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WEST AFRICA LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE STUDY

Preparing for the Future: A Vision of West Africa in the Year 2020

Summary Report

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Introduction by Anne de Lattre

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THE TEAM OF THE WEST AFRICA LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE STUDY

The study was directed by **Jean-Marie Cour**

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John Igué, director of the LARES in Cotonou, Benin supported the CINERGIE Unit in coordinating the team of experts from West Africa

Serge Snrech worked in close collaboration with Jean-Marie Cour to manage the members of the team based at the Club du Sahel office in Paris

This team consisted of **Jean-David Naudet, Benoît Ninnin, Michel Arnaud, Mukanda-Bantu Kalasa** **Laurent Bossard, Roger Pons and Vincent Leclercq** also lent their expertise to the study

The team benefitted from the advise and experience of **Anne de Lattre** throughout the duration of the study

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A number of meetings were held, as shown in the next appendix, at which the WALTPS results were discussed by decision-makers and researchers from Africa, Europe and North America

The WALTPS study is coordinated by the CINERGIE unit in Abidjan Ivory Coast CINERGIE is a joint initiative of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the African Development Bank (ADB)

The study is being conducted jointly by a group of experts based at the Secretariat of the Club du Sahel in Paris and by several groups of African experts in the countries of West Africa National case studies and the main sectoral studies dealing with political and social change, regional migration, land use planning and management of border areas are being conducted under the direct responsibility of African specialists

The scientific committee in charge of monitoring the study and defining priorities comprises around twenty people one-half of whom are researchers from West Africa

A committee of experts comprised of sixty people is also consulted on a regular basis Forty-five West African researchers and specialists who are members of this committee form the core of a network of correspondents whose role it is to make constructive comments and recommendations on the study itself as well as to promote the dissemination of its findings in their respective countries

The CINERGIE unit maintains permanent contact with senior political decision-makers and with the media A region-wide network of journalists has been set up by the unit to maintain contact with public opinion and mobilize the West African press on the subjects addressed by the study

FOREWORD

This document is an overview of the West Africa Long Term Perspective Study (WALTPS) carried out jointly by the Cinergie Unit of the African Development Bank in Abidjan and the Secretariat of the Club du Sahel of the OECD in Paris, with the support of the CILSS in Ouagadougou

It rounds out a series of some forty papers produced since 1992 by over fifty experts and researchers, most of them from West Africa An appendix gives the content the main documents produced The authors urge the interested reader to refer to the working papers, which provide important detail on many of the subjects covered in this overview

The Introduction was written by **Anne de Lattre** and the main text by **Serge Snrech,** using the working papers and original material by **David Naudet** and **Jean-Marie Cour** **Laurent Bossard** and **Jean-Marc Pradelle** contributed their expertise in re-reading the text and providing editorial support

The ideas expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the OECD, ADB or CILSS

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INTRODUCTION

THE ORIGINS OF THE STUDY

In 1991, four member countries of the Club du Sahel, Canada, the United States, France and the Netherlands suggested that a regional study be undertaken on the long-term prospects for West Africa Several Sahelian countries and several coastal West African countries backed the idea of such a study

To carry out this regional study, the Club du Sahel Secretariat and the CINERGIE project formed a multi-disciplinary team of African and non-African experts (CINERGIE is a project set up under a 1991 agreement between the OECD and the African Development Bank) The European Commission, the World Bank and the African Development Bank provided the funds necessary to finance the study

The experts carrying out the study worked under the joint direction of two facilitators, **Jean Marie Cour** in Paris and **Brah Mahamane** in Abidjan On several occasions, CINERGIE and the Club du Sahel Secretariat organized meetings of a Scientific Committee and various advisory groups, submitting to them the study's provisional findings and listening to their views The study's facilitators were in constant touch with the groups of experts set up by the United Nation Development Program (UNDP) to run National Long-Term Perspectives Studies (NLTPS) in African countries, this group is headed by **Jose Brito** The Club du Sahel Secretariat and CINERGIE had thirty months to carry the regional study through to completion

Undertaking a study of the long term prospects for West Africa meant stepping back and taking the long view CINERGIE and the Club du Sahel, not being bound by any short-term policy deadlines, were in a good position to take such a perspective

However, since long-term developments depend on individual or collective short-term decisions, it is be hoped that the study will provide food for thought and, if possible, some guidelines for day-to-day action

Such was the hope of the countries that commissioned CINERGIE and the Club du Sahel Secretariat to carry out the study

AIMS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the West Africa Long-Term Perspective Study (WALTPS) is to gain a better understanding of the main trends that have dictated change in the region over the past century or so, and to reflect on the direction of change over the next three decades The aim is to arrive at a set of hypotheses on the direction of future change and sketch in a picture of the region around the year 2020, based on these hypotheses The authors have confidence in scientific progress, human ingenuity, the entrepreneurial spirit and the will of West Africa's people to live and to live better They are aware of the dangers the future holds for West Africa They have sought to sketch a picture that holds promise, despite the difficulties the region will encounter

The image they sketch of the future incorporates a plan However the plan will have to be brought to maturity and carried out by Africans, although outside agencies with a desire to help Africa should be prepared to assist

A further aim of the study is to show that the West African population has made considerable efforts to adapt to the changes occurring in the region In all probability, it will continue to do so It has done so under difficult conditions with traditional civilizations that were poorly adapted to the modern world, with a political and administrative leadership that was ill prepared to observe and direct change, human resources that lacked education and training, and with extremely low levels of capital accumulation and financing capacity Moreover, nation-building took priority over regional cooperation For a certain period the international community favored support for African development efforts, then, the situation became unstable and gradually became highly competitive Foreign aid, though abundant for the first twenty years, has not managed to pull Africa out of its crisis and has kept the region in a position of dependence The global economic crisis has undermined Westerners' confidence in the future in general and above all in the future of Africa Official aid has diminished substantially

The authors of the study do not underestimate the dangers that such extreme and very rapid change represents for West Africa But they are convinced that West Africans have learned much through the opportunities and difficulties of the past thirty years and that, despite the exceptional constraints they will be working under in the coming decades, they will be able to benefit from the lessons learned The authors take quite the opposite view to that of a region with no future

To describe past developments and future prospects, the authors have made a more detailed analysis than is usual in long-term studies of the changes that have taken place in the region's human geography, i e in the relationship between its people and their natural environment The study facilitators asked the research team (which consisted of African and non-African experts from a number of disciplines - statisticians, demographers, economists, geographers, agronomists, town planners and political scientists) to take human geography as the core discipline to synthesize their findings

The experts were at first surprised by a reference frame that was new to them but, as they became accustomed to it, they agreed that human geography has its advantages and sheds a different light on African realities compared to that of the more common approaches It is a discipline well suited to describing one of West Africa's most significant facets the fact that it is still undergoing population settlement It is also a visual discipline it produces maps It tries to grasp the direction of long term trends It encourages modesty, for it shows that unexpected upheavals make prediction hazardous And it teaches patience

Because it looks at large-scale, long-term phenomena, human geography cannot place so much importance on the short term It cannot make a detailed analysis of sectoral trends That is its particularity and its strength, but also its limitation The working papers on which this final report is based do not contain detailed observations on recent social or economic trends in West Africa They do contain detailed analysis of sectoral trends in education, training, agriculture, health, environment etc Nor do they include any recipes for what should be done tomorrow - at most, they suggest some priorities and a few promising directions to take This West African long-term perspectives study is intended to complement the many careful studies made by specialists in different disciplines It seeks to examine trends in West Africa from a long-term viewpoint and draw from this examination some encouragement for continued action

WEST AFRICA, A REGION STILL UNDERGOING POPULATION SETTLEMENT

The underlying image depicted in the report is of a region whose most restrictive yet dynamic characteristic is the rapid growth and redistribution of its population This process will continue for some time to come the region's population is almost certain to double over the next thirty years While it accounted for only a minute portion of the planet's population growth up to the beginning of this century, Africa is today home to one additional inhabitant in four By around 2020, one in every two could be African

West Africa is not the first region in the world to undergo such rapid population growth Other examples are America in the nineteenth century and China and the Asian sub continent in the first half of the twentieth But population growth in Africa is occurring under rather unusual conditions compared to these other examples

- Population growth began later than elsewhere, and under even more difficult circumstances an archaic world was suddenly thrust into contact with the modern world and the world market,

- Whereas North America's immigrant flood included a proportion of urbanized migrants businessmen and capitalists whose skills and savings helped to build the nation, West Africa's population growth comes from its own rural population base

■ Unlike India or China, two ancient civilizations that were able to isolate themselves for a while from the rest of the world while accomplishing (in a cruel fashion) their social and demographic transformation, West Africa is entirely open to outside influences

A further factor is that progress in medicine and information, combined with the developed countries' capacity to intervene, have reduced mortality rates long before the society was ready to reduce its fertility rates

A MOBILE, ENERGETIC POPULATION

In a situation of rapid population growth, West Africans have striven with great vigor and individualism to improve their living conditions

Their spirit of initiative has taken many different forms its main characteristic has been the mobility of this population within the region, regardless of frontiers This migration mainly has been to towns In the towns, citizens have invested savings and labor to make their surroundings acceptable They have created jobs to absorb the uninterrupted influx of migrants The Farmers, for their part, have moved closer to population centers where their products find more reliable outlets than in areas of more scattered settlement And town dwellers and country folk alike have taken advantage of the lower priced consumer goods available on the world market

The authors of the study do not deny that the population's behavior has created not only positive developments but also major dysfunctions of all kinds - economic, social, ecological, etc Of course, they think the changes could have taken place differently and that far wiser policies could have been applied Policy makers would have had to separate intertwined effects, minimize the negative and maximize the positive But instead African governments concentrated on trying to catch up with the advanced countries, copying exogenous models and amassing private wealth, rather than on the careful observation and wise guidance of their people The overseas development agencies failed to grasp the scale and rapid pace of the changes going on in the region, and did not adequately understand what could and could not be done The authors of the study make no judgements on the past rather, they try to understand it

From the authors' standpoint, one of the positive aspects of African government policies has been their laissez-faire attitude With few exceptions, these governments have not sought to prevent migration around the region And despite the drawbacks it has in a way been this mobility that has allowed a region with such a fast-growing population to breath

URBANIZATION THE MAIN FACTOR IN STRUCTURING SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

The most striking feature of the population movements around the region has been the rapid growth of the towns This has also been the most influential factor in changing people's thinking and behavior

West Africa is no longer an essentially rural region, and it will be still less so in the future Moreover, contrary to one widespread view, urbanization is not necessarily a harmful trend While it does tend to destabilize, it also plays a part in the restructuring and movement towards a new equilibrium

In West Africa, rapid urbanization has so far taken place undramatically and in a balanced way The big coastal towns and the capital cities have grown, but so have the smaller towns Nigeria doubtless represents the likely pattern of urbanization for its neighbors twenty or thirty years hence a majority of town dwellers living in a tough world, having to mobilize all their energies to ensure their daily survival, but gradually becoming productive

Despite this rapid urbanization, the countryside has not emptied - on the contrary, its population increased by roughly 60% between 1960 and 1990 On the other hand, the towns have helped to restructure rural settlement patterns by encouraging farmers to move closer to markets In the years to come, urbanization will continue to have a strong influence on the spatial distribution of the rural population

Urban growth has slowed down since the crisis West Africans have adapted to the new, harsher circumstances However, urban growth will start up again though perhaps less rapidly than the rate experienced between 1960 and 1990 The study gives a striking but convincing picture of urbanization in the year 2020 some thirty cities with populations of a million or more, as opposed to six in 1990, several coastal towns merged into one high-density urban belt, sixty (compared to eleven in 1990) cities of over 500,000 people , about 300 towns of over 100,000 people, and a scattering of some 6,000 urban centers In the year 2020, between Benin City, Nigeria and Accra, there will probably be five mega-cities with a combined population of about 25 million

Changes on this scale - almost beyond the scope of our imagination will require huge investments in infrastructure and social services An enormous effort will have to be made to settle the population and provide it with work Singularly talented political and administrative leadership will be required, capable of managing imbalances, inequalities and lasting tensions, and able to rally the energies needed to provide urban infrastructures and education for the growing population

Such changes also necessitate skillful regional negotiations, and if the necessary talent does not come to the fore by inclination, then reason should summon it In describing the towns in the year 2020, the study hypothesizes that the national urban networks, which were encouraged to become autonomous after national independence, will merge into sub-regional networks, each centered on a sub regional metropolis with influence beyond its own borders This tendency is in line with the movements and behavior of the population, for which national borders might just as well not exist

URBANIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

The expansion of the towns and the futuristic urban picture sketched in this study have aroused considerable debate among the experts associated with the study team While there is general agreement as to the contribution urbanization has made to economic growth over the past thirty years, there are unresolved questions regarding the particular characteristics of this growth The experts agree that existing urban models should change extensively if they are to become more effective

Accumulation of urban capital

The experts agree that, having started with a much weaker urban capital base than other countries around the world, West Africa has made great efforts over the past thirty years The accumulated urban capital has been estimated at about US$ 300 billion, consisting of public infrastructures, roads, markets and housing The urban dwellers of West Africa have worked hard to finance the private building stock accumulated since independence - worth an estimated US$ 200 billion, or two thirds of total urban capital They have done so largely by their own means National accounting statistics greatly underestimate these investments These figures are worth comparing with the total official aid received by West Africa between 1960 and 1990 US$ 50 billion in real terms

In view of the prospects for urban growth, this indigenous investment must continue and increase But in fact, it has slowed down since the crisis, as have foreign official aid investments in the urban sector Transfers of the resources needed to finance investments with long term pay offs have declined sharply If the shortfall in local infrastructure continues, the living conditions of urban West Africans will suffer a lasting setback, this in turn will damage the capacity of trade, industry and the service sector to gradually bring greater solvency to the towns as well as the capacity of agriculture to grow more prosperous from the urban markets

Job creation in the towns

For thirty years, with an unceasing influx of rural people seeking work and a better life, West African towns have adapted to demand as best they could Modern foreign firms with stringent requirements for skills, productivity and market outlets and concerned with amortizing their investments in a high-risk situation, were not able to absorb more than a small portion of migrants It was in response to the need for large numbers of jobs of different kinds that the informal sector spread like wildfire

The informal sector was well suited to absorbing an abundant supply of labor with few skills and little education It obliged its workers to attain a sufficient level of productivity to cover their cash income needs, which were higher in town than they had been in the countryside, but was not too demanding in this respect The informal sector enabled people to meet their essential needs with the use of simple technologies In short, its vocation was, and still is, to absorb and employ as many urban newcomers as possible, rather than increase productivity in the sense of output of goods and services per labor unit

Despite the low productivity of the informal sector, urban productivity has been rising, because of the increased density of the population and trade The urban environment accounts for an increasing proportion of economic activity and gross regional product - a proportion that increased from 38% in 1960 to 66% in 1990 and would have increased even more had the crisis not greatly affected progress in the West African economy The urban economy already makes a significant contribution to changes going on in the region

However, this contribution will have to increase if the town is to become a driving force for development And it is on this point that the experts disagree

■ Some consider that the present model of the urban economy, which is inegalitarian and excessively could well impede the progress of the towns, encouraging the State which is very sensitive to the power and pressures of urban dwellers to seek revenue wherever it can foreign aid, rural areas, foreign trade, land and even illegal drugs trafficking This hypothesis gives a pessimistic view of West Africa's future development

■ Others consider it unlikely that the towns will grow without increases in production In their view, there are encouraging signs suggesting that urban society may, of itself, engender new dynamic processes These signs are of various kinds but can be united under the heading of "competition", a new concept for Africa At present, these promising signs are as follows

* Civil society is differentiating itself and is organizing itself to confront the political power structure Whereas Africa's essentially rural societies were hitherto hierarchical but egalitarian, as the struggle between divergent interests grows fiercer and the need to survive in an ever more crowded world becomes more demanding, political competition becomes an element for change

* The traditional trade with the outside world is now running out of steam, and Africa is forced to take into account global competition The recent devaluation of the CFA franc indicates that the competitiveness of African exports, increases in local agricultural and industrial production, regional trade, and less expensive social services now take priority over political considerations Other measures will follow, reviving the economy These measures may give national products a better chance in regional trade and world markets

* A class of African entrepreneurs is beginning to emerge It is made up of people whose attitudes, shaped by their education, knowledge and contacts with the outside world, are closer to those of business people in the developed countries A competitive spirit is one aspect of this

Despite these changes, growth in the urban economy will, of course, be difficult and slow The WALTPS does not believe there will be strong growth in modern manufacturing, trade and services the financial, legal, economic and political conditions will not favor this and competition with other parts of the world will be too fierce for foreign investment to start flooding into West Africa The informal sector will remain the main employer in the year 2020, the majority of town dwellers will still be earning meager incomes from these low-productivity jobs But the informal sector could gradually subdivide with the emergence of small and medium intermediate enterprises run by city-born business people possessing a certain urban culture In high-density regions, considerable markets will be open to these enterprises They will doubtless become more attentive to winning these markets than they are at present

As has already been shown, these changes will not come easily Fierce competition in economies characterized by shortages can lead to severe social inequalities, that is to say to a combination of progress, harsh social relations and acute tensions Westerners, imbued as they are with the social sensibilities of the 20th century, find such models unpalatable But, for the optimists among the study's authors, these are the more likely models of urban development in West Africa for the coming decades

FARMERS IN SEARCH OF MARKETS

Food crop production has responded quite well to the food needs of a rapidly growing and increasingly urbanized population The authors of the study, combining various methods to compensate for the unreliable nature of the statistics, have estimated that food production increased by 2% a year between 1960 and 1990 This was not enough of an increase to fully meet demand, the balance has come from commercial imports and abundant food aid (indeed, too abundant) However, food production is lagging only three years behind population growth, while food imports, as expressed in calories, has slightly more than doubled since 1960, from 6% to 14% - still a fairly modest level compared to other parts of the world

Urban market demand has played a significant role in stimulating food production, as can be seen from the maps showing the spatial distribution of the farming population Farmers have moved closer to the towns to earn higher and more reliable incomes Besides moving to new areas, they have begun to increase their productivity and yields and improve production techniques and structures Admittedly, intensification is so far occurring only locally and cautiously, it is still rare for all the right conditions to come together for both sustainable agriculture and intensification The regional market still plays only a minor part in food trade However, trends in food crop production in Nigeria may be an example of what could happen in other parts of West Africa The States of the Nigerian Federation now import scarcely any food, meeting an increasing proportion of their requirements from their own output Population density, highways linking market towns (financed in the days of high oil prices), and an endemic shortage of hard currency since the downturn in the energy market, have all been favorable for domestic food crop production, favorable to a lesser extent for intra-regional food imports and unfavorable for food imports from the world market

Although food production had a decent record in West Africa, for the last ten years export cropping has proved a disappointment It is the mediocre performance of export cropping that explains the overall lack of progress in agriculture World price trends, the inadequacies of government policies and rent seeking levies have had a major impact on farmer behavior and on the weakness of African competitiveness Since export crops will remain a significant source of hard currency in the future, the failings of earlier policies ought to be corrected

The authors of the study are united in considering that, despite the many, complex problems that have to be resolved, despite the very severe ecological dangers in some regions (especially the Sahelian zone and the increasingly densely populated coastal strip), prospects for the development of food cropping in West Africa are not unpromising Several factors could contribute to turbulent but positive progress

- Farmers will continue to shift towards the most useful farmland, as they have in Nigeria Over the next thirty years, usable farmland will become virtually saturated throughout the region, forcing farmers to move on from their present extensive farming systems to intensive farming with increased yields

- Farmers will continue to move closer to urban markets To meet the growing demand of these markets, capitalist farm enterprises will gradually emerge Where they emerge will be essentially dictated by land availability A modern form of farming will probably develop, geared to commercial production for the domestic and regional markets

These developments will take place more easily if governments resist the pressing call of the world market and if the mobility of the farming population can be maintained These conditions run directly counter to some conceptions of development for Africa They are also contrary to certain Western interests Furthermore, the vision this study gives of future patterns in food production, like its vision of the urban economy, is not at all egalitarian population pressure, the quality of the available physical resources and the location of commercial outlets will mean that intensification potential varies very widely from one area to another, there will be many farmers, including some of the better-off, who will find it hard to make a place for themselves in the changing pattern of agriculture In the view of the authors of the study, this will be the price of progress in an economy with rapid population growth It will mean permanent and sometimes acute social tensions But surely the most important point is that there be progress

A REGION IN SETTLEMENT TRANSITION AND PROLONGED IMBALANCE

After this brief introduction to WALTPS, some remarks and questions are in order

West Africa as a region in rapid population settlement transition, will be imbalanced for the foreseeable future Even if attempts are made to reduce fertility rates, this can only have an effect on population growth in the medium and long term The region's population is virtually certain to double in the next thirty years Indeed, of all the things we know about the region's future, this fact seems the most certain If this fact is recognized and accepted then the crucial question is, what steps should be taken to house, feed and employ this new population in acceptable conditions? Two measures appear to be essential decentralize the State, and organize civil society Decentralization will enable individual towns and villages to implement land use planning policies that have been arrived at after consultation A properly organized civil society will make it possible to discuss the present and the future, handle predictable conflicts by negotiation, and plan local financing of the public facilities needed for the new population

West Africa as a region in rapid population settlement transition and prolonged imbalance, will be subject to great political, economic, social and environmental tension Changes will be abrupt, unstable and varied How can positive changes best be fostered and risk and regression reduced? One major source of tension will likely be migration from poor areas to those with more resources and to towns The WALTPS estimate is of some twenty million people migrating, whereas eight million between 1960 and 1990 What can be done so that migration within and between countries migrated, does not become a source of conflict? How large might migration to the outside world become if development does not provide enough employment for a growing population? In this area, as in others, a more aware and better organized civil society can help to manage the trade-offs and negotiations needed to protect migrants from arbitrary treatment and insecurity

West Africa as a region n rapid population settlement transition, will need to manage a permanent scarcity of financial technical and human resources In the next thirty years, the gap between supply of and demand for these resources will be marked There will be strong temptation to adopt illegal solutions

The resources of States are modest compared with their needs, however much they attempt to increase taxation and levies Rural land capital and urban wealth will increase only slowly States will need to supplement direct and indirect taxes with levies on commercial transactions However, they will have to avoid their past excesses in this area, or competitiveness in exports and production for domestic and regional markets will be compromised

How can the resources be found to finance the huge need for public facilities? Would not one way be, apart from public and private investment to use new forms of labor-investment to meet the demand for education public health care and infrastructure maintenance? Should not innovative experiments be tried in mass education, using modern technology now available? For the huge problem of educating the young there has been up to now a distressing lack of thought and action

It is hard to predict what will happen to official development assistance Past trends show that it is cyclical abundant in boom years, limited during crises, and greatly eroded by indebtedness Indebtedness to multilateral bodies is likely to cause some States serious problems in the future WALTPS suggests that official development assistance should be predictable grant-based, and targeted to supplement low domestic savings It argues that official assistance should be extensively devoted to population related investments economic and urban infrastructure, local facilities, and land use planning The authors believe that local people have so far proved their ingenuity, mobility and ability to adjust, and that they will therefore be able to use this new infrastructure to work, produce and trade Since aid is at present divided between macro economic recovery and a plethora of objectives of varying usefulness and since the proportion devoted to long-term investment has dwindled the WALTPS proposals would require hard choices and changes that are worth close consideration Does aid not have too many objectives and functions? Should it not be more focused?

Changes in private external resources are not clear West Africa could make better use than at present of its basic commodities, but, despite cyclical surges, the long-term trend is not hopeful, except for energy products Non-traditional exports to world markets will increase only moderately Loans and foreign direct investment may increase, but there is fierce competition from successful regions in Latin America and Asia West Africa is likely to suffer from a chronic shortage of foreign exchange, which may not be entirely a bad thing, since it may encourage African enterprise and the expansion of the regional market How can this enterprise and this expansion be promoted?

The authors of WALTPS are well aware that this is not a good time for discussion of the long term The recession in the developed countries is not yet over, adjustment to new circumstances will take a long time Uncertainty is in the air Africa has a poor image in the media However, the specialists who worked on WALTPS are convinced that a clearer vision of the future could give justification and purpose to short-term action To abandon a continent in population settlement transition, when it shows signs of dynamism despite it's precarious situation would be a serious error, and would involve shutting one's eyes to the consequences of such a policy

Finally, a few suggestions for Africans and those countries that want to help Africa These suggestions are intended to prepare for the future, and inform choice, in the hope that, after due consideration, decisions will not be delayed for too long

WORKING SUGGESTIONS BASED ON WALTPS

Negotiation and conflict resolution

It is hoped that WALTPS has provided enough evidence that, of West Africa's particular features, two will have a determining influence on the future it will long remain a region in population settlement transition, and consequently an unbalanced region In the next thirty years, as in the last, population mobility and changing settlement patterns will be essential conditions for progress in development

Rapid settlement transition, lasting imbalance, and massive migration will expose West Africa to the permanent danger of disorder and conflict Predictable migration into towns and resource-rich areas is likely to exacerbate national and regional tensions, particularly at the social and ethnic levels These threats are a great danger for countries with weak institutions and where civil society is too poorly organized to attenuate conflicts

Africans are aware of these problems They have begun to discuss measures that could be taken to settle conflicts They are considering the creation of an African intervention force

The discussion and action needed for West Africa's long-term development can hardly be dissociated from a discussion of the negotiation and resolution of national and regional conflicts How can the connection be made? Would not a first step be to examine the WALTPS conclusions at the highest political level in Africa so that policy makers are aware of the opportunities and risks in the future and of the steps that need to be taken to maximize the former and minimize the latter?

Deciding on investment priorities

The study indicates that West Africa's need for public investment as a result of population growth and settlement will be immense, and that local and foreign resources for this purpose will be insufficient So, inevitably, choices will have to be made And they will be cruel choices They will resemble war-time economics (managing shortages) more than peace-time economics (managing abundance)

Most of the public sector economic and social investment requirement will have to be met by the Africans themselves The governments' tax-raising capacity will not be sufficient The country studies on long term development prospects should provide an opportunity to debate ways and means of mobilizing civil society to complement government efforts Sectors with especially urgent needs are mass education (literacy), basic public health and hygiene, natural resource preservation and infrastructure maintenance Foreign aid can only very partially cover needs in these areas

In the view of the authors foreign aid must, in the future, be guided by a view of West Africa as a region undergoing rapid population growth and settlement The keynote of aid must be to encourage fluidity in economic relations within the region, communications infrastructure investment to facilitate trade and the mobility of persons, local-purpose investment in the towns in short, investments with long-term pay offs which local savings cannot cover As these are long-term, costly investments, the overseas development agencies should seek agreement among themselves on investment priorities, a schedule for implementation, and criteria for concerted action

Supporting change in agriculture

Agriculture will continue to play an essential role in West African societies It will continue for very many years to be one of the region's main earners of hard currency West Africa enjoys some considerable advantages in tropical crop production Agriculture will be the principal means by which regional trade will increase By the year 2020, it is estimated that roughly half the food imports into West African countries will be from neighboring countries Lastly, the capacity of the rural areas to regulate their output of migrants to match the economic health of the towns will be an essential element for the region's social and political stability

For agriculture to fulfill these three crucial functions, farmers must shift from practices essentially based on depletion of natural resources, which results in progressive saturation and exhaustion of farmland, to practices that assure the renewal of soil fertility This implies a more intensive form of agriculture, using both more labor and more inputs per hectare

The capacity for a given area to make this shift to intensive farming depends very much on the quality of its natural resources, the degree to which they are being used and local market incentives (i e the existence of remunerative markets) We know in advance that not all areas will be able to intensify at the same time some areas where opportunities are few, or non-existent will find it hard to make up for what they take out of the natural environment The volume and buoyancy of urban demand will be very important in determining farmers' investment capacities However, there is a whole series of measures that could be taken to maximize the number of rural people taking part in this shift to intensification, for example

* Local communities should organize themselves to manage these important changes in their production systems appropriate legal frameworks, especially with regard to land tenure, decentralized agriculture credit structures, concerted land use planning,

* Farmers' should be able to organize themselves and play a part in defining farm policy, on a par with traders, processors and consumers of farm products,

* The visibility and predictability of agricultural product markets should be increased and the macro-economic policy environment for production should be encouraging In particular, it should curb pressure to import subsidized and low quality products

Encouraging regional cooperation

The study shows that the decline of traditional exports, combined with the difficulty of breaking into world markets with new export products, the low level of private investment and the inadequacy of official aid will lead to endemic shortages of hard currency These shortages will have an unfortunate impact on infrastructure but could have beneficial effects, by slowing down imports

The shortage of hard currency could also give the regional market a better chance to expand

However, mentalities are ill prepared for giving the regional market free play Governments, more than people, regard regional competition as a bad thing, just as, until recently, they saw competition on domestic markets as dangerous

Nor are the development agencies much in favor of regional cooperation, despite what they say They are not as hostile as one might think to the balkanization of the region Some prefer the *de facto* split between English- and French speaking countries, as reflected in transport networks and in the organization of the markets, to a closer relationship Regional infrastructure is not developing as fast as the need for it and the existence of different currency zones complicates regional commercial transactions

West Africans ought themselves to take the initiative of launching a well-informed debate on the advantages and drawbacks of the present situation and the prospects for regional markets The aid agencies should support a serious African debate of this kind, based on careful observation of the facts and involving both entrepreneurs and civil servants

Fostering the development of civil society

The Club du Sahel and the Cinergie unit took the initiative of setting up a private enterprise network in West Africa because they believed the gradual formation of a network of modernizing African enterprises to be one of the main ways of increasing urban income and, indirectly, rural income They also believed that better organization among entrepreneurs can also influence the attitude and behavior of the State towards business and help entrepreneurs to take control of their own future development

Encouraging the success of African entrepreneurs requires, among other things

* the organization of enterprise networks nationally and regionally Not only could these improve the general business environment, but they could also encourage a better sharing than in the past of technical, management, and commercial experience Exporters could collectively learn from obstacles and opportunities on world markets They could take advantage of joint venture opportunities to sell on regional markets,

* the organization of financial networks nationally and regionally, to share experiences in such areas as securities markets, venture capital companies, local business banks, etc

Many other associations could be created by African civil society national and regional farmers' associations, educational, religious and arts associations, charities and self-help groups to help meet the needs of the community (health care, hygiene, urban clean ups, etc)

Political associations, with a grass-roots base also have an increasingly important role to play in gathering information, discussing and encouraging discussion, training officials, and providing early warning to politicians before conflicts arise

Civil society in West Africa is already facing challenges, and will face more in the future It will have to cope with and make up for the State's shortcomings Progress so far, progress yet to be made, and possible forms of support could be widely discussed in the light of the WALTPS conclusions

Observation and analysis of the facts

Throughout the duration of the study, the experts tried to gather and analyze as much as possible facts and observations on long term trends in West Africa In this way, despite the shortage of available statistics, they have constructed an original database containing demographic, geographical and economic data

The study shows that the great region-wide transformations that will result from population growth and settlement, urbanization, new economic trends, relations between town and country and interactions between output and markets will have both positive and negative effects on development It will be necessary to support the positive trends and minimize the negative

Given that knowledge is a precondition for clear-sighted decision-making, we hope the African governments and foreign aid agencies will set about acquiring more reliable means of observing, understanding and anticipating these changes and the needs of a region undergoing rapid population growth It is possible to make a modest start to this work on the basis of the WALTPS study

The Club du Sahel and the CINERGIE project are working together to further these objectives They hope the overseas development agencies will wish to be associated with their efforts

Anne de Lattre

Area covered by the West Africa Long Term Perspective Study:



The countries of the Sahel and the coast of the Gulf of Guinea

CHAPTER ONE

WEST AFRICA UNDERGOING LONG-TERM CHANGE

Since independence, West Africa has experienced two different kinds of pressure exceptional population growth and brutal exposure to world markets (→ 1 1)

It is highly likely that these trends which have already deeply affected the region, will continue to exert an influence over the region over the next thirty years, causing further change Discussion of the long term is therefore necessary (→ 1 2)

Despite the magnitude of the challenges that need to be confronted, and thanks to the adaptability of the popular economy, West African societies have managed to provide the necessary goods and services for their peoples, albeit at the expense of more conventional economic growth (→ 1 3)

The most visible manifestation of the capacity of West Africans to adapt to change has been massive migration southward, towards the coast, and especially to the towns (→ 1 4)

A network of 3,000 towns and cities (→ 1 5) has taken in 66 million new inhabitants and provided them with income and housing (→ 1 6)

Farming has gradually become market oriented (→ 1 7) With only a slight time-lag, it has succeeded in meeting the increasing demand for food The market for food crops is becoming increasingly important for the rural economy (→ 1 8)

Indeed, much has been learned in many ways over the last thirty years The elites of recently independent States are having to defend their mediocre record at a time when new interest groups are competing for power (→ 1 9)

More generally, systems based on sharing out rents have risen and fallen, while economic and social competition has emerged as a new major influence (→ 1 10)

1.1 Two initial shocks: rapid population growth and brutal exposure to world markets

Since 1960 West Africa has faced two shocks: internally, its population has grown at a rate rare in human history, and, externally, it has been exposed to a rapidly changing world economy. These simultaneous shocks have forced the region to change substantially and rely primarily on its own strengths.



Until the late 19th century the population of sub-Saharan Africa, and West Africa in particular, remained stable, while that of most other continents was expanding. A significant population increase did not occur until the early 20th century. The current population explosion only really took off after World War II, with improved health care and hygiene. Since then, the region's population growth rates are observed to be close to 3% (2.7% on average in 1960-90). The West African population has grown at a sustained level, rising from 40 million in 1930 to 85 million in 1960 and to 215 million today.

Such growth rates which have led to a doubling of the population every 25 or 30 years, have created a shock that few areas in the world have had to contend with. This shock is all the more dramatic because it is accompanied by a profound change in the conditions for economic development.



Population trends for the world's major regions between 1750 and 2100 (billions of people)

Sudden exposure to the world economy

West Africa's exceptional population growth was accompanied by another major change exposure to the world economy that began after World War II and became particularly significant following independence

The pre-colonial and colonial periods did little to prepare the region for economic competition Weak economic development was mainly the result of exploitation of the region's natural comparative advantage raw materials or tropical agricultural commodities

After independence, the new West African states were plunged into the world markets and into a level of economic competition for which they were poorly prepared

To meet the needs of a growing population, to build modern Nations and to satisfy the demands of the new ruling classes who were aspiring to quickly catch up with developed countries, the demands were great Faced with such demands, West Africa continued to base its economic growth on those natural assets that could be readily exploited extensive agriculture which was expanding at the expense of natural resources and, in some cases, mineral commodities Added to this were international transfers which for some countries became the most important source of revenue

Under pressure from the many demands of society few investments were made in order to diversify the revenue services of the national economy Over the last thirty years, these economies have remained heavily dependent on commodity prices and international transfers

Two shocks that have forced societies to change

These two shocks led to dramatic changes inducing a rapid and irrevocable breakdown of most of the ancient balances within West African societies Most of the efforts applied by societies over the past 30 years have been in direct of indirect response to the changes brought about by these two initial shocks

On the following pages, an attempt is made to gain a better understanding and a sense of the consequences of these efforts, as well as to reflect on the direction of change in the future

In 1960, the distribution of population in West Africa was still largely determined by historic features From 1960 to 1990, it changed radically in response to the demands of the regional and international economy



The changes that began before independence are far from over Population growth will continue to rise and West Africa will find itself increasingly more integrated into world markets Further imbalances and greater change can already be predicted For this reason a discussion of the long term is necessary to outline the main directions of future change, as well as to contribute to the debate on development strategies

The population growth of the next thirty years is determined by the age pyramid With an average fertility rate exceeding six children per woman, every mother of today has, on average, more than three daughters They, in turn will be mothers in 2020 Even if there were a sharp fall in fertility rates, a rapid rise in the population could not be prevented because, at least at the start, it would be counter-balanced by a rise in the number of mothers

In 2020, West Africa probably will have a population of at least 430 million This forecast, selected by the study, lies at the lower end of standard projections used by mainstream development organizations The highest forecast estimates a regional population of some 470 million inhabitants In either case, West Africa's total population will have increased tenfold in less than 100 years

However, the fact that the population will double within a generation should not disguise the absolute necessity of attaining a rapid fall in fertility In the very long term (over 50 years), the demographic scenarios diverge considerably They may make all the difference between a difficult challenge (low hypothesis a rapid population rise in the short term but a rapid fall in fertility) and a probably insurmountable challenge (high hypothesis a progressive slowing down of fertility)

Although AIDS will not restrict the region's population growth, there is a risk that by disproportionately affecting young workers it will increase the dependency ratio (number of non workers for every worker) and make it harder for the working population to cope with society's needs On this basis, urgent action obviously needs to be taken

Population will almost certainly double
example of the age pyramid of Malian women



Fertility rates in West African Countries the origin of rapid population growth							
Benin	7 1	Ivory Coast	7,4	Liberia	6,8	Senegal	6 1
Burkina Faso	6 5	Gambia	6,1	Mali	7 1	Sierra Leone	6 5
Cameroon	5,7	Ghana	6,0	Mauritania	6,5	Chad	5 9
Cape Verde	4 3	Guinea	7,0	Niger	7 1	Togo	6 6
C A R	6 2	Guinea Bissau	5 8	Nigeria	6,4		

Source UNFPA Etat de la Population Mondiale 1993 New York 1993

Enormous investments are required to meet the needs of the region's growing population

West Africa will need, even more than in the past, to mobilize all its domestic strength and major sources of capital in order to house 430 million people, to create gainful employment for the adult population and to educate more than 200 million children Although the challenge of meeting these considerable needs is largely predictable as they are dictated by population trends, the prospects for revenue remain uncertain

A changing economic environment

The economies of West Africa were built on agricultural and mineral commodity exports This system continued to function well up until the end of the 1970s and even beyond although commodity markets had entered a new phase While technological progress in the North made it possible to use fewer raw materials and more substitutes in industrial production, the supply of raw materials from the South continued to increase An increase which was further compounded by Asian producers entering the market

From 1970 to 1990, the share of primary products in export earnings fell from 53% to 20% in the developing countries of South and Southeast Asia, from 90% to 68% in those of Latin America, but only from 93% to 89% in sub-Saharan Africa

Poor prospects for rapid diversification

During the 1970s, the system of industrial subcontracting by locating manufacturing activities in developing countries with abundant cheap labor provided a development model for a number of countries in Asia and South America Most of these countries have consequently enjoyed remarkable growth rates and improved living standards

Delocalization continues and tends to occur in free-trade zones However, the trend is changing and now favors advanced countries (both industrialized or newly industrializing) with a dynamic domestic market and a supply of qualified labor rather than poor countries with cheap labor It will therefore be difficult for new poor countries, especially in Africa, to attract international subcontracting opportunities

While Africa is losing export market share for traditional products and is having great difficulty in diversifying its exports, it remains open to imports With the economic recession, the nature of these imports has changed in an alarming way

Lower purchasing power has coincided with the arrival on world markets of massive surpluses of subsidized farm products, and all sorts of second-rate or used goods which head for a new life in Africa, virtually destroying any chance for local production

Further change is inevitable

Up until now, West African economies have been pressed to deal with their population increases and the required restructuring of settlements These economies have not chosen to or been able to diversify a dwindling economic base so as to secure the financing necessary for their own development Meanwhile, they remain highly dependent on world markets for a number of their own basic needs and consequently face growing gaps in their balances of trade

In the past, international transfers (which are stop-gap measures and look uncertain for the future) have filled these gaps They will increasingly need to be filled by the expansion of the regional economy

West Africa will have to continue to change rapidly and significantly to adapt both to its population growth and to the growing constraints in the international economic environment

The region is in fact, in the middle of a long-term process of change, during the course of which it is undergoing its own specific economic, cultural, social and political modernization For the hurried observer, the evolution may seem a long one, and during moments of crises such as the one West Africa is experiencing today, one may wonder if this process of change is on the right path

In its attempt to determine the future direction of these long-term changes, the WALTPS team has chosen to examine the processes underlying the changes over the past thirty years in West Africa, this is covered in the first section In the second section the study attempts to project a few likely evolutions on the basis of trends and mechanisms identified in the previous section A number of issues arise from this study and are presented in the third section of this report These issues should provide the background for a lively debate not only in West Africa but also in partner countries

1 3 ECONOMIES IN WHICH MEETING BASIC NEEDS HOLD A DOMINANT PLACE

West African economies remain in the earliest stages in the division of labor that other countries in the world have already experienced Alongside a modern sector, now in deep recession much of the economy is still informal and is oriented towards meeting people's basic needs (food, housing, clothing, transport) A simple world but one that, paradoxically, statisticians find difficult to comprehend

West African economies are still at an elementary stage in their development The region's infrastructure, technology and the training of bureaucrats and managers only really started after the second world war and remain incomplete

In 1960, the region was characterized by a large agricultural sector still living in semi-autarchy, a small urban fringe (13 % of the population was urban in 1960) the majority of which was made up of managers and employees (wage-earners and civil servants) of the modern sector and a minority in the informal sector

Over the last thirty years, the modern, informal and agriculture sectors have remained the main elements of West African societies

Efforts by national decision makers and their partners were focussed on developing the modern sector, which was considered to be the appropriate means for development However, over the past thirty years, this sector has stagnated and employs today only 10-15 % of the population Conversely, the principal change occurring in West African societies is the dramatic movement of the agricultural sector's population to the informal sector, mainly in urban areas as can be seen clearly in the graph These two sectors make up what we shall refer to later as the "popular economy" and what was referred to by Fernand Braudel as the "domestic" economy

This popular economy, in contrasts to the modern sector, is a rustic economy geared towards meeting the basic needs of the population Paradoxically, because of its simplicity, this economy cannot be measured with the instruments specifically designed to deal with the realities of the more formal "modern" sector

Since the modern sector represents less than 15 % of the population, the WALTPS team deemed it necessary to construct an alternative reading of the regional economy based on the analysis of individual behavior This "demo-economic" reading allows for a better understanding of the dynamics of the popular economy (see box)

A two-tier economy

Social accounting matrices (SAM)

Demo economic accounts attempt to construct a view of the economy based on the major social groups that contribute to it, rather than on the different economic sectors These accounts are presented in a social accounting matrix (SAM) a square matrix in which the rows and columns represent the resources and uses of the various accounts The starting point for constructing the SAM is the final expenditure of various categories of households and the administration Each category of urban and rural household identified in the settlement matrix is assigned a (provisional) total expenditure, broken down by heading and origin (domestic or imported) Working backwards, stage by stage, the income behind this expenditure, the goods and services used by agents and activities, the transfers that balance current accounts and capital, etc , are all calculated Since the matrix must balance the income of households and the administration from production and transfers is equal to their expenditure

The main exogenous data used relates to the patterns of final and intermediate expenditure and the flow of goods, services, and money between a country and the rest of the world These are given by the balance of payments, and set the limits to the system

The image of the real economy supplied by the SAM is more sketchy than that given by national accounts in areas such as the accounts of the public sector, but it is more complete for the relationship between domestic supply and demand, the contribution of urban and rural communities to the economy, the production and consumption of non tradable goods and services, and the contribution of the informal sector to the economy

This demo-economic analysis in fact reveals a two tier economy

- The "modern" economy grew rapidly until around 1980 and then shrunk at an even faster rate until 1990 Average productivity fell by more than 10% in ten years, while employment remained virtually static for that period The modern sector is the part of West African economies that is most directly linked to the "world economy" This sector can enjoy rapid economic growth, as was the case during 1960-1975, a period marked by a favorable economic climate At this time the modern sector was lavished with public spending, and was consequently the motor for urbanization At the same time, this sector of the economy is heavily dependant on its international economic environment, as shown during the last decade

■ The popular economy is more deeply rooted in the local environment This economy was better able to resist the recession and adapted to changing circumstances mainly by regulating the migratory flux between towns and countryside This economy is an economy of survival dominated by social function it primarily seeks to reduce risks and satisfy individual basic needs Such an economy aids African societies resist the multiple shocks to which they are exposed Nonetheless, this economy is not particularly promising in terms of rapid economic growth

The strong dichotomy between these two economies, underlines the extreme weakness of the regional trade economy which should lie between the two We shall see later on just how important the development of such an intermediate economy is for the future

Contrasting assessments of West African economic performance

Analysts are often pessimistic about Africa's outlook This can be blamed partly on the fact that their instruments (and in most cases their paradigm) are not designed to, and therefore can not, measure the great changes currently underway in West African societies

Urban construction, for example, is mainly informal and poorly measured Judging by national accounts alone, it would be hard to understand how the 66 million new town-dwellers, who have appeared since 1960 actually live! A conservative reevaluation of accumulated housing capital was made, based on the average cost of lodgings of different social groups and the actual numbers making up these groups

This reevaluation doubles the accumulated housing capital Since investment in housing has been a major component of private investment, this reevaluation means that the "real" investment rate needs to be revised to some 20 - 30 % of gross regional product (GRP), a significant amount Similarly, an analysis of the size and pattern of food expenditures in household budgets (usually 40 - 60 % of total expenditure) suggests that the food market is quite different from the one reflected in agricultural statistics

More generally and depending on the point of view, two markedly different readings can be made of West Africa's performance in the last thirty years

According to macro-economic aggregates, the region's performance was average during the last thirty years Taking the aggregates for the decade 1980-1990 only, the region's performance was very poor mainly because of the worsening international economic environment and the recession in the modern sector Even if its figures differ, the demo-economic analysis does not contradict the overall results of this analysis

On the other hand, if the demographic variable is taken into account, it is evident that despite this mediocre economic performance, the region was able to cope with massive growth in its population This happened without disasters or increased poverty This in itself is a remarkable achievement

Admittedly, the average per capita value added remained largely static over the whole period and even fell in the last decade, particularly in towns Yet, urban growth has been productive in the sense that it has involved considerable accumulation of assets, mainly private ones, and has permitted the beginning of the large-scale division of labor This is the principal outward sign of a subsistence economy becoming a market economy



The three sectors of West African societies

Although the modern sector and farming have attracted most attention, the main change in the last thirty years has been the development of the informal sector, especially in the cities This sector is expected to account for the majority of economic activity

1 4 THE RESPONSE OF PEOPLE TO CHANGES IN THEIR ENVIRONMENT HAS GIVEN RISE TO SIGNIFICANT MOBILITY WITHIN WEST AFRICA

Mobility has played a critical role in the adaptation of West African communities to their changing environment Stimulated primarily by rapid changes in economic geography this mobility falls into three categories from North to South in almost every country from the interior to the coast and most importantly, from rural to urban areas

At the beginning of the twentieth century in West Africa, colonial rule curtailed large population movements in the region For this reason in 1960, West Africa's geographic population settlement was roughly similar to that of the large historic settlement areas

These settlement areas corresponded to the areas best suited to subsistence cereal farming and to the trans-Saharan trade routes, the region's main source of wealth in the past As a result, the Sudanese and Sahelian zones were relatively densely populated Other settlement zones were developed along the coasts as trade (in gold, slaves and later tropical products) got under way

On the eve of independence, the characteristics of West African settlements corresponded only partially to the overseas trade catchment areas with which West Africa was to be linked Certain countries with high potential such as Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon, were sparsely populated, while some of the least favored zones were densely populated, particularly those in the Sahelian zones

Independence and the influence of market economics, brought about a drastic change in the economic landscape Rapid development of the export market led to a rapid increase in export earnings and growth in export producing areas Above all, the wealth generated by these changes resulted in taxable income for the young States This income was redistributed mainly to create new administrative networks in the region as well as to develop the industrial sector in the cities These changes in economic geography, set in motion a massive shift in the West African population

- from North to South in most countries
- from the interior of the region to the coastal areas,
- from the countryside to the towns, often in association with the first two trends

Sociopolitical factors were grafted onto these basic mechanisms increasing the attraction of certain countries' as migration destinations (there has been an active policy to attract migrant labor to Côte d'Ivoire) and reducing that of others (bankruptcy in Ghana during the 70's, repression in Sekou Toure's Guinea)

In total, the study has identified four large zones in which the settlement patterns have evolved in a fairly homogeneous way over the last thirty years

Urban and rural population growth in West Africa 1960 1990
marked differences between countries



■ Zone 1 comprises the main centers of urban growth in the coastal countries and their immediate hinterland

Characteristically, the population density in this zone is high (average 124 inhabitants per sq km) with 41% of the West African population occupying 8% of the area and a high urban-rural ratio (55% in 1990) This zone has grown the fastest in the last thirty years, with net immigration of 8 3 million, an annual rate of 0 4% (0 6% less Nigeria)

■ Zone 2 comprises the remaining areas near the coast

With 28% of the regional population living on 25% of the area, not only is this zone relatively underpopulated given its potential, but also it is under-urbanized In the last thirty years it has been an emigration zone, but one that could become an immigration zone in the future

■ Zone 3 corresponds roughly to the dense settlement clusters in the Sahel and includes the most dynamic parts of the Sahelian countries

With 25% of the region's population living on 13% of the area, it is more urbanized than zone 2 Because this zone faces serious constraints it also experiences net emigration (-0 3%)

■ Zone 4 covers the rest of the Sahel

It has the lowest demographic and economic potential and one of the largest rates of emigration (-0 7%)

This four-zone division of West Africa highlights the great attraction of the coastal areas which draw people both from the less dynamic areas of the coastal countries (zone 2) and from the Sahel (zones 3 and 4) Most of the migrants to the coast are concentrated in zone one



The four settlement zones of West Africa

	proportion of total area (%)	proportion of total population (%)		growth rate of total population (%)	urban ratio (%)		growth rate of urban population (%)
		1960	1990	1960/90	1960	1990	60/90
zone 1	7	35	41	3 2	25	55	5 9
zone 2	25	29	28	2 6	10	30	6 4
zone 3	13	27	25	2 4	8	32	7 5
zone 4	55	9	6	1 7	6	22	6 0
region	100	100	100	2 7	14	40	6 3

1 5 TOWNS HAVE ABSORBED TWO-THIRDS OF POPULATION GROWTH AND WILL CONTINUE TO EXPAND

The most striking development of the last thirty years has been the rapid expansion of West African towns the proportion of town dwellers rose from only 13% in 1960 to 40% in 1990 Apart from the dramatic growth of a few major cities, such as Lagos, urban expansion has been relatively balanced It has slowed down in the last ten years but it seems plausible that by 2020 the urbanization ratio will be close to 60%

Between 1960 and 1990, the number of town-dwellers* rose from 12 to 78 million as towns absorbed the equivalent of nearly two-thirds of total population growth

Urbanization appeared to be driven by both pull and push factors

- Urbanization has been a feature of rich economies such as Nigeria, whose oil boom saw its urbanization level increase from 15% to 49% The agricultural success in Côte d'Ivoire also resulted in a rapid rise in the urban ratio from 17% to 47%

- Urbanization has equally developed in those countries that have experienced serious ecological crises such as Mauritania (the level rose from 9% to 42%) or those that have fallen prey to serious political problems (Chad's level rose from 6% to 24%)

Often both factors affect one country In Mali, all medium-sized towns have expanded rapidly But whereas the growth of Mopti, Gao and Timbuktu can be attributed to the two droughts that drove rural populations off their lands, Kita, Koutiala and other cotton-basin towns have clearly grown as a result of cotton earnings and the economic benefits that they engendered

Emergence of a relatively balanced urban network

It would be wrong to consider urban growth as merely restricted to the expansion of a few major cities While the urban population increased by a factor of 6 5, the number of cities with populations greater than 100,000 rose from 12 to 90, and the number of towns with over 5,000 inhabitants rose from 600 to 3,000 The regional rank size distribution of towns is relatively normal, whereas the distribution within each country suggests greater importance of each capital city compared to secondary towns The urban network is beginning to take shape even though large towns (with more than 500,000 inhabitants) remain dispersed often at great distance (around 1000 km) throughout the region

More than 60% town-dwellers in 2020?

Even if recession has resulted in some localized de urbanization, it is most likely that the urban rural ratio will continue to increase in the long run The rate of this growth rather than the growth itself is what remains unknown

An ancient urban network
Yoruba cities in Nigeria

Although the majority of West African towns are new, an old urban tradition exists in some areas, particularly in Nigeria The dense urban network of the Yoruba land reflects the strong and ancient organization of this society As Camille Camara puts it, 'it is indeed in the western state (of Nigeria) where we find the densest urban network in tropical Africa Travelling a few dozen kilometers in any direction reveals this fact From south to north, there is first Lagos, the federal capital, the great port on the Bight of Benin ( ) At a distance of some 65 km from there is Shagamu 65 km further on is Ibadan, ( ) straight ahead is Oyo and then Ogbomosho ( ) Ogbomosho lies some 50 km from Oyo, which lies at about the same distance from Ibadan Travelling from west to east, you come across Ilaro and Abeokuta, roughly 60 km apart, the same as between Abeokuta and Ibadan, from which Iwo is 40 km, and Ifè 80 km Then 55 km driving brings you to Ondo, then to Akure and to Owo, each separated by a distance of 55 km or so In general the towns are 45 90 km apart most often 45 50 km This short distance between towns is quite exceptional for tropical Africa "

** Camara C L organisation de l espace geographique par les villes yoruba Annales de geographie n 439 pp 257 287 (1971) quoted by John Igue in Etats frontieres et dynamique d amenagement du territoire WALTPS 1993*

* The definition of a town varies greatly from one country to another The WALTPS team opted for any settlement with a population of over 5 000 If the threshold had been set at 20 000 a common practice the proportion of town dwellers would have been smaller but the rate of increase higher

> ***Structural slowdown in urbanization***
>
> *The peak of urbanization in West Africa is now past. Over the last thirty years, some countries achieved an average annual urban growth rate of more than 8%, but this is unlikely to be repeated. The change in the ratio of people living in urban and rural areas is now such that the rate of change must automatically be slower.*
>
> *In 1960, 13% of the region's population lived in towns. Under these conditions, if 1% (the average between 1960 1990) of the rural population migrates to the towns, these towns will grow at nearly 10% per year, and rural migrants will make up two thirds of this new urban population.*
>
> *However, in a situation like we have today, the urban population is 40% of the total population, and so the same rural emigration rate produces urban growth which is no more than 4.5% per year. In this case rural migrants make up only one-third of the new urban population.*

The pace of urbanization will slow down for structural reasons as the size of the rural population reservoir decreases (see box). This decrease will be influenced by the economic health of urban areas. The WALTPS low hypothesis suggests that 53% of the population will be town-dwellers in 2020. If the urban economy recovers (the WALTPS chosen hypothesis), this figure will be about 63%.

A network of cities with a population of over one million spread evenly across West Africa

Hypotheses on future urban growth are, obviously, not without consequences for the final structure of the urban network. However, even if the relative importance of major cities and secondary towns may vary slightly, the structure of the urban network will largely reflect the political and economic inheritance of the last thirty years.

■ The major cities will expand "individually" at their own pace and as a function of their ability to assert themselves regionally and internationally. Because urban growth will slow down, there will be few changes in the rank order. However, following their relative stagnation of recent decades, Accra and Conakry may well expand at an above-average rate, conversely, Dakar and some Nigerian cities are likely to fall in the rank order. Of the 30 largest cities in 1990, most will become cities of over one million. Although the rank-size distribution is fairly flat at the top because of the 19 capital cities in the region, it is likely that Nigeria as the main polarizing influence in the region and Lagos as the heart of the regional urban complex, will continue to have a strong impact on the region. Greater Lagos will probably ultimately have 12 to 15 million inhabitants.

■ The cities with over 100,000 inhabitants (280, compared with 90 in 1990) should develop into a regular grid across West Africa. This configuration is already mainly in place, and is unlikely to be upset. There are few areas with no towns at all that are susceptible to rapid expansion, except in areas where mineral deposits are being discovered, such as oil in southern Chad and gold in western Mali. Generally speaking, decentralization should increase the role of secondary towns and at the same time accentuate disparities between them as their respective central governments redistribute fewer and fewer resources.

■ The development of small towns will be affected by their relationship with the major cities and, even more importantly by the population and economic dynamics of neighboring rural areas. Despite their rapid growth in the past, towns in disadvantaged areas are likely to reach a growth ceiling in the future.

Future growth in the urban population (a threefold increase over the next thirty years) will induce, as in the past, considerable demand for public and private investment.

Changes in national urbanization levels, 1960-1990 and projections for 2020



CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF TOWNS WITH MORE THAN 100 000 INHABITANTS IN WEST AFRICA 1960-1990 AND PROJECTION FOR 2020

Population levels

100 000 to 200 000
200 000 to 500 000
500 000 to 1 million
1 to 2 million
2 to 5 million
5 to 10 million
over 10 million



1 6 THE ECONOMY HAS ADAPTED TO COPE WITH URBAN GROWTH

The urban economy's main function has been to respond to the enormous pressure from immigrants rather than seeking to increase productivity, town dwellers have shared employment Likewise, they have spent large sums of money on housing This accumulation of urban assets represents considerable investment that is several times greater than international transfers

Although towns experienced dramatic increases in their populations (multiplied by a factor of 6 5 in thirty years), per capita income in the informal sector remained remarkably stable during that period This paradox is only too apparent

The informal sector is largely made up of recent immigrants who have maintained strong links with their home communities Consequently, these immigrants are under great pressure to welcome other people who wish to leave their village Because of this, any economic growth in towns does not increase per capita income, but rather attracts new people from rural areas, keeping the basic income in the urban informal sector close to the minimum needed for survival

Because they are determined by basic needs which hardly vary over time, incomes from the informal sector have remained relatively stable This sector is not regulated by incomes but by changes in the patterns of migration It is this mechanism that explains the direct correlation between economic growth and urbanization

The economic boom years of 1960 70 saw a high rate of urbanization with towns growing at a rate of over 7% a year, on the other hand, the recession of the last ten years has been translated into a sharp slowdown with the urban growth rate declining to close to the natural rate of increase (+4 5% per year)

Since GDP is relatively stable per head in each sector growth is due to the changes in the relative size of the different sectors in a growth phase, the agricultural sector which has the lowest incomes, declines in importance while other sectors expand This is growth by distribution

The priority is job creation

Although the number of jobs in towns did increase to absorb immigrants, this usually meant a fragmentation of work rather than a division of labor that would encourage complementarity and economic efficiency The great number of activities in trade and minor services in West African economies provide evidence of this phenomenon Conversely, except for activities which enjoy natural protection (because the products are perishable - vegetables, poultry, pigs, bread - or bulky - beer), there has been little development of light manufacturing and processing activities

Inadequate management

More often than not, urbanization, a phenomenon closely associated with the growth of the informal sector, has been badly managed by politicians who have either ignored it or condemned it Consequently, town planners have taken little account of the specific needs of low-income town-dwellers Within West African cities separate worlds co-exist the formal, planned city, taking up 20% to 40% of the area but housing only 15 to 20% of its population, at the other extreme, temporary and precarious housing, in which 15 to 20% of the population lives, and in between, the majority of town-dwellers live in districts that are mostly informal but better laid out with some urban facilities

Considerable private investment

The rapid expansion of towns has led to a large accumulation of urban real estate assets public infrastructure (roads, drainage, public services) and, above all, investment in private housing

The urban assets accumulated in West Africa over the last thirty years barely appear in national accounts The analytical tools developed by the WALTPS yielded a net estimate of $300 billion (of which two-thirds is investment in private housing and some 20% in non regulated construction) This amount of financing greatly exceeds the total financial transfers the region received during the last three decades It is more than two times the present total Gross Regional Product

Put another way, the urban assets accumulated since 1960 amount to $4,000 per town-dweller

1 7 AGRICULTURE GRADUALLY HAS BECOME MARKET-ORIENTED

Farming has become part of the market economy, thanks to the rapid development of export crops and to the demand of the growing urban food market Food crop farming is given a boost when urban demand reaches a sufficient size as is currently the case in Nigeria, some parts of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana The rapid modernization of farming however, concerns only a small proportion of farmers

In 1960, West Africa's population was mostly rural (87% of the population) and mainly oriented towards subsistence farming Between 1960 and 1990, many farmers became connected to the market economy

Market orientation in agricultural production has been most visible in export crops Genuine interest in developing this source of wealth was shown by West African societies Export production often resulted in well-organized subsectors in which the State intervened directly For the State as well as the actively participating population, export productions represented a source of revenue which proved to be quite substantial The development of the export-crop market often enabled equipment, inputs and technical innovation to be introduced into the rural areas which produced these crops

The development of the food market also linked farmers to the market economy although this happened more discreetly Given the importance of home-consumption, this market has long remained a residual one With 20% of the population living in towns (often the case in the 1960s, and still the case in some Sahelian countries), there is only one potential customer for every four farmers In addition, not all farmers have access to food markets Those with the best connections to towns were the first to seize the commercial opportunities This has created increasing disparity among rural areas The food policies of States in the region gave priority to cheap food for the towns, which hardly encouraged the development of a domestic food market

Despite these handicaps, income from the regional food market has always been the largest component of the average agricultural income As a result of the rapid growth in volume and prices of export crops, the food-crop share of agricultural GDP fell to a low of 56% in 1970 Because of the regular increase in marketed output as a result of this increased demand, the domestic market accounted for 73% of agriculture's share of GDP in 1990

Urban markets influence rural settlement patterns and agricultural production

Market opportunities for farm products have had a great impact on rural settlement patterns The WALTPS has produced a map indicating the influence of markets on rural areas (see box)

This analysis shows that with the exception of a few agricultural zones where the soil and climate is less suited to farming, rural population density has increased along the same lines as urban markets have developed The heterogeneity of rural population settlements has increased over the past thirty years as a result of rapid demographic growth in economically promising areas and demographic stagnation (due to massive emigration) in other areas (cf page 8)

The nearer a farmer lives to a town, the greater his or her incentive to produce food (access to information and low transport costs) But at the same time, because of a much higher population density near towns, the constraints to farming are greater The question that is then posed is, which of these two contradictory forces will eventually prevail? The WALTPS indicates that the attraction of the market outweighs the production constraints the productivity per unit area and per farmer, of those farms near urban centers is higher than in those areas further away

In fact, agriculture in West Africa is still in a transition phase Some farms are now well inte-



Change in the structure of agricultural GDP

The share of output brought to market has increased steadily since 1960, first as export crops increased and then, even more, in the form of food crops Food crops were consistently a larger share of marketed crops in 1960-90 and are likely to contribute even more to farm income in the future

grated into the market and operate as businesses, while for many other farmers, farming remains, first and foremost, a way of life (indeed survival) Even if markets were to expand considerably, this duality in agriculture is likely to remain a lasting feature of West Africa

Measuring the relationship between rural areas and markets

To measure the intensity of interactions between town and country, we have built an indicator reflecting the intensity of the signal sent out by towns to their hinterlands This detailed "market attractiveness" indicator takes the following into account

the size of the different markets and distances from these markets,
the uneven cost of carrying goods over a given distance (due to infrastructure, topography, hydrography, etc),
conditions affecting the supply of farm surpluses (agro climatic characteristics, rural population density, etc),
competition among the different markets in for these surpluses,
- possible "shut off" effects that restrict "market attractiveness" to a certain level, above which imports become more competitive

The three maps reproduced here show the value of this indicator in 1960 and 1990 Population projections and an additional set of hypotheses were used to draw the map for 2020 (Ninnin, 1994) The black areas are strongly linked to the market, the grey areas are moderately connected, the white areas only very weakly

The links between spatial variations in market tensions and in other variables for which spatialized data were available, were then studied It was then possible to show that

-rural population density correlates highly with market attractiveness the more an area is "exposed" to the market, the greater its population density At the West Africa level, this relationship provides a far better explanation for the sharp variations in rural population density than do agro ecological criteria, which have a strong impact only where population density is high,

output per hectare and per rural inhabitant also proves to correlate strongly with market attractiveness This helps explain some of the major differences in productivity between different areas with the same agro ecological conditions,

maps of market attractiveness also provide a visual representation of market catchment areas all the areas belonging to the same market The maps here show that, up to now, the main markets have remained separate They only become strongly connected around the year 2020, by which time half the region's trade in food and farm products will originate in the region



Urban demand plays an influential role in determining the geography of agricultural supply This supply has been able to meet demand with a time lag which, after peaking at five years now stands at three years and apparently is falling At a time of rapid population growth, urbanization both reduces the pressure on farmland and produces a solvent demand for the farmers who remain This is the case as long as markets function properly and complementary trade between town and country can develop

Although the region was not very dependant on trade with the outside world in the 1960s, food imports boomed between 1970 and 1980 before slowing sharply in the last decade due to the recession and structural adjustment Admittedly, the level of imports is high compared to the available foreign exchange but this level is by no means "excessive" except in the case of a few countries, both Sahelian and coastal (see page 40) Imports measured in calories rose from 6% to 14% of total consumption between 1961 and 1990, peaking around 20% in the early 1980s

Population growth does not necessarily lead to food dependency

The caloric deficit can in fact be explained by a time-lag between regional food supply and demand, which is growing at nearly 3% per year The reasons for this time-lag are different urban feeding habits, rapid urban growth and the harshness of external competition

In 1980, at the height of the food crisis, regional food supply lagged five years behind regional demand the amount produced in 1980 was equal to the amount consumed in 1975 Rapid urbanization and the ease of importing largely explains this lag in production But, it is interesting to note that by 1993 the gap between supply and demand was reduced to three years, with regional food production in 1993 equal to the regional consumption requirements of 1990

This is, therefore, a process of "catching up" that indicates that West African farmers are capable of increasing production faster than the rate of population growth, provided that climatic, institutional and economic conditions are suitable

Côte d'Ivoire is a remarkable example farmers there can now meet domestic caloric demand with a small surplus, even though over the last thirty years the total population has more than tripled and the urban population has increased by a factor of ten

Market development a condition for intensive farming

Town dwellers are not eating more imported food

Consumption patterns vary according to the place of residence Urbanization obviously has an effect on food dependency In West Africa wheat and rice make up 13% of basic rural food consumption (cereals and starches) and 50% of urban food consumption (FAO) But contrary to popular belief, people are not eating more imported food If urban and rural households are analyzed separately, per capita food imports in 1990 were comparable to 1960 figures for both groups

Senegal, quite fairly cited as having developed a taste for imported food, imported 370 calories per person per day in 1960 65 A quarter of a century later, in 1985 89, the figure was 390 although the urban ratio had risen in the meantime, from 29% to 39% Even if Senegal's food dependency is excessive, it has not been made significantly worse by urbanization

A desire for a more varied diet, which regional farming could satisfy

The study on food consumption in Abidjan over a 25 year period (Resquier Desjardins 1989) reveals a relative increase in the quantity of roots and starches, a reduction in cereals, particularly bread (!), and only a slight increase in rice The only sign of a taste for imported food is a large increase in the consumption of meat (latest data from 1985) most of which is imported

Rising living standards usually translate into a desire for a more diversified diet rather than a diet with a higher import content (J Egg, J Coste, 1991), as seen in the trend in cassava consumption in Sahelian countries This behavior can easily be reversed during recessions, as shown by the return to root staples in Nigeria (A S Afouda, B G Soule, 1992) and Cameroon (F Roubaud, 1994)

Analysis of the period 1960-90 indicates that, in West Africa as elsewhere, urbanization which is the most basic form of large scale division of labor between producers and consumers, is a necessary condition for income growth in rural areas and for intensive farming

However, this condition is not sufficient in itself unless the following requirements are satisfied

- urban demand is sufficiently strong,
- links between market-towns and production areas function properly,
- the macro-economic environment and trade policies are favorable

In recent years, rural households have been increasingly diversifying their activities away from farming For sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the non-farm share of rural household income is estimated to be along the order of 25 30% In a sample of Sahelian countries in West Africa, the figure is about 40% of total income (Reardon 1992)

Therefore, although farming is generally the main activity, rural households are increasingly open to other sources of income

In this context in which activities and investments are constantly changing, farming can only progress significantly if it is competitive vis a-vis other economic activities This is particularly true for the adoption of technical innovations, which often require additional investment of labor or capital If these innovations are cost-effective, they are quickly adopted and sometimes financed by non-farm income, as has been observed in the Kano area (Mortimore 1994) The increase in land disputes near towns is clear evidence that private interests are being mobilized where commercial farming is possible

Supply of urban goods and services the weak link in rural-urban relations

Rural products are sold in towns in exchange for urban goods and services The export of these from urban to rural areas is similar in volume to total exports of these countries to the rest of the world But trade flows between town and country are generally unbalanced against the rural areas which receive less than they supply

For example, towns in Ghana "import" goods and services from rural areas that equal 15% of GDP, while the rural areas import only the equivalent of 11% of GDP from towns A certain degree of imbalance is inevitable and to be expected in the trade and financial relations between town and country for those countries undergoing urbanization The cities in several countries such as Guinea, Ghana and Cameroon do not always supply their hinterland with accessible and appropriate goods and services or attractive opportunities for investment in urban land and construction

If (rural) farm supply is to adjust to (urban) demand, it is essential that the quality and availability of urban goods and services for rural areas be adequate If non farm goods and services become unavailable or harder to obtain (because of rationing, disorganized markets, deteriorating infrastructure etc), then one can expect marketed farm supply to adjust downwards The current recession hitting private and public urban productive sectors is likely to exacerbate farmers' tendency to seek refuge in self-sufficiency



The gap between regional supply and demand diminishes steadily after peaking in 1981

1 9 FROM THE BIRTH OF THE STATE TO THE RISE OF PLURALISM

The State has changed a great deal over the last thirty years Directly descended from the colonial system, the State, after independence, had a monopoly over economic and political life and made serious mistakes in trying to enforce this dual contract in the interests of its societies Today, the State is, without a doubt, at a turning point in its history, the financial recession has limited its means and ambitions new actors are emerging and decentralization is the order of the day

At the start of the colonial period, African countries, unlike the Asian ones, had not acquired much experience in the management of people and space Nor were Africans accustomed to thinking in terms of national communities The colonial period brought about an important change by establishing national areas and introducing purposeful management

The colonial powers made great use of traditional authorities in the French colonies, the traditional chiefs became auxiliaries of the government, while in the British colonies, indirect rule allowed them more autonomy Yet everywhere, the traditional authorities were gradually left out of the management of the new countries The carving up of the colonial territories was not consistent with ethnic considerations but rather with the defense of the strategic and commercial interests of the colonial rulers The colonial powers produced the multi-ethnic territories that would become Nation-States This creation marginalized the traditional authorities, unable to rule in these multi-ethnic territories, while the colonial powers neglected to train alternative national elites

The demand for independence came not from the traditional chiefs but from the class of colonial auxiliaries and urban workers Even if the latter two groups were opposed to colonial power, they were in fact closer to the colonial mentality and the States that they created These interest-groups were eventually to demand power and then assume it upon independence

The double contract of independence was restricted to a small segment of the population

For two or three years, independence gave the illusion of bringing about radical change The State was perceived as the ideal entrepreneur, bringing general progress and social justice But as early as 1962 or 1963, the illusion had dissipated The personalization of power was affirmed in virtually every country by *coups d'etat,* the introduction of one-party rule, or simply the monopoly of power by autocrats

At Independence the new African elite proposed a double contract to Afican population a social contract for rapid material development and a national contract declaring the Nation State as the new dominant form of collective solidarity

Even in the early years, the social contract was seen for what it was a pact that concerned only the "modern sector", that is to say mainly urban dwellers (wage earners, educated elite etc) Peasants were considered to be a homogeneous, unenlightened mass, the essence of the Nation that needed guidance by the elite, most of whose income they provided The urban informal sector, still rudimentary in the small towns during the years of independence (only 13% of the population lived in towns at that time) was seen as a transitional phenomenon It was generally considered that the small craftsman, bearing the stigma of underdevelopment, would automatically disappear following industrial development This "modern" bias in West Africa was a striking feature of what followed during the next thirty years

The diversity within national societies and the absence of any sense of belonging to a national community made the "national contract" difficult to put into practice There were no procedures generally accepted by the whole community for peacefully arbitrating conflicts of interest, and the new States did not have sufficient moral or practical authority to fill the gap Consequently, governments had to spend much of their energy and resources buying civil peace among groups The majority of States were not easily able to balance the interests of the different social groups and regions within the Nation

The new West African States were ill prepared to function as Nations Without experience, skills and internal cohesion, these countries saw power seized by a tiny administrative elite This elite of tenuous legitimacy then held on to power by dispensing patronage, first to the administration and the modern sector, and then, to a lesser extent, to the rest of society

The recession of the 1980s exposed the shallow roots of the State

As long as resources were abundant, this system enjoyed a certain consensus The State taxed producers who still made enough profits to keep them producing and everyone got something from the system But, as public finances gradually dried up due to a fall in the world price of raw materials and the exhaustion of their capacity to borrow, the State was less able to display largesse and the consensus was shaken

The number of geographic areas in which the State no longer exercised a strong presence began to multiply This situation arose because of the State's increasing inability to meet its administrative responsibilities and the process began very early in physically distant or informal parts of the economy Gradually, governments became totally cut off from society and only governed the modern sector

The collapse of external resources in the 1980s accelerated the shrinking of the State's clientele to the point of endangering its base of support the modern sector Salaries were not paid for months, staff were put on short term contracts or made redundant, enterprises were privatized, the stricter provisions of labor law were abolished and graduates were no longer guaranteed a job All this only served to increase the number of dissatisfied people and the result was to encourage the change over of political power among parties

Young graduates the active unemployed!

Over the years, surveys have shown an increasing number of young graduates who declare themselves to be unemployed, while these same surveys show that more than half of them actually work It is symptomatic that those working claim that they are unemployed This would seem to suggest an intense frustration and dissatisfaction on their part, even after several years of informal work, these young graduates continue to consider employment in the modern sector as the only real kind of work The period of unemployment can be long, possibly surpassing two years as is the case in Benin for example

After J Charmes Facing adjustment what actions what income? Jeunes villes emplois conference held in Paris 1992

The opposition parties that gained power have not been able to effect a necessary break with the past Up until now, they have not been able to establish a social nor a national contract On the contrary, they came to power denouncing the former government's inability to respect the contract founded at the time of independence Gradually the new leaders are being caught in a trap of their own making even if they want to open up the dialogue with the people, they are subject to the same forces that led to the demise of their predecessors and which actually put them into power -- the discontented segments of modern society, beginning with the student population

Can the crisis of the post-colonial State give rise to a new African political system

Two factors suggest that current changes will ultimately go beyond mere changeovers in political power and go so far as to modify the very rationale of the system competition among elites is developing and civil society is beginning to play a greater role

Today the among administrative elites, born in the wake of independence, are challenged by new competitors the traditional middle classes (particularly the traders of colonial times), organized groups in the private sector (such as the small Baol-Baol traders in Dakar) and religious movements such as the Islamic brotherhood These historic elites had been obscured by the all-encompassing power of the State, today, they are making a comeback due to liberalization, which is giving them a new economic base and new functions The competition between various elites could be fierce and the outcome will be crucial in determining the direction societies take In effect, it will not be simply a transfer of power within an established system Behind the competition for power, important choices regarding the kind of society that is desired are having to be made, and this at a time when governments are having to redefine their role

As the population expands, as economic and social affairs gradually become more complex, and as the grip of the State on these changes weakens, so private initiatives have become more structured, cohesive and widespread Although States have not yet recognized this by changing their institutions, private initiative is now a major element in political life of West Africa Decentralization, the development of farmer's unions, and the organization of the private sector (and even the informal sector) are growing realities that States are having to acknowledge in redefining and justifying their role

In any event, whether the State reforms itself, is replaced by other forms of governance, or even becomes more radical, the age of the post-colonial State does seem to be coming to a close before our eyes A new, specifically African type of political system is about to see the light of day

The past thirty years have witnessed the rise and fall of regimes that have been based on State intervention in the management of the economic and social environment These regimes came to power thanks to favorable economic conditions and the weak structure of national societies Economic globalization, the doubling of the population and economic and social development have rendered these regimes obsolete Competition has become an integral part of most sectors of society something that society was hardly prepared for Yet, if competition is accepted as a major engine of change, it could play a central role in West Africa's future

In 1960, the countries of West Africa had virtually no industrial fabric, no entrepreneurs, no politicians, no local managers They were inspired by the hope, shared by many international observers, that they could quickly catch up with the developed countries, a hope that was supported by the rapid growth of the 1950s Inspired by the pattern set by the developed countries, they adopted active strategies to speed up the modernization of their societies These strategies were based on segmenting society into social sectors or groups each one distinct yet complementing the others

Economies were organized around public distribution

The economy was divided into sectors, the roles of which were supposed to be coordinated the modern sector, which was comprised mostly of monopolies, had the task of modernizing the country and supplying the domestic market, the agricultural and mineral export sectors were to exploit their natural comparative advantage and provide the economy with foreign exchange that was mostly absorbed by the modern sector The rest of the agricultural sector was meant to ensure national self-sufficiency Finally, the informal sector was supposed to do the rest that is to say, very little in theory (as the State was charged to do everything) but much in practice

The snags in this set-up were numerous The modern sector never managed to function in an autonomous way, it always relied upon the foreign-exchange earning sectors The theoretical complementarity was not developed, economic activities continued to be led by the commodity export sector (complemented in certain cases by capital transfers), and competition which was limited to the traditional sectors outside the State's control, was rare and restricted

This economic system was accompanied by a value system which was also compartmentalized rural culture was revered while a cosmopolitan modern urban model was held up to represent the future Any other social pattern was seen as transitional and deliberately ignored The result was a society built on two social classes intended to be solid and indivisible peasants and the modern elite

Political rhetoric urged the pooling of efforts in all areas and condemned any expression of private interests as divisive Competition was thus excluded from society Economic and social competition was perceived as wasteful and harmful The economy was dependent on the State, based on exploiting natural advantages and dominated by monopolies (or oligopolies) It maintained, indeed, even strengthened, its rent seeking character already established during the previous colonial period In politics, the one-party rule system alone existed, democracy being presented as a waste of effort, a luxury that was incompatible with mobilizing the forces a country needs to develop

Despite a few success stories, this model has now reached its limits

It is all too easy today to call the integration model a failure because it is ill suited to the current situation However, it did coincide with growth in the regional economy for a number of decades It contributed to modernizing society, improving health and education standards, transforming territories and integrating the 70 million new town dwellers without major incident Social integration had real success for two decades it educated and integrated cohorts of young people from all backgrounds in a consistent framework with shared common values

However, West African societies and their leaders did not see that internal and external circumstances were changing The integration model gradually became obsolete as competition was excluded from it West African societies and their leaders were forced into preparing for a different kind of reality The international environment and domestic social change made competition an increasingly important influence on economic and social activities

For some, West Africa is not competitive it would be more accurate to say that, until recently, West Africa was not even in competition

External competition for scarce resources has increased internal competition

In the 1970s West African economies came under fierce attack for the first time Asian countries began competing on the tropical commodity markets Later, in the early 1980s, competition on domestic markets was exacerbated by external factors - the success of Asian countries, world surpluses and internal ones - booming trade, divergent economic and monetary changes and massive smuggling

Competition, encouraged by adjustment policies, gradually became more important for these economies Public intervention declined and the modern sector shrank Meanwhile, national and international competition overtook traditional sectors, especially the food sector The informal sector which had its growth throttled by urban recession, faced more internal competition Medium-sized enterprises are emerging from this competition in a number of different sectors such as health care, education, transport, construction and public works, and trade, but rarely as yet in manufacturing The State, discredited by the collapse of parastatals and short of resources, is noticeably losing its control over society

In the social domain, competition broke up the integrating and unifying characteristics of the earlier model The urban melting-pot has not given rise to a cosmopolitan consensus among ethnic groups, but rather has increased competition among them

The emergence of competition has been a violent shock for West African economies and societies Not only because it was unpredicted, unwanted and uncontrolled by the government and economic agents, but because it occurred during particularly unfavorable circumstances falling commodity prices and declining net transfers

The State saw its control of society dwindle at a time when it was having to dialogue with an increasing number of interest groups Deeply destabilized, the State has hardly been able to manage this period of turbulence

Competition brings about economic changes and social tensions

A general trend in West Africa points towards the diversification of economic activities and social patterns the appearance of an intermediate sector and a private-sector middle class, the emergence of local communities, greater social inequalities, and a denser regional economy This diversity will inevitably increase the economic opportunities as well as the number of individuals lined up to seize them The process of change in West African societies which is in the clutches of competition is about to begin This must be considered as one of the major changes influencing in the future of West Africa

The current recession must not hide the fact that these societies are beginning to adapt to new challenges This is noticeable in the economy in the food sector, which has grown rapidly since the mid-1980s, and in the private sector, which is slowly diversifying and becoming more professional Rapid change has also occurred in political and social affairs since the beginning of the 1990s

But this adaptation will only be successful if internal and external competition (including regional) is identified and accepted (possibly even organized) as a driving force for economic and social progress in West Africa This will require a clear break with the old models, a break that leaders have not yet fully made

The development of pluralism in radio broadcasting in Mali

Mali is undoubtedly one of the most advanced African countries in matters of pluralism in radio broad casting In 1987, an Italian NGO managed to set up a non profit making rural radio station, Kayes Rural Radio, completely independent of the government's activities This was the first breach of the State radio monopoly in Mali, a de facto monopoly with no basis in law

In September 1991, Radio Bamakan, a non profit making urban radio station with no broadcasting license, put out its first broadcasts from Bamako In October 1991, Radio Liberte, the first commercial radio also began broadcasting from Bamako In December 1991, the Council of Ministers adopted the draft law on private FM sound radio broadcasting ( ) In June 1992, the 1 kW transmitter of Radio Kayire, another non profit making station in Bamako, began broadcasting Between mid 1992 and the first months of 1993, six new radio stations were set up in different parts of the country Pluralistic broadcasting in Mali was under way

(from <u>Le pluralisme radiophonique en Afrique de l'ouest</u>, Institut Panos, L'Harmattan Press, 1993)

CHAPTER TWO

A FEW GUIDEMARKS FOR THE FUTURE

Two complementary approaches were adopted for the prospective analysis in the WALTPS

The objective of the first approach is to produce a vision of the future one generation hence By definition, this vision distances itself from economic cycles -- indeed this is one of its main advantages The vision is expressed as ***a long-term image*** *of the distribution of people and their activities This image attempts to answer the questions raised at the outset of the study where and how will 430 million West Africans live in 2020? A series of "projections" based on the mechanisms identified in the 1960 90 retrospective and on various sets of hypotheses are the basis of this future image (→ 2 1)*

The countries along the Gulf of Guinea, around Nigeria, will remain the economic heart of the region Changes in this sub-region will mainly depend upon the speed of Nigeria's recovery, which is based on its ability to settle its internal political tensions (→ 2 2)

The Atlantic countries will have to choose between trading more with the outside world or greater involvement in the regional market which, in the short term, will be more difficult (→ 2 3)

Finally, in order to secure a sustainable future, the large landlocked countries will have to rely on the export of their labor and farm products, within the region (→ 2 4)

The second approach explores ***a number of medium-term scenarios*** *and examines the conditions and implications associated with these scenarios By its nature, this second approach takes account to much a greater degree, of current constraints it is intended to be realistic, even if some of the scenarios described assume a number of deliberate policy decisions*

The current situation and trends (as opposed to the long term image), suggest three broad scenarios for the ten years ahead (1) the continuation of current trends, with greater rent-seeking and, for most countries, lasting recession, (2) the development of economic poles according to liberal conventional strategies for growth and the marginalization of poorer zones which could have a destabilizing impact on the region, or 3) the strengthening of regional dynamics, which is the preferred scenario in the long term, but is premised on a rupture with the past, of which could eventually induce a certain degree of tension in the short-term (→ 2 5)

The long term image proposed by WALTPS is based on the hypothesis of a medium term revival of urban economies and a gradual convergence of West African economies with the "normal behavior observed in the rest of the world Although regional trade is likely to expand rapidly, international trade will continue to dominate and the need to import for domestic consumption will compete with investment The image suggests that the recession may come to an end during the next ten years and substantial growth may well be possible once again

Based on the foreseeable changes in settlement patterns and in the economies of West Africa, and the responses to these changes highlighted in the retrospective study, the WALTPS has outlined a vision for the region for the year 2020

Major changes in West African societies between 1990 and 2020

■ West Africa's urban population will grow at an average annual rate of 4 2% between 1990 and 2020, compared with a rate of 6 3% between 1960 and 1990 This will result in a total urban population 3 5 times greater than the present one and an increase in the urban ratio from 40% to 63% The rural population will increase at a rate of 1 0% a year and the total rural population will increase by 40% Migration within the region will remain strong

■ The number of wage-earners in the modern sector will increase at a slower rate than the urban population, the proportion of the population in the non-farming sector employed in the modern sector therefore will continue to decline, from one-third today to one-quarter in 2020

■ This implies growth of some 5 % a year for the informal sector, will thus absorb over 50% of the total population increase The informal sector will become more differentiated the first generation of micro-entrepreneurs from the countryside will be gradually replaced by a second generation of "intermediate developers" born in the towns (like most town-dwellers by then), with a minimum of capital and an "urban culture" This "intermediate sector" gradually will become the source of home-grown development in manufacturing and services

■ Continued urban growth will stimulate growth in food-crop production, which will be increasingly oriented to the market and characterized by revenue increases that will be used for investment This phenomenon which will clearly affect areas with more than 50% urban dwellers will concern only a limited number of farmers Nonetheless, it is a trend that will be evident to differing degrees in much of the region

■ Social inequalities will increase In rural areas, a small number of dynamic farmers will produce a great proportion of the surpluses for the regional market These entrepreneurs will organize themselves to defend their economic interests and become increasingly involved in managing decentralized villages and small towns In town, the appearance of a class of entrepreneurs from the informal sector will break up the present dichotomy in urban society of two major categories, the modern and informal A social continuum with a wide range of diversified activities and incomes will emerge

The main outline of the economic image

In light of past experiences, these hypotheses are plausible if deliberately optimistic They were used to produce a long term projection (2020) Added to these were a set of complementary hypothesis on changes in international trade WALTPS assumes growth of 3% a year for farm exports and 4% for oil and other energy exports Other exports will increase in line with population growth in the urban modern sector It is assumed that by 2020 the region will have a "normal" trading behavior

This economic projection of West Africa was built on the social accounting matrix for 1990, chosen as the base year (→1 4)

■ Gross regional product (GRP) will quadruple, from \$130 to \$510 billion (average growth rate 4 6%, one point higher than in 1960-90) Per capita GRP will be a little under \$1,200 in 2020, an increase of 75% since 1990, or an average increase of 1 9% per year

■ The agricultural sector will produce 14% of GRP and will account for 40% of the total population The agricultural value added will grow at an overall average rate of 3 2% 3 1% for products for the domestic market, 2 6% for products exported to the world market and 8 2% for products for the regional market The regional market will absorb 6% of total agricultural output Average agricultural productivity per farmer will increase by 85% compared with 1990 and average marketed output will increase 2 4 times

■ Some 25 million farmers (15% of the total) will produce enough for 40% of the region's consumers or 100 million people Their productivity will reach five times the self-sufficiency level, while the average productivity of the other 150 million farmers will differ little from the present regional average - which is at two times the self-sufficiency level

■ The informal and intermediate sector will absorb 60% of the total population increase In 2020, it will employ 44% of the total population and produce 23% of GRP Average productivity in this sector, part of which will become the intermediate sector, is $600 and the ratio of informal sector productivity to agricultural productivity will fall to 1 5, and be even less in the most urbanized countries where the rate of migration to towns will decline sharply

■ The non farm modern sector will account for 15% of total population and, as in 1990, 63% of GRP

■ Towns will produce 82% of GRP, compared with 66% in 1990 Per capita GRP will increase by 40% in both rural and urban areas, with the urban to rural ratio of productivity remaining virtually constant at 3 3 In 2020 per capita GRP in towns will regain the historic value attained in 1980

■ Economic growth will be faster in Nigeria (per capita average 2 1%) than in the rest of the region (1 6%) This is due to its exceptional resource base and its economic structure

■ According to this image, intra regional and overseas trade, will achieve a ratio of openness (imports plus exports over GRP) of 39%, close to the 1990 figure But the region's openness to the rest of the world will fall from 36% in 1990 to 30% in 2020 The difference is explained by intra-regional trade, which will make up 22% of these countries' total imports, compared with 9% in 1990 The imported share of countries' food demand will increase from 11% in 1990 to 15% in 2020, but intra-regional trade will account for nearly half of these imports compared with only 14% in 1990 For this to happen, average growth in intra-regional food trade will need to be around 9% a year for thirty years But even allowing for this possibility, intra-regional trade will still only provide 7% of the region's food supply Nigeria, which has an overall trade surplus with the rest of the region, will be a net food importer

Medium-term image for 2005

In the second phase, an intermediate image for 2005 was sketched This allowed two stages to be distinguished in the next thirty years the end of the recession (1990-2005) and a sustained period of growth (from 2005 onwards)

According to this image, the average growth rate of GRP over the period 1990-2005 will be lower than for the rest of the period, (on the order of 4 1% a year) but higher than that for the total population Nigeria will achieve a GDP growth rate of 5 0% after the severe recession of 1980-90, while the rest of the region will grow at 3 8% The continued, albeit slower, division of labor between urban and rural areas will contribute to the development of domestic and regional markets Intra-regional trade will begin to take off, but at a modest level (only twice that of 1990)

The profound changes in settlement patterns and economies that began with independence will be at an advanced stage, the 1980-90 recession will have been overcome, and faster growth will now begin on a healthier footing The long-range image described above can be reached by 2020 if the average regional growth rate is 5% The regional economy's accelerated growth will still depend to some extent on transfers and trade with the rest of the world, but it will be increasingly aided by greater intra-regional trade, which will grow at 10% a year between 2005 and 2020



Per capita GDP remains stable throughout the period in each sector, while the relative importance of each sector changes Only when sectoral redistribution is complete can faster growth be expected in each sector

Note the pattern of urban per capita GDP which testifies to the increasingly informal nature of towns

2 2 THE COUNTRIES OF THE GULF OF GUINEA AROUND NIGERIA THE HEART OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMY

The group of countries along the Gulf of Guinea from Abidjan to Yaounde constitute a narrow strip of economic activity along the coast, that accounts for over 80% of regional GRP This strip is the essence of the regional market and represents the greatest potential for regional trade At its center lies Nigeria, which alone produces 50% of West African GRP and possesses enough mineral wealth to ensure its long term prosperity Nigeria is truly the heart of the regional economy Nonetheless it needs to solve its internal political differences

Nigeria is indisputably a giant in West Africa on a number of different scores In 1990 it had half of West Africa's population, massive oil and natural gas reserves, an urban population that accounted for 49% of its total population (above the regional average), 80% of the region's university level graduates and a dense high-quality infrastructure It is one of the few African countries that "counts" in its own right on the international scene It is often compared to South Africa in its role as a regional pole of development and has been a net contributer to the financial markets for more than 20 years

Nigeria, a precursor?

Nigeria's population structure, (density, level of urbanization) is about thirty years "ahead" of the rest of West Africa On a certain number of phenomena associated with settlement patterns, Nigeria can be considered a fore runner a great natural laboratory This applies to intensified agriculture Kano, a town with over one million inhabitants in a semi arid climate Its rural hinterland has, for several decades, reached its "natural" carrying capacity Nevertheless, the region has succeeded in being self sufficient This clearly is a message of hope for other Sahelian cities The Igbo area has followed suit in the form of an industrial take off However, in Nigeria, potential problems which could affect the rest of the region are brewing The fight for power among different groups and the fractures in society as a result of these fights could also occur elsewhere in West Africa

Like other West African countries, Nigeria has developed grand industrial projects, a number of which have failed Because of its oil earnings, it has probably spent more on such projects than other countries have The result is high quality infrastructure (a far denser road and highway network than anywhere else in the region) but few viable industries Naudet (1993) quotes sources claiming that the country's capacity utilization rate is between 20% and 25%

Despite the failure of modern industry, however, small manufacturing industries are springing up, especially in the densely populated areas of the Igbo lands spare parts, textiles, pharmaceuticals, etc This may be the start of the intermediate sector, the "bottom-up" industrialization so eagerly awaited throughout the region (see box p 53)

In fact, Nigeria has almost everything it needs to make it one of the first African countries to achieve an economic growth spurt on its own The only issue weighing heavily on the horizon, is the governance, or even governability, of the country This will certainly be the decisive issue for the future of Nigeria and of West Africa as a whole

The international community and Nigeria's neigh bors can only stand back and attempt to predict the country's internal changes, for it would be difficult and risky to exercise any influence from the outside on the political changes that are currently underway



Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon dynamic economies whose development depends on trends in the Nigerian market

Three other West African countries with relatively large economies (where GDP is greater than 7% of the regional total) are also located on the Gulf of Guinea Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Cameroon Together with Nigeria they account for 78% of GRP They have few mineral resources and have based their economies primarily on agricultural commodity exports (although Cameroon has had a mixed agriculture-industry strategy) Though export earnings have been lower than Nigeria's,

A politically fragile structure

In the 1950s, many representatives of the ethnic minorities complained before the Willinks Commission (established by the British authorities to look into the fears of ethnic minorities prior to Independence) that the Hausa/Fulani were contemptuous of them and called them "arna", meaning pagan or infidel These groups were worried about the implications of Independence because during the colonial period, to quote Mahadi and Mangvat, 1986 "The British embarked on a policy of imposing "alien" Moslem district heads on communities that had never been conquered and incorporated into the Sokoto Caliphate"

Thus there is a latent feeling of unfair domination among the groups that believe "alien Muslim rulers" have been imposed up on them these groups formed the Northern Nigerian Non Muslim League which later evolved into a political party the United Middle Belt Congress, an instrument conceived to counter the Northern People's Congress which is the party of the Hausa/Fulani autocratic class Over the past few decades a significant number of elites from these minority groups, have been exposed to western education, risen to the top of the army hierarchy and public service, become affluent and are becoming problematic The result is a multiplication of confrontations in a contest in which the religious idiom has been politicized to such an extent that the stakes have become the survival of the Nigerian State itself

Ibrahim Jibrin Population Dynamics and Socio Political Process in Northern Nigeria, WALTPS 1993

less has been wasted on poor investment and so the wealth generated has been enough to cope successfully with the internal tensions of societies in transition When commodity prices fell, and with them the State's ability to redistribute export earnings, inherent weaknesses in these societies became apparent and regionalism and other tensions have grown rapidly

The strategies these countries adopt will be influenced by trends in commodity prices and by opportunities to diversify their economies Diversification will heavily depend upon what happens in Nigeria Pending economic recovery after the current recession, the Federation will certainly become a major customer for these countries given that its market is so large and so near But if Nigeria enters a prolonged period of stagnation or deep recession, it will be harder for these countries to diversify They will have no other option but to rely on the world market for trade

Benin and Togo eager for regional trade

Compared with their neighbors, Benin and Togo are small countries with small populations concentrated along the coast They have played a number of roles in the course of their history, acting as transport corridors for farm exports in colonial times (Igue, 1993), a free-trade zone (Togo), a or warehouse-state (Benin) The small size of these countries limits their perspectives for endogenous development (because their domestic markets are so small) and reduces major infrastructure and territorial management problems Their most noteworthy characteristic, compared with large countries, is their flexibility and ability to adapt The health of these small countries' economies will depend on making the most of this flexibility as well as on their regional environment

Should regional trade take off, Benin and Togo could act as intermediaries for the four larger countries in the Gulf of Guinea that will be trading the most Otherwise they will be obliged to find other economic activities linked directly to the world market, an activity which will prove much harder for them

1990 DATA	TOTAL POPULATION millions	(% of region)	URBAN RATIO	GDP (% of region)	per capita GDP ($)	per capita aid ($)
COTE D IVOIRE	11 4	(6%)	47%	10%	780	60
GHANA	14 5	(7%)	31%	7%	390	39
TOGO	3 5	(2%)	29%	1%	352	66
BENIN	4 5	(2%)	37%	2%	326	58
NIGERIA	93 5	(48%)	49%	48%	434	3
CAMEROON	11 5	(6%)	39%	13%	964	43
TOTAL	**138 9**	**(71%)**	**45%**	**81%**	**496**	**18**

2 3 THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES
OVERSEAS TRADE OR CLOSER LINKS TO THE REGION?

The countries along the Atlantic coast are quite autonomous relative to the regional market and are much more oriented towards the world market, especially the European one In the last thirty years, this group of countries has stagnated economically, with the Senegalese economy losing steam and the Guinean economy plunged into a lasting crisis There are real opportunities for economic recovery, even though the integration of this area into the regional economy is currently far from certain

Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Cape Verde the challenge of urban employment

The Sahelian countries on the Atlantic coast are small in terms of usable area (Mauritania is mostly desert) They are much more active in international trade, more with distant countries than the rest of the region They receive on average more aid than any other group of countries (more even than the landlocked Sahelian countries, which are poorer), for a mediocre economic performance Their agricultural potential is limited (small in Mauritania, Cape Verde and The Gambia, moderate, but seriously degraded in Senegal) They are slightly more urbanized than the regional average and should in theory become more so in the absence of rural employment opportunities

Economic growth in these countries has occurred largely due to overseas links both during the colonial period, when Dakar was the capital of French West Africa, and since then, with extensive aid and high levels of international emigration This subregion has a mediocre farm potential and will probably never be able to support a large rural population Even if towns become intrinsically less attractive, there is a strong possibility that migration from the countryside will continue as a result of the rural areas becoming increasingly more saturated



The major problem therefore, is to create enough urban employment The relative proximity of the European market may be one way forward for countries that are situated far away from the heart of the West African market

This subregion depends heavily on its ability to diversify its sources of income, on finding destinations for its migrants and on international transfers Its agriculture is poor and it is even less able than other subregions to cope with long term population growth All of this make it probably one of the most fragile regions in West Africa, with little room to maneuver on the development path

The coastal Sahelian countries import an abnormally high proportion of their food

A global model was constructed to correlate food imports with structural features (population per capita GDP urban ratio) The graph shows the ratio of actual imports to the level predicted by the model West African countries are generally less open to imports than expected with the exception of coastal Sahelian countries which import an abnormally high proportion of their food



Forest countries of the Atlantic coast great uncertainties despite real economic potential

These countries have had three decades of successive, serious political crises, from Sékou Toure's dictatorship in Guinea to war in Liberia, not to mention countless *coups d'etat* These crises have been sufficiently destructive to impede economic growth and population movement (except, perhaps, in Sierra Leone) Despite the subregion's large mineral wealth and great agricultural potential, it has remained poor, its per capita GDP is higher only than the landlocked Sahelian countries and its urban growth has been slow with an urbanization rate below 30% in each country

These countries have real potential because of their abundant natural resources However, poor governance, which can only be improved gradually and over time, might prevent them from making proper use of these resources in the foreseeable future specially as far as mining resources are concerned, as these can be exploited with only a minimum state of law by "off-shore" governments

In the long term, this group of countries may develop in any number of ways It may gradually link up, via Côte d'Ivoire, with the heart of the regional economy Alternatively, it may join the coastal Sahelian countries and turn increasingly to overseas trade, or, it may turn in on itself and perpetuate the succession of past crises

The role of Guinea will probably be decisive, but it is still too soon to judge what shape its recovery will take

Guinea's "wasted years"

Guinea possesses one third of the world's known reserves of bauxite, major deposits of gold, diamonds and off shore oil, and considerable agricultural potential However, developing this potential was long handicapped by the economic policies of the Sékou Touré years, 1958 84 Farmers in Guinea were faced with state run production systems, fixed prices, a state monopoly in input supply and marketing, and an overvalued currency They gradually lost all incentive to produce export crops although originally these were highly profitable Banana exports fell from 100,000 tons to almost nothing, and coffee exports shrank by more than 80% Pineapple production, 25,000 tons in the early 1960s, was halved by 1970, with similar trends for cocoa and groundnuts

By the early 1970s, Guinea's foreign trade was totally dependent on exports of bauxite and alumina trihydrate since diamond mining had stopped With the great volatility of world bauxite prices, a latent foreign exchange crisis erupted Despite reduced food imports, farmers marketed less of their output, the increased incentive to produce was more than outweighed by poor roads and a lack of goods to buy Economic recession combined with political repression drove people out of the country in huge numbers The last ten years have not been enough for Guinea to return to the path of development And yet, in the days before independence, its future looked brighter than that of the Ivory Coast

1990 DATA	total population millions	(% of region)	urban ratio	GDP (% of region)	per capita GDP ($)	per capita aid ($)
MAURITANIA	2 0	(1%)	42%	0%	466	120
SENEGAL	7 3	(4%)	43%	5%	598	112
GAMBIA	0 9	(0%)	32%	0%	288	108
CAPE VERDE	0 3	(0%)	32%	0%	528	328
GUINEA BISSAU	1 0	(0%)	26%	0%	172	144
GUINEA	5 3	(3%)	28%	2%	248	54
SIERRA LEONE	3 7	(2 %)	30%	1%	256	21
LIBERIA	2 6	(1 %)	26%	1%	182	43
TOTAL	**23 1**	**(12%)**	**34%**	**10%**	**373**	**81**

2 4 THE LARGE LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES LIMITED ROOM TO MANEUVER AND AN UNAVOIDABLE REGIONAL FUTURE

The large landlocked countries of the Sahel suffer from a number of handicaps in addition to being landlocked, they are vast and sparsely populated territories, suffering from major environmental problems These countries should deliberately encourage migration and continue to play their traditional role of exporting labor to the rest of West Africa They should also support the agricultural and the food sectors in which they have certain comparative advantages

The large landlocked countries are mostly in the Sahel These countries are characterized by a highly variable climate to which they are all the more sensitive since their populations remain, for the most part, rural The urbanization ratio for this subregion is only 22% These are the most deprived countries in the region They have a per capita GDP of half the regional average

These countries have a long history of massive out-migration Their future will continue to depend upon the capacity of coastal and other more distant countries to absorb these migrants

The Sahelian countries are obliged to seek a balance between two changing parameters which are beyond their control

- On the one hand, there are climatic and environmental changes which determine the ability of these largely subsistence farming communities to feed and employ their population

- On the other hand, there is a fluctuating demand for migrant labor in the coastal countries which, if it is sufficiently large will drain off the surplus population and generate sizeable remittances to be transferred to the poorest areas

Development could be relatively balanced if both parameters (agriculture and migration) evolve positively Conversely, if both decline, then it is more than likely that the Sahelian countries will fall into a recession

Between these exogenously determined parameters, the room for maneuver for Sahelian societies is slight it will depend upon the urban economies and the buoyancy of the cotton-growing areas, which are the only ones safe from drought In any case, farming will continue to play a crucial role in these countries in terms of production and as a means of temporarily retaining the population surplus

These landlocked countries suffer from one more handicap their size Except for Burkina Faso, they are large (in terms of area) and heterogenous This makes it difficult to equip them with infrastructure and to govern them A delicate balance must be struck between the provinces of the south and those of the north The southern provinces, rich thanks to their export earnings, must at all cost export to the region's coastal markets These provinces are in direct competition

Mali regional emigration and agro food sector development

"The remittances resulting from out migration have long been an important source of income for food security and investment Economic recovery in the Ivory Coast and the opportunity to return to rapid growth in Nigeria, make it likely that there will be a greater demand for labor in both countries However, as Malian migrants integrate into their new countries, there may well be a gradual decline in their remittances sent home

In the long term, job creation in Mali should therefore be a priority There is a limit however to the number of employees in the national labor market the mining sector can absorb Compared to the coastal countries, industrialization faces structural handicaps

The main sustainable alternative is the development of the food sector, based on exploiting those products in which Mali has a comparative advantage These are livestock, cereals, fruit and vegetables, which have remained competitive despite the overvaluation of the CFA franc Exports of these products to the other countries in the region provided nearly two thirds of export earnings in 1990 Since devaluation, their competitiveness has improved

Over time, the main challenge will be to export less in the raw state and more processed products with higher value added The markets exist cereal bran based animal feed, where demand in Senegal and Mauritania is estimated at some 100,000 tons a year, of which only half is supplied, maize based poultry feed meat rather than livestock exports, etc But first the obstacles to farm development must be removed and conditions created to maintain competitiveness "

Mali case study synthesis 1994 M Deme WALTPS with the northern zones of these coastal countries To compete effectively they will have to mobilize all their resources so as to ensure the necessary increases in productivity The northern provinces of the north are usually more densely populated and house the groups that were once dominant These provinces are not particularly aware of the challenges involved and yet claim a greater distribution of the national wealth

The difficulties in managing these diverse interests are likely to lead to increased separatist sentiments in the near future in the north (as is already the case in several Sahelian countries), but also eventually in the south

1990 DATA	total population millions (% of region)		urban ratio	GDP (% of region)	per capita GDP ($)	per capita aid ($)
MALI	8 2	(4%)	22%	2%	238	61
BURKINA FASO	8 7	(4%)	22%	2%	232	38
NIGER	7 7	(4%)	16%	3%	280	49
CHAD	5 5	(3%)	24%	1%	166	60
CENTR AFR REP	2 4	(1%)	41%	1%	354	100
TOTAL	**32 4**	**(17%)**	**22%**	**9%**	**243**	**55**

How can Niger cope with Nigeria's influence?

In light of the country's current crisis, the medium term challenges for the Niger economy appear clearly Can the State accumulate enough revenues to maintain essential functions such as health, education and control of the territory? And can its production system, primarily the remnants of the modern manufacturing sector and most of the craft sector, which employs many people, even hope to survive?

These issues depend heavily on the development of trade with Nigeria Trade will continue regardless of the two countries' official policies, and state strategies will be supported or evaded depending on whether they are favorable or hostile The recent structural adjustment program introduced in Niamey, which ignores the economic influence of Nigeria, provides little hope that the authorities are able to integrate the essential role of their huge southern neighbor into the management of Niger CFA devaluation and the new Nigerian exchange controls have not altered the basic cause of regional monetary distortions, where a convertible currency (the CFA franc) and an unconvertible one (the naira), co exist side by side It may be feared that even more Nigerian products than in the past will enter the Niger market They may replace products imported from world markets, which are now too expensive Only Niger's agro pastoral products, such as livestock and cowpeas, may increase their market share in Nigeria

It is hard to imagine that, in the future, Niger could exist outside a regional area that includes both the other CFA countries and Nigeria The seriousness of Niger's problems should prompt its authorities to prepare and accelerate the process of integration rather than wait for it, especially with Nigeria This could be done by far greater bilateral cooperation in joint projects and, above all, trade policy

It is not unrealistic to hope that the two states could quickly begin negotiations to open up the Federation's market to Niger's agro pastoral products What would Nigeria get out of it? Its small neighbor, with its close social links with the north of Nigeria, would maintain a "minimal State", without which there could be political instability Possible political contagion would thus be avoided

After L Bossard, 'Nigeria and perspectives for its integration into West Africa", Club of Sahel and Solagral, 1994

The next decade is largely conditioned by the dynamics already underway, it is with this time horizon in mind that the actions to be taken today and associated ones in the future, need to be determined The three scenarios sketched below for the year 2020, are meant to be thought provoking These scenarios do not cover all the range of possibilities, nor are they mutually exclusive

Analysis of the major mechanisms underlying change in West Africa and of the predictable developments in the international environment indicates three possible paths in the medium term (ten years) The table below summarizes these scenarios

The continuation of past trends, or the "dead end" of overseas trade without diversification

The first scenario extrapolates from past trends Overseas trade continues to predominate and West African societies are organized to maximize earnings from it Major cities expand rapidly as export earnings are diverted into the consumption of cheap imports Governments share this trading mentality

Nigeria, which possesses the most abundant natural resources in the region, greatly increases its leverage within the region As traditional export earnings dry up in some countries, illicit, yet more profitable trade in drugs and forgeries for example, could gradually develop

In this scenario, the coastal zones develop the most rapidly while the hinterlands produce no exports and are neglected The Sahelian countries in particular could well enter a difficult phase

In order to limit risks to the developed world (emigration, drugs, pollution and ecological disasters), aid agencies restrict themselves to a limited development management role and provide humanitarian support for the worst-hit areas This *laissez faire* scenario runs the serious risk of social, political and economic breakdown (weakened and perverted States, rapidly growing inequality and social unrest) This scenario would also entail a crash-course in self-reliance for African countries as they learn to live off expedients rather than aid, as well as to cope with insecurity This is an untrammeled free-market scenario

A strategy of orthodox growth free enterprise and good governance, which proves successful for well placed countries

The second scenario is a scenario of orthodox free market development based on the rational exploitation of comparative advantage and the gradual formation of new competitive sectors outside the primary commodity sector Output expands, but only slowly in unprotected sectors despite an active monetary policy Private investment (domestic and foreign) gradually reappears as the business climate improves

The emergence of growth poles depends not only on making best use of potential but also on a process of profound structural change separation of market and State, reform of the State and improved governance These are the characteristics that distinguish Scenario 2 from Scenario 1 This orthodox approach enables the countries that embrace it to receive the ongoing support of the international community This support is used to maintain an acceptable level of activity in towns while competitiveness improves The quality of services, particularly the social ones improves with the "reform of the State"

However, some countries are unable, because of political reasons or the lack of natural resources to enter this take off phase of growth, and continue to stagnate exerting great migratory pressure on the dynamic poles These countries are tempted by the opportunistic route and threaten the self discipline of the poles by importing cheap second rate products into the regional markets

Regional integration as a prerequisite for sustainable growth

Scenario 3 is ambitious the creation of a wide regional entity for rather modest ends an economic learning period for small and medium sized agricultural and handicrafts enterprises, that are learning to compete in a regional market managed collectively by member countries

The duality of this development is on the surface contradictory The first effect of setting up a regional market would be the reduction of major trade flows, either because some sectors would be protected or because opportunistic border-trade would be gradually reduced Intra-regional trade is likely to decline at first as local output gradually expands The first development objective is thus at the local rather than the regional level

The same holds true for migration Although regional integration seems to be an open invitation to extensive migration, local development opportunities are likely to keep people where they are

This inward oriented scenario underscores the importance of geographical distance, since long distance trade is, either directly or indirectly, linked to international trade

Although Scenario 3 is one of deliberate, radical reform, there is little chance of a noticeable rise in living standards in the near future As economic rents diminish and protectionism generates price increases, the trend is initially, rather towards recession Local production will only develop over the long run and initially at low levels of productivity The regional market will be "won" at first with very simple products, which will replace more attractive imported goods

Medium sized companies and the opportunities to export consumer products will first appear within and among the economic pole countries in West Africa A period of adjustment will be necessary Corrective mechanisms aimed at removing any existing handicaps should also encourage investment in the peripheral areas, further encouraging regional competition

This "modest" scenario is the only one that suggests a truly regional pattern of growth and seeks to avoid excessive tensions within the region that could become violent

	Scenario 1 Extraversion and rent-seeking	Scenario 2 Orthodox growth in the poles	Scenario 3 Regional integration
Growth strategies	Excessive seeking of international rents, including illicit ones	Orthodox liberal growth strategy in the poles and stagnation in peripheral areas	Priority given to the integration of the regional market
State and social change	Private trading mentality, even within the State	Separation and cooperation between market and State	Social and political progress, developing regional solidarity
Currency	Maximizing the opportunities provided by separate currencies	Monetary independence to develop international competitiveness	Greater compatibility between regional currencies
Strategy of the international community	Resignation and *laissez faire*, security and a minimum level of humanitarian activities	Keynesian adjustment and increased conditionality	Long term commitment and development of regional tools

CHAPTER THREE

CURRENT CHALLENGES

Far behind the rest of the world, West African society is experiencing the basic changes that will lead it to its own economic and political modernity This reshaping of society is occurring at great speed and at a time when the international environment is not particularly favorable These changes induce imbalances and tensions whose excesses and unintended effects need to be limited without losing the momentum of change

Flexibility and adaptability in West African societies need to be encouraged to meet this challenge and there are many ways of doing just this WALTPS underlines the importance of reflecting on long-term development strategies while at the same time taking immediate action

The study underlines the need to concentrate a major effort on education and training, which are factors of development and of social integration (→ 3 1)

The study also stresses the need to develop analytical tools (especially macro-economic ones) that take into account individuals and geographic diversity (→ 3 2)

With regard to economic policies, priority must be given to the creation of an environment conducive to the development of a more competitive urban economy and a more autonomous management of urban areas, as well as encouraging rural businesses (→ 3 3 and 3 4)

Land management and decentralization are further essential aspects necessary for civil society to show responsibility towards its environment (→ 3 5 and 3 6)

In addition, the freedom of movement of people and the development of the regional market for goods and services are two essential axes to encourage learning about competition, compensate for a probable lack of foreign currency and optimize growth (→ 3 7 and 3 8)

Finally, the study underlines the necessity for West African States and their partners to seriously reflect upon the need to mobilize substantial financial resources over the next few decades resources which West Africa seriously needs (3 9 and 3 10)

3 1 EDUCATING YOUNG PEOPLE AND INTEGRATING THEM INTO SOCIETY

The education of Africans lags far behind other developing countries The situation is growing worse as people in much of West Africa lose faith in the state school system With nearly 50% of the population under the age of 15, education should receive much more attention Education develops economic performance integrates young people and transmits new values The rehabilitation of the school system is therefore a major task of utmost urgency, but one that will be particularly hard to achieve

The absence of collective references (or too many, which amounts to almost the same thing) in West African societies is evidence of ineffective attempts at integration over the last thirty years

In this context, education is at the top of the list of the integration attempts that have failed Education is supposed to convey collective values, and is thereby an element of national integration It is also supposed to convey knowledge, and thereby the capacity for innovation and progress It has fulfilled neither of these objectives in the last thirty years

The results are disappointing primary school enrollment is 72% for West Africa as a whole and has apparently fallen since 1980 in 7 of the region's 19 countries Secondary school enrollment varies from 7% to 38% depending on the country, but exceeds 20% in only five of them Students in tertiary education numbered only 406,000 in the whole region in 1990, two-thirds of whom were in Nigeria

In a region characterized by very low average age, the inadequacy of education is a very serious threat to long-term development, weakening national cohesion and the ability of production systems to develop at a rate that is consistent with population growth and international competition

West African education suffers from many ills, generally more evident in French speaking than English speaking countries

- high unit costs, even at the primary level from 0 05 of per capita GDP per primary pupil in Ghana to 0 25 in Mali, from 2 5 of per capita GDP per secondary pupil in Ghana to 11 times in Burkina Faso On average, education costs amount to 3-4% of GNP and are roughly equal to 20% of national budgets

- uneven allocation of resources, with tertiary education favored over basic learning and technical training In Burkina Faso, 30% of the education budget is allocated to grants to students abroad,

- virtually non-existent operating budgets with the bulk of current expenditure allocated to teachers' salaries



Illiteracy rate among those over15
(as % of population)

Seven countries regressed in 1980 90 Nigeria Ghana Cote d Ivoire C A R Guinea Bissau Sierra Leone and Mali

Aid has not compensated for this bias, rather the reverse Although education accounts for 5 6% of total aid, of that amount only 5% was allocated to primary education while 40% was allocated to tertiary education

Education should be a high priority in the future

This will be very expensive R Pons estimates that it would require 7 8% of annual gross regional product and two and a half million teachers,

*Gross primary school attendance rate**



* Enrollment is the ratio of the number of children attending school to the number of children in that age cohort

two-thirds of them in primary schools, to achieve even modest objectives, *inter alia*, a lower illiteracy rate, an increase in primary enrollment from 60 to 80%, an increase in secondary enrollment from 15 to 30% and stable levels in tertiary education

Preparing West Africans for socioeconomic change

Such an effort is only possible if the role of education in society changes radically Education has long been viewed, especially in the French speaking countries, as the best means to gain access to the modern sector but no more than that It is not surprising, therefore, that the current recession in the modern sector is leading to a fall in state school enrollment This would also explain why the main opponents of the State are students who had hoped to become part of the system and are instead seeing the door slam in their faces The renewal of the education system in West Africa and its long-term success will depend on the ability to provide a broad and basic education program that meets the community's expectations It is all the more difficult given that education must also prepare students for university-level studies Meeting this demand is imperative if West Africa is to have the scientific and tech-nical manpower necessary to meet the challenges of the future

Only if primary education is successfully decentralized and the users of it are more in control of the services offered, will West Africa be able to satisfy the educational needs of the region on a large scale

Better circulation of information and knowledge within society

The domain of knowledge extends beyond the education system It concerns learning, the exchange of ideas and experiences (within and outside the region) and information Needs in this area are enormous For communications within and outside the region, there will need to be significant investments made in communication infrastructure The current stock of communication and knowledge-sharing tools -- telephones, computers, databases, technical publications, research budgets -- gives and idea of the size of the task West Africa lags further behind in this area than it does in its economic performance

The relatively small number of users of modern means of communication in the modern sector and the emerging intermediate sectors, suggest that there is little hope of these sectors actually financing this expensive communication infrastructure despite the fact that this is a key element affecting their ability to compete It is in this area that foreign donors could contribute - an area in which they hold significant technological advances

3 2 PRODUCING AND CIRCULATING INFORMATION MORE APPROPRIATE TO WEST AFRICAN ISSUES

West African societies are still at the stage in which the daily survival of people accounts for a large part of human activity and of the economy If policy makers are to support these societies as they change, they must have regular information on the behavior, numbers and movements of social groups Existing statistical systems cannot provide them with this information

Population censuses need to be revised with a view to simplifying and increasing the number of times they are carried out Better coverage of economic and geographical topics, in general, should be systematically improved

Demographic censuses -- less unwieldy, more frequent

This is certainly the case for population censuses The present frequency of censuses (every 15 years on average) is unsuited to countries with rapidly shifting populations Carrying out a survey every 5 years should be the aim, even if this means simplifying every other census i e targeting a few variables that are particularly sensitive

The processing, presentation and publication of census results should be adapted to policy-makers' needs

- provisional results should be published more quickly, preferably as computer files,

- census maps should always be published, preferably as files that can be directly used on Geographic Information Systems (GIS)

The results should be checked both nationally and regionally by

- systematically checking the consistency of national results within the region (to avoid for example, double counting of migrants, which is at present common),

- checking for consistency in the distribution of population by type of activity (farming, non-farming) and by size of town or village,

- standardizing procedures for counting the urban population and various aggregates and ratios

A regional inter-governmental organization could be given the task, together with the specialized institutions of the United Nations, of monitoring, critically analyzing, archiving and publishing demographic databases for West African countries The WALTPS provisional database could be a starting-point

Better knowledge of the grassroots economy with budget consumption surveys

With consumption data for various social groups, WALTPS used a demo-economic accounting framework and a method to produce accounts of the "real" economy that reflect the way people actually live Although there is no question of substituting these "demo-economic" accounts for the standard national accounts, this approach could be used to check the consistency and plausibility of official statistics, production statistics, and consumption data on all non-tradable goods and services, which are poorly measured by official accounts

> ***Economy, space and population the WALTPS database***
>
> *The WALTPS research focussed on individuals and space, and consequently produced a large database of spatialized data on the West African population For each of the nineteen countries studied, population changes from 1960 to 1990 were reconstructed for the smallest possible administrative units, and projections were made Further data on infrastructure, agricultural output and the economy were collected, to aid the understanding of the motivations for, and consequences of, changes in settlement patterns*
>
> *For more detail, see working document n° 1 Description of settlement patterns in West Africa commentary on the database B Kalasa*

Given their importance in national economic accounts, the current state of knowledge of household budgets is quite unsatisfactory Budget-consumption surveys are ill-suited to the real socioeconomic situation of West African countries and permanent survey programs are generally too sophisticated and expensive for the results obtained

There again, budget-consumption surveys should be designed to be of direct use to officials dealing with national accounts, which is not currently the case In order to achieve this, surveys must provide regular and reliable answers to simple questions, such as major items of expenditure (food, housing, clothes, transport), taxes and transfers, the distribution of income and expenditure They must allow for quite different population groups urban and rural, modern and informal as well as geographical variations

Finally, the income distributions revealed by conventional budget-consumption surveys are only partial They provide no information about households with a high standard of living, (i e with 5-10 times average income) foreigners and local elites It is essential to understand the behavior of these households in terms of income and expenditure, for two reasons, because of the specific structure and the size of their income (investments, transfers, levies) and expenditures, and because of the particular ways in which these households adapt to changes in the economic cycle

To supplement the results of budget-consumption surveys, appropriate methods should be devised for investigating and cross-checking specific groups

Monitoring the local and urban economy

Although currently a number of West African countries are engaged in decentralization, the quality of information on the local economy is inadequate for good management While data on the macro-economic sectors are subject to caution, the distribution of such data within the region is completely unknown Very few urban or rural authorities possess even approximate information about the economic and financial flows that affect them Few of them even possess updated maps of their areas

Responsive management of urban development requires information systems on demographic, economic and social variables and spatialized planning tools that are more factual and explicit than what is now available The spatialized economic database and maps produced for WALTPS could be the starting-point for producing monitoring tools for the local economy These tools would make it possible for urban officials not only to respond better to the needs and potential of the local economy, but also to assess more accurately the actual tax-paying ability of their local citizens as well as those rural households and businesses that benefit from urban services

Making economic information more readily accessible

Apart from the necessary changes in the type of information collected, the distribution of this information and the appropriate tools for its interpretation for daily management needs and policy design and development, needs to be improved In general, West Africa needs to decentralize knowledge and information networks

Public expenditure and development funds as well

Public expenditure and development projects should not escape scrutiny They should be accurately recorded Spatial references are obviously necessary for ex-post project evaluation and discussion of policies on de concentration, decentralization, spatial distribution of public expenditure, mobilization of local resources, in other words, land management

More reliable information on the geography of development projects would make it easier to understand how success depends on the choice of site, features of the local environment, spatial consistency between various projects and local support measures Ex ante and ex-post cost benefit analysis of projects should include the structural changes caused by the projects in the local economy, e g the impact of project expenditures at the local and national level, the use of the income produced, the secondary effects on the local economy and on its trade patterns with the rest of the country

This requires that education systems, at the primary level and at the technical and professional training levels be strengthened so that information can be used to full capacity In spite of this change it would then follow that the regional centers of training and multi-disciplinary research be developed and revitalized

But above all, information must not just serve a few macro-economic policy-makers, however enlightened they might be, in the future it must give every citizen the possibility to grasp not only the changes that are occurring but also the issues of the future, thus enabling him/her to adopt a realistic strategy

Until now, West African towns have achieved prosperity and growth mainly by circulating external wealth the taxation of commodity export earnings and foreign aid flows Rapid urbanization, the collapse of commodity prices, and the emergence of competition have pushed this system to its limits The future of urban economies lies in the increased mobilization of their own resources This challenge must be taken up if West Africa is to meet the consequences of what will probably amount to a trebling of its urban population

Economic expansion in towns (and the growth of urban employment) is at the heart of long-term development in West Africa

Growth and diversification of urban activities are necessary conditions for combatting poverty and maintaining social cohesion They also provide the basis for the division of labor, and the eventual modernization of the economy

Growth in urban production is both indispensable and possible

In the past, the urban economy managed to house and employ an increasing proportion of the population but was heavily dependent on external income in order to do so This was to the detriment of more directly productive investment The development of international competition over the last ten years, has cruelly revealed the serious lack of competitiveness of most urban activities

In the future, conditions for urban development will be very different, commodity prices will probably not rise, while the saturation of natural resources and the necessity to invest more in renewing agricultural fertility will push back the margins of production, the capacity of the rural population to finance urban development should in all event, grow at a slower rate than the urban population

In cities economic competition will increase as a result of growing demand (strongly linked to population growth) and an increasing proportion of the population wishing to join the private commercial sector, as other sources of employment, especially the public sector, show signs of running out of steam Such fierce competition will limit extensive growth in many sectors and regions This type of growth corresponded more to the pioneer phase of booming urban markets In the absence of any alternative, the economy's response to growing competition will likely be an improvement in productivity

Supporting the development of a new kind of firm

In the past decade, small and medium-sized businesses have developed in competition with, or as replacements for, activities in the modern sector This trend is often obscured by the many basic-needs businesses still dominant in the informal sector The trend is particularly evident in construction, services (transport, health care, education, information, etc), wholesaling (cereals, imports, transit) and processing (bakeries, flour-mills, timber, tailoring, etc) However, the development of these firms in activities that are exposed to foreign competition is rare, although some exceptions can be cited in Southeast Nigeria and Ghana These businesses have few official links with the State, even if their activity is sometimes connected with the private strategies of government officials (import and re-export) They are the embryo of what might be called an intermediate sector

Encouraging the development of this intermediate sector and above all, its expansion into unprotected activities or even exports is vital to West Africa's future

The expansion of the intermediate sector will feed off the encounter between the modern and the informal, either within the family, as the children of informal entrepreneurs receive a modern education, or by migration, as emigrants return home to invest Intermediate businesses will take their initial capital, entrepreneurial experience and management methods from the informal sector However, they will not operate outside the official economy, but will take advantage of modern education and use more capital-intensive production technology than informal micro-enterprises They will make a clearer distinction between the finances of the business and that of the household They will differ from the present modern sector by being smaller, having private and domestic capital, using management methods that follow less closely Western models (for example, accounting procedures and labor laws) and by having limited relations with the State

A certain number of actions aimed at supporting expansion, are possible Among them and what undoubtedly is a priority, is professional information at both the regional and national level, on prices, markets and technology It would also be appropriate to give these new entrepreneurs the freedom and the voice necessary to reinforce their professional organizations and their lobbying status with regard to judicial and fiscal reform Finally, reforming the banking system in a way so as to provide incentives to entrepreneurs is a challenge that should not be neglected

Forecasting and supporting the physical development of towns

Up until now, the physical development of West African towns has suffered from a strong duality A small part of the town, usually less than a quarter, has been planned to meet official standards similar to those in developed countries Unable to conform to such standards, the rest of the town has developed on its own, with links to urban services being established *a posteriori*

The long-term image indicates that the urban population is likely to triple, with most of the increase occurring in the informal sector At the same time, the standard of living in towns will remain close to what it is today It may, therefore, be assumed that the standards of use of space and urban services will remain stable

If consumption of urban area per capita stays at around 100 sq m per new urban dweller, nearly two million hectares will be built up in the next thirty years and mainly occupied by low-income households This is the reality that must be acknowledged in infrastructure and urban development policies These policies must be used to orchestrate urban development, rather than attempt to standardize *a posteriori*, and at great expense, districts that have developed unplanned

The size of the task is such that it should be entrusted to the private sector The State should provide the major infrastructure, set standards that are simple and cheap enough to cope with the scale of the challenge, and, if necessary, propose financial systems to mobilize savings for it

A new social contract in towns and cities?

Just as the construction of new urban infrastructure is a major problem for the future, the maintenance of growing towns and cities is greater still

As argued above, wealth-creation in towns, via the recovery of the modern sector and the gradual maturation of informal businesses, is a necessary condition for a recovery in urban growth

One other condition for urban development lies in urban wealth being better used by the authorities, (both national or local) West African towns currently provide 66% of GRP and this share could exceed 80% by 2020 Given their share of national wealth and the accumulation of urban assets, the residents of towns have as yet contributed very little to public revenue, the key to infrastructure investment The budgets of local authorities are derisory compared with the economic value of towns or of urban assets

This poor use of urban income for the maintenance of towns might have been acceptable when the urban population was small and the State had plenty to spend on the public sector, largely in towns Today this is not the case, and a number of West African towns and cities are in an advanced state of dilapidation

One of the major issues for the future is how to best mobilize local resources Simple propositions adapted to the majority of the population in the informal sector, are needed The most relevant measures are probably those related to land or property taxes As many low-income households will find it difficult to help pay for town maintenance, those who cannot afford it should be encouraged to contribute in-kind to community work (street surfacing, drainage ditch clearing, etc)

More generally, public expenditure should be directed, where possible, towards labor-intensive projects in African towns, such as the "AGETIP" projects currently underway in a number of countries The modest earnings distributed by these activities are spent mainly on essential goods, which in turn stimulate the local economy

Having greatly increased the area of land cultivated, farmers now must increase the productivity of that land Population pressure, the quality of natural resources, and accessibility to markets mean that the "potential for intensification" varies greatly from area to another However, market opportunities will be too limited to allow all farmers to become entrepreneurs

Urban demand per farmer is increasing at a rate of 3-5% a year, and satisfying this demand is, in itself, a major challenge for agriculture It underscores the need for increases in productivity similar to those achieved during the Asian "green revolution" Agricultural production must also play an essential role in supplying foreign exchange to the West African economies

West African agriculture faces a double challenge First, higher population densities in rural areas are forcing technical change Production can no longer be increased by extending former systems of production since land is beginning to be saturated Second, the growing influence of the market is forcing a change in the type of crops produced and in the organization of production

These two changes have been observed and described in other parts of the world Each time, the observers have noted thresholds below which change was hard to envisage and above which it rapidly became essential and was actually done The particular feature of West Africa is that the two changes are happening at the same time, rapidly, and in the context of fragile natural resources

Open land extensive development is still the rule

As long as natural resources are available, development is mainly extensive Production is increased by extending the area under cultivation to the detriment of the natural resource base

- When a zone is poorly connected to the market, average area per rural inhabitant remains fairly stable and at a level that is adequate for home-consumption and for the production of a small surplus Little investment is made to renew resources

- When the market strongly influences areas that are still sparsely populated (such as the pioneer areas for export crops), the strong economic incentives and resources made available to farmers lead to the creation of larger farms with greater labor productivity These farms, some of which are openly commercial, are still based on the consumption of the freely available "natural" capital This is the case in the majority of the cotton growing areas or in the coffee and cocoa growing areas

Saturated land when the market gives nature a helping hand

In areas where farmland is saturated, there are different types of situations

- Where there is a centralized market (typically an urban market), it is usually surrounded by successive rings of intensive farming that go far beyond the more noticeable peri-urban gardens In this way intensive farming in the Kano Close Settled Zone (an area where farmland has been saturated for some decades) meets the needs of a rural population of over 300 per sq km and also produces enough surplus for the urban consumers in nearby towns, including Kano and its population of over 1 million inhabitants

- Where the market is more diffuse (in areas where the price of products is independent of distance, like cotton or cocoa), the attraction of the central market no longer compensates for the problems of land saturation Confronted with land scarcity, some farmers stay where they are and begin to intensify while others migrate to "virgin" land to continue farming in the old extractive way It is due to this kind of migration that pioneer fronts advance in both savanna and forest zones

- Densely populated areas without markets (mainly in the Sahelian countries, with one or two such areas in the northern reaches of the coastal countries) may engage in labor-intensive farming with few inputs (see box) Generally, in these areas, other activities are taken on, either at home or via migration Often investment in farming is limited and is aimed primarily at meeting home-consumption needs

The need to intensify leads to greater inequality in rural areas

Land is farmed more intensively (higher output per unit area) when it is absolutely necessary (because farmland is saturated) and more profitable than non-farm activities (where there is a market providing a return on capital and labor, or when the supply of non-farm work dries up)

Market conditions are very unevenly distributed throughout West Africa Not every area can produce export crops (for reasons of climate or location), and the domestic market, though expanding, is still limited (an average of 0 6 consumers per farmer)

Not every area, therefore, can finance the investment needed for sustainable commercial farming At a time when markets are being liberalized, the farms nearest the market and those with highly profitable structures are likely to take over most of the food market as it develops

Developing agricultural entrepreneurship must be encouraged even if an increase in social disparities results The means to do so are the same as those needed for urban entrepreneurs They are based on encouraging professional organizations, the development of information networks and the creation of an environment conducive to development

Think of rural transformation along with urban development

Meanwhile, other farmers will gradually be forced to choose between leaving farming altogether or farming in a more labor-intensive way, although only poor returns for that labor will be obtained

This choice for farmers will ultimately depend upon the health of the urban economy If it recovers, it will create both a sustained demand for food, increasing the number of farms that can live off that demand, and creating job alternatives for those whose life in the villages would be too precarious In this case it is possible to imagine a dynamic balance between town and country If, on the other hand, the urban economy remains stuck in recession, the standard of living in rural areas will fall as land becomes increasingly saturated and the lack of investment lowers farm labor productivity, except in those areas closest to the markets

Spectacular progress in farming

"The result is that in the CMDT and Office du Niger areas farming is beginning to become sedentary and intensive, and there is an increasing need for hired labor Peasants' high level of income, changes their consumption and investment habits bicycles, mopeds, radios, and modern rifles are common Housing styles and the use of building materials are changing The wealthier farmers in the CMDT and Office du Niger areas are beginning to engage in property speculation in towns Their eating and clothing habits are also changing " (Bakary Sanogo, Town country relations in Mali Mali case study, WALTPS, 1994, page 20)

"A recent study in the Ivory Coast notes the appearance of a new group of farm entrepreneurs They are of varied origin, some are women or immigrants or entrepreneurs who may have previously been traditional farmers or urban employees To take advantage of the opportunities offered by local and export markets, these entrepreneurs set up businesses which blur the conventional distinction made between the formal and the informal sectors They make full use of formal banking and commercial services and modern production technology, but are also supported by traditional networks, which provide labor, land, and savings By combining farming techniques and commercial methods with medium scale production, they have achieved much higher levels of productivity than smaller and larger farms " (From Crisis to Sustainable Development, World Bank, 1989, page 164)

although some areas are left behind

Dugué (1989) concludes his study of a number of villages in Yatenga (Northwest Burkina Faso) with these remarks "These observations lead us to distinguish two major types of cropping systems an extensive system where performance depends mainly on the productivity of labor and the quality of farmland, and an intensive system (less farmland per worker) where performance is heavily dependent on the quality of the land In the latter case, it can be shown that the level of the use of inputs (chemical and animal fertilizer) and "intensification" techniques (plowing, selected seedstock) is lower than usually recommended by farm extension services In both systems, the concern of most farmers is the development of non farm activities within the village and/or the encouragement of their sons to migrate

3 5 LAND MANAGEMENT SUPPORTING CHANGE AND MANAGING INEQUALITIES IN WEST AFRICA

WALTPS reveals the importance of better understanding the relations between people and the ecological economic and social areas in which they live and work It emphasizes a number of specific policy areas for which appropriate land management strategies must be developed

"Land management means introducing rationality into areas formerly ruled by natural determinism or uncoordinated individual intentions" (Igue 1993) Land management is a major component of regional management policy, the spatial translation of a political idea In the allocation of infrastructure and public services, it seeks to reconcile two complementary objectives maximizing the economic efficiency of the territory, and ensuring its social and political cohesion

The concentration of economic activity and the management of regional inequalities

The natural process whereby population and economic activities tend to concentrate themselves in some areas is beneficial in terms of the cost-effectiveness of equipment and services and promotes the competitiveness of businesses Such a process can also play a role in the reduction of per capita income differences between rich and poorer areas, since migration from poor to rich zones tends to equalize differences One outcome of the geographic concentration of economic activities is the emergence of large urban areas composed of a network of towns and a closely integrated rural hinterland The largest of these areas in West Africa is around Lagos This area will ultimately have a population comparable to the U S east coast, with five cities of over one million inhabitants and a total of more than 60 million inhabitants along a strip of land 600 km long running east to west between Benin City and Accra Some areas in the region are thus subject to special pressure This is the case for example, along parts of the coastal strip, where one-third of GRP is produced on 6% of the region's land It is also the case of the "national peripheries", active border areas where there is dynamic private initiative and intense trade

This concentration of people and activity, which is consistent with natural market trends, cannot be left to the law of the market alone The areas in question which are undergoing a rapid and profound change must be managed Hence the importance of land management policies The coastal areas, for example, with their high potential for economic growth, also contain fragile, threatened ecosystems The long term management of these coastal areas should be one of the priority objectives of regional land management

The vast areas far from the urban zones also raise particular problems because of their sparse population density, weak economic activity, their lack of significant local resources, and the limited impact of policies in the absence of incentives for change The contrasting trends in urban areas and more isolated rural areas raise the problem of coping with inequality and the allocation of public expenditure

> ***Major challenges for developing the great Sahelian rivers***
>
> *One of the necessary conditions for intensive farming is the mobilization of natural resources, including the development of river basins*
>
> *The two great Sahelian rivers, the Senegal and the Niger, are good examples of the need for regional co operation to mobilize natural resources Although these two rivers play a decisive role in the Sahel they have their source in the Fouta Djallon in Guinea, a country where desertification is the least of its problems*
>
> *Maintaining the Fouta Djallon mountains which regulate the flow of these rivers, is essential for the life of millions of Sahelians This will depend upon the good intentions of a country whose interests in all evidence, lie elsewhere*
>
> *This is an example of the type of collaboration necessary between the different States in West Africa It is precisely in areas like these that foreign donors can provide support and in the process ensure that everyone's objectives in land management are reconciled*

Coping with inequality should undoubtedly allow a "natural" response to be asserted by the population increased mobility and the encouragement of private transfers which are usually associated with these migrations The per capita distribution of public expenditure in various areas could also be kept within an acceptable range by partially redistributing both national and local public resources Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the latter mechanism will only reduce inequality if the State manages to maintain direct control of a large part of national resources, which is not the way indicated by current trends

Restructuring West African urban networks

Although the birth of West African nations (and the increasing number of states within the Nigerian Federation) has contributed to the balkanization of the region, it has also encouraged regional land management by favoring the emergence of national urban networks These networks, centered around political or economic capital cities, are groups of towns which first functioned as administrative units, before expanding beyond that role The influence of some major towns now extends beyond national borders and numerous urban networks are integrating with each other at the subregional level, particularly around Dakar, Abidjan and Lagos The top level of the region's urban framework now consists of about ten large cities spaced every 800-1000 km

Ultimately, this top urban level will become denser, with a spacing of 100 to 500 km between cities, with a hundred or so urban centers serving 2 to 5 million people and each handling a gross product in the order of $2 to 10 billion The pattern of urban centers with regional functions will be the basis for decentralization This regional network will also provide the pattern for transport and communications networks

Development of communication infrastructure

By 2020, intra-regional trade is likely to have increased tenfold (compared with a fourfold increase in trade with the rest of the world) The greater density of the urban network and greater trade between town and country will also boost the demand for medium-range transport Apart from maintaining and rehabilitating the existing road system, the long-term challenge is to increase its density, to cope with inter- and intra-regional trade (as on the Nigeria Cameroon border, where the infrastructure is practically non-existent)

A picture of how the road system might develop in West Africa, is provided by the present road system in Nigeria WALTPS shows that the density of the Nigerian road network, which is apparently four times higher than elsewhere, is in fact comparable, given the density and structure of settlement patterns in this country The only exceptional feature in Nigeria is the extent of the road system in the zone situated between the coastal areas and the Sahelian zone which is the least populated area in Nigeria This can be explained both by the authorities' concern to maintain strong links between the northern and southern zones and by the availability of oil revenues, which has permitted for long-term investment The opening up of this area has resulted in fierce competition for access to land

Faster development in the northern zones of coastal countries

The 2020 image of regional settlement patterns suggests that generally, the population density will gradually increase in the hinterland of the coastal areas (called zone 2, see 1 4) Until now, zone 2 has been the least urbanized, experiencing net out-migration between 1960 and 1990 This trend will be reversed and the level of urbanization will increase This zone's share of the region's urban population will increase from 25% to 28% and its share of the region's rural population will increase from 39% to 42% (excluding Nigeria) This movement of population into the hinterland of the most dynamic coastal areas is essential for land management in West Africa and has many implications The development of zone 2, where river-blindness has been eradicated, may be useful to absorb the surplus population from the Sahel and to locate market-oriented farms to serve the coastal cities It may also act as a link between the coastal and Sahelian settlement areas

More generally, the shift from subsistence to market-oriented farming occurs at different speeds and in different ways, depending on the distance from the market and the use of land The current phase of extensive farming spreading outward from market areas is being replaced by more intensive farming and more capital-intensive specialized farms, which depend more on the availability of land than their proximity to the market This trend will probably create even greater inequalities in productivity among rural areas Land management policies will need to adapt to this increasing differentiation in farm structure and the rural economy

Most of the necessary changes for the future will be made by the people of West Africa themselves in response to the constraints and opportunities of their immediate environment So that all these individual efforts do not produce a cacophony, they need to be coordinated and focussed This will require a series of interconnected levels of development management

Decentralization from the "local" to the "*lands*"

The local level is the level at which there remains a strong sense of identity It is at this level that essential public services should be provided and everyday institutional problems managed In many countries, decentralization policies and the emergence of a local class of entrepreneurs who are eager to become involved in the management of their immediate environment, are moving in just that direction

The intermediate level (which John Igue calls *"lands"*, and correspond roughly to administrative regions) brings together more varied areas generally, a large city, a scattering of smaller towns and their rural hinterland These *"lands"* are usually areas with a high degree of socio-cultural cohesion This is the level at which one may hope to mobilize real "communities" for a common future This is the preferred level for managing basic infrastructure and the complementarities between town and country

Decentralization down to the local collective level should remove part of the burden of tax collection and of public service management from the central authority This is why, despite some resistance, decentralization has good perspectives On the other hand, the intermediate level is seen as competing too directly with the construction of the Nation-State, especially in ethnically diverse countries where central authority is still shaky This level is rarely used as a basis for land management regions have been perceived as administrative levels rather than intermediate areas for planning It will probably take a substantial length of time before communities are organized at this level

Remaining part of the local to regional nexus

The predominance of the Nation-State in elaborating and effectively implementing a strategy of land management should not hide the fact that the majority of West African countries remain highly inter-dependent and are each very small in terms of population and GDP None of these countries can ignore what is happening in neighboring countries, or hope to develop in a sustainable manner alone Settlement patterns occur at the regional level, markets are sub-regional, river basins and transport corridors cross national borders and the CFA countries have a single currency Land management and decentralization strategies, which are necessarily implemented nationally, should be designed with regional imperatives in mind The States, which are decentralizing nationally, should gradually learn to operate as decentralized levels of the sub-regional units that disappeared at independence and which should be rebuilt on new foundations The principle of subsidiarity in the division of tasks between central administrations and local councils should also be applied to States and aid agencies in their dealings in the subregion

Decentralization strategies which must obviously be implemented nationally, should be designed with the needs of the region in mind This does not mean that decentralization should follow a standard pattern, rather it should take account of local characteristics It should be designed to facilitate the regional mobility of people, technologies, capital, goods and services and the necessary redistribution of resources It should make regional integration easier and not harder During times of crisis, however, there is a real risk that decentralization will impede mobility (witness the indigenization movement in Nigeria), reduce transfers via the State and lead to a policy of "each locality for itself" This is the danger that must be averted

Decentralization an ongoing process

The process of decentralization must be flexible and adapt to both changing settlement patterns and to social changes Consequently, the boundaries of decentralized authorities should not be seen as fixed, but ones that remain open to change to the fullest extent possible How can the image of, say, an urban district with set boundaries be reconciled with the reality of a built-up area doubling every ten years and exerting a strong influence on its rural hinterland or, that is "linked" with another urban region, in some instances in a neighboring country?

Likewise, the authorities in charge of the decentralized units (rural communities, urban districts and urban regions), like the national authorities above them, are answerable not only to their households but also to the businesses which ensure their prosperity The rural hinterland of towns is to some extent part of their business area, analogous to "industrial estates" on the outskirts of towns Urban managers are concerned by what happens in their rural hinterland, which often comes under other authorities This overlap of urban and rural areas in the process of local development must be taken into account when discussing the issue of changing relations and shared competence between decentralized units and the local representatives of the national administration (*prefets*, governors) How can decentralization, which accentuates the geographical division of autonomous units, not undermine the relationships and trade between these units? This discussion could lead to a redefinition of the function of an administration, which might be made more responsible for the proper running of urban-rural systems, through land management

Rethinking the shape of the West African State

Although macro economic studies of West African countries abound, and socio political studies are well developed, John Igué suggests that "the territorial analysis of States is far less advanced A few geographical studies allude to the question, usually in terms of regionalization or town-country relations This lack is all the more regrettable since Africa's colonial heritage has left it the most balkanized continent on earth, with many countries where the exercise of power, and therefore the question of the State, raises many problems "

A primary feature of States is their size Sahelian states are too large, sparsely populated and hard to manage, some coastal states are too small and do not have a critical mass of population But above all, "the greatest territorial handicap of the colonial successor States is the questionable legitimacy of their borders, leading to conflict and even war"

"The problem of territoriality is primarily expressed as the need to strengthen the State's borders, and then to create a sound national community There is also the problem of a dynamic cultural space, i e a moral reference, without which the State is unlikely to operate properly Often the emergence of a true national community held together by the same cultural references is hampered by ethnic diversity and tribal issues, carefully exploited by some to gain power and patronage The various colonial powers have already faced these problems "

West African people continue to define themselves largely with respect to territorial boundaries that are not those of the nation state the hierarchical network of markets, which covers every corner of the territory, or particularly dynamic border areas

Igué points out that West African States have been unable to create new reference territories or even use the existing ones "nowhere has any balance of territories been achieved Regionalization is not working

The States use administrative frameworks, not for land management, but merely for infrastructure operations, most of which have less to do with the efficient use of space than with satisfying the ambitions of the men in power"

Recently created Nations
political map of West-Africa around 1886

One hundred years ago, almost no West African State had its current territory Colonial powers were still vying with African kingdoms for control over land Not until 20 years later was the region totally occupied and carved up



based on P Biarnès

3 7 FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR PEOPLE AND GOODS WILL ASSIST ADJUSTMENT TO FUTURE CHANGE

Mobility has been an essential means for the people of West Africa to adapt to the changes in their environment Ease of movement within the region has certainly prevented an escalation of tensions and conflicts At a time when that ease of movement is being restricted because of recession and the perceived need to protect ethnic identities, WALTPS argues that movement must be preserved

However West African economies develop, or whatever the mechanisms for redistributing wealth within them, there will continue to be great inequalities within the region, both socially and geographically

Mobility helps adaptation and reduces inequality

If one accepts that competition is fierce and that social inequality is greater when resources are few, it follows that intra-regional mobility helps to reduce these inequalities (among and within countries) by ensuring a better fit between people and resources Since migrants move from low-productivity areas to areas where they are more productive, mobility was an essential means of increasing average income

This is true on condition that economic distortions do not artificially attract people to places where there is nothing to produce This is the reproach that many authors make of towns that are heavily supplied with public spending and which attract a greater number of people than the jobs they can supply

Gradual saturation of easily mobilized resources even in the best urban and rural areas, and the increasing number of people living in these areas who would like to capitalize on these resources, will prove a structural obstacle to mobility There will certainly still be great differences in potential between "rich" and "poor" areas However, settling into the "rich" areas will become increasingly more competitive and much more expensive for the migrant This structural slowdown in movement will probably encourage the trend, already observed, towards social differentiation within areas, among peasants in areas of out-migration and among members of the informal sector in the areas of in-migration

Maintaining free movement in West Africa

The role of the public sector on the issue of mobility is threefold

- since mobility generally reflects a rational adaptive behavior on the part of the migrant, authorities should reduce obstacles to mobility,
- however, they should also reduce the artificial attraction of "short-term" opportunities to prevent a migration rush, particularly during times of economic recession, climatic difficulties, etc
- public policy should include "social" measures for the most disadvantaged people who are unable to migrate The problem with adopting such measures is to find a socially acceptable level which will not hold back potential migrants There is a risk that if they do not migrate now, it will prove even more difficult for them to do so in the future

In the past, West Africa has actually been a zone of free movement, the richest areas have attracted many migrants from the poorest ones With the notable exception of Côte d'Ivoire, most governments have attempted to impede mobility, either by making life difficult for the new arrivals (the absence of urban planning was supposed to discourage the rural exodus[1]), or by developing economic and social activities in areas of out-migration

As recession in the cities and the saturation of the last virgin lands gradually reduce mobility, policy makers in States and aid agencies should rethink their allocation of resources The need now is not to cope with the effects of a migration rush, but to encourage the resurgence of migration

Free movement and interdependence should obviously be a primary consideration and a priority within countries But to be efficient, it should also occur across larger and more diversified areas regardless of national borders The ECOWAS declaration on the free movement of people and goods throughout West Africa has not been fully implemented and it should be a top priority

Migration a challenge of the past and of the future

Variations in national population growth rates have been the result of cross border migration rather than changes in fertility and mortality rates Over the period 1960 to 1990, growth rates have ranged from 1 6% a year in Cape Verde to 4 4% in the Ivory Coast, for an average natural regional growth rate of 2 7% per year Counting only net flows, it is estimated that 11% of the West African population (less Nigeria) are living outside their country of birth The Ivory Coast is by far the main destination of immigrants, with a cumulative net inflow of 3 2 million, or an average rate of immigration of 1 2% per year, one of the highest immigration rates in the world Next come Cameroon, Senegal and Nigeria, with net inflows of one or two million The country with the highest percentage outflow (1 4%) is Cape Verde Countries of emigration are all the landlocked Sahelian ones, plus a few others that are richer but have suffered political instability or economic mismanagement

Cross border migration is only one aspect of the population shift in West Africa It is estimated that 30 40% of West Africans live outside the district or village where they were born, reflecting a large degree of mobility within each country Migration across and within borders is closely linked to economic opportunity The immigration areas contained 31% of the region's population in 1960 and produced 48% of gross regional product on 30% of the area, in 1990, the figures were 51% of population and 66% of GRP Population density in these immigration areas is now 2 4 times that of the emigration areas and the average product per inhabitant is with a 80% higher than in emigration areas

Projected settlement patterns in 2020 and cross-border migration

A number of macro economic, geopolitical and social factors will have an impact on the distribution of a total population of 430 million in West Africa The mid range forecast of settlement patterns in 2020 assumes relative freedom of movement for people within West Africa This will involve continued migration from the interior to the coast The main countries of immigration will be Cameroon (+0 6% per year), The Ivory Coast (+0 5%), Ghana, the Central African Republic and Liberia (+0 3%) Emigration will mainly come from Cape Verde and Niger (-1 1%), Mali and Mauritania (0 8%), Burkina Faso and Chad (0 6%) Over the period 1990 2020 as a whole, net migration between these two groups of countries will be roughly twenty million, compared with eight million in 1960 90

Net migration for West African countries 1960-1990 and scenario for 2020



WALTPS shows that, while people have moved in great numbers within West Africa, trade has been limited within the region and is more oriented towards the world market Existing intra regional trade has been based on policy distortions rather than on local economic competition The regional market is growing fast because the population is growing The market consists largely of basic goods with a steady demand It is an ideal place to learn the fundamentals of economic competition Particular attention should be paid to win back the regional market

The domestic and regional market in West Africa is growing and will continue to grow at a sustained rate as a simple result of the forecasted population increase (from 193 to 430 million consumers in 30 years) and the division of labor between town and country (from 78 to over 250 million urban consumers) The regional market consists of fairly rudimentary goods and services Of household expenditure, for example, 40 60% is spent on food, and much of the rest is spent on clothes and housing Most of these products could, in theory, be easily provided by local craftsmen and manufacturers

Under developed trade within the region, abnormally high levels of trade with the outside world

Intra-regional trade in the past has mainly been encouraged by artificial economic opportunities (differences in monetary policies between CFA-zone countries and the other countries in the region, different trade policies) and by the existence of ethnically based cross-border trading networks which have been able to take advantage of them Intra-regional trade based on real comparative advantage differences have remained minimal In the long term, whatever happens to the Franc Zone, such distortions are unlikely to continue Intra-regional trade should be seen more in terms of the comparative advantages each country possesses or eventually could possess

In the course of the WALTPS, an analysis was made using global data from different time periods, of the relationships among demo-economic characteristics of countries (size, population and GDP) and their degree of openness to foreign trade A significant correlation, relatively stable over time, was found among these parameters The model was then applied to each country in West Africa separately and to the region as a whole The result showed that individually these countries are roughly as open to trade as the model would predict However, taking the region as a whole, the results show that it is quite exceptionally open to international trade West African countries engage more in distant trade (mainly with their ex-colonial powers) than in intra-regional trade This observation is moreover consistent with the weakness in the economy's intermediate sector (see 1 3) If West Africa were to trade according to the world norm, then intra-regional trade would be four or five times greater than it is today

Admittedly, the trade figures do not include other resource flows - human migration and remittances Migration and intra-regional trade are two means of regulating inequalities within West Africa Regarding migration, it is the worker who has to be displaced whereas in the case of intra-regional trade, the worker remains at home and sends abroad his or her value added However, the analysis does show that there is a great potential for trade in goods and services within the region which should receive greater attention, especially given the risk that the mobility of people could be reduced

A complement to overseas trade, with a high growth potential

The long-term projection, assumes that West Africa would eventually approach the norm of the trade model The degree of openness that would result for each country and the region as a whole, was calculated If the hypothesis holds true, the region will supply 22% of these countries' total imports, meaning a degree of openness to the region (imports plus exports over GRP) of 9%, compared with 30% towards the rest of the world The 1990 figures were 3% and 36% This implies a growth rate for intra regional trade of some 8% a year

This is an optimistic forecast, since the division of the region into 19 countries probably makes it more prone to overseas trade Nonetheless, intra regional trade has healthy prospects for development It will not for all that, be a panacea, even if this record growth rate is sustained, intra-regional trade will only provide a minor contribution to total commercial flows by the year 2020 There are, however, marked differences between sectors When the model is applied to farm production alone, it suggests a major role for intra-regional trade by 2020 (46% of total agricultural imports will come from other West African countries) In the final analysis, it would seem that West Africa must adopt a diversified strategy by

- taking advantage of the potential for intra-regional trade trade which is large in volume and, given the close proximity of West African countries to each other, is particularly accessible Apart from its economic value, the region could gain important benefits from this trade in terms of regional cohesion more links among countries (today, to a large extent, labor flows one way and remittances the other), reduced dependence on the world market, giving greater resilience to the regional economy, and a refocussing of countries on production zones and traditional trade routes,

- improving competitiveness on the world market, both for traditional export commodities and new more "urban" niche markets, since the region will continue to need a considerable amount of imports from the rest of the world (roughly three-quarters of the volume of international trade of the region by 2020) Competitiveness must be maintained if the region is not to drop out of the world economy,

- increasing capital in-flows, which have gradually declined in recent years and has shifted from private foreign direct investment and loans to grants

Indonesia and West Africa
openess to trade does not necessarily lead to rapid growth

Indonesia and West Africa had many points in common during the period from 1970 to 1990 They had a similar population size, and, at mid period, a similar standard of living (per capita GDP at purchasing power parity) Furthermore, they exported similar amounts of oil And while history has divided West Africa into many countries, geography has divided Indonesia into many islands

The difference between them is that Indonesia is a dynamic Asian country and West Africa has not enjoyed such rapid growth Is this because of Indonesia's better export performance? The table below compares the ratio of exports to GDP calculated in international dollars at purchasing power parity

	1970		1980		1990	
	WA	IDN	WA	IDN	WA	IDN
Population (millions)	114	118	149	148	194	178
Per capita GDP at PPP (international $)	363	267	1010	1140	879	2234
Oil exports (billion $)	0 7	0 3	24 7	15 7	13 8	11 2
Total exports (billion $)	3 0	1 1	32 1	21 9	21 6	25 6
Oil exports/GDP PPP (%)	5 5%	2 2%	4 9%	3 7%	4 6%	3 6%
Total exports/GDP PPP (%)	7 2%	3 3%	21 3%	13 0 %	12 7%	6 4%

Source Penn World Tables

Using GDP at PPP (preferable when comparing countries with widely varying currencies), West Africa appears to be much more open to exports than Indonesia, even for non oil exports in 1990 Despite this, Indonesia s standard of living is 2 5 times higher This is noteworthy, since Indonesia's overall economic performance has been much better But above all, it was based upon a rapidly growing domestic market, a market which has remained extremely weak in West Africa

3 9 LIMITING THE MAGNITUDE AND EFFECTS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE SHORTAGES

A number of tasks need to be financed during West Africa s transformation phase the education of its people and the building of production systems, towns and infrastructure To meet these needs considerable resources have been raised but they are still heavily dependent on the global economic cycle The collapse of West African countries' purchasing power at the international level has created shortages on the regional market will this shortage lead to a fall in the quality and the quantity of products consumed or will it stimulate local production?

West African economies have remained highly dependent on overseas trade and their relations with the international community They have failed to manage the commodity boom with enough foresight to increase their competitiveness and diversify their exports Earnings were needed for other purposes, such as maintaining cohesion between social groups via the redistribution of wealth, financing infrastructure, and supporting the apparatus of the Nation-State, the importance of which can not be denied

At a time when the needs of West Africa's new population is growing, its market share in almost all exports is declining Furthermore, limits to extensive agriculture are progressively diminishing the profits in export agriculture, being eroded by the cost of renewing soil fertility and further pushed down by the fall in prices on world commodity markets

Mineral commodities are another matter They depend almost entirely upon world prices, especially in the case of oil Unless prices suddenly collapse, Nigeria will have large, sustainable revenues with which to increase its influence in the region

Financing development with exports will be difficult

Overall, it is highly unlikely that traditional sources of foreign exchange (commodity exports and capital transfers) will keep pace with all the needs The prospects of diversifying exports to the world market, particularly via the towns and cities production, are hardly encouraging in the short term

In the 1970s and 1980s, the delocalization of manufacturing to cheap-labor countries did offer the possibility for a new international division of labor thus enabling the industrialization of a number of third world countries This strategy now seems to be threatened by technological innovation and policy changes made by multinational corporations Consequently, delocalization may only offer a few short-term opportunities in West Africa, except possibly in Nigeria because of its size and its exceptional natural resource base

Drugs -- Africa's latest commodity?

"As sub Saharan Africa becomes dotted with illegal plantations, the pattern of drug traffic is changing The cohorts of "mules", "ants" and other poorly organized couriers which used to import drugs from Asia and Latin America for re export to Europe are giving way to new, more structured organizations to handle local production The traffic is becoming more professional

Across the region, the heroin trade produces the greatest flows of illegally earned money These huge sums are reinvested in production, turning trading points into areas for processing and consuming drugs

At the heart of the trade lies the most populous country in Africa, Nigeria Nigerians are near the top in the world cocaine trade (In the United States), according to experts, Nigerian heroin represents 25% of the market and up to 50% in the Washington and Baltimore areas "

Drugs, the new world disorder, Observatoire géopolitique des drogues, 1993 pages 203 7

Although it will take a long time, diversifying exports by improving the competitiveness of West African businesses is a more probable way of diversifying the region's sources of income Prerequisites for promoting industrial competitiveness are improved human resources, a wide diffusion of economic and industrial skills, the development of financial markets, an improved business climate, the emergence of a new generation of entrepreneurs, and the transformation of the "contract" between the public and private sectors, etc A quite lengthy process!

Under these circumstances, foreign exchange shortages pose a real threat to the smooth running of the economy and stable institutions Finding alternative sources of revenue becomes tempting, such as engaging in the export of illegal substances, beginning with drugs This danger is beginning to become a reality in a number of West African countries (see box)

Responding to the shortage by making best use of economic and human potential

While the long-term development of West Africa will require structural transfers (→ 3 10), it will especially require the mobilization of the region's strengths to the fullest extent possible

Extreme dependency on the volatile global environment has compromised current development processes in the region At a time when few local businesses were able to meet urban demand, the decline in purchasing power on world markets attracted cheap poor-quality imports which prevented the necessary emergence of a regional market No local producer can compete with secondhand shoes imported by the ton, with cheap frozen cuts of meat imported from the European market and with the second-rate products that can only be sold in Africa But there are limits to this fall in the quality of consumer goods The devaluation in Abidjan led to the purchase by the middle classes of cheaper products, but the poor, who already consumed the cheapest sources of protein (imported frozen fish), were forced to reduce the absolute volume of their consumption (Akindes, 1994)

In Nigeria, consumers' "international" purchasing power has dropped virtually to zero, due to the collapse of the naira Meanwhile, domestic agricultural supply has been stimulated and the development of local manufacturing has shown that with the right capital, skills and market, rapid development is possible The consequences of the collapse of Nigerian currency on that country's and the region's economy, however, have been disastrous A better mechanism must be found to protect the region from the world's jumble sales

Manufacturing boom in Southeast Nigeria

'On account of the investments made in new lines of production such as the manufacture of spare parts based on the imitation of far eastern technology, the business sector did not suffer a great lull in its activities Indeed, with the demand for cheap spare parts rising alongside the prohibitive costs of imported parts during the period of devaluation of the naira, demand for products from the Aba Nweni spare parts factories grew tremendously, resulting in a production and distribution boom With national and regional distribution networks already in place, the output of factories was easily distributed and the returns were good both for the producers and the traders This encouraged more local manufacturing of parts and in time many of the companies began to move beyond the production of parts for vehicles to the production of parts for industrial machinery Many factories, unable to replace fixed assets or to afford the costs of imported spare parts turned to the Aba Nweni industrial axis for their needs The growth of local spare parts production is perhaps the most important element of the revival in industrial activity in the Aba Nweni industrial axis but also worthy of note is the emergence of textile production and design as well as the growth of food product processing and pharmaceutical production Like the production of spare parts, these other lines of production are backed by strong marketing networks, made up mainly of traders of eastern origin, in the country and in the rest of Africa "

Nigerian experts believe this boom is related to changing settlement patterns "The strong entrepreneurial spirit that has characterized Igbo commercial and industrial networks east of Nigeria, as well as outside the country is related to the challenges of coping with high population pressure on limited land "

They are equally associated with migration and "generational" effects "Not only did the Igbo and Ibidio Unions collect a portion of the incomes of their members in the urban areas to finance community development projects in their home villages, the success of sons (and more recently daughters) away from home soon came to be measured by their ability to set up economic ventures back home and to recruit kinsmen from home for positions in their urban based businesses Such a mutual aid network would seem to have encouraged the expansion of the population in the south east who are able to amass wealth abroad, which, on the basis of past experiences, became pooled for the establishment of capital intensive spare parts industries "

The emergence of this type of manufacturing seems to have had a synergistic effect on trade and industrial activities "From Lagos to Kano, Makurdi to Aba, they (businessmen from the East) developed massive networks for the distribution of second hand goods which they delivered to households much more cheaply than the factory new equivalents, whether locally produced or imported The trade in second hand goods has thus become a major new source of accumulation which has contributed to the business boom in the East and parts of the country like Lagos " (A O Olukoshi, B Ahonsi, Nigeria case study, WALTPS)

Although domestic savings are being invested on a greater scale than suggested by official statistics and even if West Africa maintains its market share on international commodity markets and manages to develop the potential of the regional market, the resources available will be insufficient to meet its needs It will simply not be possible to do all that is necessary Net transfers from the rest of the world will be necessary for the foreseeable future, but they will have to be administered in such a way so as to avoid the negative effects of the past decades The first condition of the cost effectiveness of transfers is the programming of public investments on the basis of development priorities, itself a product of a long term vision of development

West Africa is a region undergoing a structural transformation One of the consequences of this radical change is the region's enormous need for financial resources Over the last thirty years, the countries of West Africa had the task of educating their populations, developing competitive production systems, financing urbanization and building their nations As we have seen, the results have been mixed considerable urban assets have been accumulated, economic activity has developed in some sectors rather than others, and education has stagnated

The extent of changes in West Africa will inevitably lead to economic deficits

Although it is possible to dispute the priorities adopted by West Africans and the policies that guided them, it cannot be denied that considerable investment has been made by individuals (more so than is recorded in national accounts, because it is mostly informal) Although there was substantial waste and despite the fact that more private funds could have been raised, the size of the total task clearly exceeded the financial capacities of the region

In fact, the demographic transition has always historically been a phase of tension In many cases, these tensions have been resolved by expansion (war, colonization, or migration), or domestic crisis (civil war, famine) As it is one of the last regions of the world to go through such a demographic transition, West Africa is experiencing different constraints On the one hand, migration outside Africa and internal reorganization are being impeded (inflexible borders, immigration restrictions) On the other, famine and war are restricted by humanitarian interference

Since Africa, and West Africa in particular, do not have recourse to the "traditional" methods for coping with transition, it has had to draw upon its own resources This explains the importance of exports in the economy and the importance of internal migration to adjust settlement patterns Likewise, West Africa has made a huge appeal to the international community to fill, at least in part, the structural deficits resulting from the transition

International aid has not been adapted to African circumstances

The nature, volume and timing of the resources supplied by the international community have varied greatly over time It can honestly be said that they have not been adapted to the conditions of the African continent

- These transfers have been very volatile and have been associated much more with the availability of liquidity in world markets than with the real needs or absorption capacity of African countries Transfers boomed in the 1970s, as oil money was being recycled, and then slumped in the early 1980s For the coastal countries, these transfers temporarily became net outflows

- Private flows have been weak Remitted earnings have always been greater than the sums invested during the last twenty five years This investment has seriously dwindled in recent years

- Multilateral donors have been playing an increasingly larger role in cash flows but have not really succeeded in taking the appropriate measures on the African continent This has consequently led to increasing debt with the largest sums being owed to multilaterals

Since 1970, Sahelian countries, particularly those along the coast, have benefitted more favorably than the rest of the region from international aid These transfers have compensated for a growing structural trade deficit The forest countries received major transfers resulting in serious debt during the 1970s These transfers became negative in the 1980s and are only just recovering Nigeria is a special case, with negative transfers for the entire period from 1970 to 1990

In all, the net consolidated transfers to West Africa were about $50 billion from 1970 to 1992, or only 3 4% of GRP accumulated over that period Many of these transfers were loans and have led to massive indebtedness For many countries this indebtedness is increasing as debts are rescheduled Even more alarming, the proportion of multilateral debt is growing and is now more than 50% for 5 of the region's countries Since such debt cannot in theory be forgiven, a number of countries are heading for bankruptcy The whole issue of African debt will have to be re-examined

The need for long term financial planning

It has been stressed several times that West Africa's development depends on long-term phenomena -- settlement patterns, education, skills and redistribution of power The mediocre prospects for exports raise the specter of a considerable delay, if not a complete halt, in the maturation of these long-term phenomena, which depend partly on the international economy and outside resources It would be foolhardy to suppose that loans established on a strict short- or medium-term basis could compensate for poor export performance on world markets in providing the necessary financial flows

The commitment of foreign resources, largely in the form of non repayable grants, will determine the time it will take for general development and the diversification of production systems to occur in the region

This is certainly true for West African countries with few exportable raw materials But rising deficits in the more fortunate countries must be avoided, these countries are already heavily indebted and are important as safety valves for the poorest countries The idea of restoring the balance of payments in the short- or medium-term has already been abandoned *de facto,* as evidenced in the Sahelian countries and also Ghana, experiencing structural adjustment for ten years now This change of position now needs to be thought out and managed properly as it is not exempt from danger As far as the donors are concerned, this means

- committing themselves to what might be called long-term partnerships, in which lasting deficits are accepted with no expectation of immediate results, provided the development appears to be progressing,

- reducing their interventionism, especially in the political and social realms The growing involvement of donors in defining the objectives of national policies results in these objectives not being met and aid then becomes an end rather than a means In the future aid could be devoted to more neutral or indirect activities and influence social and economic change in a limited way Aid would "set the scene" for development by supporting land management, improving the circulation and use of knowledge and actively supporting education, communication and information



APPENDICES

- Publications and documents 59
- WALTPS diffusion and discussion 65

DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS

Summary report of the WALTPS study *SAH/D(94)439*
■ **Preparing for the Future A Vision of West Africa in the Year 2020**
S Snrech with an introduction by Anne de Lattre December 1994 70 pp + appendices
Available in English and French

■ **Demographic Database of West Africa** M B Kalasa with the collaboration of J M Cour and B Ninnin Bilingual document, to be published in the first third of 1995

■ **WALTPS Cartography Collection** Bilingual document to be published in the first third of 1995

Working paper no 1 *SAH/D(93)415*
■ **Settlement Patterns in West Africa Commentary on the database** Mukanda-Bantu Kalasa December 1993 124pp + appendices Available in English and French

Working paper no 2 *SAH/D(93)410*
■ **The Real Economy of the West Africa Region Retrospective Analysis 1960 - 1990 and Alternative Visions for 2020** J M Cour January 1994 80pp + appendices Available in English and French

Working paper no 3 *SAH/D(93)411*
■ **Economic Prospects for West Africa in the Decade Ahead** J D Naudet DIAL November 1993 62pp Available in English and French

Working paper no 4 *SAH/D(93)433*
■ **Economic Geography of West Africa Markets, Settlement Patterns, Agriculture, Roads Modeling for 1960 90** B Ninnin June 1994 107 pp + appendices Available in English and French

Working paper no 5 *SAH/D(93)421*
■ **Land Use Policies in West Africa** J O Igue and B G Soule December 1993 74pp + appendices Available in English and French

Working paper no 6 *SAH/D(93)434*
■ **External Finance for Development in West Africa Trends in Resource Transfers and Discussion of Official Development Aid 1960-90** J M Cour and J D Naudet - DIAL July 1994 124 pp with tables Available in English and French

Working paper no 7 *SAH/D(93)432*
■ **L'education en Afrique de l'ouest situation, enjeux et perspectives** R Pons June 1994 47 pp

Working paper no 8 *SAH/D(93)412*
■ **Urbanization in West Africa** M Arnaud December 1993 30pp + appendices Available in English and French

Working paper no 9 *SAH/D(95)444*
■ **Evolutions socio-politiques en Afrique de l'ouest synthese des reflexions menees dans le cadre de WALTPS** L Bossard March 1995 30 pp

Working paper no 10 *SAH/D(93)417*
■ **Les consequences demographiques de l'epidémie de VIH/SIDA en Afrique de l'Ouest** J J Gabas, M Postel and M B Kalasa December 1993 32 pp + appendices

Working paper no 11 *SAH/D(93)406*
■ **Settlement Patterns and the Economy in West Africa** J D Naudet November 1992 51 pp +appendices Available in English and French

Working paper no 12 *SAH/D(93)414*
■ **Farm Performance and Population Redistribution in West Africa** J M Cour December 1993 45pp + appendices Available in English and French

Working paper no 13 *SAH / D(93)405*

■ **Modelisation des flux d'échanges exterieurs internationaux 1970 90 (effets structurels, inclinaisons specifiques) et analyse des modeles d'ouverture en Afrique de l'ouest** J D Naudet DIAL February 1993 33 pp + appendices

Working paper no 14 *SAH / D(93)407*

■ **Modelisation demo-economique des pays en voie de peuplement** J D Naudet DIAL January 1993 33pp

CONTRIBUTING DOCUMENTS, NOTES AND NATIONAL CASE STUDIES

Summary report at the end of the first round of study SAH/D(93)402

Summary of the Conclusions of the First Phase and Summary report of the meeting on the findings of the first phase SAH/CR(93)80

Reprofiler l'Etat africain A Bourgi, P H Chalvidan, E Fall, P Weiss November 1993

Les mutations politiques en Afrique de l'ouest M Diouf December 1993

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Les villes senegalaises population, espace et developpement Momar C DIOP, Amadou DIOP Dec 1993

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Nigeria

Population, Space and Development in Nigeria Summary of the Lagos Workshop Ibrahim JIBRIN November 1993

Population, Space and Development in Nigeria The Southwestern Case J A ARIYO November 1993

Population Dynamics in Eastern Nigeria and Their Socio-Economic and Political Consequences A OLUKOSHI, B AHONSI 1993

The History and Contemporary Trends in Nigeria Rural Urban Migration and Urbanization D J ABIN, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria Nigeria August 1993

Population and Socio-economic change in Southeastern Nigeria B AHONSI, A OLUKOSHI 1993

The Southwestern Nigeria Case Study Abukar MOMOH, Lagos State University 1993

Population Change and Socio-economic Processes in the Nigerian Middle Belt Z A BONAT, Ahmadu Bello University 1993

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Population Dynamics in Eastern Nigeria Their Socio-economic and Political Consequences A OLUKOSHI, B AHONSI 1993

Ghana

Structure and Growth Prospects of the Economy of Ghana from a Demo-economic Perspective Nii Kwaku SOWA December 1993

A Study of Urban-Rural Linkages in Ghana S T ADDO, Kwasi ADARKWA November 1993

Regional Development and Land Use in Ghana George BOTCHIE December 1993

Regional Integration Issues in Ghana Kwame A NINSIN, James BOK ABBAN December 1993

Population Dynamics, Urbanization and Migration in Ghana John S NABILA, Prof A F ARYEE November 1993

Mali

Mouvement des populations, spatialisation de l'economie Sekouba DIARRA, Bakary SACKO Nov 1993

Les relations villes-campagne au Mali Bakary SANOGO January 1994

Aperçu sur les tendances lourdes de l'histoire Analyse demo-economique et du nomadisme Dec 1993

Les politiques d'amenagement du territoire Ousmane M DIALLO November 1993

Burkina Faso

Etude de cas national, document de synthese 1993

PRESENTATION OF THE WORKING PAPERS

Workıng paper no 1 SAH/D(93)415

Settlement Patterns ın West Afrıca Commentary on the Database M B Kalasa December 1993 124pp + appendıces Avaılable ın Englısh and French

Thıs paper ıs a commentary on the demographıc database set up for WALTPS a populatıon explosıon unprecedented ın hıstory rapıd but faırly balanced urbanızatıon very varıed rural settlement patterns huge mıgratıons, etc It ıncludes extracts from the database for the 19 countrıes studıed (total urban and rural populatıon 1930 2020 growth rates, ınternal mıgratıon etc) and comparatıve regıonal tables

Workıng paper no 2 SAH/D(93)410

The Real Economy of the West Afrıca Regıon Retrospectıve Analysıs 1960 - 1990 and Alternatıve Vısıons for 2020 J M Cour January 1994 80pp + appendıces Avaılable ın Englısh and French

In the absence of relıable basıc statıstıcs natıonal accounts ın West Afrıca gıve an ıncomplete and dıstorted pıcture of realıty Thıs paper proposes a complementary pıcture just as ıncomplete and dıstorted usıng a demo economıc accountıng framework After summarızıng the constructıon and scope of socıal accountıng matrıces (SAMs), the author proposes an overall audıt of the demo economıc performance of West Afrıca from 1960 to 1990 Thıs analysıs reveals encouragıng features whıch may lead to faster sustaınable economıc growth They are massıve largely prıvate capıtal formatıon the emergence of sıgnıfıcant domestıc and regıonal markets lınked to urbanızatıon and a structural reductıon ın the rate of populatıon movement whıch should make ıt easıer to manage Conversely West Afrıca ıs subject to serıous lıabılıtıes such as ındebtedness margınal share of world markets aıd fatıgue and unmotıvated elıtes The author uses these posıtıve and negatıve features to suggest a possıble pıcture of West Afrıca ın 2020

Workıng paper no 3 SAH/D(93)411

Economıc Prospects for West Afrıca ın the Decade Ahead J D Naudet - DIAL November 1993 62pp Avaılable ın Englısh and French

Thıs paper assumes that exıstıng features wıll play a major part ın shapıng the ten years ahead They are a flourıshıng ınformal sector a collapsıng modern sector extensıve growth wıthout ıncreased productıvıty an economy turned towards the outsıde world trade and rent seekıng The total result however ıs overall economıc growth that has kept pace wıth populatıon growth and coped wıth new settlement patterns The author descrıbes long term trends ın the world economy and West Afrıca and then proposes three ten year scenarıos An **extrapolatıon scenarıo,** based on overseas trade and economıc rents, ın whıch Nıgerıa expands ın ımportance ın the regıonal economy and the ınternatıonal communıty wıthdraws A **"multıpolar" scenarıo,** ın whıch the countrıes of hıghest potentıal adopt long term structural adjustment wıth the very condıtıonal aıd of the ınternatıonal communıty And breakıng wıth exıstıng trends a **regıonal ıntegratıon scenarıo,** based on economıc and monetary ıntegratıon and aımıng for the development of productıon and trade wıthın West Afrıca

Workıng paper no 4 SAH/D(93)433

Economıc Geography of West Afrıca Markets, Settlement Patterns, Agrıculture, Roads Modelıng for 1960-1990 B Nınnın June 1994 107 pp + appendıces Avaılable ın Englısh and French

Advances ın quantıtatıve geography ın the last decade mean that the spatıal dımensıon of the economy can now be examıned especıally ın rural areas Thıs paper presents the market attractıveness approach devısed for WALTPS Market attractıveness can be defıned as the attractıon that urban and ınternatıonal markets need to exert on productıon areas to satısfy theır demand It provıdes a composıte ındıcator of the ımpact of varıous markets theır dıstance transport costs the supply of marketable surpluses market competıtıon for those surpluses and competıtıon from ımports Thıs empırıcal relatıonshıp ıs strengthened by comparıng market attractıveness wıth spatıalızed data on farm productıon and settlement patterns Apart from revealıng the specıfıc features of productıon areas the study proposes a measurement of the spatıal structurıng of farmıng by markets, and defınes how thıs measurement can be used to produce a long term ımage Market attractıveness also provıdes an approxımate explanatıon of the wıde dısparıtıes ın road densıty from one area to another

Workıng paper no 5 SAH/D(93)421

Land Use Polıcıes ın West Afrıca J O Igue and B G Soule December 1993 74pp + appendıces Avaılable ın Englısh and French

How have the natıons defıned by colonıal dıvısıon developed land use management? Thıs paper revıews the ınstıtutıonal framework of land use plannıng polıcıes and evaluates the achıevements (communıcatıons, educatıon health care farmıng ındustry etc) of West Afrıcan countrıes Wıth few exceptıons ıt reveals the ınconsıstency of these polıcıes, whıch were often poorly framed, deprıved of resources and based on unsuıtable areas of land Thıs unsuıtabılıty of terrıtory for polıcy explaıns why spontaneous forms of development have arısen such as networks of markets and border areas Land use plannıng needs to be re thought, the authors suggest a few ways forward such as defining policies on the basis of regions that are coherent ecologically and culturally and quite different from the administrative units which exist for the convenience of government rather than to encourage development

Working paper no 6 SAH/D(93)434

External Finance for Development in West Africa Trends in Resource Transfers and Discussion of Official Development Aid 1960-1990 J M Cour and J D Naudet - DIAL July 1994 124 pp Available in English and French

WALTPS has shown the value of regarding West Africa as a region *in settlement transition* where the greatest part of internal investment over the last thirty years has gone towards coping with new population
What is the state of external financial aid to an area of the world generally seen by the international community as a basket case ?
This paper attempts to answer this question with a consolidated analysis of all external aid and a study of development aid which is "one transfer among others but unlike the others'
In Part One Jean Marie Cour provides a retrospective quantitative analysis of transfers establishes the link between shifting settlement patterns and West Africa s financing requirements and puts forward some ideas for new methods of financing In Part Two, David Naudet analyzes the role methods and impact of aid and suggests that aid should be designed for the long term focussing on land use planning and the circulation of knowledge
Both parts stress the need to adapt the international financial flows for West Africa to the region s internal processes of which the most important is the shift in settlement patterns

Working paper no 7 SAH/D(93)432

L'éducation en Afrique de l'ouest situation, enjeux et perspectives R Pons June 1994 47 pp

Of all the challenges posed by West Africa s population explosion education is without doubt one of the greatest This paper brings together the most recent quantitative data and analyses to show the size of the problems the region is facing now and in the future 24 million children attending primary school in 1990 (60% of the age group) and more than 50 million to educate in the year 2000 The growth in school attendance over the last decade has been slow or even negative at primary and secondary level especially in technical education and apprenticeships However higher education reserved for the urban elite saw considerable and sustained growth up to the end of the 1980s Not only, therefore is there a lack of money and staff but the strategy of allocating resources is out of phase with the needs of the majority especially disadvantaged urban youth

Working paper no 8 SAH/D(93)412

Urbanization in West Africa M Arnaud December 1993 30pp + appendices Available in English and French

This paper describes West African urbanization which, from 1960 to 1980 occurred at three times the highest rate achieved in Europe during the Industrial Revolution This speed of change explains settlement patterns and land use, and the importance of the informal sector the preferred "reception area" for new migrants The city also determines a special social structuring in which 'closeness to the authorities" is the main road to individual and collective wealth The paper deals with meeting basic needs management of urban land, economic activity and social change in terms of how they have developed and adapted to the economic crisis of the 1980s

Working paper no 9 SAH/D(93)444

Evolutions socio-politiques en Afrique de l'ouest synthese des reflexions menees dans le cadre de WALTPS L Bossard March 1995 30 pp

Part I describes the development of authority and the State in West African societies from the pre colonial period to the present day Part II outlines the social and political issues for the future in the light of the conclusions of the WALTPS demo economic analysis the emergence of new classes of rural and urban entrepreneurs the development of the local economy and decentralization the role of the State, social issues involved in urbanization, and so on

Working paper no 10 SAH/D(93)417

Les consequences demographiques de l'epidemie de VIH/SIDA en Afrique de l'Ouest J J Gabas, M Postel and M B Kalasa December 1993 32 pp + appendices

As in so many other areas knowledge of the extent of the AIDS epidemic in Africa is limited What however is known for sure is that, unlike the rest of the world the mode of transmission in Africa is mostly heterosexual Its demographic impact will therefore be greater than elsewhere

Working paper no 11 SAH/D(93)406

Settlement Patterns and the Economy in West Africa J D Naudet November 1992 51 pp + appendices Available in English and French

This paper compares international and West African databases to assess the real economy in West Africa The results of this analysis are then re examined according to two deliberately contrasting and controversial demo economic viewpoints the **predatory city,** bloated distorting the natural regulation of relations with the countryside generating food dependence and unemployment, the **structuring city,** which for all its imbalances creates solvent demand and structures its hinterland

Working paper no 12 SAH/D(93)414

Farm Performance and Population Redistribution in West Africa J M Cour December 1993 33pp + appendices Available in English and French

From 1930 to 2030 the population of West Africa will have increased tenfold and the urban population one hundredfold The farm performance of West Africa over the last thirty years is examined against the background of this enormous population shift Overall, regional food balances have admittedly deteriorated, as production lags some three years behind demand But, contrary to widespread opinion urban eating habits have not become more Western, and West Africa comes second only to the rest of SSA as the region in the world with the lowest per capita food imports However poorly recorded intra regional trade appears to be below expected levels by world standards The model of farm growth led by domestic demand has not worked well The problem is analyzed under four main topics the impact of urban demand on farming what cities offer the countryside in return for food more intensive farming, and the macro economic environment

Working paper no 13 SAH/D(93)405

Modelisation des flux d'echanges exterieurs internationaux 1970 90 (effets structurels, inclinaisons specifiques) et analyse des modeles d'ouverture en Afrique de l'ouest J D Naudet - DIAL February 1993 33 pp + appendices

The paper constructs and analyzes an econometric model explaining world foreign trade behavior as a function of countries structural features In particular it 1) examines the links between a country s size or population and its openness to foreign trade and 2) defines theoretical or potential levels for trade between countries to be used for forecasts or to estimate a region's trade with the rest of the world when combined or divided into countries West Africa is analyzed as an example of openness in a region The analysis shows that West Africa as a whole does not appear to be a special case for exports or imports given its size wealth and domestic prices

Working paper no 14 SAH/D(93)407

Modelisation demo economique des pays en voie de peuplement J D Naudet - DIAL January 1993 33pp
Population in West Africa is usually strangely absent from economic modeling and therefore discussion Demand models ignore the influence of demography Supply models assume often rightly that the labor supply is unlimited separating economy from demography The paper examines ways of integrating population growth and settlement patterns into economic demand models It starts from the idea that population distribution affects economic behavior Its hypothesis is that the main cause and effect of population movements is to regulate income variations throughout society They therefore regulate internal and external shocks to the economy by increasing or diminishing their effects

EXTENSIVE DISSEMINATION AND BROAD DISCUSSION

The interim findings of the experts who have taken part in the WALTPS have been extensively disseminated and discussed in West African countries and donor agencies Members of the study team have also contributed to several internal seminars and discussion sessions organized by different institutions Finally, the main ideas discussed in WALTPS study have been released to the media in West Africa through the network of journalists coordinated by the CINERGIE project

Meetings at different stages of the study

■ Meetings of the Scientific Committee of the study Abidjan, November 1992 and Brussels, January 1994

■ West African experts committee Abidjan, January 1993

■ Meeting of West African political science experts Lagos Nigerian Institute for International Affairs, September 1993

■ Two meetings West African urban experts and Political mutation in West Africa Dakar, November 1993

■ National meeting on the Mali case study Bamako, June 1994

■ Ouagadougou Regional Meeting on the WALTPS September 1994, organized by the CILSS

Presentations and debates

■ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs La Haye, December 1992

■ Commission of the European Community Brussels, February 1993 and January 1994

■ CIDA Ottawa, March 1993 and December 1994

■ The World Bank, Washington D C April 1993, in accordance with the presentation by the NLTPS team

■ USAID, Washington D C , April 1993, March 1994 and December 1994

■ French Ministry of Cooperation Paris, September 1993 and July 1994

■ African Development Bank Abidjan, March 1994

■ Caisse française de developpement Paris, May 1994

■ Global Coalition for Africa Dakar, June 1994

■ Presentation to USAID West Africa mission directors scheduling conference Abidjan, October 1994

■ Inter-ministerial meeting Senegal, November 1994

Contribution and participation

■ Discourse at seminar Desertification and migration Almeria, February 1994

■ Contribution to the evaluation of the politics and projects in the field of road transport European Commission, Brussels, February 1994

■ Meeting concerning the interactions between Nigeria and it's neighbors - Benin, Cameroon, Niger and Chad - in the agriculture sector Cotonou, May 1993

■ Meeting concerning the interactions Nigeria - Niger Zinder, October 1993 and Cotonou, May 1993

■ Participation in the study, Renewable Energy in the Sahel The World Bank, AFTPS, 1994

■ Participation in the seminar Municipal management and decentralization Ouagadougou, Program of Municipal Development, The World Bank, March 1994

■ Contribution to the strategy post-UNCED "Towards environmentally sustainable development in Africa" The World Bank, AFTES, Washington D C

■ Preparation of remarks concerning urban politics and projects in the year 2000 in West Africa The World Bank, AF5in and AF1in, 1994

■ Participation in the Scientific Committee of CIRAD on the theme "Nourrir les villes" Montpellier, June 1994

■ Participation in the training seminar for the French urban sector contributors Paris, sep 1994

■ The United Nations Conference on World Population Cairo, September 1994

Media coverage

■ Articles in the press of numerous countries following the meetings throughout West Africa

■ Awareness seminars for West African journalists Dakar, November 1993 and Abidjan, April 1994

■ Program on Radio Netherlands, December 1993

■ Program "Echos d'Afrique" on Radio France International, March 1994

■ Articles in the Malian press and a televised debate on the occasion of the Mali National Meeting June 1994

■ Report on the study by Television Burkina, September 1994