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DEMAND FOR AN ANNUAL PASS TO
COSTA RICA'S NATIONAL PARKS

by

Jan G. Laarman
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FPEI Working Paper No. 47



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DEMAND FOR AN ANNUAL PASS TO COSTA RICA'S NATIONAL PARKS

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DEMAND FOR AN ANNUAL PASS TO COSTA RICA'S NATIONAL PARKS**ABSTRACT**

The current price of access to national parks and other protected areas in Costa Rica is a nominal daily fee generating inadequate revenue for parks management. An alternative to elevating fees is sale of an annual pass to capture willingness to pay in excess of the daily fee. A visitors survey at four protected areas revealed considerable tentative interest in pass purchase. Reported willingness to pay is at levels sufficient to allow the pass to increase net revenue when compared with daily fees alone. Demand for the pass is related to residence, household income, familiarity with Costa Rica's parks, and other explanatory variables. Demand patterns appear too complex to permit uniform strategies of pass promotion.

KEY WORDS: ecotourism, user fees, differential pricing, economics of philanthropy

INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

The pricing of access to public parks and related recreation sites is an immature science. Alternative conceptual frameworks are cost-based methods (cost recovery), demand-based methods (ability and willingness to pay), and methods imitating prices elsewhere (going-rate pricing). Leading policy and management issues are adequacy of revenue generated in relation to costs of collecting it, fairness of price levels in relation to ability of users to pay, political repercussions of shifting cost burdens between central budgets and users, and pricing as a mechanism to ration or alter visitation (Cordell 1984; Rosenthal et al. 1984; Cullen 1985; Reiling and Anderson 1985; Harris and Driver 1987; Bamford et al. 1988; Wilman 1988).

The pricing question should rank prominently in discussions on paying for tropical conservation. At a worldwide level, the number and aggregate land area of tropical parks and reserves have been increasing dramatically (Machlis and Tichnell 1985). Many of these parks are declared in law but not managed on the ground. In large measure, lack of active management is due to scarcities of human and fiscal resources. Where land has been purchased or donated from private sources, much of the funding and logistical support have originated from international aid, private foundations, and other external sources. Now that many new parks and reserves have been created, a continuing flow of funds must be

found to meet protection and management costs. This presents managerial problems and philosophical issues quite distinct from the establishment of capital funds for land acquisition.

Costa Rica illustrates a country whose protected areas have expanded rapidly, generating a considerable volume of both domestic and international visitation. Tropical nature travel is a small but dynamic segment of the world's tourism industry (Laarman and Durst 1987), and Costa Rica is a leading destination for international ecotourists (Boo 1990). Additionally, visitation by Costa Rican residents has been increasing by roughly 10 percent annually, perhaps reflecting increased awareness of national heritage, the demonstration effect of foreign visitors, and other explanatory factors.

While visitation levels have been rapidly increasing, budgets have not kept up with visitor growth. Austerity policies following Costa Rica's post-1982 economic problems leave public agencies with declining resources. Ironically, the inflow of external assistance to establish new protected areas exacerbates local funding burdens to manage them in an era of generally declining budgets and personnel (Barborak 1988).

This fiscal predicament is partially offset by the fact that the regular budgets of the National Parks Service of Costa Rica is supplemented by proprietary funds. These funds are managed to pay

operating costs, with salaries and wages for personnel continuing to be paid from the central budget authority. Currently, daily entrance fees comprise approximately half of the revenue for the National Parks Fund, even though the amount of the fee is only 25 colones (about US\$0.30) per visitor-day. This modest and uniform fee represents an upward adjustment from even lower charges a few years ago. Yet the amount of revenue collected is simply inadequate for management needs.

In 1989, the National Parks Service formed a working group to study the upward revision of daily entrance fees. A second objective, and the focus here, was to assess the feasibility of selling an annual pass to all unrestricted units of Costa Rica's protected area system as a vehicle to raise additional revenue. The hypothesis is that an annual pass may capture willingness to pay in excess of a nominal daily fee, allowing the daily fee to remain low in order not to exclude low-income visitors.

An implicit requirement for fiscal feasibility is that gross revenue from sales of the pass exceed the sum of fixed and variable costs for pass production, sale, and administration. This depends on selling a substantial number of passes while containing administrative expenditures. The existence of the pass is reasoned to reduce the volume of transactions and hence variable costs of administering daily entrance fees. Secondly, the pass may provide a mechanism for legal entrance to lightly visited parks and

reserves which cannot afford to collect daily fees because of low visitation volumes. Thirdly, the pass allows the prospect of revenue collection from persons who seldom or never visit the parks. These persons are not acquiring access, but alternative and complex forms of psychic satisfaction.

The willingness to pay for an annual pass must take account of two background factors leading towards different practical consequences. First, past research shows that some visitors believe strongly that entrance charges of any kind are intrusive, discriminatory, or both (Cullen 1985; Reiling and Anderson 1985). The attitude is that entrance charges detract from an ideally unstructured and unrestrained leisure experience (Driver and Tocher 1970). For persons who object to entrance fees in general, even voluntary purchase of an annual pass may be resisted.

An opposing although not entirely incongruent contention is that conservation efforts--particularly in the tropics--are merit goods deserving greater financial support to protect biological diversity and fulfill other social welfare functions expected of tropical wildlands (MacKinnon et al. 1986). Examples of benevolent behavior are many (Collard 1978). It is of no direct consequence here to argue the extent to which benevolent acts are motivated by altruism, moral sense, and desire to be cooperative versus the seeking of reputation, the confirmation of status, and other self-serving behavior (Arrow 1974; Collard 1978). Formal philanthropy

is indeed prominent in economic systems (Arrow 1974), and its aims may include wildlands conservation (Griffith 1984).

THE DEMAND FRAMEWORK

The demand for an annual pass is theorized within the usual framework of utility and affordability. Utility comprises the various satisfactions of pass ownership and use. Affordability is inferred from pass price in relation to incomes of potential purchasers.

Ownership alone is assumed to confer psychic benefits for some purchasers. This refers to satisfactions provided by contributing one's personal expenditures to assist parks management, whether for reasons of altruism or self-interest. The second and more conventional kind of utility stems from using the pass for parks visitation. Pass purchasers acquire some mix of recreational, social, and educational experiences. In exchange, they compensate the National Parks Service as provider of the site. Different pass purchasers will vary their blend of these two kinds of utilities, referred to as philanthropic satisfaction and use satisfaction.

As the only seller of the pass, the National Parks Service is pass monopolist. Pricing decisions take place voluntarily, as visitors elect to buy the annual pass or pay daily entrance fees. Depending upon pass price and frequency of use, the individual pass purchaser seeking philanthropic satisfaction has an opportunity to

pay more than required to obtain entry to the national parks. Conversely, frequent park visitors have an opportunity to use the pass to reduce access price below the sum of daily fees they would otherwise pay. In this way, price becomes a variable. This departs from the conventional model of price discrimination, in which different prices are set by the monopolist rather than elected by the purchasers.

At a given price, the number of passes to be sold is postulated to increase with income, acquaintance with parks, and perceived quality of the parks experience. When these demand shifters are held constant, the number of passes sold will vary inversely with pass price. For purposes of pass promotion and sales, it is also worth investigating whether demand varies with purpose of visit and sociodemographic factors.

The the income elasticity of demand for parks visitation is positive is well established where the relation has been studied, e.g., in the USA (Vaux 1975; Reiling and Anderson 1985). Moreover, use satisfaction increases willingness to pay (Noe et al. 1987). There is no reason to postulate differences in Costa Rica. Acquaintance with parks, such as through frequent visitation, is necessary to produce use satisfaction from an annual pass. On the other hand, philanthropic satisfaction does not require direct use, but can derive from book knowledge and other indirect acquaintance.

THE SURVEY

The possibility that an annual pass may be able to increase net revenue for the National Parks Service of Costa Rica led to surveying parks visitors regarding their likelihood of purchasing such a pass, and their willingness to pay for it. These issues were integrated within a broader survey on user fees at three of Costa Rica's most heavily visited national parks: Poas, Manuel Antonio, and Cahuita. These three parks account for over three-fourths of total visitation to the protected area system. Poas is an uplands volcanic park within easy driving distance from metropolitan concentrations in the Central Valley. Both Manuel Antonio and Cahuita are beach parks, offering sun and sand in combination with forested hinterlands.

The survey also included visitors at the Monteverde Cloud Forest Reserve, owned and managed by the Tropical Science Center. Although private, Monteverde is similar in purpose and size to the national parks. Conceivably, Monteverde could itself become a national park under pending reorganization of the Costa Rica's protected area system.

In August through October of 1989, more than 860 visitors were surveyed at the four study areas (Fig 1). Survey days were allocated between weekends and weekdays in approximate proportion to the distribution of visitation. Upon exit from the park areas,

visitors were asked by bilingual teams to complete a short written questionnaire (choice of Spanish or English, 21 questions). All visitors aged 17 and older were included. In families, the head of household or spouse was chosen to represent the family group. The survey teams encountered virtually no refusals to participate.

A small open-ended pretest revealed an approximate range of values on willingness to pay for an annual pass, allowing a closed-ended survey question to be developed around that range. The subject of an annual pass was approached in two sequential questions roughly two-thirds of the way into the survey:

"Some people think that Costa Rica should sell a one-year pass permitting entrance into all national parks, wildlife refuges, and other public protected areas. Would you purchase a one-year pass?" [DEFINITELY; POSSIBLY depending on...; DON'T KNOW]

"If you answered DEFINITELY or POSSIBLY, how much would you be willing to pay for the one-year pass?" [7 choices ranging from 200 to 2000 colones (US\$2.40-US\$24.00), or DON'T KNOW].

Evaluating willingness to pay for a hypothetical annual pass is a form of contingent valuation. Respondents are given the opportunity to purchase a new good, which is briefly described. This is followed by the question which elicits willingness to pay. The rest of the survey obtains respondents' characteristics, particularly sociodemographic variables, country of residence, familiarity with the national parks of Costa Rica, reasons for visitation, and aspects liked and not liked about the visit. To the extent that this three-part structure is properly designed and adequately pretested, it should lead to valid estimates of willingness to pay (Mitchell and Carson 1989, p. 3).

RESULTS ON PASS FEASIBILITY

Over half of survey respondents said they would definitely or possibly purchase an annual pass (Fig 2). In the case of possible purchase, the most frequently mentioned decision factors are frequency and length of visits to Costa Rica (among non-residents) and pass price (residents and non-residents). The difference in responses between Costa Rican residents and non-residents is statistically significant (chi-square test, $p < .01$). The apparent strong interest in pass purchase, especially among Costa Ricans, is tentatively encouraging for feasibility.

The other dimension of pass feasibility is given by willingness to pay (Table 1). If responses can be converted into ordinary demand schedules, then gross revenue is maximized by

charging a price of 600 colones for residents and 800 colones for non-residents. Combining both groups, the price which maximizes gross revenue is 800 colones under circumstances of no differential pricing for the pass. Price could be set at 1,000 colones with only minor consequences for marginal reduction in gross revenue.

Gross revenue is no guide to pricing policy without estimates of total costs for each level of pass sales. This is not possible in the present context. Because the National Parks Service would control the entire sale of passes, pass price will exceed marginal costs at the level of sales which maximizes net revenue. Yet maximization of net revenue does not result in economic efficiency. This follows from the position of the Costa Rican government as pass monopolist. Pricing policy is made even more complex by the unknown number of daily entrance fees foregone at each level of pass sales.

In view of these theoretical and practical difficulties, pass feasibility is approached indirectly. The 300 thousand visitor-days of current recorded annual use at the national parks generate 7.5 million colones of gross revenue per year at the daily fee of 25 colones. Suppose that visitors incur a mean of five days of use annually, and that prices for the annual pass are those which maximize gross revenue, as in Table 1 preceding. Suppose further that administrative costs of issuing the pass are 20 percent of gross pass revenue. These assumptions lead to a large revenue

increment (revenue more than doubles) compared with the alternative of daily fees alone.

Sensitivity analysis (not shown here) shows that net revenue remains positive under highly adverse assumptions. Moreover, the analysis is confined to respondents who said they would definitely be interested in pass purchase, leaving aside the large share who are undecided. Also omitted from consideration is an estimate of non-visitors who might purchase the pass. Moreover, cost savings by issuing fewer daily entrance fees are not accounted for here. Even with this exceptionally conservative scenario, an annual pass merits serious consideration as an instrument to generate revenue.

IDENTIFYING PASS PURCHASERS

Administrative costs decrease and pass sales increase if the National Parks Service is able to concentrate efforts on likely purchasers (Crompton and Lamb 1986). This requires an understanding of market composition.

Familiarity with Costa Rica's parks, as well as income and purpose of visit, are related to residence. Costa Rican residents indicate more familiarity with their national parks than non-residents (Fig 3), but non-residents report higher incomes (Fig 4). Relatively more residents than non-residents make visits motivated by rest and relaxation, while relatively more non-residents are motivated by natural history (Fig 5). When presented as contingency

tables and applying standard chi-square tests, each of these distributions by residence is statistically significant ($p < .01$). Hence residence appears to be important in demand formulation, although its empirical consequences for pass purchase cannot be predicted from these relationships.

The interrelationships suggest that explanatory variables must be studied simultaneously, Tables 2 and 3. In both tables, residence and income are combined with a third explanatory variable, and their separate effects are examined. While Fig 4 had shown that residence and income are closely related, Tables 2 and 3 show that each of residence and income is important individually, as well.

Table 3 indicates that views on pass purchase are related to familiarity with Costa Rica's national parks, but not to reason for visitation. Fig 6 clearly shows that those who claim to be familiar with the parks are the most likely pass purchasers ($p < .001$, Chi-square test).

Table 5 reveals the role of income for pass purchase when residence is controlled. Interest in pass purchase decreases with increasing incomes, and the relationship is statistically significant among non-residents. High-income visitors, both residents and non-residents, recorded high proportions of "DON'T KNOW."

Fig 2 showed that interest in pass purchase is higher as a proportion of residents than non-residents, but Table 5 shows that non-residents are willing to pay higher prices. Table 5 also points out the positive role of income for price. In the framework of Table 3, controlling for income leaves additional significant variation to be explained by residence. Cultural and attitudinal aspects are implicit in residence, and are evidently important here. Concerning measures of personal ties to parks, self-assessed familiarity is a less useful explanatory variable than actual number of parks visited.

A number of other variables were explored. In Table 6, willingness to pay is positively correlated with age (non-residents) and years of education (residents and non-residents). Visitors who liked several things about their visit are willing to pay more (residents), and visitors who disliked several things would pay less (non-residents). However, none of these correlation coefficients is large, and many are not significantly different from zero.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The research aimed to assess the fiscal feasibility of issuing an annual pass to raise revenue for national parks management in Costa Rica. Based on a survey at four heavily visited protected areas during three months of the Costa Rican winter, the pass

appears viable. This last section adds qualifications and identifies remaining research issues.

Biases in contingent valuation studies are well known (Cummings et al. 1986; Peterson et al. 1988; Mitchell and Carson 1989). This survey explored viewpoints on purchase and price in two questions, which is not how individuals choose in a market. This was an artefact of survey design. In retrospect, these two aspects probably should have been combined into a single (but necessarily more complicated) question.

Moreover, the survey did not allow for an emphatic negative response (i.e., "NO") to the question on pass purchase. The most negative choice was indecision (i.e., "DON'T KNOW"). Data recoding allowed adjustments for several respondents who wrote in "NO," but this was after survey completion. It must be concluded that the available survey choices biased responses in the direction of favoring purchase.

A third bias is that respondents may have given answers to conform with what they believed survey teams would consider desirable results (Dillman 1978, pp. 62-63). This "social desirability bias" would lead to overstated interest in pass purchase, as well as overstated willingness to pay for it. The existence of these biases and potential biases explained why feasibility calculations were confined to just those who answered

that they would definitely purchase, and why sensitivity analysis further reduced this number by half.

Characterization of the most likely pass purchasers is complex. Tested explanatory variables account for a statistically significant but only small proportion of total variation in views about pass purchase and price. Residence and income are separately important. Low-income visitors appear to be interested in pass purchase, but at relatively modest prices. High-income visitors are less certain about purchase, but are conceptualizing the pass in higher prices. Moreover, while residents appear to be more interested than non-residents in pass purchase, it is the non-residents who are willing to pay more. Consequently, pass promotion cannot be easily targeted to just one visitor segment or another. This is equivalent to recognizing differentiated demand, and rejecting prospects of a uniform promotion strategy (Crompton and Lamb 1986, pp. 131-136).

In reference to affordability, the negative association between income and interest in pass purchase is unexpected. Low-income visitors may have interpreted the question about the pass as a savings opportunity, implying domination of use satisfaction in their thinking. Alternatively, low-income visitors are more philanthropic than others. A third possibility is that income appears in an inverse relationship with environmental activism or other personal attributes explaining support for parks management.

These interpretations are highly speculative, and suggest questions for future investigation.

The income effects studied here in no way contradict the expectation of positive income elasticity of demand for parks visitation. Virtually all parks visitors in Costa Rica represent relatively high incomes, whether the reference is to Costa Rican residents or non-residents. The often stated goal of national parks for campesinos remains an ideal beyond present capacity to implement. Therefore, income elasticity of demand within groups of current visitors is not a valid indicator over a larger population, visitors plus non-visitors.

Extensions of the present study are numerous. Here, frequencies of annual visitation to the parks are unknown. Further work could estimate these frequencies through statistical methods, relating them to views on pass purchase and price. This would put feasibility on firmer ground. Views of summer visitors may differ from those of winter visitors, a possibility which could be studied by expanding the survey through the cycle of an entire year. Finally, willingness to pay tends to be greater if visitors believe that revenues will be used for area management (Reiling et al. 1988; Fedler and Miles 1989), but this aspect needs confirmation in the Costa Rican context.

In a wider arena, research on differential pricing as one means to capture untapped willingness to pay for national parks management is relevant beyond Costa Rica. Pricing policy for national parks is complicated when income distribution is highly skewed, budgets are severely constrained by austerity policies, and fairness of treatment between residents and non-residents is projected as a prominent cultural attribute and national policy. Although finding paramount expression in Costa Rica, these features are not unique to that country (e.g., see Harris and Driver for strong parallels in the USA).

Hence there is still much learning to be done on why and how persons may voluntarily contribute income to parks management and wildlands conservation more broadly. Economic theory offers much guidance on pricing policies, less on voluntary income transfers, and very much less on efficiency and equity implications of the two together. Furthermore, the relation between philanthropy and income is barely explored, although it is not necessarily the rich who are the most charitable as a proportion of their wealth (Collard 1978, pp. 93-104).

The identification of explanations why park visitors want an annual pass presents a fruitful area for directed inquiry. It could be reasoned that purely anonymous giving requires a higher degree of altruism than giving in exchange for recognition. Making the pass sufficiently attractive to become a prestigious

conservation symbol might enhance its quality as a private good, expanding demand for it. Conversely, and in reference to an earlier debate between Titmuss (1970) and Arrow (1974), anonymous and impersonal giving conceivably may prove more conducive to social efficiency. In modern economics, the behavioral foundations of exchange need rediscovery in an age which has tended to ignore its historical roots in moral philosophy (Sen 1987). From both this intellectual position and the pragmatic concern for social efficiency, the reasons for wanting a pass warrant attention.

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FIGURE 1. Survey Participants, by Protected Area and Residence.




FIGURE 2. Views on Pass Purchase, by Residence.




FIGURE 3. Self-Assessed Familiarity with Costa Rica's National Parks, by Residence.




FIGURE 4. Household Incomes, by Residence.




FIGURE 5. Reasons for Visitation, by Residence.




FIGURE 6. Views on Pass Purchase in Relation to Familiarity with Costa Rica's National Parks.




TABLE 1. Willingness to Pay for an Annual Pass, Survey of 864 Costa Rican Residents and Non-Residents at Four Protected Areas.

<u>Willing to Pay This Price or Higher (colones)</u>	<u>Number of Passes to be Sold</u>		<u>Gross Revenue for Nat. Park Serv. (thousand colones)</u>
	<u>To Residents</u>	<u>To Non-Residents</u>	
2,000	13	37	100
1,500	28	71	149
1,000	68	136	204
800	85	173	206
600	117	191	185
400	141	224	146
200	162	235	79

TABLE 2. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), Purchase of Annual Pass.

<u>Source of Variation</u>	<u>Sum of Squares</u>	<u>d.f.</u>	<u>Mean Square</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Sig. of F</u>
<u>A. First Grouping</u>					
Main Effects	54.0	7	7.7	5.2	.000
Residence	13.6	1	13.6	9.2	.003
Income	10.5	3	3.5	2.4	.068
Familiarity	29.9	3	10.0	6.7	.000
2-Way Interactions	42.3	15	2.8	1.9	.019
3-Way Interaction	19.1	9	2.1	1.4	.167
Explained	115.5	31	3.7	2.5	.000
Residual	1046.0	709	1.5		
Total	1161.5	740	1.6		
R Squared=.05					
<u>B. Second Grouping</u>					
Main Effects	27.7	8	3.5	2.3	.022
Residence	16.5	1	16.5	10.8	.001
Income	8.7	3	2.9	1.9	.131
Reason	2.5	4	0.6	0.4	.800
2-Way Interactions	33.0	19	1.7	1.1	.313
Explained	60.8	27	2.3	1.5	.061
Residual	985.4	642	1.5		
Total	1046.2	669	1.6		
R Squared=.03					

TABLE 3. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), Price of Annual Pass.

<u>Source of Variation</u>	<u>Sum of Squares</u>	<u>d.f.</u>	<u>Mean Square</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Sig. of F</u>
A. <u>First Grouping</u>					
Main Effects	117.8	7	16.8	5.6	.000
Residence	55.8	1	55.8	18.6	.000
Income	46.7	3	15.6	5.2	.002
Familiarity	15.3	3	5.1	1.7	.166
2-Way Interactions	59.7	15	4.0	1.3	.183
Explained	177.5	22	8.1	2.7	.000
Residual	1116.5	372	3.0		
Total	1294.0	394	3.3		
R Squared=.09					
B. <u>Second Grouping</u>					
Main Effects	120.8	11	11.0	3.7	.000
Residence	40.4	1	40.4	13.8	.000
Income	39.0	3	13.0	4.4	.005
No. Parks Visited	41.3	7	5.9	2.0	.053
Explained	120.8	11	11.0	3.7	.000
Residual	847.5	289	2.9		
Total	968.3	300	3.2		
R Squared=.13					
Note: Interactions were suppressed due to empty cells.					

TABLE 4. Interest in Pass Purchase, by Residence and Household Income.

		"Would You Purchase an Annual Pass?"			
		<u>Definitely</u>	<u>Possibly</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>No</u>
		------(no.of respondents)-----			
A. Costa Rican Residents					
by Annual Household Income					
(US\$000 or equivalent)					
<10	47	26	25	2	
10-29	43	19	34	4	
30-69	32	4	34	4	
70+	41	13	47	0	
Chi-square=11.4; d.f.=9; p=.25					
B. Non-Residents by Annual					
Household Income					
(US\$000 or equivalent)					
<10	27	37	28	8	
10-29	19	39	36	6	
30-69	19	37	41	3	
70+	11	26	36	3	
Chi-square=20.6; d.f.=9; p=.02					

TABLE 5. Willingness to Pay for Annual Pass, by Residence and by Income.

	"How Much Would You Be Willing to Pay?"						
	-----colones-----						
	200	400	600	800	1000	1500	2000+
	----- (no. of respondents) -----						
A. By Residence							
Costa Rican Residents	12	15	20	10	26	9	8
Non-Residents	5	13	8	15	29	14	17
Chi-square=31.5; d.f.=6; p=.00							
B. By Annual Household Income (US\$000 or equivalent)							
< 10	12	20	25	12	16	9	6
10-29	7	15	11	12	33	13	9
30-69	4	12	4	23	19	13	24
70+	8	10	7	8	39	15	13
Chi-square=65.9; d.f.=18; p=.00							

TABLE 6. Willingness to Pay for Annual Pass Correlated with Other Variables.

	<u>Costa Rican Residents</u>	<u>Non-Residents</u>
	----- ^{a/} (correlation coefficients)-----	
Age of Respondent (17-74 years)	-.08 (176) p=.14	.13 (262) p=.02
Years of Education (1-17+)	.18 (174) p=.01	.18 (260) p=.00
Overall Rating of Visit (5=high, 1=low)	.08 (177) p=.14	.10 (261) p=.05
No. Things Liked About Visit (0-3+)	.14 (178) p=.03	-.04 (263) p=.24
No. Things Not Liked About Visit (0-3+)	.02 (178) p=.38	-.24 (263) p=.00

^{a/}No. observations given in parentheses.