

INVOLVING COMMUNITIES:

PARTICIPATION IN THE DELIVERY OF EDUCATION PROGRAMS



Research conducted for the ABEL 2 Consortium:
Academy for Educational Development
Creative Associates International, Inc.
Education Development Center
Florida State University
Harvard Institute for International Development
Research Triangle Institute

Office of Field Support and Technical Assistance
Center for Human Capacity Development
Bureau for Global Programs, Field Research, and Support
U.S. Agency for International Development
Contract No. HNE-5832-C-00-4075-00



**INVOLVING COMMUNITIES:
PARTICIPATION IN THE
DELIVERY OF EDUCATION PROGRAMS**

Andrea Rugh, Ph D
and Heather Bossert, M A

Submitted to
ABEL Project
Creative Associates International, Inc
5301 Wisconsin Avenue, NW - Suite 700
Washington, DC 20015

1998

CREATIVE ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, INC

Involving Communities Participation in the Delivery of Education Programs

Contents

Tables	v
Acronyms	vii
Acknowledgments	ix
Executive Summary	xi
PART ONE INTRODUCTION	1
Chapter 1 Background	3
Chapter 2 Methodology	5
PART TWO CASE EXAMPLES	11
Chapter 3 The IMPACT Project in the Philippines	13
Chapter 4 The Harambee Secondary School Movement in Kenya	32
Chapter 5 The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) Experience with Primary Education	56
Chapter 6 The Community Support Program (CSP) in Balochistan	80
Chapter 7 Escuela Nueva in Colombia	101
Chapter 8 Fe y Alegria (FYA) in Bolivia	120
PART THREE CONCLUSIONS	139
Chapter 9 The Practice of Community Participation	141
Chapter 10 Community Participation and the Delivery of Education Programs	162
Bibliography	176

Tables

Table 3 1	Achievement by subject for IMPACT and the conventional system (1978)	24
Table 3 2	Illustrative cost comparisons of IMPACT and the conventional system (1978)	27
Table 3 3	Schools involved in Project IMPACT	28
Table 4 1	Kenyan secondary schools by type (1969-1996)	35
Table 4 2	Selected years of Kenyan secondary school enrollment by school type (1964-87)	44
Table 4 3	Kenyan secondary school enrollment (1988-96)	45
Table 4 4	Pass rates (%) on 1975 EACE by subject and type of school in Kenya	47
Table 4 5	1984 KCE results by school type in Kenya	47
Table 4 6	1981 KCE results in 45 secondary schools in Kenya	48
Table 4 7	Mean annual fees charged in Kenyan secondary schools (Shs)	52
Table 5 1	Scores on NFPE achievement tests (1995)	71
Table 5 2	BRAC expenditures from January 1993 - March 1996 (Tk million)	74
Table 5 3	Primary schools and student enrollment in Bangladesh (1985-1996)	76
Table 6 1	Educational status (%) of females five years and older in Pakistan (1991)	81
Table 6 2	Growth of enrollment by cluster in Turbat, Balochistan, (1992-94)	89
Table 6 3	Student achievement in CSP girls' schools and non-CSP boys' schools (1994)	90
Table 6 4	Achievement scores (%) of girls by grade and type of school (1994)	91
Table 6 5	Attendance in CSP and non-CSP schools (October-December 1994)	93
Table 6 6	Conditions in Balochistan schools during mid-morning school hours (1994)	93
Table 6 7	Number of CSP schools and children enrolled in Balochistan (1992-1994)	96
Table 7 1	Colombian participation rates ¹ (%) by income quintile and residence (1974,1992)	108
Table 7 2	Dropout and promotion rates (%) in Colombian primary schools (1978, 1987)	109
Table 7 3	Dropout and repetition (%) in Escuela Nueva and conventional schools (1987)	110
Table 7 4	Comparison of Escuela Nueva and conventional school student scores (1987)	111
Table 7 5	Achievement scores in Escuela Nueva and conventional schools (1992)	111
Table 7 6	Escuela Nueva schools in Colombia	114
Table 8 1	Fe y Alegría students and centers (1992)	122
Table 8 2	Enrollments in Fe y Alegría programs by country (1991)	123
Table 8 3	FYA - Bolivia overall costs (%) by category	133
Table 8 4	FYA - Bolivia overall contributions (%) by funding source	134
Table 8 5	Fe y Alegria primary education centers by establishment date	135
Table 9 1	Modes of community involvement in education delivery	144
Table 9 2	Community contributions to education delivery	148
Table 9 3	Who is involved in delivering the education program?	151
Table 9 4	Model impacts in relation to the conventional system	155
Table 9 5	Additional outcomes of the case models	158

Acronyms

ABEL 2	Advancing Basic Literacy and Education (phase two) Project
AED	Academy for Educational Development, Washington DC
AEM	Area Education Manager (BRAC)
AIC	Africa Inland Church
AKF	Aga Khan Foundation
BEOC	Basic Education for Older Children Program (BRAC)
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
CAII	Creative Associates International, Inc , Washington DC
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CLC	Community Learning Center (IMPACT)
CPE	Certificate of Primary Education, Kenya
CSP	Community Support Program of Balochistan, Pakistan
DEO	District Education Officer, Pakistan
DECS	Department of Education, Culture, and Sports, the Philippines
DGIS	Directorate General of International Cooperation/ Netherlands Government
DOE	Department of Education, Balochistan, Pakistan
DPE	Directorate of Primary Education, Balochistan, Pakistan
EACE	East African Certificate Exam
EDPITAF	Educational Projects Implementation Task Force, the Philippines
EFA	Education for All
EN	Escuela Nueva
ESP	Educational Support Program (BRAC)
FYA	Fe y Alegría
GOB	Government of Bangladesh (chapter 5) Government of Balochistan (chapter 6)
IA	Instructional Aides (IMPACT)
IDRC	International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada
IMPACT	Instructional Management by Parents, Communities, and Teachers
INNOTECH	SEAMEO Regional Center for Innovation and Technology
IS	Instructional Supervisors (IMPACT)
KCE	Kenyan Certificate Exam
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, Germany
KIP	Key Interested Person (CSP)
LAC	Latin American Countries
MEC	Ministry of Education and Culture (the Philippines)
MFTTU	Mobile Female Teacher Training Unit, (CSP)
MLC	Minimum Learning Competency standards
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, Kenya
MSI	Management Systems International, Washington DC
MTOT	Mobile Training of Teachers Project, Pakistan
MP	Member of Parliament, Kenya
NFPE	Non-Formal Primary Education Program (BRAC)
NGO	Non-government Organization
NO DROPS	No Dropouts Program, the Philippines
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation

NOVIB	Netherlands Organization for International Development Co-operation
NWFP	Northwest Frontier Province, Pakistan
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
P	Philippine peso
PA	Program Assistant (BRAC)
PED	Primary Education Development Program, Pakistan
PEOC	Primary Education for Older Children Program (BRAC)
PO	Program Officer (BRAC)
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
PTSMC	Parent-Teacher School Management Committee, Pakistan
R	rupee (Pakistan)
RCM	Roman Catholic Mission
RDP	Rural Development Program (BRAC)
RM	Regional Manager (BRAC)
SCSPEB	Society for Community Support for Primary Education in Balochistan, Pakistan
SEAMEO	Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization
Sh	shilling (Kenya)
SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority
SMC	School Management Committee
SOUTELE	Survey of Outcomes of Elementary Education, sponsored by SEAMEO INNOTECH
Tk	taka (Bangladesh)
TL	Team Leader (CSP)
TVO	Trust for Voluntary Organizations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UPE	Universal Primary Education
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VEC	Village Education Committee (CSP)
VO	Rural Development Program Village Organization (BRAC)
WVEC	Women's Village Education Committee (CSP)

Acknowledgments

We would like to gratefully acknowledge the help of a number of people who willingly gave of their time and documents so we could better understand the case models in this study. Since a number of the documents fall in the category of “hard to find” or “fugitive,” their help was invaluable.

We want to thank Barbara Rodes at USAID’s Women in Development Office for her assistance in identifying research materials on community participation in general and Michael Wishart at the World Bank photo library and Patricia Adams at the USAID photo library for their assistance in finding appropriate photographs.

For help in locating Kenyan information we want to thank Lynn Ilon and Edith Mukudi at SUNY-Buffalo, Elmanus Vodoti from the Kenya Embassy, and Victor Ombati for gathering data from the Kenyan Ministry of Education in Nairobi. Lillian Traeger, an anthropologist specializing in community development in Africa, read and provided important insights on self-help movements.

Marina Fanning at MSI provided us with materials on the Escuela Nueva project, and Fernando Reimers at the World Bank provided us with very recent papers on both Fe y Alegría and Escuela Nueva. Teresa Kavanaugh at AED and Dunia Arramayo sent us pictures and information on Fe y Alegría in Bolivia and John Swope provided us with his just completed draft of an assessment of Fe y Alegría in nine countries. Anne Sweetser of the ABEL project found time to gather answers for our questions while on a recent visit to the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). She and Beverly Schwartz of AED provided recent photos of children and parents involved in BRAC. Nelly Stromquist and Colette Chabbott also sent up-to-date materials on BRAC, and Leon Clark of American University helped to secure further BRAC documents.

Chloe O’Gara, Sharon Benoliel, Chris Thomas, and Uzma Anzar all contributed invaluable information and pictures of the Community Support Project in Balochistan. Christopher Galaty provided pictures of a Harambee school community in Kenya. Constance Castrence of Creative Associates International, Inc (CAII) and Ricardo Castrence provided research assistance in the Philippines, and one of the key participants in the IMPACT project, Aida Pasigna, was kind enough to give us a telephone interview in the midst of a busy schedule. Bill Cummings of SUNY-Buffalo advised us where to find several out-of-print CIDA documents on IMPACT, including a major assessment he had made in the 1980s. Dick Ammann, a Peace Corps Volunteer teaching in Philippine primary schools during the period of IMPACT, read and commented on the analyses of IMPACT. Doug Rugh designed the sketch for the publication’s cover.

We also want to express our deep appreciation for the support given this project by Jim Hoxeng, May Rihani, and David Chapman, who at all times were willing to help us with advice and solve our technical difficulties. We also want to acknowledge our indebtedness to Cynthia Prather of CAII for providing editing advice.

Without all this help it would have been far more difficult to complete the study. However, in spite of the very major part they played, we do not want to burden these individuals with responsibility for any inadvertent errors of fact or analysis we may have made. For these we take full responsibility ourselves.

Executive Summary

A Purpose

The purpose of this monograph is to assess the effectiveness of community participation in education delivery. The main research questions are

- 1) To what extent are innovative models incorporating community participation effective in delivering education?
- 2) Are there effects that can be attributed directly to community participation?
- 3) How do impact-results of the innovative models compare with those of conventional approaches? Do they, for example
 - develop grassroots institutions and participatory behaviors that serve as a foundation for solving other development problems,
 - increase participation rates, especially of girls and others who have lower rates of involvement in the education system,
 - increase achievement skills,
 - produce intended improvements in the teaching/learning process and environment,
 - increase the sense of accountability of education personnel to parents and students, and
 - require the same or lower costs than the conventional system without compromising results?
- 4) Is there evidence that the innovative models has been accepted by relevant stakeholders? Has it been or is it likely to be
 - replicated widely, and
 - sustained in existing sites?

There are two intended audiences for the study: the first are policy makers and others making decisions about where to invest education resources for productive results, and the second are practitioners looking for cost-effective approaches to problems they face in the field.

B Scope

The study first reviews case documents to develop an understanding of community participation as practice. It looks at the circumstances that made community participation seem an appropriate strategy and assesses the extent to which strategies incorporating community participation led to the intended or other impacts. It also considers a range of independent options to see whether involving community members leads to valued ends in itself. Finally, the study draws implications about the effectiveness of strategies incorporating community participation and uses the evidence to suggest ways of utilizing the strategy in future education initiatives.

Many education delivery models claim to incorporate community participation as a core strategy. Six have been selected for attention in this study by USAID/Washington:

- The IMPACT Project in the Philippines,
- The Harambee Secondary School Movement in Kenya,
- Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh,

- The Community Support Project (CSP) in Balochistan, Pakistan,
- Escuela Nueva in Colombia, and
- Fe y Alegría (FYA) in Bolivia and Venezuela

Though differing considerably in detail, these case examples have characteristics that make them suitable for this study. All claim community participation as a key component in a comprehensive education delivery model. They represent widely separated geographic areas. Most have been in existence long enough to refine their methods and approaches. All are generally perceived as successful by the development community, and all have shown some degree of replication and sustainability.

C Methodology

The study was conducted through review of documents describing the cases, interviews of knowledgeable persons, and selected visits, the mix of approaches determined in each case by the quality of the documentation. The primary sources of information were case reports, assessments, and evaluations of the six models (see Bibliography).

D Findings

1 General conclusions

Evidence from the cases leads to some tentative conclusions about community participation.

- 1) Models for improving the quality and delivery of education programs that incorporate a community participation component can produce results that are equivalent to or greater than those produced by conventional systems. They can produce these results even among student groups that, because of their characteristics, would be expected to show poorer results. It is not possible to say, however, that community participation is responsible in whole or in part for these effects since there are so many confounding factors. One can say that community participation as part of a comprehensive strategy does not prevent the positive effects from occurring.
- 2) Models incorporating community participation can be particularly useful in increasing the educational participation of disadvantaged groups such as the poor, the rural, and girls, as long as there is a way of ensuring their inclusion in groups served by the project. Community involvement in decisions about scheduling, school conditions, and facility location seems to encourage the participation of these special groups.
- 3) Community participation alone, without a productive link to technical experts who produce, deliver, supervise, manage, and reflect on the inputs and outputs of education, is not enough to guarantee the delivery of a quality education program.
- 4) Community participation is more likely to contribute importantly to the delivery of education programs where demand for education exists but circumstances are such that governments have failed to provide an adequate supply of conventional schooling opportunities.
- 5) Communities can be drawn into the process of delivering education in ways that contribute to the formation of institutions of civil society and the practice of democratic values. Doing so may add value, which is in addition to any results community participation may produce as an instrumental strategy in education delivery.

These conclusions have to be phrased as potentialities rather than foregone conclusions since each requires an effort of design or implementation to make it true. Community participation, like any other component, has a cost in money, time, and effort that projects tend to overlook. Beyond these material considerations,

it requires trust and a space to act before communities can be counted on to take independent initiatives in support of education delivery

Project designs need to recognize that

- community participation can be both a valued end and a useful means, but to be either, careful thought must go into how to involve communities and to what purposes,
- community participation may be more appropriate in some contexts and for some purposes than others, and consequently it must be clear why it is used and how to obtain the results expected, and
- community participation has a cost, which must be weighed against trade-offs in lost support for other project components

2 Specific lessons learned

The cases provide some specific lessons on community participation

a Clarifying the purposes of community participation

Community participation is not a panacea for what is going wrong or is missing in educational delivery. Frequently project designers found that their strategies for involving communities did not accomplish all that was expected. They did little in advance, however, to clarify what they hoped to accomplish, and, in most cases, they did not assess or make mid-course corrections to improve its impact when things were not going well. Whether community participation is used as a strategy to augment resources, encourage the enrollment of hard-to-reach groups, extend the government's oversight over schools, or promote the practice of civil society, each of these purposes requires a different kind of design. If expectations are clear from the start, it is apparent when progress is being made or when corrective actions are needed.

b Role of initiators

The role of initiators is a sensitive one, especially when the initiator is an outsider to the village and, even more so, when the outsider is a foreigner. Some of the issues in this relationship include local people's suspicions of outsiders, village sensitivity to being asked to contribute resources, a need for clarity in defining the separate responsibilities of the interacting parties, and an unbalanced power relationship, which puts outsiders in a position of being gatekeepers in granting permission and space for the community to act. Often a person from the local or national culture has a better chance of understanding how to approach these issues sensitively. All the project models used initiators who were nationals, though many came from communities different enough from the local community to make them "cultural outsiders." These outsiders sometimes played the useful role of connecting relatively powerless community members to centralized sources of funding and influence that could help them solve their problems.

c Role of context and focus

The extent to which community participation contributes to education objectives may be affected by a program's focus and the circumstances in which it is implemented. For example, community participation may have little *instrumental* value in programs that emphasize technical aspects of education quality where public delivery of education is reasonably effective and efficient, and where demand for education is well established. Models that focus on program quality find they more urgently require the technical contributions of experts and consequently leave little "space" for autonomous community actions. In these circumstances, education may be viewed as a service, like banking or health, which requires skilled technicians more immediately than community involvement. By contrast, models that focus on expanding opportunities in places where no schools existed before expend more effort in winning over and mobilizing communities, thus providing more room for local initiative.

d Trade-offs in costs

Two main issues relate to resources: one is the expectation that communities can be counted on to contribute significant resources of time, effort, and money to the support of education delivery, the other is the question of how much of a project's resources need to be devoted to mobilizing and sustaining community interest. Often the two are considered interrelated when they are not. Mobilizing community interest, for example, may not necessarily lead to significant community support.

Community participation can be costly. Overall, the projects tended to "front load" their investments in community participation with discussion meetings, surveys, and initiation activities to establish schools/programs, and then expected communities to take over and continue to support the programs. In several cases, the level and quality of the participation quickly diminished because community members were not given neither the space to act nor a sense of the independent responsibilities they might assume.

When community participation becomes a valued end in the delivery of education, the resource question becomes even more crucial. The costs to a project of establishing mechanisms that support the practice of democratic values can be considerably higher than those to a project that only views community participation as an instrument of education delivery. The question then becomes, "Can such activities be incorporated into the design of projects without compromising other components or without adding an insupportable burden to the costs?"

Community participation involves some costs. Policy makers should be asking themselves: 1) Does community participation enhance the delivery of education programs enough to compensate for the resources diverted from other education components? or 2) Is community participation important enough in itself to warrant the resources diverted to promote it? The cases give some evidence that an education delivery model can include a community participation component without costing more or sacrificing learning when compared with the conventional system.

e Fitting the culture

One of the interesting aspects of several models was the extent to which innovations required participants to modify their behaviors in ways directly in conflict with their own local cultural traditions. This is important for two reasons. First, it means project designers were assuming that only certain practices are effective in the delivery of education programs, ones they believed were not present in the then-existing delivery system. As an example, the assumption that only certain learning approaches are effective is questionable, since it is known that children learn by a wide variety of means, and even rote memorization systems ultimately lead to some kinds of learning (and with modification could become more productive).

The second point is that it is far more costly to change behavior drastically all at once than it is to let behavior evolve slowly while building the necessary structures to support change. In the first case nothing in the surrounding culture is ready to support the change and resistance is almost guaranteed. Indeed, practices of any kind—including instructional practices—that are influenced by indigenous sources inevitably conform to cultural principles and protect what is vital in the culture. Even a method as internationally reviled as rote memorization protects something that is valued locally and can only be replaced successfully with something that participants feel at a gut cultural level has similar or greater value.

f Reflection

In retrospect (and from afar), it is possible to see weaknesses in the way the projects involved communities and delivered education programs. For example, all the models except *Fey y Alegría* were heavily weighted toward start-up activities—clearly defined first steps to initiate the program and involve the community but very little in the way of follow-through activities to determine if the program was producing results, or where it might be weak and need strengthening. As a substitute for these activities, most of the

projects depended on external evaluations several years after the start of activities to determine how well they compared with the conventional system (which most had previously considered inadequate) While external evaluation is an essential step, it does not substitute for routine monitoring of progress and subsequent corrective measures throughout the duration of the project Only one model, BRAC, created a comprehensive process for reflection that allowed it routinely to assess how its components were working

A system for reflection is key, but even with a good one installed in a project, it may be difficult to convince authorities to act on the basis of results Education bureaucracies are often not geared to results-based planning, and evidence of positive impact does not necessarily lead to the adoption of good innovations, as several of the cases demonstrated Perhaps this attitude can be changed if projects direct more of their focus and more of their investment to routine follow-through activities, and funders connect more of their resources to the production of results In the study cases, one feels that if implementors had reflected in this systematic way on the impact of community involvement, better results might have emanated from this strategy

g Piloting and bringing to scale

In different ways, all the implementors discovered that it was one thing to develop and pilot an innovative model, and another to bring it to scale Often strategies crucial to the innovation were no longer feasible during massification, and a whole new set of issues emerged that had not been present in the pilot phase

Models take time to refine and test before they are ready for large-scale expansion, and even then another period of time may be needed to test modifications specifically made for massifying the innovation The models that included a quality component took the longest time to develop Even when expansion was carried out with relative efficiency, the implementors found it necessary to adapt program elements used during the pilot phase Some cut their supervisory visits, while others “scripted” and standardized their instructional programs to reach large numbers of teachers and students Yet others found that with expansion they met resistance from traditional elements of the bureaucracy, an absence of effective national leadership, and lack of parental enthusiasm

h Elusiveness of quality

One final rather startling finding was how elusive a commodity quality was to the designers and implementors of the programs in these case models Despite considerable effort focused on improving the quality of programs, there was little difference in the achievement levels of children in the experimental and conventional systems, nor in most cases was there an appreciable change in the methods of teaching/learning While there may be many explanations for this phenomenon—poor tests, achievement as an inadequate measure of quality, more disadvantaged children in the experimental programs, etc—it is instructive that the designers of four programs (BRAC, CSP, FYA, and Harambee) redirected their focus from quantity to quality concerns over the course of their projects because they were not satisfied with the results The final two (IMPACT and Escuela Nueva) started with a main focus on quality but also were unable to demonstrate to many others that they had achieved their objectives

3 Implications of the findings

The reasons for initiating most of the innovative models was a need to expand effective education opportunities and a realization that governments could not satisfy that need with existing capacities and resources The problem is one that is likely to intensify in the future, making it almost inevitable that the present situation of virtually free education will change Part of the problem is the almost universal expectation that a complete education “package” must include high-cost buildings and furnishings, expensively qualified teachers, and resource-intensive support structures The study models show that this expectation does not need to be met and that children can learn on their own, helping one another in simple kiosk-learning environments, or with para-professional teachers, and with parents monitoring attendance and

instruction. These projects are some of the first serious attempts to find answers to the problem of limited resources and expanding needs. If they have one lesson to teach, it is that learning can take place in more cost-effective ways than most conventional systems now offer.

The case models ranged from “supply-driven” (outsider-initiated) to “demand-driven” (community-initiated) models. Of the supply-driven models there were low community involvement (BRAC, IMPACT, and Escuela Nueva) and high community involvement models (CSP and FYA). A supply-driven model satisfies the needs identified by a supplier of education services—a government agency, donor, or NGO, within national time, effort, and resource constraints. By contrast, a demand-driven model (Harambee) satisfies the consumers of education products and is constrained mainly by community resource limitations and capacities. If an outside initiator is used in demand-driven models, this person’s role is one of negotiating the “rules of engagement” rather than directly specifying community needs or what the community must do to become engaged. A demand-driven approach is unusual enough to require developers to reorganize their thinking about community participation and its relation to education delivery. Ironically it fits donor definitions calling for local decision making, which, as the cases have shown, are rarely put into practice.

4 Some suggested models

Three hypothetical approaches derived from the successes and failures in the case models are described briefly below and at greater length in the final part of this work, which focuses on conclusions. Their purpose is to suggest implications for the future mobilization of communities.

a An Accountability Model Issue-focused community participation

In settings where education services are reasonably effectively delivered and supported, and parents are already convinced of the benefits of schooling, one might reasonably ask why resources should be diverted from other crucial education elements in order to mobilize community support. Organizations, like PTAs, for linking school and community may already exist to motivate parental support and may not, in any case, be appropriate candidates for solving other development problems.

Environments such as these suggest the need for a focused involvement of communities to address specific education issues. One area of weakness in all the models was a lack of accountability of staff to parents for program quality. This suggests that parents might be “emboldened” to exert their rights as clients and to demand accountability from responsible education authorities. Facilitators might work with both groups to develop institutional channels and mechanisms of accountability, assessment, and feedback (meetings, student reports, etc), and assist parents’ organizations to define their role in demanding quality schooling for their children. Experts would set the standards, and officials would account for their ability or inability to meet the standards, explaining to parents how they would plan to correct problems. The role of the facilitators would be to negotiate both parties’ contributions to quality. The PTA could be strengthened to serve as the institutional venue for these activities linking parents and responsible officials.

b A Partnership Model High community involvement

A high involvement model—somewhat like that of CSP, may be called for in environments where children do not participate sufficiently in schooling programs, and/or where there are major deficiencies in the government’s ability to provide education services. In this model, the involvement of parents in decisions about school locations and daily scheduling may make them more comfortable about sending their children to school. Parents in this context can also make significant contributions by filling the gaps left by the inadequacies of government. They can contribute materially and in-kind to the inputs of learning, extend the oversight of government by monitoring teacher and student attendance and performance, and provide solutions to minor problems between visits of responsible officials. In this model, the facilitator role is to empower communities to take their own independent initiatives to solve problems and then to see that they are given sufficient space to act upon them. Facilitators also need to pay attention to accountability issues so parents will feel the risks they have taken in supporting the school have been worthwhile.

The high involvement model, which is a likely option for remote communities where literacy is low and where institutions for community participation are weak or nonexistent, provides an ideal opportunity to build the structures of representative governance and the practice of civic responsibility. The institutions established to support education delivery may ultimately become the channels for solving development problems in other social sectors.

c A Demand Model: Communities request appropriate services

As it becomes increasingly difficult for governments to support the costs of universal education, communities may assume a larger role in “ordering” the specific services they need and paying a larger share of their costs. Government agencies may, in this scenario, take responsibility for developing and testing packaged options, providing training or qualified personnel to implement selected packages, and credentializing students as they complete various options. To cut costs, education could become a transportable commodity, housed in any convenient location, and consisting of the basics—an instructional manager, learners, and materials—while shedding such expensive “frills” as permanent facilities and unneeded support systems. Harambee and Fe y Alegría models alert us to what demand models might be. Fe y Alegría to program options that suit the needs of individual communities, and Harambee to the considerable energies that can be harnessed when communities decide they will organize their own services. Harambee also shows the crucial need for a servicing agency to provide quality components beyond the technical capacities of communities.

Options would include a variety of programs of different course offerings, packaged to be completed in varying lengths of time (years, number of hours each day) and designed for different age groups in teacher-managed or self-instructional modes. The cases studied here provide tested examples of a variety of these options, the only difference being that they are not presented as an array of options from which a community might choose. The options need not stop with packages for formal learning, and indeed they might include training/learning of a variety of kinds: literacy, pre-vocational, vocational, life skills, continuing education, etc.

The facilitator’s role in this model is to assist communities in choosing appropriate options and in planning how to support and pay for them. A process might be adopted whereby the community forms a representative committee, elicits the education priorities of various groups within the society, and decides what its long-term goals for education services are and what it can afford to support. The government might base costs on a scale of subsidies that reflects national priorities for an educated citizenry and might offer communities a variety of cost-cutting options such as using local volunteers or reducing costs by “recycling” the program a number of times. The government might offer subsidies for poorer communities or reward communities that include hard-to-reach groups. To service these needs, government agencies would need to restructure themselves to become service-oriented organizations, an innovation several of the models show us they would find hard to do. However, as long as ministries of education insist on costly conventional schooling packages, the delivery of education will remain a top-down phenomenon rather than a matter of community choice and decision making.

E A Final Word

Community participation as an instrumental means was neither a necessary nor a sufficient element in the delivery of quality education in any of the cases studied here. Except in the harsh environment of Balochistan or in Harambee’s context of deprivation, community participation alone was neither responsible for, nor probably even a major factor in any measurable advantages of these innovative school delivery models over the conventional systems. The cases do show overall, however, specific community contributions that may have added incrementally to each of the dimensions and might have offered more if they had been designed and funded differently. It is undeniable that participation added a richness to some of the education programs that they might not otherwise have had, and in some cases even contributed modestly to the practice of civil society. As an instrumental means, however, community participation was only one element in a multi-faceted model whose contributions have to be considered as a whole.



USAID photo

PART ONE
INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1 Background

A Introduction

Since 1994 the Advancing Basic Education and Literacy (ABEL 2) Project has supported several small studies to determine whether particular interventions have proven effective in producing intended impacts in education. The purpose of the studies is to provide information on types of interventions that appear to be most promising in improving education results.

B Purposes and audiences

1 Purposes

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the effectiveness of innovative models for education delivery that incorporate community participation as a key feature. Do the models provide effective strategies for delivering mass education? Do they enable governments to serve difficult-to-reach populations? What is the purpose of community participation and what role do community members play? How are the communities involved? What do they contribute? How necessary are they to the results? Do these models for education delivery produce results that are cost-effective compared with conventional systems? How do they compare in terms of program quality?

2 Audiences

There are two intended audiences for the study: policy makers and others making decisions about where to invest resources for productive results, and practitioners looking for cost-effective approaches to the problems they face in the field. For policy makers, the results are formulated in a way that indicates the kind and character of impacts and their cost implications. For practitioners, the models are described in sufficient detail for them to know whether they are worth investigating further. To the extent possible from the documentation, impacts of the models are reported in quantitative and qualitative form to assist in evaluating the efficacy of the approaches.

C Research questions

The main research questions are

- 1) To what extent are innovative models incorporating community participation effective in delivering education?
- 2) Are there effects that can be attributed directly to community participation?
- 3) How do results of the innovative models compare with those of conventional approaches? Do they, for example
 - develop grassroots institutions using participatory behaviors that can continue to solve development problems?
 - increase participation rates, especially of girls and others who have lower rates of involvement in the education system?
 - increase achievement?
 - produce intended improvements in the teaching/learning process and environment?
 - increase accountability of education personnel to parents and students?
 - require the same or lower costs without compromising results?

4) Is there evidence that the innovative model has been accepted by relevant stakeholders? Has it been or is it likely to be

- replicated widely?
- sustained in existing sites?

Specifically, the study will review case documents to develop an understanding of community participation as practice. It will determine the circumstances that made community participation seem an appropriate strategy. It will assess the extent to which strategies incorporating community participation led to intended or other impacts, and it will consider a range of independent options to see whether involving community members leads to valued ends in itself. Finally, the study will draw implications about the effectiveness of strategies incorporating community participation and use the evidence to suggest ways of utilizing the strategy in future education initiatives.

D Selection of case examples

There are many examples of education delivery models claiming to incorporate community participation as a core strategy. Six have been selected for attention in this study by USAID/Washington:

- The IMPACT Project in the Philippines,
- The Harambee Secondary School Movement in Kenya,
- Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh,
- The Community Support Project (CSP) in Balochistan, Pakistan,
- Escuela Nueva in Colombia, and
- Fe y Alegria (FYA) in Bolivia and Venezuela

Several have been replicated widely in a number of countries, but for the purposes of this study, they are only studied in the countries named above.

Though differing considerably in detail, the case examples have certain characteristics that make them suitable for this study. All claim community participation as a key component in a comprehensive education delivery model. Individually, they represent widely separated geographic areas of the world, with Escuela Nueva and FYA the only two occupying the same continent. All but CSP in Balochistan (which started in 1992) have been in existence since the 1960s or 1970s and have therefore had considerable time to work out their methods and approaches. All are generally perceived as successful by the development community. All have shown some degree of replication, and all have proved sustainable at some level. Though most of the cases are well-known by reputation, most are not known in enough detail to make cross-cutting policy generalizations or to use as models for future project design.

The fact that only six cases are represented here does not mean that others might not have proven equally or more instructive. Time simply does not permit a wider-ranging study. The organizational framework for these cases, however, can be easily extended to the analysis of other examples to see if the conclusions that appear to hold true for these cases would also hold true for others.

Chapter 2 Methodology

A Overview

The study was conducted through a review of documents describing the cases, interviews of knowledgeable persons, and selected visits, the mix of approaches determined in each case by the quality of the documentation. The primary sources of information were case reports, assessments, and evaluations of the six models (see Bibliography). This information was supplemented in a variety of ways. A member of the Creative Associates International, Inc (CAII) staff visited the Philippines to gather information on IMPACT, and later a designated representative of CAII interviewed key personnel in person and by telephone to complete the IMPACT information. BRAC information was brought up-to-date by an ABEL researcher who was on her own study mission to Bangladesh. The in-depth studies of CSP in Balochistan and FYA in Bolivia have recently been completed. For the latest information on CSP, we were fortunate to have access to the notes of interviews taken by an assessment team with key CSP staff members in May 1997. Escuela Nueva is a well-known and well-documented project that has been implemented in several countries and thousands of schools, with numerous reports, assessments, and critiques available. In studying this case, the difficulty was in drawing accurate conclusions from the plethora of data. Harambee is a model of a different nature, with much written about it, though frequently from a selective, politically inspired perspective. As a case, it contrasts nicely with the range of "initiated" community participation forms, showing what happens when communities take matters into their own hands. To obtain up-to-date information, it was necessary to draw on the network of a Kenyan student studying in the United States. We were able to fill most of the information gaps, but a few questions remained.

B Theoretical considerations and cautions

Community participation means many things to many people as we discovered in pursuing this study. From these six cases, one would have to say that the reputation of community participation as a delivery approach is somewhat overblown because of the confusion in what it is and what part it can play in modern-day conceptions of education service. Whatever the meaning and whatever the role, however, community participation does not operate in a vacuum when it appears. It exists as part of a model that defines the content, pedagogies, actors, and other inputs in an education program as well as the activities the community will perform. Often it is the other elements rather than community participation that carry the project and produce the results.

Consequently, it is difficult to isolate the precise impact of community participation on education delivery, either on its own or in terms of its relative share of a program's impact (except in such specific terms as the cost of constructing a school). It is also difficult to conclude that the community effort was sufficient to cause any particular impact. In relatively few instances can results be attributed directly to community involvement. At the same time it is clear that community participation contributed importantly to results under the special circumstances of some cases.

Because of these difficulties, it is easier to claim results for a comprehensive education delivery model that includes community participation as a component than to try to determine its specific results. This is partly a practical matter of using the forms of data that are available, but it is also a matter of complex systems where the components may all contribute their small part to the outcomes without carrying much weight on their own. Only when combined do they create the synergy that produces measurable results.

Caution is still required even when comparing the innovative program as a complex whole with the conventional system. These innovative delivery models, especially in pilot form, may offer unique combinations of leadership initiatives, additional funding, special supervision, motivated management, and a Hawthorne effect of focusing greater attention on experimental schools, which make them a unique time-bound phenomenon. It may be impossible to bring them to scale with the same results, as Escuela Nueva for one example so clearly discovered. Similarly these unique circumstances may also prevent the model

system from being reliably compared with a “neglected” conventional system. The best evidence of success may come from wide replication of the model or sustainability over time, with results that continue to compare favorably with both the pilot program and the conventional system.

Keeping these points in mind, we reviewed the case evidence for specific contributions that could be attributed to community involvement. Then we reviewed the evidence again from the perspective that something intrinsically good exists in community participation itself that is worth supporting as long as the model that incorporates it produces satisfactory results without adding significantly to the costs. In this second approach, the impacts of the innovative model were compared to those of the traditional system to assess their comparative advantages, with community participation being taken as one of these advantages, all else being equal.

The cases show two important limitations in explicating community participation processes. The first is that “community” is more narrowly defined in most of these cases than may be its present understanding among some donor agencies. In these models, “community” refers to the beneficiaries of a narrowly described catchment area—parents, students, and other local individuals who directly, indirectly or potentially might benefit from the delivery of education. There is no reference in the designs to the interests of the larger “community of stakeholders” in government, regional offices, and NGOs, though their presence is implied in a number of implementation activities. This study uses the narrow meaning of community as local beneficiaries.

The second major limitation constitutes a finding in itself. Though all the cases presented here have a reputation for successful involvement of community members, in fact, most assign a fairly limited role to community. Two important questions are raised by this finding. First, is there an important value that community participation can add to education delivery models? Is this value invariably welcomed in all circumstances or only under special conditions? Who are the gatekeepers of community participation who give permission and space for community members to act? Some understanding of these questions is important in order to determine whether the potential in community participation is limited or whether it might play a more significant role if given a chance.

The second question is somewhat different. If community participation is a valued end in itself as many people argue, then an essential question is whether the case examples provide evidence of those beneficial ends—usually defined as community institutions and participatory behaviors that lead to the strengthening of civil society. And if so, are models incorporating community participation, which require more effort and resources, still cost-effective in terms of education outcomes? It is interesting to note in this respect that three of the models (IMPACT, BRAC, and Escuela Nueva) have not involved communities as fully as they had originally expected, though only one (BRAC) explicitly states that one reason was the poor cost-benefit ratio of their involvement. These issues are investigated in this study by looking at how the models stand up to traditional measures of education delivery—including costs and evidence that institutions of civil society develop as a result of the implementation of the models.

C Framework for the reporting of cases

1 Organization

The cases are organized in five sections that highlight their main characteristics. The first section describes the background conditions in the country that led to the model’s design and implementation. The second and third sections provide a general description of the model as it was intended to be implemented, including a section on the part the community plays in supporting the model and one that describes the content and organization of the school program being delivered. The fourth section looks at actual impacts that were obtained after implementing the model and compares those models where possible and relevant to those of existing conventional systems. Finally, most models had some outstanding issues that participants or outside observers felt were unresolved after implementation. These are summarized along with lessons learned that are relevant to understanding community participation and the delivery of quality education programs.

2 Indicators of impact

The indicators used in this study are common measures of impact in education programs. Developers often assume that models stressing community participation will produce positive changes in some if not all of the indicators.¹ Among their expectations are that more children will participate in schooling programs to higher levels, that learning will increase, that program quality will improve, that programs will become more accountable to their customers in the community, and that costs will be reduced. It is also expected that the model will be replicated widely and that it will be sustained over time in existing sites. These last two indicators reflect a capacity to successfully implement and some degree of long-term acceptance of the model's worth.

A final indicator measures the extent to which community institutions and capacities are strengthened to solve education and other development problems. Some planners, for example, see community participation as a valued end in itself, believing it is the right of beneficiaries to make their own decisions about matters that affect their lives. Or they see the encouragement of community participation as an educational obligation to model "good practice"—meaning the active practice of principles taught in schools. Others see community participation as a necessary condition for various other social goods to occur, including the democraticization and development of the society. As evidence of this last kind of community participation, an observer might expect to find grassroots institutions and participatory behaviors encouraged that support civil society. The study also looks at this kind of evidence.

Each of the potential impacts is discussed below, first by providing illustrative indicators that in the right context might be taken as evidence of a positive impact, and then by suggesting a logical connection between community participation and the impact. Designs may assume the connection or take the presence of the community contributions a priori as a "richness" having value. In the actual cases, of course, each indicator must be evaluated in light of behavior that has gone before the project or that is customary in the conventional program.

a Community participation and the development of civil society

Evidence for the strengthening of civil society might be found in cases where community members

- initiate ideas for education improvements,
- solicit consensus on local priorities,
- make important decisions about the design and management of projects,
- form representative bodies to act for the community,
- contribute resources to solve community needs,
- monitor essential education inputs,
- actively solve community problems and assume civic responsibilities,
- mobilize campaigns in support of education, and
- demand accountability for program results from education staff

Comprehensive community involvement might encourage many if not all of these behaviors.

b Educational participation

Enhanced educational participation might be indicated where there are

- increases in the number of children who enroll in school,

¹ Project documents are strikingly devoid of any mention of what community participation means or how its accomplishments should be measured. The implication is, however, that communities can contribute to almost any aspect of education delivery and for that reason conventional indicators have been used here to measure the success of the comprehensive models.

- increases in the number of disadvantaged children, such as girls, and rural and poor children, who enroll in school,
- decreases in the number of dropouts,
- increases in the number who complete the primary stage,
- decreases in the number of those repeating grades, and
- increases in the numbers of those going on to higher stages

Community participation is often linked to educational participation through the provision of resources that increase the number of conveniently located schools, through the creation of more conducive conditions for participation such as better scheduling of classes, through changes in attitudes about the benefits of education, through community mobilization activities, and through effecting better communication between schools and families

c Achievement

Learning is increased (according to most of the project evaluators) if the innovative program produces students who

- exceed test results of a comparison group in the conventional system,
- equal or exceed the test results of conventional program students at lower cost, and/or
- equal or exceed test results of conventional students where the innovative program's students would be expected to perform less well ²

Community participation has been linked to learning/achievement in several ways. Community members can ensure that the material inputs required for quality schooling are in place, see that children and teachers attend classes regularly, help children with schoolwork, and make sure they have enough time to do their homework

d Program quality

Program quality is considered enhanced by the innovative model if, by the definition of its designers, it improved upon the quality of the conventional system. Most of the case models incorporated design features to improve program quality. This results section looks at whether these features were implemented according to the designers' intent and produced the results they anticipated. For example, a quality program might

- produce students who are better socialized, have higher self-esteem, and are neater, more disciplined, and more responsible,
- stress learning that is problem-solving and analytical,
- create student-centered, active learning,
- provide mastery, self-paced, or peer learning, and
- appear more attractive to students

Community participation has been linked to program quality through activities such as identifying qualified local teachers, actively monitoring teacher's instruction, volunteering teaching assistance and skill instruction, ensuring the regular attendance of children, etc. Community members may also communicate their expectations for a quality education and the characteristics of an educated adult

² For example, when characteristics of the target children (such as poverty) conflict with school work or when project factors (such as costs or paraprofessional teachers) suggest that if these features had been present in the conventional system, the achievement would have been less

e Accountability

An innovative program might be said to have enhanced accountability if staff

- regularly report student progress to parents,
- organize meetings where parents come to the school to discuss matters related to education,
- modify the program to make it more relevant to the expressed needs of families, as in adjusting school scheduling,
- provide feedback to program designers and policy makers to improve the program, and
- create channels of communication so parents and students can resolve problems with policies and procedures

When community members take an active role in financing, managing, and monitoring school programs and identifying teachers and principals, school staff may feel more obligated to account for results

f Costs

An innovative model might be said to have enhanced cost-effectiveness if the direct costs to the program were

- less than in conventional systems while producing the same or better learning results,
- more than in conventional systems while producing significantly better learning results, and
- the same as the conventional systems while producing the same or better learning results in an at-risk population

Community participation has often been seen as a way to increase the resource base for education programs—through money, materials, labor, and effort. Sometimes innovative programs can only stay within budget through these community contributions, which has implication for sustainability. Another important indicator, with implications for participation, is a comparison of costs to parents of schooling their children in the innovative or the conventional system.

g Replication

An innovative program has probably garnered wide acceptance if it has been replicated and brought to scale. Replication requires several elements: leadership in initiating activities, technical support, motivation, and a commitment of resources. Replication is unlikely to occur if these conditions do not exist. Because a model is not replicated, however, does not mean it is not replicatable, or is a failure. The section on replication in each case asks the question “To what extent was the model replicated and brought to scale in diverse geographic areas?” Community participation is assumed to contribute to replication either when community members actively seek the program or when they have been actively involved in the process of establishing the model. The modalities of involvement cover a wide variety of activities.

h Sustainability

An innovative program is considered sustained when it has continued to exist in reasonably original form for an indefinite period of time after initial implementation and/or a declared period of piloting is completed. A sustained model reflects a degree of acceptance and “ownership” of an innovative program. Sustainability requires a number of conditions to exist: the resources to support the model’s components, the human skills to carry it out, the acceptance of the model’s value by those who decide to continue it, and

some kind of continuing positive reinforcement from its results to motivate those sustaining it. The section in the case studies that discusses sustainability asks the question, "Was the model sustained after its initial implementation with available resources and personnel?" Designers often assume that community involvement in a pilot phase will develop the enthusiasm to shoulder long-term support for innovative programs.

PART TWO
CASE EXAMPLES

Chapter 3 The IMPACT Project in the Philippines

Components of IMPACT, Philippines Model

Education context	high population growth, long history of education, limited resources
Community involvement strategy	survey, seminars of parents and teachers, establishment of steering committees
Targets	rural children
Local institutions established	steering committees (SMC)
Membership criteria	local and regional officials
Community contributions to enrollment objectives	building kiosks for learning
education delivery	steering committee mobilized resources, solved problems
quality	parents taught special skills, helped with tutoring children
Program type	formal primary education
Length of program	5 to 7 years—self-paced, 8 1/2 hours a day with conventional school year
Students in class-group	6 to 10
Students per teacher	100+ (teacher = Instructional Supervisor)
Single or multigrade	“family” of mixed ability children
Instructional approach	programmed teaching by peers or self-instruction
Instructional materials	self-learning modules based on objectives
Curriculum	based on government curriculum objectives
Assessment	at end of each “block” of modules
Teacher qualifications	conventional requirements of government
Training	special orientation/in-service training
Supervision	conventional supervision
Instructional facility	small kiosks and Community Learning Center converted from classroom space
Supplies	modules funded by the school
Managers	conventional system of principals, supervisors
Major issues	funding for modules lack of government support

A Background

In 1972, a major assessment of education in the Philippines resulted in the Education Development Act, a plan to improve the quality of facilities and make the content of education more relevant to the local context. In the same year, the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO)¹ organized a working group of key educators from its eight member countries to establish priorities for education in the

¹ The SEAMEO secretariat and its offshoot, INNOTECH received support from USAID in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Later when the IMPACT concept was adopted by Liberia and Bangladesh, USAID also provided support

1970s The reasons for launching the initiative were that fewer than half the children in the member nations completed the six-year primary cycle and resources were inadequate to accommodate further enrollment in the conventional system The response of the group² was to initiate “a management system for mass primary education” called Instructional Management by Parents, Communities, and Teachers (IMPACT) IMPACT was a joint undertaking of the SEAMEO Regional Center for Innovation and Technology (INNOTECH) and the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC), and was funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Canada

The objective of Project IMPACT was to develop an effective and economical delivery system for mass primary education The Project was designed around the following principles

- Education should be available to all who need it, including those who have dropped out of school or never had the opportunity to go to school
- Learning materials should be based on the existing primary school curricula so students could pass official exams
- The essence of education is the learning process and therefore the child should be encouraged to learn through self-study rather than lectures
- Learning is lifelong and can take place anywhere
- Children should be allowed multiple entry and exit to schooling with progress based on mastery and individual pacing
- Education should provide for socialization and leadership training with group work being the primary mode of learning
- Education is the responsibility of parents, *the community*, and the government
- The teacher is the manager of the learning process³

Since teacher costs were 80-90 percent of the unit costs of conventional schools, the project concentrated much of its energies on reducing these costs (Cummings 1986 6)

IMPACT was launched in 1974 in five Philippine⁴ villages of Naga, Cebu with a total enrollment of 1,068 students In 1977 it was expanded to additional sites in Lapu-Lapu City of Cebu, Mactan Island, and Sapang Palay of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan Altogether according to officials only 11⁵ schools adopted the model, although the original intent was to expand the project to cover all of the primary schools in the country Each site was supervised by a member of the project staff, who in turn was supervised by a National Steering Committee of senior MEC officials This committee was expected to approve the project and mobilize support for it among lower level members in the Ministry

Despite its heralded successes, IMPACT has fallen into neglect in recent years and therefore provides a good case example of “why a good idea fails”⁶ There has been no continuous monitoring nor evaluation of the project since 1979, and personnel in the IMPACT offices of INNOTECH in March 1997 were uncertain whether the IMPACT model was even still being implemented in the original schools The descriptions that follow come from documents that were written over a decade ago and from recent interviews with IMPACT officials

B Community involvement

The few pages in IMPACT documents that touch on community participation describe how field facilita-

² A regional conference in 1973 featured Douglas Ellson’s Malayan experiments in programmed instruction which inspired INNOTECH staff, including O Claveria of the Philippines, to propose a similar program to IDRC

³ IMPACT Officer’s response to questionnaire, May 1997

⁴ The experiment was also launched in four pilot villages in Indonesia that are not reported here

⁵ Other reports say 12 sites (Wooten 1982 vii) and 33 schools (Thiagarajan and Pasigna 1988 21)

⁶ See McGinn 1996 paper for discussion of the same topic regarding Escuela Nueva



In IMPACT, younger children such as these are taught by older students
USAID photo

tors from INNOTECH, and later district officers and school staff, were intended to involve communities in support of the new program. The facilitators should introduce IMPACT through three activities: 1) a complete survey of the community's available resources (skilled persons and potential material support), during which they were "to inform" parents about IMPACT and the "anticipated problems of academic instruction and attendance," 2) a series of seminars with, first, teachers alone, then parents alone, and then both together to discuss the rationale of IMPACT and the roles the different actors would play in the process, and 3) the formation of a steering group of local and provincial officials, whose job it was "to disseminate information about IMPACT" (McKee N d a)

The "activities that could be delegated to pupils and parents (were) (a) parents could monitor their children's progress, (b) both could collect materials for the Community Learning Center (CLC), the new name under IMPACT for the school building, and (c) both could set up the CLC" (Flores 1981 35). The "role of the local steering committee in the CLC (was) (a) to secure funds for the maintenance of the CLC, (b) to assist the Instructional Supervisor (IS), the new name for the teacher, in solving problems of the CLC, (c) to assist the IS in providing community resources, and (d) to act as advisory body for concomitant problems" (Flores 1981 36).

One official estimated it took about a year for start-up of the program, "to stock the schools and to fully inform the community of the benefits of the project." During this time, communities were told of the active part they would play in the initiative. They were to 1) provide labor⁷ for school improvements, 2) teach skills (to housewives, farmers, carpenters, healthworkers, and others), 3) tutor⁸ students, and 4) help their children study learning modules at home. They were also to motivate their children to learn and provide feedback on their progress through the PTA and other school meetings, and in letters to the school (Socrates 1982).

School staff were expected to organize programs and festivals to encourage parents to visit the school and see what their children were learning. IMPACT sought to intensify the community role through financial contributions and learning support, which they believed would make community members feel they had more of a stake in the outcomes of the school. The CLC was supposed to become the hub of all learning activities where the school and the community would come together. As one observer noted, the original idea for IMPACT "confidently, but mistakenly, (assumed) that community educational resources are available and can be easily mobilized" (Cummings 1986 7).

⁷ Local officials were expected to provide materials and funds for construction.

⁸ High school students were given community service credit for tutoring children once a week. Many were resistant at first because it took time from their own studies but, according to one report, later accepted the idea when they found it satisfying to work with the younger children.



An outdoor kiosk is used for grouping learners in a Filipino school
USAID photo

In actuality, community contributions were modest “As long as (the contributions) did not interfere with the survival activities of the people, they were given freely though intermittently When a regular commitment was required, resistance or noncompliance resulted the local steering committee assigned parents to act as teacher aides The volunteers reported during the first few weeks but soon stopped coming” (Flores 1981 39)

Another expected contribution was the tutoring of IMPACT students by high school students The problem of distance between the high school and the project schools, however, discouraged the volunteers and they were absent or late, and therefore were not a reliable support Efforts to attract community members to use the

CLC’s library and self-instructional materials also received a lukewarm response, and the center remained a place for children (Flores 1981 39)

C School innovations

IMPACT documents (as well as recent interviews with officials who were involved in IMPACT) suggest that it was the innovative method of teaching/learning that was considered the hallmark of the IMPACT project rather than the community participation that was heralded in its name The design was developed by a technical working group of educators convened under the auspices of SEAMEO’s INNOTECH and the MECs of the SEAMEO member states The designers came from universities, research institutions, and member ministries There are six regional centers, two of which—in the Philippines and Indonesia—chose to implement the IMPACT experiment The original INNOTECH office in Saigon was moved to the Philippines in 1976, which meant that the experiment was more closely monitored in that country The discussion here relates to the way the model was carried out in the Philippines

The Philippine “experiment received an intensive dose of foreign technical aid in the beginning, (while) afterwards it was mainly on its own and thus, perhaps appeared more authentic Partly due to this early aid, the Philippines IMPACT project was the quickest to develop and publish results indicating success, (and) stayed closer to INNOTECH’s original design” (Cummings 1986 11)

The IMPACT model can be broken down into four components learning, curriculum, teaching, and management/supervision In IMPACT, the school becomes a “Community Learning Center” housing the library, records, offices, and testing center Students study in learning kiosks built by community members around the school grounds The school day starts at 7 30 and ends at 4 00 The children clean the school for a half-hour in the morning and work in the school garden for an hour in the afternoon

1 Learning

Student learning in IMPACT is self-paced with progress measured by achievement rather than years of schooling. Children finish in five to seven years, depending on how quickly they master learning objectives that have been incorporated into their instructional materials (see below). During the first two and a half years, children are taught by older students in programmed teaching groups of 6-10 students, under the supervision of an Instructional Supervisor (IS)⁹. After this period, they begin transitional modules, again under the direction of older students, to prepare for peer teaching. During the last three years of schooling, students learn in peer groups, composed of children of differing abilities, with each child taking a turn at being leader. They study in peer groups for three hours a day and spend one hour in depth with "core" or "advanced" materials. The peer groups make daily or weekly contracts declaring how many self-instructional modules they will complete. When students know they will be absent, they take the modules home with them to keep up with their work. Students test one another after each module (a test is provided in the student-teacher packet), and after completing a block of about five modules they take a supervised test. These tests are administered by Instructional Aides (IA), who are usually recent graduates of the IMPACT school and are given modest honoraria for their work. The tests show whether they have mastered the material or need remediation. Remediation is given by high school students, the IS, or peers.

2 Curriculum

Those familiar with IMPACT believe its most favorable feature is a self-study set of instructional modules. This modular learning, organized around the MEC's education objectives, is used by students in grades four through six. Each module includes a leader's guide, a test, and an answer sheet, and takes the student approximately three to five hours to complete. Each grade has about 200 learning objectives, which have been reduced by using an integrated subject matter approach. There are two modular learning sequences: the "core" required sequence, and the "advanced" optional sequence for those who want to enter secondary school.

Classroom teachers and supervisors produced the original modules in six months under the supervision of an instructional methods expert. The writers had little contact with students during the development phase, presumably because most were already familiar with the classroom context and student capabilities. The draft modules were tested in classrooms, and teachers using them provided feedback to the developers on how they might be improved. In 1991 they were revised to conform to new curriculum objectives established by the government. The upgrading project was funded by UNICEF and INNOTECH and undertaken in cooperation with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). During this revision, teachers were again called on to write the new modules. From one official's comment, it appears that IMPACT schools existing at that time were not informed of the updated modules.

A key feature of the modules is their flexibility. They have been used in non-IMPACT schools as well as IMPACT schools for: 1) remediation, where older students assist younger students or peers, 2) enrichment, where brighter students expand their learning while waiting for others in the class to master previous lessons, 3) catch-up, when a student is absent or requires extra practice to master an objective, and 4) supplements to learning in specific subjects. Officials also note their usefulness as core materials in multi-grade classes where older students can use them to teach some groups while teachers help slower learners.

3 Teaching

The IMPACT model "sharply deviates from conventional social standards of student-teacher relationships. The expected role of a teacher as the primary source of learning and with the main responsibility for leading the young through the learning process is significantly altered" (Wooten 1982: 8). Facilitators noted that IMPACT placed the emphasis on learning rather than teaching. Teachers assumed new roles as

⁹ The idea of establishing multigraded and multiaged "families" of students for the basic educational units evolved as a way to organize peer tutoring and emphasize respect for family values (Cummings 1986: 86).



Students respond to their teacher's questions USAID photo

managers/supervisors and no longer did "direct teaching" When these teaching functions were needed they were taken over by older primary students who followed programmed scripts for teaching lessons to groups of younger students In IMPACT schools, older children normally taught one hour a day (half the time to groups and half the time to individuals)

A number of other "teaching" resources were also provided Two half-hour radio broadcasts a day modeled Filipino and English The radio lessons and accompanying exercises were supervised by older children and broadcast three times a week for scheduling convenience The high school tutors also came three times a week for remediation, each giving one day a

month to this job Community members, identified through recommendations by parents, taught practical skills to students from their homes or places of work and received small honoraria for their efforts Roving teachers taught scouting, hygiene, sports, music, and arts one-half day a week

Several problems arose as a result of this non-traditional approach to instruction First, the teacher's new role violated parents' expectations about how teachers should be involved in children's education Second, parents were often uncomfortable with the idea that their children were being taught by other children, who in turn were "wasting time" teaching others Third, parents were concerned that their children might lag behind as a result of the self-paced learning and take more years to complete their primary program (Wooten 1982 8) Adding to the difficulties was the fact that, as the system was gradually installed, a number of teachers were no longer needed and had to be transferred Their transfers conveyed the threat of unemployment to the remaining teachers, who communicated their discontent to parents (Flores 1981 39) All these factors combined to cause considerable resistance among teachers and parents in some schooling locations

4 Management/supervision

IMPACT activities were managed at various levels by groups especially selected for the purpose or conventionally serving in managerial capacities for the government school system At the highest level was a national committee made up of key educators included because of the authority or influence they possessed that might be useful to the project They included the undersecretary of education and culture (from the pilot area Cebu), the national director of schools, president of the normal schools, and the regional director of education This committee's stamp of approval was considered essential to the project (Flores 1981 30) The selection of the first IMPACT sites was probably influenced by members of the IMPACT staff and the national steering committee who came from Cebu

IMPACT staff, as a general rule, worked through the regional director who had authority over supervisors, principals, and teachers in the experimental schools They had to "appeal to (him) to recruit or change personnel, or deal with resistance from field or office staff who were civil service employees" (Flores 1981 31)

At the school level, the IMPACT project was managed variously by principals and district supervisors. One supervisor noted that the advantages of someone like himself taking the responsibility was the fact that he could transfer the surplus teachers out of the IMPACT school to where they would be needed and could use his pool of teachers in the region to provide specialist and other services needed by the IMPACT schools. The supervisors made regular visits to the schools as part of their duties in the conventional system and took a greater or lesser interest in the IMPACT schools depending on their personalities.

In most schools the principals took the greatest initiative to organize support for the IMPACT program. The rural coordinator, as he/she was called under IMPACT, was responsible for maintaining the school, acquiring materials, orienting parents, coordinating the Learning Center staff, and informing parents of the problems and needs of children (Wooten 1982 A-2). The IS, as already noted, was responsible for managing the learning of 100 to 200 children in the IMPACT schools. He or she organized student groupings, scheduled activities, and monitored and guided learning. The IAs maintained the module library, kept records, and administered and scored tests.

D Results

1 Community participation and the development of grassroots institutions

Despite its name—"Instructional Management by Parents, Communities, and Teachers"—and the declared intentions of its designers, IMPACT assigned a relatively minor role to the school community. In interviews conducted in 1997 for this study, officials rarely spoke of community participation when talking about IMPACT unless specifically asked to do so, and documents summarizing IMPACT activities give only a few pages to the subject. Instead, both sources of information focused on IMPACT's innovative instructional program. The community's role appears to have been mostly initiated by IMPACT facilitators to meet the requirements of the project design. As one observer noted, "the strategy was one of prudence in getting them to comply with the functions defined on paper. The first year was devoted mostly to information and acceptance campaigns. Selling IMPACT to the parents was relatively easy, persuading them to perform their functions and deliver results was a different matter. The many meetings during the year were an indication of how difficult it was to get the parents to accept their new responsibilities" (Flores 1981: 37).

This same writer, in speaking about "community support," talked mainly about the "assistance of government officials, the local school board, and civic-minded citizens." The civic-minded citizens were intended to donate labor for constructing facilities (Flores 1981: 83). He went on to say that despite the "massive information drive" to explain IMPACT, the staff still had difficulty with parents who resisted the project. Their major concern was the peer teaching component of IMPACT. Many parents did not want their children to waste time teaching other students or to be taught by students instead of teachers. They feared the children would not be able to compete in national exams (Wooten 1981: 9).

Similarly the Naga IMPACT schools developed an elitist reputation by streaming some children so that they finished more quickly or studied the advanced modules. These children brought up school averages and were used more often to do the peer-tutoring. Parents of other children resented this preferential treatment (Cummings 1986: 93). Consequently, IMPACT, which was intended to promote social equity through education, tended to foster inequities inside the schools (Cummings 1986: 120).

As a result of these criticisms a number of parents withdrew their children from IMPACT schools, sometimes bringing them back later when it became apparent that national achievement scores of students did not suffer or that the difficulties of sending them so far away became insurmountable. The first five pilot schools in Cebu lost a large proportion of their enrollment this way, which usually meant parents had to expend greater effort sending their children to distant schools. The discontent of parents was compounded over time by a decline in financial aid to IMPACT schools, which meant they were called upon to replace worn out sets of modules and support the other special costs of IMPACT (Wooten 1982: 11).

Even though officials believed IMPACT was best suited for depressed areas, it was interesting that dissatisfaction tended to be higher among parents with lower socio-economic backgrounds who had more traditional expectations for education. Officials interviewed for this study blamed the lack of community involvement on local circumstances. They felt it was impossible in poor communities for parents without basic education skills or resources to support the school with material goods, labor, or volunteer time. One Filipino evaluator suggested that school sites should be assessed for their resource potential before launching IMPACT programs since some communities were simply not able to provide the resources or home-tutoring expected of them (Tullao et al 1982 133). Complying with this pre-condition would of course have precluded some of the poorest communities where education services were most needed.

There also is little evidence that, as a result of the IMPACT project, grassroots community institutions were established to advance the skills or the values of civil society, or even to give community members a meaningful role in decisions about the school or its programs. Under IMPACT, communities did not, in other words, increase their capacity to solve educational or other development problems, even though "local management committees" were selected to solve the problems of the project.

The "campaigns to win community acceptance" usually began with the formation of local steering committees, followed by public meetings with parents and community members. The composition of the committees varied, but most, as has been described above, were constituted of people whose influential names would enhance the acceptance of IMPACT. The Naga committee, for example, included a school principal, barrio captain, and the PTA president. One large committee in Lapu-Lapu was chaired by the mayor and included the superintendent of schools, the PTA president, and heads of all the civic and religious organizations. Sapang Palay chose the governor of the province as chairman, the town mayor, the school superintendent, the PTA president, the barrio captain, and chairman of the civic political youth group among others. Though parents often spoke out in public meetings on issues that concerned them, it was the explanations of influential members of the committee that eventually calmed their fears (Flores 1981 46). The main job of these committees was "public relations." It didn't hurt that they gained a sense of self-importance by being consulted about innovations in IMPACT and through receiving outside visitors (Flores 1981 31). Project documents at all times refer to the steering committees as different from parents, and in reality they involved parents only minimally.

One commentator noted that

" although the formation of local steering committees was a manifestation of acceptance (of IMPACT), parents expressed concern about their role in the project. Specifically this pertained to the plan to require parents or elder siblings to tutor and submit pupil's progress reports to the IS. A combination of reasons was given by parents for their anxiety: lack of time and illiteracy, or low educational attainment. These objections were reinforced by the traditional attitude that the responsibility of educating children rests exclusively with the schools. The requirement for direct parental involvement was seen as an imposition and even as a reflection of inadequacy or incompetence on the part of the salaried and professionally trained staff" (Flores 1981 32).

Candid comments like these, infrequent in the documents, probably indicate why IMPACT was not consistently successful in mobilizing community support.

One additional explanation for the less-than-enthusiastic involvement of the community may be found in a note accompanying cost analyses assessments of IMPACT. The author of the note observes that, "It is difficult to place a precise value on the cost of preparing the community for the IMPACT system. Most of the cost would be borne by district supervisors, principals, and teachers, in terms of unpaid overtime work in holding meetings and visiting homes. There would be very little cost to the Ministry of Education unless staff were paid extra for these public relations activities" (Tullao et al 1982 125).

In another study of IMPACT, researchers asked staff to identify the most serious constraints in successfully introducing innovations in primary schools. The three top concerns out of the eight they mentioned

were lack of funds, the indifference of the community to innovation, and the involvement of the school in too many community activities (SEAMEO INNOTECH 1978 41) These observations suggest that IMPACT planners assumed a higher level of volunteerism than actually materialized Whatever the case, school staff viewed their involvement in community activities as an additional burden for which they received no compensation

Overall the school staff saw community involvement mainly as a means of eliciting material and instructional help for the school to construct kiosks, to help in the school gardens, to provide demonstrations of homemaking and technical skills, and to help children study the modules Attempts to involve parents more intensively in instructional activities failed as few parents appeared for in-school tutoring and IAs had to be hired to compensate for the lack of volunteers School staff reinforced community inertia by using PTA meetings to exhort parents about attendance problems and explanations of the program rather than engaging them in decisions about the school

The ambitious plan of making the CLC a real hub of the community never materialized The CLC was just a school (allowing) flexible movement among pupils as they went about their programmed learning” (Flores 1981 36) One of the intended benefits for the community was supposed to have been the program’s utility for adult learners, but in fact few adults ever made use of the opportunity of either the center or the self-study modules (Wooten 1982 15)

When asked about community participation many years after the fact, one INNOTECH official explained that the main reason the designers felt it necessary to involve community members was so they would not feel marginalized by putting their children in IMPACT schools

2 Educational participation

Though a major rationale expressed by SEAMEO for initiating IMPACT was the low level of educational participation in the Philippines, evaluations of the program have not assessed IMPACT’s effects on participation Inquiries about participation data received the reply that statistics on enrollment, dropout, repetition, and promotion were not kept on IMPACT schools any longer One official observed that an IMPACT school she knew attracted higher enrollments when parents began to feel that the quality of the program improved Another noted that, in a second IMPACT school, high enrollments were maintained despite the fact that parents had many primary schools from which to choose in the neighborhood

A table of enrollments in the earliest Naga IMPACT schools, however, showed that during the period from 1974 to 1977, enrollments declined by 30 percent What is more significant is that enrollments declined in all five schools of that area The Sapang Palay school, established in the second experimental phase, however, maintained stable enrollment rates (Flores 1981 68) One explanation given for these desertions was that an angry staff member in 1974 and later in 1976 wrote articles in the press and appeared on radio to denounce the program “As a result of this verbal clash, enrollment in the IMPACT schools (declined) from a total of 1,068 at the start of the school year (and closed) at 656, or a retention rate of 61% compared with 72% in three non-IMPACT schools within the same district ”(Flores 1981 43) This mass desertion from the schools (to private institutions) left only children from the poorest families in IMPACT schools (Wooten 1982 15)

It would probably be fair to say that IMPACT experimented with a cost-effective way to deliver education to large numbers of children but that its focus was on the instructional means to that end rather than the recruitment of more children or the provision of more schools Any gains in participation that may have resulted from IMPACT experiments appear to have been fortuitous

Though little in project documents shows a systematic effort to address the issue, features of IMPACT make educational participation more convenient Children who leave the system can re-enter at any time, after being tested to see where in the module sequence they should start again, and children who are

absent for any reason can continue the use of the modules at home until they return. One school director (see box on following page) said that dropout rates under the IMPACT model had become negligible in his school. The modules also made it possible for children to advance at their own pace, whether it took a longer or shorter period to complete a grade. These “irregularities” in the IMPACT system make it difficult to make meaningful comparisons between measures of participation in IMPACT and conventional schools. As one observer noted, drop out was common to both systems, and any improvements in the IMPACT system were not perceived as a significant argument in favor of IMPACT. In both systems dropping out or transferring were so common that teachers were used to reorienting children back into the system (Wooten 1982 15, 16)

The Bagong Buhay Experience

IMPACT was launched in five experimental villages in Naga, Cebu in 1974 and then extended to seven more schools in three areas starting in 1976. The Bagong Buhay F School, located in Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, two hours drive from Manila, was one of the second wave sites.

The principal of Bagong Buhay F, Mr. Valentin F. De Leon, had participated in IMPACT from its inception as artist/illustrator and as translator of the original modules from Cebuana/English to Tagalog. He has been principal of Bagong Buhay since 1990. He explained that his school had been selected for IMPACT because the community’s population had been expanding rapidly at the time from massive relocations of families from Metro Manila. Most of the families were poor and were unable to contribute much in the way of skill training or tutoring, though they did provide some donations and labor. By 1997, Bagong Buhay had 1200 students in grades one through six, with 25 teachers, all of whom had BS in Education degrees except for two—one who had a Master’s degree and one who was a high school graduate. Despite the high student numbers, Bagong Buhay is still considered rural.

Mr. De Leon was an enthusiastic supporter of IMPACT. As evidence of its success he noted that with IMPACT the school had maintained negligible dropout rates. Even when students were sick, they took modules home and kept up with their work. The school also maintained a transition rate of more than 80 percent between the primary and secondary stages, and some students had even qualified for admission in the nearby, more prestigious private school where seven out of ten of the scholarship students come from Bagong Buhay. He enumerated a number of other awards his students had won including science research, oratory, spelling, English, history, and talent search competitions. He felt that IMPACT had produced good achievement results for the school.

Unfortunately, Mr. De Leon had to abandon the IMPACT system in 1996 because of difficulties with the modules. He noted that they had already been having a problem accommodating the growing number of students with the school’s few sets of IMPACT modules and could not afford to purchase more. Also the school’s existing set of modules no longer conformed with the Minimum Learning Competency (MLC) objectives established by DECS. So the school returned to a conventional method of teaching which, with large classes of roughly 1 teacher to 50 students, made it difficult to provide a good learning environment. He wanted to return to IMPACT because he felt it was a cost-efficient way to provide education to a large number of students. A Grade One teacher endorsed his views, saying the system had worked especially well for students in grades one through three, who responded well to student teachers. The Ministry official who was present during the interview noted that INNOTECH had upgraded the modules in 1991 to meet MEC curriculum objectives and was surprised the school had not been informed about the revisions.

—adapted from Castrence 1997

3 Learning/achievement

Studies have indicated that learning technology packages like those of IMPACT, which are developed through a systematic instructional process, consistently produce high levels of learning (see Thiagarajan and Pasigna 1988:10). One would therefore expect IMPACT to produce learning results that were superior to the conventional system. The results, however, are mixed.

In keeping with expectations for IMPACT, evaluators stressed achievement results in assessments of the project. In 1978 an independent evaluation team¹⁰ determined that students taught by the IMPACT system achieved as well as or better than students in conventional schools in the major subjects. The evaluators found that IMPACT students performed slightly better or significantly better on 19 (73 percent) of the 26 tests administered to them. The mean scores in both initial and final evaluations were significant in favor of IMPACT in Grade IV language skills, and in Grade V science, math, reading, and language skills. Otherwise, there were no significant differences between achievement levels in the two systems. IMPACT also helped average and slow learners to achieve more than the same learners in conventional schools, possibly because of the smaller learning groups, peer support, and greater individual attention given to students. High ability students achieved the same in both systems. The conclusion of the evaluators was that IMPACT is better than the conventional system in meeting children's educational needs¹¹ and in equalizing opportunities among various types of learners.

Though the results of these tests have been used to demonstrate the superiority of IMPACT over conventional systems, one must be cautious about the findings. As Cummings notes, the schools that were compared differ on certain points: 1) IMPACT schools tended to have children with higher socio-economic backgrounds, 2) IMPACT teachers had more experience and were better educated, 3) IMPACT children were given an extra reading course in the summer before entering fourth grade, and 4) significantly more of the children spoke Filipino at home. However, the fears of parents that IMPACT was best suited for "fast learners" were not born out in an IMPACT study of IQs (1986:89, 95).¹²

Table 3.1 summarizes the subject matter and grade level achievement data of 2,096 students from nine IMPACT and seven conventional schools in Cebu and Bulacan. These samples were matched for community socio-economic level, enrollment sizes, parents' income, and teacher qualifications. Except for reading scores of grade five students the results are not statistically significant (.05 level) (Wooten 1982: E-2).

¹⁰ Survey of Outcomes of Elementary Education (SOUTELE) sponsored by SEAMEO INNOTECH in 1978.

¹¹ Needs that were considered as important as basic academic skills included a sense of mutual responsibility, leadership, and sociability.

¹² Critics claimed these IQ studies are not conclusive in proving this point.

Table 3 1 Achievement by subject for IMPACT and the conventional system^a (1978)

Subject	Grade IV		Grade V		Grade VI	
	IMPACT	Conventional	IMPACT	Conventional	IMPACT	Conventional
Language	15 22 (389)	14 28 (349)	20 28 (326)	20 47 (373)	22 30 (284)	21 41 (335)
Reading	11 15 (388)	11 03 (343)	11 34 ^b (326)	10 66 (373)	12 25 (284)	12 18 (333)
Science	16 64 (367)	16 11 (351)	16 81 (309)	16 36 (383)	19 20 (266)	18 58 (340)
Math	9 16 (380)	9 08 (308)	10 65 (308)	10 97 (382)	11 74 (266)	12 34 (340)
Social Studies	9 91 (224)	10 03 (229)	9 18 (309)	9 26 (383)	10 62 (266)	11 05 (340)

a The first number in each column is the average score of the group tested. The number in parenthesis is the number of children who took that particular test.

b Statistically significant at the .05 level.

Source: Wooten 1982, Table E 3.

A tracer study (Mante 1981 in Cummings 1986:92) was also conducted to follow IMPACT students for two years after graduation and found that they achieved essentially at the same level as non-IMPACT students in higher stages of education.

Overall, IMPACT students achieved at essentially the same levels as students in the conventional system. Though occasionally achieving significantly higher scores, they were not able to sustain these higher scores through multiple administrations of subject tests.

4 School program quality

IMPACT documents refer to a number of ways educators hoped to make the learning experience better for children. They expected to implement several principles: a direct teaching approach in the early years when children are establishing skills, and then self-learning in the later years in which the child takes a more active role, self-pacing based on individualized abilities, mastery of each objective before moving to the next, and an emphasis on socialization skills so children take responsibility for helping one another. The IMPACT design incorporates provisions for the achievement of all these principles in its programmed learning, peer teaching, transition learning, and individualized self-instruction study. Reports suggest that these aspects of the program have all been implemented, work well, and are appreciated by the students and teachers. Teachers point out that learning is easier and more enjoyable in IMPACT's smaller groups of students and that children respond well to being taught by their peers who are less "authoritative" than teachers. Community members in some cases contribute a richness to the program by teaching practical skills, and, when they are able, by helping children study modules at home.

Attitude studies show that teachers in IMPACT schools generally agree that the system has advantages over conventional schooling and believe not only that academic results are good but that there are gains in children's social development, independence, poise, and self-esteem. They believe the system works better for slower learners who are less frustrated and receive more individual attention. A disadvantage of IMPACT, according to the teachers, is that it takes considerably more work than the conventional system to organize school activities. Consequently, according to parents, younger children are sometimes short-changed in teacher attention. Some of the schools continue to use conventional instruction for grade one because teachers feel student teachers are not sufficiently capable of supervising younger children's learning (Wooten 1982:13).

5 Accountability to the community

IMPACT documents do not mention independent mechanisms by which communities can hold school personnel accountable for their children's learning. Parents were supposed to provide feedback on their children's learning through the homeroom PTA, school meetings, and letters to the school, school staff were expected to organize programs and festivals to encourage parents to become informed about the school. There is no mention, however, of the responsibilities of the staff to account for outcomes of the school. Parents, for example, do not receive monthly reports on the progress of their children, and there are no community committees of parents that manage relations with the school.¹³ The main option for



IMPACT uses community members to teach practical skills such as wood-working. USAID photo

dissatisfied parents is to transfer students to another school, but this alternative is not satisfactory from the perspective of effecting change in the original school. In general, parents and implementors of IMPACT have convergent interests in wanting students to achieve at high levels on national exams. One suspects IMPACT's implementors felt they could best obtain these achievement goals by exercising full control over the education program. Parents do not appear to be perceived as clients who need to be satisfied.

6 Costs

All estimates show that the IMPACT program costs considerably less than the conventional system. The Wooten team reviewing the data found that IMPACT schooling could cost anywhere from 16 to 61 percent less than conventional systems depending upon the number of schools included in the estimates. These cost efficiencies were achieved without sacrificing academic quality (Wooten 1982: 12).

The annual per-student cost of IMPACT differs depending on how the costs are estimated. Tullao (1978) estimated the costs in 1977 for a 200-student school in a five-school system to be \$54 for an IMPACT student and \$64 for a conventional student (in Wooten 1982: E-2). Estimates of a 1,200 student school were \$24 and \$38 respectively. Another estimate of annual per-pupil costs was \$23.65 for IMPACT and \$47.37 for conventional system students (McMasters 1978 in Wooten 1982, E-2). McMasters' figures were compiled in a second phase school, which represented what would presumably be the costs of replication after the period of development and adaptation was completed.

Table 3.2 compares the costs of IMPACT and the conventional system based on a school-size of 1,200 students. The table shows the main line item differences between the two systems.

As the table indicates, the main savings come from reduced staff salaries, with additional savings coming from utility and construction costs. The number of teachers needed at the Cebu and Bulacan sites, for example, was estimated to have been reduced from 90 to 22 between 1974 and 1979, or by 76 percent.

¹³ PTAs are mentioned, but there is no indication of whether they have a special role in IMPACT.

(Wooten 1982 11) These savings were realized by more efficient utilization of qualified teachers and use of unqualified aids at a cost of small honoraria. Personnel costs were based on salaries and benefits of teachers, principals, and supervisors. The costs of personnel are 44 percent, or less than half those of conventional schools.

The facilities required for IMPACT schools cost roughly three-quarters of the costs of a conventional school since IMPACT students utilize cheaper learning kiosks built of local materials by community members. IMPACT schools spend more on equipment such as tables, test carrels, bookshelves, etc., but these costs are insignificant in comparison to construction costs.

The cost of IMPACT modules is significantly more than textbooks in the conventional system. In 1997, a complete set of the modules from grades one to three cost P 15,000 or \$577,¹⁴ a large sum from the perspective of the school or community that must purchase them. The IMPACT materials cost 20 percent more than textbooks in the conventional system, largely because of the greater amount of paper that is used to produce them. If module costs are averaged against their expected life of five years, however, the annual cost becomes less than textbooks. Modules also are more economical in the long run in terms of revisions and modifications.

The IMPACT system is normally introduced into an existing school, and therefore it requires extra costs to convert the school to IMPACT requirements. Some of the expenses include removing walls between classrooms, constructing kiosks, increasing storage spaces, and building study carrels. Personnel at all levels also require reorientation. The training of instructional supervisors is estimated at from \$15.20 to \$17.72, assuming they are trained only once in 10 years.

Although it is not possible from Table 3.2 to estimate an annual per-pupil cost (since some of the costs are one-time costs, and some are annual costs), the figures indicate that the overall costs of the IMPACT system are only about half those of the conventional system. It should be remembered, however, that purported cost savings of the IMPACT system are purely hypothetical until rearrangements within the government bureaucracy allow the savings from one item to pay for the higher costs of another (Cummings 1986 90). During the pilot phase excess teachers were simply transferred to other schools with their salaries intact, and therefore no savings were realized to the MEC, which pays teacher salaries. Since the schools also did not benefit from the savings, they did not gain the additional resources to convert learning spaces or buy more modules, and consequently had to seek funding from other sources such as local school boards, the PTA, and individual donations to cover additional IMPACT costs. These costs included routine maintenance, updating modules, modification of classrooms to make learning resource centers, and provision of honoraria for IAs (Wooten 1982 12).

Implementing IMPACT fully, as it turned out, was considerably more costly to parents than the conventional system. This was primarily because the government did not completely adopt the model or support its costs.

¹⁴ 26 pesos (P) is roughly equal to \$1

Table 3 2 Illustrative^a cost comparisons of IMPACT and the conventional system (1978)

IMPACT		Conventional	
physical facilities	\$4,374	physical facilities	\$5,893
classrooms @ \$136	2 448	classrooms @ \$136	4 080
kiosks @ \$3	60		
long tables @ \$1	20	long tables @ \$1	10
study testing carrels @ \$1	30		
blackboards @ \$2	260	blackboards @ \$2	180
teachers' desks/chairs @ \$4	48	teachers' desks/chairs @ \$4	120
utilities^b	\$400	utilities	\$600
telephone, electricity water		telephone, electricity, water	
staff	\$21,217	staff	\$48,370
instructional supervisors (IS) @ \$1 234 each	14 808	teachers @ \$1,234 each	43,190
IMPACT training	221	in-service training	110
honoraria for IS aides @ \$84 each	1,008		
materials	\$2,396	materials	\$1,985
modules @ \$ 58 per pupil ^d	696	textbooks @ \$ 68 per pupil ^c	816
paper for student exercises	1 301	paper for student exercises	780
Grand Total	\$28,387	Grand Total	\$56,848

a Items are only listed if they show differences in how money is allocated. The subtotals include all costs for the category. The estimates are based on a 1 200 student school.

b The reduced expense on utilities is based on a lower number of classrooms. Kiosks require no electricity.

c Per pupil textbook costs equal the cost of the texts divided by their five year expected lifespan.

d Per pupil module costs equal the cost of the modules divided by their five year expected lifespan.

Source: McMasters 1978 in Wooten 1982 Table E 2.

7 Replication

Despite its demonstrated successes at providing cost-effective education, IMPACT has not been replicated widely in the Philippines—in only 11 or 12 sites, according to officials. Another project, NO DROPS (No Dropouts), an Education for All (EFA) initiative launched in 1991, used the modules but not the IMPACT system to supplement formal schooling and enhance science and math learning. A number of other countries adopted IMPACT with varying degrees of success by 1986 (when the numbers were reported): Indonesia had opened 400 schools, Jamaica's program closed after an initial period of experimentation, Bangladesh opened 200 schools, and Liberia and Malaysia each had opened 40 schools (Cummings 1986 viii).

Table 3 3 shows the 12 IMPACT sites in the Philippines identified by Wooten and his team in 1982. We have not been able to find further reference to the more than 30 sites noted by Thiagarajan and Pasigna (1988).

Table 3 3 Schools involved in Project IMPACT

Year	New schools
1974-76	5 rural Cebu
1976	3 Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu 1 Sapang Palay, Bulacan Province
1976-1982	1 Sapang Palay 2 Zamboanga del Sur and Davao Mindanao
Total number of schools	12

Source Wooten 1982 3

There have been several reasons cited for why IMPACT was not expanded as planned. First, as one official noted, widespread introduction of an innovation requires major organizational changes in the educational system and leadership to see that they happen. IMPACT would have required major reorganizations in the education bureaucracy. MEC budgets were not organized in a way that made it possible to transfer savings in one line item to pay for increased costs in another. Thus, IMPACT modules became an extra cost that could not be paid for, even though savings in teachers' salaries are available to make up the difference. Similarly, IMPACT reduced the need for teachers by at least half. Teachers resisted this threat to their job security. Rather than develop an overall plan for absorbing the extra teachers, suggestions were made to increase the salaries of IMPACT teachers to compensate for their expanded responsibilities. To satisfy the teachers' unions without jeopardizing the savings from the reduced need for teachers would have taken strong leadership and a coherent policy change. To bring the IMPACT model with its many innovations to scale required the "continuity and commitment of those individuals responsible for its development and their immediate successors" (Cummings 1986 20). Unfortunately just the opposite occurred. During the period from 1974, when IMPACT began, until the mid-1980s, there were four ministers of education as well as numerous changes in other key education officials (Cummings 1986 23).

Second, the original modules were prepared in Cebuano, a language native to only one region (VII)¹⁵ of the Philippines. Further replication would have required that the modules be translated into the languages of each region if they were to be used as originally intended in the mother tongue of the children. One school translated the modules into Tagalog/Filipino, but they were not mass-produced at the time. It was not until 1991, when the modules were upgraded according to the new Elementary School Curriculum, that a Filipino version was developed and reproduced.¹⁶ These issues were not resolved at the point when IMPACT should have realized its greatest expansion.

Third, evidence to date suggests little interest among officials of the MEC in replicating the model except in special cases. The issue was less whether IMPACT was a replicatable model and more whether education officials were willing to put the time, energy, and resources into initiating the model in new schools. There was also a lingering doubt about whether IMPACT provided enough value-added to use it in areas where it was still feasible to use a conventional system. Some felt IMPACT should only be expanded in rural, poor, and remote areas where it was difficult to find teachers. Others argued that the self-instructional system would work better with more mature students at the high school level (a pilot of this idea was undertaken in the 1980s) (Wooten 1982 17).

¹⁵ There were 13 regions in the Philippines during the period of main IMPACT experimentation. IMPACT was implemented in a limited number of schools in only four of these regions.

¹⁶ Books in the conventional system are currently produced in either English or Tagalog depending on the subject. Tagalog for subjects with a cultural aspect such as social studies, and English for subjects like math where the MEC feels the cultural element is not as critical.

Fourth, IMPACT officials complained that the model was not expanded largely “due to the unavailability of funds to cover conversion costs” From the outset of the IMPACT project, resources had been one of the major obstacles to expansion of the Philippine primary system In 1975, the World Bank provided a loan to develop textbooks, and in 1978, USAID funded improvements in primary textbook production and the construction of new schools In 1982, the World Bank provided another large loan for the development of primary education The Educational Projects Implementation Task Force (EDPITAF) was established outside of the Ministry to deal with donor projects, including IMPACT

The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) was willing to support the first three-year experiments with IMPACT but assumed that someone else would take over after the innovation was developed and tested It later became clear that this time period was not enough time to ensure the bureaucratic changes necessary for replication (Cummings 1986 114) One observer noted that there were two stages in the development of IMPACT in the various countries where it was implemented an experimental stage to develop a national prototype, and the subsequent steps to incorporate the innovations in the national system In the second stage, implementors usually ran into resistance from groups wanting to preserve the conventional system “The success of the several prototypes toward institutionalization depended as much on the political skill of their advocates in addressing the forces of resistance as on the objective merits of the innovations” (Cummings 1986 18) The Philippines IMPACT apparently did not negotiate this stage effectively

8 Sustainability

Theoretically, IMPACT was in a good position to be sustained It was more affordable than the conventional system, and with the high involvement of nationals working on its components, it meant local people possessed the skills to continue the program But it did not work that way, and of all the cases it was the least replicated and sustained One report in 1982 noted that at the newest school site IMPACT was doing well, but in schools where it had been in existence for some time, there were insufficient modules and other materials, and kiosks were falling down or in poor condition In most schools there was a shortage of IAs because of lack of honoraria (Wooten 1982 14) As an education program IMPACT “cannot be sustained without an adequate supply of the necessary support items that distinguish it from more conventional approaches” (Wooten 1982 ix)

The lack of apparent advantage to the local community meant there was no compelling reason for them to commit local resources to maintaining the extra costs of IMPACT Most school officials not directly involved in the project kept their distance They were not consulted on operational matters and felt they were left with a project that no longer enjoyed donor support, yet still required supplementary funds As one observer noted, “There (was) a pervading sense that an innovation that does not provide any particular advantage to the local area, that cannot provide the requisite equipment, and that cannot be fully supported should be ended” (Wooten 1982 16)

Lack of central government interest was also a sustainability issue for IMPACT Officials in the IMPACT offices in INNOTECH are not even certain in 1997 how many schools have ever used or are still using the IMPACT model They identified 11 original pilot schools located in four regions that had used the system but forgot to include the five sites in Cebu that had previously been listed in the pilot group An official, who visited Region III in 1997 with our researcher, found that the pilot school no longer used the model because they lacked upgraded modules conforming with new curriculum objectives The nine schools in Region V were believed by the official to have continued IMPACT because they bought upgraded modules in 1995 The final school in Region IX had not requested the new modules and therefore was probably no longer using the system According to Thiagarajan and Pasigna (1988), the original test site, Naga Cebu, was closed in 1986 from lack of DECS support

Another difficulty of sustaining the model related to the cost of the modules, which served as the core materials around which teaching/learning is organized DECS provides free textbooks for the conventional system, their priority is to improve the pupil-textbook ratio in rural areas, which is about one book to three

children. Since IMPACT modules are not considered textbooks, there is no appropriation in the budget for their production. Schools using the modules must raise the money themselves, and INNOTECH, which supports IMPACT, does not have the resources to provide all the modules schools need free of charge. The cost of the set is high. In some cases, communities contribute sets to the schools, but since conventional schools receive textbooks free, this is an extra burden for parents of IMPACT students.

Another important element of IMPACT—the daily radio programs in Filipino and English, which provided a model for teaching those languages, has also lapsed.

It is surprising in this environment of benign neglect that any schools continue to utilize the IMPACT system. That some say they have used it until recently reinforces the feeling that the system works well once a school is reorganized to implement the model and staff are trained in their new roles. The Bagong Buhay school (see box) demonstrates both the potential for and the difficulties of sustaining the IMPACT model. The school reportedly maintained the IMPACT model in essentially the same form for 20 years without difficulty and only stopped when costly replacements were required for modules that had become obsolete.

E Issues and lessons learned

1 Issues

The key issue for IMPACT is why a seemingly successful, potentially cost-effective education innovation was not replicated further. Evaluators (Tullao et al, 1982: 131) noted several implementation difficulties, most of which have been discussed above. They include:

- the resistance among teachers who feared losing their jobs (salary incentives were recommended),
- inadequate training for teachers to sustain the complicated management and supervision changes of IMPACT (periodic refresher courses were recommended),
- a lack of adequate learning spaces on school grounds, especially in urban areas, as parents often did not have the resources or interest to build enough learning kiosks,
- a lack of parental support, as parents often did not have enough education to tutor children or enough time to teach skills, and
- a heavy dependence upon specific teaching/learning materials, which made the program vulnerable to production and printing delays and government costs.

In addition, they concluded that IMPACT might not be suitable in all community locations and recommended using the village survey to determine whether resources and interest were sufficient to support the model before establishing an IMPACT school.

Overall, the core problem, which they may have been too tactful to discuss in detail, has been the inability to lodge IMPACT in the educational bureaucracy of the Philippines. Project leaders and implementors did not realize in the beginning the extent to which they would have to defend their systems. In the end, institutionalization depended more on political factors than scientific evidence of IMPACT's successes (Cummings 1986: 95).

A study that compared learning systems in seven countries¹⁷ lamented that though "the (Philippines) IMPACT system has the most convincing figures in terms of cost-effectiveness and levels of achievement it seems rather unfortunate that lack of foresight among national education officials could be detrimental to the successful implementation of an otherwise viable system." (Thiagarajan and Pasigna 1988: 20)

¹⁷ Philippines, Indonesia, Liberia, Thailand, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Jamaica

2 Lessons learned

In addition to lessons about replication and sustainability, IMPACT provides a number of lessons about program quality and community participation. IMPACT shows that

- 1) Major cost savings can be accomplished in education programs without compromising quality, through reorganization of the instructional system. The key features are changing the role of teachers to managers/supervisors of learning activities, programmed learning materials, self-instruction and pacing, peer teaching, mastery of objectives, and continuous assessment.
- 2) Children can take greater responsibility for their own learning than is usually the case in conventional systems, without negative effect on achievement levels.
- 3) Attention focused too narrowly on the classroom setting may lead to neglect in other vital structures including those that support and sustain it. Demonstrable success in instructional outcomes may not produce enough momentum to reform the system as a whole.
- 4) Designers need to think about sustainability and replication in the design phase, with a plan for the gradual replacement of donor resources (if this is the main funding source) by in-country support. There must also be an agreement by the local government to replicate and/or sustain successful experiments (Wooten 1982: x).
- 5) Involving community members effectively in the delivery of education programs requires more than rhetoric. IMPACT failed to satisfy their own objectives in this regard for several reasons:
 - unrealistic expectations about what poor, often illiterate parents can contribute to education delivery,
 - an emphasis upon “influentials” rather than parents as members of committees to coordinate school support activities,
 - a failure to commit resources to the mobilization of communities, thereby putting what was perceived as an additional burden on school staff, and
 - a focus on the technologies of learning and not the groups who would use it.

One official summed up the lack of interest in the community’s role in an interview with CAII when she ignored a direct question about community participation, and stated, “What is really crucial for the wider implementation of the IMPACT system and its sustainability is the support of the government in terms of physical set-up, organizational and administrative support, and also the reproduction of learning modules.” Community, in her mind, was not a central issue in the wider replication of IMPACT.

Chapter 4

The Harambee Secondary School Movement in Kenya

Components of Harambee Secondary School Model, Kenya	
Education context	rural frustration with colonial limitations, history of self-help, limited govt resources
Community involvement strategy	traditional self-help processes discussions, assessments, work parties, organizing committees, fund raisers
Targets	self-selected
Institutions established	School Management Committees
Membership criteria	community-selected
Community contributions to enrollment objectives	communities provide all initial funds for schools
education delivery	committee ensures inputs, mobilizes resources, solves problems
quality	communities pay most costs of educational inputs
Program type	formal secondary education
Length of program	2 to 4 years, depending upon resources
Instructional approach	conventional and self-study for exams
Instructional materials	conventional government textbooks
Curriculum	based on government curriculum
Assessment	national Kenyan Certificate Exams (KCE) drive program
Teacher qualifications	conventional if teacher provided by government, often under-qualified if provided by community
Supervision	government inspectors who rarely visit because of inadequate resources
Instructional facility	conventional school buildings, with latrines and teachers' quarters
Supplies	provided by communities/parents
Managers	established management group and community committee, school director
Major issues	program quality, funding, distribution of opportunities

A Background

The Harambee Movement was born out of political frustration during the colonial period, when education opportunities for Africans were few and confined to subject skills with limited employment potential. Africans complained that colonial powers limited their access to primary and dead-end, post-primary vocational/technical education because desirable urban professional jobs required English and math which were not available in the technical curriculum. The most immediate, visible effects of this frustration after Independence were self-help secondary school projects. Within a decade Harambee schools outnumbered government schools, though they had fewer student places, were generally poorer in quality of program, and fewer than half had a complete four-year program.

Community financing has had an important history in Kenyan education. Even before Independence, communities and churches were almost entirely responsible for primary and secondary education. Chiefs would

provide land, and parents and other community members provided labor and funds for buildings, teaching materials, equipment, and furnishings

The Government developed a new institutional relationship with communities following Independence in 1963. In 1965 the Government assumed responsibility for all primary schools except mission and private schools. The government would maintain, staff, and equip primary schools, while communities provided the land, and built and furnished schools. Though the state assumed most of the financing of primary education, communities were still called upon to pay tuition and development costs. It was not until 1974 that fees were waived for students in standards one through four, though many schools continued to charge them.

This rapid expansion of primary education increased the pressure on the secondary system, which was largely undeveloped. Because demand for “academic” secondary places far exceeded the government’s capacity to provide them, efforts to establish schools at this level became the first priority of the Harambee Schools’ Movement. Harambee, originally a political slogan meaning “let’s pull together” or “self-help,” quickly became a prime mover of development initiatives in all sectors of the Kenyan economy. The idea was revitalized in a speech delivered at Kenya’s Independence in 1963 by then Prime Minister, Jomo Kenyatta, when he called for all Kenyan people to “pull together” to eradicate poverty, ignorance, and disease. For local people, the most important issue was schooling for their children, and therefore the education sector received a disproportionate share of Harambee attention. Fund raisers were held to gather support for education costs, including those of individual students wanting to study locally or abroad. The Harambee Movement, after Independence as before, continued to rely on the sponsorship of local churches and were later joined in fund-raising efforts by politicians trying to curry favor with their constituents. Both sought financing from local and foreign sources to support the schools.

During the first ten years of Independence, primary enrollments rose from roughly 900,000 students to almost 2 million students, and in the 20 years after Independence the ratio of the relevant age group enrolled in primary schools rose from 37 percent to 73 percent as the government attempted to achieve its stated aim of universal free primary education. During the same period, the number of secondary students rose from 20,500 to almost 200,000. Despite these increases at the secondary level, however, many resulting from the expansion of Harambee schools, they still did not satisfy the demand arising from the large numbers of students graduating from primary schools. In addition to the need for post-primary academic secondary schools, demand also rose for “second chance” polytechnic secondary schools and later for post-secondary institutes of technology. The underlying reasons for this expansion were the fundamental belief that education was a major route to social mobility and that Kenya’s national exams, based on a merit system, leveled the playing field for rural applicants who otherwise lacked the opportunities of urban residents.

The pressure on the secondary system became so great that within two years of Independence the government announced a program of assistance to Harambee secondary schools. It would provide qualified teachers to a few successful schools each year, allow the best students to transfer into government schools after the completion of the Form 2 exam, and would take over the support of approximately 30 Harambee secondary schools a year—one per district. This assistance meant a corresponding cutback in the Ministry of Education’s own school building program and a reduction in its control over the distribution of secondary opportunities (Hill 1991: 219-220). The government efforts were not always successful. Some government schools resisted taking in a large group of Form 3 students even when extra teachers were provided, because the government did not include additional grants to cover expenses (Lillis and Ayot 1988: 124).

The government’s initial support for these Harambee schools at Independence was eroded by the end of the 1960s and into the early 1970s as officials became concerned with the poor quality of education the academic Harambee secondary schools provided and the increasing numbers of ill-prepared graduates unable to find employment who were graduating from the schools. Most Harambee schools in fact were inferior to the government schools in the quality of their buildings, the education level of the entering students, facilities of all kinds, and the qualifications of the teachers. The school followed the basic government cur-

riculum but often stopped after two years because they could not afford the more expensive facilities required for Forms 3 and 4 (Hill 1991 219-220)

The government began criticizing the schools for their substandard facilities, poor teaching, and crowded classes and accused their founders of attracting away the best teachers from the primary schools and charging fees—sometimes double those of the government system—that were too high for most families to support To keep the spread of Harambee schools from getting out of hand, the government ruled that the schools could no longer be established without registration and approval by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (MOEST)

The new regulations stipulated that Harambee schools must be sponsored by a known religious mission or a local committee, and managed by a responsible body, with these two functions normally kept separate The schools registered their management committee with MOEST, which had a unit for unassisted schools To win approval they had to have purchased 30 acres of land, to possess a 40,000 shilling (\$2,500) capital fund, which was an impossibly large amount in many villages, and to have a minimum of two classrooms and teachers' houses and latrines all built to specifications They also needed to satisfy local authorities, District Education Officers, and Provincial Education Officers, because of the political nature of Harambee support, most schools met with little resistance from these officials as long as they had a good manager (Lillis and Ayot 1988 126)

The government restrictions proved unpopular, however, and the government reversed its policy with the Development Plan of 1970-74, which announced plans to assist Harambee schools in improving their quality The Plan called for consolidating the schools, auditing their finances, and overseeing adherence to regulations about curriculum and staffing, and it stressed the need to slow the growth of the schools, citing as a major issue the excessive cost to the government Some believed that the government's real concern was with the number of frustrated unemployed youth being produced by the schools whom they feared might eventually become a disruptive element in the society (Mwiria 1990)

The first Harambee secondary school opened in 1960, and by Independence Harambee schools already constituted about one-quarter of all secondary schools in Kenya Table 4 1 shows the exponential growth of Harambee schools after Independence As the table shows, secondary schools in Kenya fall into three categories government maintained (called government schools in this study), and assisted and unassisted Harambee schools The MOE pays all capital and recurrent expenditures of government schools out of national budgets Of government schools in 1983, 30 were national schools enrolling students with the highest primary leaving scores, 5 were "high cost" boarding schools, 219 were "low cost" boarding schools, 15 were technical boarding schools, and 372 were day schools About 15 percent of enrolled secondary students were also studying in Harambee streams located in government schools

"Assisted" schools are primarily Harambee schools, but a few are private mission schools The government provides partial support, usually in the form of salaries of qualified staff The bulk of other operating costs, however, comes from fees and community support "Unassisted" schools are also primarily Harambee schools They may eventually receive government support but in the meantime they rely on local funding In 1983, half of all secondary schools were unassisted Some schools were beneficiaries of other sources of support such as local and foreign religious organizations and businesses, and international corporations, international donors, and voluntary agencies

By 1969, Harambee schools constituted roughly one-half of all secondary schools During the 1970s and 1980s the number continued to grow until by 1978 at its peak, Harambee secondary schools totaled 1,375 or 79 percent of all secondary schools and enrolled 67 percent of secondary students Eight years later, in 1987, though the number of Harambee schools constituted roughly the same percent (73) of secondary schools, they provided an education to only 55 percent of secondary students The table shows the growing proportion of Harambee schools that became assisted over time In 1978 only 23 percent of Harambee schools were government assisted while in 1987 61 percent were assisted

The 1,142 Harambee schools that were government assisted in 1987 were mainly being assigned qualified teachers whose salaries were paid by the government. The remainder of the schools continued to be supported entirely from community funds. In 1987, the local resources spent on Harambee education accounted for 60 percent of secondary financing—considerably more than is spent in most other countries.

Table 4 1 Kenyan secondary schools by type (1969-1996)^a

Year	School type						
	Government		Harambee assisted		Harambee unassisted ^b		Total schools
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
1969	244	48	19	4	244	48	507
1970	281	48.5	19	3	281	48.5	581
1971	312	39	19	2	478	59	809
1972	346	36	18	2	585	62	949
1973	363	40	17	2	522	58	902
1974	362	35	37	4	630	61	1029
1975	409	35	8	1	745	64	1,162
1976	413	29.5	7	5	967	70	1,387
1977	437	29	7	5	1,042	70.5	1,486
1978	413	23	322	18	1,053	59	1,737
1979	418	24	393	23	926	53	1,737
1985	651	30	801	37	724	33	2,176
1986	698	29	941	39	756	32	2,395 ^c
1987	709	27	1,142	44	741	29	2,592
1988							2,717
1989							2,654
1990							2,678
1991							2,647
1992							2,640
1993							2,639
1994	2,620						2,834
1995	2,637						2,878
1996	2,764						3,004

a No data are available for the years 1980-1984 () also signifies no data available

b Although Kenya's data on unassisted schools category include Harambee church and private schools, over 90 percent of the category are Harambee schools. Data from all three are included in this category.

c The two data sources overlapped in the years 1986 and 1987. All data before 1988 reference the first source listed; the second source is referenced thereafter. The sources list different figures for 1986. The data from the first source is listed. The second source lists 2,485 schools. Sources: Data for 1964-1987 from *Annual Reports*, Kenyan Ministry of Education, Nairobi: Government Printer (unpublished data). In Mwiria 1990, Table 1. Data for 1986-93 from *Annual Reports*, Kenyan Ministry of Education, Nairobi: Government Printer (unpublished data). Data for 1994-6, Provisional Report of the Ministry of Education, Nairobi: Government Printer (unpublished data).

By the early 1990s the secondary school enrollment rate was 11 percent, and in 1992 the ratio of Form I (first year secondary) to standard 8 (last year of primary) was 42 percent (173,052 out of the 420,799). By 1995 girls had reached 46 percent of the total secondary enrollment, though they were over-represented in the community schools and under-represented in the fully resourced government-supported schools (Dutch Embassy 1994).

The poor quality of the Harambee secondary schools, despite the government's help, was reflected in the fact that only seven percent of university students had at one time or another attended a Harambee school, and only two out of every thousand who enrolled in Harambee schools would ever reach university, despite a strong desire on the part of most parents for their children to continue on to post-secondary education. If they continued at all, Harambee students were more likely to enter teacher training institutions where they made up a larger 17 percent of total enrollments.

The Kenyan Ministry of Education began to phase out distinctions between Harambee and government schools in 1985, and their census data reflect this merging in 1987. All non-private schools in Kenya now receive the same amount of funding on a per-student basis. Harambee students are still at a disadvantage, however, because their facilities started from a lower level of infrastructure when this system was instituted (Personal interview, June 1997).

Because the Harambee school initiative differs in each setting, it is difficult to generalize. We will therefore supplement general information on the Harambee schools with specific examples from various communities in Kenya (see boxes in this chapter).

B Community involvement/innovations

The Harambee Movement comes the closest of the six cases presented in this study to illustrating a spontaneous grassroots community initiative for the delivery of education. For that reason it is important to look at its community mobilization processes in some detail to understand its successes and failures. Harambee has been characterized as an initiative that is bottom-up, uses local resources, is intended for the collective good rather than individual personal gain (though politicians are increasingly using Harambee for their own purposes), and implements projects that satisfy immediate community needs (Mbithi and Rasmusson 1977 13-14).

A study of 311 Harambee projects stressed the overlapping but different groups that assume leadership in different phases of a project. In the first phase, *initiation*, for example, major leaders create awareness of community need for secondary facilities through discussion meetings, in the second, *organization*, a broader leadership defines participation criteria and fund-raising procedures, and in the third, *implementation*, the leaders of local work groups take charge of the work teams and sustain their commitment. Though women in most areas of Kenya constitute only about 5 percent of initiators, it was estimated that they contributed about 80 percent of the self-help labor.¹ This characteristic of grassroots participation—that it conforms with local norms—is one of the reasons it may not be easily manipulated from above if that manipulation requires conforming to an outsider's set of norms (Mbithi and Rasmusson 1977 35).

The study shows that the person who instigates the idea might be a politician, farmer, District Education Officer, Agricultural Officer, or Community Development Assistant, a chief or sub-chief, or an educated member of the community such as a teacher. Politicians and the educated tended to initiate larger projects like secondary schools, and local, less well-educated community members smaller projects such as cattle-dips. In most Harambee communities, the local leaders—chiefs, teachers, and church clergy—form local committees to manage the schools. These committees organize fundraisers, identify and recruit teachers, and hold other school functions. The day-to-day functioning of the school, however, is left in the hands of the registered management committee, represented by the head-teacher whose authority is rarely challenged. A complaint of parents is the widespread misappropriation of funds by corrupt headteachers and school committees. Another is the competition between vying factions and politicians about which students to admit and which teachers to hire.

¹ Originally the work groups that engaged in Harambee labor and fundraising were constituted of women organized in terms of age and often kinship, or sometimes mixed clan, neighborhood or village groups (Mbithi and Rasmusson 1977 13).



Harambee projects rely on community work parties to raise money and construct schools *USAID photo*

Mbithi and Rasmusson note that contributions for Harambee projects are usually solicited through fund-raising drives presided over by local VIPs and covered by the media, collections taken during visits to homes, levies on produce, income, wages, and salaries, and contributions in labor, materials, and cash (1977 67) Their informants considered contributions for Harambee projects to be more voluntary than compulsory, but in some areas such as the Rift Valley there was a greater tendency to assign amounts to individuals in the community (1977 152)² People were more likely to contribute if they saw a direct benefit to the community in more conveniently located facilities, expanded opportunities, an increased ability to attract government money to the area, or a reduction in hooliganism They were also more likely to contribute if they were asked by a local person whom they respected or by a national leader Since it has been estimated that more Harambee

projects fail than succeed, these tendencies identified in the study give an idea of some factors affecting the enthusiasm of contributors Other reasons given for abandoned projects were that communities were not always able to plan realistically, knew little about large-scale construction, or picked designs for the schools that were too ambitious or not suitable in other ways (Bray in Bray and Lillis 1988 205)

² Later as it became more difficult to collect sufficient funds because of the proliferation of Harambee projects and the consequence pressure on local resources communities appear to have imposed assessments on their residents more frequently (see Hill 1991 287) Even the national government in 1990 withdrew a sum from government workers salaries to provide funds for a Presidential scholarship fund for secondary students

Nzambani Harambee School

The new chief appointed in 1972 in Nzambani revived the idea of a Harambee school to increase the education level of the area. He planned to locate the secondary school in an existing primary school and transfer its students to some classrooms that would be built by local work groups. The chief appointed a project committee that included local clergymen of different denominations, politicians, traders, and officials. Since it was time for the 1974 elections, the chief used the publicity of Harambee gifts to extract as many contributions as possible from the politicians. Fund raising was begun in early 1973 by the chiefs and sub-chiefs of the catchment area. The amount each person and organization should pay was set by the committee, and collection of the funds was handled by the administrators. Men paid Shs (shillings) 15, women 10, and employed persons 25. A Harambee Day was planned in August but was postponed because only Shs 17,000 had been collected locally. Nevertheless, a house was built for a teacher. The Catholic Mission planned to provide a headmaster if the school was ready in November but since it was not, the headmaster went elsewhere. By January some students had been selected but the school was not ready—the primary students still had not moved to their new quarters. Each of the concerned parties blamed the others for the delay, and the chief was away for an extended time. When he returned he again planned a Harambee Day. Meanwhile the Catholic Mission sent money to finish the primary school classrooms so the students could vacate their school for the new Harambee school. The Mission also lent money for books and desks so as not to disturb the banked funds of Shs 40,000 that were required before the government would give permission to open the school.

The school finally opened in February with six paid-up students. Others were sent home to get the Shs 750 annual fees. The school committee estimated it would take 40 students in a class to keep the school running. The school had three teachers: a sixth form leaver waiting for university admission and two unpaid, voluntary, part-time temporary teachers—the Catholic Mission's District Education Officer and a British student studying the Harambee Movement. By March there were 30 paid-up students. The long-delayed Harambee Day was held at the end of March, with a number of district officials and the Member of Parliament (MP) present. The meeting raised Shs 33,000, with almost half raised by the MP through his business contributions, and through the personal contributions of money and material of the Vice-President of Kenya. The Harambee Day money gave the committee more than the required Shs 40,000, the school consequently demonstrated that it was viable, and the Catholic Mission confirmed its support with a pump for a well and an additional teacher's house. In May a new headmaster—a foreigner—was appointed, as well as two teachers to replace the temporary staff.

—adapted from Hill 1991

Most Harambee projects were governed by Community School Committees, whose job it was to mobilize resources and manage any difficulties with the schools. Their membership consisted variously of chiefs, teachers, ministers, farmers, businessmen, and others. They were the official group charged to negotiate with education officials, local councils, self-help groups, and, through their leaders, the government concerning all matters related to the school. Working with the headmaster, the committee was charged with deciding what contributions the parents would make (e.g., setting community work days, money collections, etc.), and it organized parents' days, PTA meetings, and other events to bring the school and community together. The committee also served as a feedback channel for parents' concerns about the school and would demand accountability from the school if exam results were not up to the standard the community expected (Anderson in Bray and Lillis 1988: 32).

The two factors that Mbithi and Rasmusson found important in the success of Harambee projects were continuity in leadership and the extent to which leaders had support of the community. Projects tended to fail when there were too many conflicting claims on community resources and/or projects were imposed from above, that is, by a government official. They suggested that it was appropriate for government officials to provide material support, consultation, and coordination but that they should not try to impose projects on a community.

The Kenya government has emphasized that schools should rely on the support of the whole community—not just parental support—because educational development benefits the whole community. Though this emphasis is sound in theory, secondary schools in particular have difficulty defining their “community” as a coherent whole, especially when they draw students from large catchment areas, and provide boarding facilities to attract students from broad enough geographic areas to keep their schools operating. Dispersed catchment areas make it more difficult to collect funds for secondary schools than for primary schools. As a result, many Harambee efforts have to rely on regional leaders and politicians to organize their efforts.

C School program

The Harambee school program is modeled on government schools that are in effect, the valued model for most of Kenyan society. The intent of the program is to produce students who perform well on the Kenyan Certificate Exam (KCE) which screens entry to higher education and other desirable opportunities. The Harambee schools follow the same syllabus and curriculum as the government schools, reflect the same organization, and their students sit the same exams. Where the schools differ in detail, it is less a consequence of intent, and more a lack of resources that lowers the quality of Harambee schools. Many of



Juniors and Seniors outside of Luwanda Secondary School, a Harambee school in Kakamega Kenya. Photo by Christopher Galaty

the successes and failures of the schools are a consequence of changes in national policies that either assist the schools or force more requirements upon them. There is, therefore, nothing unique in the principles of the Harambee Movement that inspires its supporters to make the program new or different.

Most Harambee schools were planned as four-year schools but difficulty in funding often caused them to start as two-year schools. As soon as possible after a minimum number of school classrooms are built, school committees frequently add boarding facilities to attract sufficient students to support the operating costs of the schools. Finally, if enough resources are available, schools might add science laboratories, better qualified teachers, and additional equipment that enables the school to offer the full secondary school certificate. Generally, however, a lack of resources and an inability to tap opportunities cause most Harambee schools to content themselves with less than their full expectation for quality. Forms 1 and 2 require more modest facilities, while 3 and 4 require more substantial funding. Most schools attempt to obtain assistance from the government as quickly as possible to stretch their resources.

Several factors affect school program quality in Harambee secondary schools: the intake of students, the quality of the facilities, the qualifications of teachers, the curricula, and management.

1 Student intake

The student intake in Harambee schools occurs largely by default since the vast majority of entrants are those who do not qualify for government schools or who cannot afford the expense of studying far from their homes. Consequently, the Harambee program usually has to cope with more poorly prepared and less academically qualified students. One study, however, showed that students who had studied in the higher quality, government-maintained secondary schools were likely to score 12 to 15 points better on the East

African Certificate Exam (EACE) than students with similar scores on the Certificate of Primary Education (CPE) who had studied in low quality, assisted Harambee schools. Similarly, students entering low quality, assisted Harambee schools performed 10-12 points higher than similarly qualified students who entered low quality, unassisted Harambee schools. The quality of the secondary program therefore appears much more important in determining success on the EACE than the quality of the intake students. Harambee schools cannot therefore blame the poor achievement of their students on their poor academic record when they arrive (Somerset in Lillis 1988b: 82).

Once in the Harambee schools, students are believed to be motivated to study harder because they can take an exam at the end of the second year and if they do well transfer to the third year in a government school (assuming they can pay for the boarding costs).


2 Facilities

Facilities for Harambee schools are almost entirely built through community efforts. Though the Ministry of Works provides technical specifications for schools and free plans are available, many schools are built with support from external donors and local schools in rural areas ignore them. A study of school facilities based on Inspectorate guidelines showed statistically different physical standards in schools that were categorized on the basis of student achievement levels. The schools were ranked from A to D, with almost all government schools in the upper half of the scale and almost all unassisted schools in the lower half. The government schools ranked considerably higher than unassisted Harambee schools in buildings, services, cleanliness, laboratories, libraries, equipment, ventilation, and transport. In other words, the standard of facilities correlated with achievement levels, and both types of Harambee schools were generally poorer (Wellings 1983: 29).

3 Teacher qualifications

A comparison of the government and Harambee systems in 1982 showed that in government secondary schools, 84 percent of teachers were qualified and 88 percent were university trained, while only 45 percent of teachers in assisted and 22 percent in unassisted Harambee schools were qualified, and only 18 percent in both Harambee systems were university trained. Teachers were therefore of much lower standard in Harambee schools, and in some Harambee schools, staff were employed who only had a KCE degree. Similarly, in government schools the ratio of qualified teachers to students was 1 to 31, in assisted Harambee schools 1 to 57, and in unassisted Harambee schools 1 to 108.

There are several reasons why it is not easy to attract qualified teachers: 1) the catchment area for recruitment of staff may be limited and community members, not experienced in education matters, may not know how to select suitable individuals; 2) community-supported schools are often unable to provide competitive salaries and benefits, or 3) com-



Kenyan teachers comparing notes. USAID photo.

munity-supported schools are often unable to provide the books, facilities, housing, and other amenities that make them attractive places to work. It has been suggested that "where community resources are complementing governmental ones, their overall effect is likely to be positive." Communities that construct good housing and provide a high level of support and respect for their teachers are more likely to attract and retain better teachers (Lillis 1988b 78-79)

4 Curricula

Harambee schools follow the same curricula and textbooks as the government schools and teach the same course subjects. Deviation from the curriculum is usually a consequence of inadequate resources to support special facilities and better qualified, specialized teachers. "Most Harambee schools are mere shadows of government institutions. Many are unable to offer science subjects because they lack laboratories and qualified staff, and many of those which do only feel confident to offer general science and health science rather than chemistry, physics, and biology" (Lillis 1988b 80)

In 1975, as noted above, in an effort to introduce quality improvements in the curriculum, the government announced a scheme called the Secondary Schools Harambee Package Program in which 30 to 50 Harambee schools³ a year were to be given qualified trained teachers, correspondence courses to improve the academic skills of those planning to take the Kenyan Junior Certificate Exam (which takes place in the second year of secondary), audio-visual equipment, and help from the supervisory staff of the inspectorate. In addition, the government announced that it would take over selected schools beginning with Form 1, and gradually the rest of the forms in succeeding years. This effort proved too costly, however. Instead, the government decided that students who passed the exam would be allowed to enter the much better equipped government schools in their third year. Harambee schools that bought science learning kits or an industrial arts workshop were to be given qualified science or industrial arts teachers paid for by the government. These government plans were not all realized because of the large numbers of schools, though, for the most part, the major expense of teachers' salaries was provided in the Harambee schools selected for assistance.

5 Management

Churches were normally selected to manage Harambee schools, even though the government required that Harambee schools be secular in character and students not be selected on the basis of religious affiliation. The religious organizations might, for example, provide a director and staff from their clergy, and if they had independent sources of support, contribute financially to the operation of the schools. Consequently, the group that was given management authority could contribute significantly to the success of a school both in terms of resources and committed, qualified staff. If no religious group could be found to manage the school, then another established group might be identified to manage the school.

The schools normally were run by a headteacher who had the main responsibility for the school, even to the point where he/she was rarely questioned about daily routines. The schools were required to be open to government inspection, but in practice there were not enough inspectors or funding to provide for their transport, and consequently most schools were rarely inspected. Program quality tended to suffer from the lack of supervision and central administration.

An early study (1967) at the point when Harambee was beginning its massive expansion, looked at the qualifications of headteachers. In 214 Harambee schools (83 percent of schools at that time) most of the trained headteachers were Europeans and hired through missionary groups. Headteachers who were well-qualified Africans had "unrecognized" degrees (from India or East Europe) or a "defect" such as conviction for embezzlement. In most cases headteachers with little more than basic secondary and experience in primary education managed the early schools. Now, though the problem is not entirely solved, more and better-qualified Africans are available to fill the positions.

³ In fact, many more schools were assisted once the movement got under way. In 1977 only seven schools were assisted, while by 1986 the number rose to 941 (See Table 4.1)

6 Changes in the education structure

An event that had a major impact on the Harambee system was the restructuring of the education program in 1983. Before 1983, the education program operated on a complicated 7-4-2-3 system of primary, secondary, upper secondary, and university stages. Most of the Harambee schools comprised the four years of secondary and their graduates competed both on the Junior KCE exams, where if they were successful they might enter the third year of a government secondary school, and the KCE, which determined whether they would find places in upper secondary or technical institutes.

After 1983, the system was changed to 8-4-4 of primary, secondary, and university levels, weighting the number of years of schooling more heavily to the primary level. Dropouts and failures from the primary and secondary were given chances to enter Junior Technical Schools and Harambee Institutes of Technology respectively. At this time the core curriculum was expanded at both primary and secondary stages to include prevocational training. The purpose was to prepare students to become self-employed if they should terminate their education at the end of these stages. Secondary schools also began to put a greater emphasis on science. Both courses—the prevocational and science courses—put increased pressure on Harambee schools to provide additional facilities.

D Results

1 The development of community self-help institutions

The Harambee experience illustrates both the positive and negative potential of genuinely community inspired movements. On the positive side are the community structures and skills that are mobilized to deal with the various needs of the project: leadership, planning, fundraising, labor, staffing, equipping, maintaining, etc. These structures are mobilized rapidly because they build on already existing means of organizing the community, which though perhaps not previously utilized for such large-scale projects, are nevertheless adaptable to their requirements. The Harambee secondary schools create an additional special case where supra-local connections have to be cultivated to organize the communities of the large catchment areas that are needed to support the schools. The very act of establishing the schools consequently activates and requires grassroots community organizations to become proficient in the practice of development.

The negative aspect that is dealt with elsewhere in more detail is the disjunction between the community's perceived needs and the government's view of what is good for national development. These two views are frequently incompatible. From a national perspective the country can ill afford a haphazard proliferation of expensive, poor quality secondary schools, while communities feel they are deprived of essential opportunities if schools are not established locally. At the same time, communities lack the essential skills to make their investments in Harambee schools pay off in terms of added opportunities for their sons and daughters.

Some of the community institutions that are enhanced through Harambee initiatives include local governing structures and their networks of participatory assemblies, project committees, school management committees, traditional work cooperatives, sanctioning mechanisms, and systems of local "taxation" through imposed assessments. In the process of establishing Harambee schools, participants develop many of the fundamental skills and institutions required to support civil society and democratic values, are empowered to solve a wide range of local development problems, and contribute resources that extend national budgets and capacities multi-fold. The Harambee model is extremely successful from the perspective of building indigenous community institutions to advance local development. Its failure to achieve all of its ends is primarily a problem in articulating productively with national level institutions.

2 Educational participation

By any standard, the Harambee record in expanding secondary opportunities in rural areas is impressive.

Work Parties in Harambee Projects

The inspiration for the Harambee Movement had two main sources: the positive example of community-based traditional work parties, and a desire to reform the methods of colonial-forced labor. The traditional system of work parties is called "mwethya." The term can mean an actual work party organized for a specific purpose, a system of neighborhood work parties, or a collectivity of people in a neighborhood working together on work parties (Hill 1991: 138). A work party is called together by an intermediary for the person who needs the work done. On the appointed day people gather and are given instructions on what to do and how to do it. The person who benefits from the work provides a meal and drink to the workers. A key ingredient of the effort is a good song leader who leads songs to encourage workers and to express the principles of self-help. The songs that are also sung at large assembly meetings express the goals of Harambee, appreciation for large contributions, and sometimes comments on political issues that might not be so openly expressed in other form. After the day's work is done, people drink, sing, and dance late into the night. At this time the discussion of sanctions is raised—who needs to be fined because they were absent from the work party without a good excuse.

In Kitui district in 1973 there were 732 officially registered mwethya groups. In one community, Kamale, a mwethya group that was revived at Independence was composed of 306 members—virtually all the able-bodied members of the community. In a period of 10 years it was able to complete a primary school building, build and maintain community wells, clear and maintain village paths and a road to the main highway, repair a large dam, and join with other communities in contributing to and providing labor for a Harambee secondary school and an Agricultural Institute. The mwethya network was used to provide labor and to collect contributions. Working members contributed labor one or two times a week and non-working members paid a fixed yearly sum of money. Sometimes the mwethya members worked as a group to earn cash for a Harambee project.

The mwethya elects a committee to review proposals from project committees and decide which projects to present to the membership. The committee calls a general assembly when there is business to discuss or when a chief makes the rounds of mwethya to discuss mutual problems or make announcements about the progress of projects. Chiefs and sub-chiefs become involved in Harambee projects when they are supra-local with a wider catchment area that needs to be organized. If attendance at these general meetings is low, the officials threaten sanctions such as fines, which are usually enough to raise attendance at the next meeting. The local leaders take a strong role in presenting their views but at the same time they seek consensus from the membership on the actions that should be taken. The main speakers in the assemblies come from the project committees and are answered by opinion leaders who speak for their neighborhood groups.

Mwethya contributions are obligatory and sanctioned with penalties for those who fail to pay or work the set amount. The most serious sanction is "kithendu," meaning "to strip off something" or "to attach property." When there are large numbers of defaulters and money is urgently needed, the mwethya committee declares a kithendu and appoints "soldiers" to go to defaulters at night to collect outstanding payments. If the money is not paid immediately, they seize the person's property. Owners may retrieve their property when they pay their debt, but sometimes the item is sold for the price of the debt, even though it may be worth more.

—adapted from Hill 1991

Tables 4 2 and 4 3 show the rapid rise of secondary enrollments between 1964, shortly after Independence, and 1996 During this period, there was more than a tenfold increase in secondary school enrollments, due largely to places afforded by the Harambee schools By 1987, the 1,883 Harambee schools constituted almost 75 percent of the 2,592 secondary schools in Kenya, providing an education to 55 percent of all secondary students Overall, as a result of this expansion, the ratio of secondary participation became roughly 20 percent of the age group in Kenya, which is high for a developing country⁴ The Harambee schools provided a second arm (a “second chance,” some called it) in a two-track system where the best students enrolled in government secondary schools, with many of their expenses paid, and the poorer students enrolled in Harambee schools, paying their own way

Table 4 2 Selected years of Kenyan secondary school enrollment by school type (1964-87)^a

Year	School type						Total enrollment
	Government		Harambee assisted		Harambee unassisted ^b		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
1964	26,135	76			8,359	24	34,494
1965	30,977	68			14,329	32	45,306
1970	63,203	52	6,853	5	52,183	43	122,239
1975	95,020	50			93,225	50	188,245
1980	174,116	43 5	96,556	24	129,388	32 5	400,060
1985	187,533	50	110,375	30	73,774	20	371,682
1986	201,404	48	139,798	33	79,627	19	420,829 ^c
1987	214,779	45	172,536	36	91,021	19	478,336 ^c

a signifies no data available

b Although Kenya's data on the unassisted schools category include Harambee church and private schools over 90 percent of the category are Harambee schools Data from all three are included in this category

c Two data sources differ for 1986 and 1987 The alternative statistics show 458 712 students (1986) and 522 261 students (1987)

Sources excerpted from Data for 1964 1976 from Kenyan Ministry of Education *Annual Reports* In Mwiria 1985 Table 3 3 Data for 1968 1976 85 and 1985 87 from Kenyan Ministry of Education *Annual Reports* In Mwiria 1990 Table 2 Alternative data for 1986 87 from *Annual Reports* Table 168a

Secondary school efforts peaked in 1984 at a high of 485,459 students after a consistent pattern of annual increases over the previous 25 years (see Table 4 2) In subsequent years secondary enrollments dropped briefly and then continued to rise until by 1987 they were approaching the 1984 high again Table 4 3 shows enrollments at the secondary level, after the government assumed support for all secondary schools From 1988 statistics are no longer disaggregated by type of school There were further fluctuations in enrollments through 1993 as the system reacted to changing policies concerning the secondary level the lack of government support as the system changed to 8 4 4, and later when the government decided to take over all of the Harambee schools (see below for further discussion) After 1993, enrollments continued to rise

While Harambee schools have increased the overall number of places available to secondary students, regional data show that they also were a major factor in intensifying differences in educational participation across Kenya Their growth in the various regions depended on a number of factors population den-

⁴ For example Kenya had over 10 secondary students for every three, and 13 university students for every one in Tanzania (Cooksey et al 1994 205)

sity, the number of feeder primary schools, better rainfall, and agricultural potential, which is connected with gradations in wealth and more sophisticated levels of infrastructure (Hill 1991:226). Harambee efforts were more easily mobilized in areas with higher levels of these factors. For example, the poorer Coast, Rift Valley, and North Eastern Provinces lagged behind the richer Central, Nyanza, and Western Provinces and other comparatively more prosperous areas in the establishment of Harambee schools. Government assistance to secondary schools, which was no longer independent of Harambee initiatives because of political pressures, was forced to follow the basic lop-sided distribution of opportunities that Harambee created (Mwiria 1985:72).

Table 4.3 Kenyan secondary school enrollment (1988-96)^a

Year	Total enrollment
	N
1988	540,192
1989	640,735
1990	618,461
1991	614,161
1992	579,900
1993	531,342
1994	619,839
1996	658,253

a During this period all the secondary schools became government assisted and no longer differentiated.
Source: Kenyan Ministry of Education *Annual Reports* Table 168a.

Another inequity occurred in the variable costs to parents (reported in more detail below). Government schools overall cost considerably less to parents in mean annual fees (Shs 1438 including boarding) than either assisted Harambee (Shs 2733.5) or unassisted Harambee (Shs 3228.4) schools (UNICEF 1984:92 in Lillis 1988a:91). Since the Harambee schools also tended to cater to rural families, the burden fell most heavily on those least able to pay. The reason for this was that rural students who were eligible because of their exam scores to go to government schools might not go because they could not afford the transport or boarding costs of distant schools, when a nearby Harambee school was available. Consequently, a self-selection process tended to place more affluent students (who were also more likely to have been able to afford a primary education that gave them better exam scores) in government-maintained than Harambee schools.

Though provision of Harambee schools correlates most obviously with variations in local economies, the ability to pay, and the length of time education has been available in an area, there are also other factors that are significant. Foremost among them is the level of government activity that favors larger numbers of Harambee schools on the periphery of major cities or, negatively, the presence of nomadic tribes where it is difficult to find stable enough communities to organize support for the schools (Mbithi and Rasmusson 1977:134-7). A criticism of Harambee schools is that their unplanned growth eats state resources that might be better put to a more equitable distribution of opportunities. This is a negative trade-off in community initiatives that prevents them from adequately taking the place of disinterested authorities in a fair distribution of opportunities.

A positive aspect of the Harambee Movement is that, compared to the government system, it has increased girls' enrollments disproportionately. In trying to control the growth of Harambee schools, the government

set up District Development Committees whose job it was to screen new Harambee projects. In theory, though not always in practice, one of their jobs was to ensure that where multiple schools existed in a region, the second school established (which was usually after a boys' school) should be a girls' school (Hill 1991: 226). In 1968 there were 143 government schools for boys, 61 for girls, and 28 that were coed, while by 1974 there were 235 schools for boys, 82 for girls, and 47 coed schools (Krystall 1980 in Lillis 1988a: 91). By 1979 the ratio of girls' enrollment was 50 percent in assisted Harambee schools and 45 percent in unassisted schools, compared with 32 percent in government schools. Though girls' participation is often seen as more dependent on the cost of schooling to parents than boys' participation, the higher costs of Harambee schools did not in actuality seem to be a deterrent to girls' enrollments. One reason may be the more convenient location of Harambee schools near the girls' homes, which is an incentive both in terms of accessibility and the absence of a boarding fee.

Girls' dropout rates in Harambee schools, however, are higher than boys' rates overall and are higher than girls' rates in government schools, so the picture is not entirely positive for girls. There has been no attempt to study the reasons for these poorer figures. In addition, because the Harambee program is poorer in quality, the fact that higher proportions of girls are enrolled in these schools overall means that girls may be getting an inferior secondary education (Lillis 1988a: 92). Unfortunately, published studies do not disaggregate achievement data by gender to illuminate this point.

3 Learning/Achievement

On the Kenya Certificate of Education (KCE) exam, which is the main measure of learning achievement, students of the government schools occupy the high end of the mean scores and the Harambee schools the low end. In 1983, for example, the top Harambee school was 118th out of a total of 1,385 schools whose students sat the exam. The scores are ranked from one to nine, with one being the highest score. Out of those schools scoring a mean average worse than 8, 465 out of 559 were Harambee schools (Lillis and Ayot 1988: 124).

The reasons given for the poor performance of Harambee students were poor teaching and inadequate facilities, the lower caliber of the student body, many of whom cannot win admission to the government schools because of their primary school grades, the schools' weaker administrative and supervisory structure, and local politics, which may cause weaker students to be admitted and poorer teachers to be hired.

Three tables below show different facets of the problem. Table 4.4 shows pass rate comparisons of students from government and Harambee schools on a 1975 EACE examination. Harambee students obtained lower scores on every subject test compared with the government students.

Table 4.5 shows division rankings of government and Harambee students on the KCE in 1984. The lower the division the better the students. Seventy percent of all students taking the exams had studied in Harambee schools. The majority of them (61 percent in assisted and 69 percent in unassisted Harambee schools) received either a poor "Division 4" or a "Fail" score compared to 37 percent of the government students.

⁵ Though the data are quite old, a writer in 1985 remarked that they were still valid at that time.

Table 4 4 Pass rates (%) on 1975 EACE by subject and type of school in Kenya

Subject	School type	
	Government	Harambee
English language	76	46
Kiswahili	60	37
Traditional math	46	16
Modern math	49	14
General science	56	43
Biology	72	43
Physical science	69	43
Literature in English	75	45
Christian religious education	73	49
Fasih Ya Kiswahili	71	50
History	79	37
Geography	75	37
Commerce	73	29

Source *Educational Trends 1973 77 1978* Nairobi Kenyan Government Central Bureau of Statistics In Mwiria 1985 Table 4 3

Table 4 5 1984 KCE results by school type in Kenya

Division ranking ^a	School type		
	Government	Harambee assisted	Harambee unassisted
1 or 2	30% (4,579)	13% (1 726)	8% (4,102)
3	33% (16,040)	26% (3,486)	23% (11,815)
4	26% (2,249)	32% (4,395)	34% (17,102)
Failed	11% (5,133)	29% (3,958)	35% (17,746)
Total Students	100% (28,001)	100% (13,565)	100% (50,765)

a KCE divisions are a ranking of score results They range from a high score of 1 to a failing score of 5
Sources Shuman and Mwiria 1987 18 *Science and Technology Annual Report 1984 22* Republic of Kenya Ministry of Education Nairobi Government Printer *Annual Report 1987* (unpublished data) In Mwiria 1990 Table 4

Table 4 6 shows the score comparisons of a sample of schools on a number of dimensions ⁵ In each comparison a lower score means a higher ranking This table underlines two important facts about learning achievement among Kenyan secondary students First it supports previous findings about the poor performance of Harambee as a whole and especially in comparison with students from government-maintained schools Second, these tests show that Harambee students, on average, achieved failing grades (9 0) in the two most important subjects—math and English—while government-maintained schools averaged a passing grade (8 0) While the scores do not appear much different for government students, passing grades in these subjects are essential in Kenya to enter both post-secondary institutions and direct employment

Table 4 6 1981 KCE results in 45 secondary schools^a in Kenya

Average scores	Government schools	Harambee assisted	Harambee unassisted
Division ^b	3 00	4 5	4 5
Grade ^c	7 0	8 5	8 5
Order of merit by average grade ^d	229	1100	1068
Weighted grade ^e (English)	8 0	9 0	9 0
Weighted grade (math)	8 0	9 0	9 0

a The sample includes 15 schools of each type selected because they were all established in the late 1960s or early 1970s have total student populations of about 320 recruit their students from within the district in which they are based and are all day schools

b KCE divisions range from a high score of 1 to a failing score of 5

c Grades in Kenya range from a high score of 1 to a failing score of 9

d Order of Merit by Average Grade is computed from the 1 421 schools whose students took KCE exams in 1981

e The weighted grade means the average of average grades

Source Kenya National Examinations Council In Mwiria 1985 Table 4 2

Another measure of achievement is the extent to which a school's graduates win admission into the next educational stage, and therefore are able to qualify for jobs of higher status In Kenya under the old 7 4 2 3 system, students joined upper secondary after four years of secondary school if they qualified Upper secondary was required before a student could win a chance at a coveted university education The other alternatives were to apply to training institutes that prepared students for careers in teaching, health, travel, or office work, or to go directly into the job market

The case was discouraging for Harambee graduates in regard to the prestigious upper secondary schools In 1982, out of roughly 11,000 places available, 9,000 were taken by government school graduates, and 1,400 or 13 percent by Harambee students (the rest come from private schools), despite the fact that 55 percent of secondary students were enrolled in Harambee schools Two-thirds of the Harambee graduates who did enter higher secondary enrolled in arts subjects compared to only a third of government students Only 18 percent of Harambee students entered the science stream compared to 33 percent of government students After two years when it came time for university, 87 percent of the places were filled by government students and only 7 percent by Harambee students (Mwiria 1990 363)

The situation was similar for Harambee students who attempted to win admission to training institutes For the roughly 100,000 students who sat the KCE in 1982, only 7,000 places were available in training institutes, and of these about 4,000 were in teacher training colleges Seventy-five percent of the placements in these institutes went to government school graduates Harambee graduates occupied 17 percent of the teacher training places but had difficulty obtaining places in any of the other training programs because most required lab science as a prerequisite for placement, and few Harambee schools could afford the costly equipment to offer these courses

The Uvumbi Harambee Secondary School

An African church group provided the initial capital for the Uvumbi Harambee Secondary School in 1978. The leaders of the church invited dignitaries to a fund-raising meeting to pledge financial support. The chief set aside land, and local people contributed labor to the construction of the building. They hoped the government would assume financial responsibility for the school. But the government pulled back from an earlier commitment although it later paid the salaries of two of five teachers.

The school depended almost entirely on community resources, and in 1979, for example, when there were no rains and therefore no crops, the student body was reduced to 24 students, almost forcing the school to close. By the late 1980s, the church that had originally supported the Uvumbi school no longer provided any help. Student fees of \$73 dollars a year covered everything in the school program: maintenance materials, salaries of non-governmental teachers, water, and school supplies. Boarders paid an additional \$82 a year, which together with fees comes to about a third of the \$420 average per capita annual income of Kenyans. Some students were exempted from the boarding fee if they supplied sufficient food to feed a share of the boarders. A local mother cooked for the students. There was also a small building fund to pay capital expenses. To attract students the school kept its fees lower than the government fees, and planned to keep them low as long as necessary until its success rate on the KCE justified raising fees.

In the mid 1980s at the "high" point of the Harambee school movement, the Uvumbi school, in contrast to the town in which it was located, was neat and well-maintained. There were two classroom buildings and a girls' dormitory. Boys lived in town. The grounds, which included a playing field shared with a primary school, were lined with trees. The school library had 35 books used mainly by the teachers. A storeroom served as a teachers' room. A science classroom existed but had no materials. The school, like the village, had no electricity, telephone, or indoor plumbing. Four teachers (one qualified for the secondary level) taught 120 students but were frequently absent. A headmaster acted as full-time administrator but did not teach though he also was a qualified teacher.

The headmaster claimed that he wanted to provide a student-centered, discovery kind of learning for his students but was unable to do so because of the lack of resources and the pressure to complete the government syllabus so his students could do well on the KCE. In classrooms the teachers used a traditional teaching/learning approach where they lectured and wrote lesson material on the blackboard while students answered factual questions posed by the teacher and copied from the blackboard. There were few books, and in some classes students shared the small number available. There was also a shortage of paper to write on so students figured problems in their heads and only put the answers on paper. The students were taught Kiswahili, English, history, geography, science (physics, chemistry, and biology) math, and religious education. The teachers felt overworked, had little time to prepare lessons, and received little pay for the long hours they spent at school.

About a third of Uvumbi graduates went on to post-secondary education, though most were admitted into programs of poor quality and none was in the field of science, which was the area where better jobs were available after graduation. Uvumbi's results were considered better than most other Harambee schools.

Why do students continue to go to Harambee schools? In Uvumbi they said they went because the school was close to home so they avoided the cost of boarding, because they couldn't find work, and had nothing else to do, or because they felt they should help their country by increasing their level of education. School in fact oriented them toward urban types of work and made them unwilling to undertake the kinds of manual labor found in the countryside. Even the small chance that they might find a place in the university continued to motivate many to enroll in secondary school even though the vast majority would not realize their post-secondary ambitions.

—adapted from Shuman, David A., and Kilemi Mwiria 1987

4 School program quality

The Harambee schools have not defined their contribution to education in terms of special components that would create a quality program. The main concern of Harambee students was with passing exams—there was no effort to enrich the core program or make it more difficult for them. As far as community participants were concerned, a quality program is one that produces students who can do well on the KCE (earlier EACE). The preceding section shows that most Harambee schools do not meet that expectation. A study of parents' attitudes showed that they were reluctant to blame the schools for the poor test performance and instead blamed their own children for not having studied enough. Most firmly believed that the Kenyan education system was a true meritocracy where anyone could succeed if they only studied hard enough. Most also believed that in any case some education was better than no education at all. (Mwiria 1990:365)

The thrust of the Harambee Movement, without conscious intent, has been mainly quantitative, rather than qualitative. This fact in itself has exacerbated the problems of quality, since fewer, better-resourced schools might have resulted in a better overall product. However, the reality that most Harambee schools do not produce a quality equal to the government system probably has less to do with the efforts exerted by communities and more to do with the inability of mechanisms intended to ensure quality, such as training and supervision, to reach sufficiently to local areas. As noted above, where community resources complement government resources in harder-to-reach rural areas, the overall effect is likely to be positive. This is borne out in the comparatively better results of well-resourced government schools, and, in turn, the often better results found in government-assisted as opposed to unassisted Harambee schools. It is very difficult for the community to achieve these objectives themselves when so many of the instruments that achieve quality are controlled by the government. Indeed, the community has neither the resources nor the technical expertise to do much more to effect quality.

The dilemma for Harambee schools is that in order to attract sufficient fees to provide a better quality program, the schools have to demonstrate that their students can perform well on the KCE exam, which of course can only be achieved with a quality program. Just one of the difficulties is that many cannot afford lab science courses that are required for most post-secondary education.

Early thinking on Harambee schools was that they should take the lead in providing a training more directly relevant to the rural environment. Skills such as carpentry, masonry, construction, and more scientific farming would give graduates a chance to earn money when their opportunities to enter a professional career were frustrated. The existing secondary program tended to alienate people from the kinds of work that were available in rural communities, thus creating a pool of graduates neither suited for urban nor rural employment. Attempts to change Harambee programs toward more vocational/technical training, however, met resistance from those who remembered how this kind of training under colonial administrations led to dead-end employment for Africans.

When the government restructured the education system to the 8-4-4 system in 1983 and added more pre-vocational and science courses to the core curriculum for all secondary schools, the changes led to an even greater deterioration in the quality of the Harambee programs. First, many schools could not afford the workshops and materials required for the pre-vocational and science courses and therefore the students were unable to prepare for essential KCE and Craft exams. Second, many of the Harambee teachers were incapable of teaching these kinds of specialized courses. And finally, the time spent in the pre-vocational courses took away from the time that could be spent on the "core academic" courses, leading to further deterioration in these skills.

A further difficulty arose as a result of the removal of the two higher secondary years. The university came under a great deal of pressure to absorb double cohorts of students who were suddenly ready for university training. Thus in 1990-91 university expenditures were forced to rise to accommodate the 40,000 students who were admitted that year, and concomitantly resources were diverted from secondary education, including from the assisted Harambee schools. By 1992, even the remaining grants for teachers' salaries

were no longer available, and the schools and communities had to resort to higher user fees, which forced many students out of the schools. Table 4.3 above shows the precipitous decrease of over 100,000 secondary student enrollments between 1989 and 1993 that resulted from this reallocation of funds. All this resulted in a further decline in the quality of the program the Harambee schools offered.

5 Accountability to communities and the state

From time to time the government has exerted pressure on Harambee schools to ensure their compliance with minimum standards and requirements. For example, the government requires the registration of school managers to know who they are and whether they are suitable (Bray 1988:97). They also require certain minimum conditions to be met before a school can become operational (see above). In 1985 the Minister of Finance and Planning called for more accountability of Harambee funds and expenditures to maintain the people's confidence in Harambee projects, but most schools remained unaudited because of the lack of staff and other resources to fully implement the Minister's directives. The Harambee schools have also increasingly become tools of politicians especially during elections when communities may be promised government support that does not always materialize, and politicians may interfere in decisions concerning the school such as who to admit and who to hire as teaching staff.

One would expect that local committees might have a major controlling influence over the schools, but again this is not always true. School committees, whose job it is to mobilize resources and to manage difficulties with the schools, sometimes organize school events to bring school staff and parents together and offer them an opportunity to voice concerns and demand explanations in the case of poor exam results.

As one study discovered, local committees tended to wield more power in unassisted Harambee than in government-assisted schools because in the former they exerted more control over the finances of the school. They had, for example, more latitude to hire and fire teachers and to decide on salary levels. But even these committees did not have unregulated control over the schools. All schools have to meet government requirements regarding curriculum and the instructional program that are beyond the scope of committees to decide. The extent to which the committees proved effective in wielding influence over the schools, according to one study, related to the array of skills members commanded to get the work done, the choice of the head master who preferably should be active, cooperative, and willing to carry out the committee's directives, and the cooperativeness of teachers. Teachers could refuse, for example, to listen to parents on questions of curriculum or government policy, and thus limit the spheres within which the committees could effectively work. In some cases, on the other hand, members of committees became so powerful that they exploited their positions for personal financial gain. The Kenyan government acted to control some of the most blatant cases, but these kinds of activities persisted in many communities (Bray 1988:37).

6 Costs

The intent of the Harambee schools was not to compete with the government in providing low cost schooling. Rather the schools were thought to be a way of attracting scarce government resources and services to an area. Communities counted on the likelihood that the government would take over the schools soon after they were built. They were encouraged in that belief by numerous contradictory policy announcements over the years. In 1967, for example, the government announced it would take over roughly 30 Form 1 classes each year but later reneged on the offer. It also offered to provide funding after physical facilities were completed, for a period of four years until the graduation of one class, during which time the community would open additional non-assisted classes, hoping that they eventually would also be taken over by the government. This considerable support was common in the first decade after Independence, but declined over time until assistance consisted mainly of salary support for a limited number of teachers in a few schools. It continued, however, through the 1980s for the Harambee Institutes of Technology⁶. In the early 1990s this limited support stopped for a short time until the government finally took over all Harambee schools and no longer distinguished between them and government schools.

There is not much point in comparing the costs per student in government and Harambee assisted and unassisted schools, first because of the considerable variation in Harambee schools, and second, because of widespread recognition that Harambee schools are under-resourced and generally poorer quality programs. Overall, though data are not available, it is clear that the total costs for the better-equipped government program must be considerably higher than the minimally equipped Harambee schools. The cost savings in the Harambee system are less intentional efficiencies and more a matter of necessity and the poverty of parents. The poor results in achievement and placement are a negative consequence of this lack of resources. Harambee school programs in their present state do not constitute a cost-effective schooling delivery model to be imitated without major improvements.

It does make sense, however, to compare costs of the three Kenyan programs to parents, since these costs have implications for participation rates and equity (see above). Table 4.7 summarizes the costs to parents of students in Harambee assisted, Harambee unassisted, and government schools and shows how the costs are computed. In both types of Harambee schools, the student pays considerably more than in government schools. In assisted Harambee schools, the government pays the teacher salaries, while in unassisted Harambee schools, the entire cost is borne by the community and parents, who in some cases sell their properties and belongings to meet school expenses.

Table 4.7 Mean annual fees charged in Kenyan secondary schools (Shs)

Type of fee	Government	Harambee assisted	Harambee unassisted
Tuition/boarding	1,085.0	2,352.9	2,852.6
Building	82.4	148.1	185.3
Uniform	168.4	111.1	73.2
Contingency	44.3	34.2	37.9
Activity	43.5	33.2	31.9
Medical	7.8	9.9	4.7
Books/equipment	6.6	44.1	42.8

Source: Lillis 1988a: 91

Some have asked whether the poor results of Harambee schools are worth the price to parents and government. It has been suggested that for parents, there are few alternatives available to improve their children's prospects and that their hopes remain high simply because a Harambee graduate occasionally does succeed in finding a place in post-secondary education or in reasonable employment. From the government's perspective, the Harambee schools "play an important role as agents of socialization and expanded economic opportunity, however limited they may be in that role" (Mwiria 1990: 367). The Harambee schools are, in effect, better than no education at all from the parents' perspective, and in the government's view they provide a creative outlet for frustrations that might otherwise spill over and prove disruptive to the stability of the society.

⁶ Post-secondary technical institutes (called 'second-choice institutions') were incorporated in the Third Development Plan (1974-78) and given a block grant of 600,000 Kenyan pounds. They also received a strong share of Harambee interest but are not discussed further here because they were much fewer in number (only 20 by 1985) and their support, though derived from district and regional contributions, was not as intimately involved with communities as academic secondary schools. Often their funds came from international corporations and donors and their fundraisers were organized by major figures, including in some cases Provincial Commissioners and even the President of Kenya. The Government normally contributed about 40 percent to their expenses and in a number of cases their operating costs were supported by production activities in the schools themselves. The Government controlled them through a coordinating committee, which set their operating rules.

7 Replication

The impressive increase in the number of Harambee schools was driven by a sense of local need rather than the desire to replicate a successful education delivery model. Where similarities occur in Harambee schools they emanate from a standard perception of what schooling entails—a building, a director, staff, and books. In effect, the Harambee model is a local financing model focusing on the provision of a minimum set of inputs but lacking the expertise to ensure their quality or to coordinate effective results. On one hand, the massive duplication of the Harambee idea is impressive in its scope. On the other, it is limited in its capacity to deliver the quality education that both students and government want. The model is easily replicated for some of the wrong reasons—it can be established with minimal inputs, little expertise, and substandard staff.

8 Sustainability

Through Harambee initiatives, communities in Kenya have shown far greater capacity than communities in most other countries to sustain an indigenous, alternative schooling system. How long this can last is an increasingly difficult question to answer. The same minimalist requirements that make a Harambee model replicatable serve to threaten its sustainability over the long run. Decreasing government capacity to support them adequately and a multiplicity of conflicting development demands on communities may mean costs will no longer be affordable in the future. If the skill levels of school staff and committee members who manage support activities for the schools do not improve and if lack of accountability further erodes confidence in the program, local investment in education may eventually not seem worth the high cost to parents. Many Harambee schools already operate on a tenuous basis and it would take little to close them. It is estimated that half of Harambee school projects are abandoned before completion. If coercive measures to extract funds from parents also escalate, as has happened in a number of communities, this fact alone could prove deleterious to the grassroots organizations that have been strengthened through Harambee activities and to the enthusiasm of those who have contributed so generously to Harambee projects.

In retrospect one might ask why the government didn't take greater advantage of the significant contributions of communities to upgrade the programs in Harambee schools from the start. Though the government claims costs as a major constraint, in effect, costs could have been minimal if they had concentrated on better, more self-study oriented instructional materials and better teacher support, and if the community were assisted in developing the skills to assume a more productive role in managing their schools.

E Issues and lessons learned from Harambee

1 Issues

A number of issues have been raised concerning Harambee schools in the sections above. Foremost among them were

- low program quality,
- lack of relevance to the local economy,
- poor management and supervision of the schools,
- the high costs to parents,
- inadequate overall funding,
- their inability to reach the most disadvantaged populations, and
- an ambivalent relationship with the government

Possibly the most serious of the difficulties facing the Harambee Movement was the constantly eroding financial support from the government and at the same time the increasing competition from demands upon communities to support Harambee initiatives in other sectors. These two factors together place unusually

high financial and labor burdens on communities. It is possible now that the new program to subsidize Harambee schools with a per-student contribution may help to alleviate some of the most pressing financial difficulties.

Though there is no doubt that Harambee efforts in education have led to significant expansion of secondary opportunities in Kenya, some critics question whether all the resources spent on Harambee are wise. Wellings (1983) is one of these critics. He says the schools waste resources that could be put to better use, including job creation, and that schools raise unrealistic expectations among parents and students about their children's future prospects. Despite tremendous quantitative expansion, he says, there has been little qualitative change, so that "education remains traditionalist, academic, severely hierarchical, highly formalized, and examination-oriented" (Wellings 1983: 25).

Uncontrolled local initiatives raise other important questions. If headteachers spend so much time raising funds and supervising construction, are they able to pay sufficient attention to program quality issues? Are the schools in fact unbiased in their selection of students as required, or do religious- and ethnic-based managing committees favor their own candidates and exclude others? Do the number of graduates of such schools distort the labor market producing too many of a certain kind of workers who cannot be employed?

Another important problem is whether the largely uncontrolled expansion of Harambee schools does not limit the ability of the government to plan rationally for secondary school development. For example, schools might be better off consolidating into larger entities where resources could be pooled to produce better quality programs. The demand on government resources, contrary to what one would expect, appears not to have eased through large-scale Harambee contributions, rather it has risen and been more thinly distributed, leaving little for what might prove to be wiser investments in quality inputs like training and supervision. One estimate shows that in the mid-eighties at the peak of the movement half of government recurrent expenditures were allocated to maintaining Harambee-built facilities (Thomas 1985 in Hill 1991: 283).

Harambee has been called an example of a "non-directive" approach to development, where goals are determined by the community itself, planned with its participation, and achieved through local autonomous groups with local leaders. This approach is an alternative or addition to other types of directed change (Hill 1991: 283). A tension has developed between those wanting to preserve this spontaneous nature and those trying to control it to ensure more effective results. Involvement of supra-local authorities is likely to stifle some of Harambee's initiative, but integration with central planning processes may be necessary to avoid wasteful duplication and to use resources in a more cost-effective way.

Harambee, in effect, was a form of compulsory taxation with the element of coercion at the community level increasing over time. "In retrospect much more might have been achieved if the planners had recognized the political and social unstoppable of the Harambee Movement and brought the Harambee sector more fully into the planning process at an earlier stage." To replace the movement with directed development, however, would be to ignore its social and political importance, and its genuine community development philosophy (Hill 1991: 299). As the Harambee secondary schools of the 1990s have been taken over by the government, it is too early to know how community schooling initiatives will be affected in the future.

2 Lessons learned

The most significant lesson Harambee teaches is the astonishing level of resource mobilization that can be effected when community members join together to accomplish an objective they believe in. A strongly motivated grassroots movement can have the effect, as Harambee did, of forcing a national government to modify its efforts to control it. A second important lesson of Harambee relates to process. When mobilization activities are based on existing community institutions and organizational strategies, they have many advantages. People adopt them quickly, see them as reasonable approaches to solving problems, and conform with their systems for rewarding and punishing participation or non-participation. Harambee also

teaches a negative lesson—that communities cannot accomplish a technical service like education on their own when many of the instruments for what is defined as quality are outside their capacity to control Harambee's example raises the issue of whose priorities should be central society's goals or individual development

Establishing a School the Harambee Way

The residents of Kitui began collecting funds for their first four Harambee schools in 1966 or earlier. In the space of two years each administrative division in the district had its own Harambee secondary school—usually for boys only—and the more developed communities were already starting a second school for girls. Who actually started a school was difficult to determine, since many claimed to have played a major part. The key people, however, were usually local administrators such as District Development Officers who were expected to encourage self-help development, and chiefs who led Harambee committees and fund raising, and gave publicity to Harambee projects in their regular assemblies. Often the local member of Parliament was also active in raising funds.

Once a decision was made to establish a school, a Harambee committee was elected or appointed by the chief. Next a site would be selected—often a centrally located upper primary school to avoid the expense of buying land and constructing an expensive building. The primary students could be transferred to less desirable locations and buildings. The community always hoped they would obtain government assistance, and though this was often possible in the 1960s it became difficult in the 1970s as the number of schools mushroomed and the government found its resources inadequate to assist more than a small number. Out of 19 Harambee schools existing in Kitui in 1974, only seven were aided, as a result of a combination of longevity, need, and the government's desire to equitably distribute resources across the district.

The government required that a management committee in the form of a recognized body be identified and registered before a Harambee school was recognized. In Kitui the only relevant bodies were the two major churches: Africa Inland Church (AIC), and the Roman Catholic Mission (RCM). By Independence both had a network of church and primary schools. AIC, though by far the longer established and with the vast majority of the population of Kitui as members, was local with no parent denomination outside the country to provide international assistance, while the RCM had access to extensive international resources and religious personnel to staff the schools. At the start of the post-Independence Harambee Movement, AIC managed most of the schools, but that situation changed quickly as people began to see the advantage of RCM management. By 1974 RCM was managing 13 schools in Kitui and the AIC only six.

Fund raising, which was organized by the Harambee committee rather than the school managers, was based on an assessed contribution required of all adults living and working in the catchment area of the school. Since the school was considered a direct or an indirect benefit to all residents, sanctions were imposed on people who resisted contributing their share. There were three sources of support for Harambee projects: 1) per capita assessments based on capacity to pay and collected by traditional village *mwethya* (working group) committees, 2) Harambee days, which were government-licensed fund-raising rallies including entertainment in which people made contributions in the presence of prominent guests, usually politicians, whose donations were also presented publicly, and 3) external sources such as district development committees, government departments, businesses, and overseas agencies. It was often easier to raise funds in election years when politicians promoted their candidacies with large donations to Harambee projects.

—adapted from Hill 1991

Chapter 5
The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC)
Experience with Primary Education

Components of BRAC Model	
Education context	densely populated, high education levels, homogenous populations, poverty
Involvement strategy	initial meetings, survey, village committees, monthly parents meetings
Targets	rural, 70 percent girls, landless poor
Institutions established	School Management Committees (SMC)
Membership criteria	parents, teachers, village leaders
Community contributions to enrollment objectives	emphasis in meetings on children's attendance, decisions on scheduling
education delivery	school management activities
quality	informal monitoring/social pressure on teachers
Program type	non-formal primary education
Length of program	three-year cycle for 8-10 year olds, two- (later three-, then four-) year cycle for 11-16 year olds, 2 1/2 to 3 hours a day, 6-day weeks, 268 days/year (times selected by parents)
Students per teacher	30-33
Link with formal schooling	three-year graduates matriculate into grade four of formal system
Single or multigrade	graduates of two-year cycle (now four years) receive primary certificate
Instructional approach	a single cohort progresses together and a new cycle starts at end of three years if enough target children are available
Instructional materials	should be student-centered, activity-based conventional methods are common, however
Curriculum	developed by BRAC, based on core objectives, teachers' guide roughly equal to formal system, grades one-three, fewer subjects (Bangla, soc studies, math, English, religion) and objectives
Assessment	continuous, no annual tests at first, now annual competency testing
Teacher qualifications	local resident, mostly female, 9+ years schooling
Hiring status	temporary, part-time basis, salary less than conventional system
Training	fifteen days initial training
Refresher	one to two days each month
Supervision	twice a month by BRAC staff
Instructional facility	temporarily rented space for three hours/day
Fees	no fees
Supplies	materials and supplies provided by BRAC
Managers	BRAC staff with help of School Management Committee (SMC)
Management approach	field-, learning-, and support-oriented experiments with new ideas, and has established structures for monitoring and accountability
Major issues	funding sources, program quality, meshing with formal system

A Background

Bangladesh is a country of roughly 113 million people (1992), of whom more than 86 percent live in rural areas. It has a per capita income of \$220 and a population growth rate of 2.1 percent. The literacy rate in 1995 was 38 percent (49 percent for men and 26 percent for women). There are about 40 million illiterate adults and 4 million children out of school (World Bank 1996a:37). Girls have less access to education than boys, and they are less likely to complete the primary stage. By 1992 their gross enrollment rate was 73 compared to 84 for boys. Boys averaged 5.9 years in formal schooling compared with 4.4 years for girls (UNESCO 1995). Overall primary completion rates are low at 43 percent. Though girls represent 45 percent of total enrollment in the last year of primary, they only represent around 37 percent of those who enroll in the first year of secondary (World Bank 1996a:29).

Recently the government established the Primary and Mass Education Division to expand access to primary education. In partnership with communities, it is establishing primary schools in locations where existing schools are two or more miles distant. In 1993 the government also began to use NGOs to implement education programs in urban and rural areas. By 1996 the NGOs were running 4,000 schools with a total enrollment of 160,000 students.

Little more than a decade ago, the situation was different. The government's capacity to deliver education to remote segments of the population was limited. It had little income-generating capacity both nationally and locally, and it was not organized to deliver community-based development programs. Other features that negatively affected the delivery of education services in Bangladesh included

- a lack of natural resources,
- a rural economy,
- a high population growth rate,
- a culture favoring boys over girls,
- frequent natural disasters, and
- a weak education delivery system.

On the positive side from the perspective of the education system, Bangladesh has

- a large number of educated people who are under- or unemployed and can be recruited for teaching in rural areas,
- high cultural and ethnic homogeneity,
- an extensive governing system of local units distributed across the country, and
- a large, sophisticated NGO community (Ahmed et al 1993).

In 1990, the formal primary system was composed of 45,800 primary schools (about one for every two villages), averaging three classes per school, and 200,000 teachers (or 4.4 teachers per school). It served 12.3 million students or about 75 percent¹ of the country's 15 million children between the ages of 6 and 10 years of age. Of those who entered school, however, only about a fifth to a third completed the primary stage of five years. Unofficial estimates put average class sizes at 62 students in grades one and two of the formal system, and half that number in grades three through five. There was little room for expansion, since most schools were already double shifted, with only two hours of schooling per day for the younger children and 3.5 to 4 hours for older children. The Ministry of Education (MOE) initiatives to complement the formal system with non-formal alternatives had up until 1992 not been implemented.

The Government of Bangladesh (GOB) faces major expenditures if it is to provide schooling sufficient for the universalization of formal primary education. The World Bank estimated that by the year 2000, 100,000 new classrooms would be needed for the early grades, with double-shifted classes of 60 students per class. This would have meant almost doubling the existing capacity.

¹ More realistic estimates suggest that the number is closer to 60 percent of these children.

It is in this overall context of need that the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) became involved in non-formal primary education. Long recognized for its rural development, credit, and health programs, BRAC is the largest NGO in Bangladesh. BRAC's objective in initiating its Non-formal Primary Education (NFPE) program was to develop a primary education model that could provide, in a three-year period, basic literacy and numeracy to children who were mostly unreached by the formal school system. Specifically its objectives included

- reducing illiteracy and contributing to the basic education of a significant proportion of Bangladesh's children, especially those from the poorest families,
- enhancing the participation of females in education,
- involving communities in their socio-economic development,
- contributing to the government's UPE program,
- building ethical values conducive to the intellectual and material integrity of the society, and to labor and management productivity, and
- enhancing the multi-sectoral potential of education through support for population planning, health, and public hygiene (BRAC 1997)

Some of the important features of the BRAC model are the use of non-formal programs to deliver basic education, NGO facilitation of the program, use of paraprofessional teachers, involvement of parents and teachers, effective management and the ability to expand the program rapidly. Non-formal as it is used by BRAC means "outside the formal government system of education," and implies flexibility in the organization, management and curriculum used in the initiative. Children however prepare in BRAC schools to move on to the formal system at grade four.



The village of Rajpara, Jamalpur as seen across the rice paddies. BRAC schools schedule holidays around harvest time. Photo by A T Sweetser

BRAC has been supported by a variety of international donors over the years. Between 1985 and 1988, it was supported by Interpares of Canada with a \$200,800 donation. BRAC received \$382,400 from the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD) in 1986, \$715,000 from the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) in 1989, and a special donation of \$57,886 from UNICEF for a Primary Education for Older Children (PEOC) program for older children in 1988. In addition to these funds, BRAC also has operated some schools using funds from its Rural Development Program, which is supported by some of the same donors as well as others (Lovell and Fatema 1989:30-31).

B Community involvement/innovations

The first BRAC school, which opened in 1979, was a response to the requests of women in a functional literacy class that BRAC establish a program of basic education for their children who were not attending school. BRAC helped them form a school committee, find a site, identify a teacher, and manage the school.

From these and other early experiences, a standard BRAC model has emerged for initiating a school. BRAC staff set annual goals for the number of new schools that will open. They identify clusters of at least 40 villages near a BRAC Team Office to accommodate teachers who are required to take monthly refresher courses. With the help of the community, BRAC conducts a survey to determine whether there is enough demand for education among poor families and whether qualified local teachers are available.

Next, BRAC staff members convene two or more meetings with parents of prospective students before the BRAC school opens. At these meetings, parents assist BRAC staff in selecting a teacher and setting a school schedule. They also find, renovate, and rent (BRAC pays an average of less than \$5 a month in rent) an appropriate classroom space that should be no more than 1 to 2.5 km from the students' homes. The distance is important to reduce the time children spend going to and from school (thereby reducing the opportunity costs to parents of their lost labor), to help girls feel secure, and to allow parents the opportunity to monitor what is happening in the school. In the initial meetings, a list of students is drawn up, earlier 30 and now 33 students per school (with others on the waiting list if some drop out) are needed to open a school. The names are checked against registers in local government schools to ensure that BRAC is not competing with the GOB school system. It also starts its program several months after the formal primary system begins. Parents must express commitment to sending their children to the BRAC school regularly and to attending monthly school meetings, and must agree to monitor student and teacher attendance.

BRAC conducts monthly meetings for parents and teachers at a time that is convenient for the parents. The Program Organizer (PO), who is the BRAC staff member supervising the school, usually facilitates the meeting, which because it is held during the day, is mostly attended by women. The meeting may not start until someone representing each child is present, and therefore, on average about 80 percent of the children have a parent present. The most common topic is parents' responsibility for sending children to school regularly. Other topics include children's progress, cleanliness, hygiene, parental responsibility towards their children, maternal-child health, and messages about social issues such as dowry and early marriage, which BRAC opposes.

Parents can also air their concerns about the school, but there tends to be little dissatisfaction because BRAC has addressed the major difficulties felt by parents of children in conventional schools, such as fees, other costs, distance, discipline, and scheduling. Because parents of BRAC children are some of the poorest in rural communities, they are not asked to contribute significantly to the costs of the program. BRAC requires them only to replace broken school slates and worn mats, and maintain the school facility. Their main expense is the lost work opportunities of having children participate in schooling.

Each school has a School Management Committee (SMC) made up of three parents, a community leader and the teacher. Together they are responsible for managing the school. The Committee meets whenever necessary. The SMC, with the parents, maintains and keeps the school clean, protects it from vandalism, sets school schedules, makes sure students attend regularly, and monitors teacher attendance. If a teacher needs to be absent she tells the Committee, who finds a parent to take her place in the class. In some communities, when SMCs have not been active enough, parents have taken over their duties.

School staff, who are normally residents of the community, maintain relatively high levels of contact with parents and, whenever appropriate, incorporate parents' suggestions into the structure of the school and its day-to-day operations. Parents determine the specific times for the school schedule, which normally is 2 1/2 to 3 hours a day, 6 days a week, 268 days a year with only short holidays, for a three year duration. Parents can change these hours during the year to conform with holiday and agricultural seasons. They informally monitor and follow up on teacher absences, which are very low in BRAC schools. Because

teachers are from the community they are generally known by students and parents

Student absences are also low BRAC keeps a waiting list of students to replace those who do not attend regularly BRAC is selective in the students it takes, giving priority to girls and the poor but refusing to take learning disabled children BRAC identifies poor children, especially girls, through the initial survey of households In the first cycles of a community school, poor girls total about 60-70 percent of students In later cycles this ratio may drop if most girls have already enrolled



BRAC parents attend a parents meeting in Rajpara Village Jamalpur Photo by A T Sweetser

C School program/innovations

From its experiences with the first school in 1979, BRAC refined and implemented an NFPE model in 1985 It started as a program for children between the ages of 8 and 10 who had never enrolled in school or had dropped out of the formal system after a short period Later it expanded to a second program in 1988 for older children, called Basic or Primary Education for Older Children (BEOC or PEOC) BRAC maintains a ratio of 2 1 for NFPE and BEOC schools

BRAC schools have two basic cycles a three-year cycle for the 8 to 10 year olds, which prepares them to continue to grade four of the formal system, and a two-year cycle (later raised to three years, and then four years) for 11 to 16 year olds, which covers the entire five years of primary schooling since these children are too old to enter the formal system There are no fees to attend the school, and all materials and supplies are provided free The school year is continuous except for two ten-day vacations a year so students do not forget what they have learned Typically the school program consists of 675 hours in year one and 810 hours in years two and three, totaling 2,295 hours in the full program This schedule exceeds the time spent in government schools, where students generally attend two hours a day in grades one and two, and four hours in grades three to five for a total of 220 days in the year, and have two long vacations, during Ramadan and over the summer Learning in BRAC schools is conducted as a group (not self-paced) with fairly consistent norms about the speed with which the curriculum should be covered

The BRAC schools are unique in that they are not intended to be permanent institutions The “schools” consist of one room, which is rented for three hours a day, a teacher, and 30 to 33 children Sometimes the room and the teacher are used for another “school” at another time of the day The BRAC schools serve the needs of a cohort who enroll at one time and progress through the two- or three-year cycle together At the end of this time the school ceases to exist unless there is a new cohort of 30 students who want to start a cycle The program is so popular that most schools have continued into a second or third cycle The advantages of this approach are that resources do not need to be invested in a permanent structure, that school capacity can expand to serve existing need (in increments of 30 to 33 students), that classes do not become overcrowded, and that schools can move to locations that best serve their clients The limitation on

the number of schools in operation is, of course, BRAC's capacity to manage and pay program costs Teachers are not difficult to find because of the high un- and under-employment in the country

Facilities are basic the classroom area must be no less than 240 square feet and it is usually constructed of bamboo walls with a corrugated tin roof It is furnished with mats for the children, a stool for the teacher, a blackboard, and a trunk to store materials and act as a table The walls are cheerfully decorated with posters and student work Children usually sit in a "U" so they can move around the classroom or go to a blackboard

Some unique features of the schools are the low student-teacher ratio of 1:33 (compared with 1:66 in government schools), the avoidance of physical punishment, and the absence of homework that requires parental help since most parents are illiterate At first there were no annual exams in order to stress the functional purposes of learning rather than success on exams, but later BRAC decided exams were necessary to assess the quality of its programs

1 Curriculum and instructional materials

The vast majority of NFPE graduates now continue on to the formal system For that reason BRAC tries to keep the basic instructional content of the program similar to that covered in grades one through three of the conventional schools However, instead of six subjects BRAC students now take five Bangla, math, social studies, English (from year two), and religion (in year three) Another difference is that the curriculum covers significantly fewer objectives than the standard GOB course, on average 6 per Bangla course rather than 23, and in math 9 compared to 31 Social studies content is also different BRAC schools stress local health issues and social values related to cooperation, marriage, and other issues relevant to the daily life of the children Recently, in response to curriculum changes in the GOB system, BRAC modified its curriculum to conform with the 53 competencies to be achieved by grade five (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995:54)

It is believed that BRAC's lean curriculum contributes to its success since teachers can concentrate on basic skills An important element is also that, in comparison to GOB schools, BRAC effectively implements the curriculum The BRAC schools, which often have no playground space, add two 20-minute periods for co-curricular activities, which include singing, dancing, and other "fun" activities that take the place of the break in conventional schools They also reduce the homework load to 20 minutes a day of exercises that do not require parents' help

The curricula for all subjects but religion are prepared by BRAC using a conventional development approach

The first step is a study of the learners, their families and conditions of the existing education environment Thereafter BRAC curriculum objectives are formulated, materials are developed, and they are tested in a number of experimental sites When they are found to be satisfactory, they are mass-produced and distributed

Textbooks, primers, and math books developed by BRAC in the earlier period of the program were described as traditional—doing little to discourage rote learning A new set of materials was written in 1993 to overcome some of the earlier problems They were designed to accomplish BRAC's aim of providing more student-centered, active learning Girls and boys are equally represented in the new books, and though traditional female roles are shown in the



BRAC schedules two breaks a day for co-curricular activities such as singing and dancing BRAC photo

majority of cases, there are also images of females engaged in work that reflects an expanded definition of their roles. Males are also shown doing household chores.

Teaching manuals and teaching aids were developed at the same time to guide the use of the textbooks in a nonspecific way, and in the newer versions, have moved to an annotated textbook style to make them easier for teachers to use. They now include child-to-child learning as well as activities to promote independent thinking and problem solving. Creative thinking processes are developed through physical exercise, singing, dancing, drawing, crafts, group work, games, and storybook reading. In 1993, to improve language skills, new activities were added such as daily journal writing, paired-reading, and wall newspapers. In 1994, new math workbooks and teaching manuals were produced and tested to allow more practice in key math concepts. Simultaneously, the social studies curriculum was also revised. In 1995, Morning Talk was started to help children articulate ideas from their own experiences. An Interactive Radio Program in

Reshme of Shubpur: A Fragile Learner

Reshme is a seven-year old girl who lives in a small village in Shubpur, Bangladesh. Her father is a landless day laborer who works in the rice fields of a neighboring landlord. Reshme's family, like most others in the village, can't afford to send their children to the government primary school. The family lives on the income the father earns each day and doesn't have enough to pay for school fees and materials. Reshme is needed to help in household duties such as husking rice, preparing a cooking fire, cleaning the house, and caring for the family's cows and goats.

Poor children such as those in Reshme's village are considered fragile learners—easily discouraged from completing school. Their families have little exposure to school learning, and many parents have never seen a textbook. Children who do attend government schools share the teacher with 70 to 80 other students, allowing for very little individual attention or encouragement. Teachers depend on parents or tutors to help with the homework assigned, although the parents of the poorest children are illiterate themselves. Students can pass or fail the year based on one exam. Corporal punishment is a common form of discipline. Over 65 percent of these children are discouraged enough in government classrooms that they drop out before completing the third year.

Reshme's family as well as the other families in the village prefer the BRAC school for many reasons. It's much closer than the government school, making it safer and easier for her to get there. BRAC students are not assigned homework—they complete their lessons in school, relieving illiterate parents such as Reshme's mother of helping with school work. Corporal punishment is not allowed because BRAC believes it discourages students from wanting to learn. In the BRAC school, students like Reshme are encouraged to learn and enjoy attending. Reshme's mother comments, "She's crazy to go to school. She cries to go to school. She won't miss school for even one day—even if she is dying, she'll go to school." BRAC teachers are trained to help students gain both the confidence and the skills they need to compete in government schools—so they are no longer fragile learners.

The BRAC system has helped to raise the expectations of the children in Reshme's village. One little girl in the program said, "After this school I'll go to college. Shubpur School. I'll get a job after that. I'll teach." Another adds, "I want to better myself, get a job, benefit my parents, community, and the country." A young boy says, "I'll get a job, look after my sisters, help people, go to Dhaka." Parents have also come to see education as the key to a brighter future for their children. Reshme's mother believes that she will be able to find a job after school, although Reshme's father expects her to stay close to the household. Another woman in the village comments about her daughter, "If we can educate her we can get her married to a good husband and it will be good for her and also she'll know more." The mother of a young boy offers, "He will get a job, mix with good people. Now he reads and writes at home in the evening and he's doing well."

—adapted from Dobbs N d

English is also underway so that BRAC students will meet the standards required when they enter the formal system

The BRAC curriculum continues to be developed, modified, and revised to encourage active learning based on meaningful understanding of lesson content. BRAC is still not satisfied with the results of the program, and after its period of major expansion in the 1990s when the problems of mass-producing quality education became even more obvious, BRAC has entered a period of consolidation where it intends to concentrate more of its efforts on improving program quality (BRAC 1997)

BRAC has developed a set of qualitative indicators for its program: 60 percent of lesson time should be child-centered, 95 percent of students should attend school regularly, dropout should not exceed 6 percent, 90 percent of students should attend school on time and stay the entire day, and 70 percent of children should be represented by a parent at parents' meetings. Children's self-esteem and confidence are also considered indicators of successful program output.

2 Teachers

Teachers are selected from educated members of the community by BRAC field staff with the help of parents. The candidates must have nine or more years of schooling. Preference is given to women, and as a result, by early 1996, 97 percent of BRAC teachers were women compared to 25 percent in government schools. They are selected on the basis of being articulate, committed, and married. BRAC's experience indicates that highly qualified (by rural standards) unmarried female candidates are likely to marry soon and move to their husbands' villages, thus creating an interruption in the three-year relationship between teacher and students. BRAC has had about an 8 percent per year dropout rate of teachers. If a teacher drops out, a colleague from a nearby school will substitute until a new teacher is recruited and trained. In 1995, 9,187 new teachers were recruited, 2,002 dropped out, and 32,131 were still present in the system.

Teachers continue with the same class of students through three years. They work part-time for three hours a day, but if they complete one three-year cycle and prove themselves competent, they may be able to teach in two different schools, in classes in the morning and afternoon. They are paid a small salary, and allowed 12 days of leave each year; if they are absent for longer periods of time, money is deducted from their salaries to pay a substitute. For unexpected absences, parents will sit in for the teacher. Overall, compared with the formal primary system, BRAC teachers have fewer students (30 to 33, compared with 60 to 66 in government schools), teach fewer subjects, address fewer objectives, and provide 500 more hours per year of engaged instructional time than in the conventional system.

3 Training/teaching

Since its inception, BRAC's training and instructional methods, and materials have changed several times, as it became apparent that more effective approaches were needed. The teacher now receives 15 days of basic training at a BRAC training center, followed by training at the beginning of each year, and regular refresher training one day a month. The main aim is to give teachers practical training in student-centered learning and methodologies they can use in the classroom. The training emphasizes methods that produce learning for comprehension and not memorization. Part of the training also involves building close relationships with parents.

The monthly refresher training is conducted in a nearby BRAC office to accommodate teachers who cannot stay overnight outside their homes. It generally consists of a discussion of teachers' problems, role play, and the giving and receiving of feedback. In addition, BRAC staff visit teachers at their schools twice a month to provide further training.

The basis for core training is a manual that covers child development and lesson planning, and encourages the use of child-centered learning approaches. A case analysis of the BRAC model suggested, however,

that teachers who have spent nine years or more using a memorization-recall method are difficult to retrain in such a short time. Recently BRAC has developed new textbooks that are more conducive to child-centered approaches.

Though considerable progress has been made in improving teaching methods, instruction often still follows a fairly standard pattern. The teacher presents a lesson and asks if the children understand. The students chorus responses, and she individually corrects them as she calls on each in turn. The rest of the students wait until it is their time to be called. Later she walks around the class correcting the children's individual seatwork.

An assessment of BRAC in 1995 noted that the training of teachers is brief but strongly supported by refresher training spread out over a lengthy period. The one criticism was a tendency to emphasize future classwork without fully analyzing teachers' experience with previous work. One of the ways BRAC is addressing this problem is through its Audio-visual Unit, which, since 1994, has been developing training videos to demonstrate new methodologies. The videos are used for teachers to analyze learning situations.

In Bangladesh, BRAC's program is considered innovative because it produces a more participatory form of learning, bans corporal punishment, and emphasizes good manners and cleanliness (Khan in Ahmed et al 1993: 54).

4 Management and supervision

BRAC's program successes have been credited to its development philosophy and management style. Both have been shaped by long-term experience in rural programs. The elements in its development philosophy that apply to education programs include:

- the targeting of beneficiaries who are poor and female and most likely to benefit from the program, through the use of a survey instrument supplementing national data,
- the participation of parents and community members in decision-making and the solution of problems,
- the separation of sectoral activities so that one sector is not burdened by the needs and difficulties of another yet both can draw on the resources and experience of the mother organization, e.g., schools are just schools without becoming multi-purpose community centers or credit offices, and
- the aim of expanding successful initiatives to scale.

(Ahmed et al 1993: 58ff)

BRAC's management philosophy is based on a decentralized model where the process of implementation and technical competence are considered essential to success. Initiatives are field-oriented and flexible and adjust to specific contexts. Experience is built in, in the form of tested procedures, to increase the likelihood of specific results. Staff visit the schools frequently to monitor what goes on and to adjust the program accordingly. Logistics are important to provide needed resources and administrative support when they are needed. Time is regularly scheduled for planning short-term activities and long-term sustainability.

The overall responsibility for the NFPE Program—its policies, management, liaising with other programs and donors, evaluation, and assessment—lies with the Executive Director, while direct management and supervision are accomplished through the central office of the Director of NFPE and his/her staff. There are five support units to support the work: Training, Monitoring, Field Operations, Material Development, and Logistics.

In 1992 the field staff were supported by a training manager and four training staff, one materials development manager with six staff, and two logistics staff. The head office managers and, to some extent, the

regional managers reported directly to the Program Coordinator, who had one program assistant and five monitoring officers (Ahmed et al 1993 59)

In the same year NFPE's Monitoring Unit consisted of five staff members (later increased to 15) who conducted random checks of attendance, school facilities, student achievement, discipline, student participation, and teacher evaluations. The Director, Regional Managers, and individual field offices are informed of staff findings, and adjustments are made to improve programs. The Unit follows up on these changes, whether in practices, curricula, or new materials, using indicators developed by the Director, an Education Specialist, and the monitors themselves. The Unit also assesses other aspects of the program including parents' meetings, students' knowledge, retention, graduates, school structure, etc. A 1995 assessment observed that BRAC's monitoring is strict and meticulous and creates a culture of responsibility at the field level. However, it tends to focus on numbers such as tracing staff members in time and space rather than issues such as helping children to improve their cognitive development (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995 iv)

The support staff was increased during the expansion to 34,000 schools so that by mid-1995, BRAC's full-time NFPE field staff consisted of six regional managers (RMs), 40 area education managers (AEMs), 205 Teams-in-Charge, 417 program officers (POs), 1,138 program assistants (PAs), and more than 32,000 teachers, who were considered temporary project staff (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995 13)

In the local community a school is run by a School Management Committee (see above). The critical link between BRAC and the community is the PO, who usually has a university or graduate degree. POs are given 3 days of pre-service training, 12 days of teachers' basic training during the first few months, a 12-day operation management course, a 12-day training of trainers course, and a six-day gender awareness and analysis course. A manual serves as reference for their activities. They are usually responsible for from 15 to 20 sites where their work falls into three stages: 1) surveying sites for new schools, 2) starting new schools, and 3) supporting ongoing schools. They are provided with specific instructions for implementing each of these stages.

The POs normally visit each school two times a month to check a list of 50 qualitative and quantitative indicators. They review teachers' obligatory lesson plans, observe instruction, and monitor student attendance. Because of lack of experience with instructional pedagogies and the press of other administrative responsibilities, however, they are not always able to provide the kind of support for instructional quality that BRAC would like. They also meet weekly with school committees, facilitate the delivery of supplies, and teach monthly refresher courses for teachers. They are encouraged to make use of informal meetings with community members to develop cordial relations.

The POs tend to work long hours under difficult conditions, and more than half leave within the first year. Those who remain are eligible for promotion up through the ranks. All mid-level managers are recruited in this way. In 1992 BRAC tested a program where paraprofessional teacher-supervisors from local villages were used to extend the reach of the POs. One PO would supervise three PAs, who would each be responsible for 15-17 schools. By 1996 this system had been regularized and PAs were being given 19 days of preservice training, 12 days of inservice training, and a six-day training of trainers' course. The PAs and POs are supervised and trained by teams-in-charge who are responsible for 80 schools. Area managers who have at least a master's degrees, are responsible for 500 schools. The structure overall is supervised by the monitoring unit.

BRAC has made a special effort to recruit female PAs and POs, and has adapted some of its procedures to accommodate them. Currently BRAC assigns them to offices nearer their homes, assigns several to a field office, and makes special provision for their transport. By 1992, 30 percent of POs were women, but few were interested in higher managerial positions that might require them to move to another location. In Bangladesh's conservative society the female PAs and POs are visible role models as they ride cycles and motorbikes along roadways to their work.

5 Program development

BRAC did not begin rural development work with a focus on education. Consequently its staff has developed its education expertise largely on the job through trial and error. Much of BRAC's success has been credited to the staff's willingness to continually revise procedures and programs to make them more relevant to the needs of their clients. The NFPE program has itself been characterized as a "learning system" where since 1985, various development approaches, curricula, and systems for monitoring and supervising education programs have been devised, tested, and refined to reach the current status of the program. Some of these components are still under review in the two areas of Bangladesh used as laboratory sites for testing innovations.

The learning system promoted by BRAC has several important features: data are gathered and disseminated by the people who need it, data collection is used to clarify problem issues and identify appropriate responses, and resources are committed to act on the results. The data BRAC use for program development come from the field and routine external evaluations. Negative assessments often stimulate pilot studies of potential options to correct the problem. When BRAC managers model this kind of responsiveness to feedback, local people feel they can meaningfully contribute to programs by articulating their problems.

Monitoring plays an important part in program quality, as noted above, allowing BRAC to detect problems quickly and respond immediately. BRAC has a double system: routine monitoring by its field officers and periodic visits by staff of the monitoring unit. The seven areas monitored include the school building, teachers, learners, the learning program, co-curricular activities, monthly parents' meetings, and homework in Bangla and math (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995: 31). Evaluators noted that, "The heavy monitoring might seem excessive, but in a country which is presently characterized by considerable deviation of funds and decisions based on special favors for friends, the strict accountability culture present in BRAC ensures high levels of honesty" (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995: 32).

The latest full (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995) assessment of BRAC suggested that more might be done in terms of research and evaluation, more innovative methods, and the development of audio-visual equipment to improve the quality of the program. For these areas, BRAC relies on the availability of consultants, which slows its progress. When consultants are present, activities are further delayed because training is necessary for BRAC staff.

In 1995 and 1996, the Research and Development Unit conducted a number of studies related to concerns voiced about NFPE. The studies pertaining specifically to community issues included, among others, "Linking School, Family, and Community Participation in BRAC Schools," "Opinion of Parents on What Life Skills Their Children Should Possess/Learn," "Why Students Drop Out in the First Six Months of Schooling," and "Participatory Development and BRAC." These topics suggest that BRAC is not yet satisfied with the role of the community in education delivery.

D Results

1 Community participation and the development of grassroots institutions

BRAC's experiments with community participation are particularly interesting for two reasons. First, BRAC is deeply committed to community involvement as a means of fostering comprehensive rural development. Second, BRAC has limited funding, which requires it to be as cost-efficient as possible in any activities it undertakes. Consequently, BRAC tries to involve the community as much as reasonably possible on ideological grounds, while, at the same time, it can only afford community involvement to the extent that it cost-effectively supports NFPE goals. These sometimes contradictory interests have caused BRAC at times to lower its expectations about what communities can be reasonably asked to do.

The infrastructure supporting BRAC schools is only part of the local institutional development resulting from BRAC projects. NFPE schools were established mainly in areas where BRAC already had ongoing

Rural Development Programs (RDP) At the start of NFPE, BRAC had 60 rural development centers out of which facilitators could operate Initially RDP village organizations (VOs) usually “demanded” schools and then worked with BRAC to implement them Later BRAC facilitators approached VOs in other communities to determine where demand might warrant establishing NFPE schools The fact that BRAC already had an institutional and personal presence in villages proved invaluable in organizing school programs quickly When it sought in 1993 to expand its network of schools into new villages, it ran into problems both from religious fundamentalists resisting the programs and in maintaining the same kind of quality control as in the original communities Thus NFPE, for the most part, was established more easily in locations where there was already an existing community infrastructure—and where education constituted only one component in a multi-pronged effort to address community development

NFPE and RDP frequently work out of the same office, sharing identities as well as information on their activities Both programs’ activities are consequently overlapping, integrated, and mutually reinforcing For example, their consistent development messages are conveyed in curricula, the employment of female staff members, and training content The VOs on their side reinforce issues such as the importance of educating girls, marriage practices, and health needs² BRAC reinforces RDP issues in monthly parents’ meetings in the school When there are crises affecting the activities of either program, the other lends its support In practice, activities to raise the education level of the community are coordinated by RDP officers, SMC, and BRAC staff, some of the overlapping interests that include primary education, scholarships for BRAC graduates, adult literacy courses, libraries, and training in technical skills A sense of continuity is fostered by having VOs select the children for NFPE schools and by favoring children of their members over others once all have met the same basic criteria

In its multiplicity of projects, BRAC fosters community institutions that support civil society and rural development As one component in this whole, NFPE utilizes existing institutions for support while relying on parents to fulfill fairly circumscribed functions with regard to the schools Community involvement in the schools varies from site to site, though BRAC’s experiments with different kinds of community participation over the years have led to a fairly consistent core expectation about what community members/parents should do According to this expectation, parents assist by identifying school sites, teachers, and students, and by determining school schedules They form a management committee to oversee the schools, attend monthly meetings, and informally monitor teachers Thus parents perform what is “essentially a monitoring rather than a decision-making role” (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995 27)

Community members are not involved in decisions about curriculum One curriculum developer noted, “Parents do not question what we teach” (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995 34) Sometimes there are differences between parents and BRAC staff about how they think the program should be run For example, parents have requested more corporal punishment “like the government schools” BRAC stands its ground on issues like these and does not act upon parental desires

One study of BRAC found that participation in parents’ meetings was fairly limited, that community leaders were often absent, and that POs and PAs tended to dominate the meetings Some teachers believed the meetings should be held only when there were problems, while parents believed they were useful to know how their children were progressing in school and to learn about health, hygiene, and the other issues that were presented at the meetings (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995 34) BRAC responded to this criticism by giving POs more communication skills training (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995 38)

BRAC believes the most important function parents can perform is to ensure that children attend class regularly because completion of the primary stage and learning achievement are both affected significantly by attendance As a consequence, BRAC has a very high attendance rate among its students BRAC has pulled back from its original intention of involving parents in supporting more of the financial costs and in pro-

² Some consequences for community development have resulted from NFPE delayed marriage, the continuation of students to higher education, and the multiplier effect on families from discussions in school on topics related to daily life

viding tutoring assistance. The targeting of children from poor families has prevented the first, and the negligible gains in learning from the second activity did not prove significant enough to warrant the staff time required for implementation (Ahmed et al 1993). BRAC staff take on themselves the main facilitative role in implementation, supervision, and maintenance of the program. More importantly, they also assume the role of monitoring local feeling and education results, and conveying the information back to program developers and “expert” designers.

2 Educational participation

BRAC’s programs unquestionably lead to the increased educational participation of children in terms of enrollment, attendance, and completion. If BRAC’s claims that they serve only children who normally remain outside the school system are correct, then students who enroll in NFPE schools represent the total number of places that have been added to existing capacity. BRAC schools currently serve about 8 percent (and other NGOs 5 percent) of Bangladesh’s primary school cohort (BRAC 1997:2).

What is noteworthy about the children who attend BRAC schools is that they come from the most educationally disadvantaged segments of society. BRAC screens entrants through careful surveys to ensure that they come from poor families who are not normally reached by the conventional system. There is independent evidence to support this claim. A comparison of children in BRAC and government schools showed that the families of BRAC children had a mean income equal to only two-thirds of the incomes of families of government students and that they owned roughly 60 percent of the acreage of land of these families (Ahmed et al 1993:41).

Seventy percent of all students in BRAC schools—by design, are girls—though this ratio may drop in second and third cycles when there are insufficient numbers of girls to sustain such a high level. Girls constitute only 46 percent of enrollment in government schools. In the 1993-96 expansion of the NFPE program, BRAC continued to maintain an overall ratio of 70 percent girls and a high ratio (97-98 percent) of female teachers (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995, BRAC 1997).³ These teachers have acted as role models in their communities, changing expectations for the roles women can play. Many girls from the NFPE program, when asked what they intend to do as adults, said they would like to be teachers.



Seventy percent of BRAC students are girls. BRAC photo

Khan and Arefeen (1992) make the point that the kind of children BRAC enrolls—from lower income families with less land and a high ratio of girls—are exactly the children who are statistically more likely to drop out of primary schools. Students from BRAC schools should therefore be dropping out at rates higher than those in government schools. Over the years, however, this has not been true. In 1990, BRAC schools delivered 27 out of its 30 entering students to grade four, thus achieving a 90 percent efficiency.

³ GOB policy is to raise the ratio of women primary teachers to 60 percent.

rate In one sample of eight government schools the comparable rate was 53 percent, while in another of 33 schools the rate was 40 percent The government dropout rate has been variously estimated by grade five to be from 70 to 85 percent A BRAC report claims that less than 6 percent of BRAC students drop out (or are replaced during the first year with new students) (BRAC 1997 15)

Another sample of early BRAC graduates in government schools showed that 58 percent who entered grade four in 1989 and 74 percent in 1990 continued to grade five (Khan and Chowdhury 1991) Thus according to one estimate (Ahmed et al 1993), BRAC students enter grade five at twice the rate of government school students A BRAC study following 1990 graduates showed that the retention of BRAC students in the formal system two years after graduation was 83 percent for boys and 57 percent for girls, and that four years after graduation it was 69 percent for boys and 37 percent for girls Of graduates in 1992 the comparable data after two years was 55 percent for boys and 62 percent for girls (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995 24) The conclusions of these studies support the general rule that BRAC students do better than government students in completing various grades of the primary stage

More recently, BRAC claims that about 95 percent of its students complete the three-year NFPE program,⁴ and student transfers into grade four of the formal system average about 78 percent, while only 40 percent who start grade one complete grade five in government schools Overall it was estimated that BRAC students entered the formal system's grade four at a rate 70 to 125 percent higher than government students (Ahmed et al 1993 76)⁵ Though these numbers are not directly comparable, they suggest lower dropout rates in BRAC schools In 1995 BRAC decided to introduce written exams (previously they had been informal and mostly oral) in grade three, at least partly to assess the capacity of their program to prepare children for exams in the formal system

A study has found that BRAC students tend to persist in government schools where these schools are less crowded and have better facilities, more conscientious teachers, and better supervision and supplies Other factors that make the government schools more appealing are lower costs and a program that uses a school-based as opposed to a homework-based approach to learning

The main reasons given by BRAC students for dropping out of the government system at grades four and five were poverty (62 percent) and school interfering with the family work schedule (13 percent) Entering the formal system requires costs that many BRAC families cannot afford None of the students mentioned academic problems as a cause of dropout (Khan and Chowdhury 1991) In 1994, to address the problem of BRAC children who were having difficulty paying fees in government schools, BRAC established a scholarship fund to help selected students continue to the end of the eighth grade This activity was discontinued later when the government initiated a scholarship program for rural girls

An independent evaluation in the 1990s of various primary systems in Bangladesh found that attendance was significantly higher in NGO schools than in the comparable government satellite schools⁶ and that dropout rates in BRAC schools were lower than in government schools (World Bank 1996a 33) The reasons given for the increased participation in BRAC schools were the abbreviated program time of three years and a shortened school day (although a lengthened school year), which leaves time for children as well as teachers to fulfill their responsibilities at home without conflicting with school routines

⁴ BRAC's dropout rates have been called misleading because they do not include children who drop out in the first three months and are replaced by children from a waiting list (Boeren Latif and Stromquist 1995)

⁵ BRAC students continue from grade three to grade four at a rate of 90 percent while only 30 35 percent of children entering grade one of the government system complete grade five (Ahmed et al 1993 78)

⁶ The satellite schools were a system of 'incomplete' feeder schools set up by the government to encourage communities to enroll their children These schools like BRAC schools feed children to higher grades when they are old enough to walk the extra distance

3 Learning/Achievement

Over the years a number of tests have been administered to BRAC students to determine how their achievement compares with that of government students. The first, administered in 1988 (Begum, Akhter and Rahman 1988 in Ahmed et al 1993) showed disappointing results. BRAC graduates in grade four scored significantly lower in math and environmental studies than government students in the same grade. At that time, when students were just completing the first cycles of the NFPE schools, BRAC had not oriented its curriculum to the government system since it had not anticipated such large numbers of its graduates entering in the government schools.

By 1990, a national test administered to a sample of BRAC and government students in grades four and five showed little difference in their scores—BRAC students did a little better in English and Bengali, and government students did somewhat better in mathematics and social studies. The scores in this testing reflected the changes BRAC had made in the NFPE curriculum to bring it more in line with the government program.

In 1992, attempting to get away from existing government exams as a way of measuring the quality and relevance of school programs, an inter-agency Advisory Committee for Basic Education Assessment in Bangladesh supported the administration of an alternative basic education achievement test composed of life skills/knowledge, reading, writing, and numeracy. Standards were set for what were considered minimum basic education attainment. The test was given to 2,100 11- to 12-year olds in 30 thanas of Bangladesh and to 200 11- to 19-year old graduates of BRAC schools. BRAC graduates (78 11- to 12-year olds) achieved these standards at more than double (53) the rate of other rural children (22), with about equal passing rates for boys and girls in both groups. Most children scored lowest on writing, a little higher on reading and life skills, and significantly higher on numeracy. Altogether, based on completion of specified performance criteria, 38 percent of the BRAC students attained basic literacy. Despite the better scores of the BRAC children, only half were able to meet the basic education standards. The BRAC NFPE staff felt this evidence confirmed that three years of schooling did not add up to full basic education for many of the children. However, BRAC believed that its emphasis on basic skills meant that children who went no further than the three-year cycle could attain a basic grounding in literacy and numeracy, while those who continued into the formal system would be well prepared to continue their studies. BRAC planned further program improvements to increase the skills of its students. (Ahmed et al 1993: 78)

The most recent assessment of basic competencies was administered to 1,259 BRAC graduates in 1995 (it was not given to government school graduates so does not provide a basis for comparison). This time 74 percent of the graduates satisfied all four of the criteria of basic competency. The groups surveyed were graduates of various BRAC-assisted programs: the three-year BEOC program in RDP areas, the Education Support Program (ESP)—see below, and NFPE in RDP areas. Differences between these groups were not statistically significant, nor were there major differences between girls and boys though the girls did consistently better in all types of schools. The significant correlates of competency were age, current enrollment status (in school), father's education, land ownership, and exposure to television.

Table 5.1 shows the results of a 1995 test, developed by BRAC, to measure the quality of its instructional program. It will be administered on a yearly basis, and during the coming period of program consolidation, will serve as a measure of the extent to which BRAC is able to improve program quality. The test was administered to 4,039 randomly selected NFPE and 1,232 PEOC students near the end of their three-year course. Half scored more than 50 percent in Bangla, social studies, and English, while a similar number scored 66 percent in mathematics. (BRAC 1997) These scores show that BRAC still has a considerable way to go in improving program quality if students are expected to master the items on this test.

Table 5 1 Scores on NFPE achievement tests (1995)

Subject	Max Score	Boys	Girls	All	Median
Bangla	30	15 45	15 38	15 40	15
Social Studies	30	15 02	15 08	15 07	15
Math	30	19 23	18 44	18 67	20
English	25	12 00	12 04	12 03	12
All Subjects	115	61 07	60 95	61 17	62

Source BRAC 1997 33

4 Program quality

From the start BRAC has advocated a child-centered instruction that teaches comprehension rather than rote memorization. The instruction should be interactive, problem-solving, and analytical. This objective has been difficult to achieve for several reasons, foremost among them being the difficulty of training teachers to follow a model entirely different from the one they have experienced since they were children. A strength of BRAC is that it has continued to experiment with new approaches to this vexing problem and that it intends to begin a period of consolidation in the next few years to focus on the question of quality.

In its early years, BRAC developers expressed disappointment with their ability to operationalize commitment to a more interactive type of learning. As in conventional schools, BRAC's teachers lectured and students listened and recalled, despite teacher training that tried to counteract these tendencies. One critic suggested that the training addressed these issues at too illustrative a level and that teacher guides gave "non-specific" instructions that were not sufficient to change teacher behaviors (Ahmed et al 1993).

A report in 1993 noted that BRAC is still "struggling to develop systems to ensure that teachers promote active learning, meaningful understanding, and analytical thinking" (Ahmed et al 1993 36). Since then, BRAC revised its instructional materials to correct some of these problems. It completed that process in 1995, and by 1997 though the problem has not been completely corrected, an observer noted that its methods and classroom practices have increasingly become more learner-centered and participatory.

During this period BRAC initiated supplementary activities to help consolidate learning gains. The first major effort was the launching of a system of libraries attached to the NFPE schools and maintained by teachers. By March 1996, 2,481 libraries had been established. Other activities included "reading circles" with a circulating selection of books and courses in sewing, gardening, poultry farming, etc. The gardening, for example, was intended to demonstrate the kinds of foods that could be grown to provide a balanced diet.

NFPE's program quality has improved significantly since its inception in 1985. A 1995 assessment noted that the BRAC program offers "appealing elements in learning environment and pedagogical content. The classes have diverse activities, a good mix of passive and active work, and children have access to textbooks that carry pleasant illustrations and substantial messages about equity, productivity, and respect for others" (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995).

By its own admission, however, BRAC is not yet satisfied with the results. It is interesting to note that BRAC originally did not examine children at the end of the school year for fear of causing them anxiety and producing exam-driven instruction. Now it has instituted a yearly exam (see above) to measure

qualitative improvements as they are made in the NFPE program. This problem of stressing the quality of inputs (like materials and teacher training) rather than learning outputs is one that has been common to many education systems, not just to BRAC.

At the end of the 1993-96 Phase I expansion, BRAC summarized "lessons learned" from the experience, most of which show its continuing focus on quality:

- supervision requires teaching experience in NFPE classrooms,
- continuous refresher training is a key to quality,
- trainers need to spend time in classrooms,
- training needs to be participatory and of longer duration,
- new teachers need to observe classes before training,
- children will attend at high levels if they are interested,
- testing is necessary to compare BRAC schools with the formal system and to ensure basic competencies,
- more reading material is required to keep up skills,
- gender-neutral curriculum is required, and
- women teachers become empowered by their jobs (BRAC 1997)

An issue of program quality for BRAC is how to coordinate its programs with those of the GOB. As NFPE expands, there is increasing tension with the government. The government recognizes the efficacy of BRAC in serving difficult-to-reach populations and the advantages of its flexibility, but criticizes BRAC for offering a different curriculum in a shorter time frame, hiring less academically qualified teachers and paying them less, and not emphasizing religious education enough. The GOB is experimenting with a number of projects of its own such as a satellite school program where schools of grades one and two, and sometimes three are established in underserved areas. These schools feed graduates to a mother school. A number of BRAC innovations are being used in these schools. The GOB plans are sometimes complicated by the presence of NFPE schools. BRAC says its program also suffered when the government introduced a Food for Education Program, which attracted students away from BRAC programs. Though BRAC has had reasonably good relations with the GOB in the past, it is increasingly difficult to maintain these relations as BRAC becomes more of a presence. Its latest plan is to enter a "period of consolidation" in which it will continue to open classes in existing schools without expanding further, at least until 1998, and focus more on program quality.⁷

One additional element related to program quality that warrants comment involves parental attitudes about girls' education. Parents believe higher education can spoil a girl's chance of getting married, and consequently many put their daughters in BRAC schools because they feel the schools are inferior and will not spoil the girls' future options. Parents are unlikely to be enthusiastic about program improvements unless they become convinced that they improve the girls' marriage chances. (Ahmed et al 1993 Executive Summary)

5 Accountability to clients

BRAC has shown itself accountable to the needs of parents and children indirectly to the extent that it addresses problems that have kept children out of the conventional system and provides fora in which parents can voice their opinions about the school. Parents assist in the selection of teachers, students, school locations, and school schedules, but they do not have the authority (or in some cases the expertise) to demand accountability of staff members in other areas. Documents do not refer to more direct means of accounting to parents such as individual meetings between parents and teachers, or other forms of regular reporting on student progress.

⁷ This study does not go into the important issues of BRAC's relations with the GOB and with other NGOs which is a topic more relevant to the study of BRAC as an NGO.

BRAC emphasizes a field focus, and consequently its staff is unusually responsive to difficulties in relationships with the community or local weaknesses in the program. Feedback loops exist at enough levels to address the specific and general needs of parents. However, there is no direct "complaint" or accountability channel between parents and BRAC managers, and BRAC staff decide what kinds of information is fed back to their supervisors. Overall, POs and others in the BRAC management hierarchy see themselves as being directly accountable to their supervisors rather than to community members. It is difficult to know how this might be changed in a society that assigns greater importance to the educated and the influential. BRAC has done more than most.

The system of contracting teachers for defined periods of time tends to make them more willing to please their customers (the parents and children) and their supervisors in BRAC. Compared with government teachers, they appear more conscientious in terms of attendance and in teaching the curriculum the children are expected to learn. The small size and proximity of the school to students' homes make it possible for parents to monitor the teacher's performance closely and to express their views to her personally as a member of the community. They can also complain to the PO who either acts on the spot or carries back suggestions to BRAC management for their consideration and action. BRAC's systems for routine monitoring and review of program impacts, and its openness to public scrutiny of results means it is subject to a form of accountability that ultimately reflects on the services it provides to its clients.

Overall, it is BRAC's stated mission to provide the best education possible that, more than any direction from parents, shapes the quality of the schooling program. It is not clear from existing documents the extent to which BRAC routinely reports back to parents the learning results of its programs, or whether it explains to them when and how it addresses any deficiencies it finds. The management structure of BRAC, which consists of a multilayered supervisory system, encourages the accountability of staff up the ladder to their bosses rather than "down" to community members.

6 Costs

Costs are a major problem for BRAC since it must raise the funds to finance virtually all of the costs of the NFPE initiative. Depending on how they are calculated (in this case without the costs lost to dropouts), BRAC costs are approximately equivalent to the costs of the conventional system. An independent audit of BRAC schools in 1993 indicated that BRAC spent an average \$14 per enrolled child per year, which was about equal to what the government spent at public primary schools (Rahman Huq in Ahmed et al 1993:71).

Another estimate in 1992 put the annual cost at \$19.91 per child, which, for a full three years, totaled \$60, and the cost of running an NFPE school for three years, \$1,971. By 1995 the costs had risen to \$21.03, \$63.09 and \$2,081.00 respectively (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995:19). UNICEF estimates showed that at the time it cost \$60 to produce a graduate of a BRAC school, it cost \$90 for three years of a GOB education when the GOB's high dropout rate was factored in (Ahmed et al 1993).

There are major differences in line items between BRAC and GOB budgets that reflect their different philosophies of education. Table 5.2 shows a sample BRAC budget giving the relative line item costs (comparisons are not available for government schools). The proportion of costs for teacher salaries in the BRAC schools is relatively low by world standards and much lower than government teacher salaries, 70 percent of the government expenditure in primary education goes to teacher salaries, while less than a third of the NFPE budget is spent on salaries. The BRAC teacher earns about Tk500 (\$12) a month, which is twice that of an agricultural laborer (\$ 50 for three hours work), while the GOB teacher earns Tk 2,300 except in the new satellite school program where they also earn Tk500 (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995, World Bank 1996a). BRAC has not had difficulty in finding one or two educated women in a village, and since most have substantial responsibilities at home, they are not looking for full-time employment. BRAC has demonstrated that paraprofessional teachers trained in a short time at low cost and paid a low salary are capable of becoming effective teachers of primary-level instruction.

Management and supervision costs are relatively high by world standards, reflecting BRAC's emphasis on monitoring quality, guiding the less academically qualified teachers, training on the job, and providing feedback for village-level workers. They consider investment in management and support services as a key to their success (Ahmed et al 1993:72)

The absence of a line item for capital investment and the small amount paid for renting facilities (averaging \$5 a month per school) brings the costs down. When a school reopens after a cycle with a new teacher, the cost is \$33 less than starting a new school. With an experienced teacher, it is an additional \$17.41 less.

A major part of the BRAC budget is spent on student books and supplies, which are provided free to the students. BRAC feels these costs are essential given the poverty of the students and the importance of materials in instruction and learning. Government schools also provide textbooks for each child and require neither uniforms or tuition (they do, however, have substantial private costs for tutoring, supplies, and pocket money).

Table 5.2 BRAC expenditures from January 1993 - March 1996 (Tk million^a)

Category	Amount	%
Teachers' Costs	446.38	28.79
Student Books and Supplies	621.83	40.11
Field Operations and Costs	240.93	15.54
HO Management and Support Services	127.96	8.25
Research and Monitoring	8.84	0.57
Innovative Methods	28.13	1.81
Development and AV	5.94	0.38
ESP ^b	70.5	4.55
TOTAL	1,550.48	100.00

a (1 Tk = approximately US\$40)

b The Educational Support Programme (ESP) trains other NGOs to replicate the NFPE model

Source: BRAC 1997 Table 3.1

Since 1992 the total costs of NFPE programs have increased over 5.6 percent. Books and supplies have risen due to an increase in paper and the addition of new material such as math and social study cards, and story books. BRAC has recently made efforts to reduce costs by hiring the lower salaried Program Assistants instead of Program Officers to supervise schools and by removing a management level (BRAC 1997). BRAC does not believe it can cut costs any further without compromising quality. Because of the low socio-economic level of the clients BRAC targets, it is doubtful whether they can shoulder more of the costs themselves (Ahmed et al 1993:74).

The most important difference in the two systems from the perspective of parents is that BRAC covers all the private costs that are required in the government system. Parents in the BRAC system pay virtually nothing other than the costs of replacing broken slates and worn out mats, while in government schools the average cost to parents of incidentals such as private tutoring, student supplies, and pocket money over the first three years of schooling averages \$104. The costs must also be weighed against value for money, which in the government system appears to be low. Estimates of actual time in the day devoted to learning suggest that no more than 40 minutes may be standard for government schools because of the numbers of students involved, the cumbersome system of instruction, and the time wasted in administrative details and movement from class to class. This places the burden of learning on the quality of help given to a child dur-

ing homework which then disadvantages children of illiterates twofold, because they cannot help themselves and cannot afford to pay for tutoring help

Research on the types of children who join BRAC, and on their achievement levels compared with those of government students, highlight some cost advantages in the BRAC system that may not be immediately obvious. BRAC starts with a group of children who are statistically more likely to drop out and less likely to succeed than government students, and yet BRAC produces graduates with the will to continue to upper levels of the formal primary system with comparable or sometimes even slightly higher achievement results. BRAC schools therefore demonstrate a greater cost efficiency, both in terms of internal and external criteria, in comparison to government schools.

7 Replication

BRAC has demonstrated a strong commitment to extending the NFPE program to as many out-of-school children as possible. During the 1993-95 expansion when its schools increased from 12,000 to 34,000, BRAC demonstrated the efficiency of its management structure in locating new sites, hiring and training new staff, and getting programs underway in a very short time.

A hallmark of the BRAC approach has been its capacity to expand exponentially. The program started slowly, however, as BRAC refined its processes and materials, and developed systems to support a larger set of schools. Table 5.3 shows BRAC's history of replication. In 1979 the first school was established, and by 1985, BRAC had opened 51 three-year NFPE schools. By 1987, the number had risen to 410 schools and four years later, by the end of 1991, to 6,003 schools, including 2,833 PEOC schools that extended schooling to children up to the age of 16. In 1992, the program was expanded again to total roughly 11,000 schools and finally by March 1996 to roughly 34,000 schools. Between 1992 and 1996 the total number of students rose from 337,000 to over 1,100,000.

In 1992 BRAC also opened 10 urban schools on a pilot basis. These were considerably more difficult to establish because of the latent suspicion of urban parents. New topics relevant to urban environments—such as kidnapping, begging, cleanliness and skin disease, were added to the curriculum. A yearly exam was also added to satisfy parental concerns about the quality of the schools when compared with government schools. Many of these urban students do not continue on in government schools and so a fourth year was added to some of the schools. When the pilot urban schools proved successful, BRAC increased the number so that by March 1996 there were 896 schools.



Recent graduates of the BRAC NFPE School in Rajpara, Jamalpur. Photo by A. T. Sweetser.

The reasons offered for how BRAC has been able to achieve this rapid growth include

- a 20-year experience in rural development before NFPE,
- a strong management capacity built up over the years for RDP with capacities ranging from financial and accounting skills, to logistics, research, field supervision, and

- materials development and production,
- an operational mode that pilots, modifies, and improves ideas, and
- a homogeneity of regions so models need little adaptation (BRAC 1997)

Table 5 3 Primary schools and student enrollment in Bangladesh (1985-1996)

Year	BRAC		Government schools		Government and non-Government schools	
	Total schools	Enrollment	Total schools	Enrollment	Total schools	Enrollment
1985	51 ^a	1,530 ^a			44,180 ^c	8,920,293 ^c
1987	410 ^a	12,300 ^a			44,432 ^c	9,206,710 ^c
1988	h				44,205 ^c	11,075,476 ^c
1989					45,383 ^c	11,285,445 ^c
1990					45,917 ^c	11,939,949 ^c
1991	6,003 ^a	180,090 ^a				
1992	11,108 ^d	336,849 ^b				
1993		647,550 ^b				
1994		906,867 ^b	37,710 ^e	11,361,805 ^e	56,165 ^e	15,180,680 ^e
1995	17,421 ^f	1,137,767 ^b				
1996	34,175 ^d	1,108,802 ^{b g}				

a Source Ahmed et al 1993 91

b Source BRAC 1997 8

c Includes government and private schools UNESCO 1995a

d Source BRAC 1997 1

e Source Boeren Latif and Stromquist 1995 5

f As of June 1995 Figure includes 1 241 ESP schools operated by other NGOs under the supervision of BRAC Boeren Latif and Stromquist 1995 8

g As of March 1996

h means no data available

In evaluating its capacity to serve all of Bangladesh's out-of-school children, BRAC decided in 1991 to assist a number of NGOs in replicating its model through an Education Support Program (ESP) By March 1996 it had provided technical support to 327 NGOs for 4,643 schools, and technical and financial support to 278 NGOs for 2,400 schools ESP is now financing 272 NGOs administering 2,037 schools in 58 districts ⁸

BRAC had originally planned to increase its numbers of rural schools to 50,000 by 1995 and 100,000 by 1998, but plans to add 35,000 new NFPE schools in the first phase had to be adjusted when the full funding of \$50 6 million could not be obtained The target was subsequently reduced to 19,000 new schools with a budget of \$38 4 million in Phase I Consequently, between January 1993 and March 1996, BRAC increased its number of schools from 11,108 to 34,175, and recruited and trained 34,305 teachers (BRAC 1997) The expansion was funded by a consortium of donors, including the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), Directorate General of International Cooperation/Netherlands Government (DGIS), Netherlands

⁸ ESP is not documented further here nor are BRAC's efforts in the area of international replication

Organization for International Development Co-operation (NOVIB), Overseas Development Administration (ODA), UNICEF, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau of Germany (KfW), and SIDA (Boeren, Latif, and Stromquist 1995 3)

Phase II started in April 1996 and will continue until March 1999. During this phase, BRAC has decided it will only reopen schools which complete their full course, keeping the number of operating schools at a constant total of 34,000 each year. One major reason is that the GOB is experimenting with various education programs in rural areas, and it seemed better to see how they progressed without confounding their experimentation by establishing nearby BRAC schools. "During this phase, NFPE will concentrate instead on qualitative improvements through revising and improving its curriculum, teaching methods, learning materials, and teacher development. It will also address the question of continuing education so as to consolidate learning gains in the community. During this period it will operate 4,000 school libraries, 300 Union libraries, and form 2,000 reading circles. A final aim is to forge more effective alliances with government officials and NGOs to share its experiences and develop an improved level of understanding and coordination" (BRAC 1997)

Though BRAC has successfully demonstrated its capacity to replicate the NFPE model widely, it believes the model is mainly applicable to communities in the context of Bangladesh and is not transferable to other countries (Ahmed et al 1993 Executive Summary, p 3)

8 Sustainability

The community's contribution to NFPE schools is modest and mostly consists of a monitoring role. The schools depend heavily on BRAC facilitation and resources. The schools, which consist of a teacher, children, and instructional materials in a rented room, do not leave behind a viable institution at the end of a three year cycle. They last only as long as they are needed. The community assists in identifying the essential ingredients for a school—the teacher, students, and room—but they are unable to provide the materials, training and supervision which are necessary for a quality system. Some of these enhanced inputs continue into succeeding cycles, thus reducing costs, but BRAC support must continue if a new program is launched. This is one of the trade-offs of serving poor communities who do not have the resources to pay for a service themselves and do not have the connections to tap into other existing resources.

For BRAC the crucial issue of sustainability relates to sources of funding, the vast majority of which come from external donors. Without this funding the NFPE program would be considerably reduced from its current state, unless wholly new forms of support were devised. It is not at all clear where these new forms of support might be found.

E Unresolved issues and lessons learned

1 Successes and issues

BRAC's NFPE program has been immensely successful in providing an education to unserved rural populations that is at least equal to if not better in quality than government programs. BRAC claims its successes can be attributed to the following factors:

- a simplified curriculum for primary education focusing on basic skills, appropriate to targeted populations,
- paraprofessional teachers, selected from the community, with short preservice training, regular refresher training, and strong supervision,
- small classes and correspondingly small catchment areas, so that no student or parent is far removed from school,
- active parent and community involvement,
- reduced capital costs, where funds are expended for current operations and services, and not on "bricks and mortar,"

- a focus on girls, female teachers, and a new role for women,
- flexible school timing, and
- little or no homework (BRAC 1997)

A number of issues—many of them programmatic—are raised either by documents assessing BRAC or through BRAC’s internal reviews of its own programs. Many, raised here as questions, illustrate the special problems of non-formal programs.

- 1) What is an appropriate role for the community to play in the delivery of education programs? Is education a sector (unlike agriculture, irrigation, and public hygiene) that is not as conducive to the “full” participation of non-expert community members? Is it necessary to centralize control over education inputs to ensure program quality?
- 2) Should BRAC switch its focus from the poor to all rural children, given the general lack of rural facilities in Bangladesh?
- 3) How fast can and should BRAC expand and at what price? The major issues of expansion include the availability of qualified staff and resources, and BRAC’s capacity to maintain quality.
- 4) How will donor funds be allocated to NGOs and the MOE in the future? Will BRAC’s greater cost-effectiveness tip the balance in their favor? Can they maintain good relations with the government if they are seen as competing for the same resources?
- 5) How can BRAC make managerial positions more attractive to women?
- 6) How can BRAC improve the quality of learning and at the same time increase the achievement of its graduates in the formal system (which are sometimes contradictory goals)?
- 7) Now that BRAC has expanded to 34,000 schools, how can it develop a productive coordination of its programs with those of the MOE?
- 8) Should BRAC extend its program to the end of primary and can its less qualified teachers cope with subjects in grades four and five? Government schools may not have places in these grades for the increasing numbers of BRAC students.

2 Lessons learned

There are a number of positive and negative lessons to be taken from the BRAC experience, some of which have also been noted in documents assessing BRAC’s program. The main lessons are that

- 1) An understanding of local conditions and reliance on preexisting relationships of trust facilitate the implementation of programs.
- 2) An emphasis on improving the quality of learning rather than the acquisition of permanent facilities is cost-effective and does not compromise the delivery of education.
- 3) A strong management/supervision/monitoring system keeps field staff accountable for programs to the NGO managers. However, managerial expertise may not be enough to ensure quality.
- 4) Creating a responsive “learning environment” using data collection, feedback, reflection, experimentation, planning, and corrective actions is an effective way to address the improvement of programs.
- 5) It takes time to refine models and put support systems in place before replicating widely.

- 6) BRAC has not demonstrated a significant support role for the community past its initial establishment of schools and a parent committee with modest functions, nor has it taken advantage of the opportunity of community involvement to enhance the practice of civic values. Does this mean that the involvement of communities is not an effective way of supporting the delivery of education programs, or is this simply a question of how BRAC believes resources should best be allocated?
- 7) Quality is an elusive, complex commodity needing considerable attention throughout project implementation to correct and improve components until they produce acceptable results. Quality is not something that can be designed up front as a finished product.
- 8) Long-term funding and policy support are precarious in projects lodged outside a country's formal institutions for education delivery.

Chapter 6 The Community Support Program (CSP) in Balochistan

Components of CSP, Balochistan Model	
Education context	sparse populated, hard-to-serve villages, norms restricting females
Involvement strategy	meetings, survey, 14 steps, probationary school, teacher support
Targets	rural girls
Local institutions	Village Education Committees (VEC)
membership criteria	parents elected (by 75%), unrelated to each other and to teacher, separate VECs for women
Community contributions to enrollment objectives	Parents ensure and monitor attendance of students
education delivery	VEC provides probationary inputs, monitors other inputs
quality	VEC supervises teacher
Program type	formal primary
Length of program	5 years
Students per school	54 (in 1994)
Single or multigrade	multigrade
Instructional approach	should be student-centered, activity-based, actually tends to be lecture/memory
Instructional materials	conventional government textbooks
Curriculum	conventional government
Assessment	conventional, outside evaluations
Teacher qualifications	local resident, female, minimum eight years of school
Hiring status	limited contract candidate until meets civil service requirements
Training	three-month mobile crash training course
Refresher	when needed
Supervision	teacher trainers, NGO staff, village committee
Frequency of supervision	monthly and daily
Instructional facility	first provided by community, eventually government school constructed on donated land
Supplies	government/parents provide supplies
Managers	NGOs, village committee
Management approach	shared responsibility, field-based, culturally sensitive
Major issues	program quality, political influence on government policies

A Background

Balochistan is the largest and least populated province in Pakistan. It is also the least developed. Eighty-four percent of the population lives in 9,000 small villages, the majority of which have little or no public infrastructure. Forty-one percent of the Balochistan population live on less than ten dollars a month (Thomas and 10). The public school system is poorly developed at both the national and provincial levels. Girls are constrained from entering into and remaining in school because of lack of educational opportunities, and economic and socio-cultural constraints. Girls in Balochistan are less likely to receive an education than females in any other province, and as a result Balochistan also has the lowest female literacy

rate in the country Table 6 1 shows the consistently poorer education statistics of Balochistan females five years and older compared with females in other provinces of Pakistan

Table 6 1 Educational status (%) of females five years and older in Pakistan (1991)

Province/ Area	Have never been to school	Not in school but have attended	Currently in school	Literate ^a
Punjab	64 5	16 4	19 1	18 3
Sindh	68 8	13 7	17 5	21 9
NWFP	78 5	6 9	14 5	8 2
Balochistan	88 3	2 6	9 1	4 8
Urban	48 2	24 4	27 4	34 0
Rural	77 2	9 3	13 5	9 8

a Literacy is defined as the ability to count to read and to write
Source Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 1991 in Thomas N d Table 2

Until recently, Balochistan has focused education resources at the secondary level and in urban areas, neglecting especially the primary level in rural areas. The primary school teaching force was small and poorly trained, with many having no training at all. Cultural barriers prevented female teachers from relocating to rural areas where the majority of the population lives. This discouraged the enrollment of girls, many of whose parents prefer to send them to sex-segregated schools especially after grade three. There are few models in rural areas that suggest any other role for girls than marriage and motherhood, and at the same time education is equated with benefits like employment that are mainly of use to males. This system of constraints has resulted in a girls' dropout rate of 94 percent by the end of primary school.

In 1990, the Balochistan Department of Education (DOE, DPE¹) with the support of USAID, established the Primary Education Development (PED) program to increase the access of rural children, especially girls, to primary education and to improve the quality and efficiency of the primary program.

To prepare for PED, the DPE conducted a Human Resource Survey of all settlements in the province. The findings of this study contradicted much of the conventional wisdom about girls' education that was then current. It was discovered that over half of the rural villages in Balochistan wanted a school for girls in their community. Many parents valued education for their daughters, but said they were more likely to send them to school if there was a girls' school available nearby. Despite this claim, the survey revealed that many girls were attending school in the same classroom as boys and were listed in government records as male students. The survey also discovered that the majority of parents would accept co-education up to the end of the third grade with a male teacher if he were someone known to the community (DPE 1994).

This previously invisible demand for girls' education prompted the Balochistan DPE, with support from UNICEF and PED, to address a major constraint to education for girls in rural areas: the lack of female teachers. They developed a Mobile Female Teacher Training Unit (MFTTU) program in December 1991. The purpose of the unit was to bring teacher training to women with some education who were unable to leave their villages but who could teach at the primary level. After encountering problems in placing the first teachers, the DPE revised their model to make community support of the teacher a selection criterion for her training. Simultaneously the DPE reserved teaching positions in rural areas for the MFTTU trained teachers, even though many of them were less academically qualified than teachers selected through conventional means.

¹ The Department of Education (DOE) was bifurcated in 1992 into separate directorates for primary and middle/secondary education. The relevant section became the Directorate of Primary Education (DPE). To avoid confusion DPE is used here.

In 1992, the DPE, with a Pakistani consultant, Dr Quratul Ain Bakhteari, developed a Community Support Program (CSP) process to ensure village commitment to girls' education before the government invested resources in setting up a school in a locality. She worked with two "promoters" for a year developing and testing the CSP process in a set of 27 targeted villages in one of the most difficult-to-serve districts, Lorelai. The CSP team selected the sites based on information about the availability of educated females from the Human Resource Survey and then interviewed parents and community leaders. If convinced that the community could guarantee at least 20 girls for a girls' school, the team would begin the teacher selection process.



In rural areas of Pakistan, primary schools designated as single sex institutions often have mixed student bodies
Photo by Uzma Anzar

NGOs in Balochistan in the early 1990s did not have permission to work in education. Therefore, in 1993, the Society for Community Support for Primary Education in Balochistan (SCSPEB) or "the Society" was established with the purpose of creating access to education for rural girls through a partnership between communities and government. The Society appointed technical advisors from the government on its board to establish their trust since this kind of organization working outside the government but doing the government's work was new, and some were skeptical about its potential for success. The Society's activities were funded by CIDA, UNICEF, and the World Bank. At the end of the pilot phase, the DPE contracted the Society to expand the CSP program to all 26 districts in the province. Eventually CSP was being implemented by four NGOs who were linked by contract to PED and through work with units of the DPE for teacher training, school construction, administration and management, and textbook and materials supply (Bakhteari 1997c).

Eventually the Society came to implement five projects in Balochistan all related to girls' primary education: 1) CSP for girls' formal primary education, 2) the Partnership Project, establishing community support committees for already existing schools in Balochistan, 3) a rural Girls' Fellowship Program of subsidies that allowed girls to study with a local teacher,² 4) an Urban Fellowship Program for low-income girls in Quetta,³ and 5) a Mobile Training of Teachers (MTOT) project to improve the quality of instruction in CSP schools.

The descriptions below rely on the Society's reports of its activities, a Ph D thesis by Christopher Thomas on CSP outcomes (which is the most comprehensive document on CSP by an outsider to the project), notes by a consultant who interviewed project members in June 1997, World Bank reports, and two field visits by one of the authors to observe the project in 1992 and 1995.

B Community Involvement/innovations

The most intensive period of community input into CSP schools comes during the initial period when the schools are being established. The CSP process involves a series of steps in which "community promoters" from the Society develop the trust of villagers and mobilize their support for the girls' school. First, the

² In 1994-95, 30 rural fellowship programs were established whereby subsidies for up to 50 girls per location were provided at a cost of Rs 200 per girl per year plus a 10 percent inflation increase, and a bonus of Rs 50 a month for girls who missed less than six days of school.

³ In 1994-95, 11 schools were opened and in 1996 11 more were opened outside of Quetta. These schools were established on the same basis as those in rural areas.

community identifies a female from the village who has successfully passed grade 8 (matric) or grade 10, and the NGO's promoters verify her current residence in the village. Although many urban dwellers claim a village where they were born as their residence, identifying a teacher who currently lives in the village increases her chance of being accepted. Her academic credentials are then checked and she is tested for skills in reading, writing, mathematics, and Urdu to ensure that she has not lost her skills since leaving school. The potential teacher then becomes a part of the CSP assessment team that surveys each house in the village to determine the number of girls of primary-school age. During the visits the CSP team observes how she interacts with the community to ensure that she will be able to get along with parents from all groups. The visits also provide an opportunity for the community to develop trust and rapport with the new teacher. Her role on the team is considered essential in helping parents feel secure about sending their daughters to learn under her care.

The next step is the formation of a Village Education Committee (VEC). This committee consists of five to seven men whose daughters will attend the school.⁴ Only one member of any family may be on the committee, and no member may be related to any other member or to the teacher. VEC members must be elected by 75 percent of the parents. The VEC serves as the school's official representative to the government. During a three-month probationary period that ensures the community's intention to educate their daughters, its members must construct or find temporary facilities to house the school and provide day-to-day supervision of the teacher. The new school is guided during this period by the Society's promoters.

After the probationary period has been completed, and if the VEC has performed well and enrollments have been maintained, representatives of the VEC are permitted to contact the Divisional Education Office (DEO) and request a contract for formal sanctioning of the school and the teaching post. If approved, the contract transfers ownership of land donated by the community for the school to the Education Department⁵ and permits the teacher to be sent to a MFTTU program for intensive training. At the end of the training the government sends the school a package of instructional materials. Thereafter the school is monitored once a month by the CSP community education promoters and, after the teacher completes her course, she is monitored on a monthly basis by the MFTTU teacher trainers. The community continues to monitor student and teacher attendance on a daily basis, follows up on dropouts, checks monthly progress on the syllabus, and ensures that the school is secure and operates effectively. After two or three years of successful operation the government constructs a permanent school and pays an annual maintenance fee. In recent years the GOB has agreed that all new schools must be established using this CSP process.

The Society summarizes these initial activities in 14 steps:

- A female with a grade eight or ten certificate identified,
- Her residence in the village verified,
- Her academic credentials verified,
- Her basic skills in math, Urdu, and reading/writing tested,
- Each household surveyed for girls of primary school age,
- A VEC of five to seven parents formed,
- The school started on a probationary basis for three months,
- Formal sanctioning of the school and teacher requested by the VEC and assisted by the NGO,
- A contract signed by the VEC and the DEO, which defines the responsibilities of the community and DPE,
- Land ownership transferred from VEC to DPE,
- The teacher approved by the VEC for a MFTTU Course, and upon completion, accepted as a salaried teacher,

⁴ In the conservative villages of Balochistan, women cannot serve on the VEC with men. Later the Society developed special WVECs for them.

⁵ The purpose of this land transfer is to ensure that the school will not be taken over for other purposes in the future.

- The school prepared by the VEC, the teacher formally appointed by the DPE, and supplies sent to the school,
- The school monitored monthly by NGO promoters and trainers, and
- An annual NGO monitoring meeting conducted in which difficulties are aired and VEC committees are elected

C School program

Once the school is established, the program is essentially the same as that found in any government school in Balochistan except for NGO and VEC monitoring of the school. The children use the same books, which are oriented to the same curriculum, and are instructed by essentially the same methods. Through the MFTTU, teachers have received a basic “crash training” in how to teach children by interactive methods, but most find it difficult to overcome their long experience with rote learning to teach by any other methods. At the time the CSP program was being established, only a fraction of the teachers already teaching in-service in conventional schools had completed professional training, but later a shortened course modeled on the MFTTU training was provided to all untrained teachers. The Government of Balochistan (GOB) insisted upon the CSP teachers having this immediate MFTTU training before giving them salaried teaching posts because of their lower qualifications, and even then they were required to complete secondary schooling and further training before they were given salary levels equivalent to teachers in the conventional system.

The core MFTTU training is a condensed version of the nine-month conventional teacher training course that government teachers take to become fully credentialized. The MFTTU training, however, is innovative in the sense that the regular course is supplemented with more practical, activity-oriented training. The quality of instruction in the CSP villages is also enhanced by the involvement of the community in monitoring teacher and student attendance, and by the supervision of the trainers who are contracted from nearby training institutes or secondary schools to provide the inexperienced teachers with continuing support.

D Results

1 Community participation and the development of grassroots institutions

The Society’s process for mobilizing community support both models participatory behaviors and promotes institutions that encourage participatory activities. The members of the VEC are the only village-level elected representatives in all of Balochistan, and their partnership with the government for a development purpose is unique to the area. CSP similarly provides the only opportunity for parents to voice their opinions about education, which is especially important in Balochistan where girls’ education is relatively new and controversial (Thomas N d 81).


The Society has worked out an unusually careful process for involving community members that is respectful of their cultural sensitivities, and works to allay their suspicions concerning government-sponsored activities. The process takes time to build local trust and willingness to become involved in ways new to people’s experiences. Thomas reports that the process often goes through four phases, with the community asking: 1) Who are you? Whom do you represent? Who pays? 2) Why are you (a female promoter) traveling alone? What is the relationship of the man with you? 3) Why not a boys’ school? Who will pay for the teacher and provide the supplies? What is our role? and 4) finally a discussion of the issues involved in establishing a girls’ school, the implications of that activity for the community, and the commitments they need to make to realize project objectives (Thomas N d 102). Several meetings may be required before communities in new areas are ready to become involved, or meetings may be reduced in number if CSP has established its credentials with demonstrated successes in the neighborhood.

By CSP design, VEC membership is as representative of the students’ families as possible. Traditional leaders are discouraged from becoming members so that “ordinary people” will have a chance to serve. The

members, however, tend to be the more prominent individuals of the groups they represent, and by informal consensus they are almost always literate (Thomas N d 104)

Thomas notes that in the development literature, middle range institutions like VECs are the essence of a civil society, benefitting communities because they have the effect of “turning selfish individuals into public-minded citizens” (Thomas N d 120) In Balochistan, the VEC acts as an instrument for concerted community action by managing the daily concerns of the school and becoming the intermediary between the community and outside authorities. The importance of this role can only be appreciated when the factional nature of some of these communities is fully understood. For the first time in many villages there is a cross-cutting community-level organization that transcends the narrow interests of family, religion, and tribe. “It sends a signal to parents that everyone in the village must find ways to work together to support the school, and that the school belongs to everyone” (Thomas N d 104)

The CSP system of active community management is best seen in contrast with management in non-CSP schools where teachers basically act on their own with infrequent supervisory visits from a distant DPE staff member. In non-CSP communities, parents have no authority to interfere in the schools and consequently adopt a passive attitude in relation to it and its problems. Parents expressed to Thomas the difficulty of exerting any kind of pressure on teachers in non-CSP schools since most come from outside the community and VEC members have no compelling personal ties with them, some have also been appointed through political connections that make them immune to correction (Thomas N d 93). Some District Education Officers (DEOs) have actually reported that they appoint outside teachers to a village because they are more easily controlled when they do not have a constituency in the local area. One VEC member made the interesting comment that parents would be willing to check the non-CSP school if the government gave them the responsibility to do so (Thomas N d 94). This comment suggests the importance of officials “empowering” communities before they feel able to act to resolve the problems of a local school.



The CSP process mobilizes local communities in support of the schools. *USAID photo*

An Illustrative CSP Meeting with Community

The CSP team arrives in the village and is taken to the new teacher's house. Her brother meets them and takes them to a community hall where they meet with community members. Some of the team has worked with them before. Each person introduces himself/herself: one is an ex-councillor, one a male school teacher, two appear to be community activists who have formed a welfare organization, one is the teacher's brother and the rest are onlookers. The conversation begins with the CSP Team Leader (TL) from Quetta, who has come to train a CSP team. She speaks with a Key Interested Person (KIP).

TL Asalam Alakum. We have come in response to your application for a girls' school. We see that you have a metric pass (eighth grade) teacher. Are these your papers?

Team members present a file containing the teacher's application, verified documents, her test results signed by the DEO, and the team's first visit report.

KIP Yes they are. (He looks at each document. Those present become interested.)

TL When did you submit them?

KIP Actually we made a verbal request to the DEO, who gave the information to the CSP team. When they came to the village they tested the teacher and took this application. We will now date the papers.

TL Have you seen the teacher's test results? Would you like to see them?

KIP Yes, of course we want to see them.

The team hands the results to him. Someone points at it and asks if the teacher really did the test herself and the teacher's brother nods. They all look carefully at the results.

KIP She has passed but is weak in math. (The school teacher comments that she was not prepared.)

TL Do you know how the test was taken?

KIP Yes, the teacher from the boys' school was present, along with the CSP team. We are very satisfied with the testing process, and we will see that the teacher is better prepared in math.

TL The other papers are teacher's certificates, verified by the DEO.

The Team shows the papers with the DEO verification and those present read them carefully. They are beginning to be aware of the process and see this as an opportunity to be updated on the progress of the project. The team is also gaining confidence as they see the respect for their work emerging. This formal presentation of the records is important in a community like this, which is near an urban area and is used to such documents. The progress review trains the village to become process-oriented.

KIP Now when will we get the school?

TL You have a teacher who has met government requirements. Now how many children are there in the village who will go to the school?

KIP Lots, we are a big village—about 30 families. There are also 10-12 families who live in the next village who will also send their children.

TL Can we put all this information on a map of your village, so we can see and understand who lives where and how many there are?

KIP Yes, why not? It's a good idea.

Guided by the KIP the team walks to the next village where residents also express their interest in the girls' school. They go back to the community hall and draw a map with all the houses and the names of their occupants, the paths through the village, mosques, water tanks, and teashops. When the map is completed, the TL asks the KIP to group the families into five or ten who meet every day and whose children play and work together. They identify four groups with girls who would attend the school. The team explains that the next step is to meet with the women of each of these groups the next day. The teacher's brother agrees to inform the mothers of the meeting.

—adapted and shortened from Bakhteari 1997b

Thomas believes there are advantages to the community and to the program of taking sufficient time to involve local people in the recruitment of teachers 1) there is up-front approval of the teacher by the community, 2) the teachers have roots in the community, and 3) the teachers who are women and therefore restricted to areas near their homes, become known more widely through the house-to-house survey Similarly, after the school has been established, the promoters check to see that teachers regularly visit parents If the family of the teacher and a student are feuding, teachers must visit their homes anyway or the family may no longer bring their children to school All these factors result in a more favorable view of the teacher in CSP communities, while at the same time giving the community a chance to observe how a transparent system of teacher selection works

A number of behaviors modeled by the CSP facilitators have significance for civil society The CSP process 1) gives every household in the community a chance to be heard, 2) is fair and does not discriminate between groups in the community, 3) is transparent in that all documents are discussed in public and verified by appropriate authorities, 4) allows local decision-making in matters related to the school like selection of the teacher, the site location, and the time for schooling, and 5) requires community responsibility for meeting civic commitments concerning the school In the process new attitudes are developed about the community's shared responsibilities in education, the benefits of educating girls, and the links that exist between education and the employment for women that are evident in the CSP's insistence that teachers develop adequate skills (Thomas N d 77)

CSP communities make a more significant contribution to education delivery than communities in the other case studies Among other activities, and in contrast to non-CSP villages in Balochistan, VECs run schools on their own for a three-month probationary period, build additional classroom space, donate water containers, become active promoters of girls' education, provide frequent routine monitoring for the school, advocate for local women in Purdah being allowed to teach, travel to obtain education materials keep schools clean and well-maintained, provide extra learning aids, seek additional resources from regional officials, and negotiate complicated land deals to find a central location for the school They have even been successful in modestly lowering the costs of education to parents by simplifying school uniform requirements, buying school supplies in bulk, and banning vendors from selling to children near schools (Thomas N d 79, 91, 117)

In all the CSP sites visited by Thomas, VECs were planning to upgrade their schools to middle schools, and some were even lobbying the government for more teaching posts and classrooms and had already located additional teachers These long-term possibilities and the energy with which their representatives pursued them were making the investment in primary schooling more appealing for parents (Thomas N d 80) The involvement of parents produced a sense of ownership in the CSP school that was not seen in government schools (Thomas N d 90) One evidence for this is that though government schools and buildings are routinely defaced with graffiti and have their windows broken, CSP schools are well-maintained and rarely vandalized Having a VEC that can solve problems immediately makes a significant difference in CSP communities It takes an unusually energetic headteacher in a non-CSP community to generate the same kind of support from the community (Hunte in Thomas N d 117)

A dilemma at the start of the CSP program was how to involve women in supporting schools when they could not serve on committees with men CSP promoters eventually helped the women start their own VECs (WVECs) These WVECs monitor the school and work with the mothers of the student body to encourage the regular attendance of the girls and their continuation on to the end of primary Observers have noted that the most active members of these committees tend to be grandmothers whose age allows them greater mobility in the community Married women in their childbearing years have little time for such activities, are considered sexually vulnerable, and tend to be "invisible" in the context of major family decision making CSP promoters have found it difficult to involve the mothers of school children because to reach them they have to go through the heads of household and their wives before reaching the younger women CSP promoters make the effort because of their belief that every person should speak for himself/herself and not through intermediaries, except in the case of children

With the advent of the WVECs, there has been a dichotomization of committee functions to conform with community norms. The women are responsible for school level functions that relate to the children, parents, and teachers, while the male VEC members are responsible for outside contacts with non-village functionaries such as the DEO, and other government authorities and official visitors. As villagers explain it, men can ask fathers to send their daughters to school but cannot go house-to-house to convince the mothers to send them regularly. While some would argue that the division of committee functions continues to reinforce the powerlessness of females compared to males, a more optimistic view is that for the first time women are fulfilling a public role, one that builds a network of connections between families of the community in an effort to contribute to their common development. Since literacy has become an informal criterion for inclusion on the VEC committee, it is conceivable in the future that girls now receiving an education may eventually become members of what is now the all-male VEC.

Community norms have changed in recent years concerning the education of girls, at least partly because of exposure to the media. As women expressed it to one observer, "Men want educated wives now. The first marriage is usually arranged according to what the family wants, but the second wife should be educated. The men take this second one with them when they travel." Educated women are considered to be more rational and reasonable, and can be trusted with somewhat greater mobility. In one village, VEC members wanted a younger man to marry an educated woman from outside the village so she could become the teacher in the school. The intense interest some communities display in the CSP school also shows their interest in girls' schooling. The community calls the CSP school "our school" to differentiate it from nearby government schools.

It could be argued that community participation is especially necessary in Balochistan because of the special conditions that exist there. Parents have had little exposure to girls' education and are therefore not aware of its potential benefits. Social attitudes are conservative, and parents need to be assured that education will be advantageous to their daughters and that they will be safe. Geography complicates an already weak education system, making it difficult for the government to deliver and sustain quality education programs without the help of the community (Thomas N d 114). Community involvement encourages appropriate environments and teachers, advocacy for girls' education, and local solutions to institutional problems that plague schools everywhere in the province.

2 Educational participation

Thomas reports that one of the most powerful outcomes of CSP has been the explosion of school openings resulting from the program. Within two years of operation over 200 new girls' schools were opened

(1996:51). Over a five-year period CSP and other efforts by the DPE to encourage the participation of girls have resulted in a doubling of girls in primary schools in Balochistan at the same time that boys enrollments have remained fairly stable (World Bank 1996c). Virtually every CSP school was established in an area where a school had not existed for girls before and therefore most of the girls who enrolled added



Girls in a CSP school. Photo by Uzma Anzar

students who were unlikely to have had an opportunity to become educated if the CSP school had not existed. Female enrollment rates in the villages where CSP was established averaged 67 percent, as opposed to 15 percent elsewhere in the province (and approximately 20 percent in villages with government girls' schools) (World Bank 1993 in Thomas N d 36)

Table 6.2 shows the growth of enrollment in a sample of 106 schools studied by Thomas in the area of Turbat. Thomas examines school clusters because changes in the enrollments of individual schools in close proximity may have interrelated effects. Students occasionally transfer between schools and across village boundaries to attend school. CSP clusters comprise both government and CSP schools. Non-CSP clusters consist only of government schools. The focus school for the CSP cluster is the CSP school itself, while the focus school for the non-CSP cluster is a randomly selected girls' school. Focus schools were used by Thomas to compare "treatment" schools with controls. Clusters demonstrate regional effects.

The table shows that between 1992 and 1994, the average CSP school cluster gained 62 girls, while the focus CSP school, taken alone, averaged an increase of 87 students. Non-CSP clusters only gained 27 girls in the same time period, and in their focus girls' school, 32 students.

During the same period, the CSP clusters in Turbat lost an average of 14 boys (or 4.7 percent of the boys enrolled in 1992), and the non-CSP cluster lost an average of 24 boys (8.2 percent of the boys enrolled in 1992). Although this difference may be attributed to more opportunities for boys outside schools, it also shows that schools in the CSP cluster lost fewer boys overall than the non-CSP schools.

Table 6.2 Growth of enrollment by cluster in Turbat, Balochistan, (1992-94)

Cluster ^a	Total students 1994	Growth of boys	Growth of girls	Growth of enrollments in focus schools ^b
CSP cluster - avg	467	-14	62	87
Village 1	819	-17	61	84
Village 2	203	-50	3	71
Village 3	429	-20	84	90
Village 4	536	23	62	121
Village 5	347	-8	100	67
Non-CSP cluster - avg	318	-24	27	32
Village 6	340	-55	-9	-10
Village 7	445	5	76	76
Village 8	171	8	13	30

a Schools are compared by area clusters because of their interrelated impacts.

b Each cluster is comprised of the focus school (a CSP school in CSP clusters and a non-CSP girls' school in the non-CSP cluster) and other schools in the immediate catchment area. Focus schools in non-CSP clusters were randomly selected.

Source: Thomas N d Table 16

The Thomas (1996) study shows factors that had a positive effect on enrollment in CSP and non-CSP schools. They included the provision of a girls' school through the CSP process, the quality of the school in terms of more resources and more time spent on task, and the frequency of visits from district education officers. Qualifications of teachers did not impact significantly on enrollment. Student attendance was positively related to teacher attendance and the extent to which the children were kept engaged in learning. Other factors, which were positive but not significant, were parental involvement, a child's better health,

and a teacher's use of more innovative teaching methods. A negative factor was a village's total enrollment rate, probably because the more children who attend the more likely that some will be less motivated to continue (Thomas N d 52-53). Another factor that often deters enrollment in conventional schools is the cost of uniforms and supplies, but in CSP schools, promoters discourage the use of uniforms.

3 Learning/Achievement

Thomas administered a simple skill test to 106 CSP and non-CSP schools in Turbat. The results were mixed, as shown in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3 Student achievement in CSP girls' schools and non-CSP boys' schools (1994)

Item	Type of school	
	CSP girls' schools	Non-CSP boys' schools ^a
Mean score (%)	75 ^b	81
Number of schools sampled	57	26
Standard deviation	19.70	13.37

a Although these schools are boys' schools, some girls attend them and are included in the sample. However, they are designated as such to differentiate them from non-CSP girls' schools, which also are run by the government.

b Differences between CSP and non-CSP schools are significant at the .05 level.

Source: Thomas N d, Table 12.

Overall, the students in CSP girls' schools (mean score of 75 percent) performed less well than students in the boys' non-CSP schools (81 percent). Thomas suggests that one might expect lower results from the CSP students because of the characteristics of their learning environment. The CSP schools averaged twice as many students per teacher, and one and one-half times as many students per classroom. In addition, the median length of time the schools had been in existence was only two years, most teachers were young and inexperienced, and textbook and teacher training programs in the province were only in the early stages of improvement. The fact that teachers in the CSP schools had received only modestly enhanced MFTTU training may not have been enough to produce higher achievement in their students. On the other hand, students in CSP schools received roughly double the number of days of instruction as in non-CSP. That fact alone should have produced better results and is a source of concern.

Table 6.4 shows the Urdu and math scores of a group of kindergarten and grade one students tested in a nine-school sub-sample (five CSP and four non-CSP schools) of the 106 sample CSP schools. It is important to know that the students tested were girls in three types of schools: CSP girls' schools, non-CSP girls' schools, and non-CSP boys' schools. Schools in Balochistan, for administrative purposes, are assigned a gender designation based mainly on the sex of the teacher, even though there may be students of both sexes attending the school. CSP girls outperformed non-CSP girls studying in both girls' and boys' schools (sometimes significantly). One suspects the reasons for the poor performance of non-CSP girls studying in boys' schools relate to factors in mixed-sex schooling environments of this area. Girls in mixed classes in Balochistan tend to be marginalized and feel shy around males. It is not clear why the CSP girls do better than non-CSP girls in girls' schools, although the sample is too small to be conclusive.

Table 6 4 Achievement scores (%) of girls by grade and type of school (1994)^a

Scores	Type of School					
	CSP girls' schools		Non CSP girls' schools		Non-CSP boys' schools	
	Kindergarten (n=89)	Grade 1 (n=82)	Kindergarten (n=55)	Grade 1 (n=33)	Kindergarten (n=23)	Grade 1 (n=28)
Urdu	78 ^b	50 ^c	60	40	69	40
Math	53 ^b	80 ^d	30	77	42	71

a This comparison is derived from a sample of schools in Turbat District. It involves nine girls' schools (five CSP and four non CSP) and three boys' schools. Although many of the CSP girls' and non CSP boys' schools have some children of both sexes, the scores reported are for girls only. The *n* refers to the number of girls taking each test.

b Difference between CSP and non CSP score (girls) for this subject and grade level is significant at the .01 level.

c Difference between CSP and non CSP score (girls) for this subject and grade level is significant at the .10 level.

d Difference between CSP and non CSP score (boys) for this subject and grade level is significant at the .10 level.

Source: Thomas N d Tables 19 and 21.

In a comparison with the small sample of non-CSP girls' schools⁶ where more qualitative studies were made, the CSP students also showed more rapid enrollment growth and higher attendance, as well as better achievement, suggesting that overall CSP programs may make an important difference for girls.

The results of the Thomas study, as he notes, should be considered provisional at this time with regard to achievement. It may have been too early at the time of his study to expect conclusive results since the schools had only been in existence for two years, and it may also have been difficult to obtain reliable results from such young children, especially the little girls of this area who tend to be shy with strangers.

The study attempted to identify factors related to achievement in CSP and non-CSP schools but found that only one—student attendance—was significant (Thomas N d 63). However, some factors that increase outcomes and improve the learning environment, though not significantly, are visits by education officers, more motivated and regularly attending teachers, and community support. Provision of supplies and variety in teaching techniques also improved outcomes (Thomas N d 75).

In Balochistan there have been chronic problems with girls' schools, including teacher absenteeism, defunct or closed schools, and weak social support, all of which lead one to believe that community participation should have a significant impact on both enrollment and achievement (Thomas N d 65). The more relevant question may not be whether this system produces equal or better results when compared with the conventional system, but whether there be any results at all without CSP.

4 School program quality

Overall, the CSP school program was based on the conventional government model of education existing in Balochistan. When CSP was established, the DPE, under PED, was just beginning comprehensive efforts to improve the quality of primary education in the province. CSP's aims at first were not focused on quality issues, which were already being addressed in other parts of the education bureaucracy, but rather were mainly quantitative—to overcome the obstacles to rural girls' access to education, which at that time seemed to be the overwhelmingly important issue for education in Balochistan. The Society was concerned with quality only to the extent that they did not want to compromise education further through the use of inadequately prepared teachers. Consequently, from the start they put in place a number of safeguards to prevent that happening, including the MFTTU training, NGO monitoring systems, and community oversight activities. Soon it became apparent to the Society's promoters, however, that quality was an equally important issue in rural schools and that these mechanisms were not enough to ensure quality programs.

⁶ The author regrets the fact that a large enough sample of girls' non-CSP schools was not included to permit a multivariate analysis.



A girl reads from her book in a CSP school Photo by Uzma Anzar

At first it seemed enough to rely on the monitoring activities of the VECs to ensure better program quality, but there was little the VEC could do to improve the actual instruction of the teacher. The problem became more evident as cohorts of children began to reach the higher grades of primary and it became clear that teachers were unprepared to teach the advanced content at these levels. As one report noted, teachers needed professional training less than they needed academic study of the subject content⁷

The Society's staff had difficulty in defining quality since they found the term meant different things to different people. To the DPE it was teachers using the government materials and covering textbook pages at the prescribed rate, to parents it was a teacher in attendance and children who were happy, clean, and doing their homework without having to be pushed. Studies like those of Thomas (1996) however were showing that despite the intensive training and follow-up, CSP teachers were not producing any better achievement results than non-CSP teachers, and in some cases the results were poorer. To improve the quality of the program, the Society took several actions. They decided in 1994 to contract trainers from outside the government system to train the community and government school teachers, and to do follow-up training in CSP schools. They also offered a program whereby teachers were able to repeat the work of grade five under the supervision of a tutor

so they would be better prepared to teach the upper primary grades. Finally, they attempted to establish standards of quality similar to ones recently created by the DPE-PED, instead of relying on the low standards accepted in conventional schools⁸

The achievement results from the Thomas study demonstrated a mixed picture about whether CSP in its early years had been able to provide an education equal to the conventional system in terms of achievement outcomes. Thomas shows indisputably that the attractiveness of the school was enhanced and that children enjoyed the experience as much if not more than in non-CSP schools. Others argue that even if the program is poor academically there are other gains. Girls receive attention, learn to get along with their peers, learn cleanliness and proper conduct, and become disciplined in meeting schedules and getting work done on time.

One factor that contributed to an enhanced program in CSP schools is the greater professionalism and commitment of the teachers. On numerous occasions, as Thomas documents, CSP teachers refused to participate in teacher strikes because they feared it would adversely affect student learning. Table 6.5 shows the attendance rates and number of school days in the two systems between October and December of

⁷ Warwick and Reimers 1995 noted that the length of teachers' academic training was the most significant predictor of their students' achievement.

⁸ Instructional quality tended to be better in another of the Society's projects, the Fellowship Program, because the teachers tended to be better qualified (usually males) and more responsive to the control of the community because of the contractual nature of their hiring.

1994 CSP schools were open on average more than twice the number of days (57) of non-CSP schools (22) (Thomas N d 70) Both groups had the same average attendance rate of 89 percent, so the increased number of school days in the CSP schools provided them a considerably longer period for learning

Table 6 5 Attendance in CSP and non-CSP schools (October-December 1994)

School type	School days (mean)	Attendance rate (%)
CSP cluster^a schools	57	89
Village 1	66	84
Village 2	64	89
Village 3	69	88
Village 4	28	90
Village 5	58	96
Non-CSP cluster schools	22	89
Village 6	12	81
Village 7	20	87
Village 8	33	100

a Schools are compared by area clusters because of their interrelated effects
Source Thomas N d Table 18

Monitoring of the school by VEC members has also probably improved their quality Anyone who has visited schools in rural Balochistan knows that it is the rule rather than the exception to find them closed, or teachers and children sitting doing nothing related to academic work Table 6 6 shows what was happening in 27 schools during mid-morning school hours, when Thomas made surprise visits CSP schools were generally found open and functioning, whereas non-CSP schools were either closed or only partially functioning

Table 6 6 Conditions in Balochistan schools during mid-morning school hours (1994)

Observation	CSP schools	Non-CSP schools
Children on task	5	4
Children playing outside	0	4
Teacher with small group while other students played	1	1
Students dismissed early	0	3
Children sitting idle	0	1
School closed	0	7
School exists only on paper	0	1

Source Thomas N d Table 25

One can speculate on other factors that may influence program quality in favor of CSP schools For example, in the conventional system, teacher absence is a serious problem in many rural areas because teachers are not well supervised and often do not come from or live in the immediate area of the school Even when they are present, many turn over the teaching to students, who lead the rote learning choruses that

make up the bulk of instruction. Instructional materials may be limited, and harsh discipline maintains the orderliness of the process. In these discouraging conditions, students are often absent and drop out from the boredom of learning and the fear of punishment. Poor achievement is the rule rather than the exception in these schools.

The CSP schools, through pre-conditions agreed with the community, have addressed some of these negative features: they have a teacher who is accountable to the community, training that provides some understanding of interactive instruction and the developmental needs of children (and reinforces these models in various ways including the methods used in training teachers), strong local monitoring and supervision, frequent contact with the DPE through the CSP facilitators who can usually ensure supplies and solve problems, and parents who commit themselves to sending children to school regularly. In addition, CSP is significantly linked through its training locations with well-designed and maintained schools in centrally located sites that can serve as models for local schools. (Thomas N d 75)

The DPE has also contributed to program quality through a series of policy reforms that give CSP greater flexibility in addressing local needs. It 1) removed previous age limitations (18 to 40) for employing female teachers, 2) lowered the minimum educational requirement from a secondary school diploma to a middle school diploma for female candidates, although the requirement for male candidates remained the same, 3) allowed the nine-month teacher training course to be reduced to three months, 4) permitted teacher training immediately instead of after several years, and 5) provided sufficient teaching posts to cover the CSP need. In addition, the government decided that boys' schools would only be constructed in the future if they allowed girls to attend. The government's increasing trust in the NGOs was reflected in the fact that in contracts with the new NGOs in 1995, the GOB no longer required that there be government officials on their boards.

The GOB also developed a management information system to track information important to educational policy such as teacher employment, school construction, and materials supply issues. They collaborated with PED and UNICEF in the development of the MFTTU training for women, and they increased expenditures in the Education Department by approximately 30 percent between 1990 and 1993. Development expenditures also increased by approximately 40 percent in the same period (Thomas N d 42). In addition they revised the job descriptions of education inspectors to encourage them to work closely with VECs to improve school performance. All these factors provided a more conducive environment for both quantitative and qualitative improvements in the schools.

5 Accountability to the community

There are factors in the Balochistan environment that should, theoretically, create client-focused schools. Education is not compulsory in Balochistan, and consequently, it has been argued that unless schools attract and maintain enrollments, there may be little reason for parents to send children to school. Similarly the government structure that supports schools is usually very distant from rural communities and cannot afford the resources to monitor them adequately, and therefore in effect the government needs the assistance of parents. (Thomas N d 82)

The CSP model creates conditions that should also lead to greater accountability to the community. For example, CSP defines the responsibilities of the community and the DPE, and develops trust as a neutral go-between, ensuring that both keep their agreements. The greater participation of the community, both financially and in-kind, means they are more likely to demand accountability from staff. Parents are also more involved in the day-to-day management of the school where they see what is happening and what needs to be corrected. Thomas claims that parental monitoring makes a difference in the number of days the school is in session and the amount of time teachers are teaching and keeping students on task, and that these factors increase student enrollment and attendance. (Thomas N d 82-84)

Teaching staff should also be more accountable to the community because of the way they are selected and monitored. The search for a teacher is limited to village residents, and her selection partially depends on the response she elicits from the community during the household survey. If she is unable to establish trust and support among parents, she is not selected. Thomas reports a high degree of commitment by teachers to the community, at least partly because they care about maintaining the respect and goodwill of their neighbors. Some reports suggest, however, that when CSP teachers become government employees, community control weakens, and teachers tend to become absent more and work with less commitment. VECs have not been strengthened sufficiently to control this process. Recent Society reports say that the new NGOs that have been contracted in the expansion phase of CSP tend to be from the local area and are able to exert more influence over this deterioration in teaching commitment. VECs are also being trained to deal with these situations.

Unlike in non-CSP villages, the VEC is a wholly “new mechanism to make teachers and education officials accountable at the local level” (Thomas N d 82). By creating VECs, the CSP has established an organizational structure that encourages teacher and local administrative accountability to parents (Thomas N d 41). Once the school is opened, VEC members are empowered to report a teacher to the government for attendance or behavior problems, and to recommend teachers for training. On the other hand, teachers cannot be pushed too far or they may resign, thus effectively shutting down the school. When they meet the civil service requirements, they become virtually immune from being dismissed. The test of accountability and teacher commitment to client interests are likely to come later after the schools have been established for some time and follow procedures more like those in conventional schools.

Thomas found little accountability among most DEOs who complained that they had little authority to handle the personnel and facilities issues parents raise because they take their orders from provincial authorities and are unable to make these decisions themselves. Thus despite the rhetoric of decentralization, as Thomas notes, the school system remains “highly centralized and politicized, with even the smallest decisions about teacher employment and classroom construction taken at the highest levels of the Department” (Thomas N d 85). What has made some DEOs more amenable to the CSP suggestion is the support given CSP activities by high officials in the DPE. Proponents of CSP believe that with time, the success of CSP schools will demonstrate their effectiveness and win over those who are not enthusiastic at present. Critics feel that major changes must be made in how decisions about education are made before a new role for the community can be ensured.

6 Costs

There is little cost data available with which to compare CSP and non-CSP schools. Since both are essentially government schools, the core costs of buildings, teachers' salaries, and supplies should be about the same. The main additional costs for CSP schools are the promotional costs of the Society and the special MFTTU training and monitoring that CSP teachers receive.

One estimate suggests that the CSP process adds 15 to 20 percent to the cost of the conventional government school but adds that this cost must be weighed against a 50 percent increase in enrollment and better attendance (World Bank 1996c 28). The cost to the government's PED program was covered through a 12 percent obligation from government budgets and 88 percent from a World Bank loan.

For parents the average cost of educating a child in a CSP school is Rs 524 per year compared to Rs 563 in a non-CSP school. The difference is due to VEC efforts to reduce the costs (see above) (Thomas N d 80).

7 Replication

CSP's efforts, which started in 27 Lorelai villages in 1992, have risen steadily in the five years since the inception of the program. By 1997, more than 1,500 communities had gone through the CSP process (Bakhteari 1997c 14), though not all established functioning schools. Table 6.7 shows the numbers of

schools that had been established through December 1996. In the first major expansion phase, in 1993, the CSP teams of promoters visited 548 villages, establishing 122 rural girls' primary schools with an enrollment of 4,183 girls. An additional 226 students were studying in schools that were waiting to be sanctioned. Seventy-four percent of the total 5,963 school-age girls in these villages were enrolled as a result of CSP.

Table 6.7 Number of CSP schools and children enrolled in Balochistan (1992-1994)

Month and year	Total schools	Enrolled children ^a
February 1992	27 ^b	
November 1993	122 ^c	4,183 ^c
December 1994	187 ^c 193 ^d	
December 1995	273 ^d	12,769 ^d
December 1996	573 ^e	

a indicates that no data is available

b Source: O'Grady 1993, page 5

c Source: SCSPEB 1994, page 4

d Source: World Bank Report 1995

e It was estimated that 270 schools would be established in 1996. This figure has been added to the 273 of the previous year. The number of schools established in 1996 would show an increase of 75% over the number of schools established in the previous three years. Source: World Bank 1996c: 22

By December 1994, there were 187 fully established schools, 41 on probation and 54 in the process of becoming established, for a total of 282 schools participating in the CSP system. The enrollment in the fully established schools totaled 10,131 girls or on average 54 students per school. By this time there were 170 trained teachers, 69 undergoing training, and 31 still untrained. A total of 228 VECs had been newly formed (SCSPEB 1994). In 1996, as more regional NGOs became involved in implementing the CSP process, the number of CSP schools increased by 75 percent over the number that had been established in the previous three years (World Bank 1996c: 22).

The expansion of the CSP schools has been impressive by any standard, but it is especially so given the lengthiness of the mobilization process and the difficult conditions in Balochistan's vast province. Future replication efforts face certain constraints, however. First, many villages simply do not have an educated female resident in the vicinity. A new policy to help resolve this issue allows villages that want to establish schools but have no locally available educated female, to contract a teacher—perhaps a male acceptable to them—to teach in the girls' schools. This person remains under contract (and does not obtain civil service status) until a local female is available. A fellowship arrangement may be made to cover the expenses and salary of this teacher. Second, some villages in more conservative areas have resisted becoming involved in the CSP process, often because of deep distrust of the government or an unwillingness to educate girls. Sometimes this resistance breaks down when villagers see nearby successful schools.

The most significant constraint on expansion of CSP schools is the NGOs' reliance on the GOB to assign a portion of its external funding to CSP, and its vulnerability as an "add-on"⁹ project. Although USAID funding through the PED project ended in 1994, the work continued to be funded by UNICEF, the World Bank, the Habib Bank, and Trust for Voluntary Organizations (TVO). Of the World Bank's loan, 70 to 80 percent of the funds are earmarked for construction and only 5 percent for community promotion. If this funding stops, there are two alternatives: the DPE might use its scarce resources to continue to support the Society's work, or it might take over the work itself. In the past, the DPE has been reluctant to con-

⁹ The term comes from Thomas N. D. 89 to describe the fact that CSP acts as a parallel system not yet embedded in the GOB education structure.

tract groups outside the Education Department to do its work except in cases where funding has been external. And, though voiced in other terms, some within the bureaucracy feel that these transparently established schools have removed sources of political influence politicians previously depended on to satisfy their constituents.

Concerning the second alternative, the Society believes that the government's involvement would not produce the same kinds of results it has been able to produce as a non-governmental organization. They believe it is essential for an NGO to mount this kind of mobilization in remote villages for several reasons, the most important being the suspicion with which government initiatives are held. If funding for the Society's activities should be discontinued, it is doubtful whether the DPE of Balochistan would continue to support the Society's work or provide a sufficiently effective replacement for these services. Already at one point when community enthusiasm surpassed the capacity of donor funding, the project had to slow its expansion efforts, and as a result of its limited capacity, was not been able to place more than 140 of the 200 teachers assigned to them that year (Thomas N d 89).

In 1995 the DPE decided that the CSP process should be used to hire all teachers in the province and to establish Parent-Teacher School Management Committees (PTSMCs) to oversee the affairs of government schools. Originally DEOs were requested to set up these committees, but they usually did not comply because there was no compensation for the added effort and transportation costs. Consequently the NGOs were contracted to add this activity to their program. The new committees were composed of the head-teacher (usually the school was larger than the one-teacher CSP school) and three to five parents, who were sometimes also members of the VEC committee. When both committees existed in a community, the PTSMC normally took responsibility for coordinating the needs of both schools with district education authorities. The PTSMCs were also given responsibility for administering an annual Rs 2,000 fund for minor repairs to school buildings and Rs 1,140 for school supplies. As of March 1997, 4,985 of these PTSMCs had been established, and the remaining 3,901 were to be established in the following year by the four NGOs working on the CSP process. According to reports, the PTSMCs are resisted by the Teachers' Union, and in general government officials are not very supportive. The consultant for the program did not feel that the process was carried out as effectively as with CSP, and that in fact it distracted from CSP (Bakhteari 1997c 31-32). Authorities report that though there have been complications in delivering the funds for the PTSMCs, these committees have been effective in increasing enrollments and attendance in conventional schools.

Recently the NGOs have been trying to shorten the lengthy CSP process in order to establish girls' schools and village committees more quickly. The shortcuts have included meeting with clusters of 8-10 potential teachers to informally determine their qualifications and the readiness of their communities and then to ask them to conduct the household survey and assist in forming the VEC or PTSMC in their village. Many villagers now seek out CSP to request that a school be established in their communities. Self-selected communities require less time to develop trust and prepare for the establishment of a school, thereby also contributing to the shortening of the process.

There is growing recognition that communities differ enough in Balochistan so that a variety of education delivery options may be needed to ensure that an appropriate one is selected in each case. The NGOs now can offer a range of models that include the urban and rural "fellowship" schools, home schools (located in the homes of teachers), CSP gender-free schools, and CSP girls' schools (determined by the sex of the teacher rather than the student).

8 Sustainability

It is too early to know whether communities can or will sustain their support for community schools once the Society's facilitators who are their main links to the DPE are gone. It is also unclear whether the Society itself can survive to promote new schools if their strong donor support is withdrawn. CSP schools at that point will be no different from government schools once PTSMCs are established for all conventional schools. Are the successes of CSP dependent upon the crucial links the NGOs provide to higher sources of

decision making? Does VEC enthusiasm require frequent monitoring visits to be sustained? The community cannot operate primary schools on their own. They need the resources government contributes and controls. If the contracted NGOs are no longer funded to facilitate that process, it is an important question whether that process would continue in the absence of institutionalized mechanisms to ensure it. The Society is aware of this problem, but it is difficult to see how it can be solved in the present political climate in Pakistan.

Already the successes of CSP schools are intensifying their need for additional resources. Thomas reports that CSP classes are more crowded than conventional schools because of escalating new enrollments and because some boys' schools have started excluding girls when a CSP school is located nearby. This means that CSP classes are not only taught by less qualified teachers but contain double the number of students, and remain multigraded because teachers for additional classes are not available. The addition of a local male teacher might have solved the problem at one time, but parents no longer accept this solution in a girls' school where female teachers are working (Thomas N d 110-1). If these conditions continue, one can anticipate the teacher's job becoming less satisfying and program quality deteriorating, especially if the problem-solving assistance of the NGO promoters is no longer available.

It is difficult for the government with its limited resources to keep up with both the "explosion of new schools" and expanded enrollments in existing sites. According to Thomas, 200 out of 700 new teachers a year are already being assigned to new CSP schools, while the rest must be distributed among new and existing schools in the whole of the province. Efforts to decentralize the bureaucracy might appear to be an answer to an equitable distribution of teacher posts were it not for the intense political competition for posts that is likely to ensue and that might be even more difficult to control in the districts.

In 1996 the NGOs' problems with the government became especially acute with the change in the provincial government. Despite the previous government's agreements with donors, there began an extensive political interference in teacher recruitment, particularly of female teachers hired under the relaxed rules of lowered qualifications. Teachers were hired without verifying their skills or village origin so it was often not clear where or whether they would be teaching. From the CSP point of view, this situation undermined the transparent, merit-based approach they had so carefully cultivated and made some communities question their other investments in CSP schools when the government was renegeing on its promises. One message that was conveyed to the promoters was that the new government might not be so enthusiastic about working through the NGOs. In a strong reaction the World Bank demanded that the government produce a policy statement on their intentions regarding teacher recruitment or there might be funding implications.

For a long time the Society had been aware of the need for a more localized NGO presence that could maintain the program over the long run. The Society was having an increasingly difficult time expanding into so many districts at the same time, which meant initiating and monitoring schools in very distant areas, many of which lacked overnight accommodations for their field teams. As the number of schools increased, the burden of the work increased to the point where the teams were constantly on the road. By 1994 the Society decided to decentralize some of its activities to distant division capitals. Three additional NGOs were contracted by the DPE in 1996 in Gawader, Dera Murad Jamali, and Mastung to speed up expansion of CSP schools in those areas. In a 1994 report the Society was expecting to shift from running the day-to-day operations of CSP to training new staff and overseeing the work of the new local NGOs. As the Society expressed it:

the vision is the institutionalization of the community support process—a move towards a primary education system which is operated by many partners, including parents, education field staff, district and local management and other NGOs—a system which will be owned by everyone and will not be a "Society affair" (SCSPEB 1994 Executive Summary)

The CSP process has developed working linkages among three of the constituencies that can make a difference in the continued effective and efficient management of schools—the government and communities, factions within the community, and individual parents and the school. It has not, as one report notes,

reduced all suspicions between towns, or between the genders, which have in some cases made it more difficult to consolidate schools. Some officials question whether the government can afford two small schools in each village to continue segregating the sexes. Others argue that the majority of the girls will not complete the primary level if they are not provided segregated accommodations. CSP successes have therefore increased the strain on the government's limited resources at a time when the future of foreign assistance is not clear. While the Society's promoters may be right that the functions of the CSP promoters cannot be handled effectively through governmental agencies, putting the responsibilities in the hands of NGOs only puts off the day when government bureaucracies themselves must be reformed to handle what are ultimately their responsibilities.

A final sustainability issue also relates to government support. There are still vulnerable portions of the program that can only be strengthened through policy reform. As yet VECs and PTSMCs do not have legal status and therefore their ability to function as local management agencies for schools is limited. The NGO strategy to integrate them into the overall education program includes seeking Cabinet level endorsement of the approach, Parliamentary approval to legalize the committees, and the establishment of accounts so that annual funds can be deposited directly in the name of the committees. A remaining difficulty is that the committees have no legal authority over the teacher once she or he becomes part of the civil service.

E Issues and lessons learned

The Society has been highly successful in creating partnerships between government agencies responsible for the delivery of education and hard-to-reach communities. The process created by the Society to engage parents in support of girls' education uniquely addresses the special problems of a very difficult area. The Society believes its program is successful because it is

- community-based,
- run exclusively by Pakistanis (consultant, promoters),
- supported by multiple donors: USAID, World Bank, UNICEF, Habib Bank Trust, and TVO,
- sensitive to the need to accommodate local male-dominated culture in order to allow other revolutionary changes to occur, such as community-government partnerships and parental involvement in education, and
- using strong committed people at every level.

The Society feels it has learned several lessons

- the CSP process must be carried out by an agency other than the government,
- the CSP process needs careful monitoring and follow-up, and progress needs to be measured by well-developed indicators,
- VEC members must be selected carefully to ensure a strong, respected group,
- VECs managers need training to be effective leaders, and parents need training to monitor the school program and
- follow-up training and support for teachers after MFTTU training is essential.

1 Issues

The issues the Society feels are important to CSP's future success include

- involving regional education officials more in CSP activities to build sustainability,
- resolving inconsistencies in the GOB's actions to avoid undermining community confidence in the CSP process,
- improving program quality with an important issue being whether less qualified teachers will be able to handle higher grades and more students as the schools mature,

- resolving resource-related questions, such as whether the GOB can support two single-sex schools in each village. Is CSP a viable solution to EFA goals, or does it simply increase sex-segregation and the need for separate facilities and separate sex teachers? What other options might attract girls to school without these disadvantages?, and
- other seemingly minor yet important issues include the frequent public strikes called by teachers' associations, which disrupt learning, difficult feudal landlords who resist the education of their tenant workers, and traditional tribal values, which make it especially difficult to enroll girls and find female teachers in some areas

2 Lessons learned about community participation

The lessons CSP teaches about community participation are

- 1) the importance of a culturally sensitive, flexible process for promoting community support. The process must address the fears and suspicions of local people and build their confidence,
- 2) the importance of giving local people the space to act. This is accomplished by helping community members define their responsibilities in the partnership with government, by "granting permission" for them to take initiatives, by loosening control and giving them room to act, and by being willing to accept their actions even when they lead to inefficiencies and delays,
- 3) the importance of modeling the kinds of behavior expected from community participants during the mobilization process. By ensuring the opportunity for each individual to speak for himself/herself and listening to each, by conducting a transparent, merit-based system of teacher and VEC member selection, and by working out an equitable share of responsibilities,
- 4) the importance of institutionalizing links to reinforce essential relationships. Links between parents and the school were well-developed in VECs and WVECs but were not so well developed between communities and education authorities,
- 5) the critical role facilitative agencies (both NGO and external donors) can play in stimulating certain kinds of communities to become involved in education delivery, and
- 6) the amazing energy that can be harnessed in communities that become motivated to support schools. Balochistan creates a unique cultural and geographical challenge to those wanting to deliver public education. A program like CSP may be the only hope for a reasonable standard of education in circumstances of this kind. CSP's substantial record of successes in difficult-to-reach areas reinforces the belief that a sensitive, practical approach can meet the needs of the most difficult context. The main long-term issue is sustaining the support for community mobilization both from the government and those who fund such programs

Chapter 7 Escuela Nueva in Colombia

Components of Escuela Nueva Model	
Education context	multigrade rural schools, poor quality program, well-endowed facilities
Involvement strategy	survey, school meetings, map activity, community monograph, course offerings
Targets	rural children
Local institutions	none established by this program
Community contributions to enrollment objectives	none specifically targeted to these aims
education delivery quality	none
school schedule	community is a resource for local lore, parents sometimes volunteer to tutor avoids local conflicts like harvests
Program type	formal primary government
Length of program	five years
Single or multigrade	usually multigrade
Instructional approach	student-centered activity-based, self-paced, flexible promotion, learning corners, student government
Instructional materials	generated in teacher workshops, self-study guides organized into units
Curriculum	based on government objectives
Assessment	self-assessment at end of units with periodic teacher checks
Teacher qualifications	conventional
Training	three one-week trainings spread over a year
Refresher	monthly day-long courses
Supervision	regional supervisors should visit frequently but do not, hear teachers' problems in monthly training
Instructional facility	conventional government school
Managers	regional supervisors
Major issues	inconsistent replication with expansion, resistance by traditional educators

A Background

The Colombian situation in the 1960s was described by one observer as “an excessive decentralization in which state education systems were functioning in a state of near anarchy” (Hanson 1983 89) During this period UNESCO sponsored a system of Unitary Schools as a means of delivering education to one-teacher rural schools The program was based on automatic promotion, active self-paced learning, and the use of instructional cards so the teacher could move around the classroom and work with groups of students as needed

The pilot program, consisting of 150 Unitary Schools, was intended for expansion to all schools in the country before the idea was eventually abandoned for reasons that included the difficulty in training staff to adequately utilize the new ideas, the inflexibility of the national curriculum, and resistance from teachers who complained that making learning cards took too much of their time Parents also feared their children were not receiving an education equivalent to that in the conventional system, Ministry of Education

(MOE) educators were not happy with the automatic promotion system, and supervisors who were not included in the program opposed its ideas. The program was attacked by virtually all of its participants.

The MOE decided in 1975 to design a new system, the Escuela Nueva program, to improve the curricula, training, and administrative practices of the Unitary model. The new program was similarly designed around the principles of active learning and self-pacing. Escuela Nueva was targeted to rural areas and was an amalgam of lessons learned from the Unitary Schools, combined with new ideas to improve the quality of learning in conventional government schools. Some of the problems educationists saw in the conventional system were its poorly equipped classrooms and lack of instructional materials, inflexible schedules, which interfered with local work needs, and its poor teaching/learning style based on rote methods. In addition, teachers were not trained for multigrade instruction and had little support from instructional supervisors.

Still Escuela Nueva encountered resistance. Its steering committee had to convince curriculum experts that national objectives would be maintained and that learning could occur through non-traditional methods. They had to assure trainers that teachers would be given sufficient preparation in the new methods of instruction and to show the textbook industry that they would not lose book sales.¹ (McGinn 1991: 35)

USAID provided support for the implementation of 500 Escuela Nueva schools in three departments between 1975 and 1978 when the MOE had decided to abandon the Unitary Schools. The initiative for the reform came from the Vice-Minister who was a technocrat but had no training in education. Again, there was resistance from a number of sides: from private publishers who feared they would lose the sale of conventional books, from curriculum developers who thought the program would not meet national objectives, from the universities who thought there would be fewer teachers to train, etc. Criticism decreased when the new program was confined to rural multigrade schools where almost any program was thought to be better than the existing one. In the next few years the project was lodged in one department after another in the MOE, always as an experimental program with funding from businesses and donors. (McGinn 1996: 12)

As in many other developing countries, rural education has lagged behind in Colombia. In 1975, at the time when Escuela Nueva was being established, only half the rural children in the age group 6-12 were enrolled in schools compared to 65 percent of children in the country as a whole. By the mid-1980s half the rural schools in the country still did not offer a full primary cycle, and only slightly more than half of rural children between the ages of 7 and 9 had been to school—about the same proportion as in 1975. Only 20 percent of the children who entered first grade completed the primary cycle, and a third dropped out of the first grade class. In rural areas, there was therefore considerable need to expand education opportunities and increase completion rates while simultaneously reduce dropout rates.

By 1992, a few years after Escuela Nueva had been brought to scale in 18,000 rural schools, the participation rate had risen to 81 percent for girls and 78 percent for boys in these areas, compared with 87 percent and 86 percent respectively in urban areas. The roughly 30 percent rise in rural enrollments since 1975 may have been partially a result of Escuela Nueva since over half of Colombia's rural schools had adopted the model in the intervening years.

Escuela Nueva as an effort to provide cost-effective quality education to rural areas needs to be assessed in the context of MOE and state relations in Colombia. A factor that has had a formative effect is the highly fragmented nature of power in Colombia across a number of interest groups rather than centralized in the national government. The education structure mimics the federal system of government in that there are national, state, municipal, and private school systems, all expected in theory though not always in practice to follow MOE policy guidance. In the pre-reform period the state secretaries of education, usually aspiring politicians, were virtually autonomous and generally ignored Ministry policy. In 1961, partly to correct this situation and the growing unrest of teachers who were not being paid regularly, the MOE took

¹ McGinn writes, for example, that opposition in the Ministry delayed the printing of the instructional guides for a year.



Escuela Nueva programs were first proposed to reach underserved rural areas of Colombia *USAID photo*

charge of paying teacher salaries, since officials found that once money had been sent to state coffers, it could be used for anything state authorities desired. Teachers were often being hired by state authorities for political reasons regardless of their qualifications, leaving the MOE with the task of finding money to pay their salaries. At the time, 23 percent of teachers did not meet MOE standards and, of these, 70 percent were teaching in rural schools.

The reform of 1968 attempted to address the gulf between the MOE and state establishments. Regional Education Funds were set up to control money that had previously been sent to the states by the national government, and governors were required to sign agreements that stipulated how the funds could be spent, reflecting

those Ministry policies that had been ignored. A MOE official was delegated to each state to oversee the implementation of the funds. During 1969-1973, the state officers continued to violate their contracts in every conceivable way and it was impossible for the MOE officials to perform their supervisory role. The MOE did not dare withhold money for fear of further teacher strikes.

In 1972 a council was formed in each state to make decisions about the administration and financing of the schools, and this time the MOE supervisor was given veto power over the decisions. The period between 1973-75 was a time of adjustment when new state officials came into a system that was already functioning and came to rely on the MOE officer to help them with the transition. In 1975-78, the program became institutionalized, with an expanded office and staff and with the MOE representative's power becoming equal to that of the state officials. However, governors persisted in appointing unauthorized teachers for whom there were insufficient funds (14,000 teachers between 71 and 75 alone). From 1978-80, the position of the Ministry's representative became politicized and gained substantial power (Hanson 1983:93).

These power struggles between the central government and the states formed the backdrop against which Escuela Nueva was established in Colombia, first as a centrally inspired pilot project and ultimately as a nationwide program expanded to all of the states. Whether good or bad as an idea, Escuela Nueva faced the challenge during this period of states that continued to operate relatively independently of the policies handed down from the center.

Colombia's Escuela Nueva program has been studied by UNESCO, UNICEF, and a number of other public and private organizations and has been found to be successful in raising the quality of basic education in a cost-effective manner.² Experience in other countries has also demonstrated that it is possible to implement Escuela Nueva strategies with limited economic resources. Due to its impressive successes, Escuela Nueva has now been established in several other countries in the region, including Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

² See Schiefelbein, Ernesto 1991 (June)

The descriptions of Escuela Nueva below come primarily from reports by McEwan N d , McGinn 1996, Psacharopoulos et al 1993, Shiefelbein 1990 and 1991, and Torres 1993b Escuela Nueva has four basic components community involvement, curriculum, training, and administration, each of which is described in separate sections below It is their interrelationships that make Escuela a coherent system

B Community involvement/innovations

It is claimed that the successes of Escuela Nueva schools are due at least partly to the program's promotion of school-community links The initiator of the link is the teacher who is trained in innovative ways to involve community members For this purpose teachers are given a manual with practical suggestions on what to do The teacher is taught to think of the Escuela Nueva school as an information center and focal point for community integration and development The school and community are reciprocally a learning resource for one another Teachers organize activities to provide this two-way communication

Escuela Nueva encourages teachers to use a series of activities to gain a better understanding of the community Though the teachers have considerable latitude in the kinds of community activities they initiate, some are considered standard For example, teachers visit the homes of their students at the beginning of each school year and collect information to prepare monographs about the community The monographs serve as a basis for planning how instruction can be enriched by the sharing of community skills and interests Teachers gather information describing services and resources available in the community employment profiles, health services, businesses, cultural practices, etc The teacher also records information about parents' daily and yearly schedules in order to assist them in preparing agricultural calendars, which in turn help in setting the school schedule Students are required at certain times to go out into the community to interview residents, collect recipes and songs, and learn about craft products Parents also help in student-organized construction (as in the building of desks and learning corners) and maintenance projects The purpose of these activities is to involve parents as much as possible in support of their children's learning and to make children's learning more relevant to their day-to-day experiences

Parents also are involved in other ways The libraries, the school grounds, and all cultural and recreational activities are open to parents At the end of each month parents are invited to Achievement Day organized by the student council where academic results are announced and the student government reports on its activities Parents also view presentations by the children on what they have accomplished during the month

C School program/innovations

Escuela Nueva has been described as an alternative within, rather than outside, the formal State education system (Torres 1993b 1), not a universal panacea but a method for discovering what would work in a particular set of circumstances (McGinn 1996 27) The description below summarizes those characteristics that have come to be expected in Escuela Nueva schools

1 Facilities

Rural schools in Colombia "are well endowed with infrastructure and equipment They usually have solidly built school buildings, with plenty of space and pleasant surroundings, and are properly equipped with furniture and other fittings Many of them have accommodations for the teacher They may have a kitchen, a dining room, washrooms, running water, electricity, and even television In short, they are rural schools that are privileged in comparison to those usually found in Third World countries, including Latin American countries" (Torres 1993b 10) The implication of this fact is two-fold community resources may not be needed to provide additional facilities, and this model is one that in terms of facilities may not be easily imitated in contexts where facilities are poor or nonexistent

Escuela Nueva schools generally consist of one to three classrooms with one or two teachers who teach multigraded classes for the entire five-year primary cycle Often one of the rooms is used for a library,

which serves as an additional learning materials and reference center for students and, after hours, for the community. The libraries contain about 70 books, including dictionaries, textbooks, encyclopedias, literature, maps, posters, and books on rural development. Most schools also have a playground.

Each classroom is hung with alphabet letters, numbers, and other decorations, and each has separate learning corners to provide for the four main subject discipline areas. The furnishings are simple but functional, tables and chairs can be pulled together by the students for group work or reorganized for whole group activities. Often there is no teacher's desk and no "front" of the room. A suggestion box is used to encourage student input into their learning activities. Most schools also have a community map drawn on the outside wall to indicate the location of each family home, thereby symbolizing the link between the school and the community.

2 Curriculum and instruction

The curriculum is designed to promote active learning—to teach children how to think, analyze, investigate, create, and apply knowledge. It also stresses cooperation, responsibility, and democratic attitudes. In 1992 the promoters of Escuela Nueva developed a definition of Escuela Nueva as "a specific set of materials and practices. The central concept is that a classroom teacher is freed from the task of daily instruction of a class of students" (McGinn 1996: 14). The teacher spends most of her time teaching the younger children basic skills while managing resources for the rest of the children. Older children either study alone or in small groups using "learning guides" or self-instructional materials. These same older children or parent volunteers assist students who are having learning difficulties in order to free the teacher to supervise the learning activities of younger children and help those who need special attention. The classrooms are creatively noisy, with children organizing small work groups with other students working on the same units.

Instructional materials consist of learning guides divided into units, each having a series of tasks for the students to complete. The students write the tasks in their notebooks and then draw conclusions or apply the knowledge they have learned. The tasks are sequential, that is, one leads to the next in logical progression. The students monitor their progress in completing the tasks and mark each completed unit on a chart on the wall. Though they work at their own pace, they are still classified by grades (because of the resistance to ungraded classes noted earlier).

The students in grades two through five share guides, which along with graded textbooks and accompanying teacher guides, are provided free by the government. The teacher guides, which have been produced by the teachers themselves during training, help teachers adapt the national curriculum to local needs and daily life. The instructional materials are produced in four basic subject areas according to national curriculum objectives: language, mathematics, natural sciences, and social sciences. Units state the objective of the lesson, review what has been learned in previous lessons, and provide guided practice exercises and independent activities where the child applies the knowledge that has been learned. The emphasis in all the lessons is on understanding and use of knowledge rather than on memorization and recall. As children complete the lessons in the guides, they show their work to the teacher, who gives them feedback but no marks. If they demonstrate mastery, they are permitted to move on to the next unit. If they do not achieve "mastery" they may be coached by older students. Students are provided with instructions about what skills they must be able to demonstrate to prove mastery of an objective.

The guides allow students to progress at their own pace and to work in small groups. If students need to be absent, they resume where they left off or they may take the modules home and continue at their normal pace. Students progress from one grade to the next depending on when they complete the minimum standards for the grade. This system means that the student does not have to repeat grades or to review materials he/she already knows. Though flexible, this promotion system is not automatic as it was in the case of the Unitary Schools, since the student has to demonstrate mastery of objectives. Progression to a higher grade may take more or less than a year.

Children also learn from study corners, which they organize in four subject fields from materials they create or collect themselves or which their parents have provided. They also research topics in the school library as a way of increasing their reading time. Students also have notebook journals in which they write about their daily life. They are encouraged to study the community around them, through, for example, making a map of the community and taking frequent field trips to different areas of the village to interview parents and relatives about the history of the village, collect recipes, and learn about farming techniques or other local skills.

Teaching materials are produced at the national level for reasons of cost, though some have content that is specific to regions. Other regional materials are produced locally. Torres notes that Escuela Nueva has been particularly fortunate in having the highly specialized technical competence to produce good textbooks (1993a: 11).

3 Training

Because teachers must be reoriented to their new roles as facilitators of learning and community leaders, a key part of training is helping them to make the necessary changes in attitude—pedagogical and social (Torres 1993b: 4). Originally training was only given to teachers who expressed an interest in becoming part of the Escuela Nueva program. If teachers took the training and were not convinced of its value they were not allowed to continue and did not receive the “kit” of materials. The early Escuela Nueva schools were therefore only implemented by teachers who were enthusiastic about the approach.

Training begins with teachers visiting demonstration schools where the Escuela Nueva program is being implemented successfully and where the four components of Escuela Nueva are working in exemplary fashion. There they become familiar with the new approaches and methodologies. These schools have been set up in each school department. Thereafter basic training consists of three, one-week courses distributed over the first school year. The courses are provided by regional units in charge of training, which are normally located in decentralized locations near teachers’ places of residence. Training consists of basic workshops conducted in a participatory mode to model the methods teachers will use with their students. Each teacher receives a teacher training manual, which explains the objectives of Escuela Nueva and the information that teachers need to do to implement the model. The initial training covers the aims and methodologies of Escuela Nueva, organization of buildings and classrooms, the preparation of learning corners, the establishment of student councils, and instructions on how to teach students using group work methods. During this training, teachers learn the Escuela Nueva approach, which is to learn by doing rather than by listening to lectures. In the first session they are also given training in how to develop school-community relationships. The manual suggests ideas about how to organize a recreation program for the community after school hours. In the interval before the next training, supervisors visit teachers in their classrooms to assist them in implementation and to support their requests for other kinds of training they feel they need.

After two or three months, teachers attend the second workshop, which consists of training in the application of self-instructional student materials and in the use of teaching guides, multigrade teaching, and other innovative approaches to learning. Much of this training involves supervised practice teaching. Teachers are encouraged to report on their progress to date in the classroom and to describe any innovative ideas they have developed to support the approach. The third workshop covers the use of the school library, maps, posters, and flexible promotion, and reviews what has been learned about multi-grade instruction. The workshop also covers evaluation and problem-solving. At the end of each of these workshops, the teacher receives appropriate materials—manuals, guides, library books, and other materials to implement what has been learned.

As a result of basic training, teachers are expected to change their roles from being the source of knowledge to being facilitators of knowledge and the managers of learning programs. This means they should assume responsibility for maintaining the learning centers and school library, becoming leaders in their community, and organizing community learning programs. Many of these pedagogical features draw on the

ideas of the Unitary Schools the comprehensive one-classroom primary approach, individualized learning at a student's own pace, active learning, and materials designed to let the teacher work with different groups at the same time (Torres 1993b 6)

Follow-up training occurs in microcenters near the teachers' homes—either in the same demonstration schools where the basic training occurred or in other rural schools or public libraries. Eight to 12 teachers gather to share experiences and carry out projects to improve their schools or communities. These monthly meetings provide an ongoing support group for teachers using the Escuela Nueva model.

4 Administration/management

Administration in Escuela Nueva is intended to give direction to the program rather than to control it. This means that administrators need to become fully aware of the objectives and approaches. Escuela Nueva is a decentralized program with three administrative levels: the center, the department, and the school. At the center is a coordinator with a small team responsible for coordination, the design of policies and strategies, and program evaluation. At the department level there is a committee comprising a coordinator and a team of multipliers who act as extension agents to the field. When Escuela Nueva was expanded in 1987 under the Plan for the Universalization of Rural Primary Education two new structures were added: committees at national and department levels to carry out the universalization plans, and educational units to support the schools (Torres 1993b 4).

In the schools themselves the administrative/management functions are carried out jointly by teachers and students since the schools are usually too small to have a full-time administrator. The core concept is that teachers are the managers of classroom learning. Students take over such administrative functions as self-monitoring of their own attendance. If they are absent for several days the teacher visits their homes to find out why. Students are also asked to submit suggestions for more effective ways to run the school, in a box provided for that purpose.

Teachers facilitate the establishment of a student government where students elect a president and vice-president of the school for two-month periods. The student leaders create committees of students to accomplish their campaign promises. If the teacher is absent the student leaders can run the school alone. Through their involvement in student government children develop social skills and democratic attitudes, and learn to take responsibility for their own behavior. The student government is responsible for the cleaning and maintenance of school grounds, sports activities, library operations, recreational activities, school decorations, discipline, and teaching and tutoring assistance.

A supervisory system for Escuela Nueva schools works out of regional offices. Supervisors frequently visit schools to provide technical assistance and support for teachers in the use of Escuela Nueva methodologies. At the department and school-cluster level (groups of Escuela Nueva schools in the same vicinity), workshops are held for administrators to learn about the schooling program and to encourage them to develop a collaborative relationship with teachers. Administrators are taught to organize visits to demonstration schools and to lead routine training programs for teachers.

In summary, the Escuela Nueva management system consists of a national coordination level in the MOE, which determines policies and provides technical assistance. In each regional department there is a parallel committee of the local Education Secretary, the Finance Secretary, a Project Coordinator, and a team of "multipliers" or promoters of the Escuela Nueva model.

D Results

1 Community participation and the development of grassroots institutions

Community participation in Escuela Nueva schools is limited to the activities mentioned above, which depend to large extent on teachers' abilities and willingness to organize them. The thrust of the school-

community activities is exemplified by the student field trips that encourage appreciation for the culture of the local community and take advantage of local resources to make students' learning more relevant. The expectation is that these activities heighten rural children's self-esteem in contrast with a conventional schooling program, which only emphasizes urban surroundings and values. A second type of activity that brings the community to the school is a program of core skills and training for community members that teachers are supposed to organize. Rojas and Castillo 1988 (in McEwan N d 7, Torres 1993b 7) concluded that Escuela Nueva did have higher levels of community participation than conventional schools and that it there were likely to be more activities such as adult education, agricultural extension, athletic competitions, health campaigns, and community celebrations. McEwan also shows that Escuela Nueva schools are more likely to participate in and organize community events than conventional schools. The events he describes include literacy courses, dressmaking, agricultural training, sporting events, celebrations, and health programs.

After major expansion of the program brought schools to some geographic areas of armed conflict, school-community relations received a setback in some areas. Some teacher-collected information about the community and writings in children's journals were used by insurgent and government forces against their opponents in the local population. It was difficult and even dangerous in these communities for teachers to assume community leadership roles. (McGinn 1996 20)

2 Educational participation

In 1974 just before Escuela Nueva was established, rural education lagged severely behind urban education in Colombia. Table 7 1 shows the change in participation rates in the two decades after its inception, first as a modest pilot effort and eventually as a program adopted by more than half of rural schools. In 1974 only half of rural girls were enrolled in school, while by 1992 the ratio had risen to over 80 percent for girls and 78 percent for boys in rural areas. Escuela Nueva was not designed to address the problem of low enrollments directly, rather its objective was to develop cost-effective, quality education for rural areas. It is therefore difficult to attribute major increases in enrollment to the Escuela Nueva program, even though it is likely that Escuela Nueva's more attractive program indirectly may have brought more children into the school system.

Table 7 1 Colombian participation rates (%) by income quintile and residence (1974, 1992)

Income Level	1974		1992			
	National	Rural	Urban		Rural	
Quintile	Male/Female	Male/Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1 (low)	54 1	51 2	78 4	79 9	73	77
2	61 4	44 5	85 6	86 4	80 2	80 0
3	66 3	56 5	89 1	91 1	76 3	83 0
4	78 1	56 2	94 8	95 7	81 6	84 0
5 (high)	86 3	60 0	95 4	96 8	88 2	90 5
Total	64 9	51 9	86 1	87 2	78 2	80 9

Source: Molina, Alviar, and Polania 1993 in McEwan N d Table 1

The Escuela Nueva schools possibly, also as a result of the greater attractiveness of their programs, may have contributed to the narrowing of the gap between boys' and girls' enrollments. Table 7 1 also shows these changes. In 1975 there were no national breakdowns by gender available, but it is likely that girls

lagged well behind boys in enrollment, whereas by 1992 girls were exceeding boys' enrollments by three percentage points in rural areas compared with 1 percentage point in urban areas

Escuela Nueva schools have not, however, obliterated differences in enrollment based on socio-economic level, which are still significant in rural (as well as urban) areas Table 7 1 shows that 90 percent of girls and 88 percent of boys from the most affluent rural groups are enrolled in school compared to 77 percent and 73 percent of the poorest groups What is more alarming, the gap has grown between the rural socio-economic groups since 1975, though both groups have considerably improved their educational participation over time

Small overall improvements have been made in dropout and promotion rates in Colombian schools between 1978 and 1987, as shown in Table 7 2 Since this was a period of Escuela Nueva expansion, these slight improvements may also be a partial consequence of its programs Statistics show that with the exception of grades one and two, where rural rates of dropout have increased somewhat possibly due to a more diversified student population dropout rates have decreased slightly in all other grades so that by grade five the dropout rate is 12 percent (1 percent less than 1975) Rural rates of dropout are still high however—almost double the urban rates Promotion rates were consistently higher in 1987 in both urban and rural groups of students than they were in 1978 Urban rates exceed rural rates, in some grades by as much as 14 percentage points This fact, along with achievement data, suggests that poor educational quality remains a greater problem in rural compared with urban areas



Escuela Nueva's curriculum stresses community-based activities such as farming *USAID photo*

Table 7 2 Dropout and promotion rates (%) in Colombian primary schools (1978, 1987)

Grade Level	1978				1987			
	Dropout		Promotion		Dropout		Promotion	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
1	11.9	16.8	67.7	55.6	12.1	18.9	73.8	59.2
2	8.9	14.2	75.4	65.9	8.5	14.5	82.3	72.4
3	9.3	14.2	77.5	71.2	7.6	13.6	83.4	76.4
4	8.3	14.1	80.4	73.5	7.1	13.2	83.5	77.9
5	7.5	12.6	84.9	78.6	6.1	11.6	87.9	83.4

Source Colombia Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística 1993 in McEwan N d Table 2

A study in 1987 (C Rojas and Z Castillo 1988 in McEwan N d) showed that repetition rates and, with the exception of grade one, dropout rates were considerably lower in Escuela Nueva schools than in conventional schools Table 7 3 shows these comparisons The differences in dropout rates grow with each grade until there is a 14 percentage point spread between the two systems in grade five It is not clear, however, whether these are meaningful differences given the practice in Escuela Nueva schools of allowing children

to leave and return to school without requiring them to repeat and without calling them dropouts. Another problem with the data might be that Escuela Nueva students progress at their own rates and not in yearly defined grade progressions, and therefore it is difficult to define a comparison group equivalent to the Escuela Nueva sample.

Table 7.3 Dropout and repetition (%) in Escuela Nueva and conventional schools (1987)

Indicators	Escuela Nueva	Conventional
Dropouts by Grade Level		
1	10.5	8.6
2	5.1	9.3
3	2.9	7.8
4	0.7	7.9
5	-3.0	11.1
Repetition in Grades 1-5	47.2	53.9

Source: Rojas and Castillo 1988, page 76 in Schiefelbein 1991, Table 4.

The effect of the Escuela Nueva program on participation rates is at this time speculative. The studies that have been conducted of this program concentrate most of their assessment efforts on learning results rather than on participation rates.

3 Learning/Achievement

Several evaluations have been conducted that together show modestly higher achievement results for Escuela Nueva over the conventional system. The earliest evaluation in the late 1970s showed that Escuela Nueva students obtained higher overall scores in national tests than students in traditional schools. This finding provided enough evidence of the effectiveness of the Escuela Nueva program to encourage donors to fund the first major expansion between 1979-1986, from 500 to 8,000 schools (Schiefelbein 1991: 35).

A decade later in 1987, Psacharopoulos et al (1993), in a sample of Escuela Nueva schools that had been in existence for five years or more, found that Escuela Nueva students scored higher in third grade Spanish and math, and also in fifth grade Spanish (but not math) than students in the conventional system. Table 7.4 shows these results. The Escuela Nueva students also scored higher on civic (democratic values) and self-esteem tests in both grades. The fact that Escuela Nueva had been implemented first in the most disadvantaged schools with fewer teachers tended to increase the significance of the results. Evaluators concluded that it was a comparatively successful alternative over the conventional system.

Table 7 4 Comparison of Escuela Nueva and conventional school student scores (1987)

Indicator	Grade	Escuela Nueva			Conventional			EN gain (%)
		N	Score	v	N	Score	v	
Academic self-concept	All	1840	36 1	5 4	1166	35 8	5 5	0 8
Social self-concept	All	1850	33 1	4 8	1176	32 4	5 0	2 2 ^a
Social/civic attitudes	1	1060	13 2	3 1	587	12 4	3 2	6 5 ^a
Social/civic attitudes	3	735	15 4	2 7	466	14 8	2 5	4 1 ^a
Mathematics	3	1143	15 3	7 3	681	13 7	6 7	11 7 ^a
Spanish	3	1143	13 8	5 2	684	11 6	5 4	19 0 ^a
Mathematics	5	743	13 9	6 2	516	14 0	6 2	-0 7
Spanish	5	744	15 4	5 1	510	14 2	5 1	8 5 ^a

a Statistically significant at the 5% (or less) level
 Source Schiefelbein 1991 Table 5

In a study (Loera and McGinn 1992, cited in McGinn 1996) of a national sample of 180 urban and rural schools, which included 54 Escuela Nueva schools, the results were less conclusive. Urban students scored higher on achievement tests overall than rural students whether they came from Escuela Nueva or conventional schools. In rural schools there were similar results in both types of schools for the first and third grades, but grade five students in the conventional system scored higher in math.

Table 7 5 shows the results of achievement tests conducted in 1992 by McEwan (N d). He found in a sample of 52 schools, 24 of which were Escuela Nueva schools, that there were statistically significant differences in third grade math and Spanish in favor of the Escuela Nueva schools, while differences in fifth grade Spanish and math, which also favored Escuela Nueva, were not significantly different. The lower

Table 7 5 Achievement scores^a in Escuela Nueva and conventional schools (1992)

Level/Subject	N ^b	Escuela Nueva		Conventional	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<i>Grade 3</i>					
Spanish	673	14 81 ^c	4 89	13 61	5 69
Math	673	12 92 ^d	4 79	12 09	5 11
<i>Grade 5</i>					
Spanish	557	4 77	3 72	4 51	3 32
Math	520	10 53	7 06	10 14	6 79

a Achievement test scales are 0 29 (Grade 3 Spanish) 0 31 (Grade 3 Mathematics) 0 18 (Grade 5 Spanish) and 0 25 (Grade 5 Mathematics)
 b N is equal to the total schools
 c Difference is statistically significant at 1%
 d Difference is statistically significant at 5%
 Source McEwan N d Table 7

fifth grade scores were explained on the basis of the lower dropout rates in Escuela Nueva schools, which left a larger group of low ability students in that final year

4 Program quality

The Escuela Nueva Model specifically orients its program around what it considers quality activities and inputs. Therefore, a well implemented Escuela Nueva program is, by its own definition, a quality program. While many schools call themselves Escuela Nueva schools and carry out some of the elements of the design, probably only a few implement all of the elements (Rojas 1991 and Rojas and Castillo, 1988, cited in McGinn 1996)

It is difficult to say which parts of the Escuela Nueva program are essential in producing what designers believe is a quality program. McGinn asks, "Is it the self-instructional guides developed over 15 years of experimentation, the learning corners, the school library, the student government, encouragement of free writing by students, or training of teachers to experiment and share their experiences?" Perhaps it is different things in different areas of Colombia or the different effective interactions between elements (McGinn 1996 28)

McEwan (N d) in 1992 studied the question of how faithfully the methodology was being implemented in 24 schools that were classified as Escuela Nueva schools, comparing them with 28 rural schools not following the system. He concluded that although not all of the Escuela Nueva schools were resourced in the way expected, they usually had more resources and used more of the methodologies than conventional schools. The Escuela Nueva schools for example had more textbooks and received double the number of supervisory visits per year (1.6 to 0.8). One discovery he made was that the inputs least commonly used were the community monograph, student journals, the agricultural calendar, student government, and, most surprising of all, the self-instructional guides, which are central to the system (in third grade 33 percent of students in Spanish, and 29 percent in mathematics, and in fifth grade 46 and 40 percent). Two of the least commonly used inputs are instruments—the agricultural calendar and the community monograph—that teachers are supposed to use to develop a relationship with the community.

Benveniste and McEwan report evidence of more active learning and group work, a greater emphasis on student creativity and written and oral expression in the Escuela Nueva schools, and high levels of teacher satisfaction with the Escuela Nueva methods, training, and self-instructional guides. More recent data collected from a large national sample, however, show that only 64 percent of a sample of Escuela Nueva grade five math teachers had completed the three required in-service training courses considered necessary to implement the program (1996 13). The conclusion drawn from the study was that teachers varied widely in their use of the recommended techniques and that training, formal qualifications, and personal characteristics explained only a small portion of this variation. The authors note that even when the requisite program inputs are developed and capacity is provided, the core of educational practice may remain only slightly altered (Benveniste and McEwan 1996 18)

The previously noted study (Loera and McGinn 1992, cited in McGinn 1996) of a national sample of 180 urban and rural schools, including 54 Escuela Nueva schools, collected self-reports of teaching practices by first and third grade teachers and found no significant differences between Escuela Nueva and conventional teachers in terms of their reported classroom practices or in the kinds of inputs they received.

The evidence on program quality is therefore mixed—varying from school to school depending on the extent to which the Escuela Nueva system has been implemented. Much of the evidence suggests that schools may call themselves Escuela Nueva schools—may even go through the training and receive the "kit," without ever fully or even partially adopting the program. Since supervisory visits are infrequent and of unknown quality in the expanded version of the program, it is unlikely anyone would notice how well or how poorly a program was being implemented. From some reports (see McGinn 1996), widespread expansion of the Escuela Nueva model has led to a deterioration in its quality and a loss of some teacher-generated aspects that were a key to its success.

5 Accountability to the clients

The only activities that indirectly suggest accountability for program results are monthly meetings organized by the student government where Escuela Nueva staff are present. There students display their work, and parents have a chance to compare their children's efforts with those of others. The intent of the meetings, however, is to engage parents' interest in their children's work and not to act as a forum where parents can air their complaints or ask for explanations about the program. There is no mention in the literature on Escuela Nueva that suggests the presence of PTAs or school management committees with mandates to demand accountability.

6 Costs

As one would expect, cost estimates of the Escuela Nueva program overall show the program to be more costly than the conventional system, since it is a "value-added" model. McEwan (N.d. in McGinn 1996) estimated an annual, per-student cost of \$120 for Escuela Nueva compared with \$84 in the conventional system. Higher learning outcomes and possibly lower dropout rates may make it more cost-effective.

Schiefelbein (1991), calculating on the basis of expansion to 20,000 schools, estimated the unit costs of Escuela Nueva to be only 5 to 10 percent higher than unit costs in conventional schools. The higher amount was due to the extra costs of study guides (\$15 for one book for each of four subjects per child and useable for four years, or \$8.20 per child total—reduced to \$4.50 if government book costs are subtracted), libraries (\$150-\$225 per school/class), and additional teacher training (\$82 per teacher), which are offset by the somewhat fewer numbers of teachers required for the primary cycle.

7 Replication

It has taken two decades to achieve large-scale replication of the Escuela Nueva model, with at least one additional decade in which experience was accumulated from the Unitary Model and from subsequent Escuela Nueva pilot experiments. In its pilot phase in 1975-78 (following the Unitary phase), Escuela Nueva was implemented in 500 schools in three departments of the country with support from USAID. Later, with funding from the InterAmerican Development Bank and the Federation of Coffee Growers, it was expanded to 3,000 schools. By 1985 there were 8,000 Escuela Nueva schools across the country, and by the end of the 1980s, with a World Bank loan and assistance from UNICEF, the model was extended to all rural schools having one or two teachers. By 1989 roughly 18,000 of Colombia's 24,000 public schools had adopted Escuela Nueva and by 1991, 20,000 of the 27,000 schools were using the program with an enrollment of one million children. A plan existed to increase the number of schools to 41,000 by the mid-1990s. In terms of numbers of schools calling themselves Escuela Nueva, the program appears highly successful. Table 7.6 shows this pace of replication as it is reported in Psacharopoulos et al. 1993.

According to Schiefelbein (1991), designers had been concerned with the replicability of materials and processes and with Escuela Nueva's economic feasibility from the very start of the project in 1975, and consequently the model's components were designed with these objectives in mind. Escuela Nueva expanded slowly at first with little publicity in order to give it time to produce results. The developers felt that because it was so different from conventional systems, it was important to show its superiority before attempting to convince a larger audience to adopt it. During its first ten years, the system remained in flux as teachers and developers shaped and improved its content and methods. Formative evaluations were used to weed out unsuccessful materials and processes and to improve promising ones. An external evaluation in 1982 laid the groundwork for major expansion of the model from 2,000 schools in 11 states to 18,000 schools and 800,000 students in most of the states (McGinn 1996: 19).

Table 7 6 Escuela Nueva schools in Colombia

Year	Escuela Nueva schools ^a	Conventional schools ^b	Pupils in conventional schools ^b
1978	500		
1980		33,557	4,168,200
1982	2,000		
1985		34,004	4,039,533
1986	12,000		
1989	17,948		
1990		40,340	4,246,658
1991		41,044	4,310,970
1992		44,139	4,525,959
1993		44,693	4,599,132

a Source Psacharopoulos et al 1993 263 (Pupil enrollments were not available)

b Source UNESCO 1995a

In preparing for expansion, developers found that some of the critical elements of Escuela Nueva—the creative, generative training for teachers and frequent follow-up supervision—could not be supported in their original form with so many schools. The training was therefore simplified and relied heavily on teachers role-playing the part of Escuela Nueva teachers. Supervision was also simplified for budgetary reasons related to transport and other costs, so that much of the follow-up was carried out, not through visits to schools, but in monthly meetings of teachers in centers near their homes. Classroom materials and other instructional aids, procedures, and methodologies were prepared as manuals and guides in a Escuela Nueva kit that included everything needed to implement the model. As the number of demonstration schools increased it became more difficult to ensure their quality, and many were not the model examples they should have been (Torres 1993b 9)

Overall, replication on a grand scale introduced new difficulties in the implementation of the Escuela Nueva Model, despite some strong supporters in the Ministry of Education and international organizations. Most of these difficulties arose because it was no longer possible to conduct the careful monitoring of a smaller-scale project. Supporters worried whether quality could be maintained given these problems with massive expansion. The issue for replication became not so much the number of schools that adopted the model but how genuine the product was that was being produced. This issue is discussed in more detail below.

8 Sustainability

There has been enormous international attention given to Escuela Nueva, and its ideas have been translated into education programs around the world. It would be foolhardy, given these facts, to undervalue the importance of Escuela Nueva's influence in shaping significant numbers of education designs and school systems. The question nevertheless remains whether the model overall has elements that will sustain it as the main school program in rural Colombia in the future. The answer is not clear though, as is true for the discussion of the Escuela Nueva model itself, much has been said about issues that relate to its sustainability. Some of these points are summarized below. They are organized around the issues of whether the "essence" of the model can be transferred, whether there is significant resistance to the idea, where it will find sources of funding, and what kind of support it will receive from conventional education institutions.

McGinn (1996) has raised the issue of whether it is possible to transfer the essence of Escuela Nueva ideas during massification. He believes that what happens in the classroom is ultimately determined by the

actions of teachers and the support systems they receive—from below, and not from powerful patrons and sponsors. Yet, he also states that one of the difficulties the Escuela Nueva model has faced has been the strong opposition of Ministries and universities in Colombia. He points out that decentralization of primary education increased the difficulty of ensuring consistency during replication, yet sees a contradiction in the fact that the generative process that helped establish its success with teachers initially takes time and slows development, while expansion brings in big funders wanting fast results, according to predetermined criteria. He rejects the notion that the Escuela Nueva problem is one of incomplete implementation. Instead he feels that the essential nature of the innovation was its organic, generative nature, which was lost in expansion. He says

The ultimate objective is not to get someone else to agree with and carry out “the reform,” but rather to get others to have ideas of their own which produce outcomes that later can be seen to resolve the problem. (McGinn 1996: 4)

“A mere ‘delivery’ of the principles (that transcend specific methods),” says McGinn, “is not sufficient. Externally imposed reforms necessarily must fail because they do not develop organically, that is, out of the lived experiences of the implementors.” Designers and teachers developed Escuela Nueva organically, but when the model went to scale it froze the process, ‘wrote the code’, and delivered it to many teachers. Resistance then developed among the teachers and university professors who were the standard-bearers of the conventional system. (McGinn 1996)

These arguments raise more questions than they answer. How does one mass produce any innovative program that improves on the conventional system—or is Escuela Nueva’s “essence” a special case that is too difficult to cultivate in mass replications? And how can one engage individual staff members, not all of whom want to be innovators, in generating “a proper Escuela Nueva spirit?” If the process was generated from teachers’ experiences, why does it differ so considerably from the “core” practices they were previously accustomed to using? Benveniste and McEwan suggest that the Escuela Nueva methodology may be quite different from the “core” sets of practices and relationships teachers normally utilize in rural Colombia,³ and that any recommendation to use the model implies the notion that the model can succeed in “altering the core of educational practice” (1996: 10). The authors note that even when the requisite program inputs are developed and capacity is provided, core educational practice may remain only slightly altered (Benveniste and McEwan 1996: 18). Does this not imply a difficulty in the methodologies that have been used?

As McGinn’s argument implies, teachers will innovate in practice no matter how structured the program. If teacher innovation is a desired effect, then one cannot expect every result to be exactly consistent with expectation. The challenge is in finding a model and a way to implement it, which more often than not produces results that educationists can be satisfied with. The evidence from the literature does not yet exclude Escuela Nueva from being that kind of model, and indeed evidence from studies on Escuela Nueva point to a likely failure of “complete” replication as much if not more than a failure to transfer its “organic essence” (see Rojas and Castillo 1988 in McGinn 1996).

If failure to replicate fully has been a problem for Escuela Nueva then it is important to look at the difficulties of implementation reported in the literature. The following five difficulties were among those mentioned. 1) Escuela Nueva faced the resistance of traditional elements. Psacharopoulos et al. noted that it took 15 years for Escuela Nueva to be finally accepted as a national program, and, even though officially adopted, the support it received in each department depended on the personalities of local administrators, and the legacy of tensions that existed between the state and the national government (see also Hanson 1983). 2) A number of the processes and procedures that had been established during the years of experimentation were implemented either partially or not at all, without regard to the consequences. For example, teacher recruitment varied between states, and conventional teacher training institutions

³ These core practices researchers tend to forget, are often derived from and buttressed by “culture,” which also is characterized by sets of expectations about teaching-learning relationships and valued behaviors.

often insisted upon providing teachers with formal types of training rather than the prescribed Escuela Nueva training 3) As one study (McEwan N d) shows, even when a school called itself Escuela Nueva, it was not always fully equipped to implement the program or simply might not have been using components as key to the program as self-instructional guides 4) Resisters in the government made it difficult to implement Escuela Nueva by delaying publication and/or distribution of materials and other necessary inputs (McGinn 1996 27) 5) Newly involved states that had never used the program had no demonstration schools to convince teachers that the new methods actually worked 6) In massification, implementation “became the responsibility of persons who had received only brief training, who may not have been fully convinced of the concept, who lacked the tolerance for ambiguity of the program’s parents” (McGinn 1996 27)

Funding is also an essential factor in sustainability From the outset, the Colombian government has depended heavily on substantial private and international funding to support Escuela Nueva and its replication, first from USAID and then (between 1979 and 1986) from the Colombian Federation of Coffee Growers, the Foundation for Higher Education, and the InterAmerican Development Bank, and later (after 1986) from the World Bank and UNICEF (in 1987) This substantial funding has allowed major expansion of Escuela Nueva but does not solve the problem of long-term recurrent costs to the government of special training and instructional aids to maintain the program To cut these costs, as already noted, the training program was simplified, a manual was developed to replace the teacher-generated materials, supervisory visits were made more infrequently, and everything needed to implement the model was incorporated into (“frozen” according to McGinn 1996 7) a Escuela Nueva kit Escuela Nueva per-pupil costs are considerably higher (if dropout and completion rates are not taken into consideration) than conventional systems, and there have not been overall significant gains (or drops) in achievement that have resulted from the higher investment Two critical funding questions are, “Will foreign donors continue to provide resources for expansion and support indefinitely?” and “Have cost-cutting measures already undermined the ability to successfully replicate the model?”

Sustainability also requires that education units such as training departments are willing, capable, and restructured appropriately to take over the job of reorienting teachers to Escuela Nueva methodology and other vital functions The only mention in documents of these units suggests that they have resisted innovative elements of the model Even more difficult for the program, mechanisms that tend to drive education programs and motivate participants, such as internal assessments, supervision, data collections, and reflection on the process, appear to have been cut back rather than strengthened during expansion It is not surprising to find “incomplete replication” under these conditions where staff feel more comfortable with traditional methods and there are few compelling reasons for them to change their behavior

Benveniste and McEwan argue that “the presence of suitable macro-level conditions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a successful implementation, necessitating a careful consideration of issues like local capacity and will” The variation in teaching practice they found in the Escuela Nueva schools could not be explained solely by local capacity (see Program Quality) As they note, “Implementing a program of multigrade schools represents a substantial alteration of core educational practices in rural areas of developing countries” (1996 28), and teachers frequently feel it is an inferior and more difficult form of education In Escuela Nueva, “will” was usually stronger in the first teachers who adopted Escuela Nueva because they were recruited on the basis of their support for the ideas They tended to be more receptive to the training and were more likely to put the new pedagogies into practice than teachers who came later and were simply provided with training and materials without regard for their interest (1996 23) There is a similar question about parents’ “will” to suffer the opportunity costs of sending their children to a multigraded school that they may view as inferior, even though there may be decided advantages such as the fact that the community schools are closer and the parent may have more contact with the teacher (1996 25-28)

These factors, pro and con, in the willingness of teachers and parents to support Escuela Nueva make it difficult to predict the outcomes of the program in each location Though Escuela Nueva is one of the most imitated models in the world, Benveniste and McEwan call “for a dose of caution in advocating the trans-

fer of a successful program from one country or context to another” and a careful examination of local “will” to ensure the commitment of stakeholders before implementation (1996 29)

Macro-level conditions in Colombia may not be conducive to the “accurate” replication or sustainability of a model like EN that differs so completely from traditional “core” practice⁴ The lack of stable leadership, resistant technical departments, traditionally independent regional offices of the education bureaucracy, and a weakened system for supervision and follow-up all add up to conditions that rely heavily on the will of local officials and school staff to implement a system that causes them more work and requires conscious departure from patterns of behavior that are more comfortable to them While Benveniste and McEwan are right in urging a more careful look at local will, it is also possible to create structures in the education delivery system that do more to motivate local will Escuela Nueva’s mechanisms to “involve” the community and motivate local staff have remained superficial when compared with a program like CSP, which addresses the question of “local will” more substantially

Sustainability for Escuela Nueva is very much as it was for IMPACT, a question of the sufficiency of funding, the determination of government officials to support the effort, and the capacity of government institutions to sustain it The community in actual practice does not appear to have contributed much to sustaining, managing, or otherwise making significant decisions about the school, though it has enriched the school program and possibly gained some development benefits itself where teachers have been creative in promoting the relationship

We have devoted a great deal of attention to the discussion of sustainability in Escuela Nueva, partly because it and replication have become hotly debated issues recently There is almost universal acclaim for the successes of the Escuela Nueva model, yet many are disappointed with the way it has been replicated in Colombia and abroad Many of the issues raised here may eventually be addressed by the Colombian government (though few critics offer suggestions about how this should be accomplished) Escuela Nueva as much as any of the cases studied here raises the question of “why community participation?” What is its purpose and what should it accomplish? The answers to these questions are not clear in Escuela Nueva

E Successes, issues, and lessons learned

1 Successes

No one would deny that Escuela Nueva is an innovative idea that has brought improved learning to the schools of many countries Some of the reasons given for its successes are that it

- is a program suited to multigraded learning,
- is a formal alternative within the public education system,
- is a system of four interlocking components—curriculum, training, administration, and community—that are mutually reinforcing,
- is well-endowed and equipped with physical facilities,
- serves a linguistically homogeneous population,
- has teachers who mostly have a secondary or university education and reside on the school grounds
- has had 15 years in which to mature

⁴ This term taken by Benveniste and McEwan from Elmore 1996 sounds very much like a definition of “culture” Elmore defines “core” as “how teachers understand the nature of knowledge and the student’s role in learning and how these ideas about knowledge and learning are manifested in teaching and classwork The ‘core’ also includes structural arrangements of schools—student grouping practices, teachers’ responsibilities, and relations among teachers—as well as processes for assessing student learning and communicating it to students, parents, administrators, and other interested parties (1996 9) The ‘core’ is of course difficult to change since it is part of the consistent way of approaching the world that is common to a people The surprise in reading these comments is that ways cannot be found for enhancing children’s learning without forcing “inconsistencies” in their cultural view

- has had a unique combination of political, technical, and financial support, and
- has had a stable team of individuals with drive, vision, leadership, charisma, perseverance, etc to guide it (Torres 1993b 10)

These factors are mentioned in the literature as a warning to those who would imitate the program, since this kind of highly resourced context for a program is rare in the developing world

Escuela Nueva's success also has been attributed to the deliberateness with which the model was refined and then expanded. Torres notes three stages: learning to be effective (1975-78), learning to be efficient (1979-86), and learning to expand (1987 to the present). Even then it was not ready to cope fully with such rapid expansion (Torres 1993b 11)

2 Issues

Some issues that have been raised above concerning Escuela Nueva include

- its inconsistent replication with large-scale expansion,
- resistance by traditional educators and administrators,
- the precariousness of sources of future funding support,
- a need to improve institutional support, and
- variability in the way community-school relationships are implemented by teachers

Torres notes that there is room for improvement in all the components of Escuela Nueva. "The programme's coordinating team itself is not satisfied with the guides, the teacher training, the student government, and the student-community relationship" (1993 7). She particularly notes the weakness in the way grade one is taught, the failure of teachers to draw a satisfactory balance between efforts expended on program quality and on community activities, the conflictual relationship with the Ministry of Education, a weakening of experiential learning of teachers during training, and the increasing apathy of teachers as the program expands (1993 9)

3 Lessons learned

Some lessons learned from the reports describing Escuela Nueva are the following

- 1) If the community is expected to play a significant role in education delivery, sufficient time, staff effort, and resources must be devoted to accomplishing that aim. As an add-on responsibility to teachers' duties, community participation can be a haphazard and unpredictable affair.
- 2) Innovative models for education delivery require time to refine before bringing to scale. Even then, a model that works well in a limited trial may have problems with massification. An expanded model may be qualitatively different from a pilot model.
- 3) In massification it is important to consider carefully what components to simplify or reduce. Components like supervision, internal assessments, policy analysis, planning, and reflection that drive system corrections should be strengthened rather than reduced.
- 4) The more the innovation deviates from "core" existing practices and attitudes of school staff and parents, the more difficult it may be to consistently replicate the innovation. A basic question this raises is whether a model intended for massification should not build incrementally from a base of existing practice rather than revolutionize a set of practices that may face resistance and take considerable effort to change. The question is not one of right or wrong but of conservation of energies and resources. Children can learn in a variety of ways and by a variety of methods. If the focus is on learning and not the means of instruction, there may be easier ways to improve a program.

- 5) Escuela Nueva, as in the negative example of IMPACT, shows that sustaining a model over the long-term requires, among other elements, continuity and stability of a supportive leadership, sources of sufficient funding, and an institutional commitment to change at all levels. Others have added, in assessing Escuela Nueva, the importance of local will and capacity (See McGinn 1996 and Benveniste and McEwan 1996), which tends to suggest a close look at teacher and community roles

Chapter 8 Fe y Alegría (FYA) in Bolivia¹

Components of Fe y Alegría Model	
Education context	low enrollments of poor, inability of government programs to serve all children
Program type	formal primary, and other formal and non-formal courses
Length of program	varies by school from grades 1-3, 1-5, 1-6, 7-12, some schools also have preschools
Involvement strategy	offering education options and community programs that meet local needs, motivate staff for community development
Targets	mostly semi-urban and some rural poor children
Local institutions	“centers” consisting of schools and community programs
Community contributions to enrollment objectives	construction and maintenance of center facilities, agreement to support school
education delivery quality	(staff responsible for delivery) (staff responsible for quality)
Instructional approach	student-centered, activity-based, self-paced, older teach younger students
Instructional materials	based on government objectives, and related to local areas, study guides organized into units used for a while, learning corners, etc
Teacher qualifications	conventional, salary paid by government
Training	in-service emphasis on motivating and inspiring teachers with a mission, course used by government
Supervision	relies on teachers’ motivation to do good work and supports field as needed
Managers	three layers regional, national, international, loosely connected
Management approach	network with emphasis on communication
Major issues	funding, retaining quality with expansion

A Background

Bolivia, like many Latin American countries (LAC), suffers from poor education coverage and low quality programs. More than half the population is functionally illiterate, including many who complete primary and secondary stages. The average attainment is four years of schooling, with only about 44 percent of the population completing the primary level. The problem is especially acute for females where only about 1 percent of the girls who enter primary complete the secondary level. Another disadvantaged group is indigenous populations whose mother tongue is not Spanish. If they gain access to schooling at all they tend to have low achievement and high rates of repetition and dropout. The education system has been characterized as centralized and inefficient, teachers are poorly trained and badly paid, instructional materials are insufficient for the number of children, and facilities are poor and in disrepair, with more than 70 percent of the infrastructure requiring replacement or renovation. Although the World Bank and other donors are supporting reform of the formal system, the problems are significant enough to require the assistance of NGOs and others.

¹ Bolivia is the best documented of the FYA programs serving the largest number of participants. General sections describe FYA as it is intended to be implemented overall in Latin America. Results section for reasons of space, reports mainly on Bolivia and, where data are available on Venezuela which is the second largest program.

Another criticism leveled at government schools in Latin America, besides these questions of access, equity, and poor quality, is that education programs train children to accept authoritarian regimes passively rather than providing them with the critical thinking skills they need to support more democratic forms of government as well as social and economic reform (Reimers 1997a 35)

Fe y Alegría (meaning faith and joy) is a private NGO working in 12 countries of Latin America to provide formal and non-formal educational programs for poor children. It is sponsored by the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) of the Catholic Church. Its motto, which expresses its philosophy, is “Where the asphalt ends, where there is no water, electricity, or services, there begins FYA.” In analyzing the situation of the poor in Latin America, FYA’s leaders decided that the fundamental problem was a lack of educational opportunities for a large proportion of the population. The establishment of FYA was the response to the needs of these marginalized groups in the society (Swope N d 1-2)

The idea for FYA originated in 1955 when a priest, Fr. Jose M. Velaz, set up a school for 100 poor children in the home of a construction worker in Caracas, Venezuela. In 1964 the program was adopted by other countries in the region, and by 1992 it was serving more than 500,000 students in over 500 centers, with 17,000 teaching and administrative staff (Swope N d 1-1). Although part of the Catholic Church, FYA’s philosophy is founded on the belief that its programs should have functional autonomy in the various countries, regions, and centers where it operates within the broad outline of its general objectives and principles (Reimers 1997a 35). Only about 6 percent of its staff are actual members of a religious congregation, and a number of religious organizations other than the Jesuits participate in its programs (Reimers 1997a 36). FYA is a private not-for-profit organization that has formal agreements with the governments in countries where it works (Swope N d 1-1)

Much of FYA’s work is in the formal sector where it develops partnerships among organizations, governmental agencies, and communities to provide quality education for poor children. FYA’s formal programs include day care, as well as preschool, primary, lower, and higher secondary education. Primary programs constitute the largest share of the program (56 percent), and secondary the next highest (30 percent). Though FYA enrolls only about 0.03 percent of the children in the region (3 percent in Bolivia and 1 percent in Venezuela), it is considered a model for the delivery of quality education to all segments of the population (Reimers 1997a 36). It considers its schools to be full-service community education institutions and thus calls them “centers” to reflect this comprehensive approach (Swope N d 1-2)



Fe y Alegría targets children from the most marginal populations. USAID photo

FYA provides a dose of social consciousness with its instruction. It operates on the principle that education must prepare students for their future life by giving them a basic foundation for employment, making them aware of their rights so they can protect them, promoting cultural and ethnic identity, and providing a spiritual dimension to motivate them through life (Reimers 1993). FYA’s education vision and orienting beliefs permeate all of its activities and include “shared vision, team work, socialization of goals, (and) personal realization in a team. It means direction, shared trust, shared government, and closeness.” FYA spends a great deal of time in promoting these shared expectations, with weekend reflection among teachers, training during summer holidays, and meetings among principals and their staff (Swope N d 5-1)

Table 8 1 shows the date when country programs were established, and the number of centers and students in each country. As the table shows, the program in Venezuela was the first to be established in 1955, and it was roughly a decade later before the program was extended to a new wave of countries. It was during this first wave of expansions that FYA was established in Bolivia in 1966 at a time when more than two-thirds of its school-age population were not enrolled in school and illiteracy rates stood at about 60 percent. The program grew from seven centers in 1966 to 138 centers in 1992, serving 150,000 students in eight of the nine departments in that country. Venezuela's program by 1992 had risen to 103 centers serving more than 97,000 students.

One of the factors that helped FYA grow so quickly was the decision to operate within the public sector delivery system. Its agreements with the governments where it operated allowed a great deal of autonomy, which in turn made it possible to initiate innovative activities and techniques that would not have been possible within the conventional system (Swope N d 1-2). This autonomy was supported financially with the assistance of international donors. Another factor in the rapid growth of FYA was a change in focus of the Catholic Church in Latin America which, with encouragement from the Second Vatican, redirected its activities to assisting the marginalized masses, thus providing a convenient institutional context for groups working to improve the conditions of the poor. FYA, in essence, became a meeting point for a multitude of organizations—community, state, and church—working on issues of community development (Swope N d 1-3).

Table 8 1 Fe y Alegría students and centers (1992)

Start Date	Country	Centers	Students
1955	Venezuela	103	97,358
1964	Ecuador	38	29,670
1965	Panama	8	13,396
1966	Peru	43	43,733
1966	Bolivia	138	147,535
1968	El Salvador	16	48,409
1972	Colombia	76	99,109
1974	Nicaragua	21	16,784
1976	Guatemala	23	8,584
1980	Brazil	31	4,908
1991	Dominican Republic	5	2,600
1992	Paraguay	7	710
Total		509	512,796

Source: Reimers 1997a Table 3 1

Table 8 2 shows the main programs offered in the centers of each country. FYA's main interest in Bolivia, as in Venezuela and other countries where it operates, has been formal primary schooling for urban, peri-urban, and rural areas, with another important interest in lower secondary schooling. Other programs have included preschool, higher secondary, technical stages, and non-formal programs which include radio learning, adult reading, small enterprise training, teacher training, parent education, community development, day care, health, and religious education. It also offers youth programs and non-formal training for street children. This chapter focuses primarily on the program in Bolivia but also provides information, where it exists, on Venezuela for purposes of comparison. Bolivia and Venezuela programs together constitute about half of the FYA centers and populations served in Latin America. The main sources used in

this study are several articles written by Fernando Reimers and a recent evaluation of FYA by John Swope (N d)²

Table 8 2 Enrollments in Fe y Alegría programs by country (1991)

Country	Day care	Preschool	Primary	Lower secondary	Higher secondary	Total
Bolivia	120	7,606	40,780	23,809	16,577	88,892
Brazil	6,384	6,679	3,998	50	0	17,111
Colombia	9,009	1,514	30,150	3,687	5,126	49,486
Ecuador	0	1,939	12,325	1,917	310	16,491
El Salvador	130	89	5,644	1,143	0	7,006
Guatemala	0	1,160	4,938	768	0	6,866
Nicaragua	0	1,048	5,578	1,847	518	8,991
Panama	0	0	0	520	0	520
Peru	0	144	25,426	19,189	0	44,759
Venezuela	0	7,057	39,881	13,288	1,260	61,486
Total	15,643	27,236	168,720	66,218	23,791	301,608

Source Reimers 1997a Table 3 2

B Community involvement/innovations

Though FYA’s mode for involving the community may vary from country to country, most countries follow these steps

- a community group invites FYA to start a school in its area,
- a school is opened immediately with the resources at hand,
- other local organizations are contacted to build broad support,
- community groups participate in the construction of the school to reduce labor and finishing costs,
- a parent association begins operation immediately and works closely with the principal,
- FYA involves the parents in their children’s education, and
- FYA works with the community to create a variety of formal and informal education programs (Swope N d 7-16,17)

FYA supports strong collaboration between school and community in support of education This relationship is fostered initially by explaining to parents what schooling will do to improve the lives of their children and asking for the community’s support to establish a school FYA staff assure the community that they will support local activities, including those that advance the development objectives of the community FYA does not ask communities only for resources to build or repair schools but attempts to identify their broader development needs (Reimers 1997a 40-41) To become fully involved in the life of the area, members of the religious congregations who support the movement usually build a house on the school’s land and live full time in the community

² At the time the present study went to press the Swope study was still in draft form and therefore its data and conclusions should be considered provisional Here for the most part the conclusions are reported in prose rather than statistical form to avoid too great a specificity while the report is under review

In the early days of FYA, parents' main contribution to the program was the donation of land, and the construction and maintenance of schools, but after 1968 they began participating more actively through barrio associations in support of the schools themselves. It is difficult to describe the character of the relationship with the community because it differs so considerably in the various centers. In general the effort is to make the school a community center where local culture is celebrated through presentations of area history and festivals of religious events, and where projects are undertaken to promote the development of the area. For example, the schools cooperate in establishing community projects to improve health, potable water and sanitation, and employment. One center helped establish a workshop for the production of prostheses for the handicapped (Reimers 1997a 38-39)

The Program for Parents and Children, begun in 1984 in Bolivia, is an example of an activity sponsored by FYA centers to address a community need. It consists of a series of workshops using participatory approaches to address problems affecting the quality of family life: communication, family relations, alcoholism and drug abuse, the media, etc. The aim in developing the program was to assist the improvement of family life through education and counseling. As with all programs that prove successful in a limited area, the idea was communicated through the FYA network as an optional program for other centers. By 1991, the program was offered to 27 groups, reaching 945 parents and 3,780 children in three departments of the country (Reimers 1997a 39)

In 1992, FYA established boarding schools (Houses of Knowledge), which rely heavily on community participation. Community members contribute food and supplies, and a local mother prepares the food and helps in organizing the program. Students work in school gardens to raise fruit and vegetables. Each school has a student government that establishes the rules and a board to maintain discipline (Reimers 1997a 39)

FYA school grounds also serve several purposes: students use them on weekends to play sports and meet their friends, and in most schools the students work on special projects such as holiday celebrations, field trips, sports, and cultural events. Alumni continue to have meaningful relations with the school and with each other—often forming associations that support the schools (Reimers 1997a 39)

C School innovations

FYA is unique in the way it has developed an effective relationship among the key actors in education service. From its inception in Bolivia for example, the Ministry of Education (MOE) paid the salaries of teachers and principals in FYA schools, and though it agreed initially to FYA selecting teachers, that has not occurred in practice because of political pressures from the teachers' unions. FYA does, however, select principals based on their qualifications and commitment to the goals of the organization and has developed its own training and supervision program for teachers. Communities usually contribute to construction and maintenance of school facilities, and parents pay a fee, comparable to the amount collected in conventional schools,



Fe y Alegria's school grounds are used for school activities during the week and social activities over the weekends. Photo by Teresa Kavanaugh

that covers the costs of instructional materials. International agencies provide additional support for administrative costs and experimental programs. National chapters prepare proposals for funding from international agencies (Reimers 1997a 38,39). To optimize the use of resources and reduce the cost of salaries, FYA encourages large class size.

In other respects FYA also works closely with the government system, which provides it with training for teachers, materials, ideas, and networking. FYA has experimented with a number of innovations the government has adopted, such as a pilot project in radio learning with the support of USAID funding (Reimers 1997a 39).


1 Leadership

FYA's long-term survival has been attributed in large part to skillful leadership, which has managed to negotiate a way through the sensitive political scene of Bolivia. Not only are the chief leaders dedicated educationists with a clear vision of what they want, but they are also skillful in negotiating the politics of the education system, the donor context, and the structures within FYA itself. They have built support in the media and developed channels of communication throughout the project as well as in the society at large to ensure that there is a shared understanding of the spirit of FYA innovations (Reimers 1997a 43).

2 Curriculum

In recent years FYA has developed an alternative curriculum to improve the quality of its program (see below under "Program Quality").

In this curriculum it reinforces links between the school and the community by using themes from the daily lives of community members and promoting local history resources. For example, 200 teachers produced 90 primary textbooks that reflect the cultural and linguistic diversity of Bolivia: the regional heritage, and the day-to-day realities of the children's lives (Reimers 1997a 39). In class, children relate their own daily experiences, and discuss events and issues of local concern.



Fe y Alegria's curriculum recognizes cultural and linguistic diversity. This reading poster teaches vowel sounds using words in Quechua, an indigenous language. Photo by Teresa Kavanaugh.

Earlier, FYA's innovations in instruction included individualized self-study module units, and reading and science corners where children could progress at their own pace or with the help of other students. This modular program was established starting in 1972 but later was stopped in 1976 because of lack of funds for teaching materials and school libraries. Teachers also resisted the extra work that was involved.

FYA produces pamphlets and other education materials summarizing its organizational philosophy. These materials are produced at meetings of representatives of each country and then distributed through networks of the organization to chapters in various countries. The national chapters distribute the materials locally to keep the communities aware of the objectives of the movement. It is FYA's mission that focuses the activities of the program overall more than the academic curriculum or other objectives. This mission is also applied at the level of classroom learning.

3 Teachers and training

FYA identified inadequate training as a main constraint to the quality of education and in 1972 set up a program of inservice training to provide courses in pedagogical theory followed up by visits to classrooms. The courses took place on weekends to avoid disturbing classroom learning, and occasionally training was provided during intensive week-long courses. The national chapters focused much of their attention on a field-based training that improved the quality of instruction. These courses were so successful that the government asked FYA to open the training to government staff, and between 1972 and 1977 over a third of the trainers in the formal system were trained in this course. Since that time, FYA decided that the effort put into the expansion of this activity was compromising the quality of its own programs and began again restricting training to FYA teachers, though it also started some pilot training projects. In 1982 it decided to give priority to quality over expansion in its schools, and in 1992 training programs were redesigned to orient them toward improved teaching/learning.

In 1995, 60 percent of the teacher training activity focused on reform of teaching/learning activities, with the rest concerned with FYA's vision and identity (Swope N d 5-7). The program offering for 1995 included, in the category of "identity and vision," 10 one-day obligatory regional workshops on "personal enrichment and the study of FYA ideology" and two days of voluntary regional meetings between veteran teachers and new teachers to share their vision of teaching. In the category of "mission" there were four days of a voluntary colloquium on teaching according to FYA's mission. In the category of "teaching-learning" there were 10 days of obligatory curriculum development at the school level in the three first-phase pilot regions for the new program, three days of a voluntary "faith and life" workshop to develop approaches incorporating the spiritual dimension into classroom teaching, and three days of a voluntary training workshop for a massification of the new program. Principals were also offered five days of obligatory evaluation seminars in the implementation of the new curriculum (Swope N d 5-32).

Throughout these programs FYA's training reinforces the importance of the school in the life of the community. Teachers are taught to use examples from daily life and to encourage children to tell stories about their experiences. They are taught to let children use nonstandard forms of language in expressing themselves creatively. The aim is for students and parents to feel that the school is educating a child that still belongs to the community—one whose uniqueness is recognized (Reimers 1997a 41).

Teachers are encouraged to create new programs that support FYA's mission of meeting community need and to become role models of active community participation (Reimers 1997a 41). As noted earlier, they often live on the school grounds and are usually committed on a personal level to community development. Their training emphasizes motivational aspects of teaching, causing teachers to want to learn new skills and to accomplish the organization's spiritual mission. These aspects are encouraged through watching other teachers using active pedagogies and then practicing them in workshops (Reimers 1997a 43). In the classroom, teachers are assisted in their jobs of managing instruction by older students teaching younger students and by materials that are designed to be used in self-instruction. This has made it possible, during frequent teacher strikes for higher salaries, for students to take over FYA schools and keep them open.

Compared to other countries, Bolivia offers a relatively low number of professional training days (6.6 per teacher),³ at a cost of \$116 per teacher. Principals are offered training (4 days) at a cost of \$45 per person (Swope N d 5-7,8). The training costs come from the schools themselves or from internationally and

³ For example, Guatemala offers 43 days per teacher with an investment of only \$109

nationally donor-funded projects, which means that the extent of this investment depends on the amounts these agencies are funding at any given time. Bolivia spends 5 percent of its budget on training while Guatemala spends 2.6 percent but offers many more days of training.

As noted earlier, teacher salaries are paid by the government in each country where FYA operates, and therefore they are based on national scales of longevity in the system. In Bolivia, the government contribution to FYA programs is almost exclusively confined to paying salaries. In that country rural salaries are somewhat higher than urban salaries. Even when teachers work two shifts with double the average salary, however, the income level is well below the poverty line. (Swope N d 5-14)

4 Management

As noted earlier, FYA supports the autonomy of programs in the different countries, regions, and local centers where they are located. This freedom to innovate is coupled with effective channels to communicate FYA's vision and information about successful experiments in its individual centers. In countries with a large number of centers this means three institutional levels: 1) a general directorate, which sets the overall objectives of the organization, raises funds, and communicates with the regional offices, 2) regional directorates, which help the schools prepare their plans and acquaint them with the general guidelines of the organization (each regional office handles a maximum of 45 to 50 centers or schools), and 3) individual schools, which have the authority to interpret the guidelines according to their own needs. The schools make their own plans and manage their own budgets and staff. (Reimers 1997a 36)

Bolivia's 183 centers in 1995 were being managed by seven regional offices and a national office (Swope N d 1-4). The national office manages agreements with the Ministry of Education and relations with national and international donor agencies. The National Office also provides a number of services such as accounting, budgeting, personnel and development, finance, systems, and project development. FYA's experience indicates that once a national office is responsible for managing more than 40 schools, the service becomes increasingly formalized. In Bolivia, the administrative staff consists of 60 individuals, 17 working at the national level and two to five people working in the coordination offices in each of the departments. Field coordinators visit schools frequently, and teachers from nearby schools meet together to plan their activities each month, thus providing opportunities for extensive coordination and networking among school staff.

FYA's school-based management is key in its overall efforts to decentralize projects. The main characteristics of this management include the centrality of the local school, the incorporation of the community in all aspects, from the maintenance of buildings and financing of small improvements to involvement in children's education, the initiation of school projects by community request, the school's role as encompassing more than just the management of instruction, collaboration with the national office in innovating new programs, and full-service schooling with a range of formal and non-formal education programs for the family and community. (Swope N d 6-2)

Ways in which FYA principals in Bolivia perceive their role somewhat differently from those in conventional schools—as seen in Swope's questionnaire data, include that they are considerably more involved in the selection of teachers and somewhat more involved in choosing textbooks, and that they participate more in inservice activities with teachers. Conventional school principals on the other hand see their role as being more involved in supervising teachers and observing them in classrooms. In Venezuela, the comparable differences are essentially the same. In both systems in both countries the principals feel about equally that their role also involves evaluating teachers' performance, facilitating inservice activities, and evaluating school activities annually. (Swope N d Appendix 6 1, Tables 2 and 3)

FYA has a limited budget and therefore tries to get as much as it can out of its resources. This is accomplished through a lean and efficient management structure with few administrative layers and a small staff. This approach results in a democratic, participatory style, leaving a great deal of the supervisory function to the teachers themselves. The difference compared with the conventional system is in the locus of the

action in FYA the school and the community are at the center of the action, with regional and national administration providing support and communication. In the conventional system, the MOE is the center of action, with schools implementing decisions taken in the MOE, which in turn monitor to see that its directives are followed (Reimers 1997a 42)

Because its earliest funding came from outside donors, FYA has had the freedom to innovate greater than if it had been funded entirely through public support. In Bolivia where the program has expanded most, there has been more international support than in countries where the program is smaller (Reimers 1997a 42)

It is a requirement in order to obtain public financing of teacher salaries that FYA schools fulfill the same administrative requirements and the same fiscal regulation as conventional public schools. In the Swope sample of 288 FYA centers in nine countries, 92 percent were managed privately (although 41 percent were dependent on national public school administration) and 6 percent were administered through municipal administration. Swope found that FYA centers considered themselves "private or relatively autonomous from the state." From interviews it appeared that Venezuela had the greatest autonomy from the state and Bolivia had the greatest integration of the program into the public system. Any additional financial and human resources that FYA garners outside the government are not subject to public fiscal regulation (Swope N d 1-15)

5 Experimentation and reflection

FYA's highly effective communication channels and its encouragement of staff experimentation with innovative programs at the grassroots level make it uniquely able to expand successful ideas. FYA is an example of a project that leaves room and resources for trying new ideas, which, as they prove successful, are available to other centers if they suit their needs (Reimers 1997a 43)

D Results

The results section depends heavily on the Swope study (N d), which is the first systematic comparison of FYA and conventional schools. Swope studied 288 FYA centers with primary school programs in 9 of the 12 countries participating in FYA and compared them with 291 conventional schools in the same countries. The total sample of 579 schools covered 353,383 (0.7 percent) of the 50,856,722 FYA students (see Swope N d 1-9) in the nine countries of the study. Again a caution must be noted that the study was in draft form when this manuscript went to press.

The section below, unless otherwise noted, reports the results of the study for the two largest programs, Bolivia and Venezuela. In the Swope study, the information was more complete for Bolivia.

1 Community involvement and institutions of popular participation

The stress FYA places on setting schools in the context of their communities encourages "local participation to solve local problems (and provides) an alternative 'hidden curriculum' to children in schools, emphasizing local action and participation in development" (Reimers 1997a 41). The differences in implementation of FYA programs in individual centers make it difficult to describe a consistent pattern for popular participation. FYA's overall aim to encourage these kinds of institutional structures and participatory behaviors subsumes schooling under community development goals and expects it to contribute to them. Anecdotal evidence and the pervasive visionary statements coming from FYA suggest strongly that in many FYA settings these desired behaviors do occur, but without further study it would be difficult to know precisely how widespread they are, how they are manifest, and to what extent they generalize to other areas of social and economic development.

In terms of the importance of community involvement in children's learning, there is some limited evidence available. Swope asked principals to prioritize factors that might influence student learning in their schools. Among these factors was the "participation of the family in the education process." In Bolivia 10

percent of the principals gave it a top priority and in Venezuela 13 percent. Adding together all the responses where it was considered a first, second, or third priority, only Ecuador, Guatemala, and Paraguay FYA principals considered it more important than principals from the conventional system (Swope N d 7-21). Thus, though family participation may be given significant weight in the FYA philosophy, it does not appear to be as significant a priority among FYA principals, as one would expect, though this conclusion must be considered in relation to the number of other factors that principals were asked to consider.

Principals were also asked about their priority objectives. In Bolivia more than 30 percent of the principals in both FYA and the conventional system felt that involving parents in the education process was one of their top three priorities (though usually not the top one). In Venezuela twice as many FYA principals as conventional principals found that to be true (Swope N d 7-22). Swope notes that there is a contradiction in FYA in terms of parent participation: education failure is to a large extent attributed by principals to personal and family situations of students, but these issues are given little time in teacher meetings and principals do not give them the high prioritization they deserve if they are so important (Swope N d 7-23).

Swope notes that community involvement in FYA education generally takes two forms. First, because an important share of the costs of the FYA centers are school-generated and managed, community members have an important say in how resources will be spent. Second, the involvement of parents in instructional programs, especially preschool ones, means that parents can play an important role in reducing repetition and dropout (Swope N d 7-26). Again there is not enough evidence in this study to come to a definitive conclusion about the extent of actual community participation.

2 Educational participation

By 1995 at the start of the Swope study, Bolivia was operating 183 centers, 115 of which included primary programs teaching 78,576 students, and Venezuela was operating 169 centers, with primary programs reaching 47,438 students. Presumably most of these students constituted additional enrollments that might not have occurred were it not for FYA programs. This assumption is based on FYA's stated objective to establish programs in areas where schooling is not readily available. Swope does not comment on the increases in enrollments that have resulted from FYA's presence.

Two other sources provide some evidence of FYA's contribution to educational participation. According to Reimers, in all the centers established by FYA, enrollments grew at a moderate rate of about 3 percent in primary, 2.7 percent in lower secondary, and 1 percent in higher secondary during a one-year period between 1990 and 91. In the same period, preschool expanded 46 percent to make it the fastest growing FYA program (1997a 36). Diaz found that 85 percent of FYA students in Guatemala who entered preschool completed the six years of primary by the end of seven years compared with 34 percent in the conventional system (1989 67 in Reimers 1997a 38).

Swope does, however, compare the internal efficiency of FYA and the conventional system. He looks at several indicators: "the selectivity of each system" with regard to student ability,⁴ real (calculated over students in grade) and traditional (calculated over the 1991 cohort total) repetition rates, three dropout rates,⁵

⁴ By this he means evidence that the system rids itself of poorly performing students. He takes this to be the case when the final average of a class improves from year to year as the poorer students drop out.

⁵ The rates include raw (all Drop Outs) definite (school-related) and non-definite (external to the school such as transfers). Some would argue that these categories are ambiguous and overlapping: "definite" includes dropout for economic hardship, health problems, frequent repetition, and poor attendance; "non-definite" includes family moves, changes of school, repeating a grade, and disappearance from the register. Swope says the reasons external to the school accounted for the largest proportion of principals' answers to why children dropped out. Other research has shown that dropout reasons given by school staff and parents can be markedly different, with each blaming the other for the phenomenon. Thus, it is not surprising to find reasons external to the school given more weight by principals in Swope's study. He himself notes the "considerable underestimation" that, for example, occurs in Venezuelan principals' reports of multiple grade repetitions as a cause of dropout compared to the definitive dropout causes related to this factor in the study (N d 7-7).

and optimal progress rates. After analyzing all these measures he reports that FYA in Bolivia and Venezuela moves children through the system at a more efficient rate than the conventional system—that is, with larger numbers completing the year-by-year progression in the optimal number of years with less repetition. In both countries all his measures show FYA to have better rates than the conventional system.

An essential aspect of FYA is its commitment to helping socially disadvantaged groups obtain the skills and attitudes they need to gain a sense of control over their environment. According to FYA this is accomplished by targeting communities where education services are limited, emphasizing local culture in the curriculum, reinforcing the students' self-esteem, and "providing spaces for participation" for students, teachers, and community members (Reimers 1997a: 40). Though FYA aims to target disadvantaged groups, Swope's data show little evidence in the characteristics of FYA communities to suggest that targeted groups have been reached more often than in the conventional system. In fact, principals in Venezuela and Bolivia were somewhat more likely to cite economic reasons for dropout in conventional as opposed to FYA schools (though somewhat less likely to cite these reasons in failure and repetition).

One of the main differences Swope did find between FYA centers and conventional schools was their location. The FYA sample overall was more heavily weighted toward an "urban margin" location, which appears consistent with its philosophy of opening schools in areas where there is no public sector delivery. Swope suggests that the marginality of the students in areas like these might lead to lower levels of internal efficiency (N d 1-11). However, when he compares the characteristics of FYA and government school communities in his sample (in Chapter 3) by asking principals' opinions, he finds few significant differences based on measures he considers valid for testing marginality. These measures include distance from another primary school (the majority are at least 30 minutes away and Venezuelan FYA centers are significantly farther away than conventional schools), class size, education level of parents, socio-economic level of neighborhood, and frequency of child labor.⁵² Therefore, from Swope's data, the FYA centers do not appear to provide services to groups different from those in the non-FYA schools other than this greater emphasis on urban-margin locations and possible other "not apparent" or not measured factors that relate to this environment. Swope does not provide any data on indigenous non-Spanish speaking groups or girls who might have benefitted from FYA schooling.

Swope looked at differences in course offerings that might make a difference in the participation of children in the two systems. The FYA centers as a whole offer more variety than conventional schools: some have grades one to three, others one to five, or one to six, and sometimes also add seven to twelve or preschool. In the nine-country sample, the main differences were that 38 percent of FYA and 15 percent of the conventional schools offered secondary education in the same location, and that 59 percent of FYA and 39 percent of the conventional schools offered preschool education. Swope notes that "preschool is a more direct 'student retention strategy' because it may increase the overall educability of children, while secondary education is less direct" because it encourages parents and students to extend the time spent in school (N d 1-12). Though he suggests that these differences may be associated with internal efficiency, he does not elaborate on this theme.

Swope identifies seven strategies found in the Latin American region as a whole that he says are responses to the problems of school failure. They include 1) preventative programs, which involve the health and nutritional status of children, 2) compensatory programs, which assist children with learning problems and/or adjust the school program and calendar to fit the schedules of children, 3) active community involvement in the instructional process, especially at the preschool level, 4) multiple or flexible promotion to provide more opportunities for promotion, 5) economic incentive programs to encourage parents to keep children in school through involvement in income-generating and other activities, 6) preschool programs, which give children a head start and allow older children to go to school, and 7) "education with work" technical secondary education programs (Swope N d 7-2).

⁶ In the conclusion however, he contradicts this statement by claiming that public schools have a significantly higher rate of child labor. This point, if true, suggests a lower socio-economic level for public school children.

In Bolivia as noted community involvement was the most common strategy used to retain students according to principal reports. The strategy consisted of “consciousness raising” concerning the importance of education, psychological counseling for parents and visits of school staff and social workers to the homes of students. Bolivia also implemented economic incentive strate-



A kindergarten class in rural Bolivia sings a nursery song. Photo by Teresa Kavanaugh

gies with lower registration and school supply costs, and preventive strategies through medical care (doctors' and nurses' visits), free breakfasts, and free lunches (Swope N d 7-3,6). Bolivia has the largest student transportation system of all the FYA countries, but its own program is slightly smaller (a little more than half the schools compared with two-thirds in the conventional system (Swope N d 7-32). Another incentive used to keep rural students in schools is boarding facilities. Bolivia FYA has these facilities at 20 percent of its centers compared with 35 percent in conventional schools (Swope N d 7-32). Bolivia and Venezuela also have small, state-financed programs for easing the costs of instructional materials to parents, but these have low coverage. Most FYA principals find ways to meet their students' needs through bulk purchasing of commodities and donations.

By comparison, in Venezuela, a third of the principals report that they use community involvement as the main strategy for retaining students, with another important strategy being compensatory activities, where centers try to create a warm, inviting atmosphere as well as technical help with learning problems. Venezuela has a small lunch and breakfast program and doctor and nurse visits. Only 8 percent of the centers have a transport system (Swope N d 7-5, 32,36,38).

3 Learning/Achievement

Before the Swope study examined this question systematically, anecdotal information suggested that graduates of FYA programs had better mastery of skills in reading, writing, and math than the conventional system and that they were provided more opportunities for social and emotional growth. Teachers in FYA schools make a point of emphasizing self-esteem and values training—honesty, solidarity, etc. (Reimers 1997a 39).

The Swope study did not test for the value impacts of learning but it did compare math and Spanish skill levels by looking at the grades teachers give to students.⁷ In both Bolivia and Venezuela there do not appear to be significant differences between FYA and conventional schools for math or Spanish grades.

A positive conclusion that might be drawn from this data is that, since FYA has lower dropout and repetition rates and more students progressing at optimal rates, in effect, it does a better job of providing students with a wider range of abilities—skills at least equal to those in the government system with greater efficiency.

4 School program quality

Several times since the establishment of FYA centers there have been efforts to improve the quality of the education program. The early efforts centered on the quality of teacher training. Budget allocations suggest that quality improvement still focuses on teacher training rather than instructional materials or equipment. Overall the proportional budget categories in 1995 included, in percent of total value: construction (36 percent), durable equipment (27), instructional equipment (0), and training (37). Similarly, Swope asked principals to prioritize the six factors that influence student achievement. The single most important influence from their perspective was teaching practice. Less than 40 percent in Bolivia and less than 20 percent in Venezuela felt that the availability of educational materials and textbooks was among the top three priorities in influencing achievement.

In 1992, however, it was decided to redesign training courses to orient them more to a “learning and quality-enhancing organization,” with a greater impact on teaching practice. The basis for the program was a new curriculum, designed to incorporate the FYA philosophy into several components that would be offered in each center. To develop the new program, selected teachers were brought together once a month. There were several components: An Alternative Popular Curriculum—a preschool through eighth grade program of study, A Parent-Child Program, similar to the “Head Start” program (in the United States) for poor parents to learn how to support their children’s schooling, Women’s Organizational Training, to help single mothers develop skills to give them stable earning capacity, and Faith and Light, to inculcate Christian values into curriculum and training. (Swope N d 5-6,7)

The alternative study plans for preschool through grade three were presented for approval to the Ministry of Education in 1996, and the first phase implementation was started in three regions—La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz—with teachers who had been involved in the reform. In the next phase (1996-1998) the new curriculum will be expanded to the four remaining regions in the FYA program, involving altogether 2,769 teachers who represent 90 percent of the total teachers.

If variety in program offering can be considered enhancement of quality because it better fits local needs, Swope’s sample shows the substantial range of options that have been offered in FYA centers even before the new program. For example, while almost all public schools offered a fairly standard program of grades one to five compared with FYA (74 percent), FYA offers in addition almost double the rate of preschool programs compared with the conventional systems and double the rate of secondary programs in the same location. (Swope N d 1-38)

Although it is possible that program quality may be impacted by FYA’s continuing emphasis on teacher training, no direct studies of the consequences of that training are available, and since achievement scores are essentially the same in both systems, there is no clear evidence of these or other related improvements.

5 Accountability to the community

The Swope study provides some evidence of FYA’s accountability to its clients in the local community. As in other of the case models, however, FYA only indirectly thinks of parents as its customers though it nor-

⁷ These grades were compared within rather than across countries.

mally set up channels such as parent associations where accountability activities could occur. From principal reports, for example, parent meetings in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Paraguay occur with greater regularity in FYA centers than in the conventional system, while in the rest of the countries, including Bolivia, they occur about as frequently. In both Bolivia and Venezuela these formal meetings occur about once a semester. Swope says these meetings are formal and ritualized, and that important messages are more likely to be passed during informal contacts between parents and teachers, which occur casually in passageways or on school grounds when parents may be present to take part in other activities the FYA centers offer (Swope N d 7-23)

The timing of parents' meetings may be important in how well they are attended and who from the family attends. In Bolivia the meetings are held most often after the school day in the evening or on Saturday (73 percent) while the conventional system follows these timings somewhat less often (63 percent) and carries out more of its meetings during the school day (37 percent to 25 percent in FYA) (Swope N d 7-25). Presumably, working parents would find it more convenient to come at night, while mothers might find it more convenient to come during the day.

There is no information on the topics discussed at the parents' meetings.

6 Costs

There is little information on the comparative annual costs per student in FYA and the conventional system. However, a study conducted in Venezuela showed that per-pupil costs were 30 percent higher in conventional schools than in FYA schools (Navarro 1994 in Reimers 1997a 38).

Swope has laid out overall FYA costs in nine expenditure categories. Expenditures for Bolivia are listed in Table 8.3.

Table 8.3 FYA - Bolivia overall costs (%) by category

Expenditure Category	Percent (%)
National/regional offices	5.4
Administration of centers	3.7
Teachers' salaries	21.0
Training	5.7
Education materials	5.2
Infrastructure	50.5
Extracurricular	2.4
Other labor	4.8
Other	1.7

Source: Swope N d 5-21,22

There are no comparable official data on national budgets in Bolivia available. Swope was only able to calculate per-student cost comparisons in Guatemala and Paraguay. In Guatemala the annual investment in a FYA student was \$171 compared with \$136 in the conventional system and in Paraguay \$168 for FYA compared with \$133 in the conventional system (Swope N d 5-25,26,27). FYA thus costs more overall per student in these countries.

Swope also breaks down costs by funding source. The figures for Bolivia (Table 8.4) are stated as proportions of the total contributions from the source.

Table 8 4 FYA - Bolivia overall contributions (%) by funding source

Category	Donations ^a	State	School
National/regional offices	7 0	14 2	—
Administration of centers	—	—	11 0
Teachers' salaries	—	85 8	35 7
Training	7 7	—	2 4
Education materials	7 0	—	4 0
Infrastructure	78 2	—	20 4
Extracurricular	—	—	7 3
Other labor	—	—	14 2
Other	—	—	5 0

a Donations are provided by national and international agencies state contributions by the government and school contributions from income generated through parent association dues fund raising activities private donations and overseas private donations (Swope N d 5 21) One surprising amount is that paid by the local parents' association for teachers' salaries which in effect is a payment to teachers not to strike during Bolivia's annual April shutdown for higher pay (Swope N d 5 23)

Source Swope N d 5 21 22

From this information one can estimate how the costs of FYA and the conventional system compare from the perspective of the participants. The government pays less (mainly the costs of teachers' salaries) for FYA schools because many of the costs are assumed by other parties: construction and maintenance by the community and through international and national donations, a fee for materials by the parents, innovative activities funded by donors, and other costs by religious sources. With the exception of the voluntary time and material contribution they may make, parents pay fees equal to those in the conventional system (which FYA puts into instructional materials) and if the program is better quality as people believe, they receive an added value over the conventional system. Overall the government pays less, the parents pay the same (or possibly less if other incidentals are included), and development and administrative costs are borne by international and national donors. If FYA operates in areas where children are disadvantaged (which Swope has not proven in terms of their background characteristics or local neighborhood services) and provides a better quality education, the additional costs provided by donors may prove to be, in effect, a subsidization of education for the poor.

7 Replication

A World Bank "Poverty Report" estimated demand to be so great in Bolivia that schools managed by the Catholic Church would double if the government approved all community requests for schools (World Bank 1990 86 in Reimers 1997a 38). That report suggests that funding is a major constraint on continued expansion of the FYA program. Several times promising programs such as training for government teachers and self-instructional modules had to be abandoned, partly as a result of limited funds but also, in the case of training, because FYA found massification to threaten the quality of its programs.

Table 8 5 shows the rate of replication of FYA centers in all the participating countries. Bolivia and Venezuela follow the pattern of most countries with long-term FYA programs. These countries have the highest growth rate in the 1970s, a slowing in the 1980s, and then a spurt in the 1990s. In the 1960s, Bolivia opened 15 centers, followed by 49 in the 1970s, 32 in the 1980s and 19 in the first half of the 1990s. Venezuela opened 24 centers in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by 71 in the 1970s, 11 in the 1980s and 63 in the first half of the 1990s. Although FYA schools service only a small portion of the school population in the two countries, the impact has been much greater in terms of the innovative ideas and training it has provided the conventional system.

Table 8 5 Fe y Alegría primary education centers by establishment date

Country (Foundation year)	Education centers founded (n)				Total
	1950-69 ^c	1970-79 ^d	1980-89	1990-95	
Peru (1966)	8	12	14	7	41
Bolivia (1966)	15	49	32	19	115
Venezuela (1955)	24	71	11	63	169
Guatemala (1976)	-	4	15	14	33
Ecuador (1964)	5	19	11	13	48
Nicaragua (1974)	-	5	4	2	11
Colombia (1972)	-	20	26	8	54
Paraguay (1991)	-	-	-	43	43
Brazil ^a (1980)	-	-	-	1	1
Total^b	52	180	113	170	515

a Brazil's main focus is informal intervention programs with highly marginalized youth

b Information about El Salvador and the Dominican Republic is not included in this table

c FYA expanded beyond Venezuela slowly. In the first period, 1950 to 1969, FYA had not yet expanded to many countries.

d During the 1970s, FYA was introduced into many countries, and this may account for the great increase in the number of education centers.

Source: Swope, N. d., Table 1.2

8 Sustainability

Swope measured sustainability in terms of the closures of FYA schools between 1989-1995. He calculated that 98 percent of the centers built during that period in the eight countries where he estimated these effects were sustained. Bolivia had a slightly lower level of sustainability at 96 percent and Venezuela a perfect 100 percent of centers sustained. Swope was unable to find a consistent pattern in the reasons for closures, which tended to be unique in each case.

E Successes and lessons learned

Reimers (1997a) believes FYA has been successful because it

- has a strong sense of mission, which works as a force to make consistent sense of its activities, helping participants focus their efforts productively and feel committed to FYA's aims,
- stresses the role and objectives of the community,
- relies on democratic leadership,
- depends on strict, lean management with cost-conscious, efficient use of its funds,

- was initiated with donor resources independent of public funds, which gave it more leeway to innovate,
- is staffed with dedicated educators who are skilled in negotiation and promotion and able to handle the politics involved in working with the government and expanding to scale,
- provides an environment conducive to experimentation and communicates lessons learned through its networks, and
- motivates teachers through training to want to learn new skills and innovate (Reimers 1997a 40-43)

1 Issues

Some issues raised by Swope include the need for

- more flexible promotion strategies in FYA to discourage the dropout of children, and
- more appropriate responses to the real reasons for dropout and repetition (Swope feels that some of the efforts to solve these problems have missed the point because existing data have not been used effectively and principals have misidentified the real reasons or have responded inappropriately)

As with several of the other models, FYA has a certain vulnerability because of its long-term need for external funding and its dependence on an NGO for facilitation and development of programs

2 Lessons learned

FYA is the oldest project of the cases in this study, with the most elaborated relationship between local communities and the public institutions responsible for financing and implementing formal education programs. This length of time and an urgent need to stretch its limited budget have encouraged it to develop a cost-effective program actively supported by local communities. The importance of creating capacity to continuously refine programs is perhaps the first important lesson FYA teaches. Other lessons include

- 1) A grassroots approach that focuses on schools and communities is feasible when staff and community members are motivated and are given the space to shape programs and approaches to fit their own needs. Their independent initiatives provide a variety of tested options that other centers can draw on as needed. An essential ingredient is an effective communication network to relay individual successes to others.
- 2) An emphasis on motivating participants to accomplish the organization's vision pays off in terms of greater staff responsibility and initiative. This permits a reduction in supervisory and management oversight of the program, and activities tend to have a more consistent relationship to the overall goals.
- 3) An effective relationship can be developed between international donors, government institutions, teachers, and communities when capable leaders work to produce a productive coordination of effort. "FYA is an example of a privately-managed (public) education-delivery system with mixed funding" (Swope N d 1-3)
- 4) Crucial elements in program quality are believed by FYA managers to include the selection of qualified, competent staff and control over inservice training that improves their capabilities.
- 5) The credibility of projects with community participants is developed through "effective leadership and good management of available public and private financial resources" (Swope N d 1-4)

- 6) Full-service education, where the school-center offers a range of formal and non-formal programs relevant to the needs of community members, provides a base for comprehensive social and economic development and a motivating factor in community support

PART THREE
CONCLUSIONS

Previous Page Link

Chapter 9 The Practice of Community Participation

Community Contributions to Education Delivery

- Advocating enrollment and education benefits
 - Ensuring regular student attendance and completion
 - Constructing, repairing, and improving facilities
 - Contributing in-kind labor, materials, land, and funds
 - Identifying and supporting local teacher candidates
 - Making decisions about school locations and schedules
 - Monitoring and following up teacher and student attendance
 - Monitoring teacher performance
 - Forming village education committees to manage schools
 - Attending school meetings to know about children's work
 - Providing skill instruction/local culture information
 - Helping children with studying
 - Garnering more resources from and solving problems through the education bureaucracy
-

A Introduction

1 Overview

This chapter reviews the six case studies with respect to the light they shed on the practice of community participation, while the next chapter draws more general conclusions about community participation and the delivery of education services

In the present chapter, the introduction reviews a framework for analyzing the cases with a working definition of community participation. The following sections analyze the cases by 1) reviewing the circumstances that led to the use of community participation as a strategy, 2) detailing the process for involving the communities, 3) describing the contributions communities made to the realization of the models, 4) identifying the various actors involved in implementing the models, and 5) comparing the "impacts" of the innovative programs with conventional systems on standard outcome dimensions

2 Framework for the analyses of the cases

This chapter defines community participation in terms of its practice,¹ that is, as description of what it is and does. The description is organized around the following questions

- Why was community participation needed?
- How were communities involved?
- What contributions did communities make?
- Who was involved in implementing the innovative models?
- What was the impact of the models?
- Which impacts were enhanced by community contributions?

There are three difficult aspects to analyzing community participation. The first has to do with the meaning of "community involvement." Involvement occurs at many levels, not all of which might be consid-

¹ Based on the definition for the USAID-funded Cornell studies in the 1970s and reported in Nagle 1992

ered “active participation” Barnett 1995 simplifies the task somewhat by suggesting common modes that project initiators use to involve communities

- the “tell” mode gives information or direction,
- the “sell” mode gives information and expects agreement,
- the “test” mode knows the right direction but wants to see if anything is missing,
- the “consult” mode is not sure and wants ideas about the solution, and
- the “join” mode delegates tasks or forges partnerships to solve problems

There are at least two additional modes needed to cover the range of involvement strategies found in the present cases, they can be described by the words “empower” or “enable,” depending on the shade of meaning desired, and “embolden” The first terms imply that the communities are given the skills and the permission to support the innovation, while the second implies that the community is encouraged to take its own initiatives in support of the program All these modes are essentially “supplied” by the initiators None constitutes a real “demand” mode that is different enough to warrant its own separate description in the next chapter

The second difficult element has to do with “benefits” and can be stated simply as, “Whose notion of benefit?”—the individual’s, the community’s, the state’s, the outsider funder’s, or others? The perceptions of all these stakeholders may differ so that a resultant program does not necessarily satisfy everyone’s idea of benefit In these cases it is too simple, in other words, to judge a project successful when it satisfies one stakeholder’s needs at the expense of others There are times when these needs diverge or even contradict one another

The final difficulty has to do with how to incorporate the dual meanings of community participation as both end and means While many developers talk about community participation as though it were mainly an end (or a good) in itself, they often design programs as though it were mainly a means toward education ends If community participation is an end in itself, does that then relieve it of responsibility for also being a means to either education delivery or the practice of civil society?

B The practice of community participation

It should be remembered that the six case studies were not intended as a representative sample of community participation By intent, they are “best case” examples where the designers were known to have incorporated “community participation” because they believed it would contribute to the success of the program Despite this skewing of examples, the cases prove to be very useful in illustrating the variety in participatory approaches The section below summarizes the specific findings about community participation as practiced in these cases

1 Why was community participation needed?

The precipitating reasons for community participation were fairly similar in all the cases Initiators of the projects were concerned with low enrollments, especially in rural areas, and sometimes with a focus on girls and the poor They felt parents needed to be involved to ensure higher levels of participation A second concern was the quality of the education program, which was often poor in these hard-to-reach areas Governments did not have adequate resources to improve the quality and quantity of education opportunities to the degree deemed necessary for the national good Communities, it was felt, could join government in contributing their share of resources to increasing and improving programs

The models were also cost-conscious, striving to cut costs below those of conventional systems in order to reach more students without compromising quality Poor quality programs and a lack of perceived benefit of education, program designers felt, made schooling unappealing to these mostly rural children and their parents Even when enrolled, their attendance was poor and they dropped out early, often because of

“push” factors, but also because there were more useful activities they could perform at home. Most models attempted to make education programs more attractive to children by supporting interactive and student-centered teaching methods, relating learning to daily life, drawing on local examples and skill resources, and developing opportunities for parents to become more involved in the school.

The Harambee model was the single exception to these circumstances. It grew out of the frustration of rural communities with the lack of services provided to them and the strong feeling that the main vehicle of social mobility was through what was believed to be the meritocratic education system. The problem was a combination of long-term colonial neglect of rural populations and a newly independent but impoverished government spending the larger share of its education resources on primary schools and a limited number of well-resourced secondary schools. The pressure caused by large numbers of primary graduates encouraged communities to focus their self-help efforts at the secondary level where they hoped to attract scarce government resources by constructing and equipping their own schools.

In each of the cases the government institutions then responsible for delivering education gave up some of their autonomy by agreeing to the implementation of the innovative initiatives. Why were they willing to do this? At the time most of them were beginning to recognize their own limitations in providing education services, influencing community decisions about educating children, and controlling school level inputs such as teacher and student attendance, timely distribution of materials, teaching quality, and other educational components. The only feasible way to correct these deficiencies, they believed, was through engaging the resources and efforts of people in communities where schools either were or could be located.

2 How were the communities involved?

a Involvement mode

Documents that mention community participation sometimes give the impression that through a participatory process the community will enter into an equal partnership with government to make crucial decisions about program delivery and design. Once involved, according to this view, communities will suddenly assume an independent and active role in supporting local schools simply because they see it in their best interest to do so.

There is little evidence that this happened in the current cases. More often than not, project initiators “involved” the community in a much narrower way according to their own methods and designs. “Involved” is an appropriate term because it connotes doing something to another person in a way that is controlled by the doer, the person who initiates the activity. The doer, in effect, gives community members permission for the kind of involvement they are allowed to do. Usually in the case examples, the initiators “sold” their ideas, and then “told” community members what they expected them to do. Often they created structures such as PTAs or management committees to mobilize the community and channel their support for the initiatives, but they also set clear limitations, in fact or by example, on what community members could do. One problem that arose, after the initial excitement of establishing the new program wore off, was that parents lost interest in the project or even resisted it. IMPACT parents, for example, became less interested in building learning kiosks and sometimes transferred their children out of project schools. Escuela Nueva parents often didn’t take advantage of the Learning Centers that were supposed to motivate their involvement. Attendance at BRAC monthly meetings was made compulsory to ensure that parents would come.

Table 9.1 gives a rough idea of the modes employed to involve the communities in support of the schools. Most of the models do not fall neatly into one of Barnett’s involvement categories. For example, the BRAC/NFPE program started out as a project initiated by villagers (demand). However, when donors supported BRAC to bring the program to scale, specifying a large number of new schools that had to be established, BRAC turned to a “sell” mode to recruit the new communities. Once the communities were sold, they were “told” what they would do. Harambee communities were first “emboldened” by Kenyatta and then

“joined” with churches, politicians, etc to “demand” that the government assist them in providing secondary education

In its pilot phase, Escuela Nueva sold the idea to teachers, leaving them with the option not to buy, but later as the model was brought to scale in 18,000 schools, teachers were simply “told” that the idea would be adopted. Early in the program they were “consulted” in the design of materials and methods, while later these inputs were scripted. The teachers in essence were the “communities” for whom and by whom the innovations were designed. Teachers later were “told,” through the Escuela Nueva manual, how to use the community as a resource for the school. FYA responded to community demand, then “empowered” and “emboldened” local staff to “join” with the community in furthering their goals.

IMPACT and CSP used structured means of involving communities. In CSP, each step was mapped out, showing what responsibilities the community must fulfill before the government would provide its inputs. Both projects “sold” their ideas and then “told” communities what they were expected to do. CSP communities, however, went beyond this kind of limited involvement to join forces with the government, through the facilitators, and make a substantial contribution to their schools.

Table 9 1 Modes of community involvement in education delivery

Mode	IMPACT	Harambee	BRAC	CSP	EN	FYA
Sell	√		(√)	√	(√)	
Tell	√		√	√	√	
Test						
Consult				√	(√)	
Join		(√)	√	√	(√)	√
Empower				√		√
Embolden		(√)		√		√
Demand		√	(√)			√

() A mode that was used only part of the time

Two elements may lead facilitators/initiators to use directive approaches. The first is cultural. Several of the cultures (Philippines, Bangladesh, and Pakistan) where the programs were established can be characterized as “rule-driven,” where it is common to lay down rules and procedures to avoid misunderstanding and abuse. CSP used this device to create transparency and thereby trust among villagers. In such a context, these structures often create the necessary stability for participation to flourish. The traditional, comparatively isolated CSP communities developed a strong sense of ownership in their schools, which led them to take independent actions to improve conditions after their establishment.

The second point relates to control. Project implementors at the local level on the whole felt accountable to supervisors in the facilitating organization—BRAC, CSP, Escuela Nueva, IMPACT—who in turn had to meet the timetables of funders and managers. Relinquishing control to local communities in most cases meant activities would take more time, effort, and money. There is evidence that the designs did not factor in these costs more than nominally and that project implementors counted on communities increasing rather than decreasing resources once they were mobilized. BRAC, for example, planned to use parents in tutoring children but found this activity took more staff time than the results warranted and abandoned the idea. Escuela Nueva teachers often neglected community activities because they became burdensome after a long day at work. In effect, though activities to mobilize communities were funded during start-up, there were few resources available later on as the novelty wore off for both sides. As time went by, community

involvement became a nuisance for many implementors, who measured their success by how well they satisfied superiors

b The process of involvement

All the models initiated their activities with a period for mobilizing the community. The processes were strikingly similar

- initial meetings with the community to develop trust/raise issues/divulge plans,
- surveying local human and/or material resources to see what support the school might receive/request,
- defining a role for and/or empowering the community,
- creating a mechanism, such as a committee or organization, to consolidate community efforts,
- formal or informal induction into the support role, and
- motivational activities to keep the community interested

The three elements common to most cases were a series of discussions with the community, a survey, and the selection of a local education committee. Motivational activities were also usually present

Discussions with the community The series of discussions conducted by the initiators usually had specific objectives. In BRAC they were to assess the level of interest, to identify a teacher, to find a suitable room to rent, and to elicit statements of commitment from the parents. IMPACT used the discussions to inform parents about the new program so they would not feel their children were disadvantaged by the new methods, and to assign the contributions parents would be asked to make. In CSP, the meetings were used to develop trust and a transparent system for choosing teachers and students, and to obtain commitment for contributions the community would provide to augment the government's share



Public discussions such as this one in Bangladesh are an important part of involving communities in development activities. *World Bank photo by Kevin Babriski*

The elements in Escuela Nueva and FYA that made the community's role different from the traditional system involved explaining to parents what the innovation (was) trying to do for their children, requesting support from parents, and ensuring that the school in turn would support community activities or community development (Reimers 1993: 26). It is interesting that the locally initiated Harambee projects also followed the same pattern of starting with a series of discussions where the need for a project emerged, roles were assigned, and fundraising plans were developed

Survey Most models made provision for a survey of the community with specific objectives in mind. IMPACT surveyed the community for material and skill resources (for building kiosks and teaching practical skills to children), at the same time taking the opportunity of the door-to-door visits to explain the initiative to individual householders. BRAC surveyed households to locate targeted poor children,

especially girls CSP visited households to ensure that sufficient girls were available to warrant a school in the community and to make sure that families from different family or tribal backgrounds would be sufficiently satisfied with the transparent process to agree on a site and a teacher The Escuela Nueva teachers surveyed the community to identify human resources they could draw on to enrich children's learning and, from the information they acquired, prepared a monograph describing the village life and people Based on the survey information, teachers sent children on field trips to collect data about their communities and organized other activities such as the wall map to create links between the school and the community FYA contacted as many local organizations as possible to build wide support for its centers Harambee's survey was informal and more modest, consisting of an assessment of how much each group in the community could contribute to the school project

Selection of village education committees Most models incorporated a process for identifying and appointing a committee to facilitate the affairs of the school IMPACT appointed a steering group of influential, regional officials whose job it was to answer questions about the project BRAC established a small community-run school management committee consisting of three parents, one community leader, and the teacher CSP developed detailed specifications to make membership in their VEC transparent and fair The committees should consist of five to seven men (later a parallel women's group was established), each elected by 75 percent of the parents Members must be parents, no two of whom could be related to one another, or to the teacher

Escuela Nueva had no village committee FYA established a parents' association to work closely with the principal on all matters related to the school Harambee projects depended on traditional means for organizing village projects The leadership usually appointed a committee from the community to coordinate matters (usually financial) related to the schools Material and in-kind support was provided by traditional work groups consisting of their regular members and elected leaders By law Harambee schools also had to have a recognized management group—often a church—to run the schools Since the costs of establishing the schools fell entirely on the shoulders of the community, the burden was lightened somewhat by spreading it across as many individuals and existing groups as possible

Motivational activities Most models included motivational activities intended to make community members want to become actively involved in the schools IMPACT renamed its schools "Learning Centers" and equipped them with books that were designed for community adults as well as older students IMPACT also expected adults to use its self-study modules to improve their literacy skills Both of these activities received a disappointing response BRAC required parents to attend monthly meetings where social and health issues were discussed along with admonishments about students' attendance and cleanliness Escuela Nueva provided their "Learning Centers" with libraries and vocational courses, which, similar to IMPACT's experience, did not evoke as much interest from the community as expected since, as one evaluator noted, the courses often were not ones the community wanted CSP motivated local committee members by scheduling frequent monitoring visits by teacher trainers and NGO staff to assess progress since previous meetings Some communities were also visited by interested foreigners, which gave the community a sense that its efforts were appreciated FYA was perhaps the most successful of all the models in motivating local staff "to the spiritual aim" of community development, which meant that regional or national managers concentrated on supporting rather than supervising field centers FYA's motivational activities take place during trainings and retreats, and then are maintained through communication networks and "mission" materials Flexible programs that meet the real needs of community members encourage them to stay actively involved

c Examples of involvement

Expectations that communities would provide active, sustained support for schools were disappointed in most of the cases Part of the problem lay in the way designers viewed the community's role, primarily as a resource rather than a full-fledged partner in establishing a program This view did little to reverse the traditionally passive role communities had assumed in relation to government services Now communities not only had little to say in shaping education delivery but they also had to pay for it, if not in money, at

least in time and effort. It was only a matter of time in most cases until the resource role became burdensome, especially when the conventional schools did not require equivalent contributions. IMPACT was a good example of this phenomenon, as noted already, when parents in some communities became less willing to build kiosks and pay for modules, and transferred their children to conventional schools.²

The models that elaborated the involvement process the most were BRAC and CSP. Both controlled the process from inception to implementation and maintenance through a sequence of tasks that were a prerequisite for establishing the schools. CSP, somewhat more than BRAC, adjusted its tasks sensitively to the community's need for transparency and fairness and, from reports, seems to have developed a more equal partnership with community members. For whatever reasons, CSP parents evidenced strong interest in supporting the school and were quick to take initiatives beyond what was reasonably required of them. In some BRAC villages, parents also took special initiatives, but Program Officers on their frequent supervisory visits often "did activities for them," i.e., organized and spoke at parents' meetings and routinely took an active part in SMC meetings. BRAC reports that it has not been satisfied with the way it has involved communities and, to its credit, has recently conducted several studies to determine how it can involve them more effectively.

Harambee is a unique model of community participation among the six examples—the one true case of grassroots initiation and implementation of schools. Its contribution to designs for effective models of community participation—ones that correspond more closely with World Bank and USAID definitions of the concept (see the next chapter), could be considerable. Its example, however, is likely to be overlooked because of its often poor quality programs and precarious financial situation. The Harambee example is especially important if community participation is seen as a worthy vehicle for the practice of civil society.

Harambee suggests that for a community to assume an independent role of self-sustained support, it needs more than just the permission of project initiators to become involved. Its members need to make "real" decisions about the kinds of innovations that address its own felt needs. The implications for development are profound, since it means that developers would have to change from being mainly supplier-initiators of programs to being responders to demand for programs. It means offering choices and being willing to accommodate the consequences. The Harambee programs did not fail because people lacked



Parents at the Lwanda Secondary School in Kakamega, Kenya scrutinize the school's finances as the headmaster presents the budget during a PTA meeting.
Photo by Christopher Galaty

² It is not clear exactly what precipitated these transfers, but it is likely that parents were unwilling to provide the extra resources as well as that they remained unconvinced that the new methods gave their children a better education.

understanding of their own needs but rather because the appropriate packages that would have complemented their efforts were not available

The bottom line for a locally sustained involvement, from the example of Harambee, is one where local people make their own decisions. Words like “enabled,” “empowered,” and “emboldened” though sometimes a necessary requirement of sustainability, are still forms of permission. The power to make decisions, in other words, must be real. The question is how to nurture “demand initiatives” within the structure of limitations that almost always accompany modern education service systems. This issue will be taken up in the next chapter.

3 What contributions do communities make?

Designers tended to expect communities to play a larger supportive role than they often did in reality. Table 9.2 shows the contributions that were emphasized in each of the projects.

Table 9.2 Community contributions to education delivery

Contribution	IMPACT	Harambee	BRAC	CSP	EN	FYA
Labor ^a	√	√	(√)	√		√
Funds	√	√		√		√
Land		√		√		√
Buildings	√	√	(√)	(√)		√
Student attendance ^a			√	√		
Find teachers ^a		√	√	√		
Pay salaries		√		(√)		
Girls' advocacy ^a				√		
Scheduling ^a			√	√	√	
Monitor teaching ^a			√	√		
Management ^a		√	√	√		
Teach skills ^a	√				√	
Tutoring ^a	√		√			
Provide information ^a					√	√
Instructional materials	√	√			√	

() Provide temporarily or when needed

a In kind or effort costs rather than actual money costs

The communities' contributions can be roughly divided into two categories: support that relates to the objective of increasing educational participation (e.g., labor, construction, funds), and support that relates to program quality (e.g., monitoring, management, and skill training). The two are not always mutually exclusive—for example, IMPACT parents provide funds, labor, and kiosk buildings to enhance the learning environment and not to increase the space available to students. Overall, IMPACT and Escuela Nueva stressed program quality in community contributions, Harambee and CSP stressed student participation, and BRAC and FYA involved both elements. Harambee and CSP asked the most from communities in terms of contributions, and IMPACT and Escuela Nueva requested the least, with FYA in the middle range.

Designers sometimes expected community contributions that did not materialize. Parents in both IMPACT and BRAC did not do as much tutoring as envisaged, and though BRAC parents had been expected to pay more of the schooling costs, facilitators found they were unable to do so because of their poverty. When it came to sustaining the innovative program, IMPACT parents were called upon to buy additional sets of modules as they wore out or were insufficient for the numbers of students, but were not always willing to bear this cost when conventional schools provided materials free.

Costs to the community can also be separated into material ones requiring outlays of cash or goods (such as construction materials or funds) and those requiring outlays of effort, both of which may be difficult for poor families to afford. Harambee and CSP required the greatest outlays of material support, while Escuela Nueva and BRAC had few financial costs connected with their involvement. FYA required fees equal to those of the conventional system to pay for instructional materials, as well as voluntary donations and effort. IMPACT required both material and in-kind support.

In relation to the total cost/effort needed to launch and sustain the innovative programs, community contributions, except in the case of Harambee, were relatively modest. If Harambee is taken as a measure of what rural parents might be willing to pay, then one wonders what it was in the other environments, which limited the amount and the scope of the contributions parents ultimately made. Three possibilities exist: that there was something in the context itself, something in the way initiators viewed the activity, or something in the motivation level of community members. It is likely all three influenced the level of contribution.

For example, there were several possible effects of context. The first is whether the model was initiated in an existing school or was intended to establish a new school in a community where there had been no previous opportunity to learn. IMPACT and Escuela Nueva were established in existing schools with already established ways of teaching and involving parents. It is more difficult to initiate new patterns under these conditions, especially when they require outlays of money or effort. CSP, Harambee, FYA, and BRAC started new schools. Communities tend to be more enthusiastic about contributing to new schools, especially when contributions are viewed as a requirement for locating a school in a local area. This is what happened in CSP and Harambee communities, while FYA and BRAC targeted poor communities that could only afford modest support.

A second issue of context concerns bureaucratic environments and the way communities relate to public services. Most of the countries where the models were implemented have autocratic systems of governance where powerful people determine the details of what will happen but often lack accurate knowledge of the local context. Community members may conceal their financial capacities to avoid paying for what "should be a free service." The self-initiated Harambee projects demonstrate the major contributions community members may make when requests come from local initiators for what are perceived locally as needed projects. Initiators who come from outside the community not only may not have an accurate knowledge of local capacities, but they also usually do not possess the local networks to extract even modest contributions. BRAC, for example, believed parents were too poor to pay for NFPE schooling yet were surprised when some parents of NFPE graduates entering government schools paid considerable sums to support their children's schooling.

There are geographic reasons why facilitators may rely more heavily on certain kinds of support. Balochistan is one such context where if remote communities do not take a strong role in managing schools and supporting under-qualified teachers, programs are difficult to sustain. Was it an accident of geography that made CSP facilitators "embolden" communities and give them space to act on their own, or was it effective design? Whichever it was, CSP makes a visible difference both in participation rates and the seriousness with which learning is approached.

Implementors may draw back from "extracting" a maximum amount from communities because they are subject to time and resource pressures that may make them impatient with the "inefficiencies" of local participation. CSP, with its lengthy process for establishing trust, is a good example of the effort it takes to

establish the trust and organizational capacities that elicit useful amounts of community support³ After establishing the community's confidence that the government will provide its agreed share, CSP staff details the support needed to provide a temporary school, leaving it to the community to decide how to apportion cost shares among its members This is an effective approach because it establishes a clear objective but leaves costs, facility standards, and decisions about implementation to communities By not complying, the community automatically triggers its own sanction of forfeiting the government's share

Realistically, there are limits to the kinds of contributions communities can make IMPACT, for example, discovered that most villagers do not have the skills (including literacy) to help children in their academic programs The nature of the centralized education system that exists in most countries limits "program enrichments" communities can make (such as introducing local skill training) without reducing the time spent on "important" course work that leads to coveted diplomas Also, community members often have difficulty accessing government institutions to solve local school problems because of status differences between educated bureaucrats and illiterate villagers

Finally, there may be many reasons community members themselves resist making contributions to projects They may be poor, as in BRAC's targeted communities They may not perceive any benefit in establishing a school, especially when it is a girls' school, as in some CSP communities They might be unwilling to cooperate in a project that also serves tribal groups to whom they are opposed They may not feel a costly program (like IMPACT) is any better than the conventional system They may feel that the school serves urban as opposed to rural needs or that there are no opportunities for their children to continue on to higher education levels, or to find employment after they graduate They may not feel, as in Harambee, a sense of community attachment to others in large catchment areas

Overall there may be few incentives, other than ideological ones such as FYA encourages, for project implementors to stress community participation in support of schools Time constraints, project deadlines, prescribed uses for project money, scaling up problems, a need for expertise that limits "uninformed" participation, and issues of control are just some of the factors discouraging implementors of projects from placing too much emphasis on community participation

In summary, with the exception of Harambee, community contributions have been modest and more in-kind than material Overall, communities have contributed resources, scheduling, advice, some types of tutoring assistance, and management help to ensure the attendance of children and teachers and resolve day-to-day administrative problems In no case has a community been asked to make significant decisions about the education program itself It is generally understood that academic matters should be left to experts who know what children need to learn to succeed on exams

4 Who needs to be involved?

Community contributions may or may not be crucial to the successful implementation of an education model, depending on local circumstances, but the cases show that the presence or absence of certain players in the process can be crucial The players represented in the cases included funders, providers of expertise, field initiators/facilitators, managers, follow-up monitors, and reflectors on the process Even when the package emphasizes only one aspect of delivery—quantity or quality—the model may not be successful if essential "specialists" are not involved

Table 9 3 shows who performed various functions in the six cases The term "stakeholder" is often used in projects to refer to persons who have an interest in the outcomes of an initiative Stakeholders are sometimes identified a priori under the assumption that their interest can be determined by the position they occupy The table shows, however, that there is a great deal of variety in who performs each function in

³ Documents from a now defunct project in Egypt show how early on community participation was considered a key element, but as deadlines made it difficult to afford the time to bring communities fully into the process, the term is seen less and less until it disappears entirely from project reports

the cases. It raises an interesting question: When a project individual or group takes on a function that is officially the responsibility of another group, can the program ultimately be sustained without returning it to the group who “owns” it? For example, if outsiders take on the role of funding, what are the prospects that funding will be taken over by local supporters, assuming that outsiders were involved in the first place because of local inability to fund?

For developers (whether outsiders or insiders), a key strategy may be not how to bypass those with responsibilities for producing certain results but how to ensure that those with vested responsibilities can effectively carry them out. A major requirement of any initiative may therefore be to identify disjunctions in responsibilities and successfully remove them. This is particularly important in community participation where members must join others in covering the full range of functions necessary to achieve their objectives. In all the cases there were examples where facilitators either bypassed responsible agencies or took over functions that were not being performed adequately. While these actions usually produced greater efficiency and/or effectiveness in the short term, it left all of the projects vulnerable in the long term.

Table 9 3 Who is involved in delivering the education program?

Function	IMPACT	Harambee	BRAC	CSP	EN	FYA
Funders	donor	community	donor NGO	donor	donor	donor church government
Experts	INNOTECH foreign	(government) ^a /community	NGO/ community	(government) /NGO	government	NGO
Initiators	INNOTECH	community	NGO	NGO	government	NGO
Implementors	INNOTECH	community	NGO	NGO/ community	government	local staff
Managers	school staff	community	community	community	school staff	local staff
Monitors	(INNOTECH)	—	NGO	NGO	—	NGO local staff
Reflectors	INNOTECH	—	NGO	NGO	—	NGO local staff

() Indicates that an existing package or program was used
a Harambee projects were intended to follow the government design

The sections that follow describe the various players who performed essential functions in implementing the models. The players included donors, departments of ministries, NGOs, school staff, and communities. While the models involved most key players to some extent, none effectively involved them all, and some failed to engage critical players, which ultimately led to flawed results.

a Funders

Funding for a formal public system of education is normally expected to come from state budgets, but as noted earlier in all of these cases, officials of the countries believed there were insufficient funds to provide opportunities for all children needing education. Directly, by expanding school opportunities, or indirectly through cost reductions, each of the models attempted to address this problem. Practically speaking, the shortfall in resources could be solved in any of three ways: by generating more resources at the national level, by asking communities to share more of the burden, or by soliciting funding from international donors. In five of the six cases, a substantial part of the funding came from international donors. Only Harambee generated major funding from its communities, and even then, some communities were able to tap international sources of church funding.

Funding was directed at three main activities: support for governmental organizations or NGOs that initiated and/or facilitated implementation of the projects, the development of innovative designs and, in some cases, the creation and testing of critical components, and in a later stage, bringing successful models to scale. The funders for different types of support could and often did differ. For example, SEAMEO, the organization that initiated the idea of IMPACT, had been established with assistance from USAID, while the development and trial of the IMPACT model was funded by CIDA. One of the reasons IMPACT may not have been brought to scale was the belief of Filipino educators that expansion required additional outside support for converting schools and providing the extras the schools required, while CIDA believed the tested project should be taken over by government agencies.

BRAC, in its early stage of NFPE development, was funded by Interpares in Canada, which was joined in subsequent years with support from NORAD, SIDA, and UNICEF (for its older children's program), while its large-scale expansion phase was funded by a consortium of seven major donors. BRAC has not addressed the question of support for its future programs, which are now dependent for most of their funding on outside sources. BRAC's own production facilities only support about a third of its program costs.

CSP and the Society that implements it also receive foreign support. Once established, however, CSP schools become government schools that are funded to the same degree as other government schools. The issue is one that concerns the GOB, for the expansion of schools, while a necessary expenditure, also puts a strain on government budgets as new schools are absorbed into the conventional system. Escuela Nueva is similarly implemented through government support. Originally based on the UNESCO Unitary Schools project, Escuela Nueva's initial development costs were supported by USAID in 1975. They expanded modestly with the help of the InterAmerican Development Bank, and were brought to scale through support from UNICEF and the World Bank. The extra costs for its quality-focused program are for value-added inputs, which will ultimately be adopted by the Government of Colombia if Escuela Nueva is to continue.

The problems with outside funding from the perspective of local implementors are obvious: there are time and funding limits and funders have their own expectations about how money should be spent. Often when it comes time to expand the model, the donor that paid for development may not be willing to assume the expense of bringing it to scale, or conversely, in bringing it to scale, as McGinn believes happened in Escuela Nueva, may not provide time enough for the modifications that preserve the essence of what made the model effective. Local governments are ultimately left with the responsibility of supporting the extra costs generated by the innovative project if they cannot find alternative sources of funding.

b Providers of expertise

If one assumes the traditional model of a schooling program as "a teacher teaching students a set curriculum," then at least four kinds of experts are needed to realize the delivery of a comprehensive program: experts who understand local community needs, experts who determine the content of curricula, design and test appropriate materials, and plan training and supervisory support, experts who determine how to manage inputs, credential the results, and create the policy environment where productive results can be realized, and experts who know how to build the systems and institutional arrangements for continuous program improvement. In the real world, these types of expertise rarely come together in as effective a manner as one would hope. The community experts may not be recognized as such, the program development experts may not be sufficiently skilled, the managers may not work in effective concert with the field, and institutional structures to routinize the reflection process are disregarded or poorly understood.

Table 9.3 above shows how the models dealt with "gaps" in expertise. IMPACT charged INNOTECH, a separate unit within the SEAMEO regional network, with designing the program's components, including the community's role, the development of the instructional program, the training of teachers, etc. In effect, IMPACT designers removed these components from the ministry departments traditionally providing them to a unit in INNOTECH. Ultimately, this removal from existing "experts" meant IMPACT components were no longer owned by the units that would have to sustain them over the long term.

Escuela Nueva followed a similar pattern and, like IMPACT, found that what was won in internal consistency of design by bringing the components together was lost in the resistance of those whose traditional authorities had been challenged. The opposite was true in Harambee and CSP, where it was recognized that the community's role was complementary and limited, and relied heavily on traditional government experts for the content of its education program. Both projects, however, were disappointed in the quality of education that resulted. BRAC, as a non-formal program, had fewer constraints. It could provide virtually all its own experts for every aspect of the program, even though it was still constrained by a need to prepare its graduates for the formal system. The disadvantage was that as a self-contained entity, BRAC's demise would also mean the demise of its program. FYA, through its outside funding, also had considerable latitude to innovate with professional training and instructional materials even though it remained ostensibly within the public government system.

The use of experts raises an issue about the kind of role communities can realistically be asked to play. Can one, for example, ask communities to decide on technical issues of program quality? IMPACT parents resisted the idea of students teaching students, but implementors ignored their complaints as "uninformed." BRAC parents wanted annual exams and physical punishment to be established in BRAC schools "to make them more like the government schools." BRAC responded by instituting exams but continued to ban physical punishment. To what extent should parents decide these and other issues? How does one deal with different expectations for education—what is desirable at the national level, or for NGO implementors, may not be the same as what is desirable for parents and children. The NGO may care about learning that achieves development objectives, while families may be more interested in diplomas that lead to jobs. Who should make these kinds of decisions, and realistically how much choice do parents have in matters of national curricula?

c Field initiators/facilitators of implementation

Mobilizing a community for effective action requires people who can provide leadership as well as assistance in establishing communication channels to authorities, resource management, and troubleshooting.

The models were initiated as a response either to the perceived failure or expectation of future failure of the government to provide adequately for the delivery of education services. The players who initiated/implemented the models included government organizations (IMPACT, Escuela Nueva), independent NGOs (BRAC and FYA), community leaders (Harambee), or a combination of government, community, and NGO facilitators (CSP).

Out of six cases, five were initiated and facilitated by persons from outside the community, though in all cases, by nationals of the same country. Only Harambee was organized mostly by community members, although often these members included persons with connections into higher levels of government. There are four advantages to having outside intermediaries initiate or facilitate the programs: to bring resources to the communities (all cases), to negotiate responsibilities between stakeholders (CSP, IMPACT, BRAC, FYA), to communicate with various levels of the existing education system (all cases), and to coordinate the resources and activities provided by a number of key players in a way that most communities are not able to do successfully by themselves (all cases).

Several other reasons why initiators/facilitators tended to be non-community members held true for all but Harambee: communities had become passive recipients of government services when they were available and did not conceive of a role for themselves in bringing more or better education services to their communities, the benefits of education to individuals and to the state were usually more obvious to members of a national organization than to rural community members, and the urgency to universalize educational opportunities motivated national organizations to create shortcuts to these objectives when it was clear that the government couldn't provide them alone. Harambee communities again are the interesting exception: they recognized the importance of education and their own potential role in filling the gap, and then launched an initiative to supplement the government's efforts.

With only modest technical assistance from outsiders, all the models were designed and/or implemented by cultural insiders, though not necessarily community members. Does this mean projects implemented by insiders are more inclined to be successful? To what extent are cultural insiders still outsiders when there is a major gulf in economic and educational status between them and the members of the community? How legitimate are interests of outsiders (such as pushing the girls' agenda) when promoting participatory involvement? Is funding of only some options a limitation on participation?

d Management, supervision, and monitoring

The management function (including supervision and monitoring) was carried out in a variety of ways by the projects. Responsibility for management at the school level was carried out by special managers/principals or teachers (IMPACT, Harambee, Escuela Nueva, and FYA), at the community level through oversight committees (Harambee, BRAC, CSP, and FYA), and at the level of the NGO main office (CSP and BRAC) or regional government offices (Escuela Nueva and FYA).

Since each case represents a different combination of management functions, it is necessary to describe each briefly. IMPACT invested its main management function in teachers who were given the new role of "managing instruction," which meant organizing learning groups, distributing educational materials, and assessing student progress. The larger schools also had principals who managed their programs in the traditional sense. The managing role in Harambee schools was vested in the headmaster, with oversight by a school management committee registered with the government. The community normally had a committee to resolve problems of financing and other problems the community could solve.

BRAC schools were managed at the community level with a village education committee, and serviced, through program officers, by a complex but efficient management structure responsible for all aspects of the program countrywide. CSP, by nature of their distant schools, relied heavily on the day-to-day management of community school management committees. CSP staff and teacher trainers monitored the progress of the schools in a bifurcated system that emphasized both quality (instruction) and quantity (participation and inputs). Escuela Nueva schools were usually small and multigraded. The teacher was responsible for managing the day-to-day activities of the school and the community. Monthly meetings in the regional offices gave officials who didn't have the funds or time to visit schools a chance to receive feedback from teachers. FYA relied on principals to manage daily activities in the school and community, and coordinated communication between centers through regional and national offices.

The management examples that received the most positive attention from program evaluators were those of BRAC and CSP. BRAC's successes in large part were attributed to its comprehensive and efficient management system, which is capable of responding quickly to the needs of schools and, in record time, has met replication targets. It incorporates capacities to initiate new schools, train staff, monitor progress, feedback information, solve problems, develop and test new programs, and study weaknesses that become apparent in the program. CSP has impressed evaluators with the culturally sensitive way it manages the community mobilization process, using techniques that respond to the local need for transparency and trust. CSP's efforts to create a partnership relationship of shared commitment to project purposes emboldens communities to take over the day-to-day management of schools.

The management system that most exemplifies a decentralization model is FYA, which is designed to put the local school/center at the core and build support structures around it. This model provides the most flexibility to innovate programs that meet the specific needs of local communities.

e Reflection on the process

A final function, which is missing from some of the models but adds importantly to them where it exists, is a "reflective" process. This function incorporates such activities as collecting information to improve the model, developing channels to communicate information to those who can use it, and taking thoughtful actions to improve results. BRAC is the best example of this function. Its programs have an openness to

inspection and criticism by outsiders as well as its own staff that does not occur to the same extent in other models. BRAC management encourages supervisory staff to feedback information on problems in schools and communities that can be addressed with policy changes and improvement. CSP and IMPACT are open to the scrutiny of their own staffs and showed evidence that, internally at least, they continued to improve procedures in those aspects of the program with which they were most concerned—community mobilization for CSP and program effectiveness and efficiency for IMPACT. FYA also possesses an effective system for collecting information on and communicating successful experiments to its networks of centers. Because of its cost-consciousness, FYA staff are careful to ensure efficiencies in its procedures and programs. It does not, however, appear to have procedures that systematically link these efficiencies with program effectiveness.

5 What is the impact of models incorporating community participation?

In the introduction it was noted that models incorporating community participation are often expected to produce better results than conventional models that do not include this component. It is difficult to prove that this is indeed an outcome of community participation. The special attention given to schools and communities using innovative models may in itself account for any positive effects produced. Given this necessary caution, how have various projects compared with the conventional system? Has it proven true that these particular delivery models, incorporating community participation, have produced better results than the conventional system, and can any of the positive results be directly linked to community participation?

Table 9.4 shows the impacts of the innovative models in relation to conventional systems on five dimensions.

Table 9.4 Model impacts in relation to the conventional system

Measure	IMPACT	Harambee	BRAC	CSP	EN	FYA
Educational participation^a	?	+	+	+	+	+
Achievement	=	-	=	=	=	=
Program quality	+	-	+	+	+ / (-)	+
Accountability	=	+	+	+	+	+
Costs^b	- / +	- / +	-	+	+	- / +

+ increase = same as less than ? no data available +/- reflects variation in these categories

a The rating reflects a number of indicators including enrollment, reduced dropout, completion, and attendance.

b The rating reflects costs to the state and parents.

a Educational participation

Do the models increase participation in education? Do they produce higher enrollments, better attendance, less dropout, and higher completion rates than the conventional system? Do they make education more accessible—to girls and others who tend to remain outside the system? The answer to the second question of higher enrollments is generally yes, where data are available, simply because many of the models are introduced into situations where services were not accessible before (BRAC, Harambee, CSP, and FYA). The answer to the third question of providing more access to disadvantaged groups is “yes” in three cases (BRAC, CSP, and FYA), and mixed in two cases (Harambee and Escuela Nueva). IMPACT’s results are unclear but probably mixed.

No precise data on participation rates are available for IMPACT, though anecdotal evidence suggests lower dropout and better attendance rates than conventional schools, and perhaps more enrollments early in the project. Later, for various reasons, some parents withdrew students from IMPACT schools and sent them

to conventional schools, causing overall enrollment to drop in IMPACT schools, though not necessarily in the geographic area as a whole

BRAC participation rates were unequivocally positive. There was better attendance, less dropout, and better completion rates than the conventional system, and every enrolled BRAC child was theoretically an addition to the overall pool of children receiving an education. BRAC also had a better record on educating the poor and girls. CSP had a better record than the conventional system with dropout rates (no data were available yet on completion rates), and most of the students—except the few enrolled in boys' schools who transferred to the CSP school—were additions to the pool of girls who would not otherwise have enrolled. Girls' enrollments have more than doubled in Balochistan since CSP began. Attendance rates according to Thomas were the same as the conventional system despite heavy parental monitoring.

Escuela Nueva concentrated its reforms on program quality, and consequently there is little specific information on participation rates. The fact, however, that rural enrollments increased by over 30 percent during the period of the project and that over half of rural schools were using the Escuela Nueva model suggests possible increases. In one sample, repetition and dropout were significantly lower in Escuela Nueva schools than in the conventional system. Overall the enrollment of girls is higher than boys in rural areas but considerable socio-economic differences still influence schooling in rural Colombia.

Harambee increased overall enrollments by roughly the number of its students and increased the proportion of enrolled female students over the conventional system. However, it exacerbated regional and socio-economic inequities. Other data are not available on attendance and dropout in Harambee schools.

b Achievement

Do the innovative programs increase achievement results over the conventional system? The general answer is that, with the exception of Harambee and possibly CSP, they produce achievement levels equal to or slightly higher than conventional systems but not significantly higher except on isolated subjects. Some would call this a positive sign since the "experimental" students tended to come from more disadvantaged



backgrounds, and fewer of the "poorer ability" students dropped out. Again, there are variations by project, but generally the answer is no.

BRAC students scored about the same as conventional students on national tests and twice as high on tests of basic education attainment though on the latter, they achieved only about half the standard set by the test developers. Again, evaluators have pointed out that BRAC students are from the most disadvantaged groups, which might be expected to do less well.

BRAC's students, by design, come from disadvantaged groups that do not otherwise attend school. Though not expected to do as well as more advantaged groups, assessments show they have done as well or better. *Photo by A T Sweetser*

A sample of CSP schools showed mixed results. The CSP student scores were higher than those of girls in boys' and girls' conventional schools but lower than boys in boys' conventional schools. These results are not promising given the intense preparation of CSP teachers and the fact that CSP students had roughly double the number of days of schooling as students in conventional schools during the trial period.

Escuela Nueva scores were modestly higher and in a few subjects significantly higher than the conventional system. FYA students were graded about the same as conventional students, occasionally one or the other scored significantly higher but not consistently in favor of one group over the other during the four years when records were kept. Harambee schools varied considerably in test scores. A few schools produced results that matched the better conventional schools, but on average their results were much lower than the conventional system, as evidenced also by their generally lower eligibility for higher stages of education.

c Quality of teaching/learning

Do the innovative models improve the quality of teaching/learning over the conventional system? The conventional systems in all the countries used rote-memorization methods of instruction. Evidence of improved quality in this study was taken to mean the successful implementation of elements in the innovative program, which were intended to improve methods of instruction and/or the learning environment.

As measured against their designers' expectations, considerable progress was made in improving the quality of the program in IMPACT, BRAC, CSP, and Escuela Nueva schools. The positive results in Escuela Nueva schools during their pilot phase, however, were not consistently replicated during large-scale expansion. Teachers reported no difference in their teaching practices compared with those of teachers in the conventional system, and less than half used self-instructional guides, which were the main innovation around which instruction in Escuela Nueva schools was organized. In Harambee's case, where communities lacked the expertise to improve quality, most observers would agree that overall program quality was poorer in comparison to the conventional system. FYA started a pilot project in 1996 to improve the quality of instruction, presumably because it was not satisfied with previous attempts at quality improvement. It is too early to assess whether this new project will be successful.

A special note needs to be made of BRAC's efforts to improve quality. It continually reviewed and evaluated its program to improve the quality of instruction, and finally in late 1996, it also entered a period of "consolidation" to focus more of its energies on this issue.

d Accountability of school personnel to parents

Do the innovative models increase accountability of school personnel to parents over the conventional system? Or have parents been emboldened to demand accountability for education services their children receive? It has not been a practice in areas where the models were implemented to view parents as customers who need to be satisfied with the education services they receive. There are two contributing factors: one is the perception of staff that the community is not interested, can't understand, or should not be concerned with program results. The second is that hierarchical systems of reporting tend to direct school or NGO staff attention toward pleasing supervisors. Staff tend to feel they should be accountable to community clients only when the community holds some power over them—when they either come from the same village and have social ties (CSP and BRAC) their continued employment or salaries depend on community satisfaction (as in unassisted Harambee and CSP schools), or sometimes when community education committees exist to manage the schools and members are empowered to exert their influence (BRAC, Harambee, and CSP). FYA staff, because of their motivational commitment to community development and the less hierarchical nature of their institutional structure, may also feel a closeness to community members that serves this purpose during their frequent informal contacts.

Another means of providing accountability is through routine parents' meetings and reporting systems on student progress. Even though some models provide these systems (BRAC, Escuela Nueva, FYA, and IMPACT), it is not clear that staff view themselves as accounting for their professional actions to parents in the process. Documentation is also limited on the extent to which community members believe it is their

right to demand accountability from teaching personnel (probably few do) or are listened to when they do—one expects, with the exception occasionally of CSP and Harambee, and possibly BRAC, that it is unusual for their complaints on performance to be heard. In other words, there is little hard evidence that the implementation of community “involvement” models in this study led to significantly greater accountability of school personnel to their community clients than is found in the conventional system.

The area of staff accountability to parents was largely overlooked in all of the designs, and indeed it is a difficult issue because of the often unclear line between what it is appropriate for parents to “demand” and what it is expected “experts” will decide.

e Costs of education

Are the innovative models cost-effective compared with the conventional system? That is, do they produce the same or better learning results at the same or lower cost? Since all the models show roughly the same learning results as conventional models, except Harambee, learning does not appear to have been compromised by the innovation. However, some models cost more and some cost less than the conventional system.

There are three types of cost-savings: annual per-pupil costs, costs to parents, and costs to the state. Annual per-pupil costs were lower than in the conventional system in IMPACT (by one-half, mainly because of more efficient use of teachers), Harambee (estimated), and BRAC (by one-third if the higher dropout in the government system is averaged into the estimate, otherwise it is the same). CSP and Escuela Nueva per-pupil costs were higher since they were both essentially government programs with additional “enhancements.” FYA per-pupil cost comparisons are not known fully in the two countries studied, but in other countries where Swope calculated the costs FYA is roughly 20 percent more than the conventional system.

Costs to parents were higher in Harambee, IMPACT, CSP, Escuela Nueva, and FYA because of the material and in-kind contributions they were asked to make to the programs. In BRAC alone parents’ costs were less than in the conventional system. Costs to state budgets were also less in BRAC, which was funded directly through donors outside the formal system, and theoretically (though never realized) in IMPACT through per-pupil savings. FYA cost the government mainly for teachers’ salaries, and was therefore a cost-saving for the State budget. CSP and Escuela Nueva cost their governments more, assuming donor support as part of what otherwise would have been resources available for education budgets. At first glance Harambee costs would appear to be a savings for the government, but instead the unplanned and often irrational expansion of assisted Harambee schools consumed education budgets that might have been put to better use in providing quality improvements in more efficiently consolidated schools.

f Other indicators of impact

The models can be measured on other dimensions that suggest important aspects of their performance. Table 9.5 shows these additional impacts.

Table 9.5 Additional outcomes of the case models

Measure	IMPACT	Harambee	BRAC	CSP	EN	FYA
Community institutions	low	high	low	med/high	low	high
Replication	low	high	high	high	high	high
Sustainability	low	med	low	med	med	high

Institutions that advance the objectives of civil society Does local participation in the “experimental” communities help to establish the grassroots institutions and participatory behaviors believed to enhance civil society and long-term local development?

Three of the models appear to promote these civil society outcomes (Harambee, CSP, and FYA) while in the three others, it is not clear that these outcomes have been achieved at a level that might significantly impact community development. For example, IMPACT involves the community according to its own designs and does not encourage self-standing village management committees to form (though it does use PTAs to inform parents and receive feedback about student progress). BRAC creates and supports a village education committee to discuss school problems but relies on its own program officers to control information flow back to headquarters and to resolve local problems. When school communities are part of BRAC's rural development program, there may be greater exercise of self-help participatory behaviors in rural development councils. Escuela Nueva uses the community as a resource but does not support the establishment of local institutions for long-term development.

On the other hand, CSP facilitators go further in this respect than the conventional system or other models by creating a representative body of parents to manage the school and then relinquishing control so the committees can take their own initiatives in establishing schools. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many communities become quite active in supporting the schools. Although this does not guarantee that behaviors learned through CSP—elections, transparency, cross-cutting memberships, and civic responsibility—will be used to address other development problems, many of these aspects of their development as community organizations are unique in rural Balochistan.

FYA informally encourages the expression of local needs and participatory behaviors needed to support the development of civil society. Some of its most effective modes of organization appear to be ad hoc committees and informal groupings for single purpose activities that supplement the more formal associations of parents and community members with continuing responsibilities for the maintenance of center programs.

Harambee shows both the positive and negative aspects of a delivery of education that is almost completely community-initiated. The local agencies that implement Harambee projects depend on existing community structures, which means in effect that they are only as representative and democratic as their evolution has allowed them to become. Recent competition for development resources has subjected some of these organizations to political and authoritarian controls more intense than they have experienced before. The objectives of civil society tend not to be advanced in such cases, even though community organizations as such are given a thorough workout in supporting Harambee activities.



Fe y Alegria's curriculum informally encourages students such as these girls to value civil society initiatives. Photo by Teresa Kavanaugh

Replication Were the innovative models replicated on a large scale? This measure indicates whether the models were deemed successful enough to imitate and whether their designs were conducive

to widespread dissemination. It also shows that enough of the essential actors and departments of government supported expansion to make it feasible.

All of the models were expanded significantly except IMPACT, though not always without difficulty. Harambee met official resistance in the form of difficult registration requirements and the government's renegeing for a time on financial support. BRAC ran into fundamentalist religious opposition in communities where it had not established previous relationships. CSP exceeded its NGO staff capacities and donor support and was forced to slow its progress until more money became available and new NGOs were contracted to serve hard-to-reach districts. Escuela Nueva met resistance from traditionalist elements, and consequently the program was not fully replicated in many schools.

Despite these difficulties, FYA, Escuela Nueva, CSP, BRAC, and Harambee were all replicated widely. IMPACT is the negative example that proves the point. Its facilitators never sufficiently engaged government leaders in restructuring key departments to replicate the program widely, and it has consequently never been implemented in more than a few schools in the Philippines, although it has been replicated widely in other countries.

Sustainability Is it likely that the innovative models will be sustained in the future? To be sustained, a model must be affordable, and personnel who implement it must have the skills and willingness to continue implementing it. Several cases (Harambee, IMPACT, and CSP) show that another crucial element required is to maintain productive links with government institutions that are a source of material and technical support. BRAC's program in some respects was driven by the standards of the government's program, and Escuela Nueva all along was a part of the formal system. FYA seems to have negotiated itself the most favorable relationship with a government that pays its teachers' salaries and grants it significant autonomy to create its own innovative programs.

It is not clear that any of the project models can guarantee future sustainability if all the conditions above must be met. However, it is important to separate the issue of sustainability of an initiating party (e.g., the Society, BRAC, and FYA) from the question of sustainability of programs (e.g., CSP, NFPE, and FYA centers). In some of the cases the sustainability of programs is "guaranteed" through their incorporation into the government schooling system (CSP, Escuela Nueva, IMPACT, Harambee, and FYA). When this happens the program may continue more or less according to its innovative design, depending on the extent to which government officials possess relevant skills, knowledge, and motivation to maintain its original character. IMPACT was intended to reach this stage but failed to win the acceptance of the bodies that would have to replicate and sustain it. Escuela Nueva met similar resistance, and, though replicated on a major scale, it has not been able to sustain many of its innovative features. CSP has concerns that structural problems in government institutions that contributed to low quality programs and poor field support even before the project have not been resolved and may affect CSP schools as they come fully under government control. Harambee supporters believe its programs will be better resourced and produce consistently better education results under government care. However, the sheer number of Harambee schools dilutes the resources and capacities of government to produce these quality results. Of these cases, BRAC alone designed its program to be finite until a time (unlikely to be soon) when the government is able to serve all children.

The major problem of sustainability for all the programs is the continuing availability of funds, and in this respect the initiating parties are the most vulnerable. Most of them would probably not survive without their present sources of support from the community (Harambee) or through donors (CSP, BRAC, Escuela Nueva, and FYA). IMPACT has already virtually disappeared from the Philippines because of lack of funding support for up-front school conversion and instructional materials support—its considerable cost savings never incorporated into government budgets in a way that would realize economies for the state, the schools, and the parents.

Support is a sensitive issue. On the one hand, in an example like Harambee, it is clear that communities can add substantial resources and/or cost savings to the total support available for education delivery.

However, if resources become a requirement for individuals or communities to participate in schooling programs, then the ability of targeted groups to participate may be limited (BRAC and Harambee). If the community pays the bulk of delivery support (also as in Harambee), then the long-term sustainability of projects may be in doubt (especially if other uses emerge for the same resources), the quality and quantity of the inputs may be variable, and the output of the program may suffer.

C Summary

This chapter demonstrates the considerable variation in "community participation as practice" in six countries. The variation extends all the way from how community participation was incorporated into an innovative model to how much impact it may have had on the delivery and implementation of education programs. The innovative models also differed in focus, from emphasizing expanded education opportunities in some, to focusing on the quality of the program in others, to developing a comprehensive package of both in yet others. The designers of all the models clearly believed community participation would contribute positively to project outcomes, even though they were vague in how that would happen, and often felt dissatisfied with the results.

It is difficult to assess the success of the models independent of specific measures like those used in the descriptions. Each was successful in certain ways and failed in others. A proponent of any of the innovative designs might argue that it is unfair to judge them at this time, since none except perhaps FYA was implemented to its full potential. Harambee was not joined effectively by the government, IMPACT was never brought to scale for lack of government support, BRAC remained outside the formal system, effectively leaving no permanent delivery system in place, Escuela Nueva met the resistance of educationists who only partially implemented the program, and CSP was occasionally compromised by conflicting government programs and policies.

Chapter 10 Community Participation and the Delivery of Education Programs

Best Practices

- Building trust in the community BRAC, CSP, FYA
 - Strong management structure BRAC, FYA
 - Motivational/inspirational training for staff FYA
 - Field support, communication channels BRAC, FYA, CSP
 - Strong monitoring, evaluation BRAC
 - Responsiveness to community concerns BRAC, CSP, FYA
 - Improving quality IMPACT, Escuela Nueva, and BRAC
 - Empowering local people to act Harambee, CSP, FYA
 - Clearly defining roles and responsibilities of partners CSP, BRAC
 - Harnessing traditional modes of organization Harambee
 - Garnering local resources CSP, Harambee
 - Innovating instructional materials BRAC, IMPACT, Escuela Nueva, FYA
 - Developing productive links to education authorities CSP, FYA
 - Encouraging norms of educational participation Harambee, BRAC, CSP, FYA
 - Forming and utilizing grassroots institutions to solve local education problems
Harambee, BRAC, CSP, FYA
 - Creating school management committees BRAC, CSP, IMPACT
 - Culturally sensitive approach to communities CSP, FYA
 - Cutting the costs of education without decreasing student achievement or quality of
the learning program IMPACT
 - Effective system for replicating BRAC
 - System for reflection and correction BRAC, FYA
-

A Overview

The previous chapter reviewed the case studies for evidence of community participation as practice. This chapter makes observations of a more general nature about community participation in education delivery. In addition to the overview, this chapter includes seven sections: expectations for community participation, definitions of community participation, the reality of community participation, general conclusions, specific lessons learned, three “Models of Community Participation,” and a final word.

B Expectations for community participation

It has become almost axiomatic for donor-funded initiatives to require “community participation” in projects. Even when donors define community participation theoretically, however, it is usually not clear what is meant or how this component should be implemented in practice. Critics question whether community participation is necessary at all in the delivery of education, which often requires technical expertise more than local support. From their perspective, resources should be directed at increasing the capacity of state organizations to deliver quality education efficiently and effectively. Mobilizing communities to take over state functions only postpones the time when the state’s institutions must inevitably be reformed. In the meantime programs may be inequitably and inconsistently implemented, depending on the availability of local resources and communities’ perceptions of their needs.

The counter argument is, of course, that governments may never have sufficient resources to provide educational opportunities for all children and that community support is crucial in supplementing state efforts. In certain difficult-to-reach or resistant populations, working through parents may be the only way to attract

enrollments and ensure the provision of a quality program. These proponents argue that participation, in any case, is not just about achieving education services but is a good idea in itself: that people have a right to participate in decisions about their own welfare, that participation develops the skills necessary to support civil society and democratic values, that practically speaking if people participate they are more likely to take ownership of ideas and accept responsibility for carrying them out, that participation and self-help are integral aspects of development and the sustainability of initiatives.

To these proponents, participation is also a logical extension of education—that is, it provides children with opportunities to experience in practice what they learn in school. Community participation exercises values such as transparency, equity, meritocracy, and representation, which may not be practiced in the society but which may be necessary to set the groundwork for solid development. Without community participation, this view concludes, education may become an alienating experience that prevents what is learned from enriching the local experience.

School can be a useful arena in which to practice the values and behaviors supporting civil society. Parents who participate in meetings where community issues are discussed, where everyone's opinion is heard, and where consensus of the community is sought on solving local problems are practicing the values of civil society. Electing representatives to school management committees and becoming active contributors in the development process creates a sense of civic responsibility. To make the most of these opportunities in a project requires considerable thought about the behaviors that will be encouraged to bring about results. Being recipients of someone else's decisions, for example, or taking part in required meetings to hear lectures on the virtues of attendance may not be appropriate ways to learn these values.

The contradictory expectations for community participation suggest a number of questions—not all of which can be answered by this study. Is community participation even necessary in the delivery of quality education programs? What can community participation be expected to accomplish? Do the cases suggest effective community participation strategies? Did the cases meet any of the general expectations for the implementation of community participation?

C Definitions of community participation

Designers of the case models seemed to have agreed that community participation was a useful strategy in accomplishing education objectives. However, it was not always clear how community participation was supposed to accomplish those ends. The lack of clarity meant there was no satisfactory standard against which to measure whether "adequate" or even "characteristic" community participation was going on in the projects.

International agreement on the meaning of community participation is also lacking, even though most major international funders have defined what they mean by the term "participation." The World Bank, for example, defines participation as "a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources that affect them" (World Bank 1996b). In an earlier document, it was also noted that "Participation means influence on development decisions, not simply involvement in the implementation of benefits of a development activity" (Bratnager and Williams 1992 in Nagle 1993: 17). Some World Bank staff prefer to approach participation as a means for accomplishing development ends, and not an end in itself, which may be construed as advancing political rather than development goals (Bratnager and Williams 1992 in Nagle 1993: 24).

The Administrator of USAID, Brian Atwood, in 1993, issued a "Statement of Principles on Participatory Development," which summarized USAID's concept of participatory initiatives and the relation of donors to that process. He made several main points:

- decisions about development priorities and policies should be reached in the host country by those who must sustain them,

- USAID assistance complements the “social energies” and commitments shown by the recipient society,
- USAID projects and programs are accountable to the end user or customer, and
- USAID programs aim to strengthen the capacity of the host-country society—particularly the poor—to take the next steps in improving conditions and opportunities in a sustainable way

He says that “Participation is both the end and the means both the results we seek and the way that we, as providers of development and humanitarian assistance, must nurture those results ”

Both definitions focus on decision making by all stakeholders interested in development schemes. However, USAID is more specific about the consequences of participatory development, describing the direct and indirect beneficiaries in local and national “communities” who should influence decisions about development as well as constitute the customers to whom developers are accountable. All must be empowered through participation to continue their own development. The USAID definition sees participation to be cultivated not just for its instrumental value in producing development benefits but because of its potential to widen those benefits.

D The reality of community participation

Do the cases fit either of the definitions above? To answer this question, the term “community participation” has to be examined from the perspective of the participants. The term “community” in the cases had the very limited meaning of “people in a circumscribed area who benefit directly or indirectly from the presence of quality education.” The term implies a common purpose or anticipated benefit that is either direct to children and their parents or indirect to other community members. In reviewing the cases, it is usually possible to identify a “community of clients” who were resident in a specific geographical location, but sometimes it is more difficult to determine who these clients are. For example, in Harambee, initiators of the projects had to define potential catchment areas for their secondary schools and then create a common interest among the clients so that they would support the schools. The nature of these communities, with few other interests in common, required special fundraising techniques and special leaders such as politicians, whose networks spanned larger geographic areas. In CSP, on the other hand, before school communities could be mobilized, facilitators had to reconcile contending groups within a village or settlement area so they could focus their energies in supporting the initiative. The term “community” in the cases seems to fit the narrower World Bank meaning of “direct beneficiaries,” though at the same time most of the case projects also involved “the national communities of stakeholders” implied by the USAID definition.

“Participation” is the second part of the question. Both definitions stressed decision making among the beneficiaries or clients of development initiatives. As was shown in the previous chapter, participation in four of the six cases stressed “tell” and “sell” approaches, and whatever decision making went on at the local level was narrowly circumscribed to such issues as school scheduling and school locations. Important decisions about the selection of a community for project benefits or about the kind of program to be implemented were usually made by persons outside the community. At best, a community might be asked for permission to lodge a project in its environs and, even then, as in IMPACT, the project might be carried out over the objections of parents. Certain important decisions about project interventions were made by national officials and NGO managers, and therefore satisfy at least part of the broader definition of participation by country members that USAID recommends.

In short, community participation in the case examples, with the partial exception of Harambee and possibly CSP, fall considerably short of the expectations for community participation articulated in donor definitions. Community members made few decisions about education delivery for their children (though sometimes in FYA, they made decisions about other community programs). Similarly, few implementors envisaged the community as the client to which they were answerable, even though they may have worked conscientiously toward goals that would benefit the community. It was also rare for implementors to know-

ingly create the conditions where the practice of civil society might flourish. Indeed, in the most extreme case, the insensitive behavior of implementors in “informing” the community and “assigning them responsibilities” contributed to the community’s resistance to the project.

From their rhetoric, most of the project designers also seemed to have believed in community participation as a good in itself. But their failure to specify how that good might be realized, coupled with a tendency to mobilize communities mainly in terms of program delivery, meant that those beneficial aspects went unrealized. Of all the cases, CSP devoted the most attention to establishing a participatory process that modelled the behaviors of civil society. The time, effort, and resources CSP spent in promoting these objectives suggest that these practices do not materialize on their own, especially in circumstances where they are not normally found. There is of course a potential trade-off in the loss of support for other project objectives when resources are devoted to community participation. Some would argue that the long-term benefits in ownership and sustainability more than make up for the expenses incurred, while others feel the community’s contribution never fully makes up for losses to other components of the project.

Again we are left with questions: What kinds of decisions can appropriately and practically be made at the community level given the centralized nature of modern-day education systems? Is it too much to expect of facilitators to see community members as customers, when it is usually the state’s objectives that are being carried out? How can communities be involved in education delivery in ways that reinforce the practice of civil society?

E General findings

The evidence from the cases leads to some tentative conclusions about community participation.

- 1) Models for improving the quality and delivery of education programs that incorporate a community participation component can produce results that are equivalent to or greater than those produced by conventional systems. They can produce these results even among groups that, because of their characteristics, would be expected to show poorer results. It is not possible to say, however, that community participation is responsible in whole or in part for these effects since there are so many confounding factors. One can only say that community participation does not prevent the positive effects from occurring.
- 2) Models incorporating community participation can help to increase the educational participation of disadvantaged groups such as the poor, the rural, and girls as long as there is a way of ensuring their inclusion in the groups served by the project. Community involvement in decisions about scheduling, school conditions, and facility location seems to encourage the participation of these groups.
- 3) Community participation alone, without a productive link to technical experts who produce, deliver, supervise, manage, and reflect on the inputs of education, is not enough to guarantee the delivery of a quality education.
- 4) Community participation is more likely to contribute importantly to the delivery of education programs where demand for education exists but circumstances are such that governments have failed to provide an adequate supply of conventional schooling opportunities.
- 5) Communities can be drawn into the process of delivering education in ways that contribute to the formation of institutions of civil society and the practice of democratic values. Doing so may add value to the results, which is in addition to any results community participation may produce as an instrumental strategy in education delivery.

These conclusions have to be phrased as potentialities rather than foregone conclusions since each requires an effort of design or implementation to make it true. Community participation, like any other component,

has a cost in money, time, and effort that projects tend to overlook. Beyond these material considerations, it requires trust and a space to act before communities can be counted on to take independent initiatives in support of education delivery.

If it is disappointing to find the conclusions expressed so tentatively, the implications are nonetheless clear. Project designs need to recognize that

- community participation can be both valued end and useful means, but to be either, careful thought must go into how to involve communities and to what purposes,
- community participation may be more appropriate in some contexts and for some purposes than others, and consequently it must be clear why it is used and how to obtain the results desired, and
- community participation has a cost, which must be weighed against trade-offs in lost support for other project components.

F Specific lessons learned

The cases provide some specific lessons on community participation.

1 Clarifying the purposes of community participation

Sometimes the case designers seemed to view community participation as a panacea for whatever was going wrong or was missing in educational delivery, and frequently they were disappointed to find it did not accomplish all that was expected. They did little in advance, however, to clarify what they hoped to accomplish and in most cases did not assess or make mid-course corrections to improve its impact when things were not going well.

Because it is costly to a project in time and money, it is surprising to see community participation strategies applied automatically without knowing what they might accomplish and whether they are likely to be cost-effective. Is community participation used in a project as a strategy to augment resources, to encourage the enrollment of hard-to-reach groups, to extend the government's oversight over schools, or to promote the practice of civil society? Each of these purposes requires a different kind of design. If expectations are clear from the start, it is apparent when progress is being made or when corrective actions need to be taken.

The purposes for involving the community in the cases usually have to be inferred. They range from winning community acceptance of an innovative program and providing material and in-kind support (IMPACT) to garnering significant resources (Harambee), solving minor problems and ensuring regular attendance (BRAC), supplementing the capacities of government (CSP), and making schooling more relevant to the local environment (Escuela Nueva and FYA). The disappointment some implementors expressed in the outcomes suggests they had higher expectations for community participation than actually materialized. BRAC and IMPACT drew back from community involvement. In BRAC's case it was not cost-effective in terms of staff time and student achievement to organize parents to tutor children, and if they wanted to target the poor, they could not expect material support. Only CSP and FYA seemed conscious of involving the community in ways that reinforced the values of civil society. They explicitly reflected on the consequences of actions like transparency, responsiveness to local needs, representativeness, and the provision of space for local initiatives. Similar results in other projects, if they happened at all, seemed to happen incidentally as a by-product of the community's role in accomplishing education objectives.

2 The role of initiators

The role of initiators is a sensitive one, especially when the initiator is an outsider to the village and even more so when the outsider is a foreigner. Some of the issues in this relationship include local people's sus-

pictions of outsiders, village sensitivity to being asked to contribute resources, a need for clarity in defining the separate responsibilities of the interacting parties, and an unbalanced power relationship, which puts outsiders in a position of being gatekeepers to grant permission and space for the community to act. Often a person from the local or national culture has a better chance of understanding how to approach these issues sensitively unless, as in the case of IMPACT, they assume an autocratic stance towards the local population and then undo any previous willingness to cooperate. All the project models used initiators who were nationals, though many came from communities different enough from the local community to make them “cultural outsiders.” At the national level all but Harambee were also affected by foreign funding, which in several cases determined whether the project existed at all.

CSP implementors demonstrated the most sensitive model for working with communities. They set clear objectives for their common activities, negotiated separate responsibilities for the various parties in achieving those objectives, and were conscious of the importance of building community institutions and supporting the practice of democratic behaviors as a base for broader long-term social benefits. CSP facilitators also demonstrated the useful role outsiders can play in connecting relatively powerless community members with authorities in national ministries. Outside funding contributed significantly to obtaining government support and winning policy concessions in several projects.

With the exception of Harambee and FYA, the case models of community participation were all weighted in favor of supply-side determinants. It was suppliers of education services who decided who would benefit, how the program would be carried out, and what role the community would play. Harambee alone of the models came closest to expressing the felt needs of the community. At the same time it showed the negative side of “unregulated” community participation, with its poor quality programs and haphazard, uneconomic, and poorly-planned growth.

3 The role of context and focus

The extent to which community participation contributes to education objectives may be affected by a program’s focus and the circumstances in which it is implemented. For example, community participation may have little *instrumental* value in programs that emphasize technical aspects of education quality, where public delivery of education is reasonably effective and efficient and demand for education is well established. Models such as IMPACT and Escuela Nueva that focus on program quality find they require the technical contributions of experts more urgently and consequently leave little of the necessary “space” for autonomous community actions. In these circumstances, education may be viewed as a service, like banking or health, which requires skilled technicians more immediately than community involvement. By contrast, models like Harambee and CSP that focus on expanding opportunities in places where no schools existed before exert more of their effort in winning over and mobilizing communities. In these projects there is more room for local initiative.

4 The trade-offs in costs

There are two main issues related to resources: the expectation that communities can be counted on to contribute significant resources of time, effort, and money to the support of education delivery, and the question of how much of a project’s resources needs to be devoted to mobilizing and sustaining the interest of communities. Often the two are considered interrelated when they may not be. Mobilizing community interest, for example, may not necessarily lead to significant community support as was demonstrated in IMPACT, BRAC, and Escuela Nueva.

Community participation can be costly in terms of resources. Overall the projects tended to “front-end load” their investments in community participation with discussion meetings, surveys, and initiation activities to establish schools/programs and then drew back expecting communities to take over and maintain their share of continuing support. In several of the programs (IMPACT, Harambee, Escuela Nueva, and BRAC) the level and quality of the participation quickly diminished, at least partly because they were not given the essential space to act nor a sense of the responsibilities they might assume. In IMPACT some par-

ents, tiring of the financial burdens of a program they believed was not equivalent in quality to the conventional program, transferred their children to traditional schools. In CSP schools, which eventually are expected to revert to the government system, it is still too early to know whether communities will continue their support when NGO oversight is withdrawn.¹ Escuela Nueva invested early in community activities but then relied on teachers working unpaid overtime to maintain the relations with communities, which often appears to lead to their neglect.

When community participation itself becomes a valued end in the delivery of education, the resource question becomes even more crucial. The cost to a project of establishing mechanisms that support the practice of democratic values can be considerably higher than when a project only views community participation as an instrument of education delivery. The question then becomes, "Can such activities be incorporated into the design of projects without compromising other components or without adding an insupportable burden to the costs?" In CSP, which is the best example of this kind of model, the support costs to establish these mechanisms were those incurred by the NGO that facilitated the activities. FYA reduces such costs by promoting the practice of civil society mainly through motivational training for teachers, which accompanies its regular inservice courses and then providing resources and space for local initiatives. The resources FYA provides are ongoing, showing one example of a model that "end-loads" its investments in the community.

There is another issue of cost. A proliferation of community initiative schools may increase government costs rather than reduce them. In Harambee's case, the MOE felt compelled to rescue the poor quality secondary schools that were springing up everywhere, and in doing so was unable to provide the equitable distribution of opportunities for less advantaged populations. Harambee also shows that holding the purse strings does not necessarily give the community control over the quality of the program or provide local students with appropriate, relevant education.

Community participation involves costs. Is it worth it? Policy makers should be asking themselves: 1) Does community participation enhance the delivery of education programs enough to compensate for the resources diverted from other education components? or 2) Is community participation important enough in itself to warrant the resources diverted to promote it? The cases give some evidence that an education delivery model can include a community participation component without costing more or sacrificing learning when compared with the conventional system. In the models where this is true, another question might be asked: is community participation also satisfying all the purposes for which it was designed, or are some of these purposes being short-changed?

5 Fitting the culture

One of the interesting aspects of several models was the extent to which the innovations required participants to modify their behaviors in ways directly in conflict with local cultural traditions. Examples are found in IMPACT's student teachers and BRAC's efforts to introduce student-centered learning. This is important for two reasons. First, it means project designers were assuming that only some practices are effective in the delivery of education programs, ones they believed were not present in the then-existing delivery system. It is doubtful that this assumption was tested in any of the project contexts. The fact that some of the innovative practices varied so considerably from local practice also suggests an outsider influence on design, which indeed was the situation in most of the cases. The assumption that only certain learning approaches are effective is questionable since it is clear that children learn by a vast array of methods, and even very rigid rote memory systems can be modified to create more productive types of learning.

¹ The strength of the community institutions developed under CSP will be challenged when the schools revert to the full control of the government by such negative factors as infrequent supervisory visits, a basically unreformed government system with conditions similar to those that caused some of the original problems, and the community's difficulty in accessing government authorities on their own.

The second point is that it is far more costly to change behavior drastically all at once than to let behavior evolve slowly over time while building the necessary structures to support the changes. In the first case, resistance is almost guaranteed and nothing in the surrounding culture is ready to support the change. Indeed practices of any kind, whether schooling or any other generated out of an indigenous source, will inevitably conform to core cultural principles, and through the consistency in their implementation will protect what is vital in the culture. Even a method as internationally criticized as rote memorization protects something that is valued locally and can only be replaced successfully with something that participants see as having similar or greater value.



BRAC students are introduced to student-centered learning *BRAC photo*

IMPACT is an example of how a schooling model (no matter how cost-effective) that violates local ideas of what education should be is bound to meet resistance, in this case from both parents and education authorities. Escuela Nueva was similarly resisted by traditionalist elements in the society and the education hierarchy who eventually undermined its replication efforts. BRAC, despite many modifications of its instructional materials and training, was unable to change the teaching methods employed in its schools to its satisfaction. All three could probably have produced better results if elements in their design had been generated more directly out of the local schooling context.

CSP was the project most cognizant of the cultural factor, even while helping the local population move gradually away from practices that deprived some groups of their right to be heard. Dr. Bakhteari noted as an example that CSP accommodated local custom by appointing an all-male VEC instead of forcing adoption of a mixed sex VEC, in order to make other revolutionary changes like community partnerships with government possible. After a time when they had developed trust, CSP helped establish women's VECs to involve the mothers in their daughters' education.

Being aware of the cultural principle means more than organizing activities around traditional practices. Harambee, as a community-initiated activity, was wholly organized around these practices. To the extent that local institutions represented the best interests of communities, the establishment of schools reinforced participatory behaviors. In many villages, however, these institutions were exploitative of local residents, and as pressures grew to support a variety of Harambee projects, instigators tended to become more coercive in the methods they used to extract funds and labor from local people. There were no checks on local officials other than their own consciences and any pressures the local society could apply.

6 Reflection

In retrospect (and from afar), it is possible to see weaknesses in the way projects involved communities and delivered education programs. For example, all the models except FYA were heavily weighted toward start-up activities—clearly defined first steps to initiate the program and involve the community, but very little in the way of follow-through activities to determine if the program was producing results or where it might be weak and need strengthening. As a substitute for these activities, most of the projects depended on external evaluation teams several years after the start of activities to determine how they compared with the conventional system (which most had previously considered inadequate). While external evaluation is an essential step, it does not substitute for routine monitoring of progress and subsequent corrective measures throughout the duration of the project. Only one,² BRAC, has created a comprehensive process for reflection.

² It is possible that other projects had a similar process for reflection but the fact that these processes were not reported in project descriptions suggests that they were either taken for granted or did not feature importantly in project design.

tion that allows it routinely to assess how its components are working FYA also reflects seriously on its results, partly because its staff is very cost-conscious, and tries to eliminate inefficiencies and unproductive activities

BRAC's system for reflection is a good starting point for other models The system is described in detail elsewhere, but the main elements include 1) setting clear objectives for program activities, 2) identifying appropriate indicators/measures of program impact, 3) gathering field data routinely on these and other aspects of the program, 4) conducting special data collections to clarify problem issues and to identify appropriate solutions, and 5) committing resources based on the results to improve programming Negative assessments often cause BRAC to launch pilot studies of options to correct the problem Recently it has been studying the question of how to make the involvement of communities more productive

BRAC's change of mind about exams is also instructive At first, it refused to conduct annual exams in the NFPE program because it feared they might create an "exam mentality" However, when an early assessment team showed that BRAC students performed poorly on tests compared to the public system BRAC revised its course to bring it more in line with the formal system Then when it expanded its program to urban areas, more sophisticated urban parents insisted on exams to convince them that BRAC schools provided an education at least equivalent to the government schools Later, after many attempts to reform the instructional program, BRAC realized that field reports of the new materials were not adequate to show learning improvements without an annual assessment of achievement progress BRAC also realized that using exams prepared in the formal system did not adequately measure the basic skills NFPE was trying to build and requested a national testing organization to develop tests of basic competencies BRAC's system for reflection allows it to make these kinds of mid-course corrections as the need arises

A system for reflection is key, but even with a good one installed in a project it may be difficult to convince authorities to act on the basis of results Education bureaucracies are often not geared to results-based planning, and evidence of positive impact does not necessarily lead to the adoption of good innovations (IMPACT and Escuela Nueva) Perhaps this attitude can be changed if projects direct more of their focus and investment to routinely "back-end loading" their designs with more follow-through activities, and funders connect more of their resources to the production of results In the study cases, one feels that if implementors had reflected in this same systematic way on the impact of community involvement, some might have seen better results emanating from this strategy

7 Piloting and bringing to scale

In differing ways, all the implementors discovered that it was one thing to develop and pilot an innovative model and another to bring it to scale Often strategies crucial to the innovation were no longer feasible during massification Expansion brought a whole new set of issues that had not been present in the pilot phase

Models take time to refine and test before they are ready for large-scale expansion as most of the projects discovered The models that included a quality component took the longest time to develop For example, BRAC refined its model for a decade in a few schools, while Escuela Nueva took more than a decade before its program was accepted as a national program IMPACT worked on its program for five years before it was ready to go to scale

Even when expansion was carried out with relative efficiency, the implementors found it necessary to make adjustments in elements developed during the pilot phase For example, BRAC met resistance when it began initiating its program in villages where it did not have long-standing relationships and used less qualified program assistants to supervise fieldwork At this scale, the program became more vulnerable to the continued willingness of donors to support initiatives After expanding to 30,000 schools, BRAC became concerned that the quality of the program had not been well enough established to expand so quickly, and in 1996 it decided to make adjustments in the instructional program before expanding further Escuela Nueva had to reduce its programs to manuals and "scripts" and move away from teacher

generated approaches and materials. It also reduced supervisory visits and changed its methods of selecting teachers. In the end its expanded program suffered from “an inconsistent replication,” partly as a result of these modifications but also because of resistance from traditional elements of the bureaucracy. IMPACT, as we know, never expanded within country because of lack of government support and general lack of parental enthusiasm.

Harambee, CSP, and FYA were all models with an emphasis on access to education opportunities. For both Harambee and CSP the object was to develop a means of mobilizing the community as quickly as possible to support the establishment of additional schools. Harambee’s difficulties during expansion came in trying to procure the government resources required to produce better quality programs, and locally from the intensifying competition with other self-help projects. CSP cut corners with its 14-step process, using teachers rather than NGO promoters to mobilize the community. It is too early to know whether teachers can produce the same results. Also as CSP’s transparent system for teacher selection and school establishment became more widespread, politicians saw an important source of influence denied them and began overriding the process. Though donor pressure put the system back on track, a question remains about the future.

FYA had the least trouble with expansion possibly because its communities were more politically aware of what they were missing or because FYA’s flexible process allowed programs to be more closely shaped to the immediate needs of local communities. FYA was particularly adept at doing several things: eliciting support from the main stakeholders (government, church, and community), controlling critical elements like the selection of center directors, giving local staff the freedom to take initiatives, and investing in good communication systems to solve problems and spread the word about successful innovations. FYA’s model might not satisfy the need in some countries for more direction and structure, but it does demonstrate how a loosely connected decentralized system of relatively autonomous schools can work effectively. The FYA model in short seems most geared to an expansion that replicates the original design.

8 The elusiveness of quality

One final, rather startling lesson learned was how elusive a commodity quality was in the education programs established by the case models. Despite considerable effort focused on improving the quality of programs, there was neither a significant difference in the achievement levels of children in the experimental and conventional systems, nor in most cases was there an appreciable change in the methods of teaching/learning. While there may be many explanations for this phenomenon—poor tests, achievement as an inadequate measure of quality, more disadvantaged children in the experimental programs, etc., it is instructive that four programs (BRAC, CSP, FYA, and Harambee) redirected their focus from quantity to quality concerns over the course of their projects because they were not satisfied with the results. The final two (IMPACT and Escuela Nueva) started with a main focus on quality but were also unable to demonstrate that they had achieved their objective. The implication is that “quality” is a component that needs work, and to the extent that this requires technical expertise that communities do not have, the ball may be mainly in the court of the specialists. This does not mean, however, that communities cannot play a supportive role in the implementation of quality but rather that their role should be defined, clarified, and utilized along with other supports to achieve this purpose.

G Three “Models of Community Participation”

The reason for initiating most of the study models was a need to expand effective education opportunities and a realization that governments could not satisfy that need with existing capacities and resources. The problem is one that is likely to intensify in the future. Were this not the case, it would be easy to dismiss the community’s role in education delivery as peripheral from the evidence of most of these cases. It is becoming inevitable, however, that communities will have to shoulder more of the burden for education in the future and that the present situation of virtually free education will have to change. Part of the problem is, of course, the present, almost universal expectation that a complete education “package” must include high-cost buildings and furnishings, expensively qualified teachers, and resource intensive support



BRAC students assist one another with homework after school *Photo by A T Sweetser*

structures The study models have shown that this does not need to be true Children can learn on their own, helping one another in simple kiosk-learning environments or with para-professional teachers, with parents monitoring attendance and instruction These projects are some of the first serious attempts to find answers to the problem of limited resources and expanding needs If they have one lesson to teach, it is that learning can take place in more cost-effective ways than most conventional systems offer

No single one of the models addresses the entire variety of circumstances in schooling communities For example, the models ranged from “supply-driven” (outsider-initiated) to “demand-driven” (community-initiated) models, and of the supply-driven models there were low community involvement (BRAC, IMPACT, and Escuela Nueva) and high community involvement models (CSP) A supply-driven model satisfies the school support needs identified by a supplier of education services

a government agency, donor, or NGO This supplier works within national time, effort, and resource constraints By contrast, a demand-driven model (such as Harambee) satisfies the consumers of education products and is constrained mainly by community resource limitations and capacities An outside initiator may still be required in demand-driven models, but this person’s role is one of negotiating the “rules of engagement” rather than directly specifying community needs or what the community must do to become engaged A demand-driven approach is unusual enough to require developers to reorganize their thinking about community participation and its relation to education delivery Ironically it fits donor definitions calling for local decision-making which, as the cases have shown, are rarely put into practice

Three hypothetical approaches derived from the successes and failures in the case models are described below Their purpose is to suggest some implications for the future mobilization of communities In real life, of course, a designer would combine those elements that address specific problems and local characteristics into a unique model that produces the project’s desired educational objectives

1 An Accountability Model Issue-focused community participation

In settings where education services are easily delivered and supported and parents are already convinced of the benefits of schooling, one might reasonably ask why resources should be diverted from other crucial education elements in order to mobilize community support Organizations, like PTAs, for linking school and community may already exist to motivate parental support and may not, in any case, be appropriate candidates for strengthening to solve other development problems Why should education services in circumstances like these be especially burdened with the job of developing institutions of civil society when health, banking, public works, and others are not asked to serve that purpose?

Environments such as these suggest the need if any for a focused involvement of communities To take an area of weakness in the models, parents might be “emboldened” to exert their rights as clients and demand accountability from responsible education authorities Facilitators would work with both groups to develop institutional channels and mechanisms of accountability, assessment, and feedback (meetings, student reports, etc), and assist parents’ organizations to define their role in demanding quality schooling for their children Critics of this approach might complain that parents are uninformed, lack the expertise, or are

illiterate and therefore should not be the arbiters of quality. The answer is that experts would set the standards, and officials would account for their ability or inability to meet the standards, explaining to parents how they would plan to correct problems. The role of the facilitators would be to negotiate the contributions to quality of both parties—of parents ensuring children’s schooling attendance and seeking academic help for students having difficulty, etc., and of school authorities for quality inputs, standards, collection of assessment data, and parent reporting. The PTA could be strengthened to serve as the institutional venue for these activities linking parents and responsible officials.

The cases hint that a focus on accountability might be a good way for communities to exert a positive influence on education delivery whatever their situation. Staff accountability to parents was only marginally better in the innovative programs than in conventional systems, and then only because there were sometimes opportunities for parents to air their complaints in open meetings and not because officials felt especially accountable to parents for program results. Sometimes communities controlled a crucial aspect by which they could influence better performance, such as teacher salaries or appointments, but they were not aware enough of the possibilities to exert their influence.

Though achievement tests were sometimes used to evaluate program quality, the results were not explicitly used to acquaint parents with how well or how poorly their children were doing. The one exception was the case where urban parents insisted that BRAC conduct exams to ensure that NFPE schools performed as well as the government schools. BRAC has since recognized that assessment tests are essential to measure program quality, but until now it has not taken the step of connecting parents into the feedback link routinely as customers of their programs. If parents and students are the customers of education initiatives, as the USAID definition of participation suggests, then mechanisms of this kind need to be established to allow them to exert their right to hold education staff accountable. If there is one activity of community involvement that could be crucial, this is the one—and it needs strengthening in all of the models.

2 A Partnership Model High community involvement

A high involvement model, somewhat like that of CSP, may be called for in environments where children do not participate sufficiently in schooling programs or where there are major deficiencies in the government’s ability to provide education services. In this model, the involvement of parents in decisions about school locations and daily scheduling make them more comfortable about sending their children to school. They may need rules, impersonally applied, to make them aware of the importance of regular attendance and other important aspects of home support that give children the necessary time and environment in which to learn.

Parents in this context can make significant contributions by filling the gaps left by the inadequacies of government. They can contribute materially and in-kind to the inputs of learning, extend the oversight of government by monitoring teacher and student attendance and performance, and provide solutions to minor problems between visits of responsible officials. In this model, the facilitator role is to empower communities to take their own independent initiatives to solve problems and then to see that they are given sufficient space to act. They also need to pay attention to accountability issues so parents will feel the risks they have taken in supporting the school have been worthwhile.

The high involvement model—which is a likely option for remote communities where literacy is low and institutions for community participation are weak or nonexistent, provides an ideal opportunity to build the structures of representative governance and the practice of civic responsibility. The institutions thus established to support education delivery may ultimately become the channels for solving development problems in other social sectors.

3 A Demand Model Communities request appropriate education services

As it becomes increasingly difficult for governments to support the costs of universal education, models of education delivery may emerge where communities assume a larger role in “ordering” the specific services

they need and paying a larger share of their costs. Government agencies may, in this scenario, take responsibility for developing and testing packaged options, providing training or already qualified personnel to implement selected packages, and credentializing students as they complete various options. To cut costs education could become a transportable commodity housed in any convenient location, and consisting of the basics of an instructional manager, learners, and materials. Where possible, expensive components such as permanent facilities and unneeded support systems could be shed.

Packaged options might include a formal primary course reduced to a three- to five-year duration, a three-hour-a-day core curriculum, a three-year, complete primary curriculum for older children, a two-year supervised course, rounded out with self-paced, self-instructional modules to complete the primary stage, or a course composed of any combination of lengths of time, student ages, and desired learning objectives. Hypothetical as these suggestions may seem, it is interesting that the case studies provide tested examples of almost all these options. The only difference is that they are not presented as an array of options from which a community might choose. The options need not stop with packages for formal learning, and indeed they might include training/learning of a variety of kinds: literacy, pre-vocational, vocational, life skills, continuing education, etc.

The facilitator's role in this model is to assist communities in choosing appropriate options and in supporting and paying for them. A process might be adopted whereby the community forms a representative committee, elicits the education priorities of various groups within the society, and decides what its long-term goals for education services are. Its decisions might be based on the costs of various programs, which may vary based on whether instruction is conducted by a teacher or is based on self-learning modules that require fewer personnel. The government might base costs on a scale of subsidies that reflect national priorities for an educated citizenry. Communities might also be offered a variety of cost-cutting options of payment: they might find a local volunteer who could be trained to manage the course, or they might reduce training and material costs by "recycling" the program a number of times. The government would offer subsidies for poorer communities or rewards for communities that include hard-to-reach groups. Part of the community's long-term education plan would be an analysis of how the program might be financed and, possibly with technical help, how it will take advantage of the incentives and cost savings offered by the government.

How would the community ensure quality programs in this instance? The programs would each set out clear objectives and standards for each of the options, and implementing manuals would demonstrate for trainers how they would achieve the objectives. The credentializing branches of the government's education ministries would be charged with determining whether the program objectives were being met and reporting the findings back to the community with recommendations about how the program might be improved through the use of more course manager training, supplementary instructional materials, changes in local policies and procedures, or in some cases the adoption of another more suitable education package. The staff's performance would be continually under the scrutiny of the community, and with the contractual basis of their employment, they would feel accountable to the community. Dissatisfied communities could move on to other programs or staff.

This model could be elaborated further, but the point is sufficiently made. Critics may say this is a commercialization of education services, but in effect, as *Escuela Nueva* particularly demonstrates, resources are scarce and most governments cannot afford the luxury of scaling up models to let teachers "generate their own individual ideas about instruction" before a basic minimum standard of learning is achieved.

This illustration shows what would be necessary if we take to heart the World Bank's and USAID's definitions of community participation as local decision making. Involving communities in planning for their long-term education needs is more "authentic" decision making than the "permitted" decision making that takes place in most of the case examples. An advantage of this approach is that it requires the development of institutions and practices of civil society that realize the value-added potential of community participation. If facilitators are mindful of this objective when they work out the processes of this model, they can promote both goals of community participation, as an "end in itself" and as "instrumental means to education ends."

Harambee and FYA models alert us to what demand models might be. FYA offers program options that suit the needs of individual communities. Harambee shows the considerable energies that can be harnessed when communities decide they will organize their own services. Harambee also shows the crucial need for a servicing agency to provide quality components beyond the technical capacities of communities. To service such a need, government agencies would need to restructure themselves to become service-oriented organizations, which is an innovation the other models (IMPACT, BRAC, and Escuela Nueva) show us they would find hard to do. As long as ministries of education insist on implementing conventional schooling packages in their present costly form, the delivery of education will remain a top-down phenomenon rather than a matter of community choice and decision making.

H A Final Word

As the cases show, community participation as an instrumental means was neither a necessary nor a sufficient element in the delivery of quality education. Except in the harsh environment of Balochistan or in Harambee's context of deprivation, community participation alone was neither responsible for nor probably even a major factor in any measurable advantages of these innovative school delivery models over the conventional systems. The cases do show overall, however, specific community contributions that may have added incrementally to each of the dimensions and might have offered more if they had been designed and funded differently. It is undeniable that participation added a richness to some of the education programs that they might not otherwise have had and, in some cases, even contributed modestly to the practice of civil society. As an instrumental means, however, community participation was only one element in a multi-faceted model whose contributions have to be considered as a whole.

Bibliography

- Academy for Educational Development 1995 (April) "Islamic Republic of Pakistan Second Girls' Primary Education Project, Draft Final Report Volume 1 the Project" Washington, DC Academy for Educational Development
- _____ 1994 (September) "The Primary Education Development Program Pakistan Final Report" Washington, DC USAID
- Ahmed, Manzoor, Colette Chabbott, Arun Joshi, and Rohini Pande 1993 *Primary Education for All Learning from the BRAC Experience* Edited by Cynthia Prather Washington, DC Project ABEL, Academy for Educational Development
- Andersen, Ivar J 1996 (December) "Pakistan Balochistan Primary Education Program (Cr 2482) Full Mid-Program Review Report" World Bank Office Memorandum to Paul Blay Washington, DC World Bank
- Anzar, Usmā 1994 (July) "Field Trainers for Community Support Program Final Progress Report" Quetta, Pakistan Society for Community Support for Primary Education in Balochistan
- Atwood, J Brian 1993 (November) "Statement of Principles on Participatory Development" Washington DC USAID
- Bakhteari, Quratul Ain 1997a (June) Personal Interview with Chloe O'Gara, Assessment Consultant for PED Program Washington, DC
- _____ 1997b (March) "Case Study on Review and Training for CSP (PEQIP) with SCSPEB's Field Staff Held in Uthal District, Bela" Bela, Pakistan Primary Education Development (PED) program
- _____ 1997c Report Submitted to AED on Completion of Contract for Technical Assistance, Beneficiary Participation to Balochistan Primary Education Department Programme—1994 to 1997
- "Balochistan Human Resource Survey Teacher Supply and Distribution, Final Report" 1994 (March) Balochistan Office of Additional Director of Primary Education
- Barkan, Joel 1994 *Beyond Capitalism vs Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania* Edited by Joel Barkan Boulder and London Lynne Rienner Publishers
- Barnett, Camille Cates 1995 (May) "What Has Become Clear about Participation" In U S Agency for International Development *Participatory Practices Learning from Experience*, number 13 Washington, DC USAID
- Barsaga, Eligio B (Director of IMPACT) 1997 (June) Personal communication with Ricardo Castrence Manila, Philippines
- Benveniste, Luis A , and Patrick J McEwan 1996 "Constraints to Implementing Multigrade Schools The Role of Local Capacity and Will" Stanford University Unpublished report
- Boeren, Adrian, Abu Hamid Latif, and Nelly Stromquist 1995 "Evaluation of the Expansion of BRAC's Non-Formal Primary Education Program, Phase I (1993-95)" Los Angeles Unpublished Report
- BRAC 1997 (April) "NFPE Report to Donors on Phase I (January 1993 - March 1996)" Dhaka Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee

Bray, Mark 1988 "Initiating and Directing Projects" In *Community Financing of Education Issues and Implications in Less Developed Countries* Edited by Mark Bray with Kevin Lillis Pergamon Comparative and International Education Series, vol 5 Oxford Pergamon Books, 23-38

Bray, Mark, with Kevin Lillis 1988 *Community Financing of Education Issues and Policy Implications in Less Developed Countries* Edited by Mark Bray with Kevin Lillis Pergamon Comparative and International Education Series, vol 5 Oxford Pergamon Press

Castrence, Constance O 1997 (March) Field Report and Personal Interview of Debbie Lacuesta (Research Associate, IMPACT) Manila, Philippines Creative Associates International, Inc

Catedral, Gloria L 1993a "Multiplication of Decimals" Project IMPACT module 306 Quezon City, Philippines SEAMEO INNOTECH

_____ 1997 1993b "Solving Word Problems About Addition and Subtraction of Fractions" Project IMPACT module 269 Quezon City, Philippines SEAMEO INNOTECH

Colbert, Vicky, and Jairo Arboleda 1990 (July) "Columbie L'enseignement primaire por tous Le programme <<école nouvelle>> Notes, Comments Series no 191 Paris UNESCO-UNICEF-PAM programme de coopération

Colbert de Arboleda, Vicky, and Oscar Mogollon James 1993 *Hacia la Escuela Nueva* Santafe de Bogota, Colombia Ministerio de Educacion Nacional

Cooksey, Brian, David Court, and Ben Makau 1994 "Education for Self-reliance and Harambee" In *Beyond Capitalism vs Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania* Edited by Joel D Barkan Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers, 201-233

Cummings, William K 1986 *Low-Cost Primary Education Implementing an Innovation in Six Nations* IDRC report no IDRC-252e Ottawa, Canada International Development Research Centre

De Leon, Valentin F (Principal, Bagong Buhay F IMPACT School) 1997 (March) Personal Interview with Constance O Castrence, Creative Associates International, Inc Manila, Philippines

Directorate of Primary Education "Human Resource Survey Teacher Supply and Distribution, Final Report" 1994 (March) Quetta, Pakistan

Dobbs, Francis N d (producer) *Reshme of Shibpur A Fragile Learner* [video] World Bank Film and Video Collection Washington, DC Devitt Jones Productions

Drucker, David 1986 "Community Participation Now You See It, Now You Don't" *UNICEF News* 124 2-3

Dutch Embassy 1994 "Kenya Country Gender Profile"

Flores, Pedro V 1991 *Educational Innovation in the Philippines A Case Study of Project IMPACT* IDRC report no IDRC-TS36e Ottawa, Canada International Development Research Centre

Hanson, E Mark 1983 "Administrative Development in the Colombian Ministry of Education A Case Analysis of the 1970s" *Comparative Education Review* 27(1) 89-107

Hernandez, Jose Antonio 1993 *Manual de Recreacion* Santafe de Bogota, Colombia Ministerio de Educacion Nacional

Hill, Martin J D 1991 *The Harambee Movement in Kenya Self-Help, Development and Education Among the Kamba of Kitui District* Atlantic Highlands, NJ The Athlone Press

International Development Research Centre 1978 (March) "An Evaluative Study of Project IMPACT Summary Report" Ottawa, Canada SEAMEO and INNOTECH, International Development Research Centre

Kenyan Ministry of Education N d *Annual Reports* Nairobi, Kenya Government Printer (unpublished data)

Khandker, Shahidur R 1996 "Education Achievements and School Efficiency in Rural Bangladesh" World Bank Discussion Papers, no 319 Washington, DC The World Bank

Kintzer, Frederick C N d "The Harambee Institutes of Science and Technology in the Republic of Kenya Report of a Study, 1986-1987" Fulbright Senior Research Paper

Lavilla, Dolores 1993 "How Man Adapts to His Environment" Project IMPACT Module 258 Quezon City, Philippines SEAMEO INNOTECH

Lillis, Kevin 1988a "Geographic and Social Inequalities" In *Community Financing of Education Issues and Policy Implications in Less Developed Countries*, Edited by Mark Bray with Kevin Lillis Oxford Pergamon Press, 85-93

_____ 1988b "Issues of Quality" In *Community Financing of Education Issues and Policy Implications in Less Developed Countries* Edited by Mark Bray with Kevin Lillis Oxford Pergamon Press, 75-84

Lillis, Kevin, and Henry Ayot 1988 "Community Financing of Education in Kenya" In *Community Financing of Education Issues and Policy Implications in Less Developed Countries* Edited by Mark Bray with Kevin Lillis Oxford Pergamon Press, 117-129

Lovell, Catherine H, and Kaniz Fatema 1989 *Assignment Children The BRAC Non-formal Primary Education Programme in Bangladesh* New York UNICEF

Mbithi, Philip M, and Rasmus Rasmusson 1977 *Self Reliance in Kenya The Case of Harambee* Uppsala, Sweden Scandinavian Institute of African Studies

McEwan, Patrick J N d "Evaluating Rural Education Reform The Case of Colombia's *Escuela Nueva* Program" Manuscript in English To be published in *La Educacion* Washington, DC InterAmerican Development Bank

McGinn, Noel F 1996 "Resistance to Good Ideas *Escuela Nueva* in Colombia" Harvard University Paper presented at conference of the Nordic Association for the Study of Education in Developing Countries, Copenhagen, Denmark October 17-19

McKee, Neil N d a (Producer) *Project IMPACT The Overview* [video] Manila, Philippines SEAMEO INNOTECH Productions

_____ N d b (Producer) *Project IMPACT The System* [video] Manila, Philippines SEAMEO INNOTECH Productions

McMaster, J C 1978 "Cost-effectiveness Analysis of Project Impact for the Philippines" Manila, Philippines Regional INNOTECH Centre

Monge, Patricia, Courtney Harold, and Gustavo Arcia 1997 (April) "Towards the Private Delivery of Public Education The Case of *Fe y Alegría* Schools in Guayaquil" Quito, Ecuador ABEL II Project, USAID/ Ecuador

Mwiringi, Kilemi 1990 (August) "Kenya's Harambee Secondary Schools Movement The Contradictions of Public Policy" *Comparative Education Review* 34(3) 350-368

_____ 1985 "The Kenya Harambee School Movement A Historical Perspective" Ph D diss , Stanford University

Nagle, William J 1993 (May) "Community Participation as Seen by Other Donor Organizations" Social Sector Policy Analysis Project Washington, DC Academy for Educational Development and Harvard Institute for International Development

_____ 1992 "Policy and Practice of Community Participation in the U S Agency for International Development" Social Sector Policy Analysis Project Washington, DC Academy for Educational Development and Harvard Institute for International Development

_____ 1991 (October) "A Discussion of a paper, 'Policy and Practice of Community Participation in the US Agency for International Development'" Washington, DC Academy for Educational Development

O'Gara, Chloe, and Nancy Kendall 1996 "Beyond Enrollment a Handbook for Improving Girls' Experiences in Primary Classrooms" Washington, DC Project ABEL, Creative Associates International, Inc

O'Grady, Barbara 1994 (April) "Teaching Communities to Educate Girls in Balochistan" Washington, DC Academy for Educational Development

Pasigna, Aida L (previously worked on IMPACT in the Philippines and Liberia) 1997 (May) Telephone Interview with Andrea Rugh Washington, DC

Psacharopoulos, George, Carlos Rojas, and Eduardo Velez 1993 (August) "Achievement Evaluation of Colombia's *Escuela Nueva* Is Multigrade the Answer?" *Comparative Education Review* 37(3) 263-276

Reimers, Fernando 1997a "The Role of NGOs in Promoting Educational Innovation A Case Study in Latin America" *Non-Formal and Non governmental Approaches* Edited by James Lynch, Celia Modgil, and Sohan Modgil Education and Development Tradition and Innovation Series, Vol 4 London Cassell Publishing

_____ 1997b "The Role of the Community in Expanding Educational Opportunities The EDUCO Schools in El Salvador" In *Equity and Excellence in Education for Development*, Volume 2 Edited by James Lynch, Celia Modgil, and Sohan Modgil London Cassell Publishing

_____ 1993 "Education and Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America" Advocacy Series in Education and Development no 7 Washington, DC USAID Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean

Royston, Matthew 1996 (April) "Final Research Project on a Critical Issue in Non-formal Education Participatory Research" Washington, DC American University

Schiefelbein, Ernesto 1991 (June) "In Search of the School of the XXI Century Is the Colombian *Escuela Nueva* the Right Pathfinder?" Santiago, Chile UNESCO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (ORELAC) and UNICEF Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean

_____ 1990 (July) "Seven Strategies for Improving the Quality and Efficiency of the Education System" Santiago, Chile UNESCO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (ORELAC) and UNICEF Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean

SCSPEB 1994 *See* Society for Community Support for Primary Education in Balochistan (SCSPEB) 1994

Sequeira, Pamela 1992 (January) "Mosque Schools in Balochistan" Pakistan Primary Education Development Programme

Shaeffer, Sheldon (Ed) 1992 (March) "Collaborating for Educational Change The Role of Teachers, Parents, and the Community in School Improvement" IIEP Research and Studies Programme on Increasing and Improving the Quality of Basic Education Paris International Institute for Educational Planning

_____ 1991 "A Framework for Collaborating for Educational Change" IIEP Research and Studies Programme on Increasing and Improving the Quality of Basic Education, no 3 Paris International Institute for Educational Planning

_____ 1990 (August) "Collaborating for Educational Change The Participation of Government, NGOs, and the Community in the Improvement of Basic Education" Paris International Institute for Educational Planning

Shiman, David A , and Kilemi Mwiria 1987 (January) "Struggling Against the Odds Harambee Secondary Schools in Kenya" *Phi Delta Kappan* 68 369-372

Society for Community Support for Primary Education in Balochistan (SCSPEB) 1994 "Final Report for 1994" Quetta, Pakistan SCSPEB

Socrates, Jose B (Ed) 1982 *The IMPACT System of Mass Primary Education* Quezon City, Philippines SEAMEO INNOTECH

Swope, John N d *Fe y Alegría Study (Draft)* Washington, DC Academy for Educational Development

Thiagarajan, Sivasailam, and Aida Pasigna 1988 "Literature Review on the Soft Technologies of Learning" BRIDGES Research Report Series, no 2 Cambridge, MA Harvard Institute of International Development

Thomas, Christopher J N d "Does Community Participation Make a Difference? Girls' Schooling Outcomes and Community Participation in Balochistan" Washington Unpublished

Torres, Rosa Maria 1993a (September) "ABC Assessment of Basic Competencies in Bangladesh" In *Reaching the Unreached Non-formal Approaches and Universal Primary Education* Edited by Rosa María Torres New York UNICEF

_____ 1993b "Alternatives in Formal Education Colombia's Escuela Nueva Programme" In *Prospects*, Vol 2 UNESCO Publishing

Tullao, Tereso S , James C McMaster, and Edita A Tan 1982 "Cost-effectiveness Analysis of Project IMPACT for the Philippines" In *The IMPACT System of Mass Primary Education* Edited by Jose B Socrates Quezon City, Philippines SEAMEO INNOTECH 105-137

UNESCO 1995a *Statistical Yearbook* Oxford UNESCO Publishing

_____ 1995b *World Education Report* Oxford UNESCO Publishing

U S Agency for International Development 1993-1995 *The Participation Forum* A series of monthly meetings and reports Washington, DC USAID

_____ N d *Participatory Practices Learning from Experience* Nos 1-15 Washington, DC USAID

Wellings, Paul 1983 “Unaided Education in Kenya Blessing or Blight?” *Research in Education* Manchester Manchester University Press, 29 11-28

Wolf, Joyce, Eileen Kane, and Brad Strickland 1997 (February) “Planning for Community Participation in Education” Washington USAID Office of Sustainable Development, Bureau for Africa

Wooten, John, William Jansen, and Marion Kohashi Warren 1982 (September) “Project IMPACT A Low-cost Alternative for Universal Primary Education in the Philippines” Project Impact Evaluation No 38 Washington, DC USAID

World Bank 1996a *Leveling the Playing Field Giving Girls an Equal Chance for Basic Education—Three Countries’ Efforts* Washington DC The World Bank

_____ 1996b (February) *The World Bank Participation Sourcebook* On-line version Washington, DC The World Bank

_____ 1996c (June) “Improving Basic Education in Pakistan Community Participation, System Accountability, and Efficiency” Report no 14960-PAK, Population and Human Resources Division Washington, DC The World Bank

_____ 1994 “The 1994 World Bank Poverty Assessment for Kenya” Washington, DC The World Bank