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Russia

Democracy Assessment: Political Process, Local Governance, and Civil Society

FINAL REPORT

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Submitted by:
ARD, Inc.
159 Bank St., Suite 300
Burlington, VT 05401
Tel: (802) 658-3890
Fax: (802) 658-4247
Email: ard@ardinc.com



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ACRONYMS

CIP	Civic Initiatives Program
CSOs	Civil society organizations
FFSR	Fund for the Financial Support of Regions
IRI	International Republican Institute
ISAR	Initiative for Social Action and Renewal
IUE	Institute for Urban Economics
MSPS	Moscow School of Political Studies
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
SPS	Union of Rightist Forces

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I. PURPOSE, APPROACH, AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this report is to support USAID/Russia's effort to draft its 2005–2010 country program democracy strategy. The Mission's Office of Democratic Initiatives is organized into subsector teams that are responsible for civil society, political process, independent media, rule of law, and local governance.¹ As part of the country strategy development process, USAID has commissioned an assessment of each of these five subsectors.

ARD, Inc. was engaged by USAID under the democracy and governance analytical services indefinite quantity contract to provide USAID/Russia with an assessment of three program areas within the agency's democracy portfolio: political processes, civil society development, and local governance. ARD also was asked to identify possible linkages and synergies across the Mission's democracy portfolio. Finally, ARD was tasked to conduct USAID's annual NGO sustainability index in Russia. The NGO sustainability index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia is a tool used by USAID to study the strength and overall viability of NGO sectors in each country in the region. Through analysis of seven dimensions that are critical to sectoral sustainability, the index is a valuable resource for USAID missions, other international donors, and local NGO umbrella groups and support centers. The overall assessment of three of the subsectors, recommendations for linkages across the portfolio, and the sustainability index activity should be seen as an integral component of the larger country strategy development effort currently underway.

The formal scope of work for this activity, including the sustainability index, is attached to this report as Annex A.

This evaluation was carried out over a six-week period beginning in June 2004 by a research team consisting of four Americans and three Russians. In addition, two special part-time advisors provided significant input into the development and crafting of prioritized recommendations in each of the subsectors. The team conducted more than 100 interviews in Washington, Moscow and five other Russian cities.² To augment the information gleaned from the interviews, the team also relied on selected bibliographical sources (see Annex C) in compiling the present assessment report.

The assessment process included the following activities:

- Review of background information and documents.
- Conduct pre-travel interviews in Washington, D.C.
- Conduct on-site interviews in Washington, D.C., Rostov-on-Don, Irkutsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Bor, and Vladimir.
- Conduct interviews with approximately 150 individuals representing over 100 organizations.
- Apply organization and institutional filters.

¹ There is also a team that handles partnerships and special projects.

² A contact list for the assessment team, advisors, and interviewees can be found in Annex B.

- Conduct post-travel interviews and research.
- Formulate key findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
- Formulate expected programmatic results and estimated budget outlays.

The ARD team began its work in the United States in late May 2004 by reviewing available documentation relevant to USAID/Russia's democracy program. The American members then traveled to Russia, met their Russian team members, and spent nearly three weeks meeting with a wide range of people involved in political process, civil society, and local government development assistance. Interviews were conducted across Russia with USAID officials and staff, USAID partner organizations, political party leaders, heads of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), leaders of municipal organizations, and many other professionals. The assessment team was divided into three working groups (one for each subsector) that included an American and a Russian member. All three working groups traveled to Irkutsk; the political process and civil society working groups then traveled to Rostov-on-Don, while the local governance working group traveled to Vladimir, Nizhny Novgorod, and Bor. A USAID staff member accompanied the team to each of the cities visited. Annex D contains summaries of discussion from selected meetings. (Owing to length, this annex is included only as a pdf file on a disk attached to the sleeve of the bound report.)

Upon completion of the fieldwork, the team considered the following institutional filters in advance of providing its key findings and recommendations:

- Mission strategic objectives.
- The stated expected level of Mission resources that will be available for activities in the three subsectors.
- Expected results and potential impact.

Prior to departure from Russia on June 19, 2004, the team presented a draft outline of its major findings, conclusions, and recommendations for each of the subsectors, as well as for potential synergistic activities across the democracy office's portfolio. These preliminary results were discussed with Mission staff in Moscow, and written comments were provided to the team during finalization of this assessment report.

Research for the NGO sustainability index was completed in November 2004. The final version of the index is available from USAID.

2. OVERVIEW

The assessment team has generated the enclosed report at a perplexing time for the cause of democratizing reform in the Russian Federation. Prevailing political tendencies inside the country, consonant with those in many parts of the post-Soviet expanse, are discouraging, and this in turn creates dilemmas for the USAID mission and for American policy as a whole.

The roots of the problem go back to the circumstances of the fall of the Soviet regime at the beginning of the 1990s. Besides pressures for a more open and a more responsive political system, the collapse unleashed an unruly struggle for power and wealth and a multitude of fissiparous forces that at times seemed to jeopardize the very fabric of Russian society and the ability of the state to govern. Euphoria over a smooth “transition” to a democratic polity yielded to widespread concern at the elite and the mass level about the need to entrench governing arrangements and to bring the overall transformation process under tighter rein— notions that meshed with traditionally paternalistic Russian attitudes toward authority. The stoutly presidentialist constitution put in place by independent Russia’s founding president, Boris Yeltsin, in 1993 proved to be a suitable vehicle for the purpose. Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, having tapped the yearning for stability in his ascent to power in 1999–2000, promptly installed a bundle of measures aimed at “law and order” and “strengthening the state,” surpassing what his patron initially had in mind. These included additional buttressing of executive and especially presidential prerogatives at the expense of parliament; the insertion of numerous officers from the security apparatus into senior political and administrative positions; curbs on the flow of news, information, and opinion; a frostier stance toward NGOs; restrictions on aid providers and on contacts between Russian citizens and foreigners; steps to recentralize Russia’s federal system and to pare back the role of regional leaders in national decision making; reliance on a harsh military occupation to quell the insurgency in Chechnya; and the construction of a privileged “party of power,” United Russia, with which officialdom in Moscow and the provinces has been obliged to cooperate.

Recent events have extended this unsettling trend several more notches. Strictures on the mass media and the national television networks, in particular, were noticeably stiffened in 2003–2004. Governmental manipulation of mass politics attained unprecedented heights during the latest Russia-wide electoral cycle. The Kremlin-aligned United Russia harvested two-thirds of the seats in the State Duma in December 2003, and the major liberal parties were shut out for the first time. Putin was reelected as president in the qualifying round in March 2004 with more than 70% of the popular vote. Concurrent with the election campaigns, the multipronged attack on the richest man in Russia, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and the oil company he headed, Yukos, betrayed a determination to set limits to big business’s political influence and to reassert state primacy in the natural resources sector, the engine of the Russian economy.

Contemporary Russia is by no stretch of the imagination a liberal democracy, and on Putin’s watch it has regressed significantly from certain of the democratic gains of the preceding dec-

ade. This being said, however, the USAID assessment team does not consider past achievements to have been totally eviscerated or the battle for democracy to have been irretrievably lost. Russia, like many nations swept up in the “third wave” of global political change in the last third of the twentieth century, is governed today by a hybrid regime that blends aspects of democratic governance and authoritarian domination.³ Over the long haul, modern history gives us ample reason to expect the democratization dynamic to resume and deepen, subject always to zigzags and intermittent setbacks. A well-regarded body of scholarship holds that political democracy tends sooner or later to go hand in hand with market economics and with the accumulation and prosperity fostered by private property and free exchange. Among other dividends, sustained, market-induced growth ought to encourage the emergence of a Western-type middle class in Russia. By some estimates, a sizable minority of the population already belongs to such a grouping.⁴ A large and flourishing middle class committed to defending its own interests in the public arena would eventually be one of the most reliable props of civil society, rule of law, limited government, and, above all, of political pluralism in the new Russia.

A series of short-term considerations also argue against drawing overly gloomy conclusions from Russian political developments. For one thing, many of Putin’s cardinal decisions owe as much to the logic of tempering the excesses of the Yeltsin period as to any urge to revert to the unalloyed tyranny of Soviet days. The 2003–2004 electoral cycle, which the ruling group was bent on winning at all cost, exaggerated the propensity to shun Yeltsin-era prescriptions. Putin and his allies and clients capitalized shrewdly on popular apathy (*vis-à-vis* media freedoms) and resentment (*vis-à-vis* Khodorkovsky and the “oligarchs” who profited so disproportionately from privatization). It is simply too soon to judge whether they will be willing or able to undertake a more radical march along the autocratic path in future.

For another thing, some of the recent efforts to boost the capacity of the Russian state—by improving tax collection, budgetary procedures, and bureaucratic discipline, for instance—pose no dire threat to economic, social, and political freedoms and may well contribute to the foundations of good government by equipping the authorities to respond more adequately to policy problems. A related point is that Putin’s program has contained liberal as well as illiberal strands. Examples would be passage of a land code that sanctions private ownership, reduction in red tape for small businesses, and the introduction of jury trials for serious criminal offenses.

³ Devising catchphrases for the resultant mix—“managed democracy,” “managed pluralism,” “electoral democracy,” and “competitive authoritarianism,” among others—has become somewhat of a cottage industry among academics. The contours of the debate can be traced in the periodical *Journal of Democracy*.

⁴ Thirty-six percent of voting-age citizens surveyed by Russian sociologists in the winter of 1999–2000 (in a project organized by Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul) answered affirmatively to a yes/no question about whether they belonged to the middle class. A more complex question used in an analogous survey in 2003–2004 (project directors Colton, Henry Hale, and McFaul) drew a rather different response, mostly because it explicitly gave respondents a sizable list of alternative social groups (14 in all) with which they might feel an affinity. Eight percent said they felt closest to the middle class, putting it fifth on the list of groups (workers were first and pensioners second). A slightly larger proportion identified with the intelligentsia, a group recognized (unlike the middle class) in the Soviet lexicon. Studies putting the middle class at around one-fifth of the population have been done by Tat’yana Maleva of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Harley Balzer of Georgetown University, and the U.S. State Department’s Office of Research.

Economically, Putin has had the good fortune to preside over the remarkable, export-led boom that followed on the heels of the financial crisis and devaluation of 1998. A truism of political economy is that good times redound to the benefit of incumbents, and so it has been in Putin's Russia. His almost effortless reelection in 2004 owes an enormous amount to the economic recovery, credit for which would in all likelihood have accrued to almost anyone holding his job in that same span of years. In the political sphere, quite a few of the structural features of the more liberal 1990s remain viable, albeit in attenuated form. For all the backsliding, Russia continues to have competitive elections, a plethora of political parties (though they are relatively ineffectual), somewhat abridged rights to organize and assemble, a spectrum of points of view and sentiments on offer in its communications media and intellectual establishment, and a functioning federal system. In the private sphere, there has been no tampering with the vast majority of the personal liberties granted to the populace under the aegis of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Indeed, they have been enhanced in many cases by greater purchasing power and the newfound availability of consumer conveniences.

It is equally worthy of note that, barring a drastic revision of the rules of the game, the end of Vladimir Putin's tenure in office is now in clear sight.⁵ Like Yeltsin before him, he can be counted on to want to designate a reliable political heir. Prior experience shows that under semi-democratized Russian conditions it is feasible for a strongman to manage such a succession process in terms of personnel—Yeltsin made the hitherto obscure Putin a national figure overnight by appointing him prime minister and then acting president in 1999—but that, by the same token, the cleverest maneuvering will not be enough to guarantee the final result in terms of policy. Within Russia's broader political elite, the inherent uncertainty of the impending transfer of control is bound to heighten tension and willingness to engage in risky behavior. This will all unfold against an unpredictable economic backdrop. Oil and gas production, stimulated by elevated world prices, has accounted for about half of the rise in Russian economic output since 1999, so any cooling in demand will commensurately shrink the size of the pie to be distributed and intensify conflict over it. And other economic and socioeconomic dangers lurk as well,⁶ to say nothing of the interminable strife in Chechnya, which is again showing signs of spilling over into neighboring sections of the Caucasus and beyond.

In so open-ended a setting, we recommend that USAID programs combine a patient and guardedly hopeful perspective on Russia's long-term political prospects with a willingness to invest in undertakings that give leverage toward at least partially favorable outcomes in the short term. The approach should be strategic, proactive, flexible, and informed. Adverse and uncer-

⁵ Under the 1993 constitution, he is limited to two four-year terms, the second of which will expire in May 2008. There has been discussion within his administration of a constitutional amendment to extend his presidential eligibility or to turn Russia into a parliamentary republic in which he could succeed himself by becoming prime minister. Putin has repeatedly declared his opposition to any such change, although it cannot be excluded that he has concealed his true opinion or would be open to changing his mind.

⁶ As we complete this report, a payments crisis has beset the Russian banking sector for several months. There is abundant dissension, too, over the plan to slash public subsidies in the housing and municipal-services sector. Some press commentaries have linked these simmering problems to the sag in Putin's popularity ratings since the March election.

tain tendencies in the immediate Russian environment dictate realism and a sense of proportion in setting program objectives in the coming years. We are persuaded, nonetheless, that USAID actions can make a discernible difference in two main respects, notwithstanding the near-impossibility of democratic breakthroughs at this juncture. First, it behooves the agency to implement its programs with an eye toward *protecting key elements of pluralism* that have survived from the more benign climate of earlier years. Second, and consistent with the recommendations found in this report, we suggest that USAID be *selective* in new initiatives intended to break new ground in terms of longer-term political change.

The findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the assessment team in the political process, local government, and civil society USAID/DI subsectors can be found in the chapters that follow. In addition, the team has prepared a special set of recommendations based on the finding that USAID's impact, over time, can be maximized by leveraging programs and approaches across activity sectors.

3. POLITICAL PROCESS ASSESSMENT

3.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE SECTOR

Trends and structures pose challenges for pluralism

The trends described in chapter 2 are particularly manifest in regard to political processes. There was considerable progress made since 1993 in the articulation of a new enabling environment for democratic practices, but these initial steps proved to be no panacea for the conflicts and confusion that followed the end of the Soviet system. The Russian penchant for order helped the presidency emerge as a powerful center of stability. But early aspirations for a rapid move to mature democracy have been tempered by political tactics somewhat reminiscent of a prior, more authoritarian era.

Most recently, it appears as though the trends in the direction of greater concentration of power in the Kremlin is continuing. President Vladimir Putin, referring to the need to strengthen central authority after a spate of terrorist acts in recent weeks, introduced plans in September 2004 to abolish direct elections for regional governors and to alter the voting rules of parliament. The recent announcement by Putin has led former president Boris Yeltsin to criticize the recent trends away from democratization under Putin's presidency. Yeltsin lamented the fact that Russia appears to be moving away from the spirit and letter of the 1993 constitution that he introduced, and which was subsequently approved by national referendum.

The recent trends, however, should not be overstated and seen as a complete reversal, since the structure of the political process itself already favored a powerful executive. Rather, Putin has been exercising the powers that he inherited to further strengthen the Kremlin's control over Russian politics. The president is committed to maintaining stability through means of control, rather than through greater liberalization.

A strong presidency as an institution dates back to the constitution of 1993, which provided the executive with sweeping powers. The constitution provides for little in the way of parliamentary oversight, with only a handful of appointments needing to be ratified by the legislature. The president can only be challenged by a two-thirds majority of the 450 member Duma. Such an opposition is unlikely. At first, there were too many parties for opposition forces to obtain a majority, and after the last election, pro-Putin factions have held sway over United Russia, which has emerged as the dominant political party.

The presidency also dominates the federal system. This concentration of power became more pronounced as a result of the diminution of the powers of the 178 member Federation Council. President Putin moved to pass a law in 2000 whereby elected regional governors and heads of regional assemblies no longer automatically gained membership in the Council. Instead, the regional representatives are now themselves elected from forums that Kremlin can more easily control. The governors continue to have access to State Council, which provides them with direct access to President, which in some ways is seen as more important than formal powers. The recent moves to further limit the independence of governors comes in part as a result of re-

gional complaints about the Kremlin leaving regions to pay for promises made by Moscow without transferring additional resources downwards. Just this past summer, several governors openly criticized the Kremlin's fiscal policies. More on the decentralization of fiscal resources and authorities are discussed below in the section on local governance.

The lack of strong checks on executive power has meant that systems of patronage are resilient, which is a recipe for corruption. The judiciary is also a weak and ineffective counterweight to the strong executive, further improving the environment for corruption. The dominance of strong personalities, long a feature of Russian politics, has again emerged with the consolidation of power in Putin's presidency.

The combination of contemporary trends with the structures that favor a strong presidency poses considerable challenges for short-term breakthroughs or improvements at the national level toward democratization. There is a lack of political will for further liberalization from the top of the political system, and advocates for democratic reform currently lack the vehicles (such as effective political parties and free media) to effectively push for change from below. As will be seen later in this report, there are more opportunities for effective interventions at the local levels than at the national level.

Competitive and representational mechanisms remain weak

PARTIES

In part reflective of the limited role of parliament, political parties have not effectively played a key role in fostering effective competition. Party building in Russia has been hamstrung by the limited penetration parties have had in important political institutions. In the executive branch, most officials do not belong to parties, and there is no proportionality by party in awarding powerful positions. The two men to hold the most potent position in the Russian political system, the presidency—Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin—have eschewed membership in any party, although both have lent support to pro-Kremlin parties.

The problems with political parties in Russia have a financial dimension: electoral campaigns are expensive and politicians need to find the wherewithal to cover campaign expenses and maintain head-office organization. Although money is not the decisive problem for them, interviews with party leaders indicated that they devote inordinate effort to identifying donors and raising funds. The parties have to devise ways to finance themselves that are less vulnerable to external and state pressures, as well as potential cutbacks. The Khodorkovsky affair suggests that large- and medium-size businessmen may be reluctant to risk getting too engaged in party politics, at least in opposition party politics. Party dues may prove effective at some point as well.

What perhaps most grievously inhibits Russian parties from building wider memberships and constituencies is their frequent inability to define themselves in programmatic terms and to demonstrate to potential members and voters exactly how they intend to accomplish their stated goals. Large egos, a penchant for infighting, and a lack of strategic thinking and planning

frequently stand in the way of articulating a compelling political vision. In the succinct evaluation of one senior officer in a liberal-minded party, the failure of his party in December 2003 was caused by external and internal factors, strategic and tactical. His most interesting comments concerned the internal strategic factors. First, although the party's platform had good points, its message was transmitted poorly. Second, the party had no conception of how to deal with the United Russia juggernaut—how they differed from United Russia especially—or with the other major liberal-minded party. Third, they had no effective feedback mechanism from the local activists and mid-level party functionaries back to the top leadership in Moscow (“no one likes to hear criticism, but it's essential”). A local party leader was more pointed in summing up relations between his organization's center and party troops on the ground: “We don't need anything from them. What they tell us to do [in the way of election techniques, for instance] changes with every new election, and this is handled in an idiotic fashion.”

The assessment team is convinced, in light of party shortcomings and the absence of more favorable political will, that support for party organization at the center, and for center-out or top-down organization building, should not be the nub of the agency's work under current conditions. Instead, periphery-in or bottom-up techniques are much more promising at the present time. A related focus for activity should be the rules of the electoral and party game. Here the agency should seek out ways to support those who advocate greater coherence and simplicity in electoral laws and, especially, greater transparency and integrity in their implementation. We can expect considerable turbulence in the party realm as political players regroup for the Duma elections scheduled for 2007. New faces are sure to appear in many parties—and not least in the liberal factions that did so miserably in 2003. For new or revamped parties to succeed, they will need to redouble their efforts to build strength locally, all the more so because recent legislation will make regional elections between-party affairs. United Russia is already investing heavily in regional campaigns, and any party or bloc that wishes to resist it will need to do the same.

The building of relationships between political parties and NGOs is another approach worth considering. But this will also face many challenges, as civil society at the national level is also weak and somewhat artificial, as elaborated more fully in the subsequent section on civil society. The assessment team's interviews, especially outside of Moscow, suggest linkages between parties and NGOs will be effective only after protracted engagement. While constituency building is essential for a more democratic future, linking party processes with NGO support should be done carefully and selectively, perhaps by starting with activities that involve economic and social issues rather than overt political issues. For example, constituency-building linkages between NGOs involved in social service delivery and municipal authorities could help build the networks of interaction between parties, local authorities, and NGOs, which would have positive implications for political processes in Russia at the local level.

ELECTIONS

Genuine electoral competition has been hindered in most polls in which the Kremlin has an interest. Television broadcasts have been increasingly slanted toward Kremlin positions. Attempts by business scions to enter the political arena have been heavily discouraged, as with

Khodorkovsky. Many Russian experts see harm in the 2002 change in the election law that beginning in 2007 demands a minimum of 7% of the national party-list vote for any party to be seated in the State Duma (until now the threshold has been 5%). The argument is that the higher threshold will exclude certain minority views from representation at the national level and will allow the Kremlin to intimidate smaller parties. Other observers, however, point out that the 7% barrier will mostly impede the emergence of frivolous, single-issue parties and will actually present politicians with incentives to consolidate their efforts and voters with more palatable alternatives at election time. Of perhaps greater importance and detriment is the requirement in the new Russian law on political parties that any party must have chapters in 50% of the 89 provinces of the federation and that in half of the 89 it must have at least 100 members. This clause will work against the spontaneous development of regional-based parties. It is also onerous for national-level parties, for they will be hard-pressed to recruit significant numbers of adherents in remote and sparsely populated areas, and will be tempted to resort to subterfuge and financial incentives to meet the stipulation.

Another new federal law, requiring that regional assemblies elect at least half of their deputies on party lists, like the State Duma, is double-edged. On the one hand, it may serve to strengthen political parties in some regions and acquaint the populace better with parties and party-based politics. On the other hand, the rule can be easily manipulated to stifle the legitimate political activities of some groups, as was done, for instance, in Yekaterinburg during the recent election of the *oblast дума*. The liberal-minded SPS and Yabloko alliance there was kept out of the elections on a technicality and so denied representation in the Duma.

Much of the legislation in effect in Russia regarding elections is adequate and relatively fair. The failures come in its implementation—as with nearly all laws in Russia. To cite the most egregious examples: (1) electoral commissions at various levels of government are packed with politically connected members, mostly supporters of those in power in the jurisdiction; (2) close monitoring of elections, by foreigners as well as Russians, is hampered by current administrations; (3) requirements for and limitations on campaign finance are arbitrarily and sometimes illegally enforced, again so as to minimize the efforts of opposition groups; and (4) ruling groups have been free to set up artificial “duck” or “decoy” (*utka*) parties to deflect votes away from rivals or to create political schisms at the highest levels (such as with Rodina and the “Speakers’ Party” in the 2003 campaign for the State Duma).

What laws not currently on the books would be most helpful in promoting greater democracy in Russia? Among those suggested by current USAID grantees:

- Requirements for greater transparency at all levels of government and greater access to public officials by the media.
- A law attaching a “societal” committee to every elected body, which would watch out for the voters and their concerns.
- Elimination of spending limits on election campaigns, as they cannot be enforced in practice or are enforced inequitably, and are often used as a pretext to winnow out troublesome candidates.

Federalism offers some potential traction at local levels

It appears as though the situation at national and federal levels is not filled with promising opportunities for effective donor intervention. But there are some dynamism and ongoing refashioning of arrangements as one moves away from the center. In part, this is due to the failure of the state to be able to maintain a centralized hold throughout the country. The political economy of contemporary Russia means that the state is no longer to play the benevolent role it aspired to under the communist system. There is a pressing financial need to delegate some responsibilities to more regional and local levels. This holds for both private investment and the provision of public goods and services.

The problem is that the reach of a patronage system based on strong personalities is too limited to maintain legitimacy in the periphery. If Putin or a local governor does not look your way, it is difficult to get important things accomplished. Few if any Russians today find it effective to work with or contribute to causes that are not in some way encouraged or supported by the authorities. Much of the Russian political process thus has the nature of self-fulfilling prophecy: ordinary Russians think that an effort without the imprimatur of a governor or of Putin will fail

USAID's interest in refocusing on Russia's regions and on an issue-oriented approach is therefore on the mark. The highly charged political situation in the national political arena at present is not conducive to the development of meaningful, long-term, and sustainable reforms. The assessment team believes that grassroots work is the most essential work to be done in a development context in Russia. To be sure, the obstacles at the local level are also great. In the telling phrase of one Rostov-area official (reported by a local political activist), "The governor wants to have all the political parties in his pocket: one in the front pocket, another in the back pocket." On balance, however, locality takes on special importance in a sprawling country with ethnic, climactic, and other diversity and, now, a federal constitution. As a practical matter, local and regional initiatives have more room to unfold than those undertaken exclusively at the federal level.

Conceivably, political programs might be developed to cater to certain public discontents surrounding the Russian taxation system. Namely, the inequities of the system tied closely today to the idea of "donor regions" and net "recipient regions" could play a role in focusing greater public attention on government transparency and fairness. The regions most often considered to be budgetary donors are St. Petersburg, Moscow City, Moscow Oblast, Lipetsk, Samara, Tatarstan, Perm, Sverdlovsk, Bashkortostan, Khanty-Mansi, Yamal-Nenets, Krasnoyarsk, and Irkutsk.⁷

Both key challenges and opportunities exist in looking downward

So far as the population is concerned, observers of the Russian scene (Richard Pipes, for example) are correct in noting a measure of passivity, indifference, and even hostility toward "democracy," as Americans understand this concept, and a strong desire for stability and order in

⁷ There is much fluctuation in the published lists of donors and recipients. The number of donor regions grew from 9 or 10 in 1996 to some 13 in 1999 and 18 or 19 in 2000, and then went back down to 9 in 2002. In 2003 it was said to have increased to 13.

their lives.⁸ Ordinary Russians deeply resent the fact that the former system of government and its ways of doing things ended so swiftly, facing them with a sink-or-swim situation and a shredded social safety net. The corruption that reached epidemic proportions in the 1990s and the refusal of many public officials to heed popular concerns have also alienated them. But this hardly means that Russians have rejected all aspects of a more open society or even that they have given carte blanche to their leaders and will absolve them of responsibility for their actions. Public apathy, cynicism, and lack of civil awareness are big but not insurmountable problems. Pipes himself has far from given up on the prospects of democracy in Russia, as illustrated by his active participation in Moscow School of Political Studies (MSPS) conferences. He is hopeful that Russia will eventually settle on a form of governance suitable to it, combining aspects of liberalism and Russian traditionalism.⁹ It is our judgment that limited political involvement by a relatively narrow circle of people now creates the possibility of more involvement by a broader stratum of people in time. Now is emphatically not the moment to throw to the winds the seeds of democracy that remain on Russian soil.

Citizens tend to be more politically active where there are salient social issues that need to be resolved. Resolving social/community services may be the single greatest stimulus for getting people involved in politics. The gap in the provision of such services and the resolution of community problems presents promising opportunities that has the potential to increase citizen participation, and is explored further in the subsequent sections of this assessment.

3.2 USAID'S ACTIVITIES VIS-À-VIS THE POLITICAL PROCESS

Strengths of USAID programs

In general, all USAID programming that promotes political competition and pluralism, the growth of liberal-minded political parties/groups, and/or changes in electoral and party laws to make them more equitable and transparent is of value. The issue is not the inherent merits of contributing to this effort, but rather whether the commitment of resources in this area has been able to lead to sufficient impact given other opportunities for investment. Given more resources, USAID should continue all such programs.

The election monitoring work of GOLOS (funded through multiple mechanisms) is of great importance to USAID'S political mission because it brings greater transparency to the political process. All methods that can reduce voting manipulation and other chicanery associated with "administrative resources" deserve to be fostered. Considerable resources are already devoted to this work from other sources. More critical for USAID is to help Russians find ways to make use of the monitoring data collected and available. With a pilot program only one year old, it may be too soon to tell, but GOLOS's effort to monitor deputies may not lead to significant progress given the overall constraints facing both parties and elected bodies.

⁸ Richard Pipes, "Flight from Freedom," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2004. But see also the more upbeat conclusions drawn from survey evidence in Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, "America's Real Russian Allies," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2001, and "Are Russians Anti-Democratic?" *Post-Soviet Affairs*, April/June 2002.

⁹ Personal communication to the ARD assessment team.

USAID's recent efforts to do targeted and stratified survey opinion research is an innovative way to assess aspects of the agency's work. Well-designed and well-executed surveys can provide (1) some significant benchmarks for future comparisons of regions receiving assistance with those not receiving assistance (or receiving less assistance) and (2) insights for planning purposes into how major social actors and groups, political figures, and/or strata of society view the processes and changes in which USAID is engaged. On the other hand, survey research cannot be expected to provide (1) absolute proof of USAID effectiveness, (2) detailed justification for any particular program or programs, or (3) a definitive way to prioritize programs.

USAID is fortunate to have the services of a respected survey research team (Debra Javeline and Vanessa Baird) to help educate it about the use and abuse of survey data and the possibilities and limitations of survey research. As USAID itself has done, grantees like the International Republican Institute (IRI) have commissioned survey research for assistance in internal decision making and allocation of money to their own grantees. Among the useful products to appear (for its insight) is Boris Makarenko's "Political Parties after the Parliamentary Elections" (January 2000).

In its semi-annual reports, IRI cites many polls conducted on the regional and local levels—as well as two nationwide surveys—designed primarily to help liberal-minded parties succeed at the polls. Judicious use of opinion polling should remain a fixture of grantees' strategic and tactical planning. IRI, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and their grantees are not as aware as they might be of certain other survey research resources. Foremost is the State Department's Office of Research surveys, readily available to the Moscow USAID office and through them to grantees. In addition, nearly all major Russian polling firms have their own websites, which present much useful data on a regular basis. Despite the good use to which some commissioned survey data have been put, there is a great deal more that can and should be done with this material.

Weaknesses

Grantees and especially sub-grantees have not been sufficiently careful to monitor their own work. Sub-grantees sometimes judge their success in boilerplate language and self-serving assessments. They often confuse outputs with impact. It would be advisable to see movement to a more systematic, GPRA-like approach of measuring their work. IRI and, to a lesser extent, NDI have attempted this approach in their semiannual reports. Their recognition of the need to have true benchmarks of outcomes, not just of outputs, is praiseworthy and should serve as a model for their own grantees in turn.

MSPS also provides a good example—in its report for the years 2000–2003—of how sub-grantees sometimes mix "outputs" with "outcomes."¹⁰ The entire section on "Impact" (pp. 14–16) is a first-rate example of wrestling with the complex and difficult task of measuring how their work has influenced various people in Russia. In addition, on p. 7 of that "Final Report," it is noted that "At the end of every seminar, feedback forms are distributed for participants to

¹⁰ MSPS, "Final Report, Period: July 2000-July 2003," Moscow, n.d.

noted that “At the end of every seminar, feedback forms are distributed for participants to complete. It serves to improv[e] the School’s program and selection process.” Similarly, on pp. 9, 11, and 12, the MSPS includes, respectively, a list of publications, the assertion that “with the support of the Alumni Association, Regional Schools of Public Politics have been founded in 10 regions of Russia,” and a further affirmation that “the revamp of the website has resulted in a steady increase in the number of hits. The website is also ranked among [the] best 30 websites in ‘politics’ on some search engines.”

The activities described above are all accomplishments of a sort, and yet testimonials to them can easily become exercises in mere bean counting. USAID must induce MSPS and other subgrantees to get at the crux of the matter: the bald statement that “No doubt, these kinds of exchanges have had a positive impact on democratic processes in various regions of the Russian Federation” should not go unchallenged. MSPS should demonstrate how its publications were used and to what effect. What impact did these 10 new regional schools actually have on local politics? Did they end up preaching to the choir, or did they enlist new people into the political process? Has the website managed to change the public’s perceptions or behavior in any way, or is this another form of self-congratulation and internal reinforcement for those already converted?

3.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITIES IN POLITICAL PROCESS

General considerations

Detailed cross-regional analyses of the political map can be drawn in any number of ways, given the large number of factors that can affect political life in any locale. By the same token, general laws or correlation between regional development and political programming, no matter how desirable, are hard to sustain. For many hypotheses of this type, there are both illustrative supporting examples and countervailing examples.

To be concrete, here are some potentially useful “correlations,” based in part on current programming, that USAID might consider in formulating its new strategy:

- In some regions, there has been established a “pyramid” of elections, with balloting for more than one legislative body all held simultaneously. This appeared to have a sanguine effect in Kalmykia and the Altai *krai*, where incumbent conservatives lost in a recent vote. However, in other locales, this simultaneous holding of elections for legislatures at various levels has not had the same effect.
- Effective work with legislative deputies often depends on the region’s level of industrialization and its number of large businesses. In regions with one or more large enterprises, influential deputies tend to be leaders of these large businesses and devote less time and effort to their work as deputies and especially to working with the public, out in the open. In regions without such large enterprises, by contrast, deputies are sometimes more open and public in their activity.
- During elections, media outlets tend to be less shackled in regions where the governor is at odds with legislative deputies or with the mayor and/or council of the regional capital. Ex-

amples where this has been the case in the past are Yekaterinburg, Samara, and Nizhnii Novgorod. These divisions can shift rather quickly.

- Citizens tend to be more politically active where there are salient social issues that need to be resolved. Social/communal services may be the single greatest stimulus for getting people involved in politics.
- “Overlapping programming” appears to pay dividends. In two broad regions, NDI has tried to combine media, advocacy, NGO-party coalition-building, and constituency-building political work—mostly to good effect. These two regions are along the Volga River (Astrakhan, Samara, Saratov) and in the Urals and west Siberia (Yekaterinburg, Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk, and Tiumen).
- Liberal ideas tend to fare well in communities with a disproportionate share of college and university-level students. An example cited by Rostov SPS leaders is the city of Taganrog. Others include Novocherkassk and, to a lesser extent, Rostov itself.
- Conceivably, political programs might be developed to cater to certain public discontents surrounding the Russian taxation system. Namely, the inequities of the system tied closely today to the idea of “donor regions” and net “recipient regions” could play a role in focusing greater public attention on government transparency and fairness. The regions most often considered to be budgetary donors are St. Petersburg, Moscow City, Moscow Oblast, Lipetsk, Samara, Tatarstan, Perm, Sverdlovsk, Bashkortostan, Khanty-Mansi, Yamal-Nenets, Krasnoyarsk, and Irkutsk.¹¹

Geographical Considerations. Creation of “political geographies” of Russia has often been attempted in the past. In the mid-1990s, the CIA produced a famous map of the “red-brown belt,” stretching along the Volga River and down across much of southern Russia. Most of these have been based on national election results, however, and not on more localized data. IRI is the most recent organization to attempt this kind of task, and its report is suggestive of opportunities for political reform but far from exhaustive. Unfortunately, the time it takes to develop this information often leads to results that are overtaken by events.

With respect to geographical distribution of USAID’s new program, it would appear, based on interviews conducted by the team, that regions where the administration and/or the citizenry are *more receptive* to democratic and or liberal ideas include: Novosibirsk, Karelia, Perm, Briansk, Tomsk, Ulyanovsk, Arkhangel’sk, Voronezh, Riazan’, Tver, Kamchatka, Altaiskii krai, Chuvashia, Kaliningrad, Sverdlovsk, and Samara.

Among the regions where the administration and/or the citizenry appear to be *less receptive* to democracy and liberalism are: Moscow, Tatarstan, Bratsk, Bashkiria, Krasnodar.

¹¹ There is much fluctuation in the published lists of donors and recipients. The number of donor regions grew from 9 or 10 in 1996 to some 13 in 1999 and 18 or 19 in 2000, then and went back down to 9 in 2002. In 2003 it was said to have increased to 13.

One interesting region is Kalmykia, where some would put it in one camp, others in the opposite. The same is true of Moscow and the city of St. Petersburg. Even non-democratic regions sometimes have democratic-leaning localities (e.g., Novorossiisk in Krasnodar krai).

For greatest potential impact of its development resources, USAID may wish to focus its activities on regions that are scheduled to have legislative and gubernatorial elections over the next several years. The Mission would have the choice of working with pro-democratic regions, anti-democratic regions, or a mix of the two.

Monitoring and Evaluation Considerations. In general, the assessment team believes that USAID/Russia would do well to increase its expectations with respect to holding grantees and contractors accountable for effectively measuring the impact of development activities. In addition, the team believes that USAID/Russia should use training-of-trainers methodologies to the maximum extent possible. The resources for promoting democracy in Russia are meager, and each and every dollar needs to be stretched as far as possible.

Commendably, USAID/Russia has built into many of its programs guidelines for measuring “success” or “impact.” On closer look, however, these guidelines are unevenly implemented. IRI’s semiannual report for March–September 2003 is a model effort to measure impact (see pp. 44–52).¹² IRI staff has clearly thought long and hard about what measures are meaningful and measurable for their program on political party-building. They have clearly and unambiguously defined five separate indicators and then proceeded to spell out in detail what they accomplished to satisfy those five indicators. USAID should hold this up to other grantees and sub-grantees as a “gold standard” to follow.

However, in their semiannual report for October 2002–2003, this same IRI group followed a more problematic approach to assessing impact. Sprinkled throughout this report are what appear to be good indicators of the effectiveness of their various training programs. However, the report contains strong evidence of “grade inflation” in program evaluations. Based on the ubiquitous problem of “courtesy bias” that creeps into such evaluations, it seems clear that participants were telling IRI that the training was not quite as successful as the high numerical values might at first suggest. The team estimates that the actual ratings of participants were probably much lower, meaning that grantees such as IRI should constantly be vigilant of quality control with respect to its speakers and training program. One way to do this would be to continue to ensure that some IRI staff attend almost every training seminar and pull aside participants for candid conversations about how things are going and how well the speakers are doing.

Specific follow-on activities

Now is a propitious time for USAID to amend its strategy in the political process arena. Until now, the U.S. government and USAID have tried a rather sweeping approach to transforming Russian politics. It appears that now is the time for smaller deeds. *In the interests of protecting and*

¹² International Republican Institute [IRI], “CEPPS-2/IRI Semi-Annual Report: March-September 2003.

deepening political pluralism, the transcending goal and focus of its efforts in the realm of political processes should be the involvement of Russian citizens in the political life of their country. For ordinary Russians to want to get involved there must be a more widespread perception that such activity affects their daily lives in significant and direct ways and that their more active participation will not prove bootless.

Operationally, the best way to effect change in present-day Russia is to act at the regional and local levels rather than primarily at the national/federal level. The attitude here should be, as one Novosibirsk activist put it well: "To try to get change at the federal level now is ridiculous. We must get the regional governors to change." If in due course a half dozen, a dozen, or two dozen regional administrations approach the center to lobby for changes nationwide, *then* it might happen.

Given the mismatch between Russia's size and complexity and the resources the U.S. government likely will provide, USAID must reconcile itself to a small and maybe diminishing future. Clearly, USAID is in no position to transform the political landscape, the laws and constitution, or the entire media system. USAID should move from providing assistance to Russia to becoming a partner with selected Russians on selected issues of reform.

Within the limited scope of USAID activity, the generation and dissemination of information is paramount. Monitoring of elections and elected deputies' activities plays the next most important role. If these programs can encourage even small changes for the better in local and regional legislation and legislatures, they will have accomplished much. The team recommends the following activities, with the most important listed first.

1. **Political Parties.** Although the 2003 elections suggest that the development of effective political parties in Russia remains at an indeterminate stage, it is important that USAID not give up on this activity entirely. Training for political party leaders, and encouraging the emergence of a new generation of political leadership, is of great importance to the U.S. security and political interests. The assessment team recommends that USAID focus its development activities regionally, working with political parties at the local level to increase their incorporation of grassroots constituencies. Parties could also be encouraged to link with issue-based NGOs, perhaps through strategic use of grants for NGOs in areas where the appetite for reform is greatest. The point of entry would be issues rather than the parties *per se*, and the goal would be to encourage NGOs to ally with parties as a means to better access decision-makers. Linkages with USAID local government programs on issues such as constituency building and municipal service delivery could well be an effective way to bring new faces and ideas into Russian politics. We believe that it would be advantageous to work with political parties in regions where USAID otherwise is active. The cumulative effect of multisectoral programming could bring substantially more positive results. In sum, the objective would be to work with parties to try and develop their grassroots base by developing specific platforms and programs on local issues.

2. **Election Monitoring.** USAID should support election monitoring even more broadly and deeply than it currently does and make better use of the information gathered through such monitoring. It is not clear from grantee reports and from our interviews—though it may be the case—that grantees have used monitoring results as “wedge issues” for arousing greater citizen activism, gone to local/regional/federal assemblies with specific legislative proposals to eliminate abuses, or spread this information broadly as a means of educating the public to its civic duties. Specific activities would include monitoring of candidate nomination, registrations, and de-registrations. Aleksandr Rutskoi, Yurii Skuratov, and other potentially troublesome candidates were kept off the 2003 ballot through shady tactics that would be comical if they did not have such serious effects. Henry Hale, Robert Ortung, and Nikolai Petrov recently put a lot of effort into determining how the 2003 nominations worked in the 225 single-mandate districts for the Duma, cataloguing all the dirty tricks and informal coalitions set up by governors and local oligarchs. This effort could easily be replicated in regional, especially gubernatorial, elections, and work could usefully go into pulling the information together in a readily accessible way.

3. **Use of Information Technology.** In conjunction with its media activities, we recommend that USAID increase and enhance the use of the Internet and websites not funded by the agency as well as other information-sharing technologies and resources. For example, the use of cellular telephony, not to mention the spread of broadband Internet, is rapidly expanding across all sectors of the Russian population and in all regions. USAID should look carefully at using these media to reach greater numbers of people. Significantly, the media assessment recently conducted by the Mission does not cover this medium. All major Russian cellular carriers provide Internet-based text messaging; in many countries, this technology is becoming an important source of news, entertainment, and general information. This technology could be harnessed as a way to expand the flow of information about political processes, including political platforms and the nuances of particular political issues. It is axiomatic that an informed electorate is a more effective electorate, and telephony-based initiatives may be a valuable resource in this regard.

In addition, effective use of information technologies greatly reduces the transaction costs of disseminating information and knowledge. It is a key to getting more “bang for the buck” and greater multiplier effects from every program dollar. To the extent that information technology is used for monitoring, evaluation, and information-sharing and pooling, there are no incremental budgeting needs associated with this recommendation: it should be a continual, integral part of the work of USAID, all of its grantees, and all sub-grantees.

4. LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT

4.I. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE SECTOR: PRE-NEW LAWS ON REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS AND THE NEW LAW ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

The political, institutional, and economic transition of Russia during the past 10 years is best characterized as the halting emergence of foundations for a market economy, democratic political institutions, and civil society. As the Soviet Union collapsed, a new consensus was formulated in the developed world: successful countries had to arrange their economies under the principles of market economics; government had to be smaller and efficient; and democracy was the political system most compatible with a market economy. The principles of competition, efficiency, and civic participation were identified as the core values of successful societies.

Russia's path to a new economic and political structure has been challenging. This is the case because the principles of competition, efficiency, and civic participation are foreign to a society that historically is biased in favor of centralization, is suspicious of competition, and is skeptical about the benefits of open public participation in public affairs. This dialectic is reflected in the organization of the state in Russia: the current political and administrative system is characterized by a centralized governmental structure that includes *de jure* federal organizations and *de facto* elements of a unitary state.

Russia's 89 political units have very different administrative and political status, largely reflecting differences in the relative degree of autonomy from the center and the ethnic mix of the local population. The evolution of the legal and institutional framework after independence reflected political compromises in the face of strong opposition from the regions, as evidenced by the proliferation of bilateral arrangements between the center and individual regions, rather than by consistently applied rules and principles. In recent years, regions have also claimed greater *de facto* legal and regulatory authority, largely in the absence of effective federal instruments necessary to monitor and regulate regional fiscal behavior.

Although the 1993 Constitution, along with numerous other supplementary laws and decrees, provided for constitutionally mandated interactions between different levels of government, the framework law on local government adopted in 2003 contains many inconsistent and conflicting provisions. In addition, rules and procedures intended to resolve jurisdictional issues (over shared responsibilities between central and regional governments and legislatures, for example) are ambiguous and often contradict other legislation. Overlapping and poorly defined roles and responsibilities, asymmetric fiscal relations, and unclear divisions of power between different levels of government have created confusion about the functions and modes of interaction of different parts of government. Furthermore, distorted incentives for prudent fiscal management at subnational levels have encouraged creative accounting, including reliance on tax offsets and extra-budgetary funds. In addition, contradictions among various laws and regulations often are resolved in an *ad hoc* manner, with crucial provisions often decided in the annual budget laws, which imparts a measure of unpredictability and instability to the system of intergovernmental relations.

Between 1995 and 1998, the laws on local self-government and financial autonomy of local self-governments were adopted. The latter set the apportionment factors for sharing federal taxes with local governments, which led to more predictable budget revenues for municipal governments. However, the federal government continued to issue social laws, which imposed a substantive financial burden on municipalities. Between 1999 and 2001 the federal government revised the budget and tax laws of the Russian Federation, but there were no significant changes for local governments.

Local governments were created in Russia in the early 1990s based on the principle of geographical “area.” This meant that local governments were not correlated with population, but rather with territories administered by *rayons*. Thus, by 2002 half of Russia’s cities did not have a local self-government. From a corporate governance point of view, elected mayors presiding over “governments” that do not have significant revenue and expenditure autonomy, and therefore become agents who are assigned with the responsibility of redistributing state funds, thus serve as “transmitters of state decisions.”¹³

Revenue assignment

A revenue assignment system characterized the period up to 1994. This system was non-transparent and unpredictable due to frequent changes in basic sharing parameters and assignments that were ad hoc and negotiated with individual regions. This “regulation” approach basically aimed at designing tax-sharing arrangements in which individual regions had sufficient resources (in combination with their “own” revenues and transfers) to finance a set of defined “minimum” expenditures. The lack of clearly defined, stable, and uniform revenue assignments between the center and subnational governments inherent in this approach weakened budgetary management at the subnational level and created perverse incentives for subnational governments to either hide locally mobilized revenue sources in extra-budgetary funds, or simply to reduce their efforts to mobilize revenues locally.

Although the reform initiatives subsequent to 1994 have addressed some of these concerns, particularly at the central and regional levels, the present system still suffers from a lack of effective tax autonomy at the subnational level. Revenues from taxes shared on a derivation basis, whose structures can only be changed at the central level, continue to account for the largest share of regional revenue receipts. Autonomy over taxes, which are permanently assigned to subnational governments and whose yields are fully allocated to subnational governments, is limited by federal restrictions over tax bases and rates. The minimal subnational autonomy to raise revenues and decide tax policies at the margin and the resultant mismatch between expenditure responsibilities and the real tax base has important implications for accountability and responsibility at the subnational level. In addition, there are weaknesses in the choice of taxes that are shared between the center and subnational governments and how the shared tax revenues have been apportioned among subnational governments. Revenue sharing arrangements between regional and local governments continue to be based on the “regulatory” ap-

¹³ Chernyavsky, A.V., *Review of the Municipal Finance Development in Russia in 1992-2002*. No date, p. 2.

proach, with customized and yearly changing of sharing rates and compensations through nontransparent transfers.¹⁴ This approach has created negative incentives for revenue mobilization as regional governments routinely claw back any additional revenues raised by local governments.

The absence of a modern tax administration has also hampered both the day-to-day implementation of revenue assignments and adversely affected general government revenue collections. Despite the existence of a centralized national tax administration authority, a major difficulty in tax administration has been the inability of the federal tax-collecting agency to exert effective control over the regional and local branches. The de facto dual subordination of tax officials has encouraged the widespread use of tax offsets and other monetary surrogates in subnational budgets, and weakened federal revenue collections.

Transfers

Historically, in Soviet times, negotiated and “gap filling” transfers were used to implement the “regulatory” approach toward revenue assignment. In the mid-1990s, a new system of formula-driven equalization transfers was introduced, known as the Fund for the Financial Support of Regions (FFSR), with two windows, one designed to equalize revenue availability across regions and a second to provide additional funding to regions with unmet expenditure needs. Total funding was determined in the annual federal budget and allocated separately between these two objectives, largely on the basis of past tax revenue and expenditure performance of the region. This system had several significant limitations, including the technical problem of accurately measuring taxable capacity and expenditure needs and the problem of financing sufficient equalization transfers to offset the precipitous fall in general government revenues (caused in part by the negative incentives to revenue mobilization discussed above). In addition, the actual determination of these transfers was subject to substantial political manipulation and pressure, with frequent changes in the formulas reducing revenue predictability for regional governments, particularly during the early years of transition.

Recently, a new equalization formula for the FFSR has been introduced, which combines both fiscal capacity and expenditure-need equalization in a single step, with the funding for the equalization grant fixed in the annual budget as a percentage of all federal tax revenues (exclusive of import duties). While this represents a significant improvement over the previous system, the continued use of other *ad hoc* and non-transparent transfers, such as mutual settlements (which accounted for over 75 percent of all non-equalization transfers in 1998),¹⁵ have provided a disincentive for sound budgetary management at the subnational level. In addition, earmarked transfers to regions, which may be used for current or capital expenditure purposes,

¹⁴ While transfer formulas are on paper transparent, the constant scarcity of revenues compared to the obligations of all levels of government makes full compliance with the law difficult to attain. Thus during the execution of the budget law, many adhoc measures and compromises are made.

¹⁵ Mutual settlements, which consist largely of unbudgeted transfers to compensate regional governments for mandates or the delivery of federal programs, emergency transfers, as well as other negotiated and discretionary funds, are typically allocated during the process of budget execution.

also contain a large element of negotiation and bargaining between the center and regional governments.

At the regional–local level, transfers continue to be gap-filling and negotiated in nature, which provides local governments with a soft budget constraint and perverse incentives for revenue mobilization. According to Chernyavsky,¹⁶ during the past 10 years the level of municipal autonomy has not increased, but has fallen considerably. By 2002, municipalities were able to fully control only about 4–5% of local budget revenues, as the federal government strictly regulated the remainder. Furthermore, Chernyavsky argues that there has been a steady reduction in the total share of local budget expenditures as a proportion of GDP. Between 1997 and 2002, the share dropped from 10.9% to 6.5%, while for regional governments the share grew from 6.6% to 8.3%, and for the federal government, it grew from 10.8% to 16.6%.¹⁷

Subnational borrowing

From the time of independence until very recently, subnational governments were granted the right to borrow with very few restrictions. In particular, no explicit limits were imposed and subnational governments were allowed to borrow for all purposes, including for financing current expenditures. However, as subnational governments had only limited access to private credit sources, most of the borrowing took the form of loans from the Ministry of Finance at the regional level and from regional finance departments at the local level as well as ad hoc adjustments in transfers, all of which provided subnational governments with a soft budget constraint. In recent years, concerns about the lack of responsible fiscal management at the subnational level and its impact on macroeconomic stability at the national level have prompted the introduction of limits and control regulation for subnational borrowing. It also has resulted in limits on overall debt as well as limits on the budget deficits of regions as a share of their budget revenues. Although the overall level of subnational borrowing remains low, there is an increasing trend toward greater subnational deficits, accumulation of debt, loan guarantees, and loans from “wealthy” enterprises operating within a local jurisdiction. Commercial bank debt has become the primary source of deficit finance, particularly since promissory notes (*veksels*) have been disallowed since 1997.

Social services/Civil society organizations

Civil society organizations (CSOs) exist throughout the Russian Federation. From the point of view of local governance, it is important for citizens to be active in local/municipal service delivery issues. CSOs fear that if they become dependent on local government or come to rely primarily on government money, they will be co-opted into some type of compliance with the “system.” But on the other hand, there are realities and needs faced by people at the local level where local government and citizens can collaborate. For example, most of the unfunded mandates at the local level are in the area of social services and increasingly, a greater portion of vulnerable groups (e.g., elderly, youth) are being excluded from the mainstream of Russian so-

¹⁶ Chernyavsky, A.V. Review of the Municipal Finance Development in Russia in 1992-2002. n.d.

¹⁷ Ibid. Page 4.

ciety. This presents an opportunity for collaboration between local governments and citizens that need to be exploited in the future. Most of the work of CSOs in Russia at the regional and local government levels has centered around the modification of laws at the regional level in order to allow CSOs to provide certain social services. The IUE has started work in this sector in three specific areas: simplification of transaction costs through the creation of a program called the “one window stop”; improvements in the identification of recipients of social service subsidies; and training unemployed people to find work, thereby leaving the welfare rolls.

Local governance

Given the institutional setting in which local self-governments live, there are no conditions and incentives for them to have a responsive, flexible, pro-active, and service-oriented set of policies and actions. For all practical purposes, local governments are budgetary entities of a deconcentrated unitary state rather than governments per se. In the case of the Russian Federation, most expenditures are earmarked from above and “local” revenues are collected by a federal agency are then channeled to local governments. Thus, local governments have neither the autonomy nor the authority under current law to behave as a local government is expected to behave in the Western world’s view of fiscal decentralization.

This reality has led to citizens’ indifference to municipal elections, according to Chernyavsky, evidenced by the fact that many municipal elections do not attract the minimum required number of voters needed to make them valid.¹⁸ Elected officials under this type of institutional arrangement have no incentive to interact with local citizens to find out about the community’s pressing needs or to find new ways to provide for better services. Instead, most mayors seem to spend their time at the regional government’s headquarters lobbying the governor or the regional administration for more money or for unfunded special projects. This behavior is not surprising, given that local governments do not have revenue and expenditure autonomy and therefore are forced to behave as if they were unelected heads of a budgetary institution attached to and dependent on the federal government.

It is important to mention “mono-enterprise” municipalities, which face the same constraints and limitations of most municipalities in the Russian Federation, except that instead of lobbying the governor or the regional government administration, they develop close relationships with the successful enterprise located in their jurisdiction. For example, the mayor of Shelekhov, a former executive of the aluminum plant located in the municipality, accepted a contribution of 700,000 rubles from that plant in order to pay the costs of federal government-imposed unfunded mandates and other pressing social needs. In the short run this contribution helps a local government to resolve pressing problems and to avoid borrowing from commercial banks at high rates (up to 14%). However, it also creates governance problems: it softens the municipality’s budget constraint, there is no accountability as to how the money will be allocated and spent, and it creates the possibility that local elites will capture local government.

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 6.

Because they are at the bottom of the pyramid of a centralized state, local governments suffer from the institutional arrangement within which they have to exist. A.V. Chernyavsky summarizes the state of local self-governments as follows:

The main fundamental cause of the crisis (of local self-governments) was the system of municipal finance imposed on local self-governments by the federal authorities. This is the root of all problems of Russian municipal process; this is what blocks its normal development. Deprived of almost any autonomy in the use of funds, constantly baffled by endless change of rules introduced by the federal government, powerless and debt-ridden –such self-government simply could not be of any interest to the citizen, who was supposed to find it, in the arena for public activity. The indifference of Russian citizen to new self-government was a rational reaction to its powerlessness and its uselessness, and therefore should not be viewed as a sign of some inherent anti-democratic value within Russian culture. The population viewed local self government as respectable when it functioned as a transmission channel for state funds allocated for culture, education, and healthcare, but as far as its role as the school of civil society (at least a primary school), it seemed to be a pure formality, i.e. not any better than official federalism during Soviet times. Mired by the State (whether with or without intent), local self-government lost its appeal in the eyes of the general public, and the question now is: has the appeal of local self-governance perished for good, or are there any possibilities for its revival?¹⁹

To answer Chernyavsky's question, there is room for hope because the new laws on local self-government provide some loopholes that could be exploited in order to create important synergies between local self-governments and civil society. A strategic area that needs to be exploited at the policy level is to generate more autonomy in local revenue generation (i.e., revenues generated by local property taxes that remain in the locality). At the same time, more autonomy in deciding how to spend local self-governments' budgets needs to be supported. Furthermore, it is important to search for mechanisms that promote local participation in budget planning and monitoring of budget execution. In short, the contradiction of the new law, from the point of view of the federal government, is that while it might attempt to reign in regional governments, it is opening the door for marginally more autonomy for local self-governments—a contradiction that USAID needs to exploit.

The new law on local self-governments

On September 16, 2003, the federal Duma approved a new law on delimiting functions between the federal, regional, and municipal levels of government and reforming the existing local government system. Many experts in the Russian Federation are critical of the new laws, which will take effect in 2006, and have argued that they will reconcentrate the vertical power of the federal government and represent a step backwards in Russia's democratization process. For example, Tomila Lankina expresses the following point of view:

Although the reform's ostensible key concern is "local" in that it is to bring a more efficient and transparent local government to every city, village, and settlement in Russia, it is inex-

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 3.

trically linked with the broader transformation of center-region relations and with the political, rather than purely “administrative” or “technocratic” concerns, behind them. The local government reform accompanied radical measures aimed at restructuring center-regional relations, through which the federal government gained extensive power and the regions lost many of their important prerogatives vis-a-vis Moscow. However, the governors were able to win major concessions from Moscow since they were given an important decision-making role in the Kozak commission, and their influence on the commission's work is apparent in provisions strengthening the governors' ability to select and remove mayors and control municipal spending. The local government lobby, in contrast, was granted only token representation in the key relevant decision-making bodies, and the critical voices of municipal practitioners warning against over-centralization were largely ignored.²⁰

From a fiscal point of view, the IUE²¹ notes that the centralization of expenditure decision-making by the federal government will reduce local self-governments expenditures by 31–43%. At the same time, the share of expenditure authorities transferred by the bodies of state power to local self-governments in local budget expenses may increase from 11% to 49%. In short, expenditures assigned to local self-governments under the new law will significantly exceed any net increase in local revenues.

Interviews with the Mr. Vitaliy Shipov, Adviser to the Ministry of Finance and a key drafter of the new legislation, and with Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Deputy Minister of Finance, a key thinker on the fiscal side of the legislation, suggest that the motivations of the federal government were the following:

1. The necessity of the Russian State to have presence throughout the whole territory of the Federation. Mr. Shipov described to the ARD team the different typologies of regional and local governments that exist in Russia. According to the federal government, there are cases where the oblast is strong and the municipalities are weak or nonexistent. In this case, the Russian State is present in the oblast but not in its surrounding area. There are also situations where there is a weak oblast and the municipalities also are weak, or a weak oblast and a strong urban municipality. In these cases, the regional center is weak and there is no state presence in the rural areas. A third case is where neither the regional nor the local governments have any presence. The federal government expects that the new law will resolve this problem by creating thousands of municipalities throughout the country.
2. Mr. Lavrov argues that the current law does not allow for the growth of civil society at the local level. He recognizes that the importance of regional governments offsets the growth of grassroots activities by local communities. Mr. Lavrov also states that the importance of regional governors gives tremendous leverage and power to governors vis-à-vis local gov-

²⁰ Cited on Federal, Regional Interests Shape Local Reforms by Tomila Lankina, excerpt of a book to be published in 2004: Peter Reddaway and Robert Orttung, *The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin's Reform of Federal-Regional Relations*, volume 2. Rowman and Littlefield.

²¹ Liborikana, Marina. *Local Government Report in Russia*. The Institute for Urban Economics. Moscow. n.d.

ernments and the federal government. Similarly, Mr. Shipov stated that the political purpose of the new laws is to weaken the political influence of governors.

3. On the fiscal side, Mr. Lavrov states that the new law will have positive consequences for the federal government. First of all, it will contain the accumulation of arrears caused by unfunded mandates because it does not provide for them. Furthermore, if there is a mandate and there is no financing specified in the budget law, local governments are not responsible for providing the service. Mr. Shipov provided examples of how this law will be executed. For example, in the future veterans and elderly people will not be allowed to ride in public transportation free of charge. They will have to pay the tariff that most people pay to use public transportation. Mr. Shipov stated that subsidies will be targeted as of 2006, which means that the benefit will be based on need and it will be provided by the federal government via a transfer of cash and not via the supply of the service. By approving this law, the federal government is reforming the Russian social safety net. From a purely fiscal and financial point of view, it is necessary to come to terms with what the federal government can and cannot afford. It goes without saying that under all of these new social policies, the federal government is resolving budget deficit issues.
4. Mr. Lavrov explained that the new law on local self-government would change the proportions of funds that will be going to the different levels of government. While it is true that the federal government will maintain a higher share than in the past, mainly at the expense of regional governments, local self-governments will be allocated a higher a share of local taxes collected within their jurisdiction. Plus, local self-governments will be allowed to determine how the extra funds will be spent. According to Mr. Lavrov, the latter will create the financial conditions for a more proactive local self-government administration and local citizenry, since the federal government will be giving more autonomy to local self-governments.
5. According to a report by the IUE, a strength of the new law is that revenues for local self-governments will increase by 11%. This is the case because the new law sets tax rates and shares for federal and regional governments for the long term; it allows municipal governments authority to set salaries and wages of municipal employees, and employees of municipal enterprises and institutions. Another strength of the law is that the three types of municipalities are created: settlement, municipal *rayon*, and urban district. Each type of municipality has its own particular set of assignments.

The observation of the ARD team is that USAID should work with this new reality. Therefore, it is important to take advantage of the opportunities that are open by the new laws. Although there is a perception that the federal government is centralizing, it is at the same time giving some room for local self-governments to be more active and to gain political legitimacy by delegating decisions on spending that may, with appropriate technical assistance, trigger examples

of more vibrant and active local politics.²² The new set of laws allows for marginal improvements in local autonomy. These marginal opportunities need to be exploited and used to create examples that can be replicated not just by international organizations, but by Russian reformers in their struggle to prove that a democratic/decentralized system, when given an opportunity, can be more responsive, efficient, more accountable, more participatory, and open to citizens.

4.2 USAID'S ACTIVITIES IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE

The collapse of the Soviet Union created opportunities for a particular set of technical assistance in the area of local governance. The lack of private property, markets, and economic competition required a quick response in these areas. Most Western economists and political scientists agree that private property rights are a necessary condition for economic growth and for a more active citizenry; and therefore efforts to create private property ownership among citizens are needed. Furthermore, the former totalitarian-bureaucratic state operated under a different economic logic: efficiency was not important, hard-budget constraints were not important, and quantity over quality was important. Services and their delivery were standardized from above. People were subjects of the state and not active citizens.

Under these conditions, USAID's technical assistance within the local governance sector following the break-up of the Soviet Union was appropriate. The emphasis on introducing private property rights in the housing sector (it is important to note that the federal government still owns the land, and most property is still in non-private hands) was an important one. USAID was correct in its assessment that only private property owners would be motivated to maintain housing structures. Similarly, in a country where markets had been repressed, it was important to create a housing market. Creation of a housing market was important because, for markets to function, legal codes had to be developed, and court systems had to be modernized. In a totalitarian-bureaucratic state there was no competition in the economic arena, and the ideas of competition had to be introduced. It was important in the ideological arena to prove with concrete examples the benefits of competition in the economic arena and in the provision of services. Ideas about markets, competition, and democracy had to be disseminated.

The contractors working for USAID, first the Urban Institute based in Washington, D.C., and then the IUE, centered their technical assistance on four crucial areas: property rights; creation of markets; economic competition; and dissemination of ideas in favor of private property, markets, competition, and democracy. These four areas were a logical and consistent response to the reality that the Russian Federation faced in the first 10 years of political and economic transition. The actual technical assistance was translated into the following actions:

1. **Policy.** Both institutes have been important in having a strong and credible voice in policy issues in the following areas: fiscal decentralization, local self-governments, property rights, housing markets, law on housing accessibility, and so forth. At each visit, the ARD assessment team saw material produced by the IUE; many individuals have attended a seminar

²² It could be argued that the "net losers" of this reform are regional governments.

on housing issues sponsored by the IUE. The IUE is asked by the federal government and the federal Duma to participate in policy debates in the areas mentioned above. Sometimes they are able to influence the debate and the drafting of the law, as was the case with the Law on Housing Accessibility. Sometimes IUE is unable to influence the law, as was the case with the new laws on decentralization and local self-governments. The important point here is that the IUE is an important and credible player with respect to governance policy in the Russian Federation.

2. **Dissemination of New Economic Thinking.** Through the Policy Fellows Program, the IUE has brought new ideas to municipalities where key policy-makers at the regional and local levels are interested in reform and are willing to be exposed to new approaches and policy issues.
3. **Housing Reform.** Building on the original success of the Urban Institute, the IUE has been extremely successful in housing reform. A logical extension in this area was passage of the Law for Housing Accessibility, which aims to create a mortgage market that will allow for a more equal sharing of the investment burden among developers and potential new owners. Currently, new housing development has to be financed solely by new owners.
4. **Creating Competition in the Area of Housing Maintenance and Services Provision.** An important area where the IUE has worked is in the area of creating competition in the provision of housing maintenance and services provision. Traditionally in Russia, municipal enterprises have provided this service. The IUE has provided assistance to municipalities like Bor, for example, in creating conditions for privately owned firms to compete with the municipal enterprise to provide this service. Competition has created incentives for firms to charge fees for the services they provide and for making a profit in the process. In the municipality of Bor, private firms are providing services and according to municipal authorities they have resolved a long-standing problem in this area. Furthermore, the IUE has also used this approach to organize citizens to monitor services provided by either municipal enterprises or private enterprises.
5. **The Provision of Social Services under the “One Window-One Stop” Program.** Traditionally, a citizen who receives several benefits has to go to several offices to collect those benefits. This program consolidates the transaction costs related to receiving benefits in one office and in one window. To consolidate services under this program, there has been a consolidation of databases to identify beneficiaries, to minimize the possibility of corruption, and cut costs of benefit distribution. The IUE reports that a greater number of people are receiving benefits because of this reduction of transaction costs.
6. **Creation of Performance Indicators in the Provision of Municipal Services.** Another interesting pilot developed by the IUE has to do with the development of performance indicators that measure the service delivery in waste removal services. Given the institutional structure of government at the local level, the delivery of services is separately administered

from the production of the service. Production of a service has to do with the “production function” associated with producing one unit of output of a given service. That means that the administration, municipal or private, sets up a tariff that theoretically is related to the cost of producing the service. Producing the service includes the amount and cost of labor, the capital infrastructure associated with producing a service (such as trucks), and the technology used to deliver the service (e.g., trucks equipped to pick up waste, waste treatment, etc.). Production is also related to the administration of the service, including the development of the client database, billing and collection, and so on. The financial capacity of the clients served determines the level of service (e.g., how many times a week waste is removed in a municipal jurisdiction). The service provided is the actual removal of waste from neighborhoods. Service delivery can be municipally executed or privately executed. If it is privately executed, the municipal administration should have the capacity to regulate and monitor the service delivery. The project carried out by the IUE has developed performance indicators for the collection of waste removal. Pictures that show different degrees of cleanliness in the waste removal area of residential neighborhoods helped to determine the level of service. The IUE organized neighborhood organizations that monitor the performance of the waste removal services. It also has developed a simple spreadsheet monitoring system that is administered by the municipal enterprise in charge of waste removal. This pilot is successful in improving performance and in bringing together local government and civic organizations. This successful methodology also is being used in the area of juvenile delinquency in the municipality of Bor.

7. **From Benefits to Wages.** Inspired by the Clinton administration’s program “from welfare to workfare,” the IUE developed a set of means tests to determine what groups of people could qualify for a job-seeking program. The requirements included responsibility for a child between the ages of 18 months and 18 years old, and an income level between 50% and 100% of the subsistence level. Pilots were developed in three municipalities, including Krosnika and Perm. According to consultants working for the IUE, about 85% of people in the program continued to be employed a year after graduation. The negative aspects of the program, according to IUE consultants, include jobs landed by people participating in the program did not get them out of poverty; the program is not able to address issues related to rural poverty; there are high administrative costs associated with monitoring the program; and given the financial fragility of most municipalities, most municipalities are unable to continue with the program.
8. **Revenue and Expenditure Forecast Model.** This is an important tool to develop. The ARD team was unable to see and evaluate the model, but based on the annual reports produced by IUE for USAID, the tool has been tested successfully in a couple of municipalities.
9. **Other Activities Carried Out by the IUE:**
 - **City Barometer:** a system of socioeconomic indicators of municipalities.
 - **Designing New Practical Instruments for Municipal Socioeconomic Development Programs:** evaluating cost-efficiency of socioeconomic development programs; survey

on citizens' perceptions of communities' main problems; support for small-business development; advancing residential mortgage lending in the municipalities of Perm, Dimitrovgrad, and Buzuluk.

- **Procedures for Developing Comprehensive Municipal Development Programs** with elements of strategic planning with the participation of local self-governments and public organizations representing different local community interests in Perm and Dimitrovgrad.
- **Improvements in Urban Transportation** in Volzhsk, Yoshkar Ola City, and Saratov. A manual based on these experiences was prepared for dissemination purposes.
- **Professional Management of Municipal Real Property** in Yaroslavl City and Chevoksary.

In general, the IUE has attempted to move beyond its original purpose, from housing-related issues to social services provision, introducing the concept of urban zoning, urban planning, local development, and to increasing the efficiency of service delivery. The new laws in provision of social services passed by the federal Duma where the whole logic of service provision moves from subsidizing supply to financing demand (benefits to cash) are an example of how the ideas espoused by the IUE have shaped public policy in the Russian Federation.

Strengths of USAID-funded programs

- As mentioned above, the IUE is a respected, credible, and influential think tank in Russia.
- The IUE has trained and produced excellent cadres of professionals who are now serving in the private sector, government, and in the Institute itself. These are pro-reform assets who are invaluable for Russia.
- The IUE has trained many key policy-makers of pro-active/reformist municipalities throughout the country.
- The IUE has sponsored effective seminars and has produced information material that has been disseminated throughout Russia.
- The IUE has provided long-term technical assistance in more than 60 cities.
- Numerous pilot experiments in new public policies at the municipal level have been carried out successfully in the areas of service provision, social services, and safety net policy. Their results and experiences have been disseminated throughout the Russian Federation,
- The IUE has been a reliable and honest partner of USAID.

Weaknesses of USAID-funded programs

The development of market economics and a democratic political system requires strong institutions in the private sector, in government, and in civil society. As mentioned above, when it comes to decentralization and local governments, it is critical to design clear responsibilities among levels of government. It is also important to design institutional incentives that allow participation of citizens and encourage response from elected officials and public administrations. In a democracy, coordination among different actors and stakeholders is critical; unfortu-

nately, such coordination is voluntary and therefore incentives are required to generate the type of participation and collaboration needed for the system to work.

The emphasis of the past 10 years has been on private property rights, creating markets, fostering competition, economic efficiency, and massive dissemination of ideas. This emphasis should be shifted to a new approach designed to foster conditions for responsive government at the local level. To continue with the same emphasis would be a strategic mistake (and therefore a weakness), especially at a time when a new law on decentralization and local self-government is on the verge of being implemented.

Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, there are several tactical weaknesses that could be addressed:

- Although the IUE is a center of knowledge and has produced hundreds of seminars on policy, the knowledge is concentrated in Moscow. It can be argued that in order to be credible and respected, the IUE needs to have a critical mass of knowledge close to the center of power. But intellectual power alone will not change Russia. Russia needs ideas, excellent pilot projects, and well-trained people to implement them at the regional level. The way it is now, the IUE is recreating the same structure of vertical concentration of knowledge and power at the center that it is trying to change as a matter of public policy.
- From our rapid visit to Russia it is not clear how many of the 100 people employed by the IUE in Moscow actually travel to the field. On the basis of conversations with consultants working for the IUE, most of the consultants did not like to travel to regions; did not have experience in local government issues; and preferred to spend time in Moscow gathering information, creating databases, and doing research. If this is true, USAID is strengthening the Institute and not the new institutions that need to be strengthened at the local level—namely, local government administrations.
- IUE policy recommendations assume that competition, free markets, and private property rights form the core conditions for creating a market economy. However, even in a market economy government regulation is necessary (there are arguments of how much regulation is desirable in a market economy, but all schools of thought in Western economics agree that some degree of regulation in markets is required to avoid “corner solutions”—i.e., the development of private monopolies and oligopolies). This emphasis short changes government and misses the opportunity to build the basis for a government that is responsive and open to citizens.
- Similarly, too much emphasis on efficiency and competition ignores the need to define levels of service by local governments. Levels of service, as it has been discussed above, are developed by organizations in charge of producing a service. Typically, governments do this in consultation with local citizens. The delivery can be done by municipal or government enterprises, but governments need to play a role in making sure that most people in a community receive some level of service in the different areas of local government’s responsibility.
- Emphasis on training key policy makers focuses on individuals as agents of change and not on strengthening administrations as counterparts of a citizenry that needs to have a voice in the local affairs. Administrations remain in place, individuals are not reelected or choose to

leave their position in government, and therefore the effort does not have the same multiplier effects.

- Technical assistance is dispersed throughout Russia. Although it is understandable that the IUE and USAID want to work only with municipalities interested in exploring new ideas and methods, the fact of the matter is that dispersion does not create a critical mass of reform anywhere in Russia.
- There is an emphasis on working with the same people. The impression of the ARD team is that somehow the “usual suspects” have captured the financial assistance provided by USAID. The usual suspects report many activities (e.g., seminars, books, publications, expensive brochures), but these outputs provide a partial view of reality. In the reports produced by the IUE there are no performance indicators; for example, money saved in a budget, increased coverage of a service provided at a lower cost, more revenues collected, degree of budget execution, and so forth. The apparent reason for not reporting performance indicators is because the IUE is reporting what they are doing and not how local governments that they are assisting are improving (or not).
- Examples of using performance indicators, such as in the municipality of Bor, are important and need to be replicated. But the production of the service needs to be integrated with the delivery of the service.
- The ARD team perceived a tendency on the part of IUE and USAID to have an adversarial relationship with the government. This could be a tactical mistake if the IUE or USAID want to have more opportunities to make a difference in Russia.

4.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITIES: A NEW DIRECTION

From a traditional Western point of view, decentralization and fiscal federalism are important complements to democracy. To have a functional decentralized state, the following conditions should exist:²³

- The decentralization framework must link, at the margin, local financing and fiscal authority to the service provision responsibilities and functions of local government, so that local politicians can deliver on their promises and bear the costs of their decisions.
- Local communities must be informed about the costs of services and delivery options and the resources envelope and its sources, so that decisions they make are meaningful. Participatory budgeting, as used in Porto Alegre, Brazil, is one way to create this condition.
- Communities need a mechanism for expressing their preferences in a way that is binding on politicians and administrations, so that there is a credible incentive for people to participate.
- Accountability based on public and transparent information that enables communities to monitor the performance of the local government effectively and to react appropriately to that performance, so that politicians and administrations have an incentive to be responsive.
- The instruments of decentralization—the legal and institutional framework, the structure of service delivery responsibilities, and the intergovernmental fiscal system—must be designed to support the political objectives.

²³ Litvack, Jennie and Seddon, Jessica, Editors. *Decentralization Briefing Notes*. The World Bank. No Date. Page 8.

From a strategic point of view, actions financed by USAID in the near future should be guided by the principles mentioned above. These principles derive into two broad areas of work: creating more autonomy for local governance and encouraging greater local government accountability.

More Autonomy for Local Self-Governments/More Own Source of Revenues for Local Government

At the policy level, it is important to give local self-governments greater autonomy in the revenue area. This implies the following:

- Regional and local governments should be assigned at least one major source of revenue, for which they could determine the rate, in order to increase accountability and responsibility. A group of economists working for an IMF mission²⁴ suggested the introduction at the regional level of a personal income tax (on a residence basis) with a flat rate that piggybacks on a national progressive personal income tax. The group also urged the introduction at the local level of a real estate property tax. Arguing for these policy choices is important in order to unblock the financial chain imposed by the federal government to local self-governments. Even if there are improvements at the margin as a result of the new law, in order for local self-governments to be viable, credible and politically legitimate they will need more autonomy.
- More autonomy implies greater responsibility and oversight in the collection of local revenues. The problems created by the de facto subordination of tax authorities to subnational governments have created conflicting incentives for tax collection. One way to address this problem is to strengthen and modernize the central tax administration, while paving the way for creation of tax administrations at the subnational level charged with the enforcement and collection of regional and local taxes. An effective way to proceed would be to adopt pilot programs with separate tax administrations in some regions and large cities to collect taxes well suited for local enforcement, such as the real estate property taxes. Over the longer term, the development of a tax administration capacity at the subnational level should also take into account the significant institutional limitations of local governments.

Making Politics Local in Russia: Accountability, Transparency Leading to Responsive Government and More Active Citizenry

USAID programs should create an enabling environment through policy work in the following area:

- Incentives for sound fiscal management and local accountability could be substantially enhanced through a clear, consistent, and stable legal and regulatory framework that assigns roles to the different levels of government in a much more transparent and predictable way. The new law still has ample room for improvement.

²⁴ Era Dabla-Norris, Jorge Martínez-Vázquez, and John Norregaard. *Fiscal Decentralization in Russia: Economic Performance and Reform Issues*. Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund. Conference on Post-Election Strategy. Moscow, April 5-7, 2000.

Combining policy work with pilot projects that can serve as demonstration effects in a policy dialogue with the federal and regional governments:

- Developing supporting federal regulations for regional and local governments in the areas of budget classification, information disclosure, debt registration, and others would allow for greater harmonization of standards across regions. Subnational governments also need to adopt regional and local laws and regulations that are consistent with federal laws (e.g., in the areas of tax sharing and transfers to municipalities), thereby enhancing the accountability and transparency of the budget process.

Improving service delivery:

- The system of expenditure assignments should also allow for greater subnational autonomy in setting service levels according to local needs. It is critical to combine service delivery with production of a given service. This is an area where there are opportunities to work with CSOs. An important aspect of the synergy between local self-governments and civil society is that there needs to be a movement toward efficiency and greater coverage of services.

Creating synergies between local self-governments, CSOs, and the political process:

- As it has been mentioned and demonstrated throughout this report, municipal governments are not legitimate and perceived as useful by citizen owing to a lack of stable finances and poor institutional enabling environments that impede autonomous actions by local self-governments. In 2000, Russians expressed a high level of distrust in all institutions, except the Army and the President.²⁵ On the other hand, according to the New Democracies Barometer, 66% of Russians said that most people can be trusted.²⁶ A key aspect of the synergies among self-government, civil society, and politics is the process of creating trust between citizens and government institutions. An important first step in this process is strengthening the financial position of local governments, its administration, and opening spaces for citizen participation. Compared with the United States, Russians have a greater degree of interpersonal trust and capital—66% versus 35%²⁷—an important initial condition to create synergies among the three sectors discussed in this assessment. Examples of this level of interpersonal trust are described by A.V. Chernyavsky in his report on local self-governments. He describes how in one of the Volosts of the Leningrad Oblast, a community tired of living with garbage became organized and hired a private firm, OOO Kolpinskii Spetsavtotrans, to pick up their garbage every week. There were tremendous negative externalities that nobody could ignore, and everyone was suffering from the negative consequences of not doing anything about garbage collection. The importance of this event is that citizens can be mobilized around a specific traditionally municipal type service, but also it is important to point out that government is absent from the solution. The upcoming implementation of the new law presents opportunities where local governments can become more

²⁵ Rose-Ackerman, Susan. Trust, Honesty and Corruption: Reflections on the State-Building Process. Research Paper #255. *Program for Studies in law, Economics and Public Policy*. Yale University. USA. 2001. Page 5

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid. Page 5.

proactive, useful, and therefore gain political legitimacy. In the case of Volost of the Leningrad Oblast, local government and civil society became partners in disseminating the experience, monitoring the service delivery, and demanding a more pro-active and creative role for local elected officials. According to a report produced by the IUE, a survey on citizens' attitudes toward local government showed that about 10% of citizens in Yekaterinburg were willing to participate in municipal activities that directly affect them.²⁸ This number is a good number anywhere in the world.

Strategic Priority for a New Direction in Local Governance

The implementation of the new law in 2006 presents USAID with a window of opportunity to enhance its efforts to strengthen local governments and local governance. In order to make the best use of USAID's scarce resources, and to focus USAID activities within the vastness of the Russian Federation, the ARD team recommends exploring the possibility of developing indicators that can determine, in a quantitative way, which municipalities would be more responsive to absorbing and taking advantage of USAID technical assistance. The "classification" indicators could be centered on activities in the following areas:

- Effort to collect own-source revenues.
- Budget preparation, budget execution, and closing of financial/accounting books at the end of a fiscal year.
- Municipalities reporting arrears and other types of municipal debt.
- Municipalities opening spaces for citizen participation in determining budget priorities, and investments in local infrastructure/economic development.
- Citizens participating in monitoring provision of public services.
- Municipalities, citizens, and private sector collaborating in lowering transaction costs and therefore making local governments more accessible to citizens and businesses.
- Commitment from municipalities, citizens, and businesses to sustain reforms after the technical assistance is finalized.

As a first step, a short questionnaire to be answered by interested municipalities could be developed and a database could be created where the results for each municipality would be stored. This database would provide the basis for determining which municipality would qualify to receive USAID-financed technical assistance. The information collected during this first stage of the process would serve as a baseline for a municipality that qualifies for USAID financed technical assistance. The impact of technical assistance would be measured annually against the baseline to determine positive, negative or no impact of USAID-financed technical assistance on local governance.

Follow-on Activities

1. Eliminate the dispersion of USAID-funded activities and decide on three regions where USAID will concentrate its activities in the next four years. Dispersion is generated by a de-

²⁸ Liborikana, Marina. *Local Government Report in Russia*. The Institute for Urban Economics. Moscow. n.d.

mand-driven process. But the result is that there is a lack of a critical mass of projects or experience that show that USAID activities are having an impact in Russia. (Success is the strength of the IUE in Moscow.) Therefore, it is appropriate to evaluate seriously all activities financed by USAID, determine successes, and assess where there is a political gain from making inroads in the area of local governance and focus future activities in three critical regions.

2. Both the IUE and the federal government claim that they have “simulated” the impact of the new set of laws on local government. The ARD team suspects that they have simulated the macro-impacts of the law at the different levels of government, but they have not micro-simulated the impact of the law on budget codes that will remain or be transferred to local governments. Also, they might not have micro-simulated the impact on transferring property of local governments to regional governments. At the policy level, it is important to simulate the impact of the new set of laws—for example, in the Vladimir Oblast and in the municipality of Vladimir and in one rural municipality within the Vladimir Oblast. It would be important to measure whether in fact local governments will retain more revenues that are collected within its jurisdiction, and whether those revenues are in equilibrium with the responsibilities that are assigned under the new set of laws. It is probable that a rural municipality where there is little or no economic activity will have fewer revenues under the new law than under current law—and perhaps more responsibilities, as the critics allege. Furthermore, it is probable that municipalities will bear the burden of dealing with people who will be affected by the elimination of subsidies and unfunded mandates. This area needs to be recognized early on in order to generate a strategy with CSOs as to how local governments and CSOs could cooperate to ameliorate the social impact of the new laws.
3. Local citizens need to be informed about the new law—its advantages and disadvantages. If it is true that the intent of the law is to create the basis for local democracy by giving local governments more resources and more autonomy, it is critical that USAID provide technical assistance in selected municipalities in the areas mentioned above. Also, it is important that technical assistance be provided to inform local citizens about the new law and to how to organize themselves to demand better services at the local level.
4. Building the foundations of strong and responsive local government administrations should be emphasized. Most of the work carried out by the IUE has been in the direction of creating a viable class of private owners and a private sector at the local level. This has been important work and needs to be commended. But it is time to strengthen local government administrations. If it is true that most local governments will have more autonomy as to how they will spend and execute their budgets, it is important to train public administrators on budget planning, budget execution, government accounting, and tax administration.
5. Recognizing that all politics is local is a good idea. Programs such as performance indicators in provision of municipal services, targeting in social services, and one window-one stop should be complemented by adding the production of the service considerations that have been described in this report. Efficient delivery of the service is of paramount importance. This implies that the production and the delivery of the service are working under one organizational and administrative roof. This administrative and organizational change implies that the cost of production of the service can be lowered, new technologies in the provision

of the service are easier to be introduced, and most importantly, people become aware of the cost of producing the service. Similarly, if a service will be privatized, local governments need to be strengthened to monitor and regulate competition in the provision of services. In this area, many synergies are present: more autonomy and more revenues combined with greater autonomy in budget decisions at the local level, lead—in theory at least—to more active local self-governments. The latter—also in theory—should provide the basis for more citizen and CSO participation in setting priorities, defining level of services in the provision of services, and monitoring performance of budget execution and local government performance in general. The challenge is to make theory closer to reality in Russian local governance.

6. Diversification of USAID's partnerships. Reliance on one contractor leads inevitably to a status quo bias where monopolistic behavior might be an unintended outcome. For the next four years, it would be important to reconsider how the new work orders will be competed and allocated. Arguably, there are other think tanks in Russia that could be given the opportunity to compete to provide technical services on behalf of USAID. However, to "shake" the inertia that seems to dominate the activities sponsored by USAID, it would be worthwhile to explore the possibility of allowing American firms to compete for specific parts of the USAID portfolio in local governance.
7. Better monitoring by USAID. If the emphasis becomes to help construct responsive, transparent, and efficient local governments, a new set of indicators needs to be developed in order to measure the performance of the contractor. These indicators will measure the impact of the technical assistance in local self-governments' activities. Examples are better budget execution, more revenues collected, more recovery of arrears, and more frequent open hearings where citizens influence and shape the choices and decisions made by local self-governments. According to technical specifications determined by USAID, contractors should maintain this new set of indicators. USAID should also monitor the performance of local self-governments post-intervention in order to measure sustainability and absorption of technical assistance. This new emphasis moves the technical assistance provided by USAID from an emphasis on training policy-makers to training public servants in charge of making local governments more efficient, pro-active, and open to the public.
8. Dissemination of results to local administrators. Work in support of new law implementation should pay more attention to dissemination methods. More impact-related activities and fewer seminars or workshops where people show up to socialize and not to learn. An example of this activity could be the following: assuming that the successful project (implemented by the IUE) in the municipality of Bor in the provision of garbage collection is broadened to include the operation and production of the service under one organization, then workshops can be organized in regions where USAID will be providing technical services, and besides producing a manual, the administrators from Bor can show other administrators how they have reorganized themselves to be more efficient and to provide an increasing service coverage. Instead of having consultants do the training, it is better to have administrators brag about their successes.

Priorities for USAID

At this point, the ARD team on local governance is aware of the budget appropriated for local governance activities in the next four years. It is premature to specify how much of each activity should be executed in the near future. To answer those questions, Activities 1 and 2 need to occur in the next six to nine months. Activity 1 is a serious self-evaluation where international consultants can evaluate the impact of all of the programs executed by the IUE thus far. This would entail visiting municipalities where the Institute has worked and interviewing their personnel as well as consultants and members of government. This exercise should take three months, and the results should be input for a two- to three-day evaluation meeting.

Concurrently, Activity 2 could be carried out in three regions: one where USAID has financed technical assistance, one that is predominantly rural, and one that is predominantly urban. The results of this quantitative analysis combined with the results of the seminar mentioned above should provide the Mission with inputs to determine how much of the activities proposed above should be funded over the next four years. It is important for the Mission to create its own knowledge base and not to rely on have proxies having a different set of interests and priorities.

5. CIVIL SOCIETY ASSESSMENT

5.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE THIRD SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Russia is in the midst of the process of developing an independent civil society, or “that arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals ... attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests” autonomous of the state.²⁹ Civil society, it is argued, is intrinsic to the functioning of democracy on numerous levels. Civic groups breed civic culture and serve as nesting grounds for social capital, a term used to describe the norms of trust and reciprocity that loosely bind citizens together.³⁰ They also serve as an important mediating bridge between state and society, acting alternatively as interest aggregators, watchdogs, and partners to both society and state. In sum, they help deepen, widen, and heighten the parameters of political discourse. For those who adhere to the “civil society argument”—that civil society is an important and crucial component of transitioning and consolidated democracies—Russia’s civic transition is just as momentous as its political and economic transitions.

If one were to take the pulse of civil society in Russia, what would that diagnosis reveal after over a decade of independent activity? Reflecting trends in economic and political development, Russia’s civic pulse is also located in something of a “gray zone,” exhibiting some encouraging developments as well as some worrisome symptoms. While Russian civic groups have filled the institutional space created for them through a variety of laws in the 1990s, they have not fulfilled the expectations placed on them in the heady days of the collapse of the Soviet Union.³¹

NGO development is one part of this larger civic transformation.³² Of the thousands of NGOs that have registered in the previous decade, a majority either exists on paper or consists of a membership of one. Groups are often weak and fragmented, operating sporadically when time and money permit. Most are not financially sustainable, and groups supported by Western funding have few strategies to raise income when donor support will wane and, potentially, end. Nor are there mechanisms in place to ensure the continued influx of human capital; there are few formal recruiting mechanisms to promote people into the nonprofit sector as a career

²⁹ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 7.

³⁰ Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

³¹ Michael A. McFaul, “Introduction,” in *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 10 No., 2 Spring 2002 p. 109.

³² We emphasize that the third sector is not synonymous with civil society, although we use both terms throughout the report. Rather, the third sector refers to a much narrower slice of activism; the “formal, functionally differentiated and frequently professional nonprofit organizations that interact with the state and market actors.” This nonprofit sector is one component of *civil society*, a term that refers to the numerous forms of associational life between the state and the private realm. Thus, this analysis tries to distinguish between these two terms, rather than conflate them. In addition, we do not include political parties, labor unions, or religious organizations in our definition of civil society, because donors often slot them in different categories of support, even though in theory they are considered part of *civil society*.

choice, and there is little formal training for those people who choose to pursue nonprofit development as a profession.

Further, many groups are disconnected from the publics they claim to represent. Although an NGO sector exists, that sector is not clearly anchored in domestic constituencies, and the public knows little about it. This makes NGO growth, whether in terms of financial or human resources, difficult to sustain.

The NGO community itself is badly fractured. Organizations in Moscow tend to view NGOs in the regions as overly provincial and backwards; regional NGOs resent what they perceive to be an elitist attitude combined with a lack of “real” grassroots experience. This fuels a situation in which a few NGOs assume self-appointed leadership positions and speak for NGOs across Russia as a whole. Many of these NGOs are located in Moscow, and are termed the “Moscow mafia,” for they are perceived by many NGOs in the regions as oligarchs of civic activism—they absorb resources but the investment has not necessarily resulted in better service provision, policy implementation, or policy influence. Western media sources and donors tend to facilitate this process of centralization, by speaking with a few select organizations (primarily human rights), and extrapolating from this about the condition of *civil society* as a whole in Russia.

While NGOs have slowly developed relationships with governments on the municipal and regional levels, on the federal level groups have struggled to move from gaining access to elites to impacting public policy. This will continue to be difficult, given that many NGOs have little public support to lend credence to their demands. In addition, conflicts within the sector impede their abilities to organize effectively at the federal level for change that might benefit the third sector. Nor are President Putin’s intentions toward the sector clear; as in other areas of reform, the administration is more comfortable with management from the top, especially with respect to organizations that tread too near core national policy issues such as human rights.

Finally, all of the larger contextual factors that facilitated the growth of a nonprofit sector in the West—such as beneficial tax legislation, a population with disposable income, a culture of “checkbook activism” as well as one of voluntarism—are either entirely absent or poorly developed. Factors that facilitated the emergence of civil society in the West—a middle class; equitable economic growth; and a clear framework of property rights, rule of law, a developed, independent media, a civic culture—are also extremely underdeveloped. Unfortunately, if one is an adherent of the *civil society argument*—civic groups enhance and strengthen democratic norms and institutions—Russia is a mixed test case. As one observer has stated, “Russian civil society is not well, but it is alive.”³³

However, some small but significant positive trends in NGO development are worth noting. Many of these trends are developing at the municipal and regional levels, slowly “trickling up,” in contrast to Russia’s historically top-down development process.

³³ Ibid, p. 116.

Most Russian citizens may not be card-carrying members of their local NGOs, but they informally organize around issues that are important to them. Citizen activism around local issues such as traffic codes, illegal construction, pension reform, health care, and education indicate that citizens can be engaged, even if they are not formal members of or volunteers for an organization. In other words, a narrow focus that views citizen activism only as NGO membership paints a much more pessimistic picture than actually exists.

Further, while influence at the federal level has been minimal, NGOs have made inroads in working with regional as well as municipal governments, primarily with regard to social service provision, government sponsored grant competitions, and consolidated budgets. This is paving the way to more institutionalized forms of cooperation and communication between NGOs and the state.

In addition, the emergence of a small number of community foundations indicates that other key institutions in society, whether it is businesses, local and regional governments, educational institutions, or professional associations, are networking with the third sector. A small percentage of successful businesses are also beginning to slowly absorb the concept of corporate philanthropy by establishing their own grant programs as well as foundations, which also provide a counterbalance to Western foundations and their priorities. This can also provide legitimacy to a third sector in search of financial as well as moral support.

Finally, there is the larger Russian context; although the increasing centralized political structure leaves little space for an independent opposition, nonetheless the continued economic growth is promising for the slow evolution of an independent third sector and, in the long term, civil society.

While these developments should not be overestimated, and are unevenly spread across Russia, nonetheless the status of NGOs is in a much different position than even three years previously. Certainly, compared with the development of the nonprofit sector in the West, it is extraordinarily weak. Even in comparison with third sectors in other post-communist nations, the third sector in Russia is still in a period of very uneven transition.³⁴ However, compared with the status of the third sector in Russia a decade previously, it has grown leaps and bounds. A primary challenge for USAID will be building on Russian successes at the local and regional levels, rather than imposing an overly “Americanized” view on what civic development “should” look like. Although progress is often slow and halting, the key lies in discovering the curious blend of factors that made projects work in the Russian context and replicating that, rather than trying to make Russia fit into an often mythologized (and idealized) Western vision of civic development. Another key task is to widen the definition of civil society; NGOs are but one small part of larger patterns of citizen culture and interaction. Moving beyond NGOs to help create linkages between a variety of key civic players is the next critical challenge for donors.

³⁴ For example, see the yearly *NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia*.

The following sections further discuss some of the key issues with which NGOs are currently wrestling: NGO sustainability, popular support, intrasector networking, and state access.

NGO presence and sustainability

Since the Gorbachev era, Russia's third sector has grown from a ragtag collection of 40 or so small informal organizations to more than 450,000 formally registered organizations as of early 2001.³⁵ Molded by the economic exigencies of the transition era, the bulk of voluntary organizations provide essential services and support to citizens struggling to maneuver Russia's brave new world of economic decline and political and social fragmentation. In addition, many groups filled the void created by a retreating state unable to maintain its commitments to the Soviet version of the welfare system. As a result, some estimate that 70% of NGOs are involved in some type of social service work.³⁶ These organizations are not all created "from scratch"; many Soviet era groups, having achieved legal independence, regrouped and reorganized within the new Russia. Associations of disabled, pensioners, and veterans, for example, are some of the organizations that bridge the old system and the new. In addition to the bulk of organizations that provides some form of social service or support, a small minority of Western-style environmental, women's, and human rights organizations are scattered across Russia.

Despite this organizational proliferation, the fledgling third sector is experiencing a wide array of growing pains. Outside of the major metropolitan areas, NGOs are thinly stretched across vast swathes of territory. To speak of "Russian" NGO development masks critical differences between NGO communities at the regional level. Drawing from data collected by Charities Aid Foundation, there are 3.78 organizations for every 1,000 people in Central Russia, compared with 3.72 in the Urals, 3.54 in Northwest Russia; 3.04 in the Far East, 2.75 in Siberia, 2.53 in the Volga, and 2.53 in the Southern district.³⁷ These numbers are also somewhat illusive. There is a large gap between the statistical presence of NGOs and the substantive reality of their operations; a much smaller percentage of groups carry out their activities on a regular basis.³⁸ Thus, although there may be more organizations per person—for example, in the Russian Far East—the third sector in Siberia and the Volga is much stronger in terms of regularized presence and impact. In sum, NGO development is progressing in fits and starts, and is unevenly distributed across numerous time zones.

Part of this anemic development is rooted in Russia's overall economic environment; while the economic climate of the 1990s provided the impetus for organization, it simultaneously kept

³⁵ This number includes independent civic associations, as well as labor unions and political parties. USAID, *2001 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia* (Fifth edition, March 2002), 133. The Charities Aid Foundation Russia office estimates that there are currently 300,000 NGOs, although they do not specify what they mean by NGO or identify the source of this information. www.cafonline.org/cafrussia/default.cfm. Finally, the civic activist Alexander Nikitin estimates that there are over 350,000 registered NGOs and 90,000 active NGOs. Notes from speech given by Alexander Nikitin at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. Thursday, December 13, 2001.

³⁶ Interview with Olga Alexeeva, Director, Charities Aid Foundation, October 7, 2002.

³⁷ Numbers drawn from Anna Sevortian and Natalya Barchukova, "Nekommercheskii Sektor I Vlast' v regionakh Roccii."

³⁸ For example, Alexander Nikitin estimates that as few as 25% of groups are active. Ibid.

groups from developing a stable presence. Despite encouraging economic trends, many groups currently face a daily struggle to find financing. Many citizens are unable or unwilling to give money. In a country where even checkbooks do not exist, checkbook activism, the backbone of nonprofit development in other countries, is slow to develop. The absence of tax incentives, either for businesses or individuals, to donate time and money to organizations complicates the search for funds. International sources of funding are shifting as well; several donor organizations are pulling out of Russia, scaling back their commitment, or are reprioritizing thematic emphases, which affect the approximately 7–10% of NGOs that receive financial support from the West.³⁹

Critical resources are not just financial; ensuring a constant stream of human capital remains a problem for NGOs. Citizens rarely choose the nonprofit sector as a career choice; one very optimistic estimate places the number of people involved in the nonprofit sector at about 1% of the country's adult population.⁴⁰ The Civil Society team was struck, particularly in the regions, by the impact of declining financial resources, particularly from abroad. Many NGOs that had once received support from the West had lost their most talented workers to government or business in the wake of shrinking budgets. Elena Malitskaya, president of the Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Center, estimated that their network of resource centers had lost 30 people in the last year because of budget cutbacks. In addition, the lack of university programs in nonprofit management ensures that talented students will choose alternative professions.

The prognosis, however, is not entirely negative. Rather, progress tends to be incremental, and is evidenced by specific, small-scale (yet significant) examples scattered across Russia. Governments at the municipal and regional levels have begun to support NGO initiatives by funding small grant competitions for public initiatives and projects. Though the amounts are small, and often do not provide salary support, they nonetheless represent a big step forward for NGO legitimacy. In addition, there is growing interest among a small percentage of the business community in corporate philanthropy. The small movement of community foundations, primarily nurtured by Charities Aid Foundation, is evidence of this emerging culture. Businesses such as YUKOS, Bee Line, and Alfa-Bank have also ventured into sponsoring grant programs of their own. This comes with inherent dangers; a few of the major businessmen that have started to support nonprofit organizations, such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Boris Berezovskii, have also become ensnared in fights with the Kremlin, and thus are not necessarily guaranteed sources of continued support for NGOs. In addition, for many smaller businesses, owners are hesitant to give help to a nonprofit organization when their own business is not turning a profit. Many also simply do not know about or fully trust nonprofit organizations. Despite these qualifications, businesses are donating more money overall in support of efforts, particularly those that relate to “traditional” charitable themes, such as efforts to provide assistance to children or cultural events. All of these developments indicate that other key players in Russian society are very slowly beginning to perceive NGOs as potential partners in Russia's transition.

³⁹ Interview with Alexander Borovikh, June 2004.

⁴⁰ Oslon, A., “Predbaritel'niye zametki,” in *Pogovorim o grazhdanskom obschestve* (Moscow: Fond Obschestvennoye mneniye, 2001): 6-13.

NGOs and the public

Many NGOs also lack a visible constituency. This is problematic; without domestic sources of support (financial as well as moral), NGOs will be unable to sustain themselves, not only in terms of financial resources, but in human resources as well. In addition, however, the lack of a visible constituency makes it difficult for NGOs to be taken seriously by governments. Thus, developing ties to the public (as well as to the state) is a critical task for many NGOs.

Groups are tentatively beginning to act as a conduit from private citizen to public realm; however, state-society relations are fragile, for activists had relatively little experience in functioning as an autonomous civic sector within the framework of a (somewhat fragile) democracy. Organizations are still small, insular, and wary of outreach to the public. Many organizations' membership is limited to those who work for the organization, or to the small group of clients they serve.

In turn, citizens are ambivalent about joining organizations. Although citizens have deserted their former Soviet-era organizations, they have not joined new ones. Russia's rate of associationism, at 0.65 organizations per person, is low, even for post-communist countries, which, as a bloc, have the lowest rates of organization among democratizing countries.⁴¹

The reasons for this lack of enthusiasm for "joining" are several. Some citizens may be weary of organizational membership after years of forced participation in "voluntary" activities. Scandals in the 1990s, in which the Mafia or other operations formed front nonprofit organization in order to import and export alcohol and cigarettes, or in which pyramid schemes were touted as charitable funds, did not improve the third sector's public relations situation.⁴² In addition, citizens also are unfamiliar with larger theoretical concepts such as the third sector, or civil society. A 2001 survey revealed that only 16% of Russians were familiar with the term *civil society*.⁴³ NGOs are not the only ones on a steep learning curve; citizens themselves are navigating their relationships with social groups in a new era of legalized organization.

However, once again, many small initiatives have emerged at the local and regional levels. For example, the Spring Week of Good Deeds, which emerged in many of the regions serviced by the Pro-NGO project, attracted about 327,000 participants in 2003, a number which has tripled in over two years. These initiatives were most successful with more "traditional" social service organizations that targeted disabled children, disabled adults and veterans, pensioners, daycare

⁴¹ Data drawn from Marc Morje Howard, "The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy*, 13.1 (2002), Figure 1, 159.

⁴² For example, in 1992-1995, the National Foundation for Sports became the biggest importer of alcoholic beverages in Russia, providing for 80% of imports to Russia. See D. Dokuchaev, "Fond Sporta—Natsionalny, a Prinadlezhit Edinitsam," *Izvestiya* June 5, 1997. In addition, the financial pyramid "MMM" which absconded with millions of people's savings, called people's investments "charitable donations." http://www.cafonline.org/cafrussia/r_fact.cfm.

⁴³ Oslon, A., "Predbaritel'niye zametki," in *Pogovorim o grazhdanskom obschestve* (Moscow: Fond Obschestvennoye mneniye, 2001): 6-13.

centers, nurseries, and so on.⁴⁴ These few examples demonstrate that citizens are engaged, but that the issues have to be ones that are compelling to them and meet their needs.

NGOs and the state

NGOs are very slowly developing channels of access and influence at various levels of the government. As discussed previously, NGOs have been most successful in garnering resources as well as influence in formulating policy at the municipal and regional levels.

These developments are beginning to be felt in numerous areas across Russia. For example, many of these changes were pushed by the Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Center, and worked most effectively in regional cities such as Novosibirsk, Tomsk, and Krasnoyarsk. In addition, the “Povolzhe” Center, located in Samara has also been credited with developing a system of round tables, in which NGOs and governments pool expertise and knowledge in order to formulate more effective policy. The former resource center in Rostov helped write legislation regulating NGO-government interaction. In Tolyatti, businesses and NGOs helped push for favorable tax legislation to encourage businesses to donate to the community foundation. The positive trends mentioned here are broader than the organizations engaged in the Third Sector Advancement Programs, and not limited to USAID partners.

These organizations involved in these negotiations worked tirelessly over the process of several years to make slow progress. This is a difficult task, for when administrations change, often NGOs must start over again, proving their merit to local governments. In addition, NGOs have had to engage in a difficult dance as some governments confuse NGO cooperation with NGO cooptation. Thus, for example, the Irkutsk administration scaled back NGO involvement in the awards committee because they felt third sector representatives were “too difficult.” NGOs had different priorities than local officials, which meant that many potential funding decisions were deadlocked. Also, many administrations have unrealistic expectations of NGOs. They expect NGOs to quickly solve the problems they themselves have been unable to resolve, and are impatient when NGOs are not immediately more efficient. Thus, some administrations, such the Irkutsk oblast’ officials, complained about the lack of “results” from NGOs. Although there may be some truth to this, local and regional governments have not exhibited a promising track record of service provision, and thus are somewhat suspect in their opinions.

Although NGOs have struggled to gain access to government at the municipal and regional levels, they also have limited control over broader contextual factors that influence their access. Progress and setbacks with regard to NGO-state relations can also often be attributed to the attitude of the governor and other important political elites. Thus, for example, the Volga region’s relations can be attributed to federal representative Sergei Kirienko’s championing of NGOs.

At the federal level, NGOs have slowly succeeded in gaining access to state elites, but have had difficulty translating that into actual influence on policy. The state at the national level, until the

⁴⁴ IREX, “The Spring Week of Good Deeds 2001-2003,” Moscow, February 2003.

arrival of the Putin administration, has been relatively indifferent to the utility of nonprofit organizations. The Duma has been slow to pass further legislation on areas such as social service provision, or laws regulating charitable donations, which might help support a third sector. In addition, in its efforts to cut through some of the loopholes regarding taxation, the Duma has passed legislation that has resulted in tightened regulation of the third sector.⁴⁵ When there is limited success, it tends to happen with regard to specific issues, rather than on sector-wide needs.

Nonetheless, NGOs have made some progress in terms of developing relationships with various departments in the administration of the federal government. Briefly during the Yeltsin administration, the president retained an advisor on environmental policy (which subsequently was eliminated, but has recently been recreated, and the administration still maintains a human rights commission (even if it has little impact on policy). NGOs also have a presence on some of the other commissions and advisory councils located within the administration, such as the Committee on Women, Family, and Youth, or Education and Science. This role of minor advisor rarely translated into legislation or policy implementation, however. This is due to a variety of factors. Poor government awareness of NGOs, lack of large or vocal constituencies, and the absence of a strong party system (and now the presence of a unitary party system) also keep the third sector from having a greater presence in national level politics.⁴⁶

Finally, NGOs themselves are often unable to unite on national issues; there is little or no “NGO community” or “NGO identity” at the national level. While the third sector is replete with leaders who speak for the third sector, these leaders are often self-appointed. This makes it difficult to push for legislation at the federal level on third sector issues. The ongoing battle over securing resources from abroad complicates the issue of cooperation. Groups are more interested in staking out their claim to resources at times than thinking strategically as a sector.

The Putin factor

Since Putin’s ascension to the Russian presidency, pundits have been trying to interpret his true intentions toward developing democratic norms, practices, and institutions in Russia. Although his commitment to promoting economic growth is clear, how this goal will impact democratic developments is less so. An often hyperbolic Western press, which perceives shadowy KGB elements behind every move, often muddles intricacies of Russia’s complex dance with promoting greater levels of development, economic and political in Russia. Yet, recent developments are troubling.

Accustomed to state indifference during the Yeltsin administration, NGOs have developed a much different relationship with the Putin administration, which has been verbally supportive of strengthening NGOs and civil society, but has engaged in activities which reveal much more

⁴⁵ For example, groups are potentially eligible to be taxed on incoming grants, as well as the value of the good and services they provide. As of yet, this has yet to significantly impact NGOs. Interviews, fall 2002.

⁴⁶ See Marcia A. Weigle, “On the Road to the Civic Forum: State and Civil Society from Yeltsin to Putin,” in *Demokratizatsiya*, 117–146.

ambivalent attitudes about supporting independent third sector growth as well as broader civil society development. On the one hand, the Civic Forum of 2001 was the first time that government officials and NGO representatives from throughout Russia met to discuss the development of civil society in Russia. Though many worried that this was an opening salvo in a broader effort to co-opt, and eventually muzzle, opposition to the Putin administration's agenda, in his own speech at the conference, Putin dismissed charges that the state wished to co-opt opposition, noting that "civil society cannot be established at the state's initiative, at the state's will, much less in accordance with the state's plans."⁴⁷ In addition, the Civic Forum, by setting up roundtable discussions between NGOs and federal-level administrators, created more channels of communication and a potential for greater NGO-state cooperation. For many groups in the regions, struggling to develop ties with local administrations, it sent a positive sign to regional power holders that NGOs were an important force with whom to negotiate.⁴⁸ However, in the ensuing years, many NGOs became frustrated that while the Civic Forum was an important first step in gaining access to important political elites, that access rarely translated into an impact on policy, particularly at the federal level.

In addition, Putin's more recent State of the Union address of May 2004 demonstrated that nearly three years later, the interest was also tinged with suspicion; some NGOs, he maintained, were primarily concerned with obtaining financial resources from abroad, or served "dubious group and commercial interests." As a result, he argued, these civic groups do not serve the real interests of the people, in contrast to the thousands of organizations on the ground who continue their work unnoticed. A subsequent Kremlin-organized meeting with perceived pro-Kremlin NGOs (human rights organizations such as Committee of Soldier's Mothers and Memorial were not invited) strengthened the perception that Putin, despite his protestations, wants a "managed civil society" to accompany his concept of a "managed democracy."

In our own interviews, NGOs presented various interpretations of Putin's statements. Nearly all were apprehensive, wondering what government actions would come next after this statement. Many interpreted these remarks to be aimed at primarily human rights organizations, which are almost wholly reliant on Western funding and have consistently critiqued the administration's policies, particularly with regard to Chechnya. However, several interviewees also thought that Putin's statement was somewhat accurate, in addition to being extremely worrisome. They agreed that some large, Moscow-based NGOs do get a large amount of funds from abroad, yet are unable to demonstrate "results." These groups advocate on issues that are not compelling to the population, they are much richer than most other organizations, but have no proactive plans for how to work constructively, either with the government or with local populations. In addition, some interviewees pointed out that these organizations had used ineffective strategies, often choosing an adversarial stance with the government rather than one that could yield cooperation. Many NGOs did not disagree with the substance of Putin's remarks so much as fear the potential application of his comments. Would these few sentences mark the launch or a selec-

⁴⁷ "Vladimir Putin: States are Judged by the Level of Individual Liberty. Excerpts from President Vladimir Putin's Speech at the Civil Forum." *Vremya Novosti*, November 22, 2001.

⁴⁸ This was my own experience in interviewing groups in the regions.

tive campaign against Western-funded NGOs? How would overzealous Putin supporters in local and regional administrations, in the absence of a significant opposition, interpret his comments? Putin's approval of Civic Forum helped legitimize NGO activities to many administrators in the regions; his recent comments may have the opposite effect. Many of the NGOs in the regions were subdued, waiting for the other shoe to drop in response to his comments.

Certainly, it would be foolish to ignore the many ominous developments over the past five years. Yet, it is also important to recognize that "independent media" under Yeltsin was a media controlled by various oligarchs; that while Putin is influenced by KGB colleagues, Yeltsin was surrounded by "the family"; that Putin's agenda of economic order first, political development later is supported by a majority of its citizens. In other words, the 1990s was hardly a "golden era" of democracy for Russia. And a realistic foreign policy has to work with the existing situation.

Given these recent developments, it is a good time to assess the status of NGO development as well as civil society in Russia. Do NGOs have the capacity to play a viable role in Russia's democratic development? Second, how can outside actors facilitate this process of domestic development? After more than 10 years of civil society aid, it is an appropriate time to pause, assess, and ask what has worked in building, in USAID's words, a "more open, participatory society"? Support for civil society initiatives is critical. However, USAID should continue to build on its previous successes by continuing its work with the regions and its small grants programs, and continue to broaden its definition of the third sector to include other important civic actors, such as schools, universities, and libraries. Above all, what is critical is that the next phase of strategy continue to be pro civil society, and not anti-Putin's perceived anti-third sector policies.

5.2 USAID'S ACTIVITIES IN CIVIL SOCIETY

USAID has worked for over a decade to facilitate the emergence of civil society in Russia. This has been a difficult task; unlike the field of economic development, which has existed for well over half a decade and is animated by a series of policy debates based on extensive research as well as field experience, not only in Russia, but in many developing countries, civil society development is somewhat uncharted activity. While NGOs around the world have long been involved in implementing development projects, their work has often been limited to facilitating economic development or implementing social projects. The concept of self-consciously developing civil society, in the same vein that one might stimulate economic growth, originated out of the ashes of the Cold War. As a result, development practitioners still know little about how one stimulates "civil society" and which particular strategies yield results. In many ways, Russia, along with many other post-Communist countries, have served as development laboratories. USAID, as well as other donors interested in civil society development, have also been on a steep learning curve in trying to develop effective mechanisms to stimulate civic growth.

From the beginning of its work in the early 1990s, USAID has chosen a strategy of working almost solely with NGOs as a mechanism to develop civil society, although the thematic emphases of development have shifted over time to meet changing realities. This approach differs

from what evolved in the West. While in the West, the nonprofit sector evolved out of decades, if not centuries of more diverse patterns of civic activism; in the East, donors often chose the reverse strategy, by focusing on the nonprofit sector first and then hoping that civic attitudes and patterns would follow.

In addition, civil society work in Russia is complicated by the fact that USAID works with NGOs across all portfolios. Thus, the NGO Support Program works with only a small slice of NGOs. These groups work on issues important to the third sector as a whole; issue-specific NGOs either are funded through USAID-sponsored small grants competitions through Pro-NGO or are often slotted under other programs within the USAID structure. Thus, there is no single portfolio that handles all civil society projects.

In the early to mid-1990s, programs such as the first Civic Initiatives Program (CIP) focused on providing training and technical assistance to NGOs on such topics as registration, social marketing, budgeting, and others. In addition, through World Learning as well as IREX, USAID sponsored several partnership programs, which joined Russian organizations with Western counterparts in order to transfer knowledge and skills from experienced Western NGOs to infant Russian ones. Third, USAID, through the Eurasia Foundation, sponsored small grants competitions to spread money to smaller organizations scattered all around Russia.

As NGO development shifted, so did USAID's strategies. Starting in the mid-1990s, USAID began to focus more intensively on funding networking projects and on supporting resource centers in order to spread knowledge and expertise to regional NGOs located far from Moscow. These efforts to strengthen regional development evolved into the Pro-NGO Program, which linked more than 20 resource centers in four regions in an effort to further institutionalize NGO development in the far corners of Russia. By continuing to support training and small grant making, the program aimed to ultimately increase citizen participation as well as enhance NGO capacity, financial sustainability, and public image. In addition, a separate project run by ISAR in the Russian Far East also linked NGOs across a broad expanse of territory. Many of these centers have evolved into civil society development organizations, and help facilitate government interaction or community activism, rather than simply as service providers to regional NGOs.

As Russia entered a new century, USAID, in addition to its work with NGOs, moved toward stimulating citizen activism in the hopes of fostering the emergence of a civic culture as well as building social capital. The second CIP, located in the Russian Far East, as well as Pro-NGO-funded grant competitions, marked the shift away from a solely NGO focus to one with a broader definition of civic participation. Programs such as "You the People" and the Community Service School Program, further moves USAID away from the narrower NGO approach.

This does not mean that USAID is finished with NGO support. The Third Sector Advancement Program continues its focus on NGOs, by helping them further develop their abilities to act as a critical bridge between citizen and state at local, regional, and federal levels by focusing on

three activities: strengthened associations among CSOs; strengthened policy-making capacity among CSOs; and strengthened community of practitioners that provide services to CSOs.⁴⁹ However, they have begun to branch out to significant other players within civil society in addition to their third sector work.

Strengths of USAID-funded programs

CREATING A NONPROFIT SECTOR

There is now a weak, but existent nonprofit sector that did not exist 10 years ago. In addition, these efforts have created an entirely new vocabulary for activists—“civil society,” “third sector,” “nonprofit organization,” “NGO”—as well as a new way of visualizing and creating linkages with the state, political society, other actors in the civic sector, and the private citizen. Given that the majority of growth has taken place in the past 10 years, this institutional, as well as conceptual, growth is significant, both in its statistical presence as well as in its theoretical implications for strengthening democratic institutions and practices in Russia.

CREATING AN ALTERNATIVE

In addition, throughout the trip, interviewees stressed that USAID is an important source of funding for organizations that often cannot, because of the nature of their activities, find sources of domestic support. For example, in the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that the government or business will be interested in funding rights protection groups or environmental groups. For example, the group Baikal Wave, which has fought to block YUKOS oil from building pipelines in the absence of following appropriate legal procedures, could not have accomplished its work without the support of Western organizations. This type of project is not of interest to local administrations in search of foreign investment, or businesses in search of profits.

Further, many grantees emphasized that aid from USAID and other donors helped them maintain their sense of independence from local and regional administrations in search of political support. Although many of these same groups were also pleased with the progress that they had made in securing small amounts of financial support from administrations, they recognized that it was too early, and relations were too fragile, to count on, or even work for intensive government support, particularly given the political practices of some administrations. While Western donors can create their own set of pressures on influencing group activities and goals, nonetheless NGOs noted the important role that Western funding played in creating an alternative in an increasingly narrow political space.

BROADENING BEYOND “WESTERN” NGOS

Enabling local resource centers to, in turn, become grant-making organizations has helped expand the types of organizations that can qualify for assistance and support. This has slowly helped donors reach organizations that do valuable work but may not fit easily within donor priorities to support democratic reform or change. This is particularly true, for example, for groups that may consider themselves involved in “rights protection work” (protecting the

⁴⁹ USAID Russia, “Third Sector Advancement Program Annual Program Statement,” May 28, 2004, pp. 4-5.

rights of invalids, blind, veterans, etc.) but are unable to fit themselves within the Western rhetoric of “human rights” organizations.

FOSTERING GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

While developments have stalled or in some ways moved backwards at the federal level, NGOs have worked hard for and achieved recognition from municipal and regional administrations, which has been manifested in a variety of ways.

- NGO fairs. For many NGOs in the regions, this was an initial step in educating administrations, the public, and other NGOs about their work. NGO fairs have become common in parts of Siberia, Central Russia, and the Volga district.
- Regional and municipal grant competitions. In the past few years, NGOs have successfully lobbied municipal and regional administrations to sponsor small grant competitions. Many USAID-funded NGOs were active in helping administrations set up transparent mechanisms through which to judge recipients. In many of the regions, governments increased budget funds, not only for the competitions, but for the amount delegated for specific individual projects. Although this money is still small (many budget competitions are for only several hundred dollars), nonetheless it is an important step.
- Consolidated budget competitions. In addition, USAID-sponsored NGOs have lobbied administrations to develop funding mechanisms that draw from various institutions within society. Thus, for example, government, NGOs, and businesses might agree to pool money for specific social projects.
- Social contracting. As governments have become more familiar with NGOs, they have also gradually relinquished responsibility for various tasks.
- In addition, NGOs have become increasingly active at the municipal and regional levels in drafting legislation and influencing policy.

Many of these developments were initiated by centers funded by the Pro-NGO project.

FOSTERING DOMESTIC FUNDING SOURCES

All of these developments have helped a small but notable trend in increasing domestic sources of funding for the NGO community.

SPECIFIC PROJECT SUCCESSES

These broader trends were often facilitated by a few instrumental NGOs who worked particularly effectively with grant money and USAID support, or with support from other donors. For example, many NGOs acknowledged the role that the Siberian Center had played in pushing for many of these changes. The Center was singled out by many NGOs as providers of effective training, excellent models of organization, and strategic thinking. In addition, the Samara Center “Povolzhe,” which has traversed a very different organization path, was also praised as an effective center, particularly with regard to their abilities to build relations with local and regional administrators. Furthermore, the Center for NGO Support was cited as an important source for on-line training for many NGO activists in the regions. Although these examples

were mentioned to the assessment team, we expect that similar success stories would be found elsewhere were a more comprehensive assessment be undertaken.

CONSTRAINTS AND WEAKNESSES OF USAID-FUNDED PROGRAMS

The Civil Society team recognizes the large and very intricate structure of USAID, both in the United States as well as in Russia. Programs are divided between numerous departments and portfolios. In addition, particularly in Russia, resources have diminished, while the immensity of the task at hand (fostering political and economic change in a country spanning eleven time zones) has remained constant. This has led the Civil Society team to raise the following issues, given the importance of the critical task at hand.

COORDINATION WITHIN USAID

While the Third Sector Advancement Program works on strengthening NGOs, the delineations between the different portfolios within USAID are somewhat illusory. NGOs are funded within all sectors. Yet, it is not clear how the different portfolios within USAID interact, exchange information, or create synergy among the various “successes” within their portfolios. The Mission has been breaking ground in terms of innovative programming that cross-fertilizes across portfolios, and efforts should continue in this regard.

For example, nearly every single NGO in the regions complained about networking projects that created “umbrella” coalitions among organizations across Russia. Many felt that Moscow trainers were poorly versed in local conditions, had little practical experience to impart, and were generally unprepared to provide quality training. In addition, many regional groups reported that regional representatives of Moscow based umbrella organizations were weak; the Moscow center claimed an extensive network which did not really exist on closer inspection. Alternatively, regional representatives for the umbrella projects complained that they operated alone, with little to no support from the center. The benefits they did receive—a small stipend, information through the Internet, a yearly trip to Moscow—were few compared with the costs incurred by the center.

Even though these projects are not formally funded under the Third Sector Advancement Program, it affects the work of NGOs within this portfolio. Yet, this issue may not be addressed, because it also is not formally considered the Third Sector Advancement Program’s “problem”; it belongs to rule of law or political processes or some other portfolio. These programmatic delineations make it difficult to fully address third sector growth. This is unfortunate, for it makes it difficult to connect issue-specific successes with sector-wide attempts to improve the legal, social, or political environment for the entire sector.

In addition, activity managers within the different portfolios within USAID as well as the broader Embassy staff have differing definitions of the third sector, of civil society, and how these two phenomena can contribute to democratic sustainability in Russia. For example, some staff (not in the Third Sector Portfolio) tend to equate civil society with just NGOs. Others have a very Americanized view in terms of their expectations of what NGOs “should” look like in

Russia. Some tend to view civil society as being led primarily by human rights organizations, others are more interested in social service provision NGOs as the potential locus of greater organization. As a result, it is difficult to coordinate projects, strategies, and goals in the absence of common agreement or at least understanding of each other's priorities.

Project weaknesses

CONNECTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

Although a nonprofit sector now exists, it is one that is often divorced from the constituencies they claim to represent. For example, while the Civil Society team believed that aid had helped support eloquent, democratic thinking activists in cities such as Irkutsk, for example, many of these organizations consisted of a few members, who ran several organizations and grant projects. In general, for many donor-supported organizations, the public is still absent. The main constituent is still the donor.

WEAK PARTNERS

Inevitably, not all projects will create the expected results. Nationwide programs implemented by different people in different environments inevitably create a wide range of results, some more successful than others. For example, with the Pro-NGO Program, funding regional hubs to act as incubators of greater civic activism makes sense in a country as large and diverse as Russia, particularly when donors are trying to support organizations based far away in the regions. In the ideal situation, regional hubs can act as spider plants of activism, stimulating greater organization among surrounding NGOs. However, the reverse is also true; an ineffective center can retard, subvert, or strangle development. A mentoring relationship in which a regional center acts as a mobilizing leader can turn into a monopolizing one, in which a central organization sucks up valuable resources, without fostering further development. In a bad situation, funding can create a "black hole" of development.

While Novosibirsk and Samara were credited by NGOs for stimulating regional activism and fostering growth, Krasnodar (the Pro-NGO project) and the various programs run by ISAR and currently ISC in the Russian Far East were nearly unanimously perceived as weak. Unfortunately, weakness in the center often stymies development elsewhere. Particularly in Southern Russia, although NGOs credited SRRC with being a consistent source of training, it was also consistently criticized for monopolizing resources and for using less than transparent policies and procedures. This created divisions within the NGO community, and when the pro-NGO project ended, so did the work of many of the regional resource centers in the network. Thus, networking projects did not work universally across Russia.

After interviewing multiple NGOs that worked across various portfolios, we believe that good, talented people make projects work, rather than the reverse situation. Nice sounding, important, and even necessary projects can founder and eventually shrivel, even when implemented by professional NGO activists, particularly when they have different priorities, passions, and interests. Supplying projects based on what donors feel "should" happen rather than designing projects based on what NGO activists want to make happen, feel passionate about making hap-

pen, and have been able to make happen in the past creates projects doomed to fail. Work on building on past successes rather than on future aspirations.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

We recognize that fostering civil society, or even a nonprofit sector, is a long-term process, which is contingent on a wide array of contextual factors that are often out of the control of relevant actors. Supporting this development takes a long-term commitment, reinforced with adequate resources. Unfortunately, USAID may have access to neither in the upcoming years. Thus, we wrote the evaluation under the assumption that funding will wax and wane, and may cease entirely in the near future (i.e., five years). As a result, we have tailored our recommendations under the assumption that aid will come to an end sooner rather than later, and thus our recommendations revolve around a belief that now is the time to preserve and nurture the progress that has been made while cutting away the counterproductive activities. We do not advocate an entirely new course of action, but rather seek to refine previous strategies that will fit into new program objectives of strengthening associations among CSOs, strengthening policy-making capacity among CSOs, and strengthened community of practitioners that provide services to CSOs.

Defining focus/mission

The third sector team at USAID is professional and knowledgeable, with a wealth of experience over the past decade. All of the various Annual Program Statements, strategies, and so on are clearly written. However, as the amounts of money lessen, the ARD team encourages the third sector portfolio to more clearly articulate what it hopes to leave as a defining legacy with regard to either third sector or civil society development. The mission of the USAID's civil society promotion strategies has spread substantially, such that its programs on civil society are stretched so broadly that it cannot focus compellingly on any single issue. The 2004 Annual Program Statement provides some of the direction that was lost as a result of the close-out scare; new program objectives revolve around strengthening associations among CSOs, strengthening policy-making capacity among CSOs, and strengthened community of practitioners that provide services to CSOs. But other new programs also include the Community Service School Program, as well as "You the People." All of these concepts and projects are important, but it also stretches the team very thinly across many varied approaches to civic development. It is unclear where the office's "passion" lies, if we may use the term. What does it want to leave behind after over a decade of hard work?

Coordination with other units

We would like to encourage all of the relevant actors who work with NGOs across the USAID portfolios to sit down together to exchange information on successful projects, as well as on more basic assumptions about the nature of their work. In conversations with various officers at USAID, the ARD Civil Society team noted that different officials had different definitions of the third sector, civil society, what signifies a "successful" project, and so on. This makes it difficult to coordinate activities, when different development specialists have different definitions, ex-

pectations, and so on. There is some intersection, but each goal is going to target a different audience and different types of projects.

Not only does there need to be greater information sharing among portfolios, but the work sponsored under the varying portfolios needs to be relayed to relevant regional partners. In the regions, groups complained that they did not know of the work of other USAID-sponsored projects that were implemented under different portfolios; this made coordinating work, as well as building cooperation, difficult.

Where we see potential overlap ...

Continue to look for ways of cross-fertilization with the local governance sector. Much progress that has been made has been made at the local level in working with city and regional administrations. However, this entails allowing civil society more say in the IUE plan, which is weak on NGO–government interaction.

Where we do not

Although, in theory, NGOs and other relevant actors in civil society should build relations with various important political players, in practice, building relations with political parties is not a viable option for most NGOs.

The ARD team concluded that NGO–political party networking should not be the primary focus of USAID’s political process work in Russia. Given the lack of strong alternative parties, the dominance of United Russia, and the weakness of party structures in general, most NGOs felt that working with parties was completely useless. They all recognized the importance of finding allies within the policy process; however, many felt it would be useful to work with sympathetic individuals within legislatures as well as administrations rather than gamble on parties.

Programmatic emphases

Within its work with the third sector, several projects have been particularly effective. The Siberian Center, Povolzhe, and the Center for NGO Support, although there have been many other successes as well, in other regions including the RFE and Southern Russia. Find ways to further support the work that these organizations already excel in, rather than designing new programmatic emphases. Two of these organizations, the Siberian Center and the Center for NGO Support, have also taken initiative to secure their own office space, which should help them with their long-term strategies to make the transition to finding greater sources of domestic support.

With regard to Southern Russia, SRRC has been unable to play a similar role as that played by the Siberian Center or Povolzhe. There are several possible solutions: scale back their activities to what they do best, which seems to be something revolving around consulting, or spread resources among the three strongest resource centers in the area, to ensure that other NGOs can continue to receive services in the region. However, currently, the NGOs we spoke with tended to view SRRC as an unhealthy monopoly in the NGO community.

Finally, training for NGOs is still necessary. The Academy for Education Development is one of the few organizations that is still sponsoring training for NGOs in Russia. Certainly, most NGOs have developed beyond the initial trainings offered in the 1990s. However, NGOs are faced with new challenges; as many groups achieve success in terms of gaining access to social service provisioning, or in impacting legislation, or in working with local and regional government, they will need more expertise as well as more opportunities to share their successes with other NGOs. In addition, as some NGOs develop into stable organizations, they need increasing education to match the increased sophistication of their work.

Continue emphasis on regional development to stimulate national impact

It is critical to continue assistance to NGOs in the regions, rather than get sidetracked by focusing solely on change at the federal level. Civil society developments must trickle up from the regions rather than down from the center, via a select group of Moscow organizations. How can all of these varied grassroots initiatives trickle up into building a coherent strategy to affect political change at the national level? Only by building successes at the regional and local levels, spreading those practices, and then using that momentum to create support for change at the national level.

Certainly, change is needed at the federal level. However, need and ability are two separate issues, and unfortunately, the presence of the former does not guarantee the presence of the latter.

For example, real breakthroughs, such as on taxation, are not realistic expectations for the near future. The government's focus on cleaning up business and eliminating loopholes means that it will not want to implement legislation, which will further impede that process by creating new potential loopholes. As tempting as it is to want to sponsor splashy, federal-level campaigns on "national" issues such as taxation, these efforts will not yield results until the third sector develops an identity, a strategy, a plan. Thus, it makes much more sense to encourage pushing for change at the local and regional levels, giving groups the experience they need to effect change.

Further, developing NGO tax legislation does not have to be initiated by the NGO community. In the West, 501(c) 3 legislation was very much a creation of business, not civil society activism. If the push is to come for better NGO legislation, it could originate from business, or from business and NGOs working together, or from some other configuration. In other words, the responsibility for passing legislation that favors NGOs does not need to rest solely on the shoulders of NGOs alone. In addition, what lessons can be learned from efforts to pass pro-NGO tax legislation in other post-Communist countries?

What can the third sector do to develop the types of interaction needed in order to become a player at the federal level? More interaction is needed between the various players at the regional and Moscow and Petersburg levels across the different sectors of USAID aid. Many of these groups operate in isolation from each other, and until they start talking to each other, they will not have the ability to develop short-, medium-, and long-term strategies.

Redefine meaning of viability

Sustainability is another issue that is critical for NGOs; yet, we must be realistic. Certainly, fostering groups' abilities to ensure their own work is critical; yet, USAID must avoid an overly "Americanized" view of financial sustainability. There simply is not the tax framework, nor the domestic financial support to sustain the NGO sector. Certainly, there are encouraging signs: the emergence of Russian foundations and of grant competitions at the regional level signal progress. However, we have to broaden our conception of sustainability and think about human sustainability. That is, is USAID supporting the people who will continue their work, even when funding lessens, trickles, or stops altogether?

Continue to broaden beyond the third sector

USAID has faced difficult choices about the best way to stimulate the development of a civil society. Certainly, the focus on institutionalizing a nonprofit sector makes sense. However, the nonprofit sector is not the same as civil society, and we urge USAID to continue to broaden definitions of civil society beyond the concept of the third sector/institutionalized NGO framework. Russia needs engaged citizens. The institutional network of nonprofit organizations will mean nothing if there are no constituents to interact with them. USAID needs to reach out to new priority areas, such as TOC and organizations oriented around health initiatives as well as use museums, schools, and libraries as nesting grounds of social capital. In that sense, the team supports projects such as the Community Service School Program, or the You the People Program, both of which work with schools to foster greater citizen involvement.

In sum, what should be prioritized? Finding ways to support the organizations that have, over the past decade, demonstrated a proven track record of success in terms of generating change, whether it is in pushing for legislation, facilitating government recognition, implementing policy, or engaging citizen activism. These organizations tend to be located in the regions. They tend to work on specific issues that are important to local populations, or are able to facilitate the work of such service-oriented organizations. And these organizations have been able to build critical human capital by attracting talented, smart, and dynamic individuals. The best way to facilitate civil society and democracy is to find the talented people and help them do their work, rather than define the work that needs to happen and hope that the people arrive. If USAID can continue to build on these small areas of citizen activism, rather than define where citizen activism should happen, it can make a lasting impact on the evolution of civil society in Russia.

6. SYNERGIES AND LINKAGES

6.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM

Russia definitively entered into its post-Communist era with its recent elections. The poor showing of the Communist Party in the parliamentary elections of December 2003 signaled an ongoing consolidation of power by President Putin and his supporting coalition known as the United Russia party. With his landslide victory in the subsequent presidential elections of March 2004, the popular Putin further set the stage for a strong second-term mandate. Positive macroeconomic growth has provided a relatively propitious context for Putin's second presidential term, enhancing prospects for reform.

But Putin's pursuit of economic reform has not been accompanied by increasing political liberalism. Rather, the president appears to be reducing the political space for expressions of criticism of the regime. Concerns over a trend toward authoritarianism have been enhanced by the strengthening of Putin's position as he has cracked down on Russian oligarchs who emerged during the Yeltsin period. A pall has fallen over the media sector as the government has flexed its muscle in this sector that previously was dominated by the oligarchs. The arrest of oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky suggested a decline of tolerance for the support of opposition parties, such as the Union of Rightist Forces (SPS) and Yabloko, both of which received material support from Khodorkovsky.

What has transpired in Russia is that, as the vestiges of the Communist Party continue to weaken, the vacuum has been filled by a strong presidency. One of Putin's appeals to voters has been the image of him as a strong leader capable of maintaining political stability during an era of change. But the means of consolidating power have reinforced trends toward authoritarianism, which is linked to a reward system based on patronage. This patronage is being fostered by the increasing concentration of power within a dominant party.

Such dynamics have had two consequences that mitigate against the transition toward democratic governance. First, for patronage relationships to continue to play such a pronounced role means that government units tend not to be so responsive to the citizenry, such as at the local level. Lines of accountability still tend to run upward toward the center, rather than downward to the constituents and their representatives. Second, for patronage to flourish, there must be an element of discretion available to decision-makers, which also creates conditions favorable to pervasive corruption. An ineffective rule of law system is a symptom of these political dynamics as well.

However, a dilemma is emerging as a result of this trend toward reduced political space. Namely, the state's commitment to economic liberalization and market reforms is also conditioned by an increasing responsiveness of the state to the interests and concerns of both civil society and the private sector. To make progress in terms of public sector's diversification and reducing the government's dependence on energy export revenues, there needs to be a more favorable environment for private investment. Similarly, for the provision of public services to

keep pace with popular needs and demands, public policy needs to incorporate more community participation in overcoming developmental gaps and problems. So the regime faces a dilemma that even as it seeks to consolidate its own power, it must take further steps to ensure greater responsiveness to non-state actors.

One of the principal accomplishments of the Putin regime has been the consolidation of political stability in a context of change. Widespread civil unrest has not accompanied the adjustments that have gone along with the severe economic dislocations of the past decade. The 2000 election of the popular Putin helped to curb speculation over presidential succession, and his 2004 reelection has further reinforced a sense of stability, although the business and political elites are still struggling to work out an accommodation over the respective exercise and limitation of formal and informal power. The volatility and political fragmentation that characterized Russian party politics in the 1990s have begun to settle, with new laws contributing to some coalescence of party activity at the national level.

Although stability is not a substitute for development, it does contribute to a context in which the political risks of some reforms are not as marked as in other environments characterized by conflict. There are currently opportunities afforded by this stability to push ahead with select but needed reform. In particular, there are political changes that must accompany certain economic adjustments if Russia's transformation from an inefficient centralist system is to be sustained. The three democracy and governance subsectors covered in this report offer complementary means by which to pursue common objectives that will help Russia implement reform while maintaining cohesiveness and stability.

6.2 OPPORTUNITIES FOR USAID ACTIVITIES

In such a context, the linkages and relationships between sectors and subsectors of the Mission's portfolio offer key opportunities for synergies. That is, there is a need to introduce elements of more responsive governance into policy making over substantive issues that pose developmental challenges. USAID can be a catalyst in helping foster greater citizen participation and involvement in identifying problems, advocating for solutions to those problems, and getting involved in overseeing the execution of public policy in resolving the problems.

An issue-oriented approach in building synergies across sectors offers considerable promise in fostering participation at the local level. One way to accomplish this would be to focus a series of coordinated activities around some of the key issues of the day. These would include issues in such areas as social subsidies, health, education, and the environment. All of these public policy issues are best addressed and resolved through citizen participation, and by including constructive input and state/society interaction over the resolution of key developmental challenges, such an approach would help to foster greater pressures for democracy and governance reform.

There are several characterizing dimensions to the proposed synergies initiative that have been drawn from the findings of the preceding sections:

I. Focus on local level interventions

One of the more striking common themes to emerge from the assessment teams' findings is the opportunity and need to work on developing effective means for participation at the regional and local levels. As the centralized state became fiscally unable to generate the revenue growth needed to provide the goods and services aspired to by citizens, the government tentatively moved to devolve power and decentralize many functions. However, such reforms have been partial, since the local government units were not ready to assume the functions and mandates that were, in theory, being accorded to that level of government. The result has been that there is a confusing array of laws and degrees regarding the interactions between different levels of government. There remains a strong reliance on transfers, which are often the source of negotiation between regions and the central government and even within regions. In short, the central state has not yet clearly passed along the fiscal responsibilities and mandates that are necessary to enable local government units to plan their policies in accordance with a predictable revenue stream. The 2003 law on decentralization and local self-government is a key step in the right direction, but the decentralization framework needs to evolve further as local governments and communities become more capable of taking initiative.

Part of improving the enabling environment for decentralization relies on Russia's further developing its system of federalism. Federalism, a Soviet myth that became a reality in Russia after 1991, is a crucial bulwark against total domination of the polity by the president and the Kremlin. In fact, further strengthening the federal system with clearly delineated authorities and responsibilities for regions and localities is arguably a more likely effective bulwark against renewed centralization than either political parties or the media. But for the Russian government to develop confidence in more federalist arrangements, there needs to be more confidence by the center in local administrations, which are often viewed by the center as particularly prone to corruption.

Local governance continues not only to be held back by such supply-side considerations. In addition, the subsector assessments uniformly observe that the responsiveness of governance at all levels is undermined by poor participatory and representative mechanisms. The political parties have very poor ability to integrate grassroots concerns and participation into their policies and platforms. The weak civil society sector at the national level has been both disconnected from the popular base and relatively ineffectual in advocating for national-level changes. At the local and regional levels, the focus has tended to be on the relationship between the levels of government rather than on the linkages between citizens and the state.

The Russian political system still largely reflects the paternalism and top-down approach that is its heritage. Increased responsiveness of local government depends on several improvements. The first is in the *regulatory environment*, where the ambiguities regarding the relationship between governmental authorities remains to be further refined. Second, *regional and local government units must be strengthened* in order for them to carry out their expanded functions such as in their capacity to plan and budget in a transparent fashion. Third, local and regional mechanisms for incorporation of *citizen participation* into policy making deliberations (including but not lim-

ited to NGOs and parties) must be enhanced to counterbalance the top-down political culture that has dominated Russia's past.

The area of local governance provides a promising platform from which to address public decision-making processes while simultaneously tackling substantive developmental issues and challenges. By focusing democracy and governance interventions around practical and tangible developmental challenges in other sectors, considerable synergies may be obtained. For instance, engaging community-level involvement in public health will depend on improvements in both local- and regional-level CSOs, but also in the willingness and capacity of governmental officials to absorb such input. Likewise, improved management of environmental resources will also benefit from structured participatory mechanisms that have a direct impact on public policy.

2. Need for demand-side improvements

The prospects of further achieving high-level national reform in the next four years will depend less on donor assistance than on increasing demand for governmental responsiveness and accountability from below. There is an opportunity for USAID to have a significant impact on political development by enhancing citizen participation around public policy at the regional and local levels. There is not only a pressing need to render government more responsive to the needs and concerns of the citizens, but there is a material need as well to get communities more involved in the provision of public goods and services. Democratic governance does have benefits for economic growth, public health, and overcoming other development challenges, especially at the local level.

In addition to citizen input, USAID should also consider encouraging the formation of public/private partnerships. There is currently a high premium in Russia on the promotion of the concept of the social responsibility of business. The current campaign in this regard which has been emanating from the Kremlin relates to a huge conundrum for Russia's development, which can be phrased as either "How much of a voice should the new business elite have outside its realm of operations?" or, conversely, "How much and through what devices should that elite contribute to society and the state?" This is obviously a ticklish subject, but one which could in part be addressed at the local level through public/private partnerships in the resolution of community challenges.

Opportunity exists for USAID to strengthen demand-side mechanisms in all of the subsectors evaluated in this assessment. For Russian political institutions to become more responsive and representative, political parties need to become more integrally linked to their constituent base. Already, there are signs that United Russia is seeking to use top-down methods to consolidate its reach down to more local levels of government. To counterbalance tendencies toward patronage, it would be helpful for the parties to try to better articulate various alternatives to public policy. In regard to civil society, there is ample room to begin to aggregate interests through issue-based associations that can in turn seek to access parties as well as government officials for influence. The NGOs capable of filling the developmental gap at the local level are perhaps most likely to be able to establish partnerships with the public sector that will in turn facilitate

greater civil society influence. In general, civic education will be a key element in informing citizens about the roles they can effectively play in democratic governance.

3. Anticorruption as a cross-cutting theme

A third area of potential synergy that calls out for linkage between sectors and subsectors may be found in the need to mitigate the pervasive corruption from which Russia suffers. A by-product of centralized communist rule, corruption found root in the top-down legacies that inhibited transparency and accountability. These tendencies have been reinforced by the continued reliance on patronage to consolidate the political hold of the regime.

This tendency toward corruption will not easily be reversed, especially not just through national decree or regulation. A more promising means to mitigate corruption involves public information and citizen oversight over concrete local issues. If citizens and communities are to be effectively encouraged to participate more in meeting developmental challenges, they must be enabled to be sure that public resources are being well spent and that those who make decisions over these resources are held accountable. An element of transparency and citizen oversight should therefore be built into activities at the local level that take advantage of synergies between sectors and strategic objectives.

This assessment recommends that an anticorruption cross-cutting theme be integrated into a synergies program through combining transparency and citizen participation elements. A good antidote to the arbitrary discretion that feeds corruption is for the budgets and expenditures on public investments to be subject to public scrutiny through concerned citizens. This practice could be introduced at the local level through the developmental issues tackled in the recommended synergies program. As social infrastructure initiatives are developed, the planning and budgeting should be done in a participatory and transparent fashion. Then an operating committee could be formed for each project to oversee expenditures and procurement associated with the initiative. Such an anticorruption element will be essential to encourage the type of counterpart contributions that could result from the synergies initiative, as discussed below.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

While each of the democracy and governance subsectors addressed in this assessment contain elements that could be strengthened independently, there is also compelling reason to seek to link their impact at the local level so that synergies may be obtained. By linking interventions within these subsectors to the resolution of key challenges in other sectors, the impact of the democracy and governance assistance may be rendered more concrete, evident, and measurable. The USAID strategy could therefore seek to maximize the impact of limited resources by building on synergies related to the resolution of tangible issues. Communities and their local (or regional) governments could be encouraged to tackle priority problems through a participatory process that contributes to democratic governance while simultaneously offering solutions to problems in the health, environmental, educational, and economic growth areas. In other words, this assessment has identified ways in which improved local governance processes and capabilities could lead to improved results in other sectors. The democracy and governance

interventions would in turn be designed to support mechanisms that enhance participation, responsiveness, and accountability—all of which are essential to enhanced performance in the provision of services and in generating counterpart contributions.

These recommendations for a synergies program point to an issue-oriented program. It would involve the engagement of civil society, local and regional governments, and the private sector in the identification and resolution of developmental challenges. The formation of developmental partnerships between local government, civil society, and the private sector will follow the identification of community and local governance priorities through a participatory process. By introducing a more participatory element into overcoming key developmental challenges, the goal will be to render governance both more responsive and transparent. This transparency and the oversight it renders plausible will enhance conditions for investment and participation.

The synergies program would be driven by a social infrastructure fund around which program activities would be integrated. That is, a fund in a given sector (such as health, economic growth, or environment) would be established that could be accessed through proposals that involve developmental partnerships with counterpart contributions. Program support would be provided for the prioritization of issues, the development of plans and proposals with the necessary technical and budgetary specifications, the implementation of concrete small-scale projects, and the oversight of expenditures.

The key will be to use democracy and governance innovations at the local level to mobilize community and private sector participation and contributions in resolving priority challenges. This will involve bringing the various parties (local authorities, NGOs, and private sector) together to prioritize and plan for problem-solving initiatives. Agreements will be developed regarding the nature of the roles and responsibilities of each party to the agreement, and an oversight committee will be established. By focusing on concrete issues and investments, innovative means for participation, oversight, and the ability of local government units to deal with pressing issues can be enhanced.

The synergies program would use local governance as a platform in identifying what issues the communities see as of highest priority. Mayors and elected officials can be encouraged to reach out to community groups that have an interest in cooperating with the public sector to overcome pressing concerns. By providing oversight through local councils and oversight boards, citizens and NGOs will be more likely to participate in leveraging both public and private resources. Such issues are likely to involve other sectors in the Mission's portfolio. USAID could engage the demand side through greater issue-based campaigning that unites NGOs and political parties around common goals. There could be some assistance provided to NGOs to take on the technical challenges associated with specific issues, such as in the health or education sectors. The parties could be encouraged in their aggregation and mobilization of participation from below. Local government could be enabled to better incorporate public input and to plan in a transparent fashion that contributes to greater transparency. A grants program across sec-

tors would provide some material resources to accomplish concrete objectives in addressing the developmental issues that are identified.

The Mission might consider focusing investments in a cluster of cities within a region or small number of regions. Municipalities within a region can learn from the experiences of their most immediate neighbors and successes can be replicated most readily. The approach recommended here depends on increasing accessibility by the public to governmental authorities, which tends to mitigate in favor of working in smaller cities, where the more personal ties can bring the people closest to their government.

In sum, the assessment points to an opportunity to address Russia's developmental dilemmas by focusing on multiple issue-oriented initiatives in a targeted region. The desired impacts should be evident both in the democracy and governance sector and in the other sectors under which particular issues might fall. By overcoming specific and tangible developmental obstacles, the benefits of democratic governance to multisectoral development will be realized. By concentrating several initiatives within a selected region, the prospects for replicability and impact on the national policy dialogue will be enhanced.

The proposed synergies program has the following elements:

- *Selection of region(s) and municipalities:* Rather than dispersing resources across too broad an area, it would be best to focus on numerous municipalities within a single region or small number of regions. Such a geographically targeted approach would allow for the maximization of impacts in a single region or a couple of regions that would create a more favorable environment for replication. The concentration of interventions within a single region can help to involve regional government as well, which will be important in furthering the policy dialogue over federalism. It would also provide a ready base from which to roll out the program at a later date if desired.
- *Identification/establishment of social infrastructure funds:* A fund or sector-specific funds would be established and/or identified around which proposals could be developed. These proposals would be contingent on the formation of developmental partnerships between local governments, civil society, and/or the private sector. The proposals would also entail the use of participatory methods in public policy deliberations, and the improvement of transparent budgeting practices. Oversight and sustainability elements would also be required for each successful proposal.
- *Identification of priority issues:* Working through the governors, assistance would be provided to local elected officials such as mayors to convene public sessions to identify priority issues and potential ways to resolve them. Such issues would be practical community problems that could conceivably be resolved through public and collective action. These issues are likely to be in such areas as health, environment, or economic growth. They should not be determined a priori, but identified through open deliberations that involve elected local officials interacting with constituent groups and associations. Through a participatory process,

priorities would be involved for the development of plans to overcome such challenges. The conveners would then seek to identify interested parties (both NGOs and potentially private sector) that could mobilize counterpart contributions in the realization of the social infrastructure projects that are envisaged.

- *Development of proposals:* After the formation of operating committees around the resolution of concrete problems, proposals would be developed to carry out the investments. This would involve both technical input in the preparation of plans and budgets and some technical assistance and training to municipalities to carry out these functions. The proposals would be for donor and public social infrastructure funds to tackle concrete challenges of manageable scope in other sectors that are identified as pressing by local constituents. These proposals would include provisions for counterpart contributions, oversight, and sustainability.
- *Articulation of agreements:* Once a proposal is worked out, formal agreements would be worked out to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the various parties involved, as well as specifying their counterpart contributions. The solicitation of counterpart contributions is a key element of this recommended approach. This will help institutionalize the principles of accountability and transparency that will be essential to creating a conducive environment for such contributions. The memoranda of understanding that are developed should include clear procedures for not only the respective contributions of the various parties in terms of monetary or in-kind resources, but also in terms of participating in the operational and oversight committees for each project.
- *Formation of oversight committees:* In conjunction with the operating committees, oversight committees would be formed to provide some control and oversight over the execution of the plans. This anticorruption component of the program would depend on there having been transparent planning and budgeting from the start.
- *Implementation of the social infrastructure projects:* The projects would be implemented according to plan and signed off on in phases so as to provide assurance to all contributors that the funds and respective responsibility are being discharged in accordance with the agreements.
- *Dissemination of experience:* The dissemination of the experiences through the media and regional forums would help to build a basis for replicability. There should also be a component of the program that feeds back into a national policy dialogue regarding decentralization. This would involve both incorporating local and regional officials into the dialogue, as well as associations of municipalities as appropriate.

The results that would be attained through the recommended synergies program would transcend sectoral distinctions. On the democracy and governance side, local governments would

be rendered more responsive. Constituent groups would actively be involved in policy deliberations, and mechanisms of transparency and anticorruption would be introduced and implemented. The policy dialogue over decentralization would be informed through lessons learned during implementation of the synergies program. The results in other sectors would depend on the specific nature of the social infrastructure investments, but would involve improved delivery of the various public service issues that have been addressed. The incorporation of citizen input and sustainability components in plans for sectoral investments also provides areas of likely impact, as does the introduction of oversight mechanisms into public procurement processes.

ANNEX A: SCOPE OF WORK

Assessment of Three Program Areas and Conducting of Three Short Workshops on Democracy Strategy in Russia

SUMMARY:

Structure of the Task Order: There are two tasks in this order:

1. to conduct a combined **program assessment** of three key areas of the USAID/Russia democracy program: political process, civil society and local governance with a team of three US and three Russian consultants and a local support facilitator; and
2. to award and manage a small grant to a leading Russian policy institute (think tank) with strong ties to the US policy analysis community working on Russia, to conduct three **workshops** with leading US and Russia experts on democratization in Russia, for the benefit of USAID/Russia's Office of Democratic Initiatives and concerned senior managers in the broader USAID and US Embassy community.

Time frame of Task Order:

Sign task order (and Contractor signs grant to think tank)	17 May
Assessment (US team members) have met DC informants & read up:	28 May
Assessment team first work day together in Russia	31 May
Assessment team US members leave Russia (Mission has conclusions)	19 June
Assessment final report due in USAID/Russia	12 July
Third and last policy workshop held	11 August
Workshop materials (panelists' short papers, conclusions) published	25 August
Task Order ends	31 August

PART 1: CONTEXT AND PURPOSE OF TASK ORDER

1.1. Context of Task Order:

USAID/Russia will draft its 2005-2009 country program strategy by the end of September 2004. In time for this effort, the USAID/Russia Office of Democratic Initiatives (DI) is preparing its own five-year democracy strategy. The first complete draft of the DI Democracy strategy must be ready by no later than 15 August 2004.

The Office of Democratic Initiatives consists of 20 employees organized into six teams handling various aspects of USAID's effort to build a more open, participatory, civil society and improve key elements of governance at the local, regional and federal levels in Russia. The six DI teams work on civil society (NGO strengthening and civic education), political process, independent media (TV, radio and print), the rule of law, local governance and partnerships/special issues.

Events in Russia, particularly over the last 12 months, have dramatically altered the conditions under which democracy is practiced, and have aroused levels of concern among local democracy advocates and Western policy makers of the likes rarely seen since Russia's aborted coup in 1993. A major factor shaping democratization in Russia over the coming years is that, following the startlingly complete victory of President Putin's United Russia Party in the Decem-

ber 2003 Parliamentary and March 2004 Presidential elections, Russia will not hold another federal ballot until the next Parliamentary race in 2007. This fact, combined with the recently tightening restrictions on the press, a confusing new and considerably more centralized law on local governance that phases into effect over the next three years, and a series of government crackdowns on private corporate philanthropists and a tax law that continues to deny any tax breaks or private funding sources to non-profits, raise daunting new challenges for Russians who strive to bring openness, transparency and accountability to their country's political, social and economic arenas. DI must develop a strategy that effectively addresses these and other challenges.

Given the wide diversity and range of global interests which the United States shares with Russia, DI's strategy must integrate our efforts with those of other branches of the Embassy, notably the Law Enforcement, Public Diplomacy and Political/Internal sections.

DI's goal for the democracy strategy is to develop a clear and viable approach to investing USAID/Russia's democracy funds, to strengthen the hand of key activists in the non-profit, business and public sectors who are committed to open, participatory and effective democratic governance at the community, local, regional and federal levels. In addition, the strategy should help forge consensus within USAID and among concerned branches of the U.S. government on the elements of Russian democracy that are most essential to U.S. interests and how most effectively to support them.

The DI Office has also reached a pivotal point in the life cycles of many of its current programs (primarily grants to local, and some US, NGOs), when some portfolio restructuring may be required. Therefore, some short-term portfolio restructuring must also take place even as we develop this new five-year strategic agenda.

1.2. Purpose of Task Order:

DI, with some support from colleagues in USAID/Washington, will write the actual democracy strategy. To do so effectively, though, DI must complete the remaining three of the five program assessments needed this year. Like the already-completed media assessment and the planned May 2004 rule of law assessment, the three-part assessment envisaged under this task order must recommend specific approaches to restructuring some key elements of the civil society, political process and local governance portfolios to respond most effectively to changing political and social circumstances and opportunities.

The assessment will thus produce a single report that will consist of four principal sections: the three sector assessments and a fourth section that analyzes the ways that these areas are inter-related and could be addressed jointly to greatest effect.

On a parallel track (and for the most part shortly following completion of the field work for the assessment), this task order envisages a series of three strategy-level workshops managed by a

Moscow-based think tank.¹ This think tank will assemble three Russian-US expert panels, each to examine one aspect of the broader problem of establishing a strong democracy and civil society in Russia. USAID/Russia, in conjunction with this think tank, will establish the three specific themes or questions for the workshops. The panelists will each prepare a short paper on a specific cross-cutting analytical question that can draw attention to particularly promising ways of approaching the problem (their respective workshop theme). At each workshop, DI staff and other senior USAID and Embassy officers will work with each panel to identify and consider the broader policy challenges for Russia and the US, and the more concrete opportunities for targeted cooperation and grants (from US or other donors) to improve the situation. In each workshop, part of the time may be devoted to a broader discussion involving key USAID partners and Russian activist groups.

By combining insights gained from both the assessment and the workshops, USAID/Russia's DI team hopes to produce its five-year democracy strategy, with a first draft ready by approximately 15 August 2004.

1.3. Background information on Civil Society, Political Process and Local Governance programs and current operating assumptions:

The annexes at the end of this scope of work provide background statements on the three areas to be assessed and a brief summary of USAID assistance in each area. They also include the lists of questions which the assessment team must address.

Sources for written records of past USAID programs are provided in the "Existing Resources" section below. Our current assumptions about these three sectors are also included there. These assumptions are merely those that tend to guide current DI program decision making. It is vital that the assessment team question and suggest amendments to this set of assumptions.

A few details on how DI expects the contractor to approach these tasks, along with qualifications of consultants and an indicative work plan follow.

PART 2: APPROACH, METHODOLOGY AND SCHEDULE

2.1 Assessment:

USAID/Russia expects that at a minimum the assessment team members will:

1. Review and analyze the existing reports and performance information as identified in the annexes below;
2. Interview representatives of the home offices of organizations included in the review;
3. Interview field staff of USAID/Russia, the implementing organizations, organizations implementing associated programs, including private sector organizations, other donors, and appropriate federal, regional and local governments counterparts; and

¹ After contract ratification, USAID/Moscow decided for programmatic reasons that this component of the task order would not be required. Instead, the Mission requested ARD to complete the 2004 NGO sustainability index. The statement of work for this activity can be found at the end of this annex.

4. Conduct site visits to a selected cities and regions in the Russian Federation, including, including at least five areas outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg. The teams are encouraged to conduct interviews together as much as possible. It is expected that this will lead to better thinking on the synergies part of the final report. Even if the sub-teams split up for different meetings in the same cities, at having at least some meetings in common (e.g. the civil society group might sit in on a meeting with local government officials and ask questions about civic participation, etc.) might be beneficial.

In addition, USAID/Russia expects to hold periodic update meetings with the team during the time spent in Russia. The team must formally present its findings, conclusions and recommendations DI staff and then to interested members of the Mission and the Embassy during their last week in country.

Approximately six weeks (three weeks in Russia) are estimated to complete this assessment with an assumption of a six-day workweek (including necessary travel time) and includes one week for USAID/Russia to review the final draft report and to provide comments. The assessment should begin no later than the end of May 2004. A representative work schedule is indicated below.

Activity	Description	Location	Dates
Stage I	Review background information. Discuss and finalize the methodology of assessment with USAID/ Russia. Develop report outline. Develop a work plan for the assessment. Make logistical arrangements. Conduct US-based interviews	U.S. (and Moscow for locally hired team members)	May 21, 2004
Stage II	Initial work planning with DI Office, Conducting interviews and gathering necessary information from Russian sources and site visits in Moscow	Moscow	May 28, 2004
Stage III	Visit sites outside of Moscow	Sites vary by sector	June 1-7, 2004
Stage IV	Conduct preliminary analyses and make a presentation to USAID/Russia DI on conclusions and results. Make a presentation to DI partners, USAID Director and other staff, and Embassy, on conclusions and results. Draft report and keep USAID/Russia apprised of progress on the report. Receive feedback from USAID	Moscow (then, US)	By June 10, 2004 June 11, 2004 10-18 June, 2004
Stage V	Incorporate USAID comments into the report, finalize and submit to USAID.	US (and help from Moscow team if needed)	July 5, 2004.

The final report is expected to be submitted to USAID no later than **July 12, 2004**.

2.1.2 Assessment reporting and dissemination requirements

The structure and format of the report will be proposed by the team and approved by USAID/Russia at the beginning of the assessment. The assessment report will primarily be for use by USAID/Russia project management in Moscow and implementing partners, and should be provided in English. A comprehensive Executive Summary capturing key findings and recommendations should be prepared that is suitable for broader distribution.

At USAID/Russia's determination, the full report also may be disseminated to outsiders. Prior to the return of the international consultants to Washington, the assessment team will provide a presentation on key findings to USAID/Russia and its implementing partners, as well as to Embassy colleagues..

The final report will adhere to the purpose of the assessment, and will address the questions listed in the annex below. A draft report outline is also provided below. Other information to be included in the report will be determined in consultation with USAID staff over the course of the assessment.

2.1.3 Sample draft assessment outline

- I. Table of Contents
- II. Executive Summary stating purpose, findings, conclusions and recommendations
- III. Body of the report:
 - a) Justification for the assessment
 - b) Statement of methodology used
 - c) Political Process: analysis of the sector, discussion of strengths and weaknesses of prior USAID/Russia support to the sector; recommendations on follow-on activities, provision of a prioritized list of recommended follow-on activities (including project design, monitoring, and evaluation) and corresponding budget levels (if follow-on activities are recommended); discussion of what USAID/Russia can expect to achieve, conclusions.
 - d) Civil Society: analysis of the sector, discussion of strengths and weaknesses of prior USAID/Russia support to the sector; recommendations on whether USAID/Russia should support follow-on activities, provision of a prioritized list of recommended follow-on activities (including project design, monitoring, and evaluation) and corresponding budget levels (if follow-on activities are recommended); discussion of what USAID/Russia can expect to achieve, conclusions.
 - e) Local Governance: analysis of the sector, discussion of strengths and weaknesses of prior USAID/Russia support to the sector; recommendations on whether USAID/Russia should support follow-on activities, provision of a prioritized list of recommended follow-on activities (including project design, monitoring, and evaluation) and corresponding budget levels (if follow-on activities are recommended); discussion of what USAID/Russia can expect to achieve, conclusions.
 - f) Synergies and Linkages between Political Process, Civil Society, Local Governance, Independent Media and Rule of Law: list of identified synergies, analysis of synergies, recom-

recommendations for cross-cutting activities (if any), including project design, monitoring, and evaluation and corresponding budget levels.

IV. Conclusion

V. Annexes to include: scope of work, list of persons contacted, background supplemental materials, bibliography of significant documents consulted, list of acronyms

The assessment team will provide USAID/Russia with ten hard copies of the final report, and will send the report electronically to an address provided by USAID/Russia. The format should be in MS Word.

2.1.4 Assessment team composition and qualifications

A six-person team comprised of at least three international consultants and three Russian consultants will conduct the assessment. The assessment team will be divided into three groups (political process, civil society and local governance) comprised of one Russian and one international consultant each. Each group will coordinate site visits with other groups. To facilitate the exchange of ideas and findings among assessment team members during the assessment it is recommended to have weekly meetings in USAID/Russia to discuss progress of the assessment and shift priorities if appropriate.

The field work might be supplemented by USAID/Russia staff, as available. All team members should be fluent in English. USAID/Russia suggests the assessment team be designed as follows:

1. **Team Leader/Political Process Specialist** -- Expatriate – 33 days.

The team leader will be responsible for directing the assessment exercise, and submitting the draft and final report. The incumbent must have extensive overseas program evaluation/assessment experience, including USAID experience, preferably in the E&E region and related to political process, civil society and/or local governance activities. He/she must be thoroughly familiar with techniques of program appraisal. As team leader, the incumbent should possess excellent organizational and leadership skills. Russian language skills are desirable. NOTE: Team leader's functions may be executed by one of the three international consultants as appropriate.

2. **Civil Society Development Specialist** – Expatriate –31 days.

S/he must have at least five years in political process field; have substantive overseas experience; be familiar with USAID programs in the democracy sector to develop political parties, democracy institutions, capacity of non-governmental organizations (preferably programs in the E&E region). Evaluation/assessment experience and Russian language skills are desirable.

3. **Political Process Specialist** – Expatriate – ? days

S/he must have at least five years in the field of civil society development or NGO strengthening; have substantive overseas experience; be familiar with USAID programs in the democracy sector to develop democracy institutions, capacity of non-governmental organizations (preferably programs in the E&E region). Evaluation/assessment experience and Russian language skills are desirable.

4. **Local Governance Specialist** – Expatriate 31 days.

S/he must possess both overseas and evaluation experience and be familiar with USAID programs in housing, urban, and local governance development. This consultant should have a combination of consulting experience that includes urban, local governance, local economic, public finance and social sector development. This person should also be familiar with the role that federal, regional and local governments, CSOs, communal services providers and financial institutions play in the local governance development in Russia and/or E&E region. Evaluation/assessment experience and Russian language skills are desirable.

Russian Consultants – 3 Experts:

5. **Political Process Specialist** (Russian consultant). S/he should be well-versed in the current situation in the political environment in Russia, including the current status of reform efforts undertaken by various donors, federal ministries, and regional authorities. Knowledge of programs to develop political parties, democracy institutions, capacity of non-governmental organizations in Russia is desirable.
6. **Civil Society Specialist** (Russian consultant). S/he should be well-versed in the current situation in civil society development in Russia, including the current status of reform efforts undertaken by various donors, federal ministries, and regional authorities. Knowledge of programs to develop NGOs, democracy institutions and capacity of non-governmental organizations in Russia is desirable.
7. **Local Governance Specialist** (Russian consultant). S/he must possess both overseas and evaluation experience and be familiar with USAID programs in housing, urban, and local governance development. This consultant should have a combination of consulting experience that includes urban, local governance, local economic, public finance and social sector development in Russia. This person should also be familiar with the role that both federal, regional and local governments, CSOs, communal services providers and financial institutions play in the local governance development in Russia. Evaluation/assessment experience and English language skills are desirable.

2.2 Workshops:

The Contractor, in addition to conducting the above assessment, must select, and administer a grant or contract with, a local Moscow-based policy institute, or think tank, with strong ties to the US policy analysis community specializing in Russia.

As noted in Section 1 above, this think tank will assemble three Russian-US expert panels, each to examine one aspect of the broader problem of establishing a strong democracy and civil society in Russia. USAID/Russia, in conjunction with this think tank, will establish the three specific themes or questions for the workshops in the first week after this Task Order is signed.

The panelists will each prepare a short position paper on a specific cross-cutting analytical question that can draw attention to particularly promising ways of approaching the problem (their respective workshop theme). There will be a preparatory discussion involving the organizers and the Russian panelists and USAID/Russia in advance of the actual workshop. At each workshop, DI staff and other senior USAID and Embassy officers will work with each panel to identify and consider the broader policy challenges for Russia and the US, and the more con-

crete opportunities for targeted cooperation and grants (from US or other donors) to improve the situation. In each workshop, part of the time may be devoted to a broader discussion involving key USAID partners and Russian activist groups. The think tank will be responsible for preparing a short paper summarizing the workshop and its conclusions, and attaching the panelists' position papers. This workshop paper will serve as aide-memoire to USAID/Russia and concerned sections of the US Embassy as they seek to integrate some of the workshop conclusions and insights into democracy strategy.

The workshop themes would be developed jointly with the selected local policy institute, but would center on questions such as:

1. How can Russian democracy activists (whether NGO leaders, community leaders, journalists, politicians, human rights advocates, lawyers, judges, business leaders or civil servants), persuade Russian citizens that they can influence or solve problems and "make a difference" at the local, regional or national level?
2. What are Russia's most promising, and replicable, democracy success stories and how and to what extent can a foreign donor help those who would replicate them?
3. How can Russia better balance relations between government, business and the non-profit sector – the "iron triangle" of a healthy civil society?
4. What will it take for the "higher angels" of Russian governance and civil society to assert themselves more pervasively – in the fight against intolerance, corruption and abuse of individual rights?

Timing would be according to best availability of experts in each field, but would take place from May through July.

The workshop/seminars final paper will submitted no later than **August 11, 2004** and final USAID strategy will be submitted no later than **August 25, 2004**.

A total of \$50,000 has been set aside under this task order for the grant to the think tank to produce the three workshops and resulting reports.

The Russian Think Tanks experts will summarize the results of the workshops/seminars in one final paper covering all three sectors.

PART 3: ANNEXES

Annex 3.1: Questions for the Assessment

The assessment should address the following four sets of questions related to political process, civil society, local governance, and synergies and linkages between these sectors and independent media and rule of law.

A. POLITICAL PROCESS

1. What conditions characterize the Russian political process after the 2003-2004 elections?
2. Is there a need for programs on political process, and should USAID-Russia support political process activities?
3. If so, how should USAID-Russia design an effective 5-year political process program based on lessons learned from prior programs, and this assessment process? Are there new activities that should be designed?
4. What can USAID-Russia do specifically to “make a difference,” and what can we expect to achieve through support of political process in Russia?

- Public Policy/Decision Making

1. What are Russian people’s perception of role and responsibilities of an elected official?
2. What are potential ways of influencing such perceptions and making communities more active?

- Political Party Development

1. To what extent are current political parties an effective means of transferring public interests into legislative initiatives/public policy? What is preventing political parties from building broad memberships and constituencies?
2. How independent are regional political branches in suggesting their local agendas and bringing for discussion issues important to their local constituencies? Do they seek public support for their agendas at the grass-roots level? If not, what are the constraints/challenges, how they can be addressed effectively? Is there a need for emergence of a new popular party and what could become the impetus for appearance of such a party?
3. What are common interests of political parties and other CSOs (NGOs)? What are reasons that are keeping them from working together? What are main challenges to the development of PP/CSOs partnership: Do the NGOs fear being identified too much with political organizations? Are the political parties only interested in groups that support their causes, as opposed to independent groups? Can our programs play an effective role in addressing the challenges, whatever they may be?
4. If the political party/NGO link is not going to happen in our lifetime, what other linkages should we be pursuing instead/in addition to?
5. Is it productive to continue working with the same political parties, or is a different mix or approach required? For example, should political party assistance focus on central branches of national parties, focus on regional branches of national parties, or focus on regional and grass-roots parties? Should political process training focus more on political activists than on members of political parties?
6. What legislative changes, if any, need to be made to improve pluralism, free and fair elections, and political party development?

- Media and Elections

1. What are the ways to ensure that mass media are objective reporters of the political/electoral processes? How can mass media resist various administrative pressures imposed on them during elections?

2. Is there a chance for increased public participation in elections and election monitoring as a way to ensure democratic transfer of power and adherence to democratic processes/principles?
3. What assistance, if any, needs to be provided for elections? Is election monitoring by non-partisan domestic organizations effective and relevant? Are exit polls and parallel vote tabulations professionally conducted, and do they have any impact on elections and political process? Should training be provided to teach monitoring, exit polling, and PVTs, and if so, at the national or local level?
4. What are the trends in voter turn out and voter apathy, and should USAID assistance address voter education and get out the vote efforts?

B. CIVIL SOCIETY

1. What conditions characterize the Russian society after the 2003-2004 elections?
2. Is there a need for civil society programs, and should USAID-Russia support civil society activities?
3. If so, how should USAID-Russia design an effective 5-year civil society program based on lessons learned from prior programs, and this assessment process? Are there new activities that should be designed?
4. What can USAID-Russia do specifically to “make a difference,” and what can we expect to achieve through civil society support?
5. What changes, if any, need to be made in the legal enabling environment to increase civic participation? Do NGOs have adequate legal resources to defend themselves in response to official harassment? Should USAID assistance address the legal enabling environment and legal support for civil society?
6. What is the trend in financial sustainability for civil society organizations as donor funding has diminished? How are NGOs funding their activities? Should, and can, USAID assistance address the issue of financial sustainability?
7. Are watchdog NGOs effective in monitoring government and holding it accountable? Is civil society effective in promoting transparency and exposing and preventing corruption? Can it be more effective with USAID assistance?

- Decision-Making

1. What are the venues for public engagement in debate on burning societal issues?
2. What issues of public concern can be anticipated in four years ahead (increased government control, shrinking public space, corruption, budget transparency, tolerance, health issues, quality, cost and accessibility of health, communal and other social services)?
3. What can be done to enhance citizens’ decision-making power?

- Public Discourse

1. What is the role of various civil society institutions in developing the culture of civic participation, and shaping public opinion? Who are opinion leaders at the national level?

2. What are programming choices in balancing our efforts between strengthening civic activism and social institutions? What non-electoral means should be promoted for citizens to monitor the conduct of public officials and hold the government accountable?

- NGOs/Advocacy

1. What opportunities exist for advocacy/hot agenda organizations to promote common causes in the current political context? Do they feel increasing pressure from authorities?

2. Which organizations should USAID target in its assistance programs to build platforms for promoting public agenda, encourage various forms of public engagement and civic activism?

3. How can NGOs integrate elective leaders in their activities not becoming captive in the political agenda? How can NGOs take up their constitutional right to contribute to defining social policy priorities and participate in decision-making?

4. Would a coalition of NGOs and emerging political parties advance the position of both? If so, how could outsiders encourage such coalitions?

- Democratic culture

1. Given the limited period for USAID involvement in the civil society development in Russia, should we focus on systemic changes (including changes in mindset) or on strengthening selected legacy institutions?

2. How should USAID continue its efforts in building youth citizenship competence?

3. Are the organizations that make up the third sector and the norms of *generalized* reciprocity creations of western society that will only work in western societies, or is it possible for these values to take root in Russian society and become part of the cultural and tradition?

4. Russians indicate that they have little faith in legal structures, law enforcement and law making process. What effect does the lack of trust have on democracy, civil society, and governance? What are remedies for rebuilding trust?

5. What is the efficacy of civic education? What are merits of working with informal civil society groups, i.e. citizens groups, village units, student movements or other informal entities that aren't necessarily registered as a formal NGO?

- Sector advancement

1. What are the programmatic choices for USAID assistance to increase the impact the civil society has on governance and politics at the national and local level? What are the channels to represent the third sector interests at the national level? What can USAID do to strengthen the sector's capacity to unite and advocate for its interests at the national level? What needs to be done to help the sector to become self-regulated and self-organized?

2. How could Russian universities and policy think tanks fill the information, research, and training niche that is currently fuelling the growth of the third sector?

3. Should USAID assistance focus on NGOs and civil society actions that have an impact at the national level, or is it better to focus on the local level where the impact is smaller but the prospects for success are greater?

C. LOCAL GOVERNANCE

The key assessment questions to be addressed are as follows:

1. What conditions characterize the Russian local governance system?
2. Should USAID/Russia support follow-on local governance programs? If so, how should USAID/Russia design its follow-on activities based on lessons learned from its prior programs?
3. What can USAID/Russia do specifically to “make a difference,” and what can we expect to achieve through its support? Is there a need/demand for a new local governance design? If so, how should USAID/Russia design an effective local governance program for the period of three-to-five years?
4. Do local government officials have the skills and tools necessary to fulfill their functions effectively? If not, should USAID assistance attempt to build the capacity of local government officials?
5. What mechanisms are in place to ensure transparency and accountability at the local government level? Would assistance to strengthen or create such mechanisms be effective? How can USAID media and civil society assistance be more effective in promoting transparency and accountability at the local level?

The assessment team should also answer the following essential questions complimentary to the main ones:

Local Governance Reform

1. What are expectations of local and regional officials from the local governance reform?
2. What are impediments for local governance reform at the regional and local levels?
3. What is the federal strategy--if any--in delineation of authorities?
4. What are gaps in the current local governance legislation that impede local governance reform efforts?
5. How will two level structure of local governance in Russia affect administrative barriers?
6. What kind of a national-level public dialogue-if any-is needed to address local governance reform issues?
7. What role emerging Russian think tank community plays in the local governance reform? Is there need to expand this role?

- Public Participation

1. Is there a demand for a coordinating body for local governments, CSOs, and business community at the federal, regional, local levels?
2. What instruments do local governments use to engage local communities more effectively?
3. What initiatives local governments should support to get practical feedback from local communities?
4. How you identify the term “community” in the Russian context? Could local

governments work with communities/at community level? How

- Dissemination Strategy

1. Is there a demand from local, regional or federal administrators for training in local economic development?
2. What are the most effective ways of dissemination and replication of best local governance reform practices?
3. Do existing municipal associations have a capacity to advocate for reforms?
4. Do municipal associations in Russia have a capacity to serve as a dissemination vehicle?

D. SYNERGIES AND LINKAGES BETWEEN POLITICAL PROCESS, CIVIL SOCIETY, LOCAL GOVERNANCE, INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND RULE OF LAW

Here are the questions which will identify the possible synergies:

1. What are the most important linkages between and among DG sub sectors? What are key linkages between the DG sector and other sectors, such as Economic Development and Health? Are there examples of successful public-private partnerships?
2. What differences do these linkages make to the USAID strategy and achievement of USAID/Russia objectives?
3. What are common interests of political parties, civil society, local governance, independent media and rule of law?
4. What are reasons that are keeping them from working together?
5. What are main challenges to the development of partnerships between the sectors?
6. Do civil society organizations fear being identified too much with political organizations?
7. Are the political parties only interested in groups that support their causes, as opposed to independent groups?
8. Is there a greater potential to anchor desired changes in Russian society by integrating training on the importance of civic participation by offering technical assistance through activities designed to solve issues that exert immediate pressure on citizens, such as environment, health, education, and employment?
9. What are examples of successful synergies among DG subsectors? Which of these should be replicated or continued, and what new linkages should USAID design into its new programs? Are there ways that USAID can build true synergy between and among different activities, rather than simply directing some activities to unilaterally overlap with another subsector, (such as a media activity training journalists in election reporting, or a civil society activity funding NGOs that provide legal support)?

Annex 3.2: Background and Strategic Implications for USAID/Russia's Initiatives in Political Process, Civil Society and Local Governance

Following are summaries of USAID perceptions and assumptions of the current situations in each of the three sectors. We assume that they will be changed, corrected, added to and subtracted from during the course of the assessment study and the seminars, and this is perhaps our overarching assumption: that they will be.

A. Political Process:

Background: The potential for democratic reform and the firm establishment of liberal democratic values in Russia is hindered today by: a single party-dominated system, shrinking public opportunism for political activism, popular apathy, restrictions on the independent media and judiciary, and corruption.

Given this newest political scenario of a weakened system of check and balances, more centralization, and less pluralism, Russia's most active reform-oriented parties have lost ground, despite a decade of support for the multi-party system by USAID. Voter apathy and disillusionment with the political process has risen in the last year, and recent polls suggest that a vast majority of citizens do not believe Russian elections are honest or competitive, and have little faith that they as voters, can effect change. These beliefs have been exacerbated by the heavy use of administrative resources to support the administration-backed candidates during recent local and regional elections, and also in the recent Duma and Presidential election campaigns.

Democratic Institutions: During the last four years, many nascent democratic institutions have been subordinated, as federal authorities spearhead a country-wide consolidation of authority. This centralization impedes the ability of the Federation Council, regional governments, federal-level television channels, the business community, elections commissions, NGOs, and in many instances, the Courts, to participate in the legislative process, ensure public debate on burning social issues, influence policy development on one hand and implement it on the other, and to ensure equal access to justices and to unbiased information.

Membership in the administration-supported political party Yedinaya Rossiya is high, while chances for such parties as SPS and Yabloko to participate in the legislative process has decreased as these parties failed to gain a five percent threshold in the December Duma elections. Moreover, the State Duma introduced an informal procedure called "zero reading" which permits discussion of pending legislation prior to the official Duma reading between the YRP and the government. This procedure opens the possibility that forces loyal to the President can exert an overriding influence on the course and substance of a proposed law before it comes before the rest of the Duma, and that legislative initiatives in the regions can become the prerogative of YRP and its loyal partners. This concern is magnified by a new law on political parties that requires a 50% party representation in the local and regional Dumas; the reformist parties have little significant representation, much less 50%.

Assumptions: USAID's civil society programs in the next five years may be more effective if they emphasize the roles and responsibilities of individuals and grass roots organizations, working individually, in groups and in partnerships, and with their government agencies.

Small-grant programs could be awarded at the regional level for social and community services activities, which in turn could be viewed as laboratories for citizen involvement, incubators for practical experience at the grass roots and local government levels. Such experience and associated skills are those that could later feed into larger civic action programs involving citizen as-

sociations and local governments in participatory decision-making. Philanthropic, social service providers and business associations, community foundations, partnerships and networks, both USAID-fostered networks such as Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Network, Regional NGO Resource Centers in Southern Russia, Volga Federal District and RFE, Junior Achievement (JA) and Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) and other networks such as Russian Red Cross and Russian Rotary, could be utilized as small-grant providers of civic society education and social services.

B. CIVIL SOCIETY

Background: The term “civil society organizations” reflects a broadened perception of the types of organizations that make up the core of the Third Sector: social service, environmental and grass roots advocacy groups, small business associations and networks, civic organizations, public health groups, economic think tanks, and the independent media. These are the agents of a civil society, considered critical to Russia’s emerging democratic infrastructure; they have been the focus of USAID and other donor assistance. The responsibility for civil society activism is beginning its shift to Russian stakeholders. Increasing numbers of Russian philanthropic institutions and NGOs focused on various concerns are emerging; they have the political will to work on pressing social, political and economic issues. These new groups, however, more often than not suffer from lack of the initial skills and funding required for long term growth and sustenance - support that is dwindling at a critical point in time as international donors phase out their programs.

Current constraints on civil society development include the difficult Russian regulatory environment, and unclear and inconsistent policies governing interaction between the civil society organizations and the State. Moreover, individuals, groups and local government agencies have no tradition, have never developed the skills, habits and practices, that are needed for the critical interactions between local government and citizen associations. Poor policy skills, lack of unity among NGOs, and weak links to their citizen constituencies are the result of untutored practices and the lack of a mechanism to incorporate Third Sector input into the policy formulation and legislative process.

Mind-set is a huge constraint. Possibly due to the socio-economic and political instability of the recent past, Russians typically have not forwarded their own or community interests. Nor do they perceive citizenship as entailing responsibility for one’s neighbor and community at large. The result is a lamentable lack of direct experience in mobilizing around common community concerns, accessing expertise and resources, and partnering with others for solutions to these concerns. In addition, especially among older citizens, there is an ingrained belief that it is risky to “get involved,” and feelings of mistrust, futility and disbelief that their governing bodies are interested or willing to interact with them on policymaking issues.

Assumptions: USAID’s civil society programs in the next five years may be more effective if they emphasize the roles and responsibilities of individuals and grass roots organizations, working individually, in groups and in partnerships, and with their government agencies.

Small-grant programs could be awarded at the regional level for social and community services activities, which in turn could be viewed as laboratories for citizen involvement, incubators for practical experience at the grass roots and local government levels. Such experience and associated skills are those that could later feed into larger civic action programs involving citizen associations and local governments in participatory decision-making. Philanthropic, social service providers and business associations, community foundations, partnerships and networks, both USAID-fostered networks such as Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Network, Regional NGO Resource Centers in Southern Russia, Volga Federal District and RFE, Junior Achievement (JA) and Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) and other networks such as Russian Red Cross and Russian Rotary, could be utilized as small-grant providers of civic society education and social services.

C. Local Governance:

Background: In 2001-2003, Russia conducted a major review of the delineation of authority among the several levels of government: federal, regional and local. The result was new “reform” legislation, including laws on delineation of authority between the federal center and the regions, on inter-governmental fiscal relations, and on local self-government. Although certain aspects of the legislation is regarded positively, such as a more-rational, transparent distribution of budget resources, the overall political tendency of the legislation is to recentralize authority, e.g. the first shot over the bow, the Law on Local Self-Governance that could compromise the evolving environment for civil society activism and concomitant development of participatory democracy.

Key potential problems inherent in the Local Government Law are apt to undermine not only the sustainability, but also the credibility of local governments among the citizenry. For instance, although the law mandates that citizens be given an opportunity to participate in certain aspects of local decision-making, such as the holding of local public budget hearings, most of the real decision-making authority is shifted up to the regional government level, further away from the population. The creation of a new sub-regional level of government promises a huge increase in local bureaucracies, exacerbating the existing lack of human resources at all levels and at the local level in particular. The law does not provide clear regulatory guidance for such issues as municipality restructuring and redistribution municipal assets to other levels of government.

The impact of the new legislation in general, and in particular on municipalities, will depend on its actual implementation. USAID anticipates in mid-2004 through 2006, an enormous demand for testing the proposed new legislative, for proposing alternatives and for developing the regulatory structure to make the new legislation effective.

Assumptions: The critical assumption underpinning the USAID local governance program is (1) that local government as an institution will be jeopardized as the new Law on Local Self-Governance comes into effect January 1, 2006, and (2) that during the two year period starting in 2004, there is a time-critical window for participating in the development and testing of

changes mandated by the Law, for example: transfer of municipal property to the regional governments, introduction of a new two-level administrative structure of local governance, and restructuring of the social service delivery system.

Programmatically, USAID's think tank program is the flagship for discussing, analyzing, drafting, and proposing new regulations and laws. Its history and successes, and its working relationships with the Duma and GOR federal agencies position it for a leading role in the analysis, test and suggestion process for the new round of legislation.

Annex 3.3: Current Program Summaries and Descriptions

A. Political Process Portfolio:

Political process portfolio includes the following activities:

Democratic Institutions Strengthening (International Republican Institute) activity promotes the development of participatory democracy in the Russia through direct work with political parties, potentially active citizens, and by supporting NGOs. The program also provides political campaign training to political parties committed to democratic reforms and advocates for greater citizen participation. USAID's main partner in this activity, International Republican Institute (IRI) has been active in the Russian Federation since 1991. IRI's objectives aim to help political parties strengthen their role as regional institutions; foster increased communication between elected officials and their constituents; encourage further development of the multi-party system in Russia; encourage women and youth participation in politics.

Democratic Institutions Strengthening (National Democratic Institute) activity promotes the development of democratic political institutions and helps to strengthen the links between democratic political parties and citizen groups. Overall, this project aims to increase citizen involvement in the political process. Over the four years of this activity, NDI continues the training and expansion of the VOICE coalition in the areas of election monitoring and citizen advocacy groups. The program works with pro-reform political parties to strengthen local and regional presence.

Democratic Leader Training activity promotes democratic values and principles among political, business leaders in Russia as well as among civil society groups and mass media. Through seminars and published works the program reinforces the basic tenets of a democratic society and increases participants' understanding of modern liberal political and economic systems and how these systems can be best adapted to conditions in Russia. The program encourages closer and more durable cooperation between Russian policy makers with differing political views as well as regular working exchanges between Russian and western policy makers. Moscow School of Political Studies (MSPS) has implemented this three-year activity since August 2003.

B. Civil Society Portfolio:

Third Sector Advancement Program aims to advance NGO community on the inter-regional and national level, to solidify the role of NGOs in the legislative and policy-making process, support professional association of organizations working on the similar issues, strengthen

community of practitioners: NGO lawyers, NGO fundraisers, NGO educators. The program also further develops the capacity of the regional grant-making institutions to design and administer grant programs and charitable giving programs that foster civic initiatives and address local social needs in targeted regions.

NGO Taxation Program works to promote legislation conducive for the development of various source of funding for NGOs (private donations, fees for services, corporate philanthropy, local foundations, and competitive procurement).

Civic Education Program target schoolchildren and teach them democratic values, and enhancing citizenship competence by linking school's curriculum and community service activities.

C. Local Governance Portfolio:

USAID/Russia's current four year (September 2001-September 2005) local governance program, Improve Local Governance and Economic Development: Transition to Smart Growth, is being implemented by USAID/Russia's leading think tank, the Institute for Urban Economics. The program was designed to strengthen local self-governance through improved coordination within local communities. The program helps local governments, federal and regional authorities, CSOs and business communities make a democratic transition to a more open and accountable society. Program activities develop and introduce effective and efficient models of public participation for decision-making, public private partnerships, local economic development, social service delivery practices and policies and development of a robust private housing economy. The program increases the awareness and willingness of local governments to operate transparently and in sustained partnership with their communities. Local government administrators and community leaders are provided with the skills and tools to increase the efficiency, equity and effectiveness in the delivery of social and communal services. The program also increases the policy development skills of local and federal officials responsible for local governance and social reforms, as well as relevant local-level CSO leaders.

D. Supplement: 12 Years of Community Support Organizations Assistance in Russia:

Since 1992, USAID has made a significant investment in the development of the Russian Third Sector. The following is a brief description of USAID programming:

1994 – 1997: The Civic Initiatives Program (CIP) assisted Russian NGOs in developing a positive legal and procedural public environment, and strengthening a network of viable private, voluntary organizations. In 1994, Russia had only two laws regulating activities of charitable organizations: the USSR law 'On Public Associations' and the RSFSR Law "On Property." Although federally enacted legislation was already in the works when the CIP began, the program helped to expand the legal basis for NGO operation and registration, by drafting three federal laws. Today, many Russian partner organizations, which were supported or created under the CIP program, operate effectively and respond to the evolving needs of the sector. Among them are: the Partner Foundation, the Center for Democracy, the Agency for Social Information, In-

terlegal, the Center for NGO Support, the Laboratory for Non-Profit Research, and NGO Resource Centers in Siberia and Southern Russia.

1997 – 2000: USAID/Russia's assistance efforts in civil society development concentrated on institutional development (NGOs and municipal government) and support for grassroots initiatives through small grants programs. This approach had the following key components:

1. Development of NGO Resource Centers that provide training and consultation to NGOs on issues of organizational and financial management, taxation, and fundraising, as well as technical services, such as access to office equipment, internet access, and access to information resources.
2. Small competitive grants provided NGOs with resources to improve and expand their services. A secondary effect of the proposal writing exercise is that applicants learn how to formulate their goals, develop strategies and budgets, and measure results. Successfully implemented programs put NGOs in a better position to advocate to the government, to run awareness campaigns, and establish trust with the public.

2000 – 2003: The Pro-NGO Program assists regional networks of NGO Resource Centers (in USAID target regions) to improve the environment in which NGOs operate by developing local philanthropy, promoting volunteerism, and improving the quality of NGO service delivery. Most program activities between 1997 and 2003 have been carried out in the following regions: Siberia, the Russian Far East, Southern Russia, and Samara and Novgorod Oblasts. The program also introduces new focus on developing NGOs' advocacy skills and strengthening their link to constituencies.

In 2003 USAID/Russia launched Third Sector Advancement Program to address evolving needs of the Third Sector in Russia. Various program components aim to enhance NGOs capacity to conducting meaningful policy dialogue, promote growth of private and corporate philanthropy in the targeted regions, advance NGO sector through support to associations in the areas critical for democratic transition.

Another new Democratic Values Through Civic Education Program work to expand and institutionalize the existing approaches for teaching civics, to establish and support school-based service learning programs, and to embed democratic values throughout the local community.

Since early 1990s, USAID has been supporting the development of the Russian political system. USAID has concentrated its assistance on the "nuts and bolts" of the political system, supporting reform-oriented parties so that they are able to form a healthy opposition and advocate for their causes effectively. This has included party building programs and election related trainings, as well as outreach to politically active NGOs and work with youth and women's groups to increase public awareness and involvement in political processes. USAID has also supported the development of the VOICE Coalition, a network of non-partisan election observation groups that currently has affiliates in 16 of Russia's regions.

USAID support has clearly helped to fuel and sustain the explosive growth of NGOs in Russia. Training and technical assistance has had a positive impact on the managerial competence of NGOs, and is contributing to the gradual professionalization of the sector. "Lessons in Transition", a 1999 study, captured some of what USAID and participating American organizations have learned about the process of strengthening civil society in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States. Several other studies reveal gaps, inadequacies, and the practical problems of providing technical assistance in this area. Sarah Henderson's article, "Selling Civil Society," touches upon the unexpected and somewhat paradoxical effects of foreign aid: the lack of a visible constituency, development of the distinct elite within the NGO community, and 'mission shift' – when NGOs' agendas begins to reflect those of donor organizations, rather than the NGO's own mission and their community's needs.

Currently various programs in USAID/Russia portfolio support selected civil society organizations that work to promote transparency, adherence to human rights, protection of worker's rights, voter education, free and fair elections, and environmental, economic, and social problems. For example, USAID supports the distance learning education program on NGO management for the NGO leaders from various parts of Russia, through the Center for NGO Support (CNGOS). Under Trade Union Development program USAID supports professional network of seven Public Interest Law Centers working to protect worker's rights, provide advice to trade unions, and raise general public awareness on socio-economic and labor issues. From 1999-2002, USAID has supported more than 40 Russian institutions that provide crisis counseling and legal services to victims of domestic violence, and raise awareness on domestic violence issues among specialists and the general public. USAID's Women Crisis Centers Program has contributed to the improvement of service delivery to crisis center clients, and development of the Russian Association of Crisis Centers.

USAID also supports business associations and policy think tanks. USAID's Local Governance Program complements the NGO strengthening effort by educating and promoting among local administrations the concept of competitive procurement for efficient service delivery, improving coordination among local communities, and developing the policy skills of municipal officials and local NGO leaders.

Annex 3.4: Background Reading

This is not an exhaustive list of available information sources, but items below provide the Assessment Team with most of the available documents.

1. USAID/Russia Strategy 1999-2005,
2. Progress reports submitted by the grantees to USAID/Russia since 1998,
3. Meetings with USAID/Russia grantees' staff,
4. Meetings with USAID/Russia project staff, grantees, experts, other donors, local, federal and regional officials,
5. Strategy Framework,
6. NGO Index,
7. 2004-2008 Assistance Completion Strategy for Russia/Democracy,

8. USAID/Russia Strategy 1999-2005,
9. Third Sector APS,
10. General Population, NGO Leaders, and Lawyers Survey, Final Report, CESSI/Debra Javeline, 2003,
11. Survey "Development of Forms and Methods of Political Participation and Social Self-Organization of General Public as a Foundation of Civil Society in Russia", CESSI/IESD, 2003,
12. Russian Far East NGO Support Program Evaluation, Final Report, MSI, Fall 2001
13. Reports and assessments from other donors.

2004 NGO Sustainability Index

Overview of the Scope of Work

The Recipient is expected to develop 2004 NGO sustainability index for Russia using the methodology describing in the section below. The Recipient will contract out the development of the index to Russian NGO or sectoral expert to facilitate selection of the experts, holding expert panel and translating last year index into Russian. We expect that the Recipient will organize several 2-3 regional panels or organize travel of the regional experts (representatives of the NGO community) to Moscow to attend the expert panel.

Experts will discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner. When done with all seven dimensions, average the final dimension scores together to get the final country Index score.

Prepare a Draft Country Report. The draft should include an overview statement, and discussion of the current state of sustainability of the NGO sector with regard to each dimension. The section on each dimension should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses.

This year USAID/Russia wants to create a longer report for its own use in-country. In addition, we would like to translate the report so it can be disseminated locally as broadly as desired.

Deliverables:

Draft country report, tables with expert scores

Longer report/analytical paper describing trends in NGO development over the past year, regional differences and future prospects based on the regional and Moscow-based experts contributions.

Background

The NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia is a tool used by USAID's Bureau for Europe and Eurasia to study the strength and overall viability of NGO sectors

in each country in the region, from the Baltics to Central Asia. The Index is a valuable resource for USAID Missions, other international donors, and local NGO umbrella groups and support centers. By analyzing seven dimensions that are critical to sectoral sustainability, the Index highlights both strengths and constraints in sectoral development. The Index allows for comparisons both across countries and over time. While there are some recognizable limitations to the methodology and the largely subjective data collected in the Index, it is an important tool for understanding and measuring sustainability.

While the Index was initially developed as an internal USAID management and monitoring tool, its uses have broadened significantly over the past seven years. In particular, we are pleased that local NGO sector leaders and activists have found the NGO Index process and product to be a useful opportunity to look at the larger picture and reflect on the advancements made in the sector, as well as the challenges remaining. Demand for the Index has also continued to grow. Several hundred requests for copies of the 2003 NGO Sustainability Index were received from individuals and organizations in the U.S., Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and other parts of the world over the past few months. Other offices and bureaus within USAID also look at the NGO Sustainability Index as a unique model when developing their own monitoring tools. This year we would like to explore the possibility of better tracking how the Index is used by its various constituents, perhaps by including a tear-out survey in the Index, or by posting a pop-up survey on the website.

The 2004 Index will be the eighth edition of this publication. In order to ensure consistency and simplicity, no major changes in either the methodology or the questions were made this year.

However, one significant change this year concerns the coordination and editing of the Index. E&E/Washington has contracted out the coordination and editing of the NGO Sustainability Index to Management Systems International (“MSI”) and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (“ICNL”), through a Task Order to the Civil Society IQC. Both organizations have long histories of work in Eastern Europe and Eurasia regions and in the development and use of the Index. The existing standards, methodology, and content of the Index will remain the same. USAID will participate on the editorial committee in Washington, DC, as well as in the focus groups in the field in which USAID has a presence. In countries with USAID presence, USAID missions are still expected to convene their own panels of sectoral experts. MSI will provide small grants to, and coordinate the reports from, local NGOs in post-presence countries.

MSI/ICNL will coordinate the country reports submissions, convene an editorial panel in Washington, contact missions regarding negotiations of scores, and will draft thematic discussion papers on civil society issues to be included in the Introduction section of the Index. MSI/ICNL will coordinate negotiations over scores, but USAID/W will retain decision-making power regarding the final scores.

For the past few years, several USAID Missions have arranged for an outside partner, generally a local NGO support center or the U.S. NGO support program implementer, to conduct the

NGO Sustainability Index exercise, including organizing the panel and writing the report. This approach was found to have several benefits. We still got quality reports, and expanded the universe of those who have a stake in the process and product. In addition, the workload for overburdened USAID staff was reduced, without eliminating USAID influence or control over the process, as USAID personnel still attended the focus group meeting(s), and reviewed/cleared the country write-ups and scores before submitting them to Washington. Of course, the success of this approach depends upon both the professionalism and objectivity of possible partners. Efforts must be made to ensure that the Index is not used as a tool to promote a particular NGO's activities or a particular program's successes, but to fairly evaluate the overall level of development of the NGO sector.

Other Missions have started holding a series of regional panels, in order to ensure that regional differences in the level of development were reflected. Scores from the regional panels were then averaged together to come up with final national-level scores. While this approach undoubtedly requires additional work, it may be particularly useful in large countries and/or countries where regional variations are significant.

While keeping within certain limits to ensure that the data between countries is comparable, we encourage you to experiment with these, or other similar, modifications to the NGO Sustainability Index in order to make the process and final product as simple and relevant as possible. Feel free to incorporate the modifications discussed above – or variations thereof – if you feel they will enhance the process and product in your country.

2004 NGO Sustainability Index Scope of Work

Methodology

The following steps should be followed to determine scores and draft a country report for the 2004 NGO Sustainability Index:

1. Select a group of no less than 8 sectoral experts. The panel must include USAID Mission personnel, and should in addition include a variety of the following:
 - local NGO support centers, resource centers or intermediary support organizations;
 - local NGOs involved in a range of service delivery and advocacy activities;
 - academic experts in civil society and the NGO sector;
 - NGO partners from the government, business or media sectors;
 - a variety of international donors; and,
 - USAID implementing partners.

We recommend that at least 60% of the expert group be local nationals. NGO participants on the Panel should include both advocacy and social service NGOs. To the extent possible, NGOs should represent a variety of regions and the chief sub-sectors such as women's rights, civic education and election monitoring, environment, human rights groups, youth.

In some instances, it may be appropriate to select a larger group in order to reflect the diversity and breadth of the sector. Please keep in mind, however, that a significantly larger group will make building consensus more difficult. Alternatively, if regional differences within your country are significant, you may want to consider holding a series of regional panels. It is advisable to include at least a core of individuals who participated in the 2003 process, in order to manage differences in scoring style and to have a pool of experience in the process from which to draw.

Ensure that panel members understand the objectives of the exercise. Then, distribute last year's NGO Index Country Report and the attached questionnaire and scoring instructions to the members of the Expert Panel. (Depending on the composition and language capability of your panel members, you may want to translate all documents into the local language.) We recommend distributing these documents a minimum of three days before convening the panel so that members may familiarize themselves with the contents of last year's report, think about the changes in the sector over the past year, and come up with preliminary scores for each individual indicator before coming together with the rest of the group.

We are very interested in using the preparation of this year's Index to track lessons learned for use in improving the monitoring process in upcoming years. We would very much appreciate your recording and submitting any observations you might have that will increase the usefulness of this important tool.

Convene a meeting of the NGO expert panel. We recommend that you plan to complete this meeting **no later than Friday, November 12, 2004**.

For each indicator of each dimension, allow each panel member to share his or her initial score and justification with the rest of the group. At the end of the discussion of each indicator, allow panel members to adjust their scores, if desired. Then, **eliminate the highest score and the lowest score**, and average the remaining scores together to come up with one score for each indicator. Once a final score has been reached for each indicator within a given dimension, average these scores together for a preliminary score for the dimension. Be sure to take careful notes during the discussion of each indicator, as this should serve as the basis of the written report.

Compare the proposed score for each dimension with the scores for that dimension in prior years' Indexes. If there are substantial differences (more than two-tenths of a point), the panel should discuss the reasons for these differences. (*Please compare 2004 proposed scores with scores used in the official 2003 Index, not the scores originally recommended by your panel last year.*) Be sure to include a synopsis of this discussion in your draft country report. If, upon comparison with prior years' scores, the group does not feel that a proposed score reflects the direction of change within the sector in that dimension, they may wish to reconsider the proposed score and adjust it accordingly. Please remind the group at this stage that if the Editorial Committee in Washington does not feel that the scores are supported, particularly in comparison with previous years' scores and/or the scores of other countries in the region, they may be adjusted.

Discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner. When done with all seven dimensions, average the final dimension scores together to get the final country Index score.

Prepare a Draft Country Report. The draft should include an overview statement, and a brief discussion of the current state of sustainability of the NGO sector with regard to each dimension. The section on each dimension should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses. **In addition, each section should explain any changes in the score since the previous year's report.**

In the Overview Statement, please include an estimated number of registered and active NGOs, as well as an overview of the primary fields and geographic areas in which NGOs operate.

Please limit your submission to USAID/Moscow to a maximum of ten pages. USAID/Russia will do further editing and ensure that final report is an appropriate length before submission to USAID/Washington.

While the individual country reports that go into the Washington-published 2004 NGO Sustainability Index must be kept brief, you may want to create a longer report for your own use in-country. In addition, you may want to consider translating the report so it can be disseminated locally as broadly as desired.

Deliver your draft country reports with rankings via email to Chris Brown chbrown@usaid.gov and Inna Loukovenko iloukovenko@usaid.gov at USAID/Moscow, no later than Friday, **November 29, 2004**.

8. USAID Editorial Committee will review the scores and draft reports, and discuss any issues or remaining concerns with Mission staff. The Editorial Committee may return to the Recipient for clarification/justification if deemed necessary.

If you have any questions or suggestions, please feel free to contact Inna Loukovenko at (7 095) 728-52 78 or by email at iloukovenko@usaid.gov

ANNEX B: LIST OF CONTACTS

I. ASSESSMENT TEAM—ARD, INC.

802-658-3890

www.ardinc.com

Sergey Artobolevsky, Local Government

Artob@aha.ru

Timothy Colton, Advisor

tcolton@fas.harvard.edu

Steven A. Grant, Political Process

steveandsharon@access4less.net

Sarah Henderson, Civil Society

sarah.henderson@oregonstate.edu

Bradford P. Johnson, Team Leader

bjohnson@ardinc.com

Victoria Kolesnikova, Field Coordinator

eremurus@mtu-net.ru

Elena Kovalevskaya, Civil Society

Ekovalevskaya@mail.ru

Jose Larios, Local Government

jlarios@ardinc.com

Rhys Payne, Advisor

rpayne@ardinc.com

Vladimir Rimsky, Political Process

Rim@indem.ru

2. USAID/MOSCOW

7-095-728-5278

German Abaev, Media Programs

Gabaev@usaid.gov

Chris Brown, Director, Office of Democratic Initiatives

Chbrown@usaid.gov

Ekaterina Drozhdova, Media Programs

Ydrozhdova@usaid.gov

Eugene Levkin, Local Government Programs

Elevking@usaid.gov

Yekaterina Lushpina, Political Process Programs

Ylushpina@usaid.gov

Patrick Murphy, Rule of Law

Pmurphy@usaid.gov

Rafail Narinsky, Local Government Programs

Rnarinsky@usaid.gov

Irina Turchina, Political Process Programs

Iturchina@usaid.gov

Hugh A. Winn, Senior Democracy Advisor

Hwinn@usaid.gov

3. USAID/WASHINGTON

202-712-0995

Alex Sokolowski, Political Process Analyst

Asokolowski@usaid.gov

Richard Fraenkel, Team Leader for Russia

Rfraenkel@usaid.gov

Judith Robinson, International Cooperation Specialist

Jrobinson@usaid.gov

4. MOSCOW

Political Process

SPS

7-095-232-2846

Mikhail Yakovlevich Shneider, Executive Committee Member and Head of the Technical Support Dept.

mshndcr@sps.ru

mshndcr@hotmail.com

Yabloko

7-095-780-3010

Daniil Aleksandrovich Meshcheryakov, Head of National Election Campaign

daniil@yabloko.ru

Moscow School of Political Studies

7-095-937-3881

Yelena Nemirovskaya, Founder and Director

mmps@co.ru

Golos

7-095-299-3290

Lilia Vasil'evna Shibanova, Executive Director

lilia@golos.org

NDI

7-095-956-6337

Terry Horton, Director

Terry@ndi.ru

Juhani Grossmann, Program Officer

juhani@ndi.ru

Foundation for Media Policy Development

Svetlana Grigor'evna Kolesnik, President

7-095-777-0174

kolesnik@pdi.ru

IRI

7-095-956-9510

Konstantin Viktorovich Kilimnik, Program Officer

ckilimnik@iri.org

Aleksei Vladimirovich Korlyakov, Program Officer

akorlyakov@iri.org

Marina Mikhailovna Malysheva, Program Officer

mmalysheva@iri.org

Anton L'vovich Alferov, Program Officer

aalferov@iri.org

Anastasiya Vladimirovna Kuz'mina, Program Officer

akuzmina@iri.org

Carnegie Moscow Center

7-095-935-8904

Andrew C. Kuchins, Director

andy@carnegie.ru

Nikolai Vladimirovich Petrov, Scholar-in-Residence; Member, Academic Council

nikolai@carnegie.ru

Mariya (Masha) Aleksandrovna Lipman, Editor, *Pro et Contra*

marial@carnegie.ru

Center for Ecological Policy

7-095-952-80-19

Alexey Yablokov, Chair

yablokov@ecopolicy.ru

Civil Society

Moscow Helsinki Group

7-095-951-17-29

Anastasiya Oseeva, USAID project manager

mhg-main@online.ptt.ru

Open Russia

7-095-291-90-89

Natalia Taubina

pr@openrussia.info

Agency of Social Information

7-095-364-68-42n (cell)

Elena Topoleva, Director

asi@asi.org.ru

Donors Forum

7-095-978-59-93

Natalya Kaminarskaya, Executive Secretary

Perspektiva (Disabled Support)

7-095-302-70-11

Mariya Perfilieva, USAID Project Coordinator

International Socio-Ecological Union, Ecological Club Eremurus

7-095-308-89-33

Victoria Kolesnikova, Campaign Director, Council Member

seupobeda@yahoo.com

Charities Aid Foundation

7-095-792-59-29

cafrussia@cafrussia.ru

Olga Alekseeva, Director

Inga Pagava, Development Director

Vadim Samorodov, Manager of Local Communities Development Project

No Alcoholism and Narcomania Foundation

7-095-126-34-75

nan@nan.ru

Oleg Zykov, Director

Olga Dementieva, Program Officer

Women's Crisis Centers Association

7-916-604-51-65 (cell)

rac2women@mtu-net.ru

Natalya Abubakirova, Executive Director

People's Assembly (Narodnaya Assambleya)

Elena Kovalevskaya, Executive Director

Ekovalevshay@mail.ru

Center of NGO Support

7-095-291-5729,

cngos@ngo.org.ru

Local Government

Congress of Municipalities

7-095-248-83-73

Sergey Babichev, Executive Secretary

Eurasia Foundation

7-095-970-15-67

efmosocw@eurasia.mask.ru

Tatyana Kipchatova, Program Specialist

Ministry of Finance

7-095-298-92-93

Sergey Lavrov, Deputy Minister

Ministry of Economic Development

7-095-290-11-77

Vitaliy Shipov, Deputy Minister

Center of Fiscal Policy

7-095-777-65-82 (ext.0101)

Ekaterina Sergeeva, Development Manager

esergeeva@fpcenter.org

The Institute of Urban Economy

7-095 363-50-47

mailbox@urbaneconomics.ru

Nadezhda Kosareva, Director

Igor Kolesnikov, Municipal Economy, Project Manager

Anastassia Alexandrova, Social Policy Director

Kiril Chogin, Consultant on Social Services

Institute of System Analysis

7-095-135-44-88

Vladimir Lexin

Center for Legal Support to Local Government

9 095 916-36-23

Marina Yakutova

info@lslg.ru

SUAL Aluminum Company

7-095-933-0200

Vasiliy Kiselev, Vice President

Ministry of Energy and Industry

7-095-930-22-36

Sergey Kruglik, Department Head

Union of Small and Medium Towns

7-095-925-17-49

Fax: 928-72-12

Alexander Kulikov, Executive Director

Rustowns@mtu-net.ru

5. IRKUTSK, SHELEKHOV AND ANGARA

Political Process

Irkutsk Oblast Administration

(395-2) 25-62-81

Aleksandr Ivanovich Vasil'ev, Head of the Committee for Contact with the Public and Minorities

connect@admirk.ru

Novosti

25-59-33

Ivan Vorontsov, Reporter

Ekho Moskvy in Irkutsk (radio)

56-65-38

Aleksandr Igorevich Verkhozin

Trade and Industry Chamber of Eastern Siberia

33-51-00

Anatolii Petrovich Sterkhov, Vice-President (sterkh@ccies.ru)

“Perspectives” Children’s Youth Center

Irina Konstantinovna Semina, Deputy Director

67-11-82; 67-40-44, 55-64-55 (ph/fax)

51-70-61 (home)

Hadrin_P@mail.ru

Municipal Office for the Supplementary Education of Children

Mikhail Grigor’evich Zhivotovskii, Director, “Young Technologists Station”

51-23-94

mgjsut@rambler.ru

website: www.Angarsk.info (club section)

Civil Society

Vashe Pravo

(395-2) 53-88-77, 53-64-16, (cell) 619-746

Govorukhin Mikhail Evgenievich, General Director

Young Scholars Club

(395-2) 20-55-72

Mariya Plotnikova, President

plpet@email.ru

alexey1109@yandex.ru

Center for Independent Social Studies and Education

(395-2)29-12-94

Mikhail Yakovlevich Rozhanskiy, Scientific Director

ustas02@yandex.ru

titaev-k@yandex.ru

Baikal Wave

(395-2)52-58-69

Jennifer Sutton, Co-chair

sutton@baikalwave.eu.org

www.baikalwave.eu.org

Siberian Renaissance

(395-2)59-84-42, 59-84-63

Elena Alexandrovna Tvorogova, President

root@vzs.irtel.ru

<http://www.vzs.irtel.ru>

Russian Red Cross, Irkutsk Affiliate

(395-2) 33-19-98

Anna Illarionovna Zagainova, manager of HIV program

redcross-youth@yandex.ru

Local Government

Angara Municipality

Tel.7-3951-522396

Andrey Petrovich Kozlov, Deputy Mayor

Irina Evgenievna Tsypenko, Social programs manager

kostinavn@angarsk-adm.ru

cipenkoie@angarsk-adm.ru

Shelekhov City Municipality

Tel. 7-39510-4-13-35

Sergey Vitalievich Polyakov, Mayor

6. NIZHNY NOVGOROD AND BOR

Local Government

Bor Government

(83159) 224-30, (83159) 225-93, 21691; 22383

Vladimir Ivanov, Mayor

Alexander Kiselyov, 1st Vice Mayor, Economics and Planning

Alexey Mochkaev, Head, Department for Economics and Forecasting

Nizhny Novgorod City Administration

301/5, Kremlin, N.Novgorod

(8312) 391232, 197276, 391516

Artyom Karazanov Director, Department for Economics

Vera Zolotnitskaya Director, Department for Social Protection

Evgeny Sabashnikov Deputy Head, City Duma (Assembly)

Dmitry Nikishin Director, Department of International Relations

(8312) 391-506

Resource Center for Social and Economic Innovations

Tatyana Evstratikova, Director

Olga Sennova, Executive Director

(8312) 784-370

Vladimir Federal District

Sergey Kirienko, Plenipotentiary Representative of President of RF

(095) 924-8970 (Office in Moscow)

(095) 206-1241

Municipal Unitarian Company for Housing and Communal Property

Vladimir Sirotkin, Deputy General Director

Volga-Vyatka NGO Support Center

Evgenia Verba, Executive Director.

(8312) 313-052 or (8312) 313-564

7. ROSTOV-ON-DON AND SOUTHERN RUSSIA

Political Process and Civil Society

Rostov Resource Center
(8632) 917-446, 917-042
Kirill Bitkin

Rostov Foundation
(8632) 917-446, 917-042
Lyudmila Skachkova
fondrostov@aanet.ru
lusile76@mail.ru

New Social Technologies
Yulia Bodnya
npfrostov@bk.ru

Southern Resource Center (Krasnodar)
(8612) 555-941, 537-564
Tatyana Lyskina
srrctany@list.ru

Vasiliy Ptitsyn
srrctrmn@list.ru

Rostov Union of Children and Youth Organizations
(8632) 40-13-92
Mikhail Chuprov

Civic League for the Defense of Human Rights
(8632) 77-09-54
Vasiliy Mulevan
liga70@mail.ru

International Human Rights Defense Assembly
7-903 4012144 (cell)
Dmitriy Esipov

Azov Branch, Movement of People Who Have Suffered from Chechnya Conflict
(8632) 31191, 63047
Dmitriy Titov
titov@azov.donpac.ru

Civic Accord
(8632) 48-13-23, 32-00-97
Mikhail Bobyshev
Yabloko Party
(8632) 63-25-42

Vladimir Baiburtyan
Alexey Lyashchenko

SPS Party
(8634) 311-528
Alla Frolova
Irina Levina
Valentina Shnurkova

Party of Russia's Renaissance
(8632) 40-45-36, 99-49-79
Sergey Gandrabura

Open Russia; Rostov School of Public Policy
Alexander Mamitov
mamitov@jeo.ru, shpp-rostov@aaanet.ru

Soldiers Mothers Committee
(8632) 34-16-77
Elena Zyubrovskaya

Foundation to Support Graduates of State Institutions
(8632) 77-11-14
Anatoliy Yazikov

GTRK Don TR (TV/radio company)
(8632) 64-22-45, 62-60-44
Evgeniya Aparina

Accord (NGO)
(8632) 40-25-97, 40-24-48
Lyudmila Mazurok
mazyrok@aaanet.ru

Gorod N (magazine)
(8632) 32-35-24, 910-610
Nikolay Protsenko
Niko@gorodn.ru

8. VLADIMIR

Local Government

NGO Danko
(0922) 354-009
Vitaliy Eduardovich Gurinovich, Director

City Administration
(0922) 331-267
Igor Vladimirovich Fateev, Head, Local Economic Development Division
ifateev@mail.ru

Agency of Municipal Development

(0922) 235-715

(0922) 238-401

Alexander Efimovich Illarionov, Director

City Council

(0922) 237-932

Margarita Anatolievna Malakhova, Chairman

Department of Administrative Issues, Regional Department

(0922) 326-034

Valeriy Yurievich Smirnov, Director

TACIS

Jean Bagh. NGO Development

Tacis@comset.net

ANNEX C: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

CROSSCUTTING

- Baird, Vanessa A. and Debra Javeline. USAID Democratic Initiatives Final Survey Report, General Population, NGO Leaders, and Lawyers. Russia, 2003.
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ANNEX D: SELECTED MEETING SUMMARIES

I. “Angara”

Svetlana Uralova

Angara is probably the most well known women’s organization in the region. They run an international conference in the summer. In addition, they link together many women’s groups across Siberia. I met them in 1998 when I was previously in Irkutsk evaluating Ford Foundation projects. They are an example of what I term “mission drift”; that is, in following grant money, they take on many projects that cover a diverse array of topics. However, because of their success in getting grants, they are quite well known.

Currently, they are working on a project on Canadian women and the arts. They are also preparing their international women’s conference. They advise the government at the okrug level on topics related to Gender and Development. They are also implementing a program on women in business, one on women in politics, and another of women and trafficking.

They feel that they have made progress in developing relations with local government. They are working on trying to get the city government to also give municipal grants. They are active working as “experts” for the regional Duma. They also give expertise in hearings. However, there are no highly visible women politicians at the regional level and the government thinks that women are only good for working on social issues.

We talked about Social Service provision. She said there was a law on the books but that it did not work in reality because there was no mechanism to realize it.

In closing, she also mentioned that she was also working on another grant, this one on open budgets.

Overall, this group is influential because of the connections the women have built over the years. It’s not clear what are the results of their projects.

2. Angara City Administration

June 8, 2004

Participants: Dozens of representatives of NGOs, business people, a few from SMI, Steve Grant, Sarah Henderson, Vladimir Rimsky, Elena Kovalevskaya (and Inna from USAID)

Told that we would be meeting with the city administration, we were floored to walk into a room and find the room full of people and TV cameras! (Jose quickly excused himself to go closet with the actual officials.)

We tried to configure the gathering as a sort of town meeting. Until the TV cameras left, however, nothing much of interest was said.

The more vocal expressed the basic view that they’re looking for stability in their lives. They resent the fact that the (former) government and its ways of doing things just ended overnight and they were faced with a sink-or-swim situation. No relevant information was promulgated by leaders about what had to be done and especially, about how to do it.

In most cases, “We simply don’t know how to work under the new pertaining conditions.”

The last five years have at least taught them a few things about how to complain and to defend themselves/their interests better. BUT their safety (and that of their children/families) are NOT assured. So it takes a great deal of courage to speak up/out.

MORE RESENTMENTS: the region is a donor region, sending some 60% of their revenues off to Moscow and St. Petersburg. Why can't they keep more of the money here? Why, e.g., does the government think it important to spend money to pay off foreign debts (e.g., from the Soviet period) when those debts could be forgiven and the money "wasted" on that stay home and be put to use here.

27% of the work force (in Angara? the oblast?) are bureaucrats. Way too many.

Businessmen are at the mercy of the bureaucrats – they are defenseless when bribes are demanded – they have to pay. At least 80% (even 90%) of taxpayers pay no taxes [or, alternatively, this percent of taxes are not paid??], making the situation with revenues more critical (and thus encouraging bribe-taking?).

6000 people in Angara are without adequate housing, but the city is not building any new homes.

NGOs and their sources of support. All NGOs are off-budget, so they survive at the pleasure of outside funds from Yukos, Soros, etc. (One org. present, working with invalids, won a Yukos competition and got a grant for their work.)

SUMMARY: little by little, ordinary Russians may be learning a true civil education – how to learn about their rights and how to defend them – but few are now willing to take the risks (to personal safety and well-being) that the fight for rights entails.

3. Angarsk NGOs

Organized by Igor Shadrin, head of the local NGO resource center.

We walked into a very full room of organizations that belong to the administration's NGO council. It was interesting in the sense that these people were representatives of a much larger group of civil society. The group includes representatives of labor unions, schools, old women's councils, charitable funds, papers, small business organizations, invalid organizations, administration, and lawyers.

Angarsk is in the unusual position of being a town where YUKOS works, and this YUKOS is omnipresent. They sponsor a grant competition, are active in founding the local community foundation, and are quite influential. More than 170 NGOs are registered in this town of 250,000, although only about 10 organizations work continuously, strongly.

The city has been sponsoring a concourse for the past three years. They gave out 200,000 RU last time.

NGOs portrayed a situation in which they worked well with local government, but then the conversation veered into feelings of frustration about national politics, and about taxation, center region politics, registration, unemployment, etc.

This meeting was also videotaped.

4. Angara NGO Meeting

Архив, Е.Ковалевская, поездка в Иркутск для ARD, 06 – 09 июня 2004 года.

Город Ангарск, Иркутская область

Общественность города

08 июня, вторая половина дня

Задачи делегации: оценивать перспективы развития гражданского общества, политический процесс.

Присутствовали представители общественности:

Профсоюз работников образования и науки

Газета

Предприниматель

Совет женщин Ангарска

Совет молодых специалистов

Клуб инвалидов и душевнобольных

Благотворительный Фонд местного сообщества

Совет женщин

Детская общественная организация больных сахарным диабетом

Школа № 15

Детская школа № 2

Ангарское территориальное объединение профсоюзов

Педагог-хореограф

Предприниматель

Некоммерческое партнерство Союз промышленников и предпринимателей

Станция юных техников

Центральная библиотека

Центр «Перспектива» и центр «Преодоление».

Ангарское радио

Телекомпания «Ангарск».

Муниципальный ресурсный центр поддержки НКО (организатор встречи).

Основные выводы, CS

Аудитория очень насторожена. Собрана администрацией. Люди разговорились только после некоторых усилий со стороны приехавших гостей. Местная власть вне критики. Вся критика адресуется на федеральный уровень. В городе есть ресурсы для развития НКО, по оценкам самих общественников, но они не достаточны.

Основные проблемы, волнующие общественность города – трудовые права граждан, образование, перспективы для молодежи. Отмечается необходимость объединения общественности для отстаивания прав. При этом одним из важных факторов, препятствующих организации активных протестных действий, является фактор личной безопасности.

Есть желание перенимать полезный западный опыт, в частности, отмечается, что не умеем спрашивать, куда потратили налоги граждан.

На встрече представлен широкий спектр социальных организаций.

Выход – в жестких регуляциях, стимулирующих развитие предпринимательства, отторжение части средств у олигархов

Расшифровка встречи

Ресурсные источники для развития НКО Ангарска:

Муниципальный грант, фонд местного сообщества. Конкурс ЮКОС "Создаю!".

Все делает в организационном плане администрация.

Идеи, кофир+ обучающие семинары.

В городе более 170 организаций, профсоюзы + религиозные конфессии. Представлены всероссийские общества инвалидов, слепых, садоводов. 10 крупных организаций.

Проблемы в работе, проблемы в деятельности.

Препятствия для демократии, если можно откровенно говорить об этом.

Профсоюзы.

Власть, работодатели и работники. Более благополучны те, кто усилит координацию. В городе работает трехсторонняя комиссия по регулированию социальных преобразований. Нелегальная заработная плата. 1 майская демонстрация – а раньше думали, как плохо на западе. **За свои права нам нужно бороться.** Лозунг: **достойная заработная плата - путь к преодолению бедности.** В этом году коммунисты, Единая Россия поддержали. Нужно пытаться находить диалог. Объединение профсоюзов - 60 тыс. человек. экономически активного населения города объединяем. Пытаемся друг другу помогать. С властью нормальный диалог, нормальные отношения с союзом промышленников.

Предприниматель захотел добавить-

Есть ли демократия **Демократии больше, чем в США.** Перевозчик с лицензией. У нас любой желающий может заняться этим видом деятельности. Лишняя демократия не очень хорошо. Не знаю ни одного права, которого у нас нет по сравнению с Западом.

Фонд местного сообщества.

Исполнительный директор ушел. В апреле только что создали. Его начинал строить каф. Что хотите сделать с фондом? Привлечь население Ангарска для решения социальных проблем города. Не было направлений. Финансирование (1.4. - 200 рублей – неточные цифры – Е.К.). Положение о малых грантах и больших грантах. Бюджетный кодекс. 37 заявок. Прессу подключаем. Экспертный совет носит рекомендательный характер. После заключения экспертов комиссия работает 20 дней. С учетом рекомендаций совета большинством голосов принимается решение о финансировании.

Фонд развития местного сообщества - есть ли согласие по данному вопросу (детские организации, экологи..).

Роль общественной палаты. Как приходиться к согласию по приоритетам.

Ангарский клубный дом - родились от гранта ЮКОСА. Душевнобольных с каждым годом становится все больше. Проблема с помещением, администрация обещала решить проблему. Реабилитационные средства - выделили. Есть понимание проблем инвалидов. Содружество ассоциации психологов. Новая организация – хотят узнать о зарубежных организациях, знать о жизнедеятельности.

Нужна ли западная помощь или вмешательство?

Как налогоплательщики довольны тратой налогов?

Совсем довольны. Недовольны совсем. Просьба проранжировать.

Женщина-депутат.

Рассматривать отдельно от России город невозможно. Рыночная экономика - общество не было готово ни демократии, к рынку. Никогда не платили налоги. Правила игры были прозрачными и понятными. Рынок - общество не подготовили. Никому не объяснили, как мы будем жить. Общество только начинает разбираться. Суд, милиция, неумение спрашивать, куда потратили деньги. **Не умеем спрашивать, куда потратили деньги.** Если показать мировой опыт для институтов. Денег не хватает на развитие местных инициатив. **Мы сегодня бедны, у нас**

много социальных проблем. Инвестиции запада - реальная помощь для города. Удовлетворение бюджетом. Как формируется бюджет Ангарска, я знаю. Но как в России делается, почему российские социальные программы хромают?

Профсоюзы - творческий потенциал есть, нет денег. По федеральному бюджету должны защищаться многие категории граждан. Долги за проезд ветеранов, бесплатные лекарства. Острый вопрос межведомственных отношений. **60 процентов налогов собирается в Москву. Этот вопрос никогда не озвучивается на верхах.** Готовимся к общероссийской акции. А что вы как профсоюзы можете сделать в этой ситуации? Уменьшить отчисление налогов в федерацию.

Предложено по данному вопросу представить себя консультантом правительства. Другого варианта выплатить нет - ну я бы занялась олигархами. Пусть платят деньги. Президент боится. Его советники предложили другой вариант. Мы не владеем финансовыми средствами, как его советники. Как сделать - есть ли предложения. **«Олигархи - приглашаю в Кремль. На чаше весов стоит население. Мы не сможем пережить, но, подумаешь, что 30 миллионов вымрут, - народятся новые. Взнесите взнос своей Родине, чтобы она не погибла».**

А течение многих лет Президент озвучивает полезные идеи - 1 мес. За регистрацию общественной организации вместо 300 рублей начинают брать 3000. Следить за президентом.

Послание федеральному собранию - как вы обсуждаете этот вопрос?

Правозащитники по всей России встали на дыбы. Встает вопрос, а кого правозащитники защищают. На Гражданском Форуме собрались лучшие организации и общались напрямую. Много социальных проектов профинансированы в городе из внебюджетных источников. **Детство - убыточная отрасль. Правительство задалось целью известить молодежь на корню.** Когда ходишь по детям - видишь условия, в которых живут. В советской России финансировалось. 5 строк образования, в России нынешней - 1 сроку. Деньги можно много где найти. Если нет давления общества на власть. Молчите. Вам сделали 1 статью. Никто не может предложить иное решение проблемы: мы как общество за такие проблемы и против таких. **Если бы я был советником президентом. 1 указ - закон об образовании.**

На уровне города знаем, как формируется бюджет. Нет налогооблагающей базы. Кто должен ставить вопросы. Могут ли губернаторы представлять регионы и отстаивать.

Подобный город - сколько чиновников трудоспособного населения?

Основной потенциал развития бюджета. **Предпринимательство душит на местах.**

27 процентов трудоспособного населения в Ангарске составляют чиновники. Сократите в два раза - будет меньше барьеров.

Идет реформа. Будет некоторая структура. Чиновников будет меньше. Есть аргумент у правительств.

170 общественных организаций, не объединяются. Если мы будем делать - нас раздавят. **Нам безопасность в стране никто не обеспечил. Если выступим - нас занесут в другие списки, и мы будем жить в другой шкуре.** Нельзя повышать аренду. 50 проц. Подоходного налога формируется из бюджета. Предпринимателю все равно, что платить. С каждой свиньи берут 2 кг на анализы... Федерация сделала налоги, за любую - налоги. Мелкие предприниматели – если им предложить пойти чиновниками, чиновником пойдут 80 чиновником на меньшую зарплату. Надо заработать деньги, нужно их дать заработать. Может быть, дети будут жить по-другому. **Нужны жесткие законы для развития предпринимательства.** Во всем мире беспокоятся о предпринимателе. Ни один человек не задал вопрос, чем нужно помочь, чтобы сохранить налоги. Выход: наказание чиновников. Постановления Думы не работает, если не подкреплены

федеральными законами. **5 лет назад мы бы так не высказывались. Нас жизнь учит. Мы начали объединяться, вести диалог. Жесткие законы по защите прав предпринимателей. Если предприниматель чиновник - то он защищен.** На Думе написали много подписей. **Писали счетной палате, представителю президента. Никто не был наказан - никто не пойдет и не будет митинговать.**

Вопрос к залу, что думают по поводу этого высказывания депутата?

Что может рядовой гражданин, если и депутат не может решить вопросы. Бюджетники - общественные организации, которые сдают налоги - килограмма 2 макулатуры.

Нам трудно судить - мы не предприниматели. **90 процентов предпринимателей не платят налоги. Бюджетники ощущают на себя неуплату налогов.** В начале финансового года денег в бюджете нет. Образование в городах. Как решаются проблемы в других городах.

Строительная организация. Мы можем строить больше, заказов от мэрии нет. 6000 людей в городе вообще не имеют жилья. **На общежитие больше очереди, чем на жилье.** Местная газета - ангарск. 154 закона внести изменения, 35 законов уничтожить.

Из трамвайного управления уезжают водителями в Москву, там платят 12000 и дают общежитие через 2 года.

Нужно регулировать законодательство по труду, согласовывать в трехстороннем режиме. Респ. Профсоюзы... Против реформирования труда бюджетной сферы - как только вышли 2 млн. Россиян, забыли про эту концепцию. **Опыт советского общества очень важен.**

Разделяет ли молодежь мнение, думает или иначе?

Молодежь отдалена от проблем чиновников. Нам важно, что нас слушают. Обращаем внимание на личные качества человека. Успех зависит от личных характеристик. Менталитет - разница между людьми поколения. 7 молодых специалистов в администрации. «Остальная молодежь живет по правилам».

5. Association of Russian Cities

Встреча в Союзе российских городов

Участники встречи: М.А.Якутова, заместитель Генерального директора Союза и С.С.Артоболевский

М.А.Якутова одновременно возглавляет Центр правовой поддержки местного самоуправления (и часто представляет интересы муниципальных образований в судах различных уровней, вплоть до Конституционного).

Союз существует уже 10 лет и в него входит 110 крупных городов. Он создан для выработки общей стратегии общения с федеральными властями (в том числе в обход глав регионов), экспертной помощи городам (прежде всего за счет московский специалистов) и как площадка для обмена опытом и проведения совместных мероприятий. Членами Союза являются относительно богатыми и обладают квалифицированными кадрами управленцев. В качестве таковых они наиболее пригодны в качестве пилотных, для наработки опыта реформ (с его последующей трансляцией в менее успешные городские поселения).

Ныне основной проблемой местного самоуправления является внедрение нового закона. В целом закон хорошо структурирует систему местного самоуправления, проводит разумное разделение

полномочий между территориальными уровнями. Но, в тоже время, механизм его реализации не разработан. Особенно это касается проблем финансирования и собственности. Надо сосредоточиться на анализе правоприменительной практики во всех регионах России. Принятие нового закона и связанные с ним изменения в федеральном законодательстве потребует изменений в законодательстве региональном.

Муниципальные власти требуют практической помощи в реализации нового закона, конкретных рецептов в решении прикладных задач. Так упомянутый Центр правовой поддержки широко распространяет накопленный юридический опыт, ответы на наиболее часто задаваемые муниципальными образованиями вопросы. С помощью Муниципальной Академии создается специальный сайт, дающий информацию о муниципальных образованиях в России, юридической базе местного самоуправления и предусматривающий возможность диалога заинтересованных сторон.

Союз российских городов, равно как и его члены, готовы сотрудничать с USAID и другими грантодателями по вопросам местного самоуправления, прежде всего в деле организации сайта. В настоящее время USAID слишком ориентированна на сотрудничество с Институтом экономики города. Желательно было бы, с помощью системы тендеров, привлечь к сотрудничеству несколько аналитических центров.

Распространение накопленного опыта, прежде всего в юридической сфере, ведется и через средства массовой информации. Союз издает журнал «Управа», полностью посвященного местному самоуправлению, его деятельность освещается в журнале «РФ сегодня» и региональных СМИ. Издается справочная литература. В случае получения грантов эта деятельность может быть расширена.

6. Baikal Ecological Wave

Meeting with Jenny Sutton
Ulitsa Lermontova, 140
Irkutsk, Russia 664033

This group works on environmental issues in the Baikal region. Their most recent activities involve launching a campaign against YUKOS oil and their plans to build a pipeline along Baikal.

New victory: the corollary for the EPA has just been recreated in the past few weeks, after being phased out in 2001. It reports to the Prime Minister.

Much of their work involves monitoring the work of the government, in particular, the Ministry of Natural Resources. The Baikal area has the largest gas field, and so this means that Baikal Wave spends a lot of time monitoring the government and the gas companies to make sure they follow proper procedures in terms of developing fields. By law, the state has to conduct an environmental impact assessment. In order to that, they must also open up the process to the public to get their assessment. However, often, companies start building without going through the appropriate channels, and governments also look the other way.

Yet, she has decided that working through the courts is the only viable strategy. This is incredibly difficult; it is easy for companies to find loopholes in the law, courts are under the influence of the local administration (and even an honest judge will try to avoid conflict). The process is often long and drawn out, but using the law is the only way to have a major impact.

Making a splash in the media can also be effective if the conditions are right. However, it is very hard if the local administration is on the side of business, and business can buy people off very easily (i.e. buy the school a new bus or something).

She explained what a citizens environmental impact assessment was and how it fit into the process of the state environmental impact assessment. This is where they are active – trying to compile the impact assessments, and making sure that they are done correctly.

She talked about some of the big projects run by transneft and YUKOS. YUKOS will ship in people to the towns to turn the impact assessments in their favor. The government will also get involved in trying to impede the process of open citizen hearings – Baikal Wave was raided by the FSB 5 days after an impact assessment hearing. In addition, Sutton’s house was broken into and her car stolen. There was also a lot of negative press; the media argued that Baikal Wave was taking away local jobs.

Yet, in the end, they had success. The Department of Natural resources sent the YUKOS development plan back, asking them to make changes to improve the proposal (although this ended up costing the head of natural resources her job). So YUKOS gave up; they will try to locate their pipeline elsewhere.

In addition to this, they are able to carry out a variety of other projects involving indigenous people, small business incubators, networking, education, as a result of various grants from ISAR, Eurasia, SSISC, and the Heinrich Boll Foundation. They want to continue their work on stimulating local initiatives.

They would like to get more people involved in their work, more grassroots support, but said it is difficult because of the nature of the work. Most people don’t want to stick their necks out; they have a lot to lose by getting involved.

Doesn’t think it is very effective to work with parties; it’s better to work with sympathetic individuals because the party system is so unstable, and in general, parties lack principle. However, one of their members goes to legislative meetings regularly to get a sense of who might be sympathetic to environmental causes.

Another obstacle is lack of environmental lawyers.

Yet, she feels that if they can continue to find allies in the government, then change is possible.

Overall, this was a fascinating discussion of trying to adjust strategies to meet constant, ongoing challenges. There have been several successes, and the organization seems to have strong mentoring from a variety of international organizations.

7. Carnegie Moscow Center

Participants: Masha Lipman, Nikolai Petrov, Steve Grant, Vladimir Rimsky

In response to a query about how to better link central political processes/parties with local politics, Petrov pointed to a few examples where this has worked fairly well because of what he calls “pyramid” elections – i.e., localities that hold SIMULTANEOUS elections for the national Duma, the regional duma, and perhaps city council all together. In the Altai krai, when this occurred, Surikov, the incumbent, lost. They’ve held similar elections in Kalmykia, the Archangelsk and Riazan regions.

On more general problems with democracy, Lipman believes that everything starts with Russia’s ordinary citizens. Best example: the public reaction to increasing state encroachment on public life has NOT been negative (enough, as it should be). They sometimes demonstrate initiative, and when they do, that must be

supported (e.g., by AID). She, unlike SPS and Yabloko insiders, does not think that the/a basic issue is money. True, the Kremlin has all the resources necessary to succeed in politics: control of the courts, TV, the police/special services, etc. They can “find” resources when they need to.

Differences between older and younger voters are sharp and meaningful: turnout rate among former is ca. 56%, among latter – 45%. That means that as the older population dies out, the turnout rate will fall. [SG comment: as in the West!?!]

Need to build social capital here in Russia [SG comment: Have they been reading Bob Putnam’s *Bowling Alone*?] Among the things that can be done to produce better-prepared-for-democracy citizens: get them more Internet access, better textbooks for the schools (many books are “new” but the content is still not what it needs to be) – Soros Foundation is doing good work in these two respects. Need to put Russian youth more into the broader world. (Some Memorial project cited here – not sure what it is.) And there has to be more English-language learning.

What will serve the interests of democracy: the open borders; Putin’s strong desire for (economic) integration with the West, which serves to bring in needed information too.

Russia is NOT anti-Western in any fundamental sense; there is no parallel to Islamic countries in that sense.

SUMMARY: Russians have to learn to show initiative, build social capital.

8. Civil Accord

June 10

Participants: Mikhail Viktorovich Bobyshev, Steve Grant, Vladimir Rimsky, Yekaterina Lushpina

In '96 he was working with Nash Dom Rossiya. In '97 he/others registered Civil Accord. It is NOT a political organization per se; it works along two lines: first, as an “information service;” second, doing “educational work” with/for the government, political parties, the public. The events they hold are for the entire political spectrum (although basically they work with those on the “right” (liberals). Funding comes from grants [IRI, NED, Eurasia; nothing from European groups], support from volunteers and from the local legislature.

Russia lacks a legal culture [SG comment: this would not appear to be the same as rule of law – it implies consciousness of what laws are and can do, an aware public]. “All the laws in the world don’t mean a thing if they’re not observed.” The Russian state cannot decide what kind of state it should/is to be. Laws don’t help much vs. “administrative resources.”

The last 4-5 years the group has put out weekly press reports. But for lack of funds, they have now lost their website (which had been drawing about 3000 hits a month earlier, about 5% of whom were foreigners). Should be temporary, he hopes. The site was devoted to local political affairs during the '03 election campaign.

Observations on local political parties/politics: (1) if the center doesn’t fund the local branches, they die; (2) SPS and Frolova are without any impact in Rostov, NOT BECAUSE OF RESISTANCE FROM THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER; (3) NGOs and unions have greatest potential, can be most active political forces; (4) the press can usually perform their function of informing the public of what it needs to know; (5) if you approach the local legislature in a nonadversarial way and say “Can we help you resolve such and such a problem, if often works.

On the national political scene: (1) Khakamada did not come across well on TV; Nemtsov _____ ??; (2) you can't criticize Nemtsov or Khakamada; (3) democracy depends on the economic situation; (4) the people have just grown tired; they want stability [SG comment: compare with Pipes argument in his Foreign Affairs article.]

WHAT IS TO BE DONE: the focus of his work is and must remain local self-government. If possible (if there were money), he would: (1) establish an independent body of legal consultants to offer support (in the form of lawyers) in the political process; (2) establish a resource center for NGOs (NOT political parties), which would be open and accessible to all; (3) establish courses for the young, at VUZy and elsewhere, on civic education (rectors would readily/eagerly accept proposals).

SUMMARY: Russia needs many more legal experts and lawyers to establish not just a rule of law (that comes from the top) but a legal culture (which comes more from the bottom).

9. Foundation for the Development of Information Policy

Participants: Svetlana Grigor'evna Kolesnik, Steve Grant, Vladimir Rimsky

Est. in 2003, this body is an off-shoot of the National Press Center where Kolesnik worked earlier (from 1998), doing somewhat similar projects.

The basic rule of thumb on media play (i.e., how free, how accessible) is a function of the ловкость of the people involved on BOTH sides of the issue (e.g., government officials and journalists). Ловкость = a combination of flexibility and know-how (гибкость + умение).

Here media is not "objective" for two reasons: state-run media are by definition not independent of the control of those in power; but, on the other hand, nongovernmental, "commercial" media are also not "normal" in a Western sense. They are all *engagé* – run by oligarchs and FIGs/business groups.

Fundamental job of the Foundation is to serve as a training center for journalists, editors, NGOs, members of election commissions, even government officials (e.g., such people as Bol'shakov and Dubrovin have participated). And it concentrates on what is happening at the LOCAL level. Minor area of work: conflict resolution in Nizhny Novgorod.

Illustrative examples of how political life is going right now:

A. Interesting/important new technique being tried in some areas is putting on candidate debates (as in U.S.). Trouble is that the host journalists are too eager to get involved, along with the candidates who are suppose to be the ones doing the talking. The journalists try to "educate" the candidates!

Debates took place in various places before the Dec. Duma elections. Example of a poorly run debate: Bashkiria. In Chuvashia, Gov. Volodin (?) tried to do better. But perhaps the best example of a good debate was in Kaliningrad. (Kaliningrad also "overfulfilled the plan" with respect to voter turnout: 20+% was the expected showing; instead they got 47%.)

B. Intriguing example of where things are not going very well, even though circumstances might suggest fruitful ground for democratization = Krasnodar. This is a fairly well-off city because of its commercial port. But the Gov. Tkachev is critical of pluralism and not tolerant, esp. toward minorities and refugees (of which there are many, from Chechnya, and from Armenia) – very nationalistic. He makes hay out of

attacking the “criminals” among these groups. FIGs try to dominate the political scene and not allow ordinary citizens to get involved.

C. Three basic problem areas for the media:

1. transparency
2. access to officials (there is no real law on this, but it is understood that there can be NO contact between politicians and the media without prior permission from their own party and/or the Kremlin)
3. there can be discussion of political issues before decisions are made but no real expression of differences of opinion after a decision is made (i.e., there is once again “democratic centralism” in Russia!)

Somewhat less serious problem: Although the law states that candidates must be given free airtime and space on TV and in newspapers, there are no mechanisms/organs to carry out this prescription. Comparatively minor problem: Ordinary politics does not/cannot hold the attention of the populace for long; they perk up a bit for elections, then interest quickly wanes.

WHAT IS NEEDED: to attract more people at the local level to get involved. This would take what she calls “civil advertising” – which draws people to ponder what they should be doing (to improve their own lives) and *how* to do this. Thus, in two words, MORE INITIATIVE. Classic example of what’s needed is the tiny village of Myshkin on the Volga. Without any help from outside or from above, this historical village without any resources at all developed itself as a sort of Colonial Williamsburg, with all the citizens living as in the last century, in order to bring in revenue.

The Foundation *could* survive without AID money but then it would need help from big business and from local governments. Some of these would actually give – most out of self-interest, but a few would do so with the public good in mind. The Foundation would survive from its more marketable activities – training and consulting.

If given a huge boost in funds (e.g., from AID), it would enhance its work trying to establish/maintain a dialog among NGOs, SMI, and *власть*. The model here: Novorossiisk, where a local newspaper managed to pull off this hat trick and even got the local TV involved as well.

A pet project for Kolesnik: put on a TV series showing everyday *civil life* for Russians: how consumer rights work, how civil rights work, aspects of the law that affect their normal lives; it would also portray citizen lobbying and stress that people have to learn how to act not just out of self-interest but in the interests of society as a whole. Is it possible? Yes, absolutely she says. There should be about 2 shows a month for 9 months (i.e., 18-20 programs). National channels like ORT or Channel 6 or even the more limited Ren TV would put it on, if given the money for it.

SUMMARY: most necessary for Russian media and politics – transparency and greater access to officials for journalists.

10. Golos

Participants: Lilia Shibanova (Executive Director)

Organization established ca. 2000. In the beginning, the Moscow central office worked with social organizations/NGOs at the local level. This is now changing, and they want to establish their own local representatives throughout the country.

In the past couple years, they have worked in 3-4 areas: first, monitoring national elections; second, in 15 regions, fighting for greater transparency in the budgets of these regional dumas; third, “monitoring” of duma deputies; and fourth, studying the election laws for, particularly, city councils.

What she considers the critical ingredient/most important focus for present/future work: INFORMATION (and its corollary, transparency). This is not quite the same thing as education, but plays a vital role in the process of educating Russians – to be good citizens, to defend their own interests, to play a more active role in politics, etc. etc.

In 2004 they are embarking on a new 3-year project: to produce “social” and political profiles of the regional duma representatives/deputies (based in part on their past regional duma monitoring) – a sort of “Who’s Who” of local political actors. This would include a sketch of who these people are (with, e.g., past occupations) and some idea of how they work (i.e., do they engage in any kind of true constituency politics, how “open” are they, how “publicly” they conduct their work).

The fruits of this labor should be made available widely, both through a published version and – if possible – on a website.

Asked for examples of successes and failures in their work, Shibanova offered one or two of each. Perhaps the biggest shortcoming for Golos has been its ability to find and attract volunteers in the localities to do all the necessary work.

As positive results, she cited the fact that after just one year of pressing for greater publicity/openness/transparency in the regions, many or most of the regional political bodies have now established some kind of press centers which function to make their activities more public; unfortunately, as a rule these centers do not produce very substantive information. Two exceptions to this rule: Kaliningrad and Karelia.

Another positive: the local SMI can sometimes be/act quite independently. Two good examples: Ekaterinburg and Samara. This applies not only to print media but also to TV and radio, where access to the airwaves is “free.”

THESIS WORTH PURSUING: The local media appear to do especially well in regions where the governor is at odds with the duma deputies, allowing a little more “space” for independent voices.

II. “Gorod N” Newspaper

Journalist Nikolai Protsenko, “Gorod N” newspaper

June 11

Participants: Protsenko, Steve Grant, Sarah Henderson, Vladimir Rimsky, Yelena Kovalevskaya, Yekaterina Lushpina

“Gorod N” (Anonymous Town, or City X) is basically a business newspaper, established in 1992.

The entire political life of Rostov today is concentrated in one man – the governor, Vladimir Fedorovich. But the new polpred, Yakovlev, down from St. Pete, may add something to the mix. Before, with the CPRF head Ivanchenko, there were some signs of (political) life here, but when he lost one round of the election and was dropped [illegally?] from a second, that put an end to it. There’s been nothing since him.

Political parties are basically interest groups, without a voter base, without an ideology, without anything. They have no future in Rostov either.

All initiative comes from the governor (top down), NEVER FROM THE BOTTOM UP.

The public is passive. Life (including politics) here is very “informal” – that is, everything is done by “agreement”, not according to the law.

There’s a quasi-independent newspaper here called 7C, but nearly all publications are dependent on the governor. Among the better papers are Evening Rostov, Komsomolka, and his own. The tax administration has its own newspaper. There is yellow/ scandalmongering journalism. (One recent one with the Taganrog Metal Works.) There are few public pronouncements.

Self-censorship is a reality. (Protsenko himself, reputed to be a good political observer/reporter, has quit that line of work and concentrates now on writing up tourism stories.) Don TV has a very conservative director.

The press plays a big role during election campaigns – in particular, they can keep any candidate that they want to exclude out of a race.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS: (1) perhaps only half-serious, he proclaimed that the “3 biggest problems” in Rostov were the dirty streets and constant repairs on the streets; lack of public toilets; and young people sitting around in unsuitable posture. (These remarks obviously reflect his current interest in tourism and possibly are his sardonic comment once again on how there is no political life in Rostov; (2) there needs to be more “creativity” in how civic orgs. operate – a point he stressed repeatedly and presumably reflects his own “artistic/authorial” temperament); (3) there are NO large philanthropists in the Rostov region and there are no big conflicts of interest between big businesses – AND WITHOUT THIS, THERE CAN BE NO POLITICAL LIFE; (4) possibly reflecting his current employer, he claims that if money is to be given out here, it should definitely go not to NGOs or parties but to businessmen and to informal business/ entrepreneurial groups; and finally (5) there are NO charismatic (political) leaders around to shake things up; all the politically charismatic people have gone off to Moscow. [SG comment: the Chekhovian “3-Sisters” problem with local politics.]

SUMMARY: Whether through cynicism or burnout, democracy MAY have lost another champion in Protsenko, at least temporarily – it’s hard to tell on such short acquaintance. But it’s a resource – youth, talent, wit, sharp sense of what’s going on – that the country cannot afford to lose. There’s got to be found a way to keep such people from becoming disillusioned and/or indifferent.

12. N. Leksin, Institute of Systems Research

Встреча с экспертом

Участники встречи: В.Н.Лексин и С.С.Артоболевский

В.Н.Лексин – заведующий отделом Института системных исследований, один из самых известных и востребованных (в качестве консультанта) специалистов в области местного самоуправления. Совместно с А.Н.Швецовым опубликовал 5-ти томный справочник «Муниципальная Россия».

Основная проблема местного самоуправления – заставить работать новый закон. Для этого необходим постоянный мониторинг его внедрения и действия. Уже очевидно, что понадобятся довольно многочисленные поправки к закону. Закон слишком унифицирован, почти не учитывает региональные и местные особенности страны.

The evaluations stop about a year ago and i haven't seen the one they've commissioned for now. Did the wet blanket that putin threw on you guys in May 2002 affect you much (a lot, some, not much, not at all - you can see my old survey research instincts at work here)?
not much at all. Which blanket was that, anyway?

Second, the Kumar report (p. 25) is critical of RAMP/MDP (hope you recall all these alphabet-soup programs – they were all new to me) as lacking an overall strategy and direction. i wasn't sure if he meant that AID was at fault or if Internews was to blame or someone else.

I think he was being critical of USAID. Internews, at the time, was pretty critical of USAID with respect to that project, as well, for several reasons. Manana can tell you more. I can give you a somewhat peripheral view if you want--I didn't work directly on that grant.

Third, is that national assoc. of TV and radio broadcasters" which grew like Topsy between '96 and 2002/3 still a great success, or has it petered out by now?

NAT is doing pretty well--i'd call it a success story. Helping finance NAT's launch was one of the 15 or so projects in the framework of MDP, and one of the less problematic ones.

Fourth, i think that you guys were RIGHT ON THE MARK by insisting that the key to success for media here was to get them on their feet as quickly as possible, to become self-sustaining, self-financing independent BUSINESSES, not just media outlets. are they still able to do this, or has it gotten a lot harder/impossible after all that's happened with gusinsky, berezovsky, and now khodorkovsky?

It's gotten harder, as usual for several reasons. The currency crisis of august 1998 was a big blow, since it meant that most commercial firms had to tighten belts--and the first belt they tightened was their advertising budget, which hit independent media hard. But in general the putin administration has taken a more hands-off approach than the yeltsin administration when it comes to trying to stop local & regional government authorities from pressuring the (local) media. The result is that when a governor or mayor does things like try to stop a newspaper from printing the local state TV's schedule, or tries to orchestrate a buy-out of a local broadcaster he doesn't like, or tries to abrogate a long-term cheap rent contract for the building a newspaper is using, or tries to change the editorial line of a semi-private newspaper, or uses facile arguments to try to prevent the re-licensing of a talk radio station that carries opinions he doesn't like--the "repressed medium" in question no longer can count on any defence/support from the moscow government.

Fifth, there seems to me to be an awful lot of "underused" air time here -- not quite a "vast wasteland" yet but they're fast approaching the sophomoric/cretin level of US TV -- and if i'm right that there's a sort of "cultural/educational vacuum" here, excluding perhaps the Kultura channel, which reminds me of PBS, then is there room there for a lot more high-quality programming that could include a lot of PBS-type shows produced here, all around the Russian locales? This is where a great service could be performed for Russian civil education on the lowest, broadest level I believe.

We did a lot of that in the late 90s via our (USAID- and Ford-supported) project called "Open Skies". We bought PBS-type programming from around the world, versioned it into russian, and distributed it to hundreds of local TV stations free of charge (via satellite), who ate it up. But: a) it's not cheap; program rights for all of russia still cost, and high-quality versioning isn't that inexpensive, and space segment costs something too. b) a lot of that stuff is now available on the russian market. c) if we truly do want broadcasters to be sustainable businesses, they have to respond to market needs, and the market always prefers crap to quality.

Sixth, i'm going to recommend to AID that they try to utilize radio more, as murray seeger did in his report I think. CAN WE FIND A DON IMUS OR EVEN A RUSH-LIMBAUGH-STYLE LIBERAL here in Russia to put on the airwaves and woo people into political consciousness and even activism with humor, wit, and entertainment?

I don't know much about radio; we haven't done much with radio—the originally UK-supported FNR is the main radio support NGO (internews does TV, and PDI does print). But are you sure "liberal talk radio" isn't a contradiction in terms? There was an excellent piece in "the atlantic monthly" in the US about 9 mo ago which explained why liberal talk radio is so much harder to sell then right-wing talk radio. The other thing in Russia is that people seem to be much more centered on TV than in the US, but I don't have statistics to back that up. I'm awaiting somewhat breathlessly the current attempt to start a liberal talk radio network in the US--I think Gore's involved, isn't he?

Seventh, and this is a stunner probably, is it possible to create a nationwide public TV channel here in Russia?

What does "public" mean? in other words, in what way would "public" be differentiated from ORT and VGTRK (current national (government-run) channels 1 and 2)? The consensus is that TV can be public (as opposed to state) only if it's got some source of financing that is a) noncommercial and b) not under the control of the government. This could be, for instance, the TV tax we pay in france, or it could be a tax on electricity as in (I think) Bosnia (and is currently proposed for iraq), or a tax on commercial TV advertising as in Estonia (I think). How likely do you think it is to set up a system to tax Russians for that? Not likely. It would have to be something putin would not only "not stop" but would actually support--which he wouldn't if it were outside the control of the government. Putin is neither a democrat nor a dictator; he's practical, and in his view of the world, russia at this point needs a strong hand—not a repressive hand, but a strong hand, and that means controlling the media to the extent practical. That's why he's done what he's done in terms of reining in the national TV channels. He (possibly arguably) hasn't done anything illegal; he's just called in the debts that the private national TV channels owed to the state or to state-owned companies.

14. IRI

Participants: Konstantin Kilimnik, Aleksei Korliakov, Marina Malysheva, Anton Alferov, and Anastasia Kuz'mina

Five very bright, attractive young people (at least one of whom has worked in a legislator's office in the U.S.); they are the future for any "democratic" Russia (however defined). They are almost all optimistic about the future of democracy in Russia, if not in the short-medium term, then in the longer term.

Their work is with local governments, legislatures, party building, and women, and youth.

They conclude that, post-2003 and -2004 elections they much change their aims somewhat. Their job now is to try to create a true political platform such that it would serve as the basis for building a real political coalition at the lower level (not yet, perhaps, on a national scale).

They seek to build cooperation between parties and NGOs and to spread "party advocacy." Methods to be employed include defining the right message(s) to convey, firmly establishing a recognizable identity for a party among the populace, and – especially – keeping constituents informed (of their rights, of what is going on, etc.).

Work with youth needs to focus on developing better ties with local leaders, maintaining contacts, networking. Examples of success in this area: Barnaul and Perm. One political leader who succeeds in doing this fairly well: Ryzhkov (?). They want to establish a website (working name: “Youthnet”) aimed at young people in various locales (among the first planned is for Voronezh).

Work with women: even though Russia prides itself on how well it does in giving scope to women in most areas of life, including politics, the record shows otherwise. Women are largely underrepresented in such bodies as the Duma and in the government. IRI seeks to redress the balance.

Work with parties: Yabloko has certain allies, like the Moscow Helsinki Group and the organization “Za pravo vyborov,” but needs/seeks new financing. SPS asked IRI for its analysis of why the party failed so miserably in December. They want to take the lessons therein to heart and make use of the report.

Examples of IRI “success”: they compared regions where their local trained experts worked hard (to get out the vote, to keep citizens informed of their responsibilities and what they had at stake in the election process) with regions where their people did not concentrate and found that, in general, SPS and/or Yabloko received about 2% more of the vote in the former case.

By extrapolation, “justifying their existence” in the wake of what some would call a disastrous failure on the part of those working for a more democratic Duma, these IRI staffers would say that this cadre of highly motivated and well-trained campaign workers is still intact and can be called on to work in future elections. This legacy has not been lost.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE: there is a great need for more intermediaries (like IRI!?) between the parties and the people. Ideas have to be melded with competent managers in order to produce tangible results.

They have to find “new people” – i.e., people of a “new type” who at least understand something about Western-style democracy and will work for some form of this kind of politics a la Russe.

There must be much more work done to develop constituency politics—especially right before elections.

They need to get more information out over the SMI, in particular, info showing positive results (e.g., of what happens when ordinary citizens get involved in the political process). [comment: this seems essential in order to overcome both public indifference and public cynicism toward the entire political process. Too many have the attitude that what they do – voting, engaging in politics – makes little or no difference. “Putin will win all the same.”]

How they’d spend a lot more money/what they’d do with more resources: not any new ideas; sounds like more of the same, only more.....

15. Irkutsk Oblast’ Administration Committee on Social, Religious and Inter-ethnic Affairs

Архив, Е.Ковалевская, поездка в Иркутск для ARD, 06 – 09 июня 2004 года.

Иркутск

Васильев Александр Иванович

Председатель Комитета по связям с общественностью, религиозным и межнациональным отношениям областной администрации

Основные выводы:

Комитет по связям с общественностью, возглавляемый Васильевым, достаточно активен в Иркутске. Васильев пришел на чиновническую должность, имея опыт работы в экологической НКО.

Основным инструментом работы с общественностью является грантовый конкурс, который проводится ежегодно, открыто. Решения о финансировании принимает комиссия чиновников областной администрации. Мнение общественности учитывается в проставляемом экспертами от общественности рейтинге.

Руководитель комитета считает важным сотрудничество с западными грантодающими организациями, но только в том случае, если это взаимодействие прорабатывается с участием администрации.

Общественность, по мнению Васильева, нужно выращивать, «вбухивать» деньги в псевдообщественное не нужно. Общественное то, что удовлетворяет социальной потребности общества. Государство эту социальную потребность может наиболее адекватно определить.

Фонды местного сообщества в том виде, как они сейчас существуют, слабы. Нужно законодательно вводить налоговые льготы для фондов местного сообщества. Бизнес привлекать можно. Есть опасность поддерживать не общественность, а граждан, работающих в НКО и получающих доход от общественной работы. По мнению Васильева, большие деньги для НКО могут быть вредны, так как общественная работа, «это когда душа просит».

Успех власти во взаимодействии с общественными организациями в Иркутске и области базируется на том, что власть, реализует общественные потребности на разных уровнях – от поддержки низовых проектов НКО до целевых программ.

Власть переводит НКО из сферы грантотворчества в сферу реальной социальной деятельности.

Расшифровка стенограммы.

Вопросы, связанные с деятельностью гражданского общества и щекотливые - религиозные, межнациональные.

480 заявок. 330 пошло на конкурс.

Чем занимается Комитет.

На территории Иркутской области, 12 тыс. НКО было зарегистрировано - 1994-95 гг.

8000 из них - некоммерческие, 3000 - общественные.

Зарегистрировать некоммерческую организацию раньше - 10 чел., сегодня всего - 3, изменился закон.(после перерегистрации в 1996 - перерегистрировались 1 тыс. общественных организаций, некоммерческих - только 7. За 4 последние года произошел серьезный отток общественности из сферы публичной деятельности, «не стали менее активными, но типа не хотят». Общественные организации могут себя не регистрировать, а провозглашают.

Некоммерческие организации - выполнение социально-значимых функций.

1996 год - группа из Великобритании приехала в Иркутск - создать информационную сеть (как защитить свои права). Разница в понимании. Для англичан - продать скрепку - заниматься коммерческой деятельностью. А у нас можно заниматься коммерческой деятельностью, но нужно инвестировать в развитие собственной организации. Доходы должны пускаться на реализацию некоммерческой деятельности. **Закон наложил на менталитет советского человека. Организации хотят получать помощь от государства, да еще хотят заработать.** Например, экспериментальный завод может быть общественной организацией. НКО - регистрируются по месту нахождения. Социально-значимые - образовательная, экологическая... Широкий спектр. Можно заниматься всем, если инициатива находит отклик. Есть структуры, которые ищут потерявшихся собак... У меня был социально-экологический центр (у Васильева). В видах

деятельности значилось 18 направлений. Задача - помочь людям что-то делать.

Сколько организаций реально работают.

«Общественная работа - это когда у человека душа просит». Сегодня он может загореться, завтра утuhnуть. Рассматривать активность с точки зрения попадания в прессу или участия в конференциях - неправильно. Общественная работа - это когда человек проводит работу на свой страх и риск.

1 треть активных. Есть точка зрения, когда специально хотят показать, что организации не активны, чтобы оправдать существование технических структур.

Полезность для региона. Можно ли деятельность как-то организовать.

Можно. Общественная работа не терпит насилия, нужно уметь поддерживать инициативы. Должна существовать система отношений между государственными структурами и структурами некоммерческого плана. Это взаимодействие должно быть гибким.

2 социальных проекта - помочь детям и поставить забор вокруг реликтовой рощи. В общественном сознании люди должны склониться к детям. Перекос в сферу поддержки нуждающихся в помощи.

Кто определяет, какова общественная потребность? Если провести социологический опрос, то выяснится, что нужно помогать детям и старикам. Априорное представление цивилизованного общества. Вопрос – выделить сферы общественно-значимой деятельности: что менее значимо для остального общества, что более. Сегодня уничтожен лес, завтра не поддержан тос, послезавтра закрыта спортсекция. Общество вне зависимости от наличия средств начинает деградировать. Чем больше средств вкладывается из-за важности задач, тем деградирует общество.

Говорил англичанам: не нужно вкладывать деньги в структуры, которые не предполагают длительного существования. **Фонды ориентировались более на желание, а не перспективы. Возник слой лиц, получающих доход от гражданской деятельности. Вырос клан лиц - это деятельность по грантовочеству, а не по решению социальных проблем.**

Государство выделяет деньги на финансирование проектов - областной бюджет – сколько дать на общественные организации? Справедливое распределение - путь в никуда. Справедливость - субъективное ощущение сегодняшнего дня. Органы власти и общественности - есть много разных структур. Государственные структуры - реализованные потребности в социальной функции. **Любая власть реализует общественную потребность.**

Приоритизирует ли правительство деньги в общественном секторе?

Приоритеты

Областной закон о социальных программах принят в 1999 году

Закон предполагает - если есть социально-значимая проблема, то ее нужно решать, используя возможности всех сторон. Стоимость отдельных программ исчисляется миллионами рублей. Например, наркомания,- около 10 общественных организаций, силовые структуры решают задачу... Комплексный подход. Разрабатывается Программ на базе рабочей группы, программа утверждается в законодательном собрании. Отчитывается губернатор. Законодательное собрание может вносит коррективы. Ниже уровень - закон о социальном заказе, 1999. Пять лет успешно не работал. Им ни разу никто не воспользовался. С одной стороны его сделали вторичным по отношению к социальным программам. **Проблема в том, что не все социально-значимые мероприятия могут входить в социальные программы.** Мероприятия могут носить разовый характер, но быть очень важными. Комитет инициировал изменения в закон о социальном Заказе. Отдельный конкурс на областном уровне проектов социального значения - 500тыс.рублей. Первоначально 5 млн. рублей заложили. **«Общественность нужно выращивать в плане взаимодействия с органами власти. Не вбухивать деньги в псевдообщественное».**

Уже появились несколько оригинальных проектов – сохранение сибирской лайки, создание питомника...

Все конкурсы привлекают мошенников и проходимцев - это естественно, у нас общество не готово, все вопросы решаются в практике. Конкурсная комиссия и рейтинг общественности как основа отбора.

25 секций в конкурсе. Выставление оценки - с оценкой общественности .

Общественники дают 20 процентов оценки.

Низовой уровень - 2,5 млн. рублей распределяется Комиссией.

След этап - тематическая поддержка. Через тематические комитеты.

Этот Комитет (возглавляемый Васильевым) – методический консультационный Центр. Сначала получают деньги на первом уровне. Потом выходят в тематические направления.

Конкурс открытый - все желающие могут заявить секции. Список публикуется. Конкурс идет 2 месяца. 25 секций в этом году. Секция считается состоявшейся, когда проектов подано не менее 5.

Секция может выставить общественную оценку.

Есть положение о секциях, есть клубные секции.

Комиссия состоит из представителей администрации.

Сначала была объединенная комиссия из чиновников и НКО. Начались конфликты...

Фонды местного сообщества... Мало и их развитие идет неправильным путем. Все три сектора участвуют - нет законодательных актов. Есть разовые инициативы по созданию местных сообществ. Поддержать дотационные территории. Очень тяжелые в социальном плане территории. Социальная ответственность бизнеса - вопрос не новый.

Как привлечь местный бизнес - на уровне разработки, решать через налоговые льготы в местном законодательстве - даже 2 процента привлекут бизнес. Снимется вопрос политизации социальных проблем и процессов. В комиссии чиновники и депутаты. Открытые мероприятия.

Есть возврат денег 4 проекта вернули деньги

Прозрачный бюджет. Всего по Комитету проходит 7 млн. руб. 4 млн. для общественности и 3 млн. для национальностей и религии. Администрация области - 60-70 млн. «Лучший по профессии», например. Деньги идут на это из областного бюджета, но не через комитет. Молодежный комитет распределяет 9 млн. руб. Соц. защита, образование, спорт тратят большие средства.

Когда конкурсы проводились первый раз – решения комиссией принимались за 4-5 дней. Через 4 года укладываемся за 1 день. Отработали. Есть рейтинг, есть позиции. Можно задать разные вопросы.

Прозрачность - довольно ли население. **100 проектов в среднем поддерживается из 400.** Те, кто получил деньги потом 3 года не могут получать из конкурса поддержку. Диплом и денежные средства. Участвуют в тематических конкурсах. А после идет социальный заказ - достойны больших денег. А социальные программы могут делать не более 10-ка сильных НКО.

Есть богатые города. Конкурс грантов в Ангарске богаче - 300 тыс. на грант (а здесь дают 30 тыс.).

Национальные отношения и религия. Распределение средств бюджета.

350 тыс. на религию - просветительская и религиозная работа, бывают противоречия на местах. По

национальным отношениям 500 тыс. выделяется на поддержку национально-культурных центров. Большинство денег идет на общие мероприятия, высокая активность в сфере национальных отношений. Не расписано, на какие съезды поедут. Отправить татар на Всемирный конгресс татар нужно, других на другой... иждивенчество. Закон о национально-культурной автономии - в новом законе ввести оговорку - по количеству человек.

Специальная структура, занимающаяся вопросами местного самоуправления - Департамент по работе с территориями - с мэрами и законодательными собраниями. Ведерников Александр Анатольевич. Понедельник - вторник для встреч неудобен.

Количественная структура Комиссии Васильева. 2 религ. 2 нац. 1 нач.

3 чел по общ орг. Всего 9 человек.

Сейчас будет восемь.

Бюджет публикуется? Согласовывается с общественностью.

4 млн. Нет административного бюджета в этом фонде. Есть расходы по темам.

2 конкурса по национальному направлению - публицистики по национальной проблематике - Конкурс по самим национально-культурным центрам на лучшую подготовку мероприятий. Секция по межнациональным отношениям.

Увеличение финансирования из-за рубежа. Считают, что Васильев спровоцировал Сороса на сворачивание работы. Западные гранты нужны для сотрудничества.

Нет формального участия органов власти.

«Дайте деньги – мы сами распределим», - вот точка зрения общественных организаций. Хотят делать все без власти. Но сейчас стали пересматривать подходы.

16. Irkutsk Oblast' Administration

Participants: Aleksandr Ivanovich Vasil'ev, Steve Grant, Jose Larios, Vladimir Rimsky, Elena Kovalevskaya, interpreter

Vasil'ev heads the administration's Committee for Contact with the Public and Minorities. Since the mid-90s, some 10-12,000 public organizations have been founded; 8000 of them are NKOs, 3000 NGOs. In 1995 a new law was promulgated and they all had to re-register. Today about 1/3 are active on a fairly constant basis; others wax and wane in activity.

Out of a total oblast budget of 60-70 million rubles, his commission gets ca. 7 million (the youth commission, e.g., gets 9 million). Of his funds, some 4 million go to NGOs/NKOs, 3 million to minorities and religious groups.

The administration has tried many ways to encourage/support public involvement in political life of the oblast. They established a resource center, which has been swamped with requests for assistance from NGOs. For the past 4-5 years they've held a competition for grants from NGOs/NKOs. They've tried to be flexible in meeting the needs of business people.

The annual competition for NGOs/NKOs has had a checkered path. The first year, they received many more project proposals than they could possibly fund. As time went by, fewer and fewer. The first year, they had people from the NGOs/NKOs on the board of those choosing the winning projects. The debates over whom to give the money to were furious and the process took 4-5 days. So they changed things: today, they ask for input/ratings on projects from the public orgs. and that counts for about 20% of the decisionmaking process, which now takes just one day.

HIS PET PROJECT: to establish a “social/societal commission” under every political body in the oblast. A second project: to establish a “school parliament” for teachers and school children – to educate them in civic life. This one will take place, in October.

[Vasil’ev sought us out not once but twice more to elaborate on how he views the political process in Irkutsk and in Russia more generally. Notes from Tuesday, June 8:]

He does not agree that it is a big problem in Russia today that the state keeps encroaching on the rights of the public/society. For him, the work of government in Russia since the days of the tsars has always been that of “enlightenment”; it’s the public that’s not ready to take upon itself all the work that must be done.

Equally important, the public is rather incompetent; his work with the annual grants competition has shown him this. The groups that apply don’t get their act together, don’t do the necessary preparation to ensure that their ideas can be implemented and funded over time.

BUT Vasil’ev thinks of himself as an idealist, in the sense that he wants more trans-parency in government and wants more societal involvement in the public sector/public affairs. The governor is a political liberal, he believes, because he surprised Vasil’ev when he did not support a proposal that political parties like SPS and Yabloko should need to get 7% of the vote in elections rather than 5% to pass the barrier for the Russian Duma.

Corruption per se is NOT the huge problem that most see it as. Mustn’t confuse certain customs with true corruption. Thus, in order for business to flourish, they have to have good relations with the oblast administration. So if small gifts are exchanged, birthdays observed, etc. this smoothes things out for good cooperation and so on.

SUMMARY: Here is a truly “new” chinovnik (bureaucrat) in almost all respects: he knows how to talk the talk and may even know how to walk the walk. It is self-evident that IF democracy is to have a chance in Russia, there need to be thousands more like him. BUT it is still apparent that he has some/many of the old limitations of Soviet-era bureaucrats, including the paternalistic mentality of ante-bellum American slaveholders: the Russians/Negroes/slaves are just not ready yet for freedom/democracy/civil rights because they can’t handle the responsibility/initiative/knowledge needed for this.

17. Irkutsk Oblast Committee on Relations with Society and National Relations

Alexander Ivanovich Vasiliev, Head

Vasiliev is important to our mission because he is part of the emerging nexus between NGOs and local and regional government actors. He is in charge of distributing grants to the third sector. We talked about how he works with NGOs, and his view on the abilities of NGOs to act as partners in social service provision. For three years, the regional administration has given grants to NGOs. Each year, the amount of money and number of grants given has grown.

This year (2004) they gave out the most in grant money and number of grants. They funded 87 projects from 300 applications. Applications were also at an all time high.

In 2003, they gave out grants of about 30,000 rubles each (\$1000).

However, he was also displeased with the quality of NGOs in the region. Many groups, he feels, don’t do much, or don’t have anything to show for their actions. They produce packets of information, but they don’t seem to work with the population. He’s tired of groups simply asking for more money. They all think their problem is most important. Although he thinks govt is ready to work with NGOs, he thinks

NGOs are not ready to work with government – they aren't professional enough. They are prepared to give money, and more money, if they find qualified NGOs.

He claims they had to change the way they pick grant winners because they spent 5 days arguing about the people last year and couldn't find agreement.

He also talked about the new Governor's group of NGOs.

18. Irkutsk NGO Meeting

Groups present:

Radio Station Echo Moscow in Irkutsk

Press and Society

Alliance

Women's Union "Angara"

Center of Social Partnership

Civil Information Initiative

Memory Tribute

Small Businesses of Irkutsk Oblast

Council of NGOs

First, all the groups got up and introduced themselves and explained the purpose of their organization. A lot of the groups present were in some way related to the media, although there were also business and women's groups present. Many of them seemed to have received small grants from a variety of Western donors, and were working on donor friendly projects related to transparency, freedom of the press, and working with media/business/ or government.

A large part of the conversation revolved around the issue of a lack of transparency, whether from the government or from local business

There was also a feeling that was no real political party in Irkutsk to unify interests/provide an alternative.

When discussing the NGO community, someone said that about 10,000 were registered in the oblast, but that 300 – 600 work in reality. However, the NGO community is currently in a process of unification so that they can work together more easily. This is a very different situation from 10 years ago, when many organizations were informals, and weren't registered. The only stable organizations were Komsomol, Red Cross, the Women's Council. The first organizations were more like clubs. Now there are many organizations that are formally registered. There are 850 SMI organizations registered alone (media).

When we shifted the discussion to the issue of working with government and with political parties, they talked about the problem of trying to work with the government but also independent of them. They also discussed the danger of allying themselves too closely with political parties/people. It is an easy way to develop enemies. That is why the Union of NGOs will not support any party or electoral block.

They also felt that there was no such thing as an independent media. The media is just interested in sensationalism. Part of the problem is that journalists are not paid well. No one knows who funds the various papers.

When we talked about sources of funding, we moved to a discussion of government funding. Many felt that foreign aid was important because it ensured choice, and helped them stay independent from the government. Others that that grants were a way for people to get money and then do nothing. In terms of business funding, they talked about YUKOS and their grant program in Angarsk.

The public, they feel, doesn't know anything about NGOs. Someone cited the fact that 97% of the population does know anything about them or their work. People discussed the role of the Soviet Union in shaping people's mentalities.

19. Irkutsk Focus Group with NGOs

Архив, Е.Ковалевская, поездка в Ростов-на-Дону для ARD, 09 – 11 июня 2004 года.

Иркутск

Встреча с общественными организациями

Политический процесс

Фокус-группа

07 июня, вторая половина дня

Основные выводы по CS

Лидеры НКО активно участвуют в выборах на уровне региона. Выражается озабоченность построением зависимости НКО от партии Единая Россия в связи с интересом последней к финансированию некоммерческих проектов. Ассоциированный бизнес региона не может обратить на себя внимание губернатора.

Работе НКО Иркутска помогает то, что они организовали Объединенный Совет НКО, объединенный совет является неполитическим объединением.

СМИ не свободны. Остаются возможности для самиздата.

Ситуацию усугубляет хищническая позиция Центра – ресурсы разворовываются, заводы и производства скупаются Центром. Есть некоторые надежды на новую политическую элиту, которая частично может вырасти из лидеров НКО.

Расшифровка записей

Галина Бобкова (есть в справочнике)..

Первый проект - рассказ о полезных социальных инициативах в обществе

Как СМИ может быть участником становления гражданского общества. Темы взяты в научную работу со студентами журналистами. Пресса в политическом процессе иркутского региона
Стерхов.

Координатор бизнес объединений иркутской области

12 ассоциаций бизнеса.

Программа - поддержка малого и среднего бизнеса, основных направлений б.

Верхудин.

Радиостанция «Эхо Москвы» в Иркутске, журналист.

Проблемы экономики, политики

Иван Воронцов.

Информационное агентство.

Кандидат в депутаты иркутской области.

Ольга Карасева.

Гражданская информационная инициатива- ГРИН

Экология, правозащитница и журналистика

Крупные проекты по экологии в Ангарске. Работа с правозащитниками в колонии. Помогаем организациям рассказывать о своих делах – оказываем информационную помощь. Мост между прессой и НКО. АСИ - корпункт. Освещают все, что делается НКО. Работа с прессой по профилактике наркомании.

Семенова Эльмира

Директор центра социального партнерства.

3 год средства бизнеса - гранты. Тема беспризорности. Работа с коалицией - дети улиц. Одновременно замдиректора государственного учреждения - Центр профилактики наркомании - разработка областной государственной программы

Комитет по связям с общественностью (представлен дамой).

Светлана Валентиновна Уралова - союз женщин ангара.

Стивен Грант предложил пообщаться - неформально. Стимулировать оценки по поводу демократизации и политической жизни.

Лена Творогова

Сейчас очень нервная обстановка для такого разговора. Предвыборная кампания в Городскую думу. Во время предвыборной кампании на все смотрят только в ракурсе предвыборной кампании. Возразил журналист: по закону о СМИ можем говорить обо всем, кроме муниципальных выборов. Смена политической элиты. Время людей Ножикова закончилась. **Подросла новая поросль. 19 районов в области - 1,5 тыс. кандидатов в депутаты. Придет новая политическая элита.**

3 окт – новая система: 50 процентов по одномандатным округам, 50 процентов – по партийным спискам.

Июль 2005 - выборы губернатора области.

Поле расчищено. Не объединились с усть-ордынским округом. Его отменили, так как не смогли зарегистрировать группу. Усть-Ордынск - 6 аграрных районов, которым не очень хочется объединяться с иркутской областью. **Из области все разворовано, вывезено и продано Москве.** Авиастроительный завод зарегистрировали в Москве, завод разнесли на 27 юр лиц. Все фирмы зарегистрированы на виргинских островах. Вчера прошли выборы в районную думу. 20 процентная явка. В остальных районах явка на уровне 10 процентов. Равнодушие и реализм - 88 место иркутская область по приходу на выборы Путина (5 проц. нарисовали). Районные выборы - выгодно замолчать, придут бабушки...

Связи между центром и регионами.

Эхо. Проблема забавная. Ее выразили выборы в регионе. Московские партии ничего не выделили своим региональным партиям на региональные кампании, выиграли на местах партии, которые поддерживает власть правящая элита. Правящая элита в регионах принадлежит Единой России. Все знали, кто победит на выборах, нет интриги и никто не приходит. В Москве была идея объединять партии и НКО. Коммунисты - 1,5 тыс. Яблоко умерло. Партии только номинально существуют.

Бизнес - позитив. Смелое выступление, значит позитив. Рост количества и качества НКО идет на глазах. Все больше себя заявляют. **25 человек из некоммерческого сектора участвуют в выборной кампании.** В Румынии - вход во власть бизнеса - откровение. Много лидеров НКО. Общественный вес - 500-600 на всю область. И маленькие, и большие. Пошел процесс организаций, растет опыт, коалицирования. Даже небольшие организации вносят свой вклад в развитие коалиций.

Процесс консолидации - привел к тому, что стали замечать и пускать в администрацию.

Журналистика в России - к хорошему привыкаешь быстро. В 90-е годы мы встречались с неформалами (экологи, анархисты). Можно пойти и зарегистрировать организацию, СМИ. В Иркутске зарегистрировано 850 СМИ (без московских).

НКО стеной пошли на выборы. Была удивлена. Мы в политику не пойдем - политика - дело грязное.

Список общественных организаций - более 40, которые могут участвовать в выборы

При Единой России. «Действует Совет из некоммерческих организаций. Отношения приобретают форму бартера. Нет сотрудничества». Коммерческие отношения рекламы.

Некоммерческий сектор рассосался за спинами кандидатов от Единой России.

Эхо - только на прошлой неделе узнал, что можно работать, не завися от власти. При нашем уровне коррупции - вхождение во власть... Есть много знакомых лиц, которые сидели у кормушки и которые будут сидеть.

Сложно для НКО - взаимодействие с партиями. Политическая борьба имеет неблагородный оттенок. Представители другой партии будут воспринимать тебя как подсадную утку. Стоит ли взаимодействовать - нужно подумать.

Объединенный совет НКО всегда заявлял о своей нейтральности.

В то же время был опыт, когда совету партия хотела помочь - партия обещала помочь с ярмаркой и завалили. Все пять лет делали неправильно и мероприятие не состоялось.

Роль СМИ в политике

Полностью независимых СМИ не существует. Есть более свободные и менее свободные . В основном мониторят по сайтам. Приходит из областной администрации пресс-релиз - печатают. Это показатель работы пресс-службы.

СМИ - независим только самиздат. Он по-прежнему есть. Собирают деньги - и издают. Наша журналистика не укладывается ни в одну из теорий. Либертианская. Нет - на деле журналистика это PR. Это не журналисты. Создание финансовых группировок.

Журналисту на что-то нужно покупать хлеб и сахар. В федеральном СМИ - газете «Ведомости» был один независимый человек, работал на тэц и писал то, что ему интересно.

Одна из причин - отголоски прошлого. Внутренне живем вчера, позавчера. На уровне принятия решений. У кого большие деньги, осуществляют самые большие цензуры.

Прозрачности СМИ нет. Официальные бюджеты публикуются в газетах. Кто это читает? Освоение бюджета - деньги должны выделяться. Деловые люди, связаны с административным исполнением бюджета в долг. В конце года сумма проплачивается, но происходит поздно.

Бизнес;

Контакты и связи между областной организацией и на местах.

Есть структуры, созданные администрацией – некоммерческие партнерства - малые предприятия, производители..ТПП- выжидательные. Действуем в рамках коалиции, которые раздражают администрацию. Много совместной работы. 30 лет ТПП - с губернатором так и не договорились о дате, чтобы он смог прийти на празднование. Ждем губернатора, 30 проц. организаций – крупняк. (из 250). **Такому крупному объединению не могут ответить.** Общая ситуация. Хотели, чтобы программа по наркотикам была снизу. Смогли только сделать форум, через который все общались. Большая работа, через которую власти могли бы услышать школьников и молодежь. Парадокс администраций. Красный крест принимал посла ЮНИСЕФ. Никто не знает в администрации, что это за посол ЮНИСЕФ. **Снизу невозможно выйти на уровень губернатора.** Можно организовать встречу с президентом Бурятии...читинскими чиновниками, но не с иркутским.

Школа молодых ученых.

Единая Россия вносит политическую составляющую через финансовую поддержку- сказать, что

ресурс клуба нужно поддерживать губернатора. Все, кто больше 50 тыс. получает, все на Единую Россию должны ссылаться. Собрали и призвали голосовать за Путина.

Пример с выборами. 5 декабря – выборы, инструктаж в военной части: Если нравится Единая Россия, поставьте плюс, если нет - поставьте минус. Голосовать за Единую Россию. С цеха на участке 2000 чел. – «нам сказал начальник цеха». А некоторые политологи говорят, что административный ресурс порядка 7 проц. Я хочу повышать качество преподавания - мне никто 50 тыс. не даст, а Единая Россия дает.

Есть момент, что некоторые НКО уповают, что им даст деньги администрация. Пошли разгрузили вагон - и провели большое мероприятие.

Привести экспертов не можем.

«Если я хочу сделать проект, я должна подумать, кому продаться».

Роль для иностранной организации здесь.

Точка зрения: у человека должен быть выбор. Лучше написать грант, а меня уже попросили. Важно было формировать людей, которые независимыми были от власти. Толерантность было дико, за это слово убрали с байкальской молодежной секции. Убрали за это слово с Байкальского молодежного форума.

Крупный бизнес пытается что-то подобное делать своими силами. ЮКОС - территория присутствия город Ангарск. Там есть муниципальный грант. У Снегирева гранты 60 тыс. дол. Точечные вливания. Сейчас создан фонд местного сообщества – гранты по 1000 дол. Из-за малости напрягаться. А Черемховский район - гранты дают по 10000 - фантастические деньги, потому что люди деньги не видят. 6000 для организации- небольшие деньги. НКО делает все по закону, проще заработать деньги в другом месте.

Человек просто с интересной идеей ничего не напишет.

Усольский централ. Помогали издать - лучше с кружкой среди усольских бизнесменов.

Давление на общественные организации - на налоги (у USAID - есть условие неуплаты некоторых налогов и налоговые проверки). Есть организации, которые в определенных условиях побывали - ФСБ.

Пресса не свободна

Партий нет. Где каналы, где люди выражают свою озабоченность? Есть что-то кроме кухни? Все-таки пресса это тот форум, где все озвучивается. Читатель, зритель, слушатель. Не просто посмотреть на палитру мнений, но и на хитрости лоббистов и PR-щиков. 5-10 газет никто читать не будет. То, что пенсионер выписывает, то они и читают.

Сайт можно прикрыть. Программа СОРМ внедряется. Есть 2 сайта в Иркутске - с критикой мэрии и администрации (немного перегибают).

Ярмарка НКО - не было цензуры. Был представлен интересный спектр. Творили, что хотели. Федерация альпинизма - бои, каскадеры устроили захват заложников. Мэр в городе ошалел. Угасла молодежная выставка в сибэкспоцентре. Все было очень мощно представлено - молодежные организации.

Важно оценивать люей и настроение. Сравнить ситуацию с 37 годом нельзя.

8000 молодежи опросили. 97 ничего не знали про общественные организации и знать не хотят. 1000 человек выборка. 10 человек допытывались до всех. Ответили 300 чел. Дали ответ. Люди делают что-то хорошее - нужно жить в этом. Фрондирование - люди шутят. Опрос показал -

я в шоке. Главный лозунг - все, что я делаю, должно быть оплачено. Этому поколению итак хорошо. Себя нужно искать. Одна треть думает, что мне лучше заплатить чиновнику, чем отстаивать свои права. Нелегальный бизнес - интересно. Если ты один против всей системы, я согласен дать взятку. Только совместные действия - чиновник должен выполнять уже оплаченные услуги.

Советский Союз был идеологической машиной для формирования сознания. Кто сейчас занимается формированием сознания в Иркутске? PR-щики под конкретное дело, некоммерческие организации.

Истории: как общественная инициатива перебила административную.
История с трубой, 1989 год - остановили прокладку трубу (скромная учительница литературы). Несколько человек встали на дыбы и поддержали город. В Иркутске молодая женщина предотвратила строительство завода с детской группой «Стрижи». Сохранили рощу, которую уже начали пилить. Тогда общество было готово воспринимать эти вещи.

20. Roundtable with Various NGOs

Elena Tvorogova, “Rebirth of the Land of Siberia”

Mikhail Rozhanskiy, Center for Independent Social Research and Education

Roman Vasilevich, Mikhail Govorukhin, Olga Mikhailova “Your Right”

Jenny Sutton, Baikal Ecological Wave

Aline Simone, Siberian Resource Center

Anna Zagainova, Red Cross

Aleksei Petrov, Memory Tribute

Maria Plotnikova, “Alliance”

Vladimir Litvinov, Social Psychological Center for Aid to Children and Adults “Dialogue”

Alexander Vasiliev, Regional Administration

Note: This RT was videotaped by members of the organization “Your Right.” Lena speculated that they were actually from the FSB, since no one seemed to know them or their work very well. But who knows?

In the RT, we asked about several things: working with local government, the search for resources, working together with other NGOs, and impediments to further activities.

While the person in administration (Vasiliev) was positive about the coalition of NGOs they had formed, and negative about the activities of some of the grant recipients of the oblast level competition, NGOs at the RT had another tale to tell about the same issue. Many at the round table were doubtful about the long-term ability of the government-sponsored coalition to really be a voice for the third sector. Several people raised the concern about monopolization by the government and their interests. They argued that the line was not clear between the government’s desire to work with them and their efforts to control their activities. With all of the NGOs working together, in a way it just becomes easier to co-opt their work.

The lack of human rights organizations was also mentioned, that there are a lot on paper but that no one works on these issues in reality. These organizations used to work much more frequently five years ago but they have all disappeared now.

Other organizations talked about their specific activities.

When we talked about funding, NGOs recognized that government funding was a plus, but also pointed out that it wasn't always neutral. The plus to foreign aid is that to them, it guarantees their independence. They don't feel as if they "owe" government anything. In other words, it helps provide choice.

The person in the administration asked why does everyone have to have a formal registration? This set off a debate about money, and how one can't receive grants without registration. Also, someone mentioned the need for trained accountants to keep track of finances. Just like a sick person, NGOS too will die without the appropriate medicine and "treatment" and good conditions for growth.

This led to a discussion of whom the local administration does like to fund. NGOs at the RT felt the government tended to like best of all veterans, youth, and writers and other "traditional" social organizations. The government invites them to drink coffee, but doesn't take them seriously. They still give large sums of money to groups they like under the table (some group got 1 million rubles).

Then they explained the change in policy of the regional administration's grant competition. For the first two years, NGOs were invited to participate in judging the concourse. This year, the government changed their mind, and invited them to participate and give advice, but the government made the final decision. They feel that this change is a result of the differing priorities of the administration and the NKO. Because the govt didn't like their previous decisions, they're changing the rules. Now they just get very basic indicators to rate the proposals, and the govt decides.

They see this as a larger problem of the government trying to build civil society, and that they don't want a "real" civil society.

21. Irkutsk NGO Meeting

Архив, Е.Ковалевская, поездка в Иркутск для ARD, 06 – 09 июня 2004 года.

Иркутск

Встреча с общественными организациями

8 июня. Первая половина дня.

Оценка ситуации в гражданском обществе иркутской области.

Основные выводы.

В Иркутске слабое правозащитное движение. Отмечается сокращение активности НКО. Этому есть разные объяснения – от того, что инициативные группы предпочитают не регистрироваться, до трудностей, связанных с налоговыми проверками и ведением отчетности. Отмечается, что в секторе есть конкуренция и монополия на ресурсы, есть «расслабленные» грантополучатели. Коалицирование как вид деятельности не приветствуется. Во многом это объясняется негативным опытом по привлечению субподрядчиков по крупным грантам в конце сроков выполнения грантов.

Отдельно отмечено, что общественные организации нуждаются в поощрении со стороны общества. Послание Путина в отношении некоммерческих организаций создаст серьезные препятствия на местах в лице чиновников, которые начнут давить неудобных. Мешает позитивному имиджу некоммерческих организаций в обществе. К западным деньгам, получаемым НКО, власти относятся без энтузиазма.

Расшифровка записей.

Васильев

Не все измеришь деньгами. Вопрос - сколько нужно денег.

Нужно 3 млн. рублей - а вырву 52 млн. **«Общественные структуры не готовы к освоению денег. Деньги будут разворованы».** Провалилась ситуация с Гражданским Форумом. Только отдельные структуры смогли показать работу.

В прошлом году 300 тыс. денег конкурсного грантового фонда оказались неизрасходованными. Прошерстили весь список – нет достойных.

В среднем по 5 млн. В год в иркутскую область вкидывали.

Были ли в области свой Гражданский Форум?

Как форум можно рассматривать гуманитарный конгресс.

Поощрение НКО - финансово поощряем, помещение предоставляем. Почетные грамоты - губернатора. К губернатору невозможно пройти - у тебя нормально, но что ты едешь. Зачем им (НКО) нужно идти к губернатору? Проговариваются детали. Все объясняют. «Никому не буду говорить, только губернатору». Зачем пробиваться к губернатору? Я с губернатором разговаривал за 5 лет один раз - в 2000 году. Расстрел Берлика (5 человек расстреляли из автоматов), религиозные организации - завал, митинговали. Хотят любви общественники, чувств не хватает. Губернатор для них - помазанник божий.

Рожанский Михаил.

Центр независимых социальных исследований и образования.

Качественные методы, фокус-группы, интервью. Книга по социо-культурной карте региона. Книга Байкальская сибирь. 40 кейс-стади. Что происходило в конкретных городах и деревнях. Активно связаны с Бурятией и Читинской областью. Учредители – В.Воронков. Создали ассоциацию независимых центров. 13-14 мая, 13 центров. Междисциплинарные - работа в проектах. Создание общего информационного ресурса. Центры по тематике разные - образовательная деятельность. Восстановили Интерцентр в «Шанинке».

Владимир Литвинов, директор социально-психологического Центра

Ремизов Виталий, «Ваше право» (правозащитная организация)

Правозащитная деятельность. 95 процентов услуг - бесплатно. В чистом виде правозащитная деятельность. Путают нас с чиновниками. В чистом виде правозащитная деятельность.

Как изменился 3 сектор за 4-5 лет.

Литвинов.

В 2001 создавали переговорные площадки по молодежной политике. Два шага назад - шаг вперед. Потеряли два помещения в центре города. Программ много особенно молодежные программы, социологи, психологи. Выдвигается в городскую думу. Работа в ДНД, работа с ребятами на добровольной основе.

5 лет назад иркутская область выделялась правозащитным движением. - фонд Любославского, много групп на местах. Велась большая работа. **Любославский уехал в Москву, за год все сошло на ноль. Правозащитная среда некоммерческих организаций очень слаба.** Организации инвалидов,..

«Ваше право»

Отдельному человеку податься некуда. Отстаиваем интересы в области частной собственности. Восстановление справедливости - перегрузка. Надежда на общественность. Кто финансирует - 95 процентов услуг - бесплатные. 5 процентов услуг очень хорошо оплачиваются. Оговариваются выгодные условия для организации. За счет этого содержится организация. Бесплатные действия

носит характер рекламы. Большинство людей не доверяет никому.

Принцип работы. Откуда можно найти поддержку в Иркутске. Все зависит от того, с кем ты дружишь. Может засыпать администрация. Многие товарищи спрашивают, зачем нужна некоммерческая деятельность, люди работают для людей. Есть губернские программы. Есть зарубежные, хотя и уменьшаются. Дополнения в устав - зарабатывать деньги. Беда - самим общественным организациям нужно проявить себя так, чтобы о них знали. Ниш для зарабатывания - много. Мы отходим - стремимся участвовать в маленьком общественном бизнесе. Рынок благотворительный только появляется.

Некоммерческий сектор в Иркутске убавляется. Сложная некоммерческая система, опоздали, вызывают в налоговую - штрафы. Если посмотреть старый справочник по молодежным организациям, то 50 процентов уже нет, ликвидированы.

Васильев.

Тонкость - не обязательно регистрироваться. В Иркутске - есть рабочий клуб Беробородова который постоянно проводит пикеты. Если бы хотели быть предприятием, то есть откуда плясать. **Личностного ресурса хватает. Понижается производственная активность.** Власть смотрит на оформившиеся организации как на зарабатывающие деньги. Антикризисные вопросы. Ведется безобразно экономика. Юристов нет, договоры придумывают сами. Идите в библиотеки.. Проблемы общ. организации - аналогии с хирургом. Нет надлежащего подхода - экономического, финансового. Человек не просчитал свой бизнес.

Плотникова Мария, Клуб молодых ученых «Альянс» .

Коммерческая и общественная разное. Есть направления, где нельзя заработать. Хорошая схема, более зрелое. Но есть еще поколение тех, кто несет груз Советского союза. Если студенты захотели заниматься чем-то важным, им нужно давать возможность. В этом году будет первый раз платный семинар Клуба.

Как много в иркутской области процветающих организаций.

Удовлетворение от работы. Я делаю что-то от того, что у меня такая активная работа. **Васильев: у нас общество не только конкурентное в сфере промышленности, но и в общественных организациях.** Есть целый ряд группировок в некоммерческом секторе, которые совместно выживают, распадаются, сосуществуют. Государство должно взять на себя роль в создании первичных условий. Все крупные бизнесы вкладывают деньги. Стало модным - социально ответственный бизнес. Социальная привязка - никто не пытается просвещать предприятия, чтобы они могли осмысленно поддерживать.

Рожанский.

Ситуация в гражданском обществе изменилось. Послание Путина. Команда в нач. 90-х годов - в сфере поддерживалась инновационная деятельность. Последние годы ситуация в образовании в сторону унификации. Создание общественной организации - уход из образования формального, шансы - умение вписываться в рынок образовательных услуг. **За годы активной поддержки фондами в третьем секторе создалась расслабленная зона** - прослойка людей, которые привыкли существовать на гранты. Без серьезных результатов. Общественная востребованность результата работы значит успех. То что просят продолжить - не фонды, а именно общество. Не сотрудничаем с политическими структурами.

27 организаций город Иркутск. Лояльны власти. Есть организации, которые комфортны без власти. Дружба - некоторые представители ушли во власть. Иуды - баламутите молодежь. Миллионные деньги из бюджета - байкальские скауты.

Альянс - возрождение земли сибирской. Подготовка кадров - то, что делает ресурсный центр. Объединение в союзы - комплексные. Временные альянсы.

Не согласна, что государство сделало все - хорошая лазейка для плохих людей. **Некоммерческие организации ждут признания роли некоммерческих организаций.** Социологи - роль некоммерческого сектора мала. Оценить политический вклад, человеческий - нужно оценить экономический эффект. О третьем секторе вспоминают во время избирательных кампаний. Общество рыболовов спасателей - 35 тыс. членов.

Коалиции по поводу коррупции. Организация подключает на последних этапах реализации гранта партнеров. Опыт и авторитет - но не всегда могут отработать гранты. Если не тянет, начмнет искать возможности сотрудничества. Пришлось заниматься гендерной политикой. Поддержать Марию - в коалициях есть риск монополии. **Организации, более успешные с инвесторами показывают как свой ресурс организации, которые могут об этом и не знать.** Вопрос форм... Сотрудничество с «Байкальской волной» - не нужно оформлять. В 2001 коалиция местные сообщества по преодолению насилия в семье 2001 - открыли филиал - ресурсный центр развития семьи.

Высказывание Путина будет принципом гонения на угодных и негодных. Интерпретация властей однозначная. Власти не очень хорошо относятся к тем, кто получает деньги из-за рубежа.

2005 год выборы губернатора - нас не свернут. Плюс - проводятся конкурсы. Губернское собрание общественности - господин Хороших, организация Ювента - работают в Ангарске с несовершеннолетними. На бумаге у нас много правозащитных организаций. Путин - двойственность понимания. Куда уходят местные ресурсн. Само российское государство получает западные деньги. Разрыв логики.

Подозрения всегда есть - зависит от амбиций. Все-таки чиновник от своего разума_ а от интересов, слово Путина может быть механизмом. Аргумент со ссылкой на избирательную политику. **Конституция конституцией - но вы видите, куда политика идет.**

Губернское собрание общественности - роль. Шантаж власти - если поддержаны не те проекты. Деньги Иркутска идут в область. Первые два года была общая комиссия. Когда поняли, что не тем даем. Собрались одни чиновники и быстро расписали за 2 часа. Плюсики - будем иметь в виду. Проекты по национальной культуре: дали средства проекту, который 2 раза отвергали. Потому что проектом руководит академик-администрация ссориться не будет.

Заигрывание с общественными организациями. Стратегическое планирование для участников рынка. Пригласили вступить в Единую Россию - могли назначить руководителями молодежного единства.

22. Irkutsk NGO Meeting

June 7, 2004

Participants: Ivan Vorontsov, Aleksandr Verkhozin, Anatolii Sterkhov, Galia Bobkova, Aleksei Petrov, El'mira Semenova, Ol'ga Karaseva, Steve Grant, Sarah Henderson, Vladimir Rimsky, Yelena Kovalevskaya

SMI are/must be a crucial part of civil society and democracy. But the problem here is basically twofold: access and censorship. There are NO independent media in Irkutsk region – only samizdat is “free.” People can’t get objective information, even from the nominally “free” press. Basically, SMI do PR work.

The businessman present was more positive about general situation in the region. He’s involved in anti-corruption work. Says the administration has encouraged the growth of business orgs. and has initiated various pro-business projects.

CORRUPTION: On the one hand, corruption has penetrated not just big business but also small and medium-size businesses. On the other, corruption can be “good” in the sense that it serves a certain purpose: people get more of the pie, it makes some economic sense in present circumstances.

Politics still an iffy thing. E.g., turnout in recent elections has been barely 20%. Most NKO’s don’t want to get involved in politics at all. (Not all have the right to do so, but at least 40 do.)

Other notes: there’s a new political elite in the oblast. One big issue that has animated people is the referendum in December about uniting the oblast with the neighboring oblast.

These people do not agree with the oblast administration rep that there is budget transparency. They don’t see it.

The NGOs/NKO’s say that they NEED the support of grant-giving orgs.

SUMMARY: the “big 3” lacking here are: money, transparency, and access to objective information.

23. Irkutsk SPS Meeting

Tuesday, June 8

Participants: Aleksei Koz’min, Steve Grant, Vladimir Rimsky

Very useful explanation of center-local party relations. At the core, there is a coincidence of values and ideology. The “platform” comes down to two basic planks: defense of political rights (e.g., freedom of speech, press) and of private property. He is in constant contact with the executive committee of the party in Moscow.

BUT the oblast party is far from Moscow both literally and figuratively in almost all respects. He – Koz’min -- introduced an amendment to the party statutes earlier this year to allow the local branches to decide how to handle their own affairs, especially whether or not to run in local elections. (Till then, the center directed these activities.)

The amendment was accepted, but then began the opposition; many at the center don’t like the idea. E.g., in Dec. 2003 a certain Gosman (?) told Koz’min that the executive committee didn’t care a whit about the localities and any campaigns by local party members. They were concentrating all their efforts on ads on national TV and other nationwide measures.

So his concerns fundamentally differ from those of the center. He has to worry about getting and holding on to local cadres and resources, even to the point of working with the party in power. The center will help him only with the regional дума elections (NOT with the city дума elections) – they’re only looking to keep their “brand” going in people’s eyes as widely as possible.

Second excellent example of their differences: the Moscow party center looks at local politics only through the prism of whether or not they should be for or against the local governor. And in some cases, it's an even more narrow focus: Chubais is settling his relations with Deripaska in Irkutsk (so that oligarch-to-oligarch relations trump local politics).

Meanwhile, his concerns are to rescue what he can of SPS in the region. They're salvaging resources and forming a new political coalition called BABAR (Baikal-Angara), with its own symbol, a tiger (*ba-bar*). They need to work out a plan for developing the city's economy, cleaning up the city, and – in general – developing Irkutsk and Angara. They may even stop using the SPS brand. He's toying with the idea of forming a “liberal-patriotic” political group. Irkutsk population would be receptive to this because they are at heart very liberal-minded, freedom-loving (comes from the Cossack, refugee, and Decembrist history), AND they are very attached to the land (patriotic in that sense).

CORRUPTION: Irkutsk is a very rich city; therefore it's fertile ground for corruption.

Relations with/observations about NGOs and SMI:

NGOs provide a critically important service in election monitoring and others (e.g., the Baikal Ecological Wave) perform additional very useful public service. The vote monitoring is critical, as it prevents too much manipulation of the vote.

Perhaps NGOs could help with the crucial task of educating the public AND the candidates. The latter have to learn how to relate to people, the former how to demand and defend democratic rights. Very few lawyers here know election law – which is the only way to fight against the administrative resources used against independent candidates.

SMI: they have no financing. A few newspapers, like Baikalskye Izvestiya, are fairly objective, as is the press agency AS Baikal. But recently they've started running negative ads, “black” material, in order to earn more revenue. Parties like SPS don't have enough money to pay so they need to get free air time, newspaper space. For the upcoming city council/duma elections (June 27), they will have to pay entirely for the citywide campaign.

OUTSIDE HELP: Open Russia has been active here – it established a school for political work. Nothing from AID up to now.

FOCUS OF FUTURE WORK: they are organizing small meetings with voters, not in their homes (too intrusive) but in the courtyards and other convenient places near apartment complexes. They did NOT employ door-to-door campaign techniques here for the Dec. Duma elections but must do so in future.

IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: first, United Russia frightens him. NOT because this represents a return to a one-party system but because these people are interested ONLY in money, their own careers, and power. Unlike the CPSU, which still paid lip service to ideals, to working for the good of the country and the people. United Russia is comprised of bureaucrats and criminals (literally). (In Bratsk, for example, criminals are running the city government.)

Second, the court system is a hotbed of corruption. It works for the executive branch, not for society as a whole. Worse, it works directly AGAINST any anti-government candidates.

Third, people of his political persuasion have already succeeded in putting 3 people into the oblast administration, and if they can just “sneak” a few more people inside, they could create a revolution from within.

SUMMARY: this region – like every other – needs more lawyers trained in the niceties/details of election law; the entire court system needs reforming and separation from the executive branch; change in the Russian political system will almost certainly have to come from within – in a Trojan horse fashion.

24. Предварительный отчёт о результатах интервью, проведённых в Москве 2-4 июня 2004 года
Группа «Политический процесс»

Российский политический процесс на современном этапе не может быть охарактеризован однозначно по своей направленности и прогнозам развития событий. Авторитарные тенденции федеральных и региональных властных структур пока не способны привести к консолидации правящих групп элиты и сформировать тоталитарное правление. По форме режим остаётся во многом демократическим, но за этой формой постепенно пропадает признанное международными нормами содержание таких институтов демократии как:

- обеспечение представительства интересов граждан во властных структурах,
- обеспечение защиты прав и свобод граждан, обеспечение защиты прав и свобод меньшинств (национальных, мигрантов, журналистов, сторонников тех или иных незарегистрированных политических партий и т.п.),
- обеспечение открытости власти и процедур принятия политических и управленческих решений,
- свободы слова и публичного выражения мнений и других.

Граждане быстро теряют интерес к политике, в частности, к выборам и контролю деятельности избранных депутатов и руководителей органов исполнительной власти в регионах, городах и районах, потому что убеждены в невозможности для себя повлиять на политический процесс, отстоять свои приоритеты и интересы во властных структурах.

Политические партии России фактически перестали осуществлять представительство интересов своих избирателей, а заняты либо без всякой критики разъяснением решений руководства страны гражданам (парламентские партии), либо выживанием в условиях сильного административного давления (партии, не прошедшие в парламент по результатам выборов 2003 года, в первую очередь – СПС и «Яблоко»).

Негосударственные и некоммерческие организации испытывают в политике меньшее давление со стороны администраций федерального и регионального уровней, поэтому имеют несколько больше возможностей для развития, но это развитие пока не носит устойчивого характера. В частности, сокращение, а тем более прекращение финансирования российского третьего сектора со стороны западных спонсоров и грантодателей неизбежно приведёт к резкому сокращению численности организаций этого сектора, объёма и качества услуг, которые они оказывают гражданам, а также сделает невозможным их развитие. Причина последнего утверждения в том, что российские источники финансирования третьего сектора не в состоянии обеспечить реализацию программ их долгосрочного развития. Эти источники пока играют лишь вспомогательную роль в обеспечении деятельности третьего сектора в России по сравнению с зарубежными.

Для крупных российских политических партий проблема финансирования также является важнейшей. Партия власти «Единая Россия» для этого создаёт при поддержке администрации Президента РФ финансовые фонды, аккумулирующие теневые финансовые средства крупного бизнеса. Аналогичную практику внедряют в регионах страны губернаторы и мэры городов.

Политические партии СПС и «Яблоко», не прошедшие в Государственную Думу РФ на выборах 2003 года, не в состоянии найти источники достаточного для своего развития и подготовки к успешному проведению выборов 2007 года. Причина в том, что администрация Президента РФ фактически препятствует законным способам финансирования этих партий, а незаконные – опасны для крупного бизнеса, который постоянно видит перед собой пример Михаила Ходорковского. Кроме того, крупный бизнес вынужден финансировать партию «Единая Россия». В итоге складывается следующая позиция крупного бизнеса: ему опасно и не следует поэтому финансировать оппозиционные партии.

В сложившейся ситуации возможны и реализуются многообразные демократические инициативы локального уровня. Практически все такого рода инициативы реализуются с помощью зарубежной финансовой поддержки. В частности, к инициативам такого рода можно отнести:

- обучение журналистов, демонстрация им достоинств опоры на свои аудитории в противостоянии с администрациями регионов и городов,
- повышение уровня интереса граждан к деятельности депутатов и избранных руководителей органов исполнительной власти,
- повышение уровня интереса граждан к выборам,
- попытки лоббирования поправок к законам в интересах граждан и структур гражданского общества,
- попытки привлечь граждан к формированию политической повестки дня в регионах,
- попытки создания неполитических широких коалиций общественных организаций и политических партий по лоббированию общественных интересов,
- обеспечение правозащитной деятельности, в том числе, содействие гражданам и организациям граждан в отстаивании их прав и другие.

Проекты и программы такого рода лучше реализуются в отдельных регионах России, а не на федеральном уровне и не в большинстве регионов. По политическому развитию российские регионы существенно отличаются, поэтому единые рекомендации по развитию демократических институтов для всей страны вряд ли могут быть выработаны. Но демонстрация всей стране позитивных примеров такого развития была бы, безусловно, полезной.

Было бы полезно также постоянно разрабатывать стратегии развития третьего сектора, его взаимодействия с государством и местными органами власти. Пока ни политические партии, ни ассоциации граждан не в состоянии выработать такие стратегии своего развития. В результате они прогнозируют своё развитие на очень короткие промежутки времени, а государство, контролируя и часто даже обладая всеми ключевыми ресурсами общественного развития, всё больше усиливает своё доминирование в политике и системе принятия и исполнения стратегических для страны решений.

25. Moscow Helsinki Group

Participants: Daniil Meshcheriakov, Steve Grant, Vladimir Rinsky

Meshcheriakov wears (or wore) two hats in the last year. He is both executive director of MHG and head of Yabloko's national election campaign (for 2003).

Re NGOs:

Human rights groups, like MHG, are well tied together now. There are 100s of them (he estimated about 600 at one point) throughout Russia, and their communications links are sufficient for now. The situation with all the other “thematic” groups (e.g., ecological, health) are NOT so well linked. Perhaps 500 of the

local NGOs are tied to national-level organizations. Because most must rely on existing orgs., what's needed is a coalition of NGOs.

One major problem: funding is done on a “parallel” basis, not in an integrated fashion. [SG comment: thus, what appears to be missing here is a sort of “United Way” approach to fundraising, so that individual groups don't have to compete against one another but can share a common pot of money.]

The organization “Golos” illustrates the biggest mistake made among NGOs: a definite conflict of interest arises when small orgs. engage in fundraising. They NEED the money, to live on rather than spend on programs, much more than the bigger ones, who can afford to spend the monies raised on programs rather than survival.

Re Yabloko:

The problem with Yabloko is NOT Yavlinsky (both Meshcheriakov and Shneider of SPS agree on this). The problem is fundraising – AND IT'S UNRESOLVABLE FOR NOW. Why? Because only the Kremlin is able to “resolve” this problem – it commands all the resources, esp. administrative ones, to control the flow of money.

So, the main strategic problems at present for the liberal-minded parties like Yabloko and SPS are:

1. The absence of funds. One solution would be to collect party dues. The law permits this, but....
2. Access to SMI. They can produce TV programs/spots and newspaper articles/ads, BUT THEY HAVE A HARD TIME DISSEMINATING THE MATERIAL.
3. Their “ideology” is hard to define right now.

Yabloko is set up in 6 independent regions outside of Moscow. These party organizations can survive on their own now, without a lot of help from the center.

Yabloko needs to set up a DB containing names of all those who have participated in election campaigns and find a way to hold them together between elections.

BASIC TASK FOR THE LIBERAL-MINDED PARTIES NOW: find a way to unite with/cooperate more fundamentally with NGOs. What impedes this important step is that grant-givers (like AID) are only now beginning to try to bring parties and NGOs together. The focus now must be on party-building, enlisting cadres and fundraising at the local level. (With some more money, he'd like to set up a “micro” program out in the field to serve as a model/show how this can be done.)

SUMMARY:

NGOs have to set up a United Way-like fundraising umbrella org. and link up more closely.

Yabloko (and other “liberal” parties/groups) has to link up with the NGOs for purposes of party-building.

26. NDI

Participants: Terry Horton (Dir.) and Juhani Grossmann (program officer), Steve Grant

Thoughts on present political situation: Russia has gone back to a one-party system. The Duma has absolutely no role to play now at all (not only not legislative, but neither as a consultative/advisory body).

Focus of their work: to try to build a coalition of “democratic” parties/forces. BUT, focus must now shift (after Dec. and Apr. elections) – from national level to the regional and city levels. They will work in 6

oblasts where they see promising signs of political life: along the Volga in Astrakhan, Samara, and Saratov; in the Urals/Siberia in Ekaterinburg, Magnitogorsk, and Cheliabinsk (but also some in Tiumen'). In addition, they want to concentrate on both local media and local/regional dumas.

They (NDI) find that there do exist fairly strong and meaningful ties between the center leaders (of their parties) and the local people. The locals are very enthusiastic and capable but what appears to be lacking is initiative of a kind: they continually look to the center for more/better direction of what they should be doing.

If given more resources, they would attempt to effect more of what they call “overlap programming” – that is, to meld together as much as possible work with the media, political advocacy groups, NGOs, and the democratic political parties – with the aim of building true constituency politics.

NDI is producing two products of note in the coming months: first, they are doing their own assessment of their programs, which should produce a document this summer; and they are coming up with program suggestions.

They do not/will not limit themselves to working just with Golos (as, however, appears to be case now).

Their suggestions for further discussions: SPS, Yavlinsky, Open Russia (Khodorkovsky's organization), Jennifer Hinkstenburg (?), and Laura Jewett in the DC NDI office.

June 3, 2004

27. Novosibirsk and Samara NGOs Meeting

Архив, Е.Ковалевская, Москва для ARD, 15 июня 2004 года.

Москва

Пестрикова Валентина, Малицкая Елена

10:00 – 12:30. Аэропорт

Основные выводы:

Прямые контракторы USAID в регионах – Сибирский и Самарский Центры фактически описывают ситуацию в регионах, сходную с теми описаниями, которые были даны на фокус-группах и интервью в Иркутске и Ростове-на-Дону. Ситуация характеризуется двумя основными чертами: с одной стороны многолетней деятельностью в регионе удалось добиться взаимодействия с властью, власть перенимает опыт работы с общественными организациями, проводит круглые столы, есть переговорные площадки. С другой стороны власть в некоторый момент начала узурпировать общественную инициативу и все больше диктует свои условия, в том числе и в качестве одного из основных финансовых доноров на местном уровне. Для того, чтобы удержать баланс во взаимоотношениях с властью, лидерам требуется много личных сверхусилий, инициативы. Их деятельность на уровне города и региона становится существенной и публичной (многие лидеры НКО в регионах идут в политику).

В то же время наблюдается отток кадров из структур сети. Во многом это связано с тем, что, сети, получив хороший импульс развития за последние три года, не вышли пока на уровень, когда их существование можно было бы считать стабильным более или менее – времени не хватило. Есть понимание необходимости вложений средств в сетевые ресурсы регионов.

Руководители Центров отмечают, что у членов их сетей есть самостоятельные повестки дня,

выработка общей стратегии ведется без потери индивидуальности членов сети. Фактически региональные сети обоих центров оцениваются обеими лидерами как горизонтальные. В отличие от сетей Юга России.

Остаются важные в содержательном плане для развития демократии темы, которые власть и бизнес не будут поддерживать. Не все вопросы из этой «важной повестки дня» интересны населению. В частности, отмечен низкий интерес населения к проблемам войны в Чечне. Нужна поддержка для развития таких тем. Есть понимание важности развития инициатив снизу, но именно работа с инициативами снизу требует простроенной ресурсной поддержки и в частности ресурсов для местных тренингов, обучения и поиска стратегий на местах.

Общая оценка будущих направлений развития сектора не отличается определенностью, что свидетельствует о том, что в целом общественный сектор находится на переломном этапе своего развития. Нужно время для определения стратегии, оценки ситуации. Ситуация с точки зрения остроты сравнивается со временем гражданского форума, когда стоял вопрос «кто кого».

Расшифровка Интервью.

Не с начала (пропущено первое выступление Е.Малицкой)

В конце выступления говорила о том, что многие, казалось бы важные темы, такие, например, как Чечня, не интересуют население.

Пестрикова Валентина.

Самара. Историко-экокультурная организация. Создана в 1993. Номер регистрационного свидетельства 15. Создавали организацию специалисты гуманитарных вузов. Колоссальный историко-культурный потенциал. 5 лет делали историко-культурные программы. Профессиональная ассоциация в историко-культурном отношении. Известны по территории области. 47 муниципальных образований на территории области. На ранних этапах развития искали международный опыт работы с историко-культурным наследием. Тогда международные фонды интересовались демократией и гражданским обществом. 1995-1996 год Самара открылась (до этого была закрытым городом). Тольятти была открытой территорией. Иностранцам было невозможно попасть в Самару. В первую очередь в 1996 поехал NDI, британские организации. Большие семинары, привозили организации из Москвы. Мы обнаружили, мы НКО, гражданское общество. Позиция организации для нас самих открылась. Обеспечивали взаимодействие с властью.

Увидели, что многие организации другие делают более острые программы. Организацию создавали доктора наук и кандидаты. В течение 2 лет создавались -5 летняя программа деятельности. Четко отработана юридическая сторона вопроса. Строили организацию. В отличие от тех, кто строит организацию на волне порыва. Эмоциональный порыв должен подкрепляться менеджментом. Большое количество организаций с горящими глазами. Сомнения - правильно ли мы сосредоточились на историко-культурных проблемах. Не хватает горизонтальных связей. Функция информирования. Нужно было сделать, чтобы диалог с властью продолжался. Была модной теория общественного парламента. Создали две раб группы - одна занималась ресурсным центром, вторая парламентом. Вторая группа пришла к идее, что создавать Общественную палату нереально. Хотя в это время была общественная палата в Тольятти. Центры поддержки бизнеса. Около 700 общественных организаций в Самаре. Переговоры с властью - возможности обсуждения и переговоров с властными структурами. Вопрос был, как организовать представительство третьего сектора? Технически нельзя сделать - сектор не развит, конкуренция дурная, консолидации не было. В самарской области нет общественного Парламента. В 1996 общественный Парламент уничтожили на уровне идеи.

Центр поддержки НКО строился группой наиболее активных организаций. На одну из встреч приехали представители разных фондов. Евразия - конец года, сказали, что есть деньги. Если от самарской области поступит проект - поддержит. Группа породила 3 проекта. Получился конкурс. Самарский центр понял, что в случае получения гранта от Евразии – в течение года придется работать на другие организации, - потом не сможем отказаться от этой деятельности. Вывод - иногда нужно слушать судьбу.

Историко-культурный потенциал - улучшение качества жизни. Деятельность, которая идет через этот проект, даст большой результат. В 1996 году выиграли грант на 28 тыс. дол. Были до поддержки программы ресурсных центров Евразии. Классический ресурсный центр. Год не было никаких денег на продолжение деятельности, но продолжалось то, что мы называли программой поддержки НКО. Когда не было ресурсов - обратились к тем, кто был клиентом. Давайте вместе, как быть. У самих было 38 кв. метров. Транспорт, бумага – это давали другие организации. Детский фонд приносил бумагу. Приняли на себя миссию по развитию регионов, той ее части, которая является негосударственной

Всегда работаем на объединение ресурсов. В 1999 создали Партнерство ресурсных организаций самарской области. Развитие негосударственного сектора до уровня равноправного партнерства. В настоящее время действует система круглых столов некоммерческих организаций - семьи и детства, национальных организаций и др. (всего девять круглых столов), представители не ниже ранга замов собираются. Собираются не реже раза в квартал для решения проблем. Координационный совет - аккумулировать, что набирают круглые столы. Прошло первое заседание Общественного собрания самарской области - собрание не является органов представительным, в него не выбирают, в него входят организации - 164 (от 3800 в Самаре и области). Доступ открыт всем организациям. Власть понимает как широкую общественную экспертизу. Пока было только первое заседание. Власть представила прогноз социально-экономического развития региона на ближайшие 3 года. Знакомили с тем, каков негосударственный сектор региона.

Другие вопросы для круглых столов - соблюдение прав человека в местах лишения свободы. Профессиональное сообщество из общественных экспертов. Вопросы налогообложения НКО. 4 задачи - общественный договор. Закон о квотировании рабочих мест. Совместное продвижение законотворческих инициатив самого сектора. Контроль за исполнением действующего законодательства.

Исполнение закона по благотворительной деятельности. Больше влиять на ситуацию.

Малицкая Л.

Ушли как программы, которые были направлены на развитие и структурирование сектора. Когда через организации доходим до конкретного человека. Меняли менталитет человека. Действие каждого имеет смысл. Это то, что не готовы поддерживать власти, потому что это формирование конкурентов для тех лидеров, которых поддерживает власть.

Деньги ЮКОСА - экспертный грант, который мы выполняли, был направлен на развитие активности граждан. Возможность производить инфраструктурные изменения. Замечательно работать с бизнесом.

Пестрикова В.

Рабочий день сейчас 20 часов - 8-10 программ финансируются. Остальные 12 - на поддержку того, что раньше было создано. Никаких финансовых ресурсов, кроме бизнеса, сюда не пришло. Арест Ходорковского не повлиял. Пример вложения в развитие сектора - скорее

отрицательный.

Социальная политика - прерогатива государства. Хочу понять, как нам строить свою стратегию. Ресурсов сектора недостаточно. Принципиальные изменения возможны только как инициативы снизу. Когда региональных общественных собраний будет много - будут изменения. Программа дошла до малых городов - власть кончается волостью. 5-10 процентов жителей должны сориентироваться - и не станут конкретные инициативы реализовывать.

Программа Института экономики города. Некоторые пояснения в отношении монопольной позиции Института (В.Пестрикова).

Л.Малицкая - мы центры развития общественной жизни, уходим от понятия и представления о нас, как о ресурсных центрах.

Самарская региональная организация - которая будет все время работать в регионе.

В каких направлениях НКО и муниципалитеты могут вместе работать? **Социальные услуги - социальная защита, образование, здравоохранение.** Через гранты поддерживать нужно из федеральных целевых программ. **Организация выигрывает тендер, чтобы осуществлять услуги по направлениям. Помочь работать на взаимодополнение.** Благоустройство - власть, экологическое просвещение - НКО. **Власть склонна переводить услуги в муниципалитет - власть забирает услугу и начинает отдавать ее населению как свою.**

Из-за USAID - мы независимы. Власть не дает денег, а бизнес не поддержит правозащиту, экологию не поддержат.

Последствия закона о местном самоуправлении. Будут ли готовы муниципалитеты, чтобы взять на себя ответственность?

Пестрикова В.

Нужно постоянно контролировать процесс. Представители самарской области не понимают закона - самостоятельности больше... 300 образований в самарской области. По плану запланировано большое количество слушаний. Юристы губернской думы будут просвещать, пытаться понять закон. Здесь будут новые технологии управления. Курс чиновников - как работать с населением, спрос на этот курс есть. Разослали в муниципальные образования предложения по сотрудничеству в сфере развития благотворительности. Пишут в заявках деньги. Готовы участвовать деньгами от 40 до 50 тыс. рублей грантовый пул и сопровождение конкурса до 100 тыс. - готовы заплатить деньги за собственное обучение.

В Самаре из проектов USAID работают ГОЛОС, MSI, программа развития благотворительности и местных источников финансирования.

Вопрос о тренерах и обучающих программах.

Самара - зарубежные тренеры. За последние 4 года московского или питерского тренера хорошего, который бы мог провести тренинг в Самаре, нет. Теорией овладели все, а люди практики хотят.

Малицкая Л.

Новосибирск - есть реакция на годовые программы, которые делали раньше. Сейчас интересный опыт - Новосибирск проводил семинар в Самаре. Людям нужен опыт. Македонские тренеры на Дальнем Востоке, семинар по работе социальных аниматоров - получили запрос. Востребован региональный опыт. Он более приближен к России. По тренинговым программам - теория не проверена практикой, например, с советом директоров. Свой отрицательный опыт - это больше. Опыт внедряется - разные вещи.

Малицкая

Власть пытается взять под контроль любые действия. Наша задача сделать так, чтобы этот

процесс не был формальным. Мэр города Новосибирска говорил правильные слова на одном из последних выступлений, но это не больше, чем формальность.

Пестрикова.

9 круглых столов работают - проблем нет. 3 круглых стола сформировались после того как... Сейчас нет курирующей структуры, которая их создавала. Контроль (?) распространяется на все действия и процессы.

Стратегии для третьего сектора.

Малицкая Е.

Не знаю, какая должна быть стратегия. **Стабильность поддержки USAID дала возможность развития. Развитие местных фондов - хорошая вещь. Но местные фонды не будут заниматься изменением условий жизни сектора, развитием связей...** Крупный бизнес пойдет по направлению создания собственных фондов. Эндаумент, чтобы организации были устойчивыми. Постоянная поддержка позволяла развивать сеть. Проект - заканчиваются услуги и заканчиваются организации. Ресурсные центры Евразии - не один не работает. **Кончился проект, кончилась деятельность. Главное - влияние на ситуацию, привнесение инфраструктурных изменений. Власти, никому это не нужно. Сектор разнороден - он не успел устояться. Времени не было. Увлеклись и работали на взаимодействие с властью. Испытываем проблемы внутри сектора. Власть пользуется.**

Круглый стол с точки зрения ничто, если он не преобразуется в коалицию общественных организаций. А где взять ресурсы на развитие коалиции? Большие затраты - тренинг в организации - одни ресурсы, тренинг на построение команды. Затраты большие гораздо на построение команды из членов сети. Сектор сильно теряет. Заниматься профессионализацией. Денег в регионах нет. Власть готова платить за определенные услуги. Выкачивает ресурсы. **Потеряли 30 человек по сети. Ушли. Люди востребованы. Одного взяли в администрацию, на другой - бизнес.** Деньги Инноцентра - за 1,5 года заработали на помещение, которое покупать. Отдавали часть зарплаты. Дестабилизация. Проблема с помещением большая.

Пестрикова В.

Заказы внутри региона. Месяц проработали - поняли, что физически не сможем. Юкосовский проект продолжается. Физически сил не остается на заказы. Обеспечиваем других специалистов заказами. Через 3-4 месяца повезут отлеживаться в профилактории.

Малицкая Е.

Новосибирск - поработали с русско-нем домом, сейчас заказ для еврейских общин. Организации, которые наиболее приближены к местным сообществам. Джойнт. Только сейчас стали заботиться устойчивостью своих организаций.

Интересны процессы по благотворительности - собрание, собрал губернатор. Власть поступила умело и хитро. Губернатор сказал - ждем помощи. На среднем уровне безобразие. Наш любимый губернатор - если бы не сказал, у нас не было бы благотворительности. Выход - попытка проходить на верхний уровень, вторая - возглавить процесс. Новосибирск - будут писать письмо. Технологии берут все с огромным удовольствием. Конкурс Единой России. В Кемерово этим будет заниматься ресурсный Центр. В Новосибирске будем администрировать. Сходное с периодом Гражданского форума время.

Новосиб - пусть бизнес даст нам денег. 120 детей даунов в новосибирской области. Бизнес прохладно отнесся к идее.

Если продолжать работу, что хотели бы сделать.

Малицкая Е.

Не знаю, что делать. Запрашивала представительства

Везде разное. Никто не хочет бросать то, что накоплено. Смотреть в регионах - адаптировать.

Избирательная кампания в самарской области - контроль за избирательным процессом. Лидеры НКО начинают поход за власть. Кандидаты от НКО. В Сызрани готовятся руководители НКО. Созданы объединения Любимый город. Объединения граждан, которые в период избирательных кампаний демонстрируют населению, чем хороша власть. Этим занимается регион Самара. Когда люди идут в кандидаты - за ними идут все. Сегодня по Самаре нельзя сказать, кто будет успешен. Много источников, которые можно посмотреть и обучить. Многие прошли обучение на семинарах по общественным кампаниям. Нужно **индивидуальное решение - Россия слишком большая.**

Программа ПРО-НКО везде развивалась по-разному. Развитие профессиональных сообществ. Ассоциации профессиональных бухгалтеров, союзы юристов - есть профессионалы, которых нам не хватает. С ними нужно работать, но как? Общество, сектор, сильно зависят от состояния объединений. Коалиция за общие интересы мы ассоциация юридических и физических лиц. Самара - поиск совместной деятельности.

Прямые подрядчики из регионов должны возможность поговорить с оценщиками (причина необходимости в разговоре)

Проблема, которая волнует всех (Малицкая Л.):

Важная проблема - весь спектр безопасности человека. Проблемы, которые связаны с правами человека на безопасность.

28. “Rebirth of the Land of Siberia”

Elena Tvorogova, President

This organization is the local resource center for NGOs, and part of the Siberian Network, which was part of the Pro-NGO project.

I asked her to discuss what would allow her to continue her activities, or even strengthen her abilities to carry out her activities. Her first comment was stable office space. Every month, she has to worry about having enough money to pay rent. She feels that if she only owned their office, many of their problems would be solved.

She also complained about USAID funded projects that she felt were useless. These were the ones that involved Moscow groups and Moscow training. They aren't really interested in working with people in the regions, and they aren't interested in learning from them. Rather, they are focused on telling them what to do. They make the mistake of telling regional groups what they need instead of asking what they need. In particular, she was not impressed with the Institute of Urban Economics. Often, groups such as these come in for a quick training, and then claim the credit for “success” when most of the work is done by local NGOs over the period of several years. Another example was when CAF facilitated the fund on Angarsk, while her organization had been working on that for several years.

She further pointed out the problem of coordination. Often, USAID may be sponsoring several projects, directly or indirectly, in the same city. Yet, many people do not know who is working on what. All of the people involved on funded projects need to form a coordinating council so people can work together instead of duplicating each others' work.

29. Party for the Rebirth of Russia (“Rodina”)

June 11

Participants: Sergei Leonidovich Gandrabura, Steve Grant, Vladimir Rimsky, Yekaterina Lushpina

Their platform is to establish a “social [read “socialist”] state” that will meet all the social needs of the people. He would like to unite all people/blocs/parties of a social-democrat bent. (Earlier, he helped Romyantsev organize his party.) They get funding from businessmen purely out of a coincidence of ideological interests. These are people reminiscent of the great merchants of the 19th century like Morozov and Tretyakov (he of the art gallery fame) who donated money to “liberal” parties and – in the case of Tretyakov – even the Left SRs.

His party [Russia itself??] really can’t borrow much from the United States or the West more generally.

Overall party successes: some of their people are in the city administration; 3 mayors around Russia. What works: personal contact with individuals; his party has enough staff to do this kind of work. They publish 2 weeklies, both national, and 1 local paper.

Local situation: the mayor in Rostov is not worth working with; the party is allied with labor and unions. They are close to the CPRF in ideas but NOT in methods. They lack “administrative resources” to match those of the incumbents. This situation is much more one-sided than even in 1989, under the communists, when the first “free” elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies occurred. [SG comment: I agree!] Yabloko lost its voters when it just didn’t DO anything. It went from about 27% of the vote in Rostov to today’s pitiful level.

He works well with center/other regional branches. He has daily phone conversations with the director of the southern region. They coordinate putting out pamphlets (e.g., there will be 4 issued in the course of this summer). When he proposed to the center that the party establish a youth organization (like the old Komsomol, or even the Boy Scouts), the center accepted the idea readily.

GREAT QUOTE: “The more complex the election laws [in Russia], the easier it is [for incumbents] to find ways [to strangle democracy/use administrative levers against the outs].”

BIG PROBLEM: His party simply can’t get election result data from the local administration – a problem that has to be solved on the federal level.

THE GREATEST TRAGEDY IN RUSSIA TODAY: People don’t know/understand the law. And lawyers are not allowed to do their job.

SUMMARY: One extremely useful thing that AID could try to do is work with the federal election commission (Veshnyakov) AND local election commissions to update and maintain voter lists and then make all this information available to the public. A second: work to simplify current election laws.

30. Accord

June 11

Participants: Lyudmila Mazurok, Sarah Henderson, Steve Grant, Yelena Kovalevskaya, Vladimir Rimsky, Yekaterina Lushpina

She personally was a Duma deputy (first federal gathering), then came here and established the Accord (*Soglasie*) women’s org. Composition of the group: intelligentsia, doctors, teachers, small business lead-

ers. They hold roundtables and discussion groups with a variety of people, including from all political parties.

Everyone in Russia today (especially business people) thinks that they have to work with the president and his administration. They need to break out of this mentality and the way to do this is to establish a civil society.

Her own group, nonetheless, works quite amicably with the local administration. Marinova (on the administration's office dealing with NGOs) is favorable toward their work. But Mazurok doesn't like the rampant cronyism in the administration – people support “their own.”

They try to encourage people to vote, to get involved in civic affairs – but the people are mostly indifferent. They seek to identify candidates for public office who aren't in it just for the money/perks/power, but who will work for the good of others/all. They are working with a variety of religious-based groups (i.e. of a range of faiths). She believes that more women are elected to office by rural residents than from urban areas; with men, it's the reverse.

Political parties – even United Russia – has made use of her group, inviting members to come give talks on various topics. They accept all invitations, especially because these have given them the opportunity to appear before more young people, a broader audience.

WHAT IS NEEDED: a law establishing clear rules for business and NGOs, laying out, e.g., how money can be raised, how it can be spent. (She has noted that women's groups that were “living” on grants alone didn't survive.

SUMMARY: She repeats the common, oft-voiced call for a new law on NGOs – an essential if these groups are going to thrive and accomplish their tasks.

31. Fond Rostov

June 10, 2004

Participants: Kirill Vladimirovich Bitkin, Yuliya Bodnya, Lyudmila Sergeevna Skachkova, Sarah Henderson, Steve Grant, Yelena Kovalevskaya, Vladimir Rimsky

The Rostov Resource Center (RRC), founded with such high hopes in 1996, is now doing nothing. All its resources have been transferred to the Fond Rostov. But back in 1996-97, the RRC was absolutely essential for supporting NGOs. The RRC set up a competition for giving out grants to NGOs [to fight corruption?]; the city administration set up another competition of its own. Very limited funds, however.

Since then, about 1/3 of these orgs. have become successful on their own (in particular, the human rights groups) -- through their own fundraising efforts. Many have youth branches. One good example of success: Phoenix (?).

But many others became just sort of “consumer” groups, or turned into one-man operations. They are ineffective; they never got together with/gathered their members for concerted action.

Most funds for NGOs now come from the international donors org./foundation. Even the RRC is now seen as something of an “outside” force [SG comment: he even used the term “spies” I believe] which many blame for their own failures. One fundamental problem for the RRC was that it could not [by law?]

invest its capital so as to increase the pot for future use; they had to spend it when they got it. So they became just like any other NGO – looking for money from the same sponsors as they.

POLITICAL PARTIES: none has asked the RRC or Fond Rostov for help.

Neither SPS nor Yabloko could ever show voters a good reason to vote for them in elections. So they lost potential voters/supporters.

SUMMARY: NGOs definitely need a change in the law on how to raise funds and especially on how they can administer the funds they raise.

32. Rostov Journalists' Union

Don TV and radio producer and union president Yevgeniya Aparina

June 11

Participants: Aparina, Steve Grant, Sarah Henderson, Vladimir Rimsky, Yelena Kovalevskaya, Yekaterina Lushpina

She is the head of the local journalists union. Her father was a real “*shishka*” in Soviet times – one of the first directors of the local TV station and a producer of shows.

Her aim is to put on TV things that interest people at the local level. She wants to foster a sense of community and of civic society. Rostov has one of Russia’s biggest local TV stations. It’s received a grant from the Soros foundation. Internews runs/has run a program here.

Her biggest obstacle is a very conservative station management. In the typical old style of thinking, she meets all the time with such as the following from her boss: “I’m in charge and you’re a fool.” There has to be created more of a sense of “equality” [i.e., subordinates have some say too]. She wanted to apply for a grant from some ministry but her boss/the station director didn’t want her to get any state grant, so that fell through.

The station wants her to put on a cooking show. Great, she says, but let’s include as a natural part of this show exchanges with such people as civil society activists, psychologists – so that right along with teaching people how to cook they can teach them lessons in how to live in a democratic society.

The TV station has run/runs two interesting kinds of programs: first, the more educational but still content-rich, like “The Sphere of Reason” (or The Noosphere) (*Sfera Razuma*), which is all about science and learning; “Our School-Based Country” (*Nasha Shkolnaya Strana*) – which, despite management’s resistance, turned out to be extremely popular, ran for 6 years and all schools wanted to show it. [another program called “36 x 6”??]

Second, shows of a more directly political nature, such as “Freedom Square” (*Ploshchad’ Svobody*); and a nicely titled program called “From Friday to Friday” with political commentator Ol’ga Nikitina – a talk show that alludes to Robinson Carusoe in its title: Russians are like Carusoe, left stranded on a desert island without any direction/help and they need to learn how to do everything anew – with the assistance of a man Friday.

SITUATION FOR MEDIA/JOURNALISTS MORE GENERALLY: There’s no way she or any other reporter can work as a “free” (independent, contract) journalist. TV basically performs the function of

showing news, sports, and kids shows but has no obligation to show civic programming. The idea of “cultural” programming here includes no more than shows on libraries and museums, NOT “culture” in a broader sense that would political life.

Two years ago people went to the legislature with a law project – supported by 44 different groups – to enable NGOs and NKO to work more closely/easily together. It sat for a half year without moving and eventually died.

On TV 35, until 5 PM there is “private programming” and after 5 PM only state programs. (So no prime-time audiences for “private” shows.) Also private stations are Tele X and Channel 38 (?). Between elections, there are very few programs dealing with politics; there’s more news.

SUMMARY: With all the new ideas and objectivity in the world, TV journalists still have trouble bucking “the system” when their bosses are not ready for more liberal ideas. AND THERE’S NOWHERE ELSE TO GO, in most cases, from state-dominated broadcast media.

33. Архив, Е.Ковалевская, поездка в Ростов-на-Дону для ARD, 09 – 11 июня 2004 года.

Правозащитники

Есипов Дмитрий. Международная правозащитная ассамблея (далее по тексту МПА)

Титов Дмитрий. Азовское отделение Движения пострадавших в чеченском конфликте.

Мулеван Василий. Гражданская правозащитная лига.

Интервью проведено 11 июня. 9:30 – 11:35

Основные выводы:

Все организации, представленные своими лидерами на интервью, входят в федеральные сети правозащитных организаций. Вместе с критикой «центра» (неэффективно работать с регионом из центра, неравномерное распределение финансов между центром и сетью, ненужные мероприятия, на которые тратятся деньги...) отмечается важность информационной поддержки центров и фактора включения в общероссийское и международное пространство правозащитных организаций. На уровне региона каждой из организаций удалось добиться успехов в определенных проектах. Наиболее важными из осуществленных инициатив отмечаются проекты по «открытому бюджету», защите прав иностранных студентов, работе с мигрантами.

Правозащитники убеждены, что сегодня поодиночке выжить невозможно. Нужны сетевые проекты на региональном уровне. Для реализации этих проектов имеется потенциал, наработанный за последние 5 лет. Объединяться необходимо по нескольким причинам. Главная: возрастающее давление властей на правозащитные НКО. Среди существенных факторов для объединения называются «усталость», отсутствие веры в то, что можно что-либо изменить, отсутствие притока новых людей в сектор, отсутствие ярких идей. Совместная проектная деятельность может помочь преодолеть эти трудности. Правозащитные организации видят сотрудничество с партиями как некоторую достаточно далекую перспективу. Причиной этому служит встречное отсутствие внимания партий к возможностям НКО, откровенное использование сетей НКО в период выборных кампаний без какой-либо ответственности в дальнейшем за обещания, сращивание политического истеблишмента с административным. На уровне малых городов очень слабы и малочисленны низовые партийные ячейки. Даже они формируются с использованием административного ресурса.

Также отмечен такой фактор, оказывающий влияние на развитие правозащитного движения как столкновение идеологических интересов. Демократическая идеология сталкивается с идеологией

правлящей региональной элиты, которая во многом опирается на региональном уровне на охранительную и консервативную идеологию казачества.

Для того, чтобы успешно работать на региональном уровне нужны, по мнению респондентов, наряду с сетевыми проектами, существенные по масштабам проекты по правовому просвещению населения, расширению социальной базы некоммерческого сектора, нужны консультационные вложения (от специализированные ресурсных правозащитных центров до привлечения международных консультантов и российских юристов высокого уровня).

Региональный потенциал третьего сектора есть, он значительно возрос за последние 5 лет. Но сейчас переломная ситуация именно с точки зрения противостояния давлению властей на третий сектор – для того, чтобы общественным организациям выстоять в регионах и сохранить независимость, нужна ресурсная поддержка, в том числе финансовая.

Расшифровка стенограммы.

Есипов Д.

Кратко представил организацию. Отметил хорошее информационное взаимодействие для Международной правозащитной ассамблеи (возглавляет Арутюнов, Москва). Информация собирается на портале с информацией по правам человека (посмотреть координаты) – информация разбита по направлениям. МПА имеет филиалы по России. Отделения организации обособлены. Членская организация – около 70 членов (заруб., средняя Азия - 5).

Вопрос: как более эффективно поддерживать третий сектор? Больше рассказать о ситуации в общественных организациях – регионах России.

Международная правовая ассоциация вела проект «Открытый бюджет». Матра профинансировала продолжение. Матра финансировала два раза подряд, что бывает редко. Собрали много материалов. Основная задача научить общественные организации работать с бюджетом. Законодательное участие. **В дальнейшем интереснее работать с товариществами собственников жилья.** Это специализированные НКО. Плохо знают права/обязанности. Не умеют взаимодействовать друг с другом и не умеют взаимодействовать со СМИ. Дать правовые основы – в контексте прав человека. Хаос. Есть хороший специалист-юрист.

Самое эффективное для поддержки. **Поддержка партнерской сети в разных регионах. 5-7 партнерских организаций (Ростов-Краснодар-Ставрополь).** Проектный продукт. **По одной организации выжить невозможно.** На общероссийском уровне - громадные сети, занятые, зависимость (головная организация получает весь ресурс, часто находится в Москве).

Вопрос: как можно давать деньги таким партнерствам?

Можно давать деньги одной организации – когда сеть маленькая, нет административной зависимости, надстроек. Можно сделать договор – согласно которому кто-то отвечает за издательский компонент, кто-то за образовательный компонент. Все знают, что за кем закреплено. Есть хорошо устоявшиеся партнеры – которым доверяешь, не подведут. Пример: вели проект в Краснодаре – обучение правам человека в школах (глубинке). Письма поддержки писали от руки 50 сетевых организаций.

Издержки центральной сети : полномочий не хватает, все время гоняют в Москву на семинары. Нужно охватить Южный округ. Нечего таскать постоянно людей в Москву – дорого и не эффективно.

Вопрос: Есть ли специфика правозащитных организаций Юга России.

Мулеван В.

Специфика проблем на Юге.

МХГ: выявлена этническая дискриминация в прессе. Был в Москве на конференции с послом по привлечению студентов вузов (к борьбе против дискриминации в вузах?). Занятия по правам человека, международным нормам права, **Международные права населения касаются незначительно. На практике люди не понимают**, что это такое. В организации отслеживают дела: смотреть, например, как в судах проходят аналогичные дела русских и армян. Оказание помощи студентам Азии, Африки, Кавказа. Много проблем – общежития не благоустроены, частые пожары (выгорел целый этаж в общежитии ... медицинском ? – никаких действий по ремонту не предпринято, дали в качестве иллюстрации своей работы статьи). **Незащищенность иностранных студентов. На все заявления – отфутболивают. Правоохранительные органы вымогают деньги.** На месяц при въезде в город и регистрации отнимают паспорта, дают справку. Власти: кураторы по странам, но работают неэффективно. Мулеван находится в контакте с куратором по африканским студентам. Иностранцев забирают в милицию (по 5000 р. «Типа штраф»). Собирают деньги за охрану общежития. История ограбления: у иностранного студента был цветной телевизор и что-то еще из вещей. Грабитель зашел в маске и с пистолетом – все забрал (на глазах у жены и ребенка). Обращался в милицию, безрезультатно. Союз африканских государств есть, студенты из Африки самоорганизовались. Арабы объединиться не могут – арабы объединяются по партиям. Свой союз создали африканцы. **Арабы жалуются, что их принимают за террористов. 8 - го марта в городе Ростове была акция: вышли с цветами в город к жителям с мессаджем «мы не террористы».** Лидер африканской общины уже 6 лет учится в Ростове. К приезжим из русских милиция в городе не цепляется – они уже ориентируются. Избиения иностранных студентов.

История: когда хельсинкский фонд недавно проводил под Ростовом семинар по правам человека, семинар пикетировали представители РНЕ с плакатами «Иностранцы – долой из России!».

Система поддержки МХГ регионального координатора – «Получаю по проекту «Юридические клиники» зарплату (2200 руб. в месяц). Остальное делаю сам на волонтерских началах. Как содержать клинику при таких условиях, как заинтересовывать студентов?» В дальнейшем – студентам участие в клиниках не интересно, нет перспективы.

Общались с корреспондентами – по вопросам быта и незащищенности иностранных студентов. Студенты не называют свои имена. Боятся последствий на уровне вуза. Провели анонимный конкурс по выявлению проблем иностранных студентов совместно с администрацией ростовской области. Только 2 человека указали имена. Администрация признала проблемы (?)

В Ростове 1294 иностранных студента из 76 стран. Медицинский университет – пользуется спросом. Год учебы стоит 200 дол. Отметили, что Н. Проценко хорошо работает в 3 сектором (журналист издания «Город N»), не искажает информацию

Титов Д.

Движение пострадавших в чеченском конфликте. До 1992 года жили в Грозном. Движение основано мигрантами из Чечни. Есть в движении мигранты из Средней Азии, дальнего зарубежья. Объединены на добровольных началах. 8 отделений движения. 8 различных населенных пунктов ростовской области. Работаем на местах, где проживает наибольшее количество мигрантов. Движение возникло в 1996 году (Азов – город в 30 км. от Ростова) Азовское отделение Фонда - задачи: оказание социальной, психологической, социальной и юридической поддержки мигрантам. **В Азове налажено тесное взаимодействие с социальной сферой, с областной миграционной службой.** Проблемы начались – с 2000 – когда миграционная служба была передана в Министерство внутренних дел. Суды – мигрантам выдавалось 8000 руб. как компенсация за утраченное жилье (на строительство – приобретение) нового жилья. После получения ссуды – вычеркивали из очереди на жилье. Государство взяло на себя компенсации за период первой чеченской войны – 120 тыс. рублей на человека – для периода 1992-1994 года. А люди уезжали

раньше, в 1991 году. Сейчас верхнюю границу – 1994 год. – убрали – общество за это боролось, и это можно считать победой. **МВД с социальной работы перешло на силовые методы борьбы с нелегальными мигрантами.** Трудовая миграция для ростовской области явление уже обычное – 1 млн. человек приезжает с Украины работать на поля. Законодательная база очень усложняет регистрацию приехавших на работу. Люди живут на полях, живут в трудных условиях – строят шалаши прямо на полях и в них живут. Органы МВД проводят специальные рейды.

Работники миграционной службы, уволенные при переводе миграционной службы в МВД, рассказывают, что МВД произвела закупку квартир для милиционеров – вместо того, чтобы предоставить жилье мигрантам.

Выступаем через Форум переселенческих организаций, Союз общественных организаций, работающих на Юге России – по мигрантам. Большое количество мигрантов и национальных общин – черта Ростова-на-Дону. 3 восточных района в Ростовской области, заселены чеченскими беженцами. Роль Форума – обмен информацией. Иногда собираются на конференциях. (Лидер Форума – Л.И.Графова, денег на поддержку сети нет).

Важно: Расширение сферы деятельности на малые города и сельскую местность. Слабо налажена деятельность общественных организаций. Зачатки третьего сектора. Выбили в Азове бесплатную комнату для общественных организаций – в Администрации. Время для совещаний – по графику. Налажена работа с администрацией. В селах еще хуже ситуация – нет компьютеров, нет помещений. Город Сарск (Ростовская область) – приехали люди, которые хотели бы создавать общественные организации. Консультировали. Через некоторое время при встрече выяснили, что создать общественную организацию запретили – администрация не дала. **«Вышел казачий атаман с шашкой и сказал, какие вам тут организации – я вам тут устрою. Казаки вообще против приезжих. Администрация не трогает казачество. Зам губернатора ростовской области – Атаман Великого войска донского».** Ресурс. Политика с переселенцами. **Позиции казачества очень сильны.** Развить СМИ – плюрализм – невозможно. Это должна быть массивная программа – лет на 5-7.

Д.Титов входит в Совет при губернаторе. С 1996 года – 15 проектов, 4 отделения получили финансирование от фондов. 2000 г. – консультативный совет при управлении администрации города Азов – в него вошли 17 организаций. Дмитрий его возглавляет.

Вышли на Ростовский ресурсный центр в 2001 – 2003 г. РРЦ провел 20 семинаров в Азове. Базовые семинары для общественных организаций. Начали гранты писать мелкие организации – развитие. С 2003 года сотрудничаем с МХГ. Проект поддержки многофункциональных правозащитных центров. Были привлечены для работы в области. В Аксае налажено взаимодействие с санаторием «Здравница». Съезжаются дети, включая мигрантов и местных. Аксайское отделение вело проект «Школа толерантности» (на базе аксайского санатория). «Детей приучают вместе к толерантным отношениям». В прошлом году был проект от PRI. В Азове единственная в ростовской области подростковая колония + сейчас организуют женскую колонию. Брали подростков (освобождающихся?), вели сопровождение. В первые месяцы реализации проекта снизился рецидив преступлений на 30 %.

Стали выходить на образовательные проекты в сфере прав человека. Юридическое обучение... Много различных национальных общин. ЮРРЦ – 2002 год – проект по трудоустройству в селах. Ярмарки вакансий в селах. Цыганские и (? – названа вторая национальная община, неразб.) в районах – замкнутые общины, сложно работать.

С 2004 года – проект по мониторингу соблюдения прав мигрантов на образование. У детей мигрантов есть трудности с образованием. Дети отстают.

Нужно продолжать развитие программ развития общественных организаций в малых городах и селах.

Проблемы, общие для области – резюме:

Национальные общины

Местные – приезжие

Воспитание толерантности

Права человека в малых селах

Не хватает ресурсного правозащитного центра. Много нужно информации, помощь с юридическими клиниками. Чтобы развивать в мелких городах. Не поднимутся. Нужна помощь. Методические материалы. Пример экспертно-правового совета: организовать в Ростове обучение на местах юристов. Юристы, адвокаты, как обратиться в европейский суд. Независимый Экспертно-правовой совет в Ростове. М.Полякова предлагает – если соберете судей, следователей, прокуроров – экспертно-правовой совет может приехать за свой счет. Много юристов работают в администрации. В ГАИ сделали юридический отдел – свои юристы. Обучать государственных юристов правам человека.

Вопрос: С какими структурами власти взаимодействуют?

Местные администрации: комитет по работе с иностранными гражданами - заместители по странам. Местное управление социальной защиты.

Вопрос: как взаимодействуют (и есть ли перспективы взаимодействия) с политическими партиями?

Политические партии интересуются некоммерческими организациями только в период выборов.

Мулеван В.

Вели переговоры с Единством, Яблоком, СПС. Негативное отношение к мигрантам. Партии перед выборами обращаются – просят провести собрания мигрантов. «Обещают в три короба, потом бегать нужно за ними, чтобы исполняли обещания».

Население к африканцам относится негативно.

Есипов Д.

Работа с политическими партиями – работа будущего. С депутатами от партий работать можно (общественные приемные, помощники депутатов). Письма люди всегда пишут в высшие инстанции – губернатору. Президенту. Не работает цепочка обращений в нижние инстанции. Некоторые депутаты готовы идти на контакт – «человек проникается, человека можно увлечь». Последнее послание президента – неизвестно, как скажется на этой работе. Для сотрудничества нужно, чтобы совпадали полностью взгляды. Нам все равно, какие политические взгляды. Независимость. **Точки соприкосновения есть, но механизмы не выработаны.** В Москве был Форум политических партий (неправильно, кажется, называет – Е.К.). Когда все политически партии были представлены. **Неправильно работать только с одной партией.** Нужен диалог и площадка для понимания работы всех партий. МХГ не работает с Яблоком (ответ на вопрос о поддержке МХГ Яблока). **В малых городах все зависит от личных отношений.** Если в малом городе дружат лидеры ЛДПР и Яблока – то они могут кооперироваться. Партячейки в малых городах маленькие.

Титов Д.

СПС в Азове возглавляет казачий атаман. Экзотические идеи. Всех казаков загнал в СПС.

Правые партии проиграли в Думу. Почему: не проявили особой активности. Региональные представители партий все свои акции согласовывают с администрацией. Участники одной игры.

Все на местах находятся под влиянием административного ресурса. Для взрослых – за СПС нельзя голосовать, так как там – Чубайс.

Есипов Д.

Местная власть контролирует все политическое пространство. Политическая борьба вялая. Никто не пригласил на чтение программы. Все ограничивается распространением листовок.

Вопрос: о препятствиях – что мешает работать?

Ресурсы

Нет законов

Финансов не хватает. Административное давление не дает развернуться. Проверки юстиции ... Закрытие организаций. Если явно выступать против власти. Будут давить. Обвинять в шпионаже. Давление со стороны ФСБ. Если сильно выступать, подключат все. В банке при открытии счета говорят: «Вы, наверное, Чеченский боевик». **Очень мало людей готовы идти в общественный сектор. Новые люди не готовы. Старые выдохлись. Нет идей. Мы не воспитываем кадры. Никто не пойдет за копейки.** Есть гранты, есть зарплаты – нет грантов – нет зарплат.

Непонимание общества, чем занимаются общественные организации. Здесь и вина отчасти общественных организаций. Проблемы кадров внутри общественной организации. Все думают, что шпионы. «Если Путин так думает, наверное, вся страна так думает». Люди готовы думать, что это так. **Нужна информационно-образовательная программа для всего населения.** Важно донести до людей. Все общественные организации живут в своем кругу, а общество – отдельно. Важны методические наработки Европы, Америки – чтобы поднимали планку того, что мы можем сделать.

Катастрофа, коммерческая реклама – мало места для социальной тематики в СМИ. После семинара с МХГ, который пикетировала РНЕ в наиболее массовой городской газете «Вечерний Ростов» (плохая газета, по мнению правозащитников) была опубликована статья, в которой рассуждалось о том, почему семинар проводится на иностранные деньги, куда пойдет аналитическая информация. Информация преподносится населению в искаженном виде. В Азове разрабатывается проект Закона о муниципальном гранте. Контроль и критика за действием государства невозможны.

Вопрос: Какова сеть правозащитных организаций в Ростове?

Около 20 организаций. Реально работающих по Ростову и области можно назвать 7-10 (в Ростов приезжал Косгроув, который сейчас работает на Макаруров в Москве). Активно работает Череватенко, но она депутат, у нее неприкосновенность. Нужны правозащитные библиотеки.

Ситуация с третьим сектором в Ростове и области «спящая». Формально около 4000 организаций в Ростовской области (2002- 2003 гг. – Е.К. не уверена в точности цифр). По области – 400. Нет тенденции, чтобы сектор развивался. В конце 90-х был всплеск – ожидалось, что придут юристы, которым будет интересно отстаивать права человека с гуманитарных позиций. Инвалиды всегда будут отстаивать свои права. Защита прав – идеология, ей нужно проникнуться.

Вопрос: Как можно сохранить потенциал «третьего сектора»?

Есипов Д.

Развивать те проекты, которые на это направлены. Посмотреть направление – нужны сетевые проекты. Активно велась работа с беженцами, когда были британские деньги – работали по направлениям «конфликтология», миротворчество. Правозащитные программы – специальные

программы по развитию и открытию новых правозащитных организаций. **Нужна консультативная часть.** Поддержка: здесь работаем мы, здесь работают они.

Сложности: с ФСБ, с налоговой. В Юстицию (в Минюст) ежегодно пишем отчет: кто с кем взаимодействует. Полнейший контроль, сильно ужесточили. Проводятся регулярно беседы – вызывают на беседу в Минюст, задают вопросы. Проверки. Неизвестно, чем закончится беседа (мнение респондента, когда идешь на беседу, неизвестно, как она завершится). Дают образец для отчетов, какие пункты нужно освещать. Требуют протоколы собраний, что решили, все нужно знать. Пример: региональная ассамблея вступила в движение Памфиловой «Дети России», чтобы участвовать в программе обучения правам человека – детей. Вопрос «А что, вы хотите там крышу найти, что вас Памфилова защитит?».

Вопрос: Какие есть успехи? Ситуация сейчас лучше, чем 5 лет назад?

Титов Д.

5 лет назад работа была более активной. УВКБ ООН ушло из России. Проблемы миграции приелись. СМИ раньше освещали проблему. Было больше финансирования, была идея, был выход на международный уровень. Стало затихать, началось местное давление, стал использоваться для этого административный ресурс. Давить. Одна партия стала центральной, «уже повыступать не повыступаешь».

Есипов Д.

За 5-6 лет работы в секторе выросли, изменились, поняли. Набрались опыта, научились понимать проблемы – смотреть на проблемы людей, а не с позиции личной выгоды. **Теряется вера, что в дальнейшем мы сможем изменять, помогать.** Политическая ситуация повернулась, идет отток из сектора. Чтобы не потерять путь, нужна совместная деятельность. Все разрознены. Для взаимодействия нужен импульс. Политика: выдавливать зарубежные источники, заменять их социальной ответственностью бизнеса. А бизнес власть итак нагибает. В благотворительных программах бизнеса будет та же структура зависимости бизнеса от власти. Круг не размыкается. О софинансировании: дополнительно бизнес может вложить до 10% от хорошего гранта.

34. Open Russia's Rostov School of Public Policy

June 11, 2004

Participants: Aleksandr Kirillovich Mamitov, Steve Grant, Vladimir Rimsky, Yekaterina Lushpina

The arrest of Khodorkovsky had little or no effect at the local level. Only difference is that small and medium businesses are now more afraid to help. So he has gone to “managers” (mid-level?) and private companies (??) for support.

PARTIES: Political parties at the local level have completely fallen apart after Dec. '03. They are not of interest, so local party leaders have changed affiliations or left the parties. Baiburtyan is a first-rate manager, but NOT a party leader in any real sense. But the oblast administration does not create problems for them. There is little initiative FROM BELOW UP in Rostov.

There is NO BASE HERE FOR LIBERAL PARTIES. SPS has about 700 party members in Rostov [region?], Yabloko about 400. The former are primarily business people, who want practical help from SPS in how to oppose/fight administrative resources and demands from the side of the local administration. Yabloko, meanwhile, attracts the intelligentsia and students (who form a large part of the population in Taganrog and Rostov). But they have absolutely no prospects. Next year – maybe a new party will emerge from their ruins.

GOOD QUOTE: One official told him that “The governor wants to put all the political parties in his pockets – one in the front pocket, another in the back pocket.” [SG comment: in other words, he would work more closely with some, less with others, but they’d ALL be beholden to him.]

The RSPP: His school has trained many local people; e.g., nearly all SPS leadership have gone through courses there. This part of the alumni form a sort of “government-in-exile”, a local “opposition” – at least some small sign of pluralism and democracy. [SG comment: does this make the RSPP a sort of Brookings Institution?]

Alumni include members of political parties (ca. 40%) and another 60% of various kinds, some office-holders. The RSPP invites ALL to its events/courses, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION.

They will do more work with NGOs starting this fall: showing them how to register, other practical matters.

He would like to start a “club” and hold open meetings/talks on subjects of local interest (on, e.g., minorities, a multiparty system); he’d include political PR experts, the technocrats, so as to attract more people from the middle class and the better off.

With a lot more money (not from Yukos), he would do more in the way of party building, because Yukos ONLY funds seminars and a small Bulletin (freely distributed). Since the downturn in Yukos’s fortunes, he has relied heavily on help from some unions and from friends (e.g., they can get him free space to hold events).

SUMMARY: It’s not just pressure from the federal or local power elite which is preventing the growth of true political parties in Russia.

35. Rostov Union of Children and Youth Organizations

Архив, Е.Ковалевская, поездка в Ростов-на-Дону для ARD, 09 – 11 июня 2004 года.

Чупров Михаил Георгиевич

Ростовский союз детских и молодежных организаций
10 июня, 15:30 – 17:00

Основные выводы:

По оценке М.Чупрова около 30 процентов населения города Ростов-на-Дону составляет молодежь. Ростов – университетский город, третий по величине в России. Как университетский центр Ростов привлекает молодежь со всего Юга России, в том числе и из национальных республик. Молодое население города пополняется и за счет притока молодежи из сельских депрессивных регионов с высокой рождаемостью. Особенности формирования молодежного среза города в связи с указанными факторами диктуют приоритеты в работе с молодежью: программы жилищного обустройства для молодых, программы вовлечения молодых в социальную деятельность в городе, досуговые программы на городском уровне, программы летнего отдыха для школьников, специальные программы для депрессивных сельских территорий, спортивно-оздоровительные программы.

Молодежные организации получают поддержку своей деятельности в большей степени на уровне области. Городские программы в большей степени сконцентрированы на спортивных и жилищных вопросах. Ростовский союз детских и молодежных организаций Ростова-на-Дону является преемником пионерской организации Ростова, поддерживается администрацией области. Лидер

организации активно участвует в работе общественных структур по вопросам молодежи при администрации области. Отдельно необходимо отметить, что именно на эту организацию опирается в своих региональных программах «Открытая Россия». Бюджет организации значителен по сравнению с бюджетами других организаций, имеется большой штат (с частичной занятостью сотрудников). В своей деятельности организация ориентируется на приоритеты администрации области по работе с молодежью, а также на приоритеты федеральной молодежной политики. В частности, лидером организации отмечено, что было особо пристально изучено Послание президента Федеральному собранию, в котором не удалось найти приоритетов, касающихся молодежи, что М.Чупров считает плохим знаком для развития молодежной политики в городе.

В городе есть сеть молодежных организаций, которые накопили опыт взаимодействия. Нужны крупные городские проекты для развития молодежного движения. Нужны специальные программы по работе с молодежью для сельских и депрессивных шахтерских регионов, а также программы методической поддержки новых НКО и учителей, которые в сельских регионах могут налаживать работу с молодежью. В работе с молодежью полезно сотрудничество с организациями культуры.

Расшифровка стенограммы.

Представляет молодежную организацию. **Организация реализует социально-значимые проекты, в которых могла бы участвовать молодежь города.**

Досуговые проекты, в том числе и спортивные мероприятия. Современная молодежная культура. Большой опыт работы. **Оказывают посильную помощь детским организациям, которые только создаются. Обучение руководителей. Тесно работают с муниципалитетом.**

Основная миссия – вовлечение молодежи в социальную деятельность. Михаил возглавляет (?) организацию с 12 лет. Сейчас в организации работает 20 штатных сотрудников. В основном большинство занято на неполный рабочий день. Имеют возможность получать вознаграждение. Свои способы продвижения в организации – сначала работают волонтерами, потом тех, кто проявил себя наиболее ярко, включают в число постоянных сотрудников. Отбор волонтеров проводится через летние лагеря по направлениям, куда приглашается широкий круг ребят. Там они постигают премудрости работы. Акции организации рассчитаны на широкую молодежную публику (парки, улицы). Студенты, школьники. РРЦ часто обращается к Михаилу за волонтерами. Традиционно есть возможности воспитания в волонтерской деятельности: у подростков много свободного времени. Формируем навыки проведения свободного времени через организацию общения со сверстниками.

В Ростове (включая область?) - 230 молодежных и детских организаций. Примерно 70 дворовых команд (один двор, один дом). Основная задача – вовлекать в социальную деятельность **дворовые команды**. Поддерживает Министерство образования области.

Вопрос об объемах финансирования. Распечатали бюджет 2003 года. За год через организацию проходит по проектам примерно 700-800 тыс. руб. (сентябрь – май). Без учета летнего лагеря. 60% расходов по летним лагерям оплачивают муниципалитеты.

Вопрос – есть ли совместные проекты с АЮЛ (Ассоциацией юных лидеров). Ответ – региональный АЮЛ работал долгое время (последние 2 года) вне Ростова – на Северном Кавказе, только сейчас Ирина (лидер регионального АЮЛ) обратила внимание на Ростов.

Областной Комитет по делам молодежи и туризма выделяет средства на молодежную политику. Организация заняла второе место в конкурсе.

Городской комитет работает с молодежью менее эффективно. Горкомитет занят такими проблемами как жилье для молодежи, трудоустройство. Особой поддержки не чувствуется.

Муниципальное управление образования поддерживает – занимаются школами.

Муниципальные программы имеют финансирование. Финансирование отдельных мероприятий. Комитет по спорту – спорт для всех. Часто реализуем молодежные мероприятия. По целевым программам связь с муниципалитетом очень тесная.

Несколько лет назад такое движение было достаточно активно.

Не уверены в собственном будущем. **«В последнем послании Президента по молодежной политике ничего не было. Сидели над планом мероприятий, думали, как опереться на текст послания, чтобы предложить мероприятия – вдоль и поперек изучили – ничего не нашли. В послании нет про молодежную политику и спорт.»**

Ростов: население по данным переписи составляет 1 030 000. Данные фальсифицированы. Комиссия по статистике дает цифру 986 тыс. чел. Основная задача фальсификации – попасть в клуб миллионников с целью получения определенных льгот для города. Посчитали всех в прилегающих поселках и отдыхающих. **Молодежи в городе 280 тыс. Около 30% городского населения. Это третий по величине в России студенческий город.**

13 государственных вузов. Негосударственных, включая филиалы – 23. всего 36 вузов. **Молодежь пребывает в Ростов из села. Много молодежи из национальных республик.** Из национальных республик поступают в основном в профильные вузы – юридический и др.

Реально действующих молодежных организаций около 30. В совместных общегородских проектах проявляются самые жизнеспособные. Экологика – руководитель Микушин. Лига КВН. Хильченко – молодые добровольцы Ростова (неточное название). Продетские организации – Центр детства, танцевальный центр «Андрей» (создан как общественная организация). **Не хватает совместных мероприятий,** которые мог бы инициировать Комитет. 27 числа – выводим молодежь в парк (на День города). Активное сотрудничество в Ростовской области. Совместных проектов много. Даже участвовала организация из Луганской области (Украина).

Молодежное «Яблоко» (А.Карпов) и кампания – известны, достаточно активны. В предвыборные месяцы активно работает молодежное Единство. **Активность молодежных припартийных организаций падает.** Обмен информацией – не особо интересен. Работа с молодежью для политиков – это работа на перспективу. На перспективу политики работать не хотят.

Активно работаем с областными избирательными комиссиями: Школа молодого политика. Плотно сотрудничаем во всех отношениях.

Из российских фондов получаем небольшие гранты. В большей степени на развитие добровольческих проектов. До 10 тыс. долларов получали от «Открытой России». ЮКОС напрямую перестал финансировать общественные организации и делает это через «Открытую Россию».

Есть несколько проектов, которые мы хотели бы развивать, а сейчас не можем это делать в должной степени. Проект «Измерение успеха» - направленный на повышение активности молодежных групп, которые действуют в школах, во дворах. Областной комитет выделил на этот проект деньги в рамках конкурса, но средства недостаточны (15 тыс. рублей).

«Академия успеха» – образовательные программы для молодых людей, которые привлекаются (?) в общественные организации. **Нужны новые поколения лидеров.** Новая сфера приложения сил и интересов. Ньюландия – это Новая Цивилизация летом. Интересная программа – комплексная игра. Участвуют в работе по этим программам «Открытой России».

Организация оказывает методическую поддержку.

Регионы Ростовской области на 80 процентов сельские. Шахтерские города – дотационные, депрессивные. Нужно искать возможности для того, чтобы в этих городах развивать возможности для самореализации подростков.

В сельской местности престижно работать учителем. Зарплата, надбавки.

Встречались с социологами: чем ниже уровень цивилизации, ниже образовательный уровень, тем выше рождаемость.

Юговосточные районы – высокая рождаемость, депрессивные районы. Самая низкая рождаемость в Ростове и Таганроге. Власти хотят проводить общественные кампании рядом с ЗАГСами. Уговаривать. Нужны социальные программы для молодых семей. Как можно попасть в программу «Молодой семье – достойное жилье». Ипотечное кредитование молодых семей.

В проектах есть взаимодействие с учреждениями культуры (муниципальными) и фондами. В основном все перешло в частные руки. Частные учреждения поддерживают молодежные акции. Именно часто культурные учреждения являются спонсорами при проведении мероприятий. Помощь поступает от региональных центров Интернет-образования.

Тесная работа со спортивными организациями. В Ростове все помешаны на спорте. Концепция «Спорт для всех». Количество занимающихся оздоровительными движениями в городе – до 17 процентов населения. Ходьба, нетрадиционные виды спорта поощряются через различные программы. Строится большое количество спортсооружений. Рекреационные центры решением городской администрации должны быть рядом с каждым домом.

36. Russian Green Party

Alexey Yablokov

Yablokov is the former environmental minister under Yeltsin's administration. He paints a relatively somber picture of the current political situation in Russia, making the following points:

- The Kremlin has been very effective in establishing a one-party state and creating a rubber-stamp parliament; the similarities with the old Soviet political system are striking, with political expedience the over-arching theme of Putin's rule. Yablokov pointed to the recent decision in the Danilov spy case (overturning the jury's acquittal of Danilov) as a perfect symbol of Russia's current political situation. Corruption is rampant in the country, and it serves mainly to keep the current political masters in control of the country.
- According to Yablokov, Putin is a likable and relatively capable politician. He works effectively to build national support (partly through stoking Russian nationalism and xenophobia) and keeps international powers at bay by saying all the right things to people like George Bush. He has amassed power, however, through the support of a small clique of people, many of whom have ties to the military-industrial complex. The people in the Kremlin are amoral, smart and clever. Putin says that he will not amend the Constitution to remain in power beyond 2008, but Yablokov does not believe him. Putin will find a way to stay in power.
- The media totally controlled by the Kremlin, and Yablokov fears that the Internet is next. The availability and reliability of information now resembles that of pre-Gorbachev times.
- Putin talks about supporting civil society, but only in sectors that are convenient, such as social services. NGOs with political agendas are not tolerated.
- With respect to rule of law there has been significant backsliding. In the 1990s for example, numerous lawsuits were successfully brought to redress acts environmental degradation. This is impossible now.
- The stability of the country hinges on the continued high price of oil; 40 percent of the economy is fueled by the gray market. Sixty-five percent of the population earns as little as \$100 per month (see article in Vestnik Rossiskoj Akademij Nauk, 2004, tom 74, no. 3, str. 209-18).

So, what to do? Yablokov believes that there is no alternative but to find a way to build political opposition. There is strong interest and support among greens in Russia and, together with other issue-based parties, an opposition could emerge. Financing this is the major problem as those who have financed political movements in the past are now either in exile or afraid. The Kremlin has made it virtually impossible to register a new party, and NGOs are hampered by the fact that there is no incentive for firms of people to give money to them. The country needs an NGO law. The catalyst that may make change possible is if the economy goes down due to a drop in oil prices.

37. Siberian Center in Support of Civic Initiatives

Alina Simone

Alina is in charge or traveling around to the 10 cities where the Siberian Center has resource centers in order to write articles on the activities of NGOs that had received small grants from the Siberian Center. She provided a good overview of NGO development at the local level in a variety of Siberian locations.

One of the common trends that she noticed was the funding prejudices of local governments. That is, it is good that local governments are now having grant competitions; however, they often fund children's, veterans, and pensioner's projects. They aren't interested in funding, for example, aid's projects or Domestic Violence projects. That's why other grant programs are critical, because they provide money to support things the government won't.

However, she felt that exciting things were happening between government and NGOs in Krasnoyarsk. There are lots of partnerships emerging. In Tomsk, Chita, and Novosibirsk, NGOs and government also seem to be developing a stable partnership. In Altai Republic and Buryatiya, the government is poor but interested in NGOs. In contrast, relations between NGOs and government in Altai Krai and Omsk are particularly bad. Governments are more authoritarian and have less resources there.

However, the one interesting thing happening in Omsk is the TOC movement (TOC are housing association clubs). However, these organizations are also funded by the government, and thus are used during election time to get out the vote.

None of the groups she talks to are interested in working with political parties – they all work with individuals. NGOs can make inroads most easily when they have done something that a politician can take credit for.

Many NGOs are also lobbying for legislation – for example, a law that would regularize grant competitions and stipulate the framework.

The biggest issue for many NGOs is space; many worry from month to month about making rent payments. She felt that people were willing to work for no salary, but could not work without a space that they could depend upon.

Also, salary levels are terrible. This means that good, young people are often siphoned off into the private sector. The older people are willing to work for no money, but it's harder to attract younger people.

38. Smirnyagin Meeting

Участники встречи: Л.В.Смирнягин и С.С.Артоболевский

Л.В.Смирнягин – ныне преподаватель Московского государственного университета, в середине 90-х годов – член Президентского Совета и высокопоставленный сотрудник Администрации Президента РФ. Отвечал за проблемы регионального и местного развития (в качестве эксперта и

исследователя занимается ими и ныне). Автор ряда работ по проблемам местного самоуправления. Активно сотрудничает с Институтом экономики города.

Л.В.Смирнягин, отмечая очевидные недостатки нового закона по местному самоуправлению, считает его тем не менее, очевидным прорывом в данном направлении. Часто его критика недостаточно обоснована и ведется на журналистском уровне, без достаточной аргументации. Закон может помочь навести порядок в местном самоуправлении, сделать его деятельность более прозрачной и контролируемой, в т.ч. и со стороны населения. Он позволит уменьшить субъективность принимаемых решений в области финансов. Хотя закон и способствует укреплению вертикали власти, он не позволяет говорить о полном огосударствении местных властей. Предусмотренная Конституцией независимость последних сохраняется и в рассматриваемом законе, хотя контроль сверху и увеличивается. Так предусмотрена относительно простая процедура отрешения от должности избранных глав местного самоуправления (хотя и под «контролем» судебных органов).

В то же время, текст закона проработан недостаточно, не учтены предложения многих экспертов, что может затруднить его реализацию. Слабо учтены огромные географические различия страны. Предложенная модель может оказаться слабо пригодной для ряда территорий страны. Окончательное суждение о новом законе можно будет сделать после принятия всех предусмотренных им поправок к действующему законодательству и началу его практической апробации. Одним из первых шагов в этом направлении станет проведение границ муниципальных образований различного ранга.

Проблемы местного самоуправления заслуживают того, что бы оставаться в центре внимания USAID и достойно финансироваться. Можно пожелать проявлять больше внимания социальным проблемам, в т.ч. борьбе с бедностью на местном уровне. Последнее соображение должно учитываться при идущей ныне реформе местного самоуправления.

Вывод: реформа местного самоуправления необходима и своевременна. В целом новый закон вполне работоспособен. На стадии его реализации можно повысить его эффективность, в т.ч. и социальную. Экспертная помощь, учет зарубежного опыта были бы очень к месту.

39. Committee of Soldiers' Mothers

June 10

Participants: Yelena Kharlamp'evna Zyubrovskaya, Anatolii Ivanovich Yazikov, Steve Grant, Sarah Henderson, Vladimir Rimsky, Yelena Kovalevskaya

She has worked in the committee for the last 15 years – from the very start. The secret of their success: it's all grass-roots, all initiative came from below, with volunteers. Even Gorbachev and the Ministry of Defense and the USSR SupSov supported them; after the meeting with Gorbachev, he issued an ukaz that said the procuracy had to tend to the letters and petitions coming in from all over the country. (But they were swamped by the incredible inflow.)

Her branch has good ties with the local дума, human rights groups, SPS (she dislikes Yavlinsky). But they don't really cooperate with the liberal parties, much less the communists. The governor has established a consultative council for working with NGOs.

They've received foreign support since about 1995 (Ford Foundation, Eurasia, Soros – which is sponsoring a big project with them).

They have been lucky lately (last 2-3 years) to get support from Berezovsky, which has finally given them some stability, a constant source of funds. Asked if any other, local oligarch had helped, she said that they have asked them all and not one has even bothered to reply.

The local military command subsidizes their work by giving them free office space. The local procuracy has even seen fit to invite them to some local conferences (e.g., on suicide).

This southern (i.e., Northern Caucasus??) command is a critical one, because of Chechnya and the very complex situation in southern Russia with nationalities, etc. The Committee has been working with refugees in the Rostov area – the Berezovsky Foundation for Civil Liberty (?) is providing some funding for this work.

The conference of southern Russia branches of the committee is seeking to get legislation enacted to produce military reform and support for the specific concerns of their group.

Not only conscripts but also the “professionals”/contract soldiers come to them.

Two areas of work are separate and not part of their portfolio: “humanitarian work” and rehabilitation of prisoners. Latter must be work of the state, not NGOs.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE: in order to become an even more effective, true lobbying group, they need new laws (on NGOs) and more money; need to operate on both the federal and local level.

{Yazikov's Foundation to Support Graduates of State Institutions has worked with the Soldiers' Mothers Committee for a long time; he and Yelena are very old, close friends. His own son is in the SpetsNaz (special forces) and has told him that their training has finally begun to improve. He works to get legislation to help soldiers, especially graduates of the military academies. It's not enough to have the laws, however, because what's enacted often does not get implemented. He and Yelena helped get Yeltsin's '95 ukaz on conscripting school graduates (?) overturned. }

SUMMARY: This committee – as much as any other NGO in the country – has shown that nothing succeeds in Russia like a dedicated group of selfless volunteers with a just cause. Even the government and the army have to bow before them.

40. Southern Regional Resource Center

Архив, Е.Ковалевская, поездка в Ростов-на-Дону для ARD, 09 – 11 июня 2004 года.

Южный региональный ресурсный центр

Лыскина Татьяна Валентиновна

Птицин Василий

Интервью проведено 10 июня. 12:20 – 13:30

Основные выводы:

ЮРПЦ прошел стадию перестройки. Перестройка совпала со сменой лидера и изменением механизмов финансирования (прямое финансирование через USAID). Организация сохранила структуру, обновила правление, расширив его за счет региональных представителей. Проведено стратегическое планирование, в результате которого определены ключевые направления развития

организации. Организация позиционирует себя как консультационный, обучающий и координирующий центр для сети региональных НКО, власти и бизнеса Юга России. Организация развивает систему контактов с администрациями и бизнесом и ищет возможности для поддержки собственных инициатив.

Организация сохраняет в глазах властей и населения статус богатой организации, которая финансируется через западные источники. Организация осуществляет грантовую поддержку организаций Юга России. Грантовая деятельность для организации ранее не была профильной. Организация испытывает некоторые трудности в частности из-за недостатка средств на администрирование грантовых программ. Организация также считает недостаточным предусмотренное грантом финансирование обучающих программ и семинаров, которые востребованы в регионе. Организация ранее выполняла роль объединяющего центра для НКО региона, существенным звеном в этой координационной работе были конференции и семинары для сети, проведение которых в настоящее время затруднено из-за сократившегося финансирования.

Свое будущее организация видит в развитии обучающих программ, оказании консалтинговых услуг и делает особенную ставку на развитие аналитического центра, чьи услуги могли бы пользоваться представителями НКО, власти и бизнеса. Решение социальных проблем Краснодарского и регионов лидеры организации видят в развитии программ по защите общественных интересов.

В качестве инструмента развития третьего сектора региона организация видит комплексный подход – через поддержку сети, обучение, взаимодействие с вузами, развитие инициатив и повышение компетентности в сфере благотворительности со стороны бизнеса.

Организация продолжает позиционировать себя как неполитическую организацию, хотя в организации имеются ресурсы для политического консалтинга. Есть запросы на такие виды услуг со стороны лидеров НКО, но эти случаи носят единичный характер. В целом политическая жизнь региона оценивается как «слепок» с политической жизни России, во главе которой стоит «ксерокопия президента».

Расшифровка стенограммы.

Меняется сайт – пока на сайте ничего об организации посмотреть нельзя. Рабочий план. Новые программы – есть предложения, которые были разработаны под финансирование USAID. Переехали – находятся в центре Краснодара, в новом Доме быта.

Т.Лыскина. Задала вопросы, с какой целью приехали.

С.Х. проинформировала о работе над стратегией, о 20 млн. долларов, которые будут вложены в продолжение проектов в России. Открыты к предложениям для изменения стратегии.

Вопрос: Что изменилось в ЮРПЦ за последнее время.

С.Чернышева ушла из организации. Возглавляет теперь Совет против подросткового курения «Филипп Моррис». Структурно организация не менялась. Переизбрали Правление. **Стало больше представителей из регионов. Правление стало рабочим.** За последние 7 лет не было документов, которые бы регламентировали деятельность организации (внутренние нормативные рабочие акты). В 2004-году проведены 3 сессии по стратегическому планированию. Выделены новые направления деятельности: бизнес, власть, исследовательский компонент. Новая стратегия. Включает 7 направлений: бизнес (1 подпроект), развитие НКО (4 подпроекта), власть (два подпроекта).

Сколько организаций в Краснодаре?

Около 600 общественных организаций. Реально работающих меньше. На Юге 14 субъектов. ЮФО – 20 тыс., чуть более 20 тыс. зарегистрировано, включая партии и религиозные организации.

В новом проекте провели грантовый конкурс (компонент проекта – Агентство, уточнить). По требованиям USAID из \$ 250 тыс. долларов \$ 60 тыс. должно быть роздано в виде грантовых программ. Всего на ЮРПЦ (?) планируется потратить 1 050 тыс. на три года. 60% этих средств будут выдаваться в виде грантов. Общественные организации региона, благодаря этому, могут получить поддержку. **Средства на администрирование программ явно недостаточные. Обучение НКО резко сократилось.** Динамика в регионе есть, появляются новые клиенты. Раньше семинар для новых клиентов проводили раз в месяц, всего за год было до 15 обучающих мероприятий. Сейчас таких мероприятий в году всего 2. Обучающее направление было очень популярным. Получили 5 грантов из различных фондов, в том числе и краевой грант. Положение о муниципальном гранте. Краевой – 300 тыс. рублей. Проекты до 100 тыс. рублей. Город – общий пул грантовый 350 тыс. рублей в 2004 году, гранты до 30 тыс. рублей. В прошлом году 300 тыс. рублей был грантовый фонд. Методики все наши (то есть власть заимствовала их из практики ЮРПЦ). **Понять, кто входит в окружной совет, невозможно.** Предлагали городской и краевой администрации семинары, чтобы сделать процесс распределения денег прозрачным. **На выходе этих конкурсов финансируются карманные организации.** Входим в городской благотворительный совет. Краевую власть трепали – на последние соросовские деньги проводили круглый стол. Все по новой - контакты, связи – поскольку администрации часто меняются.

Комментарий Людмилы С.

В Ростовской области 2 года назад ресурсный центр проводил проект (?) «Взаимодействие органов власти и некоммерческих организаций». Шло снизу. Приняли участие 44 организации ростовской области. Контакт с депутатами общественного собрания. Первые общественные слушания в области. 1 неделю назад Комитет по связям с общественными организациями вынул этот закон из-под сукна. 95 % вероятности, что в этом году Закон будет принят.

Лыскина Т.

Семинар по социальным кампаниям. Город грязный. Привлекаем власти, бизнес, коммунальное хозяйство. Акции по приведению в порядок города. Работа с национально-культурными автономиями: после 2 мероприятий – инициативы по созданию коалиции. Закон региональный о взаимодействии с органами власти, создают общественную палату.

Вопрос: Что думают о новых обучающих формах, об использовании дистанционного обучения.

Дистанционное обучение: в 6 миллионном городе Краснодаре постоянных пользователей Интернет 25-30 тыс. человек. Нет возможности обучаться дистанционно. Дистанционное обучение хорошо, когда нужно систематизировать знания. Школа НКО (Грешнова и Боровых) в сфере систематизации знаний по управлению НКО помогает.

Межрегиональные очные школы дают контакты, партнерские отношения, мотивируют участников.

Птицин: для начинающих НКО – базовые семинары, имевшие место, не очень эффективны. Эффективны программы на 7-10 дней. От разовых семинаров почти отказались. **Перешли на практикумы.** Развитые НКО – им нужны краткосрочные семинары по финансовому управлению и налоговому законодательству. На финансовые семинары приходили до 50 человек. Специалисты приглашались на эти семинары для комментариев. У развитых НКО потребности в обучении – имидж руководителя некоммерческой организации (тема сама узкоспециальная, нужна подготовка текстов для СМИ). Запросы на корпоративные семинары – например, для Красного Креста.

Вопрос: в скольких городах есть конкурсы муниципальных грантов?

В 6 городах. В 2 городах – Краснодаре и Волгограде есть областной. Консолидированный бюджет – конкурс для всего юга России – Волгоград, Ростов, Краснодарский край, Ставропольский край, Адыгея, Карачаево-Черкессия – в 6 субъектах.

У ЮРРЦ образ западной организации. С населением напрямую не работаем. Органы власти всегда считали шпионами. Сейчас легче. Прислушиваются. Консультируются депутаты. На муниципальный грант и краевой не можем претендовать, так как нас воспринимают сильной и богатой организацией. Предложили организаторам краевого конкурса грантов опубликовать отчет, куда пошли средства организации, в газете – предлагали. Чиновник, который отвечал за программу грантов, сказал, что для публикации отчета нет средств. Со стороны спецслужб стало полегче. Раньше звонили, но после очередного звонка попросили прислать официальный запрос. Оставили в покое. Прошли все налоговые проверки (налоговая полиция, Минюст, регулярные проверки от бизнеса).

Птицин В.

Интересно заняться обучением органов власти. Можно было бы устанавливать контакты, получать влияние. Не всегда администрация заинтересована в обучении. **Ставропольский край – более заинтересованно подходят.** Для чиновников, кто имеет дело, это интересно, для рядовых сотрудников – нет. Есть интересные мысли по поводу пятигорской академии госслужбы. Подписали договоренности на проведение стажировок в некоммерческих организациях учащихся госслужбы. ЮРРЦ 6 сейчас идет конкурс первого гранта плюс конкурс на консолидированный бюджет. Перед конкурсом первого гранта был проведен 7-дневный семинар–тренинг. 9 организаций из числа участников (не уточнили, сколько организаций участвовали в тренинге) подали заявки, 8 получили гранты.

Общественные организации: на Юге России с благотворительностью сложно. 60% организаций живет на местные источники. С другой стороны, местные источники не цивилизовались. 1/3 организаций – просто финансируют спонсоры. **Проводим семинары для бизнеса по развитию благотворительности, на конкурсной основе. Востребованное направление.** Новороссийский ЛУКОЙЛ, страховая кампания «Адмирал». Донской табак использует наработки без нашего участия.

Вопрос: какие изменения произошли в секторе за последние годы?

Стратегическое планирование, которое провели, выявило, что **развивать гражданское общество только через поддержку НКО – утопия.** Бизнес и власть от этого процесса отсечены. Причина непонимания. Сбалансированное развитие (Агентство некоммерческих организаций – приоритет). **3 сектор стал более расслоенным, дифференцированным. Проповедуем комплексный подход.** Вопрос: кого с кем из секторов сводить? Общественное мнение в широком понимании имеет значение. Демократия становится декоративной (негативный компонент). Чиновники, крупные НКО – идти в крупные массы. С 1999 года проводим программы по продвижению и защите общественных интересов. Выпускники программ получали финансирование через ПРОНКО. Никто другой комплексно не проводит. **Важно учить организации защите и продвижению общественных интересов.** Менять убеждения организаций, убеждать, что можно защитить права. Консолидация. **У людей отсутствуют навыки анализа. Они не могут сопоставить и просчитать.** Несколько человек обращались с вопросами. Анализ и изменение мотивации. Создаем и мотивируем инициативные группы. Адыгея (Майкоп) – НКО было ругательным словом. Удалось принять муниципальный грант и там проходят конкурсы. Вице-мэр пытался контролировать – провели стремительную динамичную кампанию. Его чуть не уволили, изменили миссию, деньги были получены. Часть депутатов приезжают.

Формы обучения. Инновационные формы. Кейсы обобщили. Новые формы, которые активно воспринимаются, анимационная студия. Сейчас популярны экстримтренинги, планируем проводить рефлестренинги – 2-3 часа с группами сотрудников (нет наработанного опыта). Взаимодействие с пятигорской академией госслужбы, с Волгоградской академией госслужбы – секция по сбору данных, обучающие мероприятия для студентов.

Роль на будущее

3 основных направления ЮРРЦ как сети

- 1) консультационный центр. Разрабатываются и опробуются новые технологии и опробуется структурирование сектора;
- 2) формирование общественного мнения – по поводу изменения того, что происходит в стране, в регионах, вовлекать в общее поле;
- 3) развитие благотворительности через проведение конкурсов. Переговоры – именные конкурсы и кампании. Планируются новые формы.

По второму направлению - вопрос Е.К. о неизбежном выходе в политику в этой точке.

Публичная политика. Есть лидеры общественных организаций, которые хотят включаться в политические кампании (в ЮРРЦ есть доктор политических наук, кандидат п.н. и аспирант). Устав ЮРРЦ запрещает работу с политическими партиями. Войдет в силу закон о местном самоуправлении, в каждом районе будут свои депутаты, менеджмент. Создание избирательных блоков. **Представители некоторых организаций идут в законодательную власть и пытаются что-то изменить.** Работа со студентами старших курсов вузов – по поводу инвестиций в социальную сферу. 3 человека из ЮРРЦ заняты на кафедре по связям с общественностью и коммуникациям. Информационные поля – использование собственных печатных средств. Выстраивание взаимодействия с властью. **Позиция ЮРРЦ: мы не против и на за власть.** Протестные формы активности. Сайты в Интернет. Больше свободы.

Вопрос о влиянии на третий сектор на Юге.

Сети были созданы. **Сеть – влиятельный инструмент.** Возможность выявлять потребности сектора. Влияние сетей было большим. Нет возможностей для обмена опытом через конференции, квартальные встречи.

Была общая региональная стратегия. Инновация – поддержку сети важно сохранить. Стабильная скоординированная работа – была мысль расширяться.

Не проводили не разу оценку работы. Выявить тенденции. Оценить обучающие и грантовые программы за несколько лет. На добровольных основаниях.

Конкурс «Учитель некоммерческого сектора».

Лучший тренер, лучшая обучающая программа.

ЮРРЦ – объединяющий агент третьего сектора по Югу России. Нужно вовлекать в сеть малые города и сельские районы

Социальные проблемы для Краснодара.

1. Общественный контроль (бюджет) Люди живут в общежитиях. Дороги не ремонтируются. Схема отмыва денег – элитное жилье. (поддержка от Фонда Евразия проекта по прозрачному бюджету).
2. Свободное и открытое распространение информации: из местных СМИ нет независимых. Свободу мысли - представители федеральных СМИ. Сейчас их власть начинает просто покупать. Нужно думать над этим: общественные информационные центры, газеты, на форуме люди предлагали создать информационный центр, который бы финансировался на средства граждан.
3. Беженцы и вынужденные переселенцы: 126 национальностей. Политика власти в Ставрополе, Краснодаре похожа. Проблемы миграции и межэтнических столкновений нет. Начинают культивировать ксенофобию. Закон о статусе иностранных граждан. Савва + оценщики подключаются на партнерских основаниях к аналитическим исследованиям. Исследовательские программы формировались отрывочно. Комплексных исследований не

было. Только по линии УВКБ ООН. Больше источников, на которые можно опираться, нет. Мощный информационный ресурс.

Вопрос: что нужно сделать, чтобы укреплять третий сектор на юге.

Комплексная работа с властями, НКО

Публичное поле (выход)

Вопрос о препятствиях.

Есть внутри самого сектора. Конкуренция среди общественных организаций – за средства, за влияние, конкуренция за доступ к власти, к грантам. Координационные советы, клубы. Конкуренцию удавалось преодолевать на школах, конференциях.

Сами организации не могут скидываться на конференции. Акция, статья в газете, ну и что дальше? Нужны конкурсы, в которых подразумевается партнерство некоммерческих организаций + коалиционные конкурсы.

Работа по созданию планов стратегического развития городов. Инструмент вовлечения власти, НКО, бизнеса в решение общественных проблем.

Скачкова Л.

Наблюдения по поводу ростовского бизнеса: почему они не хотят финансировать и поддерживать организации? Не видят в организациях достойного и равного партнера. В чем проблема: проводился опрос Фондом Ростов по поводу информированности населения об общественных организациях. Население ничего не могло сказать по поводу общественных организаций. Назвали только молодежный телефон доверия, объявление о котором было замещено во всех автобусах общественного транспорта Ростова. Бизнес о нас ничего не знает – нужна информационная кампания. И для населения, и для коммерческих организаций – повышение информирования о деятельности НКО. Нужна системная информационная поддержка. Будущие социальные работники. Только сейчас начали курс по социальным технологиям.

Потребности в вузах: краснодарский край.

Есть запрос педуниверситета по поводу новых обучающих технологий.

Политическая жизнь. Сейчас притихли все. Мы в шоке от того, что происходит в стране. **«Губернатор – ксерокопия с Путина».** Реформировал Путин правительство – губернатор тут же потребовал того же. Путин похвалил его за это в Хантымансийске. **Политические лидеры нейтрализованы.**

Краснодар – слабая копия с России. Народ обманывают. Инвестиции: роль губернаторов в этом процессе – миф. Новороссийск оборудуют под военный порт, поэтому федеральное правительство инвестировало средства под строительство гражданского порта. Инвестиции оценивают вместе с будущей прибылью, которую они должны дать.

41. SPS

Participants: Mikhail Yakovlevich Shneider, Steve Grant

Shneider, a member of the executive committee of the party and its technical section chief, says he's been asked to "explain" the reasons for the party's Dec. debacle endlessly. He believes there are two broad groups of reasons: outside factors and internal ones, the latter in turn divided into strategic and tactical failures.

Outside-the-party factors: Putin, Kremlin manipulation of resources, media, etc. etc. etc.

Internal strategic: first, they had a good platform, but their “message” was not transmitted well or at all; second, they had no plan on how to deal with United Russia (UR) – how they differed from UR in particular – or with Yabloko; third, they had no effective feedback mechanism, from the local activists and mid-level party functionaries back to the top leadership in Moscow – in particular, no criticism of the higher levels came back up through the channels (“of course, no one likes to hear criticism, but it’s essential”).

Internal tactical: first, Chubais should have either appeared first on the party list, or not at all (instead, he was third on the list); second, they relied too heavily on national advertising, paid TV info spots, and the media in general, and NOT on door-to-door campaigning; third, their campaign managers, Kokh and Marina Alekseevna Litvinovicha (?) were not very competent (even though the second later claimed that she had warned them all along of problems which in fact she had not).

How they’re working to overcome the problems: on June 26th they hold a party congress, at which they hope to discuss a new strategy being formulated by a party commission. (The party also has a local elections commission, headed by Chubais, and a political council, comprised of 20-30 party leaders.)

They suffer from lack of leadership – all the nominal former leaders, like Nemtsov, Chubais, and Gaidar, are more or less in retirement. They are seeking NEW PEOPLE (literally and figuratively), but are looking for these people mostly/exclusively in the center; they want someone who is nationally known to lead the party.

PERSPECTIVES: this period is almost identical to the one in 1995, when Gaidar’s (former) party Democratic Choice of Russia went down in flames and in May of 1996 they gathered to prepare a new 4-year strategy. [SG comment: We’ve gone from 5-year plans to 4-year plans!]

THE MOST CRITICAL NEEDS TODAY: first, to build a coalition; second, to find money.

Contrary to what some might think, businesses can still contribute money to independent parties (even after the Khodorkovsky affair), but just not as openly and actively as before.

WHERE DOES THE MONEY HAVE TO GO? First and foremost, into local party structures, whose fundraising problems are much greater than those of the center/national party. So the focus must be on party-building rather than on, say, constituency-building. Second, to the preparation of cadres and training, again mostly on the local level. Third, to triple or quadruple the number of “political technicians” (i.e., campaign experts), such as the 50 they had in the last campaign. (See further on this below) Fourth, for the political education of ordinary Russians; and fifth, for voter registration.

On point 5, they must create a database (DB) consisting of all voters for SPS, Yabloko, and “against all” plus those who did not vote at all and MAKE USE OF THIS DB FOR PURPOSES OF DOOR-TO-DOOR CAMPAIGNING.

THE SINGLE MOST EFFECTIVE TOOL AT THE DISPOSAL OF SPS was the 50 “technicians” they had in 2002-03, salaries for whom came from both SPS funds (ca. 15 of them) and from AID money. These 50 helped train campaign workers in as many regions. Of all the campaigns Shneider has observed, nothing has been as successful as the door-to-door techniques these trainers taught the local campaign workers. The proof: in the 50 regions where they worked, SPS got ca. 6% of the vote as opposed to the normal 3-3+% elsewhere; and voter turnout was ca. 70% as opposed to ca. 55% elsewhere. (Of course, vote manipulation can’t be discounted anywhere: where SPS had good local staff observers to monitor the voting, they found “cheating” in about 15-20% of voter districts. Thus, some half million votes for SPS were probably not counted.)

A final observation: don't work for constitutional amendments now, piecemeal. Wait about 10 years and go not for "reforms" but for a whole new constitution.

SUMMARY:

(Liberal) parties must find a way to unite in an effective coalition; to raise funds; to hire at least 200 campaign experts for regional/local advising; and to spend increased money for door-to-door campaigning in future elections.

42. SPS/Rostov

June 10

Participants: Alla Aleksandrovna Frolova, Valentina Ivanovna Shnurkova, Irina Yefimovna Levina, Steve Grant, Vladimir Rimsky, Yekaterina Lushpina

POLITICAL LAY OF THE LAND: SPS does fairly well in this region, especially in some of the big cities like Rostov, Volga-Donsk, Azov, Taganrog, Novocherkassk, Shakhty. They get close to 5% in cities/large towns, but only about 1% in villages. One big reason for success: these are university towns, and about 11% of students vote for SPS. (She more or less agrees with Yabloko's Baiburtyan, that more well-to-do people tend to vote for SPS, while Yabloko gets liberal-minded people "on salaries" [i.e., lower-paid, lower-income].)

Since 1991, SPS locally has been able to maintain about 150 young people working for the party in "normal" times, but these figure jumps to ca. 300 or more during campaigns, like the Dec. 2003 Duma elections.

They have a program now in Taganrog to train young campaign workers – with/have had about 400 participants.

WHAT WORKS FOR HER/SPS: She is very personable, very good with people, so she's had great success working with small groups of voters at places of work and particularly near to people's homes.

One effective technique: they've invited "celebrities" down to Rostov; Travkin went over big! Others have asked for too much money to appear and so they didn't come. When Boris Nemtsov came down, the party held a meeting with students in Taganrog that went very well but they couldn't rent space in Rostov for the same thing. Nemtsov was able to meet with the city administration and get permission to rent space and even to SMI coverage.

WHAT DOESN'T WORK: they've tried "door-to-door," and a letter campaign, and TV debates. None of these work well in general, although TV ads worked well in Taganrog but NOT in Rostov. Debates "failed" because they were on TV at bad times, when there are very few viewers. (For the recent city duma elections, they didn't even have debates.)

SPS has good relations with NGOs but don't get real political support from them. They've worked with veterans orgs. for the past 3 years.

CENTER-LOCALES COOPERATION/IRRITANTS: About 3 times a month they receive information from the center, such as a "calendar" that shows upcoming events of interest to the party, communiqués about intra-party affairs and sign-up campaigns. Later this month there will be a "zonal" confer-

ence/congress gathering several local party organizations to exchange information and to plan future course of action.

Chubais once asked them to distribute 1000s of letters just one week before an election. Impossible! Didn't help when Kokh called SPS a "bourgeois party."

The center asks them to do a lot: e.g., arrange demonstrations, celebrate holidays (like May 1 and Flag Day), to set up huge concerts (they had one for 150,000) – in part just "to show the colors" (keep the party visible). They got a very large number of people out for a "subbotnik" using a radio ad.

Differences with the center arose during the '93 Duma election campaign; the local political council of the party "corrected" poor directions on the ground.

IRI: a mixed bag working here. In 2002 they held a seminar/training session that attracted few. SPS expected something from them for TV but nothing came.

But the good news is that the people here DO NOT view it as "outside interference" if IRI tries to help. The local administrations don't like it, but the voters think it's a good thing – puts one more set of controls over possible manipulation/chicanery. Still, "the voters" are actually divided, with younger voters for such help and older ones somewhat against it.

Best help IRI/others can give: training seminars and teaching campaign "technology" (techniques). There should be a two-track approach here: use local/Russian political PR expertise in election campaigns; use American expertise for party work.

WHAT IS NEEDED IN ADDITION: (1) more lawyers who know election laws inside-out, especially local election norms; (2) media specialists from PDI and/or IRI (?); (3) more TV air time, but with better coordination (so that on a purely technical level, airwave transmissions/signals don't interfere with neighboring jurisdictions. (SMI in Rostov are NOT independent but still manage to be objective much of the time.)

SUMMARY: need to build and exploit Russian (i.e., not foreign) legal and campaign expertise; perhaps make better use of celebrities in politics, as in the U.S.; they have to build on their core constituency of students if they're to survive.

43. Department of State Power, Local Government and Natural Monopolies

Встреча в холдинге СУАЛ

Участники встречи: В.Н.Киселев, вице-президент холдинга и директор Департамента по взаимодействию с органами государственной власти, местного самоуправления и естественными монополиями, и С.С.Артоболевский

Холдинг СУАЛ контролирует 19 предприятий, на которых занято 60 тыс. человек. Его оборот составляет 1,5 млрд. долл. США.

На предшествующем этапе реформы холдинг передал местным властям жилье (оговорив право аренды общежитий) и часть сетей. Себе, помимо части сетей, он оставил медицинскую базу (включая базы отдыха и санатории), дворцы культуры/клубы и большую часть пионерских лагерей.

Местные власти получают выгоды от деятельности холдинга по нескольким каналам:

1. Полная легализация всей заработной платы и отсутствие налоговой задолженности увеличивает доходную часть местных бюджетов.
2. Ежегодно 650 млн. рублей тратится на корпоративную социальную программу холдинга. В основном она ориентирована на работающих в холдинге (расширение спектра медицинских услуг, выплаты ветеранам труда, повышение квалификации) и направлена на улучшение социального климата на предприятиях. Но средства, направляемые на развитие спорта, культуры, детского досуга благоприятны и для не работающих на предприятиях холдинга.
3. Сотрудничество в области экономического и социального развития городов, направленное на внедрение новых организационных схем и техники.
4. Благотворительность (весьма непрозрачный канал, который следовало бы перекрыть).
5. Особый интерес холдинга к местному самоуправлению и его развитию определяется 2-мя факторами:
6. Все предприятия холдинга расположены в малых и средних городах. Качество жизни в них особенно зависит от эффективности деятельности местных властей. Холдинг, в свою очередь, заинтересован в повышении качества жизни тех, кто работает на его предприятии.
7. Местные власти являются крупными экономическими партнерами холдинга, покупая у него услуги (например, тепло) на 400 млн. рублей в год. Заплатить эти деньги смогут только эффективно действующие власти. При этом необходимо учесть, что власти региональные дают городам с успешно функционирующими предприятиями относительно меньше трансфертов, считая, что остальное они «взыщут» с указанных производителей. Уже удалось в 2 раза сократить задолженность местных властей холдингу.

Холдинг активно сотрудничает с местными властями, при этом стараясь ограничить их стремление постоянно получать с него деньги на любые нужды, решение своих проблем. Холдинг не возражает против помощи населению «подведомственных» городов, но хочет тратить собственные деньги по своему усмотрению (см. выше). Кроме того, значительная часть местных бюджетов тратится нерационально и неограниченная помощь просто блокирует необходимые реформы. Суд оказался действенным инструментом разрешения конфликтных ситуаций.

СУАЛ инициировал совместный с US AID проект по реформе местного самоуправления, направленный на его развитие, равно как и гражданского общества (на 2004 и 2005 гг.). Проект включает 3 блока – правовой, социально-экономический и социальный. Выбрано 3 территории: Шелехов, Каменск-Уральский и Сегежский район (включая Надвоицы). Меморандум о сотрудничестве подписан, но окончательного решения американской стороны еще нет. Возможно, задержка вызвана несовпадением «сроков» финансовых годов в США и РФ. Холдинг готов начать финансирование проекта в одностороннем порядке (предусмотрено финансирование 50:50).

44. USAID/Independent Media Program

German Abaev, Katya Drozhodova

USAID's media program has recently undergone an assessment in anticipation of the agency's new strategy development. The purpose of this meeting was not to revisit themes that have been exhaustively covered in the recent assessment, but to talk generally about possible linkages with other USAID/Moscow/DI programs. Several points emerged:

- According to Abaev and Drozhodova, the fundamental question confronting USAID's media program is how to create demand among Russians for an independent media. The program works with some 300 TV stations nationally, spending (with cost-sharing) about \$3.5 million each year. In addition, the

program works with a large number of regional newspapers (\$1 million). USAID does not work with national media.

- In general, USAID has noted that regional newspapers tend to be less independent than regional TV stations, largely because of the former's Soviet roots. USAID is considering working with fewer newspapers, but on a more holistic basis.
- Radio appears to be becoming more popular, especially music formats. News formats are less useful, although Moscow Echo is an exception.
- USAID is not contemplating developing the Internet as a media source.
- USAID has not thought about tapping the potential of cell phones as a source of independent media.
- Training for court reporters is weak in the country and may be an opportunity.
- The new local government law is complex; a public education campaign using the media would be useful.
- The legal sector does not have a cadre of lawyers and judges trained in the area of defamation. Many defamation cases are brought against media outlets and their editors/owners/reporters which has had a negative impact on the sector.

45. Yabloko/Rostov

June 10

Participants: Vladimir Artemevich Baiburtyan, Aleksei Vasil'evich Lyashchenko, Steve Grant, Vladimir Rimsky

IRI visited here in the fall of 2003, during the Duma campaign. Yabloko ran Yevgenii Yemel'yanov and he won (one of just 4) but then he decided to leave Yabloko and join United Russia -- a big scandal and a particularly devastating blow for Yabloko (from which, it appears, they have not recovered here in Rostov). IRI has advised local parties on the upcoming city дума elections to try to create a united platform. They can't seem to unite on the federal level at all – but this should be possible on the local level! They can distribute one set of brochures/pamphlets/handouts, put up one set of posters.

RELATIONS WITH CENTER: During the 2003 national Duma campaign, all money came from local sources, not the center, which offered support only in the form of its ideology. And voters came out and voted for Yabloko not for the sake of the party itself but to show support for the person running. He does admit, however, that Yavlinsky's speeches and the TV spots the center put on the air did indeed help them gain support. But the local leadership's attitude toward the center is: "We don't need ANYTHING from them." "What they tell us to do – e.g, in the way of election techniques – changes with every new election – and this is handled in an IDIOTIC fashion."

That having been said, however, the Rostov party org. thinks they were the first to use "picketing" techniques, door-to-door method, and direct mailing. But they've had problems with the volunteers who help them with these.

Baiburtyan personally worked for many years with Rummyantsev and his party before coming over to Yabloko quite recently. On a personal level, he finds center-local relations OK: he can pick up the phone and talk with Yavlinsky, Mitrokhin, Arbatov just about any time he wants to. BUT, the central apparatus is "too formal" – they're too focused on their own affairs, and on "technologies"/techniques. (There has been a clash, incidentally, between the center and some local branches over what party "membership" should entail. [SG comment: shades of Lenin and the Bolsheviks!!! History repeating itself.]

A TRUE DILEMMA: His take on the future of the party nationally: Yavlinsky attracted the "intelligentsia" at the beginning – people who, in Soviet times, still cooperated with the government in order to get

anything done. Yavlinsky wanted to reconcile the post-communist governments with the intelligentsia. This approach does not work any more. BUT IF YABLOKO BECOMES MORE “HARSH” VS. THE GOVERNMENT, IT WILL LOSE VOTERS. (He says, in passing, that ordinary people are “too frightened” today to engage in such adversarial politics.)

DIFFERENCES AMONG TOP LEADERS: Yavlinsky himself IS the party. He’ll set federal-level party policy. But no interest groups have come together around his banner. The ONLY uniting idea is the defense of private property. Nemtsov has his own hobby horses, like the idea of a professional army (one sign of true liberty), but for Yavlinsky all that’s needed is military reform – this is not a more fundamental value or integral part of liberalism. And Chubais is just a socialist!!!!

(Ryzhkov [is he in Yabloko??] says that the CPRF is the “most democratic party” in Russia today. Why? Apparently because they have a true constituency that they strive to serve. But just the fact that they are allowed to exist is a true sign of democracy.)

ON THE LOCAL LEVEL: The party has had some success in local elections: they have 2 people in the oblast дума (though they used to have 3), 2 in the city дума. For the upcoming city дума elections, they have 12 candidates running for 35 seats. In the oblast дума, a Yabloko member is the head of the committee for legislation that deals with social orgs. (NGOs); in the city дума, their man is head of the budget committee.

The regional party branch has a total membership of between 2 and 3 thousand; only about 25 people, though, left the party after the Dec. 2003 debacle nationwide, while some 200 have joined since January. They have some fairly sophisticated DBs, with names of party members, “agitational” workers, vote monitors, etc. They have used a polling firm called “Delphi” (?), which used to be affiliated with ROMIR in Moscow, but then broke off to set up their own company.

FUNDING: Historically, Rostov is a commercial city – a city of merchants. So most orgs./parties have to work with business people in raising funds. Before last Dec., a local factory (which has large revenues) sponsored Yabloko (as did other businessmen); but now, this source of funds has dried up for Yabloko. So the party leaders like him and other members are forced to earn money in their own line of work just to survive. But they do get a little monetary support from the center [thus slightly contradicting what he said earlier].

Who votes for whom? In the city proper, the Yabloko vote has been rather higher than in the region as a whole: about 11-14%. They actually came in in first place – one of the few cities where Yabloko outpolled SPS. Partly because of unemployment and some very old factories that can’t sustain their work force.

Both “democratic”/liberal parties attract those with higher/better education, those from the “middle class.” Yabloko voters, however, tend to have lower income, SPS voters, higher income.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS: The problem Yabloko has is that people tell them: “You talk a very good game, but you’ve got to show us ‘what next’.” [They don’t see clearly what future exactly Yabloko has planned for Russia or their plan for how to get there.]

Problem with local self-government is that all want to be recipients of money, no one wants to give it out (be donors).

The party has good relations with SMI here; a few outlets are even critical of some politics. Local TV has given them some free interviews, spot ads.

SUMMARY: Yabloko is close to rudderless and perhaps leaderless at the national level now; local branches can gain some successes on their own – but have to define themselves and their aims much more clearly.