

**A Study of the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**

The Political Culture of Democracy in Panama, 2004

Public Perceptions about the Political System



PANAMA

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- Marco A. Gandásegul, Jr., CELA

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Scientific Coordinator and Editor of the Series
Vanderbilt University





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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACP	Panama Canal Authority
BID	Interamerican Development Bank
ECLA	Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean
IDH	Human Development Index
Km	Kilometers
OPAL	Latin American Public Opinión Project
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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Executive Summary

This Executive Summary will present some of the study's main findings that are developed in the following chapters. The results of the multivariate analysis can be found in Appendix B. The results of this study contribute to the on-going debate about democracy in Panama.

- ❑ This study was done almost 15 years after the end of the military regime. Therefore, this is a good time to review the current situation and get a glimpse of people's perceptions, what their attitudes towards democracy are, and in what direction have their political attitudes evolved.
- ❑ The data that is examined in this study was gathered by a survey applied between March 13 and 16, 2004. The instrument was applied only weeks before the general elections held in Panama on May 2, 2004.
- ❑ The survey used a probabilistic sample (except at the level of the home where quotas were applied for sex and age) stratified, multistage, and by clusters. The following parameters were used: 1. A minimum of 1500 cases, 2. Clusters of 6 - 8 interviews in urban areas and 10 - 12 in rural areas for each sample point (census segments). 3. At least 125 sample points picked on a random basis.
- ❑ The study divided the country's territory in 4 stratas made up by geographic regions. The Metropolitan Area was carved out of the districts of Panama (Capital). The Eastern Area was made up of the Provinces of Panama (excluding the above mentioned), Colon, and Darien. The Central Area included the Provinces of Cocle, Herrera, Los Santos, and Veraguas. The Western Area included Bocas del Toro, Chiriqui, and Ngobe Bugle Territory.
- ❑ A total of 1,639 persons were interviewed. With a sample this size the study can assure it is representative of the people's opinions, with an error not larger nor smaller than 3.1% if the whole country's population. An error of this sort means that if we obtain repeated samples of this size, 95% of the times we would find the same opinions with a possible deviance of no more than +/- 3.1%. For the stratas, sample errors fluctuated from the Metropolitan Area (+/- 5.1%) to the Western Area (+/- 7.6%). The Eastern Area (+/- 5.7) and the Central Area (+/- 7.3%).
- ❑ Along with all the survey results the report presents many figures, methodological notes, and the questionnaire. Several multivariate analyses are also shown in order to validate the conclusions. In many parts of the report comparisons are made with the results of 7 other surveys applied almost simultaneously in neighboring countries.
- ❑ In the past 20 years Panama has experimented important political transformations. On the one hand, a military regime (1968-1989) was replaced by a civilian government based on periodic elections where the larger political parties share power. Panama eliminated its military institution from its Constitution. Even more impressive, Panama and the US were able to culminate a process by which the latter transferred the Panama Canal to the former and evacuated its military bases after a century on the Isthmus. On the other hand, Panama has been experimenting with market driven economic adjustments for the last twenty years.

- ❑ Panama's economic structure has thus gone through important changes in the last 15 years, as well. The interventionist State very much involved in economic development has retreated, leaving almost all these areas in private hands, most of which are foreign.
- ❑ Economic growth has been unstable combining good years with other years of recession. This situation has created some uncertainty among the different sectors of the country, especially among investors and workers.
- ❑ One important detail that created much enthusiasm among Panamanians was the transfer of the Panama Canal from US administration to the National Government in 1999.
- ❑ According to a recent report of the Ministry of Economics and Finance, Panama's economic performance in 2003 showed "construction soared at a 28.6% rate, port activities grew at a 20.5% rate, fishery (12.6%) and mining (32.0%) also grew. This growth has created external effects benefiting the other economic sectors. This energy helps the country in its efforts to modernize and to prepare itself to enter the global market."
- ❑ The unemployment rate fluctuates near 14% of the active population. The informal sector represents around 40% of the working force. At the same time, over 40% of the population lives under the poverty lines.
- ❑ Panamanians have a pessimistic view of the country's economic situation. In the March 2004 survey 53.4% of the population had the opinion that the economic situation was bad or very bad. On the other hand, only 5.5% believed the situation was good or very good.
- ❑ Looking towards the economic future there is reason to be more optimistic. Close to 33.3% of the population believe the situation will get better. Only 17% believe the situation will get worse. Almost half the population have the opinion that things will not change.
- ❑ The perception people have of their own personal situation is also pessimistic. However, it is not so bad as how the country's situation is perceived. Only 14.5% of the persons interviewed felt their personal situation was good or very good. On the other hand, 24% saw their personal economic situation as bad or very bad.
- ❑ What worries Panamanians most is unemployment. According to the survey 56.1% believe that unemployment is the country's most important problem. Another 9.2% of the people interviewed believe that economic problems are the most significant problems. Additionally, 7.8% identify poverty as the main problem. In all, 73.1% of the persons interviewed view the economy as the main problem. Another 11.6% view corruption as a big problem. Crime is on the top of the list for 10.5% of the population.
- ❑ Panama has a strong sense of political community. Over 90% of the people interviewed are very proud of being Panamanian. In the Western Area where 89% identify proudly with the Panamanian political community.

- ❑ There is a striking difference between pride in being Panamanian and being proud of the political system. In a recoded scale developed for this study pride in the Panamanian political community received an average of 97 points. In contrast, the political system only received 48.5 points. When asked the question “Up to what extent should the political system be supported?” only 60.1% were willing to give their full backing.
- ❑ Political parties, the Legislative Assembly, and the National Government are the institutions with the lowest levels of confidence. The Electoral Court (Tribunal Electoral) has the highest level of confidence.
- ❑ Panama also has the highest political tolerance level when compared to all other countries that participated in the study.
- ❑ The survey also discovered that 37.9% of the people interviewed showed high levels of support towards the system as well as high rates of tolerance, opinions that are consistent with a stable democracy.
- ❑ Victimization on account of corruption is an important factor to take into account when studying support for democracy and support for the institutional system.
- ❑ Satisfaction with the workings of democracy is also important, as well as the economy, satisfaction concerning the delivery of Municipal services, and political efficiency (individual perception of how they can have influence over the political system).
- ❑ More than 70% of Panamanians prefer a democratic system over an authoritarian one. Over 80% prefer the present system and would not be in agreement for a return to a military government.
- ❑ The majority of the people interviewed identified democracy with liberty. Over 70% believe that the country’s problems must be solved with everybody’s participation and not with a “strong hand”
- ❑ However, almost 47% think there could be good reasons for a *coup d’état*. The circumstances under which some believe a coup is justifiable are high levels of crime and corruption.
- ❑ People’s perceptions of national and local problems do not coincide. At the local level public services are considered paramount, including lack of drinking water, street repairs, and lack of security.
- ❑ Only 16% of the persons interviewed are of the opinion that the municipal services are good or very good. Around 60% believe these municipal services are neither bad or good.
- ❑ Only one in sixteen Panamanians have participated in meetings called by the Mayor’s office in the past year.

- ❑ Factors such as age and their personal economic situation influence the way people measure the services the Municipality is able to deliver in the communities.
- ❑ The two factors that influence most people's attendance to meetings called by the Mayor's office are having made voluntary contributions to the solution of community problems and participating in organizations. In other word, people who participate are usually attending Municipal meetings as well.
- ❑ Factors that influence people's perceptions on their ability to solve community problems are education, gender, and the size of the community they live in. Satisfaction with the services delivered by the Municipalities and participation in meetings called by the Mayor are the most important factors that explain the levels of confidence vis-à-vis local governments.
- ❑ Around 64.7% of the persons interviewed believe that it is very probable or somewhat probable that the people can solve their municipal or local problems. Only 9.4% had the opinion there was almost no probability that the people could solve their local problems. Another 25.9% said there was a small chance they could solve their local problems.
- ❑ The survey discovered that people have more confidence in their local governments than with their national government.
- ❑ However confidence in institutions that should protect people's rights are lower than for the Catholic Church, the mass media or the Electoral Court (Tribunal Electoral), but much higher than the trust they have in the political parties or the Legislative Assembly.
- ❑ Among those institutions with responsibilities for protecting legal rights, people feel more confidence towards the Police. The Attorney General's office is the institution with the lowest levels of confidence.
- ❑ The main factors that influence the levels of confidence in judicial institutions are the mistrust in their ability to handle criminal activities, the fear of becoming a victim of crime, and the perception of corruption among judges and police officers.
- ❑ The study also discovered that support for the institutional system diminished significantly when confidence in judicial institutions also diminished.
- ❑ Most persons that have dealt with the courts or prosecutors offices are unhappy with the services these institutions have to offer. Most of the petitioners are satisfied with the services they receive from the Police. Only 41.8% of the persons interviewed are very or somewhat satisfied with the services they receive at the courts. However, 58.2% are not satisfied. The evaluation of the Police is more positive. Among those interviewed, 53.3% are satisfied while 46.7% are not satisfied. Prosecutors as well as judges are not evaluated positively. Only 45.2% of the people are satisfied with the prosecutor's services and 54% are not satisfied.

- ❑ However, it is important to mention that most of the people interviewed have not had direct contact with these institutions. According to the survey 70% of those interviewed have not had any business with the courts, 80% have not had to deal with the Police, and 87% have not had to come in contact with any prosecutor.
- ❑ The highest levels of discontent with the services delivered by the courts are in small cities (under 25,000 inhabitants), where 60% declared their lack of satisfaction. People in rural areas (40%) are very unsatisfied with the services delivered by the courts and 15% say they are somewhat unsatisfied. In middle sized cities, between 25,000 and 99,000, 59% of the population is not satisfied. Satisfaction is highest in large cities, with over 100,000 inhabitants, excluding Panama City, where 44% are satisfied and 21% answering they were very satisfied.
- ❑ According to the survey, 51% of those persons who said they had been victims of a crime said they reported the incident. This was the largest percentage among the 8 countries that took part in the study. Close to 55% of those interviewed said they had not reported the crime because it was not worth their while.
- ❑ The Municipality is the institution where people feel the largest burden of corruption, followed by the Police and the school system.
- ❑ The factors that were identified as having more influence corruption victimization are education and gender, age, residence, and wealth.
- ❑ According to the survey 82.1% of the people interviewed feel they have not been victims of corruption. Another 10.5% have been victims once, 4.8% have been victims twice, and only 2.6% have been victims over two times.
- ❑ Corruption victimization according to the study affects support for the political system and a stable democracy. Those persons that have been victims of corruption are less inclined to support the institutional system and to have a favorable attitude towards a stable democracy.
- ❑ Panama is in second place when it is compared with the other 8 countries vis-à-vis corruption victimization by civil servants. Panama is in third place along with El Salvador in total corruption victimization. However, compared to Mexico, the country with the highest levels of corruption according to the set of surveys applied, Panama has relatively low levels of corruption.
- ❑ The factors that influence significantly community and civic participation are age, wealth, number of children, crime victimization, and fear of violence in the neighborhood.
- ❑ According to the survey, Panamanians participate more in religious organizations followed by Parent & Teacher Associations (PTA) at the school level.
- ❑ However, Panama has the lowest levels of participation below most of the countries that were part of this study.

- ❑ The survey also verified that participation in organizations has influence over those persons that take part in voluntary work at the community level.
- ❑ There is a positive relation between participation in PTAs and local community committees with support of stable democracy exists.
- ❑ The electoral results of the survey were very close to what really happened in the 1999 and 2004 elections. Panamanians have responded very well to the electoral processes. There is an apparent perception that if people participate in the elections they can bring forth political change. According to the survey, 69% of the persons interviewed believe that the voting experience can contribute to the welfare of the country.
- ❑ According to the multiple regression analysis of the data, being updated at the Electoral Court (Tribunal Electoral) and belonging to a political party are the factors that influence most in explaining the tendency to vote.

Preface

Democratic governance is increasingly recognized as central to the development process. Applied democratic development is now an emerging field of academic study and development assistance. From an academic perspective, the great movement of political regimes towards democracy led to a new focus on the processes of democratization. Recent research has demonstrated the centrality of good governance to sustained economic and social progress. The result is a ballooning literature on regime change, democratic consolidation, and the institutionalization of good governance.

Development agencies have also begun to invest in programs that promote democratic governance both to spur growth and poverty reduction as well as an end in itself. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been at the forefront of donors in recognizing democracy and good governance as fundamental characteristics of development. Even a decade before the agency created the Center for Democracy and Governance in 1994, country missions – particularly in Latin America – began to invest heavily in justice reform, electoral assistance, local government, legislative development, civil society strengthening and other programs that have become the bedrock of our current extensive programming in “DG.” Every Administration over the past two decades has supported and expanded these efforts. At present we have democracy programs in over 80 countries, as well as large regional and global programs. Our programs in this region (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Colombia) are all tailored to the specific country context and managed by a local Mission, but share a focus on transparent and accountable governance and strengthened rule of law.

Unfortunately, rigorous measurement has lagged behind insight and action, but it is now underway with a vengeance. Analysts are developing and refining measures of institutional strengthening, political and civil rights, democratic culture, transparency, and other attributes of democracy and governance. At a much slower pace, donors are just beginning to examine closely the impact and effectiveness of their own work in this sector. In this context, USAID missions have supported high quality democracy surveys that analyze the beliefs, perceptions, and behavior of citizens and used the results to develop strategies of support.

Of course, surveys are only one tool in the arsenal of analytic instruments needed for good programming. We also rely on assessments of institutional development in both government and non-governmental organizations, on analyses of relationships among power contenders, and on a large range of other factors that affect prospects of democratic development and good governance. Nonetheless, surveys offer information not available from other sources on the state of democratic culture and, increasingly, on the effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions have sponsored numerous surveys, many in collaboration with Dr. Mitchell Seligson and the local research teams that have carried out the present study. These are now being put on the web and made publicly available for further analysis.

This current study, nonetheless, is pioneering. It is the first time that missions have worked in concert to develop a common transnational survey in democracy and governance, allowing reliable comparisons of the democratic attributes across all of Central America, Colombia, and

Mexico, as well as with recent studies in Andean countries. For several missions, these surveys are the second or third in a series, offering reliable measures of change for the first time. Moreover, the survey instrument itself was the product of collaboration between survey research specialists led by Dr. Seligson and the USAID Democracy Offices in the region. As a result, the data allow reliable comparisons with the growing body of democracy surveys elsewhere, but also respond to specific needs of donors. For example, there are many questions that “drill down” into aspects of corruption and local government to provide insights into these potentially fruitful areas of donor support. Potentially even more important, some of the surveys over-sample geographic areas where USAID DG programming is concentrated, so that we can measure more reliably what changes might be due to specific program interventions—an important step in rigorously measuring the impact and effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions intent on improving democracy programs and better measuring the impact of their work led this initiative. The Office of Democracy and Governance and the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean in Washington also strongly supported the work, as an innovative effort within the Agency to standardize our measurements and better report on our progress to Congress. However, we also believe these surveys will be an important resource for policy makers and academics, offering the best data available for decision-making and further research. To this end, we are supporting not only publication of the results, but a web-based data base allowing further analysis of the data. This report, and the country reports that preceded it, are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of research possibilities.

Undertaking these surveys has had other positive outcomes. For example, previous surveys have at times been important mobilizing tools for policy reformers in Latin America, with results presented to the Bolivian congress, for example, and to cabinet officials in a number of countries. In addition, the national research teams who conducted the surveys increased their own institutional capacities that will outlast this particular piece of work. Third, the surveys offer a public “voice” for citizen concerns about democracy, and the opportunity to see how particular subgroups –ethnic groups, women, people in specific regions—are faring.

We hope these surveys will be widely used by practitioners and policy-makers and contribute to our understanding of the processes of political change now underway in the hemisphere.

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Prologue

Studying Democratic Values in Eight Latin American Countries: The Challenge and the Response

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The publication you have before you is one in a growing series of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), known as OPAL in Spanish. That project, initiated over two decades ago, and for many years housed at the University of Pittsburgh, is now hosted by Vanderbilt University, and has received generous support in recent years from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in almost all countries in the region.

The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia). The sample and questionnaire designs for all eight studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as allowing for detailed analysis within each country. The 2004 series involves a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Prologue, who serves as the Director of the LAPOP, and the overall scientific coordinator of the eight-country project. Fortunately, many of the questions asked in the surveys administered in these eight countries were also included in LAPOP national sample studies carried out in 2004 in Ecuador and Bolivia, meaning that for some items it will be possible to compare across ten countries in Latin America. As of this writing, the Bolivia data for 2004 are not available, so in this volume, results for Bolivia 2002 are used. Finally, a collaborative investigation in the Dominican Republic, in which a small number of key questions from the LAPOP were included, broadens the country sample of 2004 to eleven, and gives us at least a limited picture of the Caribbean, adding to our samples of Central America and the Andes, although those data were not available for analysis at this writing. The only missing region in Latin America is the Southern Cone, a deficit we hope to remedy in the future. For several of the countries in the current round, LAPOP had previously carried surveys using identical batteries of questions. For that reason, in the country-based reports on Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, comparisons with prior results are made.

Surveys of public opinion in Latin America have become very popular in recent years. Unfortunately, all too few of those studies follow the rigorous scientific procedures that have become accepted as the norm in academic public opinion research in the United States and Europe. Those studies often suffer from poorly designed questionnaires, unrepresentative and non-random samples, poor fieldwork supervision, sloppy data entry, and data analysis that rarely

goes beyond univariate presentation of percentages.¹ As a result, such studies are often dismissed by academics and policy-makers alike.

The LAPOP project has attempted, with considerable success I would argue, to deviate from the prevailing Latin American norm to produce quality survey data that matches the highest standards of academic research in the U.S. and Europe. The surveys on which the present study relies, because it was designed from the outset to allow for cross-national comparisons, were carried out with special rigor and attention to methodological detail, as is described in this prologue and in the methodology section of this synthesis report and the individual volumes. We recognized from the outset that all survey research, by its very nature, contains error (derived from many sources, including errors resulting from probability sampling, respondent inattention, coding mistakes, and data entry failures). Our goal, was to reduce to the absolute minimum each of those errors, and do so in a cost-effective manner.

We also sought, from the outset, to make our methodology transparent and replicable. The essence of scientific research is that it can be replicated. Excitement about the prospects for “cold fusion” quickly faded when physicists were unable to replicate the initial “discovery.” All too many surveys published in Latin America contain no information whatsoever about the sample designs, or when such information is provided it is so sketchy that it is impossible to determine with any degree of detail how the sample was carried out. Equally serious, it is rare for the data base itself to be made available to the public; almost without exception the raw data are closely guarded, making it impossible for social scientists and policy makers alike to reanalyze the data looking for new insights, or to attempt to replicate the original findings. Publicly funded data bases should be available to the public. Failure to do so results in privatization of public goods. Of course, in the dissemination of data, all human subjects protection policies, as governed by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) must be followed scrupulously so that the rights of subject to protect their identities are respected.

We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy,

¹ A detailed recounting of the problems encountered in those surveys can be found in Mitchell A. Seligson, “Improving the Quality of Survey Research in Democratizing Countries,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2004, forthcoming).

political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

When readers examine the findings presented in this synthesis volume, as well as the country studies, and find that the results are those that coincide with their expectations, they might well say, “That is just what I had expected, so the survey tells me nothing new.” On the other hand, when the results are at variance from expectations, readers might say, “This does not make any sense; the data must be wrong.” These reactions to survey data are common, and for some surveys emerging from the developing world, the data may in fact be “wrong.” We cannot guarantee that our results are “right,” but we have made every effort, as described below, to try to minimize error. Given that we are working with a sample of the population of each country rather than interviews with all voting-aged adults, there is always a one-in-twenty chance that our results are not within the approximately $\pm 2.5\%$ sampling error found in each of the national samples. Indeed, as we point out in the methodology section of each country report, these confidence intervals can be wider for some variables in some countries as a result of “design effects,” i.e., we used a stratified and clustered sample, which is standard practice in modern survey samples, the impact of which is to affect the precision of our estimates while keeping fieldwork costs within reasonable limits (as a result of clustering). Rarely does anyone doing surveys today use simple random sampling, and we have not done so either. In short, if readers find some results inconsistent with expectation, that may be because we are working with *probability* samples, and the odds are, from time-to-time, our results will be wide of the mark. But, 95 times out of 100, our results should be reasonably close to what we would have obtained had we interviewed the millions of voting-aged adults in the countries included in the study (an obvious impossibility). Moreover, since we have taken special pains to deal with the problem of “non-coverage,” something that we have rarely seen done anywhere in Latin America, we believe that our results are about as good as they can be.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum

level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bi-variate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau’s CSPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for and audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the database itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most

highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.

After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced. A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the data base itself (www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/).

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, and field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers and data entry clerks, and, of course, the all-important over 12,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

Acknowledgements

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guidance throughout on sample design. The team of graduate assistants at the University of Pittsburgh have worked very hard in numerous aspects of the Latin American Public Opinion Project: Miguel García (Colombia), Daniel Moreno (Bolivia), Sawa Omori (Japan), and Rosario Queirolo (Uruguay). John Booth of the University of North Texas, and Miguel Gómez, formerly of the Universidad de Costa Rica, provided excellent pro bono advice on the questionnaire design. Chris Sani performed admirably as undergraduate assistant. Profound gratitude is owed to all of these fine people for their excellent work on this study. Finally, we wish to thank the 12,401 individuals in these eight countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would not have been possible.

Nashville, Tennessee
August, 2004

1.0 Panama's Political Culture

This chapter will deal with the most relevant aspects that pertain to our study of Panama's political culture. This introduction has been conceived to give readers a wider view of Panamanian issues prior to sharing the results of the national survey applied in March 2004. We have divided the introduction in two parts. We begin with a panoramic view of Panama's social and economic situation at present, as well as some issues of its recent past. We follow up with an analysis of Panama's political evolution in the past decade. The introduction concludes with a brief bibliography of Panamanian politics, political thought, and evolution. We also mention the results of several surveys applied in Panama during the last decade.

1.1 The Economic Situation

Panama's economic structure has undergone important changes in the last 15 years. The Panamanian state's high profile in productive areas of the economy has retreated to a more passive role and left the private sector with a stronger presence. Panama's industrial infrastructure, product of a strong import–substitution policy between 1940 and 1980, was cut in half in only the last decade. Agriculture has also lost its once important growth trends due to new tariff policies (See Table I.1). Panama's economic growth rates has experienced ups and downs with good years and bad years. This situation has created uncertainty among entrepreneurs and workers, as well as among foreign and local investors. The US transfer of the Panama Canal in late 1999 can be considered an important input to the country's economy, as well as an influential contribution to political stability.

Table I.1 GDP Growth Rate Sector, 2003

Sector	Growth Rate (%)
Agriculture	-0.1
Industry	-1.5
Transportation and communication	10.0
Commercial and financial services	1.7
Government and personal services	4.0
Total (adjusted)	4.1

Source: Dirección de Estadística y Censo, Contraloría General de la República and Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas.

The government's report on Panama's financial economic behavior in 2003 “underscores growth in the construction sector (28.6%), sea-port activities (20.5%), mining (32.8%), and fishery (12.6%). This growth has created positive externalities benefiting others economic areas. This internal dynamic has paved the way for the transformation of our economy in its process towards linking-up to the global market.”²

Panama's monetary system has the following characteristics: (1) The U.S. dollar is the medium of exchange, while the *balboa*, the national currency, is a unit of account and exists only as silver coins; (2) capital markets are free, with almost no government intervention or restrictions on banking transactions, financial flows, or interest rates; (3) many international banks operate in Panama; and (4) there is no central bank. As such, the economy of Panama can be considered a “control case” in a simulation experiment, where the monetary and

² Ministry of Economics and Finance, *Informe económico anual 2003*, Panamá: MEF. (See “Executive Summary.”)

macroeconomic equilibrium process can be studied without financial sector distortions, government intervention, or central bank policies. Hence, Panama's experience reveals the "experimental market answer" to many macroeconomic issues, and the central importance of financial integration.

Juan Luis Moreno V., 1999, "Lessons From The Monetary Experience of Panama: A Dollar Economy With Financial Integration," *Cato Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1999). Copyright ©Cato Institute. All rights reserved.

A recent UNDP report contrasts Panama's apparent high living standards compared to its neighbors with "an average income below \$100 per person /month. Half the country's population live in families with an average income below \$100 per person/month. Only 25% of the Panamanian population live in families with an average income over US\$200 per persons/month. Thus, in Panama any person that lives in a family unit with an average income over US\$400 belongs to the top 10% income bracket.³ The report brings forth sharply the unequal income distribution among Panamanians. "The lower half of the population – 50% - has the same income as the richest 1% of the population. The average income of the top 20% is 40 times that of the average income of the bottom 20%."⁴ If Panama had a better income distribution, "poverty could be reduced to a large degree," is the UNDP's final remark.⁵

Inequality can explain Panama's difficulty in confronting respiratory and gastrointestinal illnesses among children under 5 years of age. It can also explain the reappearance of malaria and tuberculosis, diseases that disappeared several decades ago. Public education has also gone through budget cuts.

Unemployment and poverty are two issues that have captured public opinion interest in recent years.⁶ Unemployment rates fluctuate around 14% and the informal work force represents close to 40% of labor. Over 40% of the population lives under the official poverty line.⁷

Table I.2 Economic Indices: Panama, 2002

	Value US\$
GDP (millions)	12,300
GDP <i>per capita</i>	4,241
Population (millions)	2,9
Unemployment Rate (2003)	12.8%

Source: World Bank and Contraloría General de la República.

At present Panama is negotiating a Free Trade Agreement with the US. The US has laid down 4 key areas it considers of most importance. These areas include government contracts,

³ Ricardo Paes de Barros and others (ed.), 2003, *La igualdad como estrategia de combate a la pobreza en Panamá*, Panama: IPEA/PNUD, p. 59.

⁴ Idem, pp. 82-83.

⁵ Idem, pp. 196-19.

⁶ According to William Hughes in 2000 "more workers exist at minimum wage levels than in 1995." See the author in "Panamá: Crisis, recesión, desaceleración o ¿qué?" Money Line, July 2, 2000.

⁷ World Bank, 2000, *Panamá: Estudio sobre pobreza*, Washington: World Bank.

pharmaceutical products, intellectual property and agro business.⁸ Panama has yet to develop its own agenda, mainly due to elections and government turnover.⁹

The Panama Canal Authority reached a record-setting peak registering an income of US\$921 million in 2003, 15% higher than 2002 (US\$799.8 million). The Canal Authority's administrator, Alberto Aleman Zubieta, believes "the new income record, as well as changes in cargo volume, shortening transit time in the Canal and record low accident rates are proof of Panama's responsibility vis-à-vis the operation of its most strategic enterprise."

The Panama Canal's new record-breaking income has two origins: The new toll structure and the growing volume of cargo. Cargo totaling 188.3 million long-tons made the Canal crossing in 2003. Cargo in containers grew 18.8% compared to the previous year. In 2003 a grand total of 11,725 ships transited the Canal, a daily average of 32.1 transits.¹⁰

1.2 Economy and Public Opinion

The survey shows Panamanians pessimistic vis-à-vis the country's economy. Not all Panamanians, however, have the same rationale in explaining their misgivings. Surveys done in recent years (see last section of this chapter) confirm this view. In the March 2004 survey, 53.4% of the population believed the economic situation was bad or very bad (See Figure I.1). Only 5.5% considered the economic situation to be good or very good. The opinions contrast with official statements in early 2004 assuring a rapid comeback of the economy and growth of the national product.

Panamanians are somewhat more optimistic about the future. Almost 33.3% believe that the economic situation will recover soon. Only 17% think that the situation will worsen. Half the population believes that there will be no change. This optimism can be tied to recent official statements foreseeing economic growth.

The perception people have of their own personal economic situation is also pessimistic. However, it is not as gloomy as their feelings vis-à-vis the country. Around 14.5% of those interviewed considered their personal situation as good or very good. However, 4% believe their economic situation is bad or very bad. Over half of the persons interviewed - 60% - did not feel comfortable with the question and preferred saying that their situation was neither good or bad.

The outstanding issue among Panamanians is unemployment. According to government sources over 13% of the active work-force is unemployed and over 40% belong to the so called "informal sector" (workers who are not formally employed). According to the survey, 56.1% believe that unemployment is Panama's main problem. Other economic issues are considered important by 9.2% of those interviewed. Poverty is identified by 7.8%. Almost 75% feel that the economy is the main issue. Corruption is identified by 11.6% of those surveyed. Around 10% believe crime is the top issue.

⁸ Office of the Representative of Foreign Trade of the EEUU.

⁹ *La Prensa*, declarations by Rommel Adames, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade.

¹⁰ Panama Canal Authority, 2003, "*Record de ingresos*," Report sent by the ACP Public Relations Office, Panama (October 31, 2003).

Figure I.1 How Would You Describe the Country's Present Economic Situation?




Figure I.2 How Would You Describe the Country's Economic Situation One Year From Now?




Figure I.3 How Would You Describe Your Economic Situation?





Figure I.4 What are the Main Issues at Present?



1.3 Democracy and Elections

Several weeks after the survey, Panama celebrated its third consecutive general election that turned political power over to the opposition. The May 2, 2004 election was held in a quiet atmosphere, leading to an early admission of defeat by the incumbent party. Martin Torrijos, the PRD candidate, won the May elections with 47% of the vote, a significant advantage over the other three candidates. The PRD also won 41 of the 78 seats in the Legislative Assembly. President Mireya Moscoso's *Arnulfista* Party placed second with 17 seats. The PRD was also able to grab 52 of the country's 75 posts for mayors, including all the Provincial capitals. The results gave Martin Torrijos and the PRD a solid footing in Panama's immediate political future.

Table I.3 Results of Panama's Presidential Elections Held on May 2, 2004

Candidates	Votes	%
Martin Torrijos	711,447	47.4
Guillermo Endara	462,766	30.9
José M. Alemán	245,845	16.4
Ricardo Martinelli	79,595	5.3
Total	1,499,072	100.0

Source: Tribunal Electoral de Panamá

The March 2004 survey also explores the population's electoral behavior in 1999. It also asked what their intentions were looking ahead towards the 2004 elections. The survey was able to discover a trend among voters who were aiming to punish the incumbent, Mireya Moscoso, who governed between 1999 and 2004. Over 40% of the people interviewed said they had voted for the *Arnulfista* Party candidate, Mireya Moscoso, in 1999. In 2004, however, only 14% said they had plans to vote for Jose Miguel Aleman, the new *Arnulfista* presidential candidate. A large segment of the population - over 30% of those who voted for Moscoso in 1999 - said it was planning to vote for the former *Arnulfista* and *Solidaridad* candidate, Guillermo Endara. Almost 15% of those who voted for Moscoso in 1999 said they were voting for opposition candidate, Martin Torrijos.

1.4 Political Culture

Panama has gone through important political changes in the last 20 years. On the one hand, the military regime (1968-1989) was replaced by a democratic government that has since held periodic elections every 5 years with systematic turn-overs between the larger parties. Panama and the US successfully complied with the 1977 Canal Treaties that put an end to Washington's military presence on the Isthmus and transferred the water-way to the Panamanian government in 1999.

On the other hand, Panama has been experimenting with economic adjustment policies during the last two decades. It also has to be underscored that Panama eliminated its military institution in 1990.¹¹

¹¹ For more information consult José Luis Moreno, Marco A. Gandásegui, Olmedo Beluche and Brown Araúz. Among US authors consult Richard Millet and Orlando J. Pérez. See bibliography of this chapter.

The national question (the Panama Canal), political order (democracy), and economic development (impoverishment of the population), in this order, were the issues that confronted Panamanians throughout the twentieth century.¹² Surveys done in recent years indicate that the same issues are still on the top of Panama's agenda. However, the order of preoccupation has turned upside down. At present most Panamanians consider the economy (unemployment and poverty) as the number one issue that must be solved.¹³ This does not mean, however, that Panamanians have lost interest in political and national issues. Panama's relations with the US continue to be paramount.¹⁴

Panama's democracy is high on the agenda of entrepreneurs, workers and other social groups. At present, Panamanians are rather proud of their electoral success-story (1994, 1999 and 2004) with opposition candidates unseating incumbents. However, Panamanians have also feel that democracy is not enough to overcome poverty.¹⁵

This research project was done 15 years after the US invasion and the debacle of the military regime. In this context it is important to review the present situation in order to understand how Panamanians are feeling today, how their attitudes towards democratic institutions and political behavior have evolved. The data that is analyzed in this report were gathered by a field survey organized in March 2004. The survey was applied a little over a month before the May 2, 2004 general elections. The electoral campaign was significant in maintaining a well informed public opinion throughout the country, both in cities and smaller towns.

The results of the survey are presented along with numerous of graphics and bibliographical notes and the questionnaire that was used. Every chapter has an annex with multivariate analysis applied to the data in order to validate the conclusions. This statistical process reinforces the premises and gives substance to the conclusions. In many parts of the report, interesting comparisons of the data are made with the findings of the other seven studies done simultaneously in the region.

The survey will become an important milestone in the ongoing debate over democracy in Panama. This debate goes back to Justo Arosemena's seminal critique on democracy in the twentieth century. Arosemena's ideas on democracy and local government have been a permanent fixture in Panamanian politics for the last century and a half. During the second half of the twentieth century the debate kindled by civil society and political parties ran parallel with issues such as sovereignty and development.¹⁶

¹²Consult Diógenes de la Rosa, Ernesto de la Guardia, Hernán Porras, Ricaurte Soler as well as US authors such as Walter LaFeber and Michael Conniff. All these authors can be found also in the bibliography of this chapter..

¹³Consult public opinion polls that have been published frequently since the mid 1990s presenting these two issues as the most important. The Diecter & Neira reports are a good example. Economists like Rubén Latchman and William Hughes underscore the the changes people's perceptions have experienced in recent years. The authors can be found in the bibliography of this chapter.

¹⁴Jorge Illueca (former President), and Raúl Molina are very outspoken. Local social movements are also articulate in voicing protests at street level. Among these MONADESO and SUNTRACS stand out. Several authors are mentioned in the bibliography.

¹⁵See Martín Torrijos', president-elect, Government Plan, "Una nueva cultura política, una nueva docencia social." Also consult *Martín Torrijos Presidente* web page (www.martin2004.org). An interesting document is UNDP's, 2004, *La democracia en América latina*, Buenos Aires: PNUD.

¹⁶Consult Justo Arosemena, Belisario Porras, and Mario Galindo H. They can be found in the bibliography

In the mid twentieth century, sociologists like Gino Germani promoted empirical studies on democracy. Germani's conceptual emphasis was on modernization and industrialization. He believed these notions were powerful tools in explaining the social transformations in the Latin American region. His focus on political development created conditions for his followers to enhance new methods and techniques that could measure political attitudes and behavior. Germani was aware that in order to understand the political system it was necessary to study the "political participation of the people or at least of the majority of the adult population."¹⁷ Germani placed great emphasis on concepts such as "national identity" and "political stability."

In more recent debates on democracy, the concept of hegemony - as understood by Antonio Gramsci - has been introduced. Germani's notion of stability as well as Samuel Huntington's use of coherence have similar overtones with hegemony.¹⁸ They all point in the direction of a common political ideology that is able to unite all social groups and classes under one set of political values and institutions.

Studies concerning political culture have flourished in Latin America. Among these, F. H. Cardoso's work on the Brazilian industrial bourgeoisie and Alan Touraine's work on political attitudes of the Chilean working class have had long lasting influence.¹⁹ In Panama, liberal social philosophers like Guillermo Andreve, Roque Javier Laurenza, and Hernan Porras made important contributions trying to understand political values.²⁰ Andreve's work dominated much of the twentieth century's liberal political values. He was convinced that universal education would consolidate a new citizenry committed to progress.

Laurenza²¹ was more pessimistic. In his interpretation of Panamanian political values he underscored the cleavages in society and was able to foresee many of the institutional difficulties Panama's political structure suffered in the second half of the twentieth century. Hernan Porras'²² classic work on Panamanian "human groups" underscored diversity as the main feature that enhances Panamanian political life.

1.5 Research on Political Culture

Political debates in Panama have usually placed democracy and its institutions on the back burner. Political debate was geared towards questions of sovereignty and development. In the 1980's democracy came forth with new energy mainly to question the legitimacy of the military

¹⁷Gino Germani, 1969, *Sociología de la modernización*, Buenos Aires: Piados, p 19.

¹⁸Samuel Huntington, 1999, "Political Development and Political Decay," en I. Kabashina y L. White, ed., *Political System and Change*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹⁹See Fernando Enrique Cardoso and Alan Touraine. These two authors are cited in the Chapter 1 Bibliography.

²⁰Guillermo Andreve, 1980, "*Consideraciones sobre el liberalismo*," en R. Soler, *El pensamiento político en los siglos XIX y XX*, Panamá: Universidad de Panamá, pp. 215-235.

²¹Roque Javier Laurenza, 1998, "*El panameño y la nación*," *Tareas* N°100.

²²Hernán Porras, 2002, "Papel histórico de los grupos humanos en Panamá," en *Las clases sociales en Panamá*, Panamá: CELA.

regime. The political debate started to change emphasis as a consequence of the Torrijos-Carter Canal Treaties (1977) and the new economic adjustment policies (1983).²³

The national question and development issues dominated intellectual work among those related in one way or another to the military governments of the 1970's and the 1980's.²⁴ In the 1980's democracy started its comeback and appeared frequently in the media as well as in the political parties agenda rejecting military rule.²⁵

The national question, as long as it was associated to ideological elements such as sovereignty, was believed to be an obstacle to democracy. People were asked to choose between the two priorities: sovereignty or democracy. Some intellectuals, however, strongly believed that prior to democracy a strong national entity had to exist. Others were convinced that democracy was the best political tool that could enhance the success of a national goal.²⁶

In the 1990's after the US military intervention, democracy became the central issue of almost all debates, displacing national questions and development issues. Several US intellectuals added fuel with their ideas to the debate assuring that the new found democracy could help solve economic and cultural issues still outstanding.²⁷

Among Panamanians, after several failed efforts to theorize on democracy and its future implications, an uncomfortable silence has taken over. Several intellectuals like Arias Calderon, Galindo H, and Ardito Barletta²⁸ have spoken out. However, their efforts go mainly unheeded. From a more critical perspective, Simeón Gonzalez and Ruben D. Rodriguez have tried to refocus the political debate by incorporating the national question (populism) with limited success as well.²⁹

²³A good example of the new trends are the documents produced by the Economic Policy and Planning Ministry (Ministerio de Planificación y Política Económica, MIPPE), published between 1984 and 1994. The main research themes tend to change and democracy starts to dominate resources displacing other problems.

²⁴Consult Ricardo Arias Calderón, 1982, "The Christian Democrats in Latin America: The Fight for Democracy," *Caribbean Review*, Vol 11, N°2, pp34-37. Also consult Humberto López Tirone, 1986, *Panamá. Una revolución democrática*, Panamá: Joan Boldo i Climent.

²⁵Consult Ricardo Arias Calderón, 1982, "The Christian Democrats in Latin America: The Fight for Democracy," *Caribbean Review*, Vol 11, N°2, pp34-37. También ver Humberto López Tirone, Humberto, 1986, *Panamá. Una revolución democrática*, Panamá: Joan Boldo i Climent.

²⁶Ricarte Soler and Simeón González are two well known representatives of the first focus, while Mario Galindo can be considered a representative of the other perspective. The authors can be found in the bibliography.

²⁷Consult Richard Millet, 1993, "Preparing for the year 2000," In M.Falcoff y R. Millet, ed., *Searching for Panama. The US Panama Relationship and Democratization*, Washington. Also Margaret Scranton, 2000, "Electoral Reform and the Institutionalization of the Electoral Tribunal in Post Invasion Panama," In Orlando Pérez, ed., *Post Invasion Panama*, Lanham, Md.

²⁸Consult Arias Calderón, 1995, *Conciencia crítica*, Panamá: IPEC. The autor publishes his newspaper articles in this book. Mario Galindo, 1998, *Reelección: Opción perniciosa*, Panamá: ILDEA. This is the author's conference on political parties and their responsibilities concerning democracy. Nicolás Ardito Barletta, 1993, "Democracia y desarrollo," en *Revista Panameña de Sociología*, N°8, pp. 118-205. The autor tries to reconcile democracy with the on going economic adjustments, leaving behind old notions associated with planning.

²⁹*Tareas* has published several articles griten by González and Rodríguez. Both authors can be in the bibliography.

1.6 Empirical Studies

Panama does not have an extensive bibliography vis-à-vis theoretical studies on political culture. It is also true that there are not many empirical studies concerning political institutions or behavior. In the early 1990's, Orlando Pérez, then with the University of Pittsburgh, did research on political attitudes. These studies were limited to Panama City, in cooperation with CELA.³⁰ Another research project was prepared during the 1993-94 presidential campaign by CELA. For the first time a full description of the Panamanian voter was prepared, their perceptions were analyzed and their values were scrutinized in order to understand their electoral behavior. The results were put together in several short volumes that circulated within the country.³¹

CELA's research project enclosed five field surveys done between September 1993 and March 1994, covering an average of 1200 adult persons (at home) on each occasion. The survey results allowed CELA to associate voting with age, education, income as well as residence.

CELA concluded that "the more education a person has, the more interest he shows in voting." Political indifference is mainly among illiterate persons or people with low grades of education. It was also detected that income was an important factor in explaining electoral behavior. Close to 90% of those interviewed, with high or middle incomes, said they were going to vote. Among persons belonging to the lower income brackets only 80% said they would vote.³²

After the 1994 elections, the US Information Agency (Office of Research and Media Reaction), organized a nation-wide survey covering a sample of 1,138 persons. According to the Report published by the Agency, "the electoral success (in 1994) has apparently led many Panamanians to reevaluate the basic component of their democracy." The survey uncovered a positive side of Panamanian attitudes towards the levels reached by their democracy: Free elections, civil liberties, accountability and transparency³³

The US Agency also brought forth an interesting aspect of Panamanian political culture: "It is possible that persons with higher education recognize the importance of certain key aspects of the society they live in and can identify its shortcomings. As a result, the dissonance persons with higher education present is higher than that shown among persons with lower levels of education."³⁴

In 1998 and 2003 a Costa Rican based research group, PROCESOS, organized two surveys that "described and analyzed the political culture of the adult population. The study compared attitudes pertaining to 1998 and 2003 as well as doing cross country comparisons in the region."

³⁰See the Pérez publications cited in the Chapter 1 Bibliography.

³¹ Consult CELA, 1994, *Informe del proyecto. Transición hacia la democracia y reconversión institucional*, Panamá: CELA. The study was partially financed by the European Economic Community's office in Panama.

³²CELA, 1994, *Encuesta elecciones 94*, "Informe N°5," Panamá, pp. 2 y 12.

³³United States Information Agency, Office of Research and Media Reaction, 1994, *Benchmarks in Democracy Building: Public Opinion and Global Democratization, A Case Study of Four Countries: Ukraine, Romania, Panama and El Salvador*, A Special Report prepared for USAID by the Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA, Washington, D.C. The full report can be found at <http://www.civnet.org/resources/teach/research/>.

³⁴Idem. The survey findings of the US agencies in 1994 coincide with the CELA studies of that same year. They tend to reconfirm the theoretical themes developed by Panamanian intellectual Guillermo Andreve during the first decades of the twentieth century.

According to PROCESOS, in 2003 “close to 50% of Panamanians were proud or satisfied with the existing democracy in the country. Half the population believes Panama enjoys a democratic regime. The survey shows that those persons with more education are less satisfied with Panamanians democracy.” These results mirror the findings of the 2004 survey.

The survey concluded that “79.2% Panamanians felt elections should be held on a regular basis. Frustration due to lack of solutions on behalf of politicians did not weaken the belief in democratic institutions and electoral processes. Despite problems relating to unemployment and poverty, Panamanians are convinced political reforms can help solve government drawbacks.”

The results of a recent UNDP Latin American survey were published in April 2004 startling many political observers. According to the survey, 54% of those interviewed would accept a non-democratic government if it could guarantee solutions to the existing economic problems.³⁵ In the report’s forward, UNDP Administrator Mark Brown states that “at the heart of the problem is the fact that democracy has spread throughout Latin America, however its roots are not deep. This explains why the report warns how over 50% of Latin Americans would be willing to sacrifice a democratic government if it would lead to social and economic progress.”³⁶ The report includes indicators on democratic development, perceptions of democracy, and opinions concerning political leaders (rulers, political parties, corruption).

1.7 Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with issues concerning Panama’s recent economic performance. According to the results of the survey, most persons are not satisfied with the country’s economic progress.

This chapter has also analyzed several of the studies that have been done recently on Panamanian political culture. The three issues that have worried Panamanians during the twentieth century, and are still present today, are the Panama Canal, democracy, and economic problems such as unemployment and poverty.

In the next chapter we will cover the methodological aspects of the survey study: How it was prepared, how the field work was organized and how the data was analyzed. In the following chapters we will examine how committed Panamanians are to defending their democracy. We will also examine local governments and rule of law (*justicia*) in Panama. We will explore how corruption is perceived by Panamanians, as well as how people tend to organize themselves and participate in political activities.

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³⁵ PNUD, 2004, La democracia en América latina, Buenos Aires.

³⁶ *Idem.* p11.

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2.0 Methodology and Distribution of the Survey

As stated in Chapter I, the present study is based on a national survey carried out during March 13-16, 2004. In this second chapter we will present the methodology used to select the survey's sample and discuss the main socio-demographic data identifying the distribution patterns.³⁷

For this study a probabilistic sample was established in all its stages, except at the level of the home where quotas were used taking into account sex and age, stratified, multistage, and by conglomerates. The parameters established were the following: 1. A minimum of 1500 cases; 2. Conglomerates between 6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas for each sample point (census segment); 3. A minimum of 125 sample points established in a probabilistic form.

Before continuing with the analysis of the sample it is important to establish the general parameters which define a probability sample, what it is and what it is for. A statistical sample is a systematic process to select some elements (sample) of a group (population) in order to make some inferences on the whole group; for a sample to be useful it should reflect the similarities and differences found in the whole group. The sample refers to the process of selection of the elements, subjects or cases of a population. For the sample to be useful it is necessary that the elements chosen represent well the whole population. If the sample does not fulfill this purpose it is said to be *biased or tendentious*; otherwise, when the sample has been well selected, it is said to be a *representative sample*. It is said that a sample is probabilistic, if its selection is governed by means of established laws of probability. That is to say, each unit of population has a determined and knowable probability of selection.

For the purpose of this survey, the national territory was divided among 4 strata made up by geographical areas of the country. The metropolitan area made up by the districts of Panama (capital of the Republic) and San Miguelito. The eastern area made up by the provinces of Panama (excluding the districts of Panama and San Miguelito), Colon and Darien. The central area made up by the provinces of Coclé, Herrera, Los Santos and Veraguas. Finally, the western area made up by the provinces of Bocas del Toro and Chiriqui as well as the Ngobe-Bugle Territory. These areas - called regions in the official literature - have been those of common use on the part of Government and private planners who design public policies and development programs. Insular areas of the Pacific coast as well as the Caribbean were excluded due to the high cost and difficult access. The unit object of the study is made up by the population 18 years of age and older living in private homes. Population residing in collective homes were excluded, such as hospitals, orphanages, schools, garrisons, hotels, etc. To avoid for the sample becoming biased in favor of more populated areas, each stratum was divided in urban and rural areas with a probabilistic selection of the conglomerates to be polled in each region. The distribution of the sample among the various strata was made proportional to the population of the stratum.

A total of 1,639 persons were interviewed which means that for the whole sample the error was of +/- 3.1, in the worse of cases.³⁸ With a sample of this size the poll provides a precise representation of the citizen's opinions, with an error no greater or lesser than 3.1% of the results

³⁷ Annex B contains a technical and complete description of the sample.

³⁸ The worse case arises when the answers are divided 50/50 making it very difficult to measure which is the preferred answer.

obtained if we could interview all the citizens of Panama. An error of this nature means that if we obtain repeated samples of this size, 95% of these would reflect the opinions of the population with an inaccuracy no greater than +/- 3.1%. For the strata the errors were: Metropolitan, +/- 5.1; Eastern area, +/- 5.7; Central area, +/- 7.3; western area, +/- 7.6. It is worth noting that the sample is self-weighted, that is to say, no type of weights have been applied to the results.

The field work was carried out in an efficient and professional manner by the Center for Latin American Studies, "Justo Arosemena."

2.1 Distribution of the Study

In this section we submit some social-demographic data defining the general content of the sample. Figure II.1 shows the distribution by strata.

Figure II.1 Distribution of the Sample According to Strata





Table II.1 Distribution of Simple by Size of City

		Frecuencia	Porcentaje	Porcentaje válido	Porcentaje acumulado
Válidos	Nacional Capital (metropolitan area)	641	39.1	39.1	39.1
	Large Cities	165	10.1	10.1	49.2
	Médium Cities	270	16.5	16.5	65.6
	Small Cities	65	4.0	4.0	69.6
	Rural Area	498	30.4	30.4	100.0
	Total	1639	100.0	100.0	

Table II.1 shows the distribution of the simple according to the size of the city or place weher the interview took place. Figure II.2 shows how the population interviewed was distributed according to gender.

Figure II.2 Distribution of the Sample by Gender



According to Figure II.3, 48% of the population interviewed was under 35 years of age, a relatively young population.

Figure II.3 Distribution of the Sample According to Age




Figure II.4 Distribution of the Sample by Education






Figure II.5 Distribution of the Sample According to Income



The distribution by income (Figure II.5) indicates that the great majority of the population have incomes lower than \$400. Figure II.6 shows a significant relationship between income and place of residence. We see that rural areas have less than half of the average income than the national capital. This result reflects the unequal distribution of wealth in Panama, one of the countries with the worst income distribution in Latin America.

Figure II.6 Income and Residence



2.2 Conclusion

This Chapter has presented a brief sketch of the methodology used to build the sample which is the basis of the survey and we have provided basic data of the distribution of the sample. In the following chapters we shall examine various aspects of the political culture of Panama.

3.0 Support to a Stable Democracy

Chapter III examines the democratic values and the support Panamanians provide to democratic political stability. As already stated in Chapter I, more than 14 years have elapsed since a U.S. military intervention removed Manuel Noriega from power and put an end to 21 years of military rule. During these years Panamanians have had three presidential elections and two referenda to amend the Constitution. These elections have been distinguished by their transparency and competitiveness. In general, in recent years Panama has been able to build basic democratic institutions. It is time, therefore, to analyze the levels of support toward a stable democratic regime and compare Panama with other countries in the region. The analysis used in Chapter III is based on a plan developed by Mitchell A. Seligson, where support for the political system and the promotion of political tolerance are requisites for democratic political stability.³⁹

The emphasis on support for democratic stability originates from the premise that in a democratic regime the opinion of the population, even though not wholly determinant, is one of the most important factors of political stability. In great measure, the legitimacy of the system depends on the opinions of the population. Juan Linz, in his work on the breakdown of a democratic system says that legitimacy depends in great measure in that the population believes, in spite of their problems, that the existing institutions are better than any other alternatives.⁴⁰ We are not speaking here of the incumbent government but of the political institutions. Seymour Martin Lipset defines legitimacy as “the capacity of a system to generate and maintain the belief that the existing institutions are the appropriate ones for society.” The theory of Lipset is based on the premise that the political system receives support and therefore legitimacy from the citizens and may survive even when faced with an economic or political crisis.⁴¹

On the other hand, David Easton, a U.S. political analyst, speaks of two important types of support: “Specific” support and “diffuse” support. The first refers to the support which the population renders the incumbent government. Even though this support is important for the rulers in that it may influence the capacity of the government to carry out its public policies, it is not so important as the second type of support. “Diffuse” support means support to the institutions, that is, the political system and the institutions defining it. The political system may survive even though the government or the incumbent president was unpopular, but becomes endangered when the institutions lose support and therefore, legitimacy.⁴²

3.1 The Existence of a Political Community in Panama

The first fact we analyze is the existence of a “political community” in Panama. That is to say, how much do Panamanians support the idea of a nation. Without a national base common to all,

³⁹ See Mitchell A. Seligson, “Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America,” *Interdisciplinary Studies of Latin America and the Caribbean* 11, No. 2 July-December (2000): 5-29.

⁴⁰ See Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

⁴¹ See Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University press, expanded edition, 1981; Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited.” *American Sociological Review* 59 (February 1994): 1-22.

⁴² David Easton, “A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October 1975), pp. 435-457.

it is difficult to build a coherent and institutionalized political system. If no common nationality exists to attract the population, the country could disintegrate.⁴³

Figure III.1 gives us the answer to the question: Is there a political community in Panama? The reply, as we may be able to observe is that there is. The survey asked “To what degree are you proud to be a Panamanian?” (B43). The answer is in the form of a scale which goes from 1 meaning “nothing” to 7 which means “much.”

Figure III.1 Proud to be Panamanian According to Strata





Figure III.1 indicates that more than 90% of Panamanians in all strata, except the Western Area where 89%, show “much” support to the question. There is no doubt, therefore, that the Panamanians have a solid political community. To be able to analyze if these results vary by the size of the population we analyzed the confidence intervals. For this analysis and those following thereafter in this chapter, we have re-decoded the variables of support (the series B in the questionnaire) from a scale of 1-7 to a scale of 0-100, this allows us to submit the results in a clear fashion using a common metric measurement.⁴⁴

⁴³ See Pipa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

⁴⁴ The conversion is made subtracting 1 from each point in such a way that all of them have a rank of 0 to 6 not 1 to 7. After each point is divided by six, to provide a range of 0 to 1. Finally, this point is multiplied by 100.

Figure III.2 Pride in Being Panamanian: Confidence Intervals by Sample



As we may be able to observe from Figure III.2, the variation is very small and the pride to be Panamanian is widely spread in the whole country.

3.2 Institutional System Support


In this section we shall analyze the opinions related to support to various specific institutions. The survey asked the degree of trust people had in several political and private institutions. In Table III.1 we can see the average for each question based on the re-codified scale of 0-100. First, the great difference is between the pride of being Panamanian and the pride in the political system. The first receives an average of 97 and the second, 48.5. Additionally, when asked “to what degree should there be support for the Panamanian political system?” the average increases just to 60.1.

We notice that the institution receiving the highest level of trust is the Electoral Tribunal. This is not surprising given the fact that all the analysts of the Panamanian democratization process have praised the work done by the Tribunal in organizing several electoral processes in a clear, competitive and free manner. We should not be surprised either that the institutions with less level of trust are the political parties, the national assembly and the national government. These results can be seen in a more prominent fashion in Figure III.3.

Table III.1 System Support Indicators

	N	Average
B43R Proud to be Panamanian	1628	97.0
B20R Catholic Church	1616	78.7
B37R Mass Media	1603	68.5
B11R Electoral Tribunal	1613	66.1
B47R Free Elections	1616	65.5
B2R Institutions	1593	62.0
B6R Political System Support	1590	60.1
B18R Police	1626	58.4
B17R Ombudsman's Office	1552	54.3
B19R General Comptroller's Office	1554	52.6
B4R Pride in the Political System	1592	48.5
B10AR Justice System	1591	48.3
B1R Just trial	1570	47.6
B32R Municipal Government	1603	47.5
B31R Supreme Court of Justice	1560	45.7
B16R General Attorney's Office	1538	45.0
B3R Basic Rights	1581	44.3
B14R National Government	1602	38.3
B13R Legislative Assembly	1592	36.6
B21R Political Party	1616	32.9
N Valid (according to the list)		1426

Figure III.3 Trust in Various Institutions



The relevant question is, How does Panama compare to other countries? For this analysis a system support scale has been built using five of the questions in the series, B1-B6. (B5 was eliminated some years ago).⁴⁵ Figure III.4 shows the results when we compare the average in the system support scale among the countries which are part of this project.

⁴⁵ In the case of Panama, these variables contain a high level of trustworthiness with a coefficient of Cronbach Alpha=.73.

Figure III.4 System Support: Panama in a Comparative Perspective




Figure III.4 indicates that Panama exhibits the fourth lowest level of support of the eight countries herein studied. Panama is beneath Colombia, Mexico, El Salvador and Costa Rica but above Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras. In the 0-100 scale, the support average in Panama is situated above (53) half of the scale.

3.3 Predictors of Institutional System Support

We are now going to analyze the factors affecting the levels of the system support. For this analysis we will use multiple regression⁴⁶ with the support scale as the dependent variable. Table III.2 (see Appendix B) provides the results of this analysis for which we have used a variety of independent variables from the common socio-demographic ones of age, gender, education, wealth level and size of the place where the interviewed lived, to political variables of theoretical importance such as the opinions on the condition of the national and personal economy, interpersonal trust, victimization from crime and fear of crime in the neighborhood and the nation, among others.

Table III.2 displays those independent variables whose impact on system support is statistically significant. It is worth noting that the results of the regression indicates that education, age, level of wealth, to be a victim of a crime, interpersonal trust, and attitudes toward the the impact of crime for the welfare of the country are not significant when we control for other variables.

⁴⁶ This type of analysis allows us to find which independent variables have greater impact in the variation of the dependent variable when we keep each independent variable constant.

We now proceed to submit several figures clearly indicating the measure in which the significant variables impact system support. In Figure III.5 we can observe that women show an average system support greater than men. Nevertheless, the difference is pretty small and an analysis of variation on the average indicate that the difference between men and women is not significant.

Figure III.5 System Support and Gender






Figure III.6 shows the results by size of the community. We can observe that there is a marked tendency to increase system support as the size of the place of residence is smaller. The rural areas show the highest level of system support. The individuals living in the nation's capital have the lowest level of system support. This could be because the individuals in the capital have greater access to mass media and therefore to information as to the actions of the government and the political institutions.

Figure III.6 System Support According to Size of the Community



The Figure III.7 indicates that as evaluations of the economic situation of the country are more negative, there is less system support. These results, although not surprising, confirm the hypothesis that the economic situation of the country affects in a significant manner the political system support.

Figure III.7 System Support According to Country's Economic Situation



The following Figure (III.8) clearly shows that the evaluations as to how the economic situation of the country will be in the next twelve months have a significant impact in the political system

support. Once again, we may be able to say that the economic situation of the country has a negative effect on the support the population gives the political system.

Figure III.8 System Support According to Future Economic Situation






Figure III.9 shows that the evaluation of the services rendered by the municipality affect negatively support to the political system. Given that the municipalities in Panama are, in general, weak in the services they render, these results must cause concern to the government of Panama.

Figure III.9 Support to System Due to Services by the Municipality.



One of the most important topics for the new democracies is crime and the fear becoming its victim. In a later chapter, the report analyzes the topic of crime more deeply, but in the next Figure (III.10) we can observe the significant impact the sense of insecurity in the neighborhood has on support for the system. It is clear that those individuals that feel greater fear of becoming victims of crime give less support to the political system; the same system that has failed to maintain public order and fight crime in the opinions of those interviewed.

Figure III.10 Support to System Due to Fear of Crime in the Neighborhood



People's satisfaction on how democracy functions has an important effect on support for the political situation. Figure III.11 shows that as the individuals grow unsatisfied with democracy in Panama, their support for the political system weakens. Figure III.12 shows the ratio of individuals that are unsatisfied with democracy in Panama. According to the study, 51.8% are satisfied with democracy and 48.2% are unsatisfied.

Figure III.11 System Support and Satisfaction With Democracy





Figure III.12 Satisfaction With Democracy in Panama



In the following figure we observe that the majority (53.8%) of the persons interviewed evaluate the work of Mrs. Mireya Moscoso⁴⁷ as “neither good, nor bad,” that is to say acceptable, 34.8% evaluate it as bad or very bad. In large measure these results are surprising given the degree of non satisfaction with the government that other surveys have found, and defeat of the official candidate in the past elections of May 2. However, we believe this may be the result of the tendency of the interviewed persons to seek an intermediate point - less extreme - between negative and positive evaluations.

⁴⁷ Mrs. Moscoso’s presidential term ends September 1, 2004, when she is scheduled to transfer power to Mr. Martin Torrijos.

Figure III.13 Evaluation of Mireya Moscoso's Government




Figure III.14 System Support and Evaluation of Mireya Moscoso's Government




Figure III.14 indicates that as the evaluations of the government are more negative, support to the system diminishes significantly. These results show the impact that the “specific” support has, as David Easton says, on the “diffused” support. That is to say, the evaluations of the efficiency of the current government may, under certain circumstances, affect support that people may grant to the political system generally.

Figure III.15 System Support and Ideology




Figure III.15 shows that as the political ideology of the person interviewed becomes moves more to the right, the higher their support for the system. This shows the phenomenon that exists in Panama where government policy, and the system in general, is quite conservative or of the right wing. The left wing is not a strong electoral force in the country, at least not in the last 15 years, therefore it must not be a surprise their lack support for the political system.

The results of the regression analysis indicate that political efficacy, that is to say, the sense that people are able to solve problems with their political effort and involvement, has a significant impact on the support for the system. In Figure III.16 30.9% of the persons interviewed believe that there is “much” probability that the people’s effort may help to solve the community’s problems. Another 33.7% believe that there is “some” probability. Adding up these two groups we have an ample percentage, 64.6% say that the people’s effort may help to solve the community’s problems.

Figure III.16 Probability That People's Effort May Solve Community's Problems





Figure III.17 indicates that as the political efficacy diminishes, there is less support for the system. Generally, the individuals with low political efficacy are alienated from the system in as-much as they do not believe in the possibility of affecting the problems of the community or in a positive manner. Therefore, we must not be surprised that these persons give less support to the political system in general.


Figure III.17 System Support and the Ability of Solving Community's Problems



Finally, the regression analysis indicates that the experience with corruption is a significant factor on support for the system. Those persons that have been victims of corruption tend to have

less support for the system. The impact of corruption on support for the system have been proven in several regional studies.⁴⁸ In Figure III.18 we can see that support for the political system diminishes significantly as the person becomes a victim of multiple acts of corruption. Moreover, we can observe that those individuals that have not been victims of corruption (the large majority of 82.1%) show support for the system above the average for the scale.⁴⁹ The persons that have been victims of a corruption act already show a level of support for the system below the average of the scale.

Figure III.18 Support to System Due to Victimization of Corruption



3.4 Political Tolerance

In this section we proceed to investigate the levels of political tolerance that exist in Panama and to compare them with the other countries in the study. Political tolerance is one of the most important democratic values. In the previous section we have analyzed support for the political system. Support for the system is important for political stability, but it does not guarantee democracy. Therefore, political tolerance, defined as acceptance by the individual of the right of others to express different opinions, is the key to establishing a stable democratic regime. The literature on political tolerance is extensive.⁵⁰ One of the most discussed topics is the manner of

⁴⁸See Mitchell A. Seligson and Polibio Cordova, 2002, *Auditoria de la democracia: Ecuador*, Quito: CEDATOS; Mitchell A. Seligson, 2002, "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 64, No. 2 Mayo: 408-33.

⁴⁹The average scale of support to the system is 52.6.

⁵⁰ See, Samuel c. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955); Mitchell A. Seligson, and Dan Caspi, "Arabs in Israel: Political Tolerance and Ethnic Conflict," *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 19 (February 1983), 55-66; Mitchell A. Seligson and Dan Caspi, "Toward and Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica," *Comparative Political Studies* 15 (1983b), 385-404; and Mitchell A. Seligson, and Dan Caspi "Threat, Ethnicity and Education: Tolerance Toward the Civil Liberties of the Arab Minority in Israel (in Hebrew)," *Megamot* 15 (May 1982), 37-53; John L. Sullivan, James E. Pierson, and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982); James L. Gibson, 1993, "Perceived Political Freedom in the Soviet-Union." *Journal of Politics* 55:4

measuring tolerance.⁵¹ This study measures tolerance as an answer to a series (D in the questionnaire) that inquires, using a 1-10 scale, up to what extent people approve or disapprove that “persons that only criticize the form of government” may exercise a series of liberties or rights.

The questions used for this analysis are the following:

The next questions ask your opinion on different ideas the people living in Panama have. Always use the 10 points scale.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Firmly disapproves									Firmly approves	Doesn't know

- D1.** There are persons that always speak bad of the form of government of Panama, not only of the current government, but the form of government, ¿with what firmness do you approve or disapprove the right to vote of those persons? Please read the scale number: [Sound out: Up to what point?]
- D2.** With what firmness do you approve or disapprove that these persons may carry out peaceful demonstrations with the purpose of expressing their point of view? Please read number.
- D3.** With what firmness do you approve or disapprove that these persons may run as candidates for public offices?
- D4.** With what firmness do you approve or disapprove that these persons may go on television in order to give a speech?


For our analysis, the variables of 0-10 scale have been re-codified, the logic here is the same as the scale of support for the system, although the manner of transforming the variables is somewhat different.⁵² The results of each question may be seen in Figure III.19.

November 936-974; James L. Gibson, 1992a, “Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be ‘Least Liked?’” *American Journal of Political Science* 36:2 May 560-577; James L. Gibson, 1992b, “The Political Consequences of Intolerance: Cultural Conformity and Political Freedom” *American Political Science Review* 86:2, 338-356; James L. Gibson, 1988, “Political Tolerance and Political Repression during the McCarthy Red Scare.” *American Political Science Review* 82, June, 511-529; James L. Gibson 1989, “The Policy Consequences of Political Intolerance: Political Repression during the Vietnam War Era.” *Journal of Politics* 51: 13-35; James L. Gibson and R. Bingham, 1985, “The Behavioral Consequences of Political Tolerance.” In Gibson and Bingham, *Civil Liberties and Nazis: The Skokie Free-Speech Controversy*. New York: Praeger.

⁵¹For an extensive discussion of this topic see the section on political tolerance in Mitchell A. Seligson, *Auditoria de la democracia: Ecuador*, University of Pittsburg and CEDATOS, 2002- 45-46.

⁵²The conversion is carried out reducing 1 of each score, so that all of them may have a range of 0 to 9 before one of 1 to 10. Then each score is divided for nine, so that they are placed in a range of 0 to 1. Finally, this score is multiplied by 100. These questions have a level of acceptable dependability to create a scale, with an Alpha =.80.

Figure III.19 Political Tolerance in Panama



In all cases the average approval is above the half-point of the 0-100 scale. This implies that Panamanians, generally, express an ample political tolerance. Among the four forms of participation, protest receives the largest approval and to be candidate the least.

In order to analyze these results better it is necessary to place them in the context of the the other 7 countries in the project. Figure III.20 shows that the Panamanians express the largest level of political tolerance of all the countries in this study. These results are quite encouraging inasmuch as Panama has a level of political tolerance significantly larger than Costa Rica, one of the countries with the oldest and most stable democracy in Latin America.

Figure III.20 Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective




Table III.3 (see Appendix B) presents the results of a multiple regression analysis that shows the predictors of political tolerance in Panama. In the table we observe that education, sex, size of the community, wealth and ideology are significant factors that influence the levels of political tolerance.

Figure III.21 Tolerance and Education




Figure III.21 indicates that there is a close relation between education and political tolerance. As the level of education increases so does tolerance. These results indicate the value of investing in education in order to increase democratic values.

Figure III.22 Tolerance and Gender Controlled by Education





Figure III.22 indicates that women show less political tolerance than men in Panama, even when controlled by education.

Figure III.23 Tolerance and Size of the Community



According to Figure III.23 political tolerance reduces significantly as the size of the place of residence reduces. We can observe a large decline in political tolerance between the National Capital and the Large Cities on one side and the other levels on the other.

Figure III.24 Tolerance and Ideology




Figure III.24 indicates that political tolerance in Panama increases as the persons interviewed are more of right wing. But, the analysis of variance indicates that the difference is not significant.

Also, we can observe that there is a considerable variation in the left, probably the result of one or two cases in category “2” that distorts the results for that end of the ideology scale. It is worth to mention that there are only 21 cases in category “2” and therefore one or two cases may distort the results.

Figure III.25 Tolerance and Wealth




Figure III.25 presents the results of political tolerance due to wealth.⁵³ As wealth increases political tolerance also increases. These results validate those of education, inasmuch as wealth and education are related.

3.5 Support to a Stable Democracy

We will now analyze the relationship between political tolerance and support for the system. This analysis is based on a framework created by Mitchell A. Seligson in other reports of the Latin American Public Opinion Project of the University of Pittsburgh. The analysis is based in dividing each scale by half (50 of 0-100) and crossing both variables to obtain a 2x2 table that shows us the theoretical relationship between tolerance and support for the system. It is important to remember that this framework only applies in electoral democracies, inasmuch as the effect of high or low support for the system and tolerance would be very different in case of an authoritarian regime. Table III.4 presents the framework.

⁵³Wealth is measured by a scale constructed by adding the variables (R series in the survey) that inquire about different material goods and how many the persons interviewed own.

Table III.4 Theoretical Relation Between Tolerance and Support to the System⁵⁴

Support for the institutional system	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown

Mitchell A. Seligson explains the logic of the classifications in the following manner, “Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome.”⁵⁵ In cases where tolerance is low, but support for the system is high, “then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.”⁵⁶ In the situation of low support for the system the possibility of instability in the political system may arise. In the case where there is high level of tolerance, “it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence.”⁵⁷ On the contrary if there is a low level of tolerance, “the breakdown of democratic order seems to be the most logical result.”⁵⁸ Nevertheless, it is very important to note that public opinions cannot determine the breakdown of a political system. There are countless factors influencing this, from the economic conditions and the geopolitical climate, to the policies adopted by the elite and the governments in question. However, there is no doubt that a political system that suffers from little support and where the citizens are intolerable is more susceptible to a democratic breakdown.

3.6 Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and Support for the System

In the next pages we shall analyze the relation between tolerance and support for the political system in Panama.

⁵⁴This theoretical setting was presented in Mitchell A. Seligson, “Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America,” *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 July-December (2000): 5-29

⁵⁵Mitchell A. Seligson, *Auditoria de la democracia: Ecuador*, University of Pittsburg y CEDATOS, 2002, 52.

⁵⁶Idem.

⁵⁷Idem.

⁵⁸Idem.


Table III.5 Empirical Relation Between Tolerance and System Support in Panama

Support to institutional system	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy 37.9%	Authoritarian Stability 16.1%
Low	Unstable Democracy 30.3%	Democratic Breakdown 15.7%

We can see that 37.9% of Panamanians support the political system and express a high level of tolerance. 30.3% express political tolerance, but low level of support for the system. These results indicate that in Panama 68.2% of the interviewed population are in the boxes of general support for democracy, and a plurality express opinions consistent with stable democracy. How is Panama compared with the rest of the countries in this project?

Figure III.26 presents the percentage of persons that are in the stable democracy box for the eight countries.⁵⁹ As we can see, Panama is the third country with the largest percentage of support to stable democracy, behind Costa Rica and Mexico.

Figure III.26 Support to Stable Democracy: Eight Countries



⁵⁹In order to create this graphic, a new variable, known “bar2x2” was created in the database. This variable eliminates cases in which there is incomplete data on the measure of tolerance or on the system support. Coding was:

si (psa5r = 1 and tolr = 1) democ = 100.
 si (psa5r = 1 and tolr = 2) democ = 0.
 si (psa5r = 2 and tolr = 2) democ = 0.
 si (psa5r = 2 and tolr = 1) democ = 0.

We now proceed to analyze the predictors of support for a stable democracy. A logistic regression shall be used for this analysis, inasmuch as the dependent variable is a dichotomy (support or not for a stable democracy).

We can see that the significant variables are: to be a victim of a criminal act, satisfaction with democracy, support for the work carried out by the government, political efficacy and victimization due to corruption. The analysis shows that the demographic variables such as age, sex, wealth, ideology, education or place of residence are not significant factors.

Figure III.27 Support for Stable Democracy and Victimization by Crime




Figure III.27 shows the impact of being a victim of crime on support for a stable democracy. Those individuals that have not been victims of crime support stable democracy 50% more than those individuals who have suffered acts of crime. These results point to the importance of fighting crime and the problem that crime entails for young and weak democracies such as Panama.

Figure III.28 presents the results when we analyze the impact of satisfaction with democracy for support of stable democracy. As we can see, as the persons feel unsatisfied with how democracy works in Panama, the less support they lend to opinions supporting a stable democracy. Figure III.11, above, indicates to us that the impact of the satisfaction on the democracy is given due to the important relation there is between the support for the political system and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. That is to say, support for the political system diminishes significantly as persons are unsatisfied with democracy in Panama.

Figure III.28 Support to Stable Democracy Due to Satisfaction With the Democracy






Figure III.29 indicates that as the evaluation of the government (in this case that of President Mireya Moscoso) becomes more negative, there is less support for a stable democracy. We are observing herein the impact of what David Easton calls, “specific” support. We see that the evaluation of the performance of the incumbent government, under certain circumstances, negatively affects the support that the citizens render to the system in general, and to democracy in particular.

Figure III.29 Support to Stable Democracy and Evaluation of Moscoso's Government




In the following Figure (III.30) we can observe that political efficacy, that is to say, the person's perception that his or her efforts are useful to help resolve the problems of his/her community, is an important factor in support for stable democracy. Persons with greater political efficacy exhibit more support for a stable democracy than those with low efficacy. That is to say, persons who feel that they can have a positive impact on the community's problems with their efforts, probably are less alienated from the system and therefore give more support to it.

Figure III.30 Support for a Stable Democracy and Political Efficacy



The multiple regression analysis indicates to us that corruption victimization is a significant factor in support for a stable democracy. We can see in Figure III.31 that those persons that have not been victims of corruption, support stable democracy above the average for the scale. We may note the dramatic fall in support for a stable democracy as the acts of corruption increase. There is no doubt that corruption is a factor that wears out democratic support.

Figure III.31 Support to Stable Democracy Due to Victimization of Corruption



3.7 Other Measures of Support for Democracy

In this section we shall analyze other forms of measuring support for democracy. The survey asked a question that has been part of the surveys of the Latinbarometer since 1995.

DEM2. With which of the following three phrases you agree more:

- (1) To people like myself, it makes no difference a democratic or a non democratic regime.
- (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.
- (3) In some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.
- (8) NS/NR

Figure III.32 shows us that more than 70% of Panamanians prefer democracy than any other form of government.

Figure III.32 Preference for Type of Regime




Figure III.33 Support for the Return of the Military or Maintain Current System






Figure III.33 shows that more than 80% of Panamanians support the current political system against the return of a military government. Additionally, the survey inquired: “**DEM11**. Do you believe that in our country there is a need for a strong hand government, or that problems may be resolved with the participation of everyone? (1) Strong hand government (2) Participation of all (8) Does not respond,” Figure III.34 shows that 70% of Panamanians prefer that problems be solved with the participation of everyone.

Figure III.34 Support a Strong Hand Government or Broad Participation



When Panamanians are asked the meaning of democracy, 54.5% identify it with “freedom.” Next is equality with 16.5%.


Figure III.35 What is the Meaning of Democracy?



Although there is significant support to the concept of democracy, there is a large minority that say that there may be circumstances under which they would support a coup d'état. The survey asked: "JC13A Do you believe at any time there may be sufficient reason for a coup d'état or do you believe there is never sufficient reason for that?" In Figure III.36 we can see that while 53.2% say that there is never sufficient reason for a coup d'état, 46.8% say that at some point a coup d'état may be justified. This is a hypothetical question and therefore does not mean 47% of


Panamanians support or desire a coup d'état, but it does show the perception that to many Panamanians a coup d'état could be justified.

Figure III.36 Is a Coup D'État Ever Justified?



The survey made a series of inquiries to see under what specific circumstances a coup d'état could be justified (see questions JC1-13 in the questionnaire). Figure III.37 gives us the results. We can observe that 40% would support a coup d'état under conditions of high levels of crime and 43% under conditions of high levels of corruption. These results must serve as warning to the national government, political leaders and international donors, that corruption and crime may affect support for the political system and democracy.

Figure III.37 Probable Support of a Coup D'État Under Several Circumstances



3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has examined support for the political system and tolerance and the links between both. We have seen there is a strong political community in Panama. That political parties, the National Legislature and the national government are the institutions with the lowest level of confidence, and the Electoral Court has the highest level of confidence. The chapter presented a series of regressions where the factors influencing support for the system, tolerance and stable democracy were analyzed. We can observe that Panama has the highest level of political tolerance of all the countries in this study. Also, we found that 37.9% of the persons interviewed show a high level of support for the system and high level of political tolerance, therefore, they have opinions consistent with a stable democracy. Additionally, we observed that corruption victimization is an important factor to determine support for a stable democracy and support for the political system. Other important factors are the satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Panama, evaluations of the national economy, the satisfaction with services offered by the municipality and political efficacy.

Finally, we can observe that more than 70% of Panamanians prefer a democratic system than an authoritarian one. More than 80% supports maintaining the current system and not returning to a military government. The majority identifies democracy with freedom, and 70% believes that the problems of the country must be solved with the participation of everyone and not with a “strong hand government.” Nevertheless, almost 47% say that there may be sufficient reason for a coup d’état. The circumstances under which a significant minority would support a coup d’état are crime and corruption.

4.0 Local Government and Democracy

According to ECLA there has been little progress in keeping up with the goals of efficiency and equity concerning decentralization policies in the Latin American region. Economic development in the region continues to be territorially unequal and concentrated. As a result, large areas with productive potential lag behind, setting the stage for more poverty.⁶⁰ ECLA adds that this explains why the role of small towns has to be present in the agenda of emerging issues in the region.

ECLA's report states "albeit (local government's) contribution to better living standards at the municipal level, poverty and migrations to larger cities of whole families searching for better wages is still very much a reality."⁶¹

The issue surrounding democracy and local governments was brought into context by Alexis de Tocqueville in the first half of the nineteenth century. The French aristocrat was convinced that democracy's strength lies mainly on the broad participation of people in many small local towns.⁶² His observation was based on his experience in rural America of the early nineteenth century.

According to Chilean sociologist, Alfredo Rodriguez, "the economic crisis and the deepening of poverty have coincided with the reappearance of democracy in the region. Democracy has framed population's expectations vis-à-vis better living conditions." Rodriguez agrees with Tocqueville that local political organization contributes to democracy. "Decentralization in this context, he points out, can pave the way for participation of new social actors who can change civil society's profile." Among these groups he mentions non-governmental organizations, grass-roots organizations and indigenous groups. Rodriguez observes, "however, that those groups with more needs such as women, elderly, migrant, poor peasants, and informal workers – are not able to organize."⁶³

The size and proliferation of those participating in the political decision making process is only one aspect. "The Municipality," Rodriguez says, "has both institutional and geographic elements where decentralization can promote changes in the decision making process. The development of participative abilities is essential in order to integrate local interests as well as social sectors into the municipal political life. A crucial aspect that can enhance municipal political dynamics is the incorporation of civil society."

Rodriguez also points to the cultural aspects of decentralization that go beyond the administrative issues. "A local government that is targeted for decentralized programs cannot be seen only as an administrative body. At a local level, the cultural identity of communities,

⁶⁰ CEPAL, 2001, *Desarrollo económico local y descentralización en América Latina: Análisis comparativo*, Director del Proyecto, Gabriel Aghón. Compiladores, Francisco Alburquerque y Patricia Cortés, Santiago de Chile: Proyecto Regional de Desarrollo Económico Local y Descentralización, CEPAL/GTZ, p2.

⁶¹ CEPAL, *Desarrollo económico local y descentralización en América latina: Un análisis comparativo*, idem., p. 97.

⁶² Ver M. Seligson y P. Córdova, 2002, *Auditoría de la democracia. Ecuador*, Quito: Ediciones CEDATOS, p.77.

⁶³ Presentación del documento de Alfredo Rodríguez, 1997, "Descentralización en América Latina," (SUR, Chile). (The final version is called "The Contents of Decentralization: Concept, Objectives, Pros and Cons, and Challenges")

families and individuals express themselves sharply. Decentralization gives local culture an opportunity to express itself in new ways.”

Summarizing, Rodriguez concludes that the decentralization process at local levels must take into consideration the co-existence of political and administrative structures, as well as the strong presence of diverse social organizations, complex productive systems, families and communities. This is why it is important to have clear criteria when classifying the different types of municipalities. These criteria can help making appropriate evaluations on their management, on how to guide the decentralization process and identify the impact on the process.

Panama’s history is closely tied to local expressions at the Municipal level, especially, the traditional town meetings (*cabildo abierto*) that have served as clearing houses where people can take their protests and have their opinions heard.⁶⁴ Panama’s independence from Spain in 1821 was declared at a Town Meeting called by the Municipality of Panama City. When Panama cut its ties with Colombia in 1903 it was also spearheaded by a Town Hall meeting at the Municipality of Panama City. The act of secession was not completed until all the country’s municipalities acquiesced through the celebration of local Town Hall meetings. During the twentieth Century these local expressions of democracy have lost most of their energy due to centralization of power in the Executive Branch.

The twentieth century was witness to the downfall of the local or regional power-broker (*cacique*), who expressed local interests, on behalf of the national political leaders (*caudillos*). In order to counter this tendency, Municipal decentralization programs were created in the 1990s with external financial help. In a report from the most recent program,⁶⁵ Panama is considered to have the poorest performance in Central America vis-à-vis responsibility in offering services and infrastructure as well as collecting taxes. The report summarizes the Panamanian situation among Municipalities as follows:

- (a) Only 2% of all public expenditures are done by the Municipalities and Provincial offices.
- (b) Municipal and Provincial contribution to the GDP is less than 1%.
- (c) Over 65% of all Municipalities are dependent on the national government for their operations.

According to Panamanian law, the Municipalities, (a) authorize all building activities within their jurisdiction, (b) are responsible for plazas, parks, recreational areas, and all public streets and avenues, (c) have the responsibility of building slaughter-houses, market places, and cemeteries (d) establish and inspect garbage facilities (e) provide community services, as well as (f) judicial services.

According to the Municipal Development Program, “legislation recognizes the importance of citizen participation when decisions are taken concerning local investments, but no operational

⁶⁴ See Justo Arosemena, *El Estado Federal*, También es oportuno revisar el artículo del historiador Alfredo Castellero Calvo, en *Tareas* N°116, (enero-abril 2004), “Los grupos de poder en la colonia,” pp5-22).

⁶⁵ Ver *Programa de Desarrollo Municipal y Apoyo a la Descentralización*, 2001, PN-0143, Gobiernos Municipales y Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (MEF).

mechanisms exist to make the process possible. In many instances the Municipal budget is divided on an equal basis among aldermen who then pick out their own pet projects belonging to Local Commissions (*juntas comunales*) or decide to invest on their own community initiatives. The result is that most municipal investments are inefficient and do not respond to local priorities. On top of these short-comings, Municipalities have almost no management abilities to follow-up on their investments.”

The Municipal Development Program is organized along three components:

1. **Decentralization and Municipal Development** (20%) that is working on a design for a “Municipal System,”
2. **Modernization of Municipal Administration and Citizen Participation** (30%) that is trying to transfer a bigger share of Municipal investments to the private sector in order to enhance better management tactics, and
3. **Local investment** (50%) that promote local public works in the framework of a Municipal Financial Credit Line managed by the national private banking system.

4.1 Citizen Opinions Concerning Municipal Issues

In the context of the March 2004 survey, people were asked their opinion concerning what they believed to be the most important issue affecting their local District. The results are shown in Table IV.I The column with the valid percentages presents all those persons who answered the question. The percentage column represents the whole sample, including those who did not answer the question.

A relative majority (27.6%) were of the opinion that the most relevant problem of their local District was related to the lack of security (crime, crime, and violence). The problem that was identified next in line of importance was the lack of street maintenance (19.5%). The economic situation was also highly considered (17.3%) and the lack of water was not far behind (16.3%). Following a trend seen in other similar studies, the population makes a distinction between local and national issues. While the lack of security tops all issues on a local level, it is not considered so important at a national level. People also associate street maintenance and drinking water issues with local authorities. In the case of the Metropolitan Area of Panama City there are large segments of the population have poor access to drinking water facilities (almost 400,000 persons, 35% of the Metro Area’s population).

The lack of garbage collection services (5.9%) and the lack of general services (5.4%) are also among the local problems identified by the population. The lack of efficient Municipal management (3%), the lack of funds (2.7%), and poor environment (0.5%) are not identified by the population at-large to be important local issues.

Table IV.1 What do You Believe to Be Your District's Main Problem?

		Frequency	%	% valid	%accumulated
Valid	None	11	0.7	0.7	0.7
	Lack of drinking water	255	15.6	16.3	17.0
	Lack of street maintenance	305	18.6	19.5	36.6
	Lack of security	431	26.3	27.6	64.2
	Lack of garbage collection	97	5.9	6.2	70.4
	Lack of services	89	5.4	5.7	76.1
	The economic situation	270	16.5	17.3	93.4
	Lack of funds and aid	45	2.7	2.9	96.3
	Bad government	49	3.0	3.1	99.4
	Environmental problems	9	0.5	0.6	100.0
	Total	1,561	95.2	100.0	
No contesta	88	78	4.8		
Total		1,639	100.0		

Almost 20% of the population believes that local problems stem from economic problems. On the other hand, 75% have the opinion that their local problems are related to social issues (lack of security and lack of organization of services).

When it comes to identifying environmental problems there is some coincidence on the local and national levels. Issues concerning the environment are not identified at either level. While only 0.2% of the people on a local level identify environmental problems as an important issue, only 0.2% of the population considers the environment to be a problem at the national level.

It is interesting to note that Panamanians identify crime more as a local issue than a national problem. While 26% of those persons interviewed believe that lack of security (crime and violence) was the main local problem, only 10.4% considered a top issue at the national level. Whatever the considerations concerning criminality and lack of security, the population tends to believe it is an issue that has to be solved on a local basis.


In the national context, the problem perceived as most important is related to the country's high rate of unemployment. The survey's results coincide with many other similar studies dating back to the 1990s. According to 56.2% of the persons interviewed, the country's main problem is unemployment. The issues that followed were corruption (11.6%), crime (10.4%), and poverty (7.8%)

Table IV.2 What is the Country's Main Problem?

		Frequency	%	% valid	% accumulated
Valid	Economic problems	147	9.0	9.2	9.2
	Inflation, high prices	8	0.5	0.5	9.7
	Unemployment	902	55.0	56.2	65.9
	Poverty	125	7.6	7.8	73.6
	Delinquency, crime, violence	167	10.2	10.4	84.0
	Lack of land to work	1	0.1	0.1	84.1
	Lack of loans	2	0.1	0.1	84.2
	Environmental problems	3	0.2	0.2	84.4
	Drug adiction	15	0.9	0.9	85.4
	Drug trafficking	4	0.2	0.2	85.6
	Corruption	185	11.3	11.6	97.2
	Gang related violence	5	0.3	0.3	97.5
	Misgovernment	39	2.4	2.4	99.9
	Panama Canal basin protection	1	0.1	0.1	100.0
	Total	1,605	97.9	100.0	
No response	88	34	2.1		
Total		1639	100.0		

It is interesting to note that problems such as drug trafficking (0.2%), drug addiction (0.9%), and gang related violence (0.3%) are not considered to be relevant. The population was also rather indifferent to older problems such as lack of land to work in rural areas, or the lack of bank loans or high consumer prices

Figure IV.1 Impact of Residential Area on Crime as Major Problem




It can be concluded that the general perception of the population is that the lack of services and the lack of security is a local problem. The economic situation is also relevant. The emphasis,

however, depends on the area where people reside. Figure IV.1 reveals how perception of violence and crime is higher in the country's capital city and tends to diminish as areas of residency get smaller.


The impact of urbanization on the perception of crime can be observed in Figure IV.1. The sample distribution according to size of the areas of residence can be clearly followed. The largest area is the country's capital city with a population over 100,000 persons. It is followed by Districts with populations between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. At the bottom there are the Districts with a population of less than 25,000 and the rural areas.

Figure IV.2 Perception of the District's Main Problems



The country's economic problems are identified by 72% of the population as those of most importance. Meanwhile, 24% of the people interviewed perceived social issues, such as corruption, crime, and misgovernment, as the country's top problems. Tables IV.1 and IV.2 seem to verify the population's belief that social problems are local while economic problems are national.

Figure IV.3 Perception of the District's Most Important Problems, According to Size



Around 48% of the people who live in the country's Capital City identify crime and lack of security as the main local problem. On the other hand, in those districts with under 25,000 inhabitants the crime issue is only perceived by 10% of the population interviewed. In rural areas this issue is only identified by 7% of the population. In smaller districts issues such as street and road maintenance are considered more important.

In those Districts that lie outside of the Capital City's Metro Area, people tend to consider the lack of maintenance of roads as well as economic issues as important. Security problems are also viewed as less important in smaller districts of the country.

4.2 Satisfaction with Municipal Administrations

The survey was keen to explore an area dealing with satisfaction vis-à-vis local government services. The key question posed in the series presented to persons interviewed was the following:

SGL1. *Do you think the Municipality is doing a good job delivering services? 1. Very good, 2. Good, 3. Not good, nor bad, 4. Bad, 5. Very bad, 8. Don't know.*

Figure IV.4 Evaluation of Municipal Services




Figure IV.4 shows that only 16% of those persons interviewed believe that the services delivered by the Municipality are good or very good. Another 59.5% held the opinion that the services were neither good or bad.

In order to determine the influence of demographic, socioeconomic, and geographic factors on people's evaluation of Municipal services an analysis of multiple variables was conducted. For this purpose regression models used in the Ecuadorian study were adopted.⁶⁶ Several variables are the same ones used in Ecuador, however new ones were also introduced. The first regression model was used to measure satisfaction with Municipal services.

The results of the model show that demographic variables such as sex and the social variables like education have no impact on peoples satisfaction with Municipal services, when the model's other factors are held constant. Other socioeconomic variables like prosperity have no influence on people's perception of Municipal services. Population distribution in urban and rural areas do not have any influence as well. However, the analysis shows that age as well as the person's personal economic situation do have influence and are significant factors.

⁶⁶ Seligson y Córdoba, *op. cit.*

Figure IV.5 Satisfaction With Delivery of Municipal Services According to Personal Economic Situation





Figure IV.5 presents a close correlation between the personal economic situation of those interviewed and satisfaction with Municipal services. The same question relating to municipal services was also included in the Central American, Mexican, and Colombian surveys. Figure IV.6 compares the opinions of people have in the 8 countries of the ability of their municipal authorities to deliver services.

When the comparison is done among all 8 countries, Panama stands out as having the people less satisfied with municipal services.


Figure IV.6 Satisfaction with Municipal Services in Comparative Perspective



4.3 Citizen Participation in Municipal Affairs


Among democracy's most cherished characteristics citizen involvement and participation have to be underscored. On the one hand, it can be understood as the ability of the citizenry to mobilize. On the other, it can be understood as the process by which citizenry creates the institutions it needs to enhance their own interests. The programs that are set up to strengthen local governments promote participation. In Latin America, albeit the electoral processes, citizen participation is relatively low. Mobilization is mostly prompted outside of the democratic institutions. Political parties, local governments and other democratic institutions seem to lack ability to promote political participation.

Figure IV.7 Attendance at Meetings Called by the Mayor in Previous Year



The survey applied in Panama during March 2004 also measured participation by asking those interviewed if they attended meetings called by the District Mayor's office during the previous year. According to Figure IV.7 one of every 16 persons attended Municipal meetings organized by the Mayor.

Figure IV.8 Attendance to Meetings Called by the District Mayor's Office, in a Comparative Perspective



According to Figure IV.8 Panama has the lowest rate of participation in local meetings throughout the Central American region, as well as compared to Colombia and Mexico. Apparently the relations between local government and citizenry have lost importance. During General Torrijos' mandate in the 1970s local governments were promoted at the Corregimiento level (the smallest political administrative entity of the Republic). The experience was relatively successful in mobilizing local groups but was unable to strengthen democratic institutions. In the 1990s the *junta comunales* were practically abandoned.

An analysis of multiple variables was run in order to determine which factors are related to citizen participation. Table IV.4 (See Appendix B) is clear in showing that only the size of the family can be associated with people's participation in local meetings. Income and wealth are not associated with participation in local meetings. Age, education, and size of locality are not associated either.

The results of the analysis do not associate sex, age, and civil status with municipal participation. The same is true with the geographical variables as well as with the socioeconomic variables. Only variables such as contributions to solving community problems and participation in associations correlate with participation in local meetings.

Figure IV.9 Attendance at Meetings Called by the Mayor's Office by Contribution to Solving Community Problems





Figure IV.9 shows that people who mobilize to solve problems on a voluntary basis more frequently also participate in meetings called by the Mayor's office. Figure IV.10 presents an association between those persons who attend community and political meetings on a more

frequent basis also tend to participate in those meetings called by the Mayor's office. What is observable is a trend that relates several levels of participation both on a community level as well as on a political basis.

Figure IV.10 Attendance at Meetings Called by the District Mayor's Office by Participation in Associations



4.4 Presentation of Petitions to Municipal Government

The fact that some people attend with more frequency the meetings called by the Mayor's office does not mean, necessarily, that they are more politically wise or presenting their petitions with the best results. Participation can often be more successful at other levels or places.

In this sense, the presentation of petitions or requests at the Mayors office reflects a more active attitude. In order to capture this spirit of participation a question was included in the March 2004 survey with the intention of exploring the relationship:

NP2. *Have you requested help or presented a petition at any Municipal office or officer in the last 12 months?*

The answer to this question is important because the number of petitions presented to local authorities increase the attendance to local meetings called by the Mayors. Two comments are in order. On the one hand, lack of participation in local meetings is not the product of indifference on behalf of the citizenry. The truth of the matter is that local authorities do not readily call the people to any kind of participation. People present their petitions without waiting for the local governments to ask them. There is probably a connection between participation and petitioning. If the former grows, there is also an increment in the latter.

Figure IV.11 Presentation of a Petition to the Local Government During the Previous Year




Figure IV.11 shows the results of the question related to the petitions people present to their local governments. The factors that explain the patterns in the presentation of petitions by the people are comparable to those that explain participation in meetings called by the Mayor's office. Education has a strong impact on the presentation of petitions (see Table IV.5, Appendix B). Place of residency has a smaller impact.

Seligson and Córdova, in their study of Ecuador, are probably right when they say that participating in meetings called by local authorities is not necessarily a signal that people are more active. The presentation of petitions requires a larger commitment and increases participation. The relationship between petitioning and participating in municipal meetings shows an increase in the presentation of petitions to local authorities.

The factors measured to explain the differences in the level of petitioning are similar to those pertaining to participation in municipal meetings. Only education has influence on the levels of petitioning. Those persons interviewed with high school education are the most likely to petition local authorities. Meanwhile, people with university levels of education petition with more frequency than those with only primary education.

Figure IV.12 Petitions Presented to Municipal Authorities, by Education





Figure IV.12 shows how education impacts petitioning to local governments. There is a steady increment in petitioning the local government when controlled by education.

Figure IV.13 Petitioning the Municipality According to Levels of Education and Gender



Commitment to local government affairs on behalf of people with more education is not necessarily associated to gender. We can observe in Figure IV.13, that men and women with lower levels of education tend to make the same amount of petitions to their local governments. However, the more education men and women acquire the former's petitioning tends to grow much faster.

The regression analysis determined that the factor with more influence over petitioning is education. The probability a person will petition his local government is twice as high if he has a University education. Close to 16% of the persons with University education petition their local governments. Only 9% of people with grammar school education petition.

4.4.1 People's Ability to Solve Local Problems


There is a rich debate that focuses on the ability people have to solve their local problems. Generally speaking the question is posed when new policies are proposed at local levels and many communities tend to hang on desperately to their traditions. At this point in time programs are introduced to induce change. The term "modernization" is used at times to justify the changes.

In order to measure people's interest in taking part in the solution of local government problems the following question was posed:

EFF6. *What are the probabilities that with the people's efforts solutions can be found for the problems of the Municipality?*

Almost two thirds of the persons asked (64.7%) answered that it was very probable or somewhat probable the people could find solutions to their Municipal problems. Only 9.4% believed there was no probability solutions could be found for local problems. An important 25.9% answered that there was a small probability. (See Figure IV.14)

Figure IV.14 Can People's Efforts Solve Municipal Problems?



Several factors can explain the perception people have of their own ability to solve local government problems (See Table IV.6, Appendix B). Education, gender, and size of the community are among the significant factors. Figure IV.15 presents the impact of education and gender. Men seem to feel more optimistic than women in their ability to solve local government problems. The higher the education level of those interviewed the more comfortable they felt solving local government problems. This was particularly true with men who had university education.

Figure IV.15 Ability to Solve Municipal Problems, According to Gender and Education





Figure IV.16 presents the perception the persons interviewed had on solving local problems according to the size of the communities they live in. A small but significant increase can be observed among small and medium cities. A decrease can be observed among the larger cities (over 100,000 inhabitants) and the country’s capital city.

Figure IV.16 Ability to Solve Municipal Problems According to the Size of the Communities



4.5 National Government Compared to Local Government

In the past, national government were seen as distant and powerful entities. On the other hand, local authorities were viewed as closer to the people. A clear distinction is made between both levels. From an economic standpoint local authorities usually are modest, but at the national level they are wealthy. With the on-going communication transformations – both surface and electronic – perceptions have changed. The survey asked the persons interviewed who they would request help from in order to solve a problem. The questionnaire put forth 4 questions:

In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation...?

1. A member of the Legislative Assembly (CP2)
2. A Government Ministry or another Government Office (CP4)
3. This District's Mayor (CP4A)
4. This Corregimiento's Representative (PCP4B)
5. The Local Municipal Police Officer (Corregidor) (PCP4C)

While 12.7% of the persons interviewed recognized that they had requested help at a Government Ministry or other Government office, 10% said they had asked for similar help at the Mayors office. On the other hand, 20% of the persons surveyed admitted having requested help from either a member of the Legislative Assembly or local Representative. Only 9.1% asked for help from the municipal police officer (corregidor).

Figure IV.17 What Government Office Would You Ask for Help in Solving Local Problems?





Figure IV.18 presents the data relating to government officers and local problems according to geographical distribution (stratas). In the Western part of the country (Chiriqui and Bocas del

Toro, as well as the Ngobe Bugle Territory), 25% of those interviewed who have requested help go to a member of the Legislative Assembly. Meanwhile, a similar percentage (25%) in the Eastern part of the country (the Provinces of Darien, Colón and Panamá, excluding Panama City and San Miguelito) as well as the Central part (Veraguas and Azuero) request cooperation from the *Corregimiento* Representative. Requests are split evenly among members of Legislature and Representatives in Panama City and San Miguelito.

These results confirm the popular thesis that people do not discriminate between Legislature members and Representatives when it comes to requesting solutions to their local problems. These elected officers were mentioned by the same amount of people.


Figure IV.18 Request for Help According to Government Officers and Strata (Region)



4.6 Confidence in Municipal Government

The persons surveyed were also asked to what degree did they trust various government officials (see Chapter 3). The confidence levels are relatively low. However, there is a tendency that people trust their local government officers more than the officers at the national government. Figure IV.19 presents the contrast when it come to confidence at both levels. The levels of confidence among different government institutions can be appreciated in Figure III.3.

Figure IV.19 Confidence in Municipal Government vs. National Government



What factors influence the confidence people have of the municipal government? To get an answer to this question a regression analysis was carried out. The results can be seen in Table IV.7 (see Appendix B). The only significant factors are satisfaction with the municipal services and attendance at meetings called by the Mayor. Figures IV.20 and IV.21 show how these factors have influence over the municipal government's levels of confidence. When people perceive that the Municipal services are bad, their confidence in local government weakens significantly. Figure IV.20 presents how persons who believe the services offered by the local governments are very good or good also have high levels of confidence (above the middle point of the support scale). Those persons who believe the services are very bad or bad present levels of confidence below the middle point of the support scale).

Figure IV.21 point out that those persons who have attended the Mayors meetings during the last 12 months have a significantly higher level of confidence in local Government than those persons who have not participated in Municipal meetings.

Figure IV.20 Support of Municipal Government According to the Evaluation Those Services Offered by the Municipality





Figure IV.21 Confidence in the Municipality and Attendance at Meetings Called by the Mayor



4.7 Conclusion

This Chapter presented abundant information concerning the perception Panamanians have of their local governments. It is important to underscore that Panamanians have different perceptions of their national government and their local governments. At the local level the most

important problems are associated to the lack of access to services, such as lack of drinking water, poor maintenance of streets and roads, and the lack of security.

Factors like age and the personal economic situation of those interviewed have significant influence on the way people perceive how the municipality delivers services. The two factors that influence the most people's decision to attend meetings called by municipal officers is their involvement in voluntary contributions to the solution of community problems, as well as participation in organizations in general. People who are willing to participate are those who are normally attending meetings called by the municipality. The factors that influence people's perceptions of their ability to solve community problems are education, gender and size of the community.

The survey also shows that confidence in local governments is closely associated with satisfaction vis-à-vis the services the municipality delivers as well as with attendance at meetings called by the municipal officers. A final conclusion of this Chapter is that people have more confidence in their local government officers than in the national government.

5.0 The Rule of Law

According to Mitchell Seligson, one of the definitions which best sums up the concept of Rule of Law is that given by Ronald Dworkin which sustains that its existence is understood as the “real preeminence of law and the effective protection of basic rights.”⁶⁷ For Seligson, the Rule of Law is the basic and essential condition for the existence of democracy. However, there is a possibility of expanding the discussion of that concept: The due observance of law is not the sole characteristic or an exclusive attribute of the rule of law or of a democracy, it is a necessary condition though not sufficient. Dworkin in the second part of his definition proposes the protection of basic rights (individual freedom, political rights and equality under the law), however, he does not state the protection of economic, social, and cultural rights as a premise to establish the existence of the rule of law.

Rodolfo Stavenhagen refers to this second part of the discussion. The Mexican anthropologist proposes that, on the contrary, the rule of law cannot be conceived as marginal to the problem of lack of equality and poverty. Stavenhagen states that poverty does not create citizenship, on the contrary, it denies it. Also, he states that the existence of political structures, like parliaments and electoral systems, are not sufficient when it comes to a decision on whether a State is or is not democratic.⁶⁸ This author does not deny the substantive advances that have occurred in this regard when it comes to Latin America. Nonetheless, he points out that those changes have not implied a transformation of bases and economic structures that have characterized the region. On the contrary, he affirms that pauperization processes as well as a deepening of inequality have been more intense than in past decades.

The problem of poverty and equality harbor similar characteristics all around the Latin American region. One can see, on the other hand, that inequality is more accentuated in respects to socioeconomic differentiation. Rightly noted, not only do the poor in Panama come close to comprise 50% of the population, the most significant fact is the level of inequality that exists between the poorest 20% of the population and the richest 20%, according to the Living Standards Survey of 1997. According to the data of this study “it is perceived that 20% of the population in the highest end of consumption concentrates almost 51% of the total consumption, the lowest end only consumes 3.5% of the overall consumption.”⁶⁹

These additional considerations and data are important to take into account because the Rule of Law in a determined country cannot be solely understood from the existence of political and juridical structures. It is also necessary to take into account socioeconomic considerations and their relation and interaction with variables like legitimacy and overall confidence of a population in a determined political system.⁷⁰ In this sense, it is worth asking if the illegitimacy of a system or the mistrust that can be felt, will not be mediated by socioeconomic considerations more than by the existence of functional institutions with acceptable development. In the following paragraphs, diverse possibilities will be explored, efforts will be made to review what institutions generate more confidence and what are those that are not favored by the citizenry.

⁶⁷ M. Seligson and P. Cordova, 2002, p.103.

⁶⁸ Rodolfo Stavenhagen, 1998, “Consideraciones sobre la pobreza en América latina,” *Tareas* N°99, pp117-118.

⁶⁹ Rosa Elena de De la Cruz, 1998, ob. cit., *Tareas*, N°99, p.135.

⁷⁰ Seligson and Cordova, ob. cit., p.103.

Simultaneous to this empirical review, some effort will be invested to explain the reasons for the confidence, legitimacy and support that exist in Panamanian institutions.

5.1 Rule of Law: A Methodological Proposal for Its Measurement

According to Seligson, it is possible to demonstrate that there is a very tight relationship “between trust in the judicial system, vital requirement for the rule of law, and the legitimacy of the political system.”⁷¹ The link proposed by Seligson becomes effective to the extent that institutions exist, operate appropriately and are trusted by the population. It is important to note that people should have a point of reference or, as one might say in natural sciences, a pattern to which one can contrast the current situation.

Then, in the proposed methodology, it is of key importance to correlate the amounts of confidence in the judicial system and the “pride” one can feel for the political system of a particular country. What variables are, specifically, related and can explain whether a society has or does not have a feeling of confidence or pride for, in the first place, the judicial system, and in second place, the State? And, on a more individual level, on what depends the trust we harbor for these type of institutions? In an optimal scenario, if the judicial branch is working efficiently, on what variables does it depend that the individual and society as a whole, perceive this efficiency and that this perception derives, also, in a feeling of pride for the political system?

5.2 Levels of Trust in the Protection of Rights

The Rule of Law can also be measured by determining which are the institutions that protect the people’s basic rights. The survey presented several questions regarding the levels of trust in various key institutions that protect basic rights. These institutions are related to the judicial system.

Now, let's use a scorecard: This card contains a scale of 7 points; each one indicates a score which goes from 1 (which means NONE) to 7 (A LOT). For example, if I would ask to what extent do you trust the news that can be seen on television, if you don't trust them you would choose 1, and if on the contrary you do indeed trust them, you would choose seven. If your opinion is between 1 and 7, you would then choose an intermediate score. Then, to what extent to you trust the news which you see on television? Read me the number. (Make sure the interviewed subject understands correctly).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Not at all					A Lot		(8) Doesn't Know

Now, using card A, please answer the questions.

B1. To what extent do you believe that the courts in Panama guarantee a fair trial? If you believe courts do not guarantee justice at all, choose number 1, if you believe that courts guarantee justice a lot please choose number 7 or choose, in any case, an intermediate score.

⁷¹ Idem. P.103.

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?

B16. To what extent do you trust the Attorney-General's Office?


B17. To what extent do you trust the human rights defense office (Ombudsman)?

B18. To what extent do you trust the police?

B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?

According to Figure V.1, people have less confidence in these institutions than in the Catholic Church, the media or the Electoral Court (Tribunal Electoral), but by far trust them more than political parties and the Legislative Assembly.⁷² Among institutions having large amounts of confidence is the police. The Attorney General receives the lowest level of confidence. The latter has been under crossfire due to large amounts of criticism in the past years for corruption and abuses.

Figure V.1 Confidence in Institutions That Protect Legal Rights Compared With Other Institutions



Now we analyze factors that influence the levels of confidence in these institutions. For this analysis we built a support index that includes the six questions we see above. Statistically the treatment of these variables is justified as a single variable, by means of a statistical analysis of

⁷² For this analysis the variables were transformed to a scale that goes from 0-100, where 0 means no confidence and 100 means full confidence. This change was done converting the original scale (1-7) in a scale of six points. A point was subtracted from each value thus becoming a scale 0-6. Then each value was divided by six converting every value was set in a range 0-1. The values were then multiplied by 100.

reliability with an Alpha .78 coefficient and a demonstrative factor analysis that shows those variables can be treated as one dimension. Table V.1 (see Appendix B) shows the results of the factor analysis. To elaborate the index, different values were added to those converted variables, in the already explained manner, from a scale of 1 to 100 to then obtain an average of general index of confidence.

Table V.2 (see Appendix B) presents us with the results of the regression analysis. As one can see, factors that are statistically significant are those relating to level of education, age of the person interviewed, size of the place of residence (that is, level of urbanization). Also, added to this socio-demographic factors, we also see that the level of fear to be a victim of a crime (AOJ11) and confidence in the punishment of criminals (AOJ12) are significant factors. Additionally, perceptions of corruption in the police (PC5) and judges (PC12) are also significant.

Graph V.2 demonstrates that as the levels of education rise, confidence in institutions which protect those rights decrease significantly.⁷³ It is possible that persons with higher levels of education have more access to information about the inner workings of these institutions and have come into more direct contact with them.

Figure V.2 Confidence in Institutions That Protect Legal Rights and Education




Figure V.3 shows that confidence in institutions that protect rights is lower around large urban areas, including the capital, than in rural areas and small cities.

⁷³ The questions on corruption asked the persons interviewed to classify private and public institutions using a scale that went from 1 to 10, where 1 is very corrupt and 10 is very honest.

Figure V.3 Confidence in Institutions That Protect Legal Rights and Size of Community






Figure V.4 shows the impact the perception of insecurity in neighborhoods and the confidence in those institutions which protect those rights. Some persons that feel unsafe in the communities have a significantly lower level of confidence when compared with those who feel safe in their neighborhoods. In the regression analysis (see Table V.2, Appendix B) we observe that being a victim of a crime is not a statistically significant factor to explain confidence in institutions which protect basic rights. Then, is not about being a victim or not, but the level of insecurity in communities which influences the levels of confidence the citizenry deposits in its justice institutions.

Figure V.4 Confidence in Institutions That Protect Legal Rights and Perception of Neighborhood Security



Another factor that has a significant impact on confidence is the judicial system’s ability to punish delinquents. Figure V.5 shows that those who have less confidence in the judicial system's ability also have lesser amounts of confidence in institutions which protect citizen's civil rights. This result cannot come as a shock, but must warn authorities of the need to strengthen the capacity and efficiency of the judicial system.

Figure V.5 Confidence in Institutions That Protect Legal Rights and Confidence Justice Will Punish Criminals



The survey made a series (PC1-21 in the questionnaire) of questions to get a better look at people’s perception of the corruption levels in several institutions, both public and private. This Chapter will not analyze corruption as such, that will be done in Chapter VI, but we have included in the regression analysis two questions of that series that measure the perception of the levels of corruption in two institutions of the justice system: police and judges. In Table V.2 (see Appendix B) we can observe that both are statistically significant factors in explaining levels of confidence in the institutions that protect civil rights. In Figures V.6 and V.7 we can see the results of these analysis.

Figure V.6 Confidence in Institutions That Protect Legal Rights and Perception of Police Corruption





Figure V.7 Confidence in Institutions That Protect Legal Rights and Perception of Corruption Among Judges




5.3. Impact of Confidence in Institutions for the Protection of Rights on Support for the Political System

To study this relationship we made a regression analysis where the dependent variable is the scale of support to the institutional system (see Chapter III on the construction and use of this scale) and the questions about trust in institutions that protect civil rights are part of the independent variables. Also we included in the analysis several socio-demographic variables, like age, gender, wealth and place of residence to assure that these relationships we describe are not the result of some characteristic present in the interviewed person. We can see these results in Table V.3 (see Appendix B).

As one can appreciate, with exception of the Ombudsman’s Office, confidence in judicial institutions is an important factor in determining support for the institutional system. As one can see in Figure V.8 each of the key items of the judicial institutions and the protection of rights displays the same positive links with support for the institutional system.⁷⁴ Those with low levels of support for the judicial system register very low levels of support for the institutional system. These results suggest that it’s very important for democratic stability the fact that citizens can trust their judicial institutions to protect their rights.

Figure V.8 Support of the Institutional System and Confidence in Judicial Institutions



5.4 Satisfaction With the Services Offered by Judicial Institutions

Another important factor that is useful in the analysis of the rule of law is the satisfaction people have of the services provided by judicial institutions. To this effect, the survey made a series of questions (ST1-14) where it asked if the interviewed person was “very satisfied,” “somewhat satisfied” or “very unsatisfied” with the services provided by the “National Police,” “the courts or the justice tribunals” and “the Prosecutor’s office.” Figure V.9 to V.11 display the results. It’s

⁷⁴ The 0 – 100 scale used to measure institutional system support was divided in three parts, high, medium, and low.

important to indicate that the overwhelming majority of the interviewed persons have not had contact with these institutions: 70% of the interviewed subjects have not had any business in the courts, 80% any contact with the police and 87% with Prosecutors. Even so, the results of those who have reported incidents or have been part of processes before these offices are indeed interesting.

Figure V.9 How Do You feel About the Services Offered by the Courts?




Figure V.10 How Do You Feel About the Services Offered by the Police?





Figure V.11 How Do You Feel About the Services Offered by the Prosecutor's Office?



According to the survey, 41.8% of those interviewed are very or somewhat satisfied with the services offered by the courts, while the great majority, 58.2% are unsatisfied. For the police, the appraisal is more positive: 53.3% are satisfied and 46.7% are unsatisfied with its services. The district attorneys, like judges, receive a negative evaluation, only 45.2% are satisfied with those services offered by the district attorneys, while the majority, 54.8% are unsatisfied.

In light of the importance judges have for the judicial system and the state, we have to analyze the levels of satisfaction when it comes to judges to see whether there are differences in the satisfaction of the services offered by the courts according to the diverse areas of the country. Figures V.12 and V.13 present the results according to the size of the place of residence (that is, level of urbanization) and region (that is, geographical area).

Figure V.12 Satisfaction With the Courts According to Size of the Community





Figure V.12 shows that higher levels of dissatisfaction are noted in small cities (less than 25 thousand inhabitants), where 60% of the population is very unsatisfied with the services delivered by the courts. Following these opinions, 40% of those persons interviewed in rural areas said they are very unsatisfied and an additional 15% say that they are somewhat unsatisfied. In mid size cities, that is, those between 25 and 99 thousand inhabitants, a broad majority of 59% say they are not satisfied. Satisfaction is greatest in larger cities, with more than 100 thousand inhabitants, excluding the Capital City, where 45% are satisfied, with 21% very satisfied.

Figure V.13 Satisfaction With the Services Delivered by the Courts and Strata




According to Figure V.13 the Central Area (Los Santos, Herrera and Veraguas provinces), is polarized with a greater percentage stating that they are very satisfied (26%) but also a greater percentage (34%) saying they are very unsatisfied. The greater percentage of persons satisfied with the court system live in the Western Area (Chiriqui and Bocas del Toro as well as the Ngobe Territory), 54%, say they are somewhat or very satisfied.

5.5 About Victimization


In this respect, it can be noted that 85.2% of the interviewed persons said they were not victims of any criminal act the year prior to the survey.

Figure V.14 Have You Been a Victim of a Crime in the Previous Year?




Only 10.3% of the persons interviewed believe that the greatest problem faced by the country is crime, crime or violence. However, at the local level people interviewed perceive crime in a much different way. The percentage of people believing crime was an important issue increased considerably. According to 26.4% of the persons interviewed stated that the worst problem in their municipalities was the lack of security.

Figure V.15 How Safe Do You Feel in Your Neighborhood?



The survey discovered that 44.6% of the persons interviewed did not feel safe in their neighborhoods. However, 55.4% said they felt safe in their neighborhoods (AJ011).

Figure V.16 How Involved are Gang Activities in Your Neighborhood?



Responding to the question regarding the presence of gangs, 35% of those interviewed answered that indeed these types of criminal organizations existed and were present. However, 65% of those interviewed felt no concern or just a little concern.

In this sense, then, one can infer that this is a problem perceived as very close to the local environments: the neighborhoods and communities. On a curious note, one can verify that, in this sector, there are high perceptions when it comes to insecurity (44.6%), notwithstanding, as one can remember, that only 14.6% said they were victims of some sort of criminal activity. From this total, 58.8% said they were victims of a robbery without aggression or physical abuse, 18.5% was a victim of armed robbery, 11% burglary while in their houses, and 6.2% said they had been victims of an assault (with no robbery involved).

Figure V.17 What Kind of Criminal Act Did You Suffer?




Figure V.18 shows that 48.6% of those interviewed did not report the felony or misdemeanor. In stark contrast, 51.4% did denounce it. In Figure V.19 we can see that Panama displays the highest percentage of people who reported the felony or misdemeanor when compared to all countries in the region.

Figure V.18 Did You Report the Crime?




Figure V.19 Did You Report the Crime? According to Country





Figure V.20 Why Was the Crime Not Reported?



Close to fifty six percent (55.6) of those interviewed who said they were victims of some sort of criminal act said they did not denounce it because they do not trust the judicial system, the police or any of the institutions responsible to protect the citizen's security. The second reason people did not report the crime was because they lacked proof. According to the people interviewed, 70% of the crimes that were not reported were due to the way the justice administration system is organized in Panama and the relationship Panamanian's have with their government institutions.

5.6 Conclusion

As one could have verified in the course of this study, the problem of the rule of law through institutional indicators creates a very prolific source of research. It is necessary, however, to create a theoretical basis that can sustain the validity of this method. But it is also true that we cannot set aside the legitimacy and confidence in diverse governmental institutions, which are related with the legitimacy of the rule of law. Nonetheless, data gathered by the survey, in many cases are apparently contradictory. The search for a better and more efficient instrument of measurement will help to validate the theoretical framework of the study.

As to results, one can appreciate that the majority of the institutions are low in their level of trust, according to the persons interviewed. It is important to note, however, that there is great appreciation for the rule of law and people in general reaffirm the need to strengthen its institutions.

The lack of confidence in the judicial system directly confronts the problem of crime, the fear of being a victim of a crime and the perception of corruption in both judges and police. These are the main factors that influence the levels of confidence in judicial institutions. We could also note that support for the institutional system decreases significantly as confidence in judicial institutions diminish. Additionally, the survey showed that the majority of those interviewed that had business in the courts and in the prosecutor's office are unsatisfied with the services delivered by those institutions. On the other hand, most of the persons interviewed said they were satisfied with the services delivered by the Police.

According to the survey, 51% of the victims of criminal acts reported it to the authorities, the highest percentage of the eight countries in this project. Of those who were crime victims, 55% justified not reporting the incident because that it would have been useless to do so.

6.0 Corruption and Democracy

Corruption in Latin America is a topic of great importance at this time. United States policy in the last years has focused on the fight against corruption. In several cases, the United States has denied entrance visas to politicians, entrepreneurs and military personnel linked to corruption. Additionally, they have provided bilateral help for government's fight against corruption.

In the case of Panama, corruption has been an important topic. Corruption and how to fight it was the most important topic in the recent elections of May 2, 2004. During the last two governments (of Presidents Perez Balladares and Moscoso), corruption, such as nepotism, the purchase of votes in the Legislature, bribing of high ranking public officials, illegal enrichment, etc., dominated public discussion and contributed largely to the loss of the government party in the three presidential elections since the current political regime was established.

Transparency International (TI) places Panama among the countries of Latin America with the highest index of corruption perception. Panama is located in position number 66 with an average of 3.4 on the scale of 10. China, Sri Lanka and Syria appear in similar place with Panama on this list of 133 countries in which the surveys were applied.⁷⁵ In the case of Panama, it has been estimated that corruption cost between 600 million and 200 million balboas (equivalent to dollars) per year. According to United Nations calculations, it is estimated that generalized corruption may cause the growth rate of a country between 0.5 and 1.0% lower than that of a similar country with little corruption.

6.1 Extent of the Problem of Corruption in Panama

The survey used the following question to measure the population's perception of the corruption problem.

EXC7. Taking into consideration your experience, ¿corruption among public officials is.....?

(1) Very generalized (2) Somewhat generalized (3) A little generalized (4) Not generalized (8) NS/NR

Figure VI.I shows us that more than three quarters of the population believe that the corruption among public officers is very or somewhat common.

⁷⁵The complete index and its explanation may be seen in <http://www.transparency.org/>.

Figure VI.1 Corruption Among Public Officials is.....?





Figure VI 2 How Common is Corruption According to Region?



Perception of corruption varies significantly among the different regions of the country, according to Figure VI.2. As expected, the more urbanized areas perceive corruption as more common. This may be due to two factors: 1. That the persons in urban areas have greater access to information and therefore are aware of the cases of corruption more easily than the persons that live in small or rural areas; and 2. That persons in urban areas are more likely to have more

contact with the government and therefore have more opportunity to become victims of corruption.

6.2 Level of Victimization Due to Corruption

In order to measure the levels of victimization due to corruption the survey included a series of questions where the interviewed persons were asked to indicate if they experienced corruption or not in different sectors and circumstances. The questions were the following:

<i>We now wish to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in life....</i>	No	Yes	NS	INAP
EXC1. Have you been accused for an infraction you did not commit by a police agent during the last year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
EXC2. Has any police agent asked you for a <i>mordidas</i> (bribe) in the last year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
EXC4. Have you seen anyone paying <i>mordidas</i> (bribe) to a police officer in the last year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
EXC6. Has a public officer asked you for a bribe in the last year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
EXC11. Have you conducted business at a municipal office in the last year? [If says not to mark 9, if says “yes” ask the following] When conducting business at the municipality (such as a permit, for example) during the last year. Did you pay any sum in addition to that demanded by the law?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC13. ¿Do you work? [If says not to mark 9, if says “yes” ask the following] In your work, have you been asked for any incorrect payment in the last year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC14. In the last year, did you have any dealings with the courts? [If says not to mark 9, if says “yes” ask the following] Have you been asked to pay a <i>mordida</i> (bribe) in the courts in the last year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC15. Did you use public medical services in the last year? [If says not to mark 9, if says “yes” ask the following] When visiting a hospital or a health center during the last year, Have you had to pay any <i>mordida</i> (bribe)?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC16. Did you have a child in school or college in the last year? [If says not to mark 9, if says “yes” ask the following] In school or college during the last year. Did you have to pay any <i>mordida</i> (bribe)?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)

Figure VI.3 indicates the levels of experience with corruption in different institutions. We can see that the municipality is the institution where Panamanians suffer corruption most, followed by the police and the schools. It should not surprise us that the municipality is the place with the most experience with corruption, inasmuch as in general we assume that the population has greater direct contact with this level of government. Although not surprising, the results must be a concern to all of us who are interested in increasing decentralization of power in Panama. Without significant efforts to fight corruption in the municipalities, the increase in decentralization, may increase the incidence of corruption victimization and, as we see in Chapter IV, this may negatively affect support for the political system and stable democratic regime.

Figure VI.3 Panama's Experience With Corruption





Figure VI.4 Number of Times Persons Have Been Victims of Corruption in the Last Year



According to Figure VI.4 the majority of Panamanians have not been victims of corruption, 10.5% have been victims once, 4.8% twice, and only 2.6% more than twice.

The question that arises is, How is Panama compared with other countries? In order to answer this question we have created several figures comparing Panama with the other seven countries on several dimensions of the victimization due to corruption. Figure VI.5 contains the results of percentage of interviewed persons that reported having been victims by public officers. We can see that Panama is the second country with the largest victimization due to corruption in the

hands of public officers. Although below Mexico, the percentage of Panama is above the other countries. Figure VI.6 gives us the percentage of people that have been victims of corruption at least once in the last year among all the countries. We can observe that in Panama 17.9% have been victims of corruptions once. This places Panama in the third position with less victimization, tying with El Salvador. It is encouraging that Panama is below the leader in acts of corruption, Mexico.

Figure VI.5 Percentage of Interviews That Report to Have Been Victims of Corruption by Public Officers in the Last Year





Figure VI.6 Percentage of the Population Victimized by Corruption at Least Once in Last Year



6.3 Predictors of Those Who are Victims of Corruption

For this analysis we shall use multiple regression using as dependent variable a scale of victimization by corruption.⁷⁶ The results can be seen in Table VI.1 (see Appendix B).

The table shows that the significant factors are education, age, sex, place of residence, wealth and how many children they have. Figure VI.7 shows that females are less likely to become victims of corruption. This may be the result of having less contact with public institutions.

Figure VI.8 presents education and sex as important factors that influence the probability of being a victim of corruption. We see that for both females and males, as education increases so does the possibility of being a victim of corruption. The relation between education and victimization by corruption is maintained for those forms of corruption that do not imply a direct contact with public institutions. Therefore, we can affirm that interviewees with greater degree of education tend to denounce acts of corruption above their contact with public institutions.

⁷⁶The index includes items EXC2 (bribe asked by the police), EXC6 (bribe asked by a public officer), EXC11 (bribe paid in the municipality office), EXC13 (bribe paid at work), EXC14 (bribe paid in a court), EXC15 (bribe in the public health services), EXC16 (payment in school). It was decided that the situations of corruption with which an interviewed person have had to face during the year prior to the study, shall be counted. See Mitchell A. Seligson report on Ecuador, Op. Cit., p. 128.

Figure VI.7 Victimization by Corruption and Sex




Figure VI.8 Education and Victimization Due to Corruption by Gender and Education






Figure VI.9 Victimization Due to Corruption by Age



We can observe in Figure VI.9 that victimization due to corruption decreases as the age of the interviewee increases. Figure VI.10 shows that as the wealth increases, the possibility of being a victim of corruption also increases.

Figure VI.10 Victimization Due to Corruption on Account of Wealth



6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the impact of corruption. We have been able to prove that corruption affects support for the political system and a stable democracy, we have also been able to prove that, although a minority of the interviewed persons are victims of corruption, corruption is an important factor. Panama is second on the list of countries for victimization by public employees, but in third place (with El Salvador) for total victimization. The municipality is the institution where people experience more corruption, with the police force in second place. The factors affecting victimization due to corruption are: education and sex, age, place of residence and levels of wealth.

7.0 Participation and Social Capital

Civic participation is one of the most important factors in a democracy. Participation is necessary for the existence of a counterbalancing system between the government and citizenry. Democracy is mainly based on the notion of “self-government,” to wit, that people can, individually and collectively, take decisions that effectively affect the public policies adopted by the government. Additionally, participation is an indispensable factor for the creation and preservation of civil society.

In a democracy, a vigorous civil society allows the people to exercise their civic and political rights. To be able to construct a civil society, it is important to create a system which stimulates the development of what Robert Putnam calls “social capital”⁷⁷. To wit, the factors within the community that facilitate coordination and cooperation to obtain mutual benefits. This means that if a person works in a community where confidence, values, networks and similar aspects exist, the result shall be more effective than the work carried out within a community lacking these factors. One of the most basic elements for the development of these values and practices is participation of the population in the organizations of civil society.

7.1 Levels of Participation

The survey allows us to analyze the levels of participation in Panama, by means of a series of questions which seek to directly know the amount of participation in different organizations of civil society.

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	NS
CP6 Any Church or temple committee meetings ?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
CP7 Any parents school or academy association meetings?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
CP8 Any community improvement committee or assembly meetings?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
CP9 Any professional, merchant or producers association meeting?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
CP13 Political party meetings?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)

⁷⁷ Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton; NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1993).


Table VII.1 Level of Participation

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never
	%	%	%	%
CP6 Religious organization	16.5%	14.0%	11.1%	8.4%
CP7 Parents School or Academy Association	2.4%	15.7%	18.2%	63.7%
CP8 Community improvement committee or assembly	4.6%	13.0%	15.2%	67.2%
CP 13 Political Party	6.3%	11.4%	10.3%	71.9%
CP9 Professional Association	2.6%	4.9%	6.3%	86.2%

As we could see from the foregoing Table and Figures, the greatest level of participation occurs in religious organizations, the lowest in professional organizations. This should cause no surprise because very few of the interviewed persons would be members of the professional sectors.

Now, we can compare Panama with other countries which are part of this project. We have restricted our analysis to the organizations for which questions were made in all countries. There were three questions, (unions, cooperatives and civic associations) that were not part of the central questions and therefore were not carried out for all cases. Figure VII.1 shows the results.

Figure VII.1 Level of Participation



We can observe that, with the exceptions of political parties and community meetings, Panamá is tied with Colombia having the lowest levels of participation. For example, Panamá has the

lowest level of participation in parents associations and one of the lowest levels for religious organizations.

7.2 Factors Which Explain the Levels of Participation

To analyze the factors which explain participation, we must carry out a regression analysis. To do this, we should see if there is a dimension with which we could create a participation scale. Factor analysis shows that there is a dimension which includes participation in political parties, parents school associations and community improvement assemblies. Participation in professional associations are not related to other forms of participation and participation in religious organizations forms a unique dimension. Table VII.2 (see Appendix B) gives the results of the factor analysis. For our study we have created a participation scale which includes participation in community improvement assemblies, political parties and parents school associations.

7.3 Predictors Participation

The results of multiple regression may be appreciated in Table VII.3 (see Appendix B). We can see as significant factors: age, wealth, amount of children, victimization due to crime and fear of neighborhood crime.

Let us proceed to analyze the impact of the significant factors on the level of participation. Figure VII.2 gives the results for the age factor. We can observe that the relation is curvilinear, that is, that participation is greatest for middle age persons. This is so because middle age persons have acquired families and responsibilities that lead them to participate, on the contrary, the young have other worries, and older persons have less need and capacity to actively participate. Remember also, that the scale includes participation in parents' school associations and middle age persons have greater possibility of having school age children.

Figure VII.2 Participation and Age





Figure VII.3 provides results of level of participation by wealth. Although the graph presents a small negative relationship, we can observe that as wealth increases, participation decreases.


Figure VII.3 Participation and Wealth



In Figure VII.4 we observe that the relationship between number of children and participation is curvilinear. Participation increases among persons without children and those with three

children. After three children, participation decreases, apparently because at those levels the amount of children does not enable active participation.

Figure VII.4 Participation and Number of Children



7.4 Effects of Participation on Community Action

The question now formulated is, how are the levels of participation affected by persons taking direct action to improve their communities? The survey asked the following:

Now, I am going to ask you some questions on your community and the problems its faces...

CP5 In the last year have you contributed or have tried to contribute to the solution of some problems of your community or of your neighbors?

(1) Yes [continue]

(2) No [Go to CP6]

(8) NS

Figure VII.5 shows the amount of persons who have contributed to solve problems of the community. We can see that only 38% of the interviewed persons have directly participated in this type of activity.

Figure VII.5 Contribution to Solve Community Problems




Figure VII.6 shows that there is a close relationship between participation in assemblies or associations to improve the community and the voluntary action to improve the community. It is probable that many activities of the improvement assemblies have to do with work to improve the community and therefore persons who participate in these assemblies may also have dedicated voluntary time to improve their communities.

Figure VII.6 Participation in Community Association by Voluntary Participation to Solve Neighborhood Problems






Figure VII.7 Participation in PTA by Voluntary Participation to Improve Neighborhood



In Figure VII.7 we can see that there is a relationship between participation in parents' school associations and voluntary participation to solve community problems. Finally, we can also see a relationship between voluntary participation and participation in political parties (Figure VII.8)


Figure VII.8 Participation in Political Parties to Improve the Community



Finally, we want to explore if there is any relationship between participation and support for a stable democracy. The basic premise of the theory of "social capital" is that group participation increases democratic stability. We can see below the results for the two types of groups with the

greatest level of participation, with the exception of religious organizations, parents' school associations and community improvement assemblies.


Figure VII.9 Participation in PTA to Support a Stable Democracy



We can observe in Figure VII.9 that there is a certain relationship between participation in PTA meetings and support for a stable democracy. We can see that those persons who attend these meetings once a week have an above average support for a stable democracy; above than the national average which is 37.9. The others are more or less at the national level.

In the case of community improvements assemblies, we can see in Figure VII.10 that there also is a certain relationship between this type of participation and support for a stable democracy. Support for a stable democracy is above the national average for those persons who participate even if it is only once a month, while those persons who never participate in these organizations support democracy below the national average.

Figure VII.10 Participation in Community Improvement Groups and Support for a Stable Democracy



7.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we have analyzed the levels of participation in civil society organizations. In the case of Panama, we can observe that Panamanians participate more in religious organizations and then, in parents' school associations. Panama has participation levels below the majority of countries that comprise this project. The factors that significantly influence participation are: age, level of wealth, number of children, victimization due to crime and fear of neighborhood crime. We can also show that participation in organizations influences persons to voluntarily participate in community improvements. Further, there is a relationship between participation in parents' school associations and community improvements groups and support for a stable democracy.

8.0 Electoral Conduct in Panama

With the return of democratic regimes, chosen through electoral processes, concern has developed for the legitimacy of elections. At the same time, there is the need to understand the behavior of the population in the face of the electoral tournament. During the survey process, the electoral conduct of Panamanians was examined and the answers were analyzed.

The dependent variable, as we will explain, was the electoral conduct of Panamanians in the elections of 1999 and 2004. In both occasions, Panamanians elected the President of the Republic and other popular representatives. The electoral contest of 1999 was carried out 10 years after the U.S. military intervention that ended the 21 year old military regime.

The survey was applied two months before the elections of May 2004. The study asked people about their vote intentions for president. The survey results were very close to the actual election results. Likewise, it was also asked for whom they had voted in the elections of 1999. The results yielded by the survey also reflected with precision the distribution of the electoral vote in that occasion.

Table VIII.1 Comparison of Vote Intentions from the Survey and Actual Results of the 1999 and 2004 Elections

Elections of 1999			Elections of 2004 ⁷⁸		
Candidates	Survey	Results	Candidates	Survey	Results
Mireya Moscoso	46.3	44.8	Martin Torrijos	52.7	47.4
Martin Torrijos	37.3	37.8	Guillermo Endara	30.8	30.9
Alberto Vallarino	14.1	17.4	José M. Aleman	11.4	16.4
Null/blank vote	2.3	3.9	R. Martiinelli	5.0	5.3

Source: Tribunal Electoral de Panamá

⁷⁸We think that the difference between the results and the surveys for candidate Torrijos and Aleman is mainly due to the fact that the Partido Arnulfista sympathizers (government party and main support of candidate Aleman), who were supporting Torrijos in the middle of March, disenchanted with the current government, finally decided to support the candidate of their party. It must be noted that the survey has error margins greater for rural areas and we suspect that part of the difference is in the rural areas.

Table VIII.2 Electoral Participation in the Presidential Elections of 1999 and 2004

	Elections of 1999		Elections of 2004	
	Absolute Number	% of population apt to vote	Absolute Number	% of population apt to vote
Electors	1,746,989	99.1	1,999,553	99.0
Null/blank votes	56,225	3.2	38,295	1.9
Valid Votes	1,274,505	72.4	1,499,097	74.9
Total votes	1,330,730	75.5	1,537,392	76.9

Source: Tribunal Electoral de Panamá

In the case of Panama, more than 75% of the population voted in both elections of 1999 and 2004. The attendance at the ballot boxes, relatively high if compared with other countries in the region, may be explained to the fact that the citizenry still considers that voting may influence policy decisions. Comparing the results of the survey in Figure VIII.1 and the actual participation in Table VIII.2, we may observe that the survey reflects with precision electoral abstention for the 1999 elections. Figure VIII.2 shows that many more persons said to have the intention of voting in the elections of May 2004 than actually voted. This is attributed to the moral pressure that “voting” has in a democracy, and therefore, when people are asked, they will regularly say “yes.” Another reason is that many people may have inconveniences on the day of the elections, and even if asked before the elections and having said that they had the intention of voting, they might not be able to go or may change their mind on the day of the elections.

Figure VIII.1 Did You Vote in the Last Elections of 1999?





Figure VIII.2 Are You Planning to Vote in the Next Elections of May 2?



Non-participation is almost the same in urban and rural areas, see Figure VIII.3. Figure VIII.4 shows that there is not much difference in electoral participation between the different regions of the country. The central area (province of Herrera, Los Santos and Veraguas) exhibits more participation than the other regions. These results reflect normal levels, as the central region regularly has the highest levels of participation.

Figure VIII.3 Did You Vote in the Last Elections of 1999? by Urban/Rural Area





Figure VIII.4 Did You Vote in the Last Elections of 1999? by Strata



How did Panama compare with the other countries in the study? Figures VIII.5 and VIII.5 demonstrate that Panama has high voting levels and high confidence in the value of elections. In

Figure VIII.5 we can see that although all the countries exhibit relatively high voting levels, Panamanians lead the statistics with their electoral participation. Figure VIII.6 demonstrates that 69% of Panamians think that voting can improve the country's situation.

Figure VIII.5 Did You Vote in the Last Presidential Elections? Comparative Perspective





Figure VIII.6 Can Voting Effect Change? Comparative Perspective



8.1 Relation Between Elections and Democracy

Regarding the debate about the quality of democracy, the notion that stands out is that which asserts that a minimum of institutional procedures are necessary in order to have a democratic system.

The concept of a minimum institutional framework for democracy, developed by Norberto Bobbio, explains the situation in the transitions between non-democratic systems to more democratic governments, and would be applicable to the analysis of the democratic transitions in Latin America. Minimum democracy is defined by Bobbio as a collection of rules that 1) express who is in charge and authorized to take collective decisions and 2) under what procedures. If there are rules capable of answering these questions, there is a democracy. This definition of democracy as a method of analysis is capable of defining the different forms that democracy may acquire in the course of time.

Minimum democracy is identified as a collection of basic assumptions:

- a) the political participation of the greatest number of persons interested in participating in political life,
- b) the majority rule, to wit, to respect majority opinion,
- c) the right to select between different elites and political programs and
- d) permanent protection of the public sphere.

The problem with this conception is that one can begin to imagine that once established, democracy shall resolve all societal problems. In relation to the questions that democracy seems not to resolve, Bobbio is concerned about the hidden powers of the state, which governs beyond popular will. The manipulation of information on government contracts (bidding), state secrets and discretionary items, privileges, favoritism and nepotism, corporate influences may undermine the legitimacy of a democratically elected government and may alienate the most democratically committed citizens.

As a process, the electoral system offers citizens an opportunity to become stimulated by national politics. In the case of Panama, 1989 was centered in the return to democracy. In 1994, the debate revolved in relation to efficiency and investment promises. In 1999 the citizenry was convinced with development speeches and populist promises. In 2004, however, the candidates did not present proposals linking them to democratic or economic questions. Nevertheless, the population went out to vote. Even though in the speeches, democracy was associated with modernization and state reform, there are indications that people did not mobilize behind the slogans the “rationalization of power or modernization of the state.”

Different authors have tried to characterize the Latin American governments that developed in the latter part of the XX century. Guillermo O’Donnell used the term “delegated democracies” to define situations in which the electorate votes for leaders that assume the roll of “National Saviors” in a crisis setting. These democracies are characterized by electing providential leaders to free them from responsibilities in critical situations.⁷⁹ In the case of Panama, it seems to be the roll reserved to the deceased charismatic leader, Arnulfo Arias, by his followers.

⁷⁹Guillermo O’Donnell, 1992, “Delegated Democracy,” *Cuadernos CAEH* No. 61.

Norbert Lechner refers to “restricted democracies” when addressing those systems that try to restrict electoral democracy and, in its place, to strengthen executive power to be able to impose, free of pressures, the “imperatives” of economic modernization. According to Lechner, in this type of democracy, technocracy and populism are combined.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, it is observed that there is a divorce between political rights and economic and social rights. O’Donnell characterizes this type of situation as a “low intensity citizenry.” It is possible that high attendance to comply with the citizenry duties to vote may coexist with low participation in economic (employment) and social (education) institutions. According to O’Donnell, “in many of the democracies that are springing, the effectiveness of a national order, personified in the law and state authority is vanishing.....”

The great challenge, according to Lechner, that Latin American democracies may face consists in harmonizing political democracy with economic growth and social equity. Likewise, CEPAL proposes an integral perspective to reorient development patterns around the central axis of equity, as a strategy for social integration. In this sense, it is trying to put in the foreground the force of human rights, specially, economic, social and cultural rights, which together with civil and political rights, provide an ethical framework to the development process.

The other aspect of citizenry taken from the notion of social democracy refers to overcoming the forms of exclusion, not only in the economic aspect, but also in the integration to a political system that may offer effective participation. In this sense, the axis citizenry - exclusion constitutes itself into one of the constitutive elements of collective action, in the context of the democratization carried out in the region.⁸¹ The excluded ones, are today a mass which seems to be in the way for those dominant or dominating who are “in;” therefore, they would no longer be part of the “polis,” with an ideology and projects that take them into consideration and which seek the transformation of society to include them.⁸²

8.2 Predictors of Intention to Vote in the 2004 Elections

Table VIII.3 shows the results of a regression analysis wherein we analyzed the factors that influence the intention to vote in the 2004 elections (See Appendix B).


The variable that best explains the intention to vote of Panamanians in the 2004 election has an institutional character. It refers to the effort carried out by the state to make the population participate in the political processes by means of their formal registration in the electoral roll (administered by the Electoral Court) (See Figure VIII.7).

⁸⁰Norberto Lechner, 1993, “State Reform,” *Nueva America*, No. 57, (Buenos Aires).

⁸¹See Manuel Antonio Garretón, 2002, “The transformation of collective action in Latin America,” *Revista de la CEPAL*, No. 76, (April).


⁸²Iriarte, Alicia, Mariana Vasquez and Claudia Bernazza, 2003, “Democracy citizenry: reflections on democracy and the democratization processes in Latin America,” *Revista Futuros*, Vol. 1, No. 4.

Figure VIII.7 Voting in the May 2004 Elections and Being Updated in the Election Rolls of the Electoral Court



Likewise, another institutional factor which explains electoral participation is membership in political parties. Around 35 percent of the adult population is registered in any of the seven officially recognized political parties in the country (See Figure VIII.8).


Figure VIII.8 Are You Planning to Vote in May 2004 and Registration in a Political Party?



8.3 Predictors of Electoral Participation in the Elections of 1999

Table VIII.4 analyzes the factors which influence participation in the electoral tournament of 1999 (See Appendix B). Pursuant to the results of the survey, registration in the Electoral Court also exercised a significant influence, as well as being a member of a political party. Different from the elections of 2004, in 1999 the level of education and age of the population had a significant impact⁸³ (See Figure VIII.9). Nevertheless, while in 1999 the size of the place had no importance to determine the electoral conduct, in 2004 it did have a significant impact.

Figure VIII.9 Vote in Presidential Elections of 1999 by Education Controlling for Age



8.4 Conclusion

In this Chapter, we have analyze the electoral behavior of Panamanians in the elections of 1999 and 2004, based on the survey results. We can observe that the results of the survey came very close to the results of both elections. Panamanians exhibit a high level of support towards the elections, both, in participation and the perception that elections may be an effective tool for political change. Nevertheless, we have made reference to the existence of other important elements in a democracy, besides elections, and governments should also pay attention to these factors. We detect that being updated in the electoral rolls of the the Electoral Court and being registered in a political party significantly influence the intention to vote.

⁸³The results by age are not surprising because a great part of the young were not able to vote in 1999. An additional analysis, not presented here, shows that for those 26 years old and older, there is no significant statistical difference in the level of participation.

Appendices

Appendix A: Questionnaire

Appendix B: Technical Note and Regression Tables

Appendix C: Survey Design

Appendix D: IRB Approval

Appendix A: Questionnaire

Versión # 9.1 Viernes, 27 de Febrero de 2004; IRB approval # 040103, University of Pittsburgh



CELA

UNIVERSIDAD DE PITTSBURGH AUDITORIA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Centroamérica, México y Colombia 2004

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País: 7. Panamá	PAIS	
Número de entrevista [asignado en la oficina no en campo]: _____	IDNUM	
Provincia: _____	PPROV	
Distrito _____	PDIST	
Segmento _____	PSEG	
Estrato: (1) Area Metropolitana (2) Area Oriental (3) Area Central (4) Area Occidental	PESTRAT	
UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural	UR	
Tamaño del lugar: 1. Capital nacional 2. Distrito con más de cien mil habitantes 3. Distrito entre 25 mil y 99,999 habitantes 4. Distrito con menos de 25 mil habitantes 5. Area Rural	TAMANO	
Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español	IDIOMAQ	

Hora de inicio: _____ : _____

Q1. ANOTE: Sexo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	Q1	
<p>PA4. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿Cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <p>(01) Problemas económicos (02) Inflación, altos precios (03) Desempleo (04) Pobreza (05) Delincuencia, crimen, violencia (06) Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) (07) Falta de tierra para cultivar (09) Falta de crédito</p> <p>(10) Problemas del medio ambiente (11) Drogadicción (12) Narcotráfico (13) Corrupción (14) Pandillas (15) Mal gobierno (16) Migración (17) La guerra contra terrorismo (18) Protección de la cuenca del canal</p> <p>(88) No sabe</p> <p>Anotar si no existe código: _____</p>	PA4	

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS		
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A1	
A2. Mira noticias en la TV.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A2	
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A3	
A4. Lee noticias vía Internet	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A4	

SOCT1. ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe	SOCT1	
SOCT3. ¿Cree Ud. que en los próximos doce meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	SOCT3	
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe	IDIO1	

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta... CP5. ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? (1) Sí [Seguir con CP5A] (2) No [Pasar a CP6] (8) NS [Pasar a CP6]	CP5				
CP5A. ¿Ha donado dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5A	
CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5B	
CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5C	
CP5D. ¿Ha ayudado a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5D	

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS		
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)		
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP7	
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP8	
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP9	
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido político?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP13	

PROT1. ¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS	PROT1		
---	-------------------	----------------	-----------	--------	--------------	--	--

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

<i>¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido Ud. ayuda o cooperación ... ?</i>	Sí	No	NS/NR		
CP2. A algún legislador de la Asamblea Legislativa	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP2	
CP4. A algún ministerio, institución pública u oficina del gobierno nacional	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP4	
CP4A. Al alcalde de este distrito	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP4A	
PCP4B. Al representante de corregimiento	(1)	(2)	(8)	PCP4B	
PCP4C. Al corregidor	(1)	(2)	(8)	PCP4C	

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría que se encuentra ..? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS		LS3	
--	--	------------	--

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS	IT1	
IT2. ¿Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo de sí misma, o cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo? (1) Se preocupa de sí misma (2) Trata de ayudar al prójimo (8) NS	IT2	
IT3. ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente, si se les presentara la oportunidad, trataría de aprovecharse de usted, o cree que no se aprovecharía de usted?	IT3	

(1) Sí, se aprovecharían (2) No se aprovecharían (8) NS

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipalidad...

<p>NP1. ¿Ha asistido a una reunión convocada por el alcalde durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda</p>	<p>NP1</p>	
<p>NP1B. ¿Hasta que punto cree Ud. que los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS</p>	<p>NP1B</p>	
<p>NP1C. Si Ud. tuviera una queja sobre algún problema local, y lo llevara a algún miembro del consejo municipal, ¿Que tanto cree Ud. que le haría caso? (1) Mucho (2) algo (3) poco o (4) nada (8) NS</p>	<p>NP1C</p>	
<p>NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina o funcionario de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda</p>	<p>NP2</p>	
<p>SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son...?</p> <p>(1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy Malos (8) No sabe</p>	<p>SGL1</p>	
<p>MUNI2. En su opinión, ¿Cuál es el problema más grave que tiene este distrito en la actualidad? [No leer respuestas] [aceptar una sola respuesta]</p> <p>(00) Ninguno [pase a EFF6]</p> <p>(01)Falta de agua (02) Falta de arreglo de calles (03) Falta de seguridad, delincuencia (04) Falta de Aseo público (05) Falta de servicios (06) La situación económica (07) Falta de fondos y ayuda (10) Mala administración (11) Descuido del medio ambiente (88) NS/NR [pase a EFF6]</p> <p>Otros _____ [anotar]:</p>	<p>MUNI2</p>	
<p>EFF3. ¿Cree que Ud. pueda ayudar a solucionar este problema?</p> <p>(1) Si [sigue con EFF5] (2) No [pasar a EFF6] (8) No sabe [pasar a EFF6]</p> <p>(9) Inap (no mencionó problemas)</p>	<p>EFF3</p>	
<p>EFF5. ¿Ha hecho algún esfuerzo alguna vez solo o en grupo para resolver este problema?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS (9) Inap (no mencionó problemas)</p>	<p>EFF5</p>	

<p>EFF6. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Qué tan probable cree Ud. que el esfuerzo del pueblo pueda servir para resolver los problemas de esta municipalidad? ¿Diría que hay mucha probabilidad de resolverlo, alguna probabilidad, poca probabilidad o casi ninguna probabilidad?</p> <p>(1) Mucha (2) alguna (3) poca (4) casi ninguna (8) NS</p>	EFF6	
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Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión, ¿existen algunas situaciones que pudieran justificar que los militares dieran un golpe de Estado?

JC1. Frente al Desempleo muy alto	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC1	
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC4	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC10	
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC12	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC13	
JC13A. ¿Cree Ud. que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un golpe de estado o cree que nunca hay suficiente razón para eso?	(1) Si podría haber razón	(2) Nunca habría razón	(8)NS	JC13A	

Ahora hablemos de la seguridad ciudadana.

<p>VIC1. ¿Ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí [siga] (2) No [Pasar a ST1]</p>	VIC1	
<p>VIC2. ¿Qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? [No lea las alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (3) Agresión física sin robo</p> <p>(4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (7) Robo de la casa</p> <p>Otro (especifique) _____ (99) Inap (no vic.)</p>	VIC2	
<p>AOJ1. [Si responde "Sí" a VIC1] ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución?</p> <p>(1) Sí [siga] (2) No lo denunció [Pasar a AOJ1B] (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no víctima)</p>	AOJ1	
<p>AOJ1A. ¿A quién o a qué institución denunció el hecho? [marcar una sola alternativa y pase a ST1]</p> <p>(1) Fiscalía (2) Policía (3) Juzgados (6) Prensa Otro: _____ (8)NS (9) Inap (no víctima)</p>	AOJ1A	

AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [no leer alternativas] (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe adónde denunciar (8) NS (9) No víctima	AOJ1 B
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De los trámites que Ud. ha hecho con las siguientes entidades. ¿Se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho con el servicio que le ofrecieron? **(REPETIR LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)**

	MUY SATISFEC HO	ALGO SATISFEC HO	ALGO INSATISFEC HO	MUY INSATISFEC HO	NO HIZO TRAMITES	NS/N R	
ST1. La policía nacional	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST1
ST2. Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST2
ST3. La fiscalía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST3
ST4. La municipalidad (alcaldía)	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST4

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿Cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8) NS	AOJ8
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy Inseguro (8) NS	AOJ11
AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿Qué tanto cree Ud. que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ11A
AOJ12. Si fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12
AOJ16. ¿Hasta qué punto teme Ud. violencia por parte de miembros de su propia familia? ¿Diría que tiene mucho, algo, poco o nada de miedo? (1) mucho (2) Algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS	AOJ16
AOJ16A. En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en el último año? (1) Si [Seguir con AOJ16B] (2) No [Pasar a AOJ 17] 8 (NS)	AOJ16A
AOJ16B. ¿Esto pasa con mucha frecuencia, de vez en cuando o casi nunca? (1) Con mucha frecuencia (2) De vez en cuando (3) Casi nunca (8) NS (9) Inap	AOJ16B
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS	AOJ17

[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1- que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión, si usted no confía

nada escogería el puntaje 1, y si, por el contrario, confía mucho, escogería el puntaje 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Nada					c) Mucho		(8) No sabe

Ahora, usando la tarjeta “A,” por favor conteste estas preguntas.

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS		
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los tribunales de justicia de Panamá garantizan un juicio justo? <i>Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.</i>		B1	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Panamá?		B2	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político panameño?		B3	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político panameño?		B4	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político panameño?		B6	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		B10A	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Electoral?		B11	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Asamblea Legislativa?		B13	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Nacional?		B14	
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la Republica?		B16	
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Defensoría del Pueblo?		B17	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Policía?		B18	
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría General de la Republica?		B19	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?		B20	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos?		B21	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		B31	

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el gobierno municipal?		B32
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser panameño?		B43
B47. ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		B47
B48. ¿Hasta que punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?		B48

[NO RECOJER TARJETA “A”]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Nada						d) Much o	(8) No sabe

Ahora, en esta misma escala, hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual, o sea el gobierno de la Presidenta Mireya Moscoso (seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS		
N1. Combate la pobreza.		N1	
N3. Promueve y protege los principios democráticos.		N3	
N9. Combate la corrupción en el Gobierno.		N9	

[Recoja tarjeta “A”]

[Entregue al entrevistado tarjeta “B”]

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo.” Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta que punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Muy en desacuerdo						e) Muy de acuerdo	(8) No sabe

	Anotar 1-7, NS=8		
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier forma de Gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		ING4	
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los panameños tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		PN2	
PN2A. Los políticos buscan el poder para su propio beneficio, y no se preocupan por ayudar al pueblo ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		PN2A	

[RECOGER TARJETA B]

[Entregue al entrevistado tarjeta “C”]

Ahora le voy a entregar otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que **desaprueba firmemente** y el 10 indicando que **aprueba firmemente**. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)	
Desaprueba firmemente							f) Aprueba firmemente				No sabe

	Anotar 1-10, 88 NS		
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.		E5	

E8. Que las personas participen en un grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.		E8	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.		E11	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.		E15	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.		E14	
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.		E2	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.		E3	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales		E16	

[No recoja tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de ver la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente							g) Aprueba firmemente			No sabe

	Anotar 1-10,88= NS		
D32. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?		D32	
D33. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político panameño?		D33	
D34. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?		D34	
D36. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?		D36	
D37. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?		D37	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Panamá. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos **[sigue tarjeta C]**.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente							h) Aprueba firmemente			No sabe

	Anotar 1-10, NS=88	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Panamá, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]		D1
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		D2
D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D3
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?		D4
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales , ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D5
D6. Y siempre pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas salgan en la televisión a expresar su punto de vista ?		D6

[Recoja tarjeta "C"]

Usted cree que ahora en el país tenemos: (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada...		
LIB1. Libertad de prensa (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	LIB1	
LIB2. Libertad de opinión (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	LIB2	
LIB3. Participación política (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	LIB3	
LIB4. Protección a derechos humanos (1) Muy poco (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiado (8) NS	LIB4	

ACR1. Ahora le voy a leer tres frases. Por favor dígame cual de las tres describe mejor su opinión: (1) La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios, o... (2) Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas, o.... (3) Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios. (8) NS/NS	ACR1	
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<p>PN4. En general, ¿diría que está satisfecho, muy satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Panamá?</p> <p>(1) muy satisfecho (2) satisfecho (3) insatisfecho (4) muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PN4</p>	
<p>PN5. En su opinión Panamá es ¿muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?</p> <p>(1) muy democrático (2) algo democrático (3) poco democrático (4) nada democrático (8) NS</p>	<p>PN5</p>	
<p>PN6. ¿Basado en su experiencia en los últimos años, Panamá se ha vuelto más democrático, igual de democrático o menos democrático?</p> <p>(1) muy democrático (2) igual de democrático (3) menos democrático (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PN6</p>	

<p>DEM13. En pocas palabras, ¿que significa para Ud. la democracia? [No leer alternativas] [anotar solo una respuesta]</p> <p>(1) Libertad (2) Igualdad (3) Bienestar, progreso económico (4) Capitalismo (5) Gobierno no militar (6) Libre comercio, libre negocio (7) Elecciones, voto (10) Derecho de escoger los líderes (11) Corrupción (12) Participación (13) Gobierno de la gente (14) Obedecer la ley Otro (anotar) _____ (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DEM13</p>	
<p>DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo:</p> <p>(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático. (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático. (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DEM2</p>	
<p>DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?</p> <p>(1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) No responde</p>	<p>DEM11</p>	

<p>AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen bien, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa?</p> <p>(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AUT1</p>	
<p>AUT2. El sistema actual de gobierno no ha sido el único que ha tenido nuestro país. Alguna gente piensa que estaríamos mejor si los militares volvieran a gobernar. Otros dicen que debemos mantener el sistema que tenemos ahora. ¿Qué piensa?</p> <p>(1) Retorno de los militares (2) El mismo que tenemos ahora (8) NS</p>	<p>AUT2</p>	

<p>FIGUA1. Hay gente que dice que solo aquellas personas que tengan suficiente inteligencia deben tener derecho a votar. Otros dicen que todos deben tener igual derecho a votar. ¿Que piensa?</p> <p>(1) Solo personas inteligentes deben votar (2) Todos deben tener derecho a votar (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>FIGUA1</p>	
<p>FIGUA2. Hay gente que dice que la Caja de Seguro Social debe prestar los mismos servicios a quienes cotizan mucho y quienes cotizan poco. Otros dicen que la Caja de Seguro Social debe prestar más servicios aquellos que cotizan mucho. ¿Qué piensa?</p> <p>(1) Los mismos servicios para todos (2) Mas servicios para los que cotizan mucho (8) NS</p>	<p>FIGUA2</p>	
<p>PP1. Ahora para cambiar el tema...Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras personas para que vote por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que vote por un partido o candidato? [<i>lea las alternativas</i>]</p> <p>(1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PP1</p>	
<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 1999?</p> <p>(1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PP2</p>	
<p>PPAR1. ¿Usted esta inscrito en algún partido político en la actualidad?</p> <p>(1) Si [sig] (2) No [ABS5] (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PPAR1</p>	
<p>PPAR2. ¿En cual de los siguientes partidos políticos esta Ud. inscrito?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partido Arnulfista 2. Partido Revolucionario Democrático 3. Partido Solidaridad 4. Partido Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacionalista (MOLIRENA) 5. Partido Popular 6. Partido Liberal Nacional 7. Partido Cambio Democrático 8. Ninguno <p>(88) NS/NR</p>	<p>PPAR2</p>	
<p>ABS5. ¿Cree que el voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro o cree que como quiera que vote, las cosas no van a mejorar?</p> <p>(1) El voto puede cambiar las cosas (2) Las cosas no van a mejorar (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>ABS5</p>	
<p>M1. Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría que el trabajo que está realizando la Presidenta Mireya Moscoso es:</p>	<p>M1</p>	

(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (8) NS/NR

<i>Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...</i>	No	Sí	NS	INAP		
EXC1. ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que no cometió?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC1	
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC2	
EXC4. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando mordidas (soborno) a un policía en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC4	
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC6	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la alcaldía en el último año? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC11	
EXC13. ¿UD. trabaja? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC13	
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (coima, soborno) en los juzgados en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC14	
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (soborno, coima)?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC15	
EXC16. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9 si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (soborno, coima)?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC16	

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos esta...?

(1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada(4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR

EXC7

[Ahora vamos a usar tarjeta “D”][Entregar tarjeta “D”]

Ahora le voy a nombrar varias instituciones públicas y privadas. Me interesa saber qué tan honrados o corruptos cree que son los representantes de esas instituciones. Le voy a pedir que califique a cada uno de ellos con una nota de 1 a 10 donde 1 sería muy corrupto y 10 muy honrado.

INSTITUCIONES	Grado de corrupción											NS		
	Muy corruptos					Muy honrados								
PC1. Los legisladores	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC1		
PC2. Los ministros	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC2		
PC3. Los alcaldes	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC3		
PPC4. Los representantes de corregimientos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PPC4		
PC5. Los policías	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC5		
PC8. Los profesores universitarios	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC8		
PC9. Los sacerdotes, clérigos y pastores	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC9		
PC12. Los jueces	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC12		
PC14. Los líderes de los partidos políticos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC14		
PC15. Los líderes de las ONG's	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC15		
PC19. La prensa	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC19		
PC21. Los Presidentes de la República	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC21		

Recoja Tarjeta D

<p>Ahora me puede decir...</p> <p>GI1. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [No leer, George W. Bush; acepta “Bush” o “George Bush”]</p> <p>(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (no sabe)</p>	GI1	
<p>GI3. ¿Cuántas provincias tiene Panamá? [No leer, 9]</p> <p>(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)</p>	GI3	
<p>GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Panamá? [No leer, cinco años]</p> <p>(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)</p>	GI4	
<p>GI5. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [No leer, Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva; acepta “Lula”]</p> <p>(1) Correcto(2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)</p>	GI5	

L1. MOSTRAR TARJETA “E”: Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos “izquierda” y “derecha” cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Izquierda					i) Derecha						
										(NS=88)	

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted sin temor, un poco de temor, o con mucho temor? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS		
DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	8		DER1
DER2. ¿Votar en una elección nacional?	1	2	3	8		DER2
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	8		DER3
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	8		DER4

VB1. ¿Esta Ud. actualizado en el Tribunal Electoral? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS	VB1	
VB2. ¿Votó en las pasadas elecciones de 1999? (1) Sí votó [siga] (2) No votó [pasar a VB4]	VB2	
PVB3. ¿Por cuál candidato votó para Presidente en las elecciones pasadas de 1999? [Si no votó, seguir con PVB4. Si votó, anotar respuesta y pasar a PVB8] 1. Martín Torrijos 2. Mireya Moscoso 3. Alberto Vallarino 4. Voto nulo/ Voto en Blanco 8. NS/NR 9. Inap (No votó)	PVB3	
PVB4. Si no votó, ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [anotar una sola respuesta] (01) Falta de transporte (02) Enfermedad (03) Falta de interés (04) No le gustó ningún candidato/partido (05) No cree en el sistema (06) Falta de cédula de identidad (07) No se encontró en el padrón electoral (10) No tenía edad (11) Llegó tarde a votar/estaba cerrado (12) Tenía que trabajar Otro _____ (88) NS/NR	PVB4	

PVB8. ¿Piensa votar en las próximas elecciones presidenciales del 2 de mayo? (1) Si [sig a] (2) No [seguir a ED] (8) NS/NR	PVB8	
PVB8A. Si las elecciones fueran hoy, ¿Por cual de los siguientes candidatos votaría Ud.? 1. José Miguel Alemán 2. Guillermo Endara Galimany 3. Ricardo Martinelli 4. Martín Torrijos (8) NS/NR (99) Inap (no votara)	PVB8A	

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?

[Encestador: llenar:] _____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla abajo para código y poner un circulo alrededor del número que corresponde]**

Ninguno = 00	Primer año de..	Segund o año de..	Tercer año de..	Cuarto año de..	Quinto año de..	Sexto año de..	ED	_ _ _		
Primaria	(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)				
Secundaria	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(11)	(12)				
Universitaria	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18) o mas				
No sabe/no responde	(88)									

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	Q2	_ _ _
Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? (1) Católica (2) Cristiana no católica (3) Otra no cristiana (4) Ninguna (8) No sabe o no quiere mencionar	Q3	
Q4 ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido Ud. a la iglesia (culto, templo) durante el mes pasado? (1) Todas las semanas (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca	Q4	

<p>Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de esta casa, incluyendo las remesas (dinero) del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?</p> <p>[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta F]</p> <p>(0) Ningún ingreso (1) Menos de \$100 (2) \$100-\$199 (3) \$200-\$399 (4) \$400-\$599 (5) \$600-\$799 (6) \$800-\$999 (7) \$1000-\$1499 (8) \$1500-\$2499 (9) \$2500-\$4999 (10) \$5000 y más (88) NS</p>	Q10	
<p>Q10A. ¿Recibe su familia remesas (dinero) del exterior?</p> <p>(1) Si [siga] (2) No [saltar a Q11] (8) NS/NR</p>	Q10A	
<p>Q10B. ¿Hasta que punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas (dinero) del exterior?</p> <p>(1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS/NR</p>	Q10B	
<p>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [no leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR</p>	Q11	
<p>Q12. ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (0 = ninguno)</p>	Q12	
<p>Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS</p>	Q14	

<p>PETID. ¿A cual de los siguientes grupos pertenece, blanco, negro, mestizo, indígena?</p> <p>(1) Blanco (2) Mestizo (3) Indígena (4) Negro</p> <p>Otro _____ (8) NS/NR</p>	PETID	
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Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R1	
R3. Refrigeradora [nevera]		(0) No		(1) Sí	R3	
R4. Teléfono convencional no celular		(0) No		(1) Sí	R4	
R4A. Teléfono celular		(0) No		(1) Sí	R4A	

R5. Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R5
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No		(1) Sí		R6
R7. Microondas	(0) No		(1) Sí		R7
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No		(1) Sí		R12
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No		(1) Sí		R14
R15. Computadora	(0) No		(1) Sí		R15

OCUP1. Cuál es su ocupación principal? 1. Profesional, directivo 2. Oficinista 3. Vendedor 4. Agricultor 5. Peon agricola 6. Servicio Domestico 7. Otros servicios 10. Obrero especializados 11. Obrero no especializados 12. Estudiante [seguir a DESOC1] 13. Ama de casa [seguir a DESOC1] 14. Pensionado rentista [seguir a DESOC1] 88. NS [seguir a DESOC1]	OCUP1	
OCUP1A En esta ocupación Usted es: 1. Asalariado del gobierno o entidad autonoma? 2. Asalariado sector privado? 3. Patrono o socio empresa menos de 5 empleados? 4. Patrono o socio empresa 5 o más empleados? 5. Trabajador por cuenta propia? 6. Trabajador no remunerado 8. NS	OCUP1A	
DESOC1. ¿Ha estado desocupado (desempleado) durante el último año? (1) Sí (2) No (3) Actualmente desocupado/pensionado/rentista	DESOC1	

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____	TI	
TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____		

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ /04 Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Firma del codificador _____

Comentarios:

Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____


Tarjeta "A"

Mucho



Nada


Tarjeta "B"
Muy de Acuerdo



Muy en Desacuerdo

Tarjeta "C"


Aprueba
Firmemente



Desaprueba
Firmemente

Tarjeta “D”

Muy honrados



Muy corruptos

Tarjeta “E”

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Izquierda

Derecha

Tarjeta “F”

Los ingresos familiares *mensuales* de esta casa:

1. Ningún ingreso
2. Menos de \$100
3. \$100-\$199
4. \$200-\$399
5. \$400-\$599
6. \$600-\$799
7. \$800-\$999
8. \$1000-\$1499
9. \$1500-\$2499
10. \$2500-\$4999
11. \$5000 y más

Appendix B: Technical Note and Regression Tables

Technical Note

We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr.. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an index (as opposed to a scale) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In

order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent's choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common "informed consent" form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CSPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for and audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there "in black and white," but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.

After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced. A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the data base itself (www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/).

**Table III.2 Predictors of Support Towards the Institutional System
Coefficients(a)**

	Non standard coeficientes		Standard coeficientes	t	Sig.
	B	Typ. error	Beta		
(Constant)	88.447	7.329		12.068	.000
Q1 Sex (1=Men; 2=Women)	3.047	1.255	.069	2.428	.015
TAMANO Size of the community	1.569	.450	.119	3.490	.001
SOCT1 How do you qualify the country's economic situation?	-1.852	.826	-.070	-2.243	.025
SOCT3 How do you view the economic situation in the next 12 months?	-1.861	.903	-.059	-2.061	.040
SGL1 How do you feel about the Municipal services?	-3.664	.827	-.127	-4.431	.000
AOJ11 Do you fear crime in your neighborhood?	-1.690	.693	-.073	-2.437	.015
PN4 Are you satisfied with democracy?	-5.488	.888	-.184	-6.182	.000
M1 Do you support the present Government's work?	-2.286	.777	-.092	-2.940	.003
L1 Ideology (scale 1=extreme left; 10=extreme right)	.784	.267	.082	2.932	.003
EFF6 People's efforts can solve Municipal problems?	-1.911	.661	-.084	-2.893	.004
EXCTOT Total index for corruption	-2.096	.838	-.074	-2.502	.012

a. Dependant variable : PSA5 System support

**Table III.3 Predictors of Political Tolerance
Coefficients(a)**

	Non standard coefficients		Standard Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constant)	55.550	5.174		10.735	.000
ED What is your last school year approved?	.725	.212	.119	3.427	.001
Q1 Gender	-4.423	1.403	-.083	-3.153	.002
TAMANO Size of community	-1.178	.490	-.074	-2.403	.016
WEALTH	.652	.297	.079	2.193	.029
L1 Ideology	.633	.304	.055	2.081	.038

a. Dependent variable : TOL Tolerance

Table III.6 Predictors of Stable Democracy in Panama

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
VIC1 Criminal victimization	.608	.171	12.721	1	.000	1.838
PN4 Satisfaction with democracy in Panama	-.467	.080	33.744	1	.000	.627
M1 Support of President Moscoso's work	-.192	.069	7.789	1	.005	.825
EFF6 Ability to solve community problems	-.165	.059	7.966	1	.005	.847
EXCTOT Total scale of corruption victimization	-.187	.085	4.831	1	.028	.830
Constant	.630	.614	1.053	1	.305	1.877

**Table IV.3 Predictors of Satisfaction with Municipal Services
Coefficients (a)**

	Non standard coefficients		Standard Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Tip. error	Beta		
(Constant)	41.665	3.677		11.330	.000
ED What is your last school year approved?	-.091	.153	-.021	-.594	.553
Q2 How old are you according to your last birthday?	-.075	.034	-.063	-2.248	.025
Q1 Gender	.464	1.002	.012	.463	.643
UR Urban/Rural	1.672	1.273	.039	1.313	.189
Wealth	.274	.213	.045	1.287	.198
SOCT1R Country's economic situationn	.032	.025	.035	1.282	.200
IDIO1R Personal economic situation	.079	.031	.073	2.580	.010
CP5R Contributions to solutions of community problems	-.005	.010	-.014	-.519	.604

a. Dependant variables: SGLIR satisfaction with Municipal services

**Table IV.4 Predictors of Attendance at Meetings Called by the Mayor
Coefficients (a)**

	Non standard coefficients		Standard coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
	B	Tip. error			
(Constante)	-8.828	3.762		2.346	.019
ED Education	.233	.184	.042	1.266	.206
Q2 Age according to last birthday	.016	.046	.010	.340	.734
Q1 Gender	.818	1.192	.017	.687	.492
Size of community	.700	.411	.049	1.705	.088
Wealth	.303	.255	.040	1.186	.236
Q11R Married	-.004	.013	-.007	-.272	.786
Q12R Number of children	.616	.384	.053	1.605	.109
CP5R Contributions to solutions of community problems	.043	.013	.087	3.311	.001
PARTI Participación⁸⁴	.234	.032	.197	7.396	.000

a. Dependant variable: NP1R Attendance at meetings called by Mayor

⁸⁴ This variable is a scale of participation in several groups. It was created on the basis of questions CP7, CP8 and CP13. These questions are part of a participation factor. The construction and use of this variable can be observed in Chapter VII.

**Table IV.5 Predictors of Petitioning the Municipality
Coefficients(a)**

	Non standard coefficients		Standard coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Tip. error	Beta		
(Constant)	3.021	5.244		.576	.565
ED What is your last school year approved?	.811	.260	.106	3.121	.002
Q2 How old are you according to your last birthday?	-.004	.065	-.002	-.055	.956
Q1 Gender	-.574	1.684	-.009	-.341	.733
Size of community	.084	.581	.004	.144	.885
Wealth	.122	.360	.012	.340	.734
Q11R Married	-.010	.019	-.014	-.522	.601
Q12R Number of children	.988	.542	.061	1.825	.068

a. Dependent: variable NP2R Petitioning the Municipality

**Table IV.6 Predictors Concerning Ability to Solve Municipal Problems
Coefficients(a)**

	Non standard coefficients		Standard coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Tip. error	Beta		
(Constant)	46.208	5.533		8.351	.000
ED What is your last school year approved?	1.021	.255	.140	4.012	.000
Q2 How old are you according to your last birthday?	.068	.057	.034	1.191	.234
Q1 Gender	-4.901	1.687	-.077	2.905	.004
Size of the community	2.083	.587	.109	3.551	.000
Wealth	.523	.357	.053	1.465	.143
L1 Political ideology	.246	.369	.018	.666	.506

a. Dependent variable: EFF6R People's own perception on their ability to solve Municipal problems.

Table IV.7 Predictors of Confidence in Municipal Government Coefficients (a)

	Standard coefficients		Standard coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Tip. error	Beta		
(Constant)	24.591	5.130		4.794	.000
ED What is your last school year approved?	-.404	.233	-.057	-1.730	.084
Q2 How old are you according to your last birthday?	.007	.051	.004	.130	.897
Q1 Gender	2.792	1.534	.045	1.820	.069
Size of the community	.816	.527	.044	1.546	.122
Wealth	-.349	.326	-.036	-1.069	.285
SGL1R Satisfaction with Municipal services	.465	.040	.290	11.562	.000
NP1R Attendance at Municipal meetings	.065	.032	.053	2.039	.042
NP2R Requested help from Municipality	.024	.023	.027	1.030	.303

a. Dependant variable: B32R Confidence in Municipal government

Table V.1 Factor Analysis of Institutions That Protect Legal Rights Component Matrix(a)

	Component 1
B16R Attorney General's Office	.754
B31R Supreme Court of Justice	.762
B10AR Justice system	.713
B17R Ombudsman's Office	.698
B18R Police	.693
B1R Fair trials	.547

Extraction method: Main component analysis.
a. 1 Extracted components

**Table V.2 Predictors of Confidence of Institutions that Protect Legal Rights
Coefficients (a)**

	Non standard coefficients		Standard coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Typ. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	43.647	4.602		9.484	.000
ED What is your last school year approved?	-.321	.150	-.064	-2.140	.032
Q2 How old are you according to your last birthday?	-.098	.033	-.073	-2.942	.003
Q1 Sex	1.115	.982	.026	1.136	.256
Size of community	.826	.355	.064	2.329	.020
Wealth	-.138	.207	-.020	-.665	.506
JC10R Too much crime can justify a <i>coup d'état</i>	.016	.010	.036	1.584	.114
AOJ11 Fear of a criminal assault	-1.442	.539	-.063	-2.672	.008
AOJ12 Confidence in judicial system's ability to punish delinquents	-2.862	.495	-.136	-5.780	.000
VIC1 Have you been a victim of some kind of criminal act in last 12 months	1.759	1.407	.029	1.250	.211
PC5R Perception of police corruption	.138	.018	.190	7.774	.000
PC12R Perception of trial judges corruption	.226	.018	.308	12.503	.000

a. Dependant variable: LEGINST confidence in institutions that protect legal rights

Table V.3 Predictors of Support of the Institutional System Including Confidence in Judicial Institutions Coefficients(a)

	Non standard coeficientes		Standard Coeficients	t	Sig.
	B	Tip. error	Beta		
(Constant)	16.408	2.874		5.710	.000
ED What is your last school year approved?	.116	.134	.023	.862	.389
Q2 How old are you according to your last birthday?	.052	.030	.038	1.741	.082
Q1 Sex	.997	.886	.023	1.125	.261
Size of the community	1.029	.307	.078	3.358	.001
Wealth	.121	.187	.017	.646	.518
B16R Attorney General's Office	.125	.018	.175	6.748	.000
B17R Obusman	.008	.016	.012	.497	.620
B18R Police	.107	.016	.158	6.671	.000
B10AR Judicial System	.213	.017	.299	12.377	.000
B31R Supreme Court of Justice	.116	.018	.162	6.261	.000

a. Dependant variable: PSA5 Support of the institutional system

**Table VI.1 Predictors of Corruption According to Type of Victim
Coefficients (a)**

	Non standard coefficients		Standard coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Typ. error	Beta		
(Constant)	.673	.105		6.414	.000
ED What is your last school year approved?	.010	.005	.064	1.954	.051
Q2 How old are you according to your last birthday?	-.006	.001	-.136	4.693	.000
Q1 Gender	-.189	.034	-.133	5.585	.000
TAMANO Size of the community	-.049	.012	-.116	4.157	.000
WEALTH	.023	.007	.103	3.110	.002
Q12 How many children do you have?	.015	.008	.056	1.910	.056

a. Dependant variable: EXCTOT Total index for corruption victimization

**Table VII.2 Factor Analysis of Participation in Various Groups
Rotated Components Matrix**

	Rescaled Component	
	1	2
CP13R Political parties	.764	.048
CP8R Community Board	.714	.124
CP7R Parents & Teachers Assoc. (PTA)	.555	.031
CP9R Professional associations	.263	.029
CP6R Religious organizations	.097	.995

Extraction method: Main component analysis.

Rotation method: Normalization Varimax with Kaiser.

^a Rotation converged on three occasions.

**Table VII.3 Predictors of Participation
Coefficients (a)**

	Non standard coefficients		Standard coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Typ. error	Beta		
(Constant)	31.925	4.490		7.111	.000
ED What is your last school year approved?	.110	.155	.024	.711	.477
Q2 How old are you according to your last birthday?	-.143	.038	-.114	3.742	.000
Q1 Gender	1.072	1.010	.026	1.061	.289
TAMANO Size of the community	.096	.356	.008	.268	.788
WEALTH	-.443	.216	-.070	2.052	.040
Q12 How many children do you have?	.887	.241	.113	3.680	.000
VIC1 Have been victim to any act of crime?	-4.053	1.450	-.071	2.796	.005
AOJ11 In relation to the community, is there fear of crime or violence	-1.357	.540	-.065	2.513	.012

a. Dependent variable: PARTI Participation

**Table VIII.3 Predictors of Intention to Vote in the 2004 Elections
Coefficients(a)**

	Non standard coefficients		Standard Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Typ.error	Beta		
(Constant)	65.385	3.883		16.840	.000
ED What is your last school year approved?	.144	.179	.027	.805	.421
Q2 How old are you according to your last birthday?	.023	.039	.015	.576	.565
Q1 Gender	-.418	1.163	-.009	-.359	.720
TAMANO Size of community	1.159	.406	.083	2.855	.004
WEALTH	.066	.250	.009	.263	.792
PP1R Tried to convince others to vote	.037	.020	.049	1.880	.060
PP2R Work for any candidate or political party	-.004	.019	-.005	-.189	.850
PPAR1R Registered in any political party	.052	.012	.109	4.173	.000
ABS5R A vote can help things get better	.022	.013	.043	1.687	.092
VB1R Updated at Electoral Court (Tribunal Electoral)	.172	.018	.244	9.633	.000
B47R Confidence in free elections	.059	.018	.081	3.208	.001

a. Dependent variable: PVB8R planning on voting in next elections

**Table VIII.4 Predictors of Vote in Past 1999 Elections
Coefficients(a)**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constant)	-2.194	6.562		-.334	.738
ED What is your last school year approved?	1.383	.303	.144	4.567	.000
Q2 How old are you according to your last birthday?	1.012	.066	.386	15.319	.000
Q1 Gender	1.757	1.964	.021	.895	.371
TAMANO Size of the community	.605	.687	.024	.881	.378
Wealth	-.351	.422	-.027	-.832	.405
PP1R Tried to convince others to vote	-.012	.034	-.009	-.358	.720
PP2R Work for any candidate or political party	.111	.032	.083	3.425	.001
PPAR1R Registered in any political party	.103	.021	.121	4.914	.000
ABS5R A vote can help things get better	.021	.022	.023	.980	.327
VB1R Updated in Electoral Court (Tribunal Electoral)	.140	.030	.112	4.725	.000
B47R Free elections	.043	.031	.033	1.373	.170

a. Dependent variable : VB2R vote in past elections 1999

Appendix C: Survey Design

Universe:

The survey's universe is made up of the country's population. The islands on both the Atlantic and the Pacific were excluded due to costs and traveling difficulties.

Population:

The study group is made up of the population 18 years of age and older, living in private houses. Persons residing in places such as hospitals, jails, orphanages, schools, barracks, and hotels were excluded.

Observation Unit – Selection Unit :

The observation unit is the family (that makes its home) in a private house. The selection unit is an occupied private house due to its stability and permanent characteristics. More than one family can live independently in the same house.

Survey Method:

The survey method applied is probabilistic, stratified, and multi stage, based on clusters with random unit selections at each stage. The final selection of the adult person interviewed inside the house is done according to a quota system based on the demographic structure of the universe.

Sectors under study:

Taking into consideration the size of the sample it was decided that the levels of inference would be limited to three representative areas.

- The National level.
- Urban and rural areas.
- Strata areas.

Sampling framework:

The sampling framework was created on the basis of population projections for July 2004. The projections were strengthened taking into account the census tracks and the maps, charts and sketches prepared for Panama's 2000 Population Census.

Stratification:

The universe was split up in four stratas (see Table).

The stratas were carved out of the country's geographic areas. The Metropolitan Area is made up of the districts of Panama (home to the country's capital city) and San Miguelito. The Eastern Area is made up of the Darien, Colón and Panama (excluding the Districts of Panama and San Miguelito) Provinces. The Central Area is made up of the Provinces of Coclé, Herrera, Los Santos, and Veraguas. The Western Area is made up of Bocas del Toro and Ciriquire Provinces as well as the Ngobe Bugle Territory. These four areas – referred to as regions in Panama's official government documents – are used on a daily basis by Government and private sector planners who design policy and set up development programs.

Table C.1 Stratas That Make Up the Universe, According to Area, and Population 18 Years of Age and Older

Strata	Province	District	Population	%
Metropolitan Área	Panama (partial)	Panama and San Miguelito	785,751	36.1
Urban			729,440	99.2
Rural			6,311	00.8
Eastern Area	Panama (partial), Colon and Darien		641,200	29.5
Urban			512,761	80.0
Rural			128,439	20.0
Central Area	Cocle, Herrera, Los Santos and Veraguas		386,168	17,7
Urban			142,037	36.8
Rural			244,131	63.2
Western Area	Bocas del Toro, Chiriquí and Comarca Ngobe-Buglé		362,840	16.7
Urban			145,037	40.0
Rural			217,803	60.0
Total			2,175,959	100.0
Urban			1,579,275	72.6
Rural			596,684	27.4

Source: Dirección de Estadística y Censo, 2000. Population projections were prepared by CELA, 2004.

Sample Units:

The sample units chosen according to the sample design are the following:

Primary Sample Unit: Is made up by the country's Districts according to the established population levels.

Secondary Sample Units: Is made up by the registration areas of the May 2000 Population Census.

Third Level Sample Units: Is made up of the occupied houses within the Census segment. In the urban areas 8 houses are picked for each unit while in the rural areas 11 houses are picked.

In each housing unit of the sample only one family is selected to become an observation unit. Within these specifications only one voting adult is chosen through a quota process, based on the demographic structure of the universe.

Following the set rules for probabilistic selection no substitution or replacements of the selected units are allowed.

Sample size

The sample size was calculated using the mathematical model for a random, proportional simple sample.

$$n_p = \frac{Z^2 P Q}{E^2 X} \times 1 \times (\text{DEFF})$$

Where

| n_p = Sample size

Z= Normal distribution value, proportionate to a level of confidence equal to 95% (the value is 1.965).

P= Proportion of the population with an attribute of 0.50

Q= Proportion of the population that does not have the considered attribute $Q=1-P=0.50$

E= Sample error (+/- 5%)

X= Non Coverage rate equal to 10%

DEFF= Design Effect. Ratio of the variance product of the sample design based in conglomerates in relation to the variance product of the sample design based on a simple random sample. The value used is 1.5.

Table C.2 Sample Size and Error Margins. Level of Confidence 95%

Stratas	Sample Size	Sample Points	Error Margins
Republic	1667	189	3.1
Urban	1,088	136	3.8
Rural	579	53	5.3
1. Metropolitan Area	600	75	5.1
Urban	600	75	
Rural	4	0	
2. Eastern Area	491	58	5.7
Urban	392	49	
Rural	99	9	
3. Central Area	299	31	7.3
Urban	112	14	
Rural	187	17	
4. Western Area	277	29	7.6
Urban	112	14	
Rural	165	15	

Source: Dirección de Estadística y Censo, Contraloría General de la República
 Processor: Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos, (CELA), "Justo Arosemena."

The margins of error at the level of stratas fluctuate according to the area. The calculations made for this study were based on the sample size, adjusting for that 10% that will not be covered and an added adjustment of 1.5 for each one of the stratas.

Design Effects⁸⁵

Every survey based on a sample has two types of errors. On the one hand, the non sample errors and, on the other, the sample errors.

The non sample errors are the result of the data gathering and information processing. These errors can be avoided if adequate measuring instruments are developed, such as training the interviewers to apply the instrument correctly, supervising the field work, creating an efficient data processing system, revising the questionnaire as well as the codification process, and keeping the files clean. These errors can be controlled but not necessarily quantified. However, the comparison between the sample results and the population can give a good idea of how representative of the population the sample is. The sample errors are the result of chance and derive from the fact that the interviews are applied only to a sample and not to the whole population.

When a sample is selected it is only one of many that can be chosen from the population. The variability between all of these possible samples is called the margin of error that can be

⁸⁵ This section is based on a report prepared in Costa Rica by Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas Cullel, 2004, *La cultura democrática en Costa Rica, 2004*. San José, Costa Rica: Universidad de Costa Rica. We acknowledge Luis Rosero-Bixby's cooperation that contributed to the development of the necessary design effects statistics for the survey applied in Panama.

calculated if all the information is available. In practical terms, the margin is calculated on the basis of the variance obtained from the sample itself.

In order to estimate the sample error of a statistic (percentages, averages, differences, totals) the standard error is calculated. This is the square root of the population's variance statistic. In this way a measurement of the statistic's precision can be made comparing it to the results if the whole population had been interviewed under the same conditions. In order to calculate this error the sample design always has to be taking into account.

The Design Effect (DDF) gauges the efficiency of the design vis-à-vis the random unrestricted sample (RIS). A value equal to 1 indicates that the variance obtained for both sample designs (complex and RIS) are the same. This means that the complex sample is as efficient as the RIS taking into account the same sample size. If the value is over 1 the complex sample produced a higher variance than that obtained by the RIS. If it is under 1 that means that the variance obtained with the complex sample is smaller than the one produced by RIS.

Table C.3 presents the sample errors (standard errors, SE) and the design effects for several key variables. The SE were calculated using the computer software Stata 8.

The design effects are considerable because a relatively large sample unit was chosen: the District. The advantages of working with this sample unit had a cost in the loss of some efficiency. High design effects (over 2) indicate that they are variables with strong local determinism. This means that they change very little within the community, in this case the District, in comparison with changes between communities.

The presence of important design effects over 1 would make it necessary to use robust estimators (able to gauge the conglomerate effect) for the significance tests. Unfortunately these robust estimators are not available in SPSS, a software that works with RIS. Thus the significance tests must be interpreted with caution.

Table C.3 Sample Errors for a Set of Selected Variables

Variables	Strata	Average	Standard error	Design Effect
Age	Metro Area	40	0.35	0.32
	Eastern Area	39	0.97	1.3
	Central Area	43	0.45	0.23
	Western Area	38	1.2	1.9
Education	Metro Area	11	0.41	6.5
	Eastern Area	10	0.55	6.8
	Central Area	8	0.67	6.8
	Western Area	8	0.26	1.0
Wealth	Metro Area	5.9	0.11	1.8
	Eastern Area	4.6	0.42	11.8
	Central Area	3.7	0.50	13.1
	Western Area	3.4	0.20	1.9
System support	Metro Area	47	0.08	.01
	Eastern Area	55	1.4	1.4
	Central Area	58	1.1	1.1
	Western Area	56	1.3	.95
Tolerance	Área Metro.	69	1.5	2.0
	Área Oriental	64	1.2	0.8
	Área Central	57	1.6	1.2
	Área Occidental	67	2.4	2.2
Corruption Index	Área Metro.	0.32	0.05	3.6
	Área Oriental	0.26	0.07	4.6
	Área Central	0.08	0.02	0.87
	Área Occidental	0.06	0.02	1.9
Vote in 1999 elections	Área Metro.	0.75	0.008	0.26
	Área Oriental	0.72	0.01	0.18
	Área Central	0.82	0.02	0.63
	Área Occidental	0.75	0.02	0.81

Survey Application

Organization and Planning

The first step in the survey's planning process focused on the preparation of a draft budget for field work purposes. The budget experimented several changes as plans progressed. For budget purposes training, transportation, food and travel allowances were also considered. Communication expenses were not considered albeit their importance.

Once the 191 sample points were identified the urban and rural primary units were allocated in 23 supervision areas. On average, every supervision area had 9 primary units assigned to it. Each primary unit had to be canvassed in 4 days, between 13 and 16 March.

Each supervision team was made up of three interviewers. During the period the survey was being applied all food costs incurred by the field workers were covered by the survey.

Payroll controls were set up to gauge the field worker's performance as well as to organize payments.

Field work distribution lists for each supervisor

- Payroll for food and transportation during the training process
- Payroll for food and transportation during field work
- Payroll for field work
- Coverage control list
- Verification and code control list
- Payroll for Verification personnel

Recruitment and Selection

The following criteria was applied in the recruiting process of field workers:

- Experience in previous surveys.
- Professional background.
- Full time availability during the survey.
- Fluency in speech.
- Straightforwardness.

Field workers fulfilled expectations. Their participation was satisfactory and their collaboration contributed to the survey's success. Out of the 89 persons recruited only two were not able to complete their task.

Training

Training took a full day and was done in two stages. The first stage was celebrated on March 9 at the Universidad de Panamá. All the recruits (43) and supervisors (14) who had assignments in Panama, Colon, and Darien were concentrated at the University campus.

The training process was divided in two phases. The first phase included details concerning the sample under the responsibility of Roberto Castillo. The questionnaire's content was gone over with Orlando Pérez. Yadira Adames shared several methodological and organization aspects with the teams.

The second stage was celebrated simultaneously in two different venues. On March 11 two meetings were held at the University Regional Center at Penonomé and at the National University of Chiriqui, David, respectively.

All the recruits (12) and supervisors (6) who had assignments in the provinces of Coclé, Herrera, Los Santos and Veraguas were concentrated at the Regional Center of the University at Penonomé. Yadira Adames and Orlando Pérez were responsible for this meeting.

All the recruits (11) and supervisors (3) who had assignments in the provinces of Bocas del Toro and Chiriqui, as well as the Ngobe Bugle Territory were concentrated at the National University of Chiriqui, David. Janio Castillo and Roberto Castillo were responsible for this meeting.

Several themes were covered during the training sessions.

Research objectives: The recruits and supervisors were told how the survey is part of an international effort.

Details concerning the sample: A thorough explanation of the methodology used to prepare the survey and the sample design was given. Special attention was given to the method used to select persons inside the houses according to sex and age brackets.

Questionnaire Content: The questionnaire was read carefully with the participation of the recruits and supervisors. Emphasis was made on the need to guarantee answers for each question. Special attention was given to those questions that had instructions telling the interviewer to skip to other areas. Special care was also given to those questions where judgements were requested on behalf of the person interviewed.

Test run of the questionnaire: Each interviewer as well as supervisor was asked to test run a questionnaire within the University grounds. After the experience a debate was organized in order to sort out the problems presented by the questionnaire and the persons interviewed.

Field work details concerning organization and coordination: Specific details concerning field work and coordination between interviewers and supervisors were discussed.

Field Work Distribution

The following material was distributed to each one of the field workers:

- Two pencils
- Erasers
- Pencil sharpeners
- Plastic folder
- Colored cards for the questionnaires
- ID card
- ID card fastener

The supervisors also received the following:

- Questionnaires
- Red pencil
- Field workers distribution list
- Maps of the general area where there segments are located as well as a sketch of each of the primary units his interviewers had to visit.
- A table with the sample points and the quota by gender and age group his team had to cover.
- A payroll to cover food expenses during field work.
- Stipends to cover transportation costs during field work.

In the province of Panama an office was rented on 12 March for the purpose of giving out the questionnaires and other materials due to the fact that the training process was done several days

prior to sending the interviewers out in the field. Material was distributed in the rest of the country on the same day training took place.

Field Work Results

Field work culminated 16 March throughout the country. On the first day – 13 March – an evaluation of the teams work bore out many difficulties especially relating to the method chosen to guarantee gender and age quotas explained during the training sessions. Having this in mind, consultations were made at different levels and a variant was introduced. After the decision was taken all personnel was immediately notified. During the following days the evaluations verified much better results from the quota sampling modifications.

After field work had formally ended it was decided to go back to the province of Darien and the district of Chepo. The effort paid off very well guaranteeing a cross-country success in coverage.

Coverage:

The original goal was to apply a total of 1,669 questionnaires. A total of 1,639 interviews were done in the 4 day period, representing 98% of the national coverage originally planned. The following table presents a summary of the national coverage according to region and gender.

Detalle	Coverage		
	Total	Men	Women
Total	98.2%	97.7%	98.7%
Urban	99.0%	98.8%	99.2%
Rural	96.5%	95.7%	97.5%

The table shows how coverage was almost 100% in the urban areas and somewhat lower in the rural areas (96.5%). This can be explained in part by the fact that the rural population is more scattered, thus making it difficult sometimes to visit all the houses at times when people are at home. These few cases were visited on more than one occasion. On the other hand, women seem to be more cooperative in rural areas as well as in the urban areas. This is due probably to the fact that women spend more time at home.

The following table presents the survey's gender structure.

	Projections		Survey	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Total	50.1	49.9	50.0	49.9
Urban	48.7	51.4	48.6	51.4
Rural	53.2	46.5	53.3	46.7

The national survey successfully reproduces the population projections both at the general level as well as at the urban and rural levels.

Verification and Codification:

Verification started two days after the field work was initiated. This allowed the supervising team to start verifying when the interviewers were still out in the field.

The Verification began counting the questionnaires according to supervisors, areas, and primary units. Once this process was over with, each primary unit was matched with the sample point in order to verify if the agreed quota had been satisfied. The next step took into account the verification of the questionnaires. This process was done with blue pencils in order to avoid confusion with the red pencil markings made by the supervisors. The verification took into consideration the following aspects:

Each questionnaire's identity was verified by checking the distribution list of each supervisor with the identification of the questionnaire.

Each questionnaire's number assigned to the interviewer or supervisor was checked to verify it matched the printed number.

Each questionnaire had to be verified in order to guarantee that none of them had a different number than the one assigned to its area.

Each questionnaire had to be verified in order to guarantee that all questions had been correctly answered.

The verification was specially careful to guarantee that all those questions that had the alternative of skipping had code number 9 (the program does not allow for any blanks).

The process had to verify that all skipping were well done.

Verify the consistency of the information vis-à-vis the questions where this was possible.

Every question in the questionnaire had to be coded.

In some cases the answer to a question was "another" not allowing at first glance to go ahead with the codification. After scratching the idea of creating new codes the ambiguous cases were placed in the already existing options.

The first group of processed questionnaires were delivered on Friday, March 19. They were from the provinces of Chiriqui, Cocolé, Herrera, Los Santos, Veraguas and Panama (including San Miguelito and Chepo).

The last batch of questionnaires were handed over on Wednesday, March 21. They were from the remote provinces of Bocas del Toro and Darien as well as the Ngobe Bugle Territory. The verification was finished on March 23.

Appendix D: IRB Approval



University of Pittsburgh *Institutional Review Board*

Exempt and Expedited Reviews
Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair

Multiple Project Assurance: M-1259

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TO: Mitchell Seligson, Ph.D.

FROM: Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair *Chris*

DATE: January 14, 2004

PROTOCOL: Democratic Values in Mexico, Central America and Colombia

IRB Number: 0401036

The above-referenced protocol has been reviewed by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board. Based on the information provided in the IRB protocol, this project meets all the necessary criteria for an exemption, and is hereby designated as "exempt" under section 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2).

The regulations of the University of Pittsburgh IRB require that exempt protocols be re-reviewed every three years. If you wish to continue the research after that time, a new application must be submitted.

- If any modifications are made to this project, please submit an 'exempt modification' form to the IRB.
- Please advise the IRB when your project has been completed so that it may be officially terminated in the IRB database.
- This research study may be audited by the University of Pittsburgh Research Conduct and Compliance Office.

Approval Date: 01/12/2004

Renewal Date: 01/12/2007

CR:ky

The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, Central America and Colombia, 2004

The publication you have before you forms part of growing number of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University in the United States. The current study, by incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia) represents the largest effort undertaken to date by LAPOP. The sample and questionnaire designs were uniform for all eight countries, permitting direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analyses within each country. The study is the product of the intensive effort of 15 highly motivated social scientists, several experts in sample design, dozens of field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers, data entry clerks and more than 12,000 respondents. The 2004 cycle includes a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by teams from the countries, and a global study, written by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson of Vanderbilt University, who directs the LAPOP. The study was made possible by the generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented under contract with ARD, Inc. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are used by policymakers, citizens and academics to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

**A Study of the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**