. In favor 5. Strongly in favor

Q4. On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 is the lowest score, indicate how important you feel that each of the following factors is in strengthening political parties:

1. Maintain a register of rank-and-file members.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. Equal opportunities for being selected as candidates.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. Participation of rank and file in decision-making....	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. Implement activities in support of the work of lawmakers and municipal councilors.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
5. Implement activities in non-election periods.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
6. Create opportunities (forums, etc.) for interaction with other civil society organizations.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
7. Political education and training programs for rank-and-file members.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
8. Affirmative action (sex, age, disability) for elected positions.	1	2	3	4	5	6
9. Affirmative action in party structures.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
10. Prevent the leadership from exerting tight control over internal supervisory bodies.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
11. Make internal bodies and statutes more effective....	1	2	3	4	5	6
12. Respect for electoral laws.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
13. Transparency in campaign financing.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
14. Transparent management of public resources.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
15. Transparency in party finances.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
16. Control over the use of public monies allocated for campaign expenses.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
17. Carry out sweeping reforms of the electoral system.....	1	2	3	4	5	6
18. Promote political participation at the local level.....	1	2	3	4	5	6

II. ADOPTION OF MEASURES

Q5. If you could adopt measures to improve the factors in Q4 to which you assigned the two highest scores, what would they be?

(Note: give a brief answer in the attached matrix).

III. IDENTIFICATION OF REINFORCING ELEMENTS

Q6. In your opinion, which two factors would facilitate the adoption of each of the measures proposed in answer to the previous question?

(Note: give a brief answer in the attached matrix).

IV. IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCES OF RESISTANCE

Q7. In your opinion, which two factors would hinder the adoption of each of the measures proposed in your answer to question Q5?

(Note: give a brief answer in the attached matrix).

Thank you very much for your cooperation!

Interviewee:

Date: _____

Interviewer:

Time began: _____

Time concluded: _____

Annex 3

*MATRIX OF MEASURES, REINFORCING ELEMENTS,
AND SOURCES OF RESISTANCE*

No.	MEASURES	REINFORCING ELEMENTS	SOURCES OF RESISTANCE

6- INDEX OF TABLES

Number of Table	Page
Table 1 Lines of action proposed by the IIHR-CAPEL for strengthening political parties in Central America	
Table 2 Interviewees' opinion as to whether political parties are necessary for democracy, according to the sectors of society they represented	
Table 3 Ranking of impact factors by importance	
Table 4 Matrix of fields of activity and crosscutting issues	
Table 5 Measures, Reinforcing Elements, and Sources of Resistance for the impact factors under Tier 1	

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