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Discussion Paper 2:

The Rwandan Refugee Crisis: Alternative Strategies

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THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CRISIS AND

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES: A DISCUSSION NOTE

The Rwandan refugee crisis is resolvable. Peace and stability in the Great Lakes region are attainable. The determining factors to achieve both, however, rest to a large extent upon the willingness of the United States government to commit resources to a specific set of objectives and to play a lead role in a new type of international coordinating and implementing structure.

This discussion note is the second recently produced by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance to stimulate discussion on key issues in the Great Lakes region. It outlines the nature of the crisis in the region and looks at possible instruments for dealing with that crisis before outlining four "alternative strategies" or *planning frameworks*.

While this discussion note is intended *inter alia* to help in the planning process, it is not intended to be a plan. A plan to address the situation in the region of the Great Lakes can only be effectively formulated in the region, in close collaboration with relevant national and international authorities at local and headquarters levels.

I - Introduction

In an important initiative at the Rwanda Roundtable in June 1996, the United States government [USG] put forward a proposal to resolve the urgent problem presented by Rwandan refugees encamped along the borders of Rwanda's neighbors. The USG stressed the need for enhancing pull factors within Rwanda as well as relocating refugee camps once refugees guilty of crimes against humanity or of bearing arms were separated from the rest of camp populations.

While this initiative is seen as catalytic both within the U.S. Government and the international community, it is regarded at the same time as difficult to

operationalize.[1] Beyond that immediate issue, the USG's proposal raises complex issues about the nature of refugee conventions and principles as well as about the very implementing structures of humanitarian operations. Yet, such concerns should by no means lead one to abandon the search for solutions. The United States does have interests in the region, and pragmatic solutions are available. No alternative option will be perfect; each will involve risks and imperfections. None, however, will be as imperfect as the consequences arising from a failure to act.

US Interests in the Region of the Great Lakes Region. The Rwandan refugee problem is in part the manifestation of a far deeper geo-political crisis throughout the Region. It is a crisis that will not remain isolated, but because of economic, political and military inter-relationships will inevitably suck other nations, initially those within the Horn of Africa, into its vortex. Instability, therefore, is, and will be, endemic to the Greater Horn Region for the foreseeable future; and it will be reflected not only in terms of complex emergencies requiring substantial humanitarian assistance, but also in terms of weakened political and economic structures that will result in geo-political radicalization even in nations traditionally friendly to the United States. As this discussion note will suggest, radicalization and extremism are becoming a regional norm, with Masisi only one manifestation of their effects spreading into other areas.

At the same time, the Rwanda refugee situation also raises fundamental moral issues that are closely tied to post-Cold War policy interests of the United States. In brief, the willingness of the most powerful nation in the world to tolerate impunity associated with genocide has, according to the bipartisan Commission on US National Interests, "consequences for Americans' well-being in a free and secure nation" and represents a failure to support "extremely important national interests."[2]

However, the danger for US policy-makers from a more general perspective would be to wait for the situation in the region "to clarify itself", or, to "develop its own course of action". Today's reality is that the course of action is already clarifying itself; and that course is marked by instability and extremism.

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[1]. On July 26 the authors submitted a paper, "Discussion Paper I: Rwandan Refugees in the Great Lakes Region - Implementing the Proposed USG Strategy", to USAID/OFDA on this subject.

[2]. The Commission's Report on America's National Interests" by Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs, the RAND Corporation and the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, July 1996]

II - Dimensions of the Rwanda Refugee Problem

Evolution of the crisis

Since the flight of the nearly 2 million people (largely Hutus) from Rwanda to Tanzania and Zaire over two years ago (in April and July 1994, respectively), the refugee crisis has ostensibly evolved. However, our understanding of the dynamics that led to the crisis and now perpetuates it has probably evolved even more than the crisis, itself.

Solutions for achieving regional stability can not be found using the traditional refugee framework, for this is not a conventional refugee situation. Broadly speaking, the purported refugee population in and near camps can be separated into three groups. The first is the leadership (ex-FAR elements and interahamwe), fundamentally responsible for the genocide, and now engaged in political and military maneuvres to reassert its hold over Rwanda. A second group comprise those who were coerced, brainwashed and threatened before they participated in the genocide. Others remain innocent, swept up in the flood of humanity that crossed borders in 1994 many of whom remain traumatized by intimidators in the camps. This situation creates anxiety and fear for the present government in Rwanda, as well as for a substantial portion of Rwanda's population that includes genocide survivors and other returned old caseload refugees that their very existence remains in question. Hence the situation that is evolving in Rwanda reflects a still traumatized society adjusting to an uncertain future. Solutions lie in confronting the political, military, and social impact of these stark realities at the country and regional levels.

Regional Perspective

From a regional perspective, it is worth noting that

o in the context of the Zairian situation, ***military capacity of the ex-FAR has increased***, with flows of arms coming in from various states. This capacity has led to increased penetration of Rwanda, incursions into Uganda and tighter links with Hutu opposition forces in Burundi's Cibitoke area;

o ***intimidation in refugee camps along the Zairian border continues, but with two significant changes*** since 1994: (i) direct military and militia involvement in camp intimidation is said to have lessened, and is now perpetuated through Rwandese

civilian structures; and (ii) the perceptions of camp populations in general about the lack of security within Rwanda and the arbitrary nature of Rwandese justice means that the intimidators have an easy job convincing refugees not to return;

o ***Zaire's Masisi has now become a military center for ex-FAR, replacing Tutsis (through systematic ethnic cleansing) with recently arrived Hutus***. This gives Zaire three advantages: (i) a Hutu leadership in Masisi that is now indebted to the president; (2) a positioning area to destabilize other countries in the region, principally Rwanda but also Uganda; and (3) a means to generate instability within certain areas of Zaire that in turn can be used to delay elections currently scheduled for next year;

o Burundi displaced camps in Cibitoke area continue to harbor extremist Hutu who have been increasingly effective at infiltrating southwestern Rwanda; but ***half of Rwandan refugees around Ngozi in northern Burundi, when confronted with a forcible move by Burundian military forces, preferred the potential hazards of repatriation to attempting escape into the hinterlands of Burundi and potential violence from Burundian military***;

o the economic paradox of the region is that both Zaire and Tanzania have benefitted from what can only be described as the "relief economy". Jobs, small enterprises and expanded markets are among the benefits of the refugee operation. Yet, at the same time, both countries are rightly concerned about the growing ecological and environmental disaster being caused by the presence of 1.7 million refugees. In the short as well as long-term, ***the benefits of the relief economy as well as the need for infrastructural and environmental/ecological recovery offer potential bases for future negotiations between concerned donors and countries of the region***;

o despite worst fears, the Tanzanian elections took place without requiring politicians to demand and implement radical solutions regarding the refugee camps. ***There are some indications that the GOT might be willing to negotiate on resettlement areas for Rwandan refugees*** who do not wish to return; but indications suggest that areas considered suitable by the GOT may not be suitable for extensive human habitation. ***The Government of Zaire seems to be far more intransigent about making land available for future resettlement, particularly land in the country's interior.*** This paper will argue under planning framework #1 and 3 that ways to persuade the GOZ to change its position might be of major importance;

o there are a variety of regional initiatives worth noting such as the OAU/UNHCR joint conference on refugees in the Great Lakes [Bujumbura, 1995] and the various regional summits of heads of state in the context of Arusha Initiative and the Mwanza Peace Process to discuss the situation in the Great Lakes, and more

recently the decision to place an embargo on Burundi. The international community should support these actions which reflect the region's ownership not only of problems but also solutions, while urging respect for standards of human rights and justice.

Rwanda Specific

From recent events in Rwanda, it is worth noting that:

o ***the divisions between moderates and hardliners are deepening within the Government, both at the local level and in the capital.*** In part these divisions are due to differences in attitudes about the very purpose of Rwanda as a state and the viability of let alone justification for, a "broad-based government". In part, they are due to tensions emerging over ways to handle the growing number of incursions from outside the country and the "rough justice" being meted out in certain prefectures. In part, these divisions reflect the difficulties of resolving contending priorities, such as the needs of the "old caseload refugees" and those of vulnerable groups;

o ***the GOR's attitudes towards refugee return is complicated for several reasons.*** In the first place, it is generally accepted that most senior GOR officials support return, and only disagree about the pace of return movements. They reflect a general attitude that even for security reasons, it is better to have the refugees back than on the other side of the border where they are tools for the opposition. There are amongst middle level RPF, the security forces and local officials strong elements that are resisting any substantial return at all, fearing heightened local tensions and further breakdowns of security in the communes. Others, predominantly those regarded as "Burundians" [who are reputed to be the real "hardliners"], have questioned the need for large numbers of Hutus to re-enter what they now regard as a Tutsi state. Some skeptics also suggest that if agricultural production improves over the next year a growing number of people in Rwanda will question the need for "additional labor".

o professional ranks in Rwanda remain thin due to lack of trained personnel amongst the present population. Nevertheless, there are many experienced professionals in the refugee camps **who would like to return and whom the GOR would welcome**, but who do not wish to exchange the salaries and benefits they currently enjoy working for international organizations and NGOs in the camps for lower, irregular GOR civil service salaries.

o insecurity in some areas [principally along the borders with Zaire and in areas of the Nyungwe forest] has grown considerably. This is reflected in a number of political assassinations, revenge killings, and attacks on genocide survivors. ***Yet, despite increased instability in the western areas, there are locations that remain***

secure and available for repatriation, eg, the center south. But security will remain one of the determining factors in refugee decisions to return.

o ***the lack of land reform continues to effect solutions for the problems of the "old caseload refugees" as well as potential returning refugees.*** As a land-based economy, this fact effects any effort to stabilize the economy and social system. Refugees in particular believe that their lands may well have been confiscated by the time they return; women -- be they refugees or not -- are all too aware that unless legislation is passed to the contrary -- they will continue to have no property rights;

o ***the social profile of Rwanda has changed dramatically since the genocide.*** According to UNICEF, women comprise somewhere between 60-70% of the present population within the country due to a disproportionate number of men being targeted in the genocide and to a mostly female returnee population. This requires a fundamental re-examination of laws and practices in a society known for its traditionalism and conservatism towards women. Moreover since July 1994 the demographic makeup of Rwanda includes a large number of Rwandans raised in Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Canada and even a small number from the United States. This Rwandan "potpourri" has already demanded changes, i.e. addition of English as an official language, but in the future will have to include creative education and training to balance the cultural orientations of these diverse groups and achieve internal stability and trust.

o coffee prices -- reflecting Rwanda's single most important product and export -- are "bottoming out", and the economy in general has not grown significantly since 1994. ***The Rwandan franc nevertheless remains stable, as the IMF does all in its power to promote structural adjustment policies which continue to hamper any chance for a major recovery of central and local civil administration;***

o The critical issue of justice and standards of guilt would appear to be reaching some form of resolution as a long-debated and frequently revised justice bill slowly moves towards ratification by the National Assembly. The criteria for guilt is not as onerous as some observers of the justice system had feared, and the very fact ***that this fundamental issue may be resolved in the foreseeable future might prove an inducement to return for a yet to be identified portion of Rwandan refugees.***

III - Instruments for Regional Stability and Refugee Solutions

Any planning framework to be effective will in one way or another have to depend upon a range of instruments that cover a broad spectrum of military and political as well as humanitarian, human rights and economic measures. In turn, the durability of their impact will depend upon the amount of time and resources dedicated to any single tool or combination of tools. The list below enumerates, in no particular order, those instruments or measures that may be of relevance to various planning frameworks. It does not suggest a plan, suggest the benefits or drawbacks of any
measure, nor at this stage does it reflect any preferred planning framework approach.

Political

- ☐ support regional initiatives that seek stability and practical refugee solutions ☐ undertake bilateral discussions with interested parties such as France
- ☐ promote political/humanitarian congruence of objectives with key actors, including EU, UNHCR, ICRC, major NGOs, this may require an international conference or a series of small working consultations in various capitals
- ☐ set up integrated international task force (eg, USG/EU/UNHCR/OAU) for planning and implementing Great Lakes initiative
- ☐ gain UN Security Council concurrence on proposed military/political elements of Great Lakes initiative (see: Military, below)
- ☐ gain UN General Assembly endorsement for overall objectives of Great Lakes initiative
- ☐ brief relevant US entities, including Congressional committees
- ☐ liaise with relevant NGOs and NGO consortia in Africa as well as in US, Europe and Canada
- ☐ brief US media in anticipation of new Great Lakes initiative
- ☐ collaborate in preparation of media campaign for radio/print/television for Great Lakes region and other concerned African countries

Military

- ☐ assess and support, where relevant and appropriate, OAU-based initiatives on peace-keeping operations, including equipment supply
- ☐ call upon international community to enforce arms embargoes in areas

where aggressive military intent is evident
☐ ensure defensive capacity of GOR is adequate to meet realistic external threats
☐ seek approval of UN Security Council for effective multilateral border security operation along borders of all Rwanda neighboring states
☐ in ensuring border security, utilize AWACS and satellite capacities to reinforce ground patrols
☐ close down all military sites purported to be "refugee camps". This action will require military force
☐ establish security posts within all remaining refugee camps to resist any resurgence of military activity
☐ undertake demining activities along relevant borders, and along routes marked for targeted return
☐ develop and support ex-FAR retraining camps and activities for eventual reintegration into RPF
☐ collaborate in the design of and support integrated efforts at demobilization, including demobilization of child soldiers
☐ develop with the countries of the Great Lakes region military activity notification and verification program as first step towards confidence building
☐ undertake, in collaboration with relevant governments in the Great Lakes, feasibility study of arms collection/destruction programs and possible links with training programs and development incentives

Economic

☐ provide medium-term assistance to support civil service salaries, reform and structures, including equipment, in Rwanda
☐ assist in developing in Rwanda's Ministry of Planning an international aid statistic focal point to provide accurate data on assistance pledged and received from all sources and for intended geographical and sectoral purposes
☐ develop wide range of small scale projects ($2500 to 10,000) to promote cross-ethnic income-generating activities in communes and urban areas in Zaire and Burundi as well as in Rwanda
☐ seek and support joint United Nations agencies/Bretton Woods institutions country and regional development strategies
☐ stimulate and support efforts to develop an economic trading zone similar to that of the SADAC countries, and seek links between the proposed organization and SADAC, IGADD
☐ seek World Trade Organization and EU support for "peacebuilding through preferential trade" plans for states of the Great Lakes
☐ seek review of structural adjustment policies to ensure safety nets for vulnerable groups
☐ actively support efforts within the context of country and regional

development strategies to promote alternative small scale export oriented industrial capacity
☐ support economic growth poles in areas designated as stable and suitable for development in states in the region and for refugee return

Humanitarian

☐ intensify post-conflict recovery programs in areas targeted for refugee return in Rwanda; these should carefully consider Rwandan capacity to manage and implement
☐ determine core studies required for initiative implementation
☐ strengthen regional information to enhance flow of trans-border information and to foster intra-regional field level planning, and, in so doing, an integrated trans-border task force on humanitarian affairs to support the efforts of the main Integrated Regional Task Force [see: Section V, below]
☐ continue "look-see" visits by refugees, and visits to camps by GOR officials
☐ determine and identify funding required by key actors (e.g. UN agencies, international and, possibly, local NGOs, Red Cross movement) in implementing the chosen Great Lakes strategy, a special fund may be required
☐ support the design of and fund resettlement and repatriation packages, including food and non-food items
☐ continue to support programs that deal specifically with vulnerable groups in Rwanda, i.e. genocide survivors, widows, unaccompanied children
☐ identify special needs, and develop strategies for, the relocation/resettlement/repatriation of vulnerable groups and unaccompanied refugee children

Human Rights

☐ establish property compensation registration procedures as key element in Rwanda justice program
☐ intensify efforts to establish police force in Rwanda
☐ as part of police force strengthening and civil service support, develop effective local security programs, particularly in areas of refugee-targeted return
☐ intensify Rwanda justice system efforts, with particular reference to implementing the GOR's anticipated legislation on genocide
☐ foster and support cultural events as well as print/radio/television media which stress peace and need for ethnic collaboration in Burundi, Zaire and Rwanda

IV - Planning Frameworks

This section outlines four conceptual approaches to help develop alternative planning "paradigms" in the Great Lakes. The approaches range from a minimalist approach [status quo approach] to progressively more complex and interventionist approaches [refugee focussed approach, region focussed approach] to what the authors call a socio-political transition focus that suggests fundamental changes in the way the Great Lakes refugee crisis is viewed. Readers are cautioned that no single one of the approaches should be viewed as self-contained nor mutually exclusive. Neither is any one free of potentially significant risk, humanitarian, security, political, to the international community or the region itself. The frameworks are presented as a collection of actions that would need to be taken based on the instruments described in section [III] above.

A. Status Quo Approach

It has already been suggested that "doing nothing" about the present refugee situation in the Great Lakes may invite more instability than selecting any number of other available options. Yet, a *status quo approach* might be the inevitable consequence of failing to gain consensus among the main actors about practical alternatives, and of the feeling that risks are too great and hazards too many.

Assumptions:

o situation in the refugee camps and in much of the region can be contained as presently configured with minimal change of present policies;

o USG will continue to support present "humanitarian efforts."
o the reality of the region is that the issue is fundamentally too complex to undertake any substantive initiative, and that recent efforts in the developing world show the bankruptcy of attempts at "social engineering".

Desired outcome:

o assurances of continued assistance will ensure relative calm in the camps and along the borders;

o trickle of repatriation, slow but steady, stemming in part from Burundi Ngozi example, weariness of refugees, deteriorating camp life and continuing sporadic GOR and UNHCR information campaigns;

Possible risks:

o tensions along the border and incursions into Rwanda increase over the next few months. Small bands of infiltrators finding increased support from local Hutu population, intensifying levels of violence and targeted killings from both GOR and ex-FAR sides;

Status quo approach
Possible risks, continued

o RPF undertakes preemptive strike, destabilizing the border region and creating a UN Security Council crisis for the USG. Rwandan initiative also intensifies rear guard activities of Hutu infiltrators;

o deteriorating situation affecting present GOR draws in Government of Uganda which in addition is also concerned about growing numbers of incursions along its own borders;

o instability at the same time affecting the refugee camp population, which spills over into insecurity for foreign and local relief workers. Despite threats to relief operations, overall costs for relief efforts do not decline;

o international media focus upon deteriorating situation in camps and region, suggesting lack of international community leadership and failure to address the issue of impunity.

Elements of implementation:

o continue efforts to encourage refugees to return by UNHCR-led information campaigns, supported by occasional visits of GOR officials to camps and look-see visits by refugees;

o intensify post-conflict recovery programs in selected home communes, and strengthen local security mechanisms;

o encourage Zaire and Tanzania to arrest known troublemakers and intimidators in camps;

o ensure defensive capacity of GOR is adequate to meet realistic external threats

B. - Refugee Focus Approach

The *refugee focus approach* assumes that the refugee problem is at the core of the present crisis in the region, and with that problem resolved a basis for dealing with more abiding concerns will be established. The approach reflects the general belief that by addressing the physical location of camps, by manipulating refugee populations either through relocation or resettlement strategies, short-term regional stability and cost reductions can be achieved. Two strategies under this approach are outlined below, but permutations of either or both might also be considered.

Strategy #1. Relocation and Repatriation

Assumptions:

o when offered the option of repatriation or relocation, a relatively high percentage [between 40 and 60%] will choose to return to Rwanda;

o Zaire (and Tanzania) will agree to provide land for refugee camps only, though in the case of Zaire probably not as deep into the interior as one might wish;

o with the refugee population relocated into smaller and more dispersed camps and with a large number of refugees having returned to Rwanda, relative stability will return to the region -- a stability that might leave some basis for future "Arusha Accord-type" negotiations.

Desired outcome:

o return from camps to Rwanda of a very high proportion of refugees, possibly even up to 70%;

o reduction of refugee caseload, leading to substantial cost savings;

o enhanced short-term regional stability, providing a basis to support negotiations leading to longer-term peace in the region that in turn might open up other regional economic and development opportunities;

o an indirect approach to the justice issue, since the guilt of returnees would be ascertained within Rwanda and those Rwandans remaining in camps would be more likely to be in the "genocidaire" category.

Refugee Focus approach
Strategy #1, continued

Possible risks:

o majority of refugees elect not to return, and basic situation remains the same; short term improvement in security but no long-term stability as military elements can still elect to seek "cover" in refugee camps, and operate propaganda and hate machine;

o despite substantial expenditure and physical risks associated with efforts to relocate camps, intimidation in new camps continue as in the old. Relocated camps continue to serve as stepping off points for incursions;

o increased costs due to logistics of maintaining camps further inside Zaire for same population levels as well as increased costs for providing failed "pull" inducements in Rwanda;

o no satisfactory resolution of moral issue as continued protection and feeding of interahamwe and ex-FAR would be most likely outcome;

o no resolution of issue related to UNHCR mandate regarding the nature of legitimate refugees.

Elements of implementation:

☐Political

o seek and promote congruence of objectives with essential actors, including key donor governments, governments in the region, OAU, UN agencies, ICRC and main NGOs;

o gain consensus with key actors on priority of camp closures. Order of closure should be based on fundamental objectives determined by relevant actors and will determine level of risk and thus military elements required [eg, Kibumba in Zaire likely to be more problematic than smaller Bukavu camps; Tanzania camps likely to be least risk militarily.];

Refugee focus approach
Strategy #1
Elements of Implementation, continued

☐ Military

o identify those camps purported to be for refugees but which in reality are military cantonments, and take action required to close them down;

o provide sufficient logistics assets to assist in the camp relocation process;

o in providing such assets, planners will also want to consider personnel requirements for ensuring peaceful moves from the camp and reregistration procedures [Note: Humanitarian, below] that will determine refugee assistance needs in the relocated camps;

☐ Humanitarian and Human Rights

In Rwanda:

o strengthen coordination structures [eg, provide funding, second staff] at donor, UN, NGO levels and with GOR to gain consensus on implementation of humanitarian elements;

o increase investment in commune infrastructure, looking wherever possible for small project opportunities, eg, brick-building for house construction;

o strengthen administrative capacity of prefectures and communes, a measure that -- as opposed to earlier well-intentioned efforts -- will really require a concerted approach that should include civil service salaries;

o increase attention to and resolution of land rights issues, as well as property compensation registration system;

o encourage passage and rapid public dissemination of genocide bill;

o re-energize public information campaigns in home communes and in the camps, including "look-see" visits, GOR official visits to camps;

o prepare transfer infrastructure in Rwanda, including way stations, registration and distribution points;

Refugee focus approach
Strategy #1
Humanitarian and Human Rights, continued

o launch public information campaign to sensitize and defuse possible tensions in home communes; and, at the same time, train, deploy and fund continued presence of human rights workers as confidence building measure during and after repatriation exercise;

o support of training of RPF to assist in repatriation including protection of refugees during transfer inside Rwanda and after arrival in communes;

In Zaire/Tanzania

o with GOZ/GOT, identify and prepare new sites, including infrastructure for refugees and humanitarian workers, public sensitization to the operation, need for assistance to populations neighboring the proposed camps;

o arrange physical transfer of refugees, including "reregistration", trucks, way stations. With regard to "reregistration", this exercise should seek to provide greater accuracy about home commune origins, numbers of children, intentions about return, and also should serve as a means to provide information about options;

o train and deploy force in Zaire to protect international workers following announcements of camp closures as well as training and deployment of forces to provide security for refugees wishing to return to Rwanda;

o establish security posts within all remaining refugee camps to resist any resurgence of military activity during implementation phase

o undertake demining activities along relevant borders, along routes marked for targeted return

Refugee Focus Approach

Strategy # 2: Repatriation & Resettlement

Assumptions:

o most refugees faced with resettlement far inside Zaire will opt for repatriation;

o Zaire/Tanzania will provide land adequate for those electing not to return;

o separation of legitimate from non-legitimate [ie, those bearing arms or guilty of crimes against humanity] refugees is impossible.

Desired outcome:

o cost reductions by closing all camps and providing only one-off distribution to population electing to remain in Zaire;

o enhanced regional security achieved by breaking up political/military machine in present camps;

o interahamwe and others guilty of genocide no longer benefitting from international assistance.

Possible risks:

o large numbers of refugees opt not to return;

o Zaire/Tanzania refuse to provide land and/or request exorbitant payment for land allocated;

o resettlement sites provide convenient base for ex-FAR and interahamwe to train and recruit new troops out of sight of international community and also to develop an economy to support their military strategy;

o safe havens such as Masisi are strengthened as military elements elect neither to repatriate nor resettle in areas far from the border.

Refugee focus approach
Strategy #2, continued

Elements of implementation:

☐Political

o seek and promote congruence of objectives with key actors, including EU, UNHCR, ICRC, NGOs;

o determine roles and responsibility of lead agency(ies) and coordination framework;

o seek and promote agreement of objectives by states in the region: Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania;

o brief relevant US entities, including Congressional committees, advocacy groups, and the press;

o with humanitarian actors, determine cost and seek financing for all elements of strategy;

o gain consensus with key actors on priority of camp closures. Order of closure should be based on fundamental objectives determined by key actors and will determine level of risk and thus military elements required (eg, Kibumba in Zaire likely to be more problematic than smaller Bukavu camps; Tanzania camps likely to be least risk militarily);

o reach decision on timing and development of strategy for announcing camp closures;

o assess impact of resettlement on Zaire elections, other political considerations, hence timing of action.

☐Humanitarian

In Rwanda

o strengthen coordination structures (e.g. provide funding, second staff) at donor, UN, NGO levels and with GOR to gain consensus on implementation of humanitarian elements;

Refugee focus approach
Strategy #2
Elements of Implementation
Humanitarian, continued

o increase investment in commune infrastructure in Rwanda;

o increased attention to and resolution of land rights issues;

o encourage passage and rapid public dissemination of genocide bill;

o re-energize public information campaigns in home communes and in the camps, including "look-see" visits, GOR official visits to camps;

o prepare transfer infrastructure in Rwanda, including way stations, registration and distribution points.

In Zaire/Tanzania

o with GOZ, identify and prepare new sites, including infrastructure for refugees and humanitarian workers, public sensitization to the operation, etc.;

o schedule and announce camp closures;

o arrange physical transfer of refugees: registration, trucks, way stations;

o develop information campaigns in communities adjacent to settlement sites;

o identify needs of neighboring communities and provision of assistance to provide balance and ensure security;

☐Security

In Rwanda

o launch public information campaign to sensitize and defuse possible tensions in home communes;

o support of training of RPF to assist in repatriation including protection of refugees during transfer inside Rwanda and after arrival in communes;

Refugee focus Approach
Elements of Implementation
Security, In Rwanda, continued:

o train, deploy and fund continued presence of human rights workers as confidence building measure during and after repatriation exercise;

o develop and support ex-FAR retraining camps and activities for eventual reintegration;

o collaborate in the design of and support of integrated efforts at demobilization, including demobilization of child soldiers;

o develop with countries of the region a military notification and verification program as first step towards confidence building;

In Zaire (Tanzania)

o train and deploy of force to protect international workers following announcements of camp closures;

o train and deploy of forces to provide security for refugees wishing to return to Rwanda;

o establish security posts within all remaining refugee camps to resist any resurgence of military activity during implementation phase;

o undertake demining activities along relevant borders, along routes marked for targeted return.

C - Regional Focus Approach

The solution to the refugee crisis might lie in the need to change the focus of the problem and hence the order of priorities through a *regional focus approach.* The problem facing the Great Lakes region is manifested by the refugee crisis, but it is not necessarily at its core. The fundamental issue in much of the region of the Great Lakes is the erosion of an established social, economic and political order, and the concomitant tensions arising out of deep resistance to change.

Assumptions:

o contrary to conventional assumptions, isolating the refugee issue by focussing solely on refugee repatriation/relocation and resettlement will intensify instability in the medium and longer-term;

o combined economic, political and military as well as humanitarian initiatives can lend the essential stability that will lead to refugee solutions and result in relatively peaceful implementation and more durable solutions;

o by focussing upon a broader approach to the region, including solutions to ease ethnic tensions, the prospects of avoiding another genocide increase;

o military intervention is doable and support from the region is possible given sufficient political will on the part of the international community.

Desired outcome:

o improved security at the regional level by eliminating direct threat to Rwanda and to a lesser extent Uganda and an indirect threat to Burundi;

o possibility of repatriating large numbers of refugees and relocating/resettling fewer in Zaire and Tanzania;

o possibility of addressing disruptive factors including rogue military [ie, ex-FAR], the interahamwe and other militia, including local Zaire militia in Masisi;

o although initial costs high for security-related military operation, long term results and cost savings arising out of camp closures, secure environment and improved regional stability;

Regional Focus approach
Desired Outcome, continued

o successful resolution of fundamental regional problem in which close and active involvement of regional and African institutions are essential should enhance confidence of regional states about the future;

Possible outcome:

o heightened insecurity in the short term as preparations for implementation get underway. Additional negative consequence include possible reprisals on humanitarian workers;

o lack of support from donors and public condemnation of action that might impact upon innocent civilians, both national and international on the borders, and in certain respects that might be seen as a form of *refoulement*;

o significant disruption starting along the borders and spreading into the hinterlands of Zaire, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi due to "patriotic and national resistance" to internationally supported initiatives to address insecurity of the region;

o accusations that USG promoting interests of minority rule in the region to exclusion of the majority.

Elements of implementation

☐ Political

o all out initiative by USG to gain consent of key allies, the UN Security Council and the OAU as well as relevant states in the region to develop a multilateral force capacity to provide protection along the main borders of the Great Lake region;

o similar initiative by USG to establish cordons by multilateral force around remaining refugee camps "to protect" such camps from those who lack refugee status. Such non-refugees would include those who clearly are serving a military function sanctioned officially or unofficially by the GOZ;

o USG to give active support to renewed "Arusha Accords" type process intended to establish regional security through agreements on restrictions of the use of military force, border security arrangements including monitoring and information sharing provisions as well as demining arrangements and security mechanisms for refugee return;

Regional Focus approach
Elements of Implementation
Political, continued

o pay urgent attention to ways that arms embargoes can be effectively enforced in the region to prevent build-up of invasion capacity while not destroying local capacities to provide security and policing to meet civilian requirements for law and order;

☐ Military

o participate in planning and implementing arrangements for proposed border security force and contingents to protect the refugee camps to be developed along with related arrangements for closing those refugee camps that are principally military cantonments, to relocate camps [as per Planning Framework #2] and to provide security for refugees intending to repatriate;

o support efforts for ex-FAR demobilization and possible reintegration into RPF, an exercise that will require extensive confidence building efforts and public information dissemination. Where re-integration is not possible, then integration into civilian life, with particular attention given to the issue of child-soldiers;

o assist in the strengthening of policing capacities in Zaire as well as Rwanda in ways that will not violate the proposed reinforced arms embargo for certain portions of the Great Lakes region;

Regional Focus approach
Elements of Implementation, continued

☐ Humanitarian and Human Rights

o in terms of the basic measures for humanitarian and human rights assistance for Planning Framework #3, those humanitarian and human rights measures listed in the previous framework would be applied in a similar fashion here;

o the essential additions within the *regional focus approach* concern active efforts to address [i] the environmental and ecological impacts of the refugee crisis along with [ii] enhanced human development programs to assist indigenous communities in resettlement or refugee camp affected areas and [iii] the promotion of alternative small-scale industries;

o considerable work has been done by UNDP and UNHCR, in collaboration with relevant host governments, to determine projects that would deal with the ecological and environmental damage created by the presence of over 1.7 million refugees in Tanzania and Zaire. These projects should be implemented, bearing in mind ways to integrate them into other development and small-scale industrial growth programs;

o as an essential step in stabilizing those areas where resettlement, repatriation and relocation have taken place, human development initiatives should be undertaken to avoid inequalities between host or stable populations and those who have only recently arrived or returned;

o opportunities from a broader perspective to stabilize the region should be considered, and one important set of actions would be encompassed in the idea of alternative small-scale industry programs that would have trans-border as well as grass-roots inter-ethnic elements.

D - The Socio-Political Transition Focus

The USG has attempted in certain parts of Africa to promote ways of looking beyond immediate requirements to a more visionary future. In that context, the USG's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative [GHAI], launched in 1994, goes beyond relief and conventional development towards more fundamental issues such as food security, conflict resolution and regionalism. Such solutions address core concerns in a part of the Continent that among other things had witnessed the creation of a new state [ie, Eritrea], the evolution of a failed state [ie, Somalia] as well as a perceived "rogue state" [ie, the Sudan] and the transition of a revolutionary state [ie, Ethiopia].

The GHAI serves as a useful reference for practical policy-makers for at least two reasons. The first is the importance of the GHAI precedence as a demonstration of USG willingness and US public acceptance of supporting assistance programs that are long-term in scope and that deal with core issues of poor societies. The second point is that there may well be potential for creative and cost-effective synergy between the programs of the GHAI and those being suggested in the *Socio-Political Transition Approach.*

Like the Horn of Africa but in many senses even more so, the region of the Great Lakes is going through a period of profound and painful transition. Its terrain is the scene of mass migration movements, unprecedented in this part of Africa since the 14th century. Its borders are porous and permeable, and the economies of its constituent elements in a state of stagnation or disarray. The interests of the USG, as noted on page 2 of this discussion note, may well call for a commitment that transcends the immediate.

Assumptions:

o conventional sovereignty and the very structure of states in the Great Lakes region are undergoing and need to undergo a profound metamorphosis;

o creation of a regional network of functional, viz, economic, linkages will be essential to support any efforts at conflict resolution;

o while efforts at "social engineering" and involvement in core issues of other states are hazardous, the possibility of major achievements is considerable if there is the commitment of time and resources;

o deeper linkages between proposed initiative and Greater Horn of African Initiative will provide not only conceptual base for the former, but also will generate degree of economies of scale and important synergies;

Socio-Political Transition approach, continued

Desired outcome:

o commitment that will draw in an extensive range of unconventional actors to an unconventional development initiative, eg, from the private sector; in the long run cost saving from standard assistance programs;

o an experiment in peace-building that will have positive implications for the future;

o to utilize experience from well established and recognized initiative [ie, GHAI] as positive precedent for a similar endeavor in the Great Lakes region; and, in this regard, recognition that the synergy of both initiatives enables planners to broaden scope of objectives;

o USG re-enforces its links with key African countries, as friends and eventual trading partners;

Possible risks:

o cynicism within USG and in the international community, particularly in Africa, about another underfunded, public relations "paper tiger";

o serious friction between OAU, individual African states and USG about its attempted neo-colonialist interventions;

o lack of interest on the part of US public as well as relevant African leaders in the proposal;

o creation of exaggerated expectations among concerned US national bodies as well as among bilateral partners and the states of the region;

o creation of initiatives and actions that cannot be sustained, eg, support for peacekeeping/peace enforcement interventions, and that might lead to considerable disruption within the region;

Socio-Political Transition approach, continued

Elements of implementation:

o creation of coordinating and implementing structure to act quickly on following up desired aspects of the planning framework [See: V/*Planning Frameworks 3 & 4*/#1, below]. The follow-up activities include not only longer-term proposals, but activities for immediate action;

o undertake discussions/negotiations with relevant bilateral/multilateral partners as well as relevant national authorities in the region concerning central cornerstones of the proposed strategy, including economic, political, human rights and humanitarian as well as military aspects. [Such discussions might include a larger and more forma; forum, eg, conference on regional stability, but they must not become a "be-all and end-all in itself" nor must they be an excuse to delay an action-oriented process.];

o develop immediate mechanisms to ensure tight border security in the region, including more effective arms controls, adequate patrols, monitoring and reporting, Chapter VII-type capacities, practical support for designated multilateral force, etc.;

o undertake immediate negotiations/discussions, re: relocation, resettlement and repatriation with relevant authorities; and, provide support for security/peacekeeping contingents to assist them in achieving these tasks;

o based upon proposals already developed, ensure concerted and coordinated funding effort to implement "pull factor" strategies.

V - Coordination and Implementation Structures

The type of coordinating and implementing structure used to ensure a coherent approach to address the problems facing the Great Lakes Region will depend upon the type of planning framework one adopts, or, at least the objectives and types of assumptions that one brings into the planning process.

Linked to the issue of objectives and assumptions is that of the duration of the activities under focus in any particular scenario, and the degree of coordination and implementation support that may be required for each.

Planning Frameworks #1 and 2 would not require any fundamental change in present coordination and implementation arrangements, though the USG would have to play a more active role in planning, funding and negotiating in the context of *Planning Framework #2*. This said, the USG will want to be sure that the present coordinating structures in individual countries and in the region are able to carry out what is required. In particular, the USG will want to be sure that

> [1] a regional structure is in place that will be able to coordinate UN and NGO activities beyond merely serving as an information gathering point. In other words, plans and implementation arising out of *Planning Frameworks #1 and 2* must not be constrained by issues of mandates and lack of cooperation between and among agencies in those areas where agreed operations are to take place;[3]
>
> [2] in countries where there is a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, that SRSG will provide overall and active coordination and, should there be either a UN peacekeeping force or a separate multilateral force, the Force Commander will support and report to the SRSG. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator also will report directly to the SRSG in the field, and will be in overall charge of all humanitarian and humanitarian-related assistance that passes through the UN structure;
>
> [3] the USG will endeavor to create a high level bilateral donors group in each country of the region to serve as a conduit for information and a platform for dialogue between the donors and UN agencies and NGOs as well as between senior national authorities;

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[3]. *Some relevant suggestions can be found in The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda [Steering Committee; Copenhagen, 1996], vol.3

[4] the USG will in a most active manner seek to ensure that NGOs funded by the United States act within agreed country specific Codes of Practice and relate to the broad-based objectives of established plans. The USG will also want to discuss the feasibility of this measure with its partners in the European Union and Canada;

[5] the USG will expect a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of these coordinating arrangements in order to provide if necessary the bases for mid-stream adjustments and to have a full post-operation evaluation.

Planning Frameworks #3 and 4 would require a far more extensive and active involvement by the USG in all aspects of policy, planning, funding and implementation than would be required for the first two options. The proposed coordinating and implementing arrangements for these frameworks would have some of the main elements noted above but would also have the following additional elements. In outlining these coordinating arrangements, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that these sorts of initiatives are intended to support the authorities and peoples of the region, and are not intended to dilute their legitimate rights and responsibilities:

[1] Integrated International Task Force. An integrated international task force would be created to support the efforts of the states of the region to arrive at solutions that will resolve present political, economic and military concerns. While supportive in nature, the task force would nevertheless be expected to play an active part in planning and implementing a broad-based strategy for the region. The task force would be principally concerned with the inter-relationship between funding and planning and implementation arrangements. Therefore, it is assumed that this USG initiative would include representatives of the European Union, other governments, the United Nations, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Organization for African Unity. The proposed task force will have a specific set of functions to fulfil, after which all follow-up activities would be handed over to established institutions;

[2] To assist the proposed task force, specialized working groups will be created for a period of no longer than eighteen months. These working groups will focus on a set of practical funding issues, including financial consequences of alternative economic strategies for the region [IBRD/UNDP/ABID/USG/EU], stabilization programs [OAU/NATO/DPKO/USG/EU], regional transition arrangements [OAU/DPA/EU/USG] and humanitarian and recovery activities [DHA/UNDP/USG/EU];

[3] The fundamental assumption that all coordinating and implementing

arrangements are intended only to be in support of relevant institutions and the peoples of the region compels this initiative to have an effective focal point representing those of the region. Hence, such a focal point must be assumed to be central to any coordinating arrangements and should be established along side the proposed integrated task force;

[4] The USG will want to ensure coherence between the GHAI and any new initiative in the region of the Great Lakes. Therefore, the appropriate office within USAID should be asked to develop a strategy not only to generate coherence between the two initiatives, but also to ensure that such coherence is maintained.

VI - The Next Steps

There are three immediate issues that need to be addressed in anticipation of any further Great Lakes initiative:

[1] Since June 1996 and even before, the USG has expressed deep concerns about the issue of refugees in the Great Lakes region. Recent initiatives by USAID and USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance have created considerable interest among a variety of national groups and certainly across a broad spectrum of actors in the international community. The USG should make every effort to share its thinking with these interested bodies as well as with those of the region, itself. Failure to do so will result in disappointment and worse, increased cynicism by potential partners;

[2] This discussion note suggested at the outset that the USG cannot afford to await for issues to clarify themselves on the ground before taking action. The USG must control events or at least be seen to be engaged in a positive process to address the crises of the region. Therefore, it is recommended that a follow-up group of experts be assembled rapidly to see from the perspectives of the USG, its major bilateral and multilateral partners as well as from relevant authorities in the region the next set of actions to be taken.