Greater Horn of Africa
Peace Building Project

The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace:

A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

Synthesis Report on Key Findings and Lessons for Improving Practice

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY **1**

A. Rationale and Content of the Study 1

B. General Lessons and Effective Practices for Initiatives Aimed at Preventing or Managing Conflict and Building Peace 8

C. General Lessons for Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level, Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio Initiatives 10

D. Comparison of the Effectiveness of Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level, Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio Initiatives in Conflict Prevention and Management 14

E. Conclusions and Recommendations 15

I. SUMMARY OF THE CASE STUDIES **18**

A. Local Peace Initiatives: Drawing on Tradition 18

B. Mid-Level Policy Dialogues: Taking Action at the National Level 20

C. Peace Radio Initiatives 23

II. EFFECTIVE PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED **25**

Summary of Chapter Contents 25

A. Introduction 25

B. General Lessons and Effective Practices for Initiatives Aimed at Preventing or Managing Conflict and Building Peace 26

C. Effective Practices and Lessons Learned in Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio Initiatives 28

III. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THREE TYPES OF INITIATIVES IN CONFLICT PREVENTION, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT OR PEACE BUILDING 53

A. Local Community-Based Peace Processes 53

B. Middle Level Non-Official National Dialogues 68

C. Peace Radio 83

IV. COMPARING THE THREE TYPES OF INITIATIVES: WHICH ARE MOST EFFECTIVE? 90

A. Comparative Impacts 90

B. What Makes for Effective Instruments? 92

V. CONCLUSIONS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THREE APPROACHES AND BROADER OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 94

A. Effectiveness of the Three Approaches 94

B. Broader Observations: General Ingredients of Success 97

C. Implications for Further Research 98

D. Possible Implications for USAID and NGO Decision-making 99

VI. APPENDICES 102

A. Overview of GHA Project
B. GHA Case-Study Questions to Address (evaluation framework)
C. Case Studies
D. Internet Survey
E. References and Acronym List

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The full report can be found at: http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report.pdf or write to peacebuilding@yahoo.com for an electronic version.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report synthesizes the findings and results of a project that examined the impacts of three generic approaches that are being taken by NGOs in the Greater Horn of Africa region toward conflict prevention, management and peace building. The project sought to find out what has been effective, and then draw lessons about why, so that effective practices might be identified for possible application in other situations.

A. Rationale and Content of the Study

A.1. Regional and Policy Context

The countries of the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) region have experienced an unusual number of intra-state or interstate conflicts[1] in recent decades. Each of these conflicts has taken a huge toll in terms of human lives lost, the suffering of refugees and internally displaced people, and the destruction of the social fabric, physical infrastructure, and natural resources. Especially as the end of the Cold War removed any strategic value that some of these conflicts may have held, the seemingly endemic nature of violent conflict in the region has led USAID and many other international development agencies to take a different approach to addressing conflict in the region. They have concluded that, unless the problem of conflict is addressed more deliberately and adequately, other than through providing humanitarian relief, these countries will not be able to develop economically or achieve full democracy, and the donors' development efforts will be continually subject to degradation or destruction. USAID's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative illustrates this new impetus by encouraging the development of early warning systems; outlining conceptual, analytical and policy tools for responding to conflict situations; and authorizing activities aimed at regulating violent conflicts in the region.

Consequently, since the mid-1990's, relief organizations and other NGOs, bilateral and multilateral donors, international financial institutions, and governments in the region have devoted increasing energy and resources to understanding the kinds of conflict affecting the region. They have launched a number of projects specifically aimed at resolving existing conflicts as well as preventing them from arising in the first place. Both on the local and national level, they are carrying out activities that seek to contain violence and encourage peace in active war zones, to rebuild societies recently ravaged by wars, and to respond to the early signs of conflict to keep them from breaking out. Interest is also being shown in how existing development programs may sometimes actually be contributing to conflict and how they can be more explicitly enlisted to manage and prevent it.

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[1] The program terminology used by REDSO/ESA is conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMR). For analytical purposes and to avoid confusion, this report will refer to the more conventionally used terms of conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and peace building.

Depending on sponsors' interests and capacities, recent conflict initiatives have used a considerable variety of approaches to try to influence conflict and build capacities for peace. These include conflict resolution training, local reconciliation projects, projects centered on women as peacemakers, natural resource management, and many others. With these countries, there have been created a number of new indigenous NGOs that receive assistance to implement conflict resolution and peace building programs. As a large number of projects have been implemented, a literature has mushroomed in the field of international conflict resolution and peace building. In numerous conferences, seminars and workshops the various approaches have been touted and discussed as possible ways to achieve some progress in reversing the trend toward conflict in the Greater Horn region.

Despite this new flurry of activity, conflict remains a serious problem in the region. Several longstanding destructive conflicts, such as those in southern Sudan and Burundi, have waged on and on; new conflicts have erupted, such as the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia; and other potential conflicts threaten to erupt, such as in Kenya and possibly Tanzania. Understandably, the increased international involvement in addressing conflicts juxtaposed with the tendency of conflicts to appear unaffected by these efforts has increasingly raised an important question: What kinds of approaches are actually effective in conflict prevention, conflict management or peace building?

Where significant results have occurred, sponsors have been eager to learn how they might be expanded or applied in other places. Other than statements of intention or anecdotal evidence of effects here and there, however, there has been little knowledge about the actual effects of these initiatives on the forces driving conflicts or on societies' ability to resist conflict. Data specifically on this question generally have not been systematically collected.

A.2. Aims of the Study

In this context, the Regional Economic Development Services Organization of Eastern and Southern Africa in USAID (REDSO/ESA) commissioned a study—the Peace Building Project for the Greater Horn of Africa—to examine the impacts of several types of existing activities in conflict prevention, management and peace building in the GHA region. Its purpose was also to draw lessons about what has been effective and why, so that the most beneficial practices might be identified for possible application in other situations. Based on settings that were found to be most conducive to such results, the study was to identify areas where promising opportunities and useful entry points might exist for introducing new initiatives. Finally, the findings were to be disseminated to USAID's NGO partners and other actors who can make the best use of them.

In particular, the study was to focus on four "priority areas" or "focal points" where specific kinds of activities, or initiatives, have been supported by USAID and other agencies. The four areas are as follows:

- Local Peace Processes that make use of traditional methods and institutions of dispute resolution,
- "Middle Level" Dialogues focused on national conflicts and contentious political and policy issues,

- Peace Radio, and
- Use of the Internet as a peace building tool.[2]

These different generic approaches to conflict were deemed to be of special interest in part because it was hypothesized that they had certain characteristics that might enable them to achieve especially good results. These characteristics included their being able to engender trust by being led by respected religious leaders, their drawing on the legitimacy of traditional elders, and their involvement of women, whose interests often cut across conflict lines. REDSO/ESA was also interested in analyzing the participation in peace processes from different segments of the community (elders, women, youth, civil servants, educators) in working with existing and new institutions (such as Peace Radio) for new purposes. These cross-cutting factors appear throughout the general lessons learned and in the citations of effective practices found in the full synthesis report.

REDSO/ESA contracted Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI) to establish the Peace Building Project for the Greater Horn of Africa and to formulate and apply a methodology for conducting the appropriate evaluations and analyzing the collected data.

A.3. Approach of the Study

This report presents the most important findings and policy implications that emerged from the project. In order to address REDSO's concerns, the project had to undertake four principal tasks and resolve certain corresponding methodological issues. These tasks and issues were as follows:

- Identify suitable concrete examples of initiatives in the priority areas of interest that could actually be studied. What are suitable and viable illustrations of the generic approaches about which useful data can be collected?
- Define criteria by which to judge the effectiveness of initiatives, specifically in terms of their achievement of conflict prevention, management and peace building objectives. What do we mean by "effectiveness" when it comes to preventing or managing conflicts and building peace?[3]
- Organize and carry out a process for collecting the appropriate data. How do we gather reliable information and data?
- Analyze the data in order to present findings and derive policy implications. How do we identify useful lessons to improve the initiatives and guide their application in new situations?

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[2] This topic was subsequently defined as a survey of existing uses, not an evaluation of the technology on conflict.

[3] The program terminology used by REDSO/ESA is conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMR). For analytical purposes and to avoid confusion, this report will refer to the more conventionally used terms of conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and peace building.

The ways in which MSI handled these tasks are described briefly below:

Case studies: The MSI team identified examples of initiatives that both reflected the features of the types of approaches that were of interest and had operated in the GHA region long enough to have produced some results (at least one year). These selections were also widely presumed to be doing a good job in addressing conflicts. The cases that were selected for study and whose results are presented in this report are as follows:[4]

Local Peace Processes Drawing on Traditional Methods of Dispute Resolution:

- Wajir Peace and Development Committee, Northern Kenya,
- Inter-tribal Peace Conferences in Southern Sudan, New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), and
- The Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in Northern Uganda.

"Middle Level" Non-Official National Policy/Political Dialogues:

- Faith-based Facilitation of the Constitutional Review, National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK),
- The Apostles for Peace (CAP) Project in Political Dialogue, Burundi, International Alert, and
- The War Torn Societies Project, Somaliland

Peace Radio:

- Studio Ijambo, Burundi, Search for Common Ground, and
- HornAfrik, Somalia

Criteria for Defining Effectiveness: To find out what was effective, the project first had to define the impacts that given initiatives would be observed to have if they were judged to be contributing significantly to reducing conflict or supporting peace building. Unlike existing program evaluations in the development field, this project specifically examined impacts of initiatives on *conflict and its peaceful management*. Conflict is a societal process that *can* be constructive if managed in non-violent ways, but that too often in this region has been violent and destructive, if not devastating. This required looking at an initiative's performance through a relatively novel lens of conflict and peace impact criteria.

[4] For details on the selection criteria and projects, see Appendix A.

The indicators of impact used in the project were derived from the various causes of violent conflicts and the societal or institutional capacities that help manage conflicts without violence. That is, an initiative may be deemed effective to the extent that one can demonstrate that it has had some significant influence on the *sources* of a conflict—i.e., the main dimensions or forces that dispose societies and communities toward it and that provoke or perpetuate violent conflicts—or has strengthened a process or condition that has been shown to *prevent or contain* such conflicts.[5]

Initiatives may be effective in achieving conflict prevention and peace building in many possible ways besides ending violence. If ending violence was the only criteria by which one were to judge effectiveness in conflict reduction, few if any of the existing efforts that address conflict would be deemed successful—i.e., most would be failures. In this light, the questions "What is effective?" or "What works?" are simplistic, for they imply that a project is to be judged on a single criterion and the only task is to ascertain whether that criterion was met or not. Because conflicts are multi-causal and multi-dimensional and are played out on more than one plane, however, effectiveness in addressing conflict can be realized in more than one way. An initiative might be influencing several aspects of the conflict besides its level of violence. Hence, a given initiative is not likely to be found to be simply successful or unsuccessful. The more appropriate way to put the effectiveness question is as follows: "What are the apparent strengths and limits, and harmful effects, of a given initiative (and under which conditions do they typically occur)?

As seen below, the possible impacts of initiatives are organized under broad categories which represent the various major possible sources of conflicts (or brakes on them), i.e., the several major underlying or obvious facets, or fronts, in which conflicts may be carried on and are manifested. These represent alternative foci or leverage points that initiatives may address and, therefore, upon which they may have some impact.[6]

A.4. Impact Criteria for Determining Effectiveness in Conflict Prevention, Management and Peace Building (based on factors that drive violent conflicts or preserve peace)

The project case-study investigators were asked to obtain evidence to answer this basic question: To what extent and how is an initiative affecting these conflict risk factors or peace capacities?

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[5] The impacts that were researched included not only those explicitly identified by the intervention's objectives, but also unanticipated positive impacts, as well as unintended negative impacts. Programs found "effective" in terms of certain intended objectives would not in fact be effective if they also "did harm" because of other, non-negligible adverse consequences.

[6] The significance of these criteria for conflict and peace is discussed further in Appendix B, which provides greater detail and some indicators of the impacts observed. Not all the questions applied to every type of intervention or every case of a type.

Structural Conditions (Predisposing Factors)

- **General economic assets**: Is the initiative improving the quantity and distribution of economic assets, such as physical or financial capital or income generating activities, or specific capacities for obtaining such assets?

  - **Inter-communal relations**: Is it fostering more positive perceptions/attitudes and more peaceful everyday interactions and relationships between rank and file members of the main parties to a conflict? Between large numbers of people from the differing identity groups (tribes, clans, ethnic groups) who constitute the mobilized constituencies in the conflicts of these countries?

Channels (Intermediary political processes and institutions)

- Social and political mobilization: Is the initiative increasing the ability of groups to organize collectively in order to pursue interests peacefully?

- Social innovation and organizational learning: Did it introduce promising new methods for peace building and spread these techniques elsewhere?

- Public formal governing institutions and processes (the state): Is the initiative creating or strengthening political processes and governing institutions (local or national) that can incorporate conflicting parties, interests and issues in regular, ongoing processes and procedures for peaceful conflict resolution?

- Top-level official political negotiations: Is the initiative advancing the resolution of specific grievances, issues and disputes among the leaders of conflicting parties engaged in the bargaining process?

Triggers and Inhibitors (immediate actions and events)

- Violent and other hostile behavior: Is the initiative encouraging conciliatory statements or policy actions and deterring or reducing provocative rhetoric and specific acts of violence?

Data Collection and Field Research

MSI's investigators each went to the field to examine one or two case studies of one of the three types of initiatives (i.e., local peace processes, middle-level dialogues, and peace radio). Over periods of between one and two weeks, they sought answers to a set of questions about the initiatives' possible impacts and the factors that might be contributing to whatever impacts were identified (See Appendix B). Depending on feasibility and appropriateness, data were collected through reviewing written materials, interviewing knowledgeable informants, convening a focus group, distributing a questionnaire, and/or doing direct observation.

Analysis

The study was to learn not simply whether the initiatives have been effective or not, and in what respects, but also why they were or were not effective. This required looking for various factors associated with an initiative's evident results, and thus might be the most important determinants of the impacts that were found. These associated elements could then be translated into practical lessons or guidelines for applying the initiative.

Actually, the project was asked to determine three kinds of effective practices or lessons:

- How can a particular case of a generic type of initiative be improved? This concerns effective practices within the process of implementing a specific initiative.
- How can the initiative be improved as a generic mode of addressing conflicts? This concerns effective practices within the process of implementing a given type of initiative.
- Which of the three generic types of initiatives works best? This concerns effective practices when choosing among several types of initiatives.

The second source of information for our effective practices and lessons learned is a USAID-sponsored workshop on the Impacts of Peace Building Initiatives in the Greater Horn of Africa in January 2001. In this workshop, representatives from NGOs throughout the region reacted to presentations of some of the case studies mentioned above, reported on additional initiatives, and offered advice for those who might try a new initiative in the future.

Results of the Analysis

The lessons the investigators derived about effective practices *within specific initiatives* are provided in the separate case studies attached to this report (See Appendix C).

Part I of this report provides a brief summary of the seven case studies conducted.

Part II of this report presents the evidence about the impacts of each of the *three generic types of initiatives* of interest, as found in the data collected about specific cases of each initiative. It also identifies the factors that make for the effectiveness of each type.

Part III compares the effectiveness of the three types with each other, and considers whether the same factors should be kept in mind when applying them or when different guidelines are necessary.

Part IV presents overall observations and policy recommendations regarding issues that may affect all the initiatives.

We present summaries of the findings from each chapter (Parts II-IV) in the remainder of this Executive Summary in the sections that follow.

B. General Lessons and Effective Practices for Initiatives Aimed at Preventing or Managing Conflict and Building Peace

The following lessons and practices are derived from all of the case studies undertaken as a whole, and represent generalizations that may be useful to the practitioner.

- In many, if not most cases, the nature and location of the conflict predetermines whether the conflict prevention practice initiated will be useful. Knowing at what level the change needs to occur for conflict to be prevented is key. Trying lots of interesting things so that it looks like something is going on to prevent conflict may raise expectations, waste resources and most of all, distract energy from initiatives that might work better.

- Local peace initiatives using local authorities and traditional leaders will work best when the nature of the problem is locally caused. Lack of incentives for parties to talk to each other is difficult to overcome. Traditional processes for managing local conflicts may exclude some stakeholders to dominate (e.g., elders). Adapting traditional conflict management mechanisms so that they enlist people from different segments of the community (elders, women, youth, civil servants, educators) to work with existing institutions in new ways can lead to achieving more durable conflict management outcomes.

- Religious leaders and religious organizations offer a number of assets for conflict prevention and peace building. In some circumstances, religious organizations can be perceived as neutral bodies, drawing on moral and religious power to facilitate intervention activities or discussions down to the level of communities and parishes when other options are not apparent. They can combine forces across faiths to initiate effective multi-faith efforts such as mediation forums, engage with government leadership in high-level dialogues and mobilize local peace efforts through community-based civic education. Neutrality can be difficult to maintain, however; once religious organizations engage in a peace building dialogue, for example, their role may shift from facilitation to advocating a position.

- Local peace initiatives exist in a “no man’s land” between governments and people. Local expectations are higher sometimes than a leader’s authority to deliver. These initiatives can open channels but they may not be sufficient to deliver peace. If local peacemakers become too popular, they can be perceived as a threat to the authorities that must ultimately implement the decisions reached.

- Peace conferences and meetings depend on long-term preparation to be considered legitimate. They cannot be driven by the timetables of outside conveners. When they work, it is because people are ready to talk and consider it in their own self-interest to do so. Preparing the groundwork for this kind of discussion can take a long time.

- Porous borders with greatly differing legal systems among neighboring states mean that local initiatives at peace using traditional community authority may work and that the spread effect throughout the region may be greater than between states with rigid borders. This can be particularly applicable to clan related conflict.

- Competition for scarce resources is at the heart of many of the regional conflicts studied. If this competition for land, water, grazing space etc cannot be addressed in the long term, conflict prevention may be only medium term at best.

- Outside actors are often key unseen players in local conflict prevention. They can either act on or destroy what local groups do to promote peace. Many locally based solutions depend on national level action to implement long term. This may mean resources, new legislation, amnesty or demilitarization. Insurgent groups have no reason to listen to local demands for peace when the stakes they seek are secondary to local needs. If they do not need local citizens for food, supplies or cover, they may be much less likely to honor requests to negotiate by local leaders. The place they really want to be heard may be many miles away.

- Transparency in selection of actors for dialogues at all levels is essential. Groups must see themselves represented and selected fairly to buy in to the process. People are more likely to participate if they do not feel a threat by doing so. The objectives of the dialogue should be clear to all participants for it to be effective. Even when they are not speaking for any group but just engaging in community problem-solving across ethnic or clan lines, the objectives must be known by all.

- Radio must be as independent as possible to be both credible and viable over time. Dependence on government owned infrastructure for transmission may hurt credibility of the programming.

- Adherence to strong ethical standards of reporting by journalists is essential to credibility. Using joint reporting teams to cover controversial stories in conditions of ethnic or clan bias is critical to program integrity.

- Two-way communication on radio or television on issues has proven very effective in promoting dialogue and for venting popular frustration. These formats can include call-in or town meeting shows. The entertainment value of programs that feature mixed groups working to solve problems can be a powerful message in societies with major cleavages.

C. General Lessons for Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level, Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio Initiatives

The lessons that the investigators derived about effective practices within the process of implementing particular projects are provided in the separate case studies attached in Appendix C. Part III presents the evidence about the effectiveness of each of the three generic types of initiatives of interest, based on generalizations derived from the specific cases of each initiative that was studied. Though the initiatives are still relatively young, some useful lessons were identified.

C1. Local Peace Processes

Local Community-Based Peace Processes:
General Lessons Learned about Planning and Implementation

- Economic sources of conflict that are often hundreds of years old are exacerbated in scarcity situations where natural resource depletion or population pressure make scare resources even more valuable. Peace processes can do little to change competition for scarce grazing land, youth lack of employment, or recurrent drought.
- Local dialogue is most effective when the origin of the problem is based on local history or competition for resources. When the actors are largely outside the region and fueling the conflict for other reasons, local discourse can only serve as an example to national leaders that they should be acting to resolve the conflict. It will not by itself be sufficient to bring peace permanently.
- The ability of well-organized local initiatives to influence armed military groups of insurgents was limited in the cases studied. There was no incentive on the part of the outside groups to listen to local peacemakers. The best these initiatives can do is to lobby central government to negotiate with the insurgents.
- Working through existing groups with respected leaders in the community helps move the process along more quickly than initiating ad hoc groups with less community support. Multi-faith approaches can be effective in regions where there is sufficient religious differentiation to make this desirable.
- Groups that work pro-actively to involve large numbers of local stakeholders have met with success in local dispute resolution. Groups that practice proactive transparency in their work and make sure that the constituent members are representative of significant portions of the communities affected met with success. This argues for a largely locally led initiative that will have its own timetable and may not work at the pace that outside supporters in central government or internationally might prefer.
- “One-off” conferences, while still capable of providing major breakthroughs, are seldom sufficient to ensure a long-term peace process. They are often dependent on the authority of the conveners who may not be from the region or the countries and may not have local support for the next steps required. It is possible that the peace process can be continued if there is a follow-up plan of actions in which local and other stakeholders have ownership.
- In cases where the conflicts are largely local, where the instigators of the violence are known and where elders are given authority to act, de-escalating the dispute from clan to individual level may be effective. Even if reprisals have occurred, elders can intervene and try the initial triggering act (usually a murder or major theft) under local legal authority and then settle the reprisals with compensation and formal apologies.

C2. Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue

Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue:
General Lessons Learned about Planning and Implementation

- Middle level dialogue can be compromised by lack of linkages to non-elite groups and to key political actors beyond its group. Who represents whom in the dialogue can be tricky if criteria for selection are not transparent and the groups represented do not do their own selecting. Outsiders know best approaches are not well received and may hurt credibility for the efforts over time.
- Dialogue cannot really occur if some of the power holders are not present to receive and/or use the results of the middle level discussions. The idea of these discussions as an alternative track to formal initiatives only works if there is a group or set of decision-makers willing and ready to listen to the middle level outcomes. They can become contentious if representation is not transparent.
- Regular contact over time is needed for this kind of dialogue to work. One-time only events are probably of a more limited impact.
- Lack of immediate physical threat to participants can help foster middle level dialogue participation.
- To have real impact at the middle level, there should be a critical mass of participants who are distributed around the country, not just in the capital. All major groups in the country should be consciously represented and easily identifiable in the discussion groups. Transparency on this point is critical to legitimacy of the process beyond the group.
- Middle level dialogue benefits from the presence of stakeholders as represented by legitimate groups who can be asked to send representatives to the process.
- Participants in the dialogue should perceive their participation as part of a larger set of objectives that include peace building in the region or country.
- These dialogues can be seen as more effective if there is a perception that they are needed to influence actions beyond the group involved.

C3. Peace Radio Initiatives

Peace Radio: General Lessons Learned about Planning and Implementation

- Use community radio stations and independent transmissions and receivers as a way to avoid political or legal limitations.
- Be wary of the government's ability to control peace radio through its control of the necessary infrastructure.
- To the extent possible, keep the peace radio initiative as reliant on indigenous resources (and as least reliant on outside donor resources) as possible, so as to increase credibility, local acceptance, and the likelihood of sustainability over the long term.
- Where government is a key player in the conflict situation (either as a party to the conflict or as a mediating force), be careful to maintain a balance between peace radio's independence and objectivity and its potential for engaging the government in positive, peace building activities and opening of the political system.
- Avoid commercialization of the conflict—take care to ensure that the purpose of peace radio is not compromised or derailed by replacing substantive content with purely entertainment programming.
- At the same time, where possible, use relaxed forms of programming to get the message across; e.g., use "soap opera"-type dramas and situational comedy shows to entertain and inform at the same time.
- Conduct needs assessments among listener groups to determine content and formats that are most likely to be effective.
- Ensure that personnel—program developers, producers, reporters, actors, et al.—have the technical expertise to produce quality programs and package information effectively.
- Ensure that the content of peace radio programs is appropriate to the culture, language, and religion of the target population of listeners; produce the peace radio programs in the local language or dialect, to the maximum extent possible.
- Ensure ethnic diversity in programming and news reporting, so as to ensure that you reach all the audiences you are trying to reach, especially all opposing sides in the conflict situation.
- In news reporting, use journalists from the region or country, not outsiders, as outsiders may not know what is new or different in what they are reporting.
- Plan a regular schedule of radio programming, so that listeners know what to expect and when to tune in for favorite programs.
- Use peace radio for two-way communication through, for example, talk-show formats.
- Use peace radio to educate listeners about appropriate roles for leaders and other citizens to play during times of conflict, about citizens' rights and responsibilities, about government's responsibilities, and so on.
- Use peace radio to highlight gender roles and dynamics in the peace building process.
- Use peace radio to inform listeners about the plight of other conflict-ridden communities, including the adverse effects that arise from conflicts that are not prevented and managed effectively.
- Use peace radio to publicize development activities, especially in rural areas, so as to enhance resource mobilization and attract additional development projects and donor attention.
- Use peace radio to disseminate early warning information, information on the status of cease-fires, and other timely information that can serve to prevent additional violent conflict.
- Use peace radio to publicize and provide live coverage of positive activities in peace building, such as conflict resolution meetings, statements of opinion leaders, etc.
- Encourage journalists to establish ethical standards for balanced reporting and maintain them.

D. Comparison of the Effectiveness of Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level, Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio Initiatives in Conflict Prevention and Management

Part IV compares the effectiveness of the three types with each other and considers which factors should be kept in mind when applying any of them. It identifies effective practices in making choices from among the differing types of initiatives. Local peace processes had the most impact on more dimensions of conflict than either dialogues or peace radio. Mid-level dialogue was less effective than local peace processes in most respects. Peace radio was found to be the weakest of the three in most areas.

Why local peace processes were comparatively more effective than the other two approaches appears to arise from:

- The scale of the conflict addressed (e.g., cattle raids compared to combat between organized armies),
- The extent of cooperation possible between the project and the governing authorities operating at the same level,
- Whether the activity involved could exercise coercive police authority over the parties to the conflict,
- Whether the activity was directed at achieving some legally binding agreement on specific disputes or involved discussion of broader issues or general relationships of the parties in conflict, and
- Whether the activity had autonomy in relation to influential outsiders because it was ether ignored, tolerated or supported.

In sum, local peace processes were relatively more effective than mid-level dialogue and peace radio because there was a closer match between the scale of the problem and the inherent capacity of the initiative involved in influencing it. In effect, more of the major functions of a state were within the control of the local actors, including policymaking, security, justice, and the economy. The two national instruments, on the other hand, were faced with larger conflicts and had much less control over the parties responsible and the means to alter their behavior. They represented only a few of the actors and forces affecting the conflict at the national and regional levels. By the same token, however, the local traditional process could not be effective in the national arena.

Although local peace processes may be able to affect more aspects of conflict than the other two, all three instruments tend to be the most effective with respect to the same dimensions of conflict. That is, while individual cases may shift the overall average performance of local peace processes above that of the other two instruments, they are strongest in the same areas as the

others are, and their weak areas tend to be the same as well. In particular, all these civil society approaches are similar to each other in that they all mainly mobilize agents for peace and introduce social innovation. They are less consistently influential in altering economic activity, governmental institutions and the level of violence. Apparently, civil society approaches are mainly good at strengthening various communication and organizational channels that operate outside governmental and the prevailing economic and political processes. Only under certain unusual conditions, do they appear to be able to make significant inroads into the sources of conflicts that arise from economies, social structures, governmental practice, political processes, and violence itself.

E. Conclusions and Recommendations

E.1. General Ingredients of Success

Most of the factors that were associated with more effective practice of each of the three instruments were specific to that approach, such as the elaborate consultative process that is used by traditional local peace settlements to reach consensus. However, a few factors can be found in some form in relation to at least two and sometimes three of the instruments. Distilling these common elements provides us with the most important factors to respect in order to achieve effective results, no matter which type of initiative is being applied.

Characteristics that were found to be associated with effective approaches more than once are as follows:

- Conflict Factors
  - The main stakeholders actually or potentially involved with the conflict are either already incorporated within the conflict prevention activity, or they believe that their interests are affected by it, and therefore take the activity seriously. At a minimum, they feel that their concerns are represented or reflected in the activity. In other words, the parties take some active interest in the activity because it has the potential or actual power to benefit or harm their perceived interests;
  - The conflict that is addressed has not become violent and militarized.
- Design Factors
  - The planning and implementation of the activity followed a clearly formulated strategy and adhered to high professional standards of balance and fairness.
  - The activity was perceived to have validity and legitimacy because of some kind of indigenous origin and character (local or national).

- Implementation Factors
  - The activity sought out and obtained support from other organized interests in the affected conflict arena.

Some of these factors, once stated, may seem obvious, and thus do not require research. But others are either not necessarily understood as important to keep in mind, or though obvious, may often be forgotten.

E.2. Implications for Further Research

The study provides suggestions regarding the kind of further research needed on effectiveness in conflict prevention. Research is needed that is able to probe more deeply into the magnitudes of particular kinds of impacts, the possible subsequent chains of causation that may or may not result, and the interactions of impacts on each other. This may suggest two kinds of research design:

- One research design that looks more in depth at individual representative cases, and several differing kinds of initiatives within such a setting, rather than examining only one type of initiative in several diverse cases. Such evidence would help greatly to verify the conclusions reached by these case studies, which have to be considered as preliminary hypotheses.

- One research design that looks at several different kinds of initiatives within a particular setting, but using a comparative approach across selected countries in different regions. This design would necessarily limit the depth of the examination in each country, yet nonetheless would yield valuable insights on the efficacy of distinct approaches, and how they do or do not work together, in diverse settings.

E.3. Possible Implications for USAID and NGO Decision-Making

Note that several of the general factors that are associated with effective results do not have to do directly with the more or less controllable aspects of an initiative, such as the design of the activity or its implementation, but rather with the less directly controllable factors such as the historical, socio-economic or political-military context and the nature of the conflict. This suggests that to the extent conflict impacts are to be expected, more attention should be paid to the settings in which initiatives are introduced and thus whether given approaches, and sets of them, are likely to be viable and efficacious in the settings in which they are introduced. To achieve this, certain procedures are advised in making choices.

<u>At the individual project level</u>: When considering inaugurating a particular type of project, a prior appraisal should be done to ascertain whether the setting is conducive to the particular kind of instrument that is being considered, and that it embodies the features that have been identified as important for effectiveness (as brought out in the checklists in Part III).

At the level of the conflict arena (local or national): Rather than asking whether a given project or type of initiative should be adopted in general, the primary question that should be addressed is what the scope and nature of a given conflict in a given setting is, and what are the various kinds of responses that the decision maker's organization and others might make that are appropriate to that situation.

I. SUMMARY OF THE CASE STUDIES

A. Local Peace Initiatives: Drawing on Tradition

A.1. Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in Northern Uganda

Since 1986, there has been ongoing civil war in Uganda between north and south. The Acholi conflict between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) movement, led by Joseph Konya, stems from the perception by the Acholi population in Northern Uganda of economic and political marginalization. Negotiated peace talks collapsed in 1994 amidst government claims that the LRA lacked seriousness while the LRA charged that President Museveni was committed to a military solution. Following the collapse of the peace talks, the LRA resumed the war with the assistance of the Sudanese government.

In order to break the cycle of violence, Northern religious leaders -- from Muslim, Catholic and Protestant faiths -- organized a forum in which to mediate between the government and the LRA. Their intervention sought to draw from their moral and religious power, neutrality, and extensive organizational anchorage of churches, parishes, and mosques. By most estimates, 90 per cent of the Acholi belong to one of the three religious faiths, furnishing the leadership with strategic institutional networks to mobilize for peace and reconciliation.

A decisive breakthrough for the ARLPI was a meeting with President Museveni in 1998 in which the leaders presented a memorandum, "A Call for Peace and an End to Bloodshed in Acholiland", that marked the formal inauguration of the intervention. Its immediate objective was to contribute to the process of establishing peace and stability in Acholiland through effective mediation, consensus building, participatory involvement of all parties, and the cessation of hostilities. In engaging the Museveni government, the ARLPI's point of departure was forgiveness and reconciliation, the centerpiece of the campaign for a peaceful approach to the conflict. Key actors credit Museveni for acknowledging the concerns of the ARLPI, marking a significant departure from the past practice of militarism. Presidential imprimatur to the intervention was a critical first step in building confidence and acknowledgement of the centrality of alternative institutional avenues for engagement. More important, national recognition bolstered the ARLPI's position in the eyes of local government actors, in particular, the Local Councils and military authorities, which were to become partners in the peace initiatives.

The result: a reduction in rebel activity and increased government willingness to seek a non-military solution to the conflict. LRA rebels are decreasing opposition and expressing a greater degree of willingness to be reintegrated into society. The government is adopting this model in other parts of the country where there is rebel activity.

A.2. Traditional Elders' Peace Conferences in Southern Sudan

Within the broader context of the ongoing North-South Sudan conflict, the Dinka-Nuer conflict in Southern Sudan was triggered in the early 1990s by an internal political fissure within the SPLA/SPLM along Dinka-Nuer lines. The North-South divide over time has fueled a series of ethnic and racial conflicts, though each is primarily based on concerns of economic marginalization. Previously, the Dinka and the Nuer coexisted peacefully and shared critical water and pasture resources, yet these groups more recently have become flashpoints of conflict. The core argument of the conflict is a structural conflict over economic resources, made more complex by the issues of identity and power within the South. Arming of civilians on both sides has worsened the severity of the conflict.

The New Sudan Council of Churches initiated an effort to spur dialogue between the two groups by organizing meetings with the Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLA/SPLM). The Council realized early on that unless a neutral body intervened to facilitate dialogues, southern Sudan was going to collapse. In turn, the Council mobilized local communities to hold periodic peace conferences that brought the conflicting parties together, providing them with the opportunity to address common concerns, such as children's safety. During these discussions, comprising people predisposed towards peace, underlying causes of the conflict and possibilities for its resolution emerged naturally, rather than being dictated by the organizers. Key to the success of the conferences was a strategy document, "Come Let Us Reason Together" (1998).

The Government of Sudan does not condone the conferences, since they are seen as a potential unifying force for the South in opposition to the central government. Given the role of the government in funding militias to fuel the war, the initiative has been hampered by its inability to address the fundamental conflict between North and South. Manipulation of parties in the South by the central government makes this initiative, in a larger sense, captive to forces that are beyond it.

During the course of the initiative, the Council has had to adapt the conferences to address new dimensions of the conflict as they arise. For instance, although consensus was developed during the conference for a reduction in the inter-ethnic dimension of the conflict, this theoretical agreement was not able to address the situation on the ground, where civilians were still heavily armed. The Council has been less successful in addressing problems of demilitarization and demobilization. As a result, there was actually an escalation of violence following several peace conferences.

A.3. Traditional Elders' Peace Process in Wajir, Kenya

The Wajir region is marginalized in terms of Kenyan politics, adding an interesting dynamic of relative autonomy from the national government in local communities. That said, state inattention also tends to foster greater innovation on the part of state functionaries engaging local actors on pertinent issues. The nature of the conflict in the Wajir is inter-clan warfare, based primarily on issues of water resources and grazing land. As new conflicts over administrative issues emerged in the 1990s, clan warfare took on a decidedly violent dimension. Further

fueling the conflict was intense resource competition in light of the 1992-1999 drought, during which time 12,000 people died.

Initiatives to mitigate the conflict and conditions that led to it have been multi-faceted and altogether successful. Its success can be in part attributed to the fact that a collaborative relationship was fostered between the state actors and the local community. Through this collaboration, a Rapid Response Team composed of the army, police, and local activists was created. In addition, the partnerships between community-based organizations (CBOs) and local government institutions proved particularly fruitful.

Another essential component of the initiative was the formation of a Peace Forum, embracing the roles of youth, elders and women in the peace process. Through local interest groups, many women worked to develop trust with elders and youth, and additionally, took the lead in reaching out to local government institutions. A positive set of relationships and channels of communication were established and have proven sustainable over the course of the initiative.

The most crucial aspect, however, was a meeting of clan elders that culminated in a negotiated framework document entitled, "Al Fatah Declaration". This declaration constituted the basis for a peace settlement among the feuding clans. As a result of this initiative, bandit activities that brutalized the communities have been significantly curbed. Moreover, local neighboring communities such as the Garissa have invited the Wajir group to assist them in mediation of similar conflicts, showing the replicable nature of such work.

As the initiative expanded beyond the core activities, it has yielded fewer results. For example, an effort was made to establish a village polytechnic institute for youth, but the institute has yet to bear fruit. Similarly, the initiative created a peace prize to be awarded annually to the most "peaceful" community, but the prize has not materialized.

Overall, the initiative has contributed to peace through information gathering, creating early-warning systems, and setting up new norms of behavior for the community. And since the local government has bought into the value of the initiative, its likelihood for sustainability is quite high. The commitment of local government functionaries to the initiative has been exemplary by Kenyan standards, with the potential to be replicated across Northeastern Kenya.

B. Mid-Level Policy Dialogues: Taking Action at the National Level

B.1. National Dialogue in Kenya: Religious Organizations and Constitutional Reform

The National Council of Churches of Kenya and allied organizations have undertaken a significant role in facilitating dialogue between the government and opposition parties regarding the contentious and vital issues of reforming the Kenyan Constitution. These policy issues

concern the power of the presidency, laws affecting multi-party political competition, and the role of the state in society and the economy.

The initiative has apparently been crucial at critical points by offering an alternative channel for addressing the issues (although not resolving them), to that of collective violence on the streets. Violence has occasionally erupted and caused considerable concern about the breakdown of civil order. The restarting of the negotiations has in a sense saved the body politic from eventual, probably divisive conflict with little redeeming social value. A model of peaceful resolution of political issues has been established that has considerable visibility. Also, the religious leaders have played an influential role in keeping these issues addressed at high levels, and they have succeeded in opening them up to participation by civil society. This has helped to increase pressure on the government and opposition to make some progress in addressing the issues.

At the same time, however, these leaders have shifted their approach from initially acting as impartial mediators to increasingly becoming partisan advocates of constitutional reform, and in particular, the devolution of power from the Presidency. The increasing polarization of this issue to which this partisanship has contributed was reflected in the division between a faith-led process of local consultations that are being held on the issues and a similar, but separate government-led process. As yet, no "moderate center" has emerged that might be able to foster the needed compromises to achieve some acceptable compromises on the issues.

Recently, however, negotiations have been going on to create some linkage between the two processes. This has helped to save face for the government and move beyond the developing stalemate between these two processes. They may yet adopt some constructive division of labor or modus vivendi. But the many constitutional issues remain far from specific resolution. In sum, whether this faith-based project ultimately has been able to foster a successful process of peaceful management of this major public dispute is yet to be determined.

This issue reflects the great extent to which Kenyan politics is still driven mainly by ethnic affiliation and manipulation, since all the major actors – the KANU dominated government and parliament, the opposition parties, and even the reformer elites – either clearly draw from one ethnic base or other, or are perceived by the others as drawing support from certain ethnic constituencies and suspected of wishing to gain political power at the expense of the others.

B.2. Somaliland War-Torn Societies Project

Somaliland's major conflict was resolved when it broke away from the collapsed Somali state, but after the reclamation of its sovereignty, the same conflicts that afflicted Somali became evident in Somaliland. The past decade has witnessed the struggle of the young state to resolve violent internal conflicts, to build sustainable peace among the different groups that constitute its population, to build a state that will sustain peace, and to rebuild an economy that will sustain the population. While significant progress towards accomplishing some of these aims has occurred, conflict over the issue of how authority would be created and shared persisted.

The War-Torn Society Project (WSP) approached Somaliland to examine the reconstruction process. WSP program objectives in Somaliland include ensuring that international assistance contributes to building peace and does not contribute to renewed conflict, promoting the

Participatory Action Research (PAR) program as a vehicle for democratizing development and empowering communities and disempowered groups such as women, strengthening the capacity of national and local government and civil society organizations to contribute to state-building and reconstruction, and building the capacity and ensuring the sustainability of a successor body, namely the Somaliland Center for Peace and Development (SPCD). Through its research capacity, the WSP provides a neutral forum for reconstruction activities to take place. The WSP serves as a flexible policy-oriented research unit that remains committed to backstopping community efforts, while also operating at the macro level.

A research center that engages the community in multi-channel dialogues on issues of contention, the SCPD assists communities in taking charge of political agendas and draws upon the expertise of the SPCD staff to address concerns. The SCPD: 1) helps create a venue within the nation to explore different ideas about reconstruction; 2) provides a forum for peaceful articulation of interests in a society that is still framing its formal institutions; 3) allows voices of the marginalized to enter the consultative process; and 4) assures a channel for two-way communication between the government and citizens.

In a particularly interesting project by SCPD, researchers traveled for six months to speak with communities across the country, meet with women, government officials and NGOs. Their final report, called a "Self-Portrait" in order to emphasize the collective production process and local ownership, is a blueprint for development priorities in the country. The report stresses governance, livestock regulation and family as key on the development agenda. The role of media in re-building Somaliland was also pinpointed as critical to achieving development objectives and resolving conflict through free information flow.

The WSP dialogue process has contributed significantly to the empowerment, and in some cases the mobilization, of groups who have much to contribute to building the types of polity, economy, and society, that will achieve a sustainable peace, but who have more often than not been excluded from the processes of state-building and reconstruction. The empowerment of these groups promises to have a positive long-term impact on government policies and on the political culture of Somaliland.

B.3. Middle-Level Dialogues in Burundi

Burundi, like its neighbor Rwanda, is a country that has been at war with itself. The conflict in Burundi has been going on for four decades. Since 1962, when the country became independent, there have been at least four major clashes between the Tutsi and Hutu, resulting in the death of almost one million people, with other hundreds of thousands of Burundi being exiled in neighboring countries. The center of the conflict has been the struggle for the control of the state. Control of the state determines the control and distribution of societal resources. While the fact of competition is a normal political process, the intensity of the struggle for control of the state in Burundi is also informed by the crushing poverty that characterizes the Burundi political economy.

Intervention in the form of promoting middle-level, inter-ethnic dialogue is an initiative promoted by International Alert. The operational objectives of International Alert in Burundi are principally to encourage and facilitate dialogue between political and ethnic antagonists, as a

necessary prelude to ending violent conflict and furthering peaceful exchange. It aims to accomplish these objectives by enhancing the capacity of Burundi in peace making by strengthening the knowledge and skills of individuals, and the capacities of groups and organizations, to work for a just and durable peace.

One of the activities supported by International Alert is the CAP Group: Compagnie des Apotres de la Paix (Apostles for Peace). CAP now comprises about fifty active members. The middle-level dialogues promoted by the CAP Group has produced fairly significant results, especially in Bujumbura, the capital. It has had an appreciable influence in bringing individuals and groups of people together to address critical questions regarding political development in Burundi. CAP members have served as important role models for others in the country. They have jointly appeared on national television and radio, and have led public fora to influence public opinion that "the other camp are not monsters." There is evidence that CAP messages through television and radio have also had an impact on the Burundi diaspora in the region (Tanzania and Kenya), and in Europe where most of the educated Hutu live.

Several other NGOs have sprung up in response to the need to promote dialogue as well, and have subsequently been supported by International Alert. The NGOs have conducted several activities and have programs aimed at peace and reconciliation through dialogue. One of these groups is the Collective Women's Organizations (CAFOB), which promotes a women's peace program. CAFOB organizes seminars for women both in Bujumbura and a few selected sites outside of the capital city to increase women's political awareness. CAFOB successfully promoted the acceptance of women at Arusha negotiations, and there was a clear increase of women being represented in most of the delegations at the Arusha 2000 meeting.

These activities provide a parallel process to political level negotiation among groups who vie for state power. In essence, middle-level dialogue actually "grounds" the political dialogue by concretizing it among the non-political elite, who in the long run may hold in their hands, the future of peace in Burundi.

C. Peace Radio Initiatives

C.1. Search for Common Ground's Studio Ijambo, Burundi

Studio Ijambo, translated as "wise words" in the local language of Kirundi, was established as Burundi's first independent radio studio in May 1995, by Search for Common Ground in Burundi and Common Ground Productions. The studio was created in a region where an estimated 85 percent of the population has access to radios, and at a time when hate radio was playing an inflammatory role in fueling violence in neighboring Rwanda.

For the past six years, the studio has employed Hutu and Tutsi staff and produced about fifteen hours a week of news, public affairs and cultural programming. In addition, the studio produces a radio drama that portrays the daily struggles of a Hutu and Tutsi family living as next-door neighbors, and their efforts to reconcile their differences. It is estimated that Studio Ijambo reaches twelve million people throughout the Great Lakes region. Studio Ijambo is also credited

with aiding in the decentralization of the media in Burundi and building local capacity for news coverage.

There are several ways that Peace Radio effectively promotes conflict prevention and peace building:

- Reaches out to illiterate populations to disseminate information, generate public dialogue and debate, advocate for specific issues, provide civic education and mobilize public support for particular actions or events.
- Conducts needs assessments of rural communities, such as World Vision's work with the Pokot and Turkana.
- Educates individuals about appropriate roles for leaders and other citizens to play during times of conflict.
- Publicizes border harmonization meetings in rural areas.
- Airs live strategic meetings between elders and other political leaders.
- Informs communities about the plight of other conflict-ridden areas, including the adverse effects and destruction that arise from conflicts.
- Propagates early warning information and current cease-fire status information.

II. EFFECTIVE PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED

Summary of Chapter Contents

This chapter begins a detailed look at each of the three initiatives that were examined: Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio.

The Introduction to the chapter, Part A, discusses the means by which the effective practices and lessons learned were derived. It also provides a guide to reading and understanding the tables that follow in Part C of this chapter.

Part B reports on general lessons and effective practices for initiatives aimed at preventing or managing conflict and building peace, across the three types of initiatives that are the focus of this study. They represent generalizations that may be useful to the practitioner.

Part C reports on our findings about effective practices, and lessons learned that are specific to each of the three types of initiatives. In a table format, it presents information on effective practices, as they relate to the three types of conflict risk factors (or sources of actual conflict) that a type of initiative might try, in a strategic sense, to influence in order to prevent or manage conflict and build peace. Illustrative examples are provided from the case studies. Finally, it includes a discussion and explanation of three types of risk factors—structural conditions, channels, and triggers and inhibitors—that were used in assessing the impacts of various specific initiatives when we conducted the case study research.

A. Introduction

In this part of the report we present some effective practices and lessons learned for practitioners who are considering undertaking or have already begun a local or national effort to prevent or mitigate conflict and build peace in the Greater Horn of Africa region (GHA). It is important to note that these effective practices and lessons learned come from a limited number of cases. By necessity, these numbers are small, because current experience in peace building in the region is still maturing as a practice area. These effective practices and lessons learned were derived primarily from two sources of information. The first source is a set of in-depth case studies of nine recent initiatives undertaken in the region by groups that set out to address specific conflict situations. The initiatives were chosen on the basis of their having been in operation long enough to produce some results (at least one year) and their reputations for having had positive impacts on their particular conflict situations. The initiatives are grouped under three major types: Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio.

The second source of information for our effective practices and lessons learned is a USAID-sponsored workshop on the Impacts of Peace Building Initiatives in the Greater Horn of Africa

in January 2001. In this workshop, representatives from NGOs throughout the region reacted to presentations of some of the case studies mentioned above, reported on additional initiatives, and offered advice for those who might try a new initiative in the future.[7]

As we have learned over the past year, effective practices and lessons learned can be identified in a variety of forms and at several levels of practical intervention. Some can take the form of considerations to take into account about a particular conflict situation when deciding, at a broad strategic level, whether to undertake one type of initiative or another, e.g., whether to undertake a community-based peace process or a middle-level non-official national dialogue. Other effective practices or lessons learned can take the form of more detailed approaches to achieving a particular objective while operating within a specific type of initiative. Still others can be identified as simple principles in the form of "do's and don'ts," with some that apply regardless of the type of initiative one might undertake, and others that apply to only one or another type of initiative. In this section of the report, we include all of these types of effective practices and lessons learned in the hope that every practitioner will find something of value to consider and apply when choosing, designing or implementing one or another of the three types of initiatives we studied.

In section B, we present a set of generic lessons and advisable practices that would appear to apply to any initiative aimed at preventing or managing conflict or building peace. Section C provides, in three sub-sections, effective practices and lessons learned that are specific to each of the three types of initiatives, namely, Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio.

B. General Lessons and Effective Practices for Initiatives Aimed at Preventing or Managing Conflict and Building Peace

The following lessons and practices are derived from all of the case studies undertaken as a whole, and represent generalizations that may be useful to the practitioner. Effective practices and lessons learned are further delineated by type of intervention later in Part C of this chapter.

- In many, if not most cases, the nature and location of the conflict predetermines whether the conflict prevention practice initiated will be useful. Knowing at what level the change needs to occur for conflict to be prevented is key. Trying lots of interesting things so that it looks like something is going on to prevent conflict may raise expectations, waste resources and most of all, distract energy from initiatives that might work better.

[7] Reports of the nine case studies are presented in Appendix 3 of this report. A full report of the NGO workshop is provided in a separate document, "Impacts of Peace Building Initiatives in the GHA: What Can We Learn from Experience to Improve Practice?" available from USAID/REDSO.

- Local peace initiatives using local authorities and traditional leaders will work best when the nature of the problem is locally caused. Lack of incentives for parties to talk to each other is difficult to overcome. Traditional processes for managing local conflicts may exclude some stakeholders to dominate (e.g., elders). Adapting traditional conflict management mechanisms so that they enlist people from different segments of the community (elders, women, youth, civil servants, educators) to work with existing institutions in new ways can lead to achieving more durable conflict management outcomes.

- Religious leaders and religious organizations offer a number of assets for conflict prevention and peace building. In some circumstances, religious organizations can be perceived as neutral bodies, drawing on moral and religious power to facilitate intervention activities or discussions down to the level of communities and parishes when other options are not apparent. They can combine forces across faiths to initiate effective multi-faith efforts such as mediation forums, engage with government leadership in high-level dialogues and mobilize local peace efforts through community-based civic education. Neutrality can be difficult to maintain, however; once religious organizations engage in a peace building dialogue, for example, their role may shift from facilitation to advocating a position.

- Local peace initiatives exist in a "no man's land" between governments and people. Local expectations are higher sometimes than a leader's authority to deliver. These initiatives can open channels but they may not be sufficient to deliver peace. If local peacemakers become too popular, they can be perceived as a threat to the authorities that must ultimately implement the decisions reached.

- Peace conferences and meetings depend on long-term preparation to be considered legitimate. They cannot be driven by the timetables of outside conveners. When they work, it is because people are ready to talk and consider it in their own self-interest to do so. Preparing the groundwork for this kind of discussion can take a long time.

- Porous borders with greatly differing legal systems among neighboring states mean that local initiatives at peace using traditional community authority may work and that the spread effect throughout the region may be greater than between states with rigid borders. This can be particularly applicable to clan related conflict.

- Competition for scarce resources is at the heart of many of the regional conflicts studied. If this competition for land, water, grazing space, etc. cannot be addressed in the long term, conflict prevention may be only medium term at best.

- Outside actors are often key unseen players in local conflict prevention. They can either act on or destroy what local groups do to promote peace. Many locally based solutions depend on national level action to implement long term. This may mean resources, new legislation, amnesty or demilitarization. Insurgent groups have no reason to listen to local demands for peace when the stakes they seek are secondary to local needs. If they do not need local citizens for food, supplies or cover, they may be much less likely to honor

requests to negotiate by local leaders. The place they really want to be heard may be many miles away.

- Transparency in selection of actors for dialogues at all levels is essential. Groups must see themselves represented and selected fairly to buy in to the process. People are more likely to participate if they do not feel a threat by doing so. The objectives of the dialogue should be clear to all participants for it to be effective. Even when they are not speaking for any group but just engaging in community problem-solving across ethnic or clan lines, the objectives must be known by all.

- Radio must be as independent as possible to be both credible and viable over time. Dependence on government owned infrastructure for transmission may hurt credibility of the programming.

- Adherence to strong ethical standards of reporting by journalists is essential to credibility. Using joint reporting teams to cover controversial stories in conditions of ethnic or clan bias is critical to program integrity.

- Two-way communication on radio or television on issues has proven very effective in promoting dialogue and for venting popular frustration. These formats can include call-in or town meeting shows. The entertainment value of programs that feature mixed groups working to solve problems can be a powerful message in societies with major cleavages.

C. Effective Practices and Lessons Learned in Local Community-Based Peace Processes, Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogues, and Peace Radio Initiatives

This section is divided into three sub-sections, one for each type of initiative. In each sub-section, we offer two sets of effective practices and lessons learned in two separate tables. The first is a list of general lessons learned about planning and implementing the type of initiative being considered. The second table requires some explanation. It is a table of effective practices, as they relate to the three types of conflict risk factors (or sources of actual conflict) that a type of initiative might try, in a strategic sense, to influence in order to prevent or manage conflict and build peace. These three types of risk factors—structural conditions, channels, and triggers and inhibitors—were used in assessing the impacts of various specific initiatives when we conducted the case study research. In the table, they are listed in the first column as possible strategic objectives that a new initiative might try to accomplish. Briefly, the risk factors/objectives are defined as follows:

Structural Conditions are underlying, predisposing, latent economic or social conditions that provide fertile ground for the emergence of conflict between groups of people. In essence, they lie at the heart, or root causes, of conflict, and, as such, require intervention if long-term, lasting peace is to be achieved. Our study of initiatives focused on lessons

and effective practices for addressing two structural conditions that commonly characterize inter-group conflict: the quantity and distribution of economic assets among groups of people and inter-group attitudes, perceptions and interactions.

Channels are the intermediary political processes and institutions that connect or divide groups of people. Channels that connect people help prevent or reduce conflict, while those that divide people create or increase conflict. Our study focused on what the initiatives could tell us about how practitioners might build or improve four key types of channels in order to reduce conflict and build peace: social and political mobilization of groups for the peaceful pursuit of their interests, social innovation and organizational learning that introduce new methods for peace building, formal governing institutions and processes at the local or national level that promote peaceful conflict resolution, and "top-level" official political negotiations among the leaders of conflicting parties that lead to the conflict resolution.

Triggers and Inhibitors are immediate actions and events that can serve, in a specific time and place, either to spark a violent manifestation of conflict or to prevent violence from occurring or escalating. They are things that are said or done, especially by people who are in a position to influence the course of events in specific crisis situations. Under this type of risk factor, we focused on what the initiatives could teach us and other practitioners about the effective use of conciliatory statements or policy actions in situations of actual or imminent violence among groups of people.

In the second and third columns of the table, respectively, we list effective practices in terms of tactical approaches one might take in order to achieve an objective in the first column, and operational examples and details of that approach taken from the case studies. Please note that there are some blank cells in this table for each of the three types of initiatives. This means that our research did not generate any specific tactical approaches or case-specific details for a particular risk factor/strategic objective.

C.1 Local Community-Based Peace Processes

Local Community-Based Peace Processes:
General Lessons Learned about Planning and Implementation

- Economic sources of conflict that are often hundreds of years old are exacerbated in scarcity situations where natural resource depletion or population pressure make scarce resources even more valuable. Peace processes can do little to change competition for scarce grazing land, youth lack of employment, or recurrent drought.
- Local dialogue is most effective when the origin of the problem is based on local history or competition for resources. When the actors are largely outside the region and fueling the conflict for other reasons, local discourse can only serve as an example to national leaders that they should be acting to resolve the conflict. It will not by itself be sufficient to bring peace permanently.
- The ability of well-organized local initiatives to influence armed military groups of insurgents was limited in the cases studied. There was no incentive on the part of the outside groups to listen to local peacemakers. The best these initiatives can do is to lobby central government to negotiate with the insurgents.
- Working through existing groups with respected leaders in the community helps move the process along more quickly than initiating ad hoc groups with less community support. Multi-faith approaches can be effective in regions where there is sufficient religious differentiation to make this desirable.
- Groups that work pro-actively to involve large numbers of local stakeholders have met with success in local dispute resolution. Groups that practice proactive transparency in their work and make sure that the constituent members are representative of significant portions of the communities affected met with success. This argues for a largely locally led initiative that will have its own timetable and may not work at the pace that outside supporters in central government or internationally might prefer.
- "One-off" conferences, while still capable of providing major breakthroughs, are seldom sufficient to ensure a long-term peace process. They are often dependent on the authority of the conveners who may not be from the region or the countries and may not have local support for the next steps required. It is possible that the peace process can be continued if there is a follow-up plan of actions in which local and other stakeholders have ownership.
- In cases where the conflicts are largely local, where the instigators of the violence are known and where elders are given authority to act, de-escalating the dispute from clan to individual level may be effective. Even if reprisals have occurred, elders can intervene and try the initial triggering act (usually a murder or major theft) under local legal authority and then settle the reprisals with compensation and formal apologies.

Structural Conditions are underlying, predisposing, latent economic or social conditions that provide fertile ground for the emergence of conflict between groups of people. In essence, they lie at the heart, or root causes, of conflict, and, as such, require intervention if long-term, lasting peace is to be achieved. Our study of initiatives focused on lessons and effective practices for addressing two structural conditions that commonly characterize inter-group conflict: the quantity and distribution of economic assets among groups of people and inter-group attitudes, perceptions and interactions. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Local Community-Based Peace Processes: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Structural Conditions			
Strategic Objectives **In using Local Community-Based Peace Processes, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective**
Structural conditions: To improve the quantity and distribution of economic assets (such as physical or financial capital or income generating activities, or specific capacities for obtaining such assets).	Promote the resumption of established pre-conflict trading relationships.	In Sudan the local peace initiatives led resumption of trade patterns among the peoples of the West Bank of the Nile. Grazing in shared areas was re-established. Agricultural production increased.	Economic stability is a key condition; any improvement in availability of goods and re-establishment of trade among disputing parties can reinforce the need to remain peaceful over time. Stable markets encourage increases in agricultural production since the unmet demand for food and other goods is high.
	Leveraging outside resources to support local economic activity.	In Uganda the ARLPI was able to get the central government to increase investment in the affected regions and to interest donors in more support for local efforts to return services and economic activity.	Bringing resources to devastated communities for other than relief can help people see that a return to normal life may happen.

Local Community-Based Peace Processes: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Structural Conditions			
Strategic Objectives **In using Local Community-Based Peace Processes, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective**
Structural Conditions: To foster more positive perceptions and attitudes and more peaceful everyday interactions and relationships between rank and file members of the main parties to the conflict (e.g. tribes, clans, or ethnic groups).	Increasing inter-communal contact and group involvement in peace making efforts and support.	Improving day-to-day relationships can work when the competing groups are not dispersed geographically. At a minimum, a trickle down effect can be noted. More contact can occur in markets, border towns and schools if formal and informal institutions continue operating. (Kenya and Sudan) Peace efforts, followed by some kind of restitution, were effective in Kenya and Sudan in beginning to normalize contact between groups. In Northern Uganda, not all groups are involved in each conflict, so limited improvements between groups that find themselves mutually affected can occur. The ARLPI in northern Uganda has improved relationships among formerly estranged segments of the population even though these are not the armed insurgents who are causing the conflict. It has also focused national discourse on the problems of the north and been able to mobilize discussion beyond the area on solving its problems.	Regular contact outside the specially convened group meetings is needed to reinforce that peaceful daily contact is desirable and beneficial. Practicing tolerant behavior and cooperation helps solidify the group decisions to do so. People view attempts at restitution as proof that the conflict will continue to be avoided. The enforcement of consequences helps individuals feel that “wrongs” have been “righted,” encouraging normalcy of relations. Since these problems are not of the making of the local populations, increasing dialogue in other venues can help to resolve the conflict over time. Political sectarianism and regionalism are weakened in the process. Local relationships among NGOs, military and civilian authorities, local government and other key actors has improved as a by-product of the peace process of engaging the national government in dialogue with insurgents.

Channels are the intermediary political processes and institutions that connect or divide groups of people. Channels that connect people help prevent or reduce conflict, while those that divide people create or increase conflict. Our study focused on what the initiatives could tell us about how practitioners might build or improve four key types of channels in order to reduce conflict and build peace: social and political mobilization of groups for the peaceful pursuit of their interests, social innovation and organizational learning that introduce new methods for peace building, formal governing institutions and processes at the local or national level that promote peaceful conflict resolution, and "top-level" official political negotiations among the leaders of conflicting parties that lead to the conflict resolution. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Local Community-Based Peace Processes: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives **In using Local Community-Based Peace Processes, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Channels: To increase the ability of groups to organize collectively in order to pursue interests peacefully.	Enlist people from different segments of the community (elders, women, youth, civil servants, educators) to work with existing institutions for new purposes.	In Kenya (Wajir) and Sudan, the councils cut across clan lines and were selected in a transparent manner. Declarations were produced in Wajir to settle inter-clan disputes. Traditional structures were re-oriented to be used for conflict resolution. By scaling down the crimes from clan acts to individual acts that could be dealt with under the formal legal system, elders were successful in de-escalating reprisal situations. Traditional means such as financial compensation and ritual apology were then used to counter harm done during reprisals. Special conferences give voices to segments of societies that are not often heard and allow them to participate in public discourse on peace. (Sudan)	A combination of formal legal measures that punished the original act of violence along with traditional compensation (overseen and adjudicated by a multi-clan group of elders) was accepted by the communities involved as an alternative to continued violence. The diversity of actors in the conference setting increased the flow of information into the community about its results.
Channels: To introduce new methods for peace building and spread the techniques.	Use existing structures and organizations as the base and graft on new norms and objectives to work for the peace process and for longer term development goals of the community.	NSCC in Sudan used the same inter-tribal conference methods in several places. In the Wajir (Kenya) case, it led to offshoot activities including rapid response teams to end conflicts, training district officers, a peace school and other training institutions for youth.	Using organizations and individuals trusted by the community hastens the likelihood that their authority will be respected and that their intervention might be effective. The Wajir model of elder intervention was studied by other communities in Kenya for replication.

Local Community-Based Peace Processes: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives **In using Local Community-Based Peace Processes, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Channels: To create and strengthen political processes and governing institutions (local or national) that can incorporate conflicting parties, interests and issues in regular, ongoing processes and procedures for peaceful conflict resolution.	Approaches vary with the nature of the conflict and the level of the authorities involved. Some cases involve insurgents who are not members of any formal country or government.	The Wajir project worked closely with local authorities in Kenya. Accused law violators were turned over to local authorities thereby reinforcing rule of law in the area. Sudan peace conferences had no relation to local or central authorities. They did contribute governance functions to the SPLM rebel movement with all that this can imply. This alliance led to peaceful resolution of disputes within the SPLM areas. In Uganda, ARLPI initiatives led to greater dialogue between central government and the region. It also competed with local service providers for resources. Pressure was put to initiate an Amnesty Law by the government.	In general, reinforcing rule of law when it is not repressive can increase public confidence in legal measures and avoid reprisals in local conflicts. Extra-governmental means are sometimes the only way to promote a peace process where there is no national interest in resolving the war. National action to institute amnesty can be an important first step in resolving disputes that involve actors from beyond the borders who have support within certain regions by anti-government groups.
Channels: To advance the resolution of specific grievances, issues and disputes among leaders of conflicting parties engaged in the bargaining process.	Negotiating peace agreements. Moderating positions of key actors in the conflict.	In Wajir, the Al Fatah declaration (which formed the basis for peace settlements in the region) was completed and accepted by the communities. NSCC in Sudan negotiated the Wunlit pact which deceased violence within the SPLM controlled areas. ARLPI moderated the GOU approach to the conflict and pressed for peace negotiations but was not able to bring the parties to that point. Intent to sign a ceasefire was pronounced by the government. No settlement has occurred.	Perceived legitimacy and transparency of the elders to negotiate the agreements. Acceptance of the convening authority of the conferences and the public support for some kind of peaceful result. National and international publicity on ARLPI work encouraged increased government attention and participation in the process.

Triggers and Inhibitors are immediate actions and events that can serve, in a specific time and place, either to spark a violent manifestation of conflict or to prevent violence from occurring or escalating. They are things that are said or done, especially by people who are in a position to influence the course of events in specific crisis situations. Under this type of risk factor, we focused on what the initiatives could teach us and other practitioners about the effective use of conciliatory statements or policy actions in situations of actual or imminent violence among groups of people. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Local Community-Based Peace Processes: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Triggers and Inhibitors			
Strategic Objectives **In using Local Community-Based Peace Processes, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Triggers and Inhibitors: to promote conciliatory actions and deterrents.	Choose methods and approaches that are available to each group and are determined by structures within the communities.	Wajir is an example of effectiveness in preventing escalation (rather than stopping initial violent incidents). Rapid response teams and elder intervention in a timely way have been effective. Wunlit and other NSCC conferences have reduced the amount of cattle theft and abductions in the region by peaceful negotiation.	Initiatives have had different results largely determined by the scale of the conflict and access to key players in each case.
Triggers and Inhibitors: To reduce provocative rhetoric and specific acts of violence.	Support/encourage peace agreements.	Having Al Fatah and Wunlit agreements in place gives conflicting parties a reference point. The intention to sign a ceasefire if negotiated keeps public opinion on the Ugandan government side more easily.	The agreements represent an accomplishment for each of the groups and help the people they represent feel that progress is being made and that they have a reason to try to avoid conflict in the future. The Ugandan government is more ready to negotiate that it was before the intervention.

C2. Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue

Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue:
General Lessons Learned about Planning and Implementation

- Middle level dialogue can be compromised by lack of linkages to non-elite groups and to key political actors beyond its group. Who represents whom in the dialogue can be tricky if criteria for selection are not transparent and the groups represented do not do their own selecting. Outsiders know best approaches are not well received and may hurt credibility for the efforts over time.
- Dialogue cannot really occur if some of the power holders are not present to receive and/or use the results of the middle level discussions. The idea of these discussions as an alternative track to formal initiatives only works if there is a group or set of decision-makers willing and ready to listen to the middle level outcomes. They can become contentious if representation is not transparent.
- Regular contact over time is needed for this kind of dialogue to work. One-time only events are probably of a more limited impact.
- Lack of immediate physical threat to participants can help foster middle level dialogue participation.
- To have real impact at the middle level, there should be a critical mass of participants who are distributed around the country, not just in the capital. All major groups in the country should be consciously represented and easily identifiable in the discussion groups. Transparency on this point is critical to legitimacy of the process beyond the group.
- Middle level dialogue benefits from the presence of stakeholders as represented by legitimate groups who can be asked to send representatives to the process.
- Participants in the dialogue should perceive their participation as part of a larger set of objectives that include peace building in the region or country.
- These dialogues can be seen as more effective if there is a perception that they are needed to influence actions beyond the group involved.

C.2 Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue

Structural Conditions are underlying, predisposing, latent economic or social conditions that provide fertile ground for the emergence of conflict between groups of people. In essence, they lie at the heart, or root causes, of conflict, and, as such, require intervention if long-term, lasting peace is to be achieved. Our study of initiatives focused on lessons and effective practices for addressing two structural conditions that commonly characterize inter-group conflict: the quantity and distribution of economic assets among groups of people and inter-group attitudes, perceptions and interactions. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Structural Conditions			
Strategic Objectives **In using Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Structural conditions: to improve the quantity and distribution of economic assets.	None of the dialogue initiatives were designed to effect this change.	N/A	N/A
Structural conditions: To foster more positive perceptions and attitudes and more peaceful everyday interactions and relationships between rank and file members of the main parties to the conflict (e.g. tribes, clans or ethnic groups).	People are brought together as a main focus of the strategy on a regular basis.	Press and other media coverage of the dialogue can help reinforce that greater tolerance between different groups is possible, and that people are committed to moving toward peace (Kenya, Burundi, Somalia) The diaspora in other countries is made aware of the dialogue through press coverage. In Somalia, the WSP group brings together women, the independent media, livestock traders, nomads, residents of remote small towns, educated professionals, intellectuals, elders, and even MPs, for non-confrontational dialogue to examine and discuss important issues of shared concern. The WSP group is also seen as one of the few with a balanced view towards clans.	Modeling behaviors that promote interaction can increase tolerance of different groups. The creation of national and local venues that engage, on an equal footing, many kinds of citizens, reinforces the norm of democratic inclusion.

Channels are the intermediary political processes and institutions that connect or divide groups of people. Channels that connect people help prevent or reduce conflict, while those that divide people create or increase conflict. Our study focused on what the initiatives could tell us about how practitioners might build or improve four key types of channels in order to reduce conflict and build peace: social and political mobilization of groups for the peaceful pursuit of their interests, social innovation and organizational learning that introduce new methods for peace building, formal governing institutions and processes at the local or national level that promote peaceful conflict resolution, and "top-level" official political negotiations among the leaders of conflicting parties that lead to the conflict resolution. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives **In using Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Channel: to increase the ability of groups to organize collectively in order to pursue interests peacefully.	Provide fora for people to discuss community interests that affect them all.	In Kenya and Somalia, these dialogues give greater voice to people who may have been ignored. People in Somalia use the groups to discuss concerns that affect everyone (corruption, use of stimulants). In Burundi, efforts to organize groups outside the capital may be one of the few attempts to engage marginalized stakeholders seldom heard such as women, inhabitants of small towns, etc. The CAFOB women's spin-off initiative has stimulated awareness of political processes and economic issues of interest through organized seminars with women outside of Bujumbura. CAFOB's efforts resulted in a clear increase in women delegates at the 2000 Arusha meeting. The group discussions in Kenya and Somalia showed that there are differences in interests and view points that are not clan dependent, but that may depend on the individual's or clan's role in society or its economy.	New segments of society were mobilized and empowered through these fora. (Kenya, Somalia, and Burundi). Clan or personal identity may not be the only factor that affects someone's view of a problem. This realization can be an important first step to preventing conflict on solely clan lines.

Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives **In using Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Channel: To introduce new methods for peace building and spread the techniques.	Introduced new models for problem-solving and discussion.	In Kenya the Ufungamano process receives lots of attention and is considered a national vehicle for constitutional dialogue. In Somalia, the participatory action research program provided a more balanced and neutral vehicle for determining the causes of conflict and the issues surrounding specific problems, as well as a means for discussing the identified issues.	It provides an alternative focus to what the central governments may or may no be doing. The participatory action research program fostered an increased common understanding of issues affecting the actions of diverse parties in the conflict, thereby contributing to a reduction in tension and feelings of hostility.
Channel: To create and strengthen political processes and governing institutions.	Fill vacuums created by lack of state processes that are inclusive.	In Kenya, the Ufungamano process promotes the idea that constitutional reform is key to the process of peaceful political change. It is regarded as a major national vehicle for addressing constitutional and underlying political issues and the intervention restarted the process of constitutional reform. In Somalia different groups have a way to come together to discuss what will be needed to recreate a society that works for everyone. The WSP process identified several issues that have found their way onto the national policy agenda, and its country report influenced the content of the new constitutions.	Can be an effective alternative when there is a stalemate or lack of ability on a national level, and brings other voices from civil society organizations into the debate for resolution of serious problems. However, it may also widen the gulf between people and government if and when government feels their power is threatened (Kenya).
Channel: To advance the resolution of specific grievances, issues and disputes among leaders of conflicting parties engaged in the bargaining process.	Keep national discussions and processes going when official groups may have stopped the dialogue at an impasse.	In Kenya, NCCK was principally responsible for restarting the official constitutional reform process national dialogue on the constitution when it stalled, and has kept the national review process going and opened it to wider audiences and input.	The impasse was broken by the actions of the NCCK because it provided an organized means for established reform-oriented NGO groups and oppositions parties to voice their desire for the review, and pushed government to take action. There is more likely to be a resolution of the constitutional impasse in Kenya if people keep up some kind of public dialogue on it.

Triggers and Inhibitors are immediate actions and events that can serve, in a specific time and place, either to spark a violent manifestation of conflict or to prevent violence from occurring or escalating. They are things that are said or done, especially by people who are in a position to influence the course of events in specific crisis situations. Under this type of risk factor, we focused on what the initiatives could teach us and other practitioners about the effective use of conciliatory statements or policy actions in situations of actual or imminent violence among groups of people. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Triggers and Inhibitors			
Strategic Objectives **In using Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Triggers and Inhibitors: To promote conciliatory actions and deterrents.	Initiate mid-level non-official dialogues that includes aggrieved stakeholders denied an audience and voice before violence erupts, or in general, within conflictual settings to promote conciliatory discussions between parties.	In Kenya, the initiation of dialogue stemmed the violence after the 1997 elections, and encouraged conciliatory behavior. In Somalia, WSP does not target political actors. It focuses on the promotion of non-threatening dialogue on specific topics of common concern between members of national government, local government, civil society organizations, traditional leaders and other actors.	Dialogue can deter or discourage violence when initiated on a timely basis as in this case in Kenya. It offers an alternative means of expression instead of violence. Dialogue between political actors in government and representatives of other segments of society gave citizens some of their first opportunities to communicate with government, state their grievances, and to discuss resolution. WSP offered a means for this process to occur.

Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Triggers and Inhibitors			
Strategic Objectives **In using Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Triggers and Inhibitors: to reduce provocative rhetoric and specific acts of violence.	Offer alternative means of discussion that operate in a neutral way to allow discussion.	In Kenya, the Ufungamano dialogue evolved into a partisan pressure group for constitutional reform thereby giving up its facilitative role for a more proactive one. In Somalia, WSP created a neutral forum for careful research and articulation of key issues and problems affecting the country through the participatory action research process, and a vehicle for discussion of the results among diverse stakeholders. In Burundi, the process brought together people who previously did not talk to each other into a dialogue about the future of the country.	It is not clear whether this shift will ultimately be better for the cause of peaceful change. The WSP process of iterative action and reflection creates a setting that fosters common understanding among segments of society. The dialogue has created an alternative to conflict, and provides less opportunity for political elite manipulation of differences between ethnic groups.

C.3 Peace Radio

Peace Radio: General Lessons Learned about Planning and Implementation

- Use community radio stations and independent transmissions and receivers as a way to avoid political or legal limitations.
- Be wary of the government's ability to control peace radio through its control of the necessary infrastructure.
- To the extent possible, keep the peace radio initiative as reliant on indigenous resources (and as least reliant on outside donor resources) as possible, so as to increase credibility, local acceptance, and the likelihood of sustainability over the long term.
- Where government is a key player in the conflict situation (either as a party to the conflict or as a mediating force), be careful to maintain a balance between peace radio's independence and objectivity and its potential for engaging the government in positive, peace building activities and opening of the political system.
- Avoid commercialization of the conflict—take care to ensure that the purpose of peace radio is not compromised or derailed by replacing substantive content with purely entertainment programming.
- At the same time, where possible, use relaxed forms of programming to get the message across; e.g., use "soap opera"-type dramas and situational comedy shows to entertain and inform at the same time.
- Conduct needs assessments among listener groups to determine content and formats that are most likely to be effective.
- Ensure that personnel—program developers, producers, reporters, actors, et al.—have the technical expertise to produce quality programs and package information effectively.
- Ensure that the content of peace radio programs is appropriate to the culture, language, and religion of the target population of listeners; produce the peace radio programs in the local language or dialect, to the maximum extent possible.
- Ensure ethnic diversity in programming and news reporting, so as to ensure that you reach all the audiences you are trying to reach, especially all opposing sides in the conflict situation.
- In news reporting, use journalists from the region or country, not outsiders, as outsiders may not know what is new or different in what they are reporting.
- Plan a regular schedule of radio programming, so that listeners know what to expect and when to tune in for favorite programs.
- Use peace radio for two-way communication through, for example, talk-show formats.
- Use peace radio to educate listeners about appropriate roles for leaders and other citizens to play during times of conflict, about citizens' rights and responsibilities, about government's responsibilities, and so on.
- Use peace radio to highlight gender roles and dynamics in the peace building process.
- Use peace radio to inform listeners about the plight of other conflict-ridden communities, including the adverse effects that arise from conflicts that are not prevented and managed effectively.
- Use peace radio to publicize development activities, especially in rural areas, so as to enhance resource mobilization and attract additional development projects and donor attention.
- Use peace radio to disseminate early warning information, information on the status of cease-fires, and other timely information that can serve to prevent additional violent conflict.
- Use peace radio to publicize and provide live coverage of positive activities in peace building, such as conflict resolution meetings, statements of opinion leaders, etc.
- Encourage journalists to establish ethical standards for balanced reporting and maintain them.

Structural Conditions are underlying, predisposing, latent economic or social conditions that provide fertile ground for the emergence of conflict between groups of people. In essence, they lie at the heart, or root causes, of conflict, and, as such, require intervention if long-term, lasting peace is to be achieved. Our study of initiatives focused on lessons and effective practices for addressing two structural conditions that commonly characterize inter-group conflict: the quantity and distribution of economic assets among groups of people and inter-group attitudes, perceptions and interactions. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Peace Radio: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Structural Conditions			
Strategic Objectives **In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Structural Conditions: To improve the quantity and distribution of economic assets (such as physical or financial capital or income generating activities, or specific capacities for obtaining such assets).	N/A	N/A	N/A

Peace Radio: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Structural Conditions			
Strategic Objectives **In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Structural Conditions: To foster more positive perceptions and attitudes and more peaceful everyday interactions and relationships between rank and file members of the main parties to conflict (e.g., tribes, clans, or ethnic groups).	Produce and air programs that emphasize the things that unite people, e.g., similar day-to-day problems and issues, and that provide positive examples of members of both groups involved in the conflict.	Burundians from both ethnic communities have been particularly positive about Studio Ijambo's 'soap opera' called "Our Neighbors, Our Selves," and the magazine show "Pillars of Humanity," popularly known as "Heroes." When asked to name programs that helped them modify, and/or change their attitudes, and/or behavior towards members of other ethnic groups, if any, most of the participants identified these two shows, more than any of Studio Ijambo's other 15 programs at the time of the study.As the first independent radio production program in Burundi, Studio Ijambo has helped change how the government and people view and treat the media. For example, Studio Ijambo correspondents who had previously worked for the government-owned radio station said they could see a big improvement in the extent to which opposition members accepted them when they started covering the Arusha negotiations and in covering Parliament. Even members of the Burundian armed forces, who have had the least favorable attitude toward Studio Ijambo's programs, have shown more tolerance toward the media.	By avoiding preaching about problems, these programs allow people to identify with persons like themselves and to consider peaceful ways to interact. The format is entertaining and offers alternatives to state media programs. People become familiar with the characters in the programs and see them evolve and find solutions over time. Modeling independent newscasting helps media credibility as long as it comes from a source recognized as not under state or factional control.

Channels are the intermediary political processes and institutions that connect or divide groups of people. Channels that connect people help prevent or reduce conflict, while those that divide people create or increase conflict. Our study focused on what the initiatives could tell us about how practitioners might build or improve four key types of channels in order to reduce conflict and build peace: social and political mobilization of groups for the peaceful pursuit of their interests, social innovation and organizational learning that introduce new methods for peace building, formal governing institutions and processes at the local or national level that promote peaceful conflict resolution, and "top-level" official political negotiations among the leaders of conflicting parties that lead to the conflict resolution. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Peace Radio: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives **In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Channels: To increase the ability of groups to organize collectively in order to pursue interests peacefully.	Provide airtime for civil society messages	Both Studio Ijambo and HornAfrik Media give programming time to social and economic messages of civil society groups. Studio Ijambo was seen as a means for NGOs to reach their audiences. The Women's Center, also funded by Search for Common Ground, enjoyed a close relationship with Studio Ijambo and used airtime to get its messages across. In Somalia, HornAfrik Media provided free airtime to civil society organizations to inform people of the public services they provide in the absence of public institutions.	By providing the first independent media outlets in Somalia, HornAfrik Media was able to capture a large amount of unmet demand for dialogue. People were anxious to express themselves particularly in talk shows and call in shows. The effectiveness of the warlord's propaganda was reduced by the alternative competition. Warlords participated in discussions and had to answer to people in public for the first time. Over time the radio stations run by factions were forced to close because of the competition by the independent media group.

Peace Radio: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives **In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Channels: To introduce new methods for peace building and spread the techniques.	Early on, develop a policy regarding the application of the principles of openness, comprehensiveness and objectivity in reporting news, especially news that has the potential for increasing conflict and violence.	Some of the key journalistic values and principles, such as openness and objectivity, by which a peace radio should be guided to be credible and effective, may be unacceptable in societies that value secrecy and ethnic loyalty more than anything else. Studio Ijambo experience is that such culturally-based challenges must be overcome or at least minimized early through rigorous training and innovative investigative approaches so that the local correspondents can function in an effective and credible way. On the other hand, reporting all the news—including news of violence that has the potential of inciting retaliatory violence—may not be the effective approach. Horn Afrik, a privately-owned radio station, has consciously chosen not to report volatile news in cases where it felt the news would have additional violent consequences by leading to escalation.	Teams of journalists that represent all groups help build public trust in the information source. People want to see themselves represented in the media. This calls for locally based programming in some countries instead of programming that is nationally based. If carefully done, conscious censoring of volatile news in situations of high tensions and conflict may be able to stop escalation because this step denies further fuel for the violence. But this statement is made in absence of evidence to the contrary in the case of HornAfrik. A warning is necessary. Conscious censoring may hurt a station's credibility over time if transparency is compromised.
	Provide open access to NGOs and civic groups to radio production.	In Burundi, many of the local and international NGOs have had access to the radio production studio and have been using it as a vehicle to reach their targeted sectors of the population. Studio Ijambo has also been serving as a forum for civil society, which, like the rest of society, is itself, divided along ethnic lines. In Somalia, HornAfrik provides free air time to CSOs. Since they are the primary means of service delivery in the absence of public programs, their messages are critical to overall welfare.	Diversity in programming is key to maintaining interest. Featuring a range of organizations is also a way to promote balance and model ethnic diversity. Giving a voice to otherwise marginalized groups helps them to feel less so.

Peace Radio: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives **In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
	Personalize the medium.	Studio Ijambo's innovative programming approaches, which include letting the people define the conflict and measure its effect, personalizing the conflict through such shows as "Heroes," and presenting it in a relaxed, conversational tone—has created and maintained a broad audience for its productions in Burundi. Such innovative approaches are critical for radio to be effective, not only as a source of credible news and information, but also as an instrument of social and political mobilization for the purposes of peace building. In Somalia, HornAfrik uses town meeting formats and viewer or listener call-in programs to make warlords and other leaders accountable.	Quality of programming is key to maintaining interest in content. Diversity of programming actors, topics and situations models messages of co-existence and cooperation. Unmet need for public discourse makes programs with exchange of views with leaders an important way for citizens to express dissent of dissatisfaction.
	Use team reporting across ethnic lines.	Through team reporting (which includes members of both of the ethnic groups in conflict), Studio Ijambo has helped raise the level of professionalism through systematic and conscious efforts to protect its programs from being contaminated by ethnic bias. In a society where there is so much hatred at close quarters between the two main ethnic groups, it is very difficult to avoid such contamination. However, there is no question that its innovative team reporting practice has sensitized the rest of the media and has shown to what extent a news organization must go to deliver balanced, fair and objective news and information to its audience.	Journalists commit to team reporting and media use it consistently across a range of programs. This reinforces a new ethics in journalism that can extend beyond the immediate peace radio venue.

Peace Radio: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives **In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
	Use innovative approaches in programming, training and general practices of journalism to draw and sustain an audience large enough to influence public opinion. Keep reinventing in order to overcome professional and cultural challenges to capture and sustain the critical mass necessary to effect meaningful change in conflict situations.	Studio Ijambo's innovative programming approaches--which include letting the people define the conflict and measure its effect, personalizing the conflict through such shows as "Heroes," and presenting it in a relaxed, conversational tone--has created a broad audience for its productions in Burundi. HornAfrik's use of 2 FM radio stations, 2 TV channels and a webpage maximize reach. These are the first independent media in Somalia. People like the interactive call-in and town meeting formats. Drama shows show the consequences of war beyond the immediate clan devastation.	People show increased interest in programming and listenership stays high. Peace is underlined in drama programs that show the consequences of violent conflict.

Peace Radio: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives **In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Channels: To create and strengthen political processes and governing institutions (local or national) that can incorporate conflicting parties, interests and issues in regular, ongoing processes and procedures for peaceful conflict resolution.	Provide civic education for communities on citizens' rights and government responsibilities.	Studio Ijambo was instrumental in influencing some policy changes pertaining to several issues, but especially the internally displaced. It was the first to bring to light killings of Hutu refugees returning from Tanzania by Burundian government soldiers in l997. The camps were closed a year later. Studio Ijambo also produced a series of programs from 1996 to 2000 on the plight of the internally displaced in the camps around the capital, especially the very young. This is believed to have contributed to a mass return from what some describe as "concentration camps" to their homes in Bujumbura's neighborhoods. Ijambo has been using the weight of public opinion to force the government to respond to several of its exposes regarding the camps and other issues. In one non-conflict area, HIV/AIDS, Studio Ijambo's weekly information program presented a series of reports on critical condom shortages in the country. These reports prompted quick government action to import more condoms. In Somalia, HornAfrik investigation of human rights abuses was the first in Somali journalism.	The media information highlighted important problems and issues not addressed by government, and moreover, the news programs were credible because of the use of balanced investigative reporting methods. Thus, the listening public brought pressure (directly or indirectly) on government to act responsibly.

Peace Radio: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives **In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
	Maintain political and journalistic independence from government and other parties who have a vested interest in the conflict.	Another important lesson from the Studio Ijambo experience and impact is that independence from government control—at least in its operation--is a necessary precondition for a mass media intervention to obtain the necessary results in peace building. One of the primary functions of such an intervention is to serve as a reliable forum for all sides to the conflict. For such a forum to be effective, it must be viewed by all sides as being impartial and credible. In the Burundian experience, the state-owned media's unwillingness to give Nelson Mandela's historic speech a full play at the very start of the negotiations in Arusha once again made it clear how indispensable the independent channels of communication are in a peace process. Studio Ijambo was the only media organization that translated it into Kirundi, the Burundian national language, and produced it. A few of those interviewed recalled listening to the Kirundi version aired over what was then Radio Umwizero.	Without the perception of independence and some credible examples, public confidence in media will be limited. As cases of media balance grow, people are more likely to listen and continue listening over time. They will listen to sources they find consistent and credible.
Channels: To advance the resolution of specific grievances, issues and disputes among leaders of conflicting parties engaged in the bargaining process.	Educate individuals about appropriate roles for leaders and other citizens to play during times of conflict.	Through its cultural and dramatic programs and editorials, Studio Ijambo has strengthened the belief of many people on both sides of the ethnic conflict that dialogue is the only rational alternative for Burundi at this time.	By spreading its effect, over time, radio can contribute to a climate of dialogue. A critical mass of programming in several formats is required to achieve this.

Peace Radio: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Channels			
Strategic Objectives **In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
	Promote peace building discussions between mid-level leaders for public consumption. E.g., air live strategic meetings between elders and other political leaders.	Studio Ijambo opened up new channels of communication for those who did not have access to the government-owned media, and as result, provided a reliable forum for an indirect dialogue between the parties and ethnic blocs. In fact, the project was founded on the premise "that journalists could make a significant contribution to opening and maintaining avenues of public discourse." HornAfrik in Somalia used call-in formats and public meetings to hold warlords accountable.	Part of the reason Studio Ijambo was so effective was because it exposed Burundian people to the different political visions and platforms the parties have been debating among themselves. This educational function of the media, which encourages informed participation from the people, naturally affects the negotiation process in a positive way. By providing the first independent media outlets in Somalia, HornAfrik media was able to capture a large amount of unmet demand for dialogue. People were anxious to express themselves, particularly in talk shows and call-in shows. HornAfrik provided an alternative to faction-controlled radio shows, and over time the competition forced these radio shows to close down, thus reducing the ability of warlords to spread propaganda.

Triggers and Inhibitors are immediate actions and events that can serve, in a specific time and place, either to spark a violent manifestation of conflict or to prevent violence from occurring or escalating. They are things that are said or done, especially by people who are in a position to influence the course of events in specific crisis situations. Under this type of risk factor, we focused on what the initiatives could teach us and other practitioners about the effective use of conciliatory statements or policy actions in situations of actual or imminent violence among groups of people. In those cells with **N/A** (not applicable), there were no data available.

Peace Radio: Effective Practices and Lessons Learned Related to Triggers and Inhibitors			
Strategic Objectives **In using Peace Radio, you can affect the following risk factors…**	**Tactical Approaches** **By considering the following tactical approach…**	**Operational Approaches**	
		This is how it worked in one or another of the case initiatives…	**And this is why it was effective…**
Triggers and Inhibitors: To promote conciliatory actions and deterrents.	N/A		
Triggers and Inhibitors: To reduce provocative rhetoric and specific acts of violence.	Provide accurate information about events in a timely way.	As an independent and credible source of verified news and information, Ijambo has become instrumental in the fight against a recurring source of ethnic tension: rumor-mongering, which can have catastrophic consequences in such a highly polarized society torn by mistrust and fear. For example, the l988 massacre of Tutsis by Hutus was triggered by a false rumor that the former was preparing to attack the latter. In Somalia, the presence of two radio stations and two TV stations plus a webpage increases the likelihood of public access to real and balanced information in time of crisis.	Public trust in media must be present for it to have a mitigating effect in time of tension or potential conflict. This may take time to develop and credibility is not won quickly.

III. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THREE TYPES OF INITIATIVES IN CONFLICT PREVENTION, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT OR PEACE BUILDING

This chapter draws together the findings regarding the three differing generic types of NGO initiatives that were examined by the project. These three forms of intervention are:

- Local Peace Processes Involving Traditional Institutions
- Middle-level, Non-official, National dialogues
- Peace Radio

A. Local Community-Based Peace Processes

This approach to conflict management seeks to involve the parties to a local conflict in a process of negotiating a settlement by drawing to some extent on traditional procedures, cultural norms and actors. The belief is that using respected local traditions is often especially effective in reaching a settlement because of the legitimacy and ties that the shared values and rituals engender. The three individual projects that reflect features of this approach and thus were studied are:

- The Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC), Northern Kenya,
- Inter-tribal Peace Conferences in Southern Sudan, New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) and,
- The Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in Northern Uganda.

A.1. Findings about Impacts

How effective are local traditional peace processes for conflict prevention, management or peace building?

- Economic Improvement: **Did they expand economic resources?**

  Positive: All three initiatives helped stimulate some degree of increased local economic activity.

  The three initiatives aimed principally at ending the violence of the conflicts they addressed, chiefly through stimulating dialogue or negotiations among key parties to those conflicts. Only the ARLPI initiative viewed local socio-economic development as an objective at the outset. However, some signs of new economic vitality followed all the initiatives, such as (depending on the case) renewed local business; new local building; restored inter-tribal trade; returning projects and new investment by donor agencies, international NGO's or the government; more regular bus schedules, or other travel to and from the area; and increased

local contributions for new local social infrastructure such as schools. The exact extent of improvement is not known, but it seems clearest in the Wajir case, somewhat less evident in the NSCC case, and least evident in the ARLPI case.

The Wajir and NSCC processes have achieved economic improvement mainly because their peace talks and subsequent projects helped to end local violence and thus restore a sense of security to the affected communities, thereby encouraging renewed local market, trade, commercial and development activity. The ARLPI has contributed to local economic activity not by increasing security, for violence has continued. But the initiative itself lobbied the central government and donors to increase the amount of aid that was already flowing to some extent to northern districts.

Limits. However, none of the initiatives have significantly altered underlying economic sources of conflict, such as the local scarcity of basic economic resources and inter-regional disparities. These conditions include the recurrent effects of drought, the dependency on traditional means of livelihood such as cattle breeding, perennial competition over grazing land, lack of access to wealth-generating natural resources (e.g. oil in southern Sudan), and lack of job opportunities for youth.

- Inter-Communal Relations: **Did they increase inter-communal contact and perceptions?**

Positive impacts: Through a trickle down effect, all initiatives probably have improved relationships and attitudes between various groups living in the areas of the local conflict. These closer relations involved the communities who were opposed in the conflict in two cases, Wajir and NSCC. In Kenya, the Wajir process accomplished this by the introduction of community-level dialogue and legitimate enforcement; reorienting the actions and attitudes of local state actors; and generally, increasing local capacity to address immediate problems of violent conflict. In Sudan, the NSCC focused on reconciliation between the Nuer and the Dinka through a process based on age-old traditions of conflict resolution focused on dialogue between chiefs and elders. However, in this case, the traditional model was used to foster dialogue among people who have been fighting. In contrast, the case of ARLPI involved, not the parties from northern and southern Uganda who were engaged in the conflict to which the initiative was addressed, but only the parties who increasingly found themselves on the one side of the conflict, in Acholiland. Specifically, local councils, Resident District Commissioners, and the military were brought together for dialogue through both the Kitgum Joint Peace Forum and the District Reconciliation and Peace Team. These processes have fostered a great improvement in working relationships and attitudes between civilian and military leaders in Acholiland.

In large rural areas, the dispersion of most members of clans or tribes over vast regions and the pattern of people living in largely mono-ethnic territories place inherent limits on the amount of contact that is normally experienced among the ordinary members of differing groups, except in the markets, small border towns and schools. In any case, changed mass attitudes are also difficult to ascertain, and no data samples were gathered directly on whether the views of rank and file clan members have changed toward each other.

Nevertheless, in the Sudan and Northeast Kenya region, presumably more favorable mutual attitudes were engendered among the respective ordinary members of groups whenever the specific peace settlements that the conferences fostered between clan or tribe leaders after specific instances of violence, then were followed by the return of stolen goods, abducted women and children, or payment of compensation. The Sudan study suggests, for example, that Nuers and Dinkas were linked at least symbolically when their violent disputes were resolved. The reported increased local economic activity may have increased the amount of inter-group contact in border towns and other areas.

The improved relationships in those cases involved distinct ethnic communities (clans or tribes) who were also the parties directly involved in the conflict. In northern Uganda, however, the ARLPI has improved relationships mainly between several kinds of groups only a few of which were directly involved on one side or other of the local conflict. It affected mainly groups on one side of the conflict who have shaped the climate in which the conflict was approached.

The violent conflict in Acholiland is not between ethnic groups, but between an estimated several hundred armed insurgents, on the one side, and the Government of Uganda and its military and security forces (GOU) -- as well as increasingly the victimized local Acholiland communities -- on the other side. It is perhaps true that the ARLPI's successful lobbying for the Amnesty Bill and the consequent establishment of the Amnesty Commission opened a door through which a few individual members of the rebel forces have felt encouraged to return to their communities. The local psychosocial programs the ARLPI fostered have presumably helped some of the young former combatants who were abducted to be reconciled with their families and villages.

The ARLPI has had some of its most significant impacts in inter-group reconciliation by encouraging better relationships between many formerly estranged segments of the local and national population, but these groups do not represent the opposed sides in the northern conflict. It has also reportedly improved local relationships between the local military and local civilian authorities and population, between local government and NGO's, and between local Acholi leaders and expatriate Acholis. Its influence on the GOU to moderate its strictly military approach to the conflict has probably helped to bring more of the local population psychologically on the government side by overcoming some of the legacy of government repression.

In addition, at the level of Ugandan national society, it has improved relations between local Acholi officials and central government authorities by improving the discourse about the North, which had been viewed as the source of the LRA insurgency. The ARLPI also seems to have reduced the sectarian rivalries between Anglicans and Catholics that have divided Ugandans to some extent politically, both in Acholiland where Catholics are the largest denomination, and throughout the country. This may have reduced some latent North-South animosity and weakened the legacy of political sectarianism that Milton Obote had perpetrated.

The significance of this for the conflict itself lies with the potential that might now exist for these increasingly reconciled groups to form a more unified political and psychological front

against the LRA. The ARLPI has mainly helped to create the potential for more of a common bond and feeling of resolve among various groups that could become more unified behind an anti-LRA effort, but not between the LRA and the LPDF and army who are actually in combat.

Limits. Whether an armed guerrilla movement such as the LRA is likely to be readily influenced by such increased pressure, even if it materializes, is not at all clear. Any observable impact on the local armed conflict that may have arisen from the reconciliation that has occurred among the various groups mentioned above is not evident so far. The ARLPI has publicly urged a ceasefire and lobbied the GOU to negotiate with the LRA and the GOS, but it has not brought the LRA as a whole any closer to either the GOU or ordinary Acholilanders.

- Mobilization: **Did they mobilize new agents of peace?**

Positive: All three initiatives enlisted people from different walks of life -- such as traditional elders, civil servants, women, youth, educators, intellectuals, diaspora -- into old institutions that were redirected to new purposes or into new local activities that served new community-wide purposes.

In Wajir and southern Sudan, the more frequent conferences of elders or the new councils, respectively, cut across the conflicting communities. The Al Fatah Declaration established a new inter-clan ongoing framework for dispute resolution, as did the Wunlit and Waat settlements regarding various Nuer and Dinka peoples. The Wajir and NSCC processes helped to re-orient traditional community (clan or tribal) structures that often supported conflict to act instead as agents of intergroup dispute resolution, if not reconciliation.

For example, when rapes, thefts, or other violent acts were inflicted by members of one clan on another in the Wajir area, the initiative met with the elders who led the clans involved. Though clans are traditional structures within which the normal responses might be revenge and thus the likely escalation of conflict, the elders were encouraged to act instead as positive "spin doctors," so to speak, of the episodes. By characterizing the actions as individual crimes, rather than harms aimed at the clan, the elders interpreted the meaning of these events to their clans in ways that short-circuited the usual cycle of retribution. They also used clan channels to locate the individual culprits and turn them over to the state authorities. The Wajir initiative also appears so far to have created a local constituency specifically for peace that may be self-sustaining.

By giving local professionals and other groups specific roles on local committees and other consultative or decision-making structures, or distinct tasks in the peace conferences, all three projects also enabled hitherto largely non-participating segments of society to participate in community affairs to an extent they had not been able to do in the past.

Limits: Being largely one-time events in different locations, the Sudanese peace conferences have not created to the same extent any ongoing local programs or constituencies promoting peace. The one-shot nature of each peace conference and their differing sites may limit the extent they can achieve a locally generated momentum. The diverse social agenda of the

ARLPI may have dissipated the amount of focus on peace in the conflict itself or other smaller-scale conflict issues.

None of the local projects has been able to join with others to lead to a broad national constituency or coalition for peace.

- Social Innovation and Organizational Learning: **Did they create new organizational capabilities or social techniques?**

  Positive: All the initiatives encouraged new ways of using old institutions in their respective local settings, and all these institutional innovations led to some replication of their approaches in other settings. Two of the initiatives also organized several new types of mechanisms for local decision-making and social action that began to address other local problems besides conflict.

  All projects started mainly with traditional institutions or other existing customs, but grafted onto them new norms and methods for handling local clashes, so the results are actually hybrids. The NSCC fostered the same inter-tribal conference technique in new places. The Wajir and ARLPI initiatives also have stimulated other virtually unprecedented types of institutions, such as more inclusive local forums for resolving disputes or for expressing and discussing grievances and community problems. The offshoot activities that Wajir spawned to tackle problems besides clan violence included the committees for women and youth, rapid response teams, the training of district officers and briefings for new ones, the plans for a "peace school," a polytechnic school, and other projects. Similarly, the ARLPI set up several kinds of new community activities such as KJPF and DPRT policy dialogues among different local leaders and officials, quasi-official decision making committees and bodies, public education programs, training of community volunteers, and the like.

  The Wajir approach to organizing local elders as champions of inter-clan peace was studied by visitors as a model for their own communities. The initiative leaders were invited to Garissa and Madera, held negotiations with other elders in Ethiopia and Somalia, and had their methods discussed in a regional workshop. The ARLPI's model of interfaith collaboration is also being viewed as a possible model by other communities.

  Limits: The NSCC model worked quite well as a local dispute resolution mechanism in several sites, but it did not generate momentum to set up other kinds of local projects in those sites. It may have been limited in the kinds of new activities it could try by the necessarily temporary, "tent" nature of the conferences (due to the security risk), and perhaps the lack of sufficient initiative and leadership from the tribes themselves.

- Governing Institutions: **Did they strengthen official governing institutions?**

  Positive: The impacts of the initiatives in strengthening the ongoing structures of local and central government differed greatly because of their very different political relationships with the existing authorities.

The Wajir project deliberately collaborated with, and often co-opted, local government officials, and thus it was ultimately supportive of the formal institutions of the Kenya state. Wajir implicitly helped to legitimate the local institutions and rules of the Kenya government by working frequently with the District officials. The elders who formed the Al Fatah became the leading local force in dispute resolution and promoter of peace-building in Wajir district, and thus they investigated crimes within the clans. But they turned over accused law violators to state authorities. The Wajir initiative also helped establish a new organizational infrastructure of local policymaking and coordinating bodies, such as the informal traditionally based "constitution" represented by the Al Fatah Declaration and the four working subcommittees.

The Sudan traditional peace conferences had no relation to the local or central authorities of the GOS, and in fact had to avoid possible government air attacks. However, they do form local structures that help to implement some of the governing functions of the SPLM rebel movement, which has become the functioning government in much of southern Sudan. This has been achieved by helping to achieve peace among local tribes within areas controlled by the SPLA and thus consolidating their military and political control. Broadly, they were part of the political movement to create some autonomous governing entity in the South, and thus an alternative state, *de facto* if not *de jure*.

The ARLPI initiative has invigorated existing governing channels so they deal more adequately with the conflict and problems in the northern districts. It sought and achieved to some extent a presidential endorsement for its local work. Along with the Acholi Parliamentary Group (APG), it has been successful in acting as a pressure group on the central government to enact policies responsive to local needs and sentiment in the north. In particular, it apparently significantly influenced the passage of the crucial "blanket" feature of the very important amnesty law and the establishment of a new governmental institution, the Amnesty Commission.

Limits: The ultimate nature and direction of the momentum that the Wajir and ARLPI quasi-public processes have generated is unclear, and thus their sustainability. Will they become the normal infrastructure for doing local government business or persist as an adjunct set of advisory or community bodies? They also have not made significant efforts to influence districting decisions and other national legislation that ultimately will affect the Wajir and other northeastern districts.

Possible Negative Impacts: In theory, the ARLPI initiative was supportive of formal government, but it competed to some degree with governing processes such as local representation and social services. The ARLPI helped support the formal apparatuses of the state such as through improving local civilian-military relations. But complaints were heard that the ARLPI's expanding activities, policy statements, institutionalization, and becoming the "conscience" of the local area, as well as its increasing international visibility and funding acumen were leading it to possibly usurp roles that should be played by local and indeed national government officials. Local officials felt they should be responsible for peace negotiations with the LRA, and the APG felt that its M.P.s should be Acholiland's principal advocates and representatives before the central government.

- **Peace Negotiations and Pacts: Did they advance political negotiations?**

  Positive: Regarding the local conflicts they sought to end, the Wajir and NSCC initiatives not only fostered negotiations over several specific episodes of the local violence, they also achieved peace agreements. The ARLPI moderated the approach of the government side to the conflict, and pressed both sides for peace negotiations, but did not bring them about.

  In Wajir and Sudan, respectively, specific local peace agreements were reached, such as the Al Fatah Declaration and the Wunlit and other inter-tribal peace pacts. The Al Fatah elders have adjudicated inter-clan disputes by arresting and trying accused persons for murder and dealing with other killings under Somali traditional procedures, which included apologies, compensation and blood money payments. Wajir also made some progress in helping to mediate inter-clan disputes in other local districts. The women from the PDC along with two elders helped to resolve a dispute over water resources in the village of Berjanai, leading to an agreement to share the resource

  In the third case, northern Uganda, the ARLPI was able to coax Museveni in 1998 to express his intent to sign a ceasefire, reportedly helped sway the GOU and local NRM and LDF forces away from a strictly military approach to the conflict with the LRA, and met with some rebels. However, the ARLPI has not been able to establish even informal contacts between the GOU and the leadership of the LRA, such as Joseph Kony.

  Regarding national actors or other states that are supporting the local conflicts, the Wajir district is unique because national politicians such as MP's or the government have not as yet sought to fan the local conflicts, as they had in the ethnic clashes in western Kenya in the early 1990's. Whether or not the reputation for success of the local initiatives has helped deter outside interference is unknown. But the initiative has not sought to influence the local MP with regard to national legislation or policies that might benefit these conflicts' resolution.

  Limits: In the southern Sudan and Acholiland conflicts, supra-local military forces or states provide support to the local combatants (i.e., the GOU, SPLA, and other outsider states versus the GOS, and the GOU and the GOS, respectively). In both instances, higher level contacts and negotiations have gone on, but have been conducted by IGAD and the Carter Center, respectively. The latter achieved a GOU-GOS agreement that has been implemented to some extent, although the LRA was not involved in the talks. But except for the ARLPI's possibly improving the GOU's openness to compromise, the local initiatives have not significantly influenced these higher-level actors and their negotiations.

  The ARLPI has not been able to convene any talks and thus reach any settlements. Regarding the national or inter-state conflicts within which the Sudan and Acholiland conflicts were embedded, neither initiative has advanced negotiations. In fact, the Sudan inter-tribal conferences most likely strengthen the SPLA side in its struggle with the GOS, by helping to consolidate its grass-roots influence in the areas it controls. On its part, the NSCC, although an activity of religious leaders who in theory are concerned with peace and reconciliation as an un-divisible public good, has not actively promoted SPLM-GOS rapprochement.

- Violent and other hostile behavior: **Did they prevent or stop violence or reduce armed capacities?**

  Positive: The initiatives have differed greatly in their ability to stop local violence, due to the very different scales of the conflicts and whether they have had the capacity to control armed activity. The Wajir and NSCC efforts have been quite successful in stopping inter-clan attacks, but the ARLPI initiative has been unable to end the armed insurgency of the LRA.

  The Wajir initiative has not been able to prevent fresh outbreaks of violence among members of different clans. In several instances, however, it has succeeded in averting the escalation of violence that ordinarily would result from the cycle of revenge and retaliation. After a young man from one clan killed another from another clan over a gun, for example, the clans struck back at each other in a cycle of escalation that left seventeen people dead. But the Al Fatah elders persuaded the clans to accept a ceasefire. It then adjudicated the original dispute by arresting and trying the first man for murder and dealing with the subsequent killings under Somali traditional procedures, including apologies, compensation and blood money payments. Similarly, the elders were not able to stop the Bagalla massacre, but they restrained the Dagaden clan that had been attacked from seeking revenge. They have also been able to coax clans to turn in their guns. The effects of such interventions over time apparently have improved the sense of security in Wajir town, where people had not felt safe walking around in the evenings. In a similar way, the Wunlit and other NSCC conferences each reduced the amount of cattle rustling and abductions among the tribes that were parties to these episodes.

  In 1998, the ARLPI was able to coax President Museveni to express his intent to sign a ceasefire and supposedly has helped sway the GOU away from a strictly military approach to the conflict with the LRA. Despite this and other initiatives, the level of the LRA's armed attacks on civilians in Acholiland has continued at a high level, and has even increased during the past year. It may be argued that, over time, the various ARLPI and APG efforts might reduce some of the factors fueling the conflict. The efforts might bring the Acholi people and leaders more into line against the LRA. The Amnesty might wean individuals away from Kony's ranks, and local economic opportunities might reduce the number of individuals that the LRA is able to recruit. Such efforts might thus help shift the balance of preponderant incentives and disincentives in the government's favor. The LRA has increasingly neither sought nor necessarily depended on local popular support to continue its guerrilla activities, however, and whether the LRA leadership is psychologically amenable to such pressures it is not clear. In any case, it is a long-term strategy. It is not clear whether the GOU military's actions have become significantly more temperate in the area.

  Possible Negative Impacts: By undertaking resolution of domestic squabbles, the initiative may reduce the amount of time, energy and resources the SPLM requires to maintain control over the southern territory and thus strengthening its position in the military conflict It is very difficult to judge whether this serves to perpetuate the larger war by strengthening their side, or helps to maintain a balance of power that, if translated into a perceived "mutually hurting stalemate" could hasten the negotiations to resolve that war.

Thus, the reconciliation that has occurred among the various local groups mentioned that may have arisen from the initiatives has not had any observable impact so far on the governments and other outside parties that are supporting one or other side in the local armed conflict The ARLPI has publicly urged a ceasefire and lobbied the GOU to negotiate with the LRA and the GOS, but it has not restrained the armed activity of the LRA or the GOU.

A.2. Conclusion: Summary of Impacts

Having examined what three particular examples or cases of this generic method of intervention perform on our various impact criteria, we now seek to generalize about the impacts of this intervention method of local inter-communal peace processes as a whole. In what respects does this method tend to help to prevent or manage conflict and build peace? What are its limits? Does it have any harmful effects?

While keeping in mind that we are using only three cases for our evidence, we can generalize about the effectiveness of this overall approach in dealing with conflicts – its central tendency, what it tends to be "good for" or do well, and what it does poorly – by looking at those elements or dimensions of conflict that it most consistently affects positively, and those aspects of conflicts that it influences less consistently or may even affect negatively.

All three initiatives can claim success in facilitating specific bilateral or unilateral steps toward peace by the parties to the conflicts. The estimated impacts of the three initiatives are outlined in the table 1, which summarizes the data presented in the narrative above by giving various verbal scores to each project's performance on all the seven criteria. Based on these three cases, local peace processes have the ability in specific applications to affect all the major aspects or dimensions of conflict, but clearly they do not consistently do so. The approach is apparently more effective in achieving certain kinds of effects better than others. Specifically, the kinds of impact where application of this approach have the most consistent positive impacts, or the highest scores, are in:

- Mobilizing agents for peace;
- Introducing and spreading social innovations; and interestingly,
- Improving local economic activity.

All three cases showed some positive impacts on those three dimensions, with the fostering of social innovations being the area of strongest impact.

Because there is considerable unevenness across the three cases with regard to the other criteria, however, we can generalize that this approach is apparently weaker, and possibly harmful at times, with regard to achieving:

- Closer inter-communal reconciliation,
- Strengthening governing institutions,

- Advancing political negotiations, and
- Actually controlling violence.

Arguably, its weakest impacts have to do with controlling violence and achieving closer inter-communal ties. Nevertheless, specific applications of this approach can achieve each of these kinds of impacts, although few applications of the approach achieve all of the impacts.

Estimated Impacts of Local Community-Based Peace Processes. *Table 1*

ON STRUCTURAL FACTORS	**Wajir**	**NSCC**	**ARLPI**
Expand economic activity? • Commerce, trade, aid • Resource base	**High** **None**	**Medium** **None**	**Low to Medium** (pressed for more aid) **None**
Improve relations between communities affecting conflict? • Groups participating in the local conflict? • Other groups influencing the conflict?	**Plausible** (between hostile clans) **None**	**Plausible** (between hostile tribes/subtribes) **None**	**None** (between LRA and Acholis, army) **Medium (diaspora)**
CHANNELS	**Wajir**	**NSCC**	**ARLPI**
Mobilize local agents for peace?	**High,** possibly institutionalized	**Medium,** possibly temporary	**Medium**
Introduce and spread social innovations?	**High**, multifaceted	**Medium** (single technique)	**High,** multifaceted
Strengthen governing institutions? • Local • National	**High** **None**	**Medium** (SPLM); **None** (GOS) **None or possibly negative (ambiguous)**	**Possibly negative** **Low**
Advance political negotiations? • Local conflict • Higher level conflict	**High** **None**	**High** **None or possibly negative** (ambiguous)	**None** **None or low**
TRIGGERS AND INHIBITORS	**Wajir**	**NSCC**	**ARLPI**
Reduce violent behavior? • Local conflict • Higher level conflict	**Medium** **NA**	**Medium** **None or possibly negative**	**None** **Low**
Overall Efficacy *To date, which initiative has exercised the greatest overall leverage against the conflict within its context? Leverage? Command?*	**High**	**Medium**	**Low to medium**

Notes:

High data suggests considerable impact
Medium data suggests some impact
Low data suggests a little impact
None data suggests nonimpact

Negative data suggests possibly harmful
Plausible no data but an impact is inferable
Not known insufficient data
NA Not applicable

A.3. What Makes for Effectiveness? Lessons to be Learned About Effective Practices and Favorable Settings

The previous section identified how effective Local Community-Based Peace Processes are in reducing various sources of conflict and strengthening various peace capacities. The ultimate purpose in gathering those findings is to help us improve these and similar initiatives in conflict prevention, management and peace-building. In particular, we want to know the following:

- How can the positive results that were obtained be replicated in the three specific settings or in other settings?
- How might the poor results of these initiatives, and any harmful results, be avoided?

To answer these questions, we need to probe into the *reasons* why the positive and negative impacts found above occurred. What were the ingredients that were associated with relative success, where was it was achieved? What elements apparently led to relative weak performances (failure), or perhaps even harm? If we can arrive at conclusions about important correlated factors, they can provide us with lessons or guidelines as to how to choose, design and implement similar initiatives of this same type in other situations, as well as how to improve these particular initiatives.

As indicated previously, there are several reasons why a given intervention may produce given results:

- The nature of the *problem* that was tackled (in this case, a conflict) may have been either relatively difficult or easy.
- Features in the basic *design* of the intervention may have been important.
- The ways the intervention was *implemented* may have been crucial.
- The immediate *context* into which the intervention was introduced and it operated was favorable or unfavorable.

Therefore, in order to replicate an effective initiative in a second setting (or in the same setting in the future) and expect to have the best chances of achieving the desired results, it is essential to look into all the kinds of factors on which effectiveness apparently depends, and whether they are present in the situation one faces. All need to be considered -- or at least should be kept in mind -- in making future choices. In effect, these factors become the criteria for identifying the kinds of new opportunities or situations and useful entry points where this type of initiative is likely to work best.

Hence, the following table (table 2) seeks to provide useful guidelines as to the factors that ideally should be optimized in future settings in order to obtain the best results possible. To arrive at these factors, the three cases of this type of initiative were probed and compared to ascertain what kinds of ingredients of the four general kinds listed above were associated with the results and thus appear to be the key determinants of those outcomes. The conclusions are given below in the form of a checklist of key questions that should be asked when considering

whether to apply this type of initiative in a given situation. In some instances, evidence is cited from the case studies to illustrate how the cases were similar or different in that respect.[8]

[8] It would go way beyond the capacity of this study to do a survey of all the places and conflict situations in the Greater Horn of Africa where this type of initiative might be promising to apply. But these guidelines provide a decision support tool for examining many such specific situations to see if they are conducive to achieving positive results.

Guidelines for Adopting, Designing and Implementing
Local Community-Based Peace Processes*: Key Questions to Ask – a Checklist
Table 2

Regarding the nature of the conflict: How tractable or intractable is the conflict being addressed?	To what extent are outside actors controlling major political and military events affecting the local area?	In the Wajir District of Northern Kenya, violent conflict between communities can arise over competition for scarce resources, especially in periods of drought. Outside actors are not a factor in affecting the local area. Although the WPDC process cannot affect climate patterns of drought and scarcity, it was able to find ways to deal with conflict successfully and reduce incidents of retaliation, and tensions, between communities and clans.
Regarding the basic design of the initiative (activity): *Was the intervention strategy appropriate to the conflict situation?*	*Are peace agreements being sought between specific institutions that represent the distinct communities that are in conflict, or is it a broader process of general public education, community problem-solving, etc.?*	
	Is the initiative working through the existing channels of an established local institution?	The WPDC and NSCC processes both used the traditions of local community leadership by male elders and of inter-group peace councils. The ARLPI worked through the local organizational hierarchies of the three faiths in the area: Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim.
Regarding the implementation of the initiative: *(How well is it implemented?)*	*Is the activity initiated by educated skillful professionals?*	WPDC was spurred by educated local women in business or the civil service. The NSCC and ARLPI projects were started by men and women clerics and other church professionals.
	Are the initiators actively creating support and cooperation from significant local groups?	The WPDC met early on with civil servants, elders, teachers and local government officials. The NSCC engaged in extensive prior consultation with tribal representatives before organizing peace conferences. In contrast, however, the ARLPI first sought presidential support, as a way to legitimize itself with local officials and subsequently held the Bedo Pliny consultation and a subsequent consultation to achieve local consensus.

	Is a methodical grass-roots process being followed to designate representatives of the local communities, and are lengthy consultations used to achieve consensus behind major policy decisions?	The WPDC and NSCC both followed careful rules for identifying local representatives for the council of elders and delegates to peace conferences, respectively, and the Al Fatah Declaration and intertribal peace agreements were reached after lengthy meetings that reached a broad consensus through following detailed agreed-upon procedures. In contrast, the ARLPI did not follow either procedure.
Regarding the immediate context: *Was it placed in fertile ground?*	*Has some similar activity of this general nature operated before in the area?*	Each of the case-study areas had received the attention of the same sponsoring organizations or others through somewhat similar earlier projects.
	Is the activity "tapping into" any articulated intensely felt local needs, such as evoked by recent violent events, or is it motivated primarily by ulterior agendas?	Following an incident in which many people were killed, the WPDC circulated a petition. The NSCC activity was motivated by recurrent intertribal clashes and the desire of tribal leaders to resist manipulation by SPLM factions and the GOS. The two most successful peace conferences addressed the tribes' concerns rather than wider politics. However, it arose as well from the NSCC's vision of a southern Sudan civil society. It is also less clear whether the ARLPI responded to specific deeply felt local anti-war feelings or instead sought to cultivate them through war sensitization and peace education. It also sought to improve the perceived lack of attention by the central government to northern problems.
	Are the local institutions that the peace process is creating able to encompass the parties that are engaging in violent conflict and to control the behavior of those who are using deadly force through effective sanctions?	The Al Fatah council of clan elders, in conjunction with the local Kenyan government police, were able to capture, judge and punish those responsible for local incidents of violence; and the inter-tribal conferences set up enforcement machinery, including monitors, to ensure compliance with their agreements. (The possible role of the SPLM as enforcer is not known.) The ARLPI however could not discipline the LRA or the LDF and the Army in its process.
	Do local government and local political authorities have relative autonomy from central government and do they support and work with the initiative?	
*To pinpoint the most important factors that explain the observed impacts, this process was followed: Where all the cases had similar positive impacts, they were compared for common elements, as these are most likely to explain the similar impacts. Where the initiatives had differing results, they were examined for the differences among them, as these are likely to explain those results.		

B. Middle Level Non-Official National Dialogues

Three initiatives, which fall into the type called Middle-Level, Non-Official National Dialogue, are convening unofficial forums in which public officials and leaders in society discuss important national-level political and policy issues facing their countries. These issues may be social and economic issues and political or military conflicts of widely varying intensity. In these cases, the conflicts involved varied in their intensity from unresolved fundamental policy debates in the would-be state of Somaliland to periodic outbreaks of violence over elections in Kenya to continuing civil war in Burundi. The initiatives are sponsored by international donors or NGOs and carried out by religious leaders and other professionals. The specific cases are as follows:

- Faith-based Facilitation of the Constitutional Review Process in Kenya, National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK),
- The Apostles for Peace (CAP) Dialogue Project, Burundi, International Alert, and,
- The Action Evaluation and Dialogue Project in Somaliland, The War Torn Societies Project (WSP).

The generic approach is variously called track-two diplomacy, track one-and-one-half diplomacy, pre-negotiation and interactive conflict resolution. As with the other types of initiatives, the application of unofficial dialogues has an explicit or implicit theory behind it.

The underlying notion is that major contentious political and policy issues, including open conflicts, can begin to be resolved when key officials together with politically influential individuals at the middle level from across the lines are able to meet outside the formal channels of government and politics. Acting at least to some extent in their individual capacities rather than as representatives of the parties to a conflict, these middle-level players can develop closer relationships and exchange views and positions with less pressure to be partisan. The dialogues may be sponsored and facilitated by various third parties and may or may not explicitly apply specific conflict resolution techniques (such as the procedures of problem-solving workshops that have been developed by Herbert Kelman and John Burton and applied in many international settings over the last thirty years).

B.1. Findings about Impacts: How effective are non-official national dialogues in conflict prevention, management or peace-building?

- Economic Improvement: **Do they expand economic resources?**

  Positive: Only the WSP initiative had economic effects, but these were indirect and potential, rather than observable. By highlighting certain economic needs and pointing out needed changes in economic policies, the dialogue might reap some added economic efficiency and thus increased resources in the medium term. One of its local workshops, for example, alerted national and local officials to the hardship caused by the monopolistic practice of livestock exporters to pay livestock producers at inflated prices.

Limits: None of the dialogue projects led directly to any increase in the economic resources enjoyed by the countries involved or to definite prospects for such benefits. The Kenya constitutional review process was not intended to improve the economic assets or economic health of Kenya, nor could it be expected to do so directly. This was not the purpose of the Burundi CAP dialogue process either. Here the focus was on the promotion of peace. [9]

Missed opportunities: Though not an economic development project, the WSP initiative was criticized by some interviewees for not involving international donors more directly in its discussions. This may have resulted in missed opportunities to channel donor aid specifically into the priorities and programs that have received the benefit of the WSP's inclusive process of consensus building and vetting. To others, this exclusion simply reflects the project's primary aim of cultivating a home-grown dialogue, so that it should not be viewed as a traditional development project.

Although the NCCK process focused on the country's constitutional rather than economic reform, when some consensus is achieved on issues or even procedures, arguably this achievement should be publicized more explicitly with donors as a sign of progress and a process they should continue to watch. This might raise the stakes for the players themselves and contribute to improving the climate for business investment and aid, thus reversing the current economic decline. The case study noted no efforts or impacts of this nature so far, however.

- Inter-Communal Relations: **Did dialogues increase inter-communal contact and perceptions?**

Positive: The Kenya, Burundi and Somaliland dialogues, as well as the sponsoring organizations themselves, deliberately bring together individuals from differing ethnic groups. By definition, however, these individuals are, by and large, members of the professional and political elites in their countries, not ordinary citizens. Because the three dialogues have all received some newspaper and television coverage, however, their cross-lines composition may convey the message symbolically to a larger population that inter-group discussions that cross-cut the main cleavages in society are currently focusing on key national issues. Although public opinion data were not collected to test this hypothesis, the examples below demonstrate that such publicity might help to instill the notion that conflicts

[9] However, the extensive existing research on other cases of dialogues and their methods (e.g., problem-solving workshops) makes virtually no reference to direct impacts on economic resources or the immediate prospects of gaining them. Two comprehensive reviews of the research literature on interactive conflict resolution (problem solving workshops, etc.) mention no evidence of economic impacts (d'Estree, et. al., 2000; Fisher, n.d.). The lack of evidence may reflect not only the fact that dialogues may not usually have economic results as primary objectives, but also, that the disciplinary perspective of dialogue researchers leads them to look mainly for impacts in terms of changes in the dialogue participants' attitudes, relationships, and other consequences that are internal to the dialogue process. Or at most, impacts may be sought on other official negotiations. But outcomes for society at large are not envisioned except indirectly. Still, this does not necessarily mean such outcomes do not ever occur. Although this literature does not document any such impacts, it reveals expectations that dialogues can lead in the long term to economic benefits and other concrete outcomes, if and when these dialogues are able to achieve agreements, create coalitions and relationships, and empower cooperative decision processes.

between interests can be addressed in a serious and peaceful manner, not only through coercion or violence.

- The Kenya dialogue's continual effort to press for the peaceful resolution of vital constitutional questions and its demonstration that they can be addressed in a consultative way may be helping to buttress the declining notion of a Kenyan national identity. The dialogue operates in the midst of a political process that generally operates on the basis of narrower allegiances and in which some talk is heard of "majimboism," or dividing the country into ethnically and politically distinct areas. An inclusive Kenyan national identity is reinforced by the dialogue's symbolizing, in a very public and prominent way, the idea that such constitutional questions are vital to the national interest and thus affect all Kenyans. The process of grass-roots consultation to hear ordinary citizens views, sponsored by the Ufungamo Initiative and the government, also are now bringing local citizens together.

- The Burundi dialogue process has brought together individuals from differing parties and ethnic groups who are solely from the small middle class in Bujumbura, and thus an elite group. Although this process only represented the middle class, CAP is able to convey the idea of, and model the practice of, inter-ethnic cooperation to a wider audience through the occasional television appearances of its members who are shown working together. The study also suggests that this process of dialogue has influenced the Burundi diaspora in the region and in Europe.

- The WSP process also deliberately includes a broad spectrum of interests from Somaliland society—differing clans, women, businessmen, and professionals. This may help cultivate the sense of, and "buy-in" to, a common national identity through participation in a Somaliland-owned process. The inter-clan WSP staff were seen by some as being fair-minded toward all clans.

Limits: Although the Kenya and Somaliland dialogues are convening public discussion forums in local communities that might mix members of differing ethnic groups, no specific evidence came to light that dialogues directly altered everyday interactions and reduced social distance at the general mass or grassroots level.

- The Kenya constitutional dialogue by itself has little potential for impact on the day-to-day relationships of large numbers of members of different ethnic groups. The dialogue focuses on constitutional reform, and not on the quality and peacefulness of relationships between members of different communities and ethnic groups.

- Although working more consistently at the grassroots level, the Somaliland dialogue also cannot by itself substantially improve clan and sub-clan linkages at the grassroots level. This would require more sustained effort and dialogue through additional types of interventions focused on such linkages beyond the issue driven workshops sponsored by the WSP process.

- Although a "culture of dialogue" may exist in some non-governmental circles in Bujumbura, it is not known what attitudinal or behavioral impacts their publicized activities may have in the countryside.

- Other cases and research reviews suggest that dialogues do have the potential to indirectly foster improved interactions between communities in conflict. One workshop aimed to encourage participants from conflicting groups to explore cooperation that could be transferred back to their communities. They saw this occurring indirectly, however, and provide little if any concrete evidence of whether and how this occurs.[10]

Negative: In the highly visible Kenya dialogue, the question of what interests should be represented in the meetings has frequently become a contentious issue in itself. This may reinforce the aura of political combat among competing interests, rather than circumvent it. Similarly in Somaliland, but to a lesser degree, local resentments were stirred up in a few instances on the matter of which groups had been selected to participate in a dialogue.

- Social and Political Mobilization: **Did dialogues mobilize new agents of peace?**
  Positive: The Kenya and Somaliland dialogues have created forums and processes that give a greater voice, vis-a-vis government officials, to unrepresented interests from those groups that have not been politically active, such as women and individuals from small towns. In this way, they have increased the potential for the mobilization and empowerment of new segments of the population.

  - The Kenya initiative was principally responsible for restarting the official constitutional reform process by voicing the desire of established reform-oriented NGO reform groups and opposition parties' for the review and pushing the government to take action. In addition to bringing the religious leaders and some number of their respective followers at the grassroots, together with other reform organizations in an ongoing process, this and the more recent local consultations have created an ongoing role for non-governmental actors and ordinary citizens to participate in the review process by giving their views about constitutional and other issues.

  - Although the Burundi Apostles for Peace apparently have not stimulated any broad-based citizen action, the CAFOB women's spin-off initiative represents something analogous but smaller, through its effort to organize seminars with women as much as possible outside of Bujumbura. These urge women to strive for economic independence and

[10] Fisher's (manuscript, n.d.) model of the possible transfer effects of interactive conflict resolution sees the possible influence of such dialogues on "inter-societal relations" as occurring not through any direct impacts on inter-communal processes, relationships, or institutions created or existing between the groups themselves. Rather it might occur indirectly, through the influence that the representatives of the opposed communal groups who meet in a dialogue may each subsequently have on their respective constituencies when they return to them from the dialogue. This literature highlights another possible re-entry effect: the increased interaction that may result between communities if better relationships and trust arise between the members of dialogues may encourage these participants to go on to establish new networks or coalitions across communal lines and carry out activities in pursuit of specific mutual interests and needs.

avoid being manipulated by the competing political factions. They hope that women then can become a pressure group on behalf of their own distinct interests and that of peace.

- The Somaliland dialogue does not aim at mobilizing broad segments of the general population to take political action or even to advocate specific policies in an organized way. It does create national and local venues that engage, on an equal footing, many kinds of citizens who share certain everyday policy concerns (e.g., the impact of qaat and the problem of bribes), but who have been largely ignored or marginalized by national politicians and government officials. This reinforces the norm of democratic inclusion. These groups include women, the independent media, livestock traders, nomads, residents of remote small towns and rural areas, educated professionals, intellectuals, elders, and even MP's. By creating non-confrontational dialogue for examining important issues affecting them, as well as enhancing communication and policy analysis skills, the dialogues have given a voice to groups that have not been empowered. They have also helped synthesize a citizenry-oriented representative process that is Somaliland-wide and indigenously-owned.

- The dialogue also highlights many issues and interests in society that cut across hitherto dominant clan identities. The Somaliland study suggests that the dialogue has served to bring out into the open differences that are not clan-based, such as between traditional and more Westernized worldviews uncovering new cross-cutting societal interests. Although these non-clan differences are new sources of conflicts, they cut across, and may counteract, clan identities.[11]

Limits: None of the dialogues as yet has stimulated the formation of mass-based popular movements or organizations, such as a broad people's peace or reconciliation campaign, that can exert significant influence on political leaders involved in the respective national political and policy conflicts that are the subject of the dialogues. Indeed, they may act as buffers or safety valves vis-a-vis more radical action, rather than as channels for broad-based peaceful mobilization. The influence of the Kenya process remained reliant implicitly on the threat of violence from more radical elements. The wider literature envisions that participants transfer their own sense of empowerment to non-participants in the form of launching new efforts on behalf of peace (d'Estree, 2000a, 38, 45). But there is no mention of instances where such energy actually has been transferred to non-participants and led to collective action.

- Social Innovation and Organizational Learning: **Did they create new organizational capabilities or social techniques?**

Positive: All three projects introduced into their societies unprecedented mechanisms for addressing political and policy questions. By demonstrating that issues can be addressed constructively, these processes that cross over conflict lines have established new constructive models for societal problem-solving and symbolized new collaborative values.

[11] Literature summarizing the results of track-two dialogues and the like mentions that individual participants themselves feel more personally empowered as a result.

- The Kenya Ufungamano process in particular is receiving a lot of public attention and is regarded as a major national vehicle for addressing constitutional and underlying political issues.

- Previously applied in Guatemala and Mozambique, the WSP action evaluation method of creating a venue for peaceful articulation of social interests and discussion of policy options through an iterative and orderly process is being studied as a model by analysts and is being considered for application in southern Somalia.

Limits: These dialogues by themselves have not encouraged other uses of dialogue through spreading or spawning similar activities in other sites.

- Governing Institutions: **Did they strengthen official governing institutions?**

Positive: To varying degrees, all the dialogues appear to have created para-governmental channels which filled the vacuums left by their countries' weak and exclusionary formal representative processes (such as elections), weak or non-existent opposition parties, and parliaments. By feeding unorganized views held by broad publics specifically to government officials or addressing governing processes themselves, they tacitly endorse the idea of legitimate governance and come to the aid of the state and its institutions.

- Besides promoting the idea of constitutionalism itself, the Kenya religious leaders' convening of constitutional dialogue between reformers and the government in 1997 helped break a stalemate and fostered a climate that allowed a framework to be agreed on for continuing the review and allowing the December elections to proceed.

- The WSP process primarily links local leadership and middle level leaders, not the latter and government officials. Yet it apparently has helped open an additional channel to ministers and MP's, and thus legitimize the central government beyond the immediate sphere of its control. It helps define a national agenda of problems that are based on the issues raised during the dialogues, such as taxation and corruption, and it produces reasoned policy papers that document these issues and propose policy options. The government participants forward these ideas to the government and parliament.

  To some extent, it also creates a two-way channel between government and groups of lay citizens. WSP provides an orderly process for engaging differing elements in the Somaliland region to come together to identify and discuss the complexities in building a state and society and to articulate and examine differing options. This helps establish a political safety-valve, for it requires many citizens to face up to policy trade-offs and reach some consensus on otherwise non-addressed and possibly divisive issues. It also has to operate within the approved parameters of the authorities, such as the assumption of Somaliland sovereignty.

  In particular, the Somaliland case study argues that the dialogue improves the capacity of national institutions and economic policy by seeking to achieve a prior consensus among Somalis about their own economic priorities as a society before dealing with donors, rather than going wherever donor money is available. Further, the increase in the

decision-making cohesion of national leaders and the integrity of their policymaking institutions may even reduce dependency on donors.

- Proponents argue that problem-solving workshops can influence the creation or reform of political institutions that embody the values of collaborative conflict resolution, rather than of elite rule, legal norms, and power-based negotiations. Though little evidence of such outcomes has been gathered, one study of local inter-ethnic projects in Bulgaria found that participants saw them as means to create a culture of democracy and dialogue (d'Estree, 2000, 48).

Limits: While the dialogues clearly provide additional channels for popular representation, they have not necessarily directly improved the formal representative institutions of popular politics and the state. Nor do they appear to have strengthened executive institutions, such as the central and provincial administration, or judicial institutions, such as the courts and police.

- While the Kenya dialogue helped to keep negotiations alive, this only excused the formal electoral process; it did not lead to reform of the elections process or legitimate it. Nor has the process had any apparent impact on government business as usual in the executive and judicial branches.

- The Burundi study did not refer to any impacts on the strengthening of Burundi governing institutions, but this question should be pursued further.

Possible Negative Impacts: The two most influential initiatives seem to have circumvented or displaced to some extent the regular roles that formal institutions of government are expected to play in aggregating society's interests.

- When Kenyan religious leaders launched their own separate review process, this may have discredited and displaced somewhat the representative functions ideally more appropriately played by the political parties and parliament, notwithstanding their obvious weaknesses. It may have widened the gulf between civil society and the state.

- Ultimately, the WSP dialogue is not an ongoing policy think tank or a formally representative political process that can substitute for a parliament and elections; nor can it serve as a fully operative system of pressure group politics. Yet it may have displaced some investment in making the civil service professional, and it did create strain with some local authorities over who should play the role of local representatives.

- On Political and Peace Negotiations: **Did they advance official political negotiations?**

Positive:

- The NCCK initiative has clearly kept the constitutional review process going and led it to open up to wider influences. The determination of the Ufungamano group to run a grassroots consultation parallel to that of the government's eventually elicited negotiations between the two processes for some kind of compromise joint process.

- The WSP process has identified several issues that have found their way onto the national policy agenda, and its country report influenced the content of the new constitution.

Limits:

- After several years and taking several forms, the NCCK process has not led to any specific legislative or policy changes in the constitution.

- The Burundi CAP initiative yielded no evidence that it had influenced the ongoing official Arusha negotiations through any of the expected track two routes, such as pushing it to resolve issues, improving relationships and trust among the principal leaders, or inserting substantive ideas.

- So far, the Somaliland initiative's parallel channels have influenced the government policy processes only modestly. By not engaging officials directly, and not generally following up on their own policy inputs, the parallel channels still have relatively limited influence on officials. It is not clear whether their policy analyses substantively resolve tough public policy issues and reconcile conflicting interests, or simply express competing demands, nor how much they have shaped the substance of national laws and policies. The initiative also has not addressed some serious unresolved issues of Somaliland domestic policy (e.g., decentralization) and external policy (e.g., sovereignty).

- Violent behavior: **Did the dialogues stop violence?**

Positive: The Kenya dialogue helped deter or discourage specific violent acts and other hostile behavior and encouraged conciliatory behavior, and thus restrained the escalation of a conflict. The Kenya process appears to have moderated the potential for more collective violence, such as when it stemmed the violence after the 1997 elections. By offering an alternative process for addressing issues, it mollified those who would seek to incite their followers to violent mass action.

Limits:

- The CAP process did not exert any influence over any of the parties to restrain themselves from armed actions.

- The WSP process does not see its role as launching a lobbying effort toward political actors. Instead, it has been engaging middle level actors in the discussion of issues, and it might find it difficult to criticize the government if, for instance, if the government committed human rights abuses.

Possible Negative Impacts: The Kenya process's influence was due in part to the fact that it became a vociferous player in the process and gave up a strictly facilitative role. The Kenya case study suggests that the Ufungamano dialogue evolved into a partisan pressure group in itself, thus moving away from the role of unofficial arbiter of a consultative process. But the increased polarization it thus created between an activist NGO community and government officials may at times have created a political vacuum in which more radical violent action is

encouraged. Also, in Kenya as well as in Somaliland, there also may be some a risk of raising popular expectations of what is possible to achieve by way of political change that exceed the capacities of the existing political system to deliver, thus further destabilizing society.

In Somaliland, there may be some risk that, especially since the Arta conference has created another would-be government in the South, the implicit popular support for Somaliland state-building that the WSP musters may worsen north-south or other unresolved regional conflicts.

B.2. Conclusions: Summary of Impacts

Just as we did with regard to local peace processes, the aim here is to use a small number of cases to discern any central tendency in this instrument -- what it does well, and what it does poorly -- by looking at those elements or dimensions of conflict that it most consistently affects positively, and those aspects of conflicts that it influences less consistently, or may even affect negatively. The table following summarizes the areas in which dialogue processes helped to prevent or manage conflict and build peace or had any harmful effects. It gives the various verbal scores of each project's performance on all the seven criteria.

Based on these three cases, although dialogues have had all the impacts in at least one case, many of these occasional impacts are very slight in many instances. Specifically, the kinds of impact where application of this approach have the most consistent positive impacts, or the highest scores, are in the following areas, ranked in order of significance:

- Introducing a social innovation, though not spreading it,
- Mobilizing agents for peace, and
- (weakly) Improving relationships between divided communities.

Less consistently, and surprisingly, middle-level national dialogues affect governing institutions and official political negotiations. This occurs when dialogues are able to feed unorganized views held by a broad range of civil society organizations as well as by other unrepresented voices in society, directly to government officials. By addressing governing processes themselves, dialogues tacitly endorse the idea of legitimate governance and come to the aid of the state and its institutions. Middle level dialogues can also maintain or promote official negotiations when these processes within the government itself are in danger of reaching an impasse. Dialogues sometimes help to suppress violence, but they also may exacerbate it. They have little or no effect on improving local economic activity.

Impacts of Dialogues. *Table 3*

ON STRUCTURAL FACTORS	**NCCK**	**CAP**	**WSP**
Expanded economic activity?	**None**	**None**	**None to Low** (identifying issues)
Improved relations between communities affecting conflict? • Groups participating in the conflict? • Other groups influencing the conflict?	**Low** (symbolically) and sometimes possible negative **NA**	**Low** (symbolically **Low** (diaspora)	**Low** (symbolically) and sometimes possibly negative **NA**
ON CHANNELS: CONNECTORS AND DIVIDERS	**NCCK**	**CAP**	**WSP**
Mobilized agents for peace?	**High** (linked NGOs localized)	**Low**	**Medium**
Introduced and spread social innovations?	**High**	**Medium (project itself)**	**Medium (project itself)**
Strengthened governing institutions?	**Medium and possibly negative**	**None**	**Low** to **Medium and possibly negative**
Advanced political negotiations • On lowest level • On higher (e.g., regional) level	**Medium** NA	**None** **None or not known**	**Low** None
ON TRIGGERS AND INHIBITORS	**NCCK**	**CAP**	**WSP**
Reduced violent behavior? • On lowest level • On higher (e.g., regional) level	**High Possibly negative** (through polarization) NA	**None** **NA**	**None** or **NA and possibly negative** **NA**
Overall Comparative Efficacy *To date which initiative has had the most impact within its context?*	**High**	**Low**	**Low to Medium**

Notes:

High data suggests considerable impact
Medium data suggests some impact
Low data suggests a little impact
None data suggests nonimpact

Negative data suggests possibly harmful
Plausible no data but an impact is inferable
Not known insufficient data
NA Not applicable

B.3. What Makes for Effectiveness? Lessons to be Learned About Effective Practices and Favorable Settings

As with Section A.3, for Local Community-Based Peace Processes, this section lays out the lessons that can be learned from the three middle-level dialogue initiatives. The lessons are laid out in the form of a checklist of key questions that should be asked when considering whether to apply this type of initiative in a given situation.

Guidelines for Adopting, Designing and Implementing Non-official Dialogues *: Key Questions to Ask – a Checklist
Table 4

Regarding the nature of the conflict: *How tractable or intractable is the conflict being addressed?*	*Is the conflict a largely non-violent one over political and policy issues (and therefore more tractable), or a militarized one involving active armed combat, such as a civil war?*	If the conflict is less tractable, then mid-level dialogues initiative processes can be more effective. For example, the ability of the Kenya and Somaliland dialogues to encompass diverse groups and engage in substantive discussions that have some influence is undoubtedly attributable in part to the considerably lower levels of hostility of their conflicts and the lack of immediate threat to their participants. These factors can be contrasted to the greater polarization and recurrent violence surrounding the smaller and less influential activity of the CAP group.
	Is there a rough balance of equal power between the parties to the conflict and yet a political stalemate, so that all sides to it have something potentially to gain by engaging in the dialogue?	In Kenya, due to the equation of violence described above, despite the fragmentation of the opposition parties and leaders, the government could not clearly defeat the opposition through violent action without incurring other high political costs such as the loss of international support.

Regarding the implementation of the initiative: *How well is it implemented?*	*Can the dialogue process get social and political support from a significant portion of national civil society and/or generate support from an established grassroots constituency in the broader public?*	Due in part to the greater vitality of civil society in Kenya, the NCCK process included in one way or another a large number of people representing possibly 40 different NGOs, so that it could gain attention and exert pressure to attend to the issues of the dialogue. The Burundi process, however, involved only about 50 people from different entities but who came largely as individuals. The WSP process also sought to involve individuals, not organizations, and could draw on far fewer established NGOs. In addition, the NCCK was able to use the influence that ministers, priests and imams had with the members of their churches and mosques, respectively, in keeping broad attention focused on the process and on educating a segment of the general public about the issues. In contrast, the WSP did not try to educate groups outside the process itself, and the CAP has no counterparts for grass-roots linkages.
Regarding the implementation of the initiative: *How well is it implemented?* **(continued)**	*Was the dialogue initiated solely by inside actors or did outside third parties take a significant lead?*	
	Did some technique of conflict resolution training inform the way the dialogue was conducted?	The Kenya process did not use professional facilitators or techniques of track-two diplomacy, problem-solving workshops and the like. The Burundi process was influenced by the norms of track-two diplomacy as carried out especially in South Africa, and the WSP process applied a certain methodology that its sponsors have been developing in different country contexts.

	Is the dialogue process clearly directed by nationals in the countries concerned?	The Kenya process was stimulated by professionals in the country and the Somaliland process was addressing issues of interest to the political elite of an aspiring state. In Burundi, however, while it was useful for the dialogue partners to speak to the political elites and to have them participate in a symbolic process, it is not clear they saw the dialogue as a major way to address the conflict and promising of enough results to warrant their greatest energies.
	Is the activity initiated by educated, skillful professionals?	
	Are the initiators actively creating support and cooperation from significant local groups?	
Regarding the basic design of the initiative (activity): *Was the intervention strategy appropriate to the conflict situation?*	*Is the non-official dialogue itself actually quasi-official because it encompasses the representatives of the key parties to the actual or potential conflict in the country, and thus its decisions can be crucial to them?*	The Kenya dialogue included the main players in the political struggle over control of the state, such as the Attorney General and the representatives of opposition parties. Because they had considerable authority for making decisions on behalf of their respective constituencies, the initiative was actually closer to being track-one negotiations than track-two dialogue or track "one and a half" dialogue. The Burundi dialogue did not include as many key players, and the WSP process, by design, was even less political.

Regarding the immediate context: *Was it placed in fertile ground?*	*Is the dialogue process regarded as vital to thwarting possible violence, so that the parties to the conflict feel they have a lot riding on whether it occurs and makes some progress?*	Notwithstanding the Kenya conflict's generally peaceful nature, the influence of the dialogue process was helped by the fact that violence had occurred over the legitimacy of the elections and a breakdown of law and order due to popular unrest occasionally threatened unless the ruling party was seen to be addressing the issues being raised. The increasing use of violence by the state and local politicians also lay in the background, so that a genuine anxiety about whether Kenya, up to now thought to be immune from the conflicts in the region, might follow the course of neighbors such as Somalia and Uganda. In the other two contexts, however, the political leaders did not need the dialogues. In the case of Somaliland, war weariness over the past conflicts made the prospect of violent conflict no longer as likely as it once was. In the case of Burundi, the conflict was out of control, so that the respective dialogues did not effectively influence the course of national politics.
	Is the government in which the dialogue is taking place significantly subject to public opinion through a competitive multi-party system, regular elections, and vigorous media?	A significant reason that the NCCK process had to be respected by both government and the opposition was that they had to compete to some extent for popular support through the media and periodic elections. In Burundi, opposition parties wield relatively less influence over the conduct of the conflict, since it is between the military and insurgent groups, and In Somaliland, the regime is held together mainly through a power-sharing arrangement that has been brokered among the leaders of the major clans and subclans, and politically significant political parties and electoral politics have not emerged.
	Has some similar activity of this general nature operated before in the area?	

	Is the activity "tapping into" and articulated intensely felt local needs, such as evoked by recent violent events, or is it motivated primarily by ulterior agendas?	In Burundi, the CAP group taps on the desire of most people to resolve the decades-long political crisis and violence through a search for peace.
	Is a methodical grass-roots process being followed to designate representatives of the local communities, and are lengthy consultations used to achieve consensus behind major policy decisions?	The WSP in Somaliland made a conscious effort to include the voices of all clans in its processes and products. During the first phase of the process, WSP held focus groups with members of all the clans of Somaliland, and by the end of the second phase, have held workshops in locations in which most, but not all, clans traditionally reside. While lengthy consultations and discussions were not used specifically to achieve consensus for major policy decisions per se, this process has promoted common understanding of issues of concern to all.
	Are peace agreements being sought between specific institutions that represent distinct communities that are in conflict, or is it a broader process of general public education, community problem-solving, etc.?	Through implementation of the participatory action research process, the WSP in Somaliland creates a broader process of general public education and problem-solving that do not necessarily only represent the concerns and interest of distinct communities.
* To pinpoint the most important factors that explain the observed impacts, this process was followed: Where all the cases had similar positive impacts, they were compared for their common elements, for these are most likely to explain the similar impacts. Where the initiatives had differing results, they were examined for the differences between them, for these are likely to explain those results.		

C. Peace Radio

The use of popular media which aims messages of peace, toleration, and reconciliation is seen as a way to counteract the inflammatory influence of rumor or messages of hate and provocative incitements to violence by leaders who may influence certain sub-communities in a population, to break the monopoly on information about the events and issues at stake in conflicts that one side or other may represent (usually because of state-controlled and partisan media), and to persuade the members of separate communities that they often have common interests that are maximized by peace. The assumption is that audiences provided with such information and moral messages are less subject to manipulation by leaders on one side of a conflict or another and will be more supportive and accepting of efforts to achieve peace. Radio, in particular, is seen to be most useful in rural African societies where most of the inhabitants do not own televisions sets.

The Greater Horn of Africa cases examined for this analysis include:

- Studio Ijambo in Burundi, organized by Search for Common Ground (later Common Ground Productions), and

- HornAfrik Media, a private sector media company in Somalia with two FM stations, two television channels and a web page.

The analysis also draws also on a study of Common Ground Radio in Bosnia, and an analysis of media in Sierra Leone conducted by Common Ground Productions.

C.1. Findings about Impacts:

How effective is peace radio in conflict prevention, management or peace building? Most of the data on radio's impact relates to attitude changes. Little data could be collected among these limited cases on what impact the medium may have had on behaviors of the listening audiences. Parallel research on knowledge-attitude-practices (KAP) done by health and education programs might be useful sources for inferences about effectiveness of radio messages.

- Economic Improvement: **Does peace radio help to expand economic resources?**

  This impact is unknown because no evidence was collected.

- Inter-Communal Relations: **Did peace radio increase inter-communal contact and perceptions?**

  Positive: For the study of Studio Ijambo in Burundi, 270 individuals from several categories in society were consulted on the impact on them of the studio's programs. Two programs in particular were repeatedly cited by those consulted as helping shape attitudes and behaviors towards cross ethnic understanding. These programs were "Our Neighbors, Ourselves," a soap opera about two families trying to live in peace with each other across the ethnic divide and "Heroes," which told the stories of people who saved others outside their ethnic group

during the massacres. People attributed (4.5 out of a possible 5 score) these programs with changes in attitude and insight.

There is also some evidence that the mere existence of the programs contributes to a climate that encourages dialogue and negotiation rather than violent alternatives. People were able to cite the Studio Ijambo motto " Dialogue is our future" or other statements from programs that support the view that dialogue is the best way to resolve differences.

In other surveys conducted by Search for Common Ground, listeners responded favorably to programs across ethnic lines. They did not unduly favor one program over another, lending credibility to the perception that the programming is balanced and ethnically neutral. Studio Ijambo produces programs for a range of age groups and targets groups not readily served by state media, thus increasing the numbers of likely listeners. Programming is diverse in its format for the same reason.

Studio Ijambo was the only media organization that translated Nelson Mandela's speech about the negotiation framework into Kirundi to inform a larger audience. State channels broadcast this information mostly in French, which reaches only 15% of the population.

- Social and Political Mobilization: **Did peace radio mobilize new agents of peace?**

  Positive: In Bosnia, local journalists are trained in conflict resolution methods as part of the preparation for broadcasting. The training is multi-ethnic and provides a setting for cross ethnic contact and dialogue as well as learning about techniques to promote non-partisan reporting of events. Some of those trained now form a network of journalists available to assist with the radio work in several cities across Bosnia.

  Both Studio Ijambo and HornAfrik Media give programming time to social and economic messages of civil society groups. Studio Ijambo was seen as a means for NGOs to reach their audiences. The Women's Center, also funded by Search for Common Ground, enjoyed a closer relationship with Studio Ijambo that it used to get its messages across. Some NGOs felt that specific social messages on prostitution and AIDS should have gotten more exposure on the programs. In Somalia, HornAfrik Media provided free airtime to civil society organizations to inform people of the public services they provide in the absence of public institutions.

  By providing the first independent media outlets in Somalia, HornAfrik Media was able to capture a large amount of unmet demand for dialogue. People were anxious to express themselves particularly in talk shows and call in shows. The effectiveness of the warlord's propaganda was reduced by the alternative competition. Warlords participated in discussions and had to answer to people in public for the first time. Over time the radio stations run by factions were forced to close because of the competition by the independent media group. HornAfrik has a commitment to helping people make informed decisions that it promotes in town meetings and other open dialogue settings. The importance of peace is underlined in the drama programs that show the consequences of war on the people.

- Social Innovation and Organizational Learning: **Does peace radio create and spread new organizational capabilities or social techniques that have peace building capacity?**

  Positive: Professionalization of media is a product of the intervention. Team reporting across ethnic lines as a means of balancing reporting was recognized as a breakthrough, and as an example, at Studio Ijambo. Personnel who formerly worked for government owned media found themselves more accepted as credible once they became journalists with Studio Ijambo. Sources sought them out when they worked for Studio Ijambo that had not agreed to talk to them when they were working for the government media. Many reporters admitted to some self-censorship so that programs would actually be broadcast over the government controlled airwaves. In Somalia, HornAfrik's systematic documentation of human rights abuses was a first in Somali journalism.

  In terms of the proliferation of this innovation, in Bosnia, a panel on media on Common Ground Productions radio program Resolutions Radio attracted 10 media outlets. After the program, the group decided to hold weekly press conferences. This kind of dialogue was unprecedented in the post-war period. The radio program served as a catalyst to expand dialogue among key media players. As a result, the Simply Women program also produced by Common Ground was expanded to another city in Bosnia. Although it is not known if it has spawned other media activity in Burundi, Studio Ijambo provides programming regularly to international media such as VOA, BBC, Reuters, and Radio France International, Deutsche Welle, Channel Africa, and Associated Press and thereby becomes a principal source for the rest of the world on Burundi.

- Governing Institutions: **Did they strengthen official governing institutions?**

  Positive: In Burundi, a program on AIDS reporting the shortage of condoms in the country led to ministry action to import more condoms and to get the word out about the shortage. The reporter was asked to stop reporting on the shortage now that evidence had been provided that condoms were available. It seems clear that the reporting led to government action and that the programs were perceived at least by government as being important enough to try to influence.

  Studio Ijambo broke the story on killings of refugees returning from Tanzania and had it broadcasted on VOA very quickly. Some think that this programming might have influenced government decisions to close the camps later.

  As the first attempt at independent radio in Burundi, Studio Ijambo may have contributed to a climate of greater tolerance toward independent media. Its strongest impact may be on media credibility as a neutral source of information. Burundi state radio asserts that the high standards of journalism on Studio Ijambo forces higher professionalism among state-controlled media. Although audiences' estimates are imprecise and hard to determine, the popularity of programs with an independent stance obviously influenced the attitudes of governing institutions. As the independent press grew in size, Studio Ijambo gained more access to government and influenced government decisions for the greater good of the Burundian people.

Possible Negative: While it is not easy to attribute negative impacts to this kind of intervention, the close symbiosis sometimes required between the radio production and transmission can be problematic. If the only transmitters in the affected areas are government controlled, there is often an uneasy truce between the peace radio promoters and the government means of transmitting the programs. Having an independent transmitter may seem like the solution, but it puts the peace radio program in place as a competitor to government run media rather than an alternative voice. The most effective compromise on this point is not easy to determine.

- On official political and peace negotiations and pacts: **Did they advance political negotiations?**

  Positive: Although Studio Ijambo reported the progress of the Arusha negotiations as part of its news coverage, how its programs themselves may have affected the several ongoing national and regional negotiations among the Burundi government, the opposition parties and the various insurgent factions is not known because no data was collected on that impact.

- Public acts and collective behavior: **Did the dialogues stop violence?**

  Positive: The investigation of human rights abuses in the news programming has been a deterrent. Interventions like HornAfrik Media in Somalia consciously manage news reporting to avoid igniting the tensions in the society. It is not clear whether this selective reporting technique will build confidence in peace over time or lead to public mistrust. Under reporting could be perceived to be in contradiction to the independence of the media.

  Limits: The limited impact of radio in influencing directly whether people engage in armed conflict may be suggested by the response of soldiers. Of those consulted for the impact study, the soldiers seemed to disagree with Studio Ijambo content the most. Even if they did not agree with the content, however, they considered the programs an important source of information.

C.2. Conclusions: Summary of Impacts

Here again, the instrument of Peace Radio is effective in some areas much more than in others. As seen in the following table, peace radio clearly can create an innovative presence with a new message in a conflict setting, and it has been used effectively to assist other organizations to get their message out and recruit members. It is plausible that it sets a tone that over time improves the climate of inter-communal relations, although it is difficult to know how this is actually translated into increased intergroup tolerance and more amicable behavior. In some instances, it also establishes an independent source of news and thus creates an alternative to state media that over time can upgrade state practices. Less consistently shown is its influence on ongoing official negotiations and its ability, by reporting on human rights abuses, to deter violence by its peace-promoting broadcasts in a potential escalated situation. It has had no apparent impact on economic activity.

Impacts of Peace Radio. *Table 5*

ON STRUCTURAL FACTORS	**Studio Ijambo**	**HornAfrik**	**Other Cases**
Expanded economic activity?	**Not known**	**Not known**	**Not known**
Improved relations between communities affecting conflict? • Groups participating in the conflict? • Other groups influencing the conflict?	**Plausible** **None or Low**	**Plausible** **None or low**	**Plausible** **None or low**
ON CHANNELS: CONNECTORS AND DIVIDERS	**Studio Ijambo**	**HornAfrik**	**Other Cases**
Mobilized agents for peace?	**Low to medium**	**Medium**	**Low to medium**
Introduced and spread social innovations?	**Medium** (project itself)	**Medium** (project itself)	**Medium** (project itself)
Strengthened governing institutions?	**Low to medium**	**NA**	**Not known**
Advanced political negotiations • On lowest level • On higher (e.g., regional) level	**None or not known** **None or not known**	**None or not known** **None or not known**	**None or not known** **None or not known**
ON TRIGGERS AND INHIBITORS	**Studio Ijambo**	**HornAfrik**	**Other Cases**
Reduced violent behavior?	**Not known**	**Plausible**	**Not known**
Overall Comparative Efficacy *To date which initiative has had the most impact within its context?*	**Medium**	**Medium**	**Medium**

Notes:

High data suggests considerable impact
Medium data suggests some impact
Low data suggests a little impact
None data suggests nonimpact

Negative data suggests possibly harmful
Plausible no data but an impact is inferable
Not known insufficient data
NA Not applicable

C.3. What Makes for Effectiveness? Lessons to be Learned About Effective Practices and Favorable Settings

The following factors help to make peace radio effective, and thus need to be kept in mind when trying to apply the initiative elsewhere.

Guidelines for Adopting, Designing and Implementing Peace Radio*: Key Questions to Ask – a Checklist *Table 6*

Regarding the nature of the conflict:	*Which conflict situations are most easily influenced?*	The level of fighting and polarization that exists may be a serious constraint. Since radio fed the fire in Rwanda, it seems clear that it might be used to douse it in Burundi where similar conditions existed and continue to exist. But it is not clear whether radio was able to affect the level of violent conflict in Burundi. Similarly, in Bosnia, the multi-ethnic nature of the conflict makes programming very challenging.
Regarding the basic design of the initiative:	*Was the intervention strategy appropriate to the conflict situation?*	Whether radio can actually reach almost all of the affected populations in conflict prevention is critical. In a setting where all groups are not receiving the programming because of geography or transmission coverage constraints, impact would be reduced. The power of the messages and information reaching almost all the population, rather than a limited number of groups would seem necessary to contain conflict and promote peace. In Burundi, establishing an independent channel of communication for unreached audiences was an important factor. Studio Ijambo was the only media organization that translated Nelson Mandela's speech about the negotiation framework into Kirundi so that a large audience would know about it. State channels broadcast this information mostly in French, which reaches only 15% of the population.
		Setting up a network with outside funds and programs rather than using local sources leads to the perception of the initiative as foreign based and less valid over time. (e.g., Radio FERN in Bosnia)
Regarding the implementation of the initiative (activity):	*How well is it implemented?*	Without very strict ethnic diversity in programming, the message is weakened. Teams of journalists that represent all groups have been successful in building public trust in the message. In those settings, people appear to look for representation in the discussion first before they tune in to the messages or even the reporting. People want to see their group represented in the face or the sound of

		the journalists. But trying to provide this consistently can be difficult.
		Using journalists from the region or country is critical to obtaining useful information. Outsiders may not know what is new or different in what they are reporting. International media attempts are less well received locally.
		High standards of journalism in fact finding and reporting are critical. The impact of the Studio's professionalism underlines the work that needs to go into providing balanced reporting. This starts with the choice of **who** covers the story and is not totally reliant on editing after the facts are obtained.
		Regulating the ethics of journalism is the work of the journalists themselves, not those they work for. Journalists should be asking themselves: Have we done good reporting? What do we know and how do we know it? Who are the sources and what is their stake? Have we verified the information? Can we conclude the truth or are we just looking at a collection of facts? Will the story have impact? What kind?
		Knowledge of local media practice and audience listening habits determines program success.
		Many cited the professionalism and relaxed tone of the broadcasts as a more effective way to reach broader audiences. Innovation is required to sustain audiences over time.
		Focusing on quality of programming instead of quantity helps build audiences.
Regarding the immediate context:	*Is it placed in fertile ground?*	Obtaining access to transmission sources is needed. Achieving this without compromising content can be tricky in certain political settings. In some geographic settings, access to regional media outlets can be an alternative to constrictive national situations.
		The issue of who transmits can confuse the listener. Some who listened to the programs broadcast on state stations were not totally aware that the program originated privately.

IV. COMPARING THE THREE TYPES OF INITIATIVES: WHICH ARE MOST EFFECTIVE?

A. Comparative Impacts

Within the scope of this investigation, the MSI team examined several cases of each of three generic types of CSO initiatives that were set up to address particular conflicts in the GHA region. The aim was to determine whether these approaches are effective in controlling conflicts and with respect to which risk factors. We found that individual cases of every instrument have achieved each of the impacts that we are measuring, and that the extent an instrument achieved given impacts depended on the features of particular cases. At the same time, however, each instrument tended to do better in certain ways of affecting conflicts, and to perform more weakly or even counter-productively in other respects.

The MSI team then looked for the most important factors in the design, implementation and context of each of these interventions that appear to explain their strengths. Several guidelines were identified that can be used in making decisions as to whether the intervention is likely to be effective if applied in new situations, and if it is applied, how to carry it out to achieve the best possible results.

Part IV takes up the question of which, if any, of these generic approaches to conflict prevention, management or peace building is more effective than the others. If one were to choose this one or that one, would you be getting "more bang for the buck"? One hypothesis of this project is that differing generic instruments may tend to achieve different results, so that a practice identified as effective would be better served if one could learn what those differing potentials are. When one chooses peace radio, or mid-level dialogue, or local, traditional peace processes, does one achieve significantly greater effectiveness, or success, or are these instruments more or less interchangeable?

The table (following) draws on the case-study data about each type of intervention in the previous tables. It sums up the range of impacts that each type of intervention appears to be capable of achieving in relation to the various conflict dimensions that are being measured. By comparing how many different impacts each instrument had some impact on, and the extent of impacts involved, we can derive an overall assessment of the intervention and compare it to that of the others.

In comparing the range of impacts demonstrated by each instrument under each of the seven criteria, we find that local peace processes had the most impact on more dimensions of conflict than either mid-level dialogues or peace radio. Local peace processes were the most effective in improving economic activity, mobilizing agents for peace, introducing social innovations, advancing political negotiations, and possibly improving group relations. In other words, local peace processes appear to have more "range," "breadth" or "depth" in their influence on conflicts than the other two instruments. Dialogue was somewhat less effective than local peace processes in most of these areas, but was possibly equal to local peace processes with respect to controlling

violence. Peace radio was the least effective of the three in the first three areas. But we do not know whether it was also weakest in relation to political negotiations and violence, since it was difficult to obtain data on such effects.

But having noted that local peace processes may have the potential to affect more aspects of conflict than the other two, it is also evident that all three instruments tend to be most effective with respect to the same facets of conflict. While individual cases may shift the overall average performance of local peace processes above that of the other two instruments, they are strongest in the same areas as the others are strongest. And their weak areas tend to be the same as well. In short, all these NGO approaches are quite similar to each other in that they all mainly mobilize agents for peace and introduce social innovation, and they are less consistently influential in altering economic activity, governmental institutions and the level of violence. In short, NGO approaches are mainly good at strengthening various communication and organizational channels that operate outside governmental and the prevailing economic and political processes. Only under certain unusual conditions, do they appear to be able to make significant inroads into economics, social structures, government, politics, and violence.

Comparative Effectiveness of the Three Instruments. *Table 7*

ON STRUCTURAL FACTORS	**Local Peace Processes**	**National Dialogues**	**Peace Radio**
Expanded economic activity?			
• Commerce, trade	**Low to High**	**None to Low**	**None to not known**
• Resource Base	**None**	**None**	**None**
Improved relations between communities affecting conflict?			
• Groups participating in the conflict?	**None to Plausible**	**Low: sometimes possible negative**	**Plausible**
• Other groups influencing the conflict?	**None to Medium**	**NA or Low**	**None or Low**
ON CHANNELS: CONNECTORS AND DIVIDERS	**Local Peace Processes**	**National Dialogues**	**Peace Radio**
Mobilized agents for peace?	**Medium to High**	**Low to High**	**Low to Medium**
Introduced and spread social innovations?	**Medium to High**	**Medium to High**	**Medium**
Strengthened governing institutions?	**Possibly negative to High**	**Possibly negative to Medium**	**Not known or Low to Medium**
Advanced political negotiations			
• On lowest level	**None to High**	**None to Medium**	**Not known**
• On higher (e.g., regional) level	**Possibly negative to Low**	**None or not known**	**Not known**

ON TRIGGERS AND INHIBITORS	Local Peace Processes	National Dialogues	Peace Radio
Reduced violent behavior? • Lower conflict • Higher conflict or actors	**None to High** **Possibly negative to Low**	**None to Medium** **None or not known**	**Not known** **Not known**
Overall Comparative Efficacy *To date which initiative has had the most impact within its context?*			

Notes:

High	data suggests considerable impact	Negative	data suggests possibly harmful
Medium	data suggests some impact	Plausible	no data but an impact is inferable
Low	data suggests a little impact	Not known	insufficient data
None	data suggests nonimpact	NA	Not applicable

B. What Makes for Effective Instruments?

Which features of the conflict, environment, design or implementation of the three measures explain why local peace processes achieved somewhat more diverse impacts than the other two instruments? The following factors that distinguished the local processes from the two national ones help to explain why local traditional peace processes were relatively more effective on more counts than the other two instruments:

- The scale of the conflict addressed (e.g., cattle raids compared to combat between organized armies),
- The extent of cooperation possible between the project and the governing authorities operating at the same level,
- Whether the activity involved could exercise coercive "police" authority over the parties to the conflict,
- Whether the activity was directed at achieving some legally binding agreement on specific disputes or involved the discussion of broader issues or general relationships of the parties in conflict,
- Whether the activity had autonomy in relation to influential outsiders because it was either ignored, tolerated or supported.

In sum, local processes were relatively more effective because there was a closer match between the scale of the problem and the capacity of the initiative involved to influence it. The two most successful local projects (Wajir and NSCC) were more effective in relation to the dimensions of conflict because the problem was smaller in the first place, they had control over the perpetrators of the violence (tribal members), the legal process for achieving resolution of the disputes involved (tribal council and tribal justice) and the public enforcement powers (the local police).

In effect, more of the major functions of a state were within the control of the local actors, such as policymaking, security, justice, and the economy. The two national instruments examined, on the other hand, were faced with larger conflicts and had much less control over the parties responsible and the means to alter their behavior. They represented only a few of the actors and forces affecting the conflict at the national and regional levels. By the same token, however, the local traditional process could not be effective in the national arena.

V. CONCLUSIONS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THREE APPROACHES AND BROADER OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Effectiveness of the Three Approaches

This section summarizes our major conclusions about the effectiveness of each of the three approaches examined:

- Local Community-Based Peace Processes
- Middle-Level Non-Official National Dialogue
- Peace Radio Initiatives

For each approach, we summarize what desired impact it is most effective in achieving, and then the factors that determine the effectiveness of the approach. This section concludes with a brief summary of our comparative analysis.

A.1. Local Community-Based Peace Processes

Local peace processes have the ability in specific applications to affect all the major dimensions of conflict, including arresting the escalation of violence. But they are apparently more consistently effective in:

- Mobilizing agents for peace,
- Introducing and spreading social innovations, and interestingly,
- Improving local economic activity.

Where local peace processes were effective depends most on whether:

- Outside actors (e.g., national level political elites, military personnel from outside the country, etc) controlled major political and military events that affected the local conflict arena,
- Specific peace agreements were sought through specific institutions that incorporated the distinct communities that are in conflict,
- The initiative worked through the mechanisms of an established local institution,

- The activity was initiated by educated, skillful professionals who actively sought support and cooperation from significant local groups,
- A methodical grass-roots process was followed to designate representatives of the local communities,
- Lengthy consultations were used to achieve consensus behind major policy decisions,
- The activity "tapped into" and articulated intensely felt local needs, such as were evoked by recent violent events, and
- The local institutions within which the peace process was carried out are able to encompass the parties that are engaging in violent conflict, and to control the behavior of those who are using deadly force, through effective sanctions.

A.2. Middle-Level Non-Official Dialogue

Although middle-level non-official dialogues also have had all the impacts on all the indicators of success related to structural factors, channels of communication, and triggers and inhibitors described in at least one case (NCCK in Kenya), many of these impacts are slight. The approach is apparently considerably more effective in:

- Introducing a social innovation, though not spreading it,
- Mobilizing agents for peace; and plausibly,
- Improving relationships between divided communities.

Less consistently, dialogues occasionally help to suppress violence. But they also can exacerbate it. The cases show that dialogues do not greatly affect governing institutions and official political negotiations. They have little or no effect on improving local economic activity.

Effective dialogue was achieved to the extent that:

- The conflict is largely non-violent over political and policy issues rather than a militarized conflict involving active armed combat,
- A rough balance of power exists between the parties to the conflict and yet a political stalemate exists, so that all sides have something potentially to gain by engaging in it,
- The dialogue process gets social and political support from a significant national civil society and/or generates support from an established grassroots constituency in the broader public,
- The dialogue process is clearly directed by nationals in the countries concerned,

- The non-official dialogue is actually quasi-official because it encompasses the representatives of the key parties to the actual or potential conflict in the country, and thus its decisions can be crucial to them, and

- The dialogue process is regarded as vital for thwarting possible violence, so that the parties to the conflict feel they have a lot riding on whether it occurs and makes some progress.

A.3. Peace Radio

Peace radio clearly can create an innovative presence with a new message in a conflict setting. It is most effective in:

- Assisting other organizations to get their message out and recruit members,

- Serving as an impetus to upgrade state media practices through establishing an independent source of news,

- Setting a tone that over time has the effect of improving the climate of inter-communal relations, although it is difficult to know how this is actually translated into increased, more amicable inter-group behavior.

Less consistently has it advanced ongoing official negotiations and deter violence. It has no apparent impact on economic activity.

The effectiveness of peace radio depends mainly on:

- The level of fighting and polarization that exists,

- Whether radio can actually reach almost all of the affected populations,

- The perception of the initiative as based in the region and using journalists from the region or country,

- Knowledge of local media practice and audience listening habits,

- Ethnic diversity in programming,

- High standards of journalism in fact finding and reporting,

- Producing innovative, quality programming that is appealing to audiences, and

- Obtaining access to transmission sources without compromising content.

A.4. Results from the Comparative Analysis of the Three Approaches

When comparing the three types of approaches with one another in terms of effectiveness as we did in Section IV, local processes were found to be relatively more effective because there was a closer match between the scale of the problem and the capacity of the initiative involved to influence it. The two most successful local projects (Wajir and NSCC) were more effective in relation to the dimensions of conflict because the problem was smaller in the first place, they had control over the perpetrators of the violence (tribal members), the legal process for achieving resolution of the disputes involved (tribal council and tribal justice) and the public enforcement powers (the local police). In effect, more of the major functions of a state were within the control of the local actors, such as policymaking, security, justice, and the economy. The two national instruments examined, on the other hand, were faced with larger conflicts and had much less control over the parties responsible and the means to alter their behavior. They represented only a few of the actors and forces affecting the conflict at the national and regional levels. By the same token, however, the local traditional process could not be effective in the national arena.

We found five cross-cutting ingredients in effective initiatives, no matter which generic approach was applied:

- The parties to the conflict addressed take some active interest in the activity because it has the potential or actual power to concretely benefit or harm their perceived interests,
- The approach was appropriately scaled to specific dimensions of the conflict,
- The activity followed a clearly formulated strategy and adhered to high professional standards of balance and fairness,
- The activity was perceived to have validity and legitimacy because of some kind of indigenous origin and character (local or national),
- The activity sought out and obtained support from other organized interests in the affected conflict arena.

B. Broader Observations: General Ingredients of Success

Having examined the effectiveness of each of three civil society apploaches to conflict prevention, management and peace building in Part III, and then compared their effectiveness in Part IV, we turn in this part to a few broader observations on cross-cutting ingredients in effectiveness.

Have any ingredients of effectiveness surfaced repeatedly in the several cases and approaches we have examined above? These may provide us with guidelines of general applicability.

Most of the factors that were associated with more effective practice of each of the three instruments were specific to that approach, such as the elaborate consultative process that is used by traditional local peace settlements to reach consensus. However, a few factors can be found in some form in relation to at least two and sometimes three of the instruments. Distilling these common elements provides us with the most important factors to respect in order to achieve effective results, no matter which type of initiative is being applied.

Characteristics that were found to be associated with effective approaches more than once are as follows:

- **Conflict Factors**
  - The main stakeholders actually or potentially involved with the conflict are either already incorporated within the conflict prevention activity, or they believe that their interests are affected by it, and therefore take the activity seriously. At a minimum, they feel that their concerns are represented or reflected in the activity. In other words, the parties take some active interest in the activity because it has the potential or actual power to benefit or harm their perceived interests;
  - The conflict that is addressed has not become violent and militarized.
- **Design Factors**
  - The planning and implementation of the activity followed a clearly formulated strategy and adhered to high professional standards of balance and fairness.
  - The activity was perceived to have validity and legitimacy because of some kind of indigenous origin and character (local or national).
- **Implementation Factors**
  - The activity sought out and obtained support from other organized interests in the affected conflict arena.

Some of these factors, once stated, may seem obvious, and thus do not require research. But others are either not necessarily understood as important to keep in mind, or though obvious, may often be forgotten.

C. Implications for Further Research

Additional research is needed to get more reliable information about the effectiveness of particular interventions and combinations of them. It is one thing to identify whether or not certain kinds of activities can have a positive impact on conflict. This study has done that. But it is quite another to measure how much impact an initiative has had in relation to the total range and power of the forces that are driving a given conflict.

Another limitation of the study is that it could not identify whether the desired secondary and tertiary impacts from a given primary impact occurred or not. For example, though peace radio may make a certain number of people more favorably inclined toward inter-ethnic reconciliation, we do not know whether that change in attitude led to any change in individual or collective behavior. Students of media impact suggest that media messages are more likely to be effective in changing behavior if they are reinforced by the immediate environment of the listener. Thus, a message of reconciliation might be more influential if it is heard in the context of an organized activity that allows the listener to engage in some reconciliation activity.

A third limitation is that conflict theory does not yet understand which of the various structural and more immediate factors that drive a conflict situation may generally be most important and how they interact. Consequently, even if we can determine that an initiative has had a certain kind and depth of impact in relation to one or other of the dimensions of a conflict that have been assessed in this study, we cannot tell how significant that impact is in relation to the several other dimensions of the conflict.

In sum, research is needed that is able to probe more deeply into the magnitudes of particular kinds of impacts, the possible subsequent chains of causation that may or may not result, and the interactions of impacts on each other; and also to develop stronger conclusions about general applicability of these approaches across diverse settings. This may suggest two kinds of research design:

- A research design that looks more in depth at individual representative cases, and several differing kinds of initiatives within such a setting, rather than examining only one type of initiative in several diverse cases. Such evidence would help greatly to verify the conclusions reached by these case studies, which have to be considered as preliminary hypotheses.

- A research design that looks at several different kinds of initiatives within a particular setting, or a particular initiative applied within a range of settings, but using a comparative approach across selected countries in different regions of the world (e.g., the Balkans, Southern Africa, Central America, South East Asia). This design would necessarily limit the depth of the examination in each country, yet nonetheless would yield valuable insights on the efficacy of distinct approaches, and how they do or do not work together, in diverse settings. A comparative approach would allow us to strengthen our conclusions regarding characteristics associated with the effectiveness of approaches that may provide us with guidelines of general applicability.

D. Possible Implications for USAID and NGO Decision-making

Note that several of the general factors that are associated with effective results do not have to do directly with the more or less controllable aspects of an initiative such as the design of the activity or its implementation, but rather with the less directly controllable factors such as the

historical, socio-economic or political-military context and the nature of the conflict. This suggests that to the extent conflict impacts are to be expected, more attention should be paid to the settings in which initiatives are introduced and thus whether given approaches, and sets of them, are likely to be viable and efficacious in the settings in which they are introduced. To achieve this, certain procedures are advised in making choices.

At the individual project level: When considering inaugurating a particular type of project, a prior appraisal should be done to ascertain whether the setting is conducive to the particular kind of instrument that is being considered, and that it embodies the features that have been identified as important for effectiveness (as brought out in the checklists in Part III).

At the level of the conflict arena (local or national): Rather than asking whether a given project or type of initiative should be adopted in general, the primary question that should be addressed is what the scope and nature of a given conflict in a given setting is, and what are the various kinds of responses that the decision maker's organization and others might make that are appropriate to that situation.

In this sense, the pursuit of which kinds of initiatives work or not is starting with a limited question. No one approach in itself holds the key. Rather than asking whether a particular approach should be the main response that one might implement to address conflicts in many situations, the process of making choices among approaches should start with an analysis of the several sources of conflicts in particular local, national or regional arenas, identify the various entry points into a conflict that these sources may offer. Then one could ask which mix of various instruments should be applied to address the various sources of conflict in that situation.

Ideally, a process including the following basic steps in strategy formulation and implementation should be undertaken within each conflict arena:

- **Conflict analysis, diagnosis** ("What is the problem?")
- **Identify possible actions** ("What is appropriate to do?")
- **Prior appraisal of possible instruments** (prospective evaluation - "What will work in this context?")
- **Implementation** ("Who does what, and when?")
- **Monitoring and Evaluation** (retrospective evaluation). ("What are the results?")
- **Strategy Modification or Termination** ("How can we do better?")

Hence, rather than producing analyses that reach conclusions about which types of intervention work best, or how to do specific projects, and then disseminating those lessons, another way to produce effective practices is to build capacity to carry out conflict assessments and conflict response analyses by funding and implementing organizations so they themselves can come up with the practices that fit given conflict arenas.

This process would not only suggest which individual initiatives to adopt, but what combinations of initiatives are needed. The analysis would identify certain packages or combinations of projects of different types that would be needed. The present study has suggested that CSO initiatives have some inherent limitations in achieving conflict prevention and management. This suggests that a broader repertoire of instruments needs to be considered and applied, thus including instruments that may be carried out by governments and other actors. Any given organization cannot undertake all of the initiatives necessary to prevent violent conflict. But rather than only respond by undertaking one or two individual projects that have limited impacts, some actors may take on the role -- as their project -- of mobilizing a range of actors to provide the several kinds of instruments needed to be effective toward the several dimensions of conflict, and thus that can make individual projects more likely to pay off.

VI. APPENDICES

A. Overview of GHA Project

B. GHA Case-Study Questions to Address (evaluation framework)

C. Case Studies

D. Internet Survey

E. References and Acronym List

Greater Horn of Africa
Peace Building Project

APPENDIX A
OVERVIEW OF THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA PEACE BUILDING PROJECT

Appendix from the Report:
The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace
A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

Contract No. GS-23F-8012H, Task Order No. 623-N-00-99-00294-00 for DG/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis Services

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The full report can be found at:
http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report.pdf
or write to peacebuilding@yahoo.com for an electronic version.

Overview of the GHA Peace Building Project

Basic Approach. The following approach has been sharpened as the most feasible and efficient way to achieve the intended product. In a nutshell, the best practices part of the project will:

- develop a framework of questions whose answers will describe the features of three types of "interventions" (described below), uncover a wide range of possible impacts they may have in terms of several criteria concerning conflict and peace, and assess their implementation experience. The evaluative questions aim to determine the impacts and implementation process when donors and the other implementers carry out these interventions, as well as the contextual conditions and situational factors (e.g., level of current or past hostilities, particular personalities, etc.) that are associated with the identified results. The generic version of this framework of questions is intended to be potentially replicable in assessing other types of interventions, and the three intervention type-specific versions of the framework may be usable with other cases of a given intervention. A consultation meeting with the project investigators will be held to refine the framework;

- apply and in the process, test, the framework by doing in-depth assessments, including site visits, of a number of specific cases in the region, each of which unambiguously represent one of the distinguishable intervention types. This testing will include discussions about the framework and the cases with pertinent staff of in-country NGOs and other organizations who are involved in implementing these or similar interventions;

- write up the findings regarding the framework questions for each case visited;

- using the same framework, "interview" other available evaluations of the same cases, as well as of other cases of the same interventions found in the region or elsewhere, in order to glean their findings of interest to the project, and thus augment the relatively small number of comparable cases of an intervention that exist in the region;

- synthesize the findings from the above primary and secondary evaluations into written composite profiles for each intervention type, from which will be drawn useful policy guidelines concerning best (or good) practices. These profiles could thus be built upon by doing further studies of other cases of these interventions.

- Definitions of Intervention Types. To be able to identify several concrete cases in the GHA region that consistently represent distinguishable generic types of intervention and thus are (relatively) comparable across differing contexts, we

have refined the following specific definitions of the three interventions of interest. The definitions are:[1]

- Peace Radio: radio programs having peace/conflict resolution/reconciliation content in them that is specifically targetted to the publics and elites of contending communal groups in conflict-affected areas and that is intended to increase inter-group toleration, peaceful resolution of differences, and a sense of common stakes.

- Middle-level Dialogues: informal, non-official discussions focussed on outstanding national level political and policy issues and disputes and that are conducted among politically influential but largely non-governmental professionals, such as religious leaders ("track 2 or track 1 ½").

- Local-level Inter-group Initiatives: sustained contacts at the local community or district level that engage the members of antagonistic communities in conflict-affected areas in order to foster peaceful resolution of their conflicts or disputes, avoid violent expressions of their differences, and increase trust. In particular, peace settlements, which may be arranged among traditional leaders, and joint economic development or other functional cooperation projects.

Thus, all three types are aimed at the leaders or other members of particular mobilized communities or factions ("identity groups") who have taken opposed positions and actions in potential, current, or past violent conflicts and have pursued their respective causes through political or military organizations.

Criteria for Selecting GHA Cases of Interventions. The choices of the GHA cases of the three types of intervention that are found in the following table appear to meet the following criteria, which are essential for producing meaningful assessments. Each case:

- clearly conforms to one of the three types of intervention
- has been in progress for at least a year before the study commences.
- adds up to a substantial amount of activity sustained over a year or longer, i.e., is not simply a one-shot event such as a single training workshop. This makes possible some realized effects of the effort and also comparison of impacts at differing moments in the dynamics of the conflict involved.
- operates in a number of GHA countries and thus differing contexts, such as stages of conflicts
- entails no serious security risk.

[1] These refinements are based mainly on the most important features of interventions for the project's purposes: the intervention strategies (incentives, processes, etc.) that they apply to influence conflicts and peace, including the affected groups or conflict-relevant phenomena they each target and seek to influence. These features operate at the "business" (impact) end of the process. Each type may involve several kinds of third party implementers. The refinements make it possible to draw on the available evaluation-oriented case-studies on comparable interventions of the same type that have been done in other parts of Africa or other regions, thereby encompassing a larger number of cases from which best practices can be identified.

Intervention Cases to be Assessed in the GHA Region

	Peace Radio	Middle-level Policy/Political Dialogues	Local-level Inter-group Initiatives a. traditional peace settlements b. local development cooperation
Burundi	Studio Ijambo, 1995-present, Search for Common Ground.	Company of Apostles for Peace (CAP) project in political dialogue, 1995-present, International Alert.	
Kenya		Kenyan dialogues on political and policy reforms, late 1990's to present, National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK)/Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI).	Wajir area initiatives regarding pastoralist conflicts, mid-1990's to present, Wajir Peace and Development Committee
	Somaliland-beamed radio, late 1990's to present, Inter Africa Group and others.	Action evaluation and policy dialogues in Somaliland, 1998-99, conducted by War-Torn Societies Project.	
Sudan			Wunlit Nuer-Dinka and Waat Nuer-Nuer peace conferences and earlier and subsequent inter-tribal conferences, mid-1990's to present , New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC).
Uganda	Local radio programming in northern areas to encourage returnees, late 1990's, Uganda Government and other support. (Study is assessing the potential for radio in the area)		Informal contacts between government and LRA and among other local contending elements, and local reconciliation efforts, late 1990's, Acholi religious leaders.

Greater Horn of Africa
Peace Building Project

APPENDIX B
GHA PEACE BUILDING PROJECT
CASE STUDY QUESTIONS TO ADDRESS

Appendix from the Report:
The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives
in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace
A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

Contract No. GS-23F-8012H, Task Order No. 623-N-00-99-00294-00 for
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Table of Contents

GHA Case-Study Questions to Address: A Simplified Outline 2

Part I. Background: Broader Context Affecting the Conflict 2

Part II. The Conflict Addressed: What are the Manifestations and Sources of the Conflict? 2

Part II: The Intervention (initiative or project studied) 4

Part III. Impacts of the Intervention: 7

Part V. Favorable/unfavorable conditions in the immediate context 16

Part VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications 18

A "Toolbox" of Conflict Prevention and Resolution Instruments 22

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GHA Case-Study Questions to Address: A Simplified Outline

Explanation. The whole purpose of the GHA project has been to learn how to do conflict prevention/management and peace building effectively. To help answer that question, MSI has done case studies of several kinds of initiatives often used in the GHA region and elsewhere.

The first thing MSI needed to determine about each of them was whether the initiatives were effective in terms of certain impacts (effects) on conflict and peace, and this in what sense "effective". How well did it do? Clues to possible impacts to look for were given in the detailed case-study framework that you received before doing the field studies. We also needed to find out why the initiatives had the particular impacts that they did. Where we find positive impacts, we want to be able to say why, and how, that occurred. Where there were no, or harmful, impacts, we also want to know why and how that occurred. In short, the basic question underlying each of the initiative case studies was: *What kinds of impacts did it have (on conflict/peace), and why?*

Bringing out the reasons for the impacts found can guide REDSO's and others' future choices about what kinds of initiatives to undertake (or to avoid), and how to do the best ones well. In other words, how to do conflict prevention and peace building most effectively!

Among the general reasons why an initiative was effective or not could be: a) the difficulty or manageability of the conflict the initiative addressed, b) the particular means/methods (the type of initiative) it used to intervene into that conflict, c) the way the initiative was implemented, and d) the contextual conditions that affected the intervention and its implementation. Therefore, what follows in this document are key questions for each case study to ask so as to identify those factors (this is a shortened, slightly revised version of the earlier case-study framework).

You will see this outline organizes the questions under 5 headings, corresponding to the focuses mentioned above. After a brief introductory section on the broad backdrop of the conflict and intervention, those concerns are:

1. The conflict: What was the conflict like?

2. The intervention: By what means/methods did the initiative intervene into the conflict, and how well was it implemented?

3. Impacts: What were its various impacts in terms of conflict prevention/management and peace building?

4. Conditions: What factors in the immediate environment of the initiative also shaped those impacts?

5. Policy implications: What specific factors that led to the impacts should be noted and applied when making future chooses among initiatives, as well as in implementing particular ones?

But to reiterate, these 5 sets of questions simply are intended to get at the overall central question of the project: *What kinds of impacts did the initiative have (on conflict/peace), and why?*

Part I. Background: Broader Context Affecting the Conflict

Touch briefly on the most relevant global, regional or national historical, political, institutional economic, and sociological factors in the environment of the conflict and initiative, and how they defined the parameters within which they occurred.

Such factors might be, e.g.: ethnic demographics and ethnic politics in Kenya; the colonial legacy of north-south division in Sudan; the post-independence ethnic asymmetries in Rwanda and Burundi; the post-Cold War disengagement in Somalia and the Guurti system of councils in Somaliland; the Islamic backdrop in Wajir, a country's level of economic development and assets/shortcomings, the size and strategic importance or marginality of the country, etc.

Part II. The Conflict Addressed:[1] What are the Manifestations and Sources of the Conflict?[2]

A. Overview: scope, evolution and intensity

Provide a 1 or 2 page succinct chronological narrative of the key conflict events and developments that the reader should know unfolded prior and during the time the initiative responded to it, indicating the geographic area and societal scope within which the conflict was waged (the conflict zone or arena) and how the level of violence and other hostility may have fluctuated over the period.[3]

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[1] Because conflict is inherent in society and not necessarily undesireable, "conflict" refers to destructive/violent conflict (actual or potential), not to political conflict that may be constructive.

[2] Part II maps the contours and aspects of "the problem" (destructive conflict) at which the "solution" (the intervention) was directed. The purpose of the map is not to describe the conflict fully for its own sake, but to provide a "baseline" of its parameters and main sources, against which to make your assessment in Part III about how effective the intervention was and how significant the impacts were in relation to the conflict's overall scope and scale. Thus, one can see which and how many sources of the conflict it addressed and which it ignored.

[3] Regarding the level of hostilities, consider which of these typical levels and stages of conflict has it moved through:

- Latent conflict, but ongoing communication and interaction among groups in society with differing interests
- Emergence of tensions and signs of emerging divisions
- Unstable peace: polarization and intensification of tensions, acts of low-level violence
- Crisis: High tensions, confrontation, and escalating violence
- War: all-out organized use of violence/armed force,
- Military stalemate, de-escalating violent conflict or cessation of violence/armed force
- Negotiations of a settlement, accords

B. Actors

Who are the central protagonists and indirect stakeholders involved in the conflict, their respective subgroups, the constituencies on which they draw support, and their relationship to these constituencies. What is the comparative power of these parties socially, politically, and militarily (e.g., symmetric, asymmetric)?

C. Issues in dispute

Are there any substantive policy, political, legal, etc. issues that the core parties see as at stake for them, and thus constitute the ostensible reasons for the conflict? What positions are the parties taking on these issues?

D. Sources of the conflict

Besides the substantive disputes above, which of the following structural, political/institutional and immediate forces ("causes") have been driving the conflict before and during the intervention? Consider that each of these kinds of factors might originate internally, externally in the region (e.g., from neighboring states), or externally from outside the region (at the global level).[4]

Structural Conditions (underlying, predisposing, latent factors)

1. Socio-economic competition: To what extent is there competition over scarce land, water, shelter, education, jobs or other income or wealth opportunities, and how these resources are apportioned among the conflict constituencies?

2. Inter-communal alienation: To what extent are the main ethnic or other identity groups separated or hostile towards each other in their everyday interactions and outlooks – such as reflected in their rank and files' social and cultural practices and institutions (mainly non-political factors such as religion, language – see #3 below), economic activities/strata, and group attitudes/perceptions?

Channeling Factors (proximate inter-mediating sources)

3. Identity group political mobilization: To what extent have various identity groups actually formed into exclusive organizations that pursue their interests and grievances collectively through political action, including possibly coercive or violent action (e.g. nationalist ideologies, ethnic-based political parties)? This gets at whether differing societal interests have accumulated distinct funding, skills, leadership, technical means, ideologies, and arms to exert group influence through largely divisive and potentially violent means.

- Settlement implementation
- Post-settlement reconstruction and reconciliation

[4] Note that these sources generally parallel the areas or "entry points" described in Part III below where the initiatives may have impacts.

4. Captured or divided governing institutions and processes: To what extent are the social and political institutions, policy and decision making processes, and communication channels of the state (including the military) and wider society, including formal and informal ones -- which ordinarily should embrace different groups in order to transact public business and regulate/resolve societal conflicts and political disputes -- are either restricted to one or more politically mobilized identity groups, are divided up among differing interests, or largely inoperative?

5. Political leaders' interaction: To what extent are powerful public officials, the leaders of major identity communities, and/or professional elites from differing groups ignoring each other and thus not engaged in any political dialogues or negotiations about important policy/political issues, or stalemated in such discussions?

Triggers (immediate, manifest sources)

6. Leaders' mindsets: To what extent are distrustful attitudes, perceptions, fears, etc. held by key individual leaders and their immediate circles about their opponents fueling the conflict?

7. Conflict behavior: What specific violent public acts, speech, gestures, and collective events are perpetuating or escalating the conflict?

Part II: The Intervention (initiative or project studied)

A crucial task now is to identify those features of the intervention's design, formulation and implementation that may have contributed most directly to the positive or negative impacts that are to be identified in Part III below. If the impacts found there are positive, practitioners will want to know from Part II what kind of intervention they might replicate; if the impacts are nil or harmful, what kind of initiatives perhaps to avoid.[5] In short, Part II helps to indicate the "what" about the intervention, its features and content, which may explain its success or failure in terms of the impacts found in Part III. (However, this Part should be done independently of looking for impacts in Part III.)

A. Basic operating features

- Who initially proposed the initiative?
- Who designed its features and conceived of the organizational structure?
- Who first took action to initiate it?

[5] These questions also allow comparison to other types of interventions, so that the discovered impacts can be attributed to a certain type of intervention. That way, a body of knowledge can accumulate for practitioners that gives guidance regarding the likely respective impacts when they use different types of interventions.

- What does what: what are the respective roles of local, national and international actors in carrying out the initiative (e.g. funding, policy and administrative decisions, implementation on the ground, political support, etc.)?

- How much is spent on it? What level of donor support is provided, and for what purposes? What is the local contribution?

- What is the level of staffing?

- How many months has it been operating?

B. The initiative as a conflict strategy: what is the essential method of intervention for influencing the conflict? How was it formulated?

The intervention design: Describe briefly the essential logic of intervention into conflict that is embedded in the initiative, explicitly or implicitly. This refers to the causal process or mechanism through which the intervention applies certain means of influence (carrots, sticks, convening/negotiating venues, information/education, etc.) to certain actors or sources in the conflict in order to achieve certain primary and secondary intended objectives (i.e., impacts -- although the actual impacts achieved are to be identified in Part III). Because this intervention design or "theory" may be one reason for its effectiveness or ineffectiveness (if it is effectively implemented – see C below), it is important to provide here a verbal "model" that briefly exposits this causal logic. That logic can be identified by asking the following:

- What are the initiative's short-term, medium term, and long term objectives? What do they imply as to the chief sources of the conflict or "points of entry," foci, leverage points, into the conflict situation that represent the primary and secondary targets of the intervention – e.g., socio-economic conditions, actors or groups in society, practices, processes, institutions, behaviors, mental outlooks, or other aspects of conflict? What is the intervention trying to impact among these things, primarily and secondarily, and what notions of effective impacts are used? (See the conflict sources in Part II for some possible targets, although many initiatives will probably target "outputs" less directly related to the conflict itself, at least as primary objectives, rather than such conflict/peace "outcomes").

- In view of these entry points, what timetable is inherently appropriate as to when such objectives could be realized (assuming favorable implementation and contextual conditions)? (For example, educating elementary school kids in conflict resolution norms is a long term conflict strategy because they have no effective political power and so will have little influence on a current local or national conflict, except on the playground!)

- What are the essential means, levers, or methods of influence (i.e., carrots, sticks, forums, etc.) that are being applied through the initiative to the various entry points above?6

- What is the domain or space within which its impacts will be realized or "spread", in terms of geographic areas, numbers of people, population groups, institutions, etc.?

- What assumptions are entailed in this logic about the conditions in the intervention's environment that are desirable for it to be implemented and achieve its objectives effectively?

- What normative "messages" or other substantive content is conveyed by the initiative (e.g., reconciliation themes in radio programs, policy rhetoric, etc.)?

Decision making: It is also useful to find out if possible how and why the initiative (and thus consciously or not, the strategy of intervention) was chosen, rather than alternatives. This may bring to light biases or political or organizational constraints that influenced the selection.

- Was this design developed through some quasi-"rational" process of diagnosing the sources of the conflict or other problems, defining certain objectives, and considering a range of options as possible responses? Or what conflict sources/problems were implicitly seen as the occasion for action?

- What was at stake organizationally, or even personally, for those who were instrumental in choosing the intervention?

C. Implementation: How well was the intervention actually carried out?

Whether or not the intervention's design was or was not appropriate to conflict sources or chosen in some way informed by analysis of the conflict, another reason why the

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[6] A list is given in the "toolbox" in Appendix A of the kinds of methods, tools, or instruments that might be reflected or embodied in the core activity or activities of an initiative. (A given initiative may involve some mix of such instruments and thus incentives, etc..) These instruments tend to use differing kinds of incentives, disincentives or other kinds of influences to exert influence or leverage on sources of the conflict, such as by:

- Providing material support (financial support, in-kind benefits)
  - Unconditionally provided (outright assistance)
  - Conditionally provided
- Fostering forums, venues, processes, channels or other communication opportunities (e.g., through facilitation)
- Supplying education, skills, information, advice, ideas, or analysis (e.g., as in technical assistance)
- Exercising pressure:
  - Moral suasion, condemnation
  - Exposing behavior publicly (e.g., through observers)
  - Imposing restrictions, deprivations (e.g., diplomatic or economic sanctions)
    - Unconditionally (outright)
    - Conditionally

intervention had whatever impacts it did might have to do with how it was actually put into operation:

- Did any training go into the activity and did it inform the implementation?
- Were the authorizing decision making bodies able to reach consensus and take needed actions?
- Was this strategy understood and accepted among the various implementers?
- What problems, constraints, obstacles, difficulties were encountered in implementation? Were they overcome? For example:
  - Were the expected resources provided by funders that were needed to do the intervention?
  - Were they sustained?
  - Was the intervention able to recruit competent staff and leadership?
  - Was the leadership able to take the needed actions to achieve the intervention's objectives?
  - Was there sufficient cooperation between headquarters and field staff or other levels of the implementing organizations?
  - Were there unexpected reactions among the targeted parties or implementers to the intervention that caused a change to the implementation process?
  - Were opportunities for shifting directions and revising approaches taken in response to new developments, so appropriate flexibility was exercised?
- Was the intervention coordinated with other important interventions of local or international actors, so that it did not work at cross-purposes and was complementary or supplementary to these other activities?
- What personal styles of key leaders or other individuals were significant in helping or hurting the implementation?

Part III. Impacts of the Intervention:

How effective was the intervention in achieving conflict prevention, mitigation or resolution? Did it have any unintended side-effects in worsening conflicts or weakening capacities for peace?

The most important focus of the case study for determining an intervention's effectiveness is its results -- as "measured" by explicit conflict and peace impact criteria. The questions below seek to ascertain whether and which among a range of possible conflict prevention/management results/impacts occurred, or did not occur.[7]

[7] Each set of impacts should be used to identify possible: a) beneficial impacts, intended and unintended; b) harmful impacts (presumably unintended); and c) null effects. Programs that are found "effective" in terms of certain intended objectives are not necessarily effective if they also "do harm" due to significant

What is effectiveness in achieving conflict prevention and peace building? Interventions may be effective in several possible ways, direct and indirect, besides the obvious notion of simply ending violence. In judging effectiveness, it is crucial to use several standards, even though achieving only one or two such impacts are usually insufficient for completely ending or managing a conflict. (Few initiatives will be able alone to control a given conflict, but their respective contributions to peace need to be identified, for they may be the several building blocks for building a sustainable peace.)

The impact criteria below have been drawn mainly from several known sources or causes of violent conflicts (i.e., major underlying and more manifest facets or "fronts" in which conflicts may be generated and manifested), as concluded in the empirical conflict and early warning research literature. To refer back to Part II, these sources of conflict also represent various distinguishable "entry points," foci, or leverage points, that interventions may address and influence.[8]

We assume here that an intervention can be presumed effective in preventing or managing conflict to the extent that it has had some significant effect on the most important sources of a given conflict. Positive impacts may also be found if an intervention has strengthened a peace process or condition that addresses the sources of a conflict and thus has been associated in other literatures to be associated with prevention or containment of violent conflicts. Thus, the possible impacts of initiatives are organized below under broad categories representing the various possible underlying, intermediate and immediate sources of conflicts. These categories here are roughly the same as were outlined in Part II, except we add a new category dealing with social innovation and social learning.

In sum, the investigator needs to ask about the extent to which the intervention had any impacts such as the following in the areas and communities affected by the conflict.[9] The questions under each heading provide clues as to what to look for in the data as to those impacts.

Possible Impacts of the Initiative

Possible Impacts on Structural Conditions
(underlying, predisposing, latent factors)

A. On socio-economic assets:

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negative impacts. Also, impacts include not only those explicitly identified by the initiative's formulators, but also impacts that may not have been consciously sought, positive as well as negative. So these should also be identified. For each overall set of factors, I list a few questions about positive impacts. For brevity's sake, I put some corresponding questions about negative impacts in the Appendix.

[8] This research is inter-disciplinary but has been done mainly by political scientists, sociologists, economists, conflict resolution specialists, and some anthropologists. A bibliography will be given in the integrative study.

[9] Of course, not all the sections or questions will necessarily apply to every type of intervention or every case of a type. But do consider them.

Has the intervention improved the total volume or distribution of important socio-economic assets, and without provoking either violent backlash from the "haves" or violent revolution from "have-nots"? Does it increase the total amount of community-wide socio-economic resources and thus public welfare ("public goods") that are available to all or most of the population, such as land, water, shelter, education, jobs or other income opportunities? Does it make an existing gross mal-distribution of these resources more equal among major societal groups (whether they are mobilized or not), but without causing a radical shifting or redistribution of the resources from a privileged powerful group to a less privileged group? These kinds of effects should also be considered with regard to non-essential but valued assets, such as exportable oil, key minerals, or rare stones.

Such impacts are important in several ways: they can displace violent means to pursue one's livelihood, reduce group competition over valued resources, limit the leverage for manipulation of prejudices by conflict entrepreneurs who may seek to exploit differences among groups, and restrict the means/resources that can be used to pursue the conflict (e.g. money to buy arms).

Desired impacts: Has the intervention:

- Increased the aggregate amount available to the general population of arable land, water, housing, employment, health and sanitation, educational opportunities, and agricultural, commerce or trade opportunities for pursuing a livelihood?
- Increased the general population's access to income from valuable, exploitable natural resources such as oil, minerals, and scarce gems?
- Increased the educational opportunities and work skills available to large unemployed segments of the population or areas of the community in particular, such as the male population between the ages of 15 and 25, urban unemployed, residents of shantytowns, and former war combatants?
- Reduced the numbers of people living in an area who are competing for the resources?
- Reduced disparities in the distribution of, or access to, these resources and/or services among social groups that are actually or potentially at odds?

Illustration:[10]

> *By providing water and sanitation facilities that attracted men and women back to their villages and provide limited employment opportunities, the European Commission Rehabilitation Programmes in Liberia in 1996 created the minimal incentives needed for demobilized soldiers to give up the idea of returning to armed activity (Brusset, 68)*

[10] There illustrations of impacts are taken from studies of a different type of initiative (inter-communal local development projects) than we studied in the GHA.

B. Impacts on inter-group relations at the "mass" level:

Has the intervention increased positive perceptions and peaceful interactions and relationships between the rank and file members of the main communities or constituencies in the conflict? When crises or violent incidents arise, they might not escalate into worse conflict, depending on the degree of mutual toleration and peaceful behavior that prevails among the major social, economic, and cultural groups at the "mass" level, even though they may have conflicting interests ("giving the benefit of the doubt"). This in turn is shaped by the extent of pre-existing social integration at the middle- and "grass roots" levels of the society and widely shared mutual attitudes. The extent of integration/segregation is revealed in the extent that the prevailing social and cultural practices and institutions of daily life allow everyday contact and communication.

Desired Impacts: Has the intervention helped build bridges such as:

- Reduced attitudes and perceptions of suspicion, distrust, fear and insecurity that the groups generally hold toward each other, or increased positive attitudes and bolstered a sense of mutual security?
- Increased the amount of social contact, interaction and cooperation and created new relationships among the members of the conflicting groups, such as women or other segments of the population, through involving them in non-political social, cultural or economic activities that serve their groups' common interests?
- Reduced everyday tensions and irritations between the groups, or daily policies and practices that had alienated them from each another?

Illustrations:

Infrastructure rebuilding programs have increased the movement of goods and people among the Bosnian political entities, and thus helped to economically integrate them and create some inter-dependence.

The World Vision International Area Development Programmes (WVI ADP's) were found to have the indirect impact of increasing meaningful interaction and interdependence among different groups, and thus were seen to "have the capacity" to increase mutual understanding and trust between their members (O'Reilly, 2).

Possible Impacts on Channeling Factors (proximate inter-mediating sources)

C. Impacts on social and political group mobilization:

Has the intervention increased the ability of particular groups to organize themselves in order to pursue their interests in peaceful ways, or discouraged the organization of coercive or violent collective action? General societal structural conditions such as in A and B above will not lead to a conflict unless some collective action is taken about them. Such collective action can take coercive and violent forms

or channel grievances and interests into peaceful forms of protest and social and political action. The ability of the parties to act collectively is determined by their development of specific skills, finances, technical means (including weapons), leadership, and mobilizing ideologies (e.g., ethno-nationalist programs) and their usage of these resources for peaceful purposes.

Thus, the intervention may be effective to the extent that it enables various groups, either within the society or the state, that have competing interests to articulate them, to organize to express their demands, and to pursue political action and strategies, in ways that are peaceful and constructive rather than violent. Such action can rectify social and political power imbalances among conflicting parties, and allow entry of marginalized non-groups into the wider political process and thus thwart desperate extremism.

Desired Impacts: Has the intervention:

- Helped to articulate or reinforce beliefs that the contending parties are part of a larger, more embracing community that have common bonds and interests (e.g., citizens of a single nation)?

- Helped to dilute beliefs or ideologies that view certain groups as distinct "ascriptive" identity groups that are based on inherent, deeply-rooted characteristics which are unalterably opposed to those of other groups, such as ethnicity, religion, class, language, region, historical experience or future destiny (e.g., as superiors or perennially oppressed)?

- Encouraged expression of interests through new channels or normal accepted methods such as petitions, elections, peaceful demonstrations, interest associations, political parties, peaceful tribal or cultural movements, or legitimate political party or other opposition movements?

- Weakened, out-maneuvered, or pre-empted alternative efforts to pursue conflict through violence, such as by inspiring the members of conflicting groups with the idea that specific peaceful solutions are possible, and that disagreements can be expressed in non-violent, manageable ways?

- Fostered the formation of "cross-cutting" identity groups, i.e. that link members from across the main lines of political cleavage (so-called "civil society"), and who thus can counter-balance the partisan pressures coming from the contending parties in a conflict by advancing alternative views, thus reducing the influence on members of the conflicting groups to join one side or another?

- Increased the supply of money, personnel, skills, knowledge, technology, or other resources going to organized bipartisan groups who support conflict prevention, resolution, and reconciliation processes or other peaceful efforts (e.g., "peace constituencies"), so these organizations become more effective advocates or implementers of these goals?

- Strengthened key leaders who voice toleration and neutrality?
- Disseminated objective, non-partisan information or implicit messages that evoke mutually positive perceptions and reduce inter-group anxieties?
- Moved specific issues onto the policy agendas of appropriate public bodies and authorities so that the issues are taken up for consideration in a legitimate accepted and peaceful way?
- Stimulate the activation of ethnic kindred or other groups in other regions (outside the immediate arena) of the conflict to come to the aid of one or other party to the conflict so as to render additional peaceful influences on the process?

Illustrations:

> *Interethnic Bosnian business associations often are voices for moderation, such as seen in the IABBH's lobbying for policies favorable for business (USAID, 17f)*
>
> *WVI ADP's created coalitions and forums that operated above the level of the village or parish, through which common concerns such as natural resource management issues could be discussed and common positions advocated. (O'Reilly, 4)*

D. Impacts on political elite negotiations

Has the intervention advanced the resolution of specific substantive issues in dispute among the leaders engaged in a bargaining process dealing with the conflict? The intervention may be effective in improving relations among the official leaders and middle-level elites (e.g., religious leaders) of different groups who are participating in high or middle-level negotiations processes that are going on (e.g., official "track-one," or non-official "track-two", or "track- two and a half") and in assisting them to achieve agreement on particular policy or conflict issues, grievances, and problems.

Has the intervention:

- Identified and encouraged the opening of communication channels among opposed top-level political officials or middle level elites, or keep such channels from breaking down, such as by engaging them in new contacts or dialogue and encouraging conciliatory gestures?
- Increased attitudes of trust that the leaders hold toward one another?
- Introduced specific new substantive ideas and options into the dialogue processes that are seriously considered or adopted as solutions of outstanding disputes?
- Affect top-level leadership active in the conflict, such as in any "track-one" negotiations? Were any " track-two" activities well received by track-one actors and did they influence them? How were these linkages made?

- Facilitated efforts to reach actual agreements on specific disputes and public policy issues, such as new constitutions, peace agreements, etc.?

- Elicit signs of actual cooperation across the conflict lines on specific common problems among the leaders of the contending groups?

- Establish new agreements or peaceful relations among minor, less salient actors, which nevertheless reduce the scope of the larger problem of conflict?

- Brought about more unity within the ranks of the opposed sides so they constitute a more reliable bargaining partner, and individual leaders are less subject to leadership struggles and ”ethnic outbidding”?

E. Impacts on integrative governing institutions and processes:

Has the intervention created or strengthened the accepted formal political processes and governing institutions of the state so the conflicting parties and issues are incorporated into ongoing peaceful decision making and conflict resolution procedures that follow agreed-on rules and procedures? Social and political institutions, policy decision making processes, judicial and other dispute resolution mechanisms, public policies, laws, and public communication channels that operate within the state and society, both formal or informal, are significant determinants of conflict or its effective management. These factors can regulate conflict in several ways: they can give voice to or block the expression of different groups in a society, can engage or exclude the respective leaders of differing groups, thus suppressing legitimate conflict (and thus possibly perpetuate it). They can aggregate and force compromises among competing demands and thus reconcile differences, including by “hiving off” or “fractionating” (sidelining) certain issues and activities to remove them from divisive and partisan pressures (e.g. through autonomous bodies, decentralization, checks and balances, etc.), and thus relieve pressure on central political institutions by reducing the scope of conflict. Or they can keep interests segregated and balanced but not engaged or un-reconciled. They can (as in the police, military and law enforcement institutions) protect citizens against coercive, criminal and conflict behavior by each other, by the state that lie outside the bounds of accepted rules, or by non-state actors. Or they can use the usual monopoly of the means of coercion by the state to advance some interests against others by carrying out violence or accentuating it.

Did the intervention:

- Create new ongoing forums, mechanisms, institutions, or significantly strengthen existing ones, that can be or are being used to handle disputes?

- Open up political processes and institutions to the participation of larger numbers of people and their leaders, who thus can be engaged in a managed process for resolving the conflicts and are less mobilizable by political entrepreneurs behind violent ways to resolve the issues?

- Expand, establish or maintain political forums or other formal opportunities ("political space") for neutral, unrestrained discussion of contentious issues by shielding them from divisive pressures of partisan conflict, thus providing venues and mechanisms through which outstanding disputes and issues can be addressed by the protagonists?

- Strengthen the potential political power and influence of marginalized groups by increasing their representation in executive, legislative, or civil service, or military positions, or by changing policies that will enhance their power, or strengthen the ability of state institutions to hear underrepresented interests and accommodate them in policies?

- Increase access to basic government-provided services by aggrieved groups and discourage policies and social practices that favor some groups and discriminate against other such groups economically, socially or culturally?

- Build autonomous spheres of social power that cross-cut identity groups and are active outside the official organizations of both government and opposition political parties and organizations, and thus which can take on some of the social responsibilities shouldered by the state and provide alternative channels for broad public debate ("civil society")?

- Create new or strengthen existing official procedures or mechanisms through which specific issues are adjudicated and justice enforced according to agreed-on rules, or help to make certain formal established decision processes to be perceived as more legitimate as a medium of interaction?

- Strengthen the ability of the state to perform basic public functions and provide public services thus removing possible causes of conflicts, including enabling security forces to play responsible accountable roles in protecting the public?

Illustrations:

The EC Rehabilitation Programmes in Liberia were found to have significant and relevant impacts at critical moments of post-conflict transition. By ensuring water supplies right after a rebel military offensive had failed, for example, the EC sent the signal that it was ready to contribute to improving the political situation. Along with the support of other actors such as ECOMOG, this was observed to have significantly improved the climate of confidence at the state and societal levels (Brusset, 67).

An overall impact of EC rehabilitation projects in several African post-conflict countries was to help local communities to organize themselves better and establish minimum structures that enabled them to cope with immediate crises, that might otherwise increase tensions and provoke violence. In Angola, for example, such projects were observed to create a climate of optimism and initiative for local actors that encouraged them to seek solutions for their problems (Pisa-Lopez, 63-64).

Possible Impacts on Triggers
(immediate, manifest sources)

F. Impacts on mass or elite conflict behavior:

Has the intervention deterred or contained provocative rhetoric or divisive speech and acts of violence or coercion or other overtly hostile behavior of the parties, or encouraged accommodating and conciliatory statements and actions? Politically significant deliberately hostile public acts, policy decisions, speech, gestures, or use of deadly force, whether by state or non-state leaders or civilian rank and file, directly escalate or de-escalate the level of hostilities or peace, the sense of physical security, and thus the degree of a society's cooperation or polarization. Whether key elite leaders of the contending communities seek to cooperate across conflict lines, or instead manipulate their respective followers to take hostile action, is especially important.

Did the intervention:

- Soften the stridency and tone and increase the moderation of public rhetoric, or helped establish certain implicit norms, moral messages, or an operative code of peaceful behavior that become accepted?
- Reduce divisive and alienating public interpretations of past conflicts and the current conflict situation?
- Improve the amount and informed quality of public discourse and debate?
- Helped the making of positive, conciliatory "tit-for tat" reciprocal gestures that can begin to engender trust?
- Deter the outbreak of apparently imminent acts of violence or keep initial outbreaks of violence from escalating?
- Reduce instances of lawbreaking and arbitrary acts from any side or contain low-level violence by seizing opportunities to stop the agents of violence or potential violence?
- Restrict the human and material means for violence (e.g., embargo small arms)?
- Protect vulnerable groups from likely attacks of violence, thus limiting its scope?
- Did local initiatives have any positive or negative effect on larger conflicts of which it may have been a part?

G. Impacts on organizational and social innovation and learning

Did the initiative help to capacitate its implementers or other specific actors through gaining better ideas, information, skills, contacts, networks, and other support, so that the impact of an intervention might be amplified or multiplied?

- Increase the ability of ("empower") the implementers to tackle tasks that, were they continued, could eventually make more progress, or if enlarged, improve the larger society?

- Did the intervention establish an innovative and fruitful method for handling social and political tensions and addressing conflict and building peace that became accepted and respected as a serious, credible, and trusted initiative? For example, did it attract more people to participate in the intervention's own activities?

- Produce models that demonstrate new constructive behavior and approaches and symbolize new values?

- Did it convey to large numbers of people positive ethical messages?

- Stimulate, "breed," spawn, or spread the intervention technique within the same or other organizations to other sites of this conflict or to other conflicts?

- Reinforce or complement the conflict resolution initiatives of other domestic or third party actors?

- Help create coalitions, networks or other wider linkages to parties or other actors at local, national or international levels, other than that in which the conflict was being waged and the initiative was implemented?

- Create supportive linkages with other local or national, or international activities that pursue similar purposes in the area of the conflict and thus leverage additional resources for these efforts?

H. Summary of Impacts

Provide a brief summary of the main ways the intervention affected the conflict and where it appears to have had little impact. Indicate any harmful impacts.

Part V. Favorable/unfavorable conditions in the immediate context

Extremely important for drawing out policy implications are the contextual and situational factors in the local, national, regional, or global environment and circumstances that surrounded the initiative – but that are not impacts from the initiative. Because this immediate setting may also explain in part the impacts found, identifying its relevant features helps to specify the situations in which this initiative's impacts may be feasible and achievable, or where it might run into serious constraints. This informs the policymaker about what kinds of situations to look for where future replications of the initiative are more likely to produce effective results, and which conditions are not conducive.

For example, as noted below, other peace building initiatives or programs may have been operating in the same area and had beneficial impacts. Also, cultural or other restraints/inhibitors of violence and capacities for peaceful management may be "built

into" the society (e.g., a strong state-wide sense of common nationhood) that supported or reinforced the initiative. Other possible "braking" factors on conflict, or supportive factors for peace, are suggested below, derived from research that has identified ingredients involved in effective conflict prevention and management.

Describe whether the following kinds of conditions and circumstances were found to be associated with the above implementation and impacts:

Conditions arising from the conflict itself

- At what point in the conflict life cycle was the intervention introduced, i.e., the level or stage of conflict hostilities such as potential violence, mid-violence, post-violence (see footnote #3, Part II)?
- To what extent were the leaders or armed forces of the conflicting parties consciously or unconsciously looking for a way out, having become exhausted with their struggle (i.e., was it "ripe" for resolution due to its reaching a "mutually hurting stalemate"?
- Were peace proposals or legal frameworks already in effect that also helped to resolve the issues?
- Did larger conflicts going on in the environment of the conflict addressed affect the intervention's ability to achieve its impacts?

Conditions in the immediate institutional, political and socio-economic environment affecting the impacts and implementation of the intervention (but not part of it)

- What underlying economic interests do identity groups share in common?
- Are there active commercial relationships that bind ethnic communities?
- Do already existing and locally originated ("endogenous") political and institutional channels, procedures and peace capacities already operate between the parties? Are certain moral or cultural norms and institutions shared in common?
- What popular moods and public climate were associated with the impacts or implementation (e.g., a mood of war weariness, indifference or apathy, etc.)?
- To what extent did the leaders on the conflicting sides actively support the intervention, or tolerate it, rather than oppose or resist it?
- Do political parties or social movements embrace members of potentially conflicting communities?
- Was the activity interrupted by powerful political events, or other uncontrolled factors besides the violent conflict itself?
- Were there any infrequent, unusual public or uncontrollable natural events that affected the results?

- The extent of coordination among donors or other third parties?
- Certain effective leaders affecting the situation (other than among the implementers)?

Conditions involving other initiatives (but not in the control of the implementers of the one studied)

- What other important interventions addressing this same conflict may have had significant positive impacts?
- What other interventions or actions by other local or international third parties (e.g. diplomacy, aid, military agreements, trade, arms supplies, etc.) may be promoting peace and thus contributing to achieving the identified impacts?

Part VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications

A. Summary of Findings

Each case study that applies the outline of questions above to an initiative should present here its overall conclusions on the central question stated at the outset: *What kinds of impacts did the initiative have (on conflict/peace), and why?*

In particular, we want to inform REDSO and other readers:

- In what respects was it effective and in what respects not?
- Why? Why was the initiative effective in those respects, and why was it not in the others? For example:
  - How did the features of the conflict affect the results?
  - How did the features of the type of conflict intervention produce those results?
  - What was important for the outcome in the way it was implemented? What aspects of its context were crucial to its effectiveness?
  - In view of the above, what "do's and "don't's" should be kept in mind when considering using this kind of initiative in other settings?

B. Wider Recommendation and Observations

The author is also encouraged to draw out other policy relevant conclusions and recommendations that have been observed and may be useful.

- What opportunities exist within this conflict zone for further beneficial impacts using this initiative, by the same or other actors? Specifically how and where should resources be invested? How can positive impacts be supported and negative impacts avoided?
- What opportunities exist within this conflict zone for applying other kinds of initiatives, by the same or other actors?

- What other promising potential partners, particularly African, exist in the conflict area, and how could linkages with these partners be set up?
- How can the linkages of the initiative to track-one or other wider diplomatic, development, political, regional and other processes be increased/improved?
- What other further steps might be taken by USAID to improve conflict prevention and management in the GHA region?
- What other insights and observations would be helpful to offer the supporters of this study or others engaged in peace building?

Suggestive Questions about Possible Undesired Impacts

On socio-economic assets:

- Decreased the aggregate amount broadly available to the general population of basic material resources on which groups are vitally dependent, such as arable land, water, housing, employment, health and sanitation, educational opportunities, and agricultural, commerce or trade opportunities for pursuing a livelihood?
- Restricted the general population's access to the income opportunities afforded by the existence of valuable, exploitable natural resources such as oil, minerals, and scarce gems?
- Blocked or reduced the income opportunities available in particular to large unemployed segments of the population or areas in the community, such as the male population between the ages of 15 and 25, landless peasants, urban unemployed, residents of shantytowns, former war combatants, or failed to make good on benefits that were promised to such groups?
- Increased the numbers of people competing for the existing resources in an area, thus increasing the potential for competition over them (e.g., such as by irrigation projects easing up land use and thus attracting more settlers into an area who compete for the land)?
- Created or widened the disparities in the distribution of or access to such resources among different social groups' that are actually or potentially at odds?
- Caused, or threatened to cause, such a rapid redistribution of resources from "haves" to "have-nots" that the insecurity of the former is increased, thus inviting violent backlash, or the "have-nots" are enticed to use violence to obtain even greater redistribution?

Impacts on inter-group relations:

- Increased attitudes and perceptions of suspicion, distrust, fear and insecurity that the groups hold toward each other, increased positive attitudes or bolstered a sense of mutual security?

- Increased stereotyping and increased favorable images of the conflicting groups appearing in the public media or in statements of leaders

- Reduced the amount of contact, interaction and cooperation among the members of the conflicting groups, such as women or other segments of the population, through involving them in non-political social, cultural or economic activities that serve their groups' common interests?

- Increased everyday tensions and irritations between the groups, or daily policies and practices that had alienated them from each another?

Impacts on social and political mobilization:

- Helped to stimulate or reinforce beliefs that the conflicting parties are members of distinct, unchanging "identity groups" that have inherent characteristics based on ethnicity, religion, class, language, region, historical experience, or other deeply rooted factors; that share a distinct group status and historical destiny (as superior or underling) fostered by a group ideology; and that share their interests that are ineluctably opposed the interests of other groups?

- Fostered the formation or activation of groups inclined to violence by increasing or allowed the supply of money, personnel, knowledge, arms, technology, leadership, or other resources going into particular violent groups or violent actions by the state?

- Weakened the voices of tolerance and neutrality and increased the pressure for the members of the conflicting groups to join one partisan side or another?

- Disseminated partisan information or implicit messages that evoke mutually hostile perceptions such as "enemy images," increase the tendency to treat groups as scapegoats, and increase anxieties?

- Institute radical, rapid changes that provoke armed backlash and political entrenchment by threatened groups or elements in a regime?

- Raised expectations that beneficial results were to follow but failed to follow through, thereby increasing cynicism and distrust of any peaceful approaches?

- Elicited the raising of new grievances and divisive issues that increase the unmanageability of the conflict?

Impacts on public institutions and processes:

- Reinforce policies and social practices that favor some groups and discriminate against other such groups, and thus increase the motivation of politically entrepreneurial leaders to emerge and define the contours of new political divisions?

- Reduce the potential political power and influence of particular groups by reducing their representation in executive, legislative, or civil service, or military positions, or by changing policies that enhance their power?

Impacts on political negotiations.

- Become discredited as an ineffective, intrusive and unreliable initiative that merely increases frustration?
- Discourage the opening of communication channels among opposed top-level political officials or middle level elites, or keep such channels from breaking down, such as by engaging them in new contacts or dialogue and encouraging conciliatory gestures?
- Increased attitudes of distrust that the leaders held toward one another?
- Introduced few substantive ideas and options into the dialogue processes that are seriously considered or adopted as solutions of outstanding disputes?
- Led to further antagonism across the conflict lines on specific common problems among the leaders of the contending groups, so as to create a new set of interests that compete with partisan aims?
- Inhibited or delayed efforts to reach actual agreements on specific disputes and public policy issues, such as new constitutions, peace agreements, etc.?

Impacts on violent behavior:

- Stimulate the collective expression of interests and grievances in extra-legal violent ways, overt or covert (e.g., assassinations, bombings, raids)?
- Increase the state's use of force in ways that lie outside the bounds of legitimate coercion?
- Contribute to the escalation of violence?
- Exonerate instances of lawbreaking and arbitrary acts by foregoing opportunities to stop or punish agents of violence or potential violence, thereby encouraging them?
- Were these actions timely in relation to the stages and course of the conflict, and opportunities that existed to possibly make a difference?

Impacts on organizational and societal learning, innovation, and social capital

- Did the initiative create more rivalry and competition among implementers of various initiatives?

A "Toolbox" of Conflict Prevention and Resolution Instruments

Official and Non-official Diplomacy

mediation
negotiations
good offices, consultations
conciliation
use of UN Charter Article 99
"track two" dialogue facilitation
diplomatic inducements and sanctions
economic sanctions
fact-finding missions,
special inquiries, commissions of inquiry
"friends groups"
contact groups

Democratization and Effective Governance

electoral assistance
election monitoring
political party development
civil society capacity building
executive and civil service assistance
legislature assistance
constitutional and legislation assistance
judicial and legal assistance and reform
local government assistance and reform
decentralization
autonomy
federalism

Humanitarian Assistance

food, medicine and other relief in conflict areas
conditional relief aid
refugee and IDP assistance
refugee education programs
reintegration programs
rehabilitation and reconstruction projects
promulgation of humanitarian law

Development

food security programs
targeted anti-poverty programs
small enterprise, job creation and micro-credit projects
inter-group development projects
inter-group women's cooperation
natural resource (e.g., water, land) management projects
structural adjustment programs
conditional aid
land reform

peace media (radio, TV)
indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms
peace commissions

Security and Human Rights

preventive deployment, protective forces
post-conflict peacekeepers
international police
military reform
civilian police
police reform
human rights monitors
civilian volunteer “witnesses”
human rights assistance
confidence and security building measures
arms control
demobilization
mine clearance

Justice and Reconciliation

arbitration
adjudication
wars crime tribunals
truth and reconciliation commissions

Greater Horn of Africa
Peace Building Project

APPENDIX C
CASE STUDIES

Appendix from the Report:
The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives
in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace
A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

Contract No. GS-23F-8012H, Task Order No. 623-N-00-99-00294-00 for
DG/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis Services

CASE STUDY ONE	**National Dialogue in Kenya: Religious Organizations and Constitutional Reform, 1990-2000**
CASE STUDY TWO	**The Role of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in Peace Building in Northern Uganda**
CASE STUDY THREE	**A Middle-Level Dialogue in Burundi: An Assessment of Effective Practices**
CASE STUDY FOUR	**Local Level Intergroup Peace Building in Southern Sudan: An Assessment of Effective Practices**
CASE STUDY FIVE	**Peace Building among Northeastern Pastoralists in Kenya: The Wajir Peace and Development Committee**
CASE STUDY SIX	**Media Intervention in Peace Building in Burundi: The Studio Ijambo Experience and Impact**
CASE STUDY SEVEN	**Impact Evaluation of The War-Torn Societies Project: Somaliland**

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The full report can be found at:
http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report.pdf
or write to peacebuilding@yahoo.com for an electronic version.

Greater Horn of Africa
Peace Building Project

Stephen Ndegwa

CASE STUDY ONE:

National Dialogue in Kenya: Religious Organizations and Constitutional Reform, 1990-2000

March, 2001

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ii

Introduction 1

The Sources and Contours of the Conflict 4
- Sources of the conflict 4
- Contours of the conflict 6
  - Procedural Concerns 7

Substantive Disagreements 9

The Intervention: A Multi-Phase Engagement 11
- Mediation in 1997: Constitutional Reform for Elections 11

Post-Election Containment of Conflict, 1998 15

Return to Mediation, 1999-2000 16

The Impact of Intervention 20
  - Update: August 2000-March 19, 2001 22

The Regional and International Context 24

Consequences and Conclusions 25

References 27

Persons Interviewed 35

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or write to peacebuilding@yahoo.com for an electronic version.

Executive Summary

This study examines the extent to which religious organizations have contributed to the management (or escalation) of the conflict over constitutional reform in Kenya during the transition period from 1990 to 2000. Constitutional review is the most significant transition conflict in Kenya today and, given the uncertainty it engenders, it has stalled at several points and been characterized by sporadic violence. Religious organizations have pursued a variety of roles to promote dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflicts whenever the reform process has stalled.

This study examines how three mediation processes unfolded and what impact they had on the conflict. First, we examine the mediation between the government and the National Convention Executive Committee (NCEC), the main reform lobby in 1997. Even though this mediation effort was abandoned, it was chiefly responsible for the follow-up negotiations among parliamentary politicians that resulted in the constitutional, legal, and administrative reforms of 1997. These reforms made the December 1997 elections possible.

Second, we examine the effort to contain the possibility of a violent upheaval in the aftermath of the problematic elections of 1997. The church was, in this instance, chiefly responsible (and not without intense criticism) for urging acceptance of the results. This was at a time when the opposition leaders had united to demand a new election, and the NCEC called for a rejection of the results and mass rallies, which could have led to the kind of extreme volatility that had occurred in rallies organized in late 1997.

Third, we examine the on-going mediation effort in which the churches have moved from being pure mediators to active agitators for a particular process of reform. This present initiative, dubbed the Ufungamano Initiative, is built upon the previous role by religious organizations in mediating between the government and the pro-reform groups. While it is too early to uncover the overall impact of this present mediation, in terms of the six factors central to the study's framework there are notable qualitative impacts in four. In the other two there has been minimal impact.

One effect of the present intervention is that it has restarted the process of constitutional reform. Another, perhaps on the negative side, has been to deepen mistrust between the incumbent regime and the opposition and civil society, as well as within the opposition. There is evidence of increased polarization and potential for, or actual, violent confrontation. The mediation effort has had very little impact on public institutions such as the provincial administration or the police, the two organs usually active in the transition conflicts. The effort may actually have a negative impact on parliament and political parties. Finally, the impact on socio-economic factors and on the social structures that frame the conflict and the larger transition have been minimal and in fact beyond the expectations of the intervention.

At present, the consequences of the transformation of the religious organizations from mediators to central contenders under the Ufungamano Initiative are unclear. Moreover, the recent experience of a build up in tension, escalating to violent confrontation and

sometimes breakthrough negotiations among elites does not offer a clear indication of the direction the current stalemate may take. Given the track record of mediated settlements, especially as parties to a conflict experience “hurting stalemates,” however, there remains a credible possibility that the stalemate will eventually be resolved peacefully. Indeed, at the completion of this report, the Ufungamano Initiative and the Parliamentary Constitution Review Commission were on the verge of merging but at the cost of an imminent splinter within the Ufungamano groups. Once again, the consequences of this, if it happens, are unclear.

Introduction

This study examines the extent to which religious organizations have contributed to the management (or escalation) of the conflict over constitutional review in Kenya during the transition period from 1990 to 2000. While the immediate focus is on the dialogue unfolding in 2000, two other junctures at which religious organizations were critical actors in mitigating conflict are examined.

Constitutional review is the most significant transition conflict in Kenya today. It is given particular weight because it is tied irrevocably to the succession of President Daniel arap Moi, who, in his twenty-second year in office, is serving his last term under the current constitution. As the most significant change in the rules governing politics, constitutional change invariably causes a great deal of uncertainty, especially in the context of an intransigent, former single-party, authoritarian regime battling to hold onto power.

In tandem with the country's broader transition from authoritarian rule since 1990, constitutional change toward a more democratic dispensation has failed to take root due to a range of interests and circumstances that have conspired to preserve the status quo. Among these factors, two are key: a) the nature of the culture of politics, in particular, its ethnic and patrimonial bases; and b) complications arising from a sustained economic decline since 1990. These underlying factors are manifest in the intransigence of the incumbent regime, in a divided opposition, and in the violence that has attended the conflict over constitutional change and the broader transition. The openings available to civil society since 1991 have made for an unstable, if promising, environment for broad-based mobilization and agitation for reforms. The fact that these have produced little structural change has led to rising tension and even consideration of more radical responses to force change. [1]

The current debate over constitutional review is the culmination of agitation that started in earnest in 1994 with the publication of the Model Constitution by the Citizens' Coalition for Constitutional Change (4Cs), one of the first organizations devoted to pressing for constitutional change. This early attempt to seek constitutional reform was a reaction to the 'incomplete' transition that took place in 1991 with the repeal of Section 2A of the constitution, which had legalized the single-party state in 1982 (Barkan 1993; 1998). While the repeal allowed for opposition parties to form and practice legally, it left in place a matrix of laws that undermined further democratization (Ndegwa 1998; Tostensen et al. 1998). Many of these laws were holdovers from the colonial period (especially the emergency era) and undermined the many liberal principles espoused in the Constitution and which are necessary for a functioning multi-party system. These included restrictions on assembly, sedition laws, and party registration mechanisms controlled by the Executive, among

[1] For example, a recent statement by the otherwise sober opposition MP Peter Anyang Nyongo that the Moi regime leaves no option than to be removed by "any necessary means" is telling of the level of frustration. (See Daily Nation editorial August 21, 2000, p. 6).

others. These constitutional, legal and administrative obstacles resulted in severe compromises in the multi-party founding elections of 1992. As a result, the former single-party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), was able to retain power and shape the subsequent phases of the democratization attempt.

Indeed, throughout Kenya's post-independence history, the constitution has played a significant role in elaborating authoritarian rule (e.g., Ndegwa 1997). For example, between 1963 and 1997, the constitution had been amended over thirty times (IED 1997). With the exception of the repeal of Section 2A in 1991 and the Inter-Parliamentary Parties Group (IPPG) reforms in 1997 (see below), all of the amendments had the effect of restricting the liberties of individuals and groups, while enhancing the power of the Executive at the expense of Parliament.

In the context of the Kenyan transition—where the dominant party clearly subsists on this warped constitutional heritage and where the opposition parties have long been locked out of power by constitutional and extra-constitutional designs (including political violence)—constitutional review is a watershed event. Disagreement over constitutional reforms, both in terms of *process* and *substance*, therefore, makes for a great deal of uncertainty. As a result, it generates intense political conflict and potential for violence as stakeholders envision losses of power and access to resources in a new institutional setting (and, very likely, a change of guard).

Two issues underscore the centrality of constitutional reform. First, the very convoluted and long drawn-out conflict over the *process* of reviewing the constitution is indicative of the stakes involved. Since at least 1994 there have been several proposals on the process offered by both the government and opposition, and each has been characterized by deep conflict among elites. Second, since 1991 and especially after 1997, there has been a rise in the prominence of violence (principally from the state and non-state organs colluding with it) and in the propensity for mass action (by civil society and opposition agitators) as tools for asserting preferences.

Politically instigated violence, especially the precipitation of ethnic conflict, has increasingly become part of the political discourse on fundamental issues (e.g., see Daily Nation editorial, August 27, 2000, p. 6). The recurrence of ethnic clashes since 1991 has shown that violence emerges whenever the regime feels substantially threatened by opposition forces. Moreover, the rhetoric that comes from some leaders within the regime establishes a link between such violence and their program for ensuring their political survival and the preservation of existing structures, including the constitution, that make this possible (Kiliku Report).

It is in the midst of such uncertainty and at critical junctures punctuating the elongated process of constitutional reform that the religious community has pursued a variety of roles to promote dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Apart from the immediate protagonists (KANU, opposition parties, and constitutional reform lobby groups), religious organizations have had the most influence on the process. The religious organizations are principally the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), an umbrella body of

mainstream protestant churches, and the Catholic Church, ostensibly the largest Christian denomination.[2] Other religious faiths such as the Muslims and the Hindus have only lately (2000) joined the formal intervention to mitigate the conflict.

This study seeks to highlight how the religious community in Kenya has intervened in the constitutional conflict, in promoting a national-level dialogue to mitigate or solve the conflict, and what effect it has had.

[2] Other protestant groups, especially evangelical groups, have historically stayed away from such open political engagements but have lately been drafted by the state to counter the weight of the NCCK and Catholics when the state has found their positions disagreeable.

The Sources and Contours of the Conflict

As indicated earlier, the present conflict over constitutional review in Kenya is in fact only the latest episode in the long process of transition from authoritarian rule. Indeed, in a transition that is preoccupied with procedural questions and in which institutional reforms are viewed as a prerequisite to the substantive achievements that have eluded oppositionists, constitutional review represents the foremost battleground between political groups. Conflict over constitutional reform, therefore, encapsulates the concerns of the broader transition; and demands for it reflect the core sources of political conflict in Kenya. While some of these sources are fundamental to Kenya's political make-up and are therefore perennial in any conflict, they are discussed here briefly and narrowly in relation to the present conflict.

Sources of the conflict

Socio-economic sources: The social and economic propellants of conflict in Kenya are basically the ethnic and patrimonial bases of politics, and the precipitous decline in the economy, respectively. Like many other transitioning states in Africa, the Kenyan polity has retained its ethnic and patrimonial bases of politics even as it has democratized. Even as politics have liberalized and elections have taken root, the nature of power has remained the same: concentrated in the hands of a few (often one most powerful man) ruling through a network of loyal leaders beholden to the center through ethnic and/or patronage ties. Indeed, this is reflected in the structures of political parties, which tend to be dominated by one man, often with a small clique of financial backers. The use of patronage to secure loyalty and support remains a cornerstone of politics even in the emerging electoral democracies. This affects not only the agenda for change (fewer patrimonial relations), but also how 'progressives' (who are often themselves similarly structured) organize to seek change and the institutional structures they encounter (which are often biased and beholden to the incumbents).

The economic decline over the last decade has affected constitutional questions in a number of ways. As noted elsewhere in Africa (Bratton and Hyden 1992), economic decline and the effects of structural adjustment throughout the 1980s precipitated the demands for political change. In Kenya, the pressure for change has continued especially as the economy has continued to slow down. The demands for change arise out of a critique of the economic crisis as a result of misgovernance; therefore, constitutional review is seen as a way to ensure better governance structures. Moreover, the government has had to face the twin pressures of meeting expanded patronage obligations in its search for electoral support and parliamentary supremacy and facing diminished resources due to adjustment, withdrawal of aid, or stringent conditions. As a result, it has had to engage in the stripping of public assets (e.g., giving away public land or selling off parastatals to supporters) (Klopp 2000). This practice fuels the perception of a runaway corrupt regime, whose only antidote is progressive constitutional reform.

Social Structures: Patrimonial networks and competition for power and resources are largely ethnic. With over forty ethnic groups, Kenya's politics have revolved around ethnic competition. In the first two decades of independence the dominance of the largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, was virtually unchallenged. Under President Jomo Kenyatta, the Kikuyu dominated both politics and the economy, which, at that time, was a prosperous one with generous growth rates. Under President Moi, who comes from a minority ethnic group, ethnic politics have become more open and ethnic hostility has become especially pronounced since the introduction of multi-partyism. Under Moi, the discourse on ethnicity has ranged from claims of ethnic self-determination (*majimbo* or federalism) to violent ejection of some ethnic groups from the so-called ancestral areas of others to create ethnic enclaves. Structurally, ethnic consciousness has produced ethnically based political parties and voting patterns that are clearly ethnic.

Mobilization: Within this social structure, competition has taken on ethnic hues. Mobilization for political action, electoral participation, and recruitment into party structures has followed ethnic lines. This has added a difficult dimension to constitutional questions. When irreconcilable ethnic interests and perceptions color constitutional preferences, the impasse is insurmountable. This, indeed, is a recurrent theme in the transition and more specifically in the constitutional debate as groups organize along ethnic lines (or are viewed as such by opponents). Both the broader democratization movement and the narrower constitutional project have been viewed by the incumbent regime as purely ethnic enterprises to wrest power from the minority ruling ethnic groups. According to the incumbent government, the principal protagonists in the reform movement are Kikuyu and, to a lesser extent, Luo politicians.

Public Institutions and Processes: The nature and actions of public institutions have also affected how conflicts over constitutional reform have unfolded and concluded. The actions of leaders and especially the active promotion of, or passive attitude toward, conflict behaviors have contributed to the crisis in constitutional reform. Public institutions such as the provincial administration and the police and the structural dominance of the executive over parliament have made it difficult for opposition parties, groups and individuals to pursue actions that would promote constitutional change. For example, the provincial administration and the police have broken up political meetings and civic education campaigns, or stood by idly as violence has been meted out on opposition politicians, including two incidents outside Parliament buildings. Overall, the structures of governance remain too beholden to the government of the day to effect any neutrality that would help consolidate democratic gains.

Conflict Behaviors and Events: A number of specific events and trends have influenced the conflict by injecting a deep sense of suspicion and highlighting the possibility of violence. First, there were ethnic clashes in 1991-92, in which over 2000 Kenyans died and property worth millions of shillings was destroyed. A report by the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Ethnic Clashes (also known as the Kiliku Report, 1992) implicated the government, especially the provincial administration and leading KANU politicians, in the violence (e.g., by inciting speeches and arming combatants). These clashes involved perpetrators ostensibly from Kalenjin and Maasai ethnic groups against Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, and Kisii

farmers, especially in the Rift Valley. These clashes were repeated yet again in 1997 in Mombasa and after the 1997 elections in a number of Central Province and Rift Valley districts. These episodes have firmly established a trend where communal violence instigated by politicians' incendiary statements in open forums with no legal consequences or government reproach has become part of the discourse of politics. As will be evident below, such violence, even at the gates of Parliament, has become commonplace (Daily Nation, August 27, 2000; August 21, 2000).

Finally, distrust between politicians runs deep. Part of this is inherent in the ethnic calculus of most politicians. However, much of it has also been learnt especially with regard to political relations in the post-transition era. For example, opposition politicians believe, with some credible evidence, that the last two elections were won by KANU through rigging and through a biased electoral system (Throup and Hornsby 1997; Tostensen et al. 1998). There is also a widespread notion that none of the state institutions (e.g., the courts, the police, the electoral commission, or the provincial administration) is neutral. All of them continually do the bidding of the incumbents. Finally, the ethnic conflicts in which the government has been implicated underscore for many in the opposition the extent to which the current government will go to retain power. On their part, incumbent politicians are concerned about loss of privilege and the possibility of being subjected to criminal prosecution for misdeeds. These misdeeds include widely noted corruption scandals, which the opposition has promised to pursue.

The factors cited above underlie and shape the difficulty over constitutional review. They exacerbate an already complicated transition and provide impetus for violence, both from within society and from the state or state-sponsored agents.

Contours of the conflict

The conflict over constitutional review is characterized by differences over substantive and procedural issues both in the short-term and in the long-term, but, most importantly, it is intensified by the uncertainty over the imminent succession. There is no such position as 'pro' or 'anti' constitutional review; indeed, each faction's position is colored (expectedly) by its calculations about the worst intentions of its adversaries and its best efforts to secure a post-succession future. Equally, there are no recognizable 'opposition' or 'KANU' positions; instead, there is a spectrum of positions with members of the same political party (especially the different factions in KANU [see Holmquist and Ford 1998]) often subscribing to different positions.

The core of the conflict has shifted at different stages from concerns with the substance of reform (in 1991, 1994, and 1997) to battles over the process (in 1995, 1999, and 2000). At present the most animated conflicts are over the process of reform. As will be evident, the two issues are not wholly detached, because the process ultimately determines the possibility for each side's substantive concerns. Indeed, the 'process' concerns are often expressed with clear designs on particular substantive outcomes.

Procedural Concerns

Fundamentally, a broad, somewhat philosophical, debate underlies the conflict over the process. Apart from the specific rules of the review process, there is also debate over the orientation of the process of constitution making. The debate is cast in terms of Parliament-led and people-driven processes. Although this is an over-simplification, it is expressive of both the emotions, the underlying philosophical orientations, and the strategies of the contenders. KANU, which has a majority in Parliament buoyed by its current cooperation with the National Democratic Party (NDP), prefers a process contained within Parliament. This indeed is the position held from the beginning by KANU. It is one that has credible legal and technical backing and that recent history suggests has been the most frequent method of resolving impasses (e.g., the repeal of Section 2A, and the IPPG reforms). It is also one that is largely in tune with the historical experience outside francophone African countries, where sovereign national conferences (as envisioned by the NCEC) have not been the norm.

The mainstream opposition, civil society organizations, and religious organizations have consistently pushed for a more open, "people-driven" process. Their position derives from an understanding of the constitutional review process as one of remaking a social contract, which cannot be concluded by representatives but by the people themselves. This view is consistent with the predominant view within the opposition, including much of civil society, that the constitution as well as the broader social contract is tattered, not the least due to the decadence in Parliament and parliamentary opposition parties. As a consequence, these groups, which have managed to keep the constitutional review agenda alive through their activity in civil society, have been pressing for a more inclusive process.

Underlying the mainstream opposition's positions is concern that the KANU regime is not interested in comprehensive review. This position is borne out by several utterances from KANU, such as the recurrent attempt to popularize the notion that Moi should serve beyond the constitutional two-term limit. Most recent is the proposal contained in the Parliamentary Select Committee's (PSC or Raila Committee) report and bill transmitted to Parliament, which proposed to delete the directive in the Constitution of Kenya Review Act of 1997 to pursue a comprehensive review of the Constitution. However, it is also clear that the debate itself contains much posturing and grandstanding as well as 'mining' for technical and other faults that can be construed to be furthering narrow or partisan interests. These can then be drawn out if necessary when one side loses the political debate. This occurs on all sides.

It is in this context that the three issues that have successively been at the center of the disagreement should be understood. While the first two have already been resolved (if unsatisfactorily), they reflect the kind of conflict it is and its iterative nature.

One is the disagreement over the internal procedures outlined in the Constitution of Kenya Review Act (1997).[3] Two disagreements are prominent: how the 13 seats allocated to commissioners appointed by political parties would be distributed, and how and to whom the seats allocated to the Women's Political Caucus should be handed out. Several other disagreements appear ephemeral because they have not figured prominently in public debates, although critical reviews of the process have highlighted them. These are, for example, whether the commission's chair is elected or is appointed by the president, whether the review should result in constitutional amendments or a new constitution altogether, and whether the final product of the commission will be approved by referendum or by Parliament.

A second area of disagreement arises from the agreement that the Review Act should be revised in order to streamline the process which, given recent experience, was seen as unwieldy and prone to breakdowns. There are several areas of contention here. One is the demand that all stakeholders named in the Act as a result of the Safari Park consensus be involved in its revision in an open negotiation forum. Second, there are those who argue that only Parliament is empowered to review the Act since it is now firmly in the purview of parliamentary business not public negotiation. Those who oppose the latter assert that the Raila Committee appointed to review the Act actually operated in a legal vacuum, as the motion that led to its creation was illegal according to parliamentary rules. As a result, these groups, including opposition parliamentarians, boycotted both the committee's hearings and the debate and vote to adopt its report in Parliament. Finally, there was disagreement among MPs about the rules of adopting the bill resulting from the skewed hearings of the Raila Committee. The debate centered on whether the bill required an absolute majority or a simple majority of the quorum or of the entire body. Characteristic of the moves that intensify distrust, this point was made moot, however, when the vote was taken when most of the opposition MPs were out of Nairobi and there was an escalating fear of a snap general election that might overtake events.

A third area of conflict is precisely the result of the lack of resolution of the first two and remains (at the time of writing) a critical problem in the conflict. This is the fact that the continued failure to resolve the earlier conflicts has produced two independent processes of reform, with obvious implications for a peaceful resolution of the larger conflict on constitutional reform and the overall democratic transition. This is also the central form and result of the religious organizations' intervention in the evolving conflict. The details of the intervention and its effects are discussed in a later section.

[3] This discussion uses the present tense since these issues are outstanding even though the incumbent government and its supporters have unilaterally decided them. They remain open questions and fundamental to the evolving conflict even as new issues arise and are likely to be revisited.

Substantive Disagreements

While substantive issues are too complex to explore in detail in this report (see, e.g., Kibwana; Maina; Mazrui; Mutua; Mutunga 1998; Ndegwa 1997), a few clearly affect the dialogue on the constitutional review process. All sides share the obvious recognition that a triumph on the process goes a long way toward securing substantive preferences. The substantive disagreement is over a range of issues, but the most significant factors fueling disagreement include the two-term limit that KANU would wish to eliminate in order to ease the succession debate.[4] But even this is inarticulate from our findings as some in KANU emphasized that it did not mean that, with the elimination of the two-term limit, KANU would automatically nominate President Moi–-ostensibly the immediate beneficiary of such a change. Indeed, members of the KANU fringe would be opposed to a third term for President Moi.

Furthermore, one KANU minister asserted that the opposition was in fact not interested in constitutional reform since, with the two-term limit in place, they are assured that Moi—whom they see as the main obstacle to their acquiring power—would exit. This, however, is not a position espoused or even alluded to by any of the pro-reform activists interviewed.[5] Other concerns are actually common to politicians on both sides and therefore do not feature openly in debates. For instance, the executive powers of the president have been of concern to both sides of the debate, such that even incumbent politicians are wary of the 'imperial' presidency and the extent to which its arbitrary powers are constitutionally sanctioned or arise out of inarticulate checks and balances.

On the other hand, there are broader 'exit' concerns for incumbent regime politicians and these have periodically come to the fore in interesting ways. For example, in 1998, nominated opposition MP Anyang Nyongo sponsored a motion to generously fund the retirement and the security of all retired presidents. More recently, and much to the chagrin of some, the NCEC proposed clemency for regime politicians to encourage them to give up power. Indeed, among the KANU rebel fringe interviewed, there was a feeling that these 'transitional justice' issues are major preoccupations of the ruling clique. Such issues must be dealt with soon or they will contribute to bottlenecking the process as incumbent

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[4] We can only discuss the substantive issues that animate the current debate. There are indeed more substantive issues touching on the frameworks of government various factions propose or that have been introduced in the decade-long discussion over constitutional review. The menu of substantive proposals remains long and imaginative and ranges from crass *majimbo* or separatist designs to more constitutionally grounded federalist proposals; from liberal models such as the one proposed by the 4Cs in 1994 to more academic treatises such as those spelled out by scholars such as Ali Mazrui, Makau wa Mutua, Wachira Maina, Willy Mutunga, Gibson Kuria, and especially Kivutha Kibwana, among others.

[5] Given the personalistic calculus of several opposition politicians and the lack of institutional strategies, however, this may not be far from the truth.

politicians seek the best possible guarantees in the procedures to secure their power in perpetuity or, at a minimum, a safe exit.

In the spectrum of substantive demands articulated in the debate there is a faction that seeks comprehensive reform for democratization and re-negotiation of institutions of governance and nationhood. On the other hand, some factions are seeking to secure protection from the opposition. The 'kitchen cabinet' for instance is preoccupied with perpetuating itself in power and at the very least securing protection from a vindictive emergent regime. Others, such as the leading opposition parties, have more immediate electoral and succession agendas. The most common concern for all of the factions, however, is to restart the process, albeit in a form that does not undermine each's core substantive concerns. Indeed, it is this common interest and the fact that the process had effectively stalled that gave the religious organizations an entry point and leverage to mediate.

The Intervention: A Multi-Phase Engagement

The current intervention by religious organizations in spearheading a civil society-directed constitutional review agenda is the culmination or continuation of a process that started in the early 1990s. The so called Ufungamano Initiative is built upon the especially prominent role played by religious organizations in mediating between the government and the then main constitutional reform lobby group, the Nation Convention Executive Committee (NCEC) in 1997. It is further built upon the experience of mediating the volatile situation following the second flawed elections of December 1997/January 1998.

As will be evident below, the achievements and lessons of previous engagements shape the present activity. Other than these two activities highlighted here, the religious organizations were also involved in the agitation for a multi-party system in 1990-91; and in the campaign to ensure free and fair elections in 1992. We focus on the initial brokering that led to the constitutional and administrative reform package known as the Inter-Parliamentary Parties Group (IPPG) reforms in 1997 and the management of the volatile aftermath of the second elections in 1998, because these are the closest in line with the current peace-building effort.[6]

Mediation in 1997: Constitutional Reform for Elections

In 1997 the religious sector's entry into the fray over constitutional review was spurred by the widespread belief that the country was tottering on the brink of a conflagration, as constitutional reform lobbies, notably the NCEC, pushed relentlessly for reforms before the 1997 elections. The NCEC's tactics ranged from high-profile confrontations with the state to otherwise mundane, but significant, civic education and mobilization activities. Its most important tactic, however, was calling for general strikes and mass political demonstrations, which turned violent on several occasions. It engaged citizens by directly organizing popular meetings in both rural and urban areas, although most of its rallies were outlawed by the government and broken up by the police. Nonetheless, these mass conventions typically attracted thousands of citizens.

The NCEC mass activities, starting with a National Convention Assembly (NCA) in April 1997, escalated to public rallies that led to violent confrontation with the state. For example, on June 1, 1997, a public rally was brutally dispersed by the police. The same happened in the general strikes and rallies called the next month on July 7 or *saba saba*[7],

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[6] Other instances of the churches' conflict-resolution and peace-building efforts include their mediation in the teacher's strike of 1998 and peace-building efforts after ethnic clashes, especially in the Rift Valley, since 1991.

[7] Subsequently, as part of a conscious emotive dramatization, the NCEC called general strikes and held rallies on days whose dates coincided with the numerical notation of the calendar month. Each occurrence was then referred to by the Kiswahili reference to the month and date, thus *SabaSaba* for the events of the seventh of July and so on.

August 8 (*nane nane*), September 9 (*tisa tisa*), and October 10 (*kumi kumi*). In these highly charged monthly mass meetings and demonstrations, the NCEC demanded constitutional reforms with the slogan, "No reforms, no elections." While the KANU regime refused to recognize the NCEC, much less move on reforms, the mass demonstrations escalated in intensity and spread to several towns. They reached their zenith in October when a Secret Police officer was killed in Nairobi Uhuru Park. By then the situation was clearly spiraling toward ungovernability, which was recognized by several observers, including the then US Ambassador, who, in separate private meetings with the protagonists, urged compromise.

The escalation of violence and the monthly descent into lawlessness was a situation that threatened NCEC's partners, especially opposition parties who had sided with it when it emerged as the most credible vehicle for demanding reforms. It was in this context of periodic lawlessness, intransigent protagonists, and indications that each side was searching for a way out that the religious organizations emerged as viable mediators between the two sides. According to one observer, "no one else could have bridged" the gulf between the NCEC and its opposition allies, on the one hand, and the KANU government, on the other.

The church's role as mediator emerged from its tradition of social engagement during the independence era and more pointed concern with matters political since the late 1980s. The 1980s were a time when the rest of civil society had been severely weakened by the single-party state, and the church (especially the NCCK) and the statutory Law Society of Kenya were the only organizations able and willing to speak out against authoritarian excesses. Moreover, given its neutrality in the 1992 elections, the church had carved for itself the role of encouraging forward and positive movement in reform without seeming to side with any particular group (or at least without the level of stridency that the political parties offered) (see, e.g., Ngunyi, n.d.).

Yet another source of the pressure for the church to intervene came from its institutional preference for managed transitions rather than 'change at any cost,' which, by October 1997, seemed a very likely possibility in Kenya. What seems evident is that the government, opposition, and civil society had reached an impasse and thus created an opportunity for a neutral party to engage in mediation. Therefore, when the religious community first proposed mediation, the KANU regime immediately embraced it as a way out of the impasse.

The crisis in late 1997 was itself a result of the incumbent government's lethargic pace on reform and the vacuum caused by a disastrously divided opposition. In May and June 1997, with elections anticipated anytime before January 1998, tension was very high due to the failure of the incumbent KANU regime to institute the comprehensive constitutional review promised by the President in 1995. Moi's 1995 plan was to invite foreign constitutional experts to review the constitution and have Parliament pass the actual amendments. Along with others such as the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) and opposition parties, the NCCK welcomed the announcement but emphasized local abilities to review the constitution and the need for Kenyans to be the captains of their own constitutional reform. Indeed, following this announcement, the NCCK and others readied themselves

to contribute to the review. In mid 1995, the NCCK invited several ambassadors for consultations about constitutional review and in May 1995 offered its views on the constitutional reform in a document named “Kenya: A Common Future.”

By 1996, with time dwindling for a comprehensive review before the second elections, the NCCK settled for a minimum reform agenda. In mid-1997 the NCCK approached the president and had three meetings with him, but no commitment to initiate the review was given by the president. However, by August 1997, the situation had changed drastically due to the mass action. The NCCK had to pursue shuttle diplomacy between the NCEC and the KANU regime. The shuttle diplomacy involved the religious leaders with the help of an emerging personality, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, who put them in contact with high- level officials in government, opposition parties and the constitutional reform lobbies. These contacts included discussions between the clerics and the Attorney General, the KANU leadership, and, ultimately, the president (in a highly publicized visit to State House).

This initial mediation brokered by the religious organizations was overtaken by two somewhat contradictory events. One was its own success in focusing attention on compromise and the other was the effects of the *kumi kumi* (October 10) revolt in which the Secret Police offer was killed. This latter event forced opposition politicians to begin to put distance between themselves and the NCEC. The possibility of compromise among politicians within parliament appealed to both KANU and opposition parties. For the former, it de-radicalized the demands made on it by blocking out the NCEC (which they considered illegitimate and dangerously radical). Moreover, it contained the conflict in institutional structures of parliament where KANU dominated. For the opposition, the movement for reform had been hijacked by the highly successful NCEC; so, relocating the debate off the streets would put them back in control of the reform demand agenda. While the opposition politicians abandoned the NCEC, which made the entire reform process possible, the KANU regime abandoned the religious groups that had first broached the idea of compromise.

The religious initiative also benefited from a separate initiative that had been going on among parliamentarians. In this initiative, moderates from KANU were having regular meetings in Parliament with moderates in the opposition (outside the NCEC). Moreover, moderate politicians were meeting regularly at the residence of the German Ambassador, who was encouraging compromise. These groups of moderate MPs would later form the core group that engineered the IPPG reforms, which would carry negotiations through to the reforms of 1997, which, in turn, made elections possible.

With elections around the corner, the pressure was on to reach compromise on reforms to ensure that elections took place—an interest the incumbent KANU shared with its opposition. As a result, the IPPG package of reforms, which included the framework for a comprehensive review of the constitution, were adopted by Parliament in November 1997. Among the three parts of the IPPG package of reforms was the Kenya Constitutional Review Act (1997), which established a Commission to review the constitution after the

elections. This Act, which was to be amended in 1998, is at the center of the current debate.

The intervention by religious organizations in 1997 established a number of lessons for the church groups. First it established the churches as credible mediators in the most central conflicts of the transition. In particular, it established the churches' credibility in intervening in critical junctures when other options for conflict resolution were unavailable or undesirable. The churches also learned lessons from being sidelined by the government and politicians after they provided the impetus for negotiation. This reflected some of the limits of the churches' role as mediators since they did not have any significant carrots or sticks except moral suasion to bring combatants to the negotiating table.

Post-Election Containment of Conflict, 1998

In 1998 the religious groups played a critical role in ensuring that peace prevailed after the flawed elections of December 1997. The election was conducted on an uneven playing field even after the IPPG reforms, and clear illegalities compromised any possibility for a free and fair election (Kiai 1998; Barkan 1998). As a result, the immediate post-election period was one with palpable tension, which could erupt into violent confrontation at any time. The volatility was most pronounced when two leading opposition presidential candidates (Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga) joined together to reject the outcome as soon as Moi and KANU were declared the winners. They demanded a new election within 21 days, while the NCEC (fresh from successful mass action that contributed to the IPPG) was calling for a rejection of the results and mass rallies, with obvious implications for violent confrontation.

The religious groups (the NCCK and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission), who were members of a three-body observer team funded by donors, urged acceptance of the results despite "overwhelming evidence" indicating the incumbent had "desperately manipulated the election" (Daily Nation, January 4 1998). The religious groups' intervention was seen by many as extremely questionable in that they declared an obviously flawed election free and fair. This verdict required a strenuous effort to stretch evidence that clearly pointed in the opposite direction. According to one church official defending their statement, they were simply saying, as everyone else, that the election was not free and fair, but not in the same words. Indeed, they argue, everyone participated in the election knowing fully well that the field was uneven (even after IPPG reforms) and, therefore, it was somewhat disingenuous of them to reject the results due to the outcome. They asserted that the practices and outcome on the polling day itself reflected substantively the choice people made.

According to one observer, the religious groups wanted Kenyans to accept the electoral outcome, especially that of the presidential election, so as to avoid predictable violence. There was significant violence, however, especially in the opposition stronghold of Central Province after Moi's closest challenger, Mwai Kibaki, lodged an election petition against the incumbent. The violence, ostensibly state-sponsored, targeted members of the Kikuyu ethnic group, especially in Laikipia district in Central province and in Njoro in the Rift Valley province. Moreover, a number of leading KANU leaders mobilized their supporters to issue threats against the ethnic communities associated with the opposition to discourage them from further challenging the Moi election in or outside the courts.

As one analyst notes, the churches' effort to "calm down the tension" was based on a clear strategy to minimize the possibility of a violent upheaval. According to Bishop Gitari, head of the Anglican Church, "It is better to accept a slightly rigged election than to have absolute chaos as alternative" (quoted in Spurk, 1999, p. 5). In the end, the elections were accepted, if grudgingly, and conflict was averted and channeled into parliament and the court system.

Return to Mediation, 1999-2000

After the post-election crisis was settled, attention turned to implementing the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, which had been adopted under the auspices of the IPPG in 1997. Hurriedly passed to allow for elections to take place and to buy time for each side as each anticipated prevailing in the election and thus managing the review, the Act had serious flaws that would soon arrest its implementation. Due to immediate disagreements in 1998, Parliament formed an Inter Parliamentary Parties Committee (IPPC) made up of 24 members of Parliament with the Attorney General as chair. This committee was to pursue dialogue both within Parliament and outside with stakeholders.

After receiving memoranda from the public about how the process of review should proceed, the IPPC invited presentations at the Bomas of Kenya from two representatives of each organization that had submitted a memo. Afterward, the IPPC opened up a broader process that brought in all parliamentarians and civil society groups to a negotiating forum at Safari Park. The intent was to seek a consensus on revisions to the Act. After plenary sessions, a twelve-person committee was appointed from all parties at Safari Park. It included six parliamentary politicians and six representatives of the civil society organizations in attendance. This committee was chaired by Bishop Sulumeti–-a reflection of the recognition of religious leaders as potentially impartial shepherds of the emerging consensus.[8]

The Sulumeti Committee drafted agreements reflective of the consensus reached by the plenary sessions. Indeed, according to one MP who was a member of the committee, everything in the committee's report and in the subsequent Act that reflected the Committee's draft was deliberately arrived at in order to achieve the greatest amount of consensus. For instance, at the Sulumeti committee very little was changed from what the plenary session had adopted and, further, very little of the committee's recommendations were changed in Parliament. Among the very few changes agreed to was a reduction in the number of commissioners from 77 to 25, which was seen as a more manageable number. In another instance, when the Social Democratic Party (SDP) presented a list of more than a dozen amendments to the report and subsequent bill then under discussion in Parliament, only eight of the amendments were accepted even though the parliamentarians agreed that they were all reasonable amendments. The hesitancy was based on the fact that the SDP—by its own choice—was not represented at the plenary and, therefore, to accommodate all its concerns could have unraveled the Safari Park consensus. According to interviewees, at the height of these negotiations a contact group of MPs regularly met on an informal basis in order to smooth out many of the potential disagreements. In November 1998, the amendments to the Act were adopted by Parliament and signed by the president to bring them into operation in 1999.

[8] Bishop Sulumeti was later to be accused by an NCEC representative of compromising himself and acting to promote the KANU agenda.

In 1999, the constitutional reform process stalled, however, as the various parties disagreed on the implementation of the Act. The initial hitch came over the nomination of women representing the Women Political Caucus, which KANU politicians saw as pro-opposition and dominated by urbane, educated women primarily from Central Province groups. An even more critical crisis arose when the nomination of the political party representatives who would make up 13 of the 25 commissioners stalled. KANU demanded a proportionate allocation of the seats, which would have given them over half the number of commissioners with the rest divided among the nine opposition parliamentary parties. Moreover, by mid 1999, the president had reverted to his original calls for a constitutional review process contained within Parliament. This had been his original position from which he was forced to compromise toward the more open process eventually adopted by IPPG in 1997 and the Safari Park consensus in 1998.

By late 1999 the impasse was seemingly unbreakable. This prompted the religious community to call on the Attorney General to re-assemble all the 54 stakeholders who negotiated the Safari Park consensus by November in order to reach a new consensus and re-start the process. The religious organizations threatened that, if he failed to call the meeting, they would sideline the government and convene the meeting themselves. At the same time the Catholic Church launched a civic education campaign to support the constitutional review process and, in a meeting with the president, urged the resumption of the process. The Law Society of Kenya also launched its own stakeholder workshop to energize stakeholders to re-start the process. In Parliament, National Democratic Party (NDP) leader Raila Odinga gave notice of a motion to request the Attorney General to convene a meeting of all stakeholders named in the Act to jump-start the process. In essence, Odinga's motion was the same as that of the religious leaders, indicating some level of collaboration. His move, however, was to become a stark contradiction and lead to the current conflict and sour relations between the NDP and the rest of the opposition and the churches.

Pressure mounted, as evidenced by the daily newspaper commentary and press statements by politicians and civil society organizations. A two-day meeting among parliamentarians was convened. This meeting, attended by the president, was held in Parliament buildings in November before the Parliament was to vote on the Raila motion and promptly break for recess. It was agreed that a Parliamentary Select Committee be formed to review the Constitution of Kenya Review Act (as amended in 1998) with a view to reaching a new consensus. This would retain the process within Parliament. According to the defenders of the Raila Committee, as the committee came to be known, the meeting the AG had been asked to convene would only have complicated matters (even though Odinga had himself asserted that the AG needed to convene the stakeholders because they were the original authors in the Safari Park consensus). Moreover, they argued that the Act was already firmly in the purview of Parliament and could not be discussed elsewhere.

With the Attorney General refusing to convene a meeting of the stakeholders, and with KANU and its cooperating parties seemingly intent on unraveling the Safari Park consensus and substitute a Parliament-led process, the religious groups went ahead and

called the meeting of the recognized stakeholders. All but the KANU and NDP representatives attended. According to the religious groups, they came together to pursue a technical agenda not a political one, in order to resolve the stalemate. This is how the Ufungamano Initiative was born. The initiative has since become a process unto itself surpassing its original goal of breaking a stalemate by pursuing the actual process of gathering views for the constitutional review exercise. In effect, though, the initiative increased the tension in the unfolding drama of re-starting the process.

The Parliamentary Select Committee chaired by Odinga ran into immediate problems in legitimating itself. First, it was attacked as being an illegal committee. Opponents argued that it was established by a flawed motion (according to Parliament's rules), because the initial motion was substantially amended to call for an instrument different from what was initially proposed.[9] Second, its legitimacy was severely eroded by its having sidestepped the stakeholders who authored the Act and inviting them to offer views instead of serve as negotiators. A walkout by committee members from other opposition parties (other than NDP) and a boycott of the debate that adopted the committee's report by all but one of the opposition parliamentarians complicated the Raila Committee's legitimacy. The bill emanating from the Committee's proposals was adopted in July, again furtively, by KANU and NDP parliamentarians when most of the other oppositionists were out of town on a political tour of the western provinces.

The Ufungamano Initiative sees its role as one of defending the Safari Park consensus to implement the Act as it is. Indeed, its make up, including representatives of civil society and religious organizations and political parties (except KANU and NDP), replicated the Act's stipulations. The religious leaders heading it assert that they have not ruled out dialogue but see the incumbent government as hesitant and bent on pursuing its own narrow agenda to keep constitutional review in its hands. The Ufungamano Initiative also sees political parties as having reneged on the Safari Park consensus. They therefore see their role as mediating and at the same time taking a position, which they would like the political parties to embrace. Some observers see this as a credible position given that the history of the Kenyan transition suggests the incumbent government has always had to be forced to make progressive change. The Ufungamano Initiative has an important role to play in not only restarting the process but also shaping the process to involve more players.

So far, apart from the debate, the press statements, and the opening up of an alternative way to review the constitution, the religious organizations have not embarked on any actual mediation work. Similarly, the Raila Committee, which completed its hearings (which the religious community did not attend) and whose bill was passed by Parliament, has not resulted in any substantive action with the new framework outlined under the Constitution of Kenya Act Amendment (2000). At present then there is a tension-filled lull with threats of or actual violence occurring in some instances especially against actors supportive of

[9] The substance of the motion by Odinga actually sought the AG intervention. That was then amended by George Anyona to call for a select committee of the House. This, according to critics, is contrary to Parliament's rules.

the religious organizations' initiative. For example, public rallies by opposition politicians supporting the Ufungamano Initiative have been violently disrupted by KANU and NDP youths and the Ufungamano commissioners have been threatened with violence.

The Impact of Intervention

The intervention by the religious community in the constitutional reform conflict has evolved substantially in the last four years. It is clear that the religious community is now at the center of the agitation for reform rather than as a mediator between two disagreeing contenders. In terms of the six factors considered earlier as sources and contours of the conflict there are notable qualitative impacts in four. In the other two there has been minimal impact. It should be noted that these latter two are macro conditions and therefore, short of a revolution, cannot be fundamentally transformed in the course of one intervention. Even in the four factors in which we can identify particular actions leading or likely to lead to some change, much of it is still conjecture. This reflects both the nature of the conflict (one about institutions rather than concrete material issues) and the incomplete status of the engagement.

Mobilization: One effect of the intervention is that it has restarted the process of constitutional reform. For example, it is unlikely the Parliamentary Select Committee headed by Raila Odinga would have been appointed had the religious groups not demanded (and held on their own) a meeting of the stakeholders to address the stalemate. In effect the religious community transformed the unorganized voices for re-starting the process of review into a coherent voice demanding and achieving some movement on the issue. Once again the religious organizations found a platform for this in the vacuum that existed in civil society to demand change. The main constitutional lobbies in civil society were inactive in 1999-2000, due to funding problems and a strategic malaise given the departure of some of its members (e.g., the NGO Council's representative) and the expired urgency of an upcoming election. Moreover, the political parties also lost momentum after losing the 1997 elections and instead shifted focus to parliamentary business.

Political Dynamics: Secondly, perhaps on the negative side, one result of the Ufungamano Initiative has been to deepen mistrust, both between the incumbent regime and the opposition and civil society and within the opposition. While the Raila Committee was in session, various accusations were traded in the media between the Committee and the rest of civil society. The Raila Committee was assailed repeatedly as a 'sell out' committee since Mr. Odinga had broken ranks with the rest of the opposition and was seen as promoting KANU's agenda. On the other hand, the religious community's Ufungamano Initiative was viewed by the government and by Raila Committee members as an illegitimate ethnic affair with no legal standing. It therefore became caught up in the ethnic discourses that have attended the transition.

Conflict Behavior and Events: The overall result of the Ufungamano Initiative has been to increase polarization and the potential for violent confrontation. The tension may be unmanageable, especially given threats from cabinet ministers and their supporters to use violence to disrupt the Ufungamano meetings (Daily Nation, various dates 2000). Rather ominous is a less prominent effort by NCEC to sensitize people on reform and to prepare provincial National Convention Assemblies (NCAs) has been the target of violent attacks by supporters of the ruling party and of the cooperating political party, NDP.

It is also possible that the parallel processes may exacerbate conflict in that they may produce mutually exclusive documents, one with legitimacy from the people, the other with legal sanction institutionalized in Parliament. Given the two would be singular points of focus for the conflict, given the timing would be even closer to the imminent succession, and given the implications of each proposal on the succession would be clear and probably contradictory, the tension could easily lead to political violence. A situation reminiscent of the 1991-92 and 1997 ethnic clashes instigated to force constitutional and electoral agendas is not unfathomable.

A number of analysts, however, do not see the parallel processes as inherently problematic but as a productive and necessary step to gaining momentum for constitutional review. The potential for violence is, in fact, lessened by the existing conditions of a general fatigue and wariness about mass action and by economic insecurity that have made mass action unlikely. This may be a rather optimistic view, though, given the events that have already unfolded.

Public Institutions and Processes: The mediation effort has had very little impact on public institutions, such as the provincial administration or the police, the two organs usually active in the transition conflicts. (It should be noted, however, that no effort was directed at these institutions.) The latest intervention by the church is likely to have an impact on Parliament and political parties. The political parties have been rather ineffectual in rallying support and pressure for change and have had to follow the lead of the religious groups, very much as in 1997 with the NCEC lobby. One effect of this could very well be the further marginalization of political parties in the reform process. The other has been to assert even further the right of organized groups in civil society to engage directly in constitutional reform rather than leave everything to Parliament. This is a positive development, since it allows for a wider range of interests to be represented and minimizes the possibility of conflict arising out of exclusion.

Concurrent to this is the fact that, by its very nature and its most central argument, the Ufungamano Initiative, engineered by the religious community, effectively undermines the legitimacy of Parliament by showing it incapable of handling the very core issues of the republic. The initiative posits rather powerfully, although not yet successfully, the notion that parliamentary processes are inadequate for arriving at fundamental reviews of the social contract. This notion is both a philosophical one and one borne out of the suspicion directed at the Parliament, dominated as it is by KANU and given to significant departures in form and substance from actions that may consolidate democracy in Kenya. While the philosophical argument is credible, the overall effect of this challenge and certainly of any success to the Ufungamano Initiative is, at least in the short-term, the further weakening of already weak institutional structures of democracy, including Parliament.

Socio-Economic and Social Structure: The impact on socio-economic factors and on the social structures have been minimal and in fact beyond the expectations of the intervention. In particular given the absence of a conclusive end to the latest intervention, there is no secondary effect felt in mitigating the current economic crisis. Moreover, the economic decline has many other immediate causes including excessive corruption, the

withdrawal of foreign aid, and an inhospitable environment for investors. These are issues outside the immediate purview of the intervention and, more specifically, ones that constitutional reform, once resolved, will not impact immediately or directly.

Similarly, it is not reasonable to expect that the intervention to mitigate the conflict over the constitution can have an immediate effect on the structure of Kenyan society and especially the ethnic and patrimonial bases of politics. Indeed, it is more reasonable to view the intervention as captive to the dynamics of ethnic mobilization, suspicion, fragmented coalitions, and patrimonial networks. Once again, only a successful constitutional reform effort—not an intervention to re-start the process—has any chance of changing the nature of power and competition for it in Kenya.

Update: August 2000-March 19, 2001

As suggested above, the constitutional reform debate took the familiar trajectory of an escalation of conflict, a stalemate, the threat or actual use of violence, and a mutual pull-back as protagonists calculated threats to common interests. The critical role played by an outsider perceived to be neutral, which had been foreclosed internally when the religious organizations became contenders rather than mediators, was restored by the entry of Professor Yash Ghai, who was appointed head of the Parliamentary-mandated Constitution Review Commission of Kenya. A Kenyan of Asian descent and currently a professor of law in Hong Kong, Mr. Ghai also has personal relationships with many in the opposition, dating from his time on the law faculty in Nairobi after independence. His appointment and his refusal to take the oath of office before seeking a merger with the Ufungamano group proved to be what was needed to avoid violent confrontations. Further dialogue has unfolded since his appointment in November, leading to a current formula for a merger.

At the completion of this report, the merger was imminent, although some members of the Ufungamano initiative, principally the civil society organizations, were sufficiently disenchanted with the merger terms that they had threatened to withdraw. It is too early to tell whether this proposed merger—weeks in the making—will be of consequence. Suffice to note that these are the groups that fired up the constitutional review demands from the very beginning, engineered the 1997 spate of street confrontations leading to the reforms of 1997, have no history of compromise with the state (as the religious groups do, at times embarrassingly so), and are likely to influence the review efforts within or outside its bounds.

In the meantime, while the negotiations over the process are completed, and, if they survive the current crisis and contentiousness over the merger as presently conceived, a new arena of contestation will be opened on the substance of reform. This is likely to produce even more conflict as a larger set of actors are likely to articulate their interests as the debate moves from a procedural one to a substantive one. Moreover, the possibility of violence is pronounced, given that violence has in recent times become more a tool of advancing substantive preferences (e.g., elections, land) than one of advancing procedural

issues (for which violence is meted out to individual protagonists rather than to entire communities).

The Regional and International Context

Clearly, the contextual and situational factors at the local, national, regional, and global level affect the implementation of interventions such as the one considered here. The preceding focuses mainly on local and national factors as the most critical to the design, implementation and impact of the intervention. Indeed, regional and global factors have had little to do with the unfolding constitutional crisis and the churches' intervention. The diplomatic pressure from the former US Ambassador and the work of the former German Ambassador in encouraging a settlement in 1997 suggest the impact that can be had by international actors, but at close quarters. This also seems to arise out of personal initiative and contacts rather than explicit policy direction. Moreover, there was no evidence to indicate any deliberate connection between the intervention by religious organizations and these representatives of foreign missions.

At a macro level, in the post-cold war environment, there is little evidence to suggest that foreign governments and donors (such as the United States, Britain, and Germany) intervene at the level of conflict discussed here. There are simply too many such conflicts in countries under transition. Others, such as the World Bank and the IMF, which clearly have an interest in improving good governance, maintain an apolitical stance focused on awaiting a conclusive outcome rather than facilitating the inherently murky political process. It is only when a situation is clearly tending toward collapse (e.g., the land takeovers in Zimbabwe, the return to civil war in Angola, and the Congo crisis) that international institutions and foreign governments intervene.

Finally, the regional context has not produced much in the form of pact-making precedents to resolve deep constitutional and transition questions. With the exception of the sovereign national conferences that characterized early transitions in Francophone Africa (Robinson), there have been no systematic pathways to democratization in Africa, especially in Anglophone countries. In the day-to-day life of strategy and action, little in the way of comparative experiences is considered, except after the fact, and mostly by academics. For example, throughout most of the 1999-2000 intervention, Ugandan clergy were engaged in an effort to mediate between political parties and the ruling Movement government in the no-party democracy referendum. None of our sources made reference to this effort and its outcome. Neither did the experience of constitutional review in Zimbabwe (very similar to the Kenyan context) feature in discussions. Overall, therefore little in the regional or global context has had a noticeable influence in the interventions discussed here.

Consequences and Conclusions

The consequences of the transformation of the religious organizations from mediators to central contenders under the Ufungamano Initiative are unclear. Moreover, the mixed historical trajectory of a build up in tension, escalating to violent confrontation and sometimes breakthrough negotiations among elites, does not offer a clear indication of the direction the current stalemate may take. There is a track record of mediated settlements, however, especially as parties to a conflict experience "hurting stalemates." For example, in 1997 and 1998 the mediation efforts were initiated and were largely effective because the threat of violence and breakdown of law and order was so evident. The imminent merger between the Ufungamano Initiative and the Parliamentary Review Commission under Prof. Yash Ghai is indicative of this trajectory. There is also an established penchant among the parliamentary parties and especially the governing party for channeling very divisive disagreements through institutional structures, especially Parliament, which has so far remained an arena where amicable agreements can be reached and cloaked in institutional legitimacy.

In this connection, there are evident tracks that could be used for pursuing negotiations to resolve the stalemate. For instance, more than a handful of the principal actors repeatedly referred to the previous examples of successful negotiations and the contacts still available through the prevailing networks within Parliament. There is therefore willingness and ability to pursue negotiation and an openness to external facilitators. The religious organizations' role as mediators is certainly compromised given their very activist stance and transformation into contenders for directing the constitutional review. It is premature to make any conclusions at the moment, however, as there are several stages yet to unfold and several issues yet to be settled. How each is settled will affect the extent to which the possibility for peaceful resolution is broadened, narrowed or, perhaps, eliminated altogether. The resolution of the constitutional conflict and indeed the cumulative impact of the iterative interventions by the church are therefore open questions.

In terms of replication and policy options, this study presents some options, but a caveat is in order. The very peculiar circumstances of an incomplete transition in Kenya since 1990 shaped the actors and interests and constrains certain possibilities. One cannot understand the choices made, therefore, without reference to the constraints of the peculiar history of the incomplete transition. These strategies are not particularly transferable since they are made to satisfy certain peculiarities rather than maximize responses to certain generic conflict issues that may arise in other situations.

Despite this caveat, three things are clear: 1) national level dialogue can produce significant progress in agenda setting, procedural terms, and, eventually, substantive change while avoiding violent confrontation; 2) religious organizations can be important mediators, especially if they have a track record of social engagement and embrace a more expansive notion of their social role to include political change; and 3) coalitions with civil society organizations with the capacity for analysis and mobilization outside the

religious groups and with partisan organizations, if their partisanship is restricted, are useful to securing reform goals.

While the capacity of the Ufungamano Initiative was always in peril due to financial constraints (their effort to raise funds from the public never materialized), their refusal to seek funds from foreign donors was critical to maintaining substantive and perceived independence. (This was especially important in a situation where the incumbent government was more than willing to accuse the opposition of being funded by foreigners and, therefore, illegitimate.)

There are several opportunities for other types of intervention that may facilitate the dialogue to resolve the procedural impasse and substantive reforms as the constitutional review takes off. For example, peace radio could be used to inform and advocate open dialogues and to deliver civic education. This possibility is remote in Kenya, however, because of the incumbent government's restrictive policy toward independent radio stations. Other forms of interventions exemplified by other studies may be useful, though. For example, partnerships with donors and African institutions can be useful in advancing the process once the actual reform work has commenced. Supporting an open process would require substantial outlays of resources that only donors can provide with some credibility to reduce the reliance on the (often-suspicious) state machinery. Similarly, African institutions such as the constitution-focused research and advocacy institutes in Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda, may offer useful lessons from their own experiences.

Fundamentally, any intervention in this area needs to proceed from well-informed analysis of the current situation at any given moment and on a contingent basis, as the process is likely to be contentious to the very end.

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5. Mr. Erastus Wamugo
6. Mr. Wachira Maina
7. Rev. Mutava Musyimi
8. Dr. Willy Mutunga
9. Dr. Karuti Kanyinga
10. Mr. Patrick Lumumba
11. Hon. Prof. Anyang Nyongo
12. Hon. George Anyona
13. Hon. Julius ole Sunkuli
14. Hon. Joseph Kamotho
15. Hon. Jembe Mwakalu
16. Ms. Abida Ali
17. Hon. Amos Wako
18. Ms. Joyce Umbima

Greater Horn of Africa
Peace Building Project

Gilbert M. Khadiagala

CASE STUDY TWO:

The Role of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in Peace Building in Northern Uganda

March, 2001

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Appendix from the Report:
The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace
A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ii

The Nature of the Conflict and Its Causes 1

Nature of the Intervention 3

Implementation of the Intervention 8

Impact of the Intervention 11

Contextual and Situational Conditions 15

Lessons Learned and Conclusions 17

References 19

Persons Interviewed 20

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The full report can be found at:
http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report.pdf
or write to peacebuilding@yahoo.com for an electronic version.

Executive Summary

This is an evaluation of the nature, impact, and outcomes of the Acholi Religious Leader's Peace Initiative (ARLPI) on the search for peace and reconciliation in northern Uganda since 1997. The ARLPI is an interfaith collaborative framework of leaders of the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church of Uganda, and Muslims in Gulu and Kitgum districts that has sought to influence and promote dialogue between the government and rebels of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA). Engaging local and international actors has allowed the ARLPI to use its organizational reach in Acholi society to advocate for a peaceful solution to the civil war and to pressure for comprehensive measures to socioeconomic problems facing northern Uganda. During the evaluation, I met and spoke with leaders of the ARLPI, national and local government officials, legislators, NGOs, and a cross-section of ordinary people who have been affected by the intervention.

The ARLPI's Track II intervention role embraces community activities that range from lobbying for amnesty for the rebels, educating the population about peace, and providing an alternative forum for the articulation of local grievances. Within a very short time, these activities have spawned new local institutions, primarily the Kitgum Joint Peace Forum (KJPT) and the Gulu District Peace and Reconciliation Team (DPRT). These institutions are a testimony to the ability and willingness of local people to contribute to peace. But the ARLPI's intervention and the institutions it has spawned are still new and untested, dependent for their long-term efficacy on comprehensive regional and national solutions to the civil conflict. Although it serves as an embryonic model of collaborative problem solving at the grassroots level, the ARLPI is still constrained by the ongoing civil war.

The Nature of the Conflict and Its Causes

The civil conflict in Acholiland pits the LRA led by Joseph Kony against the government of President Yoweri Museveni. It forms a significant part of the north-south divide that has dodged post-independence Ugandan politics. Almost twenty years of dominance of state power by northern rulers, Milton Obote, Idi Amin, and Tito Okello, ended in January 1986 with the triumph of southern elites under Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA). The shift in power to the south stemmed from the ouster of President Obote in July 1985 who had returned to power after contested elections in 1980. Following this election, Museveni's NRA launched a guerrilla war that weakened Obote's government. Tito Okello, an Acholi, became president after the coup of July 1985, but despite negotiations in Nairobi, Kenya, to end the civil war, the NRA overthrew Okello in 1986.

Museveni's victory led to a generalized sense of northern marginalization that has festered over the years. When the NRA captured Gulu and Kitgum, it dealt violently with local opposition forces, sowing the seeds of dissent. In August 1986, remnants of Okello's army, which had fled into southern Sudan, formed a movement, the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA), and began an armed insurgency against the government in Acholiland. Furthermore, in this state of lawlessness, Alice Auma Lakwena formed a new rebel movement, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), that claimed inspiration from the Holy Spirit. The Lakwena movement initially enjoyed popular support among the beleaguered civilian population and posed a considerable threat to Museveni's consolidation of power in the north. After Lakwena's defeat in 1988, her cousin, Joseph Kony, adopted her quasi-religious dogma and continued the war. The UPDA continued as a separate movement, but in June 1988, responding to a government amnesty and peace gesture, its leaders signed a peace agreement with the government. Mediated by the then Catholic Bishop of Gulu, Cypriano Kihangire, the peace settlement culminated in the incorporation of UPDA leaders into the government.

With the dissolution of the UPDA, Kony's LRA guerrillas became the principal source of northern insurgency in Acholiland. In response the government launched a coordinated counterinsurgency in 1991, Operation North, which was highly criticized by human rights organizations for its brutality and heavy-handedness. During the operation, the government sealed off much of the north from the rest of the country and created "protected camps" to isolate civilians from the rebels. Although the operation dealt a sever blow to LRA activities, it marked a phase in the deterioration of relations between the government and the Acholi. In a reversal of strategy, the government through Betty Bigombe, an Acholi Minister in Charge of the North, embarked on negotiations with the LRA in 1994. Bigombe's efforts collapsed amidst government claims that the LRA lacked seriousness while the LRA charged that Museveni was committed to a military solution.

Following the collapse of the peace talks, the LRA resumed the war with the assistance of the Sudanese government. Since 1994 military, logistical, and financial support from

the Islamic government in Khartoum strengthened the LRA's operational capacity particularly in the face of declining local support for the rebellion. Devoid of popular support, the LRA resorted to abducting children and sending them for military training in camps in southern Sudan. Sudanese support invariably added a regional dimension to the northern Uganda conflict as Khartoum claimed to be retaliating against Museveni's support for the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), battling the end of domination of southern Sudan by the Muslim north. As both sides have acknowledged mutual support for the insurgencies, local actors attempting to fashion peaceful approaches have faced tremendous obstacles in dealing with the regional context.

The LRA rebellion has exploited the uneven economic development between the north and south. Perceptions about northern economic marginalization are heightened by the limited government investment in education, health, and communications throughout the two districts. Acholiland bears all the hallmarks of underdevelopment: the death rate in both districts is estimated at 53.7 persons per a 1000, female life expectancy is 44.2 years at birth and infant mortality rate is 165 per 1000 live births. The devastations of the dreaded Ebola virus in Gulu starting in September 2000 underscored the deplorable state of health services in the north. To address some of the grievances undergirding the rebellion, the government launched the first phase of the Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Program (NURP) in 1992 focusing on investment in education, water, telecommunications, and agriculture. The NURP sought to restore the essential socioeconomic infrastructure destroyed by the civil war and bridge the disparity between the north and south. Despite the infusion of World Bank funding for phase one of NURP, continuing insurgency nullified the potential economic gains from the program. Since 1998, the government has embarked on preparation for the second phase of NURP.

The escalation of the civil war over the last 15 years has had enormous economic consequences on livelihoods. In particular, Gulu and Kitgum, once depended on cattle as a means of income and security have seen the marked decline of herds. In addition, with the deterioration of the security situation and the increase of number of people living in protected camps, food production has plummeted and deepened the dependence on relief aid. Apart from the devastation of the economy and infrastructure, the conflict has severely destroyed family structures. Widespread descriptions of Acholiland as a traumatized society underscore the magnitude of social dislocations the war has occasioned. The rebels have indiscriminately abducted and indoctrinated children, eroding the basic values of Acholi society. Since 1997, the rebels have abducted more than 14,000 children and kept them as soldiers, porters and sex slaves. At the same time the abduction of children and violence meted out against defenseless civilians forced the government to step up the program of protected camps that has affected almost 400,000, about half of the population of Gulu and Kitgum. But although the government was responding to the rebel challenge, the implementation of the policy of protected camps has generated considerable resentment in the region, especially since the camps have inadequate facilities, and for the most part, do not prevent rebel attacks.

Nature of the Intervention

The core actors in the ARLPI's inter-faith initiative are Anglican Bishop of Northern Uganda, Rev. Nelson Onono-Onweng, Catholic Archbishop of the Gulu Diocese, Most Rev. John Baptist Odama, the Anglican Bishop of Kitgum Diocese, Rev. Macleod Baker Ochola, the Muslim Chief Kadhi of Kitgum, Sheikh Suleiman Wadriff, and Muslim Chief Kadhi of Gulu, Sheikh Musa Khalil. Their intervention sought to draw from their moral and religious power, neutrality, and extensive organizational anchor of churches, parishes, and mosques. By most estimates 90 per cent of the Acholi belong to one of the three religious faiths, furnishing the leadership with strategic institutional networks to mobilize for peace and reconciliation.

Attempts to bring together the three major religions under the umbrella of the ARLPI are a departure from the legacy of religious polarization and partisanship. Like the rest of the country, the north inherited a pattern of close institutional affiliation between religious groups and political parties, notably the association of the Catholics with the Democratic Party (DP) and the Anglicans with the Uganda People's Congress (UPC). This sectarianism was exacerbated by Idi Amin's efforts to promote Islam as the dominant religion throughout the 1970s. Although Museveni launched a campaign against sectarianism starting in 1986, these divisions remained salient to political life. By transcending the inherited institutional divisions, the ARLPI views its organizational framework as a major phase in anti-sectarianism, not just in the north, but the rest of country.

The ARLPI's intervention sought to break the institutional and leadership impasse over the conflict. Except for the abortive peace talks conducted by Betty Bigombe, the Museveni government had been committed to use force to end the rebellion. The LRA's inchoate objectives, its brutality, and links to the Sudan government strengthened the government's pursuit of a military solution. At the height of militarization of the conflict, 1995-1997, there was a steady deterioration in the relationships between the civilians and the military in Acholiland, and between Acholiland elected leaders and the central government in general. This deterioration was inextricably linked to widespread claims of military heavy-handedness in dealing with the insurgency and the local people's perception that the government was not doing enough to confront some of the grievances behind the rebellion. Furthermore, in March 1997, a government-controlled parliamentary committee on defense and internal security voted to escalate the military campaign against the LRA.

The leadership vacuum was heightened by the fragmentation within the Acholi community that prevented a consistent voice that would articulate and aggregate the collective demands. Although the government had made efforts to incorporate segments of the Acholi in the NRM structures, in light of the history of north-south mistrust, there was a perception that these leaders were compromised. Moreover, as the NRM gradually allowed the resumption of political activities, a deep gulf emerged between Acholi elected members of parliament (MPs) and government ministers and

local state agencies. In the absence of clear leadership, the ARLPI seemed ready to fill the vacuum as a locus of community leadership and a bridge-builder between the Acholi and central government.

In the broad mandate as a bridge-builders coalescing around a crisis that had resonance to the community, the ARLPI intervention focused on short -and long- term objectives. In the short-term, the initiative sought to mobilize local and national leaders, the Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international community to find a mediated solution to the rebellion. Through these collaborative efforts, the religious leaders would provide the leadership that would forge the community consensus to promote and coordinate efforts for reconciliation and help to foster a culture of dialogue. The ARLPI saw the ending of the civil strife as the essential precondition for the long-term of objectives that encompassed the comprehensive mobilization of resources to deal with the multiple problems of post-conflict reconstruction, social justice, and economic development to redress the marginalization of the north.

Preliminary discussions to foster common approaches to peace began in Kitgum between June and August 1997 organized by Anglican and Catholic leaders. These efforts culminated in joint prayer for peace by Christians and Muslims on August 15 under a new organization, the Joint Justice and Peace. This organization issued a message that proposed peaceful approaches to the war and condemned the government's policy of establishing protected camps. By January 1998, these initiatives spread to Gulu, resulting in a joint meeting of religious leaders from both districts. To provide organizational framework to the initiative, the religious leaders appointed Bishop Onon-Onweng as the coordinator who would liaise with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and other donors for funding of peace initiatives. The ARLPI formally constituted itself in February 1998 by appointing a five-member task force to oversee its functions.

A decisive breakthrough for the ARLPI was a meeting with President Museveni on March 8, 1998, in which the leaders presented a memorandum, **A Call for Peace and an End to Bloodshed in Acholiland** that marked the formal inauguration of the intervention. Its immediate objective was to contribute to the process of establishing peace and stability in Acholiland through effective mediation, consensus building, participatory involvement of all the parties, and cessation of hostilities. In engaging the Museveni government, the ARLPI's point of departure was forgiveness and reconciliation, the centerpiece of the campaign for peaceful approach to the conflict. Key actors in the ARLPI claim that a reluctant Museveni was forced to concede the message of reconciliation when they reminded him that even God forgives sinners. They also credit Museveni for acknowledging the concerns of the ARLPI, marking a significant departure from the past practice of militarism. Presidential imprimatur to the intervention was a critical first step in building confidence and acknowledgement of the centrality of alternative institutional avenues for engagement. More important, national recognition bolstered the ARLPI's position in the eyes of local government actors, in

particular the Local Councils and military authorities, which were to become partners in the peace initiatives.

Legitimized at both the national and local levels, the ARLPI through funding from the UNDP embarked on a series of activities to promote peace. The UNDP's Director in Uganda, Babatunde Thomas, was major player in the formative stages of coordination of funding for the ARLPI. As part of the agreement with the UNDP, the ARLPI obtained annual funds for its activities disbursed over three-months periods. These funds were targeted specifically to holding workshops, meetings, and travel to establish contacts with the LRA and its allies.

In June 1998, the ARLPI organized a three-day consultative meeting, **Bedo Piny**, in Gulu under the theme of Active Community Participation in Healing, Restoration, and Development. This meeting brought together a broad spectrum of leaders from government, parliamentarians, military, and NGOs to focus on practical approaches to ending the war and reflect on future strategies to meet the challenges of poverty and underdevelopment. Building on the momentum generated by the meeting with the president, the meeting sought to commit the government and Acholi leadership to a sustained peace initiative that would depart from the previous erratic efforts. This meeting was innovative because it constituted a soul-searching reflection on the diagnosis and prescriptions of the civil conflict. The ARLPI structured the discussions around four central themes: the causes of the insurgency; the causes of its persistence; impact on Acholiland; and measures all parties needed to take to address its end.

On the genesis of the conflict, the meeting gave participants the opportunity for an open debate on the NRM's role in alienating the Acholi through its initial policy of impunity, destruction of civilian property, and the vilification of the Acholi. There was, however, acknowledgement a large part of the animosity stemmed from a leadership vacuum among the Acholi, a vacuum that had been filled inadvertently by the rebels. On the continuation of the war, discussion focused on the linkage between the government's support of the SPLA and Sudan's continued destabilization of Acholiland through reciprocal support for the LRA. A major criticism of the military efforts expended on the war effort highlighted the low morale of the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and inadequate commitment of resources to end the insurgency. Most participants also criticized the government for its failure to listen to local community 's view about ways to resolve the conflict.

The **Bedo Piny** proposed a number of recommendations: there was no military solution to the insurgency; efforts should be made to bring the LRA and the government to the negotiating table; an olive branch should be extended to the Joseph Kony and his combatants; parliament should enact an Amnesty Law to pave the way for dialogue and reconciliation; efforts should be made to win the hearts and minds of people in the areas of insurgency; Uganda and Sudan should begin negotiations to resume diplomatic relations; religious leaders, Acholi MPs, NGOs and all other social forces should continue to exert pressure on the government and rebels to listen to the concerns of the people; and religious leaders should begin a massive program of

sensitization to promote awareness of the benefits of peace. The consultative meeting also gave a mandate to the ARLPI to engage the United Nations system and other foreign donors in the quest for a comprehensive and lasting solution to the northern insurgency.

The June consultative forum established the legitimacy of the ARLPI as an essential interlocutor in the conflict, solidifying the gains accruing from Museveni's recognition of its role. In addition, the forum mandated the ARLPI to work with the Acholi in the Diaspora for the restoration of peace and stability. Comprising a motley of actors with different political persuasions, most of the Acholi in exile have had strained relations with the Museveni government. The history of mistrust between most of the exiles and the NRM had for long precluded meaningful dialogue on northern issues. The emergence of religious leaders as a force peace and reconciliation presented an opportunity to reach out to the exiles constituted since 1997 as the **Kacoke Madit (KM),** the convention of Acholi Diaspora. What has emerged is a reciprocal relationship of mutual engagement between the KM and ARLPI. Conscious of its limits to influence events on the ground, the exiles have appreciated the importance of drawing on local partners to help in forging new approaches to the plight of Acholiland. For its part, the ARLPI has engaged the exiles because of the resource scarcity and the imperative of borrowing power from the e wider international community. Tapping into the economic and political resources of the exiles has allowed the ARLPI to deligimitize external supporters of the LRA in exile by sensitizing them about the scale of the rebel atrocities. Local participants describe the London meeting as an eye-opener to the LRA's external supporters particularly in listening to accounts of atrocities against children. In starting a dialogue about the multifaceted problems of the north, this collaborative relationship has laid the foundation for common approaches to long-term goals of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Furthermore in establishing links with the Acholi exiles, the ARLPI has given the government an entry point into a critical Acholi constituency.

To underscore this growing relationship, the ARLPI sent a delegation of eight people to participate in the KM conference in London in July 1998 to present the recommendations of the **Bedo Piny** and solicit complementary support from the Acholi in the diaspora. This meeting recommended that the LRA and government enter into a cease-fire as a preliminary step to a dialogue facilitated by a third party; appealed to the LRA to stop abductions, killings, and destruction of property; urged the Uganda parliament to rescind the March 1997 regarding the use of military force to resolve the conflict; called upon all the Acholi to promote peace, forgiveness, and reconciliation; and called upon the government to normalize relations with Sudan.

To provide continuity to the initiative and with the objective of creating new relationships, the ARLPI organized a high-level meeting with the Resident District Commissioners (RDCs), Local Council chairs, and MPs from both district in September 1998 under the theme of "Come Let's Rebuild." The meeting dealt at length with approaches to meeting human rights abuses and atrocities in conflict. It also gave the government, through the Minister in Charge on Northern Rehabilitation, a chance to reiterate the commitment to upholding the ongoing comprehensive dialogue on the civil

war. This meeting formally requested the ARLPI, as an impartial body, to spearhead the broad-based campaign of peace education and sensitization under the framework of Community Peace-Building Program. Its centerpiece was the conscious process of actively involving the community to effectively participate in healing, restoration, reconciliation, peace, and development.

Implementation of the Intervention

The Uganda Parliament passed an Amnesty Act in November 1999, reversing the previous resolution to use military force in dealing with the LRA. The Act was set in motion by President Museveni's indication in July 1998 that he would accept a ceasefire with the rebels. The ARLPI regards the passage of the Amnesty Act as its major contribution to the search for peace. Although the mobilization for the Amnesty Act was a collective effort including the Acholi Parliamentary Group (APG) and the KM, the specific contribution of the ARLPI was to advocate for a blanket amnesty on the premise of forgiveness and healing: "We have forgiven Kony, why not the government?" This question, which became the ARLPI's clarion call, lent credibility to the consistent yearning for reconciliation. The call for a comprehensive amnesty forced the hands of the government. The Amnesty Act reflects the consensus that despite the suffering, a blanket amnesty is the only means of delivering a settlement that would also restore the role of traditional institutions in reconciliation and healing for sustainable peace.

For the ARLPI, the Amnesty Act defines their moment of triumph, beginning subsequent bids to expand its institutional roles, sharpen its focus, and build new alliances and institutions. The phase beyond the Amnesty is also a test case for intra-organizational unity and sense purpose in the face of grappling with the intermediate objectives of building peace across the community. Consistent with mandate accorded to it by the September 1998 meeting, the ARLPI embarked on systematic advocacy for peace through sensitization campaigns conducted at all levels of society. These campaigns have utilized existing religious structures of propagation and dissemination within the ARLPI framework, particularly the places of worship. Some of the campaigns have involved joint meetings, but individual institutions have conducted most of them. The Catholic Church, whose central Archdiocese in Gulu covers both districts, for instance, uses the parish priests as the vehicles for the dissemination of peace. The Anglican Church, a much more decentralized institutions, employs the bishops at the county and sub-county levels. Although a minority in Acholiland, Muslims in Gulu and Kitgum have rallied their adherents through the mosques.

A key component of the sensitization campaign has been the training of Volunteer Peace Animators (VPAs), local actors at the forefront of the peace-building program. This program began in March 1999 with training in various sub-counties under the guidance and supervision of the local religious leaders, working closely with the local council leaders (LCIII), and NGOs. Their roles include: promotion of the understanding, implementation, and consequences of the Amnesty Law as an instrument of reconciliation and building peace; facilitation of participatory dialogue on issues of conflict and peace; catalysts for non-violence, peace, and reconciliation; organization of community peace workshops; linking the "community peace-building" program activities with the sub-county chiefs and LCIII program, as well as other efforts and organizations working in the promotion of justice, human rights, reconciliation, and community development.

By August 2000, the ARLPI had trained 60 VPAs, corresponding to the sub-counties in Gulu and Kitgum. The VPAs have, in turn, formed the bedrock for sub-county peace committees, groups of people from local communities who come together frequently to: resolve specific conflicts between individuals and groups; help communities to discover root causes of conflicts and develop strategies to avoid violent conflicts; foster improved gender relations; promote collaborative action in peace building. The training component of the program has been funded almost exclusively by the Mennonite Central Committee, which became engaged in the ARLPI's activities in January 1999. The Mennonites have ensured that the proper training for the VPAs; organized seminars for the staff of the ARLPI on basic approaches to conflict resolution at community levels; sponsored an ARLPI program director to a summer program at the Eastern Mennonite College, Virginia, and another one at a Mennonite college in Mindolo, Zambia. As major actors in the training program, the Mennonites as a sister faith-based organization have helped boost the capacity of the peace campaigns. Without their assistance, the successes garnered to date may not have occurred.

Although the training program is important in enhancing the ability of the ARLPI to sustain its initiatives, it faces the challenge stemming from limited resources and understaffing. With one program director in Gulu, an assistant in Kitgum, and three office workers, the ARLPI operates on a shoestring budget. Since September 2000, the UNDP stopped funding the ARLPI's activities, leading to a frantic search for new sources of assistance. In the fall 2000, the ARLPI submitted a $336, 0000 proposal to donors seeking to expand the training and peace building programs under the rubric of "capacity building and relationship building." At the completion of its wide-ranging activities in 2003, the proposal envisages establishing permanent leadership and peace-building training program; empowering religious leaders; training 2 VPAs in each sub-county; and integrating peace-building activities in youth and women's programs.

Training for peace has been accompanied by the ARLPI's assumption of an advocacy role on questions of human rights violations and justice. As some of the rebels and abducted children responded to the government amnesty, the ARLPI became a buffer between them and state authorities. Advocacy has forced the ARLPI to deliberately engage the local officials and, at times, petitioning of the president and other national leaders, on security questions. For instance, most of the petitions to local officials in 1999 and 2000 dealt with concerns about the military's mistreatment of returning rebels and children. Furthermore, as the security situation deteriorated following systematic attacks of Acholi by Karamajong cattle rustlers in early 2000, the ARLPI sent memorandum to government officials warning of the dangers of arming civilians and the alleged collaboration of some security officials with the Karamajong raiders.

In another landmark meeting to publicize its role while building new alliances, the ARLPI jointly organized a forum on Peace Research and Reconciliation Agenda with a local NGO, the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD) in September 1999. Funded by Christian AID, the forum invited religious leaders from

conflict-ridden regions in Karamoja, Teso, Lango, and West Nile to showcase the ARLPI's ecumenical experiment.

Following the September 1999 meeting, three of the ARLPI's leaders made a visit to the U.S. under the sponsorship of the Episcopal Church of Washington D.C. In meetings with a cross-section of government, members of congress, and U.N. officials, they mobilized international attention on four themes: the release of the estimated 14,000 abducted children; strengthening the Amnesty Law so that it should have in-built mechanisms for demobilization and monitoring compliance by all the major players; dialogue and reconciliation between Sudan and Uganda; international support for resettlement, reconstruction; and development. The ARLPI leadership views the U.S. trip as a decisive event in raising their international visibility. In other efforts to build regional ties, the ARLPI has reached out to religious leaders from southern Sudan in an attempt to share experiences, promote dialogue, and explore opportunities for building working relationships across the border the ARLPI. A mid-September 2000 between the ARLPI and Sudanese religious groups aborted because of the outbreak of the Ebola virus in Gulu.

Impact of the Intervention

Government responsiveness to the ARLPI was instrumental in jumpstarting the peace initiatives, laying the background for a working relationship between the central government and local actors. At the national level, there has been a marked improvement in the discourse about the north, which previously castigated all Acholi for the insurgency. During a visit to Gulu in June 2000, President Museveni apologized for the continued insecurity in the region and vowed to devote more resources on security and development in the north: "I am sorry about the continuing problems of insecurity... I have completely subdued my anger on Kony with his LRA soldiers in the interest of Ugandans and signed the Amnesty Bill, which is already in place now for all the rebel groups still fighting the Government of Uganda. So let us see whether the Bill will work to restore an everlasting peace in this country." Regular presidential visits have also gone a long way toward overcoming the previous stance that the northern problem was essentially an Acholi problem.

The Minister of State for Northern Uganda Rehabilitation has also acknowledged that the intervention has altered the overall behavior of the government and its organs, including the military and security forces in their relations with society as a whole. The sustained attention toward the peace process has, in turn, began to significantly reduce the perception of government marginalization of the north and the siege mentality that had characterized the Acholi community. Part of the attitudinal change has been the incorporation of local level peace-building and conflict resolution in the second phase of the NURP. The overall objective of the new program is "support a comprehensive war to peace transition process through various methods in a region affected by conflict and chronic underdevelopment while maintaining the pace set by NURP I."

Central government responsiveness has forced the local institutions such as the LCs, the Resident District Commissioners (RDCs), and the military to recognize the essential contribution of ARLPI to the peace process. In the context of 15 years of animosity, and the ongoing civil war, the improvement in the working relationships between civilian and military leaders in Acholiland cannot be underestimated. Dialogue, born of appreciation of the comparative institutional advantage, is a major behavioral change flowing from the intervention of the ARLPI.

The most important institutions created in the post-Amnesty period are the Kitgum Joint Peace Forum (KJFP), and the District Reconciliation and Peace Team (DRPT) in Gulu, whose goal is to spearhead joint peace initiatives. Both bodies compromise the following actors: the ARLPI, the RDC, LCV chairs, NGOs, the military, and traditional leaders. In Gulu, the LCV chairman chairs DRPT while the KJFP is chaired by the RDC. Although created to disseminate information about the Amnesty Act, these institutions have become the forum for broader discussions about security in the two districts. Where previously local institutions talked past each other, now they can share information and plan joint approaches to collective concerns. Since they were formed, these institutions have addressed issues such as: organizing peace campaigns,

reintegrating former rebels into society, reuniting abducted children with their parents and relatives, and reaching consensus on broader policy goals for post-conflict reconstruction. Some of the religious leaders, citing the necessity of autonomous institutions, have complained about the leadership structures of the DRPT and KJFP, in particular the dominant roles of the RDCs and LCs. Yet these criticisms have, so far, not impaired their participation in these institutions.

Independently, leaders of the ARLPI have initiated negotiations with some of the rebels. This has been important in creating confidence and opening alternative avenues of negotiations. In April 2000, for instance, a breakaway faction of the LRA asked for pardon and requested ARLPI to reconcile them with the government. Its leader claimed that 800 former rebels based in Kenya were ready to be repatriated to Uganda if the ARLPI would provide guarantees of safety. There is also one publicized case of a rebel commander surrendering to ARLPI in Gulu. Consequently, some of the returning rebels have felt more secure surrendering to the ARLPI than the army. Independent initiatives toward the rebels are still new, and while the government has indicated that the ARLPI has a blanket authorization to enter into dialogue with the rebels, some of the local government leaders, particularly in Kitgum, seem uncomfortable with such initiatives.

Acholi institutions such as the KJPF and DRPT constitute the fulcrum for the national Amnesty Commission, which was created by parliament to implement the Amnesty Act. The functions of the Commission are: to implement the Amnesty Act; monitor the demobilization, reintegration, and resettlement of returnees; coordinate the sensitization process of the Amnesty; and promote appropriate reconciliation mechanisms. Since it took long for parliament to authorize funding for the Commission, the Commissioners revealed that they would draw most of the implementation blueprint from lessons learnt in Acholiland. They also noted that they were contemplating replicating Acholi institutions in other parts of the country where the Amnesty Act applies.

USAID and the Belgian governments have funded the peace campaigns of the DRPT and KJFP, reflecting their interest in peaceful approaches to the civil war. It also speaks to the recognition of the centrality of collective institutions in meeting the myriad challenges produced by the civil war. The Belgians have also funded the revival of Acholi traditional leaders through the anointment of chiefs. There is a consensus about the need to revitalize cultures and traditions which gave elders and clan leaders authority in fostering strong family units, parental care, harmony and reconciliation in the community. The role of traditional leaders is also central in the Amnesty process, as the returning rebels need to be cleansed through traditional practices. The ARLPI has invoked the compatibility of Acholi traditional beliefs with biblical injunctions to dramatize the synergy of institutional roles. Thus they have lobbied for the empowerment of traditional chiefs as complementary partners in building peace. In Gulu, for instance, the paramount chief, working alongside the ARLPI, played a role in the reconciliation between the Local Council leaders and members of parliament.

The Acholi parliamentary group (APG) is absent from the emerging district institutions. This absence is tied fundamentally to growing conflicts over roles and positions, which

stem from the ARLPI's institutionalization. The APG supported the ARLPI's initial objectives of finding ways to end the rebellion and promote reconciliation. From the perspective of the APG, these were manageable goals that coincided with the routine institutional mandate of religious leaders. Problems have arisen, however, because the APG is wary of the multiplication of the ARLPI's roles as it wades into the uncharted waters of development and reconstruction. Over time, the APG perceives the religious leaders as potential source of competition and diminution of its legitimate role as the people's voice. The criticisms made against the ARLPI by the APG members is that the religious leaders began with good intentions to end the war, but have now gradually "politicized" the organization and become an institution on the lines of an NGO. In addition, they claimed that the ARLPI wants to usurp their positions as genuine leaders: "why should we be invited by religious leaders to peace meetings, we are the people's representatives?"

Growing institutional tensions might reflect turf battles that are inevitable in the teething phases of articulating new roles and positions. Yet there are two dimensions to the institutional tensions that deserve attention. The first, inextricably tied to national politics, proceeds from the perception among some MPs that although the ARLPI has evolved as alternative entry point for the government to north, this has come about without significant alteration in the NRM's approach to the civil war or the wider problem of northern economic and political marginalization. With the polarization of national politics along the Movement and Multiparty-divide, Acholi MPs (most who are multiparty activists) have less trust for the NRM. They claim the government's peace overtures are half-hearted since the continuation of the war benefits army commanders. Moreover, they contend, the NRM prefers the status quo because then it can use the war to justify the continuance of the Movement system. These criticisms have been extended to the donor-funded peace mobilization campaigns led by KJPF and DRPT which the MPs claim target people who might have relatively little control over the rebels, reinforce collective guilt of the Acholi, and have a narrow focus. These campaigns, they contend, are opportunities for local leaders to use donor funds for personal ends.

The second dimension has a local flavor and is tied to intra-Acholi leadership feuds. It stems from the APG's concerns about its leadership position being usurped. There is also fear by some MPs that in the long term the ARLPI might become launching pads for political careers. This view finds articulation in the claim that the religious leaders would be more effective using their existing institutions rather than creating new umbrella ones such as the ARLPI. This aspect of the conflict is equally bound to have implications for donor funding since some in the APG attribute the ARLPI's institutional evolution to donor resources. Hence they criticize the ARLPI for mobilizing donor funding by charging that these efforts overstep the "original modest, but well-intentioned priority of peace." Similar criticisms are made of the role of donors in the anointment of traditional chiefs, a process that critics deride as misguided since the traditional leaders might not to be effective in the modern context of war and cultural change.

As the ARLPI has broadened its limited mandate from peace and reconciliation into a more institutional role, it has increasingly began to look like a permanent pressure

group serving as the eyes and conscience of the local community. From its new year's messages exhorting against alcoholism and laziness to petitions to local authorities about human rights violations, the ARLPI has demonstrated its growing clout over a wide array of issues affecting the community. In the pastoral message of January 2000, for instance, the ARLPI used the occasion to denounce the alleged practice by military authorities of conscripting former abducted children into the Local Defense Units (LDUs), charging that these "children need to recover from past experiences. They should be completely demobilized and demilitarized."

The ARLPI acknowledges that it has not been effective with respect to the pressing issue of protected camps. As early as October 1997, the ARLPI published a statement against the protected camps policy because it was initially forced on the people and since these camps breed diseases and foster economic dependency. Subsequently, individual leaders have continued to oppose it. But there is not much the ARLPI can do in the face of escalating rebel attacks. In addition to fears about alienating local authorities and the central government, critical partners in the peace initiative, the ARLPI confronts the dilemma of proposing viable alternatives to the protected camps, particularly when people returning to their homes become more vulnerable to rebel attacks.

Contextual and Situational Conditions

The problems posed by the institutionalization of the ARLPI belie the real obstacles to restoring peace and stability in Gulu and Kitgum. The new actors and processes that have been in place since 1997 have introduced a dynamic that marginalizes military approaches to the conflict, yet their future viability is depended, for the most part, on generating some visible successes on the security front. Although the Amnesty Act was a momentous government concession designed to attract the rebels out of the bush, few rebels have responded positively to it. In Gulu, since 40 rebels surrendered in response to the Amnesty in December 1999 there have been few rebel returnees. Instead, the Amnesty has been largely an avenue for abducted children to return to their homes. Some local officials believe that more rebels would surrender once the government's Amnesty Commission establishes the economic packages of resettlement and demobilization. But Kony repudiated the Amnesty in February 2000, telling his fighters to burn all copies of the amnesty law and kill all government agents and collaborators. As a result, the increasing insecurity, rebel abductions of children, and the closure of the main transport arteries in the region remains a major challenge to the religious leaders as they grapple with issues of peace building.

Part of the lukewarm response to the Amnesty by the rebels results from the history of mistrust. While the ARLPI has tried to allay the fear of returning about retribution, there are past publicized cases of the disappearance of returnees. More recently, widespread reports of the army inducting former abducted children into its structures do not often help the sell the Amnesty. Kony, the prize target of the amnesty, sees it as an asymmetrical instrument in the hands of a government that has not met most of his demands.

In attempts to deal with the regional dimensions of the conflict, Uganda and Sudan engaged in negotiations in Nairobi under the mediation of the Carter Center. In December 1999, they signed a peace agreement in which they agreed to renounce the use of force to resolve differences and to stop aiding or condoning rebel activities based in either country. Although the agreement presented an opportunity for the parties to find a solution to the conflict between the LRA and the government, both sides were not entirely committed to it. Besides, the LRA did not participate in the talks and Kony promptly denounced the accord. Following the signing of the agreement, a new LRA incursion in Gulu and Kitgum shattered a period of relative peace and stability. Local leaders claim that these rebels are responsible for the ongoing mayhem in the region, including the murder of Kitgum's RDC in July 2000 and a spate of new abductions.

The ARLPI has consistently held the position the Uganda government ought to resume diplomatic relations with Sudan and both the SPLA and the LRA need to be represented at the negotiating table for a comprehensive solution to the problem of the north. Frustrated at being sidelined in bilateral negotiations, the ARLPI has urged for a more substantive role in the efforts by the Carter Center to revive the Sudan-Uganda

negotiations. It is yet to be determined whether the Uganda government would countenance to inclusion of the LRA and SPLA in bilateral negotiations Khartoum. Religious leaders are demanding a voice in the macro-political context of the conflict, a role that the government might be less willing to concede. Should the ARLPI win a place at the negotiating table on bilateral questions, this might be a good measure of the expanding power of religious leaders.

Lessons Learned and Conclusions

The ARLPI is an innovative experiment in cross-confessional mobilization defying the history of sectarianism in the north and Uganda in general. As an experiment in inter-faith collaboration, it has thus far effectively used its ecumenical pedestal to agitate for a peaceful approach to the civil conflict. The ARLPI's experience of religious collaboration around an issue-area is now the standard model observers prescribe to other crisis-ridden regions such as Karamoja, Langi, and Western Uganda. Track II local efforts have a dual-face: their autonomous origin is critical in sustaining their credibility, yet they cannot endure without a supportive central government. In conflicts such as Acholiland, the central government is important in tying the hands of local recalcitrant officials who may be less receptive to alternative approaches to conflict resolution. Local state actors need direction from central government to appreciate the contributions of middle level actors such as the ARLPI. But when such actors participate in creating new institutions with government actors, they risk compromising their autonomy.

The ambiguous relationship between Track II actors and state officials is inevitable in light of the complementary roles spawned by the challenges of seeking outcome s to civil conflicts. The religious leaders and their allies have shamed the government into doing things that it might not necessarily want, but such efforts need to be sustained by responsive national and local contexts. Autonomy is, therefore, not a zero-sum phenomenon since Track II efforts ultimately operate within the opportunities and constraints of larger political contexts. Realistically, local peace-building efforts are aptly perceived as complementary, rather than competitive to national and regional initiatives.

Middle level community track II efforts work better when they focus on narrow issue-areas such as peace and reconciliation, which generate broad consensus and are easy to mobilize opinion around. The question of focus is tied to one of role multiplication that generates the need for institutionalization. The dilemma, however, is that even focusing on narrow issues requires a modicum of institution building, which the ARLPI has had to do. As these roles multiply, local actors are forced to create more elaborate organizational structures. This explains the emergence of institutional conflicts, as the ARLPI takes on a life larger than what some of its supporters envisaged.

Perhaps one way out of the problem of role multiplication and institutionalization is for such organizations to articulate clearly their missions from the outset. For faith-based institutions in conflicts, it is also critical to define their relations with other existing institutions. The long-term mission of the ARLPI has yet to be effectively articulated to the lower rungs of the religious hierarchy, creating the impression at present, that the initiative is led and driven by few individuals. Potential intra-organizational problems might arise without a conscious attempt to define its future vis-à-vis its targets and constituencies.

Long-term efficacy of such track II efforts is depended on addressing the broader causes and sources of the civil conflict. In the face of continuing conflict, the ARLPI role needs to be seen more realistically as essential halfway house between national and regional initiatives. The persistent question the ARLPI obtains from the people in Acholiland is: Where is the Peace? It underscores the dilemma of advocating for a peace that seems to lie with parties beyond the reach of local actors. Religious leaders will be even more pertinent in the post-conflict reconstruction phase as they purvey the message of healing and reconciliation to a traumatized society

The ARLPI's core activities, education and training of PVAs, plus peace advocacy, need increased and consistent funding. Funding that strengthens the institutional capacity of the ARLPI is necessary to meet its growing roles and to build a lean, competent, and professional organization to oversee the work already in progress. There is also need for a better coordination of the ARLPI's roles with national religious organizations. In addition, institutionalization of the ARLPI needs to be accompanied by more transparency and accountability.

Funding of activities auxiliary to the institutional mission of the ARLPI such as the peace campaigns is bound to compromise the core activities of the ARLPI, reduce its institutional credibility and hamper future mobilization efforts. Peace campaigns epitomize the ARLPI's institutional outreach and collaboration, but they might dent its image, particularly when donor funds are not spent appropriately. The proliferation of proposals for donor funding for peace efforts that replicate the ARLPI's roles represents a troubling spiral of competitive bidding, particularly since most of the proposals are from organizations with tenuous links to the community or the major actors in the conflict.

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2. Justice P. K. Onega, Chairman, Amnesty Commission
3. Hajj Burhani Miro, Member, Amnesty Commission
4. J. J. Otim, Presidential Agricultural Adviser
5. John J. Oloya, Rural Development Specialist, The World Bank, Kampala
6. Betty Oyella Bigombe, Social Scientist, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
7. Ronald Reagan Okumu, MP Aswa County, Gulu
8. Robert Mao, MP Gulu Municipality
9. John Okello-Okello, MP Chua County, Kitgum
10. Rt. Rev. Nelson Onono-Onweng, Coordinator, ARLPI, Northern Uganda Diocese
11. Rt. Rev. MacLeod Baker Ocholla, Bishop of Kitgum Diocese
12. John Okello, Kitgum Diocese
13. Imam Musa Khalil, Acting District Khadi, Gulu
14. Shafi Suleiman Ndehia, Deputy District Khadi, Kitgum
15. Msgr. Mathew Odongo, Vicar General, Gulu Archdiocese
16. Father Josef Gerner, Kitgum Catholic Mission
17. Father Mario Castro, Kitgum Catholic Mission
18. Lt. Col. George Magara, UPDF Spokesman, Gulu Barracks
19. Lt. Col. Walter Ochora, Local Council-V Chairman, Gulu
20. Geoffrey Okello, Deputy Resident District Commissioner, Gulu
21. John Bosco Oryem, Local Council-V Chairman, Kitgum
22. Sylvester Opira, Deputy Resident District Commissioner, Kitgum
23. Lam Oryem Cosmas, ARLPI Secretariat, Gulu

24. Ambrose Olaa, Community Development Officer, Kitgum
25. Martin Ayielar, Kitgum Children Watch
26. Geoffrey Okoth, Project Manager, Oxfam, Kitgum
27. Jeanine Anan, AVSI (Italian International Voluntary Aid Association), Kitgum
28. Jimmy Oyella George, AVSI, Kitgum
29. Mokvach Williams, AVSI, Kitgum
30. Farida Khawaja, AVSI, Kitgum
31. John Oputtu, The Monitor Correspondent, Gulu
32. Odongo Kara, Headmaster Kitgum Primary School
33. Andrew P. K. Obol, CARITAS, Kitgum
34. Paramount Chief David Ochan II, Gulu
35. Paramount Chief William Lugai, Kitgum
36. John E. Odoki-Obol II, Assistant chief
37. Rwot Justine Acan, Assistant Chief
38. Arop Poppy Paul, local elder
39. Augustine Olara, local elder
40. Esther Mego, local elder
41. Oywak Ywakamoi, local elder

Greater Horn of Africa
Peace Building Project

Julius E. Nyang'oro

CASE STUDY THREE:

A Middle-Level Dialogue in Burundi: An Assessment of Effective Practices

March, 2001

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600 Water Street, SW, Washington, DC 20024 USA

Appendix from the Report:
The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace
A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

Contract No. GS-23F-8012H, Task Order No. 623-N-00-99-00294-00 for

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ii

Nature of Conflict and Its Causes 1

Nature of Intervention 5

Implementation of Intervention 7

Impacts of Intervention 8

The Contextual and Situational Conditions 11

Conclusions 13

Recommendations 14

References 15

Persons Interviewed 16

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The full report can be found at:
http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report.pdf
or write to peacebuilding@yahoo.com for an electronic version.

Executive Summary

Burundi, like its neighbor Rwanda, is a country that has been at war with itself. The conflict in Burundi has been going on for four decades. Since 1962 when the country became independent, there have been at least four major clashes between the Tutsi and Hutu, resulting in the death of almost one million people, with other hundreds of thousands Burundi being exiled in neighboring countries. The center of the conflict has been the struggle for the control of the state. Control of the state determines the control and distribution of societal resources. While the fact of competition is a normal political process, the intensity of the struggle for control of the state in Burundi is also informed by the crushing poverty, which characterizes the Burundi political economy. Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world with a GNP per capita of only US $140.00.

Political conflict and poverty have had a negative effect in the evolution and development of a middle class, which is considered to be a crucial ingredient in democratic development. International attempts at mediating the conflict in Burundi has had limited success as the politicization of ethnicity and the resulting "ethnic" violence has eroded opportunities for dialogue between the two principal ethnic groups.

Intervention in the form of promoting middle level (inter-ethnic) dialogue is an initiative supported in part by USAID in Burundi. In its limited duration—less than three years—middle level dialogue has produced fairly significant results, especially in Bujumbura, the capital. Several Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) have sprung up in response to the need to promote dialogue, and have subsequently been supported by USAID. The NGOs have conducted several activities and have programs aimed at peace and reconciliation through dialogue. USAID needs to continue its support of these activities as they provide a parallel process to political level negotiations among groups who vie for state power. In essence middle-level dialogue actually "grounds" the political dialogue by concretizing it among the non-political elite, who in the long run may hold in their hands, the future of peace in Burundi.

Nature of Conflict and Its Causes

In April 1994, the eyes of the world were fixed on Rwanda as the international community watched in horror, an estimated 800,000 people perish in what has now been accepted as genocide by forces associated with the Rwanda government. By June 1994, the significance of the genocide in Rwanda had galvanized international action, leading to the establishment of an International Tribunal to investigate the Rwanda tragedy, and to bring to justice, perpetrators of the genocide. Little mentioned in the discussions about the downing of the plane carrying President Juvenal Habyarimana which was the immediate spark of the genocide in Rwanda, was the fact that on the same downed plane was the President of neighboring Burundi, Cyprien Ntayamira. Even more remarkable, is the fact that between 1972 and 1999, perhaps as many people if not more, have perished in Burundi as those who died in Rwanda during the April 1994 genocide. The significant difference between the two cases is that while the Rwanda incident was concentrated within only a few months, the killings in Burundi have been persistent for three decades, leading one author to conclude that "(t)he ethnic conflict in Burundi has become a model for an extreme version of low-intensity conflict—one where brutality, cruelty, disorganization [have reached] unparalleled heights (Abrams, 1995:153)." One major similarity in the two cases however, is that in both instances, it is the State that has instigated and perpetrated the killings; and the state's actions have been driven and justified by an ethnic ideology. In both countries, the proportion of the population by ethnicity is 15-20 percent Tutsi and 80-85 percent Hutu. These figures however, but more importantly the identification of someone as "Hutu" or "Tutsi," is full of contradictions because of the heavy intermixing of the two peoples (Lemarchand, 1996).

The use of an ethnic or race ideology to justify the oppression or killing of a group of people by another in the world has been widely documented. Perhaps the most notorious case is that of Nazi Germany where state ideology of Aryan superiority resulted in the killing of six million Jews. The Burundi case is by no means as extreme as Nazi Germany; however, the ideology of ethnic domination has been used effectively by the minority ruling Tutsi over the majority Hutu. The fact of Tutsi domination however has been a phenomenon that has evolved over time. At the root of it is the struggle to control the state, which in turn determines the distribution of resources in society. Thus the central problem in Burundi is the classic problem in political struggles: the determination of who gets what, when, and how.

The struggle for the distribution of resources and control of the state in Burundi has undoubtedly created a crisis that has defied easy solutions. This fact has informed many organizations which have been working in Burundi to create conditions for peace. International Alert, one of the organizations working in Burundi has stated:

"[t]here is no doubt that Burundi is, and has been for some considerable time, in a state of severe political crisis. There is an abundance of books, research reports and studies on different aspects of the remote and more contemporary history of recent developments in that country. An analysis of all this documentation does not provide

easy explanations for the present situation of violent conflict and bitter political recrimination. On the contrary, one of the only safe conclusions that can be reached is that the recent events and the present crisis result from an accumulation of past events, with one factor forming a building block for next, and all actors and factors interrelating and interacting in a complex manner." (1997:3)

Although the above study cautions against quick determination of the root cause(s) of the conflict in Burundi, it is quite clear that the political crisis in Burundi has as its central cause, the crushing poverty afflicting the country. In a country where the GNP per capita is US $140; with a growth rate of –3.7 percent in the last decade; and a population with a life expectancy of only 42 years (World Bank, 2000), one can expect to see an intense competition for resources. It is also to be expected that the state with its coercive capacity becomes an attractive target for groups who want to control resource distribution. The use of an ethnic ideology to justify the oppression of one group by another is thus only the next step up. This is where Burundi has been in the past 30 years.

A historical examination of the conflict in Burundi reveals that these were few violent confrontations between Tutsi and Hutu until a little more than 30 years ago. As many studies have shown (Lemarchand, 1970; 1996; Malkki, 1995; Weissman, 1998), when German colonists arrived near the end of the 19th century, Burundi was a long established decentralized kingdom. The principal political rivals were not "Hutu" or "Tutsi" but rather members of a small royal group, the ganwas or "princes of the blood." Although the predominately pastoral Tutsi benefited more from the extensive patron-client system than the mainly agricultural Hutu, the two groups inhabited the same lands, spoke the same language, shared a largely common culture an often intermarried. Despite an overall distinction in social status, their economic circumstances were often quite similar. Even status differences were subject to qualification. Some Hutu clans were very influential, furnishing the ganwas with many of their advisers, managers, religious authorities, and local deputies. And certain Tutsi clans were forbidden to enter the king's court. Generally speaking, regional and family identities appear to have been more central to traditional Burundi politics than ethnic ones.

It was under the influence of colonialism that ethnic ties became more salient. Centralization and modernization eroded old identities based on locality, kinship, and dynastic rule. Moreover, Belgium's colonial takeover after World War I produced authoritarian manipulations of the ganwa system that made it less able to satisfy its Hutu constituents. At the same time, Belgian educational, cultural, and administrative policies promoted the social advance of the "noble" Tutsi over Hutu.

As elsewhere in Africa, the transition to independence spawned a struggle for power among politico-ethnic elites who gravitated toward authoritarianism. But nowhere was the conflict as stark as in overpopulated Rwanda and Burundi where just two groups, with radically different populations and social statuses, confronted one other. There was hope that Burundi might avoid the worst because its ethnic dichotomies were less

extreme than those of its "false twin," Rwanda. But Burundi's politics was heavily influenced by the sudden, Belgian-abetted rise of Hutu power in independent Rwanda, a power that literally drove much of the Tutsi population out of Rwanda. In 1963, Burundi prime minister-designate Prince Louis Rwagasore—a ganwa who had brought Hutu and Tutsi together in the dominant UPRONA (Union for National Progress) party — was assassinated by political rivals. After that, the political process unfolded with the fatalism of a Greek tragedy.

Politico-ethnic conflict centered in the urban elite, led to the assassination and wounding of two more prime ministers. In 1965, when it appeared that the Tutsi side had seized the upper hand, some Hutu officers and politicians attempted a violent coup. This led to the first ethnic pogroms, including the liquidation of almost the entire Hutu political elite. It also ushered in a long series of military-based governments. After another more serious Hutu armed challenge in 1972, the regime murdered 100,000 to 200,000 people in three months, a "selective genocide," that targeted educated Hutu (Lemarchand, 1996:76-84).

The recurrent pattern of Burundi politics was now established: Political exclusion and repression generate extremist movements or resistance that propound ideologies of ethnic superiority and are willing to use indiscriminate violence against other ethnic groups. Many power-holders react in like fashion. In the process, relative moderates are either eliminated or move toward adopting more extreme agendas. "All Burundi," former UN Special Representative Ould-Abdallah has observed, "at a given moment are extremists. For a very simple reason—politics in their country has a vital stake…life and death for each person" (Weissman, 1998:5-6). After a period of restored stability in which regional, clan, and other divisions within the ruling elite come to the fore, the cycle of interethnic violence begins again.

These defining years also marked the rise of the Southern-based Tutsi military-political-business faction known as the "Bururi Lobby." Its ascendancy continues to the present day. The corrupt regime of Captain Michel Micombero was overturned in 1976 by a coup led by his cousin, Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza. Although Bagaza initially promised ethnic reconciliation and took some modernizing economic initiatives, he also pioneered new forms of repression, included a reinforcement of educational discrimination and restrictions on the dominant Catholic Church. The latter, along with moves to downsize the army and charges of government corruption, helped provoke a 1987 coup led by Major Pierre Buyoya, Bagaza's cousin and Micombero's nephew. Now, we are back to Buyoya II.

With this background, the pattern of violence in Burundi had been established. At the center of this violence was the reality of poverty and the intense elite rivalry to control the state, and hence the economic fortunes in society. And as Lund, et-al (1995:49-50) have concluded:

Before and since 1993, Burundi exhibited an unusual number of inherited and institutional factors that…have [been] identified as creating a high potential for violent

conflicts. These included, for example, a violent recent history, deeply polarized and distrustful communities, ethnicized political parties, and weak and fragmented state institutions. But while these factors laid the groundwork for the continued violent pursuit of politics, they did not make violence inevitable. What made the country repeat its past cycle of violence was the deliberate use of various forms of deadly force by members of a small largely self-appointed and self-advancing elite, acting in the name of the two main ethnic communities in their ongoing struggle for political power and material privilege.

The Lund et-al thesis on elite manipulation is amply supported by views of numerous informants I talked to in Bujumbura, between July 11-22, 2000, in a visit to Burundi for this study. The critical question though is what accounts for the fact that for over three decades, elites of both ethnic groups have succeeded in manipulating the opinion of the general population. A partial explanation can be found in the condition of the economy where poverty abounds. Under these conditions, claims by the elite of either ethnic group, that they are fighting for the common interest of the majority becomes an easy sell. But the demonizing of the "other side" and the continued insistence that the other side is interested in the complete physical elimination of its political opponents has led to the coalescing the two groups of people armed with an ethnic ideology. Rene' Lemarchand (1996) has called this process "myth-making." As he argues, mythmaking in Burundi is inextricably bound with the experience – real or anticipated – of genocide:

For the Tutsi it involves both inventing and forgetting: inventing one genocide (the 1993 killings of Tutsi) and forgetting another (the 1972 genocide of Hutu). For the Hutu, it means viewing the 1972 genocide as the most likely scenario for future apocalypses (1996: xii).

Thus part of the key to overcoming the essential psychological problem in the perception of the "other side" as a constant enemy who is ready to pounce on you at every given opportunity is to create conditions by which there is contact in the form of dialogue between groups of people, particularly the non-political elite, from both sides. The idea is both simple and profound: when there is dialogue among people who should have common interests such as peace, and socio-economic improvement, it is more difficult for the political elite to manipulate them. For the non-political elite, it is a matter of opportunity cost. Peace on the one hand means normal life where their children go to school, play in neighborhoods and opportunities for self-improvement are more apparent. Conflict on the other hand means physical insecurity, economic uncertainty and continued economic distress. The process of creating space for dialogue also points to one crucial element in the Burundi crisis. The ability of the political elite to manipulate public opinion in the country is evidence of the lack of a strong civil society to act as a buffer between the state and the rest of society. So the old adage of the crucial "middle" is even more critical in Burundi at this stage in its political development than in many other countries.

Nature of Intervention

USAID along with other international agencies have been active in pursuing a strategy of "creating space for dialogue" among non-political elite groups in Burundi. USAID has provided funding for groups such as Search for Common Ground, which are active in promoting dialogue among Burundi's non-political middle. During my visit, I spent a considerable time with one group: Compagnie des Apotres de la Paix (CAP Group) which is supported by International Alert which is in turn partly supported by USAID. Common Ground was in a leadership transition so I was not able to spend as much time as I did with CAP. The operational objectives of International Alert in Burundi are principally to encourage and facilitate dialogue between political and ethnic antagonists, as a necessary prelude to ending violent conflict and furthering peaceful exchange. It aims to accomplish these objectives by enhancing the capacity of Burundi in peace making, by strengthening the knowledge and skills of individuals, and the capacities of groups and organizations, to work for a just and durable peace. One of the activities supported by International Alert is CAP.

CAP emerged from an early study-tour to South Africa in 1996 by influential political adversaries and other senior figures in Burundi. Members of the study-tour included members of parliament, judges, military officers and others. The idea of the study-tour to South Africa was to demonstrate to the antagonists in Burundi that peace and reconciliation was possible even in the most difficult circumstances. South Africa was an excellent example of this view. The transition from apartheid to a democratic regime in South Africa had succeeded because all parties to the conflict were willing to move forward and create conditions for peace. The assumption was that if it could be done in South Africa, it could also be done in Burundi. The key though, lay in the attitude of the elite. The various group elites in South Africa had managed to largely convince their constituents that there would be room for everybody in a new and democratic South Africa and so compromise was necessary. Without compromise, South Africa would go down in flames with everybody in it. The compromises were made and South Africa is a living successful example of political compromise.

Upon their return to Burundi, most of the members in the study-tour formed CAP with the idea of forging an inter-ethnic dialogue among the elite, and to bring the idea of compromise and dialogue to the general public. CAP now comprises of about fifty active members. In terms of their activities, a few examples should suffice:

April – July 1998, an Executive Committee member and the Coordinator attended the Responding to Conflict (RTC) ten-week training course in Birmingham, UK.

During 1998, CAP organized a number of conferences in Bujumbura, one in May 1998 on the South African experience of transition

August 1998, CAP organized a public forum on the status of the Arusha negotiations

While in Bujumbura, I attended a function organized by CAP. The function was a Friday evening social at one of the local neighborhood eateries. Both Hutu and Tutsi attended the function, although the majority of the attendees were clearly Tutsi. The significance of the social was that in the recent historical past, Hutu and Tutsi rarely met socially. The social distance has actually contributed to the problem of "mythmaking" and "demonizing" the other side. The theory, and indeed the practical implications of the socials is that after sharing a meal or drink, people begin to talk about what is really important to them – safe neighborhoods, good schools, good clinics – and this leads to the realization that people from both sides face similar problems. Thus, resolving those problems begins to assume a priority, which otherwise they would lack under conditions of conflict. More importantly, these groups begin to see that there is more to be gained by cooperating than in conflict. It was therefore truly remarkable at the mentioned function when the dozen or so people gathered reacted in a collective dismay at the sound of gunfire on the outskirts of the city. The time was about 7:30 P.M. Most people's simple statement was "what do these people want now?"

The rationale for choosing middle level dialogue as a basis for peacemaking and peace building is premised on the assumption that people who talk to each other are less likely to kill each other if, and when, there is a dispute. Continued contact actually opens the door for opportunities to resolve problems in a peaceful manner. Further, given the history of conflict in Burundi, and the way the political elite has manipulated the political situation to its advantage, the "crucial middle" needs to take charge of setting the political agenda. This strategy will lead to the creation of a civil society, which over time will be the basis for establishing and enhancing democratic governance.

Implementation of Intervention

In Burundi, middle level dialogue has been going on for at least three years. The impetus for the current dialogue was the study-tour of South Africa in 1996. Over and above CAP which is supported by USAID, there are other organizations such as Alert which support other initiatives such as assistance to parliamentarians (to understand their role in building democracy and fostering dialogue); support for Burundi diaspora dialogue: dialogue and debate between Barundi from inside the country and those in exile. Alert has also supported the women's peace program through grants to the Collective Women's Organizations (CAFOB). CAFOB has played an important role in two campaigns in the last two years. The first was in response to the disappointing representation of women in the new government (Buyoya II) formed after the signing of the internal partnership agreement in June 1998. The campaign could not change the composition of the new government but it influenced the later nomination of a woman as President of the Constitutional Court. The second campaign was to gain acceptance of women at the Arusha negotiations. At the June 1998 Arusha meeting, there was only one woman in one delegation (the government delegation). By mid-2000, women were in most of the dozen or so delegations in Arusha, a clear improvement over the past. At the time of my investigation, initiatives that had been undertaken regarding middle level dialogue had had an average one and a half years of implementation.

Significantly, CAP has served as a forum for a critical examination of the conflict in Burundi. The importance of such a forum is that historically, none had existed. The fact that there has never been a serious forum for the discussion of politics in Burundi speaks to perhaps the most crucial issue in Burundi; that is, the lack of an open dialogue about the causes and consequences of the conflict actually becomes a convenient way for both sides to avoid facing the reality of conflict itself. CAP has organized public forums in Bujumbura, the capital, with some of the forums being carried on radio and television. But it must be admitted that the meetings have not been frequent and have been affected to some extent by the uncertainties of the Arusha process.

Impacts of Intervention

The principal findings of the impact of middle level dialogue in Burundi are that they have an appreciable influence in bringing individuals and groups of people together to address critical questions regarding political development in Burundi. The fact that "middle class" Barundi from the two principal ethnic groups can actually sit at a table and talk about the need to resolve the decades-long political crisis; or to simply have a meal together is in itself remarkable. As Patrick Merienne of Alert stated to me, any intervention in Burundi is helpful because it creates alternatives to conflict. This was also the view of Aqnes Niyonizigiye of CAFOB. Similar to CAP's activities but with a focus on women, CAFOB organizes seminars both in Bujumbura and a few select sites outside of the capital city. Sites outside of Bujumbura create a logistical nightmare because of general insecurity in the countryside, but CAFOB is determined to bring its message to women in Burundi. All CAFOB seminars have one overriding message: the search for peace.

For CAFOB, the search for peace in Burundi must include at its core, the condition of women. Women have borne a great deal of the burden in the Burundi conflict because not only do they have to deal with historical gender inequities, but have suffered even more because a large number of men have either been killed or exiled thus forcing women to assume multiple roles in society under very trying circumstances. Further, CAFOB's message to women in general is that women must not allow themselves to be manipulated by the political elite. Women should strive for economic independence as this would give them more options in life; and they would not continue to be held hostage by government initiatives which are always politically driven as opposed to addressing the real problems of women.

In visits to all organizations listed in the annex, the message was the same: dialogue is good because it has brought together people who previously did not talk to each other. The lack of dialogue—and hence the non/misunderstanding of "the other" gave ample opportunity for political elite manipulation. The evidence of the impact is primarily that there are these identifiable groups whose express purpose is to have public discussions about the future of Burundi; and within the same context, the expression of disappointment that as a group, the "middle" has allowed itself to be manipulated by the political elite. In the case of Burundi the fact that there is even a dialogue is an indication of progress. As Patrick Merienne of Alert put it in reference to CAP: "they have talked; within the context of Burundi, this is extremely important."[3] As further evidence of positive impact, CAP members have served as important role models for others in the country. They have jointly appeared on national television and radio; and they have led public for to influence public opinion that "the other camp are not monsters."

Patrick Merienne's views were echoed by other informants: Deo Ntibayindusha, coordinator of activities at the Martin Luther King International Centre (a Peace NGO); Jean-Marie Rugira, member of parliament and deputy president of LIPABU-Burundi

Patriotic League, another peace forum; and CAFOB, the Women's Collective. Much more importantly however, is the shift in perceptions about the outcome of the broader conflict. Virtually all informants were at pains to insist that no one side will emerge as an outright winner in the current conflict. Thus, is a dire need to continue the dialogue of national reconciliation. This dialogue must be parallel to the large political dialogue of which the official Arusha talks were the pinnacle of the process. There was also and indication of the need to continue with dialogue whether the Arusha talks succeeded or failed. In other words, these middle-level groups want to move beyond their historical status of "victims" to a new status where the political elite takes note of their presence.

Having noted the positive impacts that the dialogue has brought in terms of a genesis for inter-ethnic elite contact, it is also important to recognize the limits of this approach in the context of Burundi. The political reality in Burundi is that the state is highly authoritarian, and considerably ethnically exclusivist. And within the context of Bujumbura, the number of people who have to date been part of the dialogue seem to be members of a self-select group whose congruence of views on politics in Burundi makes the dialogues an easy thing to undertake. It is essentially "preaching to the choir." Further, even through the dialogue idea seems to resonate widely in the various NGOs around Bujumbura, the number of people involved in this process is quite limited. Informants indicated that for CAP itself, there were no more than fifty identifiable individuals who have actively participated in a serious dialogue about Burundi's political past, and what needs to be done to create conditions for sustainable peace in the country for the future.

The limited number of participants in the dialogue speaks to one of the major shortcomings of this process. The other serious problem seems to be the difficulties that CAP members within Burundi have had in convincing Barundi elites outside the country that this is a worthwhile endeavor. In a lengthy interview with Dennis Nshimirana, President of CAP and also Minister of Rural Development in Burundi (and an ethnic Hutu), one of the objectives of CAP has been to bring the message of dialogue to Barundi elite exiled in neighboring African countries and in Europe. Specifically, Mr. Nshimirana said that Hutu elites specifically saw the dialogue as a ploy by the Burundi regime to show the world that the regime was willing to allow an inter-ethnic dialogue to take place, and therefore that the regime was "democratizing." In essence however, argued the exiles, the power structure in Burundi remained firmly in the hands of the Tutsi elite, and that Hutus such as Mr. Nshimirana had become agents of an oppressive regime.

As a result of the suspicions of the exiled elite, CAPs meetings in Dar es Salaam and Germany for example, where a significant number of Hutu elites live were not very successful. The meeting in Germany in 1999 for example, was a complete disaster when opposition to the presence of CAP members elicited a near riot at the meeting place. The impression that one gets from the reluctance of those in exile to accept CAP as a genuine forum for dialogue is that those in exile argue that if the regime in Burundi genuinely saw that CAP was serious about breaking up age old advantages of the current power structure in Burundi, the government would immediately quash the effort.

The fact that CAP was still operating in Burundi then implies that it is more image than substance. Talking to Mr. Nshimirana, one gets the sense that he himself realized the uphill battle that CAP has to fight to get rid of the image that the organization is actually toothless at best, and an agent of the regime at worst.

Fundamentally, the conclusion that emerges out to an analysis of an organization such as CAP is that intervention such as the one under review here would have limited impact in a political environment such as the one found in Burundi. The limits of this strategy are actually predicated on the limits imposed by history, and the political system itself. The biggest challenge in this context is to actually identify existing elite (a tall order in Burundi); once the elites have been identified, to have them participate in such dialogues. Nshimirana and other respondents constantly mentioned that over time, the biggest political problem in Burundi was that Hutu and Tutsi elite never talked to each other, and that these two segments of the elite proceeded to mobilize the population on ethnic grounds. Peasants in Burundi, so goes the argument, always lived together in communities without major problems. Peasants usually took action vis-à-vis with the other ethnic group only after they had been mobilized by the elite. Whether one accepts this argument or not, the fact that it is an argument articulated by the elite themselves is itself significant and deserves attention.

Ultimately, an assessment as whether the intervention has an impact really has to be analyzed in the context of the overall political situation in Burundi. Here the context of the negotiations to bring about political transition in Burundi has to be the overarching issue. The question has to be for example, whether CAP dialogues had an effect on negotiations in Arusha. The answer to this important question is that we do not know. But if political tensions persist in Burundi, even after the Arusha process, even though some members of CAP were delegates in Arusha, then the answer is that the middle-level dialogues under discussion here have had less impact. This assessment Is primarily dictated by two factors: first, the fact that any answer will be speculative and not based on concrete evidence; and two, the limited duration in terms of the time period the dialogue process has been underway.

Thus we have two interpretations of the impact here. For those involved in the dialogue within Burundi, the general assessment is that the dialogue is enabling the elite to begin shepherding the process of peace, playing the role of traditional civil society. On the other hand, an independent observer must come away with the sense that the jury is still out regarding this process.

The Contextual and Situational Conditions

The immediate context that informs this case is the fact that political conflict within Burundi has been a persistent feature of the political system since the country gained independence. The conflict has primarily been fueled by the struggle for power and the need to create conditions for democratic governance. Since independence, the conflict has degenerated into Tutsi versus Hutu, with the former slinging to power at all costs because of the population distribution that heavily favors the Hutu. Tutsi fear has been that any genuine democratic election would inevitably degenerate into an ethnic census, and Tutsi would always suffer at the hands of the Hutu majority. This has justified Tutsi domination of the State, and has resulted in the creation of a highly authoritarian system. Prior to 1994, the Tutsi looked at Rwanda as an example of what would happen to them if the Hutu's controlled governments. In post 1994, Tutsi control of the state in Rwanda, and the general political instability in the region provides the context in which the political crisis in Burundi has to be understood.

The larger context of the conflict in Burundi is the general crisis in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa. As John Prendergast and David Smock succinctly put it recently:

It is widely understood that the continuing conflicts in the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi are linked inextricably through cross-border insurgencies, cross-border ethnic linkages, and cross-border economic ties. The legacy of genocide—both the 1994 Rwandan genocide in which nearly a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed and the smaller, no less significant, 1972 genocide of Hutus in Burundi—and major communal massacres, such as the 1993 massacres of Tutsi in Burundi; hangs heavily over the Great Lakes region (1999:2).

Thus one of the critical issues in reconciliation in Burundi is the resolution of the larger problem that now centers on the fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in which not only forces of Rwanda and Burundi have been dispatched, but also involves the armies of Uganda, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, and the Sudan. Since 1994, Burundi has come into sharper international focus and the world community has sought to prevent another Rwanda like genocide. The most notable efforts have been through the United Nations, where the UN Secretary General has had his special representation in Bujumbura since the mid-1990s. Other international players include the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—although its role has been limited primarily by lack of resources; the United States through the President's special envoy to the Great Lakes region; and the European Union. At the heart of all these international efforts is the negotiation process in Arusha, Tanzania where a peace accord was signed in late August 2000. More than a dozen political groups—including the government of Pierre Buyoya—signed the Arusha accord although some important groups including the main Hutu rebel force had strong misgivings about the Accord, and initially refused to sign it. The principal issue of contention is power-sharing and the integration of the Tutsi

dominated army with Hutu rebels. The observation by Prendergast and Smock made a full year before Arusha still remained the key question for the success of negotiations:

Military reform is a prerequisite for peace and probably the most contentions issue between Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi. Effective reform will require opening up recruitment, integrating some of the rebel forces, demobilizing, and setting in motion a process leading to more equal representation between Hutu and Tutsi in the military (1999:16).

While these were issues that occupied a great deal of time in Arusha, and there seemed to have been an agreement accepted by a good number of delegations in Arusha, the post-Arusha political situation sees to be uncertain to determine whether the agreement will be implemented.

Conclusions

Assessing a political process, which has been underway for three years or less, is predictably, a hazardous enterprise. However, in contexts where bloody conflicts abounded before and now there seems to be less of it, something obviously must have happened to allow for such a break in the conflict to occur. In the case of Burundi, the promotion of dialogue among elite groups and individuals has been somewhat successful, particularly if we consider the overall context of the political situation in the country. To some extent, a culture of dialogue is beginning to emerge within the non-governmental world in Bujumbura, the capital. Claims of a similar culture emerging beyond Bujumbura could not be verified by the limited nature of this study. For security reasons, I could not venture beyond Bujumbura, but statements by organizations such as CAFOB and LIPABU indicated that their membership was trying to replicate in the countryside, what they were doing in Bujumbura. Furthermore, CAP was not only having some impact in Bujumbura with its weekly meetings and appearances on television and radio, but with the Burundi diaspora in the region (Tanzania and Kenya); and in Europe where most of the educated Hutu live.

The primary reason for the relative success of this initiative is that although it is financed by outside sources, the process is run by Barundi themselves. The issue of ownership of the process is extremely important, especially under conditions of historical suspicion and manipulation, which the population at large has endured over a period of forty years. The overwhelming majority of my informants indicated how useful the dialogue had been to the peace process. Some of my informants, such as Minister Denis Mshimirirana, were themselves part of delegations to Arusha and they noted how useful the dialogue inside Burundi had been in their work at Arusha. They saw Arusha as a logical extension of the internal dialogue.

Having noted the positive elements of the dialogue, it must be recognized that the process itself has its shortcomings and it is conducted among a self-select group of individuals. The principal shortcoming is that the dialogue is still an elite driven and dominated process. All my informants had decent jobs in Bujumbura and were invariably graduates of the National University in Bujumbura, or had been trained abroad. This fact can be explained by the historical reality of politics in Burundi but the dangers inherent in purely elite dialogue must be recognized early. If the biggest complaint about political development in Burundi has been elite manipulation, then the non-political elite at the center of middle-level dialogue must ensure that their effort trickles to the general population. This would give the dialogue process more legitimacy and relevance.

Recommendations

USAID should continue in its efforts to support middle level dialogue in Burundi. One of the biggest political problems in Burundi has been the lack of the crucial middle level where public sentiments could be filtered. It is crucial however, that this support be channeled through organizations that command legitimacy in the country. There are several NGOs operating in Burundi, (including Alert and Search for Common Ground), which have a reasonable understanding of the complexities of politics in Burundi. These NGOs should serve as the sounding board for any USAID effort.

USAID must avoid getting caught up in a perception of playing favorites with any group. This would undermine the efforts of dialogue and neutrality that are so important in maintaining organizational credibility. This is not to suggest however, that any serious violation of human rights and other similar transgressions should elicit a neutral response. The idea here is that once you are rightly or wrongly identified with a particular group in the complex situation of Burundi, it is difficult to disentangle yourself.

There has to be an insistence by USAID that support is for the peace-effort and not waging an ideological war, and that peace dialogue is a prerequisite for economic development.

There has to be patience on the part of those who evaluate "progress." In Burundi, where "mythmaking" and "demonization" of the "other" side has been going on for so long, success must be judged on an incremental basis, not the big bang. The fact that there is dialogue is itself success. Perhaps this is where the question of "lessons learned" need to be addressed. It is quite clear that the biggest lesson learned in Burundi is that the commitment to peacemaking has to be long-term. The process of dialogue will have to be understood as a very long proposition. There are bound to be setbacks, which mean that small steps are in themselves victories where none exist. In the larger context of the region, there are also lessons that may be applicable to the Democratic Republic of Cong, if and when serous efforts at peacemaking get underway.

Notes

1. For security reasons, my visit was confined to Bujumbura, the capital. The country had a general curfew between midnight and dawn. However, because of uncertainty and increased tension between the Burundi government and rebels, the American embassy advised its American citizens to be indoors by 10:00pm.

2. The rough English translation of Compagnie des Apotres de la Paix is "Apostles for Peace."

3. Interview notes, July 19, 2000.

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Persons Interviewed

1. Deo Ntibayindusha, Martin Luther King International Centre, Coordinator of the Centre's Activities
2. Guy-Emmanuel Ntambutso, Interpreter
3. Denis Nshimirana, Minister of Rural Development and President of CAP; Also a delegate to Arusha
4. Jean-Marie Rugira, Member of Parliament, Deputy President of LIPABU (Burundi Patriotic League)
5. Aques Niyonizigiye, Coordinator of Programs, the Association of Women's Organizations (CAFOB)
6. Rev. Juvenal Ntakarashira Peace and Reconciliation Desk, National Council of Churches of Burundi (NCCB)
7. Patrick Merienne, Alert International Representative, Bujumbura
8. Cassien Ndikwayo, Health Projects Manager, African Revival Ministries
9. The Rt. Rev. John Wesley Nduwayo, Bishop of the Episcopal Church of Burundi; Gitega Diocese, and President of the National Council of Churches of Burundi (NCCB).
10. Louis R. Putzel, Search of Common Ground, Burundi

Burundi: Chronology of Events

- 7th-10th centuries Bantu Hutu occupy present area of Rwanda/Burundi
- 15th-16th centuries Tutsi arrive in the region from the area of Ethiopia; subsequent creations of a semi-feudal socio-economic system with Tutsi predominating
- 1885 Germany formally colonizes Rwanda/Burundi; retain most of indigenous political organization
- 1916 Belgian troops occupy Burundi in World War I
- 1923 The League of Nations awards Belgium a mandate of Rwanda/Burundi; Belgians retain most indigenous institutions; Theoretically Tutsi continue to predominate but a "middle class" (ganwa) composed primarily of Tutsi with some Hutu, perform most of the administration
- 1946 Rwanda/Burundi become a United Nations Trust Territory
- 1961 September 18, elections for the National Assembly held. UPRONA headed by prince Louis Rwegasore, eldest son of the King win a sweeping victory
- 1961 October 13 Prince Rwegasore is assassinated before taking office as Premier
- 1962 June 27, the General Assembly passes a resolution calling for the establishment of two independent nations Rwanda and Burundi.
- 1962 July 1, Burundi becomes independent. Two parties are prominent: the National Progress and Unity Party (UPRONA) and the People's Party (PP). Conflict within UPRONA between Hutu and Tutsi wings lead to Hutu wing joining PP in the national Assembly
- 1965 January Hutu Prime Minister Ngendadnwe is assassinated; tension builds
- 1965 September Mwambutsa VI is succeeded by his son King Ntare V
- 1966 November 29, King Ntare is deposed by Lt. Colonel Micombero. Burundi is declared a Republic
- 1969 alleged Hutu coup attempt is unsuccessful; leading to another Hutu purge
- 1972 April, another coup attempt; civil war follows with mass murder on both sides but majority killed are Hutu; educated Hutu are systematically massacred; virtually all Hutu elements eliminated from the armed forces.
- 1976 November 1, President Micombero is overthrown in bloodless coup; succeeded by Lt. Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
- 1987 President Bagaza is overthrown by Major Buyoya
- 1988 August, There is renewed violence. The army randomly kills as many as 20,000 Hutus
- 1991 Discussions leading to "Charter of National Unity" opening the door for constitutional reform and the reemergence of competitive party politics. The army is not pleased as FRODEBU a predominantly (but not exclusively) Hutu party emerges as the leading party
- 1993 June Elections result in a FRODEBU win. New government formed under President Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu who in turn appoints a Tutsi Prime Minister in spirit of "reconciliation."
- 1993 October 21 President Ndadaye is overthrown and killed in a military coup. He is succeeded by Cyprien Ntaryamira

- 1994 April 6 President Ntaryamira is killed along with President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda in a mysterious plane crash in Kigali, Rwanda—unleashing the Rwanda genocide.
- 1994-1996 The reemergence of army authoritarian rule; and the return of Major Buyoya (August 1996) and continued violence in the countryside. Thousands of Hutu civilians are killed. Regional Embargo against Burundi, leading to economic difficulties.
- 2000 August 29 the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement among Burundi's many factional groups. Some of the most powerful factions hold out, making the success of the Agreement uncertain.

Greater Horn of Africa

Peace Building Project

Julius E. Nyang'oro

CASE STUDY FOUR:

Local Level Intergroup Peace Building in Southern Sudan: An Assessment of Effective Practices

March, 2001

Management Systems International
600 Water Street, SW, Washington, DC 20024 USA

Appendix from the Report:
The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace
A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

Contract No. GS-23F-8012H, Task Order No. 623-N-00-99-00294-00 for

DG/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis Services

Table of Contents

Executive Summary....iii

Nature of Conflict and its Causes....1

Societal Disillusion....5

US Intervention to Assist the South....6

Key Assumptions of the Intervention....9

Implementation of Intervention....10

Impact of the Intervention....11

Contextual and Situation Conditions....13

Conclusions....14

Recommendations....16

Covenants....18

who attended the....18

References....22

Persons Interviewed....23

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The full report can be found at:
http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report.pdf
or write to peacebuilding@yahoo.com for an electronic version.

Executive Summary

For the past decade, Southern Sudan has been at war with itself. The conflict in Southern Sudan has its origins in the wider conflict between the Government of Sudan (90s) and the main Southern Opposition group to Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The Southern conflict has manifested itself as an inter-ethnic conflict primarily between the Dinka and Nuer, the two major ethnic groups in the South and within SPLM/A. It is also true, however, that other smaller ethnic groups have been drawn into the conflict. Whatever side the smaller groups have taken has been a function of their relationship to the bigger groups.

Since the mid 1990s, the New Sudan Council of Churches, (NSCC) based in Nairobi, has taken the lead in fostering a dialogue among the various groups in Southern Sudan. This attempt has led to the establishment of a working relationship between SPLM/A and NSCC by defining the different responsibilities each side has to the people of Southern Sudan. SPLM/A's role is that of a political/military organization in opposition to the 90s. The NSCC's role is that of a civil society organization interested in creating peace among Southern feuding groups, and to lay the ground for the development of a viable civil society in Southern Sudan. The latter objective is seen as a precondition for creating conditions for good governance and democracy.

NSCC's objectives have coincided with United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) interest in promoting economic development, political stability and democratic governance in Southern Sudan. USAID along with other foreign donors have spent more than US $1 billion in relief work in southern Sudan over the past decade. USAID interest is to move from "relief" to "development" work. Development, however, cannot take place without peace. Thus, USAID's support for NSCC's activities, primarily through the funding of community level/people-to-people conferences is one way in which conditions for development work can be created. This study assesses this USAID intervention and concludes that it represents one of the "effective practices" in achieving the stated objective.

Nature of Conflict and its Causes

There are two conflicts in the Sudan. The first conflict is the broader conflict between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and Southern Sudan whose principal organizing opposition movement is the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). The main fighting wing of SPLM is the Southern Sudan Liberation Army (SPLA) under the leadership of John Garang. The second conflict is an intra-South conflict. The Southern Sudanese are divided among several ethnic groups, the principal ones being the Dinka and the Nuer, who are themselves sub-divided into even smaller groups. This project is primarily concerned with the conflict among Southern Sudanese groups. However, it is necessary to understand the broader conflict between the GOS and the South in general, in order to contextualize the conflict in Southern Sudan.

The conflict between the GOS (generically known as the North) and Southern Sudan (generically known as the South) has a long history that goes back to the colonial period (For a broad perspective of the conflict see: Deng, 1995). In 1820-21, joint Turkish and Egyptian forces invaded and took over the northern regions of the Sudan. The Turkish and Egyptian slave traders used the North as a base for their forays into the South. Reaction to the Turkish/Egyptian control came from both North and South, and had a unifying effect on the country as both sections pulled together to resist foreign domination. The popular unrest culminated in a successful revolt, which began in 1881, and brought Muhammaad Ahmed al-Mahdi to power in 1885.

“The Mahdi,” as this leader was popularly known, was seen as the messiah. He used Islam as a tool to raise support in the North. The South, though it did not convert, saw the religion of the Mahdists as a tool for liberation, a way to organize opposition to the foreign rulers. When the Mahdist government gained power, however, slave raids into southern territory continued. Islam was turned against the South, thus becoming a divisive element.

Colonial intervention, known as the Reconquest, led to the British-dominated Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899-1955), that ended slavery and nominally unified the country. The decision to administer the North and the South separately, however, reinforced Arabism and Islam in the North, encouraged southern development along indigenous African lines, and introduced Christian missionary education and rudiments of Western civilization as elements of modernization in the South. Interaction between the two sets of people was strongly discouraged.

While the colonial administration invested considerably in the political, economic, social, and cultural development of the North, the South remained isolated, secluded, and undeveloped. The principal objective of colonial rule in the region was the establishment and maintenance of law and order. The separate administration of the North and the South left open the option that the South might eventually be annexed to one of the East African colonies.

Suddenly, only nine years before independence, the British reversed the policy of separate development, but they had neither the time nor the political will to put in place constitutional arrangements that would ensure protection for the South in a united Sudan. Since independence, ruthless attempts to dominate, Islamize and Arabize the South have characterized the policies of successive governments. Southern resistance to Arab-Muslim domination and assimilation has also persisted commensurately. The result has been an internecine war of visions (Deng, 1995:).

The war of visions between the North and South first broke out in August 1955, just four months before independence was declared on January 1,1956. Armed conflict has been largely between successive governments in Khartoum and liberation movements based in the southern part of the country. The preoccupying concern among the northerners at independence was to correct the divisive effect of the separatist policies of the colonial administration. The logical response was for the government to seek the unity of the country by pursuing the forced assimilation of the South through Arabization and Islamization, which for the South was tantamount to replacing British colonialism with Arab hegemony. South resistance intensified first in the political call for a federal arrangement and later in an armed struggle for secession (Johnson, 1999).

The political impasse created by the situation in the South prompted the military to take over in 1958, only two years after independence with the aim of pursuing the strategies of Arabization and Islamization more vigorously, unhampered by parliamentary democracy. The ruthlessness with which these assimilation policies were pursued in the South aggravated the conflict, which became a full-fledged civil war in the 1960's. The effect of that war on the political situation led to the popular uprising that overthrew the military regime in 1964. The oppressive policies toward the South were temporarily relaxed. With the return of democracy less than a year later, the traditional political parties assumed control and resumed the assimilation policies with a vengeance. The level of repression was higher than ever before. As the violence escalated, the differences between the North and the South became sharper, and the level of political instability rose. This vicious cycle was broken in 1969, when another military junta, this time under the leadership of Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri, seized power.

After displaying an ambivalent attitude toward the rebels, Nimeiri's government eventually negotiated with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and in 1972 concluded the Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted the South regional autonomy. The regime, however, remained under pressure from the conservative and radical fundamentalist elements and, in particular the sectarian parties and the Muslim Brotherhood, with whom Nimeiri eventually enter into an uneasy alliance. Nimeiri also underwent a personal conversion, becoming a born-again Muslim, even though he still hoped that through religious reforms he could pull the rug from under the feet of the sectarian opposition leaders and the fundamentalists with whom he had a restless partnership. He also hoped to remove the anomaly of liberal democracy in the South, which was incongruous with the national system of an authoritarian presidency. For these and other political reasons, Nimeiri gradually eroded the South's autonomy, moving relentlessly toward imposing Islamic law, of *shari'a,* and establishing an Islamic

state. Eventually he unilaterally abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement, triggering the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and it's military wing, the Southern People's Liberation Army (SPLA), whose declared objective was the creation of a new secular, democratic, and pluralistic Sudan. Within only two years of the resumption of hostilities, a popular uprising known as *initiate* led to Numeiri's own political demise in April 1985 (Johnson, 1999).

Neither the transitional government that followed Numeiri's overthrow nor the subsequent elected government was able to reach a settlement with SPLM-SPLA. The war in the South moved northward, into the non-Arab areas of the Nuba in southern Kordofan, the Ingassana in southern Blue Nile, and to a lesser degree, the Fur in the western region of Darfur. Although the imposition of *shari'a* took the limelight, because of the association of Islam with Arabism, this war became increasingly racial, remaining the greatest threat to the stability and the development of the country. Famines caused by natural disasters and by the use of food as a weapon in the conflict added a heavy toll to the war tragedy. During both regimes the ruling political parties and the SPLM-SPLA exerted intensive efforts toward peace and humanitarian relief. Important meetings and talks took place between representative groups and leaders on both sides.

When it seemed that the national will was united behind the peace process, the situation suddenly changed even more radically in favor of the religious right, which saw in the compromise a threat to the Islamic trend. On June 30, 1989, a radical Islamic faction in the military took over, this time under the leadership of General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, whose Islamist policies have widened the cleavage with the SPLM-SPLA and sharpened the issues and options confronting the nation. As a result, religion has become a highly divisive factor in a manner that has reactivated calls for separation between the North and South even within the SPLM-SPLA, which, as a movement, had been committed to unity."

While the international community has concentrated on the resumption of talks between the North and the South primarily through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) process—a forum of regional governments: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda, with financial support from outside powers including the United States—the past decade has also witnessed a steady rise in intra-South conflict.

The Nuer and the Dinka, the two largest ethnic groups in the South, historically have primarily inhabited Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal. Both groups traditionally moved through each other's areas to water cattle during migrations to and from swamp areas. Although one group occasionally raided the other group's livestock, the Nuer and the Dinka avoided full-scale conflict in the border area until the civil war resumed in 1983. As many studies have shown, historically, there have been numerous ways in which Dinka and Nuer have utilized each other's resources to survive. As John Prendergast noted in a recent study, these two groups "have raided each others livestock; traded cattle, grain, and ivory; and intermarried and expanded kinship networks (1996:12)."

The intra-South conflict, which is the focus of this study and by extension the basis for the intervention under review, has its origins in the 1991 SPLM-SPLMA internal split. Nuer incursions into Dinka territory in the Jonglei region in late1991 sparked a fierce conflict between the two groups. Soon after Riek Machar, a Nuer, and two other commanders announced a coup against SPLM-SPLA chairman John Garang, a Dinka, Garang dispatched a small contingent of soldiers commanded by William Nyoun Bany to Ayod in Eastern Upper Nile. Nyoun's soldiers were quickly forced to retreat toward Kongor by troops loyal to the splinter faction (SPLM/A-Nasir) and Nuer militia counter-attacked in two waves. The first counter-attack, in September 1991, went only as far as Kongor; the second offensive, in November 1991, advanced deep into Dinka territory, south of Bor.

Thus ensued in the 1990's a bitter conflict between the Dinka and Nuer with devastating consequences for the stability of the South in general and to the social integrity of both Dinka and Nuer communities. John Prendergast (1996:13-14) has provided an excellent analysis of how this intra-South conflict affected the internal relations among Southerners, but also, underlying the whole conflict, how the GOS used the Dinka-Nuer split to fuel further conflict in the South. According to Prendergast, the troops of the SPLM/A-Nasir (Nuer) faction were joined by soldiers from Anyanya II. A Nuer militia that fought the SPLM/A from 1983 to 1987 and then splintered, some of its soldiers joining the SPLM/A and others becoming a government-supported paramilitary force operating out of Malakal, the GOS-held capital of the Upper Nile. Thousands of Nuer civilians from northern Upper Nile, known as the "White Army" (civilian militias) or "Decbor," also entered the fray. Nasir faction commanders were either unable or unwilling to control the Anyanya II White Army personnel, who formed the vast majority of the attacking force. Their primary objectives were looting and revenge for earlier SPLM/A attacks on Nuer communities and Anyanya II operational areas. Civilians in these areas had also been heavily taxed by the SPLM/A and were the victims of constant SPLM/A atrocities, including kidnapping young women to be married to soldiers and forced conscription.

The results were catastrophic. An estimated 30,000 Nuer rampaged through Dinka areas, burning houses and killing the inhabitants, leveling hospitals and clinics, destroying crops and stores, killing cattle, and creating chaos throughout Bor district. In December 1991, the UN reported that more than 200,000 residents of the Bor and Kongor districts, in an exodus unlike anything see before in Sudan, fled south in search of food, shelter, and security. Although the final estimates vary widely, as many as 5,000 people were killed. Dinka civilians were shot or "speared or garroted - and in a particularly creative act of cruelty, thousands of cattle were blinded with pangas (machetes).

The destruction or large-scale raiding of cattle devastated the subsistence base and livelihoods of thousands of families in the Bor and Kongor districts. In surveys conducted before the attacks, Norwegian People's Aid estimated that nearly 400,000 head of cattle populated the area. By January 1992, this number had plummeted to 50,000, the balance having been stolen or killed. This destruction of the Dinka

population's asset base in Upper Nile parallels a similar campaign of asset-stripping perpetrated by the government -financed Arab Baggara militia in 1987-1988 in northern Bahr al-Ghazal, another Dinka population center. One relief official observed that the Dinka "used to wear bright-colored clothes or jellabias; they are now naked or in rags" (Prendergast, 1996:14).

Societal Disillusion

The case of the Dinka people provides a window into the process of societal dissolution in southern Sudan. The family support network and social norms and rules, which have protected the Dinka through the past crises, are beginning to break down under the strain of the war. Their economy, based on cattle, agriculture, trade, and fishing, has been compromised by frequent raids by the GOS and Nuer. The death and disappearance of large numbers of Dinka men has resulted in increased insecurity for women and a loosening of social networks in a society that places a great importance on family name and lineage.

Traditional systems of "ghost marriages" (temporary remarriages, often within the family, to ensure the continuation of a family line if a women's husband is absent for too long), which Dinkas believe ensure their survival, have weakened as fathers fail to provide for the mothers and their children. The influx of relief agencies into Dinka society has led Dinkas to inflate population figures or pretend to be needy, a condition normally stigmatized in Dinka society. As a result, Dinkas have become increasingly dependent on outside aid, and their traditional survival networks have begun to erode in some places. Women are especially at risk as they are forced to the bottom of the economy and resort to desperate measures to care for themselves and their children in the absence of family support.

In the meanwhile, the Nuer incursion into Dinka territory was matched by the intensity of the conflict within Nuer society itself. The biggest conflict was between factions that had allied with (or been supplied with weapons by) GOS. Arguably, the intra-Nuer conflict was as devastating to Nuer society, as was the Nuer-Dinka conflict to Dinka society. Thus the intra-South conflict had the effect of undermining the South's broader struggle against the North, and threatened to push the South's aspirations for either increased autonomy with Sudan, or independence, further away from the agenda. This reality also made the efforts of the international community to alleviate the South's suffering much more difficult. In spite of all these obstacles, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) has poured over $1 billion US dollars in the South. OLS has been primarily led by the United Nations and supported by other international agencies.

US Intervention to Assist the South

The United States government through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has over the past decade, evolved a strategy of intervention in Southern Sudan to alleviate the suffering of the people in the region as a result of the conflict. USAID strategy has evolved in response to the shift in the power balance between SPLM/A and its opposition, primarily in SPLM/A's favor. As Salinas and D'Silva (1999) have noted, the USAID approach that evolved, reflected the increased level of stability and security that had emerged by the mid 1990's as a result of military advances made by the SPLA in much of the southernmost part of Sudan. This area, comprising all parts of Equatoria Province lying west of the Nile, is also known as the "West Bank."

Salinas and D'Silva further note that the economic potential of the West Bank was largely neglected by both donors and relief agencies until 1994 when USAID began to fund innovative activities in the region. While other donors were reluctant to provide assistance that did not meet the strict definition of "emergency" or "relief" assistance, and facilitating economic recovery in stable areas so that the effects of future disasters could be mitigated. As areas in the West Bank stabilized, and significant trade routes opened up, USAID seized the opportunity to invest in economic transition. Salina and D'Silva conclude that:

Overall, the West Bank experience provides evidence of USAID's success in promoting economic and political transition through targeted interventions. The West Bank, though still affected by conflict, has been stable and secure enough to make such interventions possible - and effective. The primary lesson learned from this experience, therefore, is that complex emergencies and conflicts cannot be thought of in absolute terms. There are often pockets of stability, and resulting potential for transition, even in a situation of ongoing conflict. And these areas can benefit from rehabilitation-oriented programs. By devoting as little as four percent of its total assistance to Sudan over the past six years, USAID has learned that, if programmed properly, a small amount of assistance can go a long way toward restoring people's coping mechanisms and providing them with the ability to reengage in economic activities. These interventions serve to jump start the market economy, promote the development of civil society, and further the creation of a functional, transparent, and accountable civil administration (1999: viii)

This is the primary lesson that informs the intervention, which is the focus of this study: promotion of community level dialogue to promote peace building in Southern Sudan. Based on the positive experiences from activities in the West Bank, the USAID funded Sudan Transition and Rehabilitation Project (STAR) was launched at the beginning of 1999. At the center of this project was a critical assumption that if there was an increase in participatory democracy and good governance practices in opposition-held areas of Sudan, conditions for long-term peace would result. Consequently, the discourse on Sudan would move from relief and rehabilitation to serious discussions about the future of the South in the overall framework of Sudan. A further assumption

was that participatory democracy would only be created by bringing together the warring factions in Southern Sudan, primarily the Nuer and Dinka in face-to-face discussions as to the nature of the conflict and the future of their communities.

STAR's assumptions were in line with what the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) had been envisaging in creating conditions for dialogue in the south, primarily by the NSCC engaging the SPLM/A in discussions about peace in the South. Thus, with the broad objective of creating peace in Southern Sudan, the SPLM/A and NSCC held a Dialogue conference in the Yei County July 21-24, 1997 resulting in the following statement cosigned by John Garang of SPLM/A and Bishop Joseph Marona, Chairman of NSCC:

"We the leaders and officials of SPLM/A and NSCC, join together in our affirmation of freedom, democracy, fundamental human rights and the dignity and respect of all persons regardless of race, sex or religion. In order to form representative government, establish justice, achieve peace and reconciliation, promote dignity and equality, advance the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty and democracy for the peoples of the liberated areas of Sudan, hereafter referred to as New Sudan, the SPLM and NSCC, through their official leadership and representatives present at this Dialogue conference, who are signatories here below, do:

- Reaffirm our commitment to shared visions of freedom, equality, justice and dignity as the legitimate political, social, and economic aspirations of the peoples of New Sudan.

- Affirm our belief that human rights, civil liberties and eradication of all forms of oppression, as exemplified by policies and practices of the National Islam Front (NIF) and other sectarian parties, are essential to achieve a better standard of life for the peoples of New Sudan;

- Declare our intention to strive for realization of these visions and beliefs through mobilization of the people, reconciliation and unification of persons and groups, and development of civil authorities and civil society based upon democratic principles and processes, establishment of human rights, norms of justice, enactment of fair laws and administration of civil and legal systems;

- Undertake to collaborate with each other and to respect each other's roles and respective authorities for carrying out their complementary functions and activities, whereby SPLM seeks to achieve liberation and the establishment of good governance for the people of the Sudan, and NSCC seeks to achieve its spiritual mandate and as part of civil society assist in peacemaking and reconciliation among the different peoples of New Sudan;

To these ends we, the officials and members of SPLM and NSCC, are agreed to the following resolutions and recommendations and do assume responsibility for their

enactment and realization through the policies and practices enacted within and through their respective organizations. (NSCC, 1997:1-2)"

The significance of this statement was that the SPLA/M would recognize the unique role played by the NSCC as a "neutral" body with special responsibilities to serve the people of the South. It also substantively made the NCSS the natural facilitator for fostering community level dialogue among fighting factions in the South. The principal mechanism for this dialogue, supported by USAID has been the Inter and intra-ethnic Conferences. To date, there have been two major conferences: the Nuer-Dinka Peace and Reconciliation Conference, Wunlit, Tonj Country, Bahr el Ghazal (February 27-March 7, 1999) and the East Bank People to People Peace and Reconciliation Conference, Liliir, Bor County, Upper Nile (May 9-15, 2000). The Liliir Conference produced the Liliir Covenant between the Anyuak, Dinka, Jie, Kachip, Murle, and Nuer (see appendix for text of the covenant). A minor conference among Nuer groups in November 1999 on the East Bank was less successful. For USAID purposes it is significant that USAID support for these conferences was sought by NSCC to facilitate the dialogue and these were positive outcomes from the Conference.

Key Assumptions of the Intervention

There are several key assumptions, implicit and explicit, which have informed USAID intervention, and by extension NSCC activities. The first assumption is that political stability is an essential aspect of peace building in Southern Sudan. Whether it is in the realm of economic development or democratic governance, political stability provides the basis upon which both objectives can be pursued. The second assumption is that in spite of the ongoing conflict among Southern Sudanese, there is a dire need for reconciliation, not only among the warring factions, but also within the ranks of SPLM/A and NSCC. For SPLM/A, reconciliation in the South paves a way for united action against GOS; for NSCC, reconciliation gives it an opportunity to enhance its programs in peace building and the creation of a viable civil society. The existence of a vibrant civil society is generally acknowledged as a fundamental precondition for both good governance and democratic practice. The third assumption is that the situation in Southern Sudan is highly fluid, and thus defies easy characterization. Recognition must be made of the fact that the current conflict has a history that goes back to the British colonial period (and even further back); and thus it is a culmination of a pile of tragedies. Thus success will not come overnight.

With the above assumptions in mind, it is thus appropriate to reiterate the purpose of the intervention: to foster dialogue among communities that have been in conflict in Southern Sudan, largely as a result of the larger Sudanese conflict. The rationale for choosing dialogue as an intervention vehicle is based on the history of the people themselves who are now in conflict. Prior to external influence—primarily manipulation by GOS and the supply of more deadly weapons—there existed a mechanism for conflict resolution among Southern Sudanese. The mechanism was the age-old tradition of discussions between chiefs and elders in addressing all-important issues in society. This is the primary message that came from both written sources and interviews by people involved in the peace building effort (see appendix for list of interviews). The idea here then is that some of the age-old traditions of conflict resolution can be restored to help bring about a functioning peace. The assumption here is not that restoration is for the recreating of the status quo ante, since that is an impossible task. But rather, the idea is to employ and apply mechanisms of conflict resolution that have been useful in the past and creatively apply them to a new and dynamic context. The central element in this strategy is to foster dialogue among people who have been fighting. Dialogue as a mechanism in conflict resolution has a long history among Southern Sudanese peoples. The choice of dialogue as an instrument for peace by the NSCC is therefore not accidental.

Implementation of Intervention

The recent history of community level intervention in Southern Sudan goes back to the dialogue between SPLM/A and NSCC. For USAID however, the intervention began with support for the Wunlit Nuer-Dinka Peace and Reconciliation Conference of February-March 1999. The primary purpose of the Wunlit conference was to reconcile the Dinka and Nuer on the west bank of the Nile. The conference, organized by NSCC, invited participants from those areas where Nuer and Dinka border each other, which are six administrative units (counties) on each side. Thirty participants were invited from each county, for a total of 180 Nuer and 180 Dinka. Each county selected representatives according to a common formula: 15 chiefs, and 15 from other social elements (elders, women, youth, and intellectuals). In addition to the 360 participants, observers were invited: from SPLM areas (since SPLM is hosting the Bahr el Ghazal conference), the county commissioner and executive director from each county (both SPLM officials) to support the 30 participants from that county; and 6 Nuer chiefs and 2 Murle chiefs from east of the Nile. A group of about 6 rapporteurs facilitated the daily sessions; these were well-known intellectuals from Nuer and Dinka, not associated with any political faction.

A second intervention was the Upper Nile Reconciliation Conference among Nuer groups, which took place November 1-7, 1999. The purpose of the conference was to bring together the Lou Nuer of Upper Nile to talk about peace in the area. Again, the NSCC had played a pivotal role in convening the conference. The Lou area, including the towns of Waat, Akobo, Yuai, and Langkein, had been wracked by conflict as military forces under three commands had battled each other. Frequently, the "White Army" youth militia groups, numbering in the thousands, joined various groups and entered the conflict. As a result, almost all UN and NGO humanitarian groups had withdrawn from the area, and near anarchy had reigned. All forms of civil governance had collapsed, thus making the life of the general population extremely miserable. The final communiqué from the conference is known as the Waat Lou Nuer Covenant, it is reproduced later in this document.

At the time of investigation, a third conference was underway. This was the Liliir Conference, which was officially known as the East (Nile) Bank People-to-People Peace and Reconciliation Conference, May 9-15, 2000. The investigative team could not attend this meeting but received reports from attendees and the final document from the conference. The final document is known as the Liliir Covenant between the Anyuak, Tinka, Jie, Kachipo, Murle, and Nuer. (The covenant is reproduced later in this document).

Impact of the Intervention

Across the board, it is clear that community level dialogue or people-to-people contact is having a positive impact in community relations. This is the view held by the principal facilitators of these conferences: NSCC; and most of the interviewees who were either participants at the conference (for example: Canon Clemend Junda, Secretary General of the All Africa Conference of Churches) or keen observers of the Southern Sudanese seen for the past decade (for example: Harold Miller of the Mennonite Central Committee and member of the Nairobi based Sudan working group).

The key evidence that the intervention is making an impact is two fold. First, in the West Bank where Dinka and Nuer border each other, there are no longer the clashes that had previously resulted in the rustling and killing of livestock and the abduction of women and children. These activities had been the sore points in the evolving relationship between the two peoples since the internal crisis of SPLM/A. Second, there is recognition by SPLM/A that the reconciliation is happening in spite of it, even though one of the influencing factors in the ability to hold ongoing dialogue between the Nuer and Dinka is general peace, which happens to be provided by SPLM/A. So the factors that are contributing to the success of the intervention actually lie in the origin of the conflict itself.

The reconciliation between Nuer and Dinka had immediate results at the conference in Wunlit, of the return by either side of some abducted children. As related by at least three participants at the Wunlit Conference, after several days of deliberation, a Nuer chief stood up and "confessed" to have in his custody a Dinka boy of about 13-14 years, who had been abducted six or seven years earlier. The Nuer chief had raised the boy as his own and was wondering aloud what he needed to do to make things "right." The boy was paraded in front of conference delegates. And for the abducted women who had subsequently become wives, each side agreed that women would be given the option of returning home, or staying with the current husbands who in turn would pay the necessary bride price, per custom.

One of the devastating impacts of the intra-South conflict has been the abandoning or the impossibility of carrying out normal economic activities—production and exchange—between neighboring peoples. Markets had closed down and goods for trading had disappeared. More than anything else, this lack of commercial interaction among Southern Sudanese fueled the insecurity and conflict because of the increased scarcity of resources. One immediate impact of political stability has been the resumptions of economic exchange, particularly in the West Bank. If the general assumption that people who trade with each other does not fight are true, then post-Wunlit activities in the West Bank are a very positive sign indeed.

This is also the lesson that the Salinas and D'Silva (1999) study provides. It is obvious that when there is conflict, markets can hardly operate. However, the experience in the West Bank has shown than as long as farmers are assured access to markets, and

market demand continues to grow, they will continue to invest to produce surplus to sell. In other words, the issue in Southern Sudan, as it would be anywhere in the world, political stability, peace and a reasonable measure of economic certainty would unleash the energy of the people to engage in activities that are bound to improve their lives. The challenge for any intervention is to ensure that such conditions are created.

It is important to reiterate the fact that by all measures, intervention by the NSCC has had an appreciable impact in the lives of the people in Southern Sudan. In a substantive way the creation of conditions for peace seems to be accepted by many observers as a precursor to life returning to normal—at least within the context of the overarching larger conflict between the North and South. The fact that Dinka and Nuer cattle can graze in shared areas without immediately eliciting a violent response by either side is a positive development. This is an important step in creating conditions that can build up to other areas of cooperation. The fact that peoples' lives and their security are reasonably predictable makes the intervention a success. Most importantly however, is the recognition by the groups in question that their lives are better off in peaceful coexistence than in conflict.

Contextual and Situation Conditions

Given intensity of the conflict in Southern Sudan, it has not been uncommon for donor and other international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) to suspend their relief activity in the region, primarily for security reasons. This naturally has had the effect of making life more difficult for populations who had largely come to depend on outside assistance. The situation has further been complicated by a onetime the SPLM/A demand—which seems to have been withdrawn—that all international relief activities in the South be coordinated and approved by SPLM/A. The European Union (EU) among others refused to abide by this demand and has in the past year suspended its operations in the South.

The overarching context in the broad conflict between the North and the South is the IGAD process that has been in place for the past decade. Admittedly, the IGAD process leaves a lot to be desired: two of its members, Ethiopia and Eritrea, are at war with each other; one of its members, Uganda, is involved in the larger conflict in the Great Lakes Region; and Kenya, Chair of the IGAD process seems to lack the vigor of leadership that is necessary to jumpstart a process that has been dominant for a while. Perhaps a broader question—which is beyond the scope of this study—might be whether an active IGAD would have any appreciable impact on what is happening in Southern Sudan. It is possible that the IGAD process would force the GOS to reconsider its strategy of arming militias in the South, whose principal purpose is simply to create havoc in the lives of Southern Sudanese. The thinking in Khartoum seems to be that as long as the South is at war with itself, there is a little chance of success against the North.

In the last couple of years, there is evidence that both Libya and Egypt are showing more interest in what is happening in the Sudan. Egypt has long been an interested party in the outcome of the IGAD process because of the Nile and also because of GOS's support for political Islam. The latter aspect is seen by Egypt as a fundamental issue of political stability in the region, and in Egypt itself. On several occasions, Egypt has accused the current regime in Khartoum of sponsoring terrorism in Egypt. The attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while attending the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Addis Ababa in 1995 was blamed on Khartoum sponsored terrorist elements. Libya's recent interest in being part of the solution in the overall Sudan conflict can be interpreted as an attempt by Colonel Ghaddafi to further rehabilitate his regime from the effects of international sanctions and isolation. Naturally, all parties concerned have received Libya's overtures with tremendous caution.

Conclusions

Based on the evidence, it is quite clear that community level dialogue when pursued under the right circumstances is a tremendous instrument for creating and maintaining peace. If we operate with the general assumption that people who talk to each other would rarely fight; or at the very least would not allow misunderstandings to deteriorate into physical confrontation, then ipso facto, maintaining a dialogue between communities should serve the same purpose. The most important factors in the success of an intervention are 1) willingness of parties to engage in dialogue; 2) adequate preparation by the facilitators, i.e. ensure that parties understand what is at stake and the ground rules are clear (everyone to be on the same page); 3) minimal outside influence, including that of SPLM/A; and 4) refocusing on the big picture: that the origins of the intra-South current conflict actually lies in the broader North-South conflict.

One of the issues that once in a while seems to be forgotten is that the big picture actually is the economic disparity between the North and South. GOS policy on economic development has consistently favored the North, as indeed was the case during the colonial period. In many ways, it is this disparity that has been at the core of the Sudanese conflict. To complicate matters, in the last two decades, the discovery of oil deposits in the South has made the GOS even more reluctant to entertain, even remotely, the possibility of the South seceding from Sudan and forming its own separate country. The irony is that while the South may have been willing with the autonomy envisaged under the Addis Ababa Accord of 1972, the discovery of oil in the South has essentially taken that option off the negotiating table. In projecting future development, the South can now envisage a more balanced economic development between the agricultural and mineral sectors as engines of a more dynamic political economy. The lesson for Khartoum is that if GOS had faithfully abided by the 1972 Accords, most likely the current conflict may have been avoided.

Looking at the three main conferences under examination here, Wunlit and Liliir were great successes because they met most of the conditions for success. Significantly, the chiefs and other interested parties noted at the very beginning of the deliberations that they were not willing to be used as pawns in the intra-SPLM/A struggle. They also noted that while those who remained in Southern Sudan suffered from malnutrition, lack of schools and health facilities, instigators of the conflict actually lived in Khartoum, Nairobi or some other capital and had access to all the facilities that were sorely lacking in their communities.

Waat on the other hand seems to have been less successful. According to knowledgeable informants, Waat suffered from lack of common purpose among participants, and more crucially, lack of leadership. Even though NSCC had played some role in convening Waat, the conference was quickly “hijacked” by the ambitions of some Nuer politicians and commanders who saw this as a chance to take over from the disgraced Rik Machar. Machar is now seen to have sold out to Khartoum and was thus

less credible as a leader of the Nuer. Further, by concentrating on overtly political issues (as opposed to local community dialogues), the conference lost an opportunity to address community concerns, which had been the primary purpose of its convening.

Recommendations

Without a doubt, the intervention under analysis here is something that should be pursued and expanded. The results are self-evident. In the West Bank, peace has largely been restored between the previously feuding Dinka and Nuer peoples. Stability and economic exchange are beginning to characterize the relationships between previously feuding groups. It is important that the intervention continues to be seen as responding to requests by parties close to the center of the crisis; in this case, the NSCC plays that role. USAID must avoid the temptation of taking the lead role in fostering to the dialogue. In a context where the smallest misunderstanding could trigger deadly conflict between groups, it is best to assist the process of reconciliation by working through credible local contacts.

Support for the peace process needs to be incremental. There is a danger of "overloading" the system if too much is done either in terms of funding or "too much" American/foreign presence. That is why working through NSCC is so critical. As long as NSCC is seen to be a neutral player, it remains the logical vehicle for USAID assistance. Working through NSCC also insulates USAID from a possible charge of being "political" or "biased" even though clearly, much of peace making is essentially political. In working through the NSCC, USAID should strive to enhance the capacity of NSCC to follow up on recommendations from the various conferences to ensure their implementation. Community level dialogue is an extremely delicate process and requires both logistical and political support. It would seem that at the present moment, NSCC might be lacking in this capacity. Arguably, the failure to follow up on the Waat initiative may have been one of the reasons for the lack of overall success compare to say Wunlit. Informants at NSCC readily accepted this view. Further, the recommendations for the latest conference in Liliir require extensive follow up of continued consultation among several ethnic groups. Thus, the importance of capacity building within the NSCC cannot be overemphasized.

Most importantly however, is the fact that in order for any initiative to succeed, all the stakeholders must be involved from the beginning. In the case of the Wunlit and Liliir Conferences, the NSCC consulted chiefs, elder, youth groups and the SPLM/A to ensure that all groups fully understood the process, and that no single group would be disadvantaged. The fact that NSCC allowed the process to continue for several days reflected its sensitivity to tradition, and the need to understand that reconciliation is a process similar to building a house. It is a process of putting together a house, brick by brick.

In a wider context, the lesson that may be learned from the interventions similar to the one by NSCC is that one-shot deals do not work very well. It is clear from the work of NSCC that negotiations and preparatory work were conducted over a long period of time before the conferences were held. The initial foray by the NSCC was the meeting with SPLA/M in 1997. The first major peace conference took place in February 1999, a full two years after the NSCC/SPLA initiative. The fact of preparation cannot be

overemphasized. Perhaps this is the greatest lesson that comes out of the Southern Sudan initiative. Further, the timetable for when the time is ripe for any peace making activity has to reflect what the participants are prepared to do, not what the facilitators want them to do. It has to be remembered that long after the facilitators are gone, the people on the ground will continue to relate to one another. Facilitators have to make themselves available; they cannot dictate the terms and conditions of the facilitation. This is not to suggest however that facilitators cannot help shape the direction of the negotiation by pointing out the various possibilities of solving problems.

Covenants

LILIIR COVENANT
between the
ANYUAK, DINKA, JIE, KACHIPO, MURLE AND NUER
who attended the

EAST BANK PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE
in
LILIIR, BOR COUNTY, UPPER NILE, SUDAN
(May 9th to the 15th, 2000)

A gathering of traditional and civil leaders was convened in Liliir (Bor, county), to reconcile the differences and conflicts between the Anyuak, Dinka (Bor & Padang), and peace amongst themselves. The spirit of the conference was reflected at the opening by the ceremonial sacrifice of a 'White Bull,' and concluded with the declaration of a joint covenant between the represented ethnic groups. The covenant was sealed with the sacrifice of a 'White Ox,' the offering of Christian worship, and the signatures of each of the participating delegates and observers publicly recorded. The following outlines their covenant:

Under the facilitation of the NSCC, and witnessed by many church leaders and other citizens of Sudan, we, the delegates of the Liliir conference have established a covenant of peace and reconciliation between us. We declare our intention today to cease from hostile acts, and commit ourselves to the practical measures necessary to ensure the integrity and sustainability of our agreement. Recalling the spirit and wisdom handed down from our ancestors, and the memory of our daughters and sons who have unnecessarily died over the past 10 years, we pledged ourselves to observe and implement this covenant and its accompanying resolutions.

We have unanimously agreed that:

*** all traditional hostilities will cease among us, and that all military (and militia) groups are to respect the civilian population and abide by, and protect, this covenant;

*** the conditions necessary to foster local peace and development are brought about by our communities and leaders, and the provision of basic essential services for the people are made available and improved;

*** an amnesty will be upheld for all offences against our people and their property prior to the conference, in the spirit of reconciliation and unity. The amnesty takes effect from this date;

*** all abducted women and children are freely returned to their places of origin, and where necessary, marriage customs are fulfilled;

*** freedom of movement across our common borders is upheld, and trade and communication is encouraged and supported;

*** all across border agreements are respected and the authority of the border chiefs and police patrols are justly observed;

*** access to common areas for gazing, fishing, and water points will be regulated and shared peacefully among us;

*** we will demand good governance from our leaders for the achievement of unity and the observance of human rights;

***we will advocate on behalf of our sister and brothers who have been scattered and displaced, especially those from the Bor area, for the return to their homeland with the encouragement and co-operation of their communities, leaders and civil authorities of origin.

In conclusion, we appeal that the people from Upper Nile who were either blocked or did not have an opportunity to participate in the conference be told about our deliberations and be encouraged to meet with us in the near future so that the East Bank peoples' peace process can be widened and deepened. This covenant reflects the will of the people represented at Liliir. It incorporates the resolutions of the conference (attached), and we urge that they be implemented with the full assistance and protection of the civil authorities under all of the southern liberation movements. We hope that the friends of Upper Nile will support our efforts and consolidate our desire for peace.

Waat Lou Nuer Covenant

Waat, Sudan

6 November 1999

The Lou Nuer met in a People-to-People Peace and Governance Conference in Waat, Sudan under the auspices of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) from 1-7 November 1999. Delegates came from all districts in addition to Lou who came from Malakal, Khartoum and foreign countries.

Today, we declare an end to years of internal conflicts among our people, battles between different factions, and at least three different military forces and civil administrations. Our internal strife has made us vulnerable to conflicts with our neighbors on every side, and the Government of Sudan has armed various groups within our midst to stir up confusion and destruction. We have sealed this Covenant, with its included Resolutions, by the traditional sacrifice of a White Bull (Tu-Bor) and with Christian worship.

We have met to establish a lasting peace, to build a common system of governance and to appeal to others to join us in rebuilding our communities and spreading this peace and reconciliation to all of south Sudan.

We have agreed to the following:

Peace

- An end to all conflicts among Lou Nuer
- Amnesty for offenses against persons and property prior to 1 November 1999
- Extending the hand of peace to Gaawar Nuer to our west and Jikany Nuer to our East. We stand ready to resolve any outstanding issues and build a permanent peace.
- Extending the hand of peace to all neighbouring people on the East Bank of the Nile, With the NSCC, we invite all Nilotic peoples on the East Bank of the Nile to send delegations in February 2000 for a People-to-People peace

Governance

- Strongly urge our political and military leaders to construct civil and military governance systems that will unite all Nuer people and contribute to a reconciled and united south Sudan. This system must be outside the control of the Government of Sudan or persons working in Government of Sudan controlled areas of the country.

- A separation of civil and judicial cases and a rebuilding of the civil judicial system;

- Empowerment of chiefs to handle all local judicial cases and a rebuilding of the civil judicial system;

- Establishment of a police system that will maintain order within our communities and be accountable to the civil administration;

- Instruct all civil administrators to be accountable for their areas, to the people and to work in a close and transparent manner with indigenous and international NGOs;

- Require the regular military and the White Army to demobilize all children under age fifteen;

- Commit ourselves to development of water resources that enable us to have permanent communities, the establishment of schools for our children, health car for our people, and food to sustain ourselves all year

Appeals from Lou Nuer

- To all Nuer; Appeal for unity, peace and shared responsibility for security within a unified political administration.

- To all Neighbors; We declare a unilateral, permanent cease-fire and express our desire to build peace with our neighbors.

- To all Southerners; We appeal for an unending commitment to unite south Sudan so that security is assured, our political objectives are realized and our rights protected.

- To all Friends of South Sudan: We appeal for partners who will help us rebuild our communities, strengthen our civil administration, and provide support for our common security.

A Word of Promise

We will protect this peace against anyone from within our ranks or who would come against us from the outside attempting to destroy our unity and peace. For this peace we are willing to die so that our children may live in peace and enjoy this god land that God has given to us.

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1. Dr. Haruun L. Ruun, Executive Secretary, New Sudan Council of Churches, Nairobi
2. Harold F. Miller, Mennonite Central Committee, Sudan Representative Nairobi
3. Christian R. Manahl, regional Political Adviser, European Union, Nairobi
4. Bertha Kadenyi Amisi, Regional Policy Analyst, ACTIONAID, Nairobi
5. Cirino Hiteng Ofuho, Assistant Professor of International Relations and Politics; Sudan expert, United States International University
6. Dr. Makumi Mwagiru, Director, Centre for Conflict Research, University of Nairobi
7. Attended a Regional Conference on the Prevention of Conflict and Peace Building May 16-18, 2000, Nairobi Kenya Venue: Kenya College Of Communications Technology Mbagathi Campus—Sponsored by PACT, MWENGO, Nairobi Peace Initiative
8. Telar Deng, Assistant to the Executive Director, (Peace Desk) New Sudan Council of Churches, Nairobi
9. Margaret Midogo, Logistics Officer for Liliir Conference, New Sudan Council of Churches, Nairobi
10. Canon Clemend Janda, Secretary General, All Africa Conference of Churches. Southern Sudanese and attendee of the Liliir Conference
11. Paul McDermott, USAID/STAR, Nairobi
12. Elizabeth Otieno, Assistant to Executive Secretary, NSCC

Greater Horn of Africa
Peace Building Project

Stephen Ndegwa

CASE STUDY FIVE:

Peace Building among Northeastern Pastoralists in Kenya: The Wajir Peace and Development Committee

March, 2001

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Appendix from the Report:
The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace
A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

Contract No. GS-23F-8012H, Task Order No. 623-N-00-99-00294-00 for

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ii

Introduction 1

The Sources and Contours of the Conflict 2
- Social Economic Sources and Social Structure 2
- Public Institutions 3
- Mobilization, Political Dynamics, and Leaders 4
- The Intervention: The Rise of the WPDC 4
- Notable Successes in the Intervention 9

Impact of Intervention 14
- Socioeconomic assets 14
- Inter-group relationships 14
- Social and political mobilization 15
- Public institutions and processes 15
- Political leaders 16
- Public behavior and events 16

Facilitative and Constraining Factors 17
- Facilitative Factors 17
- Constraints 18

Conclusions 21

Al Fatah Declaration 24

References 27

Persons Interviewed 29

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The full report can be found at:
http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report.pdf
or write to peacebuilding@yahoo.com for an electronic version.

Executive Summary

This case study examines the work of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC), a community based organization, which has been working in conflict resolution and peace-building in the Wajir District of Kenya's Northeastern Province since 1993. The WPDC has also made moderately successful attempts to replicate its work in other districts of the province.

The conflict in Wajir district, as in other parts of Northeastern Province, is centered around competition for water and pasture land and is exacerbated by general neglect of the region by the central government. Violent conflict, both between communities and the state and among communities, has been endemic in the province since independence. Often disregarding the widespread inter-clan rivalry and violence, the central government has essentially ignored the conflict, especially when it has occurred between communities. For this reason the WPDC's efforts over the last six years have been a very significant innovation. The committee's success in several of its interventions have been significant, so much so that they have attracted notice from other regions of Kenya.

Our findings indicate that the socio-economic structures arising out of the competition over scarce resources predispose communities to intense conflict, especially in periods of drought. The weak and often sporadic and violent reactions of public institutions, notably the local security organs, have contributed not only to intense suspicion of the state but also 'exit' by communities that have turned toward informal and often violent ways to extract justice. Mobilization along clan lines to achieve protection and to respond to aggression has led to a general sense of insecurity and lawlessness and a seemingly unstoppable cycle of violence and destruction.

The creation of the WPDC in 1993 by community leaders turned this tide. Through the formation of several local level institutions, the WPDC has provided platforms to resolve disputes and enhance enforcement of state law mixed with traditional Somali notions of justice. The intervention has also offered innovative ways of co-opting the state to minimize its brutality against citizens, to re-orient its insular structures to facilitate participation, and to enhance its capacity to enforce justice. This partnership is mutually beneficial, as evidenced by comments from partners on both sides and by actual successes in peace making and mediation conducted by the WPDC with the material or enforcement support of the state.

The WPDC's intervention has been especially effective in terms of arresting the violent conflict that had perennially engulfed the district and resolving a number of potentially explosive situations. Moreover, the institutions to which the intervention has given rise, such as the elders council or the collaboration with the local administration, appear to have the potential for long-term peace preservation and enhancement. Our findings

indicate, however, that the WPDC has not been able to invest in the kinds of programs that would address the fundamental causes of conflict in the region.

Finally, we note several shortcomings (such as resource constraints or lack of institutionalization) that may hinder the WPDC's peace-making capacities and its long-term impact. Notable, however, is the fact that the intervention is quite replicable, as modestly successful attempts in at least two other districts suggest.

Introduction

Northeastern Kenya has been embroiled in perennial conflict, both between resident communities and the post-independence government, and among different communities living in the region. Indeed, throughout the independence period up until the 1997 Inter-Parliamentary Parties Group (IPPG) reforms that lifted emergency regulations,[1] the region was administered as a security zone. Especially endemic has been the conflict among communities, usually along clan lines and escalating to cyclical violence. It is in response to this type of conflict that the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) emerged in 1994. As will be evident in this case study, the WPDC has largely succeeded in arresting the conflict in Wajir district over the last six years.

The WPDC emerged in 1993-4 at the height of the most intense communal fighting in the region between 1992 and 1995. These 1992-95 clashes took a very heavy toll on Wajir district. Over 1,200 people were killed; another 2,000 were injured or raped; and thousands of livestock, including 15,000 sheep and goats, over 1,000 camels, and 2,500 cattle, were stolen. Business and daily life was severely disrupted by the looting or destruction of 500 businesses and the hijacking of 30 cars, five of which were never recovered. Fifty primary and secondary schools were disrupted, with adverse effects on 15,000 students; ten of these schools, serving 2,500 students, were forced to close (Ibrahim and Jenner 1996, p. 11). In the words of residents, Wajir had become "a mini-Mogadishu" (p. 12).

At the height of the crisis, violence spread to Wajir town, which had previously been spared for the most part. The murder of a UNICEF pilot by bandits from one clan accusing UNICEF of privileging another clan forced several NGOs to withdraw operations from the district, and many have yet to return. In this atmosphere, killings, revenge killings and counter killings, as well as rustling, were becoming the order of the day. The situation reached its zenith when market women in Wajir town refused to sell milk, vegetables, and meat to women from clans other than their own. Civil society had in effect disintegrated. All other components of society were rent: the elders of different clans stood by ineffectively or, as opinion leaders, urged and fueled counter attacks; the youths, who provided much of the fodder for violence, ran amok; and the women cheered them on, while the government passively stood by.

[1] This was a package of constitutional, legal, and administrative reforms adopted in November 1997. The reforms eased a number of restrictive practices and lifted the State of Emergency in the region.

The Sources and Contours of the Conflict

Conflict in Wajir district, as in other Northeastern Province districts, is centered around competition for water and pasture. This competition is exacerbated not only by drought, but also by the state's behavior, which alternates among neglect, a weak presence, and intense security operations to make up for former shortcomings. In 1992-94, two other factors contributed to a worsening of the situation: the collapse of the Somalia government in 1990, which led to a proliferation of arms through the already porous borders; and the fluidity of the Kenyan transition from authoritarian rule to competitive electoral politics in 1991-92.

Social Economic Sources and Social Structure

Northeastern Province is part of the arid and semi-arid terrain of northern Kenya. It is inhabited by nomadic pastoralists, nearly all of whom are ethnic Somalis. Wajir, with a land area of 56,000-KM square, is the largest of the three districts in the province, with a population of 321,000, of whom 40,000 are resident in the town.[2] Of this population, over 80 percent are nomadic pastoralists herding camels, cattle, goats, and sheep. As with nomadic pastoralists elsewhere, the inhabitants have, over time, evolved an elaborate itinerant mode of survival and various arrangements of sharing critical resources, such as water and pasture. Some of these are amicable arrangements while others have resulted from exercising dominance; but everywhere, conflict and the means that have evolved to manage it, have formed a significant part of the process of securing the livelihood of both humans and livestock. The environment is, therefore, a critical factor contributing to the conflict between various groups in the northeast in general, and in Wajir in particular.

The recurrent droughts intensify an already difficult situation in several expected and unexpected ways. First, drought forces greater competition over grazing land and water points, leading one group to seek pasture in areas demarcated as the preserves of another clan. The scarce rainfall makes it impossible to avoid conflict in periods of drought, since pasture, where it can be found, is not enough to support an expanding herd of local and roving herders. Severe droughts, such as the one underway in 2000 and the one in 1992, also lead to the depletion of the pastoralists' herds. For instance, in 1992, it was estimated that over 80 percent of the herd was destroyed (see *Wajir Story*). More significant, the conflict over scarce water and pasture that occurs in periods of drought is re-enacted as rainfall returns when a wave of rustling is precipitated by the pressure to re-stock one's herds.

Public Institutions

The fragility of the environment and the competition for resources has affected how dominant state powers have governed the region. In its response, the British colonial administration allocated grazing reserves for each major group in the then Northern Frontier District as they did elsewhere in the colony. In Wajir district specifically, they allocated grazing reserves to the three major clans of Degodia, Ajuran, and Ogaden. These boundaries were then adopted by the post-independence government in demarcating the three electoral constituencies in Wajir from 1963 until 1997. As a result, the boundaries have been reified with political significance—through electoral competition, for example—which, as we shall see below, deepens some of the conflict. In clear response to the colonial imprint, the 1997 constituency review carved a fourth constituency in Wajir district in pursuit of preserving clan hegemonies. Thus, Wajir North constituency was carved out of Wajir West where clashes between the Degodia and Ajuran were perennial whenever the Degodia outvoted the Ajuran.

Structural factors also contribute to the conflict in Northeastern Province. Two important ones are a weak state and its secondary effects, and the changing and uncertain political conditions of the transition from authoritarianism to multi-party electoral politics. The state, based on the experience of fighting a separatist movement right after independence, administered the region as a security zone under emergency regulations until 1997. As a result, there has always been a high sensitivity to breakdowns of law and order, although this is not accompanied by high competence in maintaining the same. When skirmishes have occurred between communities or, more than occasionally, attacks have targeted government or civilian installations, the reactions by the state have alternated between ignoring the actions as 'normal' banditry long associated with the region (especially when civilians are targets) and dispatching punitive expeditions reminiscent of colonial pacification exercises (especially when government installations are targets). As a result, there is intense suspicion among residents against the government (typically staffed by “down-country” people) and reciprocal suspicion of the residents by the government and military installations.

Such neglect and prejudice is not lost on residents, observers and activists. For instance, Dekha Ibrahim and Janice Jenner (1996) note that in 1992-95 the violence and suffering in Northeastern Province was at least as severe as that occurring in [other regions, i.e., Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Provinces] of Kenya, but was “almost unreported and unnoticed” (p. 1). This was the same time that ethnic clashes in these other provinces were widely covered in the media and the subject of a Parliamentary inquiry.

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[2] In 1992 the population was estimated at 275,000, with 18,000 in Wajir town. Displaced populations fleeing drought elsewhere in the northeast or fleeing civil war in Somalia have contributed to the expansion in the last decade.

Such neglect, state policies that reify clan boundaries, state violence and general ineffectiveness have led to an acceptance of social violence in the region as normal and expected.[3]

Mobilization, Political Dynamics, and Leaders

The neglect and brutality of the state has also left an important gap in the delivery of justice, especially critical in an environment where survival entails much conflict for control and access of scarce resources. The result has been the mobilization of traditional and communal forces to respond to competition and to needs for justice.

In a province administered as a security zone, the sporadic presence and arbitrariness of the state were particularly evident with the actions of the police and other security actors, especially in the escalation of revenge killings that fueled the 1992-95 crisis. The incapacity of the police to end the violence was evident to residents as, at times, suspected culprits were never arrested or were allowed to go free after, residents suspected, paying bribes to security forces. The residents thus lost confidence in the justice system offered by the modern state. Instead they resorted to their own brand of justice, which often entailed avenging wrongs communally. Indeed, this is not dissimilar to the now established practice in other parts of Kenya, where lynching suspected criminals occurs regularly—a terrifying reminder of the extent to which the public has lost confidence in the police ability to arrest and prosecute dangerous criminals.

As will be evident, conflict behavior among political leaders has been muted and not very pronounced in the public sphere. Unlike the Rift Valley, for example, where public utterances in national media and public meetings have incited populations and spread propaganda fueling ethnic clashes, mobilization by public figures has been unnoticeable in Wajir.[4] Instead, a veneer of public civility masks the incitement that occurs within the smaller public spaces of intra-clan interactions and the reproductions of social reality within these closed spaces. As reported by interviewees, incitement ranges from elders soliciting revenge actions in reaction to specific incidents, to women taunting their men-folk to punish other clans for apparent wrongs, to social learning that demands revenge as substantive to justice and upholding family/clan honor.

The Intervention: The Rise of the WPDC

In June 1993, some women drawn from the small well-educated and business elites in Wajir town were attending a wedding and began discussing how to arrest the violence

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[3] See, for example, the views expressed in a recent Daily Nation editorial, below.

[4] More recently, however, some indications of public utterances that incite violence have been evident in one of the conflicts (as will be noted below) where a local Member of Parliament has fueled aggression. Interestingly, this area is dominated by KANU supporters and has therefore not seen interests and interest articulation or aggression defined along party lines.

that immobilized the district. The impetus was the realization that there were no winners in the two-year, low-intensity, but costly, clash between clans. The breakdown of civility in the public space was in sharp contradiction to the amicable and ornate relations within the private spaces of women in Muslim weddings. Among the women spearheading the decision to seek a dialogue on peace were senior district government workers, two college-educated women, and an entrepreneur owning a private school. These women, drawn from different clans, agreed to work toward peace and formed a committee called Women for Peace to coordinate their efforts. Their initial activities included door-to-door canvassing for peace. They also facilitated a resolution by civil servants from various clans who, in continuing to work closely at their places of employment, contradicted the pervasive climate of inter-clan rivalry. These youthful (mostly male) civil servants came together to commit to peace and to working together as the Youth for Peace. The two initial groups—Women for Peace and Youth for Peace—formed the Wajir Peace Group (WPG).

A second and critical stage for the WPG was to attract elders to their nascent peace efforts. With support from the local UNICEF and Oxfam representatives, the WPG approached elders to encourage them to seek a cease-fire in the clashes and to organize meetings toward resolving the numerous conflicts. As a result, an additional committee called Elders for Peace was formed. While the women's appeal for peace was being echoed across the community and the youth were organizing activities to support the peace efforts, the creation of a council of elders (that came to be known as Al Fatah elders) was the watershed event.

The elders met in a Madrassa known as Al Fatah and were selected in a process that involved all clans. Each of the three major clans was asked to nominate 75 elders, while the smaller clans or 'corner' clans were asked to nominate four each. The selected elders met for seven days at Al Fatah for the express purpose of thrashing out the issues that affected their particular clans. Thereafter, each clan was asked to nominate a slate of elders (25 from each major clan and one each from the corner clans) to form a steering committee, which then selected 37 among them as the recognized Al Fatah elders. Each Al Fatah elder took an oath to be impartial. Drawn from a process considered representative by all clans, these elders would speak and act on behalf of the community, without division in terms of clans. A further seven days were devoted to consensus building on peace and setting up rules and codes of enforcing the peace and extracting allegiance. The result was the Al Fatah Declaration (See Appendix).

The Al Fatah Declaration has become the most important tool for peace building in Wajir district. It is the document most expressive of the creative mix of the Somali justice system, backed by the enforcement capacity of the state. It has deep legitimacy because elders with secure legitimacy in various competing clans negotiated it over time and because communities, especially women and youth, were recognized as stakeholders, if not prime movers. The Al Fatah elders have become, comparatively, a critical element to achieving peace in Wajir because, as men, they command greater traditional claims to leadership than women and, as older persons, more claims to community leadership than the youth. This subdivision in gender and age underscores

the extent to which traditional Somali social organization and social mores lend structure, legitimacy and efficacy to these efforts.

While the Women for Peace, Youth for Peace, and the Al Fatah elders work independently as separate entities, they are integral parts of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee. The WPDC, in turn, sits as part of the District Development Committee and the District Security Committee, both chaired by the District Commissioner. This gives the WPDC, which is a mix between a community-based organization (CBO) and a consortium of several government[5] and NGO service units, a rather unique profile. Most CBOs and NGOs in Kenya avoid integration into a government organ as this typically leads to stifling creativity and initiative and often compromises the independence of the organization. In the Wajir case, the situation has been very different.

Indeed, the decision to integrate into the government development and security committees was deliberate and strategic. The founders of the WPDC did not see how it could achieve peace and enforce it without the collaboration of the state. Moreover, the state, when left to its own devices, was in many instances acting in ways that did not necessarily promote peace, especially by its punitive conflict suppression. Integrating local administrative organs into peace building offered a way to reduce the suspicion inherent in the three-decade-old relationship between the state and the Northeastern communities. Assigning the chair's role to the District Commissioner also allowed for instant legitimacy and avoided further conflicts over which clan should head the group. Since the DC is the most senior official in the district, it is also easier to integrate the WPDC into the security committee, which comprises the heads of police, intelligence, and army in the district.

Indeed, as is evident in several instances, it is the local administration that has been co-opted rather than the other way round. For instance, in the current DC's own words, they (government) could not have achieved any peace without the help of the elders and the WPDC in general. Moreover, the WPDC has been able to co-opt two of the three DCs who came in after DC K. M. Rintari, who was critical to the Committee's founding and initial success. In the one exception, the Committee lobbied the higher levels of the provincial administration and the Permanent Secretary to have the DC transferred. This DC was viewed as ineffective in peace building due to a lackadaisical attitude or, worse, behavior that fueled the crisis.[6]

According to interviewees, the most difficult official to co-opt is usually the new army commander who comes in with the new division rotated into the district every six

[5] Or, perhaps more correctly, a consortia of heads of these units.

[6] While rare, this is not unheard of. For instance, a DC from Moyale was transferred after local leaders accused him of being partial to one clan (Daily Nation July 4, 2000, p. 25; Daily Nation, April 13, 2000, p. 5).

months. The commander, usually a “down country” Kenyan, has typical prejudices compounded by the military’s reluctance to share security concerns with civilians. No Army commander has ever remained unreceptive to the WPDC’s work, however, due in large measure to the WPDC’s track record of achievement in conflict resolution and its networking with district administrative organs.

The WPDC take-off was highlighted by two events that occurred in 1993-94. In a more functional administrative system, these events would be considered quite mundane, but in Wajir, especially during that period, were inspiring and galvanizing. In one event, bandits hijacked a truck carrying 35 people and murdered the passengers. A typical response from the administration would have been either a lethargic and bureaucratic reaction or the arrest of suspects (often, innocent persons) and dismissal of these suspects afterwards for lack of evidence. In this case, however, the District Commissioner, Mr. K. M. Rintari, who was new to the area, personally visited the scene of the crime with security officers. In what one respondent described as the first time ever in Wajir’s post-independence experience, the security forces pursued the perpetrators in the night and arrested them within hours. These perpetrators were promptly prosecuted. As a result, the elders of the various clans agreed there was no need to extract a communal punishment on the perpetrators’ clans in response to the incident because the perpetrators had not been harbored by the clans and were obviously acting independently of the clan. Moreover, the culprits had already been dealt with under state law. As a result no revenge killings took place in connection with this incident.

The second incident involved the community in successful enforcement of the nascent Al Fatah declaration. This incident involved a typical case of murder arising out of a feud. In this case, one of two young men feuding over a gun killed the other. As a result the victim’s clan avenged his murder and the other clan avenged in equal measure. By the time the WPDC’s Rapid Response Team[7] arrived, 17 people had been killed in the violence and the cycle seemed unstoppable. The elders meeting spearheaded by the Al Fatah elders, however, was able to persuade the clans to cease fire and embrace provisions of the Al Fatah Declaration. For instance, it was agreed that the first killing was murder and would be dealt with by prosecuting the perpetrator who was immediately arrested. The subsequent killings were to be viewed as revenge killings in the Somali tradition and would be dealt with under Somali practices, including formal traditional apologies (*sabeen*), compensation, and blood money payments (see also Ibrahim and Jenner 1996, p. 18).

Women, as noted above, were critical to the initial peace effort, as they were the first to concretely articulate the inchoate search for peace in Wajir. In more settled times, women have not been at the center of activities. For instance, they rarely participate in

[7] The Rapid Response Team is an ad hoc committee of mostly elders, who can be mobilized at short notice to investigate and establish first contact with communities in crisis.

the Rapid Response Teams and the meetings with the DC almost exclusively involve male elders. This is not always the case, however. Educated women actually occupy leading positions within the WPDC. For instance the secretary to the Committee is Ms. Nuria Abdilahi; the previous secretary was Ms. Dekha Ibrahim, who is presently away on study leave. These women sit in the District Development Committee (DDC) and the District Security Committee (DSC), the most important administrative organs in the district.

Women have also been involved in direct peace work. For example, women representatives from the WPDC were critical to resolving the dispute at Berjanai, where villagers got into a violent confrontation due to water shortages arising from the current drought. Accompanied by two elders, two women members of the WPDC held meetings with the clan women involved in the dispute and convinced them to share the resource. At other times, the women in the WPDC have undertaken work to alleviate the secondary effects of violence, which often are most burdensome to women. For example, in 1998 the Women for Peace raised funds among women in Wajir to buy household implements and food for distraught survivors of the 1998 Bagalla massacre.[8] Women have also been critical to the early warning system, as they interact with one another across clan lines more regularly than other community members do.

The youth have also been instrumental in securing peace in Wajir district. Youths have been the main perpetrators of violence, and, as such, their integration into the peace process very significantly diminishes the availability of a reserve of discontented (or otherwise unoccupied) youths who can be mobilized easily into violence. Educated young men who occupy important civil service positions in the district (such as heads of departments or provincial administration officers) lead the youth movement.[9] The Youth for Peace programs seek to neutralize factors contributing to idleness and therefore recruitment into militia. For example, the youth leaders have raised funds and equipment from business people and the local Catholic Church to sponsor a soccer tournament and the local youth polytechnic. The latter is particularly important in developing marketable skills among the growing mass of unemployed and encouraging non-violent lifestyles. Moreover, the youth leaders and young men (such as those in the soccer league) provide examples of peaceful and fruitful co-existence among people from different clans.

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[8] In this incident in 1998 the military and police reportedly murdered scores of Somali and/or Boran people in Wajir in a security operation.

[9] The youth leaders include administrators in the district commissioner's office, the district co-operatives officer, a head of a local NGO, and a officer in charge of the arid lands program sponsored by the Office of the President. They all have at least an advanced high school diploma or diploma institute training, and at least one is a university graduate.

Notable Successes in the Intervention

The Wajir Peace and Development Committee has succeeded in six notable ways:

a) It has achieved peaceful settlements in most interventions,

b) It has established an infrastructure for responding to conflict and promoting peace,

c) It has revived elements of the pre-colonial Somali justice system, which, when combined with the modern state system, seems to assure more peace than either one by itself,

d) It has induced perceptible attitudinal change and reduced the incidents of retaliation,

e) It has targeted, with modest success, (ex-)combatants through development projects, and,

f) It has produced a model of CBO-government collaboration in peace building that is unique in Kenya and that is being replicated in other northeastern communities.

These impacts are replicable in a number of instances and could be used to enhance other emerging models of community-government collaboration in peace building.[10]

As anywhere else, peace building is an arduous task and involves long, protracted processes. Three examples will illustrate how the WPDC has tried to achieve peace and the effect it has had.

The first illustrative example arises from events in December 1999, when bandits from state-less Somalia attacked a remote Kenya Police Post in the border division of Diff and stole an HK 11 light machine gun. This by itself is not an unfamiliar occurrence in Northeastern Province. As was the regular practice, the government began to mobilize its security forces to retrieve the gun. From past experience the Somali elders in Wajir knew that the government would apply maximum force, often achieving few of its objectives and instead exacting colossal collateral damage in terms of harassment, arrests, and, often, rape of women from Kenyan villages where the government's writ could be extended.

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[10] For instance, the OAU/IBAR program pursues similar community based peace-building work among groups in the northern Kenya area, especially among the Turkana of Kenya, the Taposa of Southern Sudan and the Karamojong of Uganda. Their main entry point is veterinary services, which cannot go on without peace among the communities. They found that the communities were willing to work together on issues related to animal health, from which then peace teams and peace negotiations typically arose with facilitation by OAU/IBAR. A similar program is operated by the Intermediate Technology Development Group, which is facilitating community-level peace building among various clans in the northern region of Kenya, especially Marsabit.

As a result, elders from the WPDC, especially members of Al Fatah, organized to send a peace and recovery mission to Somalia. As is the case with such missions, resources were cobbled together from various sources: the DC provided a vehicle, fuel, and armed escort, while other organizations (such as Oxfam and Nomadic Primary Health Care) provided other logistical support, including food for the elders. The elders drove 50-60 miles into Somalia to meet clan elders there. They explained to the Somalia clan elders that the bandits' actions would bring untold suffering to their kin in Kenya and that they, the elders in Somalia, should, instead of harboring the bandits, facilitate the return of the gun. As a result, the elders of the other clan took it upon themselves to find the culprits with the firearm, retrieve it, and hand it over to the Al Fatah elders and the Kenyan authorities at the border (or what remains of it!). Commendation from the DC was effusive, as reflected in his letter to the committee and individual Al Fatah elders and copied to the Provincial Commissioner.[11]

In another example, the WPDC was invited to help resolve clan feuds in neighboring Garissa district. The intervention was triggered by an attack of the Aulivan clan by the Abduwak clan as part of a long running feud. On April 1 and 2, 2000, the Al Fatah elders were invited by local leaders and the DC to mediate between the two clans. As a result, a number of resolutions echoing the Al Fatah Declaration were adopted by the two clans in a mediated meeting at the Teacher Training College in Garissa. In a pattern mirroring how the Al Fatah Declaration was established, the mediation process included an initial period of thrashing out the animus, after which the groups agreed on 'sabeen' or traditional apology and an immediate cease-fire.

A center piece of the Al Fatah Declaration was adopted in Garissa: any community that contravenes the peace resolution and harbors bandits would be fined twice the number of animals stolen and pay the traditional Somali compensation for loss of life. Communities living near scenes of highway robbery would henceforth be held responsible for thuggery in their areas and pay for the loss and damage. The meeting culminated in the formation of a PDC in Garissa to emulate the one in Wajir district. Significantly, since the April peace-building work by the WPDC, no clan violence had been reported among the Abduwaks and the Auliyans by mid-August when fieldwork for this study was completed.

Finally, the WPDC has been active in the ongoing dispute between the Garre and the Ajuran clans in northern Wajir, on the border of Wajir and Mandera districts. In the latest skirmish before the WPDC got involved, 35 people had died and over 6,000 head of cattle had been stolen between January and July 2000. This conflict encapsulates the range of factors that animate violent conflict in Northeastern Province. It also illustrates the difficulty of achieving success without repeated efforts at mediation and the difficulties arising from the involvement of politicians in already complicated conflicts.

[11] This letter was shown to the author during the case study site visit.

In northern Wajir, the fighting has been between the Garre clan, which comes principally from Mandera district and has close relations in Ethiopia, and the Ajuran community, which is the majority clan in the area, especially in the new Wajir North constituency. The Garre, who are pastoralists and farmers, have over the years settled into Wajir North and recently had a chief appointed for them to ease administration. The Ajuran community sees this trend in population expansion, sedentary farming, and the recent political inroads (selection of a chief) among the Garre as very troubling. The Ajuran fear this settlement threatens not only their access to pasture, but also their political dominance in the constituency ostensibly carved out in 1997 for their benefit. In fact, the Ajuran aver that the new chief is in fact a Mandera resident and they vow not to accept "foreign" chiefs in Wajir district (Daily Nation, April 27, 2000).[12]

Thus the clashes that have pitted these two communities have escalated, with the government seemingly impotent, while the local MP (elected in the new constituency by the Ajuran majority) stokes Ajuran discontent by asking the Garre to return to 'their' areas in Mandera. The death toll is high and the livestock rustling has led to thousands of cattle and camels being taken across the border to Ethiopia.

As the Wajir PDC secretary noted on a peace making visit, the tension in the area was palpable:

> At Gurar the situation was tense and all the residents of the town were camped at the police station. The fear was caused by the killing of two Ajuran clansmen.... At Bute station the situation was even more tense since all the residents of the town were camped at the police (station), (Administration) police lines and also at Bute Arid Zone primary school... (Elmi 2000, p. 1).

Indeed, reminiscent of the lawlessness in 1992-95 that triggered the Wajir PDC creation, the Daily Nation editorialized:

> The Government has lost grip of the security situation in northern, eastern, and northeastern Kenya. It is unimaginable that a Government can condone this kind of anarchy. These regions are fast acquiring the image of ungovernable bastions run by untouchable clan warlords (Daily Nation, July 22, 2000, p. 6).

In this context of a seemingly hopeless and spiraling violent situation, the WPDC has been very active in this area since the conflict broke out. In April 2000 WPDC facilitated

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[12] This issue echoes a similar conflict in Isiolo where ethnic Somali had moved into the area in the mid-1990s due to drought. However, over the years they have sunk roots in these areas and by the 1997 elections they were able to register to vote and elect one of their own as a councilor and contribute significantly to the election of the current Member of Parliament. In the violence in Isiolo where over 100 people were killed, the political leaders (including cabinet members) have agreed—contrary to the constitution—to repatriate the ethnic Somali to 'their' areas.) See Daily Nation May 26, 2000, p. 32; May 30, 2000, p. 7.

a four-day meeting between elders from Mandera and Wajir districts. The initial session consisted of both sides airing their grievances in open discussions. The nature of the complaints highlights the range of factors contributing to conflict in the region and the depth of this conflict.

For instance, Garre businessmen in the region complained of being robbed with impunity by Ajuran youths and claimed the bandits had established nine "toll stations" on the roads leading into the town (Elmi 2000, p. 2). The Garre also complained of being discriminated against in access to water and pasture and in the issuance of national identity cards in Bute sub-district (Elmi 2000, p. 2). On their part, the Ajurans complained that the Garre came to the district in 1979 during a severe drought but never left after conditions improved in their home regions. Instead they invited their kin to join them in their new settlements. They accused the Garre of sponsoring highway banditry and cutting off the Ajuran from their neighbors. The Ajurans also accused the Garre of sponsoring banditry attacks on villages and outposts, including sponsoring or sheltering "their allies" from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).[13]

After this initial parley, the two groups agreed to peace-building resolutions after the traditional *sabeen* and a fine of KShs. 10,000 (US$150) was imposed on the Garre for breaking the peace. The two communities then agreed to cease fire, impose fines of 200 camels for any murderous breach of the cease-fire, re-settle displaced families and have quarterly peace meetings between the two districts. The District Commissioners for Wajir and Mandera present or represented at the peace meetings were to provide security for the re-settlement of the displaced people. As part of this resettlement program, a PDC committee made up of five elders from each warring clan was selected. For the next three days the committee, joined by three elders from the WPDC and one its youth leaders, devoted its energies to re-settlement.

The immediate result was the easing of tensions, the resettlement of displaced people, and the creation of a Mandera-Wajir (Garre-Ajuran) PDC (see also Daily Nation April 11, 2000, p. 18). At the time of the author's fieldwork in Wajir (July/August 2000), conflict had resumed in the north, and the WPDC was making arrangements to return for further mediation. The failure to secure lasting peace is probably not surprising, as is evident in the government's own failure to secure peace through internal efforts via police action or external efforts via diplomatic action. This underscores the difficulty of resolving such conflicts at the formal institutional level. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reported to Parliament that he had summoned the Ethiopian Ambassador to Kenya to demand that 6,000 head of cattle stolen in one of the raids be returned, and the Ambassador had undertaken to facilitate the return (Daily Nation, June 19, 2000). Yet by the time this author visited Wajir several months later, the

[13] In addition there have also been accusations that the Garre collude with the Tigray People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (TPRLF). However, no evidence was found to support these claims. Such accusations are most suspect (Daily Nation, June 19, 2000, p. 5).

animals had not been returned and the DC had been requested to go Ethiopia to discuss the conflict with his counterpart.[14]

[14] Indeed, the area MP also noted in Parliament that the animals had not been returned, contradicting the Foreign Minister's optimistic statement.

Impact of Intervention

In terms of the framework set out for this assessment and for the comparative studies within which it is undertaken, a number of outcomes can be traced to the intervention. While impact is not noticeable (or even expected) in all the factors investigated, where it is, it has been significant. Although its permanence is difficult to project, the effects of the WPDC's work is especially significant in the degree of change it has wrought on social reality in the district. Often radical within the local context (and indeed Kenya), such change is sustained by the commitment of the WPDC and its partners in spite of a host of contraindications, mostly in terms of the historical precedents or social practices.

Socioeconomic assets

Very few of the socio-economic structures shaped predominantly by the long-term climate patterns of drought and scarcity have been changed by the work of the WPDC. This clearly has not been, however, a central goal of the WPDC. The Committee's goals have focused on resolving *conflicts* that arise out of these foundational causes of intense competition and conflict. Thus, the WPDC has not invested efforts in any programs to structurally manage the distribution or sharing of scarce resources such as water or pasture, but instead has focused on *ad hoc* responses to conflict that arise over such matters.

Even when faced with instances where the conflict clearly arises from inequitable allocation of resources or a break down of resource-sharing mechanisms, the WPDC's intervention has been driven most immediately by the priority to restore peace rather than establish any equity in sharing resources. This is clearly the case in the examples cited of the conflict over water among women in Barjenai or the conflict over land among the Garre and the Ajuran. Moreover, as is clear in the articulation of the intervention, the originators and implementers of the intervention pay little attention to the distribution of socio-economic assets. The WPDC's work does have the potential, however, for affecting distributive issues as peace making produces a momentum for setting up structures that could address them.

Inter-group relationships

The WPDC interventions have had the most pronounced effect on the relationship between groups, especially clans, in Wajir district, and in Garissa and Mandera where it has sought to replicate its work. For instance, as is evident in the examples highlighted, the WPDC's interventions, starting with re-building community relations rent by the communal warfare in 1992-95, have reduced feelings of insecurity and every day tensions in Wajir.

The reduction of tensions in Wajir is celebrated in Wajir town. Several informants reported that, during the conflict, it was inadvisable to take a casual walk in town after dark as one would be risking life and limb. Yet, at the time fieldwork for this study was

undertaken, Wajir town was sleepy but active in the evenings. The situation evident in 1993-95 was effectively reversed and much of the credit, as observers including the local government officials indicated, goes to the work of the WPDC in enhancing communication between clans. The creation of the supra-clan Al Fatah group, with its rapid response capacity, wide legitimacy and recognized neutrality, were significant assets in reducing tensions.

The fact that the WPDC has been invited to mediate conflicts in neighboring districts, and has been the subject of at least one visit by community leaders from Rift Valley Province, is a noteworthy indicator of their success in restoring civility, justice, and order among groups. Where the WPDC has been invited to mediate conflicts—in Garissa and Mandera, for example—it has had modest success in easing tensions and setting up intra-clan platforms for conflict resolution.

Social and political mobilization

Related to the WPDC's success in pacifying inter-group relations, its interventions have had a substantial influence on 'braking' the wide spread mobilization of clans into warring factions. While the WPDC has not undertaken any effort to socialize the population into re-imaging themselves outside clans, it has succeeded in reducing the tendency to mobilize for violent action within clans. The WPDC legitimizes these clans but seeks to use their networks and internal cohesion as tools to enforce justice and behavior supportive of the preservation of civil peace. Instead of attempting to change the structures of Somali society (as every dominant power has previously tried to do), the WPDC worked through Somali structures while changing the incentives and stimuli toward preferences for peace and legitimate justice upheld by both the state and the traditional system. Thus the WPDC work has been successful in large part due not to de-legitimizing or exploiting clan arrangements (as the colonialists and the modern state did) but to finding positive synergies within these versatile arrangements to galvanize for peace.

Public institutions and processes

This is another area where the WPDC's impact has been profound, although the durability of this impact remains an open question. Clearly, the WPDC has been very effective in co-opting or collaborating with local administrative structures in ways that were unheard of in the district and that are still very rare in Kenya. In its somewhat fluid set-up, the WPDC has opened up several platforms for discussing local issues through its constituent units, such as the Women for Peace, the Youth for Peace, and the Al Fatah elders. As a separate entity and as a member of the DDC, the WPDC has also provided the most significant platform for the public to participate in local administrative decisions.

Second, the interventions that the WPDC has pursued in communities have brought to those communities a platform for discussion of conflict issues and a trusted and resourceful (in terms of enforcement) partner to mediate conflicts. At the community

level too, the WPDC has turned the otherwise insular and often brutal structures of the local administration into more open, accessible, and partnering institutions in resolving community problems from conflicts—the main preoccupation—to drought relief.

Overall, the WPDC has created new processes, opened up existing ones, and made decision-making processes to be perceived as more legitimate across all clans. Indeed, it is not surprising that an immediately noticeable difference between Wajir community actors and similar persons encountered by the author in other parts of Kenya, is the level of efficacy the former exhibit regardless of class, age, or clan.

Political leaders

The effect of the WPDC's interventions on political leaders and their role in conflict and conflict resolution in Wajir district is not evident. This is because the conflicts have been mainly communal and the dialogue has not involved political leaders, but clan elders, women, and others acting at levels lower than most politicians pursue. Moreover, the conflicts have not involved the kind of partisan politics that have tended to intensify and escalate violent conflict in other parts of Kenya. Indeed, in the situation noted in north Wajir the involvement of the local MP is incidental to the core issues of conflict, i.e., competition over access to resources.

Public behavior and events

Related to the minimal role played by politicians, the conflict in the region has also not been animated by the public actions and rhetoric of individuals or group leaders. Unlike the ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley or even the parallel conflict in Eastern Province (e.g., Isiolo), the Wajir case shows very little evidence of public commentary, rhetoric or incitement.[15] Most of the violent acts that fuel conflict in Wajir are undertaken by individuals or by small bands (e.g., murder and banditry), while revenge actions are similarly planned within private spaces in clans or enacted following what seem to be socially learned pathways to protect honor and exact justice.

One noticeable impact of the WPDC's work is a shift in how people interpret such public events as murder and robbery. By de-emphasizing rumors or claims that these crimes are targeted at clans and by emphasizing that they are more random than targeted, the WPCD has minimized the possibility of revenge. The example of the interpretation of the conflict (and murderous spree) that flared after the murder of one of the two youths feuding over a gun is instructive in this case. Similarly, such alternative interpretation was useful in arresting revenge violence after the murder of the thirty-five truck passengers in 1993.

[15] The conflict in Wajir North is an exception, but not a significant one as noted above.

Facilitative and Constraining Factors

In spite of the checkered results in terms of achieving a permanent peace, especially in recent conflicts, the Wajir PDC is a credible example of how peace building can be effected at the grassroots level. In terms of what makes this model work, three factors can be isolated analytically, although it is clear they work in cohort.

Facilitative Factors

First is the range of alliances on which the Wajir PDC subsists. The collaboration brings together several organizations and individuals and therefore resources and leverage vis-a-vis the government and feuding communities. The collaboration with government eases coordination and provides both legitimacy and the weight of legal sanction when necessary. The collaboration with elders especially lends credence to the traditional system of justice that the peace efforts are dependent on. Collaboration with NGOs and other CBOs brings in several essential resources such as vehicles, fuel, food, and development follow-up or at least the promise of it.

These alliances between different sectors produce access to resources for the resource-starved organization. For example to respond to conflict in the vast arid area it is necessary to have access to all-terrain vehicles and fuel which, alternatively, NGOs and the government (through the DC) have provided. Similarly peace work would be impossible to pursue in the context of continued insecurity without the support of military personnel and regular police to enforce the writ of the state and backstop the peace initiatives with legitimate (and comparatively greater) force. As such the presence of the securocrats in the Wajir PDC and the material, planning, and logistical support from the DC, the police, and the Army is critical to the PDC's efforts.

A second critical factor has been the revived traditional Somali justice system, which provides an instantly legitimate system that is acceptable to most people and which is intertwined with the daily workings of the communities. The ability to blend this system, which relies on face-to-face interactions, with the justice system of the modern state, which relies on force, has been fruitful in achieving peace or credible movement toward peace. Given the modern system faces severe legitimacy problems because of its sporadic, corruptible, and inefficient ways, it was critical that another system was available to supplement its legitimacy.

The final factor that contributed to Wajir PDC's emergence and success is the presence of committed local administrative officials willing to collaborate and support the local-level initiatives. The first opportunity for trying the community intervention arose with the posting of the former DC Mr. K. M. Rintari, who all interviewees asserted was instrumental in establishing the PDC, in securing peace in 1993-4, and in integrating the Wajir PDC into the district governance organs. As one respondent asserted, Rintari opened up the otherwise insular administration and even allowed civilians to travel in the same vehicles as security officers -- a situation unheard of before. Indeed, Rintari's

centrality to the peace efforts is evident from the current DC's eager attempts to sustain and further the work of his predecessor and in his assertion that "he left very big shoes to fill". The fortuitous nature of this opportunity was evident when a contrary DC was posted to the area after Rintari and the PDC and its allies were forced to lobby for his removal due to his hostility to or ineffectiveness in peace efforts.

Constraints

Even with these notable achievements the Wajir PDC has been constrained in several ways. Among the most important is a shortage of resources to facilitate rapid response to conflict and to allow for institutionalization of peace infrastructure. The fact that the PDC has always had to cobble together resources from several sympathetic partners to respond to conflicts indicates its very weak capacity. Most important, the PDC has operated on its own local fund-raising efforts so far without much input from supportive or admiring partners, USAID included. The extent of local support has included the elders and women giving freely of their time for peace activities and thus taking them away from their own livelihood duties. The government officials and NGO employees usually have to take off work or work on their own time for the efforts; others such as business people have to abandon their activities, often at very short notice. Important peace promotion activities such as a peace festival and a peace prize given to chiefs most active in promoting peace among their subjects have had to be suspended after their launch due to lack of funds to sustain them beyond the first year.

Consistent donor support is therefore lacking with the effect of reducing the capacity of the group to respond effectively and efficiently to conflict situations, to support early warning and rapid response systems, and to implement peace resolutions. Donor support has at best been sporadic. For instance, Oxfam has provided emergency funds, vehicles, or food but not programmatic support; the DC has also provided vehicles from his already strained motor pool. Individuals and business people have offered foodstuff for traveling peace teams, while women have fund-raised from among themselves for relief supplies for victim families. Most significant is that the community has been able to sustain this level of giving for the last seven years. However, the burden has exacted a price in terms of attrition among the elders and women groups.

More significantly, this resource constraint has endangered activities among the youth, which of necessity should be ongoing rather than episodic as with mediation. For example, the Youth Polytechnic project has effectively stalled due to lack of funds. The polytechnic's revival was conceived as a way of re-training youth so as to provide alternative occupations to idle youth easily recruited into violent excursions. The polytechnic is a state-supported institution with a capacity of 100 students. However, the state support is dismal: the infrastructure is decayed, there is no water on the campus, and the staff is severely underpaid.[16] As a result the enrolment is only 23 students. The

[16] The highest paid instructor earns KShs. 2000 [i.e. US$ 26 a month].

Wajir PDC has previously provided the polytechnic with KShs. 100,000 (i.e. US$ 1,333) out of local fundraising and the Catholic mission provided free lunch for students. However, the PDC has not been able to continue this support and the Catholic mission has suspended its program. In the current drought conditions it is unlikely the community will be able to support the Wajir PDC initiatives at the same level as before. People's resources are extremely stretched, time is devoted mostly to making ends meet, while the DC's and NGO resources are devoted to the famine relief effort.

Apart from resource scarcity, the PDC also suffers from organizational and structural weaknesses. It is a nebulous structure, whose strength is that it is a hub of collaboration but which then undermines its institutionalization. As such many of its internal workings are reliant on personal and professional ties developed from close physical proximity. For instance, the PDC is housed with two of its most significant organizational supporters (the Nomadic Primary Health Care project and the District Cooperative Office) and is a stone-throw from the District Commissioner's complex. The organization's emergence from personal ties and the close proximity of its officers has allowed for smooth operations but has also resulted in underdeveloped institutional mechanisms of decision making. Although WPDC members confirm no evident problems, this remains a potential pitfall.

For example, there is really no central office and no established modes of decision making nor established patterns of authority. In effect while its conflict response is admirable, the Wajir PDC's structures are weak as demonstrated by its lack of formal registration, and its capacity is fragile as demonstrated by its difficulties raising funds outside the local area. The fact that its senior and founding members are a like-minded cohort of government or NGO workers is a potential hazard as retrenchment and re-deployment –- ever likely in the context of a contracting state -- would seriously undermine its cohesion.

Moreover, the WPDC's close relationship with the government is difficult to characterize precisely and thus to project its implications. Is it a client, an independent peace organ, a component of the security infrastructure, or a useful but ultimately dependent ally? Each of these designations would have its limitations. While such limitations are not as yet evident, they are likely to emerge in time, especially if there is a turnover in the Committee's membership. Indeed, close relations with the government may taint an organization's reactions to social issues (see Ndegwa 1996). This is so especially in a case such as this where the organization is dependent on the government at several levels and is dealing in an area that is clearly at the core of the imperatives of the state (i.e. security). It is clear that while the activities of the Wajir PDC indicate wide latitude, it is one that is ultimately circumscribed by state interests.

Finally, the very nature of the conflict in Wajir, and Northeastern Province as a whole poses the ultimate challenge to the Wajir Peace and Development Committee. The conflict is driven, as noted earlier, by poverty and environmental challenges complicated by state action and inaction. The environmental regime of cyclical droughts, often accompanied by famine and herd depletion, the intense competition for pasture and

water even in good weather, and the history of reified colonial and (now) electoral boundaries all fuel a vicious cycle of despair, conflict, and violence.

Clearly, the WPDC is most successful in stopping the violence and especially the revenge killings that animate the conflict within the district. Its efforts to promote peace-building infrastructure (e.g. Al Fatah Declaration, Rapid Response Teams, and replica PDCs in Mandera, Garissa, and Moyale) have met credible but limited success. However, its efforts to fully institutionalize itself, its peace structures, and indeed 'peace through development' projects to address the core causes of conflict have yet to take-off due to resource and capacity constraints.

Conclusions

The Wajir Peace and Development Committee illustrates the possibilities for local level dialogue for peace building in Kenya. The WPDC's peace building activities in Wajir district and elsewhere in Kenya over the last six years has produced several instances of success at arresting immediate conflict; its innovative institutions have the potential for effecting long lasting conflict management. In spite of the several challenges it faces and the limited scope of its goals and actual work, the WPDC provides us with several lessons that can be applied in replicating this model elsewhere.

At the most basic level, the WPDC's various interventions have arrested conflict, an especially significant outcome in a situation such as Wajir and Northeastern Province in general. Beyond this, it has enhanced the institutional context within which pursuit of more sustainable peace could be achieved. Principal among its contributions has been the introduction of community-level institutions for dialogue and legitimate enforcement; re-orienting the actions and attitudes of local state actors; and, generally increasing local capacity to address immediate problems of violent conflict.

The WPDC's limitations are clearly in the area of long-term sustainability of its conflict containment and, even more importantly, its neutralizing the fundamental causes of conflict. Thus, the Committee has little capacity to sustain its work under present resource constraints. However, the WPDC has established itself as a credible institution providing a real possibility for expanding into interventions that will ultimately address the underlying causes of conflict in the region. As the instances of replication detailed in the discussion above suggest, the WPDC intervention is one that is infinitely replicable, especially in similar conflict environments such as those in eastern and northwestern Kenya (i.e. Eastern Province and upper Rift Valley province).

It is clear from the above discussion that Islam formed an important foundation for making the Wajir PDC work a success. For instance, Islam is the near exclusive religion of the district and Somali traditions are informed by this religion. As such it make for a credible reference point for public morality and, as with the case of the Al Fatah Declaration, provides both the institutions (e.g. Madrassa) within which legitimate and revered negotiations can take place and the shared moral or legal script to undergird resolutions. Obviously, each community will provide a different ideal entry point for peace making that is legitimate and carries weight. Thus, while Islam may be critical entry point for peace making in Wajir, it is less of so in Isiolo where there is a mix of religions (Christianity, Islam, and traditional). In other areas such as Northwest Kenya where traditional religion is more prevalent, peace-making efforts have relied on other areas of commonality between warring groups, in this case veterinary services.

There are several lessons that one can draw from this case in contemplating replication or policy options. An obvious caveat is that each case conflict is deeply idiosyncratic and best understood and prescribed for though an in-depth understanding of its history, factors and changing contexts. In addition, it is obvious that besides the peculiar

conditions that obtain in this case, the usual imperatives such as a highly committed coterie of individuals who bring energy and leadership and who are entrepreneurial on behalf of peace have contributed to the success of WPDC.

From the WPDC, we can suggest the following lessons:

- Traditional institutions can play a significant role in providing legitimate frameworks for negotiating peace, enforcing sanctions, and providing the state with the legitimacy it often lacks at the grassroots levels.

- Even where civil society is the leading actor in resolving conflicts (including ones where the state is complicit either through commission or neglect), collaboration with the state is essential. This is especially so since the state is the only organ with legitimate and often sufficient force to enforce sanctions.

- Multi-sectoral engagements and a varied base of supporters who can bring both a diverse set of resources and representing a diverse set of interests is essential for success and sustainability. For instance the involvement of women, youth, elders, businesspeople, and the government and local branches of international NGOs was critical to WPDC functions.

- Not insignificantly, the minimal involvement of donors and external actors in facilitating the work of WPDC may actually be helpful for such efforts. It allows the local organization to pursue its own agenda and to work out local connections (e.g. collaboration with the state at the local level) without the subversion of its priorities to fit donor trajectories, or without unnecessarily making government anxious about outside influence.

Successful as the WPDC case is, it also presents some openings that could have (and still could) enhanced its effects and its long-term contribution to peace. This is especially where, as noted, the WPDC has not been able to envision very long-term issues especially in terms of pushing for structural interventions that could mitigate the very foundation of conflict in this region. Thus, for example, peace radio could be one additional means of pursuing the peace agenda in the regions. This would be especially useful for advocacy, civic education and early warning efforts. Second, development efforts beyond rehabilitating (ex-) combatants and the youth are essential. Especially critical is the development of markets to reduce the vulnerabilities of pastoralists such that they can liquidate their livestock when drought hits and thus minimize the strain and competition for ever-scarce pasture. This is obviously a long-term effort and one that involves the state at a fairly macro level than what the WPDC has been used to dealing with. However, given such a scheme would have to find local expression and indeed participation, the WPDC is very well placed to advocate for its adoption and its use by communities.

Finally, enhancing state capacity is critical to institutionalizing peace in the region. As is evident, the success of WPDC (indeed, its very existence) has emanated from the

state's weakness in projecting and fulfilling its security imperative. As with the range of public goods increasingly provided by NGOs in African countries, security is fundamentally an obligation of the state; it ought to or will eventually be reclaimed by it through an enhancement of its capacity. Thus, while small organizations such as WPDC may be integral to mediating for conflicts and establishing local dialogues and institutions encouraging peaceful coexistence, the state is the ultimate guarantor of peace. For lasting peace to prevail it should not be neglected.

Al Fatah Declaration

ALFATAH PEACE DECLARATION 29/9/93

(a) Taking stock of the increasing intensity of inter-clan fighting between the major clans in Wajir district and especially between Degodia and the Ajuran clans which have continued to claim lives of tens of people, many of them children, women and innocent;

(b) Considering one increasing insecurity in the district in which violent robberies, looting of property and highway robberies affecting them major roads connecting Wajir and Nairobi have continued to take place with alarming frequencies;

(c) Dismayed with the recent callous murder of the late Jeff Buttler and the serious injury of Bob McCarthy both working with UNICEF and the subsequent suspension of NGO activities in the district;

(d) Apprehensive of the imminent danger posed for the entire district the banditry menace and the clan clashes.

Leaders from the major clans namely twenty-five elected and opinion leaders each from Degodia, Ajuran and Ogaden clans respectively as well as five leaders from Garreh and Muralle clans met to deliberate on the causes of the continuing internecine strife with a view to bringing the problem to an end.

The joint leaders peace meeting taking place of Alfatah Madarasah in Wajir township between 27th and 27th September, 1993 makes the following resolutions:

1. That the inter clan fighting and stock theft be stopped immediately and a cease fire be effected from the 29th day of September, 1993.

2. That during this cease fire, livestock stollen from from Ogaden clans by Degodia and vise versa be mutually returned within seven days effective from 1st October, 1993.

3. That in order to clear the main Wajir-Nairobi road of gangestry, three sets of committees be formed with specific responsibilities of clearing specified areas namely:

    (a) Habaswein-Lag-bogol

    (b) Lagbogol-Leheley, and

    (c) Leheley-Wajir sections of the road of the highway gangsters. The

peace committees workingin these various zones will involve elders, leaders and security personnel comprising local officers drawn from the administration policein Wajir district.

4. That Wajir people without distinction will work as a united people to eliminate the banditry menace in the district. To realize this the government is urged to work closely with the various pannels of peace committees from the district headquarters to the sub-location level, who will monitor the implementation of this peace agreement and advice the authorities on the best method of eliminating the banditry menace.

5. That all minority clans in the district should join hands with the major clans in this peace campaign,

6. That all those persons or families who have deserted their homes or grazing areas or watering places, should go back immediately to their areas and enjoy peace.

7. That from the date of this ceasefire, the traditional law pertaining to blood feud will apply to those who commit murder namely the payment of hundred camels for a man and fifty camels for a women. In the case of stock theft, the rule of collective punishment involving whole groups of people will be applied.

8. That a standing committee comprising eight people from each of the major clans as well as two from the smaller clans will be formed at the district level to work with the District Security Committee for the purpose of restoring peace in the district.

9. That all clans must begin to persuade armed elements among them to submit or surrender their arms to the government.

10. That the Provincial Administration being the executive arm of the government, should instill discipline and sense of duty in the Security personnel as well as Chiefs and District Officers, so that officers working in areas where banditry menance will appear to increase instead of decrease after the implementation of this peace programme will be responsible.

11. That all NGO's namely, World Vision International, African Inland Church, Care International, Oxfam, African Muslim Agency, the United Nations especially Unicef and WFP, and Bilateral Agencies specifically GTZ be requested to come back and resume their operations in the district.

    The people of Wajir and the local administration will ensure that adequate security arrangements are made for the same personnel and their operations.

12. That the government consider the formation of a specific forces to be deployed specifically for the purpose of fighting the banditry menance.It is recommended that task force comprise mainly local officers from administration and police force.

13. That henceforth the government should take firm action against those who are found to incite people to violent fan clans clashes.

14. That Wajir people will make a public demonstration on September, 1993 condemning the inter-clan conflict and the case murder of the late Jeff Buttler and to manifest there to have all humanitarian agencies back in the district.

Find appended list of signatories to the declaration.

CC.

District Commissioner,

Wajir

Provincial Commissioner,

North Eastern Province,

Garissa

Permanent Secretary n the Office of the

President -Incharge of Internal Security

United Nations -UNICEF & WFP

GTZ

All NGOs

All MPs -Northern Kenya Parliamentary Group

The Mass Media

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Persons Interviewed

1. Ms. Nuria Abdilahi, Secretary to WPDC
2. Mr. Mohamedweli Hassan, Drought Containment Project
3. Dr. Chip Stem, OAU/IBAR PARC-VAC Project
4. Mr. Mohamed Elmi, Oxfam Great Britain
5. Mr. Abdisalan Gure, District Cooperative Officer
6. Mr. AbdiNasir Harun, Nomadic Primary Health Project
7. Mr. Abdi Billow Elmi, District Commissioner's Office
8. Mr. Abdirahman Abass, Arid Land Resource Management Project
9. Mr. Fred Mutsami, District Commissioner, Wajir
10. Dr. Asenath Omwega, ITDG
11. Mr. David Ngare, Manager Wajir Polytechnic
12. Mr. Mahmud Maalim, District Officer I, Wajir

Focus Groups:

1. Al Fatah Elders (15)
2. Women for Peace (3)

Greater Horn of Africa
Peace Building Project

Asgede Hagos

CASE STUDY SIX:

Media Intervention in Peace Building in Burundi - The Studio Ijambo Experience and Impact

March, 2001

Management Systems International
600 Water Street, SW, Washington, DC 20024 USA

Appendix from the Report:
The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace
A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

Contract No. GS-23F-8012H, Task Order No. 623-N-00-99-00294-00 for DG/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis Services

Table of Contents

Table of Contents i

Executive Summary ii

Political Elite Negotiations iv

Mass or Elite Conflict Behavior v

Introduction 1

The Conflict 2

The Intervention 6
- The Rationale 6
- The Beginnings 8

Impacts 12
- Inter-Group Relations 12
- Social and Political Mobilization 14

Political Elite Negotiations 15
- Public Institutions and Processes 15

Mass or Elite Conflict Behavior 17

Conclusions and Policy Implications 18

Theoretical Framework and Methodology 20

Studio Ijambo/Burundi – Questionnaire 24

References 27

Persons Interviewed 29

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The full report can be found at:
http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report.pdf
or write to peacebuilding@yahoo.com for an electronic version.

Executive Summary

Objectives

The principal purpose of this study was to assess the impact of Studio Ijambo, a radio production program, on peace building in Burundi.

The project was also designed to draw lessons learnt from the experience and impact of this intervention that can be useful in similar areas of conflict. The assessment was conducted in five interrelated areas of peace building in Burundi on which the investigation focused: inter-group relations, social and political mobilization, political elite negotiations, public institutions and processes, and mass or elite conflict behavior.

Key Findings

Studio Ijambo was established in 1995 in the Burundian capital of Bujumbura as a direct response to the hate propaganda that pervaded the airwaves in the Great Lakes region of Africa, where hate radio is believed to have played a significantly destructive role in the mid 1990s. The Burundian press not only reflected the deep ethnic division "but also actively promoted it," and its members tried to "rival each other over calls to kill, or in packing and advancing their mutually macabre ideologies" generating "mutual terror and distrust based on historical fears" (Rich 1997, 63).

The radio program, funded by USAID, was set up as part of a broader response to the hate campaign, to support and enhance peace building and strengthen local capacity to manage and resolve conflict in Burundi.

All in all, there is substantial evidence that the journalistic, dramatic and cultural components of Studio Ijambo's programs have had positive effect in all of the five areas of investigation. The findings of a survey as well as focus sessions and in-depth interviews of nearly 270 Burundians in eight social groups and subgroups reveal Studio Ijambos' broad impact on inter-ethnic relations, social and political mobilization, political elite negotiations, public institutions, and mass or elite conflict behavior. The results indicate a relatively high approval of Ijambo's productions.

The impact is even more definitive and visible in the contributions the program has made to change the Burundian media culture and practice, especially in the areas of news gathering and training of journalists to cover conflicts.

Inter-Group Relations

Generally speaking, Ijambo has made significant contributions to the development of a culture of peace in Burundi. Most of the respondents cited some of its cultural or dramatic components of its programs as contributory factors to the changes in their views about members of other ethnic that groups. The participants almost consistently gave the statements in a 27-item questionnaire relating to tolerance and coexistence a

high mark as the program's contribution to peace and reconciliation efforts, rating it 4.5 out of a possible 5 for this sub-category.

Responses from the Burundians who participated in this study from both ethnic communities have been particularly positive about Ijambo's 'soap opera' called "Our Neighbors, Our Selves," and the magazine show "Pillars of Humanity," popularly known as "Heroes." When asked to name programs that helped them modify, and/or change their attitudes, and/or behavior towards members of other ethnic groups, if any, most of the participants identified these two shows, more than any of Studio Ijambo's other 15 programs at the time of the study.

As an independent and credible source of verified news and information, Ijambo has become instrumental in the fight against a recurring source of ethnic tension: rumor-mongering, which can have catastrophic consequences in such a highly polarized society torn by mistrust and fear. At least the l988 massacre of Tutsis by Hutus was triggered by a false rumor that the former was preparing to attack the latter.

The findings also show that the media intervention has at least strengthened the belief of many of the people on both sides of the ethnic divide that dialogue is the only rational alternative for Burundi at this critical period in its history. The issue is systematically stressed in many of Ijambo's cultural and dramatic programs, as well as in its news editorial content.

Social and Political Mobilization

One of the original goals of the radio program was to empower civil society to strengthen its efforts in the peace building process.

Many of the local and international NGOs have had access to the radio production studio and have been using it as a vehicle to reach their targeted sectors of the population. Studio Ijambo has also been serving as a forum for the civil society, which, like the rest of the society, is itself, divided along ethnic lines.

Studio Ijambo's innovative programming approaches, which include letting the people define the conflict and measure its effect, personalizing the conflict through such shows as "Heroes," and presenting it in a relaxed, conversational tone—has created and maintained a broad audience for its productions in Burundi. Such innovative approaches are critical for radio to be effective, not only as a source of credible news and information, but also as an instrument of social and political mobilization for the purposes of peace building.

Ijambo was instrumental in influencing some policy changes pertaining to several issues, but especially the internally displaced. It was the first to bring to light killings of Hutu refugees returning from Tanzania by Burundian government soldiers in l997. The camps were closed a year later.

Furthermore, a series of programs in 1996, 1997, 1999, and 2000 on the plight of the

internally displaced in the camps around the capital, especially the very young, are also believed to have contributed to a mass return from what some describe as "concentration camps" to their homes in Bujumbura's neighborhoods. Ijambo has been using the weight of public opinion to force the government to respond to several of its exposes regarding the camps and other issues.

Furthermore, a weekly HIV-AIDS information program, which hammered the Ministry of Health with a series of reports on critical condom shortages in the country, also forced the Buyoya government to respond immediately. A few weeks after the program was aired, said Ijambo director Francis Rolt, "the [Ijambo] producer was called to the Ministry of Health so that she could be shown the condoms which the Ministry had finally imported" and was asked "to stop talking about the issue now that she'd seen the condoms" (Rolt 2001). The correspondents and producers also cited in the interviews in Bujumbura in June 2000 similar critical programs that prompted immediate government attention.

Political Elite Negotiations

Right from the start, Studio Ijambo opened up new channels of communication for those who did not have access to the government-owned media, and as result, provided a reliable forum for what came out to look like an indirect dialogue between the parties and ethnic blocs. In fact, the project was founded on the premise "that journalists could make a significant contribution to opening and maintaining avenues of public discourse" (Rich 1997, 63).

This has also exposed the Brundian people to the different political visions and platforms the parties have been debating among themselves. This educational function of the media, which encourages informed participation from the people, naturally affects the negotiation process.

How much the opposition parties in Arusha depended on the independent media to talk to the Burundian people could be seen in their clamor to get the attention of Studio Ijambo correspondents who covered the negotiations in Tanzania.

Public Institutions and Processes

As the first independent radio production program in Burundi that tried to pry open the state's monopoly of public information, Studio Ijambo has effected some institutional behavioral changes. Though it is difficult to say precisely what part of the changes can be attributed to this media intervention, there is no question that today the state and some of its agencies, including the armed forces, have shown some level of tolerance towards the independent media.

Studio Ijambo has achieved a high level of credibility as a neutral source of news and information in this highly polarized sociopolitical environment, which is riven by mistrust and fear. Studio Ijambo correspondents who worked for the government-owned radio before joining the Ijambo team said they could see a big difference in their level of

acceptance especially by the opposition when they started covering the Arusha negotiations. They could also see the same changes in attitude and behavior in their coverage of the parliament. In both cases, the subjects would refuse to talk to the government radio and television reporters, but seek Studio Ijambo reporters out instead.

Through its practice of team reporting, Ijambo has helped raise the level of professionalism through systematic and conscious efforts to protect its programs from being contaminated by ethnic bias. In a society where there is so much hatred at close quarters between the two main ethnic groups, it is very difficult to avoid such contamination. However, there is no question that its innovative team reporting practice has sensitized the rest of the media and has shown to what extent a news organization must go to deliver balanced, fair and objective news and information to its audience.

Mass or Elite Conflict Behavior

A media intervention can serve as an effective alternative to violent expressions of differences between the different sides to a conflict. Studio Ijambo, as an independent forum for dialogue, has been providing that alternative and the culture of peace it has been helping to cultivate is showing encouraging results overall.

Even the members of the Burundian armed forces, who, as the findings of the survey indicate, have had the least favorable attitude towards Ijambo's programs, have shown tolerance toward the private media with which they have been clashing over the parameters of media coverage of military and rebel activities in the countryside. Some of the changes in their behavior are credited to Studio Ijambo that they said they listened to as a credible source of news and information.

Furthermore, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that some of the programs have had even deeper impact on at least some portions of the society. Studio Ijambo staffers frequently receive telephone calls or mail messages following the airing of "Heroes" from some members of the audience to express regret for having participated in killings themselves during the l993-96 period or to give the names of other "heroes" they knew whose stories should be told.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

These findings have important policy and operational implications for donors and policy makers trying to support, implement, or design radio interventions in peace building processes. The experience of Studio Ijambo illustrates that radio can be a high-impact, low-cost instrument of intervention not only as a reliable source of news and information, but also as a vehicle of social and political mobilization in peace building. However, there are critical lessons that must be drawn from this and similar experiences from the region to ensure the effectiveness of such intervention. Some of the replicable practices and lessons learnt from the Brundian experience are:

INNOVATION: A media intervention, to be effective, must use innovative approaches in programming, training and general practices of journalism to draw and sustain an

audience large enough to influence public opinion. It must keep reinventing itself in order to overcome professional and cultural challenges to capture and sustain the critical mass necessary to effect meaningful change in conflict situations.

Studio Ijambo's innovative programming approaches--which include letting the people define the conflict and measure its effect, personalizing the conflict through such shows as "Heroes," and presenting it in a relaxed, conversational tone--has created a broad audience for its productions in Burundi.

INDEPENDENCE: Another important lesson from the Studio Ijambo experience and impact is that independence of government control—at least in its operation--is a necessary precondition for a mass media intervention to obtain the necessary results in peace building. One of the primary functions of such an intervention is to serve as a reliable forum for all sides to the conflict. For such a forum to be effective, it must be viewed by all sides as being impartial and credible.

In the Burundian experience, the state-owned media's unwillingness to give Mandela's historic speech a full play at the very start of the negotiations in Arusha once again made it clear how indispensable the independent channels of communication are in a peace process. As stated above, Studio Ijambo was the only media organization that translated it into Kirundi, the Burundian national language and produced it. Though it is difficult to measure the extent of the effect of the translated version of the landmark speech, which laid down the framework of the peace process, a few of those interviewed recalled listening to the Kirundi version aired over what was then Radio Umwizero. That the government media did not give the speech the coverage it deserved in the language the people understand best or even French may be a reflection that some in the Tutsi-dominated government were not exactly happy with some of the key provisions of the peace proposal. How unhappy some within the Tutsi community were became clear as the August 28 deadline approached.

CONFLICTING VALUES: Some of the key journalistic values and principles, such as openness and objectivity, by which a peace radio should be guided to be credible and effective, may be unacceptable in societies that value secrecy and ethnic loyalty more than anything else. The Ijambo experience is that such culturally-based challenges must be overcome or at least minimized early through rigorous training and innovative investigative approaches so that the local correspondents can function in the two worlds a media intervention puts them in—one new, the other old.

SUSTAINABILITY: In an attempt to reduce its dependency on other broadcasting outlets, Studio Ijambo "is supporting its journalists in their plans to set up their own independent radio with the same aims as Studio Ijambo," the current Ijambo director explained. "Apart from adding a fresh new independent voice to the airwaves in Burundi, this will enable the Studio to broadcast its programs without having to depend so much on media organizations, such as the state radio, which doesn't necessarily share their aims and objectives of Studio Ijambo" (Rolt 2001).

Donors and policy makers should encourage such indigenization of the intervention

instrument to ensure sustainability of the peace building process. On the other hand, efforts must be made to avoid anything that might add to the institutional tension between Studio Ijambo and the government since that may even jeopardize the slight opening of the political system now underway. The interplay between the small independent media and the state in that country must be guided very carefully and slowly.

NETWORKING: Studio Ijambo should explore the possibility of working with regional actors in the media sector not only to expand its audience, but also to protect itself from any attempt to silence it by any single country. For example, a peace radio needs assessment conducted in neighboring Uganda revealed interest among NGO organizations, a media association and an academic institution to contribute to a new independent media intervention in the conflict-ravaged northern part of the country.

Introduction

The principal objective of this study was to assess the impact of Studio Ijambo, a radio production program in Bujumbura, Burundi, set up in l995 as a direct response to the hate propaganda that pervaded the airwaves in the Great Lakes region of Africa, where hate radio is believed to have played a significantly destructive role, especially in the Rwanda massacre of l994.

The project was also designed to draw lessons from the experience and impact of this intervention that can be useful in similar areas of conflict.

The radio program, funded by USAID, was set up to support and enhance peace building and strengthen local capacity to manage and resolve conflict in Burundi. However, the assessment must first be viewed within the political context of the conflict that needed such an intervention.

The Conflict

The protracted peace negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, to end the seven-year old Burundian conflict, which has claimed more than 200,000 lives, reached the moment of truth on August 28, 2000, and showed once again the depth of the gulf that separates the two main ethnic communities in the country. The negotiations, which started in July 1998, came to a virtual deadlock when some of the Tutsi-bloc parties refused to sign the pact mediated by former South African President Nelson Mandela. However, it also showed how much the international community wants to avoid another Rwanda in this troubled region, though donors seem also equally determined to see the negotiations come to an end. Both of these outcomes of the 25-month negotiation process have significant implications for peace building in this highly polarized society.

President Bill Clinton's presence at what was supposed to be a peace signing ceremony in Arusha, at the invitation of the chief negotiator, showed how much the international community wants this peace process to work and prevent another Rwanda-type tragedy. The Clinton trip was also an indirect response to the bitter criticism that the Western nations, especially the U.S., as well as the United Nations, could have prevented the massacre that killed more than a million, mostly Tutsis and also moderate Hutus, in Rwanda. The Burundi-Rwanda crises are intertwined, and the former has all the characteristics that led to the massacre in the latter in l994. In fact, Nyankanzi describes the two as "identical twins" that "share identical ethnic composition, history, culture, and language" and "like identical twins, if one is sick the other becomes sick, too" (1998, 53). The assassination of Burundi's first democratically elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, in l993 is believed to have served as an additional flash point for the l994 massacre in neighboring Rwanda. Both nations also share a legacy of neglect by the West. Klinghoffer, who describes the Burundi-Rwanda relationship as 'symbiotic,' says, "Burundi's travails during the spring of l972 bear much in common with those experienced by Rwanda in l994; except for the ethnic mirror imaging," and the "moral indifference the world showed in l972, "surely provided a poor precedent when the 'international community' had to consider its response to the Rwanda genocide of l994" (1998:9-10).

When Clinton's acceptance of Mandela's invitation to join the signing ceremony was announced, some saw the move as an arm-twisting ploy by the chief negotiator to pressure the reluctant parties, especially the Tutsi bloc of ten parties, to meet the August 28 deadline. The announcement came as one of the many attempts Mandela and his team tried during the weeks leading up to the deadline. For example, the week the White House announced the Clinton visit, the Mandela team had two former Burundian heads of state--Sylvester Ntibantunganya and Jean-Baptiste Bagaza--as well as current President Pierre Buyoya, in South Africa in an attempt to break what was looking like a serious impasse in the Arusha negotiations. The deadlock cast more and more doubt on the negotiation team's optimism that the 19 Burundian parties would reach a comprehensive peace accord and meet the August 28 deadline, though the delegates continued to be divided mostly along ethnic lines on the key issues.

However, as the deadline approached, despite the unprecedented gesture on the part of the international community in support of the 25-month peace process, the optimism slowly began to evaporate. In the end, even Clinton's presence, along with 12 other heads of state who had come to witness what was to be a historic ceremony, and Mandela's blunt warning, aimed at the five holdout Tutsi parties, could not salvage the peace plan; once again, the impasse exposed the intractable nature of the ethnic factor which defines the political crisis in this highly divided society.

Right from the start, there was an attempt especially on the part of the Tutsi parties to downplay the ethnic factor, stressing that there were 19 "political" parties, and not two ethnic-based camps.

However, the final days of the long negotiation process showed that ethnicity is what defines the crisis. The 19 political parties were finally reduced to two ethnic blocs. The ten-party Tutsi bloc balked on most of the key issues that called for parity and asked for more talks on reforming the army, the transition period, cease-fire arrangements and the electoral system. Both groups accused each other of blocking the talks. The failure of the Arusha talks was not totally unexpected, given the depth of the gulf that separates the Tutsi and Hutu blocs of parties, centering around cease-fire, reforming the army, the electoral process, and the duration and leadership of the transition.

Mandela had expressed a great deal of optimism that the crisis would soon come to an end. In fact, the former South African president and his team of negotiators had initially set a July 20 deadline for the 19 Burundian parties to sign a peace accord. When that looked unachievable, the team moved the deadline to August 28. However, many who followed the talks and were familiar with the complexities of the remaining unresolved issues, and the breaking down of planned parallel talks between the Tutsi-dominated Buyoya regime and the Hutu rebels in South Africa, doubted these issues could be resolved by then and that the deadline could be met.

Buyoya, who was the first to endorse the new initiative, was forced to warn against Mandela's raising unrealistic expectations, mostly abroad. However, when Mandela set the initial deadline in July and the moment of truth approached, Buyoya was among the first to express doubts about it. The president's initial enthusiasm about the Mandela initiative had more to do with past efforts led by the late president Julius Nyerere who the Tutsis viewed as less than an impartial mediator. In fact, many of the Tutsi intellectuals who participated in this study accused him of being "pro-Hutu." This perception of the late Tanzanian president among the Tutsis seems to be wide spread. When Mandela visited Burundi to "sell" his peace plan to the army high command and the people in June, many cited Nyrere's failure to visit the country and talk to the people directly during the period he served as mediator as evidence of his being "anti Tutsis."

Speaking at the Arusha conference site in Burundi on July 20, Buyoya warned "against the premature signing of a peace accord to end the war in his country, saying more work remained to be done than indicated by the chief mediator. Buyoya said. "We have made new progress, but there are still problems to settle, such as the setting up of

transition institutions and their durations, the modalities of a cease-fire, the electoral system and guarantees for the accord" (Washington Times, July 21, 2000, A15). What Buyoya enumerated, along with the issue of reform of the Tutsi-dominated army, are at the heart of the problem. Of these, it looks the Mandela team thought the reform of the army was the least intractable and tried to get some agreement on it first from both sides. The Buyoya government seemed to have accepted the proposal that would set quotas to allow the majority Hutus to have a 50 percent representation in the Burundian national army, which is now more than 80 percent Tutsi. However, when Mandela addressed the army high command in Bujumbura, during his June visit to Burundi, the army brass said, this would hinge on a cease-fire agreement, which in turn depended on the Hutu rebels who were never part of the negotiation process; according to Guy-Emmanuel Ntambutso, who served as one of two official translators for Mandela when the former South African president addressed the high command in June 2000. Thus, the seeds of the latest failure to end the violence were planted early in the negotiation since the cease-fire issue was at the heart of the problem that led to the failure in the negotiation process in August. Another critical issue was reforming the armed forces; though there was some agreement on the 50-50 proposition, there was a difference right from the start on who from the Hutus should be in the army. The Burundian army brass has been opposed to the incorporation of the Hutu rebels into the national army because they feared such a move would expose the Tutsis to yet another genocide.

Some of the intellectuals complained that both sides "have really been dancing around the issues," afraid to face the difficult decisions, but at the same time trying to avoid appearing the intransigent party in front of a world waiting to see a breakthrough in the negotiations. There are some indications that the parties never really grappled with the critical issues that divided them until as late as a week before the first deadline Mandela had proposed. The European Union representative Aldo Ajello said, "We are moving from general discussion into the phase where the real problems are discussed" (Reuters August 13, 2000).

Many of those who participated in this study also cited lack of involvement of the people as another shortcoming of the peace process. Furthermore, many of the parties that played a critical role in the negotiations and even in the final outcome of the process don't have any followings among the people at home. In our group and individual interviews, we found out many of the small entrepreneurs who listen to radio, judging by their responses to our other questions, never understood what the Mandela team was proposing pertaining to the amnesty issue. In fact, the different "spins" by some of the elite factions had affected the perceptions of some of the respondents on the peace process. This was particularly evident on the key, and one of the most sensitive issues: whether or not to offer amnesty to those behind the assassination of Burundi's first democratically elected president, as well as those accused of inciting, leading or conducting massacres of Tutsis that came in the wake of the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu. The spin from some Tutsi factions had Mandela advocating amnesty for those accused of genocide, and the Hutu version had Mandela calling for amnesty for those behind the assassination. Yet, the negotiators did not seem to have a public

relations strategy to counter these and other potential distortions that may have contributed to the August 28 deadlock. In Burundi, a society riven by mistrust seems it does not take much to stir the deep-seated fears both ethnic communities feel of each other.

The failure of the Arusha negotiations has implications for peace building effort in Burundi because it adds to the impression that this is an “insoluble” crisis. Donor fatigue which was evident in Mandela’s attempt to accelerate the process since he took over as chief mediator is also bound to affect existing as well as potential peace building initiatives to change the culture of violence in Burundi. Most, if not all, of the non-governmental organizations now engaged in peace and reconciliation activities in the country depend on international assistance. Many of these organizations are doing what the government should be doing in the rural areas. Some of the government ministries don’t even have any kind of presence in some parts of the country; but the NGOs do.

The inability to move forward on the peace front may also have exacerbated the already tense sociopolitical atmosphere in the country, especially because of the high expectations the Mandela team had raised about the outcome. There are also the divisions within the Tutsi bloc parties, with some signing the accord, and the others willing to scuttle it. As to what effect this is going to have on the next journey on the road to peace to end the conflict, it is hard to say at this point. However, in the past, intra-Tutsi competition added significantly to the Tutsi-Hutu tension [Lemarchand 1994, 84-89).

However, one thing that was encouraging from the responses of both Hutus and Tutsis in this study is that both sides to the conflict seem to feel that enough is enough, that negotiation is the only way to end the cycle of violence by both groups. This is the overall assessment of most Burundians who represented a broad cross section of the urban sectors of the population and some displaced rural residents who fled the violence mostly outside of the urban centers. These included: small entrepreneurs; professional and non-professional women; university professors; college students; representatives of local non-governmental organizations; youth; and even members of the Burundian armed forces. When asked to cite something different today compared to two years ago, most of these people said the changing mood among the people from both sides of the ethnic divide that violence is not the way. There is no question that this feeling will provide the internal pressure that is necessary to keep the peace process going, forcing even the extremists to keep looking for a peaceful alternative to violence.

The Intervention

The Rationale

The Rwandan experience pertaining to the l994 genocide, where people carried the radio with one hand, and the machete with the other, has shown how effective radio can be as a vehicle for anti-social messages. It also showed how much the people where literacy is low depend on radio as a primary means of mass communication. Chalk, writing about the role hate radio played in the Rwanda genocide, said, “Radio is the premier means of reaching the public with news and information in countries where most of the population is illiterate and television sets are rare” (1999, 93).

The privately-owned Radio Television Libre de Mille Collins (RTLM), which helped fuel the genocide, proved what radio could do as a source of anti-social messages, especially in conflict situations where information and sources of information play a more significant role, than in areas and times of peace. However, the Rwandan experience also gave the world an idea of radio’s potential as an instrument of pro-social messages.

It is this experience and rationale that led to the establishment of Studio Ijambo in Burundi, which has almost all of the sociopolitical characteristics that led to the social explosion next door in Rwanda. It was founded in March l995 in response to hate radio propaganda from the Rwandan media, both broadcast and print, as well as from Radio Rutomoramgingo that was based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Though the Hutu-run RTLM was the most known of the hate mongering media outlets that were widely implicated in the Rwandan massacre. There were also other radio and newspapers in the Great Lakes area that prompted Studio Ijambo and others to counter the hate-filled airwaves with something more positive and definitely balanced and objective news and information. For example, one of the three Rwandan media officials that were tried in Arusha by the international criminal tribunal in Rwanda was Hassan Ngezi editor of *Kangura*, a newspaper believed to have incited Hutus leading up to the l994 genocide. Three years earlier, the pro-Hutu paper was denounced by the International Commission of Jurists for inciting hatred. The other media officials on trial were Ferdinand Nahimana, a founding member of RTLM and director of the Rwanda Office of Information, and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza. In addition to RTLM, *Kangura* and other “private” media, there was also the government-owned Radio Rwanda that was also accused of similar crimes during the 1994 massacre. Chalk says RTLM was in many ways an extension of Radio Rwanda. In fact, “with the benefit of hindsight, it seems likely that RTLM was founded to evade key clauses of the Arusha Peace Accords of l993, which barred the government of Rwanda, as well as the RPF, from incitement to violence, promoting discrimination based on ethnicity, and issuing propaganda inciting the people to hate” (1999, 96).

In addition to the hate campaign that spilled over from the Rwandan media, Burundi was also directly targeted by hate radio, based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(DRC), especially Radio Rutomoramgingo which broadcast anti-Tutsi messages in 1994; another media outlet that poisoned the Great Lakes airwaves was Radio Candid, which spread even more virulent anti-Tutsi hate messages during the same period (Myers at al. 2000).

Furthermore, the Burundian local vernacular print press was accused of contributing to the hate campaign aggravating even further ethnic relations at this crucial juncture of the nation's history. Two newspapers, one on each side of the ethnic divide in that country, were said to have played destructive role in this polarized society. *The Crossroads*, on the Tutsi side, and *The Witness*, from the Hutu side, both in Kirundi, added a great deal to the ethnic tension in the country. Rich, who saw the local media in action during the depth of the latest mass killings, said, the Burundian press not only reflected the deep ethnic division "but also actively promoted it." The year Studio Ijambo was established, both Hutu and Tutsi media tried to "rival each other over calls to kill, or in packing and advancing their mutually macabre ideologies" generating "mutual terror and distrust based on historical fears" (1997, 63).

Another reason that necessitated the establishment of Studio Ijambo was the clear absence of a credible source of news and information to serve as an antidote to the ethnic-laced propaganda from within and outside of Burundi. Such a source of verified information could have empowered the listeners to counter the hate messages. In general, when a media audience has a source where the listeners can verify the news and information, it makes it difficult for those who want to "spin" it to fit their purposes.

This was the social and political climate in most of Central Africa, especially in the Great Lakes region, when Studio Ijambo was established in Bujumbura six years ago. Apparently, this was part of a broader response to the hate propaganda that dominated the airwaves in this region. This was the outcome of a growing awareness among donors and non-governmental organizations of the value of radio in conflict prevention, resolution and peace building. For example, Ijambo was preceded by Radio Agatashya, which was set up in the eastern part of the DRC within weeks after the start of the l994 Rwanda massacre. It was established by Fondation Hirondelle, a European NGO. In fact, Radio Agatashya was one of two radio that aired Ijambo's programs in the spring of l995 until the latter went off the air a year later.

Describing the sociopolitical climate in Burundi, at the time Search for Common Ground was looking for ways to contribute to peace and reconciliation, in this central African nation, the UN Special Commissioner for Human Rights, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, said: "Burundians are currently living in an atmosphere of mistrust, hatred, and exclusion, withdrawn into themselves and often hostile to anything unfamiliar." Adding, the UN report said, "The cumulative effect of continued loss of loved ones," the sad memories or a desire for revenge that follow, "has created a context conducive to the development of extremist and totalitarian ideologies among the population" (UN 1995, 1).

This grim description by the UN official of the social and political environment, which was "hostile to anything unfamiliar," sums up the condition Studio Ijambo was born and

tried to survive in as an independent source of news and information and as an impartial forum for all the sides to the conflict.

The Beginnings

The Washington, D.C.-based PVO Search for Common Ground, a private volunteer organization, sent a delegation to Burundi in late l994, as a direct response to the Rwandan genocide as well as the frightening level of hate propaganda, targeting the Tutsis in the three Great Lakes nations--Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The trip was also in response to an invitation to this American PVO, along with other organizations, including Refugees International, from a special United Nations representative for Burundi to help avoid a repeat of the Rwandan tragedy in neighboring Burundi. In the spring of l995, Search for Common Ground opened a field office and launched a radio studio program "aimed at creating mechanisms for ethnic reconciliation, and decreasing levels of distrust and violence." Then in January l996, the group established a women's center to help "develop the capacity of Burundian women to promote peace and reconciliation in their families, neighborhoods, and communities" (Idriss, briefing, June 12, 2000; also Rolt, briefings, June 2000).

Studio Ijambo was set up as the first independent radio production house in Burundi to try to use the airwaves for peace and reconciliation. The first Burundian to be recruited by the Search for Common Ground team in Bujumbura in March 1995, journalist Alexis Sinduhiji, says of Studio Ijambo's mission: "Looking back on it, I understand that Bryan [Rich] wanted to create a radio station whose goal would be to diminish or help end the violence by using a very subtle and complex approach that would try to add coherence and perspective to the crisis.... [But] I was fascinated by Bryan' determination. He didn't know our society, its intrigues, its lies, or its manipulations.... I also felt sorry for him not being able to comprehend the reality facing what he proposed" (1998, 9). Rich, who left in l997, knew that Burundi was a big challenge; he also knew that it represented a historic opportunity to show that the media can be a potent instrument of peace and reconciliation. As a result, he and his pioneering team of five Hutu and Tutis reporters, defined the project's mission and agreed upon some basic goals to achieve, the most important of which:

- "to position on the studio as a neutral and independent voice and to be inclusive of all sides." In addition to developing a credible source of news and information, the team tried right from the outset to make the radio production center as a forum to bring all sides to discuss the issues that separate them. Rich says, "The premise of the project was that journalists could make a significant contribution to opening and maintaining avenues of public discourse" (1997, 63).

- to build a wide audience "of ordinary people, both perpetrators and victims of violence. " Right from the start, the team decided to let the people tell their own stories, instead of the reporters interpreting the information, so that the people's "eyewitnesses accounts would define the conflict and its consequences on everyday life and would propose solutions."

- “to create, encourage, and reinforce the confidence and credibility of local journalists.” For that, it was necessary to have a team composed of Hutus and Tutsis working together and respecting the basic rules of journalism as well as showing the common ground they shared” (Sinduhiji 1998, 9; emphasis mine).

When the program started, the team had to reinvent new tools of coping with the stumbling blocks they faced at practically every point of the way. As part of its mission statement, Search for Common Ground lists 24 methods in its “toolbox” of interventions, four of which are related to the mass media; producing television programs, peace radio, training of journalists on covering ethnic-based conflicts, and inter-ethnic investigative teams that work on in-depth articles to be published in the areas of conflict.

In addition to grounding them in the basic skills of journalism, Studio Ijambo provided training to the editorial staff in conflict prevention, management and resolution. But, the most difficult part of this was the specialized training that was designed to help the local journalists reconcile conflicting values, some rooted in the old culture, and others in the new evolving newsroom culture. Of the culturally based challenges a journalist faces in Burundi, ethnic loyalty is probably the most important because it negates the fundamental principles of journalism, especially independence and objectivity. Describing the cultural and environmental factors that stress such loyalty, Rich said, “Overcrowding, rigid family loyalty and regional and ethnic identification mean that journalists must counter incredible pressure to attain even the most basic degree of objectivity.... In Burundi, being ‘independent’ is equated with betrayal, and therefore the notion of independence itself is alien and dangerous” (1997, 63). In addition to the training that the journalists had to go through, the team also started a unique assignment strategy that sent ethnically diverse teams of reporters to cover the divided society.

Developing reliable news sources in a culture that values extreme secrecy and a society riven by mistrust was another challenge that the pioneering group had to deal with in its news and information gathering and verification methods. They had to develop techniques of verifying controversial information, which included sending double teams of ethnically diverse reporters; they also took extreme measures to protect their sources.

The founders—and their successors today--also went to extreme lengths to avoid being perceived as partisan, favoring one party or the other, one ethnic group or the other. In such a highly politicized environment, even the appearance of political partisanship for a media organization could seriously jeopardize its operations. However, Burundian government officials did not imply in any of the interviews that Studio Ijambo was partisan. To avoid being perceived as an opposition to one group or the other, the team “used Tutsis to report on the activities of the primarily Tutsi army and used Hutus to report on the attacks by the Hutu rebels. This gave the reports credibility and authenticity since people knew the journalists by their voices” (Rich 1997, 65).

Security for the journalists was, and still is today, a critical issue for the founders of Studio Ijambo that was born in the middle of 1993-96 killings. At all times, it took security measures to ensure continuity in the flow of information as well the security of its correspondents during times of total security breakdown. Ijambo even had to cover some of the hard political stories during the height of the killings by using rotating teams of journalists hoping to diffuse any unnecessary attention on any single reporter. Also as part of its security measures, the team instituted a policy of what it called an "open engagement" with the government to minimize any potential source of suspicion about any of its undertakings.

It provided some additional security for the reporters in this violently divided society and assured balance of perspective in their respective stories by working in multiethnic teams.

Using innovative methods and guided by the objectives described above, Studio Ijambo produced four news and cultural programs by the end of l995. Today, the number of programs it produces has grown more than four-fold. At the time of the field work in June 2000, it produced l7 news, current affairs, radio magazines, and cultural programs, including a very popular soap-opera, "Our Neighbors, Ourselves," which has been described as a continuing "story of hope and reconciliation." The setting, in the rural hills of Burundi, provides a good background for the gripping story that is centered around two neighboring families, one Hutu, the other Tutsi, trying to provide a model for coexistence during a difficult time. The theme of the show, which went on the air in July 1997, can be summed up in this excerpt from the soap opera's transcript: "We all have something in common no matter what they say. Even day and night meet at sunrise and sunset." It is written by a popular and prize-winning local playwright, Marrie Louise Sibazuri, who now resides in Belgium. *The Wall Street Journal* says, the play is designed "to show that it is possible to overcome the mistrust that prevails between the minority Tutsi and majority Hutu groups" (Zachary 2000, 1). In many ways, the format is based on similar dramatization techniques used by such producers as Norman Lear in the United States in trying to drive a difficult and complex social issues home. Using the situation comedy format in "All in the Family," Lear tried to confront the difficult issue of race relations in the l970s.

Another popular show is "Heroes," which recognizes the exceptional courage some individuals showed by saving members of the other ethnic group during the height of the ethnic massacres in l993-1996 at the risk of losing their own lives.

Studio Ijambo programs depended mostly on Burundi's state radio network, and Burundi's only independently owned radio, then known as Umwizero, which was struggling as a commercial station. In fact, the National Radio and Television of Burundi (RTNB) was the first to pick up Studio Ijambo programs. "The agreement was part of an attempt by the state media to quell criticism that it was overtly biased and to show that it was open to collaboration with outside producers" Rich says. RTNB agreed to give Studio Ijambo a total of 90 minutes, in two-45-minute segments and to broadcast the programs with Ijambo credit and without editing; however, the group agreed that the

national radio had the right to refuse if it thought the submissions objectionable. The founding team considered establishing a relationship with the state media as “an important achievement,” because, in addition to providing an outlet for its productions, the agreement gave Ijambo some level of acceptance among the different factions of the ruling elite.

This almost total dependency on the national radio began to ease when Studio Ijambo started to use Radio Agatashya in Zaire, which gave Ijambo programs a regional reach that it could not get from RTNB, and an outlet for stories it could not use on the national radio. This relationship even created a stirring within the RNTB staff for more openness within their own organization. “Amazingly, journalists from within the state media started to provide us with information, that they themselves couldn’t use but knew we would be able to corroborate and send to Radio Agatashya as part of our daily news package,” said Rich (1997,65). Other outlets for Studio Ijambo’s programs are the Voice of America, the BBC World Service, which give its productions an even wider reach, and helped reduce its dependency on the state-owned radio network.

As to the size of the audience of these programs and actual geographical coverage, it is very difficult to even try to estimate, as its programs are broadcast by other stations. However, several figures and numbers were banded around during the study period, including ”About 12 million.” But, the figures may be much lower than that. Studio Ijambo’s director Francis Rolt, said when the program is in French, the maximum it can reach is only 15% of the 6.5 million Burundian population. Most of the 17 programs are now broadcast in Kirundi, the national language.

Impacts

In this section, we will examine the impact of Studio Ijambo programs in the five interrelated areas of peace building in Burundi, on which the in-depth interviews, focus groups, and surveys focused: inter-group relations, social and political mobilization, political elite negotiations, public institutions and processes, and mass or elite conflict behavior.

Inter-Group Relations

There is evidence that the journalistic, dramatic and cultural components of Studio Ijambo's programs have had positive effect in all of the five areas of investigation. The result of the survey of 160 Burundians in eight social groups and subgroups also reinforce the overall outcomes of the individual and group-based investigation; the results indicate a relatively high approval of its productions. Explaining why the strong audience support right from the inception of the organization, Rich, says, "As anywhere, providing information faster and in more depth translated into credibility and respect by listeners" (1997, 64).

In the more specific areas, the findings show that at least some of Studio Ijambo's programs, especially the dramatic and cultural components, have had a positive effect on ethnic relations. Responses from nearly 270 groups and individuals who participated in this study from both ethnic communities to Studio Ijambo's 'soap opera' called "Our Neighbors, Our Selves," and the magazine show "Pillars of Humanity," popularly known as "Heroes," have been particularly positive. When asked to name programs that helped them modify and/ or change their attitudes and/ or behavior toward members of other ethnic groups, most of the participants singled out these two shows more than any of Studio Ijambo's other 15 programs that were aired at the time of the study. Almost all of the respondents could remember messages from the soap opera relating to tolerance or coexistence. The magazine show "Heroes," which tells the stories of those who saved the lives of members of other ethnic groups, at the risk of their own, during the height of the latest cycle of mass killings (1993-1996), for example, has generated a great deal of response and interest from both Hutus and Tutsis.

There is also substantial anecdotal evidence that some of these shows have had even deeper impact at least on some portions of the population. Some Studio Ijambo staffers remember calls following the airing of "Heroes" from some members of the audience to express regret for having participated in killings themselves during the l993-96 period or to give the names of other "heroes" they knew whose stories should be told.

In general, it seems that Studio Ijambo has contributed to the development of a culture of peace in Burundi, especially tolerance and coexistence. Although, it is difficult to determine how much of the changes in attitude, and, may be even behavior about tolerance is attributable to the radio production studio, many respondents cited some of its cultural or dramatic components of its programs as contributory factors to the

changers in their views about members of other ethnic groups. Here, efforts were made in posing the questions--in tones and substance--to reduce the social desirability of the responses to avoid the possibility some participants would choose the socially accepted responses--so they could feel freer to express their views, no matter how unpopular or socially unacceptable. However, the participants almost consistently gave the statements relating to tolerance and coexistence a high mark as the program's contribution to peace and reconciliation, rating them an average of 4.5 out of a possible 5 for this sub-category.

From the data, it is also possible to infer that Ijambo has contributed to the realization that dialogue as an alternative path to violence. Many of those participants could recall some statements from some of the programs or the studio's motto "Dialogue is our Future." All of those individuals who raised the issue expressed agreement that dialogue and negotiation are the only rational path to Burundi's future.

Ijambo has made significant contributions to the professionalization of the Burundian media. There is no question that its innovative team reporting practice has sensitized the rest of the media in the country and has shown to what extent a news organization must go to deliver balanced, fair and objective news and information to its audience.

The indispensability of independent channels of communication in the peace process was made even clear at the start of the latest peace process led by former South African president Nelson Mandela. Studio Ijambo was the only media organization that translated into Kirundi, the Burundian language, and produced the historic speech in which Mandela laid down the framework of the peace process. Though the speech was carried as a news item over the government media mostly in French, Ijambo was the only news organization that tried to bring it to the people in its entirety as a way of getting the people involved in the peace process. Though it is difficult to measure the extent of the effect of the translated version of the landmark speech, a few of those interviewed recalled listening to the Kirundi version aired over what was then known Radio Umwizero, now called Radio Bonesha. That the government media did not give the speech a full play in the language the people understand best or even French may be a reflection that some in the Tutsi-dominated government were not exactly happy with some of the key provisions of the peace proposal. How unhappy some within the Tutsi community were became clear as the August 28 deadline approached.

As an independent source of verified news and information, Studio Ijambo has also become instrumental in the fight against a recurring source of ethnic tension: rumor-mongering. A Tutsi journalist, who witnessed the 1993 massacre in the northern district of Bujumbura, Kamenge, explained how catastrophic rumor-mongering can be in a society torn by mistrust: "In 1988, based on false rumor that the Tutsis were preparing to attack them, Hutus had taken their machetes and massacred their Tutsi neighbors in Burundi" (Sinduhije 1998, 5). This was a replay of similar incidents on both sides of the ethnic divide during the previous cycles of massacres and retaliatory mass killings.

Social and Political Mobilization

One of the original goals of the program was to empower civil society. All indications are that many of the local and international NGOs have had access to the radio production studio and have been using it as a vehicle to reach their targeted sectors of the population. Of these, the Women Peace Center, which was founded in early 1996 by Search for Common Ground, naturally has a special relationship with Studio Ijambo in its attempt to reach out to as many women as possible and help them build peace and reconciliation capacity at all levels of society, starting at home.

Ijambo has been serving as a forum not only for the different contestants in the conflict, but also for the civil society in its peace building efforts. “We have to remember that the civil society is also divided ethnically,” said David Gakunzi, director of Bujumbura’s Martin Luther King International Center. He said, Studio Ijambo should be the voice of the civil society and that it must get involved in social issues such as prostitution, AIDS and corruption, and serve as a bridge between the different sectors of the civil society to help it identify areas and issues of common interest. Many of the participants in the study said that Ijambo has been all that, though some felt that some social issues, especially prostitution and AIDS, are not given the emphasis they deserve.

Studio Ijambo’s innovative programming approach has created a broad audience for its products. Such innovative approaches are critical for radio to be effective as an instrument of social and political mobilization. Gakunzi remembers how Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collins (RTLM) used popular music to draw the youth to its audience during the period leading up to the l994 massacre in Rwanda. “It seems Mille Collins made a conscious effort to mobilize the young for the massacres that followed,” he said. Many of those who participated in this study cited the high level of professionalism as well as the relaxed tone and approach in presenting the programs in all of Studio Ijambo’s dramatic, cultural and news programs. Evidence of the effect of Ijambo’s approach is its growing audience. Of the 267 participants less than 20 percent said they didn’t listen to Ijambo’s programs, though some times there was some confusion as to whose program they were listening to since Studio Ijambo’s productions are aired over other radio stations. Some of the respondents said that when a Studio Ijambo program is aired over Radio Burundi they get confused as to the program’s origin.

There is also substantial anecdotal evidence that shows that Studio Ijambo’s exposes in l996, 1997, 1999, and 2000 may have been instrumental in pressuring the government to change at least some aspects of its policies pertaining to refugees and the internally displaced. Ijambo was the first to bring to light killings of refugees, Hutus returning from Tanzania, by Burundian government soldiers in l997 and internationalized the story by giving it to VOA which aired it promptly. At least partially due to the media pressure that Studio Ijambo set in motion, the Ministry of Defense closed the refugee camps in November 1998. Furthermore, a magazine series in l996 focusing on the plight of the internally displaced in the camps surrounding the capital, especially the very young, is also believed to have contributed to a mass return from what some describe as

“concentration camps” to their homes in Bujumbura’s neighborhood of Buyenzi and Kinama.

Political Elite Negotiations

Right from the start, Studio Ijambo opened up new channels of communication for those who did not have access to government-owned media, and as result, provided a reliable forum for what came out to look like an indirect dialogue between the parties. In fact, the project was founded on the premise “that journalists could make a significant contribution to opening and maintaining avenues of public discourse” (Rich 1997, 63).

This has also exposed the Brundian people to the different political visions and platforms the parties have been debating among themselves. This educational function of the media, which encourages participation from the people in support of one political vision or the other, naturally affects the negotiation process.

How much the opposition parties depended on the independent media as the channel to their people could be seen in their clamor to talk to Studio Ijambo correspondents who covered the Arusha negotiations.

Public Institutions and Processes

As the first independent radio production program in Burundi that tried to pry open the state’s monopoly of public information, Studio Ijambo has effected some institutional behavioral changes. Though it is difficult to say precisely what part of the changes can be attributed to this media intervention, there is no question that today the state and some of its agencies, including the armed forces, have shown some level of tolerance towards the independent media. Government officials, including the minister of information and the director general of radio and television reflected the degree of tolerance that is evident in the institutional behavioral changes of the Burundian state.

Studio Ijambo has achieved a reasonable level of credibility as a neutral source of news and information in this highly polarized sociopolitical environment, which is driven by mistrust and fear. Studio Ijambo correspondents who worked for the government-owned radio before joining the Ijambo team said they could see a big difference in their level of acceptance especially by the opposition when they started covering the Arusha negotiations. They could also see the same changes in attitude and behavior in their coverage of the parliament. In both cases, the subjects would refuse to talk to the government radio and television reporters, but seek Studio Ijambo reporters out instead.

One of Studio Ijambo’s strongest impacts may be on the media’s institutional credibility. Through its practice of team reporting, Ijambo has helped raise the level of professionalism through a systematic and conscious effort to protect its products from being contaminated by ethnic bias. In a society where there is so much hatred at close quarters between the two main ethnic groups, it is very difficult to avoid such contamination. However, there is no question that its innovative team reporting practice

has sensitized the rest of the media and has shown to what extent a news organization must go to deliver balanced, fair and objective news and information to its audience. Sometimes its assignment editors even had to send out two different teams of ethnically mixed reporters separately to make sure the accuracy of the facts of the difficult stories (Sinduhije 2000).

It is exceptionally difficult to achieve a reasonable level of credibility as a neutral source of news and information in a highly polarized sociopolitical environment as the Burundian society is. However, in the eyes of its audience, Studio Ijambo has achieved a high level of credibility, given the constraints, as an impartial source of news and information. Adrienne Sindayigaya, the first Hutu correspondent to join the program in 1995, said, Studio Ijambo "was the first [independent radio program] to give an honest, balanced information without hiding the truth and that tried to seek solutions to the problem" (Interview with author, June 20, 2000).

The level of impact can been seen from the reaction of those who disagreed with Studio Ijambo. Of the eight groups that participated in our survey using the rapid method of data collecting in the field, the soldiers group disagreed with Studio Ijambo most. Yet the members of the group admitted they listen to the program as an important source of information. The impact of such effort has been a level of credibility never seen before in Burundi among the common people, the opposition, and even the soldiers as a source of information, according to some NGO and opposition party representatives. Studio Ijambo correspondents and production personnel who worked for the government-owned radio before joining the Ijambo team said they could see a big difference in their level of acceptance especially by the opposition when they started covering the Arusha negotiations. They could also see the same changes in attitude and behavior in their coverage of the parliament. In both cases, the subjects would refuse to talk to the government radio and television reporters, but seek Studio Ijambo reporters out instead. However, Ijambo reporters admit to some level of self-censorship when they interview rebel leaders and cover the war so their stories would be aired over the state radio, one of the six stations that carry Studio Ijambo's programs. The other stations are Radio Bonesha, the Voice of America, the BBC World Service, and Radio Netherlands International. Added to that list of outlets Ijambo's programs is the recently launched Bujumbura-based African Public Radio (Rolt 2001).

It can also be stated that Ijambo, through is practice of team reporting, contributed to raising the level of professionalism through a systematic and conscious efforts to protect its products from being contaminated by ethnic bias. In a society where there is so much hatred at close quarters between the two main ethnic groups, it is very difficult to avoid such contamination. However, in addition to hiring some of the best reporters available in the country, and instituting rigorous training program, Studio Ijambo put in place a system of team reporting, assigning its correspondents in ethnically balanced teams to protect its correspondents as well its products from ethnic bias.

Mass or Elite Conflict Behavior

A media intervention can serve as an effective alternative to violent expressions of differences between the different sides to the conflict. Studio Ijambo, as an independent forum for dialogue, has been providing that alternative and the culture of peace it has been helping to cultivate is showing encouraging results overall.

Even the members of the Burundian armed forces, who, as the findings of the survey indicate, have had the least favorable attitude towards Ijambo's programs, have shown tolerance toward the private media with which they have been clashing over military and rebel activities in the countryside. Some of the changes in their behavior are credited to Studio Ijambo that they said they listened to as a credible source of news and information.

Furthermore, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that some of these shows have had even deeper impact on at least some portions of the society. Studio Ijambo staffers frequently receive telephone calls or mail messages following the airing of "Heroes" from some members of the audience to express regret for having participated in killings themselves during the l993-96 period or to give the names of other "heroes" they knew whose stories should be told.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

These findings have important policy and operational implications for donors and policy makers trying to support, implement, or design radio interventions in peace building processes. The experience of Studio Ijambo illustrates that radio can be a high-impact, low-cost instrument of intervention not only as a reliable source of news and information, but also as a vehicle of social and political mobilization in peace building. However, there are critical lessons that must be drawn from this and similar experiences from the region to ensure the effectiveness of such intervention. Some of the replicable practices learnt from the Brundian experience are:

INNOVATION: The Ijambo experience is that for a peace radio to be effective it must use innovative approaches in programming, training and general practices of journalism to draw and sustain an audience large enough to influence public opinion. It must keep reinventing itself in order to overcome professional and cultural challenges in trying to capture and sustain the critical mass necessary to effect change in conflict situations.

Studio Ijambo's innovative programming approaches--which include letting the people define the conflict and measure its effect, personalizing the conflict through such shows as "Heroes," and presenting it in a relaxed, conversational tone--has created a broad audience for its productions in Burundi.

INDEPENDENCE: Another important lesson from the Studio Ijambo experience and impact is that independence of government control—at least in its operation, if not ownership--is a necessary precondition for a mass media intervention to be effective in peace building. One of the primary functions of such an intervention in peace building is to serve as a reliable forum for all sides to the conflict. For such a forum to be effective, it must be viewed by all sides as being impartial and credible.

A BBC team that looked at radio media during this time in the Greater Lakes region, said that providing credible, balanced news and information is a function of independent media; "a function that should be supported and encouraged by international donors for its value in promoting better governance and in building a more empowered and informed civil society" (Myers et al. 2000, 31).

In the Burundian experience, the state-owned media's unwillingness to give Mandela's historic speech a full play at the very start of the negotiations in Arusha made it clear once again made it clear how the indispensable independent channels of communication are in a peace process. As stated above, Studio Ijambo was the only media organization that translated into Kirundi, the Burundian language, and produced the program. Though the speech, which laid down the framework of the peace process, was carried as a news item over the government media mostly in French, Ijambo was the only news organization that tried to bring it to the people in its entirety as a way of getting the people involved in the peace process. Though it is difficult to measure the extent of the effect of the translated version of the landmark speech, a few of those

interviewed recalled listening to the Kirundi version aired over what was then Radio Umwizero. That the government media did not give the speech a full play in the language the people understand best or even French may be a reflection that some in the Tutsi-dominated government were not exactly happy with some of the key provisions of the peace proposal. How unhappy some within the Tutsi community were became clear as the August 28 deadline approached.

CONFLICTING VALUES: Some of the key journalistic values and principles, such as openness and objectivity, by which a peace radio should be guided to be credible and effective, may be unacceptable in societies that value secrecy and ethnic loyalty more than anything else. The Ijambo experience is that such culturally-based challenges must be overcome or at least minimized early through rigorous training and innovative investigative approaches so that the local correspondents can function in the two worlds a media intervention puts them in—one new, the other old. . Both the minister of information, Luc Rukingama, and his director general for radio and television, Innocent Muhozi, in separate interviews reiterated the need for journalists to be "responsible." In Burundi, as in most of the rest of Africa, the standard to measure responsibility is usually set by the state

SUSTAINABILITY: In an attempt to reduce its dependency on other broadcasting outlets, Studio Ijambo "is supporting its journalists in their plans to set up their own independent radio with the same aims as Studio Ijambo," the current Ijambo director explained. "Apart from adding a fresh new independent voice to the airwaves in Burundi, this will enable the Studio to broadcast its programs without having to depend so much on media organizations, such as the state radio, which doesn't necessarily share their aims and objectives of Studio Ijambo" (Rolt 2001). Donors and policy makers should encourage such indigenization of the intervention instrument to ensure sustainability of the program.

On the other hand, efforts must be made to avoid anything that might add to the institutional tension between Studio Ijambo and the government since that may even jeopardize the slight opening of the political system now underway. The interplay between the small independent media and the state in that country must be guided very carefully and slowly.

NETWORKING: Studio Ijambo should explore the possibility of working with regional actors in the media sector not only to expand its audience, but also to protect itself from any attempt to silence by any single country. For example, a peace radio needs assessment conducted in neighboring Uganda revealed interest among NGO organizations, a media association and an academic institution to contribute to a new independent media intervention in the conflict-ravaged northern part of the country.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The negative role the mass media played--both broadcast and print--in the Great Lakes region in the mid 1990s confirms the findings of early media researchers who feared mass media content would erode those cultural values that protect individuals from manipulated information and other propaganda techniques. Ever since the media became powerful enough to reach mass audiences, research in the antisocial effect of media content has dominated more than any other type of investigation in mass communication. By contrast, "the impact of pro-social effect content is a newer area and grew out of the recognition that the same principles underlying the learning of antisocial activities ought to apply to more positive behavior" (Wimmer and Dominick 2000, 375-76). Some of this was prompted by the success in the United States of the public television series "Sesame Street" and "Fat Albert and the Cosby Kids," both of which showed that the mass media channels can also be used as vehicles for positive messages.

There have been many empirical studies that focused on antisocial effect of the modern mass media content. Many studies have established a causal relationship between media content and anti-social attitudes and behavior. For example, the l972 U.S. Surgeon General's Report, which was issued ten years later, said, "The consensus among most of the research community is that violence on television does lead to aggressive behavior (National Institute of Health 1982, 8). Though some researchers questioned the direct relationship between the two variables, others support the Surgeon General's findings and conclusions. But, even those who saw only slight relationship between the two variables pointed out its social implications. For example, "Rosenthal (1986), who concluded that even a weak relationship could have substantial social consequences, examined the practical implications of this weak relationship (Wimmer and Dominick 2000, 378). Congressional mandating in the Telecommunications Act of l996 to force manufacturers to include a V-chip or a computer chip to allow parents to block negative media content is an acceptance of that preposition.

However, most of the research on media effect dealt with television, which is the most important single medium in the rich and developed societies. Radio is to the developing nations what television is to the West. Television, a visual medium, is too expensive for most of the media consumers in the developing nations. Furthermore, "the reality in Africa today is that oral communication still remains the primary means of social interaction" (Hagos 1993, 2). Awa says, "In few regions of the world has the oral tradition persisted as in Africa" (1988, 141). Radio has a better chance of success in reaching out to the people in developing nations than any other modern mass medium, although its format may be a little bit difficult for the peasants accustomed to slow, two-way traditional communication systems. The format of modern radio is usually too compact and two one-dimensional to be readily understood by the peasant who is used to slow, interactive formats.

The different data gathering methods used in this study looked for both anti-social and pro-social impact of Studio Ijambo's content programming in all three areas of investigation: inter-group relations, social and political mobilization, and public institutions and processes.

Altogether, 267 people participated in the study. Of these, 160 participated in the written survey conducted the last three days of the fieldwork because the questionnaire was constructed based on the content that came from the interviews and focus group discussions during the first week of the investigation. The 27-item questionnaire was then given to eight groups--professional women, nonprofessional women, NGO workers, youth, university students, soldiers, small entrepreneurs, and consumers--with 20 people in each. The rest of the participants were: 42 were from 6 focus groups, with an average of 7 people in each; 30 random street-level intercepted interviews; 25 one-on-one in-depth interviews, ranging from the minister information to the Kamenge district administrator, to a blue-collar construction worker in southern Bujumbura; and ten reporters, editors, producers and other media representatives, some of whom were interviewed in groups, while others participated on one-on-one basis.

Because of lack of adequate capacity in data gathering in Burundi, and many other factors, including security, time as well as cost, a non-random sampling selection method was used in this study. As a result, rapid, low-cost appraisal methods were used to gather data systematically to determine the nature and extent of impact, if any, of Studio Ijambo. These methods, if used based on established procedures that minimize bias, can generate systematic, verifiable, and thus credible information that decision makers can use. The USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, in a paper on performance monitoring and evaluation tips, places the rapid appraisal methods, between the informal methods, which are susceptible to bias, to the highly structured formal methods which generate quantitative data. "They are neither very informal nor fully formal. They share some of the properties of both and that is their strength as well as their weakness" (USAID 1996).

This study takes advantage of all the rapid method's strengths--low cost, quick, and it allows a great deal of flexibility in gathering the data. Attempts were made to avoid or at least minimize the effect on the outcome of the rapid appraisal's limitations: limited reliability and validity, lack of quantitative data, low credibility with decision makers. For example, on of the common limitations of such methods is that it is very difficult to generate quantitative data on which generalizations can be made. To avoid that, the questionnaire was designed to generate quantifiable responses from Burundians cutting across the socioeconomic and sociopolitical spectrum of the society. Also to enhance the reliability of the qualitative methods used, the rapid appraisal survey method was only used to supplement the findings from the other methods.

Deacon et al. argue that "quota samples are widely favored in research where speed is essential." These kind of "samples are not compromised by low response (You keep going until your quotas are full" (1999, 50-51). Some of the potential sources of errors that can affect the level of confidence are the problem of "bunching" in quota categories.

In the two women categories in this study--one group of professional women, the other made of nonprofessional--we noticed there a was “bunching” in age: The average age of the professional women participants was 28, while those in the second category ranged in age from 28 to 70.

Other problems associated with quota sampling may include the time and place at which one quota is sampled. To avoid this problem from creeping into our quota, we selected our sample at a time when we could get most of the members from the category. Furthermore, to avoid place or geographical “bunching,” we got the quotas from the different sectors of the Bujumbura, including the Central Market, an urban melting pot.

In all this, the main goal was to be able to made generalize based on true representative samples of the broader population. In order to achieve greater confidence in the samples representatives, we tried to cover most of the societal groups--women, both professionals and non-professionals, small entrepreneurs, consumers, soldiers, local and international non-governmental organization representatives, youth, as well as the elite.

This study has also used focus group sampling method in order to provide social context for the one-on-one in-depth interviews conducted throughout the period of the field trip. Again, the selection of the focus groups was designed to help make broad inferences by including as many socioeconomic groups as possible in the survey. The selection was also intended to provide contrast on the issues. For example, the elite focus group based at the University of Burundi represented a good contrast--ethnically as well as in terms of social class--to the working class group in the southern section of Bujumbura. The inclusion of the professional and nonprofessional groups was also hoped to provide additional insight into the attitudes and behavior of the woman media content consumer. The nonprofessional women group was made of mostly Hutu housewives and unemployed widows from the poor northern district of Kamenge of Bujumbura, while the professional women were from relatively more affluent parts of the capital.

Most of the focus groups were ethnically mixed. However, the women’s focus group of ten participants was largely dominated by Hutu women from the area of Bujumbura decimated in 1993 by the army in an attempt to flush out Hutu rebels that were believed to have infiltrated the neighborhood, forcing the residents to flee the area. Today, the residents are slowly returning to the area and rebuilding their homes (most of which were destroyed when the army bombed it indiscriminately). In fact, two of the Hutu women were widows who lost their husbands when the Tutsi-dominated Burundian army bombarded their homes in retaliation for Hutu massacres of Tutsis, sparked off by the assassination of the first Hutu president in l993. Only two of the women were Tutsi. Most of the women belonged to associations that were formed to help each other. The women said they have managed to draw some Tutsis into their associations who were forced to flee the area because of the massacres.

To add depth that one would not be able to obtain through nominal techniques of measuring complex media content messages, a scale was used in the survey. The 27-item questionnaire tried to measure the impact of Studio Ijambo in the three predetermined areas of investigation by asking the participants to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement with statements gleaned from interviews during the first week of the field trip.

Studio Ijambo/Burundi – Questionnaire

Dear respondent,

This questionnaire is part of a project designed to assess STUDIO IJAMBO's contributions, if any, to ethnic reconciliation and peace building in Burundi. Your participation in this survey is very much appreciated.

The following scale uses statements grouped into three interrelated categories to measure the impact on or contributions to reconciliation and peace building in the country since its establishment in 1995. Please mark your responses by indicating one of the following choices to which numbers have been assigned: Strongly Agree (5 points), Agree (4 pts.), No Opinion (3 pts.), Disagree (2 pts.), and Strongly Disagree (1 pts.).

I. STUDIO IJAMBO'S IMPACT ON INTER-GROUP RELATIONS

Strongly Agree	Agree	No Opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

1. "Studio Ijambo's programs give useful advice on ethnic tolerance and coexistence."
_____

2. "Most of its programs urge people to work together."
_____

3. "It has helped people to be less afraid or suspicious of other ethnic groups."
_____

4. "It provides a voice for the voiceless."
_____

5. "Its objective and balanced information reduces rumor [as source of ethnic tension]"
_____

6. "By exposing ethnic hatred on its shows, it has given people courage to work for unity"

_____

7. "It has shown courage in covering the difficult issues."
_____

8. "It is still too timid to cover the difficult stories of the conflict"
_____

9. "It can do more with the resources it has"

_____

II. STUDIO IJAMBO'S IMPACT ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

10. It provides Burundian leaders a forum to dialogue among themselves instead of demonizing each other"

_____

11. "It provides access to political parties not allowed to use the government-owned radio"

_____

12. "It forces politicians to talk to the people and about the issues that concern people"
_____

13. "It gives the youth the opportunity to present and discuss their issues and concerns

_____

14. "It has helped revitalize civil society by urging its role in the peace process"
_____

15. "It is doing a good job in creating awareness" about women's rights, prostitution &AIDS]

_____

16. "It has been urging and helping women to join in and work with associations"
_____

17. Its ethnically mixed team-reporting practices "teaching coexistence" by example.
_____

18 "It should expand its coverage of the countryside"
_____

III. STUDIO IJAMBO'S IMPACT ON PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES

19. "It has contributed greatly to weaken government monopoly of public information"
_____

20. "It has [helped] force government media institutions not to take the audience for granted"

_____

21. "It was set up when it was needed to restore the public's faith in [the institution of] radio"

_____

22. "It works to find solutions to our problems"

_____

23. Its team reporting practice "assures balance in the process of information gathering and dissemination, which is necessary for reconciliation"

_____

24. "It is [helping] restore traditional cultural values & systems-- important for unity and healing"

_____

25. "The revival of the national culture means the revival of positive values, which stress coexistence"

_____

26. Some of Studio Ijambo's programs should be televised and given more time on radio. _____

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2. Innocent Muhozi, Director General, National Radio and Television
3. Domitien Ndayizeye, secretary general, FRODEBU
4. Remy Nkenguruf, secretary general, PARENA,
5. Nkunzimana Paul, chief of Kamenge District
6. Antoine Ntamikevyo, director of Radio Umwizero
7. Alexis Sinduhije, former Studio Ijambo correspondent
8. Shamil Idriss, Director, Search for Common Ground
9. Francis Holt, Director, Studio Ijambo
10. Patrick Bizinbavyi, journalist, Radio Umwizero
11. Adrienne Sindayigaya, correspondent, Studio Ijambo
12. Abdul Bakari, coordinator, youth program, Studio Ijambo
13. Willy Nindorera, former acting director, and producer, Studio Ijambo
14. Zenon Manirakiza, deputy administrator, CRID (Center for the Revival of Indigenous Culture and Development)
15. Deo Ntigayindusha, Executive Coordinator, Martin Luther King International Center,
16. Prof. Barbara Ndimurukundo-Kururu, University of Burundi
17. Dr. Nizigiyimana Domitien, University of Burundi
18. Prof. Father Liboire Kagabo, University of Burundi
19. Prof. Thareisse Nsabimana, University of Burundi
20. Dave Rothrock, country representative, Catholic Relief Service
21. Driss Moumane, assistant country representative, Catholic Relief Services,
22. Andy Nicholson, country representative, Christian Aid

23. Ambassador Balthazar Nahimana, University of Burundi
24. Ngendakumana Boniface, National Planning Program
25. Shirahi Gomba Silver, small entrepreneur
26. Kiramvu Domittle, small entrepreneur
27. Ciza Damien, small entrepreneur
28. Kigeme Oda, small entrepreneur
29. Bigirimana Evariste, small entrepreneur
30. Kalisa Alfred, small entrepreneur
31. Prof. Sulayman Nyang, Howard University, Washington, D.C.
32. Guy-Emmanuel Ntambutso, interpreter

Greater Horn of Africa
Peace Building Project

Mary Hope Schwoebel

CASE STUDY SEVEN:

Impact Evaluation of The War-Torn Societies Project:

Somaliland

March, 2001

Management Systems International
600 Water Street, SW, Washington, DC 20024 USA

Appendix from the Report:
The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace
A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

Contract No. GS-23F-8012H, Task Order No. 623-N-00-99-00294-00 for

DG/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis Services

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ii

Introduction 1

Events of the Conflict 2

Indigenous Conflict Resolution and Existing Capacities for Peace 6

Sources of the Conflict: Six Dimensions of Interest 10

The War-Torn Societies Project Worldwide 17

The War-Torn Societies Project in Somaliland 18

Impact: Six Dimensions of Interest 27

Political Leaders and Public Behavior 36

Internal and External Circumstances Affecting Impact 37

Recommendations 39

Conclusion 41

References 43

Persons Interviewed 45

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The full report can be found at:
http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report.pdf
or write to peacebuilding@yahoo.com for an electronic version.

Executive Summary

In 1991, four months after the collapse of the government of the Somali Democratic Republic, and the flight of its President, Mohamed Siyad Barre, the Republic of Somaliland was declared an independent state. The past decade has witnessed the struggle of the young state to resolve violent internal conflicts, to build sustainable peace among the different groups that constitute its population, to build a state that will sustain peace, and to rebuild an economy that will sustain the population. At the turn of the century, it has remarkably make significant progress towards accomplishing the first two aims, and is now embarking on the second two, perhaps more challenging, aims.

The War-Torn Societies Program (WSP) is a participatory action research (PAR) program that facilitates policy-oriented dialogue between representatives of the different sectors of the society - national government, local government, civil society organizations, traditional leaders, and other actors appropriate to the topic of specific dialogues - with the goal of contributing to post-conflict peace building. Although WSP aims to engage all levels of society in the dialogue process, the majority of participants in the program are middle- and higher- (although not highest) level actors.

The field research for the evaluation was conducted during the two-week period from September 10 to September 24. One week was spent in Nairobi, Kenya and one week was spent in Somaliland. The research included interviews in Nairobi and Hargeisa, interviews and a focus group in Sheikh, and observation of two days of a three day WSP workshop in Gabiley and focus groups with some of the participants in the workshop.

The War-Torn Societies Program, produces tangible products in the form of documentation of the substantive issues that emerge from the participatory action research process. While the quality and utilization of these products can be assessed, the fundamental goal of the program is focused less on the products than on the process itself, which is intangible. As such, assessing the program presents unique challenges, since its impacts on peace building can rarely be separated from the impacts of other interventions and other events. In addition, the program is still in its early phases in Somaliland, so it is too soon to gauge the overall impact that it is likely to make.

Nevertheless, the stage of peace building in which Somaliland is situated, combined with Somaliland's particular history and culture, suggests that WSP is an ideal intervention for Somaliland at the present time. The findings of this evaluation confirm this to be the case. For although the intervention has not made - and does not aim to make - immediate tangible contributions to peace (such as the signing of peace accords), the multiplex causes of the conflicts in Somaliland and the complex nature of the choices that have to be made in relation to state-building and reconstruction, can only be resolved by processes that allow these complexities to be articulated and the implications of different courses of action to be explored.

There are a number of ways in which the program might enhance its impacts. One is to find a way to strengthen its relationships with international organizations, both in Hargeisa and in Nairobi, in a way that does not diminish ownership of the program by Somalilanders. The second is to renew its commitment to the full integration of women into the political and economic life of Somaliland as a key goal. Finally, As WSP expands its work to regions beyond Somaliland and Puntland, it is recommended that the program begin in regions on the periphery, rather than in Mogadishu.

Introduction

Among the goals of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative Peace Building Project is the development of policy guidelines for best practices. One component of the Project involves the evaluation of the impacts of three different intervention types - middle-level dialogues, peace radio, and grassroots-level intercommunal dialogue - as they have been implemented in six different contexts in the sub-region. This paper presents the findings of an evaluation of the impact of the War-Torn Societies Program (WSP) as it has been implemented in Somaliland.

WSP is a participatory action research (PAR) program that facilitates policy-oriented dialogue between representatives of the different sectors of the society - national government, local government, civil society organizations, traditional leaders, and other actors appropriate to the topic of specific dialogues. Although WSP aims to engage all levels of society in the dialogue process, the majority of participants in the program are middle- and higher (although not highest) level actors. The field research for the evaluation was conducted during the two-week period from September 10 to September 24. One week was spent in Nairobi, Kenya and one week was spent in Somaliland. The research included interviews in Nairobi and Hargeisa, interviews and a focus group in Sheikh, and observation of two days of a three day WSP workshop in Gabiley and focus groups with some of the participants in the workshop.

This paper will begin with an overview of the events leading to Somaliland's declaration of independence in 1991, the internal conflicts that occurred in the middle of the decade, the processes that brought about the current peace, and the ongoing processes of peace building and state-building. Traditional political and jural culture, how these have evolved over time, and existing capacities for peace will also be examined.

The sources of past conflicts in Somaliland and potential sources of threats to sustainable peace will be discussed, focusing on six dimensions that the conflict resolution and peace building literature identify as both common causes of protracted conflicts and as areas on which interventions aim to have an impact. These are: economic sources, inter-group relationships, mobilization, public institutions and processes, political leaders and specific issues, and public behavior and events.

The War-Torn Societies Program, both worldwide and as it has been implemented in Somaliland will be described and the findings of the "process" component of the evaluation will be discussed. The findings of the "outcomes" component of the evaluation will be discussed as they impact on the six dimensions listed above. In addition, internal and external circumstances that may have affected the program's impact will be examined. Finally, some recommendations for enhancing the program's contribution to building sustainable peace in Somaliland, as well as in Somalia, will be made.

Events of the Conflict

Conflict in the Somali Democratic Republic

For at least a decade, the government of the Somali Democratic Republic under dictator Mohamed Siyad Barre had singled out the Isaq clan family of, what was then, northwestern Somalia for political and economic oppression. In response, an opposition group, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was organized and established bases in Ethiopia. The SNM waged a guerrilla war against Barre's forces in northwestern Somalia that resulted in further retaliation against the Isaq. Meanwhile the Barre regime strove to sow the seeds of conflict between the Isaq and other clan families of northwestern Somalia, including the Gudabirsi clan of the Dir clan family and the Dolbahante and Warsangeli clans of the Darod clan family.

The conflict with Barre's regime became all out war in April 1988, with the signature of a peace accord between Somalia and Ethiopia, agreeing to normalize their relations and to cease supporting each other's opposition groups (the Somali groups being the SNM and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) from the northeastern region of Somalia). In desperation, the SNM attacked government military installations in Hargeisa and Burco. Barre's forces responded with a massive air and ground assault, bombarding northern cities and laying land mines. An estimated 50,000 people were killed and at least half a million fled to refugee camps in Ethiopia and Djibouti. One Somalilander who was in Hargeisa at the time of the bombing commented, "at different times in my lifetime I have expected to be bombed by the British, by the Italians, by the Americans, by the Russians, by the Kenyans, and by the Ethiopians, but I have never expected to be bombed by Somalis."

In the meantime, new opposition groups were organizing in the southern regions of Somalia. Two years later, one of these, the United Somali Congress (USC) marched on Mogadishu, resulting in the flight of Siyad Barre and the total collapse of the government. Somalia remained without a central authority until the National Peace Conference in Djibouti (2001) that formed a government. It is too soon to say whether or not it can establish its authority and its legitimacy throughout the country and build a lasting peace.

The Republic of Somaliland, (encompassing the territory that constituted the former British Somaliland Protectorate) declared its independence from the rest of Somalia in May 1991 and quickly set about the business of internal peace building and nation-building. However, a decade of oppression and conflict had left the country and the people devastated by war and its infrastructure and its institutions largely destroyed.

Conflict, Peace Building and State Building in Somaliland

In February 1991, a conference of the *Guurti* - the council of traditional clan leaders or Elders of Somaliland - took place in Berbera. The meeting established a cease-fire and fixed the date for another conference to be held in Burco in April and May. The

accomplishments of the Burco conference included the declaration of the independence of the Somaliland Republic, the establishment of a transitional two-year rule by the SNM (which included a role for non-Isaq clans during this period), and the initiation of a peace process with the eastern region of Sanaag. Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali "Tuur", a former diplomat, the incumbent Chairman of the civilian wing of the SNM, and a Haber Yoonis (a sub-clan of the Garxajis clan of the Isaq clan family), was made interim President of the transitional administration. From February until September 1991, Somaliland enjoyed a period of peace.

The Burco conference, while it contributed to peace between the Isaq and neighboring clans, did not address tensions within the Isaq clans and within the SNM. With few financial resources, the interim administration was unable to control the still armed and mobilized SNM, as well as non-Isaq, militias. This inability to impose law and order resulted in rampant insecurity and political uncertainty.

"Tuur's" administration soon found itself at war with a coalition of clan-based militias, which were linked to the *Calan Cas*, the military wing of the SNM. The *Calan Cas* accused the government of being dominated by civilians and "Tuur"'s Haber Yoonis clan at the expense of the military and other clans. The association of the first SNM interim administration with the Haber Yoonis led the rival Haber Jeclo to become the first major Isaq clan to oppose the interim administration. The long-standing rivalry between the Haber Yoonis and Haber Jeclo, which had been subordinated during the civil war in the face of a common enemy, now reasserted itself with a vengeance.

Competition for political and economic dominance (of the livestock trade in particular) resulted in the outbreak of violent conflict between the Haber Yoonis and Haber Jaclo clans in the town that they share, Burco, in January 1991. The confrontation was short-lived, and was resolved by the Gudabirsi and other non-Isaq clan Elders (a role they played in subsequent intra-Isaq conflicts as well), but it highlighted the inability of the *Guurti* to resolve the internal tensions of the SNM, and contributed to a more serious subsequent conflict.

The second outbreak of violence occurred in Berbera between the Haber Yoonis and the Cisa Musa. In March 1992, the administration attempted to form a national army and to establish government control of revenue-generating public facilities, including the lucrative port of Berbera. The government had few sources of revenue, while the port was providing the militias with the resources to purchase weapons. This was therefore perceived as a significant source of continuing insecurity.

The town of Berbera is inhabited by several Isaq clans, including the Saad Musa (who have substantial business interests in the town), the Cisa Musa (the original inhabitants of the town), the Haber Yoonis, and other smaller clans. The Cisa Musa, whose militias controlled the port, perceived this move as an attempt by the Haber Yoonis to usurp their control of this revenue-generating resource. In an effort to avoid an escalation of the conflict, all but the Haber Yoonis withdrew from the army and the attempt to gain control of the port. Six months of violent conflict ensued between the two clans. The

efforts of both the Isaq political elite and the Isaq *Guurti* failed to resolve the conflict during this period.

Finally, in October 1992, the *Guurti* intervened, with the Gudabirsi once again playing the role of peacemaker. A conference was held in Sheikh at which a ceasefire was agreed to and an agenda was set for a subsequent conference of the *Guurti* in Borama to restore peace (*nabadeyn*) and to deliberate the future of Somaliland (*aaya ka talin*). This conference, referred to as the Grand Borama Conference, took place between January and May of 1993. The 150-member *Guurti* and hundreds of delegates and observers from across Somaliland participated in the conference.

Several important agreements were reached at the Grand Borama Conference. The first was the transition from the SNM interim government to a system based on clan representation. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Cigal, a civilian and a Cisa Musa from Berbera, was selected to be president and Abdirahman Aw Ali, a Gudabirsi, was selected to be vice-president. The choice of Cigal was designed both to appease the Cisa Musa and to divide them, which served to undermine their power in Berbera. Third, a National Charter and a Peace Charter, were adopted. These were to serve as the framework for the next two years during the processes of state building and peace building, respectively.

The National Charter served as an interim constitution from 1993 to 1997, while the Peace Charter outlined procedures for the peace building mandate of the *Guurti*, who were to review and revise the ongoing peace processes throughout the country. The administrative structure agreed to at the conference is made up of three branches: a two-chamber legislature, an executive council, and an independent judiciary. One chamber of the legislature is comprised of an elected parliament, while the other is comprised of the Council of Elders, the *Guurti*.

The government of Cigal was more successful than that of “Tuur” in establishing its authority over revenue-generating public facilities, such as the port of and the customs office in Gabiley, through which *qaat* imported from Ethiopia must pass, which created a source of income for the administration to carry out its basic functions and to send peace building delegations all over Somaliland. The introduction of the Somaliland shilling and the opening of the central bank bolstered the financial base of the administration. A judicial system made up of regional and district courts and a police force were established and began operations, at least in the central and western towns over which the had government control.

Yet peace was again disrupted in November 1994, by violent conflict between government forces (a coalition of non-Garx*aji*s clans) and Garx*aji*s militias over the control of Hargeisa airport in November 1994. The conflict expanded to engulf Burco in March 1995 and continued until 1996, resulting in considerable destruction in both cities. In the midst of the conflict in 1995, Cigal’s first tenure in office expired. The *Guurti* extended his term in office by 18 months to avoid the total disintegration of Somaliland. However the opposition viewed this decision as unconstitutional and a

violation of the National Charter.

The conflict had de-escalated by the time the next *Guurti* conference was held in Hargeisa between October 1996 and February 1997. At this conference, Cigal was chosen for another five-year term as president, and a new vice-president, Dahir Riyalle Kahin, was chosen. An agreement was also reached on a new three-year provisional constitutional document, which has served as the first draft of the constitution, the share of opposition groups in the two chambers of the legislature was increased, and minority communities were given a share.

Somaliland has continued to enjoy peace since the Hargeisa conference. As one member of Parliament said, “By the time the WSP started, there was peace throughout Somaliland and it is getting better everyday.”. Everyone who was interviewed as part of this evaluation acknowledged that it is, however, a fragile peace. Monumental tasks remain, including the preparation of the Provisional Constitution, a proposed referendum on the Provisional Constitution and the sovereignty of Somaliland, the establishment of political parties, a national election, reconstruction of infrastructure, the establishment of financial institutions, development of the social services sector, and many others. It is to these tasks that WSP addresses itself.

(The information for this section was based on interviews conducted as part of this evaluation, the Self-Portrait of Somaliland and the unpublished manuscript for a forthcoming book by Ahmed Yusuf Farah.)

Indigenous Conflict Resolution and Existing Capacities for Peace

Traditionally, the basic political and jural unit of the pastoralist society of Somaliland was the *diya*-paying group, which is constituted by a lineage or coalition of lineages (comprised of a depth of between 4 and 8 generations within the sub-clan). Lewis (1994) defines the diya-paying group as "a corporate agnatic group whose members are united in joint responsibility towards outsiders". The *diya*-paying group is collectively responsible for the payment of compensation in the event of the death or injury of a member of another group at the hands of one of its members. It is also collectively entitled to the receipt of compensation in the event of the death or injury of one of its members at the hands of a member of another group. Although based on lineage, the *diya*-paying group is nevertheless somewhat fluid, especially when it involves coalitions of lineages.

The primacy of the *diya*-paying group was mitigated somewhat by the practice of *xeer* which was sometimes complementary with and sometimes contrary to genealogical relationships. *Xeer* is an enforceable, formal contract, that can be of a political, an economic, or a social nature, and of either a long-term or a short-term duration. Yet Somalilanders often use the term to describe different situations that form a continuum from a formal agreement to a custom. Both the breeching of a formal agreement and the violation of a custom are subject to sanctions.

Traditionally there were no formal positions of authority in Somaliland. Elders represented the lineage segments at the levels of clans, sub-clans and *diya*-paying groups; and policies were made in meetings in which all adult male members of the group had the right to participate. The scope of the participants (in terms of the structural level of lineage segments) was determined by the situation - a classic feature of segmentary lineage systems.

The British colonial administration, however, formalized both *diya*- paying group and *xeer*. According to Lewis (1994), "Diya-paying groups act similarly in less serious issues and the interests of their members are defined by written treaties (sg, heer) which are lodged in District Offices" and "Diya-paying contracts thus define the basic jural and political status of the individual and are so regarded by the administration in the settlement of disputes".

However, both the British colonial administration and Siyad Barre's government were dependent on the heads of *diya*-paying groups as intermediaries between their administrations and the people of Somaliland. Both the British and Barre attempted and often succeeded in using Elders to extend their authority over their constituencies, and although formal authority was not vested in Elders, under either the British or Barre, they often received generous compensation.

In Somaliland there is a relationship between territory and lineage (at the clan family and clan levels, but not at the sub-clan level) based, not on ownership, but on occupation of the land. "Thus, ultimately, men and their stock move where they will be

subject only to their ability to maintain their position against others, if necessary by force. It is usually only in time of war, or when there is exceptional pressure on available grazing, that prescriptive rights of use are claimed and, if they are challenged, these can be maintained effectively only by force." (Lewis, 1994).

Colonialism changed these relationships however. Simons (1995) writes, "....the requirements of pastoral nomadism - with grazing areas and water points often left unprotected - can lead to festering disputes over who actually controls these invaluable resources. Without being able to permanently stay put, groups of Somalis have had to work out their differences over these areas through negotiation or conflict on a seasonal basis....." But, she continues, "...colonial officials sought to curtail pastoral sources of conflict through more clearly defining which grazing grounds and water sources belonged to which groups. At the same time, the very process of mapping clear lines of usership led to intense jockeying among rival groups of Somalis before control could be established and then once it was, over whether the new rules were just."

Post-colonial government policies, international development assistance policies, and the urbanization that resulted from them, further contributed to modifying the traditional political and judicial systems of urban Somaliland populations - not to mention their subsistence bases. Urbanization contributed to changing the bases of individual identity as well. In the post-colonial urban setting lineage continued to be the fundamental building-block of individual identity, but that source of identity overlapped with other sources of identity, including education and profession. In spite of the fact that who became a member of educated and professional classes or the political and business elites was largely determined by lineage, identity based on membership in these other groups had a life of its own that was separate from lineage identity. All that ended with the outbreak of the war, when clan identity became a matter of life and death. Individuals who may have once aspired to be “clan-blind” suddenly had no choice but to revive the primacy of clan.

The practice of *xeer* was also modified by and adapted to urbanization. Suddenly clans who had no previous contact, and who had quite different traditions of *xeer*, were living side by side - and having conflicts with each other. When a conflict arose between urban residents who were members of different clans, the Elders of each clan got together and discussed how the *xeer* addressed conflicts of a similar nature in their respective regions of origin or within their respective clan families. They then forged a new *xeer* (since it was understood that other conflicts of a similar nature were sure to arise in the future) that was agreeable to both and that made sense in the urban context. (This material is based on interviews that were conducted as part of this author’s dissertation research.)

Thus many practices were modified during the transition from rural to urban settings in ways that enabled them to continue to be effective for resolving conflicts and other crises. This was the case for practices such as *diya*, for example payments that used to be made in camels, were now made in the cash equivalent of camels. But other practices involving collective responsibility for individual misdeeds pose problems that

are not so easily resolved in the context of an urbanized nation-state.

The experience of WSP researcher highlights the fact that this is a challenge that remains to be faced by the nation-state. The researcher responsible for the Livestock Marketing Workshop in Burco was arrested by local police and put in jail when he arrived in town to conduct the workshop. It emerged that a member of the researcher's clan had been killed a member of a clan from Burco. The researcher was to be held until his clan fulfilled its *diya* obligations to the clan of the victim. Other members of the WSP researcher team conducted the workshop and negotiations with local authorities eventually secured the researcher's release. Such occurrences are not unusual in a context in which parallel - and fundamentally different - justice systems exist simultaneously.

As described in the previous section, the *Guurti* not only fulfilled its traditional functions in the context of the vacuum created by the collapse of the Somalia Democratic Republic and the troubled fledging Somaliland administrations, it ingeniously adapted them to a much changed and more challenging context. Their successes at peace building, and Cigal's dependence on them during the early years of his administration, earned them an important and institutionalized place in the new government.

However institutionalization of the *Guurti* involved a trade off. Farah (2000) writes, "But the new status of the *Guurti* as salaried civil servants cost them their perceived neutrality and moral authority, central elements in the traditional method of reconciliation in Somali society. With a vested interest in the survival of the government, the *Guurti* utterly failed to settle peacefully the second cycle of fighting between their paymasters (the government) and the Garxajis opposition. The politicization of the *Guurti* undermined an important local peacemaking instrument and allowed the fighting to drag on much longer than did the first cycle of fighting."

The failure of the *Guurti* to dispense their constitutionally mandated role as peacemakers and conflict resolvers, resulted in the intervention in 1995 of the Somaliland Peace Committee, comprised of a group of intellectuals and professionals from the diaspora. Both parties to the conflict - the government and the opposition - were suspicious of the motivations of the Peace Committee, and as a result their contributions as a third party were consequently less than they might have been. Nevertheless their efforts helped "to put peace back on the agenda" (Farah, 2000).

More importantly the intervention of the Somaliland Peace Committee suggests that the diaspora is another untapped resource for peace building. Indeed, Somalilanders possess greater resources than are generally perceived or acknowledged, by either themselves or by the international community. Logan (2000) writes, "They have a rich, highly democratic political tradition, and their more recent political experiences have produced deeply ingrained lessons about what does not work, as well as a strongly felt and widely shared desire for peace.... In combination with the keen interest of and resources provided by the diaspora, as well as the often underestimated local resource base, these characteristics have proven powerful tools for locally-driven political and

economic reconstruction."

The Stage of the Conflict

Adam Curle (1971) identifies four stages in the progression of a conflict based on a three-sided matrix. At the top of the matrix is a continuum from unpeaceful to peaceful. There are three stages along this continuum: static, unstable, and dynamic. At the bottom of the matrix is a continuum from low to high awareness of the conflict. There are two stages along this continuum: latent conflict and overt conflict. On the right hand side of the matrix is power, the bottom half representing unbalanced power and the top half representing balanced power.

Of the six quadrants formed, two are empty, while four suggest interventions appropriate to the conditions in the quadrant. Quadrant one, with low awareness of the conflict, unbalanced power, and static relations, suggests education. Quadrant two, with high awareness of the conflict, unbalanced power, and unstable relations, suggests confrontation. Quadrant three, with high awareness of the conflict, balanced power, and unstable relations, suggests negotiation. Finally, quadrant four, with balanced power and dynamic relations, suggests sustainable peace.

In quadrant four, successful negotiations and/or mediation have resulted in a restructuring of the relationship around both substantive and procedural issues. Curle refers to these as "increased justice" and "more peaceful relations", reminding us that in any stage of the conflict, it can jump forward, jump backward, or cycle through all four of the quadrants for extended periods of time. At this writing, Somaliland is situated on the cusp of the third and fourth quadrants (although since independence, at different times and in different places, it has cycled through each of the quadrants). This is the phase or location that WSP specifically and explicitly targets.

Sources of the Conflict: Six Dimensions of Interest

Economic Sources

Prior to the civil war the Somali Democratic Republic was one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world, whether the instrument used to measure it was based on macroeconomic indicators or human development indicators. Two decades of economic crises, political crises and conflict have devastated the economy of both Somalia and Somaliland.

In Somaliland, Siyad Barre's assault, the subsequent internal wars, and the random destructiveness of the *day-day* (gangs of armed young men, some of whom are remnants of the militias, who have become common thugs and bandits) have resulted in the destruction of both public and private infrastructure, including utilities, runways, roads, bridges, port facilities, factories, wells, irrigation systems, and abbatoirs.

Both public and private institutions relating to the economy have also ceased to function. With the exception of the Central Bank of Somaliland, financial institutions, including commercial banks, credit institutions, and insurance services, no longer exist. The government has not succeeded in creating a predictable regulatory climate, which has discouraged foreign investment. Markets have been monopolized by large traders at the expense of small traders and consumers. Finally, taxation is uncoordinated between the different levels of government, creating unpredictability and a heavy burden for business people.

But for Somalilanders, the economic sources of the conflict are related as much, if not more, to the inequitable distribution of resources than to the absolute value of resources. Conditions in which some clans have had greater access to resources than other clans tend to generate more conflict than scarcity in and of itself. Such competitiveness is an outgrowth of the experience with the colonial administration, whose policies favored some clans over others, and more importantly, of the policies of post-colonial governments which hoarded resources for themselves and their own clans, and denied access to resources to others. Indeed, Siyad Barre's denial of access of resources to the Isaq clan family was one of the worse cases of this phenomenon in Somali history.

Foreign assistance has also often contributed to conflict generation in Somalia and Somaliland. There are two primary reasons for this. The first is that some development assistance has been downright inappropriate. This began with the colonial administration's digging of wells in the Haud that resulted in environmental degradation and sedentarization, (both of which inadvertently created winners and losers) and continued until the collapse of the government of the Somali Democratic Republic. The second is that post-colonial governments deliberately employed foreign assistance to create winners and losers. Somalilanders were victims of such policies during the humanitarian crisis created by the irredentist war between Somalia and Ethiopia. Siyad Barre used humanitarian assistance to create advantages for refugee populations (from

his mother's *Ogaden* clan) at the expense of Somalilanders on their own soil.

Indeed, the paucity of development assistance was attributed, by some Somalilanders interviewed for this paper, as one of the reasons that Somaliland has been so successful in achieving peace. It has enabled Somalilanders to seek solutions to their own economic and political problems in their own ways and at their own pace. It has also lessened conflict between different individuals and groups who would have vied for access to and control of foreign assistance resources.

As in most African countries, a contributing cause of violent conflicts over control of the government is related to the use of that control (of revenues and/or of foreign assistance) as a source of personal enrichment. This is in part because there was a paucity of income-generation alternatives. That is less the case in Somaliland than in Somalia, where at least in the western part of the country, favorable conditions for livestock production and its location on the sea and in proximity to the Arabian peninsula, have contributed to a robust commercial sector during much of its history. The commercial sector continues to provide some Somalilanders opportunities outside of government for income-generation, if not enrichment.

Clan politics have resulted in the lack of the establishment of a permanent class of professionals based on meritocracy. Individuals with professional training often consequently leave for better opportunities elsewhere (although they return when their clan is in power) leading to further under development. Thus for example, while UNCTAD is rehabilitating infrastructure at Berbera port, it finds that institutional arrangements are an ongoing problem. While there are many Somalilanders with the technical training necessary to operate the port (UNCTAD offers technical training as well) retention of personnel depends on what clan is controlling the port at a given time.

The presence or absence of economic resources and who controls them also has an impact on security. Revenues can be used for peaceful means or to perpetrate violence. During the complex emergency in Somalia in the early 1990s, food and other supplies provided by humanitarian assistance organizations were stolen by militias and bandits and sold to purchase weapons. As has already been described in this paper, militias controlling the port in Berbera and later the airport in Hargeisa, used revenues from these sources to purchase weapons, thereby increasing both the actual level of violence and the potential for violence.

The need for demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants is recognized, but lack of resources and expertise has meant that the government and local business people have been unable to sustain their efforts. Anticipated aid for demobilization and reintegration from international organizations has not been forthcoming, although some NGOs have contributed modest support.

Somaliland suffers from exceedingly high unemployment, which is often cited as a source of insecurity, since lack of employment is since is considered one of the reasons for joining the militias and for banditry. High unemployment is in turn blamed for the pervasive use of *qaat*. Participants in the workshop on the impact of *qaat* on family and

society included *qaat* retailers, who are generally women. When one of the retailers was accused of being part of the *qaat* problem, she responded, “Give me another job and I will do something else.”

There is general consensus that *qaat* contributes to all kinds of economic (consuming large percentages of both public and private time and money that could be used more productively) and social ills (having deleterious effects on physical and mental health and on marital and parental relationships); but without alternative sources of income *qaat* will continue to be an important source of income for individuals and an important source of revenue for the government, which a member of the national government reported accounts for as much as 20 percent of national and local governments’ incomes.

However, it is the export of livestock that accounts for the bulk of Somaliland’s and the government’s income. In 1997, Somalilanders earned 176.6 million USD from livestock, from which the government revenues were 7 million USD (Ministry of Planning, 1998-1999). However, Somaliland’s reliance on the livestock trade, and especially its almost complete reliance on one market, has been demonstrated to be a liability. Between October 1998 and March 1999, Saudi Arabia, Somaliland’s main customer, imposed a complete ban on livestock imports from all countries in northeastern Africa, due to Rift Valley Fever. (There has been a ban on cattle from the region since 1983 due to rinderpest.) As soon as the ban was lifted, the economy boomed, only to have the ban imposed again in September of this year, because there were a number of deaths in Saudi Arabia caused by this zootic disease. The ban is still in place at this writing.

The result of the first ban highlighted another liability facing Somaliland’s economy - the price paid by the administration to maintain peace. Farah (2000) explains, “The outbreak of war in 1994 derailed local efforts toward demobilization, politicized the issue of security and led to the reversal of a 1993 government pledge not to form an army. To the chagrin of the opposition, and at the cost of being accused of violating the Interim Charter, the government launched a relatively large-scale recruitment of clan militias into the National Army.” But aside from what the government perceived to be its legitimate need for an army, the government used enlistment into the army and the civil service as an inducement and a reward for loyalty.

The 1998 livestock ban created a budget deficit and the administration was unable to pay the salaries of the inflated army and civil service. The administration thus appealed to international donors for financial assistance to cover the estimated revenue shortfall, and a portion of the shortfall was met by international organizations. Farah (2000) writes, “The government appeal and donor response documents reveal important information about the burden the large security forces and the inflated public service have placed on the limited budget of the administration: almost 95% of revenue is spent on administration (20-23%) and defense and security (72%). There is little going to the productive infrastructure (3%) and social (3-5%) sectors.” International organizations continue to take up the slack in infrastructure rehabilitation and the provision of social

services, such as health care and education.

One member of the national government acknowledged that there are thousands of superfluous security forces on the government payroll in need of demobilization and reintegration. This is not only not sustainable, it impedes the development of the productive sectors, from which citizens can obtain sustainable and legitimate sources of non-governmental income. “Somaliland’s checkered experience in peacekeeping and governance during the prolonged transition period bespeaks the disruptive influence SNM clan militias and the power struggle within the SNM political elite have had on political development, internal security, and overall socioeconomic reconstruction. The creation of a large army may overcome internal strife but it cannot guarantee domestic stability and an environment conducive to political rebuilding and a transition to a democratic system of governance.” (Farah 2000).

Inter-Group Relationships

It is commonly acknowledged that clan relations are one of the root causes of conflict in Somaliland. Indeed clan is the building block of individual and group identity. But this is not in and of itself problematic and can have positive as well as negative ramifications. In general it can be said that the root of the problem is to be found in the imposition of a Western-style nation-state on a people whose culture and history are entirely different from those of the West. This is especially the case when the nation-state that results is characterized by authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism, and other ills. However those ills are themselves partially a result of the poor fit between traditional and Western-style governance.

In Somaliland, the dominant Isaq family clan has been much more successful than was anticipated in resolving conflicts with other clan families - most notably with the Dir. It has had less success in addressing conflict within the Isaq. In addition, potential conflict between the Isaq and the Darod clan families of eastern Somaliland has remained latent for most of the past decade, rather than having been resolved.

There are other group and individual identities or categories around which people mobilize and which sometimes result in inter-group conflict. An important distinction in Somaliland since it declared independence pertains to the civilian versus the military wings of the SNM and their constituents. Militarized political culture may represent the most serious threat to sustainable peace both in terms of the ever-present threat of military takeover and the political culture of compliance in the face of authority. “Siyad Barre’s militarized socialist state ruthlessly suppressed the evolution of democratic institutions and culture for a period of two decades. The final disintegration of the national forces and the governing military elite in January 1991 left an enduring political void and leadership crisis. The clan-based guerrilla organizations replacing the system of socialist military government were unable to establish centralized authority and resurrect the Somali State, thereby precipitating the country’s dismemberment into unstable mini-states controlled by ‘big men’ (Farah, 2000). He continues, “The military elite governed the Democratic Republic of Somalia more than a decade longer than the

preceding civilian leaders, and therefore produced more military officials than civilians to aspire to public office in Somalia's' post-military period. This left a legacy of entrenched militarization of political leadership that will take some time to reverse.... domestic peace and the return to a democratic system of governance are still very much influenced by the military elite." The *Calan Cas* leaders fought for the independence of Somaliland and believe that they have earned their right to political power. They perceive that they are being deliberately ignored by Cigal's administration and want to have a hand in governing the country.

Tension also exists between the Parliament and the *Guurti*, although it is not clear the extent to which this is a conflict between traditional and Westernized leaders and governance styles; or whether it is related to one of the main issues facing the drafters of the Constitution, which is the degree of power to reside in the Executive and the degree to reside in the Legislature. The *Guurti* has, in fact, supported Cigal's efforts to form a centralized government based on a strong executive branch, while Parliament has generally supported the formation of a decentralized government based on a strong legislature. This has resulted in the *Guurti* and Parliament being opposed to each other on this issue. One MP said, "Cigal has used the Elders as a rubber stamp and he has used them against Parliament".

There are also tensions between government and civil society. A decade ago, civil society in any sense, was an almost non-existence phenomena in Somaliland and Somalia. Civil society has come into being during the past decade, for several reasons, including the insistence of international organizations that they have local partners to implement projects and through whom to channel funds, the vacuum left by the collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic's government, as a means for members of the diaspora to provide assistance to Somaliland, and as a means of income-generation to gain access to donor funds targeted for specific populations (eg women) or activities (eg conflict resolution skills training).

Tension between government and civil society is inherent in a political culture with a legacy of authoritarianism and militarization. But tension has also been caused by international assistance to Somaliland that has not succeeded in balancing its support to strengthen civil society with its support to strengthen the government. The reasons for this are numerous, including the fact that not officially recognizing Somaliland has prohibited direct assistance to the government for some organizations, and the current climate in the international community which views governments as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

Somaliland society exhibits other cleavages - between urban and rural, between the young and the old, between those with formal education and those without, between the upper and middle classes and the masses, between those who have lived abroad and those who have not. These are for the most part overlapping cleavages that are cross-cut by clan. The cumulative effect of overlapping cleavages is that Somalilanders are divided by what Oscar Nudler refers to as a "worldview conflict". In Somaliland, worldview conflict exists not only between groups, but also within individuals, especially

those who have returned from the diaspora. As more members of the diaspora return to Somaliland, the potential exists that there may be an increase in conflicts whose causes are differences of worldview. The highly contested issue of the role of women in Somaliland is a salient example of a worldview conflict.

At the time of this writing, religion in the sense of different approaches to Islam - was not a cause of conflict in Somaliland. In neighboring Puntland, relationships between the SSDF and Al-Itahad had been a source of conflict.

Mobilization

The salient feature of mobilization in Somaliland has been the near impossibility of mobilizing groups on any basis other than clan. It has characteristically been all to easy for political elites to mobilize their clans to take up arms to protect perceived clan interests, as was seen by the ease with which Egal was able to mobilize members of the army belonging to his clan, but not members of the army belonging to other clans, during the conflict over the Berbera port.

“Somaliland’s prior experience of civil strife suggests that the most serious threat to peace derives from the deliberate mobilization of grievance based on perceived inequities between clans. Given the evident regional disparities that exist within Somaliland, the grounds for collective grievances are real, and constant vigilance is required if conflict is to be avoided.” (Self-Portrait of Somaliland, 2000, p. 32)

But there is an unfortunate lack of mobilization in Somaliland of other groups - considered by international interveners, at least - to be essential for democracy. Civil society is an imported category in Somaliland. It has come about only in the past decade, mainly in response to the need of international organizations to channel funds through and implement projects using local NGOs. This has resulted in a plethora of local NGOs whose main interest is income-generation for themselves and their constituents. Generally, local NGOs have been clan-based, have incompletely understood the concept of civil society, and have not been able to organize themselves to advocate for their own interests or for the interests of their constituents. NGOs and other civil society groups must also contend with a political culture that lacks an understanding of the role of civil society and that is deeply suspicious of civil society.

Women have also been unable to mobilize as an interest group. Women’s groups suffer from the same weaknesses that characterize other civil society groups. Yet many women in Somaliland are fed up with being marginalized in the economic and political arenas. During the war and in the present post-war period, women have provided economic and social safety-nets. As a member of a women’s NGO said, “We have taken care of our families and communities and have been the sole source of income for our families and communities. We are still doing those things while our men are unemployed and spending time and money chewing *qaat*.” Many women expressed the desire for change, but acknowledge that they lack the skills and the resources to pursue change effectively.

Logan (2000) writes, “In Somaliland and Puntland, women remain largely marginalized from participation in the political system, even as their role in the economy has increased dramatically during and after the conflict.... women must still struggle to overcome cultural barriers that discourage their participation in politics. Women have also been held back by their own failure to unify, coordinate and jointly plan their efforts. Given their increasing economic role and their ability to serve a positive bridging and mediating role within Somali society, greater women’s participation in politics should be a key goal.”

Public Institutions and Processes

Somaliland is at a critical juncture in the process of state building at the time of this writing. It is currently engaged in the exercise of making changes to the provisional constitution with the goal of drafting a new Constitution that includes a transition from the clan-based system to an electoral system. The government has set an ambitious program for itself, that involves the following steps: (1) Parliament will debate changes to the provisional constitution article by article, until it is accepted by the two legislative houses. (2) The provisional constitution will be explained to the public over the radio, article by article. At the same time thousands of copies will be distributed for discussion. (3) A referendum will take place to approve or reject the provisional constitution. A vote in favor of the provisional constitution will also mean an endorsement of the sovereignty of Somaliland. (4) Political parties may then be established, in line with the new Constitution. (5) The final step will be a national election, in which the people will choose which party to lead them and elect a new government. (Self-Portrait of Somaliland, 2000, p.22-23) At this writing the first draft of the provisional constitution has been distributed and the second draft is being discussed in the two legislative houses.

The single most contested issue during this process is related to the issue of decentralization. Most Somalilanders are convinced that the most effective way to offset the political culture that has resulted from years of authoritarian governance is to adopt a federalist-type system, allowing the regions considerable autonomy. It is believed that this may be the only way to address real and perceived inequities between different clans and different regions. But numerous issues pertaining to the relationship between national and local governments will have to be resolved before Somaliland can successfully implement such a system. Several individuals interviewed said that the issue of decentralization is of concern to the national government, not because it entails a reduction of its power, but because of the fear of national disintegration, if it is implemented before Somaliland is ready.

A WSP staff member said, “In Somaliland, the theme of decentralization in particular has been threatening to the government because it is still trying to sell the idea of nationhood. The government has argued that decentralization will lead to disintegration. In fact, some representatives of the regions in Parliament are also against decentralization, because they are center-focused.”

Another issue that will have to be resolved by the new Constitution is related to the balance of power between the executive branch and the legislative branch. Not surprisingly, Egal favors the executive and the Parliament the legislative. Some individuals interviewed said that the *Guurti* supports Egal because they have been co-opted by him. Others said that the *Guurti* has served the role of mediating between Cigal and the Parliament. Several expressed the opinion that by centralizing power in the executive, Egal has failed to build the institutions necessary for the government's sustainability.

Political Leaders and Public Behavior

A Somalilander interviewed for this paper provided the following explanation of how Cigal has brought about change during the nation-building process. It is included in its entirety: "Cigal recognized from the outset that one could not afford to ignore the military men. They have their pride and they have to be taken into account. What the old man did was to start by bringing in the generals and colonels and making them ministers, and allowing a degree of corruption, so that they could enrich themselves. Because they are satisfied they will go back to their regions. Little by little he began replacing them with civilians. Then he re-empowered the elders. He let it be known that if someone wanted something from the government, say a position in a Ministry, that they would have to gain access to him through their clan leaders. He did not do so by paying these clan leaders. Previously the elders had no power, although some were empowered through formal posts such as the *Guurti*. But the majority do not hold formal posts. At first each clan had a Ministry, then he started shifting things around so that different clans had access to different ministries at different times. Now he is slowly starting to change that as well. He wants a government that is based on elections rather than the *beeled* system."

The War-Torn Societies Project Worldwide

WSP was created in June 1994 as a joint project of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies (PSIS) of the Geneva Graduate Institute for International Studies. It was launched to assist societies emerging from conflict to identify which issues should be given priority in terms of policy, among the plethora of critical challenges confronting them. It was also launched for the purpose of improving international organizations' efforts to assist these societies.

WSP has been piloted in several countries: Guatemala, Mozambique, Eritrea, and Somalia and Somaliland. The methodology used is participatory action research (PAR) employing local research teams to promote and facilitate dialogue among the various actors involved in post-conflict rebuilding, by providing a neutral forum.

The War-Torn Societies Project in Somaliland

Goals

WSP Somaliland was initiated with the goal of finding solutions to the difficulties faced by the international community in responding to the challenges of post-conflict rebuilding. Another goal is the facilitation of an internal, national process belonging to local actors involved in post-conflict rebuilding. In this sense it is a PAR program in which dialogue and research are used together to set priorities and identify policy options. The process is characterized by consensus building and capacity building in a neutral space.

WSP's research goals include learning about the relationships between research and policy-formulation and the application of action-research at micro and macro levels. The program also aims to produce lessons relating to the positioning of research in relation to political processes and state building. Finally, the program aims to fashion the lessons learned into tools that can be used to effect change in the way that external organizations plan, implement, and coordinate their activities in countries emerging from conflict.

Objectives

WSP program objectives in Somaliland include ensuring that international assistance contributes to building peace and does not contribute to renewed conflict, promoting PAR as a vehicle for democratizing development and empowering communities and disempowered groups such as women, strengthening the capacity of national and local government and civil society organizations to contribute to state-building and reconstruction, and building the capacity and ensuring the sustainability of a successor body, namely the Somaliland Center for Peace and Development. The Director of SCPD, explained that the idea is to create a "neutral space" where intellectuals can come to develop and discuss their ideas. "It is not neutral in the sense in which that word is generally understood - we all know that that type of neutrality doesn't exist, that people are only neutral in that sense when they are dead - rather, neutral in the sense of being able to step back from one's emotions, if only as long as it takes to drink a cup of tea, and neutral in the sense that all ideas can be entertained and can be expressed openly."

Implementation

The first activity of the program is training the local researchers about the WSP PAR process. In Puntland, WSP has spent only days on the training and therefore found that the researchers did not have a thorough understanding of the process and had to be retrained. Learning from this experience, WSP Somaliland therefore spent a month on this activity.

The first phase of the program was the preparation of the Country Note. This is a

substantive paper discussing the key political, economic, and social issues facing the country. It was prepared using both existing documentation and by conducting focus groups in communities throughout Somaliland. The focus groups were conducted in cities, towns, and villages. One government official said, "They went to every corner of the country. The only place they did not go was to the wells. The pastoralists were the one group that was not included. A brainstorming methodology was developed (it was initially tested in Gabiley and the villages surrounding it) that involved informal give and take discussions around areas of interest to the participants. A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins is the title of the results of this research.

The first draft was published in November 1999. Over 300 copies were distributed to representatives of national and local government, members of civil society, professionals, intellectuals, and Elders, who were invited to a meeting in Hargeisa at which feedback was solicited. Based on the feedback from the meeting and on inputs received formally and informally by written and verbal means, the research team rewrote the document. The second draft was printed and 300 copies were again distributed in January 2000 to government, civil society organizations, and international organizations. It was also distributed to some of the communities where the focus groups had been conducted to solicit their feedback on the document.

Out of the research and discussion four Entry Points emerged. These are broad themes that have been identified as priorities for research. (The researchers said they were surprised by the themes, because they had assumed that the people's priorities would include health, education, water, and other social services - the sectors usually addressed by international organizations.) Under each of these themes, three sub-themes were identified. The themes and sub-themes and the locations where the workshops have been or are to be held are as follows:

Media

Objectivity and Responsibility - Borama

Coverage and Influence - Borao

Media Environment - Hargeisa

Governance

Decentralization - Beki

Taxation - Erigavo

Representation - Hargeisa

Livestock Regulation

Marketing - Borao

Health and Export Markets - Berbera

Environment - Odeweyne

Family

Impact of War - Sheikh

Impact of *qaat* - Gabiley

Institutional Support Systems - Hargeisa

Working Groups of professionals and stakeholders in each theme were formed. The Working Groups meet monthly in Hargeisa. The WSP researcher responsible for each theme is responsible for preparing a Discussion Paper that establishes a framework for future workshops based on the initial research and inputs from the Working Group. The Working Group provides feedback to the researcher who then makes changes, and back and forth it goes until an agreement is reached. The paper is then ready for the Thematic Workshop, where it is distributed to participants. The Discussion Paper is intended to catalyze discussion, frame the main issues, and identify key questions.

Before a workshop the researcher visits the community where it is to be held and identifies an anchorperson to be responsible for identifying participants. The process must adapt to local contexts. For example, in Burco, a polarized community comprised of two clans, it was necessary to utilize two anchor persons - from each of the two main clans living there.

The anchorperson is given a list of the categories of segments of the population who should be represented. These include members of civil society, local government officials, Elders, women's groups, and representatives of the relevant stakeholder groups, for example livestock wholesalers, retailers, and producers.

Workshops are generally comprised of about 20 participants. They are also generally attended by members of the research team and one or two representatives of the national government, who answer communities' questions about national processes and take the findings of the workshops to the *Guurti* and Parliament, respectively. (These individuals were chosen by these bodies to represent them in the workshops.)

The first workshop was held in May 2000. It is anticipated that the final workshop will be conducted in April 2001. At the time that this research was carried out, one workshop had been held on each of the four themes. The second workshop on the theme of the impact of *qaat* was held during the research period.

The general process followed by the workshops is to use the first day for "venting", the second day for identifying issues, setting the agenda, and discussing alternatives, and the last day is to propose recommendations for addressing. Each evening during the workshop the team meets to summarize the day's discussion and write the main points on flipcharts. The following day the flipcharts are shared with the participants. In addition, the team meets afterwards in Hargeisa to discuss the lessons learned about the process, so that it can be modified for subsequent workshops.

Strengths

Sustainability

One of the goals of WSP in both Somalia and Somaliland has been to institutionalize the PAR process by "handing it over" to a local organization. In Somaliland, the organization is an existing research center, the Somaliland Center for Peace and Development (SCPD). WSP and SCPD together have put together a group of researchers who represent some of Somaliland's best and brightest. Most have returned to Somaliland from abroad to contribute to rebuilding their country. SCPD hopes to establish itself as a permanent institute that will be involved in research, training, documentation, publication, and dissemination. WSP and SCPD are generally conflated by Somalilanders.

Staffing

Not only is WSP's staff (both in Nairobi and in Somaliland) comprised of Somaliland's brain trust, they work well together as a team. Staff members exhibit a sense of pride in being a member of the team as well as pride in and commitment to the work in which they are engaged. Each of the main clan families (Isaq, Darod, Dir) of Somaliland are represented on the staff. They appear to enjoy a considerable degree of respect from and the trust of those who have participated in the program. One government official said, "I trust the products (the Self-Portrait of Somaliland) because I trust the people on the research team to write the opinions of workshop participants, rather than their own opinions."

The Process

Almost without exception, individuals who participated in the WSP workshops reported positively about the process. The fact that they are paid to participate may skew the responses. Members of the Working Groups are not paid to participate, however, and they too were also unanimous in their positive statements about the process.

A government official said, "The process is different, but better, than traditional processes since everyone, including women, are present and have an opportunity to speak. The process acknowledges local authorities by giving them a chance to speak, but does not let them monopolize the discussion."

Almost all participants in the workshops said that this was the first time they had had

the opportunity to sit down with representatives of national and local government and representatives of every segment of society to discuss issues of common concern. This experience seems to have been empowering for all types of participants, including the MPs and members of the *Guurti* themselves.

The Products

The Self-Portrait of Somaliland and the anticipated Entry Point Papers will be significant accomplishments in and of themselves and should benefit national and local governments and international organizations, since they not only provide summaries of key discussions held at the workshops, but also analyses and syntheses of the key issues.

A member of a women's group said that not only did the process contribute to a better understanding of different groups' points of view in her own community, but that the Self-Portrait of Somaliland contributed to a better understanding of the points of view from different parts of Somaliland."

Utilization of Lessons Learned

At both the international, Nairobi, and Hargeisa levels, WSP engages in an iterative process of action and reflection. In Somaliland, program staff were quick to incorporate lessons learned and adapt program approaches and activities accordingly. Some of these are discussed elsewhere in this paper.

Weaknesses

Lack of understanding of the process

There was considerable confusion about the purpose of the program. Women in one focus group said that they did not think that the program had had the impact that they had expected, because they had expected that the program would also do something about the problems. They also said that the recommendations that they made during the first phase had not been responded to (these were related to the need for hospitals and schools). Women in another focus group said, "We expected something to result from the workshop. We wanted the government to take the recommendations from the workshop and translate them into action that would benefit women in tangible ways." Such a response indicates a lack of an understanding of the purpose of the process. This is not surprising given the traditional activities of aid organizations in Somalia and Somaliland.

Lack of Coordination with other international organizations in Somaliland

The lack of coordination with other organizations, especially those doing similar work, has added to the confusion about WSP's purpose, since on several occasions, WSP and the Life and Peace Institute (LPI) have offered workshops in the same locations during the same time period. WSP has also lost opportunities for increasing the impact

of the program. For example, in Puntland, WSP worked with UNESCO's "Radio of Peace" Program to disseminate WSP's findings over the radio, thereby reaching not only literate, but illiterate, populations, as well as a larger number of people for a fraction of the cost. This has not happened between WSP and other organizations in Hargeisa. (WSP is however videotaping portions of the workshops. These have been shared with the Working Groups as part of the preparation for subsequent workshops and have the potential to reach broader audiences as well.)

Payment of Participants

WSP acknowledged that they had spent considerable time debating the dubious merits of paying participants per diem for attending the workshops. This generates some conflict as individuals and groups compete to participate in the workshops in order to receive the per diem. (It also may have created a conflict of interest when meeting with this author.)

Slow Feedback or Lack of Feedback to and from Communities

One participant in the initial phase of the research complained that their community had never received copies of the Self-Portrait of Somaliland. One member of the government who was a participant in the meeting called to review the first draft of the Self-Portrait of Somaliland complained that their feedback was not incorporated in the final paper. A participant in the media workshop said that the products should be disseminated to more than just the government and international organizations and those workshop papers should be distributed more rapidly and more widely.

Validity of the Research

Depending on an evaluator's epistemological preferences, there may be concerns about the validity of the research. One international consultant expressed the following concerns about the validity of the research, "First the number of participants is not significant, and second is that equal weight is given to all participants." From this author's perspective, the validity of the research is not especially problematic. Indeed, given the context, both the number of participants and the participant selection process, strengthen the validity of the research.

Admittedly, the products of the research determine which issues get emphasized, which ones get ignored, what information on various issues is presented, and which viewpoints are presented more convincingly. As such WSP and SCPD have a considerable influence over which voices and which viewpoints are heard by both internal and external actors.

Paradoxes

Neutrality versus Advocacy

The UNDP Resident Representative and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, Randolph Kent, pointed out that WSP suffers from a paradox worldwide. “In post-conflict situations one has governments that are inherently incapable and communities that are by definition either antagonistic or linked to the government. The program claims to represent the community, but what community does it represent when there is no community? How can the program claim communication between communities and government when the project requires the buy-in of the government for implementation, requires that communities communicate honestly with the government, and at the same time the government does not tolerate criticism. In other words middle level dialogue could not exist without the consent of the government. And if the middle level is not in sync with the government, then the government will not give its consent, and if operates without the government's consent then the program does not fulfill its mandate and becomes an advocacy project.”

Menkhaus (2000) writes about WSP Puntland, “The very process WSP set in motion was anything but neutral, and was not in any way perceived as neutral locally. Creating space for broad-based dialogue had real political implications locally, creating winners and losers, benefiting some groups and threatening others.” In Somaliland, WSP’s research team appears to be closer to attainment of this quixotic goal.

However one perspective that does not seem to have been given voice is the one that questions the sovereignty of Somaliland itself. WSP Puntland was asked to address this issue - from the other side - and it, wisely, declined to do so. It may indeed be wise to skirt the issue in Somaliland as well. First, because the project would be shut down by the government if it was perceived in any way to be promoting reunification. Secondly, because Somalilanders are tired of conflict and many do not want to address the issue themselves - especially not until Somalia gets itself together. Many said that after so many years of war they would pay any price for peace.

The Need to Strengthen Government and Civil Society

Another of the inherent paradoxes in the process is that in order to accomplish its goals of post-conflict state building, the program must seek to simultaneously strengthen both the government and civil society. This paradox has had an impact on local perceptions of the program. In Puntland, there was a perception that WSP was aligned with the opposition, while in Somaliland there is a perception that WSP is aligned with the government. A challenge confronting the program is to convince both government and civil society of the necessity of the other for building a sustainable state and a sustainable peace.

Local Ownership versus International Community Participation

One of the stated goals of WSP internationally is to improve external aid agencies work in post-conflict societies. Menkhaus (2000) writes, "The Geneva office has maintained a strong commitment to this, while WSP Nairobi has striven to grant as much autonomy as possible to local offices. This has enhanced the sense of ownership of those communities to the program. It also allowed local communities to come together without the distractions of external actors to find their own voice and heal their own wounds. This was especially important in view of the perception that the external agencies are as much a part of the problem as they are a part of the solution. The Geneva office on the other hand was concerned that this marginalized the external organizations who, along with local authorities and civil society organizations, were the target beneficiaries of the program."

Nevertheless, the lack of collaboration with the international community represents a lost opportunity to increase the impact of the program. Both WSP and the international community have contributed to this state of affairs (these are discussed in more detail elsewhere). One international organization official, said that one reason for the low participation of decision-making staff from international organizations in WSP workshops is due to the fact that the logistical constraints were not well thought out in designing the program. These constraints include the staff time entailed, the expenses entailed, and expatriates' lack of Somali language capacity. Although not knowing the Somali language prevents expatriates from being full-fledged participants in the process, the experience of observing workshops (with a translator) is valuable in and of itself as it enables the observer to get a sense of the multiple perspectives and issues surrounding a given topic, as well as to learn which groups in a community propose which courses of action.

On the one hand, this is especially valuable since the programming of international organizations would benefit from being informed about the different perspectives of different groups on given issues and the probable winners and losers of different policies and programs. This is something that WSP is well-placed to do. A UNDP official expressed some frustration at feeling that SCPD "keeps to themselves" in order to maintain the Somali perspective, because he would like to have them influencing his programming.

On the other hand, the past experiences with international interveners have generally been disempowering for Somalilanders. Ownership of the program - both the products and the processes - by Somalilanders is one of the program's greatest strengths. The lack of involvement of expatriates has provided Somalilanders the space to reach a consensus among themselves before attempting to have an impact on the policies and programming of international organizations.

Finally, the presence of internationals in workshops, given the potential resources that they represent, may have a distorting impact on the kinds of issues that emerge, as well as discouraging Somalilanders to think about the resources already available to them.

That might encourage Somalilanders to determine which are the critical resources to which Somaliland does not have access, and approach donors for only those resources.

Nevertheless, international organizations will continue to implement programs with or without being included in the WSP process. They will continue inadvertently to create winners and losers and promote the needs and interests of some groups over those of others, and inadvertently to generate conflict as a result. A consequence of the low level of participation by international organizations is that WSP may actually have less of an impact than it has to potential to have.

Impact: Six Dimensions of Interest

Economic Sources

The WSP is a new type of program in Somaliland, and PAR is a new kind of process. It does not contribute directly to economic development and it does not bring significant monetary or material gain (either legitimate or illicit) other than several salaries and negligible per diems for a few hundred people. As such, it is generally misunderstood and not always appreciated. Indeed, some Somalilanders have nicknamed WSP "the Blah Blah Project". (On the positive side, this has reduced the conflict generated for access to resources made available by the program, which is an all too common result of assistance programs.)

Some international experts also criticized the program. One internationally renown conflict resolution expert said, "The problem with this kind of project (as opposed to infrastructure projects for example) is that they provide a way for the international community to avoid the responsibility of transferring wealth from the rich global North to the poor global South. Economic development is a precondition of peace, and this type of project does not address the economic causes of the conflict. The international community is instead putting money in low budget conflict resolution projects that don't leave anything behind, certainly not food on the table"

The leader of a local NGO reported, "Conflicts in Somaliland are resource-based. They used to be about access to water and grazing and now they are about access to capital. This is interconnected with politics. Not everyone feels that they are getting their fair share. Peace has to be approached from two sides. One is through the Elders and the *Guurti* who have been successful in resolving conflicts such as the one in Burco. The other has to be through employment generation. That is why the lack of involvement of foreign donors in WSP is a weakness of WSP. Another weakness is that it does not address the real economic issues."

Other Somalilanders interviewed for this paper especially those who had participated in the workshops - suggested that those who claimed that the program did not address economic issues do not understand the program, or in the case of expatriates, do not understand Somaliland.

That unequal distribution of resources (as they pertain to groups rather than to individuals) is more an issue for Somalilanders than absolute scarcity has already been discussed. This is something that expatriates do not always grasp - appalled as it were by the apparent material poverty of the place. In addition, because expatriates do not always understand the complexities of the society, they do understand how programs and projects that appear even-handed or appear to benefit the most vulnerable, can be manipulated to create winners and losers that reinforce existing relationships. By increasing the awareness of international organizations in this regard, WSP has the potential to make significant contributions to reconciliation and conflict prevention. It is a weakness of WSP in Somaliland (and Nairobi and Puntland as well) that it has chosen

not to actively engage with international organizations. (This was a trade-off that was made self-consciously. The advantages and disadvantages of which has been discussed elsewhere.)

Nevertheless WSP has and will make contributions to reconciliation and conflict prevention in other ways. The PAR process provides space for those who seldom have - many participants said they had never had - the opportunity to voice their concerns directly to national officials. In some case this has and will contribute to changes in public policy, in others it has not or will not. Regardless of whether the beneficiaries are Somalilanders or expatriates, both the processes and the products tackle some difficult issues head on.

For example, the workshop on livestock marketing in Burco, which may be one of the most unstable towns in Somaliland, addressed the issue of the system of *gadbad iyo neef.* This system is practiced by the big livestock exporters (who are also big staple goods importers). Instead of purchasing livestock for export from middlemen with cash, they pay for the livestock with staple goods that they have imported. However the issue was raised at the workshop that instead of giving the goods to the middlemen at market value, they give them the goods at inflated prices. Because a few powerful traders have a monopoly of the market, there is little that the middlemen can do to change the current arrangements.

This workshop was attended by national and local officials, livestock export middlemen, and livestock producers, among others. Very powerful traders were also invited, but they did not attend, reportedly because they knew they would be targeted for complaint. Ideally, had they attended, the workshop might have resulted in a discussion of alternatives in which all stakeholders could have found “win-win” alternatives. As it was at least national and local officials had an opportunity to learn about issues of importance to some of their constituents. Whether or not that will result in policies aimed at regulating the *gadbad iyo neef* system remains to be seen.

Another contribution of both the workshops and the products of the PAR process is that they promote citizens’ understanding of the difficult choices and tradeoffs that the government must make everyday in its effort to govern in a context of extremely scarce resources. For example the choice between spending money to maintain a military in order to maintain the peace and security, versus spending it to rehabilitate the port in Berbera. Citizens need to understand these choices and determine their own priorities and communicate these priorities to the government.

By convening Somalilanders representing different perspectives to look at these issues from all sides promotes critical thinking about economic development issues. And as discussed elsewhere in this report, there are advantages to be gained from providing Somalilanders the opportunity to arrive at a consensus around economic development before they engage in dialogues with international organizations. As one representative of a civil society organization said, “international organization development projects are few and far between and they are part of the problem rather than the solution. One

problem is that the government needs to act like a government. It needs to have a clear program and dictate the terms to the international organizations."

A WSP staff member said, "The program addresses peace building by addressing economic and social development. It enables internal and external actors to reach a common understanding and helps to avoid interventions that feed the conflict in a situation where central authority is not strong and therefore there is little accountability on the part of external actors. The research comes with recommendations with relevance for rebuilding, which external actors can translate into action." To this end the products themselves can make a significant contribution to donors understanding of the issues and different perspectives on the issues.

Some expatriate staff of international organizations in Nairobi suggested that the inclusion of expatriates in the workshops encourages the "culture of dependency". Years of development assistance to the Somali Democratic Republic did encourage middle and upper level actors to look first to international organizations to meet development needs. However the low level of assistance that has been provided to Somaliland by international organizations during the past decade has served to offset this phenomena, and has encouraged citizens not only to set priorities, but to create alternative means for meeting development needs.

Menkhaus (2000) in an evaluation of WSP Puntland notes, "Interviewees stressed that thirty years of very centralized rule of the Barre regime coupled with decades of top-down development aid meant that local populations had almost no experience contemplating, prioritizing, and operationalizing regional development. Nor did they possess a clear understanding of what external aid agencies would and would not do for them." This view was voiced by WSP participants in Somaliland as well. In the workshop in Gabiley, when some individuals suggested that international organizations would fund a proposal, others would provide a "reality check" with the question, "What if they don't? How else could funding be obtained for that proposal?"

However, an example of a process in which WSP did not participate and that some felt would have benefited from WSP participation involved UNDP's Sectoral Committees. These were to have been organized by the Ministry of Planning as part of the planning process for the Five Year Plan, but were to have involved government ministries and international organizations working in particular sectors. As it turned out they were organized by UNDP. One UNDP official said, "WSP has not been involved in these. There is no doubt that it has been a donor driven process. However WSP participation might enabled it to be put back into Somali hands. In Nairobi, there was a need to get Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) buy-in early on, but this did not happen and SACB has marginalized WSP. WSP would bring value-added to the Sectoral Committees and to the SACB since they have their ear to the ground. The Area Program Coordinator has a monthly meeting – which the UN heads it in the morning and the international NGOs head it in the afternoon. WSP is invited, but does not attend." One reason for this may be related to WSP Somaliland's primary identity as SCPD, which is registered with the government as a local NGO rather than an

international NGO.

Inter-Group Relationships

Perhaps WSP's greatest contribution towards improving inter-group relationships, is that it has demonstrated that there are constructive ways to address conflict - and that indeed conflict can be constructive. Although the WSP process is not conflict resolution training per se, it is an educational process that looks more like Freireian participatory consciousness-raising approaches, than like conventional training approaches. The dialogue process demonstrates that there are ways of settling differences and solving problems that do not involve the suppression of dissent or resort to the gun.

The WSP gives legitimacy to discussions about intercommunal violence by reframing the discussion in terms of issues rather than in terms of identities. By focusing on issues rather than identities, participants perceive their needs and interests as being associated with categories of identity other than clan. As discussed elsewhere, WSP has revealed that there are overlapping cleavages in Somaliland society between individuals with more traditional worldviews and those with more Westernized or synthetic worldviews. By focusing on issues, these worldview conflicts become more readily apparent.

In some instances this has generated some conflict. For example one man from Sheikh who participated in the workshop there pertaining to the impact of the war on the family said, "Many men at the workshop felt that WSP was trying to undermine their role. People from Hargeisa have different ideas than we do. But they convinced us that they were not trying to undermine us. The workshop helped us to better understand each other's point of view. That is because the process was based on mutual respect."

Another participant in the workshop in Sheikh, a member of a local NGO, pointed out that, "Inter-group relationships are not something that can be changed in one workshop alone. There is a need to hold many workshops over a period of time. Maybe WSP staff should provide training of trainers so that local communities can learn how to conduct such dialogues themselves."

WSP has made a conscious effort to include the voices of all clans in its processes and its products. During the first phase of the research, WSP held focus groups with members of all of the clans of Somaliland, and by the end of the second phase will have held workshops in locations in which most, but not all, clans traditionally reside. In relation to clan relationships, however, a significant vote of confidence in WSP personnel was made by a government official who is a member of a minority clan that has suffered discrimination at the hands of the main clan families of both Somaliland and Somalia, who said "As a Tumaale I generally prefer working with expatriates over Somalis. Expatriates are "clan-blind" and do not discriminate against people on the basis of clan. An exception is the group of individuals who work at SCPD. I trust them to treat all clans equally as they go about doing their work."

However, like all activities in Somaliland, where per diems are to be paid, WSP has

generated some conflict in communities over the issue of participation in the workshops. In Gabiley (a small town in which there are three Consortia of Women's NGOs) some women's NGOs were invited by the local authorities and others were not, which created some rancor on the part of those who were not invited. In Sheikh, WSP initially requested that the Mayor select participants, which he did. However when he was replaced, the new Mayor was unhappy about the selections. WSP resolved the issue keeping half of the old Mayor's selections and asking the new Mayor to select the other half. This turn of events probably made for a much more representative group of participants. However, WSP learned from this lesson, and preparations for subsequent workshops included hiring a local "anchor person" to identify workshop participants.

Mobilization

In the long-term WSP's greatest contribution may be to the mobilization of non-clan-based identity groups in Somaliland. Nevertheless, a WSP researcher emphasized that "the role of WSP is not that of community mobilization. Not only would that role get WSP in trouble with the government, Somaliland is not at that stage in the state-building process. The role of WSP is to facilitate communication between the people and the government."

There is general consensus that WSP has had a catalytic effect on civil society, which some international organizations in Nairobi said made the program valuable in and of itself. A member of the media Working Group emphasized that, "The process is the first time that the media has had an open discussion with members of the national government about both the media and the government's roles, rights and responsibilities, and had it published in a book". She added, "the media workshop in Borama showed that there is a need for dialogue between the media and communities as well. Under the Somali Democratic Republic the media was an arm of the government, so there is a need to build trust between communities and the media. The community where the workshop was held did not envision the possibility that it could communicate with the media and that the media can communicate news that is about and for the people."

The workshop also demonstrated that there is a need for the media to obtain and report the news from rural areas as well as from urban areas, so that rural areas can communicate their interests and needs through the media to decision-makers. Members of the media at the workshop took the opportunity to encourage community members to pass information to the media and to give interviews to the media.

A cornerstone of WSP elsewhere has been its focus on the role of civil society in giving voice to local communities in determining priorities for reconstruction. Civil society does not mean the same in Somaliland as it does in the West or elsewhere. It is encouraging to note that the individuals and groups who have adopted that nomenclature and participated in WSP workshops as its representatives, appeared to come from the middle levels, if not the grassroots, of society. Not too long ago these individuals and groups would have primarily been members of the elite who had appropriated the term

to gain access to the resources made available to civil society by the international community.

The process has also contributed to the mobilization of peripheral towns and rural areas by enabling them to articulate their issues vis-a-vis the national government, to members of that government, in a way that was empowering because it was afforded legitimacy. This is perhaps the first building block in the process of facilitating disempowered groups to mobilize on their own behalf. As Menkhaus (2000) writes of WSP Puntland, “Though essentially an elite exercise, WSP expanded local dialogue beyond the elite level. Politics and development are normally the domain of a relatively small group of leaders.... By holding the workshops in small towns and inviting nomads, fishermen, and other “non-elite” members of society to participate, the WSP team broadened political participation in a significant way.”

A participant in the workshop in Sheikh said, “people in Sheikh feel neglected by the central government - and Sheikh is populated primarily by Isaq, and is only two hours on a paved road from Hargeisa - so we can imagine how towns in other parts of Somaliland feel. But the WSP workshop reminded us that we have something to say.”

WSP also empowered intellectuals a category employed by Somalis to refer to individuals educated to the secondary or university levels. Many of these individuals hold technical degrees from abroad in fields such as medicine, engineering, and agricultural science. These individuals were marginalized both by the former government which made appointments based on clan rather than merit, and during the war, when the key to survival was the gun rather than the diploma. WSP brings these individuals into the policy process and enables them to contribute their expertise to state-building and reconstruction, through participation in the Working Groups, and through hiring them as resource people to facilitate the workshops and to write the workshops reports.

The program has contributed to mobilizing and empowering women by articulating issues, that have previously been considered private concerns (e.g., the impact of *qaat*), as public concerns at the local and national levels. Even more empowering is to have had those concerns be placed on the local and national agendas. It was reported that the day after the workshop on the impact of *qaat* on the family ended in Gabiley, the Mayor made a speech in which he discussed the need for measures to address the problem of *qaat*. The workshop also brought local and national scrutiny to bear on producers, traders, and users of *qaat*. A WSP researcher said, Gabiley is the “Minnesota” of Somaliland. If something is an issue in Gabiley it is likely to be an issue everywhere. If the Mayor of Gabiley declared that *qaat* is a problem that must be addressed, then *qaat* is more likely to be viewed as a problem in the rest of Somaliland.”

The integration of women’s concerns into the Self-Portrait of Somaliland - without labeling them as women’s concerns or putting them in a separate pamphlet - makes a considerable contribution to mainstreaming women’s issues. Equally important, WSP is

contributing to positive culture change by adding to the critical mass of women who have experience participating in public dialogues - and the mass of men getting accustomed to women doing so.

One component of mobilization involves capacity building, and WSP has reportedly made contributions in this regard as well. A staff member of an international NGO said, "One indicator of the success of this process is that one can see more strategic planning, and more organized, more formalized ways of doing things among my local colleagues these days. When I point it out, I discover that the person has attended an LPI or WSP workshop".

A high-ranking government official said that "The WSP process is extremely empowering to participants. Traditional processes have always been vertical as well as horizontal, because any man to speak out at meetings and this is how people's voices are heard up and down the chain. However the WSP process is new in that it brings together all stakeholders in a given sector at the same time and at the same place, and enables them to talk directly to each other about issues related to that sector."

Public Institutions and Processes

The WSP process is focused less on horizontal relationships between elite and middle level actors, and more on vertical relationships between elites, middle level, and grassroots leadership. This approach appears to have been effective in enhancing the understanding of each other's points of view, among different groups in the society.

An MP who has participated in workshops in the regions, said that the experience of visiting other regions and listening to the views expressed by those communities has been an eye-opener for him. A member of the *Guurti,* who participated in the workshop in the village of Beki, said that he had never visited such a remote place, and that he was surprised to hear from the community that it considers the central government to be an obstacle. "The community asked me why the government is dragging its feet on implementation of decentralization. I had to explain to them that the government is reluctant for two reasons. First, because it is fighting to preserve the integrity of Somaliland. Second, because it is unable to extend its authority throughout the Somaliland territory - it really only has authority over Hargeisa and Gabiley."

As discussed elsewhere, the questions of how far to go with decentralization and how to go about it, are among the most, if not the most, challenging ones facing Somaliland at this stage in the state-building process. A government official who participated in the workshop in Beki described the discussion that occurred there. "The people in Beki are not happy about the fact that the central government appoints their DC. In Beki it seems that just when the community has gotten to know an official and established a working relationship with them, and just when an official has gotten to know the community and to understand their needs, the central government replaces them. There is a flip side", said the official, "If they chose their own officials, even in a small place like Beki, there are two main families and they will both want a DC who is closer to their family." The role of WSP in this situation was simply to educate people - using the WSP PAR

process - about their rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis local and national government. WSP was careful not to suggest any specific course of action.

Another issue that has been a topic of discussion in WSP workshops is the fact that some communities in the regions do not feel that their representatives in the *Guurti* and the Parliament represent their interests. They feel that their representatives are more focused on the power politics of the center, at the expense of the needs and interests of the regions, thus further marginalizing of these regions.

Taxation is another complex issue that has been tackled by WSP. A WSP researcher explained, "Most Somalilanders - including the tax collectors themselves - due to past experience with an extortionist government, do not understand the concept of taxation. They understand bribes, but not taxes. They do not understand government's and citizens' rights and responsibilities in terms of taxation." He continued, "Who can offer that kind of training? Not the government and not ordinary citizens. Only a "neutral" institution like WSP can provide it".

WSP has generated some conflict by increasing the voice of civil society in Somaliland, but it appears to be a constructive conflict. A senior ministry official said that from the perspective of the government, the process provides too much voice to communities and not enough to the government. He continued, "Although the Self-Portrait of Somaliland did not tell the government anything that it did not already know, it is helpful to have the perspective of the community written in a book to support policy decisions. It would be more useful to the communities if it also reflected the government's perspective."

Ahmed Farah explained, "In Somaliland the government was initially ambivalent towards the program. On the one hand, they liked it because it gave them access to civil society and the grassroots, on the other hand they recognized it as a powerful process, were afraid of that process, and wanted to control that process. This is especially true when the program addresses issues related to governance." However, an MP praised the project saying that it carries power from the center to the margins and is contributing towards an understanding that governance is not comprised only of ministers and members of parliament. The project gives people a chance to communicate with the government, and it gives the government a chance to show people that government can be good for them."

Both the research process and the research product are being employed in the process of state building. The MPs and members of the *Guurti* who are their houses' representatives to WSP workshops, report back to their houses' at each session. In this way, Parliament and the *Guurti* learn about the findings of WSP's PAR. The Self-Portrait of Somaliland is reported to have served as a baseline document to both the Ministry of Planning during the development of the Five Year Plan, and to the Parliament in its current deliberations pertaining to the drafting of the Constitution.

Both the decentralization and the media workshops are reported to have had some impact on the wording in the second draft of the provisional constitution. The legislature

was in session and they were working on drafting the constitution when the workshops took place. The findings of the workshops and the perspectives of participants were reported back to the Parliament and the *Guurti* and some of the recommended changes were incorporated.

During a Media Working Group meeting, an MP who is a member of the Working Group reportedly asked participants how the Constitution should be changed, saying "This is still a draft and we can still change it." A civil society-based member of the Media Working Group said, "The constitution calls for freedom of the press, but at the same time there was interference from the government, including the shutting down of Jamhuriya (an independent newspaper that had printed some criticism of the government)." Since the workshop Jamhuriya has experienced less government harassment. For its part, Jamhuriya staff (who were at the workshop) have behaved more responsibly and has learned how to focus more on issues and less on personalities." But, she acknowledged, this was also a result of a BBC sponsored training for the media which addressed these issues. Somaliland has a government newspaper, Mandeeq, which along with Radio Hargeisa, serve as vehicles for government. Members of the media would like to have an independent radio station, but do not have the resources to purchase one themselves.

A consultant for an international organization suggested that WSP's most important contribution will be the development of a sustainable SCPD. "There is a need for long-term thinking on the issues that are currently tackled by WSP and there is a need for an institution that will do so." However, a senior ministry official did not like the fact that SCPD was registered as an NGO rather than as a research institution. He said, "There is a need for such an institution to inform policy and provide training to the government. Such an institution should be independent from the government, but have a collaborative relationship with government." He also acknowledged that the government does not at this time have the capacity to carry out the type of research that produced the Self-Portrait of Somaliland.

The reservations of the government are related to the fact that NGOs have more resources than the government. Therefore the best and the brightest go to work for NGOs rather than for the government. The international consultant reported that the Ministry of Planning has expressed consternation about its lack of capacity and its need for training about the processes of planning and evaluation. Such training is therefore a much needed service that an institution such as the SCPD could provide to the government.

WSP is in some ways more threatening to local governments than it is to the national government, and it has encountered some resistance from local governments. The Mayor of Sheikh was uncomfortable with WSP's role of facilitating communication between the community and the national government, because he felt they were attempting to usurp his role. "According to the Constitution," he said, "the role of local government is to take the concerns of the community to the national government. The local government knows the community and knows what the community needs and can

inform the national government".

Political Leaders and Public Behavior

The WSP PAR process of local consultation has had an impact on the programming approaches of some international organizations, who have seen its appropriateness to Somaliland and its effectiveness as a process. For example, the Human Rights Officer for the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, plans to employ a process modeled on WSP's PAR to elicit answers to such questions as: What are local conceptions of justice? What are local conceptions of human rights? What are local conceptions about what constitutes a war crime? What are local conceptions about what constitutes a human rights violation? These are important questions that have arisen in other contexts, such as South Africa, but the answers are not easy to get at through more conventional research methods. WSP's PAR model promises to contribute to answers since the answers emerge through the dialogue as participants struggle with the questions themselves.

A WSP staff member reported that some Puntlanders who attended the Arta Conference informed him that the impact of WSP on the representatives of civil society at the Arta Conference is apparent. These individuals who had participated in WSP workshops, talked about the rights and responsibilities of the government and the citizenry, and about the importance of consulting with communities in reconstruction planning. An expatriate staff member from an international NGO agreed that the cumulative impact of programs such as WSP, LPI, and Horn Afric, (LPI implements civic education and other programs throughout Somaliland and Somalia, while Horn Afrik is based in Mogadishu) is an increasingly sophisticated discourse around civil society. He also stated that it was obvious at the Arta Conference that Somalis are no longer willing to accept top down governance.

Internal and External Circumstances Affecting Impact

The International Community in Nairobi and Somalia

For a number of different reasons, WSP made the decision, first in Puntland and then in Somaliland, to disengage from the international community, and focus on programs and goals related to local processes. There were a number of sound reasons for this decision, some philosophical and others practical. One was that during most of the life of the program, the international community in Nairobi has been characterized by bureaucratic turf wars and counterproductive competition.

In an evaluation of WSP Puntland, Menkhaus (2000) writes, “Relationships between the UN and the EU/Somalia Unit (the major donor to Somalia) were extremely poor; power struggles and personality clashes within the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) were also endemic; and rivalries within the UN agencies themselves were fierce. All this was fueled by dramatically shrinking pools of foreign aid for Somalia and a fundamental lack of consensus about how to channel assistance into a zone of state collapse. Prospects for inter-agency cooperation were thus virtually non-existent. WSP could hardly have stepped into an environment less conducive for the purpose of encouraging reflection, self-criticism, and innovation in international rehabilitation aid.”

In Somaliland, for example, SACB attempted to establish a Sub-Office. One official from an international organization reported, “At the time the EU did not have a person in Somaliland and therefore they did not participate in the process of setting it up. When the EU did put someone in Somaliland, they felt they had not been consulted about the process and therefore they side swiped the initiative.” These circumstances have not helped WSP to advocate changes in the practices of international aid agencies.

A UNDP official said that WSP had highlighted the fact that the lack of the participation of Somalis in designing assistance programs has been a serious problem to date. UNDP is preparing the Human Development Report for Somalia that will be published in 2002. The official said that UNDP recognizes that what is missing from the report is the Somali perspective and would like to be able to collaborate with SCPD to fill this gap. These reports address the themes of poverty eradication and capacity building in governance. UNDP would like a Somali partner such as SCPD to advise, criticize, help correct and help focus the work, provide analysis, and make proposals.

A source of frustration for WSP with the international community is that different organizations - and sometimes different individuals within the same organization - have different expectations of WSP. Representatives from these organizations have suggested the following roles for WSP and/or SCPD: (1) inform their own policies and programming; (2) serve as an evaluative mechanism for existing projects; (3) provide a source of information about the political process; (4) act as a contributor to the political process, (5) serve as a documentation center; (6) serve as an information clearinghouse; and (7) act in an advisory capacity as a think tank.

Arta Conference

The Arta Conference, held in Djibouti between May and August 2000, is the thirteenth national conference since Siyad Barre's ouster, but it appears to have gotten further along the road towards establishing a government than previous ones. Farah (2000) writes, "In spite of its flaws, the Arta conference differs from the past reconciliation efforts in several important ways. First, previous efforts allowed faction leaders to play a central role, while the Arta conference widened the process by engaging civil society, traditional leaders, business class, and religious leaders in the process. This has angered leaders of the de facto political entities in northern Somalia who thought that they were ignored and their achievements not considered, nevertheless it made the process more representative and Somali driven. The number of participants increased from an initial 1000 to about 2000 persons comprising official and unofficial delegates representing different sectors of the Somali population and the diaspora."

However, there is also much about this new government that does not promote reconciliation - within Somalia or with Somaliland - including the fact that the new President served as Minister of the Interior and Deputy Prime Minister under Siyad Barre and that among the MPs are two of Barre's former military officers (Morgan and Ganni) who had responsibility for the destruction of Somaliland, and after Barre's ouster the destruction of the Bay and Bakool Regions.

This conference has created a considerable amount of uneasiness in Somaliland, the sources of which are both internal and external. There is little doubt that pressure will be exerted from certain groups inside Somaliland and from outside Somaliland to reunite with Somalia once its government is securely in place. This poses a considerable threat to the Somaliland government. In fact, on his return from Djibouti in September, a Somaliland clan leader, who was elected to the newly formed Somali Transitional National Assembly at the Conference, was sentenced to seven years imprisonment after he was found guilty of high treason by a Berbera court. He was subsequently released and pardoned by Egal, in response to pressure from international human rights organizations and residents of his hometown. This incident serves to highlight the perception of the Somaliland authorities that the Arta Conference poses both internal and external threats to the sovereignty of Somalland.

Recommendations

(1) The effectiveness of WSP would be enhanced if WSP were to find a way to strengthen its relationships with international organizations, both in Hargeisa and in Nairobi, in a way that does not diminish ownership of the program by Somalilanders. In Hargeisa, the program's effectiveness would be enhanced by information exchange and logistical coordination between WSP and organizations perceived as doing similar programming (mainly LPI and UNESCO) if not by outright collaboration. For example it would ensure that workshops are not held in the same place at the same time. More important are the potential benefits to programming, which could result from collaboration on specific activities. An example, described elsewhere in this paper, was the collaboration between WSP and UINESCO in Puntland, where both organizations were addressing the issue of *qaat*. WSP was able to disseminate the findings of its research over UNESCO's radio program. To its credit, WSP has invited international organization personnel to participate in the Working Groups and consistently invites them to workshops.

In Nairobi, the program would succeed in its goal of impacting the policies and activities of international organizations much more effectively were it to establish relationships with those organizations. In particular it is recommended that WSP establish a working relationship with SACB. Again, the challenge is how to do this without sacrificing the Somaliland-driven nature of the program. Even if the time is not ripe to include international organizations in the workshops, efforts to encourage international organizations to utilize the findings of the PAR would contribute to this goal. There are different ways to accomplish this. One might be to hold regular workshops with international organizations in Nairobi, along the lines of the Working Groups in Hargeisa. These workshops might be attended by members of the research team and/or by members of the Working Groups. Admittedly this is a labor and capital intensive proposal, and more personnel and more funding would be required. In addition, an expanded staff may have the negative effect of weakening the close-knit WSP team.

(2) Another recommendation is that WSP renew its commitment to the full integration of women into the political and economic life of Somaliland as a key goal. If women are to be genuinely integrated into the public life of Somaliland, organizational culture in the decision-making realm will have to change. The culture of *qaat*, much like the culture of after hours beer drinking in the West, is an important part of an organizational culture that excludes women. WSP has taken the first steps by including women participants both in the initial phase of the research and in their subsequent workshops. More importantly WSP has included women's concerns among the themes that workshops have addressed. This has placed women's concerns on the national agenda. WSP now needs to take these concerns into consideration in terms of its internal organizational culture, in terms of the culture that is promoted in the workshops, and by modeling new ways of doing things.

WSP Somaliland learned from the experiences of WSP Puntland and hired a woman researcher. This may help account for the fact that WSP has succeeded in getting women's concerns on the agenda without generating a negative backlash. But having only one woman in a male-dominated environment can have the effect of isolating and silencing that one woman. This is especially so in an organizational culture in which the real business is conducted over *qaat*. It is therefore recommended that WSP strive for greater gender balance on the research team.

(3) Should WSP expand its work beyond Somaliland and Puntland, to include other regions in Somalia, it is highly recommended that the program begin in regions on the periphery, rather than in Mogadishu. WSP might first conduct the program in those regions that have achieved some measure of peace and afterwards in those regions that are still contested. This recommendation is based on the contribution that the program has and can make towards strengthening a political culture in which citizens have internalized the idea that they have a right and a responsibility to communicate with their representatives in local and national government, have the confidence born of experience to do so, and have articulated regional issues and reached consensus about regional priorities. Only then can some balance of power between the margins and the center be achieved. Some donors have indicated their eagerness to support the project in Mogadishu, but they are advised to do so with caution.

Conclusion

Whatever the future relationship between Somaliland and Somalia, WSP will have made a contribution towards peace in an conflict-torn region. Although WSP started in sites that are relatively peaceful - Somaliland and Puntland - the program and process could make a contribution to locations in Somalia that are in different stages of conflict as well.

In Somaliland, the program has contributed to taking the important first steps in the state-building and reconstruction processes. The WSP PAR process has created the space for Somalilanders to: (1) articulate the issues and challenges confronting them (2) acquire a better understanding of the paradoxes and tradeoffs involved in these processes (3) explore alternatives that may lead to “win-win” solutions to problems (4) begin to build consensus around priorities and approaches (5) facilitate local ownership of and responsibility for these processes, (6) raise consciousness about the roles, the rights and the responsibilities of citizens and government, and (7) demonstrate that there are peaceful ways of resolving differences and conflicting needs and interests.

The WSP dialogue process can be identified as a best practice in that it has contributed significantly to the empowerment, and in some cases the mobilization, of groups who have much to contribute to building the types of polity, economy, and society, that will achieve a sustainable peace, but who have more often than not been excluded from the processes of state-building and reconstruction. These include women, members of civil society, intellectuals, agricultural and livestock producers, and the populations of peripheral towns and rural areas. The empowerment of these groups promises to have a positive long-term impact on government policies and on the political culture of Somaliland.

Although the clan remains the primary source of individual and group identity in Somaliland, it does not necessarily in itself present the greatest challenge to state building and peace building. Rather is the conflicting worldviews relating to the structures and processes that will constitute the state that may prove to be the greatest constraint. Should they be based on traditional Somali political and judicial systems? Should they replicate Western democratic systems? Or should they be a synthesis of these two and/or other systems?

If WSP Somaliland decides to engage with the international community, the program may be identified as a best practice for ensuring the all Somalilanders, whether elites, middle level, and grassroots, have a voice in determining the policies and activities of international organizations. In contexts in which the state is either nascent, as in Somaliland, or non-existent, as it was until recently and remains in much of Somalia, the dialogue process can ensure that the priorities and aspirations of the population are made known to international organizations.

In contexts in which the state is illegitimate and unrepresentative, as it is in other countries in the region and elsewhere in the world, the dialogue process also has the potential to contribute to conflict prevention. By providing a vehicle for the population to communicate with the international community, the dialogue process has the potential to contribute to ensuring that the policies and activities of international organizations, not only do not contribute to aggravating latent conflicts, but are targeted in such a way that they can contribute to preventing them from becoming violent conflicts.

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Gabiley

Consortium of Women's NGOs MANDEEQ
Consortium of Women's NGOs WADAJIR
Consortium of Women's NGOs MANCAAL

Observed Workshop One and a Half Days of a Two and a Half Day Workshop on the theme of the impact of *qaat* on the family held in Gabiley on September 12-14.

Sheikh

Group of Workshop Participants Representing Different Target Populations

Greater Horn of Africa
Peace Building Project

APPENDIX D
INTERNET SURVEY

Survey of Non-Governmental Organizations Working Toward Peace in the Greater Horn of Africa

June, 2001

Computer Frontiers, Inc.

Authored by:
Cheryl Simmons

Appendix from the Report:
The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace
A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

Contract No. GS-23F-8012H, Task Order No. 623-N-00-99-00294-00 for DG/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis Services

Table of Contents

Executive Summary 1

Survey Overview 3

Addendums 15

Key to Abbreviations

CECORE:	Center for Conflict Resolution
CFI:	Computer Frontiers, Inc.
CmC:	Computer mediated communications
CPMR:	Conflict prevention, mitigation and response -- the USAID program terminology used for conflict-oriented and peace building activities.
GHA:	Greater Horn of Africa
ICT:	Information and Communications Technology
LANs:	Local Area Networks
MSI:	Management Systems International
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development

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The full report can be found at:
http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report.pdf
or write to peacebuilding@yahoo.com for an electronic version.

Executive Summary

In view of the potentially beneficial impact that information and communications technology (ICTs) can have on conflict management and peace building, and the key role played by NGOs and CBOs in delivering services at the community level, USAID/REDSO requested that Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI) undertake a study of NGO/CBO applications of Internet technology in operational and project activities or in direct delivery of services in pursuit of conflict management/peace building in the Greater Horn of Africa *(GHA)* sub-region. Because of its technical expertise in information technology, Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI) contracted with Computer Frontiers (CFI) to construct and administer the study.

The goals of the survey were to:

1. Establish a baseline of knowledge on NGOs' actual usage of the Internet for conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMR) purposes;
2. Draw conclusions regarding the value of the Internet;
3. Identify factors inhibiting further integration of the Internet into operations;
4. Suggest implications for USAID in terms of its approach to technology integration among NGOs/CBOs working on CPMR activities; and
5. Propose simple guidelines that NGOs/CBOs could institute to introduce or further integrate the Internet into CPMR activities.

CFI relied on a survey methodology that involved distributing a self-administered questionnaire via the Internet and establishing partnerships with two Uganda-based NGOs to implement the survey. In total, 225 surveys were distributed between November 15, 2000 and January 15, 2001 in the nine countries and one territory that constitute the GHA region. One hundred fifty nine (159) follow-up phone calls were made to potential respondents. The overall response rate to the survey was 11 % with 91% of respondents working at the executive level of their organizations and 46 % being women.

The main findings of the study were as follows:

1. The telephone and the Internet were equally preferred as means of communications by NGOs/CBOs.

2. Building organizational networks and organizing pressure campaigns tended to be the specific program-related activities where NGOs/CBOs most often applied Internet technology.

3. Cost of equipment and telephone access and the need for capacity-building were identified as barriers or impediments to expansion of Internet usage by NGOs/CBOs.

4. Increased efficiency of information exchange and the capability to interact with a wider array of actors were cited as beneficial impacts of the Internet.

5. Although 66% of the respondents claimed no knowledge of the Internet being used for conflict escalatory purposes, 33% of respondents did cite knowledge of instances where the Internet was used to increase tension, manipulate information or escalate a dispute.

We suggest the policy implications for donors are as follows:

1. There is a need for introduction or expansion of Internet access, especially outside of capital cities.

2. The comparative utility of ICTs that are geared toward supporting verbal vs. text-based communications warrants further examination.

3. Increased participation in regional and global NGO/CBO coalitional organizations is dependent on increased funding to expand Internet access.

4. Increased support for hardware, software, Internet access start-up costs and capacity building are all requirements for introduction or expansion of Internet access for the majority of NGOs/CBOs.

Survey Overview

Rationale of the Investigation

Arguably, no region at this juncture is more in need of access to the range of new ICTs, including the Internet, than sub-Saharan Africa. With only 300,000 dial-up subscribers capable of accessing the Internet in sub-Saharan African countries combined, excluding South Africa, the potential beneficial impact of expanding Internet access on sustainable development goals could be very significant[1].

Because of the proliferation of the conflict in the sub-Saharan Africa region during the past decade, donors are interested in supporting the increasingly prominent role played by NGOs/CBOs in CPMR. With the continuance of Sudan's 30 year civil war, Uganda's continued involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo *(DROC),* and Ethiopia's and Eritrea's maintenance of a fragile truce, for example, donors have understandably prioritized CPMR initiatives that address the complex mosaic of conflict within the region. In addition to targeting that support to program activities, donors are also interested in understanding and extending additional support to any ICTs that bridge the information and communications gap within the subregion and that directly serve as a program component of CPMR activities or in a manner that enhances such activities.

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study was to undertake an examination of the subject area, use of the Internet. The target population for the survey was NGOs and CBOs that apply Internet technology to operational project activities or direct delivery of services aimed at CPMR-PB.

This report begins to draw a reliable picture of what is happening "on the ground" in the applied use of Internet in CPMR-PB initiatives and the range of problems associated with war-afflicted populations. It undertakes this task by:

1. Establishing a baseline of knowledge on the range of NGOs current usage and future plans for Internet usage in CPMR activities.
2. Drawing conclusions regarding the value of Internet access as it has been applied as a tool to CPMR initiatives.
3. Identifying factors inhibiting further integration of the Internet into general operations, project-related services and activities and suggesting methods to overcome those factors.
4. Identifying policy implications.

[1] Jensen, Mike. "The African Internet – A Status Report." (May 2001).

5. Devising a set of simple, cost-effective approaches or guidelines NGOs may institute to introduce or further integrate Internet usage into CPMR so that it enhances the effectiveness of program activities.

Scope of the Survey

The geographic scope of the survey is limited to the countries and territory that USAID designates as comprising the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA).[2] NGOs/CBOs were selected as the survey target population because they are well-represented in terms of geographic scope, the range of CPMR activities and the possible time period that might reasonably be assumed to see different initiatives through to the end of their project lifecycles. The sample population targeted for the survey were chief executive officers or other executive level personnel whom would presumably be knowledgeable about the program activities, operational support and past, present and prospective future plans and ideas on ICT integration into their operations. Surveys were self-administered for the 2-month period beginning on November 15, 2000 to January 15, 2001.

Methodology

In view of the limited resources available for this study, the survey adopted as the only practical method for collecting data the distribution of a self-administered questionnaire via the Internet. CFI, in consultation with MSI, developed a survey instrument that had a preponderant number of questions designed to yield descriptive data about the organization, programming, staff and ICT usage and preferences. A more limited number of questions were designed to assess the changes resulting from Internet access on interactive communications, collection and distribution of information and programming. The target population of 225 NGOs/CBOs was selected from a sampling frame that consisted of lists of NGOs/CBOs working in the GHA region collected from the Internet, through coalitional organizations and through marketing of the survey via websites or e-publications targeted at institutions working the CPMR sector.

Recognizing the need to consistently establish mutually beneficial partnerships with African institutions, CFI collaborated with two Uganda-based organizations. CECORE, an NGO offering training in peace building, endorsed and distributed the survey and methodologists from the Uganda Management Institute assisted in the survey design and data analysis. The final component of the methodology involved using incentives and reinforcements to ensure that the survey attained the highest rate of return possible.

CFI distributed 225 surveys in the nine countries and one territory that constitute the GHA region between November 15, 2000 and January 15, 2001. Follow-up telephone

[2] Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Somalia and territory of Somaliland, Sudan, Uganda.

calls were made to 179 potential respondents. The response rate to the survey was 11% with 90% of respondents working at the executive level and 43 % being women.

Key Questions

The main concerns of the survey are captured by the following key questions regarding the use of the Internet among NGOs/CBOs.

- As compared with other means of communication, to what extent do NGOs/CBOs rely on the Internet as a primary means of communication?

- Are there specific categories of services or activities in the CPMR-PB sector that are associated with Internet technology and if so, what are they?

- Is there a commonality among factors serving as barriers to NGOs/CBOs introduction or expanded use of the Internet?

- What has been the impact of introducing the Internet into program operations and what do NGOs/CBOs cite as indicators of impact?

The remainder of this report presents the findings of the survey. Where these findings are consistent with other research, note is made of other sources that reach similar conclusions.

Findings

Major Findings

1. *The telephone and the Internet were equally preferred as means of communications by NGOs/CBOs*.

As compared with other means of communication, such as the fax machine or face-to-face interaction, respondents clearly ranked the Internet as being more significant to their organizational operations. Surprisingly, though, the telephone was actually preferred by a slight margin of 53% to 47% over the Internet as the primary means of communication.

While the questionnaire did not extend its inquiry into the rationales for certain preferences, the difference in the nature of communication between sub-Saharan Africa and the United States (US), which currently generates the majority of web pages on the Internet, may be seen as one factor affecting this preference. Research points to the fact that Africa, and particularly rural Africa, has as its foundation, a system of communication based on spoken dialogue as opposed to written communications. Secondly, because English is, at best, a second or third language, or may not be read or spoken at all, in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, and especially in rural Africa, differences in the NGO/CBO personnel tendencies to adapt to computer-mediated communications (CmC) such as the Internet might, therefore, be based on: (1) urban

vs. rural environments; (2) Anglophone vs. non-Anglophone; and (3) Literate vs. non-literate.[3]

2. *Building organizational networks and organizing pressure campaigns tended to be the specific program-related activities where NGOs/CBOs most often applied Internet technology.*

While NGOs/CBOs provide a range of services in the CPMR field (See Addendum G), they tended to use the Internet as either a component of CPMR programming or to enhance the delivery of services or implementation of activities. This is especially true when NGO/CBO intentions were to build organizational networks or conduct pressure campaigns. NGOs/CBOs have made use of the Internet in developing networks and organizing regional and global campaigns, relying on these networks as starting points. Practitioners and academicians of CPMR have assumed the role of network builders and relied on these networks to effect change. Examples of such NGO/CBO networks are: 1. SANGONET for human rights and social justice organizations in Southern Africa; 2. KABISSA which provides free space on its website for Africa-based NGOs/CBOs; 3. Sierra Leone Web which acts as a central site for Internet linkages to Sierra Leone NGOs/CBOs; and 4. Forum on Early Warning and Response (FEWER) site which serves as a global resource site for organizations.[4]



[3] Aden, Abdurahman. "No Connection Under This Number: Africa and the Internet." ***Development and Cooperation.*** No. 5 (Sept / Oct 2000), p. 24 –26.
[4] Deibert, Ronald J. "Parchment, Printing and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order." ***Transformation*** No: 2 (1997).

3. *Cost of equipment and telephone access and the need for capacity-building were identified as barriers or impediments to expansion of Internet usage by NGOs/CBOs*.

All NGOs/CBOs in capital areas face comparably challenging infrastructural conditions including poor telecommunications infrastructure that impedes reliable dial-up access and telephone calling that is prohibitively expensive. In the rural areas, however, where NGOs/CBOs may need to provide services to the most vulnerable victims of conflict, there is often no electricity let alone dial-up access available, which makes the Internet service wholly inaccessible. Although equipment prices have dropped precipitously in Western countries, most NGOs/CBOs can ill-afford the cost of the newer computers, a printer and an uninterrupted power supply (UPS), all key components of an effective workstation. Finally, the availability of trained computer end-users and especially technical staff for repair, systems configuration and local area network (LAN) maintenance is limited. Therefore, provision of training as well as finding trained individuals continues to be problematic.



4. *Increased efficiency of information exchange and the capability to interact with a wider array of actors were cited as beneficial impacts of the Internet.*

Increased efficiency of information exchange has been consistently cited as one of the perceived benefits of the Internet in terms of time, the number of individuals that can be reached by one communication and the broad geographic scope of locations in which communications can be exchanged.[5]

[5] Compare National Research Council, Office of International Affairs. "Internet Counts: Measuring the Impacts of the Internet." Washington: National Academy Press. (1998), p.34.

5. *Although 66% of NGOs/CBOs claimed no knowledge of the Internet being used for conflict escalatory purposes, 33% of respondents did cite knowledge of instances where the Internet was used to increase tension, manipulate information or escalate a dispute.*

Respondents indicated that they were aware of cases in which the following types of information was placed on a website:

- Inflammatory information relating to international disputes was placed on websites of antagonists.
- Deliberate distortions or misinformation.
- Information designed to politically sabotage individuals or parties.
- Incorrect information.

In a preliminary review of the literature on this topic, there appeared to be scant information addressing use of websites as a means to escalate conflict, increase tension or manipulate information. Although some research has been devoted to aggressive use of websites by NGOs to organize pressure campaigns and computer-based attacks on websites perpetrated by hackers or antagonists in some type of dispute, the literature focuses on these occurrences in areas outside of the Africa region where the Internet is more commonly used.[6]

Other Significant Findings

Current Capacities for Usage of ICT: Prior to introducing the Internet into their organizations, NGOs/CBOs, like other organizations relied on phone, fax and postal mail to communicate with partners and individuals, all of which were unreliable and in the case of the phone and fax, prohibitively expensive. Respondents acquired news and information by word-of-mouth and television, the second option clearly being indicative of the fact that the majority of respondents live and work in the capital where electricity and TV reception are available.

Forty-one percent of responding organizations indicated that they had four computers or less in their offices and an additional 23% stated that they had no more than 11 computers. Two CBOs actually had no computers or Internet connection but responded to us via their home computers or by using the facilities of a partner organization. Therefore, in this case, sharing of information technology resources by NGOs/CBOs who were members of "umbrella organizations," and that would not have otherwise had access to the Internet, played a large role in the ability of one CBO to complete the survey.

The ratio of available computers to permanent staff varied widely with some NGOs/CBOs struggling with 20 staff members for one computer to a few instances where there was one PC for each staff member. The average, however, was approximately 5 employees to 1 computer.

[6] Bray, John. "Web Wars: NGOs, Companies and Governments in an Inter-Connected World." ***Greener Management International.*** (Winter 1998), p. 115 and Walker, George. "Information Warfare and Neutrality." ***Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law.*** 33:5 (Nov 2000), p. 1079.

A clear majority of those who answered, 77%, stated that staff training was either average or poor with the remaining 23% indicating that their employees were well trained.

Internet as A Means to Improve Operations and Implement Programs: With regard to the question of whether NGOs have made use of the Internet in program-related activities, as revealed by question 3.9, a majority of 83% indicated that they primarily used the Internet for Option 3.9.2 relating to programs (see below) or for both administrative and program purposes.

Graphic 3: Question 3.9

3.9 Which of the following statements best describe your organization's primary purpose(s) for using any of the Internet programs listed in question 8, above? ***(Please type Y before all that apply).***

___3..9.1 Daily operational needs such as administrative and financial matters (e.g. personnel recruitment, financial management, purchasing).

___3..9.2 Delivery of services or implementing of activities specifically related to programs.

However, usage in program activities apparently does not include the use of the Internet as a direct means to carry out conflict resolution or peace building projects in interactive ways, such as by conducting an on-line dialogue. In response to question 4.1 below, 58% indicated that they do not commonly use the Internet as a means of interactive communication in direct implementation of program activities.

Graphic 4: Question 4.1

4.1 Does your organization commonly use the Internet as a means of interactive communications in direct implementation of program activities or delivery of project services.

___4.1.1 YES

___4.1.2 NO

Internet as a Means to Access Information: NGOs/CBOs that accessed information on the Internet cited with equal importance all the possible reasons their organizations might use the Internet as a means to gather information. Educating staff or members on relevant topics, monitoring or tracking events as they relate to a conflict or obtaining general information were all given equal importance. Two NGOs noted that they used the Internet as a means to gather information specifically for research.

Internet as a Means to Distribute Information: Less than ½ of the NGOs/CBOs completing the questionnaire had websites. However, the 44% that did have websites most frequently cited the following reasons offered by the survey for using the Internet as a means to distribute information: 1. Providing general information about the organization and 2. Informing readers about specific program-related services.

Sixty-three percent of websites had links with other websites and cited sharing of information, promoting activities and minimizing costs as reasons for the linkages. Three NGOs/CBOs indicated that these linkages had resulted in increased collaboration with partner organizations.

There was little commonality in the groups cited as targets for the websites, which is clearly indicative of the diversity of clientele served by NGOs/CBOs within the region. Targets included government officials and policymakers, researchers, activists, partner organizations and NGOs/CBOs, cultural institutions, students, donors, lawyers, the media, the general public and institutions focused on peace and conflict resolution.

Perceived Impacts of Internet Usage on Programs: Overall, NGOs/CBOs cited the main impacts of the Internet as being beneficial to their programmatic operations because it improved the efficiency of information exchange and enabled them to interact with a wider array of actors.

A majority of 88% indicated that the Internet had not hindered their organizational activities in any manner.

Impacts of Websites: In terms of assessing the impact of websites among organizations that have them, seventy-five percent of NGOs/CBOs indicated that feedback from users served as the primary means of evidence that their target group made use of the website. Another 17% said that commitment and interest of users served as a valid indicator of website use. One NGO noted that the fact that their website was quoted by users and in the media was evidence that the site was effectively used by their target group.

Future Plans for Internet Usage: For those organizations without a website, all planned to establish a website within the next two years.

Half of the organizations expressed an interest in obtaining web development software and approximately 20% indicated an interest in acquiring teleconferencing software. Anticipated benefits identified included the ability to communicate more easily with overseas partners, localization of web development and updating, the ability to more effectively distribute information and an increased ability to share information internally.

Policy Recommendations Offered by Respondents: NGOs/CBOs made the recommendations depicted in Graphic 5 regarding how donor support could be effectively channeled to NGOs/CBOs working on CPMR initiatives.



Main Policy Implications

Given the preliminary findings cited above, what are the implications for donor policy, in terms of lending support to such initiatives?

Expanded Internet Access, Especially Outside of Urban Capitals

The state of the telecommunications infrastructure in Africa is weak, for it generally tends to be in poor working condition within the urban area surrounding the capital and almost non-functional, if not non-existent outside of the capitals save a few noted exceptions. Thus, any support envisaged to NGOs/CBOs interested in introducing or expanding Internet access within their institutions, will necessarily be limited to those organizations located in the areas within and around the capitol during the initial stages of Internet access.

Organizations that responded to this survey have indicated that the Internet has assumed an increasingly important role in their operations, although a great majority of the institutions responding to the survey, 90%, were located within the capital regions of their respective countries. However, this methodology was admittedly limited to those organizations with Internet access, therefore, the results tended to be skewed toward NGOs/CBOs located where access is readily available.

It can be assumed that some percentage of NGOs/CBOs with headquarters in the capital may have satellite offices outside of the capitol and that some NGOs/CBOs may be based solely outside of the capital. These same NGOs/CBOs are often responsible for direct implementation of CPMR programming, yet they would be the least likely to benefit from expansion of Internet access, if it were based on existing telecommunications infrastructure.

Therefore, strategies supporting the expansion of access to secondary cities and towns, especially those serving conflict-plagued communities, should be encourage and should take into consideration alternative, cost-effective wireless-based technologies strategies as a means to bypass the existing infrastructural constraints.

Examination of the Comparative Utility of ICTs that are Based on Verbal Communications vs. Text-Based Communications

African systems of communication are based on spoken dialogue in a broad array of languages, as opposed to written communications, and the information available via the Internet is primarily provided in written form and in English. Thus, the information and communications gap experienced by NGOs/CBOs will not necessarily be filled by access to information on websites and in e-mails.

ICTs that rely on spoken communications and information and in languages other than English, could be of equivalent importance to standard web content, especially in the context of a complex humanitarian emergency. Therefore, there is a need to examine the comparative utility of different ICTs which permit either verbal or both verbal and visual communications such as high-frequency radio, web-based radio programming, voice-over-IP (telephoning via the Internet), telephoning via cell phone, and teleconferencing in terms of: 1. Cost; 2. Ease of accessibility; 3. Infrastructural barriers; 4. Regulatory barriers; 5. Service and support accessibility; and 6. Adaptability to cultural context.

Support for Introduction and Expansion of Internet for Purposes of Participating in NGO/CBO Coalitional Organizations

NGOs/CBOs requested support for Internet technology that enables them to establish or expand communications with a network of like-minded individuals working for organizations in the CPMR sector, regionally and globally. Respondents also expressed an interest in relying on these networks to conduct pressure campaigns. Some of the perceived benefits resulting from support of this network are increased information exchange, coordination and collaboration, sharing of technological and information resources, and establishment of websites with information content targeted toward member organizations.[7]

Support for Hardware, Software, Internet Access Start-up Costs and Capacity-Building of Staff

The cost of new or upgraded equipment and software are consistently identified as being primary barriers to introduction or expansion of the Internet. Our survey indicates that in the most optimal case, only one in five computers had Internet access. The worse scenario was one in seventeen. Therefore, in addition to supporting hardware and software purchases and Internet start-up costs, support for establishment of Local Area Networks (LANs) would be key in allowing a higher number of staff to access the Internet, which would expand the benefits of Internet access to a wider range of individuals working for NGOs/CBOs.

Further Analysis of Internet Usage

The ability of this study to identify major overall patterns in Internet usage obviously has been severely limited by the modest resources that were available to cover this very large subject. Somewhat surprisingly, it appears that more than a few organizational incentives plus 179 follow-up phone calls are required even to obtain a higher percentage of responses than the 11 percent realized by this study.

[7] Deibert, p. 34.

Nevertheless, it is possible that the limited sample of responses achieved may roughly reflect the larger picture of Internet usage. If one can plausibly reason that only the most active, well-staffed and outgoing organizations will tend to respond to such a survey, those that did not respond this time would be unlikely to answer the survey questions a next time in ways that show significantly more extensive or innovative uses of the Internet. Of course, to get a more accurate sense of overall patterns of Internet usage and impacts, a further survey is needed, and that study would need to invest in significantly greater incentives and follow-up efforts to achieve a higher take-up. In the meantime, the findings of this study regarding the actual parameters and dimensions of Internet usage in the Great Horn of Africa may at least represent some well-grounded hypotheses, and perhaps more.

Addendums

Addendum A: Scope of Work

Under contract to USAID/REDSO, Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI) asked that Computer Frontiers, Inc. (CFI) undertake an examination of the subject area, Internet usage, relying on a descriptive, self-administered survey methodology. The target population for the survey was NGOs/CBOs that apply Internet technology to operational or project activities or direct delivery of services aimed at CPMR .

MSI requested that CFI undertake a survey with the primary goals of:

Establishing a baseline of knowledge on the range of NGOs/CBOs current usage and future plans for Internet usage in CPMR activities.

Drawing conclusions regarding the value of Internet access as it has been applied as a tool to CPMR initiatives.

Identifying factors inhibiting further integration of the Internet into general operations as well as project-related services and activities and suggesting methods to overcome those factors.

Devising a set of simple, cost-effective approaches or guidelines NGOs/CBOs may institute to introduce or further integrate Internet usage into CPMR so that it enhances the effectiveness of program activities.

Presumably, this survey draws a reliable picture of what is happening “on the ground” as the Internet is applied to activities of NGOs/CBOs working in CPMR and the range of problems associated with war-afflicted populations. This preliminary picture should be viewed as a starting point for a discussion on the overall applicability of Internet uses to CPMR, the impact on programming and operations, and areas warranting support and further investigation as defined by NGOs/CBOs themselves.

Addendum B: Scope of the Survey

Respondent Universe

The geographic scope of the survey is logically limited to the countries in the Greater Horn of Africa.

While organizations representing the public, private and NGO/CBO sectors have been integrally involved in efforts to prevent or manage conflict and develop peace building initiatives, a narrower survey target population was selected for this study, based on these assumptions:

The NGO/CBO sector is well-represented across the range of conflict resolution, prevention and peace building activities and can be justifiably cited as a generator of ideas and new approaches as well as an implementer of methodologies to address conflict.

The NGO/CBO sector is also well-represented in terms of its geographic scope of activities with a physical, on-the-ground presence in each of the GHA countries and territories.

NGOs/CBOs are adequately represented across the possible range of time periods that might reasonably be required to see different projects and negotiative processes through to the logical conclusion of their life-cycles, thus allowing them to maintain a viable institutional history of their activities and the operational contexts.

NGOs/CBOs have the institutional experience of having intervened in a broad range of conflicts, and have thus developed a knowledge base of what types of interventions have been most effective in addressing specific aspects of conflict.

Conversely, some of the factors that contributed to the decision to exclude the government sector as a target for the survey at this initial stage were:

Except for Djibouti, Kenya and Tanzania, all governments in the region were parties to some type of current conflict. While acknowledging that some of these same governments may also simultaneously be agents for conflict resolution, the fact that they are involved in conflicts tended to make the task of collecting *meaningful* information from their representatives more difficult at this juncture. A more complex and longer-term methodological strategy would have been required for collection of information under such conditions and clearly fell outside of the means provided for in this initiative.

The timeframe allotted for the study was insufficient to have accomplished the task of identifying the "key" actors within governments given the diffuse nature of CPMR activities that occur across sectors, across ministries and departments at the local, regional or national levels of governments.

Finally, although the private sector can contribute to conflict resolution goals, USAID/REDSO prioritized organizations with organizational or project activities and services *primarily directed* toward conflict resolution and peace building, which effectively excluded the majority of private sector organizations operating from within the GHA region.

Actual Respondent Sample

Respondents: Forty-three percent of respondents were women, with 85% of those who responded indicating that they had worked two or more years with their organizations. Most importantly, 90% of those who answered the questionnaire were either the chief executive of the NGO/CBO or were in a senior position possessing adequate knowledge to authoritatively complete the questionnaire.

Organizations: Ninety-one percent of responding organizations described themselves as non-governmental, not-for-profit organizations with 70% employing no more than twenty permanent staff members. Budgets ranged from a low of $40,000USD to $20,000,000 with the median budget being approximately $300,000. Ninety percent of NGOs/CBOs were located in their capitols and identified the scope of their geographic operations as:



1-National 2-Regional 3-International

[8]

Approximately eighty percent of NGOs/CBOs indicated that they offered five or more types of services (*See Addendum H: Survey Instrument).* They also provided service to specific groups, with women, farmers, the general public and children cited most frequently and with the following services being offered most often:

Primary Services Offered	Organizations

[8] National NGOs/CBOs were defined as organizations having operations within the geographic scope of the nation in which they are headquartered. Regional NGOs/CBOs were defined as organizations having operations within the sub-Saharan Africa. International NGOs/CBOs were defined as organizations having operations both inside and outside of sub-Saharan Africa.

	Citing Services *(as a percentage)*
Conducts facilitation, mediation or dialogues	11%
Institutional capacity-building	10%
Information dissemination or exchange	9%
Delivery of project services to specific target group	9%
Conducts development-related research	9%

Addendum C: Methodology

Survey Instrument
In consultation with MSI, CFI designed a survey instrument that has a preponderant number of questions that yielded descriptive information. Given that one of the primary objectives of the survey was to establish a baseline of knowledge on NGO/CBO Internet usage, the descriptive statistics derived from this study give an account of the existing state of Internet usage for operational and program-related purposes among NGOs/CBOs.

A limited number of questions were added to assess direct impact(s) of Internet access, which are best described as an immediate consequence of the introduction or use of the Internet.[9] The questionnaire was structured by topic as follows:

Respondent Profile
Organizational Profile
General Internet Usage and Capability
Program Related Usage of the Internet
As a Means of Interactive Communication
As a Means to Access Information
As a Means to Distribute Information
Impact of Internet Usage
Future Usage of the Internet
Target Population

The target population of the survey was defined as meeting the following necessary and sufficient conditions:

Conducted activities or provides services at the grassroots, national or regional levels aimed at preventing, managing or resolving past, current or potential violent conflicts or establishing peace building capacities among affected populations.[10]

[9] Ibid., p. 14.
[10] Lund, Michael. Definition of activities or services include:

- Non-official or official dialogues, mediation, consultations, peace meetings and processes, and reconciliation among parties or communities directly or indirectly engaged in conflictual relations;
- Training in conflict or dispute resolution and peace building techniques;

Conducted activities or provides services to affected populations from within the GHA region which is comprised of the countries of Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and the territory of Somaliland although can be headquartered anywhere worldwide.

Had NGO or CBO organizational status.

Had to be accessible, at the minimum, by Internet e-mail.

The sample population targeted for the survey were chief executive officers or other senior-level personnel whom were presumed to be knowledgeable about the program activities, operational support and past, present and prospective future plans and ideas on ICT integration into their operations.

Sampling Methodology

CFI utilized a sampling methodology based on identifying the units of analysis for the study, NGOs and CBOs that met the definitional criteria. This was accomplished through a process of discovering, unit by unit, those organizations that could be categorized as falling within the definition. The selection of this sampling methodology, recognized the difficulty of finding a reliable sampling frame, such as an exhaustive list of NGOs/CBOs located in the region or an exhaustive list of NGOs/CBOs working on CPMR initiatives throughout the GHA region. This effort may have yielded one of the more comprehensive lists of NGOs/CBOs working on CPMR within the GHA region.

Between November 15 and January 15, 2001, CFI used the following techniques to identify the current number of 225 potential respondent organizations:

Searched the Internet based on a list of keywords denoting primary activities that constitute conflict CPMR activities.

Identified networked, coalitional or “umbrella” organizations comprised of NGOs involved in CPMR activities and obtained their membership lists.

- Development, environmental, humanitarian assistance specifically oriented toward reducing conflict or maintaining peaceful relations or focused on areas of active, violent conflict carried out in those areas
- Peace education, peace media, and cultural projects;
- Promotion and strengthening of peaceful democratic institutions and processes, effective and legitimate governance, civil society, rule of law, and respect for human rights for the benefit of minorities and majorities;
- Regulating arms flows;
- Professionalization of police and armies to serve legitimate political authorities in enforcing security and just peace;
- Research and analysis to serve the above activities.
- These activities in the GHA region may be sponsored or implemented by NGOs/CBOs that are Africa-based.

Solicited the interest of prospective survey respondents by disseminating information about the survey through targeting of websites or e-publications of organizations widely read in the CPMR community.

Partnerships with African Institutions

Recognizing the need to meet the overall objective of establishing mutually beneficial partnerships with African institutions, CFI initiated a strategy of entering into joint initiatives with two African institutions, recognized within the region for expertise in their respective areas. CFI first entered into a partnership with methodologists affiliated with the Uganda Management Institute, who assisted in the design of the survey and the data analysis process.

CFI entered into a second joint initiative with the CECORE, an NGO offering education and training in peace building headquartered in Uganda. CECORE agreed to both endorse the survey by signing onto the cover letter and to distribute the survey from its office, thus lending regional credibility to this undertaking.

Use of Incentives

CFI offered a series of incentives in the cover letter demonstrating to the prospective respondent the tangible benefits of completing the questionnaire, thus relying on the idea that some level of “self-interest” must be integrated into a survey in order for the respondent to want to complete it.

Internet CommunicativeTechnology as a Means to Study Internet Usage
For the purposes of this study, MSI selected a methodology that relied on distributing surveys via the Internet. In addition to using the Internet search capabilities as one means to identify NGOs/CBOs that fall within the target population, CFI subcontracted to CECORE the task of distributing the surveys using their e-mail address and lending their credibility within the region to this effort. The majority of planning, organization and discussions on the most effective way to implement this initiative took place via the Internet.

Reinforcement through Follow-up

As a means to increase the rate of response, CFI relied on reinforcing the importance of completing the survey by sending a second e-mail communication to non-respondents and then a subsequent follow-up telephone call to the remaining set of not-respondents.

Analysis of Survey Data

The survey data was analyzed using frequency distributions.

Methodological Limitations

The limitations of this particular methodological approach are three-fold:

The self-administered survey methodology made no provision for interpersonal, face-to-face contact, such as could have occurred if direct interviews had been conducted as a component of the methodology. Given the importance of interpersonal interaction and verbal

communications in the regional cultural context, this limitation may have been construed by respondents and readers alike as a signal that the activity was of less importance.

One component of the methodology chosen by CFI, which should have had a mitigating effect against the impersonal nature of using a self-administered questionnaire, was follow-up phone calling.

The overall accuracy of information collected and the depth and range of information collected from self-administered surveys generally tends to be lower than information collected from other methods which allow for direct contact such as personal or phone interviews. However, the cost and time spent conducting phone calls or personal interviews, represents a clear trade-off between expediency and cost for depth and accuracy of information collected.

Given that the intent of this survey was to serve as the starting point for a discussion of Internet application to CPMR initiatives and that other initiatives using direct survey methods are envisaged for the future, the scope of this survey was considered as appropriate when viewed as the first phase of a longer term review.

It offered no means of comparison with a corresponding reference group, such as NGOs working in CPMR activities without Internet access, consequently limiting the representativeness of the sample selected. It is worth noting, however, that the primary variable under consideration, the Internet and its effect on any range of activities, rendered this issue as less important than if the variable had been some other phenomena.

Addendum D: Key Questions

The four major survey questions investigated regarding the use of the Internet among NGOs/CBOs active in CPMR were:

As compared with other means of communication, to what extent do NGOs/CBOs rely on the Internet as a primary means of communication?

Are there specific categories of services or activities in the CPMR sector that are associated with Internet technology and if so, what are they?

Is there a commonality among factors serving as barriers to NGOs/CBOs introduction or expanded use of the Internet?

What has been the impact of introducing the Internet into program operations and what do NGOs/CBOs cite as indicators of impact?

Addendum E: Guidelines for Internet Integration

Whether introducing the Internet into an institution or expanding existing Internet access within an organization, integration of the Internet can be more challenging than would commonly be thought. The host country's telecommunications infrastructure, the regulatory environment, the accessibility of trained technical support staff and the ease of equipment access are just some of the variables that really result in situational effectiveness of guidelines.

However, the following publication outlines guidelines for introduction of the Internet and has been used with some effectiveness in certain situations:

USAID/AFR/SD/ Leland Initiative. "Making the Internet Connection Count: Effective Use of the Internet in Seven Easy Steps." (Sept. 1998).

Addendum F: Responding Organizations by Country

Burundi
Jesuit Refugee Services
Organization for the Defense of the Environment

Ethiopia
Christian Relief and Development Agency
Ethiopian Human Rights Council
Ethiopian Orthodox Church-Development and Interchurch Aid Commission
Ethiopian Women's Lawyers Association
HUNDEE
PACT Ethiopia
Save the Children-USA
World Vision

Kenya
African Peace Agenda
Education Center for Women in Democracy
Indigenous Information Network
Katieno Welfare
Law Africa
World Vision
Security and Research Information Center

Sudan
Catholic Information Office
New Sudan Women's Federation
NESI-Network

Tanzania
Human Rights Education and Peace International
Muslim-Christian Commission for Peace, Development and Conflict Resolution

Uganda
African Center for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture Victims
African Women's Leadership Institute
Foundation for Human Rights Initiative

Addendum G: Survey Instrument

INSTRUCTIONS

- The attached questionnaire has been designed specifically for all non-governmental or international organizations working from within the region in any capacity to prevent, resolve or lessen the impact of conflict on the peoples living in the following countries:

- Burundi
- Djibouti
- Eritrea
- Ethiopia
- Kenya
- Rwanda
- Somalia or Somaliland
- Sudan
- Tanzania
- Uganda

- This questionnaire is best completed off-line by simply double clicking on the attachment, then saving it to the hard drive of your personal computer and completing it in either Microsoft Word or Word Perfect for Windows.

- You may move easily from one question to the next, by simply pushing the ***TAB*** key when you complete the previous question.

- Please read all instructions carefully before completing each question. They appear in italics and boldface and are placed in brackets at the end of the question.

- Please e-mail the completed questionnaire to the following electronic mail address:

ssemambo@hotmail.com

- Alternatively, a completed questionnaire may also be faxed to the following number in the United States:

+(1) (301) 601-1588

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME.

SURVEY: ORGANIZATIONS WORKING TOWARD PEACE IN AFRICA

SECTION I. Respondent Profile

1.1 What is your name? *(Optional)*	1.2. Title or position in the organization.
1.3 Gender: ____1.3.1 Male ____1.3.2.Female	1.4 Age Group: 1.4.1.___18-24 1.4.2.___25-31 1.4.3.___32-40 1.4.4. ___40-50 1.4.5. ___Over 50
1.5 How long have you worked with the organization in your current position? *(Please state the number of years)*	

SECTION II. Organizational Profile

2.1. What is the name of your organization?	2.2. Tel 1:
2.3. Tel 2:	2.4. Mailing Address:
2.5. Street Address:	2.6. Fax:
2.7. City and Country:	2.8. City and Country where your organization's headquarters is located:
2.9. Email Address:	2.10. Website Address (If any):
2.11. Please describe the major goals and objectives of your organization:	
2.12. What is the legal status of your organization? ***(Please type Y before all that apply)*** __2.12.1. Governmental __2.12.2. Non-governmental __2.12.3. For Profit __2.12.4. Non-Profit __2.12.5. Association __2.12.6. Parastatal __2.12.7. Membership (organizational) __2.12.8. Membership (individual)	
2.13. Number of members (if membership organization):	2.14. Number of permanent staff:
2.15. Primary target group for services or activities: (If any)	2.16. Estimated number of beneficiaries last year: (If any)
2.17. Which term best describes the geographic scope of your organizational operations? ***(Please type Y before all that apply)*** ___**2.17.1. National (Located within national boundaries)*:*** ___2.17.2. Regional (within Africa) *(Please list specific countries:* ___2.17.3. International (outside of Africa) *(Please list specific countries:*	
2.18. Approximately, how much is your annual budget this year? ***(Optional)***	
2.19. What are the major subject matter(s) with which your organization is concerned. ***(Please type Y before all that apply)*** ___2.19.1. Agriculture or Agribusiness ___2.19.2. Business development ___2.19.3. Conflict resolution / prevention / management ___2.19.4. Cultural Affairs ___2.19.5. Democratization or Elections ___2.19.6. Economic Reform or Privatization	___2.19.13. Humanitarian or Disaster Relief ___2.19.14. International or Foreign Relations ___2.19.15. Information Technology ___2.19.16. Labor or Workplace Issues ___2.19.17. Military or Police Affairs ___2.19.18. Political or Policy-Related Issues ___2.19.19. Press or Media

___2.19.7. Education
___2.19.8. Energy
___2.19.9. Environment / Natural Resource Management
___2.19.10. Good governance
___2.19.11. Health / Population
___2.19.12. Human Rights
___2.19.20. Trade or Commerce
___2.19.21. Water / Sanitation
___2.19.22. Women's Issues
___2.19.23. Youth or Children's Issues
___2.19.24. Other(Please Specify)_____

2.20. What specific activities does your organization undertake within the sectors identified in question 19 above ***(Please type Y before all that apply):***

___2.20.1. Conduct facilitation, mediation or dialogues
___2.20.2 Delivery of project services to specific target group
___2.20.3. Development-related research
___2.20.4. Early warning, monitoring or analysis of conflicts
___2.20.5. Information dissemination or exchange
___2.20.6. Networking of other NGOs
___2.20.7. Institutional capacity-building
___2.20.8. Lobbying
___2.20.9. Orientation or exchange visits
___2.20.10. Grassroots or community organizing
___2.20.11. Pressure campaigns
___2.20.12. Policy analysis or research
___2.20.13. Public advocacy
___2.20.14. Other(Specify)_____

2.21. If delivery of project services to specific target group is checked in question 20 (above), please describe the primary target group(s) for these services. Then, please state the type of services you provide for each target group.

Target Groups	***Type of Services***
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	

2.22.Please rank the following means of communication on a scale of 1 to 6 in order of overall importance to your organization using the following:

1-Very important 2-Somewhat important 3-Important 4-Not important 5-Not very important 6-Not important at all

____2.22.1 Face-to-face contact
____2.22.2 Fax
____2.22.3.Government Communication System (Hand or stationary radio)
____2.22.4.Other (Specify)
____2.22.5. Internet (including electronic mail and the World Wide Web)
____2.22.6. Mail (by post)
____2.22.7. Telephone

2.23.2. Please rank in order of overall importance to your organization the following means of receiving news and other general information on a scale of 1 to 6 using the following:

1-Very important 2-Somewhat important 3-Important 4-Not important 5-Not very important 6-Not important at all

___2.23.1. Face-to-face contact
___2.23.2. Radio
___2.23.3. Internet
___2.23.4. TV
___2.24.5. Print media
___2.24.6. (Other (Specify)

SECTION III: General Internet Usage Capabilities

3.1. How many Personal Computers (PCs) does your organization have *(in country)*? _____	3.2. Is your organization currently using the Internet? _____ 3.2.1.Yes _____ 3.2.2. No
3.3. When did your organization first begin using the Internet? ***(Please state the year)***_____	3.4. Of the PCs within your organization, how many have Internet access? _____

3.5. How would you rate your staff's expertise in using the Internet? *(Please type Y before the one that best applies)*

___3.5.1.Very good ___3.5.2. Good ___3.5.3.Average/Fair ___3.5.4. Poor ___3.5.5.Very poor

3.6. Prior to establishing an Internet linkage, what was your organization's primary means of communication with the following individuals or institutions? ***(Please choose the main type of communication that applies to the statements on the left by typing a Y in the appropriate column.) [Select only one type of communication per group.]***

Communication with:	***Means of Communication:*** *1. Personal Contact*	*2.Telephone*	*3.Fax*	*4. Mail (by post)*
3.6.1. Other staff members *on-site*	__	__	__	__
3.6.2. Organizations or individuals in *other parts of the country*	__	__	__	__
3.6.3. Organizations or individuals *within the Africa region*	__	__	__	__
3.6.4. Organizations or individuals *outside of the Africa region*	__	__	__	__

3.7. Prior to establishing an Internet linkage, what was your organization's primary means of obtaining general news and information? ***(Please type Y before the one that most applies)***

___3.7.1. Face-to-face contact
___3.7.2. TV
___3.7.3. Other ***(Please specify)***
___3.7.4. Radio
___3.7.5. Print media

3.8. Does your organization use any of the following the Internet programs? ***(Please type Y before all that apply)***

____3.8.1. Chatroom hosting
____3.8.2. Electronic mail (E-mail)
____3.8.3. Intranet
____3.8.4. Listserve hosting
____3.8.5. Virtual networks
____3.8.6. Telephone calling via the Internet
____3.8.7. Teleconferencing
____3.8.8. Transmission of radio programming
____3.8.9. World Wide Web (WWW)
____3.8.10. Other (*Please specify)*

3.9. Which of the following statements best describe your organization's primary purpose(s) for using any of the Internet programs listed in question 8, above? ***(Please type Y before all that apply)***

___3.9.1. Daily operational needs such as administrative and financial matters (e.g. personnel recruitment, financial management, purchasing)
___3.9.2. Delivery of services or implementing of activities specifically related to programs

3.10. How would you rate the overall importance of the following Internet features?

1-Very important 2-Somewhat important 3-Important 4-Not important 5-Not very important 6-Not important at all

____3.10.1. Finding or collecting information via the Internet
____3.10.2. Publicizing or disseminating information via the Internet
____3.10.3. Other ***(Please specify & rate importance)***_____
3.10.4. ____Receiving and sending email messages
3.10.5. ____Having a website

SECTION IV: Program-Related Usage of the Internet

A. Program-Related Usage of Internet as Means of Interactive Communications
(Including chatrooms, e-mail, listserves, teleconferencing, telephone calling via the Internet).

4.1. Does your organization commonly use the Internet as a means of interactive communications in direct implementation of program activities or delivery of project services?
____4.1.1. Yes ____4.1.2. No

4.2. If you selected NO, please explain what factors or decisions have inhibited your organization from using the Internet as a means of communications in program activities or project services?
_____
_____

4.3. If YES in question 1 above, please rate in terms of the overall number of contacts, with which institutions or individuals your organization has the most contacts using the following ratings:
1-High number of contacts 2-Moderate level of contacts 3-Low number of contacts 4-No contacts at all

Individuals / Institution

___4.3.1. Staff members *on-site*
___4.3.2. Institutions or individuals residing *within the country*
___4.3.3. Institutions or individuals residing *in other countries of the Horn or East Africa regions*
___4.3.4. Institutions or individuals residing within Africa but *outside of the Horn or East Africa regions*
___4.3.5. Institutions or individuals residing *outside of the African continent.*

4.4. How would you describe the frequency with which you use the Internet as a means of communication in direct implementation of program activities or delivery of project services? ***(Please type Y before the one that best applies)***
___4.4.1. Once a month ___4.4.2. 1 – 2 times a month ___4.4.3. Once a week ___4.4.4. More than once a week ___4.4.5. Daily

4.5. For what purpose(s) does your organization use the Internet as an interactive means of communication?
(Please type Y before all that apply)

Purposes for Which the Internet is Used

__4.5.1. Analyzing, monitoring or producing early warnings of conflicts
__4.5.2. Building organizational networks
__4.5.3. Conducting education or training
__4.5.4. Conducting facilitation, mediation or dialogues
__4.5.5. Conducting policy or applied research
__4.5.6. Conducting pressure campaigns
__4.5.7. Conducting public advocacy
__4.5.8. Coordinating activities of different organizations
__4.5.9. Establishing and managing collaborative initiatives
__4.5.10.Exchanging information with other organizations
__4.5.11.Lobbying
__4.5.12. Managing project(s) or delivery of services
__4.5.13. Mobilizing or organizing groups
__4.5.14. Other(Specify)_____
__4.5.15. Our organization does not use the Internet as a means of interactive communication

4.6. Please select all groups or individuals with which you are using the Internet as a means of communication for the activities named in question 5 (above). ***(Please type Y before all that apply)***

___4.6.1. Civil society groups
___4.6.2. Government agencies
___4.6.3. Political parties
___4.6.4. Other ***(Please specify)***_____
___4.6.5. Diplomats
___4.6.6. Military or police organizations
___4.6.7. Press or media
___4.6.8. Ethnic or regional groups
___4.6.9. NGOs
___4.6.10. Private sector

4.7. Of the group(s) listed in question 4.6 (above), with which group do you communicate the most?
_____

4.8. How would you rate the usefulness of the Internet as a means of communication for your organization as compared with: (*1. The Internet is very useful, 2. The internet is useful, 3. The Internet is not useful at all)*

4.8.1*)* Faxing? ___4.8.1.1. Very useful ___4.8.1.2 Useful ___4.8.1.3. Not useful at all

4.8.2*)* Interpersonal Contact? ___4.8.2.1.Very useful ___4.8.2.2. Useful ___4.8.2.3. Not useful at all

4.8.3) Telephone**?** ___4.8.3.1. Very useful ___4.8.3.2. Useful ___4.8.3.3. Not useful at all

4.9. Please describe the effect(s) of using the Internet as a means of communication in the activities identified in question 5.
(above)_____
_____
_____

B. Program-Related Usage of Internet as a Means to Access Information

4.10. For what specific purposes does your organization normally access information on the Internet*?*
(Please type Y before all that apply)
____4.10.1. Educate staff or members on topics relating specifically to organizational program activities
____4.10.2. Monitor or track events as they pertain to a specific issue, conflict or dispute.
____4.10.3. Obtain general information on activities of other institutions.
____4.10.4. Other ***(Please specify)***_____

C. Program-Related Usage of Internet as a Means to Distribute Information

4.11.Does your organization have a website?
___4.11.1.Yes ___4.11.2. No

4.12. If you selected NO, are there plans to create one and if so, when?
____4.12.1.Yes ____4.12.2. No

4.12.3. If YES, planned date of establishment of website?_____
(If NO, proceed to Section V on Page 6.)

4.12. Please identify all purpose(s) of your organization's website that apply below: ***(Please type Y before all that apply)***
____4.12.1. Disseminate general information about the organization
____4.12.2. Disseminate information specifically related to program services or activities
____4.12.3. Facilitate discussion via hosting of chatrooms or listserves
____4.12.4. Persuade individuals or organizations to act or mobilize
____4.12.5. Serve as a repository or storage site of information
____4.12.6. Other (*Please specify)*_____

4.13. Who are the target group(s) for the information available on the website?
_____
_____

4.14. What evidence do you have that the target group is utilizing the information?_____
_____
_____

4.15. What has been the effect(s) of your organization's ability to distribute information via the Internet?_____
_____
_____

4.16. Is your organizational website linked to the website(s) of other organization(s)? ___4.16.1.Yes ___4.16.2. No
If **YES**, please describe the purpose of the linkage._____
_____
_____

SECTION V: Impact of Internet Usage	
5.1. What has been the overall effect(s) of your organization's ability to access the Internet?_____ _____ _____	
5.2. How has the Internet *enhanced* the overall organizational activities in your institution? _____	
5.3. How has the Internet *hindered* the overall organizational activities in your institution? _____	
5.4. Are you aware of any instances in which any individuals, organizations, governments, or other actors deliberately used the Internet to *increase* tensions and conflict? (*Such as inciting followers to violence, manipulating information to generate or escalate a dispute or conflict, etc).* _____ 5.4.1. Yes _____ 5.4.2. No	5.5. If **YES** to question 5.4 (previous), please describe the instance. _____ _____ _____ _____ _____

SECTION VI: Future Usage of the Internet

6.1. If your organization could obtain any Internet technology, other than what you already possess what applications would your organization choose, what would be the intended use(s) and the anticipated benefit(s)?

Application	***Intended use***	***Anticipated Benefit(s)***
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____		
_____		

6.2. In your opinion, what are the main obstacles to your organization's further use of the Internet?
(Please type Y before all that apply)

___6.2.1. Cost of equipment
___6.2.2. Cost of telephone time to access Internet
___6.2.3. E-mail access considered sufficient
___6.2.4. Staff lack skills/training
___6.2.5. Institutional decision to restrict Internet access
___6.2.6. Staff skills or training
___6.2.7. Staff unfamiliar with benefits of access
___6.2.8. Other *(Please specify)* _____

6.3. Please describe any innovative uses of the Internet, that may be useful for the purposes of conflict prevention, management or resolution activities?

_____
_____
_____

6.4.What recommendations could you make to donors in terms of how technology could improve conflict prevention, management and resolution activities?

_____
_____

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME.

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Greater Horn of Africa
Peace Building Project

APPENDIX E
REFERENCES AND
LIST OF ACRONYMS

Appendix from the Report:
The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives
in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace
A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa

Contract No. GS-23F-8012H, Task Order No. 623-N-00-99-00294-00 for
DG/Conflict Evaluation and Analysis Services

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The full report can be found at:
http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/pbp_report.pdf
or write to peacebuilding@yahoo.com for an electronic version.

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List of Acronyms

APG	Acholi Parliamentary Group
ARLPI	The Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative in Northern Uganda
CAP	Company of Apostles for Peace, Burundi
CECORE	Center for Conflict Resolution
CFI	Computer Frontiers, Inc
CmC	Computer mediated communications
CPMR	Conflict prevention, mitigation and response (USAID)
DPRT	District Reconciliation and Peace Team
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
GHA	Greater Horn of Africa
GHAI	Greater Horn of Africa Initiative
GOS	Government of Sudan
GOU	Government of Uganda
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
KAP	Kitgum Joint Peace Forum
KJDF	knowledge attitude practices
LAN	Local Area Networks
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army, Uganda
MPs	Members of Parliament
MSI	Management Systems International, Inc.
NCCK	International Alert of Kenya
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
NPI	Nairobi Peace Initiative
NSCC	National Sudan Council of Churches
REDSO/ESA	Regional Economic Development Securities Office- East and Southern Africa
SPLA	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement
UPDF	Uganda People's Defense Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WPDC	The Wajir Peace and Development Committee, Northern Kenya
WSP	War-Torn Societies Project