


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**NATIONAL SURVEY OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN HAITI
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY**



Submitted by

**America's Development Foundation
Civil Society Component Democracy Enhancement Project
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents major findings from a national survey of democratic values in Haiti and implications for the development of democracy. It is based on a scientifically drawn national household survey of Haiti completed in the spring of 1997. Respondents are from Port-au-Prince, other urban areas, rural areas accessible by vehicle, and rural areas not accessible by vehicle. The specially developed questionnaire was based on prior research in Central and South America, Western Europe and the United States. Interviews were conducted, primarily in Haitian Creole, by specially trained, experienced interviewers. The survey was undertaken by America's Development Foundation as part of its Civil Society Component of USAID/Haiti's Democracy Enhancement Project.

MAJOR FINDINGS

Perceived attitudes of public officials Over two-thirds (69%) of the public believe "public officials don't care about people like me," and well over half indicate that neither their national leaders (56%) nor the leaders of their local government (60%) are responsive to what people want. Although public attitudes toward the leaders are negative across the board, respondents in Port-au-Prince are the most alienated, the most geographically isolated of the respondents were the most likely to give a positive answer regarding officials' responsiveness.

Knowledge of the political system The survey included 30 items as a relatively simple test of the population's knowledge of the formal aspects of the political system. Overall, the Haitian population scored an average of 79.5 on a scale of 100. The area in which they knew the least was the structure of local government, and the area in which they were most knowledgeable pertained to the duties of citizens as specified in the constitution.

Sources of political information Overwhelmingly, Haitians get their information about political matters through the radio and speaking with friends or acquaintances, with radio being the only significant media source in the rural parts of the country. It seems that effective communication of political messages in Haiti should rely on radio and traditional word-of-mouth channels.

Perceptions of political efficacy More than two-thirds of the population believe voting is a potentially powerful instrument for influencing the direction of the state, and even more (82%) believe that by organizing into groups people can have a voice in how their government operates. These responses are in marked contrast to those reported earlier regarding the perceived attitude of public officials toward the people and the responsiveness of elected officials. What the populace seems to be saying is that in spite of a lack of confidence in their leaders, they value their rights to organize and to vote.

Political system support Using a 9-item scale to assess the extent to which the population has confidence in the political system, the overall mean for the Haitian population was 46 out of a possible scale score of 100. The support index is considerably lower in Port-au-Prince (32) than elsewhere in the country, and almost twice as low in isolated rural areas.

Perception of the police The police is the institution in which people report the highest level of confidence. On a scale of 0 to 100, the police received a rating of 67, and over a third of the people (36%) gave it a rating of "a lot", the highest rating possible. As the survey found true for all government institutions, confidence in the police is inversely related to urbanicity, which in turn is related to exposure to the institution. Those rating the police the highest (a score of 74) are people in inaccessible rural areas (i.e., the people least likely to ever see a policeman) and those giving the police the lowest confidence score (57) live in Port-au-Prince.

Perception of the judicial system The overwhelming majority (97%) of those interviewed believe that the government is responsible for guaranteeing basic human rights, but only a small proportion (23%) believe that, in fact, the basic rights of those who live in Haiti are well protected. While the vast majority of those surveyed believe that there ought to be equal justice for all, only a small fraction (19%) believe that the judiciary follows this principle. Nevertheless, the people remain committed to a system of justice based on those two organs of justice. Overall, the judicial system received a confidence rating in the positive range (52 out of 100) and when asked about the treatment they had received from the police, a justice of the peace or other member of the judicial branch, about two-thirds of respondents (68%) indicated they had been treated "well" or "very well." In addition, 85 percent of Haitians reported they believe that justice is more likely to be secured from the police and the courts than from community leaders, or than from family or friends of the victim. This suggests an underlying confidence in the police and the courts as instruments of justice and the importance of working with them to strengthen their ability to fulfill the promise of delivering on an effective justice system.

Local government Most of the population (60%) believe that their local government leaders are almost never responsive to what the people want, and almost three quarters (73%) believe that the public services in their community are at best poor. However, despite this low regard for their local units of government, most Haitians (70%) say they believe it would be worthwhile to pay taxes to the commune to enable it to provide better service to the communal section.

Perceptions of non-governmental organizations Haitians are generally confident that the Catholic Church and other religious groups are working in the interests of the people (ratings about 70 on a 100-point scale), and they have especially high levels of confidence in the media (newspaper, radio and television), which received a rating of above 80. However, when asked whether they thought each of eleven types of groups helped to make their community a better place to live, only two types of groups — private business groups and sports clubs or associations — were considered to help their communities very much by more than a quarter of the population, and 40 to 50 percent of the population believe that over half of these groups do not help their communities at all. Essentially, the people seem to be saying that no one — neither governmental nor non-governmental organizations — is making their community a better place to live.

Political participation Over eighty percent (81%) indicated that they were registered to vote and, of those, 66 percent indicated they had voted in the Presidential election of December 1995. About 40 percent of the population indicates that they attended a political rally or meeting at least once, 10 percent had participated in a demonstration or protest, 12 percent had worked for a candidate or party, and 5 percent had actually run for office themselves.

Participation in community groups Church or religious groups have the greatest amount of participation (40 percent of the population), with peasant and neighborhood groups being the only other types with participation from 20 percent of the people or more. Nationally, thirty eight percent (38%) of the population indicated they had not participated in any type of organization during the past year, while 33 percent indicated they had participated in one or two groups, and 29 percent indicated they had participated with three or more. In Port-au-Prince more than 50 percent of the people do not participate in any group at all.

Tolerance for political dissent Values in support of a tolerance for political dissent are of particular importance for the development and maintenance of a democratic political system. Using a scale that ranges from 0 to 100, Haitians are above the mid-point level, with a composite score of 55. The strongest predictor of tolerance is education, with more education being associated with more tolerant beliefs. The relation between participation in community groups and tolerance is not a straight one. There is a substantial increase in the level of tolerance between respondents who participate in no community groups (composite score of 50) and those who participate in one or two (composite score of 60), but a decline for those who participate more. It may be that beyond some point, participation becomes confounded with fanaticism.

Prospects for a stable democracy The relationship between public support for the political system and tolerance for political dissent provides indicators of values supporting a stable deepening democracy, an unstable democracy, oligarchic or authoritarian rule, and democratic breakdown. The results of relating the two variables for the Haiti survey show a relatively sizable proportion of the population (35%) with values that are supportive of democracy but who are not supportive of the political system as they know it, plus another 24 percent who are rated high with respect to both tolerance and system support. This suggests a reservoir of support for actions that are perceived as changing the system along democratic lines.

Clearly, according to these results, the population of metropolitan Port-au-Prince is the most politically volatile. But it is also important to note that the residents of Port-au-Prince are by far the least inclined to support authoritarian rule. Taken together, this suggests Haiti will remain in a state of transition and turmoil until a political system consistent with its population's strong underlying orientation toward political liberty is perceived by that population to be in place. This in turn suggests, given the current condition of the Haitian economy and public service delivery system, that lasting political stability for Haiti will require substantial effort and considerable time. The challenge for the government of Haiti, and for those who wish to help it succeed, is to forge linkages of trust between the state and people, and to build a state that is as democratic as that ideal to which the Haitian people are already committed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

America's Development Foundation (ADF) would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the contributions of the many people who helped bring to completion this National Survey of Democratic Values in Haiti and Implications for the Development of Democracy. This survey was made possible under ADF's Civil Society Component of USAID/Haiti's Democracy Enhancement Project.

First, ADF would like to express appreciation to our subcontractor, Development Associates Inc., for conducting the survey and especially to Malcolm B. Young and Blair Rudes for their excellent professional work in the survey design, management, and analysis reflected in this report. Also, we wish to thank Pat Di Cerbo at Development Associates for her work in developing the survey questionnaire, training materials, and managing the initial phases of this research, Joel Jutkowitz for assistance in questionnaire design and analysis, Paul Hopstock for developing the sampling design and overseeing its implementation, and Cynthia Hamill for supervising the data entry and processing of the completed interviews and participating in the data analyses. Joseph Pierre and Therese Stewart were responsible for translating and coding questionnaire response in Haitian Creole.

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I INTRODUCTION

A PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY

The challenge for Haiti in the coming years is to move toward a fully democratic society. The goals of the USAID program in Haiti are consistent with this challenge. The Mission's Strategic Objective Number 1 is to *foster more effective and responsive democratic institutions and empowered communities* (USAID, 1996). The Mission's approach to this objective is largely concerned with governmental institutions, i.e., the judicial system, the legislature, central bureaucracies and local governments. It also includes a concern for strengthening civil society and support for *civic education and other activities at the national and local levels that will increase citizen participation, promote democratic values, and foster national level dialogue and reconciliation* (USAID RFP 521-95-006). Thus, the Mission's plans recognize the importance of dealing with both the supply and demand side of the governance equation that must be addressed by the Haitian population consistent with democratic values and behavior. The Mission's Democracy Enhancement Project has the goal of supporting the Haitian people in building a participatory, accountable, and responsible democracy and establishing the basis for long-term equitable growth.

The purpose of America's Development Foundation's activities under the Civil Society Component of the Democracy Enhancement Project (USAID/Haiti Contract No. 521-0236-C-00-6065-00) is to build the basis for a democratic civil society by increasing citizens' knowledge of government structures and operations, attachments to democratic values, and channels for effective participation in policy-making at the national and local levels. The achievement of this purpose is expected to contribute directly to creating conditions conducive to the realization of the overall goal including, most importantly, the existence of strong and sustainable democratic institutions that reinforce the rule of law, foster respect for human rights, and respond to the needs of the Haitian people.

The assessment of Haitian civil society is an integral part of this larger effort.¹ The purpose of this national survey of democratic values in Haiti, the first of its kind in the country, is to assess the general awareness of Haitian citizens of their rights and responsibilities, their confidence in local and national government, non-governmental organizations, and other relevant institutions at the local, regional, national and international levels, attitudes and values related to the democratic transition, and the extent of public understanding of selected issues of national concern, such as the role of government in democratic state, the separation of powers, decentralization, privatization, social reconciliation, and related issues. The survey will help to provide a yardstick for measuring impact of the Mission's Democracy Enhancement Project. Below, we describe our approach to measuring public attitudes and behaviors in Haiti.

¹ For an historical review and general analysis of Haiti's civil society, see America's Development Foundation's Civil Society Assessment completed for USAID/Haiti in Fall 1996.

B ORIGINS AND CONTINUITIES OF HAITIAN GOVERNANCE

Haiti is a country marked by a history of social injustice and political oppression, alternating between hope and hopelessness, resistance and resignation. Modern Haiti was born out of more than a century of French colonial rule that was at the same time one of the most economically productive and humanistically brutal the world has ever known. It was the combined efforts of almost one-half million slaves and some 30,000 *affranchis* (free men and women of color) that effectively — and violently — ousted the colonial regime, making Haiti, in 1804, the first Black republic.

The newly independent Haiti faced substantial political, economic and social barriers to becoming a strong nation. Other Western powers, concerned about the example set by a nation of self-governing former slaves, cut off open trade with Haiti and refused to formally recognize the new republic. It was not until thirty-four years after the revolution that France extended full diplomatic recognition — and then only in exchange for an "independence debt" that effectively impoverished the nation (Civan, 1994, p. 9).

It was also in the aftermath of the revolution that Haitian society became more sharply divided between the haves and have-nots — citizens of the same country but economically, linguistically, culturally and physically separate.

The former slaves responded to their new freedom by becoming fiercely independent small peasant farmers, most often in the mountains and well beyond the reach of those who would attempt to exert control over their lives. Speaking only Creole and following the cultural traditions of Africa, these citizens of the *peyi andeyo* (country outside) and their descendants were effectively disenfranchised from Haitian political life. The *affranchis* also largely abandoned the plantation economy, but rather than seclusion, they (along with ambitious military leaders of the former slaves) opted for full control of commerce and the reins of the State. Over the generations following the Revolution, this largely urban French-speaking elite learned to use the tools of taxation, the police and the courts to tap the country's resources and amass a significant amount of wealth and influence. Dictator after dictator came to power only to be overthrown and replaced by another just as unscrupulous. Nearly two centuries of systematic, State-sanctioned concentration of resources in the hands of a relatively few urban dwellers served to split further the country.

The polarization of Haitian society was intensified by its international relations. In 1915, on the eve of World War I, Germany controlled nearly 80 percent of Haiti's international trade. The U.S., with growing business interests of its own and fearing the establishment of a German military base, invaded the island and took control of all financial and political resources. U.S. policies during what was to become a 20-year occupation served to improve the country's stability and infrastructure, but failed to develop cohesive or long-lasting political and social institutions. Instead, the legacy of two decades of U.S. rule was the establishment of Haiti's first professional military force, and the further concentration of resources in the urban center of Port-au-Prince (Schmidt, 1971; Trouillot, 1990, pp. 100-108).

Despite the inequalities deeply entrenched in Haitian society, there have been some serious although unsuccessful attempts to balance the distribution of wealth and power. In 1957, Dr François Duvalier took office as President amid promises of major reform. For a short time it appeared that change had indeed come and that socio-economic conditions for the masses would to substantially improve. Relatively soon, however, the seemingly well-intentioned President had become "Papa Doc," President-for-Life, and his absolute power had corrupted him absolutely. Political parties, trade unions, student organizations and other possible sources of opposition were taken over or eliminated completely. By the time of his demise in 1971, the Haitian State was largely an instrument of intimidation and extortion and the gulf between society's "ins" and "outs" had widened (Fass, 1988, Chapter 1. Trouillot, 1990, Chapter 7)

The institutionalization of Duvalierism continued with Jean Claude, who was less brutal than his father, but equally corrupt. The majority of Haitians remained isolated from the "legitimate" workings of government and the political system. Nonetheless, there were growing efforts to organize outside of it. Influenced by the liberation theology sweeping through other parts of the world, a grass-roots movement made up of young Haitians and religious workers began an increasingly forceful and widespread anti-government campaign, eventually overthrowing Duvalier in 1986 (Mintz, 1995. Trouillot, 1990)

Again there was hope for meaningful change. Haitians overwhelmingly approved a constitution that outlined a new relationship between Haitian citizens and the State, a relationship grounded firmly in the principles of democracy. Plans were made for the first national election in decades. A profusion of newly-formed agricultural cooperatives, human rights groups and similar organizations sought to express their needs in open debate. When Haitians went to the polls on November, 1987, expectations were high for a swift, peaceful transition to democracy. Instead, soldiers and former *ton ton macoutes* opened fire on voters across Haiti, killing and wounding many.

Remarkably, Haitians continued to organize, led on by an articulate and charismatic priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who talked of a "lavalas" (flood) that would wash away all corruption and injustices. In December 1990, under close watch by the international community, he became the first democratically elected President of Haiti. Within a year, however, the hopes of his followers were dashed by a military coup that forced Aristide into exile. For three years Haiti suffered under military rule, an international trade embargo, flourishing black market, and widespread emigration. Aristide's externally imposed return in 1994 and the successful December 1995 election of the more moderate Rene Preval signaled the start of a new period of hope.

C CURRENT POLITICAL CONTEXT

To judge from the political and social climate just prior to and during the data collection for the present survey, however, the period of hope following the Preval's election has waned. The economic conditions of most Haitians had gone from bad to worse in the two plus years since the restoration of the democratic government and the time this survey of the Haitian public was made in the spring of 1997. By that time, unemployment was estimated at 65 to 70 percent, Port-au-Prince media and conversations were full of reports of growing lawlessness throughout the country born of hunger and frustration, and the reasons for the presence of United Nations peace-keeping troops in Haiti did not seem to be well understood.

In preparation for gathering the survey data, during the months of November and December, 1996, the survey's field supervisors conducted a reconnaissance of the entire country to determine the location, accessibility and population of communities that might be selected for inclusion in the study's sample. On several occasions during those two months, the supervisors' travels were interrupted by blockades of roads set up, apparently as simple acts of lawlessness. Similarly, random violence and lawlessness on the streets of Port-au-Prince was on the increase both during the late fall of 1996 and between the end of January and mid-June of 1997, when interviews were being conducted for the survey.

In addition to the rise in violence and lawlessness throughout the country, there was also an increase in political unrest. Two major political events occurred during the five-month data collection period. The first event occurred in April, while the field staff was engaged in conducting interviews in the northern region of the country, specifically, the national elections in April. Although it was the first time Haitians were to elect local assemblies (ASÈKs), as well as regional and national level officials, voter turnout was reportedly only around 3 to 5 percent of the adult population. The second major event occurred in June, when the field staff was conducting interviews in the Port-au-Prince area, namely, the resignation of the Prime Minister. It is uncertain the extent to which these political events affected individuals' responses to the survey. However, to minimize influence, survey field staff did suspend interviewing during the week of the elections in April.

D PRIOR RESEARCH ON POLITICAL VALUES IN HAITI

In the period between the restoration of civilian government in Haiti in 1994 and the next presidential election in December 1995, a series of public opinion surveys were carried out. The first of these was the "Republic of Haiti National Survey of Public Opinion," conducted in March of 1995 by Borge & Associates under contract to the Arias Foundation. Between March 17 and March 24, 1200 Haitians 17 years of age or older were interviewed. While the researchers report only a 3 percent margin of error, that ignores what is perhaps the greatest weakness with the poll, that is, "although the survey was national in scope, it did not cover the outlying rural and deep rural areas, as most such areas are inaccessible by automobile" (Arias Foundation and Borge & Associates, 1995, p. 2). Thus, the findings from the survey reflect almost exclusively the opinions of urban residents in Haiti.

The next survey was conducted in April 1995 by the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), however, the generalizability of the findings from that survey are even more limited, since data were gathered only from residents of Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien. USIA commissioned a second poll in October 1995, which included residents of Les Cayes as well as Cap-Haïtien and Port-au-Prince. Again, however, the findings are limited in their generalizability by the failure to survey citizens in rural areas or the other urban areas.

The following month a much more comprehensive survey of Haitian public opinion was conducted by CID/Gallup under contract to USAID. CID/Gallup surveyed 846 adults in 80 locations across Haiti. Comparing results from that survey with the distribution of respondents in the present survey suggests that the CID/Gallup sample may have over-represented urban respondents. Specifically, CID/Gallup reports that 41 percent of the respondents were from Port-au-Prince, 14 percent were from Cap-Haïtien, and 45 percent were from elsewhere in the country (CID/Gallup,

1995, p 111) This compares with the sample for the present survey in which 24 percent of the respondents were from Port-au-Prince, 22 percent were from other urban areas, 31 percent were from rural areas accessible by vehicle, and 23 percent were from rural areas not accessible by vehicle.² One month later, in December 1996, CID/Gallup repeated its survey with a sample comparable to the sample for the November 1996 survey

E STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THIS SURVEY

The survey instrument was developed using a number of proven questions from research conducted in the Americas and Europe, combined with questions specific to the Haitian situation (See annex 1 for the English version, annex 2 for the Creole version, and annex 3 for a more detailed discussion of the survey's structure, sample, and analysis plans) The questionnaire items are organized into eight categories (1) support for the political system, (2) support for democratic ideals, (3) citizen participation, (4) political efficacy, (5) knowledge of the political system, (6) political views, (7) views of the judicial system, and, (8) age and socioeconomic status Descriptions of each category are provided below Within each area, subsets of core items have been identified as potential measurement scales

1 Political system support In democratic systems building, there needs to be societal acceptance of the state as the ultimate arbiter, i e , the state and its separate institutions must be sanctioned as legitimate The household questionnaire includes 32 items indicating the level of system support in Haiti Items are divided into three categories (a) national-level system support, (b) local-level system support, and, (c) non-governmental system support

2 Support for democratic ideals A stable democratic order requires not only a high level of system support but also such democratic ideals as the right to dissent and to participate despite holding diverse or minority views Thirty-five (35) of the items on the household questionnaire are indicators of the level of support for personal and political freedoms and other democratic views Items are organized into three categories (a) democratic decision making, (b) support for democratic participation, and, (c) limits on democratic participation

3 Citizen participation In large measure, participation of the citizenry in the political life of the nation is the mainstay of a democratic system Participatory actions in a society may range in scope from the more insular, e g , discussing politics with family members, to the more communal, e g , running for public office A total of 28 questionnaire items in three categories relate to citizen participation (a) scope of participation, (b) participation in social and political groups, and, (c) voting behavior

4 Political efficacy Among the necessary components of a democratic society is a citizenry fully aware of their capacity to influence the structure and function of government The household questionnaire has seven items which demonstrate public belief in the **ability to affect decision making** at the local and national levels

² We are not certain exactly how Port-au-Prince was defined in the Gallup survey Depending on how the borders of the metropolitan area are defined our survey may be considered to have 35 percent of its respondents from Port-au-Prince and 11 percent from other provincial towns

5 Knowledge of the political system Thirty of the questionnaire items assess citizens' knowledge of local and national institutions, and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship

6 Political views Underlying most societies are relatively cohesive views regarding how government is defined, the role of government, and the nature of the relationship between government and citizens Ten items assess Haitian political views across three categories (a) ritualism versus rationalism, (b) ascription versus achievement, and, (c) institutional confrontation

7 Judicial System The functioning of the police, courts and other aspects of the Haitian justice system are major areas of concern for USAID and other members of the international community In addition to questions dealing with human rights protection and confidence in the police and courts asked in the context of gauging political system support, there are 7 items specifically asking whether respondents or members of their families were victims of crime, how they perceived their interaction with the police and other aspects of the system, and whether they believed justice would be better served by relying on the police and the courts or by individuals taking matters into their own hands

8 Age, Socioeconomic Status The final section of the questionnaire contains 10 items designed to collect information about the respondent that can be used in subanalyses

F NEED FOR A NATIONAL SAMPLE

Various authors have remarked that the successive Haitian governments tend to be well informed about public opinion in Port-au-Prince and, to a lesser extent, other urban centers (e.g. Cap-Haitien, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Gonaïves, Jérémie), but very poorly attuned to public sentiment elsewhere in the country (Acacia, 1994, Mintz, 1995, Trouillot, 1990) As noted earlier, the public opinion polls in 1995 by the Arias Foundation, USIA, and CID/Gallup did not improve the situation greatly, since they surveyed exclusively or, in the case of CID/Gallup, disproportionate numbers of urban residents The intent for the present survey was to develop an understanding of public opinion on democracy and civil society throughout Haiti, not just in urban areas Therefore, the design called for a truly national, random sample of the adult (16 years of age and old) Haitian population A comparison of the demographic characteristics of the sample members for this survey with those of the preceding two CID/Gallup surveys is provided in exhibit 1.1

Exhibit 1 1

Comparison of Demographic Characteristics of the Samples
for the CID/Gallup Surveys and the Present Survey

Characteristics	CID/Gallup November 1995	CID/Gallup December 1995	America's Development Foundation 1997
Sample Size	846	801	1200 ^a
Age			
Younger than 25 ^b	23%	18%	20%
25 - 34	27	28	27
35 - 44	24	25	22
45 and older	26	29	31
Gender			
Male	50%	50%	55%
Female	50	50	45
Educational Level			
None	21%	23%	30%
Primary	37	38	32
Secondary	38	36	31
Postsecondary	4	3	4
No Response			4

a/ Weighted sample See Appendix 3

b/ The CID/Gallup surveys included Haitian adults 18 years old or older and thus this category includes individuals aged 18 to 24 The America s Development Foundation survey included Haitian adults 16 years old or older and thus this category includes individuals aged 16 to 24

To implement a nationally representative sample design proved to be much more difficult than originally thought Essentially, when we attempted to draw a sample of households below the commune level (i e , communal sections, "localites," and "habitations,") there were no population size estimates more recent than the 1982 census The most recent Haitian census was in 1982, and the most recent available official adjustments were made in 1989, and these only for the department and commune level (source l'Institute Haitien de Statistique et Informatique)³

³ Substantial effort was also expended to make use of the sampling frames used by USAID health and agricultural surveys and to make use of the detailed area maps used in estimating crop production For various reasons none of these sources were suitable

As a result, during the months of October, November, and December 1996, members of the study team conducted a reconnaissance survey to gather information on which the national sample could be drawn. The teams traveled throughout the northern and southern regions of the country and gathered detailed information on household distributions in a nationally representative sample of communes (see Annex 3 for more detail). They obtained population size estimates for communal sections and groupings of residences within them, and identified those communities that were no longer in existence and those that had emerged in the 15 years since the last census was taken. During the reconnaissance, the teams also made note of logistical constraints that would need to be overcome in order to implement the survey (e.g., estimating the number of hours by foot or horseback a community was from the nearest road), and they met with community members to inform them that a survey was to take place in the early spring. A similar, although more modest, effort was also needed to draw the sample in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Because of population growth and potentially dramatic increases in the population density of some areas, aerial maps were used to define geographic areas which included housing units, and areas were randomly selected for inclusion in the sample.

The substantial effort to obtain a nationally representative sample resulted in the following distribution of respondents by geographic region: 24.4 percent in Metropolitan Port-au-Prince, defined as the areas comprising the urban centers of the four metropolitan communes (Port-au-Prince, Pétienville, Carrefour, and Delmas), 21.9 percent in other urban areas, 30.9 percent in accessible rural areas (i.e., areas reachable by all-terrain vehicle), and 22.8 percent in rural areas not accessible by vehicle.

G DATA COLLECTION

The household survey questionnaire for this study was developed by Development Associates in English. Prior to the pilot test of the forms in October 1996, the forms were translated into Haitian Creole. American Development Foundation staff in Haiti. Following the pilot test, the translations were revised. In addition, the 4 Creole-speaking Field Supervisors and 18 Creole-speaking Field Interviewers made further revisions in the translations during training in late January 1997. As a final check before going into the field, a back translation of the Creole-language questionnaires into English was prepared to check the fidelity of the translation to the original.

To accommodate the logistical requirements of gathering data in remote rural locations, as well as urban centers, interviewers and supervisors spent almost 3 full months in the field. The first month was spent in the southern region of the country, the second month and a half in the northern region of the country, and the last half-month was spent in the vicinity of Port-au-Prince. Since sample locations were selected randomly, without regard to accessibility by automobile, data collection at many rural sites posed significant logistical problems. Many rural communities were inaccessible by automobile. In some cases, one could ride a donkey to the community, in others it was necessary to walk. For example, one of the localities visited in the southern region was the village of Dupleue in the communal section of Iles Blanches in the Département de la Grand-Anse. To get to Dupleue, the field staff drove in an all-terrain vehicle as far as possible (the community of Frache) and then walked for 6½ hours. In addition to difficulties of access by vehicle, field staff encountered several cases in which access to a community was temporarily cut off by a washed out bridge, a landslide, or similar problems. In such cases, the field staff had to go back at a later time when access was possible.

H STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS

National household surveys using a cross-sectional design, where a sample of residents is interviewed at one point in time, have their strengths and weaknesses. They are very useful for monitoring trends. They also provide a wealth of data, although household surveys cannot answer detailed questions about relatively rare populations.

1 Target Population An important limitation of the estimates in this report is that they represent only the general household population in Haiti, that is, the civilian, noninstitutionalized population, age 16 and over. This excludes some important and unique subpopulations who may have very different opinions on civil society such as prison and jail inmates, hospitalized persons, residents living abroad, residents traveling abroad during the data collection period, and homeless persons.

2 Sampling Error and Statistical Significance The sampling error of an estimate is the error caused by collecting information from a sample of the target population rather than interviewing everyone. Sampling error is reduced by selecting a large sample and by using efficient sample design strategies such as stratification and optimal allocation.

Since the adult population survey sample was a probability sample, it is possible to calculate standard errors of the estimates from the data. Standard errors have been calculated for some key variables and are presented in Appendix 3. As an example, the study results indicated that 61 percent of the population owned a radio. The standard error for that result was 2.8 percent, and thus, the 95 percent confidence interval is between 55 percent and 67 percent.

Tests of statistical significance have been computed for comparisons as indicated in the text, and those found to be significant at least at the .05 level are reported. In discussing statistically significant findings, care has been taken to note where substantive significance is low.

3 Nonsampling Error or Bias Nonsampling error can be introduced into the data from nonresponse, reporting errors due to misunderstanding the question or purposely giving an incorrect answer, coding errors, computer processing errors, and errors in the sampling frame. Although nonsampling errors can be larger than sampling errors, they are virtually impossible to measure. However, over the last 50 years or so survey researchers have developed an array of standards and procedures, including quality control procedures, to help to avoid much nonsampling error.

The findings of the survey are based on self-reports and their value depends on respondents' truthfulness and memory. Over the years, many studies have established the validity of self-report data, and the survey procedures were designed especially to address Haitians' confidentiality concerns and to otherwise encourage honesty and facilitate recall. Nevertheless, some error in measurement should be assumed.

II. MAJOR FINDINGS

The national survey of Haitian values toward democracy provides a rich set of data that can be analyzed from a wide variety of perspectives. This report presents major findings in terms of the building blocks of a stable political order and those values and attitudes necessary to ensure that the existing political order is a democratic one. It also addresses issues of particular relevance to USAID programming.

A PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE STATE

The Haitian revolution of 1791-1804 was an outgrowth of over a century of one of the most violently repressive, slave-based economic systems the world has ever known. As histories of the revolution and of Haitian life during the decades before and after make clear (e.g. James, 1962), Haitian social and economic relationships have long been complex, and simple, mono-causal explanations for political structures and behaviors, particularly if based on imported assumptions, are quite likely to be wrong.

At the time of Haiti's birth the revolutionary leadership and most of Haiti's people had fundamentally different understandings of what liberty from European control and an end of slavery would mean (Trouillot, 1990: 40-50). The differences were over the structure of the Haitian economy and how work and labor would be organized. The leadership, which was heterogeneous in terms of socio-economic background and race, and the people, which were not, were in agreement that slavery should be abolished. However, the leaders were deeply committed to continuing the plantation system, with its emphasis on export crops and reliance on large numbers of field hands. The bulk of the people – mostly newly freed slaves – had more modest dreams of owning their own small parcel of land and tending their own fields. As Trouillot says (p. 44)

Hence even though the state and nation were taking shape at the same time and as part of the same revolutionary process, they were launched in opposite directions. The politicians and ideologues who emerged during the struggle were busy sketching the themes of a nationalist discourse while the emerging community, pushed into the background, was beginning to shape a peasant world view of its own.

Both views of the future became part of Haitian reality over the next 200 years. By the 1820's a majority of the former slaves had signaled their refusal to work on the old plantations and did their best to become independent peasant farmers on land that they owned or controlled. And in response, the military and commercial elites that had emerged from the revolution turned the Haitian state into an instrument of domination (Development Associates, 1997: 11-12).

A central theme of a recently completed USAID-supported strategic assessment of democracy in Haiti is that the Haitian state has always been isolated from and at odds with its people (Development Associates, 1997). The concept that the origin of state power and legitimacy resides with the people and that there are reciprocal rights and responsibilities of nation and state was completely foreign as the foundations for modern day Haiti were laid. The inherent conflicts born of the long-standing, fundamentally opposite visions of the Haitian leaders and the rest of the

population provides a basis for understanding why Haiti has so consistently produced arbitrary governments and why periodic attempts to install democracy have so consistently failed

In light of these arguments, the survey of democratic values included various items designed to explore the Haitian peoples' perceptions of their government and understanding of the state. The term "state" throughout this report, and more generally in social science literature, refers to the underlying political system on which any particular government of the moment is a manifestation. In French and other romance languages the distinction between state (l'Etat) and the nation as a whole is clearer than in English. While Louis XIV was proclaiming "L'Etat c'est moi," King George had to deal with Pitt and other forces set in motion in 1215 with the Magna Carta. What has not been clear in the context of Haiti, but is of considerable interest to persons concerned with issues of socio-political communication, is what the average Haitian is thinking when the term "l'Etat" is used.

Early in the political values survey (Q3), the respondents were asked to indicate what they thought of when they heard someone use the term "l'Etat". They were asked whether they thought of the president, the prime minister, the national assembly or parliament, all of the preceding, or something else. As shown in exhibit 2.1, well over half (58%) responded they thought the term referred to the composite of president, prime minister and parliament⁴. About 12 percent thought only in terms of the president. Some 21 percent provided an "other" response, which overwhelmingly was "the people". Indeed, 18 percent of the entire population provided the "people" as their response, rather than any one or combination of governmental institutions.

Exhibit 2.1
Public Understanding of L'Etat

Response	Percent Responding
The President	12
The Prime Minister or Parliament	2
President and Prime Minister and Parliament	58
The "People"	18
Other	3
Don't Know/No Response	7

These responses suggest that, while most (72%) Haitians understand the meaning of the state to be the organs of central government, there are sizable numbers of people with a different view. As exhibit 2.1 shows, the largest number (about 20 percent of those who gave a response) said the state was "the people". Interestingly, respondents who think of "the state" as "the people" were more likely to be urban (56 vs. 43 percent), educated above the elementary school level (46 vs. 38 percent), male (61 vs. 54 percent), and somewhat younger (median age of 33 years vs. 36 years) than those who think of "the state" as the central government. These are characteristics that may reflect

⁴The results presented in this report are based on weighted data. Although the sample was designed to be self-weighting, small variations in numbers of actual versus expected numbers of respondents occurred. The weights and weighting approach are described in Appendix 3.

greater exposure to an Anglo-American than the more traditional Franco-European political world view. Additionally, about 1 percent of the respondents indicated they think of some aspect of local government, while another 1 percent responded "people with guns"

Regardless of their various interpretations of the state, the overwhelming majority of Haitians (97%) indicated they believe that all citizens should have the same chance for the state to hear them (Q10). However, consistent with the historic schism between the Haitian government and the people, 69 percent of those responding indicated that they believed "public officials don't care about people like me" (Q39), and that both their national leaders (56%) and the leaders of their local government (60%) are almost never responsive to what people want (Q59 and Q108).

As exhibit 2.2 shows, there is a relationship between the people's perceptions of the attitude of public officials and where respondents live. There is no significant difference in responses with respect to gender, age or education. Location does, however, seem to make a difference and, although public attitudes toward the leaders are negative across the board, respondents in Port-au-Prince are the most alienated. For example, the most isolated of the respondents were the most likely to give a positive answer regarding officials' responsiveness. It appears that proximity to public officials, or to more information about their activities, has led to unmet expectations.

Exhibit 2.2

**Public Perception of Public Officials
(Percent Responding)**

	Total	Location			
		Metro P-A-P*	Other Urban	Rural Accessible	Rural No Access
1 Officials don't care what people like me think (Q39)	69	70	70	64	75
2 National leaders are responsive to what people want (Q59)					
• Almost never	56	66	54	54	50
• Only some of the time	37	32	42	39	35
• Most of the time or almost always	7	2	4	7	15
3 Local elected officials are responsive to what people want (Q108)					
• Almost never	60	69	57	57	55
• Only some of the time	31	28	38	33	28
• Most of the time or almost always	9	3	5	10	17

* On this table and throughout this report P-a-P refers to the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, comprising the urban centers of the four metropolitan communes: Port-au-Prince, Petionville, Carrefour, and Delmas.

B KNOWLEDGE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The survey indicates that over 60 percent of the Haitian population has less than a primary school education, over 35.6 percent indicated they could read or write neither French nor Haitian Creole, and over 20 percent live in a community that is not accessible by vehicle. Indeed, nearly a sixth of the population (15%) live in isolated communities and have neither a radio nor a television in their home.

From these statistics one might easily assume a high level of political ignorance among the Haitian population. However, as exhibits 2.3 and 2.4 suggest, this does not appear to be the case. The survey questionnaire included 30 items that were intended to form a relatively simple test of the population's knowledge of the formal aspects of the political system. There were 5 questions about the national government structure, 12 about constitutional rights, 10 about constitutional obligations, and 3 about the structure of local government.

**Exhibit 2.3
Knowledge of the Political System
(Scores on 0-100 Scale)**

	Total Population	Location				Literate	
		Metro P-a-P	Other Urban	Rural Accessible	Rural Not Accessible	Yes	No
Total Score (30 items)	79.5	79.6	80.4	80.0	78.6	80.8	78.4
Knowledge of national government (5 items)	79.2	78.8	79.3	80.4	78.4	80.6	77.9
Knowledge of constitutionally guaranteed rights (12 items)	69.4	68.4	69.7	70.3	69.2	69.9	69.6
Knowledge of constitutionally mandated duties (10 items)	95.0	95.8	96.2	95.0	94.0	96.9	93.3
Knowledge of local government (3 items)*	68.4	71.1	72.2	67.9	65.3	71.8	64.7

* The reliability coefficient for this subpart is particularly low (.17) and probably accounts for the relatively greater within group variation.

On the basis of Haiti's low levels of literacy and educational attainment, it could be that most Haitians would not perform well on the test of political knowledge. We had assumed that the average scores would have been somewhere between 40 and 60 percent, and that our analysis would focus

on identifying variables predicting particularly high and low scores. But, as exhibit 2.3 clearly shows, that was not the result.

Overall, the Haitian population scored an average of 79.5 out of 100 on the scale. The area in which they knew the least was the structure of local government (a score of 68), whereas the area in which they were most knowledgeable (a score of 95) pertained to the duties of citizens as specified in the constitution. Statistical analyses of the properties of the scale indicates that the overall measure was a reasonably reliable measure of political knowledge ($\alpha = .71$), although the reliability measures for three of the four subscales were considerably lower than for the scale as a whole.⁵

In general, it appears that the questions asked were relatively easy for most of the Haitian population and that the level of political knowledge was considerably higher than anticipated. This conclusion holds reasonably well not only for the population as a whole, but also when the data are broken down by major demographic characteristics. Assessing the knowledge scale, and subscales, from the perspective of gender, age, location, and education revealed no meaningful differences from the overall population results. Thus, any program of fostering democracy starts with an advantage that can be built on — an understanding of the democratic duties and rights of Haitians.

Exhibit 2.4 provides a summary of responses for each of the 30 items making up the political knowledge scale. As the exhibit shows, 90 percent of the population provided the correct response to 17 of the items, while there are four items that less than a third of the population answered correctly. Three of these incorrectly answered items came from the set of questions dealing with knowledge of constitutionally guaranteed rights. Over 96 percent of respondents indicated they believe the constitution guaranteed their right to police protection and 95 percent indicated they were guaranteed a right to good roads. The third item pertained to communication with the state. Almost 80 percent (78%) responded that they believe the constitution guaranteed their right to inform the government what actions it should take.⁶

Given the high level of knowledge, it is of particular interest to explore how the Haitian population learns about political issues and concerns. During the survey respondents were asked how they usually find out about events such as elections (Q38). Elsewhere during the interview they were also asked whether they talked with their family about local or national issues, whether they talked with their friends about such matters or whether they listened to the radio, watched television or read newspaper articles about them.

Overwhelmingly, most Haitians get their information about political matters through the radio and speaking with friends or acquaintances. As exhibit 2.5 shows, the role of the media (radio, television and newspapers) is considerably greater in urban than in rural areas, with radio being the only significant media source in rural parts of the country. Given the low level of education and literacy nationally, it is not surprising that newspapers are cited as a usual source by only 5 percent of the population.

⁵The alpha coefficients for the four parts are as follows: (a) knowledge of constitutional obligations (Q73-82) = .75, (b) knowledge of national government structure (Q4-8) = .47, (c) knowledge of constitutional rights (Q46-57) = .38, and (d) knowledge of local government (Q91-93) = .17.

⁶It has been argued by at least one reviewer of the political knowledge scale that the Constitution can be read as guaranteeing rights to police protection (Chapter 2, article XI), good roads (preamble) and informing the government of actions it should take (preamble). If this interpretation is correct, the average score for the overall scale would be 87.6, and for the knowledge of constitutionally guaranteed rights subscale the score would be 89.7.

Exhibit 2 4
Political Knowledge Item Responses
(Percent Correct)

		Gender			Education			
		Total	Male	Female	None	Primary	Secondary	Post Secondary
4	The job of the prime minister is to enforce the laws of the nation? (Q4)	65 %	66 %	63 %	70 %	66 %	59 %	38 %
5	The prime minister is appointed to office? (Q5)	71	73	69	70	71	74	61
6	The main job of parliament is to make laws?	88	91	85	86	89	90	96
7	The members of parliament are chosen through national elections?	96	97	95	95	98	96	96
8	Are the judges of the Supreme Court and other courts appointed or elected?	76	78	73	62	78	88	100
The Haitian constitution guarantees rights								
46	To freedom of expression	95	95	94	94	97	94	100
47	To bear arms	58	55	61	62	62	52	13
48	To education	92	93	90	91	93	92	96
49	To good health	93	94	91	93	94	91	100
50	To meet with and talk with anyone	89	92	85	85	91	90	96
51	To inform government what actions it should take	17	15	20	21	16	16	00
52	To liberty	93	94	92	93	94	94	93
53	To own property	96	97	94	96	97	95	100

	Total	Gender		Education			
		Male	Female	None	Primary	Secondary	Post Secondary
54 To practice any religion	98	98	98	99	99	98	100
55 To police protection	03	02	03	02	02	05	00
56 To work	96	96	94	96	97	95	100
57 To good roads	05	03	06	04	04	06	00
The Haitian constitution requires citizens to							
73 Defend Haiti if there is a war	83	86	80	77	88	88	92
74 Respect and protect the environment	96	98	94	95	96	99	100
75 Educate and improve yourself	98	98	98	96	99	99	100
76 Respect other people s rights and freedoms	99	99	99	99	99	100	100
77 Pay taxes	84	88	79	75	84	93	100
78 Respect the constitution	99	99	98	99	99	99	100
79 Provide assistance to persons in danger	99	99	99	99	99	99	100
80 Respect the law	99	99	99	100	100	99	100
81 Vote	95	96	93	96	95	95	100
82 Respect the property of others	99	99	99	100	100	100	100
91 Are members of the communal council and communal section council appointed to office?	28	30	27	18	28	35	47
92 Are communal councils made up of three members, including the mayor?	91	94	89	89	92	95	93
93 Is the main job of delegates and vice-delegates to coordinate and control public services?	87	88	85	85	88	90	89

Exhibit 2 5
Usual Sources of Political Information (Q38)
(Percent)

Source	Total	Location				Literacy	
		P-a-P	Other Urban	Rural Accessible	Rural Isolated	Yes	No
Radio	67	78	78	61	51	74	53
Word of Mouth	32	4	30	43	51	24	49
Friends	19	3	16	22	33	15	26
TV	10	21	19	3	1	15	2
Family	8	1	9	7	14	6	11
Newspaper	5	7	9	3	2	7	1
Candidates	2	*	*	5	3	2	2
Work	1	*	2	1	2	1	1
Signs/Billboards	*	*	*	1	*	*	0

* Less than 1 percent

1 The second most frequently cited source of information was “word of mouth” or “gossip” infrequently in Port-au-Prince (4%), but in the majority of cases (51%) in isolated rural communities, respondents provided this response (*tele dyol* in Creole). Word of mouth in this context may be thought of as encompassing a wide variety of sources. While friends, and particularly family, are relatively infrequently cited as usual sources of political information, it is likely that they as well as shop keepers, traveling traders, and other acquaintances are all subsumed under the broader gossip or word of mouth category. It seems that effective communication of political messages in Haiti should rely on radio and traditional word of mouth channels.

C PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

Not only do the data indicate that most members of the Haitian population are quite aware of their constitutional rights and responsibilities and of the basic structure of their political system, they also reflect a remarkable optimism on the part of the people regarding their potential to influence how their government proceeds. As shown in exhibit 2 6, more than two-thirds of the population report they believe voting is a potentially powerful instrument for influencing the direction of the state (Q11 & 45). Even more, some 81 percent, indicate they believe that by organizing into groups people can have a voice in how their government operates (Q12). These views are more strongly held by men than women, and persons who are literate rather than illiterate.

**Exhibit 2 6
Perceived Political Efficiency
(Percent Affirmative Response)**

	Total	Location				Literacy	
		Metro P-a-P	Other Urban	Rural Accessible	Rural Not Accessible	Yes	No
voting provides a voice in government (Q11)	68	66	65	74	67	72	63
voting is very important in directing the state (Q45)	69	69	69	72	63	73	62
organizing into groups provides a voice in government (Q12)	82	78	80	87	81	85	77

These responses are in marked contrast to those reported earlier regarding the perceived attitude of public officials toward the people and the responsiveness of elected officials. As was shown in exhibit 2 2, 69 percent of the people do not believe officials care what people like them think, and over 90 percent believe that national or local elected leaders are responsive to the people, at best, only some of the time.

Taking this a step further, democratic programs could most certainly benefit from efforts that focused on making the desire of the people to participate effectively in the political process a reality. Thus, emphasis on promoting organizations that provide the people a voice might be a priority.

D POLITICAL SYSTEM AND REGIME SUPPORT

The stability of a political system has long been thought to be directly linked to popular perceptions of that system's legitimacy. According to Lipset's classical work, systems that are legitimate survive even in the face of difficult times. Illegitimate systems, ones that do not have the support of the populace, can only endure over the long run through the use of repression. When repression no longer can be used effectively, or if opposition elements are willing to risk even extremely grave sanctions, illegitimate regimes will eventually fall. Authoritarian regimes survive on the basis of some combination of legitimacy and repression, while democracies tend to rely primarily on legitimacy alone.⁷ Haiti's history is largely one of repressive, authoritarian regimes. The challenge of the moment is to help keep Haiti from repeating this past.

Until recently, efforts to measure legitimacy have tended to rely on the trust-in government scale devised by the University of Michigan (Miller, 1974). That scale, it has come to be realized, depended too heavily on a measurement of dissatisfaction with the performance of incumbents rather

⁷ This is not to say that democracies do not use coercion but that its use is very limited.

than of generalized dissatisfaction with the system of government as a whole (Seligson & Jutkowitz, 1994: 18)

When analyzing the degree of support for a political system, many studies refer to the work of David Easton (1965, 1975), who distinguishes between diffuse and specific support. In this context, specific support refers to a citizen's assessment of governmental performance and may be short term. Diffuse support, on the other hand, refers to the general meaning of what the governmental system represents to the citizen — its general meaning for the person rather than what it now does. While this distinction may at times be conceptually useful, it has proved to be enormously difficult to develop independent measures of the two categories, and separate indicators of the two are generally found to be highly correlated (Anderson and Guillory, 1997: 70)

To assess the extent of political system support for this study of Haitian political values, we included a set of items developed by researchers over a period of years and tested in a variety of country contexts. This political support scale — adapted somewhat each time to fit the specific governmental structures in each country — has now been tested in studies of Germany, Israel, the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador and elsewhere. In these diverse contexts the scale has been shown to be reliable and valid, and it has proven to be a powerful analytical tool for measuring system support and legitimacy.⁸ Although it is based upon the theoretical distinction made by Easton (1975), that defines legitimacy in terms of system support (diffuse support) vs. specific support (support for incumbents), we find it useful to avoid the controversy around the meaningfulness of this distinction and to describe what is being measured as “a sort of emotionally-biased running tally that citizens keep on the performance of a system” (Kuechler 1991: 280)

For this survey of Haiti, the scale consists of 9 items. Seven of the questions dealt with specific institutions (police, judicial system, Parliament, political parties, Electoral Council, President, and Prime Minister). In each case, respondents were asked to indicate on a scale ranging from “none” to “a lot” the amount of confidence they had that the institution is “generally working in the interests of the people.” Using the same scale, the eighth question asked “how much confidence do you have that the basic human rights of those who live in our country are well protected?” The ninth item was the most general and asked “how much pride do you feel to live under the Haitian system of government?”


Exhibit 2.7 summarizes the responses for each of the nine variables for the country as a whole. To make the responses easier to interpret and compare, we have chosen to convert items to a common 0-100 scale, with 0 always representing the low end of the continuum and 100 the high end. We believe this is less confusing for the reader than using a different scoring method for each set of items in the study and when we make comparisons using multiple regression analysis, the use

⁸ For a review of this evidence see Mitchell A. Seligson, “On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico,” *Social Indicators Research* 12 (January 1983): 1-24, and Edward N. Muller, Thomas O. Jukam, and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis,” *American Journal of Political Science* 26 (May 1982): 240-264. More recently the scale has been used and reported upon in the University of Pittsburgh's Central American Public Opinion Project (1992), Development Associates' three surveys of democratic values in Guatemala (1993, 1996, and 1997), and Seligson's USAID commissioned studies in El Salvador and Nicaragua (1996).

of a single metric for all items allows us to compare the relative contribution of each item in the equation without having to resort to the complexity of using standard scores ⁹

As exhibit 2 7 shows, the level of support is generally low, with the public having the least confidence in political parties and the protection of their human rights The highest level of confidence was placed in the police and the presidency

Police The police is the institution in which people report the highest level of confidence, with over one third (36%) rating it "a lot" (i e , the highest rating possible)




At least since early in the regime of François Duvalier (1957-1971), conventional wisdom has been that most Haitians understandably feared the repressive power of the military and police The military and other armed agents of the state, could commit acts of violence with impunity, and frequently did so throughout the land In 1994, upon the return of President Aristide, the military was abolished and the police force completely reconstituted Essentially, the entire national police

⁹The arithmetic conversion of scales was performed by subtracting 1 from each item and then dividing by one less than the total number of points in the original scale and, finally, multiplying the result by 100 For example, a scale that ranged from a low of 1 to a high of 7 would first be reduced by subtracting 1 from each score, giving a range of 0-6 After dividing by 6 the lowest score would remain a 0, but the highest would be 1 Multiplying by 100 would make the maximum equivalent to 100 We followed this same procedure when we created summated scales that combined two or more items in the study

establishment, from senior officials to street level patrols, were removed from office and replaced by fresh recruits. The international community has devoted considerable effort and resources to train and otherwise support the new police. Nevertheless, the force has been beset with problems over the past year. New young officers from Port-au-Prince assigned to rural areas have often simply abandoned their posts. There have been angry community takeovers of police stations in several major localities during the past six months, and the media has reported numerous incidents of police violence in Port-au-Prince and its environs (citation coming). Despite these problems, the responses indicate that there is a relatively high level of confidence that the police are generally working in the interests of the people.

It may be that the relatively positive view of the police is a reflection of the public's awareness that the old establishment is gone and that at least attempts are being made to bring about improvements. The new force may be perceived as largely well intentioned, whatever the problems may still be. The responses also reflect the trend identified for all government institutions that the respondents with the least contact have the highest levels of confidence. As shown in exhibit 2.8, confidence in the police is inversely related to urbanicity, which in turn is related to the presence of police. Those rating the police the highest (a score of 74) are people in inaccessible rural areas (i.e., the people least likely to ever see a policeman) and those giving the police the lowest confidence score (57) live in Port-au-Prince.



We also looked at the relationship between confidence in the police and whether or not the respondent or a member of their family had, in the preceding 12 months, been the victim of a robbery, a rape or physical assault, or any other crimes. Overall, 17 percent of the respondents indicated they or a member of their family had been a victim, with this being the case for about 20 percent of the respondents in Port-au-Prince and other cities and towns, and 15 percent from rural areas. Interestingly, there was not a statistically significant difference in the ratings given by those who were or were not victims of a crime. This may suggest that for the most part contact with the police did not result in a lowering of confidence levels, but we do not know for certain that the crime was reported or contact with the police made.



To explore the relationship further we compared the ratings of police in terms of the respondents' gender, age, education, and literacy. There was not a meaningful correlation between confidence in police and either education or age, and there was not a significant difference between the responses of men and women in this regard. There was, however, a significant difference based on literacy. Respondents who could read or write Haitian Creole or French gave police significantly lower ratings (a score of 65) than did respondents who could not (a score of 72). This may be because the more literate also reside in cities and towns, where they either have greater contact with the police or are more exposed to negative media coverage.

Presidency As exhibit 2.7 shows, the overall rating for the presidency is a score of 57 out of a possible 100. This means that the majority of Haitians rated the presidency toward the positive end of the continuum, reflecting their confidence that the president was generally working in the interests of the people.

Exhibit 2.9 shows that there is a substantial difference in the views of Haitians living in Port-au-Prince and those in isolated rural areas (a score of 43 vs. 70). There are also substantial differences associated with age — respondents under 40 rated the presidency at around 50, while those between 40 and 59 gave the office a score of 65 and those over the age of 60 gave it a rating of 72.


Permanent Electoral Council Given the low turnout of the two most recent elections, estimated to be 38 percent in 1995 and 18 percent in 1997 (IFES, 1997) and the belief in prominent circles that the Electoral Council facilitated corrupt practices in these elections, the degree of public confidence in the Permanent Electoral Council seemed to contract conventional wisdom. It may be that the respondents were distinguishing between the Permanent Electoral Council — a creation of the 1987 constitution that has not yet come into existence — and the interim council that has been responsible for the recent elections. More likely, however, the reason has to do with proximity to Port-au-Prince — that is, to the seat of political power and access to media which covered the controversy around the Provisional Electoral Council in great detail.

As a comparison of exhibit 2.10 with exhibits 2.8 and 2.9 shows, the differences among respondents based on where they live is even greater with respect to the Electoral Council than for the police or the presidency. Less than one third of the respondents from Port-au-Prince registered confidence in the Electoral Council, whereas nearly 70 percent of people in rural isolated areas were confident the Council generally served the people's interests. Again, there was no difference in responses based on gender, and the differences associated with age and literacy parallel those based on residential location.



Judicial system The fourth institution to receive a generally positive indication of public support was the judicial system (a score of 52). Haitian attitudes toward the judicial process have been characterized as combining a thirst for justice (*swaf jistis*) with a rejection of the impunity that those in power have enjoyed historically from the legal consequences of their actions. The overwhelming majority (97%) of those interviewed believe that the government is responsible for guaranteeing basic human rights. Among the rights they seek to ensure is the right of equal justice for all. When asked how important it is that the judiciary punish the guilty, no matter who they may be, over 90 percent believe it to be very important. But, only a small proportion (23%) believe that in fact the basic rights of those who live in Haiti are well protected.

While the vast majority of those surveyed believe that there ought to be equal justice for all, only a small fraction (19%) believe that the judiciary follows this principle — responding positively that the judicial system treats everyone equally often enough or almost always. This limited group with faith in the judiciary is more likely to be from inaccessible rural areas, from among the elderly (60+ years), and from those who are illiterate (see exhibit 2.11). Asked the same question in another manner, whether or not the judiciary in Haiti punishes the guilty no matter who they are, the majority believes this to be the case (55%). Again, those in inaccessible rural areas, the elderly and the illiterate express greater faith in the role the judiciary play.



Despite the limited faith that those surveyed have in the judiciary and the police, they remain committed to a system of justice based on those two organs of justice. Overall, 85 percent believe that justice is most likely to be secured from the police and the courts rather than from community

leaders, or family or friends of the victim (see exhibit 2 12) In fact, the only other possibility mentioned by a sizable portion of the respondents, that of community leaders, is endorsed by 9 percent That endorsement is stronger among those who live in rural areas (15-16 percent in rural areas whether accessible or not) This suggests there is an underlying confidence in the police and the courts as instruments of justice and the importance of working with the judiciary and the police to strengthen their ability to fulfill the promise of delivering on an effective justice system

Exhibit 2 12

**Most Likely Source of Justice for a
Neighborhood Crime
(Percent)**

	Location				Total Population
	Metro Port-au- Prince	Other Urban areas	Rural, accessible	Rural, not accessible	
Police & Courts	92	92	79	78	85
Community Leaders	1	3	16	15	9
Family & Friends	2	2	2	2	2
There is no Justice	2	2	1	*	1
Other	3	1	*	5 examples	3

* Less than 1 percent

In that regard, it is also of interest to note that when asked about the treatment they had received from the police, a justice of the peace or other member of the judicial branch, about two thirds of the respondents (68%) indicated that they had been treated well or very well, and only about 14 percent indicated they had been treated badly (An additional 17 percent said did not know or did not answer, presumably because they had no recent contact) There were no significant differences in the responses of those who had and had not been victims of a crime, based on location (exhibit 2 13) While it is clear that there is limited confidence in the role that the justice system is currently playing, particularly in Port-au-Prince and among the younger, literate population, the demand exists throughout the country for the system to work Thus, the attitudes exist to support a strengthening of the system of justice, even in those areas that are not closely linked to the political center At present people are skeptical of less traditional forms of justice reform, using, for example community leaders or other local based alternative dispute resolution processes

Exhibit 2 13
Treatment by Police, Justice of the Peace
or Member of the Court

	Location				Total Population
	Metro Port-au-Prince	Other Urban	Rural accessible	Rural not accessible	
Very well	12	18	17	20	16
Well	48	56	49	55	52
Badly	10	9	14	8	11
Very Badly	3	3	4	2	3
Depends on Presentation or crime	*	1	2	2	1
No answer	5	2	2	2	3
Don't know	22	11	12	11	14

* Less than 1 percent

Parliament and Prime Minister The overall scores for these two institutions are almost equal (41 and 42), and a more detailed analyses of responses shows quite similar patterns between the two as well. It seems that the populace makes little distinction between the Prime Minister and Parliament as a whole in terms of confidence levels.

As exhibit 2 14 makes clear, the familiar pattern of greater confidence in the rural than the urban areas is also present. Indeed, the level of confidence in the isolated rural areas is twice as high as in Port-au-Prince.


Exhibit 2 14
Confidence in Parliament and Prime Minister

	Location				Total
	Metro Port-au-Prince	Other Urban	Rural Accessible	Rural Not Accessible	
Parliament	26	38	47	51	41
Prime Minister	26	38	46	59	42



Political Parties, Human Rights and Pride These were the three areas with the lowest ratings overall. Nationally, the scale scores in these areas are 29 for political parties, 35 for protection of human rights, and 34 for pride in the system as a whole. Political parties in many parts of the world are held in generally low regard, and Haitian political parties are unquestionable weak.

and lacking in membership and organizational formality and depth. As exhibit 2 15 shows, although the level of confidence in parties is lowest in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan region, it is quite low throughout the rest of the country as well.

Nearly two-thirds (65%) of the population responding to a question asking how much confidence they had that the basic human rights of the people who live in their country are well protected indicated their level of confidence was little or none. Converting these responses to the 0-100 scale, as exhibit 2 16 shows, the level was less than 50 in all parts of the country, with the greatest lack of confidence in Port-au-Prince (a rating of 26).




As the most general indicator of support for the political system Haitians were asked to indicate how much pride they feel to live under the Haitian system of government. Overall, the level of pride is low, a rating of 34 out of 100. And, again, we find clear differences among the four geographic regions. As exhibit 2 17 shows, the level in Port-au-Prince (21 on the 100 percent scale) is less than half that of the most isolated, rural communities (47).



To put these results in an international context, America's Development Foundation has used essentially the same set of items pertaining to political system support in three household surveys of Guatemala (1993, 1995, and 1997) Consistently, in Guatemala it has found parties to be rated the lowest of the political support indicators, and at a level even lower than they were in Haiti On the same 0-100 scale, the Guatemalan results have ranged from 19 in 1993 to 25 in 1997 In both countries parties are frequently derided in the media In the case of Haiti, the significantly lower rating given by the respondents from Port-au-Prince may be associated with the higher literacy levels and substantially greater access to the media of the residents of the metropolitan area

With respect to confidence that the basic human rights of the people are being protected, the ratings from Haiti are about the same as those from national surveys in Guatemala in 1993, 1995 and 1997 (37, 34, and 37) The results from Port-au-Prince, however, are generally lower than those from a 1991 survey using the same scale conducted in the capital cities of Central America As exhibit 2 18 shows, the scores on that survey ranged from a low of 22 in Honduras to a high of 61 in Costa Rica In Guatemala, unlike Haiti, concern for human rights protections was greater in the rural areas than the capital, but that is a reflection of the unrest in rural areas of Guatemala that only recently came to an end after some 30 years of civil war



With respect to the general measure of the level of pride of the people in living under their political system, respondents to the 1997 national survey in Guatemala responded to essentially the same question as asked in Haiti at the level of 44, or 10 points higher, on the 0-100 scale Responses from the 1991 survey of Central American capital cities ranged from a high of 87 in Costa Rica to

a low of 49 in El Salvador. It may be that the Haitians' lack of pride in their system is associated with the gaps that there appear to be between their expectations of their system and how they perceive that system actually performs.

Overall index of system support In order to create a single composite measure of system support we first examined the relationship of each of the variables analyzed above to see if they relate to each other in a systematic way and therefore can formally be considered to form part of a single dimension called "system support." We found we could form a reliable scale using the nine items described above: police, judicial system, parliament, political parties, electoral council, president, prime minister, protection of human rights, and pride in the Haitian political system¹⁰. We summed the nine items into an overall scale that ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 100¹¹. The overall mean for the Haitian population was 46.




Exhibit 2 19 presents the overall scale score for various types of localities. As the exhibit shows, the support index is considerably lower in Port-au-Prince than elsewhere in the country, and almost twice as low as in isolated rural areas. The national mean score for Haiti was a bit higher than in the case of the Guatemalan national surveys (40 in 1993 and 1995 in Guatemala vs. Haiti's

¹⁰ The alpha reliability index for the nine items was .899.

¹¹ We summed each item, which ranged from 0 to 100, and then divided by 9.

46), but not dramatically so, and, as in Haiti, in Guatemala the level of support was lower in the metropolitan area than elsewhere in the country¹²

To explore the nature of overall system support further we utilized multiple regression analysis to look at its relationship to gender, age, highest level of education, self-reported literacy, and geographic region. This technique allows us to compare the relative importance of the factors we have analyzed while controlling for (holding constant) all the others. The regression analysis found that region, education level, and literacy were statistically significant predictors of system support, and that gender and age were not. The strongest predictor of level of support was geographic region, with residents of Port-au-Prince much less supportive of the political system than residents from other areas. The regression analysis results are quite consistent with the remarkably direct and negative relationship between system support and proximity to the center of government as shown in exhibit 2.19. Literacy and education level are also negatively related to system support, with the more educated respondents, regardless of the part of the country in which they live, less supportive of the political system.

E LOCAL VS NATIONAL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

Local government in Latin America and the Caribbean has, for centuries, been a neglected branch of the state. In colonial Haiti and throughout the 19th century there were strong municipal centers outside of Port-au-Prince, largely based around shipping and agriculturally related trade. As part of the US occupation from 1915 to 1934 shipping was severely restricted at most of the provincial ports, roads linking many provincial towns directly to the capital by land for the first time, and the economic and social dominance of Port-au-Prince grew in consequence. The dominance has continued to grow through the remainder of the twentieth century, and now all but a very few of the once vibrant cities and towns are but shells of their former selves.

The Haitian Constitution of 1987 lays out an impressive and ambitious vision of strong local units of government. The system as set forth rests on the effectiveness of executive councils and representative assemblies at the level of the communal section (CASECs and ASECs). From this primary level, the local government system consists of elected mayors, followed by a chain of indirect elections from the ASECs to larger and larger territorial assemblies (communes, departments and an inter-departmental council) that ends with provincial representation at the national cabinet level and the appointment of the Permanent Electoral Council (Development Associates, 1997:56)¹³

This constitutionally envisioned system has not yet been put in place, but major activities on the part of USAID and other donor organization efforts in Haiti over the past several years have been focused on strengthening local governments. The goal has been to help make these local governmental units effective vehicles for improving the delivery of public goods and services as well as important mechanisms for strengthening democracy.

¹²In 1995 the results for Guatemala ranged from a low of 32 in the capital's metropolitan area to a high of 50 in the north east region of the country.

¹³For an historical overview and detailed description of the local governmental system, see the Local Government Assessment completed by ARD for USAID Haiti in June 1996.

As previously noted, in Haiti respondents indicated that neither their local nor their national government leaders are responsive to what the people want, and the perception of unresponsiveness is slightly greater toward local leaders (60 percent responded “almost never”) than leaders on the national level (56 percent). This is necessarily not the case elsewhere. In Guatemala and several other countries in which similar surveys have been conducted, local government has been found to be the most trusted public institution and the unit of government with which the public was most satisfied.

The people’s views on the unresponsiveness of local leaders are consistent with their responses to a question asking whether they would say that the public services in their community (i.e., communal section) are excellent, good, poor or very bad. Forty percent (40%) responded “very bad,” 32 percent responded “poor” and another 14 percent volunteered that there were no public services at all in their community. Interestingly, the perception that services were poor or very bad was essentially the same in inaccessible rural areas (71%) as in Port-au-Prince and other cities and towns (77% and 75% — see exhibit 2.20). Those who most often reported local public services to be good to excellent were in accessible rural areas (still only 29 percent).

Exhibit 2.20

**Satisfaction with Local Public Services
(Percent)**

	Location				Total
	Metro Port-au- Prince	Other Urban	Rural Accessible	Rural, not accessible	
Excellent	6	10	14	10	10
Very good	14	14	15	13	14
Poor	41	37	26	30	33
Very bad	37	39	44	45	42
There are no services *	2	-	1	2	1

* This response was volunteered by the respondents

To more directly explore how people view the local, as compared to the national, level of government they were asked who, in their opinion, has responded better to help resolve the problems of their community. They were asked to choose between the state, the commune or the CASEC, or to indicate that they thought there was no difference, they were also offered the opportunity to specify another group (e.g., a non-governmental agency). Of the total population, the most frequently given response was not among the options presented. About a quarter of the overall population (23%) and a third of those in Port-au-Prince (33%) responded that no institution or organization helps resolve the problems of their community. Also, as exhibit 2.21 shows, the population registers no real difference between the national and local level. Overall, 21 percent responded with the central government, 20 percent said local government (commune and CASEC combined), and 16 percent said they were all the same.

Exhibit 2 21

Relative Helpfulness of National vs Local Government

	Location				Total
	Metro Port-au-Prince	Other Urban	Rural Accessible	Rural, not Accessible	
National Government	28	22	18	16	21
Local Government	18	21	19	23	20
All the same	9	15	18	22	16
Other	6	13	20	13	13
No one helps	33	23	18	22	24
Don't know	6	6	7	4	6

Of the 13 percent who identified a source other than the central or local government as having best helped their community resolve its needs, the most frequently cited type of organization was a local community group (8 percent overall, or 61 percent of those responding). This response accounted for about 90 percent of the responses from Port-au-Prince and 75 percent of those from isolated rural areas. International organizations such as CARE and USAID were cited by about 4 percent of all the respondents from urban areas outside of Port-au-Prince and by about 8 percent of those in accessible rural areas.

Given the public's generally low regard for their local units of government, it is somewhat surprising that most Haitians (70%) say they believe it would be worthwhile to pay taxes to the commune to enable it to provide better service to the communal section. As exhibit 2 22 shows, this is the view of over 60 percent of the populace regardless of the type of community in which they live, and with the greatest level of support coming from urban areas. Again, this suggests that the Haitian people are hopeful that conditions will improve and that their government, no matter what they think of its current performance, has the potential for positive change.

Exhibit 2 22

**Attitude Toward Paying Taxes to Local Government
to Enable Provision of Better Services**

	Location				Total Population
	Metro Port-au-Prince	Other Urban	Rural accessible	Rural not accessible	
	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %
Paying taxes worthwhile	80	76	64	64	71
Paying local taxes not worthwhile	18	22	32	28	25
Don't know	2	2	4	8	4


F GOVERNMENTAL VS NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Many Haitians consider non-governmental organizations, which are largely financially supported from public and private sources outside of Haiti, as the primary source of health and other social services, and some even view them as having created a parallel structure to the state

From another perspective, non-governmental organizations can be seen as a primary building block for democracy For example, cooperatives funded by USAID during the 1970s have been credited as being instrumental in increasing participation of Haitians in economic and community development activities, in civic education endeavors, and in raising the level of political activism (America's Development Foundation, 1996)

To explore how much Haitians believe non-governmental organizations are helping improve their communities, we asked two set of questions The first was in the context of seeing how the public rated various types of entities, both non-public and public (e g , the Church and the judiciary) As already described in the discussion of political system support, the interviewees were asked to indicate on a 7 point scale, ranging from "none" to "a lot," how much confidence they had that the entity was generally working in the interests of the people Results for seven elements in the political system were presented earlier (see the first seven items in exhibit 2 7)

Exhibit 2 23 compares the results for the six governmental institutions previously discussed with four types of non-governmental groups the Catholic Church, other religious groups, labor or trade unions, and the news media (newspaper, radio and television) As the exhibit shows, all four of the non-governmental groups get generally positive ratings (above 50), with church groups and the media quite highly rated



This is the mean response for those who answered Over a third (38%) did not answer or said "don't know" to the question about labor or trade unions, probably because they had no exposure to such groups Over 90 percent of the people responded to the questions about the other institutions/types of groups

Looking at these results from the perspective of where respondents live, there is largely the same pattern for governmental and non-governmental entities That is, people in rural areas tend to express more confidence in each of these groups than do respondents from urban areas, with the lowest levels of confidence coming from residents of Port-au-Prince The exception to that general rule is the media The media received a rating of above 80 from respondents in all four types of locations, although again those from rural areas were higher than those from cities and towns¹⁴ It may be that this high rating is related to the fact that the media has no obligation to perform and therefore does not disappoint

The second set of questions deals with the contribution of non-governmental groups Haitians were asked to indicate whether each of a series of eleven types of groups helped to make their community a better place to live They were given the choice of answering "not at all" "somewhat," or "a great deal" or to indicate that they did not know The same list of groups was used in all regions of the country, except that in Port-au-Prince one question was changed to ask about "popular organizations" rather than "peasant groups," and another was changed from asking about "agricultural cooperatives" to "professional associations"

¹⁴ The ratings for media based on type of locations are 80 for Port-au-Prince 82 for other urban areas 87 for rural accessible areas and 86 for rural not accessible areas

The responses for each of the groups, for the country as a whole and broken down by type of locality, are summarized in exhibit 2 24. As the exhibit shows, none of the groups are considered to have helped the community "a lot", or even "a little", by as much as 50 percent of the population. Indeed, only two of the eleven types of groups were considered to help their communities "a lot" by more than a quarter of the population. Both private business groups and sports clubs and associations were given this high rating by 27 percent of the total populace, but in both cases there were also roughly as many people who thought they did not help at all (23% and 31%, respectively).

**Exhibit 2 24
Contribution to Community Betterment of Non-governmental Groups**

Type of Group	Location				Total Population
	Port-au-Prince	Other Urban	Rural accessible	Rural not accessible	
	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %
Groups to protect nature					
A lot	9	16	19	20	16
A little	16	22	25	18	21
Not at all	62	41	30	33	41
Don't Know	13	21	26	29	22
Human rights groups					
A lot	9	15	18	19	15
A little	18	22	23	17	20
Not at all	61	41	34	33	42
Don't Know	12	21	25	31	23
Unions					
A lot	21	25	24	27	24
A little	20	18	16	15	17
Not at all	39	23	15	19	23
Don't Know	20	34	45	39	35
Neighborhood or community groups					
A lot	12	18	22	29	20
A little	19	31	31	20	25
Not at all	60	39	31	37	41
Don't Know	9	12	16	14	13
Private business groups					
A lot	22	29	27	30	27
A little	21	19	16	11	17
Not at all	41	21	16	16	23
Don't Know	16	31	41	43	33

Type of Group	Location				Total Population
	Port-au-Prince	Other Urban	Rural accessible	Rural not accessible	
	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %
School or univ group					
A lot	10	20	27	25	21
A little	17	21	23	22	21
Not at all	57	42	32	30	40
Don't Know	16	16	18	23	18
Sports clubs or assoc					
A lot	14	20	34	36	27
A little	18	28	19	16	20
Not at all	54	34	21	17	31
Don't Know	14	18	26	31	22
Student or youth groups					
A lot	12	16	28	30	22
A little	18	28	23	19	22
Not at all	56	38	25	26	36
Don't Know	14	17	24	25	20
Women's groups					
A lot	15	18	25	29	22
A little	16	24	25	22	22
Not at all	53	43	35	38	42
Don't Know	16	15	15	11	14
Agricultural co-ops/ Professional Association					
A lot	12	15	22	22	18
A little	20	28	25	20	23
Not at all	54	38	30	33	38
Don't Know	14	19	23	25	21
Peasant groups/Popular Organization					
A lot	17	18	19	20	18
A little	25	24	27	21	25
Not at all	45	41	41	50	44
Don't Know	13	18	13	9	13

With regard to private business groups, there was very little difference between the ratings of urban and rural dwellers. There was some difference according to gender. Males were somewhat more positive than females with respect to these types of groups, with 29 percent of males indicating private sector groups helped their communities "a lot" as opposed to 24 percent of females. While there was little difference between male and female respondents overall, in Port-au-Prince 26 percent of men, as opposed to 18 percent of women, reported these types of organizations helped "a lot." And, in other urban areas the response was 32 percent for men and 26 percent for women.

Differences regarding sports clubs or associations followed the common pattern of higher responses coming from rural than urban areas. Two and a half times as many respondents in isolated rural areas as in Port-au-Prince considered these types of groups to help their community greatly to become a better place to live (36% vs 14%). Essentially there was no difference between the responses of men and women in this regard, with about 40 percent of the women in isolated rural areas indicating that these types of groups helped "a lot."

Looking at the details in exhibit 2.24 from a different point of view, there are six types of groups that between 40 and 50 percent of the population do not think are helpful at all. Of particular note are those pertaining to the protection of human rights and the protection of nature. Including those who indicated they did not know, both of these groups received negative ratings by over 60 percent of the population (64% and 63%, respectively). In both cases, by far the highest negative ratings of "not at all" were from residents of Port-au-Prince, and from males rather than females. Females, however, were much more likely than males to indicate that they did not know. Indeed, when both the "not at all" and "don't know" responses are combined, in both cases, the females were slightly less positive than males (68 versus 62 percent for human rights groups and 65 versus 62 percent for groups to protect nature).

Given the generally low, and worsening, level of living of most Haitians regardless of the type of community in which they live, it is perhaps not surprising that all of these non-governmental groups receive such low ratings. Essentially, the people seem to be saying that no one — neither governmental nor non-governmental organizations — is working to make their communities to be a better place to live. In light of the combined weight of the findings presented thus far, they also seem to be saying that they continue to have faith that their conditions may become better, and that they have relatively more confidence that non-governmental leaders, particularly those associated with religious organizations, and that the media, have the people's interests at heart.

G INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY AND POLITICAL LIFE

Social scientists have proposed numerous theories to explain why some nations develop stable democracies and others do not. In recent years there has been increasing attention given to the idea of civil society, building from Alexis de Tocqueville's (1835) observation that the strength of American democracy emanated from its citizen's highly active involvement in community life. The relatively recent work of Robert Putnam (1993) based on his study of democracy in Italy which concluded that when citizens become involved in community affairs through their participation in civil society organizations they build social capital and are thereby able to make effective demands on their governments, especially at the local level, has given much impetus to current interests in citizen participation. In this study of Haiti we look at this issue from two points of view: access and

participation in explicitly political activities, and participation in civil society or other community groups

Political Participation Earlier we found that although the Haitian public generally believes that their national and local leaders are unresponsive, they nevertheless place high value on their rights to organize and to vote. Consistent with their belief that the people can have a voice in how the government operates by voting in elections (68% — see exhibit 2.6), 81 percent indicated that they were registered to vote, and 82 percent indicated that they had voted at one time or another¹⁵. Of those who said they were registered, 66 percent overall, and 75 percent over the age of 25, indicated they had voted in the last Presidential election (in December 1995). This is also basically the same response they gave when asked whether they had voted in the election prior to the presidential election, when people voted for senators, deputies, mayors and CASECs (72 percent overall and 76 percent of those over 25)¹⁶.

As the survey responses indicate, and as election statistics until this year support, Haitians have reasonably ready access to and make use of their right to vote. In terms of the responses to the survey questionnaire, this is true for all ages, genders, and geographic locations. Males, however, are significantly more likely than females to have reported that they voted in the 1995 election (76 vs. 69 percent)¹⁷. Residents of rural areas are more likely to have said they voted as well. Residents of Port-au-Prince are the least likely to report they voted in the December 1995 Presidential election (63%), and residents of accessible rural areas are the most (80%). These responses appear consistent with those reported earlier suggesting a greater sense of efficacy and hope among the rural population than among residents of Port-au-Prince.

While voting is an important and basic form of political participation in a democratic system, other ways are important as well. Consequently, respondents were asked whether they had attended political rallies or debates, participated in a demonstration or protest, ever worked for a political party or candidate or had run for public office themselves. As exhibit 2.25 shows, about 40 percent of the population indicates that they attended a political rally or meeting at least once, 10 percent had participated in a demonstration or protest, 12 percent had worked for a candidate or party, and 5 percent had actually run for office themselves. As is also shown, there is no statistically significant difference in responses among types of localities with respect to participating in demonstrations or protests, few Haitians participate in demonstrations no matter where they live. However, there are significant differences with respect to attendance at rallies or meetings, and even with respect to having worked for a candidate or running for office themselves. Again, residents of rural areas are more likely to participate than urban dwellers. Given the findings presented thus far, it should not be surprising that the lowest level of political participation is from residents in Port-au-Prince.

¹⁵ The difference between the percent saying they were registered (81%) and those answering 'yes' to the questions 'have you ever voted?' may be accounted for either by the 1 percent who said they did not know whether they were registered or because they had voted at some time in the past and they believed their registration to no longer be valid.

¹⁶ As is true in many surveys of this kind, the percent of respondents indicating they were registered to vote or who indicated they voted is considerably higher than is really the case. According to observation reports from the 1995 elections, for example, the voter turnout was 35 percent (IFES, 1997). Survey data on voting is best viewed as an indicator of popular attitudes on how people should behave rather than of voting behavior itself.

¹⁷ Statistical significance = < .01

Exhibit 2 25

Forms of Political Participation

	Location				Total Population
	Metro Port-au-Prince	Other Urban	Rural accessible	Rural not accessible	
	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %
Registered to vote	75	78	85	83	81
Voted in Presidential Election of December 1995	63	68	80	76	73
Attended at least 1 or 2 political meetings	17	36	55	47	40
Participated in 1 or more demonstrations or protests	6	10	11	11	10
Ever worked for political party or candidate	6	13	13	16	12
Ever run for office	2	4	8	2	5

Participation in Civil Society Groups

To obtain an indication of the extent to which members of Haitian society participate in groups that have, or could reasonably become, politically active, we asked whether or not respondents had participated during the past year in each of thirteen different types of community based organizations Exhibit 2 26 provides a summary of the responses for each type of organization As the exhibit shows, church or religious groups have the greatest amount of participation (40 percent of the population), with peasant and neighborhood groups being the only other types with participation from 20 percent of the people or more

Exhibit 2 26

**Participation in Types of Community Organizations
by Gender and Literacy
(Percent Participating)**

	Gender		Literacy		Total
	Male	Female	Yes	No	
Agricultural Cooperative/ Professional Association	15%	9%	13%	11%	12%
Church or Other Religious Group	41	38	43	33	40
Local Community Project	20	13	17	18	17
NGO Project	6	2	5	2	4
Labor/Trade Union	4	2	3	3	3
Neighborhood Committee	24	18	22	21	22
Peasant Group/ Popular Organization	32	19	24	30	26
Political Party	7	3	7	2	5
Private Business Group	6	2	5	3	4
School Committee	17	11	18	8	15
Sports Club/Association	11	4	11	2	8
Student/Youth Group	13	7	15	2	10
Women's Group	7	18	10	15	12

To get a sense of the extent of involvement each individual may have had, we created a simple scale based on the number of organizations in which he or she had participated. Since we asked about thirteen different types of organizations, the scale has a range of from a low of 0, no participation, to a high of 13. For ease of presentation, we grouped the responses into three categories: "none," "some" and "a lot." Thirty eight percent (38%) of the population are in the "none" category, that is, they indicated they had not participated in any of these organizations during the past year. Thirty three percent (33%) are in the "some" category, which consists of people indicating they had participated in one or two groups during the year. Slightly over 20 percent of the population indicated they had participated with one group and slightly over 12 percent indicated they had participated with two. The "a lot" category consists of the 29 percent of the population that indicated they had participated with three or more groups during the past year (those indicating more than 8 groups accounted for less than one percent of the population).

Exhibit 2 27 shows the levels of participation by geographic area, gender, education and age. As the exhibit shows, males are more likely to participate "a lot" than females, although both are equally likely to participate in one or two community groups (i.e., "some"). Not surprisingly, respondents in the middle age groups (25-59 years old) are more likely to participate "a lot" than Haitians in either the younger or the older groups, but about a third of each of the age groups responded that they participated at least "some". The same is true when comparing the literate and illiterate, with the illiterate respondents participating more. With respect to location, the familiar patterns continue. Only in Port-au-Prince do more than 50 percent of the people not participate in any group at all.

Exhibit 2 27

**Level of Civic Participation by Gender, Age, Literacy, and Location
(Percent Participating)**

	Participation Level			Total
	None	Some	A Lot	
	Row %	Row %	Row %	Row %
Gender				
Male	34	32	34	100
Female	44	33	23	100
Age Range				
16-24	43	32	25	100
25-39	37	33	30	100
40-59	36	31	33	100
60 +	41	37	22	100
Literate				
Yes	35	33	32	100
No	44	32	24	100
Location				
Port-au-Prince	55	28	17	100
Other Urban	36	38	26	100
Rural accessible	30	32	38	100
Rural not accessible	35	33	32	100

Exhibit 2 28 shows the relationship between level of participation and the scale indicating support for the political system and the scale indicating extent of political knowledge. The exhibit also relates participation levels to the indicators of political efficacy that were previously described. As the exhibit shows, there is a positive relationship between participation and each of these other variables.

Exhibit 2 28

Level of Participation by Extent of System Support,
Political Knowledge and Indicators of Efficacy

	Participation Level		
	None	Some	A Lot
Political system support (mean score)	44	46	49
Political Knowledge (mean score)	78	80	81
Voting gives a voice in government (% agreeing)	59%	67%	83%
National officials care about what people think (% agreeing)	24%	28%	32%
Elected national leaders respond to the people often enough or almost always (% agreeing)	6%	6%	8%


H SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES

Stable democracies are, presumably, undergirded with not only high levels of system support but also high levels of support for democratic norms, especially for civil liberties and political tolerance. Support for the right to participate and tolerance of disliked groups are central pillars of democratic political culture (Seligson and Jutkowitz, 1994). In *Polyarchy*, Dahl (1983) argued that political cultures that support liberal, representative institutions are supported by two key mass attitudes: support for a system of widespread political participation and support for the right of minority dissent. In other words, a democratic culture is one that is both extensive and inclusive, with *extensive* cultures supporting democratic participation and *inclusive* cultures supporting civil liberties for unpopular groups.

Extensive Participation Based on prior research in Central America, we chose to measure extensive participation by three variables: support for participation in civic groups, political parties and protests. Because we expected near unanimity and thus little or no variance among respondents we did not ask about support for voting which otherwise would have been included on our extensive participation scale.


The levels of support for these conventional modes of political participation are presented in exhibit 2 29. Respondents were asked whether they approved, disapproved or were indifferent with respect to the public participating in legal demonstrations, working for a party or a candidate.

during an election campaign, and participating in community groups or associations in order to resolve community problems. We made a composite measure as an indication of overall support for extensive participation by summing the responses for the three specific variables and converting them to a scale ranging from 0-100 as earlier described.



As the exhibit shows, the level of support with respect to each of these items is on the positive end of the scale (i.e., above 50 on the scale of 0-100), and the score of the composite measure is 77. Of note is the relatively low rating given to participation in election campaigns. This is essentially the same as the findings from the national surveys in Guatemala in 1993 and 1995 that used the same items. There, community groups were also rated the highest (78 and 74 on the 0-100 scale) and participation in election campaigns received the lowest rating (a score of 61).


It may be that in both Haiti and Guatemala people are responding at least in part in terms of their perception of the utility of the effort. As exhibit 2 30 shows, in Haiti there is a clear relationship between the extent to which people participate in community groups and their responses regarding support for people participating in associations or groups that try to resolve problems. The greater the level of participation, the greater the support for extensive participation overall, but particularly for participation in community groups.



Inclusive Participation One can support a wide variety of participatory forms and still be opposed to the right of unpopular groups to participate. For this reason, we believe that inclusive, rather than extensive, participation is the more stringent test of democratic commitment. Our measure of inclusive participation is divided into two batteries. The first is comprised of three items that address opposition to the suppression of democratic liberties. Respondents were asked to indicate how much they would approve or disapprove of the government's prohibiting marches, meetings of government critics, and censorship of the media. The second is composed of four items comprising a measure of tolerance for the right to dissent. As the tolerance measure we ask the extent to which respondents believe that critics of the government should be extended the right to vote, organize demonstrations, run for office, and use the radio, television or the press to express their opinions.

Opposition to the Suppression of Democratic Liberties Here we ask the respondents if they would approve or disapprove of the government taking action to restrict civil liberties. Respondents indicated on a scale of 1 to 10 how much they would agree or disagree with the government if it (a) prohibited protests or peaceful demonstrations, (b) meetings in which people criticized the form of government established by the constitution, and (c) the use of radio or television to criticize the form of government established by the constitution. As with previously described measures, we converted the responses to a scale ranging from 0-100, with the high end of the scale indicating strong opposition to the suppression of the liberty being described.


Exhibit 2 31 presents a summary of the responses. As the exhibit shows, the ratings are very high, with 90 being the score for the composite of the three measures. There was very little difference in the responses given by men or women, by the respondents' level of participation in community groups, or by their ability to read and write.



There were also only minor differences when responses were analyzed in terms of age groups, place of residence of the respondent, or level of participation in community groups. Although still high, respondents over 60 years of age were significantly less supportive than the other age groups (a composite score of 82, as compared with 89 for those between 40 and 59 and over 90 for those 39 years of age or less). The differences in age groups are mostly accounted for by the responses regarding support for peaceful demonstrations (a composite score of 79 for those over 60, as compared to a score of 90 for those under 40 years of age).

Tolerance for the Right to Dissent The tolerance for the right to dissent items are the most stringent test of attitudes toward democratic liberties. In these items, we are asking respondents if they are willing to extend the crucial civil liberties of the right to vote, demonstrate, run for office, and exercise free speech and access to the media to those who are critics of their system of government. Not surprisingly, approval of these liberties was substantially lower than it was for the other, "easier" tests of support for democratic norms.


The results for the specific indicators and for the composite scale are presented in exhibit 2 32 Although lower than the other measures, the scores are still above the mid-point level, with a composite score of 55 The relatively low rating given to the item dealing with the right to run for public office, a score of 46, may be related to the legacy of the Duvalier regimes and the about-to-expire prohibitions against former Duvalierists being allowed to run for office



We also analyzed the responses in terms of gender, age, literacy, education level, type of community where respondents live, and level of participation in community groups The differences are relatively slight and generally parallel to those reported for the opposition to suppression of dissent There is essentially no difference among men and women (men score 55 and women 54) Nor, for a change, is there a meaningful difference based on where people live Based on a multiple regression analysis using these factors as well as the number of community groups in which people participate we conclude that education, and its close correlate — literacy, are the most powerful predictors of tolerance for political dissent There was also a relationship, though much weaker, with age, younger persons are somewhat more likely to be tolerant than their elders ¹⁸

¹⁸ The scores range from 58 for respondents age 16-24 55 for those 25-39, 54 for those from 40-59, and 51 for those 60 years and above

Interestingly, the relation between participation and tolerance is not a straight one. For the overall composite indicator, and for each of its four parts, there is a substantial increase in the level of tolerance between respondents who participate in no community groups (composite score of 50) and those who participate in one or two (composite score of 60). For each part, there is then a drop of 3 to 6 points between those who participated in one or two groups and those who participated in more with the composite dropping from 60 to 56. It may be that beyond some point, participation in many organizations moves toward fanaticism. If this is so, the level of tolerance for dissent would quite naturally decline at the higher levels of participation.



To put these responses with respect to political tolerance in a cross national context, we compared the levels in Haiti to the national household surveys in Guatemala using the same set of items (1993 and 1995), and to the earlier six nation study of capital city regions which used the same scale as well. The national level results from Haiti are somewhat higher than those from Guatemala. Compared to Haiti's level of 55, Guatemala's level in 1993 was 44, and in 1995 it was 49. Exhibit 2.33 provides a comparison of the results from Haiti's Port-au-Prince metropolitan area to comparable areas in the countries of Central America for each of the four parts of the composite. As the exhibit shows, the results from Haiti are generally lower than for Panama, Honduras, and Costa Rica, and higher than for Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador.

I INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SYSTEM SUPPORT AND TOLERANCE FOR DISSENT

It has been argued that political systems in which the population is both tolerant and supportive of the system are likely to be stable democracies (for example, see Seligson & Jutkowitz, 1995) Conversely, systems in which the population is intolerant and politically alienated are likely headed for the breakdown of democracy — or to be unready for its rise

Essentially, when the complexity is reduced, system support can be either high or low Likewise, so can tolerance Thus, an exhibit representing all the possible combinations of system support and political tolerance has four cells

- ▶ **High support and high tolerance** — This combination is predicted to be the most politically stable democratic case High support is needed in noncoercive environments for the system to be stable, and tolerance is needed for the system to remain democratic Systems with this combination of attitude are likely to experience a deepening of democracy
- ▶ **High support but low tolerance** — Systems with this combination are relatively stable (because of the high system support), but they are generally undemocratic They are systems which tend toward oligarchic rule in which democratic rights are restricted
- ▶ **Low support but high tolerance** — This combination is considered to be one of instability This is not necessarily a situation of reduced civil liberties, and it is difficult in this situation to predict whether the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability, perhaps characterized by considerable violence The instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance Or in a more authoritarian context, the instability could lead to the breakdown of the regime and its replacement with democracy
- ▶ **Low support and low tolerance** — This situation is symptomatic of, or leads to, democratic breakdown If democratic institutions exist, overtime the current political system is likely to be replaced by one which is autocratic If already autocratic, real change is unlikely

The results of relating the two variables for the Haiti survey are presented in exhibit 2 34 As the exhibit shows, about a quarter (24%) of the population is in the “high” zone with respect to tolerance and system support, and about a third (35%) is in what we have characterized as the unstable democracy cell If the underlying logic of this analysis holds, this implies a relatively sizable proportion of the population (35%) with values that are supportive of democracy but who are not supportive of the political system as they know it This suggests a reservoir of support for actions that are perceived as changing the system along democratic lines

To gain some perspective, we can compare the Haiti to data collected from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua in 1995 Exhibit 2 35 provides such comparisons The data from Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua are based on surveys conducted only in the capital cities, while the Guatemala data were collected through a nationwide survey Since the questionnaires used were similar to that used in Haiti, but not exactly the same, the comparisons must be made cautiously

Exhibit 2 34

**Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Haiti
(Percent of Population in each cell)**

	Tolerance	
System Support	High	Low
High	Stable (deepening) Democracy (24%)	Authoritarian Oligarchy (20%)
Low	Unstable Democracy (35%)	Democratic Breakdown (21%)

The overall pattern of the data for Haiti is quite different than for any of the Central American countries. The proportion of the population in the two cells supportive of democratic liberties (59%) is higher than for any of the other countries, and those in the cell least favorable to democracy (21%) is lower than in any of the countries except Costa Rica.

Exhibit 2 35

**Joint Distribution of System Support and Tolerance
in Selected Central American Countries and Haiti***

	Stable Democracy	Unstable Democracy	Sum of Democracy	Authoritarian Oligarchy	Democratic Breakdown
	%	%	%	%	%
Costa Rica	46	8	54	41	5
El Salvador	26	21	47	29	24
Guatemala	18	37	55	17	28
Haiti	24	35	59	20	21
Nicaragua	19	35	54	16	30

* Data for Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua are from capital cities obtained as part of the University of Pittsburgh Central America Public Opinion Project, 1991-1995 (Seligson, 1995). Data for Guatemala are from the 1995 national household survey conducted by Development Associates.

Given the dismal economic and unsettled political conditions of Haiti in the Spring of 1997, these are essentially positive results. However, the more detailed analysis of the relationships shown in exhibit 2.36 leaves a somewhat different impression.

It may be that the relatively high proportion of the population from isolated rural areas in the stable democracy cell (33%) is primarily a reflection of the irrelevance of the state in their lives. As independent peasant farmers, they may be relatively tolerant of, when not indifferent to, a state that does not directly abuse them. But as the Haitian population becomes less rural, maintaining indifference to the state becomes more difficult. The negative relationship between proximity to the organs of the state and values supporting democratic stability is pronounced, and the difference between Port-au-Prince and the rest of the country is dramatic. Clearly, according to these results, the population of metropolitan Port-au-Prince is the most politically volatile. And this is certainly consistent with political behavior.

But it is also important to note that the residents of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area are by far the least inclined to support authoritarian rule. Taken together, this suggests Haiti will remain in a state of transition and turmoil until a political system consistent with its population's strong underlying orientation toward political liberty is perceived by that population to be in place. This in turn suggests, given the current condition of the Haitian economy and public service delivery system, that lasting political stability for Haiti will require substantial effort and considerable time. The data from this survey indicate that for the most part the Haitian people believe, in the abstract, that their political institutions can work to the benefit of the nation, but they also have virtually no confidence in their elected leaders at either the national or local levels. Seemingly, they would like to believe that positive change is possible, but their skepticism is also quite clear. The challenge for the government of Haiti, and for those who wish to help it succeed, is to forge linkages of trust between the state and the people, perhaps for the first time since Haiti began its life as a nation. The challenge can also be stated as the need to build a state that is as democratic as that ideal to which the Haitian people are already committed.

Exhibit 2.36

**Joint Distribution of System Support and Tolerance
in Haiti by Type of Community
(Percent of Population in Each Cell)**

	Stable Democracy (Hi/Hi)	Unstable Democracy (Hi/Lo)	Sum of Democracy	Authoritarian Oligarchy (Lo/Hi)	Democratic Break-down (Lo/Lo)
Port-au-Prince	10%	46%	56%	14%	30%
Other Urban	20	41	60	19	21
Rural Accessible	29	30	59	22	19
Rural not Accessible	33	22	56	28	16

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH)

HAITIAN CIVIL SOCIETY HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE A1-1

APPENDIX 2 QUESTIONNAIRE (CREOLE)

ANKET SOSYETE SIVIL AYISYEN A2-1

APPENDIX 3 STUDY METHODOLOGY A3-1

APPENDIX 4 REFERENCES A4-1

APPENDIX 5 TOP LINE TABLES A5-1

APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH)

Haitian Civil Society Household Questionnaire

_____	No Haitian citizens in the household
_____	No one home
_____	Refusal _____ Incapable
_____	Unavailable

Instructions to Interviewers Please complete the information requested below for each interview

(Day/Month/Year) Date _____ / _____ / _____

Location (LSU, Communal Section) _____ Participant Sex _____

(Male or Female) _____ Participant Age _____

Start Time _____ End Time _____

Introduction to Household Good day/evening My name is _____ I am working for ASOSYE, an organization which is studying the people and culture of Haiti We would like to know people's opinions about their life in Haiti and the way things work here We chose your household in a kind of lottery of all households in this neighborhood What we need to do now is pick one adult in your household to talk to To choose that person scientifically, I have to know the number of people age 16 and over who live here So, including yourself, how many people age 16 and over live, eat and sleep at this residence and are Haitian citizens?

Number of adults in household

(If there is just one person age 16 and over, interview that person If there are two or more) OK You say there are _____ adults Which one is the oldest? and who comes after that? (after each person is named, ask) and s/he's a woman/man? (continue until you have gone through the entire household)

Respondent Selection

Household Roster			
List of Persons in the House	Age (starting with oldest)	Female	Male
1		F	M
2		F	M
3		F	M
4		F	M
5		F	M
6		F	M
7		F	M
8		F	M
9		F	M
10		F	M

- 1 If there is just one person age 16 and over, interview that person. If there are two or more, go to the Respondent Choice Table
- 2 Go to the Row in Part A that matches the number of adults over age 16 in the household
- 3 Move across this row to the next Person Number not crossed off
- 4 Cross off this number
- 5 Go back to the Household Roster and circle the number of the person indicated in the Respondent Choice Table
- 6 Ask to speak to the "(age) (sex) " Example "The table says I must interview the 43 year old male, is he at home?"

(If potential respondent is not at home, say) **I'd like to talk with him/her today. When would be a good time to come back?**

Name Best time to come back (if applicable)
--

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Introduction to Selected Respondent Good day/evening My name is _____ I am working for ASOSYE, an organization which is studying Haitian people and culture We would like to know a little bit about your life in Haiti and your opinions about the way things work here The questions will only take about 45 minutes and the answers you give are completely confidential There are no right or wrong answers, we just want to know your thoughts May I begin?

Part I Warmup/Knowledge of Institutions

1 (P1) Some people seem to follow what's going on in local and national affairs of state most of the time, whether there's an election or not Others aren't that interested Would you say you follow what's going on locally in community affairs

- (1) almost never,
- (2) only some of the time,
- (3) most of the time, or,
- (4) almost always?

(77) No response (99) Don't know

2 (P2) Would you say you follow what's going on in national affairs

- (1) almost never,
- (2) only some of the time,
- (3) most of the time, or,
- (4) almost always?

(77) No response (99) Don't know

3 (V1) When we talk about the state (L'Etat) in Haiti, do you think of

- (1) the president,
- (2) the prime minister,
- (3) the national assembly/parliament, or,
- (4) all of the above?

(8) other _____ (explain)

(77) No response (99) Don't know

Based on what you know, do you agree or disagree with the following statements

4 (K1) It is said that it is the job of the prime minister of Haiti to enforce the laws of the nation Do you agree or disagree?

- (1) Agree
- (2) Disagree

(77) No response (99) Don't know

5 (K2) It is said that the prime minister of Haiti is appointed to office Do you agree or disagree?

- (1) Agree
- (2) Disagree

(77) No response (99) Don't know

6 (K3) Do you agree or disagree that the main job of the national assembly/parliament in Haiti is to make laws?

- (1) Agree
- (2) Disagree

(77) No response (99) Don't know

7 (K4) Do you agree or disagree that members of the national assembly/parliament are chosen through national elections?

- (1) Agree
- (2) Disagree

(77) No response (99) Don't know

8 (K5) According to the constitution, the justice system in Haiti is made up of the Supreme Court plus other courts of justice Are the judges of these courts

- (1) appointed, or,
- (2) elected?

(77) No response (99) Don't know

Part II Efficacy/Participation

9 (S1) In general, do you think that the country today is going in the right or wrong direction?

- (1) right
- (2) wrong

(77) No response (99) Don't know

10 (D1) **Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?**

All citizens should have the same chance for the state to hear them?

- (1) Agree
- (2) Disagree

(77) No response (99) Don't know

America's Development Foundation

11 (E1) Do you believe that people can have a voice in how the government operates by voting in elections?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

12 (E2) Do you believe that by organizing into groups people can have a voice in how government operates?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

13 (E3A) And what about the local level — can people have some voice in the way the mayor operates by voting in elections?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

14 (E3B) And the Communal Section Administrative Council (CASEC) — can people have a voice in their affairs by voting in elections?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

15 (E4) Can people express themselves to the mayor or CASEC by organizing in associations?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

People participate in many activities in their communities — at home, at school, at work. Let's talk about your activities during the past year. For each activity that I name, please say if you have participated never, once or twice, or more than twice. Over the past year, how often have you

	Never	Once or Twice	More Than Twice	NR	DK
16 (P3) talked with your family about local or national issues?	1	2	3	77	99
17 (P4) talked with your friends about local or national issues?	1	2	3	77	99
18 (P5) listened to the radio or watched television or read newspaper articles about local or national issues?	1	2	3	77	99
19 (P6) attended a public debate, political rally or meeting?	1	2	3	77	99
20 (P7) participated in a demonstration or protest?	1	2	3	77	99
21 (P8) Have you ever run for public office?					
(1) Yes					
(2) No					
	(77)	No response	(99)	Don't know	

58

In many communities, people join different kinds of organizations as a way to help others, to help themselves or just to socialize. Let's talk about the organizations you have participated in over the past year. For each of the following organizations, please say whether you have participated over the past year.

		Yes	No	NR
22 (P9)	Agricultural cooperative	1	2	77
23 (P10)	Church or other religious group	1	2	77
24 (P11)	Local community group or project	1	2	77
25 (P12)	NGO project	1	2	77
26 (P13)	Labor/trade union	1	2	77
27 (P14)	Neighborhood committee	1	2	77
28 (P15)	Peasant group	1	2	77
29 (P16)	Political party	1	2	77
30 (P17)	Private business group	1	2	77
31 (P18)	School committee	1	2	77
32 (P19)	Sports club or association	1	2	77
33 (P20)	Student/youth group	1	2	77
34 (P21)	Women's group	1	2	77

35 (P22) **What role, if any, do these groups have in public and political affairs? Do they**

	Yes	No	NR	DK
(1) public discussions or debates?	1	2	77	99
(2) endorse candidates for public office?	1	2	77	99
(3) conduct information and/or media campaigns?	1	2	77	99
(4) lead demonstrations or protests?	1	2	77	99
(7) have no role in public and political affairs				

Now I want you to think about the group you were most active in this past year.

36 (P23) I have two questions about that group.

First, how do you choose your leaders in that group? Are they

- (1) named
- (2) elected
- (3) appoint themselves
- (4) or something else

(77) No Response (99) Don't Know

37 (P24) Second, how are important decisions taken (in that group)?

- (1) all members have to agree
- (2) majority rules
- (3) the leaders vote among themselves, or
- (4) one or two leaders in the group decide, or
- (5) some other way

(77) No Response (99) Don't Know

These next questions are about elections and voting

38 (P25) How do you usually find out about events like elections?

- (1) Family,
- (2) Friends,
- (3) Newspaper,
- (4) Radio,
- (5) Television,
- (6) Work, or,
- (7) Word of mouth?

(77) No response (99) Don't know

Please say if you agree or disagree with the following statement

39 (E5) Public officials don't care what people like me think

- (1) Agree
- (2) Disagree

(77) No response (99) Don't know

40 (P26) Are you registered to vote?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

41 (P27) Have you ever voted?

- (1) Yes (**Go to question 42**)
- (2) No (**Go to question 43**)

42 (P28) Did you vote in the last presidential election, that is, the election of December 17 1995?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

43 (P29) Did you vote in the election before the presidential election, when people voted for the senate, deputy, mayor and CASEC?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

44 (P30) Have you ever worked for a political party or a candidate?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

45 (E6) In your opinion, is your vote very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not important at all as a means of directing the decisions of L'Etat?

- (1) Not important at all
- (2) Not very important
- (3) Somewhat important
- (4) Very important

(77) No response (99) Don't know

Part III Role of Citizens/Government

The Haitian constitution gives you certain rights I'm going to mention some rights that citizens of Haiti may or may not have For each, please say if you think you are or are not guaranteed this right in the constitution

		Yes	No	NR	DK
46 (K6)	Freedom of expression	1	2	77	99
47 (K7)	Right to bear arms	1	2	77	99
48 (K8)	Right to education	1	2	77	99
49 (K9)	Right to good health	1	2	77	99
50 (K10)	Freedom to meet with and talk with anyone	1	2	77	99
51 (K11)	Right to inform government what actions it should take	1	2	77	99
52 (K12)	Right to liberty	1	2	77	99
53 (K13)	Right to own property	1	2	77	99
54 (K14)	Freedom to practice any religion	1	2	77	99
55 (K15)	Right to police protection	1	2	77	99
56 (K16)	Right to work	1	2	77	99
57 (K17)	Right to good roads	1	2	77	99

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

58 (D2) It is the role of national leaders to tell us exactly what to do and how to do it

- (1) Agree
- (2) Disagree

(77) No response (99) Don't know

59 (S2) Do you think that national leaders are responsive to what the people want

- (1) almost never,
- (2) only some of the time,
- (3) most of the time, or,
- (4) almost always?

(77) No response (99) Don't know

In Haiti there are many national institutions — like the Church, the Courts and the Media Think about how much confidence you have that these different institutions are generally working in the interests of the people Now, I'm going to show you this card It has a scale of numbers from 1 to 7 1 means "none" or "no confidence at all " 7 means "a lot of confidence " You can choose any number between 1 and 7 that best shows how much confidence you have For example, if I ask you how much confidence you have that the media are generally working in the interests of the people and you answer "3," that means that you have at least some confidence in the media but not a lot Please use this card to answer these next few questions

		None							A lot	NR	DK
60 (S3)	How much confidence do you have that the Catholic Church is generally working in the interests of the people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99	
61 (S4)	How much confidence do you have that other religious groups are generally working in the interests of the people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99	
62 (S5)	How much confidence do you have that the Haitian National Police are generally working in the interests of the people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99	
63 (S6)	How much confidence do you have that the Judiciary (courts judges) is generally working in the interests of the people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99	
64 (S7)	How much confidence do you have that Labor/trade unions are generally working in the interests of the people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99	
65 (S8)	How much confidence do you have that the Media (newspaper radio television) is generally working in the interests of the people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99	
66 (S9)	How much confidence do you have that the National Assembly or Parliament is generally working in the interests of the people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99	
67 (S10)	How much confidence do you have that Political parties are generally working in the interests of the people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99	
68 (S11)	How much confidence do you have that the Permanent Electoral Council is generally working in the interests of the people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99	
69 (S12)	How much confidence do you have that the President is generally working in the interests of the people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99	
70 (S13)	How much confidence do you have that the Prime Minister is generally working in the interests of the people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99	

67

71 (S14) How much confidence do you have that the basic human rights of those who live in our country are well protected?

None						A lot	NR	DK
	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99

72 (S15) How much pride do you feel to live under the Haitian system of government?

None						A lot	NR	DK
	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99

In the Haitian constitution, there is a list of citizen's duties to the state and country I'm going to read you a list of duties For each, please say "yes" if it is your duty according to the constitution and "no" if it is not

		Yes	No	NR	DK
73 (K18)	Defend Haiti if there is a war	1	2	77	99
74 (K19)	Respect and protect the environment	1	2	77	99
75 (K20)	Educate and improve yourself	1	2	77	99
76 (K21)	Respect other people's rights and freedoms	1	2	77	99
77 (K22)	Pay taxes	1	2	77	99
78 (K23)	Respect the constitution	1	2	77	99
79 (K24)	Provide assistance to persons in danger	1	2	77	99
80 (K25)	Respect the law	1	2	77	99
81 (K26)	Vote	1	2	77	99
82 (K27)	Respect the property of others	1	2	77	99

We were just talking of the responsibility of citizens, now let's talk about the responsibilities of the government As I read this list, please tell me what you believe is the responsibility of the government, or what is not its responsibility

83 (V2)	Collect taxes/revenues	1	2	77	99
84 (V3)	Assure a strong economy	1	2	77	99
85 (V4)	Guarantee basic rights	1	2	77	99
86 (V5)	Maintain national order/security	1	2	77	99
87 (V6)	Provide education to all citizens	1	2	77	99
88 (V7)	Protect the health of all citizens	1	2	77	99
89 (V8)	Provide basic infrastructure and services like roads, schools, water	1	2	77	99

My next few questions are about your local community here

90 (V9) When we talk about the local government, do you think of

- (1) the mayor,
- (2) the CASEC,
- (3) the delegates/vice-delegates, or,
- (4) all of the above?

(8) other _____ (explain)

(77) No response (99) Don't know

Based on what you know about local government, do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

91 (K28) The members of the council communales and council section communales are appointed to office

- (1) Agree
- (2) Disagree

(77) No response (99) Don't know

92 (K29) Council communales are made up of three members, including the mayor

- (1) Agree
- (2) Disagree

(77) No response (99) Don't know

93 (K30) The main job of delegates and vice-delegates is to coordinate and control public services

- (1) Agree
- (2) Disagree

(77) No response (99) Don't know

94 (S16) Would you say that the public services in this communal section are

- (1) excellent,
- (2) good,
- (3) poor, or,
- (4) very bad?

(77) No response (99) Don't know

65

95 (S17) Do you think it is worthwhile or do you think that it is not worthwhile to pay taxes to the commune to enable it to provide better service in this communal section?

- (1) It is worthwhile to pay taxes
- (2) It is not worthwhile to pay taxes

(77) No response (99) Don't know

96 (S18) How easy is it to approach the mayor and other elected officials of your commune to present your views or to seek their assistance for a problem or concern you face?

- (1) Very difficult
- (2) Difficult
- (3) Easy
- (4) Very easy

(77) No response (99) Don't know

We've talked about different groups that you may have in your community and that you may participate in. I'm going to name these groups again. For each, please say whether, in your opinion, this group does not help at all, helps some, or helps a great deal to make this community a better place to live.

		Not at All	Some	A Great Deal	NR	DK
97 (S19)	Agricultural cooperatives	1	2	3	77	99
98 (S20)	Groups to protect nature	1	2	3	77	99
99 (S21)	Human rights groups	1	2	3	77	99
100 (S22)	Labor/trade unions	1	2	3	77	99
101 (S23)	Neighborhood committees	1	2	3	77	99
102 (S24)	Peasant groups	1	2	3	77	99
103 (S25)	Private business groups	1	2	3	77	99
104 (S26)	School or university groups	1	2	3	77	99
105 (S27)	Sports clubs or associations	1	2	3	77	99
106 (S28)	Student or youth groups	1	2	3	77	99
107 (S29)	Women's groups	1	2	3	77	99

108 (S30) Do you think that the elected officials of your commune are responsive to what the people want

- (1) almost never,
- (2) only some of the time,
- (3) most of the time, or,
- (4) almost always

(77) No response (99) Don't know

109 (S31) In your opinion, who has responded better to help resolve the problems of this community? Would it be L'Etat or the commune?

- (1) L'Etat
- (2) Commune
- (3) CASEC
- (7) No difference (they are all the same)
- (8) Another group _____ (specify)

(77) No response (99) Don't know

110 (S32) Who has responded better to help resolve the problems of this community? Would it be the council/CASEC or the delegate/vice delegate?

- (1) The council/CASEC
- (2) The delegate/vice delegate
- (7) No difference (they are all the same)

(77) No response (99) Don't know

Part IV Democratic Attitudes/Values

Now we're going to use another card. This card has a scale of numbers between 1 and 10. 1 means you strongly agree and 10 means you strongly disagree. On a scale of 1 to 10, how much would you agree or disagree with the government if it

		Strongly Disagree										Strongly Agree										NR	DK
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
111 (D3)	prohibited protests or peaceful demonstrations?																					77	99
112 (D4)	prohibited meetings in which people criticized the form of government that is established by the Constitution?																					77	99
113 (D5)	prohibited the use of the radio or television to criticize the form of government established by the Constitution?																					77	99

People sometimes participate in activities of different kinds in order to achieve an objective for their community or group On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you agree or disagree if people

		Strongly Disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Strongly Agree	NR	DK
114 (D6)	participate in demonstrations permitted by law?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		77	99	
115 (D7)	close of a street or highway?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		77	99	
116 (D8)	occupy empty houses or unoccupied land?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		77	99	
117 (D9)	occupy factories, offices or buildings?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		77	99	
118 (D10)	try to overthrow by force a government that has been elected by the people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		77	99	
119 (D11)	participate in associations or groups that try to resolve community problems?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		77	99	
120 (D12)	work for a political party or candidate during an election campaign?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		77	99	

There are people who always speak badly about, or against, whatever the government does, whether it is the current government, a past one, or one that may come in the future How much do you agree or disagree that these persons should be permitted to

		Strongly Disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Strongly Agree	NR	DK
121 (D13)	vote?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		77	99	
122 (D14)	participate in peaceful protests or demonstrations?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		77	99	
123 (D15)	run for public office?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		77	99	
124 (D16)	use the radio, television or the press to express their opinions?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		77	99	

How important is it that the following rights be guaranteed here in Haiti? Is it not important at all, not very important, somewhat important, or very important that

		Not	Not Very	Somewhat	Very	NR	DK
125 (D17)	one can choose from several parties and candidates when voting?	1	2	3	4	77	99
126 (D18)	there is freedom to openly criticize the government?	1	2	3	4	77	99
127 (D19)	stability and order are maintained?	1	2	3	4	77	99
128 (D20)	honest elections are held regularly?	1	2	3	4	77	99
129 (D21)	the judiciary punishes the guilty no matter who they are?	1	2	3	4	77	99
130 (D22)	the media are free to report the news without government censorship?	1	2	3	4	77	99
131 (D23)	everyone can freely practice their religion?	1	2	3	4	77	99
132 (D24)	the police are under civilian control?	1	2	3	4	77	99
133 (D25)	everyone has the freedom to organize?	1	2	3	4	77	99

I am going to read these statements again Please tell me if you think the statement describes our country or not Do you believe that in Haiti

		Yes	No	NR	DK
134 (D26)	one can choose from several candidates when voting?	1	2	77	99
135 (D27)	one can choose from several parties when voting?	1	2	77	99
136 (D28)	there is freedom to openly criticize the government?	1	2	77	99

		Yes	No	NR	DK
137 (D29)	stability and order are maintained?	1	2	77	99
138 (D30)	honest elections are held regularly?	1	2	77	99
139 (D31)	the judiciary punishes the guilty no matter who they are?	1	2	77	99
140 (D32)	the media are free to report the news without government censorship?	1	2	77	99
141 (D33)	everyone can freely practice their religion?	1	2	77	99
142 (D34)	the police are under civilian control?	1	2	77	99
143 (D35)	everyone has the freedom to organize?	1	2	77	99

Part V Pragmatism/Ritualism

Ritualism/Rationalism

144 (V10) What do you think is the principal function of the State?

- (1) to defend national traditions (values), or
- (2) to respond to the decisions of the citizenry?

(77) No response (99) Don't know

145 (V11) What is the principal reason why people obey the law?

- (1) because it is an obligation, or
- (2) because it allows people to live together better?

(77) No response (99) Don't know

146 (V12) What is the principal reason why people vote?

- (1) because it is an obligation of being a citizen, or
- (2) because you can influence public policy?

(77) No response (99) Don't know

Ascription/Achievement

147 (V13) Is it best to judge a person

- (1) by his family position, or
- (2) by his personal accomplishments?

(77) No response (99) Don't know

148 (V14) Is it best to judge a person

- (1) by the morality he displays in dealing with others, or
- (2) by his personal religious faith?

(77) No response (99) Don't know

149 (V15) Is it best to judge a person

- (1) by his position in society, or
- (2) by his talents and capabilities?

(77) No response (99) Don't know

Organicist/Autonomous

150 (V16) Should the principal function of the State be concern for the well being of the family?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

151 (V17) Is the principal function of education to reinforce the unity of the family?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

152 (V18) Is the principal function of the school to prepare individuals to earn a living?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

153 (V19) Should educating a student be free?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

154 (V20) Should the education of a student be free without the influence of a church?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

155 (V21) Is the most important function of education to reinforce the family unit?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

Part VI Judicial System

Now we will turn to talking about the judicial system

156 (Z1) Would you say that to report a crime to the police, or to another representative of the state, is a thing that is

- (1) very difficult
- (2) difficult, or
- (3) easy

(77) No response (99) Don't know

157 (Z2) Would you say that the judicial system treats everyone equally?

- (1) almost never
- (2) once in a while
- (3) often enough, or
- (4) almost always

(77) No response (99) Don't know

158 (Z3) In the last 12 months, have you or a member of your family been the victims of a robbery?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

159 (Z4) In the last 12 months, have you or a member of your family been the victims of a rape or physical assault?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

160 (Z5) In the last 12 months, have you or a member of your family been the victims of any other crimes?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response (99) Don't know

161 (Z6) If a crime was committed in your neighborhood, do you think you would get justice in the hands of

- (1) the police and courts
- (2) community leaders
- (3) family or friends of the victim, or
- (4) the victim himself

162 (Z7) When you have encountered the police, or a justice of the peace, or other member of tribunal, did they treat you

- (1) very well
- (2) well
- (3) badly,
- (4) very badly

(77) No response (99) Don't know

Part VII Participation

163 (PA1) Why don't you participate in more activities which could change your community? Is it because

- (1) you have no time,
- (2) there is nothing that interests me,
- (3) my family doesn't want me to, or
- (4) I am afraid, it could give me or my family problems

(77) No response

164 (PA2) Why don't you participate in more political activities? Would you say it was because

- (1) you don't have time,
- (2) it doesn't interest me,
- (3) my family doesn't want me to, or
- (4) I am afraid, it could give me or my family problems

(77) No response

Part VIII Demographics

Finally, I'd like to ask you a few questions about yourself

165 (age) How old are you? _____

(77) No response (99) Don't know

166 (SE1) Do you know how to read or write French?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response

167 (SE2) Do you know how to read or write Creole?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response

168 (SE3) What is the highest level of schooling you have completed? _____

(77) No response

169 (SE4) Do you work in agriculture?

- (1) Yes (Go to q 170)
- (2) No (Go to q 171)

(77) No response

170 (SE5) Do you receive wages for the work you do?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

(77) No response

171 (SE6) What is your primary occupation? _____

(77) No response

172 (SE7) What is your religion?

- (1) Catholic,
- (2) Protestant,
- (3) Voodoo, or,
- (4) Some other religion?
- (7) None

(77) No response

173 (SE8) Please tell me if your house has

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>NR</u>
(1) Radio	1	2	77
(2) Television	1	2	77
(3) Refrigerator	1	2	77
(4) Washing machine	1	2	77
(5) Automobile or truck	1	2	77
(6) Telephone	1	2	77

174 (SE9) Which do you consider to be your primary language?

- (1) Haitian Creole
- (2) French
- (3) Both

(77) No response

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME

<u>Interviewers</u> Please answer the following questions	
Language used in interview?	(1) Haitian Creole (2) French (3) Both
Respondent cooperation?	(1) Very cooperative (2) Cooperative (3) Not very cooperative
Household isolation?	(1) Urban (2) Rural, accessible by car (3) Rural, not accessible by car

I certify that I personally conducted the interview of _____
name of person interviewed

held on _____ at _____
date location

Signature

APPENDIX 2• QUESTIONNAIRE (CREOLE)

ANKÈT SOSYETE CIVIL AYISYEN

__Pa gen okenn sitwayen Ayisyen nan kay la

__Pa gen pyès moun nan kay la

__Pa dakò

Enfòmasyon pou anketè yo Tanpri sonje pour ranpli enfòmasyon anba yo pou chak entèviou

(Jou/mwa/ane) Dat __/__/__

Anplasman (lokalite ak Seksyon kominal) _____

Dl sI patisipan an se fi ou gason _____ Laj Patisipan an _____

Lè ou kòmanse a _____ Lè ou fini _____

Konesans ak moun kay yo Bonjour/bonswa Mwen rele _____ Map travay pou yon òganizasyon ki rele ASOSYE k ap fè yon gade pou rive konprann pèp ayisyen ak kilti li Nou ta renmen gen dizon w sou jan w ap viv nan peyi d Ayiti epitou sou jan bagay yo ap mache Nou te sèvi ak yon sistèm lotri nan katye a pou chwazi kay ou pam anpil lòt kay Sa nou bezwen fè kounye a se chwazi yon moun ran fanmi a, pou sa fòk mwen konnen kantite moun ki viv, ki manje e ki dòmi isit la e ki gen 16 lane oswa pIplis, fòk mwen konnen tou kilès ki sitwayen ayisyen

Kantite granmoun nan kay la _____

Tablo Menaj/Kay yo

Lis Non Moun nan Kay la	Lòd laj you	Eske se fi/gason
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		

- Si gen yon grenn moun ki gen 16 lane ou plis, intevyouve moun sa a. Si gen 2 ou plis, gade lis tablo moun ki chwazi pou pale a
- Ale nan kolòn nan pati ki make A ki koresponn ak kantite granmoun nan kay la ki gen 16 lane ou plis
- Sòti nan ranje sa a pou rive sou pwochen moun nan pwochen nimerò ki pa make epi make 1
- Tounen nan tablo menaj/kay yo epi fè yon wonn toutotou nimerò ki endike sou tab chwa moun ki dwe pale a
- Mande pale ak (la) (seks) Egzanp Tablo a di fòk mwen pale ak msiye ki gen 43 lane, eske li la? Non Moun Nan _____

(Si moun ou sipoze kesyonnen a pa nan kay la, di) Mwen ta renmen pale ak li jodi a. Kilè mwen ta ka retounen? _____

Konesans ak moun ou chwazi pou pale Bonjou/bonswa Map travay pou yon òganizasyon ki rele ASOSYE k ap fe yon gade pou rive konprann pèp ayisyen ak kilti li Nou ta renmen ou pale n yon ti kras de ou epitou nou ta renmen gen dizon w w sou kijan bagay yo ap pase nan peyi d Ayiti Kesyon n ap mande yo pap pran pipis pase 45 minit e nou vle w konnen ke non w pap repete e pa pral parèt nan rapò ki gen pou fèt yo Epi tou pa gen repons ki bon ak repons ki pa bon Se sa w panse a ki enterese nou Eske nou ka kòmanse?

Pat I Detant/Konesans ensititasyon yo

1 (P1) Kit gen eleksyon, kit pa gen eleksyon, sanble gen plizye moun ki toujou swiv sa k ap fèt bò lakay yo oswa nan peyi a, nan zafè leta Gen lòt moun ki pa tèlman enterese Eske ou menm ou se yon moun ki swiv sa k ap pase onivo lokal, nan zafè kominite w

(1) Preske janmen,

(2) Yon lè konsa,

(3) Ase souvan, oubyen

(4) Preske tout tan?

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

2 (P2) Eske ou ka di ou swiv sa k ap pase nan zafè peyi a

(1) Preske janmen,

(2) Yon le konsa,

(3) Ase souvan, oubyen

(4) Preske tout tan?

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

3 (V1) Lè nou pale de leta nan peyi d Ayiti, sa sa vle di pou ou

(1) Prezidan an,

(2) Premye minis la,

(3) Chanm depite ak chanm senatè/palman an oswa,

(4) Tout ansanm?

(8) Lòt _____ (Eksplike)

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

Dapre sa'w konnen, eske w dakò oubyen ou pa dakò ak pawòl sila yo

4 (K1) Yo di, se djòb premye minis d Ayiti a pou ranfòse lalwa peyi an

- (1) Eske ou dakò, oubyen
- (2) Ou pa dako
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

5 (K2) Yo di se prezidan an ki nonmen premye minis peyi a pou djòb li

- (1) Eske ou dakò, oubyen
- (2) Ou pa dakò
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

6 (K3) Eske ou dakò, oubyen ou pa dakò ke travay pi enpòtan chanm depite ak senatè an Ayiti a se fè lwa yo

- (1) Dakò
- (2) Pa dakò
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

7 (K4) Eske ou dako, oubyen ou pa dakò ke yo chwazi depite ak senatè yo nan eleksyon nasyonal nan tout peyi a

- (1) Dakò
- (2) Pa dakò
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

8 (K5) Dapre konstitisyon an, ki se manman lwa peyi a, system lajistis an Ayiti sòti koukasyon ak plizye lòt tribinal pou rive nan jij depè Eske jij ki plede nan tribinal sila yo

- (1) Yo mete yo, oswa
- (2) Yo vote yo
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

Pat II Efikasite/patisipasyon

9 (S1) An jeneral eske ou kwe jounen jodi a peyi a ap swiv yon bon chimen oswa yon move chimen?

- (1) Bon
- (2) Move
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

10 (D1) Eske ou dakò oubyen ou pa dakò ak pawòl mwen pral diw la yo

Tout sitwayen ta dwe gen menm chans pou leta tande yo

(1) Dakò

(2) Pa dakò

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

11 (E1) Eske ou kwè ou ka gen dizon w nan zafè leta lè ou vote nan eleksyon?

(1) W1

(2) Non

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

12 (E2) Eske ou kwè ou ka gen dizon w nan zafè leta lè nou òganize n?

(1) W1

(2) Non

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

13 (E3A) E onivo lokal — eske ou ka gen dizon w nan zafè majistra kominal lè ou vote nan eleksyon?

(1) W1

(2) Non

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

14 (E3B) E KASÈK yo — eske ou ka gen dizon w nan zafè majistra kominal lè ou vote nan eleksyon?

(1) W1

(2) Non

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

15 (E4) Eske ou ka gen dizon w nan zafè majistra ou KASÈK lè ou òganize an asosyasyon?

(1) W1

(2) Non

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

Moun patisipe nan anpil aktivite nan kominite yo — lakay yo, nan lekòl, nan travay yo Ann fè yon ti pale sou aktivite ou te antreprann lane ki sot pase a Pou chak aktivite mwen nonmen, tanpri di m si ou te patisipe janmen, 1 ou 2 fwa, plis pase 2 fwa Nan ane ki sot pase a, konbyen fwa ou te

	Janmen 1 ou 2 fwa	Plis pase 2 fwa	PR	PK
16 (P3) pale ak fanmi w sou sak pase onivo lokal ou nasyonal?	1	2	3	77 99
17 (P4) konbyen fwa out te pale ak fanmi w sou sak pase nan peyi a e bo lakay ou?	1	2	3	77 99
18 (P5) konbyen fwa out te koute nan radyo gade nan televizyon/li atik nan jounal sou sou sak pase onivo lokal ou nasyonal?	1	2	3	77 99
19 (P6) konbyen fwa ou te asiste yon deba piblik, oswa yon miting?	1	2	3	77 99
20 (P7) konbyen fwa out te patisipe nan yon manifestasyon?	1	2	3	77 99
21 (P8) Eske ou te janm prezante tet ou kom kandida? (1) Wi (2) Non	(77) Pa reponn	(99) Pa konnen		

Mwen pral nonmen kèk tip òganizasyon swa bò lakay ou oubyen nan tout peyi a kote moun ka patisipe ladan yo Pou chak sa nap diw la yo mwen ta renmen ou di m nan ane ki sòt pase a, si wi ou non ou te patisipe

	W1	Non	PR	
22 (P9) Koperativ agrikòl	1	2	77	
23 (P10) Legliz ou lòt gwoup relijye	1	2	77	
24 (P11) Pwojè kominotè	1	2	77	
25 (P12) Pwojè òganis y yorele ONG	1	2	77	
26 (P13) Sendika	1	2	77	
27 (P14) Komite katye	1	2	77	
28 (P15) Gwoupman peyizàn	1	2	77	
29 (P16) Pati politik	1	2	77	
30 (P17) Gwoup sektè prive	1	2	77	
31 (P18) Komite lekòl	1	2	77	
32 (P19) Klib espò ou asosyasyon	1	2	77	
33 (P20) Gwoupman jèn/etidyan	1	2	77	
34 (P21) Gwoupman fanm	1	2	77	
35 (P22) Mwen ta renmen konnen wòl gwoup sa yo jwe nan zafè piblik ak politik Eske yo				
	W1	Non	PR	PK
(1) Kon'n fè chita tande ou bwase lidè?	1	2	77	99
(2) Bay sipò pou kandida non eleksyon?	1	2	77	99
(3) Òganize kanpay enfòmasyon ak fòmasyon? oubyen	1	2	77	99
(4) Fè manifestasyon?	1	2	77	99
(7) Pa jwe okenn wòl nan zafè piblik ak politik?	1	2	77	99
36 Fè yon ti refleksyon sou gwoup kote ou te pi aktif nan ane ki sòt pase a Mwen gen 2 kesyon sou gwoup sila a (Mete yon ti wonn toutotou tout nimewo ki reponn a kesyon sila a) Premyèman, kijan noun chwazi lidè yo? Eske yo				
(1) nonmen yo?				
(2) eske yo vote yo?				
(3) chwazi pwòp tet you?				
(4) lòt?				
(77) Pa reponn				
(99) Pa konnen				

37 Dezyèmman, kijan desizyon enpòtan yo pran? Eske (Mete yon ti wonn toutotou tout nimewo ki reponn a kesyon sila a)

- (1) tout manm yo pran desizyon lè yo tout vote,
- (2) tout manm yo pran desizyon lè majorite yo vote,
- (3) lidè yo nan gwoup la pran desizyon lè yo vote, oubyen
- (4) youn ou de lidè nan gwoup la pran desizyon
- (5) lòt
- (77) Pa reponn
- (99) Pa konnen

Pwochen kesyon yo gen arevwa ak eleksyon ak vote

38 (P23) Nòmman, kijan ou pran nouvèl tankou eleksyon, lè yap fet?

- (1) Nan bouch fanmi,
- (2) Nan bouch zanmi,
- (3) Jounal,
- (4) Radyo,
- (5) Televizyon,
- (6) Nan travay, ou
- (7) Tele dyòl?

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

Mwen ta renmen ou di m si ou dakò oubyen ou pa dakò ak pawòl nou pral di la yo

39 (E5) Mwen pa kwe moun yo te vote yo, enterese nan sa w panse

- (1) Dakò
- (2) Pa dako

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

40 (P24) Eske ou pran kat elektoral ou?

- (1) Wi
- (2) Non

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

41 (P25) Eske ou te janm vote?

- (1) Wi
- (2) Non

(si repons la te wi, ale nan kesyon 42) (si repons la te non, ale nan kesyon 44)

42 (P26) Eske ou te vote nan denye eleksyon prezidansyèl la, eleksyon 17 Desanm 1995?

- (1) Wi
- (2) Non

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

43 (P27) Eske ou te vote nan eleksyon avan eleksyon prezidan an, lè moun t ap vote pou senatè, pou depite, pou majistra ak pou KASÈK?

- (1) Wi
- (2) Non

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

44 (P28) Eske ou janm travay pou yon pati politik oswa pou yon kandida?

- (1) Wi
- (2) Non

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

45 (E6) Eske ou kwè vòt ou trè enpòtan, yon ti kras enpòtan, pa twò enpòtan, oubyen pa gen okenn enpòtans, kom mwayen pou bay dizon w sou fason leta ap mache?

- (1) Pa gen okenn enpòtans
- (2) Pa twò enpòtan
- (3) Ti kras enpòtan
- (4) Trè enpotan

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

Patı III Wòl sitwayen yo/Gouvènman an

Konstitisyon peyi d Ayiti ban nou sèten dwa Mwen pral site kèk dwa sitwayen peyi d Ayiti ka genyen oswa ka pa genyen Pou chak, mwen ta renmen w di m si ou kwè wı ou non ke dwa sa a garanti dapre konstitisyon an?

		Wı	Non	PR	PK
46 (K6)	Libète pou pale	1	2	77	99
47 (K7)	Dwa pou pòte zam	1	2	77	99
48 (K8)	Dwa a lelevasyon	1	2	77	99
49 (K9)	Dwa a lasante	1	2	77	99
50 (K10)	Libète pou chita pale ak kontre nenpòt ki moun	1	2	77	99
51 (K11)	Dwa pou di gouvènman an ki aksyon li ta dwe pran	1	2	77	99
52 (K12)	Dwa pou lib e libè	1	2	77	99
53 (K13)	Dwa pou gen byen	1	2	77	99
54 (K14)	Libète pou pratike relijyon ou vle	1	2	77	99
55 (K15)	Dwa pou gen pwoteksyon lapolis	1	2	77	99
56 (K16)	Dwa pou travay	1	2	77	99
57 (K17)	Dwa pou gen bon jan wout	1	2	77	99

Eske ou dakò oubyen eske ou pa dakò ak sa mwen pral di ?

58 (D2) Se wòl dirijan nou yo pou yo di nou tout sa nou dwe fè e kijan pou nou fè li

(1) Dakò

(2) Pa dakò

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

59 (S2) Eske ou kwè dirijan nou yo reponn a sa pep ayisyen an vle?

(1) Preske janmen,

(2) Yon lè konsa, the time,

(3) Ase souvan, oubyen

(4) Preske tout tan?

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

An Ayiti gen anpil enstitisyon nasyonal tankou legliz, tribinal ak laprès epi jounal. Reflechis ou fè diferan enstitisyon sa yon konfyans, ke y ap travay an jeneral pou byennèt pèp ayisyen an. Kounye a mwen pral montre w kat sila a ki gen yon nechèl ki sòtl nan chif (1) pou rive nan chif (7) (1) vle di "m pa fè konfyans ditou" e (7) vle di "m fè yo konfyans anpil". Ou ka chwazi nenpòt ki chif sòti (1) rive nan (7). Pa egzanp si w mande eske ou fè jounalis yo konfyans deske yap travay pou byennèt pèp ayisyen an epi repons la te "3", sa vle di ou gen yon resanblans konfyans ou fè jounalis yo, men se pa anpil. Tanpri itilize kat sila a pou reponn a pwochen kesyon yo.

		Ditou		Anpil		PR	PK			
60 (S3)	An jeneral ki konfyans ou fè legliz katolik deske lap travay pou byennèt pèp ayisyen an?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99
61 (S4)	Ki konfyans ou mete nan lot gwoup relijye deske yap travay pou byennèt pèp ayisyen an?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99
62 (S5)	Ki konfyans ou fè Polis Nasyonal d Ayiti deske yap travay pou byennèt pèp ayisyen an?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99
63 (S6)	Ki konfyans ou fè la jistis (tribinal JJJ yo) deske yap travay pou byennèt pèp ayisyen an?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99
64 (S7)	Ki konfyans ou fè Sendika yo deske yap travay pou byennèt pèp ayisyen an?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99
65 (S8)	Ki konfyans ou fè jounalis yo deske yap travay pou byennèt pèp ayisyen an?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99
66 (S9)	Ki konfyans ou fè senate ak depite deske yap travay pou byennèt pèp ayisyen an?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99
67 (S10)	Ki konfyans ou fè pati politik yo deske yap travay pou byennèt pèp ayisyen an?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99
68 (S11)	Ki konfyans ou fè Konsey elektoral deske lap travay pou byennèt pèp ayisyen an?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99
69 (S12)	Ki konfyans ou fè Prezidan an deske lap travay pou byennèt pèp ayisyen an?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99
70 (S13)	Ki konfyans ou fè Premye Minis la deske lap travay pou byennèt pèp ayisyen an?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99

71 (S14) Nan ki mezi ou kwe dwa moun byen pwoteje an Ayiti?

Ditou							Anpil	PR	PK
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99	

72 (S15) Nan ki mezi ou fyè fason leta ayisyen ap mennen bak li jounen jodi a?

Ditou							Anpil	PR	PK
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	77	99	

Nan konstitisyon peyi d Ayiti gen yon seri devwa yon sitwayen dwe genyen anvè leta e anvè peyi a Mwen pral li yon lis de dwa sa yo Pou chak, mwen ta renmen ou di m si wi ou kwè se devwa w dapre konstitisyon an oubyen repons la se non si ou pa kwè se devwa w

		W1	Non	PR	PK
73 (K18)	Goumen pou defann ayiti si gen lagè	1	2	77	99
74 (K19)	Respekte e pwoteje lanati	1	2	77	99
75 (K20)	Chache gen plis lespri epi chache vin pi fò chak jou	1	2	77	99
76 (K21)	Respekte dwa ak libète lòt moun	1	2	77	99
77 (K22)	Peye taks oswa enpo	1	2	77	99
78 (K23)	Respekte konstitisyon an	1	2	77	99
79 (K24)	Pòte sekou bay moun ki an danje	1	2	77	99
80 (K25)	Respekte lalwa	1	2	77	99
81 (K26)	Vote	1	2	77	99
82 (K27)	Respekte byen lòt moun	1	2	77	99

Nou sòt pale responsabilite sitwayen a, kounye a an nou pale responsabilite gouvènman an Pandan map li lis la, tanpri di m kilè ou kwè se responsabilitie gouvènman oubyen kilè se pa responsabilite l

83 (V3)	Ranmase taks/revni	1	2	77	99
84 (V4)	Asire gen yon ekonomi ki djanm	1	2	77	99
85 (V5)	Garanti dwa de baz yo	1	2	77	99
86 (V6)	Kenbe lòd/sekirite nasyonal	1	2	77	99
87 (V7)	Metè edikasyon pou tout sitwayen	1	2	77	99
88 (V8)	Pwoteje lasante tout sitwayen ayisyen	1	2	77	99
89 (V9)	Metè enfraestrikti ak sevis de baz tankou (Wout, lekòl, dlo)	1	2	77	99

Pwochen kesyon yo gen pou wè ak kominite w la

90 (V2) Lè nou di gouvenman lokal kisa ki vin nan tèt ou?

- (1) Magistra yo,
 - (2) KASÈK yo,
 - (3) Delege yo ak vis delege yo, oubyen
 - (4) Tout sa mwen sòt di yo?
 - (8) Lòt _____ (Eksplike)
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

Dapre konesans ou, eske ou dakò oswa ou pa dakò sou sa mwen pral di?

91 (K28) Yo nonmen manm katèl majistra yo ak manm katèl kazèk seksyon kominal yo pou djòb yo

- (1) Dakò
 - (2) Pa dakò
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

92 (K29) Katèl Majistra yo konpoze ak twa manm Majistra a se youn nan twa manm yo

- (1) Dakò
 - (2) Pa dakò
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

93 (K30) Travay pi enpòtan delege ak vis delege yo se kòdone epri kontwole sèvis piblik

- (1) Dakò
 - (2) Pa dakò
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

94 (S16) Eske ou ta di sèvis piblik yo nan seksyon kominal sa a

- (1) Yo bon anpil,
 - (2) Yo ase bon,
 - (3) Pa fin twò bon, oubyen
 - (4) Pa bon menm?
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

95 (S17) Eske ou kwè sa vo lapèn peye taks ak enpo bay lakomin pou li rive bay pi bon sèvis nan seksyon kominal la oubyen ou pa kwè sa vo lapèn peye?

- (1) Sa vo lapèn peye taks/enpo
 - (2) Sa pa vo lapèn peye taks/enpo
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

96 (S18) Gen de lè yon moun bezwen rankontre majistra a oubyen lòt pèsonaj eli nan komin nan oswa nan seksyon an pou bay lide l oubyen pou mande led pou kek pwoblèm oubyen pou rezoud kèk dout li ta ka genyen. Di m si nan eksperyans pa w

- (1) Sa trè difisil
- (2) Sa difisil
- (3) Sa ase fasil, oubyen
- (4) Sa trè fasil

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

Nou te deja pale de diferan gwoup ki ka genyen nan kominite a e kote ou ka patisipe ladan yo. Mwen pral nonmen gwoup sa yo ankò e mwen ta renmen ou di m, dapre w, pou chak mwen nonmen, si ou kwè yo ede rann kominite a yon pi bon kote pou viv, anpil, yon ti kras ou pa ditou

	Ditou	Ti kras	Anpil	PR	PK
97 (S19) Koperativ agrikol	1	2	3	77	99
98 (S20) Gwoupman pwoteksyon lanati	1	2	3	77	99
99 (S21) Oganizasyon dwa moun	1	2	3	77	99
100 (S22) Sendika	1	2	3	77	99
101 (S23) Komite katye	1	2	3	77	99
102 (S24) Gwoupman peyizan	1	2	3	77	99
103 (S25) Gwoup sekte prive	1	2	3	77	99
104 (S26) Komite lekòl ou mivesite	1	2	3	77	99
105 (S27) Klüb espò ou asosyasyon	1	2	3	77	99
106 (S28) Gwoup etidyan ou jen	1	2	3	77	99
107 (S29) Gwoupman fanm	1	2	3	77	99

108 (S30) Eske ou kwè pèsonaj ki eli m nan komin la ak seksyon kominal la reponn a sa pèp ayisyen a vle?

- (1) Preske janmen?
- (2) Yon lè konsa,
- (3) Ase souvan, oubyen
- (4) Preske tout tan

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

109 (S31) Dapre w, kiltès ki bay plis koutmen pou rezoud pwoblèm kominite sila a? Eske se leta, lakomin, KASEK yo oswa nenpòt lò gwoup lokal ou nasyonal ki pa gen anyen arevwa ak leta?

- (1) Leta
- (2) Lakomin
- (3) KASEK
- (8) Lòt gwoup _____ (Bay non gwoup la)
- (7) Tout se menm
 - (77) Pa reponn
 - (99) Pa konnen

110 (S32) Kiles ki ede nou rezoud pwoblèm kominite a Eske se KASEK (Konsèy Asanble Seksyon Kominal) oubyen delege/viz delege?

- (1) Konsèy Asanble Seksyon Kominal (KASEK)
- (2) Delege/viz delege
- (7) Tout se menm
 - (77) Pa reponn
 - (99) Pa konnen

Pat IV Atitud/Valè demokratik

Kounye a nou pral sèvi ak yon lòt kat Nechèl kat sa a gen chif sòti nan (1) rive nan (10) (1) vle di ou pa dakò ditou et (10) vle di ou dakò anpil Sou yon nechèl sòti 1 rive 10, jouk nan ki chif ou ta rive dakò oubyen pa dakò ak gouvènman an si li ta

	Ditou										Anpil										PR	PK
111 (D3) Anpeche manifestasyon ki fet nan lape?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99										
112 (D4) Anpeche reyinyon kote moun kritike fom gouvènman tablì pa konstitisyon an?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99										
113 (D5) Anpeche itilizasyon radyo ou televizyon pou kritike fom gouvènman tablì pa konstitisyon an?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99										

Gen de fwa moun patisipe nan diferan kalite aktivite pou yo rive atenn yon objektif pou kominite yo oubyen gwoup yo Sou yon nechèl sòti 1 rive 10, jouk nan ki chif ou ta rive dakò oubyen pa dakò si moun ta

	Ditou					Anpil					PR	PK
114 (D6) Patisipe nan manifestasyon lalwa pemet?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99
115 (D7) Femen yon ları ou wout nasyonal?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99
116 (D8) Rete nan kay ki vid ou te ki pa okipe?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99
117 (D9) Rete nan faktory, biwo ou bilding ki pa okipe?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99
118 (D10) Eseye fe kou deta sou gouvènman pep la te eli?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99
119 (D11) Patisipe nan asosyasyon ou gwoup kap eseye rezoud pwoblem kominite a?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99
120 (D12) Travay pou yon pati politik ou yon kandida pandan yon kanpay elektoral?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99

Gen de moun ki toujou pale gouvènman an mal, ou ki kont tou sa gouvènman an fè, kit se gouvènman anplas la, oubyen sak pa la ankò, oubyen youn ki ka la pi ta Jouk ki kote ou ka rive dakò ou pa dakò ak sa yo dwe pèmèt mount sa yo fè

	Ditou					Anpil					PR	PK
121 (D13) Vote?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99
122 (D14) Patisipe nan manifestasyon pasifik?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99
123 (D15) Kandida pou jere zafe leta?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99
124 (D16) Itilize radyo, televizyon ou jounal pou eksprime opinyon yo?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	77	99

Ki enpòtan genyen pou ke diferan dwa yo garanti nan peyi d Ayiti? Eske sa trè enpòtan, ti kal enpòtan, ase enpòtan, pa enpòtan ditou ke

	Ditou	Ase	Ti kal	Tre	PR	PK
125 (D17) Yon moun ka chwazi kandida nan diferan pati le li pral vote?	1	2	3	4	77	99
126 (D18) Gen libete pou kritike leta san gade deye?	1	2	3	4	77	99
127 (D19) Stabilite ak lod piblik?	1	2	3	4	77	99
128 (D20) Oganize eleksyon onet regilyeman?	1	2	3	4	77	99
129 (D21) Lajistis pini sa ki koupab kelkelanswa moun nan?	1	2	3	4	77	99
130 (D22) Jounalis ki lib pou bay nouvel san sanksyon?	1	2	3	4	77	99
131 (D23) Chak moun gen dwa pratike relijyon pal lib libe?	1	2	3	4	77	99
132 (D24) Lapolis sou kontwol sivil?	1	2	3	4	77	99
133 (D25) Tout moun gen dwa oganize (fome sendika)?	1	2	3	4	77	99

Mwen pral li pawòl sa yo ankò Mwen ta renmen ou di m si wi ou non pawòl sa yo dekrè peyi nou an Eske ou kwè nan payi d Ayiti

	Wi	Non	PR	PK
134 (D26) Le n ap vote nou ka chwazi youn nan plizye kandida?	1	2	77	99
135 (D27) Le n ap vote nou ka chazi plizye pati?	1	2	77	99
136 (D28) Gen libete pou kritike gouvènman an san gade deye?	1	2	77	99
137 (D29) Stabilite ak lod anplas?	1	2	77	99
138 (D30) Fe eleksyon onet regilyeman?	1	2	77	99
139 (D31) Lajistis pini koupap kelkelanswa moun nan?	1	2	77	99
140 (D32) Jounalis la lib pou bay nouvel san sanksyon gouvènman an?	1	2	77	9

	W1	Non	PR	PK
141 (D33) Chak moun gen dwa pratike relijyon l lib libe?	1	2	77	99
142 (D34) Lapolis sou kontwol sivil?	1	2	77	99
143 (D35) Tout moun gen dwa oganize (fome sendika)?	1	2	77	99

Pati V Pragmatis/Rityalis

144 (V3) Kisa ou kwe wòl leta k1 p1 enpòtan?
 (1) defann tradisyon nasyonal (vale yo), ou
 (2) reyaji a desizyon sitwayen yo?
 (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

145 (V4) K1 rezon p1 enpòtan k1 fè moun obeyi lalwa?
 (1) paske se yon obligasyon, ou
 (2) paske li pèmèt moun viv p1 byen youn ak lòt?
 (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

146 (V5) K1 rezon p1 enpòtan k1 fè moun vote?
 (1) paske se obligasyon yon sitwayen, ou
 (2) paske ou kapab gen dizon w na zafè leta?
 (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

Atribisyon/Reyalizasyon

147 (V6) Eske li 1 p1 bon pou jije yon moun?
 (1) atravè pozisyon fanmi l, ou
 (2) atravè sa li reyalize pèsònèlman (li menm menm)?
 (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

148 (V7) Eske li 1 p1 bon pou jije yon moun?
 (1) fason li montre moralite l lè li annafè ak lòt moun, oswa
 (2) atravè kwayans relijyèz pèsèl li?
 (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

- 149 (V8) Eske li l i p i bon pou jije yon moun?
(1) dapre pozisyon l nan sosyete a, oubyen
(2) dapre talan li ak kapasite l?
(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

Titilè/Otonòm

- 150 (V9) Eske p i enpòtan fonksyon leta ta dwe okipe se byennèt fanmi w?
(1) Wi
(2) Non
(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen
- 151 (V10) Eske fonksyon p i enpòtan edikasyon se ranfòse imite lafanmi?
(1) Wi
(2) Non
(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen
- 152 (V11) Eske wòl p i enpòtan lekòl se prepare chak moun pou yo ka pran swen tèt yo?
(1) Wi
(2) Non
(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen
- 153 (V18) Eske edikasyon yon etidyan ta dwe lib?
(1) Wi
(2) Non
(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen
- 154 (V19) Eske edikasyon yon etidyan ta dwe lib san infliyans legliz?
(1) Wi
(2) Non
(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen
- 155 (V20) Eske fonksyon prensipal edikasyon se ranfòse imite lafanmi?
(1) Wi
(2) Non
(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

Patı VI Systèm Jidisyè

Kounye a nou pral chanje pou nou pale yon ti kras sou zafè lajistis a

- 156 (Z1) Eske ou ta di pou rive fè yon rapò yon krim bay lapolis oubyen yon lòt reprezantan leta se yon bagay ki
- (1) Trè difisil,
 - (2) Difisil, oubyen
 - (3) Fasil
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen
- 157 (Z2) Eske ou ta ki lajistis trete tout moun egal ego?
- (1) Preske janmen?
 - (2) Yon le konsa,
 - (3) Ase souvan, oubyen
 - (4) Preeske tout tan
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen
- 158 (Z3) Nan denye 12 mwa ki sòt pase yo, eske ou menm oswa youn nan nanm fanmi w te viktim zenglendo?
- (1) Wi
 - (2) Non
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen
- 159 (Z4) Eske nan denye 12 mwa ki sòt pase you, ou menm oswa youn nan manm fanmi w te viktim yon kadejak oubyen yon atak fizik?
- (1) Wi
 - (2) Non
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen
- 160 (Z5) Eske nan deny 12 mwa ki sòt pase yo, ou menm oswa youn nan manm fanmi w te viktim kèk lòt krim?
- (1) Wi
 - (2) Non
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen
- 161 (Z6) Lè gen yon krim ki fèt nan katye w, eske ou kwè nou ka jwenn lajistis nan men
- (1) Lapolis ak tribinal yo,
 - (2) Lidè kominotè yo,
 - (3) Fanmi viktim la ak zanmi li yo,oubyen
 - (4) Viktim la menm
- 162 (Z7) Le ou kontre ak lapolis, yon jij depe oubyen yon lòt manm tribinal, eske yo trete w
- (1) Trè byen,
 - (2) Byen,
 - (3) Mal, oubyen
 - (4) Tre mal
- (77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

Patı VII Patisipasyon

163 (PA1) Poukisa ou pa patisipe nan plis aktivite ki ka chanje komınote w la? Eske ou ta di se akòz

- (1) Ou ka gen tan,
 - (2) Pa gen anyen mwen enterese fè,
 - (3) Fanmi m pa vle mwen fè anyen, oubyen
 - (4) Mwen pè sa ka banm pwoblèm oubyen bay fanmim pwoblèm
- (77) Pa reponn

164 (PA2) Poukisa ou pa patisipe nan plis aktivite politik? Eske ou ta di se akòz

- (1) Ou ka gen tan,
 - (2) Pa gen anyen mwen enterese fè,
 - (3) Fanmi m pa vle mwen fè anyen, oubyen
 - (4) Mwen pè sa ka banm pwoblèm oubyen bay fanmim pwoblèm
- (77) Pa reponn

Patı VIII Demografik

Pou nou fini, mwen ta renmen poze w kèk kesyon sou ou menm

165 (age) Ki laj ou? _____
(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

166 (SE1) Eske ou konn li ak ekri Franse?
(1) Wi
(2) Non
(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

167 (SE2) Eske ou konn li ak ekri Kreyòl?
(1) Wi
(2) Non
(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

168 (SE3) Ki pi gwo klas ou te rive? _____
(77) Pa reponn

169 (SE4) Eske ou travay nan agrikilti?
(1) Wi (si wi ale nan kesyon 170)
(2) Non (si non ale nan kesyon 171)
(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

170 (SE5) Eske yo peye w pou travay wap fè a?

- (1) Wi
- (2) Non

(77) Pa reponn (99) Pa konnen

171 (SE6) Ki okipasyon w? _____

(77) Pa reponn

172 (SE7) Ki relijyon w?

- (1) Katolik,
- (2) Kreyen, pa katolik,
- (3) Vodwizan,
- (4) Lòt -- pa kreyen,
- (7) Okenn,
- (8) Lòt _____ (Eksplike)

(77) Pa reponn

173 (SE8) Mwen ta renmen ou di m si lakay ou gen

	<u>Wi</u>	<u>Non</u>
(1) Radyo	1	2
(2) Televizyon	1	2
(3) Frijidè	1	2
(4) Machin pou lave rad	1	2
(5) Machin/kamyon	1	2
(6) Telefòn	1	2

174 (SE9) Ki lang ou konsidere tankou lang maman w?

- (1) Kreyòl ayisyen
- (2) Fransè
- (3) Toulede

(77) Pa reponn

Mwen remesye w anpil pou tan ou te akòde m nan

Anete yo Tanpri reponn kesyon sa yo

Lang ou te itilize nan entèviou a

- (1) Kreyòl ayisyen
- (2) Fransè
- (3) Toulede

America's Development Foundation

Koperasyon moun ki reponn nan

- (1) Trè koperan
- (2) Koperan
- (3) Pa trè koperan

Distan kay la (izòlman li)

- (1) Lavil
- (2) Riral, aksè ak machin
- (3) Riral, pa gen aksè ak machin

Mwen setifye, se mwen menm pèsònèman ki te fè entèviou a

Non moun nan

Nan _____ Lokalite _____
dat Kote a

Siyati

APPENDIX 3• STUDY METHODOLOGY

A Questionnaire Development

The survey instrument (see Appendix 1 and Appendix 2) was developed using a number of proven questions from research conducted in the Americas and Europe combined with questions specific to the Haitian situation. The questionnaire items are organized into eight categories: (1) support for the political system, (2) support for democratic ideals, (3) citizen participation, (4) political efficacy, (5) knowledge of the political system, (6) political views, (7) views of the judicial system, and (8) age and socioeconomic status. Descriptions of each category are provided below. Exhibit A3-1 identifies specific questionnaire items within each of the categories and also indicates the source of the item. Within each area, subsets of core items were identified as potential measurement scales. Following data collection, factor and reliability analyses were conducted to determine the final set of scales.

Categories of Analysis

- 1 Political system support (S)** In democratic systems building, there needs to be societal acceptance of the state as the ultimate arbiter, that is, the state and its separate institutions must be sanctioned as legitimate. The household questionnaire includes 32 items indicating the level of system support in Haiti.

9, 59-72, 94-110

Items are divided into three categories: (a) national-level system support, (b) local-level system support, and (c) non-governmental system support.

- (a) National-level system support**, including the support accorded to the national political system and its individual institutions, is gauged by a set of 10 items (59, 62, 63, 66-72) regarding the level of confidence citizens have that the police, the Parliament and other political institutions are generally working in the interests of the people, the level of confidence people have that their basic rights are well protected, and the extent to which the Haitian system of government is a source of pride. Two additional items (9,59) assess public convictions regarding whether the country is going in the right direction and whether the nation's leaders are responsive to citizen needs.
- (b) Local system support** is measured by six items (94-96, 108-110) concerning the level of services given to local community members, the value of contributing to the community through taxes, and the responsiveness of community leadership to the demands and concerns of members.
- (c) Non-governmental support** is measured by 4 items (60, 61, 64, 65) regarding the level of confidence citizens have in the Church, media, and trade unions. There are

also 11 items (97-107) that address the effectiveness of different kinds of community groups

- 2 **Support for democratic ideals (D)** A stable democratic order requires not only a high level of system support but also such democratic ideals as the right to dissent and to participate despite holding diverse or minority views. Thirty-five of the items on the household questionnaire show the level of support for personal and political freedoms and other democratic views.

10, 58, 111-143

Items are organized into three categories: (a) democratic decision making, (b) support for democratic participation, and, (c) limits on democratic participation.

- (a) Public belief in **democratic decision making**, i.e., the idea that the citizens of a country and the members of an organization should participate in decision making, is measured by items 10, 58.
- (b) **Support for democratic participation** is measured by three scales (items 111-113, 114-120, 121-124) pertaining to public approval of government censorship, civil disobedience, citizen disenfranchisement, and related issues.
- (c) The extent to which there are **limits on democratic participation** in Haiti is estimated using items 125-143.

- 3 **Citizen participation (P)** In large measure, participation of the citizenry in the political life of the nation is the mainstay of a democratic system. Participatory actions in a society may range in scope from the more insular, e.g., discussing politics with family members, to the more communal, e.g., running for public office. A total of 28 questionnaire items in three categories relate to citizen participation: (a) scope of participation, (b) participation in social and political groups, and, (c) voting behavior.

1-2, 16-38, 40-44

- (a) **Scope of participation** is measured with a scale of five items (16-20), including talking with friends or family about local or national issues, participating in public debates, and other activities. Item 21 asks if the respondent has ever worked for a political party or candidate. Two related items (1,2) assess overall involvement in Haitian public affairs.
- (b) Items 22-34 measure the level of **participation in social and political groups**, such as agricultural cooperatives, labor unions, and schools, and the extent to which the Haitian public would be willing to participate in such groups. Item 35 defines the role of these groups in public affairs and government.
- (c) Items 40-44 examine **electoral/voting behavior**.

4 Political efficacy (E) Among the necessary components of a democratic society is a citizenry fully aware of their capacity to influence the structure and function of government. The household questionnaire has seven items (11-15, 39, 45) which demonstrate public belief in the **ability to affect decision making** at the local and national levels.

5 Knowledge of the political system (K) Thirty of the questionnaire items (4-8, 46-57, 73-82, 91-93) assess citizens' knowledge of local and national institutions, and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

6 Political views (V) Underlying most societies are relatively cohesive views regarding how government is defined, the role of government, and the nature of the relationship between government and citizens.

Items 3, 90, and 144-155 assess Haitian political views across three categories: (a) ritualism versus rationalism, (b) ascription versus achievement, and (c) institutional confrontation.

(a) Items 144-146 examine the prevalence of **ritualistic versus rational** outlooks, i.e., the extent to which political attitudes are based on tradition or progress.

(b) Items 147-149 assess Haitian attitudes in terms of **ascription versus achievement**, i.e., the extent to which an individual's self-worth is based on social status versus individual accomplishment.

(c) **Institutional confrontation** refers to the relationship between the state and the family, i.e., the extent to which each is accorded "its own legitimate identity and independence." Items 150-155 evaluate the extent to which Haitians differentiate (autonomous) or do not differentiate (organicist) among social and political institutions.

(d) Items 83-89 examine expectations of citizens toward their government.

Two separate items (3,90) look at the public's definition of local and national government and views of political parties.

NOTE: Items (b-d above) compose a three-part scale measuring the "modernness" of the Haitian view.

7 Judicial System (Z)

Items 156-162 explore the views of the Haitian public toward various aspects of the judicial system.

8 Age, Socioeconomic Status (SE)

The final section of the questionnaire contains 10 items (165-174) designed to collect information about the respondent that can be used in subanalyses.

Exhibit A3 1
Index for Sources of Haiti Civil Society
Survey Items

D = support for democratic ideals
 E = political efficacy
 K = knowledge of political system
 P = political participation
 S = political system support
 SE = socioeconomic status
 V = political views

Questionnaire Item	Source*
Part I Warmup/Knowledge of Institutions	
1-2 (P1-P2)	Hahn, 1995 (revised)
3, 4-8 (V1, K1-K5)	designed for Haiti based on Constitution and Gallup poll results
Part II Efficacy/Participation	
9, 11-15 (S1, E1-E4)	USIA (revised)
10 (D1)	Hahn, 1995, USIA
16-34 (P3-P21)	Garreton, Lagos and Mendez (revised)
35-37 (P22-P24)	designed for Haiti
38 (P25)	Hahn, 1995 (revised)
39 (E5)	CID/Gallup 1, 1995
40-42 (P26-P28)	designed for Haiti
43 (P29)	Garreton, Lagos and Mendez (revised)
44 (P30)	Young, Seligson and Jutkowitz, 1996
45 (E6)	CID/Gallup 1, 1995 (revised)

Questionnaire Item	Source*
Part III Role of Citizens/Government	
46-57 (K6-K17)	designed for Haiti based on the Constitution
58 (D2)	Robinson, Shaver and Wrightsman, 1991 (revised)
59 (S2)	Seligson, 1995 (revised)
60-72 (S3-S15)	Young, Seligson and Jutkowitz, 1996 (revised), University of Pittsburgh (1996)
73-82, 91-93 (K18-K30)	designed for Haiti based on the Constitution
90 (V10)	designed for Haiti
94-95, 108 (S16-S17, S30)	Seligson, 1995 (revised)
96 (S18)	CDIE, 1996 (revised)
97-107 (S19-S29)	designed for Haiti based on Garreton, Lagos and Mendez
109-110 (S31-S32)	Seligson, 1995 (revised)
Part IV Democratic Attitudes/Values	
83-89 (V2-V9)	
111-113 (D3-D5)	Seligson and Jutkowitz, 1994, University of Pittsburgh (1996)
114-120 (D6-D12)	Young, Seligson and Jutkowitz, 1996, University of Pittsburgh (1996)
121-124 (D13-D16)	Seligson and Jutkowitz, 1994, University of Pittsburgh (1996)
125-143 (D17-D35)	USIA
Part V Pragmatism/Ritualism	
144-152 (V10-V21)	Silvert, 1976 (revised)
Part VI Judicial System	
156-162 (Z21-Z27)	Young & Seligson, 1997
Part VII Participation	
163-164 (PA1-PA2)	Young & Seligson, 1997
Part VIII Demographics	
165-168 (AGE, SE1-SE3)	CDIE, 1996 (revised)
169-171 (SE4-SE6)	designed for Haiti
172-173 (SE7-SE8)	Young, Seligson and Jutkowitz, 1996
174 (SE9)	designed for Haiti

* Complete citations are provided in the *List of Source Documents* below

LIST OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS FOR SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

CID/Gallup Poll, Haiti # 1, October, 1995

Constitution of the Republic of Haiti, 1987

Garreton, Manuel Antonio, Marta Lagos and Roberto Mendez *Los Chilenos y la Democracia La Opinion Publica 1991-1994, Informe 1991* Santiago, Chile Ediciones Participa

Hahn, Jeffrey, W (1995) Changes in Contemporary Russian Political Culture in V Tismaneanu (Ed), *The International Politics of Eurasia, Volume 7 Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* Armonk, New York M E Sharpe

CDIE (Center for Development Information and Evaluation) Philippine Democratic Local Government Impact Assessment, 1996

USIA, Office of Research and Media Reaction *Benchmarks in Democracy Building Public Opinion and Global Democratization (A Case Study of Four Countries Ukraine, Romania, Panama and El Salvador)* Washington, DC author

Robinson, John P , Phillip R Shaver and Lawrence S Wrightsman (Eds), *Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Attitudes Volume 1 in Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes Series* (1991) San Diego, CA Academic Press, Inc

Seligson, Mitchell A (1995) *Political Culture in Nicaragua Transitions 1991-1995* Washington, DC Management Systems International

Seligson, Mitchell A and Joel M Jutkowitz (March, 1994) *Guatemalan Values and the Prospects for Democratic Development* Arlington, VA Development Associates, Inc

Silvert, Kalman, H and Leonard Reissman (1976) *Education, Class and Nation The Experiences of Chile and Venezuela* New York, NY Elsevier Scientific Publishing

University of Pittsburgh (1996) *Encuesta de Opinion Paraguay* Pittsburgh, PA author

Young, Malcolm, B , Mitchell A Seligson and Joel Jutkowitz (June, 1996) *Second Report Guatemalan Values and the Prospects for Democratic Development* Arlington, VA Development Associates, Inc

Young, Malcolm B , Mitchell A Seligson (January, 1997) *Democratic Indicators Monitoring System Questionnaire for Guatemala Spring 1997* Arlington, VA Development Associates, Inc

Questionnaire Translation

The household and community leader questionnaires were first developed in English by Development Associates, reviewed by America's Development Foundation, and then translated into Haitian Creole. The initial translations were prepared by the Haitian Training Supervisor and field tested in the fall of 1996. Following the field test, various revisions were made and the Haitian Creole translations rechecked. Haitian-speaking staff of America's Development Foundation/Haiti field office also checked the translations. Finally, a day of field staff training was devoted to a thorough review of each item on the Creole versions of the questionnaires by the 4 Creole-speaking Field Supervisors and the 18 Creole-speaking Field Interviewers, and a number of changes were made to improve the translations. A back-translation of the Creole questionnaires into English was then prepared to check the faithfulness of the Creole wording to the English original.

Plan of Analysis

- 1 Response Frequencies**
- 2 Response frequencies by selected demographics (age, sex, SES, education)**
- 3 Factor and reliability analyses** We used factor analysis to examine the relationship among our potential scale items and to develop a final set of scales. We created an index of each scale and tested scale reliability using alpha coefficients. Scale items were generally converted to a common 0-100 scale with 0 representing the low end and 100, the high end.
- 4 Analysis of interrelationships** Once reliable scales were developed, they were used to examine relationships among political system support, support for democratic ideals, citizen participation, political efficacy, various political views. Our analyses focused on the Haitian population as a whole and on such selected subpopulations as geographic location, age, gender, and literacy.

B Sampling Design

The sampling design for the survey called for a household sample comprising a nationally representative sample of about 1,200 Haitian citizens (one per household) and a sample of 120 community leaders. Our approach to selecting each of these samples is described below.

Household sampling strategy The goal of the household sample design was to produce a nationally representative, self-weighting probability sample of 1,200 completed interviews. For the sake of breadth, we included all 9 Departments in the initial "pool" or sampling frame. For the sake of efficiency and cost, we limited survey operations to no more than 20 communes and 60 communal sections. We used a probability proportional to size (PPS) approach to the selection of communes and communal sections based on population data from the last conducted census (1982) using official adjustments made in 1989 (source: l'Institut Haitien de Statistique et Informatique).

The sample selection process had four stages Commune, Communal Section, Local Sampling Unit and Household The first two stages were completed by staff of Development Associates in Arlington, Virginia The selection of local sampling units (stage 3) was completed prior to the data collection by the field staff following training by Development Associates staff Stage 4 was carried out by the field staff during data collection

Stage 1 Commune 19 Selected

The target was to select up to 20 of the total of 133 communes Selection was done using a list of communes ordered by population size, a random starting point, and a selection interval of 359,014.7 (total Haitian population of about 7.2 million divided by 20) Using this method, the 20 random selections resulted in a sample of 19 communes (the commune of Port-au-Prince was randomly selected 2 times) The list of 19 communes, and the Department in which they are located, is presented in the first two columns of exhibit A3.2

Exhibit A3.2 Sample by Department, Commune and Section (N = 44)			
Department	Commune	Section	No of Interviews
Nord	Cap-Haïtien	Ville	60
		Ravine des Roches	20
	Haut-Limbe	Acul-Jeannot 3	20
		Ville 0	20
Nord-Ouest	Jean-Rabel	Ville 0	20
		Dessources 5	20
		Guinaude 2	20
	Môle-Saint-Nicolas	Mare-Rouge 2	20
		Dame 3	20
		Côtes-de-Fer 1	20
l'Artibonite	Gonaïves	Bayonnais 3	20
		Ville 0	40
	Gros-Morne	Ville 0	20
		Rivière-Blanche	20
		Moulin 7	20

Department	Commune	Section	No of Interviews	
Centre	Hinche	Marmont 2	20	
		Aguahedionde 3	20	
		Juanaria 1	20	
	Savanette	Savanette 1	20	
		La Haye 2	40	
		Ville P-a-P	120	
l'Ouest	Carrefour	Ville de Carrefour	60	
		Delmas	60	
	Grand-Goave	Gerard 7	20	
		Gde Colline 6	20	
		Tete a Boeuf 1	20	
		Morne a Bateau	20	
	Gressier	Morne Chandelle	20	
		Petit Boucan	20	
		Petion-Ville	Bellevue 4	20
	Port-au-Prince	Ville 0	40	
		Ville 0	40	
		Ville P-a-P	120	
	Grande Anse	Dame Marie	Pte Riviere 6	20
			Ville 0	40
Jeremie		Fd Rouge Dahere	20	
		Iles Blanches 6	20	
		Ville 0	20	
Sud	Camp-Perrin	Tibi Daveza 3	20	
		Chemplois 2	40	
Sud-Est	Belle Anse	Pichon 6	20	
		Belair 5	20	
		Baie d'Orange 1	20	
	Jacmel	La Gosseline 4	20	
		Fond Melon 2	20	
		Ville 0	20	
TOTAL	19	44	1,200	

Stage 2 Communal Sections 44 Selected

To reach the overall goal of 1,200 completed interviews, the target was to select up to 60 communal sections, 3 sections from each of the up to 20 sampled communes. The process of selection was to order communal sections by commune and population size, determine a selection interval, choose a random starting point, and make the selections. The selection interval for each of the 19 communes was determined separately, the total population of the commune was divided by the desired number of communal sections (3 per commune, except in Port-au-Prince where the desired number was 6 because it had been randomly selected 2 times in the previous stage). Using this method, the 60 random selections resulted in a sample of 44 communal sections. The list of sampled communal sections, along with the number of interviews to be completed in each section (20 times the number of random selections), is presented in the third and fourth columns of exhibit A3.2

Stage 3 Local Sampling Units Approximately 240 to be selected

Within each communal section, we randomly selected at least four local sampling units (LSUs) to include in the sample. For communal sections that were randomly selected more than once, four LSUs were chosen for each random selection. For example, in Cap-Haïtien, we selected 12 local sampling units (3 random selections x 4 LSUs).

The selection process varied somewhat, depending on the geographic size and traveling distances within the communal section, and the extent to which relatively reliable information was available. In order to carry out this stage of sampling, given that the last census was 15 years earlier and the data were no longer reliable, the field supervisors conducted a reconnaissance visit in late November and early December, 1996, to all of the communal sections and habitations selected at stage 2. During the reconnaissance visits, the supervisors obtained data on the accessibility (proximity to roads) and population of localities.

Using the information on population, supervisors listed all of the localities within communal sections by size. Then, following explicit instructions provided by Development Associates, they randomly selected the required number of localities from the list. Importantly, selection was carried out without regard to accessibility of the localities. As a result, the sample included a mix of very remote, somewhat remote, and non-remote localities.

While the above selection procedure was used in the southern and northern regions of Haiti, the selection procedure for the Port-au-Prince area was somewhat different. There, field supervisors used the most recent available map of the area and gridded the map to produce sampling areas of approximately equal populations. They then randomly selected the required number of areas.

Stage 4 Households Approximately 1,200 to be selected

The target was to complete an interview with one individual in each of at least 1,200 households. Within each LSU, field staff randomly selected households for interviews. The procedures for this selection differed somewhat between small localities, town centers, and urban areas.

Within town centers and urban areas, field staff obtained maps of the community and divided the maps into sections. They then randomly selected the required number of sections. All of the households in each local sampling unit identified in stage 3 were to be contacted.

As described above, households were chosen to reflect a nationally representative sample of Haitians. At each of the households we interviewed one person. The steps involved in selecting this one individual for the interview were as follows:

At each household, we chose one adult to talk to. To select that person, we created a roster of the name, age and sex of everyone age 16 and over in the household who is a Haitian citizen. (See exhibit A3.3 for the roster form.)

Exhibit A3.3

Household Roster		
Number	Age (starting with oldest)	Sex
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		

If there was just one person age 16 and over in the household, that person was interviewed. If there were two or more, interviewers were instructed to use a respondent choice exhibit. Specifically, they were told to go to the row in the part of the exhibit that matches the number of adults over age 16 in the household. Next, they were to move across this row to the next person number not crossed.

off and cross off this number. Then, they were to go back to the Household Roster and circle the number of the person indicated in the respondent choice exhibit. For example, if they encountered three households in a particular LSU in which there were four adults aged 16 or over, they were to interview the first on the list (the eldest) at the first household, the second on the list (the next to eldest) at the second household, and the third on the list (third from the eldest) at the third household.

Community leader selection strategy In each communal section, team supervisors interviewed at least two community leaders, an elected official and a leader of a local community-based organization. As with the household interviews, the number of community leaders interviewed depended on the number of random selections. In Port-au-Prince, for example, 12 leaders were interviewed (6 random selections x 2 leaders).

The selection process for community leaders was purposive rather than random. The supervisor, who was provided with a list of the types of leaders to interview by section, was responsible for identifying all community leaders of the designated types in a section with the assistance of a local official and interviewing one of each of the types of leaders. For example, in one section, the highest-ranking leader of a local peasant organization may have been interviewed, while in the next section the supervisor may have interviewed the head of the local women's group.

C Data Collection

Data collection for the survey was conducted by 3 teams (Teams A,B,C) of four interviewers plus a supervisor. Each team had its own driver and car. A three-day training session for field staff (interviewers, supervisors and the field logistician) was held in Port-au-Prince in late January, immediately preceding the beginning of data collection. Each team was expected to complete approximately 20 household interviews per day (about 5 per interviewer) and two local leader interviews (conducted by the supervisor) per day. In advance of the arrival of the data collection teams, the field logistician visited each community to inform local leaders of the survey and "scout the terrain." The logistician also visited each team and collected completed interviews, which were taken back to Port-au-Prince for delivery to ADF's Haiti Field Office.

The total data collection period, including training and travel was from February 1 to June 30, 1997. Interviews were conducted first in the southern region (Centre, Grande Anse, Sud and Sud-Est), followed by the northern region (Nord, Nord-Ouest and l'Artibonite), and, lastly, the western region comprising Port-au-Prince and surrounding communities. Following completion of data collection in each region, a one-day debriefing of the field staff was conducted in Port-au-Prince.

D Coding and Data Processing

Completed interviews were sent by ADF's Haiti Field Office to Development Associates in batches at the end of each of the three rounds of site visits. Upon receipt, the questionnaires were logged into the system, following which each form was thoroughly reviewed and cleaned. Where questions arose regarding particular responses, the data processing supervisor called Haiti to clarify the response. As part of the cleaning processes, questionnaires with annotations in Haitian Creole

were checked by one of the Creole-speaking coding staff members. Where the frequency of particular annotations warranted it, new codes were developed to handle the unanticipated responses.

Once the forms were clean, the data were double keyed (keyed and verified) using SPSS PC+ data entry. As an additional check on the data, a random sample of 70 of the 1,200 household interviews was rechecked and a preliminary analysis of the data of these forms carried out.

E Computing the Weight Variable

The weight variable was developed because the actual number of responses did not equal the expected number in certain communal sections. Accordingly, the expected number of responses was divided by the actual number of responses per section. This created a weight variable which in 34 of the sections was equivalent to 1.00, and in 10 of the sections ranged from .57 to 1.54.

F Sampling Errors

The statistics presented in this report are based on a stratified probability sample as described in the sampling section. All estimates are subject to sampling error.

Estimated standard errors are presented for selected characteristics in exhibit A3.4. Standard errors were estimated using PC CARP software developed by the Statistical Laboratory at Iowa State University. The standard errors can be used to construct confidence intervals for estimates based on probability samples. For example, a 95 percent confidence interval for the estimated mean of the variable "Participation Level" would be $1.77 \pm (1.96 * .11)$ ¹⁹. Thus, the 95 percent confidence interval for the mean Participation Level is between 1.55 and 1.99.

A 95 percent confidence interval for the mean of the "Tolerance for dissent" variable would be $54.68 \pm (1.96 * 1.42)$, or between a mean of 51.90 and a mean of 57.46.

Likewise, in the lower part of the exhibit we present estimated percentages of those who said they owned radios, and those who were literate. The 3% standard error for radio ownership indicates that, with a 95% degree of certainty we can say that between about 55% and 69% [$62 \pm (.037 * 1.96)$] of the population own radios. Similarly, between 58% and 70% of the population are literate (i.e., that they can read or write either Haitian Creole or French).

¹⁹ 1.96 is the critical value of t for a 2-tailed test of significance for a large sample.

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Exhibit A3 4

Standard Errors for Estimates of Selected Variables

Variable	Estimated Mean	Standard Error
Participation level	1 77	11
Knowledge	79 49	354
Political system support	45 98	1 88
Tolerance for dissent	54 68	1 42
Age	39 14	1 07
Variable	Estimated Percentages	Standard Error
Radio ownership	62%	3 7%
Literacy	64%	3 0%

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APPENDIX 5 TOP LINE TABLES

TABLE 1	Socio-Economic Characteristics
TABLE 2A	Knowledge of Political System (item responses)
TABLE 3	Types of Political Communication
TABLE 4	Measures of Political System Support
TABLE 5	Indicators of Political Efficacy
TABLE 6	Views of the Justice System
TABLE 7	Political Tolerance and Support for Participation

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TABLE 1
SOCIO ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

	GENDER		AGE RANGE				LOCATION				LITERATE		PARTICIPATION LEVEL			TOTAL	
	Male	Female	16 24	25 39	40 59	60 +	P a P	Other Urban	Rural accessible	Rural not accessible	Yes	No	None	Some	A lot	Col%	
	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%		
Gender																	
Male	100		51.8	55.2	53.6	63.5	55.3	50.6	52.3	63.5	60.6	45.6	48.8	54.7	64.0	55.1	
Female		100	48.2	44.8	46.4	36.5	44.7	49.4	47.7	36.5	39.4	54.4	51.2	45.3	36.6	44.9	
Age Range 1																	
16 24	18.5	21.2	100				28.5	22.9	16.1	11.6	26.1	8.0	22.1	19.3	17.0	19.7	
25 39	39.8	39.6		100			42.0	40.7	40.5	34.8	43.2	33.5	37.9	40.2	41.5	39.7	
40 59	27.3	29.0			100		22.2	24.0	29.9	36.1	22.5	38.2	26.6	26.3	31.9	28.1	
60+	14.4	10.2				100	7.3	12.4	13.5	17.6	8.2	20.3	13.3	14.2	9.5	12.5	
Location																	
P a P	24.4	24.3	35.3	25.7	19.2	13.9	100				33.6	7.1	34.9	20.8	14.3	24.4	
Other urban	20.1	24.2	25.6	22.5	18.7	21.5		100			26.7	13.4	20.4	25.6	20.0	21.9	
Rural accessible	29.3	32.9	25.6	31.7	32.9	33.0			100		25.4	41.3	24.1	30.4	40.7	30.9	
Rural not accessible	26.2	18.6	13.5	20.0	29.2	31.6				100	14.3	38.1	20.7	23.2	25.1	22.8	
Literate																	
Yes	70.6	56.7	85.6	70.0	51.6	42.2	89.5	78.3	52.8	40.5	100		59.1	65.1	70.6	64.4	
No	29.4	43.3	14.4	30.0	48.4	57.8	10.5	21.7	47.2	59.5		100	40.9	34.9	29.4	35.6	
Education Range																	
None	25.2	37.2	11.7	25.9	40.3	53.5	10.5	16.8	40.7	51.2	1.9	82.4	36.4	31.4	21.9	30.5	
Grade school	34.0	29.2	32.2	30.3	34.8	29.4	25.4	33.2	35.6	32.3	45.5	7.1	31.6	34.5	29.1	31.9	
Secondary school	33.4	27.9	53.2	37.0	16.0	9.6	57.3	43.7	18.2	8.1	48.0		28.4	27.9	37.7	30.9	
Postsecondary	3.6	6	1.3	3.8	1.8		6.4	2.0	7	4	3.5		1.0	2.4	3.8	2.3	
No response	3.8	5.2	1.6	3.0	7.1	7.5	4	4.3	4.9	8.1	1.1	10.5	2.6	3.8	7.5	4.4	
Recorded Occupation																	
Peasant	49.6	33.7	23.6	40.0	52.3	58.8		25.7	61.6	77.2	29.0	67.1	38.6	44.4	45.6	42.5	
Student	9.8	8.4	36.6	4.9	--		18.7	12.1	5.1	2.4	14.2	1	8.0	9.0	10.9	9.2	
Vendor	3.4	24.9	6.6	12.1	18.9	12.5	15.1	15.9	14.1	6.7	10.8	16.9	14.4	12.0	12.2	13.0	
Traditional Trade	18.5	7.8	10.5	17.2	13.5	7.9	23.7	18.3	7.8	6.4	18.4	5.2	15.6	13.3	11.7	13.7	
Salaned Worker	9.2	5.0	1.7	11.3	7.7	2.7	13.7	10.1	3.2	3.6	11.2	5	3.6	6.7	13.0	7.4	
No response	8	6	9	2	9	1.4	7	1.6	5		7	7	7	5	9	7	
Not Employed	8.6	19.6	20.2	14.2	6.6	16.6	28.2	16.3	7.8	3.6	15.8	9.6	19.1	14.0	5.8	13.6	
Religion																	
Catholic	56.4	59.8	50.3	54.9	65.1	63.5	55.3	63.6	55.6	58.0	52.7	67.4	62.1	56.0	54.8	57.9	
Christian not Catholic	36.9	37.6	44.7	38.9	31.6	32.7	37.1	30.9	40.2	39.7	41.7	29.1	32.4	39.4	41.1	37.2	
Vodust	2.0	1.1	--	1.8	2.4	1.7	2.0	4	2.3	1.5	1.3	2.1	1.6	1.3	2.0	1.6	
Other not Christian	2			2				4			1		--		3	1	
None	4.5	1.5	5.0	4.2	9	2.0	5.7	4.7	1.9	7	4.1	1.4	4.0	3.4	1.8	3.1	
Radio	62.4	60.6	73.9	62.8	54.1	55.4	94.6	77.8	48.3	29.9	74.8	37.5	60.4	59.5	65.6	61.6	
TV	28.0	28.6	40.5	29.5	22.7	17.5	82.2	30.4	6.3	3	40.4	6.4	34.0	27.4	21.8	28.3	

TABLE 2 a
KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM (ITEM RESPONSES)

	GENDER		AGE RANGE				LOCATION				LITERATE		PARTICIPATION LEVEL			TOTAL
	Male	Female	16 24	25 39	40 59	60 +	P a P	Other Urban	Rural accessible	Rural not accessible	Yes	No	None	Some	A lot	Mean
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	
The job of the prime minister is to enforce the laws of nation? (Q4)	66	63	63	65	65	68	57	59	68	75	62	72	62	66	66	65
The prime minister is appointed to office? (Q5)	73	69	72	74	71	65	72	72	72	69	72	71	70	69	75	71
The main job of parliament is to make laws? (Q6)	91	85	89	89	90	83	90	86	89	87	89	87	85	88	92	88
The members of parliament are chosen through national elections? (Q7)	97	95	95	97	96	97	96	95	97	96	97	96	93	98	98	96
Are the judges of the Supreme Court and other courts appointed or elected? (Q8)	78	73	77	79	75	72	79	85	76	65	83	65	76	74	79	76
The Haitian constitution guarantees right																
To freedom of expression (Q46)	95	94	94	96	96	93	93	95	95	95	96	94	92	94	98	95
To bear arms (Q47)	55	61	63	58	54	60	49	55	65	59	55	63	57	60	56	58
To education (Q48)	93	90	90	92	93	94	92	94	92	90	93	91	89	93	95	92
To good health (Q49)	94	91	91	93	94	94	92	93	93	93	93	93	89	94	96	93
To meet with and talk with anyone (Q50)	92	85	87	88	90	93	87	89	91	88	91	86	83	93	91	89
To inform government what actions it should take (Q51)	15	20	22	17	12	20	21	19	13	17	16	20	22	16	11	17
To liberty (Q52)	94	92	90	93	95	96	92	93	95	92	94	92	91	94	95	93
To own property (Q53)	97	94	94	96	97	96	94	96	96	96	97	96	92	97	99	96
To practice any religion (Q54)	98	98	97	98	99	100	97	100	99	98	99	99	96	99	99	98
To police protection (Q55)	02	03	04	03	02	03	05	02	03	02	03	02	04	03	02	03
To work (Q56)	96	94	94	96	97	96	94	96	97	96	96	96	92	96	99	96
To good roads (Q57)	03	06	06	04	04	04	05	04	04	05	05	05	06	04	03	05
The Haitian constitution requires citizens to																
Defend Haiti if there is a war (Q73)	86	80	84	86	84	76	86	86	83	80	89	75	79	83	90	83
Respect and protect the environment (Q74)	98	94	95	97	96	98	98	99	95	95	98	95	94	96	99	96
Education and improve yourself (Q75)	98	98	99	99	97	97	98	99	97	98	99	97	96	98	99	98
Respect other people's rights and freedoms (Q76)	99	99	99	99	99	99	98	99	99	100	100	99	98	99	100	99
Pay taxes (Q77)	88	79	86	83	84	83	94	90	80	74	90	74	81	86	85	84
Respect the constitution (Q78)	99	98	99	99	99	99	98	99	99	99	100	99	97	99	100	99
Provide assistance to persons in danger (Q79)	99	99	98	99	100	99	98	98	99	99	99	99	97	100	100	99
Respect the law (Q80)	99	99	99	99	100	99	98	99	100	100	100	99	98	99	100	99
Vote (Q81)	96	93	93	95	97	95	93	93	97	97	95	96	92	95	99	95
Respect the property of others (Q82)	99	99	99	99	100	99	98	99	100	100	100	100	98	99	100	99
Are members of the conseil communales and conseil section communales appointed to office? (Q91)	30	27	34	27	26	31	32	33	27	23	32	22	23	29	35	28
Are Conseil communales made up of three members including the mayor? (Q92)	94	89	91	92	93	90	91	93	92	90	94	89	88	91	95	91
Is the main job of delegates and vice delegates to coordinate and control public services? (Q93)	88	85	85	86	90	87	90	90	85	84	90	83	86	88	86	87

TABLE 2 b
KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM (SCALE SCORES)

	GENDER		AGE RANGE				LOCATION				LITERATE		POLITICAL PARTICIPATION			TOTAL
	Male	Female	16-24	25-39	40-59	60+	P a P	Other Urban	Rural accessible	Rural not accessible	Yes	No	None	Some	A lot	
Scale Score % correct	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Total Scale (30 items)	80.41	78.36	79.63	79.85	79.86	79.41	79.55	80.36	79.96	78.63	80.85	78.36	77.60	80.00	81.43	79.49
Nat'l Govt. Structure (Items Q 4-8)	80.97	76.95	79.12	80.38	79.50	76.75	78.78	79.27	80.40	78.45	80.59	77.91	77.13	78.93	82.13	79.16
Constitutional Rights (Items Q 46-57)	69.65	69.02	69.23	69.52	69.48	70.69	68.43	69.67	70.32	69.22	69.86	69.55	67.82	70.20	70.47	69.36
Constitutional Obligations (Items Q 73-82)	96.05	93.72	95.22	95.46	95.65	94.30	95.82	96.21	94.95	94.02	96.88	93.25	93.06	95.39	97.14	95.00
Local Govt. Structure (Items Q 91-93)	70.38	66.92	70.08	68.31	69.39	69.09	71.10	72.16	67.88	65.29	71.81	64.71	65.97	69.62	71.74	68.83

TABLE 3
Types of Political Communication

	GENDER		AGE RANGE				LOCATION				LITERATE		POLITICAL PARTICIPATION			TOTAL	
	Male	Female	16 24	25 39	40 59	60 +	P a P	Other Urban	Rural accessible	Rural not accessible	Yes	No	None	Some	A lot		
	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	Col %	
Discussed events with friend (Q17)																	
Never	16.3	22.6	18.7	14.8	21.4	28.5	11.3	15.1	24.5	24.8	12.9	30.0	27.6	16.3	11.2	19.1	
One or two times	12.4	13.2	13.8	10.9	14.7	12.7	16.0	10.1	12.5	11.5	12.4	13.6	13.3	13.6	11.2	12.8	
More than once	71.0	64.2	67.5	74.3	63.9	57.5	72.6	74.8	63.0	63.0	74.6	56.2	59.1	69.9	77.3	67.9	
No answer	2					7				4	1			3		1	
Dont Know	2					7				4		2			3	1	
Attention to media (# times) (Q18)																	
Never	17.9	24.0	15.2	18.4	24.4	27.7	4.2	10.1	28.5	36.9	10.5	39.1	25.1	21.5	13.7	20.6	
One or two times	12.9	17.4	14.4	15.2	16.3	11.8	13.3	14.7	13.2	18.4	13.9	16.7	15.7	12.4	16.8	14.9	
More than once	68.9	58.4	70.4	66.2	58.7	60.5	82.4	75.2	58.3	43.5	75.4	43.9	59.2	65.6	69.2	64.2	
No answer	2	2		2	3	--		--		7	3			5		2	
Dont Know	2				3					4		2			3	1	
Number of meetings attended (Q19)																	
Never	55.6	64.4	71.4	57.1	55.3	58.5	82.5	63.9	44.5	51.4	60.4	57.8	79.7	57.0	35.9	59.5	
One or two times	19.4	15.8	13.1	17.6	20.8	19.1	10.5	14.8	25.3	18.8	18.2	17.1	9.1	18.5	28.5	17.8	
More than once	24.4	19.6	15.5	25.3	22.8	21.8	6.7	21.3	30.0	28.6	21.2	24.2	10.8	24.2	35.1	22.2	
No answer	2				3		3				1			3		1	
Dont Know	5	2			9	7			3	1.1	--	9	4		6	3	
Family (Q38 1)																	
Yes	7.9	7.5	6.4	6.7	8.3	11.4	1.1	8.9	7.4	13.6	6.1	10.6	6.4	9.8	7.0	7.7	
No	92.1	92.5	93.6	93.3	91.7	88.6	98.9	91.1	92.6	86.4	93.9	89.4	93.6	90.2	93.0	92.3	
Friends (Q38 2)																	
Yes	20.9	15.9	11.9	16.3	25.7	20.8	2.7	16.4	21.9	32.9	15.0	25.5	15.3	21.1	20.3	18.7	
No	79.1	84.1	88.1	83.7	74.3	79.2	97.3	83.6	78.1	67.1	85.1	74.5	84.7	78.9	79.7	81.3	
Newspaper (Q38 3)																	
Yes	6.7	2.5	5.6	5.8	4.1	2.0	6.6	9.3	2.7	1.8	6.9	1.0	2.2	4.6	8.4	4.8	
No	93.3	97.5	94.4	94.2	95.9	98.0	93.4	90.7	97.3	98.2	93.1	99.0	97.8	95.4	91.6	95.2	
Radio (Q38-4)																	
Yes	68.1	65.0	71.4	67.7	64.4	61.4	78.4	78.3	61.0	51.2	74.3	52.7	64.4	64.9	71.8	66.7	
No	31.9	35.0	28.6	32.3	35.6	38.6	21.6	21.7	39.0	48.8	25.7	47.3	35.6	35.1	28.2	33.3	
TV (Q38 5)																	
Yes	10.8	9.4	15.5	12.8	4.9	5.4	20.7	18.6	2.9	1.1	14.5	2.4	13.7	8.5	7.4	10.2	
No	89.2	90.6	84.5	87.2	95.1	94.6	79.3	81.4	97.1	98.9	85.5	97.6	86.3	91.5	92.6	89.8	
Work (Q38 6)																	
Yes	1.2	6	4	4	2.1	7		1.6	5	1.9	8	1.2	7		2.3	9	
No	98.8	99.4	99.6	99.6	97.9	99.3	100.0	98.4	99.5	98.1	99.2	98.8	99.3	100.0	97.7	99.1	
Gossip (Q38 7)																	
Yes	29.6	35.9	24.7	30.9	36.5	40.6	3.7	30.4	42.9	50.7	23.5	48.8	34.9	31.7	30.0	32.4	
No	70.4	64.1	75.3	69.1	63.5	59.4	96.3	69.6	57.1	49.3	76.5	51.2	65.1	68.3	70.0	67.6	
Billboards/signs (Q38 8)																	
Yes	3	2		4	2				5	3	4				8	2	
No	99.7	99.8	100.0	99.6	99.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.5	99.7	99.6	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.2	99.8	
Candidates (Q38 9)																	
Yes	3.1	1.1	4	2.9	2.4	2.7	4	--	5.1	2.5	2.3	2.1	4	1.2	5.7	2.2	
No	96.9	98.9	99.6	97.1	97.7	97.3	99.6	100.0	94.9	97.5	97.7	97.9	99.6	98.8	94.3	97.8	

TABLE 4
MEASURES OF POLITICAL SYSTEM SUPPORT

	Gender		Age Range				Location				Literate		Participation Level			Total
	Male	Female	16-24	25-39	40-59	60+	P a P	Other Urban	Rural accessible	Rural not accessible	Yes	No	None	Some	A lot	Mean
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Scale Score (0-100)	46.08	45.85	45.22	40.42	50.04	56.02	32.01	43.38	50.89	56.38	41.62	53.98	43.96	45.78	48.78	45.98
Police (Q62)	66.66	67.90	68.48	62.92	70.44	71.68	56.92	67.63	70.20	73.72	64.61	72.36	65.35	68.64	67.95	67.21
Judicial System (Q63)	50.93	52.86	51.39	46.25	54.93	62.96	33.42	46.90	60.18	63.71	45.28	64.17	50.50	51.64	53.40	51.77
Parliament (Q66)	40.33	42.02	41.65	34.67	45.42	51.62	26.28	37.71	47.15	51.03	36.98	48.76	38.08	41.39	44.37	41.67
Political Parties (Q67)	28.06	29.26	29.56	27.16	28.87	31.24	18.10	29.66	33.88	32.07	28.27	29.23	25.65	27.56	33.16	28.57
Electoral Council (Q68)	53.21	54.74	52.68	49.41	56.60	63.66	32.37	50.51	62.95	68.47	49.45	62.72	48.04	54.36	60.25	53.85
President (Q69)	58.32	55.77	52.62	49.76	64.59	71.63	43.44	52.88	61.15	70.18	51.92	67.02	53.96	58.57	59.71	57.21
Prime Minister (Q70)	43.54	40.57	38.84	34.91	47.24	60.60	26.13	37.61	45.88	59.10	36.40	53.50	39.66	43.90	43.59	42.26
Human Rights (Q71)	36.19	33.33	35.29	29.10	40.59	40.76	25.63	30.46	37.93	45.20	30.29	43.78	33.70	32.91	38.72	34.94
Pride (Q72)	34.59	32.37	33.11	27.34	38.40	44.16	21.42	28.85	37.37	47.01	29.07	42.56	32.79	32.19	36.19	33.62

TABLE 5
INDICATORS OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

	GENDER		AGE RANGE				LOCATION				LITERATE		POLITICAL PARTICIATION			TOTAL
	Male	Female	16 24	25 39	40 59	60 +	P a P	Other Urban	Rural accessible	Rural not accessible	Yes	No	None	Some	A lot	Col%
	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%
Voting gives you a voice in govt? (Q11)																
Yes	73.3	62.0	67.9	69.9	70.4	58.8	65.5	65.4	73.7	66.9	71.6	62.5	58.9	66.6	82.5	68.3
No	24.7	31.9	27.4	27.8	25.5	34.5	31.0	30.4	23.2	28.7	25.6	32.1	34.6	31.1	15.5	27.9
No answer	2	9	4	4	6	7	7	8		7	5	5	7	3	6	5
Dont know	1.8	5.2	4.3	1.8	3.5	6.0	2.8	3.5	3.1	3.6	2.3	4.9	5.8	2.0	1.4	3.3
Organizing gives you a voice in govt? (Q12)																
Yes																
No	85.9	77.0	82.8	83.9	81.3	75.6	77.9	80.3	86.8	81.4	85.1	76.6	71.4	85.1	92.2	81.9
No answer	12.4	17.3	13.1	15.0	13.7	17.6	18.1	15.5	11.3	14.6	12.0	19.1	22.1	12.9	6.7	14.6
Dont Know	3	6	-	2	6	1.4	7	8		4	4	5	7	5		4
	1.4	5.1	4.1	9	4.4	5.4	3.3	3.5	1.9	3.6	2.5	3.7	5.8	1.5	1.1	3.0
Vote important for running country (Q45)																
Not important	9.1	13.8	10.0	11.8	11.5	10.8	9.8	13.3	9.3	13.5	8.6	16.0	15.7	11.3	5.3	11.2
Not too important	4.5	4.6	3.5	4.5	5.9	3.3	3.4	5.9	5.1	4.1	4.0	5.7	5.0	5.4	3.1	4.6
Some importance	5.3	7.6	5.5	7.4	5.8	5.4	7.0	3.9	6.5	7.3	6.3	6.5	6.5	8.8	3.2	6.3
Very important	74.2	62.2	62.1	71.0	71.4	66.5	69.1	69.0	72.1	63.4	72.6	62.2	58.3	68.0	83.5	68.8
No answer	2.7	3.0	9.6	1.1	1.1	2.0	4.3	3.1	1.3	3.3	3.3	2.1	4.1	1.8	2.3	2.8
Dont know	4.1	8.7	9.3	4.2	4.4	12.0	6.4	4.7	5.7	8.4	5.3	7.5	10.3	4.7	2.6	6.2
Officials dont care what people think (Q39)																
Agree																
Disagree	60.7	59.3	49.6	61.8	64.9	60.1	62.1	60.2	56.5	64.4	61.3	58.2	59.3	59.7	61.4	60.0
No answer	30.0	24.4	27.1	29.3	26.9	23.9	26.5	25.7	32.3	21.8	27.3	28.0	23.8	27.9	31.9	27.5
Dont know	2.1	3.7	8.1	1.1	2.3	1.3	3.3	4.7	1.5	2.5	3.6	1.4	4.1	2.8	1.2	2.8
	7.2	12.6	15.2	7.9	5.8	14.7	8.1	9.4	9.8	11.3	7.8	12.5	12.8	9.5	5.5	9.6
Encounter magistrate (Q96)																
Very difficult	19.0	18.4	19.7	17.8	20.3	16.7	35.9	17.5	10.4	12.8	20.6	15.3	24.0	16.9	13.9	18.7
Difficult	36.2	37.2	37.0	40.7	32.1	33.1	43.2	32.1	36.4	34.9	37.1	35.5	38.8	36.1	34.3	36.6
Relatively easy	20.9	16.7	19.5	19.1	18.7	18.8	9.5	18.2	23.6	23.6	18.5	20.0	15.5	22.9	19.2	19.0
Very easy	22.7	23.6	19.6	20.5	27.1	27.9	8.6	27.9	27.7	27.2	21.1	26.8	17.2	22.3	31.7	23.1
Dont know	5	-		2	3	7	4	4	3		3	2	4	3		3
	8	4.1	4.3	1.7	1.5	2.7	2.5	3.9	1.6	1.5	2.4	2.1	4.0	1.5	9	2.3
National elected leaders respond to Haitians (Q59)																
Almost never	53.8	51.4	54.2	58.8	50.3	36.3	62.1	52.3	50.3	46.1	54.8	49.2	55.3	52.8	49.3	52.7
Once in a while	36.8	33.4	36.2	33.3	34.8	41.2	30.7	40.7	36.9	32.6	37.2	31.7	30.1	36.8	40.5	35.3
Often enough	2.1	1.9	1.7	8	3.5	2.7	4	1.2	2.6	3.7	1.6	2.6	1.5	2.0	2.5	2.0
Almost always	4.0	4.9	3.0	3.2	6.9	4.7	1.5	2.0	4.1	10.4	2.8	7.3	4.1	3.8	5.4	4.4
No response	8	6	4	6	3	2.0	1.1	4	5	7	5	7	1.1	8		7
Dont know	2.6	7.9	4.5	3.2	4.2	13.1	4.4	3.5	5.5	6.5	3.1	8.4	8.0	3.8	2.3	5.0

TABLE 6
VIEWS ON THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

	GENDER		AGE RANGE				LOCATION				LITERATE		POLITICAL PARTICIPATION			TOTAL
	Male	Female	16 24	25 39	40 59	60 +	P a P	Other Urban	Rural accessible	Rural not accessible	Yes	No	None	Some	A lot	Col%
	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%	Col%
Judiciary punishes guilty no matter who they are (Q139)																
Yes	55.5	54.8	58.4	51.9	55.2	60.2	39.9	52.5	61.3	66.0	50.3	63.9	55.9	54.8	54.6	55.2
No	40.9	37.4	36.6	43.5	39.6	30.0	57.4	42.4	32.4	27.4	45.8	27.7	38.5	38.0	41.9	39.3
No answer	6	9		8	6	2.0	1.1	4	8	7	8	7	9	1.0	3	8
Don't know	3.0	6.8	5.0	3.7	4.6	7.8	1.6	4.7	5.4	5.9	3.1	7.6	4.7	6.2	3.2	4.7
Judicial system treats everyone equally (Q157)																
Almost never																
Once in a while	35.7	34.2	29.8	39.7	35.8	26.6	42.6	36.9	33.2	28.6	38.4	28.9	40.1	32.6	31.0	35.0
Often enough	42.0	39.3	44.4	37.5	43.2	40.0	44.2	40.2	39.9	37.5	41.8	39.0	34.9	42.2	46.9	40.8
Almost always	8.3	6.3	6.6	8.5	6.1	8.1	3.9	7.0	8.3	10.3	7.2	7.7	6.9	7.8	7.5	7.4
Depends on presentation	11.5	11.3	13.6	8.6	11.1	17.6	2.7	10.9	13.9	18.3	8.5	16.7	9.2	12.4	13.2	11.4
Money buys justice		2				7				4		2	2			1
No answer	2	2		3	2	--	4		2	3	2	2	3	2		2
Don't know	2.2	6.6		4.4	6.6	--	4.4		3.3	7.7	3.3	5.5	2.2	5.5	3.3	3.3
Victim of Crime in past 12 months (Q158+ Q159+ (Q160)																
No	82.3	83.8	82.7	82.4	79.8	92.2	80.3	80.2	84.6	86.2	79.6	89.1	86.3	84.7	76.6	83.0
Yes	17.7	16.2	17.3	17.6	20.2	7.8	19.7	19.8	15.4	13.8	20.4	10.9	13.7	15.3	23.4	17.0
Justice for neighborhood crime most likely from (Q161)																
Police and Courts	84.6	87.6	91.3	83.0	86.9	84.1	92.2	91.7	80.0	80.9	87.1	83.6	86.4	87.0	83.9	85.8
Community leaders	10.6	7.9	5.6	11.7	8.3	10.4	1.4	3.1	16.2	15.0	8.1	11.6	7.8	8.3	12.6	9.4
Family/friend	2.3	1.6	1.8	2.2	1.5	2.7	2.1	1.6	2.0	2.2	1.6	2.6	2.2	1.8	1.8	2.0
Victim him/herself	9	14	9	13	12	7	16	16	7	7	12	9	13	12	7	11
There is no justice	1.4	1.2	4	1.6	1.5	1.4	2.3	2.0	8	4	1.6	7	1.5	1.6	9	1.3
CASEC	2	4	--	2	3	7			3	7	1	5	7			3
No response	2				3		4				1			3		1
Treated by judicial system (Q162)																
Very well	18.3	14.9	13.8	14.6	19.9	21.3	11.8	18.2	16.6	19.5	15.8	18.6	13.0	16.6	22.0	16.8
Well	52.5	50.3	49.5	55.1	49.0	48.8	47.9	55.7	49.0	55.0	50.7	53.0	50.6	55.4	48.3	51.5
Badly	10.9	9.9	11.2	12.4	8.0	8.7	9.8	9.0	14.1	7.8	12.1	7.5	8.5	10.7	12.8	10.5
Very badly	3.3	3.4	1.7	3.7	3.7	4.3	3.2	3.6	4.1	2.5	3.0	4.1	1.7	4.7	4.1	3.4
Depends on presentation or crime committed	1.4	1.3	--	1.8	1.5	1.3	4	1.2	1.9	1.9	1.3	1.3	2.0	8	1.1	1.4
No answer	2.8	2.3	4.3	1.3	3.5	2.0	5.1	1.5	1.9	1.9	2.4	2.8	3.9	2.3	1.2	2.6
Don't know	10.8	17.9	19.5	11.1	14.4	13.5	21.8	10.9	12.5	11.4	14.7	12.7	20.3	9.7	10.5	14.0

TABLE 7
POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND SUPPORT FOR PARTICIPATION

	GENDER		AGE RANGE				LOCATION				LITERATE		POLITICAL PARTICIPATION			TOTAL
	Male	Female	16 24	25 39	40 59	60 +	P a P	Other Urban	Rural accessible	Rural not accessible	Yes	No	None	Some	A lot	Mean
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	
TD1_4 Support Right to Dissent (Tolerance)	55 45	53 71	58 41	55 00	53 61	50 22	53 65	54 79	55 15	54 19	56 01	52 24	49 56	59 60	55 64	54 68
Opponents of the government should be permitted to																
TD1 Vote (Q121)	55 75	53 42	58 20	54 32	54 45	51 12	54 57	54 36	55 27	53 95	56 01	52 36	49 71	60 29	54 73	54 73
TD2 Participate in peaceful demonstrations (Q122)	57 00	56 58	60 92	57 14	55 32	52 78	55 50	57 30	57 24	56 41	58 77	53 17	52 81	61 06	57 21	56 82
TD3 Run for public office (Q123)	47 43	44 49	49 15	45 58	46 98	41 26	43 33	46 98	46 28	46 93	46 99	44 56	39 71	51 56	48 11	46 15
TD4 Use media to express opinions (Q124)	61 13	59 89	64 70	62 70	57 45	54 41	61 62	60 39	61 01	58 15	62 31	57 36	55 31	65 13	62 14	60 58
OSDL1_3 Opposition to Suppression of Democratic Liberties	89 49	89 86	90 33	92 12	88 99	81 89	91 87	91 11	89 10	86 50	90 43	88 21	87 88	90 49	90 98	89 65
Extent of opposition to government prohibiting																
OSDL1 Protests or peaceful demonstrations	87 41	88 45	89 07	90 42	87 24	78 87	91 45	89 65	87 20	82 98	89 22	85 26	85 81	88 74	89 50	87 87
OSDL2 Meetings in which people criticize the form of government established by the Constitution	89 37	89 99	89 98	92 00	89 08	82 53	91 89	91 43	88 73	86 58	90 41	88 18	88 57	90 56	90 00	89 64
OSDL3 Use of media to criticize the form of government established by the Constitution	91 95	91 91	92 08	94 69	90 59	85 53	92 57	93 32	92 10	89 60	92 03	91 75	89 98	92 56	93 72	91 93
SCP1_3 Support for extensive participation	77 48	75 34	74 68	77 48	77 80	73 41	76 22	75 86	77 81	75 41	77 49	74 78	71 10	79 60	80 07	76 53
Support for people who																
SCP1 Participate in demonstrations permitted by law (Q114)	81 66	78 99	77 43	83 02	81 05	75 47	80 55	79 91	81 68	79 22	81 59	78 38	76 42	84 06	81 71	80 48
SCP2 Participate in groups that try and resolve community problems (Q119)	90 43	89 41	89 32	89 91	91 36	88 79	91 20	89 23	89 33	90 29	90 65	88 77	87 12	91 13	92 35	89 98
SCP3 Work for a political party or candidate during an election (Q120)	59 37	55 69	55 56	58 68	59 12	55 15	56 33	57 25	60 33	55 44	58 91	55 72	48 29	62 55	64 53	57 78
SEP1_4 Support for extra legal participation	8 62	8 75	9 00	9 37	8 05	7 33	8 35	9 45	9 50	7 37	8 75	8 54	8 10	9 10	8 92	8 67
Support for people who																
SEP1 Close a street or highway (Q115)	9 54	10 58	12 49	10 64	9 60	4 84	11 47	11 23	9 65	7 75	11 27	7 70	9 02	10 40	10 82	10 00
SEP2 Occupy empty houses or unoccupied land (Q116)	9 89	9 05	9 31	10 01	9 01	9 44	9 12	10 40	10 88	7 64	9 01	10 44	8 42	9 73	10 71	9 52
SEP3 Occupy factories offices or buildings (Q117)	11 74	11 12	10 08	12 68	10 50	11 93	10 26	12 15	13 23	10 15	10 96	12 39	10 46	12 30	11 80	11 46
SEP4 Try to overthrow by force a government that has been elected (Q118)	3 25	4 22	3 82	4 08	3 13	3 37	2 38	3 50	4 52	4 05	3 56	3 89	4 28	4 00	2 55	3 67