

*National Democratic
Institute for
International
Affairs*

**The December 1995
Parliamentary Elections
in the Russian Federation**

Pre-Election Report

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PRE-ELECTION REPORT

**THE DECEMBER 1995 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

December 1, 1995

**NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

National Democratic Institute For International Affairs

conducting nonpartisan international programs to help promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions



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PREFACE

NDI is a nonprofit organization conducting programs in new and emerging democracies. Working with political parties, civic organizations, legislatures and other democratic institutions, NDI has sponsored political development programs in more than 60 countries.

NDI has been conducting programming to assist the democratic transition in the Russian Federation since 1990 and has maintained a permanent field office in Moscow since July 1992. NDI also produced a pre-election report before the December 1993 parliamentary elections in Russia. NDI's current program in the Russian Federation, including publication of this report, is funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

This is a condensed and updated version of the Carnegie Endowment's publication entitled *Previewing Russia's Parliamentary Elections* (edited by Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov). This report draws extensively, including verbatim passages, from that publication, particularly from "part III," which was authored by McFaul and Sergei Markov, both of whom have worked as consultants with NDI since 1991. Sections of this report have been written in conjunction with McFaul and Markov by Alexander Sokolowski of NDI's Moscow office. This report was edited in late November at the NDI office in Washington.

The report is divided into six sections. The introduction explains the constitutional framework, the fundamentals of the election law and the political environment in the pre-election period. The second section lists the names of the competing parties, along with their symbols, in the order that they will appear on the ballot. The third section describes each of the parties competing in the elections, based on information available at the time of publication of this document. The fourth section describes NDI's program in support of the Russian elections. Section five contains examples of forms NDI is providing to domestic election monitors. Section six provides a map of the Russian Federation.

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I. INTRODUCTION

On December 17, 1995, the citizens of the Russian Federation will go to the polls to elect the State Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament, for the second time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first elections were held in December 1993. The upcoming elections mark an important milestone in the consolidation of new democratic institutions in the Russian Federation. They are in one sense a referendum on current government policies and a prelude to the June 1996 presidential election.

Constitutional Framework

The new Russian constitution adopted during the December 1993 referendum outlines the division between the executive and legislative branches of government and grants the president relatively wide-ranging powers in relation to the parliament. This constitution establishes a two-house parliamentary structure called the Federal Assembly.

The upper house of the Federal Assembly, the Federation Council, is meant to seat two representatives from each of Russia's 89 regions. Although the current deputies to the Federation Council were directly elected in 1993, they will most likely be appointed in the future. This question is currently under debate. In any case, the Federation Council will not be involved in the December 1995 elections.

The State Duma is the Federal Assembly's lower house. The Duma has 450 members who are elected either from single-mandate districts or party lists. All 450 Duma seats are up for re-election in December 1995. Duma deputies who were elected in 1993 will have served for two years, but those elected in 1995 and thereafter will serve four-year terms.

Fundamentals of the Election Law

The basic tenets of the State Duma electoral law differ very little from the presidential decree that regulated the 1993 parliamentary elections. As in 1993, 50 percent (225) of 450 seats will be distributed by a system of proportional representation (PR). The other half of the seats will be apportioned on the basis of single-mandate contests in 225 districts throughout Russia. As a result, all voters will cast two ballots -- one for the party of their choice and the other for a single-mandate candidate in their district. Candidates may run on both single-mandate and party list tickets. However, if they win in the single-mandate district, they must be removed from the party list.

The election law allows groups to register to compete in the elections in several categories, including parties, blocs, civic associations and movements. The generic terms used by the Central Election Commission (CEC) and most Russians to refer to all of the groups is "electoral blocs" or "blocs." This report generally uses the term "party" instead. However, in reference to individual groups, this report tries to apply the specific term appropriate to that group.

Proportional Representation (PR) System

A party or bloc must reach a threshold of at least 5 percent of the popular vote to win seats under the PR system. The seats are distributed in the following manner: the total number of votes for each party that wins 5 percent or more of the vote is divided by the 225 seats available. The resulting quotient is the number of mandates allocated to each of these parties. Votes cast for parties that fail to meet the 5 percent threshold do not figure in the distribution of mandates.

Each party runs a list of candidates (up to a maximum of 270). The bulk of the party list must be divided into regional groups. The parties themselves determine the number of regional groups they will field and the boundaries of the respective regions, but the boundaries must be based on Russia's 89 administrative regions or groups of regions. This system is designed to ensure that each party demonstrates broad regional representation.

The list may also include up to 12 names that are not tied to any specific region. These 12 names are considered to be the federal representatives of the bloc and are placed at the top of the list. The first three candidates on these party lists will be cited on the ballot with the party's name. If the party manages to receive 5 percent or more of the popular vote, these 12 candidates are first in line to become State Duma deputies. After a party seats its first 12 deputies, its remaining mandates are distributed to candidates on its regional lists in proportion to the number of votes cast for the party in the respective regions. Thus, the regional groups within a party list compete with one another.

Single-Mandate System

In the single-mandate system, candidates compete in a one-round contest in a particular district in which the candidate with a plurality of votes wins the seat. Because 10 to 15 candidates will be competing on average in each district, a candidate could win with a small percentage of the vote.

The size of districts are determined by population; the new law stipulates that the most populous district can be only 10 percent larger than the smallest. This is a change from 1993, when a 15 percent variance was permitted. This change has required redistricting almost everywhere. Three old districts were totally eliminated. The average single-mandate district has a population of about 500,000.

When parties registered with the CEC in September, they submitted a list of single-mandate candidates along with their party lists. In most cases, the number of single-mandate candidates who actually run will be lower than the registration list indicates. After their names were registered, each of these candidates had to collect the required signatures. Some were not successful. Also, the parties themselves are permitted to drop (but not add) names of single-mandate candidates until shortly before election day.

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Signature Collection

Parties were required to collect 200,000 signatures by October 22, 1995 to qualify to place their names on the PR ballot. No more than 7 percent of these signatures were permitted to be from any one region of the Russian Federation. Parties were allowed to begin their official election campaign only after the CEC verified their signatures and completed the registration process.

Candidates running in single-mandate constituencies were required to collect signatures from no less than 1 percent of the population of the district. Most candidates were required to collect approximately 5,000 signatures to qualify for placement on the ballot.

Media Regulations

The CEC issued a lengthy list of regulations for state-controlled media regarding the election campaign. Overall, mass media must provide equal conditions for all parties and candidates for campaign statements. Regulations instruct both state television stations (Russian Public Television [ORT] and Russian Television and Radio [RTR]) to provide two hours of free air time daily to all parties in equal measure from November 15 through December 15. These stations are also permitted to sell time to parties. However, the stations are not allowed to sell more time than the amount of free time they make available to all parties.

Financial Regulations

Officially, electoral parties are allowed to spend up to 4.37 billion rubles each (about \$950,000 U.S.D.) on their national campaigns. Individuals cannot donate more than 1.3 million rubles (about \$280) and organizations cannot contribute more than 87 million rubles (about \$19,000) to the campaign as a whole. Observers of the Russian political scene express doubt that these spending limitations will be respected.

Voting Procedures

Polling stations will open at 8:00 in the morning. Credentialed observers, including attorneys, members of election commissions, authorized representatives of parties, international observers, and representatives of the mass media are entitled to be present at polling stations throughout the day and during counting.

Voters must present their passports or some other sort of identification and sign their names on the voters' list. They will receive two ballots, one for the party list vote and one for the single-mandate candidates in their district. Each party list ballot will list the symbols of the 43 registered parties; the parties' names; and the names of the top three individuals on each list. Single-mandate ballots will contain the names and party affiliations, if appropriate, of each competing candidate.

Voters will then proceed to a booth or room that is "specially-equipped" for secret balloting, where they will mark their ballots. They will be instructed to indicate their choices by

making a mark in the boxes corresponding to one party on the party list ballot and one candidate on the single-mandate ballot. The last line on each ballot will present the option of "none of the above." Voters will place their completed forms in a locked ballot box.

Polls will close at 10:00 p.m. All present but still waiting to vote will be entitled to do so. After voting is completed and the polling station is officially closed, the polling station election commission members will count all ballots, subtracting voided and unused ones. They will develop two sets of protocols: one for the single mandate race and one for the party list race. When the counting is finished, they will produce three copies of each of the two protocols. The first copies, including complaints filed by observers, will be forwarded to the appropriate territorial election commission. The second copy will be filed with the polling station election commission. The third copy will be available for inspection by candidates, parties, observers, attorneys and the mass media. Territorial election commissions have three days to calculate the results from all polling station election commissions and complete their own sets of protocols, the first copies of which will get forwarded to a district election commission.

The district election commissions will estimate the results of single-mandate ballots in their respective districts. They will forward the first copy of protocols for party list balloting to the Central Election Commission. On the basis of these protocols, the CEC will calculate the results of the party list ballots.

Other Important Provisions

In order for the election to be valid according to the election law, at least 25 percent of registered voters must cast ballots. Most analysts and public opinion polls indicate that turnout will be about 50 percent.

Government officials running for the State Duma may remain in office during the campaign period. They must not, however, use government resources for campaign purposes. This year, successful candidates who are also cabinet ministers must resign from their posts if they wish to serve in the State Duma.

(The complete text of the Duma election law was translated by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, which can be contacted at 1101 15th Street, N.W., Third Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005, (202) 828-8507 or at Maly Kakovinsky 2/6, Apt. 11, Moscow 121009, tel: 7-095- 232-38-29.)

The Pre-Election Environment

Debating the "Rules of the Game"

Almost every aspect of the electoral law and election regulations -- from the concept of proportional representation to the registration of blocs -- has been the subject of criticism and debate throughout the pre-election period.

Early in the campaign period, several groups expressed concern that the electoral law and accompanying regulations did not provide sufficient protection against manipulation. These groups began organizing election monitoring organizations in attempts to detect or prevent fraud. However, as of the time of this writing, no nationwide, nonpartisan organization had emerged to monitor the elections.

Many political leaders claimed that it was too easy for marginal political groups to collect the 200,000 signatures required for the PR ballots. In addition, signature collection was no longer seen as an indication of societal support because almost all parties paid for signatures through new commercial organizations established to capitalize on this electoral procedure.

Also, the elections were almost derailed by the registration process. The CEC Chairman, Nikolai Ryabov, disqualified some blocs that did not adhere strictly to all procedural regulations. When the CEC disqualified Yabloko, a popular liberal party, and Derzhava, a major ultra-nationalist party, an uproar ensued, including a threatened boycott by many registered blocs. Almost every major party criticized the disqualifications.

As the number of registered parties grew, many expressed concern about the increasing difficulty of reaching the 5 percent threshold. In early November, several smaller parties proposed amending the electoral law to lower the threshold, and two deputies brought suit to the Supreme Court, calling the current election law unconstitutional. The Supreme Court decided not to consider the case until after the elections.

Many are still unhappy with the election law, claiming that it will lead to a Duma that is not representative of Russians' political will. Nevertheless, now that the Supreme Court has determined that the elections will take place on time and under the existing rules, attention has shifted from the content of the election law to its implementation and the campaign itself.

Parliamentary Elections and the President

Although President Boris Yeltsin has reached out to a number of parties during the past year, he has refrained from endorsing any single party in these elections. He stated that he will decide whether or not to seek another five-year term in June 1996 after considering the results of the December 17 elections. The election outcome is also likely to influence the composition of President Yeltsin's future cabinet, including the post of prime minister.

During the spring, President Yeltsin called for the formation of two large moderate parties to consolidate the fragmented political spectrum, marginalize radicals and form the basis for a stable two-party system. This led to the emergence of two groups -- one viewed as right-of-center led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin called "Our Home is Russia," and one considered left-of-center chaired by State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin called "Ivan Rybkin's Bloc." However, President Yeltsin's verbal support for these groups has grown more tepid since their formation.

Later, the president also conducted a series of meetings with Yegor Gaidar of Democratic Choice of Russia, Boris Fyodorov of Forward Russia, and leaders of other reform-oriented

movements. At that point, it appeared as though he might take a more active role in supporting these parties. However, later in the fall, President Yeltsin began reaching out to a wider circle, excluding only the Communist and ultra-nationalist parties.

Because of the relative strength of the presidency in the Russian constitution, most major political groups see winning the presidency as the only means of achieving real power in Russia. Each group hopes that the results of the parliamentary elections will establish it as a powerful societal force and provide it with a mandate to compete in the presidential contest next spring.

Characteristics of the Campaign

On the whole, most parties have campaigned in a more organized manner than two years ago. National leaders have traveled extensively in the regions to promote their parties and candidates. Many of these same leaders also hired political consultants to help improve their image and public speaking style, and some of the largest parties have retained advertising agencies to produce print and television advertising campaigns. Campaign literature has grown more varied and sophisticated, with the use of color photos and graphics.

Today most parties strike a more nationalist tone in their programs and campaign statements. The majority of parties promise the return of a strong Russian state. Most parties have also called for a form of reintegration of some or all of the former Soviet republics. Elements of nationalism appear in almost every segment of the political spectrum.

Many parties have also turned to populism to garner support. Several parties have promised to return money to defrauded investors, while others have pledged to compensate those who lost their savings during the price reforms of 1992. Other parties are placing a well-known political novice -- an entertainer, astronaut, or general -- near the top of their party lists in the hopes that celebrity popularity will translate into electoral success. If elected, many of these figures are considered likely to relinquish their Duma seats to other less renowned political leaders in the party.

Attempting to tap into widespread discontent and to distinguish themselves in a field of 43 parties, several political groups have turned to negative campaigning. To many observers, the popularity of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's negative campaign in 1993 proved that casting blame and finding scapegoats could be an effective campaign strategy. While most of this negative campaigning has been directed at the current government, others have targeted their major political adversaries. Liberal parties warn of the consequences of "communist revanchism," while the communists blame liberals for lowering the country's standard of living and causing the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Public Attitudes toward the Elections

Given Russia's size and complexity, it is difficult to make sweeping generalizations about how Russians view the upcoming elections. However, a few issues stand out. It is fair to say that segments of the Russian electorate are apathetic or cynical about politics in general. They lack faith that the government can solve their problems or that their vote will

make a difference. This attitude stems in part from the legacy of Soviet rule and in part from most Russians' preoccupation with the difficulties of their day-to-day lives. However, this apparent disaffection with politics seems to be ebbing as the elections approach. Recent polls suggest that the number of people saying they will vote on election day has risen since late summer.

Some Russian observers have predicted that the elections will be conducted unfairly in favor of the current government or traditional forces that still maintain power and influence in certain areas. These predictions usually point to expected irregularities in the vote count. So far, these predictions have been based on conclusions drawn circumstantially from the 1993 elections rather than on concrete, documented evidence. While no charges have been made that would challenge the legitimacy of the election process to date, pre-election complaints by individual political parties are noted in Section III.

II. PARTIES AND SYMBOLS

The following is a list of the 43 electoral blocs participating in the elections. The blocs are listed in the order in which they will appear on the ballot as determined by random lottery.


1. Women of Russia



2. Derzhava ("Great Power")




3. Duma-96



4. Transformation of the Fatherland



5. Tikhonov-Tupolev-Tikhonov Bloc




6. Russian People's Movement



7. All-Russian Muslim Movement "NUR"



8. Federal Democratic Movement



9. Peace, Goodness, and Happiness



10. Interethnic Union



11. Stable Russia



12. Generation of the Turn of the Century



13. My Fatherland



14. For the Motherland



15. Common Cause



16. Bloc of Independents

NONE

17. Our Home is Russia



18. Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko Bloc



19. Yabloko



20. Forward Russia



21. Bloc "89"



22. Ecological Party "KEDR"



23. Democratic Choice of Russia - United Democrats (DCR)



24. Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES)



25. Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)



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26. Stanislav Govorukhin's Bloc



27. Association of Lawyers of Russia



28. National Republican Party of Russia



29. Social Democrats



30. Power to the People



31. Congress of Russian Communities (KRO)



32. Trade Unions and Industrialists of Russia - Union of Labor




33. Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)



34. Bloc Including Leaders of Party for the Defense of Pensioners and Veterans...



- | | |
|--|---|
| 35. Party of Workers' Self Government | NONE |
| 36. Communists - Working Russia - For the Soviet Union |  |
| 37. Beer Lovers' Party |  |
| 38. Ivan Rybkin's Bloc |  |
| 39. Party of Economic Freedom |  |
| 40. People's Union |  |
| 41. Agrarian Party of Russia (APR) |  |
| 42. Christian Democratic Union - Christians of Russia |  |
| 43. Union of Russian Housing Industry Workers |  |

III. PARTIES AND ELECTORAL BLOCS

This section describes the 43 registered parties. It focuses on those parties that have some possibility of reaching the 5 percent threshold for the party list vote. These parties cover a broad and complex political spectrum. They are difficult to categorize definitively. However, for the purposes of this report, the major parties are grouped into three broad categories: liberals; centrists; and communists and nationalists. Within these categories, the parties are listed in order of their anticipated performance. Parties that are unlikely to win party list seats are grouped at the end in the same basic order of liberals, centrists and communists/nationalists. A few small, issue-oriented parties are at the end of this second grouping.

The liberal parties are those groups that advocate rapid economic reform, emphasize the rights of the individual and urge greater integration with the West. They tend to support greater autonomy for the regions. The centrists cover a wide spectrum of orientations, but share an interest in a slow or moderate pace of reform. The nationalists and communists tend to support strengthening Russia as a state, imposing order, bolstering the army and restoring a greater Russia or a new union of the former Soviet states. The communist groups tend also to endorse halting or reversing economic reform. Descriptions of individual parties follow the list below.

Only 50 percent of the 450 seats in the State Duma will be decided through proportional balloting. Therefore, the outcomes of the party list races will not necessarily correlate with the outcome of the overall elections. The 1993 elections provide an illustration of this point: Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia received 23 percent of the proportional vote, a higher proportion than any other single group. In comparison, Yegor Gaidar's Russia's Choice received only 15 percent of the proportional vote. On the basis of its strong performance in single-mandate races, though, Russia's Choice emerged as the single largest parliamentary faction. Single-mandate races are by nature localized, so information about them does not figure prominently in this report. However, the outcomes of these races must be considered in the final accounting of party performance in the upcoming elections.

LIBERALS

Yabloko
Democratic Choice of Russia - United Democrats (DCR)
Forward, Russia
Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko Bloc
Common Cause
Party of Economic Freedom

CENTRISTS

Our Home is Russia
Women of Russia

Ivan Rybkin's Bloc
Party of Workers' Self-Government
Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES)
Stanislav Govorukhin's Bloc
Trade Unions and Industrialists of Russia - Union of Labor
Social Democrats

COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS

Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)
Agrarian Party of Russia
Congress of Russian Communities
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)
Derzhava
Power to the People
Communists - Working Russia - For the Soviet Union

OTHER GROUPS

Christian Democratic Union - Christians of Russia
Bloc "89"
Federal Democratic Movement
Bloc of Independents
Stable Russia
Duma 96
Beer Lovers' Party
Transformation of the Fatherland
Interethnic Union
My Fatherland
Generation of Turn of the Century
Union of Communal Housing Industry Workers of Russia
Tikhonov-Tupolev-Tikhonov Bloc
For the Motherland
Russian All-Peoples' Movement
National Republican Party of Russia
Ecological Party "KEDR"
People's Union
Association of Lawyers of Russia
All-Russian Muslim Civic Movement "NUR"
Peace, Goodness and Happiness...
Bloc Including Leaders of the Party for the Defense of Pensioners and Veterans

LIBERALS

Yabloko *Yabloko*

Throughout the summer of 1993, reform economist and founder of a leading academic think tank, *EPItsentr*, Grigorii Yavlinsky enjoyed a steady climb in national popularity ratings as a possible future president. In television and press interviews, he contended that his economic reform package could achieve the same results as First Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar's formula, but without the pain of "shock therapy."

After the October events of 1993, when President Yeltsin ordered the bombing of the Russian parliament building, Yavlinsky founded his own bloc to contest the December elections. He invited Vladimir Lukin (former Russian ambassador to the U.S.) and Yurii Boldyrev (a deputy in the Federation Council who has since quit the bloc) to join him in creating "Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin" or "Yabloko" for short. (The name is derived from the first initials of their three names *Ya*, *B*, and *L*. Yabloko means "apple" in Russian.) Three small parties also joined the bloc: the Republican Party of Russia, the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Union.

Although his bloc enjoyed popularity before the 1993 elections, Yavlinsky ran a low-profile campaign, and won only 8 percent of the party list vote -- substantially less than predicted by most polls.

Yavlinsky made the most of his small faction of 27 seats in the State Duma, however. During two years in the State Duma, Yabloko deputies coalesced into a relatively cohesive faction, with strict discipline. In this same period, Yavlinsky also consolidated his control over the organization and transformed a loosely-bound bloc into a political party (though officially Yabloko is still termed a "civic association").

Program

Yabloko proclaims itself as the party of Russia's emerging middle class and the "democratic alternative." Yabloko also poses as the democratic opposition to President Yeltsin and the government. Yabloko opposes the government for its "failed" course of economic reform and its lack of respect for legality, which "discredit the ideas of democracy and the free market." Yabloko also condemns Yeltsin's use of military force both at the White House (the Russian parliament building) in 1993 and in Chechnya. Yabloko has voted against the government on all votes of "no confidence."

As the party seeking to defend and expand the middle class, Yabloko pledges to improve the quality of life for those "who work eight hours a day," including doctors, teachers and other professionals. Yabloko proposes additional spending on social security, education, culture and fighting crime. Yabloko calls for "Dignity, order, fairness!" and states that it wants to be the symbol of "calmness, confidence, and sufficiency." To these ends, Yabloko promises a government of law-abiding specialists and professionals who have

concrete solutions to Russia's problems. Yabloko also advocates granting greater powers to the legislature by amending the constitution.

On economic issues, Yabloko promises "reform without crises." Yavlinsky remains critical of the government's economic stabilization plans as being too hard on the average Russian and not stimulating domestic production. To pay for its proposed greater social spending, Yabloko proposes an overhaul of the tax system, including higher taxes for the energy sector.

On foreign policy, Yabloko wants to take into account Russia's interests and its unique historical development on the Eurasian continent. Yabloko has condemned NATO airstrikes in Bosnia and NATO expansion. As noted above, Yabloko also adamantly opposed Russia's intervention in Chechnya, and Yavlinsky initially went so far as to call for President Yeltsin's impeachment.

Campaign

Entering the fall 1995 campaign season, Yabloko was the only liberal organization that consistently received more than 5 percent support in all public opinion polls. Yabloko seeks to place first among all reformist blocs. This result will provide Yavlinsky the mandate to claim that he is the liberals' best hope for the presidency in 1996.

Yabloko's electorate comprises liberal urban professionals, intelligentsia, skilled workers, doctors, teachers, civil servants and youth. Yabloko strategists believe that they are not limited to competing with other liberal parties for voters, but can also draw support from the traditional supporters of the Communist Party and other groups.

Because of the party's nascent regional structure and relatively few strong single-mandate candidates, Yabloko is concentrating on capitalizing on Yavlinsky's image in the mass media to gain votes for the party list.

Yabloko's electoral campaign experienced a difficult start. On October 29, the CEC rejected Yabloko's application as an electoral bloc, despite its having turned in more than twice the number of signatures necessary for registration. At issue was the status of six of Yabloko's candidates who had been withdrawn from the party's candidate list without proper documentation. After condemnation of the decision by almost every political party leader, a demand for further explanation by the president, and a hearing in the Supreme Court, the CEC finally registered Yabloko on November 6. While the affair delayed the beginning of Yabloko's campaign, it also afforded the party free publicity and rallied prospective voters to its defense against a seemingly unfair bureaucracy.

In early November, Democratic Russia, another group that had its initial registration rejection overturned by the Supreme Court, withdrew from participation in the elections and encouraged its supporters to vote for Yabloko. Democratic Russia is led by Galina Starovoitova, Lev Ponomaryov and Gleb Yakunin.

This endorsement diminishes the sense that the liberals are obstinately splitting the vote and reaffirms Yabloko's premier standing among the liberal forces. One might have expected Democratic Russia to throw its support behind Democratic Choice of Russia, its bloc partner in 1993.

Yavlinsky has stated that he expects Yabloko to receive voter support comparable to its 1993 showing (which was 8 percent on the party list vote). Even if Yabloko repeats its past performance, it may improve its position in the State Duma if, as expected, fewer blocs meet the threshold to gain representation. If Yabloko receives more than 10 percent of the vote, the elections will be considered a boost to Yavlinsky's presidential aspirations. When it registered with the CEC in September, Yabloko listed 119 single-mandate candidates. This number is expected to drop, in part due to negotiations with other liberal parties about coordinating single-mandate candidates.

Leaders

Grigorii Yavlinsky: chairman of Yabloko; leader of the parliamentary faction Yabloko; economist; head of *EPItsentr* (The Economic and Political Research Center); former Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Government (1990); currently considered the strongest democratic candidate for the presidential election to be held June 1996.

Vladimir Lukin: State Duma Deputy; chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs; former Russian Ambassador to the U.S.; considered a possible successor to current Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev.

Tatiana Yarygina: State Duma Deputy; deputy chairman of Duma Committee on Labor and Social Support; one of the leading scholars of *EPItsentr*; number six on Yabloko's party list in 1993.

Other federal list candidates include: **Vyacheslav Igrunov** (Deputy Chair of State Duma Committee on the CIS), **Aleksei Melnikov** (State Duma Deputy and *EPItsentr* researcher), **Oksana Dmitriieva** (State Duma Deputy and *EPItsentr* researcher), **Aleksei Arbatov** (State Duma Deputy), **Boris Misnik** (Chairman of the Miners and Metal Industry Trade-Union), **Viktor Sheinis** (State Duma Deputy and one of the major authors of the election law), **Mikhail Yuriev** (businessman), **Ivan Grachov** (State Duma Deputy and *EPItsentr* researcher); **Sergei Mitrokhin** (State Duma Deputy).

Democratic Choice of Russia -- United Democrats (DCR) *Demokraticeskii Vybor Rossii -- Ob'yedinyonniye Demokrati*

The bloc Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR) -- United Democrats combines four different political organizations: Democratic Choice of Russia led by Yegor Gaidar, the Russian Party of Social Democracy led by Aleksandr Yakovlev, the Peasant Party of Russia led by Yurii Chernechenko, and the Association of National Communities of Russia led by Aleksandr Rudenko-Desnyak. DCR is the dominant organization among the four. Its predecessor organization, Russia's Choice (*Vybor Rossii*), garnered 15.5 percent of the party

list vote in 1993 (the second highest of all blocs) and also earned the largest representation in the State Duma (by virtue of its performance in single-mandate contests).

DCR traces its roots to the Democratic Russia movement (formed in 1990) and the Russia's Choice Movement (formed in the summer of 1993). A number of factors seem to have eroded DCR's base of support, including Russia's Choice's disappointing showing relative to the Communists and Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) in the 1993 party list ballots and the formation of the bloc Our Home Is Russia.

While Russia's Choice started with the largest faction in the Duma, anti-reformist coalitions (comprising the Communists, Agrarians, and LDPR) were usually able to block key reform initiatives. In addition, because a high proportion of its Duma deputies were elected from single-mandate constituencies, the Russia's Choice faction had difficulty enforcing party discipline.

The armed intervention in Chechnya presented another challenge to Democratic Choice of Russia. Before the hostilities, Russia's Choice served as President Yeltsin's most loyal faction in parliament and planned to continue a close affiliation with the president during parliamentary elections in 1995 and the presidential election in 1996. This strategy disintegrated when the party voiced its opposition to the Chechen operation. Also, after DCR took its stand against President Yeltsin, many in the Russia's Choice leadership left the bloc.

Accepting its new role in the opposition, DCR attempted to form an anti-war, liberal alliance with Grigoriy Yavlinsky's Yabloko movement. After some exploration of this idea, Yavlinsky refused to tie his future to Gaidar, believing that Yabloko would fare better alone than with DCR. DCR has been unsuccessful in its efforts to enter into a coalition with Yabloko and thus unite the democratic forces, DCR and Yabloko have agreed to coordinate the placement of most of their candidates in single-mandate races.

Program

Democratic Choice of Russia remains the most liberal of the major parties in Russia today, both in terms of its respect for the rights of the individual and for its advocacy of accelerated economic reforms. DCR is also considered the party most conciliatory toward the West. Unlike most other blocs, it has not adopted nationalist rhetoric.

On economic policy, DCR calls for the acceleration and deepening of reforms, warning that a return to a state-controlled communist system is still a realistic possibility. DCR advocates decreased government spending and more efficient tax collection to raise government revenues. Overall, DCR has been supportive of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's economic course, but argues that the government has not done enough to bring the benefits of reforms to the middle class.

The party's largest hurdle in the elections may be overcoming the perceptions that DCR is the party of "new Russians" (the *nouveau riche*) and that Gaidar's 1992 economic reforms contributed to Russia's current economic problems.

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Campaign

DCR draws its core support from urban professionals who work in the private sector, entrepreneurs, and the intelligentsia from major urban areas in Northern and European Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg). Much of DCR's support also comes from young voters between the ages of 18 and 30. Gaidar recently made a special appeal to Russia's youth to vote.

DCR's main campaign slogan asks voters to "Make the Reasonable Choice." DCR's campaign comprises two elements -- one positive and one negative. The positive theme emphasizes DCR's legislative accomplishments and program. The negative component warns voters about the consequences of a return to communist power. DCR will continue to speak out against the war in Chechnya, and couple its criticism with calls for military reform and the creation of a smaller, professional army.

Learning from its electoral experience in 1993 and understanding the potential of falling below the 5 percent mark, DCR has run a more active campaign this year. First, Gaidar has traveled extensively to regional cities to support DCR candidates. The bloc has also been among the first to broadcast its television advertisements. In addition, in mid-November, the bloc held a congress to rally its candidates and to have them endorse the bloc's program. Campaign financing has posed a major problem for DCR since the departure of the party's chief financial sponsor Oleg Boiko, who quit over DCR's opposition to the Chechnya intervention.

Current polls suggest that DCR will be close to attaining the 5 percent threshold needed to obtain seats in the State Duma by virtue of proportional representation. DCR registered 137 single-mandate candidates with the CEC in September. This number is expected to drop somewhat by election day, but not significantly.

Leaders

Yegor Gaidar: former Acting Prime Minister (June-December 1992); leader of the Russia's Choice parliamentary faction; head of Institute for the Economy in Transition (Gaidar Institute); chairman of the electoral bloc Democratic Choice of Russia -- United Democrats; associated with the "shock therapy" approach to Russia's economic reforms; running only on the party list.

Sergei Kovelyov: State Duma Deputy; former Presidential Ombudsman for Human Rights under Yeltsin until he was removed after criticizing the Chechen War; former dissident; currently Russia's most prominent human rights activist.

Lidiya Fedoseyeva-Shukshina: Well-known film actress; newcomer to politics.

The federal list also includes: **General Eduard Vorobyov** (sacked by Defense Minister Grachov after refusing to proceed with the Chechen operation), **Yurii Chernechenko** (leader of the Peasant Party of Russia), **Boris Zolotukhin** (State Duma Deputy), **Valentin**

Tatarchuk (State Duma Deputy and Chairman of the DCR Executive Committee), **Aleksandr Yakovlev** (creative force behind Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*, former member of Politburo of CPSU, current leader of the Russian Party of Social Democracy), **Grigorii Tomchin** (State Duma Deputy), **Aleksandr Pochinok**, **Aleksandr Osovtsov** (State Duma Deputy), and **Aleksandr Rudenko-Desnyak** (leader of the Association of National Communities of Russia).

Forward Russia Movement

Dvizheniye "Vperyod, Rossiya!"

Shortly after the December 1993 elections, a group comprising young deputies who had won in single-mandate seats was formed and led by Irina Khakamada. After leaving his post as finance minister, Boris Fyodorov joined and became the co-leader of the organization. This grouping, which was named "Union of December 12," for the date of the 1993 elections, comprised about 25 young deputies with ties to Russia's emerging business, finance and banking sectors. Fyodorov soon became the dominant leader in the group and changed its name to the "Liberal Democratic Union of December 12th."

After leadership disputes and the outbreak of the Chechen War polarized the Union's leaders (Fyodorov supported the use of force; Khakamada opposed it), the parliamentary grouping eventually dissolved. Fyodorov reorganized the remainder of the grouping and combined it with his own organization, the Liberal Democratic Fund, and began a new political movement, Forward Russia -- a name and concept modeled after the populist movement in Italy, "Forza Italy."

Program

Forward Russia's program combines a unique mix of reformist economics, nationalism, and anti-incumbent populism. Fyodorov compares his party's orientation to that of the Republican Party in the U.S. and the Conservative Party in Great Britain.

Boris Fyodorov advocates a disciplined financial policy, including the adoption of what he calls a "financial constitution." His group has urged greater liberalization of the economy, rapid privatization, the free trade of land, and forced bankruptcy of all inefficient former state enterprises. Fyodorov opposes protectionism for Russian markets. Forward Russia also supports reducing the government bureaucracy as a way to lessen costs and corruption. Generally, Fyodorov has criticized the government's reform program for worsening the standard of living of the average Russian. To improve the country's standard of living, Forward Russia proposes tax and pension reform, and the compensation of defrauded investors.

Fyodorov has already spoken in favor of strong federalism for Russia and against any special deals for Russia's autonomous republics. Forward Russia supported the Chechen war. Fyodorov has called for Russian membership in NATO. He also believes that the constitution should contain a provision declaring the reintegration of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan as a

goal of Russian policy. Moreover, he has recommended that all ethnic Russians be moved out of Central Asia and the Caucasus and into Russia.

Campaign

Several analysts point out that Russia's Choice did not do as well as expected in the 1993 elections because it was unable to attract that portion of the Russian electorate that is more receptive to strong leadership, populism and nationalism. Forward Russia has these characteristics and hopes to capture that segment of the electorate. Thus, Forward Russia may be the one liberal bloc that seriously attempts to appeal to the working classes and to pensioners. Polls indicate that Forward Russia has already gained somewhat of a following among pensioners. The bloc appears more oriented toward male voters than most other blocs.

Forward Russia's campaign effort features the image of its leader, Boris Fyodorov, who has already received considerable mass media exposure. Fyodorov has shed his image as a sophisticated liberal finance specialist in favor of an irreverent, anti-government spokesman. (One of Forward Russia's slogans is "Normal guys sharing their brains with the government.") Fyodorov's speeches and campaign materials attacking government have grown simpler and more direct--often including cartoons and illustrations.

Forward Russia also uses humor in its campaign. The group sponsored a contest in which the author of the best political joke receives \$3,000 (U.S.D.). The overall tone of the campaign is optimistic and almost jovial despite Fyodorov's harsh criticism of the current government and Russia's current situation. The most creative piece of campaign literature produced so far is a booklet by Forward Russia called "The Achievements of the Chernomyrdin Government." The cover features a color photo of the prime minister riding a water jet-ski in Sochi, while the pages inside are completely blank. Fyodorov has also interviewed a cardboard cut-out of Chernomyrdin during his national television slot. In addition, the campaign has published a "Contract With Russia" modeled after the U.S. Republican Party's "Contract With America."

Fyodorov has called for democratic unity and has coordinated most of his single-mandate candidates with Yabloko and Democratic Choice of Russia. In early November, Fyodorov asked all liberals and centrists to convene to discuss forming a coalition government with a common candidate for prime minister after the December elections.

As of the first week of November, Fyodorov was predicting that Forward Russia would "receive more than 5 percent" of the party list vote. However, polls indicate that the party is currently a long shot to reach the 5 percent threshold. Still, Fyodorov's charisma and public speaking ability and Forward Russia's unique niche in the political spectrum may bolster the bloc's rating during the latter part of the campaign. Forward Russia registered 137 single-mandate candidates with the CEC in September, but this number is expected to drop significantly by election day.

Leaders

Boris Fyodorov: State Duma Deputy; head of the Subcommittee on Money, Credit and the Central Bank of the Duma Committee on Budget, Taxes, Banks and Finance; ran with "Russia's Choice" in 1993, but left to form the parliamentary faction "Union of December 12" with Irina Khakamada; former Finance Minister under Yegor Gaidar (1992-1994).

Bela Denisenko: State Duma Deputy; chair of State Duma Committee on Health; elected to the State Duma on the Russia's Choice party list; author of legislation requiring foreign visitors to prove they do not have the AIDS virus.

Aleksandr Vladislavlev: first deputy chairman of Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; former co-chairman of the Civic Union, a centrist bloc of industrialists and entrepreneurs led by Arkadii Volsky that failed to cross the five percent barrier in 1993.

Federal list also includes: **Alexander Traspov** (State Duma Deputy), **Vadim Boiko** (State Duma Deputy), **Igor Ustinov** (State Duma Deputy), **Roman Gavrillov** (entrepreneur), **Aleksandr Zhukov** (State Duma Deputy), **Andrei Selivanov** (State Duma Deputy), **Vasilii Kovalev** (State Duma Deputy), **Valentin Zavadnikov** (Head of Election Campaign), **Zaur Ganiiev** (one of the leaders of oil company "LUKoil").

"Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko" Bloc (Republican Party of the Russian Federation) *Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko*

Three well-known leaders from the Republican Party of the Russian Federation formed the "Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko" bloc just before the 1995 election campaign. The Republican Party was one of the first non-communist political parties to emerge in 1990. The party had a small faction in former Russian parliament (1990 -1993). In the December 1993 elections, most of the Republican Party joined Yabloko. After several clashes between Yabloko head Yavlinsky and Lysenko (both personal and ideological), the leadership of the former Republican Party joined Lysenko in leaving Yabloko to found a new bloc, called Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko.

Realizing the need for a bloc partner and another well-known leader to attain the 5 percent threshold, Lysenko negotiated with several potential allies. In the end, Lysenko reached agreement with Ella Pamfilova, who had recently left the "Russia's Choice" faction in the State Duma. Pamfilova's stature as former Minister of Social Security, her high name recognition, and her affiliation with the bloc's social defense platform were the major factors in naming the bloc after its leaders: "Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko." In an attempt to present a *troika* that could address issues of law and order, Aleksandr Gurov, former head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) department on organized crime, was added to the bloc's leadership.

Program

The bloc advocates continued market reforms but with greater measures to assist the growth of small business and to protect those hurt the most by the economic transition. The bloc advocates radical tax reform, eliminating most forms of taxes while asserting that taxes should only be levied on real property and profits. The bloc argues that all pensions and the minimum wage should not fall below the living minimum. Like several other blocs, Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko calls for compensation to those citizens who lost their savings during the high inflation that accompanied the first stage of economic reform in 1992. The bloc also advocates reform of the military and the creation of a smaller, professional army. Devolution of powers to local governments is another plank of the bloc's platform.

One of the bloc's main slogans defines Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko's three major issues of concern: "social security, personal security, and a new federalism/local self-government." Each of these areas is addressed by the specializations of its three leaders: Pamfilova for social security; Gurov for personal security; and Lysenko for new federalism. The bloc's motto is "To live suitably!"

Campaign

Bloc leaders are hoping to win support from those who have received inadequate social support during the reform process, including pensioners, the disabled, members of families with many children, and the unemployed. Aside from the personality and reputation of its leaders, the bloc is barely distinguishable from Yabloko or Democratic Choice of Russia. The bloc claims to have considerable financial support from a diverse group of entrepreneurs.

The name of the bloc may prove to be problematic. Vladimir Lysenko is often confused with Nikolai Lysenko, the ultra-nationalist leader of the National Republican Party of Russia. Even with its greatest asset -- Ella Pamfilova's popularity -- the bloc is considered unlikely to achieve the 5 percent threshold.

Leaders

Ella Pamfilova: State Duma Deputy; member of the State Duma Committee on Labor and Social Security; former Social Security Minister (November 1991 - March 1994); ran on Russia's Choice's party list in 1993; also elected to the State Duma from a single-mandate constituency; former member of the Russia's Choice faction.

Aleksandr Gurov: former Head of the Department on Organized Crime in the Interior Ministry.

Vladimir Lysenko: State Duma Deputy; member of the Committee on Federation Affairs and Regional Policy; chairman of the the Republican Party of Russian Federation; former People's Deputy of the Russian Federation; former deputy chairman of the State Committee of Russian Government on Nationality Policy; former member of Yabloko faction.

Federal list also includes: **Alexander Mekhanik, Ida Kuklina, Oleg Gladkikh, Vladimir Kulbido, Vyacheslav Gulimov, Pyotr Gerachenko, Olga Karmayeva and Nikolai Krylov.**

Non-Partisan Political Movement of Voters "Common Cause"
Obshcheye Dyelo

The association "Common Cause" was formed by Irina Khakamada, who left the parliamentary grouping "Union of December 12" earlier this year. Common Cause champions Russia's "unheard majority." It promises to defend the interests of women, children, youth, pensioners, and the disabled. The bloc comprises a number of organizations, including: the Foundation for Children's Organizations, the Bloc of Non-Partisan Voters, the Association of Small Peoples of the North and Far East, and the Foundation for Disabled Veterans of the Afghan War.

Program

This bloc supports the general direction of reforms with an emphasis on the rights of the individual. For example, the bloc proposes that homemaking and childcare be recognized as jobs, and that the government compensate homemakers for this work. The bloc also promises to reduce discrimination against women.

Campaign

The bloc hopes to mobilize youth and women as its key supporters. Khakamada's professional image combined with her program may allow her to draw some support from Women of Russia's female electorate. The bloc will also attempt to mobilize support through its component organizations.

In late October, Common Cause spoke out against the electoral law and the system of proportional representation, which Khakamada claimed would distort the will of the people because of the proliferation of electoral blocs. Common Cause favors a strict majoritarian system. Khakamada has since led a group of political leaders who want to amend the electoral law to lower the 5 percent threshold and include a second round of elections for single-mandate seats.

Khakamada has effectively capitalized on her image as an articulate, young, modern, sophisticated leader to garner significant press coverage. She has been interviewed on numerous talk shows on radio and television, and has received more coverage on mass media than any other female bloc leader. However, this new grouping is considered to have little chance of reaching the 5 percent threshold.

Leaders

Irina Khakamada: State Duma Deputy; young entrepreneur; formerly one of the main organizers of the Party of Economic Freedom; later formed the "December 12th" parliamentary faction with Boris Fyodorov (see Forward Russia).

Rolan Bykov. Well-known film actor; newcomer to politics.

Vladimir Dzhanibekov: Astronaut; newcomer to politics.

Party of Economic Freedom

Partiya Ekonomicheskoy Svobodi

The party was formed in May 1992 by group of new successful entrepreneurs, including Konstantin Borovoi and Irina Khakamada (see "Common Cause," above). The party attempted to qualify for the 1993 parliamentary elections but was unable to collect the necessary 100,000 signatures. The leader of the party, Konstantin Borovoi, ran in a single-mandate race in Moscow in 1993 and finished second. Borovoi is a well-known entrepreneur and founder of many new private companies and business associations, including the Russian Goods and Raw Materials Exchange. The Party of Economic Freedom has traditionally supported President Yeltsin and the government.

Program

The Party of Economic Freedom defines itself as liberal and endorses all aspects of a liberal economic policy and the rights of the individual. The party supports the present government, but advocates further economic reforms.

Campaign

Party leaders hope that businessmen, entrepreneurs, young people and all who have gained from reforms will vote for their group. Understanding that the party has little chance of approaching the 5 percent mark, Borovoi's team will probably focus much of its material resources on Borovoi's single-mandate race in Moscow.

Leaders

Konstantin Borovoi: Well-known entrepreneur; chairman of the Party of Economic Freedom.

Leonid Nekrasov: State Duma Deputy; elected through a single-mandate constituency in Ekaterinburg.

Vladimir Kovalenok: General; head of the Air Force Academy.

CENTRISTS

Our Home Is Russia

Nash Dom -- Rossiya

After the December 1993 parliamentary elections, President Yeltsin's advisors realized the need to widen the base of support of the government and the president. This conviction grew clearer after the Chechen intervention left the president and government without the support of any major faction in the State Duma except Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. Soon thereafter, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai and Presidential Advisor Georgii Satarov began calling for the formation of two new "centrist parties" -- one left-of-center, one right-of-center -- that would unite smaller political groups, and form the basis of a more stable two-party system in Russia. Soon, President Yeltsin embraced the idea and asked Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to form the right-of-center bloc and State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin to lead the left-of-center bloc.

In April 1995, Our Home Is Russia held its founding congress, with many of Chernomyrdin's ministers joining the organization. The bloc also attracted the membership or support of many regional heads of administration. President Yeltsin publicly congratulated Chernomyrdin on the formation of the new bloc, and very quickly, Our Home Is Russia became known as "the party of power."

As expectations about the potential success of the bloc grew, almost all other political parties and blocs targeted Our Home Is Russia for criticism. Portraying the bloc as a tool of corporate interests and playing on the name of the giant gas enterprise, Gazprom, that Chernomyrdin headed, other parties nicknamed Our Home Is Russia, "*Nash Dom -- Gazprom*" (Our Home Is Gazprom). Instead of assimilating other blocs, Our Home Is Russia served as a magnet for their attacks on the *status quo* and the "new *nomenklatura*."

During the summer, Our Home Is Russia suffered lost momentum after an electoral setback and its first major defection. In the Sverdlovsk *oblast*, an Our Home Is Russia candidate, the incumbent governor, lost his bid for re-election to the *oblast's* former governor, Eduard Rossel. Although the race in Sverdlovsk focused on region-specific issues and personalities, the result was widely interpreted as a setback to the bloc. After this defeat, many regional heads of administration began to loosen their ties to the bloc. In late August, Sergei Shakhrai's Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) quit Our Home Is Russia.

In addition, President Yeltsin has become less forthright in his support of Our Home Is Russia. In early fall, rumors circulated about President Yeltsin's anger at Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's overly active role and his pretensions to the presidency. There were even hints that Chernomyrdin might be fired. While relations between the president and his prime minister appear to have normalized, President Yeltsin has recently grown increasingly noncommittal in his support of electoral blocs, extending mild support to all serious blocs except for the communists and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

Program

Our Home Is Russia supports the continuation of economic reforms, while emphasizing the need for greater order, stability and a strengthened Russian state.

Our Home Is Russia cites its achievements in stabilizing the economy -- most notably: stopping the decline in production, stabilizing the ruble, and holding inflation below 5 percent a month -- and it promises that a continuation of its policies will bring prosperity. The bloc calls for continuing the government's privatization program. Our Home Is Russia speaks out against extremism and societal disorder, and labels Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and the communists as its main opponents.

Like most other blocs, Our Home Is Russia appeals to Russians' sense of patriotism. During the drafting of the bloc's programmatic documents, Chernomyrdin emphasized as his government's first priority the restoration of a strong Russian state, both as a domestic apparatus and as an international player. Consistent with this theme, Our Home Is Russia's documents urge strengthening the Russian military. The bloc also features General Lev Rokhlin, a leader of the Chechen War, third on its party list as a means of attracting votes from the military.

Campaign

Our Home Is Russia is targeting voters who have benefitted from the *status quo* or at least fear further crises or an extremist takeover. This group includes government bureaucrats, civil servants, entrepreneurs and urban professionals. Polls also indicate that many older conservative voters favor Our Home Is Russia.

Our Home Is Russia enjoys a full range of financial, organizational, and media resources. Our Home Is Russia has powerful financial sponsors and links to the state television stations, and it controls several national and regional newspapers. In addition, the bloc maintains influence over a good deal of the the executive branch of authority, both at the federal and regional levels.

Still, Our Home Is Russia faces a series of problems in its campaign. Centrists have fared poorly at the ballot box in Russia's polarized political climate, as evidenced by the weak showing of the centrist Civic Union in 1993. Second, the Russia's Choice experience of 1993 shows that the "party of power" designation and affiliation with the *status quo* can hold negative electoral consequences. Third, observers argue that as a bureaucrat who has never run for office, the soft-spoken, business-like prime minister may lack the charisma to prevail over more flamboyant rivals.

Our Home Is Russia's strategists have assembled a party list representing various segments of society, including actors, writers, teachers and former athletes. The bloc also reaches out to young voters by organizing concerts with both American singers and Russian pop stars.

Our Home Is Russia registered 182 single-mandate candidates with the CEC. As the bloc boasts several candidates with money and high local name recognition, most predict that the bloc

will win more single-mandate seats than any other bloc. Its single-mandate deputies are also likely to outnumber its party list deputies.

During the campaign, Our Home Is Russia emphasizes its patriotism through its symbol (a stylized depiction of a home with a triangle from the Russian flag forming the roof) and its campaign slogan, "If Your Home Is Dear To You." It plays upon the home image to project the idea of stability. Another slogan is "On the Solid Foundation of Responsibility and Experience." Our Home Is Russia has also planned an advertising campaign by a U.S.-based firm that has produced advertising campaigns for Snickers and Proctor & Gamble in Russia.

While Our Home Is Russia had earlier predicted winning around 30 percent, campaign leader Sergei Belyaev recently reduced the estimate to 8 to 12 percent. Since then, the number of competing blocs has risen substantially, making such figures less realistic. Most pollsters and analysts predict that Our Home Is Russia will win more than 5 percent of the vote. With a strong finish to its campaign and an expected strong showing in single-mandate races, the bloc may emerge as one of the largest factions in the State Duma. Many analysts note that if Our Home Is Russia does not make a respectable showing, Chernomyrdin may not last long as prime minister.

Leaders

Viktor Chernomyrdin: Prime minister; chairman of Our Home is Russia; former chairman of the state gas enterprise *Gazprom*.

Nikita Mikhailkov: Famous director and actor of "Burnt by the Sun" (winner of Academy Award for best foreign film in 1994). His inclusion in the Our Home Is Russia party list top threesome has been considered somewhat of a surprise, especially given the fact that he espouses quite nationalist ideals and is a close associate of Aleksandr Rutskoi (see Derzhava, below).

Lev Rokhlin: General and leader in the Chechen war who is seen as having turned the tide in the storming of Grozny.

Other federal list candidates include: **Sergei Belyaev** (Deputy Chairman of Our Home Is Russia, head of the State Property Committee, director of the bloc's election campaign), **Dania Karimova** (professor of Kazan Academy of Medicine), **Zhores Alferov** (Vice President of Russian Academy of Science), **Galina Volchek** (Chief-Director of theater "Sovremennik"), **Nikolai Travkin** (Minister Without Portfolio in the Russian Government, State Duma Deputy, founder and former chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia, head of Administration of Shakhovskoi region), **Vladimir Kinilev** (Head of State Committee on Higher Education), **Vladimir Bashmachnikov** (Head of Association of Farmers and Agrarian Cooperatives), **Alexander Martynov** (Head of Union of Cossacks) and **Vladimir Ryshkov** (State Duma Deputy).

Women of Russia *Zhenshchini Rossii*

This political movement formed primarily on the basis of the Union of Soviet Women, a traditional Soviet-era organization. After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Union of Women not only preserved its old network and property but also successfully found a new niche: to protect women's rights under new market conditions. The Russian Union of Women coalesced with the Association of Women Entrepreneurs and the Union of Women of the Navy to form the Women of Russia bloc just before the December 1993 parliamentary elections.

Unexpectedly for most observers, the bloc gained 8.13 percent of votes in 1993 and formed a faction of 23 deputies in the State Duma. Faction members claim to be nonpartisan, and indeed, the faction follows a relatively pragmatic centrist course -- at times voting with the communists while other times supporting the president and the government. Twenty-one of the faction's 22 members were elected through the party list. The faction has been able to maintain excellent party discipline, and this combined with its centrism and pragmatism has allowed the Women of Russia faction to play a pivotal role on a number of legislative issues and to introduce many pieces of legislation that were adopted by the Duma.

The movement Women of Russia is Moscow-based, and is just beginning to expand its regional network. As a result, Women of Russia registered only 23 single-mandate candidates with the Central Election Commission.

Program

The movement lists as its goals the adoption of laws: 1) to provide equal opportunity for women; 2) to strengthen families; 3) to protect human rights; and 4) to institute an effective social policy. Women of Russia has already demonstrated a record of promoting social welfare issues in the State Duma. On economic reforms, the bloc supports a "socially-oriented market economy."

The movement strongly opposes any involvement of Russian military forces in violent conflicts, including the use of force in Chechnya. While the movement supports the maintenance of a strong army and strong state, it advocates solving conflicts through negotiations. Peace in Russia represents one of the movement's major goals. Women of Russia also intends to advocate constitutional amendments in 1996 to strengthen the power of the State Duma by increasing its authority to name and recall government ministers.

Campaign

Women of Russia's core support comprises women of all social strata. The bloc will rely on women's organizations to deliver its message to voters. As an organization with national popularity but an underdeveloped regional network, Women of Russia will devote most of its resources to its national list. Unlike most other blocs, Women of Russia is virtually assured of attaining the 5 percent threshold because of its stable base of support.

Leaders

Alevtina Fedulova: Deputy Speaker of the State Duma; leader of the political movement "Women of Russia;" since 1992, leader of the Russian Union of Women (descendant of old Soviet organization).

Yekaterina Lakhova: leader of the parliamentary faction "Women of Russia;" adviser to President Yeltsin on family issues.

Galina Klimantova: State Duma Deputy; chair of State Duma Committee on Women, Family and Youth Issues.

The federal list also includes: **Marina Dobrovolskaya, Fanuza Arslanova, Irina Vybornova, Antonina Zhilina, Lyudmila Zavadskaya, Natalya Malakhatkina, Svetlana Orlova, Galina Parshintseva and Yelena Chepurnykh.**

Ivan Rybkin's Bloc *Blok Ivana Rybkina*

Ivan Rybkin's bloc underwent a troubled formation. In April 1995, President Yeltsin requested that Rybkin form a large left-of-center bloc to serve as a "loyal opposition" and complement the bloc to be headed by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. Rybkin's bloc, which was originally to be called Accord (*Soglasie*), was slow to develop. Major opposition organizations refused to join because of Rybkin's close relationship to President Yeltsin, and his reputation as a pragmatist, which seems to suggest he would not be a forceful counterweight to the government.

The Agrarian Party of Russia, which Rybkin represented in the State Duma, refused to join and later expelled him from their leadership. Even after Rybkin's bloc had provided its list of candidates to the CEC, several well-known leaders withdrew their names and formed "My Fatherland" (*Moyo Otechestvo*), accusing Rybkin of "weak leadership" and having been more loyal to the president and the government than Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

In the end, the bloc comprised a coalition of the following groups: the "Regions of Russia" Movement, the Union of Russian Cities, the "Accord" Movement, the Russian Union of Youth, the "Rossiya" Movement (based on the parliamentary faction "Rossiya"), the Independent Trade Union of Miners and other small groups.

Program

The bloc claims to serve as a social democratic, loyal opposition to the present government. It criticizes the government for the radical nature of its economic reforms, while supporting its overall direction. It advocates improving social security and expanding social programs while slowing the pace of economic reforms. Rybkin also advocates according the government a much larger regulatory role in the Russian economy. Beyond these generalities, the bloc has not clearly articulated the specifics of its program to the voting public. The head of the

Rybkin Bloc campaign acknowledged this problem in November, saying voters "still know little about us."

Campaign

The bloc's leaders believe they can attract the moderate opposition that is unwilling to support Our Home Is Russia, but also does not want to vote for communists or nationalists. The bloc also hopes to capture the votes of those who espouse social democratic values.

Since Ivan Rybkin's bloc does not have a major network of regional organizations, it will rely upon Rybkin's presence in the mass media. While this strategy is problematic for other groups, Rybkin's position as the chairman of the State Duma and his close relationship with President Yeltsin have heightened his attraction to the press. A survey conducted by the Russian daily *Sevodnya* revealed that Rybkin's bloc received the most coverage of all blocs during the month of September.

When plans for its formation were first announced, Rybkin's bloc was expected to become a major contender in December. However, although Rybkin and President Yeltsin have expressed confidence in the bloc's ability to clear the 5 percent mark, polling data show that Rybkin's bloc may have little chance of receiving that level of support.

Leaders

Ivan Rybkin: Speaker of the State Duma; elected from the Agrarian Party of Russia; RSFSR People's Deputy; one of the leaders of Communist faction in the former Russian parliament; close advisor to President Yeltsin.

Yuri Petrov: Chairman of the "Union of Realists;" head of the bloc's campaign; chairman of the State Investment Corporation; former chief of the presidential staff (August 1991 - January 1993).

Arthur Chilingarov: Deputy Speaker of the State Duma; represents the parliamentary faction "New Regional Politics."

The list also includes: **Vyacheslav Nikonov, Alexandra Ochirova, Alexander Sergeev, Vyacheslav Lashevsky, Valerii Kirpichnikov, Sergei Rodionov, Sergei Trakhirov, Igor Shichanin and Pavel Borodin.**

Party of Workers' Self-Government *Partiya Samoupravleniya Trudyashchikhsya*

The Party of Workers' Self-Government, like many new groups in 1995, centers around one personality, Svyatislav Fyodorov. Well before *perestroika*, Fyodorov attained celebrity in the Soviet Union for developing new surgical operations for eye disorders. During *perestroika* he was an outspoken advocate of market reforms while developing a network of financially successful

eye-surgery clinics. Despite his status as a wealthy businessman, Fyodorov was not associated with Russia's despised new rich -- the so-called "new Russians."

During the early 1990s Fyodorov joined a number of democratic parties, but never stayed with any organization for long. Fyodorov remains one of Russia's most popular and trusted figures, a popularity that stems in part from his achievements outside politics and his independence from party politics. The Russian press recently compared Fyodorov to Ross Perot.

Program

Employee ownership forms the core of the party's program, including the participation of employees in management and decisionmaking and rights to shares and profits of enterprises. The party is attempting, in its own words, to revive the socialist ideas of the "young Marx." Fyodorov also wants to ban the export of raw materials so that they can be sold domestically at deflated prices. The party calls for a new tax system that would recreate economic ties among states of the former Soviet Union, increase investment in the high technology sector, and compensate those citizens who lost their savings as a result of Russia's radical reforms in 1992.

Overall, the bloc's platform combines a number of contradictory elements: some forms of privatization are encouraged as are concepts of collectivism and economic equity. Two of the party's major slogans are: "Altogether now for everybody's good!" and "The economy can be moral and should be moral!"

Fyodorov's party opposed the use of force in Chechnya. It supports political and economic reintegration of the "near abroad," but wants this to occur voluntarily.

Campaign

Polls indicate that Fyodorov's maturity and economic views appeal to an older, educated segment of the population that has suffered from economic reforms and is cynical about traditional politicians. This electorate includes personnel of former state enterprises, teachers, engineers, pensioners, and especially doctors.

The party enjoys two main electoral strengths: its well-known, popular leader and a network of cooperative housing organizations that supports employee ownership. The campaign will center around the party leader's media exposure, and canvassing through his organizations.

Fyodorov's bloc is considered to have some chance of clearing the 5 percent barrier. The Party of Workers Self-Government registered 123 single-mandate candidates.

Leaders

Svyatislav Fyodorov: Eye surgeon and entrepreneur; appeared among the top three on the party list of the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform in 1993.

Aleksei Kazannik: Leader of the Party of People's Conscience; former People's Deputy of the USSR who relinquished his position in the Supreme Soviet to Boris Yeltsin; former General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation.

Alexander Porokhovshchikov: Popular film actor; newcomer to politics.

The list also includes: **Pyotr Yegides, Vladimir Lebedev, Gennadii Fyodorov, Aleksei Suchilin, Boris Slavin, Anatolii Bezuglov, Gennadii Chashchin, Alla Dubrovina and Andrei Galushko.**

Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES)

Partiya Rossiyskogo Yedinstva i Soglasiya

The Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) was formed just before the December 1993 parliamentary elections, as a more moderate and regionally oriented alternative to Russia's Choice. Since the party emphasized greater self-government in the regions, party leader Sergei Shakhrai gathered support from regional heads of administration, especially in the republics. Prominent politicians, including then-Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin and former Moscow Deputy Mayor and Presidential Advisor Sergei Stankevich, also joined PRES. The party received 6.8 percent of the party list vote and formed a parliamentary faction that included 30 Duma Deputies. Twelve Deputies were elected through single-mandate constituencies and 18 from the party list vote.

An attorney, Sergei Shakhrai has served as one of President Yeltsin's closest advisors. He has represented the executive branch in high-profile trials, including those on banning the Communist Party and ruling on the legality of the president's orders to move troops into Chechnya. Currently, Shakhrai is a deputy prime minister responsible for inter-ethnic relations and federal and regional policy.

During the last two years, PRES has attempted to distance itself from its former liberal allies -- Democratic Choice of Russia and Yabloko. Instead, PRES has positioned itself as a more centrist faction in the State Duma.

PRES was a central component of Our Home Is Russia at the time of its formation. In late August, however, Shakhrai and PRES, reportedly being pushed out of the bloc's inner circle, quit Our Home Is Russia to contest the December elections separately.

Program

PRES's distinguishing features are its emphasis on greater local self-government, its pro-governmental orientation, and its nationalist and statist orientations, although these are moderate compared to some.

Shakhrai has advocated as a main issue the adoption of a new federalism, which will systematize the division of power between the center and regional authorities. While this system

would grant different rights and responsibilities to various regions, Shakhrai also advocates abolishing the policy of according special status to republics with ethnic minorities.

Recently, PRES has been gathering signatures for referenda on: 1) privatization and free trade of land; 2) granting greater rights to regional authorities; and 3) creating a special government program to move ethnic Russians from Central Asia to southern Siberia.

During the campaign period, PRES strongly opposed the proportional representation voting system, and has promised to call for the dissolution of the State Duma after elections because it believes that the system unfairly awards power to Moscow-based parties at the expense of regional representation.

Campaign

PRES has drawn its primary support from middle-aged males and skilled workers or engineers from regional cities. PRES may not attain its previous level of support because segments of its electorate may have moved to other groups. Many of the regional administration elites that PRES courted in 1993 have now joined Our Home Is Russia. Other former supporters have aligned with Forward Russia. Despite its regional focus, PRES has a relatively weak network of regional organizations and it will have to depend heavily on the exposure of Shakhrai in the mass media.

Shakhrai attempts to present himself as a scrupulously honest and open government official who deserves the trust of voters: he has declared his income and all of his assets, and has taken leave from his post as deputy prime minister. Shakhrai has denounced populism in the campaign, and PRES has accordingly refrained from adding any celebrities or generals to its federal list.

At the time Shakhrai left Our Home Is Russia, he predicted that PRES would be able to fare as well as it did in 1993. However, because of the problems described above, PRES is unlikely to come close to attaining its past level of support or reaching the 5 percent threshold.

Leaders

Sergei Shakhrai: Acting deputy prime minister, responsible for nationalities policy; State Duma Deputy; leader of the parliamentary faction "PRES" in the State Duma; prominent attorney.

Valerii Bykov: Director of a biology institute.

Vladimir Ivannikov: Director of the inter-regional association "Siberian Agreement."

The party's federal list also includes: **Anatolii Sliva** (chairman of the State Duma Committee on Self-Government), **Irina Mikhailovskaya** (chair of the Womens League of Nizhnii Novgorod), **Stanislav Polovnikov** (businessman), **Sergei Pugachov** (banker), **Aleksandr Kotenkov** (deputy minister on Nationalities of Russian Government), **Aleksandr Baranov**

(professor at the Medical Academy); **Alexander Turbanov** (State Duma Deputy), **Alexander Shishkin** (professor at Irkutsk University) and **Oleg Anfimov** (businessman).

Stanislav Govorukhin's Bloc
Blok Stanislava Govorukhina

Stanislav Govorukhin formed this bloc from one wing of the Democratic Party of Russia. During the summer of 1995, the Democratic Party of Russia decided to divide for the election period so that its leader, Sergei Glazyev, and a few of his associates could join the Congress of Russian Communities. Govorukhin's wing of the party had planned to form an electoral bloc with Svyatislav Fyodorov, but when these negotiations broke down, Govorukhin hastily formed his own bloc. Govorukhin has since declared that he will run in the June 1996 presidential election.

Program

The bloc has a centrist, nationalist political orientation. Govorukhin's bloc emphasizes the need to fight crime and to create an orderly, strong Russian state. The declared goal of the bloc is to "stop the national disgrace of Russia." The bloc's major slogan, "Stop the Great Criminal Revolution!" reflects the bloc's opposition to the current course of reforms, which it claims has brought about the "criminalization of Russian society." The bloc supports a market economy in principle, but to combat criminalization, it proposes doubling the police force. The bloc also supports lowering the tax burden of domestic manufacturers. The bloc is critical of President Yeltsin and the current government.

Campaign

The leaders of the bloc believe the electorate is the "people's intelligentsia," and patriots of Russia. Leaders expect that they will be fighting for votes from Yabloko and Forward Russia, but based on Govorukhin's message of nationalism, greater order and centrist economic policy, the bloc is more likely to compete for votes with the Congress of Russian Communities.

During the campaign, the bloc will attempt to utilize old Democratic Party of Russia channels in the regions where its base has been severely eroded. Govorukhin, with limited financial resources, will have to rely on the mass media to deliver the bloc's message. This may be somewhat effective as Govorukhin is seen as a charismatic speaker. It is unlikely, however, that the bloc will clear the 5 percent threshold.

Leaders

Stanislav Govorukhin: Leader of the Democratic Party of Russia faction in the State Duma; chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of the State Duma on Investigation of Chechen events; film actor, director and writer; declared presidential candidate.

Oleg Rummyantsev: Law expert for the State Duma; ran on the "Civic Union" party list in 1993; head of the Constitution Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, 1990-1993.

Viktor Aksuchits: Leader of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement; People's Deputy of the Russian Federation, 1990-1993.

Federal list also includes: **Andrei Golovin, Valentin Kotlyar, Yurii Leonov, Igor Muravlev, Sergei Polozkov, Valerii Krasnov, German Karelin, Vitalii Nasedkin and Valerii Kondratiev.**

Trade Unions and Industrialists of Russia -- Union of Labor
Profsoyuzi i Promyshleniki Rossii -- Soyuz Truda

The bloc Union of Labor is a partnership of two organizations -- the Russian United Industrialist Party, led by Vladimir Shcherbakov, and the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, led by Mikhail Shmakov. While a bloc of trade unions and industrialists seems an unlikely alliance from a Western perspective, the dynamics of the post-Soviet economy have created common interests that make this a natural pairing.

The bloc formed just before the elections, but its component organizations have their own histories and were partners in other organizations, including the once powerful Civic Union. After the coup attempt in 1991 and throughout 1992, the centrist Civic Union, led by Arkadii Volsky, was considered a major political force in Russia. After Chernomyrdin was named prime minister, many observers predicted that Civic Union would form the first post-Yeltsin government.

The highly polarized power struggle of October 1993 between President Yeltsin and the Russian parliament left little room for the Civic Union's centrists. Though the Civic Union ran an expensive, high-profile campaign for the December 1993 elections, it received only 1.9 percent of the vote. Soon after the election, the Civic Union effectively collapsed.

Before the 1995 elections, moderate centrists of the Civic Union type tried to form a new coalition. Although Shmakov and, to a lesser extent, Shcherbakov, considered joining Ivan Rybkin's bloc, both felt that Rybkin was too loyal to President Yeltsin and the *status quo*. In the end, Shcherbakov and Shmakov decided to form their own bloc with Arkadii Volsky. While Volsky is third on the Union of Labor's party list, he has not taken an active role in the bloc. (Volsky has been one of the government's main negotiators in Chechnya.)

Program

The bloc supports market reforms, but it rejects the strategy of the current government. The Union of Labor claims the present reform program does not do enough to foster industrial production. The bloc's program seeks: 1) to give more credits to large enterprises; 2) to pay higher salaries to stimulate demand for consumer goods; 3) to protect domestic industry from "unfair" competition from imported products; 4) to slow the pace of privatization; and 5) to

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provide strong governmental support to high-tech industries, which could be the engine for a future industrial boom.

Few political issues distinguish the bloc from other centrists. The bloc supports the gradual and loose reintegration of the former Soviet republics by fostering economic cooperation.

Campaign

The Union of Labor seeks to mobilize support from those who work in industry, especially in large enterprises. The Union of Labor is one of the few blocs that has a clearly defined electoral base. The bloc will attempt to campaign through the regional networks of the Russian United Industrialist Party and the Federation of Independent Trade Unions, both of which have considerable human and financial resources. The Federation of Independent Trade Unions alone boasts several million members. In 1993, however, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions and the Industrialists manifested an inability to mobilize their potential supporters. Thus, the bloc's major campaign challenge will be to revive the influence of its member organizations.

Understanding that its leaders are not as well known as those of many other blocs, the Union of Labor is making a special effort to increase Shcherbakov's media exposure. Because other large, well-organized blocs will be competing for the same electorate, the Union of Labor is considered unlikely to receive 5 percent of the vote.

Leaders

Vladimir Shcherbakov: Head of the Russian United Industrial Party; chairman of the International Foundation for Promoting Privatization and Foreign Investment; chairman of the State Committee of the USSR on Labor (1989-1991); deputy prime minister of the USSR, 1991.

Mikhail Shmakov: Leader of the Federation of Independent Trade-Unions of Russia.

Arkadii Volsky: Chairman of the Russian Union of Industrialist and Entrepreneurs; former head of the party list of the "Civic Union" election bloc.

The party's federal list also includes: **Valerii Trapeznikov, Dmitrii Lukashenko, Vadim Zhimirov, Igor Yurgens, Valerii Bagin, Aleksandr Neumyvakin, Valerii Nosov, Yurii Sakharnov and Anatolii Denisov.**

Social Democrats *Sotsial - Demokrati*

This bloc formed in mid-September 1995 on the basis of the Russian Social Democratic Union, led by its chairman, Vasilii Lipitskii. In November 1994, Lipitskii formed the Russian Social Democratic Union in an attempt to create a political force behind the ideals of social democracy. While the founding congress drew the support of Ivan Rybkin and Mikhail Gorbachev, the organization was unable to gather momentum. Bloc leaders had hoped to form a

much wider social democratic coalition, but were unsuccessful. The bloc comprises Lipitskii's Russian Social Democratic Party, Gavril Popov's Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms and the "Young Social Democrats" movement.

Program

The bloc is officially affiliated with the Socialist International, and advocates traditional social democratic ideals, including greater rights for workers and a larger social safety net. Like many other centrist blocs, the Social Democrats oppose the pace but not the overall direction of economic reform. Lipitskii has stated that his bloc shares a good deal of common ground with Svyatislav Fyodorov's Party of Workers' Self-Government. Popov, the former Mayor of Moscow, has mentioned Ivan Rybkin's bloc as a like-minded group.

Campaign

Despite this bloc's late start, it plans to run a full slate of 270 candidates on its party list and registered 100 candidates for single-mandate races. The Social Democrats will not be able to use the regional structure of Popov's Russian Movement for Democratic Reform to deliver its campaign message because those structures have disintegrated or been incorporated into other blocs.

The bloc's greatest asset is its name -- because social democratic ideas enjoy strong popular support in Russia. The bloc has also featured Popov in the mass media. As the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform's popularity has declined, most predict that this bloc will not reach the 5 percent threshold.

Leaders

Gavril Popov: Chairman of the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms; former Mayor of Moscow; Former co-chair of Democratic Russia.

Vasilii Lipitskii: Duma Deputy; chairman of the Russian Social Democratic Union.

Oleg Bogomolov: Duma Deputy, elected on the Democratic Party of Russia party list.

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COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS

Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) *Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiiskoy Federatsii*

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) is the main successor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Still, the KPRF should be viewed as a new and separate organization from the one that ruled the Soviet Union for more than 70 years, if only because many of the circumstances under which the CPSU ruled the Soviet Union cannot be recreated. At the same time, the KPRF should also be understood as more traditionally communist than its East European and Baltic counterparts. In sharp distinction to these parties, the KPRF was formed from the conservative wing of the CPSU. More reformist elements of the CPSU left the party to form other political parties and were never members of the KPRF.

After the Soviet Union collapsed and the CPSU was banned, Russian communists dispersed among dozens of new organizations and fronts. Leaders of the KPRF began to focus on establishing their party as the single successor to the CPSU in Russia. By the time the KPRF held its first Soviet congress in March 1993, most analysts proclaimed it to be the largest and best organized communist party in Russia. At this congress, Gennadii Zyuganov was elected party chairman.

After the "October events" of 1993 in which the KPRF opposed President Yeltsin in his standoff with the Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin banned the KPRF. Weeks before the registration deadline for the 1993 December parliamentary elections, Yeltsin revoked his ban. The KPRF was the only communist group to participate in 1993 elections. Drawing on its organizational strength, the KPRF won 12.4 percent of the vote.

In the State Duma, the KPRF formed a faction of about 47 deputies (32 of which were gained though the party list). The KPRF has emerged as one of the most disciplined, most organized factions in the State Duma. In alliance with the Agrarian Party of Russia, and Vladimir Zhrinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the KPRF could usually block reformist legislation and could often pass its own legislative initiatives.

Through 1994 and 1995, the KPRF has strengthened its regional organizations and managed to elect many of its candidates to regional and local Dumas. Most recently, the KPRF won 90 percent of the seats in local elections in Volgograd in early October. Many have interpreted this victory as a preliminary sign of KPRF strength going into the upcoming elections.

Program

The KPRF does not want simply to slow or stop reforms, it urges the restitution of many features of Russia's communist past. The party has attempted to exhibit a continuity with the CPSU both in its slogans, which call for a return to socialism, and in its symbol of the hammer and sickle. It has also included two of the major August 1991 coup plotters on its party list.

However, the KPRF is not the re-incarnation of the pre-Gorbachev CPSU. According to its leadership, two major points distinguish the Communist Party of the Russian Federation from its Brezhnev-era predecessor. The party accepts the concept of constitutionally based pluralism and acknowledges the right of other parties to compete for power. The Russian Communist Party seeks to achieve power through elections, and not through revolution. In rejecting the idea of a one-party state, however, KPRF leaders do hint at the prospect that their party may become the "vanguard" party among many -- a first among equals. The KPRF has also advocated the return of the Soviet system of government. Additionally, the party's program allows for radical change, and it calls for altering the Russian constitution so that it is more in accord "with the national interests of Russia"

The KPRF's acceptance of private property represents the second point. The party emphasizes that private property can co-exist with communal and state property. Still, the KPRF is adamantly opposed to the government's current course of privatization. The party vows to stop privatization altogether, and then undo "illegal" privatization upon coming to power. Recently, the KPRF faction in the State Duma unsuccessfully promoted legislation to nationalize some enterprises.

The KPRF advocates greater state support for enterprise production, higher minimum wages and pensions, a comprehensive state welfare system, and stronger state regulation of the market.

The KPRF stands firmly for the re-creation of the USSR, and polls show that voters believe that the KPRF is the party most likely to achieve this goal. Under Zyuganov's leadership, the KPRF has become increasingly nationalistic, dedicated to restoring Russia as a "great power." With these goals, KPRF leaders hope to divert votes from Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

Campaign

Polls indicate that the KPRF enjoys one of the most stable and loyal electoral bases of any party in Russia. This support comprises frustrated, impoverished and nostalgic pensioners. Recent polls reveal that voters over age 55 constitute more than 50 percent of the KPRF's typical supporters. Since 30 to 35 million of Russia's population are pensioners, two-thirds of which are expected to vote, the KPRF is expected to clear the five percent threshold on their support alone. Also, of those who voted for the Communist Party in 1993, 66 percent state that they plan to vote for the Communist Party again.

The KPRF has reached out to other groups as well. They have reactivated the Komsomol (the communist youth wing); tried to strengthen their ties with women's groups; and even courted businessmen who might benefit from a "stable" future under KPRF leadership. The party has purposely tried to represent all walks of life (from astronauts to teachers to bankers) on its 270-candidate federal list.

The KPRF views the parliamentary elections as the first part of a two-step process to assume power. The second step is winning the presidency in 1996. KPRF leaders hope the

parliamentary elections will place the Communist Party at the head of an opposition coalition and position Zyuganov as the communist opposition's main presidential candidate. To do this, the KPRF must fare better than both Nikolai Ryzhkov's bloc, Power to the People, and Aleksandr Lebed's bloc, Congress of Russian Communities.

To get out the vote in December, the KPRF will rely mainly on its highly developed network of regional party organizations rather than high-production television commercials. With an estimated membership of 500,000, the KPRF is a nationwide political party. Zyuganov has emphasized the importance of door-to-door canvassing as a major campaign technique. As such, the KPRF campaign may be less visible to the Moscow-based observer than other more centralized campaigns undertaken by other parties.

The party's organizational strength is already evident. In late September, the KPRF became the first electoral bloc to gather the necessary 200,000 signatures to put its name on the ballot and to officially begin its canvassing campaign. Most other blocs were unable to collect the requisite number signatures until mid-October. Also, unlike most other blocs, the KPRF did not have to rely on paying for signature collection.

Throughout the campaign Zyuganov has spoken about negotiations with the bloc Congress of Russian Communities. KPRF and the Congress of Russian Communities have reportedly already informally agreed to coordinate single-mandate candidacies in the regions. More serious cooperation between the two blocs is likely to occur in the form of a loose coalition in the next Duma. Cooperation is also possible, depending on the election results, in selecting a single presidential candidate.

Entering the campaign period, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation is viewed as the clear front-runner -- consistently placing first in public opinion polls throughout the fall. Many polls have even predicted that the KPRF and their rural allies, the Agrarian Party, will be able to control a majority of seats in the State Duma. KPRF leaders have stated that they will "improve their position dramatically" and receive at least 20 percent of the vote. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation registered 163 single-mandate candidates with the CEC in September.

Leaders

Gennadii Zyuganov: State Duma Deputy; leader of parliamentary faction and chairman of the KPRF; former leader of the National Salvation Front; former Central Committee member of the CPSU.

Svetlana Goryacheva: Deputy Chair of the KPRF; Deputy Procurator of Vladivostok; former Deputy Chair of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies; leader of the Communist women's movement.

Amangeldy Tuleev: Deputy to the Soviet of the Federation; chairman of Kemerovo Oblast's Legislative Assembly; candidate for president of Russia in June 1991 (placed fourth with 6.8 percent of the vote); RSFSR People's Deputy (1990-1993).

Other federal list candidates include: **Valentin Chikin** (Chief Editor of *Sovetskaya Rossiya*); **Yurii Masliukov** (economist); **Valentin Kuptsov** (Chief of Staff of KPRF Parliamentary faction); **Anatolii Leonov** (State Duma Deputy); **Valerii Tarasov** (painter); **Yurii Ivanov** (State Duma Deputy); **Aleksei Podberezkin** (Chairman of the "Spiritual Legacy" Movement); **Nikolai Saveliev** (consultant to the KPRF parliamentary faction) and **Valerii Vorotnikov** (head of the Agency of Economic Security "VZOR").

Agrarian Party of Russia *Avgrarnaya Partiya Rossii*

The Agrarian Party of Russia was formed in 1993 from the "Agrarian Union," a faction in the Russian Supreme Soviet. The Agrarian Union, which represents the interests of the heads of former collective and state farms, and the Agrarian trade union later joined the party with a number of other agricultural organizations. After October 1993, when it was unclear whether the Communist Party would be able to run candidates in the December elections, the Agrarian Party also served as a more moderate vehicle for communist candidates.

The Agrarian Party performed surprisingly well in the December 1993 elections. The party collected more than 500,000 signatures during the registration period -- more than any other party. The party received 7.99 percent of the party list vote (21 deputies) and won 38 single-mandate contests -- more than any other group.

As a representative of its constituents' interests, the Agrarian Party has been one of the most effective factions in the State Duma. First, Agrarian faction member Ivan Rybkin was elected Speaker of the State Duma. (Rybkin was eventually expelled from the leadership of the party). The faction's legislative agenda consisted of blocking real land privatization and increasing government subsidies to the agricultural sector. The faction achieved its first objective by joining forces with the Communist Party to block the government's agricultural reform plans. The Agrarians have also negotiated additional backing for state and collective farms in return for its support of the 1994 and 1995 budgets. Despite having two of its leaders serving in the government, the faction firmly opposes most government initiatives.

Program

The Agrarian Party's campaign program mirrors its legislative agenda -- government support for collective and state-run agriculture and rejection of the free trade of land. More generally, the party strongly supports government intervention in the economy. On political and foreign policy issues, the party's program closely resembles that of its ally, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

Campaign

The Agrarian Party's base of voters is well defined: the administrators and workers employed in the agro-industrial complex. Geographically, these voters live in Russia's rural regions. The party will rely on the collective farm directors, upon whom agricultural workers are economically dependent, to get out the vote in December. (In 1993, entire collective farms voted for the Agrarian Party.)

As in 1993, the Agrarian Party will run roughly 167 single-mandate candidates in rural districts. They have reportedly coordinated their candidates with those of the Communist Party so that Agrarian Party candidates run in rural districts and Communist Party candidates compete in urban districts.

As the only major electoral bloc appealing solely to rural voters, the Agrarian party has a good chance of again crossing the 5 percent threshold. It will have to compete mainly against rural-based candidates of Our Home Is Russia and Democratic Choice of Russia.

Leaders

Mikhail Lapshin: Leader of the parliamentary faction "Agrarian Party" in the State Duma; former chairman of a collective farm.

Aleksandr Nazarchuk: Minister of Agriculture of the Russian Federation.

Vasilii Starodubtsev. Deputy of the Federation Council from Tula; chairman of the Agrarian Union of Russia; chairman of a collective farm in the Tula region; former member of the Extraordinary State Committee in August 1991 (leaders of the coup against Gorbachev).

The party's federal list also includes: **Aleksandr Davydov**, **Aleksandr Zaveryukha** (Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government), **Vladimir Akatyev**, **Aleksandr Belashov**, **Nikolai Sukhoi**, **Anatolii Vorontsov**, **Andrei Popov**, **Mikhail Trunov** and **Vladimir Isakov**.

Congress of Russian Communities *Kongress Russkikh Obshchin*

The Congress of Russian Communities was founded in March 1993 and has recently emerged as a major political bloc under the leadership of Yuri Skokov, chairman of the Federation of Commodity Manufacturers; Aleksandr Lebed, general and former commander of the Fourteenth Army in Moldova; and Sergei Glazyev, chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia. Originally formed as a coalition of organizations representing Russian communities living outside of the Russian Federation, its initial mandate was to pressure the Russian government into defending the interests of the some 25 million Russians in the "near abroad." Under the leadership of its founder, Dmitri Rogozin, the Congress gradually widened its platform to become a more moderate nationalist group.

The Congress of Russian Communities grew considerably more influential when Yurii Skokov joined and became chairman. Skokov, an ambitious and influential insider in Russian politics, immediately sought to make the Congress a political vehicle of nationwide significance. He achieved this new status when he convinced General Aleksandr Lebed to join.

Sergei Glazyev joined the Congress more as an individual than as the former chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia. Glazyev's major contribution to the bloc is his reputation as one of the most respected and professional economists among the opposition.

The bloc's greatest electoral asset, however, is General Aleksandr Lebed, arguably the most popular political figure in Russia today. Lebed gained initial public notoriety by bringing peace to the war-torn Transdneistr Republic in Moldova. Among his troops, Lebed achieved legendary status, endowed, in their view, with "the brain of Albert Einstein and the physique of Arnold Schwarzenegger." Lebed's fame only grew after Defense Minister Pavel Grachov dismissed him as the commander of the Fourteenth Army in the spring of 1995. Lebed then moved to Moscow to start his political career. Lebed has a reputation as an honest, no-nonsense, patriotic outsider who is willing to take severe measures to fight crime, corruption, and the degradation of the military. Although generally known to be taciturn, Lebed's direct manner and booming voice make him a captivating public speaker. Lebed is currently considered a major contender in the presidential election next June.

Program

The Congress of Russian Communities is considered a nationalist organization with a centrist to socialist economic orientation. Its highest priorities are strengthening the Russian state and defending the 25 million Russians living in the former Soviet Republics. Since Skokov joined the group, the bloc has decreased its anti-communist rhetoric, and rumors have circulated about a possible alliance with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

The Congress of Russian Communities blames President Yeltsin for the collapse of the USSR, the violence at the White House in October 1993, economic chaos, drastic privatization, and a flawed Chechnya policy. In addition, Skokov is known to have a personal rivalry with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. Because the bloc is new, many Congress positions on specific issues are still relatively unknown.

The Congress' most important campaign themes stress issues of law and order and strong leadership. The Congress proposes an outright war on crime and corruption, and Lebed has previously touted Pinochet's experience in Chile as holding lessons for Russia. The Congress program calls for support of the family as the backbone of society and greater social support for pensioners and veterans. The bloc supports Russian traditions and culture, including the Russian Orthodox Church.

Glazyev's economic plan generally backs market reforms, but advocates a more protected market and greater support for Russia's ailing manufacturing sector. The Congress also advocates increasing wages in order to stimulate demand for domestically produced goods. The bloc

supports all forms of property: private, state and collective. Still, Glazyev has recently advocated a freeze on all privatization, the reversal of all "illegal" privatization, and a reconsideration of all privatization contradictory to Russia's national interests.

Congress statements have been generally anti-Western and imperialist in tone. They call for the reintegration of the USSR, but are vague on strategies for accomplishing this task. Lebed has denounced NATO's eastward expansion, warning that such an act may precipitate a third world war.

Campaign

Early polls indicate that the Congress of Russian Communities is likely to do well among provincial, conservative voters of the working class. Because of Lebed's presence, the bloc may also receive significant support from the military. Polls also indicate that the Congress has the potential to capture votes both from nationalist and communist groups.

While it was expected that the Congress would feature Aleksandr Lebed over Skokov and Glazyev because of Lebed's charismatic appeal and popularity, the bloc has chosen to highlight all three of its leaders in television advertisements and press conferences. Printed materials primarily accent Lebed and Skokov. The Congress of Russian Communities was one of the first blocs to air its series of television advertisements. These expensively produced commercials are heavy on Russian cultural symbolism and spotlight the bloc's three leaders.

During the campaign period, the Congress of Russian Communities' leaders held press conferences supporting the formation of a new Russian Orthodox organization. Reaching out to the military, Lebed has recently formed an organization to defend its interests called "Honor and Motherland." In early November, the bloc held a congress to ratify its platform and to prepare for the final stage of the campaign.

The Congress of Russian Communities is considered to have a good chance of surpassing the 5 percent threshold, mostly on the strength of Aleksandr Lebed's popularity. The bloc has already established itself as one of the major groups in the race, and has achieved heavy media exposure early in the campaign. If the Congress can attract as many votes as Zyuganov's KPRF, some observers contend that Lebed could become the presidential candidate they support. The bloc submitted a list of 140 single-mandate candidates to the CEC.

Leaders

Yurii Skokov: Leader of the Congress; chairman of the Federation of Commodity Manufacturers; former Secretary of the Security Council under Boris Yeltsin.

Aleksandr Lebed: General and former commander of the Fourteenth Army in the Transdneistr Republic in Moldova; deputy chairman of the Congress of Russian Communities; Ran on the Ecological Movement of Russia list in 1993; considered a strong presidential contender for June 1996.

Sergei Glazyev: State Duma Deputy; chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia; chairman of the State Duma Committee on Economic Policy; minister of Foreign Trade of the Russian Government (1992-1993); author of economic plan to revitalize Russian manufacturing and to slow the pace of privatization.

The Congress of Russian Communities' federal list also includes: **Lyudmila Vartazarova** (leader of the Socialist Party of Workers), **Dmitrii Rogozin** (Congress of Russian Communities founder and chairman of the Executive Committee of the Congress), **Yurii Kalmykov** (leader of Union of Peoples of Russia), **Vasilii Romanov**, **Mikhail Kolchev**, **Oleg Denisov**, **Nanyana Malutina**, **Sergei Goncharov**, and **Sergei Burkov** (Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Property and Privatization).

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) *Liberalno-demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossii*

Though virtually unknown before the 1991 presidential election campaign, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia was the only party besides the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to field a candidate in that race. LDPR's candidate, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, placed third out of six candidates, behind President Yeltsin and former Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov. Despite Zhirinovskiy's success, few took him or his party seriously at the time; his party did not organize nationally after the election and Zhirinovskiy held no significant political post.

Zhirinovskiy then splashed onto center stage of Russian politics with his party's electoral success in December 1993 when LDPR garnered 22.9 percent of the party list vote, a full 8 percentage points ahead of Russia's Choice, and much more than polls had predicted. LDPR was the only ultra-nationalist party in the race. Zhirinovskiy's brand of ultra-nationalism constituted an option for voters tired of "democracy" but unwilling to return to communism.

Zhirinovskiy ran a modern electoral campaign. He mastered the populist sound bite and understood the importance of delivering it on television. Moreover, he addressed issues that concerned voters: housing for military officers, "unfair" prices at farmers markets, and crime. He identified scapegoats for Russia's woes -- Caucasians, Jews, neighboring countries, and the West. He pledged to "lift Russia from its knees."

The impact of Zhirinovskiy's personality driven campaign was amplified by the proportional representation dimension of the electoral law. Zhirinovskiy's appeal helped LDPR gain 59 seats in the State Duma from its party list. LDPR won only five seats from single-mandate contests.

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia's performance in the State Duma has been a contradictory one. During the last two years, Zhirinovskiy has delivered some of his most vitriolic speeches ever, complete with racial slurs, imperialist bravado, conspiracy theories, and threats aimed at the West. At the same time, LDPR has supported the government on crucial votes, including the 1994 and 1995 budgets. LDPR was the only major parliamentary faction to support President Yeltsin's intervention in Chechnya.

Zhirinovskiy has maintained strict discipline within his parliamentary faction and party. During last year's party congress, he was elected chairman for an unlimited period and was essentially given total control over LDPR. The party machine reportedly has one primary objective -- the election of Zhirinovskiy as president in 1996. To this end, LDPR has devoted considerable resources to establishing regional party structures and newspapers.

Program

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia espouses militant, populist ultra-nationalism. Zhirinovskiy has backed away from his earlier calls for the invasion of Alaska and the construction of giant fans on the Baltic borders to blow radioactive waste over Russia's neighbors in the event of disobedience. However, he still champions Russian imperialism and the restoration of Russia as a world power. Zhirinovskiy continues to push for the extension of Russia's borders into Kazakhstan, Belarus, and, eventually, Ukraine.

Zhirinovskiy advocates a stronger state to establish law and order to Russia at home. Zhirinovskiy has recently proposed the creation of an internal security force of no less than one million members to protect Russian citizens from internal and external enemies. He has also pledged to use the military and intelligence services to fight organized crime.

Zhirinovskiy continues to demonstrate a deep mistrust for the United States and the U.S.-sponsored "Zionist conspiracy" aimed at destroying Russia. He has repeatedly stated that the eastward expansion of NATO would mean the beginning of World War III.

Zhirinovskiy has been critical of both the communist command system and a market economy. He promotes a populist attack on the current economic reform process and advocates state interventionism to enlarge industrial production, provide special assistance to high-tech industries, work to open up international markets, assume control of raw material exports and provide greater support for science and culture. Zhirinovskiy warns that Russia must not allow its riches to be raided by "Western bandits."

Campaign

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia's voters are usually working class residents of provincial cities who have gained little from reforms. In 1993, Zhirinovskiy voters were angry, anti-establishment, and very much against the *status quo*. LDPR's main challenge this year will be to retain the votes of this electorate while competing against a field of blocs that will be borrowing from Zhirinovskiy's 1993 campaign in both style and in substance. Summer polls indicate that the Communist Party will divert voters who still oppose the current regime but have become disillusioned with Zhirinovskiy's antics. As for the nationalist vote, LDPR will face competitors, including the Congress of Russian Communities, Derzhava, Power to the People, and even possibly Forward Russia.

To remain a step ahead of its competition, LDPR's campaign will again feature a marathon speaking tour for Zhirinovskiy in its regional strongholds as well as paid time on the mass media.

As one of the most riveting orators in Russian politics, Zhirinovskiy's speeches form the centerpiece of the campaign. Zhirinovskiy is expected to participate in various press-attracting events throughout the pre-election period. He has already met with an Italian pornography star and physically assaulted a female Duma Deputy. Zhirinovskiy has occasionally attempted to add a more statesman-like persona to his mercurial image, but during its allotted television time, LDPR featured one of Zhirinovskiy's most bombastic, anti-Western speeches in the State Duma.

The LDPR also hopes to run more competitive campaigns for single-mandate seats in 1995. Most LDPR candidates will try to establish a strong party identification, as the party does not have a pool of well-known candidates who could win on their own.

In 1995, the LDPR is considered to have very little chance of achieving its past level of success because of the crowded political field and new competition from other nationalist and ultra-nationalist groups. In current polls, LDPR appears to be near the 5 percent threshold.

Leaders

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: State Duma Deputy; chairman and faction leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia; presidential candidate in June 1991 -- placed third among six candidates with 7.8 percent of the popular vote.

Sergei Abeltsyev: State Duma Deputy; deputy chairman and Shadow Security Minister of the LDPR.

Aleksandr Vengerovskii: State Duma Deputy; one of five deputy chairmen of the State Duma.

Other federal list candidates include: **Stanislav Zhebrovskii, Aleksei Mitrofanov, Mikhail Gutseriev, Mikhail Monastyrskii, Mikhail Musatov, Vladimir Gusev, Natalya Narycheva, Oleg Finko and Sergei Kalashnikov.**

"Great Power" Movement

Derzhava

The ultra-nationalist Derzhava movement centers around the personality of its leader, Aleksandr Rutskoi. Although the movement was formed in 1992, Rutskoi has a long political history. He led a faction in the Soviet Union's Congress of People's Deputies, and formed the People's Party of Free Russia on its base. In 1991, he served as President Yeltsin's running mate and became vice president. Soon after August 1991, Rutskoi drifted to the opposition, first as leader of the Civic Union and then the more radical National Salvation Front. After March 1993, President Yeltsin stripped Rutskoi of most of his governmental responsibilities. When President Yeltsin dissolved the Russian parliament in September 1993, Rutskoi declared the act illegal and proclaimed himself president. In October, Rutskoi was the major leader of the defense of the White House. After his eventual surrender, Rutskoi was arrested and served six months in prison before release under the State Duma's amnesty law.

Rutskoi resumed his political career soon after his release from prison. He immediately began traveling throughout Russia to organize regional chapters of his nationalist political movement, Derzhava. In Moscow, Rutskoi attracted several prominent nationalists to his organization. Closer to the elections, Derzhava's future became more uncertain, as several of these same nationalist leaders quit the bloc, protesting that too many places on the party list had been reserved for allegedly shady businessmen. More problematic was the formation of new ultra-nationalist groups, which complicated Rutskoi's campaign strategy.

Program

Most of all, Derzhava laments the collapse of the USSR and vows to rebuild it. Derzhava focuses on the lack of law and order, promising to rid Russia of mafia domination and foreign criminal elements. Derzhava's program calls the current market reform process "parasitic capitalism," which serves government bureaucrats, the new rich, and the West, but not Russia's common people. Rutskoi vehemently denounces the West for exploiting Russia and supporting President Yeltsin. Perhaps the bloc's most distinctive characteristic is the extreme level of contempt that Rutskoi expresses for the current regime.

Campaign

Derzhava will be competing with the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia for the more radical sector of the nationalist electorate -- uneducated and unskilled workers living in medium-sized provincial cities who have grown poorer because of reforms. To win over these voters, Rutskoi has adopted a populist, bombastic rhetorical style very similar to that of Zhirinovskiy. Rutskoi has also traveled extensively during the last year to develop his organization. The campaign is expected to maximize Rutskoi's public exposure and will emphasize party list rather than single-mandate candidates.

The bloc's campaign slogans include "Law is our motto. EVERYBODY should follow it," "Stop the awful reforms!" and "Stop the influence of the West!"

The Central Election Commission (CEC) initially denied Derzhava's registration, which delayed the official start of the bloc's campaign. The CEC refused to register the bloc after Derzhava dropped about 60 of its original candidates from its list without proper documentation. The Supreme Court overturned the CEC's decision and ordered the CEC to register Derzhava.

The Derzhava campaign effort received a boost when the Union of Patriots threw its support behind Rutskoi in early November after the CEC refused to register the bloc. While the CEC claimed that the bloc had not collected enough signatures, the Union of Patriots claimed that they themselves refused to register in order to preserve "the unity of ultra-nationalistic forces." The Union of Patriots is led by Vladislav Achalov, Aleksandr Sterligov (head of the Natsionalnii Sobor) and Aleksandr Tizyakov (one of the August 1991 coup plotters). This bloc is distinguished by a brand of Russian nationalism that, rather than identifying with all people living in Russia, expresses support only for ethnic Russians.

Rutskoi's electoral prospects are complicated by the crowded field of nationalist and ultra-nationalist blocs. Derzhava is not expected by most observers to clear the 5 percent threshold. Derzhava registered 115 single-mandate candidates.

Leaders

Aleksandr Rutskoi; Former Vice-President of the Russian Federation under President Yeltsin (1991-1993); former leader of the People's Party for Free Russia; with Ruslan Khasbulatov, leader of the defense of the White House (then Supreme Soviet) in October 1993; retired general who served in Afghanistan.

Viktor Kobelyov: State Duma Deputy; one of the main organizers of the LDPR election campaign in 1993.

Konstantin Dushenov: former press secretary to Ioann, the recently deceased Russian Orthodox Metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Ladoga.

The list also includes: **Aleksandr Kazintsev, Rinat Mukhamadiev, Vladimir Novikov, Dzhangir Kerimov, Mikhail Kuzovkov, Ashot Sarkisyan, Aleksandr Stepanov, Musa Idigov and Vladimir Taranenko.**

Power to the People *Vlast' -- Narodu!*

This bloc was formed recently on the base of Sergei Baburin's Russian All-People's Union. The Union stemmed from the "Rossiya" parliamentary faction in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. In the Congress, Baburin served as one of the most articulate and harsh critics of President Yeltsin's regime, and the Union was a key defender of the White House in October 1993. The Russian All-People's Union attempted to participate in the December 1993 elections, but its signatures were declared invalid by the Central Election Commission. Baburin entered the State Duma by virtue of his victory in a single-mandate district and formed a grouping of about 13 deputies called "Russian Way."

After discussions with several other nationalist organizations, Baburin persuaded Gorbachev's former prime minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov, to join his electoral bloc. Ryzhkov had reportedly been looking for an appropriate vehicle from which to launch his potential presidential candidacy.

Program

The bloc vows to "prevent national catastrophe" and "to revive the Fatherland by stopping the destructive consequences of the government's 'reforms.'" Power to the People proposes a review of past privatizations, and a reversal of "illegal" ones. The bloc calls for a return to traditional Russian economic features, including a paternalistic role for the state and a strengthened social security system.

The bloc's program urges the re-creation of the Soviet Union on a new economic and political basis. After closer economic and political relations have been established throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States, bloc leaders then want to conduct an international referendum on the creation of a new union. Bloc leaders are suspicious of the West's role in Russia's future development.

Campaign

Power to the People hopes to win support from the communist and the ultra-nationalist electorate. Polls indicate that Ryzhkov is still popular among pensioners (especially women) nostalgic for the Soviet era. Given the fact that the bloc is new, unknown, boasts few resources and exhibits virtually no regional structures, Power to the People's bloc will likely rely on media exposure. However, the bloc has been frustrated in achieving success with this media-oriented strategy. Citing a survey of television exposure of electoral blocs, Ryzhkov complained about receiving a disproportionate share of media exposure, and has accused the media of bias in favor of liberal and centrist blocs.

Given the long list of blocs competing for the same electorate and Power to the People's inability to attract significant media exposure, Power to the People is not expected to meet the five percent threshold.

Leaders

Nikolai Ryzhkov: Prime Minister of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) and CPSU Politburo member; ran for president of Russia against Boris Yeltsin in 1991, placing second and receiving 16.85 percent of the vote; possible presidential candidate in election to be held in June 1996.

Sergei Barburin: State Duma Deputy from Omsk; leader of the nationalist "Russian Way" deputy grouping in the State Duma; leader of Russian All-People's Union; dean of the law department of Omsk University.

Yelena Shuvalova: Chairperson of the movement "Mothers for Social Justice."

The list also includes: **Valerii Ganichev**, **Stanislav Terekhov**, (chairman of the "Union of Officers"), **Anatolii Karpov** (former world chess champion), **Vladimir Kartashov**, **Vladimir Lebedev**, **Andrei Semenetsky**, **Zigmund Stankevich**, **Yulii Kvitsinsky** and **Georgii Tikhonov**.

Communists -- Working Russia -- For the Soviet Union
Kommunisti -- Trudovaya Rossiya -- Za Sovyetskii Soyuz

The nucleus of this bloc is the Russian Communist Labor Party and its affiliate, Working Russia. Together with a number of smaller groups, they constitute Russia's extremist communists. Under the charismatic leadership of Viktor Anpilov, these groups organized anti-Yeltsin street demonstrations throughout 1992 and 1993, including the violent May Day march in 1993 and the

defense of the White House in October. Anpilov was one of a handful of political leaders arrested after the October 1993 events, and was released from prison only after the State Duma passed an amnesty resolution the following year.

This bloc is the main communist rival to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) headed by Gennadii Zyuganov. The Russian Communist Labor Party's leaders accuse Zyuganov of "revisionism and opportunism" and his party of nationalist and social democratic tendencies. Anpilov supports world revolution and the restoration of the pre-Gorbachev USSR. While the second largest communist organization in Russia, the Russian Communist Labor Party is still dwarfed in size and influence by the KPRF.

By uniting several small communist organizations, this bloc promotes itself as the united communist bloc with the KPRF representing the only non-participant. While the KPRF attempted to reach agreement with these smaller groups on the formation of one, united communist bloc, these negotiations broke down because of major ideological differences.

Program

Russian Communist Labor Party and "Working Russia" programs call for the restoration of every aspect of the USSR, including the reintegration of all the former Soviet republics, the restoration of the Soviet political system, and the recreation of the central command economy. Their program is distinctly Leninist in orientation, calling for the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the formation of a "classless society" and violent world revolution. The bloc's leaders openly state that they are prepared to abolish the State Duma in order to recreate the Soviet system. Regarding tactics, the RCLP and Working Russia openly espouse violent, confrontational methods, including general strikes, street demonstrations, and eventually the armed seizure of the state.

Campaign

The bloc's electorate is similar to the more radical portion of the KPRF's electorate, including disaffected pensioners and radical youth. As a result, the bloc will be competing directly with the KPRF for votes. Cognizant of this competition, the bloc deliberately included the words "Soviet Union" in its name to attract those looking for the return of the CPSU. Because the bloc has little money and only one well-known leader, Viktor Anpilov, it relies on public events such as demonstrations, pickets, and rallies to deliver its campaign message.

The bloc is considered to have little chance of winning 5 percent of the party list vote, as the significantly larger and stronger KPRF will most likely attract the great majority of the communist electorate. However, the bloc may be able to garner a portion of the communist electorate: some observers argue that voters may confuse the two communist blocs on the ballot, and accidentally vote for this bloc instead of the KPRF.

Leaders

Viktor Tyulkin: First Secretary and one of the organizers of the Russian Communist Labor Party; chief editor of *Trudovaya Rossiya* (Working Russia), a militant communist newspaper.

Anatolii Kryuchkov: Leader of the Russian Party of Communists; one of the organizers of Marxist Platform in the CPSU; chief editor of *Mysl* (Thought).

Viktor Anpilov: Leader of the "Working Russia" Movement; secretary of the Russian Communist Labor Party; charismatic leader and street orator of the radical communist movement.

List also includes: **Aleksei Prigarin, Vladimir Zapolskikh, Sergei Novikov, Aleksei Sergeev, Boris Kurashvili, Frol Ananin, Elena Zaitseva, Viktor Gamov, and Oleg Shein.**

OTHER GROUPS

Christian Democratic Union -- Christians of Russia

Khristiansko-Demokraticeskii Soyuz -- Khristianye Rossii

In the December 1993 parliamentary elections, this organization led by Vitaly Savitsky participated as part of the Russia's Choice electoral bloc, and Savitsky joined the Russia's Choice faction after his election. The Christian Democratic Union remains a very small organization but still claims to be the nucleus of a larger liberal Christian political movement soon to emerge in Russia. The Christian Democratic Union is essentially a democratically oriented liberal bloc that supports strengthening the Russian family and the role of religion in Russian society. The group emphasizes the defense of human rights and proposes a ban on capital punishment. They call for more attention to social problems, including the strict enforcement of anti-pornography laws. Savitsky has also pushed (unsuccessfully) for legislation limiting the immunity of State Duma deputies. As the only Christian electoral bloc, the Christian Democratic Union will attempt to attract Russian Orthodox believers. The group has not yet developed into a national organization, and polls show that it is not well-known outside of St. Petersburg and Moscow. Its chances of passing the five percent threshold are considered small. Still, Savitsky will be competitive in his single-mandate district in St. Petersburg, where he enjoys the tacit support of the Democratic Choice of Russia.

Bloc 89

Blok "89"

This liberal bloc was formed on the basis of various fragments (led by Pyotr Phillipov) of the Russia's Choice Movement and the Association of Independent Professionals (led by Pavel Medvedev and Vadim Zhelnin). This portion of the Russia's Choice Movement broke off of Democratic Choice of Russia after the outbreak of the Chechen War. (It supported the president's use of force.) This organization considered rejoining the Democratic Choice of Russia -- United Democrats bloc and Boris Fyodorov's Forward Russia movement in August, but eventually decided to run independently. As the name suggests, Bloc 89 claims to represent the interests of Russia's 89 administrative regions. Interestingly, the bloc does not have a non-regional portion on its party list. Its entire list is broken into regional groupings. Its leader is State Duma Deputy Pavel Medvedev.

Federal Democratic Movement

Federalno-demokraticeskoye Dvizheniye

This small liberal bloc is led by: Oleg Novikov, chairman of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of Moscow; Oleg Kalugin, a retired KGB general; and Rimma Kazakova, a well-known poet. The bloc was originally denied registration by the CEC (because of procedural violations), but this decision was later reversed by the Supreme Court.

Bloc of Independents
Blok Nezavisimykh

As with Bloc 89, the Bloc of Independents does not have a non-regional part to its party list. Instead, its party list completely comprises regional groupings. The bloc aspires to form a consolidated center of deputies elected from single-mandate districts in the next State Duma. The bloc proclaims itself as largely non-ideological, but the composition of its leadership is moderate to liberal in orientation. Its leaders are Viktor Dyvadkin, Vladimir Nikonov and Pyotr Matyashov.

Stable Russia
Stabilnaya Rossiya

Although this bloc was initially formed on the basis of the faction "Stability" in the State Duma, none of the faction's deputies ended up joining the bloc. As its name suggests, the bloc calls for an end to societal crises and the normalization of Russian politics. As a result, Stable Russia possesses a centrist orientation. Its leaders are Oleg Petrov, Elina Bystritskaya and Aleksandr Gorlov.

Duma - 96
Duma - 96

This movement is associated with various enterprises with connections to the military-industrial complex. The bloc calls for a reform of the tax system and a lowering of export barriers. Its leaders are Vladimir Burenin, the dean of the Ministry of External Economics' Higher Business School; Mikhail Simontsov, corporate executive; and Georgi Kondratyev, Deputy Minister in the Russian Government.

The Beer Lovers' Party
Partiya Lyubiteley Piva

The Beer Lovers' Party was formed by young entrepreneurs as a playful foray into politics. Since then, the party leaders have become more serious, expressing support for Our Home Is Russia and promising to be a sort of watchdog for ordinary people in the State Duma if elected. The party may attract "protest votes" from those Russian who are cynical of politics. The party's leaders are Konstantin Kalachev, Dmitrii Shestakov, and Andrei Palchevskii.

Transformation of the Fatherland
Preobrazheniye Otechestvo

This bloc, which is led by the newly elected governor of the Sverdlovsk *oblast* Eduard Rossel, is the national incarnation of the regionally based organization that brought him back to power, "Transformation of the Urals." Rossel proclaims that his organization, which was formed in Ekaterinburg, is the one bloc that represents the interests of Russia's regions. The governor of the Irkustsk *oblast* is second on the bloc's federal list. Aside from its regional focus, the bloc is generally centrist in orientation. Because of the organization's late formation and lack of strength

outside of the Urals and Irkutsk Regions, the bloc is not considered to be a major contender for a faction in the State Duma. Leaders: Eduard Rossel, Yuri Nozhikov and Viktor Yakimov.

Interethnic Union

Mezhnatsionalnii Soyuz

As its name suggests, this centrist bloc is concerned with issues of nationality. The Interethnic Union is led by Abdulakh Mikitaev, the chairman of the Presidential Committee on Citizenship Issues; Albert Likhonov, the chairman of the Russian Children's Fund; and Makhmud Gareev, a retired general.

My Fatherland

Moyo Otechestvo

This opposition bloc was earlier a major component of Ivan Rybkin's bloc. My Fatherland exited Ivan Rybkin's bloc early in the campaign period with its leaders citing "weak leadership" and accusing Rybkin of being more pro-Yeltsin than Chernomyrdin. Nevertheless, the bloc's leaders consider the bloc the "constructive opposition" as well. The bloc advocates a slower pace of reform, and as its name indicates, urges strengthening the Russian state. With a late start and little to distinguish it from several other opposition blocs, My Fatherland will have to depend on the appeal of its well-known leaders: Boris Gromov, a former general and hero from the Afghan War; Stanislav Shatalin, an economist known for his economic plan providing a transition toward a market economy under Mikhail Gorbachev; and Iosif Kobzon, a well-known singer.

Generation of the Turn of the Century

Pokoleniye Rubezha

This bloc comprises a series of youth organizations, the most prominent of which are the Union of Youth Housing Cooperatives and the Student Union. It also includes a number of other smaller youth organizations of various political orientations. Its stated main objective is the protection of the interests of youth and young families. It has expressed willingness to cooperate with both Our Home is Russia and Ivan Rybkin's Bloc. The bloc's leaders are Dmitri Sokolnikov, Nikolai Pilipeshin and Marat Bariev.

Union of Communal Housing Industry Workers of Russia

Soyuz Rabotnikov Zhilishchno-Kommunalnovo Khozyaistva Rossii

This interest group bloc is of moderate orientation. As the representative of housing industry workers, the Union hopes to obtain additional government support for the housing sector of the economy. It was the 43rd and final bloc registered by the Central Election Commission. The bloc's federal list is led by Leonid Chernishov, Pyotr Surov, and Valeri Avdeyev.

Tikhonov -Tupolev-Tikhonov Bloc
Tikhonov-Tupolev-Tikhonov

This centrist to moderately nationalist bloc is led by Aleksandr Tikhonov, chairman of the Party of Consolidation; Aleksei Tupolev, director of the well-known aircraft producer "Tupolev"; and Viktor Tikhonov, long-time head coach of the USSR hockey teams.

For the Motherland
Za Rodinu!

For the Motherland is a nationalist bloc that comprises the movement "New Russia," the Peoples Patriotic Party, and the Union of Veterans of Afghanistan. Its leader is the former head of the State Property Committee, Vladimir Polevanov. He was fired after he sharply criticized Anatoly Chubais's privatization program. Yevgeny Podkozlin and Vladislav Tetryak round out the bloc's top three candidates.

Russian All-Peoples Movement
Rossiiskoye Obshchenarodnoye Dvizheniye

This nationalist bloc is connected with the Union of Cossack Military Forces of Russia, the Officers' Union -- "For the Rebirth of the Fatherland," and unions of veterans from the Afghan War. The bloc is also associated with the military-industrial complex. The movement calls for the close and inviolable connection between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian All-Peoples Movement is led by Aleksandr Bazhenov, Valeri Moshnyakov and Vladimir Platonov.

National Republican Party of Russia
Natsionalnaya Respublikanskaya Partiya Rossiya

This ultra-nationalist bloc is led by Nikolai Lysenko (State Duma Deputy), Nikolai Pavlov, and Konstantin Ovchinnikov. In contrast to many other ultra-nationalist groups, the National Republican Party of Russia is distinctly anti-communist. The party focuses on enhancing the rights of ethnic Russians, and suggests that only ethnic Russians should occupy positions in the government. On foreign policy, the party takes a European focus, and it proposes that Russia form an alliance with Germany against the United States. The party has also formed a paramilitary group called the "Russian National Legion," which sent soldiers to fight in civil conflicts in the Transdneistr Republic, Georgia, and the former Yugoslavia. In 1993, the party attempted to participate in the parliamentary elections but failed to collect the necessary signatures.

Most recently, the party has gained notoriety for Nikolai Lysenko's instigation of a fistfight in the State Duma chamber with Duma Deputy Gleb Yakunin. Because of the group's extreme views and small following, it is not expected to come close to the 5 percent mark.

Ecological Party "KEDR"

Ekologicheskaya Partiya Rossii "KEDR"

The Ecological Party "KEDR" qualified for the party list ballot in the December 1993 elections, but won only 0.76 percent of the popular vote. This year the movement hopes to establish itself as the only green party in the race. (The acronym KEDR stands for Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia in Russian. The word means "cedar.") Leaders of the bloc include Anatolii Pamfilov (party chairman), Leonid Yakubovich (a popular entertainer) and Artem Tarasov (a businessman and State Duma Deputy elected in a single-mandate district.

People's Union

Partiya Narodniy Soyuz

The party "People's Union" represents interests of those shareholders who lost their money in pyramid schemes and swindle operations. They claim that tens of millions of people fall into this category. The bloc calls for strict government control over financial and capital markets as well as government guarantees for bankrupt businesses. The party is led by Vladimir Lukyanov, Dmitrii Galagan and Gennadii Mironov.

Association of Lawyers of Russia

Assotsiatsiya Advokatov Rossii

The Association of Lawyers of Russia calls for the professionalization of the legislative process and claims that lawyers are indispensable in this process. The CEC originally disqualified the bloc because it claimed the bloc's signatures were late. The ruling was overturned by the Supreme Court, and the Association of Lawyers became one of the last blocs to register.

All-Russian Muslim Civic Movement "NUR"

Obshcherossiiskoye Musul'manskoye Obshchestvennoye Dvizheniye "NUR"

As its name suggests this bloc supports the interests of Russia's Muslim population, which is estimated at 20 million. The bloc supports the culture, traditions and language of Muslim, Turkic speaking peoples of Russia. "NUR" will be the only Muslim-oriented bloc in the race. "NUR" is led by Khalit Yakhin, Vafa Yarullin and Anver Shagidulin.

Peace, Goodness and Happiness...

Mir, Dobro, Shchastye...

The full name of this conglomerated bloc provides a quick sketch of its program and contributing organizations. The bloc's full name is "Electoral Bloc including the Leaders of the Party of the Defense of Children (Peace, Goodness, and Happiness), the Party of "Russian Women," the Party of Russian Orthodox Believers (Belief, Hope and Love), the Peoples Christian-Monarchist Party, the Party for Union of Orthodox Peoples, the Party of Agricultural Workers, the Party for the Defense of Invalids, the Party of the Repressed and Unfortunate." The bloc was organized by

Andrei Volkov, an independent State Duma Deputy. The bloc's federal list is led by Valentin Dikul (a well-known doctor), Vadim Voyevodin and Yan Koltunov.

Bloc, Including Leaders of the Party for the Defense of Pensioners and Veterans...
Predvyborniy Blok, Vklyuchayushchiy Rukovoditeley Partii Zashchity Pensionerov...

This conglomerated bloc has chosen to make its name a short version of its program. The bloc's full name is, "Electoral Bloc, including the Leaders of the Party of Defense of Pensioners and Veterans, the Party of the Eradication of Crime -- Legality and Order, Party of the Defense of Health Care, Education, Science and Culture, the Party of the Defense of Youth, Association of Free Trade Unions, the Party of Fairness, the Party of Environmental Protection." The bloc's leaders are Yevgeniya Davitashvili, otherwise known as "Dzhunya," Russia's most famous faith healer, Andrei Volkov and Aleksandr Pankratov-Chyorni.

IV. NDI PROGRAM ACTIVITY IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is committed to supporting the development of democratic political institutions in the Russian Federation through programs with political parties, civic activists, and national and local elected officials. NDI's programs in Russia are funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the National Endowment for Democracy.

Although elections are only one of the processes essential to democratic systems, the Russian parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1995 represent an important opportunity for strengthening political parties and civic groups and for promoting legislative responsiveness. NDI's pre-election program activities focus on these opportunities.

Field Presence: NDI maintains a permanent office in Moscow, which opened in June 1992. The office staff includes both regional specialists and functional trainers, whose work is supplemented by political and civic organizing and legislative specialists from around the world. Although based in Moscow, NDI-sponsored activities are carried out in seven additional Russian Federation cities and their surrounding regions: St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Nizhnii Novgorod, Krasnodar, Samara, Vladivostok and Chelyabinsk.

Political Party Development: To support the long-term development of a stable multiparty system in the Russian Federation, NDI has worked since 1992 to strengthen the capabilities of political parties that are committed to democratic principles. NDI trainers have conducted a series of national, regional and local seminars and consultations, reaching thousands of party activists from a wide spectrum of parties. During the second half of 1995, NDI's efforts focused on helping these parties prepare for and participate in parliamentary elections, with particular attention to developing their regional structures.

Election Monitoring and Electoral Processes: NDI has devoted resources to supporting election monitoring efforts by local parties and/or civic groups in Ekaterinburg, Nizhnii Novgorod, and Krasnodar. Domestic election monitoring is a vehicle for increasing public confidence in the voting process, for enhancing voter knowledge and participation, and for strengthening civic and party organizations. NDI is distributing materials and presenting briefings on both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of pollwatching, including parallel vote tabulations; offering guidance on organizational topics such as coalition-building, volunteer recruitment, and strategic planning; and establishing election monitoring support centers. In addition, NDI is providing forums for dialogue among parties, civic groups, and the Central Election Commission on the election law.

Civic Advocacy: NDI continues programs to increase the capabilities of nonpartisan civic groups to participate in politics and government. In a series of seminars since early 1994, NDI has highlighted the role of civic groups in influencing public policy, particularly at the local level. Starting in mid-1995, NDI's training has focused on the ways that civic groups can participate in the parliamentary elections on behalf of their members' interests.

Outreach and Voter Education: NDI has developed, translated and distributed throughout the Russian Federation written training materials and comparative literature on topics relevant to civic and political organizing and parliamentary and local government reform. NDI maintains a database of more than 6000 political and civic organizers, each of whom receives a mailing, including a newsletter and translated materials, every six weeks. NDI also contributes to the production of the political science journal *Polls* and to a weekly radio show on democratization. During the second half of 1995, each of these outreach efforts dealt with election-related issues. In addition, NDI assisted in the production of radio public service announcements to educate voters on candidate and party signature collection campaigns.

Local Government Assistance: Two cornerstones of any stable democratic system are the devolution of government authority and interaction between citizens and local government. With this in mind, NDI is engaged in programs to increase communication between municipal officials and their constituents, and to strengthen relationships among local deputies, political parties and civic organizations. NDI is concentrating its local government efforts in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Samara, Ekaterinburg and Nizhnii Novgorod.

V. MONITORING INFORMATION

Guidelines for Party Monitors

Rights and Responsibilities of Monitors

Rights

Your right to participate in the election process as an observer is guaranteed in Article 21, Chapter IV of the *Federal Law on Elections of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation*, which reads:

On election day, a candidate for deputy, electoral association, or electoral bloc is entitled to appoint one observer, who shall have the right to stay in the voting premises from the beginning of voting to the end of the processing of documents on election results and receive certified copies thereof.

In addition to observing the entire voting and counting processes, you are entitled to file an official complaint to the precinct electoral committee in the event that you witness any irregularities during either procedure. It is required by Article 59, Chapter X that your complaint be forwarded, along with the final results included in the committee's completed protocol, to the Territorial Election Commission for further consideration. Again, the law reads:

Complaints (applications) about violations of this federal law received by the polling station election committee on the day of the election, as well as decisions of the polling station election committee made thereon, shall be attached to the first copy of the protocol...Once signed, the first copies of the protocols of the polling station election committee shall be immediately forwarded to the respective territorial election commission.

In addition to the rights outlined above, you are entitled:

- To a position or seat within the polling station which allows you to observe all activities, including the sealing of all ballot boxes, voter registration, ballot dispensation to incoming voters, confidential voting, the dropping of ballots into the ballot box, the opening of ballot boxes at the end of the day, the counting of all ballots, and the completion of all protocols, provided you do not interfere with a voter or precinct election committee activities.
- To point out to the chairman of the precinct election commission or other appropriate official any concerns, inadequacies, or violations that you observe and to request that they be addressed.
- To record, on the attached reporting forms or other documents as you see fit, all aspects of all activities that you observe during the voting and counting procedures.

- To confer with other observers, as you see fit.
- To leave the polling site and return, as you see fit.

Responsibilities

Your primary responsibilities as an observer include the following:

- You should know the election law well.
- You should familiarize yourself with the precinct you are to observe. Look over the list of parties and candidates represented on the two federal ballots. Introduce yourself to each of the precinct election commission officials.
- You should conduct yourself professionally throughout your observation of the voting and counting processes and refrain from any activities that may hinder either.
- You should be vigilant and take detailed notes on activities you observe and describe questionable or irregular voting or counting practices. Include information on the time and place as well as identifying witnesses, if possible.
- You should ask questions, express concerns, and render opinions when asked, but do not instruct, give orders or attempt to countermand decisions of the election officials. Comments should generally be addressed to the election commission chairman.
- You should file an official complaint, to be attached to the precinct election commission's first protocol, in the event that you witness serious problems or violations during your observation of the voting and counting at your precinct.
- You should represent the interests of your party or candidate.
- You should show up thirty minutes prior to the opening of the polling site and should not leave until all ballots have been counted and protocols signed.
- You should forward your completed observation report (see attached sample) to your district party representative.

Instructions

1. Pre-Election Day Instructions
 - Read the election law carefully.
 - Ensure that the precinct voters' list is posted for voters to check their names.
 - Introduce yourself to members of the precinct election commission.

- Acquire documentation necessary to serve as a pollwatcher from your party's or candidate's authorized representative.

According to Section 4 ("Observers") of the regulations pertaining to observers:

Authorities of observers should be certified in writing by the authorized representative of the electoral association or electoral bloc. The document should specify the family name, first name and second name of the observer; place of residence; and the number of the electoral district where he or she is to visit. The document is valid upon presentation of a passport or identification document as a substitute. A preliminary notification of the precinct election commission on sending the observer to the electoral precinct is not required.

2. Election-Day Instructions

- You should bring the following items with you to the precinct polling site on election day:
 - Letter of Authorization
 - Passport or Identification Certificate
 - Monitor Reporting Forms
 - Writing Paper and Pens
 - Watch
 - Camera
 - Flashlight
 - Food (light lunch, snacks), Water
 - Candles and Matches
- You should arrive at 7:30, thirty minutes before the opening of the precinct polling site, to observe poll opening preparations.
- Once you have arrived, please complete the top portion of the attached reporting form and begin by answering the questions listed.

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SAMPLE PARTY MONITOR REPORTING FORM

Your Name _____ Phone _____

Your Address _____

Your Affiliation _____

District # _____ Precinct # _____

Poll Opening Time _____ Closing Time _____

Your Time of Arrival _____ Your Time of Departure _____

Name of P.E.C. Chairman _____

Name of Vice-Chair _____

Other Members of the Precinct Election Commission Present _____

Number of Voters on List _____ Final Number of Voters _____

Other Parties or Candidates Monitoring, Monitors' Names _____

Prior to Voting

Yes No

1. Adequate materials, ballots, and writing utensils
2. Expected election staff (no last minute changes)
3. Ballot boxes empty before being sealed
4. Ballot boxes sealed in presence of committee and observers
5. Booths or cabins allow for private voting
6. People who voted early crossed off voters' list
7. Ballots of those voting early removed from their envelopes
8. Chairman or vice-chairman of precinct committee present

During Voting

Yes No

9. Polls open on time
10. Monitors given space to observe all aspects of the process
11. Free access to the polling site
12. Polling site free of any campaign material
13. Voting lines orderly
14. Voting orderly
15. Voters required to present identification
16. Voters' lists are accurate
17. Voters signing the voters' list prior to receiving ballots
18. Voters receiving one ballot for each vote
19. Only committee members staffing the registration tables
20. Voters voting for themselves only
21. Polling booths remain private throughout the day
22. Ballot boxes remain in view of committee members and monitors
23. Polling place has adequate light, heat, space
24. Election workers respond to complaints fairly
25. Election workers act impartially
26. Party agents act impartially
27. Monitors travel with mobile boxes

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- 28. Voting calm, incident-free
- 29. Ballots signed twice, stamped by committee
- 30. Sufficient ballots
- 31. Visits by representatives of media
- 32. Visits by international observers

During Counting

Yes

No

- 33. People in line at close of polls allowed to vote
- 34. Polls close on time
- 35. Seals remain on ballot boxes until counting begins
- 36. Unused ballots counted first and then canceled
- 37. Only authorized representatives present during counting
- 38. Seals of ballot boxes broken in presence of committee and observers
- 39. Counting completed in presence of observers
- 40. Counting orderly
- 41. Ballots deemed invalid with consent of committee
- 42. Protocols filled out in triplicate
- 43. Any complaints attached to first copy of protocol
- 44. All three protocols signed by full committee
- 45. First protocol sent to territorial election commission
- 46. Third protocol made available to observers and representatives

(Please complete the monitor's protocol that follows)

Please explain any "no" answers, complaints, or challenges:

Sample Monitor Protocol

I. General Results

1. Number of voters on the voter's list: _____
2. Number of ballots received by the election committee _____
3. Number of ballots issued to voters on election day _____
4. Number of ballots issued to voters voting early _____
5. Number of ballots declared void _____
6. Number of ballots in stationary ballot boxes _____
7. Number of ballots in mobile ballot boxes _____
8. Number of valid ballots _____
9. Number of invalid ballots _____
10. Number of cast ballots containing no marks _____

II. Single-Mandate Results

Name of Candidate

Number of Votes Received

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
- 21.
- 22.
- 23.
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- 25.
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.

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