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SOCIAL GROUPS AND DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN

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CHAPTER 2:

POLITICAL LEADERS AS MODERNIZERS: THE QUAID-E-AZAM AND MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN

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March, 1971

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INTRODUCTION

Charismatic leadership played a very significant role in modernizing the political society of the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. This type of leadership was not unknown to the Indian Muslims before the advent of the British era. In fact a large number of Muslim divines had built for themselves enormous followings among the Indians, Muslims as well as Hindus, largely by virtue of their "supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities."[1] People understood, venerated and at times hysterically responded to these qualities. In the Indian society, as in all other societies respectful of tradition, charisma was and remains a great power. It was possible and remains possible for the man who wields it to shape and diffuse a new image of self-and-society.[2] However, in Muslim India of the twentieth century, charismatic leadership came not from among the traditional classes but from among the new, city-based middle class professionals. It was through this class that western political philosophy entered the traditional Muslim society. The leaders of this class, having imbibed the ethos of the West, were able to transmit to other sections of the society. The function that charisma performed in this process of permeation was to make a larger section of the society responsive toward new ideas. It is in this way that the charismatic leadership played a modernizing role in the Indian Muslim society.

Two Muslim leaders, Mohammad Ali Jinnah in the 1940s and Mohammad Ayub Khan in the 1960s, performed this kind of modernizing function. They adopted similar strategies to achieve similar results. By organizing a political party on democratic lines, Jinnah was able to reach the apathetic Muslim middle class. In doing so he effectively by-passed the traditional leadership to which this class had hitherto responded. While Jinnah's tactics embittered and estranged the ulema and other traditional leaders, it won for him the following of the literate, urban, middle-class professionals of Muslim India. Nehru was in fact quite wrong in labelling the Muslim League as a reactionary organization under the influence of the nawabs of the United Provinces, the pirs of Sind and the landlords of the Punjab.[3] In fact, it was Jinnah's charismatic leadership that made it possible for the League to liberate itself from the strangle-hold of precisely this kind of leadership and reach the average, educated Muslim of urban India.

While Mohammad Ali Jinnah was able to bring the middle class city dwellers within the periphery of the Muslim political society, Mohammad Ayub Khan was able to perform the same function for the rural middle class. Jinnah's death in September 1948 virtually halted the process of political participation that he had so ably initiated. For more than a decade after his departure, political participation was limited to the traditional elite groups and the middle-class citizens of Pakistan's major cities. Ayub Khan reactivated the process. By using the system of Basic

Democracies, much as his predecessor had used the Muslim League, Ayub Khan was able to reach the politically dormant rural middle class. Once again, a leader was to be helped in his task of modernization by a disciplined organization and by his own exceptional powers and qualities. The institution of Basic Democracies, with the bulk of its members belonging to the rural middle class, was able to help Ayub Khan in the successful working of his political strategy.

Jinnah was able to displace the traditional leadership and concentrate power in his hands. He used this power to produce changes in the traditional society by assimilating important new social groups in the system. He never had the time to disperse the power that he had accumulated aomng the old and new participant groups. Accordingly, when he died, the power that he had wielded was seized upon by the groups and apportioned according to their relative strength in the system. Jinnah's inability to institutionalize the dispersion and control of power resulted in the re-emergence of a static situation. The political system had re-achieved its state of equilibrium at a point which was considerably above, in terms of the scale of modernization, from which Jinnah had picked it up. Emergence of Ayub Khan as a charismatic leader once again introduced an element of dynamism into the system. The process was repeated once again. Ayub Khan concentrated power in his hands by displacing the traditional interests, including the section of the society that Jinnah had mobilized. Once again, the concentration of power was used to assimilate an important new social group into the system. And once again the modernizer

failed to disperse the power that he had concentrated in his hands. This time, however, the society failed to return to a state of equilibrium. The push it had received created imbalances that were not self-correcting. Accordingly, even after the departure of Ayub Khan, the system rapidly spiralled in its modernization course, all the time assimilating new social groups.

Therefore, both Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Mohammad Ayub Khan were modernizers in at least two ways, if Huntington's definition of modernization was to be used. According to him:

> Depending upon one's perspective, on can thus define political modernization to mean either the concentration of power, the expansion of power, or the dispersion of power, and peculiarly enough, political scientists have indeed defined political modernization in each of these ways. At one point or another in a country's history, each does constitute "modernization," and in turn each poses challenges to the adaptibility of the political system.[4]

It would be instructive to look a little deeper into the role of Jinnah and Ayub Khan as political modernizers, to examine in detail the strategies they adopted, the challenges they met and the legacies they left.

THE QUAID-E-AZAM,MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH

Before the emergence of Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the Quaid-e-Azam (the Great Leader), the leaders of Muslim India were either military conquerors and their descendants, or religious divines. Thus, Mohammad Ghauri, Alauddin Khilji, Babar, Akbar, Aurangzeb, Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan were either themselves military adventurers or the heirs to the dynasties established by them. Sheikh Syed

Ahmad, Shah Waliullah and Syed Ahmad Shaheed were religious leaders who owed their extremely large followings to the power that Indian mystics have always enjoyed over the masses. Even Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Sir Mohammad Iqbel gained whatever following they did as religious leaders. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was different. He was the product of the politicization of the Indian Muslim society; a lawyer from Bombay who worked his way up first in the Indian National Congress and then in the All-India Muslim League. He was therefore the first political leader of any significance produced by Muslim India.

The Quaid-e-Azam's ascendancy as the undisputed leader of the Indian Muslims[5] was significant for at least two reasons. First, and the more important of the two, it marked the partial secularization of Indian Muslim nationalism. Second, it seemed at that time to institutionalize the possession, distribution and control of power within the emerging political system. The first established a kind, the second turned out to be a political chimera. Even after the death of the Quaid-e-Azam and despite some desperate efforts, the traditional leadership was not able to capture the center of the political stage. The power that some new groups gained under him remained theirs. However, the political party that he built with great diligence did not long survive his death. It is of interest to explore in some detail the factors responsible for the emergence of Jinnah as the Great Leader of Muslim India and also of the factors responsible for the weakness of the political institutions that he created.

Islam and Muslim Politics in British India

On behalf of the Indian Muslims, the Quaid-e-Azam launched a brilliant political campaign for achieving a state in which "the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Quran and Sunnah.[6] And yet his demand for the creation of Pakistan was opposed by the bulk of the traditional Muslim leadership. In this paradox lies the clue to much of Pakistan's political history, for by accepting Jinnah as their leader and his methods for achieving their dream society, the Muslims of India took one giant stride toward the modernization of their society. They undertook the task of creating a Muslim state by adopting essentially political methods. While it is true that "the emergence of Pakistan would never have happened had it not been for the Muslims' still dynamic religious orientation to this world,"[7] it is not quite right to suggest, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith has done, that the fulfillment of this urge has tied the Muslims irrevocably to producing within the polity of Pakistan a purely Islamic state. Since the central theme of this chapter is developed as a rebuttal of this thesis, it would be worthwhile stating Wilfred Smith's argument in full and in his own words.

> Even if on second thought they may feel that the undertaking to build an Islamic society was more onerous than they once imagined, yet in a sense there is now no going back. Indeed, so far-reaching was the commitment, so overt and explicit the endeavor, that the significance and responsibility have grown inescapable. The history on which they have embarked will, deliberately or not, be Islamic. Whether they like or regret it, the en-

> gagement is large, and has been undertaken--it cannot now be discarded or shelved. For a decision to drop the 'Islamic state idea' at this stage would be no mere diversion. Rather, it would be a religious act, a deep conclusion. For it would involve the positive assertion by a great Muslim community that the Islamic ideal for society is irrelevant or unequal to the task of contemporary living, or at least that they as a people are unable so to interpret or implement it. Even without a forthright decision, merely a drift away would in fact involve a reassessment of, and challenge to, and comment on their faith.[8]

What is, of course, central to the above argument is the meaning of an Islamic society. From the time Islam penetrated the sub-continent in the eleventh century and until the advent of the British era, the writ of the Muslim rulers ran in India. There was not much trouble with the interpretation of Islamic society; for all intents and purposes, India was such a society. The Muslims ruled and applied as best as they could the principles of Islam to the conduct of the State. With the eclipse of the Muslim Empire in the eighteenth century started the great debate about the role of Islam in a state under the political domination of non-Muslims. There were two schools of thought; one of what may be called the orthodox activists and the other of the orthodox passivists. The first espoused the building up of an Islamic society by displacing the foreign non-Muslim power,[9] the other favored pursuing the precepts of Islam within the framework of foreign dominion.[10] The first regarded India to be <u>dar ul harb</u> (the land of the enemy), the second saw it as <u>dar ul Islam</u> (the land of Islam). The former school, started by Shah Abdul Aziz,

met with military defeat first in north-west India when its most eminent advocate, Saiyed Ahmad Shahid was killed in the Battle of Balakor in 1831,and again in 1857 when the British succeeded in quashing the Indian Mutiny. In the post-Mutiny era, the leadership of the Muslims of urban India came into the hands of the orthodox passivists. People like Maulvi Karamat Ali of Bengal and Sir Saiyad Ahmad Khan of the United Provinces, while remaining within the confines of orthodoxy tried to wean away the Muslims from an attitude of intolerace and fanaticism. The pressures that led to the popularization of this approach were both social and economic. The Muslims,under the influence of the activists, had stubbornly refused to attend the schools started by the British. Accordingly, with the gradual replacement of Persian with English as the official language, the Muslims found it exceedingly difficult to either find themselves employment with the government or to get accepted in the urban, westernized elite that the British rule was creating in the Indian society. To increase Muslim participation in the affairs of modern India, Sir Saiyad established a college at Aligarh and asked the British for their help. "Sir Saiyad had grown up in the shadow of the [Moghul] palace, it would have been quite natural if he had disliked the rule of a conquering people. But common sense dominated his nature."[11] With the active cooperation of the British he created an institution that was to play a significant role in the political development of the Indian Muslims.

The social and economic forces that hurt the Muslims of urban India so badly did not touch their counterparts in the rural areas. There the cause of the orthodox acitvists retained its strong attraction. The <u>ulema</u> continued to preach their message in

countless village mosques. The masses were exhorted to shun everything associated with the British raj and to endeavor to return to the glorious past of Islam. In 1867, with the founding of a theological school at Deoband, these ulema found for themselves and their numerous followers a rallying point.

According to Ziya Faruqu, "the founders of the Darul-Ulum at Deoband represented the rebellious spirit of the disgruntled Muslims who... had been manifesting their uneasiness and dissatisfaction, in one way or another, with the state of affairs created by the establishment and perpetuation of foreign rule in India."[12] Two events of significance increased the frustration of the Indian Muslims and with it the political power of the orthodox activists of Deoband. In 1900 the administration of the United Provinces, under the governorship of Sir Anthony Macdonnel,took the unusual step of sanctioning the use of Hindi in Devanagri script as the official vernacular. This step hurt the Muslims. Hindi, the language of the Hindus, as used in the late nineteenth century, resembled in both its written and spoken form Urdu, the language of the Muslims. Both were written in a modified form of Arabic script. Some Hindu extremist groups were keen to adopt the Devanagri script for Hindi and when their demand was accepted by the government, it created another obstacle for the social and economic progress of the Muslims. Devanagri Hindi was as foreign for the Muslims as English. Therefore, for the Muslims it meant learning two foreign languages. The agitation against this step was initially led by Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, a passivist from

Aligarh College. The agitation was called off when the government threatened to cut its grant to Aligarh College.[13] By succumbing to government pressure, the Aligarh moderates increased the prestige of the Deoband Ulema.

The 1906 partition of Bengal into the predominantly Muslim Eastern Province with headquarters at Dacca and the predominantly Western Province with its capital at Calcutta was effected largely as a result of the combined pressure of the orthodox Muslim passivists of Aligarh and the English Conservatives who then happened to dominate the Government of India.[14] The Muslims rejoiced at the partition. Six days after the partition was enforced a large gathering of Muslims at Dacca conveyed to the government their feeling that they "through the division of Bengal would be spared many oppressions which they hitherto had to endure from the Hindus."[15] In 1911, after a movement of terrorism started by the Hindu extremists and after the departure from India of the arch conservative Viceroy Lord Minto, the Liberal administration in London revoked the partition. Muslim and Hindu Bengal were merged again. This was the final blow to the political movement of Sir Saiyad Ahmad Khan. It disillusioned the Muslim moderates and it strengthened the hands of the extremists. The partition of Bengal won support for Sir Saiyad Ahmad Khan; his plan to isolate the Hindus by working closely with the British seemed to work. The annulment of the partition convinced the moderates and reassured the extremists in the Muslim political society that not much could be achieved by cooperating with the British.[16] The Khilafat Movement brought the two groups together. "Now for the

first time Aligarh, the citadel of Muslim middle class, was coming closer to Deoband, the centre of proletarian dissatisfaction, in so far as the anti-British attitude is concerned."[17] The movement was aimed at helping Turkey in its fight against the British. The Khalifa of Turkey was the caliph of all Muslims; accordingly, the Turko-British war was interpreted by the Indian Muslims as a Christian assault on the ideal of pan-Islamism. This movement was idealistic and romantic. When it occurred the Muslim situation outside the Indian subcontinent represented local separatist tendencies which proved decisive not only in the growth of nationalism in the Arab world but also in Turkey, the center of the Ottoman Empire.[18] The Khilafar Movement was killed by Mustafa Kemal's secularism and with it was also destroyed the recently formed political coalition among the Indian Muslims. The orthodox activists drifted away from the passivists. The former organized the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind in 1919[19] and the latter merged themselves within the Indian national movement as represented by the Congress.

The fall of the Moghul Empire followed by the success of the British to establish their hegemony over the Indian sub-continent produced serious social, economic and political tensions within the Muslim society. These tensions split the Muslim society and made it possible for an important section of it to emerge from under the domination of orthodox leadership. This process, briefly described above, was also helped by the number of <u>ulema</u> who were prepared

to reinterpret the dogma to support the modernists against the traditionalists. These ulema based their arguments on the concept of ijtihad and its interpretation.

The principle of ijtihad (original thinking and judgment) "had been accepted in classical Muslim law but, in actual practice its operation had come to an end by the time the ulema had perfected their legal systems during the first three centuries of Islam."[20] This concept of innovation, which was an integral part of the message preached by Prophet Mohammad and was the cause of tremendous dynamism in the early days of Islam, was given a peculiar twist by the early theologians. The result was that Islam, after three centuries of innovative experience, became a religion built on a dogma. The reaction against this interpretation of ijtihad came in the eighteenth century, with the teaching of Shah Wali Ullah and reached its climax when the modernists took the lead in the Muslim countries. It provided an opportunity to Mohammad Ali in Egypt, Kemal Pasha in Turkey and Mohammad Ali Jinnah in India to initiate the process of modernization in their countries. These three extraordinary leaders were able to successively start the process of political modernization in their countries.

The Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim League

The All-India Muslim League was organized in 1906 largely as a result of the coming together of the conservative elements within the Government of India and the Muslim upper classes. Accordingly,the principal objective of the League, as stated in its first resolution was to foster among the Muslims of India a sense of loyalty to the British Crown.[21] Naturally enough,

among its ardent supporters were "nobles, ministers of various states, great landowners,"[22] all those who stood to benefit in some way from the British Governance of India. As was seen above, the fruits of modernization and an increase in the level of political participation among the Muslims was reaped by the Indian National Congress. Founded in 1885, the Congress in the first two decades of the twentieth century had developed into an organization that was prepared to demand (and not beg like the League) the right of political participation for the educated classes of British India. The Muslim urban middle class shared this aspiration with its Hindu counterparts; accordingly many of its members,including Mohammad Ali Jinnah, joined the Congress and worked for it enthusiastically (Table 2.1).The appeal of the League consequently remained restricted to the upper classes. In 1927, more than two decades after its birth, it boasted of a membership of only 1330.[23] In the 1930 session of the Muslim League in which Mohammad Iqbal, the poet-philosopher, demanded a separate Islamic state in the northwest of India, the management had to engage a poet to entertain the audience while new members were recruited and brought to the session in order to meet the quorum requirements.[24]

In 1937, for the second time in his long political career, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was elected the President of the Muslim League. As can be seen from Table 1, in the period of eleven years between 1937 and 1948, the Indian Muslim society was politically transformed. Five out of its six constituent social classes gathered

under the flag of the All-India Muslim League. The party was able to win over completely to its side the urban Muslims and with the help of the landed aristocracy, the rural middle classes. The Quaid-e-Azam's success in achieving such a consensus in the Muslim society produced great political dividends. In the elections of 1937, the League had won only 4.6 percent of the total Muslim votes. In 1946, the party polled 75 percent of the votes cast by the Muslim electorate.[25]

This tremendous increase in the popularity of Jinnah's party is usually attributed to two factors. According to Maulana Azad, the League drew supporters to itself because of the reluctance of the Congress to accomodate provincial Muslim leaders in the administration formed after the 1937 elections.[26] Khahquzzaman provides a similar explanation. According to him the League was able to appeal to the Muslim voters when the post-1937 Congress government failed to serve the interests of their community.[27] Khalid Sayeed dismisses the mutual hostility between the Hindus and Muslims as the principle cause of the success of the League. According to him:

> The demand for Pakistan reminded Muslims of their past glory and opened before them vistas of future greatness. It was this stimulant which put life and vigour into the Muslim League.[28]

There is no doubt that the conduct of the Congress government in several Indian provinces and the demand for Pakistan, first made in the League session held at Lahore in 1940, won new supporters for Jinnah's organization. A number of other failures, like the incarceration of the top Congress leadership following the quit-India

movement of 1942, the sympathy shown by the British civil servants for the Muslim cause and the emphasis placed on Hindu revivalism by such right-wing militant organizations like the Mahasabha also helped the Muslim League. But these developments can at best serve as partial explanations for the enormous success of the League in politically activating the apathetic Muslim masses. To attribute to them the rise to power of the Muslim League is to belittle the role of Mohammad Ali Jinnah as a great modernizer in the political history of British India.

The Quaid-e-Azam and the Pakistan Movement

The first step in Jinnah's political strategy was to win for the Muslims of India the status of a separate nation. This was done by getting the British to embody in their various constitutional reforms the right of the Muslims to vote only for Muslims in local and provincial elections. Once the status of separate nationhood was bestowed on the Muslims, Jinnah went on to provide them with an effective political organization. Although a strict constitutionalist, bred in the tradition of western political liberalism, Jinnah favored the one party system. In this respect he was close to the Muslim modernizers like Nasser in Egypt and Habib Bouriguibar in Tunisia. "Any man who stood against the Muslim League was called a traitor or a quisling by the Quaid-e-Azam. Some of the Muslim leagues went so far as to say that any Muslim who opposed the Muslim League had betrayed the cause of Islam itself."[29]

When Mohammad Ali Jinnah resumed the leadership of the Muslims in India, the Muslim society was divided into groups with hardly any sense of common purpose. The landed aristocracy first led by the Agha Khan and after his retirement from the political scene by a number of powerful landlords was quite content to be on the right side of the British raj. The Muslim merchants and government servants were similarly disposed. Provincial leaders like Sir Sikander Hayat Khan and Khizer Hayat Khan in the Punjab, Dr. Khan Sahib and Ghaffar Khan in the NWFP, and Fazul Huq in Bengal were quite willing to cooperate with the Hindus for the sake of preserving their hold on the administrations of their provinces. In this political medley produced by disaggregated interests, the Muslim middle classes found themselves without a voice. They were disillusioned both with the Congress and traditional Muslim organizations like the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind. Jinnah was able to sense this. After becoming the President of the Muslim League in 1937, he restructured the party and redefined its goals and objectives in such a way that it no longer represented the narrow interests of a few powerful social groups. According to Huntington, in a one party system "the power of the traditional actors, if they are not completely overthrown by the revolutionary effort which brings the system into existence, tends to decrease. Personalistic leadership, particularly of the charismatic type, often plays a major role in the inauguration of one-party systems..."[30] In establishing the one-party system to guide the Muslim nation toward its goal of a separate state, the Quaid-e-Azam used all the

charisma that he wielded to subject the powerful social groups to party discipline.

The new party organization (Figure2.1) provided the channels for interest aggregation and policy making. The demand for Pakistan served the purpose of aggregating diverse interests. The urban middle class saw great benefits for themselves in securing a state in which they will not have to compete with the professional and economic interests of their Hindu counterparts. The merchants, bankers and the few Muslim industrialists saw tremendous opportunities for deploying their capital in a state free of the Hindu money classes. Even a section of the ulema saw opportunities for bringing back the recalcitrant Muslims to the path of Islam. The demand for Pakistan built on the slogan of "Islam is in danger" brought all these groups together. Declared the Quaid-e-Azam while speaking to the pathans of the North-west:

> If we fail to realize our duty today you will be reduced to the status of Sudras (untouchables) and Islam will be vanquished from India.[31]

The modernists, secularists, traditionalists, all echoed this feeling of apprehension. "We have got two alternatives before us," said Manlana Abdul Sattar Niazi, "whether to join or rather accept slavery of Bania Brahmen Raj in Hindustan or join the Muslim fraternity, the federation of Muslim provinces."[32] Fazalul Haq, for a long time a champion of the poor Bengali, and an advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity, took up the same slogan. In an open letter to Ghandi, Fazalul Haq accused the Hindu community of maltreating the Muslims. "The ruthless anti-Muslim campaign launched by

the Hindu Ministers where the Hindus were in power clearly showed that the Muslims cannot expect to receive just treatment at their hands."[33] In 1940, Haq moved the resolution demanding the creation of an independent Muslim state. Clearly the demand for Pakistan was made by the Muslim, no doubt at the behest of the Quaid-e-Azam, to provide a focus for the aggregation of the diverse interests of the Muslim society. The fact that the bulk of the Muslims were brought under the political control of the Muslim League was not because the demand for Pakistan was raised to such a deafening crescendo but to the fact that it was directed by a tightly knit, highly disciplined political organization. That the demand for Pakistan was acceeded in seven years by both the Hindu leadership and the British Government was due to the fact that it was supported by an organization that claimed the following of the entire Muslim population of British India. Earlier similar demands made by individuals and unsupported by any organization had been easily brushed aside.[34]

The three part modernization process as defined by Huntington starts with the concentration of power.[35] Between 1937 and 1942, Jinnah was able to restructure the Muslim League organization so that all the power was concentrated in his hands. When Jinnah took over the control of the organization in 1937, it was little more than a loose conglomeration of provincial parties. The constitutional reforms of 1909, 1919, and 1937 had steadily increased the power of the elected representatives in the provinces while keeping the power possessed by the central government

in the hands of the Viceroy and his executive. Therefore, the provincial parties were strong and jealous of their independence. They not only sent members to the Central Working Committee and the Central Council but also controlled the election of the President since he had to be chosen from amongst the members of these central bodies. The changes that Jinnah was able to make in the Muslim League increased the power of the central organization at the expense of the provincial leadership. Now the President of the Muslim League was given the power to appoint his working Committee; the working Committee, in turn, was empowered to control, direct and regulate all activities of the various Provincial Leagues. With political power thus concentrated in his hands, Jinnah proceeded to establish control over the independent minded leaders of the provinces. He had now entered the second phase of modernization, that of expansion of power. Thus in 1941 he succeeded in making the Muslim Prime Minister of Bengal, Assam and the Punjab resign from the Viceroy's Defence Council, in 1942 he put down with a firm hand the errant leaders of the Sind League and in 1946 he was able to declare that no matter who was given the ticket for the election, "we should support League candidate even though he may be lamp-post."[36]

"Finally," according to Huntington, "while modernization in its first phase promotes the centralization of power and then the expansion of power, it often eventually leads to the dispersion of power."[37] At one stage, a few years before he was overwhelmed with the problems created by the birth of Pakistan, Jinnah attempted to find a constitutional way for dispersing the power that was now concentrated in his hands. In his address to

the 1943 session of the Muslim League, he gave an indication of the extent to which political power had gravitated toward the Presidency:

> If you were to know what I have to attend to, you will be astonished. All over India, today this happening in Patna; tomorrow that thing happening in Bengal; the day after tomorrow that thing happening in N-W.F.P.; the day after that this thing happening in Madras... Now it is not possible for one single man to do justice to all this.[38]

He delegated more powers to his Working Committee and set up a trouble shooter Committee of Action.[39] But the partition of India upset his plans. In the thirteen month period between the birth of Pakistan and his death, Jinnah once again went through the process of concentration and expansion of power. The need for repeating the process was obvious to Jinnah; this time he was working in an altogether different framework. In the 1937-1947 decade, he had concentrated in his hands political power. Within the period of one year the Quaid-e-Azam was appointed the Governor-General, elected the President of the Constituent Assembly, declared amir-ul-millat (head of the nation) in the mosques, appointed the Legal Guide to the Legislative and appointed minister-in-charge of the important new departments of States and Frontier Regions. With power thus concentrated in his hands, he proceeded to bring the provincial governments under his control. The Government of India Act of 1935, which had been adapted to serve as Pakistan's provisional constitution, was amended to give the Governor-General new instruments for dealing with the provinces. Using these powers, Jinnah dismissed the governments of Dr. Khan Sahib in the N-W.F.P. and of M.A. Khuro in Sind.[40]

In 1947-1948, he took over administrative power. In the first case, Jinnah succeeded in creating a powerful, monolithic one-party system. In the second case he created a powerful central authority--the Viceregal system. In both cases Jinnah functioned as a modernizer. He first created a political organization based on mass support. With the help of this organization, he went to establish a strong central government in Pakistan's political system. While reorganizing the Muslim League, he reduced the power of the established social groups. While establishing the central government in Karachi, he reduced the power of the provincial governments.

Under the Quaid-e-Azam, the Muslim League was able to give representation to new groups like urban middle classes, provide a mechanism for aggregating group interests and formulate a program that won the organization legitimacy among the Muslims. What the League failed to achieve was a complete assimilation of the social groups. Once its program of achieving an independent State was fulfilled, the Muslim League found it difficult to retain the legitimacy of its one-party status. According to David Apter: "By distinguishing the important from that which is not and by identifying current and historical issues with popular figures, parties arouse interests and passions in the political process."[41] The demand for Pakistan performed this function for the Muslim community. The task of nation building to which the Quaid-e-Azam turned his energies was too mundane an affair to arouse passions in the political process. The excitement of the 1940s gave way to the frustrations of the 1950s. The task of modernization that was

initiated and carried forth by Jinnah was interrupted with his death on September 11, 1948.

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The social groups that the Quaid-e-Azam had held together parted company with one another soon after his death. The highly politicized urban professionals of Bengal broke away to form the Awami Muslim League.[42] An important section of the urban intellectuals from the Punjab left to form the Azad Pakistan Party in 1952. The first statement of policy issued by the party declared: "The real producer of industrial wealth is the working class; the happiness and welfare of a nation's workers must have top priority in any scheme of social justice."[43] The socialist flank of politics in Pakistan was strengthened further with the formation of the Ganatantri Dal (Democratic Party). At the same time, traditional interests like the landed aristocracy and merchants freed themselves from the discipline that the Muslim League organization under the Quaid-e-Azam had imposed on all social groups. The death of the Quaid-e-Azam resulted in the disaggregation of interests. The consensus that he had achieved among the social groups disappeared and all of them, including those that he had mobilized began to strive for political autonomy. Therefore, "diversity rather than unity proved to be the dominant characteristic of Pakistani politics."[44]

The political elites' solution to Pakistan's problems in the ten year interregnum (1948-1958) between the Jinnah and Ayub Khan eras was to go back to the Muslims' still dynamic religious orientation to this world. As in the late nineteenth century

and again in the 1920s, the leadership tried to build consensus on the basis of religion. This approach was based on two assumptions, both of them equally wrong. The diversity in Pakistan's political society was due not so much to the absence of an agreed Islamic mold into which the institutions of government could be cast as to presence of elements that had little urge to work together. The discovery of an agreed constitutional formula based on Islam would not have removed this diversity by linking the various groups together. Also, the political mobilization achieved by the Quaid-e-Azam was not so much due to his demand for an independent Muslim state as to the organization of a disciplined political party. Without taking time to build viable political organizations, the Pakistani leadership in the 1950s charged headlong into the difficult and uncharted terrain of Islamic constitutionalism. This venture, instead of producing political mobilizations, helped to further divide the political society. The climax was reached in the anti-Ahmadiya movement of 1953. The demand of the ulema to declare the Ahmadis, the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, as a non-Muslim minority deflected the attention of the government from the task of constitution-making to the highly academic question of discovering what is a Muslim. The Government of Khawaja Nazimuddin found it difficult both to control the movement and to find a satisfactory definition for a Muslim. Accordingly, the first task was handed over to the army and the second to a Court of Inquiry. The Martial Law administration of General Azam Khan, first of its kind in Pakistan's turbulent history,succeeded in restoring order

in the disturbed cities of the Punjab. However, the ulema who presented themselves before the Court for giving evidence proved unable to agree among themsleves as to what actually made a person a Muslim.[45] Thus a disciplined political organization that the Quaid-e-Azam left as a legacy to his successors withered away in the midst of the confusion caused by a wrong conception of the political objectives of the Pakistani society.

The other great legacy of the Quaid-e-Azam, a strong central government built on constitutional provision and in full command of provincial administrations, was also lost by his successors. The Quaid-e-Azam, the proponent of a one-party system and a strong central government was succeeded as the most powerful leader by Liaquat Ali Khan, the proponent of a parliamentary form of government. It is significant that Liaquat chose not to become the Governor-General of Pakistan. Instead, he remained as the Prime Minister, a post to which he had been appointed by the Quaid-e-Azam. Partly because of political expediency and partly as a result of political beliefs, he started dispersing the power that the Quaid-e-Azam had accumulated in the Governor-Generalship. Khawaja Nazimuddin, a pious but weak politician from Bengal,was appointed as the head of the State. The political powers of the Governor General as interpreted by the Quaid-e-Azam were divided between the Prime Minister and the Central Legislature. "If you do not like any government," he told the assemblymen, "you can turn that government out tomorrow, whereas in the past the members of the Central Legislature had no such power."[46]

In the absence of a strong organization to control them, the members of the Central Legislature were too happy to oblige. In this they were lent a helping hand first by Ghulam Mohammad who succeeded Nazimuddin as the Governor-General and Iskandu Mirza as the President of Pakistan. In 1953, Ghulam Mohammad dismissed the Nazimuddin cabinet that held the support of the majority of the members of the Central Legislature. Mohammad Ali Bogra, installed in his place as the Prime Minister, quickly won the support of the majority for himself. When certain constitutionalists among his supporters convinced him to curtail the Governor-General's powers, Ghulam Mohammad's wrath descended upon the Assembly itself. The Assembly was dissolved. When the constitutional propriety of this act was challenged in the court by Tamizuddin, the Assembly's speaker, the judges upheld the decision but advised the Governor-General to convene another Assembly. This was dutifully done, but the new assembly, chosen by the four Provincial Legislatures reflected the political power that had been gradually repossesed by the provinces. No political party controlled more than one provincial government -- a condition which was hardly conducive to political stability at the center. Between 1954 and 1958, the Second Constituent Assembly produced five administrations. Reviewing the political prospects of Pakistan in 1957, this is what Keith Callard had to say:

> The weakness of parliamentary government has been the failure of the elected politicians to make the system work. Ministries have been overthrown by intrigue backed by threats, rather than by real violence. Holders of political office have

> shown themselves unscrupulous but not totalitarian. And there have been important sections of the community which have exerted pressure to keep the democratic system in operation. The courts have applied the law as they found it, and the law is based on British precedent. The civil service and the army have shown no desire to back any potential dictator. There may be those who have toyed with the idea of suspending the working of parliamentary institutions, but they have produced no leaders who seem likely to obtain wide enough support to undertake such a step. If representative government collapses it will be because its legs are not strong enough to sustain its own body.[47]

Yet within one year of this prophecy, representative government collapsed, not under its own weight, but because the military produced a leader who was willing and able to challenge the parliamentary institutions.

Ayub Khan and a New Constitutional Order

On October 7, 1958, President Iskandar Mirza abrogated the Constitution, imposed military rule on Pakistan and invited General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, to become the Chief Martial Law Administrator. This invitation came as no surprise to its recipient. As he was to write almost ten years later: "The hour had struck. The moment so long delayed has finally arrived. The responsibility could no longer be put off."[48]

Ayub Khan had prepared himself well for the responsibility he assumed; having once assumed it, he decided that he alone could discharge it. Twenty days after the proclamation of Martial Law, Ayub Khan dispatched Iskandar Mirza into exile. On October 27, 1958 began the Ayub era which lasted for two days less than 125 months. During the first 40 months of this period,

Pakistan's first military leader prepared the country for what he considered to be its ultimate aim:

> The ultimate aim of Pakistan must be to become a sound, solid and cohesive nation to be able to play its destined role in world history. This can be achieved only if as a start a constitution is evolved that will suit the genius of the people and be based on the circumstances confronting them, so that they are set on the path of unity, team work and creative progress.[49]

Ayub Khan defined the genius of the Pakistani people in unflattering terms. "The people are good...but they are simple-hearted, hence gullible and they can be easily misled."[50] They were misled by what he, in his military man's language called the "disruptionists, political opportunists, smugglers, black marketeers and other such social vermin, sharks and leeches."[51] Accordingly, in the program that he formulated for himself, top priority was assigned to the task of ridding the society of these unpleasant influences. This cleansing operation was to be followed by the launching of a new political system, supposedly derived from early Islamic history.

> It was clear to me that Pakistan must work out its own system of application of the principles of Islam to its conditions. It was equally clear to me that this exercise must be conducted within the accepted democratic norms, of which the most important is the participation of the people in the affairs of the State. The right of the people as a whole to organize and run their affairs could not be curtailed or compromised in any manner.[52]

In Islam the people organize themselves for achieving <u>ijma</u> (consensus). Ayub Khan interpreted <u>ijma</u> in terms of the "democratic norm" of electing a leader for the community.

> The community as a whole must have the right to choose its leader and the right to remove him. Another feature of Islamic history which had found general acceptance was that the leader, once he is chosen by the community, should have sufficient power to co-ordinate, supervise, and control the activities of government. Delegation of authority was permissible but central control must remain in the hands of the chosen leader who should provide unified direction to the country and its administration.[53]

As it turned out, the emphasis on Islam was an exercise in public relations;[54] it was a smoke-screen behind which Ayub Khan planned to implement his program of social and political modernization. This program had two important planks: depriving the social groups of the power they had recaptured after the death of the Quaid-e-Azam and creating a highly centralized political-administrative apparatus. This was an ambitious undertaking; far more ambitious than the program adopted by the Quaid-e-Azam and those adopted by modernizing leaders in other Islam societies.

As was shown above, the Quaid-e-Azam's program was based on the assimilation of the important social groups into a political organization achieving legitimacy for the organization with the help of a demand for an independent state of Pakistan. Ayub Khan wanted to restructure the society, not to build on what was already present within it. In this way he was a little closer to Kemal, Nasser and Bourgiba, rather than to the Quaid-e-Azam, in the sense that the modernizers of Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia also undertook major restructuring of the political societies. There were, however, major differences between the approach of Ayub Khan on

the one hand and that of the other modernists on the other and it would be worthwhile noting them briefly.

Both Kemal and Nasser tried to destroy the power bases of traditional interest groups. In the case of Turkey, both the power and the source from which it was derived were undispersed; accordingly, all that Kemal had to do was to concentrate his attack on the institution of the Califate. Power was more dispersed in Egypt and Pakistan. Nasser's answer to the problem was to hit at the institutions and organizations (e.g., landlords, the Muslim Brotherhood) where there was a concentration of such power. Ayub Khan, however, launched an all-out war against all interest groups, traditional and modern, and chased them relentlessly.

Ayub Khan's quest for a new political system differed from that of Kemal in Turkey and Bourgiba in Tunisia. Kemal favored and Bourguiba favors the creation of political institutions based on the concept of a total separation of the state from religion. Their programs of modernization, therefore, found general acceptance with the new, educated, western-oriented elites in the society. In Pakistan, the reform movement of Ayub Khan, seeking a synthesis of Islam and democracy, found favor neither with the orthodox Muslim leadership nor with the secular-minded, westernized elites.[55]

Ayub Khan, therefore, chose a difficult and hazardous path of political reform. His success was only partial because he attempted to change many things at the same time. He may have succeeded had he limited himself to a somewhat narrower field; if he had, for instance, coupled the destruction of the power bases

of some of the interest groups with the creation of a secular polity; or the destruction of all interest groups with the creation of a monolithic political organization or with the adoption of an Islamic system of government. He failed because he attempted to be a reformer, a modernizer and a traditionalist, all at the same time.

Ayub Khan and the System of Basic Democracies

There was an important difference in the approach towards politics of General Ayub Khan of 1958-1962 and Field Marshal Ayub Khan of 1962-1969. When he assumed power in 1958, he was convinced that the political system he considered suitable for Pakistan could take root only when everything connected with the old system had been removed and destroyed. By removing these political weeds, he hoped to create the kind of soil which would receive and nurture the new institutions.

Ayub Khan's coup d'etat of October 1958 was not the culmination of a popular revolt against the established order. It was more in the nature of an intrigue hatched by a few officers against the civilian government. However, "the ostensible equanimity with which the public reacted" was, according to an Indian journalist, probably the "most remarkable feature of the change-over."[56] There were good reasons for this. For politics in Pakistan, 1958 was an exceptionally turbulent year. The worsening of the political situation produced an environment in which even the democratic forces were willing to accept a period of "respite," "cooling-off," "consolidation" etc., which the military rule

promised to bring.[57] In the words of David Rapaport: "Everywhere military usurpers are consumed with finding the right political movement so that they can act before the situation changes or someone else has exploited it for his peculiar advantage."[58] Ayub Khan had chosen his time well; the timing of the coup provided his regime with the kind of legitimacy that was denied the partially democratic administrations of the 1950s.

That Ayub Khan was not providing a cooling-off period became apparent soon after the military take-over. In a news conference, held on Octover 10, he declared that the Constitution of 1956 had been abrogated and the institutions that were created by it had been dissolved because they were "unworkable" and "full of compromises."[59] As was to become known later, Ayub Khan had made up his mind about the Constitution that he thought most suitable for Pakistan some four years before he actually assumed power. In a memorandum entitled A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan,[60] he laid down what he was later to describe as the pillars of a viable political system: "the Presidential system, the devolution of power to the Provinces to the maximum extent, the appointment of Provincial Governors by the President, the system of Basic Democracies serving as an Electoral College, the Advisory Council on Islamic Ideology for consultation in law-making, and finally the relationship between the executive and the legislature and between the executive and the judiciary."[61] However, the people first received some kind of a clue regarding

his thinking from an address delivered at a public meeting held at Karachi on December 25, 1958:

> Almost everyone must be anxious to know the constitutional future of the country. Our aim is to introduce a representative form of government, such as can be understood and worked by our people. We shall have to ensure that such a representative government is so designed that its working is not marred by political instability. As soon as the major problems facing the country have been solved, the reforms have been put into operation and the administration rehabilitated, the best constitutional brains in our country will be asked to apply themselves to the questions of framing a constitution. When doing so, the wishes and desires of the people of Pakistan will be fully respected.[62]

This important statement made three things absolutely clear. First, the new Constitution was to expand the level of political participation in the country. It was to go beyond the groups and interests that had evolved the compromise formula incorporated in the Constitution of 1956, and reach the people who had hitherto been apathetic toward and uninvolved in Pakistan's political development. Second, the Constitution was to be framed by experts who were to operate wihout any political constraint. Finally, and most significantly, the constitution making process was to be started only after the regime had introduced some important reforms. The nature of these reforms, and the type of groups to be affected by them, became clear from the kinds of commissions that were set up after October 7. The immediate result of the fulfillment of the military's mission was to reduce the power of the existing pressure groups in the society. A redistribution of this power--

the regime conceived this process as a zero-sum game--was to bring new groups into the politicized society. The viability of Ayub Khan's system was dependent on the effectiveness of the new political groups.

The rise to power of Ayub Khan was a phenomenon totally different from the ascendancy of the Quaid-e-Azam. It was slowly and with a great deal of power that the Quaid was able to assimilate the powerful social groups into his political organization. This, as was shown above, was done with a view of concentrating power in his hands. When Jinnah became the Quaid-e-Azam, the all-powerful Great Leader of Muslim India, he was able to expand his political dominion. Ayub Khan, the leader of Pakistan, was born with the silver spoon of political power in his mouth. He did not have to strive to concentrate power in his hands; the military forces and the Martial Law they imposed assured him of that. Expansion and dispersion of power was another matter. According to Ayub Khan's own assessment, he could expand his control and influence over the political society not by bringing the powerful social groups under his control but by crippling them.

The battle against the social groups was to be fought in two phases. In the first phase, these groups were to be forced to surrender the power they possessed. In the second phase, the power repossessed from them was to be distributed to the new entrants in the political society.

The first phase of the operation was completed with the establishment of the system of Basic Democracies in 1959.[63]

"Basic Democracies" was the name given to a hierarchical system of local government that started with the Union Councils in the rural areas and Union Committees in the urban areas. The Basic Democrats (BDs),who constituted these Councils and Committees, were elected by the people on the basis of adult franchise. One B.D. represented, on the average, a population of 1000; eight to ten were grouped together to form a Council or Committee. In the first elections to the Basic Democracies, 80,000 B.Ds were chosen by the people. They were grouped together to form 51,100 councils and committees, 3,800 in East and 4,300 in West Pakistan.[64] The B.D.s in the Councils and Committees elected their Chairmen. The Chairmen, along with officials nominated by the government constituted the Tehsil Councils (Thona Councils in East Pakistan) in the rural areas and Municipal Committees in the urban areas. A certain proportion of the Union Council chairmen (25 to 33 percent of the total), along with district level officials constituted the District Councils, the third tier in the system. Both the rural and urban local bodies were represented in the Divisional Councils, which formed the apex of the system. (Figure 2.2).

The reception,both within and outside Pakistan, to the launching of the system ranged between the extremely adulatory to the extremely cynical.[65] There were, of course, more balanced analyses. According to Herbert Fledman, the system "undoubtedly introduced something fresh and important, leading to a new and more active political consciousness among the people."[66] According

to Rahman Sobhan, the introduction of the system simply signaled a return to the colonial past, this time the colonizers were not foreigners but members of the powerful military and civil bureaucracies.[67] And, to K.J. Newman's "western eyes some of these provisions do not appear impressive introducing as they undeniably do, councils packed with bureaucrats."[68] However, most analyses missed the essential point; that in the Basic Democracies, Ayub Khan introduced a highly structured quasi-political organization which was to bring into the political arena groups that had been denied participation in the past. Ayub Khan aimed at the rural middle class, the millions of medium and small landholders and peasant proprietors, who inhabited the East and West Pakistan countryside. He understood the process of participation in strictly arithmetical terms. Up to 1959, the country's politics had been dominated by narrow but powerful groups. The system of Basic Democracies was a device for brushing them aside and replacing them with the vast middle class of rural Pakistan. For a time this strategy seemed to succeed.

The 80,000 Basic Democrats elected by the people in the winter of 1959 included a majority who could not be identified with any particular social group that had held political power under the previous regimes. If arithmetical averages could establish prototypes, it could be argued that in West Pakistan the Basic Democrat of 1959 vintage was 38 years old, had eight years of schooling and claimed an annual income of Rs 2320, 59 percent

of which was obtained from non-agricultural sources.[69] Indeed, he did not fit into any of the politically active social groups in the pre-Ayub era. The East Pakistani B.D. also belonged to a new breed [70] Therefore, in 1959 Ayub Khan seemed to have succeeded in his objective of replacing the political elites of the past with a political elite of his own creation.

The third stage in the process of modernization and the second phase in the political program of Ayub Khan was the dispersion of power. This was begun in 1960 when the President went to the Basic Democrats, seeking their vote of confidence. They obliged him overwhelmingly.

> At this stage I felt that I should have a mandate from the people to continue my task. It was therefore decided that I should take the opportunity of seeking a vote of confidence from the 80,000 Basic Democrats so that I might be able to give the country a constitution under a mandate from the people. The results of the vote of confidence, as announced by the Election Commission on 15 February 1960, were: 75,283 affirmative votes in my favour, representing 95.6 percent of the approximately 80,000 votes cast.[70]

In 1962, Ayub Khan set aside the recommendations of the Constitution Commission appointed by himself and rejected the form of government they had proposed.[71] Instead he opted for a strong Presidential form of government with the President and the central and provincial legislatures to be elected every five years by the Basic Democrats. In the same year the government launched an ambitious program of rural development. This program called for large investments in rural infrastructure

through the Basic Democracies. The program lent economic muscle to the already powerful Basic Democrats.

Change in the Strategy

"I don't see much sense in it," said Rabbit in The House at Pooh Corner. "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just something happened to it on the way." Something just happened to Ayub Khan's program of political reform on the way. There were three main reasons why in 1962 he chose to abandon the path of political "modernization" that he had originally laid out for himself. First, the social groups that he had sought to liquidate survived, albeit in a mutilated form. Second, the elections to the assemblies held under the Constitution of 1962 brought to the legislative centers of Rawalpindi, Dacca and Lahore the kind of people that he had sent packing in 1958. Finally, the somewhat belated recognition on his part of the fact that he owed his residence in the President House at Rawalpindi to his membership of a powerful pressure group, the armed forces of Pakistan, made Ayub Khan change his strategy. Each of these factors played some part in turning Ayub Khan away from his original objectives. It is therefore important for the purpose of this analysis to dwell a little further on each of them.

In 1962 when Ayub Khan was ready to formalize his system by promulgating a new Constitution, the political society in its composition was as heterogeneous as ever before. If anything, the new regime's political programs produced new interest

groups, partly by bringing into the politicized zone some people from outside the traditional boundary of Pakistan's politicized society and partly as a result of the mutation of the old and established social groups. To the first category belongs the rural middle class of West Pakistan, a group that was brought into the political arena as a result of the launching of the system of Basic Democracies. To the second category belong the small-town lawyers, the non-Punjabi muhajirs and the small-mosque maulvis. These sub-groups very rapidly developed their own identity and their own special interests. These groups, despite Ayub Khan's constitution, combined to wield some political influence. This became evident in the elections of 1964-1965. The second election to the Basic Democracies was held in November 1964. The new Basic Democrats were then constituted into an electoral college for the Presidential election held in January 1965. In Table III below are presented some co-efficients of correlations between the percentage of votes cast for Ayub Khan in each of the 45 districts of West Pakistan and various other indices which represent the power and influence of the pressure groups. A breakdown of the Basic Democrats into the categories desired for this analysis was not available for East Pakistan. The co-efficients of correlation between the percentages of votes cast for Ayub Khan in 45 districts of West Pakistan and indices representing the power of some important social groups give indication of the influence wielded by these interests. As can be seen from the Table 2.2, the difference in the magnitude of the pro-

Ayub Khan vote can be explained by the influence of the big landlords, refugees from the Indian part of the Punjab, the legal community, maulvis (mosque preachers) and the non-Punjabi refugees. For the reasons that will be given in later chapters, the first two groups supported the regime of Ayub Khan while the remaining three opposed him.

Under the new Constitution,elections to the National Assembly were held in April 1962. In all, 610 members contested 149 seats--7 were returned unopposed.[72] Of the 156 members of the National Assembly, 93 or slightly less than 60 percent had either been members of the Assembly in the pre-Ayub era or had contested elections to the provincial assemblies under the old system. For Ayub Khan this was both an extraordinary and disturbing development. He had hoped that the Basic Democrats, acting as electors, would send people who had achieved some kind of a status in the public mind as a result of their own efforts rather than because of their association with a power group. The elections proved him to be wrong. According to a contemporary account:

> Indirect elections have not altered the character of representations in terms of economic and professional interests. The predominance of lawyers from East Pakistan and of landlords from West Pakistan shows the re-emergence of the same old political pattern which had characterized the composition of the previous Assembly.[73]

Table 2.3 below gives the occupational breakdown of the membership of the National Assembly and Provincial Assembly of West Pakistan. The table shows that the provincial assembly elections held in May 1962 exhibited the same occupational

pattern. Two of the traditional pressure groups--landlords and lawyers--were again present in large numbers. In West Pakistan 53 percent of the newly elected members were members of the pre-Ayub assemblies. Although biographical data about the members elected in 1962 to the East Pakistan Assembly are not available, there is an impression that a large number of old politicians were returned to the new House.

Having failed to discipline the society with the stick, in 1962 Ayub Khan was prepared to try the carrot. Showing a good sense of political arithmetic but a poor feel for the lay of the political land, he chose West Pakistan's landed aristocracy and East Pakistan's urban professionals as his ideological partners. He rewarded the former by putting a virtual halt to the political advancement of the rural middle class and the latter by delegating considerable power to the administration at Dacca.

The third factor that worked against the viability of the system of Ayub Khan was the uneasisness felt by the armed forces. Shortly after the promulgation of the new Constitution and the consequent lifting of the Martial Law, the rapid destabilization of politics showed that Ayub Khan's system may not after all ensure the nation's sovereignty, independence and self-respect. If the serving officers of the armed forces were to conclude that Ayub Khan had failed in his mission, would he have the power to prevent them from doing what he himself had done to General Iskander Mirza? The only way another army commander could be prevented from testing another brand of political philosophy was for Ayub

Khan to broaden the base of his own support. If his system was to be exposed fully to the demands of Pakistan's political society it was by no means certain that a long period of peace and tranquility would be definitely assured. Faithful to his system, yet nervous of the reaction that any political unrest might produce on the highly disciplined armed forces, Ayub Khan proceeded to cultivate the support of the groups he had earlier attempted to liquidate. His choice of partners, motivated as it was by their strong presence in the legislature, seemed also logical for another good reason: the top echelon of the military leadership of the early 1960s was sympathetic to landed interests.

CONCLUSION

The Quaid-e-Azam and Mohammad Ayub Khan were both political modernizers. The former extended the scope of political participation to the urban middle classes, the latter brought the rural middle classes into the political arena. The Quaid used a highly disciplined, hierarchical political organization for implementing his political program. Ayub Khan used a hierarchical system of local government for achieving his political objectives. The Quaid, with the help of the Muslim League,went through the motions of modernization--concentration and expansion of power. Had he lived, it is more than likely that he would have found constitutional means for dispersing power and thus legitimizing his political system. In this he would doubtlessly have relied on the Muslim

League which, in all likelihood, he would have used within the framework of a one-party system. Ayub Khan also went through the same motions. In his case, concentration of power was no problem as he entered the political field with the help of the army. He used the system of Basic Democracies for expanding his power over important social groups in the political society.

Both the Quaid-e-Azam and Ayub Khan faced opposition in their efforts to reform the political scene. However, the two leaders responded in very different ways to these challenges. In trying to overcome opposition, the Quaid used the power that the one-party system had placed at his disposal. He succeeded. Opposition was overcome and in the process the Muslim League was strengthened a great deal. Ayub Khan, however, strove to accomodate rather than overcome the opposition. He thus scuttled the power that he had concentrated in his hands well before the system that had been created to disperse it had had the time to mature politically. Death interrupted the modernizing role of the Quaid-e-Azam. Lack of political foresight terminated the career of Ayub Khan as a political modernizer.

Notes

1. From Max Weber's definition of charisma. See: Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1947), p. 359.
2. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 263.
3. Khahid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 207.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 145.
5. A group of Indian Muslims never accepted the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Led by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, they called themselves Indian Nationalists and favored the existence of the Hindu and Muslim communities within one political system. Azad provides the following version for the general acceptance by the Muslims of the title of the Quaid-e-Azam for Mohammad Ali Jinnah: "...it was Gandhiji who gave currency to the title 'Quaid-e-Azam' or 'great leader' as applied to Mr. Jinnah. Gandhiji had in his camp a simple but well-intentioned woman called Miss Amtus Salam. She had seen in some Urdu papers a brief reference to Mr. Jinnah as the Quaid-e-Azam. When Gandhiji was writing to Mr. Jinnah asking for an interview she told him that Urdu papers called Mr. Jinnah the Quaid-e-Azam and he should use the same form of address. Without pausing to consider the implications of his action, Gandhiji addressed Mr. Jinnah as the Quaid-e-Azam. This letter was soon after published in the press. When Indian Muslims saw that Gandhiji also addressed Mr. Jinnah as the Quaid-e-Azam, they thought he really must be so." See Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1960), p. 109. Humuyun Kabir also attributes to Gandhi's politics the acceptance of Jinnah as the Great Leader. See "Muslim Politics 1942-7" in C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright, The Partition of India: politics and Perspectives, 1935-47 (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1970), pp. 406-415.
6. Objective Resolution adopted by the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on March 12, 1949. The Resolution was substantially repeated in the Preamble to the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan adopted by the Constituent Assembly on February 29, 1956 and promulgated on March 23, 1956.
7. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (New York and Toronto: The New American Library, 1957), p. 214.
8. Ibid., pp. 209-210.
9. In a famous decree, Shah Abdul Aziz declared India to be dar-ul-harb (the land of the enemy). "When infidels get hold of a Moslem country and it becomes impossible for the Moslems of the country and the people of the neighboring

districts to drive them away or to retain reasonable hope of ever doing so; and the power of the infidels increases to such an extent, that they can abolish or retain the ordinances of Islam according to their pleasure and no one is strong enough to seize on the revenues of the country without the permission of the infidels and the inhabitants do no longer live as secure as before; such a country is politically a country of the enemy, dar ul harb. Quoted in Hafeez Malik, Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963), p. 153.

10. "Some held on the basis of the commonly accepted [Muslim] texts that as the English did not interfere with the practice of religion, it followed logically that India was dar-ul-amn [the land of peace], the British government was an established government and it would be a breach of the law to rebel or create disaffection against it." M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967), p.
11. Mawlana Iltaf Hussain Hali, Hayat-i-Jawid (Lahore: Academy Punjab Trust, 1957), p. 259.
12. Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963), p. 24.
13. Sheikh Muhammad Ikram, Mawj-i-Kawthar (Karachi: Firoz Sons, n.d.), p. 111.
14. B.N. Pandey, The Break-up of British India (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 46-48, and 55-68
15. Quoted in K.K. Aziz, The Making of Pakistan (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), p. 25.
16. In February 1912, Lord Minto told the House of Lords of the repercussions as a result of broken promises the annulment was likely to cause to the morale of Muslim Bengal: "We told the Muslims that partition was a settled fact. We assured the Muslim population of East Bengal of our appreciation of their loyalty and determination to safeguard their interests." Quoted in D.B. Banerjee, East Pakistan: A Case Study in Muslim Politics (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969), p. 15.
17. Faruqi, op.cit., p. 55.
18. F. Rahman, "Muslim Modernism in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent," in 'BSOAS,' Vol. XXI, No. 1. (1958), p. 85.
19. According to Faruqi, the founding of the Jamiat was unique in many respects. "...for the first time, it brought the 'ulama' of all shades of opinion on a common platform and included them to organize themselves into a religo political body to guide the Muslims of India in their religious and political matters." op. cit., p. 67.
20. Fazalur Rahman, "The Controversy over the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance," in Donald Eugene Smith, South Asian Politics and Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 414.

21. A.B. Rajput, Muslim League Yesterday and Today (Lahore: Mohammad Ashraf, 1948), pp. 19-20.
22. Faruqi, op. cit., p. 48.
23. R. Palme Dutt, India Today and Tomorrow (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1955), p. 234.
24. Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 174.
25. Ibid., pp. 177 and 178.
26. Azad, op. cit., pp. 161-162.
27. Choudhury Khaliquzzamam, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore: Longmans, 1961), pp. 112-125.
28. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 179.
29. Ibid., p. 180.
30. Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 7.
31. Jamiluddin Ahmad (ed.) Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah Vol. II (Lahore: Mohammad Ashraf, 1952), p. 241.
32. Quoted in Sayeed, op.cit., p. 205.
33. Quoted in A.S.M. Abdur Rab., A.k. Fazlul Haq: His Life and Achievements (Lahore: Ferozosons, 1970), p. 110.
34. In 1885 Sir Saiyad Ahmad Khan and in 1930 Sir Mohammad Iqbal suggested setting up autonomous Muslim states in India. However, nothing much came of these demands.
35. Huntington, Political Modernization in Changing Societies, op. cit., p. 147.
36. Jamiluddin Ahmad, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 272.
37. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," op. cit., p. 7.
38. Jamiluddin Ahmad, op. cit., p. 555.
39. Sayeed, op. cit., p.
40. For an excellent discussion of Jinnah's Governor-Generalship, see Sayeed, op. cit., pp. 223-300.
41. David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 190
42. For a study of the birth and rise to political eminence, see: M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan," Asian Survey Vol. X, No. 7 (July 1970) and Ronaq Jahan, "Nation Building in New States: A Case Study of the Relationship Between East Pakistan and the Central Government of Pakistan, 1948-1958," Unpublished Ph.D. Disseration, Harvard University, 1970.
43. Quoted in Keith Collard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957), p. 74.
44. Richard E. Wheeler, The Politics of Pakistan: A Constitutional Quest (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 208.
45. Government of the Punjab, Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Lahore: Government Printing Press, 1954), pp. 214-218.
46. Quoted in Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1963), p. 45.
47. Keith Collard, op. cit., pp. 328-329.
48. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 70.

49. Ibid., p. 186
50. Ayub Khan, op. cit., p. 217.
51. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), Vol. I. p. 4.
52. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., p. 199.
53. Ibid., p. 204.
54. In fact, soon after assuming power, Ayub Khan changed the name of the State from the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to simply Pakistan.
55. For a discussion of Kemalist reforms in Turkey, see Irfan Orga, Phoenix Ascendant: The Rise of Modern Turkey (London: Robert Hale, 1958); Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," World Politics, 11 (July 1959); Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963) and Lord Kinross, Ataturk (New York, William Morrow, 1965). For an analysis of Nasser's political program see Amos Perlmutter, "Ambition and Attrition: A Study of Ideology, Politics and Personality in Nasser's Egypt," (unpublished MS); Amos Perlmutter, Egypt: The Praetorian State (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, forthcoming). For Bourguiba and politics in modern Tunisia, see Charles Micaud, ed., Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization (New York: Praeger, 1964) and Clement H. Moore in Huntington and Moore (eds.), Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books, 1970).
56. Statesman (Calcutta, October 15, 1958).
57. The reaction of many political leaders are reported in various issues of The Pakistan Times during October 1958. Even Miss Fatima Jinnah, who in 1965 directly challenged Ayub Khan and his political system, expressed a feeling of relief and satisfaction at the departure of the old politicians. See her statement as reported in Dawn (Karachi, October 28, 1958).
58. David C. Rapaport, "The Political Dimensions of Military Usurpation," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXXIII (December, 1968), p. 557.
59. The Pakistan Times (Lahore, October 11, 1958).
60. The memorandum was written in 1954 and was first published in Ayub Khan's official biography. See Mohammad Ahmad, My Chief, (Lahore: Longmans, Green, 1960), pp. 86-93.
61. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 220.
62. The Pakistan Times (Lahore, December 27, 1958).
63. Government of Pakistan, Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary), October 27, 1959.
64. Shahid Javed Burki, "The System of Basic Democracies," The Pakistan Times, February 7, 1965.

65. See numerous articles published on the subject of Basic Democracies by The Pakistan Times and Dawn on the Revolution Day -- October 27 -- between 1959 and 1968.
66. Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 107.
67. Rehman Sobhan, Basic Democracies, Works Programme and Rural Development in East Pakistan (Dacca: Bureau of Economic Research, University of Dacca, 1968), p.97.
68. K.J. Newman, "Basic Democracy as an Experiment," Political Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February 1962), p. 57.
69. Shahid Javed Burki, "Interest Group Involvement in West Pakistan's Rural Works Program," Public Policy Vol. XIX, No. 1 (Winter 1971), p. 188.
70. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., p. 210.
71. For a detailed discussion of the framing of the Constitution of 1962, see: Edgar A. Schuler and Kathryn R. Schuler, Public Opinion and Constitution Making in Pakistan, 1958-1962 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967).
72. M. Rashiduzzaman, Pakistan: A Study of Government and Politics (Dacca: Ideal Library, 1957), p. 186.
73. Mushtaq Ahmad, op. cit., p. 273.

FIGURE 2.1

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE



FIGURE 2.2


Divisional Council
Municipal Committees
Union Committees
District Council
Tehsil/Thana Council
Union Council

TABLE 2.1

Political Leadership and the Levels of Participation in Muslim India and Pakistan, 1857-1969

Groups and Classes

	Landed Aristocracy	Merchants	Urban Middle Class	Urban Masses	Rural Middle Class	Peasantry
-1857	Landed Aristocracy (High)	--	--	--	Landed Aristocracy (Low)	Ulema (Low)
857-1919	Landed Aristocracy (High)	--	Indian National Congress (Low)	Ulema (Low)	Landed Aristocracy (Low)	Ulema (Low)
919-1937	All-India Muslim League (High)	All-India Muslim League (High)	Indian National Congress (Moderate)	Ulema (Low)	All-India Muslim League (Low)	Jamiat-ulema-i-Hind (Low)
937-1948	All-India Muslim League (Moderate)	All-India Muslim League (Moderate)	All-India Muslim League (High)	All-India Muslim League (Low)	All-India Muslim League (Moderate)	Ulema (Low)
948-1959	Landed Aristocracy (High)	Merchant-Industrialists (High)	Regional Political Parties (High)	--	Landed Aristocracy (Low)	Ulema (Low)
959-1969	Ayub coalition (Moderate)	Ayub coalition (Moderate)	Regional Political Parties (High)	Regional Political Parties (Low)	Ayub coalition (Moderate)	Basic Democracies (Moderate

TABLE 2.2

Coefficients of Correlations Between the Percentage of Votes Cast for Ayub Khan in 45 West Pakistani Districts and Indices Representing the Power of Some Social Groups

	Percentage of votes cast for Ayub Khan
Percentage of the Landlords owning 50 percent of the land	.63
Percentage of Lawyers Among the Basic Democrats	-.72
Percentage of *maulvis* Among the Basic Democrats	-.51
Percentage of Punjabi Refugees Among the Basic Democrats	.58
Percentage of non-Punjabi Refugees Among the Basic Democrats	-.87

Note: All correlations are significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 2.3

Group Representation in the National and West Pakistan Assemblies (Percentages) 1965-1969

Group	National Assembly	West Pakistan Assembly
Landlords	37	42
Lawyers	24	22
Industrialists and Merchants	17	18
Retired Officials	8	11
Other Professionals	9	4

Note: The National and Provincial Assemblies had 156 members each.

Source: Burki, "Interest Group Involvement in West Pakistan's Rural Works Program," op. cit., p. 21.

CHAPTER 3:

REEMERGENCE OF OLD SOCIAL GROUPS

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Introduction

The political modernization of the Muslim community of British India was undertaken by Mohammad Ali Jinnah with the help of a political organization. The process was a gradual one. Although Jinnah had claimed the status of nationhood for his community, the Indian Muslims by no means constituted a homogeneous social, economic, or political lot. There were considerable differences between the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal, between those of Bombay and United Provinces, and between those of Kashmir and Hyderabad. In the Punjab, Kashmir, and Bengal they were in a majority; in Bombay, United Provinces and Hyderabad they were in a minority. In the majority provinces, the Muslims wielded great economic and political force in the rural areas. The landed aristocrats of the Punjab (like Sikander Hayat, Khizar Tiwana and Fazal-i-Hussain) had produced sizeable political and economic dividends for themselves by organizing the rural Muslim community behind them. In Bengal and Kashmir, where the Muslims constituted the bulk of the peasantry, leaders like Fazalul Haq and Sheikh Abdullah had made inroads into political power of the urban Hindu community by locating the bases of their support in the countryside. In the minority provinces, the Muslims had a strong presence among the urban professional communities. A large number of Muslims , lawyers, doctors, bankers, etc., had built for themselves large fortunes in United Provinces, Hyderabad and Bombay. The political

support of leaders like Khaliquzzaman,, Mir Laiq Ali, and Chundrigar was confined to the urban areas.

Jinnah was fully aware of the social, economic and political diversity within the Muslims of the sub-continent. He had to proceed cautiously in order to assimilate all the important Muslim social groups into a single political organization. Accordingly, he told Allama Iqbal, the poet-philosopher of Muslim India, that "to pull them [the Muslims] up step by step and before making them run I want to be sure that they are capable of standing on their own legs."[1]

Once Jinnah had established his personal control over powerful political bosses like Fazalul Haq in Bengal, and Sikander Hayat in the Punjab, he was prepared to set the Muslims galloping toward a political objectivity. However, it is important to remember that the centralization of political power in the Muslim community was more of a personal feat for Jinnah than an organizational triumph for the All-India Muslim League. In the words of Khahid B. Sayeed, "The secret of Jinnah's mesmeric hold over the Muslim masses lay in the fact that through Pakistan he was answering one of the deepest urges of the Muslim community, namely, the fulfillment of the promise of political power that the Qur'an offers to Muslims."[2]

There were two elements in the nature of the Pakistan movement that resulted in bringing to a halt the process of political modernization initiated by Mohammad Ali Jinnah. First, it was Jinnah's mesmeric hold over the masses that was partly responsible for galvanizing the Muslims into political activity.

It was not Muslim League's organization but the Quaid-i-Azam's charisma that made the Muslims respond with political hysteria to his appeal for a movement of non-cooperation against the Unionist ministry of Khizar Tiwana in the Punjab and call for Direct Action Day all over India on August 16, 1946.[3] These two movements contributed a great deal in convincing the British administration in New Delhi and London and the Hindu leadership of the Indian National Congress that there could be no solution to the "Indian problem" without an accommodation of the Muslim demand for Pakistan.

Second, the speed with which the political events proceeded in the Indian sub-continent throughout the decade of the 1940's made it difficult for the modernization movement of Jinnah to produce its full organizational impact. Thus when in the five-year period between 1942 and 1947, Muslim League was converted into a mass political organization, it swallowed whole such social groups as landed aristocrats, lawyers, students and ulema. The members of these groups were prepared to sacrifice their interests for the larger interests of the Muslim nation only for the period that the Muslim nation was carving out of the Indian sub-continent an independent country for itself. Once Pakistan was born, these social groups felt free to pursue their own, separate goals. Jinnah seems to have himself conceded this right to the social groups.

> We shall have time to quarrel ourselves and we shall have time when these differences will have to be settled, when wrongs and injuries will have to be

> remedied. We shall have time for domestic programme and politics, but first get the Government. This is a nation without any territory or government.[4]

It was with almost indecent haste that the social groups obliged the Quaid-e-Azam. After his death in September, 1948, these groups gradually withdrew their support from the Muslim League, reemerging once again as powerful and independent forces in Pakistan's political and economic society. The process of rapid decay through which the Muslim League went after 1948 indicates that it was the force of Jinnah's personality, with his "prerogatives ... enlarged by popular acclaim,"[5] that had unified the Muslims within the framework of one political organization. However, the organizational framework of the Muslim League was not strong enough to stand the strain produced by the death of Jinnah. Once he was dead, the social groups were able to pull with sufficient force, each in its own direction, to break the Muslim League.

Jinnah had served as a counterweight within the Muslim League organization to the power wielded by important social groups. He was aware of their power and of the need to balance it. In a speech in Delhi in April 1943 he warned "landlords and capitalists who have flourished at our expense by a system which is so vicious, which is so wicked, which makes men so selfish that it is difficult to reason with them ... [not to forget] the lesson of Islam ... The constitution and the government will be what the people will decide."[6] He thought, as did Gandhi in the case of the Indian National Congress, that

the people could provide the balance needed by a political organization which included many powerful social and economic groups. Gandhi, and after him Nehru, were able to check the power of the social groups by enlarging the organizational base of the Congress Party. Once they were gone, the party survived for the reason that the personal power wielded by them - the power that served to contain the social groups within the party - had been successfully transferred to the organization. Jinnah, engaged as he was in first creating the state of Pakistan and then making it work against very heavy odds, did not leave behind this kind of institutional legacy.

Chaudri Khaliquzzaman, a refugee from the Indian province of United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) took over the Presidency of the Muslim League in 1948. He was entrusted with re-organizing the party in the new state of Pakistan . As was pointed out earlier, the Muslim leadership in pre-independence India had drawn its support from two sources: the rural classes of the Muslim majority provinces and the urban professional classes of the Muslim minority provinces. In Pakistan, made up as it was of the Muslim majority areas of British India, political leadership was in the hands of politicians with strong economic and social interests in the rural areas. Khaliquzzaman was aware of the problem created by this uneven distribution of political power between urban and rural areas. The solution adopted by him only aggravated the situation. He entrusted the task of organizing the primary Leagues at the level of

towns, cities, districts and provinces to old politicians and since their constituencies were in rural areas, the gap that Khaliquzzaman sought to close was never filled.[7] Urban groups left without adequate representation in the Muslim League, rapidly disassociated themselves from the party. The rural interests responded to this situation by organizing their own counter-parties. The first groups to separate themselves from the Muslim League were urban professionals of the Punjab and Bengal. In 1949 Mian Iftikharuddin, an influential member of the powerful Arian family of Lahore, formed the Azad Pakistan Party.[8] The same year H.S. Suhrawardy organized his Awami Muslim League. Other parties also came into existence. The displaced landlords from India, on finding that their role in the reorganized Muslim League had been considerably circumscribed, formed the Jinnah Muslim League around the figure of Khan of Mamdot. Pir Manki Sharif, an influential religious leader, formed his Awami League around a nucleus of left-leaning ulema who had a strong base of support in the cities and towns of the North-West Frontier Province.[9] These political organizations did not only have strong regional bias, but were also inclined to represent the interests of specific social groups in the society. In due course, four social groups - landed aristocracy, the legal community, the students, and ulema - emerged from the Muslim League, determined to follow their separate political and economic interests.

LANDED ARISTOCRACY

Landed aristocracy was the most powerful of these social groups, and was to exercise a strong influence on Pakistan's political and economic development. Like some other social groups it was the creation of the British raj. For under the Moghuls, "there was no landed aristocracy of national scope independent of the Crown, at least not in theory and to a considerable extent not in fact."[10] In order to tell the story of the rise of the landed aristocracy, we have to go back a hundred and fifty years into the history of British India, to the time when India's new conqueror transformed himself from a commercial exploiter to a founder and guardian[11] of a new kind of economic and political order in the sub-continent. The introduction of a new system of land administration, known to students of Indian affairs as "settlements" were the starting point of a whole process of rural change. These settlements formed "the basis of a political and economic system in which the foreigner, the landlord, and the moneylender took the economic surplus away from the peasantry."[12]

The landed aristocracy was created by the British in the image of their own squirarchy. By the time the British reached the Punjab they had no doubt abandoned the principles of political administration that had led them to introduce the Permanent Settlement in Bengal. However, the Mahalwari system adopted by them for the Punjab also resulted in the creation of a class of zamindars. At the same time, this system provided

sufficieit incentive for the zamindar to remain on land. In return for economic rewards and official patronage, the zamindars functioned as agents of the state in their villages. They collected the government revenue from their fellow villagers and in return received panchotra, or 5 percent of the total amount due to the government. Moreover, their sons and relations were easily absorbed into government service. Therefore, under the British raj, the power and prestige of the big landlords expanded rapidly. By virtue of what Lasswell and Kaplan have called the process of value agglutination,[13] the landlords were able to add to their holdings of land. The Land Alienation Act of 1901, by removing the Hindu moneylenders, lent a further helping hand. The poor peasants now turned to their landlords for meeting their cash requirements and often found that the land mortgaged by them could not be redeemed. According to J.D. Anderson, a British civil servant who was in charge of the settlement operations in a south-western district of the Punjab, "The big Mohammadan landlords speak of the act as their economic salvation, and probably it has to some extent protected them from the result of their extravagance and made it easier to swallow up their neighbors."[14]

Some of West Pakistan's landed aristocracy owes its existence to the help rendered somewhat more directly by the British raj. In the first quarter of the present century, the government, with the help of a vast irrigation program, converted large tracts of wasteland in the Punjab and Sind into rich

agricultural land. While designing the lay-out of the canals and settling agriculturists on the new land, the administration was not unmindful of the loyalty that some of the chieftains had shown toward their rulers. Within a couple of decades the government's program of land development placed vast productive resources in the hands of a score of families, particularly in the southern districts of the Punjab and central districts of Sind.[15]

By the turn of the century, the landed aristocracy, as a result of British-sponsored "land settlements" and the Land Alienation Act, was in full social and economic control of the Muslim community in north India. In order to effectively transform this influence into political power, the Nawab Viqar-al-Mulk and the Nawab of Dacca convened a meeting of leading Muslims at Dacca at which the Muslim League came into being.[16] In the 1940's, even after Mohammad Ali Jinnah had turned the League into a mass organization, the landed aristocracy accounted for 163 of the 503 members of the party's central council.[17] However, Jinnah succeeded in diluting the power wielded by the landlords within the Muslim League organization. As the President of the League, he concentrated a great deal of political power in his hands and by recruiting a large number of urban professionals (lawyers, teachers, doctors, etc.) he was able to create a social group that could effectively challenge the landed aristocracy. Since the Muslims living in the Hindu minority areas were more urbanized,[18] the bulk of the challenge to the power of the landlords came from the areas that

went to India after the partition of the sub-continent. A very large number of the Muslim urban professionals migrated to Pakistan but were not able to create political constituencies for themselves in the new country. In 1948 Jinnah died, leaving the leadership of the Muslim League to Liaquat Ali Khan, who was the scion of a landed family. Therefore, a year after the emergence of Pakistan as an independent state, the landed aristocracy found itself not only in full control of the economic surplus generated by the peasantry, but also in charge of the country's political apparatus.

After achieving independence, the urban leadership that the Quaid-e-Azam had cultivated made one faint attempt to limit the political power of the landed aristocracy. The Agrarian Reforms Committee, appointed by the Muslim League Council in 1949, in addition to recommending the abolition of hereditary Jagirs, proposed that undivided holdings be limited to 150 acres of irrigated and 450 acres of unirrigated land, of which not more than 25 acres could be cultivated by the landlord himself.[19] But the attempt failed.

We can, therefore, understand why W.H. Morris-Jones writing in 1958 felt that "the key to Pakistan's politics is to be found in a little official publication for restricted circulation by the Government of India, entitled The Landed Families of the Punjab."[20] The landed aristocracy made its presence felt when the people went to the polls for the first time after the birth of Pakistan. In the 1951 elections to the legislative assembly of the Punjab, the big landowning families captured

80 percent of the seats. In the Sind elections of 1953, 90 percent of the assembly members were large landowners. The landlord group was also in a majority in the legislature elected by the voters of the North-West Frontier Province.[21]

Out of the 902 members of the landed aristocracy who surrendered land under Martial Law Regulation No. 64,[22] 108 or 12 percent held ministerial appointments in the central government or the provincial governments of the Punjab, Sind and North-West Frontier Province. According to the returns filed by these landlords with West Pakistan's Board of Revenue, the total area owned by them amounted to 1.218 million acres, giving an average of 11,280 acres per person. None of them owned less than 850 acres of irrigated land.[23] These statistics can provide some idea of the power wielded by the big landlords in the countryside.

General Ayub Khan assumed the reins of government with the full knowledge of the political power of the landlords. If his political program was to be successfully implemented, he had first to launch a massive attack on the landed aristocracy. In his own words:

> Apart from its social and economic consequences, such concentration of power naturally hampered the free exercise of political institutions. Democracy would never have a chance so long as the big landlords enjoyed political constituencies immune to any pressure of political opinion.[24]

Accordingly, the first important commission of inquiry appointed by the Martial Law regime concerned the landlords. The Commission was headed by Akhter Hussain, one of the few senior members of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) who did not belong to the landed aristocracy. Set up on October 31, 1958, it submitted its report on January 20, 1959. The report recommended fixing of ownership-ceiling on all individual land holdings - 500 acres of irrigated and 1000 acres of dry land. The government, for reasons to be given presently, gave an exaggerated impression about the social and economic impact of the land reforms on West Pakistani countryside. According to an article published by the pro-administration newspaper Dawn on the Land Reform Day, Ayub's 1959 agrarian program produced a major change in the villages of West Pakistan.

> The land reforms heralded for the poor tenants a life free from social and economic inequities and guaranteed an end to the feudal tyranny under which they had been smarting from time immemorial.[25]

Political scientists and economists, however, took a more sober view of the impact of these reforms. In the words of Herbert Feldman, "it cannot be said that the West Pakistan land reforms achieved anything astronomical."[26] According to Gustav Papanek, "the program was not conceived as a radical reform ... in execution it was further affected by exceptions. Only a small fraction of the land in West Pakistan was redistributed under land reforms."[27]

The real objective of Ayub's land reforms was not to distribute large parts of the vast estates held by West Pakistani landlords and consequently free the rural poor from feudal tyranny. The real aim was to make the politics in rural West Pakistan immune to the pressure of the landlords. The real significance of the scheme of redistribution as proposed by the Land Reform Commission is to be found not in the number of acres that it covered or the number of people that benefitted from it, but lies in the fact that there was a government which considered itself powerful enough to undertake land reform at all. By promulgating Martial Law Regulation 64 on March 3, only 42 days after the submission of the Report of the Land Reform Commission, the government demonstrated the power it wielded. Unfettered individual ownership of land was a sacred privilege, recognized by the powerful British raj. This right was the basis of the enormous political and economic power of West Pakistan's landed aristocracy. By introducing a constraint on this right, the new government demonstrated in unequivocal terms that the political reins were now held by hands that did not belong to the landed gentry.

On the first anniversary of Ayub Khan's revolution (October 27, 1959) the government announced a comprehensive plan to introduce a decentralized system of local government in the countryside.[28] Partly based on the system that had operated successfully in East Pakistan for nearly half a century,[29] and partly the result of Ayub Khan's preference for dividing the task

of the state into its short and long-term aspects, the system produced one significant impact on the power structure in Pakistan's politics. It reinforced what the land reforms had already accomplished, but in a different, somewhat more tangible way. The land reforms had produced a psychological impact, the Basic Democracies scheme struck deeper at the political base of the landlords' power. By carving up the protected constituencies of the landlords, the new government sought to create a political class in the rural areas which would be independent of the influence of the landed aristocracy. In one-man, one-vote constituencies, the landlords had effectively used intimidation and coercion to get themselves elected to the national and provincial legislatures. Under the new system, the landlords could use their influence to get some[30] but not all local Councillors elected. In the first elections to the local councils, held in the winter of 1959-60, a vast majority of the 40,000 Basic Democrats elected in West Pakistan could not be identified with any particular landlord or landlord group. If arithmetical averages could establish prototypes, it could be argued that the Basic Democrat of 1959-60 vintage was 38 years old, had eight years of schooling and claimed an annual income of Rs 2320, 59 percent of which was obtained from non-agricultural sources.[31] He was, therefore, a good deal different from the extremely poor, illiterate landless laborer, tenant and peasant-proprietor who constituted the bulk of Pakistan's rural population. He was also less susceptible to the kind of political influence that the landlord class could

exercise on the village folk, an evidence of which was provided in picturesque language by Sardar Ata Mohammad Khan in "Report of the Sargodah District Board Elections, 1952-53."[32]

By reducing the political influence of the landlords in West Pakistan and by restricting the franchise for electing the President and members of the national and provincial assemblies to the 80,000 Basic Democrats, the government of Ayub Khan made an important contribution to Pakistan's political development by effectively increasing the scope of political participation. Before Ayub Khan, social stratification in the villages of West Pakistan made it impossible for the rural people, other than large landlords, to exercise any political influence. It was different in East Pakistan. With the distribution of land far less askewed than in West Pakistan, the East Pakistani countryside did not possess any dominant landlord class. The people who were active politically in the countryside belonged to what can be categorized as the rural middle class. Peshimams (keepers of mosques), shop-keepers, merchants, contractors, school teachers, all played an important role in politics in the pre-Ayub and Ayub era.[33] The system of Basic Democracies, which provided an elected councillor per thousand of the population, only served to formalize the existing leadership pattern in rural East Pakistan.[34] As was shown above, in West Pakistan, the system introduced a great change - it placed the rural areas in the province at par with those in East Pakistan by bringing the middle class into political prominence. Therefore,

while the system of Ayub Khan made no difference to the level of political participation in East Pakistan, it definitely extended it in the western wing. If attention is confined to rural Pakistan and the economist's definition of welfare is adapted for defining political welfare, it can be said that the system introduced by Ayub Khan brought about greater political welfare in Pakistan's countryside. The system increased the political welfare of the rural people of West Pakistan without reducing that of those in East Pakistan. It is only by bringing non-rural groups into consideration that this analysis begins to face what may be an indeterminate answer to the impact of the system on the political welfare of all Pakistan.

Before we conclude this section, it would be worthwhile to note briefly the reasons that led to a rapproachment between Ayub Khan and the landed aristocracy. After a couple of years of Ayub Khan's rule, the country had begun to show signs of uneasiness. "Here then is the crux of the problem that faces Ayub Khan. On the one side are masses who want further miracles that he cannot perform, on the other a minority that understands freedom and craves for it."[35] It was in order to find some sort of a solution to this problem that Pakistan's new leader had to "give up the image of social harmony without political action. By the middle of 1962, it was perfectly clear to Ayub Khan that for the sake of survival he had to engage in the labor of politics. For two reasons he decided to accept political partnership with the landed aristocracy. First, the

landlords, land reforms notwithstanding, continued to exercise some influence in the rural areas. Second, the land reforms and the introduction of the system of Basic Democracies had provided the landed aristocracy with a sufficient jolt to make them want to associate themselves with Ayub Khan even on the latter's terms.

LAWYERS

Like the landed aristocracy, the legal community also owes its existence to the British raj. The Muslim rulers, including the Great Mughuls, did not establish a legal system that reached rural India. There was little need to do this because of the existence in the villages of localized and largely customary structures for settling disputes. Mughul courts appear to have dealt largely with cases involving towns-people because the courts were located in the urban areas and perhaps "because the proportion of Muslims was much larger in the towns than in rural areas throughout most of India, and so the decisions that emanated from courts that were dominated by Muslims may have been acceptacle to a large proportion of the urban population."[37] The wakil or the lawyer who functioned in the urban courts of the Mughul era was described by H.H. Wilson as being "a person invested with authority to act for another, an ambassador, a representative, an agent, an attorney."[38] It took the legal and political institutions that the British

brought into India to convert the wakil into a lawyer - a member of the profession that "developed into the most highly respected and influential one in Indian society."[39]

The number of persons that the legal profession claimed expanded rapidly, particularly during the first two decades of the present century. Before 1920, more students studied law than all the other professions put together.[40] With the increase in their number, the prestige, influence and the earning capacity of the legal community also expanded. With politics demanding in this period a great deal of attention, it was inevitable for the lawyers to take an active interest in the movement of national independence. As Jaysree has remarked: "Of five great men that the sacred soil of Gujrat created in recent years, four were lawyers and were called to the bar in England: Mahtama Gandhi, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Sardar Patel, and Vithalbhai Patel."[41]

In pre-independence India, lawyers, particularly those belonging to the Muslim minority provinces (Bombay, Gujrat, the United Provinces, the Central Provinces, Madras), manned in large numbers the liberal wing of the Muslim League. With 145 members, they constituted the second largest group in the All-Indian Muslim League Council.[42] A very large number of the Muslim members elected to the various provincial assemblies in 1945 were lawyers. Since the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was chosen by the provincial assemblies of British India, the lawyers had a good presence in the country's first law-making body. Biographies for only 48 of the 106 members of the First

Constituent Assembly (1947-1954) are available. Of these, 31 held law degrees.[43] The lawyers formed the second largest group of 23 in the Second Constituent-Legislative Assembly (1955-1958).[44]

The legal community led the movement against the campaign launched by Chandhry Khaliquzzaman to reorganize the Muslim League. When it became apparent that the leadership that had succeeded Jinnah wanted to install the landed aristocracy as the most powerful group in the political organization, several lawyers formed splinter parties of their own. Among them were the members of the Bar Associations of Dacca and Lahore. Around these nuclei formed the Awami League of East Pakistan and the National Awami Party of West Pakistan. Ayub Khan assumed power in the country at the time that the lawyer-politicians like H.S. Sutrawardy of Bengal and Abdul Quyum Khan of the North-West Frontier Province were leading movements that were threatening the established political interests in the country. Accordingly, lawyers in both East and West Pakistan formed the most important urban group that Ayub Khan challenged in the first few years following his assumption of power. He usually included this group in the broad category of "intellectuals."

> I was fully conscious of the opposition I would encounter on introducing any change in the system; first, from the intellectuals, a small but vocal minority fed on western ideas. These people, because they have had the advantage of education, form the elite and regard themselves as leaders of public opinion.[45]

According to Karl von Vorys, the lawyers in Pakistan were never in the position to pose an effective challenge to Ayub Khan. "With their wigs and flowing robes the legal community has little prospect of capturing the allegiance of the rural masses for any length of time. They do not even have a well-developed organization."[46] Ayub Khan thought otherwise.

The Law Reform Commission was appointed on November 23, 1958 under the Chairmanship of Justice S.A. Rahman who was also a member of the CSP. Although Ayub Khan was later to claim that the Commission was set up so that "justice should be more readily available and should be much cheaper,"[47] the Commission's actual mandate gave its inquiry an altogether different bias. According to its terms of reference, the Commission was "to suggest how justice may better and more speedily be done; and to that end to examine," among other things, "the making of judicial appointments, the standard and content of legal education and qualifications for practice at the Bar, the structure and discipline of the legal profession, and the Jirga and Panchayat system and their extension to suitable areas."[48] Four of the seven terms of reference for the Commission dealt with matters relating to the legal community and only three to the system of justice prevailing in the country. Once again, Ayub Khan was using a reform commission to undercut the privileges of what he regarded as an interest group. In the case of the legal community he met with a challenge that was far more formidable than that presented by the landed aristocracy.

In the words of Stinchcombe: "Agriculture everywhere is much more organized around the institutions of property than around those of occupation."[49] It was, therefore, easier for the regime to limit the power of the landlord class by introducing a constraint on the right to own property. It was extremely difficult to limit the political influence of the legal community, since the basis of its power was something less tangible than the ownership of property. The regime was convinced that the best way to influence a person was to control his pocket; it also knew that most lawyers do not have an assured income - "taking care of 'number one' is often their prime concern."[50] Accordingly, it adopted measures that resulted in depressing severely the incomes of the lawyer community in the small towns of the country.

Of the 368 recommendations made by the Law Reform Commission, proposals for establishing special courts found ready acceptance with the government. While the stated purpose of the reforms was to make it possible for the bulk of the population to have an easy access to legal institutions, their actual effect was also to reduce the opportunities available to the legal community. The Conciliation Courts Ordinance of 1961 excluded the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil and criminal courts from a number of civil and criminal cases. Furthermore, article 16 of the Ordinance laid down that no "legal practitioner shall be permitted to appear on behalf of any party to a dispute before any Conciliation Court."[51] Although The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 did not forbid the lawyers from appearing

before the arbitration councils it set up, it made such participation extremely difficult by locating the councils away from the towns, at the village headquarters of 8000 Union Councils. The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1963, empowered the executive to refer cases relating to homicide to semi-judicial bodies called jirgas, and de-emphasized the provisions of The Evidence Act, so far as jirga proceedings were concerned. This Act, apart from giving the executive a handle to exercise pressure on the people, like the two Ordinances mentioned above, also hurt the legal practitioners. The small-town lawyer, who does not normally specialize in any particular branch of law, and practices in civil, criminal and revenue courts, found that the jirga system by considerably reducing the trial period, cut deeply into an important source of his income.

As a result of these and other related law reforms, the regime succeeded in aleinating the entire legal profession. The Constitution Commission, headed by Muhammad Shahabuddin, a former Chief Judge of the Supreme Court expressed considerable dismay at the reduction of the powers of the courts under the military regime. In its report, it emphasized the fact:

> that the independence of the Judiciary should be maintained, as had been the practice for a long time, and any inroad into it, that has been found necessary during the present authoritarian regime, should not be treated in future as a precedence.[52]

The small-town lawyer was not just alienated, he felt actively hostile against the regime. Ayub Khan did not probably

anticipate this development. His broad aim was to eliminate the legal community as a powerful group of opinion-makers in the polity. In his mind the legal community was represented by the rich lawyers in the large cities of Pakistan. His program, however, left untouched the well-to-do lawyer class but succeeded in impoverishing the legal practitioners in the small towns. The impact of the law reforms was, therefore, exactly the opposite of that of the land reforms. For, the latter's influence was confined to the very big landlords. Consequently, the two "reforms" produced opposite political repercussions for the regime.

Politically, economically and socially, the small-town lawyer belonged to the class that Ayub Khan was trying to politicize. He was like the middle class land-holder in West Pakistan and shop-keeper, merchant or contractor in rural East Pakistan, in the sense that the system of Basic Democracies had also brought him into political prominence. Ayub Khan's reforms had freed the rural middle class of West Pakistan from the political influence of the landed aristocracy. At the same time the small-town middle class won its freedom from the twin influences of big-city political elites and landlords of the adjoining countryside. Whereas, the regime had planned the political emancipation of the rural middle class, that of the small-town middle class turned out to be a by-product of the system. Therefore, while the former figured in the various moves of compromise that Ayub Khan and the landlord aristocracy made toward one another after 1962, the

latter was totally ignored by the regime. After the politicization of the Ayub regime, following the promulgation of the Constitution of 1962, a fairly stable coalition between the landed aristocracy and the rural middle class took hold of politics in West Pakistan's countryside. At the same time, presumably at the prompting of Ayub Khan, Nawab of Kalabagh, the domineering, aristocratic Governor of West Pakistan, launched a subtle campaign to exclude the middle class, particularly in the small towns, from the political society. One way of doing this was to bring the district councils under the control of the landed interests.[53] In 1964, the Basic Democracies Order of 1959 was amended to provide for the post of Vice-Chairmen in the district councils. After the second elections to the Basic Democracies, held in November 1964, Kalabagh used his immense influence over the civil administration and West Pakistan Police to have his men elected as the Vice Chairmen.[54] The new district councils that took office in the summer of 1965 had 32 of the 45 Vice Chairmen from the landed aristocracy, between themselves owning more than 6300 acres of agricultural land.

This interference in the functioning of the local councils was resented by the legal community that formed the largest single group among the small town Basic Democrats of West Pakistan (see Table 3.1).The lawyers, by participating eagerly in the two Basic Democracies elections had shown some eagerness in working the system that Ayub Khan had introduced. But Ayub Khan wanted to work the new institutions without the

Table 3.1

Occupational Distribution of Urban Basic Democrats, 1964

N = 80,00

	Farmers	Businessmen	Contractors	Lawyers	Teachers	Others	Total
East Pakistan[1]	9.0	73.6		8.1		9.3	100.0
West Pakistan[2] (large cities)	0.8	43.1	23.6	13.3	12.2	7.0	100.0
West Pakistan (small towns)	12.2	8.9	24.2	48.8	2.8	3.1	100.0

Sources: (1) For East Pakistan, see Sobhan, Basic Democracies, op. cit., p. 82.

(2) The West Pakistan data is taken from my "A Comparative Analysis of the Elections of 1959 and 1964," op. cit., Appendix IV. Large cities are defined as those having a population of more than 100,000. Small towns are defined as having a population between 5,000 and 100,000. In 1964 West Pakistan had 12 large cities and 228 small towns.

assistance of identifiable groups, whether they were organized or not. In this way he forfeited the kind of support that may have helped to make his system viable. This development had other repercussions. The increasing alienation of the legal community influenced the attitude toward the government os some other urban groups, particularly students. The political association of lawyers and students became effective in the 1890's, with the launching of the Indian National Congress in 1885. The two groups continued their association through the struggle for independence (1885-1947) and through the first eleven years of Pakistan's existence. Ayub Khan's revolution and his political program further strengthened this alliance.

STUDENTS

Like the landed aristocracy and the legal community, students also played a significant role in the Pakistan Movement. Muslim University at Aligarh, Islamia College at Lahore and Salimullah Hall at Dacca were centers of political activity in the 1940's.[55] The student community was used by the Quaid-e-Azam to mobilize public opinion for his campaign to achieve Pakistan. The students took a very active part in the Muslim League campaign against the Punjab ministry of Khizan Hayat Tiwana and in the Direct Action Day of August 16, 1946. It was, therefore, difficult for them to heed the

advice given to them freely by politicians in the post-independence era to devote more time to class work and less to street politics. The reorganization of the Muslim League, undertaken after the death of Jinnah, was achieved without the help of student activists. The result was that, after independence, the Muslim students Federation, which had worked as an arm of the Muslim League, lost touch with the parent body. The Federation broke up into a number of unions with little centralized control. This development was to produce a tremendous impact on the development of politics in Pakistan.

Despite the advice of politicians in power, the students remained interested in politics and took keen interest in all the developments in Pakistan's stormy history. In Pakistan, as in all other countries, there were moments when the political leaders, sometimes deliberately and at other times inadvertently, worked against the general interests of the State. On many such occasions the only voice of dissent to be raised was that of the students. It was raised in anger and in exasperation - anger at the political leaders who failed or did not care to read the public mind, and exasperation with the public which failed or did not communicate its wishes and aspirations to the political leaders. It was in this spirit that students fought countless battles, with forces representing the authority, on the streets of Pakistan. These outbursts of anger and exasperation failed to produce institutional change. As Forum, an independent newsweekly

of Dacca, commented editorially:

> February 21 commemorates not only the blood sacrifice of those young men who fell martyrs to the 1952 State language movement. It commemorates as much the determination of the people to defy those who conspire to deny them their basic rights... To bring home the simple truth that it is the people who know what is best for themselves and not the self-appointed rulers of the day, the people of Pakistan have had to lay down their lives time after time, and to launch movement after movement in 1952, 1954, 1962, 1966, 1968, and 1969.[56]

Forum wrote this article to commemorate the memory of the students who were killed by the police after a procession taken out by students of Dacca demanding for Bengali the status of a national language had turned violent. "The Language Movement" - as the events leading to the tragedy of February 21 have come to be known - provided the students of East Pakistan with an important political issue. According to Badruddin Umar, the movements' leaders did not emerge from the orthodox leading elite of the Bengali society. The leadership group was "comprised of young men and women imbued by a new kind of political consciousness. Amongst them there is no single individual who can be identified as the leading spirit of the movement."[57] The political consciousness imbued by the language movement brought back organizational activity

to the students of East Pakistan. They formed themselves into three large province-wide organizations. All of them affiliated themselves with political parties. Thus the East Pakistan Students' League began to function as an arm of the Awami League, while the East Pakistan Students' Union and Islami Chattra Sangha started to perform the same function for the National Awami Party and the Jamaat-s-Islami.

However, the students of West Pakistan never found an issue which could galvanize them back into politics. They remained interested but their interest did not manifest itself in an institutional form. Troubles there were; as in 1956 when the students of Lahore and Karachi took to the streets and demonstrated violently against the anti-Egypt policy adopted by the government during the Suez crisis. A year later, the students of Karachi protested violently against a raise in bus fares ordered by the City Transport Authority. These student-led campaigns, although as spontaneous as the language movement in Bengal, were not of the type that could bring the students back into the political arena. No large organization took the place of the Muslim Students Federation in West Pakistan.

The institutionalization of student politics in East Pakistan produced political dividends there. In 1954, a number of parties, under the banner of the United Front, took to the field against the Muslim League Government of Nurul Amin. This was the first election in the eastern wing. The ruling party was thoroughly beaten, the United Front captured 210

out of 237 Muslim seats in the provincial assembly. As if to underscore the real significance of the elections, Chief Minister Nurul Amin was beaten by an unknown student-politician. According to Rashiduzzaman, an East Pakistani political scientists:

> Among the United Front campaigners, there was a large number of students working throughout the province ... Students from the cities spread out in the rural areas and mobilized pupils in the village schools to work for the United Front election campaign.[58]

The neglect of the student constituency by the West Pakistani politicians cost them dearly. The political movement launched by some of them in 1958 against the established interests had the sympathy of the student body of the province. However, being unorganized the students were not able to lend the kind of political muscle that was given to the United Front Campaign by their counterparts in East Pakistan. Had Quyum Khan been able to rely on the support of organized student unions, his campaign against the Iskander Mirza - Firoz Khan Noon coalition would have acquired a popular base.

Why is it that time after time and movement after movement, students provided leadership to an apathetic and indifferent population? The Pakistani leadership provided the standard law and order explanation for what was usually described as student unrest. "Before proceeding to discuss the specific problems that have been brought to our notice we feel it

necessary to mention that wherever we have been we have noticed a deep sense of anxiety in all concerned at the rapidly growing spirit of indiscipline amongst the younger generation,"[59] wrote the Commission on Student Problems and Welfare after interviewing many public figures. Ayub Khan, however, did not regard student activism as indiscipline or even as political unrest. He saw it in more positive terms. Students were one of the many important social groups in the developing countries that found the prevalent system of government out of harmony with the requirements of the society. This generated tension between the governed and those who governed. In a remarkable passage in his political autobiography, Ayub Khan first identified the problem and then proposed a solution:

> Most of the newly-emerging countries adopted the Western system of government because they did not have time to work out a system of their own. As a result, governments have been functioning in a state of tension with their people. The behavior of the politician, the student community, and the Press, has contributed to this tension. Student demonstrations are a common phenomenon in all new democratic countries like Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, the Philippines, and Japan. In the old days, one would hear a lot about lawlessness among the student community in Cairo. <u>Since the pattern of government has changed, the students have settled down.</u>[60]

This analysis has a number of things in common with the explanation that the New Left has now provided for student restiveness in the developed societies of the world. According to Alexander Cockburn:

> Student insurgents have rejected established models of political action: they refuse to pin their hopes on the remote maneuvers of parliamentary assemblies or party conferences. The main student movements are quite aware that their struggle is against the social system as a whole: they refuse to participate in it on its own terms.[61]

Ayub Khan also waged his political war against the entire social system; and, like the New Left, he also opted for institutions that would be dependent neither on the maneuvers of parliamentary assemblies nor on the whims of party conferences. Translated into practical politics this meant the creation of a system that would disallow effective participation in the political process to <u>all</u> groups in the society. This is where a visionary turned practical politician found himself on the horns of a dilemma. A section of the society, with the students as its most articulate exponents, was disillusioned with the prevailing system of government on the grounds that political participation was available only to those the system recognized and on the terms it prescribed. Ayub Khan understood this, but he also realized that by lifting these constraints on participation,

the process of decision-making would be subjected to pulls and pressures that would not be working necessarily in the same direction. He therefore designed a system which, by denying participation to all groups, concentrated all power in the hands of one individual. This was not the kind of solution which the students were looking for; there was hardly any comfort in the fact that the new regime, while denying participation to the students, had also made the pillars of the old system politically ineffective.

Since Ayub Khan had shown little hesitation in condemning the political system he had thrown overboard he received considerable student support in the beginning. The students were prepared to help the regime achieve its declared objectives of putting the country's economic house in order. For instance, they assisted the government in making a rapid survey of the conditions in which refugee populations were living in the city of Karachi.[62] However, assisting the government in setting the political house in order was a different matter altogether. Accordingly, the regime forfeited student support when the outline of the structure Ayub Khan was proposing to erect became visible to them. He sensed this and adopted two different approaches toward the students. One, to "somehow make the system of education consonant with the hopes and aspirations the country holds for itself."[63] The other, to match activism among students by encouraging formation of unions sympathetic to the government. The first approach was tried with vigour in relation to the students of

West Pakistan, the other with respect to those in the universities of the eastern wing.

A Commission on National Education was set up on December 30, 1958 under the Chairmanship of S.M. Sharif, with the directive to reorientate and reorganize the educational system in order "to develop among the people a sense of public duty, patriotism and national solidarity and to inculcate among them the habits of industry, integrity and devotion to service."[64] The Commission submitted its report on August 13, 1959, and, as was to be expected, made the kind of recommendations that could hardly affect the political power of the students.

At the same time Governoe Monem Khan of East Pakistan, an Auyb Khan appointee, organized the East Pakistan Students' Federation and linked it with the Pakistan Muslim League, the official political party. The difference in the approaches of the regime to what it considered student problems helped formulate the attitude of the student bodies in the two provinces toward politics. In West Pakistan, student activities were relatively anarchic. Denied integration into the political system, they concentrated their attention on such problems as overcrowding in the colleges and universities, stereotype teaching, lack of library and study facilities, and the expense of books and fees,[65] until such time as Zulfigar Ali Bhutto provided them with a larger issue. In East Pakistan the integration of the student unions into the

system, via the political parties, made it possible for them to play a continuously constructive role in the province's political society.

ULEMA

The Pakistan Movement, launched in 1940 and aimed at creating a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India, was led by Westernized leaders of the Muslim League. It was not a strictly religious movement as its principal supporters were urban middle classes who feared economic and political domination of relatively more advanced and politicized Hindus in an independent India. In the words of Leonard Binder:

> The Westernized leaders of the Muslim League had in mind some mutation of European nationalist theory, but the ulama were obviously incapable of reconciling nationalism and Islam. One can even yet discern a certain discomfort among the ulama with the whole concept of Pakistan as an Islamic state.[66]

Pakistan, whose birth was made possible by the secular-minded leadership, was nevertheless created for the Muslims. In order to vindicate Mohammad Ali Jinnah's two-nation theory, the government in Pakistan had to function on bases somewhat different from those operating across the border in India. This assumption became the main source of conflict between

the modernists and traditionalists in Pakistan. Both groups based their arguments on interpretations of ijma (consensus). According to the modernists, for law-making consensus had to be arrived at among the representatives of the people. Therefore a law passed by a duly elected assembly could not be repugnant to the teachings of Islam. The traditionalists interpreted ijma as consensus among those who know the law. This gave the ulema the right of veto.

A good deal of constitutional controversy centered around the interpretation of this repugnancy clause. In January 1951, at a conference held in Karachi, the ulema incorporated their interpreration of ijma into what was to be known as the 22 principles of an Islamic state. The Constitution of 1956 worked out a compromise formula which was acceptable to the ulema and the modernist leadership. The Constitution defined Pakistan as an Islamic Republic. Article 198 laid down that "no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah" and that existing laws shall be "brought into conformity with such injunctions."[67] However, the definition of repugnancy was left to the National Assembly.

Ayub Khan was aware of the power wielded by the ulema. He was convinced that the exercise of this power had to be constrained in order to implement his program of political modernization. Like the landed aristocracy, the ulema

belonged to the traditional section of the society. Accordingly, he chose to undermine their authority with the kind of shock tactics that he had employed for dealing with the landlords. One of the first acts of the new regime was to change the name of the state from the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to simply Pakistan.[68] Having done this, Ayub Khan proceeded with his attempt to demolish the authority of the ulema over the people of Pakistan. As usual, his reasons for doing this were clearly stated:

> Since the movement of Pakistan was guided by the enlightened classes under the leadership of a man who was the symbol of Western education [Mohammad Ali Jinnah], the prestige of the ulema had been badly damaged. This damage had to be repaired. The political ulema had two courses open to them: either to re-examine their own positions and revise their attitudes so that the people might be able to gain from their knowledge in dealing with their problems, or to demolish the position of the educated classes in the eyes of God-fearing but uneducated masses. Not unnaturally, they adopted the latter course.[69]

Later, as he had attempted in the case of the lawyers, Ayub Khan's attack on the ulema was concentratedon the economic basis of the power wielded by them. In 1961 the regime adopted a legislation that in effect nationalized a

large number of properties that belonged to mosques and religious shrines. The incomes yielded by these properties had made the religious leaders economically independent; by bringing them under the control of the Auqaf Department, the government brought a large section of the religious leadership under its economic control. The Auqaf Act proved far more effective in bringing the recalcitrant ulema to submission than did the various provisions directed against the legal community. One reason for this is that the impact of this legislation was quite opposite to that of the Ordinances meant to influence the lawyers. It would be recalled that various law reforms did not affect the big lawyers practicing in the large cities of East and West Pakistan. On the contrary, the provisions of the Auqaf Act brought more of the large city ulemas under the effective control of the government, leaving practically untouched the small town and village religious leaders (mullahs.) The mullah, dependent mostly on alms for his sustenance, continued to be independent of government control. As can be seen from Table 3.2, the influence of the imams in the village community was considerable, even ten years after the assumption of office by Ayub Khan. In West Pakistan, 73 percent of the villagers gave the mullah and the pir (religious leader) the first place on what may be called a scale of veneration. In East Pakistan, the religious group was not given the top place, but still accounted for the largest vote.

Table 3.2

Percentage Giving the Top Place to Various Classes

On A Scale of Veneration

(1969)

	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Maulvis	42.4	51.7
Basic Democrats	17.8	5.6
School Teachers	14.3	0.3
Contractors	10.6	0.2
Shop Keepers	4.8	--
Pirs	1.3	21.4
Landlord	0.2	11.9
Lambardar	--	7.8
Other	8.6	1.1

N = 2124

Source: Author's Survey

Note: The survey was conducted in 27 villages of the Punjab, and 13 villages in East Pakistan (3 each in Rajshahi, Khulra, and Chittagong Divisions and 4 in Dacca Division.)

CONCLUSION

The disintegration of the Muslim League in the 1950's was the result of the re-emergence of powerful social groups as independent forces in the society. Once out of the Muslim League, the groups organized their own political parties (see Figure 3.1). The landed aristocracy was represented by the Republican Party, the legal community in East Pakistan organized the Awami League, and the lawyers of the Punjab formed the Azad Pakistan Party and subsequently joined the West Pakistan branch of the National Awami Party. Some ulema formed the Mizam-i-Islam Party, while some other reorganized the Jamiat-ul-Ulamai Pakistan. The break-up of the League also strengthened the orthodox Jamaat-i-Islami. The Awami League, National Awami Party and Jamaat-i-Islami organized their student wings in East Pakistan. The students of West Pakistan, however, were left unorganized.

When Ayub Khan took over the administration of the country in October 1958, he found the political society neatly divided into a number of social groups, each with a political organization of its own. Ayub Khan's first task as a political modernizer was to concentrate political power in his own hands. Before this could be accomplished, two things had to be done. The numerous political parties that had taken the place of Jinnah's one-party system had to be destroyed. And, the social groups had to be persuaded to yield the bulk of the political power they had repossessed after the collapse of the Muslim League.

Ayub did both; a martial law decree abolished all political parties and an elaborate program of social reform made the old social groups yield a great deal of the political and economic power they possessed. Ayub Khan failed to create a political organization that, like Mohammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League, could assimilate the social groups. What resulted was a game of musical chairs in which some social groups were encouraged to occupy the place vacated by other groups. Thus the landed aristocracy was brought back into the political society as were a section of the legal and student communities. The ulema were also split into two sections, one supporting and the other opposing the regime. The attitude of the social groups toward the regime of Ayub Khan is summarized in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3

Attitude Toward the Established Order in Group Alignment in Two Eras of Active Politics in Pakistan

Group	1948-1958	1962-1969
Landed Aristocracy	For	For
Rural Middle Class	--	Neutral
Legal Profession	For	--
a. City lawyers	--	Neutral
b. Small-town lawyers	--	Against
Students	For	Against
Religious Leaders	For	--
a. Ulema and Pirs	--	Neutral
b. Maulvis	--	Against

Figure 1

The Political Party Family Tree in Pakistan, 1947-1964



Note: Within parentheses in each box are provided the names of the most important politician(s) and the social groups represented at the time of the formation of the political party. The year of the birth of the party is also given.

NOTES, CHAPTER III

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4. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.) Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Vol. II) (Lahore: Mohammad Ashiaf, 1964), p. 199.

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46. Karl von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 137.

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48. Twenty Years of Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1967), p. 733.

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50. Karl von Vorys, Political Development, op. cit., p. 137.

51. The Pakistan Code, Vol. XIV (Karachi: Government Printing Press, 1967), p. 308.

52. Report of the Constitution Commission, 1961 (Karachi: Government Printing Press, 1962), p. 100.

53. After the Union Councils, which formed the base of the system of Basic Democracies, the District Councils formed the most important tier in the structure. There were 17 such councils in East and 45 in West Pakistan. One half of the membership of the Councils was drawn from among the district level government officials. The other half was made up of the persons nominated by the government. One-half of the nominated members had to be chosen from among the chairmen of the union councils. Unlike union councils, district councils did not elect their chairmen. This responsibility was assigned to the Deputy Commissioners.

54. It is true that the district councils were supposed to represent the rural areas. However, in the districts with no big concentrations of urban populations, the small town middle class was as keen to dominate these councils as the rural elites.

55. For student activism in Pakistan see Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Political Activism of the University Students," The Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies (forthcoming).

56. Forum.,(Dacca, February 21, 1970), p. 3.

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59. Report of the Commission on Student Problems and Welfare (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1966), p. 5.

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CHAPTER 4:

EMERGENCE OF NEW SOCIAL GROUPS

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INTRODUCTION

The Muslims brought a highly stratified society into the Indian sub-continent. According to a well-known description the fundamental features of the Indian polity under the Muslims were a soverign who ruled, an army that supported the ruler, and a peasantry that paid for both.[1] Over time, however, there was an increase in the extent of the peoples' involvement in political and economic matters. By the sixteenth century the Indian polity had seen the full maturation of a new class - the nobility connected with the court. The emergence of this group and its usefulness to the soverign, particularly as tax collectors, diluted the power wielded by the court. However, as Berrington Moore has pointed out, "By skimming off most of the economic surplus generated by the underlaying population and turning it into display, the Moghul rulers for a time avoided the dangers of an aristocratic attack on their power."[2] With the weakening of the Moghul authority in the eighteenth century, the power wielded by the aristocracy increased considerably. The arrival of the British and the settlements introduced by them provided a landed base to the aristocracy. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the landed aristocracy had emerged as a powerful social group in the Indian society.

The separation of the state and religion, a principal feature of the Indian polity under the British raj, affected the

Muslim religious leaders more than their Hindu counterparts. The ulema had occupied prominent positions in the courts of the Muslim rulers, helping them to run the affairs of the state as closely as possible to the dictates of the Quran and Sunnah. The British had no use for these services. Accordingly, the first movement of resistance against the spread of the British raj was organized by the Muslim ulema.[3]

We see, therefore, that completely different set of circumstances led to the mobilization of the first social groups in the Muslim society of British India. These circumstances were produced by the same set of events - the collapse of the Moghul empire and the rise of the British raj. The landed aristocracy, created by the British in the image of their own squirarchy, soon developed very close ties with the administration. Through the process of value agglutination,[4] the landed aristocracy was able to acquire political power along with economic wealth. The ulema mobilized themselves after they became acutely aware of the political and economic deprivation caused by the replacement of Muslim rule by the British raj. The ulema's influence in the Muslim courts had been used by them to their social and economic advantage. Thus in the words of Mujeeb, "The ruler could maintain and enforce the shariah only through the qadis, the muhtasibs and the jurists, as he himself had no authority in matters of religion. The qadis' and the jurists had no means of inducing the people to accept them and their theological credentials except through the king. There was thus an alliance between them based on the particular interest of each party ...

The jurists of this period - the Chief Qadi, Shaikh al-Islam, qadis - were mainly those who used their knowledge for worldly ends..."[5] Therefore, it was in order to regain their political control that the ulema organized a series of armed movements against the British rulers.

As social groups, the landed aristocracy and the ulema have received some attention in the previous chapter. With the help of the above discussion, even at the risk of some slight repetitions, I hope to illustrate what is the subject of this chapter, i.e., the reasons for the emergence of some new powerful groups in the political and economic society of Pakistan.

The demand for an independent Muslim state in the Indian sub-continent was raised by a group of Westernized urban professionals who acutely felt the impact of Hindu competition. Accordingly, the demand for Pakistan reached a crescendo in the provinces of British India in which this competition was keenly felt by the Muslim educated classes. There was an element of absent-mindedness in the manner in which Muslim intelligentsia went on pressing for their claim for a separate state, aware all the time that if such a state was allowed to be created its principal beneficiaries would be the Muslims who belonged to the Muslim-majority provinces of British India. The British decision to accept the demand for Pakistan produced social, political and economic consequences for the educated Muslims of the minority provinces that were similar to those experienced a century earlier by the ulema. The separation of

the Muslim majority provinces from British India reduced considerably the proportion of Muslims in the independent Indian state. Thus, almost overnight, the Muslims of the United Provinces, Bihar, Delhi, Bombay, Gujrat and Hyderabad lost the lever they had used with such political advantage in the struggle for independence.

The transfer of populations that followed the partition of India brought thousands of urban professionals to the cities and towns of West and East Pakistan. This move scattered their erstwhile supporters and clients and left them without political constituencies and markets. The sense of deprivation produced by the economic, social and political consequences of migration mobilized the refugees from India.

The emergence of Pakistan produced, for the Muslim business classes, the kind of economic windfall that the advent of the British raj had produced for the landed aristocracy. The migration of the Hindu capitalist class, especially after the communal riots in Karachi in 1948, provided a tremendous opportunity to the Muslim businessmen to occupy the positions vacated by the migrants. The trade war between India and Pakistan (1948-1949) made the government adopt a policy for the quick industrialization of the country. Protected markets and availability of foreign capital at favorable terms of trade were two important aspects of this policy. In other words, the Government of Pakistan nurtured the business-industrial community much as the British had nurtured the landed aristocracy.

The economic wealth that accrued to the industrial-business class helped its members to accumulate over a period of time a great deal of political and social power.

Like the ulema, the refugees also fought a losing economic-political battle. For a large number of them the old constituencies could not be recreated and the old supporters could not be regrouped. Therefore, a section of the refugee community got progressively alienated from the very society they had worked so hard to create.

A third group that requires attention in this analysis is that of unionized labor. Labor differs in at least two respects from the other social groups that figure in our story. First, it was the only group that was organized in both East and West Pakistan. It would be recalled that the only other group which had relied on institutions to make the force of its presence felt was the student body of East Pakistan. However, unlike labor, students did not have any national organization. Second, labor was the only group that had not played a very significant political and economic role in the twenty-year period (1947-1969) of Pakistan's history that serves as a backdrop for our story. However, by the beginning of the 1970's, labor was gaining ground as a group to be reckoned with in Pakistan's political and economic society.

REFUGEES FROM INDIA

The partition of the Indian sub-continent into a predominantly Hindu India and a predominantly Muslim Pakistan was possible because of the uneven distribution of those religious groups over 435 administrative districts of British India. According to the Census of 1941, the sub-continent had 94.5 million Muslims, constituting 23.4 percent of the population. However, there were 76 districts with population more than half Muslim, situated in two clusters, one in the northwest and the other in the northeast. These districts, with the exception of five in the princely state of Kashmir and one (Gurdaspur) in the Punjab were separated from the Indian sub-continent to form West and East Pakistan. However, even after partition a large number of Muslims were left in India. According to one estimate in 1947 Pakistan's population had only 53.8 million Muslims or 57 percent of the total Muslim population of undivided India.[6] The line of partition left 43 percent of sub-continent Muslims in 265 districts that went to the share of independent India. Even though the division of British India did not create two religiously homogeneous countries and although "it was inconceivable that [Pakistan] could accomodate all of the Muslims of India, yet the mass immigration following partition resulted in achieving a greater degree of homogeneity."[7] According to one estimate, within six months of the partition of India, 6.0 million Muslims took refuge in Pakistan and 5.0 million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan

to go to India.[8]

Since a systematic plan for the exchange of populations seems not to have been a part of separatist thinking in the period preceding the partition of the Indian sub-continent,[9] there was no socio-economic matching of the immigrants with the migrants. Among the Hindus and Sikhs who left Pakistan there was a higher proportion of industrialists, bankers, merchants and urban professionals than among the Muslims who came from India. Thus the 1947 exchange of population left Pakistan less equipped to run the economic, administrative and political institutions that she inherited from the British raj. It is worth mentioning here that in the heterogeneous social, economic and political society of the sub-continent, the institutions created by the British had won many adherents among the minority communities.[10] In the laissez-faire economic system of British India the minorities found an opportunity for advance that the highly structured societies of the majority communities denied to their members. Thus the Muslim Punjabi businessmen did better in Calcutta than their counterparts in the Punjab while the Hindu merchants from Bombay faced better prospects in Sind than he did in his home state. Accordingly, the Muslims in the Muslim minority provinces of India acquired somewhat greater expertise in economic and financial matters than the members of the Muslim communities in the Punjab, Bengal, Sind and North-West Frontier.

For somewhat similar social reasons, the minority communities developed a greater taste for the parliamentary system of

government introduced by the British. The Muslims of the minority provinces knew that the only way to counter the political weight of the majority communities was to secure adequate representation in the legislative assemblies. This attitude produced not only a sense of political security but also trained the Muslims of the United Provinces, Delhi, Bombay, Madras, etc., in running democratic institutions of government.

Finally, the Muslim minority communities sought to build their political support on the basis of their professional reputation. This was so for two reasons. First, the minority communities were concentrated in the urban areas; second, they found it socially less rewarding to hold vast properties in areas dominated by the members of other communities. As against this the political leaders in the Muslim majority areas drew their support from the ownership of landed property. No wonder, therefore, that the bulk of the Muslim leadership in the minority areas came from urban professional classes (lawyers, doctors, teachers, etc.) while a large majority of the leaders from the majority provinces were big landlords.

The above discussion points to two important conclusions that are relevant for understanding Pakistan's economic and political development. There were not enough industrialists, merchants, financiers and urban professionals among the refugees who came to Pakistan to fill the positions vacated by the non-Muslims who moved out of the country. At the same

time the political, economic and social attitudes shared by the leadership groups within the refugee community were a good deal different from those of the elitist groups in the indigenous population. The massive migration of populations following the emergence of Pakistan produced a state of open conflict between the social groups prominent in Pakistan's society.

A discussion of the pattern of refugee rehabilitation is included in the chapter on urbanization. It will suffice for the purposes of the present analysis to point out that in the first phase of settlement a very large number of refugees went to the major cities of West Pakistan. In fact, it was revealed by the Population Census of 1951 that refugees constituted 60.4 percent of the population of West Pakistani cities.[11] During the 1950's a number of refugees moved to the towns from the cities. My survey of the 13 towns of West Pakistan shows that in these towns (all of them with 1969 populations of less than 65,000) the refugees accounted for 27 percent of the population. The bulk of this refugee population had moved to the towns in the 1950's.

The large concentration of the refugee community in the cities made it easier for them to continue to wield for some time the kind of political and economic power they had possessed in the pre-independence India. In Pakistan the strength of the refugee community was adequately reflected both in national and provincial politics. As we can see from Table 4.1, 36.7 percent of the important political offices were held by them in the pre-Ayub Khan period. Khwaja Nazimuddin was the only non-refugee

politician who held the post of Governor-General; he was also the only non-refugee to become the Prime Minister.

The table also points to some interesting differences in the power wielded by the refugee community in different parts of the country. Among elective officials (Chief Ministers) the Punjab was the only province that gave representation to the refugees. In all other regions, no refugee became a Chief Minister. On the national level, however, the refugees wielded very great power. Not only four out of the five Prime Ministers were refugees, but 38.3 percent of the Chief Provincial executives (Governors, appointed by the national leadership) also belonged to the refugee community.

The second wave of migration that took a number of refugees from the cities to the towns produced inevitable political and social impact As Table 4.2 shows, the economic, political and administrative presence of the refugees far out-weighed their number in the total population. With the exception of retail trade and lower-level government employment, the refugee representation at all other levels of economic, political and administrative activity was no more than their proportion in the total population.

This domination produced a sense of frustration among the indigeneous population. In the words of Tayyeb: "In the initial flush of enthusiasm the native Pakistanis welcomed the refugees who were endearingly called the 'Muhajir' (after those who had sought refuge with the Prophet Muhammad in the Hejira)."[12] The flush paled and along with it went the

enthusiasm for the values to which the muhajirs prescribed so whole-heartedly. The political and economic eclipse of the refugee community, brought about during the rule of Ayub Khan, also saw diminishing interest for representative democratic institutions.

Ayub Khan's entry into politics, at the head of an organization which did not have a high refugee representation, ended the period of muhajir political and economic domination. He was aware of the extent of the political power of the refugees, which they wielded not only because of their economic status in the society and their control of some of the political parties, but also because of the powerful positions they held in the civil bureaucracy. Not adequately represented in the armed forces but present in large numbers in the influential CSP and in command of vast economic resources, the refugees could have presented a powerful challenge to the regime of Ayub Khan . Their power therefore had to be curbed. Once again the regime employed economic weapons to achieve supremacy over a powerful pressure group.

There were three reasons for the remarkable economic performance of the refugee community. First, the business background of the Memons[13] and the Ismailis, with deeply ingrained habits of thrift and hard work, made it possible for them to turn quickly into aggressive industrial entrepreneurs. The indigeneous population did not have any community in any way comparable to the Memons and Ismailis. Second, the government regulations relating to evacuee property (property left by the

Hindus and Sikhs) made available to the refugees functioning financial, business and industrial concerns. No opportunity was given to the non-refugee population to gain access to any evacuee property. Third, a refugee-dominated administration had created a hot house atmosphere for the new industrial, business and financial concerns. A plethora of government controls assured phenomenal rates of profits to Pakistan's new entrepreneurs, estimated in one analysis of Pakistan's early industrial development to be between 50 and 100 percent.[14] While Ayub Khan could do nothing about the business background or work-ethics of the successful muhajir communities, his administration could and did take steps to establish a balance between the opportunities available to all sections of the population.

According to Ayub Khan's assessment, which was partially correct, the vast fortunes built by some members of the refugee community was due to the very unequal distribution of evacuee property. His regime, therefore, undertook the task of "rationalizing" the process of distribution of the assets left in Pakistan by the non-Muslims at the time of partition. This could be done since in 1958, ten years after independence, the settlement of property on the muhajirs remained provisional. In the words of Ayub Khan:

> The politicians ended up by adopting a perfectly ridiculous formula: it meant that if a person could produce two witnesses who deposed that he had owned half of India, then the government of Pakistan would

> have to accept this! He could, in return, testify that the other half of India belonged to those who had testified in his favour. And the government must accept this also![15]

While devising a "fair" formula for distributing evacuee property, the new regime divided the muhajir community into two groups" those who had left voluntarily, and those who had been forced to leave their homes. The latter belonged to East Punjab; the former to Delhi, United Provinces, Hyderabad State and Bombay. The refugees from the Punjab were given a good deal - the government accepted the assessments made by them of their losses of wealth and property in India. However, for the rest of the refugee community the administration adopted a highly unfavorable formula. They were to be compensated for only a small proportion of the value of the property left by them. This step in effect went against the spirit of the Pakistan movement. In theory Jinnah and the Muslim League had desired a separate homeland for all Indian Muslims and not only for those who either fortuitously found themselves on the right side of the partition line or were forcibly pushed across. As in the case of some other"reforms" the new regime never took time to assess the political repercussions that such a classification of refugees was likely to produce. Once having fixed its eyes on a goal, Ayub's government proceeded toward it at its usual break-neck speed. Martial Law Regulation 89 was promulgated and a good bit of the government apparatus was employed under the exceptionally dynamic General Azam Khan, the Rehabilitation

Minister, to quickly implement its provisions. Four years later, in 1963, Ayub Khan could claim that "the refugees had been settled" and that"they had been given a fair deal."[16] He should also have announced that his regime had simultaneously achieved its objective of diverting substantial resources from the refugees to the non-refugees. According to one estimate, this scheme saved the government more than Rs 790 million.[17] The refugees who thought they had been given a fair deal were those who belonged to East Punjab, the remaining generally resented the uneven-handed justice that had been meted out to them. In the data collected by the author from his survey of thirteen West Pakistani towns, among the 22 percent settlers who declared themselves to be unhappy with the government's rehabilitation policy, 89 percent were non-Punjabis.

Although the rise of the merchant-industrialists as a powerful social group is the subject of the next section, it is worth pointing out the impact of Ayub Khan's economic policies on the refugee section of this class. The extremely high profits that the new industrial entrepreneurs collected from their investments were partly due to the reluctance of the pre-Ayub administrations to close tax loop-holes and partly because of the various kinds of government sanctioned protections. Ayub Khan made the government fiscal machinery more effective and, at the same time, opened the industrial sector to new entrants. The most spectacular policy adopted by the new regime was the Export Bonus Scheme (EBS).[18] Introduced in 1959, the scheme loosened monopolistic controls over export-import trade. Until

1959, this trade had been dominated by the non-Punjabi section of the muhajir community. Under the EBS, export licenses were freely granted. The exporters were issued readily cashable and freely negotiable vouchers for amounts ranging between 10 to 30 percent of the f.o.b. value of exports, depending upon the commodity exported, and in the currency of the country importing the particular commodity. The vouchers could be bought at a premium determined by market conditions and used for importing a large number of commodities specified by the government. The EBS had two important consequences. It reduced profits on import-export trade - profits that had been plowed into industrial investment by the early muhajir entrepreneurs. And it made scarce industrial capital goods and raw materials available to all those who could afford to buy the bonus vouchers on the market. The latter consequence was responsible for turning a section of the landed aristocracy into industrialists.[19]

The emergence of Ayub Khan in the late 1950's and the political and economic reforms introduced by his regime affected the refugees in one important way: it divided the refugee community into two parts, those who had come to Pakistan from the Indian part of the Punjab and those who came from other provinces. It would be recalled that it was the latter group that had imbibed so thoroughly the western ethos, in both economic and political matters. The eclipse of this group meant that the forces interested in building representative political institutions could no longer exert great influence within the society.

The political and economic deprivation of a section of the refugee community was caused by the policies of the regime of Ayub Khan. This feeling of deprivation was transformed into hostility against the regime and the program it stood for. As Khalid B. Sayeed has pointed out in his analysis of the presidential elections of 1964, one factor responsible for the large anti-Ayub Khan vote in certain regions of Pakistan was the concentration in these areas of the disaffected section of the refugee community.[20]

MERCHANT-INDUSTRIALISTS[21]

The development of Pakistan's industrial sector is the subject of a later chapter. Here we are concerned with identifying the causes that led to the emergence of merchant-industrialists as a powerful social group within the society and with our analysis of its economic and political interests.

I will show in this section that Ayub Khan's industrial and commercial policies resulted in creating a division within the social group they were meant to affect. The impact of these reforms was somewhat similar to the impact of reforms in the agricultural sector. A few years after the coup d'etat of 1958, a new group of entrepreneurs had emerged within the industrial and commercial sectors with interests somewhat different from the group that had grown in power in the 1950's. As we shall see below, the bulk of the entrepreneurial class of the 1950's, was made up of refugee families that had accumulated some capital in the business sector. The class of industrialists

that developed in the 1960's had a broader socio-economic base.

It is usually asserted that the Pakistan Movement, led by the Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim League, did not have any strong ideological orientation.[22] In this respect it is regarded to be considerably different from the movement for Indian independence that was led by the National Congress. The emergence of Jawharlal Nehru's progressive group as the single most powerful faction within the Congress Party provided the Indian independence movement[23] with the kind of ideological bias that the Pakistan movement did not have. However, the absence of a large number of socialists within the Pakistan movement does not mean that the Muslim leadership did not have any ideas about the nature of the economic society they wanted to create in the country. The fact that these ideas were not formulated in the form of manifestos, programs and resolutions by the Muslim League indicates that its leadership, unlike that of the National Congress,[24] was by and large satisfied with the economic system that the British had brought to the sub-continent. The only shortcoming that the Muslim separatist leadership had found in the system was that it had not integrated fully the members of their own community. The solution to the economic problems of the Indian Muslims was a simple one: give them a country of their own and they would automatically discern the economic opportunities that they had failed to find in British India. What was needed was a change in political structure. There was no need to change the economic system.

We have already elaborated on the various reasons why the Muslims in the minority provinces endorsed the system of mixed economy that the British had developed in the sub-continent. Since Mohammad Ali Jinnah and other top-level leaders of independent Pakistan were drawn from those provinces, they were not at all eager to make major departures from the system they had inherited from the British raj. Jinnah's speech to the annual meeting of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce, delivered in April 1948, must have reassured the business class. "Government will seek to create conditions in which industry and trade may develop and prosper," he told his audience. "I would like to call to your particular attention the keen desire of the Government of Pakistan to associate individual initiation and private enterprise at every stage of industrialization."[25]

Once a little freed from the enormous burden of setting up a new governmental machinery, the Jinnah regime addressed itself to the task of building the country's economy. As I have argued above, the Pakistan movement was aimed at freeing the Indian Muslims from the yoke of Hindu political and economic domination. Political separation alone would have done little for Muslim emancipation had Jinnah allowed Pakistan to remain an economic satellite of independent India. It was, therefore, in line with Jinnah's thinking that a complete economic break should occur between the two countries. One consequence of this was the trade war of 1948-1948 between India and Pakistan.

This point needs to be emphasized a little, not only because it provides an essential link in our story but also

because it contradicts the usual interpretation given by Pakistani scholars[26] to the events that led up to the trade war. It is usually argued that Pakistan was a victim of Indian chauvinism and that very early in her independent existence she was subjected to pressures that may have resulted in her economic collapse. Nehru's belief that the "idea of a Muslim nation is the figment of a few imaginations only ...[and] even if many people believed in it, it would still vanish at the touch of reality,"[27] is usually cited as a strong evidence in support of this hypothesis. By cutting all economic ties with Pakistan, a sense of reality would make itself felt sooner and under its impact Pakistan would slowly but surely crumble.

There is no doubt that there were many among the Indian leadership who harbored this notion. There is also little doubt that, given the dynamics of Muslim nationalism, there were many among the early leadership of Pakistan who favored a total political and economic separation from India. The sequence of events that led to the trade war were in the nature of rapid escalation, with each side over-reacting to the moves of the other. Therefore, evidence can be found in the actions of the two governments to support either of the two hypotheses. My contention is that the latter explanation fits better into the logic of the separatist movement.

Once the stage had been set for separate political and economic development of Pakistan, it was not too difficult to find

actors to play a number of different roles. Among them were the members of the Muslim commercial classes who moved to Pakistan, at the urging of the Quaid-e-Azam, to take part in Pakistan's economic development.[28]

"The overwhelming majority of industrial entrepreneurs have one characteristic in common, which sets them apart from most of Pakistani society. Two-thirds of private industrial investment owned by Muslims is controlled by individuals or families who had been traders previously, the great majority of whom belong to a few 'communities,' who had traditionally engaged in trade."[29] Gustav Papanek based this conclusion on the results of a survey of industrialists conducted by him in 1959, (Table 4.3).A distinction was made between the traders - those engaged in foreign trade and those who were priminent in internal trade. According to the survey, the former sub-group accounted for more than two-fifths of industrial investment. These statistics give an indication of the process of development experienced by the bulk of the new industrial entrepreneurs. It appears that the traditional merchant classes responded to the international trade opportunities made available by the British Government during the Second World War and by the Government of Pakistan in the post-independence period.

Hanna Papanek, in her work on the development of Pakistan's entrepreneurial class, provides an explanation, formulated in terms of group values and work ethics, for the easy and rapid conversion of traders into industrialists. Thus, the "traditional

values, going back two or three generations at least, induced a strong orientation toward profit, high importance attached to savings, willingness to take considerable risks, a pattern of migration in search of business opportunities by men who left their families behind, and acceptance of a view of Islam which sees trade as a valued occupation and the injunction against 'usury' as inapplicable to ordinary interest"[30] provided the kind of impetus that was needed by the merchants to convert themselves into industrialists.

An account of the emergence of an entrepreneurial group, based on the partial modernization of the social class to which it belonged, necessarily ignores one very important factor: the attitude of the ruling elite toward the entrepreneurial group. While it is true the work ethics and the business background of Pakistan's first industrial entrepreneurs helped them a great deal, it is also true that but for the assistance provided by the new government, this group of merchant-industrialists would not have emerged at all. The reasons for the support received by this group from the government have been discussed already and we need only mention them here briefly.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Quaid-e-Azam of the Pakistan Movement, had checked the fissiparous tendencies present in the Muslim League by building up an organization which was not dependent upon one powerful group. The landed aristocracy was the most influential element in the Muslim community of British India. It made its influence felt in Muslim politics not only by

contributing a large number of experienced and talented politicians but also considerable funds to the Pakistan movement. Jinnah was able to apply effective checks to the power of the landed aristocracy by including within the Muslim League organization a large number of persons belonging to the urban professional and commercial classes. From the former source, Jinnah drew a number of political leaders and from the latter he obtained large financial contributions.

After the birth of Pakistan, the Quaid-e-Azam and the administration that he headed continued with the policy of checks and balances. The new leadership was averse to the idea of installing a socialist economic structure in the country. Accordingly, for the purposes of building up the country's economy, Jinnah turned to the private sector. Since the landed aristocracy had its home base in the provinces that constituted Pakistan, it had access to the kind of capital that was needed for beginning the task of industrializing the country. However, by letting the landed interests move into non-agricultural sectors, the government would have succeeded in only creating an extraordinaryily powerful social group. To provide the necessary balance to the wealth and hence the political power of the landed aristocracy, Jinnah and his associates urged the commercial classes to undertake industrial investment. Thus in 1947 the Quaid-e-Azam persuaded the Habib family to "pack up from Bombay and proceed to Karachi."[31] He also convinced the Isphani family[32] and a number of other prominent Muslim businessmen[33] to invest in creating industrial

capital for the economy of the new country.

Once the merchants had established big industrial houses, they came to wield tremendous economic and political power. In a society dominated by social groups, as was the case with Pakistan of 1948-1958, it was difficult to stop the merchant-industrialists from adding more gains to the social, political and economic position. Once again it was Muhammad Ayub Khan who brought about a change in the political environment that ultimately affected the merchant-industrialists.

The policies that led to the industrial growth of Pakistan is the subject of Chapter 7. Here it would suffice to mention two developments that were to produce an enormous impact on the composition of the merchant-industrialists as a social group. Soon after assuming the control of the country's administration, Ayub Khan instituted economic reforms that were designed to broaden the base of property ownership. The most effective of these was the Export Bonus Scheme that provided foreign exchange not at the official rate of exchange but at a rate determined by the market. It was the difference between these two rates that had made it possible for the merchants engaged in international trade to reap very high profits. By trimming the traders' profit margin, the regime drastically reduced their resource base.

At the same time, by provincializing the subject of industry, Ayub Khan was able to subject the growth of the sector to greater political control. His trusted lieutenants,

Governors Kalabagh and Monem Khan of West and East Pakistan were able to use licences for the installation of new industrial units as powerful political levers. Therefore, by reducing the availability of capital to established merchant-industrialists and by using the industrial licensing machinery as an instrument for eliciting political support, the Government of Ayub Khan was able to drastically alter the composition of the industrial class.

In Table 4.4, we present some indication of the changes in the ownership of industrial capital brought about by the Ayub Khan regime. By 1970 the merchant-industrialists could no longer be regarded as a homogeneous social group. For, the proportion of the refugee trader class had been considerably diluted. It managed to preserve its hold only over the financial institutions. During the ten years of Ayub Khan's rule, the landed aristocracy made considerable headway in both traditional and modern branches of the industrial sector. Thus at the time of the fall of the government of Ayub Khan, one-fifth of the firms engaged in the manufacture of textiles were owned by the landlords. These firms accounted for 12 percent of the capital invested in this sub-sector. In engineering and chemical industries, one-tenth of the firms and one-eighth of the installed capital were in the hands of the landed aristocracy. The Hotis of the Frontier Province, the Noons and Ranas of the Punjab and the Pirs of Sind became prominent landed-industrial families of the country.

Retired government officials also acquired considerable industrial capital during the days of the Ayub regime. By the end of the sixties General Habibullah, Captain Gohar Ayub, Zafarul Ahsan and Abbas Khaleeli (the last two were removed by Ayub Khan from the Civil Service of Pakistan) had acquired large industrial fortunes.

We see, therefore, that Ayub Khan's economic policies resulted in broadening the ownership base of industrial wealth. This change in the economic society produced two significant political consequences. First, it alienated from the government the bulk of the merchant class that the Quaid-e-Azam had brought into the sector of industry. Many of the big industrial houses supported the candidacy of Miss Fatima Jinnah (against that of Ayub Khan) in the presidential elections of 1965. To some extent Ayub Khan's failure to capture a majority in Karachi can be attributed to the withdrawal of political support by the merchant-industrialists who belonged to the city's refugee community.

Second, Ayub Khan's economic policies resulted in the creation of new industrial centers in the Punjab. This happened because the new groups that his regime introduced into the manufacturing sector belonged to this province. The rapid industrial development of the Punjab followed, as we shall see in a later chapter, by rapid agricultural growth produced political tensions between the various regions of Pakistan and social and economic tensions within the province itself. The latter contributed to the fall of Ayub Khan while the former led to the grave political crisis of 1970.

INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LABOR

I have already indicated that my discussion of the role of the industrial and commercial labor in Pakistan's political and economic society departs from the format developed for other social groups. This is so because labor was the only social group that exerted influence through organizations that were not attached to the political parties or other powerful groups within the society. However, in one very important respect there were similarities between the development of the student community and labor as important groups in the Pakistani society. It was noted in the previous chapter that the students in East and West Pakistan developed altogether different orientations toward matters relating to political participation. We will see in this section that the industrial and commercial labor also proceeded to develop politically along different lines in East and West Pakistan. It is important to emphasize this point and for this reason we shall make it the central theme of the discussion that follows.

Although I do not wish to pre-empt the subject of a later chapter, it must be pointed out here that Pakistan in 1947 was a predominantly agricultural country. The bulk of the industrial wealth of British India was located in the provinces that remained outside of Pakistan. Therefore, Galenson's general rule "that nations which are unstable politically and are struggling desperately to develop their economic resources do not exhibit powerful, well-functioning labor movements"[34] applies with great force to Pakistan.

The struggle for independence and the concommitant process of modernization did not involve the lower urban classes. Even the Muslim trade-union leaders, unlike their Hindu counterparts, were not active in Muslim politics before the partition. Raza, in his study of the development of trade unionism in Pakistan, provides three reasons for this phenomenon. First, with few exceptions, most party leaders in the Muslim League had no experience in trade union work. In this they were different from the leadership of the Indian National Congress. Second, the smaller Communist and Socialist parties supported the cause of the Muslims as espoused by the League and since these had strong links with labor, there was no need for the League to venture out into this field. Third, riding a wave of mass popularity, the Muslim League's call for action, even though emanating from outside the union structure, was obeyed by the unions.[35] To these I would add a fourth, and perhaps a more important reason. Jinnah, in launching the process of modernization within the Muslim community, concentrated in taking away power from the social groups that were powerful in the society. Labor was not identified by him to be such a group. Since his strategy of accumulating and concentrating power involved the assimilation of the social groups within the organization of a political party, the labor never received such a representation within the Muslim League. The labor thus never became a part of the political community created by Jinnah. Therefore, although Pakistan inherited a not inconsiderable trade union base when it split from India,[36]

the movement failed to progress. When, after the death of Jinnah, the Muslim League failed to survive as a viable political organization, labor was not one of the social groups that rushed in to fill the political vacuum. The emergence of labor as a factor of some importance in the political, economic and social history of Pakistan is, therefore, very much a post-independence phenomenon.

In 1949, Pakistan had 134 registered unions, with a total membership of 157,000, 45 percent of which was in the railways and another 5 percent in the ports.[37] This means that after independence only 12.5 percent of the civilian labor force was unionized[38] and that out of the unionized labor, more than 50 percent[39] was engaged in the sector of communication. At the time of independence, therefore, organized labor constituted a small part of the total labor force and the bulk of the unionized labor belonged to the communication sector. This very strong presence of transport workers in the unions was responsible to a very great extent for the emergence of labor as a powerful social group.

In Pakistan, as in India, the railway workers have shown a greater tendency toward radicalism than the industrial and commercial workers. This tendency dates back to the days of the 1930 depression, when the Indian Communists found the railway worker unions presenting fertile ground for both expanding their influence[40] and embarassing[41] the government. Better organized than other classes of workers, the railway

workers could provide the kind of manpower that the Communist movement most desired. The railways being a part of the government sector, a control of their workers' unions gave the Communists an opportunity to apply their pressure where it would hurt the most. The Depression of the 1930's with rampant unemployment and wage reduction, gave the leftists the chance they were awaiting.

This tradition of radicalism survived even after the partition of the Indian sub-continent. In 1948 the Communists controlled North-West Railway Workers Union,[42] formed the Pakistan Trade Union Federation (PTUF), inviting like-minded workers in other trades and professions to join them. In 1954, barely six years after its formation, the PTUF had a membership of 40,000 or about 10 percent of all unionized workers in the country.[43]

The labor of East Pakistan drew it radicalism from a different source. Before independence most of the Muslim labor of Bengal was led by the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC)[44], formed under the auspices of the Congress Party in 1918 but taken over by the Communists in the late 1920's.[45] In 1946, the areas in Bengal that were later to constitute West Pakistan had 139,000 members in 112 AITUC-affiliated unions. According to one estimate this was more than half of the organized labor in East Bengal.[46] However, despite this heavy bias in favor of leftist unions, the East Bengal labor did not display great militancy. In Weathorfords' words: "Before partition there was no center of labor protest in what is now East Pakistan,

such as Lahore had been in West Pakistan. The weak unions in eastern Bengal were mere outposts of stronger union groups in Calcutta."[47] Their influence was further diluted in 1949 with the amalgamation of a large number of non-Communist unions in EPTUF. Soon after the federation was supplanted by the moderate, pro-government East Pakistan Federation of Labor (EPFL). Therefore, when in 1947 the labor in East Pakistan was reorganized under the umbrella of East Pakistan Trade Union Federation (EPTUF), the moderates took control of the leadership. A large number of East Pakistani labor leaders were the disciples of M.N. Roy, a one-time Communist who had disassociated himself from the party to form his own Radical Humanist League.[48]

In the first few years after independence, the labor movement in the two wings of Pakistan moved in the opposite directions; while the labor of the Western wing rapidly radicalized, their counterparts in the eastern wing were successfully weaned away from politics of the extreme left. In the early 1950's, therefore, the government cracked down hard on the labor movement in West Pakistan, patronizing at the same time, the development of the labor movement in East Pakistan. In the western wing, the opportunity for government action against leftist labor leadership was provided bythe involvement of Faiz Ahmad Faiz, the Marxist poet and the most prominent member of the PTUF, in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy.[49]

Following the incarceration of leftist labor leaders the

strength of the moderate, pro-government West Pakistan Federation of Labor (WPFL) increased along with that of EPFL its sister organization in East Pakistan. The two federations were brought together into the All-Pakistan Confederation of Labor (APCOL) where they peacefully coexisted.

At the time when the organized labor of West Pakistan was going through its period of political militancy, the industrial sector of the region was making some very rapid strides. Accordingly, in the census decade of 1951-1961, West Pakistan's non-agricultural labor force living in the urban areas increased by 67.0 percent, from 1.11 million to 1.86 million. The growth of the factory labor in the early 1950's reached the rate of more than 20 percent a year[50] with the bulk of it going into large establishments.[51] The development in East Pakistan proceeded in a different direction. In the period 1951-1961, the urban labor force expanded by 45.1 percent from 0.36 million to 0.52 million.[52] The number of labor employed in small establishments in East Pakistan was more than five times that of the labor engaged in large manufacturing concerns.

The militancy of the first generation of labor leaders in West Pakistan as well as the very rapid rate of growth in the number of persons employed in large establishments in the non-agricultural sectors, made the political leadership aware of the enormous power, both real and potential, of labor in the economic and political life ofthe society. Very serious

efforts were therefore made not only to organize labor in friendly unions but also to convert it into a group that would be interested in the broad goals followed by other important social groupings within the society.

The labor situation in East Pakistan was different. With the immediate post-independence leadership devoted to gradual radicalization of M.N. Roy variety, with a considerably slower rate of economic expansion, and with a very large number of the labor employed in small, geographically scattered establishments, the political, social and economic elites felt little need to offer the kind of accomodation that they did to the labor in the western wing. The result was that the principal organ of the labor in East Pakistan, the EPFL, became an inactive partner of the Karachi-based APCOL. The situation was not that of mutual accomodation, as Weatherford[53] would have us believe, but that of paternalism imposed from the western wing. This approach of benign neglect towards the labor of East Pakistan was to produce some serious political and economic consequences.

When the East Pakistani labor was not made a participant in the political and economic system that prevailed in the 1950's, that section of the leadership that wanted such an accomodation drifted away from both EPFL and its moderate brand of politics. The Communists and bulk of the Hindu labor leadership left to form several splinter organizations. The first manifestation of the change in the politics of East Pakistani labor came in 1954, when about 300 persons were killed at the Adamjee Jute Mills

riots, and smaller numbers in the disturbances at Chandragona Paper Mill.[54] From all accounts, the riots were not apontaneous but were aimed at two specific groups: the non-Bengali industrial class as represented by the Adamjee family and the Bihari refugees in East Pakistan who then constituted nearly one-fifth of the industrial labor force in that part of the country. In the minds of the ruling elites, these riots were linked with the Zhadnov line of the international Communist movement, the line that had resulted in the subversive activities of the Pakistan Communist Party in East Bengal in the period 1947-1952.[55] Since the stronghold of the Communist movement in East Pakistan was to be found in the Hindu community[56] and since the target groups belonged to the powerful West Pakistan-based economic social groups (merchant-industrialists and refugees from India), the government's reprisal against the activists took a form which was different from that adopted in the western wing after the unearthing of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy. Instead of wooing away the labor leadership from the leftists by providing it oportunities in participating in the political and economic system, the government chose to adopt some very stern measures. Therefore, while the West Pakistani labor leaders found themselves comfortably accomodated in the unions that were favored by the government, the bulk of the East Pakistani leaders were forced to go underground. One important consequence of the adoption of different approaches toward labor leadership in the two wings of the country was that good opportunities were lost in building up a socio-economic group that would have transcended regional differences and would have helped in the process of national integration.

This failure on the part of the important social groups to integrate the East Pakistani labor into the political and economic system of the 1950's caused the latter to align itself with the counter-elites of this period. Accordingly, an important section of the industrial and commercial labor in the pre-Ayub Khan period joined some other social groups of East Pakistan to support the movement which finally led to the rise of the "vernacular elites"[57] as the most powerful elements in the political society of that province.

Ayub Khan's approach toward labor was conditioned by his attitude toward social groups in general. However, since the labor in West Pakistan was organized in unions that had a fairly long (ever since 1951) history of friendliness toward the administration and since an important section of the East Pakistani labor had played an active part in disturbing what was the established order in the 1950's, Ayub Khan adopted different policies in tackling the labor in the two provinces. This difference in approach could be easily camouflaged as the bulk of the West Pakistani labor was engaged in large-scale manufacturing and state-run railways, while a very large proportion of the labor in East Pakistan was employed in small-scale enterprises. Thus the labor policy of 1959 and the Industrial Disputes Ordinance of the same year were aimed at the former. "The whole purpose was to provide machinery for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes, for the minimizing of time lost by reason of strikes and other forms of work stoppage, and for the prevention of such abuses as illegal

strikes, illegal lock-outs, and the subsidizing of illegal cessation of work."[58]

The main thrust of Ayub Khan's approach toward labor was to bureaucratise its leadership. Accordingly, a mechanism was developed for bringing the labor leadership into greater contact with the administration. In this way the ties that the labor unions had already developed with the government in the pre-Ayub era were further strengthened. One very good evidence to support this view is the representation given to the leaders of West Pakistani trade unions in the local government institutions set up under the system of Basic Democracies. Thus, as we see from the statistics of Table 4.5, of the government-nominated members of the Divisional and District Councils, 12.5 percent were labor leaders. On the other hand the East Pakistani labor leadership received no consideration at all at the time of nomination of the members of Basic Democracies. The largest representation was obtained by the union leadership in what is now the province of Sind. This was so because of the large number of labor leaders who were made members of the District and Divisional Council of Karachi, the most industrialized city of Pakistan.

By integrating the West Pakistani labor unions into the political and economic system created by him in the country, Ayub Khan was able to win the support of an important group. At the same time, for the reasons already provided, his regime made no effort to accomodate the East Pakistani labor leadership.

This produced the obvious result. Among the groups that opposed Ayub Khan, the labor of East Pakistan occupied a very prominent place. We shall have more to say about this in a later chapter.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have described the emergence of three groups in Pakistan's political and economic society. All of them owed their existence to the birth of Pakistan as an independent state. Six million refugees came to Pakistan from India in a period of four months following the departure of the British from the sub-continent. Deprived of their properties and political base, the refugee community developed a common economic and political interest. A large number of refugees moved into the gap created by the departure of the non-Muslim business and industrial classes. Once there, they sought to consolidate their position. Therefore, the merchant-industrialist section of the refugee community soon developed common political and economic interests which they communicated to the decision-makers collectively as well as individually. The very rapid development of industry in Pakistan, particularly in the western wing, increased the number of labor. Unlike the two other new groups, Muslim labor in Pakistan was able to reorganize itself. Once so organized, it found itself in the center of the political arena, playing the kind of role which the established social interests did not appreciate. While the West Pakistani labor leadership aimed its political activity at the nature of the economic system, the East Pakistanis

struck more directly at the power of the groups that dominated the society. Therefore, the established groups sought to bring the West Pakistani labor into the political and economic system, while pushing out completely their East Pakistani counterparts.

The three groups that we have considered in this chapter were far less homogeneous than the groups that were analysed in Chapter 3. It was, therefore, easier for Ayub Khan to break them up into a number of splinter groups. The process of mutation through which these groups went during the Ayub era is pictured in Table5.6. A comprehension of this process will help us to analyse the events that led to the fall of Ayub Khan. That story we shall narrate in the last part of the book.

FOOTNOTES

1. W.H. Moreland, The Agrarian System of Moslem India (London: Cambridge University Press, 1929), p. xi.
2. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 321.
3. For a description of this movement see Hafeez Malik, Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962), pp. 123-153.
4. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework of Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale university Press, 1950), pp. 57-58.
5. M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1967), pp. 67 and 68.
6. Kingsley Davis, "India and Pakistan" The Demography of Partition," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXII (September 1949), p. 258.
7. Ibid., p. 259.
8. Quoted in Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan (London: Faber and Faber, 1950), p. 83.
9. Hannah Papanek, "Pakistan's Big Businessmen: Separatism, Entrepreneurship and Partial Modernization," unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies (Washington, D.C.: March 29-31, 1971), p. 5.
10. I have applied this hypothesis mainly to the Muslim population since the Hindu caste system makes the argument more complicated for a simple statement.
11. Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan, 1951 (Karachi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1951), p. 22.
12. A. Tayyeb, Pakistan: A Political Geography (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 172.

13. For an in-depth study of the contribution made by the Memons to Pakistan's industrial growth see Hanna Papanek, Pakistan's New Industrialists and Businessmen: Focus on the Memons (Mimeographed paper presented at the Conference on Occupational Cultures in Changing South Asis, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970).

14. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Social Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 33 and 39.

15. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 94.

16. Dawn (Karachi, March 24, 1963).

17. Ibid.,(July 21, 1959).

18. For a detailed study of the Export Bonus Scheme, see H.J. Bruton and Swadesh R. Bose, The Pakistan Export Bonus Scheme, Economics of Development, Monograph II (Karachi: Institute of Development Economics, 1963).

19. For an analysis of the impact of relaxation of government controls see Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., Economic POlicy and Industrial Growth in Pakistan (London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1969), pp. 67-80, 133-153, and 156-162. Also see Papanek, Pakistan's Development, op. cit., pp. 106-144.

20. Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1967), pp.

21. For the analysis of this section I have drawn heavily upon the surveys conducted by Gustav and Hanna Papanek. However, neither is responsible for the conclusions that I have drawn from this analysis.

22. I am referring here to economic ideologies. It must be remembered that Muhammad Ali Jinnah's two-nation theory and his demand for the creation of Pakistan has been interpreted in non-economic ideological terms. See Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, "Islamic Elements in the Political Thought of Pakistan," in Ralph Branbanti and Joseph J. Spengler (eds.), Traditions, Values and Socio-Economic Development (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1961), pp. 212-242.

23. For Nehru's views on the economic development of independent India see his Discovery of India (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), pp.

24. Rajni Kothari, India (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), pp. 98-105.

25. Karachi Chamber of Commerce, Address by His Excellency the Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah First Governor-General of Pakistan (Karachi: April 27, 1948), pp. xxxix and xi.

26. See Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp.

27. Jawharlal Nehru, Autobiography (London: The Bodley Head, 1958), p. 469.

28. Hannah Papanek, "Pakistan's Big Businessmen...", op. cit., pp. 14-16.

29. Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, op. cit., p. 40.

30. Hanna Papanek, "Pakistan's Big Businessmen...", op. cit., p. 7.

31. Hatim A. Alavi, "House of Habibs," Finance and Industry , Vol. 5, No. 11 (November, 1966), p. 43.

32. M.A.H. Isphani, Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah: As I Knew Him (Karachi: Forward Publications Trust, 1966), passim.

33. G. Allana, Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah: The Story of a Nation (Lahore: Ferozesous, 1967), passim.

34. Walter Galenson (ed.), Labor in Developing Economies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), p. 2.

35. M. Ali Raza, "Alternatives in Pakistan Trade Union Developments," The Journal of Developing Areas Vol. I (April 1967), p. 334.

36. Galenson, Labor in Developing Economies, op. cit., p. 3.

37. Government of Pakistan, Working of Trade Unions Act, 1926, during 1948-49 (Karachi: Ministry of Law and Labor, 1951), p. 1.

38. The Census of 1951 estimated total non-agricultural labor force (12 years and over) in urban areas to be 1.472 million. The rate of growth of the labor force was estimated to be about 5 percent per annum. This would give the 1949 estimate of labor force to be in the neighborhood of 1.23 million. Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol. I (Karachi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1961), p. V-24.

39. Including the labor in the government-owned Provincial Road Transport Boards of the Punjab, North-West Frontier and Sind. Some of the labor in the provate road transport companies was also unionized.

40. M.R. Masani, The Communist Party of India (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1954), p. 35.

41. Infiltration of the trade unions was a part of an elaborate plan drawn up by the Communist hierarchy in India. The plan

41. con't was made known in 1929 to the public by the British government as a part of the evidence presented in the Meerut conspiracy case. See Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 135-139.

42. The British had carved India into a number of railway zones. Each zone had its own railway. West Pakistan and the part of the Punjab that went to India was served by the North-Western railway.

43. Government of Pakistan, Working of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 during 1954-1955, p. 10 . In 1954, organized labor numbered more than 400,000. See Pakistan Labor Gazette, Vol. XII (July-September, 1965), p. 890.

44. M. Ali Raza, "Alternatives in Pakistan Trade Union Development,' op. cit., p. 340.

45. Charles A. Myers, Labor Problems in the Industrialization of India (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 57-60.

46. Government of India, Report on the Representative Character of AITUC and IFL (Delhi: Central Labor Commission, 1946), passim.

47. Wills D. Weathorford, Jr., "Pakistan," in Walter Galenson (ed.), Labor in Developing Countries, op. cit., p. 39.

48. Kamruddin Ahmad, The Social History of East Pakistan (Dacca: Pioneer Press, 1967), pp. 52-95.

49. The Rawalpindi Conspiracy was led by the radical section of the army leadership and was aimed at the overthrow of the pro-Western government of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. For a brief account of the case see Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography op. cit., pp. 36-39.

50. Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Statistical Year Book, 1955 (Karachi: Central Statistical Office, 1956), p. 183.

51. R. Gordon-Polonskaya, "Status of the Working Class in Pakistan," (1947-1957)" in A.M. D'yakov (ed.) Pakistan: History and Economy, (Washington: U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1961) p. 36. A large establishment is one that employs more than 20 persons and uses power. A small establishment is one that employs less than 20 persons, does not use power, or both.

52. Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol. I , op. cit., p. V-24.

53. "As one labor put it, the two groups [EPFL and WFPL] get along well together since they have so little to do with each other." Willis D. WEathorford, Jr., "Pakistan," in Walter Galenson, Labor in Developing Countries, op. cit., p. 41.

54. Weathorford, "Pakistan," op. cit., p. 41.

55. The subversive activities of the Pakistan Communist Party are briefly described in Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistan Conflict (London: Pall Mall House, 1968), pp. 123-124.

56. Marcus F. Franda, "Communism and Regional Politics in East Pakistan," Asian Survey, Vol. X, No. 7, (July, 1970), p. 591.

57. Rounaw Jahan, in her excellent study of the growth of dissident politics in East Pakistan, terms as "vernacular elites" that part of the political leadership which put the interests of that province, including the Bengali language, over that of Pakistans. See Nation Building in the New States: The Relationship Between East Pakistan and the Central Government of Pakistan, 1958-1968, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 79-101.

58. Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 90.

Table 4.1

Distribution of Important Political Offices Among Refugees and Non-Refugees (1947-58)

Office	Refugees	Non-Refugees	British	Percentage of Refugees
Governor General/ President*	3	1	--	75.0
Prime Minister	4	1	--	80.0
East Pakistan Governor	2	2	1	40.0
Punjab Governor	2	3	1	33.3
Sind Governor	1	3	--	25.0
NWFP Governor	3	1	2	50.0
East Pakistan Chief Minister (CM)	--	5	--	0.0
Punjab CM	2	2	--	50.0
Sind CM	--	6	--	0.0
NWFP CM	--	4	--	0.0
TOTAL	17	28	4	

* For the purpose of this analysis Jinnah is regarded as a refugee.

Table 4.2

Indices of the Impact of Refugees on the Small Towns of West Pakistan (1969-70)

Occupation	Percentages Refugees*	Percentages Non-Refugees
Retail Trade (Number)	23	77
Retail Trade (Net Worth)	38	62
Wholesale Trade (Number)	39	61
Wholesale Trade (Net Worth)	49	51
Industry (Net Worth)	46	54
School Teachers	30	70
College Teachers	41	59
Government Employees	18	82
Government Officers	35	65
Basic Democrats	29	71
Contractors	33	67

* Includes off-spring of refugees.

Source: Survey II

Table 4.3

Prior Occupations of Muslims Who were Private Industrialists in 1959 (percent)

Antecedents Characteristics	Previous Primary Occupation		Previous Secondary Occupation		Father's Occupation
	Industrialists	Industrial investment	Industrialists	Industrial Investment	Industrial Investment
Industrialists before 1947	17	16	4	30	6
Small industry, handicrafts	18	6	23	7	16
Traders-import, export	17	41	30	25	11
Traders-internal government contractors	28	22	39	24	36
Employers-professional, other	18	10	4	12	20
Agriculture	3	6	--	1	11
TOTAL	101	101	100	99	100

Source: Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, op. cit., p. 41., Table 10. Totals differ from 100 percent because of rounding.

Table 4.4

Representation of Social Groups within the Financial Industrial Community, 1970

a= percentage of firms in the group

b= percentage of invested capital in the group

Community	Finance and Insurance		Textiles (Cotton, Jute, Woolen & Synthetic)		Food Processing (Sugar & Vegetable Oil)		Chemical & Engineering	
	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b
Refugee Merchants from India	32	44	19	18	14	12	8	10
Indigeneous merchants	13	15	13	17	11	13	3	2
Landed aristocracy	3	1	20	12	4	5	10	12
Retired government officials	3	1	11	19	14	18	8	14

Number of firms: Finance and Insurance = 31
Textiles = 108
Food Processing = 28
Chemical & Engineering= 40

SOURCE: Compiled by the author from the histories of industrial firms produced by the Investment Corporation of Pakistan.

Table 4.5

Socio-Economic Background of Nominated Members to the Basic Democracies, 1964 (percentages)

	PROVINCES			
	East Pakistan	Punjab	North-West Frontier	Sind
Landlords	28.4	35.4	38.8	25.6
Merchants	15.1	24.8	--	11.0
Contractors	12.4	9.3	--	7.3
Lawyers	7.4	14.6	25.0	10.1
Retired Officials	34.3	3.6	16.7	11.0
Labor Leaders	0.6	10.6	8.3	19.3
Other	1.9	1.7	11.1	15.6
TOTAL	100.1	100.0	99.9	99.9

N (East Pakistan) = 324
N (Punjab) = 302
N (North-West Frontier) = 36
N (Sind) = 109

SOURCE: Compiled from the data made available to the author by the Departments of Basic Democracies and Local Governments, Government of East and West Pakistan.

Table 4.6

Group Attitude Toward the Regime of Ayub Khan

Parent Group	Sub-Groups	Attitude Toward the Regime
I. Refugees	1. Punjabi Refugees	For
	2. Non-Punjabi Refugees	Against
II. Merchant-Industrialists	1. Refugee Industrialists	Against
	2. Indigeneous Industrialists	For
	3. Landed industrialists	For
	4. Retired officials turned Industrialists	For
III. Labor	1. East Pakistan labor	Against
	2. West Pakistan labor	For

CHAPTER 5:

CIVIL AND POLITICAL BUREAUCRACIES

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INTRODUCTION

In October 1958, General (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan interrupted Pakistan's political life in order "to clear up the mess"[1] created by the politicians. The mess was to be cleared by getting rid of the politicians and their political parties, and by making the many social groups give up the political power they had assumed after the collapse of the Muslim League in the early 1950's. Ayub's diagnosis of Pakistan's political ills was accurate to a degree. The parties that grew out of the body of the Muslim League never sought to establish a competitive political system. They merely represented the several powerful social groups that had temporarily submerged their independent identity in Mohammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League. After Jinnah's death, the old social groups re-emerged along with a few new ones to halt the process of political modernization that he had so ably initiated.

The decade that intervened between the death of the Quaid-e-Azam and the coup d'etat of Ayub Khan saw the repeated mutation of political parties until each social group had a political organization of its own. Thus the Republican Party represented the landed aristocracy, the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Nizam-i-Islam parties served the ulema, and the Muslim League represented the students, lawyers, and other urban professional groups of West Pakistan. The Awami League served the urban middle classes of East Pakistan, the National Awami Party represented the more militant sections

of the Bengali and West Pakistani labor, and the Muslim League served the refugees from India as well as the merchant-industrialists. Therefore, in order to curb the power of the social groups, Ayub Khan had to muzzle the political parties that represented them.

Lucian Pye has said: "President's Ayub's frustration with political parties is the frustration of all Asian political systems. Asian politics are caught in a profound dilemma: they can neither get along well without political parties nor work well with them."[2] There is some truth in only the second of these two statements. For, Ayub's frustration was not with the political parties but with what they represented. These parties formed among strata already promiment in society and politics, and they provided an instrument for thwarting the rise of new groups. The parties represented a very small segment of the society. There was little sign that any one of them could enlarge the self-imposed limits of the political system in which they worked. That the system had to expand became obvious to Ayub Khan long before he contemplated assuming political power.

Ayub's awareness of the narrowness of the base of the political system came from three different sources: his own background, his experience as an army commander, and his brief association with the political elite of the mid 'fifties. Ayub belonged to a rural middle-class family. His father's combined income from land and army service was just enough to support a large family. Being the eldest of four brothers, Ayub had to share some of his father's

economic burden. This made him acutely aware of the few opportunities that were available to the members of the rural middle-class for economic and social advance. One of them was service with the government, especially in the armed forces. Ayub joined the army which brought him into contact with officers who had socio-economic backgrounds very similar to his own. As a young officer he and his family shared living quarters with other officers who belonged to the rural areas and small towns of the northern districts of the Punjab and southern districts of the North-west Frontier Province. This experience sharpened the sense of frustration felt by the members of the vast rural middle class, who had been deprived of political and economic power as a result of the closed system operated by some elitist groups. Later in the mid-fifties, Ayub Khan, as the first Pakistani commander-in-chief of the Army, had the opportunity of observing at work the members of some of the social groups that had monopolized political power for so long. "Everyone seemed to have a group of his own," he wrote in his autobiography, "and his sole occupation was to grind his own share, regardless of whether the country was ground to pieces in the process."[4]

Ayub's family background, his close ties with other members of Pakistan's under-privileged classes and his observation of the working of the elites belongong to some powerful social groups, confirmed his opinion that the "heart of our people is still sound. The malaise which

afflicted the body politic has not touched their soul which is still noble, true and pure as ever."[5]

Ayub's approach to Pakistan's political problems was far more subtle than its' usual interpretation by political scientists. Khahid Bin Sayeed has argued that Ayub's solution to the country's political malaise was based "on a theory of man-management, on which the army lays so much stress."[6] The people, like good soldiers, had to be led under a unified command, and not divided between majorities and minorities. Accordingly, Sayeed believes, it was natural for Ayub Khan to brush aside parliamentary democracy and establish a political system under the tight control of the military bureaucracy.[7]

The other view, held by some political scientists, that the coup d'etat of October 1958 that brought Ayub Khan to power was the culmination of a series of events "which started Pakistan on the path of frequent and arbitrary use of emergency powers,"[8] seems to me to be equally wrong. The frequent and arbittary use of emergency powers and the misuse of the prerogative of the Chief of State for political ends, two things that were characteristic of Pakistan's political life in the 1950's, did not encourage Ayub Khan to set up an autocratic state. On the other hand, these developments persuaded him that the kinds of checks that were needed on the power of the executive could not be applied by the institutions that came to Pakistan as her political heritage. These institutions could not work for

the good of the people, because they were dominated by a few powerful groups. Ayub knew that in order to set Pakistan on the path of political modernization, he had to reduce the power of the social groups and destroy the institutions that represented them. Accordingly, he undertook a program of political, economic and social reform aimed at reaching the classes that had been denied political and economic participation by the groups he sought to displace. The group that he endeavored to bring into the political society was the rural middle class, not only because he belonged to it, but also because it represented a very large segment of the society that was waiting to be politicized. It is conceivable that the rural middle class would have emerged as a participant group in Pakistan's political and economic society even without the help of Ayub Khan. However, this development would have taken some time. Therefore, the argument that I am presenting here is that the reasons for the emergence of Ayub Khan and the motivation for his political program are to be found in his awareness of the existence of social and political forces that were demanding release.

This awareness notwithstanding, Ayub Khan failed to build up institutions that would have accomodated individuals and groups that he had galvanized into politics. This was for two reasons. First, Ayub Khan chose to divide the politicized society into two groups; one that could take part in what we may call decision making for large aggregates, and

another that could take part in decision making for their immediate communities. The only link between the two sets of people was the system of elections, in which the latter chose the former. Second, Ayub Khan's deep conviction that his system could work without political parties.

When the system was made to work it became clear (although not to Ayub Khan) that there was a missing link between the split-level political society that had been created. A large number of the newly politicized rural middle class was quite content with the new opportunities made available to them. Likewise, a large number of people from the old social groups found themselves in the position to take part in the new political institutions at the level of the federal and provincial government. However, there was no institutionalized connection between the two sets of people. A political party would have filled this gap, recruiting people belonging to the lower level of the political society to serve at the higher level. At the same time a political party would have served the purpose of communicating to Ayub Khan's followers the concept and meaning of the political community that he sought to organize.

This gap in the system was filled by a section of the civil bureaucracy. In this, the civil bureaucracy was helped by the way the new institutions were organized. The system of Basic Democracies, made up of tiers of inter-locking local councils, was placed under the supervision of the civil administrators. This was done in order to protect the

the members of the emancipated rural middle class from being resubjected to the control of the old social groups. The bureaucrats played their role well. As chaperons, they brought the rural middle class into the political system but in the process they converted the Basic Democrats into what may be called the political bureaucracy. The result was that the process of political modernization, initiated by Ayub Khan, froze after taking one giant leap. The institutions created as a part of the modernizing process were not flexible enough to accomodate new demands that were made upon the system a decade after its inauguration.

THE CIVIL SERVICE OF PAKISTAN

Huntington has argued that functional adaptability is prime measure of a highly developed organization. "An organization that has adapted itself to changes in its environment and has survived one or more changes in its principal functions is more highly institutionalized than one that has not."[9] In Pakistan, one organization that showed remarked resilience was the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), the most powerful branch of the civil bureaucracy. The CSP was the lineal descendent of the Indian Civil Service, at one time called the "steel frame "[10] of the British raj in the sub-continent. The fact that the CSP was able to face successfullly a number of challenges turned it into an organization more powerful than any of the political institutions and, in a sense, more influential than

the military bureaucracy. The result was that no matter who wrote Pakistan's political scenario, the CSP ended up playing the most important role. It is, therefore, instructive to tell in some detail the story of the Civil Service of Pakistan.[11]

An analysis of the circumstances that have not only made it possible for the CSP to preserve its position as an elitist group in the country's civil bureaucracy, but have enabled it to chaperon administrations of various political hues, is, in fact, a study of situations involving "challenge and response." For the CSP did not win its present position of power and prestige without a struggle. Its members did battle not only with those who made direct assaults on its position as monopolistic holder of power, but also with those who challenged the Service by more devious means. Environmental changes also presented a challenge, and to these the response of the Service was shaped and formulated over a long period of time. From our point of view, an analysis of the CSP's response to the first type of challenge, direct and presented in the reports of the Commissions and experts appointed or summoned for this purpose, is far less interesting than the reactions to the two other types of challenges, the indirect and the environmental. Also, in the case of the CSP, the first type of challenge and response situation has already been studied and analyzed in many scholarly works. We shall, therefore, direct our primary concern to the other types of challenges

and response situations, not merely because they have seldom been analyzed before, but mainly because they throw greater light on the evolution of the CSP into a powerful politico-economic pressure group.

Between 1948 and 1958, three separate studies of Pakistan's civil administration were undertaken-the first by the First Pakistan Pay and Services Commission, appointed in 1948 under the chairmanship of Muhammad Munir, the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the second by Rowland Egger in 1953, and the third by Bernard L. Gladieux in 1955. Egger and Gladieux were both commissioned by the Pakistan Planning Board to advise on reforming and reorganizing the administrative system in the country with a view to facilitating national economic development.

The recommendations for administrative reform presented in the three reports were understandably influenced by the authors' perceptions of the causes that had resulted in the gravitation of such a great deal of administrative, economic, and political power into the hands of such a small group of men as the members of the CSP. The Pay Commission Report put all the blame on the incentive system which directed scarce resources of talent away from fields of employment that were productive (from the point of view of the nation, not the individuals) like business and industry and toward the relatively less rewarding field of public administration.[12] The Commission's consequent recommendation that the remuneration of CSP officers be scaled down was readily accepted by

the government and not seriously contested by the CSP. The Commission had not realized, however, that the incentive system it so energetically assailed was not based on pay differentials but on more subtle socioeconomic factors.

Rowland Egger explicitly disavowed the Pay Commission notion of attacking the system of incentives to put the elitist bureaucratic group in its proper place. Instead, in his report,[13] he singled out the administrative system of the country as the most important reason for the CSP's superior position. This system divides work into policy-formulating secretariat units under generalists like the officers of the CSP and policy-implementing departments under officers of the technical services. The generalist, in the absence of political-legislative controls, was able to exercise authority independently. On the other hand, the heads of the technical departments were expected to passively receive policy decisions from the secretariat and actively carry them out. Egger, therefore, urged the reorganization of the secretariat according to a plan which would have left the generalists with only staff duties.

In his report,[14] Bernard Gladieux attacked what may be called the caste system within the bureaucratic set-up, according to which the dividing lines within the bureaucracy are marked not on the basis of level of responsibility but on the basis of service membership. The members of the CSP are the Brahmins of the bureaucracy because their group is able to preserve its exclusiveness by limiting its membership

to those who succeed in a tough examination. All other doors to entry are barred. Gladieux, therefore, recommended the merging of all the central and provincial services into a single unified administrative service of Pakistan.

The CSP was saved from extinction as a result of the position it came to occupy in the political system. The 1948-1958 decade saw the disintegration of the Muslim League Party; the seven political parties that were formed out of its fragments produced nine highly unstable governments in as many years. In the provinces the situation was no better; in Dacca and Lahore new coalitions between political parties were rigged up almost as fast as the old ones broke down. The politicians at the center and in the provinces, while they themselves worked out these political jig-saw puzzles, were quite content to let the day-to-day administration be handled by the CSP. Even those who had sought to redefine the role of the CSP in an independent state now looked up to the Service for leadership. Chief Justice Muhammad Munir's Inquiry Court, which was appointed by the government of Khwaja Nazimuddin to investigate the circumstances which led to serious disturbances in the Punjab in 1953, had this to say about the role of the civil servant"

> [This Inquiry] has given us an opportunity to ask our officers, on whom lies the burden of administration, to bear this burden in the traditions of the steel frame, when we saw the erect figure of a district officer in the middle of an excited procession, a soft smile on a firm mouth, determination written on his face. [15]

And again:

> Consequently, we are prompted to...enquire whether, in our present state of political development, the administrative problem of law and order cannot be divorced from a democratic bed fellow called a Ministerial Government, which is so remorselessly haunted by political nightmares. But if democracy means the subordination of law and order to political ends-then Allah knoweth best and we end the report. [16]

The country's political situation had therefore produced a double paradox: It had bestowed upon the civil servant a provilege he had never demanded: the right to administer without being really answerable to the declared representatives of the people. It also produced a report which reflected the changed views of the country's Chief Justice who, only four years ago, had challenged not only the monopolistic position of the Civil Service, but also its right to claim the best available talent in the country.[17]

There is every reason for a pressure group to try to sustain a situation in which it has flourished. This is what has persuaded many political scientists to declare that the CSP must share at least part of the responsibility for the political chaos created in the first ten years of the country's existence:

> An important factor contributing to the weakness of the politicians in this first decade of independence was the excessive influence accorded to the higher civil servants and zealously guarded by them... If their British training made it unlikely that they and the armed forces would actively plot to overthrow parliamentary democracy, neither were they likely to uphold it.[18]

The Service has also been accused of preventing the development of local political institutions. "But perhaps the more serious than all this is the way civil servants in the districts have prevented the politicians from functioning as representatives of their constituents."[19]

However, there are at least three reasons why these charges must be dismissed. First, the CSP had not only inherited almost all the Muslim officers from the Indian Civil Service (ICS); it had also fully imbibed the ICS ethos. In British India, as the servants of an alien and apolitical government, the ICS officers had had no training or experience in working with politicians. Moreover, "the bureaucrat on the Western model is trained, first, to isolate himself from the political system of which he is a part, and, second, to confine his activities to the specific responsibilities of his job description."[20] This is precisely what the CSP did in the first decade of Pakistan's independence. Immediately after independence, the civil servants busied themselves trying to piece together a new government from the bits and pieces the new country had inherited from the colonial rulers.[21] Later, after the death of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the civil service officers had to add "assurance of administrative continuity" to their already very elaborate job description. Second, the CSP appears to have had little hesitation in playing second fiddle whenever the politicians were able to put together a government which was powerful

enough to call the tune in Karachi or one of the provincial capitals. No charge of interference, overbearance or arrogance has been brought against the administrators who worked in Karachi during the days of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. Similarly, the governments of Khan Abdul Quyum Khan in Peshawar and Mian Mumtaz Daultana in Lahore in the early 1950's appear to have confined the activities of the CSP officers to the specific responsibilities of their job descriptions.

Third, Mohammad Ali Jinnah's campaign aimed at the political modernization of the Muslim Society of British India had yielded dividends only after he had succeeded in concentrating power in his hands. This he had done by making the provincial leadership subject to the control of a central political organization. This had not proved to be an easy task, particularly in those areas where the Muslim community was in the majority. Thus Jinnah's claim to the leadership of the Muslims as well as the claim that his organization, the All-India League, was the sole representative of the Muslims were challenged by Fazlul Haq of Bengal and Skinder Hayat Khan of the Punjab.[22] The former had achieved considerable electoral success for his Krishak Sarmik Party while the latter had become the Prime Minister of the Punjab by obtaining the support of Hindus, Sikhs and a section of the Muslims for his Unionist Party. Jinnah's triumph over the local political bosses was made possible after the demand for Pakistan, made in the Lahore session of the Muslim League, galvanized into politics

the urban Muslim community. With Pakistan's birth in 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah lost the political program that had united the Muslims of British India so solidly behind him. Unlike the Congress Party in India, the Muslim League had not emerged as an organization rich in second-level leadership - the kind of leadership that owed loyalty to the party rather than to some social group. Accordingly, Jinnah was afraid of entrusting the administration of the country, both at the federal and provincial levels, to the League. The system of government that he introduced in Pakistan in 1947, closely resembled the one the British had operated during the days of the raj. Jinnah himself became the Governor-General and the President of the Constituent Assembly, while he appointed a number of civil servants as the provincial governors. We know from the diaries of Sir George Cunningham, the governor of North-West Frontier that he and his counterparts in other provinces wielded tremendous political power.[23]

We can therefore conclude from this analysis that the CSP did not take any direct action to subvert political activity in the province. It only placed itself in the position to receive such benefits as it could from the underdeveloped nature of the political system and environment in which it was called upon to render service. The death of Jinnah and the collapse of the Muslim League further increased the power and influence of the CSP.

The military take-over in 1958 presented the Civil Service with its greatest challenge. This manifested itself in the following ways. First, the military government had come to stay. The CSP could not look forward any more to interregna of uncertainty in which to strengthen further its hold on the administrative machinery. Second, the leaders of the October Revolution held the CSP partly responsible for the misdemeanors of the politicians: "We are convinced that the CSP must share the blame for some of the political mischief which brought Pakistan to the edge of total disaster."[24] Ayub Khan reacted by putting military officers in key civilian positions. Three senior generals from the army joined the central cabinet and, within one month of the declaration of martial law (October 7, 1958), 272 military officers were appointed either to administer civilian departments and agencies directly or to oversee the working of those civilian officers who were left in their places. Third, the ministers of the new cabinet and the military officers who took over civilian positions were experienced administrators. The members of the 12-man Ayub cabinet had a combined administrative experience of 242 years, an average of more than twenty years per minister. The new rulers, therefore, did not have to rely on the help of the CSP officers. For the first time in the history of the country, the civil secretariats in Karachi, Dacca and Lahore began to receive firm orders from the bosses in the cabinet. Fourth, the new regime "was marked

by considerable ideological ferment characterized by a comprehensive scheme of change across the entire spectrum of political and social life."[25] Included in this scheme of change was the reformation of the structure of the civil administration by the country. For this purpose a Pay and Service Commission was appointed by the government in August 1959. The Commission was headed by A.R. Cornelius, the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Since Cornelius had always been critical of the role of the CSP, his appointment was indicative of the direction in which the new government was thinking.

The October Revolution therefore had a traumatic effect on the CSP. The highly self-confident and professionally competent regime of Ayub Khan had demonstrated in a very short time that the country's administration could be efficiently carried on by persons not belonging to the CSP. The dispensability of the Service had been effectively proved. And, as if to rub in this point a little further, the new regime took what appeared to the CSP to be two "very drastic measures." In early 1959 it accused thirteen senior officers of the CSP of "corruption, misconduct...and inefficiency"[26] and, after summarily changing the conditions of their service, forcibly retired them. In the same year, the central government created the Economic Pool - a supra-administrative service which could draw its members from all the civil services to man positions in the Ministries of Finance, Commerce, Economic Affairs, etc. Forty per cent of

the members of the Pool were to be recruited from outside the Civil Service. In this way the government made it possible for non-CSP officers to get into the positions that had always been considered the exclusive preserve of the CSP. The military take-over, therefore, brought a totally new factor into the life of the CSP. The Service could no longer preserve itself by deftly stepping aside and letting the political bosses field the attacks directed against its monopolistic position. It was clear that new and somewhat less passive tactics had to be adopted, and the speed with which this was done appears to have surprised even the CSP's own members.

The Service took both covert and overt measures to save itself. First, the willingness with which its members accepted their new role partially allayed the suspicions of the military government. By the end of 1959, barely 14 months after the take-over by the military, only 53 personnel from the armed forces were left in civilian positions. The readiness with which the Civil Service cooperated with the army made it possible for Ayub to fulfill his promise of returning the military to the barracks; it also restored the civil administration to the CSP. Second, the Establishment Division of the President's Secretariat changed the recruitment policy for the Civil Service. It opened the CSP to the army by selecting five young military officers to join the 1960 class of the Civil Service of Pakistan. The privilege that the CSP had always denied to other civilian

services was readily granted to the armed forces. This was indeed a marriage of convenience while it lasted. Out of the fourteen army and navy officers who joined the Civil Service of Pakistan between 1960 and 1963, eight had very close connections with the top echelon of the military hierarchy. No wonder, then, that the military developed a vested interest in preserving the separate identity of the Civil Service.

Third, the Establishment Division was able to preserve the elitist status of the Civil Service by adopting a training policy which provided the young civil servants with the sort of expertise most needed in a developing country. The new policy was no longer geared towards producing what has been aptly described as a "literary-generalist... steeped in the ethos of British colonial administration."[27] Paradoxically, the adoption of the new policy was made possible by some of the decisions taken by the military rulers. In 1959 the central government decided to discontinue the training program under which all CSP recruits were sent to Oxford or Cambridge for one academic year. Instead, it adopted the in-service training concept that had been so vigorously advocated by several American public administration experts. Three new institutions - the Pakistan Administrative Staff College at Lahore, the National Institutes of Public Administration at Karachi, Dacca and Lahore, and the Pakistan Academies of Rural Development at Comilla and Peshawar - were set up to accomplish this.

These institutions were also supposed to serve the purpose of removing barriers between different services by affording equal opportunities of training to all civilian officers. However, the offers of technical assistance made by the governments of Britian and the United States helped the Establishment Division to sidestep this newly established egalitarian principle. In 1964 the Establishment Division laid down the rule that all young civil servants, beginning with the batch of 1959, would be sent abroad for advanced training in economics, community development, public administration, and finance and accounting. By 1968, 67 officers of the Civil Service of Pakistan had spent a total of 79 man years in 17 American and British universities. Of these officers, 52 obtained degress of diplomas in economics, 8 in public administration, 4 in community development, and 3 in finance and accounting. The new regime, by stopping the civil servants from pursuing traditional fields, encouraged them to go into new, and from their point of view, more pertinent, disciplines. This change in training policy has made it possible for the CSP to base its claim to an elitist status on superiority in training rather than on inheritance from the ICS.

Fourth, a fundamental change in the attitude of the civil servants helped them to maintain their status. The orthodox bureaucracy had always been accused of showing little enthusiasm for transferring responsibilities to local bodies:

> It is one of the inner contradictions of Community Development Programme that the people directing the Programme represent the interests and classes which stand to lose their status, privilege and power if the programme succeeds. Today political and economic power is concentrated in the hands of the westernized elite and especially the government servants. Democratization of the society is bound to reduce this power and the advantages that accrue from it.[28]

The CSP abandoned this approach toward community development and came out in full support of "democratic centralization" and "economic development from below." The fact that the Ayub regime incorporated these old cliches into its political and economic program no doubt helped the CSP to adopt a more sympathetic approach toward local self-government and community development. Also, the Basic Democracies Order of 1959 gave the civil servants working in the divisions and districts "controlling power" over the new local bodies. Under the system created by the Order, CSP Commissioners presided over the Divisional Councils and CSP (or Provincial Civil Service) Deputy Commissioners became the chairmen of the District Councils. It is not surprising, therefore, that the CSP displayed such enthusiasm in setting up the local bodies under the system of Basic Democracies. The system of Basic Democracies stopped the erosion of the power of the CSP; by being the undisputed leaders of the local communities, the civil servants commanded authority not as the agents of a law and order administration but as the representatives of an avowed "welfare state."

And with the launching of the massive Rural Works Programme in 1962, aimed at developing the rural areas by further activating the local councils, the CSP divisional and district administrators obtained a new lever of power: control over development funds. These funds were released every year by the government to the district administrators for financing small development schemes formulated by the local councils.

By readily accepting military rule, by agreeing to accept into its ranks young military officers, by training its young members to be experts in new and important disciplines, and by assuming the leadership of the local government institutions set up under the system of Basic Democracies, the CSP continued to occupy a position of power and prestige. Shaken by the October Revolution, it took half a dozen years for the CSP to regain confidence in its own destiny. A good illustration of this initial nervousness and subsequent gradual increase in self-confidence is the way the CSP reacted to the appointment of the Cornelius Pay and Service Commission. In September 1959 the central and the two provincial branches of the Civil Service Association were reactivated to pressurize the government against accepting any far-reaching plan to reform the administrative structure of the country. In the 26 months following the appointment of the Commission, the Central and Provincial Civil Service Associations met 17 times and prepared 5 documents for circulation amongst the members of the new

regime. The documents dealt with "the role of the civil bureaucracy in a developing country," "the role of the technical departments in a developing economy," "the history of the Civil Service of Pakistan," "the place of generalists in modern administration," and "the role of a central service in a federal state." In general, these documents were meant to convey three things - that only a highly trained cadre of generalists could objectively coordinate the activities of the technical departments; that only a strong central service could administratively unify the country; and that a country with rapidly changing political, economic and social institutions needed the anchor support of a cadre with a long tradition of efficient and honest service to the state.

By the beginning of 1962, however, the Service once again felt reassured about its position in the new political system. In 1962, the Associations met only twice, once to protest the appointment of a non-CSP to a cadre (CSP) position, and once to bid farewell to one of its retiring members. In these meetings the recommendations that the Cornelius Commission was likely to make did not come up for discussion at all. Twenty-six months of working partnership between the military and the CSP had made one dependent on the other. The Civil Service was no longer apprehensive about its future.

The Cornelius Commission Report was finalized on June 1, 1962. As was expected, "the Commission proposed far-

reaching changes in the Civil Service system. For example, it recommended the unification of the disparate services into a seven tiered structure. A Pakistan Administrative Service was to be created to replace the old CSP with admission available to it from the technical services."[29] No action was taken on the Report for nearly 27 months. On April 22, 1964, Ayub Khan declared:

> We have been also conscious that engaged as we are on a gigantic effort for the economic development and progress of our country, the government must get a fair proportion of the talent in the country keeping in view the attractive careers being offered to our young men by industry and commerce... With regard to the service structure the Commission recommended certain radical changes involving a complete redesigning of the existing scheme and organisation of public services in Pakistan. In our considering these recommendations the supreme importance of concentrating all our efforts and energies on the task of national development has to be kept in view. This task requires that continuity in the functions and organisation of the public service which have grown in time and have become familar to the people be maintained and that nothing should be done which might involve the risk of disrupting the administrative fabric. At the same time the necessities of reorienting the administration so as to serve the national objective of development cannot be ignored. The government has, therefore, come to the conclusion that while no radical change should be made in the existing structure, all the public services should be enabled to make their best possible contribution to the service of the nation in their respective spheres and that with that end in view they should be provided with suitable avenues for advancement. [30]

In this way the government not only shelved the Cornelius Commission Report, it also accepted the CSP contention that a radical change in the administrative structure would only serve to slow down the pace of economic development. The

government also conceded the right of the CSP to shop for the best available talent in the country, a right that both Pay Commissions had sought to deny.

THE BASIC DEMOCRATS

The system of Basic Democracies reflected Ayub Khan's belief that the bulk of the society was concerned only with its immediate environment and was indifferent toward politics at the national level. The political horizon of the people would automatically widen with the realization that decisions that affected them directly were being taken by individuals, groups and institutions over which they had no control. In such a situation the people were bound to demand for themselves a place in the process of decision-making. In other words, people would like to enter the political system. Further, Ayub seems to have believed, that the social group dominated system that he had thrown out in October 1958 was inflexible in the sense that the groups were too jealous of their position to make way for new entrants into the political society. Such a closed system had obvious dangers, some of which had begun to manifest themselves in the summer of 1958. Thus Abdul Quyum Khan, a firebrand political leader from the North-West Frontier Province, had succeeded in mobilizing a large following for himself and his party. He had marched through a number of important urban centers of West Pakistan, with tens of thousands of people following him ,crying

"bloody revolution."[31] Major General Iskander Mirza, in his presidential proclamation of martial law, pointed an accusing finger at Quyum and his associates who were "indulging in the shameful exploitation of our simple, honest, patriotic and industrious masses."[32] The placid political scene that followed the declaration of martial law gave the impression that "Pakistan's politicians could not handle the heady brew of democracy, and that sensible Pakistanis were not unhappy that the army was now in charge."[33]

Ayub Khan's solution to the political problems of Pakistan was not to let democracy turn into a heady brew. Accordingly, he launched his system of Basic Democracies with the aim of providing the people with an instrument for fulfilling their immediate needs and solving their most urgent problems. Given this kind of opportunity, Ayub Khan was convinced that the people would stay away from national and provincial politics, letting a handful of persons with the right kind of training and motivation to mind the ship of the state. To make sure that resources for their development were forthcoming, the people were given the right to select their guardians. Accordingly, Ayub Khan's Basic Democrats were charged with two responsibilities: first, to assess the aspirations and fulfill the requirements of their electorate; and second, to function as electors of the national and provincial assemblies. In this way Ayub Khan hoped to create a split-level political-administrative system in which the President, his Governors, their Councils

of Ministers and the civil bureaucracy would formulate and execute policies at the national and provincial levels while the Basic Democrats would perform the same functions at the local (village, town and city wards) level. The system was provided with its checks and balances. At the upper level, the legislature was empowered to impeach the President and was allowed to scrutinize "new expenditures"[34] that the executive proposed to undertake. At the lower level the civil bureaucracy was empowered to function as the "controlling authority" for all the councils created under the system of Basic Democracies. This arrangement produced the obvious results: the executive was able to establish full control over the legislature and the local councils. This happened because the legislatures and the Basic Democracies, without the support of the political parties, could not counter the power of organized bureaucracy. Therefore, after producing a remarkable change in the political society, Ayub Khan's system atrophied.

The system produced a change by bringing a large number of new entrants into the political society, and it atrophied because it did not have any built-in device for further expansion. The entrants that came in belonged to the vast rural middle class, particularly that belonging to West Pakistan, that had not been previously integrated into the political society as a result of the constraint exercised by several social groups. Once the rural middle class found its way into

the system, it also acted as a social group determined to maintain the oligopolistic nature of the political system.

We have already seen how the regime of Ayub Khan was able to reduce the power wielded by the important social groups. Once this process was complete, it was not too difficult for the rural middle class to enter the system. However, once Ayub Khan made his peace with some of the old social groups, these too were accommodated into the system, via the Basic Democracies. As we shall presently see, the composition of the local councils elected in 1964, compared to those chosen in 1959, reflected this change in Ayub Khan's political strategy.

While bringing into the system some of the groups that he had discovered in 1958, Ayub Khan showed a bias toward the rural areas. To him this was good political arithmetic since four-fifths of the population lived in the countryside. This strategy left the urban areas more or less untended. The system of Basic Democracracies, that extended to the rural and urban areas, allowed all the old social groups to <u>participate</u> but <u>integrated</u> mostly those belonging to the countryside. Since there was no organization that transcended the social groups, this overt discrimination heightened the sense of frustration among several urban-based groups. This, as we shall see in a later chapter, contributed to the collapse of the system of Ayub Khan.

I shall now trace the development of the system of Basic Democracies. In particular, I shall provide evidence

to show that, in the absence of political organizations, the system was dominated by social groups. The change in the type of Basic Democrats elected from the rural areas in 1964 compared to those chosen in 1959 reflects the attitude of the regime toward the social groups. We do not notice such differences in the urban areas for two reasons. First, the civil bureaucracy was able to exercise greater control over the selection of candidates for election to the Basic Democracies in the rural areas as compared to those in the urban areas. Second, in the beginning, the landed aristocracy, compared to the old social groups in the urban areas, found it more difficult to operate in the new system. Finally, I shall show that the social groups who were allowed to be integrated into the system were given the chairmanship of the various councils. Over the years the regime delegated a great deal of power to the chairmen and, with their integration into the system, the latter turned into what I call political bureaucrats. One problem about the institutionalization of political participation through the Basic Democracies was the inability to lower the level at which discussions meaningful in local politics could take place.

The Elections of 1959

The first elections to the Basic Democracies were held in November 1959. If the number of candidates who filed nomination papers is any indication, the interest generated by the system

was somewhat greater in West than in East Pakistan. In the western province there were 2.4 applications for every Union Council seat, compared with 2.2 in the eastern province. However, after the withdrawal and official screening of candidates, East Pakistan was left with more candidates in the field than West Pakistan. The pre-election toll among the West Pakistan candidates was more than three times that of their counterparts in the eastern wing. In West Pakistan, in the period between the filing of applications and elections, nearly one-third of the intending candidates withdrew from the field. In East Pakistan, on the other hand, only one-tenth of the applicants felt compelled to change their mind. (Table 5.1)

The data for cities (if Karachi can be used as a representative of this class), towns and villages also show some interesting differences (Table 5.2).Elections to the Basic Democracies seem to have generated a great deal of enthusiasm in the towns. If measured in terms of the number of nomination papers filed per seat, it was a good deal higher in the towns than in the cities and in the countryside. The rate of political mortality among the intending candidates was a great deal higher in rural, as compared with urban areas. It was 43 percent in the villages, 36 percent in the cities and 25 percent in the towns.

Table 5.3 provides some interesting information about the socio-economic background of the persons who filed nomination papers, those who either withdrew their papers or had them rejected by the authorities, and those who finally took part in

the elections. It can be seen that in the villages - the area of highest political mortality among intending candidates - 86 percent of those who withdrew from the elections were landlords. Among the landlords, the rate of drop-outs was higher for the big landlords (owning more than 100 acres) than for the middle landlords (25-100 acres) - 44.4 percent against 15.0 percent. In the towns, among those who withdrew, 44.0 percent were lawyers.

There is an interesting difference in the socio-economic backgrounds of the persons who filed nomination papers and of those who were left to fight in the elections. In the countryside, among the applicants, 77.3 percent were landlords, among the candidates 73.3 percent were landlords. Landlords owning more than 100 acres of land accounted for 40.9 percent of those who filed nomination papers, and 33.3 percent of those who finally contested in the elections. In the towns, among those who filed nomination papers, 54.7 percent were big landlords and lawyers, while among those who were candidates in the election, 43.3 percent belonged to this socio-economic category. From these statistics we can draw an interesting conclusion. The rejection by the authorities of the papers filed by some intending candidates and "voluntary" withdrawal of papers by some others reduced the proportion of big landlords and lawyers among those who were finally allowed to contest in the elections. This fact alone does not necessarily prove that the regime played an active role in the pre-election politics. However, the fact that the West Pakistan Government sent specific orders to "district officials to encourage qualified persons to become

candidates,"[35] enforces the impression gathered by the author from conversations with a number of district administrators, that the government of Ayub Khan sought to influence the results of the elections even before they were held. The Civil Service officers were unabashed at their involvement in electoral politics. As we saw above, it strengthened their own position in the political system of Ayub Khan. Besides, the role played by them was a part of the program of political guidance that the regime of Ayub Khan considered so necessary for the building up of institutions to suit the genius of the people.

The fact that only a small number of persons withdrew from the elections in East Pakistan, leaving behind more than 2.4 candidates to a seat, explains the attitudes of the regime toward the political development of that province. We have already seen that the political society in the eastern province was not as stratified as in the West. Of the social groups active in the country's politics, only the legal community and students were of any significance. Therefore, Ayub Khan could afford to let the electoral process take its course, free of any guidance from the administration. He was confident that once the electorate had given its verdict, it would be possible to integrate the Basic Democrats into the political system. This he proposed to do by giving them fairly wide economic development functions. Exercise of these functions would increase the power and prestige of the Basic Democrats in their own constituencies and also make them part of the new system. Accordingly, when the

suggestion of a public works program to be operated by the Basic Democracies was made by some foreign advisors,[36] it was readily accepted by the regime. With the launching of the program in 1962, Ayub Khan was able to bring over to his side a very large number of the East Pakistani Basic Democrats.[37]

West Pakistan's social and political conditions warranted an altogether different approach. Unless the political power of the important social groups was effectively curbed, the electorate would return the Basic Democrats who would owe their allegiance more to these groups than to the regime. Therefore, it was necessary to take all possible steps to elect relatively unattached persons as Basic Democrats. This explains why Ayub Khan felt obliged to launch his program of social and economic reform before introducing the system of Basic Democracies and why his administration showed little hesitation in interfering in the electoral process. Once a new leadership had emerged, it would recognize that it owed its existence to the policies adopted by the regime. It was for this reason that Ayub Khan saw little sense in launching a public works program in West Pakistan. It was also for this reason that, once the program had been launched, it took a direction so different from the one taken in the eastern wing.[38]

The Elections of 1964

The second elections to the system of Basic Democracies were held in November 1964. In the five-year period between the two elections, the political system launched by Ayub Khan went

through a number of changes. The regime had made peace with some of the old social groups, including the landed aristocracy. It had also permitted the formation of political parties. Well before the second elections were to be held, the government promised that the civil administration would not involve itself in any way in the selection of candidates or canvassing for them.[39]

A comparison of the data of Tables 5.1 and 5.4 and Tables 5.2 and 5.5 suggests that the elections to the Basic Democracies generated even more enthusiasm in 1964 than they did in 1959. In 1964, 19.4 percent more nominations were filed, and 36.7 percent more candidates contested elections than in 1959. Despite the higher number of nominations, there were fewer withdrawals and rejections in 1964 than in 1959. The result was that in the second elections, 2.6 candidates were left per seat, compared to 2.3 in the first elections. Once again, more seats were contested in East (which means that a small number of candidates were elected unopposed in the east) than in West Pakistan, with the former having more candidates per seat than the latter.

The fact that in West Pakistan the proportion of withdrawals and rejections among those nominated was smaller in 1964 compared with that in 1959 - 23.8 percent against 29.8 percent - indicates that the regime's promise that there would be no official interference in the electoral process was kept to a degree. Ayub Khan could afford to be relatively less partial in 1964. As we have already seen, by 1964 he had incorporated the landed aristocracy and a section of the legal community into his political

system. He could therefore adopt a politically neutral stance between the groups, particularly in the rural areas. Further, the decision not to involve the Pakistan Muslim League, the official political party, in the election to the Basic Democracies gave him freedom of manoeuvre both before and after the elections.

As we see from Table 5.6, more landlords contested from the towns in 1964 than they did in 1959. The proportion of the large landowners among the contestants was higher for the second elections - 17.2 percent in 1964 against 15.0 percent in 1959. The landed group made this gain at the expense of the legal community. In 1959, 28.3 percent of the candidates were lawyers. In 1964, their proportion had decreased to 23.4 percent.

In the towns of those who filed nomination papers, 18.8 percent were landlords, 25.9 percent were lawyers, 25.9 percent were retired officials and 18.8 percent were businessmen (merchants and contractors). Among those who finally contested the election, 18.7 percent were landlords, 23.4 percent were lawyers, 21.9 percent were retired officials and 25.0 percent were businessmen. This means that in the period between the filing of nomination papers and the elections, the businessmen improved their position considerably.

In the survey villages, 68.2 percent of those who filed nomination papers were landlords, 9.1 percent lawyers, 4.5 percent retired officials and 18.2 percent businessmen. After the period of withdrawal and scrutiny the proportion of the various social groups remained more or less the same. Among the candidates,

64.7 percent were landlords, 11.8 percent were lawyers, 5.9 percent were retired government officials and 17.6 percent were businessmen.

Once again, there was greater competition for the seats alloted to the province of East Pakistan. The domination of social groups within the West Pakistani society had made it easier for the intending candidates to arrive at pre-electoral arrangements. In East Pakistan the situation was more fluid. In fact, as we shall see below, the stakes were higher in East than in West Pakistan. In the eastern wing, members of Union Councils were allowed to reap economic rewards that were not always available to the Basic Democrats of West Pakistan.

Basic Democrats from East Pakistan

In Table 5.7 we present data that give some indication of the type of persons elected to the Basic Democracies in 1959 and 1964. From the table we notice a small increase in the proportion of Basic Democrats in the age groups 30-44 and above 45 - an increase that was achieved at the expense of the below-30 age group. Rehman Sobhan interprets this to mean that the"Basic Democracies have never really attracted the young men of the country and that 8 years of its operation has in fact led to a further decline in enthusiasm."[40] However, facts do not point to this conclusion. For, the increase in the proportion of 30-44 age group in the Basic Democrats elected in 1964 is accounted for in the fact that a very large number of the members were re-elected. The proportion of young persons among the

candidates that fought elections in 1964 was in fact a little higher compared to that in 1959.[41] Among the members elected in 1964, the number of persons with more than ten years of schooling increased considerably as did the number of non-farmers and those with incomes of more than Rs 1,000. These statistics point to the conclusion that in 1964 the Basic Democracies attracted the more affluent section of the East Pakistani society.

For the East Pakistani Basic Democrats, the income background seems to have altered quite drastically between 1959 and 1964. In fact, the persons elected in 1959 seem so incredibly impoverished as to be considerably below the average for the province. This suggests that the tables from which this data was derived contain some errors.[42] However, the data available for the Basic Democracies chairmen elected in 1959 and those chosen in 1964[43] indicate that there was an increase in the level of affluence among the elected representatives in the period 1959-1964. Once again, it is useful to quote from Rehman Sobhan's important study, if only to show how contemporary analysts interpreted the changes that were being wrought in the society by the system of Basic Democracies. Says Sobhan:

> This revelation merits scrutiny in juxtaposition with our findings about income inequalities in rural areas and the economic consequences emanating from this inequality. There is absolutely no doubt that the B.D. members of the Union Councils in the rural areas are overwhelmingly drawn from the top 10-15 percent of the income strata of the rural areas. We have already seen

> how this same class, whom we have elsewhere classified as 'surplus'farmers, controls the rural economy through their surplus land and supply of credit. It now appears that the economic domination of this same class of high income 'surplus' farmers has been reinforced by their political domination of the rural areas.[44]

The only unsatisfactory part of this explanation is the direction of causation that it implies. It was not economic wealth that led to the concentration of political power in the hands of the surplus farmers. On the contrary, it was the political power that the system of Basic Democracies placed in the hands of the large farmers that made it possible for them to add to their economic power. Membership in the councils set up under the Basic Democracies provided the large farmers in East Pakistan with access to the scarce resources commanded by the government. In East Pakistan's context, the scarcest resource was rural credit; the tieing up of the rural cooperative system with that of Basic Democracies made it easier for the farmers who were also Union Councillors to obtain this resource. Once credit was obtained, it was not always used for agricultural production. More often than not, it entered the lucrative unofficial rural money market.[45]

We can, therefore, argue that in rural East Pakistan, the principal beneficiary of Ayub Khan's system of Basic Democracies were the province's large farmers.[46] As the regime gave more and more power to the Chairman of the Union Councils and, as the

chairmen were drawn almost exclusively from the large farmer class, the power of this group increased over time.

In Table 5.8 we provide an indication of the socio-economic background of the Basic Democrats elected to the urban councils (Union Committees) in East Pakistan. We find that businessmen, including contractors, occupy nearly three-quarters of the seats. This is a significant fact. For, as we saw in Chapter 4, this class was favored by the regime of Ayub Khan. In other words, in East Pakistan, the leadership of the institution of Basic Democracies was claimed by two social groups that were favored by the regime. The system of Basic Democracies appears to have provided an atmosphere of social, economic and political harmony in East Pakistan during much of Ayub Khan's era.

Basic Democrats from West Pakistan

Table 5.9 provides data for the social and economic background of the persons elected in 1959 and 1964 to the Union Councils and Committees set up under the system of Basic Democracies. More than one-half of the Basic Democrats elected in 1959 belonged to the 30-44 age group, whereas nearly one-half of the 1964 Basic Democrats belonged to this group. There were two reasons for this shift in the favor of the older persons. As in the case of East Pakistan, a large number of persons were re-elected in 1964. Moreover a large number of established politicians who had not contested in the elections of 1959, appeared on the scene in the second election.[48] Their re-emergence

limited the field for the younger politicians.

There was some slight improvement in the income background of the West Pakistani Basic Democrats. The proportion of those earning over Rs 4,000 per annum increased from 40.9 percent in 1959 to 45.6 percent in 1964. This increase was the result of two factors. First, although the proportion of farmers among the Basic Democrats declined, the percentage of large landowners among the Basic Democrats with farming background increased considerably (Table 5.10). Second, as we see from Table 5.9, there was a significant increase in the representation of businessmen in the Basic Democracies.

The shift in favor of the professionals (lawyers, doctors, teachers, etc.) explains the increase in the number of people elected to the Basic Democracies who had some kind of college education. The proportion of Basic Democrats with more than 10 years of schooling increased from 5.1 percent in 1959 to 7.5 percent in 1964.

A comparison of the data of Table 5.10 with those of Table 5.8 points to several important conclusions. The cities with populations of more than 100,000 and towns with populations between 50,000 and 100,000 account for 58.8 percent and 7.3 percent, respectively, of West Pakistan's urban population. Taken together, they have more than two-thirds of West Pakistan's urban population living in them. Our survey towns have populations ranging between ten and fifty thousand. In other words, they belong to the category of urban centers that together account for 23.3 percent of the urban population. The weightage

of the cities in the urban population and the nature of the sample of our survey towns means that we can use the data of Table 5.8 to represent the cities and large towns and that of Table 5.10 to represent medium-sized towns. When we make this assumption, we see that there were in 1964 some very interesting differences in social group representation among the Basic Democrats. For instance, in percentage terms, there were twice as many landlords among the city Basic Democrats as there wre among the Basic Democrats in medium-sized towns. More than one-half of the city representatives were drawn from among the business classes, while these classes accounted for less than one-half of the town councillors. Compared with the towns, the legal community in the cities was considerably less well represented in the Basic Democracies. However, in the case of the towns, at least the proportion of lawyers among the Basic Democrats decreased substantially between the two elections. The ground lost by the legal community in the towns was occupied by the landlords who increased their representation by almost 100 percent. All the landlords elected to the Basic Democracies in 1964 from our survey towns possessed more than 100 acres. In 1959, 30 percent of the Basic Democrat landlords belonged to the middle farmer category, owning between 50-100 acres of land. In 1964 this category seems to have lost all representation.

The change in the rural areas was in the other direction. In the survey villages, the middle farmers increased their representation from 9.3 percent to 31.6 percent. The landed

aristocracy, which did not have a single Basic Democratic seat in 1959, also gained in 1964 and accounted for 6.8 percent of the Basic Democrats. The farmers who yielded a great deal of ground were those who owned between 100 and 250 acres; their representation decreased from 41.9 percent to 27.5 percent. The legal community was not able to capture a single seat in the 1964 election in the 27 villages of our survey. The ground lost by it was claimed by the retired government officials.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of this chapter provides an indication of the kind of impact that Ayub Khan's political program produced in Pakistan's society. The program's objective was to reach the sections of the society that had not been politically or economically integrated by the previous regimes. The means adopted to achieve this objective were to first concentrate power in the hands of a central authority and then to re-distribute it over a wider section of the society. The first phase of the program was implemented without much effort - with the help of martial law regulations and constitutional fiats, the regime abolished the political parties and reduced the power of the social groups that they represented. It was the second phase that presented the regime with some difficulties, and ultimately, persuaded it to deviate somewhat from its original purpose.

The orthodox civil bureaucracy, with remarkable espirit d'corps, was partly responsible for redefining the objectives of Ayub Khan's political program. As originally conceived, the program aimed at the gradual enlargement of the political society. As reformulated with the help of the civil bureaucracy, the program limited its scope to one-shot expansion of the economic and political society. Expansion there had to be as both Ayub Khan and his bureaucratic advisors were convinced, that it was vital to limit considerably the power of the existing social groups. This they did by bringing some new groups into the system.

The reasons why Ayub Khan sought the dilution of the power of the social groups have been examined in Chapter 2. In this chapter we provide some explanation for the interest taken by the orthodox civil bureaucracy in the task of political modernization. The bureaucracy was brought into the center of the political arena as a result of a series of events which it did not cause. The system of Basic Democracies, introduced by the new regime with the object of reaching new groups in the society, through by-passing those that were already established, brought the civil service to the center of the political stage. Thereafter, the bureaucracy nourished the system in such a way that its own position was not threatened. Over time, a patron-client relationship developed between the civil service and the new groups that the Basic Democracies helped to integrate into the society.

The regime of Ayub Khan with the help of the civil bureaucracy stage-managed the first elections to the system of Basic Democracies held in 1959. The reason for this was that the regime was not confident that its program of reform had succeeded in reducing the political and economic power of the established social groups. Since these groups were present in greater number and wielded more power in West than in East Pakistan, the regime paid greater attention to the elections in the western wing. By 1964, the year the second elections to the Basic Democracies were held, the regime had reordered the political society. There was little need to interfere in the elections.

The impact produced by the system of Basic Democracies can be pictured from the matrix of Table 5.11. We see that the social group that was successfully integrated into all but one level of the society was that of big landlords/landed aristocracy. The business community also found more than adequate representation in the urban areas of East and West Pakistan. The middle farmers were integrated into the rural sector of West Pakistan's political and economic society. As we saw in Chapter 4, the business community was a new social group. In Chapter 6 we shall emphasize that the middle farmers also constituted a new social group in West Pakistan's society. We can, therefore, conclude that the system of Basic Democracies was able to bring into the system two social groups that were new to the society. At the same time, as we see from Table 5.11 it reduced considerably the role played by the legal community

in the political system of the country. The only place where the members of this group found some representation was in the towns of West Pakistan. However, since the towns did not occupy any significant place in Ayub Khan's political or economic system, the integration of the legal community at this level of the society only helped to unsettle the matters. The political consequences of the system of Basic Democracies will be shown in the third part of the book.

NOTES

1. The Dawn (Karachi, October 8, 1958).

2. Lucian W. Pye, "Party Systems and National Development in Asia", in Joseph LaPalombra and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 369.

3. Ayub Khan provides very little information about his early life in his autobiography. Only 12 pages are devoted to the description of his family's socio-economic background and the description of his experiences as a student and a young army officer. See Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

4. Ibid., p. 49.

5. Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements Vol. II (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p. 25.

6. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 102.

7. Ibid., pp. 101-126.

8. K.J. Newman, "Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and its Causes," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXII, No. 1 (March 1959), p. 22.

9. The term "steel frame" was first used by Lloyd George in a speech delivered in the House of Commons, August, 1922.

10. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in ChangingSocieties (New Haven: Yale UNiversity Press, 1968), p. 15.

11. The section of the Civil Service of Pakistan is based largely on my article, "Twenty Years of the Civil Service of Pakistan: A Reevaluation," Asian Survey, Vol. IX, No. 4 (April 1969), pp. 239-254.

12. Government of Pakistan, Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission (Karachi: Governor General's Press, 1949), p. 28.

13. Rowland Egger, The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan (Inter-Service Press, 1953).

14. Government of Pakistan, Report of Reorganization of Pakistan Government for National Development (Karachi, 1955).

15. Government of the Punjab, Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted Under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Punjab, Lahore: GOvernment Printing, 1954), p. 287.

16. Ibid., p. 387.

17. The credit for changing the views of Chief Justice Mohammad Munir goes to the other member of the two-man Inquiry Court, Justice M.R. Kayani, himself a member of the CSP. In 1960-61, when the CSP faced a far more serious challenge to its monopolistic position, it was Justice Kayani who, as President of the West Pakistan CSP Association, resisted the attempt to introduce revolutionary changes in the country's administrative structure. It is a little surprising that the members of the CSP who have left the executive branch of the Service to join the judiciary have played a very important role, quite out of proportion to their number, in helping the Service preserve its strong executive position. Time and again, Justice Kayani, and after him Justice S. A. Haq, stood up to protect the "legitimate rights" of the Service.

18. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Vol. I (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), p. 320.

19. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 157.

20. Douglas E. Ashford, National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia and Pakistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 271.

21. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), passim.

22. Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1954),

23. Quoted by Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 242.

24. Lt. Gen. K.M. Sheikh in his October 1960 address to the trainees in the Civil Service Academy, Lahore. The author was one of the trainees.

25. Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 310.

26. Pakistan News Digest, July 1, 1959.

27. Ralph Bribanti, "The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan," in R. Braibanti (ed.) Asian Bureaucratic Systems: Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 327.

28. Masih-uz-Zaman, as quoted in Jack D. Mezirow, Dynamics of Community Development (New York: The Scarecrow Press, 1963), p.149.

29. Albert Gorvine, "The Role of the Civil Service Under the Revolutionary Government," The Middle East Journal , Vol. XIX, No. 3 (Summer, , 1965), p. 329.

30. The Dawn (Karachi), April 22, 1964.

31. Dawn (Karachi: August 14, 1958).

32. The New York Times, October 8, 1958.

33. Wayne Wilcox, "The Pakistan Coup d'Etat of 1958," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2 (Summer, 1965), p. 143.

34. The executive prepared its budget in two parts: a schedule of expenditure on on-going schemes and programs and a schedule of new expenditures.

35. Douglas E. Ashford, National Development and Local Reform: Morocco, Tunisia and Pakistan, op. cit., p. 124.

36. The program was proposed by the Harvard Development Advisory Service. See Richard V. Gilbert, "The Works Program in East Pakistan," International Labor Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (March 1963), pp. 213-256. See also, Arthur F. Raper et al., Rural Development in Action (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 21-44.

37. In the Presidential elections of 1964, more than 50 percent of the East Pakistani Basic Democrats cast their vote for Ayub Khan.

38. Shahid Javed Burki,"Interest Group Involvement in West Pakistan's Rural Works Program," Public Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (Winter 1971), pp. 167-206.

39. See the various statements issued by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and published by the Pakistan Times in the summer and fall of 1964.

40. Rehman Sobhan, Basic Democracies, Works Programme and Rural Development in East Pakistan (Dacca: Bureau of Economic Research, University of Dacca, 1968), p. 80.

41. A.T.R. Rahman, Basic Democracies at the Grass Roots (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1962), pp. 11-12.

42. Rehman Sobhan, Basic Democracies, Works Programme, op. cit., p. 84.

43. Government of East Pakistan, Report on the Members Elected to the Basic Democracies during 1964 (Dacca: Basic Democracies Department, 1966), pp. 10-14.

44. Rehman Sobhan, Basic Democracies, Works Programme, op. cit., p. 88.

45. John W. Thomas, "Agricultural Production, Equity and Rural Organization," unpublished paper presented to the Pakistan Rural Development Workshop (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1971), p. 3.

46. The large farmers in East Pakistan constituted 10 percent of the total landowners. Their average land holding is 7 acres.

47. Tariq Siddiqui, "The Union Board and the Union Council," Journal of East Pakistan Academy for Village Development, Vol. I, No. 3 (August 1960), pp. 40-50.

48. For an elaboration of this point see Shahid Javed Burki, "Interest Group Involvement in West Pakistan's Rural Works Program," op. cit., p. 188.

Table 5.1

Nominations Filed, Withdrawn and Rejected in Basic Democracies Elections, 1959

	West Pakistan	East Pakistan	Total
Filed	96,089	87,190	183,279
Withdrawn	21,684	6,040	27,724
Rejected	6,941	2,274	9,215
Candidates	53,474	78,794	132,268
Seats	40,000	40,000	80,000
Unopposed	10,311	7,083	17,394
Nominations filed per seat	2.4	2.2	2.3
Candidates per seat	1.8	2.4	2.1

Source: Compiled from Douglas E. Ashford, National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 126, Table IV.

Table 5.2

Nominations Filed, Withdrawn and Rejected in Basic Democracies Elections, 1959

	Karachi[a]	13 Towns[b]	27 villages[c]
Filed	3,359	603	92
Withdrawn	607	102	34
Rejected	596	50	6
Candidates	2,156	451	52
Seats	1,389	282	43
Unopposed	0	59	14
Seats Contested	1,389	223	29
Nominations Filed per seat	2.4	2.7	2.1
Candidates per seat	1.6	2.0	1.8

Source: (a) Douglas Ashford, National Development and Local Reform, op. cit., p. 126.

(b) Survey II

(c) Survey I

Note: There were less than two candidates per seat in, for in this election there were several multiple member constituencies.

Table 5.3

Socio-Economic Background of Candidates for the Basic Democracies Elections, 1959

	13 Towns			27 Villages		
	Those who filed nomination papers	Those who withdrew or were rejected	Candidates	Those who filed nomination papers	Those who withdrew or were rejected	Candidates
Landlords	18	8	10	17	6	11
0-25 acres	0	0	0	0	0	0
25-50 "	2	2	0	3	1	2
50-100 "	3	2	1	5	1	4
100-250 "	5	3	2	7	3	4
over 250 "	8	1	7	2	1	1
Merchants	11	1	10	3	0	3
Contractors	10	1	9	0	0	0
Lawyers	28	11	17	1	1	0
Retired Officials	7	2	5	1	0	1
No information	11	2	9	0	0	0
Total	85	25	60	22	7	15

Source: Surveys I and II

Table 5.4

Nominations Filed, Withdrawn and Rejected in Basic Democracies Elections, 1964

	West Pakistan	East Pakistan	Total
Filed	105,363	114,262	219,625
Withdrawn	18,375	5,334	23,709
Retired	5,216	1,947	7,163
Rejected	6,655	1,375	8,030
Candidates	75,158	105,606	180,764
Seats	40,000	40,000	80,000
Unopposed	8,508	3,144	11,652
Contested	31,492	36,856	68,348
Nominations filed per seat	2.6	2.9	2.7
Candidates per seat	2.4	2.9	2.6

Source: Government of Pakistan, Report on General Elections in Pakistan, 1964-1965, Vol. I, (Rawalpindi: Election Commission, n.d.), p. 67.

Table 5.5

Nominations Filed, Withdrawn and Rejected in Basic Democracies Elections, 1964

	Karachi[a]	13 Towns[b]	27 Villages[c]
Filed	4,374	691	104
Withdrawn	989	74	18
Rejected	448	24	2
Retired	207	17	6
Candidates	2,730	576	78
Seats	1,394	278	44
Unopposed	34	49	10
Contested	1,360	229	34
Nominations filed per seat	3.1	2.5	2.4
Candidates per seat	2.0	2.5	2.3

Source: (a) Government of West Pakistan, Basic Democracies Elections in Karachi (Lahore: Department of Basic Democracies and Local Government, n.d.), pp. 44-46.

(b) Survey II

(c) Survey I

Table 5.6

Socio-Economic Background of Candidates for the Basic Democracies Elections, 1964

	13 Towns			27 Villages		
	Those who filed nomination papers	Those who withdrew or were rejected	Candidates	Those who filed nomination papers	Those who withdrew or were rejected	Candidates
Landlords	16	4	12	15	4	11
0-25 acres	0	0	0	2	2	0
25-50 "	1	1	0	2	1	1
50-100 "	2	1	1	4	0	4
100-250 "	7	2	5	6	1	5
over 250 "	6	0	6	1	0	1
Merchants	9	0	9	3	1	2
Contractors	7	0	7	1	0	1
Lawyers	22	7	15	2	0	2
Retired Officials	22	6	14	1	0	1
No information	9	4	5	0	0	0
TOTAL	85	21	64	22	5	17

Source: Surveys I and II

Table 5.7

Socio-Economic Background of the Basic Democrats Elected in East Pakistan in 1959 and 1964

	1959	1964
Age		
Below 30 years	10.8	7.8
30-44 "	43.5	45.8
Above 45 "	45.7	47.4
Education		
Illiterate	2.2	1.1
1-10 Years	87.2	82.3
More than 10 years	10.7	16.6
Occupation		
Farmers	82.5	77.8
Business	15.6	17.0
Professional	0.7	2.8
Other	1.3	2.5
Income		
Below Rs 1000	89.2	10.2
Rs 1000-2000	7.0	21.2
Rs 2000-3000	3.8	21.4
Rs 3000-4000	0.0	16.8
Rs 4000 and above	0.0	30.4

Source: Rehman Sobhan, Basic Democracies, Works Programme and Rural Development in East Pakistan (Dacca: University of Dacca, 1968), pp. 79-84

Table 5.8

Socio-Economic Background of the Basic Democrats Elected in the Urban Areas of East and West Pakistan, 1964

(percentages)

	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Agriculture	9.0	37.8
Business	73.6	50.4
Industry		2.1
Lawyers, Teachers Doctors, etc.	8.1	6.4
Other	9.3	3.1

Sources: See Tables 7 and 9

Table 5.9

Socio-Economic Background of the Basic Democrats Elected in West Pakistan in 1959 and 1964

	1959	1964
Age		
Below 30 years	8.5	7.6
30-45 "	52.9	45.2
Above 45 "	37.4	46.5
Not known	1.2	0.8
Education		
Illiterate	30.3	24.4
1-10 Years	64.0	60.1
More than 10 years	5.1	7.5
Not known	0.6	8.0
Occupation		
Farmers	87.4	82.2
Business	10.6	14.7
Professional	1.1	2.1
Not known	0.9	1.0
Income		
Up to Rs 2000	23.2	27.7
Rs 2000-4000	35.9	26.7
Rs 4000 and above	39.2	43.7
Not known	1.7	1.9

Source: (a) For 1959, Government of West Pakistan, A Look at West Pakistan's Basic Democrats (Lahore: Basic Democracies Department, 1962), pp. 14-51.

(b) For 1964, Government of West Pakistan, Analytical Report on the Members Election [sic] to the Basic Democracies During 1964 (Lahore: Basic Democracies Department, 1967), pp. 2-6.

Table 5.10

Socio-Economic Background of the Basic Democrats Elected in West Pakistan in 1959 and 1964

(percentages)

	13 Towns[a]		27 Villages[b]	
	1959	1964	1959	1964
Landlords	9.9	18.6	72.1	75.0
0-25 acres	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
25-50 "	0.0	0.0	20.9	9.1
50-100 "	2.8	0.0	9.3	31.6
100-250 "	7.1	9.3	41.9	27.5
Over 250 "	0.0	9.3	0.0	6.8
Merchants	25.5	23.2	7.0	6.8
Contractors	6.4	10.9	2.3	2.3
Lawyers	21.6	15.8	2.3	0.0
Retired Officials	11.0	13.3	0.0	2.3
Other or No Information	25.5	18.2	16.3	13.6

N (13 Towns, 1959) = 282

N (13 Towns, 1964) = 285

N (27 Villages, 1959) = 43

N (27 Villages, 1964) = 44

Source: (a) Survey II
(b) Survey I

Table 5.11

Integration of Social Groups in the Political Society

Regime / Groups	East Pakistan		West Pakistan		
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Towns	Cities
Large Landlords/ Landed Aristo-cracy	X		X	X	X
Middle Farmers			X		
Legal Community				X	
Businessmen		X			X

CHAPTER 6:

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

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INTRODUCTION

The changing fortunes of the landed aristocracy were traced in some detail in Chapter 4. This group started its life in independent Pakistan at the top of the list of opinion makers in the politicized society. After the death of the Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948, the political power wielded by the landlords increased considerably. The landed aristocracy occupied a prominent position in the coalition of interests that ruled the country from 1948 to 1958. However, despite their strong presence among the decision makers, the landlords provided few economic dividends to the sector of agriculture. This neglect of the economic requirements of agriculture profoundly affected the course of Pakistan's economic and political development. What were the reasons for the indifference shown by a powerful group toward the economic development of its own constituency? Two explanations can be provided. First, it was in the larger interest of the state of Pakistan to initially direct resources from the agriculture to the industrial sector. Second, the behavior of the landed aristocracy seems illogical only when we look at aggregate statistics pertaining to the growth of the agricultural sector. The conduct of the big landlords can be easily explained when these statistics are broken down into the components that would be more relevant for studying group behavior.

It is generally believed that up to June 3, 1947, the day the partition plan was announced by Lord Mountbatten, the Quaid-e-Azam and his Muslim League associates had paid little attention to the economic problems that independent Pakistan would have to face. They drew comfort from the fact that the bulk of the western part of Pakistan was made up of the Punjab, the land of the five rivers, long known as the granary of British India. The fact that the area which was to become East Pakistan produced nearly 75 percent of the world's jute and all of its best varieties,[2] also reassured the founders of the state. It was clear then that agriculture was to be the mainstay of Pakistan's economy. It was also obvious that the people whose business was agriculture should wield tremendous political and economic power during Pakistan's early years.

The role of the Quaid-e-Azam as an economic policy-maker will be described in some detail in the next chapter. We will conclude from that discussion that it isnot necessary, as has been customary, to assign passive roles fo Jinnah and his principal advisors in so far as Pakistan's economic relationship with India is concerned. Right from the beginning, Pakistan's leadership chartered an independent economic course for the new country. This meant that Pakistan's industry had to be built quickly. It also meant the diversion of large amounts of resources from the agricultural to the new industrial sector. However, it is not necessary to assume that in

Pakistan's formative phase the landed aristocracy was fired with the kind of altruism that interest groups, no matter how nationalistic they may be, do not normally display. It was possible to divert resources from the rural to the urban sectors in the first phase of Pakistan's development because such a diversion suited the landed aristocracy, which was at that time the most powerful interest group in the political society. This is a new and not a very conventional way of looking at Pakistan's economic growth. However, it is by far the most logical one, for it provides a greater weight to political motivations and and shows all the participants in the process of Pakistan's development as both political and economic men. In this chapter, we will confine our analysis to a study of the agricultural . . .

sector. This line of approach will be continued in the next two chapters which are respectively devoted to the analysis of Pakistan's industrialization and urbanization.

Before linking group politics with the development of the agriculture sector, it would be necessary to digress a little and set the stage for this discussion. The political economy of Pakistan's agriculture sector becomes comprehensible only in the context of the pattern of land ownership. The pattern of landownership is different for East and West Pakistan. In both it is a function of two things: their socio-religious development and the land administration systems adopted by the British. What follows is a brief description of the emergence of the Muslim societies in East and West Pakistan and the impact that the British land administration system had on their growth after the end of the Muslim era.

THE MUSLIM SOCIETIES IN EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN

Sir Mohammad Iqbal, the patron saint of Pakistan, started the Muslims of India thinking in terms of a separate homeland for themselves, in the north-west of the sub-continent.[3] For some inexplicable reason, he never thought of providing the Bengali Muslims living in the north-east with an independent homeland of their own. The situation was rectified in 1940 when the All-India Muslim League in its session at Lahore passed the famous Pakistan resolution demanding two independent states for the Indian Muslims, one in the north-west and the other in the north-east of British India.[4] The concept of a unified state of Pakistan emerged later

and was not a adopted as an official demand by the Muslim League until 1946, one year before the partition of India.[5] The architects of Pakistan were aware of the enormous differences between the Bengali Muslims on the one hand and those living in the Punjab and other northern provinces on the other. The only factors which seemed to bind them together were Islam and a few centuries of common history. These were at best tenuous links even when they were not recognized as such. Ayub Khan once told an audience, "There are other Muslim countries, if they leave Islam they can still exist, but if you leave Islam we cannot exist. Our foundation is Islam."[6]

That religion provided a poor bridge between the people of West and East Pakistan was due to the fact that the Muslim societies in these two regions owed their emergence to entirely different sets of circumstances. In East Pakistan the emergence of Islam as a force was due to the presence of socio-economic cleavages that could be crossed and hence blurred by change in religion. In West Pakistan, Islam owes its existence more to political than to social and economic factors.

Mohammad bin Qasim, the first Muslim conqueror of India in the eighth century adopted a liberal attitude toward his Hindu subjects. Unlike some other Muslim generals, Qasim did not use the sword to convert the non-Muslims to Islam. "The Hindus and Buddhists of Sind were given the status of protected persons, as though they were 'People of the Book', perhaps because Muhammad bin Qasim did not have

sufficient troops at his disposal to risk stirring up unnecessary discontent."[7] Whatever the reason, the pattern of treatment he set was generally followed by subsequent rulers until the time that considerations of augmenting the revenue of the state rather than adherence to the quaranic rule persuaded rulers like Ala-ud-din Khilji to levy jizya (the head tax). The Brahmins, despite the pleadings of Muslim theologians and jurists for even handed justice, were usually exempt from the tax. In the latter half of the fifteenth century, the Muslim rulers of Delhi extended the levy of jizya to include the Brahmins who in turn so arranged that the lower-caste Hindus had to pay not only their own tax but that of the high class Brahmins as well.[8] The Muslims, therefore, added another economic burden on the already depressed low-caste Hindus. By making them more impoverished, the sultans of Delhi made the conversion of low caste Hindus to Islam socially and economically attractive. By embracing Islam, they could not only escape the jizya but also, at least in theory, free themselves from the shackles of the caste structure. Islam, therefore, found favor in those parts of India where the social and economic cleavages of the caste system had played a devastating role. East Bengal was such an area.

In the words of W. W. Hunter:

> To these poor people, fishermen, hunters, pirates and low-caste tillers of the soil, Islam came as a revelation from on high. It was the creed of the ruling race; its missionaries were men of zeal, who brought the Gospel of the unity of God and the equality of men in His sight to a despised and neglected population.[9]

Under the protection of the Muslim sovereign, Sufis in East Bengal "found freedom for the exercise of their zeal." [10] They were eminently successful as hundreds and thousands of Buddhists and low-caste Hindus embraced Islam.

Islam in West Pakistan owed its origin to an altogether different set of circumstances. The vast plains of the Indus and its five tributaries stretched between the mountains and desert dunes that separated Afghanistan and Persia from Central India. In order to get to the rich treasures of India, Alexander, Timurlane, Mahmud Ghazni, Mohammad Ghori, Babar, Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Abdali all passed throught the valleys of the Indus and her tributary rivers, leaving behind in their trail strong cultural and religious influences. After Alexander, all major conquerors of India were Muslims. Some of them came for plunder, but others came to establish empires that lasted for centuries. The founders of various Muslim dynasties in India between the twelfth and the eighteenth centuries brought with them their followers, who settled in the vast alluvial plains of north India. These settlers found land by either driving the Hindus to the south or bringing under the plow the land that still lay virgin. Consequently, almost the whole of Sind and the north-western part of the Punjab came under Muslim domination. South-east Punjab and Rajputana (now called Rajasthan) remained under the control of the Hindus. Despite this geographic distribution of the Muslim and Hindu populations, pockets of Hinduism remained in the north-western Punjab

while the Muslims managed to infiltrate the south-eastern part of the province. Even where such a mix occurred, there was relative religious homogeniety in the villages--there were villages almost exclusively Hindu existing side by side with villages that were almost wholly Muslim. Various anthropological studies of Punjabi villages testify to the distribution of population in villages according to religious lines.[11]

The important conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that the structure of the Muslim societies was totally different in East and West Pakistan. In the former, Muslims occupied the lowest strata of the socio-economic order; the religious cleavage coincided with the socio-economic one. In West Pakistan the religious and socio-economic cleavages did not coincide-- there was no particular difference between the economic structure of the Hindu and Muslim communities. The Muslim rule of the sub-continent improved the socio-economic conditions of a small section of the Bengali converts to Islam while it established the Muslims as a competing economic force in the Punjab. The collapse of the Moghul rule changed all this.

PATTERN OF LAND OWNERSHIP

The Moghuls under Akbar the Great (1556-1605) used an elaborate system of land administration to successfully achieve the twin objectives of expanding the power of the central government over the semi-autonomous feudal estates and politically stabilizing the countryside. This was an act of political modernization. Akbar did for India what

according to Huntington was done one hundred years later by "the great simplifiers, centralizers, and modernizers: Richelieu, Mazerin, Louis XIV, Colbert, and Louvois in France; the Great Elector in Prussia; Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XI in Sweden; Philip IV and Olivares in Spain; and their countless imitators among the lesser realms of the Continent."[12] Akbar was able to modernize the feudal society of India for the simple reason that the overlords being mostly the descendants of the Rajput and Pathan regimes that he had replaced exercised little political influence in his court. Under him the state used its power not only to collect land revenue(tax) from the overlords but also to regulate the relationship of the overlord with his peasants. The village nobility[13] was thus squeezed; from one side by the might of the Moghul Empire, and from the other by the pressure of the half-emancipated peasantry. Although the economic and social dividends for the peasantry were realized immediately, over the long run the overlords also benefitted from the system. The social and political tranquility that was produced in the countryside increased the income obtained by the overlord from the land. The economic performance of Akbar's India was better than that during the reign of any other Muslim monarch of the sub-continent.[14]

The government that the British established in India in the eighteenth century was as powerful as that of the Moghuls. Like the Moghuls, the British also had the opportunity of dealing with village nobility, that, being foreign,

was politically impotent. However, the British in their quest for social forces that would support their rule, failed to take advantage of their position. In their view the Indian zamindar could provide to their rule the kind of stability that his counterpart provided to the political system of eighteenth century Britain.[15] It was in this spirit that the Permanent Settlement was conceived, a system that according to Baden-Powell had "but little to recommend it either for study or imitation." For their purpose the British considered it essential that the zamindar "must be recognized in a secure legal position as landlords with a heritable and transferable estate, in order that they might be able to steadily realize the Revenue, and enjoy a substantial profit."[16] However, the government did not show a similar concern for the peasantry on the ground that the Whig philosophy "preached the evils of government which should be limited to collecting taxes, keeping order and administering justice."[17] While the rights of the zamindar were recognized because of political expediency, the rights of the peasantry were sacrificed to political convictions. It was fortutitous that India under the British did not revert to the feudal state from which it had been rescued with such effectiveness by the Moghuls. The reason was that more often than not, and more often out of ignorance, the early British rulers "settled"[18] zamindari rights on those who were not the real owners of the land.[19] Thus the Permanent Settlement came to Bengal, fixing in perpetuity the amount of land revenue the zamindars would have to pay, " and leaving him free to keep as own income

any additional sums he could collect from those lower in the hierarchy of interests in the land."[20]

The Permanent Settlement produced a deep impact on the direction of social, economic and political change in Bengal. After their conversion to Islam, some Bengali Muslims had found easy access to jobs with the government and in the large army the Muslim rulers maintained in the province. In 1757, the British defeated the Muslim army on the battlefield of Plassey and under Governor Generals Hastings and Cornwallis brought the local government under the full control of the East India Company. The Permanent Settlement administered the coup de grace. According to W. W. Hunter, the Settlement "elevated the Hindu collectors, who up to that time had held but unimportant posts, to the position of landholders, gave them a proprietary right in the soil, and allowed them to accumulate wealth which would have gone to the Muslims under their own rule."[21]

For the Muslims of Bengal the rule of their co-religionists served only as an interregnum. The British administered Permanent Settlement returned them to the abysmally low social and economic positions they had previously occupied. The situation under the British was, however, different in one important respect from the one that had prevailed in the pre-Muslim era. Previously the socially and economically depressed classes subscribed to the faith of their superiors: now the bulk of tillers of the soil and hewers of wood belonged to a new faith. The Permanent Settlement

reinforced the social and economic cleavages by adding to them a religious one.

Another important consequence of the Permanent Settlement was the creation of a class of absentee landlords. Inflation and some increase in the productivity of land drastically reduced the proportion of agricultural produce claimed by the government as land tax. This contributed to the prosperity of the Hindu zamindar class and made it possible for them to move to the cities and into other occupations by sub-letting their rights in land. While the zamindars went and settled in the cities and became merchants, businessmen or government servants,[22] their agents worked the land with the help of the Muslim tenants. "Under the system, sub-infeudation developed to such an extent that in certain areas one could find as many as fifty grades of tenure holders in between the proprietors and the cultivating tenants."[23] While the Permanent Settlement impoverished the Muslim tenants and sub-tenants and enriched the Hindu proprietors of land, by moving the latter away from the villages to the cities, it simultaneously shifted the focus of political power from the countryside to the urban areas of Bengal. Although Bengal, particularly its eastern part that went to the share of Pakistan, never attained the level of urbanization achieved by some other provinces of British India, her cities wielded more political power than those in any other part of the sub-continent. The contribution of the Permanent Settlement to this development is obvious: by removing the landed aristocracy from the land it reduced

their political power. The peasantry could only be controlled by remaining on the land; it could not be subjected to political pressure from the cities.

The Permanent Settlement, apart from what it did to the Muslims of rural Bengal, produced one other impact on the countryside. It threw the rural economy into a vicious circle. The landlords, assured of a regular flow of rents, were not interested in investing in land. With their political power reduced considerably, they could not persuade the government to take interest in the development of the rural areas. The stagnating rural economy stabilized the level of the rents received by the landlords. This further reduced the interest of the landlords and consequently of the government in the development of the rural areas.

One other legislation, the Bengal Rent Act of 1859, strengthened the social and economic forces generated by the Permanent Settlement. The Rent Act bestowed upon the tenants occupancy rights (protection against arbitrary eviction) without removing from the land the burdens of multiple ownership. As noted by Neale in his study of the consequences of the Act, these provisions served to divorce owners and managers from control of the land.[24] A landlord and his manager, with the right to punish their tenants by eviction, were more likely to influence investment decisions than those who had to contend with tenants with hereditary rights of occupancy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the rate of growth of land productivity was lower in Bengal than in the provinces in which the British adopted different

systems of land administration. The Permanent Settlement and some attendant legislation created the kind of social and economic structure in Bengal's countryside that could not persist after the partition of the sub-continent of British India. The acceptance of the Quaid-e-Azam's demand for Pakistan revolutionized almost overnight the rural society of Muslim Bengal.

The partition of Bengal into the predominantly Muslim East Pakistan and the predominantly Hindu West Bengal resulted in the cross-migration of population in 1947-48 and 1950-51.[25] With the departure of the Hindu zamindars there was no political pressure against and much social justification for doing away with absentee landlords. Accordingly, in 1950 under the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, the provincial government, by acquiring all intermediate interests in land, established a direct contact with the cultivating tenants. The tenants, who in the 1940s had paid Rs 100 million per year as rent to the landlords[26] became full proprietors of the land they were cultivating. One important consequence of the partition of India was thus to create a remarkably egalitarian society in East Pakistan's countryside. However, the partition and the consequent departure of the Hindu landlord did not result in the redistribution of political power between the urban and the rural areas. In a polity with little political organization, power is a function of the ownership of property. Skewed patterns of ownership lead to concentration

of power; mobilization of power in an egalitarian society has to await the emergence of political organization. For this reason, political power in East Pakistan remained in the hands of the urban power elites.

Socio-religious differences and a change in the attitude of the British toward land administration produced the kind of society in rural West Pakistan which was vastly different from that of East Bengal.

The British rulers who brought the Permanent Settlement to Bengal in the closing years of the eighteenth century were succeeded by those who were better acquainted with the social, economic and political conditions of India. They reacted against the zamindari system of Bengal and preached that there should be no intermediate class between the peasantry and the Government.[27] Even among this new breed of British administrators, there was some difference of opinion regarding the relationship of the State with the people. There were those who believed in strictly limiting the functions of the State to collecting its share of the produce of the land and there were those who believed in extending the scope of the government's operations to help develop the economic potential of the land. The two schools of thought were led by the Lawrence brothers, Henry and John. The former subscribed to the laissez faire system, the latter to a system of paternalistic government. Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India, showed preference for the system of John Lawrence when he transferred Henry to Rajputana in 1853 and made John the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab.[28] According to J. P. Grant,

a contemporary of the Lawrences, the new system "converted the North Western provinces into a Garden and is now doing the same thing in the Punjab."[29]

John Lawrence and his followers--the so-called Romantics[30]--believed in and urged upon the government the desirability of helping the rural people out of their deep economic misery, Under their patronage a system of land administration was designed to achieve the twin objectives of good administration and socio-economic development. The village or Mahal Settlement System was accordingly more paternalistic in its approach than the Permanent Settlement. The villagers were collectively responsible for the payment of government dues, assessed at a percentage of the net produce of the land. The government's share was not fixed in perpetuity but was calculated at the intervals of forty to fifty years. In return for the payment of land tax, the government undertook to perform some services for the villagers, the most important of which was the maintenance of land records. These documents, according to Baden-Powell "are purely statistical, i.e., bearing on the agricultural conditions, soil, products, and other particulars of the estate; partly having reference to rights in the soil and to the Revenue shares and rents payable; village customs bearing on the land revenue management are also recorded."[31] By constructing detailed records of various kinds of rights in land, including those of the tenants, and by introducing legislation like the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1887, the British government in the Punjab was able to protect the agricultural sector from the kind of sub-infeudation

that occurred in Bengal. The majority of the landlords stayed on in the villages, managing their properties and building their political constituencies. In this they were further helped by one other provision of the Mahalwari system.

The Romantics studied somewhat superficially the village life in the Punjab and decided that it was of corporate type. They saw in these villages a bewildering array of communal institutions: the panchyats (council of five wise men) sorted out disputes between the villagers and dispensed justice with remarkable effectiveness; Kamins (servants of the community) provided a variety of services to all members of the village society and shamilat deh (village common), with its water pond, meeting ground and market place, was equally accessible to all members of the community. They saw in these villages "little republics"[32] that had reached the level of social evolution not to be seen in any other part of the domain. In order to preserve the corporate pattern, the British introduced the Mahalwari system whose principal feature was to settle the dues of the state not with the individual landholders but collectively with the village. However, when the settlement officers were appointed to prepare land records and calculate the share of the government, they discovered that the little republics were not really republican in their pattern of land ownership.[33] There were considerable inequalities in the distribution of land; at the same time individuals scrupulously guarded their rights in the land. Having once decided that the Punjab village was really of corporate type in all aspects, the new administra-

tion found it difficult to back away form its resolve to give it a corporate system of land administration. Accordingly, while the mahal was regarded as collectively responsible to the state for meeting all government imposed obligations, the task of ensuring this was entrusted to one man, the lambardar. The lambardar, more often than not, was the biggest landlord in the village. In the villages where the distribution of land was not unequal, the institution of the lambardari created inequality. In the words of Baden-Powell:

> Each village has, at any rate, an official head man. In one class of villages, the head man is a natural part of the constitution; in the other he is not; but as in the latter case, some one must act as the representative of the village with the Collector, one of the leading co-sharers is selected (and to some extent elected) as official head man or lambardar.[34]

The lambardari system provided the landed aristocracy with very close contacts with the officialdom. This increased their political power within the village society. Even in those villages where the distribution of land ownership was not very unequal, the British land administration system produced social and consequently political stratification.

The British paternalistic approach to the people of the Punjab made them take steps that were considered anathema by the administrations in other provinces. In 1896 S.S. Thorburn published his Musullmans and Moneylenders in the Punjab.[35] The results of his investigation in the districts of Shahpur (Sargodah), Gujranwala and Sialkat brought into focus the social, political and economic problems generated as a result of large scale indebtedness of the Muslim

cultivators to Hindu money-lenders. Malcolm Darling, who continued Thorburn's enquiry into the problem of rural debt had this to say:

> There is one other feature that must be noted in regard to debt in the Punjab. Though almost the whole of it has been advanced by Hindus and Sikhs, neither being debarred by religion from the taking of interest, well over half has been incurred by Muhammadans ... No community can hope to thrive with so great a handicap, and, if the Muhammadan community wishes to keep abreast of its rivals, it behooves it to consider most seriously how debt can be reduced.[36]

The British were prepared to help a lending hand. They responded to the pressure exerted by the Muslim community and enacted the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1901.[37] The Act debarred non-agriculturists from holding a land mortgage for more than twenty years. The Hindu money-lender, who was a non-agriculturist, removed his capital from the villages and invested it in urban areas, leaving the field open to whatever Muslim capital was available in the agricultural sector. The landed aristocracy responded to this opportunity with vigour. To their growing power within the village community, the landlords added the economic power of the money-lender.[38] The British raj, by passing the Land Alienation Act, completed the process they had started with the introduction of the Mahalwari system. When they left in 1947, they handed over to their successor government a powerful pressure group that acquired tremendous political muscle during their reign as a result of concentration of power of property.[39]

The partition of the Punjab made no difference to the

power of the landed aristocracy. It is estimated that Hindu and Sikh landowners abandoned 5.7 million acres in West Pakistan while the Muslims left 4.5 million acres of land in the eastern districts of the Punjab.[40] According to a survey conducted in 1949, two years after the partition of the province, by the Punjab Tenancy Laws Inquiry Committee, less than one percent of the owners possessed more than one-fifth of the total area. On the other end of the scale, nearly four-fifths of the total owners owned less than one-third of the total agricultural land. In other provinces of West Pakistan, the distribution of land ownership followed the same pattern. In 1947, among the powerful pressure groups in Pakistan's political society, the landed aristocracy of West Pakistan was the only one that owed its position to concentration of power of property. Other groups, particularly the civil and military bureaucracies, derived their power from altogether different sources.

The different legacies left by the British in East and West Pakistan and the different impact of the movement of the population across the India-Pakistan border after the partition of the sub-continent made the social, political and economic development of the two regions proceed in altogether different directions. The Permanent Settlement in Bengal removed the landowner from the villages. Since he had little control over his property, the landlord exercised no or little political power in the areas in which his property was located. The diffuse nature of ownership of rural property, particularly after independence, made it

difficult to aggregate rural interests. There was no single effective group in the rural society that could put pressure on the government to make investment in agricultural infrastructure--village roads, village electrification, soil and seed research. Since government investment increases the yields from private investment, there was little incentive for the farmers to seek their fortunes in land. As is evident from the schematic representation of Table 6.1 the relationship between these social, political and economic factors worked in the opposite direction in the Punjab and other West Pakistan provinces. The landowners retained close contact with their property. Considerable skewness in the pattern of ownership made a section of the landowners (landed aristocracy) socially, politically and economically powerful. The landed aristocracy was able to effectively influence the government. This resulted in some contributions by the state and the landlords to the development of the agricultural sector.

THE PERFORMANCE OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

The partition of the Indian sub-continent and the transfer of population that accompanied had some impact on the peasant economy of East Pakistan. However, the political structures of the rural societies in both East and West Pakistan remained unchanged. While the departure of the city-based Hindu landlords made the rural economy of East Bengal more egalitarian, political power continued to be distributed unevenly. In post-partition Bengal, the power of property played no significant political role

since property was not sufficiently concentrated to produce any significant political or social impact. Consequently, the departure of the Hindu propertied classes from Bengal transferred political power completely to the urban elites. In East Pakistan, the skewness in the distribution of political power was between the urban and the rural areas and not within the urban and rural areas. On the contrary, in West Pakistan the refugees from India replaced the departing Hindus and Sikhs. Property remained concentrated in a few hands. The skewed distribution of political power was within the rural areas and not between the urban and rural areas. What implications did these developments have on the economic performance of the agriculture sector in East and West Pakistan?

When economic development is interpreted in terms of the power of the political pressure groups, it is easy to understand why the economy in general and the agriculture sector in particular stagnated in East Pakistan. The Bengali society had no strong pressure groups with economic interests to attract government capital to East Pakistan; the little capital that reached the province got invested in the industrial sector. West Pakistan's political society was a good deal different: it was characterized by the presence of an exceptionally powerful propertied interest group, the landed aristocracy. Therefore, the stagnation of West Pakistan's agriculture sector is somewhat more difficult to explain. Why did the landlords in West Pakistan allow the agriculture

sector to suffer especially when in the past, during the days of the British raj, they had persuaded the government to make sizeable contributions to the development of the rural areas?

Table 6.2 provides some information about the performance of the agricultural sector over Pakistan's twenty-year history. In 1959-60, public and private investment in agriculture as a proportion of total development capital outlay was no more than what it was a decade earlier. Consequently, the output of all the major crops showed no particular increase; some declined in their productivity. Over this period incomes per capita in the rural areas declined -- a serious development since they were already so close to the level of subsistence.

The usual explanation given by economists for the poor performance of the agriculture sector is that the terms of trade were turned against it and in favor of the industrial sector. This was achieved by the administration by procuring at less than market prices whatever surpluses of foodgrains the farmers were able to produce; by levying high excise duties on the consumer goods produced within the country and consumed largely in the rural areas, and by allocating precious foreign exchange earned by the agricultural sector to the industrialists at extremely favorable terms.[41] To this unequal treatment the farmers reacted in the manner of rational economic men. The Pakistan farmer was no less rational than the farmer in any other country; the acerage that he brought under a certain crop was a function

of the price that he expected to pay for it,[42] the surplus that he produced for sale in the market was a function of his cash requirements[43] and the input-mix that he used for producing his output was a function of the marginal return that he obtained from it.[44]

Accordingly, there was little inducement for the small and middle farmer to expand their output, either by increasing the cultivated areas under their control or by increasing the productivity of their land. The high prices charged by the government for new inputs like chemical fertilizers and insecticides aggravated further the situation caused by the low prices paid to the farmers for their produce. Therefore, the small and middle farmer acted as economic men and consequently agriculture stagnated. The landed aristocracy behaved somewhat differently, for economic and political reasons. This explanation, although complete in economic terms, still begs the question. Why did the big landlords allow the type of policy package to be devised and adopted that seemed to go against the interests of the agricultural sector? The answer to this is that the landlords did not oppose the policies described above because they harmed neither his political nor his economic interests. Let us first examine the development of East Pakistan's agricultural sector.

DEVELOPMENT OF EAST PAKISTAN'S AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

As Barrington Moore has correctly pointed out in his study of the role of landlords and peasants in the social and political development of the rural societies, the landed aristocracy, even when it ruthlessly exploits its tenants, performs some necessary economic functions.[45] One example of this is the important role of the big landlords in the Punjab as suppliers of credit to the peasantry. The partition of India smashed the prevailing system of property relationships in East Pakistan. After partition the landed aristocracy migrated almost en masse to India, leaving behind an egalitarian system of land ownership in the East Pakistani countryside. The loss of the Hindu landlords and moneyed classes meant that East Pakistan's agriculture was suddenly starved of capital. In this development lies the clue to understanding the performance of the agricultural sector in East Pakistan.

The proportion of the labor force engaged in East Pakistan's agriculture increased from 83.2 percent in 1951 to 85.3 percent in 1961,[46] giving the province the rather dubious distinction of being the only region in the whole of south and south-east Asia that increased the burden, in proportionate terms, on its agricultural sector. In 1948, one year after the partition of the Indian sub-continent, holdings in East Pakistan averaged not less than 3.5 acres. By 1961, the size had been reduced still further. The land came to be farmed with grim intensity but even then its yield was not sufficient to feed all those who were dependent on it. Most of Asia is accustomed to seeing people subsist on the amount of food that

is considered woefully inadequate in the rest of the world. East Pakistan's agriculture sector was not even able to meet these low standards. The National Sample Survey (Third Round) of 1961 reported that 81.2 percent of the villages were not self-sufficient in major foodgrains.[47] In other words, less than one fifth of the villages were able to meet their basic food requirements. Therefore, unlike the bulk of the West Pakistani peasantry, the East Pakistanis were not able to subsist on what they produced themselves on their stamp-sized farms. Accordingly, they had to purchase food from the market. This meant that their cash requirements were higher than those of their counterparts in the western province. For solving this problem the peasants of East Pakistan adopted the usual solution. According to the 1960 Census of Agriculture, 3.01 out of 6.14 million agricultural households of East Pakistan were reported to be in debt.[48] Once again the peasant in East Pakistan came under the domination of another class. This time it was not the absentee Hindu landlord but the petty farmer, local shop-keeper, grain-merchant, or contractor who had sufficient surplus cash resources to meet the increasing demands of the peasantry. For the first time in East Pakistan's history, the countryside was acquiring a resident pressure group that drew its strength from the concentration of economic power. Inequality was pronounced enough to alter the political system and the society but not to influence economic investment.

As noted earlier, the agriculturist in the Punjab was under a tremendous load of debt. However, social, political and economic consequences of peasant indebtedness in West

Pakistan were a good deal different from those in the eastern wing. This was so for at least two reasons. First, in West Pakistan debts were financed by resources that would have gone out of the agriculture sector had they not been used for meeting the demands of the peasantry. Since between 30 to 50 percent of the total peasant debt was acquired for investment purposes,[49] the Punjabi money-lender was performing an economic service, albeit very expensively. In East Pakistan, however, the bulk of the peasant debt was financed by petty farmers with small cash surplusses. As was seen above, these debts were incurred mostly for consumption purposes--for feeding the peasant families who could not produce enough to sustain themselves. The money-lender, recovering up to 100 percent from his investment in peasant indebtedness, found it more profitable to invest in money-lending than in the improvement of his own land.[50] The agricultural sector was the poorer for this misdirection of whatever surplusses were available within it.

Second, the size of the economic gap between the lender and borrower made a good deal of difference in the nature of peasant indebtedness in West and East Pakistan. In the former the gap was great, both when the lending was done by the Hindu bania and when it was done by the Muslim landlord. In the latter, the gap was small. More often than not, the East Pakistani money-lender lent all or nearly all the surplus cash he had at his disposal. Unlike his counterpart in West Pakistan, the stake of the money-lender in his lendings was very high. This made the whole process a great deal grimmer

in Bengal than in the Punjab. The peasant in East Pakistan payed a far higher interest and consequently stood to lose far more than the cultivator in West Pakistan.

Lack of easy farm credit was the principal reason for the poor performance of the agriculture sector in East Pakistan. "Much of the trouble can be traced to the mini-size of farms in East Pakistan./ Despite a subsidy of 50 percent fertilizer may still be beyond the financial reach of the very small and very poor operator unless there is an extraordinary rural credit system--which was lacking in both provinces. In West Pakistan, the sizeable number of larger farmers could, and did, lead the way with internal savings; in East Pakistan this was much less of an option."[51]

Since the incidence of agricultural debt has played a greater role in impoverishing the peasant in East than in West Pakistan, it would have been worthwhile to provide more institutional credit to the Bengali farmers. This could have been done by the government or by cooperatives. Attempts were made by both but, for reasons to be discussed presently, not much headway was made. According to one estimate, the total credit requirements of the East Pakistan agriculture sector were Rs 1,677 million.[52] By mid 1960's the government and the cooperatives were able to provide only Rs 30.2 million or 5.2 percent of the total need of the agriculture sector.

As we will see below, the agriculture sector in West Pakistan achieved a rapid rate of growth in the early 1960's. Thereafter, West Pakistan's agrarian economy has been on the move. However, even in the late 1960's the rural economy of

East Pakistan continued to stagnate (Table 6.2). The political and social reasons for this decay were perhaps even more important than the economic ones; in fact the former impinged on the latter. The inequalities in distribution of land in East Pakistan's countryside produced a wide socio-economic chasm between the petty farmer and the peasant. This was further reinforced by the system of Basic Democracies. Ayub Khan's system of local government gave real political power to the petty farmer of East Pakistan. This has been already noted in Chapter 5. The new rural political elite exploited this situation by killing or obstructing the programs that may have produced some kind of beneficial impact on the rural economy. By dominating the cooperative movement, this class made it impossible for investment capital to reach the peasants, the people who needed it most. Even the Comilla experiment was not a resounding success in this respect. Secondly, by dominating the new local government institutions, the rural elite cultivated close ties with the bureaucracy that served it well; the local government-based Rural Works Program was exploited to yield benefits for the relatively well-to-do farmer.[53] Consequently, in the words of Rahman Sobham:

> "Any attempt at breaking the economic hold of the 'surplus' farmer therefore directly threatens his political power. He will therefore use his political power to frustrate any fundamental socio-economic change in the village. To this end he cultivates the agents of the government in the rural areas. The hierarchy of the Basic Democracies system is ideally suited to cement the relationship of the 'surplus' farmer and the government official. They sit on the same councils and the officials' only real contact with the villagers is through the prism of the Union Council chairmen and members.

> The government official thus basks in the illusion of mass contact, whilst the B.D. member feeds this illusion and promotes himself as the voice of the people."[54]

The emergence of this group of surplus farmers as a powerful factor in the economic and political life of East Pakistan produced some very significant social, economic and political consequences. First and foremost, it gave the Bengali countryside a resident pressure group. Although the regime of Ayub Khan was partially responsible for creating this new group, it soon became a prisoner of its own creation. The surplus farmers soon acquired sufficient political muscle to coerce the regime into providing large doses of developmental capital to the East Pakistani countryside. This capital was funnelled through the various organizations controlled by the surplus farmers. Thus the Basic Democracies and rural cooperative societies became large recipients of government development outlays.

Second, the surplus farmers, as a result of the increased developmental activity in the countryside, reaped enormous dividends for themselves. A great number of these farmers obtained contracts for executing small government-aided construction projects. According to Rahman Sobhan the principal recipient of benefits under the Rural Public Works Program were the farmer-contractors.[55]

Third, the government development programs and the contracts awarded under them to the surplus farmers provided a very important link between the urban political elites and the farmer-contractors. This link was able to close somewhat the urban-rural power gap that was characteristic of the Bengali political

life. It was this link that was used so successfully by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in building a firm base in the countryside for the essentially urban Awami League. Whereas the previous political movements like the demands for Pakistan (1940-1947) and the demand for the recognition of Bengali as a national language (1952) were confined to the urban areas, the movement for provincial autonomy (1969-1970) won many strong adherents in the countryside.

DEVELOPMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN'S AGRICULTURE

As was noted in Chapter 4, the decision-making role of the landed aristocracy was played by the landlords who, on the average, owned more than 11,280 acres each. None of these landlords owned less than 850 acres of cultivable land. An average-sized village in the Punjab had 600 acres of cultivable land. This meant that these landlords were able to control completely at least 20 Punjabi villages. However, a landlord did not have all the land in a village under his control. His land more often than not was scattered over scores (sometimes hundreds)of villages. In each of them, he was the head-man, the lambardar, the money-lender, the most prominent person. Therefore, the political and economic constituency of the big landlord was not the 11,280 acres that he owned, but the fifty to one hundred thousand acres of cultivable land in the villages in which he was the paramount power.

The landed aristocracy's welfare function had economic as well as political and social variables. Likewise, the big landlords operated under economic, political, and social constraints. In such a situation rationality demanded that the landlords should behave not only as economic but also as political and social maximizers. This is in fact what they did. Once we are ready to regard the members of the landed aristocracy not only as economic men, but also as political and social men, the stagnation of West Pakistan's agricultural sector at a time when the big landlords wielded great power no longer seems paradoxical.

As an economic man, the landlord had to maximize his returns within the constraints imposed by the availability of resources and the state of the technology. For the big landlord water, not land, was the real constraint. Therefore, his typical response was "to extend the acerage which he crops each season by reducing the fallow on the land which in the past he left totally unused, rather than to increase the water 'delta' applied to the acerage he was already cultivating."[56]

This tendency was reinforced by the behavior of the landlord as a political maximizer. In this capacity his emphasis was on extensive rather than intensive cultivation. The more land that he could bring under his control, the larger was his constituency and the greater his political power. The big landlord used the political power at his disposal to make available to his class the resource over which the government had the greatest control, i.e., irrigation water. One evidence of this is to be found from an examination of

the charges brought by the military regime against a number of politicians who held public office before Ayub Khan took over the administration of the country. The Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, (EBDO) was issued in August, 1959, and was applied to any person who had held any public office or position, including membership of any elective body in the country, and was found guilty of misconduct while holding that office. "The exact number of persons who became, in the cant of the times, 'ebdoed'. does not seem to have been published ... [However], it seems that about 6,000 persons labored under the EBDO disqualification."[57] My own investigations reveal that out of 108 members of the landed aristocracy, at least 42 or 38.9 percent were charged under the EBDO. Of those so charged, 33 or 78.6 percent were found to have used their official powers for either "diverting to their lands a higher proportion than allowed by law and custom of the available irrigation water," or "for changing the scope and extent of government-sponsored irrigation schemes in such a way that a higher proportion than that planned originally of new irrigation water was made available for use on their lands."[58]

This near-monopolistic control of a scarce source of production increased the wealth of the landlords as well as the productivity of the lands owned by them. Therefore, while the agricultural sector stagnated as a whole, the landed aristocracy prospered. One evidence of this difference between the returns obtained by the big landlords and other types of landholders can be obtained from the data presented

in Table 6.3 The statistics of the table come from a survey done by the author of 27 villages located in the Punjab. The survey was confined to gathering some important social and economic information from the records maintained by patwaris. This table provides time series of rents received by landlords of various categories in the twenty-year period between 1948-49 and 1968-69. In 1948-49, the landlords who leased out holdings of more than 250 acres received 2 to 21 percent higher rents than smaller landholders and those who rented smaller holdings.[59] The lowest rent was received for holdings less than 10 acres in size. In the ten-year period between 1948-49 and 1958-59, the rents fetched by the large holdings increased by 39.4 percent, whereas the rents of small holdings (less than 25 acres in size) increased between 19.5 and 25.6 percent. The differential between the rents received by the very small and the very large holdings increased considerably. It went up from 21 percent in 1948-49 to 48 percent in 1958-59.

It would be recalled that 1958-59 was the year in which Ayub Khan introduced his land reforms. While it cannot be said that the reforms achieved anything astronomical, "the political implications were weighty and, although by no means extinguished as a class, the great landed magnates no longer represented the same vast and sometimes inert agglomeration of power."[60] Once again we turn to the rent data for providing us with some evidence for this decline in

the power of the landed aristocracy. The rent series for holdings between 250 and 500 acres started to decline after 1958-59, and in the following ten years fluctuated around a mean of 139. Rents for holdings of less than 10 acres did not show any appreciable increase, but fluctuated around a mean of 97. The largest increase in the value of rent was registered by the holdings of 25-50 acres in size. For these, the rent per acre increased by 33.6 percent in the ten-year period between 1958-59 and 1968-69. For holdings of 50-100 acres and 100-200 acres in size, the rent per acre increased by 19.3 and 11.3 percent respectively.

These numbers indicate a new trend, a change in the pattern of development in the agricultural sector. These data for rent, if used as surrogate for land productivity, show that (if we confine our attention to holdings larger than 25 acres) increases in output per acre were inversely related to the size of the holding. In other words, in this range of holding size, the rate of increase of productivity was the highest for the smallest holdings. We can conclude from this analysis that during the Ayub Khan era a new type of entrepreneur emerged in West Pakistan's countryside.

We have already noted the economists' explanation for the performance of the agricultural sector in the sixties and found it to be not totally satisfactory. One reason for this was that the economists failed to study the response to the change in the state of technology by different categories

of landowners. Some sociologists, applying the concept developed in diffusion research, sought to fill this gap. "Diffusion research regards the dissemination of information as the basic sociological process leading to increased agricultural productivity through the adoption of innovations. A traditional farmer can become modern, that it accept change, if he has the necessary knowledge and is willing to implement new practices. Research into the acceptance of change, based on such a theory, naturally starts with a study of how information reaches farmers and what kinds of farmers actively seek and use it."[61] Using this approach Chaudhari, Erickson and Bajwa, three sociologists who have studied the process of change in the Punjab villages, came to the conclusion that the larger the size of the land holding, the higher the adoption of agricultural practices by those who owned or rented them.[62] In the two villages studied by them in the district of Sialkot, Chaudhari et. al. found that 90-100 percent of the landlords with holdings larger than 25 acres showed medium or high levels of adoption of four improved

agricultural practices. The innovation capacity of these farmers was considerably greater than that of the small landholders.[63]

Chandhari and his colleagues arrived at the conclusion quite the opposite of the one reached by me on the basis of the data of Table 5 for the simple reason that they used the diffusion model within the usual sociological framework of traditional and modern farmers. Like the economists, they also become victims of too much aggregation. Thus the small farmers, defined as those who owned less than 25 acres, followed the traditional pattern. The big landlords, or those who owned more than 25 acres, followed the culture pattern of the modern farmer. The latter, being modern, were not only prepared to adopt agricultural innovations, but also proved to have changed in many other ways. They made more use of media of communication than did the traditional farmers, participated more often in community affairs, possessed more new equipment, and visited towns more frequently.[64] By breaking up the ownership of land into six categories, I have tried to show that the modern-traditional dichotomy does not work. In fact, as was pointed out above, the direct relationship that Chandhari et. al. discovered between size and innovation reverses itself if we break up "bigness" into four categories. The reason that facts do not support the principal conclusion drawn by sociologists about the factors responsible for change in the agricultural sector seems to indicate that diffusion model has some serious shortcomings.

Diffusion research, like the economists' input-output analysis, casts the farmer in a somewhat passive role. The economists' explanation begins when a qualitative or quantative change takes place in the availability of inputs. They then go on to study the farmers' response to this change in his environment. Similarly, the sociologists' concern starts when new information becomes available for diffusion and adoption. The question as to why new inputs became available at a certain time is not answered satisfactorily by either the economist or the sociologist. It is the answer to this question that supplies the clue needed to understand the growth of West Pakistan's agricultural sector after the 1958 take-over by the military of the country's administration.

The system of Basic Democracies, launched by Ayub Khan, in October 1959, was specifically designed to transfer to the rural middle class some of the political, social and economic power wielded by the landed aristocracy. With the help of this system the new regime tried to activate politically the middle-class landlords who had hitherto taken very little interest in politics. Ayub Khan's approach was based on a good comprehension of the game of political arithmetic - after all the rural middle class was far more numerous than the landed aristocracy and commanded far greater economic resources. The elections of 1959 to the local councils created under the system of Basic Democracies brought a large number of middle landholders into the political arena.[65] Once they were there, they exerted their influence on the civil bureaucracy; the

civil bureaucracy, in turn, consolidated its position by aligning itself closely with this new social group.[66] The rural middle class[67] constituted a social stratum different from that of the landed aristocracy - its economic, social and political goals, and the nature of the constraints that were kept in mind to reach them were not the same as those of the big landlords. There were, therefore, important differences between the way the landed aristocrat and the middle farmer responded to his economic, political and social environment. An analysis concerned with understanding the development of the agricultural sector would not be complete without an emphasis on the nature of this response. This is so for two reasons. First, the middle farmer, for the first time in the history of West Pakistan, could operate free of the control of the landed aristocracy. Second, the middle farmers had access to 31.0 percent of the cultivated land.

Using the data collected from my survey of 27 villages in the Punjab, it is possible to present a picture, rich in detail, of the development of agriculture in West Pakistan. A simple analysis, based on coefficients of correlation between the ratio of growth of crop production on the one hand, and the perceptage of land owned by various types of farmers on the other, presents some interesting results. There is a positive and significant correlation between the percentage of land in farm ownership sizes of 25-50 and 50-100 acres and the ratio of growth of crop production. In fact, we can

explain 27 percent of the variance in the rate of growth of crop production by using the percentage of land owned by farmers in the 25-50 acre category. By using the percentage of land in the ownership of 50-100 acre category as the independent variable, the explanatory power of the equation increases by 32 percent, from 27 to 59 percent. More than 88 percent of the variance is explained when we introduce the percentage of land owned by the middle-class farmers as the independent variable. These results are summarized in Table 6.4.

The conclusion that we can draw from the model presented above is clear: the middle-class farmers, owning between 50 and 100 acres of land in the Punjab, produced the revolution in West Pakistan's agriculture. They did this by first going in for intensive use of water, and then by quickly adopting the technology made available to them as a result of a break-through in the development of high-yielding seed varieties. Therefore, West Pakistan's agricultural revolution came more than half a decade before the Green Revolution - it coincided with the emergence of the rural middle-class as a powerful and independent factor in the political system introduced by Ayub Khan.

The rural middle class, released from under the political and social control of the landed aristocracy as a result of the introduction of the system of Basic Democracies, responded by adopting an economic attitude that was close to that of

the traditional profit maximizer. The middle class landlords, unlike the members of the landed aristocracy, had to treat land as a scarce resource. They did not have access to vast tracts of wasteland that were available for cultivation, a decade earlier, to the big landlords. Accordingly, they concentrated their attention on expanding their output by increasing land productivity (Gotsch's yield factor in the model outlined above.) This they did by installing tube wells and thereby increasing substantially the supply of irrigation water. The new regime, mindful of the economic interests of the group it had helped to politically emancipate, was prepared to lend a helping hand. Public policy was geared toward providing this class of landowners with all the inputs they desired at subsidized prices. Tube well parts were imported at favorable terms of exchange, energy for the tube wells was made available by the state-run Water and Power Development Authority at subsidized rates, and new inputs like fertilizer and insecticides were provided at generous rates of subsidy. According to a study sponsored by the World Bank, the political and economic program of the new regime "was a factor in changing the attitudes of large landowners, and awakening a more active interest in improving the productivity of their lands through increased investments, including tube wells and mechanization of farm operations."[68] However, the trail was blazed by the middle landowner.

If the middle landlord has contributed to agricultural

growth to the extent indicated by the above analysis, then it is obvious that he is also its main beneficiary. A good proportion of the increased incomes from land must have gone to this class of farmers. The fact that seems to confirm this conclusion is that of the total land held by the farmers owning between 50 and 100 acres, as much as 19.2 percent was acquired through purchases in the ten year period between 1959 and 1969. The proportion of land so acquired is far greater for this category of landholder than that for any other identified in my village survey. Thus the owners of holdings of less than 10 acres and between 10 and 25 acres held respectively 12.2 percent and 6.9 percent less land in 1969 than they did a decade earlier. The big landlords, with holdings of more than 100 acres, also lost 15.7 percent of the land in the same period. The principal beneficiaries were the middle landlords, with the 50-100 category having acquired 19.2 percent of total land transfers.

The story that these land transfers tell has its positive as well as negative aspects. It was no doubt healthy for the economy that the middle landlord emerged as a dominant entrepreneurial influence in the rural sector, prepared and able to make use of the additions to his income in increasing the productive assets at his disposal. In this respect, he displayed a totally different attitude than that exhibited by the landed aristocracy. The latter, as I tried to show in my discussion of the reasons of agricultural stagnation

in the decade following independence, was a political rather than an economic maximizer.

The negative aspect of this development was that the middle landlord, in his drive to acquire more productive capital, did not hesitate to eliminate those who could not compete with him. Consequently, the rapid strides made by agriculture in several Punjab districts during the decade of the 1960's caused the displacement of a large number of small landholders. It also resulted in the landed aristocracy surrendering to the acquisitive pressure of the middle landlord some of their holdings; paring at the same time their landed possessions so as to preempt the political pressure for reducing the size of the maximum holdings permitted under law. While the landed aristocracy was hard on its tenants, the middle landlord was hard on his competitors. The small land-holders, when derpived of their holdings, often took to the urban areas.

From the preceding analysis it is possible to draw the following conclusions. First, the principal determinants of recent change in the agricultural sector of West Pakistan was a class of entrepreneurs who were able to exercise influence over the formulation of public policy. This influence was exercised not only because the policy-makers became aware of the potential power of this new group, but also because in a number of cases the policy-makers themselves were the members of this class. There is no doubt that to a very large extent

the policies favoring the middle farmer were formulated because the civil bureaucracy, in charge of the function of policy formulation, saw in this rural group a potentially strong ally. There is also little doubt that the very large presence of the members of the rural middle class in the officer corps of the army added strength to the former's position in the political and economic society.

Second, the political and economic system proved elastic enough to accomodate this new clan. This expansion of the system was described as a revolution by the admirers of the regime of Ayub Khan.[69] Third, there is a good possibility that the strains the Green Revolution is producing in the political, social and economic fabric would not tear it apart. Once again, the fabric will prove to be elastic enough to sustain the shock of change. I referred briefly to the kinds of strain that the recent changes in the rural areas have produced; my conclusion is that the fabric of Pakistan's society will stretch itself to sustain the shock produced by this process of change.

CONCLUSION

The pattern of growth of agriculture sector, in both East and West Pakistan, can be attributed to the political, economic and social power (or lack of it) wielded by different categories of land holders. Thus the departure of the Hindu landlord from the East Pakistani countryside--the landlords during the days of the British raj moved out to the cities and after the partition of the sub-continent left the cities of East Pakistan and moved to those in Indian West Bengal--deprived the agriculture sector of a social group that could attract government investment in infra-structure. The agriculture sector, therefore, registered little economic growth during the last half century of the British rule. The conditions deteriorated further after the partition of India.

The birth of Pakistan provided the eastern wing's rural sector with a remarkably egalitarian society. There were only a score of big landlords, the rest were all paltry landholders with holdings that averaged a little over 3.5 acres. The situation changed very rapidly. In just over a decade a new class

of dommoes emerged--a class of landholder with a little surplus left over after meeting his own consumption requirements that could be lent at exorbitant rates of interest to the landholder and landless labor who could not produce or earn enough to feed themselves. This led to the most vicious kind of money-lending and diversion of the little surplus capital that was available into non-productive uses. Thus, in East Pakistan agricultural stagnation was caused first by the absence of a powerful economic interest group that could attract outside capital to the countryside and then by the emergence of a pressure group that used up for non-productive purposes all the surplus resources that were available to it.

The performance of the agriculture sector in West Pakistan was also influenced by social groups. In the first post-partition decade, the power possessed by the landed aristocracy was used effectively to enrich the very big landlords and impoverish the rest of the agriculture sector. With land available in relative abundance, the members of the landed aristocracy treated water as a constraint, using it extensively and thus maximizing their political as well as economic returns. The advent of the Ayub era brought about a fundamental change in the power structure; it considerably reduced the position of the landed aristocracy in the political society. Ayub Khan's political program was undertaken with the objective of shifting the focus of regime support from the urban professional class to the numerically more numerous rural middle class. The system of Basic Democracies introduced by the new regime politically and economically emancipated the middle farmer and brought rich dividends for

the ruling elite and the agricultural sector. The middle farmers operated under a production constraint different from those faced by the landed aristocracy; for them land was the real limiting factor. It was therefore farmed with intensity with the help of sub-surface water that became available in abundance. The government helped; providing at a generous subsidy material and technical know-how needed for installing tubewells. West Pakistan's agricultural revolution got underway well before the new miracle seeds arrived on the scene.

The stagnation of East Pakistan's agricultural sector in the first decade after independence and its poor performance compared to that of West Pakistan's agriculture sector in the second decade produced important social, political and economic consequences. Absence of capital was correctly identified as the main constraint in the first period; the easing of the credit situation therefore became the principal occupation of the planners in the second period. The Rural Public Works Program, Camilla Academy's rural cooperative program, and the infrastructure creating programs of the water and Power Development Authority and the Agricultural Development Corporation, all aimed at injecting new capital into the agricultural sector. Various kinds of political and economic organizations were used to channel this capital into the countryside. Since these organizations were controlled by the relatively prosperous farmers, they soon emerged as a powerful social group in East Pakistan's political society. For this group government contracts, issued under various public works programs became a major source of income. Since the rate of growth of the province's agriculture sector seriously lagged behind that of West Pakis-

tan, the Bengali farmer-contractor was able to mobilize political support for himself around the issue of economic discrimination. The phenomenal success of the Awami League in the elections of 1970 is to be attributed not only to the emotions generated by the one-issue campaign waged by Sheikh Mirjibur Rahman and his associates, but also to the remarkable social, political and economic control exercised by the politically and economically homogeneous class of farmer-contractors.

The performance of the agriculture sector in West Pakistan has also produced important social, economic and political consequences. The concentration of social, economic and political power in the hands of the landed aristocracy in the first decade after independence was the principal cause of some very important developments in the second decade. It convinced the modernizing elite that assumed power after the coup d'etat of 1958 that the power of the landed aristocracy had to be curtailed before any meaningful movement of reform could be launched. When such a movement was in fact launched. the landed aristocracy responded by abandonning its political and economic hold on the countryside, the big landlords surrendered their political monopoly in the rural areas in order to accomodate a new social group with the broader coalition that the military regime was trying to foster.

It also abandonned some of its economic interest in the countryside for it was convinced that the land-reform of 1959 was the first step toward the total elimination of the landed

aristocracy as the single most powerful group in the West Pakistani countryside. As will be shown in the next chapter, in the 1960's landed aristocracy began to shift its economic gaze from the agricultural to the industrial sector.

Table 6.1

Land Ownership Patterns and their Social, Political and Economic Consequences

	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Type of Assessment of Land Tax Undertaken by the British	Permanent	Fluctuating
Types of Landlord Produced by the British Land Administration System	Absentee	Resident
Distribution of Landed Property	Askewed	Askewed
Government Interest in Landlord-Peasant Relationship	Insignificant	Great
Power of the Landlords in the Village	Insignificant	Great
Influence of the Landlords on the Government	Insignificant	Great
Government Investment in the Agricultural Sector	Insignificant	Great
Private Investment in the Agricultural Sector	Insignificant	Great

Table 6.2

Performance of Agriculture by Region and Time Period

	1949-1950	1959-1960	1968-1969
Share in the Gross Domestic Product[a]	57.7	50.2	42.7
Per capita Income in the Agriculture Sector (Rupees)[a]	214	197	278
Public Sector Investment as Percentage of Total Public Sector Investment[b]	7.0	7.6	9.1
Private Sector Investment as Percentage of Total Private Sector Investment[b]	2.9	3.5	4.9
Per Annum Rate of Growth of Crop Production in East Pakistan[c]	0.5	2.7	
Per Annum Rate of Growth of Crop Production in West Pakistan[c]	2.3	5.4	

Sources: (a) Gustav F. Papanek, "Pakistan: Economic Survey" in The Far East and Australasia, 170 (London, Europa Publications, 1970), p. 298

(b) Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 387. For 1968-69, the figures were supplied by the Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan

(c) Joseph Stern and Walter Falcon, Growth and Development in Pakistan, 1955-1969 (Cambridge, Mass, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1970), p. 37.

Table 6.3

Rents Received by the Landlords in West Pakistan (1948-1969)

(Rupees per acre)

Year	Size of the Rented Holdings					
	Less than 10 acres	10-25	25-50	50-100	100-250	250-500
1948-49	82	87	91	92	102	104
1949-50	85	92	93	94	104	110
1950-51	85	94	94	96	108	111
1951-52	79	92	95	96	107	108
1952-53	76	93	95	95	105	108
1953-54	94	105	108	121	120	122
1954-55	89	101	110	120	125	128
1955-56	91	107	116	125	130	132
1956-57	88	107	118	130	132	128
1957-58	90	111	122	138	136	137
1958-59	98	117	128	140	142	145
1959-60	96	117	126	140	145	141
1960-61	94	118	135	139	144	139
1961-62	92	118	140	139	142	137
1962-63	97	121	145	142	140	140
1963-64	97	125	148	144	140	141
1964-65	104	128	157	150	142	145
1965-66	92	124	155	146	142	135
1966-67	94	128	160	152	148	132
1967-68	98	130	165	160	151	139
1968-69	102	135	171	167	158	143

Source: Data collected by the author with the assistance of the Deputy Commissioners and students of Government College Lahore. The data are from 27 villages, distributed as follows:

District	Number of villages
1. Jhang	3
2. Gujranwala	3
3. Lahore	1
4. Gujrat	3
5. Sahiwal	3
6. Multan	3
7. Dera Ghazi Khan	3
8. Sahiwal	2
9. Lyallpur	3
10. Bahawalnagar	3
Total	27

Table 6.4

Regression Equations to Explain the Ratio of Growth in Agricultural Production in 27 Villages of the Punjab, 1959-1969

Dependent Variable	Constant	Independent Variables	R^{-2}	Coefficient of Determination
1. ROG =	9.455 (0.642)	-.1122APOL (.0231)	-0.70	.49
2. ROG =	7.257 (0.949)	-0.0329 BPOL (.0399)	-0.16	0.42
3. ROG =	2.990 (1.19)	+.1751CPOL (.0580)	+0.52	0.27
4. ROG =	3.880 (0.477)	=0.1359 DPOL (.0225)	+.77	0.59
5. ROG =	6.502 (0.583)	+.0014 EPOL	+.01	0.00
6. ROG =	0.555 (0.456)	+0.1505 CDOL (0.0112	+94	0.88

ROG = Average Per Annum Rate of Growth, 1959-1969

APOL = Percentage of cultivated area owned by farmers having holdings of 0-10 acres in size

BPOL = Percentage of area in holdings of 10-25 acres

CPOL = Percentage of area in holdings of 25-50 acres

DPOL = Percentage of area in holdings of 50-100 acres

EPOL = Percentage of area in holding of 100-500 acres

(The figures in parenthesis are for standard errors.)

NOTES, CHAPTER 6

1. The Economist (London), March 22, 1947, pp. 404-406, May 10, 1947, pp. 716-717; May 17, 1947, pp. 747-750.

2. Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 335.

3. Iqbal's suggestion for the creation of an autonomous Muslim state in the north-west of India was contained in his presidential address delivered to the annual meeting of the All-India Muslim League held at Allalabad in 1930. See M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai (eds.), Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-1947, Vol. II (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 435-440.

4. The Pakistan resolution was passed by the All-India Muslim League on March 23, 1940 at Lahore. The resolution was moved by a Fazalul Haq, a prominent leader from Bengal. For details, see: Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 113-118 and A.S.M. Abdur Rab, A.K. Fazlul Haq (Lahn, Ferozesons, 1970), pp. 99-107.

5. M.M. Isphani, Quaid-e-Azam As I Knew Him

6. The Pakistan Times (Lahore) October 23, 1964.

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CHAPTER 7:

INDUSTRIALIZATION

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August, 1971

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"It is a general belief in Congress circles, and one held strongly it seems by Mr. Nehru himself," wrote the Economist three months before the emergence of Pakistan as an independent state, "that the Northwest and East Bengal as separate states of Pakistan would not be viable and would be compelled by economic pressure to reunite with the rest of India."[1] The very backward state of industrial development in the provinces of British India that were to constitute Pakistan provided the ground for this belief. In August 1947, Pakistan entered the world community "with an abnormally low amount of industrial capacity and industrial production for a country of her size, income, and resource base."[2] The partition of the Indian sub-continent led to a massive cross-migration of populations with 6.0 million Muslims leaving their homes in India and migrating to Pakistan and 4.0 million non-Muslims moving in the opposite direction. This produced disastrous consequences for an already impoverished economy. Three months after her birth, Pakistan was described as an economic wreck faced with serious social unrest. Nehru seemed vindicated.

However, Pakistan survived. In 1965 it was considered to be on its way "to an economic milestone that has been reached by only one other populous country, the United States."[3] In less than two decades the country had become the showpiece of the non-Communist world. It had reached a remarkable rate

of economic growth without going through the rigours of a harsh political and social system. The country had confounded the prophets of doom; its survival and development was "one of the most remarkable examples of state and nation building in the post-war world."[4]

Pakistan's economic survival and growth is usually attributed to the remarkable performance of her industrial sector. At the time of independence Pakistan had 20 percent of the population of the Indian sub-continent but only 4 percent of its industrial capacity.[5] Of the 14,569 industrial units in the sub-continent, only 1,406 were located in the areas that came to the share of Pakistan.[6] Out of a population of about 76 million only 26,000 persons were employed in factories. The new country found itself self-sufficient only in one industrial product, cement. Its cotton textile mills, fourteen in number, together with handloom production accounted only for 90 million yards of the population's total requirement of 1,040 million. Its nine sugar factories provided only 25,000 tons against estimated annual requirements of 245,000.[7] Pakistan was indeed created out of the backwashes of British India: the industry of the sub-continent had tended to concentrate near the coalfields and the major ports, while the area which was to become Pakistan remained predominantly agricultural.

In the five-year period following independence, the large-scale manufacturing sector (industrial units employing more than 20 persons and using power) grew at a rate of 23.6 percent per annum (Table 7.1). This galloping rate of growth increased the share of the industrial sector from 7 percent of the gross national product in 1949-50 to nearly 10 percent in 1954-55 (Table 7.2). On the eve of the Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65), Pakistan's most successful development program, the industrial sector accounted for nearly one-eighth of the national product. Ten years later, in 1969, the industrial sector had increased its share to 13.0 percent.

The aggregate figures of Tables 7.1 and 7.2 hide the differences in the performance of the industrial sector in East and West Pakistan. At the time of partition, the eastern wing of the country had an industrial base even smaller than that of the West.[8] After independence, West Pakistan was the scene of the rapid strides made by the industrial sector. Consequently, the east wing remained more heavily agricultural (55.5 percent of gross provincial product as against 42.9 percent in the West in 1964-65.)[9] In the mid-1960's the industrial sector accounted for only 4 percent of the gross provincial product of East Pakistan.[10] However, even this low proportion represented considerable advance over the situation at the time of independence. Gustav Papanek has calculated that in East Pakistan in 1948-1949 only 0.9 percent of the provincial product emanated from the manufacturing sector.[11]

Another characteristic of Pakistan's economic growth that needs to be noted here is that of concentration of industrial wealth in a few hands. During the 1950's and 1960's Pakistan adopted what has been termed the "busy-bee route to development."[12] The government let the private sector participate massively in building up the country's economy. The reason for this strategy was provided by Mahbubul Haq, at one time the Chief Economist of the Planning Commission, in his study of Pakistan's economic growth.

> What is important and intellectually honest is to admit frankly that the heart of the growth problem lies in maximizing the creation of this surplus. Either the capitalist sector should be allowed to perform the role, or, if this is found inefficient because of the nature of the capitalist sector in a particular country or is distastefull politically, the State should undertake it. It would be wrong to dub the consequent emergence of surplus value as 'exploitation'; its justification is economic growth.[13]

In Pakistan the decision-makers found the capitalist sector neither inefficient nor politically unacceptable. Accordingly, it was entrusted with the task of saving and reinvesting the economy's surplus. By giving this assignment to a few capitalists, the government was allowing concentration

of wealth that did not disturb the indigeneous policy framers or their foreign advisors. This approach had Papanek's full endorsement. "The problem of inequality exists but its importance must be put in perspective," he wrote in his study of Pakistan's development. "First of all inequalities in income contribute to the growth of the economy which makes possible a real improvement for the lower income groups."[14] However, in 1968, Haq no longer looked in equanimity at the skewed distribution of economic wealth in the country. Now, with equal candor, he traced the social upheaval of the late 1960's to the malfunctioning of the capitalist system. At the 1968 convention of the Pakistan Management Association, he disclosed "that 66 percent of the entire industrial capital of the country was concentrated in the hands of twenty families. The same twenty families controlled 80 percent of the banking and 97 percent of the insurance of the country."[15]

We see, therefore, that in a short period of less than two decades, Pakistan developed a dynamic industrial sector dominated by a small group of enterprising individuals. From a country with no industrial capital whatsoever, Pakistan was able to create a vibrant economy that won accolades from a large number of economists. However, the political upheaval of the late 1960's that toppled the government of Field Marshal Ayub Khan and to a certain extent caused the crisis of national integration in the 1970's shook the belief of many in the political, economic and social viability of the growth

model pursued by Pakistan. In the post-mortem that followed these events, this model, in particular its strategy for industrial development, was held out as being responsible for creating serious tensions within the society. The exclusive concern in the 1950's with the generation of economic surplus and the equally extravagant preoccupation with distributive justice in the 1970's is an indication of the fact that the economists who concerned themselves with Pakistan's growth experiment did not fully comprehend the nature of the changes they were instituting.

In order to fully understand the process of development of the industrial sector, we have to answer the following three questions. First, why did the government entrust the task of creating industrial capital to a handful of private entrepreneurs? While answering this question we will see that various policy decisions taken by the governments in the pre-Ayub and Ayub eras can be understood only by tracing them to the interests of some powerful social groups. Second, why was the industrial development of East Pakistan neglected for such a long time? While some economists have argued that the widening of disparity in industrial wealth of the two wings was occasioned by purely economic forces,[16] we will show that this too can be traced to the power wielded by important social groups. Third, what were the social and political consequences of the model of industrial growth followed by Pakistan? In answering this question we will be able to find some clues for

explaining the social and political turmoil that led to the fall of Ayub Khan in March 1969.

In other words, the present analysis departs considerably from what can be described as the conventional wisdom about the development of Pakistan's industrial sector. Economists who have studied Pakistan start with economic policies once they have been formulated and then go on to analyze their consequences. Our analysis takes us a step backward; we will concern ourselves here mainly with the dynamics of decision-making in a society characterized by the presence of numerous powerful social groups. Before we come to this, it would be worthwhile to describe briefly some of the important government policies that influenced the development of the industrial sector. Having done that we will tell the story of Pakistan's industrial development in the language of the economists. The purpose of the latter excursion is to underscore the point that has already been made, viz, that by using economic tools alone we cannot understand the nature of Pakistan's industrial growth. Some help from other disciplines is required to fully comprehend the picture.

SOME IMPORTANT POLICY DECISIONS

So far as the Muslim community of the Indian sub-continent is concerned, the most important economic policy decision was taken on March 23, 1940, when the leaders of the Muslim League passed the famous "Pakistan resolution", demanding the creation

of a separate homeland for the followers of Islam. The next most important decision was taken in 1948, a few months after the emergence of Pakistan. Jinnah, as the first Governor-General of Pakistan, persuaded his countrymen to adopt a course which would win them not only full political but also economic independence. The partition of the Indian sub-continent provided the Muslim community with an independent political country. The 1948-49 trade war with India broke their economic links with India. Within a very short time, Pakistan had developed an economy which was completely independent of her large and relatively wealthier neighbor. It is useful to analyze the course of the trade war in some detail, for this conflict was the first indication that the ruling groups within Pakistan were going to use economic policies for achieving political objectives. This trend continued in later years. Throughout the period we are dealing with here, powerful social groups moulded government economic policies to provide themselves with useful political dividends.

In British India, indirect taxes like export and import duties provided the government with more than one-half of its total revenues. At the time of partition the Government of Pakistan suggested that a formula for sharing the taxes on foreign trade should be evolved since the bulk of the exports from East Pakistan were shipped out of the Indian port of Calcutta. "The Indian representatives refused to agree and insisted that each Dominion should keep the revenue

collected within its territory. Nor would they accept a special agreement for jute. The Pakistan government was therefore forced to levy an export duty on jute crossing the land frontier from East to West Bengal."[17] The Government of India's reply to this action was to impose a similar export duty on raw jute and jute manufactures going from India to Pakistan. The Economist noted that the "Indian Government's action is clearly retaliatory, in an attempt to induce Pakistan to come to an 'amicable settlement.'"[18] However, the capacity of East Pakistan's port of Chittagong proved quite inadequate to handle the jute trade which the Government tried to divert from Calcutta. Perforce jute had to be shipped from the Indian port and "the Indian Government from time to time held shipments in order to husband adequate supplies from the Calcutta mills..."[19]

In June 1948, more than eight months after the beginning of the trade war, the two governments reached an agreement. Under it, Pakistan's jute could pass freely through the port of Calcutta without paying double export duty, while petroleum destined for use in India could be freely imported through the West Pakistani port of Karachi. Economic peace between the two countries proved to be short-lived.

In September 1949, the United Kingdom devalued the sterling. Many other countries, including India, followed this action in quick succession. Pakistan, arguing that India broke its undertaking not to alter the exchange rate between

the two countries without "due notice and mutual consultation" decided to maintain the parity of its rupee with the dollar. There were good economic reasons for this action. First, Pakistan's balance of payments with the rest of the world, particularly with India and the United States, was favorable. In 1948-1949, Pakistan's land trade with India was valued at more than Rs 55.00 crues and accounted for roughly 50 percent of her total exports and imports. Second, the implementation of Pakistan's program of industrialization depended upon the import of capital goods as cheaply as possible. Third, the government believed that Pakistan's exports had an inelastic demand, particularly in the hard currency areas. Fourth, Pakistan did not want to deteriorate further the inflationary pressures that had been produced by the partition of the sub-continent.[20]

These economic justifications notwithstanding, India was not prepared to accept the new exchange rate of Indian Rs 144 = Pakistan Rs 100. Accordingly, on September 18, 1949, Delhi halted completely the flow of goods and commodities between the two countries, hoping that a trade embargo would hurt Pakistan far more than India. "Obviously, political considerations cannot be excluded," wrote The Economist. "India has apparently accepted the Pakistan decision not to devaluate as a declaration of economic war... Although Indian consumers (and particularly Indian factory owners) are likely to be hard hit by the standstill of imports from Pakistan,

it is possible that Pakistan might suffer more during this period of trial."[21]

However, Pakistan withstood the challenge. In fact, it was then not realized (and it still does not figure in conventional wisdom about Pakistan's economic development) that the Government of Pakistan had to wage a trade war with India in order to build up her own economy. This, as we shall see later, proved to be a correct diagnosis. Without severing trade relations with India, it is unlikely that Pakistan's industrial development would have proceeded at the rate at which it did.

When the trade war was being waged in full fury, the Government of Pakistan issued the Statement of Industrial Policy. "The most striking feature of Pakistan's present economy is the marked contrast between its vast natural resources and its extreme industrial backwardness," the Statement read. "Pakistan would therefore seek, in the first place, to manufacture in its own territories, the products of its raw materials... for which there is an assured demand at home or abroad. At the same time, to meet the requirements of the home market, efforts will be made to develop consumer-goods industries for which Pakistan is at present dependent on outside sources."[22] The policy's main objective was reducing the dependence of the economy on foreign countries. In order to draw up a detailed program to achieve this objective, the government convened an economic conference in 1949. In this

conference, attended by most of the prominent merchants and industrialists, two important decisions were taken. First, "Realizing the pioneering role which private enterprise could play in industrial expansion, the Government threw open all fields of industrial activity to it, except... manufacturing of arms and ammunition; generation of hydro-electric power; and manufacture of railway wagons, telephones, telegraphic and wireless apparatus."[23] Second, to assist the development of these industries, it was decided to erect a wall of protective tariffs and to provide liberal tax incentives.

While, from the point of view of the members of the new entrepreneurial class, the Government's industrial policy was a happy one, they did not feel so sanguine about its taxation policy. The new Finance Minister maintained the high income taxes that Liaquat Ali Khan had introduced in the "poor man's budget" of undivided India in 1947. After independence, India "progressively reduced this burden, in two successive budgets, in recognition of the need for providing more incentives; but Pakistan continues to invite capitalists to risk their money rather on a basis of 'heads I win, tails you loose.' Their losses will be their own, while their profits will go to the State."[24]

Following the improvement in the financial position of the country in the wake of the Korean War, the government brought down the share of direct taxes, including those collected

from the industrial class, in its total revenues. The Korean War resulted in a boom in Pakistan's exports. With more foreign exchange available, the imports into the country also increased substantially. Consequently, the share of export and import duties in total receipts went up considerably.

The economic boom brought about by the Korean War was soon pricked. The demand for Pakistan's exports, and consequently the prices fetched by them in the international market, declined sharply. As a result, Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings were greatly reduced. The government responded to this new situation in 1952 by drastically revising its import policy, reorienting it in favor of capital goods. The fall in the quantity of consumer goods permitted into the country increased their prices in the domestic market and provided yet another incentive to the industrial entrepreneurs.

The fall in the level of the country's foreign exchange earnings persuaded the government to install an intricate system of import controls.[25] From January 1953 to 1964 all imports into the country were regulated by some form of quantitative controls. In the private sector, detailed and comprehensive licensing determined the level and composition of imports, identifying the importer, the commodities that he could bring in and the currency areas or countries from which the imports could come. Since the government had continued its 1949 policy of maintaining an exchange rate for the rupee at a level much higher than permitted by economic conditions, an

import license was worth far more to its recipient than its actual (official) value. "An import license in Pakistan is a permit to an individual or firm to import a specified value of a specified type of commodity (or group of commodities) into a specified part of the country."[26]

The government's industrial, fiscal and commercial policies yielded handsome dividends, to the country and to the industrial entrepreneurs. As we saw in Table 7.1, the manufacturing sector grew at rates that bordered on the spectacular. In response to the policy of the government, the rate of growth in the consumption goods sector was particularly high, 43 percent compared with 28 and 17 percent respectively for the sub-sectors of intermediate and investment goods (Table 7.3).

The military take-over of October 1958 completely changed for a while the attitude of the administration toward the merchant-industrialist class. Very deliberately and with considerable resoluteness, the regime of Ayub Khan moved to demolish the system of incentives that had helped the industrial entrepreneurs in reshaping the economy of the country. On November 1, 1958 Ayub Khan himself announced the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 42, to control the prices of certain categories of imported goods, goods manufactured locally and imported foodgrains. Three days later the government announced its intention of stopping all illegal trafficking in import licenses. These were desperate actions

and they did not produce the desired result. For, the facts of economic life in Pakistan could not be disguised. "There was a shortage of foreign exchange and, consequently, a shortage of many things the country needed and could not produce for itself. In such circumstances, human nature being what it is, there is always someone prepared to pay a little more for something he needs, or thinks he needs, but which is not readily available. In times of scarcity the menace of the black market is always present, and countries claiming to be better organized than Pakistan have not escaped it."[27] Black market leaders that sprang into action soon after the Martial Law/slackened their control on the administration (within a couple months Ayub Khan had returned the bulk of his military helpers back to the barracks) may have thwarted the purpose of the new regime but did not hide it. Once the regime developed a certain amount of expertise in the new field of economic management, and once it was clear to all that the generals had come to stay, Ayub Khan was able to use administrative finesse to achieve his objectives.

It was against this background that a decision was taken to introduce an Expert Bonus Scheme (EBS). The scheme created a system of multiple exchange rates for some commodities. Exporters of certain goods (and later on of some commodities) received an import license (Bonus Voucher) valued at a fixed proportion (the rate of Bonus) of the value of exports. The

bearer of the license could either use the voucher for importing certain specified goods or could dispose of it in a specially organized market at a premium (the Bonus Voucher rate). The EBS produced some obvious reverberations: it reduced the level of profits of the registered importers by bringing in a number of competitors into the field and it made available industrial capital to a totally new breed of entrepreneurs.

In 1960 the government introduced a number of changes in the import licensing system. These changes were made with the aim of reducing further the economic power of the old merchant class. Finally, a major departure from the quantitative controls was made in 1964 with the introduction of the so-called "Free List." This was a list of items that could be imported without licenses "by anyone who could meet requirements of credit - worthiness, character, citizenship, and who could import in appropriate sized lots."[28]

Some of the changes in the rates of growth within the industrial sector can be attributed to the policies adopted by the regime of Ayub Khan. We saw from the statistics of Table 7.3 that it was in the Ayub Khan era that the rate of growth of the investment goods industry considerably outstripped that of the consumer and intermediate goods industries. The new industrialist, the product of the policies of the new regime, did not share the inclination of the group of merchant-industrialists that had dominated the sector in the 1950's. The latter, because of their long association with businesses connected with consumer goods, were inclined to invest their

capital/consumption goods industry in.[29] The industrial entrepreneur of the 1960's, coming as he did from non-commercial background, did not display such a bias.

The fact that the process of industrial development during the Ayub period saw the emergence of a new type of entrepreneur explains why there was greater geographic dispersion in the 1960's.

In 1958, on the eve of Ayub Khan's coup d'etat, the city of Karachi alone accounted for Rs 1,146 million out of Rs 1,940 million of capital invested in West Pakistan's industry.[30] In other words, Karachi with a population of less than 4 percent of West Pakistan had 59.1 percent of her industrial capital. The level of concentration was even greater for consumer goods industry. Thus Karachi in 1958 had 91.5 percent of the capital invested in the cotton textile industry of West Pakistan (Table 7.4).

By 1966-67, Karachi's share in West Pakistan's industrial capital had fallen to 43.6 percent.[31] The investment goods industry that grew at a very rapid rate during the Ayub Khan era went to new industrial centers located at considerable distances from the city of Karachi. Thus the cities of Multan, Lahore and Sheikhupura accounted for over 60 percent of the total capital invested in West Pakistan in chemical industries, while Lahore alone had 61.5 percent of the capital outlay in iron and steel industry.[32]

We see, therefore, that public policy played a very important role in Pakistan's industrial development. The decisions to sever all economic ties with India, to promote industrial growth by providing incentives to the private sector, to favor the development of the consumer goods industry, to change the nature of the incentives once the consumer goods industry had developed, all produced their inevitable impact. The Pakistani industrial entrepreneur responded to these incentives and the industrial sector grew at a rate that confounded the prophets of gloom. As Gustav Papanek has remarked, "the most striking aspect of private industrial development in Pakistan was its speed, as though a movie taken at 16 frames per second were projected at 64 frames."[33]

THE ECONOMISTS' EXPLANATION

The economists who have studied Pakistan's industrial growth recognize the very important role played by public policy. However, the story is not adequate for at least two reasons. First, the take-off point for economic analysis is public policy. What happened after the government changed its import policy by drastically restricting the flow of consumer goods into the country? In what way did the industrial entrepreneur respond to the fiscal incentives provided by the government? These are the examples of the kind of question that the economists have sought to answer in their analysis. The other side of the picture receives little attention. What motivated Pakistan's

first administration into adopting policies that led to a complete halt in Indo-Pakistan trade? Why did the Pakistani leadership favor the development of industry with the help of the private sector? Questions such as these are seldom asked; or if asked, answered in purely economic terms.

The second short-coming that one notices in the standard economic analysis of Pakistan's industrial development is that it regards public policy as being "neutral" in the sense of its application to various social groups. For instance Papanek's examination of the emergence of Pakistan's first industrial entrepreneurs proceeds on the assumption that the economic policy which persuaded them to shift their capital from commerce to industry was formulated in a political vacuum. According to this explanation, it was new industrialists' business backgrounds and work ethics that made them respond positively to the new economic environment created by the government. The very likely assumption that the new economic environment was a product of a political one is not examined. In the analysis that follows we will try and fill the gaps that we have identified above. However, before we do this it would be useful to briefly narrate the story of Pakistan's industrial growth as told by the economists.

Two theoretical models have guided much of the thinking of the economists in so far as the development of Pakistan's industrial sector is concerned. These are the two-sector model of Arthur Lewis[34] and the model developed by Holis B. Chenery[35]

which provides an estimation of the normal level of industrial activity in a country, determined according to its size, population and per capita income.

Let us first consider the Chenery model. The implications of the model so far as Pakistan is concerned are obvious. Chenery, using per capita incomes , population and resource base as variables, derived a typical structure of industrial production for the 1950's. According to this model Pakistan exhibited a very large negative deviation from expected contribution of industrial production to gross national product. There is an obvious normative content in this analysis. Remarked Chenery and Taylor: "In a few countries such as Israel, South Korea and Pakistan, the subsequent growth pattern was obviously affected by the initial disequilibrium in the production structure. The result was a tendency for industry and primary production to converge toward the average cross-sectional pattern."[36] Starting at a very low level of industrialization at the time of her birth, Pakistan was in a state of disequilibrium. Such a state of disequilibrium was possible since Pakistan was carved out of the Indian sub-continent which had, in all probability, achieved the level of industrialization that conformed to her population and income. The very rapid rate of industrial growth in the territories that went to the share of Pakistan is, then, to be interpreted as an adjustment mechanism. Stephen Lewis, in his study of Pakistan's industrial growth, confirms this hypothesis.[37]

Chenery's model not only supplies the level of industrial growth reached by a 'typical' country, but also the type of industries that should lead the way in the process of development. For a country of Pakistan's size, he postulates that the development would be primarily determined by the growth of domestic demand since trade and resources differences in her case (as in the case of other large countries) are relatively unimportant. Accordingly, the "early industries" in Pakistan's development would be those which supply essential demands and which can be carried on with simple technology.[38] Once again the facts of the Pakistan case seem to vindicate this position. As we saw above, it was the cotton and jute textile industries that led the way in Pakistan's industrialization. The application of Chenery's model to Pakistan introduces an element of determinism, thereby reducing the importance of policy in industrial development. In the words of Stephen Lewis:

> After partition, even if extra trade barriers had not been erected, the normal difficulties of currency conversion and trade over international boundaries would have raised the cost of importing Indian goods and raised the cost of importing Pakistani raw cotton and raw jute... Since the countries were at similar levels of *per capita* income, and presumably had similar factor price ratios, one important factor in making domestic

> production possible in Pakistan was the relatively large market for many of the goods that had been imported from India... If the trade policy adopted had not been so restrictive, the equilibration process would have taken much longer, since the profitability of investing in Pakistani manufacturing would not have been so high. Even in the absence of economic policies that encouraged domestic production, however, there would have been considerable growth of the manufacturing sector as it responded to the increased profitability created by partition.[39]

Therefore, the only concession that Stephen Lewis is prepared to make, so far as the role of public policy is concerned, is in terms of time span: among other things, Pakistan's trade policy only quickened the process, it did not start it.

How did Pakistan generate the capital needed for getting to the normal pattern of growth predicted by Chenery and from which the economy deviated such a great deal at the time of partition? In answering this, the economists use another quasi-deterministic model, first propounded by Arthur Lewis. This model emphasizes the shift of the labor force from low productivity uses in the agricultural sector to the high productivity uses of labor in the modern sectors. Wages paid to the labor force in the non-agricultural sector are related to the productivity of labor in the traditional sector, though

wages in the former are somewhat above those in the latter. The labor in the modern sector is paid less than its marginal productivity because of the presence of a large reservoir of surplus manpower in the agricultural sector. The difference between value added and wages paid to the labor force is profits. A very large proportion of these profits is assumed to be reinvested. As the modern sector grows relative to the rest of the economy, the share of profits and therefore the share of saving in total income rises. As savings and investment rise, the rate of growth of the economy increases. As labor moves away from the agricultural sector, output per capita increases in that sector. Since there is a direct link between the wages paid to labor in the modern sector with productivity in the traditional sector, the wage bill in the former increases over time. The process stops working once the reservoir of surplus manpower has been exhausted in the agricultural sector and labor does not move to the modern sector voluntarily. In this situation the modern sector has to bid labor away from the agricultural sector by offers of high wages. This affects profits, savings and hence reinvestment in the modern sector.

The two-sector model of Arthur Lewis also reduces the part played by public policy. Given unlimited supplies of labor in the agricultural sector, the transfer of resources from the traditional (agricultural) to modern sector proceeds almost automatically. However, it need hardly be emphasized that the deterministic nature of the explanation provided by Lewis does

preclude the possibility of increasing the rate of reinvestment in the modern sector by adopting suitable measures. For instance, policies can be formulated to keep down labor productivity in the traditional sector. This would result in increasing the share of profits in value added in the modern sector. Policies can also be designed to increase the rate of resource transfer from the traditional to the modern sector. An increase in the productivity of labor in the agricultural sector would release manpower that can be employed in the non-agricultural sector. At the same time a control on prices of agricultural produce could cushion the impact on wages in the modern sector of increased labor productivity in the traditional sector.

In their analyses, however, the economists have emphasized the deterministic aspect of the two-sector model. For this purpose, they have collected plenty of very good evidence. The evidence points to the stagnation of wages in the industrial sector for some time; transfer of labor and capital from the traditional to the modern sector; and slowing down of the rate of industrial growth when productivity in the agricultural sector, hence wages in the industrial sector, began to increase somewhat. Some of this evidence merits detailed discussion if only because it provides some interesting corroboration of the theses being developed in this and other chapters. Particularly relevant is the discussion of industrial wages and the rate of savings and investment by the industrial entrepreneurial class.

In his researches, Azizur Rahman Khan showed that there was a substantial decline in real wages of the industrial sector in the period 1954-64.[40] For the West Pakistani labor, the index of real wages declined from 100 in 1954 to 90.1 in 1964. The decline in East Pakistan was somewhat less. "The experience of West Pakistan in recent years shows that the industrial employers have been able to draw labour from farm areas at a rapid rate with steady, real wage and fairly low incentive differential," concluded Azizur Rahman Khan. "Only about a quarter of the rural population had lower income than average income of a wage-earning family. But labourers (presumably from the poorest income groups) nevertheless moved from villages to urban areas."[41]

Considering the model of Arthur Lewis, and given an overpopulated agricultural sector, this is not at all a surprising conclusion. The industrial class, by keeping the wages down, were able to generate a surplus that would not have been possible had they to compete with other sectors for the supply of labor. In line with the thinking of Lewis, Gustav Papanek demonstrated that the gross reinvestment rates out of manufacturing profits were as high as 75 percent.[42] This is precisely the result one would expect to find if the economy fitted the two sector model.

It was only in the matter of regional economic growth and the disparities in the distribution of economic wealth that it led to, that the economists were prepared to significantly

depart from their deterministic line of thinking.

S.U. Khan has provided an index for measuring economic growth in East and West Pakistan during the Ayub Khan period.[43] In 1951-1952, per capita availability of cloth in East Pakistan was higher than in West Pakistan, 1.7 against 1.4 yards per head. In the eight year period that followed, West Pakistan made a dramatic advance; by 1959-1960, its industry provided 9.0 yards per head of the population compared to 3.0 yards in East Pakistan. The development of the cotton textile industry could be attributed to the easy availability of raw material in the western wing. However even in the case of an industry which depended upon East Pakistani raw material, West Pakistan had gained an edge by the end of 1950's. In 1959-60, the western wing produced 1.4 pounds of paper per head of the population compared with 0.3 pounds in East Pakistan. According to Khan's estimation the commodity quantity index for West Pakistan rose successively and showed an increase of 54 percent in 1959-60, over the base year (1951-1952). However the index for East Pakistan, having declined to a level of 98 in 1955-1956, made a recovery and reached 131 in 1959-1960.[44]

"The most obvious explanation of the increase in disparity is found in the higher aggregate investment in West Pakistan relative to East Pakistan," wrote Rehman Sobhan in 1962. "This was, in part, the result of the Government's own investment decisions and the resultant impact on the private sector of the economy... What has been the loglc behind government decisions on investment? Critics have alleged that in

fact there has been no logic and that either accident or some factor such as politics has constituted the main motivation. It is difficult to evaluate such criticisms, but it would not be inaccurate to say that economics have played a relatively insignificant role in locale policy."[45]

Anisur Rahman, in his detailed study of the problems of regional planning in Pakistan advanced similar non-economic reasons for the increase in the income disparity between the two wings of Pakistan. "In the ultimate analysis, regional disparity in Pakistan as elsewhere, is a human problem that involves natural human tendencies to be more concerned with the welfare of the region one comes from. With an overwhelming West-Pakistan-manned planning and administrative machinery, a bias toward economic progress in this region is understandable," he concluded.[46]

However, even when discussing the question of regional disparities, occasioned by the transfer of income from one wing to another, some economists stuck to the model of Arthur Lewis. Thus according to Stephen Lewis, the widening of income disparities between East and West Pakistan was largely a question of the transfer of income from the predominantly agricultural economy of the eastern wing to the somewhat more modern economy of the West. If we are to accept this conclusion then it would seem that the intention behind this transfer at least "were not as insiduous as might be supposed from the existing artifacts on the size of that regional transfer of income."[47]

Despite the fact that the economists have paid a great deal of attention to the role of public policy in Pakistan's industrial development, as a causative factor it assumes a marginal place in their analysis. Thus the drawing of the partition line between India and Pakistan was enough to trigger off a corrective mechanism for bringing up the level of industrial production of Pakistan to a point required by her size and the per capita income of her population. The policies adopted by the government, including those that led to a trade war between India and Pakistan, may have hastened somewhat the process of industrialization. Similarly, an agricultural sector beset with a high man-land ratio transferred its labor and capital to the modern sector, providing the necessary resources to the new entrepreneurs for building industrial capital in the country. The policies of the government may have quickened somehwat this process of resource transfer. And, it was the same mechanism that, to a certain extent, was responsible for bringing East Pakistani resources to the western wing. Here public policy spurred on the process of transfer considerably. Although at the present stage of our knowledge it is not possible to assign to economic forces and public policy coefficients of determination with any degree of exactness, it is my contention that the latter deserves something more than a back-seat in the causative process.

A NEW APPROACH

The approach I am adopting here is reminiscent of the one used to explain economic changes in Pakistan's agricultural sector. (See Chapter 6). The argument is that economic models notwithstanding, a number of developments in the industrial sector, as was the case in the agricultural sector, can be traced to specific policies formulated as a result of the pressure exercised by several powerful social groups. The dynamics of group politics, in so far as the development of the industrial sector is concerned, is made explicit in Table 7.5.

In several parts of this book we examine the economic consequences of Mohammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim separatism. It is inconceivable that the Jinnah regime would have abandoned its two-nation theory immediately after achieving Pakistan. Economic factors had been responsible to a great extent for the awakening of the Muslim community and in providing a sharp nationalistic edge to the Pakistan movement. The birth of Pakistan did not necessarily mean that the Muslim community of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent had been economically emancipated. Had Jinnah not carried on his two-nation campaign to its logical conclusion, the economic development of Pakistan would have proceeded in an altogether different direction. In the pre-independence period the agricultural sectors of East and West Pakistan supplied essential raw

materials to the fairly well-developed industrial sector of the provinces that went to the share of India. Drawing of political boundaries notwithstanding, this relationship could have been preserved. This assumption is not as preposterous as it sounds in the context of the 1970's. After all, it must be remembered that when partition of the Indian sub-continent was still only a possibility the view was expressed, particularly by the Congress leadership, that whatever the ultimate political settlement of India's problems, organized economic cooperation would be necessary to avoid damage to common interests.[48]

It is, therefore, quite conceivable that had the Jinnah administration not worked to disassociate Pakistan politically and economically from India, the new Muslim state would have developed its industrial wealth not at all as rapidly as it did. With the custom union between India and Pakistan continuing to operate even after 1947, Myrdals' backwash effect[49] may have further impoverished the latter.

As we have already emphasized, it is apparent from the evidence available at present that the Quaid-e-Azam favored the complete economic separation between India and Pakistan. For instance, when Lord Racliffe was demarcating the boundary between East and West Punjab and started to worry about the consequences of partition on the Punjab's canal system, he invited a rebuke from Jinnah. "Jinnah told him to get on with

his job and inferred that he would rather have Pakistan deserts than fertile fields watered by the courtesy of Hindus."[50]

As we show in Table 7.5 and as we have elaborated in an earlier chapter, in his resolve to create an independent economy for Pakistan, Jinnah was influenced to adegree by a class of Indian-Muslim merchants, many of whom were closely associated with him. Other forces of similar persuasion were the urban professional classes who had felt the real pinch of Hindu economic competition in the pre-partition period, and the members of the orthodox civil bureaucracy. The former manned the top positions in the Muslim League and the latter held high positions in the new administration. We learn from Chaudhri Muhammad Ali's account of the days immediately preceeding and following independence that the experience of some of the civil servants in running the Finance Department of the Government of India during the days of the Interim Government had given them sufficient confidence to want them to operate the economic system of Pakistan without any strings pulled from across the border.[51]

After his death in September 1948, Jinnah's policies of economic nationalism were carried on by the successor government of Liaquat Ali Khan. In this period the Muslim merchant class that had migrated or been persuaded to migrate to Pakistan had established itself in the field of industry. There were three reasons why the old businessmen became the captains of

Pakistan's new industry. First, this was the only class that had capital available for investment. Pakistan's other wealthy class, landed aristocracy, was too preoccupied in consolidating its position on the countryside to undertake investment in industry. Second, the industries chosen by the government - simple consumer goods, mostly cotton and jute textiles (Chenery's early industries) were those in which the merchants had a certain degree of expertise. Third, the close association of some members of this class with the Pakistan movement gave them access to the bureaucracy which was not available to other groups. Accordingly, in the four-year period following independence, cotton and jute textiles claimed over three-fourths of the capital invested in large-scale manufacturing. Of this, 72 percent was owned by the merchant class that had migrated from India.

The policies adopted by the Quaid-e-Azam gathered their own momentum. The merchant-turned-industrialists had acquired sufficient wealth to be able to exert strong pressure on the weak administrations that followed one another in quick succession after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951.

We identify 1951-1958 as the second phase in Pakistan's industrial development. This period was ushered in by one political and one economic event. Liaquat's death brought with even greater force a number of social groups into the political arena, each trying

to use its political influence for building up its political and economic power. The collapse of the economic boom created by the Korean war obliged the government to apply a squeeze to the economy. The strong political position of the merchant-industrialists made it possible for them to turn this crisis to their advantage. Controls on imports were increased; the licensing system that was adopted favored the industrialists who were already well established. Thus, whereas a drop in imports increased domestic prices, licensing of foreign exchange made available to the industrialists a scarce resource at cheap (official rate of exchange) price. There is evidence to show that it was the pressure exercised by the industrialists that kept the government from devaluing the over-valued Pakistan currency.[53] It was in 1955 that the government revalued the Pakistani currency and brought it at par with the Indian rupee.

Myrdal has remarked that the kind of role played by the public sector in Pakistan's development had no parallel in South Asia.[54] Pakistan's Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) created with much fanfare in 1950, was charged with the task of promoting industrial growth and not bringing industrial capital under public ownership. "Its policy was to supplement, not to supplant, private enterprise... it was charged with the duty of setting up industries and disinvesting as soon as the shyness of private capital in any field was overcome."[55] This was a convenient device; the

public sector absorbed the risks and the private sector reaped the profits. According to a survey conducted by the weekly Manshoor, more than one-third of the capital owned by fifteen largest industrial families in Pakistan in 1969 had been disinvested by PIDC.[56]

In what way did the merchant-industrialists influence government decision-making. The Chambers of Commerce were not used for this purpose[57]- the chambers did little lobbying, occasionally they issued public appeals to the Chief Executive when all other avenues of approach failed to produce the desired result. The contact between the industrialist and the bureaucrat was less formalized. An interesting account of the way the industrial classes exerted influence on the government can be found in the published sections of the yet to be released Report on the Location of the Federal Capital.[58] The Commission was headed by General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan and one of the reasons for its recommendation to shift the capital of the country from Karachi to Rawalpindi-Islamabad was the unhealthy influence of the business class on the bureaucracy.

The shifting of the nation's capital was undertaken during the period of state-controlled economy operated by Ayub Khan. In this brief period, characterized as it was by a concerted attack on the traditional power bases of all powerful social groups, steps were taken to reduce the influence of the

merchant industrialists on the administration. By bringing the administrative capital of the country to the Potwar Plateau, Ayub Khan brought his government to a distance of more than 800 miles from Karachi, the seat of the established industrial interests. At the same time he brought his regime within the range of the seats of the groups on the support of which he was to build his political base. Lahore, located in the heart of the middle class farming community; Lyallpur, the center of the small industrial entrepreneurs who had migrated from the Indian side of the Punjab;and Rawalpindi, the seat of the military bureaucracy,were all within easy reach of Islamabad, the new capital of Pakistan.

The political and economic impact produced by the Bonus Voucher Scheme and Open General License (OGL) was as great as that produced by the transfer of the capital from Karachi to Islamabad. "For the first time since the cancellation of OGL in 1952 a major sector of the economy was freed from the rigidity of import control," said a government report. "Since the cancellation of the OGL in 1952, the import trade in the country had become a close preserve of the category holders... Despite limited foreign exchange resources, Government decided to admit newcomers into the import trade. Since the 1st of January 1960, newcomers have been admitted for 58 items placed under OGL up to the end of February 1962. The hold of categorized importers over the import trade has thus been gradually loosened and the number

of newcomers is now as large as that of the established importers. A significant feature of the newcomer scheme has been that comparatively underdeveloped areas of the country have been able to obtain a fair share in the import trade."[59]

Who were these newcomers? In Table 7.6 we provide some indication of the socio-economic breakdown of the importers who were admitted by the government under the OGL scheme. We see from the statistics of this table that the most important group of importers allowed privileges under the OGL scheme were indigenous industrialists. By 1963-1964, this group accounted for more than one-third of the imports made under the scheme. In the early 1950's, this group was not represented in the "category holders" at all. These figures point to two important conclusions. First, that even in the 1960's industrialists were prominent in the import trade. Papanek's finding that in the 1950's the principal source of capital for industrial investment was profits made in international trade[60] holds even for the 1960's. Second, and relatedly, by letting some non-refugees get into the import trade, the government helped in diversifying the ownership of industrial capital.

Some more information about the newcomers to industry can be had from an investigation into the background of the persons who were issued licenses to establish industrial units

in the western wing of the country during the 1960's. In 1964-1965, West Pakistan's government of Nawab Kalabagh issued 15 licenses for establishing cotton textile units in the province. The total installed spindlage allowed under the licenses was 185,500. Of these the members of the landed aristocracy were allowed 26.8 percent to be installed in the four mills for which they received permission. Retired government officials were allotted a quota of 13.4 percent. The erstwhile powerful group of refugee merchant-industrialists was permitted to set up only one mill with 15,500 spindles (8.4 percent of the total permitted capacity for the year). This bias toward the groups that were relative newcomers to the field of industry is even more obvious in the sub-sectors of heavy chemical and engineering industries. In the latter, which was the fastest-growing branch of the industrial sector in West Pakistan, more than fifty percent of the investment was made by indigenous industrialists and retired government officials.[61]

While reducing the hold of the merchant-industrialists belonging to the refugee community on import-export trade, the regime of Ayub Khan took other steps to make investment capital available to new groups of entrepreneurs. We have already seen that commercial capital played a very significant role in the initial stages of industrial development. However, as the capital requirements of the industrial sector increased over time, financial institutions became more important as

suppliers of credit for investment. It was recognition of this fact that took several of the industrial houses into banking and insurance business. By controlling commerce, banking and insurance, these houses had a virtual monopoly over investment capital.

The fact that banks and insurance companies played an increasing role in industrial development in the 1950's was underscored by the Credit Inquiry Commission set up by the regime of Ayub Khan "to examine the scope and working of the agencies which provide credit facilities to agriculture, business and industry."[62] Like all other important commissions appointed by the regime, this too dealt with the power base of one of the important social groups that dominated the society. And, as with the recommendations of other Commissions and subsequent government action based on them, the Credit Inquiry Commission also served the purpose of diluting the power of the social group with which it was concerned.

The Commission reported that at the end of March 1953, bank advances for industry amounted to Rs 96.0 million. However, in the next six years the level of these advances increased nearly five-fold and reached Rs 452.0 million by the end of March 1959.[63] Who were the recepients of these loans? "It is evident that at the end of 1957, 61 percent of total bank credit was locked up in only 217 accounts... On the other hand, advances to the borrowers of small means did not exceed 6 percent of the total credit... and this was spread

over more than 37,275 accounts... [Therefore] while the credit facilities made available to loan accounts below Rs 25,000 constituted a minor proportion of total bank credit, the contribution of deposit accounts of less than Rs 25,000 was 31 percent at the end of 1957 and had risen to 33 percent at the end of March 1959."[62] Recognizing the fact that the new-comers to industry needed small doses of capital, the Commission recommended the setting up of an Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, catering mainly to the needs of medium-scale industry, needing not more than Rs 1.0 milliom of borrowed capital.[63] Accordingly, on August 1, 1961, the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP) started functioning. By the end of June 1968, the Bank had advanced Rs 1629.80 million to 3,223 borrowers.[64]

Who are these borrowers? In its annual reports the IDBP does not provide any information regarding the socio-economic background of the persons to whom it made industrial advances. The Bank does report, however, that in the first year of its operation, (1961-1962), 25 percent of the borrowing units were new industrialists in West Pakistan. Their proportion in the eastern wing was almost twice as much (49.5 percent).[65] By the mid-1960's, the new industrialists were receiving even greater attention: 43 and 51 percent of the capital lent by the IDBP in 1965-1966 was to new borrowers.[66] This information when juxtaposed with that provided in Tables 4.6 and 7.6 leads me to conclude that the credit policies pursued by the regime of Ayub Khan

assisted the emergence of a new group of industrialists.

The IDBP and its sister agency, the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC) were used by the government of Ayub Khan to promote industrial development in the eastern wing. In the first year, 33 percent of the loans sanctioned by IDBP went to East Pakistan.[68]

As we saw above the East Pakistani economists for a long time have recognized the importance of political forces that led to the widening of income disparity between the two wings of the country. The foundation of this disparity was laid during the time of the British raj. The British did little to develop the eastern part of the province of Bengal and one reason for this neglect was that that part possessed no powerful political group, nor an industrial raw material expensive to transport, that could interest the government in its economic welfare. Other parts of British India, either because of natural resource endowment or presence of political forces fared a good deal better.

The partition of the Indian sub-continent left the eastern wing of Pakistan under-represented in all the social groups that soon came to dominate the political society. This situation lasted for a decade. Accordingly, East Pakistan's industrial development was neglected by the government. Once again using the textile industry as providing a good index for the trends in investment, we find that in the 1950's, 86 mills were installed in the country; of these only 9 were located in the

eastern wing.[68] However, given the nature of the political system evolved by Ayub Khan in the 1960's, the development of East Pakistan became an over-riding concern of the government. In Ayub Khan's grand coalition, the landed aristocracy, middle farmers and civil bureaucracy played a very significant part. In two of these groups, East Pakistan had a fair representation. We have already seen that the CSP wielded great influence in the upper tier of administration in the Ayub Khan era, and that the middle farmers of West Pakistan and surplus farmers of East Pakistan dominated the system of Basic Democracies. In the CSP, in 1969, the Bengali representation had reached the level of 40 percent compared to zero at the time of partition. It was the result of these pressures that the Ayub Khan regime was prepared to give constitutional recognition to the fact of income disparity between the two wings of the country. A pledge was made in the 1962 constitution that the government would take all steps to remove this disparity in the course of the following two decades. Although this pledge was nowhere near fulfillment in 1969, when the regime of Ayub Khan fell and its constitution was abrogated, it must be admitted that the trend of continuous increase in disparity was arrested. In two consecutive years (1967-68 and 1968-69,) the rate of increase in private investment in East Pakistan outstripped that in the West; 7.5 percent and 3.8 percent against 5.9 and 1.1 percent.

The eastern wing's share in total private investment increased from 21.5 percent of the total for Pakistan in 1963-64 to 25.5 percent in 1968-69.[69] One might well ask that if this were the case, why the grave crisis of national integration that Pakistan had to face in the 1970's? "Modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability," says Huntington. Moreover, "the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernization."[70] This is one possible explanation.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding discussion we have given a rough estimation of the impact produced by public policy on the level and directions of industrial development. We have seen that but for the policies that led to a complete break in trade relations between India and Pakistan, the rate of growth of industrial production would have been considerably less in the latter country. We also saw that the close association of a group of businessmen with the Muslim League made it possible for the country to make big strides in the industrial production of goods in which they had some commercial experience. It was Ayub Khan's desire to change the social complexion of Pakistan that made him introduce policies that effected the direction of industrialization and also attacked, albiet in a small way, the problem of regional economic disparities. We have, therefore, been able to suggest some possible answers

to two of the three questions we posed in the introduction to this chapter. The third question: what was the social and political consequences of industrialization in Pakistan? This will be answered in the third part of the book.

Table 7.1

Annual Compound Growth Rates by Sector at 1959/60 Factor Cost (percent per year)

	Pre-Plan Period 1949/50-1954-55	First Plan 1954/55-1959/60	Second Plan 1959/60-1964/65	Third Plan 1964/65-1968/69
Agriculture	1.3	1.4	3.5	4.2
Industry	9.7	6.4	11.9	6.8
(Large Scale Manufacturing)	(23.6)	(9.3)	13.1	8.6
Rest	2.5	2.7	5.5	6.9
Gross National Product	2.6	2.4	5.3	5.7
Population	2.5	2.5	2.6	3.0
Income per Capita	0.2	0.0	2.7	2.6

Sources: (a) For the pre-plan, First and Second Plan periods, see Taufiq M. Khan, and A. Bergan, "Measurement of Structural Change in the Pakistani Economy: A Review of the National Income Estimates," Pakistan Development Review Vol. VI (Summer, 1966), pp. 198-205.

(b) For the Third Plan period see Government of Pakistan, The Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1970-1975 (Islamabad: Planning Commission, 1970), Table 1, p. 21 and p. 235.

Table 7.2

Structural Change in Gross National Product
(Value added as a percentage of GNP)

	1949-50	1954-55	1959-60	1963-64	1969-70
Agriculture	60	56	53	49	45
Manufacturing	6	8	9	10	12
Other	34	36	38	41	43

Source: T.M. Khan and A. Bergan, "Measurement of Structural Change in the Pakistan Economy," op. cit., pp. 198-205 And Government of Pakistan, The Fourth Five-Year Plan, op. cit., p. 2.

Table 7.3

Annual Growth Rate of Value Added for Major Groups of Manufacturing Industries

(percentages)

Industrial Groups	1951/52 - 1954/55	1954/55- 1959/60	1959/60- 1963/64
Consumption Goods	43	16	13
Intermediate Goods	28	27	14
Investment Goods	17	28	26
TOTAL	38	20	16

Source: Stephen R. Lewis, Economic Policy and Industrial Growth in Pakistan (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1969), Table 7, p. 43.

Table 7.4

LOCATION OF CAPITAL BY INDUSTRY GROUP, 1958

	Simple processing	Secondary processing	Textiles (excluding jute, silk)	Jute	Import processing (traditional)	Import processing (nontraditional)	Chemicals, cement, paper	Machinery, instruments	All industries
	(.....in crores of rupees.....)								
1. Karachi	2.4	14.5	56.5	0	8.9	10.7	10.0	11.5	114.6
2. Hyderabad area	3.2	7.8	3.4	0	11.5	0	4.5	0	30.4
3. Other "Sind"	19.6	0.3	3.9	0	0	0	0	0	23.7
4. Lahore, Sialkot, Gujrat area	0.4	2.7	2.7	0	5.1	3.3	2.3	13.7	30.2
5. Lyallpur	0	0	12.4	0	1.1	0	0	0.2	13.7
6. Other "Punjab"	4.8	3.6	37.0	0	1.3	2.5	16.0	9.5	65.6
7. "Frontier Province"	0.5	19.1	2.6	0	0	0	6.5	1.8	30.5
TOTAL WEST (excluding Karachi)	28.5	33.7	62.0	0	19.0	5.8	29.3	16.0	194.0
8. Dacca, Narayanganj area	28.0	2.5	18.0	21.3	5.4	1.0	0.1	2.9	79.2
9. Khulna	0.2	1.1	0	11.2	0	0	0	0	12.4
10. Chittagong	3.6	1.5	2.3	3.1	0	0	11.7	0.5	22.7
11. Sylhet and Northern area	15.8	4.7	0.8	0	0	5.0	1.8	0.7	28.7
12. Other	0.2	2.8	2.2	0	0	0	0	0	5.1
TOTAL EAST	47.7	12.6	23.3	35.6	5.4	6.0	15.4	4.1	148.0
TOTAL PAKISTAN	78.5	60.6	141.9	35.5	33.2	22.5	52.9	31.6	456.6

Source: Gustav Papanek, "The Location of Industry," The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. X (Autumn, 1970), p. 300.

Table 7.5

Decision Makers' Policy Consideration	Social Groups Exerting Pressure	Policy Decisions
Jinnah's Muslim separatism (1947-1951)	Refugee Merchants Urban Professionals Orthodox Civil bureaucracy.	(a) Trade War with India. (b) Emphasis on Private Sector. (c) High tariffs on consumer goods.
Capitalistic development of the economy (1951-1958)	Merchant-industrialists Orthodox Civil bureaucracy Landed Aristocracy	(a) Quantitative import controls (b) Import licensing system. (c) Public sector infra-structural investment
Ayub Khan's state-controlled economy (1958-1959)	Military	(a) Price control (b) Control on transactions of import licenses.
Ayub Khan's laissez-faire economics (1959-1969)	Indigeneous Industrialists Landed Aristocracy Civil Bureaucracy Middle and Surplus Farmer	(a) Lifting of import controls. (b) Lifting of price controls. (c) Licensing of industrial investment of provincial administrations. (d) Regional development.

Table 7.6

Socio-Economic Background of the Importers Issued Licenses under the Open General License Scheme (Percentages)

	1950/51	1951/52	1962/63	1963/64
Refugee Merchants	68	76	32	29
Indigenous Merchants	24	20	29	26
Refugee Industrialists	8	3	14	11
Indigenous Industrialists	-	-	25	34

NOTE: Percentages refer to the total value of the import licenses issued by the governments. Refugee and indigenous merchants are those who had established industrial enterprises soon after independence.

Source: Data compiled from the information obtained from the Office of the Chief Controller of Exports and Imports.

Table 7.7

Socio-Economic Background of the Industrial Licencees in 1964-1965

Socio-Economic Group	No. of Mills	Spindles	Looms	Location (Division)
Refugee Merchant-Industrialists	1	15,500	200	Hyderabad
Indigenous Merchant-Industrialists	3	39,900	275	Hyderabad, Multan
Refugee Industrialists	2	25,000	200	Hyderabad
Indigeneous Industrialists	3	30,500	800	Hyderabad, Lahore
Landed Aristocracy	4	49,700	700	Multan, Lahore D.I.K., and Peshawar
Retired Officials	2	24,900	450	Peshawar
TOTAL	15	185,500	2,625	

Source: Information obtained from the Directorate of Industries, Government of West Pakistan.

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Chapter 8:

URBANIZATION

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June, 1971

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INTRODUCTION

Pakistan's urban society played a very significant role in the struggle for independence. Once independence was achieved, it continued to determine to a very large extent the direction of the country's political, social and economic development. However, the urban population in 1947 or at any time after that was not homogeneous. It was made up of a number of diverse elements, each of them determined to play its own part. The nature of these parts, and sometimes the very presence on the stage of those who played them, did not fit into the senarios followed by the social, political and economic elites. Conflict ensued.

We have already identified the principal actors in Pakistan's political and economic drama. The power of these actors and the nature of their roles was to some extent the function of the process of urbanization. It is therefore imperative to understand this process. Inorder to do this, I shall attempt to answer three questions, two of them in this chapter and the third one in the concluding section of the book. First, what was the pattern of urbanization in Pakistan? Second, in what ways was urbanization influenced by economic, political and social factors? Finally, in what ways urbanization influenced the country's political, economic and social development?

Urbanization can be interpreted as a phenomenon that leads to the growth of a "continuous collection of houses inhabited by not less than 5000."[1] Even this very broad definition makes the Pakistani experience a good deal different from that of other South Asian Countries. In Pakistan, urbanization proceeded far more rapidly than it did in India and Ceylon. At the turn of the century, the urban parts of areas that now constitute modern India had 10.9 percent of the total population. Between 1901 and 1961, the urban population of India more than tripled, increasing from 25.7 million to 78.8 million.[2] The experience of Ceylon was somewhat similar to that of India.[3] In 1901 what is now Pakistan had only 5.1 percent of the total population living in the urban areas. In the sixty year period between 1901 and 1961, the Pakistani urban population increased six-fold (Table 8.1) partly because of the fact that a large number of refugees from the rural India went and settled in the towns and cities of Pakistan. Therefore, urbanization in Pakistan was not only "more rapid than that which occurred earlier in the areas of north-west European culture,"[4] but proceeded at a rate faster than of most other developing countries.

Kingsley Davis has argued that the contribution of rural-urban migration to urbanization is not as significant in

the developing countries of today as it was for the industrializing countries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the cities of north-western Europe the rate of mortality was higher and the rate of fertility was lower than in the surrounding countryside. Therefore, in order to meet the manpower demands of the industrializing areas, the cities had to depend on rural-urban migration. "Today in the underdeveloped countries the towns and cities have only a slight disadvantage in fertility, and their old disadvantage in mortality not only has been wiped out but also in many cases has been reversed. . .. As a result, throughout the industrial world people in cities are multiplying as never before, and rural-urban immigration is playing a much lesser role."[5] However, in the case of Pakistan's urbanization, immigration has played a significant role. The partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 brought seven million refugees into Pakistan, more than 2 million in excess of those non-Muslims who migrated out of the country. The rapid rate of economic development that followed independence made people move from the countryside and into the cities. Therefore, Pakistan's urbanization differs from that of some other developing countries in at least two respects. In the past half century the rate of urbanization in Pakistan has been greater than most other Asian countires. And, in recent years the significant additions to the urban population have come from immigration rather than natural growth.

Urbanization should be viewed as a process more complex than that indicated by the above definition. It should be viewed as the end product of economic, social and political forces that induce people to move from the countryside to a relatively large, dense and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous indi-

viduals. From the point of view of a political economist what is more important than merely counting the number of urban areas in a given country and the number of people who live in them is a comprehension of the forces that push the people out of the countryside and pull them toward the towns and cities.

According to one sociologist, the rate of urbanization in the developing world and the size of her major cities are "more expressions of lack of economic development than the result of it."[6] The main argument produced in favor of this hypothesis is that the low level of rural development in these countries makes it extremely difficult for their agriculture sectors to absorb in useful economic activities all the new labor force produced by the very high rates of population growth. Therefore, the cities that have over-crowded agricultural hinterlands are swamped with the migrants rendered surplus by the slow rate of growth of the rural economy. This phenomenon is often referred to as the push-factor. It is to this push factor that M.G. Kutty attributes the yearly in-migration of about 60,000 people into Calcutta. They come in "from the rural areas . . . not in response to an adequate rate of industrialization but because the agricultural sector is almost saturated; the farm just cannot absorb any more people."[7]

What has often not been realized is that the opposite phenomenon--the pull factor--can play a very important rôle in urbanization. In fact urbanization can sometimes be an

exaggerated symptom of economic development. Industrialization can provide jobs for only a small fraction of the unemployed; for a larger fraction it holds the promise of employment in some distant future. Therefore, even a very small increase in industrial development can have a very great magnetic effect on the unemployed or semi-employed labor force in the countryside. A high rate of industrial development can produce disproportionate urban growth. Karachi, with no overcrowded agricultural hinterland of its own, has succeeded in attracting people from the cities, towns and villages hundreds of miles away. Even East Pakistan, separated geographically from West Pakistan by 1,000 miles of Indian territory, made some contribution to Karachi's labor force. The migrants to Karachi came in thousands, pulled toward the great city not by the jobs that were waiting to be filled up but by the promise held out by industrial growth that jobs would eventually become available.

It has been suggested that the pull factor produces a greater impact on the economies of the towns than that of the cities. For instance, it was reported in a United Nations study[8] that the increment in employment as a result of the location of a factory in a small town may be accompanied by an increase in the overall level of unemployment. This happens because of the pull that the location of a new industry inevitably exercises on the countryside bringing in more people than can possibly be accomodated by the town's otherwise

primitive economy. However, when the private sector is allowed to play a significant part in the country's economic development, there is a greater probability for industries to be located near large cities than around small towns. In Pakistan the government made only half-hearted attempts to bring about some kind of a dispersal of industry. These attempts did not produce any great impact. The few existing cities, "with their social equipment for the support functions (transport, communications, mechanical power sources, etc.)"[9] attracted the bulk of the enterprise. According to Gustav Papanek's survey, of the total industrial investment in West Pakistan in the period 1948-1958, 97.3 percent went into six large cities. In the same period, three cities of East Pakistan accounted for 77.2 percent of the total industrial outlay in that province.[10] The concentration of Pakistan's industrial wealth in a few large cities is no doubt responsible for the concentration of Pakistan's urban population in a few urban centers. According to the census of 1961, 16 cities in East and West Pakistan, with populations of more than 100,000 account for 56.1 percent of the total urban population (Table 8.2). In India, cities of similar size have only 44.5 percent of the total urban population."

It would be appropriate here to point out one very important difference between the distributions of urban populations that we notice from Table 2 for East and West Pakistan. The urban population of West Pakistan is concentrated to a greater extent in the cities than is the case for East Pakistan. In the eastern wing the bulk of the urban population lives in the towns; 31.8 percent in the towns having populations between 25,000 and 100,000. These towns, 20 in number, had a sufficiently large proportion of the urban population living in them to play an important part in the political and economic life of that province. In West Pakistan towns of this size, 40 in number, had only 18.7 percent of the urban population. The population of the larger towns of West Pakistan was therefor too dispersed and too small compared to that of the cities to exercise the kind of political and economic pressure that the East Pakistani towns were able to exert. This skewness in the distribution of power within the urban population of West Pakistan produced serious political tensions in the second half of the decade of the 1960's.

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE CITIES

Gideon Sjoberg has made some interesting generalizations about the ecology of the feudal (pre-industrial) city.

> The feudal city's land use configuration is in many ways the reverse of that in the highly industrialized communities. The latter's advanced technology fosters, and is in turn furthered by, a high degree of social and spatial mobility that is inimical to any rigid social structure assigning persons, socially and ecologically, to special niches. . ..

Accordingly, there is a great contrast in the patterns of land use in the pre-industrial and industrial cities. In the former, the central area dominates over the periphery, there are fine spatial differences according to ethnic, occupationsl and family ties and there is a low incidence of functional differentiation in other land use patterns.[12]

Although in the feudal-industrial dichotomy used by Sjoberg, social power enters as a factor in ecology, it is not allowed to play its full explanatory role. At least for the purpose of the present analysis, this is a serious shortcoming. My principal contention in this part of the study is not that the cities in the developing world play important political roles, but that different cities display different socio-political orientations. Social power is an important factor in understanding these differences. The essential features of the model outlined above can be incorporated in an analysis that brings the role of social power into greater focus. The model to be presented here is more relevant for understanding the political development of the new nations. Its central theme is the conflict between the social forces that represent the old and the new. Nirmal Bose depicts Calcutta as "the scene of a major confrontation between the enduring institutions

of old India--her caste communities and diversity of ethnic heritages--and the pressures and values arising from the urbanization that presages India's industrial revolution."[13] This confrontation is going on in other cities of the developing world as well. On its outcome would depend the course taken by political development in these countries.

It is therefore more apprpriate to draw a distinction between what may be called traditional and modern cities. Traditional cities are those that have grown gradually around nuclei that originally served the countryside. As the needs of the surrounding countryside increased, the urban nucleus expanded in size. The expansion of the nucleus increased its own urban demands; their fulfillment further increased the size of the city. This process of expansion around a nucleus left the city with a strong inward orientation; the nucleus, no matter how far the periphery of the city stretched, continued to exercise its political, social and economic influence on the entire population. Modern cities are those that grew suddenly up to a point; sometimes because of the establishment of a new industrial enterprise, sometimes because of the creation of a new administrative center, etc. Once having been organized around some modern form of activity, the city continued to expand. The modern city may have developed with or without a nucleus; if there is a nucleus, it is dominated by some such modern activity as industry, commerce, government, etc. Then there are cities that are the by-product of traditional

as well as modern paths of growth; for example the traditional cities to which some form of modern activity is added at some point of time. How are these to be classified?

This is an important question, for a very large number of the cities of the developing world belong to this third category. It can perhaps be answered in terms of the interplay between the various social forces that dominate the political and economic life of the city. As the traditional city comes under some modern influences--industrial, commercial, administrative, educational etc.--the old social groups have to compete with the new interest groups for political, social and economic control of the city. If the population remains attached to the old social groups, the city could be described as traditional. If, on the other hand, the population comes under the political and economic control of the new interest groups, the city could be classified as modern.

What factors influence the transformation of a traditional city into a modern one? Or, conversely, what factors can keep a city traditional even when it is subjected to modern influences? It is possible to identify several static factors focusing especially upon spatial distribution of the urban population, its composition, size, and density. It is also possible to lend a dynamic context to the analysis by emphasizing phenomena such as the pattern of movement of population into the urban area as well as within it. These movements would of course influence

over time the distribution, size, composition and density of the city population. In the present study, I will focus primarily on the spatial distribution of population and its composition, my hypothesis being that these two factors are the principal determinants of the political attitude struck by the population of a city. In order to lend support to this hypothesis, I shall briefly examine the ecological structure of Lahore, the capital city of the Punjab. As the second largest city of Pakistan, Lahore has well over a million inhabitants. In recent years its growth has been rapid; during the 1951-61 decade the population increased by nearly 53 percent.[14]

"Though legend attributes the founding of Lahore or Lohawarana to Lava, the son of Rama, it is probable that the city was not founded before the first century A.D., as we neither find it mentioned in connection with Alexander, nor is it described by Strabo or Pliny."[15] The first certain historical record of the city is that of Huien Tsiang, who visited it in 630 A.D. He found Lahore to be a "large Brahamanical city,"[16] a character that was retained up to the middle of the eleventh century. In 1036, Lahore was made the capital of the capitol of the part of the Ghaznivid Kingdom that stretched east of the Indus river. For nearly five centuries the city was the bone of contention between the chieftains of Delhi, Multan and Ghazni. Latore's golden period was ushered in with its capture in 1524 by Babur, the first of the Gver Moghuls.

Abul Fazl, a courtier of Akbar the Great described it as "the grand resort of the people of all nations."[17] Under Akbar, Lahore increased rapidly in area and population. In this period the most densely populated portion covered the site of the existing walled city, although a view bazars extended beyond the wall and reached some of the populous villages outside the periphery of the city. Lahore declined in importance during the reign of Aurangzeb, the last of the Great Moghuls. Until the emergence of Ranjit Singh at the beginning of the nineteenth century, "the annals of Lahore consist of succesive invasions and conquests of Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah, and many less depredators."[18] With Ranjit Singh as the Raja of the Punjab, Lahore regained some of its lost glory. The city fell to the British on March 29, 1849 at the conclusion of the Second Sikh War and became the capital of the provine of the Punjab. The partition of the Punjab in 1947 not only sundered the lines of communication that had made Lahore the most important city in the northern part of British India but also left it without much of its hinterland. Eight years after the partition of India, the fortune of Lahore changed once again. In October 1955, the four provinces of the western wing of Pakistan were merged to form the "unit" of West Pakistan with Lahore as its capital.

Lahore's history can be divided into six periods: the Hindu (upto 1036), the Pathan (1036-1526), the Moghul (1526-1720), the pre-British (1720-1846) and the Pakistani (beginning with 1947). Each of these left its distinct ecological mark on the city. However, during all these vicissitudes one thing survived: the group

of powerful notables who took part in managing the administration and economy of the political hinterland of the city of Lahore. These notables had one thing in common, they possessed large landed estates bestowed upon them by their political masters in recognition of their service to the state. Most of the members of this group were Muslims who, because of their interest in land, developed strong ties with the Muslim peasantry in the surrounding countryside. Over time these ties were transformed into patron-client relationships. The members of the nobility undertook to safe guard the broad social and economic interests of their client groups and in return the members of the client groups rendered service on the land or in the houses of their patrons. The development of this patron-client network increased considerably the political power of the nobility and also increased their usefulness to the rulers of the Punjab. All ruling groups were interested in keeping the capital city's political environment reasonably tranquil. In ensuring this the rulers made use of the local nobility. While providing this kind of service to the rulers, the local nobility managed to further stregthen its political and economic hold over the countryside. Therefore, while the city of Lahore went through a number of serious recessions in the growth of its political and economic power, the influence of its nobility over the countryside increased almost continuously.

During the Hindu period, Lahore grew from a large village into a middle sized town serving the rich agricultural country

between the Ravi and Beas. In the Pathan period, Lahore acquired the status of a garrison town, protected on three sides by a sturdy brick wall with seven gates and by the Ravi on the fourth side. With the advent of the Moghul period, the city acquired its multi-nuclear character. The arrival of the British in the nineteenth century resulted in another wave of expansion that reached its peak in the early years of the twentieth century. The British brought the usual paraphernalia of government buildings, civil lives, district courts, cantonements, race clubs, colleges, universities and the like. The institutions that the British introduced into Lahore produced a great impact on the social and economic life of the city. The British administrative and judicial systems attracted to government service a large number of people educated in the new educational institutions. However, the recruitment policy followed by the government in the Punjab did not create the kind of impact that the British system produced in some other parts of India. A large number of posts were filled by individuals who had strong ties of kinship, caste, clan or tribe with the city's notables. Some members of this group of notables possessed large tracts of land in the villages that were outside the periphery of Lahore city before the advent of the British era but became part of the metropolis in the beginning of the present century. The patronage extended to the landlords of Baghbanpura, Moghulpura and Mianmir by the British government consolidated

their social and political position in the society even when the areas to which they belonged were gradually urbanised. At the same time the landlords reaped high economic rewards as a result of urbanization. The value of their properties increased vastly as the city expanded toward their villages. By selling their land the landlords were able to acquire capital most of which was invested in commercial and industrial activities.

What urbanization did to the landed interests around the city of Lahore can be illustrated with the help of a case study. The Arian families of Baghbanpura wielded social, economic and political influence in the village before it became a part of the city of Lahore. However, as the city expanded toward Baghanpura, the Arians abandoned their traditional occupation of vegetable cultivators and became merchants. In the businesses that they established, they were able to absorb a large number of their erstwhile tenants. As their businesses expanded, the social and economic influence of the Arian families increased. This influence they were able to exploit by winning for themselves an important place in the administrative system first established by the British and later expanded by the Pakistanis. A good indication of the influence wielded by the Arians in the political life of Lahore can be had from the data presented in Table 8.3. In the second elections to the system of Basic Democracies, the people of Baghbanpura re-

turned[68]/local councilors, 62 percent of whom were businessmen. However, only 34 percent indicated business as their principal source of income. As many as 51 percent indicated land to be the single most important source of their earnings. This indicates some overlap between the occupational categories of businessmen and landlords and points to the landed background of the bulk of Baghbanpura's political elite. The table also provides data for another of Lahore's several traditional nuclei, Mozang. The background of the Basic Democrats elected to represent the Mozang area give the same impression: that the political elite was chosen from among the classes that exercised economic and social power when Mozang was rural and its population depended upon land for sustenance. A comparison of the background of the local councilors belonging to Baghbanpura and Mozang with those of Old Civil Lines and Cantonment, two areas that owe their existence to the British raj, provides some insight into the type of social forces that dominated the politics of some of the important centers of Lahore city. The local councils in the traditional centers were dominated by the business class whereas the new centers were controlled by the members of the legal community. The bulk of the Basic Democrats elected from Baghbanpura and Mozang earned their incomes from property. More than half of the Baghbanpura's local councillors cited land as their principal source of income. In both the Old Civil Lines area and the cantonement, 44 percent

of the Basic Democrats cited the legal profession and pensions from the government as their principal source of income. The Basic Democrats representing the older centers were older than those elected from the new centers. There was also some difference in the community affiliation of the local councillors; with one community dominating the traditional centers and all important communities sharing power in the new centers.

The areas like Baghbanpura and Mozang and the social groups that dominate them have played an exceedingly important role in the political life of the city of Lahore. During the British era, the social forces that controlled these important nuclei cooperated with the government. The government in turn rewarded them politically and economically. They were, therefore, able to politically overpower the groups like urban professionals and students who played such an active part in the radical politics of some other cities of British India. After the partition of India and the emergence of Pakistan as an independent state, the traditional social groups quickly transferred their allegiance to the new government. The attempt made by the administration of Mian Mumtaz Daultana to slightly shift away from conservative politics was successfully thwarted by these groups. The anti-Ahmadya movement of 1953[19] was launched by the old social groups and was aimed at a community that had acquired considerable political muscle as a result of the aggressive social and economic policies pursued by its members. Although Daultana was not an Ahmadya and was not known to support

the members of this community, the movement was the manifestation of the discontent felt by the traditional social groups at the liberal political and economic policies followed by his government. It is interesting to note that Daultana, who was himself a member of the powerful Arian community, quickly fell in line and was dismissed by the Central Government for not taking adequate measures to arrest the spread of the movement.

In the post-partition history of Lahore, the anti-Ahmadya movement was the only occasion when the people of Lahore actively opposed the policies followed by the government of the day. On other occasions, as in 1965 (Pakistan's first presidential election), in 1966 (Anti-Tashkent Declaration movement), and in 1967-1969 (the anti-Ayub movement), Lahore showed little taste for radical politics. In the presidential elections, 68 percent of the Basic Democrats of Lahore cast their votes in favor of Ayub Khan as against 44 percent of the votes received by the incumbent President from the local councillors of Karachi city.[20] In the movement initiated by the West Pakistani students against the signing of the Tashkent Declaration by the Government of Pakistan and India, the students from Lahore were activated only after considerable momentum had been built up in Rawalpindi, Karachi and Hyderabad.[21] Finally, as I show in a later chapter, the people of Lahore played a very insignificant part in the initial phases of the anti-Ayub Khan movement of 1967-1969.

The case of a city that developed under the impact of modern institutions can perhaps be well illustrated by Rawalpindi.

Before the advent of the British era, Rawalpindi was a large pind (village) on the roads linking the Khyber Pass and the Kashmir valley with the cities of Lahore and Delhi. It was not too far from the river Rawal, but Rawal was not a major waterway and did not influence to any substantial degree the economic life of the city. Rawalpindi began to develop into a major urban area in the closing years of the nineteenth century. What induced this development was the decision of the government to locate the northern command of the British army at Rawalpindi. The British decision was motivated by the strategic location of Rawalpindi. A garrison located near the city would have easy access to both the Kyhber Pass and the Kashmir Valley, two areas that figured prominently in the military planning at the turn of the century. Moreover the river Rawal provided a good source of water in an otherwise arid region. The city crossed the 100,000 mark between 1911 and 1921. By the time of the partition, of the Indian sub-continent, it had a population of more than 200,000 (Table 8.4). The reasons that had prompted the British to locate their northern command in Rawalpindi also convinced the new government of Pakistan to turn the city into the country's military capital. The decision of the government of Ayub Khan to shift the Capital of the country to Islamabad, a new city built expressly for this purpose in the foothills of the Himalayas, only ten miles away from Rawalpindi, gave the city's rate of growth another spurt. There was, however, a tremendous difference between the type

of social, political and economic changes that were brought to Rawalpindi by the British army in the 1870's and the Pakistani army in the 1940's, and the type of changes brought by the movement of the civilian government apparatus in the 1960's. With the British army came civilian officers and magistrates to administer the growing population of the city, missionary schools and colleges to provide western education to the children of the civil and military bureaucrats, missionary and military hospitals to administer to the health requirements of the upper middle class, and shops, cinemas and restaurants to cater to the damands of the westernized elite. The military establishment made new jobs available but new employment opportunities that were opened up were not of the type that induce people to leave the villages and flock to the city. The size of the military establishment expanded but the people who found employment were carefully selected by army recruiting teams from all over the country. The social, political and economic changes produced by the arrival of the British was totally different from that produced by them in Calcutta, Bombay and Delhi. The arrival of the Pakistan army quickened the pace but not the direction of change. Right up to 1958, Rawalpindi remained a city steeped in the traditions of conservative politics. The arrival of the Central Government brought a taste of radical politics to the city. In less than a decade, Rawalpindi became a city that shared a number of characteristics with the

great modern cities of India. The ratios of the student to total population, of the university to non-university students, of the unemployed to employed, of the migrant to the native born population, of the non-government to government employees, all increased substantially. These changes produced a politically and economically restive society within the city.

As I will show more fully in a later chapter, another type of urban area has played a very important role in determining the direction taken by Pakistan's political, economic and social development. This is the town with a population of between 10,000 and 100,000. There were 119 of these in 1951 with a population of 3.069 million constituting 31.6 percent of the total urban population. In 1961 their number increased to 161 and their population to 4.179 million which was 34.0 percent of the urban population. In 1961, 2.952 million people lived in 118 towns of this size in West Pakistan. In other words, West Pakistan accounted for 73.3 percent of the towns in this category and 70.6 percent of the population living in them.

Gojra in district Lyallpur of West Pakistan can be used as an example to illustrate much that has to be said about the towns and their peculiar place in the social, political and economic history of the country. According to the Imperial Gazeteer of India, published in 1908, "Gojra was an important grain market on the Wazirabad-Khanewal branch of the North-Western Railway."[22] In 1901 it had a population of 2,589. By 1961, the town's population had reached

nearly 30,000, a twelve fold increase in sixty years. Even in recent years the towns like Gojra have been growing at a rate greater than that for the cities. Thus in the twenty year period between 1941 and 1961, the population of Gojra town increased by 128.8 percent. In the same period the populations of the cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi increased by 92.9 and 83.8 percent respectively (Table 8.4).

This rapid rate of population growth in the towns like Gojra has been made possible by the immigration of people from the rural to urban areas. Projecting from my survey of 13 towns in the provinces of the North-West Frontier, the Punjab and Sind, it can be concluded that 34.8 percent of the population of West Pakistani towns has moved in from the rural areas in the last ten years (Table 5). However, there is a considerable difference in the proportion of the rural migrants in the towns included in the survey. Psrur town in the district of Sialkat had only 11.8 percent of its population classified as rural migrants while 59.0 percent of the population of Kamoki town in Gujranwala district had moved in from the countryside in the last ten years. Considering that on the average more than a third of a town's population is made of rural migrants provides it with a political, social and economic environment which is totally different from that of the large cities. We find from several studies of the cities of Pakistan that the proportion of rural migrants in the total population is far less than that given by my survey for the towns. Thus, according to a 1959 survey of Karachi, 17.5 percent of the total population was classified as in-migrants - persons whose original place of residence is in Pakistan

(excluding Karachi).[23] According to a 1960 socio-economic survey of Rawalpindi, more than 8000 families moved into the city from the surrounding countryside and about an equal number from other parts of rural West Pakistan.[24] This works out at 23.2 percent of the city's 1961 population.

We should perhaps stress here the obvious fact that cities and towns are part of the social system in which they are located. As such they are part of the structure of economic, political, and social power. "Cities tend to dominate a political system; the pattern of cities in a country may tell us something about the dispersion of power in that political system."[25] The urban centers of a country like Pakistan can be divided into three categories. Cities like Lahore in which traditional social groups still remain economically and politically powerful; cities like Rawalpindi in which new social groups dominate and towns like Gojra in which there is a very large presence of recent migrants from the rural areas. It is therefore not very accurate to speak of one urban Pakistan. The response of the three types of urban areas to economic and political problems can be totally different. Urban societies made up of a large number of cities and towns display political characteristics quite different from those in which the society is dominated by one or a few large cities. In the former there is sufficient competition between the urban centers to prevent any particular political lifestyle from dominating the society; unless, of course, all the cities and towns belong to the same type. In the latter, however, there prevails a condition of political oligopoly in which a few urban centers can dominate the political society. It can be assumed that

the developing countries pass through the latter stage in order to get to the former. Several African countries can serve as good examples of political oligopolies of the type described above, while India can be taken as an example of the type of society uninfluenced by the presence of one type of urban center. In between these two are the countries like Pakistan in which a see-saw condition prevails. In these societies political, economic and social factors can make one type of an urban center dominate the scene for a while till a new set of events bring another type of urban community into prominence. The social, economic and political history of Pakistan is a history of a continuous interplay between these different urban forces. For Pakistan, three periods can be identified with a fair degree of accuracy. First, 1947-58, the eleven year period in which the refugees from India dominated the political and economic society of the country. The cities and towns that had a large proportion of the refugee population played an important part in this period. Second, 1958-1965, the seven year period in which Ayub Khan's conservative economic and political program activated some of the traditional social groups. In this period the cities that had these groups dominating the society played an important part. Third, 1965-1969, the four year period in which a series of economic factors made the towns to be the foci of political and economic unrest. In this period the towns that had swelled as a result of large scale rural to urban migration played a very significant part. Two of these periods, the first and the third are connected with the movement of populations and therefore should be studied in detail in this chapter. Why urban growth

takes place, and how it does so, are always economically and politically significant questions - questions that can provide some clue about the social, political and economic history of Pakistan.

MOVEMENT OF POPULATION AND URBANIZATION, 1947-1958

The bulk of the migration on account of the partition of the Indian sub-continent occurred in the four month period between August and November 1947. It is estimated that in this period some 6.0 million refugees moved into Pakistan. Flight of refugees continued up to 1951, though at a considerably reduced scale. According to the 1951 Census, in a population of 73.880 million, 7.226 million people described themselves as muhajirs - displaced persons who had to move into Pakistan as "a result of partition or fear of disturbances connected therewith."[26] Out of these, 6.528 million or 90.3 percent of the total came into West Pakistan, while the remaining went to the eastern wing of the country. More than 80.1 percent of the muhajirs who entered West Pakistan came from the districts of East Punjab and Delhi, the capital city of India. Although the bulk of the refugees entering West Pakistan were Punjabis, they were a good deal different from the inhabitants of the part of the Punjab that went to the share of Pakistan.

It is probably true of all minorities that they tend to congregate in the urban areas. This was certainly the case of the Muslim minority in East Punjab and Hindu and Sikh minorities in West Punjab. Table 8.6 illustrates this phenomenon. The proportion of Hindu population living in the urban areas of East Punjab ranged between 7 and 18 percent and that of Muslims between 12 and 31 per-

cent. In the districts of West Punjab, on the other hand, between 21 and 68 percent of the Hindu population lived in the urban areas as against between 3 and 11 percent of the Muslim poplation. This kind of distribution was found in other provinces of British India as well. Moreover, the urban population, largely because of the greater communal disturbances in the cities and towns showed a greater propensity to migrate as compared to the rural population. This was especially the case in those provinces of British India that were at some distance from the boundary line that was drawn by the Mountbatten administration between the new states of India and Pakistan. Thus while the bulk of the Muslim population of the eastern part of the Punjab migrated to Pakistan and the bulk of the Hindu and Sikh population of the western part of the Punjab left for India, the exchange of populations between some other provinces of India and Pakistan was more selective in nature. There were sizable Muslim minorities in the provinces of Bombay, Gujrat, Bihar and Assam and in the princely states of Hyderabad, Rajputana, Bhopal and Mysore. Similarly, there were a fairly large number of Hindus scattered in different parts of the provinces of the North-West Frontier and Sind and in the princely states of Bahawalpur and Khairpur. However, these Indian provinces and states with sizable Muslim minorities and these Pakistani provinces and states with equally sizable Hindu minorities did no go through the kind of communal convulsions that were experienced by the Punjab and Bengal. In them the communal dis-

turbances were confined to the urban areas. In the population movement of 1947-1951, therefore, the proportion of urban population for both Muslims and non Muslims was far greater than their proportion in the entire population. This bias in favor of urban areas in the cross migration of population following the partition of the Indian sub-continent had a profound impact on Pakistan's political and economic development.

According to the Census of 1951, nearly 40 percent of the urban population was made up of muhajirs (Table 8.8).However, as is the case with most massive movements of population, the bulk of the migrants tended to go to the large cities. Accordingly, as can be seen from Table 8, more than 60 percent of the population of the cities of West Pakistan was made up of muhajirs. For West Pakistan the proportion of the refugees in total population declined with the size of the urban center. The situation in East Pakistan was a good deal different. The largest concentration of the muhajir population was in the towns of size 25,000 to 100,000. Of the 230,000 refugees living in the urban areas of that province, 104,000 were absorbed by these towns. The reason for this difference was that whereas all the non-Muslim population moved out of the West Pakistan cities, a great number of Hindus remained behind in the Bengali cities.[27] The Bengali towns particularly bordering India lost their Hindu population and thus provided an opportunity to the incoming Muslims. This difference in refugee rehabilitation between East and West Pakistan determined to some extent the nature of urban politics in the two wings of the country.

It is interesting to note that the largest concentrations of the muhajir population was found in 1951 in the cities that did not

have powerful local social groups - the cities that I defined in the above analysis as being modern. Karachi, Hyderabad, Lyallpur and Sargodah had over 60 percent of their 1951 population made of refugees (Table 8.9).The traditional cities, Lahore, Multan, Sialkot, etc. had proportionately fewer refugees in their populations. This suggests that the refugees tended to prefer the cities that did not have powerful indigenous social forces. The muhajir community, in its quest for a permanent habitation, was not only looking for the places with good economic opportunities but also with good social and political prospects. Thus Karachi in the 1950's became a city dominated politically, economically and socially by the Urdu speaking Muslims of Delhi and the United Provinces (the present day Uttar Pradesh). On the other hand, Lyallpur became a city dominated by the small business communities of East Punjab. The political alliance that Ayub Khan forged in the 1960s displaced the Urdu-speaking muhajir community as a strong political force. Accordingly, in the elections of 1965 Karachi voted overwhelmingly against him. His administrations' sympathetic treatment of the East Punjab refugees provided him with the political support that kept the cities like Lyallpur, Sargodah and Multan relatively calm during the period of political turbulence that started with the spring of 1967.

The refugees who moved to West Pakistan tended to concentrate in a few areas. "Many towns beyond the River Jhelum in the Punjab and in the interior of Sind and the N.W.F.P. were practically deserted" while Karachi and some Punjabi cities were made to bear an almost intolerable burden.[28] Whereas Karachi and Hyderabad in Sind

received refugees mostly from Delhi, the United and Central Provinces and Rajpurtana, the cities of West Punjab absorbed refugees from East Punjab.

Table 8.10 provides some estimates of the type of refugees who moved into the cities of the Punjab. The Hindu and Sikh population of the West Punjab cities in 1941 was estimated to be a little more than half a million. The Muslim population of the five cities of East Punjab (Amritsar, Jullundhar, Ludhiana, Ambala and Ferozepur) was 420,000. The migration of the Hindus and Sikhs from West Punjab therefore left a gap that could not be filled by all the city Muslims from East Punjab. It was filled by the Muslims from the towns of East Punjab. The partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 therefore touched off a process of urbanization for the Muslims, a process that saw a large number of small town people move to the cities. The census of 1951 estimated the refugee population in the Punjab cities of West Pakistan to be 754,000. This means that the partition accounted for the movement of at least 242,000 Muslims from the towns to the cities. Not all of them stayed in the cities. When the Government of Pakistan undertook the task of permanent rehabilitation of the refugees, a large number of the migrants from the towns of East Punjab moved out once again: this time they went from the cities to the towns of the Pakistani Punjab. They were induced to leave because of what Gerald Breese has called the situation of "subsistence urbanization," which is "urbanization of very high density, of individuals living under conditions that may even by worse than the rural (or semi-urban) areas from which they have come, of not having available

the kinds of work or the means of support which will permit them to do more than merely survive."[29]

During the 1950s the refugees who could not be absorbed in the cities went over to the towns where the indigenous population had not been able to fill the economic, political and social gaps left by the Hindus and Sikhs. Evidence of the city to town migration of refugees is to be found in my survey of 13 towns. In these towns the refugees were estimated to constitute 24.6 percent of the total population. As can be seen from Table 8.5, in 1951 all but two of the surveyed towns (Charsadda and Larkana) belonged to the 10,000 to 25,000 category - the category of towns in which the refugees accounted for 13.8 percent of the total population (Table 8). If the survey can be taken to be representative of the towns in this category then it can be argued that the proportion of refugees in the population increased in the period between 1951 and 1969. That this was indeed the case is shown by the Survey data. We learn from this data that only 14 percent settled in these towns in the period 1947-1950. The largest proportion, 43 percent, came between 1950 and 1955. Another 40 percent settled between 1955 and 1960 and the remaining 3 percent arrived between 1960 and 1969. Therefore, for 86 percent of the refugee population final settling down was a part of a two-phase migratory process - from India to the cities and from the cities to the towns. Nearly 2 percent of the refugees went to the towns after initially settling in the countryside whereas 84 percent moved in from the cities.

Two questions need to be answered here. Who were the people who moved out of the cities to settle in the towns? And, for what

reasons did they leave the cities? In answering the first we also partially answer the second. We see from the data provided by the 1951 Census regarding the occupational background of all muhajirs (Table 8.11) that 1.304 million or 55.2 percent of the self-supporting muhajirs aged 12 years and over were agriculturists. Since the bulk of the non-agriculturists settled in the cities, the census data can be interpreted to represent the city refugee population. Among the non-agriculturists, 21.2 percent were unskilled laborers, 27.9 percent were skilled operators, 21.2 percent were sales workers (mostly small shop keepers and their workers, 14.7 percent were service workers (mostly domestic servants), 10.1 percent belonged to the technical and professional classes and 2.3 percent belonged to the administrative and managerial classes. The occupational categories used for the 1951 census were employed to analyse the occupational background of the refugees who are now settled in the 13 towns surveyed for the purpose of this study. The data concerning the occupations of the muhajirs can be seen in Table 8.12. The differences between the type of refugee who found a place for himself in the cities and the type who went over and settled in the towns now becomes obvious. The data of Table 12 is for non-agriculturists only; among these 27.5 percent belonged to the unskilled and 29.8 percent to the skilled worker category. Unskilled and skilled workers taken together constituted 57.3 percent of the refugee population - a proportion 8.2 percentage points larger than the refugee population of the cities. The difference becomes even larger if we include the service and sales workers in the labor class; 85 percent of the city refugees belonged

to this broadly defined category as against 91.6 percent of the muhajirs settled in the towns. In other words, 15 percent of the city refugee and 8.4 percent of the town refugee population was made up of the middle and upper classes - the clerical and office workers, administrative and managerial personnel, and technicians and professionals. Using the data of Tables 8.8 and 8.11 it would appear that the laboring class among the refugees made up 42.0 percent of the city population in 1951, 1.345 million in a population of 3.202 million. Such large number of laborers were difficult to absorb in the cities. It therefore became essential for a section of this class to move out of the cities and go to the towns. According to the survey, 32.9 percent of the town population in 1969 was composed of the laborers who had initially migrated from India. We can conclude from the above analysis that the urban professional classes from among the refugees found it easier to settle down in the cities and that a section of its labor, skilled and unskilled classes had to leave the cities in order to settle in the towns.

The Census and Survey data also provide an explanation of the power wielded by the refugees in the economic, political and social life of the cities. In 1951, the Muslim urban professionals who migrated from India constituted 7.2 percent of the city population. What is even more important, they made up 69.8 percent of the entire urban professional class.[30] As was seen in an earlier chapter, the urban professionals in the pre-Ayub era wielded tremendous political and economic power. As such, the prominent role played by the refugees becomes somewhat easier to explain.

The migration of Indian Muslims to East Pakistan, particularly from the provinces of Bihar and United Provinces, also produced a profound impact on the economic and political life of that province. That the members of a minority community tend to congregate in the urban areas - a phenomenon that we noticed in the case of the distribution of Muslim and non-Muslim population in the Punjab - was also true of Bengal and its neighboring provinces. However, the type of exchange of population that took place in the Punjab in 1947 - 1948 did not occur between East Pakistan and north-eastern provinces in India. The bulk of the Hindu population in the East Pakistani cities stayed on while large numbers of non-Hindus moved out from the border towns. The result was that the refugees from Bihar, the United Provinces and West Bengal found the opportunities they were looking for in the towns rather than in the cities. This explains why 60.9 percent of the refugees from India who came to East Pakistan, settled in the towns as against 39.3 percent in the case of the refugees who moved into West Pakistan (See Table 8.8).

The bulk of the Biharis and the refugees from the eastern part of the United Provinces who settled in East Pakistan were from the urban areas. Accordingly, when they moved to the towns of East Pakistan they took over the positions that had been vacated by the migrating Hindus. We noticed above the same kind of phenomenon for the Punjab. However, in East Pakistan there was the important difference that the muhajir community did not speak the language or follow the customs of the recipient ocmmunity. While the refugees from East Punjab were able to merge their identity into the communities of West Punjab,

the muhajirs who went to East Pakistan failed to identify themselves with the Bengalis. Whereas the cross-migration of population that followed the partition of the Indian sub-continent produced a religiously and linguistically homogeneous community in the Punjab, it added to the heterogeneity of the population of East Pakistan. This phenomenon provides a clue to the differences in the economic, political and social development of East and West Pakistan. The religious and linguistic honogeneity of the West Pakistan society made it possible for various groups to identify their interests in economic terms. In East Pakistan, on the other hand, the population divided itself along linguistic and religious lines. Accordingly, whereas most of the important political movements in West Pakistan (anti-Ayub Khan movement of 1967-1969[31]) had a strong economic bias, most of the East Pakistan political movements were organized around religious and linguistic issues (the language movement,[32] the Hazartbahl riots,[33] the Bangia Desh movement[34]).

RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION

Urbanization is said to take place when the proportion of total population residing in places defined as urban is rising, or when urban population is growing at a faster rate than the average rate of the growth for the country.[35] Growth in urban population is composed of three components: (a) natural increase, which means the excess of births over deaths, (b) net rural to urban migration, and (c) net international migration. It can be said with a great deal of certainty that the last component has not played any part in the building up of

Pakistan's urban population after 1951, the year in which the migration of Muslims from India reduced to an insignificant trickle.[36] In the industrialized countries, reproductive change did not contribute to the process of urbanization. In fact, according to Kingsley Davis, in these countries, "with mortality in the cities higher and births lower...the only real source for the growth in the proportion of people in urban areas during the industrial transition was rural-urban migration."[37] This is not so in the case of the developing countries of today. In most of them the rate of reproductive change is not very different in rural and urban areas. "In the cities death rates may tend to be somewhat lower than in rural areas, but birth rates also tend to be somewhat lower, so that the rate of growth from reproductive change is roughly the same."[38] This means that very little urbanization takes place as a result of vital process alone. Thus in Pakistan, "a number of urban areas have been gaining in population far beyond what might have been expected from natural increase alone, whereas not a few rural areas have been losing population more or less constantly."[39]

Up to 1947 Pakistan was a part of the Indian sub-continent. In the first half of the twentieth century, the rate of urbanization in India was slower than that of the countries who were at the same stage of industrial development; this despite the general rule that the more recently in history the process of industrialization has occurred, the faster is the rate of urbanization.[40] The reason for this seems to be the relative slowness of the Indian rate of economic development compared to that of most other countries at about similar stages.[41]

The level of urbanization reached by Pakistan at the beginning of the 1950's was about the same as that of India at the beginning of the 1940's. In the 1950's, however, the rate of urbanization was faster than that of India in the 1940's, faster also than that experienced by Japan, and about 68 per cent as fast as that in the United States at roughly the same level.[42] In the census decade 1951-1961, the proportion of population living in the cities increased from 5.1 percent to 7.4 percent, the rate of increase in urbanization being 45.1 percent. However, aggregate figures for Pakistan hide the very large differences between the eastern and western wings of the country. One estimate of these differences is provided in Table 8.11 which also gives the comparison of the rate of urbanization in Pakistan with that of some other countries at approximately the same level of urban development.

Two facts about Pakistan's urbanization are therefore easy to establish. First, the rate of urbanization in Pakistan has been faster than other Asian countries at the same level of development. Second, that the increase in urbanization is accounted for almost entirely by rural to urban migrations. Taking together these facts about urbanization, we can conclude that the rural to urban migration in Pakistan was at a faster rate than in the countries at a comparable stage of urbanization.

The 1951 or 1961 population census of Pakistan does not provide any direct evidence for the growth of the urban population as a result of rural-to-urban migration. All that we have from the census of 1961 is the assertion that "the growth of urban population during the period 1951-61 indicates that there has been an acceleration in the trend towards

urbanization during the last 10 years."[43] However, it is possible to disaggregate the absolute increase in the urban population into these elements: (a) natural increases in the urban population, (b) increase in the urban population due to rural-urban migration, and (c) the natural increase in the population that has migrated from the rural to the urban areas. Using the distribution of population in urban and rural areas as given in the Censuses of 1951 and 1961, and the formula of Table 14, it is possible to obtain an indication of the increases in the urban population due to rural-urban migration. We see from Table 8.14 that the rate of rural-urban migration was somewhat higher in East than in West Pakistan.

In order to understand the dynamics of rural to urban migration, we use five sources of data: (a) the two censuses provide some information which can be used to analyse rural-urban migration; (b) a demographic survey of Karachi provides some very valuable information about the social and economic characteristics of the immigrants and in-migrants in the city's population; (c) a survey of 13 towns of West Pakistan provides some useful information about the socio-economic characteristics of the migrants who moved from the rural areas; (d) a survey of 27 villages provides equally useful information about the socio-economic background of the males who have moved out to the cities and towns in the ten-year period between 1959 and 1969; (e) a survey of five villages in the district of Hazara gives us some indication of the factors influencing village to city migration that have induced people to move to Karachi.

According to the 1959 demographic survey of Karachi, 83 percent of the city's population was made up of immigrants.

Refugees from India accounted for 65 percent and in-migrants 18 percent of the city's population.[44] The in-migrants as defined for the purpose of the Survey included the people who were born in Pakistan and their families. It excluded second stage immigrants from India; these were defined as immigrants. A few things need to be noted about the social and economic status of the in-migrants relative to the immigrants and the native population of Karachi. The bulk of the immigrants (59.6 percent) came from the cities, while the bulk of the in-migrants (75.6 percent) traced their origins to the towns and villages.[45] The in-migrants had a very high male/female ratio compared to the immigrant and native populations; 187 as against 115 for the immigrants and 104 for the natives. The ratio decreased in proportion to the length of the stay of the in-migrant in the city; in 1949 it was estimated to be 147 as against 272 for 1957-1959. The in-migrants had a higher proportion of population (45.9 percent) in the 20-39 age category than either the immigrants (30.8 percent) or the native population (28.9 percent). In the in-migrant labor force, 31.7 percent were estimated to be in the semi-skilled and unskilled category. The natives and the immigrants had only 21.5 percent and 13.9 percent respectively of their labor force in this category. The natives and in-migrants had the same proportion (22 percent) of school-going persons in school-going age (5-20 years). The proportion of the immigrant population was nearly double. Finally, the average personal income of the in-migrants was far lower than that of the rest of the population. Nearly 60 percent of the in-migrants earned less than Rs 100 per month as against 47 percent and 58 percent

respectively of the immigrant and native populations.[46] The impression that this data conveys is that of the in-migrant population being considerably more impoverished, less skilled and educated, and less "urbanized" than the rest of the population. The pictire of in-migrants in Karachi therefore corresponds to that of the urban marginals in other major cities of the developing world.[47]

Is this also the picture of migrants to other urban areas of Pakistan? Detailed demographic studies of other principal cities of Pakistan is not available. What is, however, available are the results of a survey conducted by me in 1970 of 13 randomly selected towns in West Pakistan. The nature of the survey (the size of the sample, the form of questionnaire, etc.) is described in Appendix II.

We see from Table 5 that in 1969, the year of the survey, 24.6 percent of the population in 13 towns of West Pakistan was made up of in-migrants. There was, however, considerable differences between the towns themselves. The proportion of in-migrants ranged between 10.7 percent for Pasrur in Sialkot district to 36.7 percent for Kamoki in Gujranwala district. Despite this, the proportion in 10 of the 13 towns was more than for Karachi city. Of the total in-migrant population of 103,460 estimated for 1969, 103,460 or 16.6 percent arrived before 1951. The remaining 86,330 moved into the towns in the eighteen year period between 1951 and 1969. This means that in-migration to these towns accounted for 39.5 percent of the increase in their total population. The remaining 61.5 percent was accounted for by natural increase of both the indigeneous and the migrating populations.

Can we learn anything about the differences between the in-migrants living in the cities and towns from the data available from the Karachi survey and my survey of 13 West Pakistani towns? There are, of course, some dangers in comparing the results of two surveys that were conducted ten years apart. There should also be some dangers in generalising for the Pakistani cities from the Karachi survey. For, Karachi is by no means a typical metropolitan city in the developing world. There are also some difficulties in comparing the data from the surveys that did not always use the same questions for obtaining information from the respondents. However, several surveys of Indian cities show that there are remarkable similarities between the socio-economic characteristic of their inmigrants with those of Karachi. We may therefor use the Karachi survey to represent the status of in-migrants in the Pakistani cities.

tics of the migrants to the towns can be seen in Table 8.15. A comparison of the information provided in Tables 8.15 and 8.16. yields some very interesting insights into the differences between the migrant populations living in the cities and the towns. In the case of Karachi 93 percent of the migrants moved in from places that were at distances of more than 400 miles from the city.[48] In the case of the survey towns, 67 percent of the migrants came from areas lying within a radius of 50 miles.[49] One reason for this enormous difference between the distances covered by the prospective migrants to the cities and those to the towns is that in the case of the former the bulk of the migration (53 percent) was from the urban areas while in the latter most of it (82 percent) was from the countryside. Undoubtedly a large number of migrants must have

moved to the cities after having first tried their luck in the towns - a step-wise migration is indeed fairly prevalent in the developing world.[50]

The imgrants to the cities are on the whole younger than the migrants to the towns; 92 percent of those living in the cities are less than 40 years old as against 83 percent in the case of the towns. The fact that for some of the people migration to cities is a part of a two-step process serves to highlight further the age differential between the two types of immigrants being considered here. It appears that the age differences between the direct rural-city migrants and rural-town migrants would be more than that indicated by the statistics provided by the two surveys. That this is so would lead us to expect some other differences. For instance 71 percent of the male and 77 percent of the female rural-town migrants are married, compared to 41 and 48 percent for migrant males and females living in the cities. The very high proportion of married persons among rural-town migrants also explains the relatively low masculinity ratio: 144 compared with 186 for the city migrant population.

There are also some significant differences between the occupational background of the two types of immigrants. In the cities more than one-half of the migrants belong to the category of unskilled labor while one-fourth are classified as white-collar workers. The proportions are almost reversed for the migrants living in the towns. The survey of the towns also indicates that two-thirds of the migrants before leaving the countryside were either landless laborers or peasants. This perhaps suggests that nearly one-half of the people belonging

to this class, on reaching the towns, can find occupations that are not regarded as being unskilled. A large proportion of the rural-town migrants - more than one-third - described their previous occupation as "landlords." This gives one explanation for the difference in the earnings of the migrants in the towns and in the cities. We see that whereas 60 percent of the city migrants earned less than Rs 100 per month, almost the same proportion among the migrants in the towns earned more than Rs 100 per month.

From this comparison we get the picture of a rural-migrant living in the town of being older and more prosperous, and with a more stable family background, as compared to his counterpart in the cities. There can be two explanations for this. First, that there is no real socio-economic difference between the rural-town and rural-city migrants. The differences that were noted above are produced by the process of two-step migration. The poorer, rural-town migrant, not finding the kind of economic opportunities that are available in the cities, moves out to the cities. This makes the migrant population that remains behind seem to belong to a different class than the city immigrants. Second, that there are important differences between the social and economic backgrounds of the people who choose to migrate to the towns and those who go to the cities. We will argue below, with the help of some more survey data, that the second of these two propositions has greater validity.

The survey of 27 villages, results from which were used to explain some developments in the agricultural sector of West

Pakistan, provides some valuable information for understanding the phenomnon of urbanization in a country like Pakistan. Migrants to and from the survey villages fall into three categories: those who move between the villages, those who move from the villages to the towns and those who move from the villages to the cities. The survey also distiguishes between different types of migrants. Three categories were identified for the purpose of collecting data: landlords, tenants and landless laborers. The survey data, tabulated according to the type of migrant and according to the destination of the migrants, can be seen in the statistical appendix of this chapter.

As we can see from Table 8.17 of the text, there was a large turnover of the village population in the period 1959-1969. In 1961 the 27 survey villages had a population of 53,332. In the decade for which data on migration was collected, 9,446 males moved out of the villages while 2,784 males came in from the outside. These statistics give a turnover of 22.9 percent of the population. The turnover coefficient would be somewhat higher if the data on migration also included the movement of the female population. These figures do not paint the picture of static village life, a picture that has been painted so often in the anthrpological writings on the villages of India and Pakistan.[51]

The average net outmigation from the survey villages was 13 males per year per thousand of the population.[52] Yearly data for migration is available for 8 of the 27 villages. From this we learn that 62.6 percent of the outmigration took place in the five year period between 1964 and 1969 (Table 8.18). As we saw above, this bunching of migration nearer the end period is also to be found in the case of the in-migrants living in the towns and cities.

The expectation that bulk of the population that migrates from the rural areas goes to the large cities is fulfilled for West Pakistan as well.

We see from Table 19 that out of 9,446 outmigrants, 4,433 moved to the cities. In other words the cities claimed 47.0 percent of the migration from the countryside. The share of the towns and villages was 36.7 and 16.3 percent respectively. Table 20 summarises the information about the origin and the socio-economic background of the migrants who moved in the reverse direction, that is to say who left the cities, towns and villages to return to the 27 survey villages. From this data we learn that the the proportion of the migrants returning from the towns to the villages is higher than those returning from the cities; 44.1 percent in the case of the former and 42.2 percent in the case of the latter. The village to village movement contributes only 13.7 percent to the stream of back migration.

An examination of Table 8.17 reveals some very interesting differences in the socio-economic composition of the streams of out- and in-migrants. Among the outmigrants, 46.5 percent were landless laborers, 35.7 percent were tenants and only 17.8 percent were landlords. The inmigrants were weighted even more heavily in favor of the landless laborers. Among the returning migrants, 63.7 percent were those who were landless laborers before they moved out of the countryside, 28.5 percent were tenants and only 6.8 percent were landlords. The simple conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that for the landlords migration was more in the nature of a permanent move from the countryside to the urban areas than was the case for other social and economic groups.

There is a significant difference in the destination of outmigrants belonging to the three socio-economic classes we are considering here. This becomes clear from the data presented in Tables 8.19 and 8.20. The bulk of the landlords who moved out of their villages, went to the towns while a very small number migrated to other villages. Nearly one-fourth of the landlords who migrated went to the cities. Among the migrating tenants, the preference for

for a particular type of destination was somewhat less marked. Less than one-half of the migrating tenants moved to the cities, less than one-third went to settle in other villages and less than one-fourth chose to go to the towns. There is a pronounced preference for the city as the destination for the migrating landless laborers. Nearly three-fifths went directly to the cities, while less than one-third migrated to the towns. Slightly more than one-tenth of the migrating landless laborers chose to move to other villages.

Among the landlords who returned to the survey villages, one-half came back from the towns, 30.8 percent returned from the cities and 11.2 percent moved back from other villages. Among the returning tenants, 41.4 percent migrated back from other villages, 32.6 percent from the towns and 26.0 percent from the cities. Finally, among the old landless laborers who returned to the survey area, 50.2 percent came from the cities, 48.7 percent from the towns and only 1.1 percent from other villages.

Table 8.21 provides out-migration/in-migration ratios for the migrants by destination and socio-economic characteristics. These ratios provide a measure of the capability of a certain type of migrant to absorb himself in the society into which he moves. The higher the ratio the greater the likelihood of absorption. The highest ratio of Table 21 is for the landlords moving to the towns and the lowest is for landless laborers migrating to the towns. This yields the picture of the town society being in a tremendous state of flux. The towns have received large number of migrant landlords who have been able to get themselves accepted some how in their foster economic and social societies. At the same time the towns received a large number of landless laborers who were not so readily accepted. Therefore, in this period the political, social and economic societies of numerous small towns must have gone therough a period of great change, trying

to absorb one section of the in-migrants while rejecting another. As we shall see in a later chapter, this phenomenon produced some serious political and economic consequences.

Our survey provides another set of interesting statistics about out-migration from the rural areas. These data pertain to the ownership of land by the landlords who migrated out of the villages during the period covered by the survey. It would be useful to point out here that while the majority of the landlords who migrated sold all all the land they possessed, a few retained all or some of their land-holdings. The land retained by the migrating landlords was rented out, usually to tenant-proprietors. The land sold by the migrants was usually purchased by the middle class landlords.

We see from the data of the survey (see the statistical appendix) that 86.8 percent of the landlords who migrated to the towns owned less than 25 acres of land whils 12.3 percent owned between 25 and 50 acres. The records of sales maintained by the revenue officials reveal that 64.5 percent of of the land sold by the migrants was irrigated while only 15.6 percent of the land rented by them had any perenial supply of irrigation water.

Another important statistic is that 73.4 percent of the landlords moved out in the period between 1964-1969. We have already noticed bunching of migrants in this period (Table 8.17).It now appears

that this bunching is even greater for the migrating landlords than for the non-propertied out-migrants.

What is even more relevant for understanding the process of urbanization is the matrix of Table 8.20. We learn from this matrix that the rural poor account for 96.1 percent of the inter-village migration. This means that when the poor decide to leave a village they donot necessarily head for the urban areas. Infact, a large number of them move to other villages, often not at very great distance from the village of their original habitation. We find that from the survey villages, 20.8 percent of the migrating tenants and landless laborers went to other villages. Ownership of landed property seems to be an important variable determining the selection of the destination for those out-migrants who choose to leave the countryside for the urban areas. Thus 91 percent of the city-bound migrants belong to the unpropertied class as against 63.7 percent for the migrants bound for the towns. This conclusion that we draw from the statistics of Table 8.17 supports the evidence that was presented above in Tables 8.16 and 8.17 in which the proportion of white collar workers among in-migrants in the towns was higher than their representaion in the in-migrants living in the cities.

The Survey of Karachi, results from which have been used in this analysis, looks at the in-migrants as members of an urban population. A survey conducted by me in the fall of 1969 gives some very useful information about the out-migrants to Karachi and some other cities of West Pakistan. With the help of the data

of this survey we can look at the migrants to the cities as being parts of village population, separated for mostly economic reasons. The survey was done in five villages of Haripur tehsil in north-west Frontier Province of West Pakistan. It is described in some detail in Appendix III.

According to the census of 1961 Haripur tehsil of Hazara district had a population of 270,440 living in 54,852 households. The tehsil was described as predominantly rural with only 3.9 percent of the population living in the urban areas. Out of the four tehsils of Hazara district, Haripur was the only one in which urban population declined in the census decade of 1951-1961. In 1951 the urban population was estimated to be 12,820; ten years later it was estimated to be 10,217, a decline of 20.3 percent. These statistics confirm the view that the vast movement of population from Haripur to Karachi was not just a rural-urban phenomenon but that there was a substantial urban to city migration as well.[53]

Haripur tehsil had 366 villages with an average 1961 population of 711. The villages selected for the survey had a total population of 17,068 or an average of 3,654 persons per village. There was substantial out-migration from the survey villages to the cities. In the period 1961-1968, 1,035 males migrated to five cities of West Pakistan, out of whom 362 returned to their villages of origin. In the net-migration from these villages, the city of Karachi, which was at the greatest distance from the tehsil of Haripur, claimed the

highest proportion (Table 8.22). It is significant that Karachi had a higher out-migration/net-migration ratio than other cities of West Pakistan who received some migrants from the survey villages. The ratio for Karachi was 156 as against 141 for other cities. In other words, these villages had to send out 156 migrants to Karachi in order to have 100 stay behind in the city, as against 141 to the other cities of West Pakistan. This provides us with an indication of the capacity of different cities to absorb in-migrants. If we use the traditional-modern dichotomy developed earlier in this chapter, the differences between the capacity to absorb becomes even more pronounced. According to the definition adopted above, Karachi and the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad are modern whereas Peshawar, Lahore, Hyderabad and Sukkur are traditional in character. The out-migration/net-migration ratios for the migrants to these two different types of cities is 159 and 122 respectively. The patron-client mechanism which commands the distribution of resources in the traditional cities makes it easier to absorb migrants than can be done with the help of the market mechanism that characterizes the modern cities.

The argument outlined above rests on the assumption that there is some break-down in communication between the migrants who move out of the villages and the nature of the mechanism that helps to absorb them in the recipient city. It also rests on the assumption that the bulk of the migrants moving back to the villages return because of their failure in

getting absorbed in the economic and social structure of the city. One evidence of less than perfect communication between the intending migrants and the recipient mechanisms is provided by the statistics of Tables 8.23 and 8.24. These statistics also provide evidence to support the second assumption - that it is the relatively fresh migrant who dominates the stream of back-migration.

The statistics of Table 8.23 yield a high positive correlation between the absolute amounts remitted and amount remitted per person on the one hand, and the number of out-migrants to Karachi on the other. The coefficients of correlation for these two sets of series are +0.89 and +0.91 respectively. The degree of correlation changes if a time lag of one year is introduced between the two series. Now the two coefficients are +0.66 and +0.92. These figures show that the level of remittances from migrants to their parent villages is an important variable in the decision-making process of the intending migrant. The fact that the variable assumes an even greater importance with a lag of one year gives an indication of the degree of imperfection in the mechanism of communication.

Table 8.24 provides the data for the migrants returning home after having spent some time in the city of Karachi. We find that for the eight-year period between 1961 and 1968, 23.7 percent of returning migrants had spent less than a year in Karachi. As many as 29.7 percent returned after spending between one and two years in the city. This means that more

than one-half of the back-migrants into the villages of Haripur had spent less than two years in the city of Karachi. If we separate the data for 1961-1964 from that of 1965-1968, we find that for the latter period, more than 60 percent of the returning migrants had spent less than two years out of their villages. For the first period, when the back flow was not very significant, the recent emigres accounted for only 17.9 percent of the returning migrants. In the first period, then, the bulk of the back migration was for the persons who were returning to their parent villages after having spent their working lives in the city.

SOME CAUSES OF RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION

We have already seen that there is some statistical evidence to hypothesize that the rate of rural-urban migration increased in Pakistan over time. The survey data from the 27 villages in the Punjab and five villages from Haripur show a definite increase in the second half of the decade of the 1960's. What caused this increase? This question can be answered with some degree of satisfaction with the help of simple statistical analysis.

The usual assumption is that the main reason for the movement of a large number of people out of the countryside is a combination of the stagnation of the agricultural sector, and an increase of the population on land.[54] For this hypothesis to be valid, there should be statistically

significant relationships between some index of migration on the one hand and some indeces of the output of agricultural sector and pressure of population on the land on the other hand. We should, in fact, expect a negative correspondence between rural out-migration and growth of the agricultural sector and a positive association between out-migration and pressure on land. The statistics from the survey of the villages of the Punjab do not support any of these relationships.

In fact, we discover that there is a high statistically positive correlation between yearly out-migration, in-migration and net-migration per thousand of the population on the one hand, and the per annum rate of growth of crop production on the other. This indicates that there is a direct correspondence between the turnover in the village population and the rate of growth of agricultural production, a kind of correspondence which we are not led to expect if we follow conventional wisdom on the subject.

There is a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between out-migration per annum and population density. However, if we adopt a different index of the pressure of population, that of the number of males per household, we find that the relationship becomes statistically significant, with a large positive coefficient. Various other forms of relationships were worked out, but did not provide any statistically significant results.

What do we conclude from this simple statistical exercise about the causative factors involved in rural-urban migration? The first interesting conclusion to be drawn is that it is economic dynamism in the agricultural sector that produces dynamism on the demographic front as well. This hypothesis confirms some of the conclusions that were drawn in the chapter on agricultural development. The fact that the role of pioneers in West Pakistan's agriculture was played by the middle farmers has already been presented with some force. The demographic consequence of the aggressive entrepreneurship of the middle class landholders is that the small peasants tend to get displaced. Once economic forces like productivity differential and consequent fall in the price of output become pronounced, they push the small man out of agriculture. As was noted in our analysis of the agricultural sector, the rate of growth of crop production was linked positively with the numerical presence of the middle class landlords in the villages. We can now proceed a step further: the larger the proportion of land held by the middle farmers, the higher the rate of growth of agricultural production, and higher the level of out-migration. To this set of causation we must add that of the presence of population. The critical variable here is not the density of population but density of male population in the households. As we see from the regression equations provided at the bottom of Table 25, 68 percent of the variance in the level of out-migration is explained by the combined effect of the variables of rate of growth and density of male population.

So far we have confined ourselves to the factors that induce a section of the rural population to migrate out of the countryside - these taken together serve to provide an explanation of the demographers' "push-factor." In the introduction to this chapter it was stated that the pull factor plays a significant part in the phenomenon of rural-urban migration. It will now become apparent that the really significant part that "pull" plays in rural-urban migration is in helping the migrant decide on his place of future residence. The hypothesis that is being presented here can be stated as follows: A combination of economic and demographic factors operating on the countryside displaces a section of the rural population. A combination of economic, social and political factors that determine the nature of life in the city influence the displaced inhabitants from the rural areas to find for themselves some place within the entire spectrum of urban life. The spectrum of urban life is represented by traditional and modern cities on the two extreme ends and with numerous towns in between them.

The fact that the process of industrialization generates an inevitable pull on the surplus or potential surplus labor in the agricultural sector, as well as in the labor in the traditional sector of the urban economy, does not need any elaboration. The chapter on industrialization not only lent some strength to this hypothesis, but also made use of it in explaining the variance in the rates of growth of several important urban centers in East and West Pakistan. What needs

to be emphasized here is the difference between the kinds of "pulls" exercised on the rural population by the urban economy. To understand this the preceding discussion about the differences between traditional and modern cities, as well as the differences between the destinations selected by different socio-economic out-migrants from the rural sector would prove to be useful.

The social, economic and political structures of traditional cities is built up on the patron-client relationships. As these cities grow economically, the size of the resources that can be distributed by the patron-client mechanism also expands. However, the distribution of these resources and hence the absorption of new entrants into the urban economy and society is confined to the persons who can get themselves accommodated in this social framework. These are the erstwhile clients or potential clients of the city patrons. Erstwhile clients are those who lost their patrons as some previous stage to the urban economy. Potential clients are those who can make use of their caste, tribe or family associations to find themselves accommodated in the patron-client network. Absentee landlords (for example the Arian families of Baghbanpura) providing employment to their tenants illustrates the first kind of process; landlords turned businessmen (for example the Sheikhs of Mozang) finding jobs for their fellow tribesmen or kinsmen is an illustration of the second process. There are two main characteristics of the rural-urban migration involving the tenants and

landless laborers from the countryside and influential patrons in the traditional cities. First, this type of migration is more stable. This can be seen in the case of the out-migration from the villages of Haripur to the cities of Lahore, Peshawar, Sukhur and Multan, where Pathan businessmen were able to accommodate the labor and tenants who had to leave the countryside. The stability of this kind of out-migration was greater than that for migration from rural areas to modern cities.

In deciding to move to the modern cities, the rural poor are guided by the migrants that have gone from their villages and settled in the urban areas. However, the old migrants can provide little more than short-term security to their kinsmen and fellow villagemen who join them in the cities. The new migrants, as those who moved to the cities before them, have to depend upon the market mechanism for their absorption into the city economy. The fact that such absorption is not always easy was illustrated with the help of the pattern of Haripur-Karachi migration.

There is a third type of migrant who has received a great deal of attention in this analysis. He is the small landlord, displaced by the newly-found dynamism in the agricultural sector. Among rural-urban migrants he occupies a peculiar place. He is not pulled to the traditional city for he is not a part of the patron-client network that takes some of his fellow migrants to these urban societies. He is not pulled to the modern city, for he either cannot

provide or is not willing to provide the kind of labor that is needed by this type of urban economy. Accordingly, he moves to the towns that occupy a place somewhere in-between the traditional-modern spectrum that has been already described for the cities. The town of his choice is usually close to the village of his previous residence, a fact that explains the very high proportion of short-distance migration to the thirteen towns surveyed for the purpose of this study. He usually moves with his family, a fact that explains the low male-female ratio for migrants to the towns. He usually finds himself a place in the business sector of the town economy, a fact that explains a high level of middle class migrants in the town. Finally, for him it is usually a one-direction process of migration, a fact which explains the very small proportion of landlords among back-migrants.

CONCLUSION

Our understanding of the social, political and economic processes at work in Pakistan increases if we can clearly perceive the process of urbanization. A number of important conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of this chapter - conclusions that aid us in interpreting the development of Pakistan's political and economic society.

Two factors contributed to a rate of growth of urban population that was greater than that for many other countries at the same stage of development. The cross-migration of

population after the partition of the Indian sub-continent and the emergence of Pakistan as an independent country added substantially to the country's urban population. A decade later, in the 1960's, very rapid changes in the agricultural sector of West Pakistan produced a social ferment that not only increased the rate of rural-urban migration, but also sent the migrants to the areas in which they were not readily absorbed. There was no corresponding change in the agricultural economy of East Pakistan. The result was that in the 1960's there were considerable differences in the direction of political and economic development in the two wings of the country.

The partition of the Indian sub-continent led to the kind of population movement that has no parallel in human history. Between 14 and 15 million left their homes, taking with them all that they could carry. They had only one idea about their destination - the Hindus among them headed for India, and the Muslims for Pakistan. Once in the country of their choice, they stayed on in the large cities, particularly those that were located near the new international border. Over the next half dozen years there was another wave of migration in Pakistan. This time the refugees from India moved to find for themselves a permament place. The result of this resettlement process was that the educated and skilled among the refugee community stayed on in the cities , while the bulk of those who moved to the towns and the countryside were either unskilled or had rudimentary skills. Even within the cities, there was a distinct pattern of distribution of the refugee community. The elites within the community

chose to go to the modern cities - cities in which the modernized social groups held greater political and economic power than the traditional social groups. This pattern of refugee settlement made the modern cities of Pakistan powerful in the political and economic life of the country.

The advent of the Ayub era in 1958 brought to power an administration from which most of the refugee community was deliberately excluded. Ayub Khan's administration moved quickly to settle rights on the property that the refugees had acquired between 1947 and 1958. In this process the administration for reasons of administrative convenience and political expedience, discriminated between the refugees who had arrived into Pakistan from East Punjab, and those who had come from other provinces of India. Since the bulk of the former refugee community was settled in the traditional cities of West Pakistan and the countryside of the province of the Punjab, while the bulk of the latter was settled in the modern cities and many small towns of northern Punjab, Ayub Khan created a clear geographical division between the areas that supported his government and the areas that felt politically and economically restive under his rule.

The agricultural revolution in Pakistan started first in West Pakistan and a few years before the advent of the new technology. As I argued in an earlier chapter, the principal reason for the remarkable changes in agricultural productivity was the political and economic emancipation of the middle peasant. One important consequence of West

Pakistan's agricultural revolution was the remarkably high turnover in the population of the countryside. The middle farmers aggressive entrepreneurial performance created productivity differentials that in turn had a profound impact on a large number of small landholders. Not able to compete with the middle farmer, the small landholders moved out of the country, usually after disposing of their landholdings. For a variety of reasons, most important of which is the relative ease in absorption, the bulk of the displaced landlords chose to go to the towns rather than to the cities. The developments in the agricultural sector also increased the rate of migration of the tenants and the landless laborers. Whereas a significant proportion of the tenants was absorbed by the agricultural sector itself (through inter-village migration), a very large number of landless laborers moved to the cities.

These demographic changes produced a deep impact on the political and economic life of the country. The displaced landholders, once made a part of the urban community, entered the section of the society that was already politically modernized. Although they found for themselves some kind of an economic niche in the town society, the change in the state of mind that followed their movement from the rural to the urban areas created a feeling of restiveness. Urbanization produced a certain readiness to adapt to change which in turn produced an expectation of progress and propensity to growth. However, a very slow rate of economic

change in the town society did not provide the kinds of compensatory dispensation that the landholders expected on moving from the rural to the urban areas.

The migrants to the city, the bulk of whom came from among the displaced landless laborers from the agricultural sector, did not go through the kinds of social and political changes that I have described for the landholders migrating to the towns. This was for two reasons. First, a section of the migrating labor moved to the modern cities where they became part of the politically passive society that Joan Nelson has described for urban marginals.[55] For them the movement from the village to the city constituted a pure economic trade-off. If the ratio of the expectation of earnings in the city to actual incomes in the village was greater than unity, they moved to the city. If, having once moved to the city, the ratio of expected income in the village was greater than actual earnings in the city, they moved back to the village. Second, for a large number of those who moved to the traditional cities, migration involved little social and economic change. On moving to the cities, they became part of the patron-client network of which they either had once been a part, before the departure of the patrons to the cities, or were its potential components because of their tribal links.[56]

We see from this that the process of urbanization has produced in the Western wing of Pakistan the kind of social restiveness that the political and economic system did not succeed in containing. This will be the subject of a later chapter.

Table 8.1

Urbanization in Pakistan: 1901-1961

Census Year	Total Population (Millions)	Percent Variations (Per Decade)	Urban Populations (Millions)	Percent Variation (Per Decade)	Percent of Urban Population
EAST PAKISTAN					
1901	2819	--	0.7	--	2.4
1911	31.6	+ 9.1	0.8	+15.0	2.5
1921	33.3	+ 5.4	0.9	+ 8.8	2.6
1931	35.6	+ 7.1	1.1	+22.6	3.0
1941	42.0	+18.0	1.5	+42.8	3.4
1951	41.9	- 0.2	1.8	+18.4	4.3
1961	50.8	+21.2	2.6	+45.1	5.2
WEST PAKISTAN					
1901	16.6	--	1.6	--	9.8
1911	19.4	+16.9	1.7	+ 4.3	8.7
1921	21.1	+ 8.9	2.1	+21.9	9.8
1931	23.5	+11.5	2.8	+34.6	11.8
1941	28.3	+20.1	4.0	+45.0	14.2
1951	33.8	+19.4	6.0	+49.9	17.8
1961	42.9	+26.9	9.7	+60.4	22.5
PAKISTAN					
1901	45.5	--	2.3	--	5.1
1911	50.9	+11.9	2.5	+ 7.5	4.9
1921	54.4	+ 6.7	2.9	+17.6	5.4
1931	59.1	+ 818	3.9	+31.0	6.5
1941	70.3	+18.8	5.5	+44.4	7.9
1951	75.7	+ 7.7	7.8	+41.2	10.4
1961	92.7	+22.5	12.3	+56.8	13.3

Sources: Computed from Government of Pakistan, Population of Pakistan, Volumes I, II, III (Karachi: Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, 1961).

Table 8.2

Population of Urban Areas in 1951 and 1961
According to Size of Towns

Size	Number		Population (million)		Percantage of Total	
	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961
EAST PAKISTAN						
Over 100,000	2	4	0.626	1.211	34.4	45.8
50,000 to 99,999	3	5	0.219	0.295	12.0	11.2
25,000 to 49,999	15	15	0.494	0.544	27.1	20.6
10,000 to 24,999	21	23	0.325	0.385	17.9	14.6
5,000 to 9,999	17	21	0.130	0.168	7.1	6.4
Under 5,000	7	10	0.026	0.038	1.5	1.4
Total	64	78	1.820	2.641	100.0	100.0
WEST PAKISTAN						
Over 100,000	9	12	3.206	5.685	54.1	58.8
50,000 to 99,999	7	10	0.483	0.702	8.2	7.3
25,000 to 49,999	22	30	0.789	1.100	13.3	11.4
10,000 to 24,999	53	78	0.759	1.150	12.8	11.9
5,000 to 9,999	74	106	0.545	0.778	9.2	8.1
Under 5000	41	79	0.145	0.239	2.4	2.5
Total	206	315	5.927	9.655	100.0	100.0
PAKISTAN						
Over 100,000	11	16	3.832	6.896	49.5	56.1
50,000 to 99,999	10	15	0.702	0.997	1.0	8.1
25,000 to 49,999	37	45	1.283	1.644	16.6	13.4
10,000 to 24,999	74	101	1.084	1.535	14.0	12.5
5,000 to 9,999	80	127	0.675	0.946	8.7	7.7
Under 5000	48	89	0.171	0.277	2.2	2.2
Total	270	393	7.747	12.296	100.0	100.0

Sources: As in Table 1.

Table 8.3

Background of Basic Democrats Elected in Lahore in 1964

	Baghbanpura	Mozang	Old Civil Lines	Cantonement
Occupation:				
Business	62%	64%	3%	1%
Lawyers	2	2	52	46
Retired Officials	2	--	22	36
Landlords	2	5	7	3
Principal Source of Income:				
Business	34%	38%	16%	11%
Legal practice	2	2	42	41
Land	51	27	25	27
Government Pension	0	--	2	3
Urban Property Rent	10	2	12	9
Average Yearly Income:	Rs 7800	Rs 6700	Rs 4200	Rs 3800
Average Age:	48 years	51 years	42 years	41 years
Percentage Reelected:	72	67	41	22
Community:				
Sheikh	12%	29%	9%	7%
Arian	33	11	12	12
Kashmiri	15	13	11	14
Pathan	7	5	12	10
Kake Zai	11	18	10	13
Other	22	24	46	44

Note: Number of Basic Democrats for Baghbanpura was 68, for Mozang 84, for Old Civil Lines 54 and for Cantonement 43.

Source: Lahore Municipal Corporation (unpublished records).

TABLE 8.4

DECENNIAL CHANGES IN THE POPULATION OF LAHORE AND RAWALPINDI CITIES, GOJRA TOWN OF WEST PAKISTAN

	Lahore		Rawalpindi		Gojra	
Year	Population	Percent Change	Population	Percent Change	Population	Percent Change
1881	149,369	-	52.975	-	-	-
1891	176,854	18.4	73,795	39.3	-	-
1901	202,964	14.8	85,278	15.6	2,589	-
1911	228,687	12.7	86,483	-1.4	5,417	109.2
1921	281,781	23.2	101,142	17.0	7,622	40.5
1931	429,747	52.5	119,284	17.9	9,799	28.3
1941	671,659	56.3	185,042	55.1	12,964	32.6
1951	849,333	26.5	236,877	28.0	20,407	57.4
1961	1,296,477	52.6	340,175	43.6	29,665	45.4

Sources:

(a) For 1881 see Government of India, Statistical Abstract Relating to British India, 1876/77 to 1885/86, No. 21 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1887), Table 24, p. 50.

(b) For 1891 see Government of India, Statistical Abstract Relating to British India 1889/90 to 1898/99, No. 24 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1900), Table 22, p. 38.

(c) For 1901 to 1961 see Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol. 3 (op. cit.) pp. II-116 to II-121.

Table 8.5

Growth of Survey Towns and Proportion of Migrants in Their Populations

Town	District	Population 1951	Population 1961	Population 1969*	Rates of Growth 1951-1961	Rates of Growth 1961-1969	Number of migrants	% of migrants
Haripur	Hazara	7979	10217	12200	28.0	19.2	3420	28.0
Charsadda	Peshawar	27048	37396	49300	38.3	31.7	6730	13.7
Gujarkhan	Rawalpindi	8496	11529	15700	35.7	35.8	4890	31.1
Gojra	Lyallpur	20409	29665	43200	45.4	45.7	10100	23.4
Jaranwala	Lyallpur	17969	26953	39600	50.0	46.8	11300	28.5
Kot Radha Krishna	Lahore	8657	10536	12100	21.7	14.8	1730	14.3
Komaki	Gujranwala	5588	25124	40300	61.5	60.4	14800	36.7
Sangla Hill	Sheikhupura	9379	13738	19200	46.5	39.4	3890	20.3
Daska	Daska	15375	20406	27600	32.7	35.3	7420	26.9
Pasrur	Sialkat	9403	10836	12000	15.2	10.8	1280	10.7
Burewala	Multan	15372	34237	61800	122.7	80.4	17800	28.8
Rohri	Sukkur	13243	19072	24200	44.0	27.0	6800	28.1
Larkana	Larkana	33248	48008	63900	44.4	33.2	13300	20.8
	TOTAL	202,166	297,772	421,100	47.3	41.4	103,460	24.6

*Estimates made from the data of Survey II.

Sources: Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan, Vol. 3, op. cit., pp. II - 112 to II - 128.

Table 8.6

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION OF EACH RELIGION
IN RURAL-URBAN CATEGORIES

District (Pre-Partition)	Hindu		Muslim		Sikh	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Ambala	18	82	25	75	4	96
Karnal	7	93	22	78	8	92
Rohtak	7	93	31	69	68	32
Gurgaon	8	92	12	88	26	74
Hissar	12	88	16	84	7	93
Patiala	12	88	20	80	4	96
Attock	39	61	6	94	29	71
Rawalpindi	68	32	11	89	38	62
Jhelum	36	64	6	94	22	78
Mianwali	36	64	7	93	18	82
Muzaffargarh	21	79	3	97	9	91
Dera Ghazi Khan	41	59	9	91	23	77

Source: Government of India, Census of India, 1931, Vol. XVII Punjab (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1931), p. 96

Table 8.7

Proportion of Refugees in Urban and Rural Population

(1951)

	Total Population		Displaced Persons	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
Pakistan	89.6	10.4	60.9	39.1
East Pakistan	95.6	4.4	68.4	31.6
West Pakistan	82.2	17.8	60.1	39.9

Source:-

Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan, 1951 (Karachi: Ministry of Interior, 1951), p. 21.

Table 8.8

Proportion of Refugess in Urban Population, 1951

	Urban Population		Percentage of Urban Population	
	Total	Refugees	Total	Refuge s
Cities				
Pakistan	3.896	1.664	49.5	58.9
West Pakistan	3.202	1.574	53.2	60.4
East Pakistan	0.694	0.090	37.6	40.7
Towns (25,000 to 100,000)				
Pakistan	1.875	0.585	23.4	20.4
West Pakistan	1.230	0.481	20.4	18.5
East Pakistan	0.644	0.104	34.9	42.6
Towns (10,000 to 25,000)				
Pakistan	1.114	0.386	14.2	13.6
West Pakistan	0.789	0.360	13.1	13.8
East Pakistan	0.325	0.025	17.6	11.4
Towns (5,000 to 10,000)				
Pakistan	0.702	0.188	8.9	6.6
West Pakistan	0.572	0.177	11.2	6.8
East Pakistan	0.130	0.011	7.0	4.9

Source:-

Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan, 1951 Op. Cit., p.22.

Table 8.9

Proportion of Refugees in the Population of Cities, 1951

(thousands)

City	Population	Refugees	Percentage
Karachi	1,064	617	60.0
Lahore	849	366	43.1
Dacca	336	66	19.6
Hyderabad	242	162	66.9
Lyallpur	179	124	69.3
Chittagong	290	20	6.9
Multan	190	94	49.3
Rawalpindi	237	89	37.3
Peshawar	151	29	19.2
Gujranwala	121	54	44.6
Sialkot	168	43	25.8
Narayanganj	68	n.a.	--
Sargodah	78	54	69.2
Khulna	41	n.a.	--
Quetta	24	19	22.6
Sukkur	77	15	19.5

Note: The ranking of the cities in this table is according to their 1961 population. In 1961 all cities listed here had population of more than 100,000.

Source: Census of Pakistan, Population, 1951 (Karachi: Ministry of Interior, 1951), op. cit., passim.

Table 8.10

Transfer of Urban Populations in 1947

(thousands)

	Year	Population	Increase	Proportion
West Punjab	1941	17,167	--	--
	1951	20,636	20.2%	--
West Punjab Cities	1941	1,330	--	7.7%
	1951	1,822	30.0%	8.8%
East Punjab Cities	1941	828		
Hindu and Sikhs in Cities in West Punjab Cities	1941	505	--	38.0%
Muslims in East Punjab Cities	1941	420		50.7%
Refugees in West Punjab Cities	1951	754		45.2%
Population of projected Hindus and Sikhs in West Punjab Cities	1951	512		

Sources:

(a) Government of India, Census of India, 1941 (Delhi: Government Printing Press, 1941), passim.

(b) Government of Pakistan Census of Pakistan, 1951, op. cit., passim.

Table 8.11

ECONOMIC GROUPS AND OCCUPATIONS OF MUHAJIRS—ALL-PAKISTAN
Self-supporting Muhajirs[1] aged 12 years and over according to the main Divisions and Types of Occupation
(number of persons)

Main Economic Division	*Total*	*Types of Occupation*								
		Technical and Professional	*Administrative and Managerial*	*Clerical and Office Workers*	*Sales Workers*	*Agricultural and Fishery Workers*	*Skilled operatives*	*Unskilled Labourers*	*Service Workers*	*Other*
Total	2,363,185	28,264	24,016	106,604	225,291	1,304,074	295,085	225,123	154,495	233
Cultivation	1,250,271	—	—	—	—	1,250,271	—	—	—	—
Animal Husbandry	41,501	—	—	—	—	41,501	—	—	—	—
Other Agriculture	9,552	—	—	—	—	9,552	—	—	—	—
Forestry	1,156	1	—	25	—	1,130	—	—	—	—
Fishery	2,277	6	3	25	658	1,581	3	1	—	—
Mining	800	19	9	37	27	—	562	119	26	1
Manufacturing	261,454	1,612	2,516	3,297	2,864	—	235,617	13,174	2,365	9
Building, Construction, and Utilities	20,871	414	1,407	472	81	—	11,383	6,932	179	3
Trade and Commerce	255,633	578	15,201	7,866	215,804	—	6,177	5,823	4,152	32
Transport, Shipping, and Port Services	52,827	356	448	6,180	203	—	31,390	9,536	4,694	20
Post and Telecommunications	3,325	36	55	2,668	6	—	411	87	59	3
Education	9,078	8,057	139	560	45	—	37	41	195	4
Medical Services	7,929	7,122	69	398	59	—	42	66	172	1
Governmental, Municipal, &c., Services and Legal Profession	96,608	1,717	1,699	72,940	396	—	2,328	1,865	15,652	11
Domestic and Personal Services	129,096	356	2,008	1,638	1,733	—	2,424	15,119	105,812	6
Religion, Art, and Public Information, &c.	7,752	6,328	32	251	12	—	745	292	92	—
Other and Unclassified (including unemployed)	213,055	1,662	438	10,147	3,403	39	3,966	172,068	21,097	143

Source: Census, 1951, Vol. I, Table 19-D.
[1] Excluding Defence Service.

From The Economy of Pakistan, Andrus and Mohammed (Stanford University Press, 1958)

Table 9.12

Occupational Background of Refugees in the Towns of West Pakistan

(Percentages)

Town	Unskilled Labor	Skilled Labor	Service Workers	Sales Workers	Clerical and Office Workers	Administrative and Managerial	Technical and professional
Haripur	20.3	27.4	28.5	14.5	8.4	0.2	0.7
Charsadda	26.5	28.7	21.4	15.8	7.4	0.0	0.3
Gujar Khan	31.7	30.4	20.8	14.4	2.5	0.1	0.1
Gojra	38.5	37.8	10.8	10.2	0.5	0.5	1.7
Jaranwala	37.6	25.8	17.4	18.5	0.7	0.0	0.0
K.R.Krishan	34.9	30.0	17.8	14.9	1.6	0.0	0.0
Kamoki	25.8	26.4	21.2	16.5	4.8	3.0	2.3
Sangla Hill	36.9	30.1	19.9	9.8	2.3	0.5	0.5
Daska	30.0	36.8	20.2	4.8	6.2	1.5	0.5
Pasrur	37.4	39.3	14.4	6.9	2.0	0.0	0.0
Burewala	28.9	20.4	17.8	16.4	10.7	3.2	2.6
Rohri	29.8	30.8	16.5	13.4	8.1	1.4	0.0
Larkana	27.5	29.8	19.8	14.5	6.8	0.0	1.6
TOTAL	31.7	28.7	18.1	14.2	4.7	1.3	1.3

Source: Survey II.

Table 8.13

Comparison of the Rate of Urbanization* of East and West Pakistan and Some Other Countries at the Same Stage of Development

Country	Decade	Start	End	Percent Increase
U.S.A.	1850-1860	5.0	8.4	68
Japan	1898-1908	6.0	7.7	28
	1908-1918	7.7	10.7	39
India	1941-1951	5.4	7.8	44
Pakistan	1951-1961	5.1	7.4	45
East Pakistan	1951-1961	1.7	2.4	41
West Pakistan	1951-1961	8.0	13.3	66

Sources: For U.S.A., Japan and India see, Kingsley Davis, "Urbanization in India," in Roy Turner (ed.) India's Urban Future (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Californ a Press, 1962), p. 12. For Pakistan see Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol. I (Karachi:Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, 1961), pp. II-1 and II-22.

* For the purpose of this Table urbanization is defined to be the increase in the proportion of population living in urban areas of population more than 100,000.

Table 8.14

Estimate of Rural-Urban Migration in Pakistan, 1951-1961

Factor Responsibel for Growth in Urban Population	Pakistan	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Rural-Urban Migration	47.24	43.58	42.30
Natural Increase	41.49	47.16	45.36
Natural Increase of Migrant Population	11.37	10.26	12.34

Note: The contributions of the factors listed in the Table to the growth in urban population was estimated by employing the following formula:

$$1 = \frac{U_2P_1-U_1P_2}{P_2(U_2-U_1)} + \frac{U_1(P_2-P_1)}{P_1(U_2-U_1)} + \frac{R}{U_2-U_1}$$

where,

P_1 = Total Population in 1951
P_2 = Total Population in 1961
U_1 = Urban Population in 1951
U_2 = Urban Population in 1961
R = Increase in Population due to the natural increas in the population of those migrated to the urban areas between 1951 and 1961.

Source: Data obtained from Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol. I, Op. Cit., Chapter II.

Table 8.15

Social and Economic Characteristics of In-Migrants in Karachi's Population

			(Percentages)
Distance Moved	Less than 400 miles 7	400-800 miles 45	More than 800 mi. 48
Place of Origin	City 24	Towns 29	Villages 47
Age	0-15 years 33	15-40 years 59	Over 40 years 8
Income per month	Less than Rs 100 60	Rs 100-1000 39	More than Rs 1000 1
Occupational Background	White Collar 25	Skilled Laborers 16	Unskilled Laborers 59
Sex	Male 65	Female 35	Male/Female ratio 186
Time of Arrival for Males	0-5 years 68	5-10 years 17	More than 10 years 15
Time of Arrival for Females	0-5 years 56	5-10 years 24	More than 10 years 10
Marital Status of Migrant Males	Single 57	Married 41	Other 2
Marital Status of Migrant Females	Single 48	Married 48	Other 4
Family Status	Nuclear 48	Extended 18	Joint 11
School Attendance Among Males	5-9 years 31	10-14 years 45	15-20 years 12
School Attendance Among Females	5-9 years 23	10-14 years 29	15-20 years 7

Source: Sultan S. Hashmi, et. al., The People of Karachi Data Firm Survey (Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1964

TABLE 8.16

Social and Economic Characteristics of In-Migrants to 13 West Pakistani Towns

Distance Moved	Less than 20 miles 23	20-50 miles 44	More than 50 miles 30
Place of Origin	City 1	Towns 17	Villages 82
Age	0-15 years 18	15-40 years 65	Over 40 years 17
Income per month	Less than Rs 100 42	Rs 100-1000 56	More than Rs 1000 2
Occupational Background	White collar 51	Skilled Laborers 22	Unskilled Laborers 27
Previous Occupation	Landlords 37	Tenants 33	Landless 31
Sex	Male 59	Female 41	Male/Female ratio 144
Time of Arrival for Males	0-5 years 71	5-10 years 17	More than 10 years 12
Time of Arrival for Females	0-5 years 75	5-10 years 16	More than 10 years 9
Marital Status of Migrant Males	Single 28	Married 71	Other 1
Marital Status of Migrant Females	Single 21	Married 77	Other 2
Family Status	Nuclear 39	Extended 21	Joint 17
School Attendance Among Males	5-9 years 37	10-14 years 48	15-20 years 15
School Attendance Among Females	5-9 years 23	10-14 years 22	15-20 years 6

Source: Survey II

Table 8.17

Turnover in the Populations of the Survey Villages, 1959-1969

Type of Migrant	Number of Males Migrating					
	Out	%	In	%	Net	%
Landlords	1675	17.7	189	6.8	1486	22.3
Tenants	3382	35.8	822	29.5	2560	38.4
Landless Laborers	4389	46.5	1773	63.7	2616	39.3
TOTAL	9446	100.0	2784	100.0	6662	100.0

Note: Total 1961 population of the 27 villages was 53332.

Source: Statistical Appendix

Table 8.18

Yearly Outmigration of Males from Eight Survey Villages, 1959-69

	Dhab	Fateh-pur	Dalana	Chak 251	Khadal	Nanak-pur	Chak 119/7	Azam	TOTAL
1959-60	41	27	4	17	32	56	42	22	241
1960-61	31	29	38	12	33	57	23	18	241
1961-62	18	23	40	20	27	39	58	30	255
1962-63	24	26	48	14	48	49	54	23	286
1963-64	33	50	51	19	51	48	55	42	349
1964-65	39	47	49	4	54	52	58	50	353
1965-66	37	49	48	20	62	80	49	54	399
1966-67	42	55	72	21	70	64	78	56	458
1967-68	54	58	75	25	81	95	99	58	545
1968-69	49	62	49	32	87	99	107	55	540
TOTAL	368	426	474	184	545	639	623	408	3667

Source:- Survey I

Table 8.19

Out-Migration Matrix for the Villages of West Pakistan, 1959-1969

	Landlords	%	Tenants	%	Landless Laborers	%	TOTAL
Cities	399	9.0	1476	33.3	2558	57.7	4433
Towns	1210	36.3	798	23.9	1326	39.8	3334
Villages	66	3.9	1108	66.0	505	30.1	1679
TOTAL	1675		3382		4389		9446

Source: Statistical Appendix

Table 3.20

In-Migration Matrix for the Villages of West Pakistan, 1959-1969

	Landlords	%	Tenants	%	Landless Laborers	%	TOTAL
Cities	72	6.1	214	18.2	890	75.7	1176
Towns	96	7.8	268	21.8	863	70.4	1227
Villages	21	5.5	340	89.2	20	5.3	381
TOTAL	189	6.8	822	29.5	1773	63.7	2784

Source: Statistical Appendix

Table 8.21

Out-Migration/In-Migration Ratios for the Villages of West Pakistan

(1959-1969)

	Landlords	Tenants	Landless Refugees
Cities	550	690	290
Towns	1260	300	150
Villages	310	330	25o

Source: Statistical Appendix

Table 8.22

Destination of Migrants and Back-Migrants from 5 Villages of Haripur Tehsil, 1961-1968

City	Migrants	Back Migrants	Net	% of Net Migration
Karachi	876	316	560	83.2
Islamabad-Rawalpindi	38	24	14	2.1
Peshawar	49	7	42	6.3
Lahore	44	6	38	5.7
Hyderabad	17	6	11	1.6
Sukkur	11	3	8	1.2
TOTAL	1035	362	673	100.0

Source: Survey III

Table 8.23

Remittances Sent by Migrants from Karchi to Haripur Villages

Year	Number of Migrants	Number Remitting	Amount Remitted per Person (Rupees)	Amount Remitted per person per year (Rupees)
1961	102	109	28,776	264
1962	111	198	57,618	291
1963	134	320	100,160	313
1964	137	453	133,635	295
1965	98	242	81.490	281
1966	83	188	52,514	217
1967	72	172	16,944	152
TOTAL	876	1972	507,233	286

Source: Survey III

Table. 8.24

Back-Migration to the Villages of Haripur and Years of Residence in Karachi

Year	Back Migration	Years of Residence in Karachi				
		0-1	1-2	2-5	5-10	More than 10
1961	13	1	1	2	4	5
1962	12	0	2	1	3	6
1963	15	2	2	3	1	7
1964	16	1	1	4	4	6
1965	33	8	9	4	5	7
1966	67	19	24	10	6	8
1967	92	32	36	16	4	4
1968	68	12	19	17	10	10
TOTAL	316	75	94	57	37	53

Source: Survey III

NOTES

1. Definition of an urban area as adopted by the Pakistan Census Commissioner. See Government of Pakistan, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961. Bulletin No. 2, (Karachi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1961), p. 13.

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7. M.G. Kutty, "Calcutta: Problems and Plans," Asia No. 2 (Summer 1968), p. 57.

8. United Nations Secretariat, Bureau of Social Affairs, Report on the World Social Situation (New York, 1957), p. 113.

9. Gustav F. Papanek, "The Location of Industry," Pakistan Development Review, Vol. X, No. 3 (Autumn 1970), p.300.

10. Robert I. Crane, "Urbanism in India," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LX, No. 5 (March 1955), p. 463.

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12. Gideon Sjoberg, The Preindustrial City: Past and Present (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 95-103.

13. Nirmal Kumar Bose, "Calcutta: A Premature Metropolis," Scientific American, Vol. CCXII, (, 1965), p. 91.

14. Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan, Vol. 3, West Pakistan (Karachi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1961), p. II-121.

15. Government of India, The Imperial Gazeteer of India Vol. XVI (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), p. 106.

16. Ibid., p. 106.

17. Ibid., p. 107.

18. Ibid. ,p. 108.

19. For a detailed discussion of the anti-Ahmadya movement see Government of the Punjab, Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 Enquiry into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Lahore: Government Printing Press, 1954).

20. Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 223.

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29. Gerald Breese,Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 88.

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33. Sultan Hussain, Communal Unrest in Pakistan (Lucknow: Modern Publishers, 1967), p. 42.

34. Z.A.Suleri, "Six Points are Six Points," The Pakistan Times (Lahore, February 4-6, 1971).

35. Donald J. Bogue and K.C. Zachariah, "Urbanization and Migration in India," in Roy Turner (ed.) India's Urban Future (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), p. 27.

36. The net international immigration during the census decade 1951-1961 was only 0.8 million. See Government of Pakistan, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol. I (Karachi: Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, 1961), pp. 11-17.

37. Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population," Scientific American, No. 213 (Summer, 1965), p. 48.

38. Donald J. Bogue and K.C. Zachariah, "Urbanization and Migration in India," op. cit., p. 28.

39. Government of Pakistan, Population Census Bulletin No. 2 (Karachi: Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, 1963), p. 13.

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41. Daniel Thorner, "Long Term Trends in Output in India," in Simon Kuznets et.al. (eds.), Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955), p. 119.

42. The methodology of Table 13 is taken from Kingsley Davis, "Urbanization in India," op. cit., p. 9.

43. Government of Pakistan, Population Census of Pakistan, Vol. I , (Karachi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1961), pp. II-16.

44. Imtiazuddin Husain, Mohammad Afzal and Syed Amjad Bahadur Rizvi, Social Characteristics of the People of Karachi (Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1965), p. 44.

45. The proportion of villagers in the total migrant population in Karachi is not very different from the proportions noted in the case of some Indian studies. Thus a 1954-1956 study of Lucknow estimated that 65.48 percent of the migrants came from the rural areas. Radhakamal Mukerjee and Baljit Singh, Social Profiles of a Metropolis: Social and Economic Structure of Lucknow, Capital of Uttar Pradish, 1954-1956 (London: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p. 49. In a study of the urbanization of Agra, it was noted that "of those who came during 1941-1954, 76.1 percent belong to rural areas." D.S. Chauhan, Trends of Urbanization in Agra (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1966), p. 293. In a study of Kanpur, it was noted that, "a little over three-fourths of the immigrants are from rural areas." D.N. Majumdar et.al., Social Contours of an Industrial City: Social Survey of Kanpur (London: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p. 70.

46. In the matter of the earning capacity of the in-migrants, Karachi seems to differ from other metropolitan cities in the Indian sub-continent. Thus, against nearly two-thirds of the in-migrants of Karachi earning less than Rs 100 per month, the proportion with similar incomes in the cities of Bombay and Delhi was considerably smaller. See D.T. Lakdawala, Work, Wages and Wellbeing in an Indian Metropolis: Economic survey of Bombay City (Bombay: University of Bombay, 1963), and V.K.R.V. Rao and P.B. Desai, Greater Delhi: A Study in Urbanization, 1940-1957 (New York: Asia Publishing HOuse, 1965).

47. Joan M. Nelson, Migrants, Urban Poverty and Instability in Developing Nations (Cambridge, Mass: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1969), passim.

48. Data taken from Sultan S. Hashmi, Mashiur Rahman Khan and Karol J. Krotki, The People of Karachi: Data from a Survey (Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1964), passim.

49. In this respect the survey towns resemble some of the cities surveyed in India. Thus for Kanpur: "Migrants who are either from the same district or from the neighbouring districts constitute 54.68 percent." Majumdar, et.al., Social Contours of an Industrial City, op. cit., p. 71. However, in the case of the city of Lucknow it was noted that, "very few of them [migrants]...belong to the district of Lucknow itself. The proportion of these latter is only 13 percent of the rural immigrants, 2 percent of the urban immigrants and 10 percent of the total." Nearly one-tenth of the migrant population had come from outside the state of Uttar Pradish. Mukerjee and Singh, Social Profiles of a Metropolis, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

50. In the case of the migrants to Agra, Chauhan found that about 80 percent of the households made only one move, 12 percent made two moves and the remaining 8 percent made more than two moves. Trends in Urbanization in Agra, op. cit., p. 308. In the Kanpur study it was noted that nearly 13 percent of the migrants reached the city after having first settled in another urban area. Majumdar et.al., Social Contours of an Industrial City, op. cit., p. 80.

51. See William H. and Charlotte Viall Wisir, Behind Mud Walls, 1930-1960 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), Oscar Lewis, Village Life in Northern India (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), and Zekiye Eglar, A Punjab Village in Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960). Also see Prakash Tandon's biography, Punjab: Century 1857-1957 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968). Muhammad Rafique Raza in his sociological study of two villages in the Punjab found some occupational inability, but makes no reference to population turnover as an important characteristic of modern-day rural life. See Two Pakistani Villages: A Study in Social Stratification (Lahore: University of the Punjab, 1969), p. 31.

52. This rate of out-migration is greater than that recorded by John B. Wyon and John E. Gordon in their study of the villages in the Indian Punjab. According to them: "A met emigration of 11 persons per thousand per year from the study area cut population to about half the rate of natural increases." See The Khanna Study, Population Problems in the Rural Punjab (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 226.

53. Shahid Javed Burki, "Rural-Urban Migration: A Case Study of Hazara Migrants in Karachi," Government College Economic Journal, Vol. III, No. 2 (june, 1970).

54. Government of Pakistan, Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1970-1975 (Islamabad: Planning Commission, 1970), pp. 55-57.

55. Joan M. Nelson, Migrants, Urban Poverty and Instability in Developing Nations, Op. cit.

56. The process described here is different from the one described by Janet Abu-Lughod for Cairo. According to her, the rural-urban movement should not be considered in terms of a rural-urban dichotomy because of the progressive ruralization of city life and urbanization of village life. See "Migrant Adjustment to City Life: The Egyptian Case," in Gerald Breese (ed.), The City in Newly Developing Countries (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 377.

Statistical Appendix

The twelve tables included in the statistical appendix provide data of migration flows from 27 villages located in the Punjab, Pakistan. The data refers to 12,230 migrants and back-migrants from and to these villages in the period 1959-1969. The data was obtained from the records maintained by the patwaris (village clerks) and the union councils. The aim was to have a complete census of all type of migrants for the period covered. The data was collected in the summer of 1970 under the supervision of the author.

Table A

Migration Flows to and from the Survey Villages

Village	Population		Migration 1959-1969			Net Outmigra- per 1000 of population
	1951	1961	Out-Migrants	Back-Migrants	Net	
Gunnaur	2520	2420	312	91	221	9.0
Thakkarke	1050	1097	153	23	130	12.0
Massanda	1280	1494	190	64	126	8.0
Nankpur	1520	3365	639	238	401	12.0
Manonwala	1670	2135	589	304	285	13.0
Khtanpur	1640	2029	303	121	182	9.0
Chadowal	1210	1249	139	50	89	7.0
Hariawala	1640	1718	174	29	145	8.0
Fatehpur	2220	2133	426	62	368	17.0
Dalana	2156	3643	474	74	400	11.0
Pakki	1026	1358	188	37	151	11.0
Notak	1950	2524	233	31	202	8.0
Chak 251	1193	1316	184	29	155	12.0
Kotshakkar	1402	1669	333	51	282	17.0
Munde Sayid	1104	1335	167	29	131	10.0
Umral	1150	689	124	17	107	16.0
Ropar	1120	1180	222	82	140	12.0
Chak Jamal	1610	1548	229	21	208	13.0
Dhab	1807	1537	368	189	179	12.0
Dinanwala	2100	2313	424	55	369	16.0
Sardor	1225	1656	335	49	286	17.0
Chak 119/7DR	1010	2307	623	285	338	15.0
Chak L	1631	2170	504	242	262	12.0
Chak 12L	667	987	225	21	204	21.0
Khadal	1130	1397	545	180	365	26.0
Azam	1180	1305	408	141	267	27.0
Malakpur	3450	6748	942	269	673	10.0
Total	41661	53332	9446	2784	6662	13.0

Table B

Destination of Outmigrants

Survey Village	Cities	%	Towns	%	Other Villages	
Gunnaur	144	46.2	118	37.8	50	16.0
Thakkarke	59	38.6	70	45.8	24	15.7
Massanda	95	50.0	68	35.8	27	14.2
Nankpur	338	52.9	132	20.7	169	26.4
Manonwala	260	44.1	240	40.7	89	15.1
Khanpur	145	47.9	93	30.7	65	21.5
Chadowal	85	61.2	38	27.3	16	11.5
Hariawala	108	62.1	51	29.3	15	8.6
Fatehpur	244	57.3	113	26.5	69	16.2
Dalana	280	59.1	113	23.8	81	17.1
Pakki	75	39.9	92	48.9	21	11.2
Notak	94	40.3	88	37.8	41	17.6
Chak 251	104	56.5	47	25.5	33	17.9
Kot Shakkar	171	51.4	96	28.8	66	19.8
Munde Sayid	94	58.8	36	22.5	30	18.8
Umral	87	70.2	26	21.0	21	16.9
Ropar	121	54.5	76	34.2	25	11.3
Chak Jamal	111	48.5	69	30.1	29	12.7
Dhab	111	30.2	138	37.5	119	32.3
Dinanwala	127	30.0	174	41.0	123	29.0
Sardor	167	49.9	130	38.8	38	11.3
Chak 119/7DR	293	47.0	232	37.2	98	15.7
Chak L	220	43.7	209	41.5	75	14.9
Chak 12 L	82	36.4	118	52.4	25	11.1
Khadal	249	45.7	224	41.1	72	13.2
Azam	185	45.3	143	35.0	80	19.6
Malakpur	394	41.8	532	56.5	16	1.7
TOTAL	4436	47.0	3344	36.7	1679	16.3

For totals, see Table A.

Table C

Back-Migration from Cities, Towns and Villages

Survey Village	Cities	Towns	Other Villages
Gunnaur	59	19	13
Thakkarke	8	14	1
Massanda	32	25	7
Nankpur	140	61	37
Manonwala	102	154	48
Khanpur	60	52	9
Chadowal	18	30	2
Hariawala	19	10	0
Fatehpur	33	20	9
Dalana	41	29	4
Pakki	8	25	4
Notak	10	14	7
Chak 251	11	13	5
Kot Shakkar	21	30	0
Munde Sayid	13	10	6
Umral	6	10	1
Ropar	41	32	9
Chak Jamal	6	14	1
Dhab	72	103	14
Dinanwala	19	25	11
Sardor	21	24	4
Chak 119/7DR	140	121	24
Chak L	107	108	27
Chak 12 L	5	7	9
Khadal	50	72	58
Azam	35	61	45
Malakpur	99	144	26
	1176	1227	381

N=2784

Table D

Socio-Economic Background of Out-Migrants

Village	Landlords	Tenants	Landless Laborers
Gunnaur	43	76	193
Thakkarke	31	60	62
Massanda	24	71	95
Manonwala	143	224	222
Khanpur	67	80	156
Chadowal	10	47	82
Hariawala	15	55	104
Fatehpur	84	151	191
Dalana	51	166	257
Pakki	36	62	90
Notak	28	61	134
Chak 251	37	78	69
Kot Shakkar	71	112	150
Munde Saiyid	20	43	97
Umral	18	19	87
Ropar	46	59	117
Chak Jamal	39	98	92
Dhab	64	166	138
Dinanwala	77	145	202
Sardor	71	114	150
Chak 119/7DR	111	227	285
Chak L	97	235	172
Chak 12 L	42	84	99
Khadal	118	211	216
Azam	79	174	155
Malakpur	187	361	394
Nankpur	66	193	380
	1675	3382	4389

N = 9446

Table E

Socio-Economic Background* of Back-Migrants

Village	Landlords	Tenants	Landless Laborers
Gunnaur	11	21	50
Thakkarke	4	6	13
Massanda	10	19	35
Manonwala	12	84	142
Khanpur	11	121	172
Chadowal	11	30	80
Hariawala	6	12	32
Fatehpur	4	13	12
Dalana	2	17	43
Pakki	3	11	60
Notak	6	10	21
Chak 251	3	13	15
Kot Shakkar	1	8	20
Munde Saiyid	3	8	40
Umral	0	1	28
Ropar	2	1	14
Chak Jamal	10	29	43
Dhab	4	8	9
Dinanwala	8	40	141
Sardor	5	15	35
Chak 119/7DR	5	23	21
Chak L	15	121	149
Chak 12 L	1	86	155
Khadal	2	2	17
Azam	11	33	136
Malakpur	10	48	83
Nankpur	29	42	198
TOTAL	189	822	1773

N = 2784

*This refers to the social and economic status of the in-migrants before they migrated out of the countryside.

Table F

Destination of Migrating Landlords

Village	Cities	%	Towns	%	Other Villages	%
Gunnaur	25	58.1	16	37.2	2	4.7
Thakkarke	6	19.4	25	80.6	0.	0.0
Massanda	14	58.3	10	41.7	0	0.0
Nankpur	57	86.4	7	10.6	2	3.0
Manonwala	6	4.2	137	95.8	0	0.0
Khanpur	5	7.5	61	91.0	1	1.5
Chadowal	2	20.0	8	80.0	0	0.0
Hariawala	9	60.0	6	40.0	0	0.0
Fatehpur	12	14.3	71	84.5	1	1.2
Dalana	17	33.3	33	64.7	0	0.0
Pakki	8	22.2	28	77.8	0	0.0
Notak	6	21,4	22	78.6	0	0.0
Chak 251	10	27.0	27	73.0	0	0.0
Kot Shakkar	6	9.2	65	91.5	0	0.0
Munde Sayid	11	55.0	8	40.0	1	5.0
Umral	4	22.2	10	55.6	4	22.2
Ropar	9	19.6	37	80.4	0	0.0
Chak Jamal	9	23.1	28	71.8	2	5.1
Dhab	20	31.2	43	67.2	1	1.6
Dinanwal	14	18.2	58	75.3	5	6.5
Sardor	12	16.9	56	78.9	3	4.2
Chak 119/7DR	24	21.6	71	64.0	16	14.4
Chak L	25	25.8	60	61.9	12	12.4
Chak 12 L	11	26.2	31	73.8	0	0.0
Khadal	26	22.0	82	69.5	10	8.5
Azam	18	22.8	61	77.2	0	0.0
Malakpur	33	17.6	149	79.7	5	2.7
TOTAL	399	23.8	1210	72.2	66	3.9

N = 1675

Table G

Destination of -Migrating Tenants

Village	Cities	%	Towns	%	Villages	%
Gunnaur	23	30.3	24	31.6	29	38.2
Thakkarke	30	50.0	13	21.7	17	28.3
Massanda	35	49.3	17	23.9	19	26.8
Nankpur	50	25.9	38	19.7	105	54.4
Manonwala	102	45.5	51	22.8	71	31.7
Khanpur	30	37.5	9	11.3	41	51.3
Chadowal	17	36.2	15	31.9	15	31.9
Hariawala	32	58.2	10	18.2	13	23.6
Fatehpur	101	66.9	0	0.0	50	33.1
Dalana	104	62.7	20	12.0	42	25.3
Pakki	21	33.9	30	48.4	11	17.7
Notak	10	16.4	11	18.0	40	65.6
Chak 251	53	67.9	11	14.1	14	17.9
Kot Shakkar	61	54.5	11	9.8	40	35.7
Munde Sayid	13	30.2	11	25.6	19	44.2
Umral	9	47.4	4	21.1	6	31.6
Ropar	32	54.2	13	22.0	14	23.7
Chak Jamal	42	42.9	19	19.4	37	37.8
Dhab	21	12.7	61	36.7	84	50.6
Dinanwala	2	1.4	63	43.4	80	55.2
Sardor	80	70.2	17	14.9	17	14.9
Chak 119/7DR	131	57.7	55	24.2	41	18.1
Chak L	101	43.0	84	35.7	50	21.3
Chak 12 L	14	16.7	49	58.3	21	25.0
Khadal	157	74.4	12	5.7	42	19.9
Azam	43	24.7	59	33.9	72	41.4
Malakpur	162	44.9	91	25.2	108	29.9
TOTAL	1476	43.8	798	23.7	1108	32.5

N = 3382

Table H

Destination of Migrating Landless Laborers

Village	Cities	%	Towns	%	Villages	%
Gunnaur	96	49.7	78	40.4	19	9.8
Thakkarke	23	37.1	32	51.6	7	11.3
Massanda	46	48.4	41	43.2	8	8.4
Nankpur	231	60.8	87	22.9	62	16.3
Manonwala	152	68.5	52	23.4	18	8.1
Khanpur	110	70.5	23	14.7	23	14.7
Chadowal	66	80.5	15	18.3	1	1.2
Hariawala	67	64.4	35	33.7	2	1.9
Fatehpur	131	68.6	42	22.0	18	9.4
Dalana	159	61.9	60	23.3	38	14.8
Pakki	46	51.1	34	37.8	10	11.1
Notak	78	58.2	55	41.0	1	0.8
Chak 251	41	59.4	9	13.0	19	27.5
Kot Shakkar	104	69.3	20	13.3	26	17.3
Mude Saiyid	70	72.2	17	17.5	10	1.0
Umral	64	73.6	12	13.8	11	12.6
Ropar	80	68.4	26	22.2	11	9.4
Chak Jamal	60	65.2	22	23.4	10	1.1
Dhab	70	50.7	34	24.6	34	24.6
Dinanwala	111	55.0	53	26.2	38	18.8
Sardor	75	50.0	57	38.0	18	12.0
Chak 119/7DR	138	48.4	106	37.2	41	14.4
Chak L	94	54.7	65	37.8	13	7.6
Chal 12 L	57	57.6	38	38.4	4	4.0
Khadal	66	30.6	130	60.2	20	9.3
Azam	124	80.0	23	14.8	8	5.2
Malakpur	199	50.5	52	40.6	35	8.9
TOTAL	2558	58.3	1326	30.2	505	11.5

N = 4389

Table I

Back-migration of Landlords from Cities, Towns, and Villages

Survey Villages	Cities	Towns	Other Villages
Gunnaur	4	6	1
Thakkarke	0	4	0
Massanda	3	5	2
Nankpur	8	4	0
Manonwala	7	3	1
Khtanpur	4	5	2
Chadowal	0	4	2
Hariawala	0	4	0
Fatehpur	0	2	0
Dalana	1	1	1
Pakki	1	4	1
Notak	0	3	0
Chak 251	0	1	0
Kotshakkar	1	0	2
Munde Sayid	0	0	0
Umral	1	1	0
Ropar	6	3	1
Chak Jamal	1	3	0
Dhab	4	3	1
Dinanwala	1	3	1
Sardor	1	4	0
Chak 119/7DR	5	6	4
Chak L	0	1	0
Chak 12 L	0	2	0
Khadal	5	6	0
Azam	5	5	0
Malakpur	14	13	2
TOTAL	72	96	21

N = 189

Table J

Back-Migration of Tenants from Cities, Towns, and Villages

Survey Villages	Cities	Towns	Other Villages
Gunnaur	4	8	9
Thakkarke	2	4	0
Massanda	3	12	4
Nankpur	51	29	4
Manonwala	10	27	84
Khtanpur	5	6	19
Chadowal	4	5	3
Hariawala	5	2	6
Fatehpur	8	5	4
Dalana	4	5	2
Pakki	3	1	6
Notak	5	4	4
Chak 251	2	0	6
Kotshakkar	4	2	2
Munde Sayid	0	0	1
Umral	0	1	0
Ropar	13	11	5
Chak Jamal	2	0	6
Dhab	11	7	22
Dinanwala	5	2	8
Sardor	3	14	6
Chak 119/7DR	10	26	85
Chak L	24	38	24
Chak 12 L	0	2	0
Khadal	3	18	12
Azam	21	21	6
Malakpur	12	18	12
TOTAL	214	268	340

N = 822

Table K

Back-Migration of Landless Laborers from Cities, Towns, and Villages

Survey Villages	Cities	Towns	Other Villages
Gunnaur	35	22	2
Thakkarke	5	8	0
Massanda	21	14	0
Nankpur	62	75	5
Manonwala	86	82	4
Khtanpur	34	43	3
Chadowal	19	13	0
Hariawala	8	4	0
Fatehpur	22	21	0
Dalana	41	19	0
Pakki	14	7	0
Notak	8	7	0
Chak 251	10	10	0
Kotshakkar	25	15	0
Munde Sayid	21	7	0
Umral	14	0	0
Ropar	13	30	0
Chak Jamal	7	2	0
Dhab	100	41	0
Dinawala	12	23	0
Sardor	7	14	0
Chak 119/7 DR	72	77	0
Chak L	66	89	0
Chak 12 L	7	10	0
Khadal	50	84	2
Azam	25	58	0
Malakpur	106	88	4
TOTAL	890	863	20

N = 1773

Table L

Migrant Landlords to Towns by Ownership Category

Village	Total	0-25 acres		25-100 acres		More than 100 acres	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Gunnaur	43	11	68.8	5	31.2	0	0.0
Thakkarke	31	21	84.0	4	16.0	0	0.0
Massanda	24	4	40.0	6	60.0	0	0.0
Nankpur	66	4	58.6	3	42.4	0	0.0
Manonwala	143	130	94.9	7	5.1	0	0.0
Khanpur	67	50	82.0	11	18.0	0	0.0
Chadowal	10	4	50.0	4	50.0	0	0.0
Hariawala	15	2	33.3	4	66.7	0	0.0
Fatehpur	84	68	95.8	3	14.2	0	0.0
Dalana	51	12	36.4	20	60.6	1	3.6
Pakki	36	14	50.0	12	42.9	2	7.1
Notak	28	10	45.5	8	36.44	4	18.2
Chak 251	37	25	92.6	0	0.0	2	7.4
Kot Shakkar	71	60	92.3	5	7.7	0	0.0
Munde Saiyid	20	3	37.5	5	62.5	0	0.0
Umral	18	6	60.0	4	40.0	0	0.0
Ropar	46	37	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Chak Jamal	39	27	96.4	1	3.6	0	0.0
Dhab	64	37	86.0	6	14.0	0	0.0
Dinanwala	77	50	86.2	8	13.8	0	0.0
Sardor	71	56	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Chak 119/7DR	111	70	98.6	1	1.4	0	0.0
Chak L	97	54	90.0	6	10.0	0	0 0.0
Chak 12 L	42	25	80.6	6	19.4	0	0.0
Khadal	118	72	87.8	10	12.2	0	0.0
Azam	79	60	98.4	1	1.6	0	0.0
Malakpur	187	138	92.6	10	6.7	1	0.7
TOTAL	1210	1051	86.9	150	12.4	9	1.7

Chapter 9:

Collapse of Ayub Khan's System

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July 1971

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We are now in a position to use the analysis of the foregoing chapters and the conclusions drawn in them to study in some depth the collapse of the system introduced by Ayub Khan. We have already examined the assumptions on which Ayub Khan based his program of political and economic modernization. In the political blitzkrieg that followed his coup d'etat, most of the important social groups lost a great deal of their power. Those of the groups that were willing to accept his program of modernization were accomodated into the system, recovering some of the ground they had lost in 1958. However, some groups refused to cooperate and were pushed away further from the center of decision-making. In this chapter I describe the system as it was introduced in the period 1959-1962 and the changes that were introduced in it thereafter. For, after 1962 the system went through a period of mutation as some of the social groups made their peace with the regime of Ayub Khan. Those who were prepared to cooperate received political and economic dividends. The way these rewards were distributed produced an enormous impact on the course of the development of the political and economic society.

The discussion of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section deals with some of the important political and economic developments during the Ayub era. These developments brought about changes in the system that Ayub Khan introduced in the country.

The second section describes the anti-Ayub movement as it has been interpreted by a number of political scientists and economists. The third section takes a somewhat deeper look into this movement, tracing its course with the help of an index of political violence developed specially for this purpose. The concluding part links the movement with the political and economic changes that Ayub Khan brought about in the society. The political and economic picture that is painted in this chapter is in aggregate terms - the development of national political institutions, structural changes in the national economy, pattern of political violence in the society. A somewhat more disaggregated picture will be presented in the following chapter.

AYUB KHAN'S SYSTEM AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

Ayub Khan celebrated the first anniversary of his coup d'etat by establishing the system of Basic Democracies in the country.[2] The first elections to the Union Councils that formed the base of the system were held in November 1959. In February 1960, Ayub Khan sought a vote of confidence from the 50,000 Basic Democrats. He received an overwhelming endorsement, with 75,084 casting a "yes" against 2,829 casting a "no" vote.[3] Armed with what he called the mandate from the people, Ayub Khan set about giving the country new political institutions. After being sworn in on February 17, as Pakistan's first elected President, Ayub Khan announced the

appointment of an eleven-man Constitution Commission to examine the progressive failure of parliamentary government in Pakistan and, after taking into account the genius of the people, to submit constitutional proposals in the form of a report.[4]

On May 3, 1961, the Commission presented its report. The report was based on the replies that the Commission received to its questionnaire, on the response that it got from the individuals and organizations it interviewed and on its own assessment of what political institutions were best for the people of Pakistan.[5] The Commission concluded that the real causes for the failure of parliamentary government "were mainly the lack of leadership resulting in a lack of well-organized and disciplined parties, the general lack of character in the politicians and their undue interference in the administration."[6] In its recommendations, the Commission favored a presidential form of government with a federal structure; a central legislature with two houses; and direct election of the president, lower house and provincial assemblies by restricted adult franchise.

Ayub Khan waited for nearly 10 months before announcing his own constitutional plan. The only point of resemblance between his plan and that recommended by the Commission was the presidential form of government. The Constitution of 1962, as promulgated on March 1, did not differ from the basic principles of government and political organization that

Ayub Khan had drafted as early as 1954. Pakistan was to have a federal structure. The president, as well as the unicameral legislature, were to be elected by an electoral college made up of 80,000 Basic Democrats. The Chief Executive was to be assisted by a Cabinet to be appointed by him. No member of the Cabinet could hold a seat in the legislature. The governors of the two provinces were to be appointed by the president; the governors, in turn, were empowered to appoint their own Council of Ministers. The provincial legislators were to be chosen by the members of the Basic Democracies residing in the province. No political parties were to be allowed.

The first elections under the Constitution of 1962 were held in May of that year when a total of 602 candidates (286 from East and 316 from West Pakistan) offered themselves for the 150 National Assembly seats. The election to the Provincial Assemblies, held a month later, were contested with even greater vigour. For the 300 seats in the two provincial legislatures, 1887 took the field, 1000 in East and 887 in West Pakistan.[7] The keenness with which the elections were contested gave the system a sense of legitimacy.

What worried the regime was the fact that the elections to the central and provincial legislatures brought back two of the social groups that Ayub Khan had sought to discredit in the period between the coup d'etat and the promulgation of

the legislative assemblies (see Chapter 2, particularly Table 2.3). The urban professionals, particularly the members of the legal community, and the landed aristocracy, returned in large numbers to the legislatures; the former from East Pakistan and the latter from the western wing. These groups were prepared to work with the regime provided Ayub Khan made some concessions - the concessions they sought were in keeping with their political and economic interests. East Pakistan's urban professionals owed their position to the political institutions that they had nurtured for so long in their society. Accordingly they demanded that the ban on the functioning of political parties should be lifted. The landed aristocracy, mindful of the fact that it owed its political power to the ownership of property, demanded an insurance that the government would not press further its original and somewhat radical program of economic (including land) reform. These demands were accepted.

Accordingly, Sushella Kaushik, writing a year after the promulgation of the Constitution, was convinced that Ayub Khan had backed away considerably from his original political philosophy. "Contrary to expectations that the presidential form of government would lead to 'guided' and hence limited democracy under the firm leadership of Ayub Khan, the democratic elements have reasserted themselves with such vigor that they have forced the hand of Ayub in many directions."[8] In the first year of the working of the

Constitution, Ayub Khan made two concessions: he accepted the demand of the Assembly that the members of the Councils of Ministers should retain their membership of the legislature and he allowed the Assembly to pass the Political Parties Act of 1962. The first step vested the legislature with effective controls over the Council of Ministers - an essential feature of parliamentary democracy. The second step permitted the formation of political parties - another feature of an uncontrolled representative system.

In 1963, Ayub Khan went a step further and himself joined the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), a political party formed out of the fragments of several parties that had been dissolved in 1958. The PML attracted the landed aristocracy of West Pakistan and some members of the legal community of the eastern wing. The changes introduced by Ayub Khan in 1962-1963 were therefore not manifestations of the power wielded by democratic elements within the society. Instead, they were made in order to integrate some of the groups into the political and economic system. By bringing about such an assimilation, the regime hoped to strengthen itself.

As we show in Table 9.1, those groups also extracted an economic price for giving support to Ayub Khan. The regime, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, provided a constitutional guarantee of rapid economic development to the backward region of East Pakistan. The Constitution of 1962 made the promise that the disparity in incomes between the

two wings would be removed in a period of two decades. For the landed aristocracy, the economic rewards took a more tangible form. The revised Second Five-Year Plan, published in November 1961, announced that the Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Program (V-AID) was being disbanded.[9] The V-AID, by seeking to make the poorer section of the rural society become economically self-sufficient had invited the wrath of the landed aristocracy. The Agriculture Department of West Pakistan that had, for long voiced the interests of the big landlords, had compaigned relentlessly against the V-AID.[10] Accordingly, it was announced that the V-AID's "agricultural development functions are being taken over by the Agricultural Departments and... its other functions by the Basic Democracies,"[11] - two institutions that the landed aristocracy had no difficulty in controlling.

A very big concession was made to the landed aristocracy when all references to further land reform were deleted from the final version of the Third Five-Year Plan (1965-1970). The earlier drafts of the plan, published between 1963 and 1964 for eliciting public opinion, contained suggestions for lowering the ceiling of agricultural land holdings below the level to which they were brought in 1959.

The system of Basic Democracies, introduced in 1959, while providing an organizational forum to the group of surplus

farmers of East Pakistan that had gained economic wealth and political power even before the advent of the Ayub era, also served the purpose of bringing West Pakistan's middle farmers into the arena of politics. Once again a tradeoff was arranged between the regime and these groups. The Constitution of 1962 turned the Basic Democracies into an electoral college for the President and the National and Provincial legislatures. This added enormous political prestige to the institution of Basic Democracies and to its members, the Basic Democrats.

By launching the Rural Works Program in East and West Pakistan, the regime made the Basic Democracies and the elected councillors economically very powerful. They now had at their disposal more than Rs 250 million for distribution as development grants to the villages under their jurisdiction.

In 1964, Ayub Khan decided to shelve the report submitted by the Pay and Services Commission set up by the regime in 1959. The Commission had strongly recommended a drastic reorganization of the civil bureaucracy with a view to reducing the power of the Civil Service of Pakistan. The recommendations of the Commission were formulated at a time when the regime was determined to destroy the power bases of all the groups that had been influential in the pre-Ayub era. The CSP was one such group. However, in the period following the introduction of the system of Basic Democracies, the CSP had demonstrated its usefulness to the regime by providing a very effective link between the two level political system

created by the Constitution of 1962. In the absence of well-organized political parties, the CSP and its provincial counterparts (East Pakistan's Civil Service and Provincial Civil Service of West Pakistan) provided useful channels of communication between the institutions of Basic Democracies on the one hand and central and provincial administrations on the other. In return for this service to the new system, the orthodox civil bureaucracy was able to preserve itself as an elitist group within the administrative structures.

The need to dilute the power of the merchant-industrialists, a large number of whom had migrated from India and had started their operations in Karachi, led the regime to adopt industrial and fiscal policies aimed at widening the ownership base of industrial capital. The introduction of the Bonus Voucher system, relaxation in controls over imports and the setting up or strengthening of industrial banks helped bring in new people into the field of industry. However, since the government wanted to provide economic incentives such as these to the groups who were prepared to provide political support to it, Ayub Khan backed away considerably from his earlier resolve to operate a highly centralized political and economic system in the country.

The operation of a "spoil system" brought about the most important change in the political structure that Ayub Khan had initially designed for the country. "Delegation of authority was permissible but central control must remain in the hands of

the chosen leader who should provide unified direction to the country and its administration," he wrote in his autobiography. "Such a central authority seemed all the more necessary in our social and political circumstances. Without a strong central authority the country could not be held together."[12] However, with the appointment of Nawab Kalabagh and Abdul Monem Khan as Governors of West and East Pakistan, he delegated to the provinces a number of economic and political functions that had been originally planned to be the exclusive preserve of the central political administration. The Governors, armed with these powers, operated the spoils system with tremendous effectiveness.

The power to issue industrial licenses and route permits for operating passenger buses was exploited by the two provincial executives to recruit supporters for Ayub Khan and his regime. The presidential and legislative elections of 1965 were masterminded by Kalabagh and Monem Khan. His own success and that of his followers in these elections convinced Ayub Khan that the system as transformed by delegation to provincial authorities had worked. What he did not realize was that this kind of delegation of power in fact created tension within the society that may not have appeared had he continued to operate the highly controlled system that he had originally planned. Of this we will have more to say later.

With the dismissal of General Azam Khan, one of three

generals who joined the first Council of Ministers of the Ayub regime, the provincial governments were allowed to take up the task of settling the claims filed by the refugees from India. The provincial governments using their rule-making powers under the broad Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Ordinance issued by the central government, discriminated in favor of the refugees from the Indian part of the Punjab. The Ordinance, as we saw in Chapter 4, was heavily biased in favor of this group of refugees; the way it was used by the government of West Pakistan helped them even further.

By organizing the Tripartate Government, Management and Labor Conference, the administration provided a forum that the organized labor of West Pakistan found exceedingly useful. By nominating the labor union leaders, particularly those from West Pakistan, to the local councils created under the system of Basic Democracies, the regime was able to integrate this group into the political structure. And, by setting up the government-sponsored Social Security Institution, the regime was able to take upon itself some of the burden of providing to industrial labor facilities that it demanded of its employers.

One other political concession that the regime allowed in order to accomodate sub-groups into the system was made with the incorporation of the first amendment in the Constitution of 1962. This amendment, made at the urging of the legal community, gave constitutional recognition to some fundamental

rights to be protected by the judicial system. In return for this a number of lawyers, particularly those from the powerful Bar Association of Lahore, offered their support to Ayub Khan. In the elections of 1965, Khurshid Ahmad, a prominent member of the Lahore Bar, became Ayub Khan's principal political agent. S.M. Zafar, another influential lawyer from Lahore, joined the cabinet in 1965.

The above discussion describes the manner in which a number of important groups were brought into the political system by the regime of Ayub Khan. Their integration into the system did not democratize it. Creation of political parties, recognition of fundamental rights and delegation of powers to the provincial administrations were developments that did not result from a reassertion of democratic elements within the society. The regime made these concessions in order simply to broaden the social base of its political support. Even after the political parties started functioning and even after people started using the right to file writ petitions to safeguard their constitutionally-granted rights, the system of Ayub Khan remained what it was: a make-shift coalition between social groups.

Such a system could not accomodate all social groups. Given the absence of political institutions, the groups that refused or failed to integrate into the system responded by resorting to the only weapon they had at their command: political violence. As the regime of Ayub Khan worked with

diligence toward achieving its goal of modernization, both the number of the alienated groups and people whom they represented increased.

In Table 9.2 we provide a list of the major political agitations, campaigns and movements in which these groups took active parts. It can be seen that most of these groups participated in the anti-Ayub Khan movement of 1967-1969. It is to this movement that we now turn our attention.

ANTI-AYUB KHAN MOVEMENT

"Like the May 1968 revolt in France," writes Tariq Ali, "the November uprising in Pakistan had very small beginnings. Pakistan's Nanterre was a small shopping center called Landi Kotal about twenty-five miles north of Peshawar in the North-West Frontier."[13] According to this version, accepted by a number of other contemporary chroniclers, the anti-Ayub Khan movement started in November 1968 when some seventy students from Rawalpindi went to Landi Kotal, a small market specializing in smuggled goods from Afghanistan, and bought about Rs 5000 worth of merchandise. The police's interception of this group resulted in a scuffle and a number of arrests. Thereafter the students of Rawalpindi's Gordon College took out large processions and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto also arrived on the scene. "Rawalpindi had suddenly come back to life, and had done so in such a way that even

the censored press of the dictatorship could not quite conceal it."[14] The uprising, if we are to believe this account, was spontaneous but not too different from earlier student-sponsored agitations. Things moved rapidly after the Rawalpindi incidents.

"Student disturbances have become an epidemic; so have student-police clashes," wrote Z.A. Suleri. "The real story behind the student disturbances is, however, more complicated. The fact of the matter is that the disgruntled political elements have sought to use them as a matter of considered and deliberate policy."[15]

On November 11, two shots were fired at Ayub Khan while he was addressing a public meeting at Peshawar. A day later, the government responded by arresting Zulfiqar Bhutto under the Defense of Pakistan Regulations. More arrests followed. "The Government...exercised the utmost forebearance, presumably because some students were involved, but had to act when it saw that perverted politicians persisted in their disregard of the basic rules of democracy and threatened to plunge the country into chaos," editorialized The Pakistan Times.[16]

Government actions notwithstanding, the country plunged into chaos. On November 18, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, a long time associate of Ayub Khan, entered politics and declared his intention of leading the people in the absence of the incarcerated leaders. The Air Marshal's action came as a severe

blow to the regime, for it was the first visible crack in the political house that Ayub Khan had erected.

There seemed no way of halting the movement. "The only weakness of the regime lies itself in the fact that the party supporting it did not organize well enough," lamented Suleri. "The agitational politics which have marred the image of the country is no small degree due to the lacuna created by the absence of the Muslim League from the field."[17] Having tried the stick and failed, the regime brought out a carrot. All the demands raised by the students were accepted in December. However, in January of the next year, the movement spread to East Pakistan, particularly after a suspect involved in the Agartala case was shot down while attempting to escape. The situation in East Pakistan deteriorated rapidly and took on the shape of a popular revolution. According to a report dispatched from East Pakistan and carried simultaneously by The Times (London) and The New York Times,[18]

> Hundreds of villages in East Pakistan have been razed, thousands of Bengalis left homeless and more than 150 persons have been killed in 10 days of mob executions. In most parts of East Pakistan, demoralized and outnumbered policemen are virtually cowering in their barracks, as mobs of villagers roam the countryside to settle old feuds or wreak vengence on the lower echelon of President Mohammad Ayub Khan's regime. Police stations have been attacked and officials clubbed to death. Victims of the executions have been beheaded, crucified, drowned or thrown into huge bonfires...Time is running out for 70 million Bengalis who in normal circumstances barely manage to eke out a living from a land area which is about half

> the size of Britian...The situation in the cities is no better...In almost every city managements and government officials have been surrounded by workers and eventually forced to agree to higher wages, which in many cases both government and business cannot afford to pay.

In the meantime, Ayub Khan had announced his intention of not running for another term in the elections that were due for January 1970 and had convened a meeting of all political leaders to discuss the political situation with a view to finding some kind of a solution. When these attempts failed, he resigned and handed over the administration of the country to General Aghan Mohammad Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. On March 25 Yahya Khan abrogated the Constitution, proclaimed martial law and became the second military President of Pakistan. The agitation stopped immediately and the country returned to normalcy. Violence ceased immediately and the anti-Ayub movement came to an end.

What initiated the movement? This question has already received considerable academic attention. However, in most of these analyses some one important event in the Ayub Khan era receives all the emphasis. According to Robert LaPorte, the process of Field Marshal's descent began in September 1965 when the armed forces of Pakistan faced those of India's across the entire length of Indo-West Pakistani border. The military stalemate in the seventeen-day war (September 6-23) turned the men in uniform, if not hostile, then at least indifferent, to a continuation of Ayub Khan's rule.

> If a scapegoat was sought to assume responsibility..., Ayub as the allocator of scarce resources in Pakistan was a vulnerable target - until 1965-66, defense expenditures had increased at a much slower rate than total public expenditure, reaching a low of 46.1 percent of total expenditure in 1964-65, the eve of the Indian conflict.[19]

The signing of the Tashkent agreement with India in January 1966 further alienated the Army. Therefore, in 1968-69, Ayub was no longer able to use the military to quash public agitation against his rule as effectively as he had done on some previous occasions.

According to some economists, the agitation owed its beginning to the Decade of Development celebrations that lasted for nearly a year and reached their climax in October 1968.[20] The celebrations took the form of an intensive government-sponsored propaganda aimed at convincing the people that the government had made enormous economic strides during Ayub Khan's rule of Pakistan. However, the government machinery, with the help of a submissive press and controlled radio, spoke in aggregate terms. The rate of growth of the Gross National Product more than doubled in 1958-68 compared to 1949-58; from 2.4 percent to 5.5 percent. Incomes per capita increased at a rate of 2.8 percent during 1958-68 as against 0.1 percent during 1949-58. While there was no increase in exports between 1949-58, they rose by 8.9 percent during 1958-68. The annual rate of growth in the agriculture sector rose from less than 1.2 percent during 1949-58 to 3.5 percent during 1958-68.[21]

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According to N.M. Uquaili, Ayub Khan's Finance Minister in 1968, the growth in the important sector of agriculture, "in practical terms means a virtual resurrection of barren fields that held no hope at the beginning of the present era. This was the result of personal lead given by President Ayub Khan to achieve self-sufficiency in food."[22] According to this line of thinking the Finance Minister as well as the Ministry of Information missed the important point that the ordinary consumer is interested more in the immediate past and future than in long-term economic trends. These figures, the argument goes, while giving an accurate comparative picture of Pakistan's economy in the first post-independence decade (1948-58) and Ayub Khan's Decade of Development (1958-68), hide some important features of the new economic system. After showing remarkable stability for more than four years, prices of essential consumer goods began to rise in 1965. Between 1965-66 and 1968-69, the general index of wholesale prices (1959-60= 100) rose by more than 19 percentage points; from 117.54 to 136.07. Whereas the cost of living index remained stable in the period 1959-64, it showed an increase of 16.5 percent in 1964-68.[23] Because of tight government control on industrial labor unions and an equally tight control over the agricultural labor exercised by the landed class, industrial and agricultural wages did not keep in pace with

the rise in prices. According to one calculation, real wages in the 1960's fell in Pakistan.[24] Therefore, according to this view, the government information machinery not only left the poor classes of urban and rural Pakistan unconvinced of the great economic miracle of Ayub Khan's regime, but instead made them aware of the fact that they had been completely by-passed by the process of economic growth.

According to a third point of view, it was Ayub Khan's near-fatal illness that was ultimately responsible for his downfall. In the spring of 1968, the President was struck with a virus and pneumonia which developed into primary embolism. Says Wayne Wilcox:

> All of the submerged problems of the society and economy boiled in the absence of an effective lid on the cauldrom of social change, and the emergence of an open, vigorous opposition to the government was unmatched by a confident, active leadership on the part of a tired, sick President.[25]

A fourth point of view connects the agitation with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's swing over from covert to boisterous opposition to which students of West Pakistan responded with unprecedented enthusiasm.[26] Bhutto was active throughout the summer of 1968, holding meetings whenever and wherever the law permitted. The hint of insurrection was first dropped by him loud and clear in the rally at Hyderabad, held on September 21, 1968. The newspapers ignored Bhutto's speech

but printed the rejoinder delivered a month later by General Mohammed Musa, the Governor of West Pakistan.[27] A section of the students thus indirectly made aware of the charges that Bhutto had levelled against the government, was at this point prepared to join the struggle that this new and remarkable opposition Leader was now waging so relentlessly.

Some political scientists provide a socio-economic explanation for the fall of Ayub Khan. Maniruzzaman attributes it to corruption which affected all sections of the powerful civil bureaucracy during the Ayub era.[28] Corruption transfers resources from those who wield economic to those who wield political power. It is tolerated when the rate of growth of the economy can accomodate such a transfer; it is resented when a slow-down in economic development makes it difficult for the recipient of administrative favors to reward those who dispense them.[29] If corruption could be regarded as a separate income-generating sector then it could be argued that over time its share in the national income cake increased at the expense of other sectors. Since the "producers" in the sector of corruption were far fewer in number than other principal sectors, this caused considerable heart-burning.

A somewhat related explanation is provided by the regime that succeeded that of Ayub Khan. The official view links the fall of Ayub Khan with the type of administrative

machinery that was established by him in the 1960's. It was not some kind of a zeal for reform that led Yahya Khan to assume power in 1969. Accordingly, most of the important steps of his regime were taken not with the object of reforming Pakistan's economic and political society but with the aim of restoring the society back to its pre-1958 condition. It is presumably in this spirit that the new government accepted the applicability to Pakistan of the parliamentary form of government, based on universal, adult franchise; undertook the dissolution of the province of West Pakistan; and refrained from putting any serious obstacle in the way of the working of the political parties. In one field, however, the Yahya Khan regime abandoned its chosen path. In November, 1969, less than seven months after assuming power, the government set up an administrative reform commission, under the chairmanship of Justice A.R. Cornelius. The preamble to the terms of reference for the Cornelius Commission gave clear indication of the reason why the regime had seen it appropriate to reform the administrative structure of the country:

> Among the causes of public resentment, which led to country-wide demonstrations during the period preceding the imposition of Martial Law on March 25, 1969, the resentment against the structure of administration of the country figures prominently. People in all walks of life including a great majority of those in government services condemned this structure on the ground that it was a relic of the colonial past in which the relationship between

> the government functionaries and the people was that of the ruler and the ruled; that it had during the last 22 years proved to be unsuited to the needs and aspirations of a free and sovereign people; that it had continued to sustain and even strengthen a ruling elite within the service cadres, which had sacrificed administrative neutrality for political partisanship; and that it had helped to promote corruption, inefficiency and selfishness.[30]

This long preamble, with references to the "relic of the colonial past", "ruling elite within the service cadres," and "ruler and the ruled" relationship between the people and the government functionaries, was meant to serve as an indictment against the traditional component of the civil bureaucracy, like the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) and the Provincial Civil Service (PCS). The demand for reform was raised during the agitation of 1968-69 by the technical services like the West Pakistan Engineering Service and West Pakistan Health Service, and also by the subordinate services like the Central Secretariat Service and West Pakistan Secretariat Service. The need for reform was underscored by the Yahya regime when it took action against 303 high-level civil officials for corruption, misdemeanor, inefficiency and political partisanship. Although the CSP has only 550 officers in a bureaucracy of more than 60,000 (nationally), 39 of its members were included in the list of 303 indicted. Similarly, the representation of the PCS in the list was far out of proportion to its representation in the civil bureaucracy.

There is, therefore, considerable divergence in the

views that have been presented by the academic world to explain the fall of Ayub Khan. There is some truth in all of them. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto played a significant role in mobilizing the forces that over-turned the regime. Ayub Khan's illness, increase in interpersonal and inter-regional disparities, prevalence of corruption, etc., provided him with an opportunity to bring together the political elements opposed to the regime. It is conceivable that without Bhutto the agitation that built up would not have reached the pitch required to dislodge a firmly established regime. It is also conceivable that without the social and economic developments that took place in the Pakistan of Ayub Khan, the Bhutto phenomenon, despite all its attendant charisma, would not have become the social and political force that it did in 1968 and again in 1970.[31] Charismatic leadership preyed on socio-economic forces and, simultaneously, socio-economic forces built up charismatic leadership to produce the anti-Ayub Khan movement.

MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The course of violence in Pakistan's two decades of independence has been carefully documented in official publications. Every year, the government issues The Year Book of Pakistan. The last section of this publication is devoted to a presentation of time series indicating the trend in

crimes committed against persons, property and the state. The last category is subsumed under the title of "riots" and includes mostly acts of defiance by the people of the orders passed by the government under various regulations. Ayub Khan's regime used Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code and various provisions of the Defence of Pakistan Rules to regulate public political behavior. Unwillingness on the part of the public to subscribe to government-established rules of conduct usually led to arrests. Any such defiance leading to an arrest or arrests was interpreted as a riot and included in The Year Book statistics.

The Year Book provides aggregate data. In this chapter we use the riot data in its disaggregate form - the number of people arrested in the ten quarters between October 1966 and March 1969. The data is for the cities and for the towns with populations of more than 10,000.

Table 9.3 reveals a number of interesting things about the course of the political movement that eventually led to the fall of the regime of Field Marshal Ayub Khan. For West Pakistan, the series for the number of arrests made per thousand of the urban population shows two discontinuities, one in the second quarter of 1967 and the other in the second quarter of 1968. The index shows an increase of 50 percent between the first and second quarters of 1967 and 64 percent between the first and second quarters of 1968. The series for East Pakistan, however, do not show

any trend. As can be seen from Figure 9.1, there are a number of peaks and troughs in the period under examination. Two peaks, one in the second quarter of 1967 and the other in the first quarter of 1969 are of interest. The first one was associated with the emergence of Bengali nationalism. In the period April-June 1967 the government of Ayub Khan took steps to curb the movement led by the Awami League of Mujibur Rahman that had started demanding economic and political autonomy for East Pakistan. The government's actions led to the arrest of 3,627 persons in this period, shortly after Ayub Khan threatened that any movement toward autonomy could lead the country toward civil war. The tough handling of the situation by Abdul Monem Khan temporarily suppressed the autonomy movement. This peak, therefore, should be treated as an independent phenomenon not related very intimately with the anti-Ayub Khan movement. The peak of the first quarter of 1969 was, however, produced by the movement. We will link this peak with our analysis of the movement.

Two things became clear from the data of Table 9.3. First, the anti-Ayub movement did not start in the fall of 1968, but in the spring of 1967. Second, it had its beginnings in West Pakistan. The reasons behind the belief that the movement began in the last quarter of 1968 are not too difficult to understand. Most observers see it as a spontaneous November uprising because that is when it really hit the headlines in

the government-controlled press of Pakistan. Unless an effort is made to link it with the political, social and economic undercurrents that were present in the society, the political restiveness that was apparent to many, including Ayub Khan,[32] in the period 1967-68, cannot be connected with the movement. The movement itself caught the imagination of the people once its leadership was assumed by Zulfiqar Bhutto and Asghar Khan. Before them it was simply a movement of discontent that attracted the notice of a few alienated groups.

In order to understand and quantify the social and economic factors that generated the anti-Ayub Khan movement, I have constructed an index of violence. This index measures the number of arrests per thousand of the urban population (NATP) made by the government under two preventive provisions, the Defense of Pakistan Rules and Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Since no arrests were made by the authorities in the rural areas, urban population is used as a denominator for measuring NATP. It has been possible to calculate NATPs for 35 districts of West and 15 districts of East Pakistan. (In 1969 West Pakistan had 46 and East Pakistan 17 administrative districts). It is possible to construct causal relationships with NATP on the one hand and important social and economic indices on the other. The coefficients of correlation for 35 districts of West Pakistan between NATP

and socio-economic indices that were non-zero at 0.05 level of significance or above, are shown in Table 9.4 These relationships point toward a number of interesting phenomena.

There is a negative and significant correlation between NATP and the percentage of urban population in the district (PUBP) indicating that the more urbanized a district, the lower the level of political violence. The same relationship is indicated between NATP and the percentage of literate population (PLIT), percentage of persons born outside the district (PPBO), percentage of refugees in the urban population (PRUP), and per capita industrial production (PCIP). We may conclude from this that modernity lends stability to a society. That is to say that the regions within a country that have achieved higher degrees of urbanization, literacy, social heterogeniety and industrialization exhibit somewhat lesser predilection toward political violence.

However, according to Huntington, "modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability," and, moreover, "the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernization."[33] We should therefore, expect a positive correlation between political violence on the one hand and rate of growth of urban population and industrial production on the other. However, this is not the case: our data yields negative correlations between the level of violence and the rate of growth of industrial production (RGIP) and no correlation

at all between the rate of growth of urban population (GRUP) and NATP.

This does not mean that Huntington's thesis has to be discarded. A deeper look into the data reveals an interesting set of causal relationships. I hypothesize that towns might be more destabilized by urban growth than cities; the reason being that they have fewer means for coping with large-scale immigration and also because they attract a type of migrant on whom the destabilizing effect of urban life is greater than that on the migrant who goes to the cities. In order to test this hypothesis, I created a new variable, urban impact or URIMPCT, which is simply the ratio of GRUP to PUBP, arguing that NATP will be directly related to the rate of growth and inversely related to the size of the urban areas. This variable has the properties we wanted: it is inversely correlated with PUBP (not surprisingly), and positively correlated with NATP. The respective magnitudes are -0.4325 and 0.2956, are significant at the level of 0.01 and the other at 0.05. The use of URIMPCT, therefore, makes our data fit into a modified Huntington model. The modification that we have added to this model of modernization is that the size of the modernizing unit is an important factor in determining the impact of change on the society. We shall have more to say about this in Chapter 10.

The negative relationship between NATP and the rate of growth of industrial product provides another bit of evidence against the model as originally constructed by Huntington. One

of the more interesting results of the analysis is that although the rate of industrial growth seems to be associated with the degree of urbanity of the district, the per capita industrial product is not. We know from the analysis of Chapter 7, that the bulk of the industrial product in West Pakistan was located in Karachi, at least in the early period of Pakistan's economic development. Had this trend continued during the Ayub era we would expect a positive correlation between per capita industrial incomes and rate of growth of industrial product. The fact that this is not the case points to the conclusion that the rates of industrial growth in this period were high in the districts that had a low level of industrial incomes per head of the population. In these districts the level of political violence was relatively low, hence the negative correlation between NATP and RGIP.

We see from this analysis that Huntington's hypothesis that modernization breeds instability cannot be fully confirmed when we correlate data for political unrest with indices of modernization for areas <u>within</u> a developing society. Huntington hypothesized by comparing countries at diffent stages of modernization. We have applied the thesis to regions (districts) within a developing country and find that at least one part of it does not hold.

The next step in our analysis is to develop causal relationships between the socio-economic variables that are found significatly carrelated with NATP. As is immediately apparent from a glance at the carrelation matrix, the various independent variables in many cases represent different indicators of the

same phenomena. In light of this only a subset of available variables was chosen: PUBP, PLIT, GRUP, PRUP, PCIP. Using these variables the path of causation as well as the magnitude of the impact of one variable on the other and finally on the level of political violence was determined as explained in the appendix to this chapter. The model that was finally accepted is shown in Figure 9.2.

It will be noticed that in this model we have come very close to the one-equation regression model that is usually rejected by economists and political scientists alike. However, there is one important difference: the extra link between the level of urbanization and the level of violence through the growth rate of the industrial product. By including this link we are prevented from overestimating the impact of urbanity on political stability. It will be seen from the model that the direct link between the level of urbanization and political violence provides with a very high negative coefficient of -.955. This suggests that the regions that have reached a high level of urbanization would be politically stable. From the simple regression equation model one would estimate the relative impact on NATP of PUBP as -.945 as opposed to .686 for RGIP and -.531 for PCIP and this would argue that urbanity is the most important influence in reducing the number of arrests. However, by using the path analysis approach, we reduce the real impact of urbanity on arrests to -.272, which is then quite a different story.

The other paths that show up significantly in our model

are those linking per capita industrial product and proportion of refugees from India in the population with the level of political unrest. In both cases, the relationships are negative, signifying that increases in the income derived by the population from industry and presence of large numbers of refugees in the urban population worked as politically stabilizing factors.

CONCLUSION

We are now in a position to put together the conclusions arrived at above into some kind of an hypothesis regarding the movement that led to the collapse of the Ayub Khan regime. To begin with, we have found that the movement started in West Pakistan in the spring of 1967. It was discovered by the political leadership in the fall of 1968. In the first quarter of 1969, it spread to East Pakistan. On March 25, with the imposition of martial law, the movement came to an abrupt halt.

We have found that the movement had roots in causes quite different from those usually considered by political scientists and economists. While the seventeen day war with India in 1965, the exaggerated fanfare with which the administration celebrated Ayub Khan's tenth year in office, Ayub Khan's grave illness in 1968, corruption that was rampant in the administration and the extraordinary power wielded by the civil bureaucracy all led to the political upheaval of 1967-1969, its real causes lie in the socio-economic and political changes that the regime had wrought in the society. These changes we have dealt with in some detail in the first two parts of this book and need only be recounted to be placed in their proper perspective.

In our analysis of the growth of the agricultural sector in West Pakistan, we noticed the extraordinary dynamism picked up by the class of middle farmers that was politically and economically emancipated from the stranglehold of the landed aristocracy by the movement of modernization initiated by Ayub Khan. In our examination of the process of urbanization, we saw that one consequence of the agricultural revolution was the displacement of a large number of persons from the rural areas. The persons so displaced went to the urban areas; the small landholders preferred to go to the towns nearest their villages while the landless labor chose to go to the cities. While urbanity turned out to be a politically stabilising factor, we noticed that the growth rate of urban population for small urban centers was positively correlated with the level of political unrest. Therefore, the reforms of Ayub Khan in the agricultural sector sent persons to the towns of West Pakistan who were not pleased with the socio-economic change introduced by Ayub Khan. This resulted in political instability.

In our examination of the process of industrial development we saw that during the Ayub Khan era two objectives of the regime were partially achieved. In 1968 the industrial wealth of Pakistan was geographically more dispersed than in 1959. At the same time the base of industrial ownership was considerably broader at the end of the Ayub Khan period than in the fifties. The data used in this chapter corroborates the first conclusion: we see that during the sixties there was no significant relationship between the growth of industrial product and the level of

per capita industrial incomes, indicating that areas that showed high rates of industrial growth in this period were relative newcomers to the field. The negative correlation between PCIP and NATP shown by the model of Figure 9.2 indicates that this policy paid political dividends and the areas that benefitted from Ayub Khan's approach toward industrialization proved to be relatively more stable during the political troubles of 1967-1969. The fact that the regime of Ayub Khan pampered the leadership of industrial labor unions (see Chapter 4) must have helped in bringing political stability to the industrialising areas. The fact that the regime adopted a different attitude toward labor leadership of East Pakistan explains the more active role played by industrial labor in the political crisis of 1969. However, let us not pre-empt here the discussion of Chapter 10.

In our analysis of Ayub Khan's approach toward social groups we saw that a number of them were split into two or more sections as a result of the policies adopted by his regime. Among the groups so split was that of refugees from India. One section of the refugees, those belonging to the Indian Punjab, developed strong affinities with the regime while the remaining were totally alienated. The bulk of the former was settled in the Pakistani Punjab while most of those from other provinces of India were settled in the urban areas of Sind. In some of the towns of Sind, the refugees accounted for 50 to 60 percent of the population. The politically stabilising influence of

the refugee population that we notice in the model etched out in Figure 9.2 is hard to explain unless we examine separately the behavior of the refugee communities in different parts of West Pakistan. This will be done in Chapter 10.

We therefore see that urbanization, although not urbanity, proved to be the most destabilising element in Pakistan's political life, particularly during the closing years of Ayub Khan's era. This we had learnt to expect from the discussion in Part II (Chapters 6-8) of the book.

Figure 9.1

The Course of Political Violence in Pakistan, 1966-1969



Figure 9.2

Socio-Economic Causes of Political Violence--West Pakistan, 1967-1969



$R^2_{NATP} = .576$

Indirect effect of PUBP = .906 x .753 = .683

Total effect of PUBP = -.955 + .683 = -.272

Table 9.1

Groups and Their Influence on Policy Making During the Ayub Era

SUB-GROUP	POLICY DECISION INFLUENCED	
	Economic	Political
I. East Pakistan's urban professionals	1. Emphasis on regional development (1962)	1. Political parties recreated (1962). 2. Ayub Khan appointed the President of the Pakistan Muslim League (1963).
II. West Pakistan's landed aristocracy	1. Village-AID abandoned.(1961). 2. Commitment not to have another land-reform (1964)	1. Ayub Khan appointed the President of the Pakistan Muslim League (1963).
II. East Pakistan's surplus farmers	1. Rural Public Works Program started in East Pakistan (1962) 2. Rural Credit made available through the cooperatives.	1. More political and economic powers given to the Basic Democracies.
IV. West Pakistan's middle farmer	1. New agricultural inputs were made available. 2. Rural Works Program started in West Pakistan (1963)	1. More economic powers given to the Basic Democracies (1962-1963).
V. Orthodox Civil Bureaucracy	1. Rural Works Program started in East and West Pakistan.	1. Constraint on financial powers of legislatures (1962)
VI. Indigenous Industrialists	1. Bonus Voucher Scheme introduced (1959) 2. Import restrictions relaxed (1962-1964). 3. New sources of credit created (1961)	1. Power to grant industrial licenses given to the provincial government.

VII. Refugees from the Punjab	1. Liberal compensation granted for properties abandoned in India (1962)	
VIII. West Pakistani labor	1. Social Security Institution set up (1961)	1. Close ties established between the government and the trade unions (1959 2. Labor leaders appointed to the Basic Democracies
IX. City Lawyers		1. Fundamental rights incorporated into the Constitution.

Table 9.2

The Response of Alienated Groups to the System of Ayub Khan

GROUP	RESPONSE
I. West Pakistan Students	1. Agitation against the Education Reforms 1962. 2. Agitation against the USSR-India-Pakistan Tashkent Declaration, 1966. 3. Anti-Ayub Khan Movement, 1967-1969.
II. East Pakistani Students	1. Campaign on behalf of Miss Fatima Jinnah, 1964. 2. Anti-Ayub Khan Movement, 1967-1969.
III. East Pakistan Legal Community	1. Campaign on behalf of Miss Fatima Jinnah, 1964.
IV. West Pakistan Small Town Lawyers	1. Anti-Ayub Khan Movement, 1967-1969.
V. West Pakistan Small Town Ulema	1. Agitation against the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961-1962.
VI. Non-Punjabi Refugees	1. Campaign on behalf of Miss Fatima Jinnah, 1964. 2. Agitation against resettlement laws, 1962-1969. 3. Anti-Ayub Khan Movement, 1967-1969.
VII. Refugee Merchant-Industrialists	1. Financing of Miss Fatima Jinnah's election campaign, 1964.
VIII. East Pakistan Labor	1. Industrial strikes, 1962. 2. Industrial riots, 1963. 3. Anti-Ayub Khan Movement, 1967-1969.

Table 9.3

Number of Political Arrests Per Thousand of the Urban Population, 1966-1969
(Quarters)

	1966	1967				1968				1969
	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I
Pakistan	0.18	0.22	0.44	0.32	0.24	0.21	0.34	0.42	0.43	0.52
East Pakistan	0.35	0.57	1.39	0.69	0.40	0.14	0.27	0.36	0.42	1.17
West Pakistan	0.15	0.14	0.21	0.24	0.22	0.25	0.41	0.49	0.48	0.38

Table 9.4

Correlation Matrix Between NATP and Some Important Social and Economic Indicators

N = 35

	PUBP	PLIT	PPBO	PRTP	PRUP	PCIP	RGIP	PFAF	NATP
PUBP	1.000								
PLIT	0.7768	1.000							
PPBO	0.6413	0.4567	1.000						
PRTP	0.0193	0.0171	0.5037	1.000					
PRUP	0.1644	0.1645	0.6066	0.6444	1.000				
PCIP	0.2058	0.2641	0.2247	-0.0204	0.0230	1.0000			
RGIP	0.9059	0.7152	0.6246	-0.0486	0.1870	0.2621	1.000		
PFAF	0.2031	0.0940	-0.1326	-0.5451	-0.2275	0.0880	0.2837	1.000	
NATP	-0.4325	-0.4791	-0.5087	-0.2947	-0.3332	-0.5453	-0.3090	0.3027	1.0000

Correlations greater than 0.28 are significant at 0.05 level.
Correlations greater than 0.39 are significant at 0.01 level.
Correlations greater than 0.50 are significant at 0.001 level.

PUBP = Percentage of Urban Population
PLIT = Percentage of Literate Population
PPBO = Percentage of Persons Born Outside the District
PRTP = Percentage of Refugees in Total Population (1951-1961)
PRUP = Percentage of Refugees in Urban Population (1951-1961)
PCIP = Per Capita Industrial Product (1967-1968)
RGIP = Rate of Growth of Industrial Production
PFAF = Percentage of farmers Owning More than 50 Acres.

NOTES

1. Ayub Khan and his administration preferred to use the term revolution for the military take-over of October 7, 1958. Moreover, some foreign scholars have described the programs of political, social and economic reform instituted by Ayub Khan as a revolution. See Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of Martial Law Administration (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

2. Government of Pakistan, "Basic Democracies Order," in Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary) October 27, 1959. This occasion was also marked by the promotion of General Ayub Khan to the rank of Field Marshal.

3. Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, op. cit, p. 109.

4. Terms of reference for the Constitution Commission. See Government of Pakistan, Report of the Constitution Commission (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1962), p. 1.

5. Edgar A. and Kathryn R. Schuler, Public Opinion and Constitution Making in Pakistan, 1958-1962 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967), pp. 49-104.

6. Government of Pakistan, Report of the Constitution Commission, op. cit., p. 13.

7. S.M.M. Qureshi, "Party Politics in the Second Republic of Pakistan," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Autumn, 1966), p. 457.

8. Sushella Kaushik, "Constitution of Pakistan at Work," Asian Survey, Vol. III, No. 8 (August 1968), p. 385.

9. Government of Pakistan, The Second Five-Year Plan (1960-1965) (Karachi: Planning Commission, 1961), p. 15.

10. George M. Platt, "Agriculture and Administration," in Guthrie S. Birkhead, Administrative Problems of Pakistan (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 99.

11. Government of Pakistan, The Second Five Year Plan (1960-1965), op. cit., p. 15.

12. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Biography (London: Oxpord University Press, 1967), p. 204.

13. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power? (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 156.

14. Ibid., p. 158.

15. Z.A. Suleri, "A Dangerous Framework of Politics," The Pakistan Times (November 10, 1968).

16. The Pakistan Times, editorial (November 14, 1968).

17. Z.A. Suleri, "Genesis of Agitational Politics," The Pakistan Times (November 24, 1968).

18. Peter Hazelhurst, The New York Times (March 20, 1969).

19. Robert LaPorte, "Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and Change in a Garrison State," Asian Survey, Vol. IX (November, 1969), p. 853. There are other political scientists who support this view. Thus: "With the twenty-twenty vision of hindsight, my informants this week have pinpointed the beginning of Ayub's decline on the India-Pakistan war of 1965." Phillips Talbot, Pakistan Turns a Corner (PT-1-69), Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series, Vol. XIII, No. 1, 1969, p. 5.

20. See, among others, Arthur McEwan, "Contradictions in Capitalist Development: The Case of Pakistan," Paper presented to the Conference on Economic Growth and Social Justice (Rochester, July 29-31, 1970).

21. Government of Pakistan, Economy of Pakistan 1948-1968 (Rawalpindi: Ministry of Finance, 1968), p. 1.

22. Ibid., p. (i).

23. Government of Pakistan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (Karachi, Central Statistical Office, 1969), various issues.

24. Azizur Rahman Khan, "What has been happining to real wages in Pakistan?", The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. VII, No. 3, (Autumn, 1967), pp. 317-347.

25. Wayne Wilcox, "Pakistan in 1969: Once Again at the Starting Point," Asian Survey, Vol. X, No. 2, February 1970, p. 73.

26. W.M. Dobell, "Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLII, No. 3, Fall 1969, p. 307.

27. Bhutto's speech and Musa's rejoinder were printed in full in Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Let the People Judge (Lahore: Pakistan People's Party, 1969).

28. Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Crisis in Political Development and the Collapse of the Ayub Regime," The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. V (January 1971).

29. For a general discussion of corruption in developing societies, see David H. Bayley, "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (December 1966), pp. 719-732 and Joseph S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXI, No. 2 (June 1967), pp. 417-427.

30. Government of Pakistan, Services Reorganisation Committee: Composition and Terms of Reference, (Rawalpindi: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1969), p. 1. See also Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era, Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971), pp. 197-198.

31. In the elections held to the National Assembly on December 7, 1970, Pakistan's People's Party of Zulfigar Ali Bhutto surprised all political observers by winning 81 out of 138 seats allocated to the four provinces of West Pakistan.

32. In his broadcast to the nation of October 1, 1968, Ayub Khan recognised the presence of a political movement in the country aimed at his regime. "...internal threat which could separate people from each other was in no way less dangerous than the external one," he declared. See The Pakistan Times, October 2, 1968.

33. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 41, 45.

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Many social scientists have argued in recent years that the technique of representing a causal system by a single regression is theoretically naive and methodologically inaccurate. They have instead argued for the adoption of multi-equation systems to explain the intercorrelation of the various independent variables among themselves as well as their correlation with the dependent variable.[1]

The problem with such a technique is that if the system is not recursive, i.e., no variable is both a cause and effect in the system--no "reciprocal causality"--, without an appropriate number of exogenous variables, the parameters of the individual equations of the system cannot be "identified." This means, in essence, that some equations in the system are linear combinations of other equations, and thus the parameters predicted by ordinary least squares are simply one set of an infinite set of possible predictions, so that the true parameters of the equation cannot be predicted.[2]

Fortunately for those of us with recursive models, however, the identification problem is not an issue. If one assumes that the intercorrelation of the error terms of each individual predictive equation is zero, than any recursive system can be identified. The general recursive form is:

$$
\begin{aligned}
X_1 &= e_1 \\
X_2 &= a_2 + B_{21}X_1 + e_2 \\
&\;\;\vdots \\
X_n &= a_n + B_{n1}X_1 + B_{n2}X_2 + \ldots + B_{n,n-1}X_{n-1} + e_n
\end{aligned}
\tag{1}
$$

and if $E(e_i e_j) = 0$, then the system of equations is identified and ordinary least squares is an acceptable method of estimating the parameters.[3] This limiting assumption is, of course, subject to empirical test.

Such a technique was applied to the data for arrests in 35 districts in West Pakistan. The first step was to cull the correlation matrix for correlation coefficient which were non-zero at the .05 level or above between various independent variables and the arrest variable, NATP. The resulting sub-matrix is as follows:

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
PUBP	1.0000								
PLIT	0.7768	1.0000							
PPBO	0.6413	0.4567	1.0000						
PRTP	0.0193	0.0171	0.5037	1.0000					
PRUP	0.1644	0.1645	0.6066	0.6444	1.0000				
PCIP	0.2058	0.2641	0.2247	-0.0204	0.0230	1.0000			
RGIP	0.9059	0.7152	0.6246	-0.0486	0.1870	0.2621	1.0000		
PFAF	0.2031	0.0940	-0.1326	-0.5451	-0.2275	0.0880	0.2837	1.0000	
NATP	-0.4325	-0.4791	-0.5087	-0.2947	-0.3332	-0.5453	-0.3090	0.3027	1.0000

correlations greater than .28 are significant at the .05 level
correlations greater than .39 are significant at the .01 level
correlations greater than .50 are significant at the .001 level
N for all correlations = 35

As is apparent from the correlation matrix, the various independent variables in many cases represent different indicators of the same phenomena. A factor analysis of the independent variables showed this to be the case. Four factors, explaining 89.4 percent of the variance of the independent variables were extracted, and then rotated using the varimax technique. Their rotated loadings are as follows:

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PUBP	0.953	0.116	0.041	0.112
PLIT	0.883	0.002	0.130	-0.071
IURB	0.906	0.138	0.103	0.237
PPBO	0.592	0.688	0.130	-0.068
PRTP	-0.036	0.775	-0.012	-0.494
PRUP	0.090	0.927	-0.012	-0.032
PCIP	0.161	0.019	0.985	0.038
PFAF	0.125	-0.188	0.038	0.948

In light of the fact that there was much duplication of information among the independent variables, only a subset were chosen: PUBP, PLIT, IURB, PRUP, PCIP, and PFAF. From these variables a reasonably complex model was elaborated as diagrammed in Figure 1. The method of testing this model and estimating its path coefficients was not ordinary least squares, but rather a method described by Boudon, who terms the coefficients produced "dependence coefficients."[4] This technique uses solely the correlation matrix for the estimation of its coefficients. In its bare essentials, the technique attempts to find a set of coefficients for each of the various causal "paths" which have been hypothesized such that each correlation coefficient can be reconstructed by combining these coefficients. For example, take a simple three-variable system where X_1 causes X_2 and X_3, and X_2 causes X_3. The simultaneous equation representation would be as given above, but the "path equations" would look as follows, where

p_{ij} is the causal effect on variable i from variable j:

$$r_{12} = p_{21}$$

$$(2) \qquad r_{13} = p_{31} + p_{32}p_{12}$$

$$r_{23} = p_{32} + p_{31}p_{12}$$

Obviously this is a system of three equations in three unknowns and has a unique solution. However, assume that p_{32} is now hypothesized to be zero so that the terms including it drop out of the path equations. Then the system is overidentified and p_{31} has two estimates: r_{13} and r_{23}/r_{12}. Boudon proves to be of less help in answering the question of which estimate, if either, does one choose. However, one answer to the problem has been proposed by Fred Bookstein, who suggests that one create a dummy "residual" equal to the square root of $(1-R^2)$ where the R is computed in a regression equation with the path coefficients as the beta weights. He argues that minimizing the sum of the squared residuals gives reliable estimates of the true path coefficients.[5] This method was used on this first model and gave the results reported in Figure 1. Overall effects on NATP, computed as the product of all effects along compound paths and the direct path were as follows:

MODEL 1.


PUBP
PLIT
PFAF
PCIP
RGIP
NATP
.777
-.210
.248
-.181
.028
-.695
.370
-.414
.884
-.512
.469
.480

	Direct	Indirect	Total	Spurious
PUBP	-0.695	0.272	-0.423	0.000
PLIT	-0.181	-0.194	-0.375	-0.103
IURB	0.480	-0.083	0.397	-0.714
PCIP	-0.512	0.000	-0.512	-0.059
PFAF	0.370	0.000	0.370	0.168

Given that the original purpose of this method is to reproduce the original correlations, this model stands up pretty well on four of the five variables. With the exception of PFAF, the reproduced correlation is within .03 of the original correlation. For PFAF, however, the discrepancy is -0.235. For this reason, as well as the fact that the arrest data is given for urban areas, this variable was dropped from further analysis.* The other problem with the model was the coefficient along the path between PLIT and IURB which was essentially zero. Thus in the next model attempt this path was removed, and for some strange reason the setting of this essentially zero-value path to zero in the model specification produced wild results. The discrepancies for PLIT and IURB both increased markedly, some coefficients changed signs, and these facts suggested to me that perhaps the method left something to be desired.

As a result, I returned to the more widely-used method of path estimation through the use of standarized regression

* But see the Appendix on reciprocal causality and two-stage least squares estimation of a model with a feedback loop involving PFAF.

coefficients.[6] As mentioned above, the assumption of uncorrelated residuals among the various equations in the system makes the system of equations identifiable, and the "b's" of the ordinary least squares technique are consistent, unbiased estimators of the p_{ij}'s of system (2) on the previous page. Thus a reduced model, shown in Figure 2, was estimated using this technique. Drawing from experience with Model 1, the path from PLIT to IURB was not included, while all other possible causal sequences were assumed to occur. In the estimation of these path coefficients, the ordinary least squares technique has one important advantage: significance tests for the coefficients became feasible. Thus the results from Model 2 are striking in their divergence from Model 1. The paths from PUBP to PCIP, PLIT to PCIP, IURB to PCIP, and PLIT to NATP are not significant at the .05 level.

That leaves us with the rather simple Model 3, including just four variables and only one indirect path (PUBP--NATP, through IURB). In one sense we have come very close to the original one-equation regression model attacked earlier in this paper as being too naive. Yet including the extra link through IURB does aid in not overestimating the impact of urbanity. From the simple regression equation one would estimate the relative impact of PUBP as -.945 as opposed to -.686 for IURB, and -.531 for PCIP, and thus would argue that urbanity is the most important influence in reducing the

500

MODEL 2



MODEL 3



$R^2_{natp} = .486$

number of arrests. However, the real impact of urbanity includes its contribution to economic growth, which encourages arrests, and since all these coefficients are standardized, the contribution of PUBP to arrests via this encouragement can also be estimated: .906* .686 = .621. Thus the real impact of urbanity on arrests, according to the model is -.945 + .621 = -.324, quite a different story than that told by the one-equation model.

However, the model is not yet complete. An earlier analysis provided us with a set of three factors (not including PFAF), of which one was the presence of refugees. When the factor scores were regressed with NATP, all three orthogonal factors had significant coefficients, suggesting that the presence of refugees would add to our model here. I chose the percent of urban refugees since the arrest data is for urban areas. PRUP has no significant zero-order correlation with any other of our independent variables so it simply appears in the equation for NATP, and gives us Model 4. All the coefficients in Model 4 are significant. At this point we have included all the variables in their original form.

Yet perhaps we could go one step further. Is there any interesting interaction combination of the remaining variables, or those already included, that would be theoretically interesting, and explain more of the variance in NATP? Predicated on the hypothesis that "modernity breeds

MODEL 4



R^2_{natp} = .576

Indirect effect of PUBP = .906 + .754 =.683

Total effect of PUBP = -.955 + .683 = .272

MODEL 5



R^2_{natp} = .590

stability, but modernization breeds instability" and moreover that "the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernization,"[7] varying relations between PCIP and IURB are expected, and are seen to occur. Yet no such reciprocal relation is seen between PUBP and its rate of growth. Indeed GRUP is correlated neither with PUBP nor NATP. However, one possible route of analysis is the study of the impact of the urban growth. I hypothesized that smaller cities might be more destabilized by urban growth than larger ones because, first, they probably have fewer means for coping with large-scale immigration, and second because they are more likely to be in or close to more rural areas where the destabilizing effects of the city (anomie, etc.) on the individual personality of the migrant would be greater than those on his counterpart going to a larger city and coming from more advanced regions. Finally it seems likely that, and this is a variant (corollary?) of the last argument, the more naive migrant is less likely to know the accepted norms of city life and thus perhaps more likely to break the laws of the city. Thus I created a new variable, urban impact, or URBIMPCT, which is simply the ratio of GRUP to PUBP, arguing that NATP will be directly related to the rate of growth and inversely related to the size of the urban areas. This variable has the properties we wanted: it is inversely correlated with PUBP (not surprisingly) and it is positively correlated with NATP. The respective magnitudes

are -0.4325 and 0.2956; it has no other significant correlations. Thus it fits into the model as shown in Model 5.

Unfortunately when this model is tested, URBIMPCT's coefficient with NATP becomes insignificant. Thus it seems apparent that, given no new hypotheses, Model 4 provides the best prediction of the arrests given the data at hand. That the R^2 is so low, 0.576, is discouraging, but perhaps some new hypotheses can be determined. As a final test of the model, $E(e_i e_j)$ was computed for the five equations:

$$
(3) \quad \begin{aligned}
x_1 &= e_1 = \text{PUBP} \\
x_2 &= a_2 + B_{21}X_1 + e_2 = \text{IURB} \\
x_3 &= e_3 = \text{PRUP} \\
x_4 &= e_4 = \text{PCIP} \\
x_5 &= a_5 + B_{51}x_1 + B_{52}X_2 + B_{53}X_3 + B_{54}X_4 + e_5 = \text{NATP}
\end{aligned}
$$

and the intercorrelations are as follows:

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
e_1	1.0000				
e_2	0.0000	1.0000			
e_3	0.1644	0.0901	1.0000		
e_4	0.2058	0.1788	0.0230	1.0000	
e_5	0.0003	0.0002	0.0000	0.0008	1.0000

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As is apparent, our assumption of uncorrelated residuals seems to be held up by the data. For this model, the path equations are as follows:

$$r_{12} = p_{12}$$
$$r_{15} = p_{15} + p_{12}p_{25}$$
$$r_{25} = p_{25} + p_{12}p_{15}$$
$$r_{35} = p_{35}$$
$$r_{45} = p_{45}$$

and solution of this system of equations gives us the estimates:

$$p_{12} = .906$$
$$p_{15} = -.851$$
$$p_{25} = .462$$
$$p_{35} = -.545$$
$$p_{45} = -.333$$

The indirect effect of PUBP as estimated by this method is .418, and the spurious effect of PUBP on the correlation of IURB and NATP is -.771 ($p_{12}p_{15}$). Since these estimates are derived for the actual path model, rather than through the route of regression equations, and since the path model is exactly identified making these sound estimates of the path coefficients, I would suggest that these are the estimates to report, along with the multiple regression of X_5 on X_1 to X_4.

NOTES

1. Multi-equation regression systems are old hat to econometricians, and thus the greatest amount of work on the subject is in the econometric literature. The most lucid description of the methods and problems in Carl F. Christ, Econometric Models and Methods, (New York: John Wiley, 1966), chapters VIII and IX, while a more mathematical approach is found in John Johnston, Econometric Methods, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), chapters 9 and 10. The man who is most responsible for introducing these concepts to sociologists and political scientists is Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., whose Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), discussed in detail the "boxes and arrows" technique of causal modelling and the assumptions and problems involved. His later work, Theory Construction, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), incorporates much of the work of the econometricians, though in a less rigorous form.

2. The identification problem is discussed in detail in Christ, chapter VIII, and less systematically in Blalock, Theory Construction, pp. 50-71. A more mathematical approach is found in Johnson, pp. 240-252.

3. Christ, pp. 454-455; Blalock, Theory Construction, p. 49.

4. Raymond Boudon, "A New Look at Correlation Analysis," in H.M. Blalock and A.B. Blalock, Methodology in Social Research, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 199-235.

5. Fred L. Bookstein, "A New Definition of 'Path Coefficient'," (unpublished paper, Harvard University, Center for the Behavioral Sciences, n.d.).

6. See O.D. Duncan, "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples," American Journal of Sociology, 72(July, 1966), pp. 1-16.

7. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 41, 45.

CHAPTER 10:

Social Groups and Political Unrest: Two Case Studies

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In the preceding chapter we saw in some depth the nature of the social and economic elements working in the society of West Pakistan that contributed to the massive anti-Ayub Khan movement of 1967-1969. We learned that the movement could be explained to a degree by the nature of the process of urbanization in West Pakistan. We had seen earlier that the nature of urbanization was determined by the social and economic policies pursued by the regime of Ayub Khan. However, in the discussion of Chapter 9, we did not differentiate between different kinds of urban areas. Our discussion of Chapter 8 has prepared us to look at the urban sector of the Pakistani society as made up of essentially three types of urban centers - modern cities, traditional cities, and towns. In this chapter, we will use the model developed in our analysis of urbanization in Pakistan to understand the political movement of the late 1960's. In doing so we will also see the nature of the roles played by different social groups in this movement. The discussion of this chapter is presented in the form of two case studies - one dealing with the Punjab and the other with East Pakistan. The reason for presenting the hypotheses contained in this chapter in the form of case statistics would become apparent during the course of the following discussion.

Urbanization, Social Change and Political Unrest in the Punjab

The course of the anti-Ayub Khan movement can be traced in terms of the index of political violence developed in the previous chapter. The level of unrest as depicted by the number of arrests per thousand of the urban population (NATP) considerably increased in West Pakistan in the second quarter of 1967. The nineteen districts in the province of the Punjab also show an increase in the level of unrest in the same period although the increase is not as sharp as it is for the rest of West Pakistan - 38 percent against 50 percent. It therefore seems from the data that the anti-Ayub Khan movement first gathered speed in the districts outside the Punjab and that the Punjabis joined the bandwagon in the spring of 1968 (Table 10.1).

There is a considerable change in the scenario if we disaggregate the data for arrests according to the size of the urban centers that were participating in the political movement. The number of political arrests per thousand of the urban population remained remarkably stable right up to the second quarter of 1968. It is then that the seven cities of the Punjab not only joined the movement, but overtook it. This is one reason why most scholars date the start of the anti-Ayub movement to the second half of 1968. However, the towns of the Punjab showed an almost 100 percent increase

in the level of political unrest between the first and the second quarters of 1967. This means that the 38 percent increase we noticed in Table 10.1 in the level of political unrest in the Punjab is almost wholly accounted for by the towns. Therefore, it this movement is to be given a time and a place for its birth then we can say with some confidence that it started in the spring of 1967 in the towns of the Punjab.

Why did such a sharp increase in the level of political violence occur in the towns of the Punjab in the spring of 1967? Why is it that the political movement, associated with this unrest, once having been generated in the towns, transferred itself to the cities? In order to answer these questions, we must analyze the political upheaval of 1967-1969 in terms of a number of social and economic variables. This can be done by regarding the number of arrests per thousand of the population (NATP) as a dependent variable to be explained in terms of a number of socio-economic independent variables. The variables used in this chapter are the same as those employed for the analysis of Chapter 9.

To focus on the role of the Punjab in the anti-Ayub Khan movement, separate correlation matrices were constructed for the 35 districts of West Pakistan, and for 19 districts of the Punjab. Table 10.2 shows that for the districts of three provinces of West Pakistan taken together (data for the

province of Baluchistan were not available in the form used here), there is a positive correlation between the level of violence and three of the eight socio-economic variables considered useful for the purpose of this analysis. None of those positive relationships were statistically significant. However, out of the five negative relationships, four were significant in the statistical sense. The meaning of these relationships was discussed in some detail in the previous chapter. For the Punjab, however, all but one of the socio-economic variables are negatively correlated with the level of political unrest. GRUP, the growth rate of urban population, is the only destabilizing variable but it provides a non-significant relationship with political violence. Two of the stabilizing factors - those showing negative correlations with NATP - are also statistically significant. These are the levels of literacy and the industrial incomes. The two interesting conclusions that emerge from this exercise are: first, in the Punjab the anti-Ayub Khan movement gained a greater momentum in the areas which had relatively lower levels of per capita industrial incomes. Second, the movement found favor in the areas with low rather than high levels of literacy.

As we see from Table 10.3, the number of significant relationships between the level of political violence and various socio-economic indicators increases when the unrest

data is disaggregated for the cities and towns. For the 12 cities of West Pakistan, the level of political unrest is negatively and significantly correlated with the percentage of population in the district that resides in the city, with the rate of growth of urban population, with the proportion of literates in the urban population and with the percentage of refugees in the city population. For the eight cities of the Punjab only one of these relationships holds its level of significance, that between the level of violence and the rate of growth of urban population. Two interesting things emerge when we look at the data for the towns of West Pakistan. The number of significant relationships increases to six as against four and three relationships reverse their signs. The three variables that show positive correlations with the level of violence in the case of the towns are the growth rate of their populations, proportion of literates in their population, and the proportion of refugees in their populations. The two variables that show a positive correlation with the level of violence are the percentage of literacy and the percentage of refugees in the population of the town. No changes take place when correlation coefficients are reworked for the towns in the Punjab. This can be put in another way: Since the bulk of the town population belongs to the Punjab, no difference shows up in the results when the

coefficient of correlations are calculated by including the data from the few towns in the North-West Frontier and Sind.

There are two significant differences in the relationships between violence and socio-economic factors for the cities and towns of the Punjab. We see from the Table that whereas the rate of growth of the city population appears as a politically stabilising factor for the cities, it is a destabilising factor for the towns. The same applies to the levels of literacy: in the cities, higher the proportion of literate population, lower the level of political violence; for the towns the opposite relationship holds. We can conclude from this that for the cities in the Punjab growth contributes to political stability but in the towns it breeds political discontent and frustation great enough to result in violence.

The conclusions we drew from the data presented in Table 10.1 and from the exercises results of which are given in Tables 10.2 and 10.3, can be combined to formulate an hypothesis about the political movement that led to the resignation of Ayub Khan as the President of Pakistan. The hypothesis can be stated as follows: The movement originated in the towns of West Pakistan, particularly those of the Punjab, in the spring of 1967. The towns that supported the movement were those that were growing rapidly, were located in densely populated countryside, did not have many people engaged in industry, had high levels of literacy and had high proportion of refugees from India in their population. For a year the movement was confined to the towns where it built up gradually in intensity. In the spring of 1968, the movement spread

to the cities and reached its peak in the fourth quarter of that year.

The evidence presented in this paper to show that during the last two years of the Ayub regime, the towns were politically more restive than the cities seems to go against conventional wisdom. The conventional wisdom feeds itself on a perennial fear of large cities and a perennial hope for small towns. "And both such hopes and fears are so strong because in them the attitudes of various societies and cultures merge; because they are reinforced by the apprehension of bigness as such, and of the images associated with large scale settlements and enterprises--images of depersonalization, alienation, anomie, bureaucratization, and compulsion."[1] Our hypothesis that the small towns played a very significant role in the violent political movement of 1967-1969 disturbs this image and creates another according to which the towns are the centers of social, political and economic turmoil in a changing society. As emphasised in some of the earlier chapters the responsibility of turning the towns into vorteces of political activity rests on the political and economic policies pursued by the regime of Field Marshal Ayub Khan. In what follows we consider the social and economic consequences of some of the programs of political and economic modernization launched by his administration. We will then link these socio-economic developments with the political movement of 1967-1969.

The regime's first task was to identify and then politically destroy the important social groups within the society. This

search and destroy operation was launched with care: a number of official commissions were set up to study and report on such matters as land reform, improvement of the legal system inherited from the British, educational reform, settlement of the refugees from India, reform of the Muslim family laws and incorporation of the private industrial sector into a centrally planned economy. The recommendations made by these commissions adversely affected the interests of such powerful social groups as the landlords, the legal community, the university students, the refugees from India, the ulema (religious leaders) and the industrialists. Ayub Khan was right to call the coup d'etat of October 27, 1958 a social revolution.

The immediate result of the military regime's mission was to reduce the power of the existing pressure groups in the society. A redistribution of this power--the regime conceived this process as a zero-sum game--was to bring new groups into the politicized society. The viability of Ayub Khan's system was dependent on the effectiveness of the new political groups. But in this the regime failed. Some of the social groups that he sought to politically destroy survived, albeit in a mutated form. And the group that he chose to fill the place the old social groups were to vacate never quite came up to his political expectations. Accordingly, in 1962 Ayub Khan changed his political philosophy. Along with the new group--the rural middle class--that he brought up in Pakistan's political society, he included such old groups as the landed aristocracy, the indigenous industrialists, city ulema, city lawyers, and unionised labor in the broad coalition that he organized at the time of the launching of the 1962 constitution. The students,

the small town lawyers, the urban professionals, the small business communities, the old industrialists and the town and village maulvis were all discarded. Ayub Khan's program of political reform therefore threw the society into a state of political disequilibrium. That there was no immediate action on the part of the excluded groups to restore the balance in their favor was due to the short lived period of economic prosperity that engulfed the entire politicized society in the early 1960's.

One element in Ayub Khan's economic reform was emphasis on the distribution of the nation's wealth over a wider segment of the society. This was done not for the sake of distributing economic justice but for winning new political friends. The program was achieved by activating new groups of entrepreneurs in the rural and urban sectors. The middle farmer and indigenous industrialists participated vigorously in the economic boom of the early sixties. The great increase in national wealth occasioned by this boom pacified even those segments of the society that Ayub Khan had deliberately excluded from his political system. When the boom burst, it produced one serious political consequence. The old groups, deprived of all of their political and most of their economic power became openly hostile to the new system and the man who had produced it. Their sense of economic deprivation was heightened as a result of better distribution of wealth made possible by the regime. As long as the bulk of industrial capital was concentrated in the distant city of Karachi and was possessed by a handful of refugee industrialists who were barely visible to the rest of the politicized society--as was the case in the era

before the advent of Ayub Khan--the impact of an economic slowdown did not produce grave economic and political crises. The collapse of the economic boom generated by the Korean War did not result in political upheavals. However, the regime of Ayub Khan had brought wealth and prosperity to the areas and to the groups that were located within and were part of the society. The industrialization of the Lahore-Lyallpur - Multan triangle was visible to the rest of the Punjab as was the agricultural revolution led by the middle farmer. With the economy reaching what for Pakistan were dizzying heights, these developments did not produce political and economic frustation. They were, instead, symbols of the new order applauded with an extraordinary lack of self-consciousness by its own creator and respected even by those who were inherently opposed to it. Circumstances changed when the economy started back-sliding. Now the industrial triangle and the agricultural revolution became symbols of the opportunities granted to some groups and denied to others. Let us see in what way the economic slowdown of the late sixties affected some of the groups that were already despleased with the political reforms instituted by the regime.

Because of a variety of factors, Pakistan's economic bubble was pricked in the late 1960's. Ayub Khan's aggressively maintained stance of neutrality in international affairs and the seventeen day war between India and Pakistan in 1965 disillusioned the aid-givers. There was also a change in the attitude of the industrial countries towards the developing nations, from the optimism of the 1950's to the resigned pessimism of the 1960's. This resulted in considerable reduction in the quantities of

foreign capital available to the government for economic development. Pakistan's economic difficulties were compounded by a draught-induced agricultural depression in 1964-1965 (Table 10.4). These developments produced a serious impact on the political thinking of such groups as the university students and urban professionals. The impact of the downturn was felt more acutely by the middle classes in the towns than in the cities.

The small-town economy, in a country like Pakistan, is influenced more by the agricultural than the non-agricultural sector. The shop-keepers and petty merchants find the demand for the goods and commodities they deal with fluctuatung in sympathy with non-subsistence rural incomes. A sharp increase in these incomes can send a wave of prosperity through the small-town economy, a fall in the incomes of the surrounding countryside can cause an equally serious depression. Even the professional classes find their incomes fluctuating along with ups and downs in the rural economy. In particular, the lawyers practicing in the civil and revenue courts in the small town katcheries (courts) find the quantum of their business moving in sympathy with the incomes yielded by agriculture in the surrounding countryside. This is an interesting point and needs some elaboration.

A depression in the agricultural sector tells heavily on the incomes of the small peasants. In order to mitigate the impact of this squeeze, the small peasants borrow from the relatively prosperous landlords or shop-keepers in the village. The money-lenders make available the extra resources required

by the peasantry in return for mortgages that are easily entered into but not as easily redeemed. When at the time of recovery the peasants find that they have the resources to liquidate some of their debts they also discover that the redemption of debt can be a harrowing experience. Therefore, an increase in the incomes of the small peasants leads to an increase in the number of litigations into which they have to enter. This impression is confirmed by the author's experience as a sub-divisional officer and a district administrator in 1964, which as we can see from Table 5 was a year of agricultural depression. The political unrest in the spring of 1967 was preceded by three years of agricultural stagnation. In this time, the small businessmen, legal community, and other professionals must have suffered great economic deprivation. It is therefore not surprising that the small town lawyers, along with the students, found themselves in the vanguard of the anti-Ayub movement. (Table 10.5)

Out of the 63 students arrested in a sample of 9 towns of the Punjab for "anti-state activities" in the spring of 1967, 38 or 60.3 percent were studying in various city colleges. They had not come from the cities to the towns to spread a political message but belonged to these towns and had come home for the spring vacation. A post-agitation survey of the assessment of their future prospects by the students belonging to the cities and towns and studying in colleges located in the cities gives an indication of the differences between the two types of students. As we see from Table 10.6 the city students studying in the city

colleges looked to the future with far greater hope as compared to their classmates who had come to these colleges from the towns. Therefore, when the students from the towns left their colleges, on vacation or otherwise, they carried with them a feeling of acute political and economic frustration. The political constraints imposed on their activities by the regime, particularly in the period following the signing of the Tashkent agreement between India and Pakistan in January 1966 generated a feeling of restiveness among the student body in general. However, the economic downturn of the late sixties further alienated the students from the towns. It soon became obvious to them that their share in the reduced number of employment opportunities that were now available would be smaller than that of the students belonging to the cities. The city students had the social, political and economic contacts that the town students could not hope to match. Back in their towns, during the April vacations, the more politically oriented among them came into contact with the disenchanted members of the urban professionals, particularly the legal community.

We saw in Chapter 3 that the regime of Ayub Khan discouraged the organisation of West Pakistan's students into unions that embraced a number of colleges. The result was that strong regional student unions did not take root in West Pakistan to the extent that they did in the eastern wing. Had the regime not adopted this negative attitude toward student organisations in West Pakistan and had it adopted the same approach toward the students that it did toward the industrial labor of the western wing, the economic

depression of the late sixties may not have produced among the students of the Punjab the kind of response it did. It is possible to speculate that the students of West Pakistan organized into quasi-political organisations like their counterparts in the eastern part of the country, or becoming conscious of political and economic deprivation, would not have immediately resorted to violence.

We see from Table 10.5 that nearly one third of the persons arrested in the first phase of the anti-Ayub Khan movement belonged to the legal community. We have already provided an explanation for the involvement of the legal communities of the Punjab towns in the political movement of 1967-1969. The explanation was based on the assumption that the legal community, along with other members of the urban professional classes belonging to the towns, were more affected by the economic recession of the late sixties than their counterparts in the cities. Some evidence for supporting this hypothesis can be found in the data presented in Table 10.6.

The lawyers belonging to the towns but working in the cities showed a greated degree of confidence in their future compared to the lawyers practicing in their home towns --nearly two-thirds of the former viewed their future with satisfaction compared to one-third of the latter. The reason for this is easily explained. Only those lawyers return to their place of origin, after having acquired law degrees from West Pakistan's four law schools (all located in large, relatively advanced cities of Karachi, Hyderabad, Lahore and Peshawar) who do not find for themselves some kind of

niche in the legal communities of the cities. The potential of alienation of this group is therefore far greater than for the migrant lawyers working in the cities. Considering that the reform movement launched by Ayub Khan hurt the small town lawyer far more than his big city counterpart (Chapter 4), we can understand why the former took such an active part in the political movement that was aimed against his regime.

To these two groups of participants in political turmoil that hit West Pakistan in the second quarter of 1967, we must add that of the small town religious leaders, the maulvis.

In Chapter 4 we saw that the reforms of Ayub Khan aimed at bringing family laws closer to what were regarded as modern practices had alienated the ulema class. However, by nationalising the properties that supported religious shrines, the government was able to bring into its possession an economic weapon that won it some support from among the ulemas practicing in the cities. However, the small town mosque-keeper could not be won over and remained unhappy with the product of Ayub Khan's reformist zeal. This division within the ranks of the religious leadership added to the fervor of the orthodox school of thought as represented by a number of Jamiats (associations) of ulema and maulvis who confined their activities in the towns and the countryside. Their social support was provided in the main by the small town merchants, entrepreneurs, lawyers and teachers. The maulvi used the mosque pulpit effectively to preach against the unorthodox policies of the government. In his congregation the alienated social groups lent him a willing ear. The mosque in the areas

that saw the launching of the early phase of the anti-Ayub Khan became the rallying point.

We see therefore that the social matrix into which the anti-Ayub Khan movement inserted itself was quite different from the one that provided support to the regime. The social groups that came out openly against the regime did so because of a strong feeling of relative deprivation caused by the regime's policies. This sense of deprivation was acute since the alienated groups were off-shoots of some of the groups that had benefitted a great deal as a result of their close association with the regime.

Regionalism and Political Unrest in East Pakistan

The anti-Ayub Khan movement arrived in East Pakistan in early January accompanying a number of political figures who gathered in Dacca to charter a common course for their political struggle. The Dacca meeting led to the formation of the Democratic Action Committee (DAC) and its student off-shoot, the Student Action Committee (SAC). The DAC tabled demands for the restoration of parliamentary democracy while the SAC came out with an eleven point program of political, economic and social reform aimed particularly at East Pakistan. This program went a step or two further than the Six-Point Program announced three years earlier by Mujibur Rahman's Awami League. The SAC Program envisaged full political and economic autonomy for East Pakistan; break-up of West Pakistan into four equally autonomous provinces; formation of a Bengali-militia, independent of the control of the army's Rawalpindi Headquarters; nationalization of banking,

insurance and big industries; reduction in the burden of taxes and levies on the farmers and peasants and assurance of proper wages and bonuses to the industrial workers.

To win support for its demands, the SAC ordered a general strike on January 17. On the morning of the 17th, the students held a meeting under Bat Tola, Dacca University's famous banyan tree. After the meeting the students organized themselves into a procession but were halted by a contingent of the East Pakistan Rifles. This was the first of the many scuffles between the students and law enforcement authorities. Three days later the SAC got its first martyr. On January 20, Asaduzzaman, a Law student, was killed when the police opened fire on an exceptionally unruly mob. Asaduzzaman's death followed by that of Zahurul Haq, an enlisted soldier charged by the regime for having taken part in the Agartala Conspiracy, brought a complete collapse of law and order in the province. The police and the army was withdrawn from the streets of Dacca, Chittagong and Khulna. The government's withdrawal left the field clear to the SAC. Students appointed by the SAC took over policing and in some cases majisterial functions that had been abandoned by the government.[3]

This account of the start of the mass movement in East Pakistan when read along with that of the early phase of the movement in the western wing (see Chapter 9) points to some interesting differences between what were essentially two different phenomena. The only similarity between the two movements is that they were started by students. In West Pakistan the movement started in the small towns of the Punjab and had a long period of gestation.

Its search for leadership lasted for more than a year; it was only when Zulfiqar Bhutto took command of the dissident forces that the movement spread to the major cities of the province. In East Pakistan the campaign against the regime of Ayub Khan built itself into a mass political movement within a matter of days. The campaign was brought to the eastern wing by a group of politicians who had been gradually sucked into the movement in the western wing. Once a highly organized student body had assumed the management of the campaign, it quickly escalated into a mass rebellion.

Social and economic causes compelled the students of the western wing to take to the streets in order to change the system installed by the regime of Ayub Khan. Entirely political circumstances brought the East Pakistani students into the anti-Ayub Khan movement. Whereas the students of the Punjab demanded more and better jobs for themselves and those who supported their campaign, the students of East Pakistan campaigned for political autonomy for their province. In order to fully comprehend the differences between the two movements, let us get back to our social groups and see what kind of role they played in the political, economic and social development of East Pakistan.

Of the three social gruops that dominated East Pakistan's political and economic society during the era of Ayub Khan, two developed intimate links with the regime. A large number of urban professionals, including the members of the legal community, joined the Pakistan Muslim League and were integrated fully into

the system. It is interesting to note that whereas it was a member of West Pakistan's landed aristocracy who was placed at the head of that province's civil administration, it was a member of the powerful Mymensingh Bar Association who became the Governor of East Pakistan. Governor Nawab Kalabagh was able to excercise total control over West Pakistan's administration because of the fact that he hac received full backing not only from Ayub Khan but also received support from the landed aristocracy and middle farmers. Similarly Governor Monem Khan of East Pakistan was supported by a large segment of the province's legal community. Members of some other urban professional classes also sided with Ayub Khan and Monem Khan. Thus M.N. Huda was the only member of the teaching profession to receive a high political appointment during the Ayub Khan period. He was appointed as the Finance Minister by Monem Khan in his Council of Ministers and was made responsible for guiding the economic development of the province. It was Huda who replaced Monem Khan as the Governor when the latter had to resign in March 1969 as a result of the public pressure that was put on East Pakistan's administration.

The second group that lent support to the regime of Ayub Khan was that of "surplus farmers". In Chapters 5 and 6 we analysed the socio-economic circumstances that brought this group close to the government. The group was integrated into the political system with the help of the Basic Democracies. Various economic development plans, including the fabled Comilla Cooperative Program and the Rural Public Works Program, made scarce

resources available to this group at the expense of the peasantry. In return the surplus farmers gave full political support to the regime. In the presidential elections of 1965, rural East Pakistan gave the President the kind of victory that not many people expected. Again, in the late sixties, when much of Pakistan came out against the regime, rural East Pakistan remained quiescent. It was only when some of the urban groups had taken complete control of the government apparatus in March 1969, driving away from their offices the representatives of the Ayub Khan regime, that the surplus farmers switched sides. The rapid collapse of the system in East Pakistan proved to them that the political and economic order that Ayub Khan had instituted could never be resurrected.

Of the three social groups that wielded great power in the political society of East Pakistan, only one failed to give full support to the regime of Ayub Khan. The students of Bengal, with a long tradition of involvement in politics, did not approve of the system that the Constitution of 1962 established in the country. They disapproved of the system because it did not offer them an opportunity for integration. They had learnt to function within the province's political society through the political parties. However, the Ayub Khan system downgraded considerably the role of the parties and this naturally frustrated the student body. Therefore, once the system had been weakened by political strife in West Pakistan, it was quickly demolished by student activity in the eastern wing. In Chapter 3 we provided reasons for the

politically disorganized state of the student community in West Pakistan and persistence of student organizations in the east. These organizations were able to capture the movement quickly in January of 1969. Once in charge of the movement they guided it right up to March 25, when Ayub Khan handed over power to General Yahya Khan.

As we see from Table 9.1 the political agitation against the regime reached its climax in the first quarter of 1969. The number of political arrests per thousand of the urban population jumped by nearly 180 percent, from 1,085 in the last quarter of 1968 to 3,034 in the first three months of 1969. In the same period the level of violence receded somewhat in the western wing; the number of arrests decreased by 21 percent, from 4,191 in the last three months of 1968 to 3,306 in the first quarter of 1969.

So far as East Pakistan is concerned, the anti-Ayub Khan movement of 1969 was in no way different from other major political movements. Like the first language movement of 1948, the first autonomy movement of 1950, the second language movement of 1952, the anti-Muslim League movement of 1954, the food movement of 1956, and the anti-Education reform movement of 1962, the campaign against the regime of Ayub Khan was city-based with few political repercussions in the towns and the countryside. According to the data collected by Rashiduzzaman, nearly 70 percent of the fatalities linked with this movement occurred in the cities of Dacca, Chittagong, and Khulna. Dacca alone accounted for 20 of the 57 deaths attributed to police firing in the period January 17 to March 25, 1969.

(Table 10.7). In the same period, of the persons incarcerated by the authorities, nearly 40 percent belonged to these cities. The impression given by some observers as Peter Hazelhurst in a report quoted in the previous chapter, that the movement against the government of Ayub Khan took the shape of a mass uprising in East Pakistan is therefore not borne out by facts.

We see therefore that the anti-Ayub Khan movement in East Pakistan differed in three important ways from the movement in the western wing. First, it matured in a very short period. Within a period of less than three months the governmental apparatus in the eastern wing was brought to a standstill. The gestation period for the movement in West Pakistan was more than eighteen months. Second, the movement in the east was confined mostly to the cities; in the west it originated in the towns before it spread to the large urban centers. Third, the movement in the east was led by the students. In the west, although launched by the students, it was taken over by the professional politicians. What are the reasons for these differences? In answering this question it will be helpful to return once again to our social groups.

As we saw in the preceding chapters, the base of the political society in Pakistan was far narrower in East than in West Pakistan. In the east, political power was concentrated in the hands of three social groups whereas in the west it was shared by as many as eight groups and sub-groups. The system of Ayub Khan structured on the foundation of social groups found

a surer footing in East than in West Pakistan. After integrating the urban professionals and surplus farmers into the system, the regime had to coerce only the student body into submission in order to maintain some kind of political tranquility. This was done by Governor Monem Khan by using force whenever student unrest crossed what was regarded as an acceptable threshold. The situation in West Pakistan was a good deal different. There the political and economic societies were more heterogenous and, accordingly, the regime found it difficult to integrate all the important social groups into the system. Like his counterpart in East Pakistan, Governor Kalabagh also used force to curb political agitation in the western wing. However, his task was more complicated by the fact that he had to deal with more dissident groups with a vast number of social, political and economic demands. The actions of the regime split a number of these groups--the factions that remained outside the system grew progressively alienated and joined the social groups that were discarded altogether by the regime.

The first coalition formed by the dissident elements was therefore in West Pakistan. In the fall of 1964 the section of the urban professionals, the rural and semi-urban religious leaders, students, and merchant-industrialists belonging to the refugee community organized the Combined Opposition Party under Miss Fatime Jinnah to contest the presidential elections. Three years later the same groups, this time debarred from any kind of political activity, initiated the anti-Ayub Khan movement.

The strength gained by the movement in West Pakistan surprised the regime as well as the political leadership of the eastern wing. The regime's response to the movement indicated that for the first time it was not prepared to coerce the dissident forces into submission. Once this was known it was clear that Ayub Khan could not preserve his system. With this realization came the quick withdrawal of support from the social groups that had been the pillars of the system in East Pakistan. In January 1969 the East Pakistani section of Ayub Khan's Muslim League was in open revolt, prepared to endorse the eleven demands of the rebellious students. The collapse of the system was accordingly total in East Pakistan. The consequences of this development are pursued briefly in the concluding chapter of this work.

Figure 10.1

The course of the anti-Ayub Movement in the Punjab



NOTE: The figures are for arrests made in the cities and in the towns of populations over 10,000. A city is defined as an urban center with a population of more than 100,000. A town is defined as an urban center with a population of between 10,000 and 100,000.

TABLE 10.1

Number of Arrests per thousand of the urban population made under various preventive detention ordinances

	1966 Quarter	1967 Quarters				1968 Quarters				1969 Quarter
	I	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I
West Pakistan	0.15	0.14	0.21	0.24	0.22	0.25	0.41	0.49	0.48	0.38
Punjab	0.14	0.13	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.26	0.43	0.49	0.53	0.40
Punjab Cities	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.42	0.54	0.62	0.45
Punjab Towns	0.12	0.12	0.23	0.24	0.28	0.42	0.39	0.41	0.41	0.32

Source: Author's Survey

Note: The figures are for arrests made in the cities and in the towns of populations more than 10,000. A city is defined as an urban center with a population of more than 100,000 and a town as an urban center with a population of between 10,000 and 100,000.

Table 10.2

Coefficients of Correlations Between the Number of Arrests Per Thousand of the Urban Population and Some Socio-Economic Variables for West Pakistan, and Punjab.

Variable	West Pakistan	Punjab
PUBP	- .43**	- .43
GRUP	- .06	+ .25
GRTP	+ .16	.00
GRCP	- .09	- .20
PCIP	- .55**	- .57*
PLIT	+ .02	- .48*
PPBO	- .51**	- .19
PRUP	- .33*	- .07

* Significant at .05 level
**Significant at .01 level

Number of Observations:
West Pakistan = 35
Punjab = 19

PUBP = Percentage of Urban Population
GRUP = Growth Rate of Urban Population
GRTP = Growth Rate of Total Population
GRCP = Growth Rate of Principal City Population
PCIP = Per Capita Industrial Product
PLIT = Percentage of Literate Population
PPBO = Percentage of the Population Born Outside
PRUP = Percentage of Refugees in Urban Population.

Table 10.3

Coefficients of Correlation Between the Number of Arrests Per Thousand of the Urban Population and Some Socio-Economic Variables for Cities and Towns of West Pakistan

Variable	West Pakistan	Punjab	West Pakistan		Punjab	
			Cities	Towns	Cities	Towns
PPPC	- .29	- .48*	- .63**	- .37*	- .31	- .41**
GRUP	- .06	- .25	- .72**	+ .41*	- .87*	+ .49**
PCIP	- .55**	- .57	- .51	- .81**	- .24	- .78**
PLIT	+ .02	- .48*	- .60*	+ .38	- .48	+ .42**
PPBO	- .51**	- .19	- .43	- .08	- .49	- .27*
PRUP	- .33*	- .07	- .67**	+ .43	+ .27	+ .55**

* Significant at .05 level

** Significant at .01 level

Number of Observations:

West Pakistan districts: 35
Cities: 12
Towns: 53

Punjab districts: 19
Cities: 8
Towns: 44

PPPC = Principal City Population as a Proportion of Total District Population.

Table 10.4

Growth Rates of Pakistan's Economy and Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Sectors at Constant Factor Cost, 1959-60 to 1968-69 (Percentages)

Year	GNP	Agricultural Sector	Non-Agricultural Sector
1959-60	4.2	- -	- -
1960-61	5.2	3.2	7.6
1961-62	5.9	5.2	6.7
1962-63	3.5	0.5	7.1
1963-64	8.3	6.2	10.5
1964-65	4.5	1.8	6.5
1965-66	4.6	1.6	7.5
1966-67	5.0	1.1	8.5
1967-68	7.5	11.3	4.7
1968-69	5.2	2.2	7.8

Source: Government of Pakistan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 18, No. 1, January, 1970, p. 59.

Table 10.5

Number of Students and Lawyers Arrested in Nine Towns of the Punjab under Preventive Detention Ordinances During the Second Quarter of 1967

Town	Number of Arrests	Students	Percent	Lawyers	Percent
Gujar Kahn	13	7	53.8	4	30.8
Gojra	17	8	47.1	5	29.4
Jaranwala	28	15	53.6	11	39.3
Kot Radha Krishan	6	2	33.3	1	16.7
Kamoki	24	11	45.1	7	29.2
Sangla Hill	6	2	-	-	-
Daska	11	4	36.4	4	36.4
Pasrur	6	3	50.0	1	16.7
Burewala	19	11	57.9	8	42.1
TOTAL	130	63	48.4	41	31.5

* Includes multiple arrests, i.e., one person arrested more than once.

Source: Survey II

Table 10.6

Response of Students and Lawyers from the towns of West Pakistan to the Question: "What kind of prospects do you see for yourself in the future-satisfactory, unsatisfactory, cannot tell?"

Interviewed in Towns	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Cannot Tell
Lawyers[1]	30.09	53.23	16.63
Students[2]	54.19	38.29	7.52
Interviewed in Cities			
Lawyers[3]	59.13	38.72	2.15
Students[4]	29.07	51.88	19.05

Note: N (1) = 192
N (2) = 313
N (3) = 212
N (4) = 375

Source: Survey conducted by the author in the period January-February, 1970.

Table 10.7

Political Violence in East Pakistan in 1969
(January 17 to March 25)

Nature of Police Action	Dacca	Chittagong	Khulna	Other	Total
Arrests	259	25	210	766	1260
Lathi (baton charge)	7	1	1	5	14
Tear gas shelling	7	1	1	5	14
Firing	17	1	5	16	39
Killed by Police Firing	20	1	18	18	57
Wounded by Police Action	153	36	44	117	350

Source: M. Rashiduzzaman, "Mass Movements and Political Development in East Pakistan," paper presented to the Pakistan Rural Development Workshop, East Lansing, Michigan State University, June-July, 1971.

NOTES, CHAPTER 10

1. Ruth Glass, "Introduction and Conclusions," in Ruth Glass (ed.), Urban-Rural Differences in Southern Asia: Report on Regional Seminar Held in Delhi, 1962 (Delhi: UNESCO, 1964), p. 3.

2. For a list of the demands made by the Student Action Committee, see The Pakistan Observer (Dacca: January 6, 1969).

3. Much of this account is based on M. Rashiduzzaman's "Mass Movements and Political Development in East Pakistan", Paper presented at the Summer Research Workshop on Rural Development in Pakistan (East Lansing, Michigan State University, July 21-July 28, 1971).

CHAPTER 11:

Conclusion

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Ayub Khan surrendered power on March 25, 1969, to Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The principal preoccupation of the new regime was to dismantle the political and economic institutions that had been created during the Ayub Khan era. The groundwork for a new political system was laid by Yahya Khan in his November 28, 1969 broadcast to the nation. This was done in the absence of consensus between the political leaders of the country with regard to "certain major issues relating to our future constitution. It is regrettable that they have not been able to do so but one can understand and appreciate their difficulties." Accordingly, the President evolved a "legal framework for general elections on the basis of consultations with various groups and political leaders as well as the study of past constitutions of Pakistan and the general consensus in the country."[1]

The Legal Framework Order (LFO) promulgated on March 31, 1970, spelled out five basic principles on which the Third Constitution of Pakistan was to be formulated. According to these, Pakistan was to be a "Federal Republic, to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan." Second, Islamic ideology "which was the basis for the creation of Pakistan shall be preserved and the Head of the State shall be a Muslim." Third, "adherence to fundamental principles of democracy shall be ensured by providing direct and free provincial elections to the Federal and Provincial Legislatures

on the basis of adult franchise." Fourth, "all powers including legislative administrative and financial shall be so distributed between the Federal Government and the Provinces shall have maximum autonomy, that is to say maximum legislative, administrative and financial powers but the Federal Government shall also have adequate powers to discharge its responsibilities in relation to external and internal affairs and to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the country." Finally, "the people of all areas in Pakistan shall be enabled to participate fully in all forms of national activities and within a specified period, and all other economic disparities between the provinces and between different areas in a Province are removed by the adoption of statutory and other measures."[2]

The main political innovation incorporated in the LFO was that it gave to the people the right to create their own institutions. The Constitution of 1956 was formulated by an Assembly that represented a few powerful social groups within the society, and the Constitution of 1962 was given to the people by a political leader who had assumed for himself the task of interpreting the political will and genius of the people. the Constitution of 1971 was not to be formulated under such severe constraints.

The guidelines provided by the LFO favored East Pakistan. The principle of parity according to which the

two wings of the country were to receive equal representation in the legislative branch of the government was accepted by the leadership of East and West Pakistan in 1956. In the Constitution of 1962 and numerous policy statements issued by the regime of Ayub Khan, this principle was applied to other branches of government. In 1970, the government of Yahya Khan abandoned parity in favor of proportional representation, giving the more populous east an edge over the western wing of the country. Accordingly, in the 300 members constituent-cum-legislative chamber that LFO proposed, East Pakistan was allotted 169 seats.

The guidelines embodied in the LFO met to some extent the demands of East Pakistan for autonomy. For the first time in Pakistan's political history, the country was to be given a federal system of government with the role of the central government limited to a few fields. All other functions were to be exercised by the provincial governments. Considering the analyses of Chapters 9 and 10, the constitutional guidelines prescribed by the LFO lead one to ask the important question: why did the regime of Yahya Khan adopt a policy meant to placate the eastern province when it had come to power as a result of a political and economic movement that was initiated by the dissident social groups of the western wing? The answer to this question is to be found in the conclusions reached in the first and second parts of the book.

In 1969, when the regime of Ayub Khan made way for the

military administration of Yahya Khan, the political and economic society of West Pakistan was far more complex than that of the east. It was made up of the groups that had started to wield political and economic power during the days of the British, and of the groups that had attained influence during the era of the Quaid-e-Azam and the period of Ayub Khan. However, both the Quaid-e-Azam and Ayub Khan, wielding their powers of charisma, were able to concentrate political power in their hands by bringing the social groups into organizations over which they could exercise effective control. The former brought the urban middle classes into the Muslim League and was thus able to dilute the power of traditional power groups like the landed aristocracy and the ulema. The latter brought the rural middle classes into the Basic Democracies, seriously curbing the power wielded by the urban professional groups. the policies of the Quaid-e-Azam alienated an important section of the ulema. These ulema formed political associations of their own to fight the Quaid-e-Azam, and his demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India. The policies of Ayub Khan alienated the urban middle classes, including the student community. These groups formed a number of political alliances to fight Ayub Khan's guided and basic democracy. In the first case the dissident group was able to achieve little ground, partly because of the extraordinary charisma

wielded by the Quaid-e-Azam, and partly because a group espousing the cause of Islam could not effectively campaign against the demand for a separate Muslim state. In the second case, the dissident groups succeeded only when the regime of Ayub Khan deprived them of all political power, including the right to organize into political associations that could operate with governmental constraint. To their political frustrations were added economic ones when a severe economic depression, produced by reduction in foreign assistance and stagnation in agricultural production, limited economic opportunities to those who supported the regime. The result was a movement generated by political and economic deprivation that eventually brought down the Ayub Khan regime.

The regime of Yahya Khan made a correct diagnosis about the country's troubles when it started to put Pakistan's political and economic house in order. According to the new government's reading, the discontent in West Pakistan was caused mostly by economic, and that in East Pakistan by political, factors. Accordingly, in the stabilization program produced by the regime the social groups in the West were to be offered new economic opportunities while those based in the east were to be allowed to operate within a widened political arena. There was a good historical precedence for this approach. The British, especially after 1909, had sought to placate the Indian

political communities by increasing economic opportunities for the more educated, westernized and moneyed Hindus and by allowing a greater sense of political participation to the more backward Muslims. The assumption on which the British worked was that a modernizing community or group first seeks political dividends and then uses them to get access to economic opportunities available within the society. The efforts made by the regime of Yahya Khan to expand employment opportunities by reforming the bureaucratic system, to set minimum wages for industrial labor and to provide the student community with the kind of educational system that would prepare them better for absorption into the society were all aimed at some of the powerful groups in West Pakistan. The architect of governments' new labor and educational policies was Air Marshal Nur Khan who was appointed the Governor of the western wing five months after the regime of Yahya Khan had assumed office. Similarly, the grant of proportional representation was meant to satisfy the political appetite of the social groups of East Pakistan. This program produced political turmoil far greater than that of 1967-1969 for the reason that the new regime tried to do too much too early.

The system created by Ayub Khan was dismantled overnight and all the social groups were allowed to fight for place in the political society. The country had no political institutions that could contain the political battle that

ensued within reasonable bounds. It is worth tracing briefly the events that followed the promulgation of LFO in order to understand the way in which the social groups sought to align themselves.

The elections to the Constituent-cum-Legislative Assembly was set for October 6, 1970.[3] However, in July-August, 15 districts of East Pakistan were inundated as a result of floods in the Ganges and Brahmanputra Rivers. After holding discussions with the political leaders of the province, Yahya postponed the elections, fixing December 7 as the new date.

There was hectic political activity before the elections. The division of the society into social groups was fully reflected in the political arena as 25 parties were identified as separate political entities by the Election Commission. Of these, nine had no organization of any kind in East Pakistan and six claimed no followers in West Pakistan. Ten parties were organized on national lines, with branches in both wings of the country. The regional and social orientation of eight of these parties is shown in Table 11.1. One interesting conclusion can be drawn from the Table. With the exception of religious parties (Jamaat-i-Islami and the three Jamiats) no party embraced the same social group in the two wings of the country. Thus Quyum Khan's Muslim League represented the landed aristocracy in West Pakistan while Mujibur Rahman's Awami League served

the surplus farmers of the east. The urban professionals were represented by the Awami League and People's Party in East and West Pakistan respectively. The students of the eastern wing were split between the Awami League and the National Awami Party, while they went over almost en masse to the People's Party in the West. The non-Punjabi refugees joined the Convention Muslim League (Ayub Khan's party) in the east, while those in the west joined Bhutto's People's Party.

Between themselves, the 25 parties fielded 1251 candidates. In addition to these 319 persons contested as independents, claiming no party affiliation. The electorate rejected 15 parties altogether, while eight others had less than ten seats each (Table 11.2). Of the 15 parties that failed to win even one seat, 14 were of purely regional character. From among the national parties, only Nizam-i-Islam failed to enter the National Assembly. Of the organizations that confined their activity to only one wing of the country, only one - Bhutto's People's Party - proved to be successful. Another interesting fact about the election is that two political parties, Awami League and People's Party, won 87 percent of the National Assembly seats. What do these facts indicate? They seem to indicate that the Pakistani voter, even after being in the wilderness for nearly two decades, turned out to be politically sophisticated. He produced a two-party system out of a political chaos and rejected all the parties with strong regional bias.

But underlying these comforting hypotheses is the suggestion that the elections of 1970 reflected the deep political and social schisms that then characterized Pakistan's society.

Before we turn to an examination of this phenomenon, it would be useful to briefly examine the campaigns launched by the two successful parties. Mujibur Rahman's Awami League fought the election on the basis of its famous six points program, demanding political and economic autonomy for the province of East Pakistan. We have already noted that the LFO had conceded the principle of autonomy. The only advance that the Awami League manifesto made was to spell out in some greater detail the kind of division of power that the party derived between the central and provincial governments. The fact that such an agreement in principle between the LFO and the six point plan notwithstanding, the Awami League was able to evoke such an emotional response to its program indicated that the voter interpreted the party's program in a different light than the leadership. To them, it was presented as a solution of all their political and economic problems. As a Bengali political scientist said, the acceptance of six points meant to the populace an immediate solution of the provinces' crushing economic problems. It meant lifting of the burden created by rural indebtedness, of the containment within their bounds of East Pakistan's rivers, of the provision of irrigation water during the dry season, of the protection of the population

against cyclones in the exposed areas of coastal East Pakistan, and of the provision of employment to the rapidly increasing population of the province.[4] In other words, the Awami League leadership told the people of East Pakistan that their economic problems could only be solved if the important social groups in their society were allowed a more substantial share in the political pie. It is interesting to note that two of three social groups that dominated the Awami League had shared power with some of their West Pakistani counterparts during the Ayub Khan era.

It is also interesting to note that all the four social groups that supported the People's Party had been left outside the system that Ayub Khan had created. The Party's manifesto promised big economic rewards to its supporters. These rewards were to be made available not by the accumulation of greater power in the hands of the groups that possessed it during the Ayub Khan era, but by the transfer of power from these groups to those that the old regime had deliberately abandoned. When seem from this point of view - that of the juxtaposition of social groups within the political society - the victory of the People's Party was the manifestation of a greater revolution than the victory of the Awami League in East Pakistan. The People's Party, by promising a complete

transfer of power from one set of groups to another, promised a greater social transformation than the Awami League, which sought to shift the base of power from one region to another. The election made it clear that the old order had changed in West Pakistan, "that the politicization of the countryside had progressed much farther than expected, and that many urban dwellers were ready to seek radical solutions to their problems. The influence of major landlords was no longer the dominant factor in Punjab politics and the bradari ["brotherhood"] of caste and tribal connections controlling the vote had broken down."[5]

Given the analysis of the previous chapters we are now in a position to interpret the political crisis of 1970 in terms of social group participation in the political process, integration of the social groups into the political system and modernization of the political and economic society. Let us take the case of East Pakistan first. Contrary to what was asserted by a number of political observers during the months immediately following the break-down of Yahya Khan - Mujibur Rahman constitutional parleys and subsequent action by the military against the Awami League and its supporters,[6] East Pakistan was socially, politically and economically better off in 1970 than a decade earlier. For a variety of reasons, gone into in some of the previous chapters, the Ayub Khan regime undertook a fairly comprehensive program of political and economic modernization in the eastern wing. It has often been asserted that his

system of Basic democracies had little originality and was borrowed rather freely from the system of local government that had operated in East Pakistan for nearly four decades.[7] There is a great deal of truth in this. Consequently, when Ayub Khan made the system of Basic Democracies a corner stone of the new political order, he found the results more satisfying in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan. The surplus farmers, small town merchants and government traders who formed the elite of Bengal's rural society had had a great deal of experience in running Basic Democracies type of local councils. Therefore, when the constitution of 1962 was launched and made effective, the integration of the important social groups of East Pakistan into the new political system was achieved with great ease. For the same reason, the East Pakistani Basic Democrats found it easier to cooperate with the bureaucracy in developing the countryside. The rural works program was more successful in the eastern than in the western province. As has been emphasised earlier the student community was the only group that was not integrated into the political system. However even in its case the regime facilitated the task of political participation. The student communities of Dacca, Chittagong, Rajshahi and Mymensingh were not discouraged from organising themselves into unions. So organized, the student body could take part in political activity even when such activity was beyond what the law of the land permitted. This kept the students of East Pakistan quiescent when their West Pakistani counterparts were preparing to challenge the regime and the political and economic structures erected by it.

The regime of Ayub Khan took two important steps to modernize the economic society of East Pakistan. First, from an economy that was almost totally dependent on two crops (rice and jute), East Pakistan by the end of the 1960's had attained a certain degree of diversity in almost all spheres of her economic life. In 1959 agriculture contributed 60.0 percent of the gross provincial product. In 1969 the share of the agriculture sector had fallen to 54 percent. Within the agriculture sector, in 1959 rice and jute accounted for 91.8 percent of the output in value terms. As a result of increase in the production of other crops, their share decreased to 84.8 percent in 1969. In this period output of wheat and sugarcane registered rates of growth of well over nine percent. In the industrial sector, East Pakistan in this period entered the stage of big manufacturing in a big way. We noticed earlier that in the fifties more than four fifths of the provincial industrial output was derived from small scale industries. By the end of the sixties their share had declined to less than one-half.[8]

Second, the Ayub Khan regime undertook to increase the participation of East Pakistanis in economic activity. The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), two bodies that had handled nearly one third of the public expenditure in Pakistan were bifurcated in order to increase the control of the provincial governments on their investment programs. The successful development of industrial infrastructure has been attributed to

the creation of the autonomous PIDC for East Pakistan. The successes achieved in the low lift pump irrigation and tube well programs is also attributed to the creation of a separate WAPDA for the province.[9]

The very slow rate of growth of non-agricultural sectors in East Pakistan (3.2 percent per annum during the period compared to 8.5 percent per annum for West Pakistan) has been blamed on the absence of an aggressive entrepreneurial class. Whereas the location of Pakistan's first capital in Karachi and the close association of the traditional Muslim merchant class with the Quaid-e-Azam brought both resources for investment and entrepreneurial talent to West Pakistan, the eastern wing was able to attract only the middle class business communities from Bihar, United Provinces, Bombay and Gujrat. Persuaded either by their community leaders, as in the case of the Ismailis[10] or forced to migrate because of communal turmoil in their native provinces, as in the case of the Bihari Muslims, the migrant class never felt quite comfortable in their new homeland. The greater linguistic, ethnic and cultural homogeniety of the Bengali population also made the absorption of the immigrants a difficult task.[11] The result was that whereas the refugee merchant class in West Pakistan quickly transformed itself into industrial entrepreneurs, their East Pakistani counterparts remained petty traders. The fact that even after the partition of the Indian sub-continent a large number of Hindu industrialists remained behind in East Pakistan also

inhibited the growth of a Muslim industrial entrepreneurial class in the province.[12]

In other fields as well, East Pakistan did conspicuously better in the sixties than in the fifties. The provincial representation in the elite Civil Service of Pakistan increased sharply during the period of Ayub Khan. According to the 1970 Gradation List of the Civil Service of Pakistan,[13] 40 percent of the officer corps belonged to the eastern wing. At the time of partition there was only one officer in the CSP while the 1959 gradation list shows the provincial representation to be 27 percent.[14] In other branches of civil administration the Bengalis did almost as well. In the words of an East Pakistani political scientist, "there has been a significant increase over the years of Bengali representation in the Central [government]."[15]

We can conclude from this that the reforms instituted by the governmnet of Ayub Khan during the 1960's brought important social groups of East Pakistan closer to the center of political and economic power. There was a similar outcome of these reforms in the western wing. Before Ayub Khan, political and economic power in West Pakistan was concentrated in a few places (cities of Karachi and Lahore) and in the hands of a few social groups (landed aristocracy, urban professionals and the student community). In the sixties, the government was able to bring in new areas into the economic system and was able to include some new social groups within the political structure. One result

of this process of political and economic modernization was to make the groups that were left out of the system more conscious of relative economic and political deprivation caused to them.

Huntington has remarked that the "relationship between poverty and backwardness, on the one hand, and instability and violence, on the other is a spurious one. It is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political disorder." The political instability in poor countries is therefore a manifestation of the efforts to modernize rather than a product of economic and social stagnation. In fact, a purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor and politically stable. What is true between countries is also true between the regions within a country. "Thus," continues Huntington, "within countries it is the areas which are modernizing rather than those which remain traditional that are the centers of violence and extremism."[16]

The political crisis of 1967-1969 that brought down the government of Ayub Khan and the constitutional crisis of 1970 that caused an immense loss of human life and halted the process of political reform initiated by the government of Agha Yahya Khan validate Huntington's hypothesis. We have already seen that Ayub Khan's political program was based on the assumption that political activity within the society could be confined to two levels: at the local level the task of satisfying the immediate needs and aspirations of the people could be entrusted to elected representatives working within village and town councils and the task of formulating national

level policies could be left to a strong executive that had the freedom to interpret in very broad terms the will of the populace. We have also seen that this system produced some satisfaction as it was partially responsible for the very great increases in national wealth. For as long as the national product was increasing rapidly, there was not much resentment even among those groups that had previously functioned at the national level but were now either excluded altogether from the system or were relagated to integration into the system's lower level. These groups received economic rewards that were higher than those given to them when they were a part of the political system. An increase in national wealth increased the expectations of all groups but the rate of increase in expectations was not matched by the rate of increase in the country's wealth. This caused frustration and led to political violence. This phenomenon conforms to the hypothesis propuonded by Huntington. However, the situation in Pakistan, particularly in its western wing, was complicated further as a result of two additional phenomena. First, in its dispensation the political and economic system discriminated between various social groups and thus gave rise to a feeling of deprivation. Second, the process of economic development proved to have a short time horizon. Rapid economic development would have produced political instability in any case; the fact that the pace of economic growth slowed down considerably in the second half of the sixties further aggravated matters. In a

situation in which the rate of increase in national wealth had slowed down, the social groups that had begun to be dissatisfied with the system felt even more aggrieved. This provides us with an explanation for the very active role played by the student community, small town lawyers and small town mosque preachers in the movement in West Pakistan that ultimately brought down the regime of Ayub Khan. This is also the reason why the same movement was led by the city students of East Pakistan.

However in the political crisis that followed the collapse of Yahya Khan-Mujibur Rahman constitutional discussions, the groups that had been fully integrated into the Ayub Khan political and economic system played a role as active as that of the students. In fact the massive victory of the Awami League in the elections of December 1970 was made possible by the support given to Mujibur Rahman's party by the same social groups that had earlier supported the regime of Ayub Khan. This phenomenon does not indicate a sudden switching of sides by the urban professionals and surplus farmers but is a manifestation of the process of modernization that we have used to explain the political crisis in West Pakistan during 1967-1969.

It would be useful here to recapitulate briefly the history of the development of the social groups that became politically prominent in the crisis of 1971. When the Quaid-e-Azam assumed the leadership of the Indian Muslims he brought with him into

the political arena the urban professional classes. With their help he displaced the ulema and landed aristocracy as the political elites of the Indian Muslim society. However, only those areas of India had a developed clan of urban professionals in which the Muslims had made use of the educational facilities provided by the British. Accordingly, the members of this new leadership were recruited largely from the United Provinces, Bihar, Delhi and Bombay. The Muslim Urban professional class in Bengal was small because of the competition offered by the Hindu community; it was also small in the Punjab, Sind and other provinces of West Pakistan because of the preference shown by the landed aristocracy for government service. The political system created by the Quaid-e-Azam necessarily produced a demand for urban professionals, a demand that was filled by the Muslim migrants from India. The partition of India therefore produced two consequences. First, it brought a large number of lowyers, doctors, teachers, etc. from India to West Pakistan. Second, because of the migrant's preference for the western wing it produced a vacuum in the urban society of East Pakistan. This vacuum was filled rapidly by the indigenous Bengali Muslims.

In the years after the death of the Quaid-e-Azam, a number of social groups dominated the political society. Prominent among them were the landed aristocracy of the Punjab and Sind, migrant urban professionals of Karachi, the urban professionals of Bengal, and ulema of East and West Pakistan. On taking over

power, Ayub Khan's first impulse was to remove these social groups from his political system and to structure it n the basis of an altogether new social grouping. Accordingly, he brought the rural middle class of West and the surplus farmers of East Pakistan into his system. After the realization that the bulk of the political society had been denied a place in the new system and that the groups left in the political wilderness were prepared to cause trouble, Ayub Khan added West Pakistan's landed aristocracy and East Pakistan's urban professionals to the list of his supporters. Once again the Bengali urban classes found themselves integrated into the system. This time, because of a relatively longer period of political tranquility and economic development, the urban professionals reaped significant political and economic dividends. This increased their power within the society.

The sudden and unanticipated collapse of the system of Ayub Khan convinced the Bengali political and economic elites that their self-preservation depended on the institutionalization of their position in their society. This could be achieved by severing links with the social groups of West Pakistan and by monopolizing for themselves all political and social power. The precesses of modernization initiated by the Quaid-e-Azam and Ayub Khan had bestowed sufficient power on the urban professional classes and surplus farmers of East Pakistan for them to seek full control over their political and economic resources. Hence, after the collapse of the system of Ayub Khan, the

demends of these groups increased rapidly and led to their showdown with the military.

The conclusions drawn in this study, although pessimistic with reference to Pakistan, need not to be so for other developing countries. Modernization breeds instability but modernity begets stability. What is hazardous for the society is the path to modernity. It was unfortunate for Pakistan that the rapid mobilization of social groups and rapid modernization of the society during the most of the sixties was followed by the sudden collapse of the system that had made these things possible in the first place. The institutional vacuum created by the collapse of the regime of Ayub Khan sent the social groups drifting in several directions. The tragedy of Pakistan is not that the various groups in her society adopted a collision course but that, with institutional constraints suddenly lifted, each chose a path which was different from those picked up by others.

Table 11.1

Regional and Social Orientations of Political Parties, 1970

Party	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Awami League	Urban Professionals Surplus Farmers Students	- - - - - -
Jamaat-i-Islami	Town Ulema Rural Maulvis	Town Ulema Rural Ulema
Muslim League (Quyum)	- -	Landed Aristocracy
Muslim League (Convention)	Refugees (Non-Punjabi) Town Lawyers	Indigenous Industrialists Rural Middle Class
Muslim League (Council)	Urban Professionals (Towns)	Refugee industrialists
Pakistan People's Party	- - - -	Students Urban Professionals Labor Refugees (Non-Punjabi)
Jamiats	City Ulema	City Ulema
National Awami Party	Students Labor Peasantry	- - - - - -

Table 11.1

Seats Contested and Won by the Political Parties in the Elections of December 1970

Party	West Pakistan			East Pakistan			Total		
	Seats Contested	Seats Won	%	Seats Contested	Seats Won	%	Seats Contested	Seats Won	%
Awami League	7	0	0.0	153	151	98.7	153	151	98.7
Jaamat-i-Islami	79	4	5.1	69	0	0.0	148	4	2.7
Muslim League (Quyum)	67	9	13.4	65	0	0.0	132	9	6.8
Muslim League (Convention)	31	2	6.5	93	0	0.0	124	2	1.6
Muslim League (Council)	69	7	10.1	50	0	0.0	119	7	5.9
People's Party	119	81	68.1	-	-	-	119	81	68.1
Democratic Party	27	0	0.0	81	1	1.2	108	1	0.9
Jamiat (Hazarvi)	90	7	7.8	13	0	0.0	103	7	6.8
National Awami (Wali)	25	6	24.0	36	0	0.0	61	6	9.8
Jamiat (Pakistan)	48	7	14.6	-	-	-	48	7	14.6
Nizami-i-Islam	7	0	0.0	45	0	0.0	52	0	0.0
National Awami (Bhashoni)	5	0	0.0	15	0	0.0	20	0	0.0
National League	-	-	-	13	0	0.0	13	0	0.0
SKMPPM Mahaz	6	0	0.0	-	-	-	6	0	0.0
Islamic Democratic Party	-	-	-	5	0	0.0	5	0	0.0
Jatiya Gana Mukti Dal	-	-	-	5	0	0.0	5	0	0.0
Congress	-	-	-	4	0	0.0	4	0	0.0
Krishak Sramik Party	-	-	-	3	0	0.0	3	0	0.0
Masih League	3	0	0.0	-	-	-	3	0	0.0
Khaksar Tehrik	2	0	0.0	-	-	-	2	0	0.0
Jamiat (Ahle Hadith)	2	0	0.0	-	-	-	2	0	0.0
Baluchistan Front	2	0	0.0	-	-	-	2	0	0.0
National Awami (Pakhtoon)	1	0	0.0	-	-	-	0	0	0.0
Daradi Shangha	-	-	-	1	0	0.0	1	0	0.0
Sind Front	1	0	0.0	-	-	-	1	0	0.0
Independents	210	15	7.1	109	1	0.9	319	16	5.0
Total	801	138	17.2	769	153	19.9	1570	291	18.5

Source: The Pakistan Times and The Pakistan Observer, December 8 to 12, 1970, 565

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1. The Pakistan Times, November 29, 1929.

2. Ibid., November 29, 1970.

3. This discussion is based on Shahid Javed Burki, "Elections of 1970 and Pakistan's Political Future," in Pakistan's Return to Parliamentary Rule: Problems and Prospects After the December Elections (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1971), pp. 6-10.

4. Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Elections in Pakistan and Politics in Bengal," paper delivered to the South Asian Seminar, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, December 3, 1970.

5. Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes--1970," Asian Survey, Vol. XI (March 1971), p. 213.

6. See Rahman Sobhan, "Bailing Out Pakistan," The New Republic (June 5, 1971), pp. 14-15. Also see Edward Mason, Robert Dorfman and Stephen Marglin, "Conflict in Pakistan: Background and Prospects," unpublished paper, Harvard University (April 1, 1971).

7. Rahman Sobhan, Basic Democracies, Works Programme and Rural Development (Dacca: Dacca University, 1968), p. 42.

8. The statistics are taken from Gustav Papapnek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 316-329; Joseph J. Stern and Walter P. Falcon, Growth and Development in Pakistan, 1955-1969 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1971), pp. 36-49 and Government of Pakistan, The Fourth Five Year Plan, 1970-1975 (Islamabad: Planning Commission, 1970), pp. 536-543.

9. John W. Thomas, "Agricultural Production, Equity and Rural Organization." Paper presented to the Pakistan Rural Development Workshop, East Lansing, Michigan State University, June-July 1971.

10. This point was made to me by Hamza Alvi in his discussions with me.

11. Time, "Pakistan's Agony" (August 2, 1971).

12. Mustafa S. Ismail, "Who Exploited East Pakistan," The Pakistan Times (February 2, 1971).

13. Government of Pakistan, Gradation List of the Civil Service of Pakistan 1970 (Rawalpindi: Establishment Division, 1970).

14. Government of Pakistan, Gradation List of the Civil Service of Pakistan, 1959 (Karachi: Establishment Division, 1959).

15. Rounaq Jahan, Nation Building in New States: A Case Study of the Relationship Between East Pakistan and the Central Government, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, p. 203.

16. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 41 and 45.

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