

**A Study of the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**

The Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador, 2004

Perceptions and Realities of the Salvadorean Population



EL SALVADOR

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- José Miguel Cruz, IUDOP - UCA

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Scientific Coordinator and Editor of the Series
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Executive Summary

This report is the product of a study on Salvadoran political culture. It is based on a public opinion poll carried out in April and May 2004. The result of the inquiry was obtained from a base of 1,589 Salvadoran adults, that are representative of the population of El Salvador. This was done with 95% accuracy taking into account a margin of plus or minus 2.5%. The survey is part of a far-reaching study of political culture carried out in the Central American countries as well as in Colombia and Mexico.

The system support scale measures the level of citizen support to the government system, without focusing on the party currently in office. Political science readings call this “diffuse support” or “system support”. This scale has been constructed from the average for each of the five questions posed. In order that the results be clearer, they were converted to a 0-100 range. The average-results for each of the questions are the following: courts of justice (49.5), basic rights (50.1), pride (60.9), support (68.2) and institutions (68.3), and the system support scale average is 59.5.

The first measurement of system support in El Salvador was taken in 1991; however, it was limited to the San Salvador metropolitan area. On the other hand, in 1995, 1999 and now in 2004, subsequent studies have been done at the national level. System support has shown a significant increase between 1991 and 2004. This means that legitimacy for the political system in El Salvador has increased: from 49 in 1991; to 53 in 1995; to 57 in 1999; up to 60 in 2004.

The political tolerance scale is based on four questions that deal with four fundamental liberties: the right to vote, the right to peaceful protest, the right to run for office and the right to freedom of speech. This scale is based on the response-averages of the four questions and results were converted to a 0-100 range. The average results for each of the questions has been the following: run for office (43.5); give a speech (51.5); vote (54.5) and peaceful protest (55.4). The political tolerance scale has an average of 51.3.

The first studies on tolerance in El Salvador were also done in 1991, only for the San Salvador metropolitan area, though. However, in 1995, 1999 and now in 2004 studies have reached the national level. Tolerance has shown the following changes between 1991 and 2004: from 47 in 1991 to 53 in 1995, and increases to 58 in 1999; it then shrinks to 51 in 2004. That is to say, between 199 and 2004 there is a decrease in the level of political tolerance in El Salvador.

In order to analyze support for a stable democracy, the relation between the system support scale and the tolerance scale has been studied. This entailed creation of a high-end and a low-end for each. Four possible combinations resulted. The distribution of survey-respondents in these four cells is the following for 2004: 32% are in the stable democracy cell; 35% in authoritarian stability; 17% in unstable democracy; and 16% in the democratic breakdown cell.

In reference to opinions regarding democracy, 21% believe the country is very democratic, 37% say somewhat democratic, 36% hardly democratic and 7% not at all democratic. It was also shown that 9% feel very satisfied, 53% satisfied, 33% dissatisfied and 5% very dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy.

The study has shown strong support for democracy as a form of government: 73.4% prefer the current government system, whereas 18.3% would like an eventual return to military rule, and 8.2% said they did not know. Furthermore, 91.1% prefer an elected democracy, while 5.3% would support a strong leader, and 3.6% said they did not know. Also, 66.3% prefer democracy as a form of government, while 11.9% prefer an authoritarian government, and 9.7% express no preference for either a democratic government or an authoritarian one whereas 12% said they did not know. On the scale of 0-100, an average of 68.8% of Salvadorans considers democracy to be better than any other form of government.

As for corruption, 36% of Salvadorans consider that it is very widespread among the country's public officials, 31.6% believe it is "somewhat" widespread, and 32.5% think that there is little or no widespread corruption in the country. The survey showed that education, the level of political knowledge and exposure to news coverage were all important variables for the formation of the citizens' perception regarding lack of public official transparency.

In terms of victimization by corruption, the data reveals that 8.6% of people who have had contact with the courts were victimized by corruption. Of those who have children or relatives studying in a public school, 8.3% have fallen victim of corruption; 7.9% in the health system; 7.7% who have gone to city hall to solve some problem have also fallen victim to corruption; 7.3% have been victimized at work. On the other hand, 5.6% of adult citizens reported having been victim of bribery requested by a police officer during the course of a year. 4.6% were wrongfully accused by the police for fictitious misdemeanor or crime. 4.3% of those interviewed reported having been victim of bribery requested by a public servant.

Citizens most often victimized by corruption are men, young people, those with higher family income, the employed, and those who live in neighborhoods where the police are perceived to be associates of criminals.

This study revealed that many apparently do not deem certain acts corrupt. For example paying a city-hall clerk to speed-up the process to get a birth certificate, or obtaining employment through the inside influence of a relative. The study also found that victimization by corruption, measured as bribery faced by individuals, affects citizen confidence in the country's political institutions, and above all, it affects citizen backing of the political system.

As for the effects of crime, 17.1% of Salvadorans reported having been the direct victim of delinquent violence in the course of the year prior to the survey. This is the second highest percentage in the region comprising Central America, Mexico and Colombia. Around 80% of the crimes were robbery or armed-robbery, for the most part with no physical aggression. Nevertheless, some people did report violent aggression and assault. The most frequently registered victims were young men with some level of education and income that live in large cities and neighborhoods where police are perceived to be associated with crime and in which youth gang presence is evinced.

Only 37.5% of the people reported the crime they suffered. The crimes least reported tended to be the least serious ones, such as robbery without aggression. For the most part the victims did not report the crime because they thought it would do no good (47.5%). Another reason for not

reporting a crime was fear (19.7%) or for lack of proof to support their report (18%), among other reasons.

Forty-two percent of Salvadorans interviewed said they felt “very” or “somewhat” unsafe due to crime in El Salvador. Insecurity seems to be related to victimization. However, it also seems to be associated to gender, age, low family-income, scarce confidence in the justice-system, exposure to radio news, perception of police connection with delinquency in the neighborhood and the perception of gang presence in the community.

The results of the study showed that both victimization by delinquency as well as the perception of insecurity affect citizen confidence in political institutions, as well as in the institutions of the justice system and public security. Above all, the conditions of crime and insecurity affect citizen satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in El Salvador and their support for the political system.

The study identified closer relations between citizenry and local government, in terms of requesting assistance or cooperation to solve local problems.

Survey data reveals low levels of citizen participation in the local government’s undertakings, measured by attendance at town meetings (12.5%), to city-council meetings (9.6%) or through requests of assistance or petitions to city hall (12.1%). Those surveyed show mixed assessment of the degree to which municipal officials take notice of people’s requests at these meetings: 7.9% consider it great attention, 19.6% some attention, 40.7% little, 23.8% none, and 7.9% said they did not know.

Those surveyed gave a positive appraisal of city-hall procedures. Some 38.5% of those interviewed has had some business or made a request of city hall in the year prior to the survey. These made a positive evaluation of attention received, and a high degree of effectiveness, as 9 out of 10 had been able to complete their procedure.

In general, an important level of confidence in the local government was observed. Data show satisfaction with city-hall services in general: 35% consider them very good, 43.9% good, 33.2% neither good nor bad, and 2.4% very bad.

Those surveyed express satisfaction with service at city-hall: 5.7% feel they were treated very well, 53.7% say they were treated well, 26.2% consider treatment to have been neither good nor bad, 12.8% bad, and 1.7% very bad.

Fifty-point-seven percent of those surveyed identify city hall as the government agency that offered the best response to community problems. This is followed by 22.4% that pointed out none of the agencies did. Twelve-point-eight percent mentioned the national government as best. On the other hand, 8.1% did not know, 4.1% pointed out the legislative deputies, and 1.9% said they all respond the same.

The study revealed a low level of confidence in the handling of funds by city hall: 30% expressed no confidence, 34% little confidence, 19.1% some confidence, 8.5% a lot of confidence, and 6.9% did not know.

The principal factors that determine the Salvadoran voter's intention are the following: gender, age, home furnishing, level of political knowledge, evaluation of the president's work, whether the voter worked for a candidate or party in past elections, perception of vote efficiency, and confidence in political parties.

The study identified low levels of citizen confidence in political parties (average 39.9 on a 0-100 scale). Nonetheless, higher levels of confidence are reported in elections (average 65.1 on a scale of 0-100). Besides, the study reported a feeling of freedom to vote in elections.

Those surveyed expressed their support for the two electoral reforms they were asked about. There was an important level of support for establishing a minimum quota to increase participation of women that can be elected deputy (average of 65.5 on a 0-100 scale). There was also support for the reorganizing of electoral districts (average of 6.48 on a 0-100 scale).

In other matters, almost half of Salvadorans interviewed expressed confidence in their fellow citizens. Interpersonal confidence seems to be related to people's age and lower level of schooling. People with higher level of confidence in other are usually older and have a low level of education. However, interpersonal confidence proved an important variable for satisfaction with functioning of democracy and the legitimacy of the political system.

On the other hand, in terms of confidence in national institutions, Salvadorans said they have a high degree of confidence in them. In fact, those surveyed registered the highest level of confidence in national institutions compared with the data from other countries where the same studied was carried out. People of lower educational level living in rural areas of the country exhibited the highest degree of institutional confidence. Data also demonstrated that confidence in the country's institutions is frequently linked to attitudes that give the system legitimacy.

In terms of citizen participation salvadorans showed the lowest levels in the region, at least by comparison with the countries that participated in the study. For the most part, Salvadorans' participation in civil-society organizations is concentrated in participation in religious groups. About a third of the citizens participate in religious meetings, but only 5% have participated in activities of political parties or unions. However, in this case, citizen participation was associated to legitimacy in a way contrary to expected: people who participate most in organizations tend to express less support for the political system, and therefore less legitimacy for the country's political institutions.

Finally, Salvadoran social capital, understood as the social networks that stem from the combination of interpersonal and institutional confidence along with civilian participation, was seen to be associated to the place of residence: people who live in rural areas exhibit more social capital. It was also shown to be associated to insecurity from crime: people who feel unsafe exhibit less social capital. The study revealed that social capital is an important variable in maintaining the legitimacy of the system. People with greater levels of social capital tend to feel

more satisfied with the functioning of democracy and tend to lend more support to the political system. In conclusion, the study ends by pointing out the importance of social networks for the governability and democracy in El Salvador.

Preface

Democratic governance is increasingly recognized as central to the development process. Applied democratic development is now an emerging field of academic study and development assistance. From an academic perspective, the great movement of political regimes towards democracy led to a new focus on the processes of democratization. Recent research has demonstrated the centrality of good governance to sustained economic and social progress. The result is a ballooning literature on regime change, democratic consolidation, and the institutionalization of good governance.

Development agencies have also begun to invest in programs that promote democratic governance both to spur growth and poverty reduction as well as an end in itself. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been at the forefront of donors in recognizing democracy and good governance as fundamental characteristics of development. Even a decade before the agency created the Center for Democracy and Governance in 1994, country missions - particularly in Latin America - began to invest heavily in justice reform, electoral assistance, local government, legislative development, civil society strengthening and other programs that have become the bedrock of our current extensive programming in "DG". Every Administration over the past two decades has supported and expanded these efforts. At present we have democracy programs in over 80 countries, as well as large regional and global programs. Our programs in this region (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Colombia) are all tailored to the specific country context and managed by a local Mission, but share a focus on transparent and accountable governance and strengthened rule of law.

Unfortunately, rigorous measurement has lagged behind insight and action, but it is now underway with a vengeance. Analysts are developing and refining measures of institutional strengthening, political and civil rights, democratic culture, transparency, and other attributes of democracy and governance. At a much slower pace, donors are just beginning to examine closely the impact and effectiveness of their own work in this sector. In this context, USAID missions have supported high quality democracy surveys that analyze the beliefs, perceptions, and behavior of citizens and used the results to develop strategies of support.

Of course, surveys are only one tool in the arsenal of analytic instruments needed for good programming. We also rely on assessments of institutional development in both government and non-governmental organizations, on analyses of relationships among power contenders, and on a large range of other factors that affect prospects of democratic development and good governance. Nonetheless, surveys offer information not available from other sources on the state of democratic culture and, increasingly, on the effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions have sponsored numerous surveys, many in collaboration with Dr. Mitchell Seligson and the local research teams that have carried out the present study. These are now being put on the web and made publicly available for further analysis.

This current study, nonetheless, is pioneering. It is the first time that missions have worked in concert to develop a common transnational survey in democracy and governance, allowing reliable comparisons of the democratic attributes across all of Central America, Colombia, and

Mexico, as well as with recent studies in Andean countries. For several missions, these surveys are the second or third in a series, offering reliable measures of change for the first time. Moreover, the survey instrument itself was the product of collaboration between survey research specialists led by Dr. Seligson and the USAID Democracy Offices in the region. As a result, the data allow reliable comparisons with the growing body of democracy surveys elsewhere, but also respond to specific needs of donors. For example, there are many questions that “drill down” into aspects of corruption and local government to provide insights into these potentially fruitful areas of donor support. Potentially even more important, some of the surveys over-sample geographic areas where USAID DG programming is concentrated, so that we can measure more reliably what changes might be due to specific program interventions-an important step in rigorously measuring the impact and effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions intent on improving democracy programs and better measuring the impact of their work led this initiative. The Office of Democracy and Governance and the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean in Washington also strongly supported the work, as an innovative effort within the Agency to standardize our measurements and better report on our progress to Congress. However, we also believe these surveys will be an important resource for policy makers and academics, offering the best data available for decision-making and further research. To this end, we are supporting not only publication of the results, but a web-based data base allowing further analysis of the data. This report, and the country reports that preceded it, are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of research possibilities.

Undertaking these surveys has had other positive outcomes. For example, previous surveys have at times been important mobilizing tools for policy reformers in Latin America, with results presented to the Bolivian congress, for example, and to cabinet officials in a number of countries. In addition, the national research teams who conducted the surveys increased their own institutional capacities that will outlast this particular piece of work. Third, the surveys offer a public “voice” for citizen concerns about democracy, and the opportunity to see how particular subgroups -ethnic groups, women, people in specific regions-are faring.

We hope these surveys will be widely used by practitioners and policy-makers and contribute to our understanding of the processes of political change now underway in the hemisphere.

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Prologue

Studying Democratic Values in Eight Latin American Countries: The Challenge and the Response

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The publication you have before you is one in a growing series of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), known as OPAL in Spanish. That project, initiated over two decades ago, and for many years housed at the University of Pittsburgh, is now hosted by Vanderbilt University, and has received generous support in recent years from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in almost all countries in the region.

The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia). The sample and questionnaire designs for all eight studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as allowing for detailed analysis within each country. The 2004 series involves a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Prologue, who serves as the Director of the LAPOP, and the overall scientific coordinator of the eight-country project. Fortuitously, many of the questions asked in the surveys administered in these eight countries were also included in LAPOP national sample studies carried out in 2004 in Ecuador and Bolivia, meaning that for some items it will be possible to compare across ten countries in Latin America. As of this writing, the Bolivia data for 2004 are not available, so in this volume, results for Bolivia 2002 are used. Finally, a collaborative investigation in the Dominican Republic, in which a small number of key questions from the LAPOP were included, broadens the country sample of 2004 to eleven, and gives us at least a limited picture of the Caribbean, adding to our samples of Central America and the Andes, although those data were not available for analysis at this writing. The only missing region in Latin America is the Southern Cone, a deficit we hope to remedy in the future. For several of the countries in the current round, LAPOP had previously carried surveys using identical batteries of questions. For that reason, in the country-based reports on Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, comparisons with prior results are made.

Surveys of public opinion in Latin America have become very popular in recent years. Unfortunately, all too few of those studies follow the rigorous scientific procedures that have become accepted as the norm in academic public opinion research in the United States and Europe. Those studies often suffer from poorly designed questionnaires, unrepresentative and non-random samples, poor fieldwork supervision, sloppy data entry, and data analysis that rarely

goes beyond univariate presentation of percentages.¹ As a result, such studies are often dismissed by academics and policy-makers alike.

The LAPOP project has attempted, with considerable success I would argue, to deviate from the prevailing Latin American norm to produce quality survey data that matches the highest standards of academic research in the U.S. and Europe. The surveys on which the present study relies, because it was designed from the outset to allow for cross-national comparisons, were carried out with special rigor and attention to methodological detail, as is described in this prologue and in the methodology section of this synthesis report and the individual volumes. We recognized from the outset that all survey research, by its very nature, contains error (derived from many sources, including errors resulting from probability sampling, respondent inattention, coding mistakes, and data entry failures). Our goal, was to reduce to the absolute minimum each of those errors, and do so in a cost-effective manner.

We also sought, from the outset, to make our methodology transparent and replicable. The essence of scientific research is that it can be replicated. Excitement about the prospects for “cold fusion” quickly faded when physicists were unable to replicate the initial “discovery.” All too many surveys published in Latin America contain no information whatsoever about the sample designs, or when such information is provided it is so sketchy that it is impossible to determine with any degree of detail how the sample was carried out. Equally serious, it is rare for the data base itself to be made available to the public; almost without exception the raw data are closely guarded, making it impossible for social scientists and policy makers alike to reanalyze the data looking for new insights, or to attempt to replicate the original findings. Publicly funded data bases should be available to the public. Failure to do so results in privatization of public goods. Of course, in the dissemination of data, all human subjects protection policies, as governed by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) must be followed scrupulously so that the rights of subject to protect their identities are respected.

We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy,

¹ A detailed recounting of the problems encountered in those surveys can be found in Mitchell A. Seligson, “Improving the Quality of Survey Research in Democratizing Countries,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2004, forthcoming).

political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

When readers examine the findings presented in this synthesis volume, as well as the country studies, and find that the results are those that coincide with their expectations, they might well say, “That is just what I had expected, so the survey tells me nothing new.” On the other hand, when the results are at variance from expectations, readers might say, “This does not make any sense; the data must be wrong.” These reactions to survey data are common, and for some surveys emerging from the developing world, the data may in fact be “wrong.” We cannot guarantee that our results are “right,” but we have made every effort, as described below, to try to minimize error. Given that we are working with a sample of the population of each country rather than interviews with all voting-aged adults, there is always a one-in-twenty chance that our results are not within the approximately $\pm 2.5\%$ sampling error found in each of the national samples. Indeed, as we point out in the methodology section of each country report, these confidence intervals can be wider for some variables in some countries as a result of “design effects,” i.e., we used a stratified and clustered sample, which is standard practice in modern survey samples, the impact of which is to affect the precision of our estimates while keeping fieldwork costs within reasonable limits (as a result of clustering). Rarely does anyone doing surveys today use simple random sampling, and we have not done so either. In short, if readers find some results inconsistent with expectation, that may be because we are working with *probability* samples, and the odds are, from time-to-time, our results will be wide of the mark. But, 95 times out of 100, our results should be reasonably close to what we would have obtained had we interviewed the millions of voting-aged adults in the countries included in the study (an obvious impossibility). Moreover, since we have taken special pains to deal with the problem of “non-coverage,” something that we have rarely seen done anywhere in Latin America, we believe that our results are about as good as they can be.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum

level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bi-variate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau’s CSPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for and audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the database itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most

highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.

After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced. A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the data base itself (www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/).

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, and field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers and data entry clerks, and, of course, the all-important over 12,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Margaret Sarles, Bruce Kay and Eric Kite in the Office of Democracy and Governance” of USAID, supported by Maria Barrón in the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, secured the funding and made possible the entire project thanks to their unceasing support. All of the participants in the study are grateful to them, as well as to Todd Amani, USAID/Guatemala, who assumed the role of coordinating the project at the USAID end. ARD of Burlington, Vermont, managed the finances of the project and the formatting of the publications. Critical to the project’s success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied who worked tirelessly to meet what at times seemed impossible deadlines. These include, for Mexico, Jorge Buendía and Alejandro Moreno, Departamento de Ciencia Política, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM); for Guatemala, Dinorah Azpuru and Juan Pablo Pira, Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES); for El Salvador and Honduras, Ricardo Córdova, Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo (FUNDAUNGO), José Miguel Cruz, Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP) de la Universidad Centroamericana, UCA, and Siddhartha Baviskar, University of Pittsburgh; for Nicaragua, Luis Serra and Pedro López Ruiz, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA); for Costa Rica, Luis Rosero-Bixby, Universidad de Costa Rica and Jorge Vargas, Programa Estado de la Nación; for Panamá, Marco A. Gandásegui hijo, Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos (CELA) and Orlando J. Pérez, Central Michigan University; for Colombia, Carlos Lemoine, Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), and Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, University of Pittsburgh. Polibio Córdova, CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, provided excellent

guidance throughout on sample design. The team of graduate assistants at the University of Pittsburgh have worked very hard in numerous aspects of the Latin American Public Opinion Project: Miguel García (Colombia), Daniel Moreno (Bolivia), Sawa Omori (Japan), and Rosario Queirolo (Uruguay). John Booth of the University of North Texas, and Miguel Gómez, formerly of the Universidad de Costa Rica, provided excellent pro bono advice on the questionnaire design. Chris Sani performed admirably as undergraduate assistant. Profound gratitude is owed to all of these fine people for their excellent work on this study. Finally, we wish to thank the 12,401 individuals in these eight countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would not have been possible.

Nashville, Tennessee
August, 2004

Introduction

“Democracy requires a culture to sustain it, that is, citizens and political elite must accept certain principles such as freedom of expression, of information, of belief, the rights to opposition, the rule of law and human rights, among others. These norms, however, do not evolve from one day to another.”²

The previous quote sums up the importance that political culture has in the building of democracy in a country. This report is the result of research into the political culture of democracy in El Salvador in 2004. This paper is part of a regional effort coordinated by the University of Vanderbilt’s Latin American Public Opinion Project, directed by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson, financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development, in order to study political culture in Central America, Mexico and Colombia, realizing the importance citizen values, norms and attitudes have in the process of consolidation of democracy in the region.

In El Salvador, the research was carried out by the University Public Opinión Institute (Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública--IUDOP), at the la Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas” (UCA) and by the Dr. G.M. Ungo Foundation (“Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo”--FUNDAUNGO). Locally, this effort is also part of a series of studies on political culture that began in 1991 with the publication of *Perspectives for a stable democracy*, which was continued with a the publishing of two more studies: *El Salvador: from war to peace. A political culture in transition*, in 1995, as well as *Audit of democracy, El Salvador 1999*, which came out in 2000. Therefore, this paper follows-up on the previous ones and contributes to presenting the advances and reversals in the construction of a favourable political culture for the democratic regime in the country.

The present report is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter is an overview of the social economic and political context of the country at the time of the research. The second describes the survey methodology. In chapter three we begin to present the results of the study divided into different topics. The third chapter is about support to democracy. The fourth deals with corruption. The fifth presents the results on victimization and insecurity in El Salvador. The sixth chapter is all about examining the results in relation to local governments. The seventh is about Salvadoran electoral behaviour. The eighth chapter deals with social capital.

This paper is the product of the effort of several people both at IUDOP as well as FUNDAUNGO who made its publication possible. At IUDOP Rubi Esmeralda Arana, Patricia Jule, Bessy Moran and Stanley Oliva became the pillars for the preparation and development of the research process. Besides, Maria Santacruz and Luis Ventoza contributed enormously to the entire process with their commentary, suggestions and contributions. At FUNDAUNGO, Leslie Quiñónez, Manuel Delgado and Claudia Aguilar collaborated with the drafting of the chapter on the social economic context and Loida Pineda edited the document. Finally, we want to thank Professor Mitchell A. Seligson for his commentaries and suggestions.

² Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1996). Repensando los requisitos sociales de la democracia. *La Política. Revista de estudios sobre el Estado y la sociedad*, 2, p. 51-88.

Ricardo Córdova Macías
José Miguel Cruz

1.0 Background on El Salvador

1.0 Background on El Salvador

In this chapter some basic aspects of the country's recent background are presented. Three aspects are set forth. First of all, the social and economic context is presented through a review of the human development tendencies and the fluctuations in the Salvadorian economy. Second, the political context is examined, by analyzing the contribution of the peace agreement signed in 1992 to democratization and demilitarization of the country, as well as the recent electoral processes. Third, recent studies on political culture in El Salvador are identified.

1.1 Social and Economic Context

This section deals with four topics. First, a regional vision of human development is presented. Second, it focuses on human development in El Salvador. Third is an overview of the evolution of poverty. Fourth, the fluctuation of the Salvadorian economy is described.


1.1.1 Overview of Human Development in the Region

The Human Development Index (HDI) has tended to improve over the years, as can be seen in Graph I.1. The region can be classified into two groups: 1) Costa Rica is the only country that has reached a high level of human development. 2) The rest of the countries have a mid-level of development (Panama, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua).

Costa Rica presents the highest HDI in the region (0.832 for 2001), this in spite of a slight decrease at the end of the nineties that then stabilizes in early 2000. Panama has shown sustained HDI growth, going from 0.738 in 1990 to 0.788 in 2001. It has approached the threshold of high human development in recent times, but has fallen short of achieving it.

For their part, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have had an HDI below or close to 0.500 in 1990. They present improvements for 2001 reaching an HDI of over 0.600. El Salvador is the exception having reached an HDI of over 0.700 in 1999. In 2001 El Salvador had an HDI of 0.719.

Graph I.1 Central America: Human Development Index



Source: Adapted from: UNDP World Reports on Human Development: 1993, 1999, 2001, 2002 y 2003.

However, these improvements have not substantially modified the Central American countries' position on a world scale. The World Report on Human Development for 2003 places Costa Rica (0.832) in a better position for 2001, followed by Panama (0.788), El Salvador (0.719), Honduras (0.667), Guatemala (0.652) and Nicaragua (0.643). According to the Human Development Report of 2003, in 2001 El Salvador is in position 105 of 175 total countries.

Table I.1 Central American Countries Classified According to HDI 2001

Position	Country	HDI	HDI Value
42	Costa Rica	High	0.832
59	Panama	Medium	0.788
105	El Salvador	Medium	0.719
115	Honduras	Medium	0.667
119	Guatemala	Medium	0.652
121	Nicaragua	Medium	0.643

Source: Adapted from: UNDP. Human Development Report for 2003.

1.1.2 Human Development in El Salvador

The HDI in El Salvador has evolved positively in recent years. Generally, the HDI value has increased in period 1990 - 2001 exhibiting a growth tendency, as can be seen in Table I.2: in 1990 there was an HDI of 0.503, by 1995 it was 0.604, and in 2001 it had grown to 0.719.

The country also improved its position on the world scale (this being a relative indicator of human development) in the last five years, in spite of ups and downs. The country ranked 110 in 1990 (of 173) 114 in 1995 (out of 174), and 105 in 2001 (out of 175).

Table I.2 Relation of Human Development Worldwide and in El Salvador

Year	Position	Total countries	HDI
1990	110	173	0.503
1991	112	173	0.543
1992	115	174	0.579
1993	115	174	0.576
1994	112	175	0.592
1995	114	174	0.604
1996	NA*	NA	NA
1997	107	174	0.674
1998	104	174	0.696
1999	95	162	0.701
2000	104	173	0.706
2001	105	175	0.719

Source: Adapted from: UNDP, World Reports on Human Development: 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 y 2003.

*Note: NA: information not available.

Notwithstanding progressive advances in national HDI, differences among different territorial departments remain high. In Table I.3 shows that in the years compared (1999-2002), only San Salvador (0.765 and 0.783) and La Libertad (0.727 and 0.752) possess an HDI surpassing the national average (0.704 and 0.736) respectively.

In rural areas, data for 1999 shows that 6 out of 14 departments are above the national rural-average (0.604) and in 2002, five out of fourteen departments are over the national rural-average (0.632). In the same time period, in urban areas only the departments of La Libertad (0.795 and 0.817) and San Salvador (0.787 and 0.802) are above the national urban-average.

Specifically, in 2002 the highest HDI is in the urban areas of La Libertad (0.817) and San Salvador (0.802). The urban areas in these two departments are considered as having high levels of human development (surpassing 0.800). Meanwhile, the lowest HDI observed was in the rural area of Cabañas (0.568), which just surpasses the limits in countries with low human development (0.500).

Table I.3 El Salvador, Indicators of Human Development per Department

Departaments	1999			2002		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
Ahuachapán	0.626	0.694	0.583	0.652	0.718	0.609
Santa Ana	0.687	0.755	0.607	0.708	0.769	0.633
Sonsonate	0.669	0.747	0.592	0.696	0.768	0.618
Chalatenango	0.642	0.710	0.581	0.663	0.724	0.605
La Libertad	0.727	0.795	0.638	0.752	0.817	0.664
San Salvador	0.765	0.787	0.635	0.783	0.802	0.666
Cuscatlán	0.697	0.747	0.649	0.713	0.755	0.669
La Paz	0.668	0.726	0.614	0.687	0.746	0.635
Cabañas	0.609	0.694	0.538	0.637	0.718	0.568
San Vicente	0.647	0.719	0.566	0.669	0.734	0.596
Usulután	0.655	0.723	0.586	0.689	0.749	0.625
San Miguel	0.689	0.753	0.610	0.704	0.765	0.629
Morazán	0.619	0.710	0.558	0.646	0.731	0.585
La Unión	0.628	0.720	0.575	0.662	0.741	0.613
Country Total	0.704	0.764	0.604	0.726	0.781	0.632

Source: Adapted from UNDP. Human Development Report for El Salvador, 2001 and 2003.

Note: data in Table I.2 does not coincide with databases in Table I.3 as it is based on the World Human Development Report, which draws information from international organizations. Table I.3 is based on Human Development Reports for El Salvador 2001 and 2003, which uses national sources of information.

Table I. 4 presents the HDI dimensions per department for the year 2002. There are important differences to be observed among the departments. For instance, life expectancy in 2002, the country average was 70.4, whereas in the department of San Salvador it was 72.1. On the other hand, for the department of Cabañas it was 66.1. Data shows only 5 out of 14 departments present life expectancy averages over the national average. These are San Salvador (72.1), Santa Ana (71.5), La Libertad (70.8), Sonsonate (70.6) and San Miguel (70.6).

Table I.4 El Salvador: Dimensions of the Human Development Index (2002)

Department	Life expectancy at birth	Literacy	Registered in School	Per capita income (US\$)	HDI
Ahuachapán	68.9	71.9	56.1	2,813.00	0.652
Santa Ana	71.5	79.0	58.5	4,312.00	0.708
Sonsonate	70.6	76.5	60.1	4,019.00	0.696
Chalatenango	66.7	73.7	64.5	3,419.00	0.663
La Libertad	70.8	84.7	67.9	6,632.00	0.752
San Salvador	72.1	91.0	71.1	7,468.00	0.783
Cuscatlán	69.9	83.3	66.5	3,919.00	0.713
La Paz	68.8	78.6	61.7	3,669.00	0.687
Cabañas	66.1	69.8	60.7	2,852.00	0.637
San Vicente	67.5	77.0	61.9	3,210.00	0.669
Usulután	70.2	74.7	61.4	3,860.00	0.689
San Miguel	70.6	77.1	66.6	4,035.00	0.704
Morazán	66.7	65.8	62.6	3,526.00	0.646
La Unión	69.1	67.1	57.5	3,896.00	0.662
Country Total	70.4	81.7	64.9	5,260.00	0.726

Source: Human Development Report for El Salvador, 2003.

In terms of education, the department with the lowest rate of literacy is Morazán at 65%, whereas the department with the greatest literate population is San Salvador at 91%. The greatest level of combined school-registration is the department of San Salvador (71.1%) and the lowest is the department of Ahuachapán (56.1%). In the same way, the greatest difference in per-capita income (measured in US\$PPA), is between the departments of San Salvador at 7,468 (US\$PPA) and Ahuachapán at 2,813 (US\$PPA).

1.1.3 The Evolution of Poverty in El Salvador

According to the *Human Development Report for El Salvador 2003*, in the last ten years there has been considerable progress in the reduction of poverty and improvement in the main social indicators.

The *Human Development Report for El Salvador 2003* also sheds light on the fact that the population affected by poverty at the national level has gone from 65.9% in 1991 to 43% in 2002, an important 23 point decrease over a period of 12 years. The decrease in poverty has been significant in the urban area where it has gone from 60% to 34%). Less impressive has been the reduction in the rural area, where it has gone from 71.3% to 55.7%. The reduction in extreme poverty has gone from 32.6% to 19.2% which surpasses that of relative poverty which has gone from 33.3% to 23.8%.

Table I.5 Evolution of the Levels of Poverty in El Salvador (%)

Levels of poverty	1991	1994	1995	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
National Total	65.9	58.6	54.0	50.4	47.3	44.6	44.4	43.0
Relative Poverty	33.3	30.4	32.4	27.8	27.3	25.4	25.0	23.8
Extreme Poverty	32.6	28.2	21.6	22.6	20.0	19.2	19.4	19.2
Total urban poverty	60.0	49.0	45.6	40.6	37.1	34.2	35.3	34.0
Total rural poverty	71.3	70.3	64.4	64.2	61.4	59.2	57.3	55.7

Source: Adapted from: UNDP. Human Development Report El Salvador, 2003.

An overview of the evolution of the poverty levels in the table above shows that, even though the tendency is towards reduction, there can be seen a sluggishness in recent years. The greatest decrease in poverty comes in the early nineties (1991-1995), when poverty dropped 12 points from 65.9% to 54%, whereas from 1999 to 2002 poverty decreased only 4.3 points. In the last three years poverty reduction has stagnated at around 44%.

Three key factors in the reduction of poverty must be mentioned. The end of the armed conflict is one. The level economic growth in the early nineties is another. Third is the rising inflow of remittances, financial contributions from relatives abroad. "In 1992, remittances kept over 4% of rural population from falling into absolute poverty. Ten years later, this percentage had increased to 8.6%.


Notwithstanding the decreasing tendency in the levels of poverty, there has been an increase in the level of inequality in the distribution of income. "In 1992, the richest 20% the country's households received 54.5% of the national income, while the poorest 20% received 3.2%. Ten years later, the richest 20% of households had increased their share of national income to 58.3% when the poorest 20% had shrunk to 2.4%

1.1.4 Economic Performance

The signing of the Peace Agreements in 1992 became a cornerstone of the life of the country. This set-off important processes of political reform to democratize and demilitarize the country's political life. In the same vein, the country has undergone an important process of economic reform begun in 1989. This has implied a change in the economic model. Import-substitution has been replaced by a series of reforms contained in a program of stabilization and structural adjustment. These reforms, which were inspired by the "Washington Consensus," sought to give the market the leading role in the economy. By the same token, the role of the public sector was displaced. Reforms implied privatization of some of the public corporations as well as the liberalization of the economy. In sum, the nineties and the beginning of the new century comprise a period of important transformations for the country, both economically and politically.

Currently economists seem to agree that the economic reform-process being pushed forward in El Salvador -including implanting the dollar alongside the local currency in the economy in January 2001- has not produced the expected results. Since 1996, El Salvador has reported a slowing down of economic growth, which became more acute in the 200-2002 period as can be observed in Graph I.1. Yet, disagreements and debate center on the explanatory factors of the Salvadorian economy, and in spite of all the measures that have been taken the expected results have not come through. This problem is due to structural and coincidental factors as well as external and internal ones. As an example, among the external factors is the worldwide economic downturn, the fall in prices of coffee and the hike in oil prices. Internally we find, among other factors, that the exchange rates have fallen, and economic productivity has dropped.

Graph I.2 Real GNP Growth Rate (In Colones 1990)




Source: Adapted from the Salvadorean Central Reserve Bank.

In El Salvador, family remittances from abroad have increased rapidly and significantly in the nineties, “and have been an important source of income for a significant part of the population.” (...) Remittances increased from little under US\$400 million in 1990 to US\$2,000 million in 2001. At the macroeconomic level, this influx of remittances has been a key support to the economy, and has helped to close the external gap, particularly after foreign aid has been reduced considerably in recent years.

Graph I.2 shows the growth and relevance remittances have as part of the GNP. The contribution to GNP by remittances has increased from 5.9% in 1990, to 14% in 2003. This is an increase of 8.1 points.

Graph I.3 Remittances as a Percentage of GNP



Source: Adapted from the Salvadorean Central Reserve Bank.

According to an ECLAC study of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean in 2003, the real growth in the Salvadorian economy was 2.0%." This places it again in the contracting phase of the economic cycle (...) such that the per-inhabitant product remained stagnant." In 2004 the Salvadorian economy will not present any major changes in its growth tendency. It is expected that the annual variation rate in GNP will be 2.2%.

1.2 Political Context

This section begins with a brief description of the country's political situation before 2004. This includes a look at the role of the Peace Agreements and the construction of new democratic institutions. Next is a run-down of the principal characteristics of the Salvadoran post-war political-elections system, including an overview of legislative, municipal and presidential election results since 1994. Finally, some of the problems that have affected democratic governability in recent years are pointed out.

1.2.1 The Peace Agreements

To understand El Salvador politically it must be said that the institutional order that currently prevails is fundamentally product of the dynamics produced by the civil-conflict in the eighties. It is also product of the treaty signed at the end of this conflict. The Salvadoran civil war lasted over a decade and produced over 75 thousand casualties. It also devastated the economy. Large sections of the population were displaced and became refugees. The Peace Agreement signed in Chapultepec, Mexico on 16th January 1992, culminated a negotiation process that entered its final phase with the signing of an Agreement in Geneva, in April 1990. The fundamental objectives were to end the armed conflict by political means, promote the democratization of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect of human rights, and bring Salvadoran society back together again.

Each of these aspects is dealt with in the different sections of the Agreement text. The end of the war is set forth explicitly in chapter VII, called “Cessation of the Armed Conflict.” On the other hand, the purpose of democratization is approached in different initiatives that focus on restructuring national institutions. This includes the creation of a Human Rights Ombudsman, a National Civil Police and the National Judiciary Counsel. Besides, there is also a brief section on the need to reform the electoral system. To promote absolute respect of human rights, the peace treaty redefined the role of the armed forces, eliminated certain security forces such as the National Guard and the Financial Guard, and created a new National Civil Police. Finally, with regards to reuniting Salvadoran society the peace Agreements established that “a prerequisites for democracy is the country’s sustained economic and social development. At the same time, reuniting Salvadoran society and an ever-increasing degree of social cohesion, are indispensable elements to access development. Therefore, in the group of agreements required to put an end to the armed conflict in El Salvador once and for all, a minimum platform of commitments are included in order to facilitate development that would favor all strata of the population.”

For this reason the Peace Agreements symbolize the most important political reform in contemporary El Salvador. This reform pointed to several aspects. First was the demilitarization of political life. Second the doctrinal and institutional remaking of public security. Third was the FMLN was converted into a political party. Further, there were modifications to the electoral system. Finally, changes in the judiciary system. The political reform set off by the Peace Agreements constitutes a process of modernizing the political regime and making it more flexible. The approach was the following: (a) to create necessary conditions for the insertion of sectors who had been historically excluded in the political arena; (b) to redefine the “rules of the game” so that political competition take place on equal grounds; and (c) to eliminate the recourse to armed conflict as a legitimate means for political struggle.

The Peace Agreements set the stage for the edification of postwar institutions in El Salvador and laid the foundation for the establishment of a democratizing process. This way the conditions were created for broad participation of all the country’s political forces. There was openness for the expression of political liberties. Also projects for transformation of democratic institutions were initiated.

Following the signing of the Peace Agreements, political violence has diminished significantly. Respect for human rights has also improved greatly, and the possibility of exercising fundamental liberties has been generally guaranteed. Since 1992 El Salvador has periodically held relatively free and competitive elections for president, deputies and municipal councils. This has enabled diverse political forces to compete for power without implying the use of violence as in the past. By 2003, Freedom House classified El Salvador as a “free” country, with a score of 2 on the scale of respect to political rights and 3 on the civil liberties scale.

1.1.2 Characteristics of the Postwar Political Election System

At the time of writing this report, only six political parties in El Salvador have representation in the legislative assembly. Three are facing the possibility of losing their legal status when they failed to obtain the minimum percentage of votes during the presidential elections in March 2004, as stipulated in the Electoral Code. Of these six political parties, two dominate the national political scene. On the one hand, the governing Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza

Republicana Nacionalista, ARENA), is a party that has a right-wing ideology, and has been in the Executive power for over 15 consecutive years. On the other hand is the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Marí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN), a party that has a leftist ideology, made up of the former leftist guerrilla forces who became a political party at the end of the war.

According to some analysts, the political-party system in El Salvador, prior to the March 2004 presidential elections, could be characterized as polarized and pluralist, for the following reasons. First of all, there had been a great number of parties participating in the different electoral processes. For example, in 1994 there were ten political parties registered at the High Electoral-Tribunal and by 1997 the number had risen to fourteen. The total number of parties in post-war electoral processes is very close to three. Second, the post-war political system is characterized by an important political polarization. Third, the parties who hold the majority (ARENA and FMLN) represent two poles that are at the extreme ends of the political spectrum..

Table I.6 shows the results for the legislative elections in El Salvador during the post-war period. On the other hand, Table I.7 shows the number of posts obtained per party in each of these electoral processes. As can be seen, ARENA and FMLN have dominated citizen electoral-preferences since 1994, having obtained an average of two thirds of the votes. This means there has been a reduced space for other political parties in the electoral race.

Table I.6 Result of Legislative Elections (1991-2003)

Parties	1994	1997	2000	2003
ARENA	605,775	396,301	436,169	446,279
FMLN	287,811	369,709	426,289	475,130
PCN	83,520	97,362	106,812	181,167
PDC	240,451	93,645	87,074	101,854
CD/CDU	59,843	39,145	65,070	89,090
Other	67,877	123,441	88,865	105,206
Total valid votes	1,345,277	1,119,603	1,210,269	1,398,726

Source: Centro de Información, Documentación y Apoyo a la Investigación (2004). Las elecciones municipales y legislativas del 16 de marzo de 2003. *Estudios Centroamericanos*, 653-654, 171-196.

In general terms, data shows that in time, the system has become quite competitive in El Salvador, the fundamental protagonists being the two parties that represent the two poles of the ideological spectrum. In 1994 ARENA got 45% of all valid votes and FMLN got 31.3%. This gave the former 39 seats in the Assembly, while FMLN got little more than half this amount: 21. The other parties got an important number of seats: 24. The 1997 elections are more competitive and the breach is significantly reduced. ARENA obtains 35.4%, while the FMLN's electoral takings rise to 33%. The number of seats for either party is practically even (ARENA 28 and FMLN 27). Elections in 2000 are very close. The gap basically disappears to give way to very similar percentages. ARENA gets 36% of the votes, whereas FMLN gets 35.2%. However, due to the electoral system, for the first time, FMLN obtains more deputies (31) than ARENA (29). For the 2003 legislative elections, FMLN surpasses ARENA obtaining 33.9% whereas the latter gets 31.9%. FMLN maintains its number of deputies (31), while ARENA diminishes its legislative fraction (27). In short, post-war legislative elections show the following tendencies: ARENA gets its highest voting level in 1994, which falls significantly by 1997 and then

increases in 2000/2003. Whereas FMLN obtains a relatively low level of votes in 1994, its vote-level has been increasing in the subsequent elections until it surpasses ARENA in the 2003 elections. Since 2000 FMLN has had the largest fraction in the Assembly.

Table I.7 Deputies Per Party Since the 1994 Elections.

Party	Election Year			
	1994	1997	2000	2003
ARENA	39	28	29	27
FMLN	21	27	31	31
PDC	18	7	5	5
PCN	4	11	14	16
CD-CDU	1	2	3	5
Other parties	1	9	2	----

Source: Centro de Información, Documentación y Apoyo a la Investigación (2004). Las elecciones municipales y legislativas del 16 de marzo de 2003. *Estudios Centroamericanos*, 653-654, 171-196.

Municipal elections reveal a similar tendency as legislative elections, with a few differences. In 1994 ARENA controlled almost 80% of the country's city governments, including the most important cities. PDC, which had been a predominant force in the eighties, had only 11.5%. FMLN had 6.1%. PCN had 3.4%. Since 1997 there is a visible growth in the number of city-governments won by FMLN (54 in 1997, 79 in 2000, and 74 in 2003), as well as by PCN (18 in 1997, 33 in 2000 and 53 in 2003). There was an important descent in the number of ARENA controlled city-governments (167 in 1997, 127 in 2000 and 111 in 2003). Although in terms of the number of votes in 2003 ARENA and FMLN are quite close, ARENA has more city governments due to the characteristics of the population distribution and the electoral system. By 2003 ARENA still governs most of the cities of the country, but FMLN governs most of the important urban areas (most of the city-governments in the Metropolitan San Salvador area and several departmental capitals). With a much smaller number of votes, PCN controls several important city halls, basically in the rural interior of the country.

Table I.8 Results of City-Government Elections (1994-2004)

Parties	1994	1997	2000	2003
ARENA	598391	410537	438859	491449
FMLN	273498	365175	338950	471041
PDC	261130	101945	95509	104493
PCN	107110	102961	123945	210056
Coalitions of different parties	--	158113	85879	189440
CD-CDU	48763	26986	41549	37629
Other Parties	56562	108274	93517	88252

Source: Centro de Información, Documentación y Apoyo a la Investigación (2004). Las elecciones municipales y legislativas del 16 de marzo de 2003. *Estudios Centroamericanos*, 653-654, 171-196.

Table I.9 Number of City-Governments Per Party in the Last Elections

Party	1994		1997		2000		2003	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
ARENA	206	78.6	160	61.1	127	48.5	111	42.4
FMLN	16	6.1	54	20.6	79	30.2	74	28.2
PCN	9	3.4	18	6.9	33	12.6	53	20.2
PDC	30	11.5	15	5.7	16	6.1	18	6.9
CD/CDU	NA	---	0	0.0	4	1.5	4	1.5
PAN	NA	---	NA	---	1	0.4	1	0.4
USC	NA	---	NA	---	2	0.8	NA	NA
PPR	NA	---	NA	---	NA	---	1	0.4

Source: Centro de Información, Documentación y Apoyo a la Investigación (2004). Las elecciones municipales y legislativas del 16 de marzo de 2003. *Estudios Centroamericanos*, 653-654, 171-196.

On the other hand, reviewing electoral results for presidential elections, the scenarios are different. Table I.10 shows FMLN exhibiting a gradual electoral growth at the level of legislative and city elections, even though its voting level regarding post-war presidential elections has been an average of 22% below ARENA. In 1994 ARENA got 49.11% of valid votes and a Coalition of FMLN-CD-MNR got 24.99%. However, this was not enough to win a first round and there had to be another election to define the presidency, which ARENA clearly won. In 1999 ARENA got 51.96% of the votes, while a Coalition of FMLN-USC got 29.05%, with which ARENA won in the first round. The 2004 elections showed an unprecedented increase in voter participation. This made both parties increase their number of votes significantly. ARENA got over 1 million 3 hundred thousand votes. This is twice the number of votes in the presidential election of 1999. Whereas FMLN got over 810 thousand votes, which means a little over double those in the previous elections. However, looking at the percentage difference, both parties stayed close to the 22-point difference. This was due to the scanty counterbalance on the part of other participating parties, which obtained a very low number of votes.

Table I.10 Results of Presidential Elections (1994-2004)

Party	1994 ^a		1999		2004	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
ARENA	651,632	49.11	614,268	51.96	1,314,436	57.71
CDU	---	0.00	88,640	7.50	88,737	3.90
FMLN	331,629 ^b	24.99	343,472 ^c	29.05	812,519	35.68
PCN	70,854	5.34	45,140	3.82	61,781	2.71
PDC	215,936	16.27	67,207	5.68	---	---
Others	56,785 ^e	4.28	23,521 ^f	1.99	---	---
Valid votes	1,326,836	100	1,182,248	100	2,277,473	100

Source: Centro de Información, Documentación y Apoyo a la Investigación (2004). Las elecciones presidenciales. Un triunfo del bloque hegemónico de derecha. *Estudios Centroamericanos*, 665-666, 228-245.

^a Data corresponds to first round.

^b FMLN in coalition with CD.

^c FMLN in coalition with USC.

^d El PDC in coalition with CDU.

^e Refers to political parties MAC, MU and MSN.

^f Refers to political parties LIDER and PUNTO.

The 2004 election process has had important repercussions for the political system. In the first place, the two main parties, both ARENA and FMLN, won a considerable amount of votes and

doubled their electoral results from the 1999 presidential elections. Second, the electoral climate was very tense and highly polarized. Some analysts say these were the most irregular of the post-war period, marked by frequent acts of violence, disregard for electoral regulations and the use of dirty-campaign tactics. In spite of these problems the elections motivated the participation of large sectors of the population. The results reflect the will of the population to a great extent. Third, the rest of contending parties (CDU-PDC coalition and PCN) got a very low number of votes, and they did not reach the minimum the law requires.

1.2.3 Problems of Governability in El Salvador

Polarization and Disagreement

The ARENA and FMLN hegemony has had as a result intense polarization in Salvadoran society, reaching its highest level in the March 2004 elections. This hegemony is accruing consequences in the political dynamics in the country. According to Artiga-González, the actual number of political parties in presidential elections has gone from 3.2 in 1984 to 3 in 1994 to 2.2 in 2004. Add this polarization to the lack of will or willingness to come to political agreements among the leading political forces has given rise to more than a few political problems that affect different aspects of national life.

Actually, political agreement has not been a common practice at all in the Salvadoran political arena. The UNDP Human Development Report shows that political agreement is generally reached among those forces that have ideological or political affinity, but not among adversaries.


Since the signing of the Peace Agreements, efforts to reach political agreement can be said to follow a four-stage progression. The first, from 1992 to 1997, was completely dominated by the Peace Agreements. In this stage government actions were marked by the processes of political negotiation tied to fulfillment of the agreements. This allowed for a great deal of political legitimacy. The second stage according to the UNDP, “overlaps the former, when different social and political forces under various ideological banners, saw the Peace Agreements wearing out, and the need to set down other basic agreements to demarcate the territories of political and civil actors, once the transition runs out.” Different initiatives emerge, such as the Business Manifesto of the National Association of Private Businesses (Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada, ANEP), the San Andres Pact in 1995 and the creation of the National Commission on Development in 1998, among others.

The third stage is particularly different from the former. This takes place during the presidency of Francisco Flores and is characterized by “the reduction of spaces for dialogue and coordination among political and civil actors, an increase in tension and an almost total lack of communication between both parties.” This reaches its maximum expression during the open confrontation that was predominant on the eve and during the course of the 2004 presidential electoral campaign. The new government came to a Salvadoran society under a great level of political and social tension. However, due to the country’s prolonged history of social confrontation, some sectors are skeptical of the new dynamics.

Voter Absenteeism

Another feature that characterizes Salvadoran post-war political dynamics prior to 2004, has been a prevailing high level of voter absenteeism. Since the signing of the Peace Agreements, elections registered a drop in citizen participation indicators. During the 1994 elections, the percentage of citizen participation was 48.6%. In 1997 this percentage shrunk drastically to 34.4% (See Table I.4). However, in presidential elections in early 2004 came a surprise turnaround. Voter participation soared to 60% of the eligible population.

Graph I.4 Voter Participation and Voting-Age Population



Source: Adapted from Supreme Electoral Tribunal data.

According to some studies, absenteeism in El Salvador seems to be related to citizen attitudes towards the political system more than to the performance of the electoral system itself although this aspect is also present. Some analysts draw attention to strategies that promoted elections in war-time which, although themselves not a determining factor in the resolution of the conflict, eroded public confidence in electoral processes as a means to determine the country's political direction

The Problem of Insecurity

Beyond the strictly political arena, discussion and policies regarding crime-one of the country's main problems-have dominated national social-political dynamics. El Salvador is one of the most violent countries in the region according to different reports by multilateral organizations and local research. Table I.11 shows some of the statistics on the levels of violence in the region. It can be seen that El Salvador, and a few other Central American countries, show very high levels of violence, over and above the mean for most countries in the region. The violence is apparently not linked to political activities. Instead, it seems to be related exclusively to crime. A lot of the crime is attributed to interpersonal violence, as well as gang presence and the activity of organized crime.

Table I.11 Victimization and Homicide Rates in Latin America in the 1990's

Country	Victimization (% of homes)	Homicide Rates (per 100,000 inhabitants)
Argentina	38	4.8
Bolivia	34	NA
Brazil	38	23.3
Chile	31	3.0
Colombia	37	89.5
Costa Rica	37	5.6
Ecuador	42	15.3
El Salvador	47	41.3
Guatemala	55	75.3
Honduras	37	45.0
Mexico	43	17.8
Nicaragua	37	18.3
Panama	28	10.9
Paraguay	33	4.0
Peru	38	11.5
Uruguay	25	4.4
Venezuela	45	16.0

Source: Cruz, José Miguel. (2003). *Violencia y democratización en Centroamérica: el impacto del crimen en la legitimidad de los regímenes de posguerra. América Latina Hoy*, 35, 19-59.

A crime-fighting plan was launched in mid 2003, by the government under former president Francisco Flores. The plan basically focused on controlling juvenile gangs. By the name “Strong Hand”, the plan revolved around a law that envisioned putting in jail all young people who appeared to belong to gangs. This immediately divided political sectors, but got ready backing from the citizens who felt burdened with the problem of criminal violence. The Executive had a direct face-off with the Judicial Branch, judges, and a good number of Deputies. In spite of accusations that the law and procedures were unconstitutional, the plan was set in motion and it was a significant source of political gain for the government and its party, that was in serious crisis at the time due to the results of the legislative elections in 2003.

The law was declared unconstitutional in April 2004, but “Strong Hand” had already taken government institutional activity to an unconstitutional area and fixed the notion in the public view that it is permitted to pass over certain fundamental rights in order to combat crime. Consequently the Supreme Court of Justice decided to declare the law unconstitutional. In the new government’s term, the strategy to face gangs has been placed under a consensus-building policy and penal and procedural law is being reformed before issuing another special law. However, at the time of writing this report, programs that are aimed at facing up to criminal violence and gangs still emphasize the aspects of punishment and repression, over those aspects that deal with prevention.

1.3 Study of the Political Culture in El Salvador

The study of political culture is relatively new to El Salvador. The first known efforts to study political culture are from mid 1989, when the civil-war was in full-swing. Then director of University Public Opinion Institute, Ignacio Marin-Baro, carried-on a study based on a national survey on Salvadorans’ political values. This study was not published due to the sudden death of

the author. It was the first systematic effort to understand the norms and values that dictate the population's political behaviour.

Then, in the early 90's, the first effort to gather data and study political culture was made, while the war was still on. This was published in the book *Perspectives for a stable democracy in El Salvador*, published by Seligson and Cordova. This effort was later included in Professor Seligson's Latin American Public Opinion Project, which produced two studies on the state of political culture in El Salvador, in 1995 and 1999.

In the 90's other institutions joined the effort to study political culture in the Salvadoran post-war period. Among them are the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences El Salvador Program, the Dr. G.M. Ungo Foundation, and the University Public Opinion Institute of the Universidad Centroamericana Jose Simeon Cañas (UCA). Following is a list of some of these studies.

Berrocal, E. y González, Luis Armando. (2000). La democracia y su cultura política. *Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA)*, 527-536, p. 619-620.

Briones, Carlos y Ramos, Carlos Guillermo. (1999). *Las elites: percepciones y actitudes sobre los procesos de cambio y de transformación institucional en El Salvador*. San Salvador: FLACSO.

Coleman, Kenneth; Cruz, José Miguel y Moore, Peter. (1996). Retos para consolidar la democracia en El Salvador. *Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA)*, 571-572, p. 415-440.

Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2000). El problema del abstencionismo en El Salvador. Ponencia presentada en el XXII Congreso de LASA, Miami, 15-19 de marzo de 2000.

Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (1999). Una aproximación teórico-metodológica para el estudio sobre la cultura política en torno a la descentralización en Centroamérica. San Salvador: mimeo.

Córdova, Ricardo. (1998). Las bases empíricas de la democracia y la cultura política en El Salvador. En: F. Rodríguez; S. Castro y R. Espinosa (eds.). *El sentir democrático. Estudios sobre cultura política centroamericana*. San José: Editorial Fundación UNA.

Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Orellana, Víctor Antonio. (2001). *Cultura política, gobierno local y descentralización. El Salvador. Volumen III*. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO y FLACSO-Programa El Salvador.

Córdova Macías, Ricardo y Seligson, Mitchell. (2001). *Cultura política, gobierno local y descentralización. América Central. Volumen I*. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO y FLACSO-Programa El Salvador.

Cruz, José Miguel. (2003). Violencia y democratización en Centroamérica: el impacto del crimen en la legitimidad de los regímenes de posguerra. *América Latina Hoy*, 35, p. 19-59.

Cruz, José Miguel. (2002). ¿Para qué sirve la democracia? La cultura política de los jóvenes del Área Metropolitana de San Salvador. En: F. Rodríguez; S. Castro y J. Madrigal (eds.). *Con la*

herencia de la paz. Cultura política de la juventud centroamericana. San José: Editorial Fundación UNA.

Cruz, José Miguel. (2001). *¿Elecciones para qué? El impacto de la cultura política salvadoreña en el ciclo electoral 1999-2000.* San Salvador: FLACSO-Programa El Salvador.

Cruz, José Miguel. (2001). *Cultura política y consolidación de la democracia en El Salvador: capital social y confianza institucional a finales de los noventa.* Trabajo preparado para el Informe de Desarrollo Humano 2001. San Salvador: mimeo.

Cruz, José Miguel. (1999). El autoritarismo en la posguerra: un estudio de las actitudes de los salvadoreños. *Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA)*, 603, p. 95-106.

Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública. [IUDOP]. (1999). *Encuesta de valores. Serie de informes 80.* San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA.

Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública. [IUDOP]. (1998). *Encuesta sobre cultura política. Serie de informes 71.* San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA.

Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública. [IUDOP]. (1997). *Encuesta sobre gobernabilidad y expectativas hacia las nuevas autoridades municipales. Serie de informes 64.* San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA.

UNDP. (2003). Estado de la gobernabilidad democrática en El Salvador. (Capítulo 9). En: *Report on Human Development . El Salvador 2003.* San Salvador: UNDP.

Roggenbuck, Stefan. (ed.). (1995). *Cultura política en El Salvador.* San Salvador: Fundación Konrad Adenauer.

Santacruz Giralt, María. (2003). *Estudio sobre las clases medias y su comportamiento político.* San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA, FUNDAUNGO, Fundación Friedrich Ebert.

Seligson, Mitchell; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2000). *Auditoría de la democracia El Salvador 1999.* San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO, IUDOP y Universidad de Pittsburgh.

Seligson, Mitchell y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (1995). *El Salvador: de la guerra a la paz. Una cultura política en transición.* San Salvador: IDELA, University of Pittsburgh y FUNDAUNGO.

Seligson, Mitchell y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (1992). *Perspectivas para una democracia estable en El Salvador.* San Salvador: IDELA.

These studies tend to show a gradual but steady growth for the political system since the end of the war, and advances in the levels of civil participation, particularly in spaces opened at the local level. At the same time, they show how opinions on democracy and satisfaction with its workings suggest that in spite of advances, El Salvador still faces great challenges to democratic

consolidation. Actually, according to the Human Development Report for El Salvador published by the UNDP in 2003, this is still a low level of democratic political culture in El Salvador, which poses a challenge to the country's governability. The UNDP adds, "the deficient democratic civic culture that exists in El Salvador gives the idea that authoritarianism, in an eventual return under new forms, could find a fermenting pot for its development and rapid expansion. At the same time it is linked to low levels of confidence in political parties and their performance, particularly expressed in the Legislative Assembly.

Beyond agreeing or disagreeing with these declarations, the truth is that persistence of low levels of confidence in national institutions, the presence of certain authoritarian attitudes, and the ambiguity of a sector of the population towards democracy, are challenges for democratic consolidation of the country.

This new study of the democratic political culture in El Salvador is intended as a contribution to the understanding of how political culture develops in the country's democracy. To its favor, not only is it one of the largest and most far-reaching studies on this topic in the country, it also is the fourth in a nationwide series, which gives it a temporal perspective of how citizen political attitudes have developed over the post-war years.


2.0 Survey Methodology

From April 15 to May 10 2004, The University Public Opinion Institute (Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública--IUDOP), at Universidad Centroamericana “Jose Simeon Cañas”, carried out the fieldwork for the study “Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador 2004.” The objective was to understand Salvadoran political culture. The survey is part of a series of studies on political culture that have been carried out in El Salvador by Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project. The project started in 1991, as explained in the previous chapter. This chapter describes the characteristics of the present study’s final sample, and compares them with the characteristics of the country’s adult population in 2004.

2.1 Characteristics of the Final Sample


The final sample included 1,589 valid interviews, and is representative of the over-18 adult population in El Salvador. The sample error is +/- 0.024 (two point four percent). Of those interviewed 46.6% are male and 53.4% female. Residents of urban areas were 58.8%, and residents of rural areas 41.2%. This data corresponds to the national adult-population distribution, according to estimates by the General Office of Statistics and Census. According to these estimates, 47.9% of over-18 adults living in the country are men, whereas 52.1% are women. At the same time, 59.5% of the population live in urban areas in the country while 40.5% live in the countryside. Table II.1 at the end of this chapter makes comparisons with some of the country’s different demographic variables and the sample taken for the survey.

Graph II.1 Distribution by Gender of Those Surveyed




A little more than one fourth (28%) of people surveyed were youth from 16 to 25 years of age. Another similar proportion (26%) corresponds to people from 26 to 35 years old and the rest are people 35 and over.

Graph II.2 Distribution of those Surveyed by Age




Regarding education, three out of every ten people interviewed had and elementary education (35%) whereas forty nine percent had studied high school. The proportion of people is a similar when comparing those who have had no formal education and those who have had access to higher education (13% each).

Graph II.3 Distribution of Respondents by Educational Level




Most of those interviewed had a family monthly income below 144 dollars (almost 50%). A third had a monthly family income of 144 to 576 dollars, while little over 10% had a family income of over 576 dollars.

Graph II.4 Distribution of Respondents by Monthly Family Income Level



Only one fourth of survey respondents lived in the capital or the metropolitan area. One out of every ten lived in large cities and almost the same number live in small cities. Seventeen percent live in medium-sized cities, whereas the rest of the interviewed population (41%) was in the rural area.

Graph II.5 Distribution of Respondents by City Size



2.2 Sample Characteristics Compared to the Population

Following is a comparison of sample characteristics with those of the country's general population in order to corroborate whether or not the sample is really representative of the target population. To this end, data obtained through the Survey of Multiple Purpose homes (EHPM) from 2002 (more recent data about population characteristics), which are the most recent available according to Population Projection of the General Office of Statistics and Census (DYGESTYC).

Table II.1 Characteristics of the Sample and Population According to EHPM Data and DYGESTY Population Projection

Characteristics	Populaton Data	Sample
N	3,931,458	1589
Gender (%)		
Men	47.91	46.6
Women	52.09	53.4
Age (%) *		
18 to 34 years of age	52.62	51.7
35 years old and over	47.38	48.3
Educational Level (%) *		
None	19.43	12.5
Primary	36.28	35.3
Middle School	16.34	17.2
High School	17.42	21.9
University	10.53	13.1
Area (%)		
Urban	59.52	58.8
Rural	40.48	41.2
Department (%)		
Ahuachapan	4.72	4.7
Santa Ana	8.96	6.4
Sonsonate	6.88	5.5
Chalatenango	2.65	2.5
La Libertad	11.18	11.1
San Salvador	34.60	30.4
Cuscatlan	2.92	3.8
La Paz	4.27	5.3
Cabañas	2.01	2.8
San Vicente	2.37	3.2
Usulután	5.09	11.1
San Miguel	7.74	5.9
Morazan	2.39	4.3
La Unión	4.22	3.1
Drinking water in dwelling (%) *	66.2	69.3

* This data is from 2002, data which is most accessible at this time. These come from the survey of Homes with Multiple Purposes this year.

As can be seen in Table II.1, for the most part the demographic variables of the sample distribution in the survey correspond to the distribution of projections reported by DIGESTYC. However, in the case of educational level, there are some differences among the group of people with “no” education (NONE) and the group of people who have studied high school. The final sample underestimates the group that has high school education. As for the distribution by departments, the sample differs notably in two departments: San Salvador and Usulután. In the first, the sample underestimates the department’s real weight, while in Usulután is significantly overestimated.

3.0 Support for Democracy

This chapter addresses the ways in which Salvadoran political attitudes express support for democratic political stability. The first section addresses the level of political support. A second section addresses the level of political tolerance, an important value that allows for democracy to prosper. A third section analyzes the relationship between the level of political system support and the level of political tolerance. In the fourth section, a collection of evaluations is presented about democracy in El Salvador and the fifth section offers conclusions.

3.1 System Support

The stability of a political system and its ability to overcome a crisis without surrender have been directly linked to the legitimacy on which the political system relies. Seymour Martin Lipset defines legitimacy as “the ability of a system to generate and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are those that are most appropriate for society.” Lipset’s hypothesis is that political systems that are seen by the citizenry as legitimate can survive even a profound affectivity crisis, while those with low levels of legitimacy can collapse under the pressure of any economic crisis.

Lipset also recognizes that “when a system reaches a high level of legitimacy, there is no guarantee that it will not eventually lose it. Just as the political systems undergo an affectivity crisis, they can also undergo a legitimacy crisis.” In effect, Lipset explicitly points out that a long-term affectivity crisis can erode legitimacy because legitimacy itself depends on the ability of a system to “meet the expectations of important groups.” As a consequence, “a break in affectivity, repeatedly or for long periods of time, will put stability in danger, even if the system is legitimate.”

Until recently, efforts to measure legitimacy have referred to a Trust in Government Scale that was developed by the University of Michigan. However, this scale relied heavily on measuring dissatisfaction with the efforts of those who govern rather than measuring the generalized dissatisfaction with the governmental system. Moving forward, in order to analyze belief in the legitimacy of the Salvadoran political system, a scale of legitimacy called “Political Support/Alignment” will be used, which was developed by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University and has been utilized in various comparative studies at an international level. It has been shown to be an improved tool for measuring legitimacy.

This scale measures the level of citizen support awarded to the government without focusing on the government currently in power. In the literature of political science, this phenomenon is called “diffused support” or “system support.” The scale is based on five items and each item utilizes a seven-point response format ranging from “not at all” to “a lot.” The following are the formulated questions:


- B1. How much do you think that the Salvadoran courts guarantee a fair trial?*
- B2. How much do you respect Salvadoran political institutions?*
- B3. How well you think that basic citizen rights are protected by the Salvadoran political system?*
- B4. How proud do you feel to be living under the Salvadoran political system?*

B6. How much do you think that the Salvadoran political system should be supported?"

The codification systems of these variables was originally based on a scale of 1 to 7, but to represent these results in a more understandable way, they have been converted to a more familiar metric scale with a range of 0 to 100.

The following graphic presents the averages for each of the three questions: the lowest levels are presented for the courts (49.5) and basic rights (50.1), an intermediate level is found for pride (60.9), and the highest level is found for support (68.2) and institutions (68.3).


Graph III.1 Average of the Questions that Make Up the System Support Scale



3.1.1 Levels of System Support (1995-2004)


Thanks to figures obtained from national surveys carried out in 1995 and 1999, it is possible to see how levels of system support have evolved during the period of 1995-2004. In the following graph, the evolution of the five questions utilized for building the system support scale can be seen. In general terms, four of the questions (the courts, basic rights, pride, and support) identify a trend of increasing system support, while for the question about institutions there is a slight decrease from 1994 to 2004.

Graph III.2 Average of the Questions That Make Up the System Support Scale (1995-2004)



Based on the five questions, a scale that measures system support has been constructed. The scale is an average of the five items shown above. In 1991, the first series of questions to measure system support was carried out but only in the San Salvador metropolitan area; starting in 1995 studies were carried out at a national level. Graph III.3 presents the results for the 1991-2004 period. As mentioned, the 1991 survey was limited to the San Salvador metropolitan area, in order to see the evolution of attitudes for the entire period. As we can see, system support has been increasing significantly from 1991 to 2004. This reflects that the legitimacy of the political system has been increasing in El Salvador since the end of the civil war.


Graph III.3 System Support in El Salvador (1991-2004): Scale of Central Items



3.1.2 System Support From a Comparative Perspective


Analyzing the figures obtained from El Salvador in a comparative framework that includes the Central American countries, Mexico, and Colombia, we find that El Salvador is the country with the second highest level of system support (59.5), placing second only to Costa Rica (67.6).

Graph III.4 System Support From a Comparative Perspective



Given the great impact of the variable created by the evaluation of the current government (M1), it was decided to create a control for this variable in order to compare the different countries. These changes can be seen in the following graph. El Salvador ranks third (57.9), following Costa Rica (67.6) and Mexico (58.5).

Graph III.5 System Support From a Comparative Perspective With Controls to Consider the Evaluation of the Current President



3.1.3 Explaining the Levels of System Support in El Salvador

While it is true that increasing system support in El Salvador can be seen, not all of those who were interviewed responded in the same way. Some Salvadorans expressed much greater governmental system support than others. What explains these varying opinions? The following

pages report first on the statistically significant findings in order to conduct multiple regression and then report on the findings that correspond to the bivariate analysis carried out with respect to a collection of socio-demographic variables about attitudes and evaluations of national reality.


3.1.4 System Support Model

Basically there are six system support predictors: ideology (scale of left to right), perception of gang presence one's neighborhood, trust in the judicial system to punish the guilty, evaluation of the president, opinion about democracy in the country, and evaluation of the country's economic situation. Variables have been maintained under this model with regards to education, gender and personal possessions, despite the fact that they are not statistically significant.

3.1.5 Population Stratum and System Support

Place of residence turned out to be a factor in terms of system support. These results can be observed in Graph III.6. As we can see, inhabitants of lesser-populated municipalities exhibit higher levels of support and the trend is that system support is reduced as the size of the municipal population increases.


Graph III.6 System Support According to Population Stratum



3.1.6 Urban-Rural Setting and System Support

The distinction of urban and rural residence turned out to be a factor associated with levels of system support: support is higher in rural areas as compared with urban areas.


Graph III.7 System Support According to Urban-Rural Level



3.1.7 Education and System Support


Education turned out to be a factor associated with system support. In Graph III.8 it can be observed that the level of system support is higher among those lacking formal education. It is then observed that there is a clear trend for the levels of support to diminish as the levels of education increase.

Graph III.8 System Support According to Educational Level



Using gender controls, Graph III.9 illustrates the trend for support levels to decrease as educational levels increase, but there are important differences: for those lacking formal education and those who have only primary education, women exhibit a higher level of support than men; the numbers are equal for those with secondary education, and the numbers are a little higher for men for those with higher education.


Graph III.9 System Support According to Educational Level By Gender



3.1.8 Exposure to the News and System Support

In the questionnaire, three questions were included to measure the frequency with which those surveyed listen to/read/watch the news. Based on these three questions, a scale of exposure to the news was developed. In Graph III.10 it can be observed that those with a lower level of exposure to the news are those who exhibit higher levels of system support, and that the trend is that as exposure to the news increases, system support decreases.


Graph III.10 System Support According to News Exposure



3.1.9 Level of Political Knowledge and System Support

Four questions designed to measure the level of information of those surveyed were used to construct a scale to measure the level of political knowledge. Graph III.11 shows that those with a lower level of political knowledge are those that exhibit higher levels of system support, and that the trend is that as the level of political knowledge increases, system support decreases.

Graph III.11 System Support According to the Level of Political Knowledge




3.1.10 Interpersonal Trust and System Support

Literature about social capital stresses the importance that interpersonal trust plays on the economic and political behavior of the citizenry. The questionnaire included the question: “IT1. Speaking of the people here, would you say that the people in your community are (1) very trustworthy, (2) somewhat trustworthy, (3) not very trustworthy, (4) not at all trustworthy, (8)

don't know." Graph III.12 observes a clear trend: system support increases as interpersonal trust increases.


Graph III.12 System Support According to Interpersonal Trust



3.1.11 Evaluation of the Work of the President and System Support

The evaluation of President Flores turned out to be a factor associated with system support. The questionnaire asked: "M1. Speaking in general about the current government, would you say that the work that is being carried out by President Flores is: (1) very good, (2) good, (3) neither good nor bad, (4) bad, (5) very bad, (8) don't know." In Graph III.13 it can be observed that system support increases as the approval of the President's work increases.

Graph III.13 System Support According to the Evaluation of the President




3.1.12 Ideology and System Support

Political ideology is frequently a powerful factor in explaining the behavior and attitudes of the citizenry. The questionnaire included a 10-point scale to measure ideology, with 1 representing a leftist position and 10 representing a rightist position.

In El Salvador, the left and the right have come head to head for many years. For this reason it is not surprising that ideology is a relevant factor in political system support. Graph III.14 shows that lower levels of system support are exhibited by the left. As the scale moves to the right, system support increases.


Graph III.14 System Support According to Ideology



3.1.13 Political Preference and System Support

Another way to incorporate analysis of the political dimension is by asking which party the person voted for in the presidential elections of March 2004. The possible answers were recoded to give three options: the governing party (ARENA, with a rightist orientation), the principal opposition party (FMLN, with a leftist orientation), and the three center parties (CDU-PDC and PCN), which were grouped together as an option for “others.” In Graph III.5 it can be observed that ARENA supporters exhibit a higher level of system support while those who sympathize with opposition parties exhibit a lower level of system support.


Graph III.15 System Support According to Political Preference



3.1.14 Consequences of the War and System Support

The consequences of the past civil war constitute another important political factor to be considered in the analysis. In the questionnaire, three questions are included to determine whether or not, as a consequence of the civil war, those interviewed suffered the loss of a family member or had family members who were refugees (internally or out of the country) or if a family member had to leave the country. A variable to add together the responses to these three questions was created and the analysis was controlled by education, ideology, and personal possessions. Graph III.16 shows the results. Those that did not suffer the consequences of the war exhibit a higher level of system support as compared with those who did suffer these consequences.


Graph III.16 System Support According to Consequences of the War (Controlled by Education, Ideology, and Personal Possessions)



3.1.15 Satisfaction With Democratic Performance and System Support

To continue with the analysis of political factors, those surveyed were asked to evaluate democratic performance. The questionnaire asked: “PN5. In your opinion, El Salvador is very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic, not at all democratic?” In Graph III.17 a clear trend is observed: system support is higher for those who think that the country is very democratic and the trend is that system support diminishes as opinions about the democratic character of the country go down.


Graph III.17 System Support According to Opinion About Democracy



3.1.16 Economic Situation of the Country and System Support


The questionnaire asks for an evaluation of the economic situation in the country. The Salvadoran economy has been at a standstill in the last few years and analysis of the data shows that this situation has had an impact on citizens' viewpoints. In Graph III.18 it can be appreciated that more than half of those surveyed (54.4%) think that the national economy is doing poorly, while 32.9% think that it the economy is neither good nor bad and only 12.7% think that it has been doing well.

Graph III.18 Economic Situation of the Country



The evaluation of the country's economic situation is strongly associated with levels of system support, as can be observed in Graph III.19. Those that perceive that the economy is not doing well exhibit lower levels of system support. Based on the data, it can be affirmed that there is a clear link between the perception that is held about the state of the country's economy and the degree of legitimacy awarded to the political system.


Graph III.19 System Support According to the Economic Situation of the Country



3.1.17 Personal Economic Situation and System Support


To continue with the analysis of the economic situation, the questionnaire included a question that focused on measuring the evaluation of the personal situation of those surveyed. In Graph III.20 it can be appreciated that 37.4% of those surveyed perceive themselves to be in poor economic conditions, while 40.7% felt that their situation was neither good nor bad and 21.8% thought of their situation as good.

Graph III.20 Personal Economic Situation



The evaluation of personal economic situation is strongly associated with system support, as can be observed in Graph III.21. Those that express a poor personal economic situation exhibit lower levels of system support. Based on the data collected, it can be affirmed that there is a clear link between the perception held about the state of personal economy and the degree of legitimacy awarded to the political system.


Graph III.21 System Support According to Personal Economic Situation



3.1.18 Victimization Due to Crime and System Support

In the analysis we will now focus on the impact that crime has on system support levels. To analyze this aspect three questions were examined on one facet of victimization due to crime. The questionnaire asked: “VIC1. Have you been the victim of an act of crime in the last 12 months?” In Graph III.22 it can be observed that those who have been victims of crime exhibit lower levels of system support.


Graph III.22 System Support According to Victimization Due to Crime



3.1.19 Lack of Personal Safety and System Support

The other question that was examined is: “AOJ11. Speaking of the area or neighborhood in which you live, and thinking about the possibility that you will be the victim of a crime or robbery, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?” In Graph III.23 the following trend can be observed: as a perceived lack of personal safety increases in the place of residence, the levels of system support are reduced.


Graph III.23 System Support According to Perceived Lack of Personal Safety



Another dimension of the perceived lack of personal safety and its impact on the levels of system support was examined in the question: “AOJ17. To what point would you say that gangs affect

your neighborhood? Would you say a lot, some, little, or none?” In Graph III.24 it can be observed that as the perception of gang presence in the neighborhood increases, system support levels diminish.


Graph III.24 System Support According to Perceived Gang Presence in the Neighborhood



3.1.20 Trust in the Judicial System and System Support

Another question that is analyzed is the impact that trust in the judicial system has on system support levels. The questionnaire asked: “AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault, how much would you trust the judicial system to punish the person who is guilty? (1) A lot, (2) somewhat, (3) a little, (4) not at all, (8) don’t know.” In Graph III.25 the following trend can be observed: as levels of trust in the judicial system to punish those who are guilty increases, system support levels increase.

Graph III.25 System Support According to Trust in the Judicial System




3.1.21 Behavior of Municipal Government Towards Citizens and System Support

In studies carried out in 1995 and 1999 a clear association was found between satisfaction with the government at a municipal level and system support at a national level. This leads us to believe that one way to improve the chances of democratic stability is by increasing citizens' satisfaction with the way they are treated by their municipal government.

The questionnaire asked: "SGL2. How do you feel that you and your neighbors have been treated when you go through procedures with the municipal government? Have you been treated very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?" In Graph III.26 we can appreciate that as satisfaction with the local government increases, levels of national system support also increase.


Graph III.26 System Support According to Satisfaction with Local Government



3.1.22 Collection of Extended System Support items

A series of additional items was included as part of extended system support series. In Graph III.27 the results of the 2004 survey can be observed. It should first be noted that the Catholic Church has been included among the list of institutions, despite the fact that it is not a component of the democratic political system. This was done so that a comparison of the different political institutions could be made using the Catholic Church as reference point given that in Latin America the Catholic Church enjoys high levels of trust from the population. The group of institutions that enjoy the highest levels of trust are the Armed Forces (68.6) followed by the Catholic Church (68.5) and the media (67.1). In a second group, we find trust in the elections (65.1), the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office (64.9) and the National Civilian Police (64.6). A third group includes the Solicitor General's Office (63.2), the municipal government (62.9), the Government (60.6) and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (59.9). In the fourth group we find the Attorney General's Office (57.8), the Court of Accounts (53.9), the Supreme Court (53.2), the justice system (52.7), the Legislative Assembly (52.5) and, at a lower level, political parties (39.9).

Graph III.27 Trust in the Institutions



3.2 Tolerance

In this section we explore the topic of political tolerance in El Salvador. We base our work on previous empirical studies that have been carried out in the field of political science. The quantitative study of political tolerance has its roots in the research of Stouffer and McClosky when they interviewed North Americans to gauge their willingness to extend civil rights to those who advocate for unpopular causes. Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus argue that tolerance is a critical element in a democratic political culture given that over time, intolerant attitudes can produce intolerant behavior that may place those targeted by the intolerance at risk. Other researchers have extended their studies beyond the United States.


Political tolerance has been measured in many studies that have focused on the willingness of the individuals to extend civil liberties to specific groups. In some studies, the groups are chosen by the researcher and in other cases, the person being interviewed is given a list of groups and asked to select the group he or she “least prefers.” There is some evidence that both methods produce similar results.

Using previous studies conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University as a base, four questions were included in the survey making reference to four civil liberties: the right to vote, the right to peaceful protest, the right to run for public office, and the right to freedom of expression. The person surveyed was given a card with a ten-point scale. A format of ten points was used, starting with strongly disagree (value=1) to strongly agree (value=10). The following questions were formulated in the questionnaire:

- “D1. There are people who always talk negatively about the Salvadoran government, not only the current government, but the way in which the government operates. How strongly do you agree or disagree with these people’s **right to vote**?*
- D2. How strongly do you agree or disagree that these people should be able to hold **peaceful protests** with the goal of expressing their points of view?*
- D3. How strongly do you agree or disagree that these people should **run for public office**?*
- D4. How strongly do you agree or disagree that these people should be able to **make a speech on television**?”*

The codification system for these variables was originally assessed in a 0 to 10 format, but in order to make these results more understandable they have been converted to a metric scale with a range of 0 to 100. In Graph III.28 we can see the average obtained for each of the questions: run for public office (43.5), freedom of expression (51.5), voting (54.5) and protest (55.4). It is important to point out that only the question about running for public office fell below the 50% approval rate.


Graph III.28 Average of the Questions That Make Up the Tolerance Scale



3.2.1 Levels of Tolerance (1995-2004)

Thanks to the fact that we have data from national surveys carried out in 1995 and 1999, it is possible to see how levels of tolerance evolved during the period of 1995 to 2004. In the following graphic we can see the evolution of these four questions which have been used to construct the political tolerance scale. In general terms, we see that between 1995 and 1999, tolerance increased for each of the four questions, but between 1999 and 2004 there was a decrease in tolerance for the four questions, returning for all practical purposes to the 1995 levels.


Graph III.29 Average of the Questions That Make Up the Scale of Tolerance (1995-2004)



Based on the four questions, a scale has been constructed to measure political tolerance. This scale is an average of the four previously shown items. In 1991, a series of questions offered a first measurement of political tolerance but only for the San Salvador Metropolitan Area

(SSMA). Starting in 1995, studies have been carried out at a national level. Graph III.30 presents the results for the period 1991-2004. However, as it has been pointed out, the 1991 survey was limited to SSMA with the purpose of seeing the evolution of the attitudes for the entire period. As we can see, tolerance increases from 47 in 1991 to 53 in 1995 and then increases to 58 in 1998 but diminishes to 51 in 2004. Despite the observed increase in national surveys between 1995 and 1999, the data for 2004 shows a decrease in political tolerance levels in El Salvador.


Graph III.30 Tolerance in El Salvador (1991-2004)



3.2.2 Tolerance from a Comparative Perspective

In analyzing data obtained from the El Salvador case study using the framework of this comparative study which includes the Central American countries, Mexico, and Colombia, we find that El Salvador is the country with the third lowest level of tolerance (51.3), placing only above Guatemala (46.2) and Colombia (50.3).

Graph III.31 Tolerance from a Comparative Perspective



3.2.3 Explaining Tolerance Levels in El Salvador


While it is true that there has been a decrease in political tolerance in El Salvador, not all of those interviewed responded in the same way. What explains these varying opinions? The following pages report first on statistically significant findings in order to analyze multiple regression and then report on the findings that correspond to the bivariate analysis carried out with respect to a collection of socio-demographic variables about attitudes and evaluations of national reality.

3.2.4 Tolerance Model

Table III.2, which can be found in Appendix B, offers the results of the multiple regression model with statistically significant predictors of tolerance when each of the variables remains constant. Basically there are seven tolerance predictors: educational level, gender, ideology (left - right scale), personal possessions in the home, consequences of the war, evaluation of the President, and the degree of satisfaction with democracy. Age remains the same within this model, despite the fact that it is not statistically significant.

3.2.5 Population Stratum and Tolerance


Place of residence turned out to be a factor associated with tolerance. In Graph III.32 we observe that the inhabitants of the lesser-populated municipalities exhibit lower levels of tolerance and the trend is that tolerance increases as the size of the municipal population increases.



3.2.6 Urban - Rural Setting and Tolerance

Distinction of place of residence (urban/rural) has turned out to be a factor associated with the levels of tolerance: the level is higher in urban areas as compared with rural areas.


Graph III.33 Tolerance According to Urban-Rural Setting



3.2.7 Education and Tolerance


Education turns out to be a factor associated with tolerance. In Graph III.34 we can appreciate that tolerance is lower among those who lack formal education or have only primary education. A trend can be observed that tolerance increases as the level of education increases.

Graph III.34 Tolerance According to Educational Level



Looking at gender controls, we can observe that the trend is for the levels of tolerance climb as educational levels go up, but there are important differences. The level of tolerance is the same for men and women who are lacking formal education. For men, tolerance increases as the level of education increases. For women, tolerance decreases for those who have completed primary education and then increases as the level of education increases to secondary education and higher education.


Graph III.35 Tolerance According to Educational Level by Gender



3.2.8 Gender and Tolerance

In Graph III.36 we can observe that men exhibit higher levels of political tolerance than women.


Graph III.36 Tolerance According to Gender



3.2.9 Home Equipment And Tolerance

In Graph III.37 we can observe that levels of tolerance are lower in the sector of people who have fewer possessions in their home. The trend shows that tolerance increases as personal possessions in the home increase.


Graph III.37 Tolerance According to Home Equipment



3.2.10 Exposure to the News and Tolerance

In Graph III.38 we can observe that those with less exposure to the news have a lower level of tolerance and the trend is that as exposure to the news increases, tolerance increases.


Graph III.38 Tolerance According to Exposure to the News



3.2.11 Level of Political Knowledge and Tolerance

In Graph III.39 we observe that those with a lower level of political knowledge are those that exhibit lower levels of tolerance and the trend is that as the level of political knowledge increases, tolerance also increases.


Graph III.39 Tolerance According to Level of Political Knowledge



3.2.12 Evaluation of the President and Tolerance

In Graph III.40 we can observe that tolerance remains at almost the same level for those who positively evaluate (good, very good) the work of President Flores. There is a slight increase for those who believe that he is doing neither good nor bad work. Tolerance increases for those who evaluate him negatively (bad and very bad).


Graph III.40 Tolerance According to the Evaluation of the President



3.2.13 Ideology and Tolerance

As previously mentioned, the left and the right in El Salvador have strongly disagreed for many years and it should therefore not be surprising that ideology is a relevant factor in measuring tolerance. In Graph III.41 we can observe that the left exhibits higher levels of tolerance and the general trend is that as the scale moves towards the right, tolerance diminishes. A hypothesis to be explored is that given that the same party from the right (ARENA) has governed for the past 15 years, it is the sectors on the left that have been critical and for this reason the perception exists that they are ones who must guarantee the right to vote, organize peaceful protest, run for public office, and make use of freedom of expression.


Graph III.41 Tolerance According to Ideology



3.2.14 Political Preference and Tolerance

In Graph III.42 we can observe that FMLN party affiliates exhibit a higher level of tolerance (64), followed by other parties (58), while ARENA sympathizers exhibit a lower level of tolerance (47).


Graph III.42 Tolerance According to Political Preference



3.2.15 Consequences of the War and Tolerance

Previously we have pointed out that the consequences of the civil war constitute another important political factor to be considered in this analysis. In Graph III.43 we can observe that those who suffered the consequences of the war exhibit a higher level of tolerance than those who did not.


Graph III.43 Tolerance According to Consequences of the War



3.2.16 Satisfaction with Democratic Performance and Tolerance

In Graph III.44 we observe the following trend linking satisfaction with democratic performance and political tolerance: Those who are very unsatisfied with the functioning of democracy exhibit the highest levels of tolerance. This diminishes for those who are unsatisfied and continues to diminish for those who are satisfied. Finally, it increases for those who are very satisfied with democratic performance.


Graph III.44 Tolerance According to Satisfaction with the Performance of Democracy



3.2.17 Victimization Due to Crime and Tolerance

In Graph III.45 it can be observed that those who have been victims of crime exhibit higher levels of tolerance than those who have not been victims. This is an aspect that should be more deeply explored in future studies.

Graph III.45 Tolerance According to Victimization Due to Crime



3.3 Support for a Stable Democracy

The theoretical framework that serves as a reference for this study suggests that governmental system support and tolerance are both necessary for long-term democratic stability. In a democracy, it is necessary for citizens to believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions. At the same time they have to be tolerant of the political rights of others, such that there can be a majority system that coexists with certain rights for those in the minority.

This study proposes to analyze the interrelation between system support and tolerance using a theoretical framework. To do so, it becomes necessary to dichotomize both scales in terms of “high” and “low”. For this analysis, “it should be noted that the relations described here only apply to institutionally democratic systems, which means systems in which competitive elections are held regularly and in which there is wide participation. The same attitudes in an authoritarian-type system would be totally different.”

Table III.3 presents four possible combinations of legitimacy and tolerance. Political systems that are predominantly populated in the high system support / high tolerance table cell are those that tend to favor democratic stability. This is based on the logic that a high level of legitimacy in a non-coercive context is needed in order for the system to be stable and tolerance is needed in order for the system to be considered democratic.

When system support is maintained high but tolerance is low (stable authoritarianism table cell), the system tends to remain stable (due to the high level of support), though the democratic government could be in danger in the medium term. This type of system tends to move towards an authoritarian regime.

A low system support situation is expressed in the two lower boxes of the table; both of these situations are linked to instability. In the box indicating low support / high tolerance there is a tendency for democratic instability given that the instability could move towards a greater democratization in a medium term *or* it could maintain conditions of instability. On the other hand, the box for low support / low tolerance might lead one to believe that the final outcome of the conditions reflected could be democratic collapse. It is important to remember that “based on public opinion studies as the only source, collapse cannot be predicted, given that there are many other factors that can influence, such as the role of the elite, the position of the military, and the support/opposition of international actors. Nevertheless, those political systems in which the masses do not support basic democratic institutions nor the rights of minorities tend to be more vulnerable to a democratic collapse.”

Table III.3 Theoretical Relationship Between System Support and Tolerance in Democratic Societies

System support	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable democracy	Stable authoritarianism
Low	Unstable democracy	Democratic breakdown

3.3.1 Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in El Salvador

The first commentary that should be taken into consideration is that the system support scale and the tolerance scale are not positively associated with one another ($r = -.063$, $\text{sig} < .05$). This means that those who are more tolerant do not necessarily tend to offer more system support and vice versa.

The following will examine in detail how the two variables are interrelated. As we have mentioned previously, in order to do this both variables will be dichotomized as “high” and “low.” The results of the studies carried out in El Salvador in 2004 are seen in Table III.4, where it is observed that 35% of those interviewed fall in the cell of authoritarian stability, as this is the most populated cell in the table. Almost one out of three support the system and is tolerant (32% in Stable democracy table cell), while 17% are found under unstable democracy and 16% are in the democratic collapse table cell.

Table III.4 Empirical Relationship Between System Support and Tolerance in El Salvador (2004)

System support	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable democracy 32%	Stable authoritarianism 35%
Low	Unstable democracy 17%	Democratic breakdown 16%

These results can be seen in a comparative perspective over time, thanks to the fact that we have the data from national surveys carried out in 1995 and 1999. In Table III.5 we observe the evolution of the four cells for the period 1995 to 2004. In what we are calling “stable democracy”, we have a growth from 29% to 36% between 1995 and 1999, then a slight decrease down to 32% in 2004. In any case, almost a third of those interviewed are found in this cell. In the “unstable democracy” cell we see that the 23% is maintained between 1995 and 1999 and then drops to 17% in 2004. In the case of “stable authoritarianism”, the number diminishes from 27% to 25% between 1995 and 1999, and then increases significantly to 35% in 2004. This causes concern because though this number tends to remain stable, it runs the risk of being accentuated by authoritarian features. Finally, the “democratic collapse” cell diminishes from 21% in 1995 to 16% in 1999 and has been maintained at this level in 2004.


Table III.5 Empirical Relationship Between System Support and Tolerance in El Salvador (1995-2004)

System support	Tolerance					
	High			Low		
High	Stable democracy			Stable authoritarianism		
	1995	1999	2004	1995	1999	2004
	29%	36%	32%	27%	25%	35%
Low	Unstable democracy			Democratic breakdown		
	1995	1999	2004	1995	1999	2004
	23%	23%	17%	21%	16%	16%

3.3.2 Democratic Stability in a Comparative Perspective

To analyze the data obtained for the El Salvador case study using a comparative framework of the Central American countries, Mexico, and Colombia, we must focus on the “stable democracy” cell. In Graph III.46 we can appreciate that El Salvador (32.3) is slightly below the median, below Panama (37.9), Mexico (41.3) and Costa Rica (48.5).

Graph III.46 Attitudes That Favor a Stable Democracy: El Salvador in a Comparative Perspective




3.4 Evaluations of Democracy

3.4.1 Evaluation of Freedoms, Participation, and the Protection of Human Rights


The questionnaire included a battery of four questions to collect the citizen evaluation of freedom of press and opinion, participation, and protection of human rights. The survey asked the following question: “Do you think that the country currently has very little, sufficient, or too much freedom of press, freedom of opinion, political participation, and protection of human rights?” In Graph III.47 we can observe that 43.8% give the opinion that there is very little freedom of press, 37.6% believe that there is sufficient freedom, 13.6% think that there is too much freedom and 5% don’t know.

Graph III.47 Opinion about the Freedom of Press in the Country




In Graph III.48 we can observe that 51.4% hold the opinion that there is very little freedom of opinion, 37.1% believe that the level is sufficient, 8.4% think that there is too much freedom and 3.1% don't know.

Graph III.48 Opinion on the Freedom of Opinion in the Country




In Graph III.49 it is observed that 42.7% hold the opinion that there is very little political participation in the country, 34.4% think that it is sufficient, 16.6% think that there is too much participation and 6.4% don't know.

Graph III.49 Opinion on Political Participation in the Country



In Graph III.50 we observe that a majority of 63.4% hold the opinion that there is very little protection for human rights, 26.9% think that there is sufficient protection, 6.1% think that there is too much protection and 3.6% don't know.


Graph III.50 Opinion on the Protection of Human Rights in the Country



3.4.2 Evaluation of the Democratic Process


The questionnaire included a battery of three questions related to the citizen evaluation of the democratic process in the country. The survey first asked: “PN5. In your opinion, is El Salvador very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?” In Graph III.51 we can observe that 21% of the respondents think that it is very democratic, 37% think that it is somewhat democratic, 36% think that it is a not very democratic and 7% think that it is not at all democratic.

Graph III.51 Opinion About the Democratic Character of the Country




The second question asked was about democratic progress: “PN6. Based on your experience in recent years, has El Salvador become more democratic, stayed the same, or become less democratic?” In Graph III.52 we can observe that 40.6% of those interviewed hold the opinion that it has stayed the same while 36.4% believe that it is more democratic and 23% believe that it is less democratic.

Graph III.52 Evaluation of Democratic Progress



The third question was about the relationship between the degree to which citizens are satisfied with democratic performance: “PN4. In general, would you say that you are satisfied, very satisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the way in which democracy functions in El Salvador?” In Graph III.53 we can observe that 9% were very satisfied, 53% were satisfied, 33% were unsatisfied, and 5% were very unsatisfied. It is important to emphasize that four of 10 people interviewed are unsatisfied with democratic performance.

Graph III.53 Degree of Satisfaction With Regards to Democratic Performance in the Country



Additionally, the following question was included in the survey: “DEM13. In a few words, what does democracy mean to you?” In Table III.6 the different meanings that were assigned to this word can be seen: for 32.1% it represents freedom, 24.6% didn’t know, for 10.8% it was equality, for 5% participation, for 4.1% well being/economic progress, for 3.3% elections/voting, for 2.6% the right to choose leaders, and there were also other opinions.


Table III.6 Opinions on the Significance of the Word “Democracy”

Valid response	Frequency	Valid percentage
Freedom	510	32.1
Equality	171	10.8
Participation	79	5.0
Well being, economic progress	65	4.1
Elections, voting	53	3.3
Right to choose leaders	41	2.6
Government of the people	18	1.1
Obey the law	6	.4
Non-military government	4	.3
Corruption	4	.3
Capitalism	1	.1
Don’t know, didn’t respond	391	24.6
Other	246	15.5
Total	1589	100.0

3.4.3 Democracy as a Form of Government


The questionnaire included a series of questions intended to explore democratic system support when other authoritarian forms of government are an option. A first question explored the preference for the democracy of the current government versus the possible return of military leadership. The survey asked: “AUT2. The current government has not been the only kind of government that our country has had. Some people think that we would be better off if military leaders would govern once again. Others say that we should maintain the system that we have currently. What do you think?” In Graph III.54 we observe that a vast majority prefers the current system (73.4%), while 18.3% would favor the return of military leaders and 8.2% don’t know.

Graph III.54 Preferences Regarding the Type of Government




A second question explores preferences for a strong leader as opposed to the current democratic system. The survey asked: “AUT1. There are those who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be voted into office. Others say that though things don’t always work well, electoral democracy and a popular vote are always the best. What do you think?” In Graph III.55 we can observe that a vast and categorical majority supports electoral democracy (91.1%), as opposed to 5.3% who favor a strong leader and 3.6% who don’t know.

Graph III.55 Support for Electoral Democracy




A third question explores preference for a democratic regime as opposed to a non-democratic one. It was asked: “DEM2. With which of the three following phrases are you most in agreement? (1) For people like me, it doesn’t matter if the regime is democratic or non democratic, (2) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, (3) In some circumstances an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic one, (8) Don’t know.” In Graph III.56 a solid preference for democracy as a form of government can be appreciated (66.3%), while 11.9% of respondents prefer an authoritarian government, 9.7% think that it doesn’t matter if the government is democratic or authoritarian, and 12.1% don’t know.

Graph III.56 Preference for Democratic Regime



A fourth question explores democratic system support, despite its problems, as opposed to other forms of government. It was asked: “ING4. Democracy might have its problems but it is better than any other kind of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree?” This question was recodified in ING4R to provide a 0 to 100 format. In Graph III.57 we see that the trend favors democracy over any other kind of government. Those with higher levels of system support express the most favorable opinions and the average is 68.8.

Graph III.57 Democracy is Better Than Any Other Form of Government



3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we have shown that the link between system support-a fundamental component of political culture-and political stability has been increasing in El Salvador at a sustained and significant rate between 1995 and 2004. According to the multiple regression analysis, there are six system support predictors: ideology (left-right scale), perception of gang presence in the neighborhood, trust in the judicial system to punish the guilty, evaluation of the President, opinion of democracy in the country, and evaluation of the economic situation of the country.

Additionally, the data has shown that political tolerance, a fundamental component of democratic political culture, has risen between 1995 and 1999, but was significantly reduced between 1999 and 2004. According to the multiple regression analysis, there are seven predictors of tolerance: educational level, gender, ideology (left-right scale), personal possessions in the home, consequences of the war, evaluation of the President, and the degree of satisfaction with the current democracy.

Using the theoretical framework, the analysis sought to explore the interrelation between system support and political tolerance. To do so, both variables have been dichotomized and four possible combinations were created. The distribution of those surveyed in these four different boxes was as follows: 32% were found in the stable democracy cell, 35% were in the stable authoritarianism category, 17% were in the category of unstable democracy, and 16% were in the category of democratic collapse.

Finally, the survey data showed strong support for democracy as a form of government: 73.4% of those surveyed preferred the current system of government while 18.3% would have eventually liked to see a return to military leadership; 91.1% preferred democratic elections while 5.3% would have supported a strong leader; and 66.3% preferred democracy as a form of government while 11.9% preferred an authoritarian government, 9.7% said it didn't matter whether the government is democratic or authoritarian and 21.1% didn't know. On a scale of 0 to 100, 68.8 is the average number of the Salvadorans that think that democracy is better than any other form of government.

4.0 Corruption and Democracy

Corruption is one of the most serious problems currently facing Latin American democracies. In recent years, public awareness about the importance of this subject has increased and, more and more, political efforts are being made to address this problem. At the end of 2003, 95 countries signed an initiative under the United Nations International Convention against Corruption. The treaty was signed by all of the countries in Latin America except Honduras. The convention condemns crimes such as bribery, misappropriation of public funds, traffic of influences, illicit accumulation of wealth, money laundering, and cover ups, among others. It also stipulates that not only will the acts themselves be considered criminal, but also condemns any support for these corrupt acts, such as obstruction of justice in related investigations. This convention is the first instrument designed to address the affliction of corruption. It is complemented by the efforts of other international groups, such as the Organization of American States, that are working towards the same end.

In fact, debates held during the last General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) addressed this serious problem. In the opening discussion, Ecuadorian President Lucio Gutiérrez emphasized that corruption, which he characterized as a “social pathology”, discredits social development and democracy. After correctly stating that this affliction diverts resources that should be applied to development and to achieving greater well being for the people, Gutiérrez made a call to “direct maximum efforts to strengthening the hemispheric mechanism to debate this evil and, if necessary, to create new mechanisms in which all nations commit to tracking down crimes of corruption beyond borders.”

El Salvador is not exempt from the problem of corruption. According to the 2003 index of perceived corruption published by “Transparency International”, El Salvador scored 3.7 on a scale of 1 to 10 in which 10 is the highest level of transparency and 1 is the highest level of corruption. This places El Salvador in position number 61 in the worldwide transparency ranking, below Latin American countries such as Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Cuba and Colombia but above the majority of the countries in Central America. In fact, El Salvador’s neighboring countries have scores lower than 3. Nevertheless, when compared with the 2001 index, we see that El Salvador has improved very little in this period of time. In 2001, El Salvador scored 3.6 and its gain in the perception of the international community with respect to transparency over the course of two years was one tenth.

However, corruption does not seem to be seen as a serious problem for the majority of the citizens living in the country. Multiple public opinion surveys show that the majority of citizens relegate corruption to a secondary position behind those problems that they consider more urgent, such as crime and the economy. Additionally, a recent study on corruption in El Salvador found that a good part of the population, especially those with less education and fewer resources, did not even have a clear idea of what corruption and the lack of transparency mean in terms of public and private management. When asked about the meaning of corruption, more than 25% of the citizens linked corruption to problems of criminality, lack of public safety, and gangs. There were others who said that corruption is a problem of sexual morality. The investigation showed this understanding has strong implications for the way in which people address the problem of corruption or how they evaluate institutional management that addresses this problem. The same

investigation showed that many citizens positively evaluated the government's transparency given that the government was "applying the iron fist to corrupt criminals."

The effects of corruption are felt not only at the State level. Corruption also has an impact on other areas that ultimately affect a country's development. That is why corruption is now identified as an obstacle in the process of consolidating democracy. Disillusionment with democracy can result in different responses, including the decline of the political party system, threats to the ability to govern, the imminent return of authoritarianism, and an insecure, fragile, and violent social setting. These different responses have, in one way or another, made their appearance in the last decade in different Latin American countries and have usually been identified as products of poverty, underdevelopment, an authoritarian cultural tradition, and socioeconomic inequality. It is not until recently that corruption has been discovered as "another danger" to democracy.

The objective of this chapter is to examine the daily impact that corruption has on the development of a political culture that supports democracy. The fundamental thesis behind this is that corruption erodes citizens' trust in the political system, not only in vague terms, but also in very specific ways. This is not the first study in El Salvador on the subject of corruption. Valuable projects have explored the transparency problem in this Central American country, some of which have had very innovative and interesting perspectives including a study on transparency in the State budgets. Nevertheless, the study that is presented in these pages constitutes one of the few studies that attempts to empirically link corruption-which is measured by victimization due to bribery and illegal payment-with democratic stability. The study builds on Seligson's findings in different Latin American countries, utilizing the surveys created by the Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University, which found that people who have been victims of corruption tend to show lower levels of system support.


This chapter presents the El Salvador corruption study results and divides the information in the following manner: The first section presents the results that refer to the perception held by Salvadorans about corruption. The second section explores levels of corruption in the country based on a battery of questions about victimization due to corruption. The third section identifies the characteristics of victims of corruption and the final section examines the empirical relationship between legitimacy and corruption.

4.1 Perception of the Magnitude of Corruption

In beginning to explore the results of this study, it is important to examine the perception that Salvadorans have about the level of corruption that exists in the country. To this end, the following question was formulated: "EXC7. Taking your experience into account, corruption among public officers is: very widespread, somewhat widespread, not very widespread, or not at all wide spread?" The results that can be seen in Graph V.1 reveal that more than one third of the population (36%) believes that corruption is very widespread; another important percentage of people (31.6%) believes that it is somewhat widespread; 26.5% consider corruption to be not very widespread among Salvadoran public officers; and only 6% say that it is not at all widespread.


It is necessary to point out that these results do not constitute an indicator of corruption but do constitute the magnitude with which people see the problem of corruption in El Salvador. This is important because political behavior is often based on perceptions rather than reality.

Graph IV.1 How Widespread is Corruption Among Public Officers?



What do these results mean? Could it be that Salvadorans perceive greater corruption than the rest of their neighbors in the region? In order to compare opinions about the extent of corruption that exists in El Salvador, a 0 to 100 scale was created based on the results of the previous question. For this scale, 0 represents the citizens who do not perceive widespread corruption among State functionaries while 100 represents those citizens that perceive high levels of corruption. The result of this exercise shows that the average perceived corruption in El Salvador is 65.8 which, when placed in a comparative perspective with results of studies done in Central America, Colombia and Mexico, turns out to be the lowest number in the area, as is seen in Graph IV.2.


Graph IV.2 Perception of Corruption in a Comparative Perspective



As we can see, in all of the countries in the region there is greater perceived lack of probity in the State than there is in El Salvador. Under no logic does this mean that El Salvador is the least corrupt country in the area. It only means that the citizens of this small Central American country do not detect the same magnitude of corruption in public management as do its neighbors. In Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia, on the other hand, the perception of corruption is much higher. What is at the root of this phenomenon? It probably has to do with the level of probity that Salvadorans assign to the problem of corruption. In fact, when citizens were asked about the country's principal problems, only 1.3 pointed to corruption as a severe national problem. The majority of the Salvadoran citizens seem to be paying more attention to problems other than corruption. However, this information does not mean that corruption is not a problem in El Salvador or that there are not citizens who are genuinely concerned by this affliction. The results, placed in a comparative perspective, recognize that in this country corruption is perceived with less magnitude than in the rest of the countries in which this survey on political culture was carried out.

Returning to the data from El Salvador, what is it that makes the citizenry perceive high or low levels of corruption? The survey offers clues to understand this dynamic of public opinion. In the first place, the results indicate that perception of corruption depends, in part, on how well informed its citizens are. As we see in Graph IV.3, perception about the lack of transparency among public officials is concurrent with the level of knowledge that those individuals have about issues of political order. Those who have higher levels of knowledge tend to see greater corruption while those who have lower levels of knowledge about political issues do not perceive there to be corruption in the country.


Graph IV.3 Perception of Corruption According to Level of Political Knowledge



This information is logical if we consider that beyond direct experiences of victimization-which will be explored-people form their opinions based on the information that they have about public issues. This knowledge does not come out of nowhere. While information that contributes to knowledge about political issues comes from various sources, the media constitutes one of the fundamental sources. For this reason, the relationship between perceived corruption in El Salvador and the consumption of media news was explored. In this case, the fundamental hypothesis is that people that have greater exposure to the news and follow the news are more likely to perceive corruption than those who do not follow any news. To carry out this analysis, two items in the questionnaire were used to collect information about the frequency with which people tend to watch, listen or read the news via television, radio, or newspaper.


The results demonstrate an interesting phenomenon. Whether or not one listens to radio news makes no difference with respect to the magnitude of perceived corruption in El Salvador. However, receiving news from the newspaper and television did create conditions that made a difference (see Graph IV.4 and Graph IV.5). The link is statistically significant in both cases, but especially when the information is received from the newspaper.

Graph IV.4 Perception of Corruption According to the Frequency With Which the Person Surveyed Reads the News



In both cases, following the news on television and via the newspaper leads to increased perception of corruption. This data suggests that the perception about lack of transparency on the part of State officials depends, in some respects, on how much people follow national public events through television and the newspaper, but not via the radio. This likely influences the level of public discussion that exists in El Salvador with regards to the problem of corruption.


Graph IV.5 Perception of Corruption According to Frequency With Which Person Surveyed Watches the News on Television



However, perceived corruption among public officials is not only found to be related to the level of political knowledge and to the attention that citizens give to printed or TV news. It is also found to be related with other conditions. For example, the research found that place of residence-urban or rural, large city or small town-affects the way in which Salvadorans perceive

corruption. Graph IV.6 reveals that corruption is perceived to be higher in the metropolitan area of the country, San Salvador, than in any other city or type of city. It also reveals that in the rural zones, inhabitants tend to perceive less corruption than in any other location in the country.

Graph IV.6 Perception of Corruption According to City Size



Obviously this has to do with the quantity of information that flows in each of these zones. Usually those who live in large cities, and especially in the capital, tend to have greater access to information. It is therefore very important to consider the location where people live in order to understand their perception of corruption.

4.2 Levels of Corruption

As it has been pointed out, perception is very distinct from the actual phenomenon of corruption itself. Sometimes these two things equal one another, but not necessarily: there can be a lot of corruption but little perception of this corruption because it has been well disguised or because there is a lack of sensitivity to this problem. Or, there might be great concern about corruption due to intense public discussion on the subject but the levels of corruption are actually lower than the perceived levels.


The survey proposed to investigate not only the perceived corruption in El Salvador, but also the real levels of one expressions of corruption by using a battery of items to collect information about experiences of bribery or illegal payments in diverse arenas of daily activity. It is important to point out that corruption does not only refer to bribery or illegal payments. In reality, corruption is much more than this. It can include traffic of influences, illicit garnering of wealth, illegal payments, clientelism, etc. But for the scope and goal of a study of this kind, corruption is measured based on the frequency that people are victims of acts of bribery during the course of the year prior to taking the survey.

The survey included a battery of questions to measure direct personal experience with acts of corruption. The questions were presented in the following manner:

Now we would like to talk about your personal experience with some things that happen in life . . .	No	Yes	Don't Know	Doesn't Apply
EXC1. During the past year, have you been accused by a police officer of an infraction that you did not commit?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe during the past year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
EXC6. Has a public employ solicited a bribe from you during the past year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
EXC11. Have you gone to the municipal government during the past year? [If the respondent answers “no” fill in a 9, if they say “yes” ask the following question.] In order to carry out any procedure at the municipal government (such as asking for an authorization) during the past year, have you had to pay any amount of money beyond that which is required by law?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC13. Do you work? [If the respondent answers “no” fill in a 9, if they say “yes” ask the following question.] At your place of work, have you been asked for any kind of illegal payment during the past year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC14. During the past year, have you had any experience with the courts? [If the respondent answers “no” fill in a 9, if they say “yes” ask the following question.] Have you had to pay any kind of bribe in the courts during the past year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC15. Have you used public health services during the past year? [If the respondent answers “no” fill in a 9, if they say “yes” ask the following question.] Have you had to pay a bribe in order to receive care in a hospital or health clinic during the past year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
EXC16. Have you had a child in school during the past year? [If the respondent answers “no” fill in a 9, if they say “yes” ask the following question.] During the past year have you had to pay a bribe to anyone at the school?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)

All of the questions refer to acts of bribery that the person surveyed could have faced during the year prior to this inquiry. However, with the exception of the first three items (EXC1, EXC2, EXC4), which were applied to all of those who were surveyed, the majority of the items (EXC11 to EXC16) were applied only to those who had contact with the determined offices to utilize government services. The results of those questions and the actual influence of the acts of corruption depend on how frequently these institutions are visited; in other words, it depends in part on how much contact the citizens have with them. For example, if someone doesn't have a child in school, they will not be a victim of an illegal school payment. But anyone who walks down the street and is stopped by the police could be a victim of bribery or false accusation. These considerations should be taken into account when interpreting the following results.

Graph IV.7 Experiences With Corruption in El Salvador




The results indicate that the most common experiences with corruption (in this case bribery) in El Salvador during the course of a year are: bribery in the courts (8.6%); bribery in the schools (8.3%); illegal payments in the health system (7.9%); and bribery in the municipal government (7.7%). These cases affect only those who use the corresponding services, but given the magnitude of their utilization, it is fair to say that the problem is by no means insignificant. Corruption is less frequent on the street, at the hands of police or other public officials, but this is not to imply that the measure of this corruption is not also of concern.

Moreover, items that refer to treatment by the police or other public officials showed results that reveal that the influence of corruption has increased as compared to 1999. During that year, 4% of the people said that they were a victim of bribery from a public official **sometime during the past two years** and 3% were victims of police bribery during this same period of time. If we take into account that the current survey restricts the period to only one year, it is fair to say that victimization due to corruption has doubled over the course of five years.

Consolidating all of the experiences of corruption measured in the survey, we see that a total of 18% of all Salvadorans have suffered some type of corruption during the course of a year, which means that almost one in five Salvadorans are victims of bribery during the course of a year.

Regional comparisons made via the framework of the study which included the other Central American countries, Colombia, and Mexico, shows however that El Salvador is not among the countries with the highest levels of corruption. It is one of the least corrupt countries in terms of levels of victimization due to corruption when compared with its Central American neighbors. However, it is important to recognize the differences among most of these countries are minimal and the only countries with any notable differences are Mexico with a high level of victimization (33.5%) and Costa Rica and Colombia with lower levels (15.4% and 15.3% respectively).

Graph IV.8 Victimization Due to Corruption by Country




4.2.1 Victims of Corruption

Who are the most frequent victims of corruption? In order to respond to this question, a linear regression was carried out in order to identify the variables that predict whether or not someone will be a victim of corruption. As a dependent variable, a scale that integrated the different victimizations due to corruption was created with frequency of acts during the course of a year. The contained variable started with those who didn't suffer corruption (expressed as 0) to moved to the maximum experience with corruption (expressed as 5).

The regression results indicate that the characteristics of those who are most frequently victims (see Table IV.1 in Appendix B) include men, younger in age, with greater resources (measured as personal possessions in the home), are employed, and live in neighborhoods where it is perceived that the police are involved in crime.


How are these differences expressed in practice? Utilizing the condition of whether or not one has been a victim of corruption at least once during the past year, the results indicate that 22% of men and 14% of women were victims of corruption (see Graph IV.9). These differences are probably due to the fact that men tend to have more relationships with institutions than women: they are on the street more, are more susceptible to police accusations, and, in general lead a life that takes them more frequently into public spaces.

Graph IV.9 Victimization Due to Corruption According to Gender



Graph IV.10 shows that victimization due to corruption has a strong relationship with age. As the regression results point out, young people are most likely to be victims of corruption in El Salvador and for this reason are more vulnerable to abuses by public officials and the police. To what do we credit this trend? The answer can probably be discovered looking more closely at older people as opposed to young people. Just as the results reveal that young people are more likely to be victims of corruption, it also reveals that those who are older are less likely to be victims of corruption. This is probably due to the fact that they have greater capacity to handle and challenge public officials than young people. Those who are older are less easily intimidated and their life experience gives them the tools to overcome problems of abuse.

Graph IV.10 Victimization Due to Corruption According to Age Range




The results also show that those who have greater resources in their home and who are employed tend to more frequently be victims of corruption. The explanation of this seems to be very

logical: corruption happens based on the possibility of obtaining resources from the victim. It is difficult to inflict corruption on a victim with few resources because they have nothing to offer. Personal possessions in the home and the employment status of the individual are indicators of possession of resources, which in turn make the person more susceptible to victimization.

But, based on the regression exercise, the variable that turned out to be significant for understanding the phenomenon of corruption was that which collected information on the perception of the role of the police in the community. This variable is based on the following question: “AOJ18. Some people say that the police of this neighborhood (town) protect people against robbers while others say that the police are involved in crime. What do you think?”

The results shown in Graphic IV.11 reveal that where the police are seen as being associated with crime, people report more cases of victimization than in the places where the police are seen as a body to protect citizens. This obviously has strong implications on the efforts of institutions such as the police. Above all, it shows that the possibility of being the victim of corruption is intimately linked with what is happening and with the perception that people have about those institutions whose job it is to maintain compliance with the law.

Graph IV.11 Victimization Due to Corruption According to the Perception of the Police’s Role in the Community



4.3 Recognition of Corruption

The El Salvador research included a series of items to measure not only the perception of corruption or the actual victimization due to corruption, but also the ability to recognize the presence of corruption. It is usually said that corruption is a problem of public officials, but this overlooks-without minimizing the officials’ responsibility in this problem-that there is a tacit acceptance of corruption by some citizens. That is to say that corruption does not only involve the acts themselves, it also involves the attitudes and the way in which the society interprets these acts of corruption.

Four items were utilized with the goal of measuring these activities, the wording of these reactivities are shown below.

<i>I would like for you to indicate how you view the following actions: (1)Corrupt and should be punished; (2) Corrupt but justifiable under the circumstances; (3) Not corrupt</i>
DC10. A mother with several children has to get a birth certificate for one of her children. So as not to wait in the long line, she pays 20 colons extra to a municipal public employee. Do you think that what this woman did is: (1) Corrupt and should be punished (2) Corrupt but justifiable under the circumstances (3) Not corrupt (8) Don't know
DC13. An important public official has a brother-in-law who is unemployed. The official uses his leverage to find a public position for his brother-in-law. Do you think that this politician is: (1) Corrupt and should be punished (2) Corrupt but justifiable under the circumstances (3) Not corrupt (8) Don't know
EDC14. A person goes to a doctor for a check-up. After the examination the doctor tells the person that she can go to the public hospital where he works to have some tests run but she will have to pay him personally for these tests. He will make sure that the tests are done quickly and they will be cheaper than they would have been if they were carried out in a private clinic. Do you think that this doctor is: (1) Corrupt and should be punished (2) Corrupt but justifiable under the circumstances (3) Not corrupt (8) Don't know
EDC15. Given that salaries of public school teachers are very low, the principal of the school establishes a monthly school fee which has not been officially approved with the goal of raising his/her salary and the salaries of the teachers in order to increase their motivation in the workplace. Do you think that the principal is: (1) Corrupt and should be punished (2) Corrupt but justifiable under the circumstances (3) Not corrupt (8) Don't know


As we see in Table IV.2, the first conclusion drawn from the results is that not all people see acts of corruption as being corrupt. The second conclusion is that there are differences in the way people identify corruption from one act to another. For example, 17.9% of the population believes that a public official who receives an additional payment to get a birth certificate quickly is not committing an act of corruption. For almost 29% it is also not corrupt to find work through a family member that holds a position of power in the government. For 15.2%, it is not an act of corruption to pay extra money to have medical exams done outside of the institutional procedures. And for less than 15%, the fact that a principal charges illegal fees to improve the salaries at his/her school is also not an act of corruption. On the flip side of this coin, 82.1% of those consulted do see the act of receiving extra payment for the birth certificate as being corrupt. 71.2% also define using “leverage” of a family member to find employment as corrupt. 84.9% think that receiving extra payment for medical exams is corrupt and 85.3% see corruption in the establishment of illegal fees for students. Although not all people think that these actions should be punished-and important percentages support this-the majority identify the acts as cases of corruption.

Table IV.2 Opinions About Situations of Corruption (in peRcentages)

Situation	Corrupt and should be punished	Corrupt but justifiable	Not corrupt
Pay extra to obtain a birth certificate	48.0	34.1	17.9
Use the leverage of a family member in government to get a job	44.3	26.9	28.8
Pay extra to get medical exams at the hospital	66.2	18.7	15.2
Establish illegal fees to pay school teachers' salaries	66.3	19.0	14.7


These questions were integrated into one scale whose values are defined in a range of 0 to 100 in which 0 means that the person sees an act of corruption that should be punished and 100 means that the person does not see the act as corruption. The resulting average of this scale was 30 and the analysis with different variables shows that this attitude is linked to certain characteristics of the people surveyed. The results indicate that people with less educational training don't tend to see the described practices as being corrupt and for this reason they often overlook these acts of corruption (see Graph IV.12).

Graph IV.12 Perception of Non-Corruption According to Educational Level



Similar results were found with reference to average family monthly income and the level of personal possessions in the home (see Graph IV.13). Those that have fewer resources and less income reported higher average values on the “do not perceive corruption” scale than those who have more resources and a higher family income. This phenomenon is likely due to the fact that when one is living in a precarious situation, they do not tend to see acts that may be a necessary part of their survival as corrupt. It may also be due to the lack of educational formation, which impedes their having the criteria to differentiate between what is and isn’t considered corruption.

Graph IV.13 Recognition of Corruption According to Level of Home Equipment



4.4 Corruption and Democracy

In recent years, the topic of corruption has become fundamentally relevant for understanding democratic functioning, especially in the countries that find themselves in a democratization process. Corruption is no longer simply understood as a moral problem, it is now considered to be a problem with serious implications in different aspects of social development. The economic impact of corruption is that aspect which has been most explored. Briefly, the damages provoked by corruption are directly linked to the economic sphere and are evidenced in a diversion of funds, the proven appropriation of collective resources, and in the deprivation of State resources destined for victimized sectors that were rerouted to specific projects.


Corruption, in its least perceptible form, puts democratic institutions in a vulnerable position by violating the rules of the game and by creating and maintaining networks inside and outside of State institutions. A direct consequence of corruption is the disillusionment with democracy that is generated among the citizenry. The Gallup International 2000 millennium survey that interviewed almost 57,000 people in 60 countries proved that where there was greater corruption, there was a greater disillusionment with democracy.

Usually the link between democracy and corruption is established in a theoretical manner. When it has been established using empirical information, it has been done by examining levels of perceived corruption in the country-usually through the Transparency International index-and the greater or lesser democratic conditions of the country in question. Additionally, when attempts have been made to link corruption at an individual level with support that citizens offer to their political regimes, it has been based more heavily on perception indicators rather than actual cases of corruption.

In response to these gaps, Seligson developed a way to measure the impact of corruption on democracy by linking a direct measure of victimization due to corruption with the political system support index at an individual level. Seligson bases his work on the supposition that system support-legitimacy-is a fundamental requirement for democratic stability, especially in Latin America where there is a long history of political instability. The fundamental hypothesis is that those who have most suffered corruption are least likely to express political system support as opposed to those who have not been victims of corruption. In practice, this link has been proven by studies done by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt in Nicaragua, Bolivia, Paraguay, El Salvador and Ecuador and it appears to be confirmed by the new generation of figures that are implied in the present survey.

Indeed, the data suggests that corruption has a significant impact on different levels of institutional organization and the political system. In the first place, when one has been the victim of corruption it erodes their trust in justice-sector institutions-the courts, the solicitor's office, the attorney general, and the police-and their call to comply with the law. It also erodes, by the same magnitude, trust towards all government institutions (see Graph IV.14). This means that corruption, measured as events of victimization, does not only affect the credibility of the institutions charged with following the law; it also affects the credibility of all State institutions.


Graph IV.14 Trust in Institutions According to Corruption Victimization



This is related to one of the previously-explained findings: people that live in neighborhoods where the police are perceived to be linked with crime tend to be victims of corruption with greater frequency. What this really tells us is that the results demonstrate a strong link between corruption and the fulfillment of tasks and institutional trust.


But the theoretically most important impact is not the erosion of trust towards specific institutions, but rather the erosion of trust of all political institutions in the country and the legitimacy of the system provoked by corruption. Additionally, corruption causes people to feel unsatisfied with the democratic functioning of the regime. Graph IV.15 shows that people who have not been victims of corruption tend to exhibit a greater level of system support. On the other hand, those who have been victims of corruption show lower levels of system support.

Graph IV.15 System Support According to Corruption Victimization



Additionally, having been a victim of corruption significantly affects the level of satisfaction with democratic functioning and feelings about the degree of democracy that exist in the country.

Graph IV.16 Satisfaction With Democracy According to Corruption Victimization



One result illustrates the complexity of how citizens deal with corruption has to do with political tolerance (scale of questions D1, D2, D3 and D4) and the victimization due to corruption. Contrary to what happened with the system support index or with the trust in institutions, in the case of tolerance the relationship goes the other way: when there is victimization due to corruption, the level of political tolerance expressed by the citizens increases and, on the other hand, those who have not suffered bribery demonstrate lower levels of tolerance.

To what do we owe this phenomenon? There are no elements that allow us to interpret this in a satisfactory way. Most likely, experiences with corruption provoke attitudes of greater complaisance with the political world. But this should not hinder corruption from being seen as an affliction that must be effectively combated.

4.5 Conclusions

In this chapter we have examined the results related to corruption and transparency as a part of this survey about political culture in El Salvador. The investigation points out that although more than 67% of the country's adult population perceives a little or a lot of corruption among officials, El Salvador is not the place with the highest levels of perceived corruption. On the contrary, in this small Central American country there are fewer people who notice corruption in public management than in the rest of the countries in the region included in the study. This is probably due to the low importance that, in general, people give this topic on the national agenda. Nevertheless, the data shows that approximately 18% of the people have been victims of corruption during the year prior to the study and that the most frequent type of corruption is bribery in the courts, taking into account only those who have had contact with the courts.

Additionally, a comparison of these results with data from previous studies shows that the reported victimization due to corruption has increased in the last five years, at least with respect to the police.

Those who tend to be victims of corruption with most frequency are young men who have resources and who live in communities where the police are seen as being involved with crime. Finally, the results of the study show that the topic of corruption is important for the legitimacy of the institutional and political systems. People who have been victimized are less likely to support the


5.0 Crime and Democracy

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), Latin America and the Caribbean is the region with the most social and criminal violence in the world. As opposed to other parts of the world such as Africa or the Middle East where violence is prevalent due to civil wars, in Latin America violence comes essentially from criminal and socially-conflictive activities and has been on the rise for many years. The WHO data records the Latin American homicide rate at 27.5 murders per 100,000 inhabitants for the year 2000; this same data shows the worldwide average at 8.8 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

Nevertheless, violence in Latin America has substantial differences among and within the countries. For many years, Colombia has been considered to be the most violent country in the region with a homicide rate of more than 80 murders per 100,000 inhabitants while Chile and Uruguay have rates of less than 5 murders per 100,000 people. A study supported by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in the mid 1990s found that El Salvador had had homicide rates of more than 100 murders per 100,000 inhabitants. Another IDB publication reported that in the years following the Peace Accords, Guatemala's rate reached almost 150 violent assassinations per 100,000 inhabitants. A recent report published by the United Nations Development Program on democracy in Latin America reported that the homicide rate in Honduras in 1999 reached 154 murders per 100,000 inhabitants. A publication of the Pan American Health Organization in 2003 showed that in the first part of the 21st century, Honduras, Colombia, Guatemala and El Salvador had the highest homicide rates in Latin America, with numbers greater than 40 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In any case, the three northern countries of Central America seem to form a triangular zone of violence that is without comparison in any other part of the world with the possible exception of Colombia.

The persistence of violent crime in El Salvador is neither an isolated nor singular phenomenon. It is not unrelated to other exhibitions of violence, nor does it represent a sudden and momentary appearance of social conflict. El Salvador is a violent country, not only because it tends to have more intentionally planned deaths than in the majority of countries on the planet, but also because there tend to be many more unplanned acts of violence-accidents such as those defined by the World Health Organization-occurring with greater frequency than in most other countries in the Americas. And that is not all. The country is violent not only because the indexes for crime and common and political violence have increased in the post-war years. But, to the point to which we are able to scrutinize the available statistics, the country had higher violence rates before the war started when compared to prevailing levels of violence in the region (see Graph V.1). Salvadoran violence is part of a much broader phenomenon that takes into account other spheres of social behavior. It has not come up by chance or as a product of the civil war.

Graph V.1 Homicide Rates Between 1969 and 1999 in El Salvador and Latin America



Traditionally, the study of factors that influence democratic consolidation processes have focused on transition modes and on the level of economic growth and development in a country. During recent years however, new voices have appeared that call attention to other factors that affect democratic consolidation such as State corruption and violence and lack of safety. These new factors of generalized corruption and high levels of violence and lack of safety effect democracy, and especially an emerging democracy, by eroding the political culture that would otherwise support it. One the one hand, people facing these problems are often tempted to support authoritarian and repressive alternatives that put the fundamental principles of freedom and democratic rights at risk. On the other hand, citizens lose their trust in the institutions that form the political system, not only as specific support but also as diffuse support, according to Easton’s terminology.

In fact, two independent studies published simultaneously in different academic journals, using the database of the Latin America Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University found that direct victimization due to crime and the sensation of lack of safety affect political system support levels in Guatemala and El Salvador. One of these studies also incorporated data analysis from Nicaragua, but in the case of this Central American country-which has lower levels of violence than its neighbors to the north-effects on system support was the direct result of having been affected by a crime.


Just as corruption has become a fundamental subject in the regional countries’ abilities to govern, violence and lack of safety are phenomena that cannot be evaded in the study of democratic stability. Therefore, this chapter presents the results of the questionnaire related to the impacts of victimization due to crime-measured as direct victimization from an act of crime-and the resulting insecurity for democracy and the state of law in El Salvador. First the results referring to victimization will be described: who are the most frequent victims, their behavior in denouncing crime, and the link of victimization to trust in the system. Secondly, this chapter presents the results related to the population’s perceived lack of personal safety and its link to system support. The chapter ends with a few brief conclusions.

5.1 The Problem of Crime in El Salvador: Victimization Due to Crime

More than 30% of the Salvadorans interviewed for the survey said that the principal problem in the country is criminal violence, youth gangs, and lack of safety. This figure, which is taken from the very beginning of the survey, creates a guideline for understanding the importance of the phenomenon of criminal violence in El Salvador. There is a clear difference between the results established in this study and the information drawn from the questions in the last chapter about corruption, which seemed to generate very little citizen concern.

For this reason when the citizens were asked “Have you been a victim of physical aggression or some kind of crime during the past 12 months?” (VIC1), it is not surprising that 17.1% answered yes. This means that one in five Salvadorans had been a victim of crime during the course of just one year. Nevertheless, when comparing these results with corresponding data obtained from the Auditing report on El Salvador’s democracy in 1999, the general index of victimization recorded by the surveys had gone down. During 1999, the percentage of people that had been victimized by violent crime reached 22%; in 2004 it was five points lower.

Graph V.2 Victimization Due to Crime in a Comparative Perspective




However, this information does negate the fact that El Salvador, as indicated by other sources, has one of the highest rates of violence in the world. When comparing the victimization figures from the Latin America Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University surveys in 2004, we see that El Salvador has the highest percentage of victims in Central America and the second highest number in the Mesoamerican region, being surpassed only by Mexico. This percentage is not surprising given that all of the sources coincide in pointing out the magnitude of the problem in El Salvador. It should be pointed out that what is surprising are the low percentages of victimization present in Guatemala and Honduras, the other two most violent countries in the area. One way to understand these figures and the differences from other sources might have to do with the type of crime committed in the countries. The majority of statistics on violence are based on rates of homicide and crimes against life. Although some if this is collected through the

question about victimization that is used in this survey, it is clear that the majority of acts registered refer to crimes against property that do not always show the same behavior and magnitude as those shown by homicides or injuries.


In fact, when using the results of question VIC2 to examine the kinds of crimes that were suffered by those surveyed, the data shows a preponderance of property crimes: almost 50% of the crimes were unarmed robberies and almost 10% were home robberies or property damage. This obviously helps to establish a typology with respect to the seriousness of the crime as not all crimes are equal, not only terms of the act but also in terms of how they affect the victim. Crimes against life, such as homicide, sexual assault, and aggression, leave a much stronger mark on the victims than robberies or assaults, which do not compromise physical integrity.

Graph V.3 Crimes Suffered by Those Who Have Been Victimized by Crime



Reclassification of the information based on the seriousness of the crime results in the distribution exhibited in Graph V.4. More than 82% of those surveyed did not suffer any type of victimization, at least during the course of one year, while more than 10% suffered mild types of victimization and 6.7% suffered severe victimization. This categorization will be useful later to measure the impact of victimization on specific social attitudes.

Graph V.4 Victimization Due to Crime in El Salvador



5.1.1 Who are the Most Common Victims of Crime?


Not everyone suffers violence in the same way or with the same magnitude. The development of criminology and victimology has pointed out the importance of identifying the most frequent characteristics of those who become victims of crime. In this investigation, the characteristics of those who are most likely to be victims of crime was established by running a binary logistic regression with personal and context variables, which were also considered important to describe the possible victim.

In the end, the results indicate that the people who are most likely to suffer aggression or an act of violent crime are men, with higher levels of education, with a high level of personal possessions in the home, that live in the city of San Salvador (the capital), that inhabit neighborhoods where the police are perceived to be involved with crime and in neighborhoods where those surveyed perceive gang presence.

These results are in accordance with those indicated by the majority of studies on victimization and particularly those that have been carried out in El Salvador. Age was the only variable that wasn't significant that had previously been useful to predict victimization in this Central American country. Even still, in analyzing age in an individual manner, it was found that age does have statistical significance and that those who are younger tend to be more frequent victims of crime.

How then do we explain that the age variable does not appear in the regression? This is probably due to its interaction with other variables that cause it to lose its statistical weight. However, this does not deny that young people tend to be more frequently victimized than their older compatriots.


Graph V.5 Victimization Due to Crime According to Age Range



One variable that did turn out to be robust in the individual analysis as well as in the regression analysis is the educational level of those surveyed. Crime, as it has been measured here, usually affects those who have more years of education, such that the more education they have, the more likely they are to be victimized (see Graph V.6). Criminality affects one third of those with higher education.


Similarly, personal possessions in the home also turned out to be an important variable associated with victimization: the more personal possessions one has in the home, the greater the level of victimization. This trend indicates that victimization due to crime tends to affect those who are in a better social position and have resources. This has to do with the simple fact that economically-motivated violence tends to have a greater effect on those who have the wealth that make a criminal act beneficial.

Graph V.6 Victimization Due to Crime According to Educational Level



One variable that turned out to be very interesting in the distribution of victims is that which refers to the size of location in which the person surveyed lives. The data suggests that those who live in the San Salvador Metropolitan Area, the capital where two thirds of the country's residents reside, are usually more affected by criminal violence than those who live in the rest of the country, especially those who live in rural zones. As we can see in Graph V.7, victimization due to crime in the metropolitan area affects 29.5% of the population, while in the majority of other cities victimization is around 20% and in the rural zone it is 9.6%.

Graph V.7 Victimization Due to Crime According to City Size




5.1.2 Crime Reporting

37.5% of those victimized reported the crime that they suffered. This percentage is rather low if one considers the level of victimization in El Salvador. The majority of people do not report crime to security and justice institutions. However, the level of denunciation is not the same for all crimes. Some acts of crime are reported more frequently than others. For example, crimes such as physical aggression and robbery in the home are reported a little more than 50% of the time; on the other hand robberies are not reported by more than one third of the population.

Is this an indicator of the low levels of trust in security and justice institutions in the system? Judging by responses of those who said that they decided not to report the crime, the answer is yes. Almost half of the people who didn't report the crime (47.5%) said that they didn't do so because it wouldn't do any good; 19.7% referred to the risk of repercussions implied by reporting a crime; 18% argued that they had no proof; and 10.4% said that the crime wasn't that serious and for that reason they decided not to report it. The rest of the people gave other answers or preferred not to answer the question.

On the other hand, victims that decided to denounce the crime did so primarily with the National Civilian Police (92.1%). The rest of those surveyed reported the crime to the Attorney General's Office or another institution.

Graph V.8 Percentage of Reports According to the Type of Crime Suffered



5.1.3 Victimization and Trust in the System

As mentioned earlier, the number of crimes that remain unreported can be an indicator of the lack of trust that the victimized population has in its institutions. Analyzing the impact that victimization due to crime has on trust in the justice system and general institutions further confirms this statement.

One of the questions that was included in the survey asked about people’s trust in the ability of the justice system to punish those guilty of robbery or assault. In general terms, close to 53% of the population responded by saying that they had little or no trust in the justice system to punish the guilty. Placing this on a scale of 0 to 100 comparing victims and non-victims, the results show that people who were victims of crime during the year prior to the survey have a lot less trust in the system than those who were not victims of crime (see Graph V.9).


But we cannot reduce the impact of victimization to this one element. In general, the impact of crime has effects on the justice system and on other institutions that are a part of the greater system. People that have not been victims of criminal violence have more trust in the group of institutions in the justice sector and also in institutions in general. Those who have faced an act of crime express much less trust in institutions such as the police, the attorney general, the courts, and the solicitor general’s office, and also with institutions that in principal have nothing to do with the application of justice or the prosecution of the crime: the electoral tribunal, political parties, the municipal government, etc.

Table V.2 Trust in the Institutions According to Victimization Due to Crime

Victim of crime	Trust in diverse institutional levels		
	Trust that the system will punish the guilty	Trust in justice institutions	Trust in institutions in general
No	53	60	59
Yes	40	54	55

There is another impact of victimization that is not always visible—that which relates to the willingness of citizens to comply with the law. Citizens were asked: “AOJ9. When there are serious suspicions about the criminal activities of a person, do you think that the police should wait for a court order to be able to enter the home of the suspect or should the police be able to enter the suspect’s home without a judicial order?” The results of the survey indicate that the people who were victims of crime were more inclined to allow the authorities to supercede the law in order to fight crime: 40% of those who were victims of “slight” crimes and 44% of those who were victims of severe crimes. Thus, criminality generates conditions in which people approve extra-legal activities on the part of the authorities, which further contributes to the erosion of the institutional structure.

Graph V.9 Approval of Unlawful Entry According to Victimization Due to Crime



But we cannot reduce the impact of crime to this element; it also reaches the broader level of system support and satisfaction with democratic functioning. At the same time it paradoxically affects levels of citizen tolerance in a totally different way (see Table V.3).

Table V.3 Average Satisfaction With Democracy, System Support and Political Tolerance According to Victimization Due to Crime

Victim of crime	Satisfaction with democratic functioning	System support	Tolerance
No	55	60	51
Yes	49	55	57

Those who have been victims of criminal violence distrust institutions but further distrust the entire institutional nature of the political system more than those who have not experienced a


traumatic criminal event. If that were not enough, when citizens have been victims of crime they more commonly think that democracy is not functioning adequately.

An intriguing result appears related to tolerance. According to the data, those who have been victims of crime are more tolerant than those who have not experienced the trauma of violence exercised against them. There doesn't seem to be any explanation of this phenomenon, especially if we take into account the fact that criminality affects trust in institutions (as we will see further on in the document).

5.2 Sensation of Lack of Safety Due to Crime

The analysis of the impact of criminal violence on the institutional nature of the country would be incomplete if we did not take into account another important variable: citizens' lack of safety, or rather their perceived lack of safety. In looking at an act of violence, victimization itself is important at an objective level. But subjectively it is also very important to look at the lack of safety. More than one question was included in the questionnaire to explore the subject of lack of personal safety, but one question in particular is crucial for gaining a more exact measure. This question was formulated in the following way: "AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood in which you live and thinking about the possibility of being the victim of an assault or robbery, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?"

Graph V.10 Insecurity Sensation According to Degree of Victimization



The results indicate that a little more than 42% of the people said that they feel unsafe (somewhat unsafe and very unsafe) given the possibility of crime while the rest showed that they felt safe despite the existence of crime. These perceived levels of lack of safety place El Salvador more or less at the mid-point when ranked among other countries. That is, El Salvador does not obtain levels of "sensation of lack of safety" that are higher than those of their neighbors and nor does it obtain lower levels of lack of safety.

The lack of safety that prevails in Salvadoran society depends in part on acts of victimization. As we can see in Graph V.10, greater intensity of victimization results in greater perceived lack of safety and vice versa. However, lack of safety does not only depend on the victimization itself. As the studied linear regression aimed at identifying variables related to lack of safety reveals (see Table V.4 in Appendix B), lack of safety depends on various other factors, including age, family income, trust in the institutions of the justice system, the habit of listening to the radio news, perception of gangs in the area of residence, and the perception of the role of the police in the community.

In fact, a wide range of factors explains the lack of security. This is not only related to personal variables. The regression shows the enormous contribution that environmental variables have on Salvadoran's degree of safety. Among these variables, four are worth mentioning: trust in justice sector institutions, frequency of listening to radio news, the perceived role of the police, and perceived gang presence in the community of residence.

Graph V.11 Insecurity Sensation According to Level of Trust in Justice Institutions




Graph V.11 shows that those who feel a greater lack of safety are those that have little trust in the institutions in the sector. On the other hand, those who have a high degree of trust in those institutions tend to show less lack of personal safety due to crime. This is surely related to the fact that lack of safety also depends on the perception held about the role of the police-or police officers in the community of residence. The results of the regression show that this condition has an important effect on the lack of safety.

But scientifically the greatest impact on the lack of safety comes from an interesting phenomenon of criminal violence in Central America: youth gangs. The perception of gangs in the community makes a notable difference in the feelings of safety in the population, such that much of the lack of personal safety in countries like El Salvador-that has serious youth gang


problems-should be first traced to the activity of these groups before looking at any other variable.

On the other hand, it is also interesting to note the difference for those that listen to radio news. Different from what happened with the perception of corruption (see Chapter IV), in which television and newspapers exercise a great effect on the visualization of corruption, the radio has a more notable effect in the case of lack of personal safety.

Graph V.12 Sensation of Insecurity According to Perception of Neighborhood Affected by Gangs




Graph V.13 Sensation of Insecurity According to Frequency of Listening to Radio News




How does lack of safety impact system legitimacy? The survey offers evidence that, just as with victimization, lack of public safety-or the perception thereof-determines the level of political system support and satisfaction with democratic performance in El Salvador. In Graph V.14 we see the results when these two variables are crossed. In both cases, system support and satisfaction with democracy are significantly reduced when people feel a greater lack of personal safety. Those who feel a lack of safety due to anxiety caused by gangs in the community or by corrupt police are less likely to support the political system and more likely to think that in the end, democracy doesn't do much good.

Graph V.14 System Support and Satisfaction With Democratic Performance According to Insecurity Sensation Due to Crime



The sensation of lack of personal safety also impacts citizens’ opinions about the Peace Accords. The Peace Accords represented an important event in the life of the nation and for many Salvadorans it meant the beginning of a new socio-political project that broke with the authoritarianism of the past. It is commonplace for Salvadorans to say that the Accords were good for all of these reasons, but also because they ended the war. Nevertheless, the data indicates that the sensation of lack of safety also has an effect on the way in which Salvadorans give value to the peace treaty. As people feel personally unsafe, the measure of positive opinions about the Accords diminishes substantially, such that twelve years after the signing of the peace many people evaluate the Accords based on whether or not they feel safe.

Graph V.15 Opinion about the Peace Accords According to Insecurity Sensation Due to Crime



5.3 Conclusions

This chapter has shown that the problems of crime and lack of personal safety constitute obstacles to legitimacy and democratic stability in El Salvador. Although the data indicates that victimization due to crime has gone down in the last five years, the levels of violence are still high. Those who have been most victimized by crime—specifically the kinds of crime discussed in the survey—are men, who have greater resources, living in larger urban zones in the country (especially the capital), and, above all, live in neighborhoods besieged by youth gangs and where the police are found to be linked with crime. Those who have most suffered crime tend not to believe in the country's institutions, to feel unsatisfied with what they understand as democracy, and to withhold support for the current political system.

On the other hand, the impact of criminality on the institutional system cannot merely be reduced to victimization. Similar to the effect of direct criminal violence, the perceived lack of safety also erodes the fragile democratic institutional nature of the country by debilitating the political system and trust in the institutions.

6.0 Local Government

While it is true that Latin America has a long history of governmental centralism and, as a result of this, local governments have been relegated for a long time, in recent decades there has been a reevaluation of the local arena and decentralization has been emphasized as part of the State reform process. In Tim Campbell's opinion, there is a "silent revolution" in Latin America through the "transfer of decision-making and spending power from central government to local government."

However, this process has taken on unique dynamics and characteristics in Central America. In the framework of the democratization processes of the 1980s, new constitutions that defined a legal base for municipal autonomy were promulgated in Honduras (1982), El Salvador (1983), Guatemala (1986) and Nicaragua (1987). Following this, new municipal legislation was promulgated in El Salvador (1986), Nicaragua (1988), Guatemala (1988) and Honduras (1990). Costa Rica promoted a municipal regime reform in 1998, which led to the direct elections of mayors in 2002. New Central American municipal regime legislation establishes the direct election of mayors and municipal councils and introduces specific figures to promote citizen participation in each of the countries.

Despite the fact that Central American legislation has established municipal autonomy, "both the National Assembly and the Executive try to maintain strict control over municipal governments through laws, decrees, and the review of municipal codes. In many cases, such actions violate constitutional mandates and produce internal inconsistencies, contradictions, and a substantial reduction of municipal autonomy."

In recent years, the local arena has been given new value in Central America. This is primarily due to two factors. First, the municipality has a great potential for profound democracy, given that the local government is closer to the population. Public opinion studies show that citizens positively evaluate local government and the municipality is perceived as the institution that best responds to the problems of the communities. Secondly, the municipal government is recognized for allowing increased citizen participation. However, despite this positive image and the existing potential for local government, adverse conditions continue to exist: resistance from the central government, local government's lack of skill in institutional management, the narrow scope of the legal framework, budget limitations, and the hierarchical and clientelist political cultures.

Despite the multiple proposals that have been formulated in recent decades, very few advances have been made in the Central American decentralization process. "The process of decentralizing duties, responsibilities, and State resources from the central State level to the municipalities in Central America is a process that we could define more as being in a stage of debate and experimentation than true execution. In Costa Rica the process is in the proposal and debate phase; in the cases of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua they have moved on to pilot plans, in which the governments consider decentralizing, but in reality these cases are responding to experiences of administrative decentralization and even privatization . . . Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the subject of decentralization is present on the public agenda in this area, in some cases more than others, and the way is being paved, although very slowly."

In summarizing this process, it has been pointed out that “there is no doubt that in the last few years significant steps have been taken to award more protagonism and specific weight to the municipalities and they are effectively recovering some levels of political and administrative autonomy; although this does not yet reach the necessary consistency in terms of economic and financial autonomy and the development of its technical ability to manage.”

In eight different sections, this chapter will address the attitudes and evaluations that the Salvadorans make towards their local governments. The first section examines the relationship between the citizens and specific levels of government. The second section analyzes citizen participation in the management of the municipal government. The third section examines how citizens evaluate the procedures they have carried out, the fourth section is about citizen satisfaction with municipal services. In the fifth section, we look at satisfaction with treatment received in the municipal government offices. The sixth section explores opinions about who has best responded to community problems. The seventh section addresses opinions about resource management; the eighth section looks at trust in the municipal institution; and the ninth section presents conclusions.

6.1 Relationship Between Citizens and Different Levels of Government

A previous study on citizens’ relationships with national and local government highlights the close relationship that the local government has with the citizenry based on: knowledge of the mayor’s name (51%) and the period for which the municipal council members were elected (45%). This was contrasted by the fact that only 20.1% of those surveyed knew the duration of the presidential term of office and only 18.1% of those surveyed knew the number of deputies that make up the Legislative Assembly.”

Given that these questions were not a part of the current study, the questionnaire builds on the hypothesis that local government has a close relationship with the citizenry by asking a battery of three questions in order to explore the relationship or eventual contact of those interviewed with the national government, the deputies, and the municipal government. The survey asked:

“In order to resolve a problem, have you ever asked for help or cooperation from . . .”

CP2. Any deputy of the Legislative Assembly


CP4. Any government ministry, public institution, or office of the national government

CP4A. Any municipal government office

(1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Don’t know.”


To simplify this analysis the options were recoded to a 0 to 100 format. In Graph VI.1 we can observe that on the average, 8% of those interviewed had solicited help from deputies, 11% had gone to the national government, and 31% sought out the municipal government. These figures show that, in terms of asking for help or cooperation to resolve problems, the citizenry’s closest relationship is with the local government.

Graph VI.1 Who Have You Asked for Help or Cooperation?



Population stratum turned out to be an associated factor for those who had solicited help from the municipality as we see in Graph VI.2. The inhabitants of lesser-populated municipalities (less than 20,000 and between 20,000 and 40,000) have a higher average of requests for help from the municipalities and this decreases as the municipality increases in size.


Graph VI.2 Request for Help from the Municipal Government According to Population Stratum



6.1.1 Request for Help From the Municipal Government in a Comparative Perspective

When analyzing the data obtained for the case of El Salvador in the framework of this comparative study of the Central American countries, Mexico, and Colombia, Graph VI.3 shows that El Salvador is the country with the highest number of requests for help or cooperation from the municipal government.

Graph VI.3 Request for Help From the Municipal Government in a Comparative Perspective



6.2 Participation in the Management of the Municipal Government

This section examines citizen participation in local government using three relationship mechanisms: attendance at an open town meeting, attendance at a council session, and requests for support or petitions.

6.2.1 Attendance at an “Open Town Meeting”

The open town meeting is a mechanism of citizen participation that is institutionalized in the Municipal Code—holding this regular gathering is obligatory and at least once every three months, the municipal council should convene an open town meeting. “This mechanism earned a lot of political and institutional legitimacy at the end of the 1980s by forming part of a governmental action strategy to provide basic infrastructure to allow for a closer relationship between municipal authorities and small communities. It was employed so that the political organ could make contact with neighbors and channel community demands to the political system.” However, this mechanism has had format limitations and in some cases it has been seen as a requirement, such that in recent years questions have been raised about its effectiveness in promoting citizen participation in local government management.

In recent years, participative planning processes have been initiated to move beyond the presentation of community demands to the local government. These participative processes seek to develop improved mechanisms to establish priorities and assign funds based on the needs of


the community and to take these discussions to the resulting municipal development planning. It has been advised that “the quality of participative planning has been unequal and has been based on processes that have relied on important levels of citizen participation, including documents that have been artificially produced in order make FISDL disbursements possible.” However, “this type of planning has opened the doors for the institutionalization of what could be an important space for local participation and agreement and a key tool to provide local societies with a development project that has a medium- and long-term vision.” Additionally, the framework of this participative planning process has created mechanisms for social participation and agreement “that have different names, such as Local Development Councils or Committees, Inter-institutional Committees, District Agreement Working Groups, or Consultative Assemblies for Local Development” and these initiatives “posses two common characteristics: they bring together a number of local organizations and are organized to generate constant communication and coordinated efforts between the territory’s various organizations and municipal authorities. Along with these common characteristics, there are also considerable differences. In some cases, the Councils or Committees include only neighborhood organizations, while others incorporate citizen organizations and public entities that are dependent on the central government. Sometimes the local government is part of the Committee while in other cases it acts as a counterpart.” These initiatives “are characterized, in all cases, as valid citizen negotiators in local management processes.”

Something else that is new is that “for the first time, six municipalities of the country used participative process to elaborate and gain approval for regulations related to citizen participation and transparency in municipal management.” Additionally, some experiences have worked to open municipal council sessions to citizen presence. In this context, in the heart of the Legislative Assembly, there is a current discussion about profound reforms to Title 9 of the Municipal Code, which refers to citizen participation and transparency in municipal management.

6.2.2 Level of Participation


The survey asked: “NP1. Have you attended an open town meeting or another meeting convened by the mayor during the past twelve months? (1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Don’t know.” The formulation of the question explores levels of citizen participation in this traditional mechanism (the open town meeting), but is also formulated to obtain information about attendance at other meetings convened by the mayor. In Graph VI.4 we can observe that 12.5% had attended a meeting, 86.8% had not, and 0.7% didn’t know. Our 2004 survey figure approaches the town-meeting attendance levels that were reported in national studies in 1999 of 14.8% and 11.9%. This figure is congruent with the hypothesis presented in this section that during recent years this traditional mechanism for citizen participation has been stagnating.

Graph VI.4 Attendance of an Open Town Meeting or Other Session Convened by the Mayor During the Past Twelve Months



Consistent with other studies about citizen participation in the local arena, in Graph VI.5 we observe that as the population of the municipality increases, attendance at town meeting decreases. The figures reflect higher attendance for small municipalities. This important evidence reflects on the applicability and effectiveness of this mechanism to promote citizen participation in different municipalities of the country.


Graph VI.5 Attendance at Town Meetings or Other Meetings According To Population Stratum



The questionnaire asked: “MUNIFA. How did you find out about the meeting?” The results are shown in Graph VI.6. It is necessary to stress that given that 1,390 of the people interviewed

were not informed and for that reason they were excluded from this analysis. Therefore the data corresponds to the 199 people that responded that they were aware. Of those who did know, 51.3% found out about the invitation from the mayor or the municipal council, 21.6% through public announcements, 16.1% through a friend or family member, 7% through other means, 1% from television and 3% didn't know the answer.

Graph VI.6 How Did You Find Out About the Meeting?




6.2.3 Attendance Determinants of an Open Town Meeting or Other Meeting

Given that our dependent variable is a dichotomy-did or did not attend-a logistical regression was used to examine attendance determinants of an open town meeting or other meeting. Results of the model are presented in Table VI.1 (Appendix B) with statistically significant predictors of town meeting or other meeting attendance when one of the other variables remains constant. Basically there are seven predictors: gender, population stratum of the place of residence, personal possessions in the home, exposure to the news, perception of local government representing one's interests, persuasion to vote for a particular candidate or party, and having worked for a particular candidate or party in the previous elections. The variables of age and educational levels remained constant in the model, despite the fact that they are not statistically significant.

6.2.4 Attendance of a Town Meeting or Another Meeting in a Comparative Perspective

When analyzing the data obtained for the case of El Salvador in the framework of this comparative study for the Central American countries, Mexico, and Colombia we observe in Graph VI.7 that El Salvador is in the fifth position in terms of average attendance at a town meeting or other meeting convened by the mayor (12.6). Falling below Guatemala (17.3), Nicaragua (16.4), Honduras (15.1) and Mexico (12.9), El Salvador obtained a score equivalent to the average of all of the countries.


Graph VI.7 Attendance of a Town Meeting or Other Meeting in a Comparative Perspective



6.2.5 Attendance of a Council Session


The questionnaire also explored other citizen participation mechanisms in the local arena. It was asked: “NP1A Have you attended a municipal session during the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No, (8) Don’t know.” The formulation of this question was designed to measure attendance of a session of the municipal authority. In Graph VI.8 we observe an even lower level of participation in this type of session. 9.6% had attended, 89.9% hadn’t attended, and 0.5% didn’t know.

Graph VI.8 Attendance of a Municipal Session During the Past Year




The questionnaire included the question: “NP1B To what point do you think that municipal officials pay attention to what people ask for in these meetings? (1) A lot, (2) Some, (3) Little, (4) Not at all, (8) Don’t know.” In Graph VI.9 we observe with some skepticism the evaluation of how much attention municipal officials pay to what people ask for in these meetings: 7.9% think that they pay a lot of attention, 19.6% some attention, 40.7% little attention, 23.8% no attention at all, and 7.9% don’t know.

Graph VI.9 To What Point do Municipal Officials Pay Attention to What People Ask for in These Meetings?



Additionally, the questionnaire asked: “NP1C. If you had a complaint about some kind of local problem and you took it to a member of the municipal council, how much attention do you think that they would pay? (1) A lot, (2) Some, (3) Little, (4) None, (8) Don’t know.” In Graph VI.10 we observe a negative evaluation of how much attention municipal council members pay to complaints presented: 6.7% think that it is a lot, 19.4% say some, 38.5% a little, 28.8% none and 6.6% didn’t know.


Graph VI.10 How Much Attention Would a Member of the Municipal Council Pay to a Complaint That Was Made?



6.2.6 Presentation of Requests for Help or Petitions

Attending meetings is frequently considered to be a passive form of political participation and for this reason the questionnaire included a question oriented at measuring a more direct form of participation: “NP2 Have you asked for help from or presented a petition to any office, official, council member or trustee of the municipal government during the past 12 months? (1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Don’t know.” In Graph VI.11 we observe that only 12.1% presented some kind of petition to the municipality while 87.7% had not and .1% didn’t know.

Graph VI.11 Have You Asked for Help or Presented a Petition to the Municipal Government During the Past Twelve Months?



Salvadorans appear to maintain the same low level of participation in local government for all three mechanisms explored in this survey. This was true whether the mechanisms were passive (open town meeting and other sessions convened by the mayor reached 12.5% while the attendance of a council session was 9.6%) or active (presentation of petitions: 12.1%).


6.2.7 Presentation of Requests for Help (1995-2004)

Comparing the results of this question with the national studies carried out in 1995 and 1999, we can appreciate the following behavior: in 1995 the average was 12, it rose to 18 in 1999 and dropped to 12.2 in 2004.

6.2.8 Presentation of Requests for Help in a Comparative Perspective

In analyzing data obtained for the case of El Salvador in the framework of this comparative study for the Central American countries, Mexico and Colombia, in Graph VI.12 we observe that El Salvador (average of 12.2) has the lowest number of requests for help or a petition to the municipal government.


Graph VI.12 Presentation of Requests for Help or Petitions in a Comparative Perspective



6.3 Evaluation of Procedures Carried Out


The questionnaire included a battery of three questions related to carrying out procedures at municipal government office. It first asked: “MUNI8. Have you carried out any procedure or solicited any document in the municipality during the past year? (1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Don’t know.” In Graph VI.13 we can observe that 38.5% of those interviewed had carried out a procedure, 60.9% hadn’t, and 0.6% didn’t know. This means that four out of ten people had carried out some procedure at the municipal government during the past year.

Graph VI.13 Have You Carried Out a Procedure or Requested a Document at the Municipal Government During the Past Year




Secondly, it was asked: “MUNI9. What kind of service did you receive? (1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Neither good nor bad, (4) Poor, (5) Very poor, (8) Don't know, (9) Doesn't apply.” Graph VI.14 reflects the responses of only those 612 people who had carried out some type of procedure and the evaluation is very positive: 15.4% said that they received very good service, 57.5% good service, 16.3% neither good nor bad, 9.5% poor, and 1.3% very poor.

Graph VI.14 Service Received in the Procedure



Thirdly, it was asked: “MUNI10. Was your issue or request resolved: (1) Yes, (0) No, (8) Don’t know, (9) Doesn’t apply.” Graph VI.15 reflects the responses of only those 612 people who carried out some type of procedure and the evaluation was very positive: 91.3% said that the issue was resolved or the document solicited was received while only 8.7% said that it wasn’t resolved.

Graph VI.15 Procedure is Resolved




The outcome of this section about the procedures carried out in the municipal government is very positive. Of the total number of people interviewed, four out of ten had carried out a procedure or had requested some kind of document from the municipality during the past year. Those who had carried out the procedure gave a positive evaluation of the service received and the effectiveness reported was very high as 9 out of 10 people resolved the procedure in question.

6.4 Satisfaction with Municipal Services

With the aim of measuring general citizen satisfaction with municipal services, the questionnaire included the following question: “SGL1. Would you say that the services offered by the municipality are . . . (1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Neither good nor bad, (4) Poor, (5) Very poor, (8) Don’t know.” In Graph VI.16 we observe that those interviewed gave a positive evaluation of municipal services: 3.5% believe that they are very good, 43.9% good, 33.2% neither good nor bad, 17% poor, and 2.4% very poor.


Graph VI.16 Evaluation of Services Offered by the Municipal Government



6.4.1 Population Stratum and Satisfaction With Services Offered by the Municipal Government

Place of residence turned out to be a factor associated with satisfaction with municipal services. In Graph VI.17 we can observe that the inhabitants of less-populated municipalities exhibit higher levels of satisfaction with municipal services and this diminishes as the size of the municipal population increases.


Graph VI.17 Satisfaction With Services That Municipal Government Offers According to Population Stratum



6.4.2 Representation of Citizen Interests and Satisfaction with Municipal Services

How citizens evaluate the representation of their interests in the local government (mayors office and municipal council) turned out to be a factor associated with the level of satisfaction with municipal services for those who were interviewed. In Graph VI.18 we can observe that as the evaluation that the mayor’s office and municipal council represent citizen interests increases, the trend is that satisfaction with services offered by the municipality also increases.

Graph VI.18 Satisfaction With Services Offered by the Municipal Government According to Representation of Interests by the Local Government



6.4.3 Satisfaction With Services Offered by the Municipal Government (1995-2004)

In national surveys in 1995 and 1999 the same question was included. It was therefore possible to see the evolution of levels of satisfaction with municipal services for the period of 1995-2004. The average satisfaction level in 1995 was 52 and rose to 56 in 1999 and further rose to 57 in 2004. As we can see, satisfaction with municipal services has been on the rise between 1995 and 2004.


6.4.4 Determinants of Satisfaction With Municipal Services

In Table VI.2 (see Appendix B), results of the multiple regression analysis are presented with statistically significant predictors of satisfaction with municipal services when the other variables remain constant. There are basically seven predictors of satisfaction with municipal services: educational level, gender, personal possessions in the home, perception of having interests represented in the local government, perception of personal safety in the place of residence, evaluation about the economic situation of the country, and evaluation of personal economic situation. The age variable remained the same despite the fact that it is not statistically significant.

6.4.5 Satisfaction With Municipal Services in a Comparative Perspective

When analyzing the data obtained for the case of El Salvador in the framework of the comparative study for the Central American countries, Mexico and Colombia, we found that El Salvador is the country with the second highest average of satisfaction with municipal services (57.3), just below Colombia (57.6).

Graph VI.19 Satisfaction With Municipal Services in a Comparative Perspective




6.5 Satisfaction With the Treatment Received at Municipal Government Offices

With the goal of measuring citizens' satisfaction with treatment received at municipal government offices, the questionnaire included the following question: "SGL2. How do you think that you and your neighbors have been treated when you have carried out a procedure at

the municipal government? Have you been treated very well, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad? (1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Neither good nor bad, (4) Bad, (5) Very bad, (8) Don't know." In Graph VI.20 we see that those interviewed positively evaluated the way that they had been treated at the municipality: 5.7% said the treatment was very good, 53.7% good, 26.2% neither good nor bad, 12.8% bad, and 1.7% very bad.


Graph VI.20 Satisfaction With Treatment Received at the Municipal Government Offices



6.5.1 Representation of Citizens' Interests and Satisfaction With the Treatment Received at the Municipal Government Offices

How respondents evaluated the level of representation by local government (mayor's office and municipal council) turned out to be a factor associated with the satisfaction with the treatment received in the municipal government offices. In Graph VI.21 we observe that as the evaluation of the mayor's office and municipal council increased with respect to representation of interests, the trend was for the satisfaction with treatment received in municipal government offices to increase.

Graph VI.21 Satisfaction With the Treatment Received in Municipal Government Offices According to Representation of Interests by the Local Government




6.5.2 Perceived Lack of Safety and Satisfaction With the Treatment Received in Municipal Government Offices

In the bivariate and multiple regression information, we found that perceived lack of safety is a factor associated with satisfaction with the treatment received in the municipal government. It may be true that the connection is not clear at first impression and this is a topic that deserves a closer look in future studies. For the moment, we have the impression that those who have a perceived lack of safety look for a response from governmental institutions and particularly the municipal government.

In Graph VI.22 we can observe that as perceived safety increases, the trend is that satisfaction with treatment received by the municipality also increases.

Graph VI.22 Satisfaction With the Treatment Received in the Municipalities According to Perceived Lack of Safety



6.5.3 Determinants of Satisfaction With the Treatment Received in the Municipal Government Offices


In Table VI.3 (see Appendix B) the results of the multiple regression analysis with statistically significant predictors are presented with regards to satisfaction with treatment received in the municipalities when one of the other variables remains constant. Basically there are six predictors of satisfaction with the treatment received in the municipalities: trust in the judicial system to punish those guilty of a crime, perception about how local government represents citizen interests, perception of safety in the place of residence, victimization due to crime, population stratum of the place of residence, and the evaluation of the country’s economic situation. Variables of education, gender, age and personal possession remain constant despite the fact that they are not statistically significant.

6.6 Who Has Best Responded to the Problems in Your Community?

The questionnaire included a question to explore opinions of those interviewed with respect to the institutional actor that had best responded to resolving community problems: “LGL1. In your opinion, among the national government, the deputies, or the municipal government, who has best responded to help resolve the problems of your community or neighborhood? The national government? The deputies? The municipalities?”

In Graph VI.23 we observe that 50.7% identified the municipal government as the instance that best responded to resolving community problems, followed by 22.4% that said none of the above. 12.8% mentioned the national government, 8.1% didn’t know/didn’t answer, 4.1% said the deputies and 1.9% responded they were all the same.

Graph VI.23 Who Has Best Responded in Helping your Community?




6.6.1 Who Has Best Responded? (1995-2004)

In comparing the results of this question with national surveys carried out in 1995 and 1999 we can appreciate three important aspects. In the first place, Salvadorans expressed a high level of recognition of the municipal government as the institution that has best responded in helping to resolve community problems (42% in 1995, 58% in 1999 and 50.7% in 2004). Following this they mentioned that none of the actors responded (32% in 1995, 20% in 1999 and 22.4% in 2004). Thirdly, they named the national government (9% in 1995 and 1999, and 12.8% in 2004).

6.6.2 Who Deserves to Have More Responsibilities and More Money?

The questionnaire included a question to explore the opinions of those interviewed about whether or not more resources and responsibility should be assigned at the national or local government. It was asked: “LGL2. In your opinion, should more responsibilities and more money go to the municipality or should the national government take on more responsibilities and municipal services?” In Graph VI.24 we observe that 45.9% of those interviewed think that the national government should assume more responsibilities and municipal services while 36.9% think that more responsibilities and money should be assigned to the municipality, including 2.6% that think that more resources and responsibilities should go to the municipalities but under the condition that they offer better services. This is collectively summarized as a 39.5% favorable opinion for local government. 10.9% said they didn’t know/didn’t respond and 3.7% were not inclined to change anything.

Graph VI.24 Should More Responsibilities and Money Be Given to the National Government or the Local Government?



6.6.3 Who Should Have More Responsibilities and Receive More Money? (1995-2004)

An innovative finding in the 2004 survey is the emergence of the opinion favoring national government (45.9%) over local government (39.5%) in taking on more responsibilities and municipal services. This represents an important change with respect to the findings reported in the previous studies where a more favorable opinion was given to the municipalities.

Thanks to the fact that we have data from the 1995 and 1999 national surveys, it is possible to see the levels of support for the national and local government for the period 1995 to 2004. In 1995, 35.2% of those interviewed believed that the national government should assume more responsibilities and municipal services, while 22.9% thought that more responsibilities and money should be assigned to the municipality and 8.6% said that more resources and responsibilities should be assigned to the municipal government but under the condition that they offer better services. The collective summary is that 41.5% favored local government, 17.1% didn't know/didn't respond, and 6.2% were not inclined to change anything.


In 1999, 37.4% of those interviewed gave the opinion that the national government should assume more responsibilities and municipal services while 45.7% thought that more responsibilities and more money should be assigned to the municipal government and 3.6% said that municipal government should receive more resources and responsibilities under the condition that they offer better services. The collective summary is that 49.3% favored local government, 11.6% didn't know/didn't respond, and 1.7% were not inclined to change anything.

Another national study carried out in 1999 reported a divided opinion among those surveyed: 45.9% favored municipalities, 43% favored the national government and 11% didn't know/didn't respond.

In the 2004 study we pointed out that 45.9% of those interviewed think that the national government should assume more responsibilities and municipal services while 39.5% expressed a favorable opinion toward local government. 10.9% didn't know/didn't respond and 3.7% were not inclined to change anything.

A hypothesis to be explored is whether these differences have anything to do with the Salvadoran political attitudes during the 2004 election year. Favoring the national government or the local government is closely related with the political preferences held by those surveyed. In Graph VI.25 we observe that ARENA supporters favor the national government while FMLN party supporters support the municipal governments and sympathizers of other parties are equally distributed between national and local government. In any case, this topic deserves to be analyzed with more depth in future studies.

Graph VI.25 Who Should Be Given More Money and More Responsibilities?




6.7 Management of Resources

Asked spontaneously, few people will say that they wish to pay more taxes, so it is understandable that when those interviewed were asked if they would be willing to pay more taxes to the municipal governments the majority said “no.” The questionnaire asked: “LGL3. Would you be willing to pay more taxes to the municipality if they were to give better services or do you think it isn't worthwhile to pay more taxes to the municipal government?”

In Graph VI.26 we observe that 75% hold the opinion that it isn't worth paying more taxes, 21.5% show that they would be willing to pay more taxes if the municipal government would offer better services, and 3.5% didn't know.

Graph VI.26 Willingness to Pay More Taxes to the Municipality




6.7.1 Willingness to Pay More Taxes (1995-2004)

Comparing the results of this question to the 1995 and 1999 national surveys, we appreciate the following behavior: in 1995, 21% said they would be willing to pay more taxes, which increased to 27% in 1999 and falls again to 21.5% in 2004.

6.7.2 Trust in Resource Management

The questionnaire asked: “MUNI6. To what degree do you trust the municipal government to manage funds? (3) A lot, (2) Some, (1) A little, (0) No at all, (8) Don't know.” In Graph VI.27 we can appreciate low levels of trust in the municipality's management of funds: 30.6% showed no trust at all, 34.9% little trust, 19.1% some trust, 8.5% a lot of trust, and 6.9% didn't know. If we add together the options of no trust and little trust, 65.6% of those interviewed express low levels of trust in the municipality's management of funds.


Graph VI.27 Trust in the Municipal Government's Management of Funds



6.8 Trust in the Municipality

Question B32 measured the level of trust in the municipality, which was transformed into variable B32R with a 0 to 100 format. In Graph VI.28 we observe a high level of trust in the municipality. Levels of greater trust in the municipality have higher percentages and the average is 62.87.

Graph VI.28 Trust in the Municipality




6.8.1 Determinants of Trust in the Municipality

Table VI.4, located in Appendix B, shows the results of the multiple regression analysis with statistically significant predictors of trust in the municipalities when each of the other variables remains constant. Basically there are four predictors of trust in the municipalities: the perception of local government representing citizen interests, perception of safety in the place of residence, population stratum of the place of residence, and trust in political parties. Variables of educational level, gender, age, and personal possessions in the home remained constant in the model despite the fact that they are not statistically significant.

6.8.2 Trust in the municipality in a comparative perspective

In analyzing the data obtained for the case of El Salvador in the framework of this comparative study for the Central American countries, Mexico and Colombia, in Graph VI.29 we can observe that El Salvador has a the highest average of trust in the municipality (62.9).

Graph VI.29 Trust in the Municipality in a Comparative Perspective



This chapter examines Salvadorans attitudes and evaluations of their local governments. The data provides evidence that local governments maintain a close relationship with citizens measured by their asking for help or cooperation to resolve their problems.

Basically we find the same relatively low levels of citizen participation in all three mechanisms considered in the survey: attendance at an open town meeting or meeting convened by the mayor (12.5%), attendance at a council session (9.6%), and requests for help or petitions (12.1%).

In general terms, we observe that there is a level of trust in the municipality. The data shows general satisfaction with municipal services, a positive evaluation of the procedures carried out in municipal offices and satisfaction with the treatment received at the mayor's office, though there are high levels of distrust with respect to the municipality's management of funds.

When evaluating who had best responded to community problems, 50.7% identified the municipality as the agency that has best responded, followed by 22.4% who said none of the agencies, then 12.8% mention the national government, 8.1% didn't know / didn't answer, 4.1% say the deputies and 1.95 said that they are all the same.

However, when asked who should receive more responsibilities and money, 45.9% said the national government, 39.5% said local government, 10.9% didn't know and 3.7% said they wouldn't change anything. This finding represents a change with respect to previous studies in which a more favorable opinion has been given to strengthening the municipalities. This is a subject that deserves to be more profoundly analyzed in future studies and this report explores the hypothesis that these differences have to do with the Salvadoran political attitudes given the context that 2004 was an election year.

7.0 Electoral Behavior

This chapter addresses the subject of Salvadoran electoral participation. In the first section, we examine the characteristics of those who did and didn't vote in the past elections. The second section addresses representation of citizen interests. The third section analyzes the trust in political parties and the fourth section examines trust in the elections. The fifth section addresses the subject of political orientation and the sixth section examines the evaluation of the current government. The seventh section analyzes opinions about electoral reforms and the eighth section presents conclusions.

7.1 Salvadoran Voters

In the framework of the peace and democratization processes that have developed in Central America, free, open and competitive elections are being integrated into the institutional system and are now carried out regularly and on pre-established dates. In the elections held during the last decade in Central America, no one has suggested electoral fraud and the losers have recognized their defeat. There have been peaceful transitions of government, though there are still many technical problems to be overcome.

It is curious and in some ways ironic that while important advances have been made to build democracy in the region, and especially to hold free and competitive elections, this has been developed in the framework of low electoral participation. A recent study identified the following trends with respect to electoral abstention for the period 1989-1999: "First, in the region there is a trend of increasing levels of abstention. In Guatemala it moved from 30.7% in 1985 to 63.1% in 1996; in El Salvador it moved from 54.9% in 1989 to 61.4% in 1999; while in Honduras it grew from 22% (1981) to 35% in 1993 and was then reduced to 27.7% in 1997; and in Costa Rica it increased from 21.4% in 1982 to 30% in 1998. Only in the cases of Nicaragua and Panama has it remained relatively stable. Secondly, in ordering the Central American countries according to abstention level, we find that Nicaragua, Panama, and Costa Rica are the countries with the lowest abstention levels, at about 20-25%. Honduras is in an intermediate position at about 30%. Then we have countries with greater levels of abstention: Guatemala and El Salvador, oscillating between 55-60%".

In the case of El Salvador, an intense electoral calendar was developed starting at the time that the Peace Accords were signed in 1992. Three presidential elections have been held (1994, 1999 and 2004), and four legislative and municipal elections have been held (1994, 1997, 2000 and 2003). Elections have been held almost every two years.

In the post-war elections there has been a trend of growing electoral abstention: in the first round of the presidential elections in 1994, abstention was 33.1%; in the second round it was 51.1%. It continued to climb to 56.1% in the legislative elections of 1997, to 56.9% in the 1999 presidential elections, to 57.8% in the 2000 legislative elections and dropped back down to 53.4% in the 2003 legislative elections.

In the legislative elections of 2003, 1.39 million valid votes were cast, while 2.27 million Salvadorans cast their votes in the presidential elections in March of this year. There was a significant increase in the number of voters. The Electoral Register reported that 3.45 million

people were enrolled, which means that participation in the presidential elections of this past March 2004 was 66%, which is to say that electoral abstention dropped to 34%. However, in this moment, we cannot know with certainty if this increase in voters is part of a more profound phenomenon or if it is only due to particular conditions of these elections.

In the following pages, participation in the past presidential elections is analyzed, as it is an important subject for democracy. According to the data from this survey, which was executed after the past presidential elections, we see that the survey over-reports the intention to vote: 75.6% of the 1,589 people interviewed said that they had voted in the March 2004 elections. This contrasts with the 66% that actually exercised their suffrage. This phenomenon of over-reporting the intention to vote has been found in similar studies conducted in the United States by the University of Michigan and in the Central American region.

7.1.1 An Approximate Explanation of Those Who Did Not Vote

In the experience of IUDOP, when carrying out studies of an electoral nature we find that “it is difficult for the majority of Salvadorans to accept in a public way that they do not intend to vote. This also applies when they are asked the question after the fact, or in other words, when they are asked whether or not they voted.” This offers important challenges for the research strategy when utilizing the survey instrument to analyze this subject. For this reason, in designing the questionnaire, two other questions were included: one oriented to explore reasons why the person interviewed didn’t vote in the past elections and the other to explore their opinion about why other people didn’t vote.

With respect to the reason why the person interviewed did not vote, they were first asked if they had voted in the past elections of March 2004. Then next question was formulated in the following way: “EVB4. If you didn’t vote, why did you not vote in the past presidential elections of March 2004?” In Table VII.1 we observe the reasons for which the person interviewed said that they didn’t vote. The factors mentioned first emphasized illness (21.7%), not having an identification card (17.6%), not believing in the elections (8.3%), not believing in political parties (8.3%), having to work (4.9%) and lack of transportation (3.9%). Other specific factors that were mentioned with less frequency and the diverse aspects mentioned are listed in the category “other” (24.3%).

Table VII.1 Reasons Why Those Who Were Surveyed Didn't Vote in the 2004 Presidential Elections

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid percentage
Illness	84	5.3	21.7
Didn't have identification card	68	4.3	17.6
Doesn't believe in the elections	32	2.0	8.3
Doesn't believe in the political parties	32	2.0	8.3
Had to work	19	1.2	4.9
Lack of transportation	15	.9	3.9
Wasn't listed on the electoral register	10	.6	2.6
Lost identification card	9	.6	2.3
Wasn't old enough	9	.6	2.3
Arrived late and voting center was closed	8	.5	2.1
Don't know	3	.2	.8
Violence, lack of safety	2	.1	.5
Not registered	2	.1	.5
Other	94	5.9	24.3
Total	387	24.4	100.0
Lost	99 Does not apply	1202	75.6
Total		1589	100.0

To ascertain the respondents' opinions about reasons why other people did not vote, a question was formulated in the following way: "EVB10. As you know, a significant number of people did not vote in the past 2004 presidential elections. Which of the following reasons do you think explain why those individuals did not vote? (1) They didn't like any party or candidate, (2) the voting system is very complicated, (3) they didn't trust the electoral system because there is fraud, (4) they weren't interested enough to go and vote, (5) they didn't have their identification card, (6) personal problems, (7) other." In Table VII.2 we can observe that the number one reasons that people didn't vote were lack of interest in voting (28.9%), not trusting the elections (16.4%), not having an identification card (15.4%), and not liking any party or candidate (12.6%). The next level of frequency was found when other aspects were mentioned and the category "others" collects these diverse aspects (12.6%).

Table VII.2 Reasons Why Others Did Not Vote (2004)

	Frequency	Valid Percentage
Not enough interest to go and vote	459	28.9
Didn't trust electoral system because there is fraud	261	16.4
Didn't have identification card	245	15.4
Didn't like any party or candidate	201	12.6
Personal problems	140	8.8
The voting system is very complicated	44	2.8
Don't know	38	2.4
Other	201	12.6
Total	1589	100.0

In summary, when asking the Salvadorans why they didn't vote, the most common response is due to personal problems (illness, 21.7%; had to work, 4.9%; and lack of transport, 3.9%) or

technical problems (didn't have identification card, 17.6%), which are then followed by lack of trust in the elections (8.3%) or political parties (8.3%). However, the reasons given why others didn't vote ranked first a lack of interest in going to vote (28.9%), lack of trust in the elections (16.4%) or not liking any candidate or political party (12.6%), while personal or technical problems fell in a second place (didn't have identification card, 15.4%).


7.1.2 Determinants of Voting Patterns

Given that our dependant variable is a dichotomy-voted or didn't vote-a logistical regression has been utilized to examine voting determinants. In Table VII.3 (Appendix B) the results of the model are presented with statistically significant predictors of the intention to vote when one of the other variables remains constant. There are basically eight predictors of the intention to vote: gender, age, personal possessions in the home, level of political knowledge, evaluation of the President, having worked for a candidate or party in the past elections, perception of the effectiveness of voting, and trust in the political parties. The educational level variable has been maintained in the model, despite the fact that it is not statistically significant.

7.1.3. Socio-Demographic Explanations


According to numerous studies about electoral behavior in the United States, education, sex and age are the most important characteristics in predicting voting characteristics. Literature has pointed out that those who are least likely to vote are the youngest and oldest citizens. The relationship between the intention to vote and age is like an inverted "U" curve: those who have recently reached the voting age exhibit the lowest level of voting, which then goes up as age increases, until reaching older adulthood when interest in voting begins to fall. Data from the El Salvador 2004 study follows this pattern, as can be seen in Graphic VII.1.

Graph VII.1 Voting Patterns According to Age




In the case of educational level (see Graph VII.2), those with no education have a lower voting rate and this increases as the educational level increases.

Graph VII.2 Voting Patterns According to Educational Level



The gender variable turned out to be statistically significant in the logistical regression model. In the bivariate analysis it is not significant, but it is important to control the intention to vote according to educational level by gender. In Graph VII.3 we can observe an important gap between the intention to vote of men and women for those that do not have formal education. This difference is reduced at the level of primary education, but starting with secondary education more women vote than men. This gap is reduced at the level of higher education. The gap between men and women in the intention to vote is very broad for those who don't have formal studies, but it starts to decrease as education increases.


Graph VII.3 Voting Patterns According to Educational Level per Gender



7.1.4 Level of Income and Intention to Vote

Rather than using the level of income variable, given the high number cases that are lost, we will utilize the personal possession in the home scale, which was created based on various questions about possession of material goods in the home. In Graph VII.4 we observe that intention to vote increases as personal possessions in the home increase.


Graph VII.4 Voting Patterns According to Personal Possessions in the Home



7.1.5 Level of Information and Intention to Vote

In Graph VII.5 we observe that those people with a low level of information exhibit lower levels of intention to vote and the trend is that as the level of information increases, the intention to vote increases as well.


Graph VII.5 Voting Patterns According to Level of Information



7.1.6 Political Factors


A prior study pointed out that a relationship exists between intention to vote and their evaluation of political activity. The following pages explore the relationship between the intention to vote and diverse political variables. The questionnaire asked: “ABS5. Do you think that voting can improve things in the future or do you think that no matter how you vote, nothing will get better?” This question measures the perception that those interviewed have about the effectiveness of their vote. In Graph VII.6 we observe that those who think that their vote can change things have a higher intention to vote as compared to those who think that nothing will change as a result of their vote or those who don’t know.

Graph VII.6 Voting Patterns According to Perceived Effectiveness of Voting




The respondents' evaluations about democracy are a factor associated with the intention to vote, for which reason both dimensions are explored in the following: preference for the democratic regime and preference for electoral democracy. The questionnaire asked: "DEM2. With which of the following three phrases are you most in agreement? (1) For people like me, it doesn't matter if we have a democratic or undemocratic regime, (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, (3) In some circumstances an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic one, (8) Don't know." In Graph VII.7 we observe that intention to vote is greater for those who believe that democracy is preferable to any other form of government. This is followed by intention to vote levels of those who would prefer an authoritarian government in certain circumstances, then those who don't care, and then those who don't know.

Graph VII.7 Voting Patterns According to Preference for Democratic Regime



It was asked: “AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader that doesn’t have to be elected by vote. Others say that even though things don’t work well, electoral democracy and the popular vote is always the best. What do you think?” In Graph VII.8 we observe that the intention to vote is greater among those who prefer electoral democracy when compared with those who favor a strong leader and is followed by the level for those who do not know.


Graph VII.8 Voting Patterns According to Preference for Electoral Democracy



The experience of those interviewed in the area of electoral participation is a factor associated with intention to vote, for which reason two dimensions are explored: persuasion and involvement. With respect to the first dimension, the questionnaire asked: “PP1. During the last elections, some people tried to convince other people to vote for a particular party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? (1) Frequently, (2) Sometimes, (3) Rarely, (4) Never, (8) Don’t know.”


In Graph VIII.9 we can see that those who have been involved in trying to persuade others to vote for a particular candidate or party exhibit a greater intention to vote than those who have not done this.

Graph VII.9 Voting Patterns According to Persuading Others to Vote




The other question included in the questionnaire was: “PP2. There are people that work for a party or candidate during the electoral campaign. Did you work for a candidate or party in the past 2004 presidential elections?” In Graph VII.10 we see that those who participated in political activity manifested a greater intention to vote. In this case, those that worked for a candidate or party exhibit a much greater level of intention to vote when compared to those have not.

Graph VII.10 Voting Patterns According to Involvement in Campaign



Another factor associated with the intention to vote is trust in the parties. In Graph VII.11 we observe that those with greater trust in the parties exhibit a greater intent to vote.


Graph VII.11 Voting Patterns According to Trust in the Parties



7.1.7 Perceived Lack of Safety and the Intention to Vote

The perception of lack of safety is a factor associated with intention to vote. It was asked: “AOJ11A. And speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the current level of crime represents a threat to the well being of our future?” In Graph VII.12 we observe that those who perceive greater safety are less likely to vote and this number goes up as perceived lack of safety increases.

Graph VII.12 Voting Patterns According to Perceived Lack of Safety




7.2 Representation of Citizen Interests

The questionnaire included a battery of three questions to measure citizen perceptions about the representation of their interests in the three areas where representatives are elected by popular vote: the national government, the legislative assembly and the municipal councils.


For the first of these, the following was asked: “EPN3A. How much do you think that the national government represents your interests and provides you with citizen benefits? (1) a lot, (2) some, (3) a little (4) not at all, or (8) don’t know.” In Graph VIII.13 we observe that 15.8% believe that the answer is a lot, 19.3% some, 41.2% a little, 22% not at all and 1.7% didn’t know.

Graph VII.13 National Government Represents Interests




It was also asked: “EPN3B. How much do you think that the legislative assembly represents your interests and provides you with citizen benefits? (1) A lot, (2) some, (3) a little (4) not at all, or (8) don’t know.” In Graph VIII.14 we observe that 8.8% believe that the answer is a lot, 16% some, 39.9% a little, 33% not at all, and 2.3% didn’t know.

Graph VII.14 Deputies of the Legislative Assembly Represent Interests




It was also asked: “EPN3C. How much do you think that the local mayor’s office and the municipal council represent your interests and provide you with citizen benefits? (1) A lot, (2) some, (3) a little, (4) not at all, or (8) don’t know/ didn’t respond.” In Graph VII.15 we observe that 19.3% believe that the answer is a lot, 23.6% some, 41.1% a little, 15.5% not at all, and 0.6% didn’t know.

Graph VII.15 Mayor’s Office and Municipal Council Represent Interests



In order to simplify the comparison of opinions of those interviewed with respect to the representation of citizen interests, a scale that averaged the three questions was created. Graph VII.16 presents the average citizen opinion about how they perceive themselves to be represented by these political institutions. When the three items are integrated, the resulting average is 42, almost the same level as the favorable opinion for the national government (43). Deputies have a lower level (33) and the mayors and municipal councils are at a higher level (49).


Graph VII.16 Comparison of the Representation of Interests



7.3 Trust in the Political Parties

In the questionnaire a question was included to measure levels of trust in the political parties in a format of 1 to 7 points, as has been explained previously. To simplify the analysis, the original question (B21) was transformed to a 0-100 format (B21R). In Graph VII.17 we can observe low levels of citizen trust in the political parties. The lowest levels of trust obtain the highest percentages and the average is 39.9.

Graph VII.17 Trust in the Political Parties



7.3.1 Determinant of Trust in the Parties


Table VII.4 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with statistically significant predictors of trust in political parties when one of the other variables remains constant. There are basically seven predictors of trust in the political parties: trust in the judicial system to punish the

guilty, satisfaction with democratic performance, opinion about democracy in the country, persuasion of others to vote for a candidate or party, perception about the effectiveness of voting, evaluation of the country’s economic situation, and evaluation of the personal economic situation. The variables of education, gender, age, and personal possessions have been maintained, in order to control the effects of the demographic variables, despite the fact that they are not statistically significant.

The questionnaire included two questions that collected evaluations of political parties and politicians. First it was asked: “PN2A. Politicians seek power for their own benefit and don’t worry about helping the people. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?” This question had a seven-point response format but was recoded in the PN2AR variable to create a 0 to 100 response format, with 0 representing those who most disagreed with the statement and 100 representing those who most agreed with the statement. Second, it was asked: “EPN2B. None of the politicians in this country represent the people. To what point do you agree or disagree with this statement?” This question had a seven-point response format but was recoded in the EPN2BR variable to create a 0 to 100 response format, with 0 representing those who most disagreed with the statement and 100 representing those who most agreed with the statement.

In Graph VII.18, where the averages are presented in a 0 to 100 format for both questions, we observe that there is a negative impression of political parties and politicians. On average, 62 of every 100 people are in agreement with the statement that “politicians seek power for their own benefit and don’t worry about the people” while 58 of every 100 people are in agreement with the statement that “none of the politicians in this country represent the people.”


Graph VII.18 Evaluations About Politicians



7.3.2 Trust in the Political Parties in a Comparative Perspective

Upon analyzing the data obtained for the case of El Salvador in the framework of this comparative study for the Central American countries, Mexico and Colombia, we see in Graph VII.19 that El Salvador has the second highest average level of trust in political parties (39.9).


Graph VII.19 Trust in the Political Parties in a Comparative Perspective



7.4 Trust in the Elections

The questionnaire included a question to measure trust in the elections using the one to seven format that has been explained previously. To simplify the analysis, the original question (B47) was transformed to a 0 to 100 format (B47R). In Graph VII.20 we observe the distribution of citizen trust in the elections. The average trust in the elections is high: 65.1 in a 0 to 100 format.

Graph VII.20 Trust in the Elections




7.4.1 Determinants of Trust in the Elections

In Table VII.5 (see Appendix B) the results of the multiple regression analysis are presented with statistically significant predictors of trust in the election when one of the other variables remains constant. Basically there are ten predictors of trust in the elections: Ideology (left-right scale)

perceived threat of crime, degree of satisfaction with democratic performance, opinion about democracy in the country, perception about lack of safety in the place of residence, evaluation about electoral democracy, perception of the effectiveness of voting, evaluation of the economic situation in the country, evaluation of the economic situation in the coming year, and trust in the political parties. The variables of educational level, gender, age, and personal possessions in the home have been maintained, despite the fact that they are not statistically significant.


The questionnaire included a battery of four questions to measure some aspects linked with the elections. Two of them investigate the following: “If you were to decide to participate in some of the activities that I am going to mention, would you do so with total freedom, with a little bit of fear, or with a lot of fear?” and then: “DER2. Vote in a national election?” and “DER4. Run for an elected position?” With respect to the first question, Graph VII.21 shows that a majority of 81.1% feels that they could do this with total liberty, while 2.2% would have a lot of fear, 15% some fear, and 1.7% didn’t know.

Graph VII.21 Would You Vote With Freedom or Fear in a National Election?



With respect to the second question, Graph VII.22 shows that 35.9% feel that they would run for office with total freedom while 18.2% would have a lot of fear and 30.2% would have some fear and 15.7% didn’t know. Future studies should expound upon understanding the fear factors that are intervening to limit the perception of freedom to run for election.


Graph VII.22 Would You Feel Freedom or Fear if Running for an Elected Position?



7.4.2 Trust in the Elections in a Comparative Perspective

In analyzing the data obtained for the case of El Salvador in the framework of this comparative study for the Central American countries, Mexico, and Colombia, Graph VII.23 shows that El Salvador has the third highest average level of trust in the elections (65.1).

Graph VII.23 Trust in the Elections in a Comparative Perspective



7.5 Political Orientation

To analyze the political preferences of those interviewed, the following question was included: “EVB5. Which political party did you vote for in the past March 2004 elections?” To simplify

the analysis a new variable (parties) was created and the responses of annulled vote/blank vote, don't know/don't respond were eliminated. Additionally those who were not applicable given that they didn't vote were eliminated, identifying only those who voted for ARENA, the FMLN, and "Others" (included in this category is the coalition CDU-PDC and the PCN). In Table VII.6 we can observe the following results.


Table VII.6 Party Voted For (2004)

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage
ARENA	549	34.6	63.4
FMLN	256	16.1	29.6
Others	61	3.8	7.0
Total	866	54.5	100.0
Doesn't apply	723	45.5	
Total	1589	100.0	

This result is reasonably close to the past presidential elections. In the elections, ARENA obtained 57.71% of the votes and 63.4% in the survey, 5.69% more than the actual election. The FMLN obtained 35.68% of the votes and 29.6% in the survey, 6.08% less than the actual election. The other parties (CDU-PDC and PCN) obtained 6.61% in the election and 7% in the survey, 0.39% more than the actual election.

In Graph VII.24 we can appreciate that the respondents place themselves at an average of 6.91 on the left (1) - right (10) scale, which is to say that ideologically they are a little bit more right leaning.

Graph VII.24 Ideology



An interesting aspect results when the ideology variable (left-right scale) is crossed with political parties. We first point out that the number of cases is reduced given that for ideology (L1) 218 cases are lost and for partisan preference 723 cases are lost. In crossing the two questions, we


lose 802 total cases. In Table VII.7 we can observe the crossing of both variables. As it was pointed out earlier, the average of the ideology is 6.91 on a 1 to 10 scale, which is to say slightly right leaning.

Table VII.7 Cross Between Ideology (L1) and Political Party Voted For in 2004

		Party that was voted for in 2004			Total
		ARENA	FMLN	Others	
L1 Ideology (left-right scale)	1 Left	6	95	2	103
		(1.2%)	(38.0%)	(4.3%)	(12.8%)
	2	3	16	1	20
		(.6%)	(6.4%)	(2.1%)	(2.5%)
	3	2	21	3	26
		(.4%)	(8.4%)	(6.4%)	(3.2%)
	4	6	22	0	28
		(1.2%)	(8.8%)	(.0%)	(3.5%)
	5	43	51	18	112
		(8.5%)	(20.4%)	(38.3%)	(14.0%)
	6	36	24	9	69
		(7.1%)	(9.6%)	(19.1%)	(8.6%)
	7	38	6	0	44
		(7.5%)	(2.4%)	(.0%)	(5.5%)
	8	54	6	5	65
		(10.7%)	(2.4%)	(10.6%)	(8.1%)
	9	50	2	2	54
		(9.9%)	(.8%)	(4.3%)	(6.7%)
	10 Right	267	7	7	281
		(52.9%)	(2.8%)	(14.9%)	(35.0%)
Total		505	250	47	802
		(100.0%)	(100.0%)	(100.0%)	(100.0%)

In analyzing the positioning on the left-right scale (1 to 10), the ARENA party has a measure of 8.50, though its range is very concentrated. In the case of the FMLN, the measure is 3.42 and the range is a little bit more disperse. In the case of other parties, the measure is 6.06, but with greater dispersion. Taking into account only those who expressed having voted for a political party, the measure of the left-right scale is 6.77. In Graph VII.25 we can visually appreciate the cross between both variables.


Graph VII.25 Party Preference According to Ideology



7.6 Evaluation of the Government

The questionnaire included a question oriented at capturing an evaluation of the government of President Flores. It was asked: “M1. Speaking in general of the current government, would you say that the work of President Flores is: (1) Very good, (2) good, (3) neither good nor bad, (4) poor, (5) very poor, or (8) don’t know.” In Graph VII.26 we observe that 9% evaluate Flores as very good, 44% good, 30% neither good nor bad, 12% poor, and 3% very poor.

Graph VII.26 Evaluation of the Work of President Flores




7.7 Electoral Reforms

During recent years, our country has been discussing the need to encourage electoral reform. The questionnaire included two questions on the subject of electoral reform. The first question measures support to set a minimum quota in order to increase women's participation as elected deputies and the second question measures support for reconfiguring the electoral districts.


With respect to the first question, it was asked: "EREF1. How much would you approve or disapprove of setting a minimum quota to increase the number of women who would be elected as deputies?" In Graph VII.27 we observe that an important number of people favored this electoral reform and the average was 6.65 on a scale of 0 to 10.

Graph VII.27 Support to Increase the Number of Women Deputies



Upon making a bivariate analysis, we found that the level of support to increase the number of women deputies and the gender variable are associated. Women express greater support for this measure when compared with men.

Graph VII.28 Support for Increasing Women Deputies and Gender




7.7.1 Determinants to Support Fixing Minimum Quotas That Will Allow in the Increased Number of Women That Can Be Elected Deputies

In Table VII.8 (see Appendix B) the results of the multiple regression analysis are presented with statistically significant predictors that support setting minimum quotas that would allow for increased number of women who would be elected deputies. Basically there are two predictors: gender and trust in political parties. The variables of educational level, age, and personal possessions in the home have been maintained, despite the fact that they are not statistically significant.

With respect to the second interrogative, it was asked: “EREF2. How much do you approve or disapprove of reconfiguring the electoral districts in order to vote for one deputy per district instead of a list of deputies per party?” In Graph VII.29 we observe an important level of support in favor of this electoral reform reflected as an average of 6.48 on a scale of 1 to 10.

Graph VII.29 Support for Reconfiguring Electoral Districts



7.7.2 Determinants of Support for Reconfiguring Electoral Districts

Table VII.9 (see Appendix B) presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with the statistically significant predictors of support for reconfiguring electoral districts in order to vote for one deputy per district instead of a list of deputies per party. Basically there are three predictors: age, perception of the effectiveness of voting, and trust in the political parties. The variables of education, gender, and personal possessions in the home have been maintained in the model, despite the fact that they are not statistically significant.

7.8. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the principal determinants of intent to vote are: gender, age, personal possessions in the home, level of political knowledge, evaluation of the work of the President, having worked for a candidate or party in the past elections, perceived effectiveness of voting, and trust in political parties.

When asking Salvadorans why they didn't vote, they first answered personal problems (illness, 21.7%; having to work, 4.9%; and lack of transport, 3.9%) or technical problems (not having identification card, 17.6%), and in the second place lack of trust in the elections (8.3%) or in the political parties (8.3%). On the other hand, when asking about the reasons that other people didn't vote, first mentioned is to lack of interest in voting (28.9%), lack of trust in the elections (16.4%), and not liking any candidate or party (12.6%), while personal or technical problems earned a secondary spot (not having identification card, 15.4%).

The survey data shows a low level of trust in political parties and a high level of trust in the elections. A positive evaluation of an environment in which one feels free to vote is reported.

Finally, the data indicates an important level of support to two electoral reforms: fixing a minimum quota in order to increase participation of women elected as deputies and the reconfiguration of electoral districts.

8.0 Social Capital and Democracy

In reality, there are many definitions for social capital but despite its current popularity, there is no solid agreement about what this term means. Most definitions of social capital are broad and include different aspects including political institutions, civil society, and the ease of establishing market relationships. But it was not until Coleman's work on education that the concept of social capital began to be used more broadly in the academic world. In broad terms, Coleman defined social capital as the relationship between people that allows them to cooperate in order to achieve common objectives.

In 1993, in order to study the institutions' contributions to democratic performance in Italy, Robert Putnam proposed a useful definition to show the importance of this construct in maintaining the political system. According to Putnam, social capital can be understood as "the aspects of the social organization such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve society's efficiency when facilitating coordinated actions." This definition further emphasizes social aspects and refers to society as the basic unit of analysis. As a part of this concept, Putnam shows the importance of this kind of social variable in the configuration of dynamics on a more institutional scale. Additionally, he emphasized the role of associative activity that causes people who do not know one another to interact there by instilling habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public willingness, which serve to generate interpersonal trust and social reciprocity.

Putnam's conceptualization is that which has probably had the greatest influence on the development of the concept used by multilateral cooperation agency think tanks and by the political formulation offices that assist the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). According to the World Bank, social capital "refers to the institutions, relationships and norms that make up the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions." The Bank adds that social capital's importance can be seen: "numerous studies show that social cohesion is a critical factor needed for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable" (see World Bank, no date, website). Based on these conceptualizations, innumerable cooperation and assistance programs have been initiated in the poorest countries in order to strengthen networks and community links in the places that projects are being implemented. For example, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has started a program called the "Inter-American Initiative on Social Capital, Ethics, and Development" that proposes to strengthen ethical values and social capital in the region. The World Bank has a page in its website about poverty dedicated to the subject of social capital and it approaches many of its programs based on a theoretical framework that includes the notion of social capital.

Lack of agreement on the conceptualization of social capital has not kept it from being widely-used, not only as a way to academically understand what makes some communities and societies more or less successful in economic and social terms, but also in initiating public policies. In this line, many countries are developing policies specifically designed to create, foment, and develop social capital as a basis for development.

Returning to the subject of definition-and despite the fact that the general consensus on this basic concept is somewhat remote-many researchers and academics refer to social capital emphasizing conditions of trust among citizens as well as their participation in diverse areas of social life as

well as trust in institutions. Interpersonal trust, trust in institutions, and participation in organizations form the basis for the present study on Salvadoran political culture.

Social or interpersonal trust is probably the aspect of social capital that has been most studied as a synonym of this concept. In fact, this is true for a good part of the work carried out by Putnam and Fukuyama, though they are cautious when using the concept of trust as a simple synonym for social capital. Others have been more direct in comparing-almost completely-both terms. According to some authors, this is due to the need to have an indicator that easily operationalizes the concept in order to collect, with a degree of precision, the attitudes of people when they relate with other people and establish social networks. This seems to be the advantage in designing studies by using participation in organizations to easily operationalize the partial indicator. In fact, in his most ambitious work on the subject, Putnam approaches social capital in the United States by measuring levels of citizen participation in organizations, clubs, and community associations. He makes surprising discoveries including the fact that the act of joining a group or club reduces the probability of death in the following year by half.

All of this illustrates the complexity involved with empirically evaluating a concept for which there is still a lot of debate and little agreement. Many methodological and operationalization problems have arisen when measuring manifestations of this construct. This has created doubt about the empirical pertinence. Some academics believe that the concept has not been sufficiently developed such that it can be useful in research, especially given that diverse research efforts have produced contradictory results. As stated by Portela and Neira, in the end, all research efforts on social capital should be made using approximate variables given the problem that there is no unanimity about the most adequate indicators.

Despite this, few researchers doubt the importance that the construct or notion of social capital plays in understanding why some human societies or communities are more successful than others in achieving their objectives. Beyond whether social capital is limited to interpersonal trust or includes participation in social organizations and networks or social control norms, it is clear that for a community to function, certain basic levels of trust are needed among its members. It also seems apparent that for many reasons it is better that a community is organized and that its members actively participate rather than being disorganized and with no coordination of activities among members.

In El Salvador, there are few studies on social capital. A thematic principle of The 2001 Report on Human Development in El Salvador is the topic of social capital and its importance in the country's human development. With the exception of some studies on social capital and local dynamics published by the *Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales* and PRISMA, and another study on violence, gangs, and social capital published by the UCA, there has been very little development of this topic in El Salvador.

But why is it important to study social capital and its links to democracy? The best response comes from the Lundwall's text on a study of social capital in Honduras: "Societies in which citizens trust and cooperate with one another favor more responsible and efficient governments, increasing the ability to offer quality public goods creating better conditions for an inclusive democracy and a more accelerated development of society."

This chapter explores social capital in El Salvador, understanding the concept as a construct formed by interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and citizen participation. The survey results linked to social capital are examined with the variables of political culture that are important for sustaining democracy. We first review the results regarding interpersonal trust in the country. The second section does the same for those items that refer to trust in institutions. The third section develops the topic of Salvadoran civic participation and the fourth and final section expounds on the results of the social capital variable based on the previous variables.


8.1 Interpersonal Trust in El Salvador

The subject of interpersonal trust was addressed utilizing three questions in the El Salvador survey. The questions are as follows:

IT1. Now, speaking of the people here, would you say that your community is . . . (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) A little trustworthy (4) Not at all trustworthy (8) Don't know
IT2. Do you think that most of the time people only worry about themselves or do you think that most of the time people try to help their neighbors? (1) They worry about themselves (2) They try to help their neighbors (8) Don't know
IT3. Do you think that if given the opportunity, the majority of people would try to take advantage of you, or do you think that they wouldn't take advantage of you? (1) Yes, they would take advantage (2) They wouldn't take advantage (8) Don't know


The results of the questions expose varied expressions of trust. To compare them with one another, the results were converted to 0 to 100 scales in which 100 represents the highest possible level of interpersonal trust and 0 the lowest. Graph VIII.1 presents the results. As we can see, in the most general item of trust, Salvadorans have a relatively high level of interpersonal trust; however, when they were asked if their compatriots help their neighbors or don't take advantage of one another, the responses were not as high and were practically dropped to half of the level reached by the general question about trust.

Graph VIII.1 Average of the Questions That Make Up the Scale of Trust




These questions were integrated into a single “interpersonal trust” scale that reflects a general measure of the level of trust that Salvadorans have with one another. This exercise shows that Salvadorans have an average trust (between 0 and 100) that reaches the score of 46, practically the highest in the entire region with the exception of Costa Rica. As we see in Graph VIII.2, when the countries are ordered according to their interpersonal trust ranking, El Salvador has one of the highest averages (46.2), placing ahead of the majority of its neighbors included in the study. Only Costa Rica exhibited a higher average of interpersonal trust (46.3).

Graph VIII.2 Interpersonal Trust According to Country




What types of people express higher levels of interpersonal trust in El Salvador? The data shows two variables that are particularly important: the age of the people and their level of educational formation. As we can appreciate in Graph VIII.3, as people get older, they express greater levels of trust for their compatriots. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that the youngest members of the population are those who are most distrusted in El Salvador. This could be due to many things, but it would be interesting to explore the impact of problems like violence and gangs, problems that specifically affect youth and for this reason could have an effect on levels of interpersonal trust.

Graph VIII.3 Interpersonal Trust According to Age



An interesting phenomenon occurs with the variable of education. Those who have no or very little educational formation exhibit greater trust in their compatriots than those who have higher levels of education. Moreover, the graphic in question shows that the relationship between both variables is linear: greater education, less trust in other people.

Graph VIII.4 Interpersonal Trust According to Educational Level



The survey revealed that trust is not just associated with the personal variables described above. There are also a couple of environmental conditions that significantly determine the level of credibility that the Salvadorans give one another. One of these factors is victimization due to criminal violence. As we saw in Chapter V of this report, victimization due to crime affects the levels of institutional trust and system support. However, the findings in this chapter offer us with another impact of violence: it affects the trust among people, which, as we will see, also erodes the conditions for social capital—the ability to establish relationships of mutual cooperation and solidarity. Those who were victims of criminal violence during the year prior to the survey show lower average of trust in their neighbors and compatriots than those who have not been victims during the past year.


Table VIII.1 Interpersonal Trust According to Victimization Due to Crime

Victim during the past year of . . .	Average level of interpersonal trust
Crime	
Yes	47
No	40

Sig. < 0.01

According to the results exhibited in Graph VIII.5, trust among citizens is found to be closely related to system support and satisfaction with democratic performance: the greater level of interpersonal trust, the greater system support and approval of democratic performance in El Salvador.

Graph VIII.5 System Support and Satisfaction With Democratic Performance According to Interpersonal Trust




8.2 Trust in the Institutions

Chapter three has explored trust in institutions in El Salvador. This section will include a functional review of what this means as a component of social capital. The first interesting figure that we see from this series is that the consolidated trust level in concrete institutions in the country is one of the highest in the region.

If a scale is constructed based on the institutional trust items that are common to all of the countries participating in the 2004 edition of the Latin American Opinion Poll Project of Vanderbilt University, we find that the average of institutional trust for El Salvador is 58 (on a scale of 0 to 100), practically the highest in the region.


Graph VIII.6 Trust in the Institutions According to Country



In concentrating on El Salvador, what variables appear to be associated with institutional trust? The results indicate that it tends to be context variables rather than personal variables. That is to say, aspects such as gender and age have not been proven to affect the levels of institutional trust. On the other hand, educational formation, average family income, level of personal possessions in the home, and size of city of residence did prove to have a relationship with trust in institutions.


As with interpersonal trust, trust in the institutions went down as the educational level of those surveyed increased. Hence, contrary to what one would expect, people with lower levels of education have greater trust in institutions. This can be explained by the fact that those with more education have a more critical attitude when evaluating institutional efforts. The person with more education generally relates more frequently with institutions holding certain expectations that cannot always be met by the government offices. This is probably associated with the fact that those with greater resources, on the other hand, have the least amount of trust in the institutions.

Graph VIII.7 Institutional Trust According to Educational Level



Another condition that turned out to be significant in the levels of institutional trust was the citizens' city size and also whether or not the respondents lived in an urban or rural area. Those Salvadorans living in rural areas expressed greater trust in the institutions than those that live in the cities, and the level of trust clearly reduces as the size of the city increases. Thus, the lowest level of trust in institutions is found precisely where the majority of these institutions are physically located: in the capital, the San Salvador Metropolitan Area.


Graph VIII.8 Institutional Trust According to City Size



On the other hand, institutional trust also proved to be related with system support and satisfaction with the El Salvador's democracy efforts. This could become redundant, considering

that trust in institutions is, at its heart, a more specific level of system support. However, it isn't always necessarily true. People can be very disenchanted with institutional performance and express low levels of trust in the specific institutions and still actively support the more general political order and the idea that democracy is important. In the case of El Salvador, however, the data has found that trust in the institutions contributes to maintaining trust in the system as a whole.


Graph VIII.9 System Support and Satisfaction With Democratic Performance According to Level of Institutional Trust



8.3 Civic Participation

Another fundamental component of social capital is citizen participation. To measure this condition, several survey questions were used to measure attendance at meetings, belonging to organizations, or participation in different types of meetings within the local government. The results of the questions are shown in Graph VIII.10. Salvadorans tend to participate more in religious organizations, have a closer relationship with the mayor's office, and collaborate with the community more frequently than other activities. However, a general look indicates that the percentages of participation are, in reality, very low.

Graph VIII.10 Average of the Questions About Civic Participation or Attendance




Thus a scale was formed with a group of items that would reflect an acceptable accounting coefficient (Cronbach Alpha= 0.708). These items (not all of which are shown in the previous graphic) are:

CP5. In the last year have you contributed to or tried to contribute to solving any problems in your community or of a neighbor? (1) Yes, (2) No			
CP8. How often do you attend meetings of a board of trust of confidence? (1) Once a week, (2) Once or twice a month, (3) Once or twice a year, (4) Never			
CP13. How often do you attend meetings of a political party? (1) Once a week, (2) Once or twice a month, (3) Once or twice a year, (4) Never			
<i>In order to resolve one of your problems have you ever asked for help or cooperation from ...</i>	Yes	No	Don't know/Didn't respond
CP2. Any deputy of National Congress	(1)	(2)	(8)
CP4. Any government ministry, public institution or office of the national government	(1)	(2)	(8)
CP4A. Any local authority (mayor, municipality)	(1)	(2)	(8)
NP1. Have you attended an open town meeting or another meeting convened by the mayor during the past twelve months?	(1)	(2)	(8)
NP1A. Have you attended a session of the municipal corporation during the past twelve months?	(1)	(2)	(8)
NP2. Have you solicited help or presented a petition to any office, official or governor of the municipality during the past twelve months?	(1)	(2)	(8)

As we have done with the other indicators, the variable of civic participation was constructed by standardizing the results on a scale of 0 to 100 and the average was taken from all of the items as a whole. The results indicate that civic participation in El Salvador is, in fact, very low. It is practically the lowest in the region. This would imply that in reality the Salvadorans, despite their high institutional trust and relative interpersonal trust, participate very little in associations.


Graph VIII.11 Civic Participation According to Country



However, civic participation is not the same for all Salvadorans. The results indicate that men tend to participate more than women; they also show that those with higher levels of education participate more than the rest of the population and, once again, the data indicates that those people who live in the country's rural areas and smaller towns are more involved in civic participation activities.

This data explains in part the previous results on trust. As we expounded upon a few pages back, trust indexes are very high in the rural zones and small cities. The response to this phenomenon could lie in the fact that in the countryside and in the small cities people tend to participate and relate to one another more, thereby building networks that allow for the creation of interpersonal and institutional trust. As Putnam described in his study in Italy, participation facilitates effective contact with institutions and thereby generates greater trust.


Graph VIII.12 Civic Participation According to Size of City of Residence



Other results refer to the level of civic participation according to the condition of victimization due to crime and corruption. Contrary to the trend with other components of social capital, in terms of participation, those who are victimized by violence or corruption tend to participate more than those who have not been victimized.


In the case of crime, participation increases as victimization due to violence becomes more severe, that is when a person has been physically assaulted. In the case of victimization due to corruption, civic participation seems to increase for those people who have been victimized two or more times. How do we explain this phenomenon? In the case of violence, the most plausible explanation is that many people that are victimized make more effort to participate in the organizations in an effort to seek support following their victimization and also because they relate more with the institutions via procedures related to their case.

Graph VIII.13 Civic Participation According to Degree of Victimization Due to Crime



Other equally interesting data revealed that participation is higher among those citizens that were victims of the civil war suffered in El Salvador more than twelve years ago. As we can see in Graph VIII.14, the effects of the war have resulted in greater participation among these people than the rest of the population. This probably has to do with the recovery processes after the war, but also with the political commitment of these people.


Graph VIII.14 Civic Participation According to Level to Which One Was Affected by the War



In all of the cases, the data indicates that civic participation affects levels of system legitimacy, but in an inverse manner to that which was expected. Those who participate more tend to express less system support, that is, they have less respect for the political institutions in the country, tend to be less proud to live in the political system, and, among other things, less frequently feel that their basic rights are well protected. We might interpret these unexpected results by

understanding that those who participate more frequently in civic organizations tend to be more critical of the system, precisely because their interaction generates debates and therefore more critical attitudes toward the institutional organization.

Graph VIII.15 System Support According to Levels of Civic Participation




8.4 Social Capital

The variables of interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and civic participation were used to create the social capital variable. It is important to understand that this is the indicator of the concept discussed at the beginning of this chapter and execution of the previous analysis serves to locate the variables that most influence the social capital configuration.

In the first place, a comparison of the social capital indexes of the countries participating in the study show that El Salvador is in the middle of the regional ranking, below the countries of Costa Rica, Colombia and Mexico, but above its closest neighbors in Central American.


Graph VIII.16 Social Capital in a Comparative Perspective



The results show that men express more social capital than women; that is to say, men establish relationships of collaboration that offer them greater interpersonal and institutional trust than women. This is logical if we consider that male activity is more developed in public spaces while women are more confined to private spaces.


Our data also shows, as expected from the previous results, that social capital is more frequently concentrated in rural areas of the country and, in juxtaposition, tends to be more scarce in large cities and in the national metropolis. These figures are not surprising when considering that cooperation and solidarity networks are more developed in rural areas than in the cities.

Graph VIII.17 Social Capital According to City Size




The results show that besides gender and size of the city in which people live, no other personal conditions affect the magnitude of social capital. In this case, variables that collected information about victimization were not significant. However, a factor that did seem to be associated was the feeling of lack of safety. Those who feel unsafe tend to display less social capital than those who feel safe. In this case, the effect of lack of safety is not direct, but its environmental impact cannot be overlooked. Other aspects such as gang presence and beliefs about whether the police protect the community or are involved with crime are also related. As noted in other studies, the perceived presence of violence affects prospects to establish constructive relationships of collaboration and mutual reciprocity in a community.

Graph VIII.18 Social Capital According to Sensation of Lack of Safety Due to Crime




Graph VIII.19 Social Capital According to Neighborhoods Affected by Gangs



Given all of this, we conclude by saying that it is not surprising that social capital has an important effect on system legitimacy. As we see in Graph VIII.20, social capital stimulates support for legitimacy. With elevated social capital, citizens also are seen to be significantly more satisfied with democratic performance in El Salvador and they tend to perceive the country as more democratic than those who live in contexts of low social capital.

Graph VIII.20 System Support and Satisfaction With Democratic Performance According to Level of Social Capital



8.5 Conclusions

This chapter has shown that interpersonal trust stimulates the level of system support and satisfaction with democratic performance; it also shows that citizens' trust in institutions is strongly linked with system legitimacy. In the area of civic participation, the study revealed that Salvadorans have low levels of citizen participation, the lowest in the Central American region. However, in this case, high civic participation does not imply elevated system support, on the contrary: those who participate more in organizations tend to express less legitimacy for the political system.

Finally, the results shown in this chapter have signaled that social capital-understood as a combination of interpersonal trust, trust in institutions, civic participation, and willingness to participate-is important for political system legitimacy and for the vision that democracy is functioning in the country. With greater social capital, people seem to be more satisfied with the country's performance and seem to give greater support to the Salvadoran political system.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Description of the Methodology of the Study in El Salvador

Appendix B: Technical Note and Regression Tables

Appendix C: IRB Letter

Appendix D: Letter of Agreement from IUDOP

Appendix E: Questionnaire

Appendix A: Description of the Methodology of the Study in El Salvador

Determination of the Sample

1.1 Universal Population

The universe of the study takes into account the entire geography of the country, which is made of 14 departments and 262 municipalities, including their urban and rural zones.

In accordance with the Population Projection of El Salvador 1995 - 2025 of the General Statistics and Census Office of the Ministry of the Economy (DIGESTYC). In 2004 the country's total population is 6,638,177, of which 59.52% are concentrated in the country's urban zones and the remaining 40.48% correspond to the inhabitants of rural zones.

1.2. Population

The persons who are objects of this study correspond to the population over 18 years of age, residing in houses.

1.3. Sample Method

The first criterion in designing the procedure of the sample is that the resultant sample reflect most loyally the total Salvadoran population, using as a foundation the Population Projection of the General Statistics and Census Office of the Ministry of the Economy (DIGESTYC)

The system of the sample will be probabilistic, stratified, multistage, by set, and random in the selection of the members in each of the stages that this sample represents.

The sample will be stratified according to the 262 municipalities that make up the 14 departments of the country; and will take into account various stages of the selection of the members. In the beginning the First Members of the Sample will be chosen which correspond precisely to the municipalities, next the Second Members which correspond to the census segments in the urban area and cantons in the rural area, then the Members of the Third Stage will be chosen made up of blocks, and finally conglomerates of 6, 7, and 8 houses in the urban area - depending on the stratum - and 12 houses in the rural area. In each stratum the First Members of the Sample will be selected according to the probability proportional to the size of the population in each municipality

In each house, only one home will be selected and in this only one person over 18 years of age will be chosen, who fulfills the requisites of Gender and age needed to complete the sample.

1.4. Sample Framework

Said framework is composed by census cartography obtained by the General Statistics and Census Office (DIGESTYC), which includes the urban zones of the country as well as the cantons that make up the rural zones.

Most of the census cartography is updated until 1996 and others until 2000, as part of the efforts of DIGESTYC to update their base of information for the Census of Multifunction Homes. However it is necessary to mention that a part of the cartography that will be used in the survey corresponds to that raised as a part of the 1992 census which has not been updated since, but is the only one currently available, especially in the case of certain maps in the rural zone.

1.5. Sample Size

It was previously decided to carry out a total of 1,500 interviews, taking into account the aforementioned data and considering 95% reliability (Z), a variance of 50% (p), an estimated sample error of +/- 2.5%. To establish said error, the following formula was designed for infinite populations:

$$E = \sqrt{Z^2 pq / n}$$

Where,

$$E = \sqrt{(1.96)^2 (0.5) (0.5) / 1,500} = 2.5$$

The method of selection of the sample will be multistage, making a series of stratifications within the process of sample that will allow for the selection of the random sample.

1.6. Determination of the Sample by Stratum and Urban/Rural Areas

Due to lack of information concerning the urban and rural populations by municipality, the said population was estimated using the annual growth rate in the urban zone and in the rural zone at a national level. Because of which, existing data regarding population growth in the urban and rural zones in the years 1995, 2000 and 2005, was used to estimate the municipal data of interest of the year 2004. This way, taking the data from the National Census of 1992 of the Ministry of the Economy and the Office of Statistics and Census (DIGESTYC), the population information for municipalities is obtained for the year 1992.

To this data the estimated annual population growth rate is applied for the years 1992 to 1995 to obtain the urban and rural population for 1995.

For example, the annual growth rate for the urban area between 1992 and 1995 was 8.2%. To estimate the urban population per municipality for 1995 the following formula was used:

$$\text{Urban municipal population for 1995} = [(8.2/100) \times \text{Urban municipal population in 1992} \times 3] + \text{Urban municipal population in 1992}$$

In the case of the rural zone, it was calculated that the annual growth rate was -1.1%. To estimate the rural population by municipality in 1995, the following formula was used:

$$\text{Rural municipal population for 1995} = [(-1.1/100) \times \text{Rural municipal population in 1992} \times 3] + \text{Rural municipal population in 1992}$$

With the data obtained for the urban population - rural by municipality in 1995, the same procedure was repeated to calculate the population in 2000 and then in 2004, based on the data obtained earlier for 1995. The formulas used to calculate the urban and rural populations for 2000 and later 2004 are the following:

$$\text{Urban municipal population for 2000} = [(2.6/100) \times \text{Urban municipal population in 1995} \\ \times 5] + \text{Urban municipal population in 1995}$$
$$\text{Rural municipal population for 2000} = [(1.3/100) \times \text{Rural municipal population in 1995} \\ \times 3] + \text{Rural municipal population in 1995}$$
$$\text{Urban municipal population for 2004} = [(2.3/100) \times \text{Urban municipal population in 2000} \\ \times 3] + \text{Urban municipal population in 2000}$$
$$\text{Rural municipal population for 2000} = [(1.2/100) \times \text{Rural municipal population in 2000} \\ \times 3] + \text{Rural municipal population in 2000}$$

Having the population quantities for urban and rural zones in each municipality and the total quantity in each one of them, the population was immediately stratified based on the number of inhabitants per municipality; in this study; these became the First Sample Members. The first stratum was made of those municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants (These municipalities have a probability of selection of 1, that is, they are auto selected within the sample); the second stratum contained the municipalities with 50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants; the third stratum contained those municipalities with 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants and the fourth and last stratum included the municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants.

In a previous step, the number of ballots to apply to each stratum in accordance with the population quantity that made up each of them was determined. Thus, the first stratum is comprised of 39.07% of the total population of the country, for which there would have to be in said stratum 586 ballots of the total 1500 established for the sample. Stratum two includes 15.5% of the total population, thus 233 surveys would have to be applied, the third and fourth stratum pool 21.2% and 24.23% of the total population respectively, and 318 and 363 corresponding surveys in each one, respectively.

In accordance with the rural and urban population that is concentrated in each stratum, the number of ballots for each stratum established earlier was distributed, in accordance with the urban and rural population quantities in each of them. Thus, for example, in the first stratum, it was estimated that 586 inquiries would have to be carried out, of which 89.59% would be done in the urban zone and 10.41 in the rural - this is 525 and 61 inquiries in each zone respectively - and thus successively in each stratum. Next the detail of the distribution of the sample for each stratum and zone will be presented.

Table 1 Distribution of the Sample by Stratum and Zone

Stratum	Size of sample		Urban sample		Rural sample	
	%	n	%	n	%	n
Stratum 1	39.07	586	89.59	525	10.41	61
Stratum 2	15.50	233	54.70	127	45.30	106
Stratum 3	21.20	318	39.41	125	60.59	193
Stratum 4	24.23	363	35.12	127	64.88	236
Total	100.00	1500		904		596
Stratum	Size of sample		Urban sample		Rural sample	
	%	n	%	n	%	n
Stratum 1	39.07	586	89.59	525	10.41	61
Stratum 2	15.50	233	54.70	127	45.30	106
Stratum 3	21.20	318	39.41	125	60.59	193
Stratum 4	24.23	363	35.12	127	64.88	236
Total	100.00	1500		904		596

1.7. Adjustment of the Sample for “No Coverage”

In this sample, the replacement of sample members with the object of eliminating the biases that this situation could generate and replace will not be permitted; for the same reason and in order to guarantee the development of the sample with minimal expected sizes, in a previous step an “adjustment for no coverage” was made in the size of the sample in each zone (urban - rural) of each of the stratum, taking in to account the “no coverage” factor. Said factor used in each stratum and in urban and rural zones, is estimated based on the experience of IUDOP in previous studies. For example, in the case of the municipalities in stratum 1, the rate of “no survey” is 0.15 in the urban and 0.2 in the rural zones. Based on that, the new size of the sample for the urban zone is the following:

$$n^* = (1 + t) \times n$$

$$n^* = (1 + 0.15) \times 525$$

$$n^* = 604$$

And in the case of the rural zone:

$$n^* = (1 + t) \times n$$

$$n^* = (1 + 0.2) \times 61$$

$$n^* = 73$$

Table 2 Distribution of the Sample Adjusted According to the “Rate of No Coverage” According to Stratum and Zone

Stratum	Adjusted urban sample	Adjusted rural sample	Adjusted sample size
Stratum 1	604	73	677
Stratum 2	146	127	273
Stratum 3	144	232	376
Stratum 4	140	283	423
Total	1034	715	1749

1.8. Selection of the Different Members of the Sample

To continue the process, the municipalities that will be included within the sample (in each stratum) were selected, followed by the selection of the cantons in the rural zones and the segments of the urban zones. This last process of selection of segments was carried out when the entire census maps of the urban zones and the municipalities that make up the sample were on hand, later followed the process of their segmentation - which will be explained in detail below.

For the selection of the municipalities, the number of pools that would have to be chosen to complete the urban sample in each of the stratum were taken into account. Thus it was previously defined that in stratum one, pools of six houses each would be chosen, in stratum two and three, seven houses would be chosen and in stratum four each pool would have eight houses. In the case of stratum one, it was calculated that 604 surveys in the urban area would be realized, this was divided into six to obtain the number of pools necessary, which resulted in a total of 101 pools. Since in this stratum, the municipalities were auto selected, the total pools in each municipality in proportion to the size of each were distributed. To this end, the procedure described below was applied.

A list of municipalities per stratum was constructed, ordered from largest to smallest according to the size of the population in each of them. Furthermore, the list contained a column of the accumulative sum of the populations of each of the municipalities. Next, a random starting point was chosen from the accumulative list and an interval was established to be followed from this random starting point, a systematic selection of the municipalities within each department. To select the random starting point, a random number was generated in each stratum using the RAND function in Excel (normalized random number between 0 and 1). Said number was multiplied by the total estimated population for 2004 that was pooled by each stratum and the municipality where the resultant quantity was located in the accumulative list was the first municipality selected. For example, in the case of stratum 1, the random number generated by excel was 0.876794, by multiplying this by the total population pooled in this stratum ($0.876794 \times 2,576,271$) the result 2,258,859 was given, this number was found in the corresponding accumulated quantity in the municipality of Ilopango, for this reason, this municipality was the first to be placed in the first pool within the first stratum.

Next, to continue with the placement of all the corresponding pools of the stratum, an interval was made, which was determined by dividing the total population of the stratum into the number of pools necessary to complete the sample. Said intervals were summed with the indicial quantity determined by the first municipality, and thus the municipality where the second pool would be placed was that one which completed said sum, and thus successively until all pools in the stratum were placed. In the case of stratum 1, all municipalities were formed by more than one pool because of the fact that these pool a considerable population quantity. Continuing with stratum 1, the interval which was obtained by dividing the total population of the stratum into the number of pools needed ($2,576,271/101$) was 25,508, this interval was summed with the indicial quantity ($2,258,859 + 25,508$) and the value of 2,284,367 was obtained, which indicated the second municipality where the next pool would be located, which in this case resulted in the same municipality of Ilopango. In this manner all pools in the stratum were successively placed. When the application of the sum of intervals exceeded the total stratum population, it accumulated in order to continue with the procedure from the beginning of the list of said

stratum. This aforementioned procedure was used in each of the stratum to select the municipalities to include the sample and place it in the necessary pools in order to complete the sample of each stratum.

Table 3 List of Municipalities in Stratum 2 Used for Their Selection

Municipality	Population	Accumulated Population	Order of selection in the urban area
Usulután	86,585	86,585	5,6
San Marcos	82,877	169,462	7
Chalchuapa	80,361	249,823	8,9
Cuscatancingo	76,730	326,553	10,11
Zacatecoluca	75,443	401,996	12
San Martín	73,974	475,969	13,14
Cojutepeque	65,405	541,375	15
Ilobasco	65,023	606,397	16
Izalco	64,904	671,301	17,18
San Vicente	61,515	732,817	19
Metapán	59,931	792,748	20
Quezaltepeque	59,835	852,583	21
Acajutla	58,760	911,343	1,2
Opico	57,633	968,976	3
Colón	53,531	1,022,507	4
Total	1,022,507		

Random number generated: 0.841020

Initial quantity of selection: $1,022,507 \times 0.841020 = 859,949$

Obtained interval: $1,022,507 / 21 = 48,691$.

Table 3 specifies how the municipalities in stratum 2 were selected. In the first column, the municipalities included in stratum 2 of the largest and smallest populations are listed, the second column shows the population of each municipality; in the third, the accumulated population is detailed and the last specifies the order in which the municipalities were chosen. As one can see, when the application of the sum of the interval exceeds the total population of the stratum, it is accumulated in order to continue with the procedure from the beginning of the list.

Once a municipality is selected in each stratum and the urban sample is distributed in each of them, the rural sample is then distributed in each stratum. For this, the same procedure was used as that for the urban sample, with the difference that this time, the selected municipalities from the last step were only listed from largest to smallest, to distribute the rural sample in these municipalities. In the case of the rural sample, pools of 12 houses were established; in this case each pool of 12 houses corresponds to a selected canton.

It must be mentioned, that in the case of some municipalities, that according to the 1992 census, they no longer have a rural population and they were selected in the sample through the process of distribution of the urban sample. They were eliminated from the list used to distribute the pools necessary to cover the rural sample in each stratum. In said municipalities, only the total of pools will be produced which correspond to them in accordance with the urban sample.

Afterward, the different points in the sample in each municipality that should be included in the sample will be chosen. For this, two different procedures will be used depending on the nature of

the zone of the municipality. In the urban zones, each municipality will be divided in population segments based on the maps of the General Statistics and Census Office (DIGESTYC); while in the rural zones, the cantons will be designated as a population unit and will be listed in order to be randomly selected.

In the specific case of the rural zones, of each municipality selected, as many cantons as pools will be elected as necessary to cover the sample, which was carried out in a totally random form. In the majority of cases it was necessary to choose only one canton per municipality and only in a few cases was it necessary to select two cantons. The cantons were ordered alphabetically within each selected municipality, and then a random number between 0 and 1 was selected. This number was multiplied by the total number of cantons in the municipality and the canton located at the resulting number was selected; when two cantons were needed, the same procedure was used to select the second canton.

In the urban zones, the process of selection of the segments where the survey will be applied will be systematic with a random starting point using the maps of DIGESTYC. In each municipality as many segments as groups which correspond to each municipality will be selected. That is to say, in each segment, only the quantity of surveys that correspond to one pool will be taken, and that will vary depending on the stratum to which each municipality belongs, as was mentioned earlier.

Each map of the municipalities shows an urban zone of two thousand to fifteen thousand households and will be divided in numbered segments correlatively following a spiral sequence. Each segment will cover about 100 households in those municipalities with low population concentrations and about 300 households in those that are densely populated. Once divided in maps, a constant will be calculated which permits the selection of segments in a systematic form, according to the quantity of pools that correspond to each municipality to complete the urban sample.

Next, for each urban map, the number of segments of the municipal map will be divided into the number of segments which will be included in the sample, which in turn correspond to the number of pools necessary to cover it. This will result in a statistic that will be converted in to and a fixed interval, according to which the segments will be chosen based on the random starting point. For example, if the division of the total number of segments between the number of segments to be chosen gives a result of 8, a random number between 1 and 8 will be chosen, and from this number segments will be chosen at an interval of every 8 segments. More specifically, if the randomly selected number is 6, the segment with this number will be chosen, then 8 segments more will be added and thus the next segment chosen will be 14, and this will go on successively until all of the stipulated segments are chosen for this municipality.

The sample will include a total of 221 distinct points of sample, taking into account urban and rural zones - 60 points of sample in the rural and 161 in the urban.

The application of the questionnaire will be carried out in a systematic approximation to the homes located in the segments and cantons. In the case of the urban zones, each segment will be divided in a determined number of blocks, each containing a constant quantity of houses. Then,

from each segment, one block will be randomly selected. Afterward, in each selected block, a pool of 6, 7 or 8 adjacent houses will be selected - depending on the stratum to which the municipality belongs. Said houses will be selected starting from the house situated most to the south of the selected block - this will be the first house in the pool - and the next 5 houses (or 6, or 7) will correspond to the houses which are contiguously located next to the first house selected, traveling the block clockwise.

In the cantons, the south most house of the canton will be selected and the 11 houses contiguous to that will be taken just like in the urban zone; that is to say, the canton will be followed clockwise.

In each of the houses which make up the pool one person will be found to fill the required requisites of the study. The interviewers will explain to the persons in the house the objectives and the general theme of the study and will interview only those who wish to collaborate, interviewing only one person per family who meets with the characteristics of gender and age required to complete the survey. For which, each ballot will be marked with the gender and age range of the interviewee.

In the last stage of the sampling, said quotas for gender and age of the persons to be interviewed will be considered. The intention of this is to insure a distribution of the sample that corresponds to the distribution of the total population of the country in accordance with these two variables; and at the same time to eliminate the personal selection criteria of the interviewer in choosing the person to be interviewed in each house. The quotas for gender and age will be distributed as shown in Table 4.

Table 4 Distribution of Quotas by Sex and Age (Sample Adjusted for No Coverage)

Age	SEX								
	Male			Female			Total		
	Quantity of the Population*			Quantity of the Population*			Quantity of the population*		
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	
18 to 34 years	1,030,173	26.20	458	1,038,550	26.42	462	2,068,723	52.62	920
35 years and up	853,598	21.71	380	1,009,137	25.67	449	1,862,735	47.38	829
Total	1,883,771	47.91	838	2,047,687	52.09	911	3,931,458	100.00	1749

* According to projections for 2004. See: DIGESTYC, FNUAP y CELADE (1996).

All of the aforementioned procedures permit the randomness and dispersion of the selection of the sample, which insures the representation of the population in the study.

Processing of the Information

The processing of the information was carried out in various stages. At the beginning, the questionnaires were revised with the goal of verifying that they were completely answered and that they met the requirements of sex and age of the persons interviewed according to the seal that was marked on each one of them. Afterward, they were codified, placing the right codes in the corresponding box in each of the variables of the instrument, using the codes that the ballot had on each question. Furthermore, a book of codes was used in the case of specific variables of the country that had no established codes in the ballot.

Once the questionnaires were codified, these were again revised to guarantee an adequate codification. Next the data was entered into the computer. For the data entry of the ballots, the packet "Census and Survey Processing System (CSPRO)" was used. Each ballot was entered two times in the same packet, as was planned, with the goal of verifying the databases and proving the adequate and correct processing of information. For this, once the databases were finished with all of the ballots processed, a comparison of the data using CSPRO and the packet generates a file containing the disparities found in the bases and their location, so that they can be verified and corrected. Thus is obtained a base free of errors of data entry.

Finally, the database was exported to "Statistical Package for Social Science" (SPSS), in order to carry out all of the necessary analysis to draw up the study, and design charts and graphics.

Statistical Analysis

Relatively simple statistical methods are used. To establish the association between two numeric variables, the Pearson correlation coefficient is used. This has values of 0 to 1. When there exists perfect correspondence between the two values of the coefficient it is equal to the unit. In the meantime, to establish the association between continuous variables and another category, variance analysis is used. To establish if there is a statistically significant relationship between the two variable categories, the chi-squared test is used. To integrate the information from various questions about the same theme, simple addition scales are used. The resultant index is always normalized in such a way that it takes on values of 0 to 100. As an indicator of the consistency or internal reliability of the scales thus designed the Cronbach Alpha coefficient is used. Coefficients of 0.70 or more are considered trustworthy and consistent, however in some cases scales whose coefficients are less than said value are used. Factorial analysis is also used to determine the number of dimensions or factors implicit in a series of questions of the same theme.

In repeated occasions, multiple linear regression models were considered for minimum ordinary squares. Usually the dependant variable in these models is some index constructed with various reactivities. The regression coefficients of these models (and their significance) permit concise valuing of the co-factors that "explain" these indexes. Even though we sometimes refer to these co-factors as "determinants," in reality, with the available information, it is not possible to establish coincidental relationships. They only have "associations." In the regression models "Beta" standardized coefficients of regression are also seen. These are useful for valuing the relative importance of the different explanatory factors of the model, as they measure the effects in standard units. As an indicator of the kindness of the adjustment of the model in its set, the coefficient of determination or "R squared" is used. This coefficient informs of the proportion of variance explained by the model in its set, in comparison with the explanation that would be obtained by a "null" model (dependant variable estimated simply by its average.) Binary logistic regression models are also used when the dependant variable is dichotomist in its values. In these cases, the Nagelkerke "R squared" is used as an indicator of the variance explained by the model.

Precision of the Results

All surveys by sample are affected by two types of errors: the non-sample errors and sample errors. The non-sample errors are those which are committed during the collection and

processing of the information, these can be audited by the construction of an adequate measurement instrument, training the interviewers in the correct application of the instrument, supervising the field work, creating an efficient program of data capture, revision of the questionnaires and adequate codification, just like a cleaning of the file, among others. These errors can be audited, but they cannot be quantified. In any case, the comparison of the results of the sample with those of the population give an idea of whether these errors have generated biases that subtract from the representative correctness of the model.

Sample errors, on the other hand, are products of chance and result from the survey of a sample and not the total population. When a sample is selected, this is one of the many possible samples that can be selected from a population. The variability that exists among all of the possible samples is the sample error, which can be measured if one could have available all of these samples, an obviously impossible situation. In practice, the error of the variance is obtained from the same sample. To estimate the sample error in one statistic (averages, percents, differences and totals), the standard error is calculated, which is the square root of the population variance of the statistic. This permits the measurement of the degree of precision with which the statistic approximates the result, after having surveyed all of the elements of the population under the same conditions. In the calculation of this error it is very important to consider the design of the selected sample.

The effect of the design, EDD, indicates the efficiency of the design employed in relation to the design of an unrestricted random sample (URS). A value of 1 indicates that the variance obtained by both designs (complex and URS) is the same; that is, the complex sample is as efficient as a URS with the same sample size. If the value is greater than 1, the complex sample creates a greater variance than that obtained by a URS; a value of less than 1 indicates that the variance obtained with the complex sample is less than that obtained by the URS.

In Table 5 the sample errors are presented (typical errors, TE), as are the effects of design for some selected variables. The squares further show the effect of the design, such as the value of the statistic in question (average or proportion). The TE are evaluated with the digital packet Strata 8. It shows that the estimations are reasonably precise since they present small standard errors. For example, for the support for democracy index, probably the most important indicator of the study, the standard error is 0.95. This means that the average sample of the index of 59 has an interval of trustworthiness of 95%, of 1.96 times the TE, which is between 57.2 and 61.4

The effects of design are of certain consideration since a very large unit, the municipality, was adopted as UPM. The convenience of having the sample for municipal studies, had, then, to pay the cost with a certain loss of efficiency. High design effects (say, more than 2) indicated that these are variables with a strong local determinism, that is, they vary relatively little within the community, or in this case, the municipality, in comparison with the variation between communities. The presence of design effects substantially larger than the unit would require the use of large estimators (which take into account the effect of pooling) of the tests of significance. Unfortunately these large estimators are not available in SPSS, the packet assumes URS. The tests of statistical significance should be interpreted, then, in a conservative manner.

Table 5 Sample errors of selected indexes³

Variables	Total Sample				Stratum 1				Stratum 2				Stratum 3				Stratum 4			
	N	X	ET	EED	N	X	ET	EED	N	X	ET	EED	N	X	ET	EED	N	X	ET	EED
Age	1589	37.9	0.31	0.59	1589	37.9	0.40	0.39	1589	38.1	0.80	0.65	1589	37.6	0.69	0.66	1589	38.1	0.77	0.83
Education	1588	7.37	0.36	8.61	1588	9.3	0.60	9.14	1588	7.2	0.38	1.96	1588	6.0	0.48	3.77	1588	5.5	0.31	1.79
Home furnishing	1589	3.6	0.21	12.60	1589	4.9	0.35	13.47	1589	3.4	0.22	2.86	1589	2.9	0.23	4.17	1589	2.5	0.19	4.02
System support	1529	59.5	0.95	2.97	1529	56.6	1.68	3.30	1529	59.4	1.62	1.53	1529	61.7	1.26	1.16	1529	62.4	1.72	2.59
Tolerance	1527	51.2	0.93	1.82	1527	54.1	1.56	1.91	1527	51.3	1.50	0.78	1527	49.0	1.42	0.99	1527	48.2	1.89	1.73
Victim of corruption	1582	0.1	0.01	1.50	1582	0.2	0.01	0.62	1582	0.2	0.06	3.03	1582	0.1	0.02	1.14	1582	0.1	0.02	1.24
Voted in the last elections	1589	0.7	0.01	1.20	1589	0.7	0.02	1.66	1589	0.7	0.01	0.29	1589	0.6	0.02	1.22	1589	0.7	0.02	1.13
Interpersonal Trust	1546	63.0	1.05	1.49	1546	60.6	1.54	1.20	1546	64.1	2.87	1.80	1546	61.2	2.35	1.73	1546	68.1	2.03	1.36
Victim of crime	1589	0.1	0.02	5.14	1589	0.2	0.04	5.58	1589	0.2	0.02	1.03	1589	0.1	0.02	1.46	1589	0.0	0.01	1.15
Evaluation of president	1565	61.0	0.73	1.53	1565	57.8	1.07	1.10	1565	62.9	1.65	1.38	1565	62.5	1.40	1.38	1565	63.5	1.71	2.14
Opinion that democracy is the best form government	1497	68.8	0.70	0.75	1497	69.3	0.61	0.25	1497	66.4	2.32	1.30	1497	68.9	1.92	1.20	1497	69.4	1.49	0.66

X: Estimated statistic (average or percent); N: number of observations; ET: Typical Error; EED: Error of the effect of the design

³ Our deepest thanks to Luis Rosero Bixby, who calculated the effects of design for this report.

Appendix B: Technical Note and Regression Tables

Technical Note

We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr.. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an index (as opposed to a scale) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In

order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent's choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common "informed consent" form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CSPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for and audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there "in black and white," but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.

After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced., A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the data base itself (www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/) .

Table III.1 System Support Predictors⁴

	Non-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Percent Error	Beta		
(Constant)	30.856	2.813		10.971	.000
ED Education Level	-.021	.147	-.005	-.144	.885
Q1R Gender recoded	-1.899	1.035	-.045	-1.835	.067
Q2 Age	-.027	.037	-.019	-.723	.470
WEALTH Personal possessions in the home ⁵	-.293	.218	-.041	-1.344	.179
L1 Ideology (scale left-right)	1.027	.205	.145	5.013	.000
A0J17R Perception of the presence of gangs in neighborhood recoded	-.043	.014	-.076	-3.140	.002
A0J12R Confidence in judicial system recoded	.086	.014	.158	6.141	.000
M1RR Evaluation of work of President Flores recoded	.188	.026	.213	7.379	.000
PN5R Opinion of democracy in the country recoded	.116	.019	.159	6.014	.000
SOCT1R Economic situation in the country recoded	.101	.026	.104	3.898	.000

Dependant variable: PSA5 Scale of system support.

R square= .273.

R squared corrected= .267; sig <.001.

⁴ To simplify the interpretation of the results of the multiple decline model, some questions were recoded: Q1 became Q1R with value 0 for women and 1 for men; AOJ17 became AOJ17R with a value of 0 for none, 33 for little, 67 for some and 100 for a lot; AOJ12 became AOJ12R with a value of 0 for none, 33 for little, 67 for some 100 for a lot; M1 became M1RR with a value of 0 for very bad, 25 for bad, 50 for not good nor bad, 75 for good, and 100 for very good; PN5 became PN5R with a value of 0 for not at all democratic, 33 for minimally democratic, 67 for somewhat democratic and 100 for very democratic; and SOCT1 became SOCT1R with a value of 0 for very bad, 25 bad, 50 neither good nor bad, 75 good and 100 very good.

⁵ The scale was constructed through summing the questions R1+R3+R4+R4A+R5+R6+R7+R12+R14+R15. The scale has a range from 1 to 14.

Table III.2 Predictors of Tolerance⁶

	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Percent error	Beta		
(Constant)	51.619	3.795		13.600	.000
ED Education level	.551	.201	.101	2.742	.006
Q1R Gneder recoded	6.763	1.422	.127	4.756	.000
Q2 Age	-.015	.050	-.009	-.293	.769
WEALTH Personal possessions in the home	.633	.297	.071	2.131	.033
L1 Ideology (scale left-right)	-1.207	.279	-.135	-4.328	.000
HURTWAR Scale Consequences of the war	3.524	1.431	.065	2.462	.014
MIRR Evaluation of work of President Flores recoded	-.109	.034	-.098	-3.191	.001
PN4R degree of satisfaction democratic performance recoded	.064	.032	.058	1.979	.048

Dependant variable: TOL Tolerance scale.

R squared = .102.

R squared corrected = .096; sig<.001.

⁶ To simplify the interpretation of the results of the model of multiple regression, PN4 became PN4R with a value of 0 for very unsatisfied, 33 unsatisfied, 67 satisfied and 100 very satisfied.

Table IV.1 Predictors of Victimization as a Result of Corruption⁷

Model	Non-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Percent Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.447	.118		3.787	.000
Q1 Gender	-.092	.039	-.069	-2.345	.019
Q2 Age	-.004	.001	-.093	-2.929	.003
ED Educational Level	-.005	.006	-.040	-.981	.327
Q10 Monthly family income including remittances	-.010	.013	-.034	-.809	.419
WEALTH Personal possessions in the home	.028	.010	.127	2.952	.003
DESOC1R Employment	.096	.040	.072	2.368	.018
AOJ18R Perception Police protection against crime	-.001	.000	-.089	-3.060	.002

Dependant variable: EXCTOT Index of Victimization Resultant of Corruption

R squared= .039

R squared corrected = .033; sig.< .001

⁷ To simplify the interpretation of the results of the multiple regression model, some questions were recoded: Q1 became Q1R with a value 0 for women and 1 for men; DESOC1 was recoded with the name DESOC1R, in which 1 signifies unemployment and 2 having employment; AOJ18 became AOJ18R with a value of 0 to express the opinion that the police are involved in crime and 100 meaning the police protect against crime.

Table V.1 Predictors of Victimization by Crime

Variables	B	E.T.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
Q1. Gender	-.354	.163	4.703	1	.030	.702
Q2. Age	-.011	.006	3.178	1	.075	.989
ED. Education	.052	.024	4.690	1	.030	1.053
Q10. Income	.000	.051	.000	1	.998	1.000
WEALTH. Personal possessions in the home	.097	.041	5.700	1	.017	1.102
ETAMANO. Size of city			9.766	4	.045	
Metropolitan Area	.628	.255	6.070	1	.014	1.874
C. large	.236	.306	.595	1	.440	1.266
C. medium	.275	.260	1.116	1	.291	1.316
C. small	-.417	.437	.911	1	.340	.659
AOJ18R. Perception police protect against crime	-.004	.002	6.049	1	.014	.996
AOJ17R. Presence of gangs in the neighborhood	.008	.002	14.124	1	.000	1.008
Constant	-1.896	.435	18.989	1	.000	.150

Dependant variable: VIC1R. Victim of crime.
R square Nagelkerke = .167; sig.< .001

Table V.4 Predictors of Insecurity Sensation Due to Crime

Variables ⁸	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Percent Error.	Beta		
(Constant)	39.911	6.235		6.401	.000
Q1 Gender	8.854	1.963	.127	4.510	.000
Q2 Age	-.159	.068	-.070	-2.339	.020
ED Education	-.209	.263	-.029	-.796	.426
Q10 Family income	-1.403	.540	-.088	-2.597	.010
VIC2R Degree of Victimization	.153	.034	.127	4.487	.000
JUSTIN Confidence in the institutions of justice	-.146	.047	-.090	-3.104	.002
A1R Listens to the news on radio	.087	.024	.102	3.643	.000
AOJ18R. Perception Police protect against crime	-.054	.021	-.076	-2.640	.008
AOJ17R Presence of gangs in the neighborhood	.278	.027	.290	10.378	.000

Dependant variable: AOJ11R Feeling of lack of safety caused by crime.

R squared= .170

R corrected = .164; sig.< .001

⁸ The variable VIC2R was codified as follows: 0 = Not a victim; 1= Mild victim; 2 = Severe victim. The variable JUSTIN refers to confidence in the institutions of the justice sector and integrates the results of the variable scales (0-100) regarding confidence that the courts guarantee a just judgment (B1R) confidence in the justice system (B10AR), Attorney General's Of the Republic (B15R), Solicitor General of the Republic (B16R), Human Rights Ombudsmen's Office (B17R) and the National Civilian Police (B18R).

Table VI.1 Predictors of Attendance at a Town Hall or Other Meeting⁹

	B	E.T.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
ED Education level	.044	.024	3.566	1	.059	1.045
Q1R Gender recoded	.503	.167	9.073	1	.003	1.653
Q2 Age	.006	.006	1.292	1	.256	1.006
WEALTH Personal possessions in the home	-.097	.039	6.185	1	.013	.908
MEDIOS Exposure to news ¹⁰	.012	.004	12.058	1	.001	1.012
EPN3CR Representation of interests in the local government recoded	.009	.002	12.253	1	.000	1.009
PP1R Persuasion of others to vote recoded	.009	.002	13.493	1	.000	1.009
PP2R Has worked for a candidate or party	.834	.239	12.172	1	.000	2.301
EESTRATR Population stratum in the area of residence recoded	-.450	.075	35.795	1	.000	.638
Constant	-2.707	.369	53.801	1	.000	.067

Variables introduced in step 1: ED, Q1R, Q2, WEALTH, MEDIOS, EPN3CR, PP1R, PP2R, EESTRATR.

Dependant variable:NP1R.

R Nagelkerke square=.170, sig<.001.

⁹ To simplify the interpretation of the results of the regression model, some questions were recoded: EPN3C became EPN3CR with a value of 0 for none, 33 little, 67 some and, 100 a lot; PP1 became PP1R with a value of 0 for never, 33 rarely, 67 sometimes and 100 frequently; PP2 became PP2R with a value of 0 for no and 100 for yes; and EESTRAT became EESTRATR with a value of 1 for less than 20 thousand inhabitants, 2 between 20 and 50 thousand inhabitants, 3 between 50 and 100 thousand inhabitants; and 4 for more than 100 thousand inhabitants.

¹⁰ This scale was created based on the three questions A1, A2 y A3; and could be answered in a format of 0-100.

Table VI.2 Predictors of Satisfaction with Municipal Services¹¹

	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Percent error	Beta		
(Constant)	35.357	2.386		14.819	.000
ED Education level	.397	.143	.090	2.773	.006
Q1R Gender recoded	-3.758	1.034	-.086	-3.633	.000
Q2 Age	.039	.036	.028	1.077	.282
WEALTH Personal possessions in the home	-.491	.224	-.067	-2.192	.029
EPN3CR representation of interests in local government recoded	.241	.016	.359	15.116	.000
AOJ11R Perception of safety in the place or neighborhood of residence recoded	.046	.015	.075	3.142	.002
SOCT1R Economic situation in the country recoded	.077	.026	.077	2.989	.003
IDIO1R Personal economic situation recoded	.093	.026	.092	3.522	.000

Dependant variable: SGL1R satisfaction with municipal services recoded.

R squared=.178.

R squared recoded=.174; sig<.001.

¹¹ To simplify the interpretation of the results of the regression model, IDIO1 became IDIO1R with a value of 0 for very bad, 25 poor, 50 neither good nor bad, 75 good and 100 very good; and AOJ11 became AOJ11R with a value of 0 for very insecure, 33 somewhat insecure, 67 somewhat secure and 100 very secure.

Table VI.3 Predictors of Satisfaction with Treatment Received in the Municipality¹²

	Non-Standardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Percent error.	Beta		
(Constant)	41.654	2.727		15.275	.000
ED Education level	.230	.151	.053	1.518	.129
Q1R Gender recoded	-.527	1.068	-.012	-.494	.621
Q2 Age	.048	.038	.034	1.259	.208
WEALTH Personal possessions in the home	.398	.242	.055	1.644	.100
AOJ12R Confidence in the justice system to punish recoded	.039	.015	.070	2.637	.008
EPN3CR Representation of interests in the local government recoded	.213	.017	.322	12.769	.000
AOJ11R perception of safety in the area or neighborhood of residence recoded	.062	.015	.102	3.991	.000
VIC1R Victim of an act of crimerecoded	-4.950	1.457	-.088	-3.399	.001
EESTRATR population stratum of place of residence recoded	-1.102	.489	-.062	-2.252	.025
SOCT1R Economic situation of country	.084	.025	.085	3.398	.001

Dependant variable: SGL2R satisfactory treatment received in the municipalities recoded

R squared=.174.

R squared corrected=.168; sig<.001.

¹² To simplify the interpretation of the results of the regression model, VIC1 became VIC1R with a value of 0 for no and 1 for yes.

Table VI.4 Predictors of Confidence in the Municipalities

	Non-Standardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Percent error.	Beta		
(Constant)	44.682	3.364		13.281	.000
ED Education Level	-.091	.201	-.014	-.454	.650
Q1R Gender recoded	-2.215	1.436	-.035	-1.542	.123
Q2 Age	-.061	.050	-.030	-1.201	.230
WEALTH Personal possessions in the home	-.507	.321	-.047	-1.580	.114
EPN3CR representation of interests in local government recoded	.374	.023	.383	16.620	.000
AOJ11R Perception of safety in the area or neighborhood of residence recoded	.068	.020	.076	3.315	.001
EESTRATR Population stratum of the area of residence recoded	-1.864	.656	-.071	-2.839	.005
B21R confidence in political parties recoded ¹³	.176	.022	.182	7.911	.000

Dependant variable: B32R Confidence in municipalities recoded

R squared=.242

R squared corrected=.238; sig<.001

¹³ Recoded in a format of 0-100.

Table VII.3 Voting Predictors

	B	E.T.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
ED Educational level	.024	.020	1.422	1	.233	1.025
Q1R Gender recoded	-.331	.139	5.661	1	.017	.718
Q2 Age	.027	.005	28.635	1	.000	1.028
WEALTH Personal possessions in the home	.071	.030	5.683	1	.017	1.074
INFORM Level of political knowledge ¹⁴	.011	.003	11.454	1	.001	1.011
M1RR Evaluation of work of President Flores recoded	-.006	.003	4.442	1	.035	.994
PP2R Worked for a candidate or party recoded	1.444	.378	14.601	1	.000	4.238
ABS5R Perception of the effectiveness of the vote recoded ¹⁵	-.602	.144	17.556	1	.000	.548
B21R Confidence in the political parties recoded	.006	.002	8.756	1	.003	1.006
Constant	.111	.417	.071	1	.789	1.118

Variables introduced in step 1: ED, Q1R, Q2, WEALTH, INFORM, M1RR, PP2R, ABS5R, B21R.

Dependant variable:EVB2R.

R square of Nagelkerke=.141; sig <.001

¹⁴ This scale was created based on three questions: A1, A2 y A3 and has the format 0-100.

¹⁵ ABS5 was recoded as ABS5R with a value of 1 that the vote can change and 2 that things cannot change.

Table VII.4 Predictors of Confidence in Political Parties

	Non-Standardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Percent error	Beta		
(Constant)	27.499	5.383		5.108	.000
ED Education Level	-.311	.236	-.047	-1.317	.188
Q1R Gender recoded	-1.458	1.666	-.022	-.875	.382
Q2 Age	-.045	.059	-.021	-.756	.450
WEALTH Personal possessions in the home	-.386	.358	-.035	-1.078	.281
AOJ12R Confidence in the judicial system to punish recoded	.148	.023	.176	6.483	.000
PN4R Degree of satisfaction with democratic performance recoded	.115	.039	.084	2.959	.003
PN5R Opinion regarding democracy in the country recoded	.116	.032	.103	3.653	.000
PP1R Persuasion of others to vote recoded	.109	.027	.103	4.003	.000
ABS5R Perception of effectiveness of the vote recoded	-8.945	1.914	-.122	-4.673	.000
SOCT1R Economic situation in the country recoded	.131	.043	.089	3.072	.002
IDIO1R Personal economic situation recoded	.091	.042	.061	2.144	.032

Dependant variable: B21R Confidence in the parties.

R squared=.139

R squared corrected=.132 ; sig <.001

Table VII.5 Predictors of Confidence in the Elections

	Non-Standardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Percent error	Beta		
(Constant)	16.855	8.593		1.962	.050
ED Education Level	-.194	.222	-.029	-.875	.382
Q1R Gender recoded	-1.274	1.555	-.019	-.819	.413
Q2 Age	-.052	.055	-.024	-.931	.352
WEALTH Personal possessions in the home	-.071	.323	-.006	-.218	.827
L1 Ideology (Scale left-right)	3.285	.294	.297	11.167	.000
AOJ11A Perception of threat of crime	-2.254	1.052	-.051	-2.143	.032
PN4R Degree of satisfaction of democratic performance recoded	.101	.037	.073	2.727	.006
PN5R Opinion regarding democracy in the country recoded	.142	.030	.124	4.731	.000
Perception of safety in the area or neighborhood of residence recoded	.045	.022	.048	2.025	.043
AUT1R Necessity for electoral democracy recoded ¹⁶	8.092	3.330	.058	2.430	.015
ABS5R Perception of the effectiveness of the vote recoded	-8.858	1.850	-.117	-4.789	.000
SOCT1R Economic situation of the country recoded	.148	.039	.099	3.821	.000
SOCT3 Economic situation in the coming 12 months	-.843	.340	-.059	-2.477	.013
B21R Confidence in the political parties recoded	.242	.025	.235	9.651	.000

Dependant variable: B47R Confidence in the elections.

R squared=.365

R squared corrected=.358 ; sig <.001

¹⁶ AUT1 became AUT1R with a value of 1 for a strong leader and 2 for electoral democracy.

Table VII.8 Predictors of Support to Guarantee the Minimum Quota that would Permit an Increase in the Number of Women that Could be Elected Representatives

	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Percent error	Beta		
(Constant)	6.503	.312		20.842	.000
ED Education Level	-.009	.022	-.015	-.411	.681
Q1R Gender recoded	-.869	.156	-.147	-5.577	.000
Q2 Age	.004	.005	.019	.665	.506
WEALTH Personal possessions in the home	.021	.033	.021	.628	.530
B21R Confidence in the political parties recoded	.010	.002	.105	3.998	.000

Dependant variable: EREF1 degree of approval to guarantee the minimum quota to increase the numbers of women that could be elected representatives

R squared=.033

R squared corrected=.030 ; sig <.001

Table VII.9 Predictors of Support to Reconfigure Electoral Districts

	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Percent error	Beta		
(Constant)	6.134	.397		15.454	.000
ED Education Level	.026	.020	.048	1.275	.202
Q1R Gender recoded	.059	.146	.011	.405	.686
Q2 Age	.014	.005	.079	2.597	.010
WEALTH Personal possessions in the home	.043	.031	.049	1.411	.159
ABS5R Perception of effectiveness of the vote recoded	-.632	.169	-.106	-3.753	.000
B21R Confidence in political parties recoded	.005	.002	.066	2.339	.019

Dependant variable: EREF2 Degree of support to reconfigure electoral districts to vote in place of a list of representatives of each party.

R squared=.031.

R squared corrected=.026 ; sig <.001.

Appendix C: IRB Letter



University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board

Exempt and Expedited Reviews
Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair

Multiple Project Assurance: M-1259

3500 Fifth Avenue
Suite 105
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
Phone: 412.383.1480
Fax: 412.383.1146
e-mail: irbexempt@msx.upmc.edu

TO: Mitchell Seligson, Ph.D.

FROM: Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair *Chris*

DATE: January 14, 2004

PROTOCOL: Democratic Values in Mexico, Central America and Colombia

IRB Number: 0401036

The above-referenced protocol has been reviewed by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board. Based on the information provided in the IRB protocol, this project meets all the necessary criteria for an exemption, and is hereby designated as "exempt" under section 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2).

The regulations of the University of Pittsburgh IRB require that exempt protocols be re-reviewed every three years. If you wish to continue the research after that time, a new application must be submitted.

- If any modifications are made to this project, please submit an 'exempt modification' form to the IRB.
- Please advise the IRB when your project has been completed so that it may be officially terminated in the IRB database.
- This research study may be audited by the University of Pittsburgh Research Conduct and Compliance Office.

Approval Date: 01/12/2004

Renewal Date: 01/12/2007

CR:ky

Appendix D: Letter of Agreement from IUDOP



Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas

Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública

Apartado postal (01) 168, Boulevard Los Próceres, San Salvador,
El Salvador, C.A.

Tel. (503) 210-6600 ext. 415. Telefax: (503) 210-6672. email:
bmoran@iudop.uca.edu.sv

14 de abril de 2004

Estimado señor o señora:

El Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública de la Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas (UCA) se encuentra haciendo un estudio de opinión pública financiado por la Agencia Internacional de Desarrollo de los Estados Unidos (AID) y coordinado por la Universidad de Pittsburg.

Usted ha sido seleccionado/a de forma aleatoria para participar en el estudio, en el cual usted sólo tendrá que respondernos algunas preguntas sobre su opinión sobre las diversas cosas que pasan en El Salvador. La entrevista sólo durará alrededor de 45 minutos y no le quitaremos mucho más tiempo que ese.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento que desee, pero le rogamos que intente responder la mayor cantidad posible de ellas. Su participación es anónima, es decir, no se le preguntará su nombre, y las respuestas que usted dé a nuestros encuestadores son completamente confidenciales. Usted no recibirá ningún pago por su participación, pero tampoco le ocasionaremos ningún gasto.

Con su participación, usted contribuirá enormemente al estudio. Si tiene alguna pregunta sobre el mismo, puede comunicarse al Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública de la UCA al teléfono 210-6672, con la sra. Patricia Jule o con la licenciada Bessy Morán.

Por favor díganos si podemos contar con su participación.

Muchísimas gracias por su tiempo.

Atentamente,

José Miguel Cruz
Director
Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública

Appendix E: Questionnaire



ENCUDOR
SUPERVI

EDEPA

EMUNI

EZONA

ESEGME

ECASEP

EESTRAT

ETAMANO

EUR

Q1

EA4

A1

A2

A3

SOCT1

SOCT3

UNIVERSIDAD CENTROAMERICANA JOSÉ SIMEÓN CAÑAS

Encuestador: _____ Departamento: _____
 Supervisor: _____ Municipio: _____
 Fecha: _____ Zona: _____
 Segmento: _____
 Cantón: _____

ESTRATO

(1) Mayores de 100 mil habitantes	(3) Entre 20 y 50 mil habitantes
(2) Entre 50 y 100 mil habitantes	(4) Menos de 20 mil habitantes

TAMAÑO DEL LUGAR

(1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana)	(3) Ciudad mediana	(5) Área rural
(2) Ciudad grande	(4) Ciudad pequeña	

EUR. Urbano – rural: (1) Urbano (2) Rural

Hora de inicio: _____ : _____

AUDITORIA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: El Salvador 2004

Sr.(a): Estamos haciendo una encuesta por parte de la Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) para conocer las opiniones de la gente sobre diferentes aspectos de la situación nacional. Usted ha sido seleccionado(a) por sorteo para hacerle una entrevista y quisiéramos pedirle que colabore con nosotros, dedicándonos una media hora de su tiempo. La naturaleza confidencial de todas sus respuestas será respetada. No vamos a preguntarle su nombre.

Q1. ANOTE: Sexo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer

EA4. Para empezar, en su opinión, ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| (01) Problemas económicos | (02) Inflación, altos precios |
| (03) Desempleo | (04) Pobreza |
| (05) Delincuencia, crimen, violencia | (06) Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) |
| (07) Falta de tierra para cultivar | (09) Falta de crédito |
| (10) Problemas del medio ambiente | (11) Drogadicción |
| (12) Narcotráfico | (13) Corrupción |
| (14) Pandillas | (15) Mal gobierno |
| (16) Migración | (17) La guerra contra el terrorismo |
| (88) No sabe | |

Anotar si no existe código: _____

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
A2. Mira noticias en la TV	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)

SOCT1. ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?

- (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe

SOCT3. ¿Cree Ud. que en los próximos doce meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?

- (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe

IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?

(1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe

IDIO1

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...

CP5. ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio?

(1) Sí **[Seguir con CP5A]** (2) No **[Pasar a CP6]** (8) NS **[Pasar a CP6]**

CP5

CP5A. ¿Ha donado dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5A	<input type="checkbox"/>
CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5B	<input type="checkbox"/>
CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5C	<input type="checkbox"/>
CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5D	<input type="checkbox"/>
CP5E. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo para combatir la delincuencia en su barrio?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	CP5E	<input type="checkbox"/>

<i>Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año o nunca</i>	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP6 <input type="checkbox"/>
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP7 <input type="checkbox"/>
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP8 <input type="checkbox"/>
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP9 <input type="checkbox"/>
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido político?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP13 <input type="checkbox"/>

PROT1. ¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública?. ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?

(1) Algunas veces (2) Casi nunca (3) Nunca (8) NS

PROT1

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

<i>¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido Ud. ayuda o cooperación ...?</i>	Sí	No	NS/NR	
CP2. A algún diputado de la Asamblea Legislativa	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP2 <input type="checkbox"/>
CP4. A algún ministerio, institución pública u oficina del gobierno nacional	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP4 <input type="checkbox"/>
CP4A. A alguna municipalidad	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP4A <input type="checkbox"/>

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría que se encuentra ...?

(1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS

LS3

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ...?

(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS

IT1

IT2. ¿Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo de sí misma, o cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo?

(1) Se preocupa de sí misma (2) Trata de ayudar al prójimo (8) NS

IT2

IT3. ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente, si se les presentara la oportunidad, trataría de aprovecharse de usted, o cree que no se aprovecharía de usted?

(1) Sí, se aprovecharían (2) No se aprovecharían (8) NS

IT3

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto u otra reunión convocada por el alcalde durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No [Pasar a NP1A] (8) No sabe/ no recuerda [Pasar a NP1A]	NP1	<input type="checkbox"/>
MUNIFA. ¿Cómo se enteró de esa reunión? [NO LEER OPCIONES] (1) Por radio (2) Por TV (3) Por periódico (4) Avisos públicos, carteles (5) Un amigo o familiar (6) Invitación del alcalde o concejo (7) Otro _____ (8) NS (9) No aplica (No se enteró)	MUNIFA	<input type="checkbox"/>
NP1A. ¿Ha asistido a una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	NP1A	<input type="checkbox"/>
NP1B. ¿Hasta que punto cree Ud. que los oficiales de la municipalidad hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso: (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS	NP1B	<input type="checkbox"/>
NP1C. Si Ud. tuviera una queja sobre algún problema local, y lo llevara a algún miembro del concejo municipal, ¿qué tanto cree Ud. que le haría caso? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS	NP1C	<input type="checkbox"/>
NP1D. ¿Ha asistido a alguna reunión de su patronato en los últimos doce meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe	NP1D	<input type="checkbox"/>
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	NP2	<input type="checkbox"/>
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son...? (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (8) No sabe	SGL1	<input type="checkbox"/>
SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que les han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la municipalidad para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) No sabe	SGL2	<input type="checkbox"/>
LGL1. En su opinión, ¿Entre el gobierno nacional, los diputados, o la municipalidad quién ha respondido mejor para ayudar a resolver los problemas de su comunidad o barrio? ¿El gobierno nacional? ¿Los diputados? o ¿La municipalidad? (1) El gobierno nacional (2) Los diputados (3) La municipalidad (4) Ninguno [NO LEER] (5) Todos igual [NO LEER] (8) No sabe / no contesta	LGL1	<input type="checkbox"/>
LGL2. En su opinión ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más obligaciones y más dinero al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales (3) No cambiar nada [NO LEER] (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios [NO LEER] (8) No sabe / no contesta	LGL2	<input type="checkbox"/>
LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos al municipio? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) No sabe	LGL3	<input type="checkbox"/>
MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el manejo de los fondos por parte de la municipalidad? (3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Ninguna confianza (8) NS/NR	MUNI6	<input type="checkbox"/>
MUNI8. ¿Ha realizado usted algún trámite o ha solicitado algún documento en la municipalidad durante el último año? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a JC1] (8) No sabe, no responde [Pase a JC1]	MUNI8	<input type="checkbox"/>
MUNI9. ¿Cómo fue atendido? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien, ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR (9) No aplica	MUNI9	<input type="checkbox"/>
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (8) NS/NR (9) No aplica	MUNI10	<input type="checkbox"/>

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares

	Se justificaría	No se justificaría	NS	
JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto	(1)	(2)	(8)	JC1 <input type="checkbox"/>
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales	(1)	(2)	(8)	JC4 <input type="checkbox"/>
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia	(1)	(2)	(8)	JC10 <input type="checkbox"/>
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	(1)	(2)	(8)	JC12 <input type="checkbox"/>
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción	(1)	(2)	(8)	JC13 <input type="checkbox"/>

JC13A. ¿Cree Ud. que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un golpe de estado o cree que nunca hay suficiente razón para eso?

(1) Si podría haber (2) Nunca habría razón (8) NS JC13A

VIC1. ¿Ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?
(1) Sí [siga] (2) No [Pasar a ST1] (8) NS/NR [Pase a ST1] VIC1

VIC2. ¿Qué tipo de acto delictual sufrió? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]
(01) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (03) Agresión física sin robo
(04) Violación o asalto sexual (05) Secuestro (06) Daño a la propiedad VIC2
(07) Robo de la casa (77) Otro (especifique) _____ (99) No aplica (no víctima)

AOJ1. [Si responde "Sí" a VIC1] ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución?
(1) Sí [siga] (2) No lo denunció [Pasar a AOJ1B] (8) NS/NR [Pase a ST1] (9) No aplica (no víctima) AOJ1

AOJ1A. ¿A quién o a qué institución denunció el hecho? [marcar una sola alternativa y pase a ST1]
(1) Fiscalía (2) Policía (3) Juzgados (6) Prensa AOJ1A
(7) Otro: _____ (8) NS (9) No aplica (no víctima)

AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]
(1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas AOJ1B
(4) No fue grave (5) No sabe adónde denunciar (8) NS (9) No víctima

De los trámites que Ud. ha hecho con las siguientes entidades, ¿se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? [REPETIR LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA]

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy insatisfecho	No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
ST1. La Policía Nacional Civil	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(9)	(8)	ST1 <input type="checkbox"/>
ST2. Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(9)	(8)	ST2 <input type="checkbox"/>
ST3. La Fiscalía	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(9)	(8)	ST3 <input type="checkbox"/>
ST4. La municipalidad (alcaldía)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(9)	(8)	ST4 <input type="checkbox"/>

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?
(1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8) NS AOJ8

AOJ9. Cuando se tienen serias sospechas acerca de las actividades criminales de una persona, ¿cree usted que: se debería esperar a que el juzgado dé la orden respectiva para poder entrar al domicilio del sospechoso o la policía puede entrar a la casa del sospechoso sin necesidad de una orden judicial?
(1) Se debería esperar a la orden judicial (2) La policía puede entrar sin una orden judicial (8) NS AOJ9

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?
(1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy Inseguro (8) NS AOJ11

AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree Ud. que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR **AOJ11A**

AOJ12. Si fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR **AOJ12**

AOJ16. ¿Hasta que punto teme Ud. violencia por parte de miembros de su propia familia? ¿Diría que tiene mucho, algo, poco o nada de miedo?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS **AOJ16**

AOJ17. ¿Hasta que punto diría que su barrio esta afectado por las maras [pandillas]? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS **AOJ17**

AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protegen a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que esta involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted?

(1) Policía protege (2) Policía involucrada con delincuencia (8) NS **AOJ18**

WC1. ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufrió el país? (Si tiene algún familiar desaparecido, aplica)

(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS **WC1**

WC2. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufrió el país?

(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS **WC2**

WC3. ¿Por razones de conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país?

(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS **WC3**

PAZ1. ¿Considera Ud. que los Acuerdos de Paz han sido muy buenos, buenos, malos o muy malos para el país?

(1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Malos (4) Muy malos (8) NS **PAZ1**

PAZ2. ¿Qué esperaba Ud. de los Acuerdos de Paz? **[LEER ALTERNATIVAS Y ESCOJA SÓLO UNA]**

(1) Menos violencia política (2) Más empleo (3) Más programas sociales
 (4) Nada en especial (8) NS/NR
 (7) Otro: _____ **PAZ2**

PAZ3. ¿Dígame cual ha sido el principal cambio en su comunidad después de la firma de la Paz? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]**

(1) No hay guerra o violencia política (2) No hay persecución (3) No hay temor
 (4) Hay mejoras sociales (5) Hay mejoras de infraestructura (6) No ha habido cambios
 (7) Otro: _____ (8) NS/NR **PAZ3**

PAZ4. ¿Cuánto cree Ud. que ha mejorado la situación política del país luego de la firma de los Acuerdos de Paz?

[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR **PAZ4**

PAZ5. ¿Cuánto cree Ud. que ha mejorado la situación socioeconómica del país luego de la firma de los Acuerdos de Paz?

[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR **PAZ5**

DÉLE LA TARJETA "A" (AMARILLA) AL ENTREVISTADO

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada						Mucho	No sabe

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1- que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión, si usted no confía nada escogería el puntaje 1, y si, por el contrario, confía mucho, escogería el puntaje 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas.

	Anotar 1 – 7 8 = NS	
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los tribunales de justicia de El Salvador garantizan un juicio justo? <i>Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.</i>		B1 <input type="checkbox"/>
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de El Salvador?		B2 <input type="checkbox"/>
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político salvadoreño?		B3 <input type="checkbox"/>
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político salvadoreño?		B4 <input type="checkbox"/>
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político salvadoreño?		B6 <input type="checkbox"/>
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		B10A <input type="checkbox"/>
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?		B11 <input type="checkbox"/>
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Fuerza Armada?		B12 <input type="checkbox"/>
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Asamblea Legislativa?		B13 <input type="checkbox"/>
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno?		B14 <input type="checkbox"/>
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Fiscalía General de la República?		B15 <input type="checkbox"/>
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la República?		B16 <input type="checkbox"/>
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos?		B17 <input type="checkbox"/>
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Policía Nacional Civil?		B18 <input type="checkbox"/>
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte de Cuentas de la República?		B19 <input type="checkbox"/>
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?		B20 <input type="checkbox"/>
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos?		B21 <input type="checkbox"/>
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		B31 <input type="checkbox"/>
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?		B32 <input type="checkbox"/>
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37 <input type="checkbox"/>
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser salvadoreño?		B43 <input type="checkbox"/>
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		B47 <input type="checkbox"/>
B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?		B48 <input type="checkbox"/>

[NO RECOJER TARJETA "A"]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada						Mucho	No sabe

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS	
N1. Combate la pobreza		N1 <input type="checkbox"/>
N3. Promueve y protege los principios democráticos		N3 <input type="checkbox"/>
N9. Combate la corrupción en el Gobierno		N9 <input type="checkbox"/>

[RECOJA TARJETA "A"]

EB52 Cuando usted enfrenta un conflicto legal, civil, interpersonal, etc., usted:

- (1) No hace nada (2) Concilia con la contraparte
 (3) Lo resuelve a su manera (4) Acude a una autoridad judicial (Juez, Policía, Fiscal)
 (5) Consigue un abogado (9) Utilizaría un centro de mediación para resolver el conflicto (8) NS

EB52

EB54 ¿Cree usted que el hecho de que las audiencias en los procesos penales sean públicas contribuye a disminuir la impunidad? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS

EB54

[PREGUNTAR SÓLO EN SONSONATE Y SAN MIGUEL]

EB56. ¿Ha escuchado hablar acerca de la existencia de los centros de mediación promovidos por la Procuraduría General de la República? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a EAY7]**

EB56

EB57. ¿Considera usted que su nivel de información acerca de la existencia de los centros de mediación promovidos por la Procuraduría General de la República es...? (1) Adecuado (2) No es suficiente (8) NS/NR

EB57

EB58 ¿Esta usted muy de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en contra o muy en contra con la existencia de estos centros de mediación promovidos por la Procuraduría General de la República?

- (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo (3) Algo en contra (4) Muy en contra (8) NS/NR

EB58

EB59 ¿Para usted, la existencia de estos centros de mediación promovidos por la Procuraduría General de la República son...?

- (1) Nada importantes (2) Poco importantes (3) Importantes (4) Muy importantes (8) NS/NR

EB59

[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]

EAY7. Suponga que usted tiene un problema con respecto a una propiedad que otra persona reclama como suya. ¿A quién acudiría usted para resolver ese problema?

- (0) Alcaldía
 (1) A una organización no gubernamental de ayuda (ONG)
 (2) A un amigo o familiar que tiene influencias en el gobierno
 (3) A un tribunal de justicia
 (4) A la PNC
 (5) A una oficina del gobierno encargada de esos asuntos
 (6) A un amigo o familiar que tiene experiencia resolviendo problemas por su cuenta
 (7) A un abogado
 (8) NS

EAY7

EAY8. Suponga que en su comunidad hay un problema con respecto al suministro de un servicio público. ¿A quién acudiría su comunidad para resolver ese problema?

- (0) Alcaldía
 (1) A una organización no gubernamental de ayuda (ONG)
 (2) A un amigo o familiar que tiene influencias en el gobierno
 (3) A un tribunal de justicia
 (4) A la PNC
 (5) A una oficina del gobierno encargada de esos asuntos
 (6) A un amigo o familiar que tiene experiencia resolviendo problemas por su cuenta
 (7) A un abogado
 (8) NS

EAY8

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "B" (ANARANJADA)]

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo					Muy de acuerdo		No sabe

	Anotar 1-7, NS=8
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	

ING4

PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los salvadoreños tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
PN2A. Los políticos buscan el poder para su propio beneficio, y no se preocupan por ayudar al pueblo ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
EPN2B. Todos los políticos de este país no representan al pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esa afirmación?	

PN2

PN2A

EPN2B

[RECOGER TARJETA B]

Ahora voy a mencionarle diferentes instancias de gobierno. Dígame por favor qué tanto cree usted que cada una de ellas representa sus intereses y le beneficia como ciudadano.

EPN3A. ¿Qué tanto cree usted que el gobierno nacional representa sus intereses y le beneficia como ciudadano?
 (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) No sabe, no responde

EPN3A

EPN3B. ¿Qué tanto cree usted que los diputados de la Asamblea Legislativa representan sus intereses y le benefician como ciudadano?
 (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) No sabe, no responde

EPN3B

EPN3C. ¿Qué tanto cree usted que la alcaldía de su localidad y el concejo municipal representa sus intereses y le beneficia como ciudadano?
 (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) No sabe, no responde

EPN3C

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO TARJETA “C” (ROSADA)]

Ahora le voy a entregar otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que **desaprueba firmemente** y el 10 indicando que aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)	
Desaprueba firmemente										Aprueba firmemente	No sabe

	Anotar 1-10, 88 = NS
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley	
E8. Que las personas participen en un grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados	
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales	

E5

E8

E11

E15

E14

E2

E3

E16

[NO RECOJA TARJETA “C”]

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de ver la tarjeta C (la de color rosado). En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)	
Desaprueba firmemente										Aprueba firmemente	No sabe

	Anotar 1-10 88= NS
D37. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?	
D38. ¿Qué opina usted de los tratados de libre comercio entre Centroamérica y Estados Unidos? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba esos tratados?	

D37

D38

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en El Salvador. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos **[SIGUE TARJETA "C"]**

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)	
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente				No sabe	

	Anotar 1-10, NS=88
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de El Salvador, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]	
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales , ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	

D1

D2

D3

D4

D5

[RECOJA TARJETA "C"]

<i>Usted cree que ahora en el país tenemos muy poca, suficiente o demasiada:</i>	Muy poca	Suficiente	Demasiada	NS
LIB1. Libertad de prensa	(1)	(2)	(3)	(8)
LIB2. Libertad de opinión	(1)	(2)	(3)	(8)
LIB3. Participación política	(1)	(2)	(3)	(8)
LIB4. Protección a derechos humanos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(8)

LIB1

LIB2

LIB3

LIB4

ACR1. Ahora le voy a leer tres frases. Por favor dígame cual de las tres describe mejor su opinión:

- (1) La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios
- (2) Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas
- (3) Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios
- (8) NS

ACR1

PN4. En general, ¿diría que está satisfecho, muy satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en El Salvador?

- (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR

PN4

PN5. En su opinión El Salvador es ¿muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?

- (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS

PN5

PN6. Basado en su experiencia en los últimos años, El Salvador se ha vuelto más democrático, igual de democrático o menos democrático?

- (1) Muy democrático (2) Igual de democrático (3) Menos democrático (8) NS/NR

PN6

DEM13. En pocas palabras, ¿qué significa para Ud. la democracia? **[No leer alternativas] [anotar solo una respuesta]**

- (01) Libertad (02) Igualdad (03) Bienestar, progreso económico
 (04) Capitalismo (05) Gobierno no militar (06) Libre comercio, libre negocio
 (07) Elecciones, voto (10) Derecho de escoger los líderes (11) Corrupción
 (12) Participación (13) Gobierno de la gente (14) Obedecer la ley
 (77) Otro (anotar) _____
 (88) NS/NR

DEM13

DEM2. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo?

- (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático
 (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno
 (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático
 (8) NS/NR

DEM2

AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen bien, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa?

- (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido
 (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor
 (8) NS/NR

AUT1

AUT2. El sistema actual de gobierno no ha sido el único que ha tenido nuestro país. Alguna gente piensa que estaríamos mejor si los militares volvieran a gobernar. Otros dicen que debemos mantener el sistema que tenemos ahora. ¿Qué piensa?

- (1) Retorno de los militares (2) El mismo que tenemos ahora (8) NS

AUT2

PP1. Ahora para cambiar el tema...Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras personas para que vote por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que vote por un partido o candidato? **[LEA LAS ALTERNATIVAS]**

- (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR

PP1

PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2004?

- (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR

PP2

ABS5. ¿Cree que el voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro o cree que como quiera que vote, las cosas no van a mejorar?

- (1) El voto puede cambiar las cosas (2) Las cosas no van a mejorar (8) NS/NR

ABS5

M1. Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Flores es:

- (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (8) NS/NR

M1

Me gustaría que me indique si Ud. considera las siguientes actuaciones: (1) Corrupta y debe ser castigada; (2) Corrupta pero justificada bajo las circunstancias; (3) No corrupta

DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 20 colones de más al empleado público municipal. Cree Ud. que lo que hizo la señora es:

- (1) Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada
 (2) Corrupto pero justificada
 (3) No corrupto
 (8) NS

DC10

DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un funcionario importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Ud. cree que el político es:

- (1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado
 (2) Corrupto pero justificado
 (3) No corrupto
 (8) NS

DC13

EDC14. Una persona acude a un médico privado a pasar consulta. Luego de examinarla el médico le dice a la persona que la puede atender en el hospital público donde él trabaja para hacerle unos exámenes, pero que tendrá que pagarle a él personalmente esos exámenes porque él conseguirá que se los realicen pronto y porque resultan más baratos que si se los practica en una clínica privada. Considera Ud. que el médico es:

- (1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado
- (2) Corrupto pero justificado
- (3) No corrupto
- (8) NS

EDC14

EDC15. Dado que los salarios de los maestros de una escuela pública son muy bajos, el director de la escuela establece una cuota escolar mensual no aprobada oficialmente con el propósito de aumentar el salario de los maestros y de él mismo para aumentar la motivación laboral. Considera Ud. que el director es:

- (1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado
- (2) Corrupto pero justificado
- (3) No corrupto
- (8) NS

EDC15

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...

EXC1. ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que no cometió?

No **Sí** **NS** **No aplica**

(0) (1) (8) (9)

EXC1

EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?

(0) (1) (8) (9)

EXC2

EXC4. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando mordidas (soborno) a un policía en el último año?

(0) (1) (8) (9)

EXC4

EXC5. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una mordida a un empleado público por cualquier tipo de favor en el último año?

(0) (1) (8) (9)

EXC5

EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?

(0) (1) (8) (9)

EXC6

EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año? **[Si dice "NO" marcar 9 y pasar a EXC13] [Si dice "SI" preguntar lo siguiente]**

Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?

(0) (1) (8) (9)

EXC11

EXC13. ¿Ud. trabaja? **[Si dice "NO" marcar 9 y pasar a EXC14] [Si dice "SI" preguntar lo siguiente]**

En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año?

(0) (1) (8) (9)

EXC13

EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? **[Si dice "NO" marcar 9 y pasar a EXC15] [Si dice "SI" preguntar lo siguiente]**

¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida o soborno en los juzgados en el último año?

(0) (1) (8) (9)

EXC14

EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? **[Si dice "NO" marcar 9 y pasar a EXC16] [Si dice "SI" preguntar lo siguiente]**

Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida o soborno?

(0) (1) (8) (9)

EXC15

EXC16. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? **[Si dice "NO" marcar 9 y pasar a EXC7] [Si dice "SI" preguntar lo siguiente]**

En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Tuvo que pagar alguna mordida o soborno?

(0) (1) (8) (9)

EXC16

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...?

- (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada
- (8) NS/NR

EXC7

Ahora me puede decir...

G11. ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? **[No leer, George W. Bush; acepta "Bush" o "George Bush"]**

- (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (no sabe)

G11

G13. ¿Recuerda usted cuántos departamentos tiene El Salvador? **[No leer, 14]**

- (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (no sabe)

G13

G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en El Salvador? **[No leer, cinco años]**

- (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (no sabe)

G14

G15. ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? **[No leer, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva; acepta "Lula"]**

- (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (no sabe)

G15

L1. [MOSTRAR TARJETA "E" (CELESTE)]

Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	
Izquierda										Derecha	No sabe

L1

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted con toda libertad, con un poco de miedo, o con mucho miedo? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	Con toda libertad	Poco miedo	Mucho miedo	NS
DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(8)
DER2. ¿Votar en una elección nacional?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(8)
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(8)
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(8)

DER1
DER2
DER3
DER4

EVB1. ¿Tiene usted Documento Único de Identidad (DUI)?

- (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS

EVB1

EVB2. Por una u otra razón, muchas personas no votaron en las pasadas elecciones. Unos por problemas en el padrón electoral, otros por problemas personales y otras porque no les gusta meterse en política. Podría decirme, si por alguna de esas razones Ud. no votó en las elecciones presidenciales de marzo de 2004.

- (1) Si votó **[Pase a EVB5]** (2) No votó **[Siga]**

EVB2

EVB4. Si no votó, ¿por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de marzo de 2004? **[No leer alternativas]**

[En cualquier caso pase a EVB7]

- | | |
|--|---|
| (01) Enfermedad | (02) Falta de Transporte |
| (03) Violencia / falta de seguridad | (04) No inscrito |
| (05) Tener que trabajar | (06) No creer en las elecciones |
| (07) No creer en los partidos | (08) Perdió el DUI |
| (09) No tiene el DUI | (10) No tener edad |
| (11) No se encontró en el padrón electoral | (12) Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado |
| (13) Otros _____ | |

EVB4

EVB5. ¿Por cuál partido votó para presidente en las elecciones pasadas de marzo de 2004? **[Si no votó, seguir con EVB7]**

- (04) PCN (01) ARENA (02) FMLN (03) CDU-PDC (77) Voto nulo/ Voto en blanco
(88) NS/NR (99) No aplica (No votó)

EVB5

EVB7. Ahora dígame, ¿votó Ud. en las pasadas elecciones para alcaldes y diputados en marzo de 2003?

- (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [pase a EVB10] (8) NS/NR [pase a EVB10]

EVB7

EVB8. ¿Por cuál partido votó para alcalde en las elecciones pasadas de marzo de 2003?

- (01) PCN (02) ARENA (03) FMLN (04) CDU
 (05) PDC (77) Otros _____ (99) Voto nulo/ Voto en blanco
 (88) NS/NR, no aplica (no votó)

EVB8

EVB9. ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado en las elecciones pasadas de marzo de 2003?

- (01) PCN (02) ARENA (03) FMLN (04) CDU
 (05) PDC (77) Otros _____ (99) Voto nulo/ Voto en blanco
 (88) NS/NR, no aplica (no votó)

EVB9

EVB10. Como usted sabe, un número importante de gente no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2004.

¿Cuál de los siguientes motivos explica por qué la gente no votó...?

- (01) No le gustaba ningún partido o candidato (02) El sistema para votar es muy complicado
 (03) No confían en el sistema electoral, porque hay fraude (04) No tienen el interés suficiente para ir a votar
 (05) No tenían DUI (06) Problemas personales
 (77) Otro _____

EVB10

EVB11. ¿Ha sabido Ud. de alguien que en las últimas elecciones presidenciales le han ofrecido o recibiera algo a cambio para votar de cierta manera?

- (1) Sí (0) No (8) No sabe

EVB11

EVB12. ¿Y me puede decir si a Ud. le sucedió?

- (1) Sí me sucedió (2) No me sucedió (8) No responde

EVB12

Hoy en día se habla mucho sobre reformas electorales. Me interesa conocer sus opiniones sobre las siguientes reformas. Vamos a usar otra vez la tarjeta "C". **[ENTREGUE LA TARJETA C" (ROSADA)].**

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente			No sabe

EREF1. ¿Hasta que punto apruebe o desapruebe el fijar una cuota mínima para aumentar el número de mujeres que puedan ser electas diputadas? **[Léame el número]**

EREF1

EREF2. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba reconfigurar los distritos electorales para poder votar por un diputado por distrito en lugar de una lista de diputados por partido?

EREF2

EREF3. ¿Poner en manos de los diputados el derecho de financiar obras públicas y servicios públicos en sus distritos electorales? ¿Hasta que punto aprobaría o desaprobaría?

EREF3

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?

[Encuestador llenar:] _____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = _____ años total

[Usar tabla de abajo para código y poner un circulo alrededor del número que corresponde]

ED

Ninguno = (00)	Primer año de..	Segundo año de..	Tercer año de...	Cuarto año de..	Quinto año de...	Sexto año de...
Primaria	(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)
Secundaria	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Universitaria y técnico	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18) o más
No sabe/no responde	(88)					

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años

Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión?

- (1) Católica (2) Cristiana no católica (3) Otra no cristiana
 (4) Ninguna (8) No sabe o no quiere mencionar

Q3

Q4. ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido Ud. a la iglesia (culto, templo) durante el mes pasado?

- (1) Todas las semanas (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca

Q4

Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos **familiares mensuales** de esta casa, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

[MOSTRAR LISTA DE RANGOS TARJETA "F" (BLANCA)]

- (00) Ningún ingreso
 (01) Menos de \$45 (Menos de 393.75 colones)
 (02) Entre \$45 y \$90 (Entre 393.75 y 787.5 colones)
 (03) Entre \$90 y \$144 (Entre 787.5 y 1,260 colones)
 (04) Entre \$144 y \$288 (Entre 1,260 y 2,520 colones)
 (05) Entre \$288 y \$432 (Entre 2,520 y 3,780 colones)
 (06) Entre \$432 y \$576 (Entre 3,780 y 5,040 colones)
 (07) Entre \$576 y \$720 (Entre 5,040 y 6,300 colones)
 (08) Entre \$720 y \$1008 (Entre 6,300 y 8,820 colones)
 (09) Entre \$1,008 y \$1,440 (Entre 8,820 y 12,600 colones)
 (10) Más de \$1,440 (Más de 12,600 colones)
 (88) NS

Q10

Q10A. ¿Recibe su familia remesas del exterior?

- (1) Sí [sigua] (2) No [saltar a Q10C] (8) NS/NR

Q10A

Q10B. ¿Hasta que punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior?

- (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR

Q10B

Q10C. ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que han vivido en esta casa que hoy estén residiendo en los Estados Unidos?

- (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR

Q10C

Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [no leer alternativas]

- (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado
 (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR

Q11

Q12. ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (0 = ninguno)

Q12

Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?

- (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS

Q14

Q15. ¿Vivió Ud. en los EEUU en los últimos tres años?

- (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR

Q15

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: [leer todos]

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más
R3. Refrigeradora [nevera]		(0) No		(1) Sí
R4. Teléfono convencional no celular		(0) No		(1) Sí
R4A. Teléfono celular		(0) No		(1) Sí
R5. Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más
R6. Lavadora de ropa		(0) No		(1) Sí
R7. Microondas		(0) No		(1) Sí
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa		(0) No		(1) Sí
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa		(0) No		(1) Sí
R15. Computadora		(0) No		(1) Sí

R1

R3

R4

R4A

R5

R6

R7

R12

R14

R15

OCUP1. Cuál es su ocupación principal?

- | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| (01) Profesional, directivo | (02) Empleado |
| (03) Vendedor | (04) Campesino |
| (05) Peón agrícola | (06) Servicio doméstico |
| (07) Otros servicios | (10) Obrero especializado |
| (11) Obrero no especializado | (12) Estudiante |
| (13) Ama de casa | (14) Pensionado rentista |
| (88) NS | |

OCUP1

OCUP1A En esta ocupación usted es:

- | | |
|--|---|
| (1) Asalariado del gobierno o autónoma | (2) Asalariado sector privado |
| (3) Patrono o socio empresa menos de 5 empleados | (4) Patrono o socio empresa 5 o más empleados |
| (5) Trabajador por cuenta propia | (6) Trabajador no remunerado |
| (8) NS | |

OCUP1A

DESOC1. ¿Ha estado desocupado (desempleado) durante el último año?

- (1) Sí (2) No (3) Actualmente desocupado/pensionado/rentista

DESOC1

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____

TI. Duración de la entrevista [*minutos, ver página # 1*] _____

TI

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ *Fecha* ____ / ____ /04 *Firma del supervisor de campo* _____

Firma del codificador _____

Comentarios: _____

Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, Central America and Colombia, 2004

The publication you have before you forms part of growing number of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University in the United States. The current study, by incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia) represents the largest effort undertaken to date by LAPOP. The sample and questionnaire designs were uniform for all eight countries, permitting direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analyses within each country. The study is the product of the intensive effort of 15 highly motivated social scientists, several experts in sample design, dozens of field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers, data entry clerks and more than 12,000 respondents. The 2004 cycle includes a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by teams from the countries, and a global study, written by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson of Vanderbilt University, who directs the LAPOP. The study was made possible by the generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented under contract with ARD, Inc. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are used by policymakers, citizens and academics to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

**A Study of the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**