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**Democratization and Economic Interest Groups in Zambia**

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by

Kimberly Ludwig (Michigan State University)

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## Executive Summary

### **Introduction**

Zambia's venture into democratic governance in 1991 marked a much lauded and closely watched attempt at democratic transition in postcolonial Africa. While the openness of the elections themselves was widely agreed to be a promising beginning, it was also recognized by international observers interested in Zambia's experiment that deeper changes in the relationship between government and civil society would be necessary to ensure continuance of the democratization process. To assist Zambia in overcoming the "formidable" economic and political obstacles to democratization, USAID introduced the Democracy Governance Project (Paper 611-0226 of September 1992). To quote, "the goal of the Democratic Governance Project is to promote accountable government in Zambia . . . The Project emphasizes the complementarity of interventions to support "demands" for accountable government from civil society and to enable a "supply" of accountable government by the public sector." Specifically, the project proposes to meet the stated goal of "increased governmental accountability" through assisting citizens to gain improved access to government through the institutions of civil society, i.e. political parties, interest groups and civic associations (1992:65).

To explore issues of citizens' access to government and representation in the policy process in Zambia, research has been conducted on established member-based organizations-- interest groups-- that have organized around specific economic interests. Specifically, this study asks the following questions:

- i. Noting that groups in civil society contributed to the transition to political pluralism in 1991, what has become of the increased mobilization of interest groups in Zambia since that time? More precisely, have they continued to exercise pressure for a democratic form of government?
- ii. How has interest group activity been affected by the transition from a command economy and one-party state to a liberalized economy and multiparty state in Zambia?
- iii. What kinds of interest groups have emerged since the transition? Whose interests do they represent?
- iv. How are interest groups in Zambia maintained? What factors seem to promote group sustainability?
- v. Do interest groups in Zambia attempt to lobby government, and if so, how? To what degree are they successful?

### **Research Findings**

#### *i. interest group pressure*

There has been a decrease in interest groups' advocacy for democratic institutions. However, there has been a notable increase in the number, scope, and intensity of their demands upon government. These demands focus around implementing economic policies that generally encourage private sector growth, as well as specifically protecting the economic interests of group members. Also on the rise are group demands for improved government services (e.g. infrastructure, security, etc.), and critiques of government policy.

#### *ii. the effects of political and economic transition*

With the severing of UNIP from the organs of government and the renewal of pluralism, interest groups experience greater freedom to organize and advocate. Groups which maintained a degree of autonomy from UNIP during the Second Republic (e.g. the present ZACCI and ZNFU) are faring better in the new environment than those that were party organs (e.g. the cooperatives), as they have experience in working through informal channels to pressure government. Also, these groups lobby for policies which dovetail with current economic reforms; hence, they experience a more productive return on lobbying efforts. Finally, while the MMD government has not attempted to coopt groups into the MMD party apparatus, the government does seem to remain wary of groups (especially the cooperatives) that were once affiliated to UNIP.

Most broadly, economic reforms have financially impaired many established groups, as they've watched their memberships plummet. In the labour sector, retrenchments and the closing of inefficient parastatals have lowered membership levels in the trade unions and employers' associations. In the agricultural sector, cooperative membership has plummeted, due to the current lack of access to resources that were the primary incentive for members to belong. In the business sector, individual company memberships have fallen due to the closing of many small businesses; while corporate memberships have grown, due at least in part to large multinationals moving into the country. In the agricultural sector, the ZCF's membership has drastically decreased, while there has been a dramatic increase in individual membership in the ZNFU, NAPSSF, and PFU, as these groups have recently targeted the small-scale farmers who formerly belonged to the ZCF.

Paradoxically, however, there are now *more* locally-based groups: the National Farmers' Union has experienced a surge in member organizations as its "club" membership scheme has produced numerous new local Farmers' Associations; three new local Chambers of Commerce and Industry have emerged in Eastern Province, Kabwe, Livingstone and Chingola; and two new organizations at the national level have been launched to represent the interests of small entrepreneurs in the provinces (the Provincial Business Associations) and peasant farmers in the rural areas (the Peasant Farmers' Union). Even in the present austere economic environment, pluralism in the representational arena (if not in the political) is growing.

### *iii. the representation of interests*

The kinds of interest groups that have emerged since the transition vary by economic sector:

In the business sector, the umbrella organization for business interests (ZACCI) has strengthened its organizational capacity and its representation of private sector interests to become a relatively strong advocate for business. However, the increasing number of corporate members on the executive board together with the decreasing number of individual businesses belonging to local chambers threatens to diminish the representative nature of ZACCI's demands on government. The emergence of Provincial Business Associations might provide an alternative channel for small-scale producers not represented by ZACCI.

In the agricultural sector, the most established and well-organized group, the National Farmers' Union (ZNFU), has historically represented the interests of large-scale commercial farmers. However, since the transition, the group has sought to increase its representation of small-scale producers through the creation of "club membership." Nonetheless, two new umbrella organizations have emerged alongside the established ZNFU to specifically represent the interests of small-scale and peasant farmers. These groups argue that the ZNFU does not genuinely represent the interests of non-commercial or small-scale farmers. Still active but greatly reduced in size and capacity is the Cooperative Federation (ZCF), which once represented the interests of small-scale producers through the administration of local cooperative societies, but was crippled by the cessation of government subsidies after the transition. The ZCF is currently trying to recreate itself in line with the changes brought by economic liberalization.

In the industrial relations sector, the ZCTU underwent a serious blow after the transition when the Mineworkers, Teachers, and other unions disaffiliated over a dispute concerning both personalities and the desired relationship between the unions and the ruling party, the MMD. Since the transition, numerous new unions have emerged; for instance, a union to represent journalists was mobilized and several unions have splintered to represent more distinct categories of workers (hence, the Secondary School Teachers Union, the Professional Mineworkers Union, etc). Importantly, a formalized union for traders in the informal sector has not emerged, although government has unilaterally created a special organized voice for this sector-- a "desk" at State House.

*iv. the maintenance and sustainability of group activity*

In Zambia at present, most groups rely principally, if not solely, on membership dues and interest earned on accounts. In the farming and business sectors, only the umbrella organizations, ZCF, ZNFU, and ZACCI, have diversified their funding sources. In the labour sector, organizations rely principally if not solely on membership dues, with some reporting large donations from international donors. Support from a domestic patron was mentioned for only one group, the NAPSSF, while only ZNFU reports that they derive some funding from government consultancy contracts. Thus, the maintenance of many groups (with the exception of an important few, detailed in the main report) is achieved through voluntary member contributions, rather than government or donor support.

Preliminary data analysis suggests that two purposive (or collective) benefits, advocacy and representation before government, that rate as the most important benefit provided by groups across economic sectors. Thus, interest group sustainability depends on two interrelated activities: fundraising (to which increasing membership levels is important), and effective lobbying activities (to keep present members and attract new ones).

*v. the lobbying of government:*

Generally, groups find lobbying government officials at both the policy formulation and implementation stage to be the most important strategies for policy influence, while working with the mass media to influence public opinion is also of some importance. There are no significant differences across economic sectors.

Two thirds of groups in the sample report that they've communicated, consulted, or interacted with offices of the national government "often" during the last year, while only two fifths report that they "often" interact with local government. For those that do interact with national government, it is much more likely that they interact with the Ministries rather than the Office of the President or Parliament.

In general, much of the dialogue between groups and government in the Third Republic is left to informal channels of communication. Where dialogue is institutionalized, more regular representation and advocacy of interests is realized; however, the effectiveness of this advocacy varies, as does the degree to which the advocates represent the collective interest of group members. Representation on the boards of public bodies is also emerging as an important channel for access to government decision-making; however, the extent to which individual representatives on these boards are accountable to the broad interests of group members is unclear.

Interest groups, especially the well-established ones, seem to have a fair degree of influence in matters of import to their members. An example of this is the annual budget process, where submissions from groups are solicited by the Ministry of Finance, and seem to have a moderate impact on the resulting budget. Analysis of the 1996 and 1997 budget demonstrates that the budget reflected several tax proposals put forth by groups, including an increase in the personal income tax threshold, a lowering of the VAT rate from 20% to 17.5%, and changes in import and export duties intended to benefit business and agriculture. Furthermore, group leaders report that they are fairly satisfied with their policy influence efforts.

## **Analysis**

*i. interest group pressure*

While most interest groups currently support multi-partyism and economic liberalization, most of these groups did not take an active organizational role in lobbying for regime change. According to group leaders interviewed at ZACCI, ZNFU and the ZFE, such activity was a *political move*-- their organizations exist solely to influence *policy*, and "work with the government of the day." While the business group of the period, the Zambia National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, also did not join the movement in its organizational capacity, influential figures from the

business community did support the movement, as did several figures from the farming community. Most noticeably, the ZCTU *did* engage actively in the movement and the politics surrounding the call for multi-partyism; and their well-maintained organizational structure provided important support for that movement.

Presently, there is little pressure from groups for institutional change, and most do not share the political oppositions' concern over electoral institutions. However, they do exert pressure for improving the rule of law, and for making government more accountable and effective. Furthermore, to the extent that a strengthened private sector helps to establish a demand for increased accountability from government, group activity does indirectly encourage the consolidation of the goals of the democratic governance project-- demand for increased accountability and for an effective and streamlined public sector. These developments are in line with USAID objectives. The degree to which group activity indirectly encourages the goals of democratization varies by sector and by the goals of individual groups:

The key lobby group, i.e. the trade unions, that formally lobbied for a liberalized economy and democratic governance has been hamstrung by institutional changes. Alteration of the one industry-one union principle of industrial relations has prompted an increasing splintering of trade union organizations and threatened the security of their financial base. By crippling the organizational structure of the trade unions, these institutional changes have diminished a potential proponent for accountable government. However, they also lessened effective opposition to the retrenchments that have accompanied economic reform.

The business sector has relaxed its demands for democratic electoral institutions in favor of maintaining a relationship with government that is conducive to the interests of private sector business. Thus, while they cannot be expected to rally around opposition demands for constitutional and electoral change, business groups can still be expected to pressure for continued economic liberalization and public sector reform. The same is true for the farming sector. However, both business and agricultural groups' ability to lobby for continued economic liberalization is diminished by the dearth of institutionalized access to the policy process, and the lack of transparent policy decision-making.

#### *ii. the effects of political and economic transition*

Political liberalization has improved access to the policy process for most groups, while economic reforms have limited some group's ability to organize and lobby effectively. Groups working against the grain of reform, i.e. the peasant farmer and small-scale businessmen and farmers, have a rougher time of it, not least because the rules through which they once accessed government are gone, and a structured and effective channel for the representation of organized interests remains to be established.

Research findings detailed in this report suggest that if interest representation is to continue in a free and fair environment, it is important that the pluralistic arena brought about by the transition be further consolidated. Most importantly, channels through which to influence government need to be made more transparent, open to a wider variety of interests, and formalized through the creation of statutory institutions. Examples of the latter are:

- public advisory / regulatory bodies (i.e. boards and commissions) which are operated under transparent rules and membership appointment, which have access to technical advice where necessary;
- statutory arrangements for meetings between government Ministries and interest groups, such as the Tripartite Labour Council.

#### *iii. the representation of interests*

Several institutional changes explain the emergence of new groups in the representational arena,

and the splintering of established groups. The splintering of groups in the labour sector is due to changes in industrial relation law-- and to entrepreneurial leaders who see an avenue for access to leadership and / or economic opportunities through the creation of new unions. The formation of groups to represent small-scale producers in the business and farming sectors is due primarily to two factors:

- the cessation of government credit and inputs to these producers through party- incorporated organizations (e.g. the cooperatives, SIDO, etc); and
- the incentive (brought about by economic liberalization and widespread retrenchments) for small-scale entrepreneurs to engage in private sector production as a means of livelihood.

Overall, the transition has brought about an increase in the number of interest groups, and has broadened the kinds of interests (at least in the formal sector) that are purported to be represented. Interests pertaining to informal sector activity continue to lack meaningful representation.

#### *iv. the maintenance and sustainability of group activity*

Generally, the preponderance of groups which rely principally on member-based funding, as opposed to government or donor funding, implies an interest group sector which is relatively sustainable and accountable to its members, although this varies in degree from group to group. In the business sector, the predominance of large-member groups signifies a less broadly-representative interest arena; whereas the farming and laour sectors are more representative of small-members' interests. However, diversification of funding sources seems necessary in most cases to increase revenues, and thus increase the group's capacity for supporting activities that result in the effective lobbying of government. This is important, since most groups report that advocacy and representation before government are the most important benefits provided to members. Hence, diversifying funding sources could, by increasing lobbying capabilities, induce more members to join groups; which would further improve financial resources as well as making groups more representative.

#### *v. the lobbying of government*

The importance of advocacy as a benefit of group membership is an important finding for two reasons:

- first, it is a sign that leaders and members at least *perceive* there to be room in the process for influence from actors such as themselves; and
- second, group leaders believe that potential members will respond to the offering of purposive incentives-- and not just the promise of selective incentives such as access to credit and production inputs, which were tools for inducing group membership in certain sectors during the Second Republic.

Groups throughout the economy find the Ministries to be *the* point of access. This indicates that it is the Ministries which are perceived by interest groups to be the seat of policy decision-making (at least that part of the process that is accessible) in the Third Republic, and thus the locus for influence activities. This observation is strengthened by the finding that groups generally report it is Ministers or their staff, more than any other individual or group outside their membership, that they consult when formulating a position on governmental affairs.

The groups currently most vocal, and seemingly most influential, in Zambia are those that represent traditional private sector interests, and support economic liberalization: that is, ZACCI, ZAM, and the ZNFU. Groups supporting traditionally small-scale, government-supported interests (i.e. NAPSSF, PFU, the emerging PBA's) are less sophisticated in their influence attempts, rely on a smaller pool of resources, and are subsequently less influential in the formal policy process. The labour sector, comprised of groups once strong, autonomous, and relatively influential, has been hamstrung in its attempts to influence policy, due to member / leader disputes and recent legislation permitting splinter

groups to form.

Interestingly, groups that have attained influential positions are lobbying not only for narrowly-focused policies which benefit their membership, but for larger, "collective" concerns as well. Many of the public stands that groups take on policy issues have a "public watchdog" tone.

### **Program Recommendations**

USAID's Democracy Governance Project Paper (611-0226) has as its stated goal the promotion of accountable government in Zambia. To this end, "the project emphasizes the complementarity of interventions to support "demands" for accountable government from civil society and to enable a "supply" of accountable government by the public sector." As the Paper notes, interest groups are one of the key institutions of civil society that allow citizens to gain access to government and ensure its accountability. This study explores how interest groups currently active in Zambia are organized and how they lobby government, and analyzes the factors, both organizational and institutional, that affect their capacity to do so effectively. Below are suggested further interventions by USAID/Z to encourage the trend of group demands for accountable government, and to promote a public sector supply of effective accountable government. Importantly, the suggested interventions also serve to encourage private sector development

#### ***Supporting the "demand" for accountable government:***

##### *i. Promoting organizational capacity*

The most effective and representative groups provide economic and political information and analysis to their members, they hold meetings and other fora where members can network and check in on the activities of their leaders, they provide services that group members desire, and they are realistic, efficient, and effective in their attempts at policy advocacy. To accomplish these objectives, groups (especially at the national level) need well-trained and motivated staffs, and they need resources to maintain activities. The best strategy to improve resources is to increase groups' fund-raising capacity: e.g. fundraising drives, commercial activities related to group interests, expansion of membership base, sourcing of domestic and international donors (although concern for sustainability is an important issue for the latter).

Toward this end, an appropriate intervention would be the provision of technical support, an activity which USAID/Z is already engaged in with respect to the business sector. Establishment of projects (like the "small business desk" at ZACCI) which specifically offer technical assistance on group funding and organizational matters and provide sound economic policy advice in line with the principles of liberalization, would aid groups in expanding and serving their membership, and improving their capacity to demand accountable and effective government. Importantly, groups already exist to pursue these goals-- it is not necessary for USAID/Z to support the organizational expenses of forming and maintaining such groups. A single "desk" or position would not be necessary for each group (this would be akin to USAID/Z supporting a staff person); one per sector (business, farming, labour) would suffice.

##### *ii. Promoting a well-informed, empowered citizenry through existing groups*

National groups like ZACCI, ZAM, ZNFU, ZCTU, etc. have a level of understanding of the policy process that small groups like NAPSSF, PFU, PBA's, do not. The larger groups have established elite contacts, are aware of who makes decisions in government and civil service, know how to attain information pertinent to their activities, have experience with seeking influence through use of the media (e.g. press statements, appearing on television broadcast fora, etc), and understand the use of in-house publications to inform the public as well as members, etc. Access to training on these themes could improve the sustainability of the smaller membership organizations; thus increasing the number of effective membership organizations, especially those small-member ones outside the national center. This intervention could be modeled after the successful small business training seminars currently run by HRDA.

## *Enabling a "supply" of effective and accountable government by the public sector:*

As noted in this report, groups' ability to lobby for accountable government and continued economic liberalization is currently diminished by the dearth of institutionalized access to the policy process, and the lack of transparent policy decision-making. To buttress efforts to support the demand for accountable government, and to encourage the kind of report-making that promotes transparency in the policy process, four measures are here suggested. These measures are aimed at ensuring that group demands are met by an interested and capable public sector. The most crucial concern is the first measure (access to the Ministries) as this seems to be the key point of access to important policy decisions.

### *i. institutionalizing access to Ministries*

Research indicates that groups primarily interact with Ministries, and that Cabinet Office expects Ministries to aggregate and submit inputs from the private sector when policy decisions are being made. However, except for the Tripartite Labour Council, there are no institutionalized channels of access from groups to the Ministries, e.g. regular meetings between government and "stakeholders" in the various economic sectors, or a specified position / desk at the Ministry that acts as a liason officer between the Ministry and the public. Several interest groups have indicated a desire for such institutions to be developed, and a key Cabinet official indicates that the government would like to see the same. The principal obstacle, however, is the technical capacity to operate a liason desk.

A possible intervention for USAID/Z in this regard would be to provide training and technical support to current civil servants (e.g. Planning Division Officers) for liason activities in each of the key Ministries, alongside training to groups on how to access such liason officers.

### *ii. institutionalizing access to Parliament*

While lobbying Parliament is not as important to the activities of interest groups as is access to government Ministries, Parliamentary committees do have the potential for providing technical advice and expertise to Parliament, utilizing the experience and resources of established interest groups. There exists already limited activity in this regard; some groups mention their representation on such committees as being important to their overall lobbying strategy. A possible intervention for USAID/Z here again would be technical support and training to the Parliamentary staff who manage such committees, alongside training to groups on how to access these officials.

### *iii. supporting the media*

Research shows that working to influence public opinion through the press and media is an important influence strategy for several of the large lobby groups, mostly at the national level. Two interventions to further support this activity are possible: 1) continuing to support development of a free and independent media through USAID/Z projects at ZAMCOM; 2) additional training to assist groups in developing effective media relations skills, especially how to write and submit press statements and hold press conferences. These programs could be integrated into current ZAMCOM support.

### *iv. supporting the judiciary*

Research shows that while groups do sometimes turn to the legal system as a means of influencing government officials and gaining redress, this channel for official accountability is not as effective as it could be. Group leaders complain of long delays in case hearings, and the business sector is concerned with the lack of a commercial court.

## Introduction

Zambia's venture into democratic governance in 1991, heralded by the holding of the first multi-party elections since 1972, marked a much lauded and closely watched attempt at democratic transition in postcolonial Africa (see Bratton 1992 and Joseph 1992). While the openness of the elections themselves was widely agreed to be a promising beginning, it was also recognized by international observers interested in Zambia's experiment that deeper changes in the relationship between government and civil society would be necessary to ensure continuance of the democratization process. Accordingly, the current study addresses important questions regarding this developing relationship, as evidenced by the specific interaction between the MMD government and economic interest groups in Zambia. Economic groups have been chosen as the focal point of civil society for purposes of the study, because of their quantifiable demands on the policy process and the fact that they are important players in the economic reforms taking place concurrently with political reform.

This study asserts that the key relationship between social groups and authoritative decision-makers in modern democratic regimes is one of representation; that is, citizens choose groups and individuals to represent their specific interests in the policy-making process, rather than participating directly themselves. This implies that the relationship between government and civil society necessarily takes place through intermediaries; it is a relationship structured through specialized, legally constituted organizations, referred to here as interest groups (Schmitter, 1992:423). Representation also has an institutional element; that is, formal and informal "rules of the game" which define both the opportunities and the constraints that structure the group-government relationship (see North 1990). Thus, both institutions and organizations are recognized as important components of the state-society relationship.

In regimes that are in transition from non-democratic to democratic forms of governance, the development of two types of representational institutions are important: electoral institutions (e.g. voter registration, general elections), which determine the process for the selection of leaders; and non-electoral institutions (e.g. civic groups, interest associations, social movements) which determine the broader relationship between civil society, acting through groups, and the public agencies of government where decisions are made. While the development of both types are crucial to the consolidation of democracy,<sup>1</sup> some scholars would argue that it is the latter that are more significant, for "however central to democracy, elections occur intermittently and only allow citizens to choose between the highly aggregated alternatives offered by political parties... During the intervals between elections, citizens can seek to influence public policy through a wide variety of other intermediaries: interest associations, social movements, locality groupings, clientelistic arrangements, and so forth" (Schmitter and Karl, 1991:78).<sup>2</sup> It is useful therefore to think of non-electoral representative institutions as the formal and informal rules which shape how citizens seek to influence public policy, in between elections, through group intermediaries.

Institutions play vital roles in governance by shaping incentive structures in the polity. Government officials and social actors alike respond to such incentives, creating what might be termed a "representational arena" in which rules and established networks define access to government decision-making, and rules determine the boundaries of competition among social groups seeking to influence policy decisions. Organizations are separate from institutions; defined as groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives, they are created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework (North, 1990:5).

Representational institutions undergo profound processes of change during transitions from non-democratic to democratic rule, producing concomitant changes in representative organizations such as political parties, interest associations, and social movements. Changes in these organizations (in structure, in leadership, in membership) can be seen as responses to the different incentives presented by the representational institutions of the new regime. This is not to say that the process of change is abrupt in nature; the institutions of the previous regime will leave an indelible mark on whatever new

institutions develop. In Zambia, the transition from one-party rule and a command economy during the Second Republic to political pluralism and a liberalized economy in the present Third Republic has had important consequences for representative institutions, and the organizations that seek representation in the new environment. These changes will be discussed in the body of the report. It should, however, be noted that the incorporation of social groups into the UNIP party apparatus during the Second Republic produced consequences equally important to the current interest group arena.

The representative relationship between civil society and government is important not only for academic studies of democratization processes, but for development programming as well. To illustrate, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Meeting in 1993, explicitly recognized the "vital connection between open, democratic, and accountable systems of governance and respect for human rights, and the ability to achieve sustained economic and social development... the agendas for good governance, participatory development, human rights and democratization are clearly interlinked." Under the heading, "areas for action," the DAC concluded that supporting intermediary organizations such as interest and professional associations, women's organizations, consumer groups and trade unions, and encouraging government to develop mechanisms to include them in the policy-making process would encourage "participatory development." In addition, strengthening pluralism in civil society through support for professional associations, advocacy groups, and trade unions, would support "democratization."

USAID's Democracy Initiative (USAID, 1991) expresses similar objectives. Under the Initiative, USAID's Democracy Governance Project Paper (611-0226) of September 1992 introduced a project meant to assist Zambia in overcoming the "formidable" economic and political obstacles to democratization. To quote, "the goal of the Democratic Governance Project is to promote accountable government in Zambia . . . The Project emphasizes the complementarity of interventions to support "demands" for accountable government from civil society and to enable a "supply" of accountable government by the public sector." Specifically, the project proposes to meet the stated goal of "increased governmental accountability" through assisting citizens to gain improved access to government through the institutions of civil society-- specifically, political parties, interest groups and civic associations (1992:65).

This study focuses in on a specific institution of civil society: economic interest groups. For purposes of this report, "interest group" refers to any group that, "on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of other forms of behaviour that are implied by the shared attitudes." The focus of this study is specifically on those groups that have organized around a special economic interest, such as business, agriculture, or labour. The study includes only functioning associations which have active, dues-paying memberships, are voluntarily organized, and are concerned with lobbying government on economic policy at the national level.

Included in the study are all groups in Zambia organized around an economic interest, including groups from the business, agricultural, and labor sectors of the economy. Of special interest are the "apex" or "umbrella" associations which aggregate the groups in different economic sectors and represent member groups at the national level. This category includes the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), and Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM)<sup>3</sup>; the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), and the Zambia National Farmer's Union (ZNFU), the Peasant Farmer's Union (PFU), and the National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers (NAPSSF); the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE).

This study asks several related questions. These questions deal with institutional changes brought about by the transition to democracy in 1991, and with the interest organizations that these changes affect. Firstly, noting that interest groups contributed to the transition to political pluralism in 1991, what has become of the ~~increased~~ mobilization of interest groups in Zambia since that time? More

precisely, have they continued to exercise pressure for a democratic form of government? How has interest group activity been affected by the transition from a command economy and one-party state to a liberalized economy and multiparty state in Zambia? What kinds of interest groups have emerged since the transition? Whose interests do they represent? How are interest groups in Zambia maintained? What factors seem to promote group sustainability? Do interest groups in Zambia attempt to lobby government, and if so, how? To what degree are they successful?

The primary findings are:

- while interest groups in the labor sector were especially active in the transition to multi-party politics, they have become much less vocal as advocates for political change, in sharp contrast to opposition political elites and parties.
- overall, interest groups have become much more active in pursuit of influence over policy decisions which affect members' interests. Furthermore, strategies for influence have changed qualitatively and quantitatively.
- institutional changes in the Third Republic have prompted changes in representative organizations-- most importantly in the number of groups vying for influence, the strategies they engage to influence decision makers, and their "representational domain"-- that is, the numbers and types of members they purport to represent.
- however, incentives for organizational membership, as well as several key organizational variables including structure, financing, and organizational capacity, remain importantly affected by economic and cultural constraints left by institutions of the Second Republic.

The report proceeds in the following parts:

- an account of the role played by economic interest groups in Zambia's recent transition to multi-party rule;
- an examination of changes in the institutional environment since 1991 that affect group activity;
- a descriptive account of interest groups currently active in Zambia;
- an analysis of how these groups were mobilized and how they are currently maintained;
- an account suggesting the effectiveness of interest group lobbying efforts,
- policy recommendations to USAID/Z concerning program interventions most likely to encourage demand and supply of democratic governance.

## 1. Interest Groups and Zambia's Transition to Multi-Party Rule, 1991

The following account describes the role played by economic actors and interest groups in Zambia's transition to multi-party rule in 1991. The focus in this section ways in which interest organizations affected institutional change in the political arena.

### *Background*

The one-party state established by the Constitution of the Second Republic (1972-1991), was exemplary of patronage politics. Immediately following Independence, Kaunda governed in consultation with his cabinet, party colleagues, and key civil servants. However, during the 1970's a growing presidentialism in government and a centralization of party power in Kaunda's hands (Gulhati 1989, 26-27) increasingly made him the "big man" of Zambian politics (see also Gertzel 1984). Kaunda's one-party state sought to coopt much of civil society into government or party-controlled institutions:

"State corporatism in Zambia took the form of a fusion of the institutions of the state with the UNIP and civic and interest organisations. Two organising principles that underscored this fusion were centralism and participatory democracy. Together, they defined the "special governing arrangements which shaped the character of the one-party state" (Akwetey 1994:48).

This tendency was perhaps best realised in the agricultural cooperative movement, institutionalized by the Cooperative Act of 1970. The UNIP government also sought to establish a corporative relationship with the labour movement through the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, which replaced the voluntarist elements of labour policy with mandatory provisions. (Akwetey 1994:47, see also Meebelo 1986 and Rakner 1992).

Despite the UNIP government's desire to coopt civil society into functioning organs of the party, certain areas of civil society resisted the corporatist aspirations of the one-party state. In spite of an institutional arena which sought to closely align the "party and its government" with social groups, Bates and Collier point to the fact that organized interests such as commercial farmers, private business, and organized labor nevertheless stood "remarkably" isolated from the Party, or in active opposition to it.

"Commercial farmers and major portions of the business community stood either as vanquished remnants of the colonial order or as enemies defeated in the political rivalries between competing political parties. Organized labor constituted a rival mass organization... (that) engaged in protracted political struggles (with UNIP), the one seeking autonomy, the other domination" (1993, 397).

Importantly, these social groups were able to develop strong organized interest groups apart from UNIP's patronage structure-- groups which ultimately provided the organizational structure for challenging the one party state.

### *The Business and Farming Community*

The election of 1973 marked the emergence of a substantial number of Members of Parliament with business interests, thus marking a "rise to political prominence of a Zambian business class" (Baylies and Szeftel 1984:59). In this election, at least a quarter of all new, non-incumbent candidates were "solely classifiable as businessmen<sup>4</sup>," and data available for candidates in the 1978 election suggests that these tendencies observed in 1973 had continued (67). The relationship between property owners and the one-party state was a complex two-way process: on one side, it involved the entry of businessmen into Parliament and local councils through elections, while on the other it entailed the acquisition of business interests by those in party and state positions, and exit from such positions into private enterprise (69-70).

Baylies and Szeftel note that this process resulted in a growing strength of the indigenous business lobby, reinforced not only by the expanding business interests of high level state officials, but also by the strongly increased presence of businessmen within Parliament. Alongside these

developments, organizations of indigenous businessmen, in particular the Zambia African Traders Association and later the Zambia National Council of Commerce and Industry, were gaining increased credibility through the 1970's. These two developments together laid the groundwork for the development of a significant indigenous business lobby. However, these groups had limited influence over the socialist-oriented policies of the UNIP government, and remained well aware during this period of the degree to which they were politically dependent on the party for access to the state.

Since the 1970's, there have been two principle organizations in the agricultural sector representing farmers' interests: the Commercial Farmers' Bureau (CFB, which became the ZNFU) and the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF). While the CFB sought to organize and represent commercial, large-scale farmers, the cooperative movement coordinated the efforts of small-scale and peasant farmers. During the transition period, the CFB, while increasingly critical of government policy in the late 1980's, did not officially partake in the call for transition to multiparty politics. The ZNFU's official stand is now, as it was at that time also, "we support and intend to work with the government of the day" (interview with Gray, 7/97). However, members of the farming community were participants and donors at the National Conference for Multi-Party ~~Option~~. The ZCF, meanwhile, was integrated as a mass organization with the ruling party, UNIP, and thus did not openly criticize either government's policy or the nature of the one-party state.

During the 1980's, the private business sector, as well as the commercial farming sector, struggled against the growing economic crisis and lack of institutionalized access to the Party's decision-making centers. The parastatal sector and cooperative movement, while more closely integrated to the UNIP government through positions on the UNIP Central Committee, was also crippled by government's inability to sustain the previous levels of subsidization. The lack of substantive input into the party's decision-making process by representatives of these sectors compounded the crisis as the government continued to implement ill-advised policy. For example, in one such attempt the government agreed in early 1990 to introduce a dual currency exchange rate, with the intention of encouraging donor balance-of-payments support and attracting foreign investment. Domestically, however, the policy's implementation met with criticism at the government's continuing myopia: as the Times of Zambia (February 1990) reported, "business and farming have been thrown into disarray by Government's failure to discuss the measure thoroughly with those affected." Individuals with business and farming concerns were ripe for mobilization to support political change. Notably, however, the organizations representing these interests did not directly engage the state: media reports (see APPENDIX B) from that time did not mention any criticism of the one-party state from these groups, though they did mention ZCTU fairly often in this regard.

#### *The Labour Movement*

Though commercial farmers and private business were significantly outside the official organs of the one-party system, organized labor's position was somewhat more ambiguous: the workers were part of the urban constituency that benefitted from UNIP's patronage, but their leadership was opposed to party dominance of the trade union movement. The Labour and Industrial Act of 1971 sought to centralize control over the labour movement, by instituting a "one industry, one union" principle, and amalgamating all unions under an "apex" organization, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The UNIP government envisaged this move as one which would extend its control through the branches of the unions to workers throughout the country. While ZCTU was never formally affiliated to UNIP as a "mass organization," under the UNIP Constitution it was given representation on both the National Council and the General Conference. However, ZCTU was not permitted representation on the Central Committee, where government policy was deliberated and decided upon; for reasons Kaunda made clear in the following statement:

"The ZCTU as a people's organisation is responsible to the party and comes under the discipline of the party. It is the duty of the ZCTU to pursue the Party's programmes and to implement Party policies because the Party is supreme over the ZCTU and other national institutions

The election of two "youthful leaders" in 1974-75 thwarted this, the party's vision for trade unionism. Akwetey argues the "election of these two youthful leaders together with other young trade unionists, marked an important shift in leadership style and orientation." Both Newstead Zimba, elected Secretary-General of ZCTU in 1974, and Frederick Chiluba, elected Chairman-General in 1975, belonged to a new generation of trade unionists, one that differed from the "old guard" in its lack of attachment to UNIP and its goal to strengthen the ZCTU and trade unions against UNIP coercion. The trained leadership of these trade unionists, together with an educated workforce, assured financial position, and institutionalized decision-making framework, enhanced the organisational capability of the ZCTU; and gave force to its bid for substantial autonomy from the party combined with genuine participation in the policy-making process.

Throughout the 1980's, ZCTU's leadership consistently resisted UNIP's efforts to coopt them into either *de facto* or *de jure* organs of the party. Rather than acquiescing to wholesale implementation of UNIP policy, the ZCTU criticized policies they viewed as deleterious to workers' interests, and continually took workers' side in demands for higher wages and their recourse to illegal strike action. The import of this stance became apparent in 1981, when 84 illegal strikes involving 46,399 workers occurred, and Chiluba, Zimba, and others were placed in detention for six months. This, together with Chiluba and Zimba's refusal to serve on the Central Committee when appointed to it in 1989, consolidated their stature as leaders of a growing opposition to the one-party state (Akwetey 1994, see also Bratton 1992).

In response to the ZCTU's perceived intransigence and growing organizational threat, UNIP party leaders decided to institutionalize a firmer control over the ZCTU by redefining the legal status of the union vis-a-vis the party. Through an amendment to the UNIP constitution, the trade unions were to be included in the party as "mass organizations," together with the women's and youth leagues; thereafter, membership would be open to all Zambians, and the party would have direct influence over the selection of trade union leaders. While the ZCTU managed initially to block the proposal, it tended to resurface whenever the ZCTU disagreed with government policy. The final insult, however, came in 1989 when UNIP moved to push a Draft Bill amending the Industrial Relations Act through the National Assembly, a bill that clearly was designed to break the centralised structure of the ZCTU and impede its funding.<sup>5</sup> On December 30, 1989, the ZCTU leadership called for the restoration of multi-party politics and the dissolution of the one-party state. In 1990, the ZCTU publicly criticized the one-party state on at least eight occasions in the newsprint media. In contrast, although the ZFE also did not support the 1990 Act, they did not similarly challenge the state.

#### *The National Conference on Multi-Party Option*

The ZCTU played an integral role in the establishment of the MMD. Derrick Chitala, who together with Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika organized the campaign that later became the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, writes:

"after concretizing the tentative operational framework of the Alliance for Democracy and Development, the very first act in our campaign required that we link our efforts against the one party state tyranny with other individuals and institutions that had shown a resolve to campaign for multi-party democracy in our country. At the very onset, we identified the ZCTU and Mr. Vernon Mwaanga as the most probable allies" (Mbikusita-Lewanika and Chitala, 1990:vi).

Mbikusita-Lewanika and Chitala subsequently met with Newstead Zimba and Frederick Chiluba, who agreed to work with the Alliance to organize a National Conference. Charged with the task of creating a "broad coalition of multi party democracy activities," the Conference was held in July 1990.

ZCTU was nominated to serve on the National Interim Committee of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, and was closely involved with mobilizing a campaign for the MMD previous to the

elections of 1991. The Union was engaged in the following activities toward that end: the mobilization of all District Committees and all national unions to provide logistical structural support, extensive campaigning tours of all districts and Provincial Centers by ZCTU and national union leaders, and mass education campaigns to educate workers on the importance of democratizing government. The fact that the President as well as several other political leaders in the new MMD government emerged from the trade union movement bears testimony to the role that the labour movement played in promoting the advent of the MMD government. APPENDIX C gives a list of the individuals who contributed to the National Conference on Multiparty Option, and a list of individuals who transferred from the ranks of the trade union movement to prominent positions in the new MMD government.

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### **1a. Analysis**

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Importantly, while most of the interest groups currently support multi-partyism and economic liberalization, most of these groups did not take an active organizational role in lobbying for regime change. According to group leaders interviewed at the ZNFU and the ZFE, such activity was a *political* move-- their organizations exist solely to influence *policy*, and "work with the government of the day." While the business group of the period, the Zambia National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, also did not join the movement in its organizational capacity, influential figures from the business community did support the movement, as did several figures from the farming community. Most noticeably, the ZCTU *did* engage actively in the movement and the politics surrounding the call for multi-partyism, as detailed below.

Organizations which "got political" helped to bring about institutional change. They were able to do this because they were politicized, established, well-funded and organized groups. In addition to officially lobbying for such change, these organizations also "sensitized" their members to the benefits of political democracy, providing an important and effective outlet for civic education.

## 2. The Institutional Environment: Changes since 1991

While the last section dealt with the effects of interest organizations on institutional change, this section examines how changes in the institutional environment of representation has affected group activity.

### *Background*

In Zambia's Second Republic, the representational relationship between the state and society was one of state corporatism, involving the merging of the institutions of the state with the United National Independence Party and civic and interests organizations. Two organizing principles, *centralism* and *participatory democracy*, defined the "special governing arrangements" of this relationship.<sup>6</sup> In this resulting institutional environment organizations in civil society tended to lose their autonomy and independence, as they were often compelled to take up affiliated membership in UNIP. Such affiliation meant they were brought under the control of the party and government, and their activities were required to conform to the Constitution and rules of the party.<sup>7</sup> The transition to a liberalized polity and economy in 1991 formally brought about a more pluralistic representational arena, allowing groups in society to form freely under constitutionally-protected freedoms of speech and association, and dissolving the corporative relationship between the ruling party and social groups.

The ideas for liberalization of the economy and release of government from the single party's control were articulated at the National Conference for Multi-Party Option. At the Conference, a series of speakers decried the bankruptcy of the one-party state and advocated liberalization of the economy and the development of truly plural and democratic politics (see Mbikusita-Lewanika & Chitala 1990). Dr. Remmy Mushota (who was to later become Minister for Legal Affairs for the MMD government) delivered an important address in which he identified five means of institutionalizing democracy: citizenship, the right to vote, the electoral system, political parties, and interest groups. Remmy argued that in a democracy,

"it is essentially imperative that citizens be able to keep in continuous touch with their government and to influence it at every step along the way as it undertakes to determine and execute policy... the dictates of broader political processes do make it desirable that citizens be allowed and encouraged through the law to join together in groups based on similar social and economic likes and interests and thereby to influence government at those points where its activity touches these likes and interests" (Lewanika & Chitala 1990:30).

This passage captures the spirit of the liberalized viewpoint of state-society relations later enshrined in the MMD Manifesto. However, neither Mushota nor other speakers at the Conference had a specific formula for ensuring that such groups would indeed gain influence where government activity "touches (their) likes and interests." Similarly, the MMD Campaign Manifesto does not address how the interface between the private sector and the public / government sector is to actually take place; while the economic policies to be promoted are laid down in broad strokes, no mention is made for providing for the inclusion of stakeholders in policy determination, except for a brief mention of MMD's intention to "open its doors to the labour movement as a legitimate and important partner in development" (Chanda 1992:75). It seems this omission is at least partially intentional; as an officer in the Cabinet Office related, the government views the MMD Manifesto as the basis for government policy... "when the people voted MMD into power, they (the MMD) assumed that the manifesto represented what people want. The Party therefore wants to implement the Manifesto. The government can't be over-influenced by interest groups in this regard." However, he points out that the government is willing to compromise; as an example, he gave the lowering of VAT in the 1997 budget from 20% to 17.5%, and remarked, "to us, that indicates influence from the private sector."

### *The effects of institutional change: points of access to government decision-making in the Third Republic*

In the newly pluralized environment of the Third Republic, groups are concerned with two types of lobbying:

- lobbying the legislative process for changes in statutes that define their relationship to government, and
- lobbying the key points of access to the policy process.

For most groups, the latter is most important, as it concerns the day-to-day administrative issues which affect group members. To the labour and cooperative movements, however, lobbying the legislative process is of special importance, for key legislation drafted during the Second Republic is currently being revised to reflect the new environment. The two most important acts being lobbied by these groups at present are the Cooperative Societies Act of 1970 (Chapter 689 of the Laws of Zambia), and the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 (Chapter ). The issues that ZCTU and ZCF face in these lobbying efforts are particularly indicative of developments in the emerging relationship between the MMD government and organizations in civil society. In addition, these issues highlight the effect that institutional change has on interest group activity.

#### *Legislative Lobbying: The Cooperative Movement*

The initial formation of cooperative societies during the Second Republic was adversely affected by several factors: firstly, cooperatives were affiliated as "mass organizations" to the Party under the UNIP constitution; thus, representation of their economic interests had to be channeled through centralized party organs; secondly, cooperatives were formed not because of member mobilization, but as a matter of government policy-- only after the cooperative had been formed was the membership recruited; and finally, the legal framework of the Act gave excessive powers to the government to intervene in the management and daily operations of cooperatives-- for example, government officials were made signatories to the accounts of various cooperative organizations, and annual general meetings could not be held without a government official present.<sup>8</sup>

According to current co-operative officials, these institutional arrangements had several adverse consequences for the development of the cooperative movement. Most importantly, they resulted in a "shallow" membership incentive; rather than joining a cooperative to participate in the production of collective goods, individuals sought group membership for the access to government resources, e.g. agricultural credit and subsidized insurance, that it entailed (interview, Mr. Lungu, January 7, 1997). Furthermore, the emphasis on using cooperatives as channels for subsidized inputs meant that attention to other areas of co-operative investment and development were neglected. Finally, since the co-operative societies were instituted as "mass organizations" of the Party, their organizational logic was predicated upon their role as mouthpieces for official party policy-- thus, a culture of advocacy (to promulgate members' interests vis-a-vis government decision-makers) was sorely underdeveloped.

Since the regime transition in 1991, the ZCF has been urging the MMD government to address the necessary amendment of the Cooperative Act. However, ZCF officials have the impression that because of their previous affiliation to UNIP, the MMD regards them as sympathetic to the opposition, and is unwilling to work with the ZCF's national leaders. As of October 1996, the Bill was still at Cabinet level for deliberation, and at present, a final Draft Bill has yet to emerge.

Specifically, the amendments that the Federation wants to see are:

- the removal of unfettered Government powers and interference, and the Registrar's role confined to registration and de-registration of co-operatives;
- emphasis on share capital adequacy;
- provision for temporary registration of a co-operative society, registration to be made permanent only if the Registrar is satisfied that a society is viable and can sustain itself;
- charging of economic interest rates, e.g. by credit unions, so as to encourage member investment;
- an emphasis on the need for directors to be literate (Kajimanga 1996:4-5).

However, it appears that in lobbying for these changes, they are operating in a contentious environment... in his welcoming speech at the 6th National Cooperative Convention in August 1995, Chairman Chilala first thanked President Chiluba for addressing the conference, then informed him that

"we feel very much discriminated against as a cooperative sector. We are the only sector still regulated by an outdated rather authoritative cooperative societies act... We have on several occasions presented our proposals to the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries, but no action seems to be taken towards amending the Act."

He went on to report to the President that the Cooperative Federation did not appreciate the government perpetuating a negative image of the cooperative movement and advising donors and investors not to deal with them, they felt it unfair that ASIP rural investment fund announcements mentioned farmers' associations but not cooperatives, and they also found it unfair that they had become the last to be considered for government contracts. Indeed, the Federation's misgivings seemed to be well-founded... in mid-June of 1996, the Swedish Cooperative Center withdrew more than K600 million from the Cooperative Development Programme it ran jointly with the Federation since 1982, and donor funds now comprise only 1% of the Federation's funding. In January 1997, the Federation drafted a "Project Proposal for a Workshop for Parliamentarians in Zambia," with the aim of dialoguing with MPs over the redrafting of the Cooperative Act. To date, (9/97) they are still waiting for Parliament to set a date for the Workshop to take place.

#### *Legislative Lobbying: The Labour and Industrial Act*

Though political control over the industrial sector was an objective of the one-party state, the ZCTU and ZFE were never formally affiliated to the ruling party (UNIP) as was the case with other interest associations. Under the UNIP constitution, the organizations were given representation on both the National Council and the General Conference, which together with the Central Committee were the three major policy-making organs of the Party. The Central Committee, however, was the most powerful of the three; the National Council was mainly a platform used by the President for announcing policy decisions. Furthermore, the representational function of the National Council and General Conference was circumscribed by the fact that delegations to these bodies could be excluded at will by the President. These rules had the effect of limiting the participation of interest organizations in the policy process, but not of coopting those interests into the ruling party's sphere of control. When ZCTU's intransigence and autonomy became threatening in the late 1980's (see Section 1), the party and its government sought to control the upsurge through institutional means, by changing the Industrial Relations Act. It is useful to look at this strategy more closely, for it is a strategy that the MMD government has also adopted in its dealing with a uncooperative trade union movement.

The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 (CAP 517 of the Laws of Zambia, amended 1973) stipulated a one-industry-one-union policy, allowing one umbrella organization to legally represent trade unions (the ZCTU) and one organization to legally represent employers (the ZFE). Affiliation of unions and employers' associations to the apex was made mandatory and a compulsory check-off system was introduced; by thus providing the apex organizations with sure and plentiful funding, the statute promoted development of a strong organizational capacity for these groups. The Act also institutionalized access to labour policy decision makers for the apex organizations, through the auspices of the "Tripartite Council."

In 1985, the UNIP government made its first move to reign in the labour movement with the passing of *Statutory Instruments No 6*, which was to revoke the compulsory check-off system which gave the apex associations steady income flows, but was repelled by strong resistance from the ZCTU and ZFE. Joint opposition from the ZCTU and ZFE resulted in the Tripartite Meetings rejecting proposed amendments to the IRA in 1985, 1988, and 1989; prompting UNIP to act unilaterally in sending the Draft Bill to the National Assembly in 1989. This Bill later became the 1990 Industrial Relations Act, which advocated the formation of more than one trade union in an industry-- a

development that both unions and employers were firmly against. Mandatory affiliation to the apex organizations and the mandatory check-off system were abolished, and the Minister and Labour Commission were given considerable discretionary powers. Repeal of the IRA (1990) became a main plank in ZCTU's support for the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy.

When the MMD came to power in November 1991, the tripartite partners agreed to revert to the policy of one union, one industry; hence, the Industrial Relations Act of 1990 was repealed and replaced by the Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1993. Tripartite Council meetings were scheduled (and have been held) bi-annually. Since that time, however, the ZCTU has become increasingly outspoken in its criticism of the MMD governments' policies, resulting in a split in the leadership of the apex organization in 1994 over the Congress's relationship with MMD, with the anti-government faction winning control of the ZCTU. (see ZCTU profile, Section 3, for details). Subsequently, the MMD government has made clear its objective to again abolish the one industry --one union provision, and to do away with the ZCTU and ZFE's position as the only legal apex organizations. The unions especially are finding it difficult to resist, for the "one industry--one union" principle conflicts with two important International Labour Organization conventions, No. 87 and No. 98, which the Zambian government ratified in 1994.<sup>9</sup> While agreeing in principle with the ILO mandate, both unions and employers are wary of allowing the representational arena to fragment; for a multiplicity of groups means fewer members in each group, and thus a decrease of bargaining power and decline in funding for all groups.

As of April 1997, the technical committee assigned by the Tripartite Council to assess the proposed changes were proposing that the offending clause be modified to give the Labour Commissioner (a civil servant, not a politician) power to limit the number of unions (interview with Hang'andu, 16/4/97). This is to be accomplished by passing regulations which allow only organizations with 51% or more of the total membership of a given industry to engage in collective bargaining. This would ostensibly create a competitive arena for the representation of industrial interests; unions would have to fight for members in a given industry, and an incentive to prevent over-fragmentation of groups would exist. Theoretically, unions not possessing enough members to be the official "collective bargainer" would still be able to provide worker's education and lobby government on behalf of their members. However, the incentive to join and pay dues to a group outside the collective bargaining process is not a compelling one.

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#### 2a. Analysis: Legislative Lobbying

The MMD government's aims in these two cases seem disparate. In the case of the Cooperative Act, delays in relinquishing control of the cooperative movement have been manifest for six years, though government no longer provides the subsidies that once justified this control. In the case of the labour movement, government's intention to dissolve the principle of one-industry-one-union seems certain to lead to continued fragmentation in the trade union sector. The goal seems to be continued corporatism in the former case and extreme pluralism in the latter, but in both cases, these goals serve political ends: by maintaining control over the cooperative movement, the government circumvents the activities of a perceived opposition party's ally; by promoting the splintering of unions affiliated to the ZCTU, the government cripples a once potent and autonomous organization that has resisted toeing its line. In both cases, the groups face an uphill battle in lobbying for their interests.

Regarding the institutions which permit them to wage this battle, ZCTU has benefitted from an increase in the frequency and quality of Tripartite Council meetings since the demise of the one-party state, while ZCF has suffered from losing its seat on a central policy making body, and not having any structured relationship take its place. Specifically, ZCTU's access to the Ministry of Labour via the Tripartite Council-- especially its representation on the appropriate Technical Committee of the Council-- has allowed the organization a substantial voice in lobbying government for its preferences in the Industrial Relations Act. However, it is important to note that while the Council permits ZCTU and ZFE a direct line to their Ministry, it does not guarantee their preferences will be met. In contrast nonetheless, ZCF, which lacks any type of institutionalized access other than informal approaches to the Ministry of

Agriculture and the National Assembly, has been largely frustrated in its efforts to influence a new Cooperative Act. Neither group mentioned parliamentary committees as having any bearing on their access to the decision process.

### *The institutional environment of policy lobbying*

All groups in civil society must register with the Registrar of Societies, according to CAP 10, "The Societies Act," which stipulates that all groups must register and make their books open to audits of the registrar of societies. The 1996 Constitution includes provisions for the right to free speech and the right to freedom of assembly (Part III), both of which are essential to the development of free and autonomous citizen groups. It does not, however, include provisions for the formal representation of interests, nor institutionalized mechanisms which permit citizen groups ready access to the decision-making process. Rather, the means through which groups presently seek representation are mostly informal and ad hoc. Below are given the central government institutions through which groups can, in principle, reach decision-makers.

#### *i) The Cabinet Office*

According to the Constitution (No. 18 of 1996, Section 50-53), it is the Cabinet which formulates the policy of the government and is responsible for advising the President with respect to the policy of the government. The Cabinet is comprised of the President, Vice President, and the Ministers; together with the Deputy Ministers, the body is accountable collectively to the National Assembly. The Secretary to the Cabinet holds a public office, and is head of the Public Service. Officially, the responsibility for initiating policy and policy change lies within the ministries. The Cabinet office expects that ministries have liaised with organizations in the private sector when they make their submissions; while the Policy Analysis and Coordination Division at Cabinet Office encourages consultation with the private sector, they want it to be carried out *through* the offices of the ministries (interview with Kaluba, June 25, 1997).

Mr Kaluba, Permanent Secretary of the Division, reports that as part of the consultation process, his office does find out if the ministries have consulted with the private sector. Furthermore, his office occasionally informs groups at an informal level about policies which are "in the pipeline": as an example, he might call up ZACCI and tell them to confer with the appropriate Ministry regarding a certain policy. While he encourages such informal means of contact, such as having members of his office "get to know" group leaders and "get their input" at an informal level, he also reports that the government is trying to create consultative institutions that offer more formalized channels of communication, such as the arrangement with the Tripartite Council in the labour sector. However, to this end, he reports that government would find it preferable for each sector to be represented by one organization that represents a broad membership as opposed to the voice of a few individuals. As an example, he asserts that the fragmentation of the farming sector makes it difficult for government to "know who's talking."

#### *ii) The Ministries [see Appendix D]*

Ministries, along with the Cabinet, form part of the Executive branch of government. The number and definition of Ministers' office are matters left to the President's discretion: "there shall be such Ministers as may be appointed by the President" (Constitution of Zambia, No. 18 of 1996, Section 46). There is also provision for the President to appoint as many Deputy Ministers as are required to assist Ministers. Appointment to the office of Minister and Deputy Minister is made from amongst members of the National Assembly. At present, there are 24 line Ministries and 9 Provincial Deputy Ministries.

Most important to the agricultural sector is the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF). Formal linkage between the Ministry and interests in the agricultural sector is supposed to take place through the Agricultural Sector Investment Program (ASIP), implemented in 1996 but currently suspended to undergo serious revamping. Private sector representation is achieved through the

membership of farmers' associations, cooperatives, and other NGO's, on the ASIP steering committee and on local District Agricultural Committees. According to Dr. Hantuba, Acting Deputy Director, the MAFF prefers to think of the members of interest groups as "stakeholders" in agricultural policy; the ASIP marks a sincere attempt to restructure the MAFF to be responsive to such stakeholders, to generate efficient, demand-driven policies and to employ a decentralized administration which "gets out to the areas where the stakeholders are" (interview with Hantuba, 19/6/97). Informal linkages also exist between MAFF and its stakeholders: for instance, the MAFF holds workshops which stakeholders' groups are invited to attend, and they send official government representatives to workshops held by groups. Any stakeholder has the right to see the Minister or the Permanent Secretary, as these are public offices. Stakeholders also have the right to influence government opinion through the media. More formally, representation can also be had when the Minister presents the annual agricultural budget to Parliament for discussion.

From the perspective of groups in the agricultural sector, the PFU and NAPSSF report a moderate and important increase, respectively, in cooperation with Ministries since the transition in 1991; ZNFU and its members report either a moderate increase or "no change" in cooperation; and ZCF reports a moderate decrease in cooperation (1997 Survey). According to ZNFU (who at one point held the vice-chairmanship of the committee), the ASIP steering committee permitted valuable representation; however, it was dissolved in February 1997. Groups in this sector seem to be mixed in their experience with representation on the recently dissolved District Agricultural Committees: for instance, the District Agricultural Office in Mansa reported that its D.A.C. met once a month and included representatives from the Peasant Farmers' Union and Farmers' Association and the ZNFU reports that its farmers have been quite active on the committees. On the other hand, representatives from the Peasant Farmers Union in Kabwe complained that civil servants were taking the lion's share of seats on D.A.C.'s, and members of a cooperative in Nchelenge didn't seem to realize the D.A.C. existed.

Most important to the business sector is the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry (MCTI), although particular sectors (e.g. transportation, tourism, etc.) deal more often with their particular line Ministry. According to Jane Habongo, Deputy Director of Planning and Research, there are no formal linkages between the Ministry and private sector organizations (interview with Habongo, 19/6/97). However, over the years, the Ministry has held many meetings with ZACCI, and recently, (since 1995) the Ministry has begun to hold quarterly "dialogue" meetings with ZACCI (see below), ZAM, and the Textile Producers Association. At these meetings, chaired by the Permanent Secretary, issues such as the national budget, tariffs, and other policies are discussed. Private sector representation is also achieved through boards and commissions; for example, the Export Board is a statutory body under the MCTI. Informally, group members are "free to come in to the Ministry with their concerns... we are looking for consultation at every stage, to collect information from interest groups through committees and task forces" (ibid). The Ministry's position was described thus: "Groups are encouraged to put in their ideas, but the final decision is up to government. We try as much as possible to accommodate, but businessmen will always complain. Groups need to know what they want... if they want to work with government, they have to make positive contributions, give specific instructions" (ibid).

From the perspective of groups in the business sector, most report experiencing either an important (50%) or moderate (50%) increase in cooperation with their Ministry as a result of the 1991 transition to multi-party politics (1997 Survey, see Appendix B). ZACCI especially has gained greater formal access to Ministers and their staff; "dialogue meetings" are scheduled (though not always held) every two months with the MCTI, and inter-ministerial meetings with representatives and their staff from multiple Ministries are scheduled quarterly. Present at the most recent of these meetings, held in March 1997, were the Ministers and Permanent Secretaries of Finance and Economic Development, Works and Supply, Local Government and Housing, Commerce Trade and Industry, and Agriculture Food and Fisheries, as well as high-level officials from the National Roads Board and the Ministry of Communications and Transport. None of these meetings, however, are legally mandated, as is the case with the Tripartite Council.

Most important to the labour sector is the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. Formal linkage between labour, employers, and government is attained through the Tripartite Council, discussed above. However, the Ministry reports that it keeps an open door to additional *ad hoc* meetings with unions and employers (interview with Nyambe, 14/2/97). Groups in the labour sector report either an important increase (Mineworkers Union) or "no change" in the level of cooperation they experience with the Ministry since the transition in 1991 (1997 Survey).

*iii) Government Boards and Committees [see Appendix E for partial list]*

Boards and Committees, which allow interest representation from various sectors of society and the economy, seem to be a diverse group of institutions, some stipulated in the original Laws of Zambia, some created by *ad hoc* statutory instruments, some formed at a Ministers whim. Some are well-established, regulated by clear legislation which stipulates election of membership, duties and responsibilities of the Board, etc. An example of this is the Zambia Privatization Board, whose members, once put forth officially by the group they are to represent, are ratified by Parliament. Others are more loosely defined; regulations concerning membership are amorphous (allegations of patronage often surround the assignment members on this type of board), and their function (outside of providing sitting allowances) seems ambiguous. The fact that these bodies do provide sometimes substantial sitting allowances (a sit-in on the ZPA board brings in K300,000) makes assignment to them a hot commodity among members of interest group executive boards.

Of issue is the manner in which group representatives are assigned to the boards, and the extent to which they represent group, rather than individual, interests when they take their seat. ZACCI, for example, chooses representatives to boards and commissions through elections at executive board meetings. The representative is then asked to report to the executive board monthly, and take comments from the executive board back to their board or committee meetings. ZNFU seems to assign members of the secretariat (i.e. full time staff) to these bodies, and requires staff members to relinquish their sitting allowance to the main office.

\*

**2b. Analysis: Policy Lobbying in the Third Republic**

In general, much of the dialogue between groups and government in the Third Republic is left to informal channels of communication, e.g. *ad hoc* meetings with Ministers and their staff, reciprocal invitations to workshops and social functions, informal (i.e. non-statutory) requests to sit on a government board or commission. Where dialogue is institutionalized (e.g. statutory bodies that legally stipulate the right for groups to have representation on boards and commissions, the Tripartite Council in the labour sector, the recently-dissolved ASIP steering committee) more regular representation and advocacy of interests is realized; however, the effectiveness of this advocacy varies, as does the degree to which the advocates represent the collective interest of group members.

**2c. Analysis**

Political liberalization has improved access to the policy process for most groups, while economic reforms have limited some groups' ability to organize and lobby effectively. Groups working against the grain of reform, i.e. the peasant farmer and small-scale businessmen and farmers, have a rougher time of it, not least because the rules through which they once accessed government are gone, and a structured and effective channel for the representation of organized interests remains to be established.

In general, much of the dialogue between groups and government in the Third Republic is left to informal channels of communication. Where dialogue is institutionalized, more regular representation and advocacy of interests is realized; however, the effectiveness of this advocacy varies, as does the degree to which the advocates represent the collective interest of group members. Representation on the boards of public bodies is also emerging as an important channel for access to government decision-making; however, the extent to which individual representatives on these boards are accountable to the broad interests of group members is unclear.

### 3. Interest Groups Currently Active at the National Level

This section provides a descriptive account of economic interest groups currently active in Zambia.<sup>10</sup> *Interest group* refers to any group that, "on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of other forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes" (Truman 1951:33). The focus of this study is on specifically *economic* interest groups, or those groups organized around a special economic interest such as business, agriculture or labour.<sup>11</sup> The focus is limited to functioning associations in Zambia that are open to membership, are voluntary associations, and are concerned with lobbying government on economic policy at the national level, either directly or through an apex organization.

Of primary interest in this section are the "apex" or "umbrella" associations which aggregate the groups in different economic sectors and represent member groups at the national level. This category includes the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), and Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM)<sup>12</sup>; the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), and the Zambia National Farmer's Union (ZNFU), the Peasant Farmer's Union (PFU), and the National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers (NAPSSF); the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE).

### 3a. The Business Sector

#### 1. *Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI)*

The first Chamber of Commerce in Zambia, the Lusaka Chamber, was founded in 1933. Other chambers formed in various industrial and commercial centers in the country, until in 1938 the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCOM) was formed as an umbrella organization to coordinate activities between the local chambers. ASCOM was reborn as the Commercial and Industrial Association of Northern Rhodesia (COMINOR) in 1957, and yet again reborn in 1964 as the Zambian Industrial and Commercial Association (ZINCOM). In 1989 the organization changed its name again to Zambia Confederation of Industries and Chambers of Commerce (ZNICC), and again to its present appellation, Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), in 1992.

The change in 1992 was more than just a name change; it marked a fundamental shift in the organizations' mission and perception of itself. As published in the *Zambia Industrial and Commercial Directory of 1988*, ZINCOM's main function was to "keep members informed of developments likely to affect their businesses and to bring their attention to opportunities and threats in the Zambian environment." ZINCOM also represented the business community on Government bodies, such as the Management Services Board, the Prices and Incomes Commission, the Zambia Bureau of Standards, and the Foreign Exchange Committee. In keeping with government's policy during the Second Republic to closely monitor and regulate the activities of groups in the civil sector, ZINCOM was principally involved with transmitting government's requirements of the business sector to the business sector-- essentially a one-way conduit.

The transformation of representative institutions in 1991 (see previous section) resulted in a new organization with a new mission. Rather than representing government to the business sector, ZACCI pledged to coordinate the representation of business interests to government: "ZACCI is a national body representing the interests of the private sector in Zambia whose mission is the promotion and development of trade, commerce and industry" (Businessline, March 1996, VI, No.1). ZACCI now sees its function as a *partner* in dialogue with Government, a representative to government *on behalf* of its members' interests. Currently, ZACCI employs an economist to draft position papers advising government on the business sector's policy preferences, as determined by annual reports from and informal surveys of ZACCI members. Also, formal meetings with government are scheduled throughout the year, including bi-monthly "dialogue" meetings with the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, and quarterly "interministerial" meetings meant to bring together representatives from several ministries involved in policy areas of interest to ZACCI members.

An association comprised (as of March 1997) of six local chambers, 27 corporate members, and 6 trade affiliates, ZACCI's organizational needs have grown significantly over the past five years. During 1996 alone, ZACCI's membership increased by 20%, with chambers increasing from 3 to 6, and corporate members from 15 to 22. Currently, there are now a total of 7 chambers (with the addition of Livingstone in 1997). The Secretariat expanded from 2 to 7 positions, and is currently made up of professional staff positions including a Chief Executive, Chief Economist, Coordinator for Trade and Consultancy, Information Analyst, Small Business Development Officer, Accounts and Administrative Officer and Secretary. Five of these positions are supported by international donors (FES, GTZ, and UNIDO) and two are supported by ZACCI.

ZACCI's executive board is currently dominated by multi-national corporations and large-scale industry. Though the six local chambers contributed 288 (as of 1996) local enterprises to the membership while there were only 22 corporate members, all 22 corporate members sat on the executive board, while the 288 local members had only 6 representatives on the board. Although a current draft of the "aims and objectives" of ZACCI includes the increase of membership as an objective, no measures are presently in place to encourage the increase of small and medium-scale industries as members.

However, support for small and medium-scale enterprises (SME's) is a popular project-area for donor investment, current examples being USAID's HRDA program and UNIDO's SME Support Programme for Africa.


Services provided by ZACCI to its members include: business consultancy services (provided on a fee-for-service basis); secretarial services; access to a database of member's products and services; information on imports, exports, and other business opportunities; training programs; trade exhibitions; and trade and business publications; including Profit Magazine and Businessline. ZACCI provides no commercial services, such as discounts on consumer goods or low-cost insurance, no legal services, and no assistance with licensing, accreditation or codes development.

At present, ZACCI relies somewhat on international donor funding for financial support: during the last fiscal year (i.e. 1996), international donors contributed 19% while membership dues contributed 52%, and interest from cash balances contributed 22% of total revenue. International donors supporting ZACCI include Frederick Ebert Stiftung (FES), German T. Z. (GTZ), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and USAID (United States Agency for International Development). Most of these funds do not contribute to the general revenue, however, as they are granted on a project-specific basis. ZACCI's cash income is primarily generated by capitation fees from members and trade associations, and cash expenditures are primarily to administrative salaries and office expenses. The organization receives no financial support from government.


ZACCI interacts with both local and national government bodies in pursuit of its policy objectives, often with members of parliament, sometimes with ministers or their staff and local government representatives, and seldom with Presidential or State House staff. The organization reports that it is regularly consulted by government agencies, primarily over budget, legislative and economic policy issues. Media and political parties are never consulted by ZACCI, though other organizations and individual experts sometimes are. Policy influence strategies include working with government on policy formulation and implementation, working to influence public opinion through publicity and the media (though it is interesting to note that only 4% of budget expenditures go to advertising), and occasionally pursuing issues through litigation in the courts. ZACCI does not contribute to the election campaigns of politicians, nor does it organize public demonstrations.

There are four main policy areas currently of interest to ZACCI: V.A.T. provisions, duty rates, income tax, and commodity classification issues. According to a submission to the Chief Revenue Inspector concerning government's 1996 annual budget, ZACCI wanted to see a V.A.T. of 15%, V.A.T. on Zamtel bills offset against an output tax, V.A.T. exemption of certain holders of investment licenses. On duty rates, ZACCI requested a uniform 10% duty on imports and the abolition of all exemptions. On income tax, ZACCI advocated taxing all fringe benefits while increasing the tax credit, broadening the tax bands, and extending tax rates downwards to 5%, along with index linking to insulate income tax from inflation. ZACCI reached these policy positions by requesting submissions from all members and reconciling them into one joint submission. Where members disagreed over a position, ZACCI adopted the position held by the most members (interview, Mr. Simemba, 25 October 1996).

# ZACCI... at a glance




Total Membership




Chambers (x10)  
Corporates

Revenues, 1996




Expenditures, 1996




# ZACCI... at a glance


## Benefits Provided




## Lobbying Strategies



## Interaction with Government



## Policy Consultation



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### 3a. The Business Sector

#### 2. *Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM)*

The Zambia Association of Manufacturers is a much newer organization than ZACCI, having only been founded in the mid 1980's. During the transition period in the early 1990's, ZAM endorsed political and economic liberalization, and the promotion of a free market economy. Following the 1991 elections, the organization experienced what O'Donnell (present executive director) describes as "a degree of openness," and a period in which government was "one thousand times more open to policy concerns." However, since 1994, ZAM has found the environment less conducive to their interests; while politicians continue to be somewhat attentive, ZAM has found the civil service a "stumbling block," "unreceptive" to the needs of the manufacturing sector. Particularly on the government boards and commissions on which ZAM is allowed a representative, the organization feels it is "steamrolled" by large contingents of civil service staff who ignore input from the private sector and sometimes even personally attack individuals active in that sector (interview, O'Donnell, 4 November 1996).

ZAM's raison d'etre is to lobby for a better environment in which to operate, while promoting the interests of the manufacturing sector. ZAM has chosen a decidedly streamlined organizational structure to pursue this objective: there are several elected positions (Chairman, Vice Chairman, Sector Chairmen, and Treasurer) who serve the organization as unpaid volunteers, but there is no secretariat or permanent staff. When a meeting is held, the economist from ZACCI is asked to attend (secretarial services being one of the benefits offered to members), take minutes, and write any reports or correspondence necessary (a sub-contractor in Ndola is also occasionally hired to draft correspondence). This allows ZAM to focus resources on lobbying: according to O'Donnell, "all we are and attempt to do is lobby. We have a definite focus, we don't waste time on a secretariat and research department, that's why we're successful."


As of April 1997, ZAM has approximately 120 members, all of which are organizations or their representatives. ZAM's membership receives only two benefits for their dues: a voice in ZAM's policy advocacy efforts, and the monthly newsletter, "ZAM News." Again to quote O'Donnell, "if you want to make more money, you'll want to affect policy. If the environment is wrong, then join ZAM and change it." However, membership in ZAM is not for the small fish: if an enterprise desires membership, it must have the capacity to pay the K600,000 (K500,000 flat rate dues + K100,000 V.A.T.) necessary to join. As O'Donnell puts it: "if you can't pay, we're not interested in what you have to say. We don't recruit members, members come to us." Financial support for ZAM's lobbying activities is generated entirely by members' dues, and the interest that is earned on cash balances resulting from those dues. No donor aid is given or solicited. In 1996, ZAM reports a total revenue of K30,000,000. Expenditures go to advertising, publications, and meetings.

In promoting their policy objectives, ZAM utilizes several lobbying strategies. Of primary importance to ZAM is the use of the press-- taking out paid advertisements, submitting articles, and issuing press statements. This strategy proved fruitful in 1993 when the organization took out a series of advertisements in the *Times of Zambia* declaring its members' preferences for the tariff structure in the government's budget for that year. After running several of these ads and provoking the government's displeasure, the *Times* refused to carry further advertisements, and ZAM switched the campaign to *The Post*. In the end, they got the attention they were looking for: President Chiluba came to that year's Annual General Meeting, after which O'Donnell reports they received a "greater degree of respect" from government.

Representatives of ZAM also meet frequently with government Ministers and Members of Parliament, and ZAM holds formal sector dialogue meetings once a month. Such meetings don't cross ministerial boundaries, however, and ZAM would like to see interministerial meetings institutionalized-- specifically by having the World Bank "incentivize" the need for government to meet with the private sector. ZAM has no legal department, and rarely pursues issues through litigation in the courts. According to O'Donnell: "we don't believe that lawyers achieve anything-- the system prevents it... It's a waste of money." ZAM also does not support the election campaigns of politicians. Not coincidentally, ZAM's central policy concerns mirror that of ZACCI; the organization makes direct submissions to the MoF each year (circumventing ZACCI), outlining its positions on VAT, duties, and income tax.

# ZAM... at a glance


## Membership Levels




Total Membership

numbers not exact  
ZAM reports "steady membership levels"


## Revenues and Expenditures, 1996



## Revenues, 1996




## Expenditures, 1996




# ZAM... at a glance


## Benefits Provided




## Lobbying Strategies



## Interaction with Government



## Policy Consultation



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### 3b. The Agricultural Sector

#### 1. *Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF)*

ZCF was formed in 1973 as a federal cooperative society to coordinate the activities of local primary cooperatives. The primary cooperatives have a much lengthier history, the first cooperative, the North-West Rhodesia Farmers' Cooperative Society Limited, having been registered in 1914. As an apex organization, ZCF gained prominence in the mid- 1970's, resulting in a move by the ruling party to coopt the organization and affiliate it to the party as a "mass organization." UNIP's argument was that affiliation would give ZCF an opportunity to influence policy decisions when they were drafted in the Central Committee. However, the price paid was the loss of autonomy: while ZCF was granted only one out of 25 seats on the Committee, the organization was obliged to abide by all Committee decisions.

During the 1980's, ZCF grew exponentially as increasing responsibilities in the agricultural sector were assigned to it by the UNIP government: Provincial Cooperative Unions (PCU's) were formed in every province, regardless of their viability and the drain on ZCF resources; NAMBOARD was liquidated and all of its functions transferred to ZCF, including the transfer of all rural marketing depots to ZCF's member Primary Cooperative Societies; District Cooperative Unions (DCU's) were formed in any district producing a specified amount of maize, essentially to carry out agricultural marketing activities already assigned to the PCU's, thus draining resources further and creating an additional level of bureaucracy. Government's plan was for primary societies to provide credit, and DCUs and PCUs to provide marketing opportunities, all closely monitored by government officials. Hence, before 1991, government gave pronouncements which dictated projects and plans to the cooperatives, allowing no negotiation. The Department of Marketing and Cooperatives, within the Department of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries, signed the checks for fund disbursement to the cooperatives, and sent an official to all meetings that were held (Nakaponda-Sakala, 1997). Importantly, these developments were the result of government directives, resulting in the feeling among cooperative members and the public that cooperatives were owned and operated by the government, and obligated to provide resources to members (Nakaponda-Sakala 1996:8-9).

With the advent of multi-party politics and economic liberalization in 1991, the cooperatives deaffiliated from UNIP and sought establishment as an autonomous and independent movement. Principal among the changes is a desire to move away from top-down directives issued from government under the Cooperative Societies Act of 1970, and toward genuine, member-based cooperative institutions. ZCF recognizes that while the "dependency syndrome" associated with the cooperative movement during the Second Republic was workable because government provided a continuous source of funding, it is no longer sustainable in the current liberalized market economy. Thus, a whole-scale revamping of the movement and its organizations is required. To this end, ZCF's current objectives are: to have the Cooperative Societies Act amended and a new cooperative policy put in place; to promote member-driven cooperatives that are strong, independent and viable; and to promote a positive public image for the cooperative movement (Zambia Cooperative Federation, 1997:3). Where its member cooperatives are concerned, ZCF has several goals: the coordination of cooperative development work, acting as spokesman for and representative of the cooperative community, lobbying government on cooperatives' behalf, and identifying and locating resources accessible to members.

ZCF maintains a relatively complex organizational structure, most of which is a hold-over from the days of the Second Republic. At the head of the organization is the Board of Directors (comprised of a President, Vice-President, and Treasurer) which oversees a permanent staff of five department heads (including a managing director, controller, accountant, auditor, and development coordinator). Alongside the departments, ZCF maintains four service subsidiaries: finance services, insurance services, accounting services and properties. Underneath the board of directors operates the Provincial Cooperative Unions, under which are the District Cooperative Unions, under which are the Primary Cooperatives, under which are the individual shareholders in the cooperatives. It is a weighty

administrative task to manage such an organization (there are a total of 76 permanent staff members, representing a sharp drop in numbers compared to previous years... almost 100 employees lost their jobs in April 1996 alone)-- and expensive; 1996 expenditures totalled nearly K3 billion, 80% of which went to staff salaries and office expenses.


Unlike most other interest groups in Zambia at present, ZCF's revenues come primarily from its commercial activities; less than one percent is collected from membership dues. One percent of total revenues comes from grants from international donor agencies, including NORAD, the Finnish Volunteer Service, GTZ and others. Prior to August 1996, the Swedish Cooperative Center contributed substantial sums to the organization; however, in May 1996 the SCC announced the withdrawal of over K600 million from the Cooperative Development Programme it had jointly operated with ZCF, citing a failure by ZCF to fulfill its obligations as a compelling factor. Instead, SCC began a new development support programme meant to strengthen organizations created and run by small-holder farmers (with a special focus on women's groups), by working with different collaborating partners including the ZNFU. It was a sore blow to ZCF finances, however, which subsequently ran a K300 million deficit in 1996. ZCF was dealt a further blow the same year when Government announced the transfer of all former NAMBOARD assets from ZCF to the Food Reserve Agency, leaving NAMBOARD's liabilities with ZCF.

Officially, there are 950 Primary Societies who are members of ZCF. However, since the cessation of government support, many of these local cooperatives have ceased activities, and exist in name only. One of ZCF's primary goals in the Third Republic is to retrain cooperative members (through a country-wide campaign), about the new benefits and expectations of cooperative membership in a liberalized setting, and to restart local cooperatives on a more sustainable basis. However, while services such as insurance and finance are still available to ZCF members, they are now obtainable only on a commercial basis and are no longer subsidized by government. Members do still enjoy a discount on consumer goods. At present, services offered to members include: a training department that offers instruction in cooperative awareness training (meant to teach members how the new cooperative movement operates); a development department which links members with institutions offering resources and grants, and helps them with writing proposals to request funds and support; the Seed Multiplication Project, a crop diversification project aimed at women's sub-groups; and representation to government through ZCF's ongoing lobbying efforts.

ZCF's main strategy for policy influence is the holding of seminars, workshops and meetings, with invitations to government officials (however, the last meeting planned, a workshop meant to dialogue with government on the drafting of the new Cooperative Act, was indefinitely postponed when the MP's who were to be invited could not schedule ZCF onto their calendar before Parliament adjourned). ZCF also reports that aid to election campaigns for political leaders is a very important activity, as is carrying out demonstrations or protests. Occasionally, ad hoc meetings are obtained with the Ministry of Finance and the President, and proposals are sometimes sent to government, also on an ad hoc basis. ZCF does not engage in the direct lobbying of Parliament, although there is a perception that the organization holds some influence with that body given that the current president of ZCF, Mr. Benny Tetamachimba, is also MP for Solwezi West. ZCF holds no positions on government committees, and is only represented on one government board-- the Economic Advisory Board. Press releases and paid advertisements are rarely used to gain government or public attention. ZCF previously had a lawyer on staff to assist with litigation and provide legal services to members, but has recently had to let the position go when a competitive salary could no longer be paid. ZCF's policy concerns are primarily centered around the drafting of the new Cooperative Act; specifically they want to see government involvement in the cooperative movement abolished in favor of the establishment of private cooperatives.

# ZCF... at a glance


membership figures not available




Total Membership




Revenues and Expenditures



Revenues, 1996




Expenditures, 1996




20A

# ZCF... at a glance


## Benefits Provided




## Lobbying Strategies



## Interaction with Government



## Policy Consultation



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### 3b. The Agricultural Sector

#### 2. *Zambia National Farmer's Union (ZNFU)*

Zambia National Farmer's Union was founded in 1904 by farmers in Zambia's Eastern Province. During the Second Republic, while not coopted by government in the same way the trade unions and cooperatives were, ZNFU was a fixture in government's control of the command economy; for example, it coordinated the government's single channel market system (and was thereby able to collect levies on production from its members), it was responsible for negotiating with government on farmers' behalf in the fixing of agricultural prices, and membership in the organization was necessary to obtain foreign exchange. Since the political and economic changes of 1991, this relationship has changed, with several important consequences for membership incentives and the Union's relationship to government. In general, the group has become primarily a private-sector lobbyist for agricultural policies beneficial to its members, seeking to "improve the profitability of farming and to improve the agricultural environment in which farmers operate," as well as continuing to be a provider of technical information and coordination. As to its new relationship with government in the Third Republic, ZNFU leadership reports that it has a much larger role in lobbying for agricultural policy than it was allowed before, and that it has experienced a greater willingness from government to dialogue, though no actual increase in influence.

ZNFU maintains a complex organizational structure. A Board of Directors comprised of a President, Vice President, Treasurer, and several Directors, is served by a secretariat in Lusaka made up of an executive director, an assistant executive director, a national coordinator, an economist, an accountant, a statistics clerk, and secretarial staff. In total, ZNFU supports a permanent staff of 28. The Central Council is the next layer of administration, and is comprised of representatives of all affiliated organization, farmers' associations and corporate members. The Board is responsible for formulating policy, making recommendations to the Council, and implementing resolutions of the Council. Council meets once a year at the annual Congress. Below the Council are Commodity Committees and Farmers' Associations. Farmers' Associations elect a chairman, vice-chairman, treasurer, and anywhere from one to ten commodity representatives.

35 farmer associations representing over 4,500 farmers, fifteen corporate members and ten affiliated organizations, make up the Union's membership. Previously, the Union has been seen primarily as a representative of commercial farmer interests, but recently it has made serious endeavors to change this image and encourage the membership of small-scale and peasant farmers. To this end, in 1994 the Union amended its constitution to enable it to accept donor funding, recognizing that in order to increase membership in the small-scale farming sector, the range of services offered to members would have to be expanded to include services needed by small-scale farmers. These were perceived to include the provision of education, market information, training and advice-- all with the purpose of integrating small farmers into the Union. Such an exercise was projected to incur extra costs not entirely sustainable by the Union; thus ZNFU commenced to seek project-based support from international donors to expand its services to and representation of small-scale agriculture (at present, such funding makes up about 40% of total financial support).

Recognizing that small-scale farmers faced two distinct obstacles to membership in the Union-- lack of literacy and English-language skills, and capacity to pay the individual subscription fee of 20,000 plus 0.5% of annual turnover-- ZNFU also changed its membership categories to accommodate the needs of the small farmer. "Club membership" requires a group of farmers to organize themselves into a club and elect a club representative to attend farmer's association meetings in their area. The club must have ten members, each of whom pay K5,000 a year. One member of the club must have a post office box so that the monthly magazine and other correspondence can be sent to the club.

Also to encourage an increase in small-scale membership, the Union initiated employment of "District Coordinators," whose task it is to identify groups of farmers already actively operating together

(or alternatively to stimulate the formation of such groups) and to integrate them into the Union structure by providing technical information and assistance, helping them to plan grassroots projects and draft proposals to send to appropriate bodies, and monitoring for fraud and other security risks. The goal of the exercise is to form groups composed of active members, as opposed to passive recipients, in the scheme.

ZNFU offers a wide variety of benefits to its members. First and foremost is the lobbying of government on behalf of farmers' interests, and promoting the representation of farmers at the national level. Along with this function, however, ZNFU also provides a number of services, including: marketing information (provided through the National Agricultural Commodity Exchange) and marketing assistance (promoted through the establishment of over 20 farmer-owned marketing companies); technical assistance (provided through extension services, "open days," and technical seminars); financial assistance (in the form of information about funding sources) and security assistance (to protect members from criminals and unscrupulous traders and to represent them in land title, inheritance, and debt disputes). Members also receive the monthly publication, *The Farmer*, as well as occasional notices and newsletters. Also, ZNFU provides legal representation to its members. No commercial operations, or direct material benefits, however, are offered to members.


ZNFU currently receives operating funds from three sources: membership fees, corporate member subscriptions, and association subscriptions. In addition, the Union receives funds from special projects, including the separate business venture of the monthly magazine, *The Farmer*, and such projects as the importation of vehicles for members, and the sale of T-shirts and related items. ZNFU's total revenues in 1996 amounted to almost K400 million, most of which was spent on (in declining order of percentage of total expenditure): staff salaries, meetings and seminars, traveling allowances (the President and National Coordinator regularly travel to the rural associations, and all association representatives are provided transportation to Lusaka for the Annual Congress), legal fees, publications, advertising and office expenses. Since 1994, the Union has received international donor aid on a project basis. One such project seeks to establish satellite offices in the provinces to support the activities of District Coordinators (described above); at present, ZNFU has established offices in Kabwe and Mpongwe, Kabompa, Katete, Choma and Mpushi, with aid from the European Union, GTZ, IFAP, and the Swedish Cooperative Center. Another project involved a grant from the Japanese government for \$1 million to purchase vehicles, which were sold to members at a fair market price on a credit basis; while another project involved a short-term grant from USAID to the Agricultural Commodity Exchange. In attempting to further secure financial support, ZNFU primarily looks to increasing its membership, and secondarily to contacting potential international and private donors.

The Farmers' Union interacts with government on both the national and local level in pursuit of its policy goals. At the national level, the Union interacts most with Ministries and their staff, although leadership feels that relations with the Ministries is variable, depending on the personality of the particular office holder. The Union occasionally lobbies Parliament, scheduling meetings with MPs or taking them to lunch; and infrequently attempts to communicate with State House (although there has not been any meetings held with that office during the past four years). ZNFU has also attempted to influence policy in the agricultural sector through representation in the Agricultural Sector Investment Program (ASIP). The Union reports that it seldom attempts to influence government through use of the press and media, that it finds the pursuit of policy issues through litigation not very useful, and that it never consults with or lobbies political parties, or aids the election campaigns of politicians.


ZNFU is currently concerned with several policy areas, including agricultural policy, the annual budget, and fiscal policy. In support of market liberalization, the Union objects to the continuing manipulations of government in the agricultural sector, evidenced by the following two situations: in the first, a large quantity of maize was taken from the strategic reserve, milled in the Copperbelt, and dumped on the market to depress prices last season (coinciding with the holding of government elections); in the second, Government refused to allow the export of maize during the first 40 days of the season. Also currently important to the Union is agricultural trade policy and the development of export

markets, and security of land tenure. In its 1996 budget proposal, ZNFU made recommendations on taxes (V.A.T., income, corporate and livestock), levies (fuel), and import and export duties. On fiscal policy, the Union is principally concerned with the lack of credit available to the agricultural sector; while it does not advocate a return to government-sponsored credit, it does want to see the Agricultural Credit Act "tightened up," and Government to encourage commercial banks to change their conservative approach to agricultural lending.


# ZNFU... at a glance




Total Membership



Revenues, 1996




Expenditures, 1996




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# ZNFU... at a glance


## Benefits Provided




## Lobbying Strategies



## Interaction with Government



## Policy Consultation



### 3b. The Agricultural Sector

#### 3. *The Peasant Farmers' Union*

The Peasant Farmers' Union was recently founded in 1995, to address the

"need to have a common voice on the improvement of our rural infrastructure, social and economic life in villages, (and to) remove the impediments to Agriculture growth or development in order to improve our systems of productions, on- Farm Storage, Transport and Marketing, through the use of our family labour, capital and land which is our natural heritage" (PFU Constitution, Preamble).

The PFU seems to have been formed in reaction to perceived shortcomings of the ZNFU. According to PFU President Kayeka, it was felt that the ZNFU didn't want to "sensitize" rural farmers to belong to a farmers' trade union, and that ZNFU representation was restricted to commercial farmers. Thus, when donor grants were channeled through the ZNFU, they reached only commercial farmers, and not farmers in the more remote areas. Unlike peasant farmers, commercial farmers are well-informed, have sustainable storage facilities, and they know production economics. "So our grievances and the grievances of the commercial farmers are not the same. We have no storage facilities, our farmers grow crops in darkness. Farmers in rural areas need to be educated on primary health-care, good food, good water, sanitation, recreational facilities, which commercial farmers already have... We must fight for overall quality of life. We are a trade union. We represent farmers as a trade union." (interview Kayeka 26/6/97).

In its targeting of peasant farmers, the PFU seeks to fill the gap left by the demise of the cooperative societies at the local level. Their approach is to promote the understanding of farming *as an industry*: "we tell our members that farming is an industry, a business, just like mining is an industry. We tell our farmers we are no different from the miners," hence, the approach of the PFU to represent its members as a *union* (interview Kayeka 26/6/97). "Production" activities of the Union are centered at the village level, where PFU claims to have 369 operating associations, mostly comprised of former cooperative members. These activities primarily involve accessing credit as a group; farmers share the subsequent inputs and pay back loans as a group, but farm individually. The Union targets its representative or "voice" function at the district level; at present, it reports active involvement in 25 of the 63 designated agricultural districts, where it actively seeks to influence District Agricultural Committees. Activities at this level involve the formation of marketing cartels and the sourcing of funds and inputs for members. At the national level, the organization seeks to alert its members to important legislation and policy concerns, to gain consultation with government, and to source donor funding.

The PFU maintains a moderate organizational structure, made up entirely of voluntary, part-time positions. A Board of Directors functions as the policy-making body and is made up of a president, two vice-presidents, a general secretary, two board members, two trustees, and directors of finance, youth and women's clubs, publicity and information, business development. Each province has one Provincial Coordinator (PC). In each of the 25 districts where the Union is presently active, there is a District Coordinating Committee (DCC) comprised of ten voluntary members. Each village association has an executive committee, and its own constitution. The DCC's are elected by a committee comprised of two representatives from each village association, while the PC's are elected by a committee comprised of two representatives from each DCC. The national leadership is elected on a three year term of office, from an electoral college comprised of the Board of Directors, the nine PC's, and the chairman and secretary of all DCC's.

The PFU offers several benefits to its members. It assists in the sourcing of credit and agricultural inputs, and acts as an agent for producers and distributors of farm inputs such as livestock, agrochemicals, and other agriculturally-related needs of the farmer. Members pay an annual subscription of K20,000, of which K12,000 is sent to the national office, and K8,000 is kept at the district level. Currently, the national office reports "serious financial problems" due to the fact that its only source of

funding are the membership subscriptions, and these are not adequate to sustain organizational activities. Total revenue for 1996 was K33 million, of which 31,965,000 was allocated to the following expenditures: staff salaries (10%), office expenses (26%), legal fees (2%), traveling allowances (18%), and meetings and other group functions (36%).<sup>13</sup> No expenditures were made on publications or advertising. The PFU currently considers the following activities important in securing financial support: contacting international and private donors, applying for grants or contracts from government, and making efforts to increase membership.


PFU interacts with government sometimes at the national level, and often at the local level. At the national level, the Union consults with Ministries and Parliament, reporting a moderate increase over the past two years in cooperation with these two branches, but an important decrease or lack of cooperation with the Presidents Office and the Judiciary. At the local level, the Union interacts with local councils and the District Agricultural Office of the Ministry of Agriculture, and reports a moderate increase in cooperation with the local councils. The PFU reports that it considers working with government agencies in policy formulation and implementation to be the most important activity in achieving policy goals, while pursuing litigation in the courts, influencing public opinion through publicity and the media and organizing or carrying out public demonstrations or protests to also be important. The Union does not find aiding the election campaigns of political leaders to be an important strategy.

When asked about policy interests during interviews, group leaders of the PFU did not mention any specific policy positions. They did report that they want to be consulted by the Ministry and "allowed to contribute," that they tell their members to go to District Agricultural Committee meetings and "protect the interests of their members," and that their central policy objective is to meet the PFU constitutional requirement to source inputs for their members. Apparently, they plan to compile a "policy program" next year, since they are presently focused on ensuring that members get their inputs for the 1997-98 season.

When provided with close-ended-response queries on the 1997 survey instrument, however, the PFU indicated that it does have interest in several policy areas including agriculture, international trade, employment and wage issues, civil rights, education and transportation. In most of these policy areas, the Union would like to see increased levels of government services provided and increased levels of government regulation. The Union reports that when it formulates position on policy issues, it consults with members of parliament or their staff, ministers or their staff, and local government representatives, as well as Union members and the media; however, it also reports that the Union is not regularly consulted by government agencies when new legislation or changes in policy are being considered. Hence, lines of communication between the PFU and government appear to be unilateral-- the Union is left to initiate what policy dialogue exists.

# PFU... at a glance


## Membership Levels




Total Membership




## Revenues and Expenditures, 1996



## Revenues, 1996




## Expenditures, 1996




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# PFU... at a glance


## Benefits Provided




## Lobbying Strategies



## Interaction with Government



## Policy Consultation



25-6

### 3b. The Agricultural Sector

#### 4. *The National Association for Peasants and Small-scale Farmers of Zambia*

The National Association for Peasants and Small-scale Farmers of Zambia was also recently founded, in 1989, to represent the interests of peasant small-scale farmers (referred to hereafter as small farmers). It was felt at the time that the Commercial Farmers' Bureau (precursor of ZNFU) didn't cater to the needs of peasant farmers, and that a separate organization was needed. In 1991, the ZNFU moved to change this perception (see ZNFU profile), and approached the NAPSSF to negotiate a merger between the two organizations. The latter refused, believing the management style of the ZNFU to be inappropriate to the needs of their members; specifically, they felt that the ZNFU's member fee of 1% of annual turnover was not appropriate for small farmers who have no record-keeping capacity. At present, they maintain that there still exists a need for a separate association for representation of small farmers, but that a merger between themselves and the ZNFU might be possible in the future. According to General Secretary Jones Haachiinda:

"in the rural areas, there are elites who understand ZNFU management. But there are others who don't. As of now the reach of the association is not to all corners. We should merge when we've developed our links to the sector we're interested in. With competition, we'll capture all members" (interview, Haachiinda, 23 June 1997).

The PFU has also approached NAPSSF to merge with its organization, but again, Haachiinda reports the management styles of the two organizations are different; for example, the President of the PFU didn't want to elect leaders of a merged association, but to "go by tradition" and assign the oldest members to the top positions-- which would mean that the PFU president became the president of a combined association. Also, NAPSSF doesn't want to get involved in the PFU's pledge of providing fertilizer and credit inputs to its members: "we won't make false promises... we don't want to toe the appeasement line." Finally, the NAPSSF disagreed with the PFU's plan to encourage its members to invest in the recently collapsed Lima Bank in order to make it solvent again.

The NAPSSF sees its role as "monitoring Government's performance, policy, and contribution... it is also a link between Government and the farmers... it lobbies for policies that are enabling to the interests of members" (NAPSSF, Haachiinda, 1997). The association also seeks to provide education to its members concerning the new market economy and the importance of loan repayment.

Currently, the NAPSSF has a total of 5000 members, organized into 49 centers at the village level. Each center has a chairman, a secretary, a treasurer, and 4 other committee members, all of whom provide voluntary services. District level organizations (District Executive Committees) have been formed in 15 of the 66 agricultural districts, and again are operated by a volunteer leadership. The Association plans to eventually organize provincial level organizations as well. The National Committee is comprised of 10 members: an elected General Secretary, an elected President, and an appointed National Coordinator which are full-time paid positions; and seven volunteer positions including a secretary for finance, a secretary for farmers' education, a secretary for research, a projects manager, a women promoter, and a youth promoter. The Committee coordinates the village and district level organizations, and meets every three months, or as needed.

Benefits offered to members of the NAPSSF include: advice on legal matters, a voice to express member problems to the appropriate Minister, and information on marketing opportunities. Members pay an annual subscription of K5,000 - K10,000, of which 60% is sent to the head office, and 40% is kept at the local level. As membership stands currently at 5,000 individual members, membership fees are not enough to support operational activities; office expenses are currently supported by a private patron, but salaries to the full-time members of the National Committee have not been paid for months. The NAPSSF has requested funds from government (to no avail) and currently does not receive any donor aid. Total revenue for the Association in 1996 was K2.8 million, with K2.4 million of this going

to office expenses (25%), travelling allowances (15%), and meetings or group functions (60%). No expenditures were made on staff salaries, advertising, legal fees, or publications.


NAPSSF interacts sometimes with national government and often with local government. At the national level, the Association consults with the Ministries and Parliament, reporting an important increase over the past five years in cooperation with these two branches, but a lack of cooperation with the President's Office and Judiciary. In lobbying government, the General Secretary of the Association communicates first with members, and then transmits their demands to the Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, or their staffs. Access to Parliament is increasing; the Association has delivered an advisory paper at Parliament's request, and it was represented (along with the ZNFU, the PFU, and the ZCF) on a Parliamentary select committee on Agriculture, Lands, and Cooperatives on two occasions this year. At the local level, the Association interacts with local councils, and reports an important increase in cooperation over the past five years with these bodies as well.

The NAPSSF reports that working with government agencies in policy formulation and implementation is the most important activity in achieving policy goals, while influencing public opinion through publicity and the media is somewhat important. Pursuing issues through litigation in the courts, aiding the election campaigns of political leaders, and organizing or carrying out public demonstrations or protests are not generally important lobbying strategies for the NAPSSF. However, the Association recently sued Lima Bank for not giving government-mandated debt relief to small-scale farmers and instead grabbing their land for non-payment. In the end, the Association was successful in the suit and the farmers were given back their land.

The NAPSSF is interested in the policy areas of economic development, agriculture, international trade, education, and transportation. Specifically, they want to see the development of lending institutions that offer rates lower than current commercial banks, and target funding to agricultural investments such as irrigation systems; improved agricultural extension services that encourage non-traditional crops; and the facilitation of marketing and export arrangements through improvements to road infrastructure. The Association reports that it is "comfortable with private initiative," but where government and donor aid is needed, for example in the facilitation of agricultural inputs to the rural areas, assistance should be channeled through local associations for delivery to individuals, so as to ensure loan repayment. "We're good at this, we keep costs down, and use peer pressure to get the loans repaid" (ibid).


When formulating positions on governmental affairs, the Association always consults its members and individual experts, sometimes consults other organizations, and seldom or never consults national or local government representatives, its private patron, or international donors. However, the Association reports that it is regularly consulted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries when the Ministry considers policy issues such as agricultural financing, credit delivery and marketing. The Association does not make formal submissions to MAFF, but instead raises its concerns at different fora (workshops, symposiums, etc), where MAFF officials are represented.

# NAPSSF... *at a glance*




Total Membership


Revenues and Expenditures, 1996



Revenues, 1996




Expenditures, 1996




# NAPSSF... at a glance


## Benefits Provided




## Lobbying Strategies



## Interaction with Government



## Policy Consultation



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### 3c. The Labour Lobby

#### 1. *Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)*

The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions was founded in 1965, when its forerunner, the Northern Rhodesia United Trade Union Congress was dissolved and the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance was amended. The new law provided for obligatory affiliation to the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions of any trade union formed in the Republic of Zambia. This provision was withheld when the Industrial Relations Act was enacted in 1971, so that ZCTU remains until this day the only legal apex organization which individual trade unions can join.

One of the most important reasons behind the workers' support of a change in government in 1991 was the desire to improve their economic status; their expectations were therefore very high when the MMD assumed office in 1991 ("Report of the Secretary General to the 9th Quadrennial Congress"). With the MMD government's rapid adoption of the structural adjustment program, however, workers found their economic position instead adversely affected in the short term. This, together with formal institutional changes the MMD government has made with regard to the trade union movement, has made workers and their representatives increasingly pessimistic about the political and economic changes of 1991.

The official functions of ZCTU are as follows: to bargain with the government on all national matters affecting workers, especially as they relate to policy and legislation; to exercise control over national unions as per the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act and to provide necessary assistance for effective organization and administration; to participate in national affairs of the country; and to represent the working people of Zambia in international workers' fora. To fulfill these objectives, ZCTU engages in several activities, including education and training, research, promotion of co-operatives, international relations, information and publicity, and the lobbying of government on behalf of workers' interests.

ZCTU's organizational structure reflects the complexity of its representational functions, for not only is it charged with the task of lobbying government, but it also plays an important (and resource-consuming) institutional role in industrial relations between workers and industry. 22 unions are currently affiliated to the Congress, comprising its basic membership. The top-most organ of the Congress is the Quadrennial Congress, comprised of members of the Executive Committee and delegates from the affiliated national unions, whose numbers are decided according to membership in the union (a number not to exceed 28). The Quadrennial Congress (QC) meets once every four years. It enunciates policy, elects the Executive, and approves changes to the Constitution. The General Council has almost the same functions and make-up of the QC, but it meets twice a year. The Executive Committee is comprised of the Executive (eight elected officials) and one representative (general secretary) from each of the affiliates; its function is to direct the affairs of the Congress between the General Council meetings. The Secretariat is comprised of 23 full-time permanent staff, delegated to the departments of administration, education and training, research, co-operatives, organizations and international relations, and information and publicity.

As stipulated in the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, all trade unions must affiliate to the Congress upon registration of the union. The 1993 Industrial Relations Act modifies this provision: currently, membership in ZCTU is voluntary, but ZCTU is the only recognized "social partner" to represent the labour sector in the Tri-Partite Council. Currently, while 22 unions have maintained affiliation to ZCTU, four have disaffiliated and are thus not represented on the council. Benefits of membership in ZCTU include: access to programs (mostly funded by international organizations such as the ICFTU) in workers' training and education; the "guaranteed solidarity of unions" (Chirwa, 1997); legal services, research, and representation to government: "unions join ZCTU in order to enjoy political clout," (ibid).

Over the past five years, ZCTU's membership has undergone several consequential changes that have had rather deleterious effects upon the Congress's organizational capacity. Principal among these was the de-affiliation of four of its largest members in 1994: the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ), Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW), the National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers (NUCIW) and Zambia National Union of Teachers. At issue were the elections of the Executive Board at the Ninth Quadrennial Congress, held in October 1994: ZCTU Chairman General Fackson Shamenda and ZCTU General Secretary Alec Chirwa were faced by Francis Kunda from MUZ and ZCTU Assistant Secretary General Geoffrey Alikipo in a "fierce challenge" for control of the Congress. According to Mr. Shamenda, "government was instigating moves to have him and Mr Chirwa removed from ZCTU in order to install "yes men" to head the labour movement... the State was not happy with the position that ZCTU had taken on SAP (Structural Adjustment Program) as the labour movement was persistently criticizing Government for its wholesale acceptance of the IMF and World Bank tailored SAP" ("ZCTU Split: What Happened?":2). When Shamenda and Chirwa emerged the victors at the Quadrennial Congress, Kunda charged that there was "irrefutable evidence that some high-ranking politicians in the National Party had sponsored some candidates in the ZCTU elections.... and that some government Ministers (specifically the Minister of Labour and Social Security) had openly campaigned for these candidates" (ibid:6). Kunda subsequently announced the de-affiliation of MUZ from the Congress, and was later joined by the other unions named above. Since that time, the NUCIW has reaffiliated to the Congress, while the National Union of Building, Engineering, and General Workers has deaffiliated.

The loss of these four unions, particularly the Mineworkers, has had negative consequences for ZCTU's financial position-- a situation compounded by the serious decrease in membership of individual unions, due to retrenchments of workers over the past five years. ZCTU's primary source of funding is membership dues, supplemented by several commercial and business ventures (managed under their Workers' Development Corporation). Donor funding is ample, but is earmarked to specific programs and projects. From 1991 until 1993 (when MUZ and the others deaffiliated), ZCTU enjoyed a steady increase in subscription income and yearly budget surplus, due primarily to significant pay deals concluded by many unions during the period. Total income in 1993 was approximately K300 million, K240 million of which was earned from member subscriptions, while total expenditures amounted to K270 million. While data from 1995 to present has not yet been collected, it is significant that in 1994 membership in the de-affiliated unions comprised 40% of total union membership in Zambia-- representing a very substantial amount of funds that the Congress was unable to collect.

ZCTU engages in several types of strategies for policy influence, principal among which is its participation in institutionalized government fora (the Tri-Partite Council), and direct lobbying activities. According to the Secretary General's report to the Ninth Quadrennial Congress, "the ZCTU carries out lobbying activities aimed at securing the enactment of favorable labour laws and formulation of social and economic policies that are compatible with workers' aspirations." Toward this end, ZCTU leadership frequently interacts with government officials on a formal and informal basis.

The Congress currently advocates for several primary policy concerns. ZCTU makes annual submissions to the Ministry of Finance detailing budget recommendations: in 1996, the Congress called for "clear-cut" policies in employment and productivity that utilize incentive schemes, differential interest rates in the productive sector, protection of local industry, control of waste and fraud in foreign exchange allocations, the avoidance of wage freezes and retrenchments, the establishment and enforcement of a "living wage," a reduction in government defense and recurrent expenditure, and an adequately funded A.S.I.P.

### 3c. The Labour Lobby

#### 2. *Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE)*

The Zambia Federation of Employers was founded in 1955, to provide for the establishment, promotion, development and maintenance of good relations between employers and employees throughout Zambia, and to promote productivity through industrial peace. The 1971 Industrial Relations Act made the organization the sole umbrella group for employers' associations in Zambia and legally mandated the ZFE to represent employers in negotiations with trade unions and government as part of the Tripartite Council. During the Second Republic, ZFE's membership was primarily comprised of employers from the parastatal sector; however, with privatization this situation has changed in the Third Republic. The primary focus of the ZFE continues to be labour relations and collective bargaining, although the organization has been working to expand its advocacy role (Kroes 1994). ZFE reports that it has experienced positive relations with government in the Third Republic, finding ministers to be more receptive and policy consultations to be more frequent, although influence over final policy decisions is not always forthcoming.

ZFE's organizational structure is relatively moderate-- the organization is governed by an executive board comprised of a President, three Vice-Presidents (representing each of the following three regions: Midlands, Copperbelt, Southern), several trustees and trade associations; and is operated on a day-to-day basis by a secretariat composed of an executive director, a deputy executive director, and a research manager. ZFE does maintain a "legal" department, which is managed by the deputy executive director. Total permanent staff includes nine positions.


ZFE's membership is composed of individual companies, trade associations and employer associations. In total, there are 215 direct members (eight of which are industry-specific employers' associations); when the individual members of these organizations are counted, the total membership numbers approximately 10,000. Members pay dues based on a sliding scale, with the highest amount being over K2 million, and the lowest being K192,000. Membership dues contribute 60% of the total financial support, while fundraising events (e.g. training seminars) contribute most of the remaining support. The organization receives no support from government or from international donors, with the exception of occasional training programs run by WHO or the ILO. Members can expect advocacy and representational benefits as the main benefit for joining ZFE, with free legal advice, publications, training, collective bargaining and research being additional enticements. The Federation provides its members with two official publications, a quarterly newsletter and occasional "information kits" which update members on the Federation's lobbying activities, pertinent legislation and policy, and training opportunities. The Federation considers these kits to be an important service to members: "ZFE is committed to providing research, analysis, and advice in order to up-date its members with new social and Labour issues... members are free to comment and ZFE staff and specialised committees are readily available for any clarifications" (ZFE Info Kit, June 1997).

ZFE considers working with the government in policy formulation and implementation, as well as working to influence public opinion through publicity and the media, to be its most important influence strategies. The organization articulates policy concerns primarily to the Ministry of Labour. If attention from other ministries is required, the Federation requests Labour to invite the applicable ministry / ministries (e.g. Finance, Agriculture) for dialogue. Members of Parliament, as well as State House and local government, are sometimes contacted over policy issues. ZFE holds positions on several government boards and commissions, including the privatization, economic council and national social security bodies. While legal action is occasionally used to challenge government policy in the industrial court, ZFE's stated priority objective is industrial relations-- that is, maintaining a productive environment between employees and employers.

At present, the Federation's main policy objective is the 1997 Industrial Relations Act, in which it


# ZFE... at a glance

Membership information not available




Total Membership

Revenues and Expenditures, 1996



Revenues, 1996




Expenditures (percentages not available)


staff salaries	
office expenses	
travel allowances	
meetings	
advertising	
publications	

# ZFE... at a glance


## Benefits Provided




## Lobbying Strategies



## Interaction with Government



## Policy Consultation



shares interest with ZCTU in limiting trade union and employer association splinter groups. Also of interest are the redrafting of the National Provident Fund Act (ZFE is against it-- they's like pension schemes left to a competitive market), and the Employment Act. ZFE regularly makes submissions to the Ministry of Finance on annual budget matters. Submissions for the 1997 budget included recommendations on monetary and fiscal policy, import and export duties, agricultural sector development and small-scale industry, infrastructure, health, taxation, and privatization.

\*

### 3d. Analysis (SEE CORRESPONDING GRAPHS FOLLOWING THIS ACCOUNT)

#### *The interest group arena*

Several institutional changes explain the emergence of new groups in the representational arena, and the splintering of established groups. The splintering of groups in the labour sector is due to changes in industrial relation law-- and to entrepreneurial leaders who see an avenue for access to leadership and / or economic opportunities through the creation of new unions. The formation of groups to represent small-scale producers in the business and farming sectors (i.e. the PBA, PFU, NASSPF) is due primarily to two factors:

- the cessation of government credit and inputs to these producers through party- incorporated organizations (e.g. the cooperatives, SIDO, etc); and
- the incentive (brought about by economic liberalization and widespread retrenchments) for small-scale entrepreneurs to engage in private sector production as a means of livelihood.

#### *Memberships*

Most broadly, economic reforms have financially impaired many established groups, as they've watched their memberships plummet. In the labour sector, retrenchments and the closing of inefficient parastatals have lowered membership levels in the trade unions and employers' associations. In the agricultural sector, cooperative membership has plummeted, due to the current lack of access to resources that were the primary incentive for members to belong. In the business sector, individual company memberships have fallen due to the closing of many small businesses; while corporate memberships have grown, due at least in part to large multinationals moving into the country. In the agricultural sector, the ZCF's membership has drastically decreased, while there has been a dramatic increase in individual membership in the ZNFU, NAPSSF, and PFU, as these groups have recently targeted the small-scale farmers who formerly belonged to the ZCF.

Paradoxically, however, there are now *more* locally-based groups: the National Farmers' Union has experienced a surge in member organizations as its "club" membership scheme has produced numerous new local Farmers' Associations; three new local Chambers of Commerce and Industry have emerged in Eastern Province, Kabwe, Livingstone and Chingola; and two new organizations at the national level have been launched to represent the interests of small entrepreneurs in the provinces (the Provincial Business Associations) and peasant farmers in the rural areas (the Peasant Farmers' Union).

Even in the present austere economic environment, pluralism in the representational arena (if not in the political) is growing.

#### *Revenues*

In Zambia at present, most groups rely principally, if not solely, on membership dues and interest earned on accounts. In the farming and business sectors, only the umbrella organizations, ZCF, ZNFU, and ZACCI, have diversified their funding sources. For the ZCF and the ZNFU, this exercise has been fruitful-- these groups bring in the highest annual revenues, due in part to their trading (ZCF) and fundraising (ZNFU) activities. In the labour sector, organizations rely principally if not solely on membership dues, with some reporting large donations from international donors. Support from a domestic patron was mentioned for only one group, the NAPSSF, while only ZNFU reports that they derive some funding from government consultancy contracts.

Thus, the maintenance of many groups is achieved through voluntary member contributions, rather than government or donor support. In fact, donor support plays a significant role in group revenues for only three of the eight groups active at the national level (although almost all groups benefit somehow from donor project funds).

### *Expenditures*

For some groups, staff salaries make up a good proportion of annual expenditures, especially ZCF (65%), ZACCI (56%), and ZNFU (30%). While diversion towards staff salaries can imply a focus away from membership benefits, it can also indicate a group that has the capacity to serve their members through the provision of research, training and other benefits. Indeed, the groups which presently seem most sustainable and influential (ZACCI, ZNFU, and ZCTU-- see section 5 and 6) have fairly large, somewhat complex organizational structures with a fair amount of in-house professional expertise.

Thus, while staffs that are too large can drain an organization's resources, groups that are influential seem to benefit from an adequate and professional staff. The notable exception is ZAM, an organization which supports no staff at all; however, ZAM makes good use of the ZACCI staff economist as one of the benefits of ZACCI membership. Hence, the organization can focus funds on publications, meetings, and advertising-- which are attractive benefits to its members. This arrangement is both efficient and effective, and could provide a useful model for donor support of technical capacity to interest groups.

Also notable are the travel allowances spent by farming groups, as these groups must travel frequently to maintain contact with their members.

### *Benefits*

Preliminary data analysis suggests that two purposive (or collective) benefits, advocacy and representation before government, rate as the most important benefit provided by groups across economic sectors. Thus, interest group sustainability depends on two interrelated activities: fundraising (to which increasing membership levels is important), and effective lobbying activities (to keep present members and attract new ones).

Also widely important membership benefits are: meetings and conferences, research, and publications. Provision of training and education are also important to agriculture and labour sector groups. Several groups offer legal support to their members; groups in the business sector report that they do not, however; with some leaders and members suggesting this is because litigation is expensive and ineffective.

### *Lobbying*


Generally, groups find lobbying government officials at both the policy formulation and implementation stage to be the most important strategies for policy influence, while working with the mass media to influence public opinion is also of some importance. There are no significant differences across economic sectors.

Litigation as a lobbying strategy (that is, challenging the legality of an unattractive policy in the courts) is somewhat important to some groups, and not important to others. Only the ZCF (whose President is a Member of Parliament) reports that electioneering is important to its lobbying strategies. Only the ZCF and PFU report that public demonstrations (a particularly "outside" strategy) to be important to their lobbying strategy.

### *Policy Consultation*

When making decisions on official policy positions, all groups report that they consult most frequently with their members, and to a lesser extent other groups in the policy area and policy experts. Consultation with government officials at the national and local levels is engaged in less frequently for most groups.


# Apex Organizations: Total Memberships, 1997




# Apex Organizations:

## Changes in Membership Levels

(note: PFU's membership for 1996-97 is 25,000, which doesn't fit on graph))











# Apex Organizations: Finances



\*ZCF's finances are not to scale: revenues are 2.5 billion kw







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# Apex Organizations: Revenues




# Apex Organizations: Expenditures



*note: only top expenditures are given*




# Apex Organizations: Benefits provided





# Apex Organizations: Lobbying Strategies



# Apex Organizations: Interaction with Government



# Apex Organizations: Policy Consultation



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#### 4. The Mobilization and Maintenance of Interest Groups in Zambia, post-1991

While the previous section examined groups active at the national level, this section examines a broader section of groups, to capture general trends in the interest group arena. This section addresses the following questions: how do organizations in Zambia come into being, and how do they maintain themselves? How are they organized, and in what kinds of issues are they interested? What tactics do they employ in their efforts to wield influence over the policy-making process, and what factors affect their choice of tactics?

##### *Mobilization*

There is no common explanation behind the mobilization of economic interest groups in Zambia. Some, most especially the group now known as the Zambia National Farmers' Union, and the group that has become the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, as well as many of the trade unions, were started by settlers during the colonial period, and modeled after the institutions familiar to them from their native countries. Several, most especially the Zambia Cooperative Federation and its member cooperative societies, as well as the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and the Zambia Federation of Employers, were mobilized as statutory bodies, part of the one-party state's strategy to bind all civic organizations in a corporate relationship to the ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Others have emerged only recently, in the last decade. What is noteworthy in the Zambian case is that groups emerged at different times and therefore in very different contexts, as political and economic regimes changed from a colonial administration, to an independent First, Second, and finally Third Republic (see Chart One).

As Chart One shows, three of the most vocal and well-organized groups currently active at the national level, ZACCI, ZNFU, and ZFE were founded during the colonial administration, resulting in long organizational histories during which these groups learned to adapt to different politics and political systems. Not coincidentally, they seem to have adapted well to the lobbying environment of the Third Republic. All three of these groups are vociferously non-political and non-partisan; all firmly state that they will "work with the government of the day." Also noticeable is the fact that most unions in the sample originated during the First and Second Republics, during the heady days following Independence. These were thus groups born into a politicized environment; groups which were not unaccustomed to political maneuvering between the labour movement and the one-party state. As detailed above, the movement for multi-partyism made good use of the organizational abilities of the unions and their willingness to engage in political battle; however, the MMD government has recognized the political nature of these groups, and seems anxious to weaken them as a political force.

Despite their origins in different political environments, all groups face similar problems in their initial phases. As Walker points out: "the first problem facing would-be interest group organizers is to bring their groups into being and to keep them going until revenues are large enough to meet operating expenses" (1991:77). Table One shows a visible pattern to the variation in type of financing used to initiate operations: some trade unions, the ZFE, and the ZCF (all sharing ties with international labour and cooperative movements) are the only to report receiving initial funds from international donors. The rest of the groups in this sample (i.e. all local business and farming associations, and some trade unions) report receiving only small contributions from individuals and/or membership fees at their founding. The lack of government funding (only ZCF reported receiving such) to these groups points to a general grass-roots orientation of private sector group mobilization throughout Zambia's history; with the important caveat that under the Second Republic, the incentive to form certain groups (i.e. cooperatives) became influenced by government access to subsidized credit and inputs. Also of note is the fact that large contributions from a few individuals (e.g. private patrons) seems to be a factor only in the start-up of umbrella organizations such as ZACCI, ZNFU, and NAPSSF.

##### *Maintenance*

Once a group has been brought into being, how do they maintain financial solvency? In Zambia

at present, most groups rely principally, if not solely, on membership dues and interest earned on accounts (see Table One). In the farming and business sectors, only the umbrella organizations, ZCF, ZNFU, and ZACCI, have diversified their funding sources; the local associations all rely solely on membership dues (with the exception of the Lusaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which realizes 20% of its revenue from fundraising). ZFE reports a healthy third of its funding from fundraising activities, with the rest coming from membership and interest earnings. Most local trade unions also rely on membership dues, with two reporting fundraising to also be a small contributor to their coffers; however, two local unions report that grants from international donors make up the bulk of their funding.

Table One shows the sources of funding for interest group activity in Zambia. As can be seen, routine contributions (e.g. membership dues, interest) make up the major portion of total revenues for most organizations-- a sustainable financial position barring large sudden losses in membership (as ZCTU has experienced), and one that encourages the responsiveness of group leaders to their membership. Nonrecurring expenditures, while less stable sources of revenue, can be indicators of greater sophistication in fundraising capabilities-- organizations which can bring in additional revenue over and above membership dues can offer their members a greater selection of benefits, thereby attracting new members, and further improving the group's financial base. However, where such expenditures are comprised primarily of grants from outside sources (e.g. government, donors, private patrons), the issue of cooptation becomes a concern; as the old adage goes, "the piper calls the tune," the tune in this case being the activities and concerns in which the group is engaged.

At present in this category, only ZNFU (in its "special projects category") reports revenue from government contracts or grants; while several groups report that international donor funding is a factor in revenue flows, though mostly on a project basis (e.g. the funds are destined for specific projects-- not for the general revenue coffer). Several groups report income from "special projects" or "fundraising activities." Only ZCF reports revenue from trading activities and commercial ventures-- a potentially lucrative source of funding, though subject to the vicissitudes of the market as well as the organizations' access to savvy business advice. ZCF is established in its commercial activities, and even in the newly liberalized economy seems to be doing well in these ventures-- 95% of its revenues comes from this category and at K2.5 billion per year, the Federation currently dwarfs all other organizations on total revenues by at least a factor of ten.

For groups that realize a large percentage of their income from membership dues, it becomes important to examine the composition of membership dues: are they comprised of large contributions from a few members ("large members"), or small contributions from many members ("small members")? (see Table Two). Walker posits that where a "certain level of organizational maintenance is assured by a small core of (large members), groups can afford to ignore mass memberships altogether, or groups can afford to subsidize additional members at rates far below costs" (1991:84). In Zambia, ZAM and ZNFU are notable examples of this hypothesis: ZAM, comprised mostly of "large members" (dues being K600,000 per year compared to the PFU's annual subscription of 20,000 or CUSA's average of K1,000 per month), makes no effort to court a mass membership or even to increase its membership. On the other hand, the ZNFU, which maintains a mix of both very large members and very small members, exemplifies the latter prospect. In its recent bid to become more representative of farmers by extending a modified type of membership to small-scale farmers, ZNFU is indeed seeking to subsidize additional members through securing international donor aid. For most other groups, large member organizations tend not to have mass memberships, and small member organizations tend to be solely comprised of small members.

In general, the data reveals that except for the ZNFU, the "small member" situation is the case for the agriculture, as well as labour sector. For most groups in the business sector, the "large member" situation is the case-- most associations in this sector have relatively small memberships compared to the agricultural and labour sectors, but pay dues that are fifty to six thousand times greater than the lowest

dues paid by "small members" in these other two sectors (see Table Two). The current situation in the business sector is changing, however, with the recent introduction of "provincial business associations," which target small scale entrepreneurs, and require low membership subscriptions (K 20,000 per year on average). However, without large membership levels the sustainability of such groups is not assured.

This presents an interesting conundrum when we examine membership levels for 1991-1996. In the business and labour sectors, all organizations report that their individual membership levels have been falling during this period (see Chart Three; note, while ZFE did not have their membership figures available, they reported in interviews that their membership has seriously declined due to privatization of the parastatals and the number of enterprises that have closed shop). In the agricultural sector, however, individual memberships are growing rapidly as former ZCF members are joining the ZNFU, PFU, and NAPSSF; ZCF's membership (again, according to interviews, as they did not have membership levels available) have plummeted. In all sectors, there promises to be a substantial increase over the next few years in the number of groups active in the interest group sector (business and agriculture, as more groups emerge to capture the "small" producer; labour as legislation is passed to do away with "one industry, one union").

The prominence of "large member" groups is noteworthy in this context; for a larger number of groups can maintain activities if they each "capture" just a few such members, than if they have to capture the large number of "small members" necessary for group maintenance. Thus, if the trend in declining small memberships continues, the demand for "large members" could increase, and their importance to group maintenance could give such members greater influence over group policy goals. This is especially so in an environment where the smallest of "small members" are dropping off of *any* group register en masse due to the inability to pay subscriptions in the present economic environment.

#### *The Provision of Benefits*

For purposes of the organizational analysis, the questionnaire asked group leaders what type of benefits their group provides to its members, and in their opinion how important these benefits are in attracting members. While this approach can't inform us directly as to why Zambians join interest groups, it does provide information on what inducements are being offered to the public through interest groups, and what bundles of benefits group leaders find are effective for attracting members to their association.

Tables Three and Four report data on sixteen benefits, reported by group type. Ten of these benefits fit into the frequently used typology of group benefits: *purposive, solidary, material, and professional*.<sup>14</sup> Three of the remaining benefits can be described by the category *informational*, while the last three are simply given in the category "other."

- Purposive benefits are intangible rewards that accrue to a person by virtue of his support of causes, value systems, principles, or ends considered to be worthwhile.
- Solidary benefits are intangible values of a social nature, including rewards such as friendship, conviviality and status. People who join groups in response to solidary benefits are essentially joining for reasons that have nothing to do with politics.<sup>15</sup>
- Material benefits and professional benefits are intended to capture the type of benefit known as a "selective incentive," which is hypothesized to explain group membership in light of the difficulty of getting individuals to participate in group, or collective, activity.<sup>16</sup> People who join groups in response to this type of incentive, as with solidary incentives, are not necessarily interested in the political or collective aspects of group membership. Similarly so with...
- Informational benefits, which are not traditional selective incentives in that they are not private, divisible goods; however, in poor countries like Zambia, even the most basic of information is a scarce and highly prized commodity. Again, it is feasible to conclude that group membership for this type of reward does not imply a concern for the political nature of interest group activity.

The most striking finding from the sample is the fact that it is two purposive (or collective) benefits, advocacy and representation before government, that rate most important among groups across economic sectors (see Table Three and Four); in fact, in this small sample they are the only two benefits we can say with any confidence are important to groups across sectors (although meetings, professional contacts, and publications also appear to be substantial benefits). This is an important finding for two reasons:

- First, to a certain extent, the organization of groups with an intent to provide members with access to advocacy and representation in the government decision-making process is a sign that leaders and members at least *perceive* there to be room in the process for influence from actors such as themselves. This marks a significant change from the one-party state, a system which channeled access to policy influence through the Party's top levels and left little room for influence to groups outside the Party.
- Second, group leaders believe that potential members will respond to the offering of purposive incentives-- and not just the promise of selective incentives such as access to credit and production inputs, staples for inducing group membership in certain sectors during the Second Republic.

The data also indicate important differences between economic sectors. Although all groups report that advocacy and representation are important benefits, groups in the business sector are more likely to assign a high rank to "advocacy" than are groups in the agriculture and labour sector (see Table Four). This is possibly due (in light of our argument that institutions shape organizations in meaningful ways) to the nature of advocacy as an active, sometimes confrontational interaction with government in pursuit of a specific objective; a type of activity the private business sector has traditionally had the clout and resources to pursue.

Also noticeable is the fact that agricultural groups, more than groups in the business and labour sectors, are more likely to assign importance to "selective incentives," such as trips, insurance, consumer discounts, and publications-- especially those benefits grouped under "material benefits" (see Table Four). Again, this is expected in light of the argument that the institutional environment of the Second Republic shaped incentives for group membership which have repercussions today. Under UNIP's rule, peasant and small-scale farmers especially learned to expect access to such "selective incentives" as benefits to group membership, and joined groups accordingly for those reasons. Though government resources are (for the most part) no longer available to individuals through group membership, the perception that group membership equates with provision of such benefits still exists (interview, Sakala 1997), and group leaders in this sector recognize this expectation. Thus, both the Cooperative Federation and Peasant Farmers' Union, which especially targets previous cooperative members to a larger degree than the ZNFU, reports a higher importance for training, trips, insurance, consumer discounts, and publications (average 2.7 and 2.8 respectively, to ZNFU's average of 4 for these benefits, on scale where 1 = "most important" and 5 = "not at all important").

Also very important for groups in the agriculture and labour sectors are the benefits of "collective bargaining," and to a lesser extent, "coordination among organizations"-- benefits which are realized when individuals and groups seek to act together rather than alone on matters of importance. The goals realized from such action can be ones that are enjoyed privately by individuals (such as wage increases), or collective goods (such as better working conditions). In both cases, however, it is the *strategy* that is important; for a belief in the importance / effectiveness of associational activity is one of the pillars of civil society.

### *Influence Strategies*

What kinds of activities do interest groups in the Third Republic engage in to gain influence in the policy process? (see Table Five). The questionnaire asked respondents to indicate the importance of several types of influence strategies in achieving their policy goals. These activities fall into two categories:

- "inside" strategies, i.e. conventional lobbying activities such as consultations with political and administrative leaders designed to convince officials to take some form of action or to modify an established policy; and
- "outside" strategies, which can be either indirect efforts to achieve influence on policy output or a more broadly-based attempt to build support within the general public for a set of values that will affect future policy.

As Walker points out, the correlates of strategic political choices are important, because they reveal much about the political system and the problems of institutional design. "If groups representing different types of interests also adopt distinct political strategies, then any institutional reforms or other changes that restrict a particular strategy may have a biased impact on how well various interests are represented (1991:103). These considerations are especially important in systems where institutional reform is as fundamental and as rapid as in the present Zambian case.

Data from the survey shows that generally, groups find lobbying government officials at both the policy formulation and implementation stage (81% and 71% of respondents, respectively, reported this activity to be "most" or "very" important) to be the most important strategies for policy influence, while working with the mass media to influence public opinion is also of some importance (67% reported this activity to be "most," "very," or "somewhat" important). Thus, overall there does seem to be a moderate preference for "inside" strategies, as opposed to "outside" ones, but it is important to recognize that this is in part due to the inclusion of only economic interest groups in the sample. There are no significant differences across economic sectors, indicating that groups throughout the economy find the same influence strategies to be of importance. However, there is a noticeable difference between the "apex" groups active at the national level, of which 83% find working with the media to influence public opinion an important activity, and the local groups, of which only 22% find the media a useful strategy in influencing policy.

Recognizing that most groups find the direct lobbying of government to be the most effective avenue to policy influence, it is also interesting to note which branches of government are most important / most accessible to group influence in Zambia. When asked if they've communicated, consulted, or interacted with offices of the national government during the last year, 67% of groups in the sample report that they do so "often," while 43% report that they "often" interact with local government (see Table Seven). For those that do interact with national government, it is most likely that they interact with the Ministries (95% of total sample), rather than the Office of the President (24% of total sample) or Parliament (38% of total sample). This indicates that it is the Ministries which are perceived by interest groups to be the seat of policy decision-making (at least that part of the process that is accessible) in the Third Republic, and thus the locus for influence activities. This observation is strengthened by the finding that groups generally report it is Ministers or their staff, more than any other individual or group outside their membership, that they consult when formulating a position on governmental affairs (see Table Nine). Across economic sectors, it appears that the agricultural sector is more likely to interact frequently with both national and local government than the business and labour sectors (see Table Eight), and more likely to consult Ministers and their staff when formulating policy positions (see Table Ten).

### *Policy Concerns*

Of principal interest is an emergence of distinct ideological differences in the interests that

groups represent in the Third Republic. One party-state ideologies typically leave little room for a pluralism of ideas; in Zambia's Second Republic, President Kaunda's vision of "humanist" development and UNIP's "participatory democracy" dictated a centralized polity and command economy, and left little room for differing opinions. Since the liberalization of the economy and the advent of multi-party politics, groups which support a liberal ideology (especially ZACCI, ZAM, and the ZNFU) are experiencing a new arena in which to put forth their ideas and lobby for their particular interests. Indeed, in the interviews conducted with group leaders for this study, several important points emerge:

- groups leaders assert that they experience a much more open and free arena in which to express their group's interests, and
- they report they have experienced a sharp increase in opportunities to dialogue with government, and that there are more channels through which to attempt policy influence;
- however, alongside these new opportunities for the promotion of a liberal ideology exists the entrenched interests of those adhering to a statist approach to development... those who, despite their usage of the liberal terms of policy dialogue (e.g. "competition, privatization," etc), still believe in a heavily interventionist role for government, especially in development of the poorer sectors of the economy. According to group leaders, a good proportion of civil servants fit this latter category; and groups oriented toward liberal, reformist policies report having difficulties in communicating their policy concerns to these type of officials.

Based on the institutional analysis of the previous section, we should expect that where the institutions of the Second Republic created broad groups of people who benefitted from state intervention in the economy, there will be greater support for the provision of government services in general, and in services in their sector in particular. (This expectation should be tempered by the probability that rational economic actors will support the provision of government services that will benefit them, no matter what their professed ideology; and by the fact that government support of basic infrastructure has fallen to such drastic levels that increased services are probably desired from all citizens, again no matter their ideology.)

Findings from the survey (see Tables 11-12) show that across sectors, it is agricultural groups who most consistently support some increase in the provision of government services, with 100% of the groups in the sample reporting that there should be *much more* provision of service in agriculture and economic development, as well as a large majority reporting there should be more services provided in each of the following areas: education (100%), transportation (86%), employment (86%). Furthermore, among the agricultural groups, the Zambia Cooperative Federation stands out as the only group in the survey to advocate that there should be *much more* services provided by government *in all of the policy areas given*. Business and labour demonstrate a preference for increased services that directly benefit their interests... most noticeably, business groups show a preference for increased services in economic development (86%), while labour shows a preference for services in education (100%), and employment (86%).

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#### 4a. Analysis

Generally, the preponderance of groups which rely principally on member-based funding, as opposed to government or donor funding, implies an interest group sector which is relatively sustainable and accountable to its members, although this varies in degree from group to group. In the business sector, the predominance of large-member groups signifies a less broadly-representative interest arena; whereas the farming and laour sectors are more representative of small-members' interests. However, diversification of funding sources seems necessary in most cases to increase revenues, and thus increase the group's capacity for supporting activities that result in the effective lobbying of government. This is important, since most groups report that advocacy and representation before government are the most important benefits provided to members. Hence, diversifying funding sources could, by increasing

lobbying capabilities, induce more members to join groups; which would further improve financial resources as well as making groups more representative. Research implies that those groups which engage most effectively in lobbying activities are those with a better funding base, although the reverse is not necessarily true.

The importance of advocacy as a benefit of group membership is an important finding for two reasons:

- first, it is a sign that leaders and members at least *perceive* there to be room in the process for influence from actors such as themselves; and
- second, group leaders believe that potential members will respond to the offering of purposive incentives-- and not just the promise of selective incentives such as access to credit and production inputs, which were tools for inducing group membership in certain sectors during the Second Republic.

Groups throughout the economy find the Ministries to be *the* point of access. This indicates that it is the Ministries which are perceived by interest groups to be the seat of policy decision-making (at least that part of the process that is accessible) in the Third Republic, and thus the locus for influence activities. This observation is strengthened by the finding that groups generally report it is Ministers or their staff, more than any other individual or group outside their membership, that they consult when formulating a position on governmental affairs.

## 5. Interest Group Demands on Government, 1988-1996

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As discussed above, interest groups make demands on government primarily through the direct lobbying government officials, and through use of the media. As demands on government officials are made through correspondence and personal meetings, the content of this type of policy proposal is difficult to research. Demands on government made through the media, however, are more accessible; hence, this section examines interest group demands as expressed through the mass media (see APPENDIX B).

Where accounts of interest group activity and policy positions in the *Times of Zambia* are concerned, the groups most often mentioned at present are ZACCI, ZAM, ZNFU, and ZCTU (and its affiliates). Most notably, from the years 1988 through 1995, ZNCCI/ZACCI is mentioned most often of groups in the business sector, and ZCTU and its affiliates are mentioned most often in the labour sector. In the agricultural sector, from 1988-1990 ZCF gained the *Times'* ear most often; but in 1991 the ZCF's coverage began to wane, while ZNFU's coverage increased. With the possible exception of 1990 and 1996, ZFE had little mention in the *Times* during this period; and the PFU and NAPSSF were very rarely mentioned. For all groups, however, coverage in the *Times* increased dramatically from the beginning of the transition period to the present (for example, interest groups were mentioned at least 168 times in 1990, and at least 315 times in 1996).

What kinds of issues emerge in current press reports? For September 1996- September 1997, the three major newspapers (*Times of Zambia, Daily Mail, The Post*) were examined daily for reports mentioning interest groups (see APPENDIX B). Below, coverage of the group mentioned most often from each sector in the news media is briefly discussed.

### 1. Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI)

Overall, ZACCI was far and away the most vocal, and most listened-to, group during this period. ZACCI leaders, President George Chabwera and Chief Executive Gideon Phiri, get regular air-time in the broadcast media, appearing on shows such as the ZNBC *Business Review* and ZNBC *Speak Out*. Chief Executive Gideon Phiri is quoted often in both government- and private- owned media. ZACCI addresses numerous issues in the media, and maintains consistent positions on these issues. Most notably in 1996-97:

- ZACCI openly condemned the government's handling of the fuel crisis in October 1996, demanding that government "seriously tackle" the issue (Post 8/10/96);
- ZACCI lobbied support from all corners of the business community to campaign against ZESCO tariff hikes, cogently arguing that ZESCO must provide justification for the increases or reverse them, and concurrently called for an energy regulatory board to control such excesses;
- ZACCI took trading partners, most notably Zimbabwe and South Africa, to task for their failure to remove trade barriers and resolve trade imbalances.
- announced its annual budget submissions, specifically: a 15% VAT, a widened tax base, the abolition of Import Declaration Fees (IDF) and the use by the Zambia Revenue Agency of cash accounting instead of accrual accounting, to prevent members having to pay VAT on payments they had yet to realize;

In 1996-97, ZACCI was reported in the press to be relatively successful in its lobbying efforts (see previous section for policy concerns): for example, an Energy Regulatory Board was instituted in August 1997, and ZACCI was able to publicly commend government for its receptiveness to tax reform proposals in the 1997 budget. Furthermore, a *Sunday Times of Zambia* "Comment" article with the headline, "Take ZACCI Seriously," reported: "while praising the general direction of liberalization... ZACCI has continued to point out sections of the policy they deem to be askew," and lauded the group

for standing firm in the interests of its members. The year saw no personal or professional public arguments between government and ZACCI in the press; rather, it was reported on several occasions that the Government would be consulting with ZACCI on private sector issues. As reported in the previous section, ZACCI personnel indicate that they are generally satisfied with their policy influence, although they are disappointed on occasion with the seemingly arbitrary nature of policy decision making.

## 2. Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU)

ZNFU is also frequently mentioned in the print media, and has had members of their staff on ZNBC broadcasts such as "ZNBC Speak Out" (e.g. Chief Economist Alex Mwanakasale, 18/6/97). Overall, ZNFU was consistent in its calls for adherence to free market principles. For example, the Union was cited in its "praise to government for removing itself from the provision of farm implements and intervention in the crop market (Zambia Daily Mail 6/5/97); and "cheering government's determination to disengage itself from supply of agricultural inputs and crop marketing, as outlined in the 1997 budget," (Times of Zambia, 3/2/97). The ZNFU also served in a public "watchdog" capacity on several occasions, taking President Chiluba to task for promising debt relief to peasant farmers and not following through; criticizing the government for pledging to distribute fertilizer and hence squeezing out private sector supply, then distributing the fertilizer too late in the season (Times of Zambia 8/10/96); and warning small-scale farmers against investing in a financially-insolvent Lima Bank. Most notably in 1996-97, ZNFU:

- spoke out on the deleteriously slow rate of electrification in the rural areas,;
- warned of impending food shortages brought about by the policies of the Food Reserve Agency;
- called attention to the failing of key agricultural industries due to unfair competition, and the losses to the large-scale farming sector due to security personnel costs;
- criticized government policy which brought about a lack of and delay in supply of inputs such as seed and fertilizer;
- together with ZACCI, criticized the ZESCO hikes.
- announced its annual budget submission, requesting the abolition of fuel levies on farm equipment, the eligibility of VAT registered farmers to submit returns quarterly or annually rather than monthly, the zero-rating of small-scale farm implements, and an end to the use of SGS as the single inspection agency for imports and exports.

Though the Union reported experiencing "generally effective" influence with government over such policy concerns early in 1997, currently the ZNFU does not enjoy favorable standing with key government personnel, due to a recent and serious confrontation with Minister and Staff at the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries. This has greatly affected portrayal of ZNFU's policy influence attempts, especially at the national level.

## 3. Zambia Congress of Trade Unions

Although ZCTU and the non-affiliated unions were regularly featured in the press during 1996, few reports address general policy issues. In 1996-97, the most frequently reported events had to do with planned and/or executed strike action over wage and employment issues, the formation of splinter unions, and leader/member disputes. During this period:

- Railway Workers' Union carried out illegal strike action over disagreements with management personnel,
- Civil Servants Union of Zambia and National Union of Public Service Workers threatened strike action over wage and employment issues.
- Bankers Union of Zambia split off from ZUFIWA
- Secondary School Teachers' Union split off from ZNUT
- Zambian Local Government Officers split off from ZULAWU
- Public Service Professionals Workers' Union split off from NUPSW
- a new apex organization, the Federation of Free Trade Unions, formed.

The few policy concerns expressed by labour during this period, at least as addressed in the popular press, were limited to calls for the reinstatement of early retirement plans, the selling of company and council houses to employees, and the transformation of the National Provident Fund to a comprehensive national social security pensions scheme. Together with ZACCI, the ZCTU has called for broadening the tax base to avoid over-taxing the few formally-employed workers. Generally on economic policy, however, labour's perspective seems to be largely absent in the national press. This could indicate that ZCTU prefers to utilize the "insider" strategy of Tripartite Council meetings for its policy influence activities.

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#### 5a. Analysis

There has been a decrease in interest group advocacy for the development of democratic institutions, e.g. the demands that the ZCTU made in 1990-91 for reinstatement of multi-party elections. However, there has been a notable increase in the number, scope, and intensity of their demands upon government. These demands focus around implementing economic policies that generally encourage private sector growth, as well as specifically protecting the economic interests of group members. Also on the rise are group demands for improved government services (e.g. infrastructure, security, etc.), and critiques of government policy.

Presently, there is thus little pressure from groups for institutional change, and most do not share the political oppositions' concern over electoral institutions. The key lobby group, i.e. the trade unions, that formally lobbied for a liberalized economy and democratic governance has been hamstrung by institutional changes. Alteration of the one industry-one union principle of industrial relations has prompted an increasing splintering of trade union organizations and threatened the security of their financial base. By crippling the organizational structure of the trade unions, these institutional changes have diminished a potential proponent for accountable government.

However, groups do exert pressure for improving the rule of law, and for making government more accountable and effective. For example, while they cannot be expected to rally around opposition demands for constitutional and electoral change, business and agricultural groups can still be expected to pressure for continued economic liberalization and public sector reform (see example above). However, both business and agricultural groups' ability to lobby for continued economic liberalization is diminished by the dearth of institutionalized access to the policy process, and the lack of transparent policy decision-making.

## 6. The Effectiveness of Interest Group Lobbying

The actual effectiveness of policy lobbying efforts is difficult to determine. Groups report that they are by and large satisfied with their policy efforts, and ministries report that they are interested in stakeholder input; but both have an incentive to report thus, as it indicates that they are carrying out their responsibilities effectively. So how can we determine the extent to which group efforts actually result in policy influence? The ideal method would be a systematic evaluation of policies emerging from the MMD government, and an analysis of the influence that groups effected in each policy area. Such a method is difficult if not impossible, however, for two reasons. First, minutes are not kept of meetings between government and groups when they meet to discuss policy matters, and those that are are not open to public (or at least this researcher's) perusal. As stated before, these meetings are mostly informal, and take place on an ad hoc basis-- in an office at the Ministry, at a cocktail party, at a wedding or funeral. Furthermore, the decision processes through which laws are made and policies are decided are generally not matters of public record; it is therefore difficult to analyze exactly why a policy or a law turns out the way it does, and at what points pressure from groups made a difference.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to end a report on interest organizations and their relationship to government without attempting to somehow capture the outcomes of group efforts. Below, two examples of lobbying strategies utilized by groups active at the national level (i.e. ZACCI, ZAM, ZCF, ZNFU, PFU, NAPSSF, ZCTU, and ZFE) are highlighted. These examples capture two strategies which were indicated by these national groups to be the most important lobbying activities they engage in: lobbying government (especially Ministries) and working with the mass media.

### *Lobbying Government Ministries: The Ministry of Finance and Taxation Issues in the Annual Budget*

"As part of opening the budget process, the Ministry of Finance is pleased to announce the formation of a budget task force. The government is concerned with restoring the fiscal health of the country's finances. As part of the process of examining options this task force invites written submissions from business, labour, and professional organizations and also from individuals."

J.M. Mtonga, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance  
Press Release, 1996

Among the varied committees of the Ministry of Finance, there exists a "tax policy task force." Each year, this body requests submissions from interest groups and others as to their preferences for the next year's budget, analyzes the feasibility and budget repercussions of these preferences, and makes recommendations to the Minister based upon these considerations (note: while groups are asked for submissions, there are no interest groups or other non-governmental representatives in these review groups). This is thus an area in which groups have a distinct interest, and which they have a clear channel to the relevant decision-makers.

Who takes advantage of such opportunities? Below is a list (provided by a member of the task force) of interest groups and others which made a submission to the Ministry of Finance in 1995, in response to the publicly-released Permanent Secretary's request:

#### **Groups**

Export Board of Zambia  
Leather Industries Association of Zambia  
Textile Producers of Zambia  
Zambia National Farmer's Union (ZNFU)  
Zambia Episcopal Conference  
Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM)  
Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE)  
Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI)  
Zambia Export Growers Association (ZEGA)

#### **Companies**

Anglo American Corporation  
Barclay's Bank  
Dunlop Tyres  
E.R.Z. Holdings  
Enalo Limited  
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company, Zambia Ltd.  
Mukuba Pensions Trustees Limited  
Phelps Dodge  
Tata Zambia Limited  
Zambia Bottlers Limited

## Other Ministries

### Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry

This list shows that four of the nine groups this report focused on in this report made submissions to the task force: ZACCI and ZAM, representing the business sector, ZNFU representing the agricultural sector, and ZFE representing the labour sector. Absent are submissions from the PFU, the NAPSSF, and the ZCTU (as the PBA was just formed and still lacks an elected national committee, this is not surprising). Interestingly, the Ministry did not have the ZCTU's submission on file when the submission file was made available to the researcher. Furthermore, a "summary of income tax submissions"-- a matter of key interest to labours' representatives-- did not mention ZCTU. *Profit Magazine* included ZCTU's budget preferences in their report on the submissions made to the Ministry (see ZCTU profile, previous section)-- but none of these submissions concern taxation issues.

The major tax proposals for 1996 fall into 5 main areas:

- Direct taxes: PAYE, company income tax, withholding tax
- VAT: agriculture, mining, food
- Customs: tariffs
- Excise taxes: rates, motor vehicles
- Nontax revenue: fees and fines

Table Thirteen and Fifteen (1995 and 1996, respectively) gives each of the group's position on these taxes. Table Fourteen and Sixteen (1996 and 1997, respectively) give the relevant results of the resultant budgets. For both years, the budget announced by the Minister of Finance reflected changes sought by the groups in some areas, and did not reflect their submissions in others:

1996:	Submission	=>	Budget
ZACCI, ZAM	-increase PAYE threshold to K500,000	=>	threshold increased to K600,000
ZACCI, ZAM	-introduce more tax bands	=>	wider tax bands introduced
ZACCI, ZAM	-retain company tax rate of 35%	=>	company tax: reduced to 30%
for			
ZFE	-reduce " to 25%	=>	LuSE companies
ZACCI, ZAM, ZFE	-abolish withholding tax rate	=>	withholding tax lowered, 25 to 15%
ZACCI, ZAM, ZFE	-broaden tax base	=>	--
ZACCI, ZAM	-control for inflation	=>	--
ZFE	-50% allowance tax abatement	=>	--
ZACCI, ZAM, ZFE	-lower VAT, 20 to 15%	=>	--
ZACCI	-VAT refund on Zamtel	=>	--
ZAM, ZNFU	-zero-rate agricultural products	=>	basic agricultural products, zero-rated, duty on agricultural machinery reduced, 20% to 0
ZAM, ZFE	-remove import duty on raw materials	=>	no changes, duty-free raw materials
ZACCI	-reduce customs duties to uniform 10%	=>	import duties lowered across the board, but not made uniform
ZAM	-flat rate import duty, no exempt	=>	
ZAM	-abolish SGS inspection monopoly	=>	--
ZACCI, ZAM	-duty on salaula	=>	--
<b>1997:</b>	<b>Submission</b>	<b>=&gt;</b>	<b>Budget</b>
ZNFU	-rebate of fuel levy for farmers	=>	
ZNFU	-livestock tax deferred	=>	
ZNFU	-corporate income tax the same, i.e. 15%	=>	corporate tax, 15%
ZNFU	-duty exemption for agr. machinery	=>	
ZNFU	-countervailing duties	=>	
ZNFU	-abolish SGS monopoly	=>	

## **6a. Analysis**

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Generally, it appears that where there aren't important political pressures (e.g. the issue of taxing informal sector vendors and the like), or inflexible macroeconomic considerations (e.g. the cash budget), groups have some influence in the outcome of the budget process. As it is the MMD government's goal to strengthen the private sector, it behooves them to solicit this sector for advice on what kinds of policies are necessary for growth in this area-- a point reflected by the Ministry of Finance's "Budget Task Force" statement. Though thus solicited, however, interest groups clearly don't hold the reins in the Ministry of Finance, evidenced by the fact that a good portion if not a majority of their submissions go unmet. According to interest group leaders, the concessions won in the 1996 and 1997 budgets were not the most important to the groups involved. For example, ZACCI (along with ZAM) is primarily interested in bringing down the cost of imported inputs for its members. Thus, lowering VAT, abolishing the IDF, and re-categorizing certain goods used for manufacturing as "raw materials" were the crucial requests. Few concessions were made on these points.

Interest groups, especially the well-established ones, seem to have a fair degree of influence in matters of import to their members. An example of this is the annual budget process, where submissions from groups are solicited by the Ministry of Finance, and seem to have a moderate impact on the resulting budget. Analysis of the 1996 and 1997 budget demonstrates that the budget reflected several tax proposals put forth by groups, including an increase in the personal income tax threshold, a lowering of the VAT rate from 20% to 17.5%, and changes in import and export duties intended to benefit business and agriculture. Furthermore, group leaders report that they are fairly satisfied with their policy influence efforts.

## Conclusion

While most of the interest groups reported on here currently support multi-partyism and economic liberalization, most of these groups did not take an active organizational role in lobbying for regime change. According to group leaders interviewed at the ZACCI, ZNFU and the ZFE, such activity was a *political* move-- their organizations exist solely to influence *policy*, and "work with the government of the day." Organizations which "got political" helped to bring about institutional change. They were able to do so because they were politicized, established, well-funded and organized groups.

Political liberalization has improved access to the policy process for most groups, while economic reforms have limited some group's ability to organize and lobby effectively. Groups working against the grain of reform, i.e. the peasant farmer and small-scale businessmen and farmers, have a rougher time of it, not least because the rules through which they once accessed government are gone, and a structured and effective channel for the representation of organized interests remains to be established.

Two purposive (or collective) benefits, advocacy and representation before government, rate as the most important benefit provided by groups across economic sectors. Thus, interest group sustainability depends on two interrelated activities: fundraising (to which increasing membership levels is important), and effective lobbying activities (to keep present members and attract new ones). Also widely important membership benefits are: meetings and conferences, research, and publications. Provision of training and education are also important to agriculture and labour sector groups.

The importance of advocacy as a benefit of group membership is an important finding for two reasons:

- first, it is a sign that leaders and members at least *perceive* there to be room in the process for influence from actors such as themselves; and
- second, group leaders believe that potential members will respond to the offering of purposive incentives-- and not just the promise of selective incentives such as access to credit and production inputs, which were tools for inducing group membership in certain sectors during the Second Republic.

Generally, the preponderance of groups which rely principally on member-based funding, as opposed to government or donor funding, implies an interest group sector which is relatively sustainable and accountable to its members, although this varies in degree from group to group. However, diversification of funding sources seems necessary in most cases to increase revenues, and thus increase the group's capacity for supporting activities that result in the effective lobbying of government. This is important, since most groups report that advocacy and representation before government are the most important benefits provided to members. Hence, diversifying funding sources could, by increasing lobbying capabilities, induce more members to join groups; which would further improve financial resources as well as making groups more representative.

In general, much of the dialogue between groups and government in the Third Republic is left to informal channels of communication. Where dialogue is institutionalized, more regular representation and advocacy of interests is realized; however, the effectiveness of this advocacy varies, as does the degree to which the advocates represent the collective interest of group members. Representation on the boards of public bodies is also emerging as an important channel for access to government decision-making; however, the extent to which individual representatives on these boards are accountable to the broad interests of group members is unclear.

Groups throughout the economy find the Ministries to be *the* point of access. This indicates that it is the Ministries which are perceived by interest groups to be the seat of policy decision-making (at least that part of the process that is accessible) in the Third Republic, and thus the locus for influence

activities. This observation is strengthened by the finding that groups generally report it is Ministers or their staff, more than any other individual or group outside their membership, that they consult when formulating a position on governmental affairs.

Overall, the groups currently most vocal, and seemingly most influential, in Zambia are those that represent traditional private sector interests, and support economic liberalization: that is, ZACCI, ZAM, and the ZNFU. Groups supporting traditionally small-scale, government-supported interests (i.e. NAPSSF, PFU, the emerging PBA's) are less sophisticated in their influence attempts, rely on a smaller pool of resources, and are subsequently less influential in the formal policy process. The labour sector, comprised of groups once strong, autonomous, and relatively influential, has been hamstrung in its attempts to influence policy, due to member / leader disputes and recent legislation permitting splinter groups to form.

There has been a decrease in interest group advocacy for the development of democratic institutions, e.g. the demands that the ZCTU made in 1990-91 for reinstatement of multi-party elections. However, there has been a notable increase in the number, scope, and intensity of their demands upon government. These demands focus around implementing economic policies that generally encourage private sector growth, as well as specifically protecting the economic interests of group members. Also on the rise are group demands for improved government services (e.g. infrastructure, security, etc.), and critiques of government policy. Also, groups do exert pressure for improving the rule of law, and for making government more accountable and effective. For example, while they cannot be expected to rally around opposition demands for constitutional and electoral change, business and agricultural groups can still be expected to pressure for continued economic liberalization and public sector reform. However, both business and agricultural groups' ability to lobby for continued economic liberalization is diminished by the dearth of institutionalized access to the policy process, and the lack of transparent policy decision-making.

Below, developments in each sector examined in this report are summarized.

#### *The Business Sector*

While the business group of the period, the Zambia National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, also did not join the movement in its organizational capacity, influential figures from the business community did support the movement, as did several figures from the farming community. The umbrella organization for business interests (ZACCI) has since strengthened its organizational capacity and its representation of private sector interests to become a relatively strong advocate for business. However, the increasing number of corporate members on the executive board together with the decreasing number of individual businesses belonging to local chambers threatens to diminish the representative nature of ZACCI's demands on government. The emergence of Provincial Business Associations might provide an alternative channel for small-scale producers not represented by ZACCI.

#### *The Agricultural Sector*

The most established and well-organized group, the National Farmers' Union (ZNFU), has historically represented the interests of large-scale commercial farmers. However, since the transition, the group has sought to increase its representation of small-scale producers through the creation of "club membership." Nonetheless, two new umbrella organizations have emerged alongside the established ZNFU to specifically represent the interests of small-scale and peasant farmers. These groups argue that the ZNFU does not genuinely represent the interests of non-commercial or small-scale farmers. Still active but greatly reduced in size and capacity is the Cooperative Federation (ZCF), which once represented the interests of small-scale producers through the administration of local cooperative societies, but was crippled by the cessation of government subsidies after the transition. The ZCF is currently trying to recreate itself in line with the changes brought by economic liberalization.

### *The Labour Sector*

Most noticeably, the ZCTU *did* engage actively in the movement and the politics surrounding the call for multi-partyism. However, the Congress underwent a serious blow after the transition when the Mineworkers, Teachers, and other unions disaffiliated over a dispute concerning both personalities and the desired relationship between the unions and the ruling party, the MMD. Since the transition, numerous new unions have emerged; for instance, a union to represent journalists was mobilized and several unions have splintered to represent more distinct categories of workers (hence, the Secondary School Teachers Union, the Professional Mineworkers Union, etc). Importantly, a formalized union for traders in the informal sector has not emerged, although government has unilaterally created a special organized voice for this sector-- a "desk" at State House. The labour sector is currently concerned with changes in the Industrial Relations Act that portend serious consequences for the trade union movement.

USAID's Democracy Governance Project Paper (611-0226) has as its stated goal the promotion of accountable government in Zambia. To this end, "the project emphasizes the complementarity of interventions to support "demands" for accountable government from civil society and to enable a "supply" of accountable government by the public sector." As the Paper notes, interest groups are one of the key institutions of civil society that allow citizens to gain access to government and ensure its accountability. This study explores how interest groups currently active in Zambia are organized and how they lobby government, and analyzes the factors, both organizational and institutional, that affect their capacity to do so effectively. Below are suggested further interventions by USAID/Z to encourage the trend of group demands for accountable government, and to promote a public sector supply of effective accountable government. Importantly, the suggested interventions also serve to encourage private sector development

### *Supporting the "demand" for accountable government:*

#### *i. Promoting organizational capacity*

The most effective and representative groups provide economic and political information and analysis to their members, they hold meetings and other fora where members can network and check in on the activities of their leaders, they provide services that group members desire, and they are realistic, efficient, and effective in their attempts at policy advocacy. To accomplish these objectives, groups (especially at the national level) need well-trained and motivated staffs, and they need resources to maintain activities. The best strategy to improve resources is to increase groups' fund-raising capacity: e.g. fundraising drives, commercial activities related to group interests, expansion of membership base, sourcing of domestic and international donors (although concern for sustainability is an important issue for the latter).

Toward this end, an appropriate intervention would be the provision of technical support, an activity which USAID/Z is already engaged in with respect to the business sector. Establishment of projects (like the "small business desk" at ZACCI) which specifically offer technical assistance on group funding and organizational matters and provide sound economic policy advice in line with the principles of liberalization, would aid groups in expanding and serving their membership, and improving their capacity to demand accountable and effective government. Importantly, groups already exist to pursue these goals-- it is not necessary for USAID/Z to support the organizational expenses of forming and maintaining such groups. A single "desk" or position would not be necessary for each group (this would be akin to USAID/Z supporting a staff person); one per sector (business, farming, labour) would suffice.

#### *ii. Promoting a well-informed, empowered citizenry through existing groups*

National groups like ZACCI, ZAM, ZNFU, ZCTU, etc. have a level of understanding of the policy process that small groups like NAPSSF, PFU, PBA's, do not. The larger groups have established elite contacts, are aware of who makes decisions in government and civil service, know how to attain information pertinent to their activities, have experience with seeking influence through use of the media (e.g. press statements, appearing on television broadcast fora, etc), and understand the use of in-house publications to inform the public as well as members, etc. Access to training on these themes could improve the sustainability of the smaller membership organizations; thus increasing the number of effective membership organizations, especially those small-member ones outside the national center. This intervention could be modeled after the successful small business training seminars currently run by HRDA.

## *Enabling a "supply" of effective and accountable government by the public sector:*

As noted in this report, groups' ability to lobby for accountable government and continued economic liberalization is currently diminished by the dearth of institutionalized access to the policy process, and the lack of transparent policy decision-making. To buttress efforts to support the demand for accountable government, and to encourage the kind of report-making that promotes transparency in the policy process, four measures are here suggested. These measures are aimed at ensuring that group demands are met by an interested and capable public sector. The most crucial concern is the first measure (access to the Ministries) as this seems to be the key point of access to important policy decisions.

### *i. institutionalizing access to Ministries*

Research indicates that groups primarily interact with Ministries, and that Cabinet Office expects Ministries to aggregate and submit inputs from the private sector when policy decisions are being made. However, except for the Tripartite Labour Council, there are no institutionalized channels of access from groups to the Ministries, e.g. regular meetings between government and "stakeholders" in the various economic sectors, or a specified position / desk at the Ministry that acts as a liason officer between the Ministry and the public. Several interest groups have indicated a desire for such institutions to be developed, and a key Cabinet official indicates that the government would like to see the same. The principal obstacle, however, is the technical capacity to operate a liason desk.

A possible intervention for USAID/Z in this regard would be to provide training and technical support to current civil servants (e.g. Planning Division Officers) for liason activities in each of the key Ministries, alongside training to groups on how to access such liason officers.

### *ii. institutionalizing access to Parliament*

While lobbying Parliament is not as important to the activities of interest groups as is access to government Ministries, Parliamentary committees do have the potential for providing technical advise and expertise to Parliament, utilizing the experience and resources of established interest groups. There exists already limited activity in this regard; some groups mention their representation on such committees as being important to their overall lobbying strategy. A possible intervention for USAID/Z here again would be technical support and training to the Parliamentary staff who manage such committees, alongside training to groups on how to access these officials.

### *iii. supporting the media*

Research shows that working to influence public opinion through the press and media is an important influence strategy for several of the large lobby groups, mostly at the national level. Two interventions to further support this activity are possible: 1) continuing to support development of a free and independent media through USAID/Z projects at ZAMCOM; 2) additional training to assist groups in developing effective media relations skills, especially how to write and submit press statements and hold press conferences. These programs could be integrated into current ZAMCOM support.

### *iv. supporting the judiciary*

Research shows that while groups do sometimes turn to the legal system as a means of influencing government officials and gaining redress, this channel for official accountability is not as effective as it could be. Group leaders complain of long delays in case hearings, and the business sector is concerned with the lack of a commercial court.

## Endnotes

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1. Schmitter defines "democratic consolidation" as the process of transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged during the transition into relations of cooperation and competition that are reliably known, regularly practiced, and voluntarily accepted by those persons or collectivities (i.e. politicians and citizens) that participate in democratic governance" (1992:424). In the same article, Schmitter also notes that "the core of the consolidation dilemma lies in coming up with a set of institutions that politicians can agree on and that citizens are willing to support" (ibid:425).
2. Also in this vein, Larry Diamond (1996) argues a distinction between "electoral" and "liberal" democracy, the latter of which is more inclusive and includes among its features the following: "beyond parties and intermittent elections, citizens have multiple, ongoing channels and means for the expression and representation of their interests and values, including a diverse array of autonomous associations, movements, and groups that they are free to form and join." Diamond argues that democratic consolidation is "the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is better for their society than any other... they can imagine" (33). To achieve consolidation, regimes which have recently become "electoral" democracies must deepen and develop more liberal institutions-- most especially multiple and ongoing channels for the representation of their interests.
3. Note: ZAM is not an umbrella organization in the same sense that the other groups mentioned here are: it does not coordinate the efforts of other interest groups, and its members are manufacturing enterprises, not other interest groups. However, ZAM is uncharacteristically active in advocating its policy interests to government, and is one of the most vocal groups in the interest arena. Thus, it has been chosen as one of the six primary groups for analysis.
4. Following Baylies and Szeftel (1984:74), the term "businessmen" is used to refer to all those who own a business as private individuals, or are shareholders in registered companies. Businesses or business interests include small-scale retail establishments, such as groceries, and larger enterprises, such as shops, restaurants, bars, filling stations, insurance or advertising agencies, commercial farms, manufacturing firms, construction and transport companies.
5. Act 1990, as it came to be called, abolished mandatory affiliation to ZCTU and instituted a requirement for a two-thirds majority in order to re-affiliate, and gave the Minister and Labour Commissioner considerable powers of discretion over the registration and dissolution of trade unions and auditing of their accounts.
6. see Akwetey 1994:48.
7. see Mushota 1990:31.
8. Specifically, the Act confers broad discretionary powers to the Minister responsible for cooperatives: "the Minister shall take, authorize, or approve such measures as he deems advisable for the encouragement generally of co-operative development..." (Section 3). To this end, the Minister was vested with powers to "assist the organisation of co-operative societies..." (Section 4. a) and to "facilitate the financing of societies, where necessary for their establishment and operation, by the provision of, or arrangement for, loans, guarantees of loans, or otherwise" (Section 4.b). The Registrar of Co-operative Societies was also given wide discretionary powers with regard to deciding which groups could be registered as societies, and how societies would be regulated and supervised (Mbewe 1996:3). These provisions were in line with the one-party states' objectives for centralized control of the economy, regulation of social organizations, and the principles of "humanist" development... "in accordance with its promise, Government allocated certain resources, particularly financial ones, to cooperatives in the form of subsidies... loans and grants. In addition, the Government broke away from conventional

cooperative practice in providing that it would not be essential for members of new groups seeking registration to subscribe share capital before commencing operations (I.L.O., 1967:3), in order that no one should be prevented from coming forward..." (Lombard).

9. ILO No. 87 enshrines the freedom of collective bargaining, while No. 98 enshrines affirms the right of association.

10. Several methods for collecting data on these organizations have been utilized. Intensive interviews with selected leaders and members have been conducted, to gather information on organizational structure, history, and current policy concerns and activities. Participant observation techniques have been used to monitor and record meetings held by both apex organizations and their member organizations (e.g. ZACCI meetings as well as local chamber meetings). A lengthy and detailed survey covering all groups has been carried out, to accumulate data on organizational, financial, and policy-related variables. Descriptive data from this survey is discussed in this section, while analysis of the quantitative data is given in the following section. Finally, a database comprised of media reports on meetings between groups and government and relevant press statements issued by groups and government contributes useful qualitative details to the organizational descriptions. All of these methods are discussed in Appendix B.

11. In choosing this kind of group to study, I do not intend to suggest that they are the only important groups active in Zambia or its democratization process at present; rather, this type of group is especially amenable to analysis as its interests in the policy process are more readily quantifiable (e.g. measuring a group's attempt to influence tax regulations is less complicated than measuring a group's attempt to ensure "the rule of law.") Thus, professional organizations such as the Law Association of Zambia are not included, as they do not have direct interest in specific economic policy, although they might be quite active in other policy areas such as civil rights.

12. Note: ZAM is not an umbrella organization in the same sense that the other groups mentioned here are: it does not coordinate the efforts of other interest groups, and its members are manufacturing enterprises, not other interest groups. However, ZAM is uncharacteristically active in advocating its policy interests to government, and is one of the most vocal groups in the interest arena. Thus, it has been chosen as one of the six primary groups for analysis.

13. Note: these figures do not add up to 100%. Either they are miscalculated, or a category of expenditure for PFU was not included on the questionnaire.

14. These categories were used by Walker (1991), with the explanation that the first three reflect a typology developed by Clark and Wilson (1961), while the fourth, professional benefits, reflects an attention to occupationally based groups. Walker offers as confirmation that the categories "go together" a factor analysis completed by Knoke (1988) on these variables. Such analysis provides evidence that groups that provided one of the benefits in a category are more likely than other groups to provide other benefits in the same category (see Walker 1991:86, fn.3). In the present sample, factor analysis is again required to convince us that these benefits do "go together" in the Zambian context; however, the present sample is not large enough to conduct such analysis.

15. See Moe 1980:117.

16. See Manchur Olson's "by-product theory."

TABLE ONE: Funding Sources

A: Financial Contributions at Founding					B: Funding Sources Once Established				
Group	Intl. Donor	Large Contr.	Small Contr.	Other	Govt	Intl Donor	Memb Dues	Interest	Other
ZCF	xx			govt		1%	1%	3%	trading 95%
ZNFU		xx					60%		special projects 40%
PFU			xx				100%		
ZACCI		xx				19%	52%	22%	member services 7%
ZAM				memb dues			100%		
ZFE	xx						60%	8%	fund raising 32%
PBA (1 member)			xx				100%		
ZNFU members (4)			(3)	memb dues (1)			(4) only source		
ZACCI members (4)				none (4)			(4)		fund raising (1)
ZCTU members (5)	(3)		(4)	ZCTU (1)	(2)		(5)	(2)	fund raising (2)

\*members refers to member organizations of the umbrella group which returned a questionnaire; the number of member groups thus included is indicated by the number in ( ). Numbers in ( ) in the table indicate the number of member groups giving that particular response, out of the total given in the lefthand column. Thus, 3 of 4 ZNFU members report they initially received small contributions. For ZCTU, former member organizations which have recently disaffiliated are included in "members."

Intl. Donor = contribution from an international donor agency

Large Contr. = large Contributor, i.e. individual or company that makes a large contribution

Small Contr. = small Contributor, i.e. individual or company that makes a small contribution

Govt = grant or recurrent funding from government agency

Memb. Dues = member dues and subscriptions

N=21

Source = 1997 Survey

**TABLE TWO: LARGE AND SMALL MEMBERS**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Fixed Dues Kw / yr</b>	<b>Sliding Dues (Kwacha / year)</b>
<b>ZCF</b>		5,000 - 20,000
<b>ZNFU</b>		20,000 - 15 million
<b>PFU</b>	20,000	
<b>ZACCI</b>		100,000 - 1.2 million
<b>ZAM</b>	600,000	
<b>ZFE</b>		192,000 - 2.4 million
<b>PBA (1 member)</b>	20,000	
<b>ZNFU members (4)</b>	5 - 10,000	
<b>ZACCI members (4)</b>		120,000 - 500,000
<b>ZCTU members (5)</b>		3,000 - 24,000

\* members refers to member organizations of the umbrella group which returned a questionnaire; the number of member groups thus included is indicated by the number in ( ) in the left hand column. For ZCTU, former member organizations which have recently disaffiliated are included in "members."

N = 21

Source: 1997 Survey

**TABLE THREE: PERCENTAGE OF GROUPS REPORTING SOME IMPORTANCE OF BENEFIT,  
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR,  
(with Apex Organizations Given Separately in Addition)**

Benefit	Agriculture	Business	Labour	Apex (6)	Total
<b>Professional Benefits</b>					
Conferences & Meetings	100	100	100	(5)	100
Professional contacts	86	86	86	(5)	81
Training	86	57	100	(6)	77
<b>Purposive benefits</b>					
Advocacy	100	100	86	(6)	95
Representation before government	100	100	100	(6)	100
Participation in public affairs	57	86	71	(4)	68
<b>Solidary benefit</b>					
Friendship	86	71	57	43	68
<b>Personal material benefits</b>					
Trips, tours	86	43	57	(4)	59
Insurance	28	0	0	0	9
Discount on Consumer Goods	57	28	14	(3) all agr	50
<b>Informational benefits</b>					
Publications	100	86	71	(6)	81
Research	86	57	71	(6)	77
<b>Other Benefits</b>					
Coordination among organizations	86	86	57	(4)	73
Legal Help	71	28	86	(3) all agr	
<b>Maintain professional codes.</b>					
Collective bargaining					
<i>N (total = 21)</i>	7	7	7		21

Source: 1997 Survey

Figures are percentage of total sample giving each response.

55

**TABLE FOUR: IMPORTANCE OF BENEFITS IN ATTRACTING MEMBERS,  
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR,**

Benefit	Agriculture	Business	Labour	Total
<b>Professional Benefits</b>				
Conferences & Meetings	49	80	54	61
Professional contacts	42	57	34	44
Training	63	31	71	55
<b>Purposive benefits</b>				
Advocacy	68	97	71	79
Representation before government	97	97	83	92
Participation in public affairs	40	57	40	46
<b>Solidary benefit</b>				
Friendship	51	34	37	41
<b>Personal material benefits</b>				
Trips, tours	49	22	34	35
Insurance	17	0	0	6
Discount on Consumer Goods	40	17	6	21
<b>Informational benefits</b>				
Publications	77	60	51	63
Research	57	29	54	47
<b>Other Benefits</b>				
Coordination among organizations	80	57	46	61
Legal Help	37	14	69	40
Maintain professional codes	17	40	0	19
Collective bargaining	91	9	85	62
<i>N (total = 22)</i>	7	7	8	7

*Source = 1997 Survey*

Note: Entries are self-reported estimates of how important each benefit is in attracting new members to the group. The lowest entry is 0, corresponding to the benefit being "not at all important," or not provided, and the highest entry is 100, corresponding to "most important." Entries are averages for all groups of the type indicated. See Walker 1991.

TABLE FIVE: IMPORTANCE OF POLICY INFLUENCE STRATEGIES

	Level of Importance					
	Most	Very	Some- what	Not Very	Not At All	Not Applic.
<b>"Inside" Activities</b>						
Lobbying, Policy Formulation Stage	67	14	--	--	5	14
Lobbying, Policy Implementation Stage	52	19	10	5	5	10
Litigating	0	5	29	14	29	24
Electioneering	0	5	5	19	29	43
<b>"Outside" Strategies</b>						
Working with Mass Media	24	19	24	10	10	14
Protesting or Demonstrating	0	5	24	10	33	29

*N = 21, Source: 1997 Survey*

Figures are percentage of total sample giving each response.

TABLE SIX: IMPORTANCE OF POLICY INFLUENCE STRATEGIES, BY ECONOMIC SECTOR

	Agric.	Business	Labour	Local	Apex
<b>"Inside" Activities</b>					
Lobbying, Policy Formulation Stage	86	100	57**	92	100
Lobbying, Policy Implementation Stage	57	86	71	77	83
Litigating	0	0	17	10	0
Electioneering	17	0	0	0	20
<b>"Outside" Strategies</b>					
Working with Mass Media	43	43	43	22	83
Protesting or Demonstrating	17	0	0	0	20

*N = 21, Source: 1997 Survey*

\*Numbers represent percentage of groups reporting that activity to be either "most important" or "very important" among activities engaged in.

\*\*Using a percentage in this case is somewhat misleading, for 4 of the groups reported this to be the "most important" while three reported it was "not applicable."

**TABLE SEVEN: FREQUENCY OF GROUP INTERACTIONS WITH GOVERNMENT**

	<b>Often</b>	<b>Sometimes</b>	<b>Seldom</b>	<b>Never</b>
<b>National Government</b>	67	24	10	0
Office of the President (24)	100	0	0	0
Ministries (95)	65	25	10	0
Parliament (38)	100	0	0	0
<b>Local Government</b>	43	24	14	19

*N = 21, Source: 1997 Survey*

Figures are percentages of total sample reporting that particular frequency. Figures in parentheses are percentages of total sample which report consulting that branch of national government.

**TABLE EIGHT: FREQUENCY OF GROUP INTERACTIONS WITH GOVERNMENT, BY ECONOMIC SECTOR AND TYPE OF GROUP**

	<b>Agriculture</b>	<b>Business</b>	<b>Labour</b>	<b>Apex</b>	<b>Local</b>
<b>National Government</b>	86	57	57	83	60
Office of the President*	29	14	28	50	13
Ministries	100	86**	100	100	91
Parliament*	51	29	29	67	27
<b>Local Government</b>	57	43	29	83	33

*N = 21, Source: 1997 Survey*

Figures are percentages of sector reporting that they interact with that branch of government. Entries are averages for all groups in that sector, with "often" being scored as 100, "sometimes" being 60, "seldom" being 20, "never" being 0.

\*note: all groups who report interacting with President's Office and those interacting with Parliament are groups that report interacting frequently with national government.

\*\*note: this is partly an artifact of small sample size... one of the seven business sector groups reporting represents clearing and forwarding agents, and therefore only interacts with the Zambia Revenue Authority.

**TABLE NINE: INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS CONSULTED BY GROUPS  
WHEN FORMULATING POLICY, FREQUENCY**

	Always	Often	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
Individual Experts	14	33	24	5	24
Other Organizations	10	38	24	5	24
Members of Association	57	29	--	5	10
Members of Parliament & Staff	5	10	43	10	29
Ministries & Staff	14	19	48	0	19
President's Office & Staff	5	0	14	43	38
Local Government	10	14	29	19	29
Private Donors	5	24	5	5	62
International Donors	0	10	19	10	62
Media	0	5	29	33	33
Political Parties	0	0	29	19	52

*N = 21, Source: 1997 Survey*

Figures are percentages of total sample reporting that particular frequency.

**TABLE TEN: INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS CONSULTED ALWAYS OR OFTEN BY GROUPS  
WHEN FORMULATING POLICY, BY ECONOMIC SECTOR**

	Agriculture	Business	Labour
Individual Experts	57	29	57
Other Organizations	42	43	57
Members of Association	86	86	86
Members of Parliament & Staff	14	29	0
Ministries & Staff	43	29	29
President's Office & Staff	0	14	0
Local Government	29	29	0
Private Donors	29	29	29
International Donors	14	0	14
Media	14	0	0
Political Parties	0	0	0

*N = 21, Source: 1997 Survey*

Figures are percentages of sector reporting that they "always" or "often" consult that individual or organization when establishing policy positions.

**TABLE ELEVEN: PREFERRED PROVISION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES, FREQUENCY**

Policy Area	Much More	Somewhat More	Neutral	Somewhat Less	Much Less
Economic Development	57	24	9	0	0
Civil Rights and Liberties	33	10	38	5	0
Education	43	48	5	5	0
Agriculture	52	19	14	10	5
Business	19	24	29	19	10
Housing	33	19	24	5	10
Employment	24	52	0	10	14
Transportation	33	24	19	5	10
International Trade	43	29	14	10	5
Foreign Affairs	24	38	24	0	10

*N = 21, Source: 1997 Survey*

Figures are percentages of total sample reporting that particular level of provision.

**TABLE TWELVE: PREFERRED PROVISION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES, BY ECONOMIC SECTOR**

	Agriculture	Business	Labour
Economic Development	100	86	71
Civil Rights and Liberties	57	29	43
Education	100	71	100
Agriculture	100	43	71
Business	43	43	43
Housing	14	71	71
Employment	86	57	86
Transportation	86	57	29
International Trade	71	71	57
Foreign Affairs	71	71	43

*N = 21, Source: 1997 Survey*

Figures are percentages of sector reporting that they would prefer "more" or "much more" government services in that policy area.


**CHART ONE: Mobilization of Interest Groups by Political Regime**

<b>Colonial Admin.</b> 1900 - 1963	<b>First Republic</b> 1964 - 1971	<b>Second Republic</b> 1972 - 1990	<b>Third Republic</b> 1991 - present
1904: ZNFU	1964: NUPAW	1972: BAZ	1993: SFA
1904: CFA	1965: ZSPA	1973: ZCF	1995: LPBA
1933: LCCI	1968: AAWUZ	1975: CSUZ	1995: PFU
1938: ZACCI	1970: ZUFIAW	1980: MFA	
1946: NUBEGW		Mid-1980: ZAM	
1948: MUZ		1990: ZCFAA	
1950's: CCCI			
1955: ZFE			


# Chart Two: Revenue Sources

Average Percentage of Revenue Obtained by Groups from Each Sector in 1996


### Agriculture



### Business




### Labour



# Chart Three: Changes in Membership Levels

(note: PFU's membership for 1996-97 is 25,000, which doesn't fit on graph))



**BUSINESS LOBBY**

- \*Association of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors ZACCI  
c/o Drake & Gorham Ltd., P.O. Box 31776, Lusaka
- \*Bankers Association of Zambia ZACCI  
c/o Standard Chartered Bank Ltd., P.O. Box 32238, Lusaka
- Bakers Association  
POB 31936, Lusaka
- \*Chingola Chamber of Commerce ZACCI  
c/o Shamwati Ltd., P.O. Box 10795, Chingola
- Chipata Chamber of Commerce ZACCI  
c/o Idris Ugrader, tel. 20701, fax. 21210, Chipata
- Clothing and Allied Industries Association of Zambia
- Federation of Zambia Road Hauliers ZACCI  
P.O. Box 71346, Ndola
- Gemstones Corporation Zambia
- Indigenous Business Development Foundation
- Leather Industries Association of Zambia
- Master Printers and Newspaper Proprietors Association of Zambia
- Motor Traders Association of Zambia
- Kabwe Chamber of Commerce ZACCI  
P.O. Box 80914, Kabwe
- Kitwe Chamber of Commerce ZACCI  
c/o Engineering Services Installation Ltd. P.O. Box 21866, Kitwe
- \*Lusaka Chamber of Commerce ZACCI  
c/o Ndeke Hotel, P.O. Box 30815, Lusaka
- Ndola Chamber of Commerce ZACCI  
c/o Reckit & Coleman, Ltd., P.O. Box 71658, Ndola
- ^Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO)
- ^Small Scale Enterprises Promotion Limited (SSEP)
- Small Scale Industries Association of Zambia (SSIAZ)  
POB 37156, Lusaka
- Solwezi Chamber of Commerce
- Textile Producers of Zambia (TPZ) ZACCI  
c/o Swarp Spinning Mills Ltd., P.O. Box 71846, Ndola
- Tour Operators Association of Zambia (TOAZ)
- Travel Agents Association of Zambia (TAAZ)
- ^Village Industry Service (VIS)
- Women Entrepreneurs in Industry and Business (WEIB)
- Youth Entrepreneurs Association of Zambia (YEAZ)
- \*Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI)  
Showgrounds, Great East Rd, POB 30844, Lusaka, Tel: 252369, 252483
- \*Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM) ZACCI  
Kasuma Plastics, Kutwa Rd., P.O. Box 51018, Lusaka, Tel: 226-589
- \*Zambia Clearing and Forwarding Agents Association (ZCFA) ZACCI  
c/o Hill and Delamain, P.O. Box 30899, Lusaka
- Zambia National Visual Arts Council (ZNVAC)

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• delivered a questionnaire

• \* returned questionnaire

^ SIDO, VIS, and SSEP are not membership organizations, and so were not included in the study. They are government-sponsored organizations which support development in the private sector.

**FARMER'S LOBBY**

- Beef Cattle Producer's Association of Zambia *ZNFU*  
POB 50146, Lusaka
- Chadiza Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 520049, Chadiza
- Chinsali Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 1, Shiwang'andu
- \*Chippata Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 510373, Chipata
- Chisamba Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 31830, Lusaka
- Choma / Kaloma Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 630246, Choma
- Chongwe River Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 30164, Lusaka
- Zambia Coffee Growers' Association *ZNFU*  
POB 90599, Luanshya
- Copperbelt East Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 71522, Ndola
- Copperbelt West Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
Border Farmer's Coop Society, POB 21201, Kitwe, Tel: 02/215401
- Environmental Conservation Assoc. *ZNFU*  
POB 320015, Lusaka
- Zambia Export Grower's Assoc. *ZNFU*  
POB 310245, Lusaka
- Zambia Farm Employees' Assoc. *ZNFU*  
POB 31522, Lusaka
- Isoka Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 440010, Isoka
- Kaoma Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 450014, Kaoma
- Kabompo Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 140048, Kabompo
- Kabwe Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 80522, Kabwe
- Kasama Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 41790, Kasama
- Katete Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 550121, Katete
- Luapula Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 710438, Luapula
- Lundazi Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 530968, Lundazi
- Lusaka West Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 34369, Lusaka
- Mazabuka Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 670086, Mazabuka

- 
- delivered a questionnaire
  - \* returned questionnaire
  - Mbala Farmer's Union *ZNFU*

- POB 420046, Mbala
- Mkushi Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 840172, Mkushi
  - Monze / Pemba Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 660153, Monze
  - Mpika Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
P/Bag 16, Mpika
  - Mpongwe Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 146, Mpongwe
  - \*Mumbwa Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 830196, Mumbwa
  - \*National Association of Peasant & Small-Scale Farmer's Union  
Tel: 238370, Mr Charles Zandala
  - Nchelenge Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 740154, Nchelenge
  - Nyimba Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 570050, Nyimba
  - \*Peasant Farmer's Union  
Kabwe, Mr Kayeka
  - Petauke Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 560151, Petauke
  - Samfya Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 720035, Samfya
  - \*Seed Association *ZNFU*  
POB 30013, Lusaka
  - \*Serenje Farmer's Union  
POB
  - Solwezi Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 110305, Solwezi
  - Tobacco Association of Zambia *ZNFU*  
POB 32617, Lusaka
  - Ukwimi Farmer's Association *ZNFU*  
POB 560033, Petauke
  - Wildlife Association of Zambia *ZNFU*  
POB 80481, Kabwe
  - Young Farmer's Association *ZNFU*  
POB 60140, Livingstone
  - \*Zambia Cooperative Federation  
Cooperative House, Lusaka, Tel: 238901, 238538-9  
Development Services, 120 Kudu Rd., Kabulonga, Tel: 262426
  - Zambia Farmer's Cooperative Society  
Farmer's House, Cairo Rd. Lusaka, Tel: 226-992
  - \*Zambia National Farmer's Union  
POB 30395, Lusaka, TAZ House, Chachacha Rd. Tel: 223222, 222797
  - Zimba / Livingstone Farmer's Union *ZNFU*  
POB 34, Zimba

- 
- delivered a questionnaire
  - \* returned questionnaire

**LABOUR LOBBY**

- \*Airways and Allied Workers Union ZCTU  
Ndeke House, Haile Selassie Ave. POB 30272, Lusaka
- \*Civil Servants Union Zambia ZCTU  
Church House, Cairo Rd. POB 50160, Lusaka, Tel: 01/ 221332
- Guards Union of Zambia ZCTU  
Old Buchi Post Office, POB 21882, Kitwe
- Hotel Catering Workers Union of Zambia ZCTU  
ZNUT Bldg, Karachi St., POB 35693, Lusaka, Tel: 01/ 236091, 01/ 236092
- \*Mineworkers Union of Zambia  
Katilungu House, POB 20448, Kitwe, Tel: 01/ 224281, 224022, 01/ 224276
- \*National Union of Building, Engineering, and General Workers ZCTU  
Mable House, 1st Flr., POB 21515, Kitwe, Tel: 02/ 225778
- National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers
- National Union of Communication Workers ZCTU  
Buteko House, POB 70751, Ndola, Tel: 02/ 611345, 614679
- \*National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers  
Plot No.209, Independence Way, POB 80529, Kitwe
- National Union of Public Service Workers ZCTU  
Springbok House, Cha Cha Cha Rd., POB 32523, Lusaka, Tel: 01/ 227451, 225167
- National Union of Transport and Allied Workers ZCTU  
Plot No. 6888, Kalenga Bdg. Freedom Way, Lusaka, Tel: 01/ 222531
- Railway Worker's Union of Zambia ZCTU  
Combined Union Bldg. POB 80302, Kabwe, Tel: 05/ 224006
- University of Zambia and Allied Workers Union ZCTU  
Union Offices, UNZA, POB 32379, Lusaka, Tel: 01/ 252514
- Zambia Congress of Trade Unions  
Baynards Bldg. POB 20652, Kitwe, Tel: 02/ 225091, 224765, 01/ 225055  
CUSA House, Third Flr., Lusaka, Tel: 01/225055
- Zambia Electricity and Allied Workers Union ZCTU  
POB 70859, Ndola, Tel: 02/613472, 613211
- \*Zambia Federation of Employers  
6662 Mberere Rd., Olympia Park, POB 31941, Lusaka, Tel: 295-541
- Zambia National Pensioner Association  
P/B 90, Lusaka
- Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers ZCTU  
University Teaching Hospital, POB 50539, Lusaka, Tel: 01/ 251637
- Zambia National Union of Teachers  
ZNUT Bldg, Karachi St. POB 31914, Lusaka, Tel: 01/ 236670, 01/ 231439
- Zambia Typographical Worker's Union ZCTU  
POB 70069, Ndola. Tel: ?/ 611001
- Zambia Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers ZCTU  
Plot No. 17, Obote Ave., POB 21735, Kitwe, Tel: 02/ 227975, 223336
- \*Zambia Union of Financial Instit's and Allied Workers  
4th floor, Provident House, Cairo Rd. POB 31174, Lusaka, Tel: 01/ 222105, 01/ 222812
- Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union ZCTU  
POB 70575, Ndola, Tel: 02/ 615022

- 
- delivered a questionnaire
  - \* returned questionnaire

## APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGY

1. Interviews
2. Participant Observation
3. Organizational Survey
4. Media Report Content Analysis
5. Questionnaire Items used for Group Profile Graphs

### 1. Interviews

Over 50 loosely-structured, intensive interviews were conducted over the period October 1996 - September 1997 with leaders and staff members of interest groups, and members of government who interact with such groups. These interviews ranged from 1/2 hour to 2 hours, and covered topics such as: organizational structure, finance issues, lobbying strategies, and current policy concerns (for group representatives); formal and informal linkages between groups and government, changes in policy making institutions since the Second Republic, and desired activities for interest group sector (for government officials). Section 1.A. of Bibliography gives a list of interviews conducted.

### 2. Participant Observation

Data was gathered on interest group agendas and intra-organizational relationships between group leaders and principal members through participant observation at group meetings. Researcher made her official presence as an academic researcher known at these meetings. Since not all groups permitted the researcher to attend meetings, and since researcher was not available for the dates of all meetings, it was only possible to collect data for *some* of the groups under study. Since this data is not complete, it cannot be systematically compared across groups, but the experience provided the researcher with important impressions and insights that are reflected in this report. Groups permitting access to meetings, and those not permitting access to meetings, are given below:

Permitted access to Board and Executive Meetings:	ZACCI, ZAM, CRFA, CCCI, CWFA
Permitted access to Annual General Meetings:	ZACCI, ZNFU
Invited as guest to Tripartite Council Meeting:	ZCTU
Schedule conflicts prevented invited attendance:	MUZ, NASSPF
Denied access to Executive and Board Meetings:	ZFE, ZCF

### 3. Organizational Survey

#### *Survey Instrument*

The survey questionnaire was based upon work done by Professor Jack Walker on interest group mobilization in the United States. Walker's study of organizational issues and policy influence strategies was used as a model for the Zambian study because it is insightful and sophisticated, and generates many interesting hypotheses that prove useful to test in different political and economic environments. For his study, Walker conducted two surveys, in 1980 and 1985, using basically the same survey instrument. The 1985 questionnaire was mailed to 1,636 groups over the course of a year, and had a response rate of about 55%.

A modified questionnaire was developed to make the survey instrument applicable to the Zambian case; changes included soliciting information on group perspectives of the regime change in 1991, and exploring the relationship between groups and the specific governing institutions of Zambia's Third Republic. The resulting questionnaire was discussed with the economist of a leading national interest group in Zambia to determine the suitability of the questions for Zambian interest groups, but the questionnaire was not tested on specific groups, as this would have reduced an already small pool of respondents.

The survey instrument comprised 41 questions, with 5 open-ended response questions meant to gather qualitative data on group goals, benefits, political activities, and effectiveness, and 36

predominantly close-ended response questions meant to gather quantitative data that would be comparable across groups. For the latter, questions reflected several issue areas. The first dealt with organizational issues such as meeting schedules, leadership structure, membership, and staff. Following sections dealt with benefits provided by the group, funding and financial issues, intergroup coordination / competition, policy interests, lobbying strategies, and issues of group- government interaction. As the questionnaire was distributed only to groups with leaders active at the national level, where English is the official language, it was administered in English only.

#### *Sampling Frame*

The sampling frame used for the survey was drawn from several sources. The primary source is the Registrar of Societies, a statutory body with which all social groups in Zambia must register. From the official Registry, names of groups organized around an economic interest were separated, and added to a general list. Also added to the list were the associational members of the primary apex organizations. Appendix C gives this final list, with apex-affiliation given in parantheses. As this final list comprises only about 100 organizations, it was decided that the questionnaire would be administered to the whole population of active, voluntary, member-based organizations, rather than to a select sample of groups. Groups which fit this description and were therefore delivered a questionnaire are marked by an asterisk (although some groups were not given a questionnaire because the researcher could not locate them). By delivering and following up questionnaire completion in person, the goal was for a full response rate to be achieved. However, to date this is not the case: only a partial, self-selected subset has returned the questionnaire. The response rate to date is given below:

Type of Group	Total Delivered	Total responses	Response rate
Business	12	7	58 %
Agriculture*	41	8	20 %
Labour	22	7	32 %
Total	75	22	29%

\*the low response rate here is due to many of these associations being in areas far outside the capital city of Lusaka; collection of completed questionnaires was thus difficult. However, all national organizations in Lusaka did return a completed questionnaire. While NAPPSF did return a questionnaire, though, it was too late to include it in the quantitative analysis. Thus, N = 21 for the tables and analysis.

#### *Data Analysis*

Due to the low response rate thus far, only preliminary, primarily descriptive analysis has been conducted. Therefore, most of the findings reported in this report are impressionistic, not statistically valid, and percentages given should be understood as such. The analysis reports on findings where there is a substantial and interesting variation, such as the fact that 80-100% of groups are similar in a certain response; but ignores findings where variation is insignificant. The analysis at this point is mostly descriptive: causal analysis of effects between variables is not possible until more questionnaires have been returned. Efforts to collect more completed questionnaires are continuing-- a more complete sample should be available by researcher's departure date in December 1997. This data will be statistically analysed early 1998, and the results made available to USAID/Z in addendum to this report.

#### **4. Media Report Content Analysis: data collection assisted by Show George Makaha**

The government-owned *Times of Zambia (TOZ)* daily newspaper was comprehensively reviewed for the years 1990, 1991, and 1996, and a random sample of the daily editions were reviewed for the years 1988, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995. (The *Times of Zambia* was chosen because a quantitative review of the *Times of Zambia*, the *Daily Mail*, and the *Post* newspapers of October 1996 - April 1997 showed that the *Time of Zambia* wrote articles mentioning interest groups most frequently). This systematic review was conducted utilizing the National Archives collection of the *Times of Zambia* (which is missing several editions). For the TOZ newspapers reviewed, all articles which mentioned one

of the groups under study (see Appendix A) had the date of publication, the headline of the article, the issue addressed by the article, and any action taken by the parties involved, recorded into a primary database. This database was then used as a source for analyzing the contents of the article as to the nature of the issue reported. Possible issues were categorized into a secondary database, which was distinct for each sector. The date of the article was subsequently recorded into the following pre-determined categories of issues:

Business Lobby	Farmer Lobby	Labour Lobby
group leadership challenged	group leadership challenged	group leadership challenged
elections / Dismissals	elections / Dismissals	elections / Dismissals
withdraw from apex	withdraw from apex	withdraw from apex
comment on economic policy	comment on economic policy	disagreement over wages
comment on other policy	comment on agriculture policy	strike threatened
comment on govt. regulation	comment on other policy	strike carried out
comment on govt. services	comment on govt. regulation	boycott threat or carried out
criticism of regime	comment on govt. services	industrial relations
"watchdog reports"	criticism of regime	comment on economic policy
"zambianization issues"	"watchdog reports"	comment on other policy
general donor issues	"zambianization issues"	criticism of regime
political message to public	general donor issues	"watchdog reports"
business message to public	political message to public	"social partners" reports
group message to public	agricultural message to public	worker & employer relations
govt message to public	group message to public	political message to public
	govt message to public	group message to public
	report of ZCF input distribution	govt message to public

The result of this database is thus:

- a comprehensive source of information on media reports covered by the *Times of Zambia* for the years 1990, 1991, and 1996. These reports can be analyzed as to the total frequency and changes in frequency of reports on a given sector, as well as the content of reports on a given sector. Also, the frequency of reports and content of reports can be compared across sectors.
- a representative sample of information on media reports covered by the *Times of Zambia* for the years 1988, 1989, and 1992-1995. These reports can be used to compare changes in frequency across these years for a given sector (but do not give the total frequency of reports within a year for a given sector), and they can be used to compare relative frequency and content of reports between sectors.

#### *Sampling Issues*

- For 1990, 321 (88%) of the 365 daily editions were available for review; for 1991, 343 (94 %) of the 365 daily editions were available for review; for 1996, 356 (98 %) of the 365 daily editions were available for review.
- For 1988, 1989, 1992-1995, a random sampling method was used to choose 20% of the total population of newspapers published during these years (i.e. 73 out of 365 dailies per year, for a total of 438 out of 2190 dailies).

#### *1996 Newspaper Accounts: Times of Zambia, Daily Mail, The Post*

These three major newspapers were examined daily for articles pertaining to interest groups activity. While comprehensive coverage of all three was attempted, not all papers were available to the researcher every day; though at least one paper was available every day. Coverage of each is as follows (dates of collection-- Sept. 18, 1996 to Sept 1. 1997):

<i>Times of Zambia:</i>	296 out of 348 dailies
<i>Daily Mail:</i>	209 out of 348 dailies
<i>The Post:</i>	177 out of 244 dailies

## 5. Questionnaire Items used for Group Profile Graphs

**Benefits Provided:** "There may be a variety of benefits or activities that attract members to join an association. For each of the following factors, please indicate, using the scale provided, your best estimate of the importance of that factor for attracting members to this organization."

1. Most important 2. Very important 3. Somewhat important 4. not very important 5. not at all important

graph label:

publications	Publications or other informational services
training	Training, education, or technical assistance
meetings	Conferences and meetings
insurance	Low-cost insurance
lobbying	Advocacy of important values, ideas, or policies; Representation of members' opinions before government agencies
	Communication with professional peers or colleagues
	Organized tours or trips
coll. barg.	Collective bargaining
research	Research
discounts	Discounts on consumer goods
legal services	Legal assistance
	Licensing, accreditation, or codes development
	Opportunity for participation in public affairs
	Friendship or social relationship with other members
	Coordination of activities of organizations in this field

**Lobbying Strategies:** "Associations may engage in a variety of activities in order to achieve their policy goals. Using the scale below, please indicate your best estimate of the importance of that activity for this association."

1. Most important 2. Very important 3. Somewhat important 4. not very important 5. not at all important

graph label:

policy form.	Working with government agencies in policy formation
policy imp.	Working with government agencies in policy implementation
litigation	Pursuing issues through litigation in the courts
electoral aid	Working to aid the election of political leaders
media	Working to influence public opinion through publicity and the media
demonstrations	Organizing or carrying out public demonstrations or protests

**Policy Consultation:** "When formulating position on government affairs, some associations consult with a variety of individuals or organizations. Please indicate how often this association consults with the groups listed below, using the following scale:"

1. Always 2. Often 3. Sometimes 4. Seldom 5. Never

graph label:

policy experts	Individual policy experts in the policy area
other groups	Other organizations active in the policy area
members	Members of this association
Parliament	Members of Parliament or their staff
Ministries	Ministers or their staff
State House	President or State House staff
Local Govt	Local government representatives
	Private donors that provide funds to this organization
	International donors that provide funds to this organization
	Members of the press or media
	Political party leaders or others in party organizations

**APPENDIX C: Interest Group Leaders – MMD Connections**

**List of Contributors to National Conference on Multiparty Option, July 1990**

B. Banda	Adamson	A.M. Lewanika	Dipak Patel
D. Banda	Chitembwe	A.C. Liatto	P. Patel
G.C. Banda	D. Chiyabo	D.M. Ligwa	M. Phiri
M. Banda	Choolwe	Kennedy	S. Phiri
T.C. Bwalya	A.J. Coninx	M. Mulongoti	C. Phiri
N. Chibamba	Gregory	B. Muluwe	C. Sakala
A.G. Chiluba	Cornhill	S.C. Mungo	C. Sampa
FTJ Chiluba	Ann Daka	F. Mungomona	R.K. Sichinga
N.M. Chindoloma	W.K. Kabwe	R.K.K. Mushota	ACT Sichinga
G. Chindula	E.M. Kaenga	B. Mukupa Musonda	J. Sikalungwe
EMC Chipimo	K. Kalumba	D.N. Musonda	M. Sikatana
S.N. Chipungu	M. Kanondo	V.J. Mwaanga	JH Simakuni
A. Chirwa	P. Kapui	Joe Mwale	P. Simuchimba
James Chisenga	Kapumba	A.K Mwanawambwa	S. Simwemba
Derrick Chitala	Kapumba	G.B. Mwangilwa	S. Siyangwe
V.R.M. Dube	S.L. Kaputu	G.G.M. Mweemba	I. Siwale
BM Hakafwambwa	F. Katongo	B.E.A. Mwelumuka	N.K. Soko
H. Hamweemba	K. Kaumba	E. Nawakwi	E.C. Sosala
Hansungole	R.M. Kayesa	F.M. Nkandu	A. Wina
J.K. Hara	K. Kayongo	D.K. Nkonde	N. Zimba
H.M. Kabi	N.A.	B. Nkubula	S. Zukas
F.M. Kabika	Kwaleyela	C. Nsokolo	Alfred Zulu
H.M. Kabika	K. Langa		

Name	Interest Group Position	Name	Interest Group Position
FJT Chiluba	Chairman General, ZCTU	A Liatto	Secretary General, ZEAUWU
A Chirwa	Secretary General, CSUZ	CM Sampa	Asst. Secretary General, ZCTU
HM Kabika	National Chairman, CSUZ	NL Zimba	Secretary General, ZCTU

**MMD GOVERNMENT, GROUP AFFILIATIONS**

Name	Position	Occupation	Affiliation
Frederick Chiluba	President	Trade Unionist	Gen. Sec. ZCTU Chair. NUBEGW (1989)
Ronald Penza	Minister of Finance	Businessman	Gen. Sec. ZACCI (1990) Gen. Sec. LCCI (1990)
CM Sampa	Minister of Home Affairs	Trade Unionist	Asst. Sec. Gen. ZCTU
H. Kabika	Deputy Minister of Home Affairs	Trade Unionist	Chair. CSUZ
KG Shengano	Deputy Minister of Finance	Trade Unionist	Gen. Sec. MUZ
G. Mandani	Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Security	Trade Unionist	Gen. Sec. CSUZ

**APPENDIX D: MINISTERS OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC**  
*names in italics are Deputy Ministers*  
*(full names given at end)*

<b>Ministry</b>	<b>First Cabinet</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1995*</b>	<b>1997</b>
<b>Without Portfolio</b>	Brig. Gen. G. Miyanda	same	vacant	M.C. Sata
<b>Agriculture, Food &amp; Fisheries</b>	Dr. G.L. Scott <i>Dr. C.L.Kalima</i>	S. Zukas <i>G. Nkausu</i> <i>A. Sejane</i>	S. Desai <i>D. Matutu</i> <i>Dr. M. Mponde</i>	E. Nawakwi
<b>Commerce, Trade &amp; Industry</b>	R.D.S. Penza <i>D.K.A. Patel</i>	A. Hambayi <i>K. Shengamo</i> <i>D. Matutu</i>	D.K.A. Patel <i>Dr. S. Syamujaye</i>	A. Hambayi
<b>Communication &amp; Transport</b>	E.A. Kashita <i>G.K. Mululu</i>	A. Kashita <i>G. Mululu</i> <i>H. Kabika</i>	D. Lupungu <i>same</i> <i>Z.P. Mumba</i>	P. Kaping'a
<b>Community Development &amp; Social Welfare</b>	G.K. Maka <i>C.M. Sampa</i>	M.N. Wina (w) <i>M. Ngalande</i>	Dr. P.K. Kapinga <i>S.M. Manjata</i>	N. Zimba
<b>Defence</b>	B. Y. Mwila <i>Maj. C.K. Chibamba</i>	same <i>W.S. Mmembe (w)</i>	same <i>D. Bumba</i>	same
<b>Education</b>	A.N.L. Wina <i>Dr. K. Kayongo</i>	Dr. K. Kayongo <i>N. Mangilashi</i> <i>Dr. J. Shimaponda</i>	A. S. Hambayi <i>S. Miyanda</i> <i>N.I. Nguni</i>	Dr. Syamujaye
<b>Energy &amp; Water Development</b>	A. S. Hambayi <i>E.Z. Nawakwi</i>	E. Nawakwi (w) <i>Lt. Col. P. Kafumukache</i>	same <i>E.C. Mwasu</i>	S. Desai
<b>Environment &amp; Natural Resources</b>	S.K. Walubita	Dr. C. Kalima <i>S. Desai</i>	W. Harrington <i>G. Nkausu</i>	same
<b>Finance</b>	E.G. Kasonde <i>D. Chitala</i>	R. Penza <i>P. Tembo</i> <i>Rev. D. Pule</i>	same <i>same</i> <i>K.G. Shengamo</i>	same
<b>Foreign Affairs</b>	V.J. Mwanga <i>Dr. RGK Mushota</i>	same <i>W.S. Mmembe (w)</i>	Lt. Gen. C.S. Tembo <i>Dr. P.D. Machungwa</i>	Prof. L. Shimba
<b>Health</b>	Dr. B.M. Kawimbe <i>Dr. K. Kalumba</i>	Dr. B. Kawimbe <i>Dr. K. Kalumba</i>	M.C. Sata <i>same</i>	Dr. Katele Kalumba
<b>Home Affairs</b>	N.L. Zimba <i>Lt. Col. E.C. Sosala</i>	N. Zimba <i>S. Kunyanda</i>	C. M. Sampa <i>P.H. Muunga</i>	same
<b>Information &amp; Broadcasting</b>	Rev. H.S. Kristafor <i>Rev. D.C. Pule</i>	Dr. R. Mushota <i>S. Manjata</i>	A.K. Mwanawambwa <i>V.W. Kayope</i>	D. Mpamba

Ministry	First Cabinet	1993	1995*	1997
Labour & Social Security	Dr. L.S. Sondashi <i>Dr. P.D. Machungwa</i>	M. Sata <i>Dr. P. Machungwa</i>	N.L. Zimba <i>S.P. Madyenkuku</i>	Dr. P. Machungwa
Lands	D.L. Lupunga <i>E.N. Shimwandwe</i>	same <i>same</i>	Dr. L. Shimaponda <i>same</i>	D. Lupunga
Legal Affairs	R.M.A. Chongwe	Dr. L. Sondashi	Dr. R.G.K. Mushota	V. Malambo
Local Government & Housing	M.C. Sata <i>V. Kayope</i>	R. Chongwe <i>C. Bunda V. Kayope</i>	B.H. Mwinga <i>W.W. Mwembe</i>	same
Mines & Minerals Development	H. Mulemba <i>Dr. M.M. Mpande</i>	P. Kaping'a <i>Dr. M. Mpandwe</i>	S.K. Walubita <i>A. Nkole</i>	Lt. Gen. C. Tembo
Science, Technology & Vocational Training	A. Mbikusita-Lewanika <i>S.M. Desai</i>	G. Maka <i>S. Ngombo</i>	Dr. K. Kayongo <i>K. Nsuluka</i>	E. Kavindele
Sport, Youth, & Child Development	B.M. Nkumbula <i>K.M. Maine (w)</i>	Patel, Dipak <i>Rev. P. Chintala</i>	Lt. Col. Kafumukache <i>Rev. P. Chintala</i>	S. Miyanda
Tourism	Lt. Gen. C.S. Tembo <i>N. Wina (w)</i>	same <i>A Mwanawambwa</i>	G.K. Maka <i>N.K. Monyiloshi</i>	A. Mwanawambwa
Works and Supply	E.C. Chibwe	K. Walubita <i>Maj. C. Chibamba S. Madyenkuku</i>	S. Zukas <i>Maj. C. Chimbamba</i>	S. Walubita
Presidents' Office	<i>D.N. Mungomba S.B. Zukas</i>		<i>Rev. D. Pule</i>	Eric Silwamba
Vice Pres.'s Office			<i>M. Ngulonde</i>	
National Commission for Devpt. Planning		<i>D. Mung'omba</i>		
Central Province	<i>W.W. Membe (w)</i>	<i>S.D. Mpamba</i>	<i>same</i>	
Copperbelt Province	<i>K. Nsuluka</i>	<i>same</i>	<i>C. Musebu</i>	
Eastern Province	<i>H.J. Soko</i>	<i>same</i>	<i>same</i>	
Luapula Province	<i>E. Muonga</i>	<i>vacant</i>	<i>N. K. Chibamba</i>	
Lusaka Province	<i>E.M.C. Chipimo</i>	<i>same</i>	<i>same</i>	
Northern Province	<i>D.V.B. Kapapa</i>	<i>same</i>	<i>same</i>	
Northwestern	<i>P.K. Kaping'a</i>	<i>Rev. A. Chipawa</i>	<i>same</i>	
Southern Province	<i>P.H.K. Muunga</i>	<i>same</i>	<i>E.M. Migonda</i>	
Western Province	<i>M. Mumbana</i>	<i>L. Subulwa</i>	<i>same</i>	

\* On July 17, 1995, there was a Cabinet reshuffle.

\*\*note: this list is not comprehensive of all Cabinet reshuffles

**FULL NAMES**

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Bunda, Chisenga  
Chibamba, Celestino  
Chintala, Peter (Rev)  
Chipawa, Anosh (Rev)  
Chipimo, Elias  
Chongwe, Roger (Dr)  
Desai, Suresh  
Hambayi, Alfeyo  
Kabika, Henry  
Kagumukache, Patrick (Lt. Col.)  
Kalima, Chulu  
Kalumba, Katele (Dr)  
Kapapa, Daniel  
Kaping'a, Paul  
Kashita, Andrew  
Kawimbe, Boniface (Dr)  
Kavindele, Enock  
Kayongo, Kabunda (Dr)  
Kayope, Valentine  
Kunyanda, Siyoto  
Lupunga, Dawson  
Machungwa, Peter (Dr)

Maka, Gabriel  
Makyenkuku, Syacheye  
Mangilashi, Nathan  
Manjata, Stephen  
Manjata, Stephen  
Mathias, Mpande  
Matutu, Dickson  
Miyanda, Godfrey  
Mmembe, Wendy Sinkala (w)  
Mpamba, David  
Mululu, Gilbert  
Mung'omba, Dean  
Mushota, Remmy (Dr)  
Muunga, Peter  
Mwaanga, Vernon  
Mwanamwambwa, Amusaa  
Mwila, Ben  
Nawakwi, Edith  
Ngalande, Matiya  
Ngombo, Simon  
Nkaus, Gibson  
Nsuluka, Kangwa

Patel, Dipak  
Penza, Ronald  
Pule, Dan (Rev.)  
Sampa, Chitalu  
Sata, Michael  
Sejane, Ackson  
Shengamo, Koshita  
Shimba, Lawrence (Prof)  
Shimaponda, John (Dr)  
Shimwandwe, Edward  
Silwamba, Eric  
Soko, Hosea  
Sondashi, Ludwig  
Subulwa, Leonard  
Syamujaye, Syamukayumbu  
Tembo, Christon (Lt. Gen.)  
Tembo, Paul  
Walubita, Sipakeli  
Wina, Mirriam Nakatindi (w)  
Zimba, Newstead  
Zukas, Simon

**APPENDIX E: LIST OF BOARDS AND COMMITTEES**

<b>Apex Organization</b>	<b>Board or Committee</b>	<b>Description</b>
ZACCI	ZAMPOST	State-owned telecommunications company
	Securities and Exchange Commission	
	ZPA	Zambia Privatization Agency
	ZPTF	Zambia Privatization Trust Fund
	ZITF	
	ECZ	Environmental Council of Zambia
	ZEDF	Zambia Enterprise Development Fund
	CBH	Central Board of Health
	Export Board and Zambia Trade Fair	
	Copperbelt University Council	
	ITC	
	DTEVT	
	SADC Mining	
	NRB	National Roads Board
	Matching Grant Scheme	
	Zambia Railways	
ZCC	Zambia Competition Commission	
NEAC	National Economic Advisory Council	
ZNFU	ZPA	Zambia Privatization Agency
	Lands Tribunal	
	Food Reserve Agency	

## APPENDIX F: LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAWUZ	Airways and Allied Workers Union of Zambia <i>ZCTU</i>
ABCEC	Association of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors <i>ZACCI</i>
BA	Bakers Association
BAZ	Bankers Association of Zambia <i>ZACCI</i>
BCPAZ	Beef Cattle Producer's Association of Zambia <i>ZNFU</i>
CaFU	Chadiza Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
CAIAZ	Clothing and Allied Industries Association of Zambia
CEFU	Copperbelt East Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
CgFU	Chongwe River Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
CiFU	Chinsali Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
CnCCI	Chingola Chamber of Commerce <i>ZACCI</i>
CoFU	Choma / Kaloma Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
CpCCI	Chipata Chamber of Commerce <i>ZACCI</i>
CpFU	Chippata Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
CsFU	Chisamba Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
CSUZ	Civil Servants Union Zambia <i>ZCTU</i>
CWUFU	Copperbelt West Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
ECA	Environmental Conservation Assoc. <i>ZNFU</i>
FZRH	Federation of Zambia Road Hauliers <i>ZACCI</i>
GCZ	Gemstones Corporation Zambia
GUZ	Guards Union of Zambia <i>ZCTU</i>
HCWUZ	Hotel Catering Workers Union of Zambia <i>ZCTU</i>
IBDF	Indigenous Business Development Foundation
IFU	Isoka Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
KaCCI	Kabwe Chamber of Commerce <i>ZACCI</i>
KbFU	Kabompo Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
KiCCI	Kitwe Chamber of Commerce <i>ZACCI</i>
KmFU	Kaoma Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
KsFU	Kasama Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
KtFU	Katete Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
KwFU	Kabwe Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
LCCI	Lusaka Chamber of Commerce <i>ZACCI</i>
LIAZ	Leather Industries Association of Zambia
LnFU	Lundazi Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
LpFU	Luapula Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
LsFU	Lusaka West Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
MbFU	Mbala Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
MgFU	Mpongwe Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
MkFU	Mkushi Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
MoFU	Monze / Pemba Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
MpFU	Mpika Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
MPNPAZ	Master Printers and Newspaper Proprietors Association of Zambia
MTAZ	Motor Traders Association of Zambia
MuFU	Mumbwa Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
MUZ	Mineworkers Union of Zambia
MzFU	Mazabuka Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
NAPSSF	National Association of Peasant & Small-Scale Farmer's Union
NCCI	Ndola Chamber of Commerce <i>ZACCI</i>
NCFU	Nchelenge Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
NUBEGW	National Union of Building, Engineering, and General Workers <i>ZCTU</i>
NUCIW	National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers
NUCW	National Union of Communication Workers <i>ZCTU</i>

NUPAW	National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers
NUPSW	National Union of Public Service Workers <i>ZCTU</i>
NUTAW	National Union of Transport and Allied Workers <i>ZCTU</i>
NyFU	Nyimba Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
PFU	Peasant Farmer's Union
PtFU	Petauke Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
RWUZ	Railway Worker's Union of Zambia <i>ZCTU</i>
SaFU	Samfya Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
SAZ	Seed Association of Zambia <i>ZNFU</i>
SCCI	Solwezi Chamber of Commerce
SIDO	Small Industries Development Organization
SoFU	Solwezi Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
SrFU	Serenje Farmer's Union
SSEP	Small Scale Enterprises Promotion Limited
SSIAZ	Small Scale Industries Association of Zambia
TAAZ	Travel Agents Association of Zambia
TAZ	Tobacco Association of Zambia <i>ZNFU</i>
TOAZ	Tour Operators Association of Zambia
TPZ	Textile Producers of Zambia <i>ZACCI</i>
UFA	Ukwimi Farmer's Association <i>ZNFU</i>
UZAWU	University of Zambia and Allied Workers Union <i>ZCTU</i>
VIS	Village Industry Service
WAZ	Wildlife Association of Zambia <i>ZNFU</i>
WEIB	Women Entrepreneurs in Industry and Business
YEAZ	Youth Entrepreneurs Association of Zambia
YFA	Young Farmer's Association <i>ZNFU</i>
ZACCI	Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
ZAM	Zambia Association of Manufacturers <i>ZACCI</i>
ZCF	Zambia Cooperative Federation
ZCFAA	Zambia Clearing and Forwarding Agents Association <i>ZACCI</i>
ZCGA	Zambia Coffee Growers' Association <i>ZNFU</i>
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
ZEAWU	Zambia Electricity and Allied Workers Union <i>ZCTU</i>
ZEGA	Zambia Export Grower's Assoc. <i>ZNFU</i>
ZFCS	Zambia Farmer's Cooperative Society
ZFE	Zambia Federation of Employers
ZFEA	Zambia Farm Employees' Assoc. <i>ZNFU</i>
ZiFU	Zimba / Livingstone Farmer's Union <i>ZNFU</i>
ZNFU	Zambia National Farmer's Union
ZNPA	Zambia National Pensioner Association
ZNUHAW	Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers <i>ZCTU</i>
ZNUT	Zambia National Union of Teachers
ZNVAC	Zambia National Visual Arts Council
ZTWU	Zambia Typographical Worker's Union <i>ZCTU</i>
ZUCIW	Zambia Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers <i>ZCTU</i>
ZUFIAW	Zambia Union of Financial Instit's and Allied Workers
ZULAWU	Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union <i>ZCTU</i>

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## 1. Primary Sources

### A. Interviews

<i>Date</i>	<i>Name</i>
25 October 1996	Mr. Theo Bull, Member of ZACCI Executive Board
25 October 1996	Mr. Moses Simemba, ZACCI Chief Economist (also 23 December 1996, January 7, 1997)
4 November 1996	Mr. S. Mark O'Donnell, Chairman, ZAM
12 November 1996	Ms. Catherine Hill, (HIID) Advisor at Ministry of Finance
12 November 1996	Mr. Mulenga, Director of Organization and Foreign Relations, ZCTU
25 November 1996	Mr. T. Beckett, owner, Momba Farms, Choma
18 December 1996	Mr. Wotela, Assistant Director, ZNFU
19 December 1996	Mr. Mukela Mutukwa, Economist, Zambia Farmer Cooperative Society
7 January 1997	Mr. Lungu, Assistant Managing Director, ZCF
9 January 1997	Ms. Bethel Nakaponda-Sakala, Development Services Coordinator
9 January 1997	Mr. Geoffrey Shipolyonga, Assistant Development Services Coordinator
10 January 1997	Mr. C. Kajimanga, Former Legal Counsel for ZCF
16 January 1997	Mr. Tom Kamwendo, Member of Executive Board, Kitwe Chamber of Commerce and Industry
30 January 1997	Mr. Charles Muchimba, Director of Research, MUZ, (also 14 April 1997)
3 February 1997	Mr. Alex Chirwa, General Secretary, ZCTU (also 14 April 1997)
13 February 1997	Mr. George Gray, Executive Director, ZNFU (also 26 March 1997,)
14 February 1997	Mr. D.S. Nyambe, Deputy Labour Commissioner, Ministry of Labour and
13 March 1997	Mr. Gideon Phiri, Executive Director, ZACCI (also 9 May 1997)
18 March 1997	Ms. J.B. Noonde, Deputy Executive Director, ZFE
21 March 1997	Mr. Hang'andu, Legal Advisor, ZCTU (also 16 April 1997)
15 April 1997	Mr. Austin Muneko, Research Economist, ZCTU
15 April 1997	Mr. Mike Purslow, Vice President, ZAM
30 April 1997	Ms. Margaret Ngoma, ZNUT
16 June 1997	Ms. Bridget Chilala, Deputy Director, Department of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry
19 June 1997	Ms. Jane Haboongo, Deputy Director of Planning and Industry, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry
19 June 1997	Dr. Hantuba, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries
20 June 1997	Mr. Chresta Kaluba, Permanent Secretary, Policy Analysis and Coordination Division, Cabinet Office
23 June 1997	Mr. Musepa, Donor Coordinator, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries
24 June 1997	Mr. Max Sichula, Director Human Resources Development Project,
29 June 1997	Mr. Kayeka, President PFU

30 June 1997	Mr. Charles Zandala, President, NASSPF
30 June 1997	Mr. Jones Haachiindah, General Secretary, NASSPF
21 July 1997	Mrs. Judith Gonde, Secretary, Central Provincial Business Association
24 July 1997	Mr. Godfrey Mulubwa, Vice Chairman, Luapula Provincial Business
24 July 1997	Mr. Frank Chola, Secretary, Luapula Provincial Business Association
5 August 1997	Mr. Zyambo, National Coordinator, ZNFU
12 August 1997	Mr. Mutuna, Secretary of Law Association of Zambia
12 August 1997	Mr. Wakumelo, Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
29 August 1997	Ms. Esther Maane, Development Services, ZCF

### ***B. Meetings Attended***

<i>Date</i>	<i>Meeting</i>
September 1996	Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) Annual General Meeting, Pamodzi Hotel, Lusaka
October 1996	ZACCI Executive Board Meeting, Pamodzi Hotel, Lusaka (also November 1996, December 1996, 16 January 1997, 13 February 1997, 10 March 1997, 10 April 1997, 15 May 1997, 12 June 1997, 17 July 1997, 14 August 1997, 11 September 1997)
	ZACCI Dialogue Meeting with Ministers of Parliament, Pamodzi Hotel, Lusaka
7 February 1997	Tripartite Council Meeting, Mulungushi Conference Center, Lusaka (also...)
28 February 1997	Chongwe River Farmers' Association Board Meeting, Agriculture Commercial Society, Showgrounds, Lusaka
16 April 1997	Chingola Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Executive Board Meeting, RAOF Clubhouse, Chingola
18 April 1997	Copperbelt West Farmers' Association, Monthly Meeting, Border Farmers' Society, Kitwe
24 April 1997	Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU) Annual General Meeting, Mulungushi Conference Center, Lusaka
16 August 1997	Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM), Executive Board Meeting, Intercontinental Hotel, Lusaka

### ***C. Official Publications***

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1. Cabinet Office, Policy Analysis and Coordination Division. 1996. "Cabinet Handbook, Fifth Edition," unpublished manuscript.
2. Cabinet Office, Policy Analysis and Coordination Division. 1995. "Record of the Proceedings of the Induction Workshop for Cabinet Liaison Officers," paper presented at the National Institute for Public Administration (NIPA).
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4. Ministry of Finance. 1997. "Budget Address, by the Hon. R.D.S. Penza," Government Printer, Lusaka.

5. Ministry of Finance. 1996. "Budget Address, by the Hon. R.D.S. Penza," Government Printer, Lusaka.
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2. Chapter 517, Industrial Relations Act of 1990, Lusaka: Government Printers.
3. Chapter 517, Industrial Relations Act of 1993, Lusaka: Government Printers.
4. Chapter 689, Cooperative Act, Lusaka: Government Printers.
5. Chapter 105, Societies Act, Lusaka: Government Printers.
6. Chapter 1, Constitution of Zambia, 1991, Part III, Protection of Rights of the Individual, Lusaka: Government Printers.

*National Association of Small-scale and Peasant Farmers of Zambia*

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2. "Memorandum to Parliamentary Select Committee on Agriculture, Land, and Cooperatives: The Credit Policy of the Association."
3. "Minutes of the Extraordinary Meeting held at the Indeco Board Room," February 15, 1997.

*Mineworkers Union of Zambia*

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2. "1996 Bi-Ennial Conference, Livingstone: Adopted Policy Resolutions."
3. Constitution of the Mineworker's Union of Zambia.

*Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry*

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2. "Five Years Business Plan, 1996-2000," in-house report prepared January 1996.

*Zambia Association of Manufacturers*

1. "ZAM News," monthly newsletter publication. Volume 1, Issue 1, March 1996 - Volume 1, Issue 8, October 1996.

*Zambia Congress of Trade Unions*

1. "Report of the Secretary General to the 9th Quadrennial Congress." 1994. October.
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*Zambia Cooperative Federation*

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3. Kajimanga, Charles. 1996. "The Cooperative Law," paper presented to ZCF Limited In-House Workshop, October 15.
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5. "Resolutions, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Sixth National Cooperative Convention held at Hulongushi International Conference Center, 1st to 3rd August 1995."
6. "6th National Cooperative Convention: The Chairman's Welcoming Speech," 1995.
7. Lungu. "Cooperatives in Liberalised Market Economy," paper provided by ZCF.

*Zambia National Farmer's Union*

1. "Reports to Congress," report presented at 92nd Annual Congress of the National Farmers Union, held 24 April 1997.

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