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FINAL SUMMARY REPORT
ZIMBABWE
DROUGHT EMERGENCY 1992 - 1993

ERIC N. WITT, PSC
USAID/ZIMBABWE
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FOREWORD

POSSIBLY A WORLD RECORD SUCCESS - SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT RESPONSE

In the face of 100 year record drought:

On top of 12 years of declining precipitation:

Despite multitude of over-lapping responses and evaluations;

In 1991-1993,

- More food was moved,	11.5 million mts
- To more people	80 million
- In a shorter period,	14 months
- To more land locked countries	6
- Through more transport corridors	8
- By more people in the system	60,000
- With more host country self-help on commercial basis	1.2 million mt (purchased by Zimbabwe alone)

Than in any other emergency in the history of Africa or the world,
and the Southern Africa drought relief/response was successful because:

- no one died of drought famine
- attention to recovery was given equal priority
- food production recovered with first rains
- persons and countries did not become donor dependent.

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1. STATISTICS AND DESCRIPTION

- a) Country - Zimbabwe
- b) Date of disaster - January 1992 - May 1993
- c) Location Nationwide
- d) Population 10,400,000 (August 1992 census)
- e) Number of people effected Entire population
- f) Number cared for by feeding programs At least 5,100,000 persons received food assistance
- g) OTHER IMPACT

The Ministry of Finance stated that the Zimbabwean economy shrank by 8.0 percent in 1992 - and by 11.5 percent in per capita terms - due largely to "the worst drought in living memory". The agriculture sector declined by 35 percent, manufacturing output fell by 9.5 percent and the mining sector declined by 5.5 percent. Therefore, economic growth was severely curtailed.

The nation's staple food is maize and production declined to about 20 percent of normal production. That is, only 360,00mt of maize was produced, which necessitated the importation of over 2.3 million mt of maize during the drought emergency. The cost of the government's drought relief program was approximately 16.7 percent of the national budget.

h) DATES OF DISASTER DECLARATION

Government of Zimbabwe: March 6, 1992 as reported in Harare 02630.

U.S. Government: February 11 and October 1, 1992 as reported in Harare 01557 and Harare 11195.

i) **SUMMARY OF FOOD ASSISTANCE**

**TABLE I. ZIMBABWE MAIZE REQUIREMENTS
JANUARY 1992 - MAY 1993**

		Metric Tons	
<u>MAIZE SUPPLIES</u>			
On-Farm Production			360,000
GOZ Purchases			1,383,000
Off Tender	120,000		
On Tender	1,263,000		
<u>DONORS</u>			
USG			670,475
GSM	177,475		
Title I (FY92)	250,000		
Title I (FY93)	50,000		
Section 416	108,000		
Section 416/WFP	85,000		
<u>OTHERS</u>			
IBRD*	175,749		243,749
EEC	60,000		
Australia/WFP	8,000		
TOTAL SUPPLY			2,657,224
<u>MAIZE CONSUMPTION</u>			
Actual Sales by GMB			
Jan - Dec 1992	1,569,873		
Jan - May 1993	518,967		
On-Farm consumption	360,000		
TOTAL CONSUMPTION			2,448,840
Carry-over May 31, 1993			208,384

*70,000 mt of maize purchased late with IBRD loan funds was sold on arrival at port and is not included in the total.

2. RELIEF OPERATION - ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe, long considered a major producer and exporter of maize in Southern Africa, ran out of maize in February - March 1992. For the first time there were food demonstrations in town and people were climbing aboard delivery trucks at shops to obtain limited amounts of maize meal.

The massive shortage of maize was the result of a very poor rainy season (November 1991 - March 1992) coupled with - in hindsight - poor agricultural policy decisions. As early as July 1991 Ministry of Agriculture observers expressed concern about the export of Zimbabwean maize when stocks were low (the 1990 - 91 season was relatively poor with only 1.5 million mt produced). However, because of concern about high storage costs and the need to honor export contracts and a desire to reduce the costs of parastatals because of ESAP the export of maize continued. The rains began in November 1991 but then rather abruptly stopped. Zimbabwe had only received slightly over one-half of its normal mean rainfall. Optimists thought the cessation of the rain was only a temporary mid-season shortfall of rain. It wasn't. The rainy season ended in December 1991 (rather than April 1992) and the supply of maize in the country quickly ran out and the maize production of 360,000 mt was only 20 percent of normal production.

Zimbabwe needed maize and it purchased 120,000 mt of maize from South Africa on an off-tender basis. The need to import maize to maintain maize stock levels was first identified in August 1991. A trade delegation travelled to South Africa in October 1991 and a letter of credit was opened in December 1991. As it turned out, this was the last maize sold by the South Africans. It too had a massive shortfall of maize and subsequently imported 5 million mt of maize. Once the South African-sourced maize order was complete Zimbabwe began tendering for maize on a commercial basis using its own financial resources. In the coming months it would directly import over 1.2 million mt of maize which supplied about one-half of the national maize requirements for the period January 1992 - May 1993.

As the supply of maize was being assured, the distribution of maize and many of the other considerations of a drought were addressed.

It was necessary to arrange for a minimum of 5,000 mt of maize to be delivered each day in order to supply the country. These amounts did start arriving - they had to in order for the nation to survive. The vast majority of the maize was sold to the two major milling firms in Zimbabwe: Blue Ribbon Foods and National Foods. In April 1992 the commercial millers received 60,000 mt of maize, in May they received 80,000 mt and by June 1992 they began receiving 100,000 mt of maize monthly through February 1993. This enabled the millers to operate at full capacity: 24 hours a day for 6 (Blue Ribbon) or 7 (National Foods) days per week. By March 1993 other food stuffs were becoming available in rural areas with the advent of a good rainy season and the monthly off-take dropped to 34,000 mt by May 1993.

In August and September 1992 the stores in urban and rural areas had full stocks of maize meal for sale. The readily available maize meal through the commercial infrastructure was an important part of Zimbabwe's drought relief program. Once the stores were seen to be regularly supplied people gained an assurance that their basic food needs would be met and the stockpiling and hoarding of maize by consumers diminished.

There is of course, a large proportion of Zimbabwe's population that could not afford to be completely dependent upon purchased commercially supplied maize. To address the needs of the poorer portion of the rural population Zimbabwe regularly provides some basic food grain. Normally 800,000 persons will receive some food assistance during a year. The Department of Social Welfare (DSW) was given the additional responsibility of identifying drought victims throughout the country and delivering food grain. DSW was providing food and by November 1992 this had increased to 5.1 million persons. From September 1992 through April 1993 DSW was providing food grain to an average of 4.5 million persons each month.

The amount of maize provided per person each month varied between 5 and 15 kg per month (12 kg per month per person is recommended, assuming there are "no" other foods in the diet) and was subject to discussion and controversy. However, an average monthly allocation of just over 5 kg per person became the norm. The DSW received a monthly grain allocation of 30,000 mt during the term of the drought emergency. As the mission learned during on-going research at the time of the drought, extended families did have cash incomes and were able to purchase maize or maize meal and other foods to supplement the drought relief grain.

The Government of Zimbabwe was concerned that people not develop a dependency for "free" food or "handouts". It therefore established a registration process (there was a form to fill out) that enabled local officials to judge a family's need for drought relief food. Generally, a family which had one or more wage earners did not qualify for the free food distribution program. In addition, it was also required that drought relief recipients participate in a local "food for work" activity. Exceptions were of course made for the elderly or infirm.

Government set up a drought task force chaired by one of the Vice-Presidents. Six inter-ministerial committees were established to oversee various aspects of the drought including:

- Procurement
- Transport Logistics
- Distribution
- Drought Relief
- National Action on Water and Power
- Public Works

Donor representatives were not part of these committees. Reports from various Zimbabwean officials indicate that an important coordinating role was accomplished by these committees. In planning the drought relief program, it was determined that there would be a need for a supplemental feeding program. Several vulnerable groups of people were thought to need additional foodstuffs. Finally a Child Supplemental Feeding Program was undertaken to target children

age five years and younger. By July 1992 about one million children were receiving a supplemental meal 5 days per week. Food was distributed through 20,000 locations and the mothers helped to prepare the supplemental meal. By December 1992, with the arrival of the rain, many mothers stayed at home to help plant and cultivate for the new agricultural season. Fortunately the rains were good and most communities had good harvests of food grain. However, there were significant amounts of surplus supplemental foods still in stock by May 1993. Part of these were provided through WFP and it was able to send 6,200 mt of vegetable oil, beans and peanuts to other programs in the region. The balance of the "surplus" food is being used in a smaller feeding program in 1993/94.

A list of evaluations that have been completed - or are in process - is included in the Annexes. There are several major reports that have been completed by Government of Zimbabwe and WFP officials on the drought relief program. UNICEF has completed a report on the Child Supplementary Feeding Program.

3. RELIEF OPERATIONS - U.S. GOVERNMENT

The U.S. mission in Harare had been tracking maize stocks and rainfall patterns as is standard for all Missions in Africa. (One lesson has been learned from previous droughts in Africa: pay attention to basic food crop production).

The U.S. declared a disaster in Zimbabwe on February 11, 1992, almost a month prior to Zimbabwe's disaster declaration on March 6, 1992. There was a great deal of thought and planning that lead up to the declaration. There was the need to "sensitize" Washington (State-AID-USDA) to potential requirements for drought relief assistance to Zimbabwe and the region. International media coverage was encouraged to highlight the potential problems facing the people of Southern Africa. This was a real challenge as the region, fortunately, did not have starving emaciated babies to photograph. And finally, the Mission had to plan how to administer and manage the U.S. response to the drought.

In March 1992 the Mission initially requested approval for a PL 480 Title II food aid program. This request was never acted upon; however, as shown in Section 1, above, the U.S. did provide a massive amount of food assistance to Zimbabwe. It totalled 670,475 mt of maize and sorghum which was equivalent to 25 percent of the maize requirements during the drought emergency (January '92 - May '93). Additionally the U.S. provided 70,000 mt of wheat and 10,860 mt of vegetable oil.

The food aid was provided under a mix of commercial, concessional and grant programs including the GSM (Guaranteed Sales for Marketing), PL 480 Title I and Section 416. Part of the Section 416 maize was channeled through the World Food Program.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture made available a \$US20.0 million credit for the purchase of maize under the GSM - 102 program (loan guarantee). This credit was fully utilized by July 1992 and 177,700 mt of maize was purchased. The P.L. 480 Title I program of concessional loans was used to finance the purchase of maize, wheat and vegetable oil. The basic agreement and amendments were signed as follows:

Date	Commodity
May 29, 1992	Maize - 87,000 mt Vegetable oil - 10,000 mt
Amendment #1 July 2, 1992	Maize - 69,000 mt
Amendment #2 July 22, 1992	Maize - 73,000 mt
Amendment #3 September 2, 1992	Wheat 70,000 mt
Amendment #4 (FY '93) December 4, 1992	Maize 50,000 mt

On July 22, 1992, in addition to signing the PL 480 Title I Amendment #2 above, a Section 416 Agreement Grant was also signed to bring in 58,000 mt of maize and 50,000 mt of sorghum.

The mission felt it was important to engage the international media in publicizing the region's drought emergency. Reporters based in Africa (Nairobi and Johannesburg) were requested to visit Zimbabwe. The USIS office maintained a bound monthly compilation of drought clippings from the local press. These volumes of press clippings served as an "instant" bibliography on Zimbabwe's drought. The mission also prepared a drought briefing book. This went through 5 iterations and 70 copies were distributed widely in September 1992. This was an important reference and briefing document in the early months of the drought and has been equally important in the post-drought period as an aide memoire for various evaluators. Copies are held in USAID, AFR/SA, OFDA and SADE offices.

The management of the U.S. response to the drought was undertaken by Mission staff and supplemented with contract staff. Management responsibilities were assumed by the Director's office, the General Development Officer and the Program Development and Implementation Support and Engineering staff. Contract staff for the drought emergency included:

- Drought Information Team: 2 persons
- Food targeting : FEWS provided 3 persons
- Food Aid Monitor : 1 person (in addition to several institutional contracts)
- Transport Logistics Advisor: 1 person

The Mission's Food Aid Management Plan was transmitted on September 30, 1992, and is shown as Annex II. In addition to this direct management of the drought emergency by the mission a series of monitoring contracts were negotiated with local firms. Deloitte & Touche monitored the arrival of all food grain and vegetable oil into Zimbabwe. A summary of its accounting is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 ACCOUNTABILITY OF GRAIN AND OIL

<u>PROGRAM/SHIP</u>	<u>PORT-MT</u> <u>(CALEB/BRETT)</u>	<u>DEPOT - MT</u> <u>(DELOITTE)</u>
<u>GSM - MAIZE</u>		
PANTAZIS	22,215	22,772
WORLD APOLLO	32,068	33,002
BLUE BELL	22,407	23,017
RODLO	31,477	29,106
OCEAN LAKE	18,290	15,793
GOLDEN TENNYO	22,022	21,506
POWSTANIEC SLASKI	29,244	31,317
<u>TITLE I - 92 MAIZE</u>		
CORPUS CHRISTI	10,551	10,503
O'MARILYN	23,914	23,067
SUGAR ISLANDER	25,433	25,867
MARINE PRINCESS	46,228	43,966
NADELHORN	30,035	31,383
AMERICAN VET	33,542	31,587
AURORA RUBY	15,099	14,062
MARIE FLOOD	33,245	33,592
VERNER	29,985	29,250
<u>416 - MAIZE</u>		
ULTRA SEA	57,944 (Rennie Murray)	57,784
<u>TITLE I - WHEAT</u>		
NORMACSUN	34,301	32,706
CHERRY VALLEY (Ms. Maria)	6,043 30,116	34,955
<u>416 - SORGHUM</u>		
KITTANNING		48,936
<u>TITLE I - OIL</u>		
STOLT HELLULAND LIGHTENING/THUNDER		11,148
<u>TITLE I - 93 - MAIZE</u>		
O'SEAS MARILYN	24,444	23,169
O'SEAS HARRIETTE	24,517	24,679

An international maritime surveillance firm, Caleb & Brett, had a contract with Zimbabwe's Grain Marketing Board to monitor all grain arrivals at South African and Mozambican ports. The Mission received copies of all of these reports and used these arrival figures as the "base" figure to monitor the arrivals into Zimbabwe. We were able to verify that 98.6 percent of the maize arrived in Zimbabwe (a verification figure of within 95% to 100% is considered good). The maize provided under the GSM and P.L. 480 Title I programs was to be utilized commercially so no further monitoring of that maize was required. These shipments and arrivals were reported by cable weekly between September 1992 and June 1993. See Annex III for the 36th and final weekly report.

The maize and sorghum that was brought into Zimbabwe under the Section 416 program was provided on a grant basis. It was used by the Department of Social Welfare's drought relief feeding program. A monitoring contract was negotiated with DSS (Development Specialist Services) to verify the distribution of the maize and sorghum to the recipients. The Mission received weekly reports from October 1992 through May 1993 tracking the free distribution of the 108,000 mt of maize and sorghum. These reports were given to the Department of Social Welfare for follow-up action as appropriate. The donated food was delivered to the intended recipients, (See Table 3 for the summary of the food grain distribution). The U.S. provided maize was used for the drought relief program in Masvingo and Mashonaland West provinces. The U.S. provided maize fed all of the people (approximately 1.5 million) in those two provinces from October 1992 through March 1993. The Section 416 sorghum was distributed to all provinces between February 1993 through April 1993. See Table 4 for the number of people receiving drought relief food each month by province.

The Mission requested and obtained the services of a FEWS (Famine Early Warning System) team for Southern Africa. The intention was not to add another level of "warning" to the region, we already knew there was a famine. Rather, the GOZ and the Mission were interested in the improvement of food targeting. As part of the initial tasks, the FEWS team developed maps of current vulnerability of farmers

TABLE 3: SECTION 416 FOOD GRAIN DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM
a. THE DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM: MAIZE (OCT - DEC 1992)

MONTH	PROVINCE	BENEFICIARY POPULATION	ALLOCATION AMOUNT M.T.	DISTRIBUTED AMOUNT M.T.	BALANCE M.T.
OCTOBER	(a) MASVINGO	1,144,191	6,000	6,008	- 0 -
	(b) MASH.WEST	549,027	3,000	4,455	- 0 -
NOVEMBER	(a) MASVINGO	1,199,996	6,000	5,999.98	0.02
	(b) MASH.WEST	565,308	3,000	2,999.97	0.03
DECEMBER	(a) MASVINGO	1,199,800	6,000	6,099.00	- 0 -
	(b) MASH.WEST	565,308	3,000	2,961.04	40
CUMULATIVE TOTALS		5,223,630	27,000	28,533.99	40.05

b) THE DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM : MAIZE (JAN - MAY 1993)

MONTH	COMMODITY	PROVINCE	BENEFICIARY POPULATION	ALLOCATION AMOUNT (M.T.)	VERIFIED AMOUNT (M.T.)	BALANCE (M.T.)
JAN	MAIZE	MASH.WEST	557 705	3 000.00	3 000.00	0
		MASVINGO	1 057 726	6 000.00	6 000.00	0
FEB	MAIZE	MASH.WEST	556 961	3 000.00	3 000.00	0
		MASVINGO	995 941	6 335.89	6 335.89	0
MAR	MAIZE	MASH.WEST	565 445	3 000.00	3 000.00	0
		MASVINGO	600 133	6 011.00	6 011.00	0
APR	MAIZE	MASH.WEST	565 445	3 147.40	3 147.40	0
		MASVINGO	972 411	6 152.49	6 152.49	0
MAY	MAIZE	MASH.WEST	0	0	0	0
		MASVINGO	0	0	0	0
	CUMULATIVE	TOTALS	5 871 767	36 646.78	36 646.78	0


c) THE DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM: SORGHUM (JAN - MAY 1993)

MONTH	COMMODITY	PROVINCE	BENEFICIARY POPULATION	ALLOCATION AMOUNT (M.T.)	VERIFIED AMOUNT (M.T.)	BALANCE (M.T.)
J A N	SORGHUM	MAT. SOUTH	813 052	2 763.00	2 857.95	- 94.95
	SORGHUM	MAT. NORTH	982 424	3 252.99	3 039.39	213.60
	SORGHUM	MASVINGO	2 567 382	11 862.99	12 100.34	-237.35
T O	SORGHUM	MANICALAND	1 316 164	7 365.00	7 753.00	-388.00
	SORGHUM	MIDLANDS	2 021 851	9 917.01	9 500.11	416.90
	SORGHUM	MASH. CENT	1 570 579	4 296.00	4 071.63	224.37
	SORGHUM	MASH. WEST	1 620 553	4 539.00	4 462.99	76.01
M A Y	SORGHUM	MASH. EAST	2 099 413	6 003.99	5 779.62	224.372
		TOTAL	12 991 418	49 999.98	48 771.23	840.75

Table 4. People Reported Fed, by Province

	Jan92	Feb92	Mar92	Apr92	May92	Jun92	Jul92	Aug92	Sep92	Oct92	Nov92	Dec92	Jan93	Feb93	Mar93	Apr93
Mat. S.	63135	103460	71518	89631	91493	67717	135682	148913	221914	255241	245227	194048	254832	242003	241754	360018
Mat. N.	75671	50865	37554	64370	69777	36000	91203	129033	216462	294612	241473	213417	254768	280442	469423	331807
Masv.	227832	314680	363970	211331	360238	275930	498709	399307	914961	1079904	1134509	1129040	1044963	985017	972411	1060597
Manica.	223220	232036	183922	333995	311625	171110	617051	371084	843059	843765	797071	756691	749405	756218	759112	759212
Midl.	178870	191342	178879	443121	247543	251216	709408	419055	782431	806524	826298	791775	774471	632153	680777	674958
Mash.C.	40357	103036	97808	221268	194805	89908	406614	219056	398298	402970	537300	503623	499674	506351	521021	482954
Mash.W.	38530	68320	53265	98316	84929	150209	417812	338441	476355	552975	565308	552308	547027	556961	558897	472189
Mash.E.	25503	46985	27075	48150	157927	193261	520224	298212	718111	645679	705628	713603	703061	657177	644338	677228
NATION	873118	1110724	1013991	1510182	1518337	1235351	3396703	2323101	4571591	4881670	5052814	4854505	4828201	4616322	4847733	4818963

FIGURE I : Five Most Vulnerable Districts



Surveyed By
Probe Market Research

and herders. This resulted in the identification of several "most vulnerable" districts within the nation. It was viewed as unconscionable to have maps of vulnerable districts posted on office walls without having an idea of how the people in those districts were coping with the drought emergency. Five districts identified as the most vulnerable were selected for field monitoring. See Figure 1 for the map of the 5 districts. Household interviews were conducted with 120 families in each district over a 3 month period (October - December 1992) at the height of the drought emergency. The drought was indeed serious but people were receiving food relief (an average of 5.6 kg per person per month) and, importantly, people also had a monthly cash income and they were buying additional maize and supplemental foods. Life was not terrific for these people but they were coping and receiving enough food to sustain themselves.

The U.S. has provided \$250 million of assistance to SADC's transport sector in the past decade. The Mission had a comparative advantage in the logistics of what had the potential to be a massive regional relief effort including the requirements for South Africa. U.S. assistance was provided to establish a Regional Logistics Advisory Center in Harare as well as an Operations Center in Johannesburg. Funds were also made available through WFP to be used to address logistics bottlenecks in the SADC region. We did request WFP that authority to purchase be decentralized from Rome to Harare and the region so that the donors would not be creating their own sets of bottlenecks. The summary of USAID's funding for logistics bottlenecks is shown in Table 5.

There were also a series of OFDA grants to UNICEF, Peace Corps and various PVOs to support water development, food distribution and supplemental feeding programs. Although these were grants from AID/W the mission did monitor the grants and conducted field review of cash activity.

Through previous bilateral programs the Mission and the GOZ had accumulated large deposits of Zimbabwe dollars as counterpart funds. We were able to jointly program the use of these funds to support the Department of Social Welfare's

Table 5

PROGRESS REPORT - WFP GRANT NO. 690-070-G-00-2048-01

Report No. 15-R.E.McGuire, Proj.Monitor-24 Aug 93

Project Number	Project Name/Description	Request Amount US\$	Approved Amount US\$	Date	Contracted Amount US\$	Date	Assigned USAID \$US	Disbursed USAID \$US	Contractor	Remarks
USAID FUNDED PROJECTS										
LAC 1	BCG - Operations Eastern 2	190,000	182,100	25 Aug 92	182,100	28 Sep 92	130,000	128,690	BCG	Audit completed
LAC 2	Botswana Rail-Back Up Comm., VHF Radios	250,000	250,000	25 Aug 92	250,000	14 Jan 93	250,000	198,390		Delivered, BR paying \$51,700 add'l
LAC 3	CFM(S)-Wagon Repairs, Parts and T.A.	1,200,000	1,200,000	25 Aug 92	1,200,000	9 Oct 92	960,084	0	SPOORNET	\$800,000 in spares delivered
LAC 5	Malawi Railways-Faxes and Tarps	100,000	95,643	25 Aug 92	95,643	27 Oct 92	89,200 6,443	89,200 6,443	Venetian Bl. Rank Xerox	Delivery completed
LAC 8	SADCC - LAC Costs	346,200	346,200	14 Aug 92	346,200	14 Aug 92	346,200	302,348	SADC	Audit report satisfactory
LAC 9	WFP - LAC Costs	2,620,000	1,704,000	14 Aug 92	1,704,000	14 Aug 92	1,704,000	254,000	WFP	Rome accounting
LAC 10	Zambia-Stacking, Weighing Equip.	500,000	475,000	25 Sep 92	476,045	27 Nov 92	476,045	476,045	Neill Scales Durab Gabor.	Delivery completed
LAC 11	Trailman Seminar	50,000	43,725	24 Sep 92	43,725	14 Oct 92	43,725	43,725	ACN	Successfully completed
LAC 13	Spoornet Ops. Ctr., SADC Reps FX	440,000	220,000	24 Sep 92	220,000	19 Oct 92	220,000	153,200	SPOORNET	Accounting requested
LAC 19	Malawi Northern Corr. Malawi Cargo Centers & Railway	300,000	336,567	29 Sep 92	335,064	Var	335,064	335,064	Venetian Bl. Neill Scale	All delivered
LAC 23	Mozambique-Sleepers for CFM(C)	157,800	159,998	16 Nov 92	159,998	14 Jan 93	159,998	159,998	Botstrail	Delivered
LAC 26	Zimbabwe-Dept. of Social Wel.-Tarps	67,000	66,503	6 Jan 93	66,503	8 Jan 93	66,503	66,503	North	Delivered
LAC 27	Mozambique-1000 Tarps for Limpopo Line	350,000	310,000	11 Jan 93	310,000	11 Jan 93	310,000	310,000	WS&G	Delivered
PAGE TOTALS		6,571,000	5,389,736		5,389,278		5,097,262	2,523,606		

TABLE 6 UNITED STATES DROUGHT RELATED ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE 1992/93 PROGRAM SUMMARY

FOOD COMMODITY	AMOUNT (tons)	VALUE U.S. Dollars	PROGRAM TITLE Title
Maize	91,300	\$ 10,000,000	GSM - Guarantee
Maize	86,175	\$ 10,000,000	GSM - Guarantee
Maize	250,000	\$ 25,000,000	Title I - Concessional Loan
Wheat	70,000	\$ 10,000,000	Title I - Concessional Loan
Maize	50,000	\$ 5,000,000	Title I - Concessional Loan
Maize	58,000	\$ 19,870,370	Section 416 - Grant
Sorghum	50,000	\$ 17,129,630	Section 416 - Grant
Maize	85,000	\$ 31,315,789	Section 416/WFP - Grant
Maize	10,000	\$ 3,684,211	Section 416/WFP - Grant (Refugee)
Sub-Total Cereals	750,475	\$132,000,000	
Edible Oil	10,860	\$ 5,000,000	Title I - Concessional Loan
Sub-Total All Commodities	761,335	\$137,000,000	

None Food Aid - All Grant

U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance			
Rural Water Rehabilitation		US\$	50,000
UNICEF		US\$	950,000
American Red Cross		US\$	144,000
Save the Children (U.S.)		US\$	313,803
AFRICARE		US\$	427,784
Catholic Relief Services		US\$	925,194
Peace Corps		US\$	40,000
Sorghum & Millet Seed Reproduction Project		US\$	1,160,000
Zimbabwe Drought Fund-Counterpart Funds		US\$	2,200,000
Regional Drought Emergency Logistics Project (Zimbabwe component)		US\$	2,000,000
Drought Relief-Counterpart Funds		US\$	7,547,000
DSW - Drivers			
DSW - Clerical			
Crop Pack Program			
Self-Help Water		US\$	328,780
Food Targeting (FEWS)		US\$	1,600,000
Sub-Total: Non-Food		US\$	17,686,561

Total U. S. Assistance **US\$ 154,686,561**

drought relief distribution program through hiring 204 additional temporary staff and to assist with Crop Pack program designed to help small farmers recover from the 91/92 drought through the purchase and delivery of fertilizers and seeds for the 1992/93 season. A summary of the total assistance provided by the United States to Zimbabwe is shown in Table 6. In preparation for the drought recovery program it was decided to produce additional sorghum and millet seed under irrigated conditions in the off-season. The SADC/ICRISAT sorghum and millet project in Matopos, Zimbabwe, undertook to raise the seed crop on the Zambia shore of Lake Kariba. USAID provided funds. Varieties raised were previously tested and accepted in the region. There was a seed crop (less than expected because of severe bird damage) that was distributed through drought recovery programs in Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The evaluation bibliography in Annex I lists 3 evaluations of this program for additional information.

4. RELIEF OPERATIONS - PVO/NGOs

There are 641 PVO/NGOs operating in Zimbabwe and coordination among the PVO/NGOs is accomplished through NANGO, National Association of NGOs. As the severity of the drought became known NANGO established a subcommittee on the drought chaired by one of the international NGOs (SCF-UK) with previous experience in drought emergencies. Some planning meetings were held but were poorly attended.

The majority of NGOs in Zimbabwe are locally based and have a focus on small scale development activities. Many of the local NGOs did not have the management or logistical capacity to initiate a food distribution program.

The U.S. Mission early on requested a P.L. 480 Title II food aid program which would have been managed by PVO/NGOs. This request, however, was not approved by Washington. The Mission did convene a meeting of U.S. PVOs in January 1992 to discuss food relief programs. More interest was shown in drought amelioration programs, such as water development which would

complement on-going rural development activities, rather than food distribution programs (particularly since Title II foods would not likely be available).

OFDA did approve grants to the American Red Cross (\$144,000), Save the Children - U.S. (\$313,803), Africare (\$427,784) and Catholic Relief Services (\$925,194). Part of the African grant included funds from AID's Africa Bureau. These AID/W grants were made in August-September 1992 and USAID did meet periodically with the PVO representatives and a Mission field review of the grants was made during April - May 1993.

The Department of Social Welfare administered the nation's drought relief program and it had Section 416 maize and sorghum available from USAID (108,000 mt) and WFP (85,000 mt). The Section 416 grain also included funds to pay for ITSH (Internal Transport, Storage and Handling) costs. The approved budget for these costs, was costed at an average of \$51/mt. (See below in Section 5 for comments on the USG's management - or lack thereof - of its ITSH resources). The Canadian government, through CIDA, also made available C\$15 million to assist with food distribution.

The DSW had these resources - food, transport money and cash and - wanted to make them available to NGOs. DSW prepared a set of guidelines for NGO proposals and invited all interested NGOs to a meeting in early August 1992. During the period December 1992 through May 93, the NGOs distributed about 24,000 mt of food grain in coordination with DSW see Table 7 for a summary of NGO distribution. During the same period a total of 190,000 mt was distributed so NGOs distributed 12,6 percent of the food grain for the general drought relief feeding program.

5. APPRAISAL ON U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE

The bottom line: famine was averted in Zimbabwe and the Southern Africa region. This massive food relief effort succeeded because of a great deal of work by thousands of persons. The United States had a significant role in this drought

Table 7 Cooperation Agreements Concluded Between DSW and NGOs
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN DSW AND NGOS

NGO	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	START	END	MONTH TON	TOTAL TON.	TYPE OF ACTIVITY
CARE INTERNATIONAL	MIDLANDS	ZVISHAVANE MBERENGWA	1.1.93 1.2.93	5.8.93	234	1 400	SFP
SCF - UK	ALL PROVINCES EXCEPT M/C	-	1.1.93 1.10.92	30.6.93	500	4 500	FERRYING FOOD
BAPTIST UNION OF ZIMBABWE	MANICALAND MANICALAND MANICALAND MASVINGO MASH EAST	MUTASA WARD BUHERA-BANGURE MANICALAND CHIVI MUTOKO	1.12.92 1.3.93 1.1.93 1.1.93 1.1.93	30.4.93 30.6.93 30.4.93 31.5.93 30.4.93	57 58 68	279 174 272	GENERAL FEEDING " " "
Z.F.F.H.C.	MANICALAND MANICALAND	BUHERA MANICALAND	1.1.93	30.6.93	488	2 928	GENERAL FEEDING
OXFAM - UK	CHIVI MASVINGO	MASVINGO MASVINGO	1.12.92 1.12.92	30.6.93 30.6.93	193	1 351	FERRYING FOOD
AFRICARE	CHIVI	MASVINGO	1.11.92	31.1.93	32	96	GENERAL FEEDING
BAPTIST MISSION (to amend 21.5.92 agreement)	MABELELAND SOUTH	BEITBRIDGE, DITI I & 11 MTETENGWE	1.1.93	31.3.93	369	1 107	GENERAL FEEDING
OXFAM-CANADA ORAP	MAT NORTH (except Binga) MAT SOUTH (except Esigodini) MIDLANDS	KEZI, PLUMTREE, FILABUSI, NKAYIHWANGE, LU PANE, TSHOLOTSHO, GWANDS, GOKWE, ZVISHAVANE, SHURUGWI	15.12.92	30.6.93	492	3 200	SFP
MOLISV(periodic markets pilot project)	MANICALAND	MAKONI- NYAMATANDA, MATOTWE, BEMBERO NYAMUDZI AND CHITANGAZUVA	1.12.92	30.6.93	286.75	2 007	FERRYING FOOD
MANICALAND DEVELOPMENT ASSOC.	MANICALAND	MUTARE	1.12.92	30.6.93	612	3 060	FERRYING FOOD

SCF - USA	MANICALAND	MAKONI-CHIDUKU MUTOMBWA, NEHANDA, NGOME, NYANGA, NYATARE NYAMUTOWERA	16.11.92	15.5.93	252 113	2 008	FERRYING FOOD
CADEC	MASVINGO	NYAJENA, MASVINGO	1.2.93	30.6.93	271	1 355	FERRYING FOOD
EVANGELICAL FELLOWSHIP OF ZIMBABWE	MAT NORTH MAT SOUTH MASVINGO	BINGA KEZI MASVINGO	1.1.93	30.6.93			GENERAL FEEDING

relief program and the U.S. response was provided on a generally timely basis. The SADC region's Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit concluded in its assessment of the regional drought in July 1993 that, "The Government of the USA played a critical role in the relief effort, from the contributions of the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), which confirmed the findings of SADC's own Regional Early Warning System, to the early purchase and delivery of massive amounts of food grain for many SADC countries. The USA also made available more than USD 20 million in operational intervention funds which were aimed at effecting prompt solutions to logistics and transport bottlenecks and in supporting the operations of the LAC. The Harare regional office of USAID was particularly active in mobilising USA government support."

There were, however, problem areas and suggestions follow for improving the USG response to a drought emergency.

a) - **Early Listening:** There are national and regional early warning systems that the U.S. and other donors are funding as well as field missions in place. An early warning is not very useful if no one is listening. The Mission started identifying a potential problem in November 1991 and the disaster declaration was made on February 11, 1992. An AID/Washington team was dispatched to visit the region from March 24 - April 29, 1992. The first agreement for P.L. 480 Title I maize was signed on May 29, 1992 and the first ship with Title I maize arrived in East London on October 1, 1992 and was berthed on October 12, 1992. The first rail load of that maize arrived in Zimbabwe the last week of October, 1992, - a year later.

The Section 416 agreement was signed on July 22, 1992, and the sorghum shipment arrived in Cape Town on November 20, 1992, and was berthed about December 10, 1992. The first Section 416 sorghum arrived in Zimbabwe in mid-January 1993, and distribution to the rural people began on February 1, 1993. The Section 416 grain was provided as a grant for free distribution to the most vulnerable people in the drought emergency.

We can all count: the declaration of disaster was made on February 11, 1992, and the first grant aid sorghum reached the intended beneficiaries on February 1, 1993. There is plenty of room to improve this time-table. And we must note that the government of Zimbabwe and the donor community in Harare considered the U.S. response to be timely and appropriate.

b) -ITSH - Internal Transport Storage and Handling.

The Section 416 Agreement which was signed on July 22, 1992, provided 58,000 mt of maize and 50,000 mt of sorghum on a grant basis. The U.S. would ship the grain to a Southern African port and then transport it to the grain depots requested by the GMB. A separate fund was to be established to reimburse the GMB for storage and handling costs and the Department of Social Welfare and PVO/NGOs for the transport costs of distributing the sorghum and maize from the depot to the community-level food distribution points.

The food grain began to be distributed in October 1992 (the U.S. borrowed maize from the GMB which was to be replaced by the Section 416 maize once it arrived). The first voucher for payments was received in August 1993 and, as of October 1993, no payment had yet been made to any of the NGOs that distributed U.S. provided food grain or the Government of Zimbabwe. All of the maize and sorghum had been distributed by April 1993. There may be reasons for this 15 month delay in establishing procedures and reimbursing organizations and the government but the validity of them escapes us.

The Government of Zimbabwe focussed on moving food out to the people who needed it. The government stated that it knew the U.S. would eventually pay. The PVOs also moved the food grain but the delay in the U.S. reimbursement of the costs has created a cash-flow problem with the PVOs.

The Government of Zimbabwe and the participating PVOs did NOT delay the delivery of any food grain because of the absence of procedures for the

reimbursement of the ITSH costs.

c) - **Centrally funded grants:** There were 3 centrally funded grants made by Washington that had field implications but they were not fully discussed with field missions. The three grants included logistics for WFP, monitoring of grain movement (which was subsequently cancelled) and telecommunications.

There should of course be full communication between Washington and field missions before negotiating grants to avoid duplication of effort, etc.

6. ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The Consultative Group meetings were being held in Paris in February 1992. The key topic of discussion was Zimbabwe's new structural adjustment program. The U.S. delegation tried to have the looming drought and the impact of importing food grain on ESAP placed on the agenda. Food aid was not considered an important enough topic for an economic conference according to the IBRD. A lunch time table was set aside for those persons who wanted to talk about drought and food aid.

The Government of Zimbabwe declared a disaster on March 6, 1992, which began the process for the international community to "officially" respond to the drought. Some organizations and nations are very careful about responding to an official pronouncement of a disaster.

The UN/DHA office did convene a meeting in June 1992 to solicit donor support for the drought emergency in Zimbabwe and the region. AID/W dis-invited USAID/Harare after a disagreement on the use of U.S. PVOs in this emergency. Donor support was forthcoming. There was significant support for supplemental foods that could be used for child or therapeutic feeding programs. As shown in Table 1 the United States was the major basic food grain donor.

The World Bank did agree to provide significant food grain, water rehabilitation and cash assistance. There were problems in implementing this drought recovery assistance. The Bank does not have experience in the international grain markets and there were delays in placing final orders for grain. The delays were such that some of the maize was sold by the GMB upon arrival at port - the maize had arrived after the 1992 harvest. The loan funds were not fully utilized for drought management supplies and equipment. This lack of utilization was caused by having standard procurement and tendering regulations in place by government and the Bank rather than more streamlined "emergency" regulations.

After some urging, the Resident Representative of the UNDP chaired bi-weekly donor meetings to discuss the progress of the drought emergency. These meetings were well attended and regular.

The World Food Program managed targeted food grain and supplemental foods as well as on-going refugee feeding programs. Additionally the WFP provided management assistance to the Regional Logistics Advisory Center. UNICEF had a significant management role in the Child Supplemental Feeding Program in coordination with the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare.

The FAO was responsible for the initial estimates of basic food grain needs. These estimates of a need to import 1.1 million mt of maize were accurate in March/April 1992 when they were first made. However this import requirement eventually more than doubled to 2.4 million mt. The FAO did not have a system in place to provide for "adjusted" figures. This caused some complications for food aid planning as some observers thought that Zimbabwe had more than enough grain pledged or on order.

ANNEX I

EVALUATIONS OF ZIMBABWE'S DROUGHT EMERGENCY 1992 - 1993

COMPLETE

1. SADC/DHA: Drought Emergency in Southern Africa - Situation Report No. 6, June 1993.
2. DSW: Kadoma Review Meeting - Drought Relief Program, April 1993.
3. LOGISTICS ADVISORY CENTRE, Monthly Information Bulletin No. 11, June 1993.
4. D. HICKS, WFP: An Evaluation of the Zimbabwe Drought Relief Program 1992/1993, June 1993.
5. FSTAU: Assessment of the Response to the 1991/92 Drought in the SADC Region, July 1993.
6. A. R. WHITE, UNCTAD: Facilitating the Transport of Emergency Grain Supplies - Lesson to be learned, June 1993.
7. L. DINOTO, CRS: Drought in Southern Africa: Impact and Lessons for the Future, April 1993 (Congressional Research Service).
8. A. MUIR, SCF (UK): Livelihood Strategies and the Household Economy in Binga District, Zimbabwe, May 1993.
9. AID/WASHINGTON: Southern Africa Drought Assessment March 24 - April 29, 1992.
10. M. BORSOTTI, UNDP: Drought Relief Program in Zimbabwe, Critical Considerations on its Implementation: Lessons Learn and Future Steps, May 25, 1993.
11. ICRISAT, Impact Assessment of SADC/ICRISAT 1992/93 Emergency Seed Multiplication and Distribution Project, August 3, 1993.
12. L. HOUSE, SADC/ICRISAT, Emergency Production of Sorghum and Millet Seed - Winter Season 1992, 1993.

13. MPSSLW/UNICEF: Findings from the Third Round of Sentinel Surveillance for Social dimensions of Adjustment Monitoring, August 17, 1993
13. R. EWBANK, UNICEF: An Evaluation of CSFP, June 1993
15. C. TOBAIWA, SADC/FSTAU: Zimbabwe: The Response to the 1992 Drought in the context of Long-Term Development Objectives, September 7, 1993.
16. H. HALE, EURONAIID: Evaluation of NGO Food Distribution, September 1993.
17. D. ROHRBACH, ICRISAT: Impact Assessment of the SADC/ICRISAT Drought Relief Emergency Production of Sorghum and Pearl Millet Seed, September 1993.
18. Southern Africa Foundation for Economic Research, MINAG: Evaluation of the Agricultural Drought Recovery Program, November 1993.
19. E. WITT, USAID/ZIMBABWE: Final Summary Report - Drought Emergency 1992 - 1993, November 5, 1993
20. J. MASON AND M. LEBLANC: Emergency Water Relief Regional Project, September 1993.
21. S. MANTINDIKE, NANGO: The Child Supplementatry Feeding Programme: Observations of NGOs, June 23, 1993.

IN PROCESS

22. WFP: Evaluation of WFP - Assisted Regional Emergency Operation Southern Africa EMOP 5052/60 - Assistance to Drought Victims. Start - October 1993.
23. ODI: The Impact of Drought on Sub-Saharan African Economics and Options for the Mitigation of such Impacts by National Governments and the International Community, - (World Bank and ODA funding), December 1993,
24. AID/WASHINGTON: Southern African Drought Emergency Evaluation, Country - Report: Zimbabwe, December 1993.
25. SIDA: Evaluation of the Swedish Support to DESA, July - September 1993.
26. RED CROSS: Assessment of Supplementary Feeding Programs in Zimbabwe and Zambia, December 1993.
27. S. FARANISI and J. CHITEKUTEKU (Oxfam-U.K.): A Drought Review Program: The Oxfam Experience, October 1993.

UNCLAS AIDAC HARARE 11138

ORIGIN: AID-1
 INFO: AMB-1 DCM-1 ECON-1

DISTRIBUTION: AID
 CHARGE: AID
 APPROVED: DIR:TDMORSE
 DRAFTED: GDO:EWITT
 CLEARED: DD:SSPIELMAN

VZCZCSBI968
 RR RUEHC RUEHRC RUEHSA RUEHNR
 DE RUEHSB #1138/01 2741355
 ZNR UUUUU ZZH
 R 301355Z SEP 92
 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5858
 RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC 0028
 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 5371
 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1106
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 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 011138

AIDAC

SECSTATE FOR AFR/SA, SADE, OFDA
 USDA FOR FAS/EC/PDD/EAA
 PRETORIA FOR AGATT
 NAIROBI FOR RIG/A

E.O. 12356: N/A
 SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE: FOOD AID MANAGEMENT PLAN

1. INTRODUCTION. THE USG HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE OVER 700,000 MT OF FOOD STUFFS TO ZIMBABWE DURING THE DROUGHT EMERGENCY IN FY 1992. THIS INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMS:

A. GUARANTEED SALES FOR MARKETING. 177,457 MT OF YELLOW MAIZE.

B. PL 480 TITLE I. 250,386 MT OF YELLOW MAIZE; 70,000 MT OF WHEAT; AND 10,860 MT OF VEGETABLE OIL.

C. SECTION 416. 58,000 MT OF YELLOW MAIZE AND 50,000 MT OF SORHGUM.

D. SECTION 416/WFP. 95,000 MT OF MAIZE.

2. USAID HAS DEVELOPED A PROGRAM WITH THE GOZ TO MONITOR THE ABOVE LISTED FOODSTUFFS (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MAIZE GOING THROUGH THE WFP). A SUMMARY OF THE PLANNED MONITORING PROGRAM FOLLOWS:

A. PORT: THE FOOD GRAIN ARRIVES AT SOUTHERN AFRICAN

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PORTS AND SPECIALIST SERVICES INTERNATIONAL (SSI), UNDER CONTRACT TO ZIMBABWE'S GRAIN MARKETING BOARD (GMB), WILL VERIFY AMOUNT OF GRAIN RECEIVED. THIS WILL BE DONE FOR ALL GRAIN PROVIDED UNDER THE GSM, PL 480 TITLE I AND SECTION 416 PROGRAMS.

B. DEPOT: AS GRAIN ARRIVES AT THE GMB DEPOTS IN ZIMBABWE, ITS WEIGHT WILL BE VERIFIED BY THE TRANSPORTED REPRESENTATIVE, GMB DEPOT REPRESENTATIVE AND AN "OUTSIDE" REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE ZIMBABWE OFFICE OF DELOITTE AND TOUCHE. USAID WILL FINANCE THE COSTS OF THE THIRD PARTY INSPECTION CONTRACT. ALL GRAIN PROVIDED UNDER THE GSM, PL 480 TITLE I AND SECTION 416 PROGRAMS WILL BE MONITORED UNDER THIS REVIEW.

AT THIS POINT, THE MONITORING OF THE GSM AND PL 480 TITLE I PROGRAMS WILL BE COMPLETE. THE GRAIN WILL GO INTO COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS AND WILL BE NON-DIFFERENTIATED FROM OTHER GRAIN.

C. DROUGHT RELIEF DISTRIBUTION: THE SECTION 416 PROGRAM IS PROVIDING 108,000 MT OF MAIZE AND SORGHUM FOR DIRECT DROUGHT RELIEF ASSISTANCE. THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE (DSW) IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS DISTRIBUTION. A SERIES OF FORMS HAS BEEN DRAWN UP SO THAT GRAIN CAN BE TRACKED FROM THE DEPOT TO THE BENEFICIARIES. THIS WILL NECESSARILY INVOLVE A LOT OF PAPERWORK AND SHOULD BE MONITORED ON A CONTINUAL AND TIMELY BASIS. USAID WILL CONTRACT WITH A LOCAL FIRM TO MONITOR, SUMMARIZE AND, IMPORTANTLY, RECONCILE THE DISTRIBUTION ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM.

D. TARGETING: A TEAM FROM THE FAMINE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM (FEWS) PROJECT IS WORKING WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE. IT HAS DEVELOPED A SERIES OF MAPS SHOWING LEVELS OF CHRONIC AND CURRENT VULNERABILITY TO THE DROUGHT. USAID WILL BE WORKING WITH THE DSW TO EXAMINE APPROXIMATELY FIVE OF THE DISTRICTS WHERE THE POPULATION HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS BEING MOST VULNERABLE.

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SUPPLIES OF DROUGHT RELIEF FOOD WILL BE MONITORED AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE MADE TO IMPROVE THE VULNERABILITY SITUATION. USAID IS FUNDING THE CONTRACT WITH A LOCAL FIRM, PROBE ASSOC, TO UNDERTAKE THIS MONITORING PROGRAM.

3. THE FOLLOWING IS A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF USAID'S PROPOSED MONITORING PLAN FOR EACH OF THE PROGRAMS.

A. GUARANTEED SALES FOR MARKETING (GSM). THE SHIPPING SCHEDULE FOR THE GSM PROGRAM (177,457 MT) AS OF SEPTEMBER 23, IS AS FOLLOWS:

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VESSEL	MT	SAILED	ETA	PORT
PANTAZIS	22,296	ARRIVED/DISCHARGING		PORT ELIZ
W. APOLLO	32,009	ARRIVED/DISCHARGING		EAST LONDON
BLUE BELL	22,286	ARRIVED/DISCHARGING		CAPE TOWN
RODLO	31,467	SEP 03	SEP 30	PORT ELIZ
OCEAN LAKE	18,250	SEP 01	SEP 30	BEIRA
POWSTANIEC				
SLASKI	29,150	SEP 10	OCT 03	EAST LONDON
GOLDEN				
TENNYO	21,999	SEP 12	OCT 10	BEIRA

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SECSTATE FOR AFR/SA, SADE, OFDA
USDA FOR FAS/EC/PDD/EAA
PRETORIA FOR AGATT
NAIROBI FOR RIG/A

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE: FOOD AID MANAGEMENT PLAN

- MONITORING AND IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS ARE AS
FOLLOWS:

USAID WILL OBTAIN WEEKLY SHIPPING DAT
A FROM GMB ON
WEDNESDAYS AND PREPARE WEEKLY REPORTING CABLE ON FOOD
SHIPPING PROGRAM.

IF THERE ARE COMMODITY QUALITY PROBLEMS, USAID WILL NEED
TO PLAY AN INFORMATION ROLE.

USAID WILL OBTAIN WEEKLY REPORT ON ARRIVALS OF MAIZE AT
GMB DEPOTS AND REPORT ON ARRIVALS.

USAID IS FUNDING A CONTRACT WITH DELOITTE AND TOUCHE TO
ASSIST WITH VERIFICATION OF RECEIPT OF MAIZE AT DEPOTS.
WEIGHT AT DELIVERY TO BE VERIFIED BY TRANSPORTER, GMB
DEPOT AND DELOITTE REPRESENTATIVES. CONTRACTOR TO BE
MONITORED BY USAID.

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B. PL 480 TITLE I. THE SHIPPING SCHEDULE FOR THE TITLE
I MAIZE (250,386 MT), AS OF SEPTEMBER 23, IS AS FOLLOWS:

VESSEL	MT	ETD	ETA	PORT
O'MARILYN	23,888	SEP 04	SEP 28	CAPE TOWN

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GOZ/AGENT MEETS WITH ASCS MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
COMMODITIES AND THE SHIPMENT.

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 HARARE 011138

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SECSTATE FOR AFR/SA, SADE, OFDA
USDA FOR FAS/EC/PDD/EAA
PRETORIA FOR AGATT
NAIROBI FOR RIG/A

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE: FOOD AID MANAGEMENT PLAN

GOZ/AGENT COORDINATES WITH ASCS FOR THE TENDERING FOR
OCEAN FREIGHT.

AWARDS MADE AND CONTRACTS SIGNED.

COMMODITIES ARE LOADED AT US PORTS.

USAID WILL OBTAIN WEEKLY SHIPPING DATA FROM GMB ON
WEDNESDAYS AND PREPARE WEEKLY REPORTING CABLE ON FOOD
SHIPPING PROGRAM.

VESSELS SAIL.

VESSELS ARRIVE AT DISCHARGE PORTS.

USAID SENDS CABLE TO USDA/FAS WHEN VESSEL ARRIVES.

DISCHARGE SURVEY ARRANGED FOR BY GMB AND RESULTS SENT TO
USAID.

CLAIMS (IF NEEDED) ARE FILED AGAINST SHIPPER.

IF THERE ARE COMMODITY QUALITY PROBLEMS, USAID WILL NEED
TO PLAY AN INFORMATION ROLE.

OVERLAND SHIPMENTS NEED TO BE MONITORED BY USAID.

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THE GOZ/IMPORTERS NEED TO KEEP USAID CLOSELY INFORMED OF
THE STATUS OF THE OVERLAND TRANSPORT PROGRESS.

USAID IS FUNDING A CONTRACT WITH DELOITTE AND TOUCHE TO
ASSIST WITH VERIFICATION OF RECEIPT OF MAIZE AT DEPOTS.
WEIGHT OF DELIVERY TO BE VERIFIED BY TRANSPORTER, GMB
DEPOT AND DELOITTE REPRESENTATIVES. CONTRACTOR TO BE
MONITORED BY USAID.

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USAID WILL ALSO MONITOR THE MAIZE AND SORGHUM AS IT IS RELEASED FROM THE GMB DEPOT AND TURNED OVER TO THE DSW FOR DISTRIBUTION TO DROUGHT VICTIMS. A LOCAL CONTRACTOR DSS, HAS BEEN CONTRACTED TO REVIEW, SUMMARIZE AND RECONCILE ALL GMB, DSW AND PVO/NGO REPORTS, ON RECEIPT OF GRAIN FROM DEPOT TO DELIVERY TO BENEFICIARIES.

COMMODITY ARRIVAL REPORT SUMMARIES ARE DUE AT USDA ON MAY 15 AND NOVEMBER 15.

LOGISTICS REPORT WILL ALSO BE DUE AT USDA ON MAY 15 AND NOVEMBER 15.

D. SECTION 416/WFP. THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM WILL RECEIVE 95,000 MT OF YELLOW MAIZE AND IT WILL BE USED FOR REFUGEE FEEDING (10,000 MT), CHILD SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING PROGRAM (30,000 MT) AND DROUGHT RELIEF FEEDING (55,000 MT). USAID DOES NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC MONITORING ROLE WITH WFP FOOD COMMODITIES. HOWEVER, USAID IS WORKING IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH WFP AND WILL BE AN INTERESTED OBSERVER.

4. USDA GUIDANCE INDICATES THAT "ANY SIGNIFICANT LOSS" MUST BE REPORTED AND INVESTIGATED. THIS WILL BE DONE. ALL LOSSES, OR DIFFERENCES IN FIGURES, WILL BE REVIEWED NO MATTER WHAT THE SIZE. USAID WILL ASSUME, UNLESS IT RECEIVES CONTRARY GUIDANCE, THAT UNEXPLAINED DIFFERENCES IN TONNAGE FIGURES OF LESS THAN FIVE PERCENT ARE TO BE CONSIDERED WITHIN TOLERABLE LIMITS. LANPHER

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HARARE 10640

ORIGIN: AID-1
INFO: AMB-1 ECON-1

DISTRIBUTION: AID
CHARGE: AID
APPROVED: DIR:TDMORSE
DRAFTED: AADO:EWITT
CLEARED: AGDO:MDAVIDS

VZCZCSBI930
RR RUEHSA RUEHRC RUEHC
DE RUEHSB #0640 2701502
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271502Z SEP 93
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0033
INFO RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0055
BT
UNCLAS HARARE 010640

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SECSTATE FOR AFR/SA, SADE, OFDA; PRETORIA FOR AGATT

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE FOOD SHIPPING PROGRAM - REPORT NO. 36

1. THIS IS THE FINAL SUMMARY CABLE IN THIS SERIES ON ZIMBABWE'S FOOD SHIPPING PROGRAM DURING THE 1992/93 DROUGHT EMERGENCY. THE SERIES BEGAN WITH REPORT NO. 1 ON SEPTEMBER 4, 1992 (92 HARARE 9843) AND THE WEEKLY REPORTS CONCLUDED WITH REPORT NO. 35 ON JUNE 7, 1993 (HARARE 6091).

2. THE GOZ AND THE MISSION MONITORED FOOD GRAIN AND VEGETABLE OIL ARRIVALS. THE GOZ CONTRACTED WITH CALEB AND BRETT, AN INTERNATIONAL MARINE SURVEYING SERVICES FIRM BASED IN SOUTH AFRICA, TO CERTIFY THE DISCHARGE OPERATION OF GRAIN ARRIVING AT SOUTH AFRICAN AND MOZAMBICAN PORTS. THE MISSION CONTRACTED WITH THE HARARE OFFICE OF DELOITTE AND TOUCHE TO VERIFY GRAIN AND VEGETABLE OIL ARRIVALS IN ZIMBABWE. CALEB AND BRETT PROVIDED DISCHARGE REPORTS TO ZIMBABWE'S GRAIN MARKETING BOARD ON THE U.S.G. PROVIDED MAIZE EXCEPT FOR THE SECTION 416 PROGRAM. IN THE LATTER CASE, THE USDA CONTRACTS FOR THE DISCHARGE REPORT. DELOITTE AND TOUCHE PROVIDED THE MISSION WITH WEEKLY REPORTS SUMMARIZING THE AMOUNT OF GRAIN AND VEGETABLE OIL ARRIVING INTO ZIMBABWE. IT THEN PROVIDED CLOSURE REPORTS ON EACH SHIP AS ITS GRAIN OR VEGETABLE OIL CARGO WAS FULLY VERIFIED. THE DISCHARGE REPORTS AND CLOSURE REPORTS FOR THE U.S.G. PROVIDED GRAIN AND VEGETABLE OIL ARE LISTED IN PARA 3 BY SHIP, PROGRAM

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• AND FISCAL YEAR.

3. PROGRAM/SHIP	ARRIVAL AT PORT (MT)	ARRIVAL AT DEPOT (MT)
FY92 GSM - MAIZE		
PANTAZIS	22,215	22,772
WORLD APOLLO	32,068	33,002
BLUE BELL	22,407	23,017
RODLO	31,477	29,106
OCEAN LAKE	18,290	15,793
GOLDEN TENNYO	22,002	21,506
POWSTANIEC SLASKI	29,244	31,317

FY92 TITLE I - MAIZE

CORPUS CHRISTI	10,551	10,503
O'MARILYN	23,914	23,067
SUGAR ISLANDER	25,433	25,867
MARINE PRINCESS	46,228	43,966
NADELHORN	30,035	31,383
AMERICAN VET	33,542	31,587
AURORA RUBY	15,099	14,062
MARIE FLOOD	33,245	33,592
VERNER	29,985	29,250

FY92 SECTION 416 - MAIZE

ULTRA SEA/NADEL HORN (B)	57,944	57,784
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FY92 TITLE I - WHEAT

MORMACSUN	34,301	32,706
CHERRY VALLEY/MS MARIA	36,159	34,955

FY92 SECTION 416 - SORGHUM

KITTANNING	49,344	48,936
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FY92 TITLE I - OIL

STOLT HELLULAND	11,403	11,148
LIGHTNING/THUNDER	-	-

FY93 TITLE 1 - MAIZE

O'SEAS MARILYN (B)	24,444	23,169
O'SEAS HARRIETTE	24,517	24,679

4. A SUMMARY OF THE MAIZE ARRIVALS FOLLOWS:

PROGRAM	PORT (MT)	DEPOT (MT)	PERCENTAGE
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GSM	177,703	176,513	99.3
TITLE I	248,032	243,277	98.1
416	57,944	57,784	99.7
TITLE I (93)	48,961	47,848	97.7
TOTAL	532,640	525,422	98.6

THE GOZ AND THE MISSION ARE PLEASED WITH THIS LEVEL OF
ACCOUNTABILITY AND DELIGHTED THAT A FAMINE WAS AVERTED.
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