

- PN-ACL-710 -

SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

PN-XCL-710

Preventive
Diplomacy:
The Case
of Sudan

Francis Deng



A C C O R D

African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
(ACCORD)
c/o University of Durban-Westville,
Private Bag X54001, Durban, 4000, South Africa

Published by ACCORD 1997

ISBN 0-9584127-1-5

© African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
(ACCORD)

All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Views expressed in this book are not necessarily those of ACCORD. While every attempt is made to ensure that the information published here is accurate, no responsibility is accepted for any loss or damage that may arise out of the reliance of any person upon any of the information this book contains.

Cover design and production by
Artworks, Desktop Publishing & Design, Durban



12

Foreword

This is the first in a series of case studies on preventive diplomacy prepared as teaching materials by the Program on Preventive Diplomacy at the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). It is funded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) under their UNITWIN Chairs Program.

The program is designed to improve understanding of the concept and process of preventive diplomacy. The cases are prepared for classroom use, as an aid for teaching diplomatic negotiations, through presentation and discussion of specific instances of international conflict intervention, preventive diplomacy or instances where preventive diplomacy could have been employed.

The cases are structured within a framework that gives the student an opportunity to understand the background to the conflict and to identify the participants and their respective power and interests. The cases then examine regime change and the precipitants and conditions that brought about these changes. A thorough analysis of the course of events is followed by an hypothetical analysis of these events. The final section looks at some lessons that can be derived from the case.

Several questions are asked at the end of the case study. It is expected that the teacher will engage the students in an interactive exchange that explores innovative and creative responses to the situations posed. In this way it is hoped that the student will develop the ability to deal with a potential conflict situation more strategically.

The cases are modelled on several case studies that were developed by the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). In this regard I would like to thank our friend and ACCORD adviser, Professor William Zartman, for the support and guidance he has given us in the development of this series.

The author of this case study, Professor Francis Deng, is an adviser to ACCORD and has contributed immensely to the development of ACCORD. We thank him for his continued support.

This series of case studies is an attempt by an African organisation to document and disseminate African experiences in conflict and conflict resolution, so as to contribute to the international discourse on conflict prevention, management and resolution.

Vasu Gounden
Director, ACCORD



Contents

Background	1
The Identity Factor	2
Participants, Power and Interests	6
Issue or Regime Change	8
Precipitants and Conditions	10
Analysis of the Course of Events	12
Hypothetical Analysis of the Course of Events	19
Process: Post-Conflict Peace-Building	22
Process: Leverage	24
Lessons from the Sudanese Case	27
Endnotes	30



A partnership funded by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
under their UNITWIN chairs program.



E

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF SUDAN

Background

The essence of preventive diplomacy is early warning and timely intervention. To be successful, diplomatic intercession requires understanding the sources of an impending conflict and addressing them in time to abort violent confrontation. Once a conflict has broken out, the immediate need is to address its humanitarian consequences, while seeking an end to the hostilities by addressing the issues that led to the conflict in the first place. Success means restoring peace and creating conditions that are capable of sustaining the achieved peace. The process is therefore circular in that ensuring a lasting solution becomes a preventive measure that should ideally address the sources or causes of the conflict.

As the civil war in the Sudan has been raging intermittently for four decades, preventive diplomacy can only be relevant if it is understood in a broad sense, as involving initiatives to end the war and prevent further destruction and its humanitarian tragedies. Prevention can be an antecedent or intervening event with the end result being basically the same — aborting or ending violence.

It is widely recognised that most conflicts that result in humanitarian tragedies have not been the result of lack of early warning, but rather because of the lack of political will to intervene at an appropriate time. The conflict in the Sudan was predictable before it erupted in 1955. Although the conflict ended in 1972 through the Addis Ababa Agreement, the resumption of hostilities in 1983 was equally predictable. Indeed, the sources of the conflict have always been apparent, but equally recognisable as complex and difficult to manage. Paradoxically, the case of Sudan is one in which several factors interplay to both encourage diplomatic involvement and deter the discussion of substantive issues, thereby obstructing effective and sustainable resolution of the conflict. The centrality of the Sudan, geographically, racially and culturally, between Africa



and the Middle East, widens the scope of linkages and interests, while at the same time, it places the country at the margins of spheres of influence. This raises complex and sensitive issues of identity that are difficult to mediate or resolve.

The Identity Factor

Ironically, the civil war is the result of the country's greatest promise as a microcosm of Africa and a bridge or cross-roads between the continent and the Middle East. The racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious diversities in Sudan's composition are most often described as falling into North and South. The North — comprising two-thirds of the country in terms of land and population — is inhabited by indigenous tribal groups, with the dominant group intermarrying with incoming Arab traders over the period preceding Islam (but heightened by the advent of Islam in the seventh century), to produce a genetically mixed African-Arab racial and cultural identity.

These Afro-Arab Sudanese however, see themselves simply as Arabs, despite the visible African element in their skin colour and physical features. There are, however, non-Arab communities in the North, which though large in numbers proportional to the Arabised tribes, have been partially assimilated by their conversion to Islam and their adoption of Arabic as the language of communication with the other tribes.¹

It is in the South — the remaining third of the country in terms of land and population — that the African identity in its racial and cultural composition has withstood assimilation into Arabism and Islam. Northern incursions southward met with strong resistance, dating back to the hostile encounters of the slave trade that peaked in the nineteenth century.

The British colonial policy of administering the North and the South separately reinforced Arabism and Islam in the North, encouraged southern development along indigenous African lines, and introduced Christian missionary education and rudiments of Western culture as elements of modernisation in the South. Interaction between the two sets of people was strongly discouraged.



While British administration invested considerably in the political, economic, social, and cultural development of the North, the South remained isolated, secluded and undeveloped. The principal objective of colonial rule in the region was the establishment and maintenance of law and order. The separate administration of the North and the South left open the option that the South might eventually be annexed to one of the East African colonies or become an independent state. Suddenly, in 1947, only nine years before independence on January 1, 1956, the British reversed the policy of separate development, but had neither the time nor the political will to put in place constitutional arrangements that would ensure protection for the South in a united Sudan.

Since independence, the preoccupying concern among the Northerners has been to correct the divisive effect of the separatist policies of the colonial administration by pursuing the assimilation of the South through Arabisation and Islamisation, which the South has resisted. Southern resistance first took the form of a mutiny by a battalion in 1955, then that of a political call for a federal arrangement and finally intensified into an armed struggle for secession or at least the right of self-determination.²

The political impasse created by the situation in the South contributed to the military takeover in 1958, only two years after independence, with the aim of pursuing the strategies of Arabisation and Islamisation more vigorously. The ruthlessness with which these assimilation policies were pursued in the South aggravated the conflict, which became a full-fledged civil war in the 1960s. The effect of that war on the political situation led to the popular uprising that overthrew the military regime in 1964. The oppressive policies toward the South were temporarily relaxed. The Government organised a round table conference on the problem of the South. The conference rejected separation or self-determination but mandated a Twelve Men Committee to formulate an appropriate constitutional arrangement that would reconcile Southern demands with the preservation of national unity. The Committee recommended regional autonomy for the South.



Parliamentary democracy was, however, restored before the Committee's recommendations could be implemented by the interim Government. With the return of democracy, the ruling political parties resumed the assimilation policies with a vengeance. As the violence escalated, the differences between the North and the South became sharper, and the level of political instability rose.

This vicious cycle was broken in 1969 when another military junta, this time under the leadership of Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiri, seized power in alliance with the Communist Party. This party believed in autonomy for the South, provided the region first accepted socialism — something Southerners resisted. After displaying an ambivalent attitude toward the rebels following the abortive coup of 1971, when the leftist elements in the Government tried to take over power from within, Nimeiri's regime eventually negotiated with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and in 1972 concluded the Addis Ababa Agreement, which, based on the recommendations of the Twelve Men Committee, granted the South regional autonomy with a democratic parliamentary system.³

The regime, however, remained under pressure from the conservative and radical Islamic elements, in particular the sectarian parties and the Muslim Brothers (*Ikhwan El Muslimeen*), a radical rightist religious group, with whom Nimeiri eventually entered into an uneasy alliance. Although Nimeiri underwent a personal conversion, becoming a born-again Muslim, he hoped that through religious reforms he could pull the rug from under the feet of the sectarian opposition leaders. He also wanted to remove the anomaly of liberal democracy in the South, which was incongruous with the national system of an authoritarian presidency. Nimeiri gradually eroded Southern autonomy and moved relentlessly toward imposing Islamic law, *Shari'a*, and establishing an Islamic state. Finally, he unilaterally abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983 by dividing the South into three regions and ordering the transfer of Southern troops to the North. This triggered the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudan



People's Liberation Army (SPLA), under the leadership of John Garang de Mabior.

To the surprise of most people, the declared objective of the movement was not secession, but the creation of a new, secular, democratic and pluralistic Sudan. Within only two years of the resumption of hostilities, a popular uprising, *intifada*, largely fuelled by the military situation in the South, led to Nimeiri's own demise in April 1985. Most Northerners expected the SPLM/SPLA to put down their arms and ride the democratic wave. But the movement remained committed to the creation of the new Sudan, which posed an even greater threat than secession to the Arab-Islamic establishment of the North.

After Nimeiri's overthrow, the Muslim Brothers reorganised themselves into a broader-based political party, the National Islamic Front (NIF), which won the third largest number of seats in the parliamentary elections of 1986. The Front's Islamic national agenda was endorsed and significantly reinforced when General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, in alliance with the NIF, seized power on June 30, 1989, in the name of the Revolution for National Salvation. The SPLM/SPLA condemned the coup as an Islamist move engineered by the NIF and secretly committed to the division of the country along religious lines.⁴ The movement agreed, however, to enter into peace talks with the Government. The talks immediately broke down as a result of the characterisation of the problem as 'Southern' rather than 'national', the implication being a fundamental disagreement on the objective of restructuring the system toward creating a new Sudan.⁵

Further talks, which have been sponsored by various mediators over the years, have raised issues such as pluralistic democracy, separation of religion and state, and the right of self-determination, all of which have been extremely contentious. As a result, these talks appear to be in the realm of public relations rhetoric, and no appreciable progress has so far been made on the peace front.⁶



Participants, Power and Interests

The configuration of the conflict has become paradoxically both oversimplified into a religiously-based ideological dualism and complicated by factionalism on both sides of the divide. The main dichotomy remains North-South, but significant differences both in the North and the South have emerged partly as a struggle for power among the leaders and partly because of genuine differences in the visions they have for the country.

The sources of power and interests at stake remain centred on the issue of national identity and its implications to participation in public life, the sharing of power and national wealth, and the overall impact on the status of citizens. Since religion (Islam), ethnicity (Arab), language (Arabic) and Arab culture in general are seen as intertwined, Southerners, non-Muslims and Muslims alike, are the most negatively affected. Non-Arab Muslims of the North also suffer from discrimination based on these factors.

The current struggle over national identity is reflected at two principal levels: one level has to do with the configuration of Sudanese identity in the light of historical processes that have left the peoples with layers of civilisations, racial characteristics, and cultural traditions; the other concerns the repercussions for unity in a pluralistic modern nation state in which the conflict between the identities that give the country its geopolitical significance now threaten the nation with disintegration.

The crisis of national identity manifests itself in two corresponding sets of discrepancies: one is the gap between self-perceptions of identity (what people claim to be) and the reality of what they are as determined by objective factors; the other is the gap between how individual groups perceive themselves or are perceived objectively and how the national framework is defined.

What makes the identity crisis in the Sudan particularly acute is the fact that the policies of the various Governments since independence have tried to fashion the entire country on the basis of their Arab-Islamic identity. The South, with a bitter historical memory and a colonial legacy of separate development in the modern context, remains decidedly



resistant to racial, cultural, and religious assimilation into the Arab-Islamic mold of the North. It is, however, not the mere fact of integration of African and Arab elements to which the South is opposed; rather, it is the political domination of the South by the North and the imposition of their racial, cultural, linguistic, and religious elements of identity on the whole country which the South uncompromisingly opposes.

The Islamic fundamentalists in the North and the secular revolutionaries in the South represent the competing counterparts of parallel identities, which have now come into intensive contact within a unitary state system and are offering alternative visions for the nation. As one observer noted, "What we are witnessing is the clash of two antagonistic cultural outlooks, both of which are experiencing a revival".⁷

Within the North, opposition to the Islamist regime comprises not only the secularists represented by the 'modern forces' — intellectuals, professional associations, trade economists and the like — but also the traditional political parties, which, while religiously-based on sectarian grounds, do not share the agenda of the National Islamic Front with whom they are in competition for religiously-based power.

In the South, while the vision of the new Sudan advocated by the leadership is accepted as a pragmatic way of winning support inside the country, in Africa and from the international community, most Southerners, given a choice, would prefer secession. In August 1991, several members of the leadership, having concluded that the creation of a new Sudan was at best long-term and at worst utopian, rebelled against the leadership of John Garang, unsuccessfully sought to overthrow him, and openly called for secession. Ironically, while calling for secession, which the Government categorically rejects, this group allegedly entered into a political and military alliance with the Government against the mainstream. The group has, however, continued to splinter and has largely lost credibility.

While the rebel factions did not succeed in overthrowing Garang or moving the South toward its goal, they have influenced the political agenda of the movement. The SPLM/SPLA now combines its objective of



a new Sudan with a demand for self-determination for the South. John Garang, the leader of the movement, still maintains that there is no conflict between the goal of a new united Sudan and the demand for self-determination. Indeed, he sees the two as inseparable. In his view, the creation of a new Sudan is a process which will begin, and has indeed begun, in the South and then spread northward. If the right conditions are created, self-determination could end up with a reaffirmation of unity. But if it should result in Southerners opting for secession, an independent South would continue to cooperate with like-minded Northerners, in particular the non-Arab ethnic and regional groups, toward transforming the old Arab-Islamic Sudan into the new Sudan, where race, ethnicity, religion and culture will not be grounds for discrimination. Meanwhile, the call for preserving the unity of a restructured Sudan should rally opposition groups in the North to join forces with the Southern-based SPLM/SPLA, reinforcing its capacity to achieve its multi-faceted objectives.

Issue or Regime Change

The course of the Sudanese conflict has been determined as much by the internal dynamics as by the influence of external factors closely associated with the identity linkages of the major elements.

As already noted, changes in the regimes have sometimes generated a momentum for redefining the problem and seeking solutions. At certain moments – prominent among which are: the 1947 Juba Conference associated with the change of the separatist policy, the parliamentary negotiations leading to the unanimous agreement on the declaration of independence, the 1965 Round Table Conference following the overthrow of the military regime in 1964, and of course, the 1972 Addis Ababa negotiations – the North made promises which appeared to effectively address the grievances of the South and therefore provide a basis for a lasting solution. In nearly all these situations, however, either the North never intended to honour the promises or agreements, or they in fact dishonoured them when the time for implementation came.



Alongside the opportunities for redefining the problem has been a vicious cycle of return to the status quo ante, once the old political players resumed the mantle of power. That was the case following the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1965 and 1986.

Nor has the overthrow of a regime necessarily always led to a shift in policies. The military coup of 1958 only intensified the war in the South. And the June 1989 Islamic military coup only sharpened the Islamic agenda and pursued it uncompromisingly, the result being an even greater intensification of the 'war of visions'.⁸

These dynamics suggest that the components fuelling the coercive power of the politics of identity are shifting and ambiguous and as such are susceptible to the push and tug of the external surroundings. Because of the interconnection between the internal and external dimensions, the posture of international actors, such as states and international organisations, is salient to the prospects of conflict or its exacerbation. Consequently, it is just as important to understand the motivation of external involvement in the conflict. It is also important to explore the tendency of the warring parties who seek to strengthen their respective positions by looking beyond the nation's borders for moral, material and strategic support.

If the Arab/Muslim North has traditionally looked to the Arab world, and the South to its African neighbours, for legitimacy and support, there arises a question as to what has motivated actors exogenous to the conflict to welcome or resist involvement. There is also the question of whether this behaviour has stemmed from geo-strategic, economic or ideological considerations — that is 'instrumental reasons' — or has been imbued with 'affective' reasons, such as racio-cultural affinity and humanitarian considerations.⁹ Clearly, domestic and external actors to the conflict have exhibited both patterns. Nevertheless, this path of inquiry may serve to illuminate the character, reliability and longevity of external involvement and, in so doing, shed some light on much needed remedial policies to the conflict and circles of actual and potential influence.



Precipitants and Conditions

The cycle of violence in the Sudan can be summarised in the dynamics of identification, involving confrontation, reconciliation, disaffection and alienation. At independence in 1956, Sudan emerged burdened with a legacy of colonial rule which helped to fashion contrasting visions for the nation, setting the stage for the civil war. External involvement during this period, most notably British colonial policies, played an important role in exacerbating the cleavage between an Arabised Muslim North and an African, Christianised and secular South.

In retrospect, the confrontation that erupted violently on the eve of independence was inevitable as Northern politicians quickly monopolised political and economic power and sought to mould the nascent state into what they imagined to be its natural Arab/Muslim image. In reaction, the Southern insurgents during the first phase of the civil war (1955-1972) called for a complete break from the North. Yet, their strident calls for secession earned them little support from the newly independent African countries, all of which faced the daunting task of building nation-states out of multi-ethnic, and in many cases, multi-religious populations. In the North, the external dimension of the conflict was driven by Arab-centred concerns. By injecting themselves into the politics of the Middle East and siding with the Arab world on the highly contentious Arab-Israeli issue, Northern politicians were rewarded with support from the Arab world, but not from the United States, which saw Sudan's radical Arab posturing as antithetical to its geo-strategic interests. For their part, the Southern insurgents received military support from Israel during this period as a result of Khartoum's alliance with the Jewish State's Arab foes.

In the end, however, the North's continued attempts to find a military solution to the conflict at the expense of working towards a genuine compromise on the issue of national identity proved fatal. Reconciliation eventually came in 1972, only as the result of a new introspective vision for the nation, which recognised Sudan's cultural diversity and managed to bridge the ethnic and religious cleavages in the country. The



Government of General Nimeiri recognised Sudan's dual Arab and African identity with the signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. Not coincidentally, this period saw Sudan for the first time pursuing a balanced foreign policy based on the promotion of a pragmatic, internally derived concept of 'unity in diversity'.

However, by the early 1980s, domestic political and economic problems caused Nimeiri to look abroad for salvation and to the Sudanese Islamists at home for legitimacy. Nimeiri moved closer to Egypt, the oil rich Arab countries, and the United States, which out of its apprehension over Mu'ammar Qaddafi in Libya and the Marxist regime in Ethiopia, provided the Sudan with more assistance than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa. In the meantime, the South's disaffection with Nimeiri's policies increased. In 1983, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), rebelled, ushering in the latest phase of the civil war. For a time, until the overthrow of Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1990, the SPLA found refuge and received support from neighbouring Ethiopia. Sudan's hostile relations with its neighbours, Libya and Ethiopia, were closely linked to the civil war. Libya had backed a coup attempt against Nimeiri in 1976, while Sudan and Ethiopia suspected each other of supporting anti-Government insurgents.

In 1985, Nimeiri was toppled by a popular uprising primarily as a result of his bankrupt economic policies and his failure to bring an end to the civil war. His support of the Islamist agenda in his final years was to prove instrumental in the rise to power of the National Islamic Front following the military coup of 1989, which overthrew a democratically elected civilian Government. Since then, the regime has pursued domestic and foreign policies grounded in an ideology of Islamic revivalism, alienating it from both the South and mainstream North as well as from the region and the international community. Predictably, the result has been a widening of the historical cleavage between the North and South, an increase in civil violence and the West's isolation of the regime. In response, the regime has been compelled to seek alliance with Iran to the



alarm of the United States and the majority of Arab states. Moreover, the heightened polarisation between North and South has made the task of international mediation, leading to the resolution of the conflict, more arduous than at any time in Sudan's post-independence history.

Analysis of the Course of Events

Since the intensification of the conflict in the 1960s, there have been mediation attempts by concerned states, inter-Governmental and non-Governmental organisations, and international personalities. A few have been successful to any notable degree; most have failed.

The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was the outcome of a sustained process of mediation that involved Ethiopia, including the Emperor Haile Sellasie himself, the World Council of Churches, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), with humanitarian and developmental support from the international community — the United Nations and individual donor countries. The second phase of the war also elicited efforts by such prominent personalities as General Olusegun Obasanjo, former Head of State of Nigeria, former President Jimmy Carter of the United States, General Ibrahim Babangida in his capacity as both Head of State of Nigeria and Chairman of the OAU, church leaders, and statesmen from several countries. Their efforts have largely been to no avail.

In order to advance the cause of peace in the Sudan, it is important to have a closer look at the manner in which negotiations have been conducted in the past, the attitudes of the parties, and the approach adopted by the mediators. A general theme has been for the parties to welcome mediated talks more as a public relations exercise than a genuine means to a settlement. None of the parties wants to be perceived as a war-monger not interested in peace. And so, whenever a third party suggests mediation, the initial response is nearly always positive. But whenever talks start, it soon becomes obvious that not only are the positions of the parties far apart, but even more significantly, that there is no basis for compromise. The explanation is clearly that the parties are keen to appear to want peace to win international sympathy, while realising that the



prospects for a settlement are in fact negligible, since the parties remain firmly committed to positions that are extremely difficult to bridge.¹⁰

A correlative theme in the various mediation processes is that the mediators' objective has largely been to bring the parties together to talk without getting deeply involved in the issues dividing them. The assumption is that once the parties begin to talk, they will identify the issues, clarify their positions, and eventually compromise. In reality, the mediators soon find that much of the effort goes into talks about talks and that once the key issues are raised, the process falls apart, the commitments on both sides emerge as irreconcilable, the mediators remain unwilling to get involved in discussing substantive issues, and the talks inevitably fail.

The more the rebel movements from the South assert a competitive identity, the more the extremist elements of the Arab-Islamic identity have confrontationally asserted and strengthened themselves. The rise of the National Islamic Front (NIF) and its alliance with the elements in the army can mostly be explained in these terms. Preoccupation with international terrorism, which has been associated with the regime, tends to overlook the domestic roots of the religious fundamentalism or revivalism that is increasingly assuming a regional and even a global dimension.¹¹

In September 1993, the member countries of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) — an organisation coordinating the anti-drought/anti-desertification programmes of a region that includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda — undertook to mediate, under the chairmanship of Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi, an end to Sudan's long civil war. The mediators first convened a meeting with the contending Sudanese factions in Kampala, Uganda, in November 1993. A series of meetings followed in January, March, May, July, and September 1994, and January 4, 1995. Although no visible progress has yet been made toward peace, this initiative differed significantly from the previous ones, at least in clarifying the issues and aiding the process of ripening the conflict for resolution.

It is in the context of this national polarisation and global inertia,



exacerbated by the challenges of Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Rwanda, that the IGADD countries undertook their daring initiative that went beyond fostering talks to address the root causes of the conflict and to chart out the way forward in the quest for a just and lasting peace.

The premise of the IGADD mediators was that the conflict in the Sudan was not merely national, since it had regional repercussions which affected the neighbouring countries.¹² The leaders of the mediation committee also knew the Sudan and its leaders quite well. They were therefore dealing with a familiar problem in a familiar context. Rather than be satisfied with bringing the parties together, they sought to dig deeper into the problem, its root causes, and ways in which it might substantively and procedurally be resolved.¹³

The Declaration of Principles (DOP), which the mediators developed from the stated positions of the parties and presented to the parties at the May 1994 meeting, became the pillars of the peace process. The parties were asked to study the DOP and make their positions known to the Committee at its next session in July. The DOP tried to reconcile the competing perspectives in the conflict. Without prejudging the ultimate outcome, they sought to uphold the right of self-determination as an inalienable right which international law guarantees to any people whose particular circumstances justify its application. The DOP rapidly moved on to advocate giving national unity high priority. But that requires creating conditions of governance that ensure a national consensus based on mutual satisfaction and support. It was therefore considered prudent to agree on an interim period during which conditions for unity would be created and tested. Among these conditions would be separation of religion and the state, a system of Government based on multi-party democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and a large measure of decentralisation through a loose federation or a confederacy. The interim period was to be long enough to allow time for creating those conditions and testing them, but not so long as to create complacency and lethargy on the part of the controlling authorities. After the interim period, the people of the South and other areas that felt equally disadvantaged and who



had taken up arms with the SPLM/SPLA, would be asked to decide by referendum whether to continue the unity arrangement or adopt alternative arrangements, including the right of secession.

At the meeting which took place between 18 and 29 of July 1994, the SPLM/SPLA factions accepted the DOP, while the Government initially resisted it, but was eventually persuaded by the mediators to discuss the principles and register any objections they had on specific issues. The most divisive issues turned out to be the proposed separation between religion and the state and the right of self-determination. At first, the issue appeared to be semantic, with the Government objecting to the terms secularism and self-determination and seemingly receptive to other descriptive terms, such as the neutrality of religion on matters of state and the right of the people of the South to determine their destiny through a referendum. The SPLM/SPLA factions, on the other hand, wanted to stick to the terms, fearing that the Government was seeking to divert attention from the substance through a tactful use of words. Indeed, it soon became obvious that the semantic debate was merely an evasive tactic and that there was in fact a fundamental difference of substance on the issues. The meeting adjourned on the understanding that the parties would consider these main issues and return to the next session with a more definitive response.

The next session, which convened in September 1994 in Nairobi, witnessed a more dramatic affirmation of polarisation, with both parties uncompromisingly holding their stated positions. The SPLM/SPLA factions insisted on secularism and the right of self-determination. With a new leadership for the talks, the Government delegation restated its position with an ideological fervour based on several major arguments. First, secularism was totally out of the question. For them, commitment to *Shari'a* was a religious and moral obligation to an Islamic mission not only in the South, but indeed in Africa, which colonialism had interrupted. They now wanted to take off from the point of colonial interruption to continue the mission which aimed at saving Africa from the ills of western influence which had dominated. Second, self-determination



was a ploy for partitioning the country and therefore unacceptable as a matter of principle. The regime found the country within its present geographical borders and owed it to the past and future generations of the country to preserve it and pass it on as such. Fourthly, the Government objected to the format of the negotiations and preferred shuttle diplomacy to the face-to-face sessions adopted by the mediators. And finally, the Government had initiated its own internal peace process and would surprise the world in the near future with news about the internal achievement of peace.

In the aftermath of this dramatic display of intransigence, the chairman of the Mediation Committee, President Daniel arap Moi, convened a meeting of the Heads of State of the Committee, together with the Sudanese President and the leaders of the SPLM/SPLA factions, on January 4, 1995 in the hope of rescuing the talks. President Bashir of the Sudan reaffirmed the position of his spokesman in front of the Committee, and the SPLM/SPLA leadership also restated the movement's known position.

With polarisation stated in such zero-sum terms, the IGADD initiative seemed to have come to a dead end. However, recognising that the international climate was clearly unfavourable to addressing regional problems at their roots and considering that the conflict in the Sudan had major implications for the region as a whole, the Mediation Committee decided to remain engaged in the peace process, to develop a strategy based on the objective facts of the situation and the need for collaboration between the IGADD Committee on the one hand and the OAU and the international community, led by the United Nations, on the other hand.

Developments in the region, in particular the deterioration in bilateral relations between the Sudan and two members of the IGADD Mediation Committee, Eritrea and Uganda, and more recently Ethiopia, have added to the complications and threaten to undermine the effectiveness of the regional initiative. Both sides have incriminating allegations about subversive activities, including recruiting, training, and deploying 'terrorists' or 'opposition forces' in border areas.



The conflict with Ethiopia emanated from the June 1995 assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt while attending an OAU Summit in Addis Ababa. Ethiopian investigation linked elements in the Sudanese Government with the plot, an allegation the Sudan denied. Three of the terrorists were alleged to have returned to the Sudan from which they had entered Ethiopia. When the Sudan failed to extradite them to Ethiopia to stand trial, the matter was brought to the attention of the OAU and later to the Security Council, both of which adopted resolutions demanding that Sudan hand over the terrorists. Sudan's failure to do so has exacerbated the conflict with the international community in general and Ethiopia in particular.

These events raise a number of questions: Does the IGADD initiative still have a chance of success or should it be declared a failure? Have the countries which now have their own conflicts with the Sudan lost credibility as mediators? If so, who should replace them? Should IGADD be complemented in its peace efforts by countries from other regional groups, such as the OAU or the Arab League?

The mere fact that these questions are raised implies the possibility of conflicting answers. Moving the process from IGADD would be an invitation to begin a search for alternative avenues and actors which has been the predicament of the Sudanese quest for peace over the years. That would indeed play into the hands of the parties' tactic or even strategy of public relations talk about talks without progress toward peace. A more promising approach would be to sustain regional and international support for the IGADD initiative, recognising its strengths and weaknesses, and creatively seeking ways of supplementing it to make up for its shortcomings.

If this approach is accepted, then even the problem areas could be turned into opportunities. On the issue of the credibility of the neighbours as mediators for instance, the fact that they themselves are now in a conflict of low-level intensity with the Sudan underscores the interconnectedness of the conflicts in the region. Members of the IGADD Mediation Committee have made it clear from the start that they do not see themselves as detached and disinterested third parties. Quite the con-



trary, they see the Sudanese conflict as embodying the seeds of a potentially contagious and deadly virus in the region. The unfolding bilateral problems with the Sudan underscore this realism and allude to the even greater potential of region-wide explosions. With these dimensions and their linkages openly acknowledged, both the issues at stake and the urgency of finding a mutually agreeable resolution should become even more compelling for the cooperative security of all in the region.

This point is well illustrated by the degree to which Eritrea, in particular, has openly embraced the opposition and even facilitated the coming together of the various factions under the rubric of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), to adopt a common vision and strategy for the country, articulated in the Asmara Declaration of June 1995. The Declaration in many ways embodies the principles of the IGADD initiative except for the fact that it is premised on the postulated overthrow of the regime.

The Asmara Declaration embodies a three-point agenda for a future Sudan, initially called by the SPLA the New Sudan, but which the other parties of the NDA appear to endorse and pledge to work for and build. The three elements of the agenda are: a multi-party democracy; a transitional period of confederal co-existence between the North and the South; and the exercise of self-determination by the South and marginalised areas of the North bordering the South, which have been embroiled in the civil war.¹⁴

The call for the overthrow of the regime is of course understandable from opposition groups already involved in a struggle to overturn the system. Objectively speaking, however, only a comprehensive peace that involves all major political forces in the country can be reliably sustained. If the alliance of all the opposition groups and the regional and international sympathy and support which it seems to generate can bring the message home to all parties, in particular to the Government, then perhaps the warring parties can be more genuinely motivated to seek a mutually agreeable settlement. The tendency has been that whenever a party has a military advantage, it becomes tempted to push for the max-



imum, while the weaker finds no incentive for negotiating, since the odds would weigh heavily against them. Striking the delicate balance between strength and vulnerability that would support measured compromise, is as difficult as it is essential to motivating moderation.

Hypothetical Analysis of the Course of Events

The story of the Sudanese conflict is essentially one of incomparable perceptions of identity, deep-rooted lack of confidence, and the absence of a third party that can bridge the positions of the parties and guarantee the fulfilment of agreed arrangements. This could have been done before independence by the colonial powers, Britain and Egypt. Despite the resistance of Northern political parties, supported by Egypt, Britain had a leverage not only to mediate such a settlement, but also to ensure international guarantees. However, propelled by their own national interests, the cause of justice and dignity for the Africans in the South was a secondary concern which was easily sacrificed.

Another occasion was the Round Table Conference which was attended by several African countries as observers. The conference was, however, convened at a time when Africa was excessively concerned with the principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries. Any attempt to influence the outcome and to generate regional arrangements to guarantee durable implementation was not conceivable.

Yet another occasion when such guarantees could have been pressed for and conceivably accepted, was the Addis Ababa Agreement, in which both Ethiopia and the OAU played a role. Although the persuasive role of the World Council of Churches was instrumental, Nimeiri stood to gain so much that he might have been persuaded to accept such arrangements. On the other hand, the fact that he later confessed that he had not intended the agreement to be a lasting arrangement, probably argues against such a prospect.

Where preventive diplomacy could have been more vigorously pursued with the prospects of success was when Nimeiri contemplated abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement. The issue was publicly debated, and the



Western friends of the Sudan tried to influence Nimeiri not to do so. By then, Nimeiri was so much favoured in the West and was receiving so much security and development assistance, especially from the United States, that there was considerable leverage. However, the determination of the West, in particular the United States, to influence Nimeiri, was tempered by the global politics of the Cold War. Although the manner in which he negotiated peace in the South was a major factor in his friendship with the West, and the conciliatory climate created by the Addis Accord was also a significant factor in Sudan's support for the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, the United States saw Nimeiri personally as a friend and an ally against Marxist Ethiopia and radical Libya, both of whom were seen as posing a threat against Nimeiri. Accordingly, he had to be supported whatever the weaknesses of his domestic policies. His conciliatory policies which had fostered moderation were relegated to a secondary level of importance, and support for him personally became the core of U.S. policy toward the Sudan. With his domestic peace agenda no longer vital to the support he was receiving, Nimeiri lost the incentive to continue his southern policy and became instead increasingly authoritarian in his one-man rule. Believing himself invincible, and the South incapable of resuming the war, he miscalculated his moves. His division of the South and his imposition of *Shari'a* on the country became the straws that broke his back. Even then, only a few voices in Washington spoke out openly against him; most of the pivotal decision-making circles remained in support of him to the very end.

Another opportune moment for vigorous diplomatic intervention was during the democratic period, following the overthrow of Nimeiri and the transitional period. Sadiq al-Mahdi was basically well-disposed toward ending the war in the South and entered the elections with that disposition. Among the factors that geared him away from that position was the rising profile of the National Islamic Front in the results of the elections when the party rose to third place from a position of negligible electoral weight. Sadiq al-Mahdi in particular saw Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the NIF, as his competitor for national leadership on the Islamic



platform. The other factor that influenced Sadiq al-Mahdi was the rise in the demands of the SPLM/SPLA for the creation of a new Sudan which he saw as both anti-Arab and anti-Islam and therefore not negotiable. A diplomatic intervention that would have reinforced his leadership in the North and moderated the demands of the SPLM/SPLA to be contained within the South might have bridged the gap. But then, the strength of the movement lay largely in the support he was receiving from Mengistu's Ethiopia, which would not have accepted the resolution of the conflict in the South which he was using as a leverage over Sudan's support for Eritrea. It is indeed at this point that the regional security situation becomes inextricably intertwined.

It is this interconnection which gives the IGADD initiative a special significance and potential. The initiative also came at a time of critical developments worldwide. In the wake of the Cold War, the international community is faced with a proliferation of internal and regional conflicts that is overloading the peacekeeping capacity of the United Nations and the major powers. Africa has been especially hard hit, with millions of innocent lives lost in its civil wars. About 16 million of the world's 30 million internally displaced persons and 7 million of its 20 million refugees are Africans.

The response of the international community is becoming less interventionist, as the end of great-power rivalry and new budgetary limitations discourage outside Governments from pursuing activist policies in Africa. Although often still willing to offer emergency humanitarian aid and occasionally taking military action to facilitate such missions, the international community increasingly fails to address the root causes of the continent's crises. The implicit message being received is that outsiders are prepared to assist, but the primary responsibility for solving Africa's problems belongs to Africans themselves.

It is in this context that regional initiatives are assuming an increasing importance. It is also in this context that sub-regional peace efforts in the Sudanese conflict should be viewed.



Process: Post-Conflict Peace-building

The only period in the history of the Sudanese conflict which offers an experience with post-conflict peace-building is the ten-year period of relative peace resulting from the Addis Ababa Accord. Several factors can be identified to explain both the relative success of the agreement and its eventual failure.

The first is that Nimeiri genuinely came across to the Southerners as a benevolent leader who had the interest of the South at heart. This made him appear as an exceptional individual, very unlike other Northern leaders they had known. They were unwaveringly committed to support him as their interest was synonymous with his. When the so-called 'Libyan Invasion' by opposition groups in exile took place in 1976, Southerners in the Palace Guard and regional Government radio in the South, together with prominent Southerners in the Government, contributed significantly to the defeat of the invaders and rallying international supporting behind Nimeiri. Nimeiri demonstrated his commitment to the Southerners by allowing them to run their own affairs through a truly democratic system. Abel Alier, who headed the Southern Government, was also a wise, mild-charactered individual, who was exceedingly sensitive to the concerns of the North in general and of Nimeiri in particular. He therefore posed no threat to the central Government. This attitude on the part of the two leaders to reach out to allay the fears of the other side was an important factor in drawing the two Governments together.

Secondly, Nimeiri also demonstrated personal generosity of attitude toward the South at the initial stages. There was, to be sure, no reliable system of wealth-sharing between the North and the South. Much by way of transfer of resources from the center to the South was conducted through interpersonal relations between central Government ministers and their regional counterparts, at the top of which were Nimeiri and Alier. In addition, Nimeiri was responsive to encouraging foreign donors and international agencies to assist in the relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the South.

Thirdly, as a result of these largely symbolic gestures, the South experi-



enced a shift away from a separatist inclination to a genuine desire to make unity work. The South became even more committed to unity than the North seemed to be then. Indeed, there was a feeling in the North that with the South enjoying a degree of democratic freedoms which were denied the North, and a seeming attention from the President in distributional terms, the region was having a comparative advantage over the North.

On the negative side, which sowed the seeds of eventual resumption of hostilities, several factors can be identified. Perhaps the most important factor was that the agreement only partially addressed the identity crisis of the country, by giving the South limited recognition as an African appendix in a national framework, that was still largely Arab and Islamic. Southerners could at best be free to enjoy regional power, but they still occupied the status of second or third class citizens at the national level.

A second factor was that as the South began to make demands for a more equitable sharing of power and wealth and blamed Abel Alier for being too complacent in representing Southern interests at the national level, the North in general, and the President in particular, became concerned about what was brewing there. Alier was voted out of office in favour of General Joseph Lagu, who had led the Southern movement during the war. Lagu soon ran against the obstacles of the Northern power structures and became in turn accused of weakness and complacency. Alier was re-elected with a mandate to be more assertive. This time, the original basis of mild gentlemanly cooperation became replaced by hard representative politics from the South. Nimeiri could not swallow the change. Worse, he saw this militant democracy as a bad example to the North which was reeling under his authoritarian presidency. This was largely his reason for deciding to abrogate the Addis Ababa Accord.

A third factor was that the agreement never reflected a national consensus. Indeed, once Nimeiri had alienated the extreme right and the extreme left, he needed to cultivate the center to provide him with a base. The centrists, who became his advisors, were moderates who saw resolving the war in the South as an opportunity for winning the Southern con-



stituency. When the opposition groups staged the 1976 'Libya invasion', Nimeiri saw the threat to his regime coming from the North and not the South, which he assumed had been irreversibly won over and pacified.

In sum, the Addis Ababa Agreement fell short of addressing the cleavages between the North and the South in depth and developing sustainable formulas for sharing power and wealth within a national identification framework that would embrace all Sudanese on a fairly equitable footing. In order for conflict not to re-occur, genuine differences should not be glossed over, but must instead be openly discussed and solutions found, which, though not perfect, all the major parties to the conflict can live with in a sustainable way.

Process: Leverage

The issue of leverage can be approached from the perspective of the relative power of the conflicting parties or the influence of a mediator on the parties. Generally speaking, the former has been more pertinent to the Sudanese situation than the latter, although the Addis Ababa negotiations which ended the first phase of the war have some relevancy to the leverage of third parties.

Although regime changes have rarely brought about a fundamental change in the policies toward the South, they have generally created a climate more conducive to a serious reflection on the situation in search of solutions. These changes have often come about as a result of the military situation in the South and its impact on the national economy. More often than not, change has come about not so much because the Government has failed to respond to the demands of the South, but rather because it has failed to win the war. That is why following the change, successor Governments have generally tended to be even more vigorous in prosecuting the war. This was the case with the 1958-64 military regime; it was also the case after the return of democracy in 1965; and certainly, it has been conspicuously true of the present Islamic regime. There have, however, been exceptions to this pattern. The transitional Government of 1964-65, following the overthrow of the military



rule, was an example. The other transitional Government, following the overthrow of Nimeiri, also tried to reach out to the SPLM/SPLA and generated a momentum that promised a constructive dialogue. They were, however, rebuffed by the SPLM/SPLA as a continuation of Nimeiri's military rule. This was in part because the movement did not expect its vision of the New Sudan to be acceptable to the new rulers and in part because such a settlement would probably have been premature for Mengistu's strategic calculations and therefore unacceptable. The most outstanding exception to the pattern of escalation associated with regime change was Nimeiri's revolution, even though the first two years were comparable to the 1964-65 transitional Government in that it remained ambivalent in its quest for peace. It was only after the agreement was concluded that peace became the Government's main achievement and the core of its ideology for governance.

To the extent that the war in the South has been instrumental to changes in Government, it can be argued that the rebel movements have had a leverage, albeit not decisive enough to achieve their objectives. Of course, the Government has always been more powerful than the rebels, but not to the degree of winning the war. And as long as the rebels pursue guerrilla tactics to destabilise the situation, with most of the countryside under their influence, if not control, there can be no victor or vanquished. Stalemate has been the general pattern, although it has rarely been sufficiently mutually detrimental. On the whole, except for economic repercussions for the North, the war has been fought in the South and perceived by most Northerners as remote. Ironically, the intensification of the conflict by the present Government, characterising it as a holy war and inspiring religiously driven *mujahdeen*, mostly young and inexperienced, to volunteer or be conscripted, has now made the North more aware of the human suffering and sacrifices inflicted by the war. Whether this is making the stalemate mutually hurting enough to motivate the Government toward a genuine search for a just peace remains to be seen, but is unlikely if it entails compromising on the highly emotive issues of religion.



As for the leverage of third parties, the paradox of the Sudanese situation is that while the country occupies a strategic geographic location on the continent, linking sub-Saharan Africa with its Northern part and the Middle East, it remains peripheral or marginal to its core identities. As a result, while both sides have sought sympathy and support from their respective identity groups in Africa and the Arab-Muslim world, no vital interests have prompted sustained diplomatic intervention in search of a just and lasting peace. If Africans, Arabs, and Muslims in general had realised that Sudan has potential for fostering cooperation or tearing them asunder, they might have been more inspired to invest diplomatically and materially in the achievement of peace and unity. Instead, whatever investment is made is significant enough to perpetuate an internecine warfare with a relatively low-level balance of power.

As pointed out earlier, the Addis Ababa talks of 1972 were somewhat exceptional in that peace came about through the sustained effort of the World Council of Churches as the primary mover, with the moral and political leverage of Emperor Haile Sellasie of Ethiopia and the backing of the OAU. The agreement also received considerable support throughout the world and had the effect of fostering Afro-Arab cooperation. That the West invested heavily in relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes in the South also provided a leverage for sustaining the peace momentum.

In the current war, individual mediators have tended to depend on their stature and their moral weight as peacemakers. This was certainly the case with General Obasanjo, former Head of State of Nigeria. Jimmy Carter had the added leverage of being a former President of the United States who still wielded considerable influence at home and abroad. But neither of them could threaten consequences or offer rewards. Perhaps General Babangida, as President of Nigeria, a country with considerable resources, and Chairman of the OAU, had more leverage under his immediate control. And indeed, Nigeria was able to sustain a momentum in the negotiation process that exceeded previous efforts.

The more recent efforts of IGADD appear to signal more leverage in a number of ways. First, they represent a genuine sub-regional involve-



ment based on the mutuality of interests. Second, they went beyond the usual mediation limits to define elements of the problem and identify principles for resolving them. Third, they were not put off by the intransigence of the parties, but instead put the negotiating process on hold while working to influence developments on the ground, thereby helping the conflict become ripe for resolution. These measures signify a new attitude toward internal conflicts.

On the other hand, precisely because the mediators have gone into the domestic source of the conflict and have associated their own national interest with the Sudanese situation, they have provoked an adverse reaction from the Sudanese Government, which now sees them as no longer neutral. What the mediators are prescribing is a fundamental restructuring of relationships among the Sudanese and in particular between the North and the South. What the Government is prepared to do is accommodate the South in a Sudan that still reflects the vision of the North as the national framework. It is no wonder that the less acceptable the IGADD Declaration of Principles is to the Government, the more they have been embraced by the SPLM/SPLA and the South in general. That these principles have now become accepted by the NDA, which comprises all opposition groups, is a significant step forward in the search for peace. It remains to be seen whether this agreement will be honoured if and when the circumstances permit its implementation.

Lessons from the Sudanese Case

Perhaps the most significant lesson to be learned from the Sudanese case is the difficulty of managing or resolving identity conflicts. Since identity issues are deep-rooted and exceedingly sensitive, they are difficult even to discuss, let alone to resolve. The tendency on the part of those who dominate the status quo is to deny the essence of the problem and give it more palatable labels, which, while pertinent, represent partial truth at best and distortions at worst. When Northern Sudanese point at their dark skin colour and say that race is not a problem, claiming that they are Arabs only culturally, they appear to be correct on the face of things.



But they conceal, even deliberately, that Sudanese Arabs do indeed believe themselves genetically Arab, take exceeding pride in their Arab ancestry, and look down on the African heritage. In any case, even if the issue were culture not race, cultural chauvinism should not be any more acceptable than racial bigotry. When race, culture and religion are merged into a composite identity which is then projected to define the nation, the crisis becomes a zero-sum contest for the soul of the nation.

Under those circumstances, even diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict tend to shy away from the embittering truth because it points the path to failure. And yet, the problem cannot be wished away and solutions based on half-truths are not likely to endure. In a sense, the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 was an ambivalent attempt at resolving the national identity crisis in that it recognised the South as racially, culturally and religiously different from the North and accommodated it as such. This was done by giving the South a corner in the country, while leaving the national framework still defined and dominated by the Arab-Islamic identity of the North, with only marginal, largely symbolic gestures toward the South at the center.

While the case of the Sudan, as was the case in apartheid South Africa, is extreme in degree, most, if not all, African countries confront crises of identity in varying degrees. Generally, African countries deal with these identity crises through pragmatic policies of relatively equitable distribution. Otherwise no doctrine or formula has been developed for resolving or managing conflicts of identity. The dilemma Africans face is to recognise and build upon their diverse regionally-defined ethnic entities and risk fostering divisiveness and impeding national integration or deny their existence, not only as demand-making groups, but also as assets or resources for nation-building and promoting self-sustaining, development from within. This dilemma cannot be resolved by oblivion, but rather by dialogue and sincerity in addressing the problems involved.

Along the same lines, diplomatic intercession that seeks quick fixes in addressing such complex issues can only complicate the crisis. There is a tendency on the part of diplomatic peacemakers to look for aspects of



a problem that lend themselves to relatively easy solutions and to postpone more difficult ones. While this is understandable, and perhaps even practical, it is probably the more difficult ones that eventually provoke people to violent confrontation, making them determined to kill and risk being killed.

Are identity conflicts as unmanageable as they are generally perceived? The answer probably depends on how available options are framed. If the only options are that one identity group is excluded from the collective framework, forced to deny its existence through policies of assimilation, or accommodated only partially through discriminatory policies and practices, then of course neither of these can be acceptable. If, on the other hand, the options are framed in terms of redefining the national framework in a way that will allow all nationals to qualify equally as citizens with a sense of pride in belonging on relatively equitable footing, share power and national resources as identifiable groups with the common goal of preserving national unity, co-exist in a pluralistic framework that ensures mutual respect and relative equality, or as a fourth option, part ways amicably and seek cooperative bases of relating to one another as friendly neighbours, then these ought to offer a discussible range of options.

What the Sudanese situation calls for, and which is a lesson that can be learnt from the experience, is a sustained dialogue aimed at openly and courageously addressing the nature of the relations and ways of readjusting them to make and sustain peace.



Endnotes

- 1 In Sudan, unlike other African countries with a Muslim population, Islam is closely associated with the Arabic language, culture, and race, perhaps because of the historical association with the Arab world and in particular with Egypt. For the contrasting models of Islam in sub-Saharan and Northern Africa, see Omar H. Kokole, "The Islamic Factor in African-Arab Relations", in *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 6 (July 1984), pp. 687-701. According to the author, while African countries south of the Sahara underwent Islamisation, North Africa experienced two processes: Islamisation and Arabisation. "With time the North Africans came to see themselves as 'Arabs'." p. 688.
- 2 For a background on the conflict and a history of the first phase of the war, see Mohamed Omar Bashir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1968, republished by Khartoum University Press, 1979). See also Dunstan M. Wai, *The Southern Sudan: A Problem of National Integration* (London: Frank Cass, 1973) and *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan* (New York and London: Africana Publishing Company, 1981). For a Southern point of view, see William Deng and Joseph Oduho, *The Problem of the Southern Sudan* (Oxford: Institute of Race Relations, 1962); and Oliver Albino, *The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint* (Guildford and London: Billing & Sons, 1970).
- 3 For a detailed account of the Addis Ababa Agreement, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Peace and Unity in the Sudan: An African Achievement* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1973); Mohamed Omar Bashir, *Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace* (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1975). For the negotiations that led to the agreement, see Dunstan M. Wai, *African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan* (New York, London: Africana Publishing Company, 1981); Hizkias Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies — The Sudan Conflict* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987); and Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured* (Exeter: Ithaca Press, 1990).
- 4 For the reaction of the SPLM/SPLA, see John Garang de Mabior, "Statement to the Sudanese People on the Current Situation in the Sudan", General Headquarters, SPLM/SPLA, August 10, 1989.
- 5 Between September 9 and October 21, 1989, the government convened a National Dialogue Conference on Peace Issues, whose principal recommendation for solving the country's problems of regional, ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity was a federal constitution. The government endorsed the recommendations of the conference and the SPLM-SPLA acknowledged them, along with recommendations from other sources, as useful bases for constitutional talks. For the official report on the conference, see Steering Committee for National Dialogue on Peace Issues, *Final Report and Recommendations*, (Khartoum 1989), the so-called *Red Book*. The report was officially endorsed and reissued as "The Government's Peace Programme for Negotiations with the SPLM-SPLA" in November, 1989 with an "Introduction" by Colonel Mohamed al Amin Khalifa, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation and Chairman of the National Dialogue.



- 6 The latest initiative by the countries of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought and Desertification, IGADD, shows a more sustained commitment to the search for a just and lasting solution, but even that seems to have reached a dead-end as the parties remain committed to seemingly unbridgeable positions on the critical issues of secularism and self-determination. For more on the IGADD peace initiative, see the *Sudan Democratic Gazette: A Newsletter for Democratic Pluralism*, nos. 48-54, May to November 1994.
- 7 Abdelwahab El-Affendi, "Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa", in *African Affairs (Journal of the Royal African Society)*, Vol. 89 (July 1990), p. 371.
- 8 Francis Mading Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
- 9 See Alexis Heraclides, "Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement", *International Organisation*, Summer 1990, vol. 44, pp. 341-377
- 10 Francis M. Deng, "Negotiating a Hidden Agenda: Sudan's Conflict of Identities" in I. William Zartman, ed., *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994).
- 11 See Francis M. Deng, "Islamic Fundamentalism in the Sudan: A Symptom of an Identity Crisis", in Hans d'Orville, *Perspectives of Global Responsibility*, (New York: InterAction Council 1993). See also Deng, "Egypt's Dilemmas on the Sudan", in *Middle East Policy*, September 1995, vol. IV, pp. 50-56.
- 12 For the interconnectedness of the regional security among the Horn countries, see Terrence Lyons, "The Horn of Africa Regional Politics", in W. Howard Triggins, ed., *Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992) pp. 155-209.
- 13 For an example of the mediators' perspective on the conflict, the bases for their mediation, and the issues involved, see the position paper by the Government of Eritrea.
- 14 Bona Malwal, "The NDA Asmara Declaration: A Crossroads Between Acceptable Unity and Partition for Sudan".

