

# INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT



**REPORT ON THE**

**IGAD-FEWER TEAM START-UP**

**WORKSHOP ON THE CREATION OF A**

**CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND**

**RESPONSE MECHANISM (CEWARN)**

*DJIBOUTI, 26-27<sup>th</sup> April 2000*

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## THE REPORT ON THE IGAD-FEWER TEAM START-UP WORKSHOP ON THE CREATION OF CEWARN

Djibouti April 26-27<sup>th</sup> 2000

### INTRODUCTION

1. The Start-up Workshop on the creation of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) for the IGAD region was held in Djibouti from April 26-27<sup>th</sup> April 2000. The workshop was attended by the consultancy team from the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response, responsible for formulating a proposal for the creation of CEWARN, members of the sponsoring agencies: USAID and GTZ and members of IGAD.

### OPENING

2. In his opening address, Professor Benson Mochoge, Acting Executive Secretary of IGAD, welcomed the participants to the start-up workshop. The Acting Executive Secretary maintained that IGAD was at the forefront of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in the Horn of Africa. He added that Early Warning and Early Response were an integral part of avoiding, mitigating and managing conflict. Regarding the creation of CEWARN he expressed his desire for the creation and institutionalisation of a practical and workable system that could produce tangible results in the region.
3. Following the welcoming address of the Acting Executive Secretary the Chief of CPM&R, IGAD, Dr. Kipyego Cheluget, reiterated the Terms of Reference for the Program on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in the IGAD region listed by Professor Mochoge, namely:
  - (I) 9.1 - The assessment of capacities in the IGAD region for conflict prevention, management and resolution. (II)
  - 9.2 - The documentation and elaboration of the demobilization and post-conflict peace-building experience in the region .
  - (III) 9.3 - The elaboration of a proposal for a programme component to promote a culture of peace and tolerance in the region.
  - (IV) 9.4 - The development of a conflict early warning mechanism for the region.
4. Dr. Cheluget also briefly delineated IGAD's role in the Sudan and Somali Peace Processes and expressed IGAD's deep concern over the ongoing hostilities between two IGAD members, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the involvement of another, Uganda, in the prevailing conflict of the Great Lakes region.
5. On a final note Dr. Cheluget thanked the two members of IPF present at the meeting, namely USAID and GTZ, for their active support of IGAD in political and other fields, including its principles.

## INTRODUCTION BY FEWER TEAM LEADER

6. The leader of the FEWER Team, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat began his address by thanking IGAD for affording his team the opportunity to take part in the establishment of CEWARN. He maintained that this was a positive sign of greater co-operation between IGAD, non-governmental organisations and other members of civil society.
7. The Ambassador pointed out that the Horn region has been prone to conflict for the past five decades and at present is unique insofar as it is the only region where there is a failed state. This reality, he maintained, is sobering and should alert us to the many challenges to peace that still remain.
8. The Ambassador added that conflicts cannot be considered isolated phenomena. There exist conflict systems with shifting epicentres. It is therefore important to remain cognisant of the fact that conflicts in one theatre can and do impact upon conflicts in others. He stated that the use of force has been a predominant feature in the Horn. Moreover, he continued, a common and recurrent factor among the leaders of the region is the breaking of peace agreements. A paramount challenge, therefore, is how to ensure that agreements are honoured.
9. Another challenge facing the region pointed out by Ambassador Kiplagat, was the nature of relationships between governments and civil society, which have tended to be suspicious, hostile or altogether non-existent.
10. Having said this the Ambassador maintained that there were some signs of hope as evidenced by the emerging desire among some leaders in the region to address their differences and engage in greater co-operation on matters of security and economic development.
11. The Ambassador concluded his introductory address by emphasising that in the quest for peace in the region, all stakeholders must be involved: government leaders, civil society, the private sector, international organisations and so on.

PRESENTATION OF THE FEWER TEAM ACTION PLAN FOR THE FEASIBILITY STUDY ON THE CREATION OF CEWARN FOR THE IGAD REGION

12. The FEWER Team began their presentation with a list of who they would consult as a part of their feasibility study toward the formulation of a proposal on the creation of CEWARN. The list was as follows:

12.1. Who to meet:

- Ministries of Foreign Affairs: Heads of African/Political affairs
- Ministers/state secretaries
- Internal Security
- Military Academy
- Security/Intelligence
- Regional CS in Conflict Resolution
- International Relief/Hum. NGOs: OXFAM, CRS, Action Aid, ICRC, CARE, World Vision
- Church groups active in the region
- Local NGOs
- Academic Community
- Press
- Parliament: Security Committee/Foreign Affairs/Interest groups
- Diplomats
- Opposition

12.2 Who on the FEWER Team/Where?

Kenya: Howard Adelman/Susanne Schmeidl

Uganda: Sandra Ayoo/Bethuel Kiplagat

Ethiopia (OAU/ECA): Tom Hockley/Susanne Schmeidl/Howard Adelman/Abbas Gnamo

Eritrea: Gunther Baechler/Bethuel Kiplagat

Sudan: Abbas Gnamo/Bethuel Kiplagat

Somalia: Abbas Gnamo

Djibouti: Ciru Mwaura

Other probable contacts:

- ISS (South Africa)
- SADAC (Botswana)
- OCHA/Relief Web (Geneva)
- Relevant organizations based in Brussels
- Relevant organizations based in Switzerland
- Relevant organizations based in UK
- Relevant organizations based in Canada
- US: UN and other FEWER systems

12.3 Conflict Analysis: a brief list of pertinent questions and issues was presented:

- EW must be regarded as a continuing, structured and evolving process.
- Which conflicts concern you most in the region? (Why, root causes, trends)
- Which of these are amenable to conflict management? (NGOs, Govt. officials: awareness, approaches)
- Which is the most appropriate approach?
- What role should IGAD play?
- Which crisis prevention mechanisms are effective? (Role of Civil Society)
- How do you train people e.g. in institutions?

12.4 Institutions: the following points were made:

- 1) What existing institutions are vested with responsibilities for:
  - Information gathering/sharing?
  - Conflict analysis/creating scenarios, communication?

Early Warning and Early Response is a continuous system. It involves collecting *and* analyzing information. The UN tends to have problems with the latter because of political obstacles. EW should be more anticipatory than predictive: creating scenarios, assessing the likelihood of each and how to respond to them. EW systems are supposed to be disinterested systems.

- 2) The FEWER Teams' emphasis is on conflict management and mitigation: less ambitious than *resolution* or *prevention*.
- 3) There is a need to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of existing systems/mechanisms.
- 4) How do you envision overcoming these weaknesses?
- 5) What linkages exist with other institutions related to EW and Conflict Management?
- 6) Do independent modes exist for evaluating the effectiveness of such mechanisms?
- 7) What role does/should IGAD play?
- 8) Has anyone taken courses/training in EW/Conflict Prevention?

12.5. Information

- 1) What are your sources of information on factors contributing to conflict?
  - Relevance/context (who are the actors/what are their aims vis a vis conflict)
  - Accessibility of information: often hidden/difficult to access.
  - Accuracy of information: to what extent does one use media for EW? What are the dangers? E.g. Bias/sensationalisation/propaganda.
  - Importance of multiple sources of information.
  - Do you share information: With whom? How much? Through what channels?

- Can you envision a way to:
  - (a) Share information with IGAD?
  - (b) Act upon information distributed by IGAD?
- Where do you perceive gaps, constraints, and weaknesses with respect to collection/analysis/communication?

## 12.6 Expected Outcomes

- 1) To draw conclusions from a regional Conflict Analysis.
- 2) To select options from an information concept.
- 3) To make decisions concerning institutional and legal aspects of CEWARN.
- 4) To discuss a regional EW system with interested actors.
- 5) To establish an adapted EW system for the Horn area.
- 6) To train people adequately.

13. Donors: the donor representatives present made the following remarks:

### GTZ

- Generally pleased with presentations and discussion.
- Need for cautious optimism with respect to overall outcome.
- The endeavour should be regarded as a *process* and *joint* effort.

### USAID

- Hope that at end of process IGAD will take the ball and run with it. Hope that the whole process will sensitize the region toward the importance of establishing an EW & ER system.
- Need for more connection/linkage between regional organizations/information sharing/importance of relevant staff training.
- Reiteration of the need for cautious optimism as to the outcome of this process: it will be long, complex and difficult.

### EU

- Unless there is the will at the political level then the process will be hamstrung from the outset.
- Hopes that gathering of raw data as a part of EW will have a strong influence on those who can actually effect change, be they international organizations or governments. Important to talk about peace building vs. only conflict prevention.

14. The next item on the agenda was a discussion of the extent to which the 9.1 initiative (outlined above) overlapped with the CEWARN initiative (9.4)

FEWER TEAM: Stressed that there is a need to sit down and establish the extent of overlap between the two initiatives. There is a marketing component to the study: sensitising stakeholders. A practical outcome is also envisioned for the study vs. solely educational outcomes. The team also maintained that it is ready and willing to take recommendations and to synthesize already established information systems/networks/ conflict analyses. The onus, they explained, is on IGAD to direct the FEWER Team regarding particular concerns, contacts and goals.

USAID: Mentioned the importance of talking with Martin Landruff, a conflict expert in Brussels, with regard to the development of 9.1.

EU: Stressed the need to use the rich network of information that already exists on these issues.

POHAD: (Political and Humanitarian Affairs Division: IGAD) The chief of humanitarian affairs, Mr. Keflemariam Sebhatu, pointed out that a "Sub-regional Disaster Preparedness Strategy Paper" is being finalized by the Humanitarian Affairs division of IGAD's POHAD office in conjunction with other organizations e.g. FAO and that it is relevant to the CEWARN proposal.

A number of comments were then made on/questions posed about, the consultancy report done by Professor John Markakis for a project formulation exercise focusing on the 9.1 initiative:

- How can 9.4 and IGAD benefit from the 9.1 initiative?
- It was established that the timeline of Markakis' research is in two phases:
  - 1) Creation of TOR (Markakis is designing the TOR)
  - 2) In the process of drafting: expected to be complete by September (three months hence.)
- A desire for linkages between 9.1 and 9.4 and a clearer road map for what sort of linkages can be made was expressed.
- The FEWER Team raised some of the problems that they found with the report:
  - (I) Conceptual problems with the document e.g.: (1) 2.1 p.12, the claim that the CPM&R is a new field of research is untrue. (2) The definitions of conflict used by Markakis are debatable (II) Timeline problems: 9.1 is in its initial stages and 9.4 is now getting well underway. This said, the team felt that there is a need to keep the EU on board.
- There was agreement that there should be a meeting as soon as possible between the 9.1 Leeds consultancy team and the FEWER Team in London to discuss

possibilities for linkages, the dangers of duplication and so on.

15. A number of questions were then asked of the FEWER Team by the IGAD staff and donor representatives present. The questions and their respective answers varied as follows:

15.1 Q: Current meetings on CPM&R in region: is the FEWER Team aware of these? Can the FEWER Team attend/talk to relevant parties?

15.2 Q: Will associations such as farmers/women be consulted as apart of the study? Will the FEWER Team hire local consultants? Regarding NGOs, how will hostile NGO-Government relations in some areas be addressed?

*A: The FEWER Team is well aware of the importance of consulting women and of their important role in CPMR. Local consultants/academics will be involved. Indeed NGO-govt. relations may be hostile, therefore there is a need to perhaps hold meetings to try and air differences/foster co-operation.*

15.3 Q: Will IGAD staff accompany FEWER Team consultants at certain stages of the study? There may be difficulties without IGAD representatives present to establish your purpose/intentions.

15.4 Q: Are there not dangers in spreading your team too thinly?

15.5 Q: Is the FEWER Team proposing the creation of offices like IRIN/Relief Web?

15.6 Q: There seems to be a failure to distinguish between IGAD the AUTHORITY and the SECRETARIAT.

*A: The FEWER Team is well aware that IGAD is an intergovernmental organization and of the differences between the AUTHORITY and the SECRETARIAT.*

15.7 Q: To what extent does capacity building in 9.4 overlap with that of 9.1?

15.8 Q: IGAD as an intergovernmental agency lacks the independence of NGOs/private organizations: emphasis on results, pragmatism.

15.9 Q: If intelligence is not gleaned only from the media, where else will it be gleaned from? More specifically, how will the private sector be contacted?

*A: Local "informants" and contacts have been used in information gathering exercises before: e.g. past predictions in Nigeria of uprisings against the military junta govt. Religious violence was predicted but not acted upon. Creating CEWARN is not an easy undertaking: suspicion, ongoing conflict. NOTE: The FEWER Team has not come with a MODEL in mind, but is willing to*

*consider other experiences and systems in place or that have been attempted to inform the creation of IGAD's CEWARN.*

15.10 Q: EW and Conflict Analysis: is it implied that the FEWER Team will also focus on potential areas of conflict vs. those that are already embroiled in conflict?

*A: The FEWER Team is concerned with SYSTEMATIC EW which focuses also on potential conflict situations vs. only on case study hot spots. Forecasting is generally a difficult exercise but this does not mean that one should cease in attempts to refine and improve forecasting systems.*

15.11 Q: Does the proposal envision the creation of an enabling mechanism that can effect tangible results? How can information be gleaned from the ground/the front line where situations are already precarious/unstable?

*A: IGAD being an Authority may have the potential to establish information-sharing agreements that can lead to access to this information? Where remote areas cannot be accessed EW requires training to recognize signs of brewing conflict. In many situations of potential conflict the signs are almost always there but what is lacking is the political will to defuse the situation/publicize the situation. Governments are inclined to use NGOs, organizations when it suits them and discard/ignore them when it does not. It is thus important to involve stakeholders such as parliament who can challenge establishments and perhaps stimulate political will.*

15.12 Q: (I) We need to remain cognizant of the roots of conflicts that lie outside of the region: international roots for instance. (II) Also there is the handicap of poor communications networks/roads e.t.c thus how can unstable regions be accessed and assessed in terms of potential for conflict? (III) Concern that the time allocated to the FEWER Team to establish a proposal is not enough. (IV) Need to link EW to small arms proliferation (V) Need to ensure that legal instruments are in place to allow IGAD to operate at a regional level.

15.13 Q: How does the FEWER Team envision overcoming cultural obstacles to gathering information?

15.14 Q: ECOWAS has a Protocol on conflict prevention and has a specific component dealing with EW, which is institutionalized within the ECOWAS Secretariat. Indeed, there are several observation zones among ECOWAS member states, which feed information to the epicenter of the Secretariat. Does the ECOWAS model offer a foundation upon which an IGAD EW model can be established?

*A: Assessing other EW systems such as the model designed by ECOWAS is envisioned as part of the FEWER Teams' study. It should be noted, however, that the ECOWAS model has not been operationalized into a process. IGAD's CEWARN initiative is therefore quite innovative because it is linking both*

*process and research. The FEWER Team is planning a feasibility study that will occur in phases in the lead-up to an actual plan.*

15.15 Q: Impact assessment and evaluation: How do we analyze what the FEWER Team is doing and how effective it is?

A: *Among other things:*

- *Daily checklists (are we achieving what we planned to do?)*
- *Critical analyses of proposal components (continuing process)*
- *Final evaluation: was the job done? What type of evaluation does IGAD/do the donors want?*

16. Timeline: The FEWER Team then presented the timeline for the feasibility study.

- Four workshops are planned during the course of the study, which is expected to be held between July and December.
- The First (PHASE I) Presentation of Research Findings: July (5-7) Venue: Nairobi. Participants have been proposed (including SADC and COMESA) and IGAD's input here is needed.
- The Second (PHASE II) Options, Priorities: September (11-13)
- The Third (PHASE III) Implementation workshop: October (30 – Nov. 1)
- The Fourth: December
- London meeting on Country Reports: FEWER Team June 19-21

It was proposed that all workshops be held in the region, and in particular: Kampala, Nairobi, and Djibouti. It is expected that all workshops will be participatory with all delegates adding to the value of the workshops. Workshop participation is expected to comprise 29 delegates and 11 team members equalling a total of 40. Workshops are expected to be 3 days long: 2 days for discussion and 1 day for evaluation by the core team.

16.1 Themes of workshop 1

- Overview of conflict situation in the region with an emphasis on EW
- Conflict systems and analysis: economic, political, social.
- Operationalization of EW
- Conflict management institutions/ legal institutions and processes

Seven presentations are expected in the first workshop based on papers that will have been distributed and read before hand.

16.2 Action needed/considerations:

- Finalization of participants so that invitations can be sent out in a timely fashion.
- Ceremonial aspects of workshops need to be devised.
- Cultural evening/night with local press, dignitaries, participants?
- How is the media to be used? It is crucial to advertise at the outset that the process is an IGAD initiative.

16.3 Concerns: (Concerns expressed/comments made are in regular font and responses/answers in Italics)

- Venue of Nairobi: can it be changed? The city might offer too many distractions to participants.
- Who will be invited to the high level meeting? Will members of the Council attend? What do we want to achieve from the meeting?  
*FEWER Team: Hoping for technical staff to be present vs. Council, who can comment on proposal and offer technical input. Important to determine which govt. members will be present who can sell the concept. IGAD is well placed to sell CEWARN to the member states. There will be a draft document that can be proposed for implementation: the mandate is already there.*
- What are the strategies for marketing the process in the region?
- Given the large number of potential stakeholders how will members of the proposed 40 participants be selected?  
*The FEWER Teams' selection criteria include seeking a balance between governmental and non-governmental specialists, and between genders, to the greatest extent possible. The FEWER Team does not feel that the all of the same participants should attend each workshop (with some exceptions).*
- There are concerns that 40 participants are too few. On the other hand having too many participants might not be constructive: i.e. enrich the feasibility study  
*The first conference should perhaps have 40 participants. However, maybe in the second and third conferences the numbers can be increased/decreased as the situation requires: flexibility is needed.*

## **DAY 2 Thursday April 27<sup>th</sup>:**

17. Discussion of various issues from the previous day

- Recap of yesterday's issues concerning overlap of 9.1 and 9.4. Professor Adelman felt that there was still too much overlap/duplication. In his view, therefore, 9.1 should be responsible for inventory and evaluation of existing institutions rather than both 9.1 and 9.4 both doing this. For its part, 9.4 should focus on developing perspective models of what might work and the norms and ways of evaluating the existing institutions. Essentially it is desired that the research done by 9.1 inform the options available to 9.4. Complementarity versus duplication is desired.
- It was also stated that 9.4 should eliminate causal analyses of conflict from its agenda and focus predominantly on creating the final project proposal.
- Q: Cost feasibility: what kind of cost parameters are there for implementation? (Question posed to GTZ and USAID by FEWER Team)  
*A: There exists a range. The operation is quite uncertain. What the donors need are options based on a variety of different potential outcomes. USAID: assume less rather than more, especially given the uncertain political environment of the US during the upcoming election year. Therefore it is important to be cautious at first. It is also important not to limit the development of CEWARN with financial considerations: if the product is valued, then resources must be sought not only from GTZ and USAID but member states themselves, for instance.*

- FEWER Team would like greater clarification from USAID on the criteria tied to the use of their \$US400,000 budget. Moreover, the question was raised on whether there were constraints on participants from Sudan. It was proposed that these issues be dealt with in a smaller meeting later.
- Professor Adelman asked whether USAID,GTZ and IGAD could be present as observers at the FEWER Team meeting based on the completed country reports in June. It was agreed that there was some likelihood that a representative from each stakeholder could attend.

18. The purpose of a Legal System within the feasibility study was then pointed out by the FEWER Team:

- To set a framework of law establishing what information is allowed. The documentation of all existing law codes pertinent to establishing what is and is not allowed
- Determining whether state laws permit a certain kind of operation and if not what sort of legal manoeuvring is required.

19. There was then further discussion on the timeline of the feasibility study:

- Dr. Greeley of USAID proposed that the FEWER Team draft short summaries of the activities planned in their timeline of action.
- The FEWER Team expressed that they would like a list of the relevant conferences that are going to be happening this year so that they can be included in their timeline.
- Dr. Cheluget had queries about what the FEWER Team intends to propose regarding *information systems, conflict analysis and institutions*. He reiterated the desire for proposals for practical tools and devices that can be used by IGAD's POHAD office c.f. ECOWAS/ECOMOG.

In response to the above the FEWER Team made the following points: *With respect to (I) Conflict Analysis: The FEWER Team definitely wants to avoid regurgitating already existing information and simply putting in it another form. Their plan aims to address political, economic and humanitarian issues: two pages or so under each section on what areas need to be looked at that can contribute to CEWARN. (II) Information systems: The team is concerned with assessing constraints that exist in terms of technical issues: email, telephone communication e.t.c. It is also concerned with providing IGAD with a means of obtaining information it does not have access to at the moment and how it can access this information for purposes of EW. The team also envisions IGAD to serving the function of a facilitator comprising, perhaps: an information unit responsible for collecting and distributing information; a conflict analysis unit; a training unit; a research unit researching retrospectively and contemporarily (even retrospective analyses are important since important lessons can be learnt from past crises); and a unit linked to parliament. In sum a decentralized multiple source system is envisioned for IGAD.*

20. The Economic Dimensions of conflict within the feasibility study were then listed in brief by the FEWER Team.

- The aim is to look at common economic issues in the region that can influence conflict: IMF/WB reforms, debt and so on. The general approach is a politico-economic analysis of studies at the micro and macro level as well as the influence of power structures on the economy and in turn on society at large.
- Issues such as land reform, cattle rustling, famine, economic marginalization will also be researched.
- Markets of conflict: a study of the economy of war. Who benefits from conflict and desires its continuation?
- This economic analysis will draw from the economic issues identified in each country report/and by the national consultants and synthesize them.
- Issues will be analyzed on a case by case basis.

21. A tentative list of participants to the proposed workshops was then presented:

#### ERITREA

- Professor Alexander Nati
- Naigzy Gebre Medin
- Govt. Rep.

#### ETHIOPIA

- Teffera Shiawl
- Ali Said (Humanitarian)
- Professor Eshetu

#### UGANDA

- Sam Tulia
- Onyango Oloka
- Stella Sabiti
- Winnie Byanyema

#### SUDAN (Being revisited to balance the North and South)

- Dr. Priscilla Joseph
- Tilar Deng
- Al-Batta Hami
- Pauline Riak

#### KENYA

- Bertha Amisi
- Karim Kinoti
- Makumi Mwagiru

#### DJIBOUTI (Pending discussion with Saferworld and IGAD)

#### REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. ECOWAS
2. SADC
3. COMESA
4. EAC

#### OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

1. UN
2. OAU
3. ISS
4. IPA
5. EMU
6. LPI

Other participants still need to be suggested by: IGAD/GTZ/USAID

The final list will be decided by the FEWER Team and IGAD. However, the list needs to be finalized in a timely fashion (late May) so that invitations can be sent in (early June)

The workshops will have a core group of 5 members from the FEWER Team.

#### 22. National Consultants

Regarding participation by national consultants it was stated that contractual arrangements need to be finalized between IGAD and the FEWER Team.

#### 23. Evaluation procedures were then discussed:

- An ongoing evaluation will be conducted by the FEWER Team.  
Evaluation issues to consider:
- How does the process fit into the larger scheme of conflict analysis?
- What activities were carried out? Did they have any real impact? Evaluator should be able to assess these issues.
- Donors and IGAD should meet and return at budget meeting with an idea of what sort of evaluation they want.
- Based on the final result has IGAD decided to create the proposed CEWARN or parts of it?
- The role of the evaluation is to a large extent to serve the institutional purposes of IGAD/donors: they will want to know whether their money was well spent.

**ANNEX (I)**

**Memorandum of Understanding  
Joint IGAD/Donor (USAID, GTZ) FEWER Team  
Djibouti: April 26 and 27, 2000**

1. The timeline proposed was agreed upon, including the June 12 meeting and the dates for the workshops with the exception of the first workshop which was pushed to July 5-7.
2. No objections were made by the Donors to the mode by which the FEWER Team was reorganized (in contrast to the initial contract).
3. Responsibilities for the organization and operation of the workshops will be undertaken by IGAD. The FEWER Team will be responsible for providing the documentation, the proposed agenda, and moderator. Additional tasks in relation to the workshops will be negotiated between IGAD and its chosen sub-contractor.
4. Individuals to be invited to the workshops will be agreed upon between Ambassador Kiplagat and IGAD. The FEWER Team may suggest additional names to those already provided by May 30, 2000. It was agreed upon that a few slots may be left open for last minute suggestions.
5. Agreement on number of people to be invited (max attendance of 40). The participation of the FEWER Team is to be kept to the team-leaders (about 5); with a possible exception of the first workshop in July, but the latter still needs to be worked out between IGAD/Donors/FEWER Team.
6. Agreement on the selection categories of workshop participants (gender, government vs. civil society involvement etc.) was reached.
7. There will be no formal external evaluation. However the following was agreed upon:
  - a) Self-evaluation of the FEWER Team (procedures/methods will be submitted in writing to IGAD and donors); and
  - b) Donors can engage in a continuous evaluation by having open access to all documents produced, and are able to participate in all meetings and workshops.
  - c) There is no objection by the FE WER Team to a final evaluation in the end.
8. Relationship to 9.1:
  - a) FEWER Team will attempt to meet the 9.1 consultancy team next week; invite them to the June meeting and July workshop. The FEWER Team will attempt to stay in communication with the 9.1 consultancy team and make their products available to them (transparency).
  - b) Complementary emphasis on work output. This means, the FEWER Team will NOT produce an inventory of conflicts, root causes etc.; but concentrate on producing a practical early warning and conflict management system (no academic products). All related analysis focuses on the final applied and practical output.
9. The FEWER Team operates always with total transparency (accessibility to

- workshops, products, budget, processes).
10. The revised budget submitted by the FEWER Team was accepted by Donors. General guidelines by which the FEWER Team agreed to operate upon:
    - a) Produce an operational working model (early warning and conflict management) that IGAD can use.
    - b) In the process of developing the product there will be an emphasis on gaining marketability of the product.
  12. There was an agreement on an expedited method for formally signing contracts for consultants by the FEWER Team:
    - a) FEWER Team will develop generic terms of reference (TOR) for all consultants.
    - b) Once the FEWER Team identified the relevant consultants, they will provide IGAD with the relevant information and IGAD will fax a prepared and signed contract to the FEWER Team with the original following later in the mail.

**ANNEX (II)****TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF NATIONAL CONSULTANTS**

Designation: National Consultant

Contractor: Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

1. FEWER will propose the name of a "National Consultant" to IGAD. IGAD will expedite the appointment of the "National Consultant" by obtaining the required waiver of the usual procedures from USAID.
2. The project will be implemented by FEWER.
3. The purpose of the consultancy is to enable IGAD to implement and sustain CEWARN to prevent violent conflict in the IGAD region.
4. The themes and parameters of research will be determined by the FEWER Team and communicated to IGAD.
5. FEWER will be responsible for the quality of the work undertaken by the consultant.
6. The national consultant will:
  - a) be responsible for undertaking specified research on selected themes within the FEWER feasibility study;
  - b) be supervised by FEWER;
  - c) be responsible for obtaining his/her research clearance from the respective governments;
  - d) not be an employee of the government.

**ANNEX (III)****ATTENDANCE: IGAD-FEWER TEAM CEWARN START-UP WORKSHOP APRIL 26<sup>TH</sup> TO 27<sup>TH</sup> 2000**

Professor Benson Mochoge, DA&E/Acting Executive Secretary, IGAD  
Dr. Kipyego Cheluget, Chief CPM&R, IGAD  
Ms. Juliet Kamara, CDIS, IGAD  
Dr. Samuel Zziwa, IGAD  
Mr. Mebrahtu Bekuretsion, IGAD  
Mr. Keflemariam Sebhatu, CHA, IGAD  
Mr. Dex Agourides, EC Advisor to IGAD  
Mr. Miana Karaba, Chief Natural Resources, IGAD  
Mr. Awad Abdel Rahim, IGAD  
Mr. Gerald W. Mbuthia, IGAD  
Dr. Wilson Were, IGAD  
Dr. Debalkew Berhe, IGAD  
Ms. Astede Zerfu, IGAD  
Mr. Ahmed Habbane, IGAD  
Mr. Robert Matiru, IGAD  
Berhane Weldesellasie, NRMD Expert, IGAD  
Ambassador Bethuel A. Kiplagat, APFO and FEWER Team Leader.  
Dr. Gunther Baechler, SPF, Berne  
Dr. Susanne Schmeidl, SPF  
Ms. Ciru Mwaura, FEWER  
Ms. Sandra Ayoo, Independent Consultant, FEWER TEAM  
Mr. Tom Hockley, Saferworld  
Professor Peter Penz, Center for Refugee studies, York University, Canada  
Professor Howard Adelman, York University, Canada  
Mr. Niels von Keyselingk, GTZ  
Mr. Hermann Thorwart, GTZ  
Ms. Josephine Odera, APFO  
Mr. John Munuve, USAID-REDSO  
Dr. Ned Greeley, USAID-REDSO