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The Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Mozambique

Manica and Zambezia Provinces

Final Report to USAID - Mozambique
June 1997

Chris Dolan & Jessica Schafer

Refugee Studies Programme
Queen Elizabeth House
University of Oxford

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADEMIMO:	<i>Associação dos Deficientes Militares de Moçambique</i> Mozambican Disabled Demobilised Soldiers' Association
AMETRAMO:	<i>Associação dos Médicos Tradicionais de Moçambique</i> Mozambican Association of Traditional Healers
AMODEG	<i>Associação Moçambicana dos Desmobilizados de Guerra</i> Mozambican Demobilised Soldiers' Association
BPD	<i>Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento</i> People's Development Bank
CORE	<i>Comissão de Reintegração</i> Reintegration Commission
CVM	<i>Cruz Vermelha de Moçambique</i> Mozambican Red Cross
DFs	<i>Destacamento Feminino</i> Female Branch of the Army (also Renamo)
DRP	Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
DS	Demobilised Soldier
EAR / RSS	<i>Esquema de Apoio à Reintegração</i> Reintegration Support Scheme
ECMEP	<i>Empresa de Construção e Manutenção de Estradas e Pontes</i> Road and Bridge Building and Maintenance Company
FAM	<i>Forças Armadas de Moçambique</i> Armed Forces of Mozambique
GTZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</i> German Technical Cooperation
GPA	General Peace Accord
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGO	InterGovernmental Organisation
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM / OIM	International Organisation for Migration <i>Organização Internacional para as Migrações</i>
IRS / SIR	Information and Referral Service <i>Serviço de Informação e Referência</i>
ISCOS	<i>Instituto Sindical per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo</i>

Mt	<i>Metical / Meticais</i> Mozambican currency
NAR	<i>Nucleio de Apoio aos Refugiados</i> Refugee Support Bureau
NGO	Non-governmental Organisations
OSD / DHO	Occupational Skills Development <i>Desenvolve as suas Habilitações Ocupacionais</i>
OMM	<i>Organização das Mulheres Moçambicanas</i> Mozambican Women's Association
ONUMOZ	<i>Operação das Nações Unidas para Moçambique</i> United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ORF / FAR	Open Reintegration Fund <i>Fundo Aberto de Reintegração</i>
PF / FP	Provincial Fund <i>Fundo Provincial</i>
SMO	<i>Serviço Militar Obrigatório</i> Compulsory Military Service
UCP	<i>Unidade de Coordenação de Programas</i> Programme Coordination Unit
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOHAC	United Nations Operation for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<i>Assembly Area</i>	Camps set up by ONUMOZ to register and demobilise soldiers
<i>Antigo combatente</i>	Veteran of the Liberation War
<i>Bairro</i>	Neighbourhood
<i>Bacalhau</i>	Dried fish
<i>Banca fixa</i>	Small stall for selling goods
<i>Calamidades</i>	Second-hand clothing, donated abroad
<i>Cachaço</i>	Locally-brewed spirit
<i>Capulana</i>	Cloth used as female clothing
<i>Caril</i>	Sauce to accompany staple food
<i>Chambok</i>	Large stick used to beat someone
<i>Chapa-100</i>	Informal transport
<i>Chefe</i>	Boss or head, sometimes traditional leaders but not necessarily
<i>Chibalo</i>	Forced labour under colonial regime
<i>Classe</i>	Year in Mozambican education system, equivalent to 'grade' in North American system
<i>Conto</i>	One thousand Meticais
<i>Curandeiro</i>	Traditional healer
<i>Epa!</i>	Mozambican exclamation, of surprise or strong feeling
<i>Fumo</i>	Traditional leader
<i>Lobolo</i>	Sum of money or goods paid to parents of a bride by prospective groom
<i>Machamba</i>	Small plot of land for agriculture, usually less than 5 hectares
<i>Machibombo</i>	Bus
<i>Mambo</i>	Traditional leader, usually chief
<i>Mandioca</i>	Manioc/ cassava (root vegetable)
<i>Meticais</i>	Mozambican currency
<i>Moconte</i>	Ceremony to cleanse a Muslim in the dialect of Nampula
<i>Muzukuru</i>	N'dau word for nephew
<i>Niculuchu</i>	Cleansing for someone who has taken anti-bullet medicine
<i>Nduna</i>	Traditional leader, often the chief's 'police'
<i>Nyanga</i>	Shona word for traditional healer
<i>Pete</i>	Matri-local marital obligation for the prospective groom
<i>Régulo</i>	Traditional chief, co-opted by Portuguese for local government
<i>Secretário</i>	Frelimo authority at neighbourhood level
<i>Sura</i>	Locally brewed palm alcohol
<i>Tchirope</i>	Cleansing ceremony for returned soldiers

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INTERVIEW CODES

CHI	=	Chimoio
MOS	=	Mossurize
Q	=	Quelimane
MAG	=	Maganja da Costa
MOR	=	Morrumbala

NB: All names of interviewees have been changed for confidentiality, except for those who spoke to us in their official capacity.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

While the short term objectives of the Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DRP), namely to disperse the former combatants and ensure their basic needs in the initial period, have been met, and there are few visible differences between demobilised soldiers and any other citizen, it is not clear that the longer term objective of securing the peace has been guaranteed. This study, based on field research in Manica, Zambezia and Maputo provinces, examines the reasons for this. It points to areas which future programmes of this kind might be adjusted in the light of experience in Mozambique.

The study shows that in many respects the demobilised soldiers are socially and economically reintegrated and as such do not pose an immediate threat to their local communities. Despite a median period of over nine years spent fighting, there are many indicators that the demobilised are taking decisions on the basis of the social and economic considerations to be expected of any civilian in the post-war period.

Choice of destination after demobilisation was influenced by war experiences, the need to re-establish contact with families, a whole range of economic considerations, a wish to maximise opportunities for social status and to minimise political risks. The proportion of non-local to local demobilised in the three provinces differs widely, reflecting differing prioritisations of these various considerations. In Maputo city some two-thirds of the resident demobilised are not originally from the city, partially due to the fact that the later stages of the war were most actively fought in the south of the country, and that fewer soldiers were recruited there than in the centre and north. In Manica district only one third are from elsewhere, and in Zambezia this drops to less than ten per cent. The higher proportions of non-local demobilised in the two sites with greater access to trading and other non-agricultural economic opportunities demonstrates that the former combatants were not a homogeneous group who necessarily wished to return to subsistence agriculture as the primary source of livelihood, though the majority do depend on it as the basis for food security.

The ex-combatants' transition from military to civilian life has been marked by a range of ceremonies and events including traditional, religious and secular practices. The purpose of these varies from acknowledging the loss of family members, to cleansing the ex-combatants of any atrocities committed, appeasing the spirits of people killed, and thanking the ancestral spirits for a safe return. These events serve both psychological and social purposes, as they usually involve a range of other people, and thus signal a re-assertion of family and community authority over the individual, and a re-submission of the individual to that authority.

In parallel with these events, the overwhelming majority of demobilised have, in the period since demobilisation, either formalised liaisons entered into during the war, re-validated pre-existing marriages, or initiated new marriages. They have also, in Zambezia and Manica provinces, almost without exception, gained access to enough land to allow subsistence agriculture, focused principally on staple foods and small livestock production. Both in Maputo and Chimoio cities, access to land is more difficult in urban areas, but this is compensated for by more opportunities for income generation activities, particularly for women, who often earn more than their husbands and whose income is an important component of household survival strategies.

The demobilised are by necessity relatively conservative in their economic activities and aspire at least initially to security. The aspiration to have fixed and salaried

employment was widely expressed, despite the obvious difficulties realising this which arise from lack of employment opportunities generally, but reinforced in the case of the demobilised by the early termination of their education due to forcible recruitment as a result of which they were either unskilled in the first place, or by have become de-skilled during the war. The micro-projects and training programmes appear to have focused on developing new economic activities, without realising that this often conflicted with the demobilised's own initiatives which were more attuned to the priority of attaining economic security, but which were held back by infrastructural bottlenecks, especially transport, and an almost total absence of credit. They were also hampered by their use of inappropriate eligibility criteria which resulted in the failure to identify the most needy and/or the most able candidates.

The social reintegration of ex-combatants has been further helped by a 'will to co-exist' at a local level, despite weaknesses and lack of clarity about local authority structures. In Maputo city, for example, a common complaint is that relationships with local administrators have broken down and that there is no one to take problems to at a local level. The will to co-exist manifests itself in an absence of visible conflict despite multiple sources of tension between former combatants of the two sides, between those who benefited from the United Nations operation and those who did not, between the demobilised and other civilians, and between the demobilised and some local authorities. The various churches play an important role in preventing conflict. There is also much evidence of conflict avoidance strategies, principally by an individual removing him or herself from the site of conflict, a resolute refusal by people to pass public judgement on one another, and a shared willingness by most to lay the blame for many of today's problems at the door of government and the newly arrived 'democracy'.

The sense that much of the blame for today's problems lies with the government is a function of two main factors. Firstly, of frustrations with the economic problems of today, which are linked in many people's minds with 'democracy'. These include a lack of visible reconstruction efforts in many areas, particularly those formerly held by Renamo. Secondly, it is a function of deeply held grievances arising from the war itself. There is a strong sense among the demobilised that they are owed compensation for what happened to them and what they contributed to the war, whichever side they were on. Most report having been forcibly recruited and kept under arms for excessive periods of time, even if they did not have a clear sense of what they were fighting for, and most feel permanently disadvantaged by the early termination of their education. The failure of the assistance programmes to reach many of the more remote areas has further fuelled a sense of grievance, particularly among Renamo demobilised, who already feel discriminated against by the government's inconsistent benefits policies.

Frustrations at the present situation find fertile soil in these grievances arising from the war, and should be taken seriously at a national level. Although war-fatigue and social reintegration have combined to stabilise the situation at a local level, the current economic problems and resultant tensions could in time spill over into further violence. While the concerns expressed by most of the demobilised overlap broadly with those of other civilians, they appear heightened given the backdrop of their war-time experiences, and the ex-combatants' increasing anger at the apparent unwillingness of the government to hear and respond to their concerns. This anger manifests itself in expressions of sympathy for strike action, and even, at the limit, for the idea of returning to war, should there be a leader to orchestrate it. The inability of the demobilised soldiers' association to represent effectively the interests of this group to the government emerged as a serious issue, notably in Maputo city, where demobilised felt that the central government organisations were remote and over-bureaucratic.


Given that the most significant concerns of the ex-combatants are for economic opportunity and greater recognition, the study concludes that DRPs of the future must include a more explicit recognition that 'minimalist' definitions of reintegration are inadequate. Reintegration is not simply a social process, but also an economic and political one. Neglect of any of these dimensions risks jeopardising success overall.

Social reintegration is best facilitated by making choice of destination as flexible as possible, to allow people to find the place most appropriate to their needs. This may involve supporting two moves rather than just one.

Politically it is as important now as during the demobilisation period itself, to give full recognition to the demobilised for their war-time contributions; more positive recognition of AMODEG, the demobilised soldiers' association, would be an important step in this, as would non-discriminatory access to government benefits such as pensions.

Economically it is essential to consider the broader needs of rural development which will allow people to consolidate their subsistence base and develop it into an income generating opportunity as well. More consideration should be given to credit schemes and public works schemes, both of which would reduce severe bottlenecks in the Mozambican economy and allow for greater production and sale of agricultural surpluses.

Finally, the report challenges the dominant assumption that the 'absence of visible difference' among members of the population is a useful indicator of successful reintegration. Examination of the political, social and economic concerns of demobilised shows that a wide variety of 'invisible' differences are as crucial to understanding the process of reintegration, as well as making a prognosis for national security. Further, absence of visible difference between Mozambique's demobilised population and other civilians may actually be the worst rather than best indicator of successfully achieved reintegration, because it is an indicator that all are suffering high levels of economic vulnerability and are thus unable to take risks and demonstrate initiative. Recovery and reintegration will be more secure when all perceive themselves as better off than in the past and there is the emergence of wealth differentials. Thus it is the presence, rather than absence, of visible difference which will indicate both that recovery from the trauma of war has occurred, and that the pre-conditions for individual initiative are in place.




MAP 2 MANICA PROVINCE

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LEGENDA

- Limite da cidade _____
- Limite da localidade _____
- Limite do posto administrativo _____
- Limite do bairros _____
- Caminhos de ferro _____
- Estradas _____
- Picada _____
- Bairro Nhamandane 1
- " Bloco 9 2
- " Roberto Mugabe - Samora Machel 3
- " Eduardo Mondlane 5
- Posto Administrativo 6


CIDADE DE CHIMOIO			
POSTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS URBANOS	LOCALIDADE	BAIRROS	
POSTO ADMINISTRATIVO DE CHIMOIÓ 10.000 hab. 1975	CHIMOIO CENTRO SEDE 3995	27	Roberto Mugabe Samora Machel Julius Nyerere Eduardo Mondlane 3 de Fevereiro
	CHIMBORRA 17935		Joana Macha 13 de Junho Bengo 7 de Setembro Chimborra Bloco 9 Vila Nova
POSTO ADMINISTRATIVO DE FRANCISCO MANYANGA de Thonga 53.785 hab. 1975	FRANCISCO MANYANGA 12.265	3	7 de Abril Chimanga Citanga Fegat 1º de Maio Francisco Manyanga Popular de Textil
	NHAMACHHA 15.200		Nhaulile Nhamachha Muzingadzi
POSTO ADMINISTRATIVO DE NHAMADJETCHA de Nhamadjetcha 11.265 hab. 1975	25 DE JUNHO 11.265 hab.		Nhamandane Chimabero Agostinho Neto 15 de Junho 14
	NHAMADJETCHA 11.265 hab.		Nhamadjetcha Hombwe Cemitério



MAP 4 CHIMOIO CITY

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Mapa do Distrito de Mossurize e a sua divisão em Zonas






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MAP 6 QUELIMANE CITY

DISTRITO DA MAGANJA DA COSTA



LEGENDA

- + - + Limite do Distrito
- - - Limite de Localidade
- Sede do Distrito
- Sede da Localidade
- ⊕ Centro de Saúde
- ▭ Escola Secundaria
- ⊕ Aerodromo
- || Estradas
- ~ Rios

ESCALA 1/500.000

MAP 7 MAGANJA DA COSTA DISTRICT

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This report examines the process of return and subsequent social, economic and political reintegration of ex-combatants in both rural and urban settings in Manica and Zambezia provinces.¹ While the majority interviewed were those demobilised under ONUMOZ (United Nations Operation in Mozambique), the study also included numerous ex-combatants who had fallen outside the United Nations demobilisation programme. This study builds on an earlier pilot study of the demobilisation process in Mozambique (Borges Coelho and Vines 1994).

1. Background to demobilisation and reintegration programmes

The problem of what to do with soldiers after the fighting is over is not new. Prost describes how, after the first World War, soldiers returning to French society faced a difficult transition both economically and psychologically, and how their reactions to the experience forced the French government to implement special programmes to assist them (1992: 13). In western European countries after the Second World War, the demobilisation of ex-combatants was addressed through the social and economic reconstruction programme of the Marshall Plan. In Africa, the end of the Algerian war of independence in the 1960s saw the implementation of programmes to assist returning soldiers (Bouhouche 1991). Similarly the end of the Zimbabwean war of independence saw a variety of programmes aimed at reintegration of former guerrillas and soldiers from the army (Barnes 1995).

More recently, the end of the Cold War and associated conflicts has given increasing scope for externally-funded and manned interventions, reflected in a spate of peace-keeping, demobilisation and reintegration activities.

These situations are perceived as qualitatively different from western experiences because the context in which they are taking place is characterised by severe economic constraints on the capacity of the state, and the concomitant weakening of the state, which is itself often a part of the process of 'transition to democracy'. In order to explain the apparently inhuman and inexplicable practice of violence and

¹A third site is reported in Borges Coelho 1997

terror in these conflicts, it is widely assumed that the soldiers responsible were brutalised, de-socialised and alienated from society's norms, either through deliberate ritual brutalisation, or simply by the experience of war (Richards 1996; Wilson 1992). These alienated individuals are famously characterised by Kaplan as 'loose molecules' (1994), that is, individuals whose social ties have been ruptured, with no stake in society (Harrison 1993). Such individuals are therefore seen as beyond the control of civil society and able easily to disrupt a fragile peace process.

These views have been reflected in Mozambique, amongst academics, government, media and in the general public. Academics such as Harrison (1993), Hanlon (1997), Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1992) refer to a 'culture of violence' in order to suggest that the potential for demobilised involvement in crime and banditry results from an altered psychological disposition. Media has played on these fears, portraying demobilised as volatile and dangerous. Various government members interviewed echoed these negative stereotypes: 'demobilised have a different mentality', 'it is difficult to work with them, because they think and rationalise differently';² or 'demobilised must be treated with great caution because they are used to living violently'. 'Those without *machambas*³ have the most problems and cause the most trouble.'⁴ A Frelimo party official put forward a more detailed version of this argument: 'demobilised are different from returnees because they were used to taking orders, not being active, or managing their own lives. Without incentives they won't return to work. The main difference between the demobilised and returnee is attitude'.⁵

These assumptions underlay the belief that it is necessary to make demobilisation and reintegration into a package, captured in the term 'DRP', to ensure that peace will hold. The World Bank in April 1992 set up an Africa Region Working Group on Demobilization/Reintegration of Military Personnel, specifically to address these issues (World Bank 1993: v). A recent World Bank study (1993) discusses the cases of Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique and Nicaragua. This was followed by an in-depth case study of Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda, also by the World Bank (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer 1996b).

The essence of the DRP package is the belief that demobilisation must necessarily be followed by 'reintegration'. In Mozambique, as in other contexts of civil war, this

²Interview, José Maria, Mayor of Chimoio, 18.3.96

³Plot of land for farming, usually only small plots up to 5 hectares. Larger plots are generally referred to as *farmas* rather than *machambas*.

⁴Interview, D.L. Lameira, Mozambican Red Cross, Chimoio, 27.2.96

⁵Interview, A. Amelia, Chimoio, 6.5.96

consists minimally of 'buying the peace', and thereby diminishing soldiers' need to resort to banditry, weaning them off reliance on the gun for achieving social, economic and political goals.

2. Overview of the Mozambican demobilisation and reintegration programme

The Mozambican demobilisation programme was developed in the context of the Rome Peace talks between 1990 and 1992 and formed an integral part of the peace settlement. Protocol IV of the Peace Accord specified the timetable and content of the demobilisation process and the creation of a reintegration commission. The details of the economic and social reintegration programmes for the demobilised soldiers were to 'depend on the resources made available within the framework of the Donors' Conference' (GPA 1992: Protocol IV.ii.3). While the demobilisation process was delayed for strategic, political and logistical reasons (Borges Coelho and Vines 1994; Pardoel 1996a), the donors debated the design of the reintegration programmes within the wider strategies for post-war reconstruction of Mozambique.⁶

i) Scale of the programme

Between March and September 1994, 74,710 soldiers were demobilised, of which 55,076 were from the Armed Forces of Mozambique (FAM) and 19,634 were from Renamo forces. A further 16,000 men who had been demobilised from the FAM immediately prior to the GPA were also officially registered by ONUMOZ in 1993 in order to be included in the reintegration support schemes (Pardoel 1996b: 31). Thus the actual target group of ONUMOZ demobilised soldiers was 90,710. Included in this were only 1,380 female demobilised soldiers, or 1.5% of the total demobilised (Pardoel 1996b: 6).⁷ A further 11,540 joined the new army and so were not part of the ONUMOZ target group. Of these, 7,894 were from the FAM and 3,646 were from Renamo (ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization, cited in Borges Coelho and Vines 1994: 23).

⁶Personal Communication, T. Born, 20.02.96

⁷The Mozambican Demobilised Soldiers' Association (AMODEG), likely taking a more holistic view of women's participation, estimates there are 15,000 'demobilised' women countrywide. *Noticias* Newspaper, 22.11.94

TABLE 1: ONUMOZ target group

Source	Number	Percentage
FAM	55,076	60.7
Renamo	19,634	21.6
Group of 16,000	16,000	17.6
TOTAL	90,710	100

In terms of scale, the DRP had a much smaller target group than the programmes for the reintegration of returned refugees. The UNHCR stated that it had assisted twenty percent of the one million and seven hundred thousand returnees, or three hundred and seventy-eight thousand (1996: 5). There were a further three million internally displaced people, who had not been specifically targeted for assistance.

ii) Definitions and objectives of reintegration

a) Inter-Governmental organisations and donors

It is difficult to find a clearly-stated definition of 'reintegration' during the period in which the programmes were being set up in Mozambique. The definition offered by the International Organisation for Migration (the principal implementer of reintegration programmes) was that reintegration was to be understood as distinct from development, because a soldier is considered reintegrated when he is no different from the rest of the community, not when all of his problems are solved.⁸ The designers and evaluators of the programmes implemented by IOM also used this as a basis for an operational definition, supplemented by identifying specific indicators for both social and economic reintegration. They also saw the elimination of difference between the demobilised and the rest of the community as the central goal of reintegration programmes.⁹

This definition is both vague and minimalist. It is vague because in order to assess reintegration, we would require an answer to several further, crucial questions, 'how does one measure community standards?' and 'what are the relevant differences to assess reintegration'?

⁸Interview, M. Tavalaj, and C. Simmons, IOM Provincial Fund Manager and IRS/PF Assistant Manager, Maputo, 19.2.96

⁹Creative Associates 1996a: 6

It is minimalist because it does not have positive content. It does not promote a standard to be achieved, but only stipulates that whatever standard, it must be universal. Thus, it allows for serious conditions of absolute poverty, as long as relative to each other, poor people are no different.

This was the definition of reintegration proposed to achieve the objectives of security and peace. It is clear from the time-frame set for the reintegration programmes that reintegration was conceived of as a very short-term issue; as one USAID official stated, the programmes were intended to 'buy the peace', i.e. make sure that the soldiers did not return immediately to arms.¹⁰ They were intended to be different from 'development' programmes, which were seen to be more properly directed at society as a whole, rather than targeted to individuals.

There was some debate amongst donors at the time of the Donors' Conference in 1993 over whether demobilised soldiers should be targeted at all. It was believed by some to be morally wrong to do so, in the face of wide societal suffering which some felt was due, at least in part, to the actions of demobilised soldiers. Why should the perpetrators be rewarded more than the victims, in the post-war period?¹¹ However, it was finally agreed that it was worth targeting demobilised soldiers for a short period, in order to ensure that peace held.

By contrast, the evolution of IOM's programmes from providing information and referrals to actively creating economic opportunities and attempting to address issues of social reintegration, shows that there was a realisation that in order to achieve the objectives of security, it was necessary to go beyond simple elimination of 'difference' between demobilised and non-demobilised. If they had simply wished for equality in poverty, the programmes would have been much shorter. And in fact, at the end of the reintegration programmes, IOM's main donor stated that most of the programmes were unnecessary - they could have given six months' subsidy and nothing more.¹² But the programme objectives went beyond assurance of short-term security, and attempted to create economic opportunity in the interests of longer-term security. Given that unemployment in Mozambique is very high (see **Chapter 4**), achieving this objective would take the programmes beyond the elimination of difference between demobilised and non-demobilised, and might in fact create a 'privileged' group by focusing on demobilised soldiers.

¹⁰Personal communication, T. Born, USAID, Maputo, 02.96

¹¹Personal communication, T. Born, USAID, Maputo, 10.96

¹²T. Born, at the *Conferência sobre a reintegração dos desmobilizados*, UEM, Maputo, 24-25 October 1996

The package of reintegration programmes eventually agreed upon contained elements promoting economic opportunity as well as short-term security (see **Appendix I** for detailed description). The RSS/EAR scheme to distribute payments to demobilised soldiers in their district of choice was a tool for quick dispersal of the soldiers to promote security (see **Section 2, iii**). The OSD/DHO and IRS/SIR programmes were for those soldiers who did not want to return to rural areas and take up agriculture, who would, therefore, require training and assistance to get into the formal sector or to be self-employed. It was believed at this point that fifty percent of soldiers would want to return to small-scale agriculture, but no special programmes were set up to assist them (Borges Coelho and Vines 1994: 29). The PF programme was introduced because of an early recognition that not enough economic opportunities were in existence, and therefore would have to be created.

Despite this recognition of a more expansive objective than simply 'buying the peace' in the short-term, the over-arching definition remained minimalist. Thus, the final evaluation of the reintegration programmes still stressed the absence of visible difference between demobilised and non-demobilised as an indicator of satisfactory reintegration (Creative Associates 1996b: i).

b) Government

The Government of Mozambique was originally involved in the reintegration process as one of the members of the Reintegration Commission (CORE, from *Comissão de Reintegração*), in conjunction with representatives of Renamo and the UN co-ordinator (GPA, Protocol IV, article VI, ii, 2). The Reintegration Commission's mandate was to liaise with donor governments, international organisations and national NGOs, and to co-ordinate reintegration programming. Its emphasis was on economic reintegration, as social reintegration was seen as best addressed by 'indigenous society' (UNOHAC/CORE 5 1994: 1).

After the national elections in 1994 and the dissolution of UNOHAC/CORE, the government established a similar co-ordinating body, the UCP (*Unidade de Coordenação de Programas*), this time not including Renamo (IOM 1995: 15). It placed this responsibility within the national and provincial ministries of labour, demonstrating its continued belief in economic reintegration as the main objective.

There is no clear position adopted by the government at its various levels on the issue of demobilised soldiers. As individuals, however, members of the government expressed their views on the concept of reintegration in the current context of Mozambique. On the basis of these views as well as from statements in the press, it appears that the government policy with regard to demobilised soldiers is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is in their interest to emphasise the need for further assistance for demobilised soldiers, because it can attract more aid money to the country. Government is still dependent on external donors for approximately eighty percent of its spending.¹³ On the other hand, they need to play down the problems of demobilised soldiers in order to defuse claims that the soldiers themselves make for compensation and restitution for the years spent in public service in the army. Furthermore, they would like to deflect claims made by Renamo soldiers onto Afonso Dhlakama's party, so that they do not have to respond to them either.

Often these conflicting messages are given simultaneously. An official in the National Ministry of Labour put forward the view that demobilised are citizens like any other, but at the same time he thought that 'reintegration' was a problematic concept. He raised the question of whether reintegration policy should be seen simply as the \$250 per demobilised given by the IOM for micro-enterprise, or should it be more? Does it involve addressing questions of land disputes etc.? These questions suggest that in his view 'reintegration' ought to involve more than what was currently on offer. Given that his ministry was in charge of many of the programmes for reintegration of demobilised soldiers, this wider emphasis is understandable.¹⁴

The Director of Labour in Manica, the provincial counterpart of the national ministry, also believed that eventually the demobilised should be treated like any other unemployed person. Still, he thought it remained necessary for the time being to pay special attention to them. He offered two criteria for reintegration: 1) earning the national minimum wage and/or 2) ability to support dependants, but he did not indicate which he favoured, nor whether he believed that the second should follow from the first.¹⁵ This is an important issue, since the minimum wage is barely enough to ensure self-sufficiency, but on the other hand there are many people who do not earn even that little amount.

Others placed a stronger emphasis on economic self-sufficiency as a necessary condition of 'reintegration'. An official of the Bureau for Support to Refugees (NAR),

¹³Plank 1993

¹⁴Interview, G. A. Botas, Maputo, 11.12.95

¹⁵Interview, J. Rocheque, Chimoio, Manica province, 28.2.96

stated that 'reintegration is when people have at least the minimal necessary conditions for self-sufficiency'. He was surprisingly candid when evaluating the performance of NAR in the reintegration process for refugees, and he also criticised UNHCR for pulling out so quickly, before such 'reintegration' was achieved.¹⁶ Perhaps people will never be acknowledged as self-sufficient, since this would undermine the whole *raison d'être* of the agencies there to assist them.

Some government officials merely echo the language and concepts used by the assistance agencies. For example, in one district in Manica, the Administrator noted that 'the ex-combatant is like any other citizen except that he doesn't have training or education, is often illiterate, and is thus in need of micro-projects for income-generation'.¹⁷ Similarly, the IOM facilitator in the same district stated that the demobilised are more vulnerable than returnees and internally displaced people because the latter two groups were with their families during the war and were usually able to be productive while displaced, so when they return they were able to bring back something with which to start-up their new life. The ex-combatant has nothing to start-up with except weapons.¹⁸

iii) Content of the demobilisation and reintegration programme

The package of reintegration programmes eventually agreed upon consisted of five main elements (see Appendix I).

a) Demobilisation Kits

While still in the Assembly Areas, all demobilised soldiers were (in principle) to receive kits containing civilian clothing, agricultural tools and seeds, and basic household items such as buckets and crockery.

b) Reintegration Support Scheme / *Esquema de Apoio a Reintegração* (RSS / EAR)

In addition to these kits, all demobilised soldiers received a total of twenty-four months' salary in monthly or bi-monthly instalments.

c) Information and Referral Services / *Serviço de Informação e Referência* (IRS / SIR)

This programme aimed to provide assistance to the demobilised soldiers in understanding and accessing the state and ONUMOZ benefits to which they were entitled, to identify opportunities in private enterprise and NGOs for employment and training, and to refer soldiers to programmes appropriate to their needs and interests.

¹⁶Interview, Duque, Chimoio, Manica province, 01.04.96

¹⁷Interview, C.F. Chale, Guro district, Manica province, 27.03.96

¹⁸Interview, Kufakwanhumba, Guro district, Manica province, 27.03.96

d) Provincial Fund / *Fundo Provincial* (PF / FP) and Open Reintegration Fund / *Fundo Aberto de Reintegração* (ORF / FAR)

The IOM set up the Provincial Fund (PF) in November 1994, to create projects to promote employment and self-sufficiency.

A similar programme known as the Open Reintegration Fund (ORF) was designed and implemented by the German Technical Co-operation (GTZ) in the central provinces (Manica, Sofala, Tete and Inhambane) beginning in late 1994.

e) Occupational Skills Development / *Desenvolve as suas Habilitações Ocupacionais* (OSD/DHO)

This programme provided training in various skills, from basic management skills to carpentry, soldering, tailoring, amongst others.

f) Pensions

The above were the programmes primarily designed, financed and implemented by external donors. The Government was independently responsible for pensions. Retirement pensions were given to former Frelimo combatants and not to former Renamo combatants, and then only where the ex-combatant served in the army for ten years or longer.

g) Assistance to the disabled

Towards the end of its mandate, the IOM paid increasing attention to groups which were believed still to be non-reintegrated. One such group was the disabled demobilised soldiers. Paradoxically, this group was characterised as an 'especially high-risk vulnerable group' (IOM 1996: 5).¹⁹ Their interventions in this regard included medical examinations which had not been completed during the ONUMOZ mandate, and collaboration with ADEMIMO (Mozambican Disabled Demobilised Soldiers' Association) in the provision of wheelchairs and implementation of special projects for income-generation.

3. Relevance of the study

While there is a basic assumption that demobilisation should be followed by reintegration, there is little consensus on when reintegration can be said to have been achieved, let alone how best to achieve it. This is partly because of the wide range of possible objectives and actors with varying priorities. The World Bank (1993: 17) identifies security, political, economic and fiscal motivations for DRPs.

Although studies in various countries have examined demobilisation and reintegration programmes (DRPs),²⁰ these have generally not looked beyond the formal assistance programmes to the social, economic and political processes which go on in parallel,

¹⁹The perception of disabled demobilised as high-risk appears to have arisen from incidents such as riots, most spectacularly of a group of disabled demobilised soldiers who were in a centre in Savane, Sofala Province waiting for their pensions and medical assistance since their demobilisation. They set up road-blocks to hi-jack lorries carrying food. (Interview, C. Simmons, IOM IRS/PF Assistant Manager, Maputo, 18.12.95; *Noticias* Newspaper, 31.03.95)

²⁰e.g. World Bank 1993; Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer 1996a, 1996b; GDI 1995; Ball 1997; Creative Associates 1996a, 1996b

nor have they assessed the role and impact of these programmes as they relate to these wider processes. The timing of this study coincided with the phasing out of the reintegration subsidies (RSS/EAR) and programmes (IRS/PF and ORF). Thus it offered the opportunity to explore reintegration more broadly, and examine how programmes relate to broader processes. In this way it aimed to provide future demobilisation and reintegration programmes with a more comprehensive framework within which to conceptualise and plan interventions.

Because of its longer time frame and the nature of the research methodology, which allowed us to identify underlying currents and trends to supplement information on manifest incidents, the study was able to give a different perspective on the issue of security in Mozambique. While in the initial phases, demobilised were perceived as a threat throughout the country, by the time of this study in 1996, only particular areas and groups were still considered by IOM to pose potential security risks.²¹ This assessment was based mainly on the number of reported incidents of insecurity in which demobilised soldiers were believed or known to be involved, including crime, strikes, and demonstrations. The information gathered by IOM was largely from newspaper reports and word-of-mouth sources.²²

4. Research questions

Overall, the diversity of objectives of DRPs, as well as the varying contexts in which they have been implemented, has resulted in significantly differing content, leaving a number of questions unanswered. For example, should reintegration programmes aim to provide jobs for all demobilised soldiers, or more modestly, an enabling environment for their economic self-sufficiency? Are there contradictions between meeting the different objectives, such as security and economic dividends? For example in Mozambique a key question was whether long-term economic self-sufficiency of demobilised soldiers was compromised by the distribution of demobilisation subsidies in the interests of short-term security.²³

To capture these, and other issues, we took as our point of departure for research and analysis five main questions which are of particular relevance to future reintegration programmes:

²¹Interview, C. Simmons, IOM IRS/PF Assistant Manager, Maputo, 18.12.95

²²IOM 1996b

²³Interview, C. Simmons, IOM IRS/PF Assistant Manager, Maputo, 18.12.95

1) Are demobilised soldiers in fact akin to 'loose molecules' with no stake in society, and therefore a danger to social security?

This question involves answering two further questions:

a) what does it mean to have a stake in society?

b) how does this relate to security and peace generally?

2) How have the various programmes helped or hindered the ex-combatants' own efforts to re-establish a social and economic existence sustainable beyond the end of the assistance programmes?

3) Do demobilised soldiers continue to identify themselves or to be identified by others as a group with particular rights, needs, and the potential to disrupt the peace process?

4) Finally, are current definitions of reintegration sufficient to understand the situation in Mozambique and the prospects for long-term security and development? Are they sufficient to design programmes which will meet the needs and aspirations of the targeted beneficiaries?

5) Should particular dimensions of reintegration be prioritised over others?

5. Methodology of the study

i) **Laying the groundwork**

NGO documentation and press clippings were collected in Maputo and in the two provincial capitals, Chimoio and Quelimane, in the first phase of the research. Interviews were conducted with representatives of all of the major NGOs directly and indirectly involved with demobilised soldiers as well as of the relevant government departments. This allowed us to introduce ourselves, to collect relevant secondary documentation, and to establish collaborative links where possible.

In Manica, exploratory visits to districts were undertaken to inform the subsequent choice of field sites. This was done in collaboration with the Provincial Planning Commission, United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and IOM. In Zambezia, preliminary district visits were conducted in collaboration with IOM.

A crucial factor in allowing the research to take place in all areas was the credential letter provided by the Provincial Governor. In both provinces this was obtained after numerous discussions with government officials. This authorisation from the highest level proved essential to gaining permission to proceed at district and village level.

ii) Selection of Sites

Our choice of sites was influenced by a number of considerations. Firstly to ensure representation of different regions of the country: south, centre and north. Secondly, to ensure representation of urban and rural areas, and to enable comparisons with other groups, particularly returning refugees. Thirdly, to ensure a diversity of geographical and economic situations for their different impact on reintegration. Finally, to ensure coverage of both former Renamo and former Frelimo controlled areas (which in practice corresponded broadly, but not entirely, to the urban/rural division).

Manica and Zambezia provinces were chosen to represent the centre and north of the country respectively, and Maputo, the south (**Map 1**). Manica province is bisected by the Beira Corridor, along which there is an urbanised belt of population settlement, and to the north and south of which are more remote rural districts (**Map 2**). Zambezia province has a primarily rural-based economy formerly dominated by coconut, tea and cotton plantations, and enjoying a lengthy coastline (**Map 3**).

In each province urban and rural sites were selected. In Manica province the urban sites were two *bairros*²⁴ in the city of Chimoio (**Map 4**). The *Bairro 25 de Junho* was chosen for its proximity to the main army barracks and its high concentration of ex-combatants. The *Bairro Muzingadzi* was chosen because it was much more recently settled and had links to the Textafrika textile factory (until 1990 the main employer in Chimoio).

Mossurize was chosen as the rural district for the research in Manica province because it is adjacent to Zimbabwe and thus enabled us to consider both a long history of labour migration and large numbers of returnees as factors in the reintegration process.²⁵ Within Mossurize, four communities were chosen, two in the southern administrative post, one in the district capital and one in the northern administrative post (**Map 5**).

In Zambezia province, urban research took place mainly in an area just outside Quelimane (the capital city), known as Madal. It was chosen for its high concentration of demobilised soldiers as well as access to a range of subsistence activities: salt production, coconut harvesting and fishing (**Map 6**). Interviews were

²⁴Neighbourhoods

²⁵*Nucleio de Apoio aos Refugiados* 1995 counted 24,964 returnees to Mossurize district, equivalent to approximately one third of the population of the district according to the Provincial Planning Commission, Manica

also conducted in the following *bairros* of Quelimane city: Brandão, Aeroporto, Coalane, Issidua, Unidade 1° de Maio, Chirangano, Torrone Novo, Gazelas.

The two rural districts chosen were Maganja da Costa and Morrumbala. Maganja was chosen because it had been characterised by IOM as a district at high risk of insecurity, with large concentrations of Renamo demobilised soldiers.²⁶ It was historically at the heart of the coconut plantations, and its coastline offers fishing opportunities (Map 7).

Morrumbala district, like Mossurize in Manica, was chosen because of the large numbers of returned refugees, being located on the border with Malawi (Map 8).²⁷ In both districts, research teams were based in the district capital but all administrative posts and many of their localities were also visited (see Appendix II for Administrative Structures, and Appendix III for list of interview sites).

iii) Sample and access to interviewees

To capture the wider processes of social and economic reintegration, the target group of the research included both ONUMOZ and non-ONUMOZ ex-combatants, returned refugees, internally displaced people, traditional leaders, traditional healers, church leaders, government officials at all levels, as well as national and international NGOs (Tables 2 & 3).

TABLE 2: Number and location of interviews

Location	Renamo DS	Frelimo DS	Non-demobs	TOTAL
Chimoio	14	69	76	159
Mossurize	37	25	69	131
Quelimane	5	95	10	110
Maganja	49	160	22	231
Morrumbala	55	62	32	149
TOTAL	160	411	209	780
Percent total	21	53	27	100
Percent DS	28	72		100

²⁶IOM 1996b

²⁷138,665 out of an estimated total population of 210,090, according to the UNHCR Sub-Office Quelimane, 31.12.95

TABLE 3: Non-demobilised interviews

Returnees	Healers	Chiefs	Government*	Others§
56	10	30	20	38

* Includes officials at various levels of government, from local to provincial

§ Includes teachers, nurses, business people, and other individual civilians

The diverse nature of research sites and their associated logistical constraints influenced the selection of interviewees. At the local level, the first step was always to seek permission from either the government/party officials and/or *régulos* (chiefs), depending on the politics of the area. Many of these individuals were subsequently interviewed as informants in their own right.

To access ex-combatants, a variety of techniques were used. In Manica, these began with interviews with key informants, followed by the 'snow-ball' technique (each informant identifying and leading the researcher to subsequent informants). In the villages in Mossurize, localisation of demobilised soldiers was facilitated by return visits and the length of time spent in each community, sufficient to interview all ex-combatants present in the area at the time of the research. Traditional healers, church leaders and refugees were identified for interviews by the local government officials, chiefs and local residents.

In Zambezia province, key informants and 'snow-ball' techniques were used in Madal and Quelimane, with considerable assistance from AMODEG. In the two rural districts, Maganja and Morrumbala, when local leaders were asked to identify demobilised soldiers, their response was almost invariably to call a mass meeting to overcome constraints of time and distance. Depending on the numbers present, the demobilised were then either interviewed individually or in smaller groups. As in Manica, traditional healers, church leaders and refugees interviewed were identified by the local government officials, chiefs and local residents.

iv) Interview content

Interviews with demobilised soldiers and other individuals such as returned refugees or internally displaced people who did not represent specific organisations or interests covered a set range of themes. For each theme a number of specific questions were asked (see **Appendix IV**), relating to the individual and his or her household and environment. In each interview, there was also considerable scope to pursue issues of particular interest which arose in the course of the conversation. This resulted in data which are both quantitative and qualitative.

Interviews with people of the other categories were directed at exploring specific issues related to their role in and perceptions of the process of reintegration.

v) Interview methods

The majority of interviews were taped and transcribed. In the more remote field sites, many of the interviews were conducted in the local languages, and these tapes were translated as they were being transcribed. In more urban areas, the majority of interviews were conducted and transcribed in Portuguese.

Individual interviews were conducted in a variety of settings, including the interviewee's home and public meeting places. Group interviews were also conducted. In some circumstances this was done in order to promote discussion on specific issues with particular groups of people, while in others, it was to ensure that the opinions and views of all those who presented themselves to be interviewed were represented.

vi) Interviewers

The project relied heavily on fourteen locally-recruited research assistants with greatly varied backgrounds (**Appendix V**). With one exception, the research assistants were from the province in which they were working. In Manica they were local to the research site. In Zambezia those who were not local to the research site were familiar with the local languages. In all cases, their knowledge of the area in which they were working, their social and political contacts, and their cultural skills were indispensable to the research.

In addition to these fourteen, others were employed to help with transcription, translation and typing.

vii) Other data collected

In addition to participant observation in all field work areas, community economic and social activities were also mapped in Chimoio (**Appendix VI**). A survey of employers in Chimoio city was also conducted to assess employment of, and employer attitudes towards demobilised soldiers (see **Chapter 4**, and **Appendix VII**).

viii) Data Analysis

a) Quantitative analysis

Due to time constraints and in the interests of quality control, a random sample of one hundred questionnaires was taken from the total of six hundred. These were inputted into a database and analysed using the SPSS statistical package. Given that not all questions were asked in each interview, the exact number of cases is given at the bottom of each table. Our sample included questionnaires from each of the five districts, although Maganja da Costa was under-represented due to incomplete responses. The degree to which our sample is representative of amongst demobilised soldiers is indicated by the close match with the data collected by ONUMOZ on basic demographic profile: rank (Table 4), political affiliation (Table 5), age (Table 6), gender (Tables 7 & 8), education (Chapter 4, Table 21), length of service (Chapter 6, Section 2, v),.

TABLE 4: Distribution of sample by rank (%)

Rank	Study sample *	ONUMOZ ²⁸
Simple soldier	44	51
<i>Alferes</i> ²⁹	19	14
Sergeant	22	25
Lieutenant	4	3
Captain	10	4
TOTAL	100	97

* $n=68$

TABLE 5: Distribution of sample by political affiliation (%)

Affiliation	Study sample *	ONUMOZ ³⁰
Frelimo	72	78.3
Renamo	28	21.7
TOTAL	100	100

* $n=93$

²⁸Pardoel 1996b: 35

²⁹Rank below lieutenant in Mozambican army, no English equivalent

³⁰Pardoel 1996b: 31

TABLE 6. Distribution of sample by age (%)

Age Group	Study sample * ~	ONUMOZ ³¹
>21	6	4
21 - 25	18	22
26 - 30	34	30
31 - 35	20	25
36 - 40	10	11
41 - 45	5	5
46 - 50	2	2
51 <	8 ⁺	1
TOTAL	100	100

* n=87

~ Two years have been subtracted from the ages given in 1996 in order to be comparable with the ONUMOZ figures from 1994.

+ This figure reflects the non-demobilised in the study sample

TABLE 7: Distribution of sample by gender (%)

Gender	Study sample [§]	Study population*
Male	91	90.5
Female	9	9.5
TOTAL	100	100

*n=780, §n=93

TABLE 8: Distribution of sample by gender and political affiliation (%)

Affiliation	Male	Female
Renamo	30	61
Frelimo	56	11
Non-demob	4	33
TOTAL	100	100

n=99

b) Qualitative analysis

The analysis of quantitative data was complemented by a qualitative analysis of verbatim interview transcripts and field notes. Interview transcripts were analysed using a number of thematic headings, and quotations which captured commonly made arguments in a succinct manner were selected. Where appropriate, comparative ethnographic material was made use of in order to cross-check initial observations.

³¹Pardoel 1996b: 31-2

ix) Timetable

From December 1995 through February 1996, background documentation and interviews with government, international and national NGOs were conducted at a national level. Collection of secondary data, interviews with government and NGO officials, preliminary site visits and obtaining authorisation at a provincial level were completed by the end of April in Manica and by the end of May in Zambezia. Pilot interviewing and training of research assistants took place in May at both sites, as well as the selection of rural and urban research sites. Intensive interviewing and fieldwork began in Manica in May and in Zambezia in June and was completed by the end of September. Feedback sessions took place at local and provincial levels in September, culminating in a workshop in Maputo on the 24-25 October, 1996 (Appendix VIII).

x) Issues affecting data collection

a) Local perceptions of the researchers

As highlighted above, the timing of the research coincided with the end of the majority of programmes for demobilised soldiers and a general reduction in the activity of international aid organisations. It was difficult for all members of the team, but particularly for the two non-Mozambican members, to avoid being seen as yet another international project which could bring more material benefits.

This perception of the informants was both a help and a hindrance to the research. It motivated people to talk to us, but, despite our repeated efforts to stress that we had no material benefits to offer informants, many were reluctant to accept this as true. As noted above, particularly in Maganja da Costa district in Zambezia province, we were often obliged to interview much larger numbers of people than expected, which had an obvious impact on the depth of information collected.

The perception that we had some benefits to offer appeared to be related in part to whether or not we came to research sites by car. It is noteworthy that in Mossurize, where we were reliant on local transport, we were never confronted with large groups of people lining up to be interviewed, nor with the articulation of expectations to which we were unable to respond. On the other hand, because of the logistical difficulties of travelling without a private vehicle in rural Mozambique, the number of areas covered in Manica province was significantly lower than in Zambezia. Thus in

Zambezia the research enjoyed more breadth but less depth, while in Manica the reverse was true.

b) Willingness to talk

Much of the literature on the war in Mozambique leads one to expect numerous graphic accounts of the trauma of war. In our research, such events were referred to, but in a very oblique and understated manner, whereas current issues, for example, the lack of social infrastructure and the frustration with the government's pension policy, were spoken of with considerable vehemence.

This playing down of the past may be attributable to individual and/or socially-rooted concerns. Individuals may be psychologically unable to discuss what happened during the war, or it may be that the culture of many Mozambicans emphasises forgetting as the method of coping with traumatic events. An equally plausible explanation for their silence is that individuals may well have had time to come to terms psychologically with a traumatic experience but still considers it socially and politically dangerous to talk openly about such experiences in a context where former enemies are living in close proximity. A further consideration is that the research assistants themselves had particular political identities (**Appendix VI**) which may have influenced respondents' willingness to talk.

CHAPTER 2

SETTLEMENT DECISIONS

The very term reintegration suggests a return to the *status quo ante*, an integral part of which would be return to the place of origin. Yet ONUMOZ and our own statistics suggest that for many, place of origin was not the choice of destination. Our interviews demonstrate that the decision about destination was informed by a very complex set of factors. Furthermore they indicate that choice of initial destination after demobilisation should not be regarded as synonymous with preferred place of settlement.

1. Where soldiers went after demobilisation

In the country as a whole, ONUMOZ statistics show that twenty-six percent of demobilised soldiers did not return to their province of birth upon demobilisation (Pardoel 1996b: 20). This overall figure of one in four soldiers not settled in their province of origin masks important regional variations. The relative attractiveness of a place can be deduced from the proportion of those born there who were attracted back after demobilisation, and the proportion that these 'locals' form of the total demobilised population settled in that place.

Manica province scores high on both of these counts. It attracted back 6,071, or eighty-two percent of demobilised who had been born there (see **Table 9**). It also attracted 2,963 demobilised soldiers who were not of local origin, who made up thirty-two percent of the total demobilised population in the province (9,034). As a result Manica experienced a net gain in terms of demobilised: while 7,404 were born there, 9,034 chose to settle there.

Zambezia, by contrast, succeeded in attracting back only seventy-seven percent of the total of 18,611 born there, and only 1,114 demobilised who were not of local origin (see **Table 9**). These 1,114 made up only seven percent of the demobilised population in that province. The province thus suffered a net loss: While 18,611 demobilised were born there, only 15,444 chose to settle there.

TABLE 9: Local versus Non-local demobilised soldiers by province¹

Province	Local	% of DS in Province	Non-local	% of DS in Province	Total	Ratio of non-local to local
Manica	6,071	68	2,963	32	9,034	1:3
Zambezia	15,444	93	1,114	7	16,558	1:14

The three provinces studied in this project thus cover a wide range of situations. The most extreme case is Maputo province and city, where approximately three out of four demobilised soldiers are from elsewhere. Manica Province, where one in three demobilised soldiers is not originally from there, has the second highest proportion of non-local demobilised soldiers in the country. Zambezia has one of the lowest rates of non-local demobilised soldiers, only one in fourteen.

While these figures are revealing at one level, suggesting a correlation between locations with economic opportunities, (e.g. urbanisation, access to major transport and trading routes), and number of demobilised settlers, they are still at a sufficiently high level of aggregation to mask some important dynamics. They do not tell us where people went within the respective provinces: did those who returned to their province of origin also return to their actual district and place of origin or did they choose an alternative destination? Has there been a rural to urban shift? More detailed analysis of the ONUMOZ data than that which has been published to date would be able to show us this.

Equally important, as will become clear from what follows, but not deducible from the ONUMOZ data, is whether people have moved again since arriving in their first place of destination.

Although at a broad level the statistics suggest a correlation between numbers of demobilised soldiers and settlement areas with certain characteristics such as high level of urbanisation, they cannot tell us the motivations and constraints which framed each individual's decision about where to go when offered transport by ONUMOZ. What made one in four demobilised soldiers choose to settle in another province than the one in which they were born? Why did people stay in the provinces in which they were stationed during the war, even if they were not local to that province? What are the motives for rural to urban, urban to rural, rural to rural or urban to urban movement?

¹Pardoel 1996b: 20

Even without knowing these various motivations, the mere fact that different regions experienced different settlement patterns forces us to question the notion of reintegration as a return to the *status quo ante*. A demobilised soldier who settles away from his or her place of origin may be less able to call on family networks for economic support, but equally may escape all manner of social pressures which would arise if s/he went 'home'. A local leader in an urban *bairro* where one in three or more demobilised is not from that place may find it much harder to exercise authority over them than a reinstated *régulo*² in a remote rural village (see **Chapter 5**).

In the following sections we seek to highlight the complex range of factors which individuals took into account while deciding on a place to go to after demobilisation, such as family ties, social status, rights and access to land, economic opportunities.

2. Family Ties and Information: *'I didn't know who I would find there'*

A first step in resettlement is to go home to reassure one's family that one is still alive, and equally to be reassured that they are still alive, or at least to know who is still alive. This can be simply a check-in on the way to deciding on a place of settlement, or the first step to returning home more permanently.

When you were in the assembly area in Maputo, did you have any information about things here at home?

No, I didn't have any information.

You didn't know anything?

Nothing, not even who was at home, I just wanted to go home but I didn't know who I would find there, my father, my brother, my family. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)³

It's difficult to overestimate the importance of returning home to reassure the family and be reassured oneself. Some managed to maintain contact with their families during the war:

Did you have any information about your destination?

The only information I had was about my family, since they had always been there to give me a helping hand when I needed it, so I too had to make sure

²Chief, usually used when referring to someone put in place by the Portuguese colonial government, and not necessarily coinciding with the hereditary position of local chief. Also referred to at times as *mambo*, *fumo*, *nduna*, although these are used to refer to different rungs on the hierarchy in different areas.

³Interview MOS 44, 29.07.96

that I wrote to them to know how they were as well. (Frelimo DS, Quelimane)⁴

But many soldiers were stationed far from home. Fifty-eight percent of our sample did not see their family or receive information about them during the entire time they were away fighting. ONUMOZ statistics show that sixty percent of demobilised had served between nine and twenty-six years at the time of demobilisation (Pardoel 1996b: 31). The war itself created serious obstacles to communication. In our sample, the families of sixty-five percent of demobilised had left their homes to take refuge during the war, the majority fleeing to urban areas within Mozambique or crossing the border in to Malawi or Zimbabwe (n=78). For those who remained, patterns of occupation whereby Renamo came to control many rural areas while Frelimo held the towns meant that contact between Frelimo soldiers and their families in rural areas and between Renamo soldiers and their families in urban areas was impossible. This could mean years with no word from home and no way of communicating.

Renamo soldier:

Did you have a chance to visit your family [during the two years you were in Renamo]?

No, because at the base where we were stationed we couldn't move. They forbade us to go out, they were afraid we'd run away, see, because we were taken there by force. So we just lived in the base itself, we couldn't even talk with the local people, we just heard that there were people out there, but we stayed there inside the base doing jobs. None of us went outside. (Female Renamo DS, Quelimane. She was aged 15 at time of capture.)⁵

Frelimo soldier:

While you were in the army, during this whole time [from 1979 to 1994], did you manage to go and visit your family [in Gaza]?

Never. When you wanted to go on vacation, the time would come for you to go and then a message would arrive 'prepare yourselves, the war is here now'. So you would sit down again, there was no way to give up because things would get messed up again. That's how it was. (Frelimo DS, Espungabera)⁶

The wish to reassure and be reassured, however, should not automatically be interpreted as a wish to return home on a permanent basis. In some cases, it was also an important part in people's planning for their own futures, as the following example shows:

⁴Interview Q 106, 17.09.06

⁵Interview Q 86, 28.08.96.

⁶Interview MOS 27, 11.07.96

It depends on each person's heart, some people stayed there [where they were demobilised]. But for me, I decided to visit my family because since I entered the army, I hadn't seen anyone from the family [13 years]. So it was important to see my family at home, because I didn't leave as a thief, I left as a hero. And the family is crying because they think that I died in the war, while I am still alive, so it's better that I go home. If I see that things are not good at home, I will leave again. (Renamo DS, Mude. He was aged 14 at time of capture, 29 at time of interview.)⁷

In some instances, the return home resulted in radical changes in the individual's plans in order to accommodate family needs, including great sacrifices.

I had a contract in Maputo, with SOSEP [security firm], but I couldn't start work right away before coming to see my family with the transport provided by IOM. I said to them [the employers], I will go to see my family, to see if they're alive or what. They said, 'OK', and they asked, 'How many months do you think you'll stay there?'. I said, 'two months'. When I arrived here [...] I found problems. My father had lost his life, on the 10th of February, 1992 [...] And I'm still here today. (Frelimo DS, Chimoio. He never went back to Maputo because he decided to stay to look after his mother).⁸

In other cases, the individual would return to his/her area of origin only to find that his/her family had either died or taken refuge elsewhere, at which point began a long process of trying to locate them and in some cases to bring them back home.

What did you find when you arrived here?

When I arrived, the first thing I did was go to the house of the *régulo*, and informed him of everything which had happened, and told him that I wanted to return to my house, with the wife I had brought, open my home. Then I went to look for the mothers [mother and aunts] who had left. (Renamo DS, Mude)⁹

For some of the women interviewed, the loss of family also meant loss of an economic base in the rural area, and prompted a move to settle in an urban area (See Chapter 5, Section 3, iii).

3. New Family: *'I preferred to live there with her'*

While going back to check out the situation of the family was a motivation for many to return home, other people had started new families in the place they were stationed. This was the case for Bartolomeu and Domingo, Frelimo soldiers from Inhambane

⁷Interview MOS 11, 8.07.96.

⁸Interview CHI 52, 22.06.96

⁹Interview MOS 37, 12.07.96

and Gaza respectively. Both had been stationed in Mossurize district for the majority of their military lives, married there and set up homes there. They both went back to see their families after the war, the latter for the first time since leaving in 1979, but returned to continue living in Mossurize.¹⁰

Interestingly, when asked whether they intend to return home one day, they both said yes. At the same time, it was obvious that they were well established in Mossurize and it did not look as though they would be able to uproot easily. They had both been demobilised by ONUMOZ and could have been transported home had they wished it. This attitude towards 'home' could indicate both the wish to keep open the option of going home at some future date, as well as the mythical nature of the idea of 'home' which for many will always remain in the golden past but need not be concretised.¹¹

War experiences also contributed to choice of settlement area, even when this meant settling in a place which was home for neither husband nor wife. In the following example, the husband and wife were both soldiers and had got to know a new place while in the war. Afterwards they both decided to settle there.

So tell me: you were demobilised in Maringue [Sofala province], and you decided not to return to Maganja da Costa [Zambezia province] which is your home, you went to Macossa [Manica province]. Why did you go to Macossa?

I went there because I decided I should stay there. At the time when I was demobilised I was still teaching classes-

-in Maringue?

When I was demobilised [...] I came here to Macossa, and continued to give classes here in Macossa, since at the time there were no teachers from the government, there was no one there, it was just us, so I was giving lessons there. Then afterwards the structures [government officials] came here and said, 'wait, there will be reintegration of Renamo teachers, so just wait.'¹² And then we just stayed like this, and I continue to live there, even though I wasn't reintegrated, I'm just living this way.

But why didn't you go directly from Maringue to Maganja da Costa?

I just wanted to stay there [Macossa].

What did you know about Macossa?

I knew it because when I left Zambezia, I stayed in Maringue, and then I always came here to Macossa. I stayed there, I returned, and then this wife of

¹⁰Interviews MOS 26 & 27, Two Frelimo DS, Espungabera, 11.07.96

¹¹See Ranger 1994

¹²The government began a 'reintegration' programme of re-training Renamo cadres in health and education, because many of them did not have the regulation qualifications of 6^a classe education. However, lack of training facilities has meant slow implementation, and there has also been a considerable amount of protest from Renamo cadres at the policy. This has left many Renamo teachers and health cadres working without wages.

mine [who is from Tete], she was also in Macossa, and I preferred to live there with her. (Renamo DS, Macossa, interviewed in Gondola)¹³

Female soldiers who married during or after the war were most likely to follow their husbands and settle where he chose to do so. This involved a trade-off between the protection of being close to one's family and the possibility of setting up a household with a husband, in particular if there were children already. Some, in particular in matrilineal areas, chose the first option, and the man was then forced to choose between a wife and returning to his own home (see **Chapter 3**).¹⁴

4. Economic Opportunity: *'Where I was born I didn't think I would find the opportunity'*

In some cases, economic opportunities were linked to returning to one's place of origin, drawing on kinship links to access land and labour. A full sixty-seven percent of our sample had obtained land from their family, whether through sharing land or through inheritance (see **Chapter 3, Table 12**).

Gaining access to land is not entirely dependent upon returning to one's place of origin, since almost everyone, whether or not they are at home, has managed to access land. However, land is undoubtedly socially controlled and mediated, so that the best land with good sources of water and other important infrastructure will generally be accessible to the locals and/or others with acquired political clout. For example, one Frelimo demobilised in Maganja da Costa district had been granted land by his parents-in-law on which to build a house, but he was not able to benefit from the coconuts and mango trees which were on the same patch. Only his brothers and sisters-in-law could sell the produce from those trees.¹⁵

Others returned from the war to find that their claims to land had been abrogated. Such was the case of Rafael in Cabuir, Maganja da Costa. He had lived alone with his father before being called up for military service. The children of his father's first wife took over the land after the father died, while Rafael was still in the army. When he came back, he found them using the land and selling the produce, and they refused to give him a portion of land or even of the profits from selling the coconuts, saying

¹³Interview CHI 118, 21.08.96

¹⁴Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer (1996b: 14) found that women who followed their husbands back to his place of origin after the war had troubles integrating in their new communities.

¹⁵Interview MAG 227, DS, Cabuir, 27.08.96. Even 8 years after demobilisation he was unable to buy his own land.

'no way, your mother never came to this place, it was our father who was here'.¹⁶ This community of Cabuir is currently experiencing land shortage so that being part of a family lineage does not guarantee access to land in times of severe competition. Indeed, position in the family may be used as an argument against giving someone access to land, and these claims are more difficult to fight if one was absent for a long period.

Access to good agricultural land is not the only economic opportunity which influences people's choice of settlement area. As pointed out in the introduction, Manica province drew the largest number of non-local demobilised soldiers, and this is no doubt explained by its position on the Beira Corridor and the Zimbabwean border. This location provides opportunities for migrant labour and for trade which are not available in more remote areas. The demobilised soldiers were not the only migrants attracted to the Beira corridor, as many internally displaced people who settled along it for security reasons have yet to return home, and people from other provinces are also to be found there in large numbers.¹⁷

For example, Simão left Tete for Chimoio looking for work, since he had been taken out of school in 1976 for military service and was demobilised three years later in 1979. He went to the Provincial Command Headquarters and they placed him in the textile factory, Textáfrica, where he worked as a militia trainer and then after the end of the war, as a fireman. While his brothers hold high positions in Frelimo's bureaucracy, he struggles to feed his children, but he will not return to Tete now.¹⁸

Madal provides another case where demobilised soldiers have chosen to settle because it offers a variety of economic opportunities: fishing, salt production, coconut production, as well as easy access to Quelimane, a major urban centre.

Demobilised soldiers who learned a trade often felt obliged to choose a more urbanised setting rather than returning to rural areas, in order to practise that trade. For example, the case of Rosario in Quelimane:

Now you are in Quelimane, but are you thinking of returning to your place of origin [Pebane district]?

Well, now that I have this training as an electrician, and in the place where I was born I don't think I would find the opportunity to practise my profession. (Frelimo DS, Quelimane)¹⁹

¹⁶Interview MAG 210, Frelimo DS, Cabuir, 27.08.96

¹⁷Interview, Dr. U. Weyl, GTZ-MARRP, Chimoio, 24.4.96

¹⁸Interview CHI 138, Frelimo DS, Bairro Muzingadzi, 28.08.96

¹⁹Interview Q 105, 17.09.96

One surprising finding from our sample is that no one appeared to have settled permanently in the nearest town with a bank rather than in remote rural areas, in order to receive their subsidy cheques. It was expected that this might occur and be a contributing factor to urbanisation. While the timing of the research meant that we are not able to say whether people settled temporarily in urban areas in order to receive their cheques, we can say that after the end of the subsidies, there remained no trace of this as a factor influencing choice of settlement.

Instead, there were myriad complaints about long distances travelled to receive these subsidies, and money wasted in transport, food and accommodation. For example, a Renamo demobilised in Chire, who had to travel via Morrumbala to Quelimane to collect his subsidy, reported that the return fares came to a total of 180,000 *Meticais* (30+60+60+30). Although as a former lieutenant he was receiving 529,000 *Meticais* every time he collected his subsidy, the fare of 180,000 was 30,000 more than the 150,000 received by a simple soldier - the category into which most demobilised in Chire fell.²⁰ There were also a few cases of the opposite situation: women who chose to receive their subsidies in their rural areas of origin in order to hand over the money directly to their family, but then moved to an urban area as soon as the subsidy came to an end.

5. Social Status: *'I was just sitting there, without social position'*

Gains and losses in social status are traceable to various sources. There is the social status which accrues to a person just by virtue of being an insider rather than an outsider. Thus, one motivation for returning home was to regain the social status which can only be enjoyed in one's home area.

I came here because this is my land. I came by my own efforts, because at the time [of ONUMOZ] I had made all of the arrangements to stay in Sofala since I already had a wife there. But then I began to feel abandoned because I was just sitting there, without social position, without employment, so I felt obliged to come back here to my family. (Frelimo DS, Quelimane)²¹

There is also the social status within one's home community which is a function of one's economic position relative to other members of the community. Thus, social status could also act to make a person reluctant to return to a family whose

²⁰Interview MOR 42, Renamo DS, Chire, 01.08.96

²¹Interview Q 106, 17.09.96

expectations he/she cannot meet. There were many examples such as the following in which demobilised felt reluctant to go home because they did not feel they had attained the status expected by themselves or their family:

Don't you have any other family members who are in a slightly better position than you are working in other provinces?

I do, I do. But the problem is, each looks after himself, God looks after all of us. Yes, if under my present circumstances I go to a cousin or a brother's house, he won't feel comfortable, he's going to say, 'well, now that you're in a bad way, you've come looking for me'. I don't know, I don't like that kind of thing. I can look for this family of mine once I've attained their level [of wealth]. At least if I were working, I could go to travel from here to Mocuba or from here to Beira to visit my cousins, because then when I arrive there they'll ask 'how's your job?'. I'll answer, 'ah, it's fine'. Well, if I arrive there and I don't have a job, they're going to know that this one isn't working, that she's doing nothing, that she needs some help. (Female Frelimo DS, Quelimane)²²

The negative connotations for women of having been in the army can cause an automatic loss in social status upon return to civilian life, and become a motive not to go home because of the difficulty of avoiding public knowledge of one's past in one's community of origin.

Given that you are a female demobilised soldier, do you prefer people to call you a demobilised soldier or to call you by your civilian name?

Well, what we would like doesn't make any difference, we are already tainted by having been DFS²³. ...when I went [into the army] I left this first born child of mine with my partner, but until now... I went there, I stayed five years, I came back here and still they call us loose women. I had already given birth, I didn't take [birth control] pills or anything like that, I stayed five years waiting for my partner, but listen, even today they say 'those women are demobilised soldiers, they're not worth anything'. So whatever name we take on, we're already labelled. (Female Frelimo DS, Quelimane)²⁴

For women, this kind of social stigmatisation is also of great economic significance, because it reduces their chances of marriage.

Would you like to get married? or do you prefer to live on your own?

I need to get married, but it's difficult.

Why do you think that it is difficult to get married?

Because men don't come near us any more.

These men don't like demobilised women, or does this apply to other women too?

They will never like us. (Female Renamo DS, Chimoio)²⁵

²²Interview Q 20, 29.05.96

²³Female soldiers

²⁴Interview Q 87, 29.08.96

²⁵Interview CHI 131, 12.09.96

6. New Self-image: 'He couldn't live where he lived before'

While for many female soldiers, the war brought a loss of social status, for other soldiers it was an opportunity to change their self-image and their image in the eyes of others. Some had painted an urban image of their home life to their colleagues or new spouses, and then tried to live up to this after the war when they brought their wives home.

Ah, that one who you were with a minute ago, when he was demobilised he returned, but he couldn't live where he lived before, out in the bush. So he arrived here, 'I'm asking for a place to stay, this is my wife...'. Because you know that when these guys were in the army, they said, 'epa, I live there in the city', and so they brought their wives from Beira to here. They arrive here, and where they were living was in the bush, so they don't want to take their wife back there. So they ask for a place here, make their home here, and that's when the story begins. (*Bairro Secretário*, Espungabera)²⁶

Others justify their new choice of home as a reaction to the suffering they experienced during the war. Several female Renamo demobilised soldiers in Chimoio, originally from rural areas of the province, indicated that their decision to stay in the city was made because they had suffered too many long years in the bush, and it was time to live in a city with all of its modern conveniences.

7. Political and Social Security: 'From Frelimo? There are none here'

Making the move to a new place can also mean crossing the political divide and confronting issues arising from wartime alignments in communities. At times this seemed enough to discourage people from settling in a place where their political stripe set them apart, but other times adjustments were made to allow people to cohabit peacefully. (See also **Chapter 5**)

It is very evident from the distribution of our interviewees that geographical areas remain predominantly aligned either with Renamo or Frelimo in the post-war era, with very few exhibiting equal proportions of both. In Maganja da Costa district, the majority of Frelimo interviews were to be found in and around the district capital and in two of the three administrative posts, with a few pockets in the rural hinterland. In the third administrative post, the interviewees were entirely Renamo demobilised. In

²⁶Interview MOS 2, 2.07.96

Morrumbala district, the district capital showed a much greater mixture of Renamo and Frelimo demobilised, but each administrative post exhibited distinct patterns. In Megaza and Derre, the majority of demobilised were Frelimo, while in Chire, it was Renamo. Populations living in specific localities were aligned with one or other side. Similar patterns were also found in the districts of Manica province (See Table 10).

TABLE 10: Distribution of Frelimo and Renamo demobilised (%)

Location	Renamo	Frelimo
Mossurize*	60	40
District capital	32	68
Maganja~	23	77
District capital	6	94
Morrumbala§	47	53
District capital	33	67

*n=62, ~n=209, §n=117

There are a number of possible explanations for this pattern of distribution. One hypothesis is that the political divide still strongly determines where people feel comfortable to settle. Given that demobilised soldiers could be perceived as representative of one or other side, their choice of settlement would be most likely to be influenced by the political affiliation of a local population. However, there is no overwhelming evidence that Renamo soldiers have avoided settling in Frelimo areas or vice versa, out of fear for their safety. Even in Renamo-held administrative posts, it was possible to find a Frelimo party representative, and in Frelimo areas it is possible to find *régulos* who have re-established themselves even after war-time alienation. This suggests that there is at least a level of tolerance, though there are problems of stigmatisation which we return to in Chapters 5 & 6.

A more plausible explanation for the distribution pattern is that it reflects recruitment patterns. Each side recruited from different places, with a particular emphasis on the urban/rural divide between Frelimo and Renamo respectively.²⁷ Thus, we asked in a predominantly Renamo community in Mossurize district:

Did some demobilised soldiers also return to this area?

Yes, some demobilised returned here, but just from Renamo. From Frelimo? There are none here, they can only be found on the other side, in the area of Mafuia or Guenze, very far from here. The ones who are here are from Renamo.

²⁷Although the rural/urban divide is not complete, as Geffray 1990 documented in Erati district, Nampula, as neighbouring communities took different sides due to historical rivalries which had been exacerbated by Frelimo policies.

And why are there none from Frelimo here?

At the time of recruitment, those young people who were to be recruited by Frelimo did not end up being recruited by them, they were recruited by Renamo. Also many of them fled to Zimbabwe, ones who would have been recruited by Frelimo. (*Nduna, Mpingo*)²⁸

Still, there were some indications that politics could have an impact, although no interviewee cited this directly as a reason for choice of destination.

Are there other demobilised in this area?

Yes, but many from Renamo are out there [in the interior of the district], they didn't want to stay here [in the district capital].

[...] Because, even today the population around here tell you that they like Renamo, and they voted for them, they wanted to see Renamo... Renamo fought for democracy, but today the person who is governing is not the one who fought for democracy. So does this person who is governing now really know democracy? This is why the population is confused, because they know that the one who fought for democracy should be the one to govern for 5 years, and see what he wanted to do. If you go out there, and say that you're from Frelimo, people will not be happy with you, but if you say I'm from Renamo, I've come to converse with you... eh! You'll eat well. (*Renamo DS, Espungabera*)²⁹

It is probable that there are cases of people who felt unable to return to the place they had left because of crimes they committed there, but none of our respondents gave this as a factor in their own choice of destination. This could attest to the infrequent occurrence of such cases, or it could be due to reluctance to admit crimes. The evidence of our research points in the direction of the former hypothesis, because even those people who had chosen to settle in a place other than their area of origin, had gone home to visit their family at some point after demobilisation. It is clear that crimes and atrocities were committed during the war, but the type of crime against one's family or community of origin which would cause reluctance to return is probably much less frequent than those committed amongst strangers.³⁰

8. Got Stuck: *'I don't have the money to go home'*

Not returning home is not always a reflection of one's own wishes. Some people simply got stuck in the place they were demobilised, lacking the cash to get home and

²⁸Interview MOS 9, 7.07.96

²⁹Interview MOS 1, 2.07.96

³⁰Geffray 1990 also reported that none of his informants spoke of this type of violent initiation in home communities, and therefore concluded that it had not been a systematic practice, although it may have happened.

having missed the possibility to take advantage of IOM's free transportation. Such was the case of a young man who, after demobilisation, had stayed in Chimoio with two of his brothers who were still in the army, rather than return to his home in Zambezia. A year later, his brother's wife sold the house where they were all living together in order to get the money to pay for transportation back to Zambezia. He was left alone in Chimoio without a job or any money to get back on his own.

With whom do you live?

I live alone, now I regret that I failed that time to go home. If there was another form of evacuating, the way they did in the process of reintegration, if there was another form of helping us, we are pleading, if there is such an assistance it would be better because many of us are here without a job, others are used to war and are trying to return to the military life because they are without work, they are walking around alone like this.

When you get married, will you find a girl from here or will you have to go home to look for one?

I will choose one from this province of Manica, since I don't have the money to go home, I prefer to marry here. And since I don't have work, with a woman from here, her parents can give me a *machamba* out there, so that when I harvest, if it comes out well I can sell that little bit of maize to get some money for us to go back to my home. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)³¹

Another example was one of the transcribers on this project, who approached us asking for employment in order to pay for his fare back to his area of origin. He had been in Morrumbala for two years because he had married there. His wife then left him and he was working on a building site where he was paid one hundred *contos*³² per month. The fare back to his home in Alto Molocue district would cost him one hundred and fifty *contos*.

The problem of getting stuck was, if anything, more serious for those who were demobilised prior to ONUMOZ, for whom little or no provision was made for their return. The difficulty of travelling in the country during the war meant that return often required raising an airfare, making individual initiative to return almost impossible.

[...] I'm in disgrace because Frelimo took me from my home [in Caia, Sofala province] and brought me here, and for me to return, I don't have the money. I want to go home but I don't have any money, it's been fifteen years since I've seen my parents. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)³³

³¹Interview CHI 97, 30.06.96

³²One *conto* = One thousand *Meticais*

³³Interview CHI 48, 23.05.96. Demobilised in 1991.

9. Mixed motives and ambivalence: 'I will (go home for good), but really really, no'

We have highlighted a range of factors which informed individual decisions, with a different weighting for each individual, but even this is an oversimplification. Some individuals had so many considerations to juggle that they remain, even two years after demobilisation, fundamentally ambivalent about where they really wish to be.

The story of Alberto is illustrative: Alberto was working in Sofala province at a sugar factory in Buzi when the war began to heat up in the district. He tried to flee to Zimbabwe, but was captured by Frelimo and sent into the army. After training in Chimoio, he was stationed in Mossurize. To avoid starvation due to lack of food provisions he married a local woman. When at the end of the war, IOM offered to transport people back to their home districts, he decided that the best thing to do was to stay and pay *lobolo*³⁴ for his wife in order that he might be able to take her home to Buzi with him after he paid it all.

When the family found he could not make *lobolo* payments in the Zimbabwean dollars they desired, because his ONUMOZ subsidy cheques were paid in *Meticais*, they came and took her back to marry her to someone else who was able to pay in Zimbabwean dollars. Meanwhile, he had gone looking for some relatives of his who had been captured by Renamo from their village in Sofala and brought to Mossurize. He had found two nieces, and they were living with him in Mossurize while he tried to raise the money to go home to Buzi. He remains fundamentally ambivalent about where he wishes ultimately to settle:

When you go home, will you go for good?

I will go, but I will come back here again.

So you want to stay here in the end?

I will, but really really... no. I would like to try, when I get home, to see what things are like at home, whether they are good or bad. If things are good, I would like to get a job, to go back to working and living at home. So I will go for good. I'll go for good. (Frelimo DS, Espungabera)³⁵

This example encapsulates many of the various factors motivating people's decisions to stay, to return or to resettle elsewhere. His initial plans to return home, bringing with him a new wife, were disrupted by the family of his wife-to-be as a result of his economic impotence. He was further delayed by the need to reunite as many family

³⁴Sum of money or other material goods given to the parents of a bride as part of marriage obligations in customary law. See Chapter 3 for further explanation.

³⁵Interview MOS 31, 11.07.96

members as he can. That achieved, he remains torn between the desire to go home and 'see what things are like', and the attractions of the place where he has been living for the long years of the war which has also taken on elements of 'home'.

CONCLUSION

In examining where people went and why, it is clear that a return to the *status quo ante* is simply not possible, even were it desired. Many essential components have changed: the individual him or herself; their families; the local economy; local politics. What people have to do instead is to recover those bits of the past which still exist and are still valid, and seek to integrate them with the bits of their more recent past which also have value. Only thus can realistic new life strategies be developed. The balance struck in attempting to reconcile the old and the new, and prioritise the complex demands of family ties, social status, rights and access to land, other economic opportunities, political and social security, inevitably varies from individual to individual. It also changes over time for each person.

The choice of destination at the time of demobilisation is thus only the first in a series of choices leading to a place of settlement. Those choices are dependent on a number of processes: acquiring information, particularly about family circumstances and economic opportunities; re-establishing, where possible, linkages with family networks; incorporating 'new' family into old; acquiring a social status compatible with one's aspirations.

In sum, the individual's choice of destination did not mark the end of the old life and the beginning of a new life. Rather, the individual's military and civilian life, and the contexts of war and peace intertwine and overlap, such that demobilisation is not a rupture or clean break, but part of a continuum.

In the light of this, elements of the DRP were commendable for their flexibility. They allowed people to choose their place of destination, to take dependants with them, and in principle to change their place of settlement up to six months after initial transportation, though this latter possibility was not made widely known to the demobilised soldiers, and it appears few took advantage of it.

It is important to comment on the role of the subsidies in the dispersal of the demobilised. Subsidy payments were intended to anchor the demobilised in the province where he chose to collect them. The objective of this was to facilitate the

dispersal of demobilised and avoid the re-grouping of soldiers which was thought to be potentially dangerous. Interestingly, while the scarcity of collection points in most provinces could have resulted in dispersal being lessened (as demobilised might stay near the collection point rather than returning to more remote areas where they actually intended to settle), our evidence suggests that people dispersed anyway, despite the fact that this made it extremely difficult to collect the subsidy or to really benefit from it economically. Although many would have liked to circumvent this problem by taking out the entire subsidy in a single initial payment were prevented by the regulations of the programme itself. The option which was available to them, namely to change their chosen collection point, was little used because of the associated bureaucratic difficulties.

This pattern of dispersal despite rather than because of the subsidy payments may be a further indicator of the strength of the demobilised soldiers' wish to return to a civilian existence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In designing future DRP programmes, it will be important to maintain the flexibility of choice of destination throughout the period required for people to make informed decisions on their place of settlement. For example, each person could be given two transport tickets, with the option of cashing in the second one if unused. This would permit preliminary visits home to check-in and check out the situation, but would not force people to remain there if this was found to be inappropriate. If they chose to stay they would have an extra cash injection. If, on the other hand, conditions in their place of origin were such that they felt that they would do better elsewhere, they would still have access to transport while having re-made important connections at home.

Clearly, Mozambique's severely damaged infrastructure posed practical obstacles to a more flexible subsidy distribution system. However, these were not insuperable had this been a real priority, as it could have been structured differently. For example, subsidies could have been collected every four months instead of every two, thereby reducing bureaucracy and giving more flexibility for people in between collecting each subsidy. It would also have made it easier to transfer payments elsewhere.

A further recommendation is to offer the possibility of transport for those soldiers demobilised before the ONUMOZ programme. Upon their demobilisation many did

not receive any benefits, whether in cash or kind, and became stranded as a result in places they deemed inappropriate. There is no logical reason why such people could not have been included, in view of the large transportation schemes set up by the reintegration programmes for both refugees and demobilised soldiers as a recognition of the serious effects of the war on mobility and settlement. The importance of extending some benefits to pre-ONUMOZ demobilised soldiers in similar situations will emerge more strongly in the following chapters (especially **Chapter 5** and **6**).

CHAPTER 3

TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN LIFE

In the previous chapter we showed that the very choice of destination and place of settlement is the outcome of a number of processes which, combined, are initial stages in the transition to civilian life. Our emphasis was on the decision-making of the demobilised him or herself. In this chapter we shift our emphasis to the receiving families and communities and demonstrate the extent to which they too 'control' the re-insertion of the individual into family and community life.

Acceptance back into the family or community of origin or into a newly chosen place, is often conditional upon fulfilling expectations in a variety of manners, notably events or ceremonies with family, and recovery of spouse or marriage for those who leave the army single. These go hand-in-hand with economic measures, particularly obtaining a *machamba*. These rites and ritual obligations are not rigidly rule-bound nor are they entirely fixed over time. Some ceremonies continued to be practised throughout the war, others were suspended and are being re-activated in the post-war period. Past traditions are modified to fit the present context, and each individual or household negotiates the rules to suit their own needs and circumstances. There is thus little uniformity of practice even within the most isolated and ostensibly 'traditional' communities.

1. Events and Ceremonies: *'After he's been treated, he continues as a simple civilian'*

An examination of the ceremonies conducted upon arrival in the place of destination suggests at least four major functions: Acknowledging the loss of family members during the person's absence; cleansing the demobilised of any evil they may have perpetrated during the war;¹ giving thanks to their household spirits for their safe return; and re-establishing inter-dependence and re-submission to family and local structures of authority.

¹ There are a number of variations on this theme. In some, repayment dominates over cleansing, in others the focus is confession and absolution, and some involve spirits while others do not. We will use the term 'cleansing' as a shorthand, but it should be noted that we do not pretend to provide a comprehensive account of such rituals.

i) Acknowledging the loss of family members: 'When I arrived, I found problems'

For many people it was not possible to carry out funeral rites during the war. This failure was believed to be the cause of a number of ills, including the terrible drought of 1991-2. In the wake of the peace, these rites are being carried out retrospectively. Under normal circumstances a family member cannot enter into the house of the deceased until he has carried out certain of these rites. Demobilised soldiers, returning two years or more after the end of the war, were given no special dispensation from such ritual obligations - they were treated like any other individual who had to conform to the standard practices.

When I arrived, I found problems. My father had lost his life on the 10th of February, 1992. They did the ceremonies while I was away. I couldn't stay in my house here when I arrived.

You couldn't stay in your house when you arrived? Not even put your bags here?

No, not for some time.

They had done the ceremonies in your absence, and you also had to do it?

Yes. When I heard about it, while I was in the Assembly Area, they told me that my father had died, and I stayed seven days observing. Since I'm Catholic, I always went to the Church, but I also had to carry out the family ceremonies. It was our tradition which obliged me to do this.

So when you arrived, what did your mother say?

She just took me to my sister's house, where I stayed for a time, until I did the ceremony for my father. And now I'm here [in the family house] for good.

If you didn't do the ceremony, you couldn't come into the house?

No.

Why not?

I would become ill, something would happen. (Frelimo DS, Chimoio)²

The significance of family obligations to respect the deceased cannot be underestimated. Some demobilised soldiers used all of their ONUMOZ money on such obligatory rituals for deceased family members on their return, as a crucial part of the normalisation and re-integration procedure. These ritual obligations carry significant economic implications.

What did you do with the [250,000 Mt] subsidy you received?

Well, since it had been a long time since I had seen my family, I didn't do anything except build my house. The majority of the money I spent on the ceremonies, because my father had died recently, and I also realised recently what is the sacrifice of a child for a parent so I wanted to remember my mother who had died when I was only 5 years old, using that money. (Frelimo DS, Quelimane)³

²Interview CHI 52, 22.06.96

³Interview Q 105, 17.09.96

ii) **Cleansing and appeasement:** *'So that my body wouldn't have bad spirits persecuting me'*

In all research sites we found examples of ceremonies to appease unquiet spirits picked up during the war, and/or to cleanse one of any crimes committed. These traditional ceremonies were not restricted to one or other side of the civil war, nor to one geographical area, although regional variations did appear due to different cultural traditions. Neither were they a post-peace phenomenon only, though it was much easier in the post-war situation given the limited mobility possible during the war.⁴ A *curandeira* who had been working in a government-controlled area in Sofala province during the war told of the range of clients she and her husband received:

What type of things did soldiers bring to be cured? Were they sexually transmitted diseases or witchcraft, or what?

Some brought sexually transmitted diseases, and others brought problems of going crazy. This happened when they took something belonging to someone else, and then that person would inform his spirits and those spirits would pursue that thing, and the person would go crazy. All this was treated.

Were these Frelimo or Renamo soldiers?

At the time it was Frelimo, because it was before the war ended, but anyone from Renamo who was lucky enough to be able to, would come too. You couldn't tell that this one was from Renamo, only by his spirits could you distinguish. (*Curandeira*, Mude)⁵

Cleansing/appeasement ceremonies generally, though not always, preceded ceremonies to inform the spirits of one's safe return. Opinions on whether or not cleansing was necessary for every soldier differed between demobilised and civilian respondents. Many demobilised argued that it was not necessary for everyone, but only for those who had some particular crime on their conscience which fell outside of the 'rules' of war:

I did the ceremony, I made the drinks when I came back, so that my spirits could see that I had come back from the war. But before this, I went to a *curandeiro* to see what I had done during the war. This *curandeiro* did something to wash my body, so that my body wouldn't have bad spirits persecuting me. Bad spirits come from killing people who didn't know anything. Us, we didn't kill people who knew nothing [i.e. innocent civilians] We just recovered people who knew nothing.⁶ But there were other commanders who ordered their soldiers to go and kill a certain person, and the person who agreed to do this would pick up an evil spirit. But there were others who didn't do this, who refused, saying, '*epa*, I know that I am in the army, but I will only shoot at another who is shooting. When I am shot at, then I will also shoot.' Such a person will live well. He is just washed,

⁴Interview MOS 2, *Curandeiro* (Traditional healer), Espungabera, 2.07.96

⁵Interview MOS 54, 2.08.96

⁶The verb *recuperar* (recover) was used by Frelimo to describe the activity of taking civilians living in Renamo controlled areas and bringing them to live in Frelimo controlled villages, usually forcibly.

because given the way in which we had to go through different zones, you never know what problems you are causing with the spirits of those areas. (Frelimo DS, Espungabera)⁷

A civilian respondent, by contrast, explained the ceremonies as necessary to change the attitude of anyone who had gone to war:

Those ceremonies do exist. He leaves his home as a simple civilian, he's one of the people, right. He enters military life, he is given a weapon and instruction and he becomes wild, right? So when the time comes for demobilisation the family takes him to the *curandeiro*, he gets there, the *curandeiro* gives him a remedy which brings his heart back down to that of a simple civilian, not to be on edge all the time, because when he was at war he had the courage to kill. Whenever he saw a person it was just a matter of killing, so when he comes back from this military way of life to home, it's necessary to arrange a *curandeiro* to calm him down, no longer to have that courage, not to get angered at the slightest thing, to see people rather than animals. Yep, so this exists and it works. [...]

(Throughout Zambezia, you'll find this traditional treatment known as *eculupia* in ChiLolo which means to cleanse the heart), to calm down the heart, to continue as a person, to help someone to know how to live: how to live at home, how to respect his mother, how to greet his father, how to greet people when they come to visit. So after he's been treated, he continues as a simple civilian.

When he comes out of the demobilisation, it's the family who are obliged to take him, it's not him. He doesn't know that he is full of nerves and on edge, only the family will know and take him, 'come on, let's go'. (President of Locality, Derre)⁸

In addition to different views about the need for these ceremonies, there are also diverging beliefs on who is responsible for making them happen. In the first case, the demobilised presented it as his own initiative. In the second it is argued that the demobilised are not even aware that they need this cleansing. The second example is also noteworthy in that it includes elements of 'civic education': teaching proper behaviour and re-socialising for civilian life.

The involvement of other members of the family or community in the actual ceremony varies. The most active involvement was found in a ceremony reported to take place in Morrumbala. The demobilised soldier would be stripped naked and washed using a herbal brew. Next he would be taken into the main room of the house, where other family members and close friends would flagellate him with twigs. He would then be thrown naked into the yard, and left lying there, while his brother and brother's wife would have sex in the room where he had been flagellated.

⁷Interview MOS 47, 29.07.96

⁸Interview MOR 101, 03.09.96

The twigs which had been used to flagellate him would be burnt and a portion of the ashes given to each participant to take back to his or her household.⁹

Other ceremonies appeared to be less participatory, with family members mainly functioning to identify the need to bring the person to a *curandeiro*.

[...]When the *nyangas*¹⁰ do some ceremony concerning you, it's because of your father. If he has got power to take his son to the *nyangas*, then [...] the *nyangas* will have to solve it.

And if their fathers won't take them to the *nyanga*, then they won't...?
Ah, they won't, they won't. They won't go because his mind is not all right.
(*Régulo*, Mpingo)¹¹

It is interesting to note that in some situations demobilised soldiers would encourage other demobilised soldiers to seek help, though they did not have the same leverage as family members to persuade their friends.

When a person is cured he will go and inform others and his friends will go there too. For example, I was demobilised, and when I came back I couldn't get through thirty minutes speaking well with people, I just got angry. Since my father was a *curandeiro*, he treated me, and now I'm well again. So if my father were still alive I would have told my friends to go to him to be treated, but he died last year.

Have your friends who are demobilised also been treated?

Well, they are in their own houses, but some of them you can tell by the way they speak, it seems as if he was the only one who went to war, while in fact we were there together but he hasn't been treated yet. (*Renamo DS*, Mude)¹²

As well as elders and family being motivated to cure the demobilised whose behaviour they find problematic, with some cures it may in fact be part of the logic of the cure itself that it be done by a third party. There is an interesting parallel between the following ceremony and the cure for alcoholism, in which pig's milk is slipped into the drink of the sufferer. In both cases, the effectiveness of the cure appears to depend upon the subject remaining oblivious to the intervention.

Sometimes there is a method which in the past they used to use when the soldiers came back, it's a thing called *tchirope*. If you went off to defend yourself, sometimes you might wound a brother, in other words cause blood to be shed. In such a case it is necessary to use some kind of medication so that when you arrive home you don't go crazy - I don't know if they still use that now.

⁹Interview MOR 130, *curandeira*, Morrumbala, 07.09.96 & MOR 98, 2 *curandeiros*, Machindu, 05.09.96

¹⁰Traditional healer in N'dau language

¹¹Interview MOS 61, 04.08.96

¹²Interview MOS 35, 12.07.96

Does anyone use that *tchirope* now?

Well if it were that medicine, then the elders at home who are experts in these things prepare it and put in your food without you knowing. And so you eat it and don't go crazy. (Frelimo DS 1, Licuar)¹³

Each of the above examples involves a different dimension of cleansing or atonement. The first example showed cleansing to avoid being persecuted by bad spirits of innocent civilians one had killed or to atone for any offence caused unknowingly to the spirits of an area in which one was fighting. The second example was of cleansing in order for the body to be free and to wipe out thoughts of the past and the war. The fourth example again was atonement for bloodshed, although not restricted to that of innocent civilians but extended also to blood shed by a brother, i.e. a soldier. Over and above these objectives of atonement and psychological peace, there was a need in some cases to 'cancel out' medications taken explicitly for the purpose of waging war, such as in the ceremony known as *niculuchu* in Morrumbala:

Niculuchu is done when a person goes to the troops and takes very dangerous drugs to defend his body, not to be hit by any bullet. In this case, when you come out of the troops you can be worried that when you meet with your family you might fall ill. But if you didn't use any drugs in the troops, then when you are demobilised you just go home and stay, because you hadn't provoked anything. (DS 4, Licuar)¹⁴

For some, Islam or Christianity offered an alternative format to local tradition. The motivations behind these ceremonies, though, appear to be very similar: to absolve a person of crimes and purify them in order to allow their re-entry into religious life. In some, an important element was the confession of crimes, in order that the religious community know what had been done by the individual during the war.

Are you a Muslim?

I was in the past, but because of military life... there you eat many things, animals, so in order to continue as a Muslim it is necessary to do a cleansing, called *Moconte* in dialect.

Why all of this? Why do they do this cleansing?

This cleansing is done in order to forget the crimes you did, it's like an absolution, you have to be absolved again in order to continue to be Muslim. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*. Originally from Nampula Province.)¹⁵

While each ceremony has its own specific goals, common to all is the involvement of members of the family and wider community, both in identifying the need for some

¹³Interview MOR 124, 06.09.96

¹⁴Interview MOR 124, 06.09.96

¹⁵Interview CHI 70, 04.07.96 & 28.09.96.

form of cleansing and in actually carrying out the rites. Although in many cases these ceremonies take place at the initiative of others, they could not take place without a degree of willingness on the part of the individual. They signal the interest of family and community members in bringing the person back into the logic of social life, and the individual's renewed acceptance of social hierarchies and world view. As such, these ceremonies are an important marker of social reintegration.

a) The ambivalent situation of women: *'The ceremony is to pick up the hoe'*

While there were fairly well-established traditions for males leaving the community and returning after war, practices were more nebulous for the females who had left. One investigation has shown that there are ritual cleansings carried out with demobilised women in the post-war period.¹⁶ None of our own informants referred to such rituals, although this may relate at least partly to shyness on their part. As Muianga reports, it took a long time for sufficient trust to be built up between researcher and subject, for women to recount these experiences.

It may also be due the general ambivalence about the role of women in the war (see **Chapter 2, Section 2, v**), which may reflect differing interpretations of the intentionality of women who participated in the war and widely ranging reports on the actual activities of female 'soldiers': from domestic help and child minders to tailors, teachers and nurses, to sex slaves and fully-fledged combatants. The failure to formalise the roles of women by giving them specific ranks may explain the very low number of females formally demobilised by ONUMAZ in contrast to the much higher number cited by AMODEG which is likely based on more inclusive definitions of women's participation (see **Chapter 1, Section 2, i, note 7**).

One community elder claimed that there was no ceremony to be done for women after the war, but that they must simply return to their fields and get cultivating.

What happened to the women who were left after the war by men who went back to their homes?

Nothing happened, just some went with their husbands, demobilised, others stayed here with their husbands, and others stayed here because their husbands left, they are suffering very much.

¹⁶Elisa Muianga, at *Conferência sobre a Reintegração dos Desmobilizados*, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, October 24-5 1996.

Is there a ceremony that can be done for these women after the end of the war?

The only ceremony is to cultivate, there is nothing else for it. There is no ceremony, the ceremony is to pick up the hoe and go to the fields to cultivate, and make enough to go and sell, and survive this way. (female non-demob, member of OMM (Mozambican Women's Association), Espungabera)¹⁷

While this shows the belief in the power of work as a normalising factor, as other literature on Mozambican refugee experiences has also emphasised (Gibbs 1994), it is probably not the whole story. Given the well-developed range of ceremonies for men, it seems strange that nothing similar has been developed for women, at least in the last thirty-odd years since the beginning of the war of independence in 1964. This is particularly remarkable in a society where an 'un-cleansed' woman is thought to pose a danger to her immediate family members. In Mossurize, for example, (an area with a history of migrant labour) a woman who has slept with a man other than her husband must be cleansed by a *curandeiro* before being able to live with her husband again. If she so much as gives him a glass of water to drink without having been cleansed, he will vomit blood and die within days. Why does a woman who has slept with a soldier during the war not carry the same danger? And if she does, why have such cleansings not been widespread if they could enhance women's integration into communities?

It is possible that the lack of formalised ceremonies for women upon return from war parallel to those for male soldiers reflects generalised societal views about the proper role of women. To carry out similar ceremonies for women as for men would be to admit the active role played by women in the war and thus break the gender rules which reserve agency for men in the public arena.¹⁸ These issues should be explored further in a more focused study on women in and after war.

iii) Informing and giving thanks to the spirits: 'I thanked the spirit which guarded me'

Ceremonies to give thanks are much more location-dependent than cleansing ceremonies, having the specific objectives of informing the household spirits that one has returned, and thanking them for their protection during the war. In many of Mozambique's cultures, a person's connection to a place is established through land which is believed to be inhabited by household, lineage and clan ancestral spirits.

¹⁷Interview MOS 39, 13.07.96

¹⁸For an analysis of gender roles in Shona society, see Lan 1985. For broad gender analysis in Mozambique, see Arnfred 1990.

The spirits of deceased members of the family, if treated properly, can be relied upon to offer protection to living members.

a) Informing

You said you did a ceremony when you came back from the war, what was that ceremony?

I did a mass, to say that I came back from the war and my parents also made drinks to inform the spirits and the others that our son came back, he is with us now.¹⁹

b) Giving thanks

Among you four did anybody get wounded during the war?

I was never wounded from the time I was trained.

Did you have some kind of drug?

I had no drug, just a spirit, that is what looked after me.

And what did you do to thank the spirits when you came back?

That's right, when I arrived home I organised a big ceremony for the spirit which was guarding me. Not being hit by a bullet was not thanks to drugs, it was just the spirit, the elders at home; if you don't leave them arguing, then wherever you go you'll be fine. Yeah, if you leave the old ones [ancestral spirits] at home arguing and you go into the bush, you'll suffer. That's why when I arrived I organised a big ceremony, I thanked the spirit which guarded me, and up to now I am at home. (Renamo DS, Mude)²⁰

In contrast to the above, others rejected the need for such ceremonies.

This traditional stuff, I didn't do any of it. When I arrived here I just started to prepare my fields, and that was it. [...] Although I didn't do any ceremony, there is a good crop. [...] I never did that tradition with that spirit. (Frelimo DS 3, Licuar)²¹

iv) **Re-establishing family inter-dependence:** *'We are not going to leave you, we have to go home together'*

Despite his rejection of spirits and traditional ceremonies, the above demobilised also held a ceremony of a kind, which appears to have been motivated primarily by the wish to re-establish inter-dependence and demonstrate acceptance of family and local structures of authority.

¹⁹Interview MOS 57, 03.08.96

²⁰Interview MOR 124, DS 2, Licuar, 06.09.96

²¹Interview MOR 124, 06.09.96

And what kind of ceremony did you have, brother, when you came back from the troops?

Personally I didn't do any ceremony here. I did it in Licuar, because after I had been demobilised I spent some months there and I managed to send a letter to here, upon which my father came from here to there with some family members. When they arrived there, I bought ten pieces of beef, I also bought five chickens, and guess what? Two five-litre drums of *sura*²² and one container of *cachaço*²³ and I had a record-player. It was one whole night. We began to drink, we began to eat those meats until the dawn came. The next day some people were still there and then they left and we stayed behind with the family. I began to distribute the few clothes I had to the family, as well as the money I had, and so at that point the family said 'well now we are not going to leave you, we have to go home together'. With them saying that, and as I didn't have any job to go to there in Licuar, I accepted the words of the elders. I began to make my way directly here, and I stayed here. (Frelimo DS 3, Licuar)²⁴

It is also important to note that the ceremony by which this demobilised was welcomed back into the family did not take place at home. It was done elsewhere and, by the person's own account, it was after he had handed over some goods to family members that they insisted on his return. The importance of these material obligations for choice of destination was mentioned in **Chapter 2**, and its impact on livelihood strategy will be explored further in **Chapter 4** and **5**.

Not all parties were as robust as this, nor was every family able to give a hero's welcome to the returning demobilised. War had reduced many families both in number and in economic strength, such that some celebrations did not live up to expectations.

For example, Donaldo had been in the army nine years, and had only been home twice in that time. When he returned, he found only his father and brother at home. The extent of their reception was to kill a chicken, cook it with rice, invite the neighbour over, and that was it.

My family did not receive me well, because my mother had died, [...] and when I returned my father had difficulty making a proper party and preparing a celebration, since he is a single man. (Frelimo DS, Madal)²⁵

It is a sad comment on the state of the economy that killing a chicken was in fact a major gesture for a deeply impoverished family, but this must have been small comfort to Donaldo when he returned from a long and difficult absence. Another

²²Locally brewed alcohol from palm trees

²³Locally brewed alcohol, often from grain or sugar cane

²⁴Interview MOR 124, 06.09.96

²⁵Interview Q 67, 26.07.96

man, Moises, explains that he had to do it all himself with the money he received from ONUMOZ since many of his family members had died in the interim:

When I came back from the war, I found the grandfather whom I had left had lost his life, other family members had lost their lives, and so with that money [from ONUMOZ] I managed to do a little ceremony there for the spirits for them to see that their son had returned, and that was it. (Frelimo DS, Madal)²⁶

In conclusion, we have differentiated four types of ceremony conducted upon or soon after the return of the demobilised: acknowledging loss of family members; cleansing; giving thanks and re-establishing inter-dependence. While only our last example can be interpreted as directly attempting to re-establish interdependence and recognition of authority structures, we have attempted to show how in fact all the ceremonies draw in a range of family and other local people and therefore serve this function. Performance of the rituals demonstrates re-submission to local authority and value systems. Rituals also serve as markers of the transition from military to civilian life.

2. The role of marriage: *'When a man grows up, he has to get married'*

Marriage rituals and concomitant obligations form a key component in the process of normalising life for demobilised soldiers. For a male in Mozambican society, marriage is the *sine qua non* of full adult status.²⁷ It determines social acceptance in the community and is thus an almost inevitable step in the life-cycle.

Why did you get married?

I got married because I saw that I didn't have any family, and I married to have family. And also a man when he grows up, he has to get married. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)²⁸

A male becomes an adult by setting up his own household, which must also comprise a wife who will bear children and look after them, over and above performing other domestic chores and agricultural production (see **Chapter 4**).

So you have two wives. What made you marry two wives?

When I was demobilised, other friends of mine had three, four children, so because I wanted children, I had to arrange another wife, because with the first

²⁶Interview Q 63, 16.08.96

²⁷This section focuses on the experience of males. Therefore, it obviously leaves out the other side of the equation, the female experience of marriage, and re-uniting families in the post-war period. Other writing has pointed to the central importance of marriage for women in order to become adults as well as for men (Macy 1996). But it is also believed that one of the 'consequences of families "reuniting" after a prolonged period of male absence as a result of conscriptions and/or abduction into Renamo or Frelimo army' is the restriction of autonomy for women (Harrison 1993: 438).

²⁸Interview CHI 48, 23.05.96

wife it was difficult. And now she has a child too. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro Muzingadzi*)²⁹

Without this household of his own, a man is not treated as a fully fledged member of the community, and may not be allowed to participate in family or community decision-making structures.

As marriage and setting up a household are widely perceived as inevitable steps in the life cycle, they became central preoccupations for soldiers once demobilised.

TABLE 11: Change in marital status from 1994 to 1996 (%)

Marital Status	In 1994 ³⁰	In 1996*
Single	43	9
Married	51	90
Other	5	1
TOTAL	100	100

*n=94

In our sample, only nine percent of demobilised soldiers was single. One such case was a Frelimo demobilised living alone in Manica city whose family was in Macate near Chimoio. His neighbour's observations powerfully demonstrate the way in which such individuals are perceived.

When you think about his life, and you talk with him, why do you think he has no wife?

Well, he doesn't have any way of supporting one, so how could he get one?

What's his life like exactly?

His life is like a lost person. (Frelimo DS, Gondola)³¹

Although marriage potentially brings material benefits to the male in the form of income and labour, allowing him to set up a household, it is often not easy to enter into. In patrilocal marriage traditions, the *lobolo* payment which a prospective groom gives to his in-laws must be paid before he is accepted as the husband. The *lobolo* is part of the marriage contract which places the husband in an obligatory relation to his in-laws. It serves as recognition for the investment of the parents in her rearing and compensation for the loss of labour power. The payment is negotiated between the

²⁹Interview CHI 138, 10.08.96

³⁰Pardoel 1996b: 22

³¹Interview CHI 118, 21.08.96

two families, giving both benefits and burdens to shoulder as a result.³² In our sample, eighty percent had already paid *lobolo* for their wives (n=84).

Where payments are on-going rather than once-off, it can also be interpreted as a form of social security for the woman and her parents. The parents of the bride can take the daughter back at any point, on grounds of incomplete *lobolo* payment, offering an escape route for the wife should the marriage be unsatisfactory, for example in cases of wife-abuse or his infertility.

Matrilocal marriage traditions set up very different social arrangements which depend on *pete* rather than *lobolo*; the man lives with the family of his wife and contributes labour to their homestead.

In both matri- and patri-local marriage traditions, the prospective bride's family has considerable leverage and in no sense is their acceptance of the bridegroom unconditional. As such, marriage and *lobolo* payments set up new social obligations, and are an important indicator of integration into community life.

Different marital experiences throughout the war have led to three different processes which we will call regularisation, re-validation, and initiation.

i) Regularisation of marriages begun during the war: 'I gave the money afterwards'

While some soldiers entered into some form of conjugal relationship during the war and may even have set up a household, these relationships were often entered into without fulfilling the traditional marriage ceremonies which would regularise the relationship and allow them to claim the rights which such traditional rules confer.

When did you marry her?

I married her in 1989 [...] but I didn't give any money. I gave the money afterwards, when I came back. I informed my father that this is the woman with me, and then I began to get the money together until I had enough to go [back] to Maringue and give it to them [her parents]. (Renamo DS, Espungabera. Brought back wife from Maringue, Sofala province.)³³

³²In marriages which took place during war and far from the parents of the prospective groom, the man would ask someone else (often referred to as god-parent) to play the role of parent with his prospective in-laws.

³³Interview MOS 1, 02.07.96.

In some cases it was not possible to regularise relationships begun during the war, when these had been undertaken against the laws governing marriage in peace-time. For example, the case of Isak in Espungabera: he was stationed in his home province of Mossurize but had not married before becoming a soldier. During his time in the army, he met a young woman who had been captured by Frelimo soldiers while trying to cross the border from Zimbabwe. She was taken to live in the communal village, where he met her and knowing she was a captive, married her. At the end of the war, her former husband who had been living in a Renamo area of the district turned up to reclaim her. She took their two children back with her to live with her first husband. Although he admitted to missing them, likely he did not feel he had a strong case because she lived close enough for him to pursue it if he thought he might win her back.³⁴

ii) Re-validation: *'Your wife is here - if you want her, take her'*

Others had married formally before or during the war but had not been able to re-visit their wives for long periods. If they returned to find their wife alive, they sometimes found they had to re-establish their claim.

My first wife, she was from Machaze.

Is she still with you?

Yes. When I returned she had been taken by another. I came back thinking about her, thinking 'this is my wife', I married her, and I left her for the war when she had a little baby three months old. When I returned the child was 17 already. But I'm alive, my wife is alive, and so I went to resolve it with her parents, I said, 'so what's the deal? What about my wife?' They said, 'we cannot argue with you, your wife is here, if you want her, take her.' I took her, and I continued with her, and she has given me a daughter, on the 20th of the month, this baby, this is my wife here [shows photo]. This is why I liked to get married with many people. (Renamo DS, Machaze)³⁵

Some did not wish to rock the boat upon return, and did not attempt to re-claim wives they had left.

When I came back, I found my wife was already with another man. I didn't go to provoke anything, I left her and got a new wife. (Renamo DS, Mocubela)³⁶

³⁴Interview MOS 21, Frelimo DS, Espungabera, 11.07.96

³⁵Interview CHI 50, 20.06.96

³⁶Interview, MAG 150a, 10.08.96

iii) **Initiation of marriage:** *'I just spoke with her, and we went together'*

For many, marriage had been put on hold while the war was going on.

When we were in the army, it was not the time to get married. One day you were here, then you were there, we didn't have a fixed place to stay, tomorrow you're here, next day in Mossurize, next day in Beira, then in Catandica, you didn't have a place to stay. So when it all ended and they gave us our money, then we thought of making our house and getting a wife, making our plans, when there is no one telling you where to go. (Frelimo DS, Manica, interviewed in Gondola)³⁷

In some cases, a wife was sought at the very first opportunity.

How did you meet your wife?

I left the assembly area where I was, I went into the village, and I won over a woman. (*Veni, vidi, vici?*)

Why didn't you pay the *lobolo* to her parents?

I didn't have time, I just spoke with her and we went together, because whoever had a wife was obliged to bring her back with them [by ONUMOZ].

After building your house and that, what did you do?

I haven't thought yet, that is, the next thing to do. What I was thinking was to go back to where I had married my wife, where I took her from, to pay the *lobolo*. But for lack of money, I have not gone yet, because the money for my pension has not come yet, and the money for my injury has not come yet, so I don't have money yet to go and pay *lobolo*. (Renamo DS, Mude)³⁸

Although in this latter example, the respondent is fairly casual about his *lobolo* obligations, the obstacles which the varying marriage traditions pose are manifold. A basic one is the sheer amount of money required. In **Chapter 2 (Section 9)** we gave the example of a demobilised in Mossurize whose in-laws requested the payment in a foreign currency, and so he lost his wife. In the following example, the challenge of paying the *lobolo* for two wives appears to have been a positive stimulus to economic activity.

Did you have to pay *lobolo* two times then [for your two wives]?

Yes, I have paid, I am just missing one payment.

But you have to pay for each wife?

Yes, because they're from different families, one is from Maputo, the other is from Machaze.

What did you pay for her [from Maputo]?

There in Maputo they always charge a goat, a pig, food, etc. But here in Manica province they only want money, and it ends there.

And how much did you pay for *lobolo* for each of these wives?

³⁷Interview CHI 118, 21.08.96

³⁸Interview MOS 37, 12.07.96

Ah, I suffered [laughter]. If I calculate the total, if I'm not mistaken, it was 1,200,000 MT. Because you don't pay that in money, they make a list of things for mama, papa, auntie, and if you count up the list, for me it was more than 1,200,000.

And how did you get that money?

After my demobilisation, I came home, and began to open things up. I bought fish, *bacalhau*³⁹, and went to sell it, I came here to buy soap, sugar, and went back to sell it. I have made a profit, and I have a lot of money, but *Metical* money isn't worth anything. I could have had something of value. (Renamo DS, Chimoio)⁴⁰

As in the penultimate example, distance between the bride's place of origin and place of settlement shapes the way in which the payments are made. Traditionally, an initial payment was to be made which would then be followed up over a period of time with supplementary payments:

How much *lobolo* did you pay for your wife [in 1978]?

The *lobolo* at that time wasn't much, it was only 3,500 Mt., but now that I have many children, the father is asking for more.

Why is he asking for more?

He's charging more money because he says that 'what I asked you for at that time was not much because I thought my daughter wouldn't be happy with you. Now that we see that it is all going well, you must give me more money'.

And was it just money or did you have to do some work for them, build a house?

He asked me to make a house for them there [in Catandica], last year, and in August I will get someone to go and build this house for me.

Why are they asking you for this only now?

At the time they had asked for me to do it but it was the time of the war so they said there was no room to build the house. But this year they have got a place for it, it's secure and now they say they want the house. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)⁴¹

In order to avoid such arduous payments stretched out over years, there can be a battle of wits between the prospective husband and the in-laws:

When did you marry her?

I married her in 1989 [...] but I didn't give any money. The money I gave afterwards, when I came back [...].

How much money did you pay?

Well, they didn't want me to pay much money, but I forced them to accept a lot. But they ended up with 77 *contos*.

Why did you want to give a lot of money?

³⁹Portuguese dried salty fish, technically codfish but often used to refer to any dried salty fish.

⁴⁰Interview CHI 50, 20.06.96

⁴¹Interview CHI 98, 16.06.96

So that they would also accept that their daughter is far away but her husband has already paid enough money. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)⁴²

Against the wishes of the in-laws, this demobilised combatant attempted to circumvent the tradition by making a once-off payment rather than an extended series of payments. This would have been useful in that it would avoid the need to travel long distances frequently. It would mean the loss, however, of the possibility that the in-laws might give other rewards in return for such long-term loyalty. For example, Jose's attentiveness to the needs of his in-laws paid off, since they gave him another daughter in recognition of his loyalty and services.⁴³

Inability to pay the *lobolo* does not necessarily mean remaining single, but it creates tension between the man and the family of his wife:

So did you have to pay *lobolo* for your wife?

No, they had told me to give them the money, but where could I get this money?

And when you didn't manage to pay, nothing was said?

Until now they are grumbling, until now they are grumbling, 'why was our daughter taken away like this without money?' I said, '*epa*, I'm getting there papa, I'm getting there, but what can I do?'. (Frelimo DS, Madal. He has no job, a small *machamba*, survives by catching fish, lives alone with his wife.)⁴⁴

Other dimensions of tradition proved less malleable, particularly when matri- and patri-local traditions clashed. In such cases, where the demobilised soldier was from a patri-local tradition, he was often the loser:

During the war, you stole a girl?⁴⁵

No, I didn't steal any, just at the end of the war when we were in the assembly area, I got together with a girl and stayed with her, and then we were demobilised together. Then she said it was too far to come with me to my house. I went with her, took her home to Milange, and then I came home and married another.

And she said for you to take her home to her house?

She said to leave her there, and for me to go and live there. That's what she wanted, since that's the way they live there. But I couldn't follow that rule, so I took her back, and left her there, and I came home to sit [alone]. (Renamo DS, Mapungwana)⁴⁶

⁴²Interview MOS 1, 02.07.96

⁴³Interview MOS 2, non-demob, Espungabera, 02.07.96

⁴⁴Interview Q 70, 26.7.96.

⁴⁵'Stealing a girl' is the phrase used to refer to taking a woman without marrying her properly according to tradition.

⁴⁶Interview MOS 42, 27.07.96

In a second example, the soldier had been stationed in Nampula where he married two wives. After one died, he decided to return to his home in Mossurize, but he was forced to leave his children there.

So they [ONUMOZ] didn't allow you to take your wife and children back here with you?

They did allow it, they did.

So why didn't you bring them?

My wife refused, and it was difficult for me to take the children because as you know, the mothers from there [Nampula] don't allow it because they think that the children don't belong to the husband, they belong to the wife. (Renamo DS, Mude)⁴⁷

A further complicating factor arising from marriages begun during the war between people of different origins was not based on matri- vs. patri-local traditions but the clash between people of different 'races'.

How many wives do you have?

I just have one [...] Now I'm planning to go get another wife, but I don't want to get someone of a different race, I want another one from Inhambane, because this race here, they're difficult.

What's wrong with the women from here? Why do you choose women from the south?

It's not good to mix them together. (Renamo DS, Mossurize, Lives in Mossurize but brought back a wife from Inhambane after the war.)⁴⁸

3. *Machamba*: 'My father offered me three machambas, since I was never given anything in the army'

In addition to the various ceremonies and events and the marriage process, obtaining a *machamba* is a key step in the demobilised soldier's re-integration process as it provides the basis for at least minimal self-sufficiency in both rural and urban areas. In many of the rural areas visited in Zambezia and Manica, unused land appeared to be plentiful. Although we came across isolated conflicts over access to specific land, generally access to land did not emerge as an obstacle, and ninety-five percent of the sample reported having a *machamba* (n=95).

In the urban areas access to land was considerably more difficult, as a result of which many people would be forced to labour on a *machamba* as far as 40 or 50 km away from where they actually lived. In some cases, the people concerned left their rural

⁴⁷Interview MOS 36, 12.07.96

⁴⁸Interview CHI 91, 20.06.96.

lands because of the war but retained or can re-assert rights to that land while continuing to live in an urban area. Such is the case of João, whose large family fled Chigodole during the war to live in Chimoio. They remain in Chimoio even after the end of the war, but are able to return to their lands to cultivate there.⁴⁹ This may be part of a generalised phenomenon of urbanisation speeded up by the war. In other cases though, having to go some distance to a *machamba* reflected arriving late in the search for land, as the areas immediately around government-protected towns were highly populated and cultivated throughout the war.

There are, though, disadvantages to having land close to urban centres, such as high security risks. Paulo, who is from Tete, came to Chimoio with his wife to find a job after he was demobilised in 1979. He has worked at Textafrika ever since (the main textile factory in Chimoio, formerly employing 4,000 workers), where he was given a small piece of land on the Textafrika grounds (probably in order to keep him coming to work, since workers frequently go without wages due to company financial problems). Last year all of his produce was stolen from that *machamba*, and when he went to the police he found that it had been recovered but given to the provincial prison and no one would account for it.⁵⁰

The principal means of access to land is through the immediate and extended family. This may be in the form of straightforward inheritance from father to son (and in rarer cases, to an unmarried daughter):

Do you have a *machamba*?

Yes, my father offered me three *machambas*, since I was never given anything in the army. 'Here, my son, you're suffering. In the army you weren't treated properly, but here you have three *machambas* for you to work to ease the suffering in your house'. (Frelimo DS, Gazelas)⁵¹

Or it may be in the form of more distant family connections, including in-laws, who can assist in obtaining land. The following Frelimo demobilised came to Chimoio from Beira in 1992 with his wife, and was lucky to benefit from family connections in both Beira and Chimoio:

Do you have a *machamba*?

Yes, I have two, one is close by here in Tembwe, and the other is out there in Gondola (20 km away) where my family is right now doing the harvest.

⁴⁹Interview CHI 67, Frelimo DS, Chimoio, 16.07.96

⁵⁰Interview CHI 112, Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*, 03.08.96

⁵¹Interview Q 75, 16.08.96

How did you get these *machambas*?

The one in Tembwe, it was my brother who gave it to me. The one in Gondola was attributed to me by my in-laws. When I arrived here, since I was new I didn't have the means of getting a place. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)⁵²

It is not uncommon to access land through the extended family of the in-laws:

Do you have a *machamba*?

Well, I can say that I do have a *machamba*, but it's not a very big piece of land. I got it when I left the military. To get land in these areas close to the city was really difficult, so I had to go to Zembe, where my wife's aunt lives, and she managed to give me a small portion. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)⁵³

In the next example, the *machamba* referred to is forty kilometres away from the demobilised's home in Madal. The respondent also has coconut palms on his father's land in Gurue (several hundred kilometres away) but he does not usually go there so his uncles collect the coconuts.

How did you get this *machamba*?

I got it through my wife, she went to ask her father, since the land belongs to her father, and so her father gave me a few portions to make my *machamba* there, to feed our child and ourselves as well. (Frelimo DS, Madal)⁵⁴

The decision to effectively 'abandon' his inheritance, and to settle in a place far from his *machamba* demonstrates the balancing act which individuals have to do in deciding where to be physically settled.

For those unfortunate enough not to have family members able or willing to help them access land, some other options are open. One female Renamo demobilised living in Chimoio but originally from a rural area, had no *machamba* but said she would try to get one now that her subsidy had ended. Her intention was to ask her neighbours to give her a portion of their *machambas*.⁵⁵

A previous attempt to 're-integrate' demobilised soldiers after the war for independence involved setting up agricultural settlement centres. The success of these ventures was never to be tested since most of them were abandoned during the war. After the end of the war some of these centres have been re-occupied and present an opportunity for non-local veterans to access land. For example, Carlos is

⁵²Interview CHI 30, 21.05.96

⁵³Interview CHI 43, 25.05.96

⁵⁴Interview Q 63, 19.08.96

⁵⁵Interview CHI 131, Renamo DS, Chimoio, 12.09.96

an *antigo combatente*⁵⁶ originally from Sofala who now lives on his own at the office for *Associação dos Antigos Combatentes* in Chimoio. He is trying to set up a cattle raising project in Chigodole, the settlement centre for *antigos combatentes* in the countryside near Chimoio which had been abandoned during the war. Despite this chance to get some land, he is unable to raise the capital necessary to make a real start at ranching, so he is thinking of going back to his father's land in Sofala.⁵⁷

For those without either family members or friends who could help access land, a last resort is to buy or rent a *machamba*:

The following respondent from Beira, who was expelled from the army and also from his job because of psychological problems, now lives just outside of Chimoio city.

How did you get your *machamba*?

The process of getting a *machamba*... you see, there are different ways of getting land here. There is land which is for housing, and land which is owned by someone. When I arrived, since I didn't have financial resources, so I went to the areas where people put houses and asked if I could cultivate in these areas and make my *machamba*. But if someone arrives who wants to set up a house there, you have to give that land up, it's not yours, you just use it while you can. Another type... the *machamba* I got, because it was the first year, I managed to get myself settled... there are *machambas* which you can rent. You pay an annual rent and you can have this *machamba*, it used to be 50 *contos* but now it has gone up to 150 *contos*.

So you are renting from someone? Someone owns these *machambas* and makes you pay rent?

Yes, they rent them. There are former owners, and generally it is difficult because they always ask for rent, you pay annually. Or else another way of doing it is you are given a *machamba* and every week you have to go to the owner's land to work one day, as a payment for using the *machamba*. So there are two types of rent system. (Frelimo DS, Chimoio)⁵⁸

TABLE 12: Source of land for *machamba*

Source	Percentage*
Inheritance	42
Family	22
Chief	9
Friend	5
Purchase	4
Community	4
Rent	3
Wife	3
Other	8
TOTAL	100

*n=77

⁵⁶Frelimo veteran of the Liberation War

⁵⁷Interview CHI 17, *Antigo Combatente*, Chimoio, 13.05.96

⁵⁸Interview CHI 11, 10.05.96

CONCLUSION

In the first section we differentiated four types of ritual or ceremonial event, all of which involve family and other members of the community. In the ceremony to acknowledge loss, it is the family which decides when a person is fit to enter the home of the deceased. In cleansing ceremonies, family and friends of the ex-combatant are often involved in the decision to seek help as well as sometimes participating in the ceremonies. These ceremonies may include elements of 'civic education'. In thanksgiving ceremonies, the family may be actively engaged in organising the event, and other prominent community members are often invited, notably those in positions of authority. They may also use the occasion to assess whether or not they really wish to see the demobilised return. In church ceremonies, it is the church which effectively grants permission to a demobilised soldier to enter his chosen religious congregation.

These ceremonies can be seen as occasions at which a person's identity as a demobilised soldier in the eyes of others begins to dissolve, a process over which the community is able to exercise considerable control. Some people claim that they are able to tell whether a demobilised has done the ceremony or 'treatment', merely by observing his demeanour. It is family and other community members who are addressing his 'otherness' and the demobilised, by participating, implicitly allows himself to be brought once again under the control of local authorities. A more explicit commitment to peace on the part of the demobilised soldier is demonstrated by the surrender of his 'invisible weapons', notably through ceremonies such as *niculuchu*, the renunciation of special protection against bullets.

Three further points can be made with regard to the role of the spirits. On the one hand, the fact that there were household spirits before the war, that they acted as protectors during the war even when the soldier was far from home, and have to be thanked upon return, establishes an important continuity between past, present and future, a 'red skein in a relatively turbulent period. On the other hand, deliberate appeasement and atonement of spirits angered by war - the most obvious example being reparations paid to the spirits of innocent victims - mark a decisive end to the moral framework associated with the war period and the shift back into peacetime standards of morality. Finally, deaths during the war generated new spirits for whom ceremonies must be performed. Failure to do so leaves the spirit world in disequilibrium and the chances of life going forward successfully for those still living are seen as much reduced.

Such events and ceremonies largely involve the family and community in the place of origin and thereby serve to re-establish links and interdependence with members of the demobilised soldier's past life. In contrast, marriage is not necessarily tied to the place of origin, and is clearly about planning for the future. As noted, a wife contributes emotional and economic support at home, enabling the demobilised soldier to engage in income-earning activities outside the home as well as legitimising his participation in social and political activities in the community.

In many respects it is the prospective in-laws who hold the keys to this wider social legitimisation. Although there are individuals who manage to carry away a wife with promises of future payment, the in-laws enjoy considerable power of veto over the marriage union. The main factor informing their decision is the aspirant husband's economic capacity. If he wants the subsistence security which a wife and *machamba* offer, he has first to prove that he can somehow bring in the cash which will also be necessary to the household economy.

The economic importance of the *machamba* will be fully discussed in the next chapter. Suffice to say it offers for many a subsistence base on which to build more diversified economic enterprises. This chapter stresses the importance of social connections in the process of accessing or acquiring land. In areas of origin these are likely to be the immediate family, while those who have moved to new areas are most likely to use their wives as an access route to land controlled by her family. The very interlinked nature of the processes of marriage and access to land suggests that success in either should be taken as an indicator of re-integration.

The findings are also important at a wider level for our understanding of re-integration. The ceremonies demonstrate active renunciation of war by the demobilised and active involvement of the wider community in this. The fact that non-family members, i.e. in-laws, hold keys to a demobilised becoming a full 'adult' in his own eyes and in the eyes of others, is surely also an important means of social control. The in-laws have no immediate reason to forgive an unsatisfactory prospective son-in-law. The demobilised soldier, particularly when not in his home area, has every reason to behave civilly if he is to get a wife who in turn is highly likely to be the key to accessing land. In other words, the stereotyped view of the demobilised as a loose cannon who cannot be controlled by anybody and whom people fear, is strongly qualified by this evidence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The individualised and personal nature of much of what has been discussed in this chapter clearly brings it under the rubric of social re-integration. On the part of the re-integration programme designers there was reluctance to become involved directly in social re-integration processes, which were believed to be better handled by local people themselves.⁵⁹ Given the complexity of the processes described above, we feel that such caution is in many respects justified.

Yet it has been shown that the subsidy payments directly contributed to all of these different events and ceremonies. Perhaps what should be remembered in future programmes is that such activities are a valid use of the money in so far as they serve a re-integrative function. The question remains, in what ways could this support be extended?

Given the importance of funerals and the fact that many people died during the war but must be acknowledged afterwards, assistance for social re-integration could attempt to help people with funeral expenses. This could simply be in the form of grants. Or, it could be in the form of setting up mutual assistance circles such as exist in South Africa, for example. In urban areas where people are more transient, people are not able to depend on their neighbours as much for support in times of need. Therefore, organisations are set up in which people contribute regularly to a central fund and are then able to call on the money when they require it.

As demonstrated in **Chapter 2**, at the time of demobilisation and decision-making on destinations, information plays a crucial role. With regards to decision-making about marriage, information is just as pivotal. Therefore, the recommendation to allow people two sponsored trips rather than just one, applies equally to the situations described in this chapter. People would be able to make *lobolo* payments on a second trip, they would be able to feel more comfortable about decisions to take a wife home *versus* remaining in the area of origin of the wife, or to remain in a matri-local area rather than return home to a patri-local one.

In order for demobilised soldiers to get back in touch with their families and obtain information which would allow them to prepare themselves for their home-coming several measures are recommended. At demobilisation points, photographs were taken for administrative purposes. A copy could have been sent to the individual's

⁵⁹J. Born, USAID, 22.10.96

district of origin and displayed, along with an address for people to write, while the demobilised soldiers were waiting to be demobilised. Targeted assistance to the postal system to facilitate collection and distribution of letters to assembly areas would also have helped people become informed about the situation at home, such that they would be prepared for the situation they would find upon return. Furthermore, their families would have been able to prepare and know what to expect.

For those intending to design 'civic education' programmes, there are models already in existence in communities which should be studied both for their content and method. This will be explored further in **Chapter 5**.

In many African countries the valuable work of traditional healers is increasingly being recognised, most notably in areas of mental health. It is, however, still an unfortunate legacy of colonial and post-colonial interventions that many people feel ashamed openly to admit to using healers. There is therefore a need for corrective measures in order to validate and support the role of traditional healers for their contributions to both mental and physical health.

Programmes bringing together medical practitioners and traditional healers in order to share information and encourage referrals between them are already underway in two of the areas in which we worked, namely Madal and Mossurize. Support for AMETRAMO, the fledgling traditional healers' association, would help to standardise pricing and avoid dishonesty. It could also allow people to claim such treatment for health care benefits from their employers, as in the case of Armindo, a demobilised who suffered from severe nightmares. His employer paid for him to spend three weeks in hospital, which had no effect. He then went to a *curandeiro* for a week and was cured, but his employer refused to pay for it since he could not get an official receipt.

CHAPTER 4

THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY, THE SEARCH FOR INITIATIVE

An examination of demobilised soldiers' strategies to secure themselves economically suggests a distinct sequence. The first priority is to ensure household subsistence. This creates the space in which further economic initiatives can then be pursued. In this chapter we look further at strategies adopted in the search for economic security: the importance of agricultural production and in particular women's contribution to this; and the pursuit of formal employment, regarded by many demobilised soldiers as the principal route to economic security, but open to only a tiny minority.

We then examine a range of economic initiatives, both those taken by demobilised soldiers themselves and those promoted by the assistance programmes for reintegration through training and micro-projects. These range from agricultural production through street-vending to carpentry and long-distance trade.

Given the wide range of activities engaged in by demobilised soldiers and the successes of some in achieving a sustainable livelihood, the question remains why this is not the case for everyone. This chapter will illustrate the obstacles to success for many demobilised soldiers, both those inherent in the economy and those arising from flawed externally planned and funded interventions to stimulate new economic activity.

Demobilised soldiers are considered as heads of household in this chapter, given that seventy-two percent of our sample claimed to be the head of the household (n=78). Their responsibilities towards the household are great, and the number of people dependent on them has increased since demobilisation, putting extra stress on their capacity to provide.

TABLE 13: Increase in number of dependants in demobilised households since 1994 (%)

Number of dependants	ONUMOZ 1994 ¹	Our sample 1996*
None	59	4
One person	9	8
Two people	12	13
Three people	8	15
Four people	5	17
Five people	3	13
More than five people	4	25
TOTAL	100	100

*n=93

1. The search for security

The previous chapter highlighted the obligations and ceremonies necessary to establish a household in the post-war period and showed that marriage is key to gaining adult status and access to land. In this section we look further at the importance of the *machamba* as the basis of most livelihood strategies and the role of the wife in the household economy.

i) Subsistence farming and livelihood strategies: *'Pick up the hoe, and you'll live'*

In rural areas the majority of families is dependent on subsistence farming. As stated in the previous chapter, ninety-five percent of interviewees in the sample had a *machamba*. Availability of land in the rural research sites was never cited as a problem, as arable land was abundant. It has been estimated that Manica has approximately twenty four hectares of land suitable to agriculture per family, and Zambezia approximately eight.² This is well above the average household plot of between one and two hectares.

And now that the subsidy has ended, how are you surviving?

I'm living just as a person. A person is a person.

And how are the other demobs you know living?

Here in order to live, the only thing to do is pick up the hoe, and you'll live, because you'll produce something in your *machamba*, and the rest you can get, [e.g.] soap. This is the only way to live, by the *machamba*.. [...] Because if you cultivate, you will have food for the entire year, and the rest you can

¹Pardoel 1996b: 42

²Whiteside 1996: 21

sell to sustain your family, and so you will live. [...] because in our region when you produce, lots of food comes out. (Frelimo DS, Mapungwana)³

The ONUMOZ programme included initial packages of seeds and tools to help the demobilised soldiers begin their farming. Others who were demobilised prior to ONUMOZ were not so lucky, and shortage of tools and other materials was cited by some as an impediment to improving their agricultural work.

And in the next season, will you increase production, or will you stay with this piece you have, is it sufficient?

I will increase it, only this year I didn't manage to increase it because it was late already. Besides lack of time, there were also materials I needed which I didn't have. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)⁴

Even in urban areas, the *machamba* remains the basis of food security, though it is often located some distance outside the city due to high population density. The median distance in Chimoio was fifteen kilometres (n=16). In rural areas, people live adjacent to their *machamba* (median = 0 km., mean = 3 km.)(n=31).

Can you tell me about your means of survival? Do you work?

At this time I'm not working. I just survive making small *machambas*, and with the products I manage to satisfy my family. And I have also tried some small business there in the market, and this way I manage to survive. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*. He has 9 people at home: himself, his wife, his mother, five children and an orphaned niece. He has two *machambas*, one he got from his brother, which is about 5 kilometres outside the city, and another he got from his in-laws, which is 20 kilometres away)⁵

The volatile economic situation and greater material demands of urban life oblige people to maintain and use this resource with care:

What about this harvest there in the *machamba*? After you've brought it here will you use it, or help the family, will you sell it, or what?

Well, since last year I suffered a lot with hunger, I'm not going to play with food any more and sell it. It's better that I suffer without money but with food at home - no, I'm not going to sell it this year, I won't sell my food. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*. His *machamba* is 30 km. away from the city)⁶

Of our sample, including both rural and urban respondents, sixty-three percent stated that they would not be selling any of their agricultural produce, but would keep it all for household consumption (n=83). However, this referred principally to the staple food produced, usually maize in Manica and rice in Zambezia. Many other products

³Interview MOS 43, 27.07.96

⁴Interview CHI 70, 04.07.96 & 28.09.96

⁵Interview CHI 30, 21.05.96

⁶Interview CHI 48, 23.05.96.

from the *machamba* are sold to provide cash income, such as fruits, peanuts, tomatoes and onions grown on the banks of a river or irrigated, and anything else which can be used to make the '*caril*', or sauce which accompanies the maize meal or rice. The following table shows some of the wide variety of produce grown (other products include sunflower, oranges, lemons, avocados, tangerines, cucumber, cabbage).

TABLE 14: Type of produce grown in *machamba* (%)

Product	Study sample*
Maize	84
Cassava	46
Beans	46
Sweet potatoes	30
Millet	26
Peanuts	21
Rice	20
Potatoes	19
Tomatoes/onions/chard	18
Bananas	17
Marrow	15
Sugar cane	15

* *n*=88

Livestock is another important aspect of household agricultural production. Most livestock was lost during the war, and people have bitter memories of their once-impressive herds. Plough animals in particular were decimated, and very few people have been able to re-stock their herds. People now concentrate on rebuilding small livestock herds.

TABLE 15: Livestock (%)

Type of livestock	Study sample*
Chickens	76
Goats	35
Ducks	29
Pigs	15
Turkeys	10
Pigeons	10
Cows	4
Other	6

* *n*=68

N.B. An estimated one fifth of respondents had no livestock at all.

ii) **Women as producers: 'The women here are the workers in the machambas'**

Just as marriage is a *sine qua non* for acceptance as a fully-fledged adult in society, it is also, along with a plot of agricultural land, an indispensable basis for economic security. As noted in **Chapter 3**, women can help gain access to land for agriculture, especially in situations in which the male has settled out of his place of origin. Although men are involved in clearing and ploughing, and often take principal care of irrigated plots, women are generally the primary cultivators on small plots of land. One respondent was particularly scathing about the [lack of] activity of men:

Men from here, the work they do is just to drink. He doesn't work, he spends his life drinking and in the afternoon he goes and bothers the woman at home if she hasn't prepared the meal. The women here are the workers in the *machambas*.

And the husband?

He spends his life hanging out. As soon as he has built his house, then he is off, poof! to dawdle and hang about. (Member of OMM, Cabuir)⁷

The above comments were made by a woman in an area which produced copious amounts of *sura* and where men generally seemed under-occupied. In other areas, there appeared to be a more mutual sense of responsibility.

The help that comes from living on your own is different from living with someone else. [...] When there are two people, at least if it is cultivation season, you return to your field when you had finished your portion and you find that your wife has increased it; this is the help that a woman brings. But if you are alone, you go out, and you find your field just as you left it. (Frelimo DS, Gondola)⁸

This is also born out by the following figures from our sample, in which respondents stated that they participated in the work of the *machamba* along with their wives, although their role was principally clearing land, while the women were more active than the men in the harvest. (These figures should be taken with some caution, given that self-reported work may not correspond exactly to regular work habits. However, we did observe many men working in the fields alongside women in various parts of the country).

⁷Interview MAG 198, 26.08.96

⁸Interview CHI 119, 21.08.96

TABLE 16: Division of agricultural labour (%)

Labourer	Agricultural work	Harvest
Myself (DS)	83	71
Wife	82	83
Other family	19	23
Children	16	21
Labourers	0	7
Neighbours	0	5

n=83

iii) Women as carers: *'Without my wife, I couldn't do anything'*

As well as being agricultural producers and sellers, women are responsible for the physical maintenance of the household and its inhabitants, and act as guards in the absence of the male.

[B]ecause it is the wife who stays in the house with our things. For example, now that I'm here, my wife is staying with the children. Without my wife, I couldn't do anything, I don't know about other people but I couldn't do anything, my wife is the guard at my house. If I go away, wherever I want, she stays in the house to look after things, the chickens and the goats. (Renamo DS, Mossurize)⁹

In the absence of a social security system, the importance of a wife as a carer and labourer becomes more acute for those who were left disabled by the war.

I married this woman after arriving here. I stayed a while without marrying until my uncle said 'no, this life is not okay, you are an invalid, you must arrange a woman to be here to help you, and the kind of woman you can arrange must not be a young girl, one of those young girls of today who just play around. Organise yourself a slightly older woman who has experienced giving birth and who has experience of marriage... (Renamo DS, Mocubela, seriously injured right hand.)¹⁰

The division of labour between males and females is much more pronounced in the following figures from our sample.

⁹Interview CHI 91, 20.06.96

¹⁰Interview MAG 134, 08.08.96.

TABLE 17: Household labour (%)

Labourer	Housework	Collect water	Collect firewood
Wife	75	76	61
Myself (DS)	30	19	28
Children	23	21	15
Mother	10	9	8
Other family member	7	8	4
Buy	-	1	28

n=84

N.B. Only one respondent had a servant

N.B. 12% had a well

iv) The need for a cash income

While produce from the *machamba* may provide a large part of the staple diet for both urban and rural households, obtaining some basic processed food-stuffs such as sugar, salt and oil requires a source of cash income. Other household needs, such as health care, clothing, school, transport, as well as social obligations such as *lobolo*, all require money.

a) Household non-food needs:

As explained in Chapter 3 (Section 2), *lobolo* is one of the important cash requirements for males, and it is not a one-off payment but rather on-going obligations to the in-laws. Education is also a major financial burden. Sixty-one percent of our sample cited lack of money as the principal obstacle to academic achievement for their children.

Health needs also require cash, since health care is no longer provided free by the state, and traditional medicine also costs money. Forty-four percent of respondents stated that they preferred hospital treatment, eight percent preferred traditional medicine, and forty-two percent used both, depending on the illness and the success of each treatment (*n*=83). Eighty-two percent of respondents stated that someone in the family had been ill in the previous six months.

TABLE 18: Health problems in demobilised soldiers' families (%)

Who was ill	Study sample*
Child	51
Myself (DS)	37
Wife	22
Parents	18
Others in household	14

* n=74

TABLE 19: Most frequent illnesses (%)

Illness	Study sample*
Diarrhoea	29
Malaria	27
Headache	19
Fever	10
Rheumatism	5
Cold	5
Toothache	5
Asthma	4
Other	34

* n=75

b) Sale of agricultural produce as a means of income generation

If an agricultural surplus is produced, then families can sell it to obtain some cash, though, as noted above, this puts food security at risk. Some men give their wives their own portions of land to farm, and they use the produce from their own labour as they choose.¹¹ Often this income is used to meet household needs, while men use their income to invest in business or building or improving the house (or, as suggested by the respondent above, leisure pursuits such as drinking).

The gender division of labour is also reflected in the marketplace. Women sell agricultural surplus, while men sell manufactured items such as shoes, tools, and canned drinks. However, in the wake of social and economic changes brought about by the war, these roles are not rigidly adhered to (Chingono 1994; Macy 1996), and men and women will substitute for each other when necessary. Wives of men who

¹¹Interview, CHI 76, Chicacaule locality, 29 .06.96

have a *banca fixa*¹² may sometimes be the principal sellers or they may step in when the man has other things to do.

I have three wives now. Two are at home where one looks after the food for the day. The third is at the *banca* - so they all help each other. (Renamo DS, Machaze)¹³

As the Maputo study of reintegration showed, in urban areas women often bring in up to three times the income of their husbands through informal trade activities, and are more likely to use it for household sustenance. However, traditional views on the 'proper' role of women mean that women's financial contribution is often underplayed and unacknowledged. When a man is counting the household income it is not uncommon for him only to state his own salary and ignore the money brought in by the wife even when the latter is treble the amount he earns. Indeed, a woman who lets it be known that she is bringing in more than her husband may risk losing him in divorce (Macy 1996).

Despite women's clear involvement in domestic subsistence and income generation activities, it is rare to find men who acknowledge the role the woman plays in as honest a way as the following (as our interviewer's surprise demonstrates):

Who is the head of the household here?

The head of my house is my wife.

What?!

The head of the house is the woman, the man does not order her around...

And whose is the house? Who is the owner of the house?

The house, well, the person who organised it was me, but when you're talking about [who's in charge], it has its own mistress who keeps the house organised. (Former soldier in Portuguese colonial army, aged 56 years, Madal)¹⁴

v) **Employment:** *'Me, a Mozambican citizen, I have to have a job!'*

The gendered division of labour is based on the wider division of roles and responsibilities for women and men in society. Women are conventionally expected to bear and care for the children, and their 'place' is in the home. Men are expected to

¹²A stand for selling produce, referred to as *fixa* when it is made of durable material, usually set up inside markets or by the side of a road or path. Sometimes referred to as *quiosque*.

¹³Interview CHI 50, 20.06.96

¹⁴Interview Q 59, 15.08.96.

head their households, make the important decisions and sustain the family through their participation in the cash economy (Macy 1996).¹⁵

It is therefore not surprising that many demobilised soldiers are centrally preoccupied with formal, salaried employment. In principle it offers a means to achieve household economic security, potentially more stable than business or agriculture which are susceptible to the vagaries of market and weather:

Your money has ended, how do you feed yourself now, do you have a *machamba*?

I have a *machamba*, but it's very little. The product we plant is called *mandioca*,¹⁶ it's an annual plant which means that you plant it this year and it takes a year to harvest the produce. So I have a *machamba* and I wait for the little I have, to harvest next year. I have to wait until the end of this year to reap the harvest I planted last year. All this time I'm just living on the edge.

But most demobs around here are in the fish business?

Yes, I was in the fish business too, buying here and selling in Maganja. But buying and selling fish has its proper time, and it varies. For example, at the moment the market is full of fish and there is no demand for it. Now if a person buys fish for 40 *contos*, takes it to Maganja and then has no success, it's better to stay at home waiting for the time when the fish is in high demand in Maganja. With these markets, it's only sometimes. We buy when we see that there is a demand in that market, and we go to the sea to buy fish. But *epa!* doing business for someone who doesn't know... it's just more suffering. For me it's more suffering. I would like to be in work, working knowing that at the end of 30 days I will be paid. In business you can buy millions of things and then be stuck with failure. (Frelimo DS, Bajone)¹⁷

Formal employment also fits in with the man's view of his proper role in society:

And what about that Renamo soldier you know? Is his life better than yours, or are you the same?

The life of the Renamo demob, well, I can't know it perfectly, because they may also like the way they are living now [in the city], since they were living in the bush. But for me, it's not right being unemployed because being a man, me a Mozambican citizen, I have to have a job. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*. This man was employed after demobilisation but lost his job when the company down-sized its workforce. He now survives baking bread to sell.)¹⁸

The majority of our respondents stated that they wished above all else for salaried employment. Their focus on formal employment led many to state repeatedly that they were doing 'nothing', that 'I want to work', when in fact they were actively

¹⁵Even though the last few decades have witnessed social changes in the actual behaviour of men and women, beliefs about gender roles appear to be changing more slowly.

¹⁶Manioc/cassava

¹⁷Interview MAG 15, 21.06.96

¹⁸Interview CHI 70, 04.07.96 & 28.09.96.

involved in a range of economic activities. They use the term 'work' only to refer to formal, salaried employment.

As 'work' is clearly so central, why are so few in such employment? The dearth of salaried employment affecting demobilised soldiers and non-demobilised alike is partly a reflection of pre-independence colonial underdevelopment and post-independence economic decline due to war and mismanagement. There has also been little attempt to kick-start the economy in the post-war period. The large investments required to recover from war damage are simply not forthcoming, and Mozambican entrepreneurs are severely under-capitalised.¹⁹

In rural areas covered by this study, the majority of the larger plantations and processing plants which in the past were major employers are yet to be rehabilitated, notably the coconut, cashew and cotton plantations of Zambezia province. Difficulties in raising capital to invest in rehabilitation are compounded by the slow pace of rebuilding rural infrastructure to support economic activities, particularly roads, which private companies regard as the responsibility of the state. The state in turn must raise money externally in order to pay for its road rehabilitation programmes, but their efforts have been stumped by IMF funding constraints as part of the Structural Adjustment Programme (Hanlon 1997: 39-44). Such conditions make many people compare the present unfavourably to the past, and some have clear ideas about what would need to be done in order to improve the situation:

What's life like today?

Life today, life today, life today... Ah! What can be done? What can be done, we are suffering... The suffering we felt during the war, it's almost the same as the suffering we feel now.

Why do you say this?

What makes me think this is that what I want now, and what I need, I don't see it. For example, if I want to work, I won't find it, even any old work to support my family, I don't see it.

What's needed for there to be employment here?

Here to have employment, it is necessary that there be reconstruction, agricultural production, irrigation and plumbing, and the people who work there should be paid so that life would improve. Then there would be access to employment for many citizens to sustain themselves, whether buying soap or food... (Renamo DS, Mude)²⁰

These various problems have resulted in exceptionally low numbers in formal employment. According to the *Economist* (Oct. 28, 1995, cited in Macy 1996: 2), of

¹⁹Hanlon 1997

²⁰Interview MOS 35, 12.07.96

Mozambique's seven million adults, only 95,000 are formally employed and these jobs are concentrated in just a few urban centres. The trade sector is recovering more rapidly than productive sectors, but most trade is now concentrated in the informal rather than formal sector.

In Chimoio, our own random sample of sixty businesses out of the one hundred and five registered with the *Direcção de Indústria, Comércio e Turismo* (Provincial Cabinet of Industry, Commerce and Tourism), found only four businesses which employed more than the average of five employees (see Appendix VII). The following table shows how few demobilised soldiers are employed in these businesses:

TABLE 20: Number of employees in sample of 60 businesses in Chimoio

Employee	Number	Percent
DS	33	5.5
ONUMOZ DS	17	2.8
Non-DS	543	91.7
TOTAL	593	100

In the study sample, four-fifths were not in wage employment (n=79). Naturally this extreme shortage of employment puts those who control access to employment in a very strong position *vis-à-vis* job applicants. Reports of having to buy one's way into employment are legion:

And how did you get the job at the construction company?

Well, when I went to contact the *chefe* who worked there, there was that thing of 'the goat eats where it is tethered',²¹ so I had to take two chickens that I had here at home, and I gave them to that man, and I managed to work there those two years. After that, they had to get rid of workers, including me. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)²²

Salaries in formal employment are generally too low to provide a living wage, but one's position can provide opportunities to generate extra income, whether through bribe-taking or the use of company resources. It is these opportunities rather than the salary itself which make formal employment so attractive. As a result, employees in all ranks are drawn into corruption, which then becomes entrenched and permeates from the bottom of the pyramid to the top. As everybody is implicated, no one can

²¹The Mozambican phrase referring to corrupt practices in the work place, immortalised by late President Samora Machel in the term '*cabritismo*'.

²²Interview CHI 70, 04.07.96 & 28.09.96

blow the whistle on anyone else.²³ While access to such opportunities is desired by many demobilised, it is ironic that it is this entrenched corruption which often reduces the effectiveness of the assistance intended for them (see **Section 3, v**).

The obstacle generalised corruption creates for those seeking employment is compounded, in both urban and rural contexts, by significant employer prejudice against them. Employers have absorbed messages from media, government and international community that demobilised soldiers are dangerous, brutalised 'killing machines' or otherwise untrustworthy. In such a context one negative experience of a demobilised soldier as a worker can serve an employer as justification to discriminate against all others:

Here in the locality of X, sometimes these companies are corrupt. Once I went to speak with Boss Anselmo, the Manager of Company Y. 'Look, I'm a demobilised, I would like a job here.' He asked me what type of work did I want? I said, 'no, I can't decide, you're the boss. If you give me a job in the kitchen, I'll accept, all I want is a salary, money.' He said, 'you can't answer me in this way, you're being cheeky.' I said that I was ready to listen to whatever he had to say. A person who is in a position of responsibility like this cannot answer in such a way, it seems as though he has no feeling. He said that 'the problem of you demobilised, you demand so much, you want to rob us, you'll speak badly to our workers, and then hold a strike.' I said that no, I wouldn't divulge his secret: that when they take workers to Z, the workers must pay them with a chicken in order to go to work in Z, and they leave demobilised soldiers behind because they don't have a chicken.

When I think of what the State is doing it makes me feel angry. Because the company also takes orders from the government, so we demobilised feel very badly. This is why we have to beg to be considered for a job now, before we start to cause problems, beating up children while selling cigarettes on the street. They'll complain, and who will they say it was? The children of the government. Because we demobilised are the children of the government. We did our time, when we were just pretty young boys in the war. Now that the war has ended, someone won, and we are nothing. (Frelimo DS, Bajone)²⁴

The veiled threats to respond with aggression to the company's refusal to employ demobilised soldiers probably perpetuate the generalised stereotype of demobilised as volatile and violent. The low number of strikes and riots actually perpetrated by demobilised soldiers in the 3 years since demobilisation suggests that such talk is largely bluster. The few strikes which have occurred were in relation to specific promises of further monetary assistance alleged to have been made, rather than to the wider issue of lack of employment.²⁵ The latter is certainly a source of great individual frustration but not a cause of group protest.

²³See also Hanlon 1997: 130, and Green and Mavie 1994

²⁴Interview MAG 11, 21.06.96. Company and site names withheld for confidentiality.

²⁵For example, the strikes in Beira and Alto Molocue in early 1996 (*Noticias* Newspaper, 27.03.96, p.4)

vi) Education and skills: 'I think I was really disadvantaged'

Low levels of education and training result in a large pool of unskilled labour which hampers both individual and national economic improvement. In Mozambique, adult literacy is only 33% (MOA/MSU Paper No. 16 p.1, cited in Macy 1996: 2) and there is a general dearth of trained personnel in all sectors of the economy despite the great improvements made in the immediate post-independence years (Cravinho 1995: 145).

As a group, demobilised soldiers suffered severe disruption of education and training. Recruitment campaigns in both rural and urban areas paid scant regard to a youth's real age, provided he/she was physically mature. Two members of the research team in Quelimane, as young adolescents, had been picked off the street by recruiters and were only rescued by the intervention of contacts, another fled the country aged 15 to avoid this fate. One in his late teens became a Renamo administrator.

ONUMOZ statistics show that 37% had their education interrupted (Pardoel 1996b: 24), and that upon demobilisation, 34% of soldiers had no formal education at all, while 32% had only primary level education (Pardoel 1996b: 23). Our study sample included fewer people with no education, but more with only primary level education:

TABLE 21: Educational level (%)

Educational level	ONUMOZ	Study sample*
None	34	9
Primary school	33	57
Secondary school	26	28
Middle School	3	6
University	1	0

* n=71

Only nine percent of our respondents received further education while in the troops, leaving them with low levels of education at the end of long years of service (n=68). They were unlikely to return to school, however, since they were too old to live at home and be supported by parents and could not afford to go to school if they were head of a household. Not just education, but technical training was foregone: only sixty-two percent of our respondents had received any training they regarded as usable in a civilian context (n=58).

Many demobilised soldiers express considerable bitterness at the opportunities they have involuntarily foregone by being forcibly recruited from school. Although the state of the economy is such that education is no guarantee of employment, and many of the well educated remain unemployed, there is no doubt that education helps; many employers demand secondary or middle level education. They also use educational level as a criterion to narrow the pool from which they will select employees, even when such educational qualifications are not strictly relevant to the job in question.

In idealising the opportunities which education can create in the here-and-now, many demobilised are articulating a deep grievance about the disruption of their life plans and attempts to meet their own aspirations. Before, they had a vision of the future. Now it is opaque.

My life is going very badly. Because I think of those things I could have had. In the middle of all that I went to the war and I was interrupted. For example they took me out of school where I was studying. When I was demobilised I didn't manage to matriculate again to study, and I don't even have a job. So I think I was really disadvantaged. Yes, if I studied, maybe I would have some job or other. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)²⁶

vii) The rejection of manual labour: *'I could be in an office, I could be a guard'*

Lack of education means that most demobilised soldiers are eligible only for manual or unskilled labour, such as a cleaner, porter, or agricultural labourer. However, many consider such occupations inappropriate to their status and are left with few options. There is a sense that such jobs are rejected because to accept them is to swallow the bitter truth that all their dreams of youth will never be actualised.

There are also several very practical reasons why such labour is rejected. For seriously disabled demobilised soldiers, manual labour is clearly out of the question, and even work on their own plot of land is often impossible, leaving them in a vulnerable and dependent position. A large number has suffered injuries which reduce their capacity for physical labour but do not render them eligible for disability allowances. In our study sample, forty-six percent stated they had been injured during the war, mostly bullet wounds or shrapnel lodged in their bodies (n=69). By contrast, only three percent receive disability pensions (n=79).

For the many who were injured but not sufficiently to receive a disability pension, and even for those who have no injury, some manual jobs are extremely arduous

²⁶Interview CHI 70, 04.07.96 & 28.09.96

and/or dangerous, particularly for someone who is no longer fit and agile, and who was not trained from a young age. An example is climbing coconut palms to collect the fruit, one of the few jobs offered on the coconut plantations in Zambezia and an option rejected almost universally by the demobilised we spoke to in the area. In fact, in our visits to the coconut company in Bajone, we found only one demobilised soldier working there.²⁷ In addition to the sheer physical difficulties, many demobilised feel that offers of such work are an act of deliberate discrimination.

If someone goes to a company to ask for work, he is always sent to do heavy labour, which is work that many of our friends don't do. This type of work is just given to us demobilised, collecting coconuts... But this work, for me it is too heavy, because in my entire life I have never been a coconut collector.

So what type of work could you manage?

Well, in my entire life I've never worked. I was a student, I finished 4^a *classe*, then went to Maganja to do 6^a *classe*, then went to Mocuba where I was in 7^a *classe* when I was recruited for the army. Until today I was never in a job. But I think that I could do any work, as long as it's not forced labour.

Such as?

I could be in an office, I could write, I could be a guard. (Frelimo DS, Bajone)²⁸ [Of the 50 ex-combatants and ONUMOZ demobilised encountered in our study of Chimoio businesses, some 50% were employed as security guards, one of the primary jobs considered appropriate by both demobilised soldiers and employers]

References to 'forced labour' were also made by interviewees in Mossurize district, where the road rehabilitation work offered to demobilised soldiers was compared unfavourably to the *chibalo*²⁹ of Portuguese colonialism. Many men left Mozambique to work on plantations in neighbouring countries or the mines of South Africa to escape forced labour. Nonetheless, the small amount of money earned by those who did *chibalo* (usually road or other construction work), was enough to return home and buy clothing and other essentials for the family. Work on the roads now, by contrast, is often paid at less than minimum wage, and when the men get home they cannot even afford to buy a *capulana* for their wives because the cost of living has greatly outpaced wages. Thus many prefer to stay at home and work on the *machamba* rather than do such arduous work for so little money.

²⁷Field notes, July 1996

²⁸Interview MAG 15, 21.06.96.

²⁹Forced labour required of every male not able to pay the head tax in cash, and also used as punishment for crimes. It was legally abolished by the Portuguese in 1962 at the first signs of nationalist resistance in Angola, but still continued unofficially, particularly in war zones where 'dragooned African workers built military projects and constructed *aldeamentos* (protected villages)' (Henriksen 1983: 132)

viii) **De-skilling or demotivation? 'There is no rest'**

It is commonly held that in the course of the war, soldiers had become de-skilled in relation to the demands of civilian life. As the previous section on lost education and training opportunities shows, there is some truth in this. It is tempting to extrapolate from this that demobilised soldiers no longer understand the meaning of work, because during the war they were not required to work for survival. Frelimo soldiers received rations and elicited contributions from the population when necessary, while Renamo relied almost exclusively on contributions from the local population.³⁰

P. Waziweyi, a farmer who was attempting to recruit demobilised soldiers for a GTZ-funded scheme, found that very few responded to his offers even though he was promising to pay the national minimum wage which was higher than wages at other nearby farms. One explanation he offered for this poor response was physical inadequacy:

Is it a problem of the demobilised soldiers, that they're not...?

Truly, these others that I have seen in Catandica, they're not strong enough to work.

Physically?

Physically. They tend to drink too much. So they wake up the following day tired, and if they hear of uprooting big trees, they say, 'oh, we are going to die'. (Chimoio)³¹

However, he also offered several alternative hypotheses. One was that many had already worked for other farmers in the area who had broken salary agreements with them, so they were wary of the schemes. Another was that he may not have disseminated the information adequately, and so many simply did not know about the opportunity. In particular, he had been advised to go recruiting in an area with high numbers of ex-Renamo soldiers because they were reputed to be more inclined to accept agricultural labour than ex-Frelimo soldiers.

A subsequent attempt to encourage three female Renamo demobilised soldiers in Chimoio city to pursue this opportunity for employment was unsuccessful. Despite the fact that one of the three had recently been evicted because she was unable to pay her rent, and all claimed to have no other source of income, not one of them would accept a job as an agricultural labourer. They insisted that they would take any job offered to them... except agricultural labour.

³⁰The voluntary nature of these contributions from the population to both Frelimo and Renamo soldiers varied.

³¹Interview CHI 128, 11.09.96

And now that your subsidy has ended, and you have to buy everything here in the city, what are your plans for survival?
I'm preoccupied with finding a job in order to survive.

But you don't want to do this work on the farm. Why not?
Well, I came out of a very difficult job [the army], and so to return to forced labour, I find it difficult. There is no rest. (Renamo DS, Chimoio)³²

It is wrong to assume that soldiers who lived by the gun have somehow become irreversibly lazy, as the following sections on initiative show, but difficult to deny that soldiers may be psychologically exhausted and in need of a relatively long recovery period.

A person's background and expectations influence the options which he considers viable. Someone whose brothers are all *chefes*, or whose family owned a large herd of cattle before the war, or who had aspirations to go to university, will understandably be reluctant to settle for a job which injures his dignity and view of himself (see **Chapter 2, Section 6** for a discussion of the way in which expectations and aspirations kept people from returning home, or led them to settle in new place). From this perspective AMODEG's wish to see the prioritisation of employment consistent with the skills and aspirations of its members, is both understandable and reasonable.³³

It is important to remember at this point that demobilised soldiers are heterogeneous in terms of both their background and war-time experience (see quote above referring to the different expectations of Renamo soldiers recently arrived in the city *versus* urbanised Frelimo soldiers). While demobilised soldiers feel there is a strong case for formal employment, both as a source of security and of opportunities for other income, the reality is that they cannot access the kind of jobs they would like. Their low educational qualifications debar them from the few jobs on offer which they would regard as suitable, a source of grievance to which we return in **Chapter 6**.

2. The search for initiative

As argued above, individuals would like employment to serve at least two functions: economic security and social status. Many of the jobs on offer satisfy neither. Employers are in a strong position *vis-à-vis* workers and can therefore pay low wages.

³²Interview CHI 131, 12.09.96

³³*Domingo* Newspaper, 11.10.92

For someone who had aspirations prior to recruitment, to accept a manual job at exploitative rates of pay may be to reduce his social status and his sense of self-worth. To add insult to injury one is expected to pay a bribe to be employed. For all of its attractions, formal employment is clearly not a panacea.

In the absence of employment opportunities, assistance programmes were designed to encourage greater individual initiative. However, these programmes failed to support the considerable initiative which already existed, displayed by many individual demobilised soldiers.

In the following case, the demobilised soldier was placed in the factory Textafrika after completing his military service, but recently the company had not been paying salaries and he had to turn to other means to support his family:

When I presented myself, I was put into Textafrika, and until now I remain there, miserable. And I do no work. I work during the day, the third shift, and when I'm free I do odd-jobs, but it's not enough to satisfy my situation.

What's the work you are doing?

I work as a mason, with mud bricks.

Where did you learn this profession?

I did apprenticeship. [...] I experimented first on my own house, and when people saw it they said that I was the best maestro. And I continue to do this work.

So you made your house?

I'm making it, but at the moment I'm doing a house for my neighbour before finishing mine because I have no other way of surviving, the company [Textafrika] doesn't pay, it hasn't paid us salaries for 6 months. So I thought I would build the house for that man so that my children can eat. I have five children here in the house, so after they eat, the rest of the money can resolve the situation in my house. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro Muzingadzi*)³⁴

Others take stock of the macro-economic situation and reconcile themselves to the fact that they will not be able to find salaried employment, but instead must go out and try something else:

After you left the army, did you manage to find work?

I got a job in the X Company, as a mason's assistant. But there in these companies, I think that you have to be lucky to have any guarantee of security. I worked there two years and then they had to decrease the number of workers, saying that the company wouldn't be able to pay all of the workers there. When I left, I got a job in the house of a man there in Manica, and I worked there. But that man didn't pay well, and I saw that it was better to be at home doing some business or other, than working for this man. [...]

³⁴Interview CHI 112, 03.08.96

And when I was demobilised, there in the [cantonment] centre they asked me if I wanted to work or not. I said I wanted to work, and I filled out a document which I gave in to the Department of Labour. When I gave it in, they said I should come by every two weeks to see the results. When I got there, first I signed up, and they asked me if I had a telephone at home to communicate with me. I said I didn't, but I had a friend there, a cousin who worked in a shop with a telephone. So they sent for this man, and he came, to tell him they would communicate if there was a job. So I waited, but they never called me. One day I went myself, and I went to ask the Head of Human Resources, but they told me nothing. At the time, I wasn't alone, there were other people there, and they tried to give encouragement, saying wait... I asked myself what are you waiting for, while you are having trouble surviving at home? So I had to arrange a manner of getting food to eat. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)³⁵

Although the macro-economic situation is unfavourable for salaried employment, many people were quick to take advantage of the openings in the informal sector in the wake of the Peace Accord. In our study sample, seventy-five percent are selling something in order to generate income (n=92).

TABLE 22: Income generation activities of demobilised (%)

Item sold	Study sample*
Agricultural produce	49
Basics (salt, sugar, oil, soap)	23
Fish (fresh and dried)	21
Home-brewed alcohol	20
Cigarettes	14
Home-made clothing	9
Prepared food	9
Second-hand clothing (<i>calamidades</i>)	6
Bread	5
Cloth	5
Drinks and beer	3
Clay pots	3
Furniture	2
Other	26

* n=69

³⁵Interview CHI 70, 04.07.96 & 28.09.96

i) The Subsidies: *'I only got enough to eat, not enough to live'*

One of the principal objectives of the ONUMOZ subsidies was to entice soldiers to demobilise and leave the army,³⁶ and in this it appears to have been successful, as only approximately 12,000 soldiers volunteered to enter the new army, far short of the target of 30,000.

And when you left the assembly area for home and you received the first money, what did they tell you the money was for, why were you receiving this money every month?

It was to help, because if they told us to give in our irons [weapons] and go home, I couldn't accept to give it in, because it is worth more for me to take it home and kill animals with it in the forest and sell it. So they had to give us money for us to see that this life is a little bit better than the other life. But even so the money was very little. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)³⁷

The money provided by ONUMOZ allowed some to use their creativity and take their own initiatives, using the money as investment capital.

I began with the money that I received at first, I bought a bucket and a radio-cassette player. I took the radio-cassette player home [to Mossurize] and I exchanged it with a man who wanted it, for four goats. Then I went to receive my first two months subsidy, and I met a man who said, 'go to Beira, buy me a bicycle'. So I went to Beira and bought it, and brought it back, and the man gave me seven goats in exchange. Then I bought two turkeys, and they reproduced three times, surviving well, until there was a total of 28 turkeys. (Renamo DS, Mossurize. Received 700,000 Mt. ONUMOZ subsidy.)³⁸

Some took the chance to launch an entirely new enterprise, perhaps using what they had learned during their time in the war. The following demobilised soldier from Mossurize, who had fought in various parts of Sofala and Tete provinces, went home only briefly before leaving again to try and earn a living from fishing. He took the 1 million Mt. he was given as the initial subsidy payment, recruited his father to go with him, and travelled back to Caia, in Sofala.

How did you have this idea?

Because when I lived there [during the war], I saw people going fishing and bringing back good fish, so I knew that this work could make you lots of money. That's why I bought the net and went all the way there.

How long did you stay there?

Two months.

And it didn't work out?

It didn't. I only got enough to eat, not enough to live [laughter].

³⁶Discussion with T. Born, USAID Maputo, 20.02.96

³⁷Interview MOS 44, 29.07.96

³⁸Interview CHI 91, 20.06.96.

So you sold the net and came back here. Then what?

Then I thought of entering the [carpentry] course. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)³⁹

The initial payment received by this person was higher than the average, a reflection of the rank he had held during the war. For the lower ranks, the monthly subsidy provided by ONUMOZ was not always enough to start a new business.

[T]hey are unhappy with the money they were paid. Indeed some say that it would have been better if we had been given all the money at the Assembly Area, then you could use it for business, rather than being told to go and collect it from Mocuba which costs seventy-five *contos* just to go and collect fifty *contos*. If we had been given it all on the same day it would have been possible to buy some things and make a profit, because the total amount received by a normal soldier was 1500 *contos*. With that he could have done something, given that the transport from the Assembly Area to here was free. (Renamo DS, Mocubela)⁴⁰

Lack of initial capital appeared to be one of the principal differences between those who had managed to start up a successful business and those who had not been able to do more than the minimum to set up a household and get married. Another difference was the extent to which family obligations required investment of the subsidy money.

How are the other demobilised soldiers living?

Some are selling clothing, soap, dried fish, and one is working in a business. The problem of the others is that some received money only to arrive home to find there was great hunger there... To buy food for two months uses a lot of money, and so he doesn't have success, and now he's thinking of working.

But how did some have successes and others not, why did this happen?

This happened because some received very little, 75,000 is not much money for someone to receive. Another received 200 [*contos*], but at home he might have parents who cannot work so he has to provide for the house and this money is not enough. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)⁴¹

ii) Urbanisation as an indicator of initiative: *'It's worth it, but with difficulty'*

Urban areas generally offer better markets for those who have a trade or skill to practice. Filomon is from Pebane, and sacrificed the chance to have a *machamba* in his home district in order to live in Quelimane and practise his electronics trade. He manages to make a reasonable living, sometimes 45,000 Mt. per day, sometimes 45,000 per week depending on the movement, which could mean 180,000 Mt. a month at the worst and 1,250,000 at the best. He did have coconut palms in Pebane

³⁹Interview MOS 1, 02.07.96

⁴⁰Interview MAG 134, 08.08.96

⁴¹Interview MOS 44, 29.07.96

but during the war people got so desperate that they cut down the palms for food. He is lucky enough to have a nephew in the Frelimo party headquarters in Quelimane who sometimes helps him monetarily; kinship ties are important in increasing livelihood security and advancement.⁴²

Urban (and semi-urban) markets also present the opportunity for artisanal production, such as preparing food to sell in the market, making bricks and pottery, brewing alcohol, tailoring, carpentry, building houses etc. These pursuits are often under-capitalised and lack economies of scale. Nevertheless, they can still contribute significantly to a household's livelihood.

And so what do you do [for your family's sustenance]?

I buy wheat and I make bread to sell.

Where do you buy the flour?

I buy it in the shops.

In large quantity?

No, small quantities, 20 kilos, because I don't have more money. If I had money I could buy two or three bags.

And does it bring you anything when you buy 20 kilos, make bread, is it worth the work?

Yes, it's worth it, but with difficulty.

You don't have support from your family?

No, at the moment I don't. My wife is also dependent on me.

She doesn't carry out any activity here at home?

No, her work is to go to the *machamba*. To go to the *machamba*, she needs money for the *chapa-100*.⁴³ So the money, I have to get it. To get this money you need some kind of business, and my business is this one which doesn't really bring in much because the quantity is very small. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)⁴⁴

The markets for skilled people can quickly become saturated, such that they remain underemployed even in large urban centres. For those who do not have even the small amounts needed to go into business, it is still possible to live from hand-to-mouth in urban areas if one is prepared to do all kinds of work for other people.

⁴²Interview Q 105, Frelimo DS, Quelimane, 17.09.96

⁴³Local transport, named for the fare price of 100 Mt., although the fares have long since exceeded 100. *Chapas* are privately-owned vehicles and they are fairly flexible in the routes they run but will obviously go for the most profitable routes and have no obligation to service less popular ones. They run in various states of disrepair and are commonly involved in road accidents because of mechanical failure.

⁴⁴Interview CHI 70, 04.07.96 & 28.09.96

Do you work?

No, I don't work. I was demobilised and until now I don't have anything to do.

None of your family who is with you works? [Wife, three children and brother-in-law]

No, no one.

So to survive, do you do any business?

I just do some odd-jobs. [...] When someone needs bricks, I make them for him; when someone needs a latrine, I go to his house and dig the latrine, when someone needs a well, I go and dig it. I have to, because when I left my house for here it was Frelimo who brought me here and now they are not returning me to my house; when I was demobilised I just got stuck here. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*. Originally from Caia, Sofala province)⁴⁵

iii) Banca Fixas and rural trade: 'We want to do business, but transport... ah!'

In both urban and rural areas, a favoured way of making extra income to supplement agricultural produce is the *banca fixa*. The initiative involved in such enterprise ranges widely. Some people simply buy cigarettes, candies and other small items from city shops, take them into the *bairro* or rural area and set up a roadside stand in which to sell them for a small profit. Others travel far and wide to get diverse products from warehouses or other direct suppliers and bring them back to remote rural areas.

Jorge is one of the more ambitious traders. He has set up a *banca fixa* in the district capital of Machaze district, Manica province, stocked with products mainly brought from Chimoio each month when he goes to collect his disability pension. Usually one of his three wives is in charge of looking after the *banca fixa*, because on top of this business, he is a travelling trader, buying all kinds of products where supplies are cheap and taking them to where demand is high:

What do you sell at your *banca*?

I sell soap, sugar, cooking oil, dried fish, and salt.

And do these products sell well?

Yes, they do.

Where do you have to go to get them?

Soap I get here in Chimoio, salt and dried fish is in Mambone (Inhambane).

How often do you have to go there to stock up?

⁴⁵Interview CHI 48, Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*, 23.05.96.

Each month if I get transport I go twice. It is the lack of transport which is holding me back, we don't have a *machibombo*⁴⁶. By *chapa-100* it's almost two hours trip and you have to pay 35 *contos* to get to the national highway. (Renamo DS, Machaze Chimoio)⁴⁷

Success in these enterprises depends on a number of factors. In urban areas, competition is stiff, and the amount of capital determines whether one is able to invest in larger quantities or more attractive and lucrative produce (e.g. canned or bottled drinks and alcohol). Access to locations with good through-fare is also a determinant of success. Rural areas share the principal hurdle of lack of capital, compounded by critical inadequacies of transport and market infrastructure.

Jorge's capital for his trading came both from his subsidy payments and his disability pension, and his initiative has allowed him to make and save a considerable amount of money. It is not enough, though, to purchase his own means of transportation. Both he and Juma feel that this is the primary obstacle to their further success.

Juma: With the first money I received [disability pension], I bought some boxes of soap, some second-hand clothes, and I brought them home, to exchange them for maize. Now I have a lot of maize, and if I could get transportation, I would carry it out to sell, and I could buy the cows that I need. Because right now I have 143 bags of maize of 90 kilograms.

Where would you go to sell this?

We thought maybe Xai-Xai, or Maxixe. But transport... we made a deal with Mr. Zé, what was it?

Jorge: 7,500,000 to Maxixe. But epa! I couldn't do it. This is the one thing that is killing us. We want to do business, but transport, ah! Because now, from Machaze to here, we pay 80 *contos* just one way.

Juma: And us from Espungabera, 100 to here, 100 home. 200 *contos*.

Jorge: And that's without baggage! [...] Then there was that man from South Africa who came along with the offer of a vehicle for us to buy, and he offered it for 7,000,000. If only we had it... We told him to come back in a few months and we'll see if we can get that money together. (Renamo DS, Mossurize and Machaze, interviewed in Chimoio)⁴⁸

Jorge and Juma are meeting a need for consumer goods in rural areas which lack cash because they have no direct access to markets. They are also ensuring that agricultural surplus reaches urban markets. Their situations starkly demonstrate the limits to individual initiative in the absence of wider economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. Both are dependent on being able to shift goods from areas of supply

⁴⁶More reliable transportation than the *chapa-100*., usually larger and often licensed, travelling the more popular routes and longer distances, and usually with a more predictable schedule than the *chapa*.

⁴⁷Interview CHI 50, 20.06.96 & 20.08.96

⁴⁸Interviews CHI 50 & CHI 91, 20.06.96

to areas of demand. Both are held back by having no transport of their own, and no access to credit.

Although Juma has to fit in with the erratic schedule of the private transport owners, he does live on a fairly well travelled route and can get transport if he is willing to pay for it. In other places the transport situation is abject, and under such circumstances it would often be foolish rather than just risky to set up a *banca fixa* or other types of small business.

In Mocubela (Zambezia province) we interviewed two demobilised who had a *banca fixa* which they had set up on their own initiative before receiving additional financing from IOM. They complained that the amount of money given to them was minimal and did not allow for any serious investment in their business. They were keen to expand into purchasing surplus directly from producers and re-selling in Quelimane, a service which was a high priority for most in the community. However, they were also stuck for transport. Asked how they would get the produce to market, they answered,

We don't have a way. What inspired us to buy was the idea that we could buy the product and then go to the City Council and they will pass a message to the IOM because they have transport, and they will ship out these products from here. When the produce is sold, we would reimburse the money for petrol. Until today we've had no success. (Renamo DS, Mocubela)⁴⁹

IOM was never intended to act as a marketing intermediary but the fact that these demobilised saw it as the only option is indicative of the infrastructural deficiencies in such areas. It is not only entrepreneurial demobilised who are thwarted in the attempt to buy up agricultural surpluses. Even the Mozambican Grain Board (ICM) itself is sometimes unable to raise the loans required in order to purchase surplus produce and transport it to markets for sale.⁵⁰

Thus those demobilised who rely principally on their *machamba* as a source of income are severely disadvantaged. They may have plenty of land on which to produce, but no way of bringing their surplus to market. For example, in the area around Derre, Morrumbala District:

⁴⁹Interview MAG 133, 08.08.96

⁵⁰*Diário de Moçambique* Newspaper, 30.8.96, p.3, (reports lack of funds in Zambezia for agricultural commercialisation); *Savana* Newspaper, 6.9.96, p.4, (reports the successes of ICM in buying maize in various districts of Manica province, but the difficulties which mean that they are not able to get to all areas nor buy sufficient quantity.)

With the hoe which my family lent me I have produced a lot, I filled a granary: I still have beans from last year and there are more beans in the fields. I still have corn from last year and there is this year's as well. And despite this, even though transport can get to our area, ever since I left Quelimane and came to our area Mudula, not a single vehicle has arrived. Even though the population there is crying out for the products, whether the different types of beans, groundnuts, chickens, corn - right up to today those things are there inside going to rot, and people are still walking around in a miserable state. [Because of the distance] from here to Derre, when a person carries a tin [on his head], when he gets home he falls sick, and can't manage to walk. So on this matter, there is no lack of strength, we are willing to make fields from here as far as you can see... the only thing missing is the transport, the vehicle which comes to our area and buys the very product; this situation is really holding us back. (Renamo DS, Licuar)⁵¹

In addition, large cashew plantations lie untended which formerly exported produce to urban areas and international markets. The trees continue to produce but the crop remains unharvested. Rural areas are thus trapped in a vicious circle: lack of roads leads to lack of market opportunities which leads to lack of cash and in turn inability to buy consumer goods, resulting in reluctance on the part of the rural population to produce agricultural surplus and thus economic stagnation.

iv) Lack of credit

The problems of poor infrastructure and transport could be overcome to an extent if more credit were available.

My plans for the future require assistance. If there were some assistance, or if the Metical money had some value, I think that next year I could do something worthwhile and bring money into my house.

Because I think of the money I have saved. I have many millions saved, but thinking of myself, who can help me increase this money to buy transport so that I can do my business? No one. (Renamo DS, Chimoio)⁵²

What the individuals quoted above lack is not initiative but credit. They were insistent that they would pay back any money advanced to them. Many others said the same, pointing to the need for credit rather than for massive donations of money.

What did you do with the rest of this money?

I just bought food for my family, because there was no aid for them to live. But later when my name came out in Chimoio, I got some money for my disability. With this I bought a *capulana* and sheets to sell. To earn at least something to lessen the suffering. But to say that I have any work, I don't. I just asked the state to help me, to give me some more money to add to what I have saved, to buy a grinding mill. Then with the money I make at the mill, I

⁵¹Interview MOR 124, 06.09.96

⁵²Interview CHI 50, 20.06.96

would always pay back to the state what they lent me. That's what I wanted. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)⁵³

Credit is sorely lacking in Mozambique, for small entrepreneurs in particular but not exclusively, since even the big businessmen have trouble convincing newly privatised banks to finance them. Some NGOs are starting up small credit circles on the lines of the Grameen Bank scheme so successful in Bangladesh, but these are few and far between.⁵⁴

We are thus brought full circle. We began with the argument that the *machamba* provides the economic base upon which further economic initiatives can be taken. We then showed a variety of ways in which initiative has been demonstrated. One of the most promising, the commercialisation of agricultural surpluses, would both enhance the economic security provided by the *machamba* and give scope for further economic activity for those demobilised willing to take the initiative. Yet, this is not possible currently, because of lack of infrastructure, markets, transport and credit.

3. The assistance projects

Given the lack of employment opportunities in the Mozambican economy and the demonstrated initiative of individual demobilised, there is a certain logic in the micro-project model adopted by IOM and the employment creation schemes of GTZ.⁵⁵ However, there appear to have been many problems in their design and implementation, ranging from perceived injustice in accessibility and eligibility criteria, misappropriation by non-demobilised individuals, and, perhaps most fundamentally, a poor fit between the projects, the aspirations of the majority of demobilised, and the wider economic environment.

i) **Eligibility: 'Even a person who had not studied was taken to fight'**

Many complaints stemmed from misunderstandings and divergent opinions on the purposes and objectives of the assistance, as well as the intended beneficiaries. Since the ONUMOZ subsidy had been paid to all soldiers demobilised by ONUMOZ, they

⁵³Interview MOS 44, 29.07.96

⁵⁴In Chimoio, for example, Concern has started credit circles in some of the *bairros*, and CARE is beginning an entirely new NGO dedicated to small credit. It is not easy for demobilised soldiers to enter these schemes, however, since CARE's eligibility criteria include at least one year experience in business as well as long-term proof of residence. (Interview, J-F. Legrand, CARE, Chimoio, 15.3.96)

⁵⁵Interviews, IOM and GTZ, Maputo and Chimoio, 1995-6

questioned why the projects on offer subsequently were not a right which all enjoyed equally, but a bonus bestowed on some and not on others. Further, some project eligibility criteria appeared arbitrary to the demobilised soldiers, and therefore unjust.

For example, those who lived in remote rural areas complained that they had not been informed in sufficient time to benefit from the courses and projects which came to their districts.

These projects which are happening in Quelimane, we just hear about them, but when we get there they say, 'sorry, it's over already.' Then the governments of those people who sent these things will be told that the demobilised have projects, when it wasn't the demobilised who received the project, or just one person received it. (Frelimo DS, Bajone)⁵⁶

The demand for educational qualifications also appeared to some as unfairly exclusionary, given that the reason they lacked such qualifications was their forcible military service.

But haven't you gone to see about these courses or projects?

We went there and we spoke with them, but we refused to do these [aptitude] tests. The thing is, when we fought, even a person who had not studied was taken to fight, but then when they are giving out money, they start to choose one over another. (Renamo DS, Mude)⁵⁷

This same respondent had his own suggestions for the way in which to run the programmes:

If it were me, I would do the following: since each person is sure that he should receive money, what they should do when the people come is count how many there are and divide it up. Then take these people and teach them how to use the money, 'you should take this money, buy clothes to re-sell so that the money will increase; you cannot take the money and go drinking, or else it will run out without you gaining anything and tomorrow you will be a thief.'

So they would teach everything, and then you would see that these people have got it into their heads, in the same way that we were taught in the army how to use the weapon, and if we did it wrong we would be punished. The same way these ones who will get money should be taught. This group would go, and when more money comes, they would give it to others, until everyone has received, without confusion or problems. (Renamo DS, Mude)⁵⁸

The agency justification for selecting people who had some educational qualifications was that they were more likely to succeed, and since there was limited money it made

⁵⁶Interview MAG 11, 21.06.96

⁵⁷Interview MOS 57, 03.08.96

⁵⁸Interview MOS 57, 03.08.96

sense to give it to these people. In a society in which everyone has access to educational opportunity, qualifications offer one indicator of a person's abilities. In Mozambique, though, where educational opportunities were drastically limited, in particular for those young men whose education was interrupted and terminated by the war, educational attainment is a poor indicator of potential for success. It is thus fundamentally unfair.

Although it is difficult, in a situation of tight time constraints and limited human resources, for the assistance agencies to find other criteria by which to assess business acumen, it must be a priority. Both because failure to do so generates huge frustration and because individuals who have demonstrated abilities are passed over, as was the case with Jorge:

You need to be able to write, but in the past we were taken into the army when we hadn't studied at all, and we didn't have any work experience. You need a request form, whatever, pay 10 *contos*, in order to get any work, in order to have a project. So instead we end up doing it this way, pay someone for transport, go and get it, pay, bring some salt, sell it.

If it were the case that this GTZ went from door to door to hear each poor person and how they were, many people in the districts could end up well, with a good value, but *chee!* They only go there to the administration, they get there, and they say, 'wait, wait, just write your name, and wait', and there is never any answer. (Renamo DS, Machaze)⁵⁹

ii) Political bias resulting from restrictive eligibility criteria

Despite the stated objective of equal treatment for all, the programmes are structured and implemented in such a way that the outcomes are inevitably unequal for ex-Renamo and ex-Frelimo soldiers. In order to be eligible for the training courses, a demobilised soldier had to possess a minimum educational level. This automatically excluded many former Renamo soldiers who had come from rural areas where they had had significantly less access to educational opportunities prior to recruitment. Thus although no overt discrimination against Renamo soldiers could be alleged, in practice structural discrimination resulted.

Return to the more remote rural areas, from which Renamo recruited much more than Frelimo, also meant enjoying fewer opportunities to the fruits of reintegration programmes. Many people reported hearing about reintegration programmes or training courses but arriving too late to participate because of the lack of communication and transportation links. Given that the programmes relied on local

⁵⁹Interview CHI 50, 20.06.96

information networks, discrimination inherent in these flows of information transferred over to the programmes themselves. In some cases, Frelimo authorities refused to travel to Renamo areas, and since they also had the monopoly on transportation in these areas, the result was the effective exclusion of people living there.

iii) Unaccommodating logistics

Even for those demobilised who did hear about courses and projects in time to participate, there were practical constraints to participation, particularly for those coming from remote rural areas. The courses were invariably held in district capitals, so 'rural' participants would have to travel to enter the course, and find somewhere to stay while they were studying. A further difficulty was that survival during the course became that much more difficult if one did not already have a fixed source of income. The monthly subsidy for participants was 75,000 Mt., hardly enough for one person to survive, let alone feed a family of dependants. It is not surprising that there was often a low rate of attendance.

iv) Inadequacies of training

Even among those who did benefit from the reintegration programmes, there were complaints about unfair treatment. The IOM training courses sought to motivate people by telling them that they would receive kits⁶⁰ at the end of their courses on the condition that they performed well, a condition many either did not or chose not to hear. Furthermore, in recruiting for training courses which were not always popular, there was an incentive on the part of local recruiters to make inflated promises in order to entice participants.

So you said you benefited from a carpentry course of IOM, and after the course what happened?

After the course - because when we signed up, IOM said that we would get material after the course - but after the course we have no material, nothing, they just gave us the certificate. Then we went to these places, and they also told us that there is no material for us there in Maputo, because 'where you were doing your course, it wasn't a course, it was already working', while they had told us that it was a course and afterwards we would get material after six months. Six months are over, and we just have a certificate and no material, while some of our friends received material. (Frelimo DS, Gondola)⁶¹

⁶⁰The kits consisted of equipment to practice the trade learned on the course, but no materials. A carpenter, for example, would receive a tool kit - but no wood.

⁶¹Interview CHI 118, 21.08.96

The low popularity of some training courses was due to a number of reasons. In some cases, it was because people did not see the economic potential of such courses. In rural areas they might have an economy without sufficient cash, as highlighted above (Section 2, iii), or there might not be room in the market for another carpenter, for example. In urban areas, there was often a glut of unemployed tradesmen, and someone with a six-month course would have difficulty competing with someone who had been working for many years in a trade. A striking example of how the training projects created an over-supply of a particular skill, was the Quelimane street full of bicycle menders with no bicycles to repair.

v) **Corrupt practice: 'There are only projects for the bureaucrats'**

One of the ways in which the assistance agencies attempted to avoid setting up projects which were unsuited to local conditions was by involving the local government in the process of project identification and selection.⁶² Where this collaboration worked, it improved their chances of setting up projects which would succeed in the long term. In other cases, though, the demobilised soldiers found themselves on the raw end of a deal between the agencies and the local political structures which left them out, and the results smacked of corruption to them.

An oft-heard complaint on the part of demobilised soldiers was that projects intended to benefit them had been co-opted by others, and civilians put in their place. Sometimes this was traceable to the GTZ policy of funding private individuals or state and NGO projects to set up businesses which would eventually employ demobilised soldiers. If employment was delayed, the demobilised would suspect injustice, and in some cases their suspicions were confirmed when project implementers disappeared or the projects failed. Other cases were less clear-cut, but allegations were heard of government structures⁶³ blocking projects which would compete with their own bureaucrats' private interests, as well as other forms of corruption.

There are the structures there, the administrator, sub-administrator, secretary... in our case we were promised that after demobilisation we would get projects, but there are no projects there. Not one. There are only projects for the bureaucrats. They come there, they choose a civilian and put him in the place of the demobilised, and then if we complain they say, 'oh that one, now he thinks he will interfere'. (Renamo DS, Chimoio)⁶⁴

⁶²Interview, J. Burkhard, IOM Provincial Co-ordinator, Manica, 28.02.96

⁶³In both Mozambique and South Africa the word 'structures' is used to describe both the authority structure and the individuals contained within it.

⁶⁴Interview CHI 50, 20.06.96

vi) When is 'micro' too small?

As outlined in Section 1, i demobilised in both rural and urban areas rely heavily on the *machamba* as the basic source of food, and women are primarily responsible for small farming. Men are likely to become involved when agriculture is seen as having commercial potential. Despite the difficulties in agricultural marketing and rural economy, many demobilised had visions of the potential of agriculture to improve their situation, and they appealed to the assistance agencies to help them with the initial investment capital required for modern inputs. These proposals for agricultural projects were turned down.

You told me that you applied for a project from IOM, can you tell me what this project was?

Well, first we were told that each one of us should choose a project that we wanted. A team came to the district, with representatives of IOM, GTZ, and AMODEG were there too. They came, and they said each demobilised should choose a project that he wanted to do in the district, but that this project should also benefit the district here. So we stayed and began to make the lists with the proposals, according to the needs of each person. We made it and sent it to AMODEG. Some people proposed grinding mills, others *banca fixas*, others as travelling traders. I got together with one other [demobilised soldier] and we made an agricultural project. We wanted to make a farm which would be big enough to employ other demobilised soldiers, to produce crops such as peanuts and cotton.

Then later when we brought the list here to AMODEG, we just waited for the answers, and our district delegate to AMODEG came here to Chimoio, and that's when he was told that we had to wait for the answer. The people who did the proposals for *bancas*, these small businesses [they were told that they would get financing]... but the projects for grinding mills, agriculture, they were rejected because they required much money, and there was only a little money. So he brought us this information and we were stuck. But up to now, even those who proposed small businesses haven't had a decision, they haven't had a response, so they're just waiting. (Renamo DS, Gondola)⁶⁵

IOM rejected them because they did not fit the 'micro-project' mould and the required inputs cost too much money. GTZ's complicated application procedures and high standards of proof of business competence were often too daunting for the demobilised soldiers, and few succeeded in getting project funding from them.⁶⁶

⁶⁵Interview CHI 119, 21.08.96

⁶⁶As of February 1996, only 19.23% of GTZ project implementers were demobilised soldiers. Given the types of large investment and employment projects envisaged by GTZ, their reluctance to finance anyone without long-standing proven managerial skills is at least understandable. However, this gave rise to resentment on the part of demobilised soldiers, who only saw it as another way in which the funds which were to benefit them were being siphoned off by others.

vii) **Unfulfilled promises: 'We didn't ask these organisations to make us promises'**
Considerable damage appeared to have been done by the promises left unfulfilled. Some promises had been made during the war, but a large proportion of demobilised said that they had been promised things after rather than during the war, in the Assembly Areas and/or in their place of destination.

And during the war, did Dhlakama⁶⁷ make any promises for after the war ended?

From Afonso, no, it was just the foreigners who made promises. When the NGOs hold meetings, they say they will bring help for those who are unable to do anything [disabled], since there are those who have no sight, no arms, no legs because of the war. But they don't bring anything.

And what were the promises these organisations were making?

It is difficult to single out one thing, there were many promises. There was a time when they said we must write down in the book the things which we needed to help us, fill in the form with what we wanted, but nothing ever came. And now if they call meetings, I have no energy or interest in going to them.

And when you have a problem, who should help?

Since these people from NGOs come saying that they will help us with all of these things, and after your subsidy cheque is ended these things will continue... well, we were waiting for their promises. But there are too many leaders.

If you were a leader, what would you do for the demobilised?

For me, being a leader is not in my ambitions. But we didn't ask these organisations to make us promises, the promises come from them. They promise help and then they do not help. If it weren't for them, since the war has ended, I could just go home as an invalid and stay being helped by my wife, or arrange someone to work for me. (Renamo DS, Mude. He has a crippled hand and is unable to work in the *machamba*)⁶⁸

Although many people did not get the information they needed in order to benefit from the projects, the great majority had heard that such assistance existed. In our study sample, fifty-nine percent had heard of IOM, nineteen percent of GTZ⁶⁹, and another twenty-nine percent had heard of organisations who assist demobilised but did not know their names (n=73).

The extent to which unfulfilled promises actually deprived people of initiative and left them discouraged and disempowered is something to consider seriously as we look back at the years since the General Peace Accord (see **Chapter 6**). Certainly, some of the statements made by the demobilised soldiers are exaggerated to emphasise their frustration. But there were people who told us in apparent sincerity

⁶⁷Afonso Dhlakama, leader of Renamo

⁶⁸Interview MOS 13, 09.07.96

⁶⁹Since GTZ was not present in Zambezia, this low percentage probably reflects the Zambezia sample, as well as GTZ's lower profile generally.

that they would sit obstinately waiting for the assistance to come, willing the government to take some action. Such disempowerment is evident from the following person: demobilised back in 1989, he is still waiting for something which is never going to come.

What is this project that you want to carry out?

Well, at first I filled in some documents to request to install a grinding mill, and they had already agreed but then it got stuck, for what reason I don't know. Then I filled in forms with some colleagues from Maputo, to request a truck so that I can do a project with it, and some of them have received their projects. I don't know if it's because they have friends there at the place where they are giving out documents. But mine has not come out yet. This was already the second one, and so now I am completely stumped, and I don't have the energy to do anything else. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)⁷⁰

viii) Female Soldiers and Projects

In Manica province, none of the twenty-one female demobilised (of whom seventeen Renamo and four Frelimo) interviewed in both rural and urban areas had benefited from project-funding or employment creation schemes. Only three had benefited from a training programme, one in a rural district (Renamo) and two in the city (Frelimo).

Although all those in the city expressed a desire for projects, only two had actually applied. They all expressed preference for small trade, and wished for funding to set up a *banca fixa*, or else to receive training and equipment to set up a tailoring business. They said they had been to IOM to find out about projects, but when questioned further, it was discovered that they had in fact been only to the AMODEG offices and not directly to IOM. They believed that they were too late for funding, or they were waiting to hear the results of AMODEG's proposed project for a tailoring course and shop, which was pending response from the African American Institute and the Swiss NGO Oseio. A similar proposal had been rejected by GTZ.

They explained their reticence at pursuing project funding from IOM by the fact that they thought funding would only go to men, or that it would go to men first and only go to women if there were money left over at the end. Others had heard that they came too late for funding, and that IOM was not funding in the city any more, but only in the rural districts. Their source of information appeared to be a network of demobilised females from Renamo, at the top of which was the Head of the Women's Department in AMODEG, Chimoio.

⁷⁰Interview CHI 30, 21.05.96

The majority of those in rural areas expressed no desire for projects or other such things, as they were primarily involved in subsistence agriculture. They felt that if anyone in the family was to earn income, it should be their husband (or for those who had no husband, a male family member, or a prospective husband). The one exception in a rural area was a Renamo demobilised who was chosen as AMODEG Head of Women's Department for Macossa District. Her proposed project was for agriculture, but she had been told by IOM that this would require too much money and would not be funded.

The three females who did apply for projects had done so through their involvement in AMODEG. Not one received funding.

These females were generally lacking both the information and education necessary to benefit from the project funding. Yet they were in a particularly vulnerable situation economically, especially those who were unmarried and had children (eight of the twenty-one, just under forty percent). There was no effort to target women and help them overcome the hurdles which stood in the way of their benefiting from project funding or even training courses. All of the Renamo demobilised females had been technical cadres of Renamo during the war: nurses, radio operators, and even one tailor. These skills could have been built upon, with some targeted re-training. This could have been co-ordinated with the government programmes for re-training Renamo cadres, and other NGO projects using community health workers.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we have examined the demobilised soldier's search for security in the economic and social spheres, and the interdependence of these two spheres. We have argued that this search informs many decisions and actions taken by the demobilised. We further suggest that the unenthusiastic response of many demobilised soldiers to available opportunities such as manual labour or particular training courses is on the one hand because such activities fail to provide either social or economic security, and on the other because they fail to accommodate the initiatives of the demobilised themselves.

Other research in situations of displacement, migration and resettlement points to a common behaviour pattern in which people tend to become very conservative in their livelihood strategies. Only after basic physical, financial and social security is re-established and stabilised do people begin to take new initiatives and assume more risks in their activities.⁷¹

A critical element for economic security in both rural and urban settings in Mozambique is the establishment of a household, with a wife and a plot of agricultural land for subsistence farming. The majority of demobilised soldiers in our sample has managed to get married and gain access to land, either through family and kinship networks, or more rarely through other social networks or by purchase.

The household economy is not assured by subsistence agriculture alone, since there are manifold necessities which require cash. Reliance on the produce from their *machamba* for income generation as well as basic food-stuffs is problematic in both urban and rural areas.

Agriculture is not inherently secure given that most producers lack inputs such as irrigation and fertiliser which would enable them to survive the vagaries of climate and other environmental hazards. If people sell their produce early in the harvest season, they risk going hungry later in the season if crops fail and they are unable to supplement their income with wage labour.

In rural areas, as well as the risk of food insecurity, people are obstructed from obtaining the cash they need to sustain their household by the lack of markets in which to sell their surplus. A possible way of getting cash in rural areas, the sale of produce to traders, depends on the trader being able to take produce to a market profitably. The lack of rural transport and infrastructure make this option unviable in most places, and producers facing the loss of produce to spoilage logically reduce the area cultivated.

For these reasons, people seek other means of income generation. Though few demobilised have access to it, an overwhelming majority aspire to holding a salaried job. It is seen as providing a regular, dependable wage (at least in theory, as explained above), as well as crucial opportunities for extra cash through taking advantage of one's official position for patronage, graft and corruption. Salaried

⁷¹See, e.g., Scudder and Colson 1982

employment is strongly desired given social expectations of men to be the providers for the household, and the high status accruing to men in salaried occupations.

The macro-economic situation of Mozambique is such that few enjoy the benefits of paid employment. Lack of opportunities is compounded by demobilised soldiers' educational lacunae, their inability to pay bribes, and some degree of employer discrimination against them. The psychologically exhausted state of many after the long years of war has also made them less inclined to accept the opportunities which do exist for manual labour in agriculture and on plantations. Combined, this situation has meant that they must pursue other means of bringing cash into the household economy.

A demobilised soldier who aspires to an office job or fixed employment is expressing hopes and expectations which are legitimate for any civilian. While not necessarily easy for agencies to satisfy, such aspirations indicate a return to normality rather than a dangerous and obstructionist mentality. Is a demobilised soldier somehow being unreasonable if he rejects back-breaking work with minimal compensation?

Demobilised soldiers have taken a wide variety of initiatives to create their own opportunities for income generation in urban and rural areas. Their pursuits range from buying and selling merchandise in local or far-reaching trade, through self-taught professions such as house-building and brick-making, to artisanal skills such as carpentry, tailoring, brewing, bread-baking, painting, fishing, and pursuits such as running video-parlours.

The main obstacle to improvement of these income-generation activities is the lack of capital to improve methods of production, to expand activity, to cut out intermediaries and increase profits, and to create more business security. Some were considerably assisted by the subsidy money funded by donors, and others who receive pensions are able to make use of this much-needed capital.

The assistance projects were admirable in their intentions to support such self-employment initiatives as well as training and even long-term job creation. Their success, though, was qualified by defects in the design and implementation of projects arising from dubious underlying assumptions, the constraints of the economic context, and multiple and conflicting agendas.

One of the intentions of the entire DRP was to ensure the dispersal of demobilised soldiers and discourage the formation of concentrated groups. Concentration was

particularly acute in urban areas, which held obvious attractions as settlement destinations for demobilised soldiers, and which were also in many instances their area of origin anyway. The tying of subsidies to the first destination of the demobilised soldier meant that if a soldier wanted to be taken 'home' by the free transport provided, he would be unlikely to move from there quickly since he would have to remain to receive the subsidy every two months (see **Chapters 2 & 3**). Paying subsidies in small instalments rather than in an initial lump sum was also intended to ensure dispersal of the demobilised throughout the country.

Large numbers of demobilised soldiers did settle in urban centres, particularly in provincial capitals.⁷² When the project assistance money was targeted at concentrations of demobilised soldiers, urban (and semi-urban, e.g. district capital town) areas were inevitably favoured. Logistical difficulties in getting to remote rural areas, let alone disseminating information and carrying out the laborious and time-consuming task of project identification and implementation, compounded this urban bias.

This had several paradoxical consequences. Firstly, those who did in fact disperse to rural areas were penalised for having done so. We heard consistent complaints from demobilised in rural areas that they had no access to micro-projects or economic opportunities. In isolated places such as Bajone, there are distinct clusters of extremely discontented demobilised who perceive themselves as marginalised. Lacking easy access to decision makers in the cities they suffer from the 'out of sight, out of mind' syndrome. (This issue will be taken up again in **Chapter 6**)

Secondly, the programmes failed to help the demobilised to develop their agricultural base: the three key elements to create a viable agricultural marketing system - infrastructure, transport, and credit - were seen as beyond the scope of micro-projects. This despite the fact they would have anchored people more securely in the rural areas and thus served the objective of dispersal. Also many of the projects submitted for agricultural commercialisation would have provided employment in rural areas with all the benefits for the local community such economic stimuli provide.

⁷²ONUMOZ statistics only indicate the number of demobilised soldiers in a district, and therefore do not show the extent of urbanisation within districts. In all provinces the number of demobilised soldiers settled in the provincial capital is at or close to the top of the list, with Gaza and Inhambane as notable exceptions (IOM 1996). In Manica province, we ran our own study of numerical data and found that in general, the district capital had the highest number of demobilised, with the exception of a high concentration in Dombe, Nhamagua, Machipanda and Dacata administrative posts.

Thirdly, prioritising urban and semi-urban areas inevitably favoured Frelimo demobilised who tended to concentrate in such areas, to the disadvantage and dismay of Renamo demobilised in more remote areas who naturally interpreted geographic 'favouritism' as political discrimination (see **Table 10**).

From an economic perspective the emphasis on micro-projects had two key flaws: the types of activities chosen to stimulate the informal economy demonstrated lack of understanding of the economic base, and by their nature were unable to address structural problems.

In promoting *banca fixas*, for example, it was assumed that people had disposable income with which to buy the products on sale, an assumption which proved false particularly in the more remote rural areas where people have no access to markets and therefore to generating surplus income. As a result nearly all rural *bancas* we found had stagnated. In a place like Bajone, where a coconut picker (the major source of employment) could hope to earn 100,000 Mt. per month, few people would have the 40,000 Mt. needed to buy a capulana.⁷³

The sight of these micro-projects failing was particularly painful given that they had been promoted in preference to projects which could have catalysed the backbone of the informal economy, household agriculture. It is striking that these critical obstacles to development were noted several years ago when post-war reconstruction was being planned, but little appears to have been done (e.g. in Green and Mavie 1994).

The emphasis on micro-projects to the exclusion of salaried employment also demonstrates a flawed understanding of culturally and contextually shaped motivations. It is ironic that many aid workers choose to prioritise their own individual advancement in making career choices and life decisions, while the beneficiaries of their programmes are obliged to prioritise the security and stability of their households and/or extended family in making their own life decisions.

It would be inaccurate to reduce the demobilised soldiers' responses to the projects, programmes and employment opportunities to a 'Classical economic' rational response to household security needs. Livelihoods are not just about keeping your body going, but about holding body and soul together. That this is not happening was

⁷³The fact that many demobilised were prepared to walk 3 days to collect their paltry subsidies is a clear indicator of the scarcity of disposable cash in such communities.

clear from the demobilised soldiers' bitter emphasis on lost educational opportunities and the almost principled rejection of manual labour.

There also seemed to be a conflict in the assistance programme between the objective of targeting people who were deemed to pose a security risk, and that of targeting those who were most needy and vulnerable. Female demobilised were never identified as a 'security risk', and therefore received much less attention than their male counterparts. Yet their particular experiences, combined with societal prescriptions for 'proper' gender roles, meant that many became especially vulnerable after the war. They faced rejection by their communities of origin (see **Chapters 2 & 5**), stigmatisation preventing them from getting married (see **Chapters 2 & 5**), and exclusion from economic opportunities which would allow them independence from males, families and husbands. Their lower educational qualifications set them below their male counterparts in competition for jobs, and also made them less likely to seek assistance. Responsibility for children was another impediment to taking advantage of opportunities for work or training courses.

In evaluating the assistance schemes, it is not clear that benefits of the few micro-projects which were economically successful outweigh the social costs of the frustrations caused by unfulfilled promises and perceived marginalisation of demobilised soldiers.

The money could have been better spent on setting up credit schemes such as the one envisaged by KPMG advisory firm (1995), or that of CARE (see above, footnote 15), which would have supported economic initiatives of a wide range of people. IOM showed insight by commissioning the KPMG feasibility study on establishing a credit scheme, perceived as having potentially wide economic and social benefits. However, the advisory firm concluded that such a scheme would be risky and it could foresee problems which would make the scheme unsustainable over a 10 year period.

Given the situation described in this chapter and concurring with other research on the economic prognosis for Mozambique,⁷⁴ we recommend that this is a risk worth taking, and in any case could compare favourably with the results of the grant schemes implemented by IOM and GTZ. The KPMG report argues that the attitude of demobilised soldiers pre-disposes them to perceive any money lent as their due rather than as a repayable loan. Our own evidence contradicts this. Certainly

⁷⁴e.g. Castel-Branco 1996, in which he stressed the centrality smallholder agriculture should take in national development planning, and the obstacles to this, i.e. concentration of capital in the hands of urban elites or intermediaries lack of credit.

demobilised soldiers feel that they were instrumentalised during the war and are owed something from the government. However, feeling that one is owed employment indicates a desire to work for a living, not a desire to be paid off and sit idle. Demobilised soldiers lamented the lack of opportunities as much as lack of compensation.

On a larger scale, it is unfortunate that the programmes for reintegration of demobilised soldiers were not allocated the funds to play a significant role in reconstruction and rehabilitation of economic infrastructure in Mozambique. As a result the economic context within which micro-projects could flourish simply did not exist and many fell apart within a short space of time.

Household security and stimulating the rural economy would best be addressed if reintegration and reconstruction were conceptualised as mutually dependent rather than separate and parallel or indeed sequential processes. The Quick Impact approach pioneered by the UNHCR to open up areas for returning refugees suggests how work for demobilised soldiers can be combined successfully with efforts to rehabilitate the rural economic infrastructure, providing benefits to the communities in which demobilised soldiers resettled, and thereby contributing to social reintegration. In Mossurize we saw noteworthy examples of communities grateful to demobilised soldiers for opening up roads - and noted that the schemes had ground to a halt because of low wages.⁷⁵ The extremely low salaries relative to the physical exertion required and the high prices of consumer goods made these schemes unattractive to demobilised soldiers, particularly while the subsidies were still being paid.

Without investments and improvements in the rural economy, rural-to-urban migration which occurred throughout the war is unlikely to be reversed. Given the disastrous consequences of forced resettlement, attempts to counter urbanisation must take account of people's preferences and therefore must be creative in their approach.⁷⁶ GTZ offers an example of such realistic and appropriate planning in their strategy for Manica province: to relocate productive structures into the countryside, while allowing people to maintain their reproductive structures in urban areas where they have settled.⁷⁷ This is in recognition of the fact that people living in the city

⁷⁵Interview, Provincial Director of ECMEP (*Empresa de Construção e Manutenção de Estradas e Pontes*), Espungabera, 17.09.96

⁷⁶A large proportion of demobilised soldiers from Renamo cited villagisation as one of the main motivations for fighting in the war, and scholars have also pointed to Operation Production, the government's attempt to remove people from urban areas, as one of the turning points in recruitment for Renamo (e.g. Geffray 1990, Legrand 1991).

⁷⁷Interview, Dr. U. Weyl, GTZ-Mozambican Agricultural Rural Rehabilitation Programme, Chimoio, 24.4.96

have many reasons to want to stay there, including security and social reasons. Once production, and therefore jobs, are located in rural areas, other economic activity will be stimulated and people will eventually be attracted back into the rural areas to live as well as to work.

The messages of this chapter also point to a structural problem with the assistance programmes with regards to the time scale and human resource inputs allocated to 'reintegration'. The programmes may defend themselves against the charge that they did not contribute to national reconstruction and development by arguing that this was never their intention. We suggest that this should have been their intention, and is therefore no defence. Reintegration as a fundamental part of the reconstruction process requires a concerted and large-scale effort, collaboration between all those who are involved in national and local decision-making, and enough time to ensure that programmes are sustainable and have a lasting impact on society such that peace will really last. The premature shut-down of the IOM programmes in the middle of 1996 was an avoidable scandal. Provincial IOM co-ordinators had been laying the groundwork for programmes in the more remote rural areas to which they had had little access in the first period of the Provincial Fund. Without warning, the plans had to be thrown away and these rural areas left adrift, with only the promises left lingering as a reminder of what they were missing out on.⁷⁸

If reintegration is conceived of as 'buying off' the belligerents and thereby buying the peace, rather than as a fundamental part of the entire reconstruction process, then it will not buy lasting security even if it buys short-term quiescence. The following chapters will look at the issue of security in the current context of Mozambique, four years after the General Peace Accord and two years after demobilisation, in order to identify those weak points which were not strengthened by the assistance programmes but in some cases were actively weakened.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Reintegration assistance programmes need to design economic interventions which foster economic security and, more problematically, meet the need for social status.

To do this an understanding of the economic base has to be developed. Economic security in Mozambique would be enhanced through support to household

⁷⁸Field work and interviews, Manica province, March-September 1996.

agricultural production through greater access to inputs such as seeds, tools and fertilisers, and programmes to restock herds. This would have to be supported by rehabilitation of markets and transport infrastructure to ensure rural trading networks. Loans to the Mozambican Grain Board would also allow rural marketing at guaranteed prices.

Such an understanding would recognise not just bottlenecks in the physical infrastructure but the impact on people's responses of particular historical experiences, such as forced labour and resettlement. This might mean simply using appropriate terminology, e.g. 'association' rather than 'co-operative'. Or it might mean a fundamentally different approach, e.g. the GTZ approach using incentives to rural settlement rather than previous government approaches using forcible resettlement.

Projects targeted at demobilised soldiers should build on their demonstrated initiative rather than instil a new 'entrepreneurialism' which is insensitive to underlying social and economic priorities.

In a country such as Mozambique, where the recovery of the agricultural economy is of the essence, this would involve a combination of employment opportunities in large-scale public works programmes, particularly road and bridge reconstruction, and support to individual projects attuned to the local context, such as rural trading initiatives. Wages for public works programmes should be higher than the minimum wage, given that the nature of the work offers few opportunities to supplement the income earned.

Projects should be designed to incorporate and balance both credit and grant financing. For example, equipment grants could be complemented by loans for running expenses.

Eligibility criteria should recognise curtailed educational opportunities rather than penalising those with low levels of education. For example, CARE (Chimoio) uses proven business experience rather than educational attainment as its principal criterion for credit allocation. Oral tests should be administered for illiterate people, and basic numeracy could be taught.

Stereotypes of demobilised as 'lazy good-for-nothings' should be challenged through active promotion of health and education programmes which respond, where necessary, to the psycho-social needs of demobilised and their families. Health clinics and extensionists could be trained as educators on psychological issues such as

psychological exhaustion and trauma, as they are for HIV prevention. If this were promoted as government policy, it would go a long way to addressing negative media stereotyping.

CHAPTER 5

LOCAL POINTS OF TENSION, STRATEGIES OF RESOLUTION AND AVOIDANCE

In the immediate wake of the demobilisation of combatants there were two major security issues preoccupying decision-makers within and outside Mozambique. Firstly, there was a real worry that the peace would not hold. It was feared that the recently demobilised might re-group along previous political alignments, particularly if one or other party did not accept the election results, as had happened in Angola.¹ Secondly, that there could be widespread banditry involving individual or groups of demobilised with access to arms, creating chaos amongst the civilian population and thereby hindering the reconstruction process. Both scenarios were fuelled by the fear that large weapon caches remained undisclosed and could be drawn on at will, and that there could be groups of undeclared soldiers hiding in the bush who had not been demobilised and could be quickly called upon to take up arms again.²

In many ways these fears were entirely plausible at the time. The fragility of the peace was evident when Afonso Dhlakama, leader of Renamo, withdrew from the elections at the start of polling and only re-entered after high-level diplomatic negotiations. The 92,000 who had been demobilised over the months preceding the elections constituted one of the largest masses of demobilised soldiers in the experience of sub-Saharan Africa.³ Large numbers of soldiers of both Frelimo and Renamo had spent long years in the army.⁴ This was feared to have had significant negative impacts on them. One was that they might be committed politically and would carry hostilities over into the post-war context. Another was that in being given skills to fight and kill, they had become de-skilled and de-socialised for civilian life - and therefore would see taking up the gun as the only viable post-war survival strategy.

It was not within the scope of this study to verify rumours concerning hidden weapons caches or search for armed groups still in the bush. However, we did explore attitudes to the peace, the likelihood and possibility of further war, banditry and crime amongst both demobilised and non-demobilised.

¹Southern African News Features, 27.02.95

²Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 11, August 1994.

³World Bank 1993

⁴Pardoel 1996b

In this chapter we focus on the various points of tension which may give rise to conflict at a local level: between demobilised soldiers; between demobilised soldiers and their extended family; between demobilised soldiers and others in the local area. This is followed by an examination of the various channels of resolution as well as avoidance strategies to which people resort to deal with different types of conflict. In the following chapter, we will examine the link between local level conflict and national security and the prognosis for peace in the longer term.

1. Tensions between soldiers

i) **Frelimo / Renamo tensions: Reconciliation or the will to co-exist?**

As outlined above, there was a real fear that Frelimo/Renamo animosity would be carried over into the post-war period. Our findings suggest that the initial period of encounter between soldiers from the two sides was characterised by tension and conflict, but by the time of the study, things had settled and there were only occasional outbursts of overt animosity and hostility. While this may reflect forgiveness and reconciliation, by and large it appears more accurate to attribute the relative peace which prevails to a will to co-exist and establish basic security.⁵

The war itself was carried out in such a way that there was little interaction between the two sides during long periods of the fighting.⁶ When Frelimo attacked Renamo bases, Renamo's main tactic was to flee, except in the case of the main bases (e.g. *Casa Banana* Base in Gorongosa District or *Sitatonga* Base in Mossurize District). Then as soon as Frelimo left, Renamo soldiers would return.⁷ Renamo attacks were often ambushes in which there could be more contact, and both sides occasionally took prisoners whom they subsequently co-opted to fight on their side.⁸ Many Frelimo soldiers were in positions behind the front lines, either because their rank took them out of the fray or because they were controlling heavy weapons and remained behind in attacks.

⁵Wilson (1994) has argued that the peace in Mozambique was assured not due to international negotiations nor assistance, but to the people's own will to establish peace and their total exhaustion with war.

⁶e.g. 'The war in Zambezia is often described as a war of avoidance. Apart from some attacks on Renamo bases by government troops or attacks on smaller towns by the rebels, military activity is often kept to attacking populations living in the territory of the other, avoiding direct confrontations.' (Legrand 1991: 15)

⁷Interview MOS 42, Renamo DS, Mapungwana, 27.07.96

⁸Interviews, CHI 50, Renamo DS, Chimoio, 20.06.96, and CHI 52, Frelimo DS, Chimoio, 22.06.96

For large periods of the war, soldiers were more likely to come into contact with civilians than with soldiers from the other side. Thirty-one percent of our study sample stated having participated in combat ten or fewer times, while the remaining sixty-nine percent were in combat 'very often'. Soldiers would feel comfortable amongst those populations clearly under their control, but not in places they controlled only temporarily.⁹ This helps to explain widespread stories of mistreatment of population, who were easily conceived of as 'the enemy' and therefore deserving of brutal treatment. Propaganda was also used to demonise the opposition, for example the Frelimo portrayal of Renamo soldiers as 'bandits' and 'monkeys'.¹⁰

a) Points of tension upon encounter

It was not surprising, then, that first meetings of Frelimo and Renamo soldiers after the war were fraught with tension. There were some accounts of organised meetings during the assembly period, in which the two sides were brought together in a controlled situation to meet for the first time.¹¹ Others recounted meeting informally in towns near the assembly areas where soldiers went to drink

You [Frelimo soldiers] accepted to stay with men from Renamo? No, we were not in the same place, we were about 4 or 5 kilometres away from their Assembly Area. They had their own Assembly Area. We only met each other at the place where we were to be transported from by IOM, at the hotel, 'you were from Renamo', 'yeah', 'I'm finally out, I'm going to rest at home'

Do you remember the first time you met someone from Renamo, after the Peace Accord?

Yes, I remember, but I didn't have the chance to speak with them.

Why not?

I didn't want to speak with them because, well, it was not because I didn't like them, but there was always mistrust. Our group went to one side, and they stayed amongst themselves to converse.¹² (Frelimo DS, Chimoio)

One of the points of tension between the two sides was the question of who had won the war. It is not uncommon for wars to be conceived of as competitive games to which there must always be a winner and a loser, since this is a particularly effective way of motivating people to become rivals. In Mozambique, the settlement of the

⁹Interviews, Q 41, Frelimo DS, Madal, 18.06.96; MOS 2, Frelimo secretary and militia, Espungabera, 02.07.96 MOS 1, Renamo DS, Espungabera, 02.07.96; MOS 20, Frelimo DS, Espungabera, 11.07.96, *inter alia*

¹⁰Interview MOS 39, non-demobilised, Espungabera, 13.07.96

¹¹Interview CHI 74, Frelimo DS, Chimoio, 20.07.96

¹²Interview CHI 52, 22.06.96

war by the Peace Accord meant that this question was left unresolved, and neither side could claim to have conquered the other. The issue of who won the war was left to be settled by the elections. In the first few months after demobilisation, therefore, people pinned their hopes of victory on the election results.

At first there were competitions, just in terms of people boasting. When someone went drinking, for example, they would start competing between Frelimo and Renamo... until the elections. Then it ended, there was no more of that. (Frelimo DS, Espungabera)¹³

In the short term, elections did bring a sense of resolution, or at least closure to the period of fighting. Whether they resolved tensions in the longer term will be examined in the following chapter.

b) Social co-existence

The geography of the war and recruitment patterns, as explained in **Chapter 2**, meant that most areas were either predominantly Renamo or Frelimo. However, few were entirely homogeneous, and in some places the mix was more balanced than in others. In our study sample, ninety-seven percent said they had contact with [other] demobilised soldiers (n=79), of whom forty-eight percent had contact with both Frelimo and Renamo soldiers, while twenty-four percent had contact only with Frelimo soldiers and twenty-seven had contact only with Renamo soldiers (n=70).

Thus, co-existence of people from the 'other side', both civilian and demobilised, was necessary once soldiers had chosen their place of settlement. There were several forces which worked to ease the initial tensions and facilitate co-existence.

Firstly, the assistance programmes brought together demobilised from both sides to receive the ONUMOZ subsidy cheques each month, and later to do training courses, receive funding for micro-projects, or to work on GTZ employment projects.

We're just fine now. Even when we were receiving money, we helped each other there, those of us from Frelimo and those from Renamo, talking to each other without problems. Just like today, there are no problems. Not even in this project which I was telling you about [an IOM-financed *banca fixa*], [soldiers from] both sides are benefiting and there's no problem. (Frelimo DS, Espungabera. N.B. the statement that there are no problems between demobilised now sounds a bit like wishful thinking, and may be partly explicable by the fact that this respondent is the district delegate for

¹³Interview MOS 83, 27.08.96

AMODEG, so his own position requires him to work towards peaceful co-existence.)¹⁴

The subsidy cheques were distributed in the district capital, so demobilised from all of the outlying areas would be brought together, both Renamo and Frelimo. In Chimoio, we were told of Frelimo soldiers at the collection point assisting Renamo soldiers who were not able to read and were unfamiliar with the banking system.¹⁵

These meetings were not perfectly harmonious, of course. A resident of the district capital in Mossurize recounted how there had been conflicts between Renamo and Frelimo soldiers because of the different customs the guerrillas had developed while living in the bush. One such incident occurred in a town bar where they would go to drink after receiving their cheques. A Renamo soldier took off his shoes to dance, causing the others in the bar to laugh at him. Offended, he complained to his (former) commander, which made people laugh all the more.¹⁶

Another forum which facilitated the coming together of demobilised soldiers from both sides was the demobilised soldiers' association, AMODEG. The association changed its statutes at the time of the Peace Accord to incorporate Renamo soldiers officially, inviting them to take up leadership posts in the hierarchy. It decreed that for each of the main positions, there had to be an adjunct who was from the opposite side in the war.¹⁷

Do you have contact with them [soldiers from Frelimo]?

Very good, because I have this position of District Delegate of AMODEG, so I have the possibility to contact them. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)¹⁸

Eighty-six percent of our study sample were aware of AMODEG (n=80), though only forty-eight percent had paid their membership dues (n=52). In the cities and larger towns where Frelimo demobilised were dominant, AMODEG was often the only place where soldiers met others from the opposing side. Such is the case of the AMODEG representatives in Manica district. The representative for the administrative post of Machipanda is a demobilised soldier from Frelimo, while the district delegate is from Renamo. The former admitted that while most of his friends were demobilised soldiers, the first demobilised soldier from Renamo he had ever met was the district delegate.

¹⁴Interview MOS 83, 27.08.96

¹⁵Interview, CHI 96, Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*, 30.06.96

¹⁶Interview MOS 2, Secretary/Curandeiro, Espungabera, 02.07.96

¹⁷*Domingos* Newspaper, 11.10.92

¹⁸Interview MOS 1, 02.07.96

What do you two usually speak about when you talk about the war?

Ah, about the war we usually talk... how we were adversaries... what was it like in the places you were fighting, all of that stuff... we have really good conversations about it all...

And when you were talking, was there never a time when you tried to find out whether you had been at the same battle, fighting one against the other?

No, never, we never had these problems of arguing, no. Just that at first, when he arrived, I didn't really trust him actually. I wasn't trusting, but ah! now people have already come, friends, to reconcile us that 'ah, it can't be like that, it's true that you're from this area and he's not from here', but ah! we talk and until now we're talking and nothing bad has happened, nothing.

Why didn't you trust him?

I didn't trust him because he who was the enemy is always the enemy, not so? (laughter), but ah! now I've seen that he couldn't go back and fight any more. No, now we're friends. (Frelimo DS, Manica)¹⁹

While it may be possible for the government to avoid 'reconciling' with its former enemy in such a manner, it is more difficult for people who must live as neighbours to do so. Nevertheless, someone who is able to co-exist with his former enemy may at the same time harbour deep resentment at present perceived injustices, which also nurture unresolved grievances from the past. Acceptance that in the current circumstances, it is necessary to get along with one's neighbours at least minimally should not be taken as synonymous of 'reconciliation' and forgiveness. Thus, in Mossurize the areas we visited appeared more or less calm on the surface, but the Catholic nuns in the area told us that they are still unable to gather small groups of people in villages in order to pray together, because sufficient trust has not been re-established.²⁰

The extent to which each individual has really internalised the idea of 'reconciliation' varies greatly. It depends not only on his own experience in the war but also that of his family. Some people have been able to step back and reassess the situation, and accept fully the argument that the soldiers themselves were instrumentalised and therefore are not to blame individually. Others will never be able to forget what was done to their families, although they are prepared to live next door to someone whose army was responsible for it.

The relationship between Frelimo and Renamo soldiers were certainly adversely affected by the differential treatment meted out in assistance programmes and compensation schemes. These issues surfaced in **Chapter 4**, and they will be taken

¹⁹Interview, CHI 118, interviewed in Gondola, 21.08.96

²⁰Interview, Sister Fernanda, Espungabera, 18.09.96

up again more fully in **Chapter 6**. Suffice to say here that policy decisions taken by those in power, have repercussions which can affect relationships between individuals who have no involvement in the decisions themselves.

Although Renamo didn't fulfil its promises, did it achieve democracy?

Yes, I think that Renamo did achieve democracy. That has been won. It's just that they didn't respect their own forces. There should be some privileges. What Frelimo has Renamo should have. Look, all those of Frelimo who lost a leg have a pension, while I with my hand in my pocket, it looks as though I wounded it in a robbery. It looks as though I was never a soldier, so I always feel insulted, not because I was a member of Renamo. I feel offended because my friend who is in the same position as me is receiving money and I am not, so it seems as though I never fought. (Renamo DS, Mocubela)²¹

ii) ONUMOZ / Non-ONUMOZ tensions: 'They said I wasn't a demobilised'

Targeted assistance programmes create another division between demobilised soldiers. As discussed in Chapter 4, many ONUMOZ demobilised, although in principle eligible for benefits, also did not have access to project financing or other benefits. As a result, those who did receive were obliged to maintain a low profile in an attempt to avoid provoking the jealousy of other ONUMOZ demobilised.

However, some of the strongest expressions of frustration came from those who were demobilised by the government before the ONUMOZ programme, and thus did not benefit at all from the programme targeted at those demobilised by ONUMOZ. The following person was demobilised in 1991, just one year before the Peace Accord.

As you were saying, you stayed in the troops for eighteen years. Did you gain anything during that whole time which is of value to you today?

I didn't get anything there. We were just fighting, and then I was demobilised and I've just been at home ever since. But I'd like to point out that my companions now find themselves in a good position, because when their pensions come out, they're gaining something. At the end of the month they go to the bank and take their money, so they have some security. Whereas myself [I was there from] '74 to '91 but I don't receive, I don't do anything. I remain stuck at home. I'm in a very bad way. (Frelimo DS, Derre)²²

Those defined as ineligible can see no relevant differences between themselves and those who are receiving. They feel particularly bitter knowing that some spent less time in the troops than they did, lost less than they feel themselves to have lost, and may not have experienced the terrors of the battle-field.

²¹Interview MAG 134, 08.08.96

²²Interview MOR 128, 05.09.96

I'm desperate for a job. We're not receiving any assistance, but we could at least be given a job. We fought a lot; some of us don't have legs, arms, and others died - but we're not receiving anything. Those from ONUMOZ, they entered the army so recently, they were taken out and now they're receiving, and we, for example myself, fought and now we're not gaining anything, and we're not considered. One day I went to get a job with my demobilisation card from SMO (Compulsory Military Service), and they turned me away and said I wasn't a demobilised. I left there, even though I had my card. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)²³

2. Family conflicts: *'Because of the money, my family could be hateful'*

In previous chapters we outlined various mechanisms whereby the demobilised soldier is 'reintegrated' and welcomed back into the family: thanking the spirits, cleansing ceremonies, healing rituals, marriage and bridewealth payments. Though these serve powerful integrative functions, there are also several continuing sources of tension within the family.

Not surprisingly, given their experiences, which aside from the battle-field often included time in urban areas with a wide range of people, activities and opportunities,²⁴ demobilised soldiers returned home as changed persons with different life-expectations (see **Chapter 2, Section 6**). Perhaps this is best summed up in the song lyrics 'how are we going to keep them down on the farm now that they've seen Paris?'²⁵

As I have some kind of a vision, an educated perspective, I only live there [in a very remote rural area] because that's where I come from. But for me to participate in the activities there is very difficult. Those of us who have come from the interior suffer a lot of set-backs, especially someone who has spent some time outside, has seen the way other people live. For someone like that to tell the family, (and I mean my family), that this is the way to live, well they just don't accept it. It seems they think you're trying to dominate them. (Frelimo DS, *Semente*)²⁶

A more common problem was that the very relations of reciprocity which play such an important integrative function, can themselves become a sources of tension. Family relationships are based on the ideal of reciprocity. This does not mean exchanging gifts of equal value, but rather, applying an overall principal of

²³Interview CHI 48, 23.05.96

²⁴But see section below on drinking and anti-social behaviour for the opposite case in which soldiers may require 'de-bushing'.

²⁵It has been argued that participation in the war provided youths with an opportunity to vent frustrations at rural life and acquire some of the trappings of urban life, in other words the war was a vehicle for pre-existing aspirations (Dinerman 1994: 585)

²⁶Interview MOR 135, 20.09.96

redistribution of resources among members. The one who is seen to be better off is expected to be more generous. This is both a sign of 'big man' status and a determinant of it. When people within a family are roughly equal in material wealth, the help becomes more mutual, as in the following case.²⁷

Do you give some of what you produce in the *machamba* to other members of the family?

Yes, I have two sisters-in-law to whom I offer food, since they are not from here. [...] Since their husbands are not working, and *epa!* they are people too, just like me, so I had to help them, and later they too will help me. (Frelimo DS, Madal)²⁸

The flip-side of re-entering relationships of reciprocity was that expectations of pre-war patterns of economic contribution were revived. As a result, the ONUMOZ subsidy often went to the family rather than the individual. This was particularly the case for demobilised women, many of whom said that they had given all of their subsidy money to their family.

How much money did you receive?

I gave the money to my parents.

Even when you moved to Chimoio, did you switch to receive money in Chimoio or did you continue to receive it in Mossurize?

I continued to receive it in Mossurize, and I went there every two months to collect it and give it to my uncle. (Renamo DS, Chimoio. N.B. this is a great distance to travel: the trip takes around twelve hours, and, at the time of the subsidies, cost approximately 50,000 Mt. each way)²⁹

Where the individual had difficulties meeting family expectations, this sometimes caused offence and friction.

But this bitterness, where does it come from?

It's because of our poverty that we are not treated well, because of that person who took us far away. They do not even treat us well in our own area. If there is a funeral and the demobilised doesn't contribute money, the family will say, 'ah! that one has problems, he's poor.' When you feel like this as a demobilised, you get offended, you get nervy. (Renamo DS, Bajone)³⁰

An example of the friction caused by past expectations impinging on a present situation which has changed is the situation of demobilised soldiers returning to Mossurize district. They were often received and accepted back into the family in the

²⁷The importance of gifts, the meaning of 'reciprocity' and obligations amongst kin is more complicated than this brief sketch, of course. For more detailed anthropological discussions of these issues, see Mauss 1954

²⁸Interview Q 70, 26.07.96

²⁹Interview CHI 131, 12.09.96

³⁰Interview MAG 11, 21.06.96

expectation that they would be able to provide in the same way as previous generations of men who had gone to work in South Africa. Migrants who worked in South Africa earned relatively good wages, enough at least to purchase gifts for all members of the family and bring back some cash as well. Even while they were working, they would send back packages for the family which would go to the father or an older brother or uncle to distribute, each item marked for the person for whom it was destined.

How did you manage to send money from South Africa to here?

Even though there was no postal service, there were many people who went to work in South Africa, and you would find someone who was going home, then you would go and buy things and send it home with others who were going there.

For whom did you send things, for your wife but also for other members of the family?

Yes, I always sent things in the name of my eldest brother, and then I would write that these things are for my wife X, these things are for my wife Y, [...] for my parents, my brothers. (Non-demob, Mude, age approx. 70)³¹

The subsidies the demobilised received were far lower than the wages of a migrant worker to South Africa. It was commonly known, however, that they were receiving money, and so expectations amongst family were raised. This could lead to witchcraft, feelings of resentment and marginalisation, on the part of both family and demobilised soldiers.

3. Tension in communities

i) **Crime: 'Someone tries to make his life, and someone comes at night to kill him'**

As in many societies currently, Mozambicans express alarm at rising crime. It is not uncommon for demobilised soldiers to be held responsible, and labelled as bandits and criminals, though there is little evidence to support this.³² It is also fuelled by uncertainty about what happened to all of the weapons so abundant during the war.

Demobilised soldiers are themselves victims of crime, and fear incidents like any other citizen.

If it were back then, there would be no problem. A couple would live with their weapon in the house, but they didn't rob, there wasn't this type of armed

³¹Interview MOS 10, 07.07.96

³²Colonel Manjate, at the *Conferência sobre a Reintegração dos Desmobilizados*, Maputo, October 24-25 1996, reported that his recent investigations have shown no link between demobilised soldiers and crime.

robbery. Now, someone tries to make his life, and someone comes at night to kill him... I don't know if it happens this way in other countries... (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)³³

In our survey, sixty-one percent of demobilised stated that there is crime in the area in which they live (n=72). The most common crime cited (ninety-six percent) is robbery (n=55). In general, people report that they do not know who is committing these crimes, although public opinion still places suspicion on demobilised soldiers.

In their own defence, many argue that if soldiers really were criminals, then would they not have been more dangerous during the war when they were actually armed? Protestations of innocence by demobilised soldiers are often made on the basis of availability of weapons. 'How could it be we who are robbing, when we gave in our weapons?'

We're sitting here, we have no work, and then they say that it is demobilised soldiers who are robbing- when this isn't true! Back then [during the war] we were working with lots of weapons but no one was robbing. Today many people were demobilised, there are no soldiers who walk around with weapons, but there is robbery. (Frelimo DS, *Bairro 25 de Junho*)³⁴

Instead, demobilised soldiers point to other culprits. The following respondent suggests that it must be people who deserted from the army and therefore were not forced to hand in their weapons to ONUMOZ.

What type of crime do you have in this area?

Mostly the crime we have in this area is from deserters from the army who went and hid weapons, and now they're pulling them out and going around threatening people to take their money.

They were people who left the army?

Now what can we say? Even when we try to find out where they got the weapon from we're unable to, since even we who had our own weapons left them there, yet today we find someone with a weapon. Where did he get it? It's difficult. It's those who went hiding, escaping to Zimbabwe, who today are coming and threatening people, looking for those whom they know have money and when they get there they start to threaten. This is the crime we're facing here now. (Frelimo DS, *Mapungwana*)³⁵

Many point to youth as the culprits of crime and banditry rather than demobilised. One explanation for this is that during the war youth learned to get by 'each for himself', using the weapons which abounded at the time, without the constraints of political allegiances or military hierarchy. When they find themselves with nothing,

³³Interview CHI 48, 23.05.96

³⁴Interview CHI 48, 23.05.96

³⁵Interview MOS 43, 27.07.96

they fall back on methods learnt during the war.³⁶ What may distinguish youth from demobilised is that the latter are of an age which requires them to set up a household, whereas the former are free from such constraints. The household may act as a constraint on uncontrolled banditry by enmeshing people in social relationships which are likely to act to keep them within the law.

Others allege that crime is organised by police or government, because they have access to weapons, and they are able to use the demobilised as accessories in crime.

Well, this case of incidents in the zones, many are provoked by the Government, not demobilised or civilians. Because these days there are no demobilised who have weapons, weapons are with the police, with the administration. If, for example, they order a car to stop and they have two weapons, where did those weapons come from? I was demobilised in Milange and on my way here I travelled in a lorry. It's not possible to come back and arrive here with a weapon, so in our opinion we can see that it is the government.

There are hunters, members of the police who 'buy' civilians or demobilised as they know how to use weapons, then they say 'take this weapon and go and make trouble in such and such a place and bring us the goods so we can share them between us'. Well, if that demobilised is already out of money he accepts. He doesn't have a project, so he can accept in order to benefit from the bread, yes. (Renamo DS, Mocubela)³⁷

Thus, demobilised soldiers feel stigmatised and mistrusted, and resent that their reputation has been damaged by those who manage to profit from the suspicious climate, in particular police and ordinary criminals.

The case of the '*Chimuenjes*' in Manica province appears to substantiate the claim of unfair stigmatisation, as well as demonstrating that demobilised in general have little interest in returning to armed conflict or banditry. The *Chimuenjes* are allegedly a group of Zimbabwean dissidents who collaborated with Renamo during the war in return for which Renamo promised to support their cause once in power. They are believed to live on former Renamo bases in the Dombe and Dacata regions of Sussundenga and Mossurize districts, planning their attack on Robert Mugabe's government. They are held responsible for many pillaging attacks on villages and shops in the area. In one incident in Manica province, a gang posing as *Chimuenjes* who carried out an armed robbery on a stretch of highway was captured, and it came to light that the ringleader was a policeman.³⁸

³⁶Interview MOR 135, 20.09.96

³⁷Interview MAG 134, 08.08.96

³⁸Interview CHI 49, Albino Fyfe, Provincial Deputy of Renamo, Chimoio, 19.06.96

Local farmers allege that there are Mozambicans amongst the group, possibly former soldiers who were not demobilised by ONUMOZ, a view supported by the demobilised themselves.³⁹ In fact, the demobilised expressed as much concern as others at the rumours of *Chimuenje* activity.

In your opinion do you think there could be another war now?

In my opinion? No, I don't think there could be another war. Well... maybe there could, because there are these bandits going around in this area of Mossurize, a little in Sofala too, there on the border of Manica and Sofala. Sometimes I go in there [to the interior], and I talk with the population to hear what's happening. They say there are armed men taking goats, cows, other good things.

So, it remains to be seen whether these are people who fled during the war from both sides, from Frelimo and also from Renamo. For the moment, since they have nothing to do, they are doing this type of banditry. Or maybe it's a group which even has a political objective... We don't know yet. Maybe the government already knows, maybe the higher authorities know. But myself, for example, for the moment, I have trouble knowing because I'm living in the town.

But in your opinion, since you knew many soldiers when you were in the army, do you think that any of them still think about starting another war?

No, no one.

No one?

The way I see it, no one could have that type of idea. (Frelimo DS, Espungabera)⁴⁰

We ourselves witnessed an incident in which two suspected *Chimuenjes* were arrested in Mossurize district. Two men had requested lodgings in someone's house and then had left their weapons there. When the men returned for the weapons, the owner of the house called together the community, who seized them and brought them to the police.

As those demobilised who travel are themselves susceptible to highway robbery, and are thus victims rather than perpetrators, they particularly resent the connection drawn between themselves and the *Chimuenjes*.

Do you know anyone who has been assaulted?

For example, I was assaulted. I was robbed when I went to give my *lobolo* in Machaze for my wife. I had 300 *contos* stolen here in Madondinho, I was ambushed here. We were in a car, around 6 o'clock and we were ambushed. They shot up the front of the car, told everyone to get out, and searched us and took all our money. (Frelimo DS, Mapungwana)⁴¹

³⁹Bannerman 1996: 16

⁴⁰Interview MOS 83, 27.08.96

⁴¹Interview MOS 43, 27.07.96

In our view, most demobilised are not interested in a return to conflict or banditry. Indeed, several groups and individuals insisted that should anybody try to re-ignite the conflict, they were prepared to take immediate steps to prevent this.

Do you know of anyone who is thinking of starting another war?

Júlio: Right now I don't know anyone. If I did know, you would definitely hear about it.

Virgílio: Yeah, this is true, because if someone started saying that they wanted to start another war, even the government would know about it because I would inform them that that person was getting ready to start another war. (Group discussion with Frelimo & Renamo DS, Espungabera)⁴²

The repugnance felt by some individuals for those engaged in banditry is clearly expressed by the following demobilised. Despite having made every effort to get out of the army as quickly as possible, including welcoming demotion, he said he was prepared to join up again in the interests of maintaining stability and security.

If they said, Bonifácio, the country is under threat, let's go defend it...?

Yes, I would. I defended the country and I'm happy about that. What demoralised me were the conditions. [...] But even so, if they told me there was a threat... These days, when I hear that there are armed bandits, I don't like to hear this. I don't like to hear it at all. I would even go on my own to fight, because their presence is demoralising. I don't like to hear about armed men, I don't like it. [...] When I hear that there is an individual disturbing the country, I would prefer to go and deal with it myself. I don't like to hear that sort of news, that someone is threatening the country. (Frelimo DS, Espungabera)⁴³

Perhaps in response to allegations against demobilised soldiers and in recognition of the problem of crime, the demobilised soldiers' association, AMODEG, has proposed that its members be involved in the fight against crime.

In fact, we have said with regards to all these assaults etc., that we could be part of the investigations into the existence of these armed men. Not that we have any connection or because we know... no. We have an obligation to maintain the peace in this country; peace cannot be considered, and I say this even to the politicians, I say that peace cannot be treated like a bar of soap which people use and then it runs out, no. We must keep in mind that no one knows when it will end. Peace has come to stay in Mozambique.⁴⁴

In order to assist with improving security, AMODEG proposed a project which would both employ demobilised soldiers and improve safety on a particularly dangerous part

⁴²Interview MOS 52, 09.07.96

⁴³Interview MOS 4, 04.07.96

⁴⁴Interview, Júlio Nimuire, President of AMODEG, Chimoio, 18.08.96

of the national highway (the Save-Inchope stretch). Their proposal was to set up a petrol station, restaurant and shops, which would provide jobs and economic benefits to the area as well as attracting more settlement to the road and making it less dangerous for motorists. The proposal was under consideration by GTZ as of April 1996, although by August it still had not been financed.⁴⁵

ii) Drinking and anti-social behaviour: 'This doesn't give us a good reputation'

Allegations against demobilised soldiers do not stop at crime. Fears that they would have difficulty fitting into civilian society focused also on drinking and other anti-social behaviour.

Drinking is part of social life in both rural and urban areas, but it is supposed to be done in fairly circumscribed ways so that it does not get out of control. As the following demobilised soldier explains, once a person is drunk he is supposed to go home rather than stay and risk causing trouble.

What do other people say about those who returned from the war?

People can say that of the people who returned from the war... I can say that when a person goes out to drink and becomes drunk, if he is thinking right, he will get up and go home. But when you drink, get drunk, and then cause problems with people, that's when the people start to say, 'you see, it's these people who were with *Matsangaisse*⁴⁶, and they go around beating the population'. Many do this. This causes us to be badly spoken of, because it's not worth it for me to do good when everyone else does bad. This doesn't give us a good reputation. (Renamo DS, Mude)⁴⁷

Clearly this behaviour is not peculiar to demobilised soldiers. Complaints heard during the research indicated that, as is often the case, older generations feel that in general, youth behaves badly these days. But they do not single out the demobilised in particular for criticism. The number of cases reported during the research of real problems with alcoholism was too small to be considered a serious issue. However some people, including demobilised soldiers themselves, argue that war has impacted on the behaviour of some demobilised.

Some people when they come out, their behaviour is deformed: they go drinking, or they go smoking. But I returned the same as I went in, I didn't change at all. (Frelimo DS, Espungabera)⁴⁸

⁴⁵Interviews, Júlio Nimuire, President of AMODEG, Maputo, 12.02.96 and Chimoio, 18.08.96; *Noticias* Newspaper, 12.04.96, p.3

⁴⁶Andre Matsangaisse was the first leader of Renamo, and his name was used by the rebels before the term 'Renamo' became widely used.

⁴⁷Interview MOS 36, 12.07.96

⁴⁸Interview MOS 4, 04.07.96

This can also play into the hands of people who are looking for an excuse to criticise demobilised soldiers, or to allocate blame for problems, or to advance their own individual interests by discrediting others.

iii) Scapegoating and stigmatisation: 'No one likes us'

Resentment at being branded as criminals was generally expressed by male demobilised soldiers, while women demobilised soldiers expressed feelings of being scapegoated and stigmatised because their involvement in the war.

Need for the protection of one's family was much stronger for single female demobilised who returned from the war, both because of their particular liminality as soldiers and because of the status of single women in society. This helps to explain their acceptance of the demands of family - to the extent of handing over all of their subsidy money. Those who had not yet been able to find their families, or who returned to find no family left, or a very changed family, appeared to be the most vulnerable. Several women interviewed were in such a situation, and as a result had not managed to establish a household but instead were in a state of transience.

For you, what did you do with the money from ONUMOZ?

I used it all up because of hunger. Because I didn't find my house, my family, not my father, nor my mother, nothing. I don't have family - I came back to find they had all died. I am alone with my children, the father of the children doesn't come at all.

But you are not from Chimoio. Why are you living here in Chimoio?

Since I didn't find my family at home [in Chibabava], I didn't have anyone there so I came here.[...] The reason we don't go back home, but we stay here in the city, it's because we demobilised, if we go there to our homes, no one likes us. (Female Renamo DS, Chimoio)⁴⁹

This woman explained that not only did demobilised suffer witchcraft because of envy over the money they were receiving; many young people had been recruited/captured from a village at the same time, but only some returned in one piece, creating hard feelings or even suspicions that those who did return had somehow played a part in the death or disappearance of others. Many families do not yet know what happened to their children who had been taken into the war, and there has been no concerted effort since the end of the war on the part of the authorities to identify the dead and inform families. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for many who survived the war to face the families of others, when they do not know the

⁴⁹Interview CHI 127, 09.09.96

whereabouts or fate of former companions and cannot satisfy the family's need to know what happened.

Do you have brothers who were demobilised as well?

Yes, I do.

How are they living?

The others didn't return, they stayed there in Maringue [Sofala province].

Why didn't they return home?

What made them not return home is a small thing, they said they were afraid of dying. Because some people's sons died there in the war, and if they see us returning they will say, 'and where is my son?', and I will have to say 'he died', or 'he stayed there', and then there will be the problem of witchcraft. That's why they preferred to stay living there, to prevent these problems. (Renamo DS, Muedzwa)⁵⁰

Some demobilised pointed out that there was often more 'reconciliation' between demobilised soldiers from the two sides than between demobilised soldiers and civilians. The soldiers understood that others had been forced to fight and obey orders just as they were, while the civilians had no conception of what it had been like in the army.

How do you see other demobilised? Do they form a well-defined subgroup or are they like other civilians?

Well, as a demobilised I can say that there is a small difference between the demobilised and the civilians. At times the population has the idea of pursuing us, saying 'you are the ones who used to persecute us'. Some even call us bandits - those who were in Renamo - and there are always differences between demobilised and population.

Will this continue or will it be forgotten?

Yes, [it will], or rather it could be forgotten, but it will take a long time. Sometimes someone appears and says 'you killed us to win this stall' [*banca fixa* owned by the demob]. Sometimes they insult us about our belongings. If someone puts on nice clothes, they say 'you killed and you persecuted us to win these things'. (Renamo DS, Mocubela)⁵¹

This feeling of stigmatisation was also expressed by a Frelimo demobilised:

What support do you hope for?

At the moment I'm not hoping for anything. We're not taken into consideration. At least here in our locality, we're not seen as people and some despise us. (Frelimo DS, Derre)⁵²

⁵⁰Interview MOS 91, 31.08.96

⁵¹Interview MAG 134, 08.08.96

⁵²Interview MOR 120, 05.09.96

It is undoubtedly because of this kind of stigmatisation that the majority of demobilised, asked if they preferred to be known as demobilised or civilians, preferred the latter. Few explain why as clearly as the following.

I like to be called a civilian, to finish with being a 'demobilised', with being a soldier, (I like) to just stay as a civilian, a civilised person, to be in my own camp, to be in my own house.

iv) **Fragmentation of structures of authority: *'If a Mozambican commits an error, he must be corrected or educated'***

After independence in Mozambique, political authority was radically transformed at all levels of society. 'Traditional authority' was discredited as reactionary and pro-colonial by Frelimo, and chiefs were deposed in favour of party officials. This move underestimated the degree of local support for chiefs, and the varied political geography of the country. As a result, these edicts were unevenly applied; not all chiefs were deposed, not all Frelimo party officials were up-starts, and the practice of decision-making in many respects remained the same, bending only slightly to accommodate the new orders from above.⁵³ Nonetheless, there was considerable upheaval, and the stance taken by Frelimo against 'traditional authority' is credited as one of the reasons for widespread rural support of Renamo, who generally took the opposite stance and reinstated the institution of local chieftains, though adapted to their own purposes.⁵⁴

The legacy of this mixture of ideology, political expediency, and armed conflict varies widely in the local political scene, and there is great uncertainty about who is in power and who holds authority, and arguably a resultant fragmentation of power.

Anxiety that demobilised soldiers would exploit this situation to create problems politically within their communities was compounded by fear that they might react to their loss of status by not accepting any authority. Status was lost in two major ways. Under the leadership of Samora Machel, military values of discipline, hierarchy, command were promoted as the ideal for society, and 'the soldier' held up as the ideal of the 'new man'.⁵⁵ Thus, in relation to civilians, Frelimo soldiers enjoyed a certain degree of prestige and respect during the war. They also commanded fear and

⁵³Alexander argues that 'in the Mozambican context, institutions as well as individuals shift in and out of "statehood" over time, place and context' (1995: 2).

⁵⁴Geffray 1990 argues that the marriage of Renamo and traditional authority was made for convenience rather than deep ideological conviction, and when it suited it would be ignored or overridden.

⁵⁵Young 1997 argues that discipline in the FAM was portrayed as the ideal for society; Cravinho 1995: 94 explains the ideal of the 'new man' within Frelimo ideology

redoubt simply by carrying a weapon. Similarly, it has been suggested that Renamo soldiers enjoyed a sense of social promotion which came from inciting fear and respect amongst those who had previously commanded them as their elders.⁵⁶

In the post-war context, soldiers are no longer held up as the ideal 'new man', nor do they control the means of coercion. It is justifiable, therefore, to wonder how these soldiers would react to what such a social and psychological demotion; would they accept the authorities whom they had previously overridden, and would they treat their fellow civilians with disdain and disrespect?

In our research, we came across several communities where there was still dispute about who should take positions of leadership: in Semente, Morrumbala District; in Matsinho, Gondola District; in Murabiwa, Maganja da Costa District. It is striking that in such contexts of what effectively constituted a power vacuum, we did not come across any incidents in which demobilised soldiers had used coercive skills acquired during the war to profit from this situation. The only such report was of a demobilised soldier in northern Mossurize district who maintained a weapon and was using it to extract taxes from the population.⁵⁷

On the other hand, we did observe, and were told of, multiple ways in which the existence of alternative authority structures was played on by both demobilised and the authorities themselves. These actions demonstrated lack of respect for the local power structures by demobilised but equally, there were incidents of abuse of power by those in authority.

a) Lack of respect by demobilised: *'I was a commander, I know how to kill'*

Cases in which demobilised showed lack of respect were found in areas under control of *régulos* and those under Frelimo secretaries.

The following case took place in an area where the *régulo* was actually a powerful figure in the community, and had been ruling since the 1950s, with a break of ten years during the war when he fled to Zimbabwe to escape Frelimo persecution. After the war, the people of his area who had taken refuge returned to Mozambique, but he decided to remain in Zimbabwe. Several years after the Peace Accord, a group of

⁵⁶Geffray 1990 puts forward the case most strongly for 'social promotion' as a factor holding recruits into Renamo from fleeing, as they enjoyed benefits not available to them in their former positions.

⁵⁷Personal communication, David McDermott-Hughes, Maputo, October 1996.

elders, most of whom had been part of his council of elders, went to find him in Zimbabwe and ask him to return to rule the area again. Despite this general respect for his authority, he still had problems with some demobs in his area.

You see that one over there [a demobilised] who was here talking a lot? There were those people who were building that hospital, under the supervision of a *Boer*⁵⁸ called Mario. When he arrived [the demob], he said that 'when they finish building the hospital I want to put my hand-print on it' [in the wet cement]. The builders told the *régulo*, and he refused to allow it, so those who were building also refused. So then they went to tell the district authorities. The district authorities already had this information, and they told the police. The police sent a summons for him, but he didn't go, he went drinking instead. So then other members [of Renamo] came, and they resolved the matter and managed to end it.

How did they manage to resolve it, if he refused to comply with the police?

The way they resolved it, they asked the *régulo* why he wrote the letter to inform the police to come and tie him up, when he didn't kill anyone, he just talked? So why didn't he inform us [members of Renamo] so that we could resolve this problem? (Renamo DS, Mude)⁵⁹

The *régulo* actually attempted to expel the unruly demobilised soldier from the community, by sending someone else to set up a house on the land which the soldier was using to plant his crops. The demobilised soldier called the *régulo*'s bluff, though, and stayed. The person who was sent to live on his land went elsewhere. The steps taken by the *régulo* in forwarding the case to the district authorities and the police are a symptom of the lack of clarity over who really has power at a local level, or at best a recognition that there are now multiple sources of power.

The following case involves Renamo soldiers who did not want to accept the authority of the Frelimo *bairro* secretary.

Do you still have these problems here in the *bairro*?

Now and then. It's a good thing that this one was made responsible for demobilised, I think it was a month ago [referring to the appointment of the district delegate to AMODEG]. It's better that it be one of them [Renamo], who knows the way things were [during the war]. Because some would come and say, 'What, you, the secretary? Did we fight together? I was a commander, I know how to kill. You are nothing.' It's still like this.

So we tell them, 'Sir, you can go now. You may have been a commander, but you can go, and come back tomorrow. Today we will not deal with this.'

He says, 'But who was this person who was complaining about me? I want to see this person.'

⁵⁸This term is used for anyone who is white, not just South African or Rhodesian.

⁵⁹Interview MOS 37, 12.07.96.

'No, you can't do this. If you do this, we will have to arrest you and put you in jail, and tomorrow when you have sobered up, we will bring you back to deal with it.'

Because the first thing is, they don't know that if a Mozambican commits an error, he must be corrected or educated. If you pick him up, he'll say, 'You're against me because I was in Renamo'. No, any Mozambican who errs, we will do this. We are not just against you, we are against anyone who does wrong.

So they began to see that this was true. (*Bairro* Secretary, Espungabera)⁶⁰

The secretary telling the story attributed this exchange to bravado stemming from an inflated sense of power. But it could also relate to Renamo's political platform during the war which was based on opposition to anything symbolic of the Frelimo state, of which Party secretaries were a particularly visible element at the local level.⁶¹ Thus the problem of not respecting those in authority does not just result from a lack of clarity in the political order, but also from people's ideological background which does not predispose some demobilised to accept the dominant local authority.

b) Abuse of power by authorities: '*A demobilised has nowhere to go to*'

One of the obstacles to establishing authority which will be accepted by all to resolve conflicts is that no one is seen to be impartial, because power has been so closely linked to the state and political parties.⁶² Both Frelimo and Renamo demobilised report discrimination by the dominant local authority on the basis of their war-time affiliation.

Have you taken a case to the *mambo*?

Yes, I once took a case when I came out of the troops. I found that the wife I had left had re-married, so I took the problem to the *mambo*. I went there and they obliged me to pay money to lay a complaint. So I paid the money, but the problem was not resolved. They just dropped it, just like that. (Frelimo DS, Derre)⁶³

His view of the *mambos* was that they resolve cases, but it depends on who you are...

In my case, because I was a demobilised from Frelimo, the *mambo* [identified with Renamo] automatically didn't want to solve my problem, and so I can't do anything. And now I just stay where I am.

⁶⁰Interview MOS 2, 02.07.96

⁶¹Hall 1990a

⁶²See Alexander 1995

⁶³Interview MOR 119, 05.09.96

Equally, Renamo supporters feel that their cases will not be resolved impartially by Frelimo-affiliated structures.

Things are bad for us demobilised here. If you have a problem and you go to the tribunal, you will be treated as a demobilised, and people will turn against you. In the end, a demobilised has no where to go to. These *chefes da zona*, these secretaries, they treat us badly.

So there is discrimination?

Yes, there is no understanding between us and them. (Group of Renamo DS, Bajone)⁶⁴

There is a serious problem: on the one hand, the demobilised lack respect for local authority. On the other hand, some of those very same people, by failing to show impartiality, do nothing to dispel the sense of discrimination and win the respect. However, this rather bleak picture is not uniform. In the following, a Frelimo *bairro* secretary recounts a case in which a *bairro* resident admitted to stealing a chicken belonging to a Renamo demob, using the excuse that the man was from Renamo and therefore deserved to have his chicken stolen. The secretary placed great emphasis on the idea of impartiality, and that discrimination against Renamo supporters was not to be tolerated.

'Wait, sir, it was I who stole the chicken.'

'Why did you do this?'

'Ah, that man is from Renamo.'

'A-ha? And where are you from?'

'I'm from Frelimo.'

'A-ha? But is it true that you stole?'

'Yes.'

'Well, I will do the following. We don't want thieves here, understand? You hear me? Here in this *bairro*, there is no discrimination. This man is a Mozambican too. Since you are admitting that you stole, we will not send the case to the police. You will go and get two chickens and give them to this man.'

Then that man [from Renamo] said, 'but I want my chicken back.'

'No, this is not possible either, because he sold it, and the man who bought it has eaten it. We have resolved many problems here, even children who were killed, and the person said, 'I want my child back', but it's not possible, because it has died already. What can we do? They must pay for that person who died. If he died, they cannot say, 'I want my child.' But he will get you two chickens.' (*Bairro* Secretary, Espungabera)⁶⁵

⁶⁴Interview MAG 11, 21.06.96

⁶⁵Interview MOS 2, 02.07.96. It turned out that the chicken thief was wanted in connection with other serious thefts - for the complete transcription of the account, see Appendix IX)

4. Conflict resolution mechanisms

As the above sections illustrate, there are many points of conflict and insecurity, unsurprising given the long period of upheaval and the resulting political, economic and social transformation. There are, though, resolution mechanisms, and there is evidence of a will to keep the peace.

Amongst our sample, there was a great diversity amongst respondents on the question of to whom they would appeal in case of a problem. Only three percent said they had no one to go to in case of a problem.

TABLE 23: Who demobilised go to when they have a problem (%)

Person	Study sample*
Chief	25
Elders	23
Friends	20
Uncle/aunt	14
Parent	12
Neighbour	11
Sibling	9
Party secretary	9
Other family	6
Church counsellor	3
Police	3
No one	3
Other	8

* n=65

The preferred resolution mechanism depends on both the type of the problem, and the person's own attitudes and beliefs. Problems between husband and wife tend to be resolved within the household.

And when you have a problem in the house, where do you go to consult?
I don't go to complain because of a problem with my wife at home, I just resolve it with my neighbours. My wife doesn't go to the police. If we went to the police, love would be over. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)⁶⁶

⁶⁶Interview MOS 44, 29.07.96. In practice, this may mean that the 'man is master in his home' and has free rein to do as he pleases. Kriger (1992: 195) discusses the issue of wife-beating in the Zimbabwean war and the way in which men resented guerrilla interference to stop the beating, such that eventually the guerrillas stopped making a pretence of pushing for female equality.

More serious problems between couples, for example divorce, will be taken to the chief in rural areas, or, in urban areas, to the local party. Chiefs will use customary law to settle divorce, while party secretaries use a blend of customary law and 'civic education'.⁶⁷ Problems the secretary cannot resolve may be taken to an official court, one of which exists in each administrative post and each district capital.⁶⁸ The courts in the district capital send problems of homicide, or theft of more than 1 million Mt, to the provincial court.⁶⁹

For minor problems amongst friends and neighbours, most people said that they would resolve things amongst themselves. Amongst family members, most people also said that they would try to resolve the issue themselves, and only if it were really serious would they take it upwards to a higher authority.

**When you have a problem, from whom do you ask advice?
What type of problem?**

For example if you have a problem at home and you are wondering how to solve it, do you go to the *régulo* to ask 'papa, what should I do'?

No, I don't go to the *régulo*, I go to my friends. If I don't have friends, I go to my brothers or my little brothers, or my grandfather. I don't go to the *régulo* for family problems. When you go to the *régulo* it's a serious problem, but a family problem we resolve it in the family.

Who is the person in the family who will resolve the problems, who is the first person you go to?

The first person is my oldest sister. (Frelimo DS, Mapungwana)⁷⁰

In Mossurize, the person who is often called upon to resolve problems within the family is the *muzukuro*, the child of a female member of the family who has married and moved out of the family home. Her child is considered to belong to her husband's family, and will therefore be impartial with respect to his mother's family.⁷¹

Problems of theft are either taken to the local party secretary, or to the chief's 'police', the *nduna*. The secretary will channel the problem upwards to the police if the problem is serious. The *nduna* similarly will bring the problem to the *régulo* if it is more than a minor issue. Similarly, the *régulo* will usually channel assault cases upwards to the police, although we were told of cases in which the *régulo* merely banished a person convicted of murder rather than reporting the case to the police.

⁶⁷Interview, Secretaries Bastos and Melo, *Bairro 25 de Junho*, 08.05.96

⁶⁸Interview MOS 2, *Bairro* Secretary, Espungabera, 02.07.96

⁶⁹Interview MOS 18, District Judge, Espungabera, 10.07.96

⁷⁰Interview MOS 43, 27.07.96

⁷¹Personal communication, Victor Igreja

Only fifty percent of respondents stated that there was a police presence in their local area (n=54).

Witchcraft is also taken to the chief. The chief will use a *curandeiro* to diagnose the problem, and the culprit will be summoned. The spirit believed to be possessing the sufferer will itself indicate by whom it was sent, and what it requires to be appeased. Provided the accused accepts the verdict, compensation will be paid and the case considered closed. If the accused does not accept the verdict, he/she can ask for a second opinion of another *curandeiro*. Some problems are not resolved because an accused will simply send the spirit to someone else in their own family rather than paying it off with the compensation required. In this way, it is believed, spirit possession can be passed down from generation to generation.

Curandeiros do not always indicate the accused, however. Often one *curandeiro* will specialise in diagnosis and another will specialise in cure, and the afflicted does not necessarily need to find the 'witch' in order to carry out a cure. Some people prefer simply to cure the problem and avoid looking for who is to blame. Some *curandeiros* will simply say, 'it is someone who is close to you', and the person may then become suspicious of a particular neighbour or family member, or they may choose to ignore this.

An alternative to *curandeiros* to solve witchcraft are the evangelical African churches, such as the Apostles and the Zion Church. Many people see these churches as a way to avoid witchcraft, or to obtain cures without having to pay a *curandeiro*, because in theory church prophets are not supposed to charge fees. In practice we came across churches which charged adherents money to be cured of their problems, for example *Igreja Universal Reino de Deus* (Universal Church of God's Kingdom). Our sample revealed that belief in ancestral spirits can go hand-in-hand with church attendance: eighty-five percent believe in ancestral spirits (n=74), and sixty-seven percent go to church (n=91). The most popular church was Catholic (thirty-eight percent), followed by Seventh Day Adventists (seventeen percent), Zionists (sixteen percent) and the African Assembly of God (eleven percent) (n=64).

The above suggests that, despite the war, many traditional channels of conflict resolution have remained open or have been re-opened, and are being used by demobilised and non-demobilised alike. There have though been changes, in both degree and kind, of conflict resolution mechanisms, and the more serious the dispute, the less likely it will be resolved through these methods.

TABLE 24: Changes in Church attendance (%)

Time period	Church attendance
Before the war	77
During the war	55
After the war	67

n=81

As the preceding examples of lack of respect by the demobilised show, there are cases of complete disregard for local authority. In the city, political polarisation had led to conflicts between Renamo supporters and local Frelimo party authorities. One Frelimo *bairro* secretary in Chimoio reported having been beaten up by Renamo supporters when he went to try to stop a political meeting they were holding within the *bairro*. He says that Renamo supporters are afraid of them, and have their own parallel authorities.⁷² In rural areas, several *régulos* stated that they were having problems with some demobilised who refused to accept their authority.

We don't have a very good communication with those people who were soldiers. They are taking themselves to be *mambos*.

So you don't have a good relationship with the soldiers?

Yes, some are very good. But some are not very good. (Chief Mpingo, Mpingo)⁷³

In the Mossurize example, the demobilised were opting for setting up their own methods of settling disputes, or appealing to their party officials rather than obeying the *régulo*, setting themselves up in opposition to him.

If there is a problem between friends, the *régulo* might try to resolve it, but if it is one of us, all of us demobilised are called, they inform us that our friend is doing something wrong, and we resolve it in this way.

Has this happened here yet?

Yes, this type of case has happened. [Case described above, section?]

And now how are the relations between the demobs and the *régulo*?

There's no problem between us and the *régulo*, but if the *régulo* doesn't respect us well, we have to sit down with him, speak to him, until we resolve this problem.

How did you become the head of the demobilised here?

It wasn't through the *régulo*, it was between us members [of Renamo] that I was chosen to be the leader. (Renamo DS, Mude)⁷⁴

⁷²Interview, *Bairro* Secretaries Bastos and Melo, *Bairro 25 de Junho*, Chimoio, 08.05.96

⁷³Interview MOS 61, 04.08.96

⁷⁴Interview MOS 37, 12.07.96

Arguably, this formation of alternative power groups is not indicative of an effort to resolve conflicts, but rather a concerted effort to shift the balance of power.

Since the beginning of the Peace Talks and constitutional reform in 1990, some moves have been made towards mending the rift between the Frelimo government and 'traditional authority', which in theory would pre-empt such attempts to shift the balance of power. But there is as yet no framework defining the responsibilities of chiefs in relation to government. Disputes over who is the rightful traditional leader of communities are also not uncommon, and the means for settling them is not clear. Many of these disputes are intermingled with political wranglings between Frelimo and Renamo, further complicating the issues. The government also intends to move forward with 'decentralisation' of political power, but has yet to settle the issues of where and when local elections may be held.

At all but the lowest political levels, Frelimo appointed its own people to government positions after the first national elections, rather than adopt a power-sharing model as advocated by some. This happened despite the fact that Renamo won a majority in five of the country's ten provinces, and in many of the rural districts.⁷⁵ Local elections may change this, but as noted above, this is still a distant possibility. In the meantime, there are some attempts to accommodate local leaders, but there is still the worry that there is no impartiality. (This issue will be taken up again in **Chapter 6**)

Even where there is no attempt to create a new centre of power, many of the urban demobilised soldiers, in common with their civilian counterparts, have become more distanced from traditional practices such as using *curandeiros* and consulting chiefs, in comparison with their elders who still admit to using *curandeiros* and believing in witchcraft. Most perceived such traditional practices as constraints to success, and their removal as a good thing, and a mark of progress.

5. Conflict avoidance strategies

In addition to a variety of mechanisms for conflict resolution at household and community level, there are also numerous strategies for avoiding conflict. These may prevent further conflicts arising. Equally, whether at household or community level, they may be a response to the failure of other conflict resolution mechanisms. Four strategies of conflict avoidance adopted by the demobilised will be discussed here:

⁷⁵De Brito 1995

Integration into social activities to minimise overt difference, refusal to pass judgement on contentious issues and people, physically removing oneself from the site of conflict, and, finally, transferring blame for past events upwards to superiors.

The first strategy, integration into social activities to minimise overt difference, is particularly clear in the return by the majority of demobilised to some form of religious activity (sixty-seven percent of our sample). In addition to the various cleansing functions the churches may play (see **Chapter 3**), they are also seen as a means of conflict prevention. The most notable preventive activity is the ban on alcohol in many evangelical Christian churches, and in Islamic mosques. Many admitted that they had problems with their wives only after they had been drinking. The church was seen as a way of avoiding such domestic conflicts. It was also argued that money saved on alcohol could be used to invest in business.

i) Refusal to pass judgement: 'Nobody knows what he does there'

The second strategy, the refusal to comment on or pass judgement on contentious issues or individuals, served to avoid conflict both over local issues and over larger national debates. This strategy is captured in the phrase 'one cannot know what is going on in someone else's house', a response to even the most innocuous question. The phrase was also a common response of the non-demobilised who were reluctant to speak about others in small communities for fear of the repercussions. Making clear that one is not aware of what is happening in another person's house is also connected with the fear that the main channel for witchcraft is through someone who has seen the interior of one's house.

Are there demobilised there in Murabiua?

Yes, there are lots, from both Renamo and Frelimo.

And what do they do?

Well, I can't really tell you that, because each one stays in his own house and nobody knows what he does there. (*Curandeiro, Mocubela*)⁷⁶

However, this attitude extended to contentious national issues. Asked questions such as 'who won the war?' and 'do you think the elections were fair?' very few people were prepared to make categorical statements, preferring to say 'I don't know' and then offer an opinion rather than a judgement - but the depth of feeling among those who did venture a judgement suggested that these 'opinions' are in fact used to avoid being heard to pass judgement.

⁷⁶Interview MAG 128, 08.08.96

ii) Physical removal from site of conflict: *'You just come home to visit'*

A particularly serious conflict avoidance strategy, simply moving away, was the most frequent response to pressure from the family to contribute financially, especially when these expectations were virtually impossible to meet.

Those who returned to their area of origin only to leave again, moved either to another rural area further from the reaches of their family, or to an urban area where they could expect to escape this type of pressure.

Why didn't you stay living in Mossurize?

I didn't like living there any more, because since I had left there, it became difficult. I didn't want to stay there because of the money. My family could be hateful, saying, 'where is that money that you received?'. So I preferred, after seeing that the family was being hateful, to leave my family and go away on my own. (Renamo DS, Chimoio)⁷⁷

One justification for such a move was that the individual feared that if he or she stayed, s/he would become a victim of witchcraft.

I was wondering, since you said that when the demobs came back from the war and received money, their neighbours would send witchcraft to them... now that more money is coming for projects, won't this cause more witchcraft problems?

What you need to do then, if there is a lot of money, is to find a way of doing your business. You go to another area where you will do your work, and you come home just to visit. Then you can avoid witchcraft. (Renamo DS, Mude)⁷⁸

The tension between individual advancement and family obligations is evidenced in the fear of witchcraft and the consequent desire to move away from family. This is not unique to demobilised soldiers, but was exacerbated by the targeted assistance programmes setting them apart as privileged from others in their families or communities.⁷⁹

iii) Allocation of blame: *'We were just the sons'*

The conflict avoidance strategies outlined relate primarily to the avoidance of domestic or local conflict. The refusal to pass judgement for fear of reprisals applied

⁷⁷Interview CHI 131, 12.09.96

⁷⁸Interview MOS 57, 03.08.96

⁷⁹For a discussion of the way in which the fear of poisoning is used by professionals in Sierra Leone to justify a move away from the family and family obligations, in order to pursue individual advancement, see Harrell-Bond 1978

at a range of levels, from the avoidance of inter-household and inter-party conflict, right up to reluctance to be drawn into taking a position *vis-à-vis* national politics.

None of these strategies actively resolves conflicts or underlying tensions. This is perhaps most disturbing in the strategy of allocating blame to those 'above'. Demobilised soldiers, almost without exception, allocate blame and responsibility for the war upwards onto their leaders rather than horizontally onto their fellow soldiers. Thus, there was great emphasis on the way in which 'brothers' were made to fight against each other by their 'fathers'. This allows demobilised soldiers from both sides to co-exist with the very people whom they were supposed to want to kill before the peace.

When you have met people from the opposing army, have you not encountered shocks, or felt badly disposed? Or have you asked yourself whether you were rivalled during the war?

To see whether this one is from Frelimo or not? No, but to know that we were fighting each other in vain, yes. Because he is my brother, and at the time of the war we fought because we were possessed by bad ideas to kill each other, without knowing what we were doing, to exterminate each other between brothers. (Renamo DS, Mude)⁸⁰

Claims of ignorance emphasise the lack of agency of the individual, and therefore lack of responsibility for war-time actions.

Do you remember the first time you met someone from Frelimo after the war?

After the war? Lots. Even on the course, there were lots of them. And us too, from Renamo. And there was friendship, because everyone was friends, no one really cared that I was from Renamo, the other from Frelimo. We knew who was from what side, but we would go drink together, be friends. Because this wasn't the bad thing. The ones who know what was bad are the presidents, we were just the sons. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)⁸¹

Even the following respondent, who told of extreme cases of war-time brutality between the two sides, had developed a rationale of the situation which allowed him to get by in his daily encounters with his former enemy.

You said that sometimes the neck [of a corpse] would be severed, during that period did you ever come across one of your colleagues whose neck had been cut by Frelimo?

Yes, even worse, when Frelimo came across one of our friends, besides cutting the neck, they would put tyres [round the neck], pour petrol and burn them.

I don't understand the motive for this...?

⁸⁰Interview MOS 35, 12.07.96

⁸¹Interview MOS 1, 02.07.96

They [Frelimo] would say that these are bandits, they have been inoculated [i.e. protected against injury], so they haven't really died. If we don't do this he is going to get up and collect his friends. It's a trick which he is playing - that is why they used to do these crimes.

That's why you manage to remember but to forgive as well?

All this I know that I did, that we did this because we were in a war, and that's why we are now in reconciliation. Even this friend who was sitting here is from Frelimo, but we never talk to each other of such things. We are just normal friends. We were carrying out our duty as we were supposed to - though now we are seeing very clearly that those men who were obliging us to massacre amongst ourselves are now receiving millions. They are living well, they own cars, while we have to walk from here to Pebane to buy our groundnuts and other items, we have to carry goods on our heads until we reach that main road. (Renamo DS, Mocubela)⁸²

The importance of this allocation of blame is more fully explained in **Chapter 6** - while it serves reconciliatory purposes at local level, it may not auger well for long-term peace at a national level, as central issues are left unresolved.

CONCLUSIONS

Two questions capture fears many held for the post Peace Accord period: 'Will the peace hold or not?' and/or 'will the country descend into social unrest and armed conflict?' These questions reflected uncertainty about how demobilised soldiers would behave in the peace-time context.

Given the slow pace of demobilisation and uncertainty about whether all troops had been declared, it seemed entirely plausible that the Frelimo-Renamo conflict could re-ignite and the demobilised could have re-grouped along their prior affiliations as if the Peace Accord had never happened. Equally, they were regarded as the most likely agents to pull the country towards armed banditry and domestic insecurity, given their military training but particularly their supposed volatility and lack of social integration. It is perhaps no coincidence that this view developed at the time of the demobilisation in Mozambique in 1994, the same time as the wide circulation of David Kaplan's article 'The Coming Anarchy' which argued that soldiers in many civil conflicts in Africa had become 'loose molecules' with no stake in society.⁸³

⁸²Interview MAG 134, 08.08.96

⁸³Kaplan 1994

The fact that there has been no return to war along the previous lines suggests that that particular fear was exaggerated, perhaps because it underestimated the degree of war-fatigue that existed. Furthermore, as will be explored in **Chapter 6**, many demobilised from both sides, now, two years after demobilisation, express deep ambivalence about their involvement in the war and great reluctance to return to war.

However, to infer from this that just because the demobilised will not automatically rally to the Frelimo or Renamo banner there will be no further conflict, is to risk being complacent about the current peace. Renamo-Frelimo tensions are still played out at a number of levels, offering a framework within which to air specific grievances, for example the lack of pensions for Renamo demobilised. In addition there are other important sources of identity which may cross-cut and over-ride these political allegiances: ONUMOZ *versus* non-ONUMOZ, traditional *versus* modern, rural *versus* urban, females *versus* males.

While the first of these is specific to the demobilised, most of these divisions apply to civilians as well. Any one of these various identities and labels can become the most salient at any given time, depending on whether one is considering the local or the national context. Indeed the identity 'demobilised' is a key one in which 'Renamo' and 'Frelimo' may be over-ridden, if all demobilised share the same grievances *vis-à-vis* the Government (see **Chapter 6**).

The fact that there has been no dramatic increase in social unrest in the last couple of years undermines the argument that demobilised soldiers are volatile 'loose molecules'. Previous chapters have suggested a variety of mechanisms by which demobilised become reintegrated at the family and local level. Unlike youth, who do not have a household to sustain, demobilised soldiers are tied in to a place and persons by the establishment of a household and the reciprocal obligations involved in family relationships. The absence of widespread banditry perpetrated by demobilised soldiers also suggests that demobilised soldiers do in fact have a stake in society.

They are thus not 'loose molecules', but are enmeshed in social relationships which serve integrative functions. They are as susceptible to crime as their neighbours, but few appear to have access to weapons. As well as individuals offering themselves to fight against the *Chimuenjes*, for example, the demobilised soldiers' association has also taken steps towards encouraging demobilised collectively to become part of the solution rather than the 'problem'. Given that they are the ones who know best the

sacrifices of going to war, their offer to become engaged again in the fight against crime is a strong indication of the desire to establish security and protect the peace.

Furthermore, we found that while the conceptual opposition of 'volatile demobilised' to 'stable society' exaggerates the volatility of the demobilised soldier, it also overestimates the stability of society more generally. Mozambican society is in a state of flux as everyone seeks to re-establish, re-construct their livelihoods, social relationships and identities. Power and authority structures in society are also fragmented and uncertain. The concept of social reintegration is therefore problematic. It assumes a static baseline against which to compare the group in question, in this case the demobilised, when in fact the baseline itself is shifting all the time.

A variety of sources of tension were identified in this chapter. Since the elections 'resolved' the issue of who won the war, tensions between demobilised now centre more around who receives assistance and who does not. Tensions amongst family members focused on obligations and reciprocity; family members may reject demobilised if they fail to contribute in line with their expectations, while demobilised may resent the obligations of the family, and rail against constraints to their economic advancement. Further, differences may have arisen between demobilised and family members due to their different war experiences, in particular in cases where the former have become 'urbanised' in their outlook but return to a rural area.

Within communities, tensions arose over crime and allegations that it was the demobilised who were responsible. The behaviour of demobilised came under criticism for some, on the grounds that their habits were corrupted by the years in the war and they no longer obey social norms. This was compounded by opposition to authority figures, both due to political affiliation and also as a rejection of traditional authorities as bearers of obligations which fetter individualism. Scape-goating of demobilised soldiers has also raised tension in communities.

Given that there are multiple sources of tension, and that these arise not only from war-time experiences, but also from the tensions inherent in a society in flux, how can we explain the relative stability which has characterised Mozambique since demobilisation?

While points of tension can lead to conflict, there are a variety of local level conflict resolution mechanisms. These range from informal resolution within households or

between friends, to more formal mechanisms such as the *régulo*, the *bairro* secretary, tribunals and courts, or the police.

There are serious problems in the relationship between these formal mechanisms: the rules of the game are not explicit nor transparent to individuals seeking resolution, and as the above examples show (**Section 4**), cases can be shifted from one setting to another in an attempt to gain satisfaction. This means that the strength of each is lessened. Furthermore, it allows the emergence of new loci of power which may or may not be accountable to individuals within their area of influence.

There are also a number of conflict avoidance strategies. An active strategy to prevent conflicts was adherence to the strictures of religion, while a more passive one was to avoid talking about any points of tension. Some felt obliged to remove themselves physically from the conflict, while others used logic and argument to transfer the blame for problems to others, thereby averting conflict between individuals who might have to live as neighbours (see **Chapter 6**).

Despite the fluidity of the social situation in the post-war period, continuities and transformations are identifiable in both the sources of tension and the modes of resolution. People are prepared to try either to resolve or to avoid conflicts, despite the absence of clear structures of authority. This does not necessarily indicate 'reconciliation', but it does demonstrate a 'powerful will to co-exist' at a local level - at least for the time being.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Tensions between soldiers from opposing sides awaiting demobilisation could be reduced through an active programme to bring them together in safe fora, as occurred to a limited extent.

To the greatest extent possible, the benefit system should be standard for all demobilised, regardless of their affiliation during the conflict. For example, in Mozambique, Renamo and Frelimo demobilised received their payments in the same place, which appeared to help reduce tension between the two sides, as everybody could see that they were going through the same system. It also allowed people to meet informally, talk with each other, and share experiences.

This standardisation should extend beyond the immediate demobilisation programme, and into the provision of state benefits, such as pensions. The failure to do so merely perpetuates divisions and signals that the government itself is not really committed to reconciliation at the national level. Government should take responsibility for compensation and extension of benefits to soldiers demobilised prior to the international demobilisation programmes.

The integrative function of the subsidies has been clearly demonstrated, not just in terms of the physical goods that it can buy but in terms of reinforcing relations of reciprocity. As in the majority of cases, the money does not go to the demobilised alone, but is used to help the entire family to reconstruct their lives, there is a case to be made for raising the amounts paid so that the benefits can be spread around without creating conflict which may arise if the demobilised is unable also to invest in his own future.

Local authority structures should be fully informed of the benefit package available for demobilised soldiers, so that they can intervene in an informed manner where conflicts arise over the use of such benefits. They could also be encouraged to inform the community of the intention of the benefit package in a way which they saw as appropriate to help avoid the misunderstandings arising from unfulfillable family expectations.

Support should be given to demobilised soldiers' associations, as they can play an important role in combating stigmatisation of demobilised soldiers, and providing another forum for former opponents to meet and begin the process of reconciliation.

The function of religious organisations in providing demobilised soldiers with a normative framework which allows them to avoid conflict should not be underestimated. This does not necessarily mean that they should become recipients of large amounts of donor money, but that they should, at the very least, be consulted and encouraged to play a role in 'civic education', not just of the demobilised soldiers but of their congregations.

Once again, the fact that conflict avoidance by people removing themselves physically from a place underlines the value of a flexible transportation system.

The introduction of a family-tracing system, both to link up those who are still alive and to trace those who have died, to find out when and where individuals lost their lives, would do a great deal to reduce tensions and scape-goating of survivors.

'Civic education' programmes, such as the ones introduced in Mozambique, should also be targeted at dispelling myths about female demobilised soldiers, and assisting in their social 'rehabilitation'.

Attention should be given to the way in which the past is being taught in schools, as this is a central way of transmitting messages to society. The question of explanation of the past and allocation of blame is crucial, given its impact on social relations and potentially on the maintenance of social order.

CHAPTER 6

RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS - The breakdown of reciprocity

The previous chapter highlighted multiple sources of tension and conflict at a local level. Conflict resolution mechanisms were identified as well as conflict avoidance strategies to which people resort. The most common of these conflict avoidance strategies was the allocation of responsibility and blame for what happened during the war and for the current situation onto the leaders rather than onto fellow soldiers or citizens.

In this chapter we examine the framework within which demobilised explain this upwards allocation, namely the relationship of reciprocity between 'father' and 'son'.¹ We explore how within this framework, all demobilised, regardless of war-time affiliations, feel they have a claim to the government's attention and assistance. Many of these claims are rooted in their personal experiences of the war. The process of recruitment, obedience to externally imposed objectives, rupture of life plans and loss of opportunities have all contributed to the sense that the demobilised have fulfilled their obligations as 'sons' and that it is now the turn of the government to reciprocate.

We then look at how four years after the General Peace Accord, and in the light of continuing failure to meet these expectations, there is a sense that the relationship of reciprocity has broken down. This is compounded by disappointments over 'democracy' and perceived discrimination against Renamo areas, as a result of which the demobilised feel disempowered and increasingly marginalised. Under these circumstances, what channels do the demobilised regard as available to resolve their grievances and assert their rights? And how does this influence the prognosis for security in the future in Mozambique?

1. State-citizen reciprocity: *'They think of the government as a father...'*

In contrast to liberal political theory in which rights entail responsibilities, the following evidence shows that the demobilised construe their rights as derivative. The demobilised are able to allocate blame for the war on the government because they

¹We will use 'son' for convenience in this chapter, although there were both female and male soldiers, and the same relationship exists between a father and a daughter.

have personalised the relationship between state and citizen and regard it as analogous to the relationship between 'father' and 'son'. The fundamental characteristic of this relationship is reciprocity; in fulfilling his responsibility to do as his father demands, the son acquires rights. Equally, by virtue of his seniority, the father has rights over the son, which also entail responsibilities. Thus the relationship between rights and responsibilities depends on one's place in the hierarchy. For the ordinary soldier, responsibilities have to be fulfilled in order to enjoy rights; for the state, rights are enjoyed but entail subsequent responsibilities.

In the war situation, the sons' responsibility was to fight for the cause dictated by their father, and the father had the right to expect this of his sons. During the war, there were two fathers: the government and Dhlakama/Renamo. With the war over, there is only one, and the sons feel they have a right to expect the father to fulfil his responsibilities towards them - in this case to provide compensation and reward.

I would not like it if the demobilised were forgotten by the government, since we are the sons of the government. (Frelimo DS, Madal)²

While the father-son relationship is straightforward for Frelimo demobilised under a Frelimo government, it might initially appear paradoxical that Renamo demobilised also regard the government as the 'father', given that Frelimo, the same party they were fighting against, is still in power. Yet they use the same framework to explain their current relationship to the government in power.

Renamo demobilised explain that they can now consider the current government as their father because 'we fought for democracy, we achieved this objective, and so it doesn't matter whether it is [President] Chissano or [Afonso] Dhlakama who is in power'. In other words, now that the system is legitimate, what matters is the position rather than who fills it. Therefore, there is no problem transferring allegiance. Thus this conceptualisation of 'father - son' reciprocity is compatible with the democratic principle that an elected government is accountable to all its subjects, not just those who voted for it.

However, the linkage of 'father - son' reciprocity to democratic principles may be as much opportunistic as ideological. The term 'democracy' represents very different things to different people. Further, there is widespread sentiment among Renamo demobilised that the elections were not just (see **Table 28**). It would therefore be naive to read this stated submission of Renamo demobilised to government authority

²Interview Q 66, 25.7.96

as an unconditional acceptance of western-style democracy and of the present government.

It may in fact be a post-hoc rationalisation of the objectives of the war and their relation to the post-war polity based on a pragmatic appraisal of their present situation. There is no doubt that at the time of the elections, Dhlakama actively promoted the view that 'we were fighting for democracy and not power'. In this way he also absolved himself of responsibility towards the demobilised in the post-war period and ensured that if promises were not fulfilled, the government would be blamed.

It is also important to point out that while we have described this as a transfer of filial allegiance from Renamo to the government, many Renamo demobilised still believe their party also has responsibilities towards them. Thus they are able to keep both parties as potential resources - both in terms of calling in debts and as a vehicle for pressuring the government.

Here we hope to have only two parents, Chissano and Dhlakama, like for example a father and mother - so we can say that Dhlakama is the mother, because he is behind... They say that one hand washes the other. (Renamo DS, Derre)³

2. Grievances arising from the past

It is difficult to pinpoint the source of the concept of the state as the 'father', because it appears a logical extension of the historically-rooted patriarchal organisation of public and private life.

Who introduced this concept of the government as father?

Well, I don't know the answer. I think it's what I told you, that people think [of the government] as a father because he does everything. He protects, gives orders, forbids certain things, and many other things. For these reasons they think of the government as a father...

There is no father without a mother - so who is the mother in this case?

When people talk of a father they mean it in the sense of someone with responsibility who is put in charge of all the work. [The word] father is used in the sense of a responsible person who is in charge. (Renamo DS, Derre)⁴

³Interview, MOR 118, 05.09.96

⁴Interview MOR 125, 06.09.96

It is clear, though, that both parties to the conflict played on this personalisation of the public sphere, and that soldiers' war experiences reinforced it.

i) Recruitment

For the young men and women who were taken to be soldiers, both the recruitment process and subsequent military life demanded the same unquestioning obedience as a father would expect of his child.

The two sides recruited in different ways and from different geographical areas, a differentiation which became starker as the war progressed and Mozambique became territorially divided between those areas controlled by Frelimo and those under Renamo (see also **Chapter 5, Section 1, i, b**). However, forcible recruitment was common to both: forty-eight percent of our sample had been forcibly recruited, and only fifteen percent had volunteered (n=83).

TABLE 25: Reason for entering army by political affiliation (%)

Reason for entering army	Renamo*	Frelimo**
Compulsory Military Service	35	54
Forced conscription	87	28
Volunteered	10	14
To go abroad	0	2
Peer pressure	0	2
TOTAL	100	100

*n=32, **n=56

This introduction to military life was a painful experience for many, in which they lost control of their lives and had to submit to forces far stronger than themselves. The clarity and detail with which people remember this experience is evidence of its dramatic and often painful nature.

Although the government's law of compulsory military service stated that youngsters must be over the age of eighteen, a great deal of recruiting actually went on in schools. The criterion for recruitment became whether the person was sufficiently mature physically, rather than whether he/she met the legal age requirements.

⁵This reflects a case in which a man was conscripted by Frelimo and subsequently captured by Renamo.

I was studying in Maganja. On that day I left Maganja to go to the civil registry to sort out my documents. When I arrived at the registry, I began to sort out my ID card. As I was doing this, a group came from the recruitment centre in Quelimane and they seized the people who were in the registry. They took me too, but there were some people there who knew that I was a student. They called the District Education and Culture office in Maganja to tell the hostel, because I was staying at boarding school. The District office wrote a message to the hostel and the head of the hostel brought a document proving that I was a boarder at the secondary school. But they didn't want to listen.

They took off my shirt and my trousers and I was just left with a photograph and they took me to Mabala and then to Macuse, and then they took me to Quelimane. From Quelimane to Maputo, and that pair of trousers was never given back to me, just a pair of torn trousers and a torn shirt, not that one of mine. This was in 1986. (Frelimo DS, Bajone Tapata)⁶

Renamo was heavily dependent on forcible recruitment.

They took me from here at home just as I was preparing to kill a goat, just as I was chasing it to kill it, it was in the afternoon.

Did you think of fleeing?

If you fled they killed your whole family, so I was afraid to flee and send suffering to all my family... All those people I had left there, it was worth my suffering (to save them), so I stayed to the finish (Renamo DS, Megaza).⁷

The recruit's sense of loss of volition was reinforced by the way in which he was often taken away in full view of his parents - who were also powerless to intervene. At least those who were recruited in front of their parents knew that their parents were aware of what had happened to them. Others were not so lucky, and had to rely on informal methods to inform their parents that they had been taken into the army (see **Chapter 2, Section 2**).

What did the Renamo soldiers say when they came to your house?

They said to my parents, we want this man to come with us to our barracks. My parents were afraid, and there was no time to reply, and I accepted to enter.

How did you feel when they came to take you into the army?

Me? Ah, since I was just a boy, and I didn't know what it was all about, when I entered I was afraid. But after a few days there, I got used to it.

What did your parents tell you about why Renamo was fighting?

They didn't know anything about it. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)⁸

⁶Interview MAG 15, 21.06.96

⁷Interview, MOR 30, 30.07.96

⁸Interview MOS 1, 02.07.96

ii) Fear of reprisals: 'You could flee but you would get caught'

After recruitment, fear of reprisals was a strong incentive to remain in the army rather than attempt to flee. The majority of both Renamo and Frelimo soldiers stated that they remained in the war against their will; it was logistically impossible to flee, they feared the reprisals for desertion, and the war was ubiquitous. Remaining in active duty was thus almost inevitable, generating a sense of resigned fatalism.

The following are two typical responses from Renamo demobilised:

Since the work of the war was obligatory, if you agreed or you didn't, it was still obligatory. There was nothing you could do, you just had to accept it all. (Renamo DS, Mapungwana)⁹

Did you try to flee and return home?

The problem was that war was very difficult.

You couldn't flee?

You could flee, but you would get caught, many people died from trying to flee. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)¹⁰

Similarly, Frelimo soldiers felt they could not escape the war, even if they wanted to:

Did you ever think of running away, giving up?

Even if I thought that I didn't want any more of this war, the war would be there at home even if I went home. It was all the same, there was nowhere that didn't have war. [...] Everywhere was hot, except Zimbabwe, so many people fled there.

Why didn't you flee to Zimbabwe?

I didn't flee to Zimbabwe because I was a military man, I thought a lot about fleeing to Zimbabwe but it would have been difficult. I thought that if I left these weapons, if they caught me, what would I say to them? Where had I left the weapons? So I felt really scared. But those who didn't feel scared, many of them fled, many ran away. (Frelimo DS, Mapungwana)¹¹

iii) Identification with objectives

Most demobilised stated that they were recruited forcibly (forty-eight percent) or for Compulsory Military Service (thirty-five percent) (n=83), and were not therefore necessarily either aware of the political objectives of the side on which they were fighting, or in agreement with them. Nonetheless, there were some who claimed to have been informed of the objectives of the war before they were recruited and to have agreed with these objectives. Others became convinced once they became aware

⁹Interview MOS 42, 27.07.96

¹⁰Interview MOS 44, 29.07.96

¹¹Interview MOS 43, 27.07.96

of the objectives. Clearly, coercion was not the only reason why some remained involved for as long as they did.

Political education played some part in convincing new recruits that they were fighting for a 'just' cause, with many of the respondents on both sides reporting regular political education classes. The impact of this is evident from people's opinions on the objectives of the war:

TABLE 26: Objectives of war by political affiliation (%)

Objectives of war	Renamo	Frelimo
Don't know	16	50
Democracy	56	18
Defence against bandits	0	12
Against Frelimo	8	0
Frelimo policies	12	0
Power struggle	0	9
Liberation and Peace	4	6
Other	4	5
TOTAL	100	100

n=73

In general, Renamo soldiers appeared to be more convinced by the objectives they believed they were fighting for, even though many also asserted that they would have fled had they not been afraid of the reprisals. They cited 'democracy' (fifty-six percent), doing away with the 'Communist laws' such as State farms and appropriation of private property, pass laws, and other policies such as villagisation and anti-polygamy campaigns (twelve percent). Those who were convinced that they were fighting for a just cause gained the courage to continue.

Did you not think about fleeing?

No.

Why not?

Why didn't I think about fleeing? It's that I found out in practice in the war, why I was fighting. Really, I knew that I was fighting for democracy, for our country to liberate itself. So then I thought that I shouldn't flee, better that I die here. (Renamo DS, Mude)¹²

¹²Interview MOS 35, 12.07.96

Frelimo demobilised, on the other hand, appear to have had less sense of conviction: a full fifty percent of Frelimo demobilised asserted that they were still in the dark about the supposed reasons, or that they did not believe there were reasons for the war:

So were there any reasons for you to fight?

Mm. There were none. Because in my own opinion, I think that when Frelimo was fighting against Portuguese colonialism, then there was a purpose to it. But for the two of us [Renamo and Frelimo] to fight, for what? In that case there was no real purpose. (Frelimo DS, Derre)¹³

Of those Frelimo soldiers who claimed to know the objectives of the war, the main reasons cited were 'democracy'¹⁴, followed by protection of the country from 'bandits' and defence of the country, or more locally, defence of the community - as in the following example:

This war, the objective is that they were doing bad, they would come and take my things here.

Who came to take your things?

Renamo.

Here?

Here in the village.

And that's why you went to fight?

Yes, they came to destroy our villages, they came to do scandalous things, and this is what gave us the nerve to go there to make him stop all his badness. (Frelimo DS, Mapungwana)¹⁵

Some also stated that they remained out of a sense of duty, and they saw at least some degree of righteousness in this.

Did you think of fleeing during the war?

No, I had the courage to fulfil my duties.

Why didn't you think of fleeing?

I didn't think of it because I saw that if I left, there would not be anyone else to defend our country. That's why I stayed to defend it, in order for us to end all the problems. (Frelimo DS, Madal)¹⁶

Another explanation which has been put forward to explain why Renamo soldiers did not desert was that they gained a sense of social promotion in the army and release

¹³Interview MOR 128, 05.09.96

¹⁴Frelimo soldiers who cited 'Democracy', were describing what the war was over, not necessarily that Frelimo itself espoused democracy as an objective

¹⁵Interview MOS 43, 27.07.96

¹⁶Interview Q 63, 19.08.96

from the bonds of 'traditional' rural society (Geffray 1990). This did not emerge as a theme in our interviews.

Regardless of the reasons for staying in the war, be it fear of coercion, sympathy with the objectives, or enjoyment of the associated status, all built up a sense that in spending many years fighting they had acquitted themselves of their responsibilities as sons, and that the state should now meet its obligations to them. In other words, an individual's level of commitment, whether prior to or during the conflict, was not regarded as a determinant of the level of compensation they are due subsequently. In the 'father - son' framework, the son is not rewarded for personal ideological commitment but for fulfilling commands of the father, regardless of personal views.

iv) Rupture of life plans, loss of opportunity

A further sense that the state is now under obligation to the demobilised arises from the fact that the soldiers sacrificed opportunities in order to fulfil the commands of the state. Many perceived the war as a rupture of their life plans, and almost all felt that they had lost a great deal due to their time in the army.

As highlighted in **Chapter 4 (Section 1, vi)**, demobilised soldiers overwhelmingly lament the loss of educational opportunities due to the war, and the access to salaried employment which they believe an uninterrupted education would have brought.

And how do you think that your entry into the army set your life back?

Yes, it set my life back a lot, because when I went to the army, there was nothing that I gained there, I didn't even buy a plate, nothing. It was just living, working, getting paid badly and eating badly. If we had received a good salary, it would have been at least acceptable, but no, it just made me regress. And worse, when I returned, there was a problem to reintegrate me into my job, I had to get a contract and I wasn't returned to the right category. So there was really a regression.

If I had been in civilian life, I could have achieved what I had planned, but... I suppose I can't complain, when there is war, there will always be delays and postponements. Because war never constructs, it only destroys. And this destruction is not just material, it's moral... (Frelimo DS, Espungabera)¹⁷

Frustration at lost opportunities is equally true of Renamo and Frelimo soldiers. Outward signs of success in gaining a livelihood which sustains one's family often mask internal dissatisfaction and disappointed expectations. A former Renamo commander who was recruited while at a teacher training course told us of his previous dreams to go to university. After the war he was asked to fill in the forms at

¹⁷Interview MOS 4, 04.07.96

the Assembly Area detailing his ideas for the future. He wrote that he would like to continue studying.

To do what afterwards?

I would like to continue to study, as I am seeing that life these days requires it. A person must study.

But to do what afterwards?

My desire ever since I can remember has been to get to university level, because this would be a benefit not only to me but also to my people, our people. (Renamo DS, Manica)¹⁸

He is currently running a kiosk which brings in enough money to support his family, but 'it is not solving any of my problems, and I am not optimistic'. He has had to transfer his hopes for a university education onto his children.

For female demobilised soldiers, loss of respect in society is one of the central preoccupations (see **Chapter 5, Section 3, iii**), although those who are now living in urban areas also lament loss of educational opportunities.

What did you lose in the war?

Where I was, we had to serve as Renamo's women. I was forced to go with one of the commanders, and I had a child by him. At the time of demobilisation they forbade the people who had children by commanders or soldiers to tell, we were supposed to say that the children just appeared. We couldn't name the fathers of the children. (Female Renamo DS, Quelimane)¹⁹

v) Frustrated expectations: *'Up to now I haven't received anything they promised'*

Against a backdrop of lost opportunities, promises made during war became an important component of soldiers' expectations for the post-war period. Both Frelimo and Renamo soldiers cited promises which had raised their hopes for the future.

Frelimo promises often centred around the guarantee of employment subsequent to the war.

Did they make any promises for after the war was over?

They said that after the war ends, *epa*, I think that we will be in peace, free, we won't have any more problems, there will be employment, and everything will be good for all Mozambicans so that there is no more confusion. (Frelimo DS, Madal)²⁰

¹⁸Interview CHI 121, interviewed in Gondola, 21.08.96

¹⁹Interview Q 86, 28.08.96

²⁰Interview Q 63, 19.08.96

Some expected not even to have to wait until peace, but believed that they needed only fulfil the two years of Compulsory Military Service in order to benefit.

I went to the army because at that time the government was saying that all young Mozambicans must complete their Compulsory Military Service, and that anyone who didn't wouldn't get a job. So I went personally to register myself, thinking that as the government was saying that after two years we'd be out again and get jobs, I decided that I wasn't going to suffer, I was going to do it. However, instead of being two and a half years, it was nine years of war. And after nine years I was demobilised, and up to now I haven't received anything they promised. (Frelimo DS, Madal)²¹

This respondent is not atypical: sixty percent of soldiers spent from between nine to twenty-five years in the army (Pardoel 1996b: 29), and in our study sample the median number of years spent was ten (n=81). However, disaggregated by political affiliation, the median number of years for Frelimo demobilised was nine and a half (n=50), while for Renamo it was twelve and a half years (n=29).

In addition to spending such long periods of time in military service, it has been an additional blow for demobilised soldiers to find that employment opportunities if anything decrease in inverse proportion to the length of time served, as explained in **Chapter 4, Section 1, v.**

Some were not concerned about the political objectives of the war. Instead, they were motivated by explicitly material objectives, so their post-war expectations were consequently material.

What were the objectives of the war?

I still don't know why they were fighting. We know that when we were recruited, we were told that 'you shouldn't take it badly, later on you will profit from it', without knowing [at the time] that they were conning us... These days we demobilised are nobodies - you just pick up your hoe and your head starts to hurt. (Frelimo DS, Derre)²²

Renamo soldiers had similar promises of material compensation made to them during the war, and are equally let down by the failure of fulfilment.

And now that you've had time to reflect on all this, what are your thoughts on Renamo?

About Renamo? Well, I think that we suffered a lot in the bush: we didn't have boots, we received nothing, we didn't eat tinned fish, we only learned about tinned fish in the cantonment centres. There was always a grievance

²¹Interview Q 67, 26.07.96

²²Interview MOR 120, 05.09.96

among us because Frelimo arrived eating tinned fish. We thought there might be a change in payment, but there was no difference, the payment stayed the same. And besides that, those from Frelimo who have done ten years get a pension, and we from Renamo don't. I think Renamo was cheating us because we are left in misery. (Renamo DS, Mocubela)²³

Making promises of future compensation for war efforts was probably mainly a tactic to maintain morale and prevent desertion. It is difficult to know how many actually believed the promises at the time. Few were as frank as the following respondent, as it could undermine the strength of their claims for compensation.

When you were receiving messages from your leaders during the war telling you what the war was about, were they also making promises about what would happen after the war, what you would have?

I would say that this is like a father saying to his son, do this and afterwards I'll give you this. But as time goes on, the child realises that there is nothing, it's just talk, just the way parents will talk, but we know that a father always talks so that the son will have morale.

What did they promise you would have?

They promised many things, it's not even worth saying because it's just embarrassing, they promised many things.

Why aren't they giving you now?

We knew that it was just talk. (Frelimo DS, Mapungwana)²⁴

Ironically, it is now the dismal economic situation which creates the spare time for pondering such grievances.

What do you do in your spare time?

We think. We don't have anything to do, we just talk about this war and how it tricked us badly, how they didn't give us what they promised...

You don't have music or football?

We don't have the means to buy [the necessary equipment], we have no means. (Frelimo DS, Derre. He is responsible for four orphaned nephews, over and above his own three children)²⁵

3. Present frustrations

The combination of forcible recruitment, submission to commands from above, disruption of life plans, and promises for future reward thus fitted the model of a 'father - son' relationship of unquestioning obedience. This can explain at least in part

²³Interview MAG 134, 08.08.96

²⁴Interview MOS 43, 27.07.96

²⁵Interview MOR 120, 05.09.96

the continued participation of so many men in a conflict for which few felt enthusiasm or internally-motivated commitment.

It also created a strong sense of accrued rights after the war ended. These men expected that the 'father' would fulfil his end of the bargain, and take up his responsibilities towards his 'sons'. The post-war period thus became the time of reckoning, when debts which the demobilised felt had been accumulating during the war would finally be called in.

However, things were not straightforward. Firstly, the lack of a clear winner of the war complicated the demobilised soldiers' claims for compensation. Whom could they hold responsible for the debts and promises? Under the General Peace Accord neither side could claim victory, so the issue was deferred until after the elections. This left people in a state of confusion, as evidenced by the following table charting opinions on who won the war:

TABLE 27: Winner of the war by political affiliation (%)

Who won the war	Renamo DS	Frelimo DS
Renamo	36	4
Frelimo	35	34
Nobody	7	40
Population	4	9
Don't know	18	13
TOTAL	100	100

n=82

These responses were given in 1996, two years after the elections. Their diversity is evidence of the wide range of views both on the objectives of the war, (see above **Section 2, iii**), and on the broader meaning of elections and democracy.

i) Democracy which doesn't deliver: *'Why is everything turned on its head these days?'*

The use of the term 'democracy' became current in Mozambique during the course of the war. It was Renamo who introduced the idea into its propaganda, at least partly in order to gain material support from the West.²⁶ 'Democracy' in this sense stood for the opposite of 'communism'. In its political education and mobilisation campaigns

²⁶Vines 1990: 78

within Mozambique, Renamo used 'democracy' to stand for a wide range of aspirations, from eliminating communal villages to returning traditional authority to power.

Frelimo changed its constitution to introduce a multi-party system in 1990, and moved toward incorporating some of Renamo's main policy prescriptions, but peace was needed in order to hold the first elections.²⁷ While for some, especially those in power, 'democracy' signified the holding of multi-party elections, for the population in general 'democracy' had become a rallying cry, and had come to stand for a wide range of aspirations more related to quality of life than to national political practice.

What is democracy?

Democracy? We want prices to be reduced to understand that this is democracy. (Renamo DS, Derre)²⁸

After the General Peace Accord, people were told that democracy would come with the first national elections. Expectations were high that peace and 'democracy' would bring new prosperity, an end to suffering, and even a return to the *status quo ante* of Portuguese rule which had begun to look attractive in comparison to the long years of difficult independence.

The promise of 'democracy' did bring elections but it brought no great change in the standard of living of the majority. Disappointment on this account is now strongly expressed in all quarters.

There are two principal reasons people feel unsatisfied with the elections. Thirty-one percent of our sample said the elections were not just, and another twenty-three percent said they did not know (n=70). Disaggregated by political affiliation, the figures show that many more Renamo supporters feel that the election results were unjust:

TABLE 28: Opinion of election results by political affiliation (%)

Were results just?	Renamo	Frelimo
Yes	30	60
No	57	10
Don't know	13	30
TOTAL	100	100

n=70

²⁷Hall 1991: 15

²⁸Interview MOR 100, 06.09.96

Linked to this is bewilderment at the way the system functions, and frustration at the difficulty of articulating grievances within it. This sense of bewilderment is well expressed by a group of returned refugees in Zambezia who voted for Dhlakama's Renamo party:

Do you think that the elections were fair?

Well, we don't really know. But if our leaders say that it was Dhlakama who won, and then afterwards we hear on the radio that up there, amongst themselves, they've decided that Dhlakama lost, well, we are just bewildered. Chissano had fewer votes, and his friend [Dhlakama] had lots of votes. So why is everything turned on its head these days? Well, that's a matter for them, nobody can really say anything. (Interview with five returned refugees, Derre)²⁹

A second reason for disappointment with the elections is that 'democracy' did not bring the improved standard of living which people hoped it would.

Do you think the elections were fair?

I can't really tell if they were fair or not. All I can say is that since the peace, things have been going backwards. Now we see a pair of trousers for 120,000 Mt. or even 300,000 Mt. So now I can see that the war isn't over at all, they are still making things worse.

So do you think it is good to have elections?

I may say it is good even if it isn't in fact - but what I would like to see right now is prices coming down! (Frelimo DS, Derre)³⁰

In line with the idea that reaping the benefits of elections should involve material improvement for individuals, the following respondent focused on the promise of projects:

Were the elections fair?

They were fair, but we are still weeping about these projects which we haven't benefited from. These first elections still haven't proven themselves. (Frelimo DS, Derre)³¹

Having judged the value of democracy by its material outcomes, many people have now come down on the opposing side. The following table shows people's attitudes to their lives currently:

²⁹Interview MOR 126, 06.09.96

³⁰Interview MOR 120, 05.09.96

³¹Interview MOR 119, 05.09.96

TABLE 29: Attitude to life currently (%)

Life now is:	Study sample*
Bad	48
Normal ³²	23
Good	13
Better than past	7
More expensive than past ³³	5
Same as past	3
TOTAL	100

* n=75

During the war 'democracy' was seen as the negation of unpopular Frelimo policies. This has now changed. Disillusionment with the democratic process is compounded by its association in people's minds with all the negative impacts of economic liberalisation. The fact that unpopular measures have been removed becomes irrelevant when some of the negative impacts of change are contrasted to 'socialism', which now stands for the more popular of Frelimo's post-independence policies. Thus, there is much complaint about price fluctuations and other corollaries of free market competition and structural adjustment, which goes under the guise of 'democracy'.

In the past there was no democracy but on the other hand there was a single law, there was a single price in the shops, in the markets, in the hotels. If you left one hotel and went to another you would find the same price, if you left one shop and went to another you would find the same price and today this no longer happens. You arrive here, ask how much is the *capulana*, he tells you 15,000. You go to another and he says it is 45,000.

You see this as a big problem?

Yes, it is a big problem. (President of locality, Machindu)³⁴

At a local level, many people feel that 'democracy' is problematic because it invites competition for power, and makes the resolution of conflict much more difficult. As Alexander (1995) demonstrated in her study of political authority in Manica province, the way in which people conceive of power is the result of their historical experience. A history of centralised one-party rules makes it difficult to imagine how politics could be arranged otherwise. Thus, the universe of possibilities for the political arrangement of society is limited by the realm of people's imagination and experience.

³²This is a Mozambican expression of pessimism, like 'Could be better'

³³Although only five percent responded to the question by saying 'life is expensive', most of those who said it was 'bad' also cited this reason.

³⁴Interview MOR 101, 03.09.96

Is it good to have many political parties?

There can be a lot of parties, if the government wants there to be many, because when there are many governors it is difficult to resolve problems. One can never know what is the idea of each one who governs, so it becomes difficult. If it is one person who is governing, then it is easy for us because there is only one person for us to obey. If it is many, it causes us headache. (Non-demob, Member of OMM, Espungabera)³⁵

As the above response demonstrates, there is a deep contradiction between belief in the state as 'father', and the principles of multi-party democracy.

Given this lack of a widespread political understanding of and commitment to democracy, many fear that elections and democracy could lead to another war, if there is 'no understanding' between those whom they perceive as competing for power.

Do you think that there should be other elections in the future, they should continue?

To continue them? I think that... to continue to have them when people don't get along, this is no good. They will be done, yes, but when there is no understanding, it doesn't work. It could even provoke another armed confrontation. (Renamo DS, Mude)³⁶

In essence, the lack of economic improvement accompanying democracy has been perceived by many as a failure of democracy itself. These complaints are generalised amongst the population, as Frelimo and Renamo supporters alike, and demobilised and non-demobilised are all affected by the high prices of consumer goods and the difficulties of generating income through employment or agriculture.

Beyond these grievances, complaints specific to demobilised centre on the breakdown of reciprocity because of the government's failure to compensate them for their years in the war and to fulfil their expectations. These expectations do not merely include financial remuneration, but moral recognition and acknowledgement as well.

As I already know the system there, if I don't want to vote for anybody I will just fold the paper and leave it. Because truly at the moment, I still can't say who is the government. I used to think it was the one who put me into the army. I thought I had a government. Because a father can never forget his son. Even if the son died five centuries earlier, there will come a day when he (the father) will prepare something in remembrance of his son who died. Well, our government is not doing that.

So you're saying that the government already forgot?

³⁵Interview MOS 39, 13.07.96

³⁶Interview MOS 36, 12.07.96

Yes. My very own government. I can say that it doesn't think that the person it took into the war was a living being, perhaps they were stones... (Frelimo DS, Bajone Tapata)³⁷

ii) Benefits as rights: 'They are trampling on my rights'

While many demobilised feel that they have a claim on the new government, regardless of their previous affiliation, this sentiment does not appear to be mutual. Even Frelimo soldiers have difficulty accessing their pensions, and they have not seen any of the other promised benefits materialise, for example preferential access to land.

The breakdown of reciprocity is clearest in the case of Renamo demobilised. In accordance with the General Peace Accord, they were treated even-handedly by the internationally-run demobilisation programme:

For all purposes, demobilised soldiers of both parties shall become civilians and shall be accorded equal treatment by the State (Protocol IV, Article VI, ii, 1).

They are bitter to find that the state is not according them equal treatment. In the case of pensions, the government's criterion is ten years of service, yet no Renamo soldiers are eligible for this benefit, despite the fact that the median time they spent in the war was thirteen years.

In a similar fashion to the complaints of the pre-ONUMOZ demobilised (see **Chapter 5, Section 1, ii**), Renamo soldiers argue that there is no relevant difference between the two groups which could justify the differential treatment.

We have two governments, some from Frelimo, others from Renamo. So then the pensions come to our district. You go there, but we see no pensions for Renamo, yet we see those of Frelimo are receiving. While we suffered together! (Renamo DS, Mocubela-Murabiwa)³⁸

Not only did they suffer together, but the following soldier argues that in fact, Renamo should have first access to pensions, since they were not receiving salaries during the war, while their Frelimo 'brothers' were.

We feel very badly about the pension situation. We have no pensions, and I went to ask but they said, 'for you in Renamo, there is no pension. Pensions are only for soldiers of the government, because you were not being paid salary [in the army]'. But in the end, a person who ate yesterday compared to

³⁷Interview MAG 17, 22.06.96

³⁸Interview MAG 150, 10.08.96

a person who has not even seen bread, which person should be offered food first? If you ate lunch today, but the other guy hasn't eaten anything since yesterday, who should be the first to be offered food? (Renamo DS, Morrumbala)³⁹

The inconsistent nature of the eligibility criteria is a further source of confusion. Although not eligible for normal pensions, disabled Renamo demobilised *are* eligible for disability pensions. The sense of unfairness which these inconsistencies creates is compounded by the rural-urban divide, which in many places broadly corresponds to the political divide. Those living in rural areas suffer great difficulties accessing the benefits for which they are eligible, and attribute this to corruption and discrimination.

Why would someone say that the war hasn't ended yet?

Well, I live here in Mossurize, but I receive my disability pension in Chimoio. Now, sometimes I might be ill, or sometimes there might be lots of rain so that no cars can go to Chimoio. I wait until the rain ends, maybe two or three months. When I get there to ask for what is due to me, I tell them that I couldn't come for three months because there was much rain, or because I was ill. They tell me that there is no money for me because I came late. But those are my rights! So this is why I could say that the war has not ended, because they are trampling on my rights. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)⁴⁰

This denial of benefits takes place against a backdrop of general neglect of previously Renamo-held areas.

But the Frelimo government, we see things are not going well, even in the districts we haven't seen anyone working yet. [...] They say to us, your father died, Samora won, where is Dhlakama? So they are exploiting us, and even our money doesn't come, they are eating our money.

Frelimo is eating well, and Renamo and their people get nothing, only massacre. Axes, hoes and other things which came from foreign countries for the people of Mozambique, for those who don't have them, we don't get any but we see them sold in Zimbabwe. Frelimo is stealing our things, and eating all at our expense. Our cheques ended and we are sitting doing nothing, and they tell us you should wait, they will come with papers and you will be given them to fill in, and when your name comes up, you will eat too. [You'll wait for] your money until you die. Up to now we have nothing, but they eat well. (Renamo DS, Mude)⁴¹

This is perceived by most as deliberate discrimination and a political provocation.

Why are there no Frelimo soldiers living here in this area?

I don't know, perhaps because we aren't receiving any assistance here and they are receiving some assistance [there in Chiurairue].

³⁹Interview MOR 75, 29.08.96

⁴⁰Interview MOS 52, 09.07.96

⁴¹Interview MOS 11, 08.07.96

Why are they receiving assistance and you aren't?

I don't know why there is this difference, it's because of this that another war will start. (Renamo DS, Mude)⁴²

The sense of being victims of deliberate discrimination was not peculiar to demobilised Renamo soldiers. Former Renamo teachers, nurses and administrators feel equally let down.⁴³ Teachers and nurses have generally lost their positions or been demoted to clerical positions because the government holds that they are not sufficiently qualified to teach.⁴⁴ It is particularly poignant when they are not replaced by anybody - is no education preferable to a low standard of education?

iii) Marginalisation

The outcome of failure to meet past promises, elections which are often perceived as unjust, democracy which fails to deliver economically, and the view that a relationship of reciprocity has been betrayed, results in widespread sentiments of marginalisation, with potentially serious consequences.

[...] People remain of the belief that something will happen, but now much time has passed, much time passes and we are beginning to become marginalised, we begin to think all kinds of things. And we will opt for committing crimes, demobilised soldiers will opt for crimes, though this was not our intention. We will commit crimes in order to survive, but this was not of our own volition, to rob or assault or do whatever in order to take from someone who has in order for us to survive as well. (Frelimo DS, Quelimane)⁴⁵

Marginalisation is not just economic. It also includes sentiments of exclusion, neglect, and alienation from political and social life. It has as much to do with expectations and how people feel about poverty, crime and justice as with how poor or insecure they are in material terms.

We are living, eating, sleeping badly thanks to the government. Why do I say this? Because at our demobilisation it said that each individual must go to the zone where he was born. Well, we are already back now but they don't want to bring us any work. (Frelimo DS, Bajone Tapata)⁴⁶

A key component of this marginalisation is an inability to articulate these frustrations face to face with the government.

⁴²Interview MOS 37, 12.07.96

⁴³Interview MOR 43, Chire, 01.08.96

⁴⁴Interview MOR 116, Chilú, 04.09.96; Interview MAG 135, Mocubela, 08.08.96; Interview MOS 12, Mude, 09.07.96; Interview MOS 17, Mude, 08.07.96; Interview CHI 119, Gondola, 21.08.96

⁴⁵Interview Q 69, 17.09.96

⁴⁶Interview MAG 15, 21.06.96

But I would not like it if the demobilised were forgotten by the government, since we are the sons of the government. For example there are many people who are marginalised, there exists marginality. Others are spoken of as demobilised, others not, but because there are many who have no profession, they're unemployed, they have no other way of living. [...] Someone who works just thinks about developing himself and his life, his family and his parents, he doesn't think about going begging or talking badly, he feels secure. (Frelimo DS, Madal)⁴⁷

4. No channel for resolution of problems with government

As outlined in Section 3, iii, people have serious reservations about democracy, and are impatient to see concrete improvements in living standards. The five year period between elections is too long to wait when there are immediate and pressing problems, and in any case, they have no confidence in the neutrality of the system.

In the previous chapter we indicated that authority structures are in a state of flux and often perceived as unaccountable. This extends from the local level right up to the government, including the police, who are seen as corrupt and in connivance with government.

Have you ever been to the police?

Not yet. I haven't taken any problem, since this problem that I have I can't take to the police, because the police are together with the government as well. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)⁴⁸

For those whose first impulse is to approach the authorities, this often results in further frustration and a feeling of helplessness, since there are no channels of appeal.

In your point of view, what is the best way to resolve a problem; having a strike, talking, what do you think?

In my opinion you must approach the appropriate authorities, since they are also living daily with our situation, that we demobilised are in misery. So the authorities see this, and I don't know if they have forgotten, or if they don't forget. But my approach is to go to them and speak with them, and then if you see that they are not resolving anything, *epa!* what can you do? what can you do? (Frelimo DS, Madal)⁴⁹

⁴⁷Interview Q 66, 25.7.96

⁴⁸Interview MOS 44, 29.07.96

⁴⁹Interview Q 66, 25.7.96

i) Strikes as a response to marginalisation: 'A war like we had? No, but you will see strikes...'⁵⁰

Faced with these difficulties in making their views heard and gaining satisfaction from the government, many are beginning to feel that radical steps are the only way to gain attention.

In 1996 there was a 'strike' (demonstration) of demobilised soldiers in Alto Molocue District, Zambezia province, in which the District Administrator was severely threatened and his house burned down. The question whether they would have joined in the strike if they had been in the area evoked divergent responses. The reasons given by those who would have joined in the strike are all related to frustration at lack of outlets for their grievances at a local level, the breakdown of reciprocity and a growing sense of economic and political marginalisation, as outlined in previous sections.

The feeling that the government still owes them a debt is a source of constant provocation to the demobilised, exacerbated by the lack of adequate means of communication with the government

We are suffering, we feel in our heart that there is a debt owed to us for the reasons I told you; we are not happy with what the Government did. We are very angry, to the point of not even wishing to talk to someone who is not a soldier. It's not worth it. What is necessary is to talk with the Government itself. (Renamo DS, Megaza)⁵¹

Thus, many feel that demonstrations are justified because it is necessary to call in the promises made:

What's your opinion in relation to the strikes?

Well, I can say what I think about the strike of Molocue, as I heard it. I heard that our colleagues held a demonstration because of the money promised by the government which was never given to them. In my opinion I would say that the demobilised were right to hold the strike, because it was a promise, they promised and they didn't fulfil their promise. Whoever makes a promise must keep it. (Renamo DS, Morrumbala)⁵²

In the absence of other means to express frustration, strikes appear to be the only way to draw the attention of the government:

Do you think striking is a good thing?

Yes, someone can feel strongly enough to strike. If he doesn't do that the Government doesn't see him so he thinks that the Government isn't interested -

⁵⁰Interview MOR 134, Renamo DS, Derre-Semente, 15.09.96

⁵¹Interview MOR 30, 30.07.96

⁵²Interview MOR 75, 29.08.96

and these days there isn't anybody who isn't in need of money. We are all in need of money, nobody wants to walk around dirty, we all want to walk around clean. (Frelimo DS, Derre)⁵³

Furthermore, people have visible proof that strikes achieve results:

So now we are seeing that if you don't carry out some kind of argument or demonstration, the government will not remember you. Just for them to know that there are people living here, you have to have a demonstration. For example, what happened in Morrumbala, what happened in Molocue. When the population there did this, then they were sent supplies to keep them happy. So we here in Maganja, because we have never done a massacre they do not recognise us yet. (Renamo DS, Mocubela-Murabiwa)⁵⁴

ii) War: the second radical option?

For some, striking is not viewed as a sufficient solution. They are considering going a step further.

We feel very angry, and we want to work. We want to eat, or if not, we will have to rob. I may not have the right equipment, but I'm getting prepared. The government has no interest in us, and it is said that they will only pay attention to someone who takes up arms. So this is what we're doing up to now, preparing our material, each one is preparing. The problem is how to get the equipment.

Up to now, we have these machetes which we were given by ONUMOZ. And we are wondering what we should do with them. We will begin to intimidate people, but we need to get weapons again. So we're preparing the material, each one with his own thoughts. Those weapons that we gave in [to ONUMOZ], they will shoot us down with them. They'll shoot us, the owners of those weapons, we who did our service with them! (Group of Renamo DS, Bajone-Namuera)⁵⁵

The reasons for going back to war are the same as for striking: material grievances and the failure of the government to listen to these grievances and to compensate for the past.

Well, not all of us are reconciled in practice, many are saying that we did our bit and we don't see any result, so it would be worth going back to war - because we are living badly, I mean seventy-five (contos) is what one chicken costs, for a spent soldier that is nothing, and many are discontented, in truth they are not happy with this. (Renamo DS, Mocubela)⁵⁶

⁵³Interview MOR 120, 05.09.96

⁵⁴Interview MAG 150, 10.08.96

⁵⁵Interview MAG 11, 21.06.96

⁵⁶Interview MAG 134, 08.08.96

Corruption in the delivery of assistance is seen as part of the breakdown of reciprocity which could lead to war if the government is not careful.

Could those who provoked the war provoke another one?

They won't provoke another war, they will only provoke another one because they like to eat at someone else's expense, in this case (at the expense of) us soldiers. I know I can't write but I have heard that overseas there is money to support us. Who is eating the money? The very government of Chissano. So the person who isn't thinking of the consequences [i.e., the government] may end up provoking a war.

If my son's uncle or grandfather brings me something to give to my son and I then take the things and eat them, then my son and I won't see eye to eye; he will get angry with me and start to abuse me, I in turn will become angry and say 'you as my son dare not disrespect me' - and so you already have a fight, even though I was the one who did wrong by eating at his expense. (Renamo DS, Megaza)⁵⁷

It is not only disenchanted demobilised who make the link between the economic situation and war. The demobilised often focus on unmet expectations specific to them, while others see the potential for war in the situation in general.

Having experienced the war between Frelimo and the colonists, and between Frelimo and Renamo, now that we're at peace do you see the signs of another war here in Mozambique?

Well, for someone who knows how to analyse, yes, we can see certain things. Because to start with, things have changed a lot. We have nowhere to sell our maize, and even if you had money to buy a *capulana*, it's different from when the whites were here. [...] It is for these reasons we think maybe this is the sign of yet another war. (Returned refugee, Derre)⁵⁸

5. So why no new war to date?

It is difficult to judge the veracity of bellicose statements, given that the language of war has become ubiquitous over the long years of armed conflict. It cannot be doubted, though, that there is a high degree of frustration amongst demobilised soldiers. In many statements, such as the following, the potential for violence appears close to the surface:

Could there be another war?

I can't say. I am like a bull in a pen.

A bull in a pen?

The bull in a pen depends on the cow-herd to open the gate.

I see...

⁵⁷Interview MOR 30, 30.07.96

⁵⁸Interview MOR 126, 06.09.96

If he opens the gate, I will leave the pen. (Renamo DS, Chire)⁵⁹

However, some demobilised who use strong language, when pushed, admit that they are not actually planning a war and do not think it would solve their problems.

Do you think there could be another war?

Yes, if they don't give us our pension money and all that we want, there will be another war.

So if another war happens, it will be the demobilised who start it?

No, it won't be us, it will be others.

Do you know people who are ready to make war now?

No, there is no one who can come again and start a war, the war that will happen is with our mouths only, just talking. (Renamo DS, Mude)⁶⁰

Instead, Renamo demobilised have absorbed the rhetoric of their national leaders, who, as part of the move from guerrilla army to political party, advocated transforming the war of weapons into a 'war of words':

Do you talk about the war when you're drinking with your friends?

It might come up, but only if we get angry. After all, we worked a lot and [yet] we have no power, we of Renamo. We just heard they will do this that and the other, but in concrete terms it's all just talk. People say that the war ended, but the war of words continues. (Renamo DS, Mude)⁶¹

If demobilised feel marginalised, and feel that the only way to get the attention of the government is through actions such as demonstrations or at the limit, war, why has there not been a rekindling of the conflict or large-scale violence?

Firstly, there are some people who still believe that democracy provides a medium-term solution to the problem of marginalisation.

Elections are like a *machamba*. If we see that in the *machamba* where we cultivated, nothing was produced or we didn't harvest anything, next year we'll move to another plot of land. (Renamo DS, Espungabera)⁶²

Some also continue to feel a sense of duty towards the government.

And if you were recruited again for military service, would you accept?

Well, I cannot say no to an order of the government. Even today he can say that I am called up, and I have to go. I have to go, I cannot refuse. (Frelimo DS, Madal)⁶³

⁵⁹Interview MOR 42, 01.08.96

⁶⁰Interview MOS 37, 12.07.96

⁶¹Interview MOS 11, 08.07.96

⁶²Interview MOS 44, 29.07.96

However, such sentiments are in the minority. There are more pragmatic reasons why people are unwilling to strike or to go back to war. Some who rejected the strike explained their reluctance because they do not wish to be involved in trouble, thereby jeopardising their regained civilian identity.

I could not take part in that kind of banditry. Since leaving the troops I have never caused trouble, never been arrested, and I have never asked for money. I have just become one of the population. (Frelimo DS, Derre)⁶⁴

Others did not strike for fear of police reprisals.

If you had been in Alto Molocue, would you have participated in the strike?

No.

Why not?

Because if I had participated, later I would get in trouble. Since our government today... the police when they hear that so and so is a demobilised, and many were on strike, then they would go looking for the perpetrators, the leader, and even if you weren't involved, they would say it was you and take you in. (Frelimo DS, Madal)⁶⁵

This fear was based on historical precedent, as the following demobilised from before ONUMOZ recounted:

What was the motive of this demonstration?

This demonstration was because of the money, because we were supposed to be paid the salaries which had not been paid in the previous months. So we pursued the issue, we pursued it until we got tired without achieving anything. That day, I didn't go but I heard that some had held a demonstration, and that was the last day, no one went again because we were threatened by the police and the soldiers, because at that time it was 1993, it was before the Peace.

And it ended there? You never went back to find out about your money? You never went back there?

No, because when they were threatened, they just fled haphazardly, and those who were caught by the police were taken to jail, and the rest were afraid so they didn't go back there. So we are still waiting, until today, this group... our government... until today no one has gone back there. (Frelimo DS, Madal)⁶⁶

Reluctance to return to conflict may also be grounded in memories of the harsh conditions of the war, and relief that the physical fighting is finally over. Even four years after the signing of the Peace Accord, there is still a sense of jubilation in many places that the war has come to an end, and that there is now sufficient security to establish livelihoods.

⁶³Interview Q 41, 18.06.96

⁶⁴Interview MOR 121, 05.09.96

⁶⁵Interview Q 70, 26.07.96

⁶⁶Interview Q 67, 26.07.96

How is your life these days?

Life now, I think it is good because when you go to bed at night, you take off your shoes, you take off your trousers and you put them aside, while before, you had to sleep with everything ready to flee. It was just *che!* running out as you are, with your suitcase ready, your shoes ready to flee. So I think that it is good. If things continue like this, I think it is good. (*Bairro* Secretary, Espungabera)⁶⁷

These sentiments are widely echoed by demobilised soldiers who were only too glad to get out of the troops.

You wanted to leave [the army]?

Yes, to leave. Some people would get sick, or steal or commit a crime to get out, but my strategy was a bit different, so that no one would realise that I wanted to leave. When they sent me to the garrison [i.e., a demotion], I was content, because I knew that after that, it was out.

I was not happy at all [in the army]. I would get angry, I would even cry just like that, just from thinking. Then they sent me to Nampula where they needed radio operators. In Nampula I asked for leave to go home to visit my family, and they let me go in order to get better. I spent five months with my family, working in the *machamba*. And I seemed to get better. (Frelimo DS, Espungabera)⁶⁸

A final possible explanation for the absence so far of a massive return to violence or war lies in the soldiers' conceptualisation of their participation in the war and violence in general. As discussed in **Chapter 5, Section 5, iii**, a key conflict avoidance strategy was to lay the blame for all that happened on the leadership of both sides, rather than on the soldiers who only carried out orders. An extension of this was the sentiment expressed by most demobilised that if anyone were to begin another war, it would be the leaders rather than the average demobilised soldier.

Do you think there could be another war?

Myself, as I sit here, a disabled person, I don't need any more war. I don't know about those leaders, who can't agree with each other. They might get together and decide to start the war again, just like when we had finished the war with the Portuguese. I don't know if it will continue any more, I don't know. (Renamo DS, Mapungwana)⁶⁹

⁶⁷Interview MOS 2, 02.07.96

⁶⁸Interview MOS 4, 04.07.96

⁶⁹Interview MOS 42, 27.07.96

CONCLUSION

By contrast with **Chapter 5**, where we suggested that there is a range of conflict resolution mechanisms and conflict avoidance strategies in place to resolve local level conflicts, in this chapter we have demonstrated that there are no satisfactory mechanisms in place with which to resolve deeply held grievances against government and national leaders. In terms of the prospects for national security and lasting peace, this is not reassuring. While the demobilised generally do not show signs of being prepared for another war, they are deeply ambivalent about the possibility of conflict, given the economic situation and unpredictable leadership. Although they are unlikely to initiate further war, it is not at all certain that they would not heed future calls to arms - and as our findings suggest, the recent war set such a precedent. Most, after all, were often recruited against their will, but nevertheless carried out the orders of their leaders over an extended period of time.

Would you have liked to join the new army or not?

No, but if those superiors had said you must go here, I would have gone. I would always go, because we are followers, I could never refuse to obey orders. (Renamo DS, Megaza)⁷⁰

The current frustrations which prompt people to speak of imminent war are rooted in post-Peace Accord failure to resolve issues associated with the war itself. The war may have begun as a strategy of Rhodesian and South African destabilisation campaigns against the Frelimo government. Yet as time went by, it took root in the political scene of Mozambique, and Renamo was able to rally together many people discontent with Frelimo policies,⁷¹ as evident in the Renamo demobilised's greater clarity about the objectives of the war (**Section 2, iii**). In particular, Renamo appealed to a discontented population of rural smallholders, who had been most directly prejudiced by Frelimo's statist, urban-biased policies.⁷²

The war was brought to an end, many believe, because drought and insecurity led to extremely low food production which meant that people were no longer able to support the economic drain posed by the armies.⁷³ War had failed to achieve much more than an exclusion of the state from areas controlled by Renamo, and some limited gains to a few who were able to capitalise on the conflict. Meanwhile, the economic situation in Mozambique had deteriorated to such a degree that even the

⁷⁰Interview MOR 31, 31.07.96

⁷¹See e.g. Geffray 1990, Legrand 1991, Cahen 1993: 54

⁷²Geffray 1990, Cahen 1993

⁷³Legrand 1991: 22, UNHCR 1996: 4

most basic needs of the majority could not be met without external intervention and assistance.⁷⁴ The international climate was also ripe for settling the conflict, and so serious negotiation skills were brought to bear and managed to achieve a settlement.⁷⁵

It was hoped that once peace was assured, 'democracy' would deliver whatever else was needed to get Mozambique back on the road from destruction to development. While the conduct of free and fair elections observed by several thousand international observers signalled to some that the problems of Mozambique were resolved, this overlooked the crucial fact that what people have come to understand as 'democracy', and what the international community understands as 'democracy', are two very different things. There are two central problems arising from the divergence of views on democracy.

Firstly, the population uses the term 'democracy' to stand for the fulfilment of a wide range of aspirations. If no improvements are forthcoming, 'democracy' is held responsible, as well as the current government. A few years have passed since the elections, and it is becoming clear that basic grievances, ranging from the broad to the specific, are unresolved.⁷⁶ Now, not only are rural areas suffering from underdevelopment and deleterious economic policies as badly as they did in the past, but urban dwellers are feeling a serious pinch due to policies of structural adjustment which put prices for consumer goods out of their reach.⁷⁷ 'Democracy' did bring elections but it brought no great change in the standard of living of the majority. Disappointment on this account is now strongly expressed in all quarters.

This situation is potentially threatening to the prospects for peace and social security, and some argue that 'the only solution to averting this potential powder keg is for the country to experience rapid economic growth'.⁷⁸ This 'powder keg' situation is partly due to generalised marginalisation, as stabilisation and structural adjustment 'have contributed to creating the material preconditions for the dissatisfaction in rural areas to increase'.⁷⁹ These dissatisfactions find fertile soil in the young men who also have specific grievances arising from their involvement in the war.

It is particularly worrying that there continues to be discrimination against Renamo areas, given that most explanations of the war cite such neglect and

⁷⁴Finnegan 1992: 119

⁷⁵Saul 1996: 10

⁷⁶Nilsson 1993b: 42

⁷⁷Willett 1995, Finnegan 1992: 104

⁷⁸Willett 1995 quoted in Hanlon 1997: 127

⁷⁹Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995, quoted in Hanlon 1997: 127

underdevelopment of rural areas as an important cause. Analysts agree that there must be a social and political sharing of power and the resources it brings in order to avoid future conflict,⁸⁰ and 'an obvious flow of resources into former Renamo areas - more roads, schools, health posts, shops and agricultural extension officers'.⁸¹ The emphasis on fiscal control central to stabilisation programmes ignores the political repercussions of economic programmes, such that 'stabilisation could actually restart the war or help to provoke violence, as has happened elsewhere'.⁸²

While academics debate the causes of economic problems, the population draws on past experience for alternative models - and any model from the past in which things were perceived as better than today is considered an option .

Now that the war has ended, what can we do to prevent another war from happening?

What can help us not to have a war is to have shops here, and work, and each person will be able to buy there. Also what stops the war is that we want the life we had before, not this life of taking things from people, in that way another war will begin. Each person must have his own things, and if we have robbery, we will be looking for ways to deal with this and then another war will start. (Renamo militia, Mude)⁸³

As pointed out in **Section 3, i**, memories of the past are often used selectively. Colonial times are viewed through rose-tinted spectacles: '... at least we could buy what we needed', is an oft-repeated refrain. Even the much-decried socialism is now seen as 'not so bad', in particular for those living in urban areas who, from the early years of independence until structural adjustment was introduced in 1987, benefited from highly subsidised access to food and produce. In such circumstances, it is not impossible that some people may even come to think that things were 'not so bad' during the war.

A second and related problem with the newly introduced 'democracy', is that the model of state-citizen relations is at odds with the way in which people conceived of them previously. Whereas in the western model of democracy, the individual has rights which entail responsibilities to the state, and the state is the servant to the citizen, the model presented by the demobilised is of the individual having responsibilities from which flow rights, in other words the citizen is the servant of the state.

⁸⁰Cahen 1992: 9

⁸¹Hanlon 1997: 143

⁸²Hanlon 1997: 126

⁸³Interview MOS 55, 02.08.96

In the western model, if the servant, namely the state, fails to perform, he is removed through the electoral process. In the demobilised's model, the state is not a servant but a father, and they are the sons. While they have fulfilled their responsibilities, the state is failing to reward them appropriately. They see no likely channels for a solution in the short-term, given their limited understanding and commitment to the electoral model, and the abundance of more pressing immediate needs.

In theory, the two models can be reconciled. If the Mozambican state, using the western model of state as servant, took its duties seriously, it would fulfil the needs of the demobilised to be recognised and rewarded by their father/master. Instead, it attempts to avoid this responsibility by hiding behind the curtain provided by the international agencies, which is the rhetoric that 'demobilised should be no different from any other civilian'.

Given that the electoral process is poorly understood and mistrusted, the demobilised see few channels for the airing their grievances against the government. In such circumstances, it is little wonder that there is much talk of strikes, demonstrations and the resort to violence. Though the threat of state use of force to prevent demonstrations is cited by some as sufficient deterrence, corruption amongst police, military and others at all levels of the hierarchy, weakens the state's control over its means of coercion.

It is heartening to hear some express aversion to the use of violence and reluctance to return to war, and appears to be a tribute to successes in re-establishing social interdependence which militate against individual violence. But it is not encouraging to hear the high level of frustration and latent violence just below the surface. If it was the economic situation which encouraged many to remain in the war, on the side of Renamo in particular, or eventually to espouse its objectives, then the widespread persistence of grievances about the economy does not bode well for the future. Further, the constituency of demobilised soldiers with its particular grievances must be seen as the most vulnerable to manipulation by someone with an agenda and the capacity to initiate further violence.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CONCLUSIONS

In **Chapter 1** we outlined five conceptually linked questions of particular relevance to future reintegration programmes.

The first question was 'Are demobilised soldiers in fact akin to Kaplan's 'loose molecules', with no stake in society?'. Central to this view is the idea that during war, soldiers become brutalised and alienated from societal norms, and will behave accordingly in the post-war period. We have shown how there is very little evidence that this has happened in Mozambique.

In **Chapter 2** we demonstrated that the complex considerations demobilised soldiers faced in choosing their place of destination were primarily social and economic in nature - should they reunite with family, and if so how? Where were the economic prospects best? Where would they enjoy the most social status? Where would be most in harmony with their new self-image? Where would they enjoy political and social security? These are not the questions of de-socialised 'loose molecules' - they are the legitimate concerns of any civilian when making a major move of such a nature.

We further suggested in **Chapter 3** that the majority of demobilised have undertaken a number of rites and ceremonies which explicitly mark the transition from military to civilian life: rites to acknowledge the loss of family members, rites to cleanse themselves of evil deeds and appease the spirits of those offended by war-time actions, and rites to inform and thank the spirits for their safe return. We found that the initiative for these ceremonies came either from the demobilised himself, OR from his family or receiving community. This involvement of non-demobilised in 'normalising' the situation of a demobilised soldier is important both in signifying a sense of shared responsibility, and in demonstrating that the demobilised are prepared to submit to a variety of local level 'authorities', whether family, *curandeiro*, party secretary or *régulo*.

We found that stated beliefs about gender roles for males and females have changed little, though practice may deviate from these; being married and setting up a

household are key indicators of adult status, and a prerequisite for recognition as a responsible member of the local community. Whereas at demobilisation only about half the soldiers reported themselves as married, by the time of our study nearly all were married.

The marriage process itself, whether in the patriarchal *lobolo* system, or in the matriarchal systems found in parts of the north, necessarily involves the demobilised conforming to very strong social norms and making new social links - which in turn form the basis for livelihood strategies in both urban and rural areas. Furthermore, marriage ceremonies and subsequent family life put considerable pressure on the demobilised to be able to provide at least the subsistence needs of his family, compelling him/her into economic activity.

In the light of this evidence it is clear that demobilised are not simply killing machines devoid of civilian skills and a sense of social responsibilities. Whether by choice or necessity, they are firmly bound into a variety of interconnected social networks within which there is little scope to behave as a 'loose molecule'. At the domestic level it appears that by and large the transition from 'demobilised soldier' to 'civilian' has been achieved.

The fact that they are not 'loose molecules' and that social reintegration is to a large degree supported by existing value systems and structures of obligation, largely supports the view that 'indigenous society' has considerable capacity to address social integration, though there is also scope for interventions which will facilitate this (see **Recommendations**). Nevertheless, success in social integration should not give the policy makers and funders the impression that reintegration *per se* is best left to the demobilised and their communities, as it is only one dimension of the overall process of reintegration.

While there is scope and a need to support financially these social reintegration processes, it is as important to support related economic and political reintegration processes which are often beyond the capacity of individuals and their receiving communities to address.

As stated in **Chapter 1**, it was believed that there was a direct causal relationship between social integration and national security and peace. However, the linkage is not nearly so straightforward. Demobilised soldiers who do have a stake in society, and are socially interdependent rather than 'loose molecules', also have a political identity.

This is at least partially determined by grievances related to unresolved political and social issues - and these may not bode well for future security and long-term peace if they are not addressed, an issue to which we return below.

Our second question was 'How have the various programmes helped or hindered the ex-combatants' own efforts to re-establish a social and economic existence sustainable beyond the end of the assistance programmes?'

The institution of marriage demonstrates most clearly that it is not helpful to make a sharp distinction between social reintegration and economic reintegration. In **Chapter 4** we showed that a primary consideration for most demobilised is the search for economic security. A wife and family provide a major pressure to achieve this, but also the principal means of realising it, through access to land and wives' active involvement in subsistence farming.

The evidence suggests that only once basic economic security has been achieved can the demobilised broaden his activities to pursue other income generating opportunities. While salaried employment, the preferred option of most, is not a realistic one under present circumstances, we found people involved in numerous non-agricultural income generating strategies.

Arguably the component of the DRP which most successfully facilitated these processes was the bi-monthly subsidy. Although grossly inadequate, and therefore in no way capable of creating 'dependency' among the recipients, it assisted people in achieving a semblance of food-security, re-establishing a household, making *lobolo* payments and small-scale investments. It was also non-discriminatory, as it was provided for Renamo and Frelimo demobilised alike.

Most of the other programmes neither helped nor hindered the majority of demobilised, both because they were insufficiently resourced, and because they largely ignored the need for economic security and the strategies individuals adopted to achieve it.

The micro-projects, in particular, were based on misguided assumptions about the need to discover 'initiative' and a weak analysis of the economic context within which such an initiative could take root. As a result the demobilised's search for security was ignored - and the very real initiative which is present among the demobilised was also overlooked. The use of inappropriate criteria of eligibility for programmes or

assistance was a further impediment to identifying the most able, and/or the most needy.

An unintended negative consequence of the programmes was that conflicts arose between those demobilised who received and those who did not. Further, when the programmes appeared, demobilised expected them to reach everyone, whereas they were intended to benefit only a few. This led to increased frustration and disempowerment.

In **Chapter 1 (Section 4)**, it was suggested that a key question for designers of DRPs should be whether to provide jobs for the demobilised, or, more modestly, an enabling environment within which to pursue existing opportunities. Our analysis of the projects and programmes suggested that both were needed, but neither has been totally successful.

Our third question was 'Do demobilised soldiers continue to identify themselves or to be identified by others as a group with particular rights, needs, and the potential to disrupt the peace process?'

In **Chapters 5 and 6** we explored how the failure to address the economic and social pressures under which the demobilised find themselves is a key factor in maintaining a sense of group identity. This identity is also manipulated for various reasons by all the parties: the demobilised themselves, in order to press demands for compensation; civilians, who hope to benefit from stigmatising them; the government, in order to attract more aid funding; and political parties in order to score political points.

In their domestic setting very few of the demobilised are interested in being seen as former combatants. Where disputes arise, a variety of mechanisms exist to resolve them. While these are relatively strong at the level of the household, they become increasingly weak at the higher levels of appeal.

It is in terms of the demobilised's attempts to seek compensation from the state that their sense of group identity is strongest. There is a widespread sense that the relationship of reciprocity between the state and the demobilised, the only framework within which most demobilised can make sense of what happened to them during the war, has broken down. This is in part because satisfactory mechanisms to deal with deeply held grievances and unfulfilled expectations *vis-à-vis* the state are not in place.

A commonly held assumption among policy makers is that 'democracy' is a guarantor of peace and security. However, the arrival of democratic elections and 'democracy', with its accompanying set of abstract rights, does not in itself guarantee that rights derived from fulfilling past obligations will be honoured under the new political system. As outlined in **Chapter 6**, the longer the government seeks to ignore what the demobilised regard as its obligations to them, the less faith the demobilised have in the capacity of 'democracy' to deliver, the more their group identity is reinforced, and the more radical the steps they consider to overcome the *impasse*. These range from strikes to a return to arms.

This has serious implications for the way in which the security situation is conceptualised. If, as we suggest, there is indeed a will to co-exist at the local level, but that this rests on the hope that serious grievances will be resolved at the national level, then the low levels of strikes and demonstrations should not be interpreted as symbolising general satisfaction with the present situation and therefore an indicator of national security.

National security has to be looked at in terms of the state's capacity and willingness to respond to grievances of specific constituencies. These grievances were, at the time of the research, primarily economic rather than political in nature, as demonstrated by the willingness of the majority of demobilised from both sides to regard the state as 'father'.

However, in circumstances of discrimination against Renamo demobilised for benefits, and lack of development of Renamo-held areas, they also become political issues. We would suggest that as long as fundamental economic interventions are delayed, the potential to disrupt the present peace will remain latent. The fear of the demobilised as 'loose molecules', with its emphasis on the psychology of the individual, distracts us from seeking to understand the individual's political relationship to the state.

The answers to these first three questions lead to a discussion of the fourth: 'Are current definitions of reintegration sufficient to understand the situation in Mozambique and the prospects for long-term security and development? Are they sufficient to design programmes which will meet the needs and aspirations of the targeted beneficiaries?'

In **Chapter 1** we examined a number of definitions of reintegration held by various Government officials and international NGOs involved in the DRP. Most of these

were minimalist, and couched in terms of reducing visible difference between the demobilised and those around him: 'A soldier is reintegrated when he is no different from the rest of the community, and not when all his problems are solved'.

We would argue on the basis of the evidence presented here, that such 'minimalist' definitions are wholly inadequate, whether in terms of meeting the needs of the target group or the macro-objective of sustained peace and security. Our findings suggest that it is necessary to give a much richer definition of 'reintegration' which encompasses a range of social, economic and political processes and end-goals.

There are several major problems with the 'minimalist' definition. Firstly, there is no norm against which to measure the relative integration of the demobilised; recent social, economic and political changes in Mozambique over the last thirty years have resulted in large numbers leaving the country or being internally displaced, resulting in massive changes in the demographic profile of the country and in patterns of livelihood. It is thus difficult to identify a *sensu comum*, or baseline, against which to measure demobilised soldiers' livelihoods and lifestyles. Since the General Peace Accord of 1992, everyone has been involved in processes of change, re-building, re-establishment, re-connecting or starting anew.

A second problem is to decide which 'differences' are relevant to assessing the actual state of reintegration. The evaluators of the international assistance programme conceived of 'difference' primarily in material terms. After measuring it through self-reporting questions to a small number of demobilised and non-demobilised, they concluded that there were no significant material differences between demobilised soldiers and other civilians (Creative Associates 1996b). While we agree that it is difficult to identify specific and generalisable material differences between demobilised and others, there are other important differences which relate to the demobilised's experience and are relevant to their sense of being 'reintegrated'. These include a deeply felt need for compensation for the direct suffering they experienced during the war as well as for the opportunity cost of being involved in it, and a need for non-discriminatory recognition by the government in the form of pensions and other benefits. In this sense, the demobilised do not want 'reintegration' if that means going back to the *status quo ante*. They want to be part of a wider process of reconstruction in a way which reflects their personal transformation, justifies their losses, and acknowledges their role in bringing about democracy.

A further problem with the 'absence of difference' model, is that there is much in the literature on relocation to suggest that rather than being an indicator of (re)integration,

absence of difference may well indicate the very opposite, a lack of integration. Scudder et al. suggest that after a major move (whatever the cause, whether voluntary or involuntary) there is tendency for individuals and communities to act conservatively as a way of coping with the change of circumstances (as we have suggested in **Chapter 4**).¹

In this 'transitional stage' people will prioritise economic security and be averse to risk-taking. Only once this transitional phase is complete can one expect to find 'increasing initiative and risk-taking and the emergence of a dynamic and increasingly open-ended society... characterised by widening wealth differentials, increasing social stratification, and the emergence of a class structure' (Scudder & Colson 1982: 275). In other words, the absence of material difference should be a cause for concern, indicating that the transitional stage, in this case from war to peace, is not yet over.

Thus, even if it were possible to identify a social norm in Mozambique after the long years of flux, it would not be adequate to identify material differences without taking into account the socio-cultural meaning of 'sameness' and 'difference'.

We can now turn to our fifth question, 'should particular dimensions of reintegration be prioritised over others? We have argued that the minimalist definition of reintegration which does not specify at least social, economic and political dimensions, is inadequate. We have also argued that while they can be distinguished for analytical purposes, they are in practice closely inter-dependent, especially because social integration and the establishment of a secure economic subsistence base are inextricably linked. We have shown how social integration alone, although a valid objective in its own right, is not sufficient to guarantee the wider objective of national security. Moving further up the scale, we have argued that political integration at the national level depends on the resolution of economic grievances rooted in the past and exacerbated by the present, and the failure to address these is the most likely cause of any future conflict.

Having established the interdependence of these, can we prioritise interventions in the different dimensions of integration? Overall it appears that political and economic reintegration are in more need of external intervention and can be prioritised over social reintegration which is more within the capacity of individuals and receiving communities. However, measures taken to resolve economic problems must take into account the socio-cultural context, or they risk being ineffective or even counter-

¹Scudder, T & Colson, E. 1982: 267-287

productive. The economic and political spheres are so closely linked that it is impossible to prioritise one over the other. The standardisation of benefits and the equal distribution of resources for reconstruction to all areas of the country, stand out as the two issues where the economic and political are most closely intertwined.

We therefore offer the following framework for analysing the social, economic and political processes and end-goals of reintegration:²

Social Reintegration

Processes:

- Re-establishment of family links and status
- Revitalisation of social practices which have been put on hold during the conflict, notably rituals and ceremonies
- Marriage with its accompanying material benefits and obligations

End-goals:

- Re-establishment of a viable system of inter-dependence of individuals and their families
- Establishment of a viable household
- Recourse to and reliance on members of the wider community
- Political and social 'reconciliation', and peaceful co-existence
- Freeing individual from guilt and repercussions of war-time activities

Indicators:

- Settlement in area of choice
- Access to land
- Marriage
- Lobolo payments
- Participation in organised religious activity
- Absence of social stigmatisation
- Non-discrimination by others on the basis of identity as 'demobilised'

²Some of these are specific to the context of Mozambique, but most could be generalised to other situations

Economic Reintegration

Processes:

- Re-establishment of a subsistence agricultural base
- Revitalisation of rural marketing networks
- Search for additional sources of income, notably trade, artisanal production, and salaried employment
- Re-opening and restoration of the plantation economy and other commercial industry
- Civic education to reduce stigmatisation of the demobilised by employers
- Establishment of a fair system of benefits payments

End-goals:

- Viable, independent and sustainable subsistence base
- Economic environment with incentives and rewards for productive effort
- Sufficient income generation to develop a forward-looking livelihood
- Availability of salaried employment
- Fair access to employment opportunities
- Occupation which meets the individual's desired status
- Non-discriminatory access to benefits

Indicators:

- Production and marketing of agricultural surplus
- Consumption of non-essential items
- Expenditure on non-essential items
- Investment in forward looking activities (e.g. education)
- Willingness to take risks
- Rising proportion in salaried employment
- Expressed satisfaction with socio-economic status
- Emergence of socio-economic stratification

Political Reintegration

Processes:

- Reinstitution and reinvention of local conflict resolution mechanisms acceptable to all
- Participation in national and local elections
- Engagement in constructive dialogue with government, for example through the demobilised soldiers' association

End-goals:

- Accountable and generally acceptable structures of authority at local level
- Social peace and security at a local level
- Confidence that the political system is accountable and responsive at a national level

Indicators:

- Absence of scape-goating of demobilised in the national press
- Concerted attempts to streamline the payment of benefits
- Public recognition and compensation to the demobilised from both Renamo and Frelimo
- Membership in the demobilised soldiers' association
- Effective lobbying through demobilised soldiers' association

2. RECOMMENDATIONS³

Overall

- Give positive rather than negative content to the definition of reintegration
- Include social, economic, political and security objectives
- Recognise that these objectives are inter-dependent
- Run assistance programmes in parallel rather than sequentially

To facilitate social reintegration:

- Maintain flexibility of choice of destination throughout the period required for people to make informed decisions on their place of settlement
- Extend selected demobilisation benefits to those demobilised prior to a formal DRP
- Target 'civic education' programmes at the entire population rather than only at the demobilised. Issues to address include stigmatisation and discrimination against the demobilised, in particular the female demobilised
- Assist with funeral expenses
- Assist family re-unification through the dissemination of information while demobilised are still in Assembly Areas
- Recognise the role of traditional healers in addressing issues of mental health and measures to validate and support the contributions of traditional healers to both mental and physical health
- Increase subsidy amounts from below the minimum wage to an amount reflecting the knowledge that although this is a payment to the individual it is in practice a payment to his or her family as well, and will be dispersed to meet a variety of economic and social needs
- Decentralise subsidy payment mechanisms to the lowest feasible level to ensure both maximum dispersal (by obviating the need to resettle near towns with banks), and maximum use of the money for household consumption (by eliminating wastage on transport)
- Introduce a family-tracing system, both to link those who are still alive and to trace those who have died, to find out when and where individuals lost their lives

³These recommendations do include some steps which were taken in the Mozambican DRP and which we consider to be generally applicable

To facilitate economic reintegration:

Overall

- Consider household as well as individual economic security
- Recognise the need for social status and self-esteem
- Develop an understanding of the economic base and its strengths
- Support household agricultural production through greater access to inputs such as seeds, tools and fertilisers, and programmes to restock herds
- Rehabilitate markets and transport infrastructure to ensure rural trading networks
- Challenge stereotypes of the demobilised as 'lazy good-for-nothings' through active promotion of health and education programmes which respond, where necessary, to the psycho-social needs of demobilised and their families

Project level

- Support individual projects attuned to the local context, such as rural trading initiatives
- Design projects to incorporate and balance financing through both credit and grants.
- Develop eligibility criteria which recognise curtailed educational opportunities rather than penalise those with low levels of education
- Recognise the impact of particular historical experiences, such as forced labour and resettlement, on people's responses to economic development projects and schemes
- Identify and facilitate existing initiatives (e.g. marketing of agricultural surplus) rather than introduce new economic activities for which there is no market and which do not address social priorities
- Address infrastructural bottlenecks to the marketing of agricultural surplus through public works schemes, principally road and bridge reconstruction

To facilitate political reintegration at local and national levels:

- Initiate the process of reconciliation between soldiers from opposing sides while they are still awaiting demobilisation
- Standardise to the greatest extent possible, the benefit system for all demobilised, regardless of their affiliation during the conflict
- Extend this standardisation beyond the immediate demobilisation programme, and into the provision of state benefits, such as pensions
- Compensate and extend benefits to soldiers demobilised prior to the international demobilisation programmes (by government)

- Involve local authority structures in the dissemination of information on benefits available to demobilised soldiers, so that they can intervene in an informed manner where conflicts arise over the use of such benefits
- Use public media, particularly radio, to disseminate information about what benefits are available, who is eligible and how they can access them
- Support demobilised soldiers' associations in combating stigmatisation of demobilised soldiers, providing another forum for former opponents to meet and begin the process of reconciliation, and in representing the demobilised soldiers' interests to the government
- Consult with religious organisations, and encourage them to play a role in 'civic education', not just of the demobilised soldiers but of their congregations
- Give attention to the way in which the past is being taught in schools, as this is a central way of transmitting messages to society
- Identify and acknowledge publicly the role of the demobilised in the 'new society', possibly through public national rituals of recognition of the demobilised's role

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APPENDIX I

Programmes in the Mozambican DRP

1) While still in the Assembly Areas, all demobilised soldiers were in principle to receive kits containing civilian clothing, agricultural tools and seeds, and basic household items such as buckets and crockery. In practice, some received the entire kit in the Assembly Areas while others were given a partial kit and told they would receive the rest upon arrival in their place of destination, which did not always happen.

2) *Esquema de Apoio a Reintegração* (Reintegration Support Scheme) (EAR/RRS)

In addition to these kits, all demobilised soldiers received a total of twenty-four months' salary in monthly or bi-monthly instalments.

The first three months' salary was paid while the soldiers were still at the Assembly Areas. When the soldiers arrived in their district of choice, they were given a further three months' salary. Both of these initial payments were funded by the Government, and were provided to Frelimo and Renamo soldiers alike.

Thereafter, they received a further eighteen months' subsidy collected on a monthly or bi-monthly basis from the nearest branch of the *Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento* (BPD), using a cheque book which had been given to them in the Assembly Area. These latter eighteen months were funded by international donors, at a total cost of \$30 million.¹ Due to the staggered timing of demobilisation, the end of the payments occurred over the six-month period from January to June 1996.

It is important to note that the salary scale was set at the beginning of the subsidy payments in Mozambican *Meticais*, thus its real value decreased over the twenty-four month period due to inflation. This was intentional on the part of the donors, who saw the decreasing value of the payments as a way of ensuring that the demobilised soldiers would become less reliant on the subsidy to meet their needs.²

3) *Serviço de Informação e Referência* (Information and Referral Services) (SIR/IRS)

This service was also begun in the Assembly Areas and implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The programme aimed to provide assistance to the demobilised soldiers in accessing and understanding the state and ONUMOZ benefits to which they were entitled, to identify opportunities in private enterprise and NGOs for employment and training, and to refer soldiers to programmes appropriate to their needs and interests.

Each province had an IRS office, which created a network of district facilitators drawn from local government to collect queries from demobilised soldiers and to forward replies from the provincial office. The IRS continued to function until the end of 1996,

¹T. Born, at Conference on the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers, Maputo, October 24-25 1996

²Personal Communication, T. Born, 23.10.96

at which point IOM closed these offices and transferred the responsibility to provincial departments of labour.

4) *Fundo Provincial/ Provincial Fund (PF/FP) and Fundo Aberto de Reintegração/ Open Reintegration Fund (ORF)*

Partly in response to gaps identified by the IRS in opportunities accessible to demobilised soldiers, the IOM subsequently set up the Provincial Fund (PF) on the 15 November 1994, to create projects to promote employment and self-sufficiency. The PF was initially set up in the northern and southern provinces (Zambezia, Nampula, Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Maputo and Gaza), and a similar programme known as the Open Reintegration Fund (ORF) was designed and implemented by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) in the central provinces (Manica, Sofala, Tete and Inhambane) beginning in late 1994.

The main difference between the two programmes was that IOM focused on micro-projects carried out directly by individual demobilised soldiers, while GTZ aimed to create long-term and large-scale employment opportunities, which would not necessarily be implemented by demobilised soldiers. Initially, while eighty percent of beneficiaries of IOM projects had to be ONUMOZ demobilised soldiers, GTZ projects allowed up to fifty percent of beneficiaries to come from other vulnerable groups (loosely defined to include refugees, non-ONUMOZ demobilised soldiers, and single-headed households).³

When new World Bank funding for the GTZ programme was delayed in mid-1995, the IOM Provincial Fund extended to cover the central provinces as well. In late 1995, GTZ received its funding from the World Bank and in those provinces the two worked in parallel.⁴ IOM's Provincial Fund ended in December of 1996, while GTZ's ORF will continue until at least June 1997. Under the conditions of the World Bank funding, eighty percent of the beneficiaries must be ONUMOZ demobilised soldiers.

5) *Occupational Skills Development/Desenvolve as suas Habilitações Ocupacionais (OSD/DHO)*

This programme was funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Trust Fund and implemented by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), through local training institutions, and the Italian organisations ISCOS and COSV in collaboration with the Provincial Departments of Labour throughout the country. It provided training in various skills, from basic management skills to carpentry, soldering, tailoring, amongst others.


³Interview, R. Tump, GTZ Regional Coordinator, Chimoio, 15.4.96

⁴Interview, C. Della-Vedova, IOM Provincial Coordinator Sofala, Beira, 26.2.96

APPENDIX II ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

Traditional Structures

Frelimo/Government Structures



1. Each chief is part of a larger chiefdom, with a senior chief, usually approximately the size of an administrative post.

2. The *Ndunas* is likened to the 'police' of the chief, with differing degrees of responsibility in different areas.

1. *Chefe* is like 'head', and is used in all of the administrative divisions together with the name of the division in order to differentiate, e.g. *chefe do posto* *chefe da localidade*.

2. Neighbourhood

3. Block of houses within a neighbourhood, usually 50.

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APPENDIX III

List of Interview Sites

Zambezia Province:

Quelimane city

Quelimane *bairros*:

Issidua
Coalane Segundo
Unidade 1° de Maio
Aeroporto
Chirangano
Torrone Novo
Brandão

Madal

Gazelas

Maganja da Costa district

Maganja da Costa district capital

Maganja da Costa district capital *bairros*:

Puzuzo
Ctangala
Machimbui
Morotone
Bala
Namambiri
Muediwa
Mussanhama
Inroga
Munona
Mulemba
Simão
Messia
Mepuala
Fernando
Bala Morotone

Bajone

Ilha de Idugo
Namuera
Tapata
Tagana
Missal

Mocubela

Maneia
Murabiwa
Ginama

Nante

Cabuir

Nanene Feira
Namuravua

Morrumbala district

Morrumbala district capital

Morrumbala district capital *bairros*:

Mepinha

Cimento

Augustinho Neto

25 de Setembro

Samora Machel

Megaza

Chire

Derre

Chilu

Machindu

Zapanda Licoa

Semente

Manica Province:

Chimoio city

Chimoio *bairros*:

25 de Junho

Muzingadzi

3 de Fevereiro

7 de Setembro

FEPOM

Textafrika

Chicacaule

Gondola

Mossurize district

Espungabera

Espungabera *bairros*:

Chipungumbira

1º de Maio

Cerere

Mude

Mpingo

Mapunguana

Makuiana

Dacata

Dibi

Chiurairue

Guro district

Guro district capital

APPENDIX IV

Interview Questions

Número da entrevista: _____

Número da cassete: _____

Entrevistador: _____ Data: _____ Local da entrevista: _____
Morada do entrevistado _____ Língua da entrevista: _____

A. DADOS

1. Idade _____ 1a. Sexo: Masculino 1 Feminino 2
2. Natural de: Província _____ Distrito _____ Posto _____
Localidade _____
3. Proveniência da sua família _____
4. Habilitações Literárias _____
5. Língua mais falada em casa: Xitewe 1 Chimânica 2 Shona 3 Sena 4
ChiNdau 5 Nhungwe 6 Português 7
Chuabo 8 Lomwè 9 Chichewa 10
Nhanja 11 Marange 12 Makua 13
Manhawa 14 Mapebane 15 Outra _____

B. COMPOSIÇÃO FAMILIAR

2. Com quem vive e quantos? ___Esposo/a 1 ___Filhos 2 ___Irmãos 3
___Pais 4 ___Outros familiares 5
___Orfãos 6 Outros _____
3. Quantos filhos tem actualmente? _____
- 3a. Falecidos? _____
5. Estado civil: Solteiro/a 1 Casado registo 2 Casado igreja 3
Casado junção 4 Viuvo/a 5 Divorciado/a 6
6. Quantas mulheres tem/ Quantas mulheres tem seu marido? _____
- 6a. A(s) sua(s) mulher(es)/marido é (são) de onde?
Aqui 1 Outro distrito 2 Outra província 3 África do Sul 4
Zimbabwe 5 Malawi 6
7. Pagou lobolo/pete (ou seu marido pagou)? Sim 1 Não 2

8. O que é que pagou e quanto?

_____ Dinheiro 1 _____ Animal 2 _____ Roupas 3
_____ Vinho 4 Construir casa 5 Machamba 6 Outro _____

9. Quem é o actual chefe da família:

Eu 1 Esposo/a 2 Filho/a 3 Irmã/o 4 Tio/a 5 Avó 6 Neto 7
Pai/Mae 8 Outro _____

C. EM CASA

1. De quem é a casa onde vive?

Minha 1 Esposo/a 2 Filho/a 3 Irmã/o 4 Tio/a 5 Avó 6
Neto 7 Alugada 8 Emprestada 9 Governo 10 Pais 11
Outro _____

2. Quem faz os trabalhos de casa?

Eu 1 Mulher 2 Filhos 3 Todos 4 Empregado 5
Mãe 6 Outros familiares 7 Outro _____

3. Quem vai buscar água?

Eu 1 Mulher 2 Filhos 3 Todos 4 Poço 5
Empregado 6 Compra 7 Mãe 8 Outros familiares 9

4. A quantos quilómetros/ quantos minutos de marcha? _____ km ou _____ minutos

5. Quem vai buscar lenha?

Eu 1 Mulher 2 Filhos 3 Todos 4 Compra 5
Empregado 6 Da machamba 7 Mãe 8

6. A quantos quilómetros? /quantos minutos de marcha? _____ km ou _____ minutos

D. SAUDE

1. Alguém esteve doente nos últimos tempos na família? Sim 1 Não 2

2. Quando? Este mês 1 Este ano 2 O ano passado 3

3. Quem foi? Eu 1 Mulher 2 Filho 3 Pais 4 Outro _____

4. O que que tinha?

Malaria 1 Dor de cabeça 2 Dores de barriga/diarreia 3
Constipação 4 Doenças da pele 5 Febres 6
Dificuldades de dormir 7 Sarampo 8 Asma 9 Vertins 10
Epilepsia 11 Dores de dente 12 Dores de ouvido 13

Outros _____

5. Qual é o tratamento de preferência? Hospitalar 1 Tradicional 2 Ambos 3
6. Onde é que obtém o tratamento tradicional? _____
7. Quanto custa a consulta tradicional? _____
8. Quanto custam os medicamentos tradicionais? _____
9. Quanto custa a consulta no hospital? _____
10. Quanto custam os medicamentos hospitalares? _____

E. EDUCAÇÃO

1. Quantas pessoas vão à escola na sua casa e quais são as classes que frequentam?
1ª-4ª ___ 1 5ª-7ª ___ 2 8ª-10ª ___ 3 11ª-12ª ___ 4
2. Qual é o nível de formação que gostarías que eles atingissem? _____
3. Quais são os obstáculos que dificultam o sucesso escolar?
Dinheiro 1 Falta de lugares 2 Trabalho 3 Gravidez 4
Distância 5 Cabritismo 6 Falta de professores 7
Falta de escolas 8 Doença 9 Outros _____
4. Conhece os professores dos seus filhos? Sim 1 Não 2
5. Gosta deles? Sim 1 Não 2
6. Costuma ir as reuniões da escola quando estas são marcadas?
Sim 1 Não 2
7. Tem condições para comprar o material que as crianças precisam?
Sim 1 Não 2 Parcialmente 3

F. TRABALHO

- 1a. Quantos empregos já tinha na vida? _____
- 1b. Trabalhava antes de entrar na tropa/ antes da guerra? Sim 1 Não 2
- 1c. Foi o seu primeiro emprego? Sim 1 Não 2
1. Aonde trabalhava ?
Fábrica 1 Conta própria 2 Minas 3 Plantação/farma 4
Governo 5 Professor 6 Outro _____
2. Que trabalho fazia? _____ (tipo de trabalho, ex. guarda, motorista...)
- 2a. Em que sitio foi?

Aqui 1 Outro sitio na provincia 2 Outra provincia 3
Africa do Sul 4 Zimbabwe 5 Malawi 6

2b. Por quanto tempo? _____

2c. Como é que foi formado para este emprego? Aprendizagem 1

Curso de formação privado ou do estado 2 Não precisava de formação 3

2d. Porque é que desistiu deste emprego? _____

2e. Alguma (outra) vez trabalhou fora do pais? Sim 1 Não 2

2f. Por quanto tempo? ____ anos

2g. Quando foi a ultima vez que trabalhou lá? _____

2h. Qual foi o trabalho que fazia? Mineiro 1 Trabalhador na plantação 2

Construcção 3 Conta própria 4 Outro _____

2i. Porque é que desistiu?

Fim do contrato 1 Velhice 2 Deportação 3 Falha da empresa 4

Despedido 5 Preciado pela família 6 Outro _____

3. Trabalhou depois da desmobilização/ guerra? Sim 1 Não 2

4. Onde? Fábrica 1 Conta própria 2 Minas 3 Plantação/farma 4

Governo 5 Professor 6 Outro _____

5. Que trabalho fazia? _____ (tipo de trabalho)

6. Trabalha actualmente? Sim 1 Não 2

7. Há quanto tempo? ____ Anos ____ Meses

8. Qual é o trabalho que faz? _____ (tipo de trabalho)

9. Onde? Fábrica 1 Conta própria 2 Minas 3 Plantação/farma 4

Governo 5 Professor 6 Outro _____

10. Como é que conseguiu este emprego?

Família 1 Concurso 2 Patrocínio 3 Outro _____

11. O salário é suficiente? Sim 1 Não 2

12. Se não, o que é que fazem para compensar?

Biscatos 1 Machamba 2 Nada 3 Negócios 4

13. Recebe alguma ajuda?

Nada 1 Pensão de reforma 2 Pensão invalidez 3

14. Desde quando? _____

14a. Quando é que o subsidio acabou? _____

15. Aonde recebe a ajuda?

- Banco 1 Aqui 2 Outra provincia 3 Governo 4 Outro _____
16. Quanto recebe por mês? _____
17. O que é que faz com esta ajuda?
Sobreviver 1 Investir 2 Negócios 3 Outro _____
18. Há outras pessoas na família que trabalham? Sim 1 Não 2
- 18a. Quantos? _____
19. Que tipo de trabalho fazem?
Negócio 1 Conta própria 2 Empregado 3 Guarda 4
Estado 5 Professor 6 Plantação 7 Mineiro 8
Outro _____
20. Onde? Aqui 1 Outra provincia 2 Outro sitio na provincia 3 Fora 4
21. Para além do trabalho normal, alguém faz serviços para outras pessoas na comunidade? Sim 1 Não 2
22. O que é que recebem por isto? Nada 1 Dinheiro 2
Outros serviços _____

G. PRODUÇÃO AGRÍCOLA

1. Tem machamba? Sim 1 Não 2
- 1a. De quantos hectares? _____
2. Onde fica? _____ (Local, Posto, & Distrito)
- 2a. Há quanto tempo que tem essa machamba? _____
3. A quantos quilómetros daqui? _____
4. Como obteve a terra para a machamba?
Família 1 Comprou 2 Amigo 3 Aluguer 4
Comunidade 5 Herança 6 Régulo 7 Outro _____
5. O que é que se produz na machamba?
Milho 1 Mapira 2 Mexoeira 3 Feijão 4 Hortaliças 5
Abacate 6 Banana 7 Amendoim 8 Arroz 9 Mandioca 10
Batatas 11 Abóbora 12 Pipino 13 Batata doce 14
Laranjas 15 Tangerinas 16 Limão 17 Couve 18
Girassol 19 Cana doce 20 Outro _____
6. Quem é que lá trabalha?
Mulher(es) 1 Filhos 2 Eu 3 Amigos/vizinhos 4
Trabalhadores 5 Eventuais/contratados 6 Outros familiares 7

7. Quem participa na colheita?
 Mulher(es) 1 Filhos 2 Eu 3 Amigos/vizinhos 4
 Trabalhadores 5 Eventuais/contratados 6 Outros familiares 7
8. Como é que tem sido a produção em relação aos anos passados?
 Boa 1 Normal 2 Má 3
9. Do total produzido na machamba, quanto é que é vendido?
 Todo 1 Parte 2 Nada 3
10. Quando é que se vende?
 Depois da colheita 1 Alguns meses depois 2 Quando precisar 3
11. Aonde? Comerciante 1 Mercado 2 Estrada 3 Comunidade 4
 Zimbabwe 5 Malawi 6
12. Oferece uma parte da colheita à outros familiares? Sim 1 Não 2
13. Quantos animais tem? ___Galinhas 1 ___Patos 2 ___Cabritos 3
 ___Ovelhas 4 ___Bois 5 ___Pombas 6
 ___Porcos 7 ___Perus Outros _____
15. Vende? Sim 1 Não 2 Quando precisar 3

H. COCOS

1. Tem coqueiros? Sim 1 Não 2
2. Quantos? _____
3. Como é que os obteve? Família 1 Comprou 2 Amigo 3
 Aluguer 4 Comunidade 5 Herança 6
 Outro _____
4. Quem faz a colheita? Filhos 1 Eu 2 Amigos/vizinhos 3
 Trabalhadores 4 Eventuais/contratados 5
 Outros _____
5. O que é que se faz com os cocos? Sura 1 Vender assim 2
 Consumir 3 Descascar 4
6. Quem descasca? Filhos 1 Eu 2 Amigos/vizinhos 3
 Trabalhadores 4 Eventuais/contratados 5 Outros _____
7. Quem seca o coco? Filhos 1 Eu 2 Amigos/vizinhos 3
 Trabalhadores 4 Eventuais/contratados 5
 Outros _____
8. Vende os cocos? Sim 1 Não 2
9. Onde? Mercado 1 Comunidade 2 Empresa 3 Outro _____

I. ACTIVIDADES DE PESCA

1. Pesca? Sim 1 Não 2
2. Com quem pesca? Sozinho 1 Com outros 2 _____
3. Onde é que pesca? No mar 1 No rio 2 Na lagóa 3 Machamba 4
4. Que meios utiliza? Canoa 1 Barco 2 Gaiola 3 Rede 4
Zagaia 5 Anzol 6 Outros _____
5. Em que época? Todo o ano 1 Época das chuvas 2
6. O que é que faz com o peixe? Comer 1 Vender 2 Guardar 3 Trocar 4
Dar à familiares 5

J. OUTRAS ACTIVIDADES ECONOMICAS

1. Vende algum produto? Sim 1 Não 2
2. Que produtos é que vende?
Agrícolas 1 Bebida tradicional 2 Comida preparada 3
Bolos/pão caseiro 4 Cigarros 5 Mobílias 6 Calamidades 7
Açucar/ sal/ óleo 8 Peixe 9 Refrescos/cerveja 10
Roupa feita em casa 11 Cantos de barro 12 Outro _____
3. Onde é que os adquire?
Feitos em casa 1 Comprados na loja/comerciante 2 Numa fábrica 3
Zimbabwe 4 Malawi 5 Machamba 6 Outro _____
4. Quem ensinou à produzi-los?
Família 1 Tradição 2 Curso 3 Escola 4 Amigos 5
5. Quem vende? Eu 1 Esposo/a 2 Filho/a 3 Irmã/o 4 Tio/a 5
Avó 6 Neto 7
6. Onde vende? Barraca 1 Banca fixa 2 Na rua 3 Em casa 4
Mercado 5 Zimbabwe 6 Outro _____
7. Quem costuma comprar? Comunidade 1 Comerciantes 2 Turistas 3
8. Os produtos tem saída? Sim 1 Não 2
9. Quanto custa cada produto? _____
10. Quantos é que costuma vender por dia/semana? _____
11. Ouviu falar de alguma agência de ajuda aos desmobilizados? Não 1

- OIM 2 GTZ 3 Sim, não conhece o nome 4 AMODEG 5
12. O que é que fazem?
 Dinheiro 1 Projectos 2 Formação 3 Reuniões 4 Nada 5
 Outro _____
- 12a. Já beneficiaste de formação da OIM? Sim 1 Não 2
- 12b. Que curso? _____
- 12c. Já fizeste um projecto da OIM ou da GTZ? Sim 1 Não 2
- 12d. Teve sucesso? Sim 1 Não 2
13. Poderias beneficiar dos seus programas? Sim 1 Não 2
14. Por quê/ não? (Transcrição) _____
15. Conhece alguém que está à beneficiar destes programas? Sim 1 Não 2

K. VIDA SOCIAL

- 1a. Tem amigos de confiança? Sim 1 Não 2 Alguns 3
1. São amigos desde quando?
 Antes da guerra 1 Durante a guerra 2 Depois da guerra 3
2. Onde vivem? Aqui 1 Outros bairros 2 Outra cidade 3
3. O que é que têm feito como divertimento?
 Música 1 Dança 2 Beber 3 Suruma 4 Mulheres 4a
 Videos 5 Cinema 6 Futebol 7 Ir à praia 8 Conversar 9
 Outro _____
4. Es membro de algum grupo cultural (ex. canto e dança)? Sim 1 Não 2
6. O quê faz o grupo? Cantar 1 Dançar 2 Rezar 3 Outro _____
7. Qual é o seu papel no grupo? _____
8. Faz parte dum grupo desportivo? Sim 1 Não 2
9. Ouviu falar de algum grupo ou associação dos desmobilizados?
 Não 1 AMODEG 2 ADEMIMO 3
 Antigos Combatentes 4 Sim, não conhece o nome 5
10. O que é que faz? Dinheiro 1 Projectos 2 Formação 3
 Reuniões 4 Nada 5
- 10a. Es membro? Sim 1 Não 2
11. Se não é membro, gostaria de ser? Sim 1 Não 2
12. Por quê [não]? _____

13. Na tua zona existem (outros) desmobilizados? Sim 1 Não 2

14. Da Frelimo 1 Da Renamo 2

15. Tem contacto com eles? Sim 1 Não 2

15a. O que é que achas deles? _____

28. Quando têm problemas, à quem costuma pedir conselhos?

Velhos 1 Tios 2 Padrinhos 3 Padre 4 Curandeiro 5

Pais 6 Vizinhos 7 Irmãos 8 Amigos 9

Conselheiros da igreja 10 Pessoas desconhecidas 11

Régulo 12 Outros _____

29. Já levou algum caso ao secretário de bairro? Sim 1 Não 2

30. Quando? Este ano 1 Depois da guerra 2 Durante a guerra 3

Antes da guerra 4

31. Quantos casos? _____

32. Quem estava implicado nos casos? Família 1 Amigos 2 Vizinhos 3

Soldados 4 Outros moradores do bairro 5 Outro _____

--Descreve-- {transcrição}

33. Já levou algum caso ao régulo? Sim 1 Não 2

34. Quando? Este ano 1 Depois da guerra 2 Durante a guerra 3

Antes da guerra 4

35. Quantos casos? _____

36. Quem estava implicado nos casos? Família 1 Amigos 2 Vizinhos 3

Soldados 4 Outros moradores da zona 5 Outro _____

--Descreve-- {transcrição}

37. Já foi levado ao secretário de bairro? Sim 1 Não 2

38. Quando? Este ano 1 Depois da guerra 2 Durante a guerra 3

Antes da guerra 4

39. Quantas vezes? _____

40. Quem levou-lhe? Família 1 Amigos 2 Vizinhos 3

Soldados 4 Outros moradores do bairro 5 Outro _____

--Descreve-- {transcrição}

41. Já foi levado ao régulo? Sim 1 Não 2

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42. Quando? Este ano 1 Depois da guerra 2 Durante a guerra 3
Antes da guerra 4

43. Quantas vezes? _____

44. Quem levou-lhe? Família 1 Amigos 2 Vizinhos 3
Soldados 4 Outros moradores da zona 5 Outro _____

--Descreve-- {transcrição}

45. Alguem na familia já sofreu feitiço? Sim 1 Não 2

46. Quando é que foi?

Este ano 1 Depois da guerra 2 Durante a guerra 3 Antes da guerra 4

47. Quem feitiçou? _____

48. Como é que resolveram? {transcrição}

L. RELIGIÃO

1. Acredita nos antepassados? Sim 1 Não 2

2. Reza? Sim 1 Não 2

3. Regularmente 1 De vez em quando 2

4. A que religião pertence? Assembleia de Deus Africana 1 Católico 2
Baptista 3 Velhos Apostolos 4 Igreja
Universal 5 Mazione 6
12 Apostolos 7 Islâmica 8 Animismo 9
Adventista do 7º Dia 10 Outro _____

4a. Onde fica a sua igreja? Neste bairro/aldeia 1 Outro bairro/aldeia 2
Na cidade 3 Sede do posto 4
Sede do distrito 5 Outro pais 6

5. Rezava antes da guerra? Sim 1 Não 2

5a. Na mesma igreja? Sim 1 Não 2

6. Rezava durante a guerra? Sim 1 Não 2

7. Onde? Assembleia de Deus Africana 1 Católico 2 Baptista 3
Velhos Apostolos 4 Igreja Universal 5 Mazione 6
12 Apostolos 7 Islâmica 8 Animismo 9
Adventista do 7º Dia 10 Testemunha de Jeová 11
Outro _____

7a. Quando voltou da guerra, fez alguma cerimonia na igreja?

Sim 1 Não 2

8. Que tipo de cerimónias fazem quando se trata da morte de um familiar?

Igreja 1 Tradicional 2 Ambos 3

9. Quem é responsável pela cerimonia?

Familia 1 Igreja 2 Comunidade 3 Curandeiro 4 Outro _____

10. E obrigatório fazer essas cerimónias? Sim 1 Não 2

11. E se não consegue fazer o que é que acontece?

Doença 1 Morrer 2 Nada 3 Outro _____

M. CRIME

1. Tem havido bandidagem na sua zona? Sim 1 Não 2

2. Quando? _____

3. Quais são os crimes mais comuns? Roubo 1 Assalto 2

Violação de mulheres/menores 3 Assassinatos 4 Destruição de
propriedade (bens) de outros 5 Outros _____

4. Quem é que faz essa bandidagem?

Homens armados 1 Desmobilizados 2 Pessoas da zona 3

Polícia 4 Desempregados 5 Desconhecidos 6

Outros _____

5. Por quê é que fazem bandidagem? Não sabe 1 Fome 2 Malandrice 3

Guerra 4 Outro _____

6. Há polícia na sua zona? Sim 1 Não 2

7. Já foi à polícia resolver algum problema? Sim 1 Não 2

8. Quando? Este ano 1 Depois da guerra 2 Durante a guerra 3

Antes da guerra 4

9. Quantos casos? _____

10. Quem estava implicado nos casos? Familia 1 Amigos 2 Vizinhos 3

Soldados 4 Outros moradores da zona 5 Outro _____

11. Já foi levado à policia? Sim 1 Não 2

12. Quando? Este ano 1 Depois da guerra 2 Durante a guerra 3

Antes da guerra 4

13. Quantas vezes? _____

14. Quem levou-lhe? Familia 1 Amigos 2 Vizinhos 3

Soldados 4 Outros moradores da zona 5 Outro _____

N. MOVIMENTOS

1. Onde estava a sua família durante a guerra de libertação?
Aqui 1 Outro sitio na provincia 2 Outra provincia 3
Africa do Sul 4 Zimbabwe 5 Malawi 6
2. Onde é que você estava?
Aqui 1 Outro sitio na provincia 2 Outra provincia 3
Africa do Sul 4 Zimbabwe 5 Malawi 6 Tanzania 7
3. Onde estava a sua família durante a guerra de Smith?
Aqui 1 Outro sitio na provincia 2 Outra provincia 3
Africa do Sul 4 Zimbabwe 5 Malawi 6
4. Onde é que você estava?
Aqui 1 Outro sitio na provincia 2 Outra provincia 3
Africa do Sul 4 Zimbabwe 5 Malawi 6
5. Alguma vez receberam alguém em vossa casa que fugia de um ataque, ou da guerra? Sim 1 Não 2
6. Quando? _____
7. Fugiam de quem? Smith 1 Frelimo 2 Renamo 3 Outro _____
8. A sua família tinha que fugir de algum ataque durante a guerra mais recente?
Sim 1 Não 2
9. Aonde foram? Outro bairro 1 Aqui 2 Cidade 3 Zimbabwe 4
Malawi 5 Aldeia 6 Africa do Sul 7
Outro _____
10. Recebiam algum apoio onde estavam? Sim 1 Não 2
11. De que tipo? Comida 1 Roupa 2 Abrigo 3 Utensilios 4
Sementes 5 Outro _____
12. Quem é que dava?
Governo 1 Igreja 2 ONG 3 ACNUR 4 ONUMOZ 5
Renamo 6 CVM 7 Outro _____
13. Quando é que decidiram voltar para casa? _____
14. Por quê? Cultivar/falta de terra 1 Guerra acabou 2 Reunir com a familia 3
Chamado 4 Deportado 5 Para votar 6
Repatriamento voluntario 7 Outro _____
15. Receberam alguma ajuda em transporte? Sim 1 Não 2
16. Receberam algum apoio depois de regressarem? Sim 1 Não 2

17. Que tipo de apoio? Comida 1 Roupa 2 Abrigo 3 Utensílios 4
Sementes 5 Outro _____
18. Quem é que deu? Governo 1 Igreja 2 ONG 3 ACNUR 4
ONUMOZ 5 Renamo 6 CVM 7
19. Quando é que terminou? _____

O. EXPERIENCIAS DE GUERRA

1. Quando entrou no exército? _____
2. Por quê? Serviço Militar Obrigatorio 1 Defender a patria 2
Recrutamento forçado/raptado 3 Libertar o pais 4
Outro _____
3. Onde fez o treino? _____
4. Por quanto tempo? 3 meses 1 6 meses 2 1-2 anos 3 <2 4
5. Em que é que se especializou? _____
6. Qual era a sua patente? Nenhuma 1 Alferes 2 Sargento 3
Tenente 4 Capitão 5 Major 6 General 7 Tenente-coronel 8
7. Transferências durante a guerra: _____
8. Durante a guerra, visitava a família? Sim 1 Não 2
9. Quantas vezes? _____
10. Por que é que não? Não permitiam 1 Não querer 2 Perigo 3
Outro _____
11. Quantos anos ficou sem ver a sua família? _____
12. Como é que os soldados conseguiam alimentação, no quartel?
População 1 Rações militares 2 Machambas 3
Desenrascar 4 Outro _____
13. No combate? População 1 Rações militares 2 Machambas 3
Desenrascar 4 Outro _____
14. Quantas vezes participou em combate? _____
15. Ficou ferido durante a guerra? Sim 1 Não 2
- 15a. Qual foi a ferida? Balas no corpo 1 Perca de vista 2
Perder um membro 3 Mutilação 4 Outro _____
16. Durante a guerra, nunca pensou em desistir? Sim 1 Não 2
17. Por quê? _____

18. Que nível literário tinha quando foi incorporado na tropa? _____
19. Conseguiu aumentar o seu nível escolar quando estava na tropa?
 Sim 1 Não 2
20. Quais são as habilidades profissionais que aprendeu quando estava na tropa? Nenhuma 1 _____
21. Quais dos líderes políticos ouviu ou viu durante a guerra? _____
22. Receberam mensagens dos líderes? Sim 1 Não 2
23. Fizeram alguma promessa para depois da guerra acabar? Sim 1 Não 2
24. Quando foi desmobilizado? _____
- 24a. Por quê é que foi desmobilizado?
 Pediu para sair 1 Serviço cumprido 2 Doença/ferida 3
 Acabou guerra 4 Outro _____
25. Esteve numa área de acantonamento da ONUMOZ? Sim 1 Não 2
26. Aonde? _____ (Nome, distrito e provincia)
27. Por quanto tempo? _____
28. Houve algum incidente na área de acantonamento? Sim 1 Não 2
29. O que é que recebeu quando saiu de lá?
 Dinheiro 1 Kit 2 Nada 3 Roupa 4
30. Como chegou ao destino final?
 Transporte 1 Conta propria 2 Outro _____
- 30a. Fizeram alguma cerimonia em casa quando voltou da guerra?
 Sim 1 Não 2
31. (Se não é de cá), pensa em regressar à zona de origem? Sim 1 Não 2
32. Que informação você tinha sobre o seu destino? _____
33. Como obteve? Radio 1 Jornal 2 Amigos 3 Carta 4 Outro _____
34. O que é que perdeu com esta guerra?
 ___Casa 1 ___Animais 2 ___Viatura 3 ___Familia 4
 Terra 5 Bens 6 Negócio 7 Emprego 8 Saúde 9 Outro _____

P. OPINIOES POLITICAS

1. Quem é que ganhou as eleições? Frelimo 1 Chissano 2 Ninguém 3
 Renamo 4 Dhlakama 5 Não sabe 6
2. Os resultados foram justos? Sim 1 Não 2

3. Acha que é bom haver eleições? Sim 1 Não 2 Não sabe 3
4. Ouviu falar das eleições autárquicas? Sim 1 Não 2
5. Quem deveria dirigir a sua comunidade?
Os actuais chefes 2 Os régulos 3 Não sabe 4 Outro _____
6. E seu país? Os actuais chefes 2 Não sabe 3 Outro _____
7. Quem é que ganhou a guerra? Não sabe 1 Ninguém 2 Povo 3
Governo 4 Renamo 5
8. Qual era o objectivo da guerra?
Não sabe 1 Não havia 2 Defender dos bandidos 3
Democracia 4 Outro _____
9. Poderá acontecer outra guerra? Sim 1 Não 2 Não sabe 3
10. Como é que a vida está hoje em dia? Bem 1 Mal 2 Normal 3
Melhor 4 Outro _____
11. E no passado, como era? Mesmo 1 Melhor 2 Pior 3
Não sabe 4 Outro _____

APPENDIX V

Composition of Research Team

Supervisors: Dr. Barbara E. Harrell-Bond (Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford)
Alex Vines (Human Rights Watch, London)

Maputo Coordinator: Dr. João Paulo Coelho (University of Eduardo Mondlane)

Zambezia and Manica Supervisor: Chris Dolan (Refugee Studies Programme)

ZAMBEZIA TEAM

Research Coordinator:	Chris Dolan
Interviewers: Quelimane:	Sr. Emílio Morais (Quelimane) ¹ Sr. Boaventura Moreira (Alto Molocue) Sr. Daniel Rui Poio (Chire) Sr. Abilio Magaia (Morrumbala)
Maganja:	Sr. Manuel Araújo (Maganja da Costa) ² Sr. Idelito Orlando (Maganja da Costa) Sr. Loborino Borges (Maganja da Costa)
Morrumbala:	Sr. Oscar Walter (Maganja da Costa) ³ Sr. António Tumba (Morrumbala)

MANICA TEAM

Research Coordinator:	Jessica Schafer (University of Oxford)
Interviewers: Chimoio:	Sr. B. Mario Dinis (Chimoio) Sr. Victor Igreja (Maputo) Sra. Filomena de Jesus João (Chimoio) Sr. Francisco Soares (Nicoadala, Zambezia)
Mossurize:	Sr. B. Mario Dinis (Chimoio) Sr. Victor Igreja (Maputo)
Assistants: Mossurize:	Sr. Patrick Cedreque Machanjaira (Mossurize) Sra. Judite Mateus (Mossurize) Sr. Efremo Samuel (Mossurize)

Background of Research Assistants:

4 Demobilised Soldiers (3 Frelimo, 1 Renamo); 3 Returned Refugees; 7 'Others'

Background of Transcribers, Interpreters, Typists:

5 Demobilised Soldiers; 2 Returned Refugees; 18 'Others'

¹The place of origin of the interviewer is in brackets after their name

²Team leader

³Team leader

APPENDIX VI

Economic Activities in two *Bairros* of Chimoio

Economic activities in Bairro Muzingadzi, September 1996

Activity	Zone A	Zone B	Zone D	Centro	TOTAL
Artisans					
Bicycle repair	0	0	1	0	1
Carpenters	2	3	1	6	12
Tailor	0	1	0	0	1
Jewellers	1	0	1	1	3
Cobbler	1	1	1	1	4
Light industry					
Grinding mill	0	1	0	0	1
Sellers					
Market	1	0	0	1	2
Firewood sellers	1	1	0	1	3
Brothels	0	4	0	1	5
Hotel	0	1	0	0	1
Restaurant/bars	0	1	0	0	1
Bars	0	2	0	0	2
Stalls	11	11	9	7	38
Kiosks	0	2	0	0	2
Health					
Registered healers	2	3	3	3	11
Unregistered healers	0	1	0	0	1
Other resources					
Dam	0	0	0	1	1
Cemetery	1	0	0	0	1

Economic activities in Bairro 25 de Junho, September 1996

Activity	Zone A	Zone B	Zone C	Zone D	Zone E	Zone F	Zone G	TOTAL
----------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	-------

Artisans

Bicycle repair	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	4
Carpenters	2	2	2	2	3	5	0	16
Tailor	0	0	0	2	1	4	0	7
Artisans	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	4
Cobbler	0	2	2	2	2	2	0	10

Light industry

Grinding mill	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	4
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Sellers

Market	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	11
Firewood sellers	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	4
Brothels	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Shops	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	4
Drinking spot	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	6
Bread shops	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	5
Stalls	2	3	0	4	4	4	4	21
Kiosks	3	1	4	1	1	0	0	10

Health

Healers	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	4
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APPENDIX VII

Business Survey in Chimoio

Random sample of 60 businesses out of a list of 105 registered with the Provincial Department of Industry, Commerce and Tourism, June/July 1996

Number of employees

Sub-total (under 40 employees)	275	in 56 businesses (Average 5 employees)
Sub-total (over 40 employees)	318	in 4 businesses (Average 79.5 employees)
TOTAL	593	
Overall Average	10	
Demobilised and ex-combatants	50	8.4% of workers
Demobilised (ONUMOZ)	17	2.8%
Ex-combatants	33	5.5%
Females	76	13%

Companies who have employed ex-combatants

Yes	12	20%
No	48	80%
Happy with them?	11	
Dismissed	0	
Problems	0	
How many still employed?	17	

Companies who have employed ONUMOZ demobilised

Yes	10	18%
No	50	82%
Happy	9	
Dismissed	1	
Problems	2	
How many still employed?	17	

215

Type of work


	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Guards	26	49
Electrician	5	9
Sales	5	9
Stockist	5	9
Painter	3	6
Plumber	3	6
Apprentice mechanic	2	4
Service station worker	1	2
Baker	1	2
Tailor	1	2
Other	1	2
Total	53	100

Reasons for not employing demobilised/ex-combatants

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
No work for them/no salaries	29	62
No one came asking	4	9
Asked MinLab but none was sent	3	6
They're problematic/confused/war ideas	3	6
Not trained	3	6
Family members only	2	4
Don't know if we have demobs (seasonal)	2	4
Attempted but was not funded	1	2
Total	47	100

APPENDIX VIII

Interview Timetable



APPENDIX IX

Story of the Stolen Chicken

Excerpt from Interview MOS 2, with *Bairro* Secretary, Espungabera - 1° de Maio, 02.07.96

For example, that man who was with you there, when he first arrived to live here, people said, 'that one was in Renamo'. So they stole his chicken. He heard that it was his neighbour who had stolen his chicken, so he went to find out who this was.

He went to his house and asked if he was there. 'Come out, come out', but he didn't come out. So what happened? When the thief saw that the others were all drinking, he went out to sell that chicken in the market. Then the people noticed that the door to his house was open, but he had left already. So they realised that this was the one who had stolen the chicken. And an old man came along who said he had seen the man selling the chicken in the market. They went to look for him, but they couldn't find him anywhere. They decided to take all of his clothing, so that when he returned to find it all missing, he would come looking for it.

When I came back, they came to inform me of what was going on. When the thief came, he forgot that he was the one who started the problem. He got home and found that he had no clothes so he went to ask his neighbour, 'did some thief come here and steal my clothing? I'm left without a stitch.' So the others grabbed him and brought him here to me. When they arrived, I told them to take off the rope, and let him tell what happened.

'This one stole my chicken and went to sell it in the market.'

'Did you in fact steal the chicken, sir?'

'No, I didn't steal anything!'

'Tell the truth, sir.'

'No, I didn't steal any chicken. I went to take my chicken in Muedzwa.'

'At what time did you go there?'

'I saw him at nine o'clock.'

'Call that old man. What time did you see him in the market?'

He said it was a quarter to ten.

'So is it possible that at nine you were here, you left here for Muedzwa, and returned by a quarter to ten? That's not possible. So, I'm going to have to write my report on this robbery and give it to the police, and you will be chamboked. We don't want thieves here.'

He said, 'No, don't, Mr. Secretary.'

'No, I'm going into my office and writing my report...'

'Wait, sir, it was I who stole the chicken.'

'Why did you do this?'

'Ah, that man is from Renamo.'

'A-ha? And where are you from?'

'I'm from Frelimo.'

'A-ha? But is it true that you stole?'

'Yes.'

'Well, I will do the following. We don't want thieves here, understand? You hear me? Here in this *bairro*, there is no discrimination. This man is Mozambican too. Since you are admitting that you stole, we will not send it to the police. You will go and get two chickens and give them to this man.'

Then that man [from Renamo] said, 'but I want my chicken back.'

'No, this is not possible either, because he sold it, and the man who bought it has eaten it. We have resolved many problems here, even children who were killed, and the person said, 'I want my child back', but it's not possible, because it has died already. What can we do? They must pay for that person who died. If he died, they cannot say, 'I want my child.' But he will get you two chickens.'

They accepted it. So I sent him with two of his friends to verify that all of his clothing was there, and then he would bring the chickens. They found all of the clothing there. But then when the thief left, he began to say again, 'Ah, that one is from Renamo, he complained to the secretary. But they did not bring the complaint to the police. Let's go.' So they went to the police, and they called the other one. He arrives, and tells them that the case was already being resolved by the secretary. So the police call me, I go there and I explain the situation.

'This one stole a chicken and tried to say that it was because the other one is from Renamo. But we don't work like that. Weren't you told to repay the chicken?'

'Yes.'

'So why did you come to complain to the police?'

'Ah, that man stole my money.'

'How much money?'

'A million.'

So I called the people, and I said, 'I sent these people with this man to verify his clothing. They said that all of the clothing was there, there is nothing missing. Now today, two days later, he is saying that there is a million missing. He's lying, isn't he?'

When they threatened him with a chambok, then he admitted it, 'I was lying, he didn't steal any money'.

Then the police began to ask, who is this person? I said, 'he's a resident of the Bairro 1° de Maio'.

'What's his name?'

I told them his name, and the police said, 'ah, this man is wanted by the Boers over there, he stole the Boer's things.' So they phoned and the Boers said to send him over. In the end it turned out he was a big thief. So his mother had to find two chickens and the man stayed in the jail for six months. They don't play around there, those Boers.

So these are the problems we have here in this *bairro*.