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**PERFORMANCE MONITORING PLAN
FOR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NUMBER 3
"MORE RESPONSIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE"**

PREPARED FOR:
USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA

BY:
William Schoux, Team Leader
Leslie Fox, Democracy & Governance Specialist
Michael Milklaucic (USAID)

CONTRACT NUMBER:
HNE-0159-C-00-3080-00

December, 1996



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I. INTRODUCTION

This final report provides USAID/West Bank and Gaza with the *Performance Monitoring System* for SO 3, as called for in the subject scope of work (see Annex A). The Performance Monitoring System is composed of the following components:

- Presentation of the revised D/G SO results framework in both graphic and narrative form with corresponding performance indicators. This component of the System is presented in its entirety in Chapter II; and,
- The Performance Monitoring Plan presented in Chapter III, including an overview of performance baselines and targets (Part A); a review of data sources (Part B); performance data tables, or the performance monitoring plan in tabular form (Part C); and data collection methodology and reporting requirements including a detailed description of special USAID data collection efforts.


The Team was composed of two senior MSI associates, a democracy and governance expert and the team leader who spent two weeks and three weeks respectively in-country. They were joined for one week by the Democracy Officer backstopping the West Bank and Gaza program from USAID/Washington. While the majority of the Team's time was spent in Tel Aviv, several trips were taken to towns in the West Bank and Jerusalem to meet with USAID implementing partners and potential participants in the proposed performance monitoring plan.

In addition to the review and validation of the D/G Results Framework (RF), the Team spent considerable time with the D/G SO Team reviewing the logic underlying the strategic objective. The fruit of these deliberations is presented in Chapter II, below. Suffice it to note here that the Mission had put considerable intellectual effort into the conception of the RF. MSI's proposed revisions and RF narrative have only tinkered at the margins of this previous work, and perhaps added a bit of value by clarifying certain points which were only touched upon in the approved Results Framework of April 1996.

We would only note here an issue we raise in greater detail throughout this report. This concerns the challenging environment in which the Mission is implementing its democracy and governance strategic plan. If there is any recommendation that we would emphasize, it is that all parties concerned with producing results through this framework understand that while the SO is framed in traditional development terms, the goal to which it contributes is one promoting the continuation of a fragile peace process, not what would be considered a traditional development objective in other locales. The principal effort of the Team has, therefore, been to lower the level of results (and expectations) from those initially presented to USAID/Washington in the Country Strategy document. Commensurate with this understanding is its corollary, that is, democratic development is an inexact science and a risky business. In practical terms, this means that cause and effect do not always lead to predicted results. Or that if they do, the targets used to measure them are normally overly ambitious. And in a geographical entity approximating a country with no previous democratic experience, the availability of data is not always apparent. Having said this, the MSI Team has considered it an honor to work with the Mission and its partners in this worthy and challenging endeavor.

The remainder of this report presents a performance monitoring plan which, it is hoped, provides both the structure and methodology necessary to ensure results measurement, and the flexibility to deal with a data environment that is emerging at a pace well behind the democratic institutions that are being supported and monitored.

Strategic Objective 3
More Responsive and Accountable Governance



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II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NUMBER 3: REVISED RESULTS FRAMEWORK

A component of the MSI Team's SOW included reviewing and validating the Mission's April 1996 approved D/G SO and results framework. The following four sections provide the Team's analysis of the D/G SO and its underlying logic and recommendations for revisions.

A. The Overall Political Context and Its Impact on D/G SO Achievement

It is important to keep in mind that the Mission's 1996 - 2000 strategic plan's overall objective is strengthening Palestinian commitment to the peace process (and both internal and regional stability) as defined by the September 1993 Oslo Peace Accords, not the creation of an independent, well-governed and democratic Palestinian nation. It is in the context of this legal and political framework that the D/G SO -- *more accountable and responsive governance* -- and its logic of results must be viewed and, more importantly, by which future achievements must be measured. The strategy period coincides with the "end-points" of the on-going political transition, that is, from partial but continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza to the point in time when it is hoped that negotiations over the final status of the territories leads to Palestinian autonomy and full self-rule. How does this affect the ability of the Mission to achieve the D/G SO? By the fact that throughout this transition period two separate, but overlapping sets of Palestinian political institutions will be acting on behalf of the Palestinian people, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority (PA).

The PLO is responsible for negotiating the final status of the territories, just as it did the Oslo Accords which provided for the creation of the PA and the limited domain over which it now exercises self-rule. As such the PLO and its constituent parts -- the Palestinian National Council, Executive Committee and PLO Chairman -- are imbued with a higher degree of legitimacy and authority than the institutions of the PA -- the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), Executive Authority (EA) and Head of the PA -- whose legitimacy, authorities and tenure are conditioned by and derived from the Declaration of Principles (DOP). The distinction between these two sets of political institutions, their relationships and respective mandates reflects the complexity of the political environment in which USAID/WB&G has designed its D/G program and which is now in the early stages of implementation. Unlike D/G programs in most other USAID-assisted countries whose objective is to support the transition to or consolidation of a democratic system of governance in a recognized nation-state, the West Bank and Gaza D/G strategy aims rather to keep the peace process on-track by improving the process of Palestinian self-governance -- and by extension the social and economic benefits that will derive therefrom -- being undertaken by the interim political institutions of Palestinian self-rule.

While the strategic objective and intermediate results portrayed in this revised results framework differ only marginally from those submitted to and approved by USAID/Washington in May 1996, the indicators developed to measure results' achievement have been significantly modified to better reflect what is realistically achievable under current and anticipated political conditions as defined by the Oslo Peace Accords, and within the Mission's overall goal which was crafted to support them. One final overview point is noted here. As a general rule of thumb, it can be anticipated that the greater the progress made in the peace talks, the greater the likelihood that the political institutions involved in Palestinian self-rule will be able to promote more accountable and responsive governance. Conversely, the more problems encountered in the negotiations, the more likely that development objectives such as that being pursued through the D/G SO, will take a back burner to the more fundamental issue of peace. The remainder of Part II, therefore, discusses the results framework and its underlying logic within the parameters defined by the Oslo Accords and the unfolding political situation.

B. The D/G SO and its Contribution to the Mission's Program Goal

The Mission's democracy and governance (D/G) strategic objective (SO) is one of three SOs and two Special Objectives (SPO) contributing to USAID/West Bank & Gaza's overall program goal of *strengthening Palestinian commitment to the peace process by helping them to realize the tangible benefits of peace*. According to the Mission's Strategic Plan covering the period 1996 - 2000, by the end of the strategy period, the Mission will have contributed to the creation of a democratic and stable society, characterized by *more responsive and accountable governance*, the approved D/G SO. In short, through achievement of the three strategic level results composing the Mission's program plan, that is, expanded economic opportunities (SO 1), greater access to and more effective use of scarce water resources (SO 2), and more responsive and accountable governance (SO 3), the conditions will have been created that will permit attainment of the Mission's program goal.

The promotion of democracy and improved governance is one of five principal goals that compose the Agency's sustainable development strategy. It is also, together with the promotion of free and open markets, a principle foreign policy objective of the United States government. Both sets of objectives take the premise that democracy, while an important and desirable end in itself, is the political system most likely to provide the conditions necessary for the development of free markets and, hence, broad-based economic growth and opportunities. **Democracy** -- and its underlying principles of political participation and competition as well as respect for human rights and the rule of law -- is also the system most likely to render a form of governance which is characterized by: the accountability and responsiveness of public leaders to the governed; transparency and informational openness in the way that public decisions are made and implemented; and, ultimately, by ensuring the effectiveness of public institutions in the performance of the public's business, particularly in their allocation and management of public resources.

Governance is defined here as the way in which any social unit -- from an entire society to the smallest local association -- organizes itself politically to either: 1) identify and solve public problems; 2) make and implement public policies and decisions; or 3) allocate and manage public resources. **Democratic governance**, therefore, is the application of democratic principles to the process of governance. Underlying the notion of democratic governance is that of shared participation in public decision-making as well as in the implementation of these decisions. In addition to the political institutions of the state, a system of democratic governance posits a legitimate, if not equal, role for the institutions and organizations of civil society as well as empowered and autonomous local governments to participate in public decision-making. Underlying the Mission's D/G SO is the understanding that by broadening participation in the Palestinian governance process to include non-central state actors, that the nature of public decisions will more closely reflect citizen concerns, in turn leading to more tangible results, and ultimately, increasing citizen commitment to the peace process as self-rule demonstrates the possibility of positive improvements in social and economic life.

Having demonstrated the link between the D/G SO and the Mission's overall program goal, it is worth repeating once again that the latter is not a goal stated in *developmental* terms. Rather it is a *transition* goal whose emphasis is on supporting the peace process. While the Agency's overall goal is that of *sustainable development* with component strategies (e.g., economic growth, democracy building) also stated in developmental terms, the Mission's goal is a transitional one moving along the continuum from peace-to-development. At the same time, however, the strategic objectives developed under and contributing to the achievement of this goal are framed in "traditional" developmental terms. Or at least that is the case for the D/G SO. The purpose of returning to this issue once again is not to invalidate the D/G SO, but rather to ensure that USAID/WB&G not be expected to achieve or be held accountable for a set of results that are normally associated with purely developmental objectives. Again, it is within this

framework that the D/G SO, intermediate results and performance indicators has been assessed and re-validated.

C. The D/G SO Results Framework

This section looks at the logic of the overall D/G Results framework focussing on the development problem being addressed, critical assumptions conditioning the achievement of the SO, the logic underlying the SO, and performance indicators at the SO level.

1. The Development Problem and Critical Assumptions

Given the Palestinians' history of occupation and statelessness, the opportunity to govern their own affairs at any but the most local level has never existed. While it is true that Palestinians have a high degree of education and literacy, and are generally disposed to support a democratic form of self-rule, it is equally true that their lack of a democratic tradition and inexperience in managing public affairs leaves the current interim governing arrangement open to the possibility of both undemocratic practice and the ineffective allocation and management of public resources. The danger to the longer-term objective of Palestinian autonomy and full self-rule, therefore, is in undermining the short-term objective of limited self-rule which is intended to demonstrate the benefits of peace. Absent these tangible benefits, Palestinian commitment to the peace process itself could be undermined thus throwing into question the legitimacy of both long and short-term objectives. There is little that USAID itself can do about the larger issue of political negotiations between the PLO and Israel over the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. But there are, in fact, significant steps that USAID/WB&G and its partners can take to support Palestinian self-rule and governance within this larger context. It is to these practical considerations of how to improve the governance process and its outcomes under the current interim and limited self-rule arrangements that the Mission has addressed its democracy and governance program.

It is for the above noted reason that the maintenance of peace and continued progress in the final status negotiations are critical assumptions in both the Mission's Country Program Strategy and its D/G SO. In short, they are not within the Mission's manageable interest and, thus, outside of the D/G Results Framework. In addition, the Mission does not consider it to be within its manageable interest to affect the outcome of the *Basic Law* in a way that it believes will contribute to achievement of both the relevant intermediate results and, in turn, the overall SO. While it is hopeful that the Basic Law gets passed in a way that strengthens the larger macro-political enabling environment, the Mission believes having a Basic Law is not essential to the PLC being able to undertake its legislative functions.

2. The Underlying Logic of the D/G SO

The Mission's choice of *more accountable and responsive governance* rather than *government* as the highest level result which it has committed itself to achieve was a deliberate one. The SO reflects the understanding that in order to obtain "good" or effective governance, which includes characteristics of accountability and responsiveness, that participation in the principal functions of governance -- public decision and policy-making, problem solving, and the allocation and management of public resources -- must include all political actors with a legitimate claim to representing the public interest. Thus, in addition to supporting institutions of the Palestinian Authority, i.e., the PLC and Executive Authority -- what in other situations would be called "state" institutions -- the Mission has targeted strengthening civil society and democratically-elected and autonomous local governments as legitimate participants in the process of Palestinian governance within a limited and interim self-rule framework.

The logic of the D/G results framework states that by broadening participation in public decision-making to include all four political actors, more responsive and accountable governance will occur. Implicit to this logic is the fact that all four sets of institutional actors are considered *legitimate* partners in the

governance process and, that in addition to participation in public decision-making, each institutional actor should serve as a check on these other actors. In short, democratic practice by these political institutions is an inherent component of the logic. Specifically, the results framework logic states that in order to achieve the SO, four lower order or intermediate results (IR) must be achieved collectively over the strategy period. They are discussed in more detail below.

3. Performance Indicators at the SO Level

The MSI Team in collaboration with the Mission D/G SO Team significantly modified the original set of performance indicators at the SO level. The revised set of performance indicators are as follows:

- Citizen perceptions of PA's allocation and management of public resources
- Citizen perceptions of civil society's effectiveness in public decision-making
- Executive Authority-prepared budget reviewed and approved annually by PLC

D. Intermediate Results Supporting the D/G Strategic Objective

The original results framework submitted to and approved by USAID/Washington portrayed three first order intermediate results. They were:

IR 3.1 Increased participation of civil society in public decision-making

IR 3.2 Strengthened legislative and public policy capability

IR 3.3 More effective local government

As a result of the MSI technical assistance team's review and validation of the original results framework one additional intermediate result was added and a number of the original IRs were modified. The following presents the four finalized IRs that must be achieved to ensure SO attainment.

IR 3.1: Increased participation of civil society organizations in public decision-making and government oversight

IR 3.2: Enhanced capability of PLC to perform functions of a legislative body

IR 3.3: EA more effectively performs legislative and policy-making functions

IR 3.4 More effective local government

As can be readily noted, the principal difference between the original and revised results framework is the splitting of the former IR 3.2 into two separate intermediate results. The initial reason for the Mission's combining PLC and EA functions in one IR was that it was unclear early on what the distribution of responsibilities and authorities would be between the two institutions. In addition to the actual creation of separate branches of government, two reasons underlie the changes recommended by the MSI Team in this revised framework. First, the original IR was framed in terms of improving two governance *functions*, that is, legislative and policy-making. The latter IR targets strengthening the capabilities of the two democratic *institutions* most involved in carrying out the two governance functions. In short, the logic brings consistency to the overall results framework by promoting strengthened institutions as the means to improving Palestinian governance. Implicit to the D/G results

framework logic, therefore, is the longer-term goal of putting in place a set of democratic institutions that will contribute to the objective of good or effective governance capable of serving the Palestinian people over the long-term and not just in a transition or interim period.

The second reason for splitting the original IR in two is to ensure that the results specified can be clearly tracked and measured. This is particularly important as the objectives associated with each of the two new IRs are very different. Suffice it to note here, the Mission's analysis of the current political situation has led to the formulation of a strategy which clearly places greater importance on strengthening the PLC vis-a-vis the EA as a means of achieving more accountable and responsive governance. The decoupling of the original IR is consistent with this analysis.

As discussed in Part B, the achievement of these four IRs is both necessary and sufficient for the attainment of the D/G SO. The conceptual underpinning for this logic derives from the notion that autonomous arenas of political power, each in relative balance to the other, operating under an agreed upon set of fundamental and ordinary laws, and with a legitimate claim to representing the public good, will produce a form of governance that is both accountable and responsive. In practical terms such a balance of political power will enhance the quality of public decisions and the effectiveness of their implementation, while ensuring that no one political arena will be able to abuse the powers accorded to it under the rules in force. Essentially there are four arenas of legitimate political power in a democracy which must be in relative balance in order to ensure accountable and responsive governance:

- Between institutions of the central state, that is, among the executive, legislature and judiciary;
- Between civil society organizations operating at the macro-political level and central state institutions;
- Between the central state and democratically-elected local governments; and,
- Between local level civil society and democratically-elected local governments.

The four intermediate results that compose this results framework address three of these strategic relationships in terms of trying to promote balance in the conduct of key governance functions. Although it should be noted that in the Palestinian context, for a number of reasons -- some historical, some cultural -- the Executive Authority and its head have assumed far greater power than either the PLC or civil society at all levels. And although the status of local government has yet to be determined, it is likely that the EA will, initially, at least, have far greater power than the newly-elected municipal, village and local councils. As such, there is significantly greater concern in the crafting of this results framework that the PLC, civil society and local government increase their capacity for participation in governance matters than there is for the EA.

We note here the Mission's initial decision not to provide support to the strengthening of the Palestinian judiciary, or the broader area of the rule of law (ROL). While the importance of the judiciary's role in checking the power of the executive is a critical one in any political system, in the Palestinian context the complexities make it far too difficult to attempt at this point in time. This is largely due to the multiplicity of legal systems currently in operation in both the West Bank and Gaza, a result of the several legal systems that have been imposed on the Territories by the concerned external powers (i.e., Egyptian, British, Jordanian and Israeli) over the past six decades. If and when the current legal systems become unified under the PA, the Mission will reconsider its support of this aspect of its democracy and governance program. In the meantime, the EA's power will be held in check through the Mission's support of both the PLC and civil society, and their enhanced capacity to *demand* the EA's adherence to established ROL norms and practices.

While it is clear that to achieve the overall SO result all four IRs must also be achieved, in operational terms, each of the four corresponding institutions represented by these IRs can be treated as separate or discrete program components. In other words, if the larger political context becomes less “enabling,” the Mission will still be able to work with those institutions which view capacity building support to be in their best interest over the long term. The “compartmentalizing” of USAID’s support to concerned political institutions under a D/G strategic objective is not unusual as it represents an acknowledgment that there will be ebbs and flows in the larger political context, and that regardless of the political situation, there will always be areas where assistance can be strategically directed.

Each of the first order IRs, the lower order intermediate results that contribute to them, and their corresponding indicators are discussed in the four following sections.

1. Increased Participation of CSOs in Public Decision-Making and Palestinian Authority Oversight

a) The Underlying Logic of Intermediate Result 3.1

Civil society is, simply put, an autonomous realm of voluntary associational life that exists between the household and the state. It derives its strength and legitimacy from the voluntary act of individual citizens coming together to advance shared interests, solve common problems and articulate collective aspirations. It is this function of civil society organizations (CSOs) and their decision-making autonomy that legitimates their role as partners in the governance process. The issue, however, facing USAID, as it does all donors who aim to be strategic in their programming, is which CSOs among the many that occupy this intermediary realm of voluntary associational life merit support. The Mission has chosen that subset of Palestinian civil society which has the explicit objective of engaging “state” institutions in the arena of public decision-making and ensuring adherence to the rule of law. Even in this far narrower sliver of civil society a large number of CSOs exist which either actually undertake these functions or have the potential to do so based on the evolving concerns and interests of their members or clients. Thus, the Mission has initially targeted and set as a priority *public interest* CSOs, also called *specialized civic organizations* (e.g., advocacy groups, watch-dog and human rights organizations, policy think-tanks) whose primary concern is focussing on issues, policies and reforms of a macro-political or systemic nature, that is, who want to ensure the overall integrity and functioning of the political (democratic) system including institutions and processes.

In summary, the logic of this IR argues that by increasing the participation of CSOs in public decision-making and PA oversight, and particularly EA oversight, Palestinian governance will become more responsive and accountable.

b) Lower Order Intermediate Results and Their Logic

In order to achieve the first order IR, increased participation of CSOs in public decision-making and PA oversight, four second order IRs were defined as follows:

- *The enabling environment for civil society in place*
- *CSO capacity in public decision-making and PA oversight strengthened*
- *CSOs effectively aggregate and articulate citizen interests*
- *CSOs effectively disseminate information to citizens on public policy issues*

The logic underlying these second order IRs in terms of their contribution to the first order IR is as follows. First, in order for CSOs to be able to participate as *legitimate* actors in public decision-making and PA oversight an enabling legal, policy, regulatory and fiscal environment must be in place. The legal and policy enabling environment starts with the fundamental freedoms of association, speech, assembly and press. These rights are normally enumerated in a constitution. In the Palestinian context, they are expected to become part of the Basic Law. Assuming that these fundamental rights will be accorded through the anticipated Basic Law, of more particular importance to CSOs are the regulations, policies and fiscal laws that affect their ability to fulfill their organizational mandates. These “secondary” rights are expected to be spelled out in the so called “NGO law which, in fact, covers a wide range of CSOs. Because the Mission believes that the achievement of this IR is within its ability to affect, it is treated as a result and not an assumption that falls outside of the results framework.

Secondly, if CSOs are considered *legitimate* actors in the discharge of public functions, then they must also be able to demonstrate a minimum degree of competence to be considered *credible* actors in such governance functions as participating in public decision-making and PA oversight. Thus, there is a need to strengthen their capacity in such areas as strategic planning and policy research, analysis, formulation and advocacy. This is the result to which the second, lower order IR is directed.

The third lower order IR which must be achieved concerns the ability of CSOs to effectively aggregate and articulate citizen interests to the concerned PA authorities involved in policy-making and legislative functions. What this result also demonstrates is the degree to which CSOs are actually grounded in or belong to the communities they claim to represent; in short, it demonstrates their legitimacy as public actors vis-a-vis Palestinian citizens. This is particularly true for *public interest* CSOs which are normally composed of a small number of founder-members, often urban-based elites, with little or no broad-bases membership at the grassroots community level. Whether these CSOs work through more sectoral-oriented, service delivery NGOs or community-based organizations to reach Palestinian citizens is less important than whether they are able to demonstrate strong linkages to the local level.

Finally, the last second order IR contributing to the civil society result relates to the ability of CSOs to disseminate information on relevant policy issues to citizens so that they are able to make informed decisions on these policies. As can be readily seen, both this IR and the preceding one are closely linked. CSOs undertaking these two functions must possess a sound technical capacity as well as effective networks linking them to citizens at the local level.

c) IR 3.1 Performance Indicators

Performance indicators measuring IR 3.1, *increased participation of CSOs in public decision-making and government oversight*, include:

- Key laws, policies, reforms, etc., initiated by CSOs that are accepted, reviewed, and formally acted on by PA (percentage)
- Key laws, policies, reforms, etc., initiated by PA (either EA or PLC) modified as a result CSO input (percentage)

Performance indicators measuring achievement of IR 3.1.1, *enabling environment for civil society in place*, include:

- Enabling NGO law enacted (yes/no)
- CSO perceptions of PA’s (particularly EA’s) application of NGO law (percentage)

Performance indicators measuring achievement of IR 3.1.2, *CSO capacity in public decision-making and PA oversight strengthened*, include:

- Perceptions (positive) of EA and PLC concerning the quality of CSO policy and legislative initiatives (percentage)

Performance indicators measuring achievement of IR 3.1.3, *CSOs effectively aggregate and articulate citizen interests*, achievement include:

- Citizen perceptions (positive) of CSO's representation of their interests on selected issues (percentage)

Performance indicators measuring achievement of IR 3.1.4, *CSOs effectively disseminate information to citizens on public policy issues*, include:

- Citizen perceptions (positive) of CSO information dissemination on selected issues (percentage)

2. Enhanced Capability of PLC to Perform Functions of Legislative Body

a) The Underlying Logic of Intermediate Result 3.2

The legislative branch in virtually all countries regardless, of whether they operate within a parliamentary or presidential system of governance undertake three basic functions: (i) deliberation and law-making; (ii) executive branch oversight; and (iii) constituent representation. While the Basic Law which will delineate authorities and competencies between the Executive Authority and Palestinian Legislative Council has yet to be passed, it is anticipated that it will provide the PLC with the authority to undertake all three functions. And, in fact, current PLC *Standing Orders* already in effect and operational, do provide for these functions, although technically they have no binding effect on the EA.

The logic of this IR in terms of its contribution to SO achievement is that it posits both ***demand and supply-side*** governance functions for the PLC. The PLC's demand-side function relates to its oversight role vis-a-vis the EA. Among the institutions of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority, the PLC is the only body with the legitimacy to ensure that the EA does not overstep its mandated powers. As the Basic Law has not yet been passed, the PLC is the only institution with the capacity to demand that, at a minimum, fundamental human rights and civil liberties are adhered to by the EA. The PLC's legitimacy derives from the fact that it is an elective body with a direct mandate provided by citizens in each constituency. In the absence of the legal authority that would obtain from the enactment of the Basic Law, it is the moral authority that the PLC derives from this legitimacy that ensures the overall integrity of Palestinian democratic self-rule. The supply-side governance functions of the PLC are those of law-making and constituent representation. Supply-side is taken in the sense that the PLC is rendering good governance to the public through its legislative and representative functions, rather than demanding good governance from the EA.

In summary, it is the capability of the PLC to undertake both supply and demand-side functions that contributes to *more responsive and accountable governance*.

b) Lower Order Intermediate Results and Their Logic

There are three second level intermediate results whose collective achievement will lead to attainment of this first order IR. The are:

- *PLC demonstrates increasing ability to exert EA review and oversight*
- *PLC develops enhanced deliberative and legislative capacity*
- *PLC members demonstrates growing responsiveness and ability to represent constituent interests*

The logic of these three lower order IRs corresponds to increasing capacity of the PLC to perform the oversight and legislative functions and inculcating an understanding among PLC members that being responsive to their constituents constitutes another basic requirement of their office.

c) IR 3.2 Performance Indicators

Performance indicators measuring achievement of IR 3.2, *enhanced capability of PLC to perform functions of legislative body*, include:

- Approval ratings (positive) of PLC by civic leaders (percentage)
- Citizen approval rating (positive) of PLC (to those of EA) (ratio)
- PLC-initiated legislation passed as a percent of all legislation passed & submitted to EA (percentage)

Performance indicators measuring achievement of IR 3.2.1, *PLC demonstrates increasing ability to exert EA review and oversight*, include:

- Formal EA response to specific PLC (plenary and committees) requests for information
- Formal PLC-initiated proceedings (e.g., hearings, investigations) held on specific instances of non-legislative EA actions (number)

Performance indicators measuring achievement of IR 3.2.2, *PLC develops enhanced deliberative and law-making capacity*, include:

- Pending or potential legislation subjected to public hearings (percentage)
- Action taken on PLC-initiated draft legislation as a percent of PLC-introduced draft legislation (percentage)
- EA-initiated legislation passed with PLC “substantive” modifications to all EA-initiated draft legislation introduced (percentage)

Performance indicators measuring achievement of IR 3.2.3, *PLC members demonstrate growing responsiveness and ability to represent constituent interests*, include:

- Formal town or public meetings bringing PLC members together with their constituents (number)
- Constituent perceptions (positive) of selected PLC member responsiveness (percentage)

3. More Effective EA Legislative and Policy-Making

a) The Logic Underlying IR 3.3

The EA is composed of the Cabinet and Head of the Palestinian Authority, the former being appointed by the latter. The EA and the PLC are the constituent political institutions of the PA. Like executive branches in most newly elected democracies, the EA is the more powerful of what elsewhere would be called state institutions. Compounding this problem, which has been evidenced in the EA's disregard of the PLC in a number of matters, is the larger issue of the PA's relationship to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This situation has reinforced the power of EA vis-a-vis the PLC. In short, the ideal of a balanced relationship between institutions of the "state" in the PA does not exist and is thus a potential threat to the evolution of democratic practice in West Bank and Gaza.

The Mission, realizing this situation, has developed a very focused set of results relative to the EA. Results under this intermediate result are intended to increase the effectiveness of the EA's legislative and policy-making functions. By increasing the EA's effectiveness in performing these two supply-side functions, including both the predictability and transparency of the decision-making process, the quality of its public policies will be improved thus leading to more responsive and accountable governance.

b) Lower Order Intermediate Results and Their Logic

The second order intermediate results associated with IR 3 are:

- *Uniform rules and procedures for EA policy-making and legislative functions in place*
- *EA applies established rules and procedures for legislative and policy-making functions*

By establishing and applying a uniform set of rules and procedures for the drafting of legislation and the formulation of public policy, the public as well as other democratic institutions will know in advance the overall decision-making process of the Executive Authority. The mere fact that these rules and procedures are known to the public and applied accordingly, provides a degree of predictability and transparency in one of the most important processes in a democratic polity. As such, citizens, citizen's groups (civil society) and the PLC will be able to track the process and increase the likelihood that they can intervene in the decision-making process and have the opportunity to present their views and interests to the EA before policies and legislation are finalized. Predictability and transparency are critical ingredients contributing to enhancing the governance process and making it more responsive and accountable.

c) IR 3.3 Performance Indicators

Performance indicators at the IR 3.3 level include:

- Concerned civic actors who believe EA legislative and policy-making rules are consultative (percentage)
- Public policies and draft laws that meet established time requirements (percentage)

Performance indicators measuring achievement of IR 3.3.1, *uniform rules and procedures for EA policy-making and legislative functions in place*, include:

- Uniform rules and procedures for legislative and policy-making functions are approved by EA cabinet (yes/no)

Performance indicators measuring achievement of IR 3.3.2, *EA applies established rules and procedures for legislative and policy-making functions*, include:

- Concerned civic actors who believe legislative and policy-making rules and procedures are clearly articulated and accessible (percentage)
- Laws drafted and policies formulated that adhere to legal and technical quality standards (percentage)

4. More Effective Local Government

The MSI team was asked not to review IR 3.4, more effective local government (formerly IR 3.3). While the Mission still intends to support the decentralization process and newly formed local government institutions, the nature of this support is still too uncertain to predict at this time. This is primarily a result of the fact that none of the laws required to formalize the authorities and functions of the newly created local governments are as yet approved or in place. This includes the electoral code governing future municipal, village and local council elections and the separate local government law itself defining the authorities of local government, particularly in relation to those of the PA. As local elections have already been delayed from their original July 1996 time-table with no new date as yet set, the situation remains too uncertain for the Mission to determine the set of results that it can reasonably be expected to achieve with its anticipated level of support.

E. Summary Table: SO 3 Results and Performance Indicators

The following table summarizes the results and performance indicators established for the D/G strategic objective.

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE
PERFORMANCE MONITORING SYSTEM: RESULTS FRAMEWORK

OBJECTIVE/RESULT	INDICATORS
SO 3 MORE RESPONSIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Citizen perceptions (positive) of PA's allocation and management of public resources (percentage) • Citizen perceptions (positive) of civil society's effectiveness in public decision-making (percentage) • Executive Authority prepared budget reviewed and approved annually by PLC
IR 3.1 Increased Participation of CSOs in Public Decision-Making and Government Oversight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key laws, policies, reforms, etc., initiated by CSOs and accepted, reviewed and acted on by PA (percentage) • Key laws, policies, reforms, etc., modified as a result of CSO input (percentage)
IR 3.1.1 Enabling Environment for Civil Society in Place	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enabling "NGO" law enacted (yes/no) • CSO perceptions (positive) of PA's application of NGO law (percentage)
IR 3.1.2 CSO Capacity in Public Decision-Making and Government Oversight Strengthened	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EA and PLC perceptions (positive) concerning the quality of CSO policy and legislative initiatives (percentage)
IR 3.1.3 CSOs Effectively Aggregate and Articulate Citizen Interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Citizen perceptions (positive) of CSOs representation of their interests on selected issues (percentage)
IR 3.1.4 CSOs Effectively Disseminate Information to Citizens on Public Policy Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Citizen perceptions (positive) of CSO information dissemination on selected issues
IR 3.2 Enhanced Capability of PLC to Perform Functions of a Legislative Body	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Citizen approval ratings of PLC {to EA approval ratings (ratio)} • Approval ratings of PLC by civic leaders (percentage) • PLC-initiated legislation passed (as a percent of all legislation passed) (percentage) and submitted to EA

OBJECTIVE/RESULT	INDICATORS
3.2.1 PLC Demonstrates Increasing Ability to Exert EA Oversight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formal PLC-initiated proceedings (e.g., hearings, investigations) on specific instances of EA actions (number) • Formal EA responses, in writing or in person, to specific PLC (plenary or committee) requests for information (number)
IR 3.2.2 PLC Develops Enhanced Legislative and Deliberative Capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public hearings on pending or potential legislation subjected to public hearings (percentage) • Action taken on PLC-initiated draft legislation as a percent of PLC-introduced draft legislation (percentage) • EA-initiated legislation passed with PLC modifications to EA-initiated bills Passed (percentage)
IR 3.2.3 PLC Members Demonstrate Growing Responsiveness and Ability to represent Constituent Interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open plenary meetings/hearings as a percent of all PLC plenary meeting/hearings (percentage) • Constituent perceptions (positive) of selected PLC members responsiveness (percentage) • Formal public meetings bringing PLC members together with their constituents (number)
IR 3.3 EA More Effectively Performs Legislative and Policy-Making Functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concerned civic actors who believe EA legislative and policy-making functions are consultative (percentage) • Public policies and draft laws that meet established time requirements (percentage)
IR 3.3.1 Uniform Rules and Procedures for EA Policy-Making and Legislative Functions in Place	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uniform rules and procedures for legislative and policy-making functions are approved by EA cabinet (yes/no)
IR 3.3.2 EA Applies Established Rules and Procedures for Legislative and Policy-Making Functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Laws drafted and policies formulated that adhere to legal and technical quality standards (percentage) • Concerned civic actors who believe legislative and policy-making rules and procedures are clearly articulated and accessible (percentage)
IR 3.4 More Effective Local Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public perception of the responsiveness of local government (percentage)

III. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NUMBER 3: PERFORMANCE MONITORING PLAN

A. Overview of Performance Indicators, Baselines and Targets

As will be discussed in greater detail in the following two sections -- Review of Data Sources and Performance Data Tables, respectively -- the ability to establish baselines and targets for each of the proposed indicators in this Results Framework was virtually impossible, except in a very small minority of cases. Although the magnitude of this situation is of obvious concern, it is not unusual in the emerging field of democracy and governance to confront a lack of data from which to construct realistic baselines and targets used in the measurement of performance indicators and their corresponding results. The situation is compounded in the West Bank and Gaza program for a number of reasons, not the least of which has been the total absence of a functioning democracy until earlier this year and the limited domain over which Palestinians can claim to exercise self-rule. With no history of democratic self-governance, there has been no experience and hence little hard data generated from which to establish reference points used to measure the performance of either democratic institutions or processes, basic indicators used in determining the well-being of any democratic system. This has left one principal area where data can be gathered to measure the Mission's D/G SO, that is, the views and opinions of Palestinian citizens and leaders of newly established political institutions.

Of the 13 results¹ -- including the D/G SO, and first and second order intermediate results -- being tracked under this performance monitoring plan, nine have indicators which require measurement of citizen or political leader perceptions or views to determine results achievement. Nearly one-half, or 12, of the 25 indicators developed for this measurement plan deal with citizen or political perceptions. Of the remaining 12 indicators, 11 are based on determining numbers, ratios or percentages of *outcomes* of actions taken by the leaders of political institutions (e.g., number of ministers responding to PLC summons; the ratio of laws passed to laws introduced by CSOs; percent of EA draft laws adhering to established legal and quality standards). The remaining two indicators are binary in nature, requiring a simple yes/no answer. While the MSI Team realizes the use of binary indicators is not the most useful type of measurement, the results they correspond to are more in the way of *necessary* conditions that must be achieved if the overall SO is to be attained. Since the Mission believes it to be in its manageable interest to affect the outcome of these two results, the only target that can be used is a yes or a no. Not surprisingly, these are only two of six indicators which have an established baseline.

As a general rule, the MSI Team has tried to keep the number of indicators (and corresponding baselines and targets) for each result to the minimum necessary to ensure valid measurement of results performance. This is discussed in greater detail in Section D, below.

B. Review of Data Sources

The principal sources of data which the MSI Team has used to establish baselines and targets come from a limited number of interviews conducted with concerned organizations; and from the review of key documents provided by the Mission, and a number of current and potential implementing partners. The principal organizations interviewed (see Annex B) included: 1) USAID's primary US contractor, Associates in Rural Development (ARD) implementing activities under intermediate result 3.2, and two Cooperative Agreement Recipients (grantees) contributing to the achievement of multiple IRs under this strategic objective; 2) the two principal research and polling organizations operating in the West Bank and Gaza; and one international NGO working in the D/G sector. It was not necessary for the team to meet with any other Palestinian NGOs, or members of either the Executive Authority or Palestinian

¹ Please note that IR four, *More Effective Local Government*, is not included as part of this Performance Monitoring Plan for reasons discussed earlier in this report.

Legislative Council. Rather, the Team relied on both D/G SO Team members and USAID's implementing partners to determine the availability of data from these Palestinian sources. It should be noted that the US implementing partners and the two Palestinian research and polling organizations were instrumental in assisting the Team to validate baselines and targets, as well as determining the availability of data, and the reasonableness in terms of costs of collecting it. In short, the dearth of data sources parallels the limited nature of available data.

The key documents used in determining data sources (see Annex C) included those provided by: 1) the two Palestinian research and polling organizations; 2) the single USAID contractor; 3) two implementing US PVO grantee implementing partners; and 4) a range of materials provided by the Mission itself (e.g., RFPs, RFAs, PVO and NGO proposals, a number of donor and Palestinian NGO studies). In the following review of data sources only those organizations that were actually interviewed by the Team are discussed, which to the best of the Team's knowledge represent the data sources available.

1. Palestinian Authority (Public Institutions)

a) Executive Authority: Intermediate Result 3.3

The EA, composed of the President and his Cabinet, has developed few procedures or built an institutional structure capable of undertaking either effective policy-making or its implementation. Power and decision-making is largely concentrated in the office of the president. Thus, as a source of generating data for use in measuring its performance it is severely lacking. It is anticipated, however, that the contractor the Mission selects to implement activities under the intermediate result 3.3 will assist the EA to create required structures and establish procedures capable tracking its performance which will additionally benefit the Mission in operationalizing this performance monitoring plan. Specifically, the Contractor will assist the EA to create a central point (unit) and set of procedures capable of accepting input from civil society actors wanting to participate in the EA's policy-making and legislative process. As discussed in relevant performance data tables, the EA contractor will be the principal source of data related to IR 3.3 and its contributing results, IR 3.3.1 and IR 3.3.2.

b) Palestinian Legislative Council: Intermediate Result 3.2

Like the EA, the PLC is a relatively brand new institution. It has, in fact, established a set of internal *standing orders* defining rules and procedures relative to its three basic functions; and does have a functioning, if fledgling, administrative Secretariat which will increasingly be able to track various outputs of the PLC as well as its overall performance, both of which will be of eventual use in the performance monitoring plan. In the meantime, USAID's principal contractor, Associates in Rural Development, working with the PLC will become the primary source of data used in tracking the relevant indicators and targets associated with IR 3.2 and lower order IRs 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 and their tangible targets. Over time, it is anticipated that the Secretariat will be able to take over these responsibilities from ARD, one of which is channeling inputs from civic actors into the PLC's law and policy-making process. The MSI Team was extremely impressed with the ARD Team, and believes that its capacity and integrity to track and report on data relevant to the concerned IR is more than adequate. This is discussed in greater detail below.

2. Palestinian Civil Society: Intermediate Results 3.1, 3.2, 3.3

Two potential sources of CSO-generated data that may be used in the performance monitoring plan, including all three intermediate results, are the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) based in Nablus and the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC) based in Jerusalem. Both organizations currently undertake survey research and public opinion polling related to political issues in

the West Bank and Gaza, and have been doing so since 1993 and 1994, respectively. Both organizations have a core staff of professionals including political and social scientists and polling and survey methodologists. They also are able to call upon experts in specific fields from Palestinian universities located throughout the West Bank including the Law Center at Berzeit University. Both organizations undertake and publish survey polls on a quarterly basis on a range of political issues, many of which are similar to those proposed in the performance monitoring plan. CPRS has a far greater interest in tracking issues within the Palestinian NGO community, including tracking a limited number of activities undertaken by some 200 members of the Palestinian NGO network (PNGO), an umbrella organization representing Palestinian NGOs. Both organizations have significant donor support. From our limited discussions with these partners and the D/G SO Team itself, both organizations are highly regarded and it can be expected that the quality of their data collection will be high. It should be noted that CPRS does not normally undertake assignments through contracting mechanisms which may limit its participation in the performance monitoring plan.

3. U.S. Implementing Partners: Intermediate Results 3.1 and 3.2

The principal US PVOs that have the potential to serve as data sources in the D/G SO performance monitoring plan -- primarily intermediate results 3.1, *Increased CSO Participation*; and 3.2, *Enhanced PLC Capability* -- are the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute. NDI is currently implementing two D/G SO component activities, one supporting the PLC intermediate result, and one falling under the civil society IR. While the Team has not specified a role for NDI in the performance measurement plan, its knowledge of both the PLC and its linkages to a wide range of Palestinian CSOs through its Civic Forum network, will undoubtedly provide a wealth of supporting data and *anecdotal* evidence to that coming from the Plan's principal sources. The MSI Team was extremely impressed with NDI personnel running these two programs. IRI is currently working with CPRS and intends to tighten this relationship through its USAID grant which intends to spin off a component of CPRS, *the Legislative Research Unit*, to the PLC. Again, while no specific role is intended for IRI in the Plan, it will be capable of supplementing data should the primary data source require it.

Finally, as touched upon above, ARD is the principal USAID contractor supporting the strengthening of the PLC (NDI is providing a series of training opportunities both within and outside of the West Bank/Gaza for PLC members). As such, ARD has come to figure prominently in the Plan and will become the primary source of data for tracking and reporting on the PLC IR 3.2. The Team has little doubt that ARD is capable of undertaking this function.

C. Performance Data Tables

This section contains 25 performance data tables covering the strategic objective, three of the four first order intermediate results and corresponding second order IRs. In essence, this is the D/G SO performance measurement plan presented in tabular form. In addition to the concerned results, i.e., SO or IRs, and corresponding indicators, each table provides, in principal, performance baselines and targets covering the strategy period, data sources, units of measure, and a comments section which provides a more in-depth discussion of the relationship of the indicator to the result as well as issues related to data collection methodologies. A narrative discussion of this plan is presented in Part D, below.

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA

Date/Month Approved: 12/96

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: More Responsive and Accountable Governance

Indicator (a): Citizen perceptions (positive) of the PA's allocation and management of public resources

Unit of Measure: Percent of positive citizen perceptions. Polling firm will need to establish rating system including definition of what constitutes "positive."

Source: Local polling/research firm

Comments: The allocation and management of public resources are principal tasks of both the executive and legislative branches. The allocations are the decisions made on the use of public resources. While both the PLC and EA allocate public resources, only the EA manages them.

There are at least two public opinion polling firms conducting polls on the attitudes of Palestinians towards politics. The selected firm will need to break the survey question into two parts: one addressing perceptions of the EA, the other, towards the PLC. Questions should be asked to determine the degree of positive citizen perceptions. Suggested rating system: good, satisfactory, poor.

The question implies a significant degree of understanding on the part of those interviewed concerning the functions of public institutions in a democracy. In establishing targets after the baseline is determined, it will be necessary to phrase the questions so that the answer is not given in the asking. Because of the sophistication of the question, the end of strategy period target is lower than other

indicators in the SO set. This indicator is tracked and reported on yearly.

The year 2000 targets may perhaps look low; compared to citizen perceptions of government in more advanced countries, it is either equal to or higher than.

	Year	Planned	Actual
Baseline			
	1997	TBD	
	1998	TBD	
	1999	TBD	
Target	2000	EA: 60% PLC: 60%	

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96		
Strategic Objective 3: More responsive and accountable governance				
Indicator (b): <i>Citizen perceptions (positive) of civil society's effectiveness in public decision-making</i>				
Unit of Measure: Percent of positive citizen perceptions. Polling firm will need to establish rating system including definition of what constitutes a "positive."		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Local polling/research firm	Baseline			
<p>Because this SO is concerned with governance and not government, it is important to include the perception of civil society as a legitimate actor in the governance process. This is best measured by citizen perceptions. Because the concept of civil society is not a developed one among the Palestinian public, the way that the question is phrased will be important; again the issue that having to provide too much explanation may answer the question. The Team, however, has been assured by concerned polling firms that it is possible to get the required response without compromising the integrity of the data.</p> <p>The target of 70% is relatively higher than that of either the PLC or EA. This is based on two reasons. First, Palestinians already have significant experience and a favorable impression with the role of NGOs in the delivery of needed social and safety-net services. Secondly, experience from most other countries in which USAID works, indicates that CSO have a far higher degree of legitimacy than any of the institutions of the state in terms of ensuring that citizen interests are protected and promoted. We would expect the same in the Palestinian context.</p>		1997	TBD	
		1998	TBD	
		1999	TBD	
		Target	2000	70 %
This indicator should be tracked and reported on yearly to the Mission.				

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA

Date/Month Approved: 12/96

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: More Responsive and Accountable Governance

Indicator (c): Executive Authority-prepared budget reviewed and approved annually by PLC

Unit of Measure: Binary indicator: Yes/No on an annual basis

Source: Associates in Rural Development

Comments: There is no more powerful and comprehensive statement of a government's policy agenda than that found in its annual budget presentation. The job of preparing the budget, and therefore establishing national priorities in the allocation of public resources, is that of the executive branch; in the case of West Bank/Gaza, the Executive Authority. In a democracy, however, it is the legislative branch, or the PLC in this case, that approves the budget and ensures that executive priorities match the interests and needs of the countries citizens or more specifically the constituents of elected PLC representatives.

The logic of this indicator is that with a review and approval of annual budgets submitted by the EA to the PLC, national budget priorities expressing public resource allocations and which in turn reflect of national policies and priorities, will more nearly end up -- as a result of PLC modifications -- as true expressions of the public interest and not the narrow interests of the executive branch. In short, public participation will have been broadened in one of the most important single decisions made concerning the policies that effect the entire polity. At the same time, the credibility and legitimacy of the PLC, the principal political institution capable of checking the power of the EA will have been increased.

This indicator was designed to complement the first two measuring performance at the SO level. While it is a binary, yes/no, indicator it provides a *hard* or quantitative measure of SO performance, that together with the two opinion-based indicators provides an accurate and strong measure of SO results.

The indicator will be tracked on an annual basis with a yes response indicating achievement. No national budget had either been prepared or submitted to the PLC in 1996. 1997 will become the base year with a yes target expected in 1998.

	Year	Planned	Actual
Baseline	1996	No	
	1997	No	
	1998	Yes	
	2000	Yes	
Target	2000	Yes	

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96			
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.1: Increased participation of CSOs in public decision-making and PA oversight					
<i>Indicator (a): Key laws, policies, reforms, etc., initiated by CSOs and accepted, reviewed and acted on by the PA</i>					
Unit of Measure: Percent of key laws, etc., initiated by CSOs that are accepted, reviewed and acted on by PLC or EA		Year	Planned	Actual	
Source: Local polling/research firm; and USAID PVO/NGO grantees	Baseline				
<p>Comments: This indicator measures the participation of Palestinian CSOs in the public decision-making process including law & policy-making among other decisions. It includes initiatives which are directed either to the EA or the PLC.</p> <p>This result is one of a high degree as it looks at not just CSO initiatives but those acted on by the PA. The polling firm will thus track laws/policies initiated by CSOs and actions/inactions taken/not taken by PA. This will give an idea of both the number of CSO initiatives which would be expected to increase over time as well as those acted on.</p> <p>At the same time, many of USAID's possible NGO grantees will be engaged in public decision-making actions. Thus, this indicator can include both a smaller sample of CSOs (USAID grantees) and/or a far larger sample (all those CSOs who actually engage in public decision-making). The polling firm should be called upon to undertake the tracking of both surveys. It is expected that a USAID contractor will help the EA to establish single point for the receipt of CSO input; the PLC secretariat will perform this function for the PLC.</p> <p>Once the initial baseline is established, then targets for succeeding years can be established.</p> <p>This indicator should be tracked and reported on semi-annually.</p>		1997	TBD		
			1998	TBD	
			1999	TBD	
	Target		2000	TBD	

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA

Date/Month Approved: 12/96

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.1: Increased participation of CSOs in public decision-making and government oversight

Indicator (b): Key laws, decisions, reforms, etc., modified as a result of CSO input

Unit of Measure: Percent of laws, policies, reforms, etc. commented on by CSOs that are actually modified by PA (EA or PLC)		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Local research/polling firmest PVO/NGO grantees	Baseline			
<p>Comments: This indicator is the same as that of the previous one, except it deals with policies, laws, reforms etc., initiated by the PA (either EA or PLC) rather than CSOs. It still implies a rather high degree of result being achieved as it looks for a concrete change in PA initiatives, not just that they were commented on by CSOs.</p> <p>The indicator will track all PA initiated laws, policies, etc., commented on by CSOs and those actually modified as a result of CSO comments. Methodology used by the selected polling firm must take into account that a smaller number of policies, laws commented on by CSOs will decrease the significance of this indicator. Not only does it become more significant as CSO comments increase, it will indicate success of deliberate USAID-financed activities. Again, a USAID contractor will have assisted the EA to establish a central point within this body to receive CSO input, while the PLC secretariat will perform the same function within the PLC.</p> <p>Targets should be set once a baseline has been established through polling firm survey. This data will be supplemented by USAID grantees (US and local).</p> <p>Data should be collected semi-annually.</p>		1997	TBD	
		1998	TBD	
		1999	TBD	
	Target	2000	TBD	

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96		
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.1.1: Enabling environment for civil society in place				
<i>Indicator (a): Enabling "NGO" law enacted</i>				
<p>Unit of Measure: Yes/No, but includes having established a set of critical provisions that must be enacted in the final legislation</p> <p>Source: Government Gazette; USAID D/G SO Team Monitoring of</p> <p>Comments: In addition to the fundamental rights and liberties that will be enacted through the passage of the Basic Law that pertain to all Palestinian citizens, the so called "NGO" law will detail the specific rights and obligations that a wide range of CSOs will be subject to. Assuming the Basic law will be passed, then the NGO law provides the best proxy for whether an enabling environment for CSOs exists.</p> <p>The unit of measure is a simple yes/no. But the yes/no must be based on whether a minimum number of provisions considered by a cross-section of CSOs to be favorable are included in the law. USAID in collaboration with its PVO/NGO grantees/future grantees should establish this threshold. The baseline exists as of 1996; the target is expected to be achieved by the year 2000. As a law is already in draft, and has been the object of considerable CSO and donor debate with the PA with favorable reactions, it is anticipated that the law will be passed in 1997.</p> <p>The required data will be published in the government gazette, when the law is finally enacted. Also, the D/G SO team will monitor the progress and final passage of this law and take responsibility for reporting on it. In this regard, it would be useful to have one member of the D/G SO Team specifically designated to monitor progress of this law until it is finally passed.</p> <p>To be tracked quarterly and reported on semi-annually.</p> <p>Responsible Office: DG</p>		Year	Planned	Actual
	Baseline	1996	No	
		1997	Yes	
		1998	Yes	
		1999	Yes	
	Target	2000	Yes	

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA

Date/Month Approved: 12/96

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.1.1: Enabling Environment for Civil Society in Place

Indicator (b): CSO perceptions of the PA's application of the NGO law

Unit of Measure: Percent positive CSO perceptions of EA's application of NGO law. Assumption: CSOs view NGO law as containing enabling provisions.

Source: Local polling firm

Comments: While the passage of an NGO law that is favorable to CSOs is a basic precondition for an enabling environment, if it is not applied as passed then it will have little meaning for the ability of CSOs to participate normally in the process of Palestinian governance. This indicator thus measures the degree to which the law is being applied and enforced by the PA through the perceptions of those most affected by it, i.e., Palestinian CSOs.

The sample for measuring this particular indicator does not have to be too large as it should be relatively straight forward as to whether the provisions of the law are being properly enforced or not. A sub-sample of roughly 25-50 of the CSOs that belong to PNGO should be adequate to provide a valid result.

Once the law is passed then at least 75 % of the respondents should view the law as being positively applied; over the strategy period it should increase to 80%. It is unlikely that even with the best NGO law, that all CSOs will be satisfied with its application. It can be anticipated that the law that does pass will fall short of the ideal being sought, thus 100% positive approval is unrealistic.

The indicator should be tracked on a semi-annual basis, because of the implications that non-compliance would have on the Mission's programs.

Responsible Office: D/G

	Year	Planned	Actual
Baseline			
	1997	TBD	
	1998	TBD	
	1999	TBD	
Target	2000	80%	

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96		
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.1.2: CSO capacity in public decision-making and government oversight strengthened				
<i>Indicator (a): PA perceptions (positive) concerning the quality of CSO policy and legislative initiatives</i>				
<p>Unit of Measure: Percent positive EA & PLC perceptions. Selected polling firm will need to establish rating system including defining what constitutes "positive."</p> <p>Source: Local polling/research firm/USAID PVO/NGO grantees</p> <p>Comments: Once CSOs have the right to participate as legitimate actors in the Palestinian governance process -- in fact, they already participate in policy-making -- they will require expertise in a range of skills areas to undertake advocacy-related functions (e.g., strategic planning, policy research and analysis, formulation and advocacy). This particular indicator measures the capacity of CSOs to formulate policy either as statements or in the form of draft legislation; or to respond to the the initiatives of either the EA or PLC through modifications. As such, the indicator serves as a proxy for CSO capacity in the areas of policy research and analysis and formulation.</p> <p>The measure for this indicator are the government institutions most directly affected by CSO policy-making initiatives, i.e., the EA and PLC. As such, the selected polling firm will interview a cross-section of these PA leaders to gain their perceptions of CSO capacity in these capacity areas. Anecdotal data can come from Mission grantees.</p> <p>Years 1997-2000 targets will be established once a baseline has been determined by a survey of the PA leaders. This indicator will be tracked and reported on semi-annually.</p> <p>Responsible Office: D/G</p>		Year	Planned	Actual
	Baseline			
		1997	TBD	
		1998	TBD	
		1999	TBD	
	Target	2000	TBD	

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96			
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.1.3: CSOs effectively aggregate and articulate citizen interests					
<i>Indicator (a): Citizen perceptions (positive) of CSO representation of their interests on selected issues</i>					
<p>Unit of Measure: Percent of positive citizen perceptions. Selected polling firm will establish rating system including definition of what constitutes "positive."</p> <p>Source: Local polling/research firm</p> <p>Comments: As intermediaries between citizens and government institutions, CSOs perform the function of interest aggregation and articulation vis-a-vis these public decision-makers. Therefore, it is important that CSOs not only effectively perform this function, but ensure that citizen interests are accurately reflected. This is particularly important because most CSOs performing this function do not have a broad based membership thus leading to the possibility that the issues they represent to the PA do not necessarily represent citizen interests. Thus, this indicator will also indirectly measure the degree to which CSOs are seen as legitimate and credible citizen representatives as well as effective ones.</p> <p>Survey methodology requires a question to first determine whether respondent is familiar with a specific CSO(s). If response is yes, then perception question can be asked. It is suggested that in order to increase the relevance of this indicator to USAID's D/G program that a range of pre-selected issues of importance to both citizens and USAID be developed to better target the nature of CSO representation.</p> <p>It will be necessary to first conduct a survey to establish the initial baseline and subsequent targets for this indicator. This indicator should be tracked and reported on semi-annually.</p> <p>Responsible Office: D/G</p>		Year	Planned	Actual	
	Baseline				
		1997	TBD		
		1998	TBD		
		1999	TBD		
	Target	2000	TBD		

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA

Date/Month Approved: 12/96

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.1.4: CSOs effectively disseminate information to citizens on selected public policy issues

Indicator (a): Citizen perceptions (positive) of CSO information dissemination on selected issues

<p>Unit of Measure: Percent positive citizen perceptions. Selected polling firm will develop rating system including definition of what constitutes "positive."</p> <p>Source: Local polling/research firm</p> <p>Comments: In order for citizens to exercise their civic responsibilities, from voting to participating in public decision-making, they must be adequately informed about the nature and importance of the public issues about which decision-makers are deliberating. The dissemination of such information is a principal function of CSOs, in some cases the same CSOs that also aggregate and articulate citizen interests; in others a different set of CSOs. Such information can be disseminated in generic civic education programs, but increasingly as the issues become more complex, through targeted information campaigns on select issues.</p> <p>The selected polling firm will include in its methodology a question to first determine whether respondent knows a CSO(s) involved in information dissemination; the follow-up question then asks for their perceptions. In conjunction with USAID and a sample of CSOs, the polling firm will need to develop a set of select issues that citizens will be asked to comment on in relation to their perceptions of CSO effectiveness in information dissemination.</p> <p>In order to establish a baseline and subsequent targets, a survey will first have to be administered. A 70 % favorable rating is deemed to be an accurate reflection of what can be achieved by the end of the strategy period.</p> <p>Tracking and reporting on this indicator will take place semi-annually.</p> <p>Responsible Office: D/G</p>				
	Year	Planned	Actual	
	Baseline			
	1997	TBD		
	1998	TBD		
	1999	TBD		
	Target	2000	70 %	

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96			
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.2: Enhanced Capability of Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) to Perform Functions of a Legislative Body					
Indicator (a): Approval rating (positive) of PLC by Civic Leaders					
Unit of Measure: Percentage of "positive" ratings received by PLC in survey of civic leaders at end of each legislative session		Year	Planned	Actual	
Source: Local polling/research firm	Baseline				
<p>Comments: This indicator assumes that civic leaders will be a more informed and knowledgeable sample group than other sub-sets (e.g., citizens CSO members), and thus less prone to exaggerated expectations or misunderstandings of existing political institutions, their competence and jurisdiction. They will, therefore, be in a position to more objectively rate the performance of the PLC.</p> <p>Rather than asking respondents for their opinion about the general performance of the PLC, they will be asked to comment specifically on each of the performance of each of the PLC's three basic functions, i.e., deliberation and law-making; executive oversight; and constituent representation.</p> <p>No baseline data is currently available. While the heads of civil society organizations will form part of the survey sample, this indicator seeks a far wider range of opinion than that which comes from CSO. In addition, the leaders of religious groups, the university community and civic organizations (neighborhood leaders). A baseline will be established by the selected polling firm in a survey of civic leaders that will need to be determined beforehand.</p> <p>A target approval rating of the PLC by the year 2000 will need to be established that is tied to the baseline that will be established in the first survey. The polling firm will develop a rating system including what constitutes a "positive" rating of the PLC. The proposed index rating system is: good - acceptable - poor - no opinion.</p> <p>The indicator will be monitored and reported on semi-annually.</p>		1997	TBD		
			1998	TBD	
			1999	TBD	
		Target	2000	70%	
	Responsible Office: DG				

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96			
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.2: Enhanced Capability of Palestinian Legislative Council to Perform Functions of a Legislative Body					
Indicator (b): PLC-initiated legislation passed as a percent of all legislation passed by PLC and submitted to EA					
Unit of Measure: Percentage of PLC-initiated laws that are passed in each (four month) legislative session of all laws in each session		Year	Planned	Actual	
Source: Associates in Rural Development	Baseline	1996	0.00		
<p>Comments: This indicator measures the degree to which the legislature is able to assume the overall burden of law-making and thus exercise its legislative functions, as opposed to depending on the Executive Authority to perform that function. This includes all steps related to the legislative process, from initial drafting to final PLC passage of a given piece of legislation to its submission to the EA for signing into law.</p> <p>An obvious assumption relates to the PLC's authority to undertake legislative functions; this will be determined by the Basic Law and later implementing legislation.</p> <p>ARD, one of the Mission's two contractors/grantees working with the PLC will report on this indicator as part of its overall performance reporting to the D/G SOT.</p> <p>This indicator will be tracked and reported on at the end of each legislative session, currently four months in duration, and consolidated on a semi-annual basis for reporting to the Mission. A methodological issue that should be noted is that if the total number laws initiated by the PLC is small, then the indicator may not be very significant.</p> <p>While it may be possible to use 1996 as the baseline year, it would be more useful to take 1997 for a number of reasons, one of which may be the passage of the Basic Law.</p> <p>This indicator will be tracked and reported on semi-annually.</p> <p>Responsible Office: DG</p>		1997	25%		
			1998	25%	
			1999	25%	
		Target	2000	25%	

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96		
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.2: Enhanced Capability of Palestinian Legislative Council to Perform Functions of a Legislative Body				
Indicator (c): Citizen approval ratings of PLC (to those of EA)				
Unit of Measure: "Positive" ratings of PLC (divided by "positive" ratings of EA) at the end of each four month legislative session		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Local Polling/Research Firm	Baseline	1996	29.4 %	
<p>Comments: The indicator that will be measured here is that of citizen approval ratings of the PLC, a fairly straight forward measure of the PLC's overall performance. Which distinguishes it from 3.2(a) which relies on the views of a more informed group of civic leaders related to the PLC's performance of its three principal functions. A second and related indicator that the D/G SO team will monitor outside of the Plan is based not on providing an absolute public rating of the PLC, which might easily be affected by factors beyond the control or competence of the PLC (e.g. peace process, Israeli behavior, etc.), but rather, vis-a-vis the EA whose performance and effectiveness would equally be affected by these exogenous factors.</p> <p>Two methodological issues need to be considered in this latter instance: first, two of the principal polling firms already provide this data on a regular (quarterly) basis. The D/G SOT will need to choose one and track it annually. Secondly, the selected polling firm will need to test the assumption that exogenous factors do, in fact, affect PLC and EA equally. Baseline data are currently available in recent public opinion surveys conducted by either of two polling firms, the most recent of which undertaken in November 1996. As these surveys have been undertaken since February 1993, and are intended to continue for the foreseeable future, both polling firms are a reliable source of data.</p> <p>By the end of the strategy period, we would expect to see at a minimum, parity in the ratings that citizens give to both the EA and PLC. The target will be based on the percent of respondents that rate PLC and EA performance as good. This data would be monitored and reported on semi-annually.</p>		1997		
		1998		
		1999		
	Responsible Office: DG	Target	2000	EA:PLC Parity

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96			
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.2.1: PLC Demonstrates Increasing Ability to Exert EA Review/Oversight Function					
Indicator (a): Formal EA response to specific PLC (plenary and committees) requests for informaton					
Unit of Measure: Number of formal responses by EA for information during each four month legislative session		Year	Planned	Actual	
Source: Associates in Rural Development	Baseline	1996	0.00		
<p>Comments: This indicator is a measure not only of PLC assertiveness but of the degree to which EA, both elected (ministers) and appointed officials, feel obligated to respect and acknowledge the PLC's review/oversight authority. The indicator will track to points in the process: 1) at the initial request; and 2) when responses are made.</p> <p>The MSI Team considered turning this indicator into a percentage in terms of the "EA responses to PLC <i>reasonable</i> requests as a percent of total PLC summons." The problem, however, was in trying to establish criteria that would distinguish between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" summons. There appear to be cultural and political determinants that simply make this exercise too subjective to be considered valid.</p> <p>Baseline data can be taken to be zero at this time. ARD will need to establish future targets in conjunction with the D/G SO Team once the Basic Law is passed, establishing definitive relationships between the PLC and EA and/or leaders of these two bodies are able to negotiate the terms and conditions of their relationship. As part of the baseline and target setting exercise, ARD will need to retro-actively review and analyze (for the period September 1996 - March 1997) PLC requests. While the PLC's Standing Orders provide for this function, these are internal procedures and are not binding on the EA.</p> <p>This indicator will be tracked during each legislative session by ARD but reported on semi-annually to the Mission after being consolidated.</p>		1997	TBD		
			1998	TBD	
			1999	TBD	
		Target	2000	TBD	
Responsible Office: DG					

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96		
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.2.1: PLC Demonstrates Increasing Ability to Exert EA Review/Oversight Function				
Indicator (b): Formal PLC-initiated proceedings (e.g., hearings, investigations) on specific instances of EA actions				
Unit of Measure: Number of proceedings initiated by either plenary or committees reviewing EA actions as reported in the minutes of the PLC during each session		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Associates in Rural Development	Baseline	1996	0.00	
<p>Comments: Conducting proceedings related to EA actions as prescribed within PLC standing orders represents a self-conscious, structured effort by the PLC to exert EA review/oversight. Proceedings will be initiated by either the plenary or in the relevant committees. These proceedings will not deal with legislative or policy-making functions of the EA which are already covered under other indicators; rather they will be directed to possible instances of EA abuse of powers and corruption.</p> <p>Although the PLC has not held many hearings to date, more are expected to take place in near future, particularly once the Basic Law is passed. ARD will develop criteria or a definition of what constitutes non-legislative actions undertaken by the EA and submit it to the D/G SO Team for approval. ARD and the Team will establish targets for subsequent years once an initial baseline has been determined. Care will need to be taken, however, in developing these targets as the initial baseline may not be a significant target itself. One guide to establishing these future targets will be for ARD to review and analysis of last years resolutions already passed by the PLC to determine the nature of significant future hearings.</p> <p>ARD will monitor both PLC plenary sessions and committee meetings during each legislative session over the course of a year to determine data for use in reporting. This indicator will be tracked and reported on semi-annually by consolidating figures from each of the legislative sessions held in the target year.</p>		1997	TBD	
		1998	TBD	
		1999	TBD	
	Target	2000	TBD	
Responsible Office: DG				

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96		
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.2.2: PLC Develops Enhanced Legislative and Deliberative Capacity				
Indicator (a): Pending or Potential Legislation subjected to public comment				
<p>Unit of Measure: Percentage of pending or potential legislation that are subject to scheduled public hearings held to permit review, debate or discuss legislation as reported in the minutes of the PLC over the course of each four month legislative session</p> <p>Source: Associates in Rural Development</p> <p>Comments: Legislatures have a variety of tools available to facilitate and enhance the law-making process. Among them are those in which expert witnesses, constituents or other interested parties can inform legislative deliberations. This, therefore, demonstrates a disposition of law-makers to utilize available resources including the wisdom and expertise of its citizens. The indicator measures potential legislation which may never be brought up for vote as well as pending legislation.</p> <p>The targets are determined by taking the percentage of all pending or potential legislation that are actually subjected to public hearings.</p> <p>The baseline for year one of the performance monitoring plan is fixed at zero. Future targets will be determined by ARD in collaboration with the D/G SO Team through review of PLC minutes from either of the first two legislative sessions, or by monitoring PLC meetings on a day-by-day basis over the course of the next legislative session. ARD will define what constitutes a "public hearing," and present it to the D/G SO Team for approval.</p> <p>ARD will be expected to track on this indicator yearly by consolidating the figures gained in each of the PLC's legislative sessions and report on it semi-annually.</p> <p>Responsible Office: DG</p>				
	Year	Planned	Actual	
	Baseline	1996	90 %	
		1997	TBD	
		1998	TBD	
		1999	TBD	
Target	2000	90 %		

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96			
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.2.2: PLC Develops Enhanced Legislative and Deliberative Skills					
Indicator (b): Actions taken on PLC-initiated draft legislation to all PLC-initiated legislation					
Unit of Measure: The percentage of PLC-initiated legislation that are actually acted on during each four month legislative session		Year	Planned	Actual	
Source: Associates in Rural Development	Baseline	1996	100 %	100 %	
<p>Comments: This is a measure of legislative efficiency, comparing tangible productive outcomes against overall activity. It suggests the level of ability to deliberate and successfully negotiate legislation, implying both negotiating and drafting skills. It does not mean however, that a law has to be passed to demonstrate effectiveness or enhanced legislative capability. In this case it includes legislation that is "disposed of" in the PLC, that is, either passed or killed by the plenary (after action by the concerned committee); and if passed, forwarded to the EA. In short, the point of departure for measuring this indicator starts when legislative initiatives are "reported out" of the concerned committee and accepted by the plenary for action.</p> <p>A baseline of 100% taken for year one of the performance monitoring plan given the actual data. Subsequent targets will be determined by ARD in collaboration with the D/G SO Team through review of PLC minutes from either of the first two legislative sessions, or by monitoring PLC meetings on a day-by-day basis over the course of the next legislative session. A credible means of establishing future targets is suggested however. Since perfect efficiency would be reflected by a 100 %, it seems reasonable to expect a new and learning institution to decrease its "inefficiency" by 50% in each successive legislative session with a year 2000 target of 100 %.</p> <p>ARD will track and report on this indicator semi-annually after consolidating figures from each PLC legislative held in a given year. To tie this result more closely to those which ARD is expected to achieve under its contract, working with the PLC Secretariat to monitor this indicator for the PLC's own internal use is recommended</p>		1997	TBD		
			1998	TBD	
			1999	TBD	
		Target	2000	100 %	
Responsible Office: DG					

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/90		
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.2.2: PLC Develops Enhanced Legislative and Deliberative Skills				
Indicator (c): EA-initiated legislation Passed with PLC "Substantive" Modifications to total EA-initiated legislation Passed				
Unit of Measure: The percentage of EA-initiated laws passed with PLC modifications to total number of EA-initiated laws passed over the course of each legislative session		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Minutes/decisions of PLC; Associates in Rural Development	Baseline	1996	0 %	0 %
<p>Comments: Legislatures typically deliberate over legislation introduced by the executive branch. A legislature that routinely passes executive-initiated legislation without modification provides no legislative added value, and thus can legitimately be called a "rubber stamp legislature." As this indicator is meant to measure the legislative and deliberative skills of the PLC, it factors out EA-initiated bills that are not passed (with or without modification) which would reflect more directly on the PLC's oversight function. Otherwise the percentage would be contaminated by PLC obstruction of EA-introduced legislation, either intentional or unintentional. In order to be considered "modified" the legislative must have substantive rather than editorial revisions initiated by the PLC.</p> <p>The baseline is established at 0 % in year one of the performance monitoring plan. The year two (1997) target has been set at 75% or the level at which is estimated that a new but independent legislative body can reasonably expected to make credible input into the law-making process. Each succeeding year has an increase of 5% in legislation reviewed and substantively modified by the PLC with a year 2000 90 % rating. Even the strongest legislative body will find some legislation that does not require substantive, thus a 100% indicator is not realistic.</p> <p>This indicator will be tracked and reported on semi-annually.</p>		1997	75 %	
		1998	80 %	
		1999	80 %	
	Target	2000	90 %	
Responsible Office: DG				

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96		
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.2.3: PLC Demonstrates Growing Responsiveness and Ability to Represent Constituent Interests				
Indicator (a): <i>Constituent Perceptions (positive) of Selected PLC Members' Responsiveness</i>				
Unit of Measure: Percentage of positive constituent perceptions of selected PLC members		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Local polling/research firm	Baseline			
<p>Comments: While approval rating of legislatures as a whole can be affected by a variety of exogenous factors (peace process, Israeli behavior, EA actions, etc.) constituent opinion is more likely to filter out such factors in rating the performance of their individual representatives. In other words, the degree to which PLC members are responsive to constituents interests, problems and views and represent them successfully in the legislative branch are what this indicator is measuring.</p> <p>No baseline data is yet available. The selected firm will conduct annual public opinion surveys, that determines individual member approval ratings. The polling firm will need to develop a rating system including the definition of what constitutes a "positive" rating of PLC members. In collaboration with ARD the polling firm will need to develop criteria for a representative sample. The D/G SO Team will need to note the following methodology issues: 1) how to determine the sample of selected constituencies; and 2) whether over the course of the SO period, the sample should remain the same given changes in member composition. The firm will have to develop a representative sample for both the West Bank and Gaza.</p> <p>No target can be established before baseline data is collected which would take place in the first survey in 1997. The selected firm will track and report on this indicator annually, although it will have data on a semi-annual basis if needed by the Mission.</p>		1997	TBD	
		1998	TBD	
		1999	TBD	
	Target	2000	TBD	
Responsible Office: DG				

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96		
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.2.3: PLC Demonstrates Growing Responsiveness and Ability to Represent Constituent Interests				
Indicator (b): <i>Formal Public Meetings of PLC Members with Their Constituents</i>				
Unit of Measure: Percent of citizens reporting having participated in formal meetings with their PLC member during a four month legislative session		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Local survey/polling firm	Baseline			
<p>Comments: A responsive legislative branch depends to a large extent on the accessibility of individual members to their constituents as a means for the latter to make known to the former their interests and concerns; and for the former to inform the latter about public issues that directly affect their welfare. The holding of public meetings that bring together representatives and their constituents is a principal indicator of PLC member accessibility.</p> <p>The indicator must, however, be limited to formal public meetings in order to factor out informal private contacts which may not have any political or legislative content.</p> <p>Because of the difficulty in measuring the number of formal meetings held with constituents, the new unit of measure and methodology has changed to <i>the percent of constituents</i> reporting meeting with their PLC member. This is measurable whereas counting the number of such meetings was deemed to difficult and expensive. This new indicator will require asking a two part question: do you know your PLC representative? If yes, have you participated in a formal public meeting with him during the last year?</p> <p>This indicator will be tracked and reported on semi-annually, although data will be available for each of the PLC's legislative sessions.</p>		1997	TBD	
		1998	TBD	
		1999	TBD	
	Target	2000	TBD	
Responsible Office: DG				

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA

Date/Month Approved: 12/96

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.3: Executive Authority More Effectively Performs Legislative and Public Policy-Making Functions

Indicator (a): Draft laws and public policies that meet established time requirements

Unit of Measure: Percentage of draft laws and public policies meeting established time requirements

Source: USAID EA Contractor

Comments: The ability of the executive branch to formulate public policy and initiate draft legislation in a timely manner is indicative of its effectiveness as a public institution. These two functions are at the heart of all executive branches and thus are chosen to indicate EA effectiveness.

Currently there is no data available for this indicator as no time requirement has been established for drafting laws and formulating policies. USAID has issued an RFP for the purpose of contracting with a firm to provide technical assistance to the Executive Authority. Once the contractor has been selected it will need to establish the "time requirement to be used to measure this indicator.

Once the contractor is selected and on site, it will work with the EA to establish an appropriate policy-making process and procedures, including time requirement for the preparation of draft laws and policies (from initiation until passed by cabinet or sent to PLC). A preliminary target for the time frame will be selected for the first year of the activity. The experience of the first year of implementation will be used to corroborate or refine the preliminary target and to establish the baseline and the targets for subsequent years.

The indicator will be tracked and reported on by the contractor annually.

Responsible Office: DG

	Year	Planned	Actual
Baseline			
	1997	TBD	
	1998	TBD	
	1999	TBD	
Target	2000	TBD	

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96		
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.3: Executive Authority More Effectively Performs Legislative and Public Policy-Making Functions				
Indicator (b): Concerned civic actors who believe EA legislative and policy-making functions are consultative				
Unit of Measure: Percentage positive perceptions of civic actors		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Local polling/research firm	Baseline			
<p>Comments: One of the principal indicators of an executive branch that more effectively performs legislative and policy-making functions is the degree to which it provide for public consultation. The measure for this indicator is therefore the perception of concerned civic actors of the EA's efforts to gain public input into its legislative and policy-making process.</p> <p>As with indicator IR 3.3.2(b), a narrow sample of concerned civic actors will be determined by the selected firm in collaboration with the USAID contractor selected to implement this intermediate result. In both cases the same sample of civic actors (e.g., professional and business associations, CSOs/NGOs, human rights organizations and think-tanks, religious leaders, etc.) will be used.</p> <p>No current baseline data exists, but will be determined by the first polling firm-conducted opinion poll. Once this base line target is established then subsequent targets can be determined through the end of the strategy period.</p> <p>The firm will be expected to track and report on this indicator annually, although it will conduct its surveys on a semi-annual basis.</p>		1997	TBD	
		1998	TBD	
		1999	TBD	
		2000	TBD	
	Target	2000	TBD	
Responsible Office: DG				

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96		
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.3.1: Uniform Rules and Procedures for EA Legislative and Policy-Making Functions in Place				
Indicator (a): Uniform Rules and Procedures for legislative and policy-making functions are approved by the EA cabinet				
Unit of Measure: Yes/No		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: USAID EA Contractor	Baseline	1997	Not approved	
<p>Comments: Currently rules and procedures for the conduct of the EA's legislative and policy-making functions are not uniform. One of the tasks of the contractor will be to assist the EA with the development of such rules and procedures. It is important for the recently established EA to regularize its procedures so that both officials and concerned citizens can understand what constitutes the normal process and what constitutes deviation from the norm. Once such rules and procedures are established, officials will be able to judge their work against the same standards and observers will be able to determine when there are deviations.</p> <p>The contractor selected to provide support of the EA will be held accountable for achieving this result. Thus, it will be best placed to monitor and report on the indicator established in this regard. The contractor's responsibility is simply to note whether and when the rules/procedures have been passed. That is all this indicator is measuring.</p> <p>While it possible that the rules and procedures will be approved by the EA Cabinet, the more realistic expectation is that it will be passed in 1998.</p>		1998	Approved	
		1999	Approved	
	Target	2000	Approved	
	Responsible Office: DG			

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA		Date/Month Approved: 12/96		
INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.3.2: Executive Authority Applies Established Rules and Procedures for Legislative and Policy-Making Functions				
Indicator (a): Laws drafted and policies formulated that adhere to legal and technical quality standards				
Unit of Measure: Percentage of laws and policies adhering to approved rules and procedures		Year	Planned	Actual
Source: USAID EA Contractor	Baseline			
<p>Comments: This indicator and that which follows measures the applications of these rules and procedures for the drafting of legislation and formulation of policy which were approved by the EA cabinet. In the case of this indicator, technical and quality standards that were established as part of the overall rules and procedures will be adhered to.</p> <p>As the rules and procedures for these functions have not yet been formulated, there is no data on their applications. One of the early tasks of the contractor will be to work with the EA to define the rules and procedures. Once accomplished the contractor will be able to track whether the rules and procedures, including legal and quality standards are applied with regard to each case of legislation or policy.</p> <p>Although no baseline or targets have yet been established, the D/G SO Team believes that a year 2000 target of 50 percent is reasonable.</p> <p>The contractor will then track and report on this indicator annually.</p>		1997	TBD	
		1998	TBD	
		1999	TBD	
		2000	50%	
	Target			
Responsible Office: DG				

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PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA

Date/Month Approved: 12/96

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3.3.2: Executive Authority Applies Established Rules and Procedures for Legislative and Policy-Making Functions

Indicator (b): *Concerned civic actors who believe legislative and policy making rules and procedures are clearly articulated and accessible*

Unit of Measure: Percentage positive perceptions of concerned civic actors

Source: Local polling/research firm

Comments: If the EA is to more effectively perform legislative and public policy functions, one of the principal steps it can take is to ensure that the way it goes about these functions is clearly articulated and accessible to the public. This provides concerned civic actors who wish to influence the public decision-making process with a transparent and predictable process that can be easily tracked and accessed.

The universe of potential respondents has been narrowed from all citizen to those civic actors who have an interest in participating in public decision-making. This includes the professional/business community, CSOs/NGOs, religious leaders, grassroots community leaders, etc. Part of selected firms task in tracking and measuring this indicator will be to develop a sample of concerned civic actors that will be polled over the strategy period.

Currently there is no available data to measure this indicator. However, in early 1997, the polling firm should conduct an initial survey to establish the baseline. With this established subsequent targets can be established. The firm will establish the rating system including definition of what constitutes "positive" perceptions. The firm will track and report on this indicator annually thereafter.

Responsible Office: DG

	Year	Planned	Actual
Baseline			
	1997	TBD	
	1998	TBD	
	1999	TBD	
Target	2000	TBD	

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D. D/G SO Data Collection Methodology and Reporting Plan

1. Considerations in Operationalizing the Performance Monitoring Plan

The first consideration in operationalizing the performance monitoring plan deals with the size and composition of the D/G SO Team itself. Currently the Team is composed of six members, i.e., five Americans and one Palestinian; a second Palestinian is expected to come on board as soon as required formalities are completed. In practical terms, however -- that is, in both operationalizing and implementing the D/G strategic objective and the corresponding performance monitoring plan -- only four of the seven team members will be involved in day-to-day operations including responsibility for overall results. As discussed in greater detail below, minimizing the actual time involved by these four officers has been a principal consideration in the development of this plan.

The second consideration deals with the role of implementing partners and contractors in the implementation of the performance monitoring plan. As the MSI Team has structured data collection and reporting requirements under the Plan, there was a conscious decision to keep the number of partners/contractors to a minimum, and where appropriate to have the services contracted rather than obtained through a Cooperative Agreement or grant. The latter decision largely made based on the degree of accountability that is obtained through a contract versus that gained through a CA. It should be noted that all current USAID grantees and contractors have contributed significantly to the design of this performance monitoring plan, reflecting their extensive knowledge of West Bank/Gaza context.

Finally, because the majority of indicators are being tracked and measured through the use of survey polling methodology, we have tried to keep corresponding questions and measurement units as simple and uncomplicated as possible given the knowledge base of the survey population (e.g., Palestinian citizens, the heads of civic organizations) related to emerging democratic processes and institutions in the West Bank and Gaza. This also includes, to the extent possible, the use of consistent and clear units of measurement for all indicators in which an opinion survey is the principle source of data. In this regard, it will be noticed that the vast majority of indicators call for the use of *percentages* as the primary unit of measurement.

The remainder of Part III, provides the D/G SO Team with specific recommendations concerning the operationalizing of this performance monitoring plan. Section 2, immediately below provides a set of summary guidelines in tabular (matrix) and narrative form. The matrix provides guidelines on: (a) the primary data source used in fixing the baseline and targets; (b) methodological issues and concerns; and © the organization (e.g., implementing partners, contractor, D/G SO Team) responsible for tracking and reporting on indicators. The narrative section continues this discussion by focussing on each of the principal results, that is, the SO and three first order intermediate results and reviews them in terms of the proposed data collection methodology, identified implementing agents, and monitoring and reporting responsibilities. *Finally, we provided guidance on the way in which initial baselines and subsequent targets for each indicator will be established.* In summary, the information found in section 2 will provide, as nearly as possible, a step-by-step set of guidelines for operationalizing the performance monitoring plan.

2. Performance Monitoring Plan Guidelines

The following matrix lists the indicator, primary data source, methodological issues and the party responsible for tracking and reporting on the indicator. The matrix flows from and expands upon the performance data tables found in section C, above. There are a few points to note when reading this matrix. First, the primary data sources differs in this matrix from those found in the performance data tables. The former tables focus on the organizational source that will track and report on the data (e.g.,

local polling firm, USAID contractor and grantees), while the latter matrix shows the primary data source from which the data is being generated (e.g., public opinion survey, government gazette). In a small number of cases, the organizational source and data source are the same as the only way that data will be generated and collected is by the organization tracking and monitoring a given indicator. The *primary data source column* also notes where a survey is the designated source of data and specifies the type of population (e.g., Palestinian citizens, CSO leaders) to be surveyed.

The *methodological concerns/issues* column provides both the D/G SO Team and its current and future partners and contractors with the specific methodological issues and concerns that will have to be dealt with in operationalizing this Plan. As nearly one-half of the indicators involve the polling of specific groups, a number of issues related to survey methodology and techniques are raised and guidelines recommended. For example, where a survey population is asked to comment on the performance of a particular political institution or non-governmental actor targeted for assistance under the SO, the guidelines note the need to develop a two step question: the first, ensuring that the respondent is aware of the institution/organization and understands its basic functions; and, the second, asking her/him to rate the performance or effectiveness of the institution/organization. And for each of the surveys to be conducted it will be necessary to develop an appropriate and consistent rating system for measuring responses to these "performance" questions. MSI provides a *suggested* rating system, but ultimately the final design of the questionnaire and overall survey polling methodology and techniques needs to be left to the firm that is selected to design and administer the survey(s). The firms who will compete for the survey component under this performance monitoring plan should be evaluated in terms of their ability to address the issues raised in this final report.

The final column of this matrix is specifically designed to identify the organizational responsibility for tracking and reporting on a given indicator. Where the organization is already operating in a partnership or contractual relationship with the Mission, it is identified by name (e.g., Associates in Rural Development). Where there is no such current relationship, even if anticipated through an RFA/RFP, then only the type of organization and the nature of its future relationship to the Mission is discussed. As noted above, the aim of the plan has been to keep to a minimum the D/G SO Team's responsibility for the tracking and reporting on individual indicators. As discussed in the final section of this report, the D/G SO Team's role in the overall operation of the Plan is one of consolidating reports coming from the primary implementing agents of the Plan, i.e., partners and contractors, monitoring their implementation performance, maintaining the *New Management System (NMS)*, and preparing the annual *Result Reporting and Resource Request (R4)*. The Team notes in summary here that technically, it is only the SO level that results are reported to Washington, although all results must be entered into the *New Management System (NMS)*.

PERFORMANCE MONITORING PLAN: SUMMARY GUIDELINES

RESULT/INDICATOR	PRIMARY DATA SOURCE	METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS/ISSUES	RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRACKING/REPORTING
SO 3(a): Citizen perceptions of the PA's allocation and management of public resources	Annual public opinion survey of <i>Palestinian citizens</i>	Determine appropriate sample size in WB&G; 2 part question addressing perceptions of EA and PLC; develop rating system including definition of "positive"	Independent local polling/research firm; to be contracted
SO 3(b): Citizen perceptions of civil society's effectiveness in public decision-making	Annual public opinion survey of <i>Palestinian citizens</i>	Determine appropriate sample size in WB&G; 2 part question: respondent understanding of civil society? if yes, rate its effectiveness; and, develop rating system	Independent local polling/research firm; to be contracted
SO 3(c): Executive Authority-prepared budget reviewed and approved annually by PLC	PLC minutes; government gazete; ARD	This is a simple binary, yes/no, indicator. ARD will need to establish criteria as to what qualifies as a review rather than a simple rubber stamp.	Independent polling firm will need to coordinate with ARD to ensure consolidated reporting
IR 3.1(a): Key laws, policies, etc., initiated by CSOs and accepted, reviewed and acted on by the PA	PA & PVO/NGO records & interviews; ARD for PLC; and new contractor for EA	Develop appropriate sample of CSOs to be tracked (e.g. USAID NGO grantees & sub-grantees, Civic Forum members); then track their initiatives through EA and PLC to final outcome on an annual basis	Independent polling/research firm to be contracted has overall responsibility; USAID grantees and contractors and PA are primary data sources
IR 3.1(b): Key laws, policies, etc., modified as a result of CSO input	PA & PVO/NGO records & interviews; ARD for PLC; and new contractor for EA	Develop appropriate sample of CSOs to be tracked (see above); determine with CSOs which PA laws, etc., will be targeted for modification, and then track decision-making process from PA to CSO to PA annually	Independent polling/research firm to be contracted has overall responsibility; USAID grantees and contractors and PA are primary data sources
IR 3.1.1(a): Enabling "NGO" law enacted	Government Gazette	USAID, PVO/NGO grantees and a cross-section of the Palestinian CSO community must first establish the criteria that will determine whether law is favorable	USAID D/G SO Team
IR 3.1.1(b): CSO perceptions of the PA's application of the "NGO" law	Annual opinion survey of <i>CSO leaders</i>	First determine CSO sample to be tracked; 25-50 CSOs should be adequate; either a sub-set of PNGO or Civic Forum; 2 part question: do you believe NGO law was favorable? If yes, has it been adequately enforced?	Independent local polling/research firm; to be contracted
IR 3.1.2 (a): PA perceptions concerning the quality of CSO policy and legislative initiatives	Annual opinion survey of <i>PA leaders</i>	First determine PA sample, including EA and PLC members; consider that over time not all of them will continue to be members of EA; develop rating system	Independent local polling/research firm; to be contracted

RESULT/INDICATOR	PRIMARY DATA SOURCE	METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS/ISSUES	RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRACKING/REPORTING
IR 3.1.3 (a): Citizen perceptions of CSO representation of their interests on selected issues	Annual public opinion survey of <i>Palestinian citizens</i>	Determine sample size in both WB&G; develop a set of pre-selected issues of interest to citizens; 2 part question: do you know CSOs undertaking ... ? If yes, what is your opinion of their effectiveness in ... ? Develop rating system including definition of "positive"	Independent local polling/research firm; to be contracted
IR 3.1.4 (a): Citizen perceptions of CSO information dissemination on selected public policy issues	Annual public opinion survey of <i>Palestinian citizens</i>	Determine appropriate sample size in WB&G; develop a set of pre-selected issues/informational areas that will be used to determine citizen responses; 2 part question: do you know a CSO(s)involved in ... ? if yes, how effective has it been in ... ? Develop rating system.	Independent local polling/research firm; to be contracted
IR 3.2(a): Approval rating of PLC by Heads of CSOs	Annual opinion survey of <i>civic leaders</i>	Determine appropriate sample and size; suggested sample be taken from a combination of PNGO membership, university, religious leaders; and size 25-50; must factor in possible bias in responses if NGO law is not viewed as favorable; develop rating system.	Independent local polling/research firm; to be contracted
IR 3.2(b): PLC-initiated legislation passed as a percent of all legislation passed by PLC and submitted to EA	Government Gazette, PLC minutes, & PLC secretariat interviews for each legislative session	A system must be established by ARD to track 1) all legislation which is passed by PLC; and 2) legislation which it initiates and passes in a given session; this may involve working with secretariat to develop such a system; issue: strength of indicator will be a function of number of PLC-initiated laws in a given session.	Associates in Rural Development
IR 3.2(c): Citizen approval ratings of PLC (to those of EA)	Annual public opinion survey of <i>Palestinian citizens</i>	Annual public opinion surveys are already being conducted on a regular basis related to both indicator questions by two different local firms; the D/G SO Team will simply need to choose one and track responses; assumption that "exogenous" factors affect both PLC and EA equally will need to be tested.	D/G SO Team; the independent local firm whose data is chosen for use by the Team will be contracted to test the assumption previously discussed
IR 3.2.1(a): Formal EA response to specific PLC (plenary or committees) request for information	PLC minutes for each legislative session	Although PLC minutes should show ministers who testify at PLC sessions, they may not show when ministers refuse to comply with a summons. ARD will thus be required to develop a system for tracking this indicator for each legislative period. The committee structure will be the locus of both summons and meetings/hearings.	Associates in Rural Development

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RESULT/INDICATOR	PRIMARY DATA SOURCE	METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS/ISSUES	RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRACKING/REPORTING
IR 3.2.1(b): Formal PLC-initiated proceedings(e.g., hearings, investigations) on specific instances of EA actions	PLC minutes for each legislative session	ARD will need to develop criteria to determine what constitutes a non-legislative EA action; EA members do not need to be present at these hearings; PLC committees are the locus of the hearings; in setting targets beyond the baseline year, ARD should review PLC-issued resolutions from previous sessions.	Associates in Rural Development
IR 3.2.2(a): Pending or potential legislation subjected to public hearings	PLC minutes for each legislative session	While PLC minutes should provide the source of data to track indicator progress, ARD will need to develop a system for tracking all pending/potential legislation and that which is subject to public hearings; "public hearings" will need to be defined as will "potential" legislation.	Associates in Rural Development
IR 3.2.2(b): Actions taken on PLC-initiated draft legislation to all PLC initiated legislation	PLC minutes for each legislative session	Not all legislation needs to be passed to be considered "acted on," therefore demonstrating PLC effectiveness; ARD should define "legislation on which actions have been taken"; it will also need to develop a system for tracking all PLC-initiated legislation and that which is acted on.	Associates in Rural Development
IR 3.2.2(c): EA-initiated legislation passed with PLC "substantive" modifications to total EA initiated legislation passed	PLC minutes for each legislative session	ARD will need to develop a system for tracking EA-initiated legislation, both that passed with PLC modifications and that passed without; EA-initiated legislation not passed is factored out.	Associates in Rural Development
IR 3.2.3(a): Constituent perceptions of selected PLC member's responsiveness	Annual opinion survey of <i>constituents</i> in selected constituencies	Survey methodology will require determining which constituencies and how many in WB&G to choose for a representative sample; to what extent will changes in PLC members due to elections affect the integrity of the survey; a rating system will be developed.	Independent local polling/research firm; to be contracted
IR 3.2.3(b): Formal public meetings of PLC members with their constituents	Annual public opinion surveys of <i>Palestinian citizens</i>	Methodology will require determining whether normal sample survey of citizens in WB&G is correct or whether to focus on specific constituencies; 2 part question: do you know your PLC member? If yes, did you participate in a formal public meeting with him/her during this year?	Independent local polling/research firm; to be contracted

RESULT/INDICATOR	PRIMARY DATA SOURCE	METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS/ISSUES	RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRACKING/REPORTING
IR 3.3(a): Draft laws and public policies that meet established time requirements	USAID contractor	Currently there is no body in the EA either capable or responsible for monitoring time requirements, thus the indicator will be monitored by the USAID contractor for this IR; first the process and procedures for law and policy-making must be developed, and then time requirement can be established and tracked.	USAID EA contractor; to be selected
IR 3.3(b): Concerned civic actors who believe EA legislative and policy-making functions are consultative	Annual opinion survey of <i>concerned "civic" actors</i>	Rather than a general public opinion survey, the methodology calls for targeting concerned "civic" actors; a definition of "concerned civic actors must first be defined; a rating system must then be developed including what constitutes "positive."	Independent local polling/research firm; to be contracted
IR3.3.1(a): Uniform rules and procedures for legislative and policy-making functions are approved by EA cabinet	EA minutes	The methodology is binary, i.e., yes/no; the USAID contractor will be best placed to monitor the passage of the concerned rules and procedures, whether they are placed in EA minutes or not.	USAID EA contractor; to be selected
IR 3.3.2(a): Laws drafted and policies formulated that adhere to legal and technical quality standards	USAID contractor	First rules and procedures for these functions must be established which will include legal and technical quality standards; contractor will need to establish a system for tracking laws and policies and a methodology for applying quality standards to them.	USAID EA contractor; to be selected
IR 3.3.2(b): Concerned civic actors who believe legislative and policy-making rules and procedures are clearly articulated and accessible	Annual opinion survey of <i>concerned "civic" actors</i>	Rather than a general public opinion survey, the methodology calls for targeting concerned "civic" actors; a definition of concerned civic actors must first be defined; and a rating system must then be developed including what constitutes "positive."	Independent local polling/research firm; to be contracted

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a) Performance Monitoring at the Strategic Objective Level

Two of the three indicators at the SO level measure citizen perceptions. In both these cases surveys are called for to determine the initial baseline and subsequent targets. We recommend that a local independent polling/research firm be contracted through a competitive process to undertake performance monitoring and reporting on both indicators measuring results at the SO level. As discussed in more detail in the final section of this report, the same firm will be requested to undertake all opinion surveys under this performance monitoring plan, whether of the entire citizenry or specified groups targeted under other indicators. One survey instrument with seven different questions corresponding to each of the six indicators measuring the perceptions of *Palestinian citizens* and the single indicator measuring the perceptions of the *constituents of PLC members* (see matrix) will be administered semi-annually, including that which establishes the initial baseline. No data exists for either indicator at this time. We also recommend that the same firm take responsibility for tracking the third “binary” indicator, i.e., *executive authority-prepared budget reviewed and approved annually by PLC*.

Baseline & Targets Summary: The initial baseline for both survey-based indicators will be set through the initial opinion survey. As noted on both performance data tables, year 2000 targets have been set based on previous opinion surveys which asked similar questions and what the MSI Team in collaboration with the Mission and its implementing partners believed to be reasonable expectations of achievement.

b) Performance Monitoring of IR 3.1, Civil Society Strengthening

At both the IR and sub- (secondary) IR levels, we recommend that the same independent local polling/research firm as discussed above take responsibility for tracking and reporting on all related indicators. The single exception is indicator 3.1.1(a), *Enabling NGO law enacted*, which will be tracked separately by the D/G SO Team. The individual data tables and summary guidelines (matrix) explain in adequate detail the methodology to be used in establishing the baseline and then determining subsequent performance targets. Our recommendation for placing overall responsibility with this firm for IR 3.1 indicators is based on keeping “the moving parts” involved in the implementation of the Plan to a minimum, thus providing a single institutional interface with the D/G SO Team, and thereby decreasing its overall management burden while increasing the firm’s degree of accountability for results.

Four of seven IR 3.1 indicators will be measured through opinion surveys: two measuring citizen perceptions [IR 3.1.2(b) and IR 3.14(a)]; one measuring CSO leader perceptions [IR 3.1.1(b)]; and one measuring PA leader perceptions [IR 3.1.2(a)]. Citizen perceptions will be measured through the first survey instrument noted in (a) above. Measurement of CSO leader perceptions will be administered through a second survey document which will include indicator IR 3.2(a) and the two indicators measuring perceptions of civic actors, IR 3.3(b) and IR 3.3.2(b) (see below). A third and final survey instrument will be developed and administered to PA leaders, IR 3.1.1(b).

Two of the seven IR 3.1 indicators, i.e., IR 3.1(a) and IR 3.1(b) depend on the review of PA & PVO/NGO grantee records as well as interviews with concerned PA and PVO/NGO leaders which constitute the primary data sources. Thus, the firm will be required to work closely with ARD, NDI and the contractor for IR 3.3, as well as with the concerned government institutions and non-governmental organizations to collect data and report on target progress.

Baseline and Target Summary: As with most of the indicators under this SO, no data exists to either establish performance baselines or to set subsequent targets; except in the case of some Year 2000. Baselines for both IR 3.1(a) and IR 3.1(b) will be established in conjunction with all concerned primary data sources, that is, concerned PA and PVO/NGO grantee leaders and ARD and the IR 3.3 contractor

(see relevant performance data tables and matrix summary guidelines for methodology). IR 3.1.1(a), *Enabling NGO law enacted*, provides both a baseline and Year 2000 target. As a binary indicator, the issue to be addressed is whether 1997 becomes the year when the law is enacted. The MSI Team believes it is a reasonable target at this point. IR 3.1.1(b), *CSO perceptions of the PA's application of the NGO law*, has no established baseline, but a final Year 2000 target. As discussed in matrix and performance data tables, there are a number of methodological issues to be resolved prior to establishing the baseline and subsequent targets.

IRs 3.1.2(a), 3.1.3(a), and 3.1.4(a) all require administration of the opinion survey to establish baselines and targets for the entire strategy period. The principal methodological issue that must be first addressed relates to IR 3.1.3, and determining the sample of PA leaders to be surveyed.

c) Performance Monitoring of IR 3.2, Enhancing PLC Capabilities

Of the 10 IR 3.2 indicators, three are measured through the use of survey polling methodology, i.e., IR 3.2(c), IR 3.2.3(b), and IR 3.2.3(c). Tracking responsibilities for these three indicators will be undertaken by the selected independent, local polling/research firm with information provided to ARD who will then consolidate all IR 3.2 data and report on in to the D/G SO Team. Two of these three indicators are measuring citizen perceptions and will thus be administered through the first survey instrument, as will the third, which measures constituent perceptions. The remaining indicator, IR 3.2(b), will be directly tracked by the D/G SO Team as the primary data source, a public opinion survey of Palestinian citizens, has been and will continue to be undertaken by two local polling/research firms. The Team will, therefore, decide from among these two firms which set of data it will use, and then monitor it on an annual basis. In this case, data to establish the baseline already exists (see performance data table). The D/G SO Team will, however, need to contract the selected firm to test and verify the underlying assumption used with this indicator, that is, "exogenous" factors equally affect the EA and PLC. It should also be noted, that this indicator is one of two that use a ratio rather than a strict percentage as the unit of measurement. This is because the more powerful measurement is one which compares public opinion of the PLC to that of the EA.

Tracking of the six remaining IR 3.2 indicators will be the responsibility of ARD as will their reporting. While the MSI Team has identified the minutes of the PLC as the primary data source, it will still be necessary for ARD to develop systems to track the relevant targets (e.g., legislation passed, ministers responding to summons, hearings/meetings held) in the event that the PLC Secretariat is unable to discharge its minute-taking function adequately, or in a timely manner.

Baseline and Target Summary: Of the three indicators being measured by opinion surveys, data necessary to establish the initial baselines exists for only for IR 3.2(b); this is also the only indicator which has a Year 2000 target; the two remaining indicators will require the administration of the opinion survey in order to establish subsequent targets.

Of the seven indicators being tracked by ARD all but one [IR 3.2.3(b)] have an initial baseline established. This was possible because none of the indicators being measured (e.g., legislation passed, ministers responding to PLC summons, etc) have as yet been undertaken by the PLC, an indication of its relative youth. USAID in consultation with ARD based on a review of minutes from previous legislative sessions and/or by tracking closely activities related to targets in the up-coming session. It will also need to gain additional input from other D/G SO grantees, members of the PLC itself, and together with the D/G SO Team arrive at *reasonable* targets for the remainder of the strategy period.

d) Performance Monitoring of IR 3.3. More Effective EA Functions

Of the five IR 3.3 indicators, two will be measured by opinion surveys, IR 3.3(a) and IR 3.3.2(b). The same independent, local polling/research firm as used in measuring each of the preceding results will be contracted to undertake IR 3.3 tracking and reporting. The only methodology issue that needs to be addressed in these two cases is the definition of what constitutes "civic actors" (see matrix for details), the specified survey universe. Tracking and reporting on the remaining three indicators, IR 3.3(b), IR 3.3.1(a) and IR 3.3.2(a), will be the responsibility of the contractor to be selected for this IR (an RFP has already been released). While it is anticipated that the primary data source for one or more of these indicators will be the minutes of the EA, there is currently no unit within the EA (comparable to the PLC Secretariat) capable of or with a responsibility for tracking the relevant targets (e.g., draft laws and policies that meet established time requirements, laws and policies adhering to legal and technical quality standards). Therefore, we recommend that the contractor not only track and report on the indicator, but serve as the primary data source. This is particularly necessary as IR 3.3(a) and IR 3.3.2(a) will require that the contractor work with the EA to help establish *time requirements* and *legal and technical quality standards* which are, in fact, prerequisites for the establishment of related baselines and subsequent targets.

Baseline and Target Summary: The only baseline established among these five indicators is that of IR 3.3.1(a), which is a binary (approved/not approved) indicator. IR 3.3(b) and IR 3.3.2(b) will require the administration of an opinion survey to establish both baselines and subsequent targets. As noted in the matrix, the only methodological issue that the contracted polling/research firm will need to address is how define the sample survey of "civic actors." Baselines and targets for the remaining two indicators, IR 3.3(a) and IR 3.3.2(a), will be established by the contractor for this IR. These two will be somewhat problematic because they depend on defining targets about which there is little *practical data or experience* available; and, that rather complicated *rules and procedures* must be established which will largely determine the definition of the targets of themselves. The selected contractor for this IR will need to gain some hands on experience with the EA, and particularly those staff members and EA leaders that will responsible for determining these rules and procedures, before being able to realistically establish targets. **Or**, the D/G SO Team will have to invest some of its own resources to undertake this task if the new contractor is not expected to be operational in the next three months.

3. Final Recommendations for Operationalizing the Plan

Having laid out the principal considerations underling this Plan in section 1, and detailed guidelines for tracking and reporting on each of the 25 indicators in section 2 (and the performance data tables in Part II, D), the MSI Team now provides its final recommendations for *operationalizing the performance monitoring plan* to the USAID D/G SO Team in the following sections.

a) Primary Data Collection and Reporting

This Plan calls for three principal organizations taking responsibility for the initial data collection and reporting. We have tried to keep primary responsibilities for these tasks the responsibility of one organization per major result. In other words, for the D/G SO itself and each of the three IRs, one of the three principal organizations will have overall responsibility for tracking and reporting on the relevant indicators to the D/G SO Team. Both the SO and IR 3.1 will be the responsibility of the independent, local polling/research firm. It is recommended that the Mission put out an RFP early in calendar year 1997 seeking bids on the work called for under this plan. From the MSI Team's visits to several such firms located in the West Bank/Gaza as well as from discussions with USAID PVO/NGO grantees, it is evident that the required expertise and experience exists for a competitive process. It is recommended

that the selected firm develop and administer the **three** survey instruments required to measure indicators for the SO and IR 3.1 by April 1997.

IR 3.2 will be the overall responsibility of Associates in Rural Development, while IR 3.3 will be the overall responsibility of the new contractor for this IR to be selected sometime in the next three months. Both contractors will obviously have to work closely with the independent polling/research firm that will also be responsible for tracking a number of indicators under both IRs.

Reporting from each of the three "contracted" organizations to the D/G SO Team will need to be standardized through the use of "Results/Indicator Tracking and Reporting" form and timed to the Team's overall NMS and R4 reporting requirements.

b) D/G SO Team Monitoring and Reporting Requirements

The Plan places limited responsibilities on the D/G SO Team itself for primary monitoring and reporting of indicators. In the two cases where this is called for the amount of time required will be minimal. The Team's principal responsibilities will be in: (i) operationalizing the plan in conjunction with the three principal contractors; (ii) monitoring the performance of the three contractors responsible for tracking and reporting on primary data sources; and (iii) consolidating the reports of each of the contractors by principal result, i.e., the D/G SO and three first order IRs, entering the consolidated data into the NMS and preparing the annual R4 report. We recommend that each of the three US members of the D/G *operational* Team take responsibility for carrying out these three tasks in relation to one of the principal results; one Team member would take responsibility for the D/G SO and one other IR (preferably IR 3.1).

The MSI Team strongly recommends that the D/G Team, at a minimum, contract for technical assistance to help *operationalize* this Plan; and, at a maximum, that it contract for both operationalizing it and seeing it through the first full year of implementation. Performance monitoring under Agency re-engineering is a relatively new and complicated endeavor for most Missions; performance monitoring of D/G SO's is even more challenging because of the newness of the field in general, and the glaring difficulties in data availability and collection in particular. In taking this Plan to the next step, i.e., operationalizing it, will require intensive work with all three contractors that will implement it, particularly the local polling/research firm. While MSI has tried to provide step-by-step guidelines for tracking and reporting on each indicator, there are a range of methodological issues to be resolved before the contractors can take the first step in determining baselines and subsequent targets. Even if the D/G Team has the expertise in such areas as survey techniques and polling methodology, it will likely have its hands full continuing to monitor on-going activities, starting-up IR 3.3 with the new contractor, plus normal administrating and reporting requirements, the combination of which normally keep most Missions working six to seven days a week just to stay in place.

We recommend the additional services of a specialist contractor during the first year -- one, at the most, two additional trips to the operational phase work recommended above -- of Plan implementation for a number of reasons. One of the "methodological" problems of using implementing agents (PVO/NGO partners or contractors) to monitor and report on results for which they are responsible, is the issue of their objectivity. This is certainly one of the principal responsibilities of the D/G SO Team, that is, to ensure that the reporting of the contractors is objective and reliable. The D/G Team may require some assistance in this area. Secondly, there are bound to be revisions to both indicators and the baselines and targets that measure them, after an initial period of working with them. Likewise, methodology problems will not be fully worked out until the plan has been tested in the field. In both cases, technical assistance would be useful, if not necessary, to work out the "bugs" and revise the accordingly. Thirdly, in the preparation of the R4, the D/G Team may find that it needs support in reviewing, verifying and consolidating contractor reports, and perhaps in writing pieces of the R4 as necessary. Finally, while the

MSI Team is not calling for any special studies to be conducted as part of this performance monitoring plan at this time, such a need may emerge during the first year of Plan implementation and an outside contractor may best placed to either undertake it directly or ensure that it is completed under the contract.

ANNEX A

Scope of Work

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SCOPE OF WORK
PERFORMANCE MONITORING SYSTEM: DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE
USAID/WEST BANK AND GAZA

I. Product Required

USAID/West Bank and Gaza requires the assistance of a team of experts to develop a performance monitoring system for its Strategic Objective No. 3 (SO 3), "More Responsive and Accountable Governance." The performance monitoring system will be consistent with Agency definitions and requirements as set forth in Chapter 203 of USAID's Automated Directives System (ADS). It should be in final form and ready for use by USAID/West Bank and Gaza's Strategic Objective team for SO 3 (the SO team) to track performance and objectively report on progress in achieving the Strategic Objective.

II. Background

The USAID/West Bank and Gaza strategic plan, including a results framework with preliminary indicators, was approved in April 1996. Agency guidelines emphasize the role of performance monitoring as a management approach to help gauge progress, guide programmatic and resource allocation decisions, and report on results. All USAID missions are required to establish and maintain performance monitoring systems to enable the regular and routine collection and analysis of data on results. The systems should be finalized shortly after approval of a mission's strategic plan. Such systems include performance indicators, performance baselines and performance targets and a plan which sets out the means of collecting and analyzing information.

III. Statement of Work

Approach to the Work

The team of experts will take a collaborative approach to their work in order to produce a work product which is adopted and ready for use by the SO team. Collaboration will be particularly important as the experts verify intermediate results, refine indicators, identify targets and propose a system for data collection. The experts should plan for and hold periodic meetings with the SO team (or a subteam as designated by the SO team leader) on various aspects of their work in order to keep the SO team informed and involve it in decisions along the way. Additionally, the leader of the team of experts should consult on a daily basis with the person designated by the SO team leader as the "backstop" for this activity.

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

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Task Descriptions

These task descriptions should be viewed as a general guide to the work. The team of experts, in its workplanning, should bear in mind that the tasks are not necessarily consecutive, and are to some degree interrelated.

Task 1. Program Familiarization

As a critical point of reference, the team of experts will carefully review the Mission's approved strategy and relevant USAID/W comments on the strategy (to be provided by the SO team). As background for its work, the team will need to spend considerable time familiarizing itself with the program of activities currently supported or planned under SO 3, including anticipated outputs and timeframe for each activity. Additionally, it will be important to review the systems of monitoring and data collection used by implementing organizations to track the outputs and impact of its activities, since activity-level monitoring systems are one potential source of data for the overall performance monitoring system. The team of experts should plan on meeting with selected staff of implementing organizations as a part of program familiarization. The SO team will suggest appropriate people for these meetings and will provide the team with relevant documentation.

However, because all of the activities under SO 3 will have just begun when the contractors conduct this assessment, the systems of implementing organizations to monitor performance will be in a nascent stage. The contractor will be expected to participate in and at times facilitate discussions between USAID and the implementing organizations on the development of monitoring systems, baselines, targets and indicators.

Task 2: Review of General Data Availability

The team of experts will review and summarize the availability of data relevant to the results framework and indicators for SO 3. The experts will develop a comprehensive listing of sources of relevant data currently available within Gaza and the West Bank; investigate the accessibility (to USAID staff and contractors) of such data and the cost implications, if any; of obtaining it; and analyze the quality (both reliability and validity) of data for each potential source. Significant gaps in data (e.g. in comparison with country-level data elsewhere) should be described. In order to perform this task, it will be necessary for team members to interact with Palestinian officials, and representatives of other donors, educational institutions and private organizations, as well as individual researchers. The SO team will suggest appropriate people for the team of experts to meet.

Task 3: Confirmation/Revision of Results Framework

The team of experts will review the intermediate results and preliminary performance indicators included in the existing results framework for SO 3, as well as the RFAs and RFPs that were issued for the various components of the strategic objective. This review will take

into account USAID/W comments on the results framework (to be provided by the SO team), and will incorporate the opinions and ideas expressed by SO team members. Using these sources as well as the expert team's own judgment, the team will prepare a revised results framework which revalidates or includes adjustments to the intermediate results and performance indicators. A series of meetings with the SO team will probably be required to gain consensus on the revised framework.

Task 4: Performance Monitoring Plan

A Performance Monitoring Plan defines each indicator to be tracked, includes performance baselines and targets for each indicator, and describes the methodology to be followed to collect and analyze data over time.

Subtask (a): Performance Baselines and Targets. The team of experts will establish targets (including units of measure, where appropriate) for each performance indicator. Baselines will be established where existing data permit. Where additional data collection will be required to measure the baseline, the team will define the baseline and set out a cost-effective and timely method for data collection. (If baseline data prove to be unavailable or too costly to collect, the indicator may need to be changed.) Performance baselines should reflect, as near as possible, the value of each performance indicator at the commencement of USAID-supported activities that contribute to the achievement of the relevant strategic objective.

Subtask (b): Data Collection Methodology. The team of experts will define the approach to be used by the SO team in undertaking its performance monitoring. The approach must enable comparable performance data to be collected regularly, even in the event of a staff turnover. Procedural requirements for collecting and using relevant performance data should be described, including source, method and schedule of collection for all required data and assignment of responsibility. Other relevant information on the methodology should be added in the form of comments on each indicator. It is anticipated that sources will vary, and include implementing organizations, official statistics, and in some cases special USAID-funded studies. As with baseline data, if performance data prove to be too costly to collect in terms of funding or staff time, it may be necessary to adjust the indicator. The team of experts should summarize the level of effort required for USAID to undertake the data collection and analysis and indicate any special skills needed to do so.

Task 5: Performance Monitoring System

The team of experts will compile a summary document which presents the performance monitoring system for SO 3. The document will be in a form that can be used by the SO team to manage the data collection process, ensure the quality of performance data, and analyze and report on results. This summary document should include:

- (1) a presentation of the results framework, including performance indicators,

performance baselines and performance targets for the strategic objective and all intermediate results (with these results revised, as appropriate),

(2) the performance monitoring plan, in tabular format, with comments/notes included where appropriate,

(3) a review of available sources of data relevant to the SO, categorized by source (e.g. public, donors, USAID implementors), along with an estimate of the quality and reliability of this data, and contact persons for accessing the data. This review should cover the range of data which may assist in assessing progress in implementing SO 3, even if not included in the performance monitoring plan.

(4) detailed description of any special data collection efforts that USAID will need to undertake and/or fund directly as part of the performance monitoring plan, including statement of work and budget.

IV. Team Qualifications and Level of Effort

These tasks will require the services of two professionals:

- * Team Leader/Senior Monitoring Specialist, with extensive experience in the development and application of performance monitoring systems for democracy and governance programs.
- * Democracy/Governance Specialist, with a practical understanding of impact measurement of democracy and governance programs.

All professionals should have the background and experience to work collaboratively in a team setting with members of the SO team. At least one of them should have good group facilitation skills. At least one team member should have experience in developing and implementing programs in private sector development. At least one team member should have successfully completed previous work involving USAID's new directives for performance monitoring. At least one team member should be able to quickly budget and prepare scopes of work for data collection efforts. One team member should have qualifications for and be designated as gender specialist. All professionals should have the computer skills to undertake their work.

Total level of effort required is an estimated 6 person weeks, with 6 work days per week. There is no absolute requirement for amount of time per expert; time per person should be proposed based on the breakdown of individuals' skills and their anticipated role in performing each task.

The team will be supplemented by a staff member of the Democracy Center of USAID's Global Bureau that the Mission will choose.

V. Timeframe

The estimated timeframe for the provision of this assistance is November 3 through November 23..

ANNEX B

Organizations Interviewed

LIST OF CONTACTS

MSI CONSULTING TEAM FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE MONITORING PLAN

USAID/West Bank and Gaza

David Rhoad, Deputy Director
Rosalie Fanale, Program and Project Development
Bassam Cort, PPD
Kim Delaney, Democracy and Governance
Connie Paraskeva, DG
Donna Ives, DG
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Andrae Gaerber
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International Republican Institute

Lauren Ross

Jerusalem Media and Communication Center

Ghassan Khatib
Jamil Rabah

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

Kevin Johnson
Margaret Zaknoen

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ANNEX C

Documents Reviewed

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Applications for Grants by Palestinian NGOs Pursuant to RFA 296-96-A-615, Democracy Understanding and Development Project for CSOs:

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International Republican Institute, "Increasing NGO Participation in Policy Making and Strengthening the Legislative Process in the West Bank and Gaza Strip"

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, "Building an Informed and Active Civil Society in the West Bank and Gaza"

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