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HISTORY
OF
USAID/SENEGAL

VOLUME II OF II

PROJECT SUMMARIES



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USAID/Senegal

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HISTORY OF USAID/SENEGAL

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PROJECT SUMMARIES

INTRODUCTION,

The project summaries describe some of the projects implemented by USAID/Senegal during the past twenty years. These projects have all been completed and evaluated. Active, on-going projects are not included in these projects summaries, they are described in the document entitled "Overview of the Current USAID Program in Senegal."

As for the History of USAID/Senegal, of which this document constitutes Volume II, the Project Summaries are written primarily for the use of development professionals, rather than for the non-specialized general public. Each Project Summary contains five sections:

- ◆ Project Title and Number. Project Duration (Fiscal Years in which the project began and ended). Total Cost of Project in millions of dollars (expenditures, US contribution only). Sources used for the preparation of the project summary.
- ◆ Project Description, based on the description given in past overviews of the USAID program in Senegal.
- ◆ Implementation Experience, describing project implementation, and major constraints and problems encountered during project design and implementation. This section is based on the source documents described in the first section: independent final evaluation reports, USAID/Senegal Project Assistance Completion Reports (PACRs), USAID/Washington Special Studies and Evaluation Reports, etc.
- ◆ Project Accomplishments. This section is based on the source documents described in the first section.
- ◆ Lessons Learned. This section is based on the source documents described in the first section.

All the source documents used for the preparation of these Project Summaries are available in USAID/Senegal Documentation Center.

Special attention has been given to the sections on Implementation Experience and Lessons Learned, as they are meant to convey information that may be useful for future project activities: constraints, attitudes, recurrent problems, events, mistakes made in past design and implementation of projects, etc.

Only essential information is given, as tightly "packed" as possible. Yet, these two sections are sometimes lengthy because of the complexity of the project, the wealth of information obtained, the unusual situations encountered, or the likelihood that situations similar to those described will be encountered again.

SUMMARY OF SUMMARIES

The sections on Implementation Experience and Lessons Learned of the Project Summaries show that, over the years, the same mistakes, the same weaknesses keep coming up in project design and implementation. Here are the most recurrent ones:

- Wrong assumptions at the project design stage, based on unchecked, erroneous, outdated or unreliable information and data
- Overly ambitious, unrealistic, overly complex project design. Underfunding
- Overestimation of implementing agency's capability to effectively manage and implement the project. Wrong choice of implementing agency
- Unclear description of lines of authority, of management and implementation responsibilities
- Complex project management and implementation structure
- Slow start-up of project due to contracting problems, especially under the Host Country contracting procedure
- Poor supervision and monitoring by project managers, implementors, and USAID. Poor planning
- Deviation during project implementation from Project Paper and/or Grant Agreement project terms
- Poor coordination and cooperation among project managers and implementors. Conflicting understandings, among project partners, of their respective roles and of project objectives
- Information and data produced by project not shared, not used
- GOS' failure to provide financial contribution and/or logistical support in a timely fashion

PROJECT SUMMARY

CASAMANCE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT	685-0205
Project Duration	FY 78 - FY 86
Total Cost of Project	\$21.4 million

Source USAID/Senegal Program Overview, May 1984
 Draft Evaluation Report, unidentified author, May 1986

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The purpose of the project was to increase agricultural production in the Lower Casamance by strengthening the regional development agency (SOMIVAC) with its extension arm (PIDAC), and by linking this work to on-site experimentation and trials conducted by the national agricultural research organization (ISRA)

USAID provided technical, material, and financial support to all three organizations. PIDAC worked with local farmers on their rice, corn, peanut and millet crops (during the 1982-83 agricultural season, PIDAC worked with 62,000 farmers on 3,985 ha of rice, 1,763 ha of corn, 6,617 ha of peanuts, and 3,264 ha of millet). The ISRA research station at Djibélor, which concentrated in the past on rice, expanded its program to include other crops and to carry out farming systems research.

The project established a seed farm of 20 ha in 1981. Other project activities included setting up a literacy program to train farmer groups to manage farm inputs and credit, constructing village and zone warehouses as well as salt barrier dikes, surveying the health impact of the Guidel dam under construction by the African Development Bank, studying the socio-economic role of women in the Lower Casamance, providing village health care, and constructing a training center, laboratories, and other facilities for SOMIVAC, PIDAC, and ISRA.

IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE

Project implementation had a slow start. Grant agreement signed in August 1978, institutional contract for technical assistance signed in August 1981.

The first project evaluation (July 1981) noted that basic assumptions described in the Project Paper (PP) presented an overly optimistic view of the development potential of the Lower Casamance, and that the PP had not given enough attention to the highly significant decrease in total rainfall, and the varying quality of soils, as constraints for agricultural development.

Project experience confirmed the above findings. The PP assumptions failed to take into

consideration the implications of the changed rainfall pattern for agricultural production, particularly for the expansion of transplanted rice production. The PP also assumed "existing proven production packages" ready for extension. These packages did not exist for the Lower Casamance farming zones, and it was only in the last three years of the project that substantial effort could be made in the area of agricultural extension activities.

Experience demonstrated that it was not necessary to finance a PIDAC seed farm in order to have high quality seed for distribution to farmers. Seed multiplication was obtained through contracts with individual farmers.

The health component outlined in the PP had to be redesigned, as it was determined that the proposed approach duplicated the planned activities of other agencies such as UNICEF. This component was eventually started in the fall of 1983.

The PP institutional analysis overestimated the capability of the principal host country implementing agencies to manage and implement the project. SOMIVAC/PIDAC did not have the capability to function effectively. This constraint had serious negative implications in project implementation and, as a consequence, USAID had to devote substantial time to project implementation.

The PACD had to be extended three times.

PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

1 Agricultural Production

- Technical packages well defined. As a result of applied research, coupled with PIDAC field experience, farmers were able to get increased yields for rice, corn, and millet.
- Increased vegetable production as result of irrigation obtained from hand dug wells. A hand pump costing approximately \$75, which can be constructed and repaired locally, was introduced by the project. Increased vegetable production was also the result of an intensive cropping program using residual moisture found in the soil after the rainy season.
- Successful program developed for the multiplication of improved varieties of seeds through contracts with individual farmers.
- Successful primary school agricultural program which enabled students to earn money to cover the needs of the school. It also provided an opportunity to expose receptive young people to the appropriate use of fertilizer, new varieties of seeds and improved methods of farming.
- Successful credit program which provided loans to individual farmers to obtain inputs.

which helped increase agricultural production. All loan repayments were deposited in an account which was used to finance new loans after project completion.

- Small anti-salt dikes built, which protected rice lands, stored water of rainy season and allowed the water table to rise

- WID Division established by PIDAC to raise consciousness of host country project managers concerning the participation of women in the project. As a result of the work of female village agents, 45 women's sections were organized within village producer groups, which enabled women to participate in project supported activities.

2 Social Action (Literacy and Health)

- Self supporting literacy program in local language started. Text material used to reinforce technical themes (appropriate weeding, importance of clean water, etc.). Literacy program also provided functional training to the Presidents and Secretaries of farmers' groups in basic bookkeeping for the credit program.

- Laboratory constructed to conduct blood and urine tests relating to water-borne diseases. Study of the population in the Guidel dam area undertaken to determine effect of dam in water-borne diseases.

- Agricultural extension agents trained to deliver basic health messages on better nutrition, improved sanitation practices and oral rehydration therapy.

- Self supporting village pharmacies organized.

3 Long Term Development

- Additional purchasing authority obtained for SOMIVAC. Functional autonomy obtained for PIDAC.

- Methodology developed for SOMIVAC to evaluate impact of extension agencies such as PIDAC. Reliable system developed for the collection of agricultural statistics.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Any future activity in Lower Casamance must take into consideration changed rainfall pattern, problem of salt intrusion, and varying quality of soils. Water management should be a priority for future project activity.

2. Important factors that impact on host country implementing agency's institutional development and ability to carry out project implementation: (a) ability to take implementation

decisions, and to order/receive commodities, in a timely fashion, (b) financial accounting system and inventory system meeting USAID standards, and (c) rating system in place to evaluate and act upon job performance of host country employees

3 Above requirements should be in place before project implementation starts. Accordingly, project design should provide for "pre-implementation" technical assistance

PROJECT SUMMARY

BAKEL SMALL IRRIGATED PERIMETERS	685-0208
Project Duration	FY 77 - FY 86
Total Cost of Project	\$7.8 million

Source USAID/Senegal Program Overviews, February 1982/May 1984
AID Evaluation Special Study No. 34, December 1985

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The project purpose was to introduce technologies of irrigated culture in 23 villages along the Senegal River in the Bakel area, and to demonstrate the technical and economic feasibility of irrigation. Project outputs included introduction of improved practices for dryland crops, development of 1,800 hectares of irrigated small perimeters in 23 villages, and improved understanding of the area's health situation. The project strategy was to build on the efforts already begun by farmers to install small irrigated perimeters by assisting Société d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta et des Vallées du Fleuve Sénégal et de la Faléme (SAED), the Government implementing agency, to supply farmers with necessary guidance, inputs, and extension services, while farmers supply labor to develop the perimeters.

The health component was to help the population create a healthier environment by teaching techniques of basic health care and monitoring water systems. Secouristes (first-aid men) were to staff health huts under the supervision of nurses. The huts provided basic medicines and first aid. They were to be self-supporting. The project was also to fund a survey of water-related diseases in the villages.

IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE1 Dryland Agriculture

Very little information was included in the Project Paper regarding the strategies for improving dryland agriculture. Research, extension, and training activities in dryland agriculture never really got underway.

2 Irrigated Agriculture

Project implementation was not trouble-free. CIDR, a French NGO originally contracted by USAID/Senegal to provide technical assistance, left after approximately one year because of a dispute over salary levels, the project was without technical assistance for a full year before a U.S. contractor was brought in. During the interim, SAED continued its program, with

monitoring by USAID/Senegal

SAED technical performance was uneven in these early years. Initial topographic and soil studies were poorly done, SAED had difficulty getting bulldozers and other equipment to Bakel to level land so that farmers could build dikes and canals. The farmers thus constructed these works according to their own plans, creating problems and additional rebuilding costs. Pumps and spare parts were unavailable when needed, the fuel supply was erratic, and frustrations were great.

Relations between SAED and the farmers were also strained, essentially because the farmers, who had ultimate responsibility for the management of the irrigated perimeters, were offered few incentives to do so. For example, under the terms of their contract with SAED, the farmers were to sell to SAED all of the production surplus not used for the farmers' domestic consumption, prices were set by the GOS, generally well below the parallel market prices paid in Mauritania or Mali, particularly for rice. Not surprisingly, quantities of rice kept by the farmers for their "domestic consumption" rose substantially to the detriment of quantities sold to SAED.

Other mishaps occurred, and the rift between SAED and the farmers grew to the point that farmers decided not to work with SAED. Each party accused the other of not living up to its contractual obligations. The dispute was taken to higher level authorities to no avail. Finally, the implementation by SAED of its new decentralization policy, and the actions of a newly appointed, energetic, director of SAED in Bakel, helped give a new start to the SAED-farmer relationship. By 1985, at a time of poor rains, all seemed committed to making irrigated agriculture in Bakel work with a minimum of strain.

3 Related Agricultural Activities

As part of its new approach, SAED increased its support to villagers in their efforts towards diversification. A Peace Corps Volunteer was recruited to work with villages in fruit tree cultivation, primarily bananas and guavas. Demonstration farm personnel, notably the American agronomist, worked with women and youth groups in vegetable gardening. The farm undertook trials in irrigated maize and sorghum, in addition to rice trials. An American advisor posted in SAED/St. Louis worked on several labor-saving devices, including rice decorticators. These related activities, many of which were done on technicians' personal time, helped enhance SAED's new image in Bakel.

4 Health Services and Surveillance

The health component was treated as a separate component, under separate management at the national and local levels. It was to establish village health huts in the 23 villages under the auspices of the Ministry of Health (MOH), with trained secouristes (village health workers) and midwives supervised by village health committees operating small first aid pharmacies on a revolving fund basis.

By December 1980, 17 villages had health workers operating pharmacies. Management and supervision of these people was fraught with problems, as Bakel is far from MOH regional headquarters. Problems relating to supply lines for pharmaceutical products and the relationship between Bakel district activities and the regional health authorities were not resolved until late 1982, when management was moved to Bakel. By 1985 the health workers and midwives were reportedly still in place and working, although the pharmacies were not expected to cover costs.

The health surveillance activity was run independently out of Dakar University's Department of Parasitology and the National Campaign Against Parasites. The head of both of these entities was the same well-qualified Senegalese doctor, so coordination was not a problem. From 1980 to 1983, teams were fielded, baseline studies were undertaken, incidence of schistosomiasis and other diseases monitored and treated, and laboratory technicians were trained and equipped to continue surveillance. This component was discrete and simple to manage, and it achieved its objectives.

5 The Solar Pump

In early 1978 a new purpose was added to the project to test the feasibility of using a solar pump for irrigation purposes. The idea for this new component grew out of a series of discussions held among various parties in Senegal, France, and the U.S. The pump was designed to provide enough water to irrigate 200 hectares. In cooperation with the French Government and DGRST, the Senegalese organization for scientific research, a prototype solar pumping station was installed near Bakel. By 1982 it was conceded that it would be able to irrigate only 32 hectares at top efficiency, and in early 1983 all work ceased on the pump.

6 Fisheries

Based on positive results of a 2-year effort in the Dagana and Podor irrigated perimeters, in 1982 the project took on a village fish ponds component. The rationale behind the component was that since water was being pumped from the river for irrigation, some of it could be used to maintain the ponds and provide fish for consumption and income in the villages. The ponds were to be managed by the existing irrigation groupements, which would be assisted by Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs). The fish in the Senegal River had never regained their pre-drought number, and the fish ponds would meet an expressed need of the people.

The program was initiated in collaboration with the GOS Department of Water and Forests rather than with SAED, but management was shifted to SAED in March 1983. The program actually covered the whole Senegal River Valley, from the delta to Bakel. Three PCVs worked in the Bakel area, and two former PCVs were contacted by USAID/Senegal to oversee the work. By late 1983, 12 village ponds were under construction in the Bakel perimeters, each capable of producing 2-4 tons of fish per year.

By mid-1985 this component was to be picked up by Catholic Relief Services. At that time the program counted five operational fish ponds, although none had yet had a harvest, problems cited

included poorly bred fingerlings, siting of ponds on porous soil, lack of interest by the villagers, and villager tendency to eat the fish too soon. A new group of PCVs was scheduled to arrive in July 1985 for training and eventual placement, and some were targeted for Bakel. Because of success at other sites, the program was to be continued.

PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Although the project met only 50 percent of its quantitative output objectives, the purpose of introducing the technology was certainly achieved.

Agriculture programs were active in 25 villages. A total of 3,500 farmers were organized into 28 village-level groupements. Over 900 hectares were irrigated, with an average yield of 4 tons of rice per hectare recorded in some areas (see "Project Revisited" below).

The project constructed an operations base near Bakel that included a guest house, equipment repair center, parts stockroom, offices, conference rooms, and apartment for staff. A demonstration farm conducted applied research, produced seed, and provided extension services to farmers. In cooperation with Peace Corps, fish culture was introduced.

The project trained or improved the skills of most farmers participating in irrigated agriculture in the project zone through a series of crop production workshops in villages and visits by the farmers to the demonstration farm. In addition, training was provided to SAED mechanics (pump repair and maintenance), village pump operators, etc., and to 4 long-term students sent to the U.S. to study agronomy, agricultural management, and agricultural engineering.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Projects should carefully assess socio-cultural and economic characteristics of a target population during project design. A project considering introduction of new technology may be more successful if it starts in an area where people are more open and have experience outside of a village or area.

2. A project management strategy will be more effective if it fosters local participation in management decisions and permits local organizations to build on indigenous structures and practices in the area. Allowing the organization to choose its own officers and management style, for example, will foster organizational, and hence project, sustainability.

3. Appropriate government policy changes may be necessary to enable target populations to participate effectively in project decision-making. Although a project may be performing well in the field, incentives may be ineffective for project sustainability if national or regional policies (e.g., pricing) are inappropriate.

4 A hands-off approach to a project by a donor can be effective management under certain conditions. If host country staff is adequately trained, a loose management style can foster a sense of ownership of the project among this staff. This sense of ownership may be an essential ingredient for sustaining key project efforts after donor funding ceases.

5 A strategy fostering beneficiary participation requires concomitant and comprehensive training. Providing responsibility with little means to exercise it may prove frustrating and unproductive. A carefully designed and executed training program can help build beneficiary ownership of project objectives and actions. In addition, appropriate training for mid- and upper-level managers can have significant project impact, particularly when reinforcing needed policy changes.

PROJECT REVISITED

USAID/Senegal Program Overview of February 1987 presented this project as a success story (a) crop yields reached 6 tons/ha for rice and nearly 3 tons/ha for maize, the highest yields per hectare of any irrigation system in the Senegal River Valley, (b) there was heavy demand both for new irrigation systems and for expansion of existing systems, (c) building upon the high overall returns from irrigation and the strong local participation in building new irrigation systems, the project had more than doubled the anticipated irrigated area for the 1985-1986 season, targeted at 150 new hectares.

However, the mid-term evaluation of a follow-on project (Irrigation and Water Management Project 685-0280), conducted in May-June 1990, noted that not a single irrigated perimeter constructed in the Bakel area since 1977 had been financially successful.

The PACR for the follow-on project noted that data used in its PP had been taken from reports issued under the Bakel Small Irrigated Perimeters Project. The evaluation of this follow-on project revealed that most of the data used were inaccurate and misleading. See Project Summary for the Irrigation and Water Management Project (685-0280).

PROJECT SUMMARY

SINE SALOUM RURAL HEALTH CARE	685-0210
Project Duration	FY 77 - FY 84
Total Cost of Project	\$3 2 million

Source USAID/Senegal Program Overview, March 1983
 AID Project Impact Evaluation Report No 9, October 1980
 Draft Joint GOS-USAID End of Project Evaluation Report,
 July 1982
 AID Evaluation Special Study No 20, "Prospects for Primary Health Care in
 Africa", April 1984

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The project goal was to help the Government of Senegal (GOS) develop a model, self-financing health services delivery system for the rural population of the ex-Sine Saloum Region (presently the Fatick and Kaolack Regions). The project was to establish a network of 600 village health posts staffed and supported by 1,800 community level personnel in six departments of the ex-Sine Saloum Region.

Project activities entailed developing infrastructure, training village health personnel, establishing a supervisory system, furnishing supplies and equipment, and providing decreasing levels of budgetary support over the life of the project.

The project assigned much of the responsibility for the local health operation to the villagers themselves. The villagers were to build health huts through a network of management committees and rural community councils. They were also charged with replenishing these huts with basic drugs. The cost of the pharmaceutical products and of services were to be borne by the client villagers.

IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE

In April 1980, USAID conducted an impact evaluation which disclosed that the project had serious problems. One-third of the village health huts opened had already closed. The evaluation noted the principal problems to be the lack of financial viability, support and supervision, and poor pharmaceutical replenishment. Other problems cited concerned the selection of village health workers (VHWs), transport for supervision and logistics, location of huts, payment of VHWs, and village health committee support.

The GOS and USAID/Senegal redesigned the project to address the problems cited in the impact evaluation. The redesign emphasized the need for (1) improved management structure, (2) additional training for village management committees, (3) retraining for village health workers, (4) improvement in the drug replenishment system, and (5) health hut financial viability. The redesign limited the project activities to four departments within the ex-Sine Saloum Region, and proposed that the project focus on only 20 rural communities and 60 selected villages within those communities. The purpose of the more limited focus was to slow the pace of implementation in order to have more time to effectively organize and train village health committees and develop a health infrastructure that would adequately support the system.

PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Project efforts led to the creation of a basic health services delivery system composed of approximately 378 village health huts in four out of six administrative departments of the ex-Sine Saloum Region. A total of 48 government-operated health posts, staffed by nurses and environmental health agents, provided supervision to the village health workers. Each health unit received basic drugs which were sold to create a revolving fund for financing further supplies. Aimed toward the achievement of an effective, self-sustaining village-based health system, the project directed assistance at training village health workers, village health committees, and government supervisory personnel at the dispensary level.

A GOS-USAID/Washington evaluation was completed in the summer of 1982. The evaluation recommended a Phase II to carry out project activities in the two remaining departments and to reinforce the health services delivery system in the other four with specific interventions to address malnutrition, vaccine preventable diseases, malaria, and diarrhea-related mortality. These measures were technically simple and inexpensive. Once perfected, they were to significantly reduce the childhood and maternal mortality in the region and improve farmer productivity during the critically important agricultural season, June-September.

Project 685-0242, Rural Health Services II, constituted the recommended second Phase.

LESSONS LEARNED

A Project Design

1. Community participation in management and financial support is essential for preserving continuity and guaranteeing village support. Outside resources should not preclude local participation.

2. The mid-level health workers (MLHWs) are the pivotal cadres in a primary health care (PHC) program. Their support and supervision is essential to village level health

improvement MLHWs merit a concentrated and sustained training effort to develop their capabilities to support village health workers (VHWs)

3 Sanitation agents play an important role in preventive health activities and maintain a balance between curative and preventive health care at the village level

4 Availability of essential drugs are vital to establishing health hut credibility Initial drug inventories should reflect hut utilization rather than population size

5 Cooperative country inputs should be carefully analyzed to determine possible negative consequences of contributions, i.e. low Ministry of Health personnel indemnities

B Project Implementation

1 Project staff and project participants, including villagers, should be able to make mistakes without risk of having support terminated Growth, as evidenced by this project, comes from having the time and support necessary to learn from mistakes

2 Successful implementation depends on competent personnel as well as on sound project design Charismatic personalities should not be mistaken for technical competence and genuine motivation to achieve project objectives

3 The capacity of project implementation principals and staff to confront problems, analyze them and seek solutions is an indicator of project potential for success

4 Open channels of communication and support at every level are essential to program development and sustainability

5 Careful screening and selection of technical assistance as well as timing of technical assistance is critical to effective implementation

6 Initial training is very important but equally important is continued in-service training Of particular importance is regular reinforcement of village health committees

7 Data collection and analysis systems should be well designed and simple to use

8 All concepts and training materials introduced must be as simple as possible locally adaptable and locally maintainable

9 Project implementors must be sensitive to the right time to wean the project from outside inputs including materials, finances and technical assistance

C Project Evaluation

- 1 Joint evaluations have great value as an educational and sensitizing experience for all
- 2 The western concept of "balanced books" should not serve as a criterion for hut viability. The pricing and sale of pharmaceutical products follows strong social customs and pressures, villages have various ways of replenishing funds to purchase essential medications
- 3 Future evaluation of community participation in PHC programs should include assessment of the effects of community participation on the development process. The community action, decision-making and support relating to PHC programs appear to enhance other aspects of individual and community development

D Management

- 1 The Senegalese decentralized administrative structure is complementary to and reinforces the community participation in PHC. The structure allows for and encourages village organization and decision-making which has a significant positive influence on the development of village based health care
- 2 Decentralizing health services to the village level has enabled the GOS to meet heretofore unmet demand for health care services

Taken from A I D Evaluation Special Study No 20, "Prospects for Primary Health Care in Africa", April 1984

"Most Primary Health Care (PHC) programs in developing countries experience problems of implementation and viability. Senegal's Primary Health Care program in the Sine Saloum region was no different."

"The principal lesson learned from Senegal's PHC program is that a thorough, critical evaluation, when taken seriously and acted upon by a donor and the recipient developing country government, can turn a failing program around."

"The Sine Saloum PHC program is not without problems, however. For example, the program is largely curative, it has had little success introducing preventive measures, such as improved health and hygiene behaviors, oral rehydration therapy, and family planning information and services. The program's near exclusive emphasis on curative services results from the fact that at least at present it provides mainly those services that clients demand and are willing to pay for. Lacking are the kinds of essential PHC activities - education, outreach, surveillance - necessary to effect the attitudinal and behavioral changes which lead to long-term improvements in health status."

PROJECT SUMMARY

YMCA/ORT YOUTH JOB DEVELOPMENT	685-0222
Project Duration	FY 79 - FY 85
Total Cost of Project	\$3.2 million

Source USAID/Senegal Program Overview, May 1984
 Mid-Term Evaluation Report, by Aurora Associates, February 1981
 End of Project Draft Evaluation Report, by Alexander Vlad and Iria d'Aquino,
 May 1984

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Under an Operational Program Grant (OPG) from AID, YMCA/ORT was to build an extended system of vocational training services enabling unemployed Senegalese urban youth to acquire marketable technical skills and assistance in job placement and adjustment. The basic goals of the project were to (1) establish a viable functioning vocational training center (Centre de Formation et de Promotion des Jeunes, CFPJ) staffed with qualified instructors, (2) "senegalize" CFPJ completely, phasing out all non-Senegalese staff and reducing current expenditures, (3) enable the project to become self-sufficient, (4) establish a placement program which would insert graduates into the economic mainstream of the country.

IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE

Implementation of the project did not conform with the objectives of the Grant Agreement. Initially, this five-year project had an estimated budget of \$1,758,427 funded by USAID, with contributions of \$828,000 from the GOS, \$125,000 from YMCA, and \$66,000 from Peace Corps.

The budget was depleted in two years without the Center showing any positive results (classes only opened in 1981). The OPG was increased several times, to reach a total of \$3,285,000.

The mid-term evaluation report of February 1981 gives a long list (over ten pages) of mishaps, mistakes, misunderstandings, misconceptions, and misrepresentations that plagued the project. The only partner who had little to be blamed for was the GOS.

- The GOS had provided continuous and high level support for the project and for vocational training in general. It had provided qualified counterparts and contributed agreed upon contributions without undue delay. The GOS had also provided suitable land for the Center. The role of GOS overall had been one of the most positive and successful aspects of the project.

Among major flaws found by the evaluation team were (to cite but a few)

- The original Project Authorization and Request for Allotment of Funds included as a Condition Precedent (CP) that prior to the disbursement of funds, the Grantee furnish to USAID a plan for the procurement of technical training services and equipment, including a schedule which would coordinate such procurement with the construction of the Center. YMCA did not fulfill the CP, but USAID disbursed funds.

- The absence of a plan and schedule made it difficult for YMCA to see the project in its totality and the relationship of its various components, and to measure slippage in the delivery of project components. This contributed to poor management decisions by YMCA, including the decisions to begin providing technical services of expatriate instructors before there were adequate facilities or equipment, and to delay ordering some equipment as a belated economy measure. Delays in the construction of the Center by the contractor complicated the situation.

- Conflicting understanding by partners of their respective roles, described in the YMCA-GOS protocol on one side, and the YMCA-ORT agreement on the other side, was worsened by personality differences and cultural differences.

- YMCA operated under the belief that there was an informal verbal understanding with USAID that the original budget of \$1.8 million would be increased. YMCA operated under the assumption that a total of \$5 million would probably be made available to the project.

- USAID/Senegal did not adequately monitor the project, and did not react to the fact that the rate of expenditures was more than double what was originally anticipated, and that funds available would not be sufficient for the life of the project.

The End of Project Draft Evaluation Report states that

- Based on the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation report, the assessment report of June, 1981, and the USAID General Inspector's Office audit report of June, 1981, measures were taken to improve the situation. "The parties concerned (AID, GOS, YMCA, ORT) strove to better coordinate activities and adhere to a development plan, while introducing necessary adaptations." Administration and management problems recurred, however, in subsequent years.

- Teaching provided seemed to be of good quality and appreciated by the business sector. Training programs emphasized practical applications of trades taught. However, pedagogical methods advocated by ORT were not always applied at the Center, and the apprenticeship program called for in the Project Paper was not followed. Further, the evaluation team feared a certain deviation in the teaching approach that would bring CFJP's vocational training closer to the formal educational system, and thus defeat the project's goal.

- The placement service called for in the project was non-existent. The Center succeeded, however, in placing a good number of its graduates through the personal interest and efforts of the ORT technical advisors. Employers interviewed were generally satisfied with the basic knowledge and competence of the Center graduates they had hired, and were willing to continue to hire them. However, in the evaluators' opinion, a significant number of these employers were unwilling to pay equitable starting salaries and to offer promotion opportunities to the graduates.

PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

- The Centre de Formation et de Promotion des Jeunes (CFPJ) completed and operated by GOS, with Senegalese staff. Courses offered in textile skills, masonry, metalwork, electricity, plumbing, drafting and electromechanics.

- Sixty-four students participated in an on-the-job apprenticeship training program with Dakar-based companies and firms during August-September 1983, and graduated in June 1984.

- Approximately fifty graduates placed in part-time or permanent positions.

LESSONS LEARNED

1 The assumption that training and placing unemployed school leavers into productive employment or self-employment is feasible, is valid. Whether the center's establishment, design and institutional framework is the optimal means to achieve this end at the minimal cost is problematical.

2 The project was marred with problems not because likely difficulties were unforeseen, but because measures which were recommended in the original grant agreement were not followed, and USAID disbursed funds without requiring that they be followed. The original OPG predicted all too well the types of problems likely to be encountered and urged that steps be taken to minimize them. These recommendations were not, for the most part, adhered to.

3 The project design and the cost/benefit ratio should be examined to learn if the same objectives could be achieved for a larger number of beneficiaries using a different approach than the construction and staffing of an institution similar to the CFPJ.

1983 Short-term consultant person/months were significantly reduced. On the GOS side, of the three counterpart positions, only the Project Manager was initially filled, no soil scientist was found, and a junior, insufficiently qualified person, was assigned to the third position. Eventually, the soil scientist position was filled by an expert hired under contract. But continuity was broken when the COP's counterpart left for training after one year on the project.

RSI was to prepare an Operational Plan in cooperation with DAT, by June 1982, showing how activities under the RSI contract were to be implemented. As of December 1983, date of the in-depth evaluation, such plan had not been prepared.

The evaluation noted limited project progress: map production was behind schedule, formal training was done for only half of the GOS personnel planned, training had benefitted project work to only a very limited extent, communications among USAID, GOS, and RSI project staff was less than adequate, etc.

The assessment conducted by USAID/Senegal in January 1985 noted that

a. The original choice of the host ministry was a poor one. The shift of DAT to the Ministry of Decentralization was only slightly more appropriate but did not substantially improve GOS understanding of its role of supervision, as neither of them had the technical capabilities required. The in-depth evaluators noted that the University of Dakar's Geography Department repeatedly expressed its desire to collaborate closely with RSI.

b. The Contractor demonstrated lack of authority, it should have tried harder to ensure that the GOS met its commitments rather than risk jeopardizing the attainment of project objectives. The in-depth evaluation noted that the first COP, a competent soil scientist, had to handle details of coordination, find work space, and carry out other administrative and managerial tasks, at the expense of making maps, collecting information and advising project scientists and counterparts. The second COP, a geomorphologist, found himself behind in his technical tasks for many of the same reasons, eventually he chose to concentrate on these tasks, at the expense of bureaucratic work and communication between RSI and DAT.

c. USAID should have been more supportive of the Contractor's efforts. The Project Officer could have more closely monitored project implementation and acted as mediator between the Contractor and the Grantee when problems were impeding progress towards the achievement of project objectives.

PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

1. Baseline resource maps and interpretations

As a result of the December 1983 in-depth evaluation, map outputs were revised and limited to four sets each of four categories of maps (vegetation, land capability, geohydrology, and soils).

at a 1/500,000 scale. As of December 1984, preliminary work (interpretation and field work) on vegetation and land capability was completed, and was behind schedule for geohydrology and soils maps. Finalization work (analysis, drawing, legends) was well behind schedule for the four categories. Printing of maps and preparation of reports had not even been started.

The USAID/Senegal assessment team recommended in January 1985 that the project be extended six months to finish technical work on mapping, to write reports/legends, and to carry out the printing, in order to get at least one objective of the project accomplished.

2 Training

a Formal training the two short-term U.S. training programs (one person each) were merged into one ten-month training program for one person (the DAT natural resource planner). Regarding third-country training, three out of four mid-level officials were sent to Ouagadougou. Apparently they were not satisfied with the training level received. Two of the participants went to France for degree work immediately after their return from Ouagadougou. Thus, formal training was of limited benefit to the project.

b Non-formal training quantitatively, the on-the-job training component did not achieve its target. Only three counterparts, out of fifteen projected, worked on a permanent basis with the expatriate experts. According to project staff members interviewed, this training was of very limited benefit to the project.

Most GOS counterparts felt that they did not have the opportunity to be trained in thematic teledetection techniques, the primary limitation was that the expatriate experts lacked the communications skills essential to make this on-the-job training possible, also, communication between experts and their Senegalese counterparts was limited to personal technical work instead of an "integrated thinking mechanism" which would have better enabled transfer of technology. (The in-depth evaluation report of December 1983 noted that counterparts were "squeezed" into the expatriates' program of project management, mapping, training, and institution building. Not all the counterparts provided had the specific training, for example in geology or pedology, to benefit from direct instruction from the expatriate pedologist and geologist. Pressed for time, the expatriates tried to work together with their Senegalese counterparts as well as possible, knowing that their counterparts would not remain in the project in a capacity of geologists or pedologists.)

c Seminars the seminars reached ninety-five people instead of the eighty planned in the revised project objectives. However, according to some project staff members, the course duration was too short, and provided only very basic remote sensing skills to the participants.

3 Institution Building

The USAID/Senegal assessment team found that since the beginning of project implementation, the institution building component was considered a secondary objective by USAID, the

Contractor and the GOS ministries involved. In spite of efforts and advice from the University of Dakar staff involved in this component, the two host ministries did not provide the necessary support to make institutionalization happen, and it was believed that Senegalese staff members would not be able either to take over or to manage mapping studies by the end of the project.

The in-depth evaluation brought up a fundamental question: were the goal and purposes, and the means for the accomplishment of this project, ever appropriate and feasible?

The project purposes essentially tried to focus on the needs of two different GOS organizations: the National Remote Sensing Center at the University of Dakar, and DAT. This notion was reflected throughout the Project Paper, and culminated in the requirement, as a condition precedent to disbursement of USAID funds, for a service agreement between DAT and the University of Dakar.

However, in doing so, two substantially different issues were confused in project design: (a) directing technical assistance toward institutional development of a national remote sensing center at the University of Dakar, and (b) directing technical assistance toward the development of a national land-use plan (within strict time schedules), and simultaneous institutional development of the GOS agency concerned with this objective (DAT).

Each of the two objectives called for a totally different approach, and the requirements in terms of personnel, equipment, time limits, etc., were totally different for each of these objectives. It was unrealistic to expect that they could be accomplished by a two million dollar project which allowed for only two long-term expatriate staff. In other words, the project purposes, as stated, were appropriate for two projects, but were not attainable with one project.

Interestingly, though, the project goal - the preparation of a national plan for management and optimal utilization of Senegal's natural resources - had already been met: some twenty baseline resource maps had been provided to DAT by two parallel UN projects. At the time of the in-depth evaluation, a preliminary land-use plan was being completed by DAT for submission to the respective GOS agencies concerned. It was expected that this plan in its final form would be ready by June 1985 to serve as a basis for the 7th four-year development plan.

However, the real needs of Senegal in remote sensing and land planning techniques had hardly been addressed.

LESSONS LEARNED

A From the USAID/Senegal assessment report

1. Chiefs of party should understand USAID procedures, have basic experience in personnel management and, as part of their in-country orientation, participate in cross-cultural seminars.

2 Selection of the host entity must be based on a full review of the functions and skills involved in a given project

3 USAID monitoring should include reviewing and redressing if necessary even those basic elements on which a project may be based such as the selection of the host entity, the responsiveness of the host government, the selection of contractor personnel, etc

4 Project Implementation Plans should indicate relative timing of key events and benchmarks, but should not be date specific until materials are in place, offices found, and counterparts appointed

B From the in-depth evaluation report of December 1983

1 Collaboration between a U S university and a host country university cannot be accomplished through contractual arrangements with a host country government agency Direct collaboration between RSI and the University of Dakar would have provided the best means for effective transfer of remote sensing technology, managerial and organizational capabilities to operate a Remote Sensing Center

2 It is wrongly assumed that, in relatively small projects, costs may be cut by asking the technical people to carry out both technical and managerial tasks, with little administrative assistance

3 Project managers working against deadlines and budget constraints will typically try to produce a tangible product - a product by which his or the project's financial or technical success or failure is determined - at the expense, perhaps, of less visible tasks such as training and administrative work

4 Personality or communications problems are worsened by (a) the host country manager being overwhelmed by requests for people and assistance, (b) the rebound effect of the U S manager's frustration for not getting what he/she needs (and by binding agreements, should get) to perform his/her job

PROJECT SUMMARY

FAMILY HEALTH AND POPULATION	685-0248
Project Duration	FY 85 - FY 93
Total Cost of Project	\$21 03 million

Source USAID/Senegal Program Overview, March 1993
 Final Evaluation by Devres, Inc , October 1991
 USAID/Senegal Project Evaluation Summary, September 1992

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The purpose of the project was (a) to achieve an effective, nationwide family planning program offered through public and private sector institutions, and (b) to improve the demographic data base for more effective development planning

This project, a follow-up to the Family Health Phase I Project (685-0217) had five principal activities (1) expanding family planning and family health service delivery so that services would be available in all health centers and in 25% of the health posts, as well as through a variety of private channels, (2) training of medical and auxiliary health personnel and members of other appropriate organizations and groups to manage the nationwide family planning (FP) program, (3) supporting Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) activities to establish a solid public awareness and acceptance of FP and health services delivery, (4) enhancing the demographic data base to improve development planning, and in particular, assisting with the 1988 National Census, (5) fostering population policy development to solidify the support of policy makers and planners in both the public and private sectors. Approximately 10% of the resources were devoted to increase the role of the private sector in the delivery of FP services.

By the end of 1992, approximately 101,100 Senegalese women of reproductive age were expected to have benefitted from this program, and their offspring should also have had a better chance to develop into healthy children if birth intervals were prolonged.

The focus of the last two years of the project was (1) to consolidate the FP system in place with particular emphasis on improving the quality of care, and (2) to support the embryonic Senegal National Family Planning Program (NFPP) and the critical integration of the project activities under the NFPP.

IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE

In 1989, the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) under which the project was originally designed, and which had supervised the project for the first five years, and the Ministry of

Health (MOH) which provided the technical support and FP personnel, were both abolished. A new Ministry of Public Health and Social Action (MPHSA) was created which assumed the responsibilities of both abolished ministries and took over the management of the project.

At about the same time, because of suspicions of mismanagement, the USAID Regional Inspector General (RIG) and the GOS Inspector General audited and inspected the project. Both found considerable evidence of malfeasance, which led to the change of the GOS Project Director, Project Accountant and Logistician.

Also in 1989, the Chief of the Health, Population and Nutrition Division at USAID/Senegal, and the Chief of Party of the technical assistance contractor (ISTI) completed their tours. These changes resulted in a major loss of experience, operational knowledge and institutional memory.

The project evaluation plan called for three evaluations to determine progress toward attainment of project objectives, identify problems, assess information needed to overcome those problems, and judge the overall development impact of the project.

The first two evaluations were never carried out. The project went for five and a half years without an overall independent program review. The final (and only) evaluation was carried out during the sixth year of the project (1991). The evaluation team found it difficult to locate primary data, to speak with people who could help the team understand records and reports, or to get first hand views on what "really" occurred in specific cases.

1 Project administration and management

Supervision of the project by two ministries established vertical processes and, sometimes, parallel development of programs. This vertical and parallel development isolated FP from other health activities and created frustration, and rivalries between the ministries.

Within the project, each of the three components functioned, to a great extent, on its own. Coordination among components and with the regions was poor. With the creation of MPHSA, coordination improved, weekly meetings were held at the central level. Yet, the meetings were reported to be ineffective because of the large amount of material to be examined, and insufficient time devoted to each problem. Eventually, a technical advisor was appointed within MPHSA to follow issues relating to the project.

The investigation conducted in 1989 by RIG and GOS resulted in the project being left with little or no direction on the GOS side, and the suspension of most project activities. USAID and ISTI took a more active role to fill the vacuum, their actions going from the definition of project plans, to the control of the local account budget by ISTI. The GOS project personnel resented not receiving feedback from ISTI on its financial management of project resources, not receiving reports of consultants, not being involved in the selection of contractors, etc.

At the time of the evaluation in 1991, the situation was changing, and the role of the new project leadership had improved. There was still a need, however, for clarification and redefinition of roles, and a shift of greater authority and responsibility to GOS and to the Senegalese project personnel.

On the financial side, because of GOS' failure to provide its contribution, resources for local operating costs for vehicles, gas, per diem, local training, utilities, etc. were insufficient. Many GOS and project personnel wrongly believed that was the result of USAID's freezing the US local currency contribution. USAID did not insist that the GOS meet its financial commitment, nor did USAID substitute U.S. funds for the local contribution the GOS failed to provide to the project.

2 Information, Education and Communication (IEC)

The IEC program was, in general, well planned and executed. Its major focus was on FP/child spacing, with a secondary goal of providing information on STDs and fertility. The subject of STDs and AIDS, because of its complexity and uniqueness, was not given the special attention it deserved.

Overall educational planning was done well, and involved a wide range of professionals and technicians. However, detailed planning, identification of specific sub-groups of the population, and the development of specific strategies to reach them, were not adequate.

The mass media campaign was particularly noteworthy, combining message research, collaborative planning, creative production, and close working relationships with the Senegal Radio and Television Office (ORTS).

A large number of IEC agents and community volunteers were trained in FP communication. These volunteers, however, were disproportionately distributed in the six Regions of the project. Their recruitment and performance in certain areas were less than hoped for, probably due to the lack of remuneration or incentive.

The involvement of health workers in FP IEC, particularly of midwives working at health centers and health posts, a major goal of the project, was not met. Inefficient use was made of audiovisual and print materials.

Supervision was insufficient due to the lack of vehicles, fuel, and per diem after 1989, and to the unrealistic supervision programs and schedules imposed on extension workers.

Important IEC-related research was undertaken. Information on women, men, and overall socio-cultural characteristics of the population was made available to IEC planners. Much of the data, however, was too general, and was not translated into a form useful to them. No significant research was undertaken into the knowledge, attitudes, and practices of Senegalese concerning STDs and AIDS.

Family Life Education, an important element of the project, was not treated sufficiently. The Ministry of Education's reluctance to approve the introduction of population issues in the primary and secondary school curricula until 1989 was a significant barrier to project efforts.

Community leaders were reached indirectly through press and television, but no specifically designed, concerted, campaign was developed to reach national, regional, and local religious, political, and traditional leaders.

No pre- and periodic post-campaign audience evaluation was carried out. No performance evaluations were carried out on personnel trained by the project. As a result, project staff were unable to assess the success of their efforts and take remedial measures. No archive of project-produced materials was kept, thus depriving future planners of a basis on which to develop new programs, and limiting the thoroughness of evaluation efforts.

3 Family planning clinical services

The project increased the availability of FP services for the general population. The number of FP clinics increased from 17 in 1985 to 123 in 1990, and the number of active clients from 8,543 to 39,000 over the same period.

Although health clinics were improved, effective management of the system was lacking: some clinics were over-burdened while others were under-utilized, allocation of financial resources for operations of the clinics was insufficiently related to need, etc.

The quality of clinical services was found insufficient: women were not well-counseled on the advantages and disadvantages of different contraceptive methods, instructions provided to women on the proper use of contraceptive methods was not complete, etc.

The number of midwives and physicians trained exceeded the project objectives, but few nurses received FP training. However, a core of national trainers was created, making it possible to institutionalize in-country training.

FP data collected at the clinical level was inaccurate and unreliable. Collection of reliable data was hampered by the lack of guides or protocols and of clear definitions of data categories, the insufficient training of midwives and FP workers, the non-availability of client records, etc.

FP clinics did not receive adequate supervision from national or regional level staff, due to insufficiency of funds for travel, per diem, and gas, confusion over organizational roles, etc. Private and para-public sector clinics received significant supervision.

4 Sexually transmitted diseases (STD) and infertility

There was insufficient attention to treatment of STD and infertility patients in the implementation of the project. Services provided to patients were poorly handled and of low quality. There was

inadequate use of STD laboratories in the diagnosis of STD cases

There was little coordination between the project STD component and the National STD and AIDS programs. There was a lack of training given to FP workers in special counseling, screening, etc. Equipment and supplies for STD laboratories were kept in warehouses for 18 months before they were released for use.

5 Bio-medical and psycho-social research

While many research studies were carried out, no central research plan had been developed, and no one had been assigned overall research management responsibility. No organized process was introduced to review research proposals, evaluate, or disseminate research results. No central library was established as a depository for research papers and reports.

The operational research activity was not well-managed. There were major deficiencies in the coordination process. There was lack of dissemination and use of results. Some surveys were planned but not executed.

Too much bio-medical, psycho-social, and academic research was carried out, in comparison to needed operational studies.

6 Construction and renovation of facilities. Maintenance of equipment

The project was relatively successful in meeting planned output targets for construction and renovation of facilities, outpacing the ability of the system to effectively use the new and expanded FP centers.

Equipment was insufficient in 67 percent of the centers. Equipment available in some centers was poorly maintained.

7 Contraceptive logistics management

To coordinate contraceptive inputs, a "Contraceptive Products Requirements Committee" was formed among donors, principally USAID and UNFPA.

Stocks of contraceptives were generally sufficient at the central and regional levels. Periodic "stock outs" were reported, however, at all the FP clinics visited by the evaluation team. Supply problems resulted from weaknesses in the distribution system (lack of project vehicles and fuel at the regional levels were often cited).

Control of inventories was poor at both the central and clinical levels. No clear control over the central warehouse, no inventory cards or stock register, regional and clinical methods for inventory controls varied considerably.

The management information system did not produce the data and reports necessary to manage logistics. Data inconsistencies existed throughout the system, numbers conflicted between logistics-based data and clinic-based data.

Logistic staff had not been sufficiently trained in many basic concepts of logistics management.

8 Women in development sub-projects

Attempts to develop small scale projects to generate women's income and to increase women's exposure to FP information were not successful.

Few of the 62 WID sub-projects envisioned under the original Grant Agreement met minimum credit criteria.

The GOS agency responsible for management of village-level development projects did not seem prepared to provide the management and staff resources to administer the WID sub-projects, the project staff was not equipped to deal with the kind of institutional requisites necessary to manage these sub-projects.

These women activities seemed to be marginal to the central clinical thrust of the project.

9 The Private and Para-Public Sector (PPPS) project component, and contraceptive social marketing (CSM)

PPPS clinic workers were highly motivated, facilities and equipment seemed well cared for. Salaries paid to PPPS clinic staff were often higher than salaries paid to public sector personnel.

Family health and population activities of PPPS organizations generally conformed with the health policies of Senegal and furthered project objectives. Client satisfaction at PPS FP clinics compared very favorably to client opinions at public sector facilities. However, there were no apparent funds that could continue to support PPPS clinics if USAID funding were terminated.

Considerable effort was made in the planning and design of a CSM program for Senegal. Political support had been secured from key sectors, but support from GOS and the medical establishment was still to come.

10 Demographic data base improvement

Basic census reports were published within three years of the census, as specified in the project logframe. Regional demographic surveys were not carried out as planned.

Information prepared by the National Bureau of Statistics (BNR) was not adequately diffused to, or used by, the clinical sub-components and other data users. Existing surveys and census data

were not fully exploited to assist the FP program in planning and evaluation of impact

In-country, long-term and short-term overseas training was achieved as planned, and provided needed skills to census staff

During the project, the BNR had four different Directors, and underwent a number of reorganizations which disrupted the continuity and coherence of the BNR component of the project

PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The project achieved most of the project outputs, in form or substance. The number of facilities providing services exceeded project targets

As a result of the evaluation, (1) measures were taken to consolidate key activities within the project and to ensure the financial integrity of these activities, so that objectives could be achieved within the time frame, (2) a logistics management system, a research strategy, and special criteria for WID sub-projects were developed, (3) review of IEC materials was undertaken

1 Increased awareness of demographic factors

The project helped to increase the awareness of GOS planners and policy makers to the importance of demographic factors in development planning. As a result, a National Population Policy was adopted in April 1988, and a National Family Planning Policy was put into effect in March 1990

2 Increased access to modern family planning methods

The IEC campaign of 1988-1989 was very successful in increasing overall awareness and acceptance of FP

The number of active contraceptive acceptors increased from 7,500 in 1985 to 29,890 in 1990 at public sector clinics. In the private sector, that number increased from 1,000 in 1985 to 9,111 in 1990. Against the original project goal of 200,000 acceptors by 1992, there were, in 1990, 70,107 acceptors in all sectors using modern contraceptive methods

3 Training

The development of a core of national trainers was a notable success of the project. With the institutionalization of in-country training capability, more in-country training and less USA based training was provided, and the training targets set in the project were surpassed (the number of midwives and physicians trained exceeded project objectives)

The project provided useful technical assistance and training to BNR staff in demography and census methodology. Training and seminars in population policy and the impact of population growth on development helped to increase GOS awareness of population issues and contributed to the development of a national population policy.

4 Demographic data base improvement

One important activity of the project was to improve Senegal's demographic data base. This activity increased awareness of the relationship between rapid population growth and overall economic and social development, and allowed more effective development planning to take place. Two important demographic and FP surveys and a national census of population were carried out during the project period.

LESSONS LEARNED

1 Overdesign and underfunding of the project

a. The project purpose was too optimistic and unrealistic to be accomplished within the proposed time frame and given the cultural and policy position of Senegal at the time the project was first designed.

b. The number of project components was too large to be successfully managed by USAID, the GOS, or the Contractor, during the anticipated life of the project. The number of activities to be carried out under each component was too large, and their focus too wide.

c. The diffusion of authority among many project components made it difficult to determine who was ultimately responsible for many decisions.

d. The level of financial resources provided by USAID and/or available from the GOS was insufficient to support the large number of components and activities. GOS accounting system was inefficient to control advances of U.S. funds.

e. The project provided insufficient training and technical assistance to develop an adequate number and quality of local management and technical staff capacity to sustain all project components and activities.

f. USAID should take into account the GOS ability to financially support a project, and track whether the GOS financial commitment is being met.

g. USAID should make flexible grant agreements, so as to tie USAID contributions to pre-determined project performance or other criteria.

2 Project evaluation

a In large projects, separate technical evaluations of independent project components should be carried out before conducting an integrated program and management evaluation

b The lack of relevant evaluation criteria, of a system for collecting operational data, and insufficient time on the part of the evaluation team limited an evaluation of management issues in any depth

c GOS urged that the evaluation team give attention to project administration, especially to the cost effectiveness of project components. If efficient project management that assured project sustainability, was a goal of the project, criteria for evaluating management effectiveness should have been included in the Project Agreement

PROJECT SUMMARY

ENEAL RURAL MANAGEMENT TRAINING	685-0256
Project Duration	FY 82 - FY 88
Total Cost of Project	\$3.1 million

Source USAID/Senegal Program Overview, February 1987
 USAID/Senegal Project Assistance Completion Report, June 1988

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The purpose of this project was to develop the capacity of the Ecole Nationale d'Economie Appliquee (ENEAL) to train lower- and middle-level rural development cadres in managerial skills relating to project design, implementation, and evaluation. The training program aimed to support rural employment and self-sufficiency in Senegal.

ENEAL has served for many years as a key training institution for government rural development agents. The project built upon ENEAL's established training system, combining extensive field exercises with classroom work. Through technical assistance and curriculum redesign, the project developed "training of trainers" techniques that provided local organizations with project management skills. The project also included an informal literacy training component designed to aid ENEAL graduates in initiating literacy projects in rural areas. ENEAL also accepted foreign students from other Sahelian countries, lending a regional impact to the project.

The project provided a three-person technical assistance team from Texas Tech University, plus short-term consultants, and sent ENEAL faculty members to the U.S. for management training. A US personal services contractor developed management related literacy techniques, to be used in the training of management trainers.

IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE

The project was implemented in a timely fashion. All project inputs and other elements were in place. Implementation was effective and the established yearly targets were attained.

Despite the project's success in meeting its original objectives, ENEAL's ability to carry these gains forward or translate project success into meaningful training programs was constrained by a number of realities which were not perceived at the time the project was designed and authorized.

These constraints included (a) a "top-down" management structure unsuited to an academic institution, (b) a lack of regular communication between ENEAL, the organizations which used

it, and other training institutions, both governmental and private, (c) a cumbersome bureaucracy at ENEA that hindered the planning and execution of routine tasks, (d) a lack of reliable financial support from GOS, which made acquisitions or expenditures problematical, (e) a policy of staff training, work assignments, and arbitrary promotion that did not always reflect the capabilities or contributions of individuals

Due to the above conditions, the ENEA staff was on the whole poorly motivated, or motivated by financial considerations alone. Many were dissatisfied with working conditions and wanted to leave. This included several graduates of Texas Tech who had not been given teaching assignments commensurate with their training since returning to ENEA.

The implementation of the in-service training workshop was an innovation for ENEA. This training showed great potential for the systematic upgrading of skills of the professional staff.

An information management component of the project enhanced the performance of ENEA's library and research units, aiding the teaching staff to efficiently handle the information exchanges within ENEA. However, communication and dissemination of information generated by divisions within ENEA were not always distributed to other divisions.

PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Nine out of ten participants successfully completed graduate training. Seven new management courses were introduced into ENEA's core curriculum and specialized college programs. A training book translated into four national languages and other teaching materials were tested and disseminated. Seven seminars and training workshops in management and computer operations were completed. Two in-service training sessions for ENEA graduates were carried out.

The project improved ENEA's specialized courses. ENEA's ability to deliver training for rural management was improved, its teaching staff upgraded and its curriculum made more relevant.

LESSONS LEARNED

1 Without certain reforms, such as a real decentralization effort and financial support on the part of GOS, the growth of ENEA would have a limited impact on the national scene.

2 Individual colleges within ENEA should function as independent entities with their own authority to implement research projects within ENEA. This would facilitate contractual implementation and enhance their effectiveness.

PROJECT SUMMARY

COMMUNITY AND ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT	685-0260
Project Duration	FY 84 - FY 94
Total Cost of Project	\$15 0 million

Source USAID/Senegal Program Overview, March 1993
 Final Evaluation Report, PVO Component, by DATEX, Inc , July 1991
 Final Evaluation Report, Small Scale Enterprise Component, by Social Consultants International, Inc , January 1994

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The purpose of the project was to enable village groups and small entrepreneurs to manage and sustain their own development. The project had two components: (1) sub-grants to U.S. and local PVOs to assist village organizations (VOs), through the provision of training, technical advice, and credit, to plan and implement financially viable productive activities, and (2) a loan fund providing credit to small scale enterprises (SSEs) using strict business criteria and the highest legal allowable interest rate.

The project sites were originally in the Regions of Kaolack, Fatick, Thiès, Diourbel, and Dakar. They were subsequently extended to the Regions of Ziguinchor, Kolda, and Tambacounda, with a GOS contribution of \$1.7 million to support the SSE component activities in these regions.

From Dakar, a Management Unit (MU) funded under a cooperative agreement with New TransCentury Foundation managed and monitored all project activities. A National Project Committee, which included representatives of USAID and six GOS concerned ministries, approved PVO proposals, reviewed overall project policy and criteria for selection of beneficiaries, and participated in periodic project reviews and evaluations.

IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCEA PVO COMPONENT

There were a number of management and implementation problems related to the original project design. Many of them surfaced early in the project's long history and were worked out through changes in the implementation process. Others were never resolved and remained with the project until the end of the PVO component.

1 Complexity of project design

One level of project complexity was caused by the marriage of the two diverse components, SSE and PVO, on the assumption that they would be complementary. Instead of reinforcing each other, this cobbling of components with different objectives and necessarily divergent methodologies worked to the detriment of the more complex and management-intensive PVO activities.

Project implementation was complex and cumbersome in terms of process and functions. Whereas the MU had responsibility for implementation, it did not have commensurate authority. The effort involved in obtaining approvals was inordinate, and considerably decreased the flexibility that the MU should have had in decision making.

2 Start-up time

The project took approximately two and a half years longer than anticipated to get all units in place and up and running, effectively reducing the life of project from six to three and a half years. Over two years elapsed between drafting the PP and project start-up.

Overly optimistic assumptions were made about PVO/NGO willingness and capacity to participate, as well as VOs' level of development and preparation for credit-based activities. The approval process was exceedingly slow for subproject activities.

One result of these timing problems was that far fewer VOs were reached and those that were served had much less time to interact with project-provided services than was intended.

3 Recruitment of PVO/NGO participants

PVOs and NGOs did not volunteer to participate in the project in anywhere near the numbers anticipated. The project eventually worked with every PVO/NGO that could meet the basic registration requirements.

Among the reasons for this reluctance was that many PVOs/NGOs perceived the project's conditions and restrictions on activities as too difficult, and USAID's reporting and auditing requirements as too intrusive. Since a key aspect of the project relied on a credit and loan repayment approach with which most PVOs/NGOs had little or no experience, many were reluctant to participate in such a prescriptive program.

4 Rigidity in selection of village subproject activities

Insistence on the criterion of credit worthiness in all VO activities ignored the variations in the level of institutional development among VOs, many of which did not even exist prior to the project.

Due in part to the influence of the "minimalist credit strategy" used by the project's other component (SSE), income generating subprojects were the only types of activities that VOs could consider. The rationale adopted by the MU and USAID/Senegal was that short term, profit making subprojects were needed to produce revenue with which to pay back loans, and to finance other subprojects from a revolving fund.

VOs were severely limited in the scope and types of projects which were deemed credit worthy by the project. Village projects involving windbreaks, woodlot, and fruit trees, for example, were eliminated from consideration because of their indirect and long term payoffs.

Initially, the National Project Committee also contributed to this problem by only allowing agriculture-related activities in the dry season for fear that the PVOs/NGOs' work would threaten government extension agency's activities. Later in the life of the project, this requirement was relaxed, but 90 percent of all subprojects were in only two sectors: animal fattening and gardening.

Gardening proved unprofitable in many instances, contradicting the economic analysis of the PP. In the end, only animal fattening offered a reasonable expectation of success under project policy. VOs were severely restricted in terms of income generating options by the project itself, and innovative activities envisioned in the PP were precluded.

5 Credit provision or rural development activities?

The manner in which the project evolved pitted the rural development aspects of the PVO component against the credit provision aspects. The PP said very little about loan repayment by VOs, concentrating instead on grants to VOs and on institution building of both VOs and PVOs/NGOs. The design seemed to view the PVO component as preparing VOs for future involvement in credit programs.

However, the project suffered a confusion of objectives and shift in emphasis that tended to treat loan repayment rates as uniquely important, compared to more nuanced measures of VO growth and development towards sustainability. The focus on repayment rates, coupled with the strict limits on the types and timing of subproject activities allowed by the project, skewed the actions of VOs, PVOs/NGOs and MU towards profitability within the life of the project.

Of the total loans made, 65 percent of the principal was recovered by the time of the final evaluation.

6 Limited USAID/Senegal input

Because of the experimental nature of the project, the PP called for USAID to maintain considerable project oversight and to contribute on a technical level, while delegating implementation to the MU. The Cooperative Agreement between USAID and NTF altered the original PP design, removing "as much of the management burden as possible from

USAID/Senegal", and "leaving the primary project implementation responsibility with the Management Unit (MU) "

The inaccurate assumption in the PP that USAID would undertake specific management tasks, such as PVO/NGO coordination and technical agricultural supervision, may have led to an underestimation of the staff strength which would be needed by the MU. Almost all of USAID/Senegal's substantial involvement was delegated early in the project to an already fully occupied Assistant Project Manager. Important project tasks, such as PVO/NGO recruiting, and technical agricultural feasibility analysis, did not get the attention called for in the Cooperative Agreement.

This reduction in USAID's involvement without a compensating increase in MU staff, especially coupled with inaccurate assumptions about PVO/NGO technical capacities, contributed to unskilled and/or inexperienced PVOs/NGOs and VOs making poor decisions that cost dearly.

USAID/Senegal's diminished role also restricted its ability to learn more first-hand from this project. It was reduced to the role of a somewhat distant overseer, often unsure of exactly what was happening and sometimes mistrustful in that ignorance.

7 MU staffing, level of effort, skill requirements

At the outset, the MU appeared to have a balanced and adequate staff. However, by the end of 1986, when the project had virtually split into two disparate parts, the staffing problems became acute. The credit specialist assigned to the MU, fully occupied with the SSE component, refused to work with the PVO component. This effectively left the PVO specialist and the training specialist with the responsibility of managing all of the PVO component tasks: support and assistance to eight PVOs/NGOs (most of which needed considerable assistance), a grant and credit program for 57 VOs with 114 subprojects, and a literacy and credit management training program for 57 VOs.

The mid-term evaluation recommended that the PVO staff be increased, but this was never done. By the end of the PVO component, this staffing problem had contributed to considerable rancor between USAID/Senegal and the PVO component staff.

8 National Project Committee (NPC) role

The PP described the NPC as a policy making committee, but the PP Executive Summary described it as a management committee responsible for the approval of individual subprojects. The NPC members were of a level of seniority that was not conducive to the detailed study of individual subproject proposals and managerial activities.

The experimental, pilot nature of the project, both in its credit aspects and in its involvement of PVOs in a major project, undertaken during an economically perilous time in Senegal, probably contributed to an overly cautious approach on behalf of the GOS, which insisted on following

project activities very closely. This close management and monitoring of the project eased considerably towards the end of the project, when its benign nature was clear to all.

9 Coordination and communication among PVOs/NGOs

The project provided an opportunity for PVOs and NGOs to learn from each other, to become more effective participants in rural development and enterprise promotion. However, this opportunity was not exploited.

The MU brought PVOs and NGOs together for training in how to better function within the project, but did not sense the responsibility of facilitating PVO/NGO communications and mutual learning. Relatively little exchange took place, despite the fact that the eight PVOs/NGOs were grappling with many similar issues (technical problems, marketing, VO strengthening, etc.)

Similarly, relatively little exchange took place among VOs' members, who also had a lot to learn from each other.

10 Monitoring and evaluation

Data on credit and loan activities was collected quarterly, but there was no effective monitoring system of any other aspect of the PVO component. The MU's loan tracking system did not provide the MU with reports containing the VO loan portfolio status information needed to make informed credit management decisions. The MU did not generate action-oriented credit administration reports, and could not effectively follow up its loans.

The PVO component lacked baseline data against which to evaluate the progress of the project.

11 The Village Education Program (VEP)

The VEP, one highlight of the project, was not listed among project outputs in the original PP. After the mid-term evaluation and subsequent PP amendment, the VEP was established to train villagers in reading and writing, and in basic skills which would help them implement their own projects.

The VEP lasted two years, during which some 1,000 villagers participated. Two hundred lesson plans were developed in wolof and serer, along with methodology guides in both languages and a guide to management of projects in wolof.

B SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISE COMPONENT

1 Institutionalization

Since June 1985, the project provided assistance to SSEs to engage in income-generating

activities. At the outset of the project, it was presumed that once the project was developed and had demonstrated that extending credit to SSEs was a viable and profitable activity, local commercial banks would take over the activity and streamline it among its own operations.

The project developed an effective model for providing credit to SSEs. This early success, and the GOS' request for assistance in employment generation, led to a decision to expand SSE credit activities to Dakar.

By 1988, however, it was evident that none of the banks were interested in this activity nor in the SSE portfolio of loans, and the decision was made to create an institution to continue the activities of the project at its conclusion. No action would be taken to formalize such an institution until the project proved its financial viability.

In January 1990, the SSE credit component was physically separated from the PVO component (though technically it was still part of the Community and Enterprise Development Project). This credit activity was named ACEP (Agence de Crédit pour l'Entreprise Privée). By 1991, the ACEP component started to prove its financial viability.

Meanwhile, the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) had become aware of the urgent need to promote savings and credit organizations. BCEAO ordered several studies to determine the most appropriate legal framework for such institutions to operate effectively in Senegal. At the same time, ACEP had identified the most important criteria and conditions that had to be met to operate efficiently as a viable and profitable institution. These were (1) be tax exempt in order to maintain its financial viability, (2) be granted the freedom to set its interest rates for both savings and credit, (3) have the ability to solicit and receive savings from the general public, and receive grants and credit lines from donor countries and other organizations, (4) remain a private institution with no outside interference.

Based on the above criteria, and after reviewing the results of the preliminary studies conducted at the request of BCEAO, ACEP's management decided that the most appropriate type of institution to take over ACEP activities would be a Credit Union. USAID agreed with that concept and was able to convince the Ministry of Finance to secure an interim legislation for the establishment of such credit entities.

The interim legislation was issued in February 1993, and in early March 1993 membership was opened to create the new institution. By the end of March 1993 the founding members officially established the newly created credit union, Alliance de Crédit et d'Épargne pour la Production (ACEP), to take over the activities of the existing ACEP. In May 1993 the Ministry of Finance officially approved the new institution's statutes and granted it its Charter.

As of the end of November, the institutionalization of this project had been technically achieved. However, it was incomplete as the new institution could not begin to function and assume the operations of ACEP until the ACEP project assets were transferred to it. The Grant Agreement did not clearly define the conditions and procedures by which those assets would be transferred.

This created confusion and misunderstanding concerning the final disposition of the project's assets. The transfer was finally completed in December 1993.

2 ACEP's organization structure and staff

Prior to the creation of ACEP, the SSE component was structured in great measure to produce reports rather than financial results. Professional staff devoted much time to the writing of financial analysis for each loan application, despite the fact that data in the informal sector was unavailable or unreliable. Branch managers were required to produce monthly activity reports, detailed accounts of visits to clients, etc. As one ex-SSE staff stated "It was a project, not a business."

New management radically changed the structure of the SSE component. The SSE credit component was physically separated from the rest of the project and renamed ACEP (Agence de Crédit pour l'Entreprise Privée). The organization structure was changed to conform to a model designed to regionalize ACEP's financial services. Financial analyst positions were eliminated and the post of regional manager was created. Each regional manager was responsible for the portfolio and supervision of four to five branches. All accounting, loan tracking, etc. became the responsibility of headquarters. With a complete support system from headquarters, the branch and regional managers' only concern was to develop volume, while maintaining quality.

Between 1989 and October 1992, the NTF representative served as ACEP's director. In October 1992, a Senegalese national was named director general. At the time of the evaluation, ACEP employed 29 professionals, of which 23 were field staff. One important attribute of ACEP's distinct organizational culture was that staff performed as part of a team, sharing information and experience, each member taking responsibility for the whole.

3 ACEP's financial and accounting procedures

The evaluation team found that ACEP's Manual of Procedures was complete and thorough. In its opinion, ACEP's excellent loan portfolio was proof of the effectiveness of the organization's financial and accounting procedures.

ACEP's accounting and financial systems were regularly audited. In 1993, USAID contracted with the local Price Waterhouse affiliate for an audit of the financial statements submitted by ACEP to USAID. The firm stated that ACEP's financial statements could not be audited because it did not have a double-entry accounting system. As a project, ACEP's accounting system had been set up, with USAID's approval, primarily to track project expenditures and did not conform to the Senegalese accounting rules. After much discussion over the years, it was finally decided that ACEP would institute a double-entry accounting system once it became an independent financial institution. During FY 1993, ACEP maintained both systems.

4 Factors contributing to the success of the project

Among factors contributing to the success of the project, the evaluation team put first and foremost the work done by NTF's credit specialist. Other factors were

a Total autonomy of ACEP. Executive powers given the technical assistance team, with no interference or micro management from USAID or GOS. USAID's shielding ACEP from outside political pressures.

b Targeted group was selected from small scale and micro enterprises, not able to secure loans from traditional institutions. More affluent borrowers familiar with the banking system were discarded to avoid potential of such borrowers abusing the system. Loan size was defined so as to permit lending based on character and collateral, rather than on complicated feasibility studies. ACEP's presence in areas void of any credit institution. Frequent visits by ACEP branch managers to their clients to insure proper use of loan funds and timely repayment.

c Very low administrative overhead and modest "no frills" branch offices. Profit sharing policy for ACEP's employees, and in particular for branch managers.

5 The future after project completion

The Ministry of Finance had the responsibility of monitoring the activities of all credit unions, and intended to continue its supportive environment for the newly created institution to expand its activities and extend its services in the agricultural sector.

During the last two years of the project, several donors expressed interest in supporting ACEP's activities beyond the PACD. A large Canadian credit union had agreed to provide technical assistance for three years, with Canadian Government funding.

PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

A PVO COMPONENT

The project was designed in 1983 as a pilot project, in part to test the hypothesis that PVOs and NGOs could be an effective alternative to traditional government services to meet the needs of small farmers for goods and services.

The original project targets of 25-30 PVOs enrolled in the project, delivering needed services to 200 VOs, were revised as a result of the mid-term evaluation, and reduced respectively to 8 PVOs and 55-60 VOs.

By the completion of the PVO component, all eight PVOs/NGOs had received considerable institutional support and training, and had acquired extensive experience in working in rural

community development projects. They had also gained extensive experience with rural credit programs.

The eight PVOs/NGOs worked with 57 VOs, and designed and managed some 114 village subprojects. Five continued to collaborate with the VOs they had initially worked with in the project, and actively sought funding from non-project sources. The other three PVOs/NGOs did not continue to work with the VOs after their project funding ended.

Of the 57 VOs, at least three could be considered virtually self-sufficient at the end of the project, and had the leadership, management and financial skills to undertake both income generating and community development projects profitably.

Other VOs acknowledged that their participation in the project had given them a sense of solidarity and an experience of working together on subprojects.

The VEP was of high quality and was greatly appreciated by rural producers. VO members spoke with an unusual degree of sophistication when discussing credit, loans, interest, repayment rates, business management practices, and the like. As measured by better credit repayment rates and group cohesion among VOs that most intensively used this training, the VEP contributed to the groups' sense of ownership, a key element of long term sustainability and self-reliance.

As a pilot project, the PVO component demonstrated that PVOs/NGOs could deliver goods and services to rural communities. The project strengthened PVOs/NGOs so that they could work effectively in the rural areas, helping to fill gaps created in rural development by GOS' policy of decentralization.

The project also apparently helped to change the attitude of GOS from one of suspicion and doubt about the capability of national and international NGOs to manage rural development projects, to one of acceptance and willingness to work with USAID and other donors to assist in their development.

B SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISE (SSE) COMPONENT

The project attained all its objectives and exceeded all its expected outputs.

Institutionalization of the project through the creation of a credit union was legally attained. All project assets were transferred to the credit union. The private financial institution that assumed all the profitable activities of ACEP commenced operations in 1994.

Profitability of the project was demonstrated: 19.97 million CFA net profits posted in 1991, 63.62 million CFA in 1992, and 56.36 million CFA by the end of August 1993. Appropriate procedures, manuals, and credit management systems were in place and were replicated in other regions of Senegal.

By the end of August 1993, four months before the end of the SSE component, 3,793 enterprises had received credit from the project, against an expected project output of 1,750

At that date, 2,477 new jobs had been created under 2,209 evaluated loans against an expected project total output of 800 new jobs. This represented 1.12 new jobs per loan, projecting this factor on the total of 5,412 loans made by ACEP, a potential 6,061 new jobs were probably created

An appropriate model for institutionalizing and replicating urban based SSE lending activities was created. Senegal enacted interim legislation to allow such institutions to operate until permanent legislation was enacted. Legislation was to be approved by the West African Central Bank in 1994

LESSONS LEARNED

A PVO COMPONENT

The sheer complexity of the project design was in itself a major flaw

The design was unrealistic in its anticipated implementation schedule, reducing project effectiveness and impact

PVOs/NGOs' perceptions about the project and about USAID's procedures were an impediment to their recruitment, reducing the number and delaying the involvement, of those PVOs/NGOs that eventually participated

The rigidity of subproject criteria and their application worked against the economic objectives of the project

Broader rural development objectives suffered when a narrow measure of success in credit provision gained undue importance

Implementation of the PVO component was rendered less effective by inadequate staffing

NPC's excessive involvement was a burden to the smooth functioning of the project

By not focusing some resources on PVO/NGO communications and coordination, the project missed opportunities to improve PVO/NGO effectiveness and to increase long term VO sustainability

The inadequacy of monitoring systems limited the MU's ability to identify, diagnose, and assist PVOs/NGOs and VOs in solving institutional, management and technical problems

A strong functional literacy and training program can have considerable influence on VOs' long term sustainability

The project demonstrated that rural credit was badly needed to stimulate production, and that, under the proper conditions, rural producer groups would accept and repay loans eagerly

B SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISE COMPONENT

Future project agreements should clearly define the fate of project assets at the end of the project, and reflect detailed procedures concerning the final disposition of such assets

At the outset of similar projects, where monitoring of profitability is important, USAID should insure that the project establish an accounting system that complies with the laws and procedures of the Host Country. This would insure that USAID will be able to secure a certified financial statement at the end of the year. Both USAID and the Contractor have to understand and interpret Host Country accounting systems to accommodate USAID requirements

Avoid starting the project without clear definition of project objectives and type of institution to replace the project at its maturity. A legal framework must be in place governing the activities of such an institution at the outset of the project

PROJECT SUMMARY

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SUPPORT	685-0269
Project Duration	FY 87 - FY 92
Total Cost of Project	\$4 0 million

Source USAID/Senegal Program Overview, March 1990
 USAID/Senegal Project Assistance Completion Report, June 1991

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The project was designed to support the 1984 GOS initiative under the New Agricultural Policy to expand the responsibilities of Senegal's private sector. It was to provide technical assistance, a nine million dollar credit fund, participant training and commodity procurement to facilitate expansion of the privatization of key cereals production inputs (fertilizer, certified seed, agricultural equipment, crop protection materials, etc), and of cereals marketing and transformation.

The project's four components were

1 Privatization of input marketing and seed multiplication

This component would facilitate privatization, encourage expansion of production input use, and would support restructuring of the cereals seed sector. It would support research by the Senegalese Agricultural Research Institute (ISRA) to permit effective selection and multiplication of highly productive cereal varieties, to be released for private sector certified seed multiplication. The project would also support improvement of a seed certification and quality control program under the Ministry of Rural Development (MDR).

2 Revolving credit

This component would provide nine million dollars to participating banks to extend credit to output marketing and transformation enterprises and production input suppliers, distributors, and marketing enterprises. The project's Banking Committee would monitor credit policy, and a US fiduciary bank would manage the fund. Under contract with USAID, a local CPA would monitor the use and impact of loans issued to the private sector entrepreneurs by participating banks.

3 Agricultural statistics

This component would provide timely and accurate cereals production data and production input usage data. MDR's Agricultural Statistics Service would generate and analyze data to assess the

impact of the project and the New Agricultural Policy

4 Media program

This component would support the expansion of the privatization, credit, and statistics programs. It would implement appropriate educational and promotional campaigns to expand available information for producers, consumers and traders to encourage their use of a complete technological package of production inputs.

IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE

1 Contractor selection

During the first two and a half years, project implementation suffered from a series of delays. The Request for Proposals was issued in late November 1987. The contractor selection process by GOS was completed in June 1988. Negotiations between MDR and the selected contractor Chemonics were completed in November 1988.

Due to inflexible GOS contracting procedures, MDR and Chemonics had to negotiate two separate Host Country contracts, which were eventually signed in July 1989 and August 1989 respectively. Chemonics and the University of Arizona negotiated a subcontract for the management of the participant training and provision of short-term technical assistance.

USAID negotiated with Citibank a contract to manage the nine million dollar revolving credit fund.

2 Technical assistance

Delays in contractor selection and contract negotiations made it difficult for the contractor to fill the five TA staff positions in a timely manner. The Chief of Party arrived in country in December 1988 under a pre-contract arrangement, and three other specialists arrived in April-May 1989, too late to plan and implement actions in all four components for the 1989 growing season. One of them departed post permanently in mid-July for medical reasons. Further delay ensued when USAID decided to place on hold the two vacant positions.

Fifty-eight months of short-term assistance had been planned. At the time of the evaluation (3½ years from project approval, 1½ years from the PACD), only a few months of this assistance had been utilized.

Similarly, only five out of nine host country personnel had been sent for long-term training overseas.

3 Project design and implementation issues

There were numerous contradictions and inconsistencies within the design documents, the Grant Agreement, and the Host Country contract, particularly concerning the project goals, purpose and targets

The resources provided in the project design were insufficient to accomplish the project's multiple and vast objectives. This was clear in the case of the seed activities, where two experts, working with their counterparts, were to work on seed production, quality control, and certification issues for five types of cereals nationwide.

Similarly, the project design assigned an unreasonable number of tasks to the contractor's Chief of Party.

The design of the project management and decision-making structure was complex and cumbersome, involving the participation and approval of a multiplicity of autonomous Senegalese public and private sector organizations and committees, several different offices and layers of management within USAID, the contractor's team and the Senegalese project unit. This diversity of decision-makers was a major cause for the numerous delays experienced in key areas of project implementation.

The lines of authority between the principal organizations and individuals responsible for project implementation were not clearly delineated in the project design, and were not clarified during the implementation process. This resulted in continuous struggles and conflicts over both technical and financial decision-making between the different actors involved, and created tension and mistrust within the project unit and the contractor's team.

Similarly, there was inadequate coordination and collaboration between the numerous offices, officials, and experts involved.

Although the project was being implemented through a Host Country contract, USAID/Senegal personnel at various levels were unusually involved in project implementation decisions, causing frustration within the GOS project unit. This situation was exacerbated by unclear decision centers in USAID/Senegal and conflicting guidance from various sources at USAID.

At the time of the evaluation, 17.7 million dollars out of 20 million obligated remained unutilized.

4 Privatization of input marketing and seed multiplication

The design of the seed multiplication sub-component was based on invalid assumptions, among which

- Privatization and improved quality control in seed multiplication and seed certification

would lead to a significantly increased use of improved cereal seed and a concomitant increase in national cereal production. However, at the time of the project design, the vast majority of Senegal's cereal producers were largely subsistence farmers in rainfed areas, producing 90 percent of the country's cereals. These subsistence farmers preferred the traditional varieties, frequently lacked access to whatever improved seed might be available, and were often unable to obtain the funds to purchase such seeds.

- Privatization of input supply, particularly fertilizers, and improved data collection concerning input use, would lead to increased farmer access to these inputs and thus increased input utilization. However, even the pre-project design analyses confirmed that most cereal farmers in rainfed areas had neither the financial resources to purchase these inputs nor an interest in using them, due to the climatic and financial risks involved. Due to the absence of strong extension support throughout the cereal producing areas, most farmers lacked the technical knowledge to use these inputs properly.

During implementation, the input privatization activities were largely subsumed under the credit component, as the delivery of credit to input suppliers was the main mechanism to promote the privatization of input distribution.

The two US experts and their counterparts focused on one geographic region and on one primary crop, with the subsequent expansion of regions and crops dependent on the pace of success of their initial efforts.

Of the seven long-term BS and MS degree training positions planned for seed-related activities, only two seed specialists were sent to pursue MS degrees. Planned short-term training programs were not executed.

Under pressure from GOS counterparts, and in order to respond to the seed analysis needs of Senegal, USAID ordered inappropriate and technologically too advanced laboratory equipment, which was delivered before the arrival of the seed specialists. At the time of the evaluation, the majority of the equipment remained unpacked and unused.

Seed certification procedures were being conducted in spite of a lack of national seed legislation to enforce quality control regulations.

5 Revolving credit

There were inconsistencies and confusions in the various project documents concerning the target beneficiaries of the credit component.

The design of this component was based on numerous assumptions which proved to be largely invalid. Two of the most notable of these assumptions were

- The commercial banks were interested in and willing to lend to the target beneficiaries,

small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) engaged in cereals-related activities. It was found that the banks considered SMEs to be highly risky operations, and that such firms generally lacked the necessary collateral and formal business skills to qualify for commercial bank lending.

- The banks would be willing to extend significant amounts of further credit to the largest input distribution firms. However, most of these firms had already borrowed up to the limits acceptable to the banks.

USAID and MDR agreed to use project credit funds to conduct a one-year, \$300,000 test credit program to finance a limited number of vegetable producers, and input traders that serviced those producers. The test would assess the feasibility of engaging commercial banks in lending to groups in the agricultural sector which the banks believed were less risky. It would also test the soundness of a strategy to diversify target groups.

No credit demands were ever made to the fiduciary bank by the eligible participating banks.

The decision and information processes concerning requests and interest rates were not well handled. Decisions took a long time to be reached, in several cases, banks were not clear what the final decision was, or had to wait for six months to know the decision. The decision process bypassed the dossier review system set up with Citibank, and involved USAID directly in project decisions.

As a result of the cumbersome decision process, both the project and USAID lost credibility with the banks. At the same time, the project credit line was in direct competition with other sources of credit, offered at much softer terms.

Marketing efforts to stimulate demand for the credit were concentrated largely on one segment of the intended target beneficiaries, the largest input suppliers and their distributors. Only limited efforts were directed at informing other target beneficiary groups, including SMEs involved in seed multiplication and cereals marketing and processing, of the availability of the credit.

Yet, there was a clear need and demand for credit for certain cereals-related activities and for various other types of agricultural and agribusiness operations.

6 Agricultural statistics

In the project design, the definition of the tasks to be undertaken by the statistical expert lacked focus. The information objectives, priorities, and mechanisms for dissemination of statistical data to the private sector were vague. These issues were not clarified in the development of the workplan.

The statistics component was never properly integrated into the project, and linkages were not identified between the planned statistical activities and the project goal and purpose.

No substantial technical assistance was ever provided due to delays in personnel selection and the conflict within the project unit, which led to the departure of the statistical expert

The sampling methodology being used at the time of the evaluation for producing national agricultural data was inaccurate. Due to the lack of resources, and the absence of a national level statistics policy to guide survey design, the sampling design technique used village population as a proxy for agricultural activity

GOS' priorities had changed from the time the project was designed to the time it was implemented. The priorities of the Statistics Division of MDR had evolved, and it was unclear if the unit would address the precise data and analysis needs of the privatization efforts

7 Media program

The project design objectives and targets were vague and excessively broad. They were but a shopping list of possibilities without direction or strategy. The lack of coordination of the media campaign, and of quantitative or qualitative guidelines, resulted in the loss of a coherent message on GOS' NAP privatization program and on the project

The TA funds allocated to complete baseline communications strategy and design surveys were not utilized

"To save time", USAID bypassed full and open competition and contracted with Sene Communications, a local firm. The firm was an independent, sole proprietorship, which had neither the staff, the professional marketing background, agricultural expertise/field experience, nor the resources, to perform the contracted tasks. Its performance in past USAID projects had not been evaluated. The contracting process caused contention and suspicion on the part of GOS counterparts

The USAID contract with Sene Communications established no quality control method to assess the quality of materials produced

It was impossible for the evaluation team to verify the exact number of audio recordings presented due to the lack of coherent, identifiable, project design target numbers and the confusion concerning the materials actually produced. It appeared that, out of the 93 programmed radio broadcasts contracted for, 52 were produced. No transcripts, no timetable or information about their transmission were available

A video was produced, but no copies were available

Nine percent (500 out of 5,500) of the manuals were produced. These manuals were intended for illiterate farmers. Given the modern, generic, graphic symbols utilized, it was doubtful that the visual messages could be understood by the target audience

The posters produced had discordant graphics and text. Colors and graphic appeal were inappropriate. Concepts and symbols were not clear. The information was too general and vague.

8 Conclusions

- a. The project goals were overly ambitious and unrealistic.
- b. The invalid design assumptions resulted largely from insufficient pre-design and design analysis, which resulted from an effort to accelerate the design and approval process.
- c. Despite the inadequacy of the pre-design analysis, there still were significant and relevant findings which were contradicted or ignored in the PP and subsequent project documentation.
- d. The design rationale of attempting to integrate the project's diverse and multiple objectives, and its various discrete components, into a single project could not be sufficiently justified conceptually, and was a major cause of the subsequent management problems which developed.
- e. The linkages between the design and the specific objectives of the project's individual components, and the attainment of the project's fundamental goal of increasing national cereal production, were not sufficiently justified.
- f. The design rationale of targeting the assistance to a single commodity group was inappropriate for several of the project activities, especially data collection and credit delivery. The commodity focus did not match the structure of GOS data collection activities. The cereals focus in credit delivery was unnecessarily cumbersome to administer, and it was impossible to assure that the credit end-users would restrict the use of any items financed to cereals only.
- g. The project designers and project implementors gave insufficient attention to supporting GOS' efforts to develop and implement a coherent, concrete strategy for agricultural and agroindustrial privatization.
- h. The credit delivery mechanism was an inappropriate vehicle for extending credit to most of the intended target beneficiaries, particularly small- and medium-scale agribusiness firms and seed multiplication operations.
 - i. Because of the high risk involved, any credit delivery mechanism designed to lend to agribusiness firms, especially SMEs, requires an interest spread considerably higher than the 5-7 percent envisioned in the project design.
 - j. The credit needs which exist in the cereals-related agricultural and agribusiness subsectors cannot be met through existing supplier credit systems.

k The intensification of cereal production in Senegal's rainfed areas depends not on the privatization of seed multiplication and input supply, but on several other essential factors which were lacking in the project improved cereal seed varieties showing increased production potential without the use of other costly inputs, delivery systems which can distribute these varieties to isolated rainfed areas, effective extension and demonstration support, access to efficient processing technologies, access to financing to purchase adequate equipment

l Given the increasing misgivings within USAID/Senegal about the viability of the project and the effectiveness of project management, USAID should have called for an evaluation of the project at a much earlier date

Upon review of the evaluation report, USAID decided to terminate the project

PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Farmers taught the proper cultural practices, based on the use of their own labor Increased participation of private seed producers Certified seeds produced

The 1989 media campaign accomplished the following 52 radio broadcasts of 30 minutes duration in six national languages, 36 village and Chamber of Commerce meetings attended by 1,214 farmers and 350 traders, 500 copies each of two different posters produced, 500 technical manuals and 1,500 brochures printed, one 20 minute 16mm film produced

LESSONS LEARNED

Pressure to accelerate project design and approval processes, without thoroughly researching and verifying the critical underlying assumptions of proposed projects, should be resisted

The linkages between project goals and objectives and the activities designed to achieve them need verification during the design stage Any mechanisms necessary to achieve these linkages need to be specified at the design stage

During project design, clear lines of authority and responsibility must be established between any participating institutions and individuals Project implementation should not be entirely dependent on the anticipated collaboration of numerous different organizations and individuals

The formulation of effective privatization policy and projects depends on a thorough understanding of the operations, constraints, preferences, and needs of the private sector organizations which are expected to assume the roles formerly performed by public sector organizations

Privatization per se is not a panacea for public sector problems Other conditions and/or factors

are necessary for the success of privatization efforts, such as the availability of a quality product, an effective demand for this product, an infrastructure and a delivery system to permit the distribution of the product, access to financial resources and technical support, etc

If private sector firms are to actively collaborate in USAID projects, they must be provided attractive incentives for their participation, clear but not overly restrictive guidelines, and timely feedback. Reporting requirements and meetings should be minimized.

Assistance targeted at a narrowly defined goal is likely to be an inefficient mechanism to achieve that goal if the assisted individuals or institutions perform a variety of tasks not directly related to the specific goal. Such targeting may impose artificial and counterproductive constraints on the recipients' activities. The assistance may be used for unintended purposes.

The host country contracting mechanism is more cumbersome to administer than alternative mechanisms, and is particularly inappropriate for complex projects involving numerous host country government institutions.

PROJECT SUMMARY

IRRIGATION AND WATER MANAGEMENT I	685-0280
Project Duration	FY 85 - FY 91
Total Cost of Project	\$6 0 million

Source USAID/Senegal Program Overview, July 1988 and March 1990
 Midterm Evaluation Report, The Pragma Corp , July 1990
 USAID/Senegal Project Assistance Completion Report, December 1991

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

This was a follow-on project to the Bakel Small Irrigated Perimeters Project, BSIP (685-0208), which provided technical assistance and commodities, and funded 1,250 hectares of irrigated perimeters in 23 villages (see Project Summary for that project)

The purpose of the project was to improve and expand village-level irrigated farming in the Bakel area, and to encourage private sector participation that could be replicated throughout the Senegal River Basin. The target groups were small farm households and entrepreneurs who provided rural services and agricultural inputs.

The project, along with other donor programs, supported the overall GOS New Agricultural Policy (NAP) of 1984, which reduced the role of the parastatal Société d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta et des Vallées du Fleuve Sénégal et de la Falémé (SAED) in the construction and operation of irrigated perimeters. SAED was to retain its functions in planning, monitoring and extension, but under this project, it was to begin transferring its responsibilities over to farmer groups, and contracting out to private sector enterprises. To promote the accelerated development of village-scale irrigated perimeters, the project would work with farmer groups to design and construct a prototype medium-scale perimeter which could be brought into full operation by private and commercial investment¹.

The project would strengthen SAED's capacity to carry out technology evaluation and planning, and would provide training to farmers in the operation and maintenance of irrigated perimeters. The village perimeter had a proven track record and could be rapidly expanded with a modest investment. It was necessary, however, to develop medium-scale, viable irrigation models which

¹ The USAID/Senegal Program Overviews of July 1988 and March 1990 contain errors in the project description: the former stated that the project would provide training to farmers in the design and construction of irrigation perimeters, the latter stated that the project would provide training to farmers in the planning of small irrigation perimeters.

had the potential to attract private investment for the development of farming systems along the Senegal River

The project would provide assistance to resolve key questions of system design, land tenure and appropriate mechanization for medium-scale irrigated perimeters

IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE

The recommendations made by the 1982 and 1985 evaluations of the BSIP Project encouraged USAID to proceed with its plans for an innovative approach to irrigated farming in the Bakel area. These evaluations had concluded that the potential for private sector support to profitable irrigated farming in Bakel was encouraging. They emphasized that Bakel was suitable for continued irrigation development.

1 Project design and implementation issues

An independent design specialist was contracted to finalize the Project Paper (PP). Neither an economist nor an irrigation engineer were involved in the design phase, and the Mission did not require from the design specialist that he verify available data. Most of the data that he used concerning production rates, water costs, and the potential for private sector interventions came from reports issued under the BSIP project.

The project was implemented in two phases: (a) an interim implementation phase from January 1986 to February 1988, with technical assistance provided by personal services contractors previously working under the BSIP Project, and (b) a follow-on phase from March 1988 to September 1990, with a five-person TA team and short-term consultants provided by Harza Engineering under a Host Country contract with SAED.

It took more than two years to sign the long-term TA contract (RFP issued in January 1986, contract signed in April 1988). The delay was due to difficulties in attracting qualified technicians to the very remote and uninviting Bakel region, scarcity of competent French speaking irrigation specialists, unacceptable financial proposals, protracted negotiations between SAED and Harza, and difficulties in incorporating GOS and USAID legal requirements in the Host Country contract.

The Chief of Party (COP)/Design Engineer and a local-hire Irrigation Operations Engineer were dismissed within six months of starting work. The COP was replaced immediately, the replacement engineer (a recent University graduate) arrived six months later. During their respective assignments, neither one was active in field operations, spending most of their time in the office. As a result, field operations, irrigation systems maintenance and technology transfers were given low priority. The Agronomist was successful in revitalizing the SAED demonstration farm. The other two TA members (Rural Development Specialist and Administrator) hardly provided any significant training to SAED staff or to the farmers. The

TA team spent an inordinate amount of time on contract administration, yet, most of the administrative work was poorly done and/or inadequate

The short-term consultants were, for the most part, more successful. They produced a socio-economic monitoring system and a series of studies and reports. These studies provided substantial data on irrigation water-related diseases, cooperative operations, credit, marketing, agricultural production practices in the project area, potential for local private sector involvement in irrigated agriculture, commercial profitability of irrigated agricultural systems.

The findings from these studies were very valuable for the 1990 project evaluation, and helped USAID reach the decision to terminate the project, especially Phase I of the feasibility study of medium-scale irrigation perimeters, which concluded that medium-scale irrigation systems were not commercially profitable under the economic and climatic conditions prevailing in the study area.

SAED's management capability proved also to be ineffective. Bakel is the most remote area where SAED operates. Owing to its lack of amenities, severe climatic conditions and isolation, it was considered a hardship post. SAED's Bakel Delegation was a low priority branch, staffed with junior and mid-level, poorly motivated, personnel (only after repeated USAID requests was a competent Delegation Engineer assigned to Bakel in late 1989).

As a result, the project-funded construction program was not effectively managed, either administratively or technically. SAED was unable to develop a strategy to encourage private sector participation in irrigated perimeter design and construction, and in the provision of agricultural services. SAED poorly managed the Harza contract, and its persistent financial problems seriously constrained SAED operations in the Bakel area.

2 Project evaluation

The 1990 mid-term evaluation report confirmed that Bakel was a bad choice for proving replicability of the village irrigated perimeters (PIVs). Weather is inclement and rainfall relatively heavy in the Faléme zone. Pumping costs are high because the slope of the embankments in the upstream region is steep, increasing the hydraulic head differential. The scarcity of clay soils and flood recession land militates against rice cultivation (very little rice is grown there). Bakel's distant location from market centers and its general marginality are also negative factors.

The evaluation team found that PP assumptions were extrapolations based on unsupported data. Crop yields for the PIVs were estimated to reach world records and costs of irrigation were grossly underestimated. These erroneous assumptions led to financial and economic rates of return expected to exceed 15 percent.

The financial rate of return calculated for PIVs under various crop mixes proved negative. Thus, the PIVs were not replicable (the evaluation report commented that not a single PIV constructed

in the Bakel area since 1977 had been financially successful)

An increase in crop intensity/hectare did not occur. The PP underestimated the farmers' main goal of achieving subsistence production, with only a secondary interest in commercial production from a few groups. There was minimal multiplier effect on employment, and no evidence of a reversal in the long-term outmigration trend characteristic of the Bakel population, one of the primary goals of the original project.

Although the PIVs were neither viable nor replicable for the crop mixes that were tried, onion was found to be a promising crop. Crop diversification mostly pertained to dry-season, irrigated vegetables and fruits. Lack of marketing outlet remained a constraint and disincentive to irrigated crop intensification.

PIV designs were generally acceptable, but construction for the most part was unsatisfactory, due to poor supervision by SAED staff and poor selection of sites. Because of poor construction, over 500 hectares had been abandoned by farmers, and the remaining were farmed at a very low cropping intensity.

SAED's disengagement from all services except for extension and training created a void. Attempts to fill it through privatization were delayed in the absence of an adequate reorientation of farmer groups.

There was ineffective communication between SAED, Harza and USAID. Lack of a clear line of authority caused unsatisfactory working relationships between SAED/Bakel and the TA team.

The TA team failed to accomplish a significant number of required outputs. Harza's integration with SAED was poor and resulted in duplication and divergence of activities unsatisfactory to both parties.

In Bakel, the capacity of, and demand for, private sector supply of agricultural services were lacking.

SAED's approval for farmer groups to qualify for credit was not based on investment viability, but rather on payment of debt to SAED. Nonpayment could be traced to unprofitable irrigated crop production, which was due in part to poor PIV construction by SAED.

The historic notion of PIVs geared towards subsistence production and equitable distribution of benefits was in conflict with the project's emphasis on profitability and economic viability.

The observation tour organized in October 1989 for nine Bakel farmers and village leaders to irrigation schemes along the Niger River in Niger was inappropriate to the PIV experience.

Bovine traction appeared to have potential in the region. There was a well-developed market in which these animals could be purchased and sold. Yet, only a few animals had been trained at

the time of the evaluation

Based on the recommendations of the May-June 1990 evaluation, USAID and GOS decided to terminate the project, effective March 31, 1991

PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

From 1986 to 1988 the project funded, under a Fixed Amount Reimbursement (FAR) arrangement, the construction of 239 hectares of new irrigation perimeters (800 hectares were planned) and the rehabilitation of 50 hectares (400 hectares were planned) SAED, with its own funds, constructed over 500 hectares of new systems between 1986 and 1990

The project also funded the procurement and installation of 18 pumps

A 14-hectare demonstration farm, which had ceased its activities in 1986-1987 due to SAED's lack of funds, was reactivated by the TA team, which designed and put in place an excellent demonstration program

A socio-economic monitoring system was put in place in Bakel It produced a baseline survey of 50 farm families, an analytical model for irrigated agriculture and an analysis of socio-economic data for the 1989-90 rainy season Based on this system, SAED began a data bank

A series of studies were completed, which provided substantial data on irrigation water-related diseases cooperative operations, credit, marketing, agricultural production practices in the project area, potential for local private sector involvement in irrigated agriculture, commercial profitability of irrigated agricultural systems

In-country training (a) visits of the demonstration farm trials were organized for 16 farmers and 37 farmer group leaders, (b) training was provided to 9 farmers in pump operation, to 30 water controllers in water management techniques, to 30 village technicians in production management practices, to 27 bookkeepers in procurement and stock control, and to 27 oxen handlers and 27 pairs of oxen in bovine traction

An observation tour was organized by USAID in January-February 1991 for eight Bakel farmers to visit suitable irrigation systems in Niger

The project funded the construction of an eight-room office building at the SAED Bakel Base, and the renovation of six houses for the TA team

LESSONS LEARNED

Large-scale implementation should be preceded by pilot projects to verify whether expectations

