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Lessons Learned from EXERCISE BLUE CRANE



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Peacekeeping in the New Millennium: Lessons Learned from Exercise Blue Crane

Edited by Cedric de Coning and Kwezi Mngqibisa

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Foreword

Maj. Gen. Andre Bestbier, SD, SM, MMM

Maj. Gen. Bestbier was the Chief Exercise Director for Exercise Blue Crane. He is the Deputy Director of Staff Joint Operations at the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).



Exercise Blue Crane presented challenges of gigantic proportions to the participating forces of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, the success of the exercise was way beyond expectations, as was endorsed by Dr. Leonard Kapungu, representative of the United Nations Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, during the final debrief session in Pretoria on 9 July 1999.

As director of the exercise I was in the privileged position to experience the positive spirit in which all the participating military as well as civilian components blended into one dynamic organisation with the sole purpose to make Blue Crane a SADC success.

I wish to convey my sincere appreciation for everyone's contribution towards Exercise Blue Crane, without which we would not have been able to host an exercise of such stature and extent: may the friendships

Success

Positive spirit

**Sound
foundation**

Exercise Blue Crane

which were established during the exercise serve as sound foundation for the future benefit of all people of our sub-continent.

Peace in our region

May this publication serve to substantiate the lessons we have learnt from Exercise Blue Crane in such a way that it contributes substantially to peace in our region.

Editorial

Cedric de Coning

Cedric de Coning designed and coordinated the civilian aspects for Exercise Blue Crane as the Civilian Exercise Controller. He is Assistant Director and Programme Manager, Peacekeeping at The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).



Exercise Blue Crane was a SADC peacekeeping exercise which took place at the South African Army Battle School in the Kalahari Desert, South Africa as well as in and around the Indian Ocean port of Durban, from 12-30 April 1999. The exercise was based on a multinational United Nations peacekeeping operation which adopted the classic interpositional role between two warring factions on a mythical island called Naraland.

A total of 12 SADC member nations participated in the brigade level exercise. It was the first time that SADC staged a peacekeeping exercise of this size and scope, and it was the largest of its kind ever held in Africa. Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom contributed financially, while India, Belgium and the United States assisted with the airlifting of the various contingents. India and France participated during the navel leg of the exercise. The United Nations (UN), the Organisation for African

**SADC
peacekeeping**

**Largest ever
held in Africa**

Exercise Blue Crane

Unity (OAU) and about 19 other African and overseas countries sent approximately 50 advisors and monitors to the exercise.

Civilians



Our understanding of conflict systems have undergone considerable change in the last decade. In the new conflict paradigm, civilians are both targets and perpetrators of violence. In today's conflicts, civilians have become the principal objects of war. Civilians are willfully displaced, tortured and killed to create chaos, de-populate certain areas and commit ethnic genocide. Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone are recent examples of the way civilians are consciously targeted and terrorised. These conflicts need a specific type of response, namely a political and humanitarian driven one. The roles civilians play in modern peacekeeping missions have thus developed in direct response to these changes in our understanding of the new conflict paradigm.

Complex



Consequently, peacekeeping is no longer exclusively a military affair, where a neutral force is deployed between two warring parties to monitor a ceasefire. Today, peacekeeping missions are complex multi-dimensional campaigns, where the military is but one player in a multidisciplinary team which includes diplomats, conflict resolution experts, humanitarian relief agencies, human rights workers and civilian police. ACCORD assisted the SADC countries to design, plan and coordinate all the civilian aspects of the exercise, and were involved with a wide range of civilian actors, including UN diplomatic, human rights and humanitarian staff; an OAU monitoring mission; a SADC Human Rights Observer Group (SADC-HROG); the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); and African non-governmental organisations. (See Annexure A for Civilian Participants List)

Civilian and military roles

Exercise Blue Crane provided the SADC countries with an opportunity to train together, to exercise multinational command and control, and to integrate the civilian and military roles in an exercise that simulated many of the realities of a modern conflict scenario. Most participants came to the realisation that peacekeeping is much more complex than they first thought. It is not an easy task to bring thousands of people from different cultural, functional and organisational backgrounds together, and to integrate them into one operational whole. The complexity of the undertaking is multiplied when it is done

Editorial

in a very short period of time, under difficult and often dangerous conditions. The logistics of feeding, clothing, housing and continuously re-supplying such a large group of people is, in itself, a huge undertaking.

SADC has gained a great deal from this experience and the exercise generated a large body of lessons learnt. These include the need to intensify joint peacekeeping training, and to integrate certain aspects of military, police and civilian training and preparation for peacekeeping missions. The exercise should also assist SADC to refine its training priorities, focus more regional training on those aspects where it is most needed, and to decide how it will conduct multinational field training exercises of this nature in future.

Perhaps the real significance of the exercise was the opportunity it offered for SADC to participate in a joint peacekeeping exercise. The impasse that developed surrounding the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, and the differences in approach towards the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have threatened the natural cohesion that has characterised SADC until now. Exercise Blue Crane created an opportunity for SADC to stand together and develop its joint capacity to participate in UN peacekeeping missions.

During a March 1999 meeting in Swaziland, the InterState Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of SADC agreed, in principle, to establish a SADC stand-by brigade. The ISDSC is now studying the feasibility of establishing such a stand-by brigade along the lines of the Danish SHIRBRIG model (but probably not with the same 'high-readiness' intent). Exercise Blue Crane, although planned before this decision was taken, gave further momentum to the assessment study and the feasibility of such an initiative. If such a proposal was accepted, SADC would develop and maintain a SADC brigade level capacity to participate in UN style peace missions. It would also lodge this capacity with the OAU and UN stand-by systems.

Exercise Blue Crane gave each and every participant – whether they were a corporal from Mozambique or a UN civilian affairs officer from Zambia – the opportunity to get as close to real peacekeeping

Lessons learnt

Joint capacity

Stand-by brigade



Exercise Blue Crane

Training conditions

as is possible under training conditions. It gave the various military contingents the opportunity to work together under joint command, to test their interoperability and to practice their common standing operating procedures (SOPs). It also created an opportunity for SADC's police forces to work together as UN police officers, and thus to develop the capacity to contribute to UN missions across the globe. The exercise also created an opportunity for the various civilian actors, police and military to develop and test a new coordination mechanism — the Mission Coordination Centre (MCOC). The latter is based on the Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CIMIC) and the Civil-Military Operation Centre (CMOC) concepts developed during the NATO missions in former Yugoslavia. Exercise Blue Crane provided the UN and international community with an ideal laboratory to test its application in a UN style peace mission.

Mission Coordination Centre (MCOC)

SADC SOPS

The physical legacy of the Exercise is a set of SADC SOPs for future UN style peacekeeping missions, which were jointly developed by the various SADC countries during the run-up to the exercise. The SOPs were tested during the course of the exercise to evaluate their effectiveness, and will be available for SADC and others after the necessary adjustments have been made.

Lessons learned

Exercise Blue Crane was followed by a Lessons Learned Seminar on 8-9 July 1999, when the various SADC and overseas countries came together to analyse and formulate the lessons that could be drawn from the exercise experience. Any lessons learnt could be used when similar exercises are planned for the future, or where relevant, for actual future UN peace missions. This publication aims to place all these reports together in one publication, including that of the military, police and civilian component. Apart from these component reports, the book includes a report by the International Advisors and Monitors Group, as well as the closing address by Dr. Leonard Kapungu, Head of the Lessons Learned Unit at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for the United Nations.



Neutral third-party

From the myriad of lessons learnt during Exercise Blue Crane, the following three stand out from our perspective:

- firstly, UN style peacekeeping (in other words, neutral and

impartial third-party peace missions) is the most appropriate form of international intervention;

- secondly, the reminder to SADC of the benefit that can be derived from standing together as a cohesive sub-regional unit; and
- thirdly, the need to integrate as early as possible the various civilian, police and military components present in modern peace missions. This implies joint training and integrated planning of future missions and exercises from the earliest possible moment.


**Sub-regional
unit**

**Integrate
components**

Exercise Blue Crane

Kwezi Mngqibisa

Kwezi Mngqibisa participated in Exercise Blue Crane as the Deputy Civilian Exercise Controller. He is Senior Programme Officer, Peacekeeping at ACCORD.



Exercise Blue Crane was a peacekeeping capacity-building exercise which took place at the South African Army Battle School in the Northern Cape Province from 7-30 April 1999.

**Capacity-
building**

Exercise Blue Crane was based on a typical UN operation positioned between two warring factions on a mythical island called Naraland, located in the Indian Ocean. The exercise involved approximately 4,500 participants, with defence force members from the SADC countries of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. About 500 of the total number of participants were military observers, civilian police forces and personnel from UN agencies, the ICRC, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and private voluntary organisations.

UN operation

Exercise Objectives

The objective of Exercise Blue Crane was to enhance the all-round

Exercise Blue Crane

Capacity capacity of SADC for participation in peace operations. The exercise was designed to expose those areas where peacekeeping capacity needed to be improved, such as the aspects of command and control. Based on the results of Exercise Blue Crane, an in-depth analysis of SADC's existing ability and capacity to participate in peace missions will be carried out. The outcome of this analysis will determine future planning for capacity-building within the SADC, both as a unified group, as well as in individual countries.

Effective peacekeeping To improve the general capacity and ability of the participating countries to work together as an effective peacekeeping force, the objectives of Exercise Blue Crane were the following: to exercise regional and multi-national command and control during peace support operations at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical). This meant exercising participants in the application of the doctrine and principles of peace support operations as laid down by the UN. This was achieved through exercising both the military and civilian participants in a multi-functional peace mission.

Humanitarian operations Secondly, the exercise aimed at training participants on providing support to humanitarian relief operations, with reference to: assistance with maintaining the local infrastructure; development of civil-military relations; practice of procedures for the handling of refugees, prisoners, returnees and displaced persons; and practice in the handling of casualties.

Interoperability Thirdly, participants were exercised in multi-national formation level headquarters in command of peace support operations. The promotion of interoperability and the generation of regional standard operating procedures were important. All participants were trained in the handling of the media, to practice the monitoring of demilitarised zones (DMZ) and the movements of opposing forces, and to practice the establishment of freedom of movement and the promotion of violence cessation.



In order to achieve the exercise objectives, it was imperative to ensure that civilian and military participants underwent training that would develop:

Exercise Blue Crane

- An understanding of each other's roles and mandates;
- An understanding of each other's strengths and weaknesses, i.e. complimentary roles;
- An understanding of the need for compromise and problem-solving through effective communication;
- An understanding of the need to exchange information and create liaison channels; and
- An understanding of the need for holistic management of the overall mission.

Complimentary roles

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), who hosted the exercise, enlisted the assistance of ACCORD to design and coordinate the political and civilian role players in the exercise. In order to represent the key civilian actors and to achieve the exercise objectives, the civilian participation was designed as follows:

Civilian participation

- A Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG);
- Staff in the office of the SRSG;
- OAU Observer Mission (OAUMIN);
- SADC-HROG;
- UN Humanitarian Agencies;
- ICRC; and
- NGOs.



The Scenario



Naraland is a small island situated off the eastern coast of southern Africa. It spans a distance of 140 km in an east-west direction and 110 km in a north-south direction. The country is divided into four provinces: Manacaland, Kambonia, Suma and Lava, the latter being the seat of the legitimate government. Chaos is brewed by two rival movements: the Mananca Resistance Movement (MRM) and the Kambonian Liberation Movement (KLM), which have been opposing one another for a long time.

Naraland

During the 1800s the more powerful Mananca drove the Kambo tribe from its fertile ancestral lands. The Kambo eventually settled in what is now the semi-desert province of Kambonia. The Mananca retained

Mananca

Exercise Blue Crane



Map of Naraland Island

possession of the land conquered from the Kambo, which has become the province of Manancaland. The Kambo have never abandoned their claims to the land in Manancaland which was once possessed by them.

Colonial period

In 1876 the entire island was conquered by a European power during the Scramble for Africa. Intertribal tension was aggravated by the colonial authorities' use of the Mananca as civil administrators and police in Kambonia, and elsewhere. Artificial boundaries, based on geographical rather than ethnic realities, were imposed and maintained by the colonial power during this period.

Independence

With the coming of Naraland independence in 1960, and the appointment of President Lavali as federal president, the Kambo (under Chief Kambo) launched an unprovoked attack on Manancaland in an effort to regain its lost territory. The Mananca (under Field Marshall Mananca) used their colonial experience, as well as equipment and

Exercise Blue Crane

weapons left behind by the colonial authorities, to defeat and drive the Kambo back. The old provincial boundary, still not accepted by the Kambo, was re-established. Mediation efforts by the Naraland government to solve the problem failed.

Subsequently, the Kambo were subjected to severe persecution and discrimination. They had no franchise and severe taxes were imposed. Even today, skirmishes between the two provinces continue to erupt. The MRM has adopted a formal structure based on their colonial police experience, whereas the KLM forces have adopted an improvised, irregular organisation. The prolonged conflict has weakened the Naraland government, which is unable to contain the crisis.

Although the Naraland government appointed a governor for each of the provinces after independence, only the governor of Suma Province remains. President Lavali has assumed power in Lava, while the governors of the other two provinces have fled overseas. There is no control over Mananca and Kambonia. Severe budget cuts have left the national police and para-military gendarmerie underfunded. Lack of funds, together with outdated equipment, makes enforcing the will of the national government on Mananca and Kambonia impossible. Corruption and general lawlessness are the order of the day.

There are also current conflicts and hardships: droughts and low prices have ravaged the agriculturally based economy, and the discovery of diamonds in Kambonia has provoked further attacks by the Mananca.

All parties involved in the conflict are reporting human rights violations, some of which may even amount to ethnic cleansing. Widespread famine and constant conflict have caused an even greater number of people to become displaced. Suma has become a safe haven for refugees from a neighbouring country, as well as internally displaced people who flow into the province in their thousands every day. Kambo belligerents conduct training, weapons smuggling and reorganisation activities from the camps. The Suma authorities turn a blind eye because of their need to have the Kambos out of their province as soon as possible.

Prolonged conflict

Suma Province



Diamonds

Human rights

Exercise Blue Crane

Kambonia and Mananca have reached a military stalemate, and are currently occupying strategic ground in opposition to each other.

International Intervention

UN intervention


International media coverage has led to an international outcry regarding the loss of lives. NGOs, UN agencies and the ex-colonial power have all confirmed that Naraland is in dire straits, and have requested the UN alleviate the situation.

The leaders of both belligerent parties and the Naraland Government have agreed to international mediation due to war-weariness, depleted resources and loss of life. An agreement between the belligerents and the government, in the form of the Treaty of Windhoek, was reached to end the conflict on the island.

Peacekeeping

A UN Security Council mandate, Resolution 982 of 1998,¹ authorised the establishment of a peacekeeping force in Naraland consistent with the offer of the OAU and the SADC. The force, known as the United Nations Mission in Naraland (UNMIN), was authorised:

- To establish buffer zones, and to monitor the ceasefire and withdrawal of Manancaland and Kambonia belligerents in accordance with the Treaty of Windhoek;
- To use all possible means to facilitate the delivery and provision of humanitarian assistance to the affected populations;
- To assist with the restoration of normality in Naraland; and
- To suggest, through the Secretary-General of the OAU and the chairperson of the SADC, any other actions to enhance peace and security in Naraland.



Treaty of Windhoek

The Treaty and Ceasefire Agreement of Windhoek commits the signatories to the pursuit of the following:

- International disagreement mediation;
- Demilitarised zone establishment;
- Hostility cessation;
- Demobilisation and disarmament;
- Cessation of new weapons acquisition from any source;

Exercise Blue Crane

- Establishment of preventative No Fly and Maritime Total Exclusion Zones;
- Prevention of treaty breaches;
- Wide area re-establishment of the Naraland Police Department (NPD);
- Return or resettlement of displaced persons and refugees;
- Release of illegally detained persons (including combatants);
- Conflict resolution cooperation with the UN; and
- Any other international agencies and NGOs willing to assist with the rebuilding of the country.



The SADC chairperson authorised the contribution of a SADC brigade to the UN peacekeeping force, in accordance with UN Resolution 982 of 1998, to conduct peacekeeping in Naraland as part of the UNMIN. The force's activities will be conducted in accordance with the ceasefire agreement as negotiated between the belligerent parties. Its mandate calls for the monitoring and implementation of the agreed DMZ between Kambonia and Manancaland, as well as the disarming of belligerents and the prevention of illegal arms smuggling. The SADC force will also return internally displaced persons and refugees, release and return illegally detained soldiers/persons, re-establish civil authority, re-establish governmental institutions and infrastructure, and provide humanitarian aid/relief/support (see Diagram 1, page 20).

United Nations Mission in Naraland (UNMIN)

Reported violations of the ceasefire agreement must be investigated by the UNMIN. These include any reports of: human rights abuses, discriminatory practice, arms smuggling, humanitarian disaster, accusations of police brutality, accusations of favouritism, theft, kidnappings, sniper action, hijackings and disappearances of UN soldiers.


Ceasefire

The end result will hopefully be the creation of political stability within Naraland, which will create an environment favourable to the promotion of peace and security on the island. Only then will the government of Naraland be in a position to conduct the proposed free and fair election.

Elections

Diagram 1
UN Mission
in Naraland

UN MISSION IN NARALAND



Exercise Blue Crane

Endnotes

- 1 See Annexure B for the United Nations Security Council Resolution 982 (1998) and Annexure C for the United Nations Mandate.

Military Participation in Exercise Blue Crane: Exercise Debrief

Maj. Gen. Andre Bestbier, SD, SM, MMM

Maj. Gen. Bestbier was the Chief Exercise Director for Exercise Blue Crane. He is the Deputy Director of Staff Joint Operations at the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).



Introduction

This chapter is the summary of the official debrief of the military component for Exercise Blue Crane.

It is necessary to take note that the debrief report on Exercise Blue Crane includes minute detail. This is meant to be used as a guideline for planning, should an exercise of the same nature be attempted again. This accompanying summary aims to condense the detail to digestible proportions without losing the impact of the report.

**Debrief
report**

Exercise Blue Crane

Strong Points

Donors Without the contribution of the donor countries Exercise Blue Crane would still only be an unreal daydream within SADC.

The aim, to build capacity regarding peace support operations was without a doubt achieved. The most predetermined exercise objectives were achieved and is seen as the single most important strong point.

Participation One of the German advisors attending remarked that, it was a feat on its own to get all the SADC countries involved in the planning and to get twelve of the fourteen participating in the execution of the exercise. Even greater was the achievement to get all the participating contingents airlifted, in time to the exercise terrain over the vast distances applicable. To further exceed all expectations these forces were integrated into an effective brigade to conduct the exercise.

Organisation An ICRC representative remarked that the exercise was better planned and organised than most UN Missions he has seen.



The functioning of the Personnel Maintenance Office, the personnel management, commitment of the staff and personnel support in general was perceived highly positive. The utilisation of liaison officers per contingents and interpreters proved to be indispensable. The high standard of discipline throughout the exercise was a commendable strongpoint. Provisioning of forces by most countries participating since the early planning stages, proved to be reliable.

Media The timeous media briefing released prior to commencement of the exercise proved to be worth our while. Handling of the media on all levels, be it as part of attaining exercise objectives or as real coverage of the exercise went smoothly. The decision to have simulated press staffed with real reporters apparently was a world first and worked excellently. It not only ensured reality, but also improved understanding and strengthened mutual trust between the military and the media.

Contributing factors to the success achieved by the visitors organisation was its representative composition regarding participating

Military Participation: Exercise Debrief

countries, the flexibility and positive attitude of the staff and the reliable communication system provided. The centralisation of all administration regarding visits was a major contribution to above-mentioned success as well.

The decision to erect the basic structures (observation posts and control points) before hand, proved to be most cost effective. This ensured cost effective utilisation of available time for training.

Personnel preparedness regarding medical fitness was a strong point as all participants were medically tested and declared fit before the exercise, according to UN requirements. During the exercise the correct, effective and timeous handling of casualties, including evacuation contributed to the high morale of all participants.

Air support was in general rendered excellently. It must be mentioned that all flying requirement were fulfilled without exception. The high serviceability maintained on all aircraft, as well as high standard of flying safety must be mentioned specifically. The amount of accident and incident free flying hours generated in only fifteen days is an achievement of which the participating Air Forces can be justifiably proud.

Participants reached general consensus that the maritime aim was achieved. The major strength was the cooperation on all levels between the participating Naval contingents.

As previously mentioned pre-planned training objectives were achieved. The high standard developed to execute drills on the technical level, is a direct result of the high standard of instructors utilised. Another positive feature is the fact that the lesson learnt during Exercise Blue Hungwe was purposefully addressed during this exercise. A strong point which ensured some degree of uniformity was the availability of a SADC approved Standing Operating Procedure (SOP). The positive influence that the pre-deployment training and command post exercise (CPX) had on the success of the field exercise, emphasised the importance thereof during any combined venture.

Time utilisation



Air

Training

Exercise Blue Crane

The effortless and streamlined manner in which execution was conducted, was a direct result of the excellent cooperation, coordination, positive attitude, initiative, integration and interaction that existed between the participating contingents and civilian participants. The crucial and positive role played by the international advisors participating in the exercise must never be underestimated.

Strategic movement

Integrating all available means of transport ensured the successful assembly of all participating forces at the exercise terrain. The contribution of donor countries regarding the strategic airlift and participating naval vessels must be mentioned specifically. The positive role played by the movement centres which were situated at Upington and Sishen airfields can also not be ignored.



In principle the exercise control organisation ensured the fluency of the execution of the field exercise. This control was well planned and conducted in a highly professional manner. The effectiveness of command and control enhanced by the centralisation of air assets under command of the Force Commander and under control of the Air Operations Centre at Force headquarters. The Civil-Military Coordination Seminar played a major role to enhance command and control effectively. Without this seminar civilian participants would never have been orientated regarding military command and control.

It is perceived that the major contributing factor enhancing communication compatibility and effectiveness down to company level, was the decision to centralise *Command Management Information System* (CMI) support and appoint the SANDF to be responsible. A definite strong point was the duplication of communication in the system regarding telephones, facsimile, telegraphic network and tactical tele-communications (HF, VHF and UHF). Overall signal support was commendable and includes adequate power supply, effective Signal Dispatch Services, reliable communication systems, continuous Tactical and Technical maintenance.

Infrastructure

The major influence that the well established existing infrastructure, at and surrounding the South African Army Battle School, had on the success of the exercise must never be underestimated.

Military Participation: Exercise Debrief

Proper logistical planning with a simple logistical system in support, executed by loyal and dependable support units ensured effective logistical support for the duration of the total exercise. A great achievement that must be mentioned especially, is the enormous amount of kilometres travelled country wide without any serious accidents.

Logistical Support

Composing an representative planning group timeously, including all military, police and civilian participants played a major part in the success attained with Exercise Blue Crane. The high standard of planning, continuous cooperation and uninterrupted involvement of the SADC countries is commendable. One of the most important strong points was the creation of a neutral scenario being well planned and suitable to be used for any type of exercise anywhere with minor adaptations

Weak Points

A fair deal of frustration was created by the fact that several contingents did not adhere to target dates for the supply of nominal rolls. Where they did, vast differences between the nominal roll and people reporting for participation occurred. This caused unnecessary strain on staff. A major negative influence was portrayed through the lack of continuity in critical planning staff. The major influence created by the withdrawal of some contingent at relative short notice could not pass unnoticed.

Staffing

Sufficient provision was not made to establish a proper operational corporate communication capability to be utilised simultaneously for real time and exercise purposes.

Although this was experienced very positive care must be taken to differentiate between real time and exercise activities. It is imperative that journalists be properly briefed regarding their role in the exercise to ensure that they don't make privileged exercise information known untimely, to participating forces.



Exercise Blue Crane

Care must be taken to include women and children to simulate refugees and internally displaced persons in future exercises.

Air An opportunity to gain combined air operation experience was allowed to go by, as only SADC countries utilised the opportunity to participate in the exercise regarding air operations.

Although plenty communication related problems were experienced initially during the exercise, the vast was due to lack of experience and finger trouble. After it was rectified excellent communication systems were maintained. The fact that the functionality of the Mission and Force Headquarters was not part of the exercise objectives must be borne to mind.

Language Some participants staffed in key posts could not communicate in English, combined with the lack of sufficient interpreters it impacted negatively on communication. The suggestion is to keep to UN policy regarding mission languages.



- a Visitors. Initially it was planned to handle the United Nations Military Observers (UNMO's) International Advisors and Military spectators as one group, this proved to be a major fault and initially created enormous confusion. Due to the difference in role, functions and objectives of these groupings it is necessary to plan and cater for them separately in detail. Proper joining instructions must timeously be made available to these people.
- b Liaison officers. Although the utilisation of liaison officers regarding foreign contingents was perceived as a strong point, it was not fully exploited. The maximum gain will be obtained if the system is extended to include national headquarter, Civilian Police (CIVPOL) and all non-military participating organisations. Liaison personnel from these organisations at exercise control, the visitors organisation and Personnel Maintenance Office will also be beneficial.

Operation Room Several shortcomings regarding operation room procedures were experienced and noted for future exercise during a possible command

Military Participation: Exercise Debrief

post exercise on Mission/Force Headquarter level. It is important to keep in mind that Exercise Blue Crane focussed on the technical level and operation room procedures was not part of the objectives to be exercised.

Although SADC SOP's were written and available, everybody was not fully familiar with them. Some work will still have to be done to enhance standardisation and to make it totally practical.

The frequent changes in number and availability of donor aircraft continuously delayed the finalisation of the air movement plan. The late withdrawal and unserviceability of donor aircraft nearly created a disaster. Regarding the land movement plan finalisation was hampered by the availability of the air movement plan as well as coordination and communication. Some administrative problems were caused at the ports of entry due to the late submission of data by some SADC contingents. The above mentioned only has reference to troop movement in, and not to the actual exercise.

Lack of overall knowledge and experience regarding peace support operations was visible on all level of command. More formal training of staff officers and intensive pre-exercise training is essential. The fact that logistical and personnel training objectives was not included in the exercise was a weakness.

Participants are of the opinion that updates on the scenario was not communicated effectively. More detail regarding Naraland Governmental policies was needed to enable mediators to negotiate realistically. The Security Council Resolution should also make provision for elections, democratisation, reconciliation and peace building during future exercises.

Fluency of the administration process at the personnel maintenance office was lacking and caused congestion. Time spent on leader group orientation was insufficient and should be complemented with individual handouts. Care must be taken to ensure representivity of all countries at the exercise control organisation.

Common standing operating procedures (SOPs)



Training

Execution

Exercise Blue Crane


The fact that peacekeeping logistics were not practiced was a weakness.

Transport

Regarding transport the main weakness was the availability of light transport (4x4 vehicles) and the lack of qualified drivers. It is furthermore true that it is virtually impossible to supply the total need for light 4x4 vehicles.

Finance

Major problems occurred during the preparation for the exercise and some latter ones during the execution regarding finance. All of these could have been eliminated with the timeous availability of a knowledgeable financial staff officer, as from the initial planning stage for the exercise. Care must be taken not to again embark on such a venture at a time where the change of financial years has a direct influence on the execution. It must be noted that sound management prevented the above mentioned to reflect negative on the exercise.



The functioning of headquarters was not a focus point during Exercise Blue Crane. It is of the utmost importance to place emphasis on headquarters procedures and functioning during future exercises. Headquarters referred to included Mission/Force Headquarters, Sector Headquarters and National Headquarters. Furthermore it is essential to have representatives of all participating non-military organisations as part of the planning group from the initial stages. One representative representing all non-military organisations is not sufficient. Regarding planning group personnel, continuity is essential and must be maintained at all cost.

Opportunities

Personnel

The establishment of a personnel operations team with mobile equipment readily available is seen as a viable opportunity, not only for the host country but for SADC as a whole.

- a. Exercise Blue Crane created the opportunity for all participants on all levels to gain experience in peace support operations. Participants with little experience gained from the contact with experienced peace support soldiers. This was applicable with

Military Participation: Exercise Debrief

regards to all facets of the multi-dimensional nature of peace support operations.

- b. Participating contingents are of the opinion that in-deployment training must be followed by a CPX before the field exercise commences. All levels of command and participating organisations must take part in this CPX. This will create the opportunity for a logical flow of events and allow time for proper deployment drills.
- c. SADC countries must make full use of the opportunities created through the availability of international courses to get personnel fully qualified.

Multi-national SADC staff should be identified and trained as a permanent peace support operation headquarters. These headquarters could be grouped regularly for tactical exercises without troops. It would be of even greater value if a fulltime headquarter or secretariat could be established to coordinate the activities of envisaged work groups and to execute general staff duties.

The opportunity now exists to appoint workgroups to finalise the Standing Operating Procedures for the SADC up to Mission/Force Headquarters level. Attention must also be given to write logistical prescriptions, a peace support operations manual for SADC at battalion and lower level as well as a Aide Memoir for SADC officers.

- a. The availability and deployment of information technology equipment during operations are a major opportunity to be investigated.
- b. The opportunity to specialise on logistics, personnel and training within the different SADC countries are a subject for investigation as well,
- c. The opportunity to activate a combined operations room with emphasis on personnel, logistics and finance at least one month before deployment, to coordinate national and SADC interest, must not be neglected.

Opportunities must be created during the planning phase for related staff officers of participating contingents to liaise, appreciate and plan before deployment. This is of utmost importance regarding critical support services like personnel, logistics, signal etc. Experienced and



International courses

Doctrine

IT support

Planning

Exercise Blue Crane

formally trained personnel must be appointed to plan exercises of this nature to make full use of the opportunities created. Continuity of planning staff is of major importance to ensure the utilisation of all opportunities.

Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC)



Technology Interoperability (Navy)

The decision to include civilians and therefore establish a CMOC during the exercise created enormous opportunities to gain experience. However in future it is necessary to make provision for CMOC on all applicable command levels, to include planning representatives from the initial planning stage and to plan its role in the exercise in minute detail. To achieve this, more civilian participants would be needed.

In order to enhance interoperability, more advanced technology solutions must be sought. To address the individual security concerns of the partners for peace, this solution should be sought in a combined manner and at the appropriate staff talks.

Threats

Lessons learnt

A threat to subsequent exercises or peacekeeping operations is the probability that the doctrine, tactics, drills and procedures developed and tested during this exercise, are not dynamically maintained and further developed.

The magnitude of language and religious diversity within the SADC countries could pose a threat to combined peace support operations.

International agreements

Total absence of memoranda of understanding between the Republic of South Africa (RSA), SADC countries and donor countries, superficial status of forces agreements (SOFA) and incomplete rules of engagement could pose a serious threat to the success of peace support operations. These documents must be negotiated in detail and signed properly timeously.


The contribution of the available infrastructure in the proximity of the exercise area must not be underestimated. The lack of infrastructure in a remote area could pose a serious threat to a similar exercise or

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peace support operation deployment on the same level.

Contingency planning to ensure back-up systems when making use of donor support is essential. This would prevent total failure when such support does not materialise as agreed upon, especially on short notice.

Donor support



Recommendations

The momentum for capacity building should be maintained by means of individual and multi-national CPX's on sector, force and mission headquarter (HQ) levels annually, as this is relatively inexpensive.

Due to the high cost of the field training exercises (FTX's) a multi-national exercise of this extent can not be done annually. However consideration should be given having a multi-national FTX at battalion level possibly every third year.

Multi-national FTX's

Multi-national SADC staff should be identified and trained as a permanent standby peace support operation headquarters. This headquarter should be grouped on a regular basis to do CPX's.

Standby

The opportunity now exists to appoint multi-national work groups to finalise the SADC SOP's up to mission and force HQ level and to write logistical prescription and procedures. A peace support operations manual for SADC battalions and lower levels as well as an Aide Memoir for SADC officers should be compiled.

Consideration should be given to the establishment of a permanent secretariat to coordinate the activities of envisaged work groups and to execute staff duties.

Permanent secretariat

Conclusion

Over and above the exercise was an resounding success. Although plenty negative issues were mentioned, its combined influence could never overshadow the positive results obtained.

Exercise Blue Crane

Non SADC countries participation

India	1 Landing Ship 1 Patrol Vessel 1 IL 76 Aircraft
USA	1 C130 Aircraft
France	1 C160 Aircraft
Belgium	1 C130 Aircraft
Germany	1 C160 Aircraft

SADC countries participation

Country	Personnel	Formations
Angola	7	none
Botswana	38	3 x Observers; 1 x Company
DRC	none	none
Lesotho	138	1 x Company
Malawi	167	1 x Company
Mauritius	8	Police
Mozambique	136	1 x Company
Namibia	161	1 x Company
Seychelles	none	5 x Officers
South Africa	3751	1 x Batallion Group
		1 x Batallion (OPFOR+CIV) Air support Naval support
Swaziland	145	1 x Company
Tanzania	191	1 x Company
Zambia	172	1 x Company 1 x LT TPT Aircraft 1 x Helicopter
Zimbabwe	27	none

Civilian Police Participation in Exercise Blue Crane

Mark Malan

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Introduction

From 18-28 April 1999, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the South African Police Services (SAPS) joined forces to host, on behalf of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordinating Organisation (SARPCCO), the CIVPOL component of the regional peacekeeping field exercise named Blue Crane. This followed a similar collaborative effort whereby the first United Nations Police Officers Course (UNPOC) to be presented to police men and women of the SADC countries was conducted at the South African Police Training College in Pretoria from 4-14 November 1998. Thirty-three students from 12 SADC countries graduated from the course, which was sponsored by the governments of Norway and Sweden.

Civilian police

Exercise Blue Crane

Planning During February 1999, the South African Department of Defence officially announced its intention of proceeding with the conduct of Exercise Blue Crane over the period 12-30 April 1999. The SANDF accordingly requested SAPS to reactivate planning for the civilian police component of this exercise. After consultation with the SARPCCO Secretariat, it was decided that the participants to the regional UNPOC conducted from 4-14 November 1998, should be recalled to complete the final practical phase of their training alongside the military in Blue Crane. This made good sense, especially in view of the late announcement by the military to postpone the exercise during 1998, and an equally late announcement to proceed with Blue Crane in April 1999.

Foreign trainers Virtually all the police officers that completed the regional UNPOC in November 1998 reported for the exercise, and deployed to the South African Army Battle School on 19 April 1999. Most of the foreign trainers involved in the regional UNPOC returned to South Africa to support the refresher training and field exercise, including officers from Canada, Ireland, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Commissioner Djim Biteye represented the United Nations Civilian Police Unit.¹ Norway and Sweden once again generously provided the necessary funding to make police participation in Blue Crane possible.

SARPCCO After refresher training from 20-21 April, the field exercise was conducted from 22-26 April. Although the exercise debrief was originally scheduled for 27 April, it was possible to conduct this in conjunction with the 'Visitors' Day' on 26 April, thus allowing all CIVPOL participants to depart Lohatla for Johannesburg on 27 April 1999. Participation in the field exercise was certified by SARPCCO, under the hand of Commissioner N.S. Moleboge of Botswana, in his capacity as current Chairman of SARPCCO. Commissioner Frank Msutu, who spent some time with the participants in the field, kindly presented the certificates on behalf of the Chairman.



Performances were analysed day-by-day, during lengthy debriefing sessions in which exercise control and umpires participated actively. The report which follows is based partly on observations made during the daily debriefs, and mainly on the final debrief during

Civilian Police Participation

which participants inputs were actively encouraged. Comments are arranged in the order that was adopted for the final exercise debrief, as follows:

- Call-up and joining instructions;
- Logistics;
- Refresher training;
- Exercise Control;
- Umpiring;
- CIVPOL Commissioner;
- Sector Commander;
- Local Commander; and
- Monitoring and Patrols.

This narrative is followed by a few general observations on the exercise environment, a brief conclusion, and a summary of main observations and recommendations for further action.

Evaluation According to Final Debrief

Call-up and joining instructions

Despite the late confirmation of the dates of Blue Crane, participants felt that they received their invitation and joining instructions in good time, and that the latter provided adequate information on what was expected of them during the field exercise. This aspect was facilitated by the creation of a participant list for the November 1998 UNPOC, and the ability of the ISS to target the relevant participants fairly directly, whilst copying invitations to the various diplomatic missions in Pretoria.

It was noted that ISS could act much quicker than national police agencies and SARPCCO to bring together participants from the region, and the suggestion was made that the Institute should continue to play this role. However, it is the Institute's view that responsibility for the coordination of regional training should devolve as rapidly as possible to SARPCCO and to host police agencies, and that the ISS should strive with the region for such an outcome. This sentiment was accepted by all, with the proviso that ISS should not prematurely

Final debrief



Joining instructions

Participants

Exercise Blue Crane

disengage from its involvement in establishing regional CIVPOL training capacity.

Logistics

All logistic arrangements (hotel, air travel, ground transport, allowances, etc.) contracted to civilian agents were concluded effectively. Once at the Army Battle School, however, CIVPOL became dependent upon the South African Army's support for such basics as shelter, water, food and sanitation. In addition, CIVPOL had to rely on the Army for radio communications and general office support.

Inhospitable environment



The result was that CIVPOL was confronted with a number of logistic problems soon after arrival at the Battle School, some of them real, and some of them exacerbated by a lowering of morale in the dusty and inhospitable environment. The food ration proved inadequate and unsuitable for the regional participants. The water supply was irregular, as was the availability of showers. The generator was unserviceable at times, leaving the bulk of participants without electric power and thus light. Radio communications often failed, due to faulty repeaters or merely a lack of electrical points to charge batteries, and there were no telephone lines for exercise purposes.

Although Blue Crane provided a good opportunity for participants to practice some basic map-reading and navigation, this aspect could not be emphasised due to the fact that the appropriate area maps were only obtained from the military shortly before the termination of the exercise.

Logistic support

Suffice it to say that the most serious logistic problems were overcome by the initiative and perseverance of a single SAPS sergeant who was assigned to support CIVPOL in the field. The clear lesson to be learned is that it is unwise to rely too heavily on the administrative and logistic support of an outside agency, and that the host police agency must make a far greater effort at logistic support for future exercises. The latter includes both the realm of equipment and sufficient trained support staff to back a field exercise.

On the other hand, regional participants should be psychologically

Civilian Police Participation

prepared for deployment situations where minimal support is available — either on missions or during future field exercises.

Transport to and from Lohatla, as well as during the exercise, was provided by private contractors, and no problems were experienced in this department. The availability of reliable, sufficient, and suitable vehicles enabled CIVPOL to deal with many of the logistic problems. This turned out to be essential to the success of the exercise.

Refresher training

Participants felt that the two-day refresher programme had been adequate and appropriate to prepare them for the field exercise.² Some of the umpires commented that the programme could have included a bit more practical work — such as simulating and coaching a few of the generic scenarios that were to be ‘thrown at’ participants during the field exercise.

It was felt that more emphasis is needed on the theory of diplomacy and the teaching of negotiation and mediation skills during the generic UNPOC. While these aspects are well-covered in the *UN CIVPOL Handbook*, some participants would have liked instruction on how to set up a functioning UN CIVPOL station. The latter need might also have been addressed by those who had recent station-level experience within their own police agencies, or could also have been addressed by asking umpires for assistance.

Perhaps more could have been done during refresher training to emphasise the transition from training course to field exercise, for there is a fundamental difference in approach to the two types of training endeavour. Insufficient attention was paid to explaining the limited role of exercise control, the style and format of umpiring, and just what was expected of participants at all levels, in terms of resourcefulness and initiative.

Exercise Control

Exercise control (Excon) for CIVPOL consisted essentially of three people: an Exercise Controller (SAPS), an Assistant (SAPS) and an independent observer/advisor (ISS). This team was responsible for

**Private
contractors**

**Refresher
programme**



**Exercise
control**

Exercise Blue Crane

designing and directing the flow of the exercise in close collaboration with the umpires, and in consultation with the military Excon. This task had to be accomplished, of course, within the broad parameters of the predominantly military exercise scenario for Naraland.

Host-country police

CIVPOL Excon was also responsible, in conjunction with the umpires, for coaching, briefing and activating the host-country police department, namely the NPD and for ensuring that other role-players (such as local population, refugees, etc.) provided by the military had been appropriately briefed for their tasks. The general aim of CIVPOL Excon was to schedule events in such a manner that participants mastered the basics of CIVPOL monitoring; were confronted by more and more complex situations up to a climax; and then were allowed to consolidate their work before exercise termination.



In general, CIVPOL Excon functioned more or less independently, with the aid of a military liaison officer. While some would have liked a closer integration of CIVPOL with overall (military) Excon, it was felt that this would have wasted time and scarce personnel in an environment geared to military events that differed fundamentally in nature and scope from those of CIVPOL.

While the above made a lot of practical sense, the impression was unfortunately created that CIVPOL was running its own exercise, independent of the military and to a large extent also from the other civilian actors. To be fair, this was not necessarily something that could have been prevented by CIVPOL Excon, and it has to be noted against the background of the broader civilian-military-police dynamics that prevailed during Exercise Blue Crane.³ Nevertheless, there were a few tactical exercise problems that may have been ameliorated through better integration at the Excon level.

Basic station routine

It was felt, for example, that participants were confronted with too many events, too early in the exercise. In other words, they were 'swamped' by a number of dramatic scenarios before having the chance to establish a basic station routine and communication and reporting procedures. Too many events were included in the original planning, and this was exacerbated by peripheral military and civilian

Civilian Police Participation

events (initiated by other Excon components) which demanded CIVPOL reaction and/or participation. The lesson for future exercises is to keep it simple during the start-up phase, and to allow space for unexpected events introduced by other players.

On the positive side, all agreed that the events were very realistic, and that the role-players provided by the SAPS and the South African Army did an excellent job. Their (sometimes robust) enthusiasm for the job was complemented by good cooperation with the CIVPOL umpires.

Umpiring

The CIVPOL umpires were all police officers with mission experience, and they got on exceptionally well together and with Excon and participants, as most had been trainers during the November 1998 regional UNPOC. Commissioner Biteye from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) was a new and welcome addition to this team, and soon fostered an excellent working relationship with his fellow umpires and participants. The goodwill that prevailed really held things together when participants were placed under increasing pressure by Excon and the umpires.

Such pressure can at times be a good thing, and the 'hands-on' nature of the umpiring certainly made participants aware of what it is like to be on the receiving end of a diligent monitoring action. On the other hand, there were also clear instances of 'over-umpiring' (for example, with three umpires critiquing and coaching one CIVPOL commander). This is not to say that there were too many umpires, for it was agreed that the number was about right — but the umpiring activities needed to be better coordinated.

Although there was an extensive daily debriefing session involving Excon and the umpires, this focussed mainly on the performance of participants and not enough on the general flow and coordination of the exercise — including the nature and style of umpiring. While the latter is obviously personality-related, an effort could have been made to apply a problem-solving approach to coaching, rather than more common pedantic methods. Once again, the specific roles and

Realistic



Over-umpiring

Exercise Blue Crane

expectations of umpires were never really spelled out from the outset — a lesson taken to heart by Excon.

Scheduled debriefings

While an inordinate amount of time was spent on daily debriefings at the Excon/umpire level, there was a lack of scheduled debriefings at the participant level. This can be partly attributed to pressures of time during the exercise (often compounded by logistic problems), and to the logic that too frequent debriefings would rob the exercise of continuity and realism. However, there was broad agreement that individual umpires could have conducted debriefs in situ with smaller groups of participants, and that the participants themselves, under supervision of key exercise CIVPOL personnel, could have also conducted their own daily debriefs on past performance and future challenges.

Finally, it was felt that the expertise provided by the umpires was indispensable to the success of the exercise. But the idea was mooted by the umpires themselves that the whole endeavour would have benefited from at least some experienced regional (rather than foreign) police officers in the roles of umpires and as participants.⁴ Indeed, a few experienced participants working alongside their colleagues and setting a good example would obviate the need for much of the coaching and training that had to be done by umpires during Blue Crane.

Operational and tactical levels

CIVPOL Commissioner

This section must be prefaced with the observation that the entire Exercise Blue Crane was designed (by the military) to exercise mission components at the operational and tactical levels — and not as an exercise for higher-level decision making at mission headquarters. The latter component was accommodated by the military as an appropriate prop for contextualising the work of the army battalions in the field. Rightly or wrongly, neither the exercise SRSG nor the Force Commander really stamped their authority on events — and the CIVPOL Commissioner did not fare any better in this environment. While the exercise CIVPOL Commissioner was the most senior participant and was selected because of previous mission experience, the comments that follow pertain to the office of the CIVPOL Commissioner, rather than the individual himself.

Civilian Police Participation

The office of the CIVPOL Commissioner never really established itself as a major component of Blue Crane. It was the last component to be set up at Mission HQ level, and was relegated to an insignificant location with insufficient resources to establish a well-functioning office.⁵ Neither the Commissioner's office nor Excon were very assertive in attempting to rectify this state of affairs, and CIVPOL was soon operating in the same fashion as the other mission components at the HQ level — much to the frustration of the umpires.⁶

There was no real, meaningful interaction between the SRSG, the Force Commander, and the CIVPOL Commissioner. Reporting of incidents and events upwards and downwards was often selective and distorted, if not outright fictitious. This was possible because the military Excon had Blue Crane virtually on 'auto pilot', which left the key figures at Mission HQ level free to muddle through with virtual impunity. As a result, little coaching and few corrective actions took place at this level — except for the CIVPOL Commissioner's office, which was the subject of continuous 'hands on' umpiring.

Because of the situation sketched above, umpiring at the higher level was often confrontational. Umpires felt that the Commissioner's office was being overwhelmed by the flow of information from the sector and local levels, that there was a lack of initiative and decisiveness, that personnel did not know how to use the CMOC,⁷ and that too many reports were fabricated rather than based on factual exercise incidents.

On the other hand, the recipients of this criticism felt that the umpires could have played a greater advisory and less judgmental role at this level, and that they could have been assisted more in integrating with the other mission components. All in all, the Mission HQ experience proved somewhat frustrating for both umpires and participants, and illustrated the need to promote and advance the role of CIVPOL in a much more assertive manner among the other mission components.

Sector Commander

Most of the observations made about Mission HQ pertain equally to the Sector level of Blue Crane. In addition, the Sector Commander's

Meaningful interaction



Overwhelmed



Sector level

Exercise Blue Crane

work was confounded by the fact that there was initially no CMOC established at the Sector level, which resulted in his office acting basically as a message relay between the local level and the CIVPOL Commissioner. By the time this issue had been resolved (two days into the exercise), Excon and the umpires had decided to move the Sector Commander and his assistant to Mission HQ in order to boost the dwindling morale and flagging capacity at this level.

The law of Murphy continued to operate, as the move had hardly been effected when it was announced that a CMOC had been created at Sector level. By this time, the Sector Commander had become the *de facto* assistant of the CIVPOL Commissioner, which had further robbed him of decisional powers and initiative.

Good spirit

Despite the obvious frustrations, the people involved at Sector and Mission HQ level reacted to events and umpiring in good spirit, and learned a lot in the process.



Local Commander

It was at the level of the local commander (responsible for the teams monitoring two local NPD police stations) that the majority of operational and tactical lessons were brought home. As reported under 'Exercise Control', the local commander was really thrown into the deep end and became bogged down by a multiplicity of challenging occurrences and events on the first day of the exercise. On the other hand, this situation did expose a tendency towards centralised authority and a lack of confidence in delegating responsibilities to other CIVPOL monitors.

Station level

Also mentioned previously is the lack of capacity to organise personnel and activities at the station level — a factor that led during the exercise to sub-optimal personnel utilisation (e.g. the untimely switching of personnel and consequent lack of continuity in engaging with NPD, too few people allocated for certain tasks and too many for others, etc.). Although such problems were addressed by the umpires, they may have been rectified more appropriately had daily debriefs been conducted at the level of the local commander.

Civilian Police Participation

Given the ‘events overload’, it was perhaps a natural mistake to concentrate on reporting the dramatic whilst neglecting to report the mundane but important factors bearing on the monitoring mission and the general security situation in Naraland. However, the flow of information from local level up to Mission HQ did improve over time, and the commander did manage to maintain contact with neighbouring ‘UN’ military forces through an appointed liaison officer.

All in all, the local commander displayed a great deal of resilience in dealing with multiple challenges to his authority, and it was perhaps he and those in his immediate vicinity that learned the most from the exercise.

Monitoring and Patrols

The CIVPOL monitors assigned to the NPD stations and those sent on patrols were obviously exposed to the most physical events ‘on the ground’, and it is here that a lot of satisfaction could be gained in terms of tactical lessons learned. Once again, ‘hands-on’ monitoring by dedicated umpires proved invaluable to the learning process. It was felt that, after some initial indecisiveness by the monitors, some real progress was made towards effective CIVPOL monitoring during the second half of the exercise.

Despite the fairly rugged terrain of Naraland, vehicle driving and safety were of a high standard throughout the exercise, with personnel and vehicles emerging unscathed at the end.⁹ The umpires were satisfied that all participants managed to master the essentials of CIVPOL reporting, within the limits posed by over-crowded radio channels, lack of telecommunications and an absence of any computerised systems.

A simplified system of hand-written reports and radio logs had been designed by CIVPOL Excon, and this functioned adequately under the circumstances. The most serious problem was the tendency to fabricate the content of reports (both to and from higher authority), rather than supplying the true facts of the various incidents. This can only be ascribed to the pervasive ‘exercise mentality’ and should not be a problem during an actual mission.

Local commander



Vehicle driving and safety

Exercise Blue Crane

The latter could also explain a number of other details that were noted about CIVPOL performance, such as lack of assertiveness and initiative, lack of sufficient concern for own safety, poor mine awareness, willingness to make false promises during negotiations, etc. It therefore serves little purpose to belabour such issues in this report, beyond addressing the broader theme of the exercise environment.

General Observations on Exercise Environment

Field exercises

The most pervasive sentiment articulated by the umpires during regular debriefs pertained to a general ‘lack of initiative and commitment’ to the task at hand by participants at all levels. This must be stated up-front, as it is in stark contrast to observations of enthusiasm and dedication made by the trainers of the same participants during the November 1998 UNPOC. Moreover, by attempting to explain this behavioural discrepancy, we may arrive at several valuable conclusions regarding this and future field exercises for regional police officers.

Sense of realism



It is clear that both participants and umpires were a bit taken aback by the stark surroundings of the Army Battle School and the spartan living conditions under which they operated. To be sure, most would have accepted this situation without hesitation if they were on a real mission (with a real mission service allowance) to fix a real criminal justice system in a real country. But the Naraland exercise scenario, with its insular location and absence of real population, did not succeed in injecting such a sense of realism into the exercise that senior police officers could accept their lot without voicing some dissatisfaction.

Support mechanisms

There was probably a far greater degree of perceived realism for the army troops in the field. They flew in by military transport to a strange environment and proceeded to do what the military does anywhere — to dig in, to train, and to follow orders without asking questions. To them it mattered little if they were in Naraland or Comoros, for the military unit has its own physical and psychological support

Civilian Police Participation

mechanisms which enable it to function efficiently anywhere. Not so the police, who are generally accustomed to living amongst some semblance of civil society, and whose support mechanisms function very differently from that of military units.

Without expanding further on the issue, Blue Crane provided a rather unreal environment for the CIVPOL component. It proved impossible for Excon and the umpires to counter this factor, despite their enthusiasm and dedication. Most umpires went to great lengths to explain that physical hardships go hand in hand with any CIVPOL mission. In fact, the harder the umpires and Excon worked, the more salient became the 'exercise mentality' among participants.

Thus, while the major rationale for conducting a regional CIVPOL field exercise was the proximity of some 4,000 troops and the opportunity to deploy in a joint civil-military venture, this factor also accounts for a great deal of the negative side of the CIVPOL exercise. Host police agencies (and donor countries) involved in future military field exercises therefore need to be far more assertive in defining the nature of the entire exercise, or to be far more autonomous in the design and implementation in the CIVPOL component thereof. Otherwise, it is better to contemplate the staging of a smaller, dedicated CIVPOL exercise during the early stages of regional capacity-building — one that would produce a much better return on investments in time and money.

In Blue Crane, we were too compliant with the military during the planning stages and only asserted a measure of autonomy when it was too late — when CIVPOL was already at the mercy of military bureaucracy.

Having said the above, there is one more point to be made on the nexus between reality and participant commitment. If the CIVPOL participants to Blue Crane had been earmarked by their respective governments for imminent deployment on an actual UN mission, they would have approached the field exercise with an earnestness that could not be engendered by the most creative of scenario writers and the most realistic of environments.

Unreal environment



Measure of autonomy

Exercise Blue Crane

Conclusion

Solid foundation



Exercise Blue Crane was preceded by a regional UNPOC that provided participants with a solid foundation of knowledge and the basic skills needed for a successful field exercise. However, this success could not be taken for granted, and the extra-regional umpires provided participants at all levels with constant advice and testing. This was essential, as the most salient observation by the trainers was that participants lacked assertiveness and initiative when dealing with exercise contingencies. Although taxing at times, both Exercise Control and the participants agreed that such coaching was most valuable.

Ideally, such coaching should have come from local umpires, but the region has thus far failed to deliver the kind of experienced personnel needed to guide the training and development of expert CIVPOL monitors. This stage can only be reached when the countries of the region become regular contributors of police officers to UN missions.

Hope for the future

It was reported earlier that during December 1998, all the SADC countries that participated in the regional UNPOC received a letter from UN Headquarters, requesting them to agree in principle to the contribution of their national police officers to UN missions.⁹ By April 1999, only Lesotho had replied in the positive, offering the services of the two officers who were trained in the regional UNPOC and who participated in Blue Crane. It is this humble but timely offer that provides hope for the future. We must encourage a similar spirit of commitment from the other nations of Southern Africa.

To this end, it is proposed that the ISS support SARPCCO and the SAPS in hosting a second UNPOC for Southern African countries towards the end of 1999. The aim of this course would be 'to train UN Police Officers from those SARPCCO members that have indicated a firm intention to supply the UN with mission-ready CIVPOL monitors'. The training faculty for such a course should include more regional police officers.¹⁰

This report has aimed at a factual and critical appraisal of CIVPOL

Civilian Police Participation

participation in Blue Crane. Such an approach is necessary, given the considerable investment made thus far in establishing international training standards for CIVPOL in the Southern African region. While the process can only be regarded as very successful, follow-on actions must be taken in order to consolidate these gains.

It is hoped that the regional police agencies will take up the challenge of supporting UN peace missions and, under the auspices of SARP-CCO, cooperate in the training of select police officers for such deployment. A further regional UNPOC, towards the end of 1999, will serve to cement the foundations that have been laid through the entire process of preparation for and participation in Blue Crane.

Summary of Main Observations and Recommendations

ISS should withdraw as soon as practicable from a training coordination role and leave this to the appropriate agency (SARPCCO), but not before this agency is fully prepared to assume such a role, or the whole UNPOC/CIVPOL development process for Southern Africa could be jeopardised.

More emphasis should be placed on 'Diplomacy and Negotiation Skills' in the training of potential CIVPOL participants. This may assist in eradicating the 'lack of assertiveness and initiative' noted in the Blue Crane participants, as they would have the skills and hence the confidence to take action.

If joint military/police exercises are to be held in future, there must indeed be better integration of these units in order that the exercise be truly productive.

More frequent debriefing of participants, even post incident, is necessary to reinforce correct behaviour and to rectify deficiencies.

Regional trainers/umpires should participate to bring credibility to the programme, as soon as such a capacity has been built.

Training

Coordination role



Joint military/police exercises

Credibility

Exercise Blue Crane

From a functional perspective, separate CIVPOL exercises may well be more productive and cost efficient than participation in predominantly military such as Blue Crane.

Role and functions of CIVPOL

There is a need for greater military awareness of the role and functions of CIVPOL. This aspect should be covered in sufficient detail in peacekeeping courses presented at the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre and in peacekeeping courses presented at the various national command and staff colleges.



Candidates for any future Regional UN Police Officers Courses should be selected from countries 'committed' to CIVPOL participation. The capacity must not just be built, but utilised, or precious resources will be wasted and 'donor fatigue' will surely result.

Endnotes

- 1 See Annexure D for a comprehensive list of CIVPOL participants in Exercise Blue Crane.
- 2 See Annexure E for the Refresher Training Programme.
- 3 Without going into too much detail, the military obviously dominated the show, whilst the 'pecking order' for other mission elements was determined by who was at Lohatla first and who could push their own agenda most aggressively with the key military organisers. The CIVPOL component was very task-oriented, and did not play this game very well.
- 4 Such experience should ideally be gained through participation in UN missions. Additionally, Norway and Sweden have offered berths on their UNPOC for participants from the SADC countries. With a strong 'train the trainer' approach, these courses provide Southern Africa with the opportunity for establishing additional teaching capacity.
- 5 The Commissioner was allocated an obscure, unmarked tent with two tables and two chairs. This was in sharp contrast to the central location of the Force Commander office, which was extremely well equipped and co-located with that of the SRSG in a permanent building that functioned as the locus of activity at Mission HQ level.
- 6 In fairness, once again, it must be noted that strong protest from CIVPOL probably would not have made much difference to the organisational dynamics, and may quite easily have placed unnecessary strain on real-time military-police relations. The argument raised by one civilian observer – that CIVPOL should

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- have deployed to Lohatla earlier to 'integrate with the other mission components' – is also overly simplistic, in that it ignores issues of time and cost verses perceived benefit.
- 7 Civilian-Military Operations Centre. Once functioning fairly well, and 'discovered' by CIVPOL, the exercise provided a good learning experience for representatives from all the mission components.
 - 8 It is regrettable to report one non-vehicle related injury. On 23 April 1999, Inspector Thadeo Malungumu (Tanzania) was injured during one of the CIVPOL main events that involved some rough role-play. This resulted in a pinched brachial nerve and the temporary loss of some mobility of the left shoulder and hand. Inspt. Malungumu was treated at the local medical station, before being evacuated by air on 25 April to I Military Hospital, Pretoria, for further tests and therapy.
 - 9 With the exception of Zambia and Zimbabwe. These two countries did not receive such a letter of request, because they were contributing CIVPOL monitors to the UN mission in Angola at the time of the UNHQ request.
 - 10 Interest has been expressed in inviting select 'Blue Crane graduates' to participate as trainers in a Norwegian UNPOC scheduled for October 1999. Such participation would contribute to the establishment of a core of competent local trainers with international exposure.

Civilian Participation in Exercise Blue Crane

Cedric de Coning

Cedric de Coning designed and coordinated the civilian aspects for Exercise Blue Crane as the Civilian Exercise Controller. He is Assistant Director and Programme Manager, Peacekeeping at ACCORD.



Exercise Blue Crane was a SADC peacekeeping exercise hosted by South Africa during April 1999. It was the first time in southern Africa – and the first time in Africa – that a peacekeeping exercise included a significant civilian role.

The Peacekeeping Programme at ACCORD, which is part of the Norwegian funded Training for Peace in Southern Africa Project, designed, planned and coordinated the civilian aspects of the exercise.

The objective was to design the civilian participation in Exercise Blue Crane in such a way that both the civilian and military participants would:

- develop an understanding of each other's roles and mandates;
- develop an understanding of the need for joint problem solving and joint initiatives;

Civilian roles

Understanding roles

Exercise Blue Crane



- develop an understanding of the need to exchange information and create liaison channels at all levels; and
- develop an understanding of the need for holistic management of the overall mission.

From a civilian point of view, the exercise did not focus too much on the technical procedures and techniques it would apply in such situations. Instead, the focus was on the coordination and liaison with the other mission components. The technical procedures vary little, whether there is a peacekeeping mission or not. For example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will carry out its normal tasks *vis-a-vis* refugees, regardless of whether there is a peacekeeping operation or not. The difference is that when specialised civilian agencies become part of a larger peacekeeping mission, the need arises to coordinate activities, exchange information and establish liaison channels at all levels. The focus for the civilian participants in Exercise Blue Crane was on the latter aspect.

Integrated mission management

Measured against these objectives, the exercise was a success. The participants who had the opportunity to interact, developed a greater understanding of each other's roles and mandates; of the need to coordinate and exchange information; and the need for a joint and integrated mission management system. Various lessons were learned in the process, and the purpose of this Blue Crane report is to capture those lessons in a format that would make them user-friendly for the planning and execution of future peacekeeping exercises and operations.

Civilian component



The civilian component was designed to reflect a UN led peacekeeping mission, with UN humanitarian and human rights actors. It also included parallel missions, such as an OAU Observer Mission and a SADC-HROG. In addition, it included the ICRC and a number of NGOs. The media was included under the civilian component to perform the dual function of simulated press for exercise purposes, together with their normal real-time media responsibilities. These various civilian roles were simulated by diplomats from most SADC countries, or were performed by real-time UN, OAU, ICRC and NGO personnel.

Civilian Participation

In order to reflect on the various elements of the civilian participation in Exercise Blue Crane, the report will be sub-divided into the following sections:

- Preparation and Planning;
- In-Mission Training and Integration;
- The Role of the SRSG and his Office;
- Humanitarian Actors;
- Human Rights Actors;
- The OAU Observer Mission in Naraland;
- The International Committee of the Red Cross;
- Simulated press/Media;
- The MCOC (Mission Coordination Center); and
- International Advisors.

(See Annexure F for Civil-Military Coordination Session)



Preparation and Planning

Planning for Exercise Blue Crane started in December 1997. In February 1998, the first SADC Planning Conference was held in Pretoria and included some civilian observers: for example, the ICRC. ACCORD approached the SANDF in March 1998, and proposed that the exercise be designed to include a significant civilian component. The reasoning was that the various civilian actors play an increasingly important role in modern peacekeeping missions, and that an exercise of this nature would benefit from reflecting that reality as closely as possible. The SANDF accepted the proposal and tasked ACCORD with the responsibility of designing the civilian component, integrating it into the rest of the exercise, as well as coordinating the civilian activities during the exercise. ACCORD's role in this regard was approved and confirmed at the next SADC Planning Conference.

By June 1998, when ACCORD joined the planning process, the background scenario and most of the basic planning were in place. The planners were able to make changes to some aspects of the scenario to accommodate the needs of the civilian actors. For example, the UNHCR needed the scenario to be changed to make provision for

**Significant
civilian
component**

Exercise Blue Crane

refugees. In general, however, it was difficult to influence a planning process that had already started.

Civilian actors should be identified and integrated into the planning process as early as possible.

Full participants

It was a key objective for ACCORD to achieve a situation where the civilians were recognised as full participants in the exercise, as opposed to being merely props for the military exercise. This was achieved, to a large degree, at the Mission and Sector Headquarter levels. However, there is ample room for improvement at the tactical level.

Civilians should be full participants, not only props for the military component. This implies full participation in the preparation and planning process as an equal partner.

The civilian aspect of the Blue Crane planning process was perhaps unique, in that an NGO was tasked to coordinate the civilian participation in the exercise. In most other exercises that involved a significant civilian component (for example, the Nordic Peace exercises) the planning was done by the military, and the civilians were integrated through a civil-military liaison cell that exchanged information with the various civilian actors. The result was that the civilian participation fell under the CIMIC aspect of the military planning process, and the civilian actors did not coordinate amongst themselves until a very late stage in the planning process. In the Blue Crane scenario, the civilian participants interacted with the military as a consolidated group with one focus point. One of the advantages of this approach was that the already overburdened military planners were relieved of the added responsibility of planning and coordinating the civilian aspects. A weakness of this approach was that an NGO was given the responsibility to coordinate a range of actors, which included SADC member states and UN agencies. In future, and as SADC governmental institutions develop capacity in the peacekeeping field, this role could perhaps best be fulfilled by the Foreign Ministry of the host country, or by the responsible unit of a future SADC Organ. Nevertheless, the interaction and collaboration that

Civilian Participation

took place served as an example for all of how governments and NGOs can work together to achieve common goals.

Blue Crane has shown that civilian participation can and should be a free-standing, equal, independent component in the overall exercise — not a mere sub-product of the military planning process that falls under the CIMIC or Civil Affairs planning cell.

Civilian participation can be facilitated by having a single focal point to coordinate and represent the various civilian participants.

In the run-up to Exercise Blue Crane, ACCORD identified and contacted the various civilian actors. ACCORD met with the ICRC and the UNHCR, and both these organisations took part in some of the planning meetings and conferences. Most other participants were briefed and consulted throughout the process via e-mail and telephone contact. Approximately one month prior to the exercise, a meeting was held with the ICRC and the various UN agencies present in South Africa, to brief them on the state of planning at that stage. Approximately three months prior to the exercise, a similar briefing was held with all the SADC embassies in Pretoria. In hindsight, these meetings should have been held earlier and more frequently. The planning process would have benefited from a civilian planning committee made up of all the key players. Such a committee could have had a positive influence on the planning process, in that the planning would have been more representative, would have benefited from a wider pool of experience and creativity, and would have generated wider ownership of the planning process among the civilians participants. This is especially true for key individuals, such as the SRSG, who should have been brought into the planning process as early as possible.

The various civilian participants and components should be brought together as early and as regularly as possible in the process.

A civilian planning committee, comprising key actors such as the SRSG, the UN lead agency and various components (humanitarian, human rights, etc.) should be established as early as possible.

**Single focal
point**



**Civilian
planning
committee**

Exercise Blue Crane

Exercise Blue Crane, and most peacekeeping exercises of this nature, was a military initiative. The SADC defence forces decided that such an exercise needed to be held and South Africa was designated to host the exercise. As a result, the SANDF was the key organiser, planner and host of the exercise. As indicated above, ACCORD became involved only approximately one-third along the process, when it was tasked with the responsibility of coordinating the civilian participants. One of the important realities of this situation was that the SANDF was, at the end of the day, responsible for the budget and fundraising of the exercise. Although ACCORD, through the Training for Peace in Southern Africa Project, covered the cost of its own planning role and the costs associated with bringing the civilian participants to the exercise, all the in-exercise costs, such as accommodation, food, daily allowance, materials and transport, was provided by the SANDF and covered under the general Blue Crane budget. This implied that the civilians were, in essence, the guests of the SANDF, with direct consequences on the ability of the civilian component to influence decisions and otherwise impact on the overall exercise.



Financially independent

The civilian component should be as financially independent as possible. Its equality, status, freedom of movement and ability to impact on the other components of the exercise is directly related to the resources under its control.

The preparations included a peacekeeping training workshop for South African participants in August 1998, a peacekeeping workshop in April 1999 for the instructors at the SA Army Battle School where the exercise was held, and an 'in-mission' Civil-Military Coordination Seminar immediately prior to exercise.

Professional training

Professional training of the civilian participants is crucial to the success of the exercise. The various civilian participants should undergo general peacekeeping training prior to the exercise, and mission (exercise) specific training immediately prior to, or during the 'in-mission' (exercise) training phase.

The civilian training should be specialised (for example, human rights observers, where relevant) and multidimensional. In other

Civilian Participation

words, exposure to all the various components and disciplines in modern peacekeeping. This kind of training is best done in a learning environment where soldiers, police and civilians are trained together.

Civil-Military Liaison Seminar (Pre-exercise Briefing Seminar)

The Civil-Military Liaison Seminar (see Annexure G for programme) was held from 18-20 April at the SA Army Battle School. The CIMIC Seminar was intended to:

- Integrate the civil and military participants;
- Clarify the multidisciplinary nature and roles within the UNMIN; and
- Brief the participants on the exercise scenario, structures and procedures.

The participants in the seminar included all the civilian participants, representatives from the international military advisors group, selected senior military officers from the mission headquarters staff, representatives from the umpiring and exercise control organisations and legal officers, as well as officers from the military health services. From time to time ad-hoc groups joined the seminar. For example, a group of military observers attended a lecture on the role of UN military observers.

In order to integrate the civil and military participants, presentations were given on the various multifunctional roles within UN peacekeeping missions, as well as in Exercise Blue Crane. They included the SRSG and his staff, UN agencies, the military, civilian police, military observers, human rights observers, the ICRC and NGOs. The CIMIC Seminar also served as an opportunity for the various participants to get to know each other better on an individual basis prior to the start of the actual exercise. Time was also spent familiarising the civilian participants (the military participants had similar briefings during their in-deployment training phase) with the exercise scenario, UNMIN mission plan, and exercise procedures and structures.

CIMIC Seminar



Multifunctional roles

Exercise Blue Crane



The CIMIC Seminar played a crucial role in integrating the civilian participants in the exercise. Although the seminar also contributed to introducing and familiarising some of the military participants to the civilian participants (and their roles in the exercise), it was felt that the latter objective was not fully achieved, as most of the crucial military players had other pressing responsibilities in the last few days before the exercise. Many of them did not have the time and opportunity to participate in the CIMIC Seminar. Similarly, the deployment and schedule of the CIVPOL group prevented them from being represented at the CIMIC Seminar. As a result, it took longer than would otherwise have been necessary to integrate the CIVPOL and military elements into the exercise, and to achieve overall unity of effort.

Unity of effort

Some form of combined civil-military-CIVPOL ‘in-mission’ training seminar is crucial in achieving overall unity of effort. It is also necessary to ensure that the first hours and days of exercise time are not used to familiarise the various elements with each other and the exercise scenario.

Deployment

In order to integrate the civilian, military and police elements prior to the start of the exercise, their deployment should be coordinated so that they are all in-theatre together a couple of days before the start of the exercise.

Care should be taken to select those soldiers, police and civilians who need to work together, including the various leader groups — and their respective programmes should be freed-up to allow them to attend such a seminar as a matter of priority.

Joint ownership

Such a seminar should not be organised and hosted by one element (in this case the civilian participants), but by all the elements together so as to ensure joint ownership. Such a seminar is probably best hosted by the SRSG, the Force Commander, CIVPOL Commissioner and other Mission Headquarter staff as a kind of combined strategic planning session where each element briefs the other on its objectives, activities, deployment, etc.

Civilian Participation

Special Representative of the Secretary General & Staff

The highest management level, for the purposes of Exercise Blue Crane, was the Mission HQ under the leadership of a SRSG. The Mission Headquarters included the Force Commander, the CIVPOL Commissioner, the Chief Military Observer, the Chief Administrative Officer and the Humanitarian Coordinator. The role of the SRSG was carried out by H.E. A.A. Panguene, the High Commissioner of Mozambique in South Africa.

His staff included a Deputy SRSG, a personal assistant, a spokesperson and liaison officers to the the MCOC, as well as the maritime sector. All these roles were performed by SADC diplomats.

The focus of the exercise was on the tactical execution of incidents. To a large degree, the role of the SRSG and his staff was symbolic, in that it provided the civilian, CIVPOL, military observers and UN force with an ultimate political authority to whom issues could be referred for decision making. In an exercise of this nature, the incidents and flow of events are pre-planned. Consequently, there is little scope for creative decision making at the Mission HQ level. This can be frustrating for the SRSG, the Force Commander and others, who sometimes feel more like actors who perform according to a prepared script, rather than decision-makers in their own right.

The SRSG and other senior personnel are usually people who are in senior positions, with high demands on their time. They are used to being 'in-charge.' As a result, it can be very frustrating for them to feel that they are sitting around with free time, instead of actually managing the situation as they are used to. This feeling can be further aggravated in an exercise setting where the SRSG would probably have quite a bit of free time in-between negotiations and mission management meetings, so as to allow time for the implementation of decisions thus reached, without the normal routine office functions in-between that would normally fill the remainder of the day.

One way in which this situation can be alleviated is to select experienced, but retired personnel who would have more time to devote to

Mission Headquarters

SADC diplomats

Managing the situation



Exercise Blue Crane

Exposure and training

such an effort. At the same time, however, one should not ignore the exposure and 'training' that senior SADC diplomats can gain from being part of such a peacekeeping exercise. Such exposure can certainly add to a senior diplomats preparation for a future SRSG-type role. The SRSG should also be prepared for quite a bit of 'acting and role-play,' as most of his/her time would probably be taken up with simulated negotiations with leaders of the various factions, as well as mission management meetings, press conferences and other activities.

The SRSG and other senior personnel should be properly briefed on their 'limited' role, so as to avoid frustration.

At the same time, their presence is crucial to the overall reality of the exercise. It is important for all the participants (for instance, for troops at a check-point) to see the SRSG negotiating with the rebel leaders. This would give those soldiers a more holistic understanding of their role within the overall mission effort. Another way in which the SRSG and other senior staff can be given more ownership of the exercise, would be to involve them in the planning of the exercise at an early stage in the process. In that way, the planners can benefit from the SRSG's experience, and at the same time, he/she would obtain insight into the overall exercise, as well as a better understanding of his/her role in the overall process. This is probably true for all the senior personnel, such as the Force Commander, CIVPOL Commissioner, etc.

Involve the SRSG in the planning process as early as possible.

Perception

In Exercise Blue Crane the civilian participants, including the SRSG and his staff, arrived much later than the military participants. Consequently, the Mission HQ complex was already occupied by the military. The result was that the Mission HQ and its facilities, such as photocopying machines, computers, printers and telephone, were seen as being under the control of the military. This added to the overall perception that the civilians were dependent on the military.

As far as possible, the office of the SRSG and its staff should have their own resources, facilities and support staff.

Civilian Participation

The SRSG and his staff met each other for the first time at the exercise, and as the first days were used for the CIMIC Seminar, they literally only had one day to establish their office, decide on a division of work and the allocation of tasks. Most of this time was taken up with putting the necessary physical infrastructure (tables, chairs, electricity) in place.

It would be useful for the SRSG and his staff to meet before the exercise starts, possibly as soon after their deployment as possible, to plan how the office will work and to ensure that all the facilities they need are in place. At the same time, it would be important for the staff of the SRSG (for example, his spokesperson) to familiarise themselves and coordinate with the other role players they would have to work with. For example, with others who act as spokespersons for the military, CIVPOL and/or the various UN agencies.

The Humanitarian Dimension

The humanitarian dimension is one of the most crucial elements in most modern peacekeeping missions. It is the dimension where most civilians in peacekeeping missions would be found, and one of the key areas for civil-military coordination. Humanitarian actors can be divided in three categories, namely: the UN agencies, such as the UNHCR and the World Food Programme; governmental aid agencies, such as The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA); and NGOs, such as OXFAM, Christian Action for Research and Education (CARE) and Save the Children. During a peacekeeping mission, the various UN agencies would normally decide on a UN Lead Agency, most often the UNHCR. The Lead Agency would be responsible for coordinating the other agencies and would also represent the humanitarian dimension of the UN mission HQ. Lately, in situations where the UN had a resident representative – normally the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) representative – who would be in place before a peacekeeping operation was launched,

Civil-military coordination



Exercise Blue Crane

the UN resident representative has become the Deputy SRSG. This ensures continuity within the UN system and links the peacekeeping mission to the UN presence, both before and after its existence. The UNDP resident representative is also normally an experienced senior manager who knows the UN system very well. Consequently, he/she is in a good position to assist the SRSG, who is normally chosen for his diplomatic skills.

Humanitarian representative

In Exercise Blue Crane the UNHCR was the UN Lead Agency, and the UNHCR representative, Mr. Cosmos Chanda, was the humanitarian representative at the UN mission HQ. The World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) had to withdraw their participation at the last moment, due to the unfolding crises in Kosovo. We also had the ICRC, and the work of humanitarian NGOs were simulated by a small number of students and SADC diplomats.

In future more time and effort should be invested in the training of humanitarian personnel prior to their deployment in conflict situations. If better planned and coordinated, their participation in field exercises of this nature could become an important aspect of their practical training and preparation.



Humanitarian tasks

Although the humanitarian dimension is represented by a large number of civilians and considerable resources in the real world, it can be simulated by relatively few people in an exercise of this nature, where the emphasis is on coordination. In the humanitarian field, like in most others, coordination takes place on three levels, namely on strategic, operational and tactical levels. The strategic level (in other words, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), UN HQ, and donor pledging conferences) was not simulated – only presumed – in Exercise Blue Crane. The UNSC Resolution that established the UNMIN set out specific humanitarian tasks and authorised the UN force to create a safe environment in which these humanitarian tasks could be executed. The operational level was represented by decision making at the Mission HQ level, as well as coordination through the MCOC. As the MCOC did more than just humanitarian

Civilian Participation

coordination, there is a separate section on the MCOC below. This section deals more with the tactical level.

In Exercise Blue Crane, we basically simulated two key humanitarian tasks, namely emergency food relief delivered via road by WFP convoys, and the protection and care of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) by the UNHCR. A refugee camp was established at Malansrus and an IDP camp was erected at Mount Huxley. Daily food convoys travelled from the main airport at Dippies to the two camps using different routes.

Again, the emphasis from a civilian perspective was on coordination. It was not the UNHCR's intention, for instance, to exercise how to manage a refugee camp. The emphasis was on how to coordinate their work with the military, civilian police and other civilian elements of the mission. Consequently, most of the incidents simulated were designed to focus on situations where the UN force (or CIVPOL monitoring the local police) would assist the UNHCR with security incidents at refugee and IDP camps. These incidents could include rioting, the search for weapons, separating combatants from civilian refugees and how to deal with a refugee or IDP camp if it came under attack.

However, the emphasis on security incidents was sometimes frustrating for the UNHCR personnel, as they did little of the routine work they would normally do, such as the registration of new refugees. At times, they felt they were only there as props for the military. One of the problems was that the UN force, CIVPOL and refugees/IDPs stayed close to the camps, while the civilians only came to the camps for the incidents. This was because it was logistically more problematic to house and feed the civilian participants in the field. The ideal would have been for the refugees/IDPs to stay in the camps, together with the UN and NGO relief personnel. This would have allowed more routine activities to be carried out between security incidents. However, the latter would require the temporary establishment of a refugee/IDP camp, complete with tents, ablution facilities and a field kitchen, which can only happen at considerable cost.

Security incidents

Exercise Blue Crane

Intensity and frequency of incidents

One of the problems with exercises of this nature is that the intensity and frequency of incidents are unrealistic, but necessary, taking into account the time constraints and cost. Civilian participants need to be properly briefed on the type, intensity and frequency of incidents so that they are not frustrated by the unrealistic ‘fast-forward’ way in which events have to unfold in the exercise timeframe.

The possibility of simulating a more realistic refugee/IDP camp should be seriously considered in future exercises. To warrant the cost, relief agencies could use it to train their staff, which would imply much better planning and preparation, as well as a much larger civilian effort. Nevertheless, this could be a very worthwhile idea to pursue.

Although the WFP had to withdraw, it was felt that simulating escorting duties for food convoys was a very important aspect to practice, and it therefore continued to take place. UNHCR personnel, assisted by NGO staff and SADC diplomats, simulated WFP personnel and humanitarian relief NGOs. The food convoys, and their escorts, were exposed to various situations, such as having to negotiate their way through belligerent roadblocks, coming under attack, mine incidents, sniper attacks and medical evaluations.

Food convoys

Food convoys and escort duties are such crucial peacekeeping activities, that more should be exposed to it. More convoys, with more incidents – including routine incidents such as vehicle breakdown (to decide whether to leave a vehicle behind or to hold-up the hold convoy) – should be included.

Visual realism

Where possible, the trucks should be civilian or painted white to be more realistic. The lasting educational impact of visual realism should not be underestimated.

The humanitarian dimension was a crucial element in the overall success of Exercise Blue Crane, and it would have to be one of the most important civilian elements in any future peacekeeping field exercises of this nature.

Civilian Participation

The humanitarian dimension is crucial to the overall success of the exercise. Special effort should be invested in the planning and integration of this element into the overall exercise.

The Human Rights Dimension

The human rights dimension of the exercise was not planned from the beginning. Apart from providing for a SADC-HROG, no detailed planning was done as to how that observer group would integrate with the larger mission, and no preparation was undertaken to prepare a legal basis for the human rights dimension.

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

Expert advice became available only after the UN established a southern Africa regional office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Unfortunately, it was too late in the planning process to amend the basic scenario, Security Council Resolution and Main Events List. However, Mr. David Johnson, head of the regional office, was able to draft additional documents, such as a Security Council Resolution, which added a human rights mandate to the exercise and created the legal basis upon which the human rights activities could be based.

The human rights dimension should be incorporated from the beginning of the planning process, and human rights specialists should form part of the planning process from the outset.

The UN Security Council Resolution and other exercise material should provide for all the exercise elements, including the humanitarian and human rights aspects.

Again, if more time were available it would have been preferable to include a UN-HROG to the UN mission profile. Ideally, a human rights representative should also be included at the UN Mission HQ

Legal basis

Human rights mandate



Human rights representative

Exercise Blue Crane

level. However, in Exercise Blue Crane we added a UN human rights advisor as a special advisor to both the SRSG and SADC-HROG.

SADC Human Rights Observer Group

It was crucial to include a human rights actor in the exercise scenario. The need to add a human rights actor – combined with the wish to simulate different missions with different mandates, reporting to different higher authorities – resulted in the establishment of the SADC-HROG. In the exercise scenario, the SADC-HROG was established by SADC and mandated to monitor the human rights situation in Naraland. This group was also required to report regularly on the human rights situation to the SADC chairman.

SADC has not launched missions of this nature to date (except for Election Monitoring Missions) and it was hoped that by having such a mission in the exercise, SADC would be encouraged to also utilise missions of this nature in its repertoire of tools.

The SADC diplomats who were assigned to the SADC-HROG did not have previous exposure to human rights observer missions, but they had some exposure to what is expected of human rights observers during the Civil-Military Liaison Seminar, and were also assisted by the expert advisor from the UNHCR.

Basic human rights training

In future exercises, the human rights observers should ideally be people who already underwent some basic human rights training and who are interested in performing observer duties in real situations. In this way, these field exercises can form the practical part of their training and preparation.

Non-Governmental Organisations

Human rights NGOs

Human rights NGOs play a crucial role in the delivery of human rights programmes in the field, whether that is done through education and training, observation and monitoring, and/or advocacy. To simulate

Civilian Participation

this aspect, an African human rights NGO, AFRONET, was invited to participate in the exercise.

Unfortunately, their participation was also not included early enough in the planning process to have integrated them into the scenario and/or Main Events List. However, their presence assisted in making the other actors aware of the work the human rights NGOs conduct in the field.

The two AFRONET representatives, and most of the other NGO and university representatives, participated in the actual exercise by being allocated to the UNHCR, food convoys and/or the SADC-HROG. This provided them with a broad introduction to peacekeeping and gave them the opportunity to learn from those institutions they were assigned to.

Human Rights NGOs, especially those involved in monitoring and research from an advocacy perspective (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc.), are normally even more independent than NGOs involved in Human Rights education on behalf of UN agencies. However, in an exercise situation, roles and incidents have to be pre-planned. Special care needs to be given to the realistic representation of these roles within the constraints of an exercise environment.

Most NGOs have limited resources. At the same time, it is unrealistic for such NGOs to be dependent on vehicles and other resources provided by the military. Special thought should be given to how NGO participation in these exercises can be funded and resourced.

Normal human rights observer duties, such as interviewing alleged human rights victims, are very difficult to simulate in a field exercise of this nature. Again, in Exercise Blue Crane, the emphasis was on the coordination and – in the case of the human rights dimension – education of the other mission elements as to the importance of the human rights dimension, which is a crucial element in the overall holistic mission design.

**Limited
resources**

**Overall holistic
mission design**

Exercise Blue Crane


It would be possible (and desirable) to incorporate practical training of human rights observers in peacekeeping field exercises of this nature, but that would require early planning and coordination with those active in the human rights training field. Separate funding for the human rights aspect of the exercise would also be preferable.

At the same time, care should be taken to incorporate the human rights dimension into all aspects of the peacekeeping mission, both in terms of the planning process, and in terms of reporting and representing mission structures during the exercise.

OAU Observer Mission

Key role An OAUMIN was included in the exercise scenario to highlight the central role the OAU should play in peacekeeping and conflict management in Africa. The addition of an OAU observer mission could further simulate a situation where there is more than one mission in the field which needs to be coordinated. Another important consideration is that it served to introduce the concept of civilian missions to the OAU, as well as other regional and sub-regional organisations.

The OAUMIN scenario provided for a mandate by the OAU's Central Organ to monitor the political process. In other words, the implementation of the Treaty of Windhoek. The UN mandate refers to a request from the OAU and SADC that a peacekeeping force be deployed. The OAU also played a key role in the negotiations that led to the signing of the Treaty of Windhoek, and hence the observer mission to monitor its implementation.



The OAU was invited to send a representative to lead the OAU mission, while the rest of the OAU team was staffed by SADC diplomats.

The OAU should perform a crucial role in peacekeeping in Africa and it is recommended that they be included as observers in any future exercises.

International Committee of the Red Cross


The ICRC was part of the planning process from the beginning, and was also a key participant in Exercise Blue Hungwe in Zimbabwe in 1997. As a result, there was ample time to include the ICRC in the planning process and scenario. The ICRC had the opportunity to explain their role and function to the Blue Crane planning committee. Consequently, several activities normally carried out by the ICRC in conflict situations, were included in the Main Events List. The ICRC was also able to bring their own resources to the exercise, such as a vehicle and communications equipment. The ICRC also played a role in training the military participants in the law of armed conflict. This training took place during the leader group training phase and at the ACCORD Blue Crane Peacekeeping Training Workshop. Overall, the ICRC participation in Exercise Blue Crane was a good example of how a civilian role player can be integrated into a peacekeeping field exercise.

From a mission coordination point of view, the ICRC's very unique mandate, together with a focus on its own neutrality, place it in a category of its own. At the same time, it is very important for the mission to coordinate and cooperate with the ICRC, as their special services may be needed from time to time. It is thus important for both the military, police and other civilian players to develop an understanding of the ICRC's mandate, and how cooperation and coordination can take place within the constraints that their special position place on the relationship. By developing this understanding in an exercise environment, many crucial hours and days can be saved in a real peacekeeping operation.

The ICRC is a crucial role player for any peacekeeping exercise and should be included in the planning process as early as possible.

The ICRC should be used to brief and train the leader group, legal officers and all other relevant groups on International Humanitarian Law (Law of Armed Conflict).

Law of armed conflict



Brief and train


Exercise Blue Crane

The Mission Coordination Centre

Central clearing-house

The MCOC was created at Mission Headquarters level to act as a central clearing-house for the various elements of the UN mission. It was established as a point of contact for all the non-UN actors in Naraland. It was modelled along the lines of a, but differed in that it was not intended to only coordinate between the military and other elements. Instead, it coordinated among all the mission elements equally, under the auspices of the SRSG.

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)



Initially, it was planned that the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) would act as the facilitator of the MCOC. Unfortunately, OCHA had to withdraw their participation at the last moment because of the unfolding crisis in Kosovo, and the responsibility for coordination shifted to the UN lead agency, the UNHCR. The resources necessary to run the MCOC were provided by the force, and included the physical structure (tent); furniture; stationary; telephone communication with the rest of the UN mission; radio communication among all the civilian elements and the MCOC; as well as vehicles and drivers. Liaison officers from the various UNMIN components staffed the MCOC.

The MCOC was established as an operations room, where all the various components of the mission were represented. In other words, the Office of the SRSG, the Force HQ, the CIVPOL HQ and the UNHCR. In addition, the MCOC served as the primary point of contact for the UNMIN and the various non-UN actors, such as the OAUMIN, the SADC-HROG, AFRONET, the ICRC and other NGOs. All these players had direct radio communication with the MCOC, and when personnel strength allowed, had at least one liaison officer placed at the MCOC.

CIMIC liaison officers

Unfortunately, the CIMIC concept was brought into the planning process so late that it was no longer possible to amend the various headquarters (mission, sectors, battalions) to include CIMIC liaison officers. The result was that some officers, usually the operations officer or his deputy, had to double as the CIMIC officer too. None of these officers had training in CIMIC, and the only place where this

Civilian Participation


really worked was at the Mission HQ level. However, even at Mission HQ the deputy operations officer who was designated as the CIMIC Officer had to continue to perform his normal operations duties. Consequently, he was faced with an abnormal workload. It also took him a couple of days to understand his duty and function. As a result, very little information flowed from the military to the MCOC.

The CIMIC concept needs to be introduced in SADC (and Africa in general), and SOPs need to be amended to include CIMIC officers, CIMIC structures and CIMIC procedures.

CIMIC needs to be included in the region's peacekeeping training curricula, and CIMIC specialists need to be trained in SADC and abroad.

Although the need to coordinate is acknowledged, most coordination in modern peacekeeping missions have taken place either between the military and others (concept in Somalia and former Yugoslavia), or among the humanitarian agencies (Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC), etc.) themselves. To date, there has been no formal coordinating mechanism established for UN (or other) peacekeeping missions, where all the various mission elements come together in a joint operations room setting. The MCOC was an attempt to experiment with such a joint operations centre. Firstly, it had to develop its own SOPs, communication methods and staffing structures. All of this had to happen during the first hours and days of a four day exercise. At the same time, the centre had to fully operational. Thanks to a super human effort by Sharon Reddy of the UNHCR, and Sandy Schwarer of Rand Afrikaans University, the MCOC served as a very valuable laboratory for how such a coordination mechanism can function in the future. Some of the key characteristics of the MCOC, and some of the lessons learnt during this experiment, were:

From a strategic perspective, the MCOC should contribute to overall mission coordination in order to achieve unity of effort, as well as a joint understanding of the way in which the mission is going to achieve the end state. At operational and tactical levels the MCOC acts as the focal point for the exchange of



**Valuable
laboratory**

Exercise Blue Crane

information. All requests for assistance and cooperation between mission elements should be channelled through the MCOC, and all joint activities should be monitored by the MCOC. General information about movements, dangerous areas and mines should also be communicated to each other through the MCOC.

MCOC concept

The defining characteristic of the MCOC concept (as opposed, for example, to the CMOC which is military driven) is that all the mission elements are represented on an equal footing. It is, in essence, a carbon copy of the Mission Management Team (SRSG, Deputy SRSG, Force Commander, CIVPOL Commissioner, Human Rights Component, Election Component, etc.) in an operations room format, with liaison officers representing the various mission elements.



The MCOC should be coordinated by the OCHA, or an equally neutral body, and not by one of the key mission elements (military, humanitarian, etc.).

All the mission components should be second liaison officers to the MCOC, and these officers need to be mandated and empowered to exchange information and coordinate activities with their counterparts. The liaison officers should not only be messengers. They should be problem solvers who have the aptitude, ability and positions within their own organisations to effectively and speedily create solutions.

Non-UN Actors

The MCOC should also serve as the contact point for non-UN actors with the UN mission, and *vice versa*. NGOs, the ICRC and other international and regional actors can obtain and exchange information with the UN mission at one central point. In Exercise Blue Crane all the non-UN actors had unrestricted access to the MCOC. Non-UN actors were asked to place liaison officers at the UNMIN, and had direct radio communication with each other and the MCOC. This did not cause any problems in the exercise situation. In fact, it probably resulted in an unrealistically high level of coordination. However, it can be anticipated that this would not be possible in actual UN missions, and

Civilian Participation

policies would need to be developed on a variety of issues. For instance, what level of access should non-UN actors have to the MCOC? Should non-UN actors – especially other governmental bodies such as the OAU and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as bigger humanitarian NGOs – have liaison officers at the MCOC? If not unrestricted access to the MCOC’s central operations room, what should the interface with the non-UN actors look like? For example, a daily briefing or a second unclassified operations room.



At Mission HQ, at Sector HQ and at lower HQs, depending on mission design. An essential requirement is that all the various mission elements need to use the same geographical subdivision of the area of operations. In Exercise Blue Crane, the MCOC was initially only located at Mission HQ level. However, as most of the coordination needs were tactically driven, the MCOC first held a daily briefing at Sector level, and later moved its interaction with the force to Sector level. It was discovered that coordination is best done at the level where it needs to be executed. However, it should be duplicated and supported at higher levels if a decision is required from that higher authority.

Location

It is crucial that all the UNMIN components and non-UN actors bring as much meaningful information to the MCOC as possible. In Exercise Blue Crane, most of the information initially flowed from the civilian organisations to the military. It was only later in the exercise, once the military realised the utility of the MCOC, that it also started to use it as a vehicle to exchange information with other mission components. As in any system, what you get out of it is directly related to how much you are willing to commit/contribute.

Flow of information

Another lesson learnt at Exercise Blue Crane was that the liaison officers from the various mission components can not be expected to also be the ‘staff officers.’ The MCOC needs a small number of permanent staff to log all activities and to act as a secretariat for the facilitator. This function can best be carried out by the military as part of its CIMIC operation. A typical team should

Facilitator

Exercise Blue Crane

probably comprise a team leader, staff officers, clerks and drivers, as well as a small security detail. However, it would be advisable that if personnel strengths allow, then CIVPOL and other civilians should also be utilised as part of the secretariat staff.

Communication

Depending on the size of the mission and the type of communication equipment used, the Secretariat may need a small number of signal staff to manage the MCOC's communications function.

Simulated Press/Media

Media relations

The media play a very important role in how conflict situations – and peacekeeping missions – are perceived by the general public, political leaders, and international and regional organisations. As a result, the relationship between the media and a UN mission is one of the critical factors that will determine its success or failure. Consequently, the relationship with the media is an extremely important aspect of any mission, and all mission components should be trained in media relations.

Interact with the press



One of the objectives of Exercise Blue Crane was to train all ranks in the handling of the media. The Blue Crane Planning Committee decided that one of the ways in which this could be done, was to have people in the exercise who would play the role of the international press. They would hold interviews with various people, arrive unannounced at checkpoints, and create opportunities for the participants to interact with the press. It was further felt that the best people suited to play the role of the press, is the press themselves. To our knowledge, this has never been attempted during an exercise before. Consequently, it was decided to invite a small number of journalists to play the role of simulated press during the exercise.

Simulated-press

However, from the point of view of exercise control, the activities of the simulated press would have to be planned, coordinated and staged like any other aspect of the exercise. Consequently, the journalists were asked to agree to be 'stage-managed' as simulated-press for exercise purposes, but were also given the opportunity to cover the

Civilian Participation

exercise as real media members. This was an added bonus, as it gave the small number of simulated press journalists an almost exclusive right to cover the exercise. The rest of the media only had access to the exercise on one media day. The simulated press/real-media combination created a symbiotic balance between the need of the exercise planners to train the participants in media relations, and the media's desire to cover the 'story' of the exercise.

Using real media as simulated press for exercise purposes added a great deal of realism to the media relationship aspect of the exercise. It is recommended that real media be used for this role in future.

Whilst this use of the media was very successful from both a public relations and exercise perspective, some minor problems were experienced. Of these, the most important was perhaps the fact that since the media played two roles, they needed to interact with two different bodies within the exercise structure, namely exercise control, and the media and visitors group. The former was responsible for the simulated press aspects, while the latter was responsible for the real-press needs. These minor problems were easily resolved through continuous coordination, but point to aspects that need to be carefully managed in future exercises.

Another problem is that few media organisations can afford to dedicate one or more of their normal full-time staff members for a long period of time (ten days for Exercise Blue Crane). As a result, the simulated press group for Exercise Blue Crane only consisted of print and radio journalists. A television crew was sorely missed, both in terms of simulated press and real-time coverage. For future exercises, it is strongly recommended that everything possible should be done to include a television crew. One of the important considerations for the inclusion of real media as simulated press, is the educational spin-offs from the media organisation's point of view. The journalists that participated developed a much better understanding of what peacekeeping is all about. In the future, their various organisations will benefit from improved reporting and insight of peacekeeping related stories from these participants.

**Media played
two roles**

**Educational
spin-offs**

Exercise Blue Crane

International Advisors

Expert advice

The international advisors from the UNDPKO played an invaluable role in assisting all participants in the exercise. They provided expert advice and gave ample examples from their own experience in peacekeeping operations, which either served to enforce the lessons learned from Blue Crane, or introduced new solutions to some of the problems experienced in the exercise. These ranged from tactical suggestions regarding the operational procedure in the MCOC, to advice on how the relationship between the civilian entities, the military and the civilian police could be optimised at strategic level. We would like to take this opportunity to thank the UN for making this team available to Exercise Blue Crane, and for the invaluable contribution that it made to the overall success of the exercise.

International expert advice, such as that provided by the UNDPKO in Exercise Blue Crane, is an invaluable contributing factor to the overall success of an exercise. It is strongly recommended that the UNDPKO be involved in this, and in other ways, in all future SADC field exercises.

Worldwide attention



One of the problems experienced in relation to the international advisors, was that the Blue Crane Planning Committee did not foresee the number of international advisors that would have to be accommodated. As a result, adequate resources were not put in place to receive and host the international advisors. Although most of these problems were eventually resolved on the ground, care should be taken not to repeat this situation. Peacekeeping exercises of this nature attract worldwide attention, and provide the opportunity for networking and building relationships within the peacekeeping community. By not having adequate resources dedicated to this aspect, one is in danger of alienating friends. Ideally, the occasion should be used to strengthen partnerships. An exercise of this nature is a success when it is positively perceived internationally. When positive messages are sent to the international community about the participants' readiness, capacity and ability to participate in international peacekeeping missions, then the exercise can be regarded as a success.

Civilian Participation

The hosts should put in place a dedicated visitor's organisation with enough resources to handle a large number of international advisors and observers.

Conclusion

This was the first time that a peacekeeping exercise of this magnitude was organised in southern Africa, and the largest peacekeeping exercise ever organised in Africa. At the same time, it was the first time an attempt was made to extensively incorporate civilian role players as actual participants in an exercise. As such, Exercise Blue Crane was a resounding success and an important milestone, especially from a civil-military coordination point of view.

At the same time, the exercise provided us with the opportunity to make mistakes (and we used this opportunity often) in a safe, harmless and controlled environment. The time and resources SADC and the donor countries invested in Exercise Blue Crane would have been wasted if we did not learn from these mistakes. The investment would also have been a waste had we not taken the time and effort to incorporate these lessons learnt into our Standard Operating Procedures, into the planning processes for future exercises and into our training curricula. This is especially true in light of the recent ISDSC decision to consider the establishment of a SADC peacekeeping brigade.

From a civilian point of view, the primary lessons learnt from Exercise Blue Crane were: that we need to intensify the training of civilian role players; and that we need to develop more opportunities for joint civil-military training prior to deployment in actual peacekeeping missions.

We would like to thank all the civilian participants who so enthusiastically invested their time and energy into making Exercise Blue Crane a success. They did so under trying physical circumstances, and displayed great patience and humility. We would like to recognise your spirit and dedication, without which the civilian component of Exercise Blue Crane would not have been possible.



**Opportunity to
make mistakes**

**Joint civil-
military training**

Exercise Blue Crane

Norwegian Government

Finally, we would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the Norwegian Government, who sponsored the civilian participation in Exercise Blue Crane through the Training for Peace in Southern Africa Project.

Lessons Learned from the Perspective of the International Advisors Group

Lt. Col. Bengt Carlsson

Lt. Col. Bengt Carlsson participated in Exercise Blue Crane as the Deputy Head of the International Advisory Group. He is the Chief of Staff at the Swedish Training Centre (SWEDINT).

Introduction

It is a privilege and honour for me to be invited to this Lessons Learned Seminar representing the International Advisors and Monitors Group.

The purpose with my presentation is to give a brief summary of Lessons Learned from the perspective of our group and I will also add some supplementary details based on personal experiences.

**International
Advisers and
Monitors Group**

Exercise Blue Crane



A peacekeeping exercise of this magnitude provides you with the opportunity to make mistakes. You used this opportunity, as we all do during exercises, but the mistakes do not overshadow the success of Exercise Blue Crane.

I hope my presentation will contribute to the set of recommendations which will serve as guideline for future SADC exercises. But please bear in mind, that I am just one out of 54 members of the group. I'm not here only to repeat what we all know, I presume I'm here to give a straightforward message.

The Advisory Group

Practical advice

The purpose of the Advisory Group was to provide practical advice on the United Nations Peace Support Operation (UN PSO) with the aim of enhancing the ability to play an active role in future UN operations.

Our aim was not to produce a summary of deficiencies, but to provide SADC countries with an independent view seen from outside their own organisation.

Considerable experience

The group ranged in rank from Sergeant First Class to full Colonel with considerable depth of experience in UN operations and extensive military expertise.

Our introduction to the exercise at Lohatla Army Battle School left a great deal to be desired. We discussed how to organise ourselves to be best employed. This resulted in the creation of the International Advisers and Monitors group.

Planning phase

Joining instructions

None of us received detailed joining instructions prior to our arrival in South Africa. This resulted in individuals reporting without the proper or required equipment. Invitations were not specific enough. Before leaving home we did not know what to expect in regard to our role in

Perspective of International Advisors Group

the exercise. This also created confusion for the Exercise Directors as we were initially considered to be UNMOs — exercise participants.

We recommend that on future SADC exercises the Exercise Director should establish precisely what are the requirements in terms of non-SADC participants, including rank and speciality in the exercise organisation.



Briefing Phase and Command Post Exercise

All Advisors, Exercise Control Staff and participant leaders attended a range of briefings on 12 and 13 April 1999. Not all subjects were pertinent to the Adviser Group but were informative. Nevertheless, as some aspects of the lectures had to be subsequently taught to the exercise troops at all levels, summaries could have been available to facilitate their task.

Some of the information should have been made available at least three months in advance. Concern was also expressed within the group that no reference was made to security or safety for the exercise. Despite the format used to pass the information, it was felt that this session was necessary to establish a minimum baseline of knowledge of Peace Support Operations in general and on Exercise Blue Crane in particular.

At the start of the CPX, participants were clearly applying a war fighting concept but with advice, particularly at company level, this soon changed. Problems were also apparent in those units which were not able to use the English language. This would have serious consequences on actual UN operations and, at least all leaders should have some English capabilities.

At battalion level the CPX was most successful in resolving Command, Control and Communication difficulties inevitable in any composite organisation. Exercise play however stopped at battalion level because Sector HQ was not yet established and not able to participate efficiently at that stage. Force and Mission HQs were also not set up and did not participate. This shortfall did not benefit the CPX.

Briefings

Information

Language

Command Post Exercise (CPX)

Exercise Blue Crane

SOPs were not understood by the CPX participants due to their late availability and were insufficient in number. A good part of the CPX time was used to discuss incidents or what should be the reaction to these incidents.

Flow of information


In summary, this short CPX was a good shake out for the battalions but fell short of establishing a good flow of information from Platoon, Company, Battalion, Sector, to Force HQ. It would have been very beneficial to have a second CPX after the in-deployment training, just before the FTX itself.

In-Deployment Training

In-deployment training consisted of instructions at unit level on the Nordic PSO Doctrine and reconnaissance of respective Tactical Areas of Responsibility. With appropriate staff available this training could in future be conducted prior to deployment.

Force HQ appeared unclear

In the beginning of this period the Sector HQ remained non-operational and lacked reference documents and stationery. The Force HQ appeared unclear about it's actual role in PSO. UN Mission HQ was not established. Advice was given on the need to develop a comprehensive logistical plan as required by all UN missions and a draft was prepared.



At the end of this period of seven days our general opinion was that the major shortcomings reported from Exercise Blue Hungwe still existed on Exercise Blue Crane namely Command and Control, SOPs, and Logistics.

Field Training Exercise

Period of learning

The field training exercise can be described as a period of learning by doing. Sometimes chaotic, sometimes well organised. Media day on the very first day of the field training exercise and in the end extensive preparation for the Visitors Day. To exercise the troops suddenly became less important!

Perspective of International Advisors Group

The Battalion's reports and returns process was not fully successful and the formats appeared to have changed. The belligerents were considered to be too aggressive for this stage of the exercise. We found difficulty in following exercise play through the various levels. One company could not cope with the overload caused by an excess of agencies and visitors. The Main Events List needed amendment.

Sector HQ had received details of six of the 33 incidents which confirmed the failure of both communication and reporting procedures. The Observation Post (OP) Order which had been produced appeared to be flawed as it lacked the necessary detail for communications, logistics, medical and civil liaison/authorities. The staff at Force HQ had tended to become too involved with real time problems rather than exercise play.

It is remarkable that logistics was set aside and no exercise play was planned. Naraland was an island situated in the Indian Ocean. How do we cope with such a situation without maintenance?

A field training exercise can be more effective but it takes more of planning, preparation and coordination. None of us can afford to repeat the major shortcomings for a third time.

Exercise Control

During the exercise, there were three different organisations that were involved in supervising the exercise participants. First there was the Exercise Control group formed exclusively from the South African Army officers. The second group was the Umpire organisation which was formed from the SADCs countries officers. Lastly, we had the International Advisors and Monitors Group. All these three groups of officers had members with all exercise participant units and HQs. Most of the functions of these three groups had a lot of similarities and overlap. This, at time, created confusion for exercise participants and created a proliferation of daily meetings and increased need for coordination. It is highly recommended on future SADC exercises to integrate these three groups in one organisation with mixed teams.

**Belligerents
were aggressive**




Logistics

**Three different
organisations**

Exercise Blue Crane

Administration

Provide appropriate support



Due to the fact that the Exercise Director did not know the number, rank and experience of the non-SADC countries participants, no provision had been made to provide appropriate support for our group. Particularly the lack of adequate transport impeded the optimum use of me and my colleagues. Also miscellaneous items like maps and office supplies were difficult to obtain. We believe that these shortcomings could have been avoided.

One aspect of the success of an exercise of this nature is how it is perceived internationally and what messages it sends to the international community about the readiness, capacity and ability to participate in international peacekeeping missions.

Visitors and liaison organisation

Problems were eventually resolved on the ground but we strongly recommend a visitors and liaison organisation with enough resources to handle a large number of international guests.

Recommendations

Involve all participants as early as possible

- Exercise Blue Crane has highlighted some areas that need further attention. The Planning and Preparation process must involve all participants as early as possible and each phase of the exercise start off with coordination of aim, purpose and main events in order to better control the exercise.
- It is recommended that SADC should establish the optimum force structure taking in to account the military capabilities of each contributing SADC country.
- A special attention should be given to Command-Control-Communication and Intelligence, and logistics.
- Possible use of an overseas specialist UN training team for advice and exercise design is recommended.
- Establishment of a training unit to relieve participating units from the burden of in-deployment training and to achieve appropriate standard skills for PSO among all contributing SADC countries is recommended.

Command-Control-Communication

Perspective of International Advisors Group

- The Mission Coordination Centre plays a key role between the Military and the Civilian Wing within a PSO. This should be considered in future exercise organisations. To bring this centre to run it would be necessary that all components are represented in a sufficient number and to guarantee a qualified staff work the installation of a Chief of Staff (COS) with supporting staff is suggested.
- A special attention should be given to logistics.
- UN Mandate and SOP must be known and understood by all participants and available in a sufficient number.
- It is highly recommended on future SADC exercises to integrate Exercise Control, Umpire and the International Advisors and Monitors Group in one organisation with mixed teams.
- We recommend a visitors and liaison organisation with enough resources to handle a large number of international guests.

**Mission
Coordination
Centre**

**Integrate
Exercise
Control**

Conclusion

Exercise Blue Crane has been a political success from the first day and also a success in many other aspects. The fact that 12 of the 14 SADC countries have participated in this exercise is a feat in itself.


The training conducted during the exercise contributed to further develop the SADC countries capabilities in conducting Peace Support Operations. It has been a big step in the right direction.

It is recommended that the next step should focus on training Command, Control and Communication as well as logistics at all levels. A CPX would be a good vehicle to achieve this aim.

Political success



EMPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ADVISERS & MONITORS



Lessons Learned from the Perspective of the United Nations

Dr. Leonard Kapungu

Dr. Leonard Kapungu delivered the opening address at the Exercise Blue Crane Lessons Learned Seminar in Pretoria on 9 July 1999. He is the Head of the Lessons Learned Unit at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.



I am once again honoured to represent the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Bernard Miyet, at this Seminar to draw lessons from the Blue Crane Exercise. Just a week ago, I was honoured to open, on behalf of the Under-Secretary-General, the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre. On that occasion, I stated, on his behalf that 'Effective Peacekeeping requires specialised training, and that while the United Nations can always assist in this regard the requisite training remained the primary responsibility of the Member States'.

In my statement, on that occasion, I referred to the efforts

**Effective
peacekeeping
requires
specialised
training**

Exercise Blue Crane

of the SADC countries to train peacekeepers within the context of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, which is the hallmark of today's peacekeeping. The training emphasised, *inter alia*, coordination between military contingents from different countries, as well as between military and civilian components. I referred to the success of the operation of the Blue Hungwe exercise, which was held in Zimbabwe in April 1997 and to the operation just held in April 1999 herein South Africa, code-name Blue Crane.

Improving future exercises



Lessons learned must begin at the strategic level

We meet to draw lessons from the Blue Crane experience with the intention of improving future exercises as well as improving future participation of SADC countries in United Nations operations. Let me say at the outset, as I did in my statement at the opening of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, the performance of SADC countries in United Nations peacekeeping has been exemplary.

Before I go into the analysis of lessons that we at the United Nations learn from our peacekeeping operations, which could be of some value in future exercises in the Region or elsewhere, let me say this: it is not easy to learn. Learning is a process, which must be developed into a culture for those who engage in such complex tasks. We must learn from what goes well and from what goes wrong. Drawing lessons should not lead to finger-pointing but must have a common objective — to always improve whatever we do.

We, at the United Nations, after 50 years of launching and managing peacekeeping operations, have learned a few things. Lessons learned must begin at the strategic level — how decisions are taken by the Security Council, or in the case of the Blue Crane Exercise, from the organ that created the mandate for the Exercise. It is that organ that sets the objectives of the operation and determines the resources

Perspective of the United Nations

for all elements — military and civilian components of the operation or exercise.

Secondly, lessons should be drawn from the planning process. We at the United Nations have learned that it is more efficient to have integrated planning. It undermines an operation if the military and the civilian plan separately. Planning must be done together. The reason is that today's peacekeeping is neither only military nor only civilian. In actual fact, operations go in stages. Most of the time when a crisis occurs in a country, there are already UN specialised agencies and NGOs in the area who are inhibited in carrying out their functions because of the lack of a safe and secure environment. The military component of a peacekeeping operation is introduced mainly to assist in the establishment of such an environment. During that period, the civilian component assists the military in attaining this objective. Once a safe and secure environment is attained, the civilian component, such as civilian police, humanitarian agencies, human rights agencies and NGOs come to the forefront, with the military playing a supporting role. Roles change as the requirements on the ground dictates.

Only integrated planning can lead to a success of reversing roles as dictated by the situation in the ground. We believe this must be reflected upon in exercises that train for peacekeeping missions. The situation on the ground is never static, agreements on the ground are not often observed, and new situations are always created that require continuous reference to the organ that gave the initial mandate. In my long years of service, I have never seen or been told of an Agreement, which the parties do not try to break. I only find such a situation in exercises that, from start to finish, operate on the basis of initial agreements, which never change throughout the operation. In reality, parties to the conflict are mischievous and this must be taken into account when such exercises are coordinated.

**Lessons should
be drawn from
the planning
process**

**Integrated
planning**

Exercise Blue Crane

Selection of the leaders essential

The third lesson that we have learned at the United Nations, which could also be learned in exercises is that the selection process of the leaders of both the military and civilian component, is very essential. Success and failure rides on their selection. They must be people with initiatives capable of managing events, and people, capable of managing frustrations and willing to be humble. I have not heard of an SRSG or a Force Commander or a Police Commissioner who has not been frustrated. May be this happens only in exercises. In reality, leaders of operations get frustrated. People in such positions should develop close relations with junior officers who serve as desk officers. I have known of SRSGs who do not cooperate with their junior officers and only want to deal the Secretary-General and Under-Secretary-General. Such leaders have often failed. Thus in exercises, there is need to introduce elements of how to manage frustrations and how to be humble.

Logistical support

This really brings me to the entire question of logistical support for both peacekeeping operations and for exercises such as the Blue Crane. I note that many countries in the SADC region reported that unless they received certain logistic support they would not be able to participate in the Blue Crane Exercise. This reminds one of what happened during the ill-fated Rwanda operation when many African countries stated that they were willing to provide troops if they received logistical support. Some countries requested for their elite troops to be provided with boots and helmets as part of the logistical requirements for their participation in the operation.

Against this background, we may need to seriously consider what logistical support can be provided for each African country participating and for the other African states in order for the request of logistical support from donors or the United Nations to have credibility. I was in some way involved with the Rwanda operation at the

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United Nations and we found some requests for logistical support indeed laughable and beyond belief.

The lessons we draw from these operations and from the Blue Crane exercise is that SADC countries must seriously think of establishing several logistical bases either individually or preferably as a regional group. The United Nations and donors may be more willing to supplement the requirements. In any case, when the United Nations peacekeeping operations are considered it is a requirement that such contingent supplies itself for about 90 days. If this requirement is taken seriously then it could just be the beginning of developing several logistical bases which would enable the participation in both United Nations peacekeeping operations and in exercises such as the Blue Crane.

The fourth general lessons I would like to mention is that resources are scarce for most peacekeeping operations. Hence there must be a willingness to share available resources. Once there is a commitment on common objectives, once there is a willingness to cooperate, the sharing of resources becomes easier. We at the United Nations have begun moving towards integrated civilian and military components in peacekeeping operations. For example, in the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), both the civilian and military components worked closely together under the direction of the Transitional Administrator. One of the success stories of UNTAES was that both civilian and military components participated in the pooling of resources to meet the logistical and administrative needs of the Mission. In order to avoid friction between the civilian and military components, UNTAES developed and co-located integrated support teams, such as the JLOC and the Movement Control Centre. The arrangement proved to be effective and improved rapport and cooperation among all sections.

**Establishing
several
logistical
bases**

**Integrate
civilian and
military
components in
peacekeeping
operations**



Exercise Blue Crane

Operational flexibility and responsiveness

The joint resource tasking and sourcing concept practiced by UNTAES was made possible by the fact that nearly all ISS sections were jointly manned by civilian and military staff. The support mission was a complex undertaking. UNTAES operated in a largely cash economy, with poor public infrastructure. The ISS maintained the Mission's resources to provide third-line logistical support to the military contingents and other components. Most of the ISS sections, particularly engineering and logistics, worked closely with their military staff counterparts in co-located offices. This model not only economised civilian and military resources, but also greatly improved operational flexibility and responsiveness. Other ISS sections included communications and information technology services, assets disposal, supply and property management and transport.

Both the military and the civilian logistics should be co-located. They work together and are there to support each other. This has to be considered when exercises are designed. It should indeed be underlined that all components must work together, as none can succeed when the other fails.

Increasing complexities

Another lesson that we have learned at the United Nations is that support for an operation is enhanced if there is accountability. There is greater support for operations and/or exercises if it is believed that whatever operations that are launched in future would be done under the authorisation of the United Nations. Let me reiterate what I stated when I opened the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Center as the representative of Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Miyet. 'In the light of the increasing complexities of today's peacekeeping, the United Nations has become very much aware that in many cases, it can no longer carry the burden of peacekeeping alone. To that effect, it is very conscious of the fact that effective peacekeeping requires cooperation with regional organisations

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while holding firm to the central theme of the Charter that the maintenance of international peace and security is the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council. The United Nations needs regional organisations to help carry out that responsibility'. I continued to state that recent events have also made it obvious, if ever there was any doubt that no regional organisations even the most powerful in the world, can maintain regional peace and security alone without the partnership of the United Nations.

Last, but by no means the least important of the major lessons we have learned from peacekeeping operations, is the significant role of the media. In that context, I will emphasise that the mass media is inherently the most powerful channel of mobilising local support from all sides in a conflict. This is indispensable for the successful execution of the mandate of all peacekeeping operations. Thus, as soon as a mission is deployed, the value of establishing an effective public information strategy and of developing techniques for implementing that strategy, can not be overstated. In this regard, I will again draw attention to the role of the media in UNTAES. The UNTAES Public Affairs Office was established as soon as the mission was set up, and the broadcasting facility it quickly provided (UNTAES Radio) did a lot to soften the propaganda of the local station – Radio Vokuvar – which in turn, facilitated the work of the mission.

In various other ways, the UNTAES Public Affairs Office contributed to the smooth operation of the Mission. Worthy of mention is its thrice-monthly UNTAES bulletin, which represented the core of the information activities in both Croat and Serb languages. This allowed UNTAES to counter disinformation and rumour, and to inform the population of the condition in the region. Equally, series of press briefings organised by the Office helped both Serb and Croat journalists to understand each other and to have



Significant role of the media

Counter disinformation and rumour

Exercise Blue Crane



a clear picture of the work of the United Nations in Eastern Slavonia. This encouraged both sides to work for national reconciliation and the ending of 'hate propaganda' through the media. This demonstrates the potency of the media as allies to peacekeeping operations. The role of the media, therefore, is a vital element which need to be factored into the planning and execution of exercises of the nature of Blue Crane.

As we seek to strengthen the SADC regional peacekeeping machinery, we should never forget the central lesson of our time.

Annexures

Annexure A

Civilian Participants List

SRSG & Staff

- SRSG: H.E. Ambassador A.A. Panguene, High Commissioner of Mozambique to South Africa
- DSRSG: Horst Brammer, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), South Africa
- SRSG's Spokesperson: Daniel Ngwepe, DFA, South Africa
- MCOC Liaison Officer: Itumeleng Maake, DP's Office, South Africa
- SRSG's Personal Assistant: A. Mangate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Mozambique
- Civil Affairs Officer (Maritime): Hussein Solomon ACCORD

OAU Observer Mission (OAUMIN)

- Col. Amr Badran, OAU
- Col. F. Okonkwo, OAU
- Phakamile Gongo, DFA, South Africa
- Anne N. Mutelo, Namibia High Commission, Pretoria

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SADC Human Rights Observer Group (SADC-HROG)

- V.S. Chuckun, Second Secretary, Mauritius High Commission, Pretoria
- N. Lindunda, Zambia High Commission, Pretoria

United Nations Agencies

- David Johnson, Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), Pretoria
- Cosmas Chanda, SADC Liaison Officer, UNHCR, Pretoria
- Amah Assiama, Protection Officer, UNHCR, Pretoria
- Leonard Zulu, UNHCR, Zambia – Maritime, Durban
- Sharon Reddy, UNHCR, Pretoria
- Raxon Tshobemea, UNHCR, Pretoria
- Floyd Mngomezulu, UNHCR, Pretoria

International Committee of the Red Cross

- Patrick Flynn, Delegate to the Armed Forces, ICRC, Harare
- Michael Kleiner, Delegate, ICRC, Pretoria

Non-governmental Organisations

- Kennedy Mabasa, Ceasefire Campaign
- Andrew Kazilimani, AFRONET, Zambia
- Anthony Mukweta, AFRONET, Zambia
- Sagaren Naidoo, South African Institute of International Affairs
- Alexandra Schwarzer, Rand Afrikaans University
- Joelien Pretorius, University of Pretoria

Media (Simulated Press)

- Erika Gibson, Beeld
- Jenine Coetzer, Channel Africa
- Sarel van Zyl, SABC Radio
- Hans Pienaar, The Star
- Pholane Motale, Sunday World

International Advisors (DPKO Advisory Team)

- Bjorn Skjaerli, UNDPKO, New York
- Maj. Stein Ellingsen, Norway
- Maj. Bjorn Loken, Norway

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- Col. Kurt Mosgaard, Denmark
- Lt. Col. Sam Siyaya, UNDPKO, New York
- Lt. Col. Jim Brubaker, USA

Civilian Exercise Controllers

- Cedric de Coning, ACCORD
- Kwesi Mngqibisa, ACCORD
- Bereng Mtinkulu, Defence Secretariat, South Africa
- James Machakaire, ACCORD
- Ian Henderson-Wille, ACCORD – Maritime, Durban

Annexure B

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 982 Establishing UNMIN

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4100th Meeting, on
16 August 1998

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of
12 August 1998 (S/1998/300),

Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations that there
continues to be armed fighting forces in Naraland,

Deploring the level of violence in Naraland which has caused a
heavy loss of life and serious humanitarian consequences for the
Provinces of Kambonia and Manancaland,

Reaffirming its commitment to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict,

Deploring the atrocities committed and human suffering caused by
all parties to the conflict,

Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes, as
stated in the report of the Secretary-General, a threat to international
peace and security,

Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the
United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and
security and aware that in accordance with the Charter it may
welcome the assistance of regional arrangements and agencies
to carry out its responsibilities,

Commending the efforts undertaken by Mr. Watikani, the

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special envoy of the Secretary-General, to bring a peaceful solution to the conflict,

Expressing its appreciation to the international and regional organisations that have provided assistance to the populations affected by the conflict and deploring that personnel of these organisations have suffered injury and death in the exercise of their humanitarian tasks,

Noting also the agreement for a cease-fire in the armed dispute between the belligerents concluded on 12 June 1998 in the

Treaty of Windhoek,

Acting, under the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Calls for the full and immediate implementation of all its relevant resolutions;
2. Commends the Treaty of Windhoek, as contained in documents S/24587, to all parties in the internal dispute and strongly urges all parties to the Naraland conflict to immediately cease hostilities in accordance with that agreement;
3. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 10 August 1998 (Document S/1998/300);
4. Welcomes the offer by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), described in the report of the Secretary-General of 10 August 1998 concerning the establishment of a peacekeeping operation to create a secure environment for implementation of the Treaty of Windhoek and the delivery of humanitarian aid to Naraland,
5. Authorises the establishment of a peace-keeping force in Naraland consistent with the offer of the OAU and the

Exercise Blue Crane

SADC as described in said Secretary-General's report to be known as UNMIN with the following mandate:

- a. To establish buffer zones, monitor the cease-fire and to monitor the withdrawal of Manacaland and Kambonia belligerents in accordance with the Treaty of Windhoek;
 - b. To use all possible means to facilitate the delivery and provision of humanitarian assistance to the affected populations;
 - c. To assist in the restoration of normality in Naraland.
 - d. To suggest through the Secretary-General of the OAU and the Chairperson of the SADC any other actions to enhance peace and security in Naraland.
6. Authorises the Secretary-General of the OAU and the Chairperson of the SADC to make necessary arrangements to appoint a Force Commander for UNMIN and for the unified command and control of the forces involved which will effect the tasks referred to in paragraph 5 above;
7. Authorises the military and police forces assigned to implement the operation approved in paragraph 5 above, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to defend themselves, humanitarian workers and the populations of Naraland and the bordering regions, in the event of any deliberate obstruction to the provision of humanitarian aid or the implementation of the Treaty of Windhoek,
8. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension and impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Naraland.

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9. Emphasises that the peacekeeping operation approved in paragraphs 4 and 5 above should be an interim arrangement to preserve the intent of the Treaty of Windhoek and to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance;
10. Welcomes offers by some Member States to provide financial and logistic assistance to the United Nations for this peacekeeping operation;
11. Calls upon all Member States and international organisations to contribute to the efforts of humanitarian assistance to the population of Naraland;
12. Requests those Member States which are in a position to do so to provide contributions, in cash or kind, to the peacekeeping operation approved in paragraphs 4 and 5 above and requests the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the contribution can be channelled to the operation concerned;
13. Calls upon all parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the OAU and the Chairperson of the SADC to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance by the United Nations, its specialised agencies and other international and regional humanitarian organisations to all peoples of Naraland and the surrounding region, under the supervision of the lead agency, the UNHCR, and the operational Force Commander appointed by the OAU;
14. Urges all parties to take all the necessary measures to ensure the safety of personnel sent to provide humanitarian assistance, to assist them in their tasks and to ensure full respect for the rules and principles of international law regarding the protection of civilian populations;
15. Requests the Secretary-Generals of the UN and OAU respectively and, as appropriate, to report to the Council on

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a regular basis, the first report to be made no later than 15 days after adoption of this resolution, on the implementation and the achievement of the objective of establishing a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the implementation of the Treaty of Windhoek so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decisions for a prompt continuation of a peacekeeping operation;

16. Emphasises that it will closely monitor events in Namaland and will keep open other options for new and more stringent measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration;

Decides to remain actively apprised of the matter.

Annexure C

The United Nations Mandate

United Nations Resolution 982

General Principles

1. The Government of the Federal Republic of Naraland (the Government), in agreement with the leaders of the belligerent Provinces of Naraland, Kambonia and Manancaland, (the Belligerent Parties) reaffirm their commitment to respect and implement the Treaty of Windhoek and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.
2. The Government and the Belligerent Parties, invite the United Nations to perform, in addition to its missions of good offices and mediation, the tasks defined in the present mandate with a view to the full implementation of the Treaty of Windhoek.
3. The Government and Belligerent Parties recognise that the successful completion of the peace process within the framework of the Treaty of Windhoek and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations' Security Council, is first and foremost their own responsibility, and undertake to cooperate fully and in good faith with United Nations and United Nations representatives.
4. The Government and Belligerent Parties reaffirm their clear wish that the United Nations, within the framework of its mandate, should play an enlarged and reinforced role in the implementation of this mandate, as agreed, in the areas of military issues, National Police, national reconciliation and the establishment of a peaceful settlement. All three parties reiterate their determination to respect and protect the Mission of the United Nations in Naraland, its operations, staff, facilities and property.

Exercise Blue Crane

5. The Government and Belligerent Parties invite the United Nations, within the framework of its mandate, to assume the chairmanship of all relevant meetings between the Government and Belligerent Parties.
6. Maritime Total Exclusion Zone. A Total Exclusion Zone will be established that reaches 100 nautical miles (NM) seawards from Sumaville and extending 70 NM to the west as 70 NM to the east from that port.

Specific Principles

The Government and the Belligerent Parties invite the United Nations, within the framework of its new mandate, to undertake the following tasks:

1. Military Issues
 - a. Overall supervision, control and verification of the re-established cease-fire, with the participation of the Government and Belligerent parties.
 - b. Verification and monitoring of compliance with the cessation of all hostile propaganda between the two Belligerent Parties.
 - c. Notification, verification and monitoring of all movement of forces (Government and belligerent) throughout the territory of Naraland.
 - d. Creation and putting in place of United Nations teams to monitor and verify the cessation of hostilities throughout the country and to investigate alleged cease-fire violations.
 - e. Supervision of the limited disengagement of belligerent forces in areas where forces are in contact.
 - f. Supervision of the movement of both Belligerent troops to the areas designated by United Nations and agreed to between

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all parties involved, during the limited disengagement of forces in areas where they were in contact.

- g. Reception of information officially provided on the location of Mananca forces and Kambonia units which are not in contact.
 - h. Verification and monitoring of those areas being abandoned by either of the belligerent forces.
 - i. Verification, monitoring and control of the operation to collect lethal war material of the two belligerent forces by their respective leaders. United Nations will, as part of a consecutive action, collect this lethal war material on the ground and proceed to store and take custody of it.
 - j. Verification of strict compliance with the accords concerning the belligerent Parties without prejudice to the competence of the Government of Naraland with respect to their national defence policy.
 - k. The parties signatory to the Treaty of Windhoek agree that the Government of Naraland should seek help from the United Nations and specialised institutions to assist them to carry out demining operations in the country. In this context the Government and Belligerent Parties agree to provide all the information available to mines and other explosives, to help implement programmes of mine surveys, of mine awareness, and of demining, for the good of all inhabitants of Naraland. The United Nations undertakes to provide support towards the creation of national capability in this area.
- 2. Creation and putting in place United Nations teams' to monitor and verify arms smuggling activities.
 - 3. Police Activities
 - a. Verification and monitoring of the activities of the Naraland Police Department, placed under the legitimate authority, in

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order to guarantee its neutrality.

- b. Verification and monitoring of the collection, storage and custody of all the armaments in the hands of civilians, by the Naraland Police Department.
 - c. Verification and monitoring of the neutrality of the activities of the Naraland Police Department relating to the commitment made in matters of security arrangements guaranteed for the belligerent leaders.
4. National Reconciliation Activities Certified that the requisite conditions have been fulfilled, including those related to the security of persons and property, to enable the normalisation of the State administration.

Annexure D

CIVPOL Participants in Exercise Blue Crane

1	Botswana	Supt. Kago Ikaneng
2		Sub/Inspt. Gilbert Muchauza
3		Sub/Inspt. David Rapula
4	Lesotho	Capt. Bernard Ntaote
5		Second Lt. Lerata Fobo
6	Malawi	Snr. Supt. Pike Mphaka
7		Asst. Supt. Hannings Mlotha
8		Inspt. Modesta Liwimbi
9	Mauritius	Chief Inspt. Rashidali Beekun
10		Inspt. Sardanand Tauckoory
11	Mozambique	Supt. Richard Jerace
12		Asst. Supt. Kalipolile Yassine
13	Namibia	Sgt. M.T. Nghimwena
14		Const. Alarky Kalo
15	Seychelles	Police Inspt. Winsley Cedras
16	South Africa	Col. Riaan van Staden
17		Supt. S.F. Masemola
18		Capt. J.M. Gouws
19		Capt. T.M. Tsie
20	Swaziland	Inspt. Richard Mngometulu
21		Inspt. Phumzile Magagula

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22	Tanzania	Supt. Paul Chagonja
23		Asst. Inspt. Thadeo Malingumu
24	Zambia	Snr. Asst. Comm. Francis Ngulube
25		Asst. Supt. R. Yamba
26		Chief Inspt. Lazarous Ndhlovu
27		Asst. Comm. Solomon Jere
28	Zimbabwe	Supt. Macle Majongosi
29		Chief Inspt. W.C. Tadyanemhanda
30		Inspt. M.M. Melaphi
31	SARPCCO	Antonie Ferreira
32	Finland	Chief Inspt. Henrik Snellman
33		Chief Supt. Tor Tanke Holm
34	Norway	Chief Inspt. Dag Dahlen
35		Inspt. Torgrim Moseby
36	Sweden	Detective Chief Inspt. Leif Ahlgren
37	Canada	Insp. Wayne Martin
38	Ireland	Supt. Bredan Corcoran
39	SARPCCO	Snr. Asst. Comm Msutu
40	UNDPKO	Comm. Djim Biteye

Annexure E

Refresher Training Programme 20 April 1999

No	Time	Subject	Presenter
1	08:00 - 08:10	Welcome	Mark Malan
2	08:10 - 08:30	Intro to SA Army Battle School/ administrative arrangements	Riaan van Staden
3	08:30 - 09:00	Geographic orientation/safety/ Battle School Standing Orders	Riaan van Staden
4	09:00 - 09:30	Flow of training/exercise programme up to departure	Riaan van Staden
5	09:30 - 10:00	Allocation of key personnel for field exercise	Mark Malan; Riaan van Staden
Brunch			
6	10:45 - 11:45	Orientation: Conflict in Naraland and establishment of UNMIN	Mark Malan; Riaan van Staden
7	11:45 - 12:15	Mission management/exercise control for Blue Crane	Riaan van Staden
8	12:15 - 13:00	Main events, teams and tasks	Riaan van Staden
Tea			
9	13:30 - 14:00	CIVPOL: Roles, duties, privileges, immunities, and responsibilities	Dag Roger Dahlen
10	14:00 - 14:30	UNMIN mandate and CIVPOL responsibilities	Riaan van Staden
11	12:15 - 13:00	General staff duties/media relations	Leif Ahlgren
Break			
12	15:30 - 16:00	Vehicle responsibilities and vehicle familiarisation	Riaan van Staden
13	16:00 - 16:30	Practical driving instruction	Sgt. J.J. Swanepoel
14	16:30 - 17:30	Practical driving instruction	Sgt. J.J. Swanepoel

Exercise Blue Crane

Refresher Training Programme 21 April 1999

No	Time	Subject	Presenter
1	08:00 - 08:30	The essential monitoring tool: Using the CIVPOL handbook and other instruments	Dag Roger Dahlen
2	08:30 - 09:00	Monitoring local police stations and detention facilities	Leif Ahlgren
3	09:00 - 09:30	Monitoring police investigations and arrest	Torgrim Moseby
4	09:30 - 10:00	Monitoring during civil disorder, states of emergency and armed conflict	Torgrim Moseby; Dag Roger Dahlen
Brunch			
5	10:45 - 11:30	Communications	Riaan van Staden
6	11:30 - 12:15	Reporting and exercise documentation	Riaan van Staden
7	12:15 - 13:00	Final personnel allocations and deployment orders	Riaan van Staden
Tea			
8	13:30 - 15:00	Deployment to exercise posts	All
9	15:00 - 17:00	Activity briefings for main events commencing 07:00 on 22 April	Umpires, NPD and Ex Control

Annexure F

Civil-Military Coordination Session 9 July 1999

No	Time	Subject	Presenter
1	08:00 - 08:15	Welcome & briefing on the programme	Cedric de Coning
2	08:15 - 08:45	Report on the deliberations of the military session	Maj. Gen. A. Bestbier
3	08:45 - 09:15	Lessons learned from the perspective of the International Advisors Group	Lt. Col. Bengt Carlsson
4	09:15 - 10:00	CIVPOL	Snr. Sup. Riaan van Staden; Mark Malan
Tea			
5	10:30 - 11:00	Lessons learned from the perspective of the United Nations (DPKO)	Leonard Kapungu
6	11:00 - 11:30	Preparation and planning	
7	11:30 - 12:00	In-Mission Training and the CIMIC Seminar	
8	12:00 - 12:30	The role of the SRSG and his office	
Lunch			
9	13:30 - 14:00	The humanitarian dimension	
10	14:00 - 14:30	The human rights dimension	
11	14:30 - 15:00	The International Committee of the Red Cross	
12	15:00 - 15:30	The role of media/simulated press	
Tea			
13	16:00 - 16:30	The Mission Coordination Center	
14	16:30 - 17:30	General evaluation & closing	

Annexure G

Civil-Military Liaison Seminar Programme 18 April 1999

No	Time	Subject	Presenter
1	08:00 - 08:30	Opening and official welcome	Maj. Gen. A. Bestbier; Amb. A.A. Panguene; Maj. Gen. Kitani
2	08:30 - 08:45	Structure and purpose of the Seminar	Cedric de Coning
3	08:50 - 09:15	Exercise Blue Crane: Background, planning, objectives and structure	Brig. Gen. G.A. Haasbroek; Brig. S.B. Moyo
4	09:20 - 10:00	Briefing on the Exercise scenario: The situation in Naraland	Col. L. van Vuuren
Brunch			
5	11:00 - 12:00	The United Nations Mission in Naraland (UNMIN)	Cedric de Coning; Maj. Gen. Kitani
6	12:05 - 12:30	Briefing on the SA Army Battle School and the Exercise terrain	Col. A. Grundlingh
Tea			
7	13:30 - 14:30	History and development of UN Peace Operations	Lt. Col. Sam Siyaya
8	14:35 - 16:00	Briefing and video on the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) and Exercise Blue Hungwe	Brig. Gen. E.A. Rugeje
9	16:05 - 17:00	CIMIC: Civil-military cooperation	Maj. Stein Ellingsen

Civil-Military Liaison Seminar Programme
19 April 1999

No	Time	Subject	Presenter
1	08:00 - 08:05	Orientation	
2	08:05 - 09:00	The role of the SRSG and his staff	Cedric de Coning
3	09:05 - 10:00	Peace support operations: The role of the military	Bjorn Skjaerli
Brunch			
4	11:00 - 11:40	CIVPOL: The role of the civilian police in peace operations	Snr. Sup. Riaan van Staden
5	11:45 - 12:15	AFRONET	Andrew Kazilimani
6	12:20 - 13:00	The role of human rights monitors	Cedric de Coning
Tea			
7	13:30 - 14:15	United Nations Military Observers (UNMO)	Kurt Mosgaard
8	14:20 - 15:00	UNHCR: The role of the High Commissioner for Refugees	Cosmos Chanda
9	15:05 - 15:45	The Mission Coordination Centre (MCOC)	Cedric de Coning
10	16:15 - 17:00	The role of the media in peace operations	Panel

Exercise Blue Crane

Civil-Military Liaison Seminar Programme 20 April 1999

No	Time	Subject	Presenter
1	08:00 - 08:05	Orientation	
2	08:05 - 09:00	The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	Col. Patrick Flynn (Rtd); Mr. Michael Kleiner
3	09:05 - 09:30	The OAU Observer Mission to Naraland (OAUMIN)	Col. Amr Badran
4	09:35 - 10:00	Communication structure and procedures	Col. Ian Fordred
Brunch			
5	11:00 - 11:40	Exercise control	Col. L. van Vuuren
6	11:45 - 12:15	Umpiring organisation	Lt. Gen. P. Lara; Brig. Gen. S.B. Moyo
7	12:20 - 13:00	Closing ceremony	Maj. Gen. A. Bestbier; Amb. A.A. Panguene; Maj. Gen. Kitani
8	13:00 - 17:00	Tour of the Exercise terrain	

List of Acronyms

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AFIC-N	Norwegian Armed Forces International Centre
CARE	Christian Action for Research and Education
CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination Centre
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CMI	Command Management Information Systems
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Centre
COS	Chief of Staff
CPX	command post exercise
DMZ	Demilitarised Zone
Excon	Exercise control
FTX	field training exercise
HQ	Headquarters
HROG	Human Rights Observer Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ISDSC	InterState Defence and Security Committee
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JLOC	Joint Logistics Operation Center
KLM	Kambonian Liberation Movement
MCOC	Mission Coordination Center
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MRM	Mananca Resistance Movement
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NM	nautical miles

Exercise Blue Crane

NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NPD	Naraland Police Department
NUPI	Norwegian Institute for International Affairs
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OAUMIN	OAU Observer Mission
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
OP	Observation Post
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC-HROG	SADC Human Rights Observer Group
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAPS	South African Police Services
SARPPCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordinating Organisation
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SOFA	status of forces agreements
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SWEDINT	Swedish Training Centre
TFP	Training for Peace in Southern Africa
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UN-HROG	United Nations Human Rights Observer Group
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Naraland
UNMO	United Nations Military Observers
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNPOC	United Nations Police Officers Course
UNPSO	United Nations Peace Support Operation
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
WFP	World Food Programme