

ZAMBIA DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT

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**Political Participation in Zambia, 1991-1996:
Trends, Determinants and USAID Program Implications**

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by

Michael Bratton (Michigan State University),
Philip Alderfer (Michigan State University)
and
Neo Simutanyi (University of Zambia)

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Executive Summary

Introduction

- * Through its Zambia Democratic Governance Project, the USAID Mission to Zambia implements the Agency policy of strengthening democratic representation through increased citizen participation. This Project aims to make public decision-making "accessible and effective", with accessibility defined as the involvement of stakeholders in the public policy process.
- * This special study asks: To what extent are Zambians actually involved in public life? What trends are evident in popular participation between the country's democratic transition in 1991 and its 1996 general elections? What explains political participation in Zambia in all its dimensions? What are the implications for USAID's Zambia Democratic Governance Project?
- * The study reports results from a national probability sample survey of 1182 Zambian adults conducted immediately after the November 18, 1996 general elections. Comparisons over time are made with results from a baseline survey (n= 421) conducted in June 1993.

Description

- * The 1996 general elections were flawed. The conduct of the elections confirmed that the Chiluba government was quick to circumvent the rule of law, slow to react to allegations of corruption, intolerant of criticism, and willing to exploit its command over government resources to undermine opponents.
- * Nevertheless, most Zambian citizens endorsed the integrity of the 1996 elections, with an overwhelming majority considering that no candidates "had an unfair advantage". This popular mood stands in stark contrast to international and domestic condemnations of the elections, which focused on the MMD's manipulation of constitutional rules.
- * Trends in voter turnout are contradictory. On one hand, due to problems with voter registration, fewer eligible adults turned out at the polls in 1996 than in 1991. On the other hand, among registered voters alone, there was a significant increase over time in the proportion who claimed to have cast a ballot. Given the somber atmosphere of 1996 elections, however, especially when compared to the euphoria of 1991, fewer Zambians reported attending an election rally or working for a political party.
- * Continuities were observed in some aspects of political participation between elections. Zambians continued to report high levels of involvement in community meetings and collective action; and they continued to rely heavily on local notables and church organizations, rather than governmental agencies, in solving problems of socio-economic development.
- * In other aspects of non-electoral participation, change was evident between 1993 and 1996. Zambians were almost twice as likely to say that they had approached a Member of Parliament for help to solve a problem, having shifted their lobbying efforts somewhat away from traditional leaders. At the same time, their expressed satisfaction with the MP's ability to deliver development benefits dropped off sharply.
- * Citizens showed an improved grasp of the nature of Zambia's new democratic regime. Almost one-half found governmental affairs "generally understandable to people like me", up from one-third in 1993, reflecting not only cognitive gains but also meaningful improvements in citizens' sense of political efficacy.

* Indeed, five years after the historic democratic transition of 1991, Zambians remained consistently and strongly in favor of political reform. By clear majorities they said that the 1991 transition was good for the country, that they wanted to retain multiparty competition rather than return to one-party rule, and that (if they had to choose) elected government was preferable to effective government.

Analysis

* Political participation is a multidimensional concept. Factor analysis reveals that in Zambia, participation has three dimensions -- voting, "contacting" and "communing" -- that are in good part consistent with patterns of participation elsewhere in the world. Importantly, however, voting lies at the periphery of what Zambians regard as important about democracy as compared to community-based action (communing) and face-to-face interactions with political representatives (contacting).

* Regression analysis was used to analyse the determinants of political participation, both overall and for each of these dimensions. It showed that explanation of political participation in Zambia requires reference to three sets of determinants: socio-economic, attitudinal, and institutional.

* Socio-economic determinants -- namely age, gender, residential location, and education -- influenced participation in Zambia, though not consistently for all dimensions of participation and sometimes in unexpected ways. For example: rural dwellers were more active than urbanites; and women were more disadvantaged in non-electoral participation than in voting.

* Political attitudes -- including attitudes to corruption and political and economic reform -- did not systematically drive voting or other participatory behaviors. Only two political attitudes seemed to matter: a citizen's interest in politics and a citizen's assessment of the performance of the local government councillor. The latter finding confirms the local orientation of the Zambian political culture.

* Institutional considerations comprised by far the most compelling account of political participation in Zambia. Two political institutions constituted gateways to active citizenship: voter registration and political party membership.

* Voter registration helped explain *all* dimensions of participation, not just voting. For example, it increased the likelihood that individuals would discuss politics, attend community meetings, and contact a national political leader. In Zambia, many eligible voters remain unregistered because, for deliberate as well as inadvertent reasons, opportunities for voter registration are not widely distributed.

* Party membership was a crucial determinant of political participation. Card-carrying members of political parties were more likely to vote in elections, and engage in contacting and communing behaviors. The organizational weaknesses of parties and the limited numbers of party members, are major reasons why political participation is not more widespread in Zambia.

* Somewhat surprisingly, membership in voluntary associations did not promote participation in 1996, though it had earlier. We conclude that civil society in Zambia was partially demobilized following the 1991 transition. Having attained their goal of political change, and facing the need to attend to pressing issues of economic survival, Zambian citizens pulled back from what had been an intense period of involvement in associational life.

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Program Recommendations

* If USAID/Zambia so chooses, this report can be used as a guide on *how* to promote political participation in Zambia. The authors recommend a direct strategy of institutional strengthening in five areas, presented in the priority order suggested by the study findings:

1. **Voter Registration.** USAID/Z should support the Zambian Electoral Commission to enhance its political independence from the Zambian government and to boost its human, technical and financial capacities. Special attention should be given to breaking the administrative constraints that limit access to voter identification documents.
2. **Political Parties.** USAID/Z should continue to support a program to strengthen political parties in Zambia but with a narrower focus than its previous work in this area in this country. Emphasis should now be placed on membership recruitment and fund-raising.
3. **Civic Associations.** To stem the recent withering of civil society, USAID/Z should recommit itself to building capacity in selected voluntary associations. Consideration of support should be given to associations with proven capacity to enhance participation in Zambia, such as labor unions, agricultural cooperatives, and community organizations affiliated with the Catholic Church.
4. **Political Representation.** USAID should reconfigure its civic education program to address the growing "representation gap" between citizens and elected leaders in the Zambian polity. The Civic Action Fund, which should be expanded, could promote small grants competitions on this theme, especially to involve local government leaders and units.
5. **Rule of Law.** If and when the rule of law becomes a pillar of the Mission's DG Strategic Objective, USAID/Z may wish to plan for achieving people-level impact. Ameliorating popular felt needs for trustworthy crime control would seem to constitute a legitimate part of any new USAID/Z program on the rule of law.

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Introduction

Following the end of the Cold War, the U.S Agency for International Development launched a Democracy Initiative intended in part to “strengthen democratic representation” by “increas(ing) the participation of citizens” (USAID, 1991, p.1). In the Clinton administration, the Agency’s mission of sustainable development includes the goal of achieving sustainable democracies. Specifically USAID’s Strategic Framework for Democracy and Governance (DG) identifies key program approaches to achieving “more genuine and competitive political processes” and “a politically active civil society”: these include creating “a better informed electorate” and increasing “participation in policy formulation and implementation” (USAID, 1996, 48). In addition, USAID Administrator Brian Atwood announced a “participation initiative” to involve the Agency’s clients in strategy development, program design and evaluation.

Through its Zambia Democratic Governance Project, the USAID Mission in Zambia aimed at the goal of “increased governmental accountability” (USAID, 1992, 65). Through the Project, public decision-making would become “accessible and effective”, with accessibility defined as the involvement of stakeholders in the public policy process (ibid., 66). Several components of the Project — for example, civic education, media independence and legislative strengthening — were meant to lead to a better informed, more active citizenry who made use of new channels of political representation that had become available as a result of Zambia’s transition to multiparty rule in 1991.

This study asks: To what extent are actually Zambians involved in public life? What has happened to popular participation between 1991 and 1996? What explains political participation in Zambia in all its dimensions? What do the answers to these questions imply for USAID’s Zambia Democratic Governance Project?

While drawing on other sources of information, this study reports results from a national probability sample survey of Zambian adults (over the age of 18 years) conducted immediately after the November 18, 1996 general elections. Administered by trained enumerators over a ten-day period ending November 29, the survey elicited responses on political attitudes and behavior from 1182 eligible voters in all nine of the country’s provinces. A description of the survey’s questionnaire, sampling methodology, administration, and data analysis procedures is attached at Appendix 1.

The primary findings are:

- * while turnout of eligible voters has declined since 1991, other aspects of participation have generally held steady or increased;
- * while political participation varies according to citizens’ social background and selected political attitudes, the main barriers to participation are institutional.

The report proceeds in the following parts:

- * a summary account of the 1996 general elections which constitute the culminating event for the study;
- * a description of electoral participation as reported by respondents to the November 1996, post-election survey;

- * a review of other aspects of political participation in Zambia, especially between elections;
- * an account of trends in participation based on comparisons between results of a 1993 baseline survey and the 1996 post-election survey;
- * an analysis of dimensions of political participation in Zambia, emphasizing similarities and differences with other parts of the world;
- * a multivariate statistical explanation of the determinants of political participation in Zambia that explores the relative importance of socioeconomic, attitudinal and institutional factors;
- * a set of policy recommendations to USAID about program interventions that are most likely to promote citizen participation in democratic governance in Zambia.

Zambia's 1996 General Elections

When Zambia returned to multi-party political competition in October 1991, it was held up as a model for democratization in Africa (Joseph, 1992; Bratton, 1992). Since that date, however, the record of Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government has given analysts of Zambian affairs reason to rethink their earlier optimistic assessments. While the MMD has scored a measure of success in the area of economic reform, its performance on the political front has been retrogressive. While rhetorically committed to openness and transparency, the Chiluba government proved quick to circumvent the rule of law, slow to react to allegations of corruption within its ranks, intolerant of criticism, and disturbingly willing to exploit its command over government resources and institutions to undermine its opponents.

The Election Context. All of these undemocratic tendencies were displayed in the country's flawed second elections of November 18, 1996 (for fuller discussion, see Simutanyi, 1997; Simon 1997; Anon, 1997; Bratton and Posner 1997¹). The run-up to the elections was marked by the following key events:

- * The government exploited its parliamentary majority to enact a constitutional amendment that barred candidates from contesting the presidency if their parents were not native-born Zambians. This measure effectively excluded former President Kenneth Kaunda and was thought by observers to have been designed with this purpose explicitly in mind. In rushing the constitutional amendment through parliament, the MMD government showed its willingness to curtail public debate on contentious issues and to go back on assurances privately made to donor representatives about impending governmental decisions.
- * Following months of delay and a tender procedure fraught with irregularities, the government awarded a contract for a new voters' register. Registration of voters began in December 1995.² Three months and several deadline extensions later, the exercise concluded with only 2.3 million registrants out of an estimated population of 3.8 million eligible voters.³ This number represented a decline since 1991, not only in the number of registered voters (2.9 million in 1991), but also in the number of registered voters as a percentage of those eligible (87 percent in 1991 vs. 60 percent in 1996) (see NDI, 1996a).⁴
- * In February 1996 three journalists from *The Post* newspaper were arrested and jailed on charges of libel and contempt of parliament on the orders of the Speaker of the National Assembly, only to be released after

three weeks following a High Court ruling that the Speaker had exceeded his authority. Eight opposition party leaders, including UNIP vice president Chief Inyambo, were arrested in June 1996 and charged with treason in the wake of a spate of bomb scares and explosions in Lusaka. The High Court later ruled that the detainees had been wrongfully imprisoned and dismissed the government's case.

* After the postponement of local government elections in November 1995, a controversy emerged concerning when the general elections would actually take place. Opposition leaders asserted that the government would be illegally constituted if it remained in power after October 31, 1996 and declared that they would refuse to recognize its authority after that date. The government, however, unilaterally extended its mandate to November 18. Quite apart from the legal merits of this interpretation, the government's position served to heighten the atmosphere of uncertainty surrounding the elections and to reinforce misgivings about their integrity.

* Following the announcement of an election date, UNIP, along with six other small opposition parties, declared that it would boycott the polls. They pointed to the exclusion of Kaunda and the botched registration exercise as reasons why they felt the election would be a sham. In addition to withdrawing all of its parliamentary candidates from the race, UNIP promised to mount a campaign to encourage citizens not to participate in the election and called on its party organizers to (illegally) confiscate voter cards from party members to ensure that the boycott call would be heeded. Other opposition leaders went back and forth on the validity of the elections. When they lost, they made inflammatory statements about the government and its leaders, threatened to "make the country ungovernable", and even called for international sanctions.

* MMD took advantage of its control over government resources to bolster its electoral prospects. Although opposition rallies and speeches received some coverage in the government-controlled media, an analysis of their content conducted by the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) found "glaring disparities in the allocation of air-time and space among the main contenders in the election."⁵ MMD candidates enjoyed the use of government vehicles and equipment for campaigning purposes. Fertilizer, maize-meal and development funds were distributed to attract supporters in rural constituencies and council houses were sold at bargain prices in urban areas. MMD campaigners threatened voters with the withdrawal of development funding from their constituencies if they elected members of the opposition.

The Election Results. Despite the tensions of the campaign, election day itself passed peacefully. Confounding widespread expectations of violence and confusion, observers across the country reported that voters were orderly and serious as they waited to cast their ballots. Compared with 1991, when Zambians anticipated sweeping change, voters in 1996 came to the polls with more realistic expectations about how quickly their lives would improve. At the time and not very far away, tens of thousands of Hutu refugees were being repatriated from Zaire to Rwanda, leading many voters to comment that they viewed voting as a preferable alternative to the ethnic violence that had engulfed their neighbors.⁶

The results of Zambia's 1996 general elections are displayed in Table 1.

Facing four other candidates, President Chiluba won reelection in a landslide with 72.6 percent of the vote, only three points below his mark in the two-candidate race of 1991. His nearest rival, Dean Mung'omba of the Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC), won just 13 percent. In the parliamentary elections, MMD captured 61 percent of the vote and 131 of the 150 available seats. ZDC, which won 14 percent, managed to win only two seats, while National Party (NP) and Agenda for Zambia (AZ) took five

and two seats respectively. The agrarian National Lima Party (NLP) and six other minor parties failed to win any seats. Independent candidates won in ten constituencies, giving them one seat more than all the opposition parties put together.

The election results revealed a number of interesting trends. First, while voter turnout, at 58.7 percent of registered voters, was more than 15 points higher than it had been in 1991, it still only represented about 29 percent of those eligible. Thus, while President Chiluba may have received a clear majority of votes, his mandate came from less than 20 percent of the voting-age population. Second, while MMD's strength was similar in urban and rural parts of the country, there was considerable variation across regions in the degree of MMD support, which ranged, in the parliamentary poll, from 70.5 percent in the Copperbelt and in the President's home region of Luapula to a low of 44.4 percent in Northwestern Province. Twelve of the 19 parliamentary seats won by opposition or independent candidates were located in just two provinces: Western and Northwestern.⁷ A third trend was the emergence of independent candidates and ticket splitting. Some 99 independent candidates, many with a popular local base, ran for office in 1996. As a result, MMD's presidential and parliamentary vote tallies (nearly identical in 1991) showed significant divergence in 1996, particularly in constituencies where independents were strong. The substantial gap between President Chiluba's share of the vote (73 percent) and that of his party's parliamentary candidates (61 percent) suggests that the individual qualities of parliamentary candidates may have been as much a part of voter decision-making as party affiliations (see below).

The biggest difference in voting patterns between 1991 and 1996 came in Eastern Province, where UNIP had won every constituency in 1991 but handed MMD all 19 seats in 1996. A comparison of voter turnout rates in Eastern Province and the rest of the country makes it clear that the opposition boycott successfully kept many voters away from the polls. While Eastern Province residents were slightly more likely than other Zambians to register to vote in 1996, their 37.0 percent turnout in the elections was more than 20 points below the national average. Eastern Province was also the only region of the country to record a drop in voter turnout from 1991.⁸ Since the stay-away call came well after the conclusion of the voter registration exercise, the comparatively low turnout rates in Eastern Province attest to the effectiveness of the boycott there. And since those most likely to heed the embargo were also those most likely to vote against the MMD, the boycott probably accounts for a large part of MMD's change of fortunes in the region.

There is no evidence, however, that the opposition boycott had any demonstrable effect on voting patterns in the rest of the country. Outside the east, where UNIP was weaker to begin with, UNIP sympathizers apparently reacted to their party's withdrawal from the election by voting for other opposition parties, or even for MMD, rather than by boycotting. In the end, the boycott proved to be an enormous tactical, and even strategic, miscalculation for UNIP⁹. Its collapse served to discredit Kaunda and generate deep, and perhaps insurmountable, divisions within the party. Not only did it fail to engender the broad-based compliance necessary to support a credible claim that the election had been illegitimate, but, it effectively removed UNIP from the political arena. By reducing the opposition presence in parliament, the boycott also undermined political pluralism and multiparty democracy in Zambia.

Even had the opposition boycott been more effective, it still would not have explained MMD's broad electoral success in the country as a whole. To do this, reference must be made not simply at the enormous advantages in campaign resources that MMD possessed -- UNIP, after all, enjoyed similar advantages in 1991 -- but also at MMD's ability to convince voters that it should be given another five years to finish its program of reforms. MMD had won mass support in 1991 because, after 27 years of

Kaunda's increasingly repressive and economically destructive rule, it was viewed as an agent of change. It won mass support again in 1996 because it was able to draw upon its beginning successes in market liberalization, rehabilitation of transport infrastructure, and health care reform to convince voters that it was still the party best positioned to raise standards of living for average Zambians.

The failure of opposition parties to exploit MMD's weaker record in other areas and persuade voters that they represented a better alternative was critically important. Although opposition parties did succeed in winning the sympathy of donors and urban elites over the government's handling of the constitution and voter registration, these issues failed to resonate among the vast majority of voting Zambians, who seemed to feel that MMD was doing a reasonable job. The 1996 post-election survey found that 43.2% of Zambians assessed the overall performance of the MMD government as good or very good, whereas only 21.7% saw it as poor or very poor. The remaining 35.1% ranked the MMD's performance as fair. Notably, these figures were virtually unchanged from the baseline survey conducted over three years earlier in June 1993, suggesting that the government's support was holding steady over time. By focusing their energies on other issues (the constitution rather than jobs and agriculture) and the wrong audiences (the donor community rather than the community of voters), opposition parties left the field open for an easy MMD victory.

Participation in the 1996 Elections

A precedent of low voter turnout had already been set in Zambia's founding multiparty elections of October 1991. Unlike the euphoric founding contests in other African countries like Angola, Burundi, Gabon, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa, where turnout of registered voters exceeded 85 percent, Zambia had joined countries like Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo where fewer than half of all registered voters cast a ballot (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, 208). For this reason alone, voter turnout was expected to be low in the November 1996 elections. A dampening of turnout was also expected because of the obstacles encountered by would-be voters seeking registration in 1996, as well as their lukewarm response even when the government extended the registration period. Shockingly, by election day, only 1.1 million of the 2.3 million freshly registered voters had bothered to pick up their voter cards.

The 1996 post-election survey was designed in part to cast light on Zambian electoral behavior. Data on participation in the 1996 general elections is displayed in Table 2.

Among respondents to the survey, 61.3 percent claimed to be registered voters and 51.3 percent claimed to have cast a ballot in the 1996 elections. Men were much more likely to say that they were registered voters (69.9 percent) than were women (53.0 percent)¹⁰. Also, a clear majority of older people claimed registration (73.1 percent in the over 45 year age group) but only a minority of youngsters (46.4 percent among 18-26 year-olds)¹¹. Age and gender also seemed to matter for casting a ballot in 1996, at least when considered in isolation from all other factors that might affect voting. Whereas 59.8 percent of men claimed to vote, only 43.0 percent of women did so¹²; and whereas 59.8 percent of those over 45 said they voted, only 38.8 percent of those under-26 so reported¹³.

These survey estimates of voter registration and voting in 1996 seem inflated. Why? Some previously registered voters may have thought that they were still eligible to vote even though they did not re-register during the most recent registration period. More likely, respondents over-reported registration and voting due to the contaminating effects of the election, which was held immediately before

the survey¹⁴. Interviews were conducted between two and twelve days after polling, which may have led some respondents to exaggerate their participation in socially-approved electoral behaviors¹⁵.

For this reason, we do not hinge our analysis of political participation in Zambia, or even of electoral participation, on the single indicator of a 1996 ballot. As will be seen, voting in 1996 is just one of several voting acts and a dozen aspects of overall participation (including many non-voting acts) considered below.

Zambian voters think of themselves as a determinedly independent bunch. Of those who voted in 1996, almost all (88.8 percent) said that they chose an elected representative on their own rather than under pressure or persuasion from someone else. For the very small proportion who did not choose independently, respondents reported that they were swayed (in order of importance) by a family member, a political party official, a candidate, or a chief or headman. The fact that the vast majority saw themselves as self-conscious political decision-makers, however, implies that citizens have quickly become attached to freedom of electoral choice and that it will be difficult for any government to deprive them of this newly restored political right.

An emerging sense of citizen autonomy and sovereignty was also evident in the standards that people applied in choosing candidates. More than two-thirds of voters (67.4 percent) said that they decided who to vote for on the basis of the candidate's individual qualities rather than the candidate's political party affiliation. The personal qualities that voters found attractive included (in order of importance): the candidate had already brought services to the constituency (17.6 percent); the candidate visited the community regularly (17.0 percent); the candidate promised to bring services (11.2 percent); voters just wanted a change of leadership (8.3 percent); and the candidate was honest and trustworthy (7.7 percent). For example when one Western Province respondent was asked what qualities attracted him to a particular MP, he replied that "he seems to be a hard worker, and he regularly visits the community." It is striking, but not surprising, that Zambian voters evaluate their parliamentary representatives primarily in terms of actual or expected abilities at constituency service. Considerations such as these lay behind the record number of independent candidates elected to the National Assembly in 1996. The preference for individuals over institutions also reflects a deep seated resentment among voters of the arbitrary practices of dominant ruling parties in Zambia. These include selecting parliamentary candidates at the national level and imposing them in the locality against the wishes of constituents.

Revealing strong local ties and orientations, most Zambians (82.1 percent) supported the idea that Members of Parliament should be required to live within the areas that they represent. But, when we asked voters whether their preferred candidate actually did live in the locality, only 39.6 percent reported that he or she actually did so.¹⁶ Zambians often expressed perceptions that MPs were inaccessible and neglectful of constituency problems, with only 24.7 percent of respondents stating that they were satisfied with the performance of their legislative representative (see Table 3). Interestingly, however, MPs who *did* live in the area were likely to be assessed *more* negatively (79.1 percent) than MPs who were not local residents.¹⁷ This suggests that, despite what Zambians say about preferring "hometowners" as their representatives, they seem to assess MP performance by other criteria, perhaps by whether their representative has political clout at the national level. While wanting their MPs to be locally beholden, they also want them to be nationally influential, not least in order to capture the resources needed for upgrading services in the constituency. This finding also suggests that pervasive complaints about weak MP-constituency relations in Zambia cannot be erased simply by electing more "hometown" representatives.

Finally, the survey cast light on the legitimacy of the 1996 elections. When we asked about popular attitudes to the 1996 election boycott mounted by UNIP and its opposition allies, an overwhelming proportion of respondents (83.9 percent) declared that they were unaffected. This response varied by region from a high of 88.1 percent in Luapula Province to a low of 62.0 percent in Eastern Province. Notably, even in UNIP's stronghold in the east the boycott reportedly affected well under half of all respondents. For those who were affected, the most common response was that the boycott "limited my choice of candidates", reflecting frustration with the boycott rather than support for it. This finding is borne out by the mere 2.3 percent of all Zambians who said they had ever participated in an election boycott. Again the largest contingent of boycotters (just 4.9 percent) was found in Eastern Province.

Consistent with these findings, most Zambians endorsed the integrity of the controversial 1996 elections. Fully 80.9 percent considered that "the most recent elections were generally fair" and that no candidates "had an unfair advantage". This popular mood stands in stark contrast to international and domestic condemnations of the election, which focused on the MMD's manipulation of electoral and other rules. The constitutional issue that was the centerpiece of the critics' case — that is, the exclusion of Kaunda from the presidential contest — apparently failed to resonate within an electorate that was more preoccupied with the delivery of jobs, incomes and services. For example, of those Zambians (19.1 percent) who thought the election was unfair, just 16.4 percent (i.e. 3.1 percent overall) saw it as flawed *because* Kaunda was barred; most of these respondents referred to *other* electoral irregularities such as vote-buying, alleged count-rigging, and the use of public resources in the MMD campaign. Several respondents welcomed Kaunda's elimination, volunteering that they had no wish to return to the bad old days of UNIP and opining that it was time for the "old man" to retire from politics¹⁸. Thus, regardless of the merits of the case made by civic leaders and international donors, the electorate as a whole was largely unconcerned with the democratic principle of open electoral competition.

Other Aspects of Participation

Political participation does not begin and end with voting but embraces numerous other citizen acts between elections. The role of Zambians in other key aspects of participation is depicted in Table 3.

Consistent with the view that in Zambia, "all politics is local", respondents to the 1996 survey reported extensive involvement in community affairs. Almost two out of three Zambians (65.7 percent) claimed to have attended a community meeting during the previous five years and two out of five (41.8 percent) said they had "got together with others to raise an issue".

In the period since 1991, Zambians have clearly preferred conventional forms of political participation through established organizations to the spontaneous politics of mass protest. Only 6.1 percent of respondents said that they had taken part in a political demonstration, march or rally in the five years up to November 1996. At the same time, Zambians preferred personal, face-to-face political engagement to the detached forms of communication that usually accompany the use of formal political channels. Only very small proportions of Zambians had recently signed a petition (2.1 percent) or written a letter to a newspaper (3.6 percent). Apparently, the written word is not an important means of political communication in this society in which approximately half of the population remains non- or semi-literate¹⁹.

Because Zambians prefer direct personal interactions, it is not surprising to find that they report relatively regular contacts with political leaders. Overall, two out of five respondents (40.7 percent) say that they have made at least one direct contact with an elected representative or a public official. The closer that leaders live to the people, the more likely that such constituency relationships will occur. Whereas 23.7 percent of respondents contacted a chief, 19.0 percent contacted a local government councillor, 13.4 percent contacted a government officer, and 12.9 contacted an MP. Clearly, citizens found it easier to initiate exchanges with local officials (chiefs and councillors) than with national political figures (MPs and government officers). Interestingly, the extent of contact relates positively to citizen political satisfaction. For example, even though hometown origins are no guarantee of popularity, citizens who had met with their MPs or local government councillors were more likely to say that they were satisfied with their performance²⁰.

Perhaps because citizens find difficulty in attracting the attention of political leaders, especially at national level, they seek to solve personal and community problems through alternative channels. For example, people needing assistance are just as likely to seek out an influential private citizen (like a schoolteacher or a business leader) (20.6 percent) as they are to contact a local government councillor (19.0 percent). Reliance on personal ties to local notables is a predictable response in a patron-client culture where the capacity of government has long been in decline. Similarly, Zambian citizens are more likely to turn to their churches than to government institutions when they want to get something done. More than half of the population (a remarkable 54.7 percent of survey respondents) had appealed to local church leaders for help during the period 1991 to 1996. This behavior was associated with far higher levels of trust in church institutions than in governmental institutions, though it is unclear whether such trust was a cause or an effect of institutional contacts. Whereas 77.8 percent of Zambians were prepared to say that they trusted church institutions "a lot", only 21.1 percent and 20.9 percent respectively were prepared to say the same of their local government council and of the Zambian National Assembly.

We noted earlier the emergence of a sense of individualism in political decision-making. Does this tendency carry over from voting into non-electoral forms of participation? When citizens contact leaders with requests for assistance, do they do so on their own personal account or on behalf of a group? It depends on the type of leader approached. Not surprisingly, contacts with private patrons tended to be of an individualized nature (only 39.0 percent on behalf of a group), whereas contacts with public officials usually took place in the name of a residential community or a group based on common interests (76.7 percent). Contacts with traditional leaders (47.3 percent) were about evenly split. The fact that the most common form of lobbying, that is, to church leaders, was likely to be individual (58.7 percent) suggests that traditional political solidarities are gradually giving way to the expression of individual self-interest.

Trends in Political Participation, 1991-1996

This section examines whether Zambian citizens have become more active or less so in the country's political life since the democratic transition. Have they maintained the high levels of political mobilization observed during the heady days of 1990 and 1991? Or have they channeled spontaneous protests into sustained participation in elections and formal organizations? Alternatively, have they simply withdrawn into political apathy and quiescence?

This study addresses these questions by comparing results from the November 1996 post-election survey with results obtained from an earlier baseline survey conducted in June 1993. Both surveys asked Zambians about their political knowledge, opinions and behavior, almost always using identical

questionnaire items. As such, the two surveys together represent a unique resource for beginning to assess whether, and in what direction and to what extent, political participation in Zambia is changing. Taken together, the surveys also provide a rare glimpse into the evolution of public opinion on key policy issues and on the popularity of political leaders, parties and governments, and regimes of governance.

Caution is always warranted in imputing change to political actions and attitudes from survey data. First of all, we cannot assume that subjective political attitudes are firmly formed. In many cases, respondents may not have developed well-rooted opinions on survey topics, and any purported "change" in attitudes over time may reflect little more than each individual's shifting and ongoing effort to arrive at a comfortable position, often for the first time. This problem of "non-attitudes" (Weisberg and Bowen, 1997, 83) is likely to be particularly pronounced for survey populations with low levels of formal education who find themselves in the unfamiliar surroundings of a brand-new democracy. Therefore, this section of the report concentrates on objective indicators of political behavior (like voting, electioneering, joining in community action, and contacting leaders), on which data is more concrete, and only tangentially on political attitudes.

Second, the validity of cross-temporal comparisons rests on the similarity of the survey samples used over time. The issue of sampling becomes particularly acute in research projects that do not employ a panel design in which exactly the same individuals are interviewed more than once. Because a panel design was not feasible in Zambia (given the high cost of repeatedly contacting an identical group of respondents in a large country with a mobile population), this study relied on two separate national probability samples drawn in June 1993 and November 1996 respectively. The survey methodology is spelled out in Appendix 1.

Table 4 presents the social background of the respondents in each survey.

The reader will notice that the proportion of respondents by gender, age, education, employment and residential location were almost identical in the 1993 and 1996 samples. Most divergences in social characteristics between samples were easily explicable: for example, currency inflation was the main cause of increasing median individual and household incomes between 1993 and 1996.

In two respects, however, the samples were dissimilar. To begin with, the 1996 sample was far larger than the 1993 sample, including 1182 respondents versus 421 respondents. Moreover, it covered all nine of Zambia's administrative provinces, whereas the 1993 baseline sample omitted Luapula, Northern and Western Provinces since these were not selected in a random sample of provinces. The improved coverage of the 1996 sample had the advantage of reducing the margin of error in reporting results (from +/-5 percent to +/-3 percent) and representing Zambia's ethnic groups accurately in proportion to their distributions in the national population. By including Northern and Luapula Provinces, respondents identifying themselves as "Bemba" now emerged correctly as the country's majority ethnic/linguistic grouping²¹.

The critical issue is whether differences between these samples introduces systematic bias into the survey findings. Responses over time can be compared reliably only if 1996 responses do not vary significantly between the original six provinces first covered in the 1993 baseline survey and all nine provinces covered in the second survey. We tested all the key variables that are explained in this study and found that no meaningful sampling biases exist.

For example, consider voting in the 1996 election. Perhaps 1996 voter turnout patterns were dissimilar across provinces. In practice, we found no statistically significant difference between the 51.7% who reported voting in 1996 in the original six provinces and the 51.3% who reported voting in 1996 nationwide²². Thus, when comparing voter turnout rates in 1993 and 1996 we can infer that distortions do not arise from variances in the way that samples were drawn. Take another example, in this case citizen views about the performance of the MMD government. Perhaps the inclusion of Luapula and Northern Provinces (generally thought to be bases of MMD support) in the 1996 sample would reveal that the 1993 sample had been biased. A slight difference in the expected direction emerged across groups of provinces but, importantly, it was not statistically significant. Whereas 41.9 percent of respondents gave MMD a positive rating in 1996 in the provinces included in the narrower 1993 sample, the share of positive responses barely rose to 43.2 percent when a complete array of provinces was included²³. Again, we can conclude that, for the intents and purposes of this study, popular assessments of MMD performance in 1993 and 1996 can be legitimately compared.

Table 5 shows trends in political participation in the first five years of Zambia's Third Republic, that is, since the introduction of multiparty political competition in 1991.

In interpreting these trends, the reader should bear two caveats in mind. The direction of a trend is more important than the precise spread between figures over time. Nevertheless, a spread of 8 percent or more is preferred because it certifies that observed differences are not due to sampling error (± 5 percent in 1993 and ± 3 percent in 1996).

Trends in Electoral Participation. The first thing to notice is that over-reporting of electoral participation declines over time, perhaps as respondents perceive a receding risk of reporting a "wrong" answer. Take voting in the Zambia's October 1991 elections for example, which 54.9 percent of respondents to the baseline survey claimed to have done. When respondents were asked again in 1996 about whether they had voted in 1991, only 42.8 percent of eligible voters reported having done so, a figure that is acceptably close to the 38.0 percent who did so according to official figures (Republic of Zambia, 1996)²⁴. This procedure also cut in half (from 40.1 percent to 20.6 percent) the proportion of persons claiming to have voted in the 1992 local government elections. These updated and more realistic figures are the ones used for analysis of voting behavior in this study.

If, as critics claimed, the 1995/96 voter registration in Zambia was incomplete and inaccurate, one would expect the proportions of eligible adults who are registered to vote to have declined between 1991 and 1996. The survey confirmed this trend, with the proportion of eligible adults registered dropping some six percent (from 65.1 percent to 61.3 percent registered) between the two multiparty general elections. Again, what matters in these results is not so much the precision of the figures but the general trends they reveal. In this regard the results suggest that, as could have been predicted from voter roll problems, the franchise in Zambia became less accessible after the 1991 transition.

Similarly, given the controversy generated by the elections, one might expect a reduction in voter turnout between Zambia's founding and second elections. From one perspective -- that is, for all eligible adults -- the trend in voter turnout is indeed downward. The survey results confirm a roughly seven percent decline in self-reported voter turnout (from 54.9 to 51.3 percent) when the two elections are compared.

From another perspective, however — in this case, for registered voters alone — voter turnout can be seen to have increased over Zambia's two recent multiparty general elections. Whereas 67.4 percent of registered voters said they voted in the 1991 general elections, 83.7 percent so reported for the 1996 general elections. There was thus a significant increase over time in the proportion of registered voters who claimed to have cast a ballot. Importantly, the extent of the increase reported in the survey roughly matched official figures: whereas Zambia's Electoral Commission recorded a 30.4 percent increase²⁵, the survey results reflected a 24.2 percent increase in turnout of registered voters. And when we asked people if the frequency of their voting participation had changed since 1991, about one out of four adults (21.1) said that it had risen. Not surprisingly, more than one out of three (34.5 percent) of registered voters gave this response, again confirming that increases in voting participation were of the expected order, and most marked among those who were able to register.

Thus, for those citizens who crossed the threshold of voter registration, trends in voter participation were actually quite positive and ran in the opposite direction to trends in voter participation for the adult population at large. This strongly suggests that voter registration is a key discriminatory factor for electoral participation in Zambia, a finding that will be tested and explored further as this analysis proceeds.

If voter registration is a gateway to electoral participation, why don't more Zambians enter? Do they choose to abstain or are they being prevented from registering? To address this question we asked non-registrants in both surveys why they failed to take out voters cards. The same reasons were advanced for both 1991 and 1996, but in shifting priority order. About one-fifth of non-registered adults (19.3 percent in 1993 and 20.9 percent in 1996) said that they had missed the voter registration period, usually because they did not hear about it or because they were traveling away from home when registration occurred. Another, smaller group reported ill-health as an obstacle. These common reasons remained roughly steady across time.

Clear trends were evident, however, in other reasons for non-registration. These trends challenge the commonplace assumption that low levels of electoral participation in Zambia can be traced to political apathy among citizens. Interestingly, the main reason cited for non-registration in 1991 (30.7 percent) was rarely cited in 1996 (18.1 percent), namely that the respondent was "not interested" in voting. In other words, while many adult Zambians may have been disengaged in the run-up to the 1991 elections, they were apparently much keener to exercise their right to vote by 1996. If Zambians wished to register as voters in 1996, why were they unable to do so? The survey data suggests that the principal obstacle was that many persons did not possess a national registration card, an official identity document required for both registration and voting. Fully one out of four (25.7 percent) among the disenfranchised cited this administrative constraint as the leading reason for their exclusion from the electoral process.

Trends in Non-Electoral Participation. What about non-voting behavior? Of course, one should not expect all aspects of political behavior to change markedly over time, especially over the short interval of three and a half years between the two surveys. Indeed, one would anticipate that, following a tumultuous transition, citizens would seek a new equilibrium in which some form of "normal" politics is once again consolidated. Thus, the challenge is to identify innovative aspects of political participation against the background of behavior that remains very much the same.

Let us begin with continuities in political participation between elections. In 1993 and 1996 almost identical proportions of adult Zambians said that they attended community meetings (66.9

versus 65.7 percent) and political demonstrations (6.5 versus 6.1 percent). Similarly, the proportion reporting contact with local government councillors was virtually unchanged across the two surveys (17.4 versus 19.0 percent). The fact that the 1996 findings replicate those of 1993 instills a measure confidence that these questionnaire items are reliably capturing the relatively fixed features of mass political behavior in Zambia.

On other aspects of participation, change was evident. When 1996 is compared to 1991, fewer Zambians reported attending an election rally (50.9 versus 58.7 percent) or working for a political party or election candidate (14.0 versus 25.0 percent). These declines are understandable when one considers the sharply contrasting atmospheres of the times: in 1991, after many years of quiescence, most Zambians were stimulated by the prospect of real political competition to re-enter the political arena, bringing with them euphoric expectations of political and economic change; by 1996, a much more sober and realistic mood prevailed, shaped both by the realization that the MMD government was unlikely to fulfill all its promises of political reform and economic recovery and by the absence of any credible alternative political movement.

Even as Zambians pulled back from election campaigns, they showed some signs of beginning to use established channels of political representation. In 1996 as compared to 1993, they were almost twice as likely to say that they had approached a Member of Parliament for help to solve a problem (12.9 versus 6.9 percent). To be sure, the persistently low levels of political contacts between citizens and their national representatives indicates that representative channels were still underused. But the survey data provide indicative evidence that past patterns of popular reliance on chiefs and headmen are not only declining (contacts with traditional leaders were down from 32.9 to 23.7 percent), but are being at least partially replaced by relationships with elected representatives.

Trends in Political Attitudes. Before leaving the subject of recent trends in Zambian public life, we wish to present a few select instances of continuity and change in mass political attitudes. Strictly speaking, these items are not aspects of political participation itself; instead they can potentially help account for participation. As such they belong on the independent, rather than the dependent side of any explanatory equation. But, rather than belabor our later analysis of political participation with discussion of the changing nature of popular attitudes, we find it more convenient to discuss this topic here.

Survey findings about trends in political attitudes can be found in Tables 6, 7 and 8.

In part because Zambians have a measure of access to relevant information, they have improved their knowledge of politics and the political system in the multiparty era. In 1996, a large proportion of citizens (70.7 percent) reported that they sometimes listen to news bulletins on the radio, a figure that has held steady since 1993 (69.0 percent) (see Table 6)²⁶. The proportion of citizens reporting reading newspapers, however, has dropped off slightly from 51.7 percent in 1993 to 44.3 percent in 1996, perhaps largely due to rising newspaper prices²⁷.

Regardless of trends, exposure to news media in Zambia must be considered high by African standards which helps to explain rising levels of citizen political knowledge. In almost all cases, Zambians were better able to name individual political leaders in 1993 than in 1996, including their councillor (up 24.5 percent), their MP (up 22.4 percent), and the Minister of Finance (up 73.4 percent)²⁸. While the proximity of the 1996 general election may explain much of the improved popular awareness of individual MPs, other factors may also have been at work with regard to local councillors, who were not up

for re-election.

More significantly, citizens also seemed to grasp the nature of Zambia's new democratic regime. Whereas in 1993 only bare majorities could distinguish between political parties and governments (51.3 percent) and central and local governments (54.8 percent), these majorities had grown somewhat by 1996 (to 57.5 and 61.0 percent respectively). These findings suggest that, at least on the margins, the mentality of the one-party state, is beginning to erode. Citizens are somewhat less likely to blithely accept that a centralized political machine should be able to infiltrate and dominate all political institutions. Zambians also claim to have made rapid strides in understanding "how government works". In 1993, two-thirds of respondents (66.7 percent) thought that "government sometimes seems so complicated that I cannot really understand what is going on", perhaps reflecting the turmoil of the transition and the novelty of the multiparty system. By 1996, however, almost one-half (48.7 percent) had come to find governmental affairs "generally understandable to people like me". We would argue that this striking shift reflects not only popular gains in cognitive understanding of the political process, but also meaningful improvements in citizens' sense of political efficacy in dealing with governmental institutions.

We therefore asked directly whether citizens were sufficiently self-confident to take political action (see Table 7). To begin with, two out of three respondents told the researchers that they were interested in national and local political matters, a prerequisite for active citizenship. Notably, this figure did not vary between 1993 (66.8 percent) and 1996 (67.7 percent), confirming both that interest in politics has been sustained in the post-transition period and that most Zambian citizens were not politically apathetic. Zambians showed somewhat greater interest in national (64.6 percent) than local politics (57.8 percent), though a clear majority (54.8 percent) was interested in both. As we shall see below, interest in politics proves to be an important factor in explaining whether citizens actually participate.

Consistent with a sustained high level of interest in politics in Zambia, two out of three persons (68.0 percent in 1993 and 69.6 percent in 1996) said that they discussed political matters with others. Zambians were only slightly less confident that they could influence the opinions of their families, colleagues and friends (66.2 percent in 1993, declining to 63.8 percent in 1996). But they were pessimistic that they could make their political representatives listen (40.5 percent in 1993), a dark mood that has only deepened under Zambia's multiparty regime (to 34.3 percent in 1996). Thus, at precisely the same time that Zambians became more familiar with the identities of elected M.P.'s, and increased contact with them, they lost confidence in their own ability to influence these political representatives. These findings point to a widening "representation gap" between the locality and the political center.

This is not to say that citizens have given up on making democracy work. By a margin of almost two to one, Zambians have confidence in the efficacy of the vote. For every person who believes that "no matter how we vote, things will not get better in the future", two fellow citizens believe that "we can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives" (66.2 percent).

Indeed, five years after the historic democratic transition of 1991, Zambians as a whole remained consistently and strongly in favor of political reform (see Table 8). By overwhelming majorities they said that the 1991 transition was good for the country (75.9 percent), and preferred to retain multiparty competition rather than return to one-party rule (73.0 percent). Moreover, despite the government's ban on Kaunda's presidential candidacy and the opposition boycott of the 1996 elections, they consider that, in practice, Zambia now enjoys real political competition. In 1996 as in 1993, they explicitly rejected the thesis that the MMD represents a continuation of UNIP's one-party rule (74.0

percent). And, when asked to choose, three out of five (62.9 percent) continue to prefer elected government over effective government, this despite MMD's questionable record at delivering on its promises of widespread socio-economic recovery.

Hence, with very minor exceptions, Zambia continues to enjoy a broad-based popular constituency for political reform. Tolerance of political differences may have slipped a tad from 1993 to 1996 (from 75.4 percent to 70.0 percent supporting freedom of expression), perhaps because of tensions engendered by the 1996 election campaign. But, remarkably, support for elected government was just as strong in 1996 (62.9 percent) as it was more than three years earlier (63.4 percent). This attribute of public opinion can be regarded as an important cultural resource for the long-term task of consolidating democratic institutions in Zambia.

The Dimensions of Political Participation

Having described trends in political participation in Zambia, we now turn to analysis. The first step is to shape the survey findings on participation into a form in which they can be easily examined.

Broadly conceived, participation concerns "the entire process of how and why people get involved in politics" (Chilcote, 1981, 228). More precisely, political participation consists of "those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take" (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978, 46).

As scholars have argued, and as the Zambian experience illustrates, political participation is a multidimensional concept. Among other things, it embraces a wide range of citizen behaviors from registering to vote, actually voting in various types of elections, attending community meetings and election rallies, campaigning, lobbying representatives and officials, writing letters and signing petitions and, when all else fails, assembling in protest demonstrations. Given this complexity, we face a challenge when trying to explain political participation. On the one hand, one would not want to try to account for each and every different type of participatory act, a process that could potentially involve an endless series of separate analyses. On the other hand, one would not want to oversimplify the concept of political participation by reducing it to a single component.

An intermediate approach is therefore required to discern whether the data on political participation falls into coherent clusters. Stated differently, are there grounds for believing that certain types of participatory behavior hang together? It may well be that individuals who perform certain participatory acts are also likely to perform other, related ones. If so, it may be possible to distill the rich detail of mass participation into a few, major dimensions.

This approach to participation has been used on survey data generated in mature democracies like the United Kingdom (e.g. Parry, Moyser and Day, 1992, 50), authoritarian one-party regimes like the former Soviet Union (e.g. Bahry and Silver, 1990), and for comparative studies across world regions (e.g. Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978). These studies indicate that political participation is indeed composed of a few discernible dimensions that can be readily revealed by the statistical technique of factor analysis. An existing body of comparative theory leads us to expect five general clusters of participatory behavior; voting, electoral campaigning, contacting representatives, collective action, and protesting. An interesting question is whether political participation in new democracies follows the patterns of older ones. Do Zambians participate in the same clusters of political activity as citizens in other countries?

Table 9 presents the results of a factor analysis of 13 different types of political activities undertaken by Zambian citizens between 1991 and 1996²⁹.

It shows that political participation in Zambia can be grouped into four main dimensions. Three of these dimensions -- *contacting*, *voting* and *protesting* -- were consistent with aspects of participation that occur regularly in other settings.

But participation in Zambia also displayed singular features. For example, campaigning and collective action hung together; Zambians who said they regularly discussed political issues with others and attended community meetings were also likely to attend campaign rallies. Two additional activities also clustered into this group -- getting together with others to raise an issue and promoting a political party or candidate. We labeled this distinctive dimension as *communing*, to capture the fact that discussions, meetings and rallies in Zambia are as much social occasions -- where friends assemble to enjoy each other's company -- as explicitly political events. In fact, this distinctively African dimension lay at the core of political participation in Zambia, accounting for as much variance in overall participation as the three other dimensions combined (see Table 9).

Let us briefly review the content of the other dimensions, starting with *contacting*. Our analysis showed a cluster of four activities (in order of importance to the factor): contacting Members of Parliament, contacting chiefs and headmen, contacting officials from government agencies, and contacting local councillors. This finding accords with earlier observations that Zambians seek face-to-face interactions with their political representatives and that contacts with MPs are becoming the focal point of such efforts. It also suggests that contacts with one type of public official begets contacts with others, perhaps as citizens build confidence that they have a right to approach and engage their political representatives.

Two activities, registering to vote and voting in elections, grouped together into the dimension of *voting*. The variable labeled "total number of times voted" measured respondents' participation in the three principal elections held since the democratic transition, excluding parliamentary by-elections. These were the 1991 and 1996 general elections and the 1992 local government elections. Again, those who voted in one of these elections were also likely to have voted in the others. Interestingly, voting was a relatively unimportant dimension of participation in Zambia, accounting for less variance in overall participation than *communing* or *contacting*, and barely more than unconventional forms of protest action. This suggests that the essentially private act of voting lies at the periphery of what Zambians regard as important about involvement in a democracy as compared with more public forms of participation embodied in community-based action and face-to-face contacts with political representatives.

The fourth dimension of political participation, *protesting*, referred to joining a political demonstration and signing a petition. Although this dimension of participation is important in other countries, it was dropped from further analysis in this study because so few Zambians (under 7 percent) had actually engaged in these activities.

To summarize, three dimensions of political participation were selected for further analysis: *communing*, *contacting* and *voting*. We also remained interested in *overall participation*, that is, the three main dimensions treated as a whole.

We constructed additive scales in order to measure the involvement of individual Zambians along each dimension and as a whole. First, for each activity, ordinal responses ("never, once, sometimes, often") were collapsed into dichotomous responses (Yes/No). Next, respondents were given a score of one for each "yes" response in the cluster of relevant variables identified in the factor analysis. Scales were then constructed from these individual scores by adding together the points that each individual had accumulated. For example, a six-point scale of *communing* was created based on respondents answers to five items that cohered into that dimension (range = 0-5)(see Table 9, rows 1 through 5). The same technique was used to create a five-point *contacting* scale as well (range = 0-4)(see Table 9, rows 6 through 9).

Voting was treated somewhat differently. A four-point scale of *voting* behavior was initially created from respondent's answers to whether they had voted in the 1991, 1992, and 1996 elections (range = 0-3). A five-point scale was then created from the existing voting scale plus one additional question, that is, whether the respondent was registered to vote. As will be seen, the existence of alternative voting scales enabled the use of voter registration as either an independent variable or a dependent variable in the analysis that follows.

Finally, two aggregate scales of political participation were constructed to broadly capture *overall participation*. Following the procedure for voting scales, one scale of overall participation included registering to vote and the other did not. These overall scales simply combined the 12 (or 13) items used in the dimensional scales of political behavior discussed above. All scales were subjected to additional tests of reliability to further confirm they represented valid and coherent dimensions of political participation³⁰.

The factor analysis on the data for the 1996 post-election survey confirmed two important findings from the 1993 baseline survey. First, the *same dimensions* of popular political behavior -- *communing*, *contacting*, and *voting* -- emerged in 1996 as in 1993. Second, the *same political behaviors* adhered into each dimension at both earlier and later times³¹. These findings suggest that there is a basic structure to political participation in Zambia that has relatively stable features against which trends and developments can be reliably tracked over time by survey research.

Determinants of Political Participation

We can now turn to the main analytic question: what determines political participation in Zambia? What factors encourage it and what factors depress it?

At least three sets of competing explanations for citizen engagement and abstention have been proposed. First, a *socioeconomic* explanation traces political participation to the background characteristics of national populations, noting that individuals of higher socioeconomic status and attainment are more likely to be active citizens. Second, a *cultural* explanation suggests that democracy can only arise and flourish where citizens have internalized its values and are committed to promoting and defending it. Finally, an *institutional* argument postulates that systems of rules and incentives determine the extent to which citizens are mobilized into politics. In particular, organized affiliations with voter registration, political parties and interest groups are likely to directly affect participation. Each of these competing explanations is examined below.

Explanatory variables. For each competing explanation we employed a battery of indicators, which constitute the independent variables in the analysis.

To test socioeconomic explanations we used a standard set of social background indicators. The 1996 survey sample accurately portrayed the demographic profile of the national population as measured by the country's most recent decennial census (Republic of Zambia, 1995). For example, 50.8 percent were female, 43.2 percent were urban dwellers, and 14.0 percent were employed in the formal sector of the economy (see Table 4). The sample also confirmed that most Zambians possessed low levels of formal education — with 52.6 percent of respondents reporting seven years of primary schooling or less — which, all other things being equal, might be expected to impair meaningful political participation.

To appraise cultural explanations we used survey responses to a wide array of attitudinal questions. We have already reported on Zambian respondents' interest in politics and sense of political efficacy. We also recorded levels of political tolerance (Table 8 shows 70.0 percent support for freedom of expression) and trust in governmental institutions (a mean score of 2.35 on a scale of 0-4). Given growing donor concerns with official corruption in Zambia, we tracked citizen feelings of political cynicism towards political leaders. And, given the recency of the democratic transition, we asked about individual attitudes towards political or economic reform and sense of satisfaction with the performance of the MMD government. Wherever possible, we used scales assembled from more than one questionnaire item to represent cultural constructs. Only two such scales appeared in the data: life satisfaction and trust in governmental institutions³². Otherwise we used single questionnaire items as independent variables.

In order to assess institutional explanations, the 1996 survey asked about citizens' organizational affiliations. We reconfirmed that Zambians are joiners, with 82.1 percent reporting that they belonged to a voluntary organization, usually a Christian church. Attachments to political parties were far weaker: only 54.0 percent admitted to supporting a political party (of which 78.9 percent named the MMD) and just 30.4 said they carried a party card (a low figure compared with mandatory card-carrying in the one-party era). As a product of the country's democratic transition, many Zambians reacted against the compulsory affiliations of the past by exercising the new-found freedom *not* to belong to any partisan body.

Testing Competing Explanations. We now turn to statistical tests of competing explanations. Regression analysis was used to estimate multivariate equations for political participation, both overall and for each of its dimensions. The same sets of independent variables — combined into broad categories of social background, political attitudes and political institutions — were included in each equation. This approach enabled an assessment of the impact of each variable while controlling simultaneously for the effects of all others.

The results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 10³³. It shows that a complete explanation of political participation requires reference to *all three* sets of determinants. We explore each set of determinants in turn, ending with discussion of their respective weights in the overall explanation.

Socio-Economic Determinants. As stated, socio-economic explanations of participation stress the ascriptive and achievement characteristics of eligible adults (Nie, Powell and Prewitt, 1969). The regression analysis showed that several socioeconomic characteristics -- namely age, gender, residential location, and education -- influenced participation in Zambia, though not consistently for all dimensions of participation and sometimes in unexpected ways.

Age helps to explain many aspects of political participation in Zambia (see table 10, row 1). Not only were older people more likely than younger people to vote, as shown earlier, but they were also more likely to contact political leaders and to participate overall. These findings are consistent with findings from other countries that older voters turn out more reliably at the polls (e.g. Milbrath and Goel, 1977, 114; Niemi and Barkan, 1987). Nevertheless, age was not associated with communing behavior, such as discussing politics or attending meetings and rallies. This coincides with observations that democratic transitions are often generational struggles for access to political power, with younger folk, usually university students, being the most vocal advocates for change (Bratton 1994; Bates and Weingast, 1996).

Gender also plays a part in determining political participation in Zambia³⁴. The regression analysis showed that men were more likely than women to participate in communing and contacting activities. The literature on the political and economic roles of women in Africa helps us to construe this gendered nature of political participation in Zambia. First women are responsible for family welfare; they have little choice during periods of economic contraction but to adopt a conscious strategy of "withdrawing from politics and concentrating instead on more immediate issues of survival" (Parpart, 1988, 221; Geisler and Hansen, 1994). Second, cultural values stress gender inequality; many Zambians including some women themselves still see politics, particularly the pursuit and exercise of political office, as a male preserve (Schuster, 1983, 19). And, third, political leaders in Zambia have sought to regulate and control female political behavior, for example when UNIP used trading licences to encourage market women to become cheerleaders for the ruling party.

Residential location also affects participation. Apart from South Africa, Zambia is one of the most urbanized countries in the sub-Saharan region; almost half of its population lives in towns, initially attracted there by employment opportunities on the copper mines and related service enterprises. Our analysis supports the contention that two separate polities exist in urban and rural environments, though urbanity's influence on political participation is not what one might expect. In an unexpected inversion of urban bias, we found a *negative* relationship between urbanity and participation behaviors. Stated differently, urban residents were *less* likely to participate in communing and contacting than their rural counterparts. This result is likely driven by the strong relationships between residential location on the one hand and the frequency with which respondents contacted their local chiefs and headman³⁵ or attended community meetings³⁶ on the other.

Finally, we discern a relationship between *education* and participation. Better educated individuals are assumed to be more likely to participate in politics because schooling creates informed, reflective, and self-confident citizens (Janowitz, 1983; Ichilov, 1990; Carnoy and Samoff, 1990). This hypothesis is supported by the Zambian case. Higher education levels were associated with all three dimensions of political participation -- voting, communing, and contacting -- and therefore with overall political participation. Of all the dimensions of participation, education's relation with contacting was the strongest, which confirms informal observations that educated Zambians felt less intimidated than their unschooled compatriots at the prospect of approaching a public official. As with age, however, the effects of education on participation were not particularly strong, especially when compared with the powerful impacts of gender and residential location³⁷. We return to the issue of weighing the effects of competing explanations below.

Cultural Determinants. Next we turn to political attitudes and the roles, if any, such individual orientations play in molding political participation.

The regression analysis tested for the possible effects of a wide variety of political attitudes, including political efficacy, political tolerance, political trust, political cynicism, orientation to political reform, and assessment of the MMD government. It also tested for media exposure and political knowledge. None of these personal orientations played a statistically significant role in explaining any aspect of participation. For example, political cynics (who considered that public officials were self-serving or corrupt) were no more or less likely to participate than political idealists (who held a more generous view of the motivations of leaders). Similarly, reformists (who favored change in political arrangements and economic policies) were just as likely to get involved in political life as those who defended the status quo.

In the end, only two political attitudes were associated with political participation. These were a citizen's assessment of the local government councillor and a citizen's interest in politics.

In the 1996 survey, respondents were asked how satisfied they had been with the performance of both their local government councillor and MP over the past five years. Interestingly, assessments of MP performance were unrelated to any form of political participation. By contrast, positive *assessments of local government councillor performance* were significantly related to several types of political activity, including voting (but not registering to vote), communing, contacting and overall participation (See Table 10, row 5). This finding strongly suggests that most Zambians continue to appraise governmental performance from a local perspective, using the effectiveness of the local government councillor as a barometer of overall government capacity³⁸. Where councillors are held to have performed poorly, it seems that citizens become discouraged and withdraw from the political process; where councillors are assessed positively (probably by contributing to the solution of concrete development problems³⁹), citizens appear to engage more willingly in public life.

The survey also asked respondents "how interested are you in national/local political matters?". A citizen's level of *interest in politics* turned out to be highly relevant to all manner of participatory actions. Across the board, political interest was strongly and significantly associated with voting (including registering to vote), communing, contacting, and overall participation. Those who said they were interested in politics were more likely to register to vote, to vote on polling day, to attend community meetings and campaign events, to discuss politics with others, and contact political officials than are respondents who were not interested in politics. In this regard, Zambians are much like people elsewhere in the world whose cognitive engagement with politics leads them into political activism (Almond and Verba, 1963).

We showed earlier that political interest is high among Zambians, with over two-thirds of the adult population claiming to be either somewhat interested or very interested in local and/or national politics. This level of interest remained unchanged from 1993. Interest in politics was in part shaped by a citizen's social background; not unexpectedly, male gender and years of education were both positively and significantly related to this attitude⁴⁰. Thus, if political interest does indeed lead to increased political participation, the challenge for policy makers is twofold: first, to encourage interest in politics among women and among those with lower levels of education, many of whom are themselves female; and, second, to foster and maintain citizens' interest in politics between election years and in the face a growing tide of skepticism about the effectiveness of political representatives.

Institutional Determinants. The umbrella concept of "institution" is a broad one. At the macro-level, political institutions include system-wide sets of rules like constitution and electoral laws that concern, for example, franchise eligibility, the delimitation of electoral districts, and vote-counting (Powell, 1982; Franklin, 1996). These rules create incentives and sanctions that shape individual political behavior (Duverger, 1963; Powell 1986; Jackman, 1987; Jackman and Miller, 1995). At the micro-level, political institutions include the organizations with which citizens affiliate and that link them to one another or to the state. Previous studies have established that political parties (Bennett and Bennett, 1986; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) and voluntary associations (Putnam, 1993; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995) are key agencies for political mobilization and representation in modern democracies.

Our regression analysis revealed that two political institutions powerfully affect political participation in Zambia. The first was voter registration, namely, the universal rule that Zambian citizens over the age of 18 years must register as voters if they wish to cast a ballot in local, parliamentary, or presidential elections. The second key institution was party membership, namely whether citizens choose to carry a paid-up party card for an officially-recognized political party. We found that voter registration and party membership constituted key institutional gateways through which citizens must pass in order to become active participants in the Zambian political system. These institutional determinants are discussed in reverse order below, with the most important factor saved for last.

First, however, we must address the puzzle of why *voluntary associations* did not appear in the final list of explanatory factors. Previous analyses of 1993 baseline data had demonstrated that people who belonged to trade unions, cooperatives and the Catholic church were more active in local and national politics (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu, 1994; Bratton, 1997). The 1996 data confirmed that these "joiners" were more likely to attend community meetings and get together with others to solve a problem, both of which were central elements of what we have called *communing*⁴¹. But associational membership did not contribute to an explanation of overall participation or any of its dimensions, especially when other factors were controlled for.

We interpret these results as evidence that civil society in Zambia was partially demobilized following the 1991 transition. Having attained their goal of political change, and facing the need to attend to pressing issues of economic survival, Zambian citizens pulled back from what had been an intense period of involvement in associational life. Other researchers have noted the recent decline of civic associations in Zambia's urban areas (Schluyter, 1996). UNIP's decay left an organizational vacuum at the local level: "the community organization was not given any new structure. MMD had no party structure to fill the posts in a new hierarchy like the UNIP organization, but the idea of the ruling party as the only community organization remained...As a result (urban) residents do not have the tool of a strong organization to embark into action or to put pressure on Government" (ibid. pp. 276 & 282).

To what extent has the role of voluntary associations in mass mobilization and interest representation been taken over by political parties in the post-transition era? The present analysis revealed that *party membership* was a crucial determinant of political participation. (See Table 10, row 7). Card-carrying members of political parties were more likely to vote in elections, engage in *communing* behavior, and evince higher overall political participation than are those who were not members of political parties. This finding stands to reason. As loyal partisans, party members reliably turned out in large numbers at election rallies and made up the local workforce to promote candidates for office, activities that lay at the heart of *communing*⁴². Similarly, all parties engaged in a "get out the vote" efforts around election days.

Party members were the grassroots activists who led such efforts in the locality; as such, they were much more likely than unaffiliated citizens to actually cast a ballot⁴³.

At first, one dimension of political participation appeared unaffected by party membership: contacting political officials. This was so for two reasons. First, MP's and other national government officials are often geographically remote and difficult to contact, even for local party activists. Once national leaders were excluded from analysis, we found that party membership returned to its expected role as a key explanatory variable, being significantly related to contacting local officials like traditional leaders and local government councillors⁴⁴. Second, party activists often associated with party officials in ways that were not captured by the contacting dimension of political participation as defined here. For example, 41.6 percent of respondents who identified with a political party said they "sometimes" or "often" attended meetings for party members. The vast majority of these (67.7 percent) were card-carrying party members. We suspect that, for these party members, party meetings provide an alternative form of exposure to political officials that obviated the need to approach leaders directly.

One would expect that in new democracies in Africa, especially those emerging from a sustained period of single-party rule, the performance of political parties would display significant continuities. The Zambian data confirm that parties remain a principal mechanism through which political elites mobilize support at the mass level, both between and during elections. We must not assume, however, that party membership necessarily increases participation. Much depends on the health and strength of political parties themselves. As was shown earlier, only half of all Zambians identify with a political party (54.0 percent) and far fewer carry party membership cards (30.4 percent). And we have reason to believe that most political parties in Zambia — including the ruling MMD -- are underfinanced, poorly organized and unprofessionally managed (NDI, 1996b)⁴⁵. Given weak parties, and low levels of party membership, one would therefore expect *low* levels of political participation. This is a core element of our explanation of why more Zambians have not become mobilized into active citizenship in the multiparty era.

Let us turn, finally to *voter registration*. Not surprisingly, as a legal prerequisite for voting, it was strongly associated with citizens' participation in local and national elections⁴⁶. In so doing, voter registration wholly or partially "washed out" the impact of other variables. Most strikingly, it eliminated education's impact on voting⁴⁷. Similarly, party membership (among other things) eliminated gender's effect on voting⁴⁸. These findings suggest that apparent socioeconomic effects on some dimensions of participation may sometimes be spurious. What is really at work are the effects of political institutions that are differentially accessible to different social groups.

More unexpectedly, voter registration helped explain *all* dimensions of participation, including non-voting behavior. For example, voter registration increased the likelihood of communing behavior, even for such seemingly unrelated acts as discussing politics and attending community meetings⁴⁹. Moreover, it increased the likelihood that a citizen would contact a national political leader⁵⁰. Thus voter registration seemed to empower citizens well beyond the formal act of voting, perhaps by making them feel included in the political process and endowing them with the necessary credentials to speak up.

But opportunities for voter registration are not widely distributed. Zambia has yet to adopt a system of continuous voter registration and citizens can obtain voter cards only intermittently during registration drives that are held every few years. Young people attaining voting age are particularly

disadvantaged by long time lapses such as the eight-year gap in full registration exercises in Zambia between 1987 and 1995. Rural dwellers, who face long distances and unreliable communications, also experience difficulty in reaching governmental centers during periods of voter registration. Moreover, the administrative independence and capacity of the Electoral Commission is impaired by under-funding and subordination to the executive branch. The government of the day has not been reluctant to use its powers of incumbency to concentrate voter registration efforts among known supporters and to limit access for opposition groups or areas. Thus, for deliberate as well as inadvertent reasons, many eligible voters remain unregistered.

Low levels of voter registration in Zambia, along with low levels of party membership, help to explain why political participation is not higher than it is. In both cases, poorly functioning political institutions perform more as obstacles than facilitators of participation.

Conclusion

We have shown that several sets of determinants are required for a comprehensive explanation of political participation in Zambia. To grasp the phenomenon of participation in all its complexity, reference must be made to socioeconomic, attitudinal *and* institutional factors. Using all three of these factors, we have explained more than half the variance (51 percent) in overall participation as reported by respondents in a 1996 national sample survey (see Table 10, row 10).

But which set of determinants is the *most* important? As will be shown in the next section, this is not an idle theoretical question; it carries consequential implications for DG assistance programming.

The relative importance of explanatory factors was assessed by excluding them sequentially from the regression analysis and observing effects on the total amount of variance explained.

This procedure suggested that the socioeconomic background factor was least important, though male gender and rural residential location did matter⁵¹. Political attitudes were somewhat more weighty, especially citizens' interest in politics⁵². Dominating the account, however, were political institutions, notably voter registration and, to a lesser extent, political party membership⁵³.

In sum, institutional considerations comprised by far the most compelling account of political participation in Zambia.

Policy and Program Implications

In encouraging political participation, numerous opportunities for assistance programming are available to USAID. The analysis presented above provides guidance to USAID policy makers and programmers in sorting through a wide range of options and directing limited DG resources to activities that are most likely to have maximum impact.

Strategic Options. In the first place, this study identifies needs and suggests *what* to do. Because political participation takes multidimensional forms — not only voting, but also what we have called communing and contacting — there is a choice of many program foci, depending on the main forms that participation takes in a given country. For Zambia, where communing and contacting lie at the core of

local conceptions of participation, program designers may wish in the future to encourage, not only voting, but also participation between elections. Especially deserving of attention in the Zambian context are contacting elected representatives (M.P.'s and councillors) and community-based action initiatives.

Secondly, the analysis suggests *how* to promote political participation by pointing to the program strategies and tactics that are most likely to work. We have shown not only that participation is associated with multiple explanatory factors, but we have demonstrated that some factors are more important than others. In Zambia, where institutional factors constitute the main gateway to participation, we would argue that selected political institutions — especially those that can increase voter registration and political party membership — are the most effective entry points for participation programming.

Indeed, the analysis points to clear strategic options. USAID/Zambia can choose between three strategies to promote participation which we label “indirect”, “intermediate” and “direct”. We briefly outline these strategies below, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses.

* An *indirect* strategy would approach its program objective through the social background factors that influence citizen participation. It would seek to remove key socioeconomic constraints. For example, because older, educated Zambian males are most likely to get involved in public life, a program to encourage general education for girls would have positive benefits for their political participation. But these benefits would accrue only indirectly (and slowly, over the long-term) alongside other potential effects of female education that are unrelated to the target of political participation.

* An *intermediate* strategy would nurture democratic political attitudes among citizens, which affect participation more strongly than social background factors. USAID/Zambia has already become deeply involved in this approach. Its existing programs of civic education through FODEP and the Civic Action Fund inform Zambian citizens of their civil and political rights and encourage wider participation. As a recent evaluation of these programs has shown, however, the beneficiaries of civic education have been disproportionately drawn from groups that are already educated and interested in politics (Bowser et.al, 1997).

* A *direct* strategy would address frontally the major institutional constraints to popular participation. In Zambia, overall participation (not just voting) is driven by voter registration and party membership, which together explain more about political participation than any other set of determinants. And the effects of political institutions are generally negative: weaknesses in the existing voter registration machinery and in fledgling multi-party organizations have a depressing effect of all types of political participation. The apparent post-transition decline of civil society has much the same effect. These facts point compellingly to a program approach based on institutional strengthening. In other words, removing institutional constraints would be the single most effective contribution that USAID/Z could make to political participation in Zambia.

Program Recommendations. In the light of these strategic options, we recommend that USAID consider the activities listed below as it redesigns the Zambia Democratic Governance Project. Taken together, our recommendations amount to a direct strategy of targeted institutional strengthening.

We do not presume to do anything more than identify a range of proposed activities. These are situated, to the best of our knowledge, within the limits of feasibility imposed by current Zambian conditions. Of course, responsibility for making any policy decisions about these or other

program options rests with the USAID/Z Director. And all programming features and details are reserved for USAID/Z staff, consultants, and customers.

The recommendations are presented in our preferred priority order, which is derived from the findings of this study.

*** Voter Registration.** USAID/Z should support the Zambian Electoral Commission to enhance its political independence from the Zambian government and to boost its human, technical and financial capacities. The program should focus on improving the coverage of voter registration among eligible adults in Zambia. Technical assistance should be provided to redesign and implement a reformed voter registration system. The design team should explicitly address the possibility of (a) introducing continuous voter registration as citizens turn 18, (b) improving delivery of national registration identity cards, (c) creating a single national identity/voter registration document, (d) decentralizing the registration process and (e) strengthening the capacity of local government units to conduct voter registration. Given past Zambian Government reluctance to entertain some of these reforms, and persistent concerns that the Electoral Commission is not completely neutral, any voter registration intervention will have to be accompanied by a persuasive and sustained campaign of policy dialogue.

*** Political Parties.** USAID/Z should continue to support a program to strengthen political parties in Zambia but with a narrower focus than its previous work in this area in this country. Instead of addressing the full gamut of organizational development issues (with the associated opportunities for distributing political patronage), the program should emphasize (a) membership recruitment methodologies, (b) local fund-raising techniques (c) internal organizational accountability (d) polling membership policy preferences (e) policy issue specification for party platforms (f) low cost campaign strategies and (g) relations with governmental and civic organizations. As before, to avoid any hint of partisanship, the program should be made available to all interested parties. The design of the program should incorporate lessons learned from a rigorous evaluation of USAID/Z's previous party strengthening effort in Zambia and the implementation of any new program should be bid out competitively to a range of qualified providers.

*** Civic Associations.** To stem the recent withering of civil society in Zambia, USAID/Z should recommit itself to building capacity in selected voluntary associations. The focus of this program should be broadened beyond the narrow confines of one civic education organization to potentially include those entities with proven ability to stimulate participation in Zambia (labor unions in urban areas, cooperatives in rural areas, the Catholic church nationwide). Fruitful linkages are possible here between the Mission's democratic governance and economic growth Strategic Objectives. Learning from experience with FODEP, any core support to civic organizations should be conditional on proof of established management capability and efforts to raise funds and share costs. Given the strained relations between the Zambian government and the NGO community following the 1996 elections, USAID/Z will need to protect its clients through policy dialogue in this area too.

*** Political Representation.** USAID should reconfigure its civic education program to address the growing "representation gap" in the Zambian polity. The Civic Action Fund, which should be expanded, should promote small grants competitions on this theme. Especially favored would be projects to bring citizens into closer contact with elected local government councillors and M.P.s around community-based activities in selected localities. Rather than stressing yet more voter education, the program focus should be on inter-electoral participation (i.e. communing and contacting) that enables groups of citizens to help themselves and to hold their elected representatives accountable. Given the predominantly local orientation

of Zambian citizens, the Civic Action Fund should explicitly target some of its grants to local government initiatives. Along the lines of the Ford Foundation's "Innovations in American Government" awards program, prizes could be awarded to the best low-cost experiments to promote local participation and these success-stories systematically disseminated to all local government units in Zambia.

*** Rule of Law.** If and when the rule of law becomes a pillar of the Mission's DG Strategic Objective, USAID/Z may wish to plan for achieving people-level impact. Our 1996 survey noted that an overwhelming majority of Zambians (80.9) felt that the 1996 elections were generally fair despite the constitutional amendment to bar Kaunda's presidential candidacy⁵⁴. For whatever reason, these data suggest that donor and popular notions of what constitutes the "rule of law" are widely divergent. One reason may be that donors view DG issues from a national (and international) perspective, whereas citizens see them through local lenses. We know from the 1993 survey that most Zambians experience the law most immediately through issues of crime (which 67.8 percent said was a major problem in their lives) and that they distrusted the Zambia Republic Police more than any other central government institution⁵⁵. In keeping with the Agency's participation initiative, ameliorating popular felt needs for trustworthy crime control would seem to constitute a legitimate part of any new USAID/Z program on the rule of law.

Endnotes

1. The present section of this study draws heavily on this last paper.
2. Nikiv Computers, Ltd., the company that won the contract, was one of the highest bidders, prompting speculation that it had been awarded the tender either as part of a kickback scheme or as a payoff for rigging the elections in favor of the MMD.
3. The figure of 2.3 million registered voters comes from "Presidential and Parliamentary General Elections, 1996: Provisional Results," Electoral Commission of Zambia, November 25, 1996. The figure of 3.8 million eligible voters was calculated from the 1990 Census of Population and Housing (Republic of Zambia, 1995).
4. Both the number and percentage of registered voters in 1991 are probably somewhat inflated due to the inclusion in the rolls of voters who had passed away since 1987.
5. "How Some Monitors Arrived at 'Not Free and Fair' Verdict," *The Monitor*, November 29-December 5, 1996.
6. Authors' discussions with voters on, and after, election day.
7. Along with Central Province, these were the only regions of the country in which MMD candidates won a smaller share of the vote than the combined totals for opposition candidates.
8. While the turnout of registered voters rose by 15 percent nationally, it dropped by 9 percent in Eastern Province.
9. While boycotts may have worked against colonial regimes or in one-party settings, they are far less effective in democratic contexts where alternative channels are available for citizens to communicate their disagreement with the status quo.
10. $\Phi = .174$, sig = .000.
11. $\Phi = .247$, sig. = .000
12. $\Phi = .168$, sig = .000
13. $\Phi = .199$, sig = .000
14. In designing the research project, we grappled long and hard with the question of survey timing. On one hand, we considered conducting a mass attitude survey *before* the general elections, in which case it would have been possible, among other things, to report on emerging public preferences for contending political leaders and parties. We were concerned, however, that respondents may not have answered truthfully to sensitive and unfamiliar questions in a public opinion poll in the heat of an election campaign. More importantly, it would have been impossible to gather objective data on electoral behavior before the event, forcing us to rely instead on hypothetical projections about whether, for example, voters *intended* to vote, and for whom.

We therefore decided to conduct the survey *after* the election in order to ask eligible voters

about the part they had *actually* played in the 1996 vote. While continuing to believe that this was the right decision, we have nonetheless confirmed that post-election surveys are themselves not free of bias. In particular, a questionnaire administered immediately after the vote in a new African democracy runs the risk that respondents will over-report socially-approved behaviors. In all countries, including those with mature democratic regimes, some survey respondents report that they have voted, or engaged in other valued electoral behaviors, when in fact they have not.

15. In Zambia, the post-election survey found that 51.3 percent of eligible voters claimed to have voted in 1996, whereas the Electoral Commission reported that 58.7 percent of registered voters did so (Republic of Zambia, 1996). Correcting this official figure for the proportion of voters registered -- as calculated from aggregate data reported above (49.0 percent) or from survey returns (61.3 percent) -- the actual 1996 voter turnout was somewhere in the range of 25 to 36 percent of eligible voters. Thus, over-reporting of voting by respondents in the 1996 post-election survey was significant.

16. This questionnaire item may not have been well understood. When asked whether the MP "lives in this area", some respondents may have interpreted the question narrowly to refer to their own village or immediate environs, rather than to the parliamentary constituency at large. Conversely, a few respondents, consistent with M.P.'s themselves (Alderfer, 1997), may have interpreted the question to mean that the candidate's owning a house in the constituency, even if not permanently resident there, was tantamount to "living in the area". While we suspect there were more misunderstandings of the former type than the latter, it is nonetheless worth noting that these two types of possible error tend to cancel each other out.

17. Phi = .166, sig. = .001.

18. The fact that Kaunda had announced his retirement from active politics in October 1992 only delegitimized his bid to return.

19. The modern oral "tradition" has both positive and negative effects: it reinforces the politics of personal contact but can often substitute rumor for truth, thereby distorting political action.

20. For MPs: gamma = .177, sig = .014. For councillors: gamma = .308, sig. = 000.

21. People who identify themselves as Bemba may not be the Bemba proper but (as for the Bisa, Ushi, Swaka, Lala, Lamba etc.) within the Bemba-speaking group.

22. An even more rigorous test compares means in 1996 for the six "original" provinces with the three "new" provinces. This test yielded a two-tailed $t = .649$, signifying a difference of means not significantly different to zero.

23. Two tailed $t = .396$, signifying a difference of means not significantly different to zero. This test statistic also refers to the difference of means between the six "original" provinces and the three "new" provinces.

24. Calculation based on the 84.4 percent of registered voters who said they voted in 1991 in the 1993 baseline survey. To be sure, the 1996 survey did not ask the questions about 1991 voting by respondents who were not registered voters in 1996, which might explain the remaining slight difference between survey and official figures.

25. From around 45.0 percent of registered voters in 1991 to 58.7 percent in 1996.
26. The proportion that reports listening every day has also held steady: 29.9 percent in 1993 and 31.6 percent in 1996.
27. Apart from the drop in absolute reader numbers, the regularity of readership was also down: whereas 27.5 percent saw a paper at least "several times a week" in 1993, only 16.7 percent did so.
28. The only exception was the Vice-President, whose correct identifications were down 21.9 percent.
29. We used factor analysis with principal components approach and varimax rotation to confirm the presence of these dimensions of political participation.
30. Cronbach's alpha was used to measure the reliability of these scales. This score varies from 0 to 1 and measures the variance in responses used to create additive scales. Scores of 0.7 or greater are usually considered to confirm the reliability of such scales. The two scales of voting behavior (excluding and including registering to vote) were found to be the most reliable (alpha = 0.7242 and 0.8253, respectively). Communing and contacting scales were less reliable (alpha = 0.6386 and 0.5794) but were more reliable than the same scales using 1993 data. This indicates that citizens' participation in these activities has cohered to a greater degree than was found earlier, though there is still some variance in the frequency with which respondents participate in communing and contacting.
- Lastly, the scales of overall participation were found to be quite reliable. The reliability coefficient for the 12-item participation scale that excluded registering to vote equalled 0.7619. The 13-item overall participation scale that included registering to vote equalled 0.7914. Though political participation can be factored into four different dimensions, we are confident that the overall participation scales reliably capture participatory behavior across a range of statistically relevant, theoretically meaningful activities.
31. The only difference between the 1993 and 1996 results was the addition of new questions not asked in the first survey. For example, respondents in 1993 were not asked how often they had "gotten together with others to raise an issue," nor were they asked if had "contacted a government official." These new questions bonded precisely as we would have expected with others in the communing and contacting scales, respectively.
32. Each scale cohered reliably. For life satisfaction, Chronbach's alpha = .8683; for trust in government, Chronbach's alpha = .7737.
33. Readers unfamiliar with regression tables should focus on the coefficients marked with asterisks. These signify relationships between variables that are highly unlikely to have occurred by chance; that is, they probably represent "real" underlying relationships. A positive coefficient indicates a positive relationship; a negative coefficient a negative one. Individual coefficients represent the influence of each independent variable on the dependent variable (participation), while controlling for the effects of all other variables. The adjusted r-squared statistic (range 0 - 1) indicates the total variance in participation explained by all independent variables taken together.
34. The gender variable was a binary dummy; male = 1, female = 0. Therefore, significant negative regression coefficients would indicate that women are associated with a given political behavior. If the regression coefficient is positive, it indicates that men are more likely to engage in that activity.

35. Bivariate analysis showed that urban residents were less likely to contact each type of political leader. However, the strength and direction of the relationship between urbanity and contacting was likely driven by a single item: the frequency with which respondents contacted chiefs and headman. For example, urban residents comprised 43.2 percent of the total sample. However, only 13.6 percent of those who said they had contacted a chief or headman were from urban areas.

36. Only 35.5 percent of those who attended community meetings were from urban areas, though these respondents comprised 43.2 percent of the total sample.

37. See regression coefficients in Table 10.

38. Respondents were often unable to distinguish between the institutional (e.g. budgetary) problems of councils and an individual councillor's ineffectiveness. Some rich councillors took credit for using their own financial resources for improving the social and physical infrastructure of their wards.

39. We know that the Zambian electorate is results-oriented. For example, when survey respondents were asked what their MP should do for them after they were elected, 56.7 percent identified "soliciting development funds" as the most important activity. This expectation put tremendous, often unrealistic, demands on parliamentarians and, presumably, also on elected local government officials.

40. For gender, Spearman's rho = .161, sig = .000; for education, Pearson's r = .218, sig. .000.

41. For community meetings, phi = .104, sig. = .014; for raising an issue, phi = .087, sig = .062.

42. For election rallies, phi = .355, sig. = .000; for promoting candidates, phi = .308, sig. = .000.

43. For voting in the 1991 general elections, phi = .296, sig = .001; for voting in the 1996 general elections, phi = .310, sig. = .000. Card-carrying was not always evidence of party loyalty or affiliation. Some respondents held multiple cards for various parties as a means of maximizing their chances for patronage opportunities. Others wore party T-shirts simply because they were free clothing.

44. For local officials, Pearson's r = .080, sig = .072; for national officials, Pearson's r = .022, sig. = .591.

45. The perceived lack of a credible and effective opposition reinforced the tendency to drift back to a single dominating party and to resignation to extend the term of the government in power.

46. For voting in the 1991 general elections, phi = .621, sig = .001; for voting in the 1996 general elections, phi = .813, sig. = .000.

47. The regression coefficient was -0.001 and was highly insignificant. Because education and voter registration are highly correlated, the influence of registration as an explanatory variable washes out the independent influence of education when both are included in the same equation. Bi-variate analysis confirms these findings. Better educated respondents are much more likely to register as voters, though once registered are not more likely to actually vote than their less educated counterparts. Higher levels of education are associated with some types of political participation, but low levels of education should not be considered a significant barrier to political participation in Zambia.

48. Similarly, the positive correlations between gender and voting reported are called into question. Party membership and interest in politics are also significantly related to gender. Men are much more likely hold a paid-up membership card for a political party and to claim an intense interest in politics. The strong relationship between these explanatory variables washes out the independent relationship between gender and voting. It suggests instead that women must gain access to educational opportunities and organizational memberships before they will become active voters.

49. For discussing politics, $\phi = .167$, $\text{sig} = .000$; for community meetings, $\phi = .266$, $\text{sig} = .000$.

50. For contact with MP, $\phi = .189$, $\text{sig} = .000$; for contact with government officer, $\phi = .131$, $\text{sig} = .000$.

51. Excluding socio-economic variables, political attitudes and political institutions alone explained 46.2 percent of the variance in overall participation.

52. Excluding attitudinal variables, the socio-economic and institutional factors alone explained 41.0 percent of the variance in overall participation.

53. Excluding political institutions, socio-economic variables and political attitudes alone explained 36.6 percent of the variance in overall participation.

54. Nevertheless, a virtually identical majority (80.8 percent) felt that the President does not stand above the constitution, which he should not be able to change at will. Perhaps Zambians accepted the "Kaunda clause" either because they agreed with it or because it had been passed by Parliament in a sort of "rule by law".

46. By 1996, the National Assembly was more negatively assessed than the police.

**Table 1: Results of Zambia's Second Elections,
November 18, 1996**

Province	Legislative Election				Presidential Election	
	Voter Turnout '96 (% registered voters)	Voter Turnout '91 (% registered voters)	MMD Vote Share (% valid votes)	MMD Seat Share [opposition seats]	Chiluba Vote Share (% valid votes)	Split Tickets (Pres minus Parl %)
Central	56.6	35.4	49.8	12 [2]	73.2	23.4
Copperbelt	71.7	49.4	70.5	22 [0]	86.3	15.8
Eastern	37.0	46.0	61.9	19 [0]	64.0	2.1
Luapula	64.8	41.1	70.2	14 [0]	85.5	15.3
Lusaka	57.8	43.8	64.3	10 [2]	74.4	10.1
Northern	64.4	42.4	63.0	18 [3]	80.5	17.5
Northwestern	68.1	40.0	44.4	6 [6]	51.2	6.8
Southern	57.7	42.2	57.0	19 [0]	67.1	10.1
Western	53.5	40.0	49.8	11 [6]	43.1	-6.7
Zambia	58.7	43.4	61.0	131 [19]	72.6	11.6

Sources: 1996: *Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, 1996: Provisional Results* (Lusaka, Electoral Commission of Zambia, November 25, 1996)
1991: *Summary of Parliamentary Election Results* (Lusaka, Zambia Independent Monitoring Team, 1991).

Table 2: Electoral Participation, 1996 General Elections	% of Respondents
% Who say they are registered voters	61.3
% Who say they voted in the November 1996 general elections	51.3
% Who say they voted in the October 1991 general elections	42.8
% Who say they voted in the November 1992 local government elections	20.6
% Who say they have ever voted since 1991	52.6
% Who say they voted for Chiluba/MMD in 1991 presidential election	37.7
% Who say they voted for Chiluba/MMD in 1996 presidential election	42.7
% Who say they voted for an MMD candidate in the 1996 parliamentary elections	t.b.a.
% Who say they made their own choice, rather than being convinced by someone else (of voters for MP)	88.8
% Who say they voted for an individual rather than a party (of voters for MP)	67.4
% Who say that MPs should live in the area that they represent	82.1
% Who say that the MP they voted for lives in their area (of voters for MP)	39.6
% Who say the 1996 election boycott did not affect them	83.9
% Who say they have ever participated in an election boycott	2.2
% Who say that the 1996 elections were generally fair	80.9

Table 3: Non-Electoral Participation, 1996	% of Respondents
% Who have participated in the following activities: attended a community meeting got together with others to raise an issue signed a petition written a letter to a newspaper attended a demonstration	65.7 41.8 2.1 3.6 6.1
% Who have contacted the following persons for help to solve a problem: chief or headman local government councillor MP government official church leader some other influential person	23.7 19.0 12.9 13.4 54.7 20.6
% of contacts made on behalf of a group (rather than as individual) (mean %) with traditional leaders with public officials with private individuals	47.3 76.7 39.0
% Who are satisfied with performance of their MP	24.7
% Who are satisfied with the performance of their local government councillor	28.7

Table 4: Social Background of Respondents, 1993 and 1996 Surveys	1993 Survey	1996 Survey
Number of Respondents	421	1182
% Female	50.8	50.8
Age (mean years)	35.4	34.2
Education (mean years)	7.1	7.2
% Urban**	42.8	43.2
% Understand English	-	68.5
% Read and/or write English	-	64.3
Household Size (mean number of persons)	5.49	-
Children at Home (mean number)	-	2.99
% Formal Employment	12.6	14.0
Household Income (mean, in kwacha)	30327	85617
Household Income (median, in kwacha)	18000	35500
Meals eaten per day (mean number)	-	2.47
<u>Province:</u>		
Central	12.8	9.6
Copperbelt	20.7	19.7
Eastern	15.9	12.1
Lusaka	22.6	13.9
Luapula	-	7.4
Northern	-	11.5
Northwestern	12.6	5.3
Southern	15.4	13.0
Western	-	7.4
<u>Ethnicity:</u>		
Bemba	11.4	22.3
Chewa	5.2	4.8
Kaonde	11.4	4.4
Lozi	4.0	4.8
Lunda	3.6	1.4
Ngoni	3.6	7.3
Nsenga	16.6	7.3
Tonga	20.9	13.2
Tumbuka	2.4	4.7
Other	20.9	29.8

* Excludes open-ended questions

** Unless otherwise stated, the base for percentage calculations is eligible voters, i.e. citizens over 18 years old.

Table 5: Trends in Political Participation, 1991-96	1993 Survey	1996 Survey
% Who say they voted in the October 1991 general elections	54.9	42.8
% Who say they voted in the November 1992 local government elections	40.1	20.6
% Who say they were registered voters	65.1	61.3
% Who say they voted in the November 1996 general elections	-	51.3
% Who say they voted in most recent general election (of registered voters only)	67.4	81.2
% Who say their voting participation has increased since 1991	-	21.1
% Who say their voting participation has increased since 1991 (of registered voters only)	-	33.1
% Who gave the following reason for not registering to vote (of non-registered adults only)		
missed registration period	19.3	20.9
was suffering from ill-health	14.3	11.6
did not have a national identity card	10.0	25.7
not interested in voting	30.7	18.1
% Who have participated in the following activities:		
attended a community meeting	66.9	65.7
attended an election rally	58.7	50.9
worked for a political party or candidate	25.0	14.0
written a letter to a newspaper	6.5	3.6
attended a demonstration	6.5	6.1
% Who have contacted the following persons for help to solve a problem:		
chief or headman	32.9	23.7
local government councillor	17.4	19.0
MP	6.9	12.9

Table 6: Political Knowledge	1993	1996
% Who ever listen to a news bulletin on the radio	69.0	70.7
% Who ever read a newspaper	51.7	44.3
% Who can distinguish separate functions for: political parties and government central and local government	51.3 54.8	57.5 61.0
% Who know the names of: the councillor for the area their Member of Parliament the Minister of Finance the Vice-President of Zambia	52.3 50.4 18.4 69.5	65.1 61.7 31.9 54.3
% Who think that they understand how government works	33.3	48.7

Table 7: Attitudes of Political Efficacy	1993	1996
% Interested in political matters (either national or local)	66.8	67.7
% Interested in national political matters	-	64.6
% Interested in local political matters	-	57.8
% Interested in political matters (both national and local)	-	54.8
% Who discuss political matters with other people	68.0	69.6
% Who think they can influence the opinions of others	66.2	63.8
% Who think that they can make elected representatives listen to their problems	40.5	34.3
% Who think that voting will make things better in the future	-	66.2

Table 8: Attitudes to Political Reform	1993	1996
% Who regard the 1991 transition as good for the country	-	75.9
% Who prefer to retain multiparty competition rather than return to one-party rule	-	73.0
% Who think Zambia enjoys real political competition (rather than one-party rule)	74.5	74.0
% Who say they tolerate expression of political viewpoints different to their own	75.4	70.0
% Who prefer elected (rather than effective) government	63.4	62.9

**Table 9: Dimensions of Political Participation:
Factor Analytic Results**

	Communing	Contacting	Voting	Protesting
Attended an election rally	.72654	.10633	.18960	.12860
Got together to raise an issue	.65236	.29243	.07362	.04001
Attended a community meeting	.64693	.16709	.22242	-.19828
Discussed politics with others	.63162	.03205	.02728	.12717
Promoted a party candidate	.58589	.18653	.03909	.35249
Contacted an MP	.15206	.69755	.10091	.26328
Contacted a chief or headman	.17573	.66022	.03126	-.28380
Contacted a government official	.05567	.64588	.06687	.16076
Contacted a local councillor	.25007	.63804	.13830	.16509
Registered to vote	.14397	.07722	.91511	.05668
Total number of times voted	.19906	.17801	.88839	.04302
Participated in a demonstration	.16007	.11490	.02440	.74158
Signed a petition	.04834	.10421	.05521	.72516
Percentage of Variance	29.3	10.9	9.1	8.6
Eigenvalue	3.810	1.414	1.186	1.121
N	1182	1182	1182	1182

Table 10: Regression Analysis of Political Participation

	Voting (incl. voter registration)	Voting (excl. voter registration)	Communing	Contacting	Overall Participation (incl. voter registration)	Overall Participation (excl. voter registration)
SOCIAL BACKGROUND						
Age	.032***	.017***	.004	.007**	.047***	.029***
Male	.098	-.011	.385***	.305***	.783***	.663***
Urban	-.039	.053	-.215**	-.518***	-.828***	-.706***
Education	.042***	-.001	.033**	.048***	.137***	.084***
POLITICAL ATTITUDES						
Assessment of councillor	.028	.049**	.080**	.123***	.216***	.252***
Interest in politics	.153***	.075***	.437***	.116***	.733***	.631***
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS						
Party membership	.844***	.183***	.574***	.101	1.678***	.863***
Voter registration	--	1.550***	.320***	.245***	--	2.087***
Multiple R						
	.477	.764	.621	.459	.638	.717
Adjusted R²						
	.222	.579	.380	.204	.403	.510
Standard Error						
	1.344	.741	1.169	.918	2.380	1.960
F						
	39.332***	162.894***	71.927***	31.088***	90.073***	121.454***
N						
	933	932	917	930	918	917

** = <.05 *** = <.005

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Survey Methodology

1. Survey questionnaire

* The survey instrument comprised 81 questions and over 100 individual items grouped into ten sections. A first section examined respondents' *social background*. Succeeding sections highlighted respondents' *participation* in political activities and *associational life*. The remaining sections probed *political knowledge* and attitudes about *political accountability*; *political efficacy*; *political trust*; *political reform*; *economic performance*; and *economic reform*.

* This instrument replicated most of the questions used in a 1993 baseline survey of popular political attitudes in Zambia conducted under USAID's Zambia Democratic Governance Project. Additional question items and new question wordings and sequences were pre-tested on 15 respondents in urban Lusaka and rural Mazabuka on August 8 and 9, 1996.

* After revisions, the questionnaire was translated from English into into five local languages: Bemba, Kaonde, Lozi, Nyanja, and Tonga. Respondents were given the choice of answering questions either in English or one of these local languages.

2. Sampling methodology

* The target population for the survey was eligible voters in Zambia as of November 1996. The sample of survey respondents thus included Zambian citizens who were at least 18 years old on the day of the interview. Non-Zambians, or persons under 18, were excluded.

* The sample was designed to constitute a representative cross-section of the population of eligible voters from all of Zambia's nine administrative provinces. By paying careful attention to the representativeness of the sample, we sought to establish grounds on which to make scientifically valid inferences about the population of Zambian citizens as a whole. The accuracy of a sample, and the risk of error that a researcher is willing to accept, are determined primarily by the sample size. In selecting the size of our sample, we opted for standard parameters common used for the type of categorical data generated by survey questions. These parameters included a confidence level of 95 percent and a confidence interval of plus or minus 3 percent. Thus, the reader can be sure in 19 cases out of 20 that a reported mean score on any given variable will differ by no more than 3 percent in either direction from what would have been obtained by interviewing all eligible Zambian voters.

* Sampling theory allows that, within these parameters, reliable results can be generated with a minimum sample of 1068 (Rea and Parker 1992, 125-131). Due to administrative, procedural, or mechanical errors some questionnaires are eventually discarded from every survey. Here 1200 individuals were surveyed in order to ensure the collection of at least 1068 valid, random responses. In the final analysis, 1182 valid returns were collected between November 19, 1996 and November 30, 1996.

* The sampling procedure was designed using a mixture of random, quota, and selective methods, in multiple stages. In the first stages, within each province, we used a modified random method to pick administrative districts, census supervisory areas (CSAs) and standard enumeration areas (SEAs). The first step was to select administrative districts in which the interviews would take place. Since Zambia's 57 districts vary widely in population, purely random techniques would not have yielded a representative cross-section of the population of eligible voters (Sudman 1976, 133-134). Therefore, two additional steps

were taken. First, districts were ranked according to populations listed in the 1990 census ("Descriptive Tables," Vol. 10, table 1.1) and truncated into two groups at a natural demarcation point between the 39 larger Districts of more than 70,000 people, and 18 smaller Districts with 70,000 or fewer people. Second, a random sample of 17 Districts, with probabilities proportionate to size (PPS), was drawn from among the 39 larger provincial Districts. "Essentially, (PPS) involves assigning to each sample cluster a sequence of random numbers equal to its size and then sampling systematically." (Sudman 1976, 134. See also Kalton 1983, 38-47) The advantage of this technique is that it produces a random sample of an entire population, but reduces the probability that the sample would be solely comprised of exceptional cases. Three additional districts were then selected by the survey team supervisors from among the list of 18 smaller Districts to augment the first stage of PPS sampling. These additional Districts were chosen to ensure adequate small District representation in the final sample, maximize representation by province, and incorporate politically relevant populations (e.g. by ethnicity) omitted by the PPS sample.

* The second step in drawing the sample was selection of CSAs within each of the 20 chosen districts and selection of SEAs within each CSA. Given the roughly equal population sizes of these units, purely random methods were used to choose selected CSAs and SEAs. Because of administrative and logistical considerations, each team was assigned to work in one CSA per day.

* Below the SEA, at the level of individual respondents, a quota sampling method was used to replicate the national population of eligible voters. A quota sample identifies potential survey respondents in the proportions in which they are known to exist in the population at large. We used data from the Central Statistical Office, especially the 1990 census, to establish empirical frequencies of various subgroups in the national (and, where possible, provincial and district) populations.

* Three criteria were used to determine sampling quotas, each of which reproduced official population figures. First we stratified the population by gender, male and female; then by age, into three equal-sized groups of young, middle-aged and old; and finally by social status, to which we attached different meanings in urban and rural areas. In urban areas, social status distinguished persons in *formal employment* from those in *informal employment* or those who are *unemployed*; in rural areas, social status distinguished those who had access to *improved water* for drinking and cooking from those who only had access to *natural water* supplies. Improved water supplies included piped water, standpipes, wells, and boreholes; natural water supplies were lakes, rivers, streams, and dambos. This final criterion was used to distinguish rural residents whose lifestyles had been at least partially modernized from those who remained largely isolated and untouched by urban social influences. The quotas were then adjusted to account for subgroup variations: for example, there are more young males in urban areas than rural areas, a smaller proportion of women than men in formal employment, less access to improved water in Northern and Luapula provinces, and so forth.

3. Training and Supervision

* Five survey teams conducted field interviews for eleven days immediately after the November 18, 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections. Each survey team comprised five individuals: four enumerators and one supervisor.

* Survey enumerators were University of Zambia graduates fluent in at least one of the local languages in which the survey was administered. Enumerators underwent two days of intensive training prior to deployment in the field. This training encompassed all aspects of questionnaire administration, including: survey sampling and selection of survey respondents; conducting interviews; completing survey returns; as well as practice administering translated surveys in local languages.

* Survey supervisors were from Michigan State University, the Institute for African Studies at the University of Zambia, and Harvard University. In addition to participating in enumerator training, the supervisors underwent two days of supplementary training in sampling methodology, survey administration and survey logistics. Supervisors checked each return on the day it was completed, correcting any problematic responses with the relevant enumerator. Each team leader also kept daily *field notes* in order to record sampling decisions, add contextual details, highlight problematic questionnaire items, and provide a basis for checking that complementary actions were taken across different survey teams and regions.

Data analysis procedures

* Data entry and analysis were performed at Michigan State University.

* Data entry was completed between January 10, and February 4, 1997 by five trained Michigan State University undergraduate and graduate students. The data was entered on micro-computers using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) and all entries were cross-checked and cleaned by the authors.

* Initial data analyses were conducted between February 5, and February 15, 1997, again using SPSS. Additional analyses were conducted between May 28 and June 6, 1997.

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