

CDIE

Impact Evaluation

United States Agency for International Development

PROVIDING EMERGENCY AID TO MOZAMBIQUE

For 16 years, civil war wracked this impoverished former Portuguese colony. The fighting devastated the country's people and its economy. USAID acted quickly to provide food and other aid to millions in need. The assistance saved countless lives. It also helped resettle masses of refugees and enabled them to reestablish their livelihoods as subsistence farmers.

SUMMARY

This Impact Evaluation assesses the effectiveness of USAID emergency assistance provided to Mozambique from 1987 through 1995. It covers the final years of a 16-year civil war, a major drought, the implementation of a peace accord, and the transition from relief to development.

A four-member evaluation team from USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) collected field data and reviewed documents in Mozambique during October 1998. Team members interviewed USAID staff, other donors, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), Mozambican government officials, and beneficiaries of U.S. emergency assistance. The team also collected data and interviewed people in the United States, South Africa, and Malawi.



J. Born, 2/93

CHILDREN AND ESPECIALLY INFANTS are most at risk during famine. These children are among the survivors at a USAID-supported camp at Marromeu, in central Mozambique; others were less lucky.

Mozambique, a country slightly larger than California and Arizona combined, achieved its independence from Portugal in 1975 after a 10-year war. It inherited an impoverished economy lacking schools, health facilities, and development services. With the end of colonial rule, most of the Portuguese expatriates and many skilled Mozambicans fled, leaving the country without the technical and managerial skills to operate commerce, factories, the professions, the transport system, and the government.

The government of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) established a one-party state with a socialist, centrally planned economy. Although the government had some success improving health, education, and social services, its management of state-owned factories and farms was a disaster, as were price, trade, and investment controls.

The push, following independence, to transform this southeast African country into a Marxist state alienated many Mozambicans as well as whites in neighboring Rhodesia and South Africa. It stimulated support for the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), an opposition force that launched a civil war against the Frelimo government.

Civilians suffered greatly from violence, economic dislocation, and property destruction during the civil war of 1976–92. By 1984 real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) had fallen by half compared with preindependence levels. By 1992 nearly half of Mozambique’s 16 million people were either internally displaced or in refugee camps in neighboring countries. During the civil war the United States was the main emergency aid donor, contributing 60

percent of total food aid. In 1989 an estimated one third of the population depended on food aid for 60 to 70 percent of their needs. Finally, exhausted from a long war that neither side seemed able to win, the armies signed a General Peace Accord in 1992.

USAID food aid helped prevent starvation and supported the peace accord by encouraging refugee repatriation and resettlement. In 1994 an orderly postconflict election was held; Renamo received 38 percent of the parliamentary seats; Frelimo, 44 percent. Compared with other war-torn countries, Mozambique’s shift from brutal civil war to peace is one of the most successful transitions achieved in recent years. This evaluation examines the role of USAID emergency assistance in that transition in three areas—*humanitarian, political, and economic*.

Humanitarian Effects

Food supplies plummet and communicable diseases surge during a complex emergency. The standard way of assessing the effects of emergency aid is to analyze the differences in malnutrition, morbidity, and mortality rates between those receiving aid and those not. However, collecting reliable and consistent data during decades of war was impossible. Given this lack of quantitative data, the evaluation team sought to get a qualitative assessment of impact by interviewing a range of people who

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
CONTENTS

Historical Context 4

USAID’s Humanitarian Response 6

The Impact of U.S. Humanitarian Assistance ... 7

Lessons Learned 15



CIVIL WAR between soldiers of the Marxist-leaning Frelimo government and Renamo insurgents uprooted roughly half of Mozambique's 16 million people. More than 2 million took refuge in neighboring countries; 4 to 6 million withdrew to safer areas within the country. The 16 years of hostilities ended in 1992 when neither side had victory in sight.

dealt with the emergency and those who received emergency aid.

Political Effects

Mozambicans consistently reported that donor food aid neither prolonged the war nor gave either side an advantage. Rather, outside military aid kept the war going. When that aid ended and the economy collapsed after a 1991–92 drought, neither side had the resources or the will to continue the conflict.

After the 1992 peace accord, food and other aid helped refugees return, resettle, and start farm-

ing. The aid helped cement the peace process by restarting the economy and contributing to subsistence farmers' survival and production.

Economic Effects

After years of emergency assistance, some Mozambicans (particularly those in refugee camps in neighboring countries) had grown accustomed to free food and aid agencies' support. For some, this created an attitude of dependency that was hard to change after the emergency ended. To turn the dependency mentality around, PVOs used both negative techniques (cutting off food aid and closing feeding stations) and positive approaches (food for work, and resettlement packages of food, tools, and seeds). Despite these efforts, though, the emergency may have undermined traditional community values.

The Mozambican government's emergency agency (known by its abbreviation, DPCCN), was unable to handle the crisis. USAID provided technical training and logistical support to build the emergency agency's capacity, but the effort failed. When faced with the choice between preventing starvation and building local capacity, USAID decided in favor of feeding hungry people. Under USAID direction, American PVOs took over food aid management. That solved the short-term problem. But most institutional development efforts would have to wait until the emergency ended.

Conclusions

USAID and American PVOs know how to run an effective relief program. In Mozambique they were able to manage a long-term emergency, which at its peak affected more than 6 million people. During the worst part of the famine other donors were slow to act. In contrast, USAID creatively diverted PL 480 shipments from other countries to Mozambique.

USAID food poured into the country and American PVOs delivered massive amounts of food and other aid to those in need. Everyone the CDIE team interviewed agreed that death and suffering would have been much worse had USAID assistance not been available. U.S. assistance helped mitigate the effects of a major human catastrophe.

Food aid did not significantly affect the course of the war. The armies were small and their food needs limited. The food they stole from farmers and relief supplies was minimal and had little effect on national food-grain availability. USAID food aid to needy civilians also had little effect on the war's progress. External politics and military aid from abroad kept the war going. The war ended when both sides lost their foreign financial backers and arms suppliers.

After the General Peace Accord of 1992 and the end of the drought, people began a massive movement and resettlement. More than one third of Mozambique's population was resettled in a little over two years. U.S. assistance supported the resettlement effort by helping avert conflicts, reduce social tensions, and cement the peace process down to the village level. It helped maintain social calm and prevent political instability. Hotheads and agitators had a hard time stirring up farmers who were receiving food aid and successfully re-establishing their livelihoods.

USAID economic policy reform programs, development projects, and nonemergency food aid all bolstered relief efforts. Conversely, some relief programs also helped support economic development. This demonstrates the need for a coherent U.S. approach in which each type of aid not only accomplishes its own goals but supports other aid efforts as well.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Portuguese legacy to Mozambique was one of poverty, disease, and illiteracy. When the country gained independence in 1975, the literacy rate was only 7 percent, life expectancy was 41 years, and there were fewer than 100 trained doctors in the country.

The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo), the insurgent group that fought for independence and was given control after the Portuguese left, implemented programs to improve social welfare, notably in health and education, including adult literacy. Mozambique also adopted a socialist-style planned economy ill suited to a country composed primarily of subsistence farmers. The government nationalized many companies, launched ambitious state-run agricultural schemes, and introduced price and marketing controls.

Mozambique's civil war was rooted in regional and global politics that started with Frelimo's fight for independence from Portugal. Cold War considerations led the West to support Portugal, a NATO ally, while the Soviet bloc backed Frelimo. At independence, Frelimo wanted to build a modern socialist nation and received support from its Soviet allies. Renamo opposed the Marxist-leaning government.

Both the Reagan and Bush administrations debated whether to support Renamo or Frelimo. Many American conservatives viewed the war as an ideological battle over communism that warranted support of Renamo based on the Reagan doctrine of supporting guerrillas opposed to communism. Unwilling to support a socialist government but recognizing the humanitarian needs of the people, the United States provided a small humanitarian assistance program. That changed in the late 1980s as the Frelimo government abandoned most of its socialist ideology and engaged in a program

of market-based economic reforms supported by USAID and the World Bank. The United States then greatly expanded its humanitarian assistance and development support.

Meanwhile, white-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa's apartheid government were alarmed at the prospect of a black-ruled socialist country on their borders, ready to export revolution. White Rhodesian military officers formed Renamo in 1976 as a means of keeping newly independent Mozambique from supporting black guerrillas who were trying to overthrow the Rhodesian government. South Africa soon took over sponsorship of Renamo. Renamo's guerrillas sought to disrupt the nation's economy and infrastructure by cutting railway and power lines, destroying roads and bridges, and sabotaging oil-storage depots. They also massacred civilians in their raids on towns and villages. Renamo's guerrilla warfare severely damaged Mozambique's infrastructure. This economic loss caused widespread human suffering. Mozambique's Soviet-bloc allies countered Renamo's threat by providing the Frelimo government with weapons and financial support.

Although a civil conflict nominally based on ideology, the war was actually generated by foreign countries and fueled by a drive for power by local military and political leaders. Without foreign military and financial resources, the war would not have been possible.

The war was fought mainly in rural areas and centered on the strategic control of territory. Frelimo controlled the major towns and had its greatest support in the south, near the capital, Maputo. Renamo was most successful in the central part of the country, mainly in the Zambezi River Valley. It was mainly a low-intensity, hit-and-run guerilla war fought largely with small arms and land mines destroying roads, bridges, homes, shops, and

health centers. Both armies terrorized the rural population by seizing food and killing people.

During the war, agricultural production plummeted. The conflict displaced roughly half of Mozambique's 16 million people: more than 2 million refugees fled to neighboring countries, and 4 to 6 million moved to areas of relative safety within the country. Half of those went to the Beira corridor, in central Mozambique. Through the corridor runs a road and rail line that was protected in the last years of the war by Zimbabwean troops.


By the mid-1980s the country's economy and infrastructure were a shambles. In addition to the war, inappropriate government policies and excessive government intervention in the economy had created severe imbalances. The per capita gross national product of \$80 was the lowest in the world, real GDP growth was a negative 2.3 percent, inflation was 41 percent, and the fiscal deficit was 24 percent of GDP.

In 1987, with support from the World Bank, the government launched an Economic Rehabilitation Program. This was a fundamental shift to market-based policies and structural reforms. The approach included unifying the exchange rate, liberalizing trade, eliminating most price controls, liberalizing interest rates, and privatizing more than 900 public enterprises.

The reforms succeeded. In the period 1987–97 annual real GDP growth averaged 6.8 percent, and annual export growth was 15.6 percent. By 1997, inflation had slowed to only 5.8 percent.

The transition from civil war to peace began with the signing of the General Peace Accord in October 1992 and was largely completed with Mozambique's first democratic, multi-party elections in October 1994. Several factors contributed to the 1992 peace treaty. First, nei-

USAID Assistance to Mozambique FYS 1984 Through 1998, (US\$ Millions)



ther the Frelimo government nor Renamo had won a decisive military victory after 16 years of war. Both sides were exhausted. Second, the collapse of the Soviet bloc beginning in 1989 caused a sharp drop in foreign military assistance to the Frelimo government. Renamo suffered the same loss of external military support when apartheid ended in South Africa. The final factor pushing both sides toward peace was the devastating drought and famine of 1991–92.

USAID'S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

In the mid-1980s, USAID assistance to Mozambique amounted to less than \$50 million a year, with emergency aid a small portion of total aid. As the war and human suffering escalated from 1988 onward, USAID assistance doubled to an annual average of \$100 million a year. By 1992 Mozambique was in the final throes of war and a major drought and depended heavily on emergency relief aid. Total U.S. assistance doubled again in 1992 to \$200 million. After the peace accord, U.S. assistance averaged about \$125 million a year in the period from 1993 through 1995 (see figure).

The war over, USAID designed a three-year relief-to-development plan that included grant food aid (title II) and commercial food aid (title III), which was sold in urban markets; support for elections and civic education; resettlement packages for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); demobilization of the two armies; and rebuilding rural transport infrastructure and mine clearance.

The war's end raised the problem of how to use aid to encourage people to return home. Refugees and internally displaced persons had been receiving free food and some health care and schooling. The internally displaced received only irregular food aid shipments and were often harassed by Frelimo and Renamo. They were more willing to return home than refugees in camps in nearby countries. The refugees had a relatively better life and more donor support.

To encourage refugees to leave the camps, food aid was cut off. As an incentive to return to their home villages, returnees were offered a resettlement package of food, seeds, farming tools, and household goods that enabled farming households to begin producing food again. Food aid was promised until their first harvest—an important incentive.

Although donor incentives were important, they meant nothing without improved security. Peace and demobilization of the armies were key to getting people out of the camps and back to their homes. Once they knew they could live and work in peace, many people returned on their own and the resettlement process went quickly, with little incentive from donors.

Massive numbers of people moved in a very short time. Between October 1992 and August 1995, 1.7 million refugees returned from other countries and between 4 and 6 million internally displaced persons returned home.

Domestic agricultural production increased dramatically, and dependency on free food dropped. By September 1995 the number of emergency food-aid beneficiaries had declined to about 600,000 from 1.5 million two years earlier. During 1996–97 USAID assistance fell to about \$50 million a year. The Agency shifted its emphasis back to development.

Mozambique is considered a major success story among war-to-peace transition programs in sub-Saharan Africa. A long and devastating civil war ended, the peace accord worked, soldiers were demobilized, and refugees and displaced citizens returned home. The whole process was completed in a little over two years, a remarkably rapid transition.

THE IMPACT OF U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The CDIE evaluation team examined how emergency aid affected Mozambique and its people in three ways: its humanitarian effects, its political effects, and its influence on long-term development.

Humanitarian Effects

Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world. Decades of war and misguided economic policies have left the country with a long history of structural poverty, as is evident in the high rates of poor nutritional status as well as infant, child, and maternal mortality. Approximately 80 percent of the people depend on subsistence agriculture, and 60 to 70 per-

Health and Income Indicators, 1984–89, 1994			
	Mozambique		Sub-Saharan Africa 1994 ^b
	1984–89 ^a	1994 ^b	
Infant mortality^c	200	116	97
Under-5 mortality^c	325 to 375	275	174
Maternal mortality^d	2,000 to 3,000	1,500	971
Per capita GNP^e	\$80	\$133	\$350

^aEstimates based on UNICEF and GRM 1989 reports.
^b*Human Development Report*, 1997, UNDP.
^cPer 1,000 live births.
^dPer 100,000 live births.
^e*World Development Report*, 1993, 1995, World Bank.

cent of rural households are estimated to live below the poverty line. Conditions have improved during the past 10 years but are still substantially worse than even the low levels of sub-Saharan Africa (see table).

The United States was Mozambique’s primary emergency assistance donor, contributing a total of \$636 million during 1987–95. Of this amount, \$529 million was food aid. The United States provided 60 percent of total food aid. In 1989 an estimated one third of the population depended on food aid for 60 to 70 percent of their food needs.

Findings

There are no valid quantitative data to objectively assess the impact of U.S. emergency assistance on lives saved. Rough estimates of national infant and child mortality rates are available (table), but more detailed data are not available for the years before 1990. The limited nutritional and health data that exist cannot be aggregated or compared effectively because they were collected using different methods, and in different regions and years.

Given the lack of sound data, the opinions of the people who lived through the emergency are the principal source of information. The CDIE evaluation team met with those who dealt with the emergency: USAID relief managers, other donor relief workers, PVO staff, priests and religious workers, and Mozambican relief staff and government officials. In addition to those groups, probably the most important interviews were with a broad range of rural Mozambican men and women uprooted by war. They described for the team what effect U.S. assistance had had on them.

The consensus among donors, relief workers, and Mozambican government officials was that food aid had been pivotal to people's survival during the emergency. The view was that food aid kept hunger and malnutrition from being more prevalent and more acute. All agreed that many more people would have suffered and died without U.S. food aid, although it was impossible to estimate the number of lives saved.

At the beneficiary level the effect of food aid varied greatly, depending on

- When people were uprooted. There were three different phases of the emergency (before 1987, aid needs were limited; during 1987–92, the war was at its destructive peak, and a drought sharply increased aid requirements; and during 1992–95, aid needs were greatly reduced as peace and resettlement took place). Aid needs were different in each period.
- Where beneficiaries sought refuge. There was considerable difference between those who stayed in Mozambique and those who fled to other countries. People's access to assistance also depended on whether they were in Frelimo-controlled areas, which received almost all of the U.S.

aid, or in Renamo areas, which received little aid. Those in cross-border refugee camps did much better than those who remained in Mozambique.

- Which intermediary managed U.S. relief aid. Experience differed depending on whether a beneficiary received foreign donor relief aid through the Mozambican government or through the World Food Program or foreign PVOs. The government did a much poorer job.

Before 1987 the war was disruptive but few people had to flee their homes. Relief efforts were relatively minor and localized. From 1987 onward, however, the war intensified, and people fled to the relative safety of the Beira corridor or to neighboring countries. The road and rail line from the port of Beira to landlocked Zimbabwe is vital to Zimbabwe's economy. During the later war years this corridor was guarded by Zimbabwean troops and thus served as a haven for Mozambican civilians.

In the final time period, the 1991–92 drought created a surge of hungry people looking for food and safety. People slowly began returning home after the 1992 peace accord, and resettlement continued through 1995.

Those who fled to nearby countries had a hazardous journey but generally received adequate food and medical care when they reached the refugee camps. They also were relatively secure from Renamo or Frelimo harassment. *Internally* displaced persons had less assurance of adequate and regular relief food and were often threatened and harmed by Renamo and Frelimo soldiers. The internally displaced who received aid directly from PVOs received more regular and adequate supplies than those aided by the government. The resettlement period of 1992–95 was the smoothest. Military harassment of civilians virtually ceased, relief sup-

plies were more than adequate, and resettlement aid helped people start farming again.

Most people who lived in the Zambezi Valley sought refuge in Malawi rather than in IDP camps in Mozambique. The evaluation team interviewed refugees who had returned to their home villages of Caia, Murraça, Murrumbala, Mutarara, and Sena. They had harrowing stories of why they had to leave their homes but few complaints about their treatment in refugee camps in Malawi. Food, schooling, and health care were adequate.

In the Malawi camps they received food aid from the United States and other donors. When they returned home in 1992–94, they received resettlement packages of food and tools and other services from PVOs. They had few complaints about relief aid. By 1998 they had fully reestablished their farms, and owing to improved government policies in many cases were more prosperous than 10 years ago.

Those who spent the war as internally displaced persons told a different story. They were in Mozambique during the harsh war and the drought years of 1987–92, and most received aid through the government rather than from the relatively more efficient international PVOs. They did not enjoy the relative peace and order of the refugee camps in Malawi.

Internally displaced persons consistently reported they survived the war with food aid, by cultivating small amounts of land, and by earning money through petty commerce to buy food. Food aid thus was part of their survival strategy but not necessarily the major or most reliable component, because, the majority re-



J. Born, 2/93

DESTRUCTION OF INFRASTRUCTURE was extensive during the war. The 2.5-mile-long Don Ana rail bridge across the Zambezi River at Mutarara was blown up in 1986 by Renamo insurgents. That cut trade with Malawi and between the northern and southern halves of Mozambique. After the war, USAID emergency assistance rebuilt the bridge for use by vehicles.

ported, food distributions were irregular and insufficient. Food aid therefore helped but did not ensure their survival. Malnutrition was a serious problem.

Emergency assistance in the Beira corridor and the region around Marromeu created social tension and conflict among the internally displaced. Former internal refugees complained that assistance was distributed unfairly, with allotments influenced by recipients' political affiliations and social status. As everyone was hungry during the war and drought years, those who received less aid preyed on those who received more. People fought over food, not politics, during the war. People in Marromeu said they stole from one another to survive and those who had more were the first targets. "We all became thieves," said one villager. People also reported that the government's village-level food distributions caused fighting because personnel were not well organized and quantities were insufficient, so people knifed open sacks and fought to get a share. Former recipients also felt the government had not been honest and fair when it distributed food, and workers stole much of it.

Another problem was that food aid attracted both Frelimo and Renamo soldiers; as one village group dryly observed, the theft was “Frelimo by day and Renamo by night.” Some women said they gave part of their food aid to Frelimo soldiers because they were afraid of them.

Those living in Renamo-controlled areas received a little food aid from the International Committee of the Red Cross but almost nothing from PVOs operating in Mozambique. The United States provided limited aid through ICRC.

U.S. government policy was to provide emergency assistance only to government-controlled (Frelimo) areas. People in Renamo-controlled areas had to feed themselves and Renamo soldiers. Catastrophe loomed when production was low or fighting destroyed houses and crops. At that point people either stayed and suffered or tried to move to the relative safety of IDP areas in Mozambique or refugee camps across the border.

Political Effects

U.S. humanitarian aid is designed to help people in need and is supposed to be free of international politics. The United States provides emergency assistance to civilian populations even if it disagrees with the government’s politics. As a previous USAID Administrator once said, “A hungry child knows no politics.” In Mozambique, however, local and international politics put that policy to the test.

Findings

Food aid can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it keeps people alive to fight longer; on the other, it ensures that they will be able to restart agricultural production after the war. In Mozambique, foreign political and military

support for Frelimo and Renamo was the primary basis for the long civil war. U.S. humanitarian aid had little if any influence on the war, according to people at all levels—government officials, human rights observers, PVO managers, and Mozambican subsistence farmers. All agreed that external politics had played the key role in driving the war, dwarfing any minor political effects of U.S. assistance. In fact, most people were surprised when questioned whether food aid had prolonged the war.

Soldiers need to eat, but the total muster on both sides was only about 100,000, a small number relative to Mozambique’s population of 16 million. Renamo had some of its strongest support in food-surplus areas because those areas had suffered the most from the Frelimo government’s mismanagement of the economy. Renamo forces generally operated in those food-surplus areas. Both Frelimo and Renamo tried to divert food aid to their control, intimidating PVO workers and hijacking trucks to steal food. The amounts were probably small and had little effect on overall national food supplies, but the effect on aid workers and civilian populations in need was chilling. On balance, both military forces placed only a minor demand on food supplies. Food aid was not a critical element in keeping the armies fighting.

Both expatriates and Mozambicans stated that emergency food aid was misused and politicized from the national to the local levels. Many said that Frelimo government officials took a share of U.S. food aid for their own profit. The Renamo military stole food aid from convoys and rural villages. Food aid distributions in rural villages were a magnet for looting by both militaries. The consensus among informants was that “a man with a gun does not go hungry.” Food aid thus helped support both military forces to some extent but was not an important factor in the military conflict.

The politicization of food aid was a problem. Politicians at all levels reportedly used their influence over food aid distributions to favor particular people and reinforce their political power. As late as 1994 the Frelimo government and Renamo tried to politicize food aid during the elections by pressuring American PVOs to deliver food to certain regions. One characteristic problem of local elections was that politicians reported emergencies and demanded food aid in order to generate popular support and votes.

On the positive side, emergency aid contributed to social stability and Mozambique's successful peace process. It helped resettle the country's dispersed rural populations and to reestablish their agricultural production. Both processes were essential to bolstering political stability.

A pivotal element of the peace accord was demobilization of Renamo and Frelimo soldiers. Disgruntled and hungry soldiers who have been demobilized but still have weapons are a threat to civil order and development. Diffusing that threat were several factors: demobilization camps, free food provided by other donors, a UN cash payment after leaving the camps, and training and resettlement support. Food aid supported the rapid demobilization and reintegration into civilian life of the armed forces of both Renamo and Frelimo. It was an essential component of the rapid transition from relief to recovery.

Economic Effects

At some point in the transition from relief to development, emergency assistance ends and development begins. But the transition is not clear or sharp; rather, it is a complicated interplay between relief and development programs. An effective transition requires, on one hand, emergency programs that support devel-

opment and, on the other, development programs that support the transition out of emergency assistance.

Sixteen years of war and misguided government policies had virtually destroyed the country's infrastructure and rural markets. Apart from the Zimbabwe-protected Beira corridor there were no working roads or rail lines. Bridges and roads had been mined, and marketing networks barely functioned.

Once the war ended, emergency assistance programs demined, rebuilt, and opened roads in order to save money on the cost of airlifting relief food and to transport returnees back to their homes. Opening the roads restored free movement and spurred market development. It also helped develop the private transport sector and facilitated the movement of food from surplus to deficit areas.

Five issues emerge from the Mozambique case study:

1. Emergency assistance can create a "dependency mentality" that undermines future development efforts.
2. During an emergency a conflict usually arises between the short-term objective of delivering relief goods and the long-term objective of contributing to development by building local institutional capacity.
3. When the emergency ends, transitional relief programs need to build the groundwork for future development. Recapitalizing farmers and rebuilding rural infrastructure are critical.
4. A flexible approach is important throughout the transition.

5. Development programs can have an important impact on the transition from relief to development.

Findings

1. Dependency. Emergency assistance, by its very nature, creates psychological and physical dependency. People are removed from their usual pattern of productive life—often traumatized, sitting idle, receiving free food. Over time, beneficiaries begin to expect aid donors to take care of them. If food is free it is hard to induce people to work voluntarily on community self-help projects or even to do food-for-work projects. Why work if you don't have to?

Dependency was a particular problem for those who returned from refugee camps in Malawi. Many had for several years been in camps where they had free food, medical care, and schooling for their children.

Rural Mozambicans probably found their first contact with international humanitarian assistance confusing. Receiving food aid from those who were neither kin nor otherwise socially linked probably was surprising and not clearly understood. To combat dependency, PVOs told recipients that free food would end by a specific date. Many did not expect it to happen, though. They realized they would have to leave the refugee camps only when food grants were actually cut off. A similar problem occurred with food aid for resettled farmers, to carry them to their first harvest. For many it was a painful adjustment.

In 1998 (four years after emergency aid ended) most of the village groups interviewed by the evaluation team in Marromeu and the Beira corridor still had a dependent attitude. They were asking American PVOs for free seed, tools, food, and even tractors. In contrast, those who lived in Renamo-controlled areas and therefore

received little if any emergency assistance reportedly were more independent and community oriented after the war.

Mozambican civil servants and expatriate development workers generally agreed that the dependency mentality is difficult to change and that people had lost some of their traditional values of self-help and community support. A few people stated that after years of assistance some government officials also had become dependent on donor aid.

2. Relief distribution and local institutional capacity. USAID relief programs provided on-the-job training for Mozambican relief workers and educated farmers through agricultural extension. However, a major training and institutional development effort with the Mozambique government agency charged with managing disaster assistance (DPCCN) failed.

DPCCN initially handled all donor relief aid, moving commodities from ships at port to warehouses, district distribution centers, and finally to relief camps. DPCCN was overwhelmed; it lacked the managerial and logistical skills to handle such a big emergency. Food often was diverted to nonpriority recipients or stolen and resold. Rumors about corruption and profiteering were widespread. Typical DPCCN relief food losses were about 30 percent, and sometimes as high as 50 percent. Valuable commodities that were easy to sell (such as edible oil) suffered large-scale diversion while food grains were less likely to be lost. A "loss" meant that food was usually sold through the black market and ultimately fed people, although not for free. The problem was accountability.

USAID funded a DPCCN logistical support unit staffed by CARE. It developed accounting and information systems and provided training and



T. Born, 2003

PEOPLE LIVED IN FEAR OF SOLDIERS *who destroyed farms and tortured or killed civilians. This family hid in the bush for two years before coming into a USAID-supported feeding camp in Sena. The family had nothing—they are wearing grain sacks for clothing. They are severely malnourished, the son near death from starvation and the daughter blind from an infection or lack of vitamin A.*

equipment. Losses remained high although accountability improved. In 1992, when disaster shipments were at their peak, the Agency finally removed U.S. food aid from DPCCN management. From then on, much of it was managed from port to recipient by American PVOs.

There is a clear trade-off between developing local skills and institutional capabilities, and the need to get food to those most in need. Some observers questioned whether the gains in aid effectiveness and efficiency offset the lost opportunities for capacity building. They point out that donors should have invested in helping Mozambique develop its own institutional capacity to handle future emergencies.

USAID food aid losses dropped from over 30 percent to under 5 percent when management was switched to PVOs. One of a donor's greatest concerns is aid effectiveness. The Agency tried to build local capacity but finally decided

that the immediate need to avoid deaths from starvation was more important.

3. *Rebuilding the rural economy.* Subsistence farmers who returned home needed to rebuild houses, clear abandoned fields, plant a first crop, and then wait six to eight months to harvest. To address their needs, USAID assistance in the early 1990s included capital to restart rural subsistence farming and to rebuild the infrastructure necessary to restart the rural economy. These relief programs, which supported rural self-sufficiency and future economic development, are listed below, with a description of their effects.

SEEDS AND TOOLS. The seeds and tools needed by small farmers cost less than \$50 per household, but this was a large expense relative to the farmers' per capita income. Moreover, tools and seeds generally were not available in local markets. PVOs located and purchased seeds to solve these problems.

The opportunity to introduce better seeds and farming methods was a development benefit. World Vision and Food for the Hungry Incorporated conducted field trials to identify higher yielding and short-season varieties. Along with new seed, they also introduced improved agricultural practices. Farmers were particularly happy with the quick-maturing varieties. Their shorter growing season made the crops less risky in an unreliable tropical climate.

FOOD FOR WORK. As the war ended, the Agency's emergency programs phased out of food grants and into food for work. This switch helped break a dependency mentality from years of relief food grants. Food for work was aimed at pointing people toward independence and community development. Projects emphasized labor-intensive rural road construction and rehabilitation, building of schools and health clinics, and rehabilitation of small-scale

irrigation works. Construction quality was generally satisfactory, but there is a concern about whether adequate maintenance will be provided.

By the mid-1990s, as economic recovery continued and local markets, agricultural production, and employment steadily improved, food for work became less appropriate, and projects evolved into cash for work. The change took place for the following reasons: 1) It was important not to discourage local food production, which had increased substantially since 1992. 2) Developing the cash economy helped create sustainable market mechanisms for supplying food and consumer goods. 3) Cash for work permitted a more rational disposal of household income.

ROAD DEMINING. Once the war ended, roads were demined, rebuilt, and opened through emergency assistance programs. This was done to save money on the cost of airlifting relief food and to transport returnees back to their homes. Opening the roads restored free movement and spurred market development.

IMPACT ON LOCAL FOOD PRODUCTION. The United States and other donors provided large food shipments in response to the drought of 1991–92 and additional food aid to support the 1992 peace accord. Some of that food aid arrived in 1992, but most arrived in 1993 when Mozambique had ample rains and a good grain harvest. Relief shipments came while domestic production was high, and prices for domestically produced crops thus fell to low levels. During most of the war, imported food aid had only a minor effect on local markets since the war had sharply depressed domestic production. In 1993, however, food aid depressed the price of domestic maize and may have discouraged the marketing of locally produced grain.

4. The importance of flexibility. The transition from relief to development is the most difficult phase of complex emergencies because it occurs against a background of rapid and often unforeseen change. People are moving to different regions, new settlement patterns are emerging, and new trading patterns are developing.

USAID emergency relief projects can be approved and implemented quickly. In contrast, development projects have a long lead time and generally take two years or longer to move from concept to implementation. PVOs in Mozambique consistently reported that this constrained their work during the transition.

Coordination among donors was another problem during the transition. At times donor efforts overlapped or were at cross-purposes; for example, one donor was *giving* away seed while another was *selling* it. The transition from relief to rehabilitation or to development programs was inconsistent, which complicated planning and management at the national and local levels.

Flexibility is essential in addressing these problems. It does not mean lack of planning or writing a blank check. When strategic objectives are well defined, budget limits identified, and good control mechanisms in place, flexibility is possible without excessive risk. It allows for adjustment in timing, objectives, tactics, and finances.

5. The effect of development programs on relief efforts. Development programs helped relief efforts and the transition from relief to development. In particular, USAID support for Mozambique's economic policy reforms reduced state control of markets and prices and promoted the privatization of many state-owned industries. Markets, rather than govern-

ment edicts, began to determine prices and production.

With economic liberalization, the number of small markets and private traders surged. Liberalized markets and production incentives promoted rapid resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced. In addition, the USAID commodity import program provided goods to help restart the economy while USAID road and demining assistance helped open up trade in rural areas.

One of the biggest problems in the relief program was making sure food reached those in need in rural areas. Political influence in the national and regional capitals could have drawn food away from rural areas. USAID title III food aid provided food for sale in commercial urban markets. Meeting urban demand helped ensure that food aid reached the needy in rural areas.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Managing relief distribution. Food aid was a valuable resource in Mozambique. Fragile government institutions were overwhelmed by the emergency. The emergency management agency did not have the technical expertise to plan, organize, and manage massive relief aid. There were reports of corruption, theft, and political or personal favoritism. Target populations did not always receive timely and sufficient food aid. USAID had to take action to save lives and ended up managing much of the logistics.

It is important to avoid theft, misuse, and politicization of food aid. The government should set policies on relief distribution and targeting, but donors, PVOs, and the private sector may have to manage actual distribution. Efforts to strengthen institutions such as emergency management agen-

cies may have to wait until after an emergency ends and the development phase can start once again.

2. Coordination. At times, donor efforts overlapped or were at cross-purposes. For example, one donor was *giving* seed while another was *selling* it. There was no universal transition from relief to rehabilitation or development programs. One donor might be moving to a development program while another was still providing grant relief. This lack of coordination confused beneficiaries and also undermined efforts to reduce dependency.

Donors, PVOs, and the host government need to work closely together to respond effectively to complex emergencies.

3. Coherent policy approach. PL 480 title III fed Mozambican cities, allowing relief food aid to get to rural areas. USAID policy reform efforts encouraged economic growth, particularly in agriculture. This encouraged returnees to go back to farming and to produce for the market. USAID efforts to remove price and market controls and to rebuild transportation infrastructure helped farmers sell their products and buy goods. The commodity import program provided inputs needed to restart the economy.

All U.S. assistance, both emergency and development aid, should have a consistent approach and support emergency programs. Split responsibilities for aid increases the risk that programs will lack coherence and may even waste U.S. funds.

4. Dependency. Relief assistance creates dependency, particularly during a long-term emergency. Food for work and seeds and tools can help reduce the dependency mentality and move people toward productive self-sustaining activities.

Humanitarian aid should include assistance that helps people support themselves.

5. Training. Using expatriates to operate relief programs is expensive and marginalizes local nationals. Training nationals to take over expatriate positions is essential for promoting sustainability at the local and national levels. However, the immediate need to save lives and alleviate suffering may relegate this objective to second place. This was the case in Mozambique. USAID was unable to develop capacity of the government relief agency during the emergency.

USAID should ensure that a training component is included in emergency relief efforts. If it can't be done during the emergency, it should be done afterward.

6. Demobilization. Demobilizing the Renamo and Frelimo armed forces was a key part of the transition program. Discharged soldiers are a potential threat to civil order and development. In Mozambique, demobilization camps, free food, a UN cash payment after leaving the camps, and training and settlement support helped support reintegration.

Rapid demobilization and reintegration into civilian life is essential for the transition from relief to recovery.

7. Push and pull. Refugees and internally displaced persons received free food, creating in many a dependent mentality. Cutting off food aid helped *push* them out of the camps. A resettlement package of food, seeds, farming

tools, and household goods helped *pull* them back to their home villages. This package enabled people to begin producing their own food. Free food aid until the first harvest was an important element.

At the end of the emergency, refugee return programs need a push to move people out of camps and a pull to draw them back home.

8. From relief to development. This transition is often the most difficult phase of complex humanitarian emergencies. The types of assistance activities change rapidly, and the type of USAID funding procedures also change. In Mozambique, the end of the relief phase varied by region. Some areas still needed relief, whereas others were ready for the development. PVOs working during the transition period reported funding gaps as they switched to development programs. Emergency aid programs have only limited bureaucratic hurdles to clear. By contrast, once the emergency aid ends, traditional USAID development programs face extensive administrative and legal requirements. The transition from relief to development can be an administrative problem for NGOs and USAID.

Flexibility is necessary during the transition from relief to development in order to fund both relief and development activities. This will help reduce the usual gap in assistance. USAID and NGOs need to work creatively within USAID development program regulations.

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