

**Food Security in
Ethiopia:
A Case Study
Comparing the Food
Security
Frameworks of the
Ethiopian
Government, the
European
Commission and the
U.S. Agency for
International
Development**

Final Report

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**Food Security in Ethiopia:
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Ethiopian Government, the European Commission and
the U.S. Agency for International Development**

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Executive Summary

This report, prepared for USAID/G/EGAD/AFS by Abt Associates Inc., is a case study of the efforts being made by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Commission (EC) and the government of Ethiopia to confront serious food insecurity in Ethiopia. The scope of work which has guided preparation of this report asks that particular attention be paid to comparing the frameworks used by these three entities and the extent and nature of cooperation and collaboration among them in achieving progress in reducing the causes of food insecurity.

Ethiopia is a particularly important country for such a review because not only are the major food aid donors – notably USAID and the EC – continually dealing with serious emergencies (such as the present drought) and having to provide food for the feeding of millions of people, but they have been working for several years on a variety of activities intended to reduce the factors causing long term (i.e. chronic) food insecurity. Yet, in spite of more than four decades of food aid and other economic assistance, two-thirds of the country's under-five children are today seriously stunted. Difficult as it is to provide assistance to today's 63 million inhabitants, the United Nations Population Fund estimates that the number of Ethiopians will exceed 125 million by 2025.

In comparing the food security frameworks used by the three entities the report finds that all use similar definitions of food security. All recognize, at least theoretically, the importance of increasing the availability of food and access to it. All note the importance of satisfying nutritional and health demands of household members and all note the close relationship between overcoming serious food insecurity and serious poverty. In one way or another, all point to the need to continue building the capacity of the Ethiopian government to respond to droughts and other emergencies as well as dealing with longer term causative factors.

The Ethiopian Government

The Ethiopian government presented its national food security strategy to the donors in the 1996 Consultative Group meeting in Paris where it was well received. Its strategic elements focus on the need to increase agricultural production and the nation's food supply, improving access to food by the poor in both rural and urban areas and enhancing the capacity to both reduce the risk of food crises and speed the response to such crises. The articulation of the strategy was followed in mid-1998 by the government's presentation of the national food security program. The program consists of comprehensive rural development programs in four (Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR and Tigray) of the country's nine regions¹ intended to "...ensure access to food for the most vulnerable people in selected areas of the country." Their programs were developed by

¹ Ethiopia is a federal political system comprised of nine regions (states) and 2 chartered cities*: Addis Ababa*, Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Dire Dawa*, Gambela, Harari, Oromiya, Somali, Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (SNNP), and Tigray.

the regions themselves and are to be implemented by regional and sub-regional, rather than national, officers. These programs encompass promoting both on-farm and off-farm production, environmental protection, employment creation, improved access to rural credit, water development, livestock improvement, fisheries development, land reforms, reforestation, human health, education, agriculture marketing reforms and the development of manufacturing. These four regional food security programs are sufficiently comprehensive as to constitute full-scale regional economic development programs, at a price tag estimated to be in excess of US\$700 million if fully implemented.

Since its public introduction, the national food security program has made little progress toward full-scale implementation. The donors posed a large number of substantive questions, which have yet to be fully addressed by the government. Communication between the government and the donors on the proposed food security program has been sporadic, in part because of the preoccupation with the war with Eritrea and the recurrent emergencies.

The European Commission

The EC's food security efforts in Ethiopia are based on its global definition of food security as having been achieved "...when people's fear of not having enough to eat is removed and the most vulnerable groups, namely women and children in marginal areas, have access to the food they want." Specifically, the EC's program is focused on strengthening Ethiopian organizations responsible for designing, carrying out and monitoring food security programs – both those devoted to reducing the causes of food insecurity and those responding to emergency needs – at the central and regional level.

The EC is working with regional authorities in Tigray and Amhara Regions in the initiation of employment generation schemes, involving both food- and cash-for-work programs among rural communities in the worst-off areas of these two regions which have been particularly hard hit by droughts and other emergencies. They are also in the design phase of regional Integrated Food Security Programs (IFSPs) aimed at establishing and restoring sustainable food security options for vulnerable households in these areas, first in Tigray and Amhara, and subsequently in Oromiya and the SNNP Regions. The EC also provides food and cash assistance to more than 20 European NGOs undertaking development and rehabilitation programs in food insecure areas.

Cooperation with USAID has been good. Both have been active in the review of the government's national food security program, both share a similar conception of what needs to be done to improve food security in Ethiopia. Both have focused attention on particular regions – most notably Amhara. Collaboration has been particularly close in the collection of market price data where the EC has provided 'bridging' finance to keep the data gathering process active after USAID was required to terminate its market price data gathering project. The EC's Food Security Research Network (RESAL) published the results of these surveys on its website. USAID/FEWS and the EC's Local Food Security Unit collaborate on the publication of a highly regarded food security bulletin.

The United States Agency for International Development

The USAID food security framework has grown out of its long-term involvement in Ethiopian food security problems and the particular design of its Strategic Objective (SO) approach in Ethiopia. USAID's definition of food security involves the need to increase food availability and access to that food by poor households and the appropriate nutritional utilization of that food within an environment of improved health and other social service availability. Two of the five Strategic Objectives, which form the overall USAID economic development program in Ethiopia, relate to food security.

SO#1 focuses on the transfer of improved food and agricultural technologies to rural households in a specific region – Amhara. The approach will increase the involvement of the participating rural households in the design, implementation and monitoring of environmentally-friendly project activities including rural savings and credit, micro-enterprise and other off-farm development activities in addition to the focus on increasing agricultural production and productivity.

SO#5 (which is just now becoming part of the USAID/Ethiopia strategy) will compliment SO#1 by strengthening agricultural input retailers, farmers associations and cooperatives. It will seek to increase production incentives and employment opportunities and also to facilitate better food distribution, resulting in better access to food by poor households throughout Ethiopia. In addition, USAID/Ethiopia will provide assistance to the federal government to develop those aspects of the national food security program involving more efficient food market mechanisms.

USAID/Ethiopia is also considering support for a 'southern tier' strategy which would attempt to assist the mostly pastoralist inhabitants of the areas lying along the border with Somalia and Kenya in the south. This program, if enacted, would try to reduce the severe food security often experienced by these livestock-dependent clans and lineages by improving the marketing of livestock and related activities intended to increase income earning capabilities.

Like the EC, USAID is focused on capacity-building at the regional and central government levels, and on the importance of involving both local government and local communities in the development process. USAID provides Title II food assistance through a large number of US-based NGOs. It is limited in its ability to provide financial assistance to these organizations, but they are able to 'monetize' a portion of the Title II food in order to generate local currency to cover logistics costs and community-based food security projects.

All of the USAID food security-related program activities are being developed in close collaboration with regional authorities and with the approval of central government authorities.

The Bigger Problem

This case study reflects quite good cooperation and collaboration among the governmental, EC and USAID activities aimed at food security objectives in Ethiopia. However, there are indications that such collaborative efforts, taken together, are still not adequate to achieve the goal of increasing food security (and reducing food insecurity) in Ethiopia. Chronic food insecurity in Ethiopia is truly massive, encompassing the vast majority of Ethiopians throughout the country (as attested by the Figure 2 data on stunting). The food security programs of USAID and the EC do not appear to be of a scale – in terms of numbers of likely beneficiaries positively affected, or in the magnitude and impact of resources employed – to make a sizeable difference in national food insecurity over the long term. Too many of the factors creating and perpetuating the state of serious chronic and severe transitory food insecurity are not addressed or not addressed on a scale adequate to improve, in a sustainable way, the food security status of a large number of Ethiopia's food insecure poor households. There is a sense among some observers that the pace and scope of the proposed food security activities will not be adequate to cope with the reality of a country of 126 million mostly very poor rural households in 2025. Emergencies will continue to divert time and attention away from longer-term programs attempting to reduce the factors making Ethiopians so vulnerable to the adverse consequences of these shocks.

Achieving an adequate level of food production in Ethiopia (or finding ways for Ethiopia to be able to purchase – with its own resources – considerably more food from the rest of the world) by 2025 *and* enabling the preponderant majority of Ethiopians to be able to grow and/or buy that level – therein is the *real* food security challenge for the Ethiopian government and the donors. There is some question as to whether the USAID and EC (and, in fact, all donor programs combined) are likely to of a magnitude to solve *this* problem.

This report contains nine general recommendations for USAID and the EC actions growing out of the report's principal conclusions (listed in Section IV). In summarized fashion, the recommended actions are:

1. The donors and the government need to test their strategies against the very real need in 2025 for a food security system to be in place enabling 126 million Ethiopians to be able to reliably provision themselves with food. If the totality of what the donors and government are proposing to undertake within their food security frameworks falls short of this challenge, these strategies need to be revised.
2. The regional governments and the central government must find a way to redefine and re-delegate responsibilities for dealing with those food security problems which are of a national rather than a regional character, particularly issues of national food availability and the movement of food (and other resources) between regions. USAID and the EC should offer whatever assistance is required to facilitate harmonization of regional with national food security responsibilities.

3. Communication between the government and the donors on the national food security program has been inadequate for more than a year. A vigorous, continuing dialogue must be constituted. USAID and the EC should agree on the nature of what is needed to improve the dialogue process and, if necessary, undertake a joint position requesting that the impasse be broken. There may be a need for a central USAID/EU meeting (e.g., NTA) to be held in Addis Ababa with the heads of delegation to that meeting taking a joint position in order to lend visible weight to the sense of resolve felt by the two donor organizations on this essential issue.
4. There may be need for a devolution of authority for implementation of a national food security program from the Prime Minister's Office to some other location in government (probably the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation). USAID and the EC should press for such action.
5. Cooperation between USAID and the EC in the Amhara Region should move toward collaboration, wherever possible, as a means of reducing overlap and duplication. The same should be true in their capacity-strengthening efforts in central government organizations.
6. The EC's Local Food Security Unit has taken the first steps to develop a comprehensive relational database to include all relevant information on all food security-related activities underway in Ethiopia. USAID, other food security donors and the government should participate fully in this critically-needed endeavor.
7. There is need for a formal, continuing donor dialogue on food security involving not only USAID and the EC, but all donors involved in food security programs, most notably the World Bank. A donor Food Security Working Group should be established with the goal of greater sharing of information about present and future activities and movement toward much closer collaboration in confronting the multi-dimensional problems creating food insecurity in Ethiopia.
8. A comprehensive food security strategy in Ethiopia requires that parallel efforts are underway in: i) reducing the rate of net population growth and ii) decreasing the stunting rate among Ethiopia's next generation. No food security strategy is likely to be successful if the population rate doubles every 24 years and the principal factors causing stunting are not identified and aggressively reduced. USAID and the EC, within the context of the larger donor community, should review the entire set of on-going and proposed assistance activities that can help in reducing the rate of population increase and the level of child stunting.
9. The NTA should consider playing a more proactive role in facilitating the effectiveness of more fully collaborative USAID/EC food security activities in Ethiopia.

Acronyms

APC	Africa, Pacific and Caribbean
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee to Combat Drought in the Sahel
CSA	Central Statistics Agency (Ethiopia)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DPPC	Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission
EC	European Commission
ECU	European Currency Unit
EGS	Employment Generation Scheme
EW	Early Warning
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FFW	Food for Work
GFDRE	Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GHAI	Greater Horn of Africa Initiative
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning System
GMRP	Grain Market Research Project
IFSP	Integrated Food Security Program
LFSU	Local Food Security Unit
MEDAC	Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation
MT	Metric Ton
MOH	Ministry of Health
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSFU	National Food Security Unit
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RESAL	European Food Security Network
SERA	Strengthening Emergency Response Abilities Project
SGR	Strategic Grain Reserve
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region
SO	Strategic Objective
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
USAID	United State Agency for International Development
WDR	World Development Report
WFP	World Food Program

I. Introduction and Background

Introduction

If improved food security is to be achieved in poor, food insecure countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, close donor and government coordination and collaboration is essential. There must be particularly careful deployment of always scarce economic resources² to maximize enduring improvement in food availability at the community and household levels and in the ability of otherwise food insecure individuals to gain consistently adequate access to the food intake required for good health, needed physical and cognitive growth in children, and productive activity. Such coordinated effort will always be more successful where there is agreement on what needs to be achieved, how and in what time frame.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Ethiopia – one of the most food insecure countries on earth. Ethiopia combines all the classic causes of chronic food insecurity (poverty, high net population growth, low levels of human productivity, a deteriorated natural resource base, widespread health problems, lack of – and deterioration in – service delivery systems and physical infrastructure) with the major causes of transitory, acute food insecurity (recurrent drought, episodic warfare, and an unusually large number of other natural calamities³) in a country where the ability of people to cope with these afflictions has been declining since the mid-1960s. The average external food aid requirement during the decade of the 1990s has been approximately 700,000 MT per year. Current projections show the annual need for food aid now moving into the range of 1,000,000 MT per year. Ethiopia does not, and will not in the foreseeable future, generate foreign exchange sufficient to purchase more than a token share of this requirement. Further, even these numbers are dwarfed by the projected food imports almost certain to be required in 25 years. (See Section III below.)

This case study looks at the level and characteristics of cooperation and collaboration in dealing with the causes of this dire situation among the government of Ethiopia, the European Union's Delegation of the European Commission (EC) in Ethiopia and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). It is one of two country studies⁴ prepared by Abt Associates Inc. for USAID/G/EGAD under the Agricultural Policy Development activity. A draft of this paper is scheduled for discussion between USAID/Abt Associates and RESAL (European Food Security Network) in early April 2000 and at the next EC/USAID New Trans-Atlantic Agenda (NTA) meeting in late April and possible subsequent use within OECD/DAC in refining Poverty Reduction Network Guidance and for World Bank use in preparation of the 2001 World

² Including food aid.

³ e.g., plant diseases, insect infestations, a rapidly increasing malaria problem, the recurrence of measles, and, of course, AIDS. Just this year a new and potentially devastating infestation of sorghum beetles of Middle Eastern origin has been identified for which there are no local natural enemies in Ethiopia.

⁴ The other is Haiti.

Development Report (WDR) on Poverty and in the further development of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PSRP).

This case study reviews the similarities and differences in the analytical and programmatic frameworks employed by three of the principal development entities in Ethiopia: government authorities (both central and regional), the EC, and USAID. It reviews individual, collaborative, and cooperative endeavors meant to reduce the causes of chronic and transitory food insecurity or to attenuate its adverse effects. It identifies areas where collaboration and cooperation are manifest – both in dealing (as is the present case) with emergency information collection, analysis and response and also with the enduring elements of food insecurity causality. It also identifies endeavors where more cooperation or collaboration might prove possible and beneficial. Finally, the case study reviews the results thus far achieved and likely to be achieved within the framework of presently projected activities and compares this with the likely magnitude of the food security problem in Ethiopia in 2025, i.e. when children already born will have entered adulthood and begin forming new families. Will food insecurity have been reduced in some significant way for them as a result of what the government, the EC and USAID are doing today? The final sections of this report offer conclusions and recommendations for USAID and EC actions in these areas.

The focus is on ‘cooperative’ and ‘collaborative’ efforts – actual and potential. In this report the term ‘*cooperation*’ is used to denote the sharing of information, ideas and resources in cases where the actual implementation is sponsored and undertaken by one of the three parties. ‘*Collaboration*’ refers to cases where there is shared implementation of information gathering, planning, the physical conduct of development activities, and evaluation endeavors – simultaneous or sequential.

The term ‘*framework*’ encompasses:

- ? the definition of ‘food security’ and of food security goals and objectives
- ? gathering and analysis of data on food security status and changes therein
- ? program formulation
- ? program and project implementation
- ? monitoring and evaluation of progress toward achievement of desired outputs and objectives
- ? operating modalities, including:
 - o degree of collaboration/cooperation desired and achieved
 - o the time frame for accomplishing objectives
 - o relative focus on overcoming acute vs. chronic problems
 - o relationship between proactive vs. reactive elements of the program (i.e. does the need to react to repeated food emergencies characteristically reduce the time and resources available for preparedness and mitigation intended to reduce chronic household vulnerability to food insecurity?)
 - o reliance on private vs. public instrumentalities
 - o the selection of food vs. non-food resources
 - o the evaluation and modification of the framework over time

- changes over time in any of these modalities.

Given the short time available to prepare this case study, it is, perforce, notional rather than comprehensive. Its purpose is to elicit interest in and discussion on the points raised in the conclusions and recommendations in Section III (summarized in Section IV) and to highlight areas where further cooperation and collaboration would be feasible and beneficial.

The preparation of the report has been undertaken on the basis of interviews in Addis Ababa, Brussels and Washington and the review of extensive documentation provided by these and other officials of all three governmental bodies and their implementing and consulting partners, including NGOs. The willing cooperation of all interviewees during a period of intense workload created by the present serious drought emergency in northern and eastern Ethiopia is deeply appreciated.

Background

This report only summarizes what is presently known and generally agreed regarding the causes of manifest food insecurity in Ethiopia. The literature on the state of Ethiopian poverty, food insecurity and the presently unfolding emergency is large and is continually up-dated.⁵ This Report also employs population projections and estimates published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (from UNFPA data) and information on the availability of arable land in Ethiopia generated by FAO. Other information has been taken from USAID, EC, Ethiopian government, GIEWS and FEWS documents and publications.

Ethiopia's estimated 63 million people are among the poorest in the world with a per capita GNP of just over \$100, only one-third that of the CILSS countries in West Africa and only 21 percent of the US\$480 figure for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.⁶ The country is subject to recurrent drought and, for at least the past 30 years, has been increasingly unable to grow and/or transport enough food to feed its expanding population. In every year since the mid-1980s, between one and five million Ethiopians have received some form of food assistance, most of it financed by the international donor community. As of March 2000, estimates of the numbers of Ethiopians who will need food assistance are edging up from eight million to the newest estimate of ten million⁷, putting the 2000 emergency in the same category as the 1984 drought/famine. In addition, and notwithstanding the likely adverse impact of the present emergency, an estimated two-thirds of all Ethiopia's under-five population is already significantly stunted⁸ as can be seen in Figure 1 – the worst stunting situation in sub-Saharan Africa. Such stunting is evidence of chronic or episodic undernutrition (and ill-health) for two of every three of Ethiopia's young children. More recent surveys show estimated national

⁵ For a recent example, see: FAO/WFP "Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Ethiopia" (Rome, Jan 26, 2000)

⁶ World Bank (1999) *World Development Report: 1999* (Washington, DC)

⁷ This estimate is based on interviews in Addis Ababa with Ethiopian government and donor staff.

⁸ Minus two standard deviations below the median of the standard reference population.

stunting rates of between 64 and 68 percent⁹, with percentages in excess of 75 percent in some *weredas* (districts) in Tigray and as high as 86 percent in some *weredas* in South Gondar in Amhara Region, as surveyed by Catholic Relief Services in late 1997.¹⁰

Many factors combine to create such serious food insecurity in Ethiopia. The population is overwhelmingly rural and dependent on intensive farming of small plots of land for the production of the food and other agricultural products they consume and sell. The soils in many parts of the country are severely eroded and have become nutritionally and physically exhausted from centuries of nutrient depletion and soil loss. A large percentage of the country's seven million farming households produce less food in a given year than they need for adequate nutrition. They are, in most years, net food buyers, requiring the generation of income or other resources for these food purchases. Opportunities to do so are, in reality, extremely limited in both rural and urban Ethiopia.

The food and agricultural input marketing systems do not function efficiently in many parts of the country, in part due to: i) inadequate and deteriorated transport systems, ii) decades of poor public policies influencing the agricultural sector (although the policy framework is felt by many expert observers to have improved significantly since the mid-1990s) and, iii) a lack of knowledge of appropriate agronomic practices among large numbers of Ethiopian farmers. Improved seed stocks, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides are not widely or consistently available, or are not affordable¹¹. Credit to help low income farmers purchase seasonal inputs needed for replenishing soil fertility and fending off biological, insect, bird and animal losses is difficult to secure in most of rural Ethiopia. While the present federal government has moved to liberalize input supply, expand credit availability and enable land to be rented or exchanged on a short-term basis, the total impact of these actions to date has been limited.


In addition, inexorably increasing human, crop and animal needs for water are outpacing the ability of localized annual rainfall, river flows and sub-surface aquifer replenishment to satisfy ever-higher demand in many parts of Ethiopia. Water stress is a serious and growing problem for many of the poorest Ethiopians, particularly in the drought-prone northern and eastern parts of the country. Population growth, currently estimated at 2.9 percent per year, is also forcing many households to farm on ecologically marginal, less well-watered, less productive lands. As a result of all these factors, per-hectare yields, even in years of adequate rainfall, are very low. Production increases in recent years have been largely the result of putting more (mostly marginal) land into production. While, in some years, production increases have outpaced year-on-year population increases, annual food production on typically very small household plots has not increased, on average, as fast as the inexorable growth in the number of new mouths to be fed.

⁹ Central Statistics Agency, Welfare Monitoring Survey, 1995/96, first round data cited in Dercon, Stefan (1998) "Poverty and Deprivation in Ethiopia," Draft manuscript dated 2/11/98.

¹⁰ Catholic Relief Services "Title II Special Objective – Food Security and Nutrition Baseline Survey" (Addis Ababa, December 1997)

¹¹ Some argue that the use of some of these inputs is probably not economic in many agronomic situations in Ethiopia, particularly when labor is abundant and cheap.

Figure 1



Source: United Nations, Sub-Committee on Nutrition 3rd Report on World Nutrition (December, 1997) Annex 1.

Changes in economic policy in the years since 1992 have, however, been encouraging. The government's role in agricultural marketing has declined steeply in the face of increased privatization, decreased market price manipulation and liberalized foreign exchange rate policy. On the other hand, increased restrictions on inter-regional movements of food imposed by regional authorities have hampered the pace of improvement in the development of efficient national food markets. Ethiopia, as the 21st century begins, remains extremely poor, extremely food insecure.

Box 1: The 2000 drought emergency¹²

The ability of both government and donor staff to focus on long-term structural food security problems and the nature of collaborative and cooperative efforts by the three parties to deal with those problems was unavoidably reduced during the preparation of this report by their need to respond to emergency requirements stemming from the development of serious food shortages in Tigray, North Wollo, northern Amhara, Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNPR) and other areas of the country.

Poor belg (short season) rains for the third consecutive year have resulted in a much reduced capacity of subsistence farmers to cope with these drought conditions. A late start of the 1999 mehir (main) rainy season resulted in late land preparation, late planting and a reduction in the area planted. The mehir rains (which ended in October, 1999) were themselves generally adequate, but still insufficient to offset deficits in the production of high yielding, long term cereal crops caused by the repeated belg rain failures. The January 2000 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission forecasts a decrease of six percent in the 1999 national crop compared to 1998 (itself not a good year). Such national production figures, however, mask very serious food shortage situations in Tigray, northern Amhara, eastern and southern parts of Oromiya, Somali, southeastern SNNP and in the Afar areas. Food and nutrition security appears at present to be most adversely affected in North and South Omo, Konso, the Tigray *weredas* of Abergele, Atsbi, Hawzien and many *weredas* in Wag Hamra, North and South Wollo, and southern Gondar. There has also been a serious shortage of oxen in many areas (a result of repeated years of inadequate availability of grazing) which has hampered plowing. Overall, national average cereal yields have declined from an already low 1.009 MT/HA in 1998 to a forecast figure of 0.985 MT/HA in 1999. The continuing war with Eritrea has also contributed to the problem by, among things, causing the forced displacement of about 350,000 people and the abandonment of thousands of hectares of land in the border areas.

The national harvest to be available in 2000 was estimated by the FAO/WFP Mission to be about 10.07 million MT. While this harvest will be adequate for market demand in many parts of the country, those areas experiencing deficits will have difficulty associated with transport, marketing and purchasing power problems in importing enough food from the better-off regions to satisfy demand unmet by local production. As the FAO/WFP Mission suggests, marketing and transport will be critical issues in 2000.

The estimated cereal import requirement in 2000 needed to meet relief requirements is 764,000 MT derived from projected food availability of 11,830,000 MT and estimated demand ('utilization') of 12,594,000 MT. An additional 47,000 MT are estimated to be required for 350,000 people displaced by the war with Eritrea.

The above calculations assume a normal belg harvest in 2000. Factoring in carry-over stocks and pledges, the net unmet food aid requirement for 2000 is about 651,000 MT. In addition there is need for additional transport and other support for the distribution of food to the needy areas and the allocation of that food in a variety of ways to an estimated eight million Ethiopians.

As of March 1, 2000, the belg rains are late; in general, there have been no rains. Should this continue, the size of the emergency could rival the very severe conditions of 1984. The total number of people requiring assistance, now estimated at 8 million, could grow to 10 million or more – nearly one-sixth of the total population.

¹² Much of this information is taken from the FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Ethiopia: *Special Report*, January 26, 2000.

II. The Three Food Security Frameworks

This section of the case study describes the nature of the food security frameworks employed by the Government of Ethiopia, The European Commission and the U.S. Agency for International Development. In general, all three use a similar set of definitions of the term ‘food security.’ All three, for example, recognize the need to increase food availability in Ethiopia – a country with a serious and growing gap between what is being produced and marketed domestically and both market and nutritional demands.¹³ All three also give equal emphasis to the needs of rural and urban poor households to increase access – or entitlement – to the food they need for a healthy and productive life. In one way or another, all three note the close relationship between the achievement of improved food security and overcoming the constraints, which have held the vast majority of Ethiopians in dire poverty.¹⁴ In addition, all three use definitions which note, although in varying degrees, the importance of simultaneously improving the nutritional status of household members, particularly of pregnant and lactating women and children under five years of age.

The Ethiopian Government’s Food Security Framework

The National Food Security Strategy

A comprehensive national food security strategy was presented by the Ethiopian Government to the donor governments at the 1996 Consultative Group meeting in Paris. It was well-received by the donors at the time and remains the core statement of Ethiopia’s food security objectives and guidance for food security-related programming.

The ‘National Food Security Strategy’ describes a state of widespread and profound food insecurity in Ethiopia. It notes that sustainable improvement in food security status must focus simultaneously on: i) increasing agricultural production and the nation’s food supply, ii) improving entitlement (access) to food for the poor majority in both rural and urban areas, and iii) enhancing capacity to both reduce the risk of food crises and speed the response to such crises.

The strategic elements which are focused on increasing *food production* include diffusion of simple agronomic packages to smallholder agriculturists in high potential areas. This involves increased availability and diffusion of improved planting materials, expanding and enhancing extension services, and enabling greater access to fertilizer and other inputs. In addition, in the lower potential areas, *food access* or *entitlement* programs would be instituted, aimed at developing additional on- and off-farm employment

¹³ “Market demand” can be thought of as the aggregate calories (or other nutrients) that can be afforded by a population at prevailing market prices. “Nutritional demand” refers to the aggregate calories (or other nutrients) that are needed for the good health, adequate productivity and physical/cognitive growth of each and every member of that population.

¹⁴ Approximately 90 percent of all Ethiopians live below the poverty line of US\$2 per day. (World Bank *World Development Report, 1998*, Washington, DC)

opportunities. These activities recognize the fact that rural households in these areas are unlikely to produce enough on characteristically small plots on less-fertile, less well-watered lands to satisfy (through self-production or sale of crops and animals) their food security and nutrition requirements. Food-for-work and cash-for-work programs were envisioned in the government's food security strategy which would raise incomes in food insecure areas while at the same time creating economically beneficial and enduring physical assets such as feeder and farm-to-market roads.

The government's strategy also identified the need for (relatively large) investments in its deteriorated primary transport infrastructure to reduce the cost of transporting food from surplus areas to deficit areas and enable – to the extent possible – the expansion of private marketing of agricultural commodities.

The strategy recognized the likelihood of continued need into the indefinite future for external financing of food aid, and the need for complimentary development investments outside the food production sub-sector, e.g. in health, education, local capacity-building, and safety net-type transfer programs to the worst-off of the absolutely poor households. Investment in these complimentary activities would be made in the context of the government's overall growth and development strategy (e.g. through the education and health sector investment programs and government and NGO humanitarian assistance efforts) consistent with, but outside, the proposed National Food Security Program.

To implement the food security strategy, the government has established a Federal Food Security Steering Committee chaired by the Prime Minister's Office. The Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDAC) serves as the secretariat and houses the government's National Food Security Unit (NFSU). Members of the NSFU represent the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture and Water Resources as well as the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) and the donors. In addition, each of the participating geographic regions¹⁵ has established a Regional Food Security Steering Committee which have been responsible for the preparation – and are intended to be responsible for the implementation – of the principal components of the proposed national food security program.

Present USAID and EC food security strategy frameworks and the components of those strategies now being planned or already under implementation are consistent with the precepts of the government's food security strategy. There have been no calls for a restructuring of food security policy or of the enunciated strategy. There are, however, quite serious problems with the nature, dimensions and pace of likely implementation of the national food security *program* which the government has developed – and presented for donor financing – to achieve the food security objectives of that strategy. Discussion of this problem forms the heart of Section III below.

¹⁵ Ethiopia is a federal political system wherein considerable authority over development programs has been devolved to regional, zonal and *wereda* governments.

The Government's National Food Security Program

The government's proposed National Food Security Program (NFSP) was presented to the donors in August 1998 and was extensively reviewed in a World Bank-led multi-donor review in October/November 1998. Its objective is to "...ensure access to food for the most vulnerable people in selected areas of the country."¹⁶ The program is comprised of comprehensive food security programs in four of Ethiopia's largest and most food insecure regions: Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR, and Tigray.¹⁷ The regional programs have been developed by the regional governments themselves and are to be implemented through regional – rather than national – administrative and implementing organs. The NFSP is, thus, four separate, distinct, regional programs. Each regional program addresses problems believed to be causing food insecurity which are largely contained within that region. The various regional food security steering committees are responsible for reviewing overall program and project formulation and for the mobilization of resources. Implementation of the components of each of the regional food security programs is the responsibility of that region's sector bureaus and departments, often operating at sub-regional levels, i.e., zonal, *wereda* and sub-*wereda*.

It is not possible in this case study to describe the components of all the four regional food security programs. They are comprehensive and extensive. For example, the Amhara program proposes activities promoting on-farm food production, environmental protection, local food processing, increased access to rural credit, surface and ground water development and irrigation, livestock feed improvement, animal health and husbandry, fishery development, reforestation, land redistribution, human health and sanitation, nutrition, education, agricultural market reform, off-farm employment generation, and capital accumulation leading to industrial development in the region. This, in other words, is a food security strategy which has all the characteristics of a full-scale regional economic development program focused principally on the most food insecure *weredas* within the region. The food security programs proposed by the other three regions are equally comprehensive. The dollar value of all the proposed components of the four programs combined was estimated by the government at the time of presentation to the donors to be in excess of six billion Ethiopian birr (i.e. between US\$700 and \$750 million).

Since its public introduction in 1998, the government's National Food Security Program as described in the regional volumes has made little progress toward full-scale implementation for several reasons. The donors have posed a number of substantive issues and questions to the government revolving around, among other things, the need to develop priorities among the large number of proposed interventions and the need for realistic action plans which would phase the various elements more coherently in accord

¹⁶ Food Security Unit, MEDAC "The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Food Security Program (1998-2002)" Addis Ababa, June 1998.

¹⁷ In each of these regions there are areas of relative food security and areas of relative food insecurity. The government's program focuses almost entirely on the most food insecure *weredas* of the four regions.

with their likely cost-effectiveness and likely impact in generating improved, sustained food security.

The government has had apparent difficulty in responding to the donor questions and concerns, in part, perhaps, because of the relatively limited role in program design and implementation which the federal government has allocated to itself vis-à-vis the regions. In addition, the war with Eritrea, which started in May 1998 and continued throughout 1999 and into 2000, has diverted both the attention of senior government officials and government budget resources to defense. Finally, of course, there has been the need to focus on the growing 2000 drought emergency.

Since it was presented to the donors in 1998, there has been little progress in moving the national food security program toward implementation. There have, however, been some significant, though more limited, food security initiatives on the part of both the EC and USAID in direct collaboration with some of the regional governments. These are described in the following two sections discussing the EC and USAID food security frameworks and food security actions undertaken within those frames.

The European Commission's Food Security Framework for Ethiopia

In 1994, the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU) determined that achieving real food security improvement in the least food secure countries in its African, Pacific and Caribbean (APC) countries would, henceforth, be a cornerstone of EU development policy. Food aid and other forms of development assistance until that time governed by separate principles in line with separate objectives – were to be made to operate more harmoniously to reduce both the causes and the consequences of widespread food insecurity. Thematically, since 1994, the EU's food security policy has focused on:

- ? Using food aid and non-food tools more flexibly and effectively to confront the fundamental cross-sectoral nature of food insecurity;
- ? According principal priority in food insecure countries to improving people's physical and economic access to food;
- ? Redefining the roles and nature of involvement of the principal players (governments, donor agencies and civil societies) to increase effectiveness in confronting food insecurity;
- ? Encouraging the integration of the APC markets into international trade, while at the same time protecting the most vulnerable groups.

The EU/EC definition of 'food security' has also evolved. Its earliest conception focused on adequacy of food availability. This evolved through the 1986 World Bank definition ('...access for each individual at all times to the food resources making possible a healthy, active life...')¹⁸, to the current (1996) definition wherein '...a country enjoys food security when people's fear of not having enough to eat is removed and the most

¹⁸ Thus, adding the concept of adequate 'access' to that of adequate food 'availability'.

vulnerable groups, namely women and children in marginal areas, have access to the food they want.’¹⁹ This current concept of food security is based on the understanding that confronting food insecurity requires adopting flexible approaches explicitly developed to suit individual conditions.

The EC’s food security strategy for Ethiopia continued to evolve during the 1990s. The initial expression of the present strategy statement was developed by an independent consulting firm – ADE –in 1995-96. Since then, and especially since the initiation of the EC’s Food Security Network (RESAL) in 1998, there have been regular updates to the general strategy statement, posted by ADE on the internet.

Other dimensions of the discussions related to food security have helped shape the present EC food security strategy for Ethiopia. These include issues regarding the relationship between improving food security and reducing poverty, the relationship between food security and market forces, and the particular importance of the role of food aid. The more important precepts in each of these categories include:

Food Security and Poverty

- ? Reducing food insecurity and reducing poverty are interrelated, but are not the same thing
- ? Growth alone does not abolish hunger or food insecurity
- ? Trickle-down approaches are not broad enough to reach the wide base of the food insecure in most APC countries
- ? Food security depends on the *nature* of economic growth
- ? Food security depends on access to the means of production and resources (including natural resources and, in many cases, agrarian reform). “If poverty reduction programs are to be effective in the long term, they must focus more on the fair distribution of rights than on the direct distribution of food.”
- ? Access to the mechanisms of public decision-making is critical

Food Security and the Market

- ? The market –the economic actions of private and public participants operating dynamically within a system continually attempting to match supply and demand elements – is one of the most important and effective means enabling individuals to have access to the food they need. The market alone, however, cannot guarantee food security for all. Some factors contributing to food insecurity lie beyond the allocative mechanisms of the market – political, cultural, knowledge-based and social justice dimensions among them
- ? Markets in the real world – local, regional, national and international – are never perfect and are subject to a constant barrage of manipulative forces which may serve to reduce the positive impact of the marketplace on food security

¹⁹ This discussion of changing food security definitions is taken from European Commission. Directorate General for Development (1998) *The EC’s food security strategy and the APC countries* (Brussels).

- ? To the extent this is so, other, offsetting mechanisms are required – in addition to the primary market forces – to help secure and maintain minimally acceptable food security for poor households

The role of food aid in support of food security objectives

Food aid programs should operate in ways that:

- ? Promote food security and alleviate security at national, regional, local, household, and individual levels
- ? Raise nutrition and improve the diets of food insecure people
- ? Help improve the availability of safe water for the affected population
- ? Promote availability and accessibility of foodstuffs for the affected population
- ? Contribute toward the balanced economic and social development of affected peoples in both rural and urban settings, especially with regard to the equitable Treatment of men and women
- ? Help make recipients the agents of their own development
- ? Increase domestic food production
- ? Reduce dependence on food aid

Food aid programs should also:

- ? Take into account dietary habits, nutritional requirements, equal access by all beneficiaries
- ? Be provided according to objective evaluation of real needs
- ? Be provided, generally, to support projects, programs and sectoral activities promoting sustainable food production and food security in the recipient country
- ? Support the development of food security strategic elements, where needed
- ? Help finance inputs essential to increasing production of food crops
- ? Help finance transport, storage, water supply, private sector commercial development of food production
- ? Help finance applied research and field training
- ? Help support the development of women's and producers organizations
- ? Help develop local manufacture of fertilizer and other inputs, where possible

The Present EC Food Security Strategy for Ethiopia

The EC's food security strategy – as it has evolved in Ethiopia – is consistent, in all its major aspects, with the government's own strategy framework. The main identified objectives for national and household food security are:

- ? sustainable reinforcement of national and household food and nutritional security in the framework of the liberalization of the economy (long-term)
- ? fostering improvements in the marketing of agricultural products in ways creating added incentives for small farmers to increase production and for rural populations generally to increase incomes

The Present Program

The implementation of the present EC strategy is focusing first on strengthening Ethiopian organizations responsible for designing, carrying out and monitoring food security programs. At the national level this includes non-food assistance in capacity building at MEDAC, DPPC, the National Meteorological Service Agency and the Ministry of Water Resources. Capacity building at the regional level is focused on training of administrative personnel. The first major region-based food security programs that relate to the National Food Security Program of 1998 are employment generation schemes (EGS) in Tigray and Amhara Regions (and later in Oromiya and SNNP). These programs use both food- and cash-for-work and additional financial assistance to initiate and sustain major employment programs for household members where additional income or additional food is needed to supplement self production of food. These EGS schemes are a response to the continuing need for emergency and rehabilitation assistance enabling drought-affected households to earn income in the form of food or cash. In some cases the EGS schemes are in an advanced design stage. In some locations they are now on the verge of implementation. Each of these local programs has been developed in close collaboration with the Regional Food Security Steering Committees and vetted by the National Food Security Unit in MEDAC. The sequence of activities starts with identification and prioritization of projects. (The February 2000 workshop held in Bahr Dar was the beginning of this process for Amhara Region.) This is to be followed by the preparation of detailed implementation plans, the acquisition of such inputs as hand tools and transport and the training of staff responsible for implementation of EGP program. The EC budget for the EGS program, which will eventually be active in 60 *weredas*, is 6,620,000 Euros.²⁰

The same level of collaboration between EC and regional and national food security organizations is also evident in the preliminary development – now underway – of regional Integrated Food Security Programs (IFSPs) in Tigray and Amhara. These programs, funded from the EC/Ethiopia's 1998 budget allocation, will focus on establishing and restoring sustainable food security options for vulnerable households in selected *weredas*. The program aims to increase agricultural production on small subsistence farms, improve agricultural and household livelihood diversification, help develop rural access roads, and provide training in literacy, health and sanitation to targeted communities.

The EC also provides food aid and financial resources to more than 20 European NGOs for both developmental and humanitarian programs in Ethiopia. More than 38,000 MT of food was provided these NGOs in 1998. In addition 91,000 MT of EC food aid was provided through the World Food Program (WFP) from the 1998 budget.

²⁰ Originally denominated in ECUs.

Modalities

The EC's Local Food Security Unit (LFSU) is aided in the conceptualization of its food security programs in Ethiopia by the European Food Security Network (RESAL) in EC/Brussels and its contracted agent, ADE, which is helping to conceptualize food security programs and monitoring and evaluation in Ethiopia.²¹ As an element of the EC's employment generation strategy, RESAL/ADE conducted, in February 2000, a workshop in Bahr Dar the regional capital of Amhara Region, on income diversification and expanding off-farm employment activities. USAID was an active participant in the workshop because, like the EC, it is planning to support an employment-creating strategy in its food security assistance in the region. In general, RESAL's role in Ethiopia, and elsewhere, is to provide support for dialogue and debate on long-term food security strategies and facilitate decision-making and the development of food security proposals in the short-term.

The LFSU has provided financial and technical support for the collection of early warning (EW) and market price data. Both efforts have been undertaken collaboratively with Ethiopian government entities such as DPPC and the Central Statistics Agency (CSA) and with USAID/Ethiopia. The LFSU and USAID/FEWS collaborate in publication of the bi-monthly Food Security Bulletin, widely distributed in Ethiopia. The EC's assistance in the continuing collection of market price data has been particularly important as a signal of collaboration between USAID and the EC since previous USAID financial support and technical assistance for collection of market price data was effectively suspended by action of the Ethiopian government. The EC's willingness to provide 'bridging' support until such time as USAID/Ethiopia and the Ethiopian government could agree on resumption of USAID support has been instrumental in the continuing collection of this essential information. The market price data are published on the RESAL website. There are plans to expand the number of Ethiopian local markets covered to a total of 40 when USAID support resumes (which is anticipated in mid-2000).

The LFSU is also the primary EC organization providing emergency food and other European non-food assistance to the Ethiopian government in support of drought/famine and other emergency situations.

Collaboration and cooperation between the EC and USAID in Ethiopia has been particularly close and mutually beneficial. The planning and implementation of food security projects by the EC has been undertaken in close *cooperation* with MEDAC of the central government and close *collaboration* with regional planning authorities in Tigray and Amhara (where progress is furthest along) and also with regional officials in Oromiya and SNNPR where development of IFSP programs has now started.

²¹ As well as in Yemen and Haiti.

The USAID Food Security Framework for Ethiopia

USAID has been a major force in confronting both chronic and transitory food insecurity in Ethiopia since the early food aid programs of the mid-1960s. USAID was a significant part of the massive response to both the 1973 and 1984 droughts. In the 1990s, the USAID/Ethiopia program has been based, in part, on the development of strategic objectives explicitly aimed at removing or reducing the factors giving rise in Ethiopia to serious, widespread and growing food insecurity. Programs over the past four decades have ranged from large-scale food-for-work (FFW) activities in road building and reforestation during the 1960s and 1970s to support through NGOs to community-based interventions intended to spur increased food production, improved nutritional and health at the local level. Other programs have focused on food market development, rural enterprise development, food crop research, the financing of core infrastructure, and the strengthening of agricultural education facilities from farmer training centers to university-level training and research.

The growing gap between Ethiopia's annual food production and its consumption requirement has resulted in significantly increased requirements for food imports. USAID has striven to utilize its food assistance – in both its government-to-government and its NGO-managed food programs – to enhance rather than discourage local food production and to increase household incomes, and improve household nutrition, health and sanitation. USAID has traditionally been the largest single food aid donor in Ethiopia. This assistance has, over the years, been provided in the form of program assistance (bolstering appropriate policy reform), project assistance (government-to-government FFW for employment and asset creation, FFW through NGO programs, maternal and child health, school feeding, and – increasingly – for local development programs) and emergency feeding activities. In recent years, PL 480 Title II monetization programs have been a principal means of supporting NGO development programs in many food insecure areas of the country.

Food Security Defined

Achieving enduring food security is a major objective of U.S. development assistance in all countries of the world where food insecurity is a significant problem. The statement of principle prepared by USAID for the 1996 World Food Summit continues to be the clearest defining statement of food security guiding U.S. policy and program development and implementation in Ethiopia and throughout the developing world:

“Food security exists when all peoples at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life. Food security has three dimensions:

- ? *Availability* of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports;

- ? *Access* by households and individuals to adequate resources to acquire appropriate foods for a nutritional diet; and
- ? *Utilization* of food through adequate diet, water, sanitation, and health care.²²

While U.S. food assistance continues to play an important role in achieving global food security, it cannot, in itself, achieve lasting food security. Long-term food security requires a comprehensive, but targeted, food and non-food assistance strategy in which the two categories of resources are concerted to achieve situations where food insecure beneficiaries are enabled to produce or purchase the food they need on a sustainable basis.

The Present USAID Food Security Strategy for Ethiopia

For the past seven years, the USAID/Ethiopia development strategy to promote peace, prosperity and well-being for most Ethiopians has focused on four strategic objectives (SOs): i) increasing domestic food production and availability, ii) increasing the use of primary and preventative health care services, iii) improving the quality and equity of primary education, and iv) increasing access to and participation in a democratic system. Within this framework, increasing food security has been the predominant objective.

To achieve its overall goal of tangible progress toward peace, prosperity and physical well-being for the majority of Ethiopians, USAID/Ethiopia established three sub-goals: i) enhanced food security (through SO1), ii) smaller, healthier, better-educated families (through SO2 and SO3), and iii) an increasingly stable and democratic Ethiopia (through SO4).

To promote the food security sub-goal, USAID/Ethiopia has focused on increasing domestic food grain production (i.e., on supply) by promoting liberalization of agricultural marketing, promoting institutional and structural improvements in marketing of agricultural inputs and agricultural production, increasing the analytical capacity to deal with important policy reforms, and support for a ‘national food safety net.’ Considerable assistance has been provided to enable the Ethiopian government to deal more effectively with disaster situations. The Strengthening Emergency Response Abilities (SERA) project provides technical assistance to the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission (DPPC) for improving its early warning analysis capabilities. In corollary efforts under the health and nutrition SO, USAID has been developing a major effort to confront malnutrition among children and pregnant and lactating mothers.

In addition, PL 480 Title II food resources have been provided to enable U.S., international, and local NGOs to respond to serious, transitory food shortages and for use in locally-based NGO development programs aimed at promoting long-term improvements in household food security in chronically food insecure areas of the country.

²² U.S. Agency for International Development. (1996) *U.S. Position Paper Prepared for the World Food Summit*, (Washington, July 1996.)

During 1999/2000, significant changes have been made in USAID/Ethiopia's Strategic Objectives. SO1 has been substantially modified. A new SO5 has been developed, and a 'Southern Tier Strategy' is being considered to provide assistance to the southern-most, primarily pastoralist, areas of the country.

Strategic Objective 1

USAID/Ethiopia's SO1 will support the development and transfer in Amhara Region of improved food and agricultural technologies to rural households. This will be accomplished by re-orienting the region's agricultural research and extension systems from a supply-driven to a demand-driven modality. Farmers are to be more deeply involved in problem identification and the testing of possible solutions. The intended outcomes will include all aspects of food security: increased rural production, increased household income, and improved nutritional status. The technologies selected are to be environmentally friendly. The process will be supported by USAID assistance in expanding rural credit availability, rural savings and micro-enterprise development and for other off-farm and non-farm employment promotion activities.

Strategic Objective 5

Activities under this SO will compliment achievement of SO1 objectives by strengthening agricultural input retailers, farmer associations, and cooperatives. It will seek to increase production incentives and employment opportunities and also to facilitate better food distribution, resulting in better access to food by poor households throughout Ethiopia. In addition, USAID/Ethiopia will provide assistance to the federal government to develop those aspects of the national food security program involving more efficient food market mechanisms. Success in achieving SO5 objectives will be measured by: i) the degree of improved market integration achieved, ii) increases in the numbers of licensed private traders operating and other indicators of increased competition in agricultural input and output marketing, iii) increases in factor market (land, labor and capital) activity over the period 2001-2006, including the removal of constraints in the development of these markets.

In addition to these two SOs, USAID/Ethiopia has been exploring the possibility of providing support in the so-called "southern tier" of Ethiopia. Assistance to these areas, lying along the borders with Kenya and Somalia, is seen as a way of reducing the often severe food insecurity experienced by the mostly pastoralist inhabitants of this region and the flashpoints for conflict among the clans and lineages. Such a program would likely fall under the precepts of USAID's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) strategy. It would involve developing improved marketing of livestock and related activities aimed at increasing incomes and reducing vulnerability of pastoralists to episodic shocks.

Like the EC, USAID is also focusing on building capacities in selected Ethiopian federal government entities and, in this case, in a particular geographic area which USAID has selected for special emphasis – the Amhara Region. USAID will continue to support the

strengthening of DPPC's data gathering and analytical capacities and the development of better disaster response capabilities at both the central and regional levels. The Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) Project is expected to be continued into a fourth phase ("FEWS NET") for the period 2001-2005 and will emphasize the development of enhanced networking of EW information among all government, donor and NGO organizations. The close collaboration with the EC's LFSU is intended to continue, but there may also be even greater involvement with the Ministry of Agriculture and the regional agricultural bureaus, and the Central Statistics Agency (CSA) under FEWS NET.

USAID provides Title II food assistance through a large number of US-based NGOs. It is limited in its ability to provide financial assistance to these organizations but they are able to 'monetize' a portion of the Title II food in order to generate local currency to cover logistics costs and community-based food security projects.

As was noted in the description of the EC's food security framework, USAID is planning to revive its strong support for an enhanced system of market price data collection and plans to expand this effort to a total of 40 markets.

Modalities

USAID has developed close collaborative relationships with the government of Amhara Region and like the EC, has undertaken joint planning activities with Amhara authorities. In addition, USAID has cooperated fully with the central government's National Food Security Unit in MEDAC, ensuring that there was full knowledge in the NFSU of what USAID was planning and implementing. USAID/Ethiopia has vetted its redesigned SO1 and SO5 with MEDAC who have signaled official support for the objectives and proposed implementation arrangements for these key elements of overall USAID food security strategy in Ethiopia.

There has been close cooperation with the local EC staff and with the RESAL/ADE program for increasing off-farm and non-farm employment. USAID participated in the RESAL/ADE off-farm employment workshop in Bahr Dar. Both organizations have collaborated closely with the regional administration in Amhara.

III. USAID/EC Collaboration in the Face of Increasing Food Insecurity

The tenor of the discussion in the previous sections of this case study reflects quite good cooperation and collaboration among the governmental, EC and USAID activities aimed at food security objectives in Ethiopia. However, there are indications that such collaborative efforts, taken together, are still not adequate to achieve the goal of increasing food security (and reducing food insecurity) in Ethiopia.

The Bigger Problem

While the three strategic frameworks described in Section II are congruent in many respects and have enabled the EC, USAID and the Ethiopian government to share a more-or-less common conception about the definition of food security and its context and causality, there remains a large and complex problem. Chronic food insecurity in Ethiopia is truly massive, encompassing the vast majority of Ethiopians throughout the country (as attested by the Figure 2 data on stunting). The food security programs of USAID and the EC do not appear to be of a scale – in terms of numbers of likely beneficiaries positively affected, or in the magnitude and impact of resources employed – to make a sizeable difference in national food insecurity over the long term. What is still needed is the effectuation of an agreed, well-designed strategy of a size and duration sufficient to reduce chronic food insecurity for a substantial proportion of poor, food insecure Ethiopian households. The progress discussed above has been limited. For nearly 18 months, the dialogue between the donors as a group and the central and regional governments as a group on the implementation of the proposed national food security program has been in a state of near suspension. What has been described in the preceding sections regarding the evolution of the EC's and USAID's food security programs indicates that accomplishments have resulted from dialogue between the EC and USAID, respectively, and the involved regional governments on some – but by no means all – of the components of the government's proposed national program. The elements which have been described are indeed important and worth undertaking. They are not, however, of a magnitude to make substantial progress in confronting the national food security problem. Too many of the factors creating and perpetuating the state of serious chronic and severe transitory food insecurity are not addressed or not addressed on a scale adequate to improve, in a sustainable way, the food security status of a large number of Ethiopia's food insecure poor households.

There is an immediate need to break what amounts to a “communication logjam” that has developed between the donors and the government. There is also a need to re-think the government's allocation of food security-related responsibility between the regions on the one hand and the central government on the other. Many of the most important factors creating and deepening food insecurity cannot be fully addressed at the regional level. National priorities must be weighed against regional priorities in such areas as reducing barriers to marketing and transporting of food across regional boundaries, enabling the

movement of food in response to national, not regional, price variances. These factors may also involve the need for Ethiopians unable to earn a living in one region to move without restriction to another. They may involve the allocation of agricultural inputs in accord with national rather than regional comparative advantage in order to maximize total crop (and animal) production in Ethiopia.

Underlying everything is a sense of disquieting concern among long-time Ethiopia-watchers that:


- ? The real-world pace of implementation of the individual projects proposed by the US, the EC (and other donors) will fall far behind what is planned and, in any event, is likely to be an order of magnitude less than what is needed to enable the majority of the estimated 126 million people who will be living in Ethiopia 25 years from now to be – at the very minimum – at least as well off, in terms of food availability and access, as they are today.
- ? Emergencies – involving ever-increasing numbers of people – will continue to divert attention, resources and priorities away from the need to overcome the long-term, structural causes of chronic food insecurity.
- ? The pace and magnitude of overall progress realistically attainable under the proposed national food security program (particularly given the lack of progress and likely future difficulties in reaching agreement on priorities, timing, identification of financing for major components, willingness of the government to allocate significant budget to its own food security program, etc.) will be insufficient to cope with the scale, breadth and constantly increasing dimension of the fundamental factors creating pervasive food insecurity.

Ethiopia's food security problem is bigger and more profound than is presently being addressed in the food security program proposed by the Ethiopian government and, certainly, bigger and more profound than is being addressed by the food security efforts of the present EC and USAID programs. Simply stated, the problem is that the food security needs of Ethiopia's growing population are rapidly outstripping the country's capacity – through domestic production, international purchases and donor largesse – to provide for those needs. Figure 2 below demonstrates one of the relationships underpinning the larger problem. This chart employs FAO data on total arable land availability in Ethiopia and U.S. Bureau of the Census data on actual and estimated population growth for the period 1950-2050 to show the relationship between available arable land and population in the two 50-year periods, 1950-2000 and 2000-2050.

Today, in 2000 (the mid-point of the chart), there is about one km² of arable land available in Ethiopia for every 100 inhabitants. At the time of the massive drought and famine of 1973, this square kilometer of arable land 'only' had to support (in food and other agricultural products) about 50 Ethiopians. At the time of the 1984 drought, that same square kilometer had to provide food and other agricultural products for just under 70 people. In the year 2025 it will have to serve the needs of approximately 170 people.

B 2050 – when the grandchildren of today’s adult population will themselves have reached maturity – that beleaguered kilometer of land will have to be pumping out production to serve the food needs of about 275 people. The relative heights of vertical line A and B in Figure 2 demonstrate the relative magnitude of the potential problem in the 1950-2000 period vs. 2000-2050. If Ethiopia’s ability to produce goods and services were likely to be continually increasing on a per capita basis during the next 25 years, this chart might not be suggesting a problem. There is little in Ethiopia’s recent economic history or in its natural resource patrimony to suggest a path whereby the people of Ethiopia escape a future of increasing inability to secure – through self-production, international purchase, or international transfers – sufficient food. At its most fundamental level, this is Ethiopia’s core food security problem.

Figure 2



As Figure 2 demonstrates, Ethiopia has to grow (and/or use part of the product of its domestic land, labor and capital to import) enough food to support a population in 2025 that will number approximately 120-125 million people and do so on a patrimony of arable land which has had difficulty producing enough food and other agricultural products to support an estimated population (in 2000) of just over 60 million.

The national cereal harvest has been in the range of 10-11 million metric tons (MMT) in a reasonably ‘good’ year during the 1990s.²³ The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) calculates that per capita cereal consumption in Ethiopia averages 150kg/person/year. Add to that a 20 percent factor for feed and other uses, plus an added 10 percent for on-farm losses, the rough demand figure grows to approximately 195 kg/person/year. Multiply that by the estimated 126 million people who will be resident in Ethiopia in 2025 and the annual cereal requirement rises to about 24 MMT.²⁴ Achieving that level of production in Ethiopia (or finding ways for Ethiopia to be able to purchase that much more food from the rest of the world) by 2025 *and* enabling the preponderant majority of Ethiopians to be able to grow and/or buy that level – therein is the *real* food security challenge for the Ethiopian government and the donors.

Are USAID, the EC, and the Ethiopian government working to solve *this* challenge? There is little time to waste in confronting the requirement to more than double – on a sustained basis – national food availability within the next 25 years. If the necessary food is to be produced domestically, this requires an approximately three percent per year increase in that national harvest, year-in and year-out, over the entire 25 year period. Even that, difficult as it would certainly be to achieve, would only serve to keep food availability at roughly the same per-person level as today. Failing to do so would require increased food imports on a scale dwarfing the recent annual levels of 700,000 MT. It appears unlikely that either the Ethiopian private or public sector, or the donor community at large, will have the resources to cover the cost of increasing Ethiopian food imports five, ten, or fifteen fold to feed those 126 million people who will continue, in all likelihood, to be living in a land where per hectare cereal yields are maintained at or below one metric ton per hectare, as is presently the case. There is, in sum, a need for a much increased program of support for what amounts to an Ethiopia-specific ‘green revolution’ with the objective of increasing food availability and doing so massively. Of equal importance will be the need to enable these 126 million individuals to gain continuing access or entitlement to this food through increased self production or enhanced capacity to purchase it.

Conclusion # 1: the three entities need to test their present strategies against the challenge of doubling food availability and of increasing the entitlement to that food by all Ethiopians between 2000 and 2025. If the present strategies and their likely rates of implementation progress do not measure up to that challenge, the donors and the government need to rethink, at a minimum, current and future planning for the next decade and the decades beyond. Will actual food availability and access to that food resulting from their efforts be enough in the face of this requirement? Given the level of progress since the government presented its food security strategy to the donors in 1996, it would not seem likely. Both USAID and the EC are focused on increasing access to food by a relatively small sub-set of Ethiopia’s population. There is need to increase access on a much larger scale. It is unclear how this will be accomplished and unclear to what extent the donors will be involved. In addition, and just as important, as increasing

²³ With some individual years well below that average.

²⁴ Or the equivalent in cereals plus other foods, e.g. *enset* (false banana), root crops, meat, fish, milk, eggs, horticulture, and gathered wild foods.

widespread access to food is the availability of sufficient food in the future. If USAID and the EC continue to focus on problems of access, who will help engender increased production or increased ability to import? This may be an area where the World Bank and other major donors need to step up involvement.

Recommendation #1: *USAID and the EC (in the context of detailed discussions with other donors) should assess the likely outcomes of their present food security strategy elements – singly and in combination – against the scale of what will need to be accomplished in increasing the amounts of food available throughout Ethiopia, enabling all Ethiopian households to produce or procure the food they need for healthy and productive lives.*

In this context it is unrealistic not to briefly discuss the actual and potential role of the World Bank in confronting Ethiopian food insecurity. While preparation of this report did not entail a detailed review of the World Bank program, the overall scope and importance of the World Bank in Ethiopia should be touched on.

As the single largest donor, the World Bank finances a program containing more than a dozen significant activities in areas encompassing roads, agriculture research, seed industry development, increased fertilizer availability, water supplies, energy exploitation, and sector development programs in health and education. The life-of-program value of these activities exceeds US \$1.3 billion. While these programs are large and of value in improving key aspects of performance in a wide variety of economic sectors and sub-sectors, profound questions can be raised regarding their net cumulative impact on the food security status of the majority of Ethiopian households. Certainly, large scale World Bank lending to Ethiopia over the past many years has yet, for a multitude of known and unknown reasons to make a substantial impact in reducing the incidence of food insecurity.

Major questions need to be asked by the donor community, including USAID and the EC, regarding the World Bank's effectiveness in improving food security broadly in Ethiopia in ways congruent with their own efforts: i) can future World Bank programs in Ethiopia be designed to better facilitate USAID, the EC and other donor efforts to increase access to food? ii) can they be of a nature and scope to enable total Ethiopian food and agricultural production, or Ethiopia's capacity to import needed food, to more than keep pace with population growth over the next quarter century? iii) can the efficiency with which its overall lending program positively affects the lives and livelihoods of poor Ethiopian households be increased either through a different project composition in its lending portfolio, or through new approaches within individual activities? iv) can monitoring and evaluation of its food security related actual impact at the community and household level be improved?

The World Bank clearly has a central role to play in assisting all Ethiopians achieve household food security. Whatever manner of increased cooperation and collaboration USAID and the EC are able to devise to better attack the causes of pervasive food

insecurity in Ethiopia, they must also attempt to influence, and embrace, the World Bank's efforts aimed, even if tangentially, at the same objective.

Other problems hamper progress. The war with Eritrea has siphoned attention and financial resources and created serious security problems in an area of substantial food insecurity. The drought emergency commands a considerable share of the time and resources of both government and donors. Repeated past droughts and other emergencies have reduced the long-term ability of affected households to cope with these exigencies and adapt to secular environmental deterioration. The present emergency has also reduced the availability of scarce, high-level human resources to plan and implement the massive development efforts required to deal with the bigger problems discussed above.

Several other problem areas must also be addressed. Ethiopia's nascent federal system, with considerable authority and responsibility devolved to the regions, puts a premium on the need for qualified civil servants at the regional and sub-regional levels in a country where these skills are in short supply. The problems which donors have expressed with the national food security program are in part caused by proposed programs, which are not well 'fleshed-out', not clearly prioritized or carefully costed. To a considerable degree this is caused by the paucity of trained and experienced planners, economists, development specialists, engineers, nutritionists, educators, etc. at the regional level with the skills to put together such comprehensive packages of the needed size and complexity.

There is another food security specific issue caused by the present balance between the regions and the center. When a particular region is food-short (for whatever reason), market forces must be able to induce food to flow from surplus zones (where it is presumably less expensive) to deficit zones (where it is presumably more expensive). There is a marked tendency among regional authorities in Ethiopia today to control food flows into or out of a region to protect regional food reserves or farmers. Already there have been cases where NGOs have been denied permission to move food stocks from a warehouse in a particular region to another in a different region even though it is their own food (often from some donor's humanitarian food aid program) originally intended to serve the needs of potential beneficiaries, usually in multiple regions. Traders have also encountered region-imposed barriers to the movement of food.

Increasingly, the answer to a particular region's food security problems may well rest in actions needed in another region. This can be the need to move food or the need to allow people to move from degraded lands in one region to more productive lands in another. It is difficult to achieve *national* food security objectives within the framework of *regional* food security strategies promoting their individual food security interests and not those of the citizens of the country as a whole. This issue is complicated by the political reality of a federal system which was established in the early 1990s in part as a way of preventing post-war Ethiopia from being fractured into ethnic mini-states. Maintaining the delicate political balance between the regions and the central government while simultaneously taking the essential actions needed to increase food security for all Ethiopians is another

politically complicating but essential element needed to solve the overall food security puzzle in Ethiopia.

Conclusion #2: *The regional governments and the central government must seek a mutually acceptable method for re-defining and re-delegating food security responsibilities in a way that the center is given added authority to tackle needed inter-regional activities, particularly with regard to national food availability and the movement of food between regions.*

Recommendation #2: *USAID and the EC should indicate willingness to offer whatever assistance might be needed to facilitate the central and regional governing bodies achieve resolution on the issue of harmonizing national and regional food security priorities and the resultant actions needed to implement decisions made to improve Ethiopia-wide food security.*

The 1998 National Food Security Program, as reviewed by the donors in Oct. 1998, needs considerable revision. The four regional programs have been subject to considerable critical comment. The Ethiopian government has not acted to resolve the many outstanding issues. In fact, there has been a communication void on the government side. There has been no identified government interlocutor dealing with the donors on these issues for several months. The donors have expressed frustration with this situation. The Prime Minister's Office, which chairs the government's food security steering committee, has presumably been (and continues to be) preoccupied with other events, in particular, of course, the war with Eritrea.

Conclusion #3: *A vigorous, continuing high-level dialogue must be constituted between the central and regional governments and the food security donors in order to move toward consensus on the national food security program and its implementation at both the central and regional levels.*

Recommendation #3: *USAID and the EC should agree on the nature of what is needed in terms of improved communication, the need for an officially identified government interlocutor and next steps in breaking the present impasse on progress on the national food security program and undertake a joint effort requesting such action be undertaken by the government. In this respect it is further recommended that at an appropriate time a central USAID/EU joint session (e.g. NTA) be held in Addis Ababa with the heads of delegation to that meeting making a joint effort in order to lend visible weight to the sense of resolve felt by the two donor organizations on this essential issue.*

Conclusion #4: *It appears that the Prime Minister's office needs to devolve authority for food security decision-making to the Ministry of Economic Development And Cooperation (MEDAC), or other appropriate entity within the government. The delegation of responsibility for overall implementation of the national food security program within the government should be made, presumably from the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDAC), which*

houses the National Food Security Unit and serves as the secretariat to the National Food Security Steering Committee.

Recommendation #4: USAID and the EC should press for such action.

Present USAID and EC Collaboration and Cooperation

In the absence of significant movement on redesigning and implementing the national food security program, both USAID and the EC have:

- ? moved forward to implement programs in Amhara Region (USAID and EC), Tigray (EC) and southern tier (USAID),
- ? continued their support through international and Ethiopian NGOs for small-scale development programs with food security objectives, and
- ? continued to respond to the drought/famine emergencies.

Both EC and USAID non-emergency food security programs are focused largely on improving the *access* side of the food security equation. USAID is attempting to bolster smallholder production in Amhara and non-farm employment. EC is working first on an Employment Generation Scheme (EGS) in Amhara and Tigray (using both FFW and cash-for-work) to be followed by assistance to these regions' Integrated Food Security Strategies. Focus will be on capacity building at regional level (and at MEDAC). Both USAID and the EC have done a good job in collaboration with regional authorities and coordinating (and receiving approvals) from MEDAC.

Coordination on emergency response is extremely good among all the food aid donors and between the donors and DPPC. There is an immediate problem involving the need to replenish 'borrowings' from the Ethiopian Food Security Reserve (FSR)²⁵ to bring it back to a useful size, but the magnitudes of food needed to do that are dwarfed by the total requirement likely in 2000 to deal with the projected national food shortage. Both the EC and USAID recognize the need for capacity-building assistance to DPPC, both centrally and in the regions. The EC is proposing additional capacity-building assistance in its present programming cycle. USAID has already been providing modest capacity-building assistance to DPPC in its SERA project.

Early warning of impending emergencies has been an essential element of timely and well targeted responses in Ethiopia since the early 1970s when USAID and UNICEF helped the then Imperial Government to establish the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (now DPPC). The USAID-financed FEWS program was initiated in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s and has continued to be an indispensable element in helping

²⁵ Both USAID and the EC have 'borrowed' food stocks from the Ethiopian government's FSR for use in their on-going food aid programs with the intention of replenishing the FSR from future food aid shipments. The rapidly increasing size of the food requirement needed to respond to the 2000 emergency and the speed with which the food is required for distribution has caught both donors and government experts by surprise. The food intended to replenish the FSR is still en route, as of March 2000.

gather, analyze and publicize timely information on trends and events capable of triggering the need for emergency assistance. For the past three years EC/LFSU and USAID/FEWS have collaborated in the publication of the monthly or bi-monthly Food Security Bulletin. This has been a mutually beneficial collaboration, reducing overlap and duplication. The product is timely and extremely valuable to the users. It is widely used by government, donor and NGO staffs throughout the country.

Collaboration on collection of market price information has been particularly close between USAID and EC/RESAL/ADE. Under an earlier project (The Grain Market Research Project – GMRP) USAID/Ethiopia had supported both the collection of price data and the preparation of a series of reports and studies by in-country Michigan State University staff on a number of issues related to food markets, food aid and food security. Unfortunately, the government terminated that project over differences of interpretation of some of the information. The EC/Ethiopia office, with support from RESAL/ADE, was in a position to provide financing to keep the core price data collection effort underway. RESAL/ADE has established a website (www.resal.org) which provides reporting on short-term trends and events affecting food security in Ethiopia,²⁶ including constantly updated market price information. The collaboration with USAID/Ethiopia has been particularly noteworthy in this instance. Without it, the information collecting process established under the GMRP project would have been lost.

Prospects for Future Collaboration and Cooperation

Based on discussions in Addis Ababa during the preparation of this case study, it is clear that the EC and USAID staff are in full agreement that the government needs to move forcefully to address the many issues raised by the donors in their review of the government's National Food Security Program. Discussions with Ethiopian staff in MEDAC also suggest a measure of frustration with the lack of delegated authority to begin to move more rapidly in reaching agreement with the regional governments and the major donors on the major components of the strategy, developing a work program, identifying sources of financing and, in effect, 'getting on with it.' In the continued absence of agreement on fundamental issues, USAID and the EC have moved to support strategic, but limited, elements of the program as described earlier in this report. The World Bank has attempted to bring all the donors and the government together to make progress and resolve issues, but progress thus far has been minimal. The Bank has been hampered in these efforts by the fact that it is not able to provide grant financing in support of the national program. The government has made it clear to the Bank that grants – as opposed to credits – are essential, given Ethiopia's likely inability to incur additional debt to finance food security interventions. In effect, the World Bank, with all its resources and experience, is relegated to the role of 'donor of last resort' under these circumstances. Nonetheless, the government has requested that the Bank lead the donor

²⁶ Such reporting is undertaken in a total of 20 low income food dependent countries. ADE is contracted by RESAL to undertake these responsibilities for Ethiopia, Yemen and Haiti. RESAL has one professional officer in Addis Ababa working closely with EC's LFSU.

review process of the national food security program. The Bank has attempted to so, but with relatively little progress, thus far.

Conclusion #5: *The following factors are important when considering the future of collaboration and cooperation among the EC, USAID and the Ethiopian government:*

- ? *There continues to be an impasse in making progress on the proposed national program, even though there is clear – albeit implicit – agreement among most of the parties that what is being done in the interim is inadequate to the overriding task of reducing the primary causes of profound and growing food insecurity in Ethiopia.*
- ? *There are several areas where collaboration/cooperation is occurring already. These have been described earlier in this report. Even if the larger impasse continues, there is no reason that these collaborative efforts should not continue and be expanded.*
- ? *The EC and USAID are planning to step up collaboration on market data collection. There is need to expand such collection to a larger market centers in order to be more representative of the sub-regional different markets in the country. This will require the training of additional field staff to undertake the data collection and publication.*
- ? *Joint FEWS/EC information gathering and publication will continue. Efforts to improve the ‘vulnerability assessment’ aspects of food security analysis²⁷ should be a more important element of this effort.*
- ? *The EC/LFSU has proposed developing a food security web site for Ethiopia. This would be a natural collaboration between USAID/FEWS and the EC’s Local Food Security Unit. The collaboration would be extended to CSA, the Ministry of Agriculture, and possibly to the University of Addis Ababa.*

Recommendation #5: *Cooperative USAID/EC efforts in developing capacities in Amhara Region should be intensified. Cooperation should, in fact, become collaboration so that all necessary aspects of capacity building in that important region are agreed on by the EC and USAID (with the concurrence of regional authorities) and addressed in a resource-efficient manner. The same is true for capacity-strengthening efforts in MEDAC and strengthening in a joint manner of emergency analysis and response capacities in DPPC. What could be accomplished in Amhara could serve as a template for similar collaboration in other regions.*

The EC has initiated the development of a large database to retain as much information on food security projects, region by region, as can be collected. Thus far, the database has been developed only for Tigray and the offer has been made to other donors to

²⁷ Being done collaboratively with WFP and Save the Children/UK.

participate. It is an excellent start and, if it can be expanded to cover all food security projects and be kept up-to-date, it would be an invaluable tool for further improving the effectiveness of collaboration and cooperation.

Conclusion #6: The further development of this food security database, its being made operational, and subsequent periodic updating can be an important tool for improving food security-related planning, implementation and evaluation, particularly as a means of reducing unneeded overlap and duplication.

Recommendation #6: USAID, the appropriate Ethiopian government agencies and other donors with food security-related activities should participate fully in the EC efforts to implement a comprehensive food security database (a database not just available to all organizations, but the product of all organizations).

There is need for a continuing dialogue between the donors in Ethiopia on food security issues – both those related to episodic emergencies and to chronic food insecurity. The US and the EC are likely to be committing large levels of financial and food resources both in confronting the causes of food insecurity in Ethiopia and responding – in the form of emergency food aid and humanitarian mitigation programs – over the long term to its transitory consequences. The need for both coordinated and, when feasible, collaborative efforts could not be clearer. The World Bank should also be an active participant in this continuing dialogue. The World Bank will almost certainly have to continue to be in the forefront of the effort to increase (greatly) total food availability in Ethiopia. Other donor participation should be considered, but participation should be limited to major food security donors.

Conclusion #7: There is no escaping the need for even greater future coordination and collaboration between staff of the EC and USAID offices in Addis Ababa on food security issues. A formal food security dialogue mechanism is needed in which the World Bank is an active participant. At present, the World Bank's Resident Mission in Addis Ababa maintains only a temporary food security position in its local staff.

Recommendation #7: The USAID SOI office, EC's Local Food Security Unit, and a representative from the World Bank's Resident Mission should constitute a 'food security working group'. Other donor organizations could also be represented. In this context consideration should be given by the Resident Mission to making the World Bank's present short-term food security position a permanent one.

Working with the Ministry of Health (MOH), USAID has been developing a rural nutrition program for Ethiopia, which has important food security implications. This should be factored into the overall design of food security strategy by both the government and the donors. The Ethiopian government should be requested to consider including this nutrition intervention as an important element of its food security strategy.

Among the more important 'themes' emerging from interviews undertaken for this report concerning the development of future collaborate ties between the two organizations are:

i) The need to constantly be alert for ‘coherence’ in food security advice given to the government from all donors. Unfortunately it is quite easy for the individual donors to provide conflicting advice to the government. One of the major reasons for maintaining an on-going food security dialogue among the donors is to reduce the likelihood that individual donors will make suggestions contravening those made by other donors.

ii) Making progress is contingent upon focusing financial and other resources on priority activities. Agreeing on objectives, priorities and the appropriate sequencing of activities to achieve agreed objectives is absolutely essential.

iii) Looking for ‘economies of scale’ in food security analysis work is an obvious recommendation. Sharing both the data gathering and analysis workload as well as the analytical products makes sense for saving both cost and time.

iv) Both the EC and USAID have strengths and weaknesses in the manner in which they provide food security related support to Ethiopia. The EC presently appears to be more flexible in making the choice between using food aid or non-food aid resources in particular situations than is the case for USAID. On the other hand, USAID appears to have a speedier decision-making process. Some interviewees suggested taking advantage, wherever possible, of these and similar strengths or weaknesses.

Two additional important points need to be made in order to conclude the case study. First, efforts to improve the food security status of the nearly 90 percent of Ethiopians below the poverty line cannot succeed in the absence of parallel successes in bringing down the country’s net population growth rate of 2.9 percent/year and its high under-five stunting rate. Substantial donor support will be required to help design and implement Ethiopian government (and NGO) efforts in both areas.

Conclusion #8: A comprehensive food security strategy in Ethiopia requires that parallel efforts are underway in: i) reducing the rate of net population growth and ii) decreasing the stunting rate among Ethiopia’s next generation. No food security strategy is likely to be successful if the population rate doubles every 24 years and the principal factors causing stunting are not identified and aggressively reduced.

Recommendation #8: USAID and the EC, within the context of the larger donor community should review the entire set of on-going and proposed assistance activities that can help in reducing the rate of population increase and the level of child stunting with a view of better integration of activities of appropriate scale with the national food security strategy.

Second, this case study is being prepared for presentation at the up-coming NTA meeting in April 2000. The NTA mechanism, involving a meeting of two of the largest donors to Ethiopia for emergencies and longer-term food insecurity mitigation, seems particularly

well suited for exploring many of the issues of collaboration and cooperation discussed in this report. In addition, the NTA member states may be well positioned to approach the Ethiopian government with the proposal that the government improve communication with the donors on next steps for the national food security program.

Conclusion #9: *The NTA could be an important player in a major Ethiopia-specific, “Food Security Initiative” Its role could be to focus resources more effectively between the two major donors organizations and to make a strong case to the government regarding the need to improve the dialogue between the government and the major donors on the national food security program.*

Recommendation #9: *The NTA should consider a more proactive role in facilitating the effectiveness of more fully collaborative USAID/EC activities in combating the causes of chronic food insecurity in Ethiopia.*

IV. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

This section brings together and summarizes the major conclusions regarding the present “state of play” of cooperation and collaboration between the Ethiopian government, USAID and the EC in confronting food insecurity in Ethiopia and recommendations for USAID and EC action which were contained in Section III. The recommendation(s) for action follow directly from the related conclusion.

Conclusion 1 - the collaborative efforts are helpful and important in limited situations. However, they are not of a scale sufficient to address the most fundamental problems creating and deepening food insecurity in Ethiopia. *The three entities need to test their present strategies against the challenge of doubling food availability and of increasing the entitlement to that food by all Ethiopians between 2000 and 2025. If the present strategies – and their likely rates of implementation progress – do not measure up to that challenge, the donors and the government need to rethink, at a minimum, current and future planning for the next decade and the decades beyond. Will actual food availability and access to that food resulting from their efforts be enough in the face of this requirement? Given the level of progress since the government presented its food security strategy to the donors in 1996, it would not seem likely. Both USAID and the EC are focused on increasing access to food by a relatively small sub-set of Ethiopia’s population. There is need to increase access on a much larger scale. It is unclear how this will be accomplished and unclear to what extent the donors will be involved. In addition, and just as important, as increasing widespread access to food is the availability of sufficient food in the future. If USAID and the EC continue to focus on problems of access, who will help engender increased production or increased ability to import? This may be an area where the World Bank and other major donors need to step up involvement.*

Recommendation 1 - *USAID and the EC (in the context of detailed discussions with other donors) should assess the likely outcomes of their present food security strategy elements – singly and in combination – against the scale of what will need to be accomplished in increasing the amounts of food available throughout Ethiopia, enabling all Ethiopian households to produce or procure the food they need for healthy and productive lives.*

Conclusion 2 - The present devolution of responsibility for food security programs to the regions has both good and bad elements. There are serious issues of national food marketing which are adversely affected by the tendency of regions to limit inter-regional food and other trade. There are food security priority-setting needs which transcend any individual district and must be dealt with at the national level. *The regional governments and the central government must seek a mutually-acceptable method for re-defining and re-delegating food security responsibilities in a way that the center is given added authority to tackle needed inter-regional activities – particularly with regard to national food availability and the movement of food between regions.*

Recommendation 2 - *USAID and the EC should indicate willingness to offer whatever assistance might be needed to facilitate the central and regional governing bodies achieve resolution on the issue of harmonizing national and regional food security priorities and the resultant actions needed to effectuate decisions made to improve Ethiopia-wide food security.*

Conclusion 3 - *There has been a dearth of productive communication between the donors and the government on the national food security program since the joint government-donor review in late 1998. There is need to develop a constant high-level dialogue between the government and the food security donors in order to move toward consensus on the national food security program and its implementation.*

Recommendation 3 - *USAID and the EC should agree on the nature of what is needed in terms of improved communication, the need for an officially identified government interlocutor and next steps in breaking the present impasse on progress on the national food security program and undertake a joint demarche requesting such action be undertaken by the government. In this respect it is further recommended that, at an appropriate time, a central US/EU joint session (e.g. NTA) be held in Addis Ababa with the heads of delegation to that meeting making a joint demarche in order to lend visible weight to the sense of resolve felt by the two donor organizations on this essential issue.*

Conclusion 4 - *Improved and continuing communication between the government and the donors on the national food security program is essential. One problem has been the need for a designated interlocutor on the government side. It appears that the Prime Minister's office needs to devolve authority for food security decision-making to the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDAC), or other appropriate entity within the government. The delegation of responsibility for overall implementation of the national food security program within the government should be made, presumably from the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDAC) which houses the National Food Security Unit and serves as the secretariat to the National Food Security Steering Committee.*

Recommendation 4 - *USAID and the EC should press for such action.*

Conclusion 5 - *The food security donors need to establish a permanent food security working group with a membership of the EC, USAID and the World Bank as the core group, but also including representation from other donors who have strong interest and possibly greater involvement in food security programs. The following factors are important when considering the future of collaboration and cooperation among the EC, USAID and the Ethiopian government:*

- ? *There continues to be an impasse in making progress on the proposed national program, even though there is clear – albeit implicit – agreement among most of the parties that what is being done in the interim is inadequate to the overriding*

task of reducing the primary causes of profound and growing food insecurity in Ethiopia.

- ? *There are several areas where collaboration/cooperation is occurring already. These have been described earlier in this report. There is no reason, even if the larger impasse continues, that these collaborative efforts should not continue and be expanded.*
- ? *The EC and USAID are planning to step up collaboration on market data collection. There is need to expand such collection to a larger market centers in order to be more representative of the sub-regional different markets in the country. This will require the training of additional field staff to undertake the data collection and publication.*
- ? *Joint FEWS/EC information gathering and publication will continue. Efforts to improve the ‘vulnerability assessment’ aspects of food security analysis should be a more important element of this effort.*
- ? *The EC/LFSU has proposed developing a food security web site for Ethiopia. This would be a natural collaboration between USAID/FEWS and the EC’s Local Food Security Unit. The collaboration would be extended to CSA, the Ministry of Agriculture, and possibly the University of Addis Ababa.*

Recommendation 5 - *Cooperative USAID/EC efforts in developing capacities in Amhara Region should be intensified. Cooperation should, in fact, become collaboration so that all necessary aspects of capacity building in that important region are agreed on by the EC and USAID (with the concurrence of regional authorities) and addressed in a resource-efficient manner. The same is true for capacity-strengthening efforts in MEDAC and strengthening in a joint manner of emergency analysis and response capacities in DPPC. What could be accomplished in Amhara could serve as a template for similar collaboration in other regions.*

Conclusion 6 - *The further development of this food security database, its being made operational and subsequent periodic updating can be an important tool for improving food security-related planning, implementation and evaluation, particularly as a means of reducing unneeded overlap and duplication.*

Recommendation 6 - *USAID, the appropriate Ethiopian government agencies and other donors with food security-related activities should participate fully in EC efforts to effectuate a comprehensive food security database – a database not just available to all organizations, but the product of all organization.*

Conclusion 7 - *There is no escaping the need for even greater future coordination and collaboration between staff of the EC and USAID offices in Addis Ababa on food security issues. A formal food security dialogue mechanism is needed in which the World Bank is*

an active participant. At present, the World Bank's Resident Mission in Addis Ababa maintains only a temporary food security position in its local staff.

Recommendation 7 - *The USAID SO1 office, EC's Local Food Security Unit, and a representative from the World Bank's Resident Mission should constitute a 'food security working group'. Other donor organizations could also be represented. In this context consideration should be given to making the World Bank's present short-term food security position a permanent one.*

Conclusion 8 - *There is a larger context surrounding food security that also needs to be addressed. A comprehensive food security strategy in Ethiopia requires that parallel efforts are underway in: i) reducing the rate of net population growth and ii) decreasing the stunting rate among Ethiopia's next generation. No food security strategy is likely to be successful if the population rate doubles every 24 years and the principal factors causing stunting are not identified and aggressively reduced.*

Recommendation 8 - *USAID and the EC, within the context of the larger donor community, should review the entire set of on-going and proposed assistance activities that can help in reducing the rate of population increase and the level of child stunting with a view of better integration of activities of appropriate scale with the national food security strategy.*

Conclusion 9 - *The NTA could be an important player in a major Ethiopia-specific, "Food Security Initiative." Its role could be to focus resources more effectively between the two major donor organizations and to make a strong case to the government regarding the need to improve the dialogue between the government and the major donors on the national food security program.*

Recommendation 9 - *The NTA should consider a more proactive role in facilitating the effectiveness of more fully collaborative USAID/EC activities in combating the causes of chronic food insecurity in Ethiopia.*