


PN ACF-171

# FOOD SECURITY POLICY FORUM

Proceedings

July 25, 1994

The Fortieth Anniversary of the  
U S Food for Peace Program



"America's Bounty Serves the World"

Sponsored By

Coalition for Food Aid

PN-ACF-171

**FOOD SECURITY POLICY FORUM**

**Proceedings**

**July 25, 1994**

**Washington Court Hotel  
Washington, D C**

*Sponsored By*

Coalition for Food Aid  
Washington, D C

*Technical Assistance and Funding Provided By*

The United States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research, Office of Health and Nutrition under the Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring Project (IMPACT), Contract No DAN-5110-C-00-0013-00, managed by the International Science and Technology Institute, Inc (ISTI)

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- A Program Agenda
- B List of Participants
- C Glossary of Terms
- D Cooperating Sponsor Questionnaire Results
- E Pathways to Food Security

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A one-day policy forum was organized by the Coalition for Food Aid, with technical and financial assistance from USAID's IMPACT (Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring) Project, in order to discuss how the goal of food security applies to Food for Peace (P L 480) programs implemented by private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and cooperatives, jointly referred to as Cooperating Sponsors (CSs). The focus of the program was P L 480 Title II non-emergency programs.

The Coalition for Food Aid is an organization of PVOs and cooperatives that conduct international food aid programs. The Coalition examines and develops food aid policies, procedures, and programs. The Food Security Policy Forum was the result of the work of many Coalition members and the staff of the IMPACT Project. Their efforts, along with those of Forum participants, including USAID, GAO, OMB, USDA, Congressional Research Service, and congressional staff, are greatly appreciated. The Forum organizers would like to thank all of the participants for their contributions to the day's discussion. Special thanks go to the facilitator, Emily Moore, the presenters and moderators, the CSs who completed questionnaires, Laura Ziff, a graduate student at Duke University who interned at the Coalition, and Roohi Husain who provided logistic support. The forum organizers would also like to thank Dr. Eunyong Chung and Dr. Frances Davidson of USAID's Office of Health and Nutrition for their support and encouragement.

Proceedings of the forum were recorded. The proceedings herein were compiled by Karen Canova from the transcription of the recording and notes taken by Ellen Levinson of the Coalition for Food Aid and by Emily Moore. Prior to the forum, a questionnaire was sent to CSs asking about their experiences with designing Title II programs linked to food security objectives, and identifying indicators to measure program impact. Packets were distributed to forum participants with a program agenda, list of participants, glossary of terms, summary of the responses to the questionnaires, and a set of theoretical "pathways" to illustrate how various Title II program activities may be linked to a broader food security goal. All of these items are included respectively as Annexes A, B, C, D, and E, herein.

## ACRONYMS

ACDI	Agricultural Cooperative Development International
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency International
BHR	Bureau for Humanitarian Response (USAID)
CBI	Cooperative Business International
CDIE	Center for Development Information and Evaluation (USAID)
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CS	Cooperating Sponsor (PVO or cooperative)
ENI/USAID	Bureau for Europe and the New Independent States (USAID)
FACG	Food Aid Consultative Group
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAS	Foreign Agriculture Service, USDA
FFP	Food for Peace Program
FFW	Food for Work Program
FY	fiscal year
GAO	U S General Accounting Office
G	Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research (USAID)
G/OHN	Bureau for Global Programs, Office of Health and Nutrition (USAID)
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
NCBA	National Cooperative Business Association
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OICI	Opportunity Industrial Centers International
ORT	oral rehydration therapy
PD-19	USAID Policy Directive 19, on Food Security
P L 480	Public Law 480 (for definition, see Annex C Glossary of Terms)
PVO	private voluntary organization
SF	school feeding
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission on Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USG	U S Government
WFP	World Food Program of the United Nations

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), there are approximately 800 million people in the world today who are food-insecure, meaning they do not have access to sufficient food to meet their needs for healthy and productive lives. As part of its effort to enhance the world's food security situation, the United States has provided food assistance to numerous developing countries over the years, reaching hundreds of millions of people through programs implemented by the U S Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U S Agency for International Development (USAID) working in partnership with recipient governments, international organizations, private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and cooperatives. Cooperating Sponsors are PVOs and cooperatives that develop and implement P L 480 (Food for Peace) Title II food assistance programs that target households and communities where, due to many factors, food insecurity is a prevalent and chronic problem.

At the Policy Forum on Food Security, U S Government officials, congressional staff, General Accounting Office representatives, and Cooperating Sponsors explored the relationship between food security and food aid programs, and the practical experience of Cooperating Sponsors in developing and evaluating food aid programs with food security as a goal. To put food security in context, an important observation was made during the Forum. Food security is a developmental goal and, despite good planning and best intentions, progress towards this goal can be derailed due to civil conflict, famine and other crises. Then, food aid becomes a critical element in a mission to save lives. Strengthening food security in vulnerable communities can help prevent, prepare for and lessen the impact of many types of emergencies.

### **Legislation on Food Security**

Since 1954, the primary mechanism for providing food assistance to developing countries has been the U S Food for Peace Program. The policy direction of P L 480 was fundamentally changed with the 1990 Farm Bill, in which Congress established the promotion of food security as the overall goal of P L 480, replacing a more general foreign policy goal. With the 1990 legislation, the linkage between food aid and broad-based economic growth was reinforced. The 1990 legislation also emphasized the role of private sector involvement through the establishment of a Food Aid Consultative Group, comprised of Cooperating Sponsors and government officials, for the consideration of food aid policies, regulations and procedures. As Congress begins deliberations on the 1995 Farm Bill, under which P L 480 will be reauthorized, the implementation of these and other 1990 amendments will be reviewed.

"Food security" is defined in the P L 480 statute (Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended) as "access by all people at all times to sufficient food and nutrition for a healthy and productive life." It is further defined in USAID Policy Directive 19 (PD-19) as encompassing the concepts of adequate availability of, access to and utilization of food at the household, community or country-wide level.

### **The General Accounting Office Review**

In 1993, the U S General Accounting Office (GAO) completed a review of USAID food aid programs and concluded that it is difficult to determine whether they promote food security. One of the reasons given by the GAO was that USAID had not yet established a clear policy and operational guidance to

assist program managers in identifying food security objectives and evaluation methodologies for food aid programs

In the case of Title II programs, the emphasis until the late 1980s was on operations accounting for and monitoring the use of donated food or local currencies. In recent years Title II has become more focused on developmental objectives and Cooperating Sponsors have been seeking ways to identify impacts. In the past, evaluations were conducted and the data collected showed some positive results, and this information was used to redirect some programs and to provide information to others on "lessons learned." However, until recently, seeking and measuring "impact" was not really emphasized during the design phase.

### **USAID Food Security Policy and Guidance**

USAID views food security as an essential component of its sustainable development strategy, with economic, environmental, population and health, and democracy-building dimensions. Facing shrinking resources for Agency operations and staffing, and the concomitant pressures to demonstrate to Congress the impact of its programs, USAID is trying to develop and systematically apply methodologies and performance indicators for monitoring and evaluating impacts of various types of programs. In order to do this in Title II and other areas of food aid, USAID recognizes that it will have to work closely with its partners in food aid programming — Cooperating Sponsors — to develop appropriate strategies to fulfill these requirements.

Since the 1993 GAO report, USAID has issued food security guidance to the field on P L 480 Title III programs (government-to-government commodity grants) and for FY 1995 has required Cooperating Sponsors to identify food security objectives and impact indicators for Title II programs. USAID is currently working on a policy paper which would provide a clearer indication of the Agency's view of food security. In addition, the USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Response, particularly the Food for Peace Office, is engaged in strategic planning exercises to identify how food aid programs contribute to a food security goal and to evaluate food aid programs.

Within USAID, there is debate about the scope of food security policy. Some believe it necessarily encompasses the three aspects cited in PD-19 — availability, access and utilization. Do you grow and process food or is it available in the marketplace? Do you have adequate income or other resources so you can afford to purchase it? Do you have assets or savings to use to augment your food production or when crops fail? Do you eat adequate amounts of the right types of foods for nutritional well-being during different phases of life? Others believe that a food security policy should be more focused on agricultural productivity and consumption or nutritional issues, because the concept of "access" to food seems too broad — it encompasses the ability to purchase food, and therefore the underlying problems of poverty, a poor economy and lack of sufficient income.

Comments were also made that food security for "all people at all times" is not an achievable goal and that even within a developed country such as the United States, food security has not been reached. Therefore, the impact of a program on a particular problem which contributes to food insecurity would seem to be a more realistic objective for a food aid program, particularly Title II.

## **Aiming for Food Security in Title II Programs**

As Cooperating Sponsors prepare to meet the FY 1995 requirement of linking Title II program objectives and impact indicators to food security goals, two fundamental questions are raised

Is food security an appropriate guiding principle for Title II programs?

How are food security-related objectives best achieved through Title II programs?

The Policy Forum provided an opportunity for examination of these questions

Cooperating Sponsors stated that they believe food security is an appropriate goal for Title II food aid programs, but the focus should be on household and local impact, and not on nationwide indicators. Constraints to food security should be assessed for each situation, and the interventions developed should respond to local needs and opportunities, and should involve indigenous organizations or local communities. Availability of, access to and utilization of food are all important elements, and none should be ignored when designing programs.

Several Cooperating Sponsors have developed their own strategies, systems and field guidance for collecting baseline data, analyzing food security problems and developing programs and evaluation methodologies — although these strategies are new and have only been partially implemented. Others have developed an operational definition of food security based on PD-19. It seems that all of the Cooperating Sponsors at the Forum have reviewed and revised their programs or designed new programs based on food security objectives, and have developed or are developing indicators to show progress towards food security.

However, several Cooperating Sponsors expressed concern that too much may be expected from individual programs. Because Title II targets some of the neediest population groups, the programs may be of critical importance to the people who participate, but it may be difficult to show impact and results may take years. Immediate results should not be expected. Programs should be evaluated for progress towards food security. Practical, inexpensive methods of collecting data and providing useful evaluation information should be sought.

In conclusion, it was emphasized that USAID should move forward with the development of a food security policy paper and operational guidance, and that consultations with Cooperating Sponsors is crucial. Cooperating Sponsors will continue their internal program reviews and development of food security strategies, and their experiences and findings should be reflected in USAID policy and guidance.

## **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

**Ellen S Levinson**  
**Executive Director, Coalition for Food Aid**

Coalition Executive Director Ellen Levinson called the forum to order at 9 A M , thanking USAID's Office of Health and Nutrition for providing technical assistance to the forum through the IMPACT Project, and Laura Ziff, a graduate student from Duke University who has been interning with the Coalition

The purpose of the forum is to review the following issues

- 1 Cooperating Sponsors' practical experiences in linking Title II food aid programs with food security objectives and impact indicators
- 2 The intent of Congress in 1990 when food security replaced a more general foreign policy goal as the overall goal of P L 480
- 3 How USAID is incorporating food security into its Agency policies, directives, and program reviews
- 4 Whether food security is an appropriate goal for Title II, and what steps should be taken to practically apply the concept

The forum is timely in 1990, there were amendments made to P L 480 as part of the omnibus 1990 Farm Bill, and that was the first time that food security was made part of the policy goal of the U S Food for Peace Program Since 1990, USAID has established a policy directive, PD-19, which provides an Agency-wide definition of food security Cooperating Sponsors are required in FY 1995 to demonstrate how their Title II objectives and impact indicators are linked to food security and the General Accounting Office (GAO) is currently conducting a review of Title II to consider, among other things, how these programs relate to food security Because P L 480 must be reauthorized in 1995, this is a good time to start to think about how well the 1990 Farm Bill has worked in the area of food security, and whether it is an appropriate goal for food aid programs The most important part of the examination of Title II and food security is to consider whether it is a practical goal, and whether linking Title II program objectives and impact indicators to food security serves a worthwhile policy purpose This is where the rubber meets the road — what can realistically be expected in the field and at what price?

To put food security in perspective, as a CS plans a Title II program, it must satisfy many objectives and audiences and is subject to multiple mandates and pressures, including (1) the objectives of the host country government's development plan, (2) the CS's own headquarters strategic plan, (3) the USAID Mission's strategic objectives, (4) the Title II food security mandate, and (5) the needs of the communities, indigenous organizations, and people with whom the CS works Theoretically, the last of the five should be the primary focus of development interventions, and the other four requirements should support that work However, in practice, trying to meet all of these objectives places the CS in a difficult position It is within this context of multiple demands that the practicality and appropriateness of food security will be explored

## **USAID POLICY ON FOOD SECURITY**

**Terrence Brown**

**Assistant Administrator, USAID Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination**

### **A How food aid fits into overall USAID strategic objectives**

USAID and CSs have many common objectives which neither can achieve alone. Both groups need to work together as partners — shared benefits and shared risks, with mutual respect and commitment to their achievement. The different perspectives are a strength and not a weakness.

Food aid should be considered a mainstream foreign assistance resource. Food security is essential for sustainable development, which is one of USAID's strategic objectives. Food security is also an issue of broad-based economic growth, especially among the poorest. Hunger prevents people from being economic participants except as supplicants, the lack of economic opportunity engenders poverty. Food security is also (1) an environmental issue — food insecurity can drive the exploitation of marginal lands, misuse of water supplies, exhaustion of soils, and deforestation, (2) a population issue — closely connected to poor maternal health, high rates of infant mortality, and the disempowerment and illiteracy of women, factors that can worsen any hunger problem, and (3) a democracy issue — the pursuit of democracy is hampered when basic human needs are unmet, while food insecurity can contribute to civil strife and create migration pressures.

Enhancement of food security is a worthy cause, and one for which food aid may be particularly appropriate. At the same time, there may be situations where food aid may seem to be appropriate, but where the resources may not be available.

### **B USAID's new emphasis on "managing for results"**

With the reduction in overall resources, including the number of USAID Missions, there has been a necessary shift from process or input accountability to demonstrating results.

Continuing budget pressures, coupled with escalating emergency needs, require us to review all programs carefully to be sure we are achieving and communicating results. Congress is demanding that we demonstrate clear developmental results and benefits to the American people. The recently enacted Government Performance and Results Act reinforces the commitment of both the Executive Branch and Congress to this effort. The Clinton Administration, with the National Performance Review, is committed to making government more responsive and more effective. USAID Administrator Brian Atwood has personally committed himself to this effort, designating all of USAID as a "reinvention lab."

"Managing for results" means three things:

1. A shift from managing inputs to achieving results, which includes
  - planning for results (identify objectives, delineate strategies, specify targets),
  - measuring for results (select indicators, set baselines, collect data, analyze performance),

using results (review performance, report on performance, and make decisions including resource allocations based on results obtained)

This requires strong top-down leadership, for effective bottom-up decision-making, occasional failures are acceptable, but we must learn from our experience

2 A common programming system for the Agency, including

strategic priorities, with guidelines to Missions,

multi-year strategic plans (both Missions and the Washington programming offices),

annual plans (Missions and Washington),

annual performance reviews, and

modified budgets based on performance

3 Making it work

We are in the early stages of re-engineering the system (there are now 29,000 pages of guidance!), the thrust is to maximize overall impact

The process will take place over several years. Projects are still the focus, and inputs must still be properly managed. There are institutional biases preventing the desired shift to results. More than 70 Missions now have strategic plans with objectives and 55 have performance indicators

**C How "managing for results" affects food aid programs**

Cooperating Sponsors can expect the following changes

procedures will be simplified,

it will be easier to use resources, managers will be empowered with authority and information to make decisions,

the emphasis will be on proactive, information-based management,

expectations and requirements will be more clearly stated, reducing audit vulnerability,

it will be easier for partners to participate in strategic planning and program design, requirements will be simpler and uniform regardless of the type of resource

Illustrative is the new P L 480 Title III guidance, notifying Missions that USAID will focus these limited resources solely on helping to resolve food security problems related to food consumption and production in the most food-needy least-developed countries. In this way, USAID hopes to have a measurable and enduring impact that will eventually lessen or eliminate the need for food aid in those countries that now seem to need it the most

**D USAID is limiting its areas of involvement**

- 1 The USAID strategy is defined through the following areas of emphasis health and population, environment, democracy, economic growth, and humanitarian assistance Food security can be an important element of each Within this framework, country strategic plans will define the priority focus of USAID activities, including funding for PVOs, as well as food aid resources These strategic plans will be an essential instrument in programming USAID resources Activities will be assessed in terms of how they contribute to the achievement of the objectives, allowing greater flexibility to reach these objectives
- 2 USAID is limiting its geographic involvement Unless USAID does so, the U S risks scattering its resources too thinly and accomplishing little or nothing of enduring significance USAID is phasing out of 21 countries by the end of FY 1996, these were selected for one or more of the following reasons
  - the country had reached graduate or near-graduate status (no longer requiring grant assistance as the most appropriate instrument of our cooperation),
  - small country programs with excessive cost (these will be covered through a regional mechanism), or
  - the government is a poor partner, making it unlikely that any type of assistance will result in progress toward sustainable development
- 3 USAID is focusing on results across the board, and asking its development partners the same questions it asks itself What are your objectives? How will you know if you've achieved them? How will you track progress? How will you use the information to adapt and adjust your programs? USAID will be interested in seeing the kinds of planning, monitoring and evaluation systems that enable you to answer these questions
- 4 USAID will continue to move to incorporate performance information into its budget and country strategy reviews, beginning with the FY 1996 budget cycle

**E Communicating with CSs regarding USAID's policy and program changes**

The Agency will be moving as quickly as possible to ensure that it is keeping within a common framework with a consistent set of policies and procedures It will try to maintain as transparent and consultative a process as it can throughout

USAID is looking forward to working with PVO partners to make "managing for results" work so that everyone can

meet challenging development needs and this administration's foreign policy objectives,  
forge more effective and participatory relationships with all our development partners,  
help establish the leadership role of the U S in addressing the challenges of development

## Questions and Responses

*Levinson* You mentioned that "greater flexibility" will be given regarding program activities so that program sponsors can focus on trying to reach objectives. Do you mean that if a CS has a multi-year plan in place, and the CS determines that changes must be made due to changing circumstances, the CS will have greater flexibility to make program changes, or are you speaking of USAID officials only?

*Brown* We mean both USAID and our development partners. The major shift in managing for results is that we should be less concerned about input planning and more concerned about results. We have a contract — an agreement — about mutual expectations based upon outcomes, and it should be easier to modify tactics in order to achieve that overall outcome. One of the problems with project structure is getting locked into a design structure that prevents seeking information about what is happening along the way, so the mid-course corrections that are inevitable in any program are more difficult to make. In the new system, we expect to decide more carefully what outcomes we are seeking, how to measure them, and how to report on them. This should be less onerous in terms of detailed up-front microplanning of activities for a 3-4 year period. This is a definite change in the way we do business, and Title II will be part of that new system.

*Etah-Jane Morgan-Harris*

*Africare* You mentioned that some of the changes will be to eliminate food aid in countries that need it most. What do you mean by that?

*Brown* Our overall objective should be to go out of business. One of the issues in dealing with food aid is that there is an infinite need, and a finite resource. There are more places that need a program built around food security than we can manage in terms of our total resources. These are difficult choices, but by focusing our use of resources on a smaller number of countries, we can have more sustainable impact. The process of choosing the 21 Missions to close down was very difficult, it included a Mission in which I spent five years. Although on a day-to-day basis it may seem as if we are having some impact in certain countries, within a longer period of time it becomes more apparent that the program may not be sustainable. The most effective use of resources is where we can combine our total development and food assistance policy within a country framework and achieve sustainable results.

*Tom Marchione*

*BHR/USAID* Regarding new Title III guidance, will Missions be required to include food security objectives in order to obtain Title III resources?

*Brown* We are narrowing our policy focus concerning Title III programs.

some countries will no longer be Title III-eligible, and

local currencies will focus more on the rural sector

*Bob Bell*

*CARE*

What is the status of the USAID food security policy paper and the role of PVOS in drafting this paper?

*Brown*

It is still in preliminary draft form, not ready for out-of-Agency circulation. It's hard to put a date on when a discussable paper will be ready, certainly in August sometime. It is a very important statement for us. Deputy Administrator Carol Lancaster is also involved. Its development is taking a bit longer than we had hoped, but it is central in defining our objectives well and where we are going. I think a bit more time on the internal process will result in a better product for you all to look at later.

## CONGRESSIONAL STAFF PANEL

- Topics**
- 1 Congressional debate and intent during consideration of the 1990 Farm Bill**
  - 2 How the concept of food security replaced the more general foreign policy goals of P L 480**

**Moderator** **Charles Hanrahan**, Senior Specialist in Agriculture Policy, Congressional Research Service

**Panelists** **Kathleen Bertelsen**, House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
**Anita Brown**, House Committee on Agriculture  
**Lynett Wagner**, USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service (formerly with the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry)

*Hanrahan* The 1954 enactment of P L 480 was a landmark Fundamental changes were made in 1966, altering it from an emphasis on surplus disposal to one which linked food resources with development assistance In 1977 efforts were made to further reinforce the development link In 1990 the following significant changes were made

The policy direction was fundamentally changed, from an emphasis on foreign policy to one that linked enhancing food security in developing countries to U S foreign policy and U S agricultural productivity

The link to development assistance was reinforced, not only with creation of the new Title III bilateral development grant program, but also under Title II which is the primary focus of today's meeting

The management of the program was clarified responsibility for Title I was given to USDA, and Titles II and III to USAID

The Food Aid Consultative Group (FACG) was established to assure a seat at the table for PVOs for the consideration of food aid policies and procedures

Our panelists participated in the 1990 amendment process and will briefly review how food security became the policy goal

*A Brown* In the process of preparing the 1990 Farm Bill, the House Agriculture Committee first believed it would be necessary to purge the old legislation of incomprehensible language, paragraph by paragraph, line by line The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Agriculture Committee went further and recommended a complete re-write

The House Agriculture Committee did not include a food security goal in its draft of the 1990 bill However, the Foreign Affairs Committee did, and we supported it It was eventually included in the conference report and the final bill that was passed We had no aversion to the concept We wanted to be sure that food security was not confused

with food self-sufficiency, which implies that a country should produce all of its own food. The notion of "access" is therefore important and is included in the statutory definition of food security. Accessibility to food by a country means that a country is able to produce and purchase the food it needs.

*Bertelsen*

The House Foreign Affairs Committee decided to rewrite the law. I traveled with several members of the Committee to countries where we became convinced of the need for certain reforms.

Before 1990, P L 480 had multiple objectives with little cohesion, which often happens in legislation. First, we had a problem with foreign policy and food aid; foreign policy didn't necessarily fit in with other objectives of P L 480 (emergency relief, development, and trade expansion). The State Department was trying to use food aid as a reward for good behavior or political favoritism, even if food aid was not useful. There was too much waste and poor management; it was becoming a cash cow, a "freebie" for some.

Second, each of the objectives was valid and important, but they didn't hang together coherently. We decided in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and later with the House Agriculture Committee to go back to fundamentals — what is food aid really for? That is how we arrived at the definition of food security.

The State Department objected to a rewrite; they did not want to have one of their tools removed. You can never totally eliminate foreign policy, but you have to establish a framework in which it has to be justified for certain countries. There are still problems with the concept of food security. I don't think USAID has done enough to articulate what it means. But we're going into the 1995 Farm Bill, under which P L 480 will be reauthorized, and we have to know what needs to be fixed. I would welcome input — practical and concrete solutions. Our first hearing will be on August 3rd, and there will be more hearings in September.

*Wagner*

First, in agreement with my colleagues on the panel, at the Senate Agriculture Committee in 1990 we felt that there should be a greater integration of food aid and foreign policy, and a greater emphasis on food security in needier countries. We did try to raise the significance of food security in the bill, in contrast with using food aid as a straight foreign policy tool.

Second, we tried to raise the significance of private sector involvement and the role of PVOs through activities such as the Consultative Group. Among the ways to use commodities, we emphasized an increase in private enterprise and greater democratic participation. We had difficulty in coming up with an appropriate definition of food security. In the Senate Committee we supported a broad definition, including access to food as well as production. Food security was meant to be a comprehensive term — access through broad-based sustainable economic development, thus rejecting the notion of food self-sufficiency, which assumes countries should produce all the food they need. Instead, we recognized the role of trade and enhancing the ability of countries to generate the foreign exchange to import commodities they need, but don't have a competitive

advantage in producing

I would also like to have your ideas on the 1995 Farm Bill. The GAO reports on the P L 480 program will be out soon. We required the GAO report in the 1990 bill to create a mechanism for follow-up, looking at the use of commodities and the use of local currencies generated in meeting the overall policy objectives of the P L 480 program.

*Hanrahan* Where are you in your committees now regarding the 1995 food aid reauthorization?

*A Brown* The subcommittees are getting information from around the country and planning hearings for September.

*Bertelsen* Our first hearings will be on Title I on August 3, then Titles II and III in September. I'll be going to Ethiopia and Kenya in the fall, then to Asia in December.

*Wagner* The Senate has no committee or subcommittee hearings scheduled, yet. At USDA, we have started a process where we are looking at food aid and export enhancement programs to see where we would like some changes in the 1995 Farm Bill. We will hold "farm forums" dealing with both the domestic and international sides later this year. We're always looking for input, including today's discussions on food security.

## Questions and Responses

*Frances Davidson*  
*G/OHN*  
*USAID*

The discussion reminds me of why I went into nutrition — looking at food and food production brings everything together, from the farmer to foreign assistance and foreign policy.

Democracies do not have famines. Issues of democracy and food security at macro and micro levels are becoming increasingly important. I wonder if your agencies and committees have looked at the link between democracy and whether nations have an available supply of nutritionally adequate food.

*Bertelsen* Food security is the underlying current of all we do. Every time we look at food aid, an underlying concern is democracy and what kind of role it plays. The House Foreign Affairs Committee puts food aid into the larger context. One recent example is the loss of democracy in Nigeria and its relationship to the lack of food.

*A Brown* In the House Agriculture Committee, we think more of food than foreign policy, though the two are intertwined. Our primary concern is food availability for people of the developing world.

*Dan Martz*  
*Rep Bereuter (R-NE)*

What is the House Agriculture Committee doing in the GATT Uruguay Round implementing legislation and how might that affect funding for P L 480?

*A Brown* The implementing legislation is going to cost about \$12 billion over five years and most of this is the cost of tariff losses due to trade liberalization. In the area of agriculture, we have an \$800 million agricultural tariff loss. OMB has estimated that savings in agriculture programs due to the new trade agreement will be \$1.7 billion — \$1 billion from reductions in export subsidy programs and \$700 million in higher farmer income and agricultural prices which will lead to lower deficiency payments to farmers. With \$1.7 billion in savings and a loss of \$800 million, that leaves about \$900 million. Members of our Committee, including the Chairman, have sponsored a bill which would take some of the savings generated and try to capture those savings and move them to other agricultural export and food aid programs. In reality I don't think there will be much money available — under the Export Enhancement Program the reductions were made on a commodity-by-commodity basis, therefore you would have to look at each commodity. There might possibly be a small amount of money that could be transferred, but I'm afraid we will probably have to give up all of the savings for implementing the bill.

*Jim Phippard*  
*ACDI*

The panelists have mentioned most of the highlights of the 1990 Farm Bill. I was serving on the Senate Agriculture Committee staff in 1990.

First, as an analytical framework, the work leading up to the 1990 Farm Bill looked at all food aid programs as a continuum of activities that could be invoked in different types of situations, which in the past had been seen in isolation and not as an integrated package. A "continuum" of food aid includes emergencies, post-emergency transition, and post-transition market development. Concerning the 1990 process, a political coalition developed based on the continuum, ranging from people who were concerned about emergencies, nutrition, economic development, and market development — some were amazed at how they all came together under one umbrella.

Second, Lynett Wagner commented on the importance the bill placed on the role of the private sector. There is one element of that which bears repeating: the emphasis on the food aid transaction itself as a development tool. This relates to how you undertake programs and whether government-to-government activities continue, as we saw in Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States. If there was a continuation of these government-to-government programs, the Senate was concerned that they could serve to reinforce the same power structure and people in power, which conflicted with our

country's goals of helping to promote change. Moving programs through the private sector, however, could actually enhance change.

Third, implicit was the fact that development is an important goal of food aid programs. There is a whole range of ways that one could impact development within the panoply of tools available under Title II alone. We need to keep that in mind as we see so many emergencies, we need to maintain a perspective of balance between emergencies and food for development programs.

*Tim Frankenberger*

*CARE*

There's been quite a bit of conceptual development in our understanding of food security recently, and the importance of the relief-development continuum has been borne out in the legislation and in our work. The problem is competition for limited resources, emergencies are growing in number and food for development is essentially shrinking because of this. How will the 1995 legislation address this issue? Will you be operationalizing what "emergencies" are, so we can know whether or not an emergency has been declared, rather than relying on a political definition of an emergency?

Second, concerning cost-benefit analysis of investing in vulnerable areas versus investing in more favored areas or where the infrastructure is already in place. We have seen in Africa that money that could be put into capital development (e.g., Zimbabwe) is instead being used to feed people during emergencies. If you invest in vulnerable areas that tend to be food-deficit regions, you can reduce the amount of money to feed people in the long run. Has any cost-benefit analysis been done vis-a-vis the 1995 legislation to prove that investing in vulnerable areas is a practical way to deal with the growing number of emergencies? Investing where infrastructure already exists is a short-term solution to a long-term problem.

*Bertelsen*

"Emergency" in legislation is very difficult to define. I want to keep the political element out. As for investing in vulnerable areas, we have not asked for any studies. I don't know, I hope you have some answers. No legislation has been written yet.

*A. Brown*

From the House Agriculture Committee perspective, we try to stay out of foreign policy. How would you like us to define "emergency?" Come and talk to us.

*Wagner*

I have no ready answer either. As far as where to focus our resources, we should consider FAO and IFAD, where the focus is on increased food supply. The FAO Director General has put a high priority on food security, especially on helping net-importing, food-deficit countries, and a more targeted use of resources. There may be room for us to work more closely with those types of organizations and other donors in looking at long-term development activities. By helping countries develop basic infrastructure and production facilities, we can prevent some emergencies.

*Peggy Sheehan*  
*CBI*

The panelists said their definition of food security began with a self-reliance concept, rather than self-sufficiency, and then was broadened to include private sector and PVO involvement and a more comprehensive concept of sustainable development. USAID doesn't yet have a policy paper available on food security. I suggest that we work with them on a definition that is as broad as the statutory definition. In 1990, everybody thought that was a good definition. Food aid is a continuum, and not just individual isolated programs. We did work on the continuum several years ago, and we need to get the program back on track and revive earlier legislation.

*Hanrahan*

In conclusion, this forum is an important part of the process of reauthorization. You've had an opportunity to talk with three of the principals involved in the 1990 legislation, who will also be involved in the 1995 legislation.

## FIRST COOPERATING SPONSOR PANEL PATHWAYS TO FOOD SECURITY

**Moderator**     **Emily Moore**, IMPACT Project Consultant

**Panelists**     **Peggy Sheehan**, Chief Operating Officer, Cooperative Business International (NCBA Affiliate)  
**Randy Purviance**, Senior Manager, Adventist Development and Relief Agency International (ADRA)  
**Tim Frankenberger**, Food Security Advisor, CARE

*Levinson*     *Introductory Remarks*

1    The Food Aid Consultative Group (FACG) was established in the 1990 Farm Bill to provide a forum where CSs could participate with USAID and USDA to discuss policy and guidance decisions on food aid programs. Today's forum is actually an offshoot of a May 5, 1993 decision by the FACG that, as part of USAID's strategic objectives regarding humanitarian assistance and economic growth: (a) linkages should be made to food security, (b) food security should be emphasized within those strategic objectives, and (c) CSs should work with USAID to identify how Title II objectives and impacts could be linked to food security.

2    Regarding "managing for results," throughout the history of food aid the emphasis has been more on getting food to people, than on measuring the impact of the activities carried out in conjunction with providing food or using local currencies. Thus, monitoring the movement of food or the use of local currencies has focused on *accountability* for the resources. Nonetheless, evaluations were performed and developmental progress was evident in some cases. Even though the term "food security" was not necessarily used when describing positive program outcomes, Title II program results could often be associated with improved food security.

3    Only recently has there been a shift to focusing on ways to better measure *food security impact* when programs are being designed. Therefore, this really is a new area in food aid. As part of the 1990 Farm Bill, money was earmarked under Title II for CSs to pay for administrative and management costs for better oversight of programs in the field, this has also opened up the door for exploring more careful evaluation and measurement of impact.

4    The focus of the next two panels will be on the linkages between Title II programs and food security, the core of our discussion today.

*Moore*     **A     Results of Cooperating Sponsor Questionnaire**

A Cooperating Sponsor Questionnaire was sent to eighteen CSs, fifteen of which were returned. The questionnaire concerned CSs' experiences in working with the food security mandate, first in terms of formulating objectives that contribute achievement of the overall food security goal, and second in terms of creating and working with

indicators that would measure or demonstrate achievement of the CS's objectives. The results of the questionnaire are summarized in Annex D.

There was a remarkable commonality of responses. Some comments concerned the "zero sum game" which pits emergency uses against development uses of food aid resources. Others mentioned the continuing conflict between direct distribution and monetization. Some CSs are experiencing problems in countries where food security is not among the strategic objectives of the USAID Mission. And some CSs expressed concern with what appears to be a narrowing definition of food security within USAID. Most CSs have found that they can use the definition of food security in USAID PD-19 (availability of, access to and utilization of food) as a basis for considering food security problems and identifying program objectives which are linked to a food security goal. However, a few CSs are developing their own logical frameworks to provide clearer guidance to their own field staff for designing programs and identifying impact indicators related to food security. A common theme throughout the responses is that CSs use Title II resources to seek impact at the household or community level, while PD-19 and USAID seem to focus on country-wide programs and policies, which are more appropriate for Title III government-to-government programs.

## **B Pathways to Food Security**

A series of overheads were projected to illustrate the concept of "Pathways to Food Security" (Annex E). The purposes of these "pathways" include

- a framework within which to review current programs,

- a quick way to check on our assumptions about presumed linkages, i.e., if we do this, then that should happen,

- a visual presentation that enables us to ascertain how far along the chain of presumed causality lies the CS's responsibility and interest,

- a way to determine at which step along the pathway the CS should formulate its "ownable objectives", and

- a way to show which steps should be turned into indicators of success to achieve the program objectives.

When a CS has interlocking projects under an umbrella program, the pathways may suggest ways in which to build their own "objectives tree."

1 The three components of food security are *availability, access, and utilization*. It was once common to believe that if we could just grow enough food, no one would be hungry. A more sophisticated view emerged, primarily inspired by the publications of Amartya Sen, who pointed out that a person can starve in view of a full silo. The FAO definition of "food security" thus incorporated *availability, stability of supply, and access*. More recently the concept of *utilization* has been added to the notion of food security — one can consume a sufficient quantity of appropriate food, but if the body is

riddled with worms and other parasites, the food cannot be properly used

*Availability* consists of three aspects production, which includes increased crop yields, more land under production, dairy and fisheries development, reduced post-harvest loss, which incorporates treatment and storage, and stability of supply, which includes access roads, storage, and markets

*Access* is used to classify those who are temporarily or those who are permanently blocked from access to adequate levels of the right types of available food Those whose access may be temporarily blocked include pregnant and lactating women, infants and school-age children, and those for whom help is presumably a stepping stone to ultimate self-reliance The permanently blocked include location-specific groups such as widows, the elderly, the infirmed, and witches or outcasts

*Utilization* can be subdivided into factors that refer to knowledge of diet, food preparation, weaning foods, and food storage, and health status which, in turn, incorporates various aspects of environmental sanitation, personal hygiene, and health services

2 An overview of the major components of food and nutrition security (page 1 of Annex E) was presented The two major components — *availability and access* — together contribute to community and household level food security Factors that influence these, such as number of household members, gender of the household members who control the income, and traditional customs affecting household distribution practices are also factored in Appropriate consumption (including intake commensurate with nutritional needs), influenced by factors such as personal health status and the principal caretaker's knowledge of feeding practices, should result in proper utilization of the food consumed, and finally this should lead to nutrition security or appropriate nutritional status

3 The next chart concerns *availability* of sufficient food (page 2, Annex E), which includes adequate production of food, reduction of losses, and stabilized supplies (in both geographic and seasonal senses)

4 A part of the preceding chart is expanded in the next one, which concerns adequate *food production* (page 3, Annex E) components could include expanded/improved land, sufficient water, improved farming practices, and appropriate use of inputs At the bottom of this chart is agroforestry The presentation by ADRA on this panel will refer to the agroforestry and the tree nurseries pathways on pages 5 and 6 of Annex E, the CRS presentation will refer to the storage and treatment pathway on page 4, and the CBI presentation will refer to the income pathway on page 7

5 The next chart (page 8, Annex E) is the pathway concerned with *school feeding*, and is one of the more controversial It illustrates well the question of "*how far along the pathway should the CS's responsibility lie?*" We have heard that school feeding does not count with respect to pathways to food security because the time frame is too long, it takes a whole generation before impact can be expected The question is is increased

enrollment and attendance as far as we need to look — do they constitute impact? Or must we go further in time and say what happens as a result of increased school attendance — do the children actually learn, and what do they do with that learning?

It raises another issue what is the CS' responsibility with respect to proving these linkages? There is an enormous amount of research that already demonstrates these linkages. No one would expect a CS to demonstrate that vaccinations, properly administered (in the right dose, at the right time, to the right people and so on), cause a decline in disease incidence. Similarly, if wells are properly sited, properly built, properly maintained, and properly used, should the CS be obliged to demonstrate that this results in declines in fecal- and waterborne diseases?

A school lunch or breakfast program can affect food security in two ways (1) immediate nutrition transfer (not a reversal of stunting or wasting, but temporary hunger alleviation, so that the children's attention span is increased, and therefore learning is facilitated), and, (2) income transfer to the child's family, which can be expected in some circumstances to result in increased enrollment and attendance and fewer drop-outs. Page 9 of Annex E presents a possible menu of related indicators.

6 Next (page 10, Annex E) is a simple pathway illustrating *programs often associated with school feeding programs* — gardens, technical assistance, and nutrition education — and how these can lead to improved availability and utilization of food.

7 The next pathway (page 11, Annex E) illustrates how *school construction* can influence food security. I saw a remarkable connection recently in Ghana, where roofless schools are everywhere, and classes are often held under baobab trees. Our evaluation team found that immediately following ADRA's construction of a proper school building, there was a surge in enrollment. Enrollment can be tricky: is the increase really "new" enrollees, or is the new school merely stealing transfers from another school? In the Ghana case there was also a surge in attendance, which could not be so easily explained. Classes held under a tree are canceled when it rains and classes held in a roofless school are poorly attended when the sun is especially hot. It was therefore not surprising that we found, for example, a newly built school in which attendance went from 60 to 85 percent. The pathways chart then follows the same pathway up as the one for school meals, up to and including reduced fertility, etc.

8 These charts illustrate ideal pathways, or hypotheses. The smooth passage from one box to another is obviously not always true. Under the auspices of the IMPACT Project, IFPRI conducted a study in Ghana with the hypothesis that participation in credit schemes should lead to increased income, which in turn should lead to improved food security at the household level. But the remaining links are weaker as demonstrated in the chart on page 19, Annex E. Possible explanations for the interrupted pathways appear laterally on the chart, these explanations emerged from a workshop in Ghana with policymakers and women farmers who were told the results of the IFPRI study.

9 Another example is the chain from producing seedlings to surviving trees that form windbreaks, which result in reduced wind erosion, improved soil fertility, and increased crop yields (in narrative form on page 17, Annex E). At this point the chain branches

the farmer can now either cultivate the same amount of land as before, deriving more produce, which can be used to feed the family or be sold for income, or she can cultivate less land, deriving the same amount of produce (because of increased yields), and use the time left over to sleep, drink, attend literacy classes, improve child care, and so forth. This chart illustrates that some pathways are indeed less-than-ideal, raising again the question — how far along the chain of presumed causality should we develop our indicators for measuring success, and should we separate the CS's responsibility from interest? Also, what do we do about unexpected outcomes? If we build a road, are we responsible for those who travel over it and where they go? Should we be concerned with who got the seedlings and what the farmers did with them?

The pathways were created to stimulate thinking about these and related questions and issues

*Moore* (To the panel) Please describe your organizational approach to using food security as a goal for Title II programs and your experiences in developing objectives and impact indicators

*Sheehan*  
*NCBA/CBI*

**A Food Aid Programs Can Show Results**

Our experience at NCBA has demonstrated that food aid programs can show results and they actually do end. The example of the NCBA Indonesia Title II program, which ended recently, illustrates this point. The program began ten years ago with the goal of creating jobs and labor-intensive new types of agriculture, especially those for the export market that would not compete with U.S. products. We didn't call it food security then, but rather improving the income of participants so they can buy their own food on the local market. I was happy to hear Terrence Brown say that the Agency is now more results-oriented. At NCBA, we've been trying to measure results for many years. Some results of the Indonesia project include an increase in the number of jobs, improved income levels, and higher volume of goods produced and exported.

**B NCBA Examples — Improved Food Security**

As part of the NCBA Indonesia program, donated Title II commodities were sold and the funds generated were invested in a series of projects to help establish farmer-owned cooperatives intended to increase agricultural productivity and marketing and to provide sustainable incomes and businesses. We achieved excellent results in these areas. The cooperative and business network we have helped develop is expanding into new products and marketing, as well as providing health care and other services to its members and others.

The project began with a cooperative in central Java, there are now regional offices all over Indonesia. Ten years ago there were five employees, now there are 14,000 employees. The coop is reaching out to millions of farmers. The project has developed a business in vanilla production. Seventy-five percent of the vanilla we use in the U.S.

is developed by this coop, which was assisted through a food aid program ten years ago. The volume of production has increased ten-fold. Incomes of individual members are now three times as large. The coop is now exporting mushrooms and baby corn.

When we realized that credit was becoming an obstacle, we then used food aid to develop a financial intermediary, with 42 members all over Indonesia. It's extraordinary to see cinnamon, cocoa, coffee, and other products all coming along. It is now a democratic institution with economic growth, run by a federation of cooperatives all over the country, similar to what ACIDI is doing elsewhere.

The definition of food security is strongly linked to income generation and sustainable growth. It's a continuum. In our Indonesia program, there is now an emphasis on health and nutrition, which has resulted in another spinoff — a clinic and full-time doctor paid by the coop, as well as a store. This project is a model for replication. It fits the definition of food security and is economically sustainable, all within the context of democracy-building.

A similar thing happened in the 1970s and 1980s with an NCBA project in India. With the same model, donated dairy products and oils were used to create dairy and other farmer cooperatives for improved production, marketing, and services to participants. This resource led to a self-sustaining program which currently employs millions.

### **C Proposed Program**

NCBA has proposed a program for FY 1995 which also builds food security through the creation of sustainable and productive enterprises, farmer-owned cooperatives, and increased incomes in a poverty-stricken area. However, it seems that questions about the scope of food security are holding up approval of this project. The broad definition of food security as provided in the law and PD-19 is not necessarily being applied when USAID reviews projects.

*Purviance  
ADRA*

#### **A Food Security is a Useful Concept**

ADRA applauds the food security concept, it will help us direct our planning efforts both at headquarters and in the field. In the evaluation of existing programs, we can use it to determine what to keep and what to close down, and also what areas we may need to add. We believe it will assist field personnel as they design new programs by helping them to get a clearer definition of the problem they're trying to resolve. They can see more clearly what inputs are needed, and will be able to design indicators that will relate more directly to resolution of the problem.

#### **B A Tool for Decentralized Planning and Implementation**

We are now starting to transfer this way of thinking down to the grass roots, as we shift more and more planning and implementation functions from headquarters out to the field level. The food security concept will also be useful as we concentrate our programs and more clearly define catchments, rather than placing projects in dispersed areas. For

example, having a Child Survival program which is in 16 locations in one country, makes it difficult to measure impact

### **C Increased Work and Cost Associated with Impact Indicators**

There is, however, increased work and cost associated with using impact indicators. For example, there may be increased costs in programming, such as additional personnel — a project which in the past required only construction and supervisory personnel, may now require public health or medical personnel to demonstrate changes in disease prevalence or parasite infestation. There will also be expenses for baseline studies, management information systems, and evaluation. Some of these components are already in place, but additional inputs will be needed. We hope that the process will follow a path similar to that of Child Survival programs, with a more standardized process, standard indicators, and standard information systems, in order to avoid reinventing the wheel.

### **D When and to What Degree do We Measure Impact?**

We also have a concern, as Emily Moore said, about the level on the causality tree where a PVO will be required to show impact. The farther along the pathways, the more expensive it will be to demonstrate impact. Some of the earlier indicators that measure outputs are relatively easy and inexpensive to measure. Beyond that, data collection becomes more time-consuming and costly. The tree nurseries pathway illustrates the same problem: the higher up on the pathway, the more expensive it is to measure impact, although the more fundamental changes may be there. Increased biomass, improved soil fertility, and higher crop yields are probably easier to measure than increased food available for family consumption.

*Moore* Responses to the Coalition's questionnaires included many who indicated that they need help — demonstrating impact is placing a heavy burden on the CSS. It's not just a question of inventing indicators, but designing entire monitoring and evaluation plans.

*Curt Schaeffer*  
*CARE*

CARE concluded several years ago that we had become adept at measuring outputs, but rarely had we gone the next step. We decided that the best way for us to get a handle on impact was to critically look at the conceptual frameworks and definitions coming out of IFPRI, Tufts, Arizona, IFAD, etc. The process was difficult but we are further along now. We adapted certain tools to our needs, including rapid food security assessment. Last year, we used rapid food security assessments in seven countries to better understand our programming and to collect data to make management decisions about future programming. The data may tell us to close a program, or to reformulate a project. Using the food security concept has helped us in the following ways: (1) all of CARE's programming now focuses on the household as the development unit, (2) we now do a better job of collecting data to understand the dynamics of the household, which speaks

to better geographic targeting of communities, and better monitoring and evaluation, (3) we look at development more broadly, casting aside sectoral boundaries by focusing everything we do, whether it is family planning or food distribution, on the household. The dynamics of the household are always changing and keeping track can be expensive.

We are now committed to this concept in order to do responsible programming. It is unfortunate that four years into the 1990 amendments to P L 480, USAID is still not able to come out with a food security policy paper.

*Frankenberger*  
*CARE*

The following is a discussion of CARE's food security assessment process, and the concepts used to determine how to best integrate food security into our program objectives and activities.

#### **A Determining Nutritional Outcomes**

We use the UNICEF model at CARE to help us determine the factors that influence nutritional outcomes. Nutritional status is a result of the interplay between food security, health care, and disease. This perspective helps us to understand the relationship among health programs, adequate nutrition education, care for women and children, as well as adequate food availability and access.

Food is a cross-cutting resource which allows us to integrate various sectors, incorporating agriculture and natural resources with the health sector. We see nutritional security as the sum total of socioeconomic, behavioral, cultural, and physical conditions that mutually reinforce each other to affect nutritional outcomes. Nutritional status is the biological manifestation of nutritional security. It can be influenced not only by people's access to food, but also by proper sanitation and care for children. Improving food access may not necessarily bring about favorable nutritional outcomes, however. If we find that nutritional status has not improved, even if access to food has improved, we may need to redirect our activities into health care for mother and child. Therefore, household food security is a necessary condition for nutrition security. CARE uses nutrition security much as USAID uses "utilization" as a component in food security.

#### **B Household Food Security**

Household food security is the capacity of a household to procure a stable and sustainable basket of adequate food. CARE, like the World Bank and FAO, is interested in the quantity, quality, and cultural acceptability of food supplies. Food supplies can be sustained through time in the following ways: (1) appropriate natural resources management, (2) maintenance of productive assets so that people can recover from drought or disasters and go on feeding themselves without food aid, (3) promoting self-reliance and human dignity (we don't want to promote beggars), and (4) not competing for resources used to meet other livelihood needs, such as health, education, shelter, and leisure. There may be competition among food, health, and education needs.

## **C Liveliness Security**

Livelihood security is an overriding concept that is related to both food security and nutritional security. Livelihood security means adequate stocks of cash and food to meet basic needs, i.e., how people make a living. It consists of a range of on-farm and off-farm activities that provide a variety of procurement strategies. If people cannot have a secure livelihood, their ability to meet their nutritional and food needs will not be there. From CARE's perspective, the importance of sustainable development is equivalent to livelihood security. When we want to know what the food security problems of an area are, we ask about the livelihood strategies, the constraints people are facing, and whether those livelihoods are becoming more vulnerable over time. If people have secure livelihoods, they will have secure ownership of, or access to, resources and income-earning activities that will allow them to deal with periodic disasters, and help them to offset those risks and meet those contingencies. A livelihood that is sustainable should be seen as a precondition to household food security and nutrition security. That's why this link between relief and development is so critical. When we understand how people make their living, we understand how they meet their food and nutritional needs, and whether or not they are going to be vulnerable.

People do not adapt to changes in their environment arbitrarily, when it comes to meeting their food needs. There are many strategies they follow. Some require less resources and their ability to return to the status quo is greater, but as time goes on there is a greater commitment of resources and their ability to go back to the status quo is seriously jeopardized. There are two key thresholds people pass through as they try to meet their food needs: first they start to sell off their liquid assets, becoming more vulnerable to food insecurity, at the next level, they sell off their productive assets and become extremely vulnerable to food insecurity, which is when relief activities kick in. We want to understand how relief and mitigation activities relate to one another. It may be too late to save productive assets at the time of relief, therefore, we want to intervene sooner so people can eventually recover from the disaster and get on with leading productive lives. Every development agency separates its development activities from its relief activities. We have to rid agencies of those artificial dividers in order to build truly sustainable, flexible programs.

## **D Interventions**

There are three types of intervention activities for which CS would use Title II

1 Livelihood promotion trying to improve household resilience so they can meet long-term food needs. They do so (especially in drought-prone areas) by diversifying crops, promoting soil and water conservation, reinforcing coping strategies that do not degrade the environment, improving food storage, improving common property resource management, and mesolevel development. (If there are surplus and deficit areas, and you can improve the linkages between them, you can make food cheaper for poor people to buy, most poor people are net purchasers of food.) By improving the infrastructure, you create incentives for merchants to bring food to deficit areas.

2 Livelihood protection protecting households to prevent an erosion of assets and assisting in recovery If we can intervene before they sell off their productive assets, we can help them recover from disaster (similar to crop insurance in the U S ) This relies on three components First is to detect change soon enough so you can respond before people sell off their productive assets We need to have location-specific indicators when food security is worsening Second are interventions that improve the long-term viability of communities so when the next drought hits, they will not be as susceptible to it These interventions involve food or income transfers focused on community derived infrastructure improvements Third is organizational coordination among donors, NGOs, and the government, responsibilities must be laid out in a non-crisis year, creating a contingency plan

3 Livelihood provisioning saving lives — this is what much of food aid programming was for many years But we should also be concerned with how to maintain livelihoods, not just lives, to break the dependence on food aid The ideal goal is to get out of the food aid business altogether This is why we combine livelihood promotion activities with every provisioning intervention

## **E Indicators**

There are three types of indicators that we are developing at CARE to improve the food security impact of our projects

1 **Targeting** One set of indicators is for targeting in order to find out where the chronically vulnerable populations are in an area These indicators usually consist of structural variables such as access to resources (the landless and female headed households), or indicators that represent socioeconomic groupings (caste, ethnicity, etc )

2 **Monitoring** A set of indicators is used to demonstrate that a group is likely to suffer from transitory food insecurity, that is, the food shortage that occurs within a year There are three types of indicators within this category

- **Leading indicators**, which are normally monitored through early warning systems, tend to be collected on rainfall, crop production, and market prices — variables that suggest the conditions are worsening in an area They are collected unobtrusively
- **Concurrent indicators**, based on coping strategies such as crop adjustment, dietary changes, loans, selling animals, etc Some of these strategies are more desperate than others and will often call for livelihood protection measures
- **Trailing indicators**, or outcome indicators, that suggest the outcomes of the food problem, such as malnutrition levels, outmigration, and environmental degradation

3 **Evaluation** In terms of evaluation, we want to know whether or not our interventions actually have made a difference — did we have a food security impact on

those households? What we want to look at carefully are the concurrent and trailing indicators. We want to see if people's strategies are not as bad as they were before, and if outcome indicators are not as bad as before, then we have likely had a positive food security impact on the area.

## **F Implementation of the Food Security Strategy**

To get an organization like CARE to adopt these concepts, we are undertaking a four-stage process.

1. First we do a rapid food security assessment in our food-assisted countries. These assessments consist of the following:

- Institutional assessments to determine how projects are designed in that country, what criteria will be used for targeting, and what information they are using to monitor and evaluate impact. We want to know the current status of CARE programs in the targeted area.
- We then go into an area and try to characterize the food and nutritional security situation in the areas where programs are targeted. We collect information at the household level using a rapid assessment approach to see what people are doing, what their conditions are with respect to food and nutrition security, and whether or not the program makes sense for that situation. Using multidisciplinary teams, we can identify a range of options that will improve the food security situation. An important part of the assessment is the capacity-building part — training our field staff in monitoring and evaluation techniques. The process also allows us to identify changes or adjustments needed in existing programming activities, as well as identify new project areas. Also, we are not just focusing on food access, but we are trying to look at the whole food security picture, e.g., if health services and sanitation are seriously limited in this area, we will try to focus our health programs there. This doesn't mean a reversion to the old integrated rural development concept, but rather the coordination of very focused projects.

2. The next step is to do a baseline. Rapid assessments help us limit the kinds of information we collect in a baseline, making it more cost-effective. Baselines are useful for evaluating eventual impact, and also for determining priority interventions. Usually, a rapid assessment tells what the existing problems are in the area, but it doesn't tell you what proportion of the population suffers from a particular problem nor does it tell you what would be the best intervention. Baselines do that.

3. We then establish food security monitoring and evaluation systems to help us detect transitory food security changes as well as evaluate the impact of our projects. The indicators we use in these systems are very location-specific. Evaluating impact depends on the nature of the particular intervention. You don't want to evaluate something for which the project is not responsible.

4 Finally, project implementation, in which we are not only readjusting existing projects but we are also starting pilot projects to see if we really can have a food and nutrition security impact in that area

## **H Food Security as a Policy Goal**

We are happy that the legislation has mandated that food security be integrated into food aid programs. A key problem, however, is that until USAID incorporates food security into its strategic objectives in country plans, it will be difficult to create coherency with existing USAID strategies. Most USAID policy documents have focused more on Title III. Title II programs need more guidance, are more focused on addressing local needs, and should be coordinated more effectively with Title III. There is a need to do an inventory of what is needed at both the macro level and the micro level.

### **Questions and Responses**

*Marchione*  
*BHR/USAID*

Emily Moore's question is critical to what degree is there a burden of proof on the CS to show that all of these pathways and linkages exist? We should spend some time on that issue.

In addition, what population are we targeting? This is an easier question to deal with than to tease out all these pathways. In some instances, judgements regarding the food security relevance of an intervention can be made based on what type of population is being targeted. Has there been any effort to develop targeting indicators as to where the vulnerable populations are? Are we addressing the chronically food-insecure? Are we addressing those areas subject to intermittent food insecurity, or those vulnerable to drought crises, or are we addressing areas that, relatively speaking, are not food-insecure? That's an important issue but not one that requires a tremendous amount of analysis or puts a tremendous burden on the CS.

Returning to the question of pathways and the burden of proof. Emily, you set up an extreme case with immunization, where you have a one-to-one correspondence between immunization and good health. Many of the variables being addressed by the PVOs do not have anything like that correspondence. When you look at better nutritional status, the relationship becomes very tenuous indeed. It gets expensive to measure at higher levels. You either have to invest in these measurements, or invest up front in terms of establishing that these linkages exist, that either you or someone else has done those analyses in the relevant context, not applying Indonesian data to an African case. Then you can monitor at lower levels.

*Moore*

Right, I picked the extreme of immunization to make the point. But you have to ask if it's worth the extra money after you've shown that a well was properly sited, built,

maintained, and used, or do we then have to measure declines in related disease incidence?

*Purviance* Part of the problem for us is that as a development agency, primarily, it would cause us to become a research agency. It is important to find the linkages that already exist to justify impact on food security in our programs, rather than to collect all the data ourselves. We must keep it as simple as we can.

*Moore* There needs to be some balance between taking data from one country and applying them to another — is it acceptable to take something we know about Burkina Faso and apply it to Ghana, rather than replicating an expensive study? Probably the answer is on a case-by-case basis.

*Stephen Sposato*  
*ENI/USAID* I complement the panel. The linkages have been well laid out. I can't speak for the Agency, but I offer my ideas for your consideration. Back to the legislation, defining food security as food available to all people at all times is very difficult to achieve. Even in the U.S. we hardly achieve food security. Tim Frankenberger spoke well regarding gathering information — we cannot go beyond what the project is intended to impact. For example, bringing in rice for a Food For Work (FFW) project and then measuring income of workers, the linkages have been well examined, but go beyond that — how do we achieve political stability, economic growth, and education beyond the project area — it is a mistake to try to measure more than feeding the people and cooking the food properly. Look at the context. Is there already political stability? But, do not try to associate the program with the continuance of that stability. I'm disagreeing with Tom Marchione, but agreeing with Randy Purviance.

*Moore* I was struck by the Food for the Hungry approach (though this is not related to Title II). It relates to the distinction between what a PVO is interested in and what they agree to be held responsible for. Food for the Hungry routinely includes education (usually health and nutrition) along with their credit programs. Although they declare that they are very interested in what people do with the new-found income resulting from their credit programs, they do not take responsibility for what the participants choose to do with it.

Peggy, regarding Tom Marchione's question, what do you do about conducting a program in a food-insecure region of a country which overall is relatively food secure?

*Sheehan* I realize because resources are limited, priorities must be set, we're all trying to develop the most cost-effective approach. Sometimes we know of a food-insecure area, where we began efforts years earlier, but meanwhile the country has graduated from grant assistance. It's a difficult thing to squeeze the focus down, but we need flexibility to choose among programs. We have to target, as we can't feed everyone in the world. In the Indonesia example, we were on the ground with considerable experience, and we

knew what the problems were and had the ability to act on them. We were targeting according to what we can do as a CS, and thus chose Timor, which has significant poverty and food security problems, rather than trying to pick up and transfer the model to Africa.

*Schaeffer*

Regarding operationalizing the definition of emergencies, you need to distinguish between rapid-onset disasters (as in Rwanda) and slow-onset livelihood failure (much of the Sahel for the past 10-15 years). It will then be easier to operationalize a definition of emergencies. In rapid onset, they have to be addressed immediately. Recurrent droughts and people's ability to deal with them is eroding because of population increase, bad government policies, etc. Our approach and how we target should be different. We should find better ways to target the chronically vulnerable so that in the shrinking food aid environment we can get more out of our food aid investment. The only way is to understand the local context more effectively. It is easier to do a large feeding program, administratively, than to do real food security development activities. For the latter you either need a whole bunch of new resources, or you have to shrink the area to be addressed. We don't want to own up to that. With respect to large-scale feeding programs, you can deal with one-third of Ethiopia, but to be involved with long-term food security, you may have to shrink to one-third of that. If we're interested in developing the long-term capacity for people to meet their own food needs, we have to look at resource requirements, which means that legislative interventions will be needed to ensure the resources are there. Otherwise it doesn't make sense to talk about two types of emergencies. You can't fix them the same way.

*Glen Whiteman*

*FAS USDA*

Many countries will never be food self-sufficient. In the pathways, none of the three pathways addresses the need for food imports or ways to finance these imports.

*Moore*

Those pathways were drawn with CSs in mind, and they deal with household level food security, not the national level. Not included in the overheads, but in your packet, there's a footnote that indicates that income and education underlie everything else. If you can't grow it, you've got to buy it, which is true for both the national and household level. You're right, I've not addressed the question of how to get the foreign exchange to buy the food at the national level, but we are trying to address it at the household level.

*Sheehan*

This was taken into account by the legislation, countries cannot always grow what they need, the definition of food security is not just self-sufficiency, it was expanded into being able to buy what you need.

*Moore*

In the questionnaire distributed to CSs before this meeting, we asked for which categories of programs do you find it most difficult to meet the mandated goal of measurement and verification? CARE's response was MCH and SF, whereas ADRA's response was in

terms of where the catchment area is indefinite, or where impact can't be expected in a short period of time What problems are others having?

*Ghandi Selvanathan*

*OICI* CARE is a long-time player in this field The notion of food security is rather recent Before that, CARE was involved in food distribution Has CARE any data or baseline information on food security in various countries?

*Frankenberger* CARE has not done a good job in the past of collecting baseline information, only 15 percent of our projects have baseline information, and some of that is questionable We're the first to admit this needs to be corrected We have anecdotes about improvements, but not scientific proof of what it was before compared to now

*Schaeffer* I recently participated in an evaluation of the CARE India program, the largest Title II program in the world, looking at its impact on 140,000 villages, 8.5 million beneficiaries Yet CARE in its contract with USAID was charged only with getting the food out, there is nothing in the contract to say we were to measure impact I wish we had been doing so 10, 20, 30 years ago, but we have to start somewhere Until recently we were satisfied with reporting outputs only

*Moore* If even CARE can bare its soul and confess to this, surely others can do the same It does make some feel defensive when a CS is asked why they haven't been measuring impact all these years

*Steve Gale*

*CDIE/USAID* USAID and its development partners will have to spend more time and energy on performance measurement

1 We don't need new indicators, we need to think about new questions

When we say we have impact, impact compared to what? What's our baseline, what was our target?

At what cost are we getting impact? Is the taxpayer willing to pay for that impact?

Causality once we say we've achieved an impact, and this is its price, can we demonstrate it is a result of what we did?

2 Monitoring and evaluation are quite different monitoring is never going to tell us what happened, it will only tell us how things are going Evaluation needs to be planned for in advance It is very hard methodologically to look back and say what the impact was, so you need to plan ahead and have controls, baselines and targets

3 As we change and elevate and become more complex with our terminology, such as "nutritional security," there is going to be more difficulty demonstrating impact. While I applaud moving from simple concepts to more integrated concepts, at the same time the integrated concepts will be more difficult to show to Congress and the American public, as well as more difficult to achieve.

*Frankenberger* CARE is trying to break away from traditional Title II categories, from MCH and SF programs. You should go into an area identify the problem, and determine what is the most appropriate intervention for that area, it might mean a mix of interventions. We want to be open to new ways of doing things. Second, there is a difference between evaluating Title II and Title III. If all your Title III resources are being used to influence policy and then you use national level statistics to measure impact, we might overestimate the impact that USAID had on a country. Looking at changes in nutritional status in the whole country over the last five years may be unfair to the program. We need to be realistic about the policy impacts possible with Title III.

What scares me are strategic planning exercises that use broad-based, national indicators. USAID is going to have difficulty showing change at the national level for which they can be accountable, unless the country is very small. There needs to be comparable development of food security indicators for Title III as well as for Title II.

## **FOOD SECURITY CONTINUUM FROM RELIEF TO DEVELOPMENT**

**M Douglas Stafford**

**Assistant Administrator, USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Response**

The central theme of the Bureau for Humanitarian Response is nongovernmental operations. Improved food security is important to U.S. foreign policy, to USAID, and to millions of poor and hungry people. Rwanda is a grim reminder of this. USAID understands the efforts needed to support the field operations we are now mounting. I'm proud of the role USAID is playing, not the least of which is USAID's partnership with PVOs and international agencies.

The attention of the American people and of the world's people is now focused on how this partnership performs. We will be able to save the people of Rwanda. There are three million refugees and three million displaced people. A refugee is dying every minute. Eventually the refugees will go home. The real solution lies in the political accord — unless this happens by early August, the crops now in the field will be lost.

The real answer to Rwanda is broad-based development and popular participation in the creation of institutions which will help ease tribal conflict. Easy to say, but almost impossible to accomplish. We are reaching a consensus that development is the surest way to mitigate complex disasters. The same partnership of PVOs, USAID, and international organizations that work effectively on emergencies is best positioned to mount the development programs required.

A relief-development continuum is quite simple. Successful development can prevent or help countries prepare for better managed disasters. Effective emergency assistance prepares people to return quickly to normal economic, social, and political development. The key to progress on both ends of the continuum seems to be anchored in food security. Those countries that have been able to establish basic food security at the national, village, and household level have made the most development progress. Bangladesh is an excellent example of a very poor country which has successfully used U.S. food aid to establish food security and is now beginning to experience broad-based economic growth. On the other hand, food insecurity is often a major factor in convincing people to become refugees or internally displaced. Once a crisis reaches the point where large numbers of people are on the move, it is very difficult to manage. Some 20 million in the Horn of Africa, besides Rwanda, are at risk.

I recognize there are still some semantic and definitional issues to be sorted out and there are some who don't care for the idea of the continuum. We can no longer accept divisions which isolate development partners from those providing emergency assistance. In 1989, the USG spent less than \$300,000 on declared disasters, but five years later that has risen five-fold to \$1.5 billion. Therefore, the growing emergency requirements are putting pressure on development assistance, including PVOs and WFP Title II development programs. We are committed to preserving Title II development programs. I am sure that everyone would agree we also need to respond to emergencies. We must explore all options for meeting these two approaches. We must have the resources for both. Most importantly, we must work together — PVOs, USAID, and international organizations, all have an interest in food security and in the relief-development continuum.

## Questions and Responses

- Levinson* If you're looking at emergencies in Eastern Africa, it seems the timing is right for the USG to be creating contingency plans for the future. We really don't have a specialized food aid mechanism to rapidly respond to emergencies. Is there discussion about creating one so we don't end up with the situation again where the U.S. cannot commit adequate food resources in a timely manner?
- Stafford* The analogy to Rwanda is Iraq, although Rwanda is an even bigger emergency than Iraq. We knew that the PVOs and international agencies could not respond to such king-sized disasters. With Iraq, you had the U.S. Army in place, and infrastructure already in Europe and Turkey. It was a major decision to take on the task at all, you don't normally take care of people in their country of origin. We had to cross a definitional hurdle and it changed UNHCR significantly. Then, the world community took on Yugoslavia. We've taken on any number of disasters after that. The response has not worked too badly, as in the drought in Southern Africa. The important thing to think about is whether the U.S. will think in terms of a military role or a separate humanitarian role. There's a lot of room for criticism, and we all ought to do autopsies. Yes (to Levinson's question), this is something that people need to look at. A lot of food aid has gone on without a superhuman coordinated effort, a lot of mechanisms have worked fairly well.
- Frankenberger* How much long-term planning is going on in addition to the emergency response? Is anyone thinking about how people are going to feed themselves after they go back to Rwanda? For example, a lot of the bean crops are not going to be planted this year so there will be a major food shortage six months from now.
- Stafford* This morning, National Security Council discussions are focused on the return of refugees. If the RPF will behave as a government and demonstrate that minority rights will be taken into consideration, people will return, and people have been tasked with looking at that and at the long-term needs. I'm not sure what direction this will go. I can't tell you if we're into another 25-year Sudan.
- Levinson* I was glad to hear about the emphasis on the development side of food aid as the linkage to mitigate and prevent emergencies, and to improve local coping mechanisms and the ability to adjust to disasters. If we just focus on catching up with emergencies, how can we make progress in development? There have been budget cuts for food aid programs, as well as decreases in surplus stocks held by the Commodity Credit Corporation of the USDA. The multiple goals of meeting emergency needs at the same time as trying to get a foothold in development, and trying to focus on areas that are most vulnerable, are difficult to achieve. A new mechanism is needed to deal with emergencies separately from these ongoing targeted assistance programs. There's a need for creative thinking in that area.

## SECOND COOPERATING SPONSOR PANEL PATHWAYS TO FOOD SECURITY

**Moderator**     **Emily Moore**, IMPACT Project Consultant

**Panelists**     **David Pirano**, Technical Unit Director, Catholic Relief Services  
**Vicky Denman**, Food Aid Technical Advisor, Catholic Relief Services  
**Judy Bryson**, Director of Food for Development, Africare

*Pirano*  
*CRS*

CRS welcomes the concept of food security as defined by PD-19. We had been struggling to find an overarching goal or tag, particularly as we make programming decisions and determine the sectors in which to intervene. PD-19 provided the structure we wanted — it is broad, yet useful to analyze our programs in context.

There may be some lessons learned in our efforts to show impact in CRS's MCH programs. One of our overall goals was to lower childhood malnutrition rates. It seemed like a good, measurable goal, but it is actually quite complex. On the surface, both malnutrition and food security are easy tags, but once you go deeper, there are so many factors that come into play, that it is difficult to show causality. The CRS MCH programs are comprised of various interventions that we assumed would lead to decreased malnutrition. But, many evaluations were either inconclusive or concluded there was no improvement in child malnutrition. Looking back, part of our problem was that we focused a bit too much and perhaps did not plan well enough in advance how we would evaluate our programs. We did not take into account other factors that were impinging on the expected outcome. We also expected the government to take care of some of these other factors. With the current focus on food security and the pressure on showing impact, the pendulum is now swinging to the other direction — from measuring only inputs to measuring impact and attributing causality, this may be going too far. We may now be at the point in food aid where we were with MCH — where we can't show impact or causality to the degree we are being required to show it. Yet, there are positive results which we may be overlooking.

With respect to the concept of "managing for results," CRS field staff wants a framework, and CRS headquarters expects the field to show results, but the difficulty is in demonstrating causality. The emphasis is now on "why we do what we do." Why, for example, do we intervene in agricultural production or in health? As long as we can demonstrate why we do these programs and why we expect them to increase food security, I would hope we will be able to continue them.

For example, we have not collected adequate baseline data in the past, so proof of impact now becomes difficult. In Rwanda (before events of this year), we looked at what CRS could do to improve food security. Most arable land in Rwanda is already cultivated, further expansion is out of the question. Increasing yields from currently cultivated lands would also be very difficult because of the economic constraints of bringing in technical assistance and fertilizers. However, we realized

post-harvest losses are extremely high (25-40 percent of the crop),

there are surplus areas and deficit areas, and

without storage, farmers must sell immediately after harvest at very low prices, buying back at much higher prices in the hungry season

We therefore chose storage as the most appropriate intervention With FFW, CRS assisted in the construction of 90-ton silos, the project purchased crops at harvest time at the official government price, and farmers were then able to buy back later at only a small mark-up

The project did three things (1) reduced losses due to moisture and insects, thereby increasing the total amount of food available, (2) stabilized supplies in a temporal sense, by increasing the supply of food available throughout the year, and in a geographic sense, by placing silos in surplus areas with food sold to deficit areas, and (3) farmers had more cash income available by bringing sale and repurchase prices closer together

Indicators, admittedly not too sophisticated yet simple and less costly, included (1) percent loss due to use of silos, (2) amount of food moved from surplus to deficit areas, and (3) the amount of additional cash available to farmers These were operational indicators to let us know whether we were doing what we intended to do

The concept of the emergency-development continuum has been around a long time Rwanda is a good example of how important it is not only to look ahead, but to meet people where they are In Goma today, what's hindering food security right now is not food (for now, at least), the bigger problem is sanitation, which can undermine other activities The continuum, to me, means meeting people where they are and doing what is the most important thing for them at a particular point in time

*Denman  
CRS*

The MCH program is one of the largest food-assisted operations at CRS Traditionally, we have tended to focus mainly on food distribution, but this is only part of a package which can include health education, organization of women's groups for credit and savings, income generation activities, gardening, or environmental sanitation MCH programming works at both the household and individual levels It increases effective utilization of food — how it's absorbed, correct preparation of food, deworming medications, etc It also affects availability of food because of the women's activities, working together on their gardens, credit programs, etc Savings (assets to fall back on) shouldn't be underestimated, as they affect the availability of or access to food MCH also affects access by educating caregivers and focusing attention on vulnerable groups like infants and pregnant women

This examination of the pathways to food security raises numerous questions How far up the chain of presumed causality will the PVO be held responsible? To what other factors is the impact relative? What is the cost of measuring it appropriately? If impact is found, can it be attributed to the PVO? Even with large-scale expensive studies, it may not be possible to demonstrate a causal relationship — examples are the many studies done in the U S on the school lunch program Nevertheless, those of us in more

difficult research environments overseas, may be pressed to demonstrate even more in our programs than can currently be demonstrated in U S domestic programs

We must also look at the long-term picture Changes in maternal and child health can take many years, yet we may be asked to measure impact from a single project cycle of only a few years

The Child Survival program, with its standard set of interventions, introduced some of the rapid assessment technologies The commonly used Rapid Knowledge and Practice Survey is a low-cost tool for management decisions which focuses on whether you're doing what you said you would do It does not attempt to collect mortality, morbidity, or nutritional status data, nor does it attempt to measure impact, because linkages have already been established and need not be proven again by each implementing agency USAID has accepted the Rapid Knowledge and Practice Survey

Planned phase-out will become necessary, we cannot do large-scale programs if we must also do large-scale evaluations Program cost will be increased as emphasis is placed on impact evaluations

*Moore*

That leads us nicely into Judy Bryson's presentation, which focuses on assessment and evaluation, which is similar to how we ended this morning's panel with CARE's rapid appraisal techniques We've tried to structure both segments of these panels starting with food security and program design, then moving to measurement and impact on food security

*Bryson  
Africare*

Africare has pending a large Food for Work program in Angola Our largest food program is in Sierra Leone, where Africare is assisting the Sierra Leone Red Cross to deliver WFP commodities to 138,000 refugees, as well as conducting FFW programs to resettle households Our only Title II program now is a 100 percent monetization program

Africare this year undertook a food security assessment of the impact of our 100 percent monetization program in Guinea Bissau We found that food security can be an important conceptual framework for project activity, particularly in Africa Introducing village communities to the conceptual framework of food security and using the PD-19 definition, "when all people at all times have sufficient food to lead a healthy and productive life," and its three facets — availability, access, and utilization — can be an important means of developing public awareness of the elements which impact on their food security and the constraints to improving it Regularly meeting to determine how well the strategies are working can provide means for monitoring, fine-tuning, and eventually evaluating outcomes We believe we can use this process as a data collection instrument

This fits well into the types of data collection Tim Frankenberger talked about this morning We will have to start with a baseline if we are to measure impact We now

recognize the importance of trying to develop methodologies and arriving at agreed-upon targets, similar to that in Child Survival programming. The plural of anecdotes is not data. All of us have wonderful stories of what our programs have achieved, but they are not data. We have to have better methodologies.

The assessment of food security impact helps to clarify that it is important to develop programs that cover all three facets of the definition — access, availability, utilization — and to make partnerships with other organizations to ensure that all facets are covered, as David Piraino alluded to. Africare focused first on agricultural development and production, and second on access to markets and incomes. We also have Child Survival and other health programs, but in our food programs we had not been looking at utilization. So, when we redesigned the program in Guinea-Bissau, we proposed to subcontract with the Ministry of Health to do nutritional monitoring. We think this will help them in their outreach capacity, but will also help us to see if our programs are having an impact on utilization. We will also be adding nutrition messages to other education provided to village associations.

In addition to other indicators, Africare uses "food processing" and "value added." These enhance time and place uses of food and also provide quality benefits — digestibility and assimilation improvements — that can come from food processing. These impact access and utilization, as well as availability.

Under access, there needs to be a third element — integrated, efficient markets supplying food at reasonable prices to poor populations. Africare feels strongly about this. One of the major problems in Africa is that it is not well integrated into foreign markets, nor are internal markets efficient and well-integrated. We believe that monetization is a valid means of distribution for food aid. PVOs can use monetization differently from market development programs such as Title I or Title III. Differences include:

- 1 Training of traders and actively soliciting trader participation, particularly those who are supplying poor rural populations, it is not something that is likely to be undertaken by Title I or Title III programs or by the Export Enhancement Program.
- 2 Expanding the number of traders and increasing their capitalization and turnover are also helpful for improving market efficiencies, competition, and the capacity to participate in the market.
- 3 Tailoring commodity packaging to incomes of the poor, there's a difference between those who want to maximize profit and those who wish to ensure that the commodities moving into the market are those that are consumed by poor populations.

Regarding moving up the causality chain as mentioned earlier, there has been a lot of research in Child Survival. Johns Hopkins University and others have the resources to look at the causality questions thoroughly. It is easier to do it in a discrete area such as Child Survival than in the complexities of these excellent food security pathways. Organizations such as the World Bank, USAID, and other major donors have the budgets to begin to amass the information and experience in these many areas, especially at the higher level of causality. There are things that relate to any sort of development project,

not just food aid CSs should establish some of the lower links in the chain, such as soil fertility and yield increases, and the higher links should be established by an overarching data collection exercise Such a division of evaluation responsibility would be very helpful to us, allowing us to concentrate on collecting data within our budget resources It would make a very useful contribution to the battles over USAID's withdrawal from food-insecure countries According to USAID policy, if a PVO is permitted to continue food aid programs in those countries, it must meet stringent requirements, ideally, to be able to demonstrate national impact or pilot programs that demonstrate what could be done to have an impact at national levels

*Moore*

The following is a brief review of the major themes that emerged from the previous presentations

1 The difference between measurable and verifiable objectives I hope we all agree that not all objectives must have numbers in them in order to be valid, but we must have ways of demonstrating that they have been achieved

2 Pathways distinguishing between accountability and the CS's interest For example, is the CS responsible for the ultimate use of income, time, roads? Is it worthwhile to replicate what we did in Burkina Faso in every country that has a school feeding program? David Piraino was modest in delineating the indicators they used in Rwanda Maybe those modest indicators were completely appropriate In Ghana, our evaluation team found that as a result of a grain storage program, a hundred families who had been food-insecure for as long as anyone could remember were in just one year no longer food-insecure Harvest losses had gone from "very high" to zero In a short time they had taken care of the hungry season problem, and were now tackling the "what if there's no rain" problem, they were already planning for a bad year buffer stock Is it worth taxpayers' money to measure more than that — isn't that enough? Are we letting the pendulum swing too far?

3 Is there really a time frame? It can take five or more years for a health intervention to pay off, compared with the grain storage project in Ghana which shows dramatic results in one year If you count school attendance as impact, then school construction and school feeding may fall among the rapid time-frame programs But are we to be limited only to programs that have a rapid payoff? Or should we only do projects that are easy to measure?

## Questions and Responses

*Shurley Pryor*  
*G/USAID*

The purpose of indicators is to help you adjust programs I don't hear anyone saying they want to adjust programs, just that they want to continue them as well as measure them

- Bryson* The food security conceptual framework would provide an excellent tool both for monitoring and for working with local communities, by continuing this process, we will be able to fine-tune and adjust programs
- Denman* With the Child Survival program, one of the basic questions in the survey is "will answering this question help me manage or adjust this program "
- Pryor* Not just adjusting programs, but also comparing them is one program more beneficial than another
- Denman* It's really hard to compare Is export agriculture more beneficial to Third World women than MCH?
- Pryor* You have to be able to answer that question in order to know where to put money Do you have an alternative for answering that question?
- Denman* We need to say what an effective MCH program is If we can't, we should not be doing the program You look at that question in comparison to other questions whose answers we already know, nutrition education for 300 women may not be as effective as it is for 30 women The million dollar question for USAID is — do we want to help emergencies or development? Health or small enterprise? Those are often political decisions
- Pryor* Are you saying that we're having an impact, we just can't measure it? Is that so for all programs?
- Denman* Here's an example MCH versus Child Survival programs in India we visited villages where there was a long-term impact, but it is difficult to measure women sitting at home all day versus women who can save money and send their children to school How many organizations were set up, how many women now speak up at meetings? Is female literacy effective in improving the health status of women and children?
- Levinson* This is an interesting dynamic — which is better for you, apples or oranges, versus a basket of inputs? Do we have a triage mentality, how do we divide up resources when they are scarce? They've always been scarce Each PVO and coop has its own capabilities which should be taken into account What are your capabilities as a Cooperating Sponsor and where are you best able to work?
- Frankenberger* As a Cooperating Sponsor, we look at the context to determine which intervention is appropriate and we look for synergistic effects with other NGOs and partners

*Bryson*

How do we choose? Food security efforts focus on poor regions and poor people, where the economic returns may not be as great compared to more developed regions. Take into consideration, though, that the cost of intervention would be very high if we only addressed food needs during emergencies. What do we gain with food security? It forces us to use more rigorous analysis — food alone is not a project. We look at the overall development picture.

**Topic PUBLIC POLICY PANEL GOVERNMENTAL VIEWPOINTS**

**Moderator Peggy Sheehan, Chief Operating Officer, Cooperative Business International**

**Panelists Harold J Johnson, Director of International Affairs Issues, GAO**  
**H Robert Kramer, Office of Food for Peace, USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Response**  
**Gloria Steele, Center for Economic Growth, USAID Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research**

*Sheehan* Please explain your agency's or bureau's involvement in food security From your various perspectives, how do you define food security and analyze the impact of programs on food security?

*Johnson*  
*GAO*

The 1990 Farm Bill requires GAO to review P L 480 every two years and to consider, among other things, the impact these programs have in enhancing food security The first report on Titles II and III was issued last July, and the GAO report on Title I will be completed in August, 1994 Our second look at Titles II and III is just beginning, and the final report should be ready in Spring, 1995

The first GAO report on Titles II and III concerned the Washington Office of Food for Peace and activities in seven countries GAO concluded that USAID had no clear policy or strategy for how food aid should support food security and was unable to assess the impact that food aid had on food security because it was not collecting the necessary information Therefore, GAO recommended that USAID should (1) clarify and provide guidance to regional bureaus, Missions and Cooperating Sponsors on how Title II and III programs are expected to meet the legislation's food security objectives, (2) develop and systematically apply methodologies and performance indicators for monitoring and evaluating the impact of food aid programs on food security, and (3) direct Missions and CSs to collect the data necessary for those evaluations

USAID's policy statement PD-19 focuses on economic growth as the long-term cure for food insecurity The GAO agrees that food security is inextricably linked with poverty, but PD-19 does not lay out the Agency's expectation for the impact that food aid could have or how the problem of food security could be approached Since the GAO report was issued, USAID Administrator Atwood has commented that food aid is a valuable resource for achieving food security, and USAID is now developing a food aid policy statement Some of the policy questions that should be addressed are (1) What is the appropriate balance between macroeconomic development as emphasized in the current policy statement and the need for short-term humanitarian interventions? (2) For what purpose and at what points along the emergency-rehabilitation-development continuum are direct feeding programs appropriate? (3) What is the criterion for graduation from a direct feeding program? (4) How should CSs use food aid to enhance food security at the community and household level? (5) Are direct feeding programs still a priority? (6) How should monetization projects be linked to food security?

The GAO's second recommendation is that USAID ensure that data are collected to assess the impact on the reduction in food insecurity, and require the development of measurable performance indicators. In its guidance for FY 1995 Title II Cooperating Sponsor projects, USAID emphasized that projects must be linked to food security objectives and indicators developed to assess impact. However, this guidance did not prioritize or discuss possible approaches for measuring impact, which were left up to individual CSs to determine.

It is appropriate for USAID and CSs to work together to formulate strategies for achieving food security and for developing indicators. Forums such as this one are important in advancing the discussion. This is a complex problem and developing indicators is not an easy task. Many other factors outside USAID and CSs affect food security. Rapid food security assessment is a promising approach. Although this method probably would not stand a strict academic test, it is cost effective. CSs should have more than anecdotal evidence to evaluate project success. Consistent monitoring and evaluation of projects can give information on what projects work best under a given set of circumstances, and result in better decision-making.

Over the years, accountability for food aid has focused on management issues. This is a minimal requirement, and evaluations must look beyond monitoring resources to program impact. The outlook for increased resources is bleak, and therefore it is more important than ever to rigorously evaluate programs to make sure resources are used effectively.

*Kramer*  
*BHR/USAID*

Thanks to the Coalition for engaging us in this critical dialogue. In the three months since I took the position of Director of FFP, I have been struck by the dedication and unique ability of CSs to understand and address the needs of people within the context of their local communities. Even when USAID lost sight of its primary mandate, to improve the lives of the poor, the PVOs stood steadfast in their objectives.

The FFP Office will be engaged in the following activities over the next few months:

**1 Enhancing the credibility of food aid and the role of those who manage the resource within the Agency** In doing so, we hope to help our PVO colleagues who face similar challenges. For far too long, food aid has been considered marginal, abundant, and could be used indiscriminately. That must change.

**2 Improving the management of P L 480** The GAO report issued a very stern, appropriate challenge — to significantly enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of food aid resources. The results of this report surprised no one. Food aid is nearly one-third of the resources of USAID, but very few staff members manage the program. This reflects the benign neglect of many years.

**3 Implementing a Food for Peace Transformation Program** The FFP Office has been chosen as one of the Agency's two headquarters "reinvention laboratories." The FFP transformation program (a) defines a strategy to increase the awareness of USAID staff at all levels about the role of food aid within the framework of the USAID strategy.

for sustainable development, (b) strengthens the professional capability of USAID staff responsible for food aid management, (c) provides comprehensive training and a career path for American and foreign service national food aid managers from all regions of the world, (d) initiates a recruitment program for individuals with solid conceptualization and management skills, and (e) begins a strategic planning process

We can all cite anecdotes of successful programs. I've heard many today suggest, and I agree, that we don't have a documented body of evidence of success, what works where, when and why. Not only are we beginning to document the impact of food aid, we are also establishing a monitoring and evaluation plan to document that impact in a routine way in the future. These plans set forth the questions managers at different levels need to ask, the sources of information, and persons responsible for collecting and analyzing the data. With these monitoring and evaluation plans, we can reduce the amount of useless information and develop more reliable and useful information systems. By planning at the outset how lower-level objectives will be measured, we will be able to make better use of resources.

No one benefits from the Byzantine procedures and regulations that have been established over the years that govern P L 480 programming. A process was begun last year by the PVOs to clarify authority and simplify procedures. We will work closely to establish new processes and procedures that will meet all of our needs, as well as the goal of better management of P L 480.

**4 Changing the Title II program review process (Multi-year Operational Plan reviews) from a perfunctory paper exercise to an issues-driven, substantive program review that food aid deserves.** Standards for program identification, design and review should fully reflect the critical importance of the resource. To do less demeans both the resource and the professionals who manage it.

**5 Reinforcing the critical role of P L 480 and the PVOs by commemorating the 40 year anniversary of the P L 480 program this year.**

I hope you agree that the above items are important, and that you will collaborate with us in a spirit of partnership. I have been told that this agenda is too ambitious. With your help, we will not fail. To all, I issue a challenge: the period of benign neglect is over. We must work together to enhance the credibility of the resource we manage.

Food aid is an expensive resource. Adopting a more focused concept of food security as our strategic objective provides a programmatic compass to guide our decisions. Ongoing and planned new activities must meet the test of relevance to this objective. Sustainability of benefits is at the heart of the objective. Indicators of progress toward achievement of the objective must be agreed upon, and information systems that measure progress must be developed for use at the project and overall program levels.

As FFP began the strategic planning process, we quickly realized that all the existing definitions of food security, including PD-19, did not provide us with that compass. It became clear we had to sharpen our focus. Measuring impact of food aid programs against a strategic objective so broad that just about any type of activity could be justified

under it, was getting us nowhere

Since the Agency is in the process of redrafting a food security policy paper, we decided to lower our sights, and think about more precise objectives that we could use to measure progress with some confidence. A two day workshop was too brief for such an ambitious process, but it served as the basis for a dialogue with our colleagues about strategic planning. We plan to hold another retreat in August with our colleagues, other U S government agencies, and the PVO community. We believe we will be able to establish a consensus about our common objectives and begin to create a series of performance indicators we can all use to measure the impact of our activities. Recent reviews of CSs' FY1995 Multi-year Operational Plans also revealed a need to know the definition of food security and to develop a more uniform set of performance indicators. These reviews have also established a need to more precisely establish the circumstances in which food aid should be used for development activities. In some cases, food is not the most efficient resource. What is needed for some activities is cash, especially local currencies. We have all been reluctant to look for other resources.

There are numerous issues we must address as we define food security and program our resources. Food is an expensive resource when we consider the cost of the commodity, freight, and management. Food security is highly variable among and within countries. The most food-insecure countries are in Africa and South Asia, therefore, food should be targeted to those countries. While monetization provides us with certain opportunities, it clearly must be focused on food security, we cannot afford to use monetized food to support any and every development activity. We must also ensure that the intrinsic value of food is understood and that we make every effort to recover the cost of commodity, freight, and management. It is critical that we articulate to our agencies and to our constituents that food aid is no longer to be considered a marginal resource. We must continue to look at how we design, manage, and evaluate this resource.

*Steele*  
*G/USAID*

The GAO expressed concern over the absence of policy guidance in food security. USAID has a food security policy, what we do not have is operational guidance, and we are working on that. The GAO report also expressed concern for what appears to be a proliferation of activities that attempt to achieve the food security goal. However, food security is a broad problem. Its three aspects — availability, access, and utilization — can result in very different strategies. Further complicating the matter is that the problem may differ by country. It becomes very difficult to provide across-the-board guidance on what can and cannot be funded. CRS made an appeal to that effect, and we will take that into consideration in drawing up operational guidelines.

In designing food security strategies — using food aid in particular — we need to understand what specific food security problem we are trying to address. I would like to emphasize what Tim Frankenberger said earlier. Because the approach we take depends on the type of problem we are trying to address, we could derail, rather than facilitate, food security. Lines between the three aspects (availability of, access to and utilization of food) are thin, but they exist. One intuitively thinks that bringing in food aid increases access to food for specific segments of the population, but that may not be the case. It may increase the supply but will not necessarily increase access by

vulnerable groups unless accurately targeted. We have heard a lot about disincentive effects that poorly targeted programs cause. We need to be clear about what we are trying to do, whether it is increasing supply or improving access.

As a result of growing concerns regarding world hunger, a number of research institutions have begun to examine the world food outlook into the 21st century. Their interpretations are contradictory in some cases. I'd like to focus the rest of my discussion on access. Concerning the global food crisis itself, some believe the earth's capacity to produce food is in jeopardy, and others believe that the world can feed itself, well into the 21st century. Technological policy and institutional innovation can help reverse current negative trends. Another area in which there is not much consensus concerns the relative importance of increasing supply versus improving access to and utilization of food by the poor. Most agree that there is sufficient food to feed the world on an aggregate basis, but that hunger exists on a more localized basis at the national or regional level. The hunger problem is not due to an inadequate supply, but rather to the inability of people to purchase the available supply, as well as to underlying nutrition and health-related problems.

There are also areas of agreement: hunger is most critical in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Even in food surplus countries and regions, there are food-insecure people. There is evidence to show that problems of access and poor utilization, rather than inadequate supply, are the most critical food security problems today. Unless the access and utilization problems are addressed, food supply will also become a severe problem in the future. I don't mean to say that food supply programs should not be supported. It is essential to advance yield-increasing technologies because they can also reduce the cost of food production. I also believe in the importance of research to adapt technologies for local application.

The lack of access to food is due to poverty. Focus on food security forces us to focus on poverty. Alternative solutions for improving access include:

- 1 direct distribution (non-market distribution),
- 2 helping the poor to increase income, and
- 3 reducing the cost of producing and delivering food.

Targeting of food transfers is not as important in emergency situations as it is in non-emergency situations. In a situation where food aid is additional to normal import levels, we must be particularly careful about targeting to make sure that food goes to those who cannot express effective demand in the marketplace.

What we have learned, as in Mozambique, is the importance of coordinating implementation and design of both emergency and non-emergency development programs. Coordination between the two programs can be facilitated through increased information and communication. It is also important to focus on productivity gains, so that food costs can be reduced.

Defining income-diversifying strategies that can enable people to obtain food is one strategy, but costs of food must also be reduced so that food is available. Our studies

show the difficulty farmers face in trying to diversify out of food production when food is not otherwise available or food costs are high. In trying to increase incomes we need to ensure that food is available at affordable prices to the people we are trying to diversify out of agriculture.

## Questions and Responses

*Frankenberger*  
*CARE*

Everything that every CS is involved in should not be lumped under food security. The key here is proper targeting of the food-insecure. Identifying the food-insecure and understanding the local constraints to food security will tell us what the program ought to be. We should not let the project mix drive us. Rather, the food security target population and the constraints they are facing should drive whatever intervention we select. We should not limit that toolbox to just a few things, but should keep it wide open. As Gloria Steele has pointed out, different contexts will have different ways of dealing with the problem. The key is having a good way to determine who is and who is not food-insecure. In looking around at some small enterprise development activities, I sometimes question whether monetized food is being used to target food-insecure populations. If we start looking more carefully at who's being targeted, then the problem the FFP Office is facing as to whether or not all of these interventions should be allowed becomes irrelevant.

*Marchione*  
*BHR/USAID*

Gloria Steele said that focusing on food security forces us to focus on the poor. Tim Frankenberger just made the point that there are places where food aid is not necessarily focused on the poor. To a certain extent, there is a tradeoff between food security and development goals. You can get into a situation where people are trying to balance the two and not doing either very efficiently. When you're trying to deal with a food-insecure population that may not be very productive, what implications does that have for our longer-term development strategy?

*Steele*

Food security forces you to think of the poor. Whereas in development, the focus is just looking at what the most productive areas are, many times it isn't investing in the poor. The highest payoff may not be from investing in the poor.

*Sheehan*  
*CBI*

Have we gotten to the point where we no longer consider food security a development goal?

*Steele*

I hope not. You cannot achieve food security goals if you don't try to do development at the same time, one of the most effective ways of improving access is through development.

- Marchione* There may be a tradeoff between food security and the most efficient growth strategy I've seen that tension in some USAID Missions
- Steele* A number of studies have examined the potential for addressing food security in low-potential zones in Africa, and to what extent investing in high-yield technology brings about development The conclusion is that it is necessary to "jump-start" development by investing in something other than low-potential enterprise
- Kramer* When I said my office concluded that current definitions of food security are too broad, I thought that would elicit a stronger reaction Earlier, people seemed concerned about the issue of causality If you have a strategic objective, you want to be able to determine that your activities are having the desired impact One of the reasons why I think you have to lower your sights is that food security is a goal, and you can't measure a goal Whereas a strategic objective can be achieved, measured, and competently managed So we came up with lower level, strategic objectives, resulting in the problem of causality that has plagued some of us for many years Also, something called "plausible association" means that it is unnecessary to demonstrate a causal relationship between a program output and a strategic objective if we are reasonably assured that there is an association People are hung up on the problem of being able to develop causality When we talk about how to develop monitoring and evaluation plans, some of that uneasiness will start to dissipate
- Sposato*  
*ENI/USAID* I would like to react to Bob Kramer's statement that the food security goal is too broad I agree that the legislation is broad — we don't even have food security in the United States So asking USAID to demonstrate it overseas is an onerous task I'd like to put the question to GAO, did you consider that the legislation is a political statement, not a working level statement meant to be implemented?
- Johnson* The legislation is a statement of a broad goal, but at the same time would require that the agency charged with implementing it define a strategy for accomplishing the goal That's what we at GAO did not see the first time we looked at these programs It is necessary to break it down into component parts measurable objectives need to be identified at the start of projects There's a need for a road map showing how that goal can become a reality

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Charles Sykes  
Vice President, CARE

### A Is food security appropriate as a guiding principle for P L 480 Title II programs?

The particular value of today's forum is its timing in relation to forthcoming 1995 legislation. The fundamental question of food security as an appropriate guiding principle for Title II programs was the same question the members of the Coalition for Food Aid considered in 1989 when we were invited to comment on the reauthorization for 1990. At that time, we took the FAO definition of food security. After passage of the 1990 Act, USAID defined food security as an important objective within the context of its overall mission.

Food security has now gone beyond its original meaning. What we saw in introducing the concept was that it provided an overarching objective, bringing Titles I, II, and III under a single objective. It still has validity. Looking at the next 23 years, however, we're anticipating another two and one half billion people in the world. With some one billion people currently below the poverty line and 700 million people considered food-insecure, food security is not a bad objective for now and for the future. While we cannot deal with all the problems now, we are able to focus on some. Macroeconomic policies play an important role in increasing food production. We also recognize a sharp decline in investment in agricultural production. We don't have the same impetus as we did during the Green Revolution, nor the same commitment today.

M S Swaminathan's memorial lecture four years ago on the issue, available from the Hunger Project, speaks to how many of the problems of access to an adequate supply of food for a healthy and productive life can be addressed through nutrition, as well as water.

There has been a tremendous lag time between reauthorization of the P L 480 statute and operationalizing it. For example, USAID still has no revised handbook for the 1985 and 1990 legislation, and Regulation 11 was revised only two years ago. As we move into a new cycle of legislation, we have not made the changes which operationalize the objectives set forth in legislation that is currently 9 and 5 years old. We need to close the gap. I appreciate that FFP's major objective is to close that gap. In section 207 of current law, there are provisions that call on USAID to do just that to streamline Title II regulations and procedures, but they've not been fully implemented.

Today we talked about evaluation, impact, and the diverse ideology of malnutrition and hunger. Sixty years ago in the United States, we started the school lunch program, we might see the number of student loans today and make an interesting correlation. How long should the time line be in devising indicators? We really needed to define a new context in which we know more accurately what these programs were about.

The old way of programming food aid as political reward resulted in the use of scarce resources where there was little or no food insecurity. The adoption of a food security goal for P L 480 was intended to curtail the use of food aid as a political reward.

We are deeply disturbed by the closing of USAID Missions where there are so many food-insecure

people. We hope that USAID will reconsider. There is little correlation between the number of USAID staff and the quality of programs. USAID can find proxies that will enable programs in food-insecure countries to continue without the presence of USAID missions.

Two years ago, only two USAID Missions had food security among their strategic objectives. We appreciate Bob Kramer's efforts to change this.

There are two dignified ways of acquiring food: buy it or grow it. We could add "work for it." We heard about a wide range of programs from CSs that indicate that there are success stories and important results.

We should look at the problem that there may be a long gestation period before food aid program results are evident. Funds have been made available to CSs through USAID Institutional Support Grants to evaluate programs and to conduct baseline studies. It is important to have money available to do baseline studies, to meet extraordinary expenses, and to improve overall performance. We'll come back to this in the next round of legislation.

**B To achieve food security objectives through Title II programs, which areas need to be further strengthened?**

New USAID food security policy would be a major step in that direction, serving as guidance for the presentation of programs as well as in the legislative review.

The Cooperating Sponsor is pulled in many directions and has multiple responsibilities in the field when designing a Title II program — the local mission, USAID Title II guidance, the CS's own mission, needs of the local community and the host government. In India, the school feeding program helped to increase the number of girls enrolled in and completing school, and the host government involvement was an important part of the program. A recent Washington Post article referred to the Tamil Nadu program, which went from 100,000 pupils in 1969 to 1.6 million in 1972, half of them girls. Now the girls are at reproductive age and the fertility rate in Tamil Nadu is at replacement level. In that program CARE looked at nutritional impact, while the Tamil Nadu government was looking at attendance and enrollment levels.

Other factors affecting food aid needs and availabilities are the agricultural provisions in the GATT agreement. What implications do these provisions have generally on international food aid and international food security? As global agriculture becomes more market-oriented, there's going to be a drying up of those residual food aid resources that had served the food aid programs for the last four decades. This is going to come quickly as subsidy programs are phased out and the tariff barriers are reduced in developed countries. The countries most severely hit are the food-insecure, debt-strapped countries. The only way they'll be able to become food secure is through food imports (for which they do not have enough money), or by growing it themselves. We've seen a considerable amount of stagnation in many of these countries. So the implications are profound for the international community's ability to cover that gap.

Today we covered the broad scope of issues surrounding the relationship between P L 480 Title II and food security. We started from the broadest picture of food security in the law and what it encompasses. Then, we focused on what it is like to develop Title II program objectives and impact indicators, and the various ways that Cooperating Sponsors are looking at these issues in the field, assessing local food security problems, identifying appropriate objectives and interventions, and deciding how to measure impact. Finally, we looked again at the broader policy perspective, the role of food security in USAID policy and guidance, and what is the best operational definition of food security. Our discussion has probably stirred a lot of thoughts and raised some new questions.

The next step I would like to suggest is to actually follow through on the May 5, 1993 resolution that was passed by the Food Aid Consultative Group. It called on CSs and USAID to work together to identify objectives and indicators which are practical and appropriate for linking Title II to food security. We are not here to answer all questions, but rather to lay the foundation for the next step. USAID's Food for Peace Office is planning an August meeting to start that process, and CSs are developing strategies to approach food security in a practical way.

## **ANNEXES**

**COALITION FOR FOOD AID  
FOOD SECURITY POLICY FORUM**

July 25, 1994  
Washington Court Hotel  
Washington, D C

*Technical assistance provided by the US Agency for International Development,  
through IMPACT, Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring Project*

**Purpose To draw upon the experience of Cooperating Sponsors and USAID officials to identify the practical applications of food security as a goal for P L 480 Title II programs**

**AGENDA**

- 8:30 AM Coffee, juice and rolls
- 9 00 AM Introduction and Background Ellen S Levinson, Executive Director, Coalition for Food Aid
- 9 15 AM USAID Policy on Food Security Terrence Brown, Assistant Administrator, USAID Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination
- 9 30 AM Congressional Staff Panel, moderated by Charles Hanrahan, Congressional Research Service
- Kathleen Bertelsen, House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
Anita Brown, House Committee on Agriculture  
Lynnett Wagner, USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service,  
formerly of Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition & Forestry
- (1) Congressional debate and intent during consideration of the 1990 Farm Bill
- (2) How the concept of food security replaced the more general foreign policy goals of P L 480
- 10 15 AM Coffee Break
- 10 30 AM First Cooperating Sponsor Panel Pathways to Food Security, moderated by Emily Moore, Facilitator

Representatives of the National Cooperative Business Association, ADRA International, and CARE will describe their experiences with developing food security-linked objectives and impact indicators for P L 480 Title II programs. A series of "Pathways to Food Security" will be identified and discussed, tracing various Title II program objectives and activities to the broad goal of food security.

- 12 15 PM Lunch Hosted by the Coalition for Food Aid
- 1 15 PM Food Security Continuum from Relief to Development M Douglas Stafford, Assistant Administrator, USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Response
- 1 30 PM Second Cooperating Sponsor Panel Pathways to Food Security, Representatives of Catholic Relief Services and Africare
- 2 30 PM Break
- 2 45 PM Policy Panel, moderated by Peggy Sheehan, Chief Operating Officer, Cooperative Business International
- Harold J Johnson, U S General Accounting Office (GAO)
- H Robert Kramer, Food for Peace Office, USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Response
- Gloria Steele, Center for Economic Growth, USAID Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research
- The panel members will discuss food security issues from their various perspectives GAO - assessing impact as part of a congressionally mandated review of P L 480, USAID - reviewing Title II operational plans for food security linkages and exploring new directions for USAID food security policy
- 3 30 PM Concluding Remarks, moderated by Charles Sykes, Vice President, CARE
- Is food security appropriate as a guiding principle for P L 480 Title II programs?
- To achieve food security objectives through Title II programs, which areas need further work or strengthening?
- 4 00 PM Adjourn

**COALITION FOR FOOD AID  
FOOD SECURITY POLICY FORUM**

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## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

**P L 480** - The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended Commonly referred to as the "Food for Peace Program," it authorizes the provision of U S commodities to developing countries (as a grant or through very concessional loans) to enhance "the food security of the developing world " P L 480 is comprised of three Titles

- Title I - concessional loans made by USDA to foreign governments for food purchases from the U S
- Title II - donated food aid used as part of targeted assistance programs conducted by PVOs, cooperatives or WFP in developing countries, and donated food aid for emergency use
- Title III - food aid grants provided by USAID to foreign governments in developing countries

**Food Security** - Defined in the P L 480 statute as "access by all people at all times to sufficient food and nutrition for a healthy and productive life "

**Private Voluntary Organization ("PVO")** - Defined in the statute as "a not-for-profit, nongovernmental organization that receives funds from private sources, voluntary contributions of money, staff time, or in-kind support from the public, and that is engaged in or is planning to engage in voluntary, charitable or development assistance activities (other than religious activities) "

**Cooperative** - Defined in the statute as "a private sector organization whose members own and control the organization and share in its services and its profits and that provides business services and outreach in cooperative development for its membership "

**P L 480 Title II** - Title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, which is administered by the U S Agency for International Development (USAID) The objectives of P L 480 Title II are to address emergency needs, to implement activities to alleviate hunger and its causes, and to promote economic and community development and sound environmental practices The law requires a minimum level (1 550 MMT in FY 1995) for "non-emergency Title II programs," which are mainly multi-year programs that (1) target populations and regions with chronic food deficit and/or nutritional problems and (2) are implemented by PVOs, cooperatives or the World Food Program An additional 475,000 MT of commodities must be made available each year and is primarily reserved for emergency needs

**Cooperating Sponsor ("CS")** - A PVO or cooperative which designs and implements humanitarian or development assistance programs in developing countries using agricultural commodities donated under P L 480 Title II

**Goal** - Something distant, on the horizon, out of reach, towards which a program can only make a contribution, usually it is never fully realizable (such as "total health" or complete eradication of a particular disease) While a Ministry of Health may set an achievable objective for itself, such as a certain percent decline in maternal mortality by a particular year, the CS making only a partial contribution towards realization of the Ministry's objective would consider it a CS goal

Although the goal is not expected to be achieved by the CS itself and should therefore not be measured by the CS, progress towards its achievement is measured by evaluating success or failure to achieve the goal's supporting objectives

**Objective** - Objectives are "ownable " The CS takes responsibility for their achievement The CS is fully accountable at the level of the objective If the CS works indirectly through counterparts, objectives should be formulated in partnership with the counterparts, the CS then shares in the counterpart's responsibility for achievement of the objectives If the counterpart fails to "produce," the assisting CS has several alternatives withdraw support from the counterpart, support the counterpart in different or stronger ways, or (together with the counterpart) adjust the objective to be more realistic and achievable

Not all objectives need be formulated in quantifiable terms but they should somehow be measurable or verifiable Achievement of an objective is usually verified through periodic evaluation techniques, while progress toward its achievement is routinely tracked through monitoring procedures

**Strategy** - The general approach, route, or pathway chosen as the way the CS plans to achieve its objectives Although a strategy is not "measured," it should be periodically assessed to make sure it is the most appropriate pathway toward achieving an objective

**Activity** - A cluster of activities make up a strategy Activities are "actions" undertaken in order to achieve an objective (Activities can be further broken down into tasks ) Activities are often (mistakenly) considered as ends in and of themselves, but they are only the "movement" necessary to arrive at the end point, which is achievement of an objective It is essential to ensure that planned key activities have actually taken place before attempting to evaluate achievement of an objective It is meaningless to search for "results," "effects," or "impact" of an intervention, for example, if the training materials sit unused in a warehouse, or if those trained retired immediately thereafter and never put their training into use

Lists of activities form the basis for a time line, or Gantt chart - designating "who" should perform these activities, and "when "

**Effects, Impact** - There was once a near-consensus that "effects" referred to short-term results, while "impact" meant long-term consequences Recently, the distinction on the basis of a time frame has to some extent given way to a distinction on the basis of the strength of the observed change "effects" are not considered (by some) as important as "impact," a word which seems to have a more dramatic ring to it than "results," "consequences," or "effect "

Also quite recently, the distinctions have nearly disappeared and the terms are used interchangeably

Let us, however, for the sake of time-saving in the course of this one-day forum, agree to revert to the earlier usage, and reserve "impact" for results or consequences (good or bad) that occur after at least a year following the key intervention, and refer to "effects" as those results which can be verified (measured or observed) more quickly

In both cases, when there are multiple interventions or influences that affect an outcome, attributing an observed change or portion of a change (whether improvement or deterioration) to a single intervention can be both difficult and expensive

**Monitor, Evaluate** - Monitoring is continuous, routine, and asks "what happened?" It is focused on (1) process (did inputs and resources arrive on time, at the right place, in the right quantities? were they used appropriately?) and (2) on short-term effects (did the trainees know more at the end of the course than at the beginning?) Evaluation is periodic, builds on information collected during routine monitoring but expands further, looking at long-term impact, and asks not only "what happened?" but "why did it happen or fail to happen?" and "was the strategy selected the most appropriate one for achieving the objectives?" An evaluation can also challenge the appropriateness/feasibility of the original objectives as well

**Indicator, Benchmark, Milestone** - Benchmarks (and milestones) are interim indicators, markers along the way toward eventual achievement of an objective. If 9000 surviving seedlings are expected after 3 years, benchmarks could suggest an even distribution in thirds (3000 each in years one, two, and three), or benchmarks could assume that 12,000 seedlings were all planted in year one, that 11,000 were still alive by year two, and 9000 by the end of year three

Indicators used "before-the-fact" (before a project has been fully designed or launched) provide information on who and where the vulnerable are, they indicate the population to be served, or to be involved

Indicators used "after-the-fact" (but built into a monitoring and evaluation plan before the project begins) are used to provide information on success or failure in achieving an objective

## Food Security Policy Forum

### SYNTHESIS OF RETURNED QUESTIONNAIRES

Questionnaires were sent to Cooperating Sponsors ("CSs") asking about their experiences with "food security" -- as an objective, and efforts to measure success in achieving it. Fifteen of the 18 questionnaires were returned.

#### Question

1 Tonnage CSs responding utilize anywhere from no tonnage at all (some use food aid from non-Title II sources, one no longer uses Title II but had considerable experience with it in earlier years) to over a quarter of a million metric tons a year.

2 USAID's definition of food security (PD19) Nearly all responding CSs agreed that it is an acceptable definition, but one said it is too vague and confusing, one said the definition is clear, but is interpreted too narrowly, and another said it is fine, provided it is interpreted broadly.

3 CSs' definitions of food security Most CSs do not have their own definition, or have one which closely parallels PD19 (e.g., including essential elements referring to all people at all times having access to sufficient food for a healthy life). One would exclude free feeding from any such definition. One wrote of the **prospects** for access to sufficient food (according to the World Health Organization concept), not for all but for the **majority**. One referred to the three components in PD19 (availability, access, and utilization). One distinguished between food security, nutrition security, and livelihood security. And one said that "access" should refer to poor distribution among regions.

4 Distinguishing nutrition and food security Three had never heard of nutrition security. Nine said nutrition security should be considered part of food security. One said that nutrition security is a step beyond food security, and one said it should be considered "beyond" if that means "broader." One, referring to the question of attribution (attributing nutritional improvement to the ingestion of Title II commodities) wrote that "nutrition security might be becoming too technically sophisticated to use in the field, since it is difficult to measure levels of nutrition of other foods eaten by recipients. If we provided all food intake, there would not be a problem."

5 How the CSs formulate objectives for Title II programs Eight respondents said their process is a mixture of starting with food security objectives from which relevant programs and projects are then developed, and starting with existing programs and then determining how their objectives support achievement of an overall food security goal. Two described their own procedures.

- First, we do an institutional assessment to understand our current status with regard to the goals, objectives, and activities of ongoing programs. Second we assess the food security situation in the area we are working in to see if the projects are addressing the food security constraints effectively. Third, we make program adjustments in targeting, interventions, and monitoring based on this new information. Fourth, we design other projects to address gaps not filled by current projects.
- Neither. We identify the problem and determine the best solution as well as the most logical way to fund and implement.

6 Linking food security with program objectives Seven CSs said they have no problem, two said it's been a bit difficult, two find it very difficult, and two say it depends on the type of project (with one of these identifying maternal and child health programs and school feeding as more problematic, and the other saying that (1) short-term projects, (2) those operating where the catchment area is indefinite, and (3) those where impact cannot be expected in the short-term are most difficult). One CS pointed out here (as others did elsewhere) that one problem is that food security is not among many USAID missions' objectives. Another noted that USAID emphasizes emergencies, which makes full monetization difficult. Another said they had "no problem" provided that the definition is sufficiently broad.

7a CSs' experience in working with food security as an umbrella concept Nine found it positive, one was neutral, one found it unhelpful. One added that although it was expected to be helpful, it has turned out that AID's narrow interpretation got in the way.

7b Constraints in using the food security concept Again, USAID's narrow interpretation was mentioned (by two CSs). One noted that increasing income as a means toward improving access (one of the key components of food security) was not considered a "legitimate" objective under the food security mandate. Two pointed out that if food security is not among a USAID mission's objectives, the CS can find itself in a conflict situation. Others noted time constraints, CS staff's unfamiliarity with the concept, a bias against housing as a legitimate objective under the umbrella; lack of clear definitions, and appropriate linkages but ways to measure success are poor.

One commented that "the great diversity of Title II programming makes it difficult to fit into anything but a broad definition. Also, food inputs are often such a small portion of overall inputs to a family's wellbeing, that it is difficult to measure their impact with any precision."

8 Developing impact indicators related to food security (some CSs already addressed this issue above when discussing their experiences in formulating related objectives) Three found no problem in doing so, 7 found it a bit difficult (one commented that it is especially hard when a USAID mission does not include food security among its objectives), and two found it very difficult. One pointed out that creating indicators is simple when food is distributed to a controlled population (as in a refugee camp) but very hard when food is only one of many inputs.

9a CS experience in developing impact indicators Seven found it to have been a positive experience, two were neutral, one found it not helpful, one said they are still formulating indicators, and one said they cannot get over the first hurdle of monetization versus direct feeding (USAID's preference apparently being for the latter). One CS noted that the process of formulating indicators has forced them to focus more on impact, and has resulted in greater knowledge of just how difficult it is to do a precise analysis.

9b Constraints in developing food security indicators Three cited lack of baseline data against which to compare current conditions, two pointed to a need to have standardized indicators; others remarked on the need to distinguish process from impact indicators), some USAID missions' definition of strategic objectives for their countries, and a lack of an overall USAID strategy (resulting in wide variations among country missions).

10 Indicators used by CSs currently There was such a wide range of responses to this question that they cannot be synthesized here. One CS indicated that they do not have any indicators yet since they haven't yet had an evaluation. One referred to indicators by sector: in health, they use immunization coverage, Vitamin A use, in small enterprise development, they use increases in household income. One presented a full set of quantitative and qualitative indicators.

Concluding general comments included the following


- The need for assistance in developing baseline data,
- the commonality of CSs' need to improve skills in needs assessment and evaluation,
- the difficulty of dealing with USAID's apparent preference for emergencies over direct distribution, and direct distribution over monetization, and
- the problems concerning the absence of any interest in or focus on food security in many USAID missions

**P A T H W A Y S   T O   F O O D   S E C U R I T Y**

**FOOD SECURITY POLICY FORUM**

**25 July 1994**

OVERVIEW MAJOR COMPONENTS OF FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY




**AVAILABILITY of SUFFICIENT FOOD** results from growing enough (yields per hectare or acre, productivity, land under cultivation)  
 losing less of it (proper treatment and storage)  
 being able to buy what you can't grow (income)  
 stability of supply, both across seasons and zones (storage, roads, market systems)

**ACCESS to the vulnerable**, or those with special needs, refers both to the categories who will forever need assistance (the truly destitute) and those for whom help is presumably a stepping stone to ultimate self-sufficiency (the poor who can be helped to become less poor, those whose age or condition is temporary, etc)

**UTILIZATION** of the food which is available and to which one's access is not blocked is then affected by a variety of intervening variables, such as one's state of health, traditional practices which may prevent the most needy from receiving adequate nutrition (even if the food available at their household level is theoretically adequate), by the nutrition/sanitation/hygiene knowledge and practices of the principal family caretaker (which in turn can be strongly affected by her time and energy constraints), and by the propensity of the one who controls the allocation of family resources to spend on family wellbeing

AVAILABILITY OF SUFFICIENT FOOD



[food for training]


[food for work]

[food for work]

[food for work, cooperative marketing, auctions local traders triangular transactions, private sector infrastructure]


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ADEQUATE FOOD PRODUCTION




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STORAGE and TREATMENT




An elaboration on the above simple storage scheme is a cooperative community grain bank. Monetized Title II commodities provide the start-up capital so that the coop can purchase the coop members' harvest (instead of their having to sell at very low prices to middlemen). The members' grain is stored until regional prices rise in the lean season, at which time the coop members buy back their grain at only a slight margin above what they were paid for it at harvest time (and much lower than lean season prices charged by middlemen). The small profit made by the coop goes for administrative costs and increasing the stock in storage so that eventually there will be enough not only to tide members over during the lean season, but to provide at least a one-year local buffer stock in case of crop failure.

AGROFORESTRY




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TREE NURSERIES




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HOW DOES INCREASED INCOME LEAD TO INCREASED FOOD SECURITY?



**SCHOOL FEEDING HOW DOES/CAN IT LEAD, VIA VARIOUS PATHWAYS, TO FOOD SECURITY**



Food has many properties -- aesthetic, spiritual, social, psychological, ceremonial, nutritional, and economic


Because food is food, we have tended in the past to focus on its nutritional value only. We do not expect major nutritional changes in a child who receives a school lunch or breakfast during the school year, stunted children will not catch up with their classmates in height, wasted children need more intensive nutritional input than a lunch or snack can provide. But children who walk long distances, or children who eat no breakfast at home, can be provided an important nutritional input which will alleviate their hunger and facilitate the learning environment. A 3-country study in Benin, Togo, and Burkina Faso (by University of Dijon) found that the presence of a school canteen was one of three (out of more than 50) most predictive variables positively associated with learning on a standardized exam given to 3000 second-graders in each of the countries. The researchers interpret their unexpected (to them) finding on the basis of a probable mixture of the canteen's positive effects both on regularity of attendance and on the wake-up-and-pay-attention effect of the nutrition transfer.

### SAMPLE MENU OF INDICATORS FOR A SCHOOL MEAL PROGRAM


- 1 Enrollment percent increase, by gender Don't expect an INCREASE if the program is ongoing Caution how much of an observed increase is really NEW enrollees, adding onto the previous total in the zone, the region, the country? and how much of the increase is transfers from another school? Can pupils enroll at any age, or only up to age 6 or 7? can pupils enroll at any time in the year (such as when a school lunch program begins late in the academic year)? can they enroll in any school (i.e., is it likely that a lunch-providing school "steals" pupils from a nearby no-lunch school?)
- 2 Attendance percent now compared with the percent before or after a change (a school newly integrated in the program, or a school suspended), percent attendance in a lunch school compared with no-lunch schools (Attendance rate = total number of pupil-days attended divided by the total number of possible pupil-days in the year -- i.e., school open, teacher present, non-holiday -- times 100)
- 3 Repeat rates percent of grade X who are taking the course a second time Caution is repeating in this context a privilege or a disgrace?
- 4 Drop-outs percent who began the school year who are no longer enrolled at the end of the year Caution this applies only to school-year attrition, number 5 below applies to total attrition Some teachers/school don't declare a much-absent child to be a "drop-out" until after a certain number of consecutive absences
- 5 Attrition percent of an entering class (e.g., P1) who are no longer enrolled some (e.g., five) years later (when they should have reached P6) Caution should the start or the end of the P6 year be considered? If there's a great deal of in and out enrollment, the attrition figures can be misleading -- many of the original P1 class have left but have been replaced by others, and after five years it seems there's been little attrition judging from total numbers Was a new school built nearby that siphoned off many pupils?
- 6 Exams percent who succeed on a national, standardized examination (usually not administered until sixth grade or later)

Raw numbers rarely tell us much We need some kind of comparison -- the situation after an intervention compared with what it was before (i.e., the need for baseline data) Or a contrast between a "treatment" population and a "control" population that is very similar in important ways


ACTIVITIES OFTEN ASSOCIATED WITH SCHOOL LUNCH/BREAKFAST PROGRAM




SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION OR REHABILITATION



LATRINES/MOZAMBIQUE SLABS




WELLS






TRAINING OF VILLAGE HEALTH WORKERS



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FOOD RATIONS PROVIDED AT MCH CENTERS



MCH is increasingly referred to as "WCH" -- Women and Child Health -- because of the importance of good health and nutrition for young women BEFORE they experience their first pregnancy

R

#### MEASURING or VERIFYING IMPACT

As we follow these separate pathways, it becomes clear that each individual type of intervention requires a separate conceptualization of how far along that pathway it is appropriate to go when defining indicators of "success" of the intervention

In some cases, the linkages are so well-established that it would be a waste of resources to do the research all over again, If vaccines are properly administered (right dosage, right time, right age and so on), it is NOT necessary to measure the inevitable decline in disease incidence and prevalence

Almost as clearly linked, latrines (IF properly sited, constructed, maintained, and used) WILL result in reduced incidence of fecal-borne diseases, and these not be measured (In this case, even if a disease decline is found, the attribution of this happy result to the construction and use of the latrines can be an expensive undertaking and almost certainly not worthwhile )

But what about a really LONG chain of expected (and some unexpected) causality -- some pathways leading to food security, while others leading to just the opposite How far along such a chain should a PVO be held accountable? What's the nursery manager's responsibility may be at a very different point along the chain than the PVO and NGO counterpart who expect that outplanted seedlings are not the "end" of the chain, but only interim points along the pathway Here's such a chain, or pathway

seeds are planted the seedlings are tended a certain proportion of seedlings survive (does the nursery manager's accountability end here?) some or all of them are sold or given away (or does his/her accountability go this far?) the receiving farmers outplant them and again a certain percentage survive the seedlings grow up to be trees which form a windbreak which cuts down wind erosion and so soil fertility improves so now yields per hectare must necessarily improve Now the pathway begins to branch the happy farmer can either plant fewer hectares next year (because s/he can get the same amount from less area) if so, s/he can use the extra time to sleep, perchance to dream, to take a literacy course, to start an income-generating activity, to drink beer, to increase and improve child care Each of these branches, of course, leads on to other desirable OR UNDESIRABLE outcomes (Is the PVO who sponsored the nursery responsible for increased beer-drinking?) The same happy farmer could also opt to farm the same area as last year and thus reap more produce Again we branch The extra food can be consumed by the family, which may improve the family nutrition (or it could make it worse) Or the farmer could sell some of the surplus and use the money to buy more beer to buy a radio, to pay off the moneylender, to buy more family food, to buy better family food, to buy convenience food, or even to buy worse food for the family In the last option, family food intake deteriorates Convenience food creates free time, which as we saw above can be used in "good" and "bad" ways Even more and/or better family food does not necessarily then lead to improved nutritional status of vulnerable family members, instead, it could lead to overfed males or overfed stronger children

By tracing such a pathway, we note several things

- what may be an output in one project context might be considered effect in another, and possibly even "impact" in another
- it is necessary to distinguish between what a PVO should be INTERESTED in (how did they use the new money? what did they do with their new "leisure" time?) and what the PVO should be RESPONSIBLE for accomplishing. If a new road carries people not only to the clinic, the market, and the school, but also to the bar and the bordello, should the PVO be held accountable?

INDICATORS are only one part of a COMPREHENSIVE MONITORING AND EVALUATION PLAN (which should also include WHO should measure or verify WHAT? using WHAT INSTRUMENTS or DATA SOURCES? gathering information FROM WHOM? WHEN, HOW OFTEN? to be analyzed BY WHOM? to be synthesized BY WHOM? to be summarized/reported on BY WHOM? for use BY WHOM? for WHAT PURPOSE?) The last -- for what purpose -- should be determined before any of the others are mapped out so as not to collect roomful of data for no good use

We shouldn't try to measure everything in sight. If you've got well-formulated objectives, deciding what to measure (or verify, in the case of non-quantifiable objectives) should not be that difficult.

We shouldn't assume linkages have been demonstrated just because they seem plausible or because there are many anecdotes that confirm them (e.g., household level food security doesn't automatically ensure good nutrition for all household members; any more than community level food security ensures that all households in the community have enough to eat).


It's still useful to distinguish between short-term effects and medium- or long-term impacts. It's rare to find impact right away.

Most, but not all, objectives can be formulated in quantifiable terms. If so, the principal indicator (which will help us know if we achieved our objective) should be one with numbers in it, i.e., a quantitative indicator. Sometimes, however, a qualitative objective is perfectly legitimate, it would be ludicrous to try to attach numbers to its attainment. Find a non-quantitative way to verify its achievement.

Benchmarks (or milestones) are markers along the way to ultimate achievement. (If 100 flowers are expected to bloom by the end of the third project year, do we expect them to do so in increments of 33, 33, and 34? or 10, 30, then 60 in the third year?)

**BLOCKAGES, INTERVENING VARIABLES**

WHY doesn't HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL FOOD SECURITY (theoretically enough food for everyone in the household) necessarily translate into improved nutritional status for vulnerable household individuals (women, infants, children, elderly, the infirm)?



AFRICARE's INDICATORS (Guinea Bissau)

MONETIZATION - INDICATORS OF IMPACT AND SUCCESS

Indicators of Impact

**On private sector situation**

- Level of disturbance of normal functioning of national market for each imported commodity
- Disincentive effect on local production of imported commodities
- Impact on country's private trading system
- Fairness and efficiency of traders selection process

**On food security situation**

- Impact on imported commodities prices
- Impact on national supply of commodities
- Impact on country's foreign currency reserves
- Impact on high-risk groups from a food security perspective (poorest households)

Indicators of Success

- Generation of the desired amount of monetized funds to support the work of TSRIP
- Very small or none
- Very small or none
- Monetization process reinforces it
- Process fair and efficient
- Small lowering impact on prices
- Stabilizing effect on national supply
- Contribution to foreign currency savings
- Appropriate proportion of imported food reaches poorest households

Note A main criteria for measuring the impact of monetization is to recognize that the amount of food aid imported is relatively small compared to the size of the national markets for those products

**INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS AND BENCHMARKS (FSIF)**

Indicators of Effectiveness

Benchmarks

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Development of a detailed methodology and reporting approach on food security</li><li>● Baseline study of food security situation of association villages</li><li>● Rate of disbursement of programmed FSIF funds</li><li>● Number of projects processed, approved, and executed by FSIF each year</li><li>● Actual work done in the association villages</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Completed within first 3 months</li><li>● Completed within first 6 months</li><li>● Disbursing equivalent of US \$50,000 in GP each year</li><li>● About 20 processed, 10 approved/executed each year</li><li>● Socio-economic infrastructure/environment of 30 villages improved by end of MYOP (about 40 projects done)</li></ul> |
|---|---|

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**NUTRITION - INDICATORS OF IMPACT AND SUCCESS**

Indicators of Impact

Indicators of Success

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Improvement in nutritional value and diversity of household diets</li><li>● Decrease in incidence of malnourished children</li><li>[Similar approach can be used with pregnant women if additional indicator is desired]</li><li>● Improvement in adult household members' nutritional knowledge</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● At least 30% of surveyed household improved diets</li><li>● By 40% for association children households (10% per year)</li><li>● By 30% for FSIF-supported villages (7.5% per year)</li><li>● By 20% for 3 sectors of Tomabli overall (5% per year)</li><li>● Adequate level of knowledge attained by 40% of surveyed adults in FY-98</li></ul> |
|--|--|

THREE ASPECTS OF FOOD SECURITY — SUMMING UP

Availability

- INCREASED FOOD PRODUCTION
  - increased crop yields
    - improved soil fertility
      - windbreaks
      - agroforestry
    - irrigation
    - improved farming practices
      - composting
      - use of inputs
    - higher productivity
      - better health
      - more efficient use of time and energy
  - more land under production
    - swamps drained
    - grazing land converted
      - herd management
        - herd reduction
        - paddocking
  - dairy development
  - fisheries development
- REDUCED POST-HARVEST LOSS
  - treatment and storage
- STABILITY OF SUPPLY
  - roads
  - storage
  - markets

Access

- ACCESS BY THE DESTITUTE
  - widows
  - orphans
  - refugees
  - displaced
  - lepers
  - witches, outcasts
  - elderly, infirm, etc
- ACCESS BY OTHERS
  - pregnant women
  - lactating women
  - infants
  - school children
  - poor, very poor

Utilization

- IMPROVED KNOWLEDGE OF DIET AND APPROPRIATE FEEDING PRACTICES
  - nutrition education
  - health education
  - school, community gardens
- IMPROVED HEALTH STATUS (affecting individual body's use of food consumed)
  - environmental sanitation
    - soakaway pits
    - garbage disposal
    - latrines
    - cleanup campaigns
    - environmental education
  - personal hygiene
    - clean water
    - accessible water
    - hygiene education
  - health services
    - immunizations
    - prenatal, postnatal care

NB School feeding, school construction/rehabilitation, and income-generating interventions support a variety of the above in all three categories (via literacy, education, purchasing power for more and better food as well as health services)

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