

PN-ACR-94  
GERSONY REPORT

**SUMMARY REPORT**  
**HONDURAS POST-HURRICANE MITCH**  
**EMPLOYMENT GENERATION ASSESSMENT**

Report submitted to:

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**SUMMARY REPORT**  
**HONDURAS POST-HURRICANE MITCH**  
**EMPLOYMENT GENERATION ASSESSMENT**

**Background**

In December 1998, the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in Honduras and the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) engaged the authors to conduct a rapid field-based employment generation assessment. Its purpose was to determine the appropriateness, feasibility and relative priority of a nation-wide employment generation program as a major component of its future reconstruction support. Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula – Honduras' principal cities – were not included in the assessment's scope.

The team evaluated the impact of the disaster on pre-Hurricane Mitch jobs and income, likely patterns of job and income recovery, and the bottlenecks which constrained such recovery. It inquired about topics which intersect with the ability of families to stabilize themselves economically, including shelter and housing, food production and food-aid assistance, and transportation infrastructure. It observed the efforts of organizations already actively addressing rehabilitation and reconstruction needs.

This report summarizes in general terms findings and conclusions which have been briefed in detail to the sponsoring organizations and to representatives of the Government of Honduras, private sector, labor and other groups.

**Assessment Procedures**

The field assessment was conducted in three parts:

- during December 1998, and again briefly in February 1999, the team visited Choluteca Department.
- during January 1999, the team visited Colon and Atlantida Departments.
- during February 1999, the team visited southeastern Olancho Department.\*

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\* Southeastern Olancho alone represents 10% of Honduras' territory. Hereinafter, "Olancho Department" refers only to the southeastern 50% of the department visited, where 95% of departmental damage was concentrated.

These four departments represent 25% of Honduras' territory and almost 20% of its population. They were selected because among them, according to government reports setting forth the key indicators available at the time (see recapitulation, Annex A), they accounted for 54% of the country's deaths and 44% of homes destroyed in the disaster.

In each department, the team attempted to visit the most damaged areas and, in addition, a selection of lesser damaged locations, including a variety of topographical settings. In the course of the assessment, the team consulted in detail with about 460 persons (Annex B), including:

- 36 mayors and municipal officials representing 25 (70%) of the 36 municipios (Annex C) which comprise the four departments visited;
- 123 officials and executives, including governors; agro-industry, credit union and cooperative managers; market and other commercial merchants; church, development agency and non-governmental organization field staff; and officials and contractors of central government organizations active in emergency operations, including FHIS and SOPTRAVI.
- 305 workers, farmers, cattlemen and agricultural laborers from different social, ethnic and economic backgrounds.

These discussions took place with only one or two individuals at a time, and had an average duration of about an hour.

In roughly five weeks of field work, the team visited 91 affected towns and villages. In travel which comprised a total of 6,000 kilometers, it observed about 600 kilometers of surfaced roads, 1,000 kilometers of unsurfaced roads, and 200 bridges in the four departments.

At the request of the USAID Mission, the team provided twenty briefings of about two hours' duration to a total of 51 individuals (Annex D). Pending at this writing is a brief final consultation in Washington.

## Principal Findings

The principal findings of the team concerning the areas of Choluteca, Colon, Atlantida and Olancho visited are as follows:

### EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

**Employment opportunities and the income of individual farmers and ranchers in major agricultural industries were in some cases temporarily affected by the disaster. The great majority of pre-hurricane agro-industry jobs will resume by March 1999. Longer-term employment losses will affect some melon workers in northern Choluteca and some banana workers in parts of two municipios of western Colon.**

- Employment in many large-scale agro-industries was temporarily affected to varying degrees by the disaster. With a few exceptions, employment in the **African palm, cattle and dairy, citrus, pineapple, shrimp and sugar cane** agro-industries and in their processing plants appeared likely to recover by March 1999, when access roads and pastures were expected to dry out and transitivity would be restored to main road networks. More than 30,000 direct jobs or incomes for individual farmers and ranchers are generated in the areas visited by these activities.
- Employment in the **melon** industry in southern Honduras was affected to a greater degree and will be curtailed for a longer duration because of a shortfall of 33% in projected 1999 production. About 4,000 permanent and 17,000 temporary (six to eight month a year) direct jobs had been projected for 1999, including planned expansion. About 5,000 temporary jobs, the equivalent of about 3,000 person-years of employment, will not materialize.

The shortfall in melon jobs will affect northern Choluteca. Melon fields along the Choluteca River Valley, especially in the Orocuina and Apacilagua area, were heavily affected. Many migrant melon worker families who expected part-time employment, reside in northern Choluteca as well. It would appear that much of the lost employment will be recovered in the year 2000.

Nonetheless, melons will continue to generate 4,000 permanent and 13,000 temporary jobs – roughly 75% of the usual cohort.

- Banana workers suffered the greatest single employment losses in the areas visited. Bananas account for about 25% of agricultural export foreign exchange – almost as much as coffee. But bananas are cultivated in only two of the 40 municipios reviewed by the team, which is also where all the affected workers live.

Mitigating the employment gap somewhat, the agricultural economies of those two municipios in western Colon (Sonaguera and Saba) also include significant citrus cultivation, a routine source of employment and income for temporary banana workers when they are not employed by the Standard Fruit (Dole) banana company and which was not significantly affected by the disaster.

Dole employs two categories of workers:

- permanent employees engaged on a long-term basis whose compensation package includes health care, Christmas and tenure bonuses, severance and other benefits; and
- temporary employees (six – eight months per year), engaged as needed on a short-term basis, and who receive no benefits.

Virtually 100% of the 2,000 hectares of banana plantations in Sonaguera and Saba were destroyed in the hurricane. Of the 2,420 permanent and temporary jobs normally generated by the company, it is expected that 1,670 (70%) will be lost in 1999. The company's replanting and reinvestment strategy is not yet clear. It is uncertain how many of these lost jobs will be recovered in 2000.

In the aftermath of the disaster, the company suspended its operations almost completely. While not working, permanent workers were receiving a weekly cash grant stipend and family food basket. They were also able to engage in non-banana temporary employment or other economic activities, such as the lucrative orange harvest, thereby also competing with more than a thousand temporary workers who had lost their jobs but did not receive the stipend and food basket.

The company expected to mobilize its work force again in February/March. At that time, the unemployed labor force will be significantly reduced in this relatively limited area, presumably to the advantage of the temporary banana workers who are looking for alternative work.\*

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\* Standard Fruit/Dole losses in Yoro Department – not included in the four department survey reported here – were also significant. Of the 6,200 cultivated hectares, 2,500 (60%) were destroyed. Of 5,600 permanent and temporary jobs, up to 3,500 will be lost for at least a year. Permanent workers in Yoro received the same benefits as those in Colon.

- The major coffee-producing department of El Paraiso is a principal source of seasonal migratory cash employment for residents of northern Choluteca. Thousands of workers had already migrated to El Paraiso in December when the team visited northern Choluteca. It appeared that employment levels were normal. A few reports assert that harvest difficulties in some coffee areas were reducing what they perceive as normally more profitable work.
- Preliminary results of a January 1999 UNDP/International Organization for Migration (IOM) census of the poorest and most acutely affected hurricane victims – residents of temporary public shelters – appear at least indirectly to confirm the foregoing reports. About 70% of these residents reported their homes as having been completely destroyed and described agriculture as their principal pre-hurricane source of employment. Of all shelter residents, over 70% who were working before Hurricane Mitch report that their employment was not substantially affected by the disaster.

**Small family-farm crops about to be harvested, such as basic grains, plantains and cacao, were largely destroyed in October. Despite additional setbacks in some areas because of renewed January flooding, prospects for 1999 planting and harvests are encouraging.**

- Farmers in Choluteca grow small amounts of corn and beans to provide for some or all of their own family's consumption. While these are not large-scale producers, their basic grains are important parts of the family budget of this relatively lesser-income area. The farmers interviewed for this assessment credibly reported the loss of virtually 100% of their October harvest. In addition, up to 10% of their small plots in parts of northern Choluteca had been destroyed along riverbeds or buried under the numerous landslides readily observed throughout that region. Replanting of both major crops would have to await the May 1999 rains.

It appeared that much of the harvest of sorghum – used as a substitute for corn – would be nearly normal.

- Farmers in the more prosperous Colon and Atlántida departments raise corn and beans for both their own consumption and for commercial sale. They reported the loss of 70%/80% of their crops. Their first post-hurricane corn planting in December was affected by renewed flooding in January. Nonetheless, almost all of the farmers consulted had replanted again or had prepared their land for replanting in February, once the rains abate.

Almost 100% of the cacao pods ready for harvesting in small family plots in some areas of the north was destroyed. However, the cacao trees themselves were standing and most farmers expect a near-normal harvest in September.

**Plantain** production is common for consumption throughout the northern coast of Honduras. It is cultivated for large-scale commercial sale in the western Atlantida areas of Meroa and El Tigre. Like most of the banana trees in the north, plantains were almost entirely destroyed by the hurricane.

The team was unable to visit El Tigre but met with farmers along the Toloa/Rio Meroa plantain belt of western Tela municipio in Atlantida. Farmers had already used the sprouts naturally generated by the damaged trees to replant most of their fields. Harvest of the first crop is expected in September/October.

- Following Hurricane Mitch, the Industry and Commerce Ministry's Agricultural Survey Department conducted a thorough systematic crop validation/projection exercise throughout Honduras. Its February 1999 report concludes that despite hurricane and flood losses, the combined October 1998/April 1999 corn harvests will exceed the previous year's harvest by 44%. Bean and sorghum harvests are projected to decline by 33% and 17%, respectively, apparently due in part to the October disaster and in part to market cycles. By March/April, it is believed that supply and demand will approach a normal balance.

### **Processing and Assembly (Maquila) Industries**

Only a few of Honduras' numerous maquila industries were located in the areas visited by the team. Of these, one South Korean-financed clothing assembly factory in the town of La Ceiba was completely destroyed. The factory, which will not be rebuilt, employed 600 women.

### **Wages for Temporary Labor**

Much manual labor in agro-industries, and occasional labor in small-scale agriculture, are paid by the unit produced, rather than by the day. When paid by the day, wages in Choluteca Department for about six hours' work are about L35 per day.\* In one remote corner near the Nicaraguan border, wages were reportedly as low as L25 per day. However, migrant workers in melon, sugar and coffee asserted that when paid by the task they could earn between L80 and L150 per day.

In Colon, Atlantida and Olancho starting wages in most areas were about L50 per day. Paid by the task, however, workers reported that they could earn L80 to L150 per day, and even L200 a day picking oranges.

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\* The current exchange rate is about L14 to US\$1.

## ROADS AND BRIDGES

Durable reconstruction of roads and bridges was the top reconstruction priority of the overwhelming majority of those consulted. In January it was still a constraint in some areas on marketing of existing produce, on local and transnational private sector reinvestment, and the chief concern of rural farming villages.

The team traveled 6,000 kilometers in the course of its assessment study. During these travels, it had the opportunity to observe 1,000 kilometers of unsurfaced roads, 600 kilometers of surfaced roads, and close to 200 bridges in the surveyed departments.

### Colon, Atlantida, Olancho

Especially in Colon, Atlantida and Olancho, damage to both primary surfaced roads and to unsurfaced secondary and tertiary roads, and to the bridges which are their vital links, constrained travel every day.

Intransitable and unreliable roads were already in January a bottleneck to marketing available milk, palm, fish and pineapple and a constraint to the repair of productive infrastructure and equipment which might otherwise have been undertaken.

Major agro-industries considering re-investment in areas where hundreds of millions of dollars of losses had been suffered were questioning whether the principal roads and bridges required to get their products to markets and ports would be reconstructed in a timely and durable way.

Not all farm-to-market roads had been opened; not all rivers whose bridges were destroyed were yet temporarily forded. Many temporary repairs, whether carried out by Honduran or external agencies, had been washed out already in the unexpected heavy January rains in the north. The national road ministry, SOPTRAVI, is carrying out emergency and short-term rehabilitation on priority roads. The dry season will facilitate such repairs, the fording of rivers and other measures.

But whether or not "temporary repairs" had opened their roads, small farmers and village improvement committees (patronatos), echoed by mayors and municipal secretaries, stressed that durable economic reactivation over the next decade – and employment and income – all depend on more weather-resistant reconstruction of transport links. This was considered the top priority of the overwhelming majority of those consulted – from captains of industry to campesinos.

Along this area's main road network, the larger and more important bridges tended to suffer disproportionately. Also, a number of sections of surfaced roads along economically important routes were washed out, in particular:

- about four kilometers along the only route to Puerto Castilla, near Corocito in eastern Trujillo municipio;
- a number of patches comprising one kilometer of road in the Jutiapa, eastern Atlantida area of the same road; and
- a small patch between Juticalpa and Catacamas in eastern Olancho.

The surface and drainage systems of most other roads was affected to some degree. But along a significant number, bridges were destroyed, landslides had cut off access (or, if cleared, threatened to do so again), and severe deterioration and lack of adequate drainage generated lengthy unpassable sections. Major durable road and bridge reconstruction is required along the most affected routes; significant maintenance is required for the balance.

### Choluteca

Road and bridge damage in Choluteca Department appeared to be similar, if of slightly lesser magnitude, than in the other areas. In economic and employment productivity, southern Choluteca is more similar to Colon and Atlantida. Northern Choluteca is not a highly productive area. Rather, it is a subsistence farming area whose population relies for cash employment on providing migratory seasonal labor to a variety of agro-industries in southern Choluteca and in El Paraiso. Many of them rise early, travel long distances each day to work sites, and return late at night. For them, reliable road access to employment centers is the basis of their family income. For the industries they support, their labor is equally essential.

A number of sections of surfaced roads along economically important routes were washed out, in particular:

- about 10 kilometers along the Marcovia/Monjaras road which serves the melon and shrimp industry; and
- a combined total of one kilometer in patches along the Pan-American Highway between Choluteca and San Marcos de Colon.

Damages to unsurfaced roads are similar to those in the north. It appeared, however, that in general there were proportionately fewer bridges destroyed and roads were damaged but less acutely.

## HOUSING AND SHELTER

The departments visited by the team account for 44% of the 33,220 houses reported by the Government of Honduras as destroyed throughout Honduras. One of the team's initial steps in each department and municipio was to identify and visit all areas described as "most affected." The intersection between homes destroyed and loss of employment was also reviewed.

Destruction of houses and displacement of families was always a prominent factor in discussions with municipal officials and others. At times, significant housing destruction was also associated with the destruction of income-producing fertile river-bed farms and pastures or with self-employment and home businesses.

### Colon Department

Colon Department alone accounts for 25% of the houses reportedly destroyed throughout Honduras. The number of homes reported destroyed – over 8,500 – suggested that close to one in every four homes in the department no longer existed.

This proportion of damage was apparent in Santa Rosa de Aguan municipio, where 350 (30%) of the municipio's 1,200 families lost their homes. Elsewhere, however, data gathered from individual municipios visited and from the team's observations in the field of the locations identified as "most affected" suggested a number of different conclusions:

- Significant housing destruction occurred in a relatively few locations.
- The magnitude of destruction appeared to be less than 2,000, rather than more than 8,000 homes.
- The proportion of houses destroyed within the department – even based on individual municipal reports – appeared to be less than 7% rather than 25%.
- Municipal data for the number of homes destroyed suggested lower levels of destruction than the department-wide statistics suggested. Even those lower figures, however, include a large number of homes which were only slightly damaged but which are located in areas declared uninhabitable and which probably ought to be treated as a separate category.

At a time when the terrifying memories of the hurricane were still fresh, and renewed flooding was occurring, the majority of home owners "to be relocated" refused to consider doing so. Their homes are intact and they believe that the risk of another event such as the floods created by Hurricane Mitch is small.

As hurricane memories fade, their opposition to relocation may increase further. Municipal officials made it clear that they would not oblige relocation and that they do not possess the resources to provide alternative solutions.

### Other Departments

Data for other departments appears to be more reflective of actual losses than in Colon. The 3% of homes reportedly lost for Atlantida and 7% for Choluteca, correspond more closely with municipal data and direct observations. Choluteca is the scene of acute problems – in Choluteca town, which lost 12% of its homes; in Marcovia, which suffered a 15% loss, and in Morolica, a unique case of dramatic destruction. It is equally significant that 93% to 97% of the housing of these departments is intact.

### Temporary Public Shelters

The population of public shelters (albergues) had already decreased dramatically by December/January. A January census of all albergues revealed that 1,650 families -- 0.5% of the population of the four departments -- resided in them. Choluteca town accounted for half of all shelter residents. Almost three-quarters of public shelter residents of the four departments visited who were employed before the hurricane reported they remained employed, which was consistent with the national average for shelter residents.

The relative number and proportion of displaced families residing in public shelters is attributable, in the authors' view, to:

- The proportion of houses not destroyed (between 93% and 97%). The critical mass of surviving houses was adequate to absorb many of the displaced families, at least while they repaired or partially rebuilt their homes. Honduras' closely-knit network of extended families provided shelter during the critical period following the floods. [That this network was less present in larger cities may account for the disproportionate concentration of public shelters required there.]
- The speed with which both damaged and some destroyed houses have been and continue to be repaired. Walls of houses built with adobe or wattle-and-daub (bajareque) without a plaster seal disintegrated when exposed to flood waters. The structures of most damaged homes remained in tact or reparable. These homes were repaired or partially rebuilt quickly with readily available local materials.

- The proportion of economic activity, employment and income which continued despite the disaster.
- Enlightened policies by municipalities which permitted homeless families who left shelters for independent arrangements to remain eligible for relief or other later assistance.
- The independent attitude of most Hondurans who prefer to not reside in public shelters or to depend on public assistance, including their preference to return to and protect their own property (assuming they deem it safe).

## **CURRENT RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES**

### **FHIS**

In the four departments visited by the team, FHIS, in part with USAID funding, has implemented 366 rehabilitation projects which generated an estimated 3,500 short-term jobs. Of all organizations active in these areas, FHIS effected the most rapid, practical and effective program for repair of damaged infrastructure.

By the time of the authors' visits, FHIS had completed or was executing projects to durably reconstruct the vast majority of schools and potable water systems damaged in the disaster. The repairs excluded schools and water systems so completely destroyed that their reconstruction costs exceeded the organization's financial resources; or those destroyed along rivers, where the sites on which they had been located were no longer suitable.

Because of unexpectedly heavy January rains, some of the temporary post-hurricane road repairs executed by FHIS and other national and international organizations in the northern departments were reported to have been washed away. This experience highlighted the unpredictability of rainfall in the context of the El Nino phenomenon and the need for carefully planned durable reconstruction which provides for drainage, landslide control and other preventive measures.

## Food aid

Emergency PL-480 Title II and other food donations during the first two to three months following the hurricane appear to have met a genuine need and served as a useful, reassuring and timely relief measure. Detailed field surveys confirm that in the meantime most farmers in the northern departments planted again and are anticipating a reasonable harvest in March/April. Planting in more arid Choluteca will begin with the first rains in May/June and harvests are expected in August/September.

The PL-480 Section 416(b) food which has been programmed to assist in Honduras' reconstruction appears to be welcome and useful. These donations – principally of commodities which would be imported commercially in any case – will be monetized and the proceeds used for reconstruction. To the degree that such imports can include a greater proportion of wheat, they will be especially appreciated.

PL-480 Title II donations are meant for direct distribution to needy families. In the authors' view, in future such food could be usefully provided to the following categories of beneficiaries for the duration indicated:

- to the elderly without support during 1999.
- to the remaining residents of public shelters during 1999. Although the majority continue to be employed, most of these families lost their homes and all of their possessions. While many could survive without it, food aid could be a useful temporary income supplement to them as they work this year to re-establish themselves.

In neither of the foregoing categories does it appear necessary or appropriate to require the contribution of labor in exchange for food.

- to directly-affected families in a few specific geographic areas whose breadwinners have temporarily lost their usual subsistence food production. A modest, carefully-targeted, well-managed food-aid program which concludes in April and September (in the north and south, respectively), could be a useful economic bridge for these affected families.

A \$40-million program of 63,000 metric tons of PL-480 Title II food – reportedly sufficient to assist between 850,000 and one million persons – is being implemented during 1999.\*

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\* World Food Program (WFP) may provide additional tonnage from other donors.

Some food short-term distribution remains necessary. However, there is a general concern among many national and international sources consulted that the volume programmed for 1999 is double or triple the actual need. The food aid will continue to be distributed after the first post-hurricane harvests are realized, after the residual need has diminished further. In the departments visited, the capability of the implementing organizations to adequately organize, support and supervise the program seemed doubtful, while the burdens placed on some local municipalities by the volume of food aid appeared to be diverting its personnel and resources from higher priority initiatives.

Corn prices are at ten-year lows. National basic grain production is quickly recovering and is characterized by one U.S. agricultural expert as approaching a normal balance between supply and demand. Possible localized disincentive effects on production generated by external food donations could neither be confirmed nor ruled out.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A large-scale employment generation program would not be an appropriate priority response to Honduras' reconstruction needs. In the areas visited, jobs and income are recovering quickly. An employment response which is planned now will not be carried out until later this year, when the need will have diminished further.
2. Durable reconstruction of roads and bridges is the top priority of the areas visited. The emergency period is ending. Quick, expensive temporary repairs would not be an appropriate use of long-term reconstruction funds. Reconstruction work should both repair and upgrade roads, emphasizing measures which reduce long-term maintenance and prevent landslides and intransitability. This type of work requires methodical analysis and planning to guarantee durability of results and transparency.

Durable reconstruction of roads, bridges, streets and local retaining walls would generate jobs for unskilled laborers. Some of these activities could be concentrated in specific pockets where the disaster has caused medium- or longer-term employment deficits.

3. A general distribution in early May of small amounts of fresh red bean seed to small farmers throughout the areas visited would accelerate small-scale economic reactivation and would take advantage of the disaster to add vigor to rural seed supplies.
4. An immediate reduction in the volume of Title II food aid programmed for 1999, and a cautious approach to further food aid requests, are indicated. A smaller, better-managed effort with pinpoint targeting would be a more appropriate response to the needs of the affected areas.

## REPORTED DEATHS AND HOUSING DESTRUCTION BY DEPARTMENTS

REGION	# of Deaths	% of Total Deaths	Population	% of Total Pop.	# of Houses Destroyed	% of Total Destroyed	% Destroyed Within Dept.*
<b>North</b>							
Atlantida	1,076	19%	297,000	5%	1,650	5.0%	3.3%
Colon	1,156	20%	190,000	3%	8,250	24.5%	26.1%
Cortes	198	4%	806,000	15%	3,300	10.0%	2.5%
Gracias a Dios	317	6%	45,000	1%	550	1.7%	7.3%
Islas de la Bahia	81	1%	28,000	1%	1,100	3.3%	23.8%
Yoro	271	5%	412,000	8%	1,760	5.3%	2.6%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,099</b>	<b>55%</b>	<b>1,778,000</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>16,610</b>	<b>50.0%</b>	<b>5.6%</b>
<b>Central</b>							
Comayagua	324	6%	306,000	6%	880	2.7%	1.7%
El Paraiso	385	7%	313,000	6%	880	2.7%	1.7%
Francisco Morazan	412	7%	994,000	18%	4,400	13.3%	2.7%
La Paz	37	1%	133,000	2%	330	1.0%	1.5%
Olancho	399	7%	354,000	7%	440	1.3%	0.7%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,557</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>2,100,000</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>6,930</b>	<b>21.0%</b>	<b>2.0%</b>
<b>South</b>							
Choluteca	460	8%	355,000	7%	4,400	13.3%	7.4%
Valle	65	1%	147,000	2%	2,200	6.6%	9.0%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>525</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>502,000</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>6,600</b>	<b>20.0%</b>	<b>7.9%</b>
<b>West</b>							
Copan	49	1%	270,000	5%	1,100	3.3%	2.4%
Intibuca	45	1%	154,000	3%	110	0.3%	0.4%
Lempira	6	0%	218,000	4%	110	0.3%	0.3%
Ocotepeque	79	1%	91,000	2%	330	1.0%	2.2%
Santa Barbara	297	5%	339,000	6%	1,430	4.3%	2.6%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>476</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>1,072,000</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>3,080</b>	<b>9.0%</b>	<b>1.7%</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>5,657</b>		<b>5,452,000</b>		<b>33,220</b>		

\* Based on an average family size of 6 members.

Gersony:JAN99

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**CONTACTS CONSULTED**

<b>NAME</b>	<b>POSITION</b>
<b>CHOLUTECA DEPARTMENT</b>	
<u>Cholulteca town</u>	
1. Ing. Oscar Rueda	Ingeniero Municipal
2. Lucia Miranda	Alcaldia -Catrastrros dept.
3. Juan Ramon Flores	Chorotega credit union director
4. Edith Murra	Departmental Governor
5. Luis Felipe Lagos	CARITAS assistant director
6. Padre Jesus Balladares	Catholic priest
7. Padre Alvaro	Catholic priest
8. Carlos Lara	President, Granjas Marinas (shrimp)
9. Ing. Juan Benito Guevara	Alcalde
10. Nelson Rodriguez	Alcaldia staff
11. Arturo Ariaza	Inspector de obras de municipio
12. Lucida Ramon	WFP Cholulteca office director
13. Carlos Cardona	WFP field officer
14. Alfredo	WFP field officer
15. Herman Rubenstein	Hardware store owner
<u>Orucuina</u>	
16. Angel Lagos	Secretario Municipal
<u>Apacilagua</u>	
17. Norma Ulloa	Secretario Municipal

El Triunfo

- |     |                                |             |
|-----|--------------------------------|-------------|
| 18. | Dilma Leticia Arnoldo Martinez | Alcaldesa   |
| 19. | Field Assessment Advisor       | AICF/France |

Concepcion de Maria

- |     |            |                                     |
|-----|------------|-------------------------------------|
| 20. | Cont. Saul | Nueva Lucha Credit Union accountant |
|-----|------------|-------------------------------------|

El Corpus

- |     |                          |              |
|-----|--------------------------|--------------|
| 21. | Bessy Carazco de Mayorga | Mayor's wife |
|-----|--------------------------|--------------|

Marcovia/Monjaras

- |     |                 |                                      |
|-----|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| 22. | Wilfredo Acosta | President, Patronato de Barrio Sinai |
| 23. | Name not noted  | Hardware/Food supplier store owner   |

Marcovia town

- |     |                      |                                 |
|-----|----------------------|---------------------------------|
| 24. | Senior Field Manager | Ingenio Los Mangos (sugar cane) |
|-----|----------------------|---------------------------------|

Pespire

- |     |                       |                                   |
|-----|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 25. | Reyna Leticia         | Secretaria Municipal              |
| 26. | Reyna Margarita Nunez | Gerente, Pespirenses Credit Union |

Duyure

- |     |                |                      |
|-----|----------------|----------------------|
| 27. | Osmin Aguilera | Alcalde              |
| 28. | Suyapa Ponce   | Secretaria Municipal |

San Marcos de Colon

- |     |                  |                            |
|-----|------------------|----------------------------|
| 29. | Enrique Calderon | Alcalde                    |
| 30. | Dr. Sandoval     | Doctor, Choluteca Hospital |

## VALLE DEPARTMENT

### San Lorenzo

31. Miguel Angel Molina Gerente General, Montelibano Melons

## COLON DEPARTMENT

### Trujillo town

32. Dr. Beato Gonzalo Castillo Batiz Alcalde

33. Padre Burgos CARITAS/Colon Coordinator

34. Mauricio Rosales CRS/Colon PL-480 Officer

35. Ing. Takachi Matsusaka Director, DIHE-PESCA (Japanese fishing project)

36. Kym Brinkley Manager, Hotel Villa Brinkley

37. Monsenor Virgilio Lopez Bishop of Colon

38. Prof. Freddy Lazaro Matute FUCAGUA Executive Director

39. Prof. Wilfredo Chavez FUCAGUA staff

40. Lic. Miriam de Crezco Departmental Governor

41. Luis Alonso Garcia Castillo Gerente General, AgroPalma

42. Name not noted Secretaria Municipal

### Sonaguera/Isletas Central

43. Ing. Jorge Godoy Standard/Dole (bananas)  
Personnel Manager

44. Ing. Armando Quiroz Standard/Dole (bananas)  
Production Manager

45. dona Elsa President, Patronato de Isletas Central

Sonaguera town

46. Ing. Carlos Alberto Morazan                      Alcalde  
47. Siony Rivera    Director, Sonaguera Credit Union

Tocoa town

48. Oscar Salgado    Director, Cressida (African Palm)  
49. Reyna Isabel Cardona                                  Gerente, La Ceibena Credit Union  
50. Carlos Hernan Banegas Lazo                          Alcalde  
51. Regidora Vilma    Municipal Councillor  
52. Luis Enrique Matute                                      LEYDE distribution staff  
53. Elmin Roberto Vega                                      LEYDE distribution staff

Santa Rosa de Aguan

54. Felix Cantalicio Medina                                  Registrar Municipal  
55. Diogenes Arriola Arauz                                  Juez Municipal  
56. Ing. Jerson Blanco    Industrial engineer

Limon/Francia

57. Juan Barrientos    Patronato de Francia

Limon town

58. Oscar Flores    Alcalde  
59. Bruce Borden    Cattle owner  
60. Mr. Gorman    Cattle ranch manager

Trujillo/El Tesorito

61. don Tono    President, Patronato de El Tesorito

Trujillo/Los Leones

62. Jose Luis Santo Los Leones Cooperative President  
(African palm)

Sonaguera/La Curva

63. don Mario President, Patronato de La Curva

Sonaguera/Los Carrioles

64. Name not noted President, Patronato de Los Carrioles

Sonaguera/Lorelay

65. dona Tela Secretaria, Patronato de Lorelay

**ATLANTIDA DEPARTMENT**

La Ceiba

66. Juan Luis Cano Standard Fruit/Dole (bananas)  
Personnel Manager

67. Orlando Javier Cattle and milk expert

68. Pepe Herrero Sausage-maker/rafting promoter

69. Lic. Rossell Aceituna Director, La Ceibena Credit Union

70. Cont. Mario Guifaro La Ceibena board member

71. Cont. Justo Ruiz La Ceibena board member

72. Jose Navarete La Ceibena board member

73. Roberto Dip President, Chamber of Commerce,

74. Ing. Alejandro Canales Administrador Municipal

75. don Hernan President, Patronato de Toncontin

76. don Marco Promotor Social, Yaruca

77. Reinaldo Urbina President, Patronato de Rio Viejo

78. Mauro Tartalia CARE water project director

- |     |                              |  |
|-----|------------------------------|--|
| 79. | Gonzalo Ramiro               | LEYDE Security Coordinator               |
| 80. | Gonzalo Bueno                | DIAGRO (agric. products) director        |
| 81. | Rev. Alfonso Martinez Galeas | Pastor - Iglesia de Dios                 |
| 82. | Patrick Blake                | Dole pineapple division director         |
| 83. | Ing. Fernando Pinto          | LEYDE chief of milk collection           |
| 84. | Lic. Ramon Ostilio Lopez     | FHIS Regional Director                   |
| 85. | Ing. Andiro                  | FHIS Regional Engineer                   |
| 86. | Ing. Luis Rietti             | Gerente, CAICESSA<br>(Dole/African Palm) |

Jutiapa town

- |     |                 |                      |
|-----|-----------------|----------------------|
| 87. | Abraham Padilla | Secretario Municipal |
| 88. | Isidro Bonilla  | Alcaldia staff       |
| 89. | don Jorge       | APROCACAO director   |
| 90. | Name not noted  | SOPTRAVI engineer    |

Jutiapa/Nueva Armenia

- |     |                      |                                       |
|-----|----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 91. | Carlos Humberto Lobo | President, Patronato de Nueva Armenia |
|-----|----------------------|---------------------------------------|

La Masica

- |     |                 |                         |
|-----|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 92. | Cesar Moradel   | Secretario Municipal    |
| 93. | Carlos Bonilla  | Administrador Municipal |
| 94. | Wilmer Martinez | CARE social promoter    |

Tela/San Alejo

- |     |                    |   |
|-----|--------------------|---|
| 95. | Ing. Mario A. Lara | San Alejo (Chiquita/Clover Palm Consortium) |
| 96. | Ing. Exeli Arias   | San Alejo (African palm)                    |
| 97. | Ing. Hugo Bonilla  | San Alejo (African palm)                    |



113. Jose Manuel Romero

Gerente, COCAOL (coffee cooperative)

114. Andres Murillo

Gerente, Cooperative Juticalpa (Catacamas branch)

Santa Maria del Real

115. Luis Alonzo Paz

Alcalde

San Francisco de Becerra

116. Hernan Espinal

Alcalde

## TEGUCIGALPA

	NAME	ORGANIZATION	POSITION
117.	Elena Brineman	USAID	Mission Director
118.	Todd Amani	USAID	Chief, SPS
119.	Duty Greene	USAID	SPS
120.	Jim Wright	BHR/FFP	FFP officer
121.	Clemence Weber	USAID	Chief, ANRO
122.	Dennis Ortega Perdomo	USAID	ANRO
123.	James H. Sanders	US Army COE	Geologist
124.	Edwin L. Harp	USGS	Geologist
125.	Ing. Carlos Flores	USAID	Mission Engineer, MDRO
126.	Todd Sloan	USAID	Municipal Development officer
127.	Diego Beltrand	IOM	Country Representative
128.	Al Rossi	USAID/San Salvador	Regional Inspector General
129.	Marco Zavala	USAID	Chief Financial Analyst
130.	Larry Grizzard	USAID	Controller
131.	Ing. Rene Paz Bueso	SOPTRAVI	Director General, Conservacion de Carreteras
132.	Ing. Gustavo Izeguirre	SOPTRAVI	Chief, Unsurfaced Roads Unit
133.	Ing. Miguel Angel Matute	SOPTRAVI	Bridge designer
134.	Inga. Kathya Pastor	SOPTRAVI	Director General, Carreteras
135.	Ing. Marcio Figueroa	SOPTRAVI	Unsurfaced Roads – Colon/Atlantida/Yoro
136.	Ing. Mario Casco	SOPTRAVI	Unsurfaced Roads – Choluteca/Cortes

137.	Ing. Marco Tulio Canales	SOPTRAVI	Contracted Supervisor – Colon/Atlantida/Yoro
138.	Ing. Jose Zuniga Soto	SOPTRAVI	Contracted Supervisor – Cholulteca/Cortes
139.	Inga. Yvette Rodriguez	SOPTRAVI	Chief, Mano de Obra Unit
140.	Ing. Pastor Alvarado	SOPTRAVI	Deputy Chief BID Unidad Ejecutora
141.	Lic. Jose Barahona	SOPTRAVI	Chief, Internal Audit Unit
142.	Inga. Lorena Reina	SOPTRAVI	Chief, BCIE Unidad Ejecutora
143.	Ing. Rolando Yon-Siu	BID/SOPTRAVI	Project Officer Roads and Bridges
144.	Ing. Ricardo Figueroa	WB/SOPTRAVI	WB Project Manager
145.	Ing. Ramon Cardona	FHIS	DG, Unidad Generacion de Empleo (UG)
146.	Lic. Hector Molina	FHIS	UG Gerente Financiero
147.	Ing. Valeriano Duron	FHIS	UG Field Inspector
148.	Ing. Oscar Callejas	FHIS	Director, Unidad Costos
149.	Ing. Anna Lee Lee	FHIS	Unidad de Costos
150.	Ing. Miguel Valladares	US Army	Corps of Engineers
151.	Capt. John Burgess	US Army	JTF Bravo J7 (Roads)
152.	Lic. Romeo Ucles	AHMON	Technical Director
153.	Ing. Marcos Arguero	Engineer	Former USAID Engineer
154.	Inga. Patricia Perez	USAID/MDDIO	Project Assistant
155.	Lorena Aguilar	USAID/CONT	Financial Analyst
156.	Liliana Matute	USAID/CONT	Chief Accountant
157.	Miriam Lopez	USAID/CONT	Voucher Examiner

158. Armando Busmail            USAID            Agriculture and Natural  
Resources Officer

159. John Chudy                    USAID            Agriculture and Natural  
Resources Officer

<b>Contacts consulted (see above)</b>	<b>159</b>
<b>Rural workers in three departments</b>	<b><u>305</u></b>
<b><u>TOTAL</u></b>	<b>464</b>

Gersony 19Feb99

**DEPARTMENTS AND MUNICIPIOS VISITED**

**CHOLUTECA DEPARTMENT**

**Municipios Visited: 11**

Choluteca  
Concepcion de Maria  
Morolica  
El Triunfo  
El Corpus  
Duyure  
San Marcos de Colon  
Apacilagua  
Orocuina  
Pespire  
Marcovia

**Municipios Not Visited: 3**

Namasigue  
Santa Ana de Yusguare  
San Jose

**COLON DEPARTMENT**

**Municipios Visited: 5**

Trujillo  
Santa Rosa de Aguan  
Tocoa  
Sonaguera  
Limon

**Municipios Not Visited: 5**

Iriona  
Bonito Oriental  
Saba  
Balfate  
Santa Fe

**ATLANTIDA DEPARTMENT**

**Municipios Visited: 5**

Jutiapa  
La Ceiba  
La Masica  
Arizona  
Tela

**Municipios Not Visited: 3**

El Provenir  
San Francisco  
Esparta

**EASTERN OLANCHO DEPARTMENT**

**Municipios Visited: 4**

Juticalpa  
Catacamas  
Santa Maria del Real  
San Francisco de Becerra

**SUMMARY**

<b>Departments Visited:</b>	<b>4</b>	
Municipios Visited:	25	70%
Municipios Not Visited:	<u>11</u>	<u>30%</u>
<b>Total Municipios:</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100%</b>

**BRIEFINGS**

**Tegucigalpa**

1. Elena Brineman Director, USAID/Honduras
2. Joseph Lombardo Deputy Director, USAID/Honduras
3. Todd Amani Chief, SPS, USAID/Honduras
4. Mark Schneider Assistant Administrator, USAID/LAC
5. Gail Lecce Chief, MDDIO, USAID/Honduras
6. Ing. Carlos Flores USAID/Honduras, MDDIO
7. Todd Sloan USAID/Honduras, MDDIO
8. Amb. James Creagan U.S. Ambassador to Honduras
9. Paul Trivelli Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy
10. David Wolfe Economics Officer, U.S. Embassy
11. Duty Greene USAID/Honduras, SDS
12. Richard Loudis USAID/Honduras, SDS
13. David Alverson USAID/Honduras, ANRO
14. Kevin Creagan U.S. Crisis Corps
15. Marguerite Houze Deputy Assistant Secretary, PRM
16. Amb. Brunson McKinley Director General, IOM
17. Roberto Kozak IOM Regional Director
18. Diego Beltrand IOM Country Director
19. Bobbie Myers USAID Regional Legal Advisor
20. Mary Ann Anderson Chief, HRD, USAID/Honduras
21. John Chudy USAID/Honduras, ANRO

22. Inga. Carmen Zambrana	USAID/Honduras, SPS
23. Marta Larios	USAID/Honduras, HRD
24. Vicente Diaz	USAID/Honduras, SPS
25. John Heard	OTI/Washington
26. Catherine Haberland	OTI/Washington
27. Elizabeth Kvitashvili	OTI/Washington
28. David Gould	OTI/Washington
29. Bob Kramer	OTI/Washington
30. Lic. Eduardo Facusse	Presidente, COHEP Consejo Hondureno de la Empresa Privada
31. Lic. Wilma Sierra de Fonseca	Directora Ejecutiva, COHEP
32. Abogado Oscar Manzanares	Asesor Legal, COHEP
33. Lic. Ana Abarca	Sub-Directora Ejecutiva, COHEP
34. Ing. Jesus Simon	Representante, Camara Hondureno de la Industria de la Construccion
35. Ing. Felipe Antonio Peraza	Presidente, Asociacion Nacional de Industriales
36. Mario Flores	Secretario de Actas, CTH [SOTRAMACO]
37. Efrain Laureano Perez	PRODEPAH [Chemonics]
38. Lic. Margarita Rojas	PRODEPAH
39. Ing. Guillermo Alvarado	Minister of Agriculture
40. Ing. Miguel Angel Bonilla	Vice Minister of Agriculture/SAG
41. Lic. Jaime Salinas	Ministry of Agriculture Director Ejecutivo, UPEG/SAG
42. Lic. Guadalupe Hung Pacheco	Ministry of Int'l Cooperation/ SETCO

- |                            |  |
|----------------------------|--|
| 43. Lic. Elva Flores       | Ministry of Finance [PL480-416 unit]       |
| 44. Lic. Acucena Zepeda G. | Ministry of Finance [PL480-416 unit]       |
| 45. Ing. Jaime Salinas S.  | Ministry of Agriculture UPEG/SAG           |
| 46. Ing. Emil Falck        | PRODEPAH Land Tenure Specialist            |
| 47. Omar Gonzales          | United States Embassy Agricultural Attache |
| 48. Dennis Sharma          | Agricultural Officer, USAID [TDY]          |
| 49. Salvatore Pinzino      | USAID/Food for Peace Officer               |
| 50. Gideon Lichfield       | Mexico City Bureau Chief, The Economist    |
| 51. Martin Ede             | Consultant, European Union                 |