FN-ACG-150

Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation

Assessment of Current Pricing Policies

Submitted by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Emerging Markets First Washington Associates, Ltd

Submitted to USAID

Deloitte Touche

Π

٥

Tohmatsu

IQC No PCE-I-00-99-00008-00 Support for Economic Growth and Institutional Reform






TABLE OF CONTENTS

| I | INTRODUCTION | 2 |
|-----|--|----|
| II | FINANCIAL RESULTS AS BASES FOR PRICING POLICIES | 3 |
| III | JLGC FINANCIAL RESULTS | 4 |
| IV | OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING PRICING POLICIES | 9 |
| v | PRICING POLICIES OF OTHER ECAS | 10 |
| VI | JLGC'S CURRENT PRICING POLICIES | 12 |
| VII | JLGC'S DEFAULT EXPERIENCE | 13 |
| VII | I FINANCIAL MODEL FOR FUTURE PRICING | 21 |
| IX | RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DLG AND PSG FEES | 29 |
| x | RECOMMENDATION FOR POST-SHIPMENT PREMIUMS | 31 |

I INTRODUCTION

The prime source of income for most credit guarantee organizations are the fees, premiums, or commissions charged for guarantees issued These charges are levied on the lending institutions which are the immediate beneficiaries of the guarantee program, but in virtually all cases those fees are passed on to the borrower

Worldwide, there are more than 100 active credit guarantee organizations About half are export credit agencies(ECAs) and the rest are mostly oriented to the small business sector A plurality of these schemes charge a one-time, front-end fee of 1-4% of the amount of the loan involved (but in some cases of the amount of the guarantee approved) This is then followed by an annual fee of 1-3% of the amount of the actual guarantee The front-end fee, sometimes referred to as a commission, is usually intended to cover application processing costs, whereas the annual fee is meant to include some allocation for potential claim payments. In a growing number of cases, the front-end fee is a fixed amount, reflecting the relatively fixed cost of processing applications of different sizes. Many of the newer credit guarantee operations limit these fees to a low amount of U S \$100 or so

In most credit guarantee schemes, the annual fee of 1-3% is insufficient to cover both administrative costs and claims An annual fee of 5% or more would usually be necessary to achieve this However, such a high fee would have the undesirable effect of substantially increasing borrowing costs, sharply reducing the applications for coverage, decreasing the average creditworthiness of those applications which were submitted, and diminishing the availability of bank credit for the economic sectors which are suppose to be assisted by the guarantee program

For these reasons, most credit guarantee programs are provided with a capital fund which is large enough to earn substantial investment income The income from the fund, together with fees, is usually sufficient to cover all expenses, including net claims

II FINANCIAL RESULTS AS BASES FOR PRICING POLICIES

ECAs generally establish their premiums and fees on one or more of the following bases (1) to maximize net profit, (2) to maintain the real value of net worth over time, (3) to cover administrative costs and net claims, or (4) to cover administrative costs alone

The first option, maximizing the net profit, is generally followed only by private sector insurers The public service and national interest goals of official ECAs preclude their making all out attempts to maximize profit, which can be achieved only by increasing fees which are paid by the rest of the export community

The second option, of maintaining the real value of net worth over time, or even increasing its value, is the policy followed by most official ECAs It implies charging a level of premiums and fees which, **together with investment income**, will enable the ECA to at least break even after putting aside a sufficient amount of reserves to cover all probable claims

The third option, of having fees alone cover all administrative costs plus net claims, is achieved by relatively a few agencies offering pre-shipment guarantees alone However, most ECAs offering high-volume programs in addition to pre-shipment guarantees (like post-shipment insurance and loans) are able to achieve the goal of the third option

The fourth option, of having fees cover just administrative expenses (not including net claims) should be achievable by all ECAs It is a minimum standard which is met by almost all agencies, except for start-up ventures The fourth option of course, requires that net claims be covered from some source other than fees--usually investment income

III JLGC FINANCIAL RESULTS

JLGC has shown rapid and substantial improvement in most financial indicators in recent years, based upon current pricing policy and other operational and financial practices This is reflected in the table below, which summarizes JLGC's balance sheets and income statements, in Jordanian dinars, for 1996, 1997, and 1998

| BALANCE SHEET (JE | | D) | |
|---|-----------|-------------|---------------|
| ASSETS | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 |
| Cash in hand & at banks | 4 | 12 9 | 13 7 |
| Certificates of Deposit at 10% | 7 | 12 3 | 360 |
| Term deposits at 9% | 8,494 | 10,704 | 10,985 90 |
| Investment in company shares | 843 5 | 890 6 | 816 1 |
| Other current assets | 040.0 | 000 0 | 0101 |
| Accrued interest | 78 6 | 78 | 82 8 |
| Accrued commissions | 14 5 | 31 5 | 55 8 |
| Prepaid Expenses | 34 | 97 | 98 |
| Refundable deposits | 11 | 18 | 25 |
| Total Other Current Assets | 97 7 | 121 2 | 151 1 |
| Investment in government bonds | 1,000 | 1 000 | 988 2 |
| Fixed assets | 142 6 | 184 2 | 163 1 |
| Total Assets | 10,582 50 | 12,913 90 | 13,478 30 |
| LIABILITIES & SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 |
| Liabilities | | | |
| Proposed dividends | 322 6 | | |
| CBJ unpaid dividends | 150 | 296 3 | 296 3 |
| Deferred revenue | 79 2 | 74 9 | 54 9 |
| Other liabilities | | | |
| Board of Directors renumeration | | 25 | 25 |
| Scientific research & vocational training | | 46 | 45 |
| Universities fees | | 46 | 4 5 |
| End of service endemnity provision | | | 19 3 |
| Accrued expenses | | 93 | 93 |
| Unpaid call-up capital on investee co | | 56 2 | |
| Accrued re-insurance fees | | | 56 |
| Total other liabilities | 67 3 | 99 9 | 68 3 |
| Loan guarantee provision | 1,493 20 | 1,731 30 | 1,797 40 |
| Total Liabilities | 2,112 40 | 2,202 50 | 2,221 20 |
| Shareholders Equity | | | |
| Authorized capital of 10 Million shares | | | |
| Subscribed capital of 9,875,000 shares | | | |
| Paid in capital | 8,065 | 9,875 | 10,000 |
| Statutory reserve | 117 4 | 163 9 | 209 4 |
| Voluntary reserve | 117 4 | 163 9 | 209 4 |
| Retained Earnings | 170 3 | 508 4 | 838 2 |
| Total Shareholders Equity | 8,470 10 | 10,711 30 | 11,257 10 |
| Total Liabilities & Shareholders Equity | 10,582 50 | 12,913 90 | 13,478 30 |
| INCOME STATEMENT | | | |
| Devenues | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 |
| Revenues | 70.0 | 440.4 | A 44 |
| Commissions on guranteed loans | 70 2 | 118 4 | 211 |
| Commissions on guranteed export loans | | 18 | 127 |
| Counsulting fees | | 32 | 39 |
| Total income from operations | | 123 4 | 227 6 |
| Analysis of Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation's 5 | ·=··· | Deloitte To | uche Tohmatsu |

| | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 |
|--|-------------------|----------------|------------|
| Amount recovered from loans written off | 775.00 | 14 9 | 15 2 |
| Interest Income | 775 90 | 1,000 80 | 962 7 |
| Bonds interest | 90 8 | 90 5 | 90 6 |
| Certificates of deposit Interest | 44.0 | 40 7 | 52 |
| Dividends | 11 3 | 13 7 | 10 5 |
| Other Income | 13 2 | 20 7 | 21 5 |
| Total Revenue | 961 6 | 1,264 50 | 1,333 70 |
| Less Loan guarantee provision | 177 8 | 414 | 241 2 |
| Export Guarantee Provision | | | 4 |
| General & Administrative expense | | | |
| Salaries & Wages | 123 5 | 172 2 | 232 9 |
| Contributions to Social Security | 78 | 14 1 | 17 5 |
| Contributions to Savings Fund | 63 | 10 3 | |
| Board of Director's Transportation | 20 6 | 20 7 | 26 |
| Rent | 16 9 | 20 | 26 2 |
| Depreciation Expense | 30 6 | 42 4 | 47 6 |
| Maintenance Expense | 04 | 07 | 13 |
| Vehicles Expense | 61 | 64 | 66 |
| Marketing Expenses | 28 6 | 23 5 | 14 8 |
| Professional Fees | 16 8 | 87 | 11 9 |
| Office duties & training courses | 19 1 | 24 8 | 27 2 |
| Employees incentives | | 78 | 116 |
| Fees & subscriptions | 12 6 | 09 | |
| Stationery & printings | 77 | 11 9 | 8 |
| Post Telephone & electricity | 61 | 10 1 | 12 7 |
| Others | 73 | 11 8 | 14 |
| Total General & Administrative Expense | 311 | 375 8 | 458 9 |
| Provision for decline in value of Investments | 16 4 | 91 | 174 5 |
| | 456 2 | 465 5 | |
| Net Income b/f taxes & other provisions Provision for scientific research etc | 450 Z -4 5 | 405 5 -4 6 | 454 9 |
| Provision for universities fees | -4 5 | | -45 |
| | | -46 | -4 5 |
| Board of Directors renumeration Net Income | -18 3 | -25 | -25 |
| | 428 7 | 431 2 | 420 8 |
| Add Retained earnings previous year | 155 4 | 170 3 | 508 4 |
| ncome available for appropriation | 584 1 | 601 5 | 929 2 |
| Appropriation | | | |
| Statutory reserve | 45 6 | 46 6 | 45 5 |
| Voluntary reserve | 45 6 | 46 6 | 45 5 |
| Proposed dividends | 322 6 | - | |
| Retained earnings, year end | 170 3 | 508 4 | 838 2 |
| Total | 584 1 | 601 5 | 929 20 |
| As shown in the balance sheets, JLGC has increased r | | | |
| the last three years, from the equivalent of US \$11.9 n | | | |
| end of 1998(using an exchange rate of JD1 00 = US \$ | 1 41) At the same | time, the valu | e of total |
| | | | |

are financial assets, invested in term deposits, company shares and government bonds, most of which are liquid and available to cover any claims that may be filed JLGC=s actual liabilities are minimal, amounting to \$3 0 million in 1996 and \$3 1 million at the end of 1998 However, contingent liabilities, pertaining to outstanding guarantees, have shown substantial growth, increasing from under \$20 million in 1996 to \$33 8 million at the end of 1998 Contingent liabilities are off-balance sheet items and are therefore not shown on the previous statements

JLGC=s income statements show a 39% increase in revenues, from \$1.4 million in 1996 to \$1.9 million in 1998 At the same time, there was a 48% increase in general and administrative expenses, which rose from \$0.4 million in 1996 to \$0.6 million in 1998, and a 38% increase in loan guarantee provisions for claims, from \$0.2 million in 1996 to \$0.6 million in 1998 The bottom line result was that net income remained about the same throughout the 3 year period, at \$0.6 million. Neither administrative expenses nor claims appear to be out of line with JLGC=s current volume of business. Sound management practices in coming years, including appropriate marketing and pricing policy, should produce a general increase in net profitability.

In order to judge the appropriateness of JLGC=s current pricing policies, it is worthwhile to compare various financial data of JLGC with those of other ECAs

In 1998, JLGC=s revenue from premiums and fees was equal to less than 2% of loans covered during the year This compares with an average ratio of 3% for 43 other guarantee and insurance organizations worldwide The latter was strongly influenced by medium to long-term business covered in very risky markets, which command relatively high premiums, an activity in which JLGC did not indulge

JLGC=s premium and fee revenues are also lower in relation to administrative expenses than world averages During 1998, JLGC=s general and administrative expenses equaled 34% of revenues This compares with an average of 28% for all other guarantee and insurance organizations However, bear in mind that JLGC is still relatively young and is in the process of building its portfolio, which entails greater relative administrative expense than required for older, more well established agencies

JLGC=s premium and fee revenues are actually higher than world averages in relationship to claims paid In 1998, JLGC=s premium/claims ratio was 17%, compared to an average of 59% for all other guarantee and insurance organizations Assuming that JLGC is handling claims expeditiously, this may indicate relatively conservative underwriting standards

A final measure of premium and fee pricing policy would indicate that JLGC=s premiums and fees are low in relation to world usages. After adding investment income to premium and fee revenues, JLGC=s bottom line net income was 32% of premium and fee revenues in 1998. This compares with an average of 53% for all other guarantee and insurance organizations. Again, these data should be interpreted, at least in part, as a reflection of the relative newness of the JLGC.

On balance, a comparison of JLGC=s financial and performance data with other ECAs worldwide indicates the desirability of some slight increase in JLGC=s premiums and fees However, it is important not to overdo this

IV OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING PRICING POLICIES

A number of other factors influence the level of guarantee fees and insurance premiums charged by ECAs The main ones are discussed below

National Interest Considerations_ECAs typically charge higher or lower fees depending upon the extent to which they seek to encourage additional exports, domestic employment, or other national interest considerations

Whole Turnover Requirement_ If the guarantee or insurance holder is required by the ECA to cover all or a significant part of its credits whether or not it wishes to do so, the ECA can and should charge a lower level of fees or premiums

Breadth and Scope of Total Exposure_ECAs with a relatively small, concentrated risk portfolio usually charge higher fees or premiums than ECAs with a large, good spread of risk portfolio

Percentage Covered The percentage of risk on each transaction which is covered by the ECA has a very important impact on the level of premiums and fees Higher percentages of cover typically carry higher premium rates because there is less incentive for the guaranteed or insured party to minimize losses

Application Fee, Underwriting Fee, etc Some ECAs charge fees additional to the basic insurance or guarantee fee This may produce lower levels of guarantee and insurance premiums **Risks Covered_** Premiums and fees also vary with the types, of risks which are covered Coverage of more, rather than fewer, specified risks results in higher, rather than lower, premiums

Other Criteria Additional criteria frequently used by ECAs in determining specific premiums and fees include the credit term (tenor) involved, the country of the buyer, the buyer=s financial status, the type of product to be exported, the existence of foreign competition, the existence of a guarantee from a sovereign or financial institution, experience with the insured party, type of trade documentation utilized, etc

9

V PRICING POLICIES OF OTHER ECAS

Competitive Situation Bearing in mind the numerous factors affecting premium levels, the table below compares average premium rates for short-term post-shipment export credit insurance offered by all of the ECAs which were Berne Union members in 1996 With rare exceptions, this is whole turnover business

POST-SHIPMENT EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE PREMIUMS AS PERCENTAGE OF BUSINESS COVERED (up to six months)

| COUNTRY | ECA | PREMIUM |
|-------------|-----------|---------|
| Argentina | CASC | 0 50 |
| Australia | EFIC | 0 28 |
| Belgium | OND | 0 77 |
| Cyprus | ECIS | 0 41 |
| Denmark | EKR | 0 20 |
| Denmark | FGB | 0 50 |
| France | COFACE | 0 80 |
| Germany | HERMES | 0 80 |
| Hong Kong | HKEC | 0 54 |
| India | ECGC | 0 39 |
| Indonesia | ASEI | 0 49 |
| Israel | IFTRIC | N/A |
| italy | SIAC | 0 47 |
| Jamaica | EXIMJ | 3 15 |
| Korea | KEIC | 0 15 |
| Malaysia | MECIB | 1 38 |
| Мехісо | BANCOMEXT | 0 64 |
| Netherlands | NCM | 0 48 |
| New Zealand | EXGO | 0 28 |
| Norway | GIEK | 0 35 |
| Singapore | ECICS | 0 54 |
| Spain | CGIC | 0 67 |
| Spain | CESCE | 0 60 |
| Sri Lanka | SLECIC | 0 66 |
| Sweden | EKN | 0 54 |
| Switzerland | ERG | N/A |
| Switzerland | FEDERAL | 0 30 |
| Turkey | TURKEXIM | 0 34 |
| UK | ECGD | 1 64 |
| UK | TI | 0 19 |
| USA | EXIMBANK | 0 40 |

| COUNTRY | ECA | PREMIUM |
|----------|----------|---------|
| USA | FCIA | 0 30 |
| Zimbabwe | CREDSURE | 0 33 |
| Poland | EGAP | 0 41 |
| China | PICC | 1 00 |
| Taiwan | TEBC | 0 41 |

As shown above, the average insurance premium for six months is approximately 50% (equivalent to 1 00% for 12 months) The highest premium is 3 15% for Jamaica and the lowest is 20% for Denmark

Short-term pre-shipment guarantee fees for selected Berne Union and non-Berne Union members are shown below for 1996 In every case, this reflects single exporter coverage and the guarantee agency has no whole turnover requirement

PRE-SHIPMENT WORKING CAPITAL GUARANTEE FEES AS PERCENTAGE OF LOAN COVERED (up to 12 months)

| Country | Guarantee Agency | 1996 |
|-------------|------------------|-------------|
| USA | SBA | 75 |
| USA | EXIMBANK | 1 25 (Avg) |
| Colombia | FNG | 3 50 (Avg) |
| Egypt | CGC | 2 00 |
| Korea | KCGF | 1 00 |
| Taiwan | SMBCGF | 75 |
| Indonesia | ASKRINDO | 60 |
| Thailand | SICGC | 1 50 |
| Philippines | GFSME | 1 80 |
| Malaysia | CGC | 50 |

As shown above, the average guarantee fee is about 1 4% per annum on the amount of the loan covered, ranging from a high of 3 50% for Colombia to a low of 50% for Malaysia

VI JLGC'S CURRENT PRICING POLICIES

With regard to the PSG program, JLGC=s current policy is to charge a guarantee fee equal to 1 5% per annum on the amount guaranteed (which is 75% of the amount of the loan) This is equivalent to a guarantee fee of 1 125% per annum on the amount of the loan. The fee is paid either up-front or quarterly, as agreed between JLGC and the bank

The DLG program has two basic rates On productive sector loans the guarantee fee is currently 15% per annum of the ceiling amount Housing sector loans are charged a guarantee fee of half that amount, or 75% per annum of the ceiling amount guaranteed

With regard to the ECG post-shipment program, offered with COFACE participation, the current premium rates range from a flat 37% to 1 20% of the gross invoice value of covered shipments, for credits with a term of up to 180 days Thus, on a per annum basis the rates are at least double the above Premiums are paid monthly in arrears, based upon the value of covered shipments

No differentiation of fees on a per annum basis is currently made to account for loan size, loan term, sector of borrower (agricultural or individual), size of borrower, purpose of loan (new investment or expansion), type of collateral, or location of borrower

VII JLGC'S DEFAULT EXPERIENCE

JLGC=s total default experience is in line with that of other ECA and credit guarantee organizations in their formative years

A detailed examination of JLGC=s defaults since inception is given in the pages which follow This indicates that there are major differences in defaults on loans by individual banks Also, the size of the loan makes a big difference, as does its term Factors which appear to make little difference in defaults include the size of the company (for those with 25 or less employees), the purpose of the loan (new investment or expansion), and the location of the borrower (inside or outside Amman) Conclusions cannot be drawn on the influence of different types of collateral on defaults nor on the influence of whether the beneficiary was industrial or agricultural

LOSSES PER BANK BY SEVEN (7) CATEGORIES

0 10K 10 40K 40 Defaults Total Loans Defaults **Total Loans** Defaults **Total Loans** Defaults **Total Loans** Defaults **Total Loans** % of Total Bank Name w/in Bank w/in Bank all Banks all Banks w/in Bank w/in Bank all Banks ali Banks w/in Bank w/in Bank 2 Housing Bank 94% 16 6% 24 1% 28 1% 90 6% 77 6% 36 2% 32 6% 0 0% 58% 3 Union Bank 0 0% 34 7% 0 0% 5 5% 0 0% 38 5% 0.0% 1 5% 100 0% 26 8% 4 Amman Bank for Investment 0 0% 187% 0 0% 0 5% 0 0% 81 3% 0 0% 06% 0 0% 0 0% 5 Industrial Development Bank 18 2% 15 4% 77% 16 4% 81 8% 39 7% 54% 10 5% 0 0% 45 0% 6 Cairo Amman Bank 14 7% 19 5% 7 7% 2 3% 85 3% 71 9% 69% 21% 0 0% 8 6% 7 ABC/Jordan 100 0% 18 1% 34% 7 9% 0 0% 51 7% 0 0% 5 6% 0 0% 30 3% 8 Bank of Jordan 27 3% 15 0% 57% 2 2% 72 7% 53 2% 24% 19% 0 0% 31 8% 9 Jordan Gulf Bank 26 2% 31 4% 20 7% 37% 73 8% 48 9% 91% 14% 0 0% 196% 10 Jordan Kuwait Bank 11 5% 14 9% 7 7% 5 2% 79 9% 88 5% 9 2% 7 0% 0 0% 5 2% 11 Philadelphia Inv Bank 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 100 0% 100 0% 14% 0 3% 0 0% 0 0% 12 Jordan Inv and Fin Bank 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 100 0% 79 1% 96% 1 0% 0 0% 20 9% 13 Middle East Inv Bank 29 9% 49 9% 10 0% 68% 70 1% 50 1% 37% 17% 0 0% 0 0% 14 Arab Bank PLC 0 0% 3 9% 0 0% 0 9% 100 0% 52 1% 36% 2 9% 0.0% 44 1% 15 Arab Land Bank 20 7% 28 4% 13 0% 51% 79 3% 64 0% 78% 28% 0.0% 7 7% 16 Jordan National Bank 0 0% 86% 0 0% 1 3% 0 0% 74 8% 0 0% 28% 0 0% 167% 18 Arab Jordan Inv Bank 0 0% 10 5% 0 0% 14% 100 0% 42 8% 48% 14% 0 0% 46 7% 19 ANZ Grindlays Bank 0 0% 21 0% 0 0% 1 1% 0.0% 79 0% 0 0% 10% 0 0% 0 0% 21 British Bank 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 22 Export and Finance Bank 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 49 1% 0.0% 2 5% 0 0% 50 9% 26 Carlo Amman (public cars) 0 0% 51 3% 0.0% 4 4% 0 0% 48 7% 0 0% 10% 0 0% 0 0% 63 Housing Union Bank 0 0% 5 3% 0 0% 2 0% 0 0% 65 5% 0 0% 62% 0 0% 29 2% 66 Housing Carlo Amman Bank 0 0% 8 0% 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 59 5% 0 0% 28% 0 0% 32 5% 67 Housing ABC/Jordan 0 0% 23% 0 0% 0 6% 0 0% 47 7% 0 0% 3 2% 0 0% 50 0% 68 Housing Housing Jordan Bank 0 0% 128% 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 62 8% 0 0% 15% 0 0% 24 3% 74 Housing Arab Bank PLC 0.0% 3 9% 0 0% 04% 0 0% 53 7% 0 0% 14% 0 0% 42 4% 75 Housing Arab Land Bank 0 0% 3 3% 0 0% 03% 0 0% 84 6% 0.0% 2 2% 0 0% 12 1% 76 Housing Jordan National Bank 0 0% 10 5% 0 0% 0 7% 0 0% 57 4% 0.0% 0 9% 0 0% 32 1% 78 Housing Arab Jordan Inv Bank 0 0% 77% 0 0% 0 5% 0 0% 72 9% 0 0% 11% 0 0% 194% Totals 127% 15 1% 81 4% 60 9%

Loan Size

Loan Term

| | | Less tha | n 1 Year | I | | 1 3 Ye | ears | 1 | | 3 5 Ye | ears |
|---------------------------------|------------|-------------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|
| | Defaults | Total Loans | Defaults | Total Loans | Defaults | Total Loans | Defaults | Total Loans | Defaults | Total Loans | Defaults |
| | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total |
| Bank Name | w/in Bank | w/in Bank | all Banks | all Banks | w/in Bank | w/ın Bank | ali Banks | all Banks | w/in Bank | w/in Bank | all Banks |
| 2 Housing Bank | 0 7% | 1 5% | 5 9% | 5 1% | 15 3% | 12 5% | 22 2% | 10 4% | 57 7% | 70 8% | 33 1% |
| 3 Union Bank | 0 0% | 9 0% | 0 0% | 2 9% | 0 0% | 80 1% | 0 0% | 6 2% | 100 0% | 10 9% | 10 3% |
| 4 Amman Bank for Investment | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 39 8% | 0 0% | 0 6% | 0 0% | 60 2% | 0 0% |
| 5 Industrial Development Bank | 0 0% | 5 4% | 0 0% | 11 7% | 0 0% | 21 7% | 0 0% | 11 4% | 100 0% | 5 2% | 1 7% |
| 6 Cairo Amman Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 8 8% | 30 1% | 4 4% | 1 8% | 51 3% | 54 7% | 10 0% |
| 7 ABC/Jordan | 0 0% | 16 7% | 0 0% | 14 9% | 100 0% | 53 0% | 2 0% | 11 5% | 0 0% | 30 2% | 0 0% |
| 8 Bank of Jordan | 0 0% | 5 4% | 0 0% | 1 6% | 100 0% | 76 4% | 12 0% | 5 4% | 0 0% | 16 6% | 0 0% |
| 9 Jordan Gulf Bank | 97% | 2 0% | 23 5% | 0 5% | 39 8% | 63 1% | 17 9% | 3 6% | 50 5% | 35 0% | 8 9% |
| 10 Jordan Kuwait Bank | 0 0% | 3 9% | 0 0% | 2 8% | 28 8% | 57 3% | 10 9% | 9 9% | 71 2% | 37 4% | 10 6% |
| 11 Philadelphia Inv Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 100 0% | 100 0% | 5 2% | 0 6% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| 12 Jordan Inv and Fin Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 34 9% | 0 0% | 0 8% | 50 0% | 46 5% | 6 9% |
| 13 Middle East Inv Bank | 0 0% | 91% | 0 0% | 2 5% | 31 0% | 85 9% | 5 9% | 5 8% | 69 0% | 5 0% | 5 2% |
| 14 Arab Bank PLC | 100 0% | 58 0% | 70 6% | 26 5% | 0 0% | 37 6% | 0 0% | 4 2% | 0 0% | 4 5% | 0 0% |
| 15 Arab Land Bank | 0 0% | 5 8% | 0 0% | 2 1% | 61% | 36 8% | 2 2% | 3 3% | 93 9% | 55 9% | 13 2% |
| 16 Jordan National Bank | 0 0% | 11 3% | 0 0% | 3 5% | 0 0% | 41 3% | 0 0% | 3 1% | 0 0% | 38 2% | 0 0% |
| 18 Arab Jordan Inv Bank | 0 0% | 7 0% | 0 0% | 1 9% | 100 0% | 74 8% | 17 4% | 4 8% | 0 0% | 18 2% | 0 0% |
| 19 ANZ Grindlays Bank | 0 0% | 8 0% | 0 0% | | 0 0% | 79 0% | 0 0% | 2 1% | 0 0% | 13 0% | 0 0% |
| 21 British Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| 22 Export and Finance Bank | 0 0% | 21 0% | 0 0% | | 0 0% | 23 3% | 0 0% | 2 4% | 0 0% | 55 7% | 0 0% |
| 26 Cario Amman (public cars) | 0 0% | 4 9% | 0 0% | | 0 0% | 25 8% | 0 0% | 1 1% | 0 0% | 69 2% | 0 0% |
| 63 Housing Union Bank | 0 0% | 2 4% | 0 0% | | 0 0% | 14 7% | 0 0% | 2 7% | 0 0% | 26 8% | 0 0% |
| 66 Housing Carlo Amman Bank | 0 0% | 1 9 3% | 0 0% | | 0 0% | 4 2% | 0 0% | 0 4% | 0 0% | 19 7% | 0 0% |
| 67 Housing ABC/Jordan | 0 0% | 6 3% | 0 0% | | 0 0% | 19 7% | 0 0% | 2 7% | 0 0% | 55 8% | 0 0% |
| 68 Housing Housing Jordan Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | | 0 0% | 23 1% | 0 0% | 1 1% | 0 0% | 42 1% | 0 0% |
| 74 Housing Arab Bank PLC | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 48 6% | 0 0% | 2 5% | 0 0% | 38 0% | 0 0% |
| 75 Housing Arab Land Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 20 8% | 0 0% |
| 76 Housing Jordan National Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 17 5% | 0 0% |
| 78 Housing Arab Jordan Inv Bank | 0 0% | 5 8% | 0 0% | 0 7% | 0 0% | 58 5% | 0 0% | 1 7% | 0 0% | 35 7% | 0 0% |
| Totals | | | 4 1% | 7 5% | | | 22 4% | 30 6% | | | 56 7% |

16

| | | | | | | | | | | _ |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | D-f-ult- | | strial | - | | Agricul | | | . | Serv |
| | Defaults | Total Loans |
| Bank Name | % of Total w/ın Bank | % of Total w/ın Bank | % of Total all Banks | % of Total all Banks | % of Total w/ın Bank | % of Total w/ın Bank | % of Total all Banks | % of Total all Banks | % of Total w/in Bank | % of Total w/ın Bank |
| 2 Housing Bank | 23.5% | 9 4% | | 13 7% | 0.0% | 1 4% | 0.0% | 14 6% | 28 2% | 18 1% |
| 3 Union Bank | 0.0% | 5 4% | 0.0% | 0 7% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 100 0% | 35 8% |
| 4 Amman Bank for Investment | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 15 5% | 00% | 2 7% | 0 0% | 55 8% |
| 5 Industrial Development Bank | 43 6% | 43 7% | 61% | 40 1% | 0 0% | 0.0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 56 4% | 21 6% |
| 6 Cairo Amman Bank | 10 678 | 9 5% | 12 8% | 1 0% | 0 0% | 16 2% | 0.0% | 11 8% | 0 0% | 21 2% |
| 7 ABC/Jordan | 0 0% | 39 8% | 0 0% | 15 0% | 0 0% | 6 5% | 0 0% | 17 4% | 100 0% | 17 4% |
| 8 Bank of Jordan | | 5 1% | | 0 6% | 0 0% | 7 2% | 0 0% | 6 3% | 0 0% | 33 8% |
| 9 Jordan Gulf Bank | 35 0% | 40 6% | · - 9 2% | 4 1% | 0 0% | 2 9% | 0 0% | 2 1% | 35 0% | 27 3% |
| 10 Jordan Kuwait Bank | | 16 3% | ~ | 4 9% | 0 0% | 0 7% | 0 0% | 1 6% | 0.0% | 25 9% |
| 11 Philadelphia Inv Bank | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| 12 Jordan Inv and Fin Bank | 50 0% | 60 5% | it 10 2% | 2 6% | 50.0% | | 53.3% | 5 6% | 0 0% | 0.0% |
| 13 Middle East Inv Bank | 0 0% | 1 8% | 0 0% | 0 2% | 23.0% | 1 7% | | 1 4% | 0 0% | 4 9% |
| 14 Arab Bank PLC | 100001/2 | 29 8% | 7,7% | 5 8% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 17 7% |
| 15 Arab Land Bank | 56:1% | 8 8% | 11.7% | 1 4% | | 4 5% | 33.3% | 4 9% | 0 0% | 21 8% |
| 16 Jordan National Bank | 0 0% | 12 9% | 0 0% | 1 7% | 0 0% | 30 3% | 0 0% | 27 8% | 0 0% | 26 8% |
| 18 Arab Jordan Inv Bank | 100.0% | 12 3% | 10 2% | 1 4% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 12 3% |
| 19 ANZ Grindlays Bank | 0 0% | 17 4% | 0 0% | 0 8% | 0 0% | 12 1% | 0 0% | 3 9% | 0 0% | 19 9% |
| 21 British Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| 22 Export and Finance Bank | 0 0% | 34 9% | 0 0% | 6 2% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 17 7% |
| 26 Cario Amman (public cars) | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| 63 Housing Union Bank | 0 0% | | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| 66 Housing Cario Amman Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| 67 Housing ABC/Jordan | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| 68 Housing Housing Jordan Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| 74 Housing Arab Bank PLC | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| 75 Housing Arab Land Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| 76 Housing Jordan National Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| 78 Housing Arab Jordan Inv Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% |
| Totals | | | 38 2% | 17 6% | | | 7 3%; | 2 5% | | |
| | | - In double at t | -llt11 | | | 1 1 · | | | | |
| | 4 87 97 PM | | nk s detault fa | te is between | and 10% more I | nan the percenta | ige of business i | n that area | | |

= Individual bank s default rate is greater than 10% more than the percentage of business in that area

| Size o | f Co | omp | any |
|--------|------|-----|-----|
|--------|------|-----|-----|

| | | 1-5 Em | ployees | | 6-25 Employees | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|------------|-------------|--|
| | Defaults | Total Loans | Defaults | Total Loans | Defaults | Total Loans | Defaults | Total Loans | |
| | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | % of Total | |
| Bank Name | w/in Bank | w/in Bank | ali Banks | all Banks | w/in Bank | w/in Bank | all Banks | all Banks | |
| 2 Housing Bank | 56 2% | 71 5% | 41 9% | 28 4% | 43 8% | 25 6% | 29 6% | 24 6% | |
| 3 Union Bank | 100 0% | 65 1% | 13 4% | 2 4% | 0 0% | 34 9% | 0 0% | 3 1% | |
| 4 Amman Bank for Investment | 0 0% | 76 1% | 0 0% | 0 5% | 0 0% | 23 9% | 0 0% | 0 4% | |
| 5 Industrial Development Bank | 74 5% | 41 3% | 9 2% | 10 3% | 25 5% | 38 8% | 2 8% | 23 5% | |
| 6 Cairo Amman Bank | 0 0% | 51 7% | 0 0% | 1 5% | 100 0% | 46 4% | 11 8% | 3 2% | |
| 7 ABC/Jordan | 31 0% | 23 2% | 1 0% | 2 4% | 0 0% | 50 4% | 0 0% | 12 5% | |
| 8 Bank of Jordan | 0 0% | 40 6% | 0 0% | 1 4% | 100 0% | 35 5% | 5 6% | 2 9% | |
| 9 Jordan Gulf Bank | 55 2% | 49 3% | 8 3% | 1 3% | 44 8% | 24 0% | 6 1% | 1 6% | |
| 10 Jordan Kuwait Bank | 46 3% | 70 2% | 12 7% | 5 8% | 24 4% | 28 8% | 6 1% | 5 7% | |
| 11 Philadelphia Inv Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 100 0% | 100 0% | 2 4% | 0 7% | |
| 12 Jordan Inv and Fin Bank | 0 0% | 20 9% | 0 0% | 0 2% | 100 0% | 65 1% | 16 2% | 1 8% | |
| 13 Middle East Inv Bank | 100 0% | 80 8% | 97% | 2 6% | 0 0% | 15 9% | 0 0% | 1 2% | |
| 14 Arab Bank PLC | 0 0% | 28 7% | 0 0% | 1 5% | 100 0% | 33 3% | 6 1% | 4 3% | |
| 15 Arab Land Bank | 20 7% | 74 4% | 3 8% | 3 1% | 79 3% | 25 6% | 13 2% | 2 6% | |
| 16 Jordan National Bank | 0 0% | 60 3% | 0 0% | 2 1% | 0 0% | 39 7% | 0 0% | 3 4% | |
| 18 Arab Jordan Inv Bank | 0 0% | 70 1% | 0 0% | 2 1% | 0 0% | 22 9% | 0 0% | 1 7% | |
| 19 ANZ Grindlays Bank | 0 0% | 69 2% | 0 0% | 0 9% | 0 0% | 30 8% | 0 0% | 0 9% | |
| 21 British Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | |
| 22 Export and Finance Bank | 0 0% | 33 0% | 0 0% | 1 6% | 0 0% | 48 7% | 0 0% | 5 7% | |
| 26 Cario Amman (public cars) | 0 0% | 100 0% | 0 0% | 2 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | |
| 63 Housing - Union Bank | 0 0% | 100 0% | 0 0% | 8 9% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | |
| 66 Housing - Cario Amman Bank | 0 0% | 100 0% | 0 0% | 4 5% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | |
| 67 Housing - ABC/Jordan | 0 0% | 100 0% | 0 0% | 6 4% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | |
| 68 Housing - Housing Jordan Bank | 0 0% | 100 0% | 0 0% | 2 2% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | |
| 74 Housing - Arab Bank PLC | 0 0% | 96 9% | 0 0% | 2 3% | 0 0% | 3 1% | 0 0% | 0 2% | |
| 75 Housing - Arab Land Bank | 0 0% | 100 0% | 0 0% | 2 5% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | |
| 76 Housing - Jordan National Bank | 0 0% | 100 0% | 0 0% | 1 5% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | |
| 78 Housing - Arab Jordan Inv Bank | 0 0% | 100 0% | 0 0% | 1 4% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | |
| Totals | | | 43 6% | 64 4% | | | 48 0% | 26 7% | |

Loan Usage

| | | Ne | w | | | Expansion | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Bank Name | Defaults % of Total w/ın Bank | Total Loans % of Total w/ın Bank | Defaults % of Total all Banks | Total Loans % of Total all Banks | Defaults % of Total w/ın Bank | Total Loans % of Total w/ın Bank | Defauits % of Totai all Banks | Total Loans % of Total all Banks | | | |
| 2 Housing Bank | 58 9% | 74 5% | 59 7% | 33 3% | 34 3% | 14 8% | 29 9% | 18 8% | | | |
| 3 Union Bank | 0 0% | 56 4% | 0 0% | 2 4% | 0 0% | 8 8% | 0 0% | 1 0% | | | |
| 4 Amman Bank for Investment | 0 0% | 28 7% | 0 0% | 0 2% | 0 0% | 65 3% | 0 0% | 1 4% | | | |
| 5 Industrial Development Bank | 25 5% | 46 8% | 4 3% | 13 2% | 56 4% | 26 9% | 8 1% | 21 6% | | | |
| 6 Cairo Amman Bank | 26 5% | 33 9% | 5 5% | 1 1% | 0 0% | 31 6% | 0 0% | 2 8% | | | |
| 7 ABC/Jordan | 0 0% | 18 2% | 0 0% | 2 1% | 100 0% | 41 6% | 1 2% | 13 7% | | | |
| 8 Bank of Jordan | 0 0% | 39 6% | 0 0% | 1 5% | 100 0% | 35 1% | 7 2% | 3 8% | | | |
| 9 Jordan Gulf Bank | 15 5% | 14 5% | 4 9% | 0 4% | 38 8% | 45 8% | 10 4% | 4 0% | | | |
| 10 Jordan Kuwaıt Bank | 54 0% | 55 8% | 14 2% | 5 2% | 0 0% | 29 9% | 0 0% | 7 9% | | | |
| 11 Philadelphia Inv Bank | 100 0% | 23 1% | 3 6% | 0 1% | 0 0% | 76 9% | 0 0% | 0 7% | | | |
| 12 Jordan Inv and Fin Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 100 0% | 65 1% | 20 9% | 2 4% | | | |
| 13 Middle East Inv Bank | 46 0% | 64 7% | 6 1% | 2 3% | 23 0% | 13 2% | 2 6% | 1 4% | | | |
| 14 Arab Bank PLC | 0 0% | 13 0% | 0 0% | 0 8% | 0 0% | 15 7% | 0 0% | 2 7% | | | |
| 15 Arab Land Bank | 7 3% | 42 7% | 18% | 2 0% | 92 7% | 36 0% | 19 8% | 4 8% | | | |
| 16 Jordan National Bank | 0 0% | 41 8% | 0 0% | 17% | 0 0% | 46 2% | 0 0% | 5 2% | | | |
| 18 Arab Jordan Inv Bank | 0 0% | 52 0% | 0 0% | 1 8% | 0 0% | 6 2% | 0 0% | 0 6% | | | |
| 19 ANZ Grindlays Bank | 0 0% | 23 9% | 0 0% | 0 3% | 0 0% | 40 6% | 0 0% | 1 6% | | | |
| 21 British Bank | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | | | |
| 22 Export and Finance Bank | 0 0% | 3 3% | 0 0% | 0 2% | 0 0% | 11 1% | 0 0% | 1 7% | | | |
| 26 Carlo Amman (public cars) | 0 0% | 90 6% | 0 0% | 2 1% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | | | |
| 63 Housing - Union Bank | 0 0% | 92 6% | 0 0% | 9 3% | 0 0% | 1 2% | 0 0% | 0 3% | | | |
| 66 Housing - Carlo Amman Bank | 0 0% | 85 2% | 0 0% | 4 3% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | | | |
| 67 Housing - ABC/Jordan | 0 0% | 92 1% | 0 0% | 6 7% | 0 0% | 5 4% | 0 0% | 1 1% | | | |
| 68 Housing - Housing Jordan Bank | 0 0% | 71 3% | 0 0% | 1 8% | 0 0% | 18 6% | 0 0% | 1 3% | | | |
| 74 Housing - Arab Bank PLC | 0 0% | 76 9% | 0 0% | 2 1% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | 0 0% | | | |
| 75 Housing - Arab Land Bank | 0 0% | 82 2% | 0 0% | 2 3% | 0 0% | 6 5% | 0 0% | 0 5% | | | |
| 76 Housing - Jordan National Bank | 0 0% | 93 0% | 0 0% | 1 6% | 0 0% | 7 0% | 0 0% | 0 3% | | | |
| 78 Housing - Arab Jordan Inv Bank | 0 0% | 84 5% | 0 0% | 1 3% | 0 0% | 3 9% | 0 0% | 0 2% | | | |
| Totals | | | 32 1% | 57 2% | | | 37 4% | 20 1% | | | |

VIII FINANCIAL MODEL FOR FUTURE PRICING

A financial model was developed by Mr Sean Berg, another consultant to JLGC, with FWA advice and assistance This model is a tool to be used by the JLGC in making future pricing decisions. The model generates detailed information on the income statement and balance sheets effects of changes in key variables, including Change in Volume of Business, Change in Ceiling Volume, Change in Expenses, Change in Invested Capital Interest Rate, Increase/(Decline) in Investments, Change in Claims Experience, Change in Recovery Rate, and Application Fee The model is on a diskette which has been given to JLGC and runs on EXCEL

The financial model is broken into two parts one covering pre-shipment and post-shipment export credit guarantees and one for domestic loan guarantees Detailed operational and financial projections are generated for each year from 1998 through 2001

Base case projections generated by the model are shown on the next 8 pages By changing one or more of the key variables, entirely new projections are generated which carry their own pricing implications The most important indices to monitor, of course, are the total amount of loans(indicating achievement of national interest objectives) and net income before taxes(indicating financial viability of JLGC) Both are crucial in determining the appropriate level of premiums

As presented herein, the financial model is a powerful tool to assist in pricing policy and many other aspects of management decision making By changing any or all of the variables, one can see on a real-time basis the impact on the future of JLGC, and management can take steps in advance of need to influence future directions of the company

Perious Page Liam

MODEL

| Scenario Analysis | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------------|----------------|--------------|-----------------|---------------|------------|---------------|------------|
| Financial Model for JLGC E | Export Credit | Guarantee Prog | ram (present | ed in Jordanian | Dinars) | | | |
| | 1998 | | 1999 | I | 2000 | | 2001 | 1 |
| | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount | 2000 Rate/ | Amount | Z001 Rate/ | Amount |
| | | th Rate | | th Rate | | th Rate | | th Rate |
| Scenario | GIUW | | Glow | | GIUW | | Glow | |
| Change in Volume of Business | 0% | | | | | | | · |
| Change in Ceiling Volume | 0% | | | | | | | |
| Change in Expenses | 0% | | | | | | | |
| Change in Invested Capital Interest Rate | 0% | | | | | | ····· | |
| Increase/Decline in Investments | 0% | | | | | | | |
| Change in Claims Experience | 0% | + | | · - · · · · · | | | | <u> </u> |
| Change in Recovery Rate | 0% | | | | | | | |
| Application Fee | 0 00% | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | + |
| Level of Business | | | | 1 | | | | <u> </u> |
| Line Preshipment Export Credit Guarantee | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| 1 Total Amount of Loans | ł | 1 333 296 | 352 3% | 6 030 000 | 20 0% | 7 236 000 | 20 0% | 8 683 200 |
| 2 Average Size of Loan (Executed and Under Executio | n) | 74 072 | 9.5% | 67 000 | 0.0% | 67 000 | 0.0% | 67 000 |
| 3 Number of Loans (Executed and Under Execution) | | 18 | 400.0% | 90 | 20 0% | 108 | 20 4% | 130 |
| 4 Average Loan Period (% of Year # of days) | 28 4% | 104 | 27 8% | 100 | 27 8% | 100 | 27 8% | 100 |
| 5 Guarantee Percentage Total Guaranteed Amount | 75 0% | 999 972 | 75 0% | 4 522 500 | 75 0% | 5 427 000 | 75 0% | 6 512 400 |
| 6 Average Portfolio (Annualized Basis) | | 284 000 | | 1 256 250 | | 1 507 500 | | 1 809 000 |
| 7 Average Premium Rate Total Premium Income | 0 43% | 4 260 | 0 42% | 18 844 | 0 42% | 22 613 | 0 42% | 27 135 |
| 8 Application Fee | 0 00% | | 0 00% | - | 0 00% | | 0 00% | 27 100 |
| 9 Effective Premium Rate Total Premium Income | 1 50% | 4 260 | 1 50% | 18 844 | 1 50% | 22 613 | 1 50% | 27 135 |
| Postshipment Export Credit Guarantee | | | | | | | | |
| 10 Average Size of Contract (Executed and Under Exec | ution) | 766 200 | 233 5% | 2 555 556 | 0.0% | 2 555 556 | 0.0% | 2 555 556 |
| 11 Number of Contracts (Executed and Under Execution | | 5 | 80 0% | 9 | 22 2% | 11 | 27 3% | 14 |
| 12 Total Amount of Exports | í | 3 831 000 | 500 4% | 23 000 004 | 22 2% | 28 111 116 | 27 3% | 35 777 784 |
| 13 Guarantee Percentage Amount (85% Guarantee x | 17 0% | 651 270 | 17 0% | 3 910 001 | 17 0% | 4 778 890 | 17 0% | 6 082 223 |
| 20% Share) | 1.0% | 001210 | 1 11 0 10 | 0010001 | 17 070 | 4770 050 | 17 078 | 0 002 223 |
| 14 Total Premium Rate Total Premium (85% | 0 57% | 18 640 | 0 66% | 129 030 | 0 78% | 185 899 | 0 78% | 236 598 |
| Guarantee JLGC and Coface share) | | | | | | | | |
| 15 Average Premium Rate Total Premium (Including Commission) | 1 31% | 8 500 | 1 50% | 58 838 | 1 77% | 84 398 | 1 77% | 107 416 |
| 16 Application Fee | 0 00% | - | 0 00% | | 0 00% | | 0 00% | |
| 17 Effective Premium Rate Total Premium Income | 1 31% | 8 500 | 1 50% | 58 838 | 1 77% | 84 398 | 1 77% | 107 416 |
| | t | | | | | + | | |

| | Scenario Analysis | | | · · · · · · | | | · | ······ | |
|----|---|----------------|---------------|--------------|-----------------|---------|------------|--|------------|
| | Financial Model for JLGC E | xport Credit G | uarantee Prog | ram (present | ed in Jordanian | Dinars) | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | 1998 | | 1999 | | 2000 | | 2001 | |
| | | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount |
| | | Growt | h Rate | Grow | th Rate | Grow | th Rate | Grow | th Rate |
| | Total Guarantees | | | | | | | | |
| 18 | Total Average Guarantee Exposure | | 935 270 | 452 4% | 5 166 251 | 21 7% | 6 286 390 | 25 5% | 7 891 223 |
| 19 | Total Fee Income | | 12 760 | 508 8% | 77 681 | 37 8% | 107 011 | 25 7% | 134 551 |
| | Capital | | | | | | | | |
| 29 | Capital (end year) | | 4 165 090 | | 4 741 251 | | 5 424 776 | | 6 231 177 |
| 30 | Investment Income on Capital | 9 97% | 395 574 | 9 00% | 374 858 | 9 00% | 426 713 | 9 00% | 488 230 |
| 31 | Percentage of Total JLGC Capital | 37% | 11 257 000 | 37% | 12 814 192 | 37% | 14 661 556 | 37% | 16 841 018 |
| | Claims | | | | | | | | |
| | Pre shipment program | <u></u> | | | | - | | | |
| 32 | Gross Claims/Rate | 0.0% | | 1 5% | 67 838 | 1 5% | 81 405 | 1 5% | 97 686 |
| | Recovery Rate (lagged one year) | 80% | | 80 0% | | 80 0% | 54 270 | 80 0% | 65 124 |
| | Net Claims | 0 00% | | 0 30% | 67 838 | 0 30% | 27 135 | 0 30% | 32 562 |
| | Post shipment program | | | | | | | ······································ | |
| 32 | Gross Claims/Rate | 0.0% | | 2 0% | 78 200 | 2 0% | 95 578 | 2 0% | 121 644 |
| | Recovery Rate (lagged one year) | 50% | | 50% | | 50% | 39 100 | 50% | 47 789 |
| _ | Net Claims | 0 00% | | 1 00% | 78 200 | 1 00% | 56 478 | 1 00% | 73 856 |
| 35 | Total Net Claims | | | | 146 038 | | 83 613 | | 106 418 |
| | Expenses | | | | | | | <u></u> | |
| 36 | Staff Level Expense | | 96 973 | 27 8% | 123 931 | 10 0% | 136 324 | 10 0% | 149 956 |
| 37 | General Overhead Expense | | 66 488 | 11 6% | 74 200 | 5 0% | 77 910 | 5 0% | 81 806 |
| 38 | Marketing Costs | | 5 507 | 62 4% | 8 943 | 11 0% | 9 927 | 20 0% | 11 912 |
| 39 | Training Costs | | 13 461 | 51 0% | 20 327 | 0.0% | 20 327 | 0 0% | 20 327 |
| 40 | Total Expenses | | 182 428 | 24 7% | 227 401 | 7 5% | 244 488 | 8 0% | 264 001 |
| | Provisioning | | | | | | | | |
| 41 | Guarantee Provision – Pre shipment Guarantee (40% o income) | f fee | 1 704 | 342 3% | 7 538 | 20 0% | 9 045 | 20 0% | 10 854 |
| 42 | Guarantee Provision – Post shipment Guarantee (27 79 commission) | % including | 2 354 | 592 4% | 16 298 | 43 4% | 23 378 | 27 3% | 29 754 |
| 43 | Total Guarantee Provision | | 4 058 | 487 4% | 23 836 | 36 0% | 32 423 | 25 2% | 40 608 |
| | Provision for Increase (Decline) in Investments | | (64 565) | | | | | | |
| 45 | Total Fee Revenue | · | 12 760 | 508 8% | 77 681 | 37 8% | 107 011 | 25 7% | 134 551 |
| | Total Interest Revenue | | 395 574 | 5 2% | 374 858 | 13 8% | 426 713 | 14 4% | 488 230 |
| 46 | rolar microst Revenue | | 393 514 | J Z 70 | 574 000 | 13 0 76 | 420713 | 14 470 | 400 230 |

| | Scenario Analysis | | | | | | ************************************** | | ····· |
|----|---|--------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------|--|-------|------------|
| | Financial Model for JLGC E | xport Credit | Guarantee Prog | gram (present | ed in Jordanian | Dinars) | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | 1998 | | 1999 | | 2000 | | 2001 | - r |
| | | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount |
| | | Grow | /th Rate | Grow | th Rate | Grow | th Rate | Grow | th Rate |
| 47 | Net Income before Taxes | | 286 413 | 29 7% | 201 303 | 27 6% | 256 812 | 23 9% | 318 171 |
| 48 | Distributions | | | | | | | | |
| 49 | Retained Earnings | | 286 413 | 29 7% | 201 303 | 27 6% | 256 812 | 23 9% | 318 171 |
| 50 | Guarantee Assigned Capacity | | 20 825 450 | | 23 706 256 | | 27 123 878 | | 31 155 884 |
| 51 | Cumulative Loan Guarantee Provision | | 4 058 | 3011 4% | (118 144) | 43 3% | (169 333) | 38 9% | (235 143) |
| 52 | Average Number of Employees | | 66 | 91% | 72 | 38 9% | 10 | 0 0% | 10 |
| 53 | Fee/Exposure | 1 4% | | 1 5% | | 1 7% | | 1 7% | |
| 54 | Fee/Expenses | 7 0% | | 34 2% | | 43 8% | | 51 0% | |
| 55 | Fee/Expenses + Provisioning | 3 8% | | 19 5% | | 23 3% | | 25 4% | |
| 56 | Cumulative Loan Gty Provisioning/Outstanding Gty Exposure | 0 4% | | 2 3% | | 2 7% | | 3 0% | |
| 57 | Guarantee Provision/Net Claims | 0 0% | | 16 3% | | 38 8% | | 38 2% | |
| 58 | (Total Exp + Provisioning Gty Fees)/Earnings on Invested Capital | 27 6% | | 46 3% | | 39 8% | | 34 8% | |
| 60 | Total Outstanding Guarantees Committed to Equity | 0 22 | | 1 09 | | 1 16 | | 1 27 | |
| 61 | Average Guarantee Outstanding per Employee | | 141 708 | 406 3% | 717 535 | 12 4% | 628 639 | 25 5% | 789 122 |
| 62 | Average Guarantee Fee per Employee | | 1 933 | 458 1% | 10 789 | 0 8% | 10 701 | 25 7% | 13 455 |
| 63 | Average Total Revenue per Employee | | 61 869 | 1 6% | 62 853 | 15 1% | 53 372 | 16 7% | 62 278 |

Scenario Analysis

Financial Model for JLGC Domestic Loan Guarantee Program (presented in Jordanian Dinars)

| | | 1 | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
|------|---|---------|------------|--------|------------|-------|------------|-------|------------|
| | | 1998 | -1 | 1999 | 1 | 2000 | - I | 2001 | |
| | | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount |
| | | Grow | th Rate | Grow | th Rate | Grow | th Rate | Grow | th Rate |
| | Scenario | | | | | | | | T |
| | Change in Volume of Business | 0% | | | | | | | 1 |
| | Change in Ceiling Volume | 0% | | | | | | | |
| | Change in Expenses | 0% | | | | | | | |
| | Change in Invested Capital Interest Rate | 0% | | | | | | ····· | 1 |
| | Increase/(Decline) in Investments | 0% | | | | | | | |
| | Change in Claims Experience | 0% | | | | | | | - |
| | Change in Recovery Rate | 0% | | | | | | | |
| | Application Fee | 0 00% | | | | | | | |
| | Level of Business | | | | | | | | |
| Line | | | | | | | ┨────── ┨ | | |
| # | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | Total Amount of Loans | | 8 493 888 | 23 7% | 6 480 000 | 26 7% | 8 208 000 | 26 2% | 10 360 000 |
| 2 | Average Size of Loan (Executed and Under Execution | n) | 17 056 | 5 5% | 18 000 | 5 6% | 19 000 | 5 3% | 20 000 |
| 3 | Average Number of Loans (Executed and Under Exec | cution) | 498 | 27 7% | 360 | 20 0% | 432 | 19 9% | 518 |
| 4 | Average Guarantee Ceiling | | 11 160 000 | 14 3% | 12 760 000 | 15 2% | 14 705 000 | 10 5% | 16 250 000 |
| 5 | End Year Guarantee Ceiling | | 11 610 000 | 19 8% | 13 910 000 | 11 4% | 15 500 000 | 97% | 17 000 000 |
| 6 | Total Utilized Ceiling to date (projected usage rate) | 81 9% | 9 507 326 | 70 8% | 9 852 095 | 69 9% | 10 836 431 | 73 4% | 12 478 523 |
| 7 | Avg Premium Rate Tot Premium Income (projected rate increases) | 1 50% | 167 400 | 14 3% | 191 400 | 15 2% | 220 575 | 10 5% | 243 750 |
| 8 | Application Fee | 0 00% | | 0 00% | | 0 00% | - | 0 00% | - |
| 9 | Effective Premium Rate Total Premium Income | 1 76% | 167 400 | 1 94% | 191 400 | 2 04% | 220 575 | 1 95% | 243 750 |
| 10 | Average Guarantee Percentage Amount (Current Year) | 60 0% | 5 096 333 | 60 0% | 3 888 000 | 60 0% | 4 924 800 | 60 0% | 6 216 000 |
| | Housing Loan Guarantees | | | | | | | | |
| 11 | Total Amount of Loans | | 3 908 016 | 135 4% | 9 200 000 | 30 4% | 12 000 000 | 33 3% | 16 000 000 |
| 12 | Average Size of Loan (Executed and Under Execution | n) | 23 262 | 14 0% | 20 000 | 0 0% | 20 000 | 0 0% | 20 000 |
| 13 | Number of Loans (Executed and Under Execution) | | | 173 8% | 460 | 30.4% | 600 | 33 3% | 800 |

| | Scenario Analysis | | | | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | |
|----|---|-------------|---------------|--------------|-------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------|-------|------------|
| | Financial Model for JLGC Do | mestic Loan | Guarantee Pro | gram (preser | nted in Jordaniai | n Dinars) | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | 1998 | | 1999 | | 2000 | | 2001 | |
| | | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount |
| | | Grow | th Rate | Grow | th Rate | Grow | th Rate | Grow | th Rate |
| | | | 168 | | | | | | 1 |
| 14 | Average Guarantee Ceiling | | 5 826 667 | 108 3% | 12 135 000 | 2 5% | 12 437 500 | 24 6% | 15 500 000 |
| 15 | End Year Guarantee Ceiling | | 12 395 000 | 4 2% | 11 875 000 | 9 5% | 13 000 000 | 38 5% | 18 000 000 |
| 16 | Total Utilized Ceiling to date (projected usage rate) | 21 7% | 2 690 187 | 57 2% | 6 794 659 | 89 7% | 11 655 460 | 98 6% | 17 747 141 |
| 17 | Avg Premium Rate Tot Premium Income (projected rate increases) | 0 75% | 43 700 | 108 3% | 91 013 | 2 5% | 93 281 | 24 6% | 116 250 |
| 18 | Application Fee | 0 00% | | 0 00% | | 0 00% | | 0 00% | - |
| 19 | Effective Premium Rate Total Premium Income | 1 62% | 43 700 | 1 34% | 91 013 | 0 80% | 93 281 | 0 66% | 116 250 |
| 20 | Average Guarantee Percentage Amount (Current Year) | 70 0% | 2 735 611 | 70 0% | 6 440 000 | 70 0% | 8 400 000 | 70 0% | 11 200 000 |
| | Total Guarantees | | | | | | | | |
| 21 | Average Guarantee Ceiling | | 16 986 667 | 46 6% | 24 895 000 | 9 0% | 27 142 500 | 17 0% | 31 750 000 |
| 22 | End Year Guarantee Ceiling | | 24 005 000 | 7 4% | 25 785 000 | 10 5% | 28 500 000 | 22 8% | 35 000 000 |
| 23 | Total Utilized Ceiling to date (projected usage rate) | 50 8% | 12 197 513 | 64 6% | 16 646 753 | 78 9% | 22 491 891 | 86 4% | 30 225 664 |
| 24 | Average Premium Rate Total Premium Income | 1 2% | 211 100 | 1 1% | 282 413 | 1 2% | 313 856 | 1 1% | 360 000 |
| 25 | Application Fee | 0 0% | | 0 0% | | 0 0% | | 0 0% | |
| 26 | Effective Premium Rate Total Premium Income | 1 73% | 211 100 | 1 70% | 282 413 | 1 40% | 313 856 | 1 19% | 360 000 |
| 27 | Average Guarantee Percentage Amount (Current Year) | 63 2% | 7 831 944 | 65 9% | 10 328 000 | 65 9% | 13 324 800 | 66 1% | 17 416 000 |
| | Counseling Services Unit | | | | | | | | |
| 28 | Counseling Revenue | | 3 943 | 45 3% | 5 730 | 11 7% | 6 400 | 32 8% | 8 500 |
| | Capital | ···· | | | | | | | |
| 29 | Capital (end year) | | 7 091 910 | | 8 039 279 | | 9 091 996 | | 10 258 096 |
| 30 | Investment Income on Capital | 9 97% | 673 546 | 9 00% | 638 272 | 9 00% | 723 535 | 9 00% | 818 280 |

| | Scenario Analysis | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|---|---------------------------------------|----------------|--------------|----------------------|---------|------------|-------|---------------------------------------|
| | Financial Model for JL | GC Domestic Loan | Guarantee Prog | gram (presen | ted in Jordaniar | Dinars) | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| | | | | | | | <u> </u> | | |
| | | 1998 | | 1999 | | 2000 | | 2001 | |
| | | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount | Rate/ | Amount |
| | | | /th Rate | | h Rate 12 760 761 | | th Rate | 63% | th Rate |
| 31 | Percentage of Total JLGC Capital | 63% | 11 257 000 | 63% | 12 /00 /01 | 63% | 14 431 740 | 63% | 16 282 691 |
| | Claims | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | | | | | | |
| 32 | Gross Claims/Rate | 3 40% | 266 512 | 3 39% | 350 119 | 3 00% | 399 744 | 2 58% | 449 333 |
| 33 | Recovery Rate | 40 0% | 106 657 | 42 9% | 150 201 | 50 0% | 199 872 | 60 0% | 269 600 |
| 34 | Net Claims | 2 04% | 159 855 | 1 94% | 199 918 | 1 50% | 199 872 | 1 03% | 179 733 |
| | Expenses | | | | | | | | |
| 36 | Staff Level Expense | | 165 115 | 26 6% | 209 036 | 10 0% | 229 940 | 10 0% | 252 934 |
| 37 | General Overhead Expense | | 113 208 | 16 5% | 131 888 | 5 0% | 138 482 | 5 0% | 145 406 |
| 38 | Marketing Costs | | 9 376 | 60 6% | 15 058 | 0 0% | 15 058 | 0 0% | 15 058 |
| 39 | Training Costs | | 22 921 | 69 6% | 38 873 | 0 0% | 38 873 | 0 0% | 38 873 |
| 40 | Total Expenses | | 310 621 | 27 1% | 394 855 | 7 0% | 422 353 | 7 1% | 452 271 |
| · · · · - | Provisioning | | | | | · | | | |
| 43 | Guarantee Provision | | 241 290 | 7 8% | 222 462 | 31 4% | 292 257 | 32 3% | 386 689 |
| 44 | Provision for Increase (Decline) in Investments | | (109 936) | | | | | | |
| 45 | Total Fee Revenue | | 215 043 | 34 0% | 288 143 | 11 1% | 320 256 | 15 1% | 368 500 |
| 46 | Total Interest Revenue | | 673 546 | 5 2% | 638 272 | 13 4% | 723 535 | 13 1% | 818 280 |
| 47 | Net Income before Taxes | ····· | 226 742 | 36 3% | 309 097 | 6 5% | 329 182 | 5 7% | 347 820 |
| 48 | Distributions | | | | | | | | |

| <u></u> | Scenario Analysis | | | | | | | | |
|---------|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|--|-----------------|------------|
| | Financial Model for JLGC D | omestic Loan | Guarantee Pro | gram (presen | ited in Jordania | n Dinars) | ······································ | | |
| | | 4000 | | 4000 | L | | L | | |
| ····· | | 1998 Rate/ | Amount | 1999 Rate/ | Amount | 2000 Rate/ | Amount | 2001 Rate/ | Amount |
| | | | h Rate | | th Rate | | h Rate | Kate/ Growth | |
| 49 | Retained Earnings | Giow | 226 742 | 36 3% | 309 097 | 6 5% | 329 182 | 5 7% | 347 820 |
| 50 | Guarantee Assigned Capacity | | 35 459 550 | | 40 196 396 | | 45 459 980 | | 51 290 478 |
| 51 | Cumulative Loan Guarantee Provision | | 1 797 486 | 1 3% | 1 820 030 | 5 1% | 1 912 415 | 10 8% | 2 119 370 |
| 52 | Average Number of Employees | | 17 4 | 1 1% | 17 6 | 2 3% | 18 | 0 0% | 18 |
| 53 | Fee/Exposure | 2 7% | | 2 8% | | 2 4% | | 2 1% | |
| 54 | Fee/Expenses | 69 2% | | 73 0% | | 75 8% | | 81 5% | |
| 55 | Fee/Expenses + Provisioning | 48 7% | | 46 7% | | 44 8% | | 43 9% | |
| 56 | Cumulative Loan Gty Provisioning/Outstanding Gty Exposure | 14 7% | | 10 9% | | 8 5% | | 7 0% | |
| 57 | Guarantee Provision/Net Claims | 150 9% | | 111 3% | | 146 2% | | 215 1% | |
| 58 | (Total Exp + Provisioning Gty Fees)/Earnings on Invested Capital | 33 7% | | 51 6% | | 54 5% | | 57 5% | |
| 59 | Average Utilized Guarantees Committed to Equity | 1 72 | | 2 07 | | 2 47 | | 2 95 | |
| 60 | Total Outstanding Guarantees Committed to Equity | 2 40 | | 3 10 | | 2 99 | | 3 10 | |
| 61 | Average Guarantee Outstanding per Employee | | 976 245 | 44 9% | 1 414 489 | 6 6% | 1 507 917 | 17 0% | 1 763 889 |
| 62 | Average Guarantee Fee per Employee | | 12 359 | 32 5% | 16 372 | 8 7% | 17 792 | 15 1% | 20 472 |
| 63 | Average Total Revenue per Employee | | 51 068 | 3 1% | 52 637 | 10 2% | 57 988 | 13 7% | 65 932 |

IX RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DLG AND PSG FEES

- 1 JLGC should impose a Aflat fee≅ of JD50 for all applications under DLG and PSG programs, to help cover processing costs This fee would be paid by borrowers to the banks, which would in turn pay it to JLGC This is in line with standard practice at many ECAs and other credit guarantee organizations It is estimated that the flat fee would increase JLGC=s net income by 2 5% in 1999 and 2 3% in 2000
- 2 JLGC should change the PSG guarantee fee from 1 5% per annum on the amount of the guarantee to 1 4% per annum on the amount of the loan This would increase fee income from PSG by almost 25% and would make JLGC=s fee equal to the average working capital guarantee fee charged by the other agencies studied
- 3 For borrowers utilizing both PSG and ECG post-shipment programs at the same time, JLGC should offer a 25% discount in the PSG guarantee fee to account for the extra revenue to JLGC and the lower chances of loss under PSG stemming from coverage of the borrower=s overseas accounts receivable
- 4 After the first year, and for up to 5 years thereafter in which JLGC has satisfactory experience with a guaranteed borrower, JLGC should offer a 5% discount in the PSG guarantee fee to encourage ongoing program usage by proven good credit risks
- 5 JLGC should maintain its current policy of charging uniform fees on all sizes of loan In effect, this will assure that bigger loans (which have lower defaults) help to support smaller loans
- 6 JLGC should maintain its current policy of charging uniform fees on a per annum basis, regardless of the term of the loan This will assure that some encouragement is given to longer term finance, which has economic benefits for the country (even though default rates are higher)
- 7 JLC should maintain its current policy of charging uniform fees to borrowers in both industrial and agricultural sectors Statistics indicating lower defaults fro agriculture may be flawed by the relatively small number of cases involved
- 8 JLGC should maintain its current policy of charging uniform fees on all size companies Default rates are similar for the different size companies studied
- 9 JLGC should maintain its current policy of charging uniform fees, regardless of the purpose of the loan (new investments or expansions of old investments) Default rates are similar for both types of loans
- 10 JLGC should maintain its currently policy of charging uniform fees, regardless of the location of the borrower within Jordan Default rates are similar for firms inside and outside

Amman

- 11 JLGC should maintain its current policy of charging uniform fees, regardless of the financing bank In lieu of fee increases, JLGC should initiate improved underwriting procedures for banks with high default rates and, if experience does not improve, should consider decertification of individual banks
- 12 JLGC should review DLG and PSG fees on an annual basis, but try to avoid making adjustments more frequently than every 3-5 years Stability and continuity of fee pricing policies will support marketing efforts and sustain profitable operations for JLGC over the long-term

X RECOMMENDATION FOR POST-SHIPMENT PREMIUMS

FWA makes the following recommendations

- 1 JLGC should pass on to exporters COFACE's charges for credit limit opinions issued in conjunction with the ECG post-shipment insurance program
- 2 JLGC should offer applicants their choice of political-only, commercial-only, or comprehensive cover This would have to be negotiated with COFACE and any other coinsurer or reinsurer that JLGC might work with
- 3 For simplicity and in order to encourage the use of comprehensive cover, political-only or commercial-only premiums should each be 60% of comprehensive premiums However, under the COFACE arrangement, alternative formulas may have to be followed
- 4 With reference to comprehensive coverage premiums, in the event that JLGC decides to underwrite transactions for its own account without COFACE insurance, FWA suggests that JLGC apply rates based upon a modification of the new OECD agreement on minimum premiums. These take into account the "actuarial" experience of a majority of the world=s export credit insurers in dealing with export credit transactions of varying risk and are designed to cover all related expenses and claims.
- 5 The OECD minimum premium should be modified to take into account the fact that JLGC would be covering short, rather than medium-term, transactions This is done in the table below, based upon 85% or 75% coverage for exports to each of 7 country risk categories (from Abest≅ to Aworst≅ risk countries)

| % Cover | | | Y RISK CATEGORY | | | | |
|---------|----|------|-----------------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 85% | 67 | 1 32 | 2 20 | 3 24 | 4 37 | 5 43 | 6 57 |
| 75% | 59 | 1 17 | 1 94 | 2 86 | 3 86 | 4 79 | 5 80 |

SUGGESTED POST-SHIPMENT PREMIUM RATES (up to six months)

6 The risk categories assigned to each country by a major OECD credit insurer as of March 31, 1999 are shown in the table below This may serve as a guide to JLGC for initial country risk ratings

COUNTRY RISK CATEGORIES (prepared by SACE, 3/30/99)

| Abu Dhabi | 2 | Cuba | 6 | Kuwait | 2 |
|--------------------|---|---------------|--------|--|--------|
| Afghanistan | 6 | Cyprus | 3 | Laos | 6 |
| Albania | 6 | Czech Rep | 2 | Latvia | 4 |
| Algena | 5 | Denmark | 1 | Lebanon | 5 |
| Andorra | 2 | Dipponti | 6 | Lesotho | 5 |
| Angola | 6 | Dominica | 5 | Liberia | 6 |
| Antigua | 6 | Dominican Rep | 5 | Libya | 6 |
| Antilles | 6 | Ecuador | 6 | Liechtenstein | 0 |
| Argentina | 4 | | 4 | | I A |
| Armenia | | Egypt | | Lithuania | 4 |
| Aruba | 6 | El Salvador | 5 | Luxemburg | 1 |
| | 6 | Entrea | 6 | Macao | 3 |
| Australia | 1 | Estonia | 3 | Macedonia | 6 |
| Austria | 1 | Ethiopia | 6 | Madagascar | 6 |
| Azerbaijan | 6 | Fiji | 5 | Malawi | 6 |
| Bahamas | 3 | Finland | 1 | Malaysia | 3 |
| Bahrein | 3 | France | 1 | Maldive | 5 |
| Bangladesh | 6 | Gabon | 6 | Malı | 6 |
| Barbados | 4 | Gambia | 6 | Malta | 2 |
| Belgium | 1 | Georgia | 6 | Mauretania | 6 |
| Belize | 5 | Germany | 1 | Mauritius | 3 |
| Benin | 6 | Ghana | 5 | Mexico | 4 |
| Bhutan | 5 | Greece | 1 | Moldova | 6 |
| Bolivia | 5 | Grenada | 5 | Monaco | 1 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 6 | Guatemala | 5 | Mongolia | 6 |
| Botswana | 4 | Guinea | 6 | Morocco | 4 |
| Brasil | 5 | Guinea Bissau | 6 | Mozambique | 6 |
| Brunei | 2 | Guinea Equat | 6 | ······································ | - |
| Bulgaria | 5 | Guyana | 6 | | |
| Burkina Faso | 6 | Haiti | 6 | | |
| Burundi | 6 | Honduras | 6 | | |
| Byelorussia | 6 | Hong Kong | 2 | | |
| Cambodia | 6 | Hungary | 3 | | |
| Cameroon | 6 | Iceland | 1 | | |
| Canada | 1 | India | 4 | | |
| Cape Verde | 5 | Indonesia | 5 | | |
| Central Africa Rep | 6 | Iran | 5 | | |
| Chad | 6 | Iraq | 6 | | |
| Chile | 2 | Ireland | 1 | | |
| China | 2 | Israel | 3 | | |
| Colombia | 4 | Jamaica | 5 5 | | |
| Comoros | 6 | | 1 | | |
| | 6 | Japan | - | | |
| Congo Congo Dan | | Jordan | 5 | | |
| Congo Rep | 6 | Kazakhstan | 5 | | |
| Cook Islands | 5 | Kenya | 6 | | |
| Costa Rica | 5 | Kırghızstan | 6 | | |
| Cote Dilvoire | 6 | Korea, South | 3 | | |
| Croatia | 4 | Korea, North | 6 | | |
| | | | | | |

| Myanmar Namibia Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigera Norway Oman Other Arab Emirates Pakistan Palestine Panama Papua N Guinea Paraguay Peru Phillippines Poland Portugal Puerto Rico Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda Sao Tome e Princ Saudi Arabia Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka St Vincent & Grenadines | 645116661335655553312255663666242631556 | Trinidad&Tobago Turisia Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom United States Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Vietnam Yemen Yugoslavia Zambia Zimbabwe |
|--|---|--|
| Sri Lanka | 5 | |
| | | |
| Sudan | 6 | |
| Surinam | 6 | |
| Swaziland | 5 | |
| Sweden | 1 | |
| Switzerland | 1 | |
| Syna Taiwan | 6 | |
| Tajikistan | 2 5 | |
| Tanzania | 6 | |
| Thailand | 4 | |
| Togo | 6 | |
| - | | |

5355661135556664

- 7 JLGC should review and adjust the entire country limitation schedule at least annually and make interim changes to reflect major shifts in risk and creditworthiness, which affect the suitability of applying different premium rates to individual transactions
- 8 JLGC should review the basic table of post-shipment premiums on an annual basis, but try to avoid making adjustments more frequently than every 2-5 years Stability and continuity of reasonable insurance premiums will encourage program usage and enhance JLGC=s financial position