


PN-ACA-446



COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN
USAID ASSISTANCE TO GUINEA
FYs 1998 - 2005



MAY 12, 1997



Embassy of the United States of America

Ms. Carol Peasley
Assistant Administrator (Acting)
Bureau for Africa
United States Agency for International Development
Washington, DC

Dear Ms. Peasley,

It is with a great sense of satisfaction and pleasure that I forward to you USAID/Guinea's Country Strategic Plan, 1998-2005. I can assure you that this document has benefitted from a great deal of consultation and collaboration with the Country Team and a wide range of development partners on the ground in Guinea. It is, I believe, a plan deeply rooted in Guinea's immense development potential and U.S. interests.

The USAID program is highly valued by Guineans and for good reason. I can honestly say that it is the most effective use of taxpayers resources I have seen in any of my seven African tours. Results are visible in small towns and villages across this beautiful but impoverished land. I am particularly pleased that the CSP tackles head on some of Guinea's difficult democracy and governance issues. Democratization is a high priority for this mission, and USAID plays an important role in furthering these objectives. I believe that the CSP has justified the resources and the approach to really make a difference, not only in the important DG field, but in primary education, family health and natural resources management.

An ongoing issue in our bilateral relations is political and economic reform. Halting progress is evident on both fronts. A strong and vibrant USAID program structured to deliver assistance directly to the grassroots while poised to target distinct and potentially high payoff activities such as the recent US study tour by National Assembly deputies, the Leland Initiative, and perhaps the 1998 presidential elections is an important tool to support and encourage the reform process. I understand completely the need to manage for results and flexibility in the field is an essential ingredient to respond to rapidly unfolding opportunities.

If the USAID program is to retain a leading role, resources should be increased. The USAID budget and staff have taken a serious beating in the current climate of resource scarcity. I strongly recommend that despite the pressures to do less, that USAID do all it can to assure a reasonable level of resources for the Guinea program. The CSP proposes several resource scenarios. From my perspective, the "breakthrough" scenario is the most sensible given the program's high performance and potential, our excellent US PVO partners and the efficient management structure established through reengineering.

In closing, let me say what a pleasure it is to work with USAID. We have exceptionally collegial relations which have created a strong and unified team approach. This CSP embodies that teamwork and I trust that you will find it meets all your expectations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Tibor P. Nagy Jr.".

Tibor P. Nagy, Jr.
Ambassador

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
LIST OF ACRONYMS

AGBEF	Association Guineenne pour le Bien-Etre Familiale
AIDS	Acquired Immunity Deficiency Syndrome
AIDSCAP	AIDS Control and Prevention Project
AIM	AIDS Impact Modeling
AMF	Agricultural Marketing Foundation
AMIP	Agricultural Marketing Investment Project
AMLGF	Agricultural Marketing Loan Guarantee Fund
AVSC	Association for Voluntary and Safe Contraception
BCRG	Central Bank of Guinea
BI	Bamako Initiative
CBD	Community Based Distribution
CCCO	Combatting Childhood Communicable Diseases
CDIE	Center for Development Information and Evaluation
CDR	Rural Development Municipality/Commune de Développement Rural
CLUSA/NCBA	Cooperative League-USA/National Cooperative Business Association
CPR	Contraceptive Prevalence Rate
CPSP	Country Program Strategic Plan
CSP	Country Strategic Plan
CYP	Couple Years of Protection
DAAF	Central Division of Finance and Administration
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
ED	Essential Drugs
EPI	Expanded Program of Immunization
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
ESRP	Education Sector Reform Program
EU	European Union
FDHIRD	Fouta Djallon Highlands Integrated Rural Development
FP	Family Planning
HIS	Health Information System
ICMCI	Integrated Care Management Childhood Illnesses
IFPA	International Family Planning Association
IR	Intermediate Result
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrollment Rate
GNRM	Guinea National Resources Management
GOG	Government of Guinea
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
HIS	Health Information System
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IMC	Inter-Ministerial Committee
IMF	International Monetary Fund

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IR	Intermediate Result
IRBD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
KFW	German Development Bank
MAEF	Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry
MCH	Maternal Child Health
ME/PEV/SSP	Medicaments Essentiels
MEN	National Ministry of Education
MEPU	Ministry of Pre-University Education
MIS	Management Information System
MOH	Ministry of Health
MPFE	Ministère pour la Promotion des Femmes et des Enfants
MSF	Médecin Sans Frontières
NAD	New Activity Description
NCBA/CLUSA	National Cooperative Business Association/Cooperative League-USA
NEAP	National Environment Action Plan
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NPA	Non-Project Assistance
NPHCP	National Primary Health Care Program
NPI	New Partnership Initiative
NRM	Natural Resources Management
ORS	Oral Rehydration Salt
OSFAM	Option Santé Familiale
PASE	Education Sector Adjustment Program
PEV	Programme Elargi de Vaccination
PHC	Primary Health Care
PHN	Population Health Nutrition
PRIDE	Rural Enterprise Development Project
PSI	Population Services International
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
RP	Results Package
SAAF	Administrative Services of Financial Affairs/Services Administratifs des Affaires Financières
SCF	Save the Children Federation
SM	Social Marketing
SMC	Social Marketing of Contraceptives Project
SO	Strategic Objective
SSP	Soins de Santé Primaires
STI	Sexually Transmitted Illnesses
WB	World Bank/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
UCOFIS	Unions des Cooperatives Financières Spécialisées/Financial Cooperative Unions
UNICEF	United Nation Children's Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations Family Planning Agency

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The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgement on the legal status of any territory or its endorsement.

*Spirit, are they yours? Scrooge could say no more.
They are Man's, said the Spirit, looking down upon them.
And they cling to me, appealing from their fathers.
This boy is Ignorance. This girl is Want. Beware them both, and all of their degree, but
most of all beware this boy, for on his brow I see that written which is Doom, unless the
writing be erased.
Deny it! Cried the Spirit, stretching out its hand towards the city. Slander those who tell it
ye! Admit it for your factious purposes,
and make it worse! And abide the end!*

From A Christmas Carol by Charles Dickens

A. OVERVIEW AND THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Guinea, rich in marine and mineral resources, is blessed with fertile soils, abundant rainfall and significant hydroelectric potential. This rich natural endowment has the potential to improve the economic well-being of its estimated 6.8 million population. However, with 80 percent of the population living in rural areas, and with agriculture accounting for only 17 percent of GDP in 1995, Guinea is far from realizing its potential. In fact, Guinea had a per capita GDP of only 520 dollars in 1994, when it ranked 160 out of the 174 countries listed in the United Nations Development Program Human Development Report.

The current situation is partly explained by a legacy of 25 years under the ambitious but ill-fated authoritarian regime of the country's charismatic first president, Sékou Touré. Under his regime, civil society and the private sector were suppressed, the once prosperous agriculture sector was devastated, the legal and judicial system atrophied, essential social services, transport, power, and communication systems deteriorated. State central planning left the economy in shambles. This regime ended with the death of Sékou Touré in 1984 and the seizing of power by Lansana Conté. This new government (second Republic) undertook a program of dramatic political and economic reforms.

Following the re-establishment of civil rights and freedom of expression, a new constitution adopted in December 1990 authorized the creation of political parties. Communal elections were held in March 1991. Guinea's first multi-party presidential election since independence was held in December 1993, and multi-party legislative and communal elections in June 1995. For the first time in Guinea's history, a multi-party National Assembly was seated in October, 1995. On the economic policy front, an ambitious economic and financial program dating back to 1985, which includes two Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities (ESAF) in 1991 and 1997, has made significant progress in streamlining the civil service, improving the regulatory environment, increasing the efficiency of the tax system, introducing market-based instruments of monetary control, liberalizing the price, exchange and trade system, and downsizing and improving the performance of the public sector.

The political and economic liberalization of the last 12 years has significantly altered the economic and political scene and achieved tangible results. From 1987 to 1990 annual real GDP grew by an average 4.5 percent, and inflation decreased from 36.7 to 19.4 percent. Subsequently from 1991 to 1996, real GDP growth averaged 3.8 percent and inflation was reduced to 3.5 percent by 1996. The constant danger of turning to the printing press to compensate for failure to increase government revenue has been kept at bay by sufficiently responsible monetary and credit control which has given Guinea a relatively stable exchange rate with only a small divergence from the parallel market rate.

The respectable success of the program has, however, remained significantly below Guinea's potential and the expectations of reformers. Although the share of GDP going to public administration declined between 1988 and 1995, reflecting an effort to cut public expenditure, the goal of making the private sector the engine of growth has not yet materialized, at least in the formal sector. For example, between 1988 and 1995, total

investment decreased from 17.2 to 14.6 percent of GDP, while private sector investment decreased from 8.9 to 8.1 percent of GDP. The share of agricultural GDP, a principal potential beneficiary of economic liberalization, has remained stuck at 17 percent. A decrease in total exports in the same period from 30.1 percent to 20.4 percent of GDP, mirrors the decrease in mining exports which declined from 27.8 to 16 percent of GDP during the same period. The modest increase in trade, from 24.1 to 26.3 percent, is a tangible sign that the formal private sector is likely to respond to reform, when the risk-benefit balance is right.

This relatively modest success was perhaps inevitable. Full implementation of this ambitious reform effort would have shifted power and decisions from a political elite to a broad and diffused economic base and required the political elite to give up privileges to a broad civil society which even now is reluctant to risk challenging authority. The successive structural reform programs have, therefore, experienced brief periods of good performance under the pressure of conditionality, followed by slippage, particularly in the areas of tax and customs administration and expenditure control. Delays in implementing structural reforms and lack of effective follow through ultimately led to poor fiscal performance and impeded the disbursement of external assistance.

To be sure, declining terms of trade related to a 26 percent decrease in bauxite prices contributed to the less than stellar results of the GOG reform efforts. Poor infrastructure and pervasive corruption also have discouraged the development of private sector institutions such as the financial sector, and modern production and marketing systems essential for sustainable development.

Given the constraints on formal-sector investment caused by institutional bottlenecks and administrative blockage, growth shifted to the informal sector where impediments were easier to overcome. A virtual explosion in petty trade, small workshops and smallholder agriculture has created tens of thousands of new jobs and invigorated village life. While this development has been a bright spot in an overall rather sluggish economy, observers and the GOG recognize that sustainable growth will require substantial formal private investment.

Prodded by events stemming from the conflicts inherent in this system, the Government has taken important, if halting, steps to address them. The President named a new cabinet and created the new post of Prime Minister in July, 1996. The new government, largely made up of technocrats, seems committed to follow through with reforms under a new ESAF and renewed donor goodwill shown in the resulting Paris Club debt rescheduling in February 1997.

The new government and ongoing efforts by the National Assembly to establish itself as a truly autonomous institution have been positive steps towards improving Guinea's environment for sustainable development. The pace and extent of Guinea's development will continue, however, to be constrained by an environment which seems to discourage individual initiative, and a privileged vested interest class which will in all likelihood continue to resist change. But, the greatest obstacle to Guinea's development is, perhaps,

the reluctance of her citizens to stand up for their rights and the rule of law.

SOCIAL TRENDS

Guinea has some of the worst social indicators in the sub-region. A low life expectancy (47 years) and one of the lowest per capita income levels in the world. Infant, child and maternal mortality rates are among the highest in the world. Even so, the population continues to grow. Annual population growth was estimated at 3% for 1995, higher than for any previous period. The total fertility rate of 5.7 children per woman of reproductive age (1992 DHS) coupled with a very low contraceptive prevalence (1.7 percent) suggest that population growth will not be declining in the very near future. If the population continues to grow at the current rate, it will double reaching 14 million in 24 years. Half of the population is under age 15. In a country of 6.8 million people, 2.3 million adults are literate, 4.1 million people are without access to health services, 3.0 million do not have safe water and 3.5 million lack adequate sanitation. There are not sufficient schools for the growing number of school children. Only 34 percent of school age children have access to primary education. Access by girls is even lower. The major health problems are infectious and parasitic diseases including malaria and respiratory and diarrheal diseases. Nutrition status is poor and access to health services is very limited and services are very poor. While the rate of HIV infection for the population as a whole remains relatively low at approximately 1%, the population of women infected has increased by 39% over the past eight years.

The 1996 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report which reports life expectancy, adult literacy, and per capita income, ranked Guinea 160 out of 174 countries. This is an improvement over the 1994 Report which ranked Guinea dead last. The Government is abundantly aware of these depressing statistics and has initiated steps to address the problem. As if the UNDP Report were a wake-up call, the Government declared that the reduction of poverty is one of its fundamental objectives. The GOG is addressing poverty issues by promoting access to income generating activities and improved access to social services. GOG views the reduction of poverty as being intimately linked with the creation of favorable conditions for sustained growth. Support of the economic reform program is an important element of this strategy. Reconstitution of its human capital with particular emphasis on the most disadvantaged groups is also an important element in the poverty reduction strategy.

Poverty was generally thought to be centered in the rural areas but in recent years poverty has become a serious problem in urban centers, particularly in Conakry. Rural migrants and large numbers of refugees from neighboring countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone) have settled in squatter neighborhoods lacking basic services of water, solid waste collection and sanitary disposal of waste, thereby contributing to general deteriorations of the quality of life. The GOG over the next three years plans to concentrate its resources to promote increased access to social services, particularly to women and children, and to improve the qualitative and quantitative survey techniques to monitor and evaluate household status to identify incidences of poverty conditions in the country, and to involve participation of affected disadvantaged population in socio-economic policy formulation and

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implementation.

B. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: RELATIONSHIP OF THE PROGRAM TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS

Guinea serves three out of four of the U.S. national interests articulated in the 1995/96 USAID Strategic Framework (enhancing peace and stability, preventing humanitarian crisis and protecting against specific global dangers) and has great potential for furthering the fourth, promoting U.S. economic interests. The positive role that Guinea plays in the prolonged conflict and humanitarian crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone by hosting 600,000 refugees on her soil, providing troops to the international peace keeping force in Liberia and Sierra Leone and launching diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict is an enormous burden for such a poor country. Without Guinea's "good neighbor" policy, it is highly likely that the conflict would have cascaded throughout the entire subregion, creating massive numbers of displaced persons, sowing instability and chaos. But Guinea has allowed the international community time to search for peaceful solutions and avert what could be a much more serious humanitarian disaster.

Guinea is important in protecting the U.S. and the international community from global dangers such as the AIDS pandemic and other virulent tropical diseases such as ebola and lassa fever by cooperating with international and U.S. health authorities in research and prevention campaigns. Guinea's forests, though shrinking, harbor great biodiversity and some of the last contiguous stretches of the once great West African tropical forests. The central highlands are the catchment for four out of five of the major rivers of West Africa, supplying a stable and essential source of water for agriculture, energy, commerce and municipal uses for millions of West Africans. Guinea's largely untapped but enormous mineral reserves, hydroelectric potential, forest products and latent agricultural resources hold great prospects for furthering U.S. economic and commercial interests. U.S. private firms already have considerable investment in the mineral sector, and with an improved governance and investment environment, other sectors hold promise.

In the paradigm presented by the new Secretary of State last year, Guinea falls into the category of "an emerging democracy in transition." Although Guinea is a small nation relative to Nigeria and Zaire and investments in Guinea must be weighed against U.S. interests in those places, a small nation like Guinea offers something that many others do not: the opportunity to build a sustainable democracy. In the ultimate decisions about where to invest U.S. resources in the coming years, the focus should not only be on failed or near-failed states, those in crisis and where development results may be decades away. We should also focus on countries where our investment not only makes a difference, but may very well be THE difference between failed states and sustainable development. Guinea is struggling to find its way out of 25 years of crushing Stalinist rule to a pluralistic society and a liberal economic regime. The pathway is difficult and precarious. Guineans, like few others in West Africa, look toward the United States as the world's oldest modern democracy, for inspiration, assistance and mentoring. Our experience and expertise can and will make a difference for literally millions of her citizens if we stay the

course.

USAID/Guinea is achieving results in health and education sectors that are considered examples of USAID's best work by other Agencies, Congress and the press. Gender-focused activities have broken new ground. For example, in 1996, Guinea was able to report systematically the progress of women in all sectors as a result of USAID activities. Guinea is also only one of a handful of Missions implementing the Agency's New Partnership Initiative, with solid, cutting-edge partnerships with a host of U.S., international and local NGO's, local communities, government and the private sector. When it comes to "return on aid investment", USAID/Guinea's program is unrivaled. From the strategic standpoint of U.S. interests, to a model for sustainable development, it is in our very strong interest to continue and even expand USAID's program in Guinea to achieve the agency's goal of sustainable development.

Conflict Resolution and Crisis Prevention

Guinea plays an important role in regional conflict resolution and crisis prevention. Beyond its diplomatic and peace-keeping role in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises and the hosting, and even to a large extent the integration of 600,000 refugees into its national territory, Guinea is trying out its fledgling diplomacy on a broader range of regional conflicts and tensions. She has recently been involved in trying to broker the resolution of regional territorial flash points between Cameroon and Nigeria and increasingly voicing concern and support for peace keeping forces and resolutions in international bodies such as the OAU and the United Nations General Assembly. Although still relatively unsophisticated and poorly equipped to play a major role outside of the immediate sub-region, these recent efforts demonstrate Guinea's increasing desire to become a full-playing member of the community of nations.

Conflict prevention at home is an area where Guinea is less comfortable and vastly under equipped to deal with in the context of a modern, liberal democracy. The government of the first republic dealt with conflict by suppressing and crushing civil liberties, imposing a heavy and autocratic central administration and nipping "troublemakers" in the bud through imprisonment, execution or expulsion. The price in terms of a shattered society, destruction of the human spirit and the collapse of civil society was enormous and incalculable, and haunts Guinea well into her post-Stalinist democratic transition. Introducing political and social liberalism without stirring the always present embers of ethnic rivalry, unleashing naked power-grabbing and the subversion of nascent democratic institutions to powerful special interests is a challenge to which the Guinean government has not yet risen. In this, then, the transition to a truly democratic and liberal society, lies the path to establishing peace and prosperity.

This path is strewn with hazards. Absolute poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, endemic corruption and a history of despotism make the Guineans poor candidates for classic, participatory democracy. Yet the aspirations of ordinary people to live improved lives, to have access to education and health services, clean water, to be free of the drudgery of daily, back-breaking labor, debilitating tropical diseases and parasites and to enjoy the

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fruits of their well-endowed country are palpable in conversations with citizens everywhere. Guineans see what is happening to their neighbors to the south through the tyranny of warlordism and greed, and they have turned away from that path. They also see their neighbors in Mali beginning to enjoy the liberties of an emerging democracy; freely operating private media, unfettered debate, unrestricted physical movement and assembly, local governance, improved infrastructure and better services.

The seeds for change have sprouted on Guinean soil and there is no turning back. The question is whether Guinea will continue to enjoy relative peace and harmony through this transition, or whether the forces of tyranny, self-interest and greed will manipulate the process and plunge the country into the chaos that is only too common in the region. Guineans are a tolerant people; some would say too tolerant of poor government and short-sighted leadership. But they were isolated from the outside world for 25 years, and have little understanding of and no experience with western post-colonial models. Some visionaries are emerging and even some of the entrenched political leadership are beginning to show signs of understanding their people's aspirations.

Guineans are also an independent-minded lot. After all, they were the first and only French-West African colony to vote "no" in the French Referendum of 1958, thus paving the way to a painful and precipitate independence. They have paid an enormous price for their "freedom", but the generation that understands that history is rapidly passing. The bulging demographics of a rapidly expanding population have left a large and potentially volatile and destabilizing group of restless youth that may not be as patient as their forefathers.

Sustainable development with all that implies is the solution to conflict prevention within Guinea. One must bear in mind that the transition to democracy with the attendant social and political change, is potentially a destabilizing process. Helping Guineans manage that instability to bring about a positive and peaceful transition is the challenge for U.S. Government interests and represents an important role for USAID/Guinea. The process is likely to be bumpy, but for U.S. interests to be served, we must stay the course. We should firmly maintain the long view by supporting the creation of a vibrant civil society while scanning the terrain for potential high-impact, short-term targets at the national level that can rapidly improve the democratic governance environment. Helping citizens play a more active role in their communities will help them gain experience in governance, take more responsibility for their own destiny and expand their confidence and civic pride. The proper enabling environment will turn that energy into a peaceful channel for debate, dialogue and conflict resolution.

Resource Scenarios and Strategic Interests

For USAID/Guinea, the New Partnership Initiative is our *modus operandi* and the heart of our strategic approach. We believe firmly that the concepts of NPI will establish the conditions at the community level for poverty alleviation and sustainable development. By linking together US entities, particularly PVOs that have a long-term interest in the country, the committed staff and the technology to work in a variety of sectors and at the

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community level, by partnering with local and regional organizations and entities of government at all levels, we can help create the capacity and conditions for sustainable development to occur. We fully realize that this approach is not a panacea and that fundamental changes at the national level must occur as well to launch Guinea firmly on the path to sustainable development.

But we believe that our comparative advantage lies with this, albeit labor-intensive but effective approach. We still have a core of dedicated and capable mission staff and we have attracted the best development partners in the business to Guinea. They recognize and sense a groundswell of change and a productive and fertile development environment. USAID can focus our resources and our partners at the local and community level while using our considerable leverage with the International Financial Institutions and other donors and our prestige as the world's leading democracy with the GOG to keep the reforms at the national level on track. The whole of our program has now become greater than the sum of its parts, as other donors begin to finance our successes. Even our now limited in-country presence has been identified by other donors as an important requisite for their continued support.

C. OTHER DONORS: OUR DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

Donor assistance is a significant component of Guinea's development budget. Approximately 82% of GOG's public investment for FY 96 was financed by donors, reflecting the GOG's heavy dependence on external assistance to achieve its development objectives. The ushering in of the Second Republic (post Sékou Touré 1985 - 1993) and the launching of the IMF/World Bank economic and financial reform program saw an increase in the number of donors in Guinea and an increase in their allocations. The lead donors include France, USA, Japan, Canada, and Germany. Among the multilateral donors are the European Economic Community (EEC), the United Nations and its executing agencies, i.e. UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, ILO, UNFPA, WHO, UNIDO, WFP. The World Bank/IMF are the leaders among the international financial institutions. Other international financial institutions include the African Development Bank, Arabian Bank for Economic Development, the Islamic Bank for Development, and the European Investment Bank of the EU. These financial organizations provide significant support to the economic and financial reform program of the Government. As illustrated in the table below the majority of the donors are working in the same sectors underlining the consensus that Guinea must reduce its reliance on revenues from the mining sector and exploit its rich agriculture base to finance social services and development.

With the steady improvement on the political and economic fronts, there has been an increase in the number of international NGOs working in Guinea. In the last year alone, three US PVOs began operations.

DONOR ACTIVITIES BY SECTOR

Sector	Bilateral					Multilateral			
	USA	France	Japan	Germany	Canada	IBRD	UN	EU	ADB
Agricul.	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Health/ Population	X	X		X		X	X		X
Education	X	X		X	X	X		X	X
Infra- structure	X	X			X	X		X	X
Natural Resources/ Forestry	X	X		X	X	X		X	X
Finance/ Planning	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	
Energy		X			X				X
Industry		X					X		
D/G	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	
Humanitarian Assistance	X						X		

USAID's donor partners are France (primary education), EEC (health, primary education), Canada (D/G). Besides being the largest of all donor organizations in Guinea, the World Bank is USAID's major donor partner (economic policy reform, basic education, health, NRM, governance). Noted below are brief descriptions of the programs of the major donors. USAID is in partnership with six of the US PVOs with a presence in Guinea. These PVOs form the core of the NPI.

France: Fonds d'Aide et Cooperation (FAC) and Caisse Française de Développement (CFD): France is the lead bilateral donor in Guinea, providing 30% of total bilateral assistance and 11.2% of total donor assistance. France renewed its assistance program to Guinea in 1979 and it grew steadily until 1993. Since 1994 French budget levels have been on a decline. This decline may be part of the global reduction in donor assistance programs. The French are working in the social sectors (health, education, democracy/governance) agriculture export development, marketing, rural credit and rural enterprises development, rural infrastructure, economic and financial institutions capacity building, and infrastructure development (energy, hydraulic and urbanism, transport development). France is one of our major partners in the multi-donor financed primary education project.

Japan has become the third largest bilateral donor in Guinea with programs in rural development and food security. **Canadian** assistance is in rural development, environmental protection, and human capacity development. USAID works closely with Canada on D/G activities. **German** aid focusses on environmental protection, health, and

institutional development. German aid is in partnership with our health/ population activities with the financing, through KFW, of contraceptives for our social marketing of contraceptives project. **Saudi** assistance provides financing for human resources development, social and health development and integrated rural development. **Kuwait** assistance is concentrated on road infrastructure.

The Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and IMF) with a 1995 portfolio of \$37.7 million are financing financial/economic sector improvement, health, education, transport infrastructure, and agriculture development. The Bank is our major partner in education, health, and economic/financial reform. **The European Union** (EU) portfolio of \$68.1 million in 1995 supports road construction, integrated rural development, education and health. The EU is one of our major partners in the multi-donor primary education project. **The African Development Bank** portfolio of \$50.6 million is concentrated in agriculture, natural resources, health, energy and human resources development.

**DONORS ASSISTANCE TO GUINEA*
DISBURSEMENTS FROM 1992 TO 1995**

(\$000)

DONORS	1992		1993		1994		1995	
Bilateral	%		%		%		%	
USA	35,195	7.4	37,159	7.5	29,644	7.0	20,135	5.6
France	79,751	16.9	81,880	16.6	55,866	13.2	47,238	13.2
Japan	25,015	5.3	23,439	4.8	29,737	7.0	10,958	3.1
Germany	8,354	1.8	16,921	3.4	10,628	2.5	12,338	3.4
Federation of Russia	3,648	0.8	9,458	1.9	13,232	3.1	2,290	0.6
Canada	3,375	0.7	9,528	1.9	6,992	1.6	10,359	2.9
Saudi Arabia	3,572	0.8	581	0.1	9,086	2.1	8,468	2.4
Kuwait	--		4,203	0.9	945	0.2	8,986	2.5
Others	15,679	3.3	12,244	2.5	10,214	2.4	16,586	4.6
Subtotal	174,589	37.0	195,413	39.6	166,344	39.2	137,358	38.3
Multilateral	%		%		%		%	
World Bank (IDA)	90,180	19.0	121,333	24.6	87,110	20.5	37,049	10.3
IMF	12,862	2.7	17	-	25,095	5.9	661	0.2
EU (European Union)	46,083	9.8	37,501	7.6	43,125	10.1	68,108	19.0
ADB (Afr. Dev. Bank)	69,992	14.8	54,674	11.1	43,848	10.3	50,653	14.2
UN Agencies	70,063	14.8	74,170	15.1	46,125	10.9	47,550	13.3
Others	5,964	1.3	7,593	1.5	8,353	2.0	11,840	3.3
Subtotal	295,144	62.4	295,288	59.9	253,656	59.7	215,861	60.3
NGOs	%		%		%		%	
Subtotal	2,681	0.6	2,532	0.5	4,680	1.1	4,980	1.4
TOTAL	472,414	100	493,233	100	424,680	100	358,199	100

*Source: UNDP Guinea 1995 Report

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D. USAID'S CUSTOMERS

USAID/Guinea's customers are primarily the 80% of Guineans living in the rural communities, particularly vulnerable groups such as women and children. These populations have low incomes, limited opportunities for economic advancement, lack access to social services (health, education), and have limited power to influence political and policy-making processes.

USAID/Guinea has used a broad variety of methods to understand its customer needs, demands and their reactions to our services. Some of the methods and mechanisms used included; studies, site visits, counterpart meetings, rapid appraisals, donor round tables, evaluations and impact monitoring surveys. From this experience we have learned that in order to fully understand the needs of our customers, it is critical to maintain direct contact with our ultimate customers using rapid appraisal and participatory appraisal methodologies, and to work with community members, host-country governments (local as well as national), and NGOs (indigenous and international). In this way USAID/Guinea makes its ultimate customer focus the cornerstone of a partnership that empowers people at multiple levels. Each of the Strategic Objective teams actively pursued a series of consultations which directly shaped the identification of the strategic focus, the intermediate results and ultimately the results packages.

The Family Planning and Maternal and Child Health workshop held in February 1997 was a good example of how this partnership focuses on the identified needs of our ultimate customers. In effect, consistent with reengineering's emphasis on participation, results and client focus, USAID/Guinea through its Strategic Objective team, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health held a 3-day workshop. The workshop involved a full range of health care implementation stakeholders in Guinea including Ministry of Health employees working at the national, regional and sub-regional levels, NGOs, PVOs and the donor community. The objective was to refine USAID/Guinea's provisional FP/MCH SO Results Framework. The workshop outcomes provided the basis for refinement and finalization of the RF. Agreement was reached on the role and responsibility of each entity in managing for results.

The Primary Education strategic Objective team has been working in close collaboration with the Ministry of Education, as well as other donors since the initial steps of the design of the Fundamental Quality and Equity Levels Activity. Working groups for the identification of activity components were initiated. In February 1997 the Ministry of Education, with the assistance of the Strategic Objective core team, held a round table to review all activity components (equity, quality, strategic planning and decision making) and prepare for start-up. In addition, every up-country visit by the team is used for re-appraisal of customer satisfaction/feedback.

Similarly, the D/G and Natural Resource Management teams work closely with development partners, donors, others as needed, but particularly with the ultimate customers, villagers living in some of the poorest region of the country, to be certain that resources are removing of the most critical impediments to their well-being. In addition to


direct communication with our customers, USAID management and the entire country team have been undertaking extensive consultations since early 1996 with high-level GOG officials and decision-makers and other donors to discuss the focus and the direction of the new strategy.

To enhance collaboration with our customers, we will expand the use of these methods taking advantage of the existence of expanded strategic objective teams, result packages teams as well as the knowledge and expertise of Peace Corps volunteers. Thus each Strategic Objective team, using the USAID/Guinea Customer Service Plan as a point of departure, plans and implements methods appropriate to the needs of a given Strategic Objective.

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USAID/Guinea Results Framework FYs 1998 - 2005

Agency Goals and USAID/Guinea Goal and Strategic Objectives



II. PROPOSED STRATEGIC PLAN FOR GUINEA

A. SUMMARY OF PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

The overall USAID program goal which will guide our assistance to Guinea is "Improved Economic and social Well-being of all Guineans in a Participatory Society." USAID will pursue this goal by investing in people and launching a broad-based poverty alleviation program and fostering increased citizen participation in both political and economic spheres. Supporting education and human resources development will not only allow Guinean citizens to improve their well-being, but also will enhance their ability to participate fully in the transition to democracy. This CSP directly addresses three of the Agency's goals and a fourth is proposed.

The financial and human resources that Washington has told us to plan on resulting from the "parameters setting exercise" are meager indeed. We think that the USG can and will do better, given the national interests described above, the high level of performance that the USAID program has consistently demonstrated, and the growing willingness of the Guinean government for democratic and economic reform. But we also realize that Guinea must thoroughly demonstrate that it is a worthy partner. The country's performance in democracy has been its achilles heel. Guineans and outsiders alike agree that fundamental changes are needed to create the environment for sustainable development, attract direct foreign investment, provide social services and improve governance.

The "parameters meeting" asked us to examine a "breakthrough" resource level (tied to improved Democracy/Governance performance). We agree that DG performance would lead Guinea to a stage where additional USAID resources should be made available. In the strategy that we present in the following pages we do not try to expand everything or shave here and there depending on hypothetical resource availabilities. Rather, we have painstakingly staked out strategic areas and approaches, defined results and constructed a program around resource "parameters". We have constructed three "core" strategic objectives that go to the heart of Guinea's long-term development priorities and that coincide with our nation's comparative advantage, the Agency's strategic goals, and administration and congressional priorities. We have further elaborated a fourth strategic objective that would "enter" our program as the conditions for full sustainable development were reached under the "breakthrough scenario." The gateways, criteria and sequencing for determining when this fourth objective would "kick in" are discussed in sections II and III.


We were also asked to propose a "low case" budget scenario. This is very difficult for a variety of reasons, but for one, the course we would propose might very well depend on the reasons precipitating the low resource scenario and when it might occur. Our first impulse is to recommend that we "pull the plug" on the program if it must fall below the "core" level. The costs of mounting a small program in Guinea seem much greater than potential results might justify, particularly if the reason for diminished resources is worsened democracy performance. The timing of the "low scenario" is also an important factor in determining the program approach that we might recommend. Because U.S.

PVOs are for the most part recent arrivals, the network they are forming that we anticipate will be woven into a durable fabric for sustainable development is still fragile. However, if the NPI fully takes root in the out years of the strategic period, we might be able to effectively mount a program through NGO's without much of a USAID staff presence. Alternatively, if we achieve sustainable results in one of our technical objectives, we might be tempted to recommend early exit. We deal with these issues and the mechanics of establishing resource scenarios more fully in Part III.

USAID/Guinea proposes three full Strategic Objectives under the "current" funding level of about \$14 million/year. One SO will increase the use of family planning, maternal health, STD/AIDS prevention services; another will emphasize the primary education with special attention to the needs of rural populations and girls everywhere. The third SO directly attacks Guinea's relatively poor performance in democracy and governance and citizen participation.

**Education Strategic Objective
Intermediate Results
and Indicators**

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: QUALITY PRIMARY EDUCATION PROVIDED TO A LARGER PERCENTAGE OF GUINEAN CHILDREN, WITH EMPHASIS ON GIRLS AND RURAL CHILDREN

A. LINKAGE TO AGENCY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The strategic objective supports Agency Goal 1 broad-based economic growth and contributes directly to Agency Objective 3.1 "Basic education expanded and improved to increase human productive capacity".

B. DESCRIPTION

1. Statement of the Strategic Objective

USAID's commitment is to ensure that an increasing number of school-aged children receive, on a more equitable basis, an improved quality of primary school education which adequately prepares them for a productive role in Guinean society. Until recently, the Education SO statement read, "Increased enrollment in primary schools with emphasis on female and rural participation". While this statement highlighted the need to increase access and enrollment, the SO3 team felt that the educational quality focus that was also a key part of the objective was not adequately reflected. Thus in 1997 after consultation with a broad array of partners, customers and expanded team members, USAID/Guinea decided to revise the statement to better reflect the ultimate goal of the SO. The new Education Strategic Objective statement reads, "Quality primary education provided to a larger percentage of Guinean children, with emphasis on girls and rural children".

2. Problem Analysis - problem to be addressed and identification of affected customers

USAID believes that broad-based economic growth cannot be sustained without investing in people. Education directly affects people's ability to remain healthy, participate fully in the economic and civic activities of their country and make decisions regarding use of natural resources - it cuts across all sectors and is critical for any country's overall development strategy. Education must begin at the earliest ages, so that young people acquire basic skills such as literacy and numeracy upon which to build other critical skills. The 1995 adult literacy rate was 50% for males and 22% for females over age 15. Over half of Guinea's population of 6.8 million in 1996 were children under the age of 15, and the average annual population growth rate from 1990-94 was 2.8%. This young and growing population is the future human resource base of the country; increasing demands will be made on all of the country's resources and services, including the still weak education system. USAID feels that the broadest development impact will be made by focusing its efforts on building the basic educational skills of the young generations of Guinea, giving priority to primary school-aged children (age 7 - 12), particularly targeting the most disadvantaged groups - i.e. rural children and girls.

USAID/Guinea has chosen to focus on primary school children in Guinea, particularly rural and female children, as the ultimate customers of SO3. The immediate (intermediate) customers are: (1) individuals and entities at the Ministry of Education (MEN) and teachers intervening at all levels of the primary school system to design, manage, and evaluate the delivery of quality primary education; (2) Associations of Students/Parents and School Friends (APEAEs); and (3) Guinean NGO's working to support education at the community level.

The fact that rural children and girls face barriers to education in Guinea is especially disturbing, as in the early 1990's 73% of the population lived in rural areas and 87% of the labor force was devoted to agriculture. While primary school enrollments for children aged 7 - 12 have shown quite an increase in recent years (the gross enrollment rate (GER) for primary school rose from 28% in 1990 to 47% in 1996), there is still a large disparity between rural and urban enrollment, and enrollment of boys vs. girls. Girls made up only 31% of total primary school enrollment in 1996 (grades 1-6), and only 33% of eligible rural children were enrolled in primary school. The importance of providing young women with an education cannot be underestimated: women are an important economic force in Guinea - they made up 48% of the overall labor force in 1990. Myriad studies have shown the correlation of girls' education with family size, income, infant mortality and overall family health. In order to strengthen the skills of the often disadvantaged rural and female populations, a stronger and more responsive education system which balances access, equity, and quality must be built.

Improving a weak education system and ensuring both quality and overall system expansion is not a task that can be accomplished through "projects" or "activities" of 4 or 5 years duration. Constraints related not only to supply and quality, but also to *demand* for educational services must be attacked. The Ministry of Education cannot expand the school system by itself - parents and communities must see the value of educating their children in order to be willing to make the investment. They must be brought in as active participants in the educational decision-making process. Recent studies from Guinea show that in a number of even the poorest communities, parents have contributed directly to schooling for their children through supportive actions such as helping to construct local schools. Nevertheless, there is also clear evidence that strong attitudinal barriers remain, both regarding the value of educating children (particularly girls) and/or the lack of confidence communities have (often justifiably) in the public education system. It will thus be necessary to work closely at the *family and community levels*, e.g. with parents' associations and NGOs so that they are willing to work with the Ministry of Education to bring about the changes needed to improve the basic educational levels of children in Guinea.

While specific education policy emphases and related activities in Guinea may change and evolve over the next 5 - 10 years, the Government of Guinea (GOG) has made a strong long-term commitment to basic education improvement. To ensure sustainability and long-range impact, the focus of the SO will remain constant during this 8-year strategy period, i.e. placing priority on basic education for primary school-aged children, particularly girls and rural residents who are key to Guinea's development but face barriers to improving

their education.

Policy Context

The policy environment for change in the education sector in recent years has been very positive. In 1989 the GOG approved its "National Statement of Education Policy, 1990 - 2000". This document set overall policy targets for Government of Guinea interventions in the education system in collaboration with other national and international organizations. These goals are reiterated in the Government of Guinea's strategic development document, "Guinea, Vision 2010", which sets overall government goals for the next 15 years. Primary education has been given priority.

As a means of achieving these national education goals, an Education Sectoral Adjustment Program (PASE) was launched in 1990 by the GOG, who requested assistance from various development partners to support their reform goals. The first phase of PASE, called "PASE I", was characterized by very close coordination and complementarity among participating donors - principally USAID, the World Bank, and the French Cooperation - established through joint negotiation with the GOG. PASE I ended in 1994, having contributed directly to the accomplishments noted in the chart below:

**GOVERNMENT OF GUINEA
PASE: Education Sectoral Adjustment Program
1990 - 2000**

<i>Accomplishments by 1996</i>	<i>Targets for the year 2000</i>
GOG budget allocation to education rose from 14% to 26% (exceeding planned target of 20% for the year 2000)	GOG budget allocation to education must rise from 14% to 20%
Share of education budget allocated to primary education rose from 25% to 38%	Share of education budget to primary education must rise from 25% to 40%
Primary school GER: rose to 47% Girls GER: from 19% to 31% Rural GER: from 20% to 33%	Primary school GER must rise from 28% to 53%
More than 3000 classrooms built by 1994; other classrooms used more efficiently by multigrade teaching in rural areas	1000 new classrooms must be constructed annually

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During PASE I, USAID pursued a strategy in support of key policy reforms through its Education Sector Reform Program. Under this program, non-project assistance (NPA) provided budgetary resources to help leverage a greater share of GOG expenditure for primary education, and project assistance was provided to support institutional capacity building in key areas of management and administration. As shown in the table above, the budgetary restructuring done as a result of the NPA conditionality had as a direct result the early achievement of one of the PASE goals set for the year 2000, i.e., GOG budget allocation to education had risen from 14% to 26% by 1996, exceeding the planned target of 20% set for the year 2000.

Since 1994, the GOG, USAID, and other donors have continued with the second phase of education reform efforts under "PASE II", working to reach, or in some cases possibly to exceed, the goals established in the policy statement of 1990. Under PASE II, priority has been placed on *educational quality*, i.e. improving the quality of teaching and learning in primary schools in an expanding, more equitable system. Working to improve the *quality* of education may in some ways be a more difficult and involved task than focusing primarily on expanded *access* by helping to lay the initial groundwork for reform. Nevertheless, the successes so far evidenced in PASE I and continued GOG and donor commitment to carry on with reform provide a solid base upon which to build. (Actions to be taken by each partner will be discussed in more detail below.) USAID's continued involvement at this stage will help ensure that the sectoral reforms begun under PASE I will be brought to fruition, that education system capacity will be further reinforced, and that new initiatives consistent with reform objectives will be developed and undertaken under PASE II.

Current Constraints in the Primary Education Sector

While recent gains in the education sector have been impressive, there is still a long way to go in addressing the human resource development needs of Guinea's school-aged children. USAID's participation under PASE II is in some ways a continuation of efforts to solidify education reform that were begun under PASE I. Now that certain of the basic building blocks are in place to support reform, the question of *quality* of education, both at the administrative and classroom levels, is key.

As described above, USAID cooperated closely with the GOG and other partners to play a key role in supporting GOG education reform efforts under PASE I. An increase in national resources devoted to primary education is one important result that can be traced directly to USAID's use of NPA. Another important role that USAID has played has to do with *equity*: USAID was the first donor to place emphasis on the issue of equity in primary education. USAID assisted the MEN's Equity Committee to identify baseline information needs, develop resource proposals, and plan a social awareness campaign for the education of girls and rural children. USAID also helped MEN take the first steps toward decentralizing its budgeting and management systems, to try to bring planning closer to the local level. While these advances are important, many critical steps remain to be taken to improve overall education quality in Guinea. Some of the key constraints currently facing the education sector include:

* *Strategic planning and management* is notoriously weak in the Ministry of Education. The Ministry lacks the capacity to create a framework that can inform planning and decision-making. No emphasis has been placed on dissemination and use of statistics by a wide population of customers and partners, and the demand side of information use has been virtually unaddressed. The Ministry of Education prepares copious statistical data which are neither widely used nor user friendly.

* *Teaching and learning obstacles* abound. Very few instructional materials are in primary school classrooms. Those that are present are often poorly developed, misused, or locked away for "safekeeping" in storage cabinets. Teachers are not able to effectively use the materials at their disposal, nor are they taught cost-effective methods to produce teaching aids from locally available materials. National curriculum standards do not exist. The quality of teaching is poor, and effective delivery of in-service teacher training has been impeded by the lack of a policy and systematic approach. Students do not move smoothly through the primary school system: high repetition and drop-out rates mean that more time and money are needed to educate each student, and thus considerable resources are wasted due to inefficiency. (It is currently estimated that it takes an average of 12 years for a student to complete sixth grade.)

* *Gender and geographic disparity* is a serious problem. A disproportionate number of school children live in cities or are male. While only 27% of Guinea's children live in cities, over 50% of the children attending Guinea's primary schools live in cities. In 1996, girls' enrollment in first grade was 45% of the total, but girls' enrollment represented only 31% of overall enrollment in primary school. Drop-out and repetition rates were also higher for girls than for boys (1994 primary school repetition rate was 18% overall, but 22.5% for girls).

* *Community and local NGO participation* in education remain weak. Despite the positive steps taken by the Government of Guinea to initiate a social awareness campaign on education, their efforts to engage customers and partners in dialogue on such issues as school construction policy, school financing, and promotion of girls in schooling needs to be greatly strengthened. Parents and communities need to be much more involved in deciding how their schools should be run.

3. Critical assumptions and causal relationships in the Results Framework

During this strategy period, the team has defined three intermediate results (IRs) which it believes will support the Government of Guinea's efforts to increase access, quality, and equity in primary schools in Guinea. The causal relationships and critical assumptions for each intermediate result are discussed below:

Intermediate Result 1: Improved Sectoral Strategic Planning, Management, and Decision-Making

Causal relationships: In order to provide *better quality education* and to improve *access*

(two explicit goals of SO3) it will be necessary to increase the performance and efficiency of the Ministry of Education. If wise decisions can be made concerning scarce resource use, more places will be available for children currently without access to school. The Ministry of Education is directly responsible for defining and developing the mix of policies and associated inputs needed to provide quality instruction and access in public primary schools. Ministry of Education personnel must be able to analyze policy options and determine how they will operate within a context of budgetary and human resource limits. Strengthening the links between budgeting and planning and developing the ability to incorporate data analysis into decision-making processes are essential for effective management. It is also essential that decisions on school reform be made in close coordination with local schools and communities. Thus decentralization of financial and management capacity is an important part of this intermediate result.

Critical assumptions: (1) The GOG and the MEN will make resources available in order to execute policies; (2) MEN structure and delegation of authority will be transparent and allow for decentralized use of information and decision-making as well as for decentralized budget development and financial control; (3) the Government of Guinea will be committed to broadening stakeholder participation in decision-making.

Intermediate Result 2: Improved Instruction in Primary Schools

Causal relationships: Improving instruction in primary schools is related to increased *quality, access, and equity* of schooling. To the degree that schooling becomes more relevant to children's lives and benefits are clearly perceived by Guinean parents and communities, demand for schooling should increase. Improving the primary school curriculum is an important step toward ensuring that what is being taught is useful and relevant to children's needs. It is also linked to improving equity, in that what is taught in schools should allow children to develop in an atmosphere free of limiting stereotypes based on income group or gender. If quality of teaching is improved - one factor among many that are needed to improve student learning - more children should be able to move smoothly through the education system, reducing the need for wasteful grade repetition and drop-outs. In order to sustain quality improvements in classroom instructions, teachers must have ongoing support and opportunities for training and skills improvement.

Critical assumptions: (1) Improved instruction and materials design and development will lead to better student performance; (2) improved teacher support will lead to better instruction and better student performance; and (3) resources to support qualitative improvements such as those listed above will be available and provided in a timely manner.

Intermediate Result 3: Development and Implementation of Equity-Enhancing Programs

Causal relationships: To increase participation rates in primary schools in Guinea, special attention needs to be paid to disadvantaged groups. As described above, access to education is very inequitable in Guinea at present. A principal goal of the SO is to attack the underlying causes for unequal school participation. Increased access to primary school

requires a commitment not only from the public and private sectors, but also from community religious and cultural leaders. It is also necessary to create and maintain a supportive environment in the classroom for disadvantaged groups once they are *in* school, through actions such as working to eliminate gender and other stereotyping in teaching materials and methods.

Critical assumptions: (1) The GOG and MEN are committed to making resources available to equity improvements and supporting ongoing efforts targeted at the community level; for (2) interest in pursuing equity objectives extends beyond the education sector, with other groups willing to join in; and (3) parents, teachers, and community groups are willing to take actions supportive of increasing equity objectives.

4. Commitment and capacity of other development partners

Donor commitment and capacity in supporting the primary education sector in Guinea remain strong under PASE II. Principal donors and international institutions providing support to the primary education sector remain the French Cooperation (FAC), USAID, and the World Bank. The U.S. and France provide project and technical assistance, while World Bank funding is in the form of a low-interest, long-term loan to the GOG approved in 1995: \$42.5 million payable over 40 years with an interest rate of less than 1%. Other education sector partners include the GTZ, the European Union, UNICEF, the African Development Bank, the Japanese development agency, and a number of European and North American NGOs.

Under PASE II, both the GOG and donors have identified educational quality as a key issue in primary education. The World Bank agreed to finance the production and delivery of textbooks. The MEN asked for U.S. assistance in developing and establishing management systems for an overall instructional support network to include instructional materials, teacher training, classroom management, and assessment. Through technical assessment and analysis, USAID decided that instructional materials assistance will include the development of comprehensive teacher manuals and other related low-cost instructional materials, in order to create a technologically appropriate assistance package which addresses sustainability and optimizes the impact of learning materials in the classroom. This work complements ongoing FAC support to the National Research and Pedagogical Institute. The FAC has indicated that it will provide technical advisors in the areas of teacher training, assessment and pedagogical supervision, as well as place roving advisors in the field.

USAID will also be supporting the promotion of greater non-governmental participation in the reform and management of the education system.

While USAID has limited the focus of its support to primary education, the FAC, development banks, and other agencies also work in secondary and technical education. There are some activities at the primary level in which more than one donor is working - inter alia production of textbooks, school construction, teacher training, training of MEN of Education personnel, working with community groups to coordinate and avoid

duplication of efforts, regular donor meetings are held, often with direct MEN participation. Ongoing coordination and communication mechanisms have been established by partners in the sector to share technical information and jointly plan activities with the GOG and determine areas for action.

5. Illustrative approaches

USAID will work with the GOG and partner organizations (e.g. the World Bank, French Cooperation, NGOs, etc.) to ensure an improved and more equitable education system that serves a larger percentage of children. To do this, beginning in 1997 a "fundamental quality level" (FQL) approach was introduced. FQL is principally a planning framework: standards will be set that specify the basic threshold conditions for a school's infrastructure, staffing, materials, and management linked to students' learning. The FQL approach will be used to define standards that help the Government of Guinea meet its quality and equity objectives while expanding access within a limited resource capacity. *The aim of FQL is to ensure that education system expansion adheres to minimum quality criteria, and that increased access is not obtained at the expense of quality.*

It will be crucial to ensure that stakeholders are involved in the design, implementation, and evaluation of FQL activities. Part of the USAID's SO3 strategy is to employ a process of *national consensus* to set FQL standards for quality and equity, to bring parents and communities directly into the decision-making processes related to school reform. USAID will be starting four new activities in support of primary education improvement in 1997: one of these involves working with Ministry of Education personnel and teachers to improve the policy environment for primary education as well as the technical and managerial skills of those managing the process, and three involve working directly in communities with NGO's and parent groups in support of community participation and equity. All four activities are part of an overall FQL approach - the idea is to link efforts at the education sector's "macro" policy level with work that is being done directly at the "micro" community level to increase participation. It will be necessary to work for reform at both levels in order to see real and lasting improvement.

A process of consultation and consensus-building will be used to identify problems in the sector, potential solutions, how they might be implemented and by whom. One strategy which has been suggested for tying together activities at the policy and community levels is to create, under the FQL approach, a certain number of what may be called "*flagship schools*". This concept is very similar to the "model school" approach that has been used in other countries: certain schools that are employing new approaches or using newly received materials will be designated to serve as "mini laboratories" for studying the effects of interventions such as training, increased community involvement, use of low-cost materials, etc. These schools would serve as a type of cross-cutting results focus area that would examine, through a strategy of planned variation and experimentation, the effect of different combinations of project inputs and other low-cost enabling factors. An emphasis would be placed on *sustainability*: the flagship schools would not be inflated with an infusion of inputs that would not be available over the long-term. The idea would be rather to study the various efforts to improve education taking place in the flagship

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schools and *measure impact* of different interventions. By closely examining both successes and failures in the flagship schools, incentives and mechanisms could be created for the spread of those innovations which are successful and which can be transferred to other locations. The contractor charged with working on SO3 activities directly at the Ministry of Education policy level would partner with the PVOs working with SO education activities at the community level, local counterparts, community leaders, school directors, and teachers, to identify schools in various parts of the country that are willing to commit themselves to becoming models of what can be accomplished through greater community and school initiative.

The approaches just mentioned refer to the overall integrated approach that the SO team will pursue in this strategy period. Illustrative approaches specific to each IR are described in more detail below:

Intermediate Result 1: Improved Sectoral Strategic Planning, Management, and Decision-Making

Approaches: USAID efforts will support the growth of *strategic planning* capacity in the Ministry of Education, and the strengthening of the link between *budgeting and planning*. Activities will build on the results-accounting orientation of PASE I by institutionalizing and improving the overall strategic planning, analysis, decision-making capacity, and procedures of the PASE Steering Committee, which is charged with *policy formation and reform management*. The Steering Committee will be assisted in identifying key analytic questions to regularly assess progress toward goals, establish information needs crucial to performance management and policy adjustment, improve its ability to interpret data and to weigh trade-offs in resource allocations. Activities will aid the *decentralization* process to establish and train regional units that plan, budget, and are held accountable for good resource management. The Steering Committee will also be aided in formulating an *overall policy on stakeholder participation*, developing guidance and procedures for regular policy dialogue with public and private sector stakeholders. Methods for replicating both analytic and consultation processes at the decentralized level will also be developed.

Intermediate Result 2: Improved Instruction in Primary Schools

Approaches: Because quality, equity, and planning are inseparable from system efficiency, SO3 activities will emphasize all three. To improve classroom quality, activities will focus on *in-service teacher training* and providing the national pedagogical institute (INRAP) with assistance in developing their own capacity to produce *low-cost teaching manuals and student materials*. Assistance in defining a *curriculum policy* and *revising the curriculum* will also be provided, with special attention to elimination of biases and stereotyping in school materials and teaching methods. While the institutional capacity of INRAP will be developed in these areas, wider involvement within the MEN, as well as *community involvement*, will be included in the process. Activities to assist in developing and implementing a *national student assessment program* will be developed, to enable the MEN to monitor progress made under the initiatives of PASE II.

Intermediate Result 3: Development and Implementation of Equity-Enhancing Programs

Approaches: In the area of equity, activities will focus on increasing school access for all children, but particularly for *rural and female students*. USAID's approach in support of this IR during the strategy period directly supports goals of the Agency's **New Partnership Initiative**. Several U.S. and Guinean private voluntary organizations (PVOs) will take the lead in building the capacity of local NGOs and parent associations, aiming to increase the ability of these organizations to participate in civil society through the management of their public schools. Activities will be based in some of the poorest rural communities in Guinea, where equity and access to education are of major concern. In these areas (selected sites in Moyenne Guinea and Mandiana prefecture in Haute Guinea), two U.S. PVOs will work directly with parents associations and with local NGOs to build the community's capacity to participate in local and regional school activities, and to link these groups to decision-making processes that are normally only accessible to Ministry personnel. If successful, this approach will be replicated nationwide.

Special priority will be given to improving the environment for *girl's education* during the strategy period, through Guinea's participation as an emphasis country in the Global Bureau's Girls' and Womens' Education (GWE) Activity. The Guinean affiliate of Plan International will manage the activity, which will work on several fronts: (1) to continue to provide support to the MEN's Equity Committee to develop, plan, and manage activities that improve the educational participation of girls and rural children in primary education; (2) to broaden support for girls' education beyond the primary education sector by including other important governmental and non-governmental groups that can aid the effort; and (3) to work at the community level in selected areas with parents and children in developing and applying innovative approaches to increase both quality of and access to school for girls.

Potential future policy issues during the strategy period

The strategies and approaches described above will be employed over at least the next five years of strategy period. Before reaching the five-year mark, USAID's will do assessment of changes in the primary education sector since the inception of PASE, to analyze lessons learned and to fine tune the approaches to be used in the later years of the strategy period. As previously stated, however, USAID does not envision changing its commitment to supporting basic education quality, equity and access, as there is still much ground to cover to reach sustainable education reform in Guinea.

A few of the potential areas which may be of particular interest in later years of the long term strategy include the following topics: consideration of language policy for teaching in the initial years of primary school; further strengthening of multigrade classes; analysis of double-shift schooling policies; further strengthening of teacher support "networks"; additional activities to further solidify incorporation of important curricular concepts such as civics democracy and governance, environmental and health issues, gender, etc.; wider use of radio learning for both teachers and students; strengthening links of primary

education to secondary education and studying effects of policy changes at these levels.

6. How sustainability will be achieved

Steps toward ensuring sustainability of educational reform in Guinea began with the inception of PASE I in 1990. The GOG was required to increase the share of its national education budget going to education, and to primary education in particular. SO3 continues to closely track budget trends in education to monitor sustained commitment by the GOG: to date annual expenditures continue to rise toward meeting targets set for the year 2000. In some cases, e.g. percentage of the national budget devoted to education, the GOG has already exceeded planned targets for the year 2000.

One explicit means for monitoring and ensuring long term GOG commitment to supporting education has been built into the contract of FQEL's primary contractor. The contractor will be required to submit annual progress reports on Ministry of Education planning and budgeting that show the Ministry of Education's plans for *gradual assumption of costs paid for under the contract* in relation to teacher training, teaching materials production/distribution, and achievement testing. Other donors and international organizations such as the European Union, and the World Bank maintain certain specific conditionalities for their assistance to the education sector, and USAID monitors these indicators as well.

USAID's emphasis on working directly at the community level to strengthen parent groups and local NGO's is also a strategy to ensure sustainability of education reform over the long term. The position of actors outside of the government will be bolstered in order to maintain needed momentum to sustain education reform. Approaches chosen stress the creation of both Ministry of Education and local community capacity to create support networks, sustainable models for replication, and ongoing feedback and dialogue mechanisms.

7. How achievement of the SO will be judged, including (1) proposed performance indicators and targets and (2) performance targets conveying an understanding of magnitude of change vis a vis USAID's investment and/or that of USAID's partners.

At the time this strategy was being written (April 1997), the Education SO was immersed in full-scale start-up of four new activities in support of the FQEL approach described above. Technical personnel selected to work on the various education results packages all arrived and/or began work in-country in March and April 1997. An initial period of widespread consultation and discussion with stakeholders and partners to solidify the workplan for the FQEL activities was to begin in May. A finalized workplan that would include precise benchmarks, targets, and indicators to measure performance towards achieving results over the life of the activity was due by month four after start-up (August 1997) - unfortunately, several months after the deadline for submitting this Mission Strategy document. The indicators proposed below were thus selected by the SO3 team *prior* to the more detailed technical analysis and feedback that would soon be available to it. While it is not anticipated that the proposed indicators will be modified substantially,

the FOEL workplan will provide information allowing further refinement and specifying targets for each results level in the strategic framework.

Strategic Objective level: "Quality primary education provided to a larger percentage of Guinean children, with emphasis on girls and rural children".

Proposed indicators:

- 1) **Primary school gross enrollment rate** - disaggregated by gender and geographic area.
- 2) **Primary school repetition rate** - disaggregated by gender and geographic area.
- 3) **Grade 4 achievement test results (reading and math)** - National student achievement tests in math and reading for second and fourth grades were to be developed as part of FOEL in 1997. Pilot tests were to be administered in sample schools beginning at the end of Year 1 of the activity. Therefore, initial baseline data for this indicator would be collected in 1998 and annually thereafter to measure progress. Results would be disaggregated by gender and geographic area.

Intermediate Result No. 3.1: Improved Sectoral Strategic Planning, Management, and Decision-making

Proposed indicators:

- 1) **Percent of primary schools attaining FQL levels (rural and urban)**
- 2) **EMIS data used to plan, analyze, and refine FQL**

Intermediate Result No. 3.2: Improved Instruction in Primary Schools

Proposed indicators:

- 1) **Revised curriculum objectives for math and reading defined, approved, and in use**
- 2) **Second grade promotion rate** - disaggregated by gender and geographic area.

Intermediate Result No. 3.3: Development and Implementation of Equity-Enhancing Programs


Proposed indicators:

- 1) **National equity strategy defined** - This indicator refers to one of the explicit goals of the Girls and Womens Education Activity in Guinea, i.e., to establish a national Equity Task Force with a working strategy to take action on educational equity

concerns.

2) **Local constituencies strengthened for implementation of equity initiatives-**
Precise measurements for this would be developed based on the new activities beginning in 1997. Three of the four FQL activities were to begin working directly at the community level with NGOs and/or parent associations in support of educational equity.

**Health Strategic Objective
Intermediate Results
and Indicators**



STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: INCREASED USE OF ESSENTIAL FAMILY PLANNING, MATERNAL HEALTH AND STI/AIDS-PREVENTION SERVICES AND PRACTICES

A. LINKAGE TO AGENCY GOAL AND OBJECTIVES

The USAID/Guinea population, health and nutrition (PHN) strategic objective falls under the Agency goal No 3: "stabilizing world population and protecting human health" and USAID/Guinea's development program goal of "improved economic and social well being of all Guineans in a participatory society". The Mission's PHN strategy will support the Agency's goal No 3 by expanding ongoing family planning and STI/AIDS-prevention activities and designing new maternal child health activities. In addition, the Mission's PHN strategy will support Agency's goal No 5 "Lives saved, suffering reduced and developmental potential reinforced" through delivery of FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services in Guinea's forest-region which contains a high percentage of refugees.

B. RELATIONSHIP OF THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TO GOG GOALS

The Republic of Guinea's national health policy is predicated on the principles of the Bamako Initiative (BI) which ensures access, availability, quality, and efficient use of primary health care services to the majority of the population at a reasonable cost. The national health policy also promotes sustainability through an integrated delivery of preventive and curative services as well as community participation in the design, management and evaluation of primary health care services.

USAID health strategy supports Guinea's national health policy through its emphases on increasing the use of family planning, maternal child health care and STI/AIDS-prevention services. The strategy accomplishes this objective through the provision of improved access, quality and demand of services to rural populations, and through effective collaboration involving the MOH, donors, NGOs and the private sector.

1. Linkages Among FP, CS, Maternal Health, STI/AIDS- Prevention Services:

The inclusion of FP, maternal and child health, and STI/AIDS-prevention services within one SO fully supports the Agency's and the Government of Guinea's emphasis on the linkages between reproductive health and child survival sectors, and reflects the Mission's approach of implementing these components in an integrated manner. Guinea is relatively advanced compared to other countries in its integration efforts by virtue of its Expanded Program of Immunization/Primary Health Care/Essential Drug Program and the other vertical programs existing within health centers and hospitals. Through the proposed strategy of focusing on the primary health care center and community through the NPI approach, USAID believes we will maximize our return on the USG investment by achieving the stated results at the lowest cost. A large part of USAID's efforts will be directed to expanding the availability, quality, and use of sustainable family planning

services, including further development of the private sector and social marketing. Community-based distribution systems will reach a larger segment of the population. In addition, a key emphasis will be on building community support for family planning and for maternal health services.

C. DESCRIPTION OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

1. Statement of Strategic Objective

In 1995, USAID/Guinea (USAID) submitted to AID/W an updated CPSP, recommending an expansion of the health SO beyond social marketing of contraceptives to a new integrated and expanded health SO. Although the draft CPSP was not formally reviewed, a New Activities Description (NAD) was approved and the Mission was asked to proceed with an expanded mandate. The rationale for expanding the health strategy from a strictly family planning focus to an integrated program comprising Maternal and Child Health (MCH), STI/AIDS control hinges on the recognition that sustainable fertility reduction is improbable given Guinea's extremely poor health status. In Guinea's context, conventional wisdom and experience from other developing nations demonstrate that improved health of children and mothers through increased access to a quality package of integrated MCH services in the public sector not only enhances the demand for family planning services but offers the best possibility for sustainability. In order to attain expected results during the duration of this SO and beyond, the following essential mix of FP/MCH/STI/AIDS interventions is proposed:

- **Child health:**
breast-feeding, nutrition, immunization, integrated management of childhood illnesses (IMCI), {diarrheal diseases, presumptive malaria, acute respiratory infections}
- **Maternal health:**
pre-intra-post natal care, reproductive health/FP, prevention, screening and referrals of high risk pregnancies.
- **STI/AIDS-prevention and treatment:**
Public Sector: community based distribution of health and family planning products screening and treatment of STIs cases. Private Sector: social marketing of condoms and health products.
- **Adolescent reproductive health:**
community based program to prevent STIs and unwanted pregnancies.

These interventions will be actively supported by a comprehensive delivery of IEC programs through mass media, interpersonal communications (peer education, use of religious and traditional leaders) and outreach programs. The rationale for the above

interventions is supported by a series of evaluations, sector assessments, and design activities conducted between 1993 and 1997. The following are cited examples: 1993 "Health Information Assessment" prepared by David Boyd and Mark LaPointe of the CCCD (Combatting Childhood Communicable Diseases) project, March-April 1994 "Health and Population Assessment" conducted by SEATS, September/October 1994 "Decentralization and Management Information Systems in the Health Sector" by Alex Ross and Meba Kagone, "Overview of Pharmaceutical Distribution in Guinea" by Patrick Najman, and "A Literature Review of Studies Relating to Health center Utilization" by Scott Hall.

a. Partnerships with community-based NGOs

Since 1991, the Mission in partnership with US PVOs, local NGOs {Association Guineenne pour le Bien Etre Familial (AGBEF)} and in collaboration with the Ministry of Health has been providing family planning and HIV/AIDS-prevention services. Through the establishment of a supportive enabling environment in both the public and private sectors, USAID and other partners have developed FP programs which have produced results meeting or surpassing planned targets.

b. New partnerships initiative (NPI)

A key additional direction for the new strategy is the building of sustainable linkages and relationships with multiple partners, including the MOH, other GOG Ministries, donors, NGOs and PVOs, and communities to support the USAID health and family planning program as well as the nation's health system. In addition to supporting the Agency's New Partnership Initiative, such linkages will support democracy and governance by working directly with communities to empower their members to participate in health decision-making at the family and community levels. In addition, linkages will be established with business associations, religious and traditional leaders to underscore community participation. The establishment of these linkages is critical to the development of a socially responsible civil society and the accountable government needed for sustained development.

c. Health and food security PL-480

The new PHN strategy will address health and food security by emphasizing maternal and child nutrition status to improve overall family productivity. Currently, a US PVO (Africare) is making use of local currency from the monetization of vegetable oil to implement a food security/health initiative in one of the underserved regions of Guinea (Dinguiraye in Upper Guinea) which has the highest levels of acute and chronic malnutrition among children 5 years of age. This activity supports intermediate result 3 (enhanced demand and behavior favoring use of FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention) of SO2. The household nutrition component of the strategy can be used as an entry point for family planning programs, especially because demand for family planning services increases as the importance of child labor in agriculture declines. Furthermore, the health and nutrition component will significantly reduce the incidence of acute and chronic malnutrition, thereby having an impact on child morbidity and mortality.

d. Linkages with other SOs

Education: Increased Enrollment in Primary School, with an Emphasis on Rural/Female Participation.

More direct linkages with the primary education SO will be undertaken. Areas of possible consideration include improving services in school infirmaries and participating in the development of health messages for school curriculums. The Mission has supported the establishment in-country of American PVO offices (such as Save the Children Federation) to support activities under both the PHN and Education SOs.

Democracy/Governance: Greater Participation in Governance particularly at the local level

The SO supports democracy and governance through activities which strengthen locally elected development and health management communities. Achieving SO results, notably IRs 3 and 4 will lead to empowerment of families and communities in health decision making. Therefore, the SO team will work with those synergistic activities identified under democracy and governance SO, such as those conducted by the NGO the Cooperative League of USA (CLUSA) which is developing a model for working with communities in Guinea and empowering them to become more active in civil society.

Natural Resources Management (NRM)

The NRM SO shares linkages with FP/MCH/STI/AIDS-prevention in two aspects. First, NRM will emphasize the capping of springs and wells for potable water supply and vegetable irrigation. Making potable water available throughout the year will reduce human diseases related to unhealthy drinking water and also help women spend considerably less time in fetching water, especially during the dry season. Consequently, readily available potable water will allow rural women to devote more quality time to their children's welfare. Second, NRM emphasis on food security, through improved production, will lead to an increase in family income and consequently have an impact on nutrition and the welfare of families. Finally, NRM will benefit from efforts to stabilize population growth through family planning which in turn will reduce environmental degradation.

e. Development hypothesis

The development hypothesis underlying this strategic objective is premised on the knowledge that increased use of family planning, maternal-child health, and STI/AIDS-prevention services and practices will lead to improved health and reduced fertility among Guinean families. In order to bolster USAID and other partners' achievements in improving the health sector especially in family planning, USAID and partners have identified the following goal for the PHN sector: "**improved health and reduced fertility of Guinean families**". The SO for attaining this goal is "**increased use of essential FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services and practices**".

2. Problem Analysis

a. Low use of modern family planning methods

Guinea's population of 6.8 million (US Census Bureau projection for 1995), is rising quickly with a fertility rate of 5.7 (DHS, 1992), a population growth rate of about 2.8%, and the estimated birth rate of 41/1000 women of reproductive age (DHS, 1992). Contributing to the desire for many children are high infant (153/1000) and child mortality (252/1000) rates. Maternal mortality is also high at 666/1000,000 live births (DHS 1992). Life expectancy is low at 47 years with newborns having a one in four chance of death before age five. These high rates contribute to Guinea's being ranked last in the 1994 United Nations Development Program Human Development Report. The 1992 DHS cites 1.7% contraceptive prevalence rate, while unmet need for contraception is estimated at 25%. The quality of family planning service is low due to poor clinic environment, lack of trained staff to provide family planning services, low knowledge of modern contraceptive methods, (55% for men and 28% for women); Information, Education and Communication programs (IEC) related to family planning are weak at all levels and contraceptive stockouts are frequent. In addition, religious and traditional pro-natalist beliefs hinder FP acceptances in many parts of the country, and FP services are not coordinated. While USAID has had enormous success in family planning, it is obvious that we have just made a good start.

b. Inadequate maternal and child care services

Poverty, lack of knowledge, high fertility, and lack of access to quality health services contribute to the high levels of maternal and child morbidity and mortality in Guinea. The overall pattern of child morbidity and mortality is dominated by the interactive combination of communicable disease, undernutrition, and micronutrient deficiencies. At least 70 percent of deaths among children aged 0-4 years are due to causes which are preventable or easily treated: diarrheal diseases (19%), vaccine preventable diseases (16%), malaria (16%), and respiratory infections (18%). Studies report chronic malnutrition of 17% to 27% in school-age children. Although 93% of infants are breast-fed, exclusive breast-feeding in the first two months of life is estimated at only 5%. A 1995 World Bank study cites poor quality of and access to care in health centers as major determinants of the current low rate of health center utilization.

c. Rising rates of incidence of HIV/AIDS

AIDS and sexually transmitted illnesses (STI) are important public health problems in Guinea. While the reported HIV sero-prevalence remains under 2%, a small study of commercial sex workers found 32% were positive. The percentage of women among reported AIDS cases has increased by 39% over the past eight years. Financial resources available for HIV/AIDs from the GOG have been extremely inadequate. There is thus a need for laboratories for diagnostic tests, training of staff, decentralization of surveillance, and operations research.

d. Low government revenues to public health

Revenues allocated to public health by the GOG are remarkably low and what is provided goes for the support of hospitals and services accessed disproportionately by the wealthiest segments of the population. Decentralization policies have made health centers officially autonomous except for salaries of government-employed personnel, but many health centers are not utilized sufficiently to generate enough income to cover their fixed costs. Furthermore, travel costs and excessive time lost have been cited as significant cost factors that discourage utilization of public services. Community-level actions to increase utilization and strengthen the efficiency and financial viability of the health centers are possible solutions to strengthen community participation, and the business and financial sectors will create an enabling environment for increasing financial revenues.

e. Guinea's health system

Prior to 1987, Guinea's health care delivery system was in a state of virtual collapse. However, between 1987 and 1997 the Government of Guinea developed an impressive National Primary Health Care Program (NPHCP) based on the "Bamako Initiative" model which seeks to promote community participation, cost recovery, and a more consistent supply of essential drugs. To date, 304 of 346 health centers have been integrated into the program and the Ministry of Health (MOH) estimates that 75% of the population live within a five-kilometer radius of an operational health center.

This impressive achievement has made Guinea's Primary Health Care Program one of the best health center cost recovery systems in Africa. The system is characterized by several enlightened principles. For example, the pricing structure effectively subsidizes preventive services and other basic needs as charges for all health center consultations include the cost of medication for the treatment. Furthermore, the revenue derived from curative services cross subsidizes health center preventive services, outreach activities, and operational expenses. Health centers can thus retain revenue in a local bank account under a joint management system comprising community management committees and health centers. The system to date has ensured the financial independence of the health centers which receive no central budget allocation except for staff salaries.

Despite this progress, the cost recovery system still requires further improvement. Possible approaches for enhancing sustainability of primary health care systems include but are not limited to the following: strengthening the role of the community health center management committee, conducting research on the population's willingness to pay, investigating alternative pricing levels and mechanisms (unique consultation fee vs. fees for each component of a service), exploring other resource mobilization strategies, increasing national MOH contribution for operational support of health centers, and applying equity in allocating resources (across health centers).

In the public sector, Guinea's young health system is entering a second key phase of development which will require additional system support. Whereas the current cost

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recovery system has been essential to the creation of a basic health care delivery system, future sustainable development requires attention to additional resource mobilization strategies, improved quality of care, and improved management capacity. Although health sector policies are enlightened, the delivery of health services is impeded by major problems in management and organization, including low absorptive capacity, inefficient or inappropriate use of resources, inadequately trained management staff, lack of GOG contribution to non-salary recurrent costs for health centers, and severe GOG financial constraints. Moreover, utilization of health services is low, attributed to the poor quality of care resulting from factors such as inadequate training and motivation of health workers, poor supervision, and stockouts of essential drugs.

f. USAID experience to date

Prior to the 1995 update of USAID/Guinea's Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP), the SO focussed on increasing the ability of families to determine their household size. The objective was achieved through USAID funding to Population Services International (PSI) to furnish technical assistance for the implementation of activities designed to limit population growth and the spread of STI/AIDS. USAID through PSI/Option Santé Familiale (OSFAM) and other local NGOs such as Association Guinéenne pour le Bien-Etre Familiale (AGBEF) and other partners have developed FP programs which have produced results meeting or surpassing planned targets. The biggest impact has been in social marketing of contraceptives and the development of an extensive network comprising almost 4,000 contraceptive sale outlets. This resource has been enhanced by the promotion of extensive mass media and outreach programs designed to increase awareness, promote use of contraceptives, and reinforce preventive behaviors for controlling the spread of the HIV/AIDS virus.

In 1996, there was a 7.6% increase in sales of contraceptives which is expected to continue through 1998. Since 1992, contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) has increased from 1.3% to 6%, the target in 1996. Couple years of protection increased from 12,807 in 1992 to 32,532 in 1996. The Mission's new PHN strategy will build on the successful introductions for modern contraception by developing further partnerships with local NGOs.

In addition to commercial sales of contraceptives, FP services have been successfully introduced into the Bamako Initiative primary health care program with an outreach community-based distribution system. Further success has been demonstrated by the introduction of FP and STI/AIDS activities in the Medical School of the University of Conakry and the four regional health schools through collaboration with the Ministry of Education. The USAID family planning activities have played a pivotal role in fostering a receptive political environment for promoting the sale of contraceptives in the country. A national population policy has been promulgated, giving increased rights to women over their fertility, a family code has been drafted and legislation has been passed to promote family planning products and services through public and private sectors channels. The percentage of people having specific knowledge of contraceptive methods has thus increased from 10.5% in 1992 DHS to 89% in 1996 based on PSI project evaluation.

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g. Affected customers and targeted areas

Customers affected by this SO will be children 0-5 years old, adolescents, and women and men of reproductive age, primarily in the Upper and Forest regions of Guinea. During the eight year life span, it is expected that over 2 million individuals will benefit from the SO.

The areas in Upper and Forest Guinea comprise three administrative regions divided into Prefectures (Health districts). Eight such health districts are in Upper Guinea and seven in Forest Guinea. The choice of these areas are supported by detailed needs assessment and sector analysis conducted over the past four years. The findings confirm extreme poverty, very poor health status and the lowest awareness of modern contraceptives of the four regions.

Lessons to be derived from this initial effort will inform future health interventions as USAID expands into the two remaining regions. Private sector activities through social marketing will have a national focus to build on progress made to date, reinforce the systems already established, and make full use of the existing connections between health centers and communities.

3. Critical Assumptions and Causal Relationships in the Results Framework

For the strategy period 1998 to 2005, the SO team has identified four intermediate results necessary for achieving expected results under the family planning and health SO. The strategic objective is "increased use of essential FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services and practices". The developmental hypothesis linking the objective with the Mission's goal postulates that increased use of family planning, maternal child-health and STI/AIDS-prevention and practices leads to improved health and reduced fertility which in turn lessens economic burdens, and thereby improves the social well-being of all Guineans. While causal relationships for each intermediate results are discussed below, critical assumptions are listed at the end of the discussion on causality owing to their cross-cutting nature.

Intermediate Result 1: Increased access to FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services and product

Causal relationships: In order to increase use of essential FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services and products, there must be increased access to these services. USAID and its partners will thus increase the availability of health products and services as well as increase the equitable availability (geographic, financial, and gender) of these services.

Intermediate Result 2: Improved quality of FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services and products

Causal Relationships: Improving the quality of services and availability of products will lead to increased use of FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services. If services provided at health centers are judged by the public to be of high quality, reliable, and provided with full respect for the client, utilization will increase. In order to attain a high quality delivery of services, health providers' performance must be improved as well as the management, monitoring and evaluation systems from community to national levels.

Intermediate Result 3: Increased demand and behavior for FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services, products and practices

Causal Relationships: In order to increase use for FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services, family planning and health behaviors need to change. One of the keys to changing behavior is to improve the awareness and knowledge of preventive primary health care among regional and prefectural decision makers, religious and community decision makers, mothers and youths, as well as vulnerable high risks groups. The implementation of an effective and systematic Information, Education and Communication (IEC) program will increase the awareness, knowledge, and the demand for and use of FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services.

Intermediate Result 4: More effective response among donors, government, community organizations, NGOs, and private sector in addressing critical health system constraints.

Causal relationships: Success in achieving anticipated results of this SO also resides in improving the national capacity to address critical health system constraints by a number of development partners: the GOG, donors, community organizations, NGOs and the private sector. To this end, there must be an effective and sustainable coordination involving all concerned partners. To enhance coordination, certain data and information are to be collected and systematically analyzed.

Critical assumptions

- The GOG continues to support the National Primary Health Care Program including decentralized management of health care and the cost recovery system.
- Critical commodities including pharmaceuticals are available for project activities at reasonable prices.
- Key donors such as the World Bank (IBRD), World Health Organization (WHO), the German Development Bank (KFW), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and European Union (EU) develop a comprehensive multi-donor initiative to address key policy management and resource constraints, and maintain their current funding levels for sector services.

- Health sector initiatives continue to be guided by the precepts of the Bamako Initiative; i.e. communities and NGOs continue to play a central role in the management of health centers and implementation of primary health care interventions.
- Cost recovery continues to be viable to support the availability of drugs and other family planning and health commodities.
- All partners undertake capacity building to strengthen implementation and management of FPH activities.

4. Commitment and Capacity of Other Development Partners

Many partners are involved in Guinea's efforts to increase the use of family planning, maternal and child health, and STI/AIDS-prevention services and practices. Some are the Ministry of Health, the "Guinean Association for Family Well Being" (AGBEF), and the National AIDS Control Program. Representatives of international organizations such as (UNICEF), the World Bank (IBRD), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and World Health Organization (WHO) have been critical in helping to establish and sustain the delivery of health and family planning services to Guineans. NGOs, including Medecins Sans Frontières (MSF)/Belgium, Medicus Mundi, (an Italian NGO), Centre Canadien d'Etudes et de Coopération Internationale (CECI), and more recently Africare, the Cooperative League of USA (CLUSA), and Save the Children Federation (SCF) have provided critical support for the Guinea public health system to deliver health and family planning services and to increase community participation.

The private sector (particularly pharmacies and private medical clinics) and other organizational networks have contributed to the delivery of services, and have been involved, formally or informally, in the development of the health strategic objective and results framework through several consultative meetings of key stakeholders since 1994. A private medical sector has only begun to develop in Guinea due to the lack of available credit extended to private physicians to open practices, the inability of rural populations to afford private fees, and regulatory barriers to entry into the market. Private pharmacies are found in the larger regional towns, but their prices exceed the ability of the average household to pay.

The Ministry of Health is revising the national health policy and reorganizing many departments within the MOH. One expected outcome is further decentralization of authority and resources to lower levels of Guinea's health system. The Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Children (MPFE) which coordinates policy concerning women and children, including population matters is a strong partner in this initiative and is committed to the achievement of this strategic objective.

In many regions, local and international NGOs/PVOs have assisted the public sector deliver services through renovation of facilities, training, and some equipment and commodity purchases. The current USAID/G Social Marketing of Contraceptives Project (SMC) with

PSI collaborates extensively with the private sector to market condoms. USAID is fortunate to have several excellent US NGO partners to work with in Guinea. Africare and Save the Children Federation are already experienced in nutrition, health, child survival, and education programs. The prospects for increasing the number of NGOs active in health in Guinea in support of the public sector are excellent. Indigenous NGOs such as AGBEF are growing and with the help of PSI and USAID have developed increased management capacity. In addition, tremendous potential exists to build relationships between NGOs active in health with those active in democracy and governance, such as CLUSA.

Several donors work in both family planning, maternal and child health, and STI/AIDS-prevention. In family planning, USAID has been the most prominent donor, although UNFPA, and more recently, the German Development Bank (KFW) have been significantly involved. A partnership between KFW and PSI already exists and KFW has agreed to co-fund PSI's family planning program. In the Expanded Program of Immunization/Primary Health Care/Essential Drug, UNICEF continues to support the Ministry of Health. The World Bank, which is considering a new reproductive health project, is among the three largest donors or concessional lenders in health. The Bank's focus is on the northern two natural regions (of the country's 4). The European Union is planning a large new health project in the Upper and Forest Regions (same regions as USAID's interest) and in Conakry. This assistance will focus on four aspects some of which complement USAID activities while others are unrelated. They include: technical support for planning and management of hospitals and health units, construction and rehabilitation of health units and office buildings, equipment and logistic support to regional and prefectural hospitals and health units, and individual and groups initiatives aimed at strengthening the delivery of diverse health care services. Most of these proposed interventions are infrastructural improvements and highly complementary to USAID programs.

Owing to poor donor coordination in the health sector, a key issue will be the continued coordination with other donors to prevent duplication and ensure the effective use of resources. Individual donors and other partners sponsor meetings to which others are invited, but a routine dedicated effort to coordinate does not yet exist. Through intermediate result 4, USAID intends to seize a leading role in donor coordination.

5. Illustrative Approaches

USAID's approach to achieving the strategic objective is to target essential health services and practices in focus areas rather than providing direct support to the central government through its Ministry of Health. The approach strengthens public sector, community based services at the district level. USAID will encourage a more effective response among donors, government, community organizations, NGOs, and the private sector in addressing critical health system constraints through improved linkages amongst the interventions proposed.

a. Community participation and support

In order to encourage community/public participation at the local level, the GOG has embarked on a policy of decentralization, with the health ministry leading the way. MOH leadership is also committed to community participation in management of health care services and to providing a more rational allocation of financial and human resources to support primary health care at the prefecture and health center levels. The challenge is to translate these sound policies into the effective and sustainable delivery of services at the local level. Significant questions have arisen including the nature of ownership of health centers (i.e do they belong to the community or to the government?) decision making authority regarding conflict between community members and health center staff which is appointed by the government, and disillusionment of community members owing to non-compensation for work done. In order to overcome these issues with sustainable solutions, operations research will guide USAID programming.

Intermediate Result 1: Increased Access to FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-Prevention Services and Products

To increase access to services and products, an approach which supports the nationwide availability of contraceptives and other health products is planned. Product distribution together with sales and integrated education/promotion programs will increase access to essential services and products. Other specific activities to increase access and support are: training of health center personnel (in the acquisition of preventive and clinical curative skills including STI/AIDS-prevention and treatment), strengthening and expanding information, education and communication capacity to fully integrate services at the health center levels, more efficient management of the health centers, expanded community based distribution of products, improved logistics management for a dependable supply of essential drugs and products, operations research, and linkages to and coordination with other donors and partners for better results.

Intermediate Result 2: Improved Quality of FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-Prevention Services and Products

In order to improve the quality of existing services a two pronged approach will be taken:

(a) the skills and attitudes of health workers and supervisors will be enhanced to improve the performance of health providers and community-based workers. Thus, in-service training in clinical and counselling skills will address such areas as integrated norms, standards, and protocols. In addition, on-the-job training will create a referral system for high risk pregnancies and emergency delivery needs as well as develop supervisory and monitoring skills. "Training of trainers approach" will develop a cadre of trainers at the regional and possibly prefectural levels. Health delivery services including reproductive health and regular client counseling in school infirmaries will be enhanced through training of health providers.

(b) Improved monitoring and evaluation of health and management systems are necessary to improve service quality. USAID will improve the capacity of the monitoring staff



through training of managers and provision of management tools, such as tracking forms.

USAID recognizes that the availability of health products is fundamental to improved service quality. Although USAID will not provide most commodities, it will work with health centers to identify sources of commodities, assist in developing linkages between sources, and train staff in commodity logistics.

Intermediate Result 3: Increased Demand and Behavior Favoring Use of FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-Prevention Services, Products and Practices

Experience from other developing countries shows that increased knowledge of appropriate health practices leads to increased demand for services and products. A combination of improved knowledge of health risks within vulnerable groups, improved knowledge and responsible behavior amongst caretakers and improved knowledge of positive health practices by traditional practitioners are necessary to achieve improvement in knowledge of positive health practices and services in the focus areas.

Two Result Packages have been established to achieve this IR. The first (RP1) will strengthen public sector services, particularly community-based services. The geographic focus is in Upper and Forest Guinea. RP1 will stimulate community awareness of health issues by promoting non-clinical availability of health information and services, as well as "essential" preventive and care-seeking behaviors by households and individuals. In order to enhance demand and quality as well as induce behavior change, RP1 will emphasize training of health center personnel and at improving information, education and communication strategies. For example, there will be training of health center personnel on FP/MCH and reproductive health as well as refresher training for existing staff. The training umbrella will be broadened to encompass not only senior health center staff but also paramedics and auxiliaries who have had less formal training but play important supporting roles in delivering comprehensive health services.

Improved training, more effective use of existing materials and networks, effective community participation, and development of new IEC approaches must all be used to strengthen health center capacity to educate and promote behavior change. New innovative ways to increase advocacy for improved health practices of all kinds on the part of local and national decision makers and opinion leaders will be pursued. The strategic objective team will thus work to increase local health staff IEC capacity while developing new materials. IEC activities will expand slowly from a focus on existing services and practices to improved services and practices as basic operations research is completed. Messages will continue to focus on family planning and STI/AIDS prevention, as well as ORS use and availability. New messages will be developed that will increase community members' knowledge of home health practices. Situations which require effective care outside the home will be highlighted. In primary schools, existing curriculums will be revised to emphasize preventive measures for reducing behavior and sanitation related illnesses: malaria, infectious diseases, HIV/AIDS.

Results Package 2 (RP2) will continue and expand the very successful social marketing (SM) interventions already supported by USAID through PSI and its Guinean NGO counterpart OSFAM. To achieve desired results the SO will do the following: (1) increase availability of health products, (2) improve knowledge and acceptability of such products, and (3) increase equity in the availability of health products and practices.

In addition, USAID will apply two principle social marketing approaches in increasing demand for services and products. First, USAID will expand the distribution and private sale of condoms, hormonal contraceptives and oral rehydration salts (ORS). Second, public understanding of family planning and preventive health will be increased. Implementation will be through mass media and product promotion. The involvement of primary school students and staff for preventive awareness health messages in FP/MCH/STI/AIDS-prevention will enhance effective community participation. Thus, USAID will support health education efforts in the schools and collaborate with traditional village peer groups, local NGOs, Peace Corps, the Ministry of Youth Arts and Sports, and the Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Children's affairs in the design and dissemination of IEC messages.

The issue of equity has been raised by health sector assessments in the past and figured prominently during the SO2 Results Framework planning workshops organized by USAID in February 1997. External reviews have found that substantial portions of the population cannot afford the essential health services, particular at certain times of the year. Where family solidarity cannot overcome this problem, other solutions are needed. This is an area that will require operations research for developing possible solutions.

Intermediate result 4: More Effective Response Among Donors, Governments, Community Organizations, NGOs, and the Private Sector in Addressing Critical Health Constraints.

Implementation of the following approaches is expected to achieve this intermediate result. They include strengthening: a) donor partnership at the national level, b) local organization capacity and involvement; c) inter-sectoral collaboration within government and among private and public and traditional sectors to solve health problems at all levels, and d) NGOs and other local organizations and health systems' capacity to work together to solve health problems.

In addition, activities necessary to achieve results will require a greater reliance on GOG systems and resources that are already stretched to their limits. Few if any direct interventions will be made to address critical health systems constraints at the central level. Rather, USAID will build on its track record of donor collaboration in order to address this key constraint. USAID will support a coordination council as well as foster NGO coordination in focus geographical areas. Small grants to PVOs will support model projects and operations research. USAID will also fund at least two DH Surveys.

The time frame for achieving the strategic objective and intermediate results is eight years. Building on our current program, USAID expects to attain significant SO and intermediate

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results on the family planning and STI/AIDS components early on. This expectation is based on past trends in the use of family planning and social marketing in STI/AIDS-prevention services, present capacity to affect changes, and anticipated resources from USAID and other sources. The MCH services and practices represent newer areas for USAID involvement. USAID therefore expects to attain major impact within the first three to four years as capacity must first be developed.

Operations research

Given problems related to access, quality, demand and behavior discussed in the section on illustrative approaches, operations research will be a useful tool for developing and testing new approaches for a sustainable delivery of a comprehensive, integrated FP/MCH/STI/AIDS-prevention service. Two types of operations research (macro and micro) are envisaged: The macro research will include strategies to find solutions to equity issues such as: increasing and improving community participation in the management of health centers, investigating community's willingness to pay, investigating alternative pricing levels and mechanisms, increasing community based distribution and outreach, increasing national MOH contribution for operational support of health centers, and applying equity in allocating resources across health centers, investigating cultural constraints, promoting effective donor coordination, etc. The micro research will focus on such topics as: testing of IEC models, integrated case management, STI treatment algorithms, referral systems, effective use and management of resources, etc.

6. How Will Sustainability be Achieved

A number of the GOG's health sector policies support long-term sustainability. They include decentralization, cost recovery and retention of revenues at the local level, and implementation of a population and a health policy. Moreover, additional attention by the GOG to ensure the supply of essential drugs and commodities and national coordination of health sector donors, NGOs, communities, and partners will greatly increase the chances for long-term sustainability.

To sustain and expand the use of essential FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services, the strategic objective will institutionalize, through training and follow-up, quality of care in health settings. By stressing participation and awareness, communities will be encouraged to increase their sense of control over their own health and the management of their health centers. General and financial management training will be supported and community-based distribution systems (which are also attached to the health centers) will be expanded. In addition, USAID will work with its partners to improve the management of the GOG distribution network of essential drugs in order that communities have these essential products for sale. The SO will also advocate a better policy environment favoring the evolution of the private health sector.

The SO's approach for enhancing community participation and behavior change will ensure long-term sustainability of results. Fertility and health decisions are made by individuals living and working within the context of their community, and sustainable individual health-

directed decisions stem from a personal recognition for change. Thus, the SO's focus will center on the family and the community to promote sustainable healthy behaviors and use of FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services, products, and practices through enhanced knowledge.

7. How Achievement of the Strategic Objective Will Be Judged, Including Proposed Indicators and Targets

A series of indicators and performance targets will be used to monitor the progress and measure the achievement of this strategic objective. (Please see annex.) At the objective level, the indicators are: contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR), tetanus toxoid coverage of women of reproductive age, measles coverage by 12 months of age, condom use with non-regular sex partner.

Indicators for measuring Intermediate Results are as follows:

IR2.1: geographic access within 5km to health center or 2km to outreach service delivery points, proportion of population aged 15-49 that knows where condoms can be obtained within 1 hour, proportion of health center clients who are given prescriptions because they cannot afford drugs at the health center, and unmet need for family planning services.

IR2.2: proportion of health centers whose staff use latest MOH service guideline protocols to provide each of 5 groups of essential services, and proportion of properly diagnosed cases which warrant referral that are successfully referred from health center to hospital.

IR2.3: proportion of mothers and fathers stating their intention to space or limit number of their children, proportion of women intending to deliver their next child with assistance from a trained midwife or traditional birth attendant, and proportion of mothers intending to have their children vaccinated.

IR2.4: proportion of days in past 6 months during which the warehouse supplying health centers had all essential drugs in stock, proportion of IR and DPS teams in target areas receiving 100% of their budgeted operating funds to support peripheral PHC services, proportion of health centers and outreach points having staff fully trained in current protocols for essential services, and proportion of health centers and health posts adequately repaired and equipped to provide essential services.

In addition to the above indicators, baselines will be established for evaluating achievements where necessary. Subsequent measures (such as DH Surveys, case studies, Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI) coverage surveys and standard measures of social marketing product distribution) will be used for updating baselines at periodic intervals.


Administrative monitoring of impact on USAID customers will be done jointly by USAID, the GOG, other donors, and through the implementing agents for the results packages. USAID Strategic Planning and Results Center will help the strategic objective team develop

integrated tracking systems, provide technical support and monitor the achievement of the strategic objective for reporting to USAID/Guinea management and USAID/Washington.

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Democracy & Governance Strategic Objective
Intermediate Results
and Indicators

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**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: GREATER CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE,
PARTICULARLY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL**

A. LINKAGE TO AGENCY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

This strategic objective supports the Agency goal of Developing Sustainable Democracies. It is a new objective which builds on and consolidates Mission's current D/G Special Objective: "Fostering Civil Society Development and Good Governance." To reach a critical element of the target population -- the vast majority of Guineans who are overwhelmingly preoccupied with basic economic necessities -- and to obtain the active participation of this group for attaining this objective, some activities under the SO support the development of participatory democracy in the management of economic cooperatives and associations. As such, it also supports the Agency's Broad-based Economic Growth goal.

B. RELATION OF THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TO GOG GOALS

This objective is in line with, and highly complementary to, GOG stated goals of interaction between the government and its citizens. As the problem analysis section below emphasizes, a fundamental problem addressed by this Strategic Objective is the gap between existing laws and the degree to which they are implemented.

The 1990 *Loi Fondamentale*, Guinea's Constitution, is a modern and progressive document expressly designed to put as much distance as possible between the oppressive government of the First Republic and subsequent governments. The *Loi Fondamentale* sets the stage for the creation of genuine democratic institutions and laws and, as noted in the recent D/G assessment, "in most areas, though with significant exceptions, the legal framework of democratic institutions is in place". Also significantly, and particularly since the February 1996 military mutiny, prominent government leaders, led by the President himself, continue to extol Guinea's commitment to the rule of law, good governance, accountability and democratic processes in general.

GOG laws and regulations on decentralization, NGOs, Cooperatives, and other aspects of state-citizen relations, are all in line with the proposed SO. Guinea's colonial experience and legacy from the First Republic, have, however, generated some state-citizen codes of behavior which have inhibited significant movement toward these often stated objectives and intentions. The considerable good will USAID enjoys in Guinea and the United State's comparative advantage in democracy and governance will contribute significantly to advancing this objective and sustainable development in Guinea.

C. DESCRIPTION OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

1. Statement of the strategic objective

There exists in Guinea a significant gap between the laws of the country and the reality of politics and administration. Not surprisingly, a related gap exists between those who take political decisions in Guinea and the bulk of the population which must live with the consequences of those decisions. The strategy proposed here aims to narrow these gaps by concentrating USAID/Guinea's Democracy and Governance resources mainly on local-level activities (local refers not only to rural areas, but also to urban localities--*quartiers*, etc.), reinforcing the nascent development of civil society at the local level to which USAID has already contributed through economic growth, natural resource management, health and education programs, as well as its experience as a New Partnerships Initiative Leading Edge Mission. Although a greater focus on local-level programs than those at the national level is proposed, important contributions can be made with smaller amounts of resources being directed to central government institutions. The new strategic objective is therefore stated as "**greater citizen participation in governance, particularly at the local level**".

2. Problem Analysis

Guinea has made important strides in developing a participatory, accountable system of governance since the end of the repressive Sékou Touré regime in 1984, but much remains to be achieved. Guineans have enjoyed opportunities to elect their local and national leaders, but this right has been impinged upon in numerous ways by current political leaders unwilling to relinquish their grasp on power. Likewise, legal provisions are in place for decentralizing government and enabling economic development, but in practice, much control is still exerted from the national level over the political and economic choices of local communities. In essence, political leadership remains unaccountable to the large portion of the Guinean population and to the very laws which it has promulgated, and has shown very little commitment to allowing developments which would undermine its control. Thus unchecked executive power remains the fundamental constraint to progress in the area of democracy and governance.

This lack of accountability has significant impact on Guinea's development prospects. Corruption is endemic and results in the non-productive use of resources. Vested interests in the current situation go a long way toward explaining the slow progress of economic reform, which also contributes to non-efficient resource allocation, while the unstable macro-economic picture discourages needed international investment. Moreover, poor governance and misadministration hamper the efforts of average Guineans to improve their own lives, prolonging the poverty that holds back the country. In this context, improving the quality of governance and assisting Guineans to claim their rightful stake in the administration of the country is key to improving the overall prospects for development.

The factors constraining accountability and participation in Guinea are many. Poverty looms large, as do the concomitant lack of education, infrastructure, institutional capacity

and information in the country. Twenty-six years of pervasive repression under Sékou Touré also undermined mutual trust and a sense of political efficacy, essential building blocks for the political participation that is necessary for political accountability. This lack of trust and hesitance about public or civic activity is striking and played an important role in shaping the local-level orientation of the strategy we propose below, insofar as we believe that development of democratic practices and interactions between leaders and citizens at a very tangible and immediate level will be the best antidote to the now endemic distrust and fear.

After the 1984 military coup, the GOG initiated a policy of deconcentration and decentralization in Guinea which reorganized the country into communes (in the urban areas) and rural development communities (CRD) run by elected local government bodies (*conseils communautaires*). Although these local government bodies lack fiscal autonomy and do not have a separate legal existence, they are a key element of the on-going decentralization process in Guinea, the second oldest experience in the region, after Cote d'Ivoire. There remains, however, a disconnection between representative local government institutions and the grassroots associations, and much more needs to be done before local governments throughout the country effectively serve their dual purpose of local representation and local administration. Empowering grassroots associations will strengthen the representation of marginalized groups, improve their ability to participate in local government bodies, and result in better solutions to local problems.

During the same period of this decentralization/deconcentration policy, and particularly since the beginning of the democratization process in 1990, a Guinean civil society has emerged and is very active both in the cities and in the rural areas. A large number of grassroots associations are involved in a wide range of economic and social activities, including small business/micro-enterprise, horticulture, environment protection, training/extension, etc. These different grassroots associations have become donors' focus for assistance. USAID for instance has worked with grassroots associations in micro-credit activities (the PRIDE project), democratic governance training (the CLUSA project), and natural resources management. The problem is that most of the groups that are emerging around economic and other activities have not really developed working relationships with local government representatives to advance their interests and get better government support for their needs (some would argue that this precludes them being called "civil society" at this stage).

The weakness of civil society, and especially of civic advocacy organizations, is one of the most plausible explanations of the gap between the legal framework and democratic practices in Guinea. The fragility and vulnerability of the democratization process in Guinea also result from the immaturity of civil society organizations and their inability to create a strong pro-democratic front. Civil society organizations face a series of constraints which restrict their ability to play a more effective role in the consolidation of democratic governance in Guinea. Despite the fact that remarkable efforts have been made to set in place a relatively liberal legal framework for civil society, there is an urgent need for coordinating NGO interventions and for establishing more convivial relationships between State and civil society. The other most common problems facing civil society

organizations in Guinea relate to their low level of awareness of the legal framework covering their types of organizations and to their sectors of intervention, their lack of internal democracy, their lack of unity, their lack of resources and/or their total reliance on external financial support. In addition, support NGOs are most often created from the top by university graduates and/or retrenched civil servants with weak linkages to the grassroots level, and are therefore unable to articulate and address community needs.

A specific need, expressed by USAID's development partners carrying out community-based organizational activities, is increased access to the basic information about the legal provisions governing their own activities and those of the individual Guineans participating in these activities. It is directly related to the success of the strategy, as the local and national civil society around which the strategy is built cannot function successfully if they do not know about and cannot get access to the laws governing these activities. Particular need was expressed for dissemination of the laws and regulations governing NGO activities, commerce, the powers of the different branches of local and national government, and basic individual rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis public authorities. Not only do the texts of the laws need to be centrally accessible, but even more important is access for the majority of Guineans who live outside Conakry and do not speak or read French.

The strategy's proposed assistance to advance the rule of law would respond to this need for information which is also a key factor in narrowing the gap between the legal texts and legal environment noted above. We emphasize, however, that the activity proposed-- translation and dissemination of laws and summaries of laws, and targeted civic education -- is aimed at meeting a specific need of the local and national groups that are at the center of the strategy. It is not an overall strategy for improving the rule of law in Guinea. This is a very large need in Guinea, but one that is beyond the capabilities of USAID's limited resources at this time. Nearly everything in the judiciary needs improvement, from the quality of judges to the quality and distribution of court facilities. While this is a fundamental shortcoming of the conditions for democracy and governance in Guinea, we believe that building up Guineans' capacity to participate in the making of laws and to address themselves to the legal system is a more pressing need with higher payoff. Such a prior development would also increase incentives for the government to hold itself accountable for legal infractions.

Guinea's 114-member National Assembly is poised either to provide dynamic leadership into the 21st century, or to become an ineffectual but personally lucrative club for the leaders of the political class. An operational, and well-informed Assembly will, however, advance the establishment of a real balance of power within the government. Transparent and fair elections for national assembly deputies are an important enabling factor for consolidating and safeguarding democratic developments at the local level. To insure reelection, the deputies would have to be responsive to their constituencies, and as the population's awareness of the Assembly's potential increases, there will be more interest in the role of local government as a means of accessing the Assembly. At the same time, one can expect the gradual shift in the understanding of the legal--versus the actual and/or perceived--role of the *tutelle* as a result of activities like those proposed in this strategy.

The Assembly is receiving limited support from a number of donors. However, much remains to be done. USAID is well-placed to engage local and international organizations and individuals to assist the Assembly in the expansion of its analytical capacity. If successful, this assistance could be reconfigured for regional and local levels, where similar needs exist. As shown by the recent visit to the United States by the National Assembly President and several of his colleagues, exposure to the workings of their counterparts outside of Guinea stands to have a positive and lasting impact.

Two years after Guinea's last national elections, the issue of election administration continues to dominate conversations inside and outside of Conakry. There is widespread agreement that both the presidential and the legislative elections yielded flawed outcomes. A programmed event, elections serve as a mechanism for the peaceful and timely transfer of power to individuals or groups that have the support of a majority or of varying percentages of the population. To be successful, elections must be organized in order to allow maximum participation by the eligible electorate and to yield a result meeting the approval of both winners and losers. The presidential, legislative, and local elections conducted between 1993 and 1995 illustrated the need for substantial legal and procedural improvements in order to put into place a process that strengthens, rather than diminishes, Guinean democracy. Support for a transparent and fair political process is also key to the Agency conflict prevention objective in Guinea, particularly in light of what appears to be an incipient conflict between Guinea's political elite, public statements by opposition parties threatening to create their own militia to protect themselves and their supporters from alleged intimidation and arrests. With the Presidential elections less than two years away, helping insure a successful political process becomes critical to the sustainability of Guinea's development process itself.

3. Critical Assumptions and causal relationship in the results framework

The central assumptions on which this strategy is based are 1) that citizen empowerment in Guinea is best achieved through organizational development, civic education and advocacy based on tangible interests of small groups; and 2) that this community-level approach will yield positive and cumulative results over time in the form of a more active citizenry participating in a more democratic and open society, as well as generating more resources and employing them effectively. The risk of this approach, of course, is that progress may be slow, unspectacular and susceptible to reversals, particularly in the shorter term. Success also depends on government willingness to allow activities which may seem to threaten its hold on power. In addition, this approach is labor- and time-intensive, both for implementers and participants. Yet, for all the reasons cited above, we believe that this locally-oriented approach, in combination with strategic assistance at the national level where possible, holds the best possibilities for long-term sustainability.

To fully achieve the strategic objective, the mission has identified four interrelated and mutually reinforcing intermediate results: 1) Improved local governance through grassroots empowerment ; 2) More representative political processes; 3) Empowered national civil society organizations; and 4): Enhanced appreciation for the rule of law through better access to legal information. The major emphasis is on IR-1 for the reasons

cited above. Full achievement of the SO results however, depends on the successful achievement of all IR's. The results framework will require further development and refinement as the mission gains experience in this field, particularly in IR's 2-4.

Intermediate Result 1: Improved Local Governance Through Grassroots Empowerment

Causal Relationships

This IR constitutes the major component of the DG strategy, which seeks to increase responsiveness of governance through citizen advocacy. By building on community activities already being fostered through other SOs or other donor activities and by supporting new ones, the program under this IR would: 1) empower citizens by strengthening their grassroots associations with participatory democracy; 2) foster effective linkages between local associations and local government organizations through citizen advocacy; 3) increase responsiveness and transparency of local governance; and 4) encourage dissemination of the resulting good governance models.

Critical assumptions

The essential conceptual assumptions are that citizen empowerment can be achieved through local associations, and that such empowerment will result in a more active, participatory governance processes. In addition, this program assumes that locally-elected governing bodies will remain an integral part of the Government of Guinea's decentralization plans. At this time, urban and rural communities councils exist without a legal mandate, since elections have not been held on the specified timetable. The proposal also assumes that citizens want more from the government than they are currently getting, and that they would be willing, given the necessary skills and encouragement, to advocate for change.

Intermediate Result 2: A more representative Political Process.

Causal Relationships

The efforts of the civil society that must work within Guinea's laws and administrative practices must be complemented by improvements in the political process if civil society is to play a real role in the life of the nation. Improved functioning of the National Assembly and the increase of popular participation in the political process via transparent, competitive elections are viewed as key elements in facilitating this effort. Activities under this IR would also enhance the social stability needed for success of the SO and sustainable development in general.

Critical Assumptions: (1) Government leadership seeks to achieve the balance of powers between branches of government as set out by Guinea's Constitution; (2) the Government of Guinea is committed to supporting the administration of transparent elections at the national, regional, and local level; (3) civil society is capable of playing at least a minimum



role in election administration; (4) transparent elections are a key condition for sustainable democracy in Guinea; and, (5) local and international resources to support qualitative improvements of the National Assembly and the election process will be available and provided in a timely manner.

Intermediate Result 3: Strengthened National-Level Civic Organizations

Causal Relationship

A more vibrant civil society creates conditions for increased accountability and transparency at all levels. Secondly, civil society is one of the main communication channels between the citizenry and elites. It is to make sure that decision-making processes are informed by popular needs and concerns, and that citizens are educated about their rights and duties. A strong and well structured civil society is therefore a precondition for the formation of a credible public opinion, the emergence of a democratic culture, and citizens voice in national affairs. The local focus of this strategy is also directly related to the democracy and governance condition at the national level in Guinea. Better organized and informed national level civic organizations are a critical link between grassroots empowerment and good governance at all levels.

Critical assumptions

Strengthened centrally-based NGOs are willing to enter into more balanced relationships with grassroots associations and the government officials continue to see that the increased effectiveness of the civil society this closer partnership entails is in everyone's interest. Positive developments in the National Assembly, including the very progressive stances taken by the President of the Assembly (despite his being a member of the ruling party), indicate that further opportunities to build on such openness should be pursued over the period of the strategy.

Intermediate Result 4: Enhanced Appreciation For The Rule Of Law Through Better Access To Legal Information.

Causal Relationships

This IR does not constitute a broad strategy for improving the rule of law in Guinea. The Guinean legal/judicial system indeed requires any number of improvements, from the quality of officials and lawyers, to the distribution and quality of facilities, to the provisions of some laws (e.g., media). Better commercial law enforcement and efficient commercial courts would help encourage private investment. Undoubtedly, these are serious problems for democracy in Guinea, but resolving them will require large amounts of resources. It is also not clear whether institutional changes from above will fundamentally change Guineans' willingness to reform the legal system.

This IR would, however, provide the raw material needed for effective participation of the society in good governance. It would make the law more accessible to government

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officials and the citizens alike and help focus potential disputes on the issues and away from personalities. It would also inform the citizenry and provide objective criteria for them to obey the law and question arbitrary use of it.

Critical assumptions

Legal rights information and education will have significant impact when tied to tangible needs and interests of the individuals and associations with which USAID works across all sectors of the program. It requires that citizens be interested in asking for and that public officials be willing and able to move closer to the legal texts they have created.

4. Commitment and capacity of other development partners

Other donors have shown significant interest in this objective. Most donors, if not all, direct part of their development assistance through civil society organizations, especially through NGOs. There is also significant donor cooperation which, in the context of the New Partnership Initiative, Mission plans to advance, with particular emphasis on learning from the different approaches being used for local development and governance.

France, the largest bilateral donor, leans toward strengthening government structures and less to developing the civil society. It also concentrates more at the central level, essentially providing equipment to Ministry to Decentralization and Territorial Administration, and short-term staff training. In collaboration with the CENAFOD, a local NGO, the Canadian Government through the *Centre Canadien d'Etudes et de Cooperation Internationale* (CECI) is providing training to elected officials from 13 CRDs in the Middle Guinea.

The UNDP supports grassroots associations through the "*Programme d'Appui aux Initiatives de Base*" (PAIB). The program consists in providing technical assistance (training and alphabetization) and micro-credit. The PAIB project has been extended to December 1997, and the UNDP has been developing a comprehensive DG program which it hopes would be co-financed by other donors in Guinea.

The World Bank which financed a very successful campaign to inform Guinean citizens of their rights, provides some support to the judicial system, an important conditionality in the context of the ESAF with the IMF and of a Financial Sector Program with the Bank. The World Bank also increasingly uses local NGOs for the implementation of some of its activities.

In a cross-cutting approach in dealing with DG, the German Agency, GTZ, has recently introduced DG components into its support to health and micro-enterprise programs. The Frederick Ebert Foundation has been very active in support of civic advocacy groups (human rights activists and the press) through funding of study tours, participation in conferences and professional meetings at the international levels, editing and dissemination of documents.

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Donor efforts in providing institutional support to civil society organizations in general, and to civic advocacy groups are therefore substantial. USAID/Guinea --in addition to current activities being conducted under the New Partnership Initiative-- could make a decisive contribution by leveraging many of these D/G activities in a more cohesive set.

5. Illustrative approaches

The strategic objective seeks to build on USAID/Guinea's success in local-level mobilization in other sectors, but it is specifically aimed at more than just mobilization around specific interests. These interests--be they economic (e.g., access to credit), service-oriented (provision of health care), or social (improvement of women's representation in local government), or a combination of these--can be the catalysts for greater democratic participation and ultimately better governance. The strategy we propose could lead to programs that add advocacy and participation in governance to existing USAID activities, or to programs that seek out new local groups to work with.

In all cases, we believe USAID will have better success building on pre-existing community groups, even if they are an early stage of development, rather than attempting to develop brand new interest organizations. This DG strategy does not simply assume DG results from any sort of community organization activity. We see the results of this strategy not simply in the establishment of community organizations, which has important implications for democracy, but in the impact of citizen empowerment through community organization on the quality of local, and by extension, national governance and representation. While citizen empowerment through community group development is an important end in itself, Guinea has need of more. The country is at an early stage of democratic transition and needs to reinforce the foundations of that transition, and of a national governance structure. Thus this strategy looks specifically to the interlinkage of local associations and local government bodies.

By working at the local level to further develop the institutional capacity of civil society in all sectors and helping local groups to interact with local government more effectively, USAID can help Guinea meet two essential needs: First, this approach, since it takes a highly interactive and participatory approach, will help Guineans develop the skills, understanding and sense of efficacy that will assist them not only in managing their own group activities better to achieve desired results, but also in addressing their concerns to relevant local governing bodies, whether deconcentrated administrative authorities or decentralized representative counsels. Second, by interacting with local governing bodies, Guineans will make more relevant and responsive a national structure which the country ultimately needs for nation-building and effective administration, but which at the moment appear to be of marginal relevance to many Guineans. There are numerous activities that could be undertaken to improve the quality of Guinea's political process. Listed here are activities that could be considered for implementation soon after the adoption of the strategy.

Intermediate Result 1: Improved Local Governance Through Grassroots Empowerment

Programs under this IR would seek to develop both the internal capacities of local associations and their ability to affect local governance through support and training for internal democratic practices, advocacy skills training and civic/legal education. These programs would have two aspects. Grassroots associations would be involved in income-generating, service provision/management, or other interest-based activities on the one hand, and these associations would be provided with training in democratic practices and advocacy skills, as well as information about their legal rights and responsibilities and the roles of governing bodies they deal with, on the other. Bridging the "empowerment gap" between the grassroots associations and the local government bodies is an integral aim of the proposed strategy.

Training and institutional capacity building for local government bodies themselves would be an integral element of this process. In order to increase the impact of activities under this IR, additional activities would be undertaken to share experiences and successes with other communities and government entities. Activities to promote this "demonstration effect" might include regional fora on local government practices, fora for associations (organized at the CRD level, for example), or inclusion of local government officials in monitoring good governance achievements.

CLUSA and AFRICARE have already acquired a commendable field experience in Guinea and in the region in general. Other USPVOs include VITA and ATI. Subcontracting with local NGOs would strengthen their own capacities as well as build on the connections they already have in the country. Local NGOs with experience in local development include CENAFOD, OVODEC, UEPD, UGVD.

Intermediate Result 2: A More Representative Political Process.

The opportunity remains for discussion on the design of the administration of Guinea's future elections. Interest in continuing dialogue has been expressed among Guinean opinion leaders. The President and the majority party have pronounced themselves as opposed to the creation of an independent election commission. However, the majority leadership admits that there is a need for future elections to be transparent and to yield results that are acceptable to the population.

Once in place, the long overdue Economic and Social Council may provide a venue for a political debate on issues such as election administration. In the meantime, the organization of one or more working groups on election administration involving elements of the National Assembly, qualified Guinean civil society groups such as those mentioned above, and international specialists may prove to be the most timely approach. It is important to encourage the establishment of a new election administration body by as early as possible in 1998 to allow sufficient time for the preparation of the December 1998 presidential elections. The first workshop could involve a review of election administration practices across sub-Saharan Africa. It is recommended that with each

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successive event, the focus of the program gradually be shifted solely to Guinea. The support of this activity could be shared with other donor groups working in Guinea such as UNDP and Frederick Ebert.

USAID, coordinating with the heads of the National Assembly and the Assembly administration, could offer resources for the support of issues briefs for the National Assembly Delegates prior to their discussion of such matters as regulation of natural resource use, tax structures, vaccination programs, health care, and elections administration. Depending on the subject matter, the briefs could be facilitated by local, regional, and/or international specialists, in partnership with local or regional interest groups. This unique approach can aid in counteracting the personalization and partisanship of Guinean politics.

With time, Guineans will demand accountability of not only their elections, but their government. A first step in developing this capacity can be the training of local NGOs in the techniques of election monitoring. As mentioned earlier in this section, the limited capacity of Guinean NGOs dictate that their involvement in any activity will require technical, material, and financial inputs. The establishment of an indigenous election monitoring network can enjoy a number of secondary and tertiary impacts in the areas of NGO capacity building and civic and voter education. Again, USAID's many points of contact among local associations might offer a foundation upon which to establish this network.

Assistance with the design of a new election commission can be provided. A solution to this polarized issue will require a good deal of negotiation between Guinean decision makers and between them and donors who have particular interests in what they assist financially. USAID has a comparative advantage in the provision of technical support to the effort to create a new commission. The political climate surrounding this issue suggests that USAID consider coordinating its efforts with one or more donors active in Guinea that are experienced in technical election assistance, such as Canada, Germany, EC, or UNDP.

Intermediate Result 3: Strengthened National-Level Civic Organizations

In areas selected for grassroots-level implementation of the DG program, USAID/Guinea should encourage the establishment of partnerships between national NGOs on the one hand, and local NGOs, CRD councils and targeted grassroots associations. For example, a community council could "contract" with an NGO such as *Entraide Universitaire pour le Développement* (EUPD) to build a school or a health center, the *Organization Guinéen pour les Droits de l'Homme* (OGDH) could provide assistance to local NGOs (developmental NGOs, home-town associations, etc.) in areas such as summarizing and translating key legal texts in local languages. By forging this type of partnership, USAID/Guinea would address the need to develop capacities of national NGOs to respond to demands generated in the area of democratic governance, and thus would solve the sustainability issue.

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We consider the following approaches as the most constructive and efficient ones for improving civil society roles in the areas of public advocacy and civic education in Guinea.

Helping establish an institutional mechanism for better coordination of activities of civil society organizations and for more systematic consultation between State and civil society. Two options present themselves in order to address this need:

- (a) restructuring and providing institutional support to GOG's SCIO (*Service de Coordination des Interventions des ONG*) to become an autonomous organization in which would be represented NGO and cooperative movements as well as decentralized institutions and relevant GOG technical divisions; or/and,
- (b) strengthening networks of NGOs such as the *Forum des ONG* or the *Bureau Provisoire de coordination des actions des ONG* in order to play coordination roles and become a forum for dialogue between NGO, GOG, LGUs and donors. Support to these networks could include assistance for the establishment and equipment of headquarters.

Strengthening of the independent press to play a greater public advocacy and civic education roles. The support to the independent press could be done by:

- (a) analyzing the impact of the press and developing programs aimed at improving the capacity of the press in the areas of civic education and public advocacy.
- (b) improving journalists' access to information flows at the international level through office equipment and internet connection for the *Maison de la Presse* (pending the outcome of the funding request regarding this issue submitted to the *Bureau d'Appui de la Cooperation Canadienne*.)
- (c) Helping journalists build working relationships and strategic alliances at the regional and international levels through study tours, participation in internal fora for journalists. As mentioned earlier such types of support are of paramount importance for Guinean journalists whose relative isolation increases their vulnerability.
- (d) funding of workshops and training sessions to increase journalists' professional skills. The objective of such initiatives would be to increase Guinean journalists' ability to treat adequately issues of national interest in complex domains such as economics, finances, environment, etc.

Assuming that legislation liberalizing the broadcast media will be promulgated before or during the implementation of this DG strategy, USAID could support the expanded use of private radio for educating the population on their civic rights and duties, for discussing issues of community interest and for information dissemination. USAID could for example

finance broadcasted civic education campaigns. In the context of the upcoming elections, voter education (by for example selected civic advocacy groups) might be considered as a civic education theme.

A number of Guineans in key positions in government and the private sector have benefited from being participants in US exchange visits supported by USAID and USIS. These visits have achieved notable results and should be continued. Regional visits should be considered given their ability to present situations that are closer to home in terms of resource availability and government-society relations. International NGOs with experience in Guinea should be encouraged to include Guineans on election observation missions and visitors programs as appropriate.

Some of the most dynamic and/or promising national NGOs should be provided support in order to play a greater locomotive role for the NGO movement in Guinea. Assistance to these NGOs could include equipment of headquarters, internet access, training in areas such as financial management and accounting, project design, implementation and evaluations, etc. NGOs which could be considered for this type of support include: OGDH; EUPD; CENAFOD, etc. Rapid institutional assessments will need to be conducted prior to selecting partner NGOs. Selected NGOs could be provided assistance in order to meet requirements for eligibility to the direct funding by USAID.

Intermediate Result 4: Enhanced Appreciation for the Rule of Law Through Better Access to Legal Information.

One approach is making the existing legal archive in Conakry more effective by insuring timely printing of laws and providing institutional support for archiving, sorting and searching legal texts. At the moment, someone who wants to know the laws regarding NGOs, for instance, can be given nothing except copies of all Guinean laws (if they are all available), through which he or she must search by hand. Computerization is already in place, but the process of archiving and cataloguing legal texts has lagged far behind expectations.

Translation of laws into local languages, or the production of summaries of the basic provisions of relevant laws in local languages is a second approach. These could be distributed to/through USAID's development partners in local areas and through public information activities such as a follow-on to the "Know Your Rights" campaign.

6. How achievement of the SO will be judged, including (1) proposed performance indicators and targets and (2) performance targets conveying an understanding of magnitude of change vis a vis USAID's investment and/or that of USAID's partners.

Progress under this objective will result in an improved environment for both political rights and civil liberties. Therefore, progress should be captured through a suitably adapted political rights and civil liberties index. We would also want to identify specific legal and regulatory benchmarks which would be expected to have a causal effect on the established political rights and civil liberties variables. Moreover, given the gap between

- Diversity, quality, and autonomy exercised by Electoral Commission

Intermediate Result No. 4.3: Empowered national civil society organizations

Proposed indicators:

- Number of federations of associations with membership in more than one of Guinea's natural regions;
- Number of known public cases of lobbying of the National Assembly and the Executive on group interest issues;
- Number of private radio stations

Intermediate Result No. 4.4: Enhanced appreciation for the rule of law through better access to legal information.

Proposed indicators:

- Percent of target population knowledgeable about their civic responsibilities
- Percent of target group who know their rights vis-a-vis local government
- Availability of private radio, openness of access and willingness to participate in public debate
- Number of filed requests for legal information at national legal archives
- Number of cases filed with court system

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Guinea's laws and implementation, we would have to include some indicators that capture the evolution of (1) citizen knowledge of, and willingness to assert, their rights; (2) public official awareness of and willingness to apply the law fairly and equitably; (3) official response to citizen demand for the rule of law; and (4) the evolution of the justice system in adjudicating disputes. Given the complexity of this task, we have tentatively identified some likely candidates for measuring performance at the strategic and intermediate results levels, but the Mission emphasizes that it plans to bring the requisite experts to help select Guinea-specific indicators which are up to the task, reliable and cost effective.

Strategic Objective level: Greater Citizen Participation in Governance, Particularly at the Local Level

Proposed indicators:

- Percent of polls monitored by trained impartial citizens
- Percent of population participating in civil society groupings (political parties, church, labor unions, NGOs, neighborhood groups, PTAs)
- Percent of women elected to participating CSO and CRD management bodies
- Percent of eligible voters who believe elected or appointed officials are responsive to their needs

Intermediate Result No. 4.1: Improved local governance through grassroots empowerment; Proposed indicators:


- Increased generation and programming of revenues by local government
- Number of CSOs organized and operating in targeted areas
- Percent of partner CSOs lobbying/consulting government and elected officials at local level
- CSO involved in the management and citizen oversight of local public funds at the CRD level in target areas
- Number of CSOs organized in target areas to play an active role in defending common group interests
- Number of local government institutions in target areas with transparent and accountable financial systems

Intermediate Result No. 4.2: More representative political processes;

Proposed indicators:

- Percent of elected opposition deputies in National Assembly appointed to NA committees
- Number of bills significantly affected by National Assembly
- Number of local organizations with democratic elected officials and by-laws
- Civil liberties index
- Freedom of political competition
- Number of NA commission briefings/hearings to obtain citizen input
- Quality and transparency of election administration

Natural Resource Management Strategic Objective
Intermediate Results
and Indicators



STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: INCREASED USE OF SUSTAINABLE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

A. LINKAGE TO AGENCY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

This strategic objective supports Agency Goal 4 to promote rational management of the environment for long-term sustainability and it contributes directly to Agency Objective 4.5 of sustainable natural resource management. The achievement of this strategic objective will help Guinea manage its forests optimally and exploit its agriculture resource base for food production and income, on a sustainable basis. Another contribution of this strategic objective is the conservation of biological diversity, Agency Objective 4.1. Improved management of protected areas and sustainable use of biological resources will also be realized under this strategic objective.

By helping rural households increase their incomes through farm and non-farm activities, this strategic objective also supports Agency Goal 1. It is linked to Agency Objective 1.1 "Strengthened Markets" by contributing to improved agricultural market performance. The strategic objective will also expand access and opportunity for the poor, Agency Objective 1.2, by focusing on the smallholders who account for 96 percent of agricultural households. USAID/Guinea will put special emphasis on helping resource-poor women in rural areas by facilitating their access to training, credit, and micro-enterprise opportunities.

B. RELATION OF THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TO GOG GOALS

This strategic objective supports the GOG's objective to protect the environment and to preserve Guinea's productive base through better natural resource management. It also contributes to the government's objectives to enhance food security, to improve the productivity of agricultural households, and to alleviate poverty in the rural areas.

C. DESCRIPTION OF NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

1. Statement of the Strategic Objective

Accelerating degradation of natural resource base is the major environmental problem in Guinea. Causes include rapid population growth, poverty, and use of unsustainable agricultural and natural resource management practices. In order to assist Guinea to address this environmental problem, USAID/Guinea proposes a strategic objective which aims to **increase use of sustainable natural resource management practices.**

People will adopt and continue using sustainable natural resource management practices only if they perceive at first and receive later tangible benefits from such action. Therefore,

USAID/Guinea's strategy in natural resource management will be based on social and economic incentives and community participation.

The development of this natural resource management strategic objective is based on the findings of the March 1997 agricultural sector assessment, the results achieved by and lessons learned from USAID-funded activities in Guinea, a review of our partners' activities, the expressed needs of our customers, and relevant experiences in other developing countries. Through in-depth analyses of the problems, consultations with customers and partners and consideration of USAID's comparative advantage, USAID/Guinea identified areas where its interventions can be most effective and efficient in promoting sustainable natural resource management in Guinea.

This strategic objective depends not only on the utilization of sustainable natural resource management practices, but also on the growth in agricultural markets and income-generating micro and small enterprises. Therefore, our natural resource management strategy is highly dependent on integrated economic growth strategies. Given the current decline in funding for economic growth, the Mission has decided to emphasize natural resource management over economic growth. However, the improvement of agricultural marketing systems and the development of income-generating enterprises at the village level are critical and integral components of this strategic objective. The scope of these two components can be expanded and deepened if results warrant and funding is provided.

Under the full funding scenario, a complete set of results packages will be designed for the four natural regions of Guinea. These results packages will include all necessary components for the full achievement of the results expected under this strategic objective. Under the incremental funding scenario, initial implementation will start in the Middle Guinea, followed by a gradual expansion of the geographic areas and scope of activities. If funding is limited during the entire strategy period, USAID will confine its assistance only to the replication of its current successful natural resource management activities in a large area of the Fouta Djallon Highlands. Of course if no additional funding is provided in 1998, USAID will close down all current activities which form the basis for this strategic objective.

The Natural Resource Management Strategic Objective supports USAID/Guinea's goal of improving the well-being of all Guineans in a participatory society through increasing smallholders' income and improving community-based natural resource management.

2. Problem Analysis

Agriculture is the key sector for long-term sustainable growth of the Guinean economy. The agricultural sector grew at an annual average rate of 4.1% from 1991 to 1995 and contributed 24% of GDP in 1994. Guinea is one of very few African countries where agricultural output is growing significantly faster than population. This steady increase in production of key agricultural commodities for the past five years is encouraging, but there are signs that without improved management of natural resources this growth will

not be sustained. Households with access to more fertile soils appear to be increasing their productivity, while poorer households without access to these resources experience declining labor productivity. This is leading to increased pressure on communally owned resources, such as forests and pastures, and increasing demand for unsustainable agricultural production on fragile soils.

Survey data from 1991 and 1995 indicates that increased production of rice and peanuts has come from both increased yields and increased area cultivated. Paddy production increased by 207,000 tons (49%), with 46% of the increase accounted for by increased yields and the other half accounted for by increased area cultivated. Peanut production increased by 54,000 tons (69%), with 40% of the increase accounted for by increased yields. This suggests some improved farm management, technology adoption, and increased use of more fertile soils for high value food and cash crops. However, the per hectare yields of these crops remain very low: 1.44 tons for rice, and 0.91 tons for peanuts. Thus, there are significant opportunities to increase yields for these crops.

In contrast, the growth in the production of other principal food crops has come essentially from increases in the areas of land under cultivation and not from any significant increases in yields. Cassava production increased by 229,000 tons (62%) through a doubling of area cultivated and a 20% decline in yields. This may be due to increasing disease problems and increased use of less fertile soils for this crop. Cassava production is nearly as important as rice production on a national basis and is critical to food security among Guinea's poorer population groups. Maize and fonio production which are also important for these poorer groups increased by only 24,000 tons (13%) through increases in cultivated area with yields remaining constant. Trends in the production of these food crops suggest an increased use of poorer soils and declining rural labor productivity among poorer groups. Based on a case study in Zaire, declining yields of cassava is an early warning of sharp increases in rural malnutrition and increased demand for child labor which reduces school attendance.

Guinea continues to depend significantly on imports, particularly rice, to meet its total food consumption needs -- i.e., 290,750 metric tons of rice was imported in 1995 (of which 14,000 metric tons was food aid); 64,100 metric tons of wheat flour; 48,000 metric tons of sugar; 17,000 metric tons of edible oils. Over the period 1991 to 1995, rice imports have been relatively stable because growth in rice production, estimated at 5.9 percent per year, kept up with growing domestic demand. Even with continuing rapid growth in domestic rice production, it will not be easy to effect major declines in rice imports in the short-term due to annual population growth of 2.9%. Between 1991 and 1995, increased production of roots and tubers accounted for as big an increase in domestic calorie production as did increased rice production. Food security in Guinea will remain vulnerable to changes in world rice prices and sustainable growth in production of roots and tubers. Where and how increases in rice, roots, and tuber production are achieved will become increasingly important for sustainable natural resource use in Guinea.

Regional trade among Guinea and its regional neighbors in West Africa will be of growing importance to environmental management in Guinea. Increased exports of

environmentally sustainable products to pay for imports from neighboring countries in West Africa is one potential strategy to reduce unsustainable resource use and increase non-traditional exports from Guinea. Promoting the most environmentally sustainable way for food insecure groups in Guinea to pay for imports from Cote d' Ivoire or Mali is a key part of regional cooperation with neighboring states.

Growing Demand for Unsustainable Uses of Natural Resources

Approximately 80 percent of the total population lives in rural areas. The agricultural population consists of 443,000 agricultural households and is growing at 1.8 percent per year. Thirty-four percent of these households farm land holdings of less than one hectare, 30 percent have between one and two hectares, 32 percent have between two and seven hectares, and only four percent have land holdings of more than seven hectares. A significant share of households, especially those that hold less than two hectares, seek more land to expand food crop production. As a result of the conversion of forests to agricultural lands, the rate of deforestation has been accelerated. According to the Forest Service, about 136,000 hectares of forests have been destroyed a year.

Due to population growth, low incomes, and high unemployment in rural areas, Guinean smallholders (defined as agricultural households owning seven hectares of land or less) increasingly rely on extensive subsistence farming and environmentally inappropriate cropping patterns to keep up with their demand for food. More marginal lands are being farmed, more woodlands are converted to agriculture by slash and burn practices, fallow duration is reduced, and investment in conservation measures is lacking. As a result, soil fertility is lost and erosion becomes more and more serious, causing continued loss of agricultural productivity and increased environmental degradation which will affect the food security of the rural poor. According to a case study under conditions similar to those in Guinea, annual productivity losses due to soil erosion are estimated to lie in the range of 4.4 percent for less sensitive crops to 6.8 percent for more sensitive crops.

The influx of nearly 600,000 refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone in the forested region of Guinea in recent years has posed serious threats to the local natural resource base and biodiversity. Guinean authorities express concerns about destruction of forests, wildlife habitat, and the killing of wild animals by the refugees who convert woodlands into agricultural lands for food production. Irreversible environmental degradation is occurring and measures are needed to help the refugees and local populations achieve food security through improvement of agricultural productivity or through assistance in developing alternative economic opportunities. In addition, competition between local populations and refugees over use of natural resources, land ownerships and economic opportunities may lead to serious conflicts.

The problem of low productivity is exacerbated by inefficient agricultural marketing systems limiting the availability and affordability of productivity-enhancing inputs which enable smallholders to intensify the production of both traditional agricultural commodities and high value crops, such as vegetables and fruits. Smallholders also encounter limited opportunities to sell their surplus production at a profitable price. As a result, rural

households that cannot increase their incomes continue to practice unsustainable extensive farming to meet their subsistence needs, leading to degradation of natural resources.

Growing need for better management of natural resources

The current growth in agricultural production based on unsustainable practices is already causing serious degradation of the natural resource base throughout the country. Severe environmental problems in the Fouta Djallon Highlands, the sources of the three major rivers in West Africa, is increasing competition for arable land and lowering yields for basic food crops including upland rice, fonio, maize and cassava. The general pattern is one of poor, predominantly subsistence households seeking to increase their immediate basic food requirements by using environmentally inappropriate cropping patterns that result in high soil erosion levels from their rain-fed lands. Important soil loss is caused by the cultivation of highly erosive crops on the hill sides, and by resource-poor people earning their living through illegal charcoal making, timber exploitation, and agricultural conversion of forest lands. Although the concept of community-based natural resource management has been introduced in Guinea under a USAID-funded activity, the widespread application of this concept is hindered by the lack of effective organization at the community level to participate in the decision-making process.

The problem of low productivity is exacerbated by the inefficient agricultural marketing system limiting the availability and affordability of productivity-enhancing technologies which enable smallholders to intensify the production of both traditional agricultural commodities and high value crops, such as vegetables and fruits for the market. Smallholders also encounter limited opportunities to sell their surplus production at a profitable price. As a result, rural households that cannot increase their incomes, continue to practice unsustainable extensive farming to meet their households' subsistence demand, leading to degradation of natural resources.

The current patterns of resource use in the Fouta Djallon Highlands as well as in other regions of Guinea cannot sustain increased food production and food security in the long run. If this continues, it will lead to serious environmental consequences in terms of lost potential production and on- and off-site impacts on soil erosion and runoff. The negative impact of environmental degradation in Guinea is expected to reach beyond the population of the immediate area and will adversely affect economic activities in agriculture, livestock and fisheries, and health conditions in countries down-stream on the Senegal, Niger and Gambia rivers which have their sources in Guinea.

In the Rome declaration on world food security at the FAO World Food Summit in November 1996, poverty and environmental degradation were identified as two of the four major causes of food insecurity. It was further stated that increased food production, including staple food, must be undertaken and this should happen within the framework of sustainable natural resource management. In order to sustain increased food production in Guinea, the promotion of rational natural resource management through increased use of sustainable practices is deemed critical. USAID proposes to assist Guinean smallholders to

invest in more profitable and less destructive practices through increasing household income.

3. Critical Assumptions and Causal Relationships in the Results Framework

Sustainable natural resource management requires the alleviation of poverty and the participation of affected people. This Strategic Objective will be attained through two Intermediate Results (IRs): (1) *Increased Smallholders' Income*, and (2) *Enhanced Community-Based Natural Resource Management*.

Intermediate Result 1: Increased Smallholders' Income

● **Causal Relationships:** The living conditions of the people in the rural areas, especially smallholders, should be improved through increased farm and/or non-farm income in order to alleviate poverty, the leading cause of environmental degradation. In this way, not only can the pressure on the environment be relieved, but also people can make long-term investments in conserving and improving natural resources.

Increased agricultural income is critical to sustainable natural resource management. Farmers whose production and income increase, tend to invest in the conservation of their natural resource base and to intensify their farming on productive lands with increasing use of inputs and environmentally sound technologies. In fact, agricultural income and investment in sustainable natural resource management are mutually linked in a two-way relationship. Increased income will lead to more use of sustainable natural resource management practices, which in turn will result in further income increase.

In order to increase their on-farm income through increased productivity and sustainable production, farmers must have access to yield-enhancing inputs on competitive markets and must be able to sell their surplus production. Inputs such as inorganic fertilizers should be made available and affordable and market opportunities should be open to smallholders. The market-oriented approach therefore is fundamental to this strategic objective and improving the efficiency in the agricultural marketing systems is of primary importance.

Non-farm income also contributes to sustainable natural resource management. Village enterprises and other off-farm activities can help increase smallholder productivity and income while reducing unsustainable natural resource use. A study in Rwanda shows that farmers tend to conserve land better where there is more non-farm income and a higher off-farm wage, and that soil conservation investments increase with more non-farm income. Non-farm income also enables smallholders to maintain sustainable traditional practices and purchase needed food. Experiences in Kenya indicate a synergy between agriculture and micro and small enterprises. Agriculture supplies raw material to micro-enterprises. In return, micro-enterprises provide marketing and processing services, create

the demand for agricultural products, offer job opportunities for the poor, and provide smallholders with additional income to purchase farm inputs.

● **Critical Assumptions:** (1) The political and macroeconomic climate will not deteriorate; (2) The Government will implement proposed policies and regulations critical to agricultural production and marketing, (3) Other donors continue to support the rehabilitation and maintenance of farm-to-market and market-to-market roads; and (4) Sustainable credit programs for smallholders and village entrepreneurs will be supported by other donors.

Intermediate Result 2: Enhanced Community-Based Natural Resource Management

● **Causal Relationships:** Participation of local populations is essential for sustainable natural resource management. Natural resource management programs cannot be sustained without the active participation of the local populations and grass-roots organizations. Resource users are more willing to participate in protection and conservation of natural resources if they derive economic benefits from such actions. Therefore, sustainable management of communal natural resources should be based on initiatives which simultaneously empower local communities to participate in the decision-making process, provide strong incentives to conserve the natural resources, and offer the prospect of increasing the resource users' incomes and welfare.

Community-based natural resource management has been successful in Niger, Benin, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Kenya and the Philippines. In Guinea, the community-based approach to natural resource management is deemed not only appropriate but essential because concerned public agencies lack human and financial resources to effectively protect the environment and conserve the natural resource base.

The concept of community-based natural resource management was successfully introduced in Guinea by USAID's on-going Guinea Natural Resources Management Activity in the Fouta Djallon Highlands. However, this concept is still new not only to the government agents but also to the local populations who lack the necessary knowledge and skills. As a result, the application of the community-based NRM concept and the strengthening of local capacity to plan and manage communal natural resources should go hand-in-hand to assure the high probability of success.

● **Critical Assumptions:** (1) The Government will implement proposed policies and regulations critical to community-based natural resource management; (2) The Government continues to share with local populations, the responsibilities and benefits of the co-management of natural resources

4. Commitment and Capacity of Other Development Partners

USAID/Guinea has been working well with other donors and international organizations through the new partnership initiative in various sectors in Guinea. The Mission will continue using the NPI approach to leverage the resources of other development partners

for the achievement of this strategic objective. The commitments of our partners in the following areas are expected to continue during this strategy period.

- **Natural Resource Management:** The European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, and the governments of France, Germany, and Canada fund projects in natural resource management with emphasis on natural forest rehabilitation, environment protection, and improvement of agricultural production, mostly in Guinea's Upper, Maritime and Forested Regions.

Peace Corps volunteers have been involved in the implementation of USAID's on-going Natural Resources Management Activity. Peace Corps is expected to play a bigger role under this strategic objective with focus on environmental education and agroforestry.

- **Technology Development and Transfer:** France, the European Union, the World Bank, GTZ and UNDP have been supporting the development and transfer of sustainable agricultural technologies through institutional support and development projects. The Agronomic Research Institute of Guinea has been able to identify and produce several high-yield varieties of different crops and environmentally appropriate technologies. Efforts will be made under this strategic objective to link these technologies to smallholders in target areas.

- **Infrastructure, Agricultural Marketing and Credit:** The World Bank's Agricultural Export Promotion Pilot Project focusses on improving agricultural marketing infrastructure and supporting producers and exporters of agricultural products, especially fruits and vegetables. The *Caisse Française de Développement* also supports the marketing of onions, potatoes, rice and coffee. France and the World Bank continue their investment in road construction and rehabilitation to improve the transport of agricultural products. The *Caisse Française de Développement* has completed a feasibility study for a \$20 million rural road rehabilitation project. These undertakings are expected to benefit smallholders with regard to the marketing of farm produce and to the supply of affordable inputs.

In addition to USAID-funded credit programs, smallholders can have access to agricultural credit through commercial banks, rural lending institutions such as *Crédit Rural* and *Crédit Mutuel*, development projects, professional organizations, and village financial associations.

5. Illustrative Approaches

The ultimate customers of this strategic objective are primarily the smallholders who account for 96 percent of the rural households in Guinea. Strong emphasis will be placed on women, especially the socially and economically disadvantaged, as they play a crucial role in natural resource management. The issue of gender in development which has been one of the major foci of the current Natural Resources Management Activity, will continue to receive special attention under this strategic objective and will be integrated into the design, implementation and evaluation of the results packages and activities.

Agricultural traders and micro and small private entrepreneurs are also ultimate customers. From the regional perspective, millions of people in neighboring countries whose livelihood depends on the water flows in the three important rivers which originate in the Fouta Djallon Highlands can be considered as beneficiaries of this strategic objective.

Using the New Partnership Initiative (NPI) approach, USAID/Guinea will work with the GOG, other donors, international organizations, private businesses and enterprises, PVOs, NGOs, Peace Corps, and other elements of civil society to foster enabling conditions and create linkages and synergies among customers and partners. This cooperation will focus on promoting sustainable natural resource management through resolving constraints to increase in smallholders' agricultural production and income, through increasing off-farm income generating opportunities for land-poor households, and through strengthening the participation of community level organizations in natural resource management.

The participatory approach, incentive-based strategy and demand-driven services are the keys to the achievement of this strategic objective. The strategic objective team will strive to ensure the active participation of our customers and the satisfaction of their needs, with special emphasis on women. Surveys of customers, using the rapid rural appraisal methodology, will be conducted to assess their needs and priorities. The design of results packages and activities for this strategic objective will be based on the findings of these customer surveys and consultations with partners and stakeholders.

Depending on the funding level, activities under this strategic objective can first start in the Fouta Djallon Highlands as an expansion of the on-going Natural Resources Management Activity to areas outside the presently targeted watersheds, with U.S. PVOs and Peace Corps being the principal implementors in collaboration with the GOG's development and forest services and Guinean NGOs. Gradually, activities will be expanded to other areas outside the Fouta Djallon.

As discussed in Section C.3 "Critical Assumptions and Causal Relationships" above, the achievement of this Natural Resource Management Objective will be based on two intermediate results: (1) Increased Smallholders' Income and (2) Enhanced Community-Based Natural Resource Management, for which results packages and activities will be designed. Below are illustrative approaches used for each intermediate result.

Intermediate Result 1: Increased Smallholders' Income

There is a strong positive correlation between the use of sustainable natural resource management practices and smallholder income. Therefore, USAID efforts will support activities which assist smallholders to increase their agricultural and/or off-farm incomes.

Increased Agricultural Income: Increased agricultural income will be achieved through activities aiming to increase agricultural productivity and improve marketing of farm products. Environmentally sound, yield-enhancing technologies will be made available to smallholders through extension activities carried out by Peace Corps volunteers and agents



working for the PVOs, NGOs and government services associated with this strategic objective. Participatory training in farm management will be provided to smallholders.

Linkages will be established between smallholders and public services involved in technology development and transfer and with private suppliers of agricultural inputs. Access by smallholders to credit for input purchase and product marketing will be facilitated through collaboration with USAID-supported institutions (PRIDE, OIC, Agricultural Marketing Foundation, and Loan Guarantee Fund) as well as with financial institutions supported by other donors.

Activities will be developed to improve access by agricultural producers and traders to market information and essential services and to strengthen linkages between producers, traders and transporters. The previous investment in road rehabilitation and maintenance by USAID and new investments by other donors are expected to continue improving the efficiency in transport of agricultural inputs and outputs. Participatory training programs to improve farm management and agricultural marketing will be designed and implemented.

Increased Non-Farm Income: Activities will be designed to increase non-farm income through (1) increasing local supply of producer services, (2) promoting use of remittances from outside target areas for local agricultural investment, and (3) increasing access to locally produced consumer goods and services.

The on-going Natural Resources Management Activity has identified several opportunities for community-based enterprises which provide non-farm income to villagers. Under this strategic objective, these opportunities will be further developed. Linkages with PRIDE and CLUSA will be established to provide training in enterprise development and management for village entrepreneurs. Special attention will be given to women and other land poor villagers.

Intermediate Result 2: Enhanced Community-Based Natural Resources Management

Activities will be designed to enhance community-based natural resource management through strengthening local capacity to plan and manage natural resources and through increasing co-management of communal natural resources.

Successful interventions under the current Natural Resources Management Activity will be replicated in new areas by the Peace Corps, PVOs, Guinean NGOs, and the Forest Service. Efforts will be focussed on promoting the co-management of forest resources not only in the Fouta Djallon, but also in other regions in Guinea. USAID will work with the GOG to ensure that the present policy environment favorable to the participation of the local populations in the management of natural resources will be maintained.

6. How Sustainability Will Be Achieved

Sustainability of the activities implemented under this strategic objective will be achieved through the following approaches and strategies:

Use of New Partnership Initiative Approach: Lessons learned from the Mission's past and on-going activities have shown that the NPI approach is very effective in achieving sustainable impact. USAID/Guinea will strengthen the partnership with international financial institutions like the World Bank, other donors, PVOs, NGOs, private businesses and enterprises, and other elements of civil society to foster enabling conditions for the achievement of intermediate results. PVOs, Guinean NGOs, grass-roots organizations, and the Peace Corps will play an important role in the implementation of activities under this strategic objective. These institutions have the capacity to deliver the services to the ultimate customers in an effective and efficient manner which enhances sustainability.

People-centered Approach: The empowerment of people and communities to play an active role in the decision making process is fundamental. The USAID strategy is centered on the *resource users* rather than on the top-down national policies which are often developed by bureaucrats insensitive to the true needs of the grass-roots populations. Thus, all activities under this strategic objective will be designed, implemented and evaluated with the active participation of the ultimate customers. Strengthening the local capacity of USAID/Guinea's ultimate customers to plan and manage natural resources will be a major focus.

Incentive-based Approach: People will not adopt and continue adopting appropriate sustainable natural resource management practices if they do not perceive at first and receive later significant economic benefits from such action. Since USAID/Guinea's strategy is based on social and economic gains by resource users, sustainability is very much enhanced.

Land Tenure Security: Although the national Land Code was approved by the GOG in 1991, the actual application of this Code has not been realized. USAID/Guinea will work with the World Bank and the UNDP to support the GOG's effort to implement the Code.

Fostering Enabling Conditions: Sustainability requires the realization of certain enabling conditions. One of the most important conditions is the policy environment favorable to the achievement of intermediate results. The GOG's macroeconomic and agricultural policy has stimulated the development of a dynamic private sector. However, the private sector still lacks the necessary capacity to assume marketing functions that used to be undertaken by the state. To overcome this constraint to sustainability, USAID/Guinea will continue its effort to develop and strengthen the capacity of the private sector through result-focused participatory training in the areas of agricultural marketing, credit, and enterprise management.

The sustainability of community-based management of forest resources has been enhanced by the change in GOG's policy and in the attitude of the officials of the public forest service. The present Forest Code allows the private sector to take part in the management of forest resources. In fact, the Minister of Agriculture, Water Resources and Forests has signed an Act to empower the Forest Service to grant authority to communities to enter into management agreements. The concept of a partnership between the government and rural communities in managing natural resources has been



adopted by officials of the Forest Service who are promoting the change in the role of the forest guard from a repressive agent to a partner. USAID/Guinea will continue collaborate with the Forest Service to reinforce these positive changes.

7. How Achievement of the Strategic Objective Will Be Judged, Including Proposed Indicators and Targets

A number of indicators and performance targets will be used to monitor the progress and to measure the achievement of this strategic objective. A survey will be conducted in FY 1998 to establish the baseline for these indicators. Depending on the funding level and the established baseline, a target will be set for each indicator. The table of performance indicators and targets in Annex B is based on the full funding scenario. In a limited funding scenario, the targeted geographic areas and scope of activities under this strategic objective will be cut back. For example, if the full funding is not provided, USAID activities will be limited to the Middle Guinea (*Moyenne Guinée*) and/or those activities related to the marketing of farm products under Intermediate Result 1.2 "Increased Agricultural Income" will be dropped.

At the objective level, two indicators will be used: (1) The area of protected forests, and (2) the area of lands under sustainable agricultural practices. The achievement of Intermediate Result 1 "Increased Smallholders' Income" will be measured by (1) the percentage of households improving welfare from improved practices and (2) the percentage of households involved in non-farm income activities. The achievement of Intermediate Result 2 "Enhanced Community-Based Natural Resource Management" will be measured by (1) land area under community-based management plans and (2) the proportion of villages implementing plans of *gestion de terroir*.

Sources of data and information used in measuring performance indicators will include activity reports, GOG reports, internal reviews, surveys of customers and partners, and external evaluations.

PART III: RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

This Country Strategic Plan is presented under four different budget scenarios as agreed upon at the October 31, 1996 "parameters meeting" in Washington. These scenarios are presented in Tables 1-4 and represent; 1) Current or Core scenario at \$14.0 million; 2) a breakthrough scenario at \$22 million; 3) a steady progress plan for about \$17.0 million, and; a low budget plan at \$8.0 million per year. These tables also provide an estimated workforce summary and operating expense (OE) level for each proposed budget scenario.

The "breakthrough" plan comprising four full, robust strategic objectives is presented in full in Part II. This program represents the optimum development plan for USAID/Guinea in terms of results gained relative to both OE and program resources expended. This optimization is obtained partly because of the synergy created by the integration of results across different sectors and certain economies of scale obtained in program oversight and management. In fact, staff and OE resources for this scenario are materially the same as for the "steady progress" scenario discussed below.

The "steady progress" budget scenario also supports four strategic objectives, but results would be considerably scaled back for the natural resources strategic objective as budget resources would be severely rationed to that SO. But because of the "accordion-like" design of the natural resources SO, we could still obtain significant results at this funding scenario by limiting the geographic and population coverage and avoiding start-up or up-front costs because we are building on a very successful pilot activity. The other SO's cannot withstand a significant reduction of resources and maintain their internal integrity. In fact, more than a very modest budget reduction would very likely force a major redesign of the results frameworks for all three of the other SO's. Therefore, we have protected these SO's at a minimum threshold level under all but the lowest budget scenario.

At the "current or core" budget level, the mission would not have sufficient budget resources to support even a reduced natural resources strategic objective and would drop out natural resources after a "transition year," leaving only three strategic objectives beginning in FY 99 in family health, primary education and democracy and governance. It is only possible to maintain the DG strategic objective under this budget scenario because the DG SO builds heavily on the progress and grass roots approach already begun under our previous program and because we are "cross-cutting" DG into our other SO's through the New Partnership Initiative strategy. This integration gives us more flexibility to achieve significant results than if DG were more of a "stand-alone" program.

If the "current or core" plan were approved, we would be forced, because of lack of financial and staff resources to rapidly close down remaining activities in our current agricultural marketing strategic objective including a very successful microenterprise program, agricultural marketing improvement and of course the natural resources management program described above. All of these activities are the foundation on which we propose to build the new natural resources strategic objective. Once these activities are decommissioned, it will be costly and perhaps impractical to regain momentum for the proposed NRM objective. To take full advantage of prior USAID investments, successes

and leadership, we strongly recommend at a minimum the "steady progress" resources scenario beginning in FY 98 to allow us to consolidate our natural resources management program into a broad, integrated and coherent program and to position USAID for real leadership in the NRM sector.

It is difficult to propose a low budget scenario because what we would recommend depends not only the cause of invoking that scenario, but when we might be required to implement it. Investments already made and the results contingent on those investments and potential additional investments are important factors when considering how to allocate resources under a severe budget reduction. If, for example, the reason for the low budget scenario would be a rapid deterioration of democracy and governance performance, let's say in the lead-up or conduct of the planned late 1998 presidential election, we might recommend a complete withdrawal of DG support and moving to a very "low key" posture. If on the other hand resources had to be drastically cut in the middle of the strategic planning period based on an overall Agency resources decline, we would be more prone to recommend keeping one or two good-performing and "earmarked" strategic objectives. In any event, it is difficult to imagine how it would be in the US interest to maintain a low-budget under what would very likely be high-cost program to administer. The preferable course of action would probably be to close the program in response to any event(s) that would precipitate a serious OYB reduction. Nevertheless, for planning purposes, we have included Table 3 low budget scenario which retains two strategic objectives.

The "breakthrough" scenario as discussed at the "parameters meeting", will be defined by Guinea's democracy and governance performance. The rationale for tying resource scenarios to DG performance is that good performance substantially improves the quality of our partnership and the prospects for sustainable development. Because of the way we have structured this CSP with the NPI approach and emphasis on community participation, only a major deterioration in DG performance will adversely affect attainment of results in three proposed strategic objectives (family health, natural resources and primary education) and will create only some limitations for achieving certain results in the DG objective. The presentation of the DG strategic objective in Part 11 above explains some of the DG issues and the mission's proposals for improving DG in Guinea.

All of these proposals are contingent not only on budget resources, but perhaps even more importantly, the staff to execute them. We have learned that the NPI approach pioneered by this mission is labor-intensive, at least in the earlier stages. The need for continuous and frequent consultation with partners and customers and to interact in a true partnership requires time, expertise and dedication from high-quality and well trained staff. Through reengineering we are rapidly changing the way we do business, freeing up staff from previously desk-bound labor to more real intellectual work, but this transition is still far from complete. We believe that as reengineering systems mature, we will be able to work ever more effectively in the field.

We have very carefully considered our staffing needs in conjunction with the proposed program taking into account the vulnerabilities of operating in the Guinean environment.

What we are proposing herein for the "current or core" scenario conforms to the personnel ceilings imposed by Washington. For each of the other scenarios, the required personnel complement varies slightly. It is our judgement that it will take the same number of staff to implement the "breakthrough" as the "steady progress" program scenario, whereas the "current or core" program will take slightly fewer staff than either of the higher scenarios. The Summary Workforce table gives our best estimate of the numbers of each category of staff required to implement each of the budget resource scenarios and the total OE requirements for each. This workforce projection is based on several assumptions such as NMS will be fully functioning and reduce certain accounting and financial staff requirements, that the NPI approach will take much less staff resources for contract administration and documentation and that the reengineered USAID will allow us to reduce paperwork, documentation and reporting and focus on results, partnering and consultation. We have also indicated where other donors will play a significant role in achieving certain results that are key to USAID result achievement. We will work closer than ever before with other donors to leverage resources and complement our activities, staff and management resources.

TABLE 1

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS (FYs 1998 - 2005)

Current/Core Scenario
(\$14.0 million)

Strategic Objectives (SO)	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005
SO1: Increased Use of Sustainable Natural Resources Management Practices	*1.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SO2: Increased Use of Essential Family Planning, Maternal Health and STD/AIDS-Prevention Services and Practices	5.0	5.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
SO3: Quality Primary Education Provided to a Larger Percentage of Guinean Children with Emphasis on Female and Rural Participation	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
SO4: Fostering Civil Society Development and Good Governance	4.0	4.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
Total OYB including Global	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0
OE (\$ million)	2.69	2.71	2.76	2.99	2.83	2.99	3.07	3.16
Workforce	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80

* Finish PRIDE 0.5

* Add to NRM 0.5

1.0

TABLE 2

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS (FYs 1998 - 2005)

Break-through Scenario
(\$22.0 million)

Strategic Objectives (SO)	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005
SO1: Increased Use of Sustainable Natural Resources Management Practices	6.0	5.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
SO2: Increased Use of Essential Family Planning, Maternal Health and STD/AIDS-Prevention Services and Practices	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
SO3: Quality Primary Education Provided to a Larger Percentage of Guinean Children with Emphasis on Female and Rural Participation	6.0	6.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
SO4: Fostering Civil Society Development and Good Governance	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Total OYB including Global	22.0	22.0	22.0	22.0	22.0	22.0	22.0	22.0
OE (\$ million)	2.85	2.91	2.94	3.11	3.23	3.35	3.44	3.52
Workforce	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84

TABLE 3

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS (FYs 1998 - 2005)

Low Scenario
(\$8.0 million)

Strategic Objectives (SO)	FY *1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005
SO1: Increased Use of Sustainable Natural Resources Management Practices	1.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SO2: Increased Use of Essential Family Planning, Maternal Health and STD/AIDS-Prevention Services and Practices	1.5	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
SO3: Quality Primary Education Provided to a Larger Percentage of Guinean Children with Emphasis on Female and Rural Participation	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
SO4: Fostering Civil Society Development and Good Governance	1.5	1.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total OYB including Global	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0
OE (\$ million)	2.29	2.27	2.35	2.42	2.48	2.54	2.59	2.63
Workforce	55	51	51	51	51	51	51	51

* Transition year to consolidate and bring to closure

TABLE 4

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS (FYs 1998 - 2005)

Steady Progress Scenario
(\$17.0 million)

Strategic Objectives (SO)	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005
SO1: Increased Use of Sustainable Natural Resources Management Practices	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
SO2: Increased Use of Essential Family Planning, Maternal Health and STD/AIDS-Prevention Services and Practices	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
SO3: Quality Primary Education Provided to a Larger Percentage of Guinean Children with Emphasis on Female and Rural Participation	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
SO4: Fostering Civil Society Development and Good Governance	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
Total OYB including Global	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0
OE (\$ million)	2.78	2.81	2.89	2.96	3.05	3.14	3.23	3.31
Workforce	84	84	84	84	84	84	84	84

Program Management Requirements

TABLE 5

**USAID/Guinea Resource Requirement
Strategy Period FY 1998 - FY 2005
Summary Workforce by Budget Scenarios**

Category	FY 1998				FY 1999				FY 2000				FY 2001			
	Current/ core	Break- through	Low	Steady Progress	Current/ core	Break- through	Low	Steady Progress	Current/ core	Break- through	Low	Steady Progress	Current /core	Break- through	Low	Steady Progress
USDHs	8	9	6	9	8	9	6	9	8	9	6	9	8	9	6	9
OE Internat'l Hire	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
OE Local	53	53	37	53	53	53	33	53	53	53	33	53	53	53	33	53
Program	18	21	11	21	18	21	11	21	18	21	11	21	18	21	11	21
Total	80	84	55	84	80	84	51	84	80	84	51	84	80	84	51	84
OE Requirements in (\$ million)	2.69	2.85	2.29	2.78	2.71	2.90	2.27	2.81	2.76	2.99	2.35	2.89	2.83	3.11	2.42	2.96

Note: OE requirements include costs for ICASS

Category	FY 2002				FY 2003				FY 2004				FY 2005			
	Current/ core	Break- through	Low	Steady Progress	Current/ core	Break- through	Low	Steady Progress	Current/ core	Break- through	Low	Steady Progress	Current /core	Break- through	Low	Steady Progress
USDHs	8	9	6	9	8	9	6	9	8	9	6	9	8	9	6	9
OE Internat'l Hire	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
OE Local	53	53	33	53	53	53	33	53	53	53	33	53	53	53	33	53
Program	18	21	11	21	18	21	11	21	18	21	11	21	18	21	11	21
Total	80	84	51	84												
OE Requirements in (\$ million)	2.92	3.23	2.48	3.05	2.99	3.35	2.54	3.14	3.07	3.44	2.59	3.23	3.16	3.52	2.63	3.31

USAID/Guinea Strategic Plan FYs 1998 - 2005
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PL 480 Food Assistance

PL 480 Title II - Monetization

Food security is one of the goals of the GOG as noted in its agriculture sector policy letter (Lettre de Politique de Développement Agricole) and in its "Guinea 2010" vision statement. Poverty and deterioration of natural resources have been cited as two causes of food insecurity. Poverty alleviation has been explicitly declared by the GOG's as one of its fundamental objectives and it has drawn up a three year plan to focus its efforts on 1) improving food security, 2) promoting self-help projects, 3) facilitating access to basic social services.

USAID is working with two US PVOs (Africare and OICI) to improve food security at the household levels. Africare and OICI are using PL 480 Title II monetized proceeds to implement two food security initiatives in two regions in Guinea. Africare is working in the underserved region of Upper Guinea on a food security/nutrition/health intervention which provides training of health workers and households in nutrition education, improved post harvest food handling and storage methods. OICI is working with the agriculture training school in the Mamou region and focusses on training of small holders in agriculture production and rural household in improved food consumption and utilization practices with particular focus on women. Both interventions aim to improve household income and food security. These two interventions, funded by BHR/FFP, were approved in 1996 for five years (until 2010), and addresses in a modest way the food security problem in Guinea.

In the past the USAID has used monetization of PL 480 commodities to address food security problems in Guinea (PL 480 Title III in 1991 - 1994 and PL 480 Title II monetization in 1996). Budget constraints prevent USAID from developing a significant program to directly address this problem. Therefore, we will continue to integrate US PVO food security programs into the natural resources management SO and the family health SO results frameworks. These two US PVO interventions are pilot efforts and should they be successful and replicable, USAID will consider resources allowing, the expansion of the activities into other areas.

Other USAID Support

USAID plans to draw upon USAID/W support, particularly Global Bureau, in the execution of this Strategic Plan. All of the SOs will require assistance from Global Bureau and AFR/SD.

The natural resources SO team will require assistance from AFR/SD and Global Bureau in natural resources management, agriculture marketing, micro and small enterprise development and lending. Assistance will be sought to reinforce the capacity of local institutions involved in better business practices training, agriculture marketing and to increase awareness among entrepreneurs of international business practices.


The family planning/MCH SO will require substantial assistance from AFR/SD and Global for procurement of contraceptives, AVSC, PRIME, DHS and TAACs. In the past, Global Bureau interventions have been very beneficial in providing assistance in targeted areas and to assist in development of the policy agenda for this SO.

The primary education SO will access Global Bureau for its girl and women's education initiative, as Guinea is one of six emphasis countries worldwide.

ANNEXES

USAID/Guinea Results Framework FYs 1998 - 2005
Agency Goals and USAID/Guinea Goal and Strategic Objectives

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INTERMEDIATE RESULTS AND INDICATORS

INCREASED USE OF ESSENTIAL FP/MCH AND STI/AIDS PREVENTION SERVICES AND PRACTICES

Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results	Performance Indicator	Baseline	Performance Target (1998-2005)
Strategic Objective: Increased use of essential FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services and practices.	a. Contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) b. TT coverage, women of reproductive age c. Measles coverage by 12 months of age d. ORT use rate e. Condom use with non-regular sex partner	a. 1% in 1992 b. 43.3% in 1995* c. 52.2%* d. 26%* e. TBD in 1998	a. CPR increased at least 1 percentage point per year in urban areas, ½ in rural. b. At least 80% TT coverage, women of reproductive age. c. At least 80% coverage measles vacc. by 12 months. d. At least 65% use of ORT for last episode of d child's diarrhea of more than 24 hrs. e. At least 50% of people reporting sex with non-regular partner in past 12 mos. used condom.
Intermediate Result 2.1: Increased ACCESS to FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services and products	a. Geographic access within 5 km to HC or 2 km to outreach service delivery point. b. Proportion of pop. aged 15-49 that knows where condoms can be obtained within 1 hr. c. Proportion of health center clients who are given prescriptions because they cannot afford drugs at the HC. d. Unmet need for family planning services.	a. 35 to 40%* b. TBD in 1998 c. TBD in 1998 d. 25% in 1992*	a. Decrease unserved percentage by at least 50%. b. At least 80% c. Less than 5% d. Decreased by at least 50%
Sub-intermediate Result 2.2.1: Increased availability of health products and services	a. % of PHC delivery points offering full package of essential services. b. Number of sales points per 1000 population. c. Percentage of service delivery/sales points experiencing no stockout in essential drugs or supplies over the past three months.	a. TBD in 1998 b. TBD in 1998 c. TBD in 1998	a. At least 95% b. To be Determined c. 100%

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<p>Sub-intermediate Result 2.2.2: Increased equity in the availability of health services</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rates at which the indigent, poor, and seasonally poor use public health services compared with the rate for the non-poor. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TBD in 1998 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ratio of 1:1.
<p>Intermediate Result 2.2: Improved QUALITY of FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services and products</p>	<p>a. Proportion of health centers whose staff use latest MOH service guideline protocols to provide each of 5 groups of essential services. b. Proportion of properly diagnosed cases which warrant referral that are successfully referred from the HC to a hospital.</p>	<p>a. TBD in 1998 b. TBD in 1998</p>	<p>a. At least 90% b. At least 80%</p>
<p>Sub-intermediate Result 2.2.1.: Improved performance of health workers and community-based workers</p>	<p>a. Proportion of health center patients who receive services according to norms and standard case management protocols for the 5 groups of services. b. Proportion of community based workers who perform their essential tasks according to service protocols.</p>	<p>a. TBD in 1998 b. TBD in 1998</p>	<p>a. At least 90% b. At least 90%</p>

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Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results	Performance Indicator	Baseline	Performance Target (1998-2005)
Intermediate Result 2.2.2:: Improved health and management monitoring and evaluation systems from community to national level.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proportion of health centers producing periodic written analyses of local disease patterns and of services provided. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TBD in 1998 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least 75%
Intermediate Result 2.3: Increased DEMAND and behavior favoring use of FP/MCH and STI/AIDS-prevention services, products, and practices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Proportion of mothers and fathers stating their intention to space or limit number of their children. b. Proportion of women intending to deliver their next child with assistance from a trained midwife of TBA c. Proportion of mothers intending to have their children vaccinated. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. TBD in 1998 b. TBD in 1998 c. TBD in 1998 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. At least 50% b. At least 60% c. At least 95%
Sub-intermediate Result 2.3.1: Improved knowledge of positive health practices and services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Proportion of target population knowing where to obtain essential services/products. b. Proportion of adults and adolescents who have heard of AIDS, know it is fatal, and know at least one way to avoid it. c. Proportion of pop. 15-49 who know at least one modern contraceptive method. d. Proportion of mothers who know that rapid breathing in a sick child is a sign that urgent medical help is needed. e. Proportion of mothers who know that exclusive breast-feeding should start right after birth and continue until 6 mos. of age. f. Proportion of adults knowing that malaria is transmitted by mosquitoes and what to do for a child with presumed malaria. g. Proportion of children fully vaccinated by 12 months of age. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. TBD in 1998 b. TBD in 1998 c. 89 to 91%* d. TBD in 1998 e. TBD in 1998 f. TBD in 1998 g. 16.3%* 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. At least 95% b. At least 95% c. At least 95% d. At least 75% e. At least 60% f. At least 80% g. At least 80%

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<p>Sub-intermediate Result 2.3.2.: Improved community support for health and family planning services, products and practices</p>	<p>a. Proportion of communities have solidarity funds or other mechanisms to ensure emergency care and referral transport of persons without ready cash. b. Proportion of communities having at least one civic association promoting FP and/or STI-AIDS-prevention. c. Proportion of communities in which the local chief and religious leaders express approval and support for family planning and condom use to prevent STI/AIDS.</p>	<p>a. TBD in 1998 b. TBD in 1998 c. TBD in 1998</p>	<p>a. At least 50% b. At least 80% c. At least 75%</p>
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Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results	Performance Indicator	Baseline	Performance Target (1998-2002)
Intermediate Result 2.4: More effective response among donors, government, community organizations, NGOs, and private sector in addressing critical health constraints.	a. Proportion of days in past 6 mos. during which the warehouse supplying health centers had all essential drugs in stock. b. Proportion of IR and DPS teams in target areas receiving 100% of their budgeted operating funds to support peripheral PHC services. c. Proportion of health centers and outreach points having staff fully trained in current protocols for essential services. d. Proportion of health centers and health posts adequately repaired and equipped to provide essential services.	a. TBD in 1998 b. TBD in 1998 c. TBD in 1998 d. TBD in 1998	a. 100% b. 100% c. At least 95% d. 100%
Sub-intermediate Result 2.4.1: Donor partnership strengthened at national level	a. Meetings with health sector donor partners. b. Proportion of other health sector donors in Guinea from whom GFPH has a copy of their annual work plan and review.	a. N/A b. N/A	a. At least once a month b. 100%
Sub-intermediate Result 2.4.2: NGO and local organization capacity and involvement strengthened	• Proportion of health districts in which at least one local organization is collaborating on the expansion of essential services and products.	• TBD in 1998	• To be Determined
Sub-intermediate Result 2.4.3: Intersectoral collaboration within government and between public, private, and traditional sectors to solve health problems strengthened at all levels	a. Proportion of private sector medical practitioners in targeted areas meeting with public health officials at least once a year to discuss FP/MCH and STI/AIDS prevention. b. Proportion of districts organizing meetings or orientation sessions with traditional healers during a six month period. c. Proportion of districts in which public health officials discuss their program	a. TBD in 1998 b. TBD in 1998 c. TBD in 1998	a. At least 80% b. At least 75% c. At least 80%
Sub-intermediate Result 2.4.4: Improved district health management	a. Proportion of health centers having written copies of latest policy guidelines, protocols, and performance standards for the five targeted essential services. b. Proportion of health centers visited during the past month by a DPS supervisor who provided formative supervision	a. TBD in 1998 b. TBD in 1998	a. 100% b. At least 90%

•MOH annual statistics

*1992 DHS

•Guinea Vision 2010

*PSI estimates in Project areas

INTERMEDIATE RESULTS AND INDICATORS

QUALITY PRIMARY EDUCATION PROVIDED TO A LARGER PERCENTAGE OF GUINEAN CHILDREN,
WITH EMPHASIS ON GIRLS AND RURAL CHILDREN

Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results	Performance Indicator	Baseline	Target (in 2002 ¹)
Strategic Objective: Quality Primary Education Provided to a Larger Percentage of Guinean Children, with Emphasis on Girls and rural Children	*a. Primary school gross enrollment rate *b. Primary school repetition rate *c. Grade 4 achievement test results (reading and Math) *To be disaggregated by gender and geographic area	*Choice of baseline year will be determined by August 1997 as part of FQEL start-up	a. TBD 1997 b. TBD 1997 c. TBD 1999
Intermediate Result 3.1: Improved Sectoral Strategic Planning, Management, and Decision-Making	a. Percent of primary schools attaining initial Fundamental Quality Levels (FQL) targets 1. Rural 2. Urban b. Education Management and Information System (EMIS) data used to plan, analyze, and refine FQL	a. TBD in 1998 b. TBD 1998	a. TBD 1998 b. Data being analyzed and used: 1998 FQL refined: 1990 on
Intermediate Result 3.2: Improved Instruction in Primary Schools	a. Revised curriculum objectives for math and reading defined, approved, and in use *b. Second grade promotion rate *To be disaggregated by gender and geographic area	a. N/A b. TBD in 1997	a. Defined:1998 Approved:1999 Use:2000 on b. TBD in 1997
Intermediate Results 3.3: Development and Implementation of Equity-Enhancing Program	a. National equity strategy defined b. Local constituencies strengthened for implementation of equity initiatives	a. N/A b. N/A	a. Strategy defined 1998 b. 76 PTAs 5 NGOs

¹Targets beyond 2002 will be determined

INTERMEDIATE RESULTS AND INDICATORS

GREATER CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE, PARTICULARLY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results	Performance Indicator	Baseline	Target (in 2002)
Strategic Objective: Greater citizen participation in governance, particularly at the local level	a. Percent of polls monitored by trained impartial citizens b. Percent of population participating in civil society groupings c. Percent of women elected to participating CSO and CRD management bodies	TBD in FY 1998	TBD in FY 1998
Intermediate Result 1: Improved local governance through grassroots empowerment	a. Increased generation and programming of revenues by local government b. Number of CSOs organized and operating in target areas	TBD in FY 1998	TBD in FY 1998
Intermediate Result 2: More representative political processes;	a. Percent of elected opposition deputies in National Assembly appointed to NA committees b. Number of bills significantly affected by NA	TBD in FY 1998	TBD in FY 1998
Intermediate Result 3: Empowered national civil society organizations	a. Number of federations of associations with membership in more than one of Guinea's natural regions b. Number of private radio stations	TBD in FY 1998	TBD in FY 1998
Intermediate Result 4: Enhanced appreciation for the rule of law through better access to legal information.	a. Percent of target population knowledgeable about their civic responsibilities b. Number of cases filed with court system	TBD in FY 1998	TBD in FY 1998

DONORS

Bilateral

France (*Caisse Française de Développement (CFD)* and *Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération (FAC)*)

United States of America

Japan

Germany

Canada

Federation of Russia

Saudi Arabia

Kuwait

Denmark

Italy

Belgium

Switzerland

China

Egypt

Cuba

Peoples Republic of Korea

Multilateral Organizations:

IBRD (World Bank)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

European Union (European Development Fund (EDF) and European Investment Bank (EIB))

African Development Bank (AfDB) (including the African Development Fund (AfDF))

UN Agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, WFP, HCR, IFAD, WHO, UNFPA, UNIDO)

Arabian Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA)

Islamic Bank for Development (IBD)

Saudi Fund for Development (SFD)

OPEP Fund for International Development (OFID)

Non Governmental Organizations:

AFRICARE (US)

OICI (US)

PLAN International (US)

CLUSA (US)

Save the Children (US)

World Education (US)

Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI)

Association Française des Volontaires du Progrès (AFVP)

Aide et Action (French)

ADRA International

Terre des Hommes (Swiss)

USAID/GUINEA PARTNERS

Natural Resource Management

Africare

Cooperative League of USA (CLUSA)

Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA)

Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC) Int.

Guinée Ecologie

Union Guinéenne des Volontaires de Développement

Association Guinéenne des Femmes Chercheurs

Centre Africain de Formation pour le Développement

Integrated Enterprise Development Project (PRIDE)

Agricultural Investment and Marketing Foundation (FICA)

National Directorate of Rural Works

National Directorate of Decentralization

National Directorate of Forests and Wildlife

National Directorate of Cooperation

National Directorate of Environment

National Directorate of Agriculture

Agronomic Research Institute of Guinea

Center of Environmental Studies and Research - University of Conakry

The World Bank

French Development Fund (*Caisse Française de Développement*)

African Development Foundation (ADF)

European Union

UNDP/FAO

GTZ/KFW

Canadian Center of International Studies and Cooperation

Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie de la Guinée (BICIGUI)

Banque Populaire Marocco-Guinéenne (BPMG)

Société Générale de la Banque Guinéenne (SGBG)

Union Internationale des Banques Guinéennes (UIBG)

Peace Corps

Rural Development Committees (CRDs)

Health/Population

Ministry of Health (including National AIDS Committee)

Population Services International (PSI)

The Guinean Association for Family Well-being (AGBEF)

United Nations Fund for Population (UNFPA)

United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF)

World Health Organization (WHO/OMS)

German Bank (Kreditonstalt Fur Wiederanfbau - KFW)

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The Guinean Branch of the Juristes African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children (CPTAFE)
German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)
Doctors Without Borders/Belgium (MSF/B)
Family Planning International Assistance (FPIA)
The Guinean Women Association for the Fight Against STD/AIDS (ASFEGMASSI)
The Women Association for the Promotion of Breast-feeding and Infant Nutrition in Guinea (AFPAMNIG)
The Media
European Union
Community and Religious Leaders
Other Health NGOs
Peace Corps
International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)
Ministry of Women's Promotion
Volunteer in Technical Assistance (VITA)
Alumni groups
AFRICARE

Primary Education

Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research
Education Development Center (EDC)
Save the Children (SC)
World Education (WE)
Global WID/Plan Guinea
The World Bank
The European Union
The French Cooperation
The Canadian Agency for International Development
UNICEF
German GTZ

Democracy/Governance

AFRICARE
African Development Foundation (ADF)
Forum des ONG: NGO forum
Guineans Women Cooperative (COFEG)
Non Governmental Organization Intervention and Coordination (Office SCIO)
Opportunities Industrialization/Centers (OIC/Guinea)
African Training for Development Center (CENAFOD)
OSFAM
United Nations Development Program (PNUD)
Guinean Human Rights Association (OGDH)
Volunteer in Technical Assistance (VITA)

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National Directorate for Decentralization (DND)
Research and Cooperative League USA (CLUSA:)
Canadian International Cooperation Center (CECI)
National Service for Technical Assistance to the Cooperatives (SENATEC)
Association for Establishment of Democracy in Afrique (AID-AFRIQUE)
Guineans Association for Human Rights (AGDH)
Foundation Frederick Ebert

ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the Agency goals is to manage environment for long-term sustainability. USAID places high priority on the environmental sector as it contributes to the Agency's goal of sustainable, broad-based economic growth. Wise use of natural resources and environmental protection are fundamental to USAID's assistance program. Ensuring the environmental soundness of every USAID program, project, and activity is a prerequisite for sustainable development. It is also a legal obligation under the Agency's regulations.

This environmental analysis is done in accordance with sections 117, 118 and 119 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) which relate to overseas assistance affecting tropical forestry and biodiversity.

Section 117 of the FAA states that: "Special efforts shall be made to maintain and where possible to restore the land, vegetation, water, wildlife, and other resources upon which depend economic growth and human well-being, especially of the poor." This section also requires USAID to "take fully into account" the impact of its activities on the environment and natural resources of developing countries.

Section 118 of the FAA precludes assistance for certain activities that may affect tropical forests unless an environmental assessment indicates that the activity will contribute significantly and directly to improving the livelihoods of the rural poor and will be conducted in a manner that supports sustainable development.

Section 119 of the FAA aims at the conservation of biodiversity and the protection of endangered species. It specifies that USAID must ensure that ongoing and proposed actions by the Agency do not inadvertently endanger wildlife or plant species or their critical habitats, harm protected areas, or have other adverse impacts on biological diversity.

USAID missions are required under section 118 and 119 of the FAA to provide information on tropical forests as appropriate in their country development strategy. The information should contain an analysis of : (1) actions necessary in that country to achieve conservation and sustainable management of tropical forests; and (2) the extent to which the actions proposed for support by the Agency meet the needs identified.

This analysis does not cover all aspects of biodiversity in Guinea. However, the Mission believes that much of the desired information has already been developed through other works, especially the Biodiversity Monograph (*Monographie Nationale sur la Diversité Biologique*) prepared by the National Directorate of Environment with the assistance of the United National Environmental Fund. As the Mission has reviewed its program in light of these already completed works, any additional detailed reporting would only be redundant.

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II. ASSESSMENT OF PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE CONSERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND TROPICAL FORESTS IN GUINEA

USAID/Guinea conducted an agricultural sector assessment in March 1997, which included an assessment of natural resources in Guinea. The results of this assessment indicate that population growth and poverty have led to environmental degradation which threatens the conservation of biological resources and tropical forests in Guinea.

1. Increased Extensification of Agriculture on Marginal Lands

The large majority of Guinea's rural households are resource-poor smallholders who increasingly rely on extensive subsistence farming and inappropriate cropping patterns to keep up with their demand for food. More marginal lands are being farmed, more woodlands and forests are converted to agriculture by slash and burn practices, fallow duration is reduced, and investment in conservation measures and improved seeds is lacking due to insufficient revenues. As a result, soil fertility is depleted and erosion becomes more and more serious, causing continued loss of agricultural productivity and increased environmental degradation.

2. Degradation of Forest Resources

Guinea's woody vegetative cover consists of 10.6 million hectares of wooded savanna, 1.6 million hectares of dry forests, 700,000 hectares of dense forests, and 250,000 hectares of mangroves. These woody resources are very degraded due to partial conversion of forest land to crop agriculture, inopportune burning, and irrational resource harvesting. This destruction concerns not only the dense forests but also all gallery forests. According to the Forest Service, the deforestation in recent years has been at the average rate of 136,000 hectares per year, 36,000 of which belong to dense forests. A few decades ago, there were about 14 million hectares of dense forests. Today, only 700,000 hectares of these dense forests exist mostly in the Forested Guinea.

There are 162 forest reserves (*Forêts classées*) in Guinea with a total areas of about 1,182,133 hectares which account for 4.80 percent of the national territory. Unfortunately, most of these forest reserves have been devastated by resource-poor people who earn their living through illegal charcoal making, timber exploitation, and agricultural conversion of forest lands, and by the forest service's lack of human and financial resources to effectively protect these resources. The majority of the forest reserves are small in size, with only 19 percent being 10,000 hectares or larger. In fact, 72 percent of the forest reserves have less than 5,000 hectares in size. These smaller forest reserves, while important, make biodiversity conservation more difficult.

3. Degradation of Biodiversity Resources

As people continue to expand their extensive farming to meet their demand for food, biodiversity resources are under pressure through the conversion of woodlands into agricultural lands causing the shrinkage of the wildlife habitats throughout the country, especially in the Fouta Djallon Highlands where the competition between smallholders and wildlife is extremely high due to high population density and shortage of arable land and where a number of endemic plants are observed between the altitudes of 700 and 1,000 meters. Moreover, the uncontrolled killings of wild animals by local hunters have drastically reduced the fauna population and put some species on the brink of extinction.

In the Maritime Guinea, the unsustainable harvest of significant amounts of fuel woods from the 250,000 hectares of mangrove is also a major problem for biodiversity conservation, in addition to the conversion of steep forest lands to upland rice cultivation by slash and burn practices.

In the Forested Guinea, the adverse environmental impacts from the conversion of forest to cropland are accelerating with the influx of more than 500,000 refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone and biodiversity conservation has been identified as being of highest priority in this region for both plants and animals.

One of the major biodiversity concerns is the Nimba Mountain Reserve located near the borders of Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast in the forested region. This reserve possesses a special characteristic of biological diversity due to the existence of different types flora and fauna that make up the tropical ecological systems at high altitudes. Classified as an integrated natural reserve in 1944, a biosphere reserve in 1980, and a world patrimony site in 1981, the Nimba Mountain Reserve consists of 145,200 hectares and is rich in plants and animals, some of which are unique in the world. However, its great biodiversity and its potential for eco-tourism have been threatened by a rapid increase of the population which is due in part to the influx of the refugees from neighboring countries and the immigration of people who seek job opportunities in the local mining sector. The destruction of natural forests and wildlife habitats to expand crop production has occurred and the killings of wild animals for food have been intensified. The GOG has created the Center for the Management of the Environment of the Nimba Mountain to protect the reserve. However, this center lacks necessary resources to carry out its mission effectively.

4. Weak Institutional Capacity for the Management of the Environment and Natural Resources

In general, Guinea has established an adequate policy and legal framework for the management of the environment and natural resources including the conservation of

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biological diversity and tropical forests. This framework is based on a number of important legislations, policy papers, and international conventions, among which are the following:

- The Tropical Forest Action Plan;
- The Forest Code and its implementing texts;
- The Environment Code and its implementing texts;
- The Code for fauna protection and hunting regulations;
- The Land Tenure Code;
- The Agricultural Development Policy Letter;
- The National Environmental Action Plan; and
- The Ramsar Convention related to humid zones of international importance, with regard to habitats of waterfowls;
- The African Convention for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources; and
- The Convention on Biological Diversity.

However, the GOG does not have a functional coordination of all the activities concerning the environment and natural resources in various sectors. There are duplications of efforts and the concurrence for resources among different ministries within the Government. Currently, the Ministry of Public Works and Environment is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the National Environmental Action Plan and the application of the environmental regulations. The Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and Forests is in charge of management of soil and forest resources. There is little coordination between these two ministries. Moreover, both of them lack the necessary technical and management capacity as well as financial resources to effectively administer their programs.

Although the current Forest Code allows for the participation of the communities in the management of forest resources, the application of that provision at the local level has been hindered by the weak capacity of public institutions and the ineffective organization at the community level to plan and carry out community-based natural resource management.

III. USAID/GUINEA'S STRATEGY ADDRESSING THE IDENTIFIED CONSTRAINTS

The Tropical Forest Action Plan (TFAP) adopted by the GOG in 1989 recognized that the degradation of the ecosystems has advanced in all regions of the country and this would adversely affect the future of the national economy which depends to a large part on agriculture. The TFAP cited the rehabilitation of these forest reserves as the first, urgent task to be undertaken by the Government.

USAID's has helped Guinea address its environmental problems through two actions which aim at reducing the pressure on the environment: (1) increasing smallholders' income for sustainable natural resource management and (2) stabilizing population through family planning.

community actions on conservation of natural resources. They advise villagers how to prevent environmentally harmful bush fires and to rationally manage communal forests.

In order to expand the impact of the current NRM activity, USAID/Guinea proposes a natural resource management strategic objective under the new country strategic plan. This strategic objective aims to increase use of sustainable natural resource management practices by smallholders through increased household income and enhanced community-based natural resource management. The achievement of this strategic objective will help Guinea manage its forests optimally, conserve biological resources, and exploit its agriculture resource base for food production and income, on a sustainable basis.

Under this new strategic objective, smallholders will be assisted to increase their agricultural income through increased land and labor productivity and through improved marketing of farm produce. Environmentally sound, yield-enhancing technologies will be made available to smallholders through extension activities carried out by Peace Corps volunteers and agents working for the PVOs, NGOs and government services associated with this strategic objective. Participatory training in farm management will be provided to smallholders.

Opportunities for community-based enterprises to provide non-farm income to villagers identified under the ongoing activity will be further developed and replicated in other areas. Special attention will be given to women and other land poor villagers.

Enhanced community-based natural resource management will be effected through strengthening local capacity to plan and manage natural resources and through increasing co-management of communal natural resources. Successful interventions in management of communal natural resources under the ongoing activity will be replicated in new areas by the Peace Corps, PVO, Guinean NGOs, and the Forest Service. Effort will be focussed on promoting the co-management of forest resources not only in the Fouta Djallon, but also in other regions in Guinea. USAID will work with the GOG to ensure that the present policy environment favorable to the participation of the local populations in the management of natural resources will be maintained.

2. Stabilization of Population through Family Planning

As rapid population growth is identified as one of the major causes of the environmental degradation. As 80 percent of Guineans are living in the rural areas, USAID's health strategic objective which aims to increase the use of essential family planning, maternal health and STD/AIDS prevention services and practices will certainly have an impact on the conservation of natural resources and biological diversity.

IV. OTHER DONORS'S ACTIVITIES CONCERNING PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND CONSERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY

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The accelerating environmental degradation and the regional importance of the Fouta Djallon Highlands with respect to the sources of the three major rivers in West Africa have attracted commitments from several donors to help Guinea in the area of natural resource management.

1. Soil, Water and Vegetation Conservation

The European Union's *Programme Régional d'Aménagement des Bassins Versants du Haut Niger et de la Haute Gambie* started in 1991 with a funding of ECU 37.5. Its second phase will begin in 1998 with a funding of about US \$ 50 million. The project focuses on the long-term protection of the two watersheds: Upper Niger and Upper Gambia. It is concerned primarily with natural resource management, with emphasis on soil conservation, waterpoint improvement, and improving vegetative cover through agroforestry and brush fire management in Middle, Upper and Forested Guinea.

The *Projet de Gestion des Ressources Rurales* which started in 1996 with a total funding of 25.2 million DM from the German Development Bank (KfW) and GTZ will continue until the year 2003. This project supports natural resource management and environmental protection by improving agriculture in populated areas and rehabilitating natural forests in Forested and Maritime Guinea.

United Nations Environmental Fund's [UNEF] *Projet Développement Rural Moyenne Guinée* objective is to preserve and manage natural resources while improving the lives of the rural population in Middle Guinea. United Nations High Commission for Refugee's [UNHCR] *Projet de Reboisement UNHCR en Guinée Forestière* is rehabilitating land degraded by refugees in Forested Guinea.

2. Biodiversity Conservation

European Development Fund supports biodiversity conservation with two activities, the *Projet de Conservation des Chimanzés en Guinée* and the *Parc National du Haut Niger*. The later project is a study for creating a park in Upper Guinea. The United Nations Development Program [UNDP] supports scientific studies of the biodiversity rich Nimba mountains area of Forested Guinea with the *Protection de l'Environnement et de Gestion Rationnelle de Ressources du Monts Nimba*. The project includes training and extension for a pilot farm.

With the financial assistance of United Nations Environmental Funds, the National Directorate of Environment is developing the *Monographie Nationale sur la Diversité Biologique* which provides a comprehensive assessment of the state of biological diversity in Guinea.

3. Institutional Support

The Canadian International Development Agency [CIDA] supports the *Centre de Études et Recherche en Environnement* at the *Université Abdel Nasser de Conakry* with geographic information system [GIS] training and equipment. GTZ's *Projet Conseiller Forestier* provides a technical consultant to DNFF for a period of one year, and possibly up to three years, to help develop the Forestry Code. UNDP's *Élimination des Substances Appauvrissement de l'Ozone* is a project to train customs officials in how to identify and dispose of substances that have been identified as harmful to the ozone layer.

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GUINEA AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT- March 1997

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. Introduction

The Guinea Agricultural Sector Assessment has two major objectives:

- ◆ evaluate the production and marketing of major crops and the management of natural resources in Guinea from the sustainability viewpoint, and
- ◆ identify several areas where United States Agency for International Development (USAID) interventions in Guinea can be most effective in promoting sustainable agricultural production and natural resource management.

The assessment will contribute to USAID/Guinea's on-going strategic planning process. Under the current program schedule, USAID/Guinea is expected to submit to USAID/Washington for review and approval a new Country Strategic Plan (CSP) by May 1997. This CSP is to cover the planning period fiscal years 1998 to 2002.

In December 1996, USAID/Guinea received from USAID/Washington a cable entitled "USAID/Guinea Country Strategic Plan: Program and Budget Parameters." The communication was intended to frame USAID/Guinea's overall strategic planning process for the new CSP. It has implications for what types of activities are feasible to propose for any development assistance program in the agricultural sector. According to this cable, the development of any future development assistance in Guinea will be conditioned by three principal factors: Guinea's current status as a watch list country, USAID's overall policy and program priority areas, and the CSP funding scenarios set forth by USAID/Washington.

Due to the flawed 1995 legislative elections, current United States Government policy prohibits direct financial support to the Government of the Republic of Guinea (GOG), except for funding for the education sector. Until the watch list designation is removed, direct funding of public agency activities in sectors other than education is problematic.

USAID/Washington expects that the high level of Congressional and Agency interest in funding social sector activities in population, child survival, AIDS prevention, and basic education will continue. By contrast, funding for economic growth and democracy/governance is expected to be tight. Guinea is considered a priority country in the environmental sector by the Africa Bureau. It was confirmed that the environmental sector will continue to be a priority, although there may be increasing limitations for funding in the future.

The guidance communication notes USAID/Guinea's active role as a leading edge Mission for the New Partnership Initiative. The expectation is that USAID/Guinea resources will be best devoted to capacity-building with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and creating linkages and synergies between different actors, including American and local NGOs and private voluntary organizations, businesses, and community and national level government to better achieve common development objectives.

II. The Contributions of the Agricultural Sector to the Guinean Economy

1. Contribution to Gross Domestic Product

The contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP has gone from an average of 50 percent in the 1960s to less than 25 percent in the 1990s. The contribution is estimated to have been 24 percent in 1992, 23 percent in 1993, and 24 percent in 1994. The major declines in sector contributions in the 1970s were largely attributable to the economic policies put in place by the First Republic, particularly an inappropriate exchange rate policy, government enforcement of fixed producer prices, marketing quotas imposed on producers, and the effective disincentives to private sector participation in agricultural enterprises.

The annual average rate of growth in the agricultural sector has been estimated at 4.1 percent from 1990 to 1995. In the 1990s, growth in the sector in real terms has been higher than Guinea's rate of population growth, making it one of the very few economies in Africa where such growth has occurred.

Figures indicate that growth rates have been fairly consistent in all sub-sectors, except for fisheries in 1995. In the agriculture crops sub-sector, most growth is estimated to have occurred as a function of farm households increasing the total area under cultivation, with much less growth attributable to increases in productivity per hectare or per person-day engaged in crop cultivation.

2. Contribution to Foreign Exchange Earnings and Balance of Payments

Good performance in the sector in the 1990s has had favorable impacts on Guinea's balance of payments. Agricultural exports as a percentage of total exports have increased from 8.6 percent in 1991 to 16.6 percent in 1995. However, these increases in agricultural exports (e.g., coffee, pineapples, bananas, mangoes, and oil palm products) have not generated sufficient foreign exchange earnings to fully offset imports of food products. From 1991 to 1995, food imports have remained relatively steady in value terms, and the deficit in the agricultural balance of payments has been reduced from US\$ 105.4 million in 1991 to US\$ 35.6 million in 1995.

3. Characteristics of the Rural Population and Contribution to Employment

The agricultural population in the country was estimated at 3,479,000 in 1996. This population is composed of 49.3 percent males and 50.7 percent females, with 46.6 percent under 15 years of age and 4 percent over 65 years of age. It is estimated that the agricultural population is growing at only 1.8 percent per year, versus 4.8 percent for the urban population. The active agricultural work force is estimated at 1,893,000 persons, with a strong female representation (i.e., 117 active females for every 100 active males). The net rate of rural/urban migration is reported to be 2.08 percent per year, which amounts to about 72,000 persons per year. The literacy rate in the agricultural population is low. An estimated 66 percent of heads of household are considered illiterate. Of the literate population, 34 percent is estimated to be in the age group 35 to 44 years of age.

It is estimated that there are 443,000 agricultural households in Guinea. On average, each household is comprised of eight people, of whom five are active in farm enterprises. Thirty-four percent of households have land holdings of less than 1 hectare, 30 percent have between 1 and 2 hectares, 32 percent have between 2 and 7 hectares, and only 4 percent have land holdings of more than 7 hectares. There has been a gradual evolution in the average area cultivated by households.

According to the 1995 agricultural survey, only about 80,000 agricultural households received assistance from existing agricultural projects (i.e., approximately 18 percent of total agricultural households). Project assistance is generally directed at households producing within single commodity production/marketing chains (e.g., cotton, oil palm, and vegetables).

The total cultivated area in major food crops in Guinea was estimated at 850,000 hectares in 1995, about 15 percent of available arable land. Of this cultivated area, 90.6 percent is estimated to be cropped in pure stands. The average cultivated area per household was 1.80 hectares in 1975 and 2.03 hectares in 1995. Rice cultivation occupied an estimated 48.2 percent of this total area in 1995. These averages, however, mask considerable variability among regions. Large agro-industrial plantations are rare in Guinea and are largely limited to production of natural latex oil palm products and, to a lesser extent, fruits and vegetables. Some medium-scale enterprises also exist, largely held either by traditional leaders or civil servants. **The total area exploited under plantations and large farms is estimated at 5 to 10 percent of cultivated land, with the remainder being under individual household management.**

4. Contribution to Food Security

Guinea currently lacks a reliable agricultural statistical base to permit detailed analyses of the agricultural situation and/or the status of food security in the 1990s. Current production statistics are based only on national agricultural surveys conducted in 1991 and 1995. With respect to food imports, statistics have been collected by the *Projet National d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire* (PNASA) since 1992 from a variety of sources.

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The government's food availability estimate for 1995 shows a projection of the food security situation from 1995 to 2005. Livestock products included, total daily calories are approximately 2,100 calories per capita. The projection indicates about 93 percent of daily calories per capita coming from vegetable sources, domestic and imported, and only 7 percent coming from animal products. Within the vegetable component, cereals, tubers and edible oils are projected to constitute more than 90 percent of daily available calories per capita, with fruits, vegetables and sugar making up the rest of the component calories. Rice is seen to be the predominant source of calories (i.e., 45 percent of all calories supplied by rice, of which 25 percent is from domestic rice and 20 percent is from imported rice).

In 1997, Guinea continues to depend significantly on imports, particularly rice, to meet its total food consumption needs. Over the last 4 years, relative stability has been observed in the quantities of rice imported. This may indicate that marginal increases in demand for rice are now largely being met by increases in domestic paddy production. At the present rate of growth in rice production, estimated at 5.9 percent per year, and with the population growth rate at 2.9 percent, it will not be easy to effect major declines in rice imports in the short-term. This, in turn, implies that food security in Guinea will remain vulnerable to changes in world rice prices for the foreseeable future.

The principal focus of the government's food security strategy at present is on rice. Major policy choices will have to be made in the medium term as to whether the GOG should deliberately promote more domestic rice production or allow agricultural production to be determined by comparative advantage and open market forces. If the latter choice is made, then the question is how to effectively support crop diversification through the existing agricultural sector support agencies. Such policy making and implementation may be effective if much better agricultural statistics are available for a much wider range of crops. Choices made in the next few years, with regard to how to deal with food security issues, could well determine whether Guinea's potential for agricultural production will be realized in an economically rational manner and under sustainable cropping conditions.

III. Agricultural Sector Reforms and Structural Adjustments and Their Impacts

Successful sector development is critically dependent on reforms in many areas. The responsiveness of the private sector to the inducements provided by the GOG's overall reform program and the actual supply response from farmers, agribusinessmen, and international marketers of Guinean agricultural commodities may be at least as dependent on the successful implementation of reforms outside the sector as in it.

1. Results Obtained in the Sectoral Program 1991-1996

The first *Lettre de Politique de Développement Agricole* (LPDA 1), adopted in December 1991, set forth the priority areas for sectoral reforms as related to Guinea's overall economy reform program. The withdrawal of the state from commercial activities in

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production and marketing and the creation of conditions which favored the emergence of a dynamic private sector were seen as the most important actions to be undertaken to restart economic activities in Guinea.

If one looks at agricultural sector performance in terms of GDP and balance of payments from 1991 to 1996, the figures presented are positive and encouraging. Increases in production have been particularly strong in certain sub-sectors. In comparing the agricultural surveys of 1991 and 1995, one sees significant growth in production of food crops and meat.

Although these statistics are encouraging, survey data also indicate that the gains in food production have come essentially from increases in the area of land under cultivation to major crops, and not from any significant increases in per hectare yields. It is estimated that average rice yields were 1,380 kilograms per hectare in 1991 and 1,430 kilograms per hectare in 1995. Maize yields were estimated at 960 kilograms per hectare in 1991 and 1,030 kilograms in 1995. Manioc yields were reported to have actually declined from about 7,000 kilograms per hectare in 1991 to only 6,100 kilograms per hectare in 1995. Peanut yields were reported to have been 870 kilograms per hectare in 1991 and 910 kilograms per hectare in 1995. Given the small increases in yields reported for most major crops and the interannual variability to be expected, one must conclude that per hectare crop yields for rice, maize and peanuts were essentially stagnant over the period, and manioc yields were in significant decline.

If there was significant progress in domestic food crop and livestock production since 1991, there has been less real progress in increasing the volumes of agricultural commodities exported. Most of the gains reported in the value of agricultural exports over the period resulted more from the effects of rising world prices for a few key commodities -- coffee and cotton -- than from any significant increases in the tonnages exported.

The program for production of natural latex (i.e., hévéa) appears to be progressing fairly well. The objectives set for planted areas in 1991 were surpassed over the planning period. Production from the first trees planted started earlier than anticipated, putting pressure on for faster development of processing facilities. The future of this sub-sector appears to be good, even if overall impacts will be limited to relatively small areas of forest in southeastern forested Guinea.

Tropical fruit exports have remained weak and far from the levels recorded in Guinea in the 1950s. Exports of pineapples have been stagnant at between 1,000 and 2,000 metric tons of fresh fruit. Exports of fresh mangoes are only about 500 metric tons, and those of watermelons and other melons only amount to a few hundred metric tons. Increasing exports is seen mainly as a problem of poor organization of production and marketing chains and inadequacies in existing infrastructure available for conditioning and shipping quality fruit.

With regard to natural resource management, numerous actions suggested by LPDA 1 were undertaken over the period, but problems persist. A special effort was made to sensitize the population about controlling bush fires, installing firebreaks and fire management, and economizing on the use of firewood. These efforts were accompanied by training courses for government agents. In addition, a variety of management systems (e.g., for mangrove areas, watersheds, and flood plains) and infrastructure (e.g., bore holes, waterpoints, spring boxes) were put in place.

The principal difficulties in implementation of these actions revolved around the institutional capacity to support natural resource management. Specifically, no good system for managing revenues collected from forestry activities has been established, nor has an effective system for taxes and fees for resource exploitation been devised and implemented. Finally, the effective reorganization of the roles and responsibilities of the many organizations and institutions charged with natural resource management remains to be accomplished.

With regard to rural infrastructure development, 5,620 kilometers of rural road were rehabilitated as of the end of 1995. This constituted 70 percent of the target objective of 8,000 kilometers set forth in LPDA 1. Placement of improved water management structures in small flood plains was accomplished at the rate of 1,237 hectares of land per year through 1995 against a medium-term planning target of 2,800 hectares per year. Finally, 6,979 waterpoints were developed through the end of 1995 vis-a-vis the target figure of 6,100 waterpoints set out in the LPDA 1.

In the area of agricultural credit, the two specialized organizations set up to handle sector credit needs (*Crédit Rural* and *Crédit Mutuel*) are judged by government planners not to have functioned well. To the contrary, it is reported that both organizations have reduced their interventions in rural areas and, thereby, left a major hole in the overall strategy for agricultural development. Many respondents said that they considered the effective lack of agricultural credit at all levels as the primary constraint on development of sector activities.

Three key observations can be made about the GOG's public investment program from 1991 to 1995. First, aggregate agricultural sector investment in most years in the 1990s has been overwhelmingly determined by flows of external finance, largely from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. Second, GOG contributions to the Public Investment Program have been highly variable, and third, total agricultural sector investment has been highly variable over the period.

Overall, realization of projected investment targets ranged from 78 percent to 97.8 percent, except during 1993 and 1994, when actual financing amounted to only 31.1 percent and 32.1 percent, respectively, of projected investment levels. Finally, national budget funding as a percentage of actual total agricultural sector investment ranged from

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7.3 percent to 13 percent, except in 1993 and 1994 when government contributions amounted to 26.1 percent and 25.2 percent, respectively, of total actual investment.

2. Sectoral Planning and the LPDA 2

After evaluating performance under the LPDA 1 and within the context of the GOG's macroeconomic reform framework, the second *Lettre de Politique de Développement Agricole* (LPDA 2) was drafted in late 1996. The LPDA 2 is still in draft form awaiting its approval by the government and donor agencies at a Round Table scheduled for the first

quarter of 1997. As of now, the nine principal policy objectives of the LPDA 2 are to:

- ◆ reduce national economic dependence on the mining sector by rational and progressive exploitation of Guinea's agricultural sector potential;
- ◆ follow a food security policy that supports increases in the productivity and agricultural production favoring the rural poor, promotes diversification in food production, and broadens food consumption choices for the entire population;
- ◆ develop agricultural exports and reduce food imports with the objectives of reducing the deficit in the agricultural balance of payments;
- ◆ support development of dynamic private sector participation in the sector by improving the agricultural credit system, which is the major brake on development of such enterprises; developing necessary economic infrastructure to support sector growth; and creating a legal and regulatory environment compatible with private sector participation;
- ◆ follow a policy of public sector disengagement from all production and commercial activities in the agricultural sector;
- ◆ improve the productivity of agricultural households by encouraging the systematic use of selected, improved seeds and plant materials; fertilizers; insecticides; herbicides and pesticides; and appropriate agricultural equipment;
- ◆ improve the performance of public agricultural support services, notably through better management of existing resources and putting in place necessary means for the work defined;

- ◆ develop agricultural activities to feed the population and create employment opportunities in rural areas for the 52.5 percent of the rural population judged to be disadvantaged and poor, as against poor populations of 6.7 percent in Conakry and 24.3 percent in other urban areas; and
- ◆ ensure protection of the environment and promote rational use of Guinea's natural resources.

The assessment report reviews a broad range of conditions and factors which affect Guinea's agricultural sector and its potential for development in Chapters III to VI. The following table shows the key constraints the assessment team sees as having major impacts on the sector in 1997 under four categories and in priority order within each column.

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Economic and Financial	Human and Institutional	Production	Infrastructural
High real interest rates on available credit and a financial climate which drives investors almost exclusively toward short-term financial options.	Lack of detailed data sets and analyses to provide the basis for effective planning and implementation of development activities in the public and private sectors and in the donor community.	Lack of reliable private sector systems for provision of high quality and appropriate seeds, plant materials, and nursery stock.	Improvements in national road network are now challenged by lack of an effective maintenance system, including cost sharing with principal users.
Low effective purchasing power in commodity markets and lack of rural savings to self-finance even seasonal agricultural operations.	GOG difficulties in translating national plans into a set of operational conditions sufficient to attract private sector investment. Attitudes and actions of GOG officials at lower levels are often not consistent with policies at higher levels.	Lack of private sector systems to provide other agricultural inputs needed to ensure maximum performance from improved seeds, plant materials and nursery stock, coupled with excessive donor/project interventions in what should be purely commercial activities.	Lack of commodity processing facilities and appropriate village level equipment and techniques for transforming surplus agricultural output into alternative products for sale.
Lack of an effective banking system to provide operational and investment credit to producers and commodity chain intermediaries.	Business agreements negotiated under non-transparent conditions often take precedence over formal National Investment Code and other published rules and regulations.	Pressures on available cropland resulting in increasing cultivation on marginal soils and steep slopes and severe reduction of fallow periods.	Limited scheduled air freight space through Conakry and non-competitive rates compared to West African competitors. Failure of shippers to meet space commitments.
Tax and fee schedules, administrative restrictions, and generalized corruption which raise transactions costs and do not create incentives for trade in imported agricultural inputs or agricultural exports.	Lack of a single window facility for establishing private enterprise operations. Overlapping agency functions which open the door for extraction of informal transaction charges from potential investors.	Limited performance of the agricultural research system and its failure to generate a constant stream of adapted innovations for producers and the agribusiness community.	Limited scheduled ocean freight capacity and limited port freight handling facilities. Lack of cold storage and handling facilities for perishable agricultural commodities.

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The assessment team suggests that USAID/Guinea develop a strategic approach for the agricultural sector oriented around the theme of enhanced economic security of rural households, with three approaches:

- ◆ increase rural household access to food, goods and services;
- ◆ improve rural household productivity in sustainable agricultural production systems; and
- ◆ foster income-generating enterprises for rural households through private sector agribusiness associations.

In considering which among the possible interventions cited in the report would be most appropriate to propose as activities for inclusion in a Strategic Objective framework, the assessment team thought the following criteria were most appropriate as guidelines for activity selection and prioritization. The proposed activity:

- ◆ relates directly to the most important sectoral constraints identified by the assessment team;
- ◆ could have objectively verifiable results within the 5-year planning horizon;
- ◆ could bring significant benefits to the largest possible beneficiary populations;
- ◆ is sharply focused and can be defined in discrete and precise terms;
- ◆ would lend itself to participatory approaches in both planning and implementation;
- ◆ is one where there is a comparative advantage in using American expertise;
- ◆ could be accomplished within the bounds of projected USAID resources over the planning period and/or presents opportunities to co-financing with other major donors;
- ◆ could build on prior USAID experience in Guinea; and
- ◆ relates to on-going USAID activities in Guinea.

The assessment team believes that the following five activities in priority order best address the stated criteria and, therefore, are the best prospects for inclusion in any USAID/Guinea Strategic Objective package for agriculture and natural resources management in the next 5-year planning period.

- ◆ A program for strengthening road maintenance capacity;

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- ◆ A program for strengthening collection of agricultural statistics and policy analysis;
- ◆ A program for improving the integration and operations of agricultural commodity chains;
- ◆ A program for introduction and testing of appropriate storage, conditioning and processing technologies for agricultural commodities; and
- ◆ A program for co-management of classified forests and creation of income generating activities on hillsides.

The following paragraphs discuss the proposed activities.

1. Program for Strengthening Road Maintenance

The GOG, with assistance from the donor community, has invested heavily in development of the country's secondary and tertiary road network over the past decade (US\$ 33 million for USAID alone). This investment has had significant and positive impacts on the economic and social development of rural Guinea. Maintenance of this crucial national infrastructure is absolutely essential to future growth of the agricultural sector. Keeping these roads open and functional at all times of the year makes possible delivery of agricultural inputs and services to farm households, the evacuation of agricultural commodities for more efficient market operations, and participation of previously isolated villagers in a broad array of essential economic or social services.

Unfortunately, the road network in place is threatened by lack of an effective road maintenance program for the country. What is needed is a program that is affordable and participatory, demands the support of road network users and beneficiaries, and equitably shares the costs of network maintenance.

The *Direction National du Génie Rural* (DNGR) has provided a preliminary request for USAID assistance in this area which appears to be well thought out and workable within the constraints of USAID's probable resources over the next 5 years. This program would be highly compatible with supporting the further development of both NGOs and participating local groups around the country, including the *Communautés Rurales de Développement* (CRDs) and the structure of community councils. It could be a program with a broad beneficiary population in all parts of the country. Given the progress the DNGR and USAID have already made with respect to impact analysis of rural roads programs, the continuation of this activity should be highly successful.

2. Program for Strengthening Collection and Analysis of Agricultural Statistics

The assessment team firmly believes that the biggest single institutional constraint to rapid development of the agricultural sector in Guinea is unreliable and untimely information.

There is no comprehensive and unified database for the sector, which admits a very high potential for misallocation of scarce resources at all levels. For example, the national public investment program for 1997 alone projects a spending level of approximately US\$340 million, including at least 32 major agricultural projects.

With regard to the private sector evolution, liberalized open market systems are based first and foremost on free and transparent flows of relevant information to all participants along commodity chains and across markets. The system cannot function efficiently without such information. The assessment team, therefore, sees a high payoff potential for this low-cost activity. Targeted support for agricultural data collection, analysis, and results distribution is also an activity that could be planned and implemented in collaboration with other major donors, particularly with the World Bank and FED, who have already committed themselves to working on particular aspects.

The assessment team recommends an activity with the *Service National des Statistiques Agricole* (SNSA) and *Bureau de Coordination des Politiques Agricole* (BCPA) targeted to generate sustainable flows of reliable data and analysis for those important agricultural commodities which are completely neglected in the MAEF's current data series, specifically the fruits and vegetable sub-sector and other commodities which may have considerable prospects for export to regional and international markets (e.g., shea nut butter, kola nuts, perennial fruit and nut crops, and more exotic specialty commodities).

We specifically advocate USAID support for detailed commodity chain (*filière*) studies to provide detailed analysis of the agricultural input supply system and detailed proposals to the GOG on policy changes necessary to reduce system costs, as well as make transactions more transparent to all parties. We also recommend studies of comparative advantage related to the GOG's current food security strategy. The assessment team does not advocate broad, untargeted support for all aspects of the agricultural statistics program in Guinea.

With respect to sustainability of capacity, we believe USAID's real comparative advantage lies in training Guinean economists, statisticians, planners, and research and extension personnel in proper data collection methods; data analysis using appropriate computer software packages; and, perhaps most important, use of analytical results to better inform the policy and planning dialogues within government, concerned private sector agents, and the donor community.

3. Program for Improving the Integration and Operations of Agricultural Commodity Chains

After a broad assessment of comparative advantage in several commodity production/marketing chains, the assessment team believes the GOG and USAID/Guinea should select a small group of commodities with the best prospects for development. Detailed commodity chain analyses should then be conducted to identify the major

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bottlenecks to achieving greater competitiveness through reductions in *filière* costs, increases in output quality and conformance to market standards, presentation and timeliness in marketing, and changes in current GOG policies. The planning and implementation of a structured program(s) to develop one or two commodity chains in a participatory process with producer associations, exporters, market intermediaries, *Institute de Recherche Agricole de Guinée* (IRAG) researchers, *Service National de la Promotion Rurale et Vulgarisation* (SNPRV) staff, bank and credit program representatives, input suppliers, and others should then proceed with the goal of creating a workable model of operational efficiency in one or two commodity chains that could then be replicated across other commodities.

The assessment team realizes in proposing this activity that it sounds very much like the activities already being undertaken by the Agricultural Marketing Investment Project. The major differences we would suggest are:

- ◆ a much more sharply focused approach by concentrating on the one or two commodities with the best prospects for development, after in-depth analyses;
- ◆ a targeted approach from the ground up with all concerned participants in the selected *filière*(s), and in all segments of the production/marketing/sales chains; and
- ◆ a strategy that is aimed at making at least one commodity chain into an operational model for the others.

4. Program for Introduction and Testing of Appropriate Storage, Conditioning and Processing Technologies for Agricultural Commodities

One of the most evident marketing problems encountered by the assessment team was the high losses in both commodities and revenues encountered by producers, especially those who grow and market perishable produce. In some cases, up to 30 percent of a crop can be lost in physical terms, and producers suffer additional losses when their produce arrives on glutted markets with low prices per unit. Not all of this problem can be avoided given the nature of production systems in Guinea, but the situation could be substantially improved through better commodity storage, conditioning, and processing into saleable products. New techniques and equipment are needed at all levels from the household to the largest export firms.

This area did not receive sufficient attention in the design of the World Bank-financed National Agricultural Services Project. In discussions with World Bank officials, it was indicated that the lack of a storage/conditioning/processing component for agricultural research and extension was a significant oversight which now needs to be remedied. The same officials indicated that there were good prospects for close collaboration between USAID and the Bank in designing and implementing the needed component, and that funding was not a constraint. What was needed was high-level expertise to analyze the

present situation and then work with IRAG, SNPRV, and local groups to introduce better methods for storage, conditioning and processing of agricultural commodities.

The assessment team believes this activity would be highly complementary to the previously proposed activity with commodity chains, but broader in scope. The objective would be to improve economic security for rural households by reducing crop losses and creating income-generating activities by making new products available for household consumption and market sale.

5. Program for Co-Management of Classified Forests and Creation of Income Generating Activities on Hillsides

Despite the fact that many donor-financed projects in natural resource management are spread around the country, the GOG has yet to develop a sustainable operational model for managing classified forests and other areas. The methods and regulations in place create no incentives for local populations in and around these areas to protect them from degradation and are unsustainable when managed by GOG agencies alone. Experience has shown worldwide that management of all such areas must ultimately be based on the active participation of local populations who, in turn, benefit in tangible ways from the resource management system. GOG, particularly the DNFF, needs workable models to replace the management systems in place, but it seems unlikely that such new participatory systems will be developed in the near future without better ideas, participation and policies.

Coupled with this management activity is the need to develop income-generating activities for hillside and other areas that are marginal for production of annual crops. Guinea has huge tracts of steep land in the Fouta Djallon and elsewhere that are unsuitable for production of annual crops. Such land, however, may be eminently suited to other income-generating activities, including managed forestry, planting perennial tree crops, and harvesting natural forest products.

Given the situation, the assessment team believes that USAID/Guinea should continue, and, if necessary, intensify, its efforts to develop a workable co-management system for the Nyalama Forest. We realize that this activity is a small one in financial terms but, as one Peace Corps Volunteer who has worked in the GNRMP activity for 3 years stated, what is needed is intensive and participatory work with the local people and GOG officials to work out an acceptable management model, not large amounts of external funding. With a well-articulated strategy, this activity would be well suited to Peace Corps and NGO participation.

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IV. Assistance Scenarios**1. Current Scenario**

Under the current scenario, USAID/Guinea's total budget is projected to be US\$14 million annually over the planning horizon. Assuming under this scenario that there is a Strategic Objective for agriculture, the assessment team recommends that the Mission consider agricultural sector support only for the first and second priority activities discussed in the preceding section (i.e., for road maintenance and strengthening the agricultural statistics and policy analysis program). With anticipated participation from other donors, primarily the World Bank and FED, for the second program, we believe a total funding commitment of US\$1,000,000 annually over the 5 years would adequately cover both programs.

2. Break-Through Scenario

Under a break-through scenario, the assessment team recommends that consideration be given to all five activities levels.

DEMOCRACY/GOVERNANCE SECTOR ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

This report develops an analytical and strategic framework for a Democracy and Governance strategy for USAID/Guinea. It draws on extensively researched DG assessments carried out by members of the DG TDY team on previous visits (see Annexes), as well as consultations held during a 2-week trip in late April 1997. The analysis first provides an overview of the reasons for a DG strategy, the outlines of the proposed strategy and justification for its areas of focus, and some considerations regarding risks, assumptions and policy context. Four following sections spell out the main programmatic elements of the strategy--essentially, the areas in which Intermediate Results would be identified. Each section provides further analysis of the specific problem area as well as programmatic suggestions. Three annexes--reports from the previous research--are also attached.

WHY WORK IN THE DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE SECTOR IN GUINEA?

Guinea has made important strides in developing a participatory, accountable system of governance since the end of the repressive Sekou Toure regime in 1984, but much remains to be achieved. Guineans have enjoyed opportunities to elect their local and national leaders, but this right has been impinged upon in numerous ways by current political leaders unwilling to relinquish their grasp on power. Likewise, legal provisions are in place for decentralizing government and enabling economic development, but in practice, much control is still exerted from the national level over the political and economic choices of local communities. In essence, political leadership remains unaccountable to the large portion of the Guinean population and to the very laws which it has promulgated, and has shown very little commitment to allowing developments which would undermine its control. Thus executive power remains the fundamental constraint and risk for any programming in the area of democracy and governance.

This lack of accountability has significant impact on Guinea's development prospects. Corruption is endemic and results in the non-productive use of resources. Vested interests in the current situation go a long way toward explaining the slow progress of economic reform, which also contributes to non-efficient resource allocation, while the unstable macro-economic picture discourages needed international investment. Moreover, poor governance and misadministration hamper the efforts of average Guineans to improve their own lives, prolonging the poverty that holds back the country. In this context, improving the quality of governance and assisting Guineans to claim their rightful stake in the administration of the country is key to improving the overall prospects for development.

Guineans also enjoy a vibrant and growing independent press, though distribution of newspapers--state-owned or private--barely reaches beyond Conakry. We propose some suggestions for pursuing further options in supporting the independent press. But the real need in Guinea is for freer airwaves, given the country's low level of literacy. At present, government controls all broadcast media, and the team saw little evidence that domestic independent radio or television would be allowed in the foreseeable future, though the government seems somewhat more open to allowing international broadcasting access to Guinean airwaves. Local observers we spoke with, however, were adamant that while international broadcasting would surely improve the information deficit in Guinea, it would not be capable of addressing the difficult political issues that Guineans face. Local private broadcasting, especially radio, we were told, could make a real difference in the amount of political information and debate in the country. We recommend that USAID pursue any opportunity to support the idea of freeing the airwaves to private domestic broadcasters, through policy dialogue and perhaps even through creative uses for government-owned community radio (civic education, etc.). Independent television broadcasting would also add to the freedom of information and ideas, though it reaches a significantly smaller audience than does radio.

The strategy also proposes limited assistance in the area of rule of law, but it should be emphasized that the activity proposed--translation and dissemination of laws and summaries of laws--is aimed at meeting a specific stated need of the local and national groups that are at the center of the strategy. It was pointed out in several meetings with NGOs that they need to have better access to the provisions of law regarding their activities. It is not an overall strategy for improving rule of law in Guinea. This is a very large need in Guinea, but beyond the capabilities of USAID's limited resources at this time. From our consultations, we have the sense that nearly everything in the judiciary needs improvement, from the quality of judges to the quality and distribution of court facilities. While this is a fundamental shortcoming of the conditions for democracy and governance in Guinea, we believe that before major efforts to reform the judicial system are undertaken, it is more important to build up Guineans' capacity to participate in the making of laws and to address themselves to the legal system. Such prior developments would also contribute to improving incentives for government to hold its own accountable for legal infractions.

We also point out that since no member of the team is an expert in the legal sector, we could not offer the mission well-developed recommendations for assistance. Rather, we have taken the approach of soliciting views about the legal and judicial framework from many government and non-government representatives, and we have identified a specific target of need that addresses a specific aspect of the overall problem of accountability and participation in Guinea. If it is determined that broader assistance in legal reform is necessary, we recommend a more complete evaluation of the needs of the judiciary and the broader legal sector be conducted.

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1. Problem Analysis and Strategic Approach

During several research trips, the team members found a significant gap between the laws of the country and the reality of politics and administration. Not surprisingly, a related gap exists between those who take political decisions in Guinea and the bulk of the population which must live with the consequences of those decisions. The strategy proposed here aims to close these gaps by concentrating USAID/Guinea's DG resources mainly on local-level activities (local refers not only to rural areas, but also to urban localities--quartiers, etc.), reinforcing the nascent development of civil society at the local level to which USAID has already contributed through economic growth, natural resource management, health and education programs, as well as its experience as a New Partnerships Initiative Leading Edge Mission. While we suggest a greater focus on local-level programs than national-level, however, we also point out the important contributions that could be made with smaller amounts of resources being directed to central government institutions.

The factors constraining accountability and participation in Guinea are many. Poverty looms large, as do the concomitant lack of education, infrastructure, institutional capacity and information in the country. Twenty-six years of pervasive repression under Sekou Toure also undermined mutual trust and a sense of political efficacy, essential building blocks for the political participation that is necessary for political accountability. This lack of trust and hesitance about public or civic activity was striking to the team and played an important role in shaping the local-level orientation of the strategy we propose below, insofar as we believe that development of democratic practices and interactions between leaders and citizens at a very tangible and immediate level will be the best solution to distrust and fear.

This approach is cross-cutting insofar as it seeks to build on USAID/Guinea's success in local-level mobilization in other sectors, but it is specifically aimed at more than just mobilization around specific interests. We suggest that these interests--be they economic (e.g., access to credit), service-oriented (provision of health care), or social (improvement of women's representation in local government), or a combination of these--can be the catalysts for greater democratic participation and ultimately better governance. The strategy we propose could lead to programs that add advocacy and participation in governance to existing USAID activities, or to programs that seek out new local groups to work with.

In all cases, we believe USAID will have better success building on pre-existing community groups, even if they are in early stages of development, rather than attempting to develop interest organizations out of whole cloth, but it also the case that this DG strategy is not one that simply assumes DG results from any sort of community organization activity. We see the results of this strategy not simply in community organization, which has important implications for democracy, but in the impact of citizen empowerment through community organization on the quality of local, and by extension, national governance and representation. While citizen empowerment through community group development is an

important end in itself, Guinea has need of more. The country is in an early stage of democratic transition and needs to reinforce the foundations of that transition, and of a national governance structure. Thus this strategy looks specifically to the interlinkage of local associations and local government bodies.

By working at the local level to further develop the institutional capacity of civil society in all sectors and help local groups interact with local government more effectively, USAID can help Guinea meet two essential needs: First, this approach, since it takes a highly interactive and participatory approach, will help Guineans develop the skills, understanding and sense of efficacy that will assist them not only in managing their own group activities better to achieve desired results, but also in addressing their concerns to relevant local governing bodies, whether deconcentrated administrative authorities or decentralized representative counsels. Second, by interacting with local governing bodies, Guineans will make more relevant and responsive a national structure which the country ultimately needs for nation building and effective administration, but which at the moment appear to be of marginal relevance to many Guineans.

The local focus of this strategy is also directly related to the team's assessment of the democracy and governance situation at the national level in Guinea. There is limited room to maneuver in the current political situation. The current political leadership, with a few notable exceptions, seems to have little interest in opening up the broadcast media, fundamental economic reform, or adhering to basic tenets of its own laws. National-level NGOs, for their part, lack resources, human capacity and an encouraging enabling environment to be effective watchdogs over government or to provide fora for alternative political ideas and activities. Professional groups, such as business or bar associations, which often play a key role in advocating better governance in developing countries, are weak or nonexistent. In consultations during the April TDY, the team learned that the Chamber of Commerce has been prevented by the government from holding elections for internal leadership for several years. The Guinean Bar Association, for its part, is constrained by political divisions that prevent it playing a significant role in opposing abuse of power. Religious groups may offer greater opportunities, given their very successful contributions to other USAID projects.

However, since events and developments at the national level have important repercussions at lower levels, and since important exceptions to the generally closed political situation do exist, the strategy includes results and activity suggestions at the national level. Opportunities to strengthen centrally-based NGOs which could assist in implementation of the strategy are discussed. Positive developments in the National Assembly, including the very progressive stances taken by the President of the Assembly (despite his being a member of the ruling party), indicate that further opportunities to build on such openness should be pursued over the period of the strategy. These opportunities are discussed in more detail in the following sections.

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2. Critical Assumptions and Risks

The central assumptions on which this strategy is based are 1) that citizen empowerment in Guinea is best achieved through organizational development, civic education and advocacy based on tangible interests of small groups; and 2) that this community-level approach will yield positive and cumulative results over time in the form of a more active citizenry participating in a more democratic and open society, as well as generating more resources and employing them effectively. The risk of this approach, of course, is that progress may be slow, unspectacular and susceptible to reversals, particularly in the shorter term. Success also depends on government willingness to allow activities which may seem to threaten its hold on power. In addition, this approach is labor- and time-intensive, both for implementers and participants. Yet, for all the reasons cited above, we believe that this locally-oriented approach, in combination with strategic assistance at the national level where possible, holds the best possibilities for long-term sustainability.

Following from the labor-intensive nature of this kind of approach, and also from our assessment that any DG interventions, perhaps particularly for elections support, will require extensive negotiations between USAID and the Government of Guinea, a further critical assumption is that USAID will have a full-time DG officer and team to oversee the process.

Democracy in Guinea also faces the risks of military intervention and ethnic conflict. The predilections of the military for either intervention through a coup or further disorder along the lines of the February mutiny are not clear, but any activity that mobilizes Guineans for change should be evaluated in terms of its possible contribution to discontent in the military. Ethnic tension is a more clear concern, as many of the current political parties--and divisions within some of them, including the ruling party--follow ethnic lines. National law does not stipulate that parties have a minimal "national" presence. Thus electoral competition in particular is bound to be fraught with ethnic overtones. Local organization activities could also have an ethnic aspect, especially if it translates into advocacy and mobilization above the local government level. The best antidote to the first problem of ethnicity is probably transparent elections, though even transparency cannot guarantee acceptance of results. The second problem can be ameliorated by careful geographical and cultural distribution of local-level activities. This approach could provide an additional benefit for USAID and others working in Guinea by offering the possibility of comparing the success of different types of organizational approaches in different cultural and economic settings.

INTERMEDIATE RESULT #1: IMPROVED LOCAL GOVERNANCE THROUGH GRASSROOTS EMPOWERMENT

1. Statement of Intermediate Result

Proposed IR: Improved local governance through grassroots empowerment. This IR constitutes the major component of the DG strategy, which seeks to increase responsiveness of governance through citizen advocacy. By building on community activities already being fostered through other SOs and supporting new ones, the program under this IR would: 1/empower citizens through strengthening their grassroots associations; 2/ foster effective linkages between local associations and local government through citizen advocacy; 3/ increase responsiveness and transparency of local governance; and 4/ encourage dissemination of the resulting good governance models. Activities under this IR would focus on improving the internal practices and capacities of local associations, but with an explicit aim at creating more effective linkages between local associations and the governing bodies that affect their ability to achieve their goals.

2. Problem Analysis

The team believes that the sustainability of the democratic process in Guinea will largely rest on strengthening representative local institutions through the empowerment of grassroots communities.

The overall logic behind this approach is presented in the introduction. We simply point out here that it is widely accepted that representative local institutions are better placed to solve local problems than centrally appointed officials. Moreover, local institutions are more accessible and have more relevance for most people, especially in poor, predominantly rural countries. We propose approaching the problem of improving the performance of these institutions through strengthening local associations because we see the need in Guinea for individuals 1) to have a tangible interest at stake to encourage willingness to speak out, and 2) to have an organizational network behind their advocacy, both to support individuals who do speak out and to serve as a training ground for more active participation in public life.

It is probably on the above assumption that GOG after the 1984 military coup initiated a policy of deconcentration and decentralization in Guinea. Through a series of ordinances and decrees between 1985 and 1991 the country was reorganized into communes (in the urban areas) and *communautes rurales de developpement* (CRD) run by elected local government bodies (*conseils communautaires*). (See Annex 1 for more details) Although those local government bodies lack fiscal autonomy and a separate legal existence, they have contributed to the on-going decentralization process in Guinea, which is the second oldest experience in the region, after Cote d'Ivoire. Although decentralization in Guinea has been initiated from the top it has in some cases contributed to the grassroots' taking initiatives and making decisions on local matters. Much more needs to be done, however,

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before local governments throughout the country effectively serve their dual purposes of local representation and local administration.

For the past 15 years and even more since the beginning of the democratization process in 1990, a Guinean civil society has emerged and is very active both in the cities and in the rural areas. A large number of grassroots associations are involved in a wide range of economic and social activities, including small business/micro-enterprise, horticulture, environment protection, training/extension, etc. These different grassroots associations have become donors' focus for assistance. USAID for instance has worked with grassroots associations in micro-credit activities (the PRIDE project), democratic governance training (the CLUSA project), natural resources management.

Gathered evidence from field investigations revealed that there remains a disconnection between representative local government institutions and the grassroots associations. One aspect of this problem can be seen in the fact that the Conseils Communaux and the Conseils Communautaires are mostly controlled by elderly and the village notables while economic activities are dominated by women and the youth. Empowering grassroots associations will strengthen their ability to participate in local government bodies, the end-result being better solutions to local problems and better representation of marginalized groups in government. A further result should be that local government bodies will become a more integral and legitimate part of the national governance structure.

3. Critical assumptions

The essential conceptual assumptions behind this activity are that citizen empowerment can be achieved through local associations, and that such empowerment will result in more active, participatory governance processes.

In addition, this program assumes that locally-elected governing bodies will remain an integral part of the Government of Guinea's decentralization plans. At this time, Conseils Communautaires and Conseils Communaux exist without a legal mandate, since elections have not been held on the specified timetable. There has been no suggestion that these elections will not be held in the future, but evidence that the process is going to move forward would be an encouraging sign. It will be important to follow the outcome of the current proposal before the National Assembly that would change the method of selecting secretaries-general of the district and quartier councils from election to government appointment. The outcome of this proposal should provide some insight into the government's desire to control local representation.

The proposal also assumes that citizens want more from government than they are currently getting, and that they would be willing, given the necessary skills and encouragement, to advocate for change.

4. Causal relationships

Democratic governance training of grassroots associations will lead to more participation, transparency and accountability within those associations. Giving assistance to economic and service provision activities carried out by these associations will provide more incentive and enhance the sustainability of the DG activity. Based on this assumption it can be argued that stand alone DG activity could be short-lived.

5. Commitment and capacity of other donors

The French remain the major donor to decentralization, yet their assistance is largely concentrated at the central level, that is providing equipment to MATD and short-term staff training. In collaboration with the CENAFOD, a local NGO, the Canadian Government through the Centre Canadien d'Etudes et de Cooperation Internationale (CECI) is providing training to elected officials from 13 CRDs in the Moyenne Guinee (see Annex 1 for further details). The training curriculum includes: understanding of local laws and regulations, management of local resources, project design, and democratic governance.

The UNDP is supporting grassroots associations through the "Programme d'Appui aux Initiatives de Base" (PAIB). The program consists in providing technical assistance (training and alphabetization) and micro-credit. However it should be mentioned that the PAIB project was initially scheduled to close by end-December 1996. A June 1996 impact evaluation team recommended that the project be extended for one year, a recommendation which was accepted. Building on that experience UNDP has planned to have a comprehensive DG program which would involve buy-ins from various donors in Guinea. At the same time, UNDP is also developing a new strategic plan for the next five years, so it is not clear how preexisting programs will fit into any new framework that emerges.

GTZ has mostly adopted a cross-cutting approach in dealing with DG. It has introduced DG components into its support to health and micro-enterprise programs.

Finally it should be noted that the above are low-budget and geographically-limited coverage programs, using the services of international NGOs/PVOs which in turn subcontract with local NGOs.

6. Illustrative approaches

Programs under this IR would seek to develop both the internal capacities of local associations and their ability to affect local governance through support and training for internal democratic practices, advocacy skills training and civic/legal education. This could consist of adding new activities to existing USAID community organization programs (health management, commodity production/marketing, natural resources management) and/or seeking new associations based on different types of interests (e.g., women,

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neighborhood improvement, literacy). The selection criteria should include cultural differences (particularly differences in social relations of production and patterns of political recruitment), geographical distribution (including rural-urban), socio-economic differences. Other criteria could also be based on the perceived degree of commitment of local governing bodies to improve their capacity and performance. Whether USAID decides to select on the basis of local associations or on the basis of local government interest is mainly a policy decision, though we would suggest in any case building on existing momentum rather than attempting to jump-start processes where they have not already begun on their own.

Potential partners: CLUSA and AFRICARE have acquired a commendable field experience in Guinea and in the region in general. Other USPVOs include VITA and ATI. Subcontracting with local NGOs would strengthen their own capacities as well as build on the connections they are already have in the country. Local NGOs with experience in local development include CENAFOD, OVODEC, UEPD, UGVD. (See Annexes 1 & 2 for more details on these groups).

Programs to achieve results under this IR would have two aspects. Grassroots associations would be involved in income-generating, service provision/management, or other interest-based activities on the one hand, and these associations would be provided with training in democratic practices and advocacy skills, as well as information about their legal rights and responsibilities and the roles of governing bodies they deal with, on the other. Bridging the "empowerment gap" between the grassroots associations and the local government bodies is an integral aim of the proposed strategy, and of projects under that strategy. The DG project would not just assume spillover effects from strengthening local associations through other sectoral programming, but would add specific activities assisting local associations to achieve real changes through their local government bodies.

A final step in this process could be the investment of resources in training and institutional capacity building for local government bodies themselves.

In order to increase the impact of activities under this IR, we suggest additional activities should be undertaken to share experiences and successes with other communities and government entities. Activities to promote this "demonstration effect" might include regional fora on local government practices, fora for associations (organized at the CRD level, for example), or inclusion of local government officials in monitoring good governance achievements.

A further element of programming should be careful donor coordination in order to complement and not duplicate efforts. In addition, consultation among donors should look to learning from the different approaches being used for local development and governance.

7. Sustainability

Sustainability should be a direct result of this IR, as local associations mobilize their own resources more effectively and become vested in the process of participatory governance. Efforts to achieve the "demonstration effect" discussed above should also enhance sustainability.

Periodic media coverage in the form of documentaries (TV and rural radio) could also be encouraged to help inform other associations/CRDs of achievements.

Use of ATLAS/AFGRAD/IVP alumni: USAID has invested in the training (long and short-term) of hundreds of Guineans both in the US and elsewhere in Africa. Some of those alumni now hold important political and senior administrative positions in the country. Well-organized and integrated into networks they could be of important help in supporting AID's initiatives in Guinea.

Internet: Guinea is one of the partners in the Leland Initiative. As the latter is planning to apply Internet to decentralization West African region-wide, the IR's networking aspect could be further strengthened.

8. Possible Indicators

- * number of local associations practicing internal democracy
- * representation of youth/women in the Conseils Communaux and Conseils Communautaires
- * a measure of citizen advocacy to councils--i.e., number of decisions made with input from assisted groups
- * citizen understanding of the role of the councils

[A note on timing: Given pre-existing differences in local associations' capacities and local government bodies' institutional capabilities, results in terms of advocacy and greater representation on local councils may take much longer to achieve in some cases than in others.]

INTERMEDIATE RESULT #2: IMPROVING GUINEA'S POLITICAL PROCESS.

1. Statement of Intermediate Result

There is a need to improve Guinea's political process. Work with the population on the receiving end of Guinea's laws and administrative practices can be complemented by efforts targeting decision-makers at the national level. Potential activities will focus on the support of the National Assembly and the increase of popular participation in the political process via transparent, competitive elections.

Activity in this area is intended to improve the National Assembly's capacity to professionally analyze and prioritize agenda items. Another potential outcome of this support is the creation of a legally--and financially--autonomous election administration. A related anticipated product of assistance in this area is the promulgation of a revised election law and instructions that foster the transparency of Guinean elections at the national, regional, and local levels. Activities designed to achieve this intermediate result can be customized to fit within all sectors of USAID/Guinea's program over the period covered by this strategy.

2. Problem Analysis

The National Assembly. Guinea's 114-member National Assembly is poised either to provide dynamic leadership into the 21st century, or to become an ineffectual but personally lucrative club for the leaders of the political class. An operational, and well-informed Assembly will advance the establishment of a real balance of power within the government. As the Assembly gains standing and as the population's awareness of the Assembly's potential increases, there will be more interest in the role of local government as a means of accessing the Assembly. At the same time, one can expect the gradual shift in the understanding of the legal--versus the actual and/or perceived--role of the tutelle as a result of activities like those proposed in the other IR's in this strategy.

The Assembly is receiving limited support from a number of donors. However, much remains to be accomplished. USAID is well-placed to engage local and international organizations and individuals to assist the Assembly in the expansion of its analytical capacity. If successful, this assistance could be reconfigured for application at the regional and local levels, where similar needs exist. As exhibited by the recent visit to the United States by the National Assembly President and several of his colleagues, the Assembly's exposure to the workings of their counterparts outside of Guinea stands to have a positive and lasting impact. Suggested activities aimed at strengthening the Assembly's role in the government and in Guinean society are discussed later in this section.

The Electoral System. Two years after Guinea's last national elections, the issue of election administration continues to dominate conversations inside and outside of Conakry. There is widespread agreement that both the presidential and the legislative elections yielded flawed outcomes. A programmed event, elections serve as a mechanism for the peaceful and timely transfer of power to individuals or groups that have the support of a majority or of varying percentages of the population. To be successful, elections must be organized in order to allow maximum participation by the eligible electorate and to yield a result meeting the approval of both winners and losers. The presidential, legislative, and local elections conducted between 1993 and 1995 illustrated the need for substantial legal and procedural improvements in order to put into place a process that strengthens, rather than diminishes, Guinean democracy.

To date, Guinea's elections have not been free of manipulation by the Guinean administration or by the political class. These manipulations have been compiled in reports generated by domestic and international organizations that have had the opportunity to monitor one or more of Guinea's elections. In 1993, the GOG, in response to encouragement from inside and outside of the country, facilitated the establishment of a national election commission (NEC). This commission was designed only to supervise the conduct of the presidential and legislative elections by Guinea's Ministry of the Interior and Security. Created by presidential decree, the NEC possessed no formal legal or financial foundation. Its over 60 members drawn from the Guinean government, political parties, and civil society, were appointed by the interior minister and approved by the President.

Despite its organizational shortcomings and limited mandate, the NEC established itself as a potentially credible "moral guarantor" of Guinea's electoral process. Citing the lack of timely preparation for the December 1993 presidential elections by the interior ministry, the NEC joined a diverse group of civil society groups and political parties in demanding their postponement. Ignoring popular opinion, President Conte ordered that the elections take place as planned. The NEC publicly refused to assume its mandated oversight role. The flawed results of the presidential election generated strong domestic and international criticism. The Commission did oversee the June 1995 legislative elections. Their procedural and legal role was governed by the presidential decree forming the NEC, and was further minimized by the Ministry of Interior and Security. However there was no way to control for the Guinean public's memory of the NEC's stand in December 1993. Many Guineans acknowledge that the presence of the NEC members at the national and constituency levels diffused numerous conflicts over the period of the legislative elections.

Guinea's first elected multiparty National Assembly took office on August 11, 1995. With the election fresh in their minds, groups within and outside of the Assembly called for substantive revisions to the electoral process. The concept of the professionalization of Guinea's electoral system prior to the next presidential elections scheduled for 1998 has received bi-partisan support within the National Assembly. This support has drawn attention specifically to the ongoing power struggle within the majority party. President Conte and the leadership of the majority PUP-PCN have spoken out against the creation of an independent commission, citing the lack of a role for such a commission in France, the United States, and other western nations. National Assembly president, and former PUP-PCN Secretary General, El Hadj Biro Diallo has indicated his support for the establishment of an election commission in the interest of transparency.

The polarized nature (along philosophical and perhaps also ethnic lines) of the debate over the election commission suggests that more time is needed to develop a consensual approach. USAID can play a role in developing that consensus through the support of a series of activities designed to foster an inclusive debate on the administration of future elections in Guinea. These activities are discussed below.

3. Causal Relationships and Critical Assumptions

Causal relationships: Developing the capacity of the National Assembly and building popular confidence in Guinea's electoral process will strengthen Guinea's fragile democracy. The capacity of the Assembly may be enhanced through its exposure to the practices and successes of similar groups. Building confidence in the electoral process will develop with the gradual professionalization of Guinea's election administration, and with the education of all actors in the political process--citizens, administrators, elected officials, aspiring candidates, and civic organizations--of their responsibilities and rights within a competitive, participatory political process.

Critical Assumptions: (1) Government leadership seeks to achieve the balance of powers between branches of government as set out by Guinea's Constitution; (2) the Government of Guinea is committed to supporting the administration of transparent elections at the national, regional, and local level; (3) civil society is capable of playing at least a minimum role in election administration; (4) transparent elections are a key condition for sustainable democracy in Guinea; and, (5) local and international resources to support qualitative improvements of the National Assembly and the election process will be available and provided in a timely manner.

4. Commitment and Capacity of Other Development Partners

The National Assembly benefits from assistance provided by a number of international donors. It is reasonable to anticipate that those groups, including the European Commission, the French Cooperation, the United Nations Development Program, and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation will continue to provide technical and/or material assistance through direct assistance, exchanges, and conferences. Based on experience elsewhere on the African continent, if Guinea were to make substantive moves toward the establishment of a legally and financially autonomous election authority, a number of multi- and bilateral donors would support the effort. Between 1993 and 1995, the European Commission provided substantial support for the development of Guinea's computerized voter registry. For its 1995 activities, the NEC received financial and material support from the EC. The United Nations Development Programme has been involved in providing human and financial resource support to the organization of both the 1993 and 1995 elections. It is reasonable to believe that both will be involved in the support of an election administration that meets the requirements of the majority and the opposition political parties.

A number of non-US foundations and bilateral donors will find it easier to justify their involvement with the establishment and support of an autonomous election administration. Elections Canada, the Sweden-based international Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance, and Germany's Frederic Ebert Foundation number among some of those groups. Finally, several US foundations offer expertise in the areas of election systems

design and election administration, including the members of the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening.

Pending the establishment of an autonomous election authority, there exists the opportunity for the support of useful dialogue between Guineans. This dialogue is necessary to build consensus around a model for Guinean election administration. The target population for this exercise should be the National Assembly, select appointed and elected officials, Guinean NGOs and the Guinean press. Among Guinean NGOs, AID-Afrique, COFED, AFJG, OGDH, and AGDH have expressed interest in being involved in this discussion. A recently accredited NGO, the Guinean Electoral Assistance Office (Bureau Guineen d'Assistance Electorale--BGAE), stands to play a role as well. There is reason to question the capacity of these organizations to support national, or even regional initiatives. Most have small memberships. Some key individuals are involved in more than one group. The facilitation of the participation by local groups calls for substantial institutional and logistical support to be provided by the donors.

5. Illustrative Approaches

There are numerous activities that could be undertaken to improve the quality of Guinea's political process. Listed here are activities that could be considered for implementation soon after the adoption of the strategy.

Organization and facilitation of a series of workshops on national election administration. The opportunity remains for discussion on the design of the administration of Guinea's future elections. Interest in continuing dialogue has been expressed among Guinean opinion leaders. The President and the majority party have pronounced themselves as opposed to the creation of an independent election commission. However, the majority leadership admits that there is a need for future elections to be transparent and to yield results that are acceptable to the population. Presently, the Majority is prepared to completely disregard the proposed text calling for the composition of a national election commission submitted by the opposition. It is apparent that any piece of legislation proposed within the National Assembly is seen as a partisan submission, regardless of the content of the text.

Once in place, the long overdue Economic and Social Council may provide a venue for a political debate on issues such as election administration. In the meantime, the organization of one or more working groups on election administration involving elements of the National Assembly, qualified Guinean civil society groups such as those mentioned above, and international specialists may prove to be the most timely approach. Crucial to the workshops' success is not only the selection of the proper mix of participants and facilitators, but the timing of the event(s). The workshop should be organized when the National Assembly members are convening in Conakry for the next session. The first activity might be scheduled for September/October 1997, two weeks or one month prior to the opening of the Assembly's budgetary session. A second workshop might take place

Development of a domestic election monitoring capacity. With time, Guineans will demand accountability of not only their elections, but their government. A first step in developing this capacity can be the training of local NGOs in the techniques of election monitoring. As mentioned earlier in this section, the limited capacities of Guinean NGOs dictate that their involvement in any activity will require technical, material, and financial inputs. The establishment of an indigenous election monitoring network can enjoy a number of secondary and tertiary impacts in the areas of NGO capacity building and civic and voter education. Again, USAID's many points of contact among local associations might offer a foundation upon which to establish this network.

Assistance with the design of Guinea's national election administration. A resolution to the question of how Guinea's future elections will be organized and by whom may or may not come out of the election administration workshops mentioned earlier. Assistance with the design of a new election commission can be provided within or outside of the workshops. A solution to this polarized issue will require a good deal of negotiation between Guinean decision makers and between them and donors who have particular interests in what they assist financially. USAID has a comparative advantage in the provision of technical support to the effort to create a new commission. The political climate surrounding this issue suggests that USAID consider coordinating its efforts with one or more donors active in Guinea that are experienced in technical election assistance, such as Canada, Germany, EC, or UNDP.

The old NEC's lack of legal and financial standing was one of its key weaknesses. The key to the commission's successful creation is its empowering legislation. The commission's structure and terms of reference should be laid out in that law. The law must also clarify to whom the commission is ultimately responsible.

The election commission membership could be composed of some mix of individuals nominated by the National Assembly, the administration, political parties, and civil society. To diminish the politization of the commission, political parties could be asked to nominate individuals who are not card-carrying members of any party, but who have the respect of the parties. For the sake of efficiency and effectiveness, the total number of commissioners needs to be kept as low as possible.

Based on conversations held to date, it should be anticipated that it will be impossible not to include the Ministry of the Interior in the conduct of Guinea's future elections. The legal and financial structure of the commission can be shaped to limit the Ministry's contribution to transport and logistics. To further remove the commission from the shadow of the administration in general and the Ministry of the Interior in particular, the National Assembly could be asked to appoint the commission's director general, the commission's operations point person.

An inter-party advisory committee could be established to provide the political parties with a mechanism to monitor the commission's work. This structure also provides the

commission with a mechanism via which it may more easily communicate with the political parties.

INTERMEDIATE RESULT #3: SUPPORTING CIVIL SOCIETY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL²

1. Statement of the intermediate result

Empowered national civil society organizations capable of: (a) playing a more efficient public advocacy role; and, (b) catalyzing broad-based participation in decisionmaking processes.

This intermediate result clearly supports the Mission DG strategic objective which is to pursue greater citizen participation in governance at local and national levels. First, a more vibrant civil society creates conditions for increased accountability and transparency at all levels. Secondly, civil society is one of the main communication channels between the citizenry and elites. The *raison d'être* of civil society is to make sure that decisionmaking processes are informed by popular needs and concerns, and that citizens are educated about their rights and duties. A strong and well structured civil society is therefore a precondition for the formation of a credible public opinion, and the emergence of a democratic culture.

2. Problem analysis

The democratic transition in Guinea is contrasted and fragile. Its fragile nature --clearly shown in occasions such as the February 1996 mutiny and upheavals following or preceding major recent elections-- calls for a strong pro-democratic coalition which would serve as a dissuasive force capable of preventing risks of restoration of a despotic regime.

The democratization process is contrasted because of the huge discrepancy between the legal and regulatory framework, on the one hand, and actual practices on the other. In Hansen's "democratization ladder"³, Guinea could arguably be considered as a country in the late or the consolidation phase of the transition to democratic governance, if one only considered the legal and regulatory framework. But, if assessed on the basis actual practices, the DG context in Guinea would be more close to the "early transition phase". In such a context, efforts should be directed primarily to rule enforcement --which does

² For more details on the analysis and recommendations made in this section see: Annex 2.

³ This heuristic device suggested by HANSEN (1996), is very helpful in comparing DG contexts in different countries. However, as the author himself recognizes, realities are generally hybrid and much more complex than the theory.

not mean that improvement of the legal framework for democratic governance is not important. Indeed, the implementation of existing laws provides the building blocks for further improvements in the legal framework.

3. Rationale for supporting civil society at the national level

The weakness of civil society, and especially of civic advocacy organizations, is one of the most plausible explanations of the gap between the legal framework and democratic practices in Guinea. The fragility and the vulnerability of the democratization process in Guinea also result from the immaturity of civil society organizations and their inability to create a strong and dissuasive pro-democratic front.

In this section, civil society refers non-state organizations engaged or which could take part in activities aimed at improving governance and consolidating the democratization process. Organizations of this nature include civic advocacy groups such as human rights and pro-democracy groups, policy think tanks, the press, etc. Most of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or organizations registered as such are already involved to some extent or could take part in prodemocratic advocacy and civic education.

The associational life in Guinea has experienced a spectacular development over the last 15 years. The NGO movement has rapidly grown concomitantly with the political and economic liberalization in Guinea. Non existent during the First Republic, embryonic during the second Republic, the movement become a real phenomenon since 1990. Currently 587 NGOs are officially registered, of which 76 have the statute of international NGOs. In addition, there exist currently about 1500 cooperatives organizations.

Civil society organizations face a series of constraints which restrict their ability to play a more effective role in the consolidation of democratic governance in Guinea. Despite the fact that remarkable efforts have been made to set in place a relatively liberal legal framework for civil society, there is an urgent need for coordinating NGO interventions and for establishing more convivial relationships between State and civil society.

The other most common problems facing civil society organizations in Guinea relate their low level of awareness of the legal framework related to their types of organizations and to their sectors of intervention; their lack of internal democracy; their lack of unity; their lack of resources and/or their total reliance on external financial support. In addition, support NGOs are most of the time created from the top by university graduates and/or retrenched civil servants with weak linkages with the grassroots level, and are therefore unable to articulate and address community needs.

Institutional support to civil society could be envisaged in the form of training or technical assistance in order to improve their knowledge of the regulatory environment, increase their management skills and their capacity to develop proposals, identify funding sources and monitor their development activities. Whenever possible, partnership between support

NGOs and grassroots associations should be facilitated. Attempts towards the formation of umbrella organization could be encouraged through logistical and financial support (renting and equipment of headquarters, funding of workshops and coordinating meetings, funding of a coordination bulletin, communication connections, etc.).

The printed press, and particularly the independent press, deserves a special attention, especially because the broadcast media are under the control of the government. The independent press plays a critical watchdog role in addition of its civic education functions. But given that journalists of the independent press are at the forefront of the battle for expanding and deepening democratic governance in Guinea, they constitute the segment of civil society most exposed to the repressive machinery of the State. Their vulnerability is accentuated by the fact that, as other Guinean civil society organizations, they are generally isolated both at the national and international level, partially as a result of Guinea's political isolation during the First and Second Republic. Journalists of the independent press would be less vulnerable if coalesced with human rights activists at the national level and if well connected with professional associations of journalists at the international level. Another way of reducing their exposure is to enhance their professional skills.

Given the low literacy rate in Guinea, the most effective way for undertaking civic education is the broadcast media, especially radio. In the current context, the only authorized broadcast media --the national radio and TV and rural radios-- are under the control of the government. However, a bill for the liberalization of the broadcasted media in Guinea recently submitted by Opposition Deputies is being reviewed by GOG and the National Assembly.

The emergence of a strong civil society, and the formation of a public opinion are necessary for the consolidation of democratic governance. But they require sustained long term efforts to which USAID/Guinea could contribute decisively by complementing other donor interventions.

4. Other donors

Most donors, if not all, direct part of their development assistance through civil society organizations, especially through NGOs. The most active donors in supporting civic education and/or civic advocacy are the following:

The Canadian International Development Agency, through its regional Democracy and Media project started in 1996 and targeting Guinea, Benin, Mali, Niger and Senegal. This project provided training to journalists and equipment such as computers to editors of the independent press. CIDA is currently reviewing a request submitted by GERDDES-Afrique for the establishment of a "Maison de la Presse" in Guinea. The Canadian PVO CECI, funded by CIDA, has been also implementing the Program for Democracy and Human Rights (PDDP) which provides institutional support to civil society organizations such as

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OGDH for the design, printing and dissemination of brochures on human rights in Guinea; SLEEG (teachers' union) for the development of civic education modules to be included in primary school curricula; ADIK (a local NGO based in Kankan) for the translation in local languages and dissemination of key texts such as the decentralization law and the land tenure code.

UNDP, through the Support Project to Community-based Initiatives (PAIB), which is in its final stage, has provided institutional capacity building for grassroots organizations in Upper Guinea and Guinea Forestiere. UNDP has just designed a new follow-up project which will focus on good governance and civil society strengthening.

The Ebert Foundation has been also very active in support civic advocacy groups (human rights activists and the press) through funding of study tours, participation in conferences and professional meetings at the international levels, editing and dissemination of documents.

The World Bank increasingly uses local NGOs for the implementation of some of its activities. Local NGOs such as EUPD are for example eligible to direct funding from the World Bank for building education infrastructures.

Donor efforts in providing institutional support to civil society organizations in general, and to civic advocacy groups are therefore substantial. There are however key areas where USAID/Guinea --in addition to current activities being conducted under the New Partnership Initiative-- could make a decisive contribution. Critical domains when USAID could make a difference include the need to: (a) forge partnership between national-level support NGOs and civic advocacy groups on the one hand, and local NGOs and grassroots associations on the other; (b) establish and/or strengthen coordination mechanisms among NGOs, and between the NGO community, the government and decentralized institutions; (c) improve the independent press's capacity to play more effective public advocacy and civic education functions.

5. Illustrative approaches

We consider the following approaches as the most constructive and efficient ones for improving civil society roles in the areas of public advocacy and civic education in Guinea

5.1. Helping establish an institutional mechanism for better coordination of activities of civil society organizations and for more systematic consultation between State and civil society. Two options present themselves in order to solve this need:

- (a) restructuring and providing institutional support to GOG's SCIO (Service de Coordination des Interventions des ONG) to become an autonomous organization in which would be represented NGO and cooperative movements as well as decentralized institutions and relevant GOG technical divisions; or/and,

- (b) strengthening networks of NGOs such as the *Forum des ONG* or the *Bureau Provisoire de coordination des actions des ONG* in order to play coordination roles and become a forum for dialogue between NGO, GOG, LGUs and donors. Support to these networks could include assistance for the establishment and equipment of headquarters.

A thorough feasibility analysis will be needed prior to choosing any of these options. For each of these options the sustainability issue will need to be looked at closely. An idea worth exploring would be the remuneration of services provided by the restructured SCIO and the consortium of NGOs to their member organizations.

5.2. Strengthening of the independent press to play a greater public advocacy and civic education roles. The support to the independent press could be done by:

- (a) analyzing the impact of the press and developing programs aimed at improving the capacity of the press in the areas of civic education and public advocacy.
- (b) improving journalists' access to information flows at the international level through office equipment and internet connection for the *Maison de la Presse* (pending the outcome of the funding request regarding this issue submitted by GERDDES to the *Bureau d'Appui de la Cooperation Canadienne*.)
- (c) Helping journalists build working relationships and strategic alliances at the regional and international levels through study tours, participation in internal fora for journalists. As mentioned earlier such types of support are of paramount importance for Guinean journalists whose relative isolation increase their vulnerability.
- (d) funding of workshops and training sessions to increase journalists' professional skills. The objective of such initiatives would be to increase Guinean journalists' ability to treat adequately issues of national interest in complex domains such as economics, finances, environment, etc.

5.3. Assuming that legislation liberalizing the broadcast media will be promulgated before or during the implementation of this DG strategy, USAID could support the expanded use of private radios for educating the population on their civic rights and duties, for discussing issues of community interest and for information dissemination. USAID could for example finance broadcasted civic education campaigns. In the context of the upcoming elections, voter education (by for example selected civic advocacy groups) might be considered as a civic education theme.

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5.4. Institutional support for selected NGOs

Some of the most dynamic and/or promising national NGOs should be provided support in order to play a greater locomotive role for the NGO movement in Guinea. Assistance to these NGOs could include equipment of headquarters, internet access, training in areas such as financial management and accounting, project design, implementation and evaluations, etc. NGOs which could be considered for this type of support include: OGDH; EUPD; CENAFOD, etc. Rapid institutional assessments will need to be conducted prior to selecting partner NGOs. Selected NGOs could be provided assistance in order to meet requirements for eligibility to the direct funding by USAID.

In areas selected for grassroots-level implementation of the DG program, USAID/Guinea should encourage the establishment of partnerships between national NGOs on the one hand, and local NGOs, CRD councils and targeted grassroots associations. For example, a community council could "contract" with an NGO such as EUPD to build a school or a health center. OGDH could provide assistance to local NGOs (developmental NGOs, home-town associations, etc.) in areas such as summarizing and translating key legal texts in local languages. By forging this type of partnerships, USAID/Guinea would address the need to develop capacities of national NGOs to respond to demands generated in the area of democratic governance, and thus would solve the sustainability issue.

6. Indicators

Illustrative approach 5.1. (Umbrella organization for civil society):

- * a functioning umbrella organization established
- * membership of the established umbrella organization
- * level of financial contributions of member organizations
- * level of diversification of sources of direct funding

Illustrative approach 5.2 (Support to the independent press):

- * Changes in the perceived role of the independent press through:
 - average number of copies printed and sold.
 - readership satisfaction about the quality of the press (requires periodic surveys)
- * Number of State decisions influenced by the press
- * Anecdotal evidence regarding the role of the press in the areas of public advocacy and civic education
- * Anecdotal evidence of decreased harassment of journalists

Illustrative approach 5.3 (civic campaigns through private radios):

- * Number of people reached
- * Among number of people reached, percentage understanding civic education themes promoted

Illustrative example 5.4. (Institutional support to national NGOs):

- * improved accounting and financial management systems
- * level of financial autonomy
- * diversification of funding sources
- * improved internal democracy
- * internal capacity in project design, management and monitoring
- * Number of national NGOs meeting USAID's direct funding requirements
- * Anecdotal evidence of improved and expanded partnerships between national NGOs on the one hand, and grassroots associations and local government units in DG intervention areas.

INTERMEDIATE RESULT #4: ACCESS TO LEGAL INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY FOR USAID'S DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS.

1. Statement of Intermediate Result

Under this intermediate result, USAID would undertake a few focused activities to increase Guineans' access to information regarding the laws that govern their lives. This would focus particularly on providing USAID's development partners with legal information regarding their organizational activities and their rights vis-a-vis authorities with whom they interact. Some activities might also be undertaken to distribute information about basic rights in a more diffuse way.

2. Problem analysis

This IR is proposed to fill a specific need expressed by several of USAID's development partners, especially those carrying out community-based organizational activities, for increased access to the basic information about the legal provisions governing their own activities and those of the individual Guineans participating in these activities. It is directly related to the success of the strategy, as the local and national civil society around which the strategy is built cannot function successfully if Guineans do not know and cannot get access to the laws governing their activities. Particular needs were expressed for dissemination of the laws governing NGO activities, commerce, the powers of different branches of government at the local and national level, and basic individual rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis public authorities. Not only do the texts of the laws need to be centrally accessible, but even more important is access for the majority of Guineans who live outside Conakry and do not speak or read French.

A further need has been expressed for less-targeted approaches to legal education. Especially given the success of the recent World Bank "Know Your Rights" campaign, it could be very helpful for USAID to undertake follow-up activities so that the momentum of that campaign is not lost.

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As was pointed out in the introduction, activities under this IR do not constitute a broad strategy for improving the rule of law in Guinea. During the course of its consultations, the team found that the Guinean legal/judicial system indeed requires any number of improvements, from the quality of officials (it was pointed out that there has been no new magistrate added in the last 11 years) and lawyers, to the distribution and quality of facilities, to the provisions of some laws (e.g., media). Judges have been found to be politically biased in many cases. Better commercial law enforcement and efficient commercial courts would help encourage private investment. Undoubtedly, these are serious problems for democracy in Guinea, but resolving them will require large amounts of resources, and it is not clear whether institutional changes from above will fundamentally change Guineans' willingness to address themselves to the legal system. Moreover, USAID can achieve better results with limited resources by building on its pre-existing organizational linkages and experience in community development.

3. Critical assumptions

1) That legal rights information and education will have significant impact when tied to tangible needs and interests of the individuals and associations with which USAID works.

4. Illustrative approaches

The following approaches have the prospect of making significant contributions to achieving this IR.

Making the existing legal archive in Conakry more effective by insuring timely printing of laws and providing institutional support for archiving, sorting and searching legal texts. At the moment, someone who wants to know the laws regarding NGOs, for instance, can be given nothing except copies of all Guinean laws (if they are all available), through which he or she must search by hand. Computerization is already in place, but the process of archiving and cataloguing legal texts has lagged far behind expectations.

Translation of laws into local languages, or the production of summaries of the basic provisions of relevant laws in local languages. These could be distributed to/through USAID's development partners in local areas.

Public information activities such as a follow-on to the "Know Your Rights" campaign.

5. Sustainability

USAID should consider to what degree fees for access to the legal archive or for copies of legal summaries would be deleterious to access. Such charges could make increase the likelihood of USAID being able to end financial support for these activities.

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