

PN-ABZ-357
91976

HOPE RESTORED?

HUMANITARIAN AID

IN SOMALIA

1990-1994

JOHN G. SOMMER
Director
Somalia Humanitarian Aid Study

NOVEMBER 1994

RPG

Refugee Policy Group

CENTER FOR POLICY
ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH
ON REFUGEE ISSUES

A

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

MAP

| | |
|--|------------|
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| ♦ Endnotes | 5 |
| CRISIS AND RESPONSE: KEY EVENTS, TRENDS AND DECISION POINTS | 6 |
| ♦ Roots of the Crisis | 6 |
| ♦ Onset of the Crisis: 1990-1991 | 9 |
| ♦ Crescendo of Crisis and Initial Responses: Early 1992 | 15 |
| ♦ Crescendo of Response: Mid-1992 | 21 |
| ♦ The Thanksgiving Decision and UNITAF | 27 |
| ♦ UNOSOM II | 39 |
| ♦ Endnotes | 50 |
| ISSUES AND ANALYSIS | 65 |
| ♦ Acting in Time | 65 |
| ♦ A Question of Balance | 70 |
| ♦ Effectiveness of Actions Taken | 81 |
| ♦ Endnotes | 101 |

CONTENTS

(Continued)

| | |
|--|------------|
| MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED | 112 |
| ♦ Major Conclusions | 112 |
| ♦ Lessons Learned | 120 |
| ♦ Endnotes | 124 |
| GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS | 125 |

ANNEXES

SOURCES

- A-1 **Select Bibliography on Somalia**
- A-2 **List of People Interviewed**

CHRONOLOGIES

- B-1 **Brief Chronology of Somalia Crisis and International Responses, 1990-1994**
- B-2 **U.S. Congressional Action on Somalia, 1990-1994**

STATISTICAL TABLES

- C-1 **U.S. Government Assistance to Somalia (Non-Military)-FY 1991-1994**
- C-2 **U.S. AID/OFDA In-Kind Grants for Somalia Emergency FY 1991-94**
- C-3 **U.S. Food Commodities Going to Somalia FY 1991-1994**
- C-4 **U.S. Defense Department Expenditures in Somalia FY 1992-1994**
- C-5 **Summary of Total USG Expenditures in Somalia, April 1992 to July 1994**
- C-6 **Total Funding Through U.N. Agencies for Somalia, 1992-1993**
- C-7 **U.N. Somalia Operations: Financial Components**
- C-8 **Contributions by Member States to U.N. Operations in Somalia**
- C-9 **Select Relief Agency Spending and Activities in Somalia**

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


This study has benefitted from the support and guidance of hundreds of individuals in the United States, Europe, and Africa, ranging from top level government, United Nations, and NGO policy-makers to relief workers and victims of the crisis in Somalia -- literally, from the Somali in the displaced persons camp to the former president of the United States in Kennebunkport, Maine. Each has contributed time and energy, often impassioned, as well as the varying perspectives without which this complex story, and its lessons, could not be understood. They have done so not only by participating in personal interviews, but also by sharing written views and supporting documents, and by joining in group discussions to review and inform earlier drafts of the study.

Key support has been given by members of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance in the U.S. Agency for International Development, not only by virtue of OFDA's indispensable funding of the study, but by providing substantive background and general support to its implementation. Bill Garvelink and Valerie Newsom should be singled out for special gratitude both for their help and for respecting RPG's independence in coming to its own conclusions, wherever the chips may have fallen.

Last, but hardly least, the study owes much to colleagues in the Refugee Policy Group in Washington and Geneva. Dennis Gallagher, as RPG's Executive Director, not only conceptualized the idea of the study, but was actively involved and provided important intellectual and practical advice and support throughout. Carole Collins, as Senior Research Associate, is due special gratitude for her indispensable role as daily collaborator, analyst and alter ego throughout the period of the study. Steven Hansch offered innovative ways of looking at mortality and health data and in thus understanding the possible effects of relief action and inaction in Somalia. Indeed, all RPG colleagues are due sincere appreciation for their help and collegial support.

John G. Sommer
Director, Somalia Humanitarian
Aid Study
November 1994

D



INTRODUCTION

Somalia in late 1990 became a harbinger of the "new world order": a country in chaos, torn by internal conflict, suffering from famine exacerbated by drought, and the site of tragic death on a massive scale. With the Cold War as history, the country had lost the strategic significance that had led first the Soviets, then the Americans to prop up the then-ruling dictator Siad Barre. As a result, aside from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a valiant group of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), it was difficult to attract broader interest in helping to stop the starvation. Nor did the international community, admittedly distracted by momentous events elsewhere in the world, show much interest in decisive diplomatic efforts to help mediate a peace among the warring Somali factions. The United Nations eventually took modest steps, but these lacked strength and efficacy on the ground.

Finally, as the horror of the situation became overwhelming by mid-1992, and as a handful of individuals in the U.S. Administration and Congress spoke out, the U.S. gradually, then boldly acted. A U.S. military airlift was organized, followed by a historic ground force of over 30,000 U.S. and allied troops whose mandate was to ensure the security of food deliveries to the starving. These dramatic steps changed the dynamic of the previous approach which had been to painstakingly negotiate -- and often pay extortion -- for safe passage of relief supplies with Somali faction and militia leaders. In fact, it was in response to donor frustration and anger over the losses from extortion, looting, and general insecurity that the military intervention was ordered. Correctly or not, it seemed the only way to stop the starvation.

On the departure of most American combat troops once the immediate relief operation was completed, the U.N., reluctantly, re-assumed official leadership of the international community's obligations in Somalia, by then expanded to include assistance for nation-building. The U.S., however, maintained an influential role which unfortunately included complicity in four months of ensuing warfare between the U.N. and the Somali faction led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid. After 18 U.S. soldiers who had tried to capture General Aidid were killed by his forces, the U.S. Administration announced the withdrawal of virtually all its military in favor of an attempt at political negotiation. Although some political agreements were subsequently reached among the contending Somali factions, they, like earlier agreements, were largely observed in the breach. By mid-1994, the clan warfare and banditry were again in full swing, although the food situation was relatively normal, in part due to good intervening harvests.

The Somalia crisis illustrates the need for a delicately managed balance between humanitarian, political, and military approaches in situations where all three are present. While the military response in Somalia clearly helped meet the short-term humanitarian needs, its very massiveness seemed to distract attention from the root political causes of the problem, without whose resolution the country would (and did) relapse into warfare.

The international response to the Somalia crisis can be partly described as a collision of realities. The U.S., the U.N., and the Somalis each had their own political, bureaucratic, and cultural realities which invariably conflicted with one another. The U.S., lacking domestic political support for a lengthy engagement, sought a "quick fix" that would permit it to withdraw. The U.N. knew it was insufficiently prepared to take on the task of Somalia and wanted to keep the U.S. involved longer. The Somalis benefitted from the influx of aid, and had a cultural style of prolonged discussion that far exceeded any donor's patience or resources. Indeed, the timeframes, too, were on a collision course.

In purely humanitarian terms, the Somalia relief operation enjoyed significant success. While recent estimates show that 154-240,000 lives were lost due to delays in undertaking earlier decisive action, 100-125,000 lives were saved by valiant relief workers, their supporting donors, and the U.S.-led military forces during the 1991-93 period.¹ Relief operations were conducted in conditions of extreme insecurity, requiring constant (indeed, excessive) compromises to get the aid through, and at considerable physical risk to relief personnel, some of whom were killed. Although more effort should have been given to earlier public health interventions in order to save lives lost to measles, diarrhea, and other diseases, innovative methods of food delivery were employed and a food monetization program was undertaken for the first time in an emergency situation with some promising results.

Somalia has become one of the seminal engagements in U.S. foreign policy. Along with Viet-Nam, it represents, to many, a failure of American power. Somalia did not turn the U.S. inside out, or result in over 50,000 American deaths, as did the Viet-Nam war. However, quite aside from its own suffering and internal dynamics, Somalia has played an important role in illuminating what may or may not be appropriate roles for the United States, and the international community as a whole, in a tumultuous post-Cold War era. This era is characterized by a breakdown of divisions between east and west and a consequent opportunity for broader global cooperation for purposes that include action to alleviate human suffering and promote human rights. Absent super-power competition for control of client states, strictures against violating national sovereignty have weakened, particularly where urgent humanitarian concerns are at stake. Yet the era is also characterized by an upsurge of nationalisms that have created ever more

humanitarian crises, exhausting the capacity or will of the international community to respond, and sufficiently complex that responses are fraught with both danger and the uncertainty of success.

Somalia inherited the worst of two worlds. It inherited the Cold War legacy of outside support for a harsh dictatorship and concomitant lack of democratic governing structures and discipline; when the dictatorship was overthrown, the country fell into anarchy. It also inherited a kind of post-Cold War void, in the sense that the international community had as yet no experience of coping with such crises in the "new world order" of the 1990s. To put it bluntly, Somalia became the guinea pig.

The crisis in Somalia came to world attention as a humanitarian crisis. People were starving due to drought and civil strife. But the problem was never at heart simply a humanitarian one; it was, and remains, political. Indeed, the central irony of recent Somali history is that a humanitarian manifestation (mass starvation) of an underlying political problem elicited a military response. This response, while helping to meet short-term humanitarian needs, further complicated the fundamental political problem -- with potentially anti-humanitarian consequences. Such is the irony -- and the basis for the lessons -- of Somalia.

Conclusions and lessons are already being drawn -- and applied -- from Somalia experience, some of them the wrong ones. In this sense, the importance of Somalia is not Somalia alone.² As a concerned Somali professional put it, "The international community should not be prejudiced against [involvement in] a Haiti or Burundi because of mistakes made in Somalia."³

This study, conducted by the Refugee Policy Group for the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, covers the period September 1990 to mid-1994 and has the following objectives:

- ◆ to identify key phases, decision points, and policy options faced in the Somali crisis by U.S., U.N., and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and decisions made in reaction to them;
- ◆ to discuss the various operational approaches in responding to the famine and civil conflict;
- ◆ to examine the individual institutional roles of U.S., U.N., and other donor agencies and the interaction among them; and

- ◆ to suggest lessons learned for the future.

The study focusses on the major famine areas of southern and central Somalia, rather than on the less affected northwest and northeast. The section that follows highlights some key events to furnish the context for decisions taken, or not taken, by the international community. These are stated as factually as possible, discussion and analysis being saved for the second main section of the study. That section is followed, in turn, by conclusions and lessons learned.

ENDNOTES

1. 240,000 is the estimate for excess mortality due to fighting and famine, and 154,000 represents the numbers thereof who could have been most readily saved through timely and effective action. The range of 100-125,000 lives saved include 50,000 during January 1991-August 1992, another 40,000 during August-December 1992 (the U.S. military airlift period), and about 10-25,000 during the subsequent UNITAF intervention period. For an explanation of this data, see Steven Hansch et. al., *Excess Mortality and the Impact of Health Interventions in the Somalia Humanitarian Emergency*, Refugee Policy Group and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, August 12, 1994.
2. Conclusion of a discussion on Somalia at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1/14/94.
3. Interview with Hussein Mursal, 12/4/93, Mogadishu.

CRISIS AND RESPONSE: KEY EVENTS, TRENDS, AND DECISION POINTS

Roots of The Crisis

Somalia's civil war emerged as a product of political, social, and economic repression under the Siad Barre regime that had seized government control in 1969. Barre's advent to power had at first been viewed positively, in light of the breakdown in the country's early post-independence democratic system. Indeed, in his early years in power Barre contributed to creating stability and initial steps toward modernization, declaring the traditional clanism to be backward and an impediment to progress. Subsequently, however, he used the government to impose policies that favored certain clans and sub-clan groups at the expense of others. These policies were deeply resented, but protests against them were harshly put down. Under this pressure, clans then assumed an important role in organizing resistance against the regime and its pattern of human rights abuses.¹

The international aid community became especially familiar with Somalia during the late 1970s, as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and bilateral donors were asked to support Ogadeni (ethnic Somali) refugees from Ethiopia. This was a result of Barre's launching of the Ogaden war against Ethiopia in 1977 in an attempt to annex Somali-populated areas of that country. The war initially won wide support among Somalis and brought Barre considerable popularity, but this support eroded as Somalia suffered sizeable casualties, large refugee flows, and economic havoc -- and ultimately lost the war. The Barre regime proved adept at finding ways to wrest maximum resources from refugee aid programs, claiming that 1.2 million refugees needed aid. UNHCR and other donors agreed to officially assist a still-inflated number of 700-800,000 refugees (or some 20 percent of Somalia's then-total population) throughout the 1980s, even though this generated more food imports than needed; the real refugee number was estimated at 300,000.² The siphoning off of aid to Barre's army and to enrich the small elite caused a lack of donor trust in Somalis that would color subsequent responses to crises in that country.³

Barre also proved adept at extracting military and economic aid from donors such as Italy and the two major Cold War protagonists. Italy, the largest overall donor to Somalia, contributed \$1 billion during 1981-90.⁴ The Soviet Union was Somalia's principal super-power benefactor during 1969-77 until the United States, in an unusual trade of clients and aid "swap" with Ethiopia, took over that role from 1978 to 1988, with some aid continuing into 1989-90. U.S. assistance to Somalia was to ensure military access to the Berbera and Mogadishu ports and airports, located strategically close to Middle East oil supplies, and to counter the Soviet Union's presence in Ethiopia. The U.S. provided the Barre government with almost \$600 million in foreign bilateral economic aid -- or 16.8 percent of its total of such aid -- between 1979 and 1991; it also provided over \$200 million in foreign military aid from 1982 to 1990, for a total of over \$800 million.⁵

This international assistance had several effects which contributed over the long run to Somalia's later crisis. Military equipment was used against various Somali clans and groups opposed to the Barre government, further exposing his clan favoritism and undermining national unity. It also helped militarize conflict within Somali society, as groups seeking greater democracy and an end to human rights abuses themselves felt forced to use arms; this seemed the only way to oppose Barre's ever more despotic rule and clan nepotism.⁶

The military aid had a ballooning effect on the Somali economy which was further fueled by refugee and other food aid, as well as by direct economic aid, some of which was apparently illegally used to support Siad's armed forces as much as to generate economic development.⁷ Beyond this, foreign, and notably U.S., assistance fed an "aid habit" from which privileged Somalis benefitted excessively and on which they relied.⁸ A number of observers believe the looting of 1990s emergency aid is simply a variant, not a departure, from past Somali patterns of receiving assistance.⁹

Finally, international support of the Siad Barre regime caused Somalis in the opposition to suspect the motivations of outsiders. Outsiders' overall political embrace of Barre was as much a problem as the specific military and economic aid provided. This was true of the U.S., of Italy (where relations were further complicated by corrupt business dealings between the two),¹⁰ and of Egypt (whose former minister of state for foreign affairs would become secretary-general of the United Nations and a key player in the coming crisis).

Start of Civil War

The end of the Cold War effectively ended Somalia's role as a U.S. strategic asset, even as it left Somalia and other areas of the Horn awash with weapons from a variety of sources. The key catalyst for the outbreak of open warfare was Barre's 1988 decision to bomb Hargeisa and Burao, in northern Somalia. The bombing followed an influx of anti-Barre dissidents from Ethiopia to Somalia following a deal he and Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam made to halt support for each other's dissidents in the other's country. The forced return of these dissidents to Hargeisa and Burao reinforced anti-Barre efforts by northern clan-affiliated political groups which had long felt excluded from government power. The brutality of Barre's attacks against them, the massive civilian casualties estimated at 15-60,000¹¹, the resultant refugee flows, and the outcries from human rights groups caused western donors to severely cut their Somali aid programs. While the Bush administration was loathe to reduce military aid to Somalia, Congressional outrage at Barre's human rights violations forced a cut-off in 1988. The bombing also generated bitter memories and culturally sanctioned demands for revenge among victimized Somali communities, further splintering an already tattered national social fabric, intensifying the unfolding civil war, and contributing to the break-up of the country as northwestern Somalia ultimately declared independence.

As war steadily spread southward across the country in 1989-90, it disrupted food production. Because of recurrent cyclical drought patterns, food production levels had been traditionally unreliable, even in the fertile southern region where most of Somalia's production is centered. Indeed, the country was never fully self-reliant in food, importing at least 30 to 50 percent of its requirements.¹² Land seizures had been common in the region bounded by the Juba and Shebelle rivers in the 1980s, the victims being minorities who were also the country's most skilled cultivators; those remaining were denied aid, credit, or services, making irrigation and efficient marketing impossible, not to mention adding to the political tensions.¹³ Following a period of drought in the mid-1980s, drought again spread across the country in the latter part of the decade, drawing down food reserves to dangerously low levels just as the civil war began to peak. By 1990, contending military forces displaced farmers and other civilians in the country's richest agricultural areas, the central and southern regions, further disrupting agriculture. Animal exports, the country's major revenue earner which traditionally supplied foreign exchange to purchase food abroad, also plummeted. And another important source of revenue -- overseas remittances by Somalis working in the Persian Gulf countries -- would soon dry up as a result of the Gulf crisis and war.¹⁴

International Community Fails to Respond

These events occurred as the major western powers and United Nations were heavily preoccupied with developments in Iraq and Kuwait, eastern and central Europe and the former Soviet Union, and Central America. In Africa, aid donors were more concerned with the unravelling of Ethiopia's repressive regime and with the economic collapse and re-ignited civil war in southern Sudan (a new Islamic fundamentalist government had seized power in Khartoum in June 1989). Thus, neither the U.S. nor the U.N., nor any other group of nations, acted to head off the brewing Somali conflict as the harbinger of a humanitarian emergency to come. The U.S., as elsewhere embarrassed by its past support of a despot in a new era of emphasis on human rights and democracy, lent some support to Egyptian and Italian efforts to bring about negotiations between Siad Barre and his opponents, but failed to take any stronger action; its "heart was not in it."¹⁵ Likewise, the U.N. failed to actively pursue diplomatic or other initiatives.

Onset of Crisis: 1990-1991

By the eve of the final battle to oust Siad Barre from Mogadishu in December 1990-January 1991, the capital was in a state of crisis. U.N. security officials in New York considered the situation so perilous that they required U.N. agencies to evacuate "non-essential" staff from Mogadishu as early as September 1990. By November and December 1990, reports of vehicle thefts and hijackings and shootings of expatriates had become a daily reality as anti-Barre fighters had begun infiltrating the capital, most of which was already off-limits for foreigners. In December, CARE asked to place its vehicles inside the U.S. Embassy compound, hoping to retrieve and use them once the security situation improved; they were later looted by Somalis storming the compound in January 1991.

Jan Westcott, a USAID contract employee who had arrived in Mogadishu in November 1990 to oversee a modest remaining AID NGO partnership project, found she had to spend most of her time monitoring NGO-related security incidents rather than helping them expand their programs.¹⁶ At this point, only a handful of NGOs and U.N. staff were operating in Mogadishu; others had been forced to relocate from rural areas and towns in central and southern Somalia to Nairobi, Kenya. By late 1990, violence was moving ever closer to the U.S. Embassy compound, AID and U.S. Embassy cars had been shot at, U.S. staff increasingly were asked to make blood donations for the injured, an armed attack on the offices of World Concern had thoroughly frightened the director's

wife and children, and plans for a peace conference in Cairo fell through, diminishing hopes for a negotiated settlement. Based on a recommendation of Ambassador James Bishop, the U.S. State Department ordered the departure of American dependents and non-essential personnel by December 20, reducing the number of official Americans from 150 to 37 still in country.¹⁷

Intense street warfare in late December and early January forced the final evacuation of all U.N., diplomatic, and NGO staff. U.S. personnel, who with a few other expatriates, Somali-Americans, and Somali colleagues had fled to the Embassy compound for safety, were airlifted out on January 5 and 6 as looters scaled the walls and removed most items of value.¹⁸ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) temporarily evacuated its personnel a day later, and the French NGO Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) also left briefly. Only SOS-Kinderdorf's Dr. Willi Huber, who was unusually well integrated in the local community, stayed behind and heroically continued ministering to thousands of war-wounded Somalis. On the day Barre fled the capital, January 26, all government administration collapsed. The fact that a few civil servants and police tried to continue working voluntarily is noteworthy.

By late January the ICRC and MSF had returned to Mogadishu, and by early February ICRC returned to Kismayu. While situations varied throughout the country, the conditions they found in these two cities were appalling, especially in the capital where both looters and departing Barre forces had stripped and destroyed everything they could, including water pumps, pipes, copper wiring, the telephone system, blood bank, national bank, shops, and public buildings. With the police disbanded and prisoners released from jail, the breakdown of civil administration was virtually total.

The overthrow of Siad Barre led to two types of security problems: banditry by those who saw the gun as the easiest means to gain food, other resources, and/or prestige;¹⁹ and intensifying factional fighting among the groups that overthrew Barre, as they fought to gain political ascendancy as well as to ensure that Barre, now based in Gedo, did not return to power. Although the capital was relatively calm during much of 1991, over the course of the year the conflict between two rival United Somali Congress (USC) leaders in Mogadishu, General Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, began to emerge as the largest threat to peace in the country. By the latter part of the year, real warfare would erupt as forces allied to the two leaders lobbed mortar rounds at each other from their respective northern and southern zones of Mogadishu, causing, by some estimates, 30,000 deaths and as many as 300,000 people forced to flee the city.²⁰

Effects on Food Supplies and Hunger

Continued fighting in many parts of the countryside throughout 1991 combined with the accumulated effects of drought to doom much of Somalia's food production. Fighting that interfered with port operations significantly cut food imports and the livestock exports that helped to finance them. By September-October 1991, early warnings of famine were being sounded by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the ICRC -- but evoked little response. An ICRC official, noting in October that in some areas "people have been dying for five months," called the Somali situation "catastrophic". Those displaced by fighting suffered particularly, the population movements themselves causing havoc in the countryside.²¹ While the Horn of Africa is known for its constant population movements, Somalia began to be especially characterized by uprootedness, migration, and armies on the move -- at the same time that many of the most at-risk people were tragically, and fatally, *non-mobile*, and died because they did not become refugees.²²

Although virtually all statistics relating to Somalia are suspect, largely due to constant population movements, opportunistic distortions, and inherent technical difficulties in data collection, they give at least a crude sense of the magnitude of the problems. During 1991, for example, aid officials reported that up to 90 percent of the rural population were suffering from lack of food.²³ The FAO estimated that 4.5 million people, or 60 percent of its then-population estimate, were at risk of starvation, and that Somalia's food harvests through June 1992 would equal only 25 percent of normal because of disruptions to agriculture caused by clan fighting.²⁴ The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated food production would be at 40 percent of normal levels.²⁵

While relief ships were periodically unable or unwilling to dock during 1991 -- for example, food shipments to Kismayu were suspended after three expatriate relief workers were robbed by bandits -- some were able to dock in Mogadishu during August and September with supplies for ICRC and CARE. In addition, ICRC was regularly, albeit with difficulty, sending food in via smaller ports and beach landings. In December, SOS Kinderdorf and UNICEF began airlifting supplies into Mogadishu for use by NGOs working in the capital. Late in the month, outgoing U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar appealed to the factions to allow relief shipments to get through, calling the fighting "a nightmare of violence".²⁶

International Diplomatic Efforts

There were a number of diplomatic efforts to mediate the conflict during 1991, but they made little headway. These included efforts by Italy and Egypt to convene a July peace conference in Cairo; efforts by the presidents of Djibouti and Kenya to broker a peace accord at two successive meetings in Djibouti; and other efforts by the Islamic Conference Organization and by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni as chair of the Organization of African Unity. The second Djibouti meeting, in July 1991, was widely attended by foreign representatives as well as leading Somalis, and called for a ceasefire and formation of an interim government. Its short-term promise was dispelled, however, after Ali Mahdi cited conference resolutions to justify being sworn in as president in mid-August and then appointed a government cabinet in October of which Aidid disapproved. This provided the political backdrop to the intense November 1991-January 1992 fighting in Mogadishu mentioned above.²⁷

U.S. Involvement After January 1991

The fall of Mogadishu to rebel forces and the international community's subsequent withdrawal severely limited the amount of information available to the outside world on what was going on in Somalia. ICRC and MSF provided some information to the NGO community based in Nairobi. John Fox, a U.S. Embassy political officer evacuated from Mogadishu via the U.S. to Nairobi, became the only U.S. official tracking Somali affairs full-time (Westcott being an AID contractor). He met with various factions visiting the Kenyan capital and kept as much of a watching brief on the abandoned Mogadishu embassy and its former Somali staff as possible from afar, working to get salaries to local employees remaining in Somalia or having sought refuge in neighboring countries.²⁸

On March 25, 1991, Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen declared Somalia a civil strife disaster, the official step needed to activate the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to respond. In February, OFDA had already appointed Jan Westcott as the U.S. emergency relief coordinator for Somalia, based in Nairobi, to coordinate U.S. aid to the ICRC, NGOs, and U.N. agencies. It was considered a major, and courageous, initiative when Westcott travelled to Mogadishu for an authorized maximum of 24 hours in April 1991 as the first U.S. Government visitor since the fall of Siad Barre. Fox had urged such a visit to demonstrate to the State Department that U.S. personnel could survive amidst the dangers of Mogadishu, a first step toward winning agreement to a more regular U.S. presence in Somalia. Westcott visited the remains of

the U.S. Embassy (where she photographed the damage and rescued correspondence left behind in a blown-open safe) and checked on local staff. Security and logistical support provided by the president of Conoco-Somalia proved critical to her ability to make the visit. (Conoco's presence and support was later suggested by some -- unconvincingly to most -- as evidence of an underlying U.S. Government commercial rationale for aiding Somalia.)²⁹

Westcott's trip was a turning point for OFDA, which thereafter began to fund relief efforts in Somalia through ICRC and NGOs. This supplemented other U.S. Government aid through the Food for Peace and Refugee Program offices. During FY 1991, total U.S. Government emergency assistance to Somalia would total \$29.6 million, an amount that tripled the following year.³⁰

In May 1991, OFDA Director Andrew Natsios testified on Somalia before Senate and House foreign affairs committees, and on June 28 the Senate passed a bill introduced by Senators Nancy Kassebaum and Paul Simon calling on President George Bush to lead humanitarian efforts and help organize peace negotiations. Earlier, during the Siad Barre regime, Congress had pressed to reduce U.S. aid due to his human rights violations; later it continued to urge more pro-active U.S. leadership in international relief efforts. Indeed, Congress led the Administration in guiding U.S. policy in Somalia throughout the crisis.

In July 1991, Political Officer Fox made the first official post-Barre trip by a U.S. Government official to Mogadishu. Westcott followed again in August to monitor the first arrival of U.S.-donated food in the capital.

As the crisis in Mogadishu worsened with renewed fighting from September on, Natsios, after a meeting with an ICRC representative in Washington, warned in October of massive deaths unless vastly greater relief efforts were mounted. He urged the ICRC, resistant for financial reasons, to substantially increase its efforts, and assured it of U.S. financial support. In November, Assistant Secretary Cohen "re-declared" Somalia a civil strife disaster, and Natsios joined the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in a demarche to other donors urging expanded funding of ICRC activities. The ICRC was to become the international community's primary surrogate in Somalia during late 1991 and early 1992.³¹

Relief Efforts

Along with ICRC in mid-1991 were ten or so NGOs working on a smaller scale in Somalia; of these, the principal ones were SOS, MSF, CISP (an Italian NGO), and Save the Children-U.K., working in Mogadishu. Functioning in the continued chaos of Somalia was very difficult for all of them. In October 1991, 45 ICRC vehicles were looted and workers repeatedly robbed. Despite these conditions, ICRC was then distributing about 2,000 tons of food per month in Mogadishu, about a third of what was needed in the city.³² In a precedent-setting step of extreme controversy -- one that would cause moral anguish throughout the humanitarian intervention -- ICRC felt it had to begin paying armed Somali militiamen for protection. (In the beginning they did so with food rather than cash which was at that point devalued.) This seemingly simple expedient proved to be a major decision, followed, albeit reluctantly, by virtually all relief agencies. Although pay-offs are not uncommon in famine situations, those in Somalia developed on a scale unprecedented in previous humanitarian aid history.³³

During the second half of 1991, MSF continued to provide medical care to the wounded during upsurges in street fighting in Mogadishu, as did the newly arrived International Medical Corps (IMC). SCF-U.K. was also much respected for its relief efforts, and CARE, too, returned at this time.

Other NGOs maintained operational bases in Nairobi, with staff making periodic trips into Somalia in support of relief efforts there. In February 1991, these groups had formed an Inter-NGO Committee on Somalia (INCS) to exchange information and attempt to coordinate efforts. Somali political faction representatives were invited to share their perspectives, until their political posturing and competition drove the NGOs to limit the time during which Somalis were welcome to attend.³⁴ This type of disjunction between expatriate NGOs and Somalis reflected an ambivalence about working with Somalis that would surface periodically throughout the intervention.

The U.N. and its Agencies

During most of 1991, the United Nations absented itself from Somalia due to an administrative decision based on insecurity. UNICEF fielded an assessment mission in February and later channelled some funding and seconded staff to NGOs pending U.N. permission to operate in the country; after strong appeals to the Secretary-General, this was finally received in December 1991. The World Food Program shipped 28,000 tons

of food to Somalia in late 1991, much of which was looted. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), following the recommendation of Resident Representative Osman Hashim, determined the situation was hardly ripe for development activities and completely stayed out. Given its traditional role as representative of the U.N. family of agencies, and of the Secretary-General himself, this absence was a particularly unfortunate symbol of U.N. lack of engagement.

According to Under Secretary-General James Jonah, Lloyds, the U.N.'s insurer, had threatened to break its contract if U.N. staff returned to such dangerous conditions.³⁵ However, few observers believe this was the sole limiting cause of U.N. impotence at a time when ICRC, NGOs, and others were returning to Somalia. Representatives of these groups felt keenly disappointed, even angered, by the U.N.'s disengagement.³⁶ Furthermore, the lack of a U.N. "eyes and ears" capability would diminish its ability to function effectively in the country later on. U.N. absence left a vacuum and a skepticism among most NGOs and Somalis that would be hard to overcome. There was a "tragic delay", Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun would later say, "and now we are paying the price."³⁷

Crescendo of Crisis and Initial Responses: Early 1992

ICRC in the Lead

As the late 1991 Aidid-Ali Mahdi fighting generated new hardships in Mogadishu, ICRC spent much of its time talking with Somalis, trying to understand their situation, building relationships, and, as the unfolding severity of the situation became clearer, trying to mobilize other international actors to help. On December 23, 1991 ICRC President Cornelio Sommaruga appealed to then-U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar for urgent efforts to respond to the "tragic situation of Somalia" and to "save these people from their agony." When a U.N. security team sent to Somalia from New York decided it was still too dangerous to authorize U.N. resident staff, ICRC was forced to take on even more responsibility on behalf of the international community. Indeed, by February 1992, facing the complete disintegration of all local structures, ICRC made an exception to its normal policy and decided to consider the entire Somali population as eligible for aid; ICRC then devoted an unprecedented one half of its worldwide budget to Somalia alone.³⁸ Even then, the needs continued to vastly outpace the response.

By February 1992, ICRC was distributing 4,000 tons of dry food per month to prevent starvation in the famine areas. In April, it shifted to large-scale wet feeding in Mogadishu (and later in other locations) when dry food looting became unmanageable. (Because it was subject to spoilage, prepared food was not particularly valuable to looters.) Unable to use the Mogadishu port due to the fighting and looting, ICRC brought its food in through smaller ports and beach landing sites, sometimes supplemented with helicopters; a side benefit of this was to allow closer access to needy rural areas and to avoid over-reliance on any particular local political faction (especially in Mogadishu). A further advantage was to somewhat lower the visibility of ICRC's aid so as not to suggest to other donors that more aid was not needed.³⁹ At the same time, ICRC arranged for numerous journalists to visit Somalia to see the extent of the need, in the hope that other donors, thus informed, would join in helping.

Efforts to Involve the U.N.

In December 1991, OFDA's Natsios, calling Somalia "the worst humanitarian crisis today", joined the ICRC and NGOs in criticizing the lack of a strong U.N. role. Jonah himself would later admit that "the United Nations can be criticized for not promptly organizing itself to be effective on the political side, which it did not do until December of 1991."⁴⁰ Under outside pressure, the appointment of a new, more activist Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt, and rising awareness within the U.N. of the need to act, new efforts took shape in early 1992 to find a political solution and to coordinate greater flows of humanitarian assistance. The Security Council adopted several resolutions concerning Somalia, beginning with Resolution 733. Proposed by Cape Verde and passed on January 23, 1992, it sought to pave the way for a solution by urging the parties to cease hostilities, calling on other countries to maintain an arms embargo, and requesting the Secretary-General to boost reconciliation efforts and relief flows. Because some Security Council members were reluctant to intervene in a civil conflict situation without a host government invitation, a legal fiction was created in the form of a letter from the Somali charge d'affaires in New York, even though he clearly represented no one at that point. This, however, provided the "legal basis" for action under Resolution 733.⁴¹

Also in January, Jonah was sent to Somalia to meet with all parties on the Secretary-General's behalf. His trip demonstrated the dangers of attempting rapid diplomacy with little advance groundwork, which was inevitably minimal given the U.N.'s year-long absence from Somalia. While attempting to be even-handed, Jonah was initially seen as tilting toward Aidid thanks to the latter's careful orchestrating of his local

travel. Jonah's later statements implying support for Ali Mahdi -- perhaps intended to correct that perception -- only served to sharpen tensions between the two Mogadishu leaders, while smaller clans, which had sought to play a mediating role and avoid siding with either Ali Mahdi or Aidid, felt ignored and alienated by his concentration on Mogadishu. Furthermore, many did not trust his non-transparent style of negotiating separately, rather than collectively, with local leaders.⁴² Notwithstanding all this, a ceasefire agreement was reached between the two Mogadishu leaders on March 3, 1992.

Following the agreement, Boutros-Ghali sent a technical team to Somalia to prepare plans for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism. The team obtained Aidid's and Ali Mahdi's agreement, leading to the formation in April 1992 of UNOSOM I, the appointment of Mohamed Sahnoun as the Secretary-General's special representative, plans for 50 unarmed ceasefire observers and 500 armed guards to protect food relief in Mogadishu, and the establishment of a 90-Day Plan of Action for emergency humanitarian assistance. Thus was born the U.N. mandate in Somalia.

Sahnoun has been widely credited for his culturally sensitive and effective negotiating style and breadth of consultations throughout the country. U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley, who was later cast in a somewhat similar role, albeit as U.S. special envoy, suggests that the breadth and comprehensiveness of Sahnoun's contacts have probably not been matched since.⁴³ Sahnoun gave reconciliation efforts a high priority. He launched intense efforts, from May up to the time of his dismissal in late October, to create greater understanding and consensus among the parties to the conflict, engaging in extensive and repeated negotiations with a large array of leaders at many levels.

Also in March 1992, UNICEF's country representative David Bassiouni was appointed as the first U.N. humanitarian coordinator to Somalia. The position would normally have gone to the new UNDP representative Brian Wannop, but the latter, notwithstanding a direct order of the Secretary-General, refused to be based in Mogadishu on the grounds that most other donors and diplomatic personnel were based in Nairobi. UNDP also failed to provide anticipated financial support for Bassiouni's efforts, with the result that UNICEF picked up some of the slack.⁴⁴

At the time of Bassiouni's appointment, ICRC and WFP had agreed to divide responsibility for food delivery in Somalia, with the latter responsible for Mogadishu and the former for a number of other locations. The problem was that Mogadishu's port had been closed since December 1991 and that Bassiouni felt ICRC's strategy of using smaller ports undercut his and WFP's efforts to open it. He was also concerned about a general pattern of ICRC not keeping the U.N. sufficiently informed of its activities.⁴⁵ ICRC, on the other hand, felt it necessary to maintain a clearly separate identity from that

of the considerably less popular U.N. in Somali eyes. In the event, and as a result of the efforts of a joint committee for relief assistance composed of representatives of north and south Mogadishu and from the U.N. (including WFP Country Representative Holbrooke Arthur), the port was reopened in May 1992, and the delivery of additional emergency supplies became possible throughout both the Ali Mahdi- and Aidid-controlled parts of the city.

A promising operational development within the U.N. at this time was the establishment in March 1992 of the new Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) to coordinate U.N. and donor appeals and emergency responses worldwide. In April, Swedish envoy Jan Eliasson took up his appointment as its first "humanitarian aid czar", albeit a czar with few powers or resources. Given the gravity of the Somalia crisis, Eliasson was criticized by some for giving it insufficient priority and failing to visit Somalia during the first five months of his tenure. Others, however, criticized him for spending too much time on travel in general and not enough on effectively organizing his new department and attempting to make it a significant force within the U.N. system.

Escalating Starvation

Notwithstanding these initial international efforts, the U.N.-brokered ceasefire, and the abating of clan conflicts in early 1992, there was a horrifying spread of famine, especially in Somalia's historically most productive regions. The U.N. technical mission visiting in March estimated that 1.5 million Somalis were seriously threatened by lack of access to food and health care, and that a further 3.5 million urgently needed humanitarian assistance, out of a total estimated population of 6 million.⁴⁶ The most severely affected groups were those that had not been direct participants in the civil war, but had fallen victim to theft of food harvests and reserves and destruction wrought by Barre's and other militias in renewed fighting in this most fertile part of the country. Most farmers were unable to plant for the next harvest. Their livestock had often been killed, homes burned, and wells damaged. Looters springing up amidst the economic and social chaos also took their toll. Thus, food reserves and general assets that normally carried Somalis through periods of drought or other disturbances were no longer available to them. Studies suggest that if a serious humanitarian intervention had been conducted at this stage of early 1992 -- and preferably in 1991 -- many of Somalia's lost lives would have been saved.⁴⁷

Trying to face down the famine were a small number of NGOs, who, with ICRC, were still virtually the sole international observers of the unfolding holocaust. Up to a third of Somali children under five died of starvation and associated diseases in the famine zone.⁴⁸ Countless others died for lack of potable water, some of them, ironically, amidst sudden floods, which only added to the cumulative suffering wrought by war and drought decimating Somalia's food reserves and supplies. Often the only timely "relief" item to reach the hundreds who died each day at major feeding camps was the traditional white burial cloth used by Somalis to wrap their dead.⁴⁹

In May 1992, Jan Westcott returned to Mogadishu and was horrified: "The general population of the country is so desperate that death from a bullet or from starvation is of no consequence to a displaced Somali with no hope," she cabled to the OFDA office in Washington on May 13, 1992. At roughly the same time, mortality data from the Centers for Disease Control were sent to OFDA but seemed to take time to be acted upon. "The policy levels were relatively passive" till mid-1992, a CDC researcher felt.⁵⁰ During May, Medecins Sans Frontieres documented famine deaths in Merca, and in June, ICRC's Geoff Loane visited a new "epicenter of death" in Baidoa and recalls "hitting my limit. It was a slight on the international community to have let this happen," he felt as he reported the horror to his Geneva headquarters.⁵¹ ICRC followed up by launching its own airlift to Baidoa, as its normal preference for negotiating safe road access would have taken too long under the dire circumstances. A key element of ICRC's effort was to support its Somali Red Crescent partners, one of whose most important responsibilities (given the danger of epidemics) was collecting dead bodies from the streets and conveying them to grave sites, a task for which relatives of the deceased were often too weak or too poor. At the height of the crisis, in Baidoa alone they picked up and buried 800-900 bodies per day, for a total of 16,000.⁵²

The U.S. Government Response - a House Divided

Information on the unprecedented scale of the unfolding Somali tragedy had begun flowing into the U.S. Department of State beginning in late 1991.⁵³ State's East Africa office, supported by the Human Rights Bureau, was working closely with OFDA to try to get the U.S. back in to help. Except for some ICRC and NGO grants, aid had been largely halted due to Barre's human rights violations and to Brooke Amendment provisions barring assistance to countries in arrears on their debts. Within the State bureaucracy, Assistant Secretary Cohen fought "tooth and nail" to help OFDA become operational inside Somalia.⁵⁴ Such efforts were opposed, however, by Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs John Bolton and by Brent Scowcroft, President

Bush's national security advisor, who were against expending effort and scarce financial resources on an area peripheral to U.S. strategic interests. "Let's not try to right every wrong in the world," Bolton was reported as saying.⁵⁵ The State Department leadership had opposed Cape Verde's original draft Resolution 733 in the U.N. Security Council in January, and insisted on watering it down. Secretary of State James Baker reportedly reacted angrily upon learning of the decision to send 50 unarmed ceasefire observers; with the U.N. peacekeeping budget in arrears due to the Cambodian and other operations, he was concerned about the cost.⁵⁶ The U.S. found itself isolated within the Security Council during this period. The Security Council's president could not help asking, "Is Africa worth only a few crumbs of bread?"⁵⁷

Although OFDA had acted ahead of the rest of the U.S. Government in its response, both NGOs and new OFDA Director Jim Kunder, who came on board in December 1991, feel that Somalia was still of relatively low priority within that office.⁵⁸ OFDA was struggling to respond to multiple crises, with Somalia merely one among many, including Sudan, Bosnia, Ethiopia, and especially the former Soviet Union, where "much of the earth had suddenly opened up for the possibility of emergency intervention."⁵⁹ While OFDA was giving increasing grant support to NGOs, Kunder notes that his own newness on the job and State Department unwillingness to authorize sending an official assessment mission to the field slowed what might have been a faster, larger engagement. During a February-March trip to Ethiopia's border with Somalia, where Kunder personally saw large numbers of Somali refugees in terrible condition, he began to understand the true magnitude of the crisis and to explore strategies to send aid inside Somalia from Ethiopia.

While the Bush Administration was divided on how to respond to Somalia, Members of Congress -- notably Senators Simon and Kassebaum and Representative Tony Hall -- had been pushing with renewed vigor in early 1992 for it to become more actively engaged in efforts to achieve a ceasefire and ensure food deliveries. Responding to their January 15 letter to Baker (signed by other Congressional colleagues as well), the State Department in mid-March said it was considering proposals to flood the combat zone with food -- but no such action was yet being taken. Following several months of House and Senate hearings and meetings with OFDA, NGOs, and U.N. officials, legislators by the end of June were urging both the Administration and the U.N. to give Somalia the "highest priority".

Crescendo of Response: Mid-1992

I have just returned from Baidoa, Somalia, a town 100 miles west of the capital, Mogadishu. What I witnessed there will haunt me for the rest of my life. I decided to go against the advice of my friends in the Department of State.... The women of Baidoa and the children they revere are so weakened from the prolonged famine they have endured that without urgent medical attention, all the food in the world would not save them... relief workers told me that the death rate there was between 200 and 300 people a day.

- Congressman Mervyn Dymally⁶⁰

The U.S. Wakes Up

Everything began to change in June-July 1992. A combination of greater media and Congressional attention, slowly building NGO pressure, and the politicizing of Somalia as a U.S. presidential election issue created a "critical mass" of pressures that led to a sharply increased U.S. and international response. By June 1992 OFDA's phone was ringing off the hook as media, congressmen, and ordinary citizens called seeking more information. Staff could hardly work on anything except Somalia as demands for information escalated both inside and outside the State Department building.⁶¹

Although the British and other European press, and very occasionally the U.S. press, had made reference to the Somali crisis for some months, most observers credit *The New York Times'* July 19 front page story and photo with sparking greater media and policy-makers' attention, particularly as other editors soon followed *The Times'* lead and the "CNN factor" came into play. ICRC's Loane recalls having taken an initially hesitant Jane Perlez, *The Times'* correspondent, on his visit to Baidoa; before being exposed to the horror, she had asked "Why don't Somalis take more responsibility for themselves?"⁶²

Heightened U.S. Government attention was also generated by U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone's "A Day in Hell" cable. Handed to President Bush by then-deputy National Security Adviser Jonathan Howe, it described his shock upon visiting feeding camps for Somali refugees along the Kenyan border. Hempstone, with impeccable conservative credentials, was considered no easily shaken bleeding heart. This was followed by Senator Kassebaum's July trip to Somalia with Jim Kunder, and subsequent congressional testimony by Andrew Natsios, then head of AID's Bureau for

Food and Humanitarian Assistance, of which OFDA is a part. All of this added to the growing momentum for action. Furthermore, the U.S. presidential campaign was heating up, and candidate Bill Clinton began to sharply criticize President Bush's inaction on behalf of the starving in Somalia.

From Europe, French Government Minister Bernard Kouchner had visited Somalia in May 1992 and been persuasive in affecting government and public opinion in the European Community. Indeed, the French became so engaged in the issue that even in their famously shut-down vacation month of August they were able to conduct a nationwide food-collection campaign. The Irish Prime Minister visited Somalia in August, followed by an October visit by Irish President Mary Robinson. Meanwhile, in a July 22 Security Council meeting, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali referred angrily to "fighting a rich man's war in Yugoslavia while not lifting a finger to save Somalia from disintegration"; it was a sound-bite heard 'round the world.⁶³

On July 24, President Bush issued a statement committing the U.S. to provide air transport and fund the deployment of the long-delayed 500 U.N. Pakistani troops to guard relief shipments in Mogadishu. He also instructed Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to be "forward leaning" on Somalia.⁶⁴ A number of observers felt Bush's stance was in response to Clinton's campaign pressures. Many also believe that a similar desire to generate political support on the eve of the Republican Convention contributed to his August 14 announcement of Operation Provide Relief, in which he ordered the U.S. military to airlift food supplies into Somalia. Bush himself states that "it was the impossibility of continuing ground delivery which dictated resort to airlift to get supplies to distribution points. Political considerations in general, and the Republican Convention in particular, were absolutely irrelevant to the substance and timing of that decision."⁶⁵

Operation Provide Relief, August 1992

The U.S. military airlift, dubbed Operation Provide Relief, grew out of internal U.S. Government discussions during the summer of 1992 about the possibility of a more extensive U.S. intervention. In June, the National Security Council (NSC) had begun convening inter-agency "Deputies' meetings" on Somalia,⁶⁶ and Secretary of State Eagleburger had set up a departmental Somalia Task Force in late July to review events and formulate the "forward leaning" policies requested by President Bush. At that point, U.S. officials despaired of gaining Somali acceptance for the 500 U.N. "food guards", and doubted that this level of effort to protect relief deliveries would be sufficient to save lives. At the same time, the financial drain caused by the Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and

Desert Storm operations discouraged support for a truly major U.S. initiative. "As always happens," said Kunder, "the first way out that occurred to planners seeking to respond to public pressure without difficult policy changes was to look at airdrops and airlifts."⁶⁷

Natsios initially was opposed to the airlift, indeed would have preferred an earlier ground intervention.⁶⁸ In fact, this was not the first time airlifts had been considered or conducted: ICRC had been airlifting food to Belet Uen since March, Lutheran World Federation began its airlifts on May 14 -- ultimately flying 1100 missions with 18,000 tons⁶⁹ -- and the World Food Program began airlifts in August. The U.S. (through OFDA), E.C., Germany, and Belgium had all been running or paying for airlifts, as had Italy, the U.K., and France. U.S. Government-funded civilian aircraft alone carried a total of 19,435 metric tons to Somalia and 60,000 tons to Northern Kenya for Somali refugees.⁷⁰ But the U.S. military airlift idea proved attractive to State Department and NSC planners who wanted something relatively safe, that would "jump-start the relief effort",⁷¹ inspire other donors to assist, "get the job done", and from which it would be relatively easy to disengage. The decision was made and implemented quickly, reflecting the Administration's intent that it be dramatically symbolic of the U.S.'s response.

General Frank Libutti received orders at Central Command in Tampa the morning of August 15 to take off for Kenya to evaluate the possibilities that very afternoon. His plane, refueled twice in mid-air to save time, arrived in Mombasa before the Kenyan government could be properly informed, let alone clear the mission's presence, creating something of a diplomatic row. (Libutti and Ambassador Hempstone had to do some fast-talking with President Moi after Kenyan newspaper headlines decried the "U.S. invasion".⁷²) Notwithstanding the initial haste, it took two weeks to arrange the required diplomatic clearances, arrival of OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) members, coordination with NGOs, preparation of the intended 4-5 Somali landing sites, and warehouse food releases. A Joint Task Force multi-service command under General Libutti then coordinated the fourteen U.S. military planes involved at the height of the operation. In addition, two planes were contributed by Germany and three by Canada.

OFDA's Expanding Commitment

OFDA's commitment in Somalia was quickly augmented by the deployment of Disaster Assistance Relief Teams (DARTs) to Nairobi and Mombasa to coordinate the airlift with the U.S. military. The DART arrived in Mombasa on August 21 and that same day organized the first of several relief food airlifts from Mombasa to a UNHCR-

run Somali refugee camp in Wajir, Kenya. Within eleven days, the first military airlifts into Somalia itself began; they were to continue, at subsequently declining levels, until February 1993.

The DART sub-office in Mombasa, assisted by AID regional office staff, functioned as a logistics arm for the airlift and as an interface between the U.S. military and NGOs. Its role was to set priorities for relief flights, to "verify need and coordinate delivery." On a daily basis it communicated by radio with NGOs on the ground inside Somalia to ensure that security conditions allowed a safe landing and that receiving NGOs were ready to offload and take responsibility for the shipment being delivered.⁷³ U.S. military rules of engagement prohibited flying unless assured of safe landing conditions. Food movements were also coordinated through the World Food Program in Mogadishu, particularly since WFP supplied some of the food and paid NGOs' internal transport, storage, and handling.

The DART main office in Nairobi managed OFDA's overall relief response to the Somalia crisis, overseeing the Mombasa airlift, coordinating with Nairobi-based NGOs and U.N. agencies working in Somalia, and liaising with the Kenyan government and U.S. Embassy. It coordinated daily communication, via "SitRep" reports, from the Mombasa DART to OFDA headquarters in Washington.

The DART also served to facilitate the awarding of OFDA contracts and grants to agencies carrying out relief efforts in Somalia. A most appreciated feature was "to bring the mountain to Mohamed" -- contract officers to the field -- which speeded up aid delivery by a critical, often life-saving several weeks over the alternative of referring all proposals to its Washington bureaucracy. DART field staff would do the work-up on NGO proposals; a grants officer would do the administration, including preparing the "PIOTs"⁷⁴, and deal with program issues; and the DART contract officer did the fiscal work.

Between August and November, with a staff of 600-800 people, Operation Provide Relief conducted 2,486 flights, carrying 28,000 metric tons of relief supplies, equal to 112 million meals, or enough to feed Richmond, Virginia for 180 days.⁷⁵ Because food prices were significantly lowered as a result of the airlift, Natsios, despite his initial opposition, subsequently concluded it had helped after all.⁷⁶ (A number of relief experts believed it important to flood the market with food in order to make it more accessible to more people and, theoretically at least, less attractive to looters.) The airlift succeeded, by all accounts, because of the exceedingly effective cooperation achieved among OFDA, the U.S. military, and relief agencies on the ground, along with judicious planning and, no doubt, a certain amount of luck. Perhaps equally important for the

future, it created in Washington "an activist consensus [for aid to Somalia] in the national security bureaucracy where none had existed earlier."⁷⁷

There were difficulties, to be sure: overwhelmed relief infrastructures as large populations were enticed by the airlift to the new feeding centers; constant security problems, some of them exacerbated by the airlift; limited flexibility due to military requirements; inappropriate "airport use charges" (otherwise known as extortion); and a fueling of the war economy through the added influx of valuable commodities.⁷⁸ Mounting security problems meant that airlifted food could not be moved further than 30 km. or so beyond the receiving landing sites;⁷⁹ as a result (and also due to rain-damaged roads), OFDA was reluctantly forced to approve occasional airdrops. ICRC faced a particular problem: given its historical tradition of neutrality requiring that no arms be carried on its relief missions, a combination of sensitivity and obfuscation was required to meet ICRC institutional requirements and to protect the integrity of its red cross and red crescent symbols, while also protecting the U.S. military's need to ensure security for personnel and equipment. A major problem, and the ultimate reason for its perceived lack of sustainability, was the putative expense of the airlift and the resultant conclusion that any airlift was inherently incapable of responding to the full scale of the crisis as it further unfolded.⁸⁰

The New Aid Scene

The mid-1992 Somalia media publicity, followed by the airlift, set in motion a much broader change in the entire dynamic of the relief effort. From August onward, a whole new set of NGO actors came on the scene, with a diverse array of oft competing relief strategies and approaches. Their diversity confused the Somalis and illuminated the need for greater collaboration among NGOs, U.N. agencies, and bilateral donors. In September-October, both new and old-timer NGOs in Mogadishu established a consortium to coordinate with U.N. and bilateral aid structures; it met weekly with the U.N.'s humanitarian coordinator. While this helped to some extent, the very number of NGO actors disrupted carefully crafted negotiating processes set up by earlier actors, notably ICRC. ICRC had tried to develop a transparent negotiating process with "any Somalis who wanted to be involved", for example, to negotiate safe road access for food delivery vehicles. This process fell apart with the airlift approach of "throwing a machine at the problem". Road negotiations were soon overtaken by events, leading, in turn, to increasing reliance on costly airlifts -- and eventually to military intervention.⁸¹

Given the sudden influx of resources in the context of a non-functioning formal economy, historical patterns of enrichment through aid exploitation -- a sense that aid belongs to no one, hence to everyone -- and a tradition of weapons availability, it was perhaps not surprising that many Somalis took advantage of the situation and increasingly seized relief resources by force. In the context of rampant economic collapse, the influx of relief workers and their supplies became the newest (and often only) source of quick wealth to be exploited by anyone with a gun. The question would inevitably arise as to whether aid was exacerbating the larger problem of Somalia.

U.N. Efforts

While the U.N. in mid-1992 was working intensively through Ambassador Sahnoun to mediate a long-term peace agreement among the various Somali factions, progress was slow because of the need to negotiate not only with the main faction leaders, but also with the sub-clan leaders and elders who often provided their power bases. Added to this was a Somali sense of time quite different from the Western desire for a "quick fix". Somalis value lengthy discussions and "processing"; "they need endless time", noted one savvy observer.⁸² Indeed, this key cultural difference explains much of the problem encountered by international diplomacy in Somalia throughout the crisis. Sahnoun, who adapted his diplomatic style to Somali realities, is convinced he was making tangible progress toward isolating the more intractable warlords from their sub-clan supporters and moving toward a broader political agreement. He also felt that the 50 unarmed U.N. observers were playing an important and appreciated role in Mogadishu, and that the agreed 500 peacekeeping troops could have played an important role if their dispatch had not been delayed by three months due to a slow U.N. response, and if their eventual deployment had not been so sharply limited by safety concerns.⁸³ In this latter feeling, he was in a virtual minority of one; most observers feel these numbers were woefully inadequate, enough, at best, for a symbolic message of international concern. Sahnoun publicly criticized the poor performance of the U.N. and its agencies, notably WFP in the first half of 1992.⁸⁴ He also felt his efforts were being sabotaged, first, by supply shipments to Ali Mahdi's forces in U.N.-marked airplanes (which added to Aidid's mistrust of the U.N.), and then by an announcement from United Nations headquarters -- without advance consultation with him or with Somalis on the ground -- that 3,000 additional troops (plus logistics support) would be sent to Somalia. His criticisms of U.N. management annoyed Boutros-Ghali who in late October, in effect, dismissed him.

Sahnoun was replaced on a short-term basis by veteran diplomat Ismat Kittani who, ironically, agreed with 90 percent of Sahnoun's criticisms of U.N. performance (albeit refraining from saying so publicly)⁸⁵, but was unable to achieve the level of trust that his predecessor had enjoyed with the Somalis. Some Sahnoun admirers wonder if even he could have succeeded in "plucking the feathers" of Aidid's support base, winning Aidid over to an agreement short of one giving him absolute power, and broadening opportunities of expression to representatives of civilian, unarmed society. Yet his removal seriously set back efforts to negotiate a halt to the rising tension between Aidid and Ali Mahdi in Mogadishu. It led to effective suspension of many carefully crafted relief shipment agreements concluded with diverse factions elsewhere, and marked, to many minds, the death knell for any near-term political solution.

On the relief side, the U.N. during the summer and fall of 1992 tried to expand its efforts on behalf of Somalia through additional Security Council resolutions and the October launch in Geneva of a DHA-organized 100-Day Plan of Action to more rapidly deploy UNOSOM personnel and boost relief flows. With OFDA funding, CARE President Philip Johnston was seconded to UNOSOM to carry out the plan; he ultimately replaced Bassiouni as the U.N.'s humanitarian coordinator, a move that gave temporary hope to NGO representatives who had lost considerable confidence in the wake of Sahnoun's removal. However, Johnston's subsequent illness and limited tenure (a problem with virtually all appointments in Somalia) inevitably limited his contribution. The 100-Day Plan itself was considered effective in food distribution, but not in other relief activities, partly due to security problems, but also to its nature as a relatively unprioritized list of different agencies' project ideas.⁸⁶ The predecessor 90-Day Plan had proved even less successful for much the same reasons.

The Thanksgiving Decision and UNITAF

By October-November 1992, mortality statistics began to indicate that the emergency was easing. Rains had returned, promising a good food crop to ease the shortages; indeed, ICRC had begun purchasing seeds produced in Lower Shabelle for its agricultural programs.⁸⁷ Death rates were falling, some say, because the most vulnerable and likely to die had already done so -- a number now estimated, albeit with uncertainty, at 240,000.⁸⁸ A November *Washington Post* article graphically showed that death rates in Baidoa had declined from a high of 1,780 per week in early September to 306 two months later, although that was not true of all locales. Baidoa was also facing a severe water shortage, since Barre's troops had destroyed most of its wells.⁸⁹ Sources disagree

on whether mortality rates were actually falling, or falling sufficiently quickly, or whether such a fall represented a permanent downward trend, indicating success, or a temporary one dependent on future security conditions. Some assumed, quite simply, that now the hardier were likely to die. In fact, insecurity -- manifested via attacks on convoys and relief workers -- continued and in places increased. In late October, clan warfare culminating in the capture of Bardera by General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan", Siad Barre's son-in-law, exacerbated the security situation in that area. Yet food prices remained at their relatively low post-airlift level, suggesting that between the available food from previous relief deliveries and new crops coming on stream with the end of the drought, enough may have been accessible to the population to meet most of the basic needs of those with at least some resources. The extent to which this possibility, and not only the clearly distressing interruptions of relief deliveries, was taken into account is of considerable importance in judging the necessity of the massive military intervention that would follow.

Media and NGO Pressures

CNN and other TV media, now present in large numbers in Somalia following the influx of NGOs and beginning of the airlift, began showing dramatic footage of looting incidents and continuing starvation in the country. The rapid influx of NGO workers and journalists into Mogadishu and the region in mid-1992 had contributed to further attracting clan and freelance looters and various kinds of extortionists. News reporting was extensive on the extortion of NGOs and theft of food shipments by Somali clan militias. Kittani had been shocked at the situation he found on arriving in Mogadishu and had so informed the Secretary General and Security Council.⁹⁰ In November, he and Natsios (based on information received from CARE's Johnston) separately began asserting that 80 percent of food aid was being diverted or looted, although the factual basis for this figure was hotly denied by most NGOs and ICRC who differed significantly over varying definitions of what constituted diversion. Some felt that food paid to meet the extortionate demands of security guards should not be viewed as diverted food, on the theory it was used in exchange for services performed. Similarly, others felt that since militia members and looters needed food, too, one could not count all forcibly taken commodities as looted in the sense of misappropriated; the term "spontaneous distribution" was coined, the point being made that collective obligations in Somalia oblige all, including warlords, to share resources, and that all food aid thus contributed to reactivating local markets.⁹¹

Recurrent incidents of armed robbery, shootings, and lootings sparked growing NGO debate on the ground and back at headquarters on whether or not to urge stronger U.N. security measures to protect relief staff and operations. Within the NGO community in the U.S. and Europe, there were mixed views on whether an enhanced U.N. military presence in Somalia would strengthen or undermine their security. Some, like ICRC and the American Friends Service Committee, publicly opposed any use of force in civil conflict as likely to lead to greater conflict with local forces. The Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) was "concerned that increased unnegotiated international military presence...is likely to exacerbate the difficulties and undermine the process of long-term reconciliation," as well as result in "even greater insecurity and restriction of movement for...NGOs."⁹² Others believed a larger U.S. armed presence would deter looters and snipers and make relief operations more secure. CARE was perhaps the most forceful in making the case for intervention. CARE/U.S. President Johnston and CARE/International Chairman Malcolm Fraser had met with Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in September to urge a United Nations governing role in Somalia, following which Johnston repeated his call for strong action on Public Television's MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour -- an unprecedented and not uncontroversial step for a U.S. NGO. The U.S. NGO consortium InterAction had been advocating greater support for Somalia for some months, including the need for greater U.N. troop support for relief agencies' security, but not outright for an additional military intervention.⁹³ In the end, the 80 percent figure -- a fiction and a "shameful manipulation" to some -- helped make the case for the major military deployment that followed.

U.S. Government Decision-Making Process

Almost from the beginning of Operation Provide Relief, Administration policy-makers felt that the airlift was inadequate to the need. Despite more food aid and humanitarian workers than ever before, they believed the vast majority of rural Somalis were not benefitting from aid because security limited food deliveries to a small radius around the selected few airfields. They may have under-estimated the significant amounts of aid still reaching needy Somalis in less visible locations through other means, most notably by ICRC beach and land transport. For right or for wrong, many in Washington felt more frustrated than before the airlift.⁹⁴ Furthermore, given ongoing security problems, it was feared that the U.N.'s 500 Pakistani troops might need to be evacuated for their own security. Given the arduous process of gaining Aidid's and Ali Mahdi's approval for their assignment in the first place, this was hardly a welcome prospect. "UNOSOM I had failed in its mission," President Bush reported to Congress.⁹⁵ In the Senate, Paul Simon had already introduced in July a resolution urging the U.N. to

deploy "security guards" with or without Somali faction approval, if necessary.⁹⁶ On a subsequent visit to Somalia, he and Congressman John Lewis called for more security for relief workers and supplies. Simon likened the situation to the Irish famine of the 1840s, saying "I have seen grim things around the world, but never like this, and I hope I never see anything like this again."⁹⁷

In high level Administration councils, widening support developed for military intervention, although there was a simultaneous reticence on the part of civilian members to appear too enthusiastic for fear the military would immediately object. Indeed, Central Command and Pentagon leadership initially opposed a U.S. operation, believing it to be, frankly, crazy in a setting like Somalia, particularly given the lack of clarity about achievable goals for such an operation and the difficulty of getting out again. If any major action was to be seriously considered, U.S. policy makers thought it should be a U.N. intervention. As summed up by the same Ambassador Hempstone who had earlier raised President Bush's awareness of the problem through his "Day in Hell" cable, "If you liked Beirut [where a U.S. military barracks was bombed, resulting in 241 Marine deaths], you'll love Mogadishu;" he went on to warn against U.S. involvement with the "Somalia tarbaby".

The climate in the Deputies Committee soon changed, however, in part due to somewhat greater openness to the idea of a U.S. intervention on the part of a substitute military representative, General McCaffrey; he noted that while the military didn't recommend an intervention, they also recognized that only the U.S., and not the U.N., would be able to pull together an operation quickly enough to be effective. This encouraged some previously reticent civilian members of the committee to be more open in favoring an intervention, and the momentum to intervene built up.⁹⁸ In a subsequent Deputies meeting, Admiral David Jeremiah, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that "If you think U.S. forces are needed, we can do the job."⁹⁹ The turnaround had originated with Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell who himself saw that the U.N. was "running into trouble...[and] getting nowhere", was well aware of political pressures to act, including those of members of the Black Caucus, and knew President Bush felt that "if we could do something, we should."¹⁰⁰

While civilian sources indicate an intervention of a maximum of 8,000 troops was first contemplated, this seems to have applied only to early proposals for limited "zones [or points] of tranquility" where food aid might be distributed through safe corridors protected from armed gangs. Although some recommended this more decentralized option as most likely to avoid the special problems of Mogadishu, others felt it ignored the fact that the neediest areas were generally the least secure ones and the likelihood that Somali gangs "would not cooperate with peace-keepers who did not have

superior strength."¹⁰¹ The zones of tranquility approach was apparently never seriously considered at the highest levels of policy-making. Powell, for one, felt it would have been no more than a "bandaid" and "wouldn't have intimidated the SNA."¹⁰²

Central Command officers report that their preliminary back-of-the-envelope estimates for an operation confined to Mogadishu, Kismayu, and Baidoa alone would have required 12-15,000 troops; this fell between the 1,500 needed to feed starving people in a benign environment such as a Hurricane Andrew situation, and, at the other extreme, an estimated 80-88,000 necessary to occupy all of Somalia.¹⁰³ Notwithstanding their reluctance, the military had been doing contingency planning, including simulation exercises during the previous year in anticipation of a possible Horn humanitarian intervention.¹⁰⁴ Encouragement for such advance planning may have been provided by President Bush's September 22 speech at the United Nations favoring multilateral peacekeeping and signaling to the military that they should prepare for U.S. participation as an important element of their post-Cold War *raison d'etre*.¹⁰⁵

The eventual decision to send in up to 28,000 U.S. troops matured over two-three weeks of intense deliberations in November 1992. It culminated in the President's decision the day before Thanksgiving to follow the "massive force" strategy advocated by Powell, implemented with success in the Gulf War, and recommended, by then, by all the President's top advisors.¹⁰⁶ The 28,000 would be divided on an approximately 1:3 ratio between troops and logistics back-up, some 7,000 of the latter comprising engineering forces to restore roads and bridges necessary for food transport. Roughly 9,000 of the total would remain off-shore. The overall number to secure the main part of the southern famine zone was extrapolated from the 12-15,000 calculated for the three cities, the high number reflecting in part a lesson learned in Lebanon: provide plenty of protection for your soldiers.¹⁰⁷

One incentive for the decision was that it was an "easy" alternative to intervening in Bosnia which policy-makers in general, and the military in particular, were convinced could result in nothing but failure. As one official put it, "the best thing about Somalia was that it saved us from Bosnia".¹⁰⁸ Humanitarian action in Somalia would demonstrate both solidarity with Moslem and African nations and U.S. support of international peacekeeping in the "new world order". President Bush himself was reportedly motivated in large part by the simple Christian ethic that "if the U.S. can make a difference in saving lives, we should do it...No one should have to starve at Christmastime," he told Natsios and Johnston in December.¹⁰⁹ The degree to which Bush fully understood the ramifications of the decision, in particular the unlikelihood of being able to pull out by the end of his term of office the following month, has been questioned. Powell "said from the beginning we can't do this by January 20; we'll barely be in by

then."¹¹⁰ Others question whether Bush would have made the decision to intervene had he been continuing in office beyond January 20, 1993. Bush himself says "I would have felt more free to make this decision had I been continuing as President because I would not have had the concern about the possibility of having to turn an incomplete operation over to my successor." He adds that "I did not believe that the operation could be completed and the troops withdrawn by January 20, but I did hope that the operation could by that time be in its final stages and that troop withdrawal could be underway. As it turned out, withdrawals had begun by January 20." A close White House aide believes Bush had procured President-elect Clinton's concurrence for the intervention beforehand.¹¹¹ With respect to withdrawal, Bush later stated that "I had no understanding of any sort with President Clinton. I simply told him the first time we met that I planned to begin withdrawals as soon as possible."¹¹²

On November 25, Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger carried the President's decision to U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali who had shared in the deepening concern over developments in Somalia. Days before, the Secretary-General had received an anguished letter from WFP Director Catherine Bertini reporting a mortar attack on a WFP ship carrying 10,000 tons of food in Mogadishu port and the virtual impossibility of delivering food to the starving under the prevailing security conditions; the attack was the last straw. On November 29 Boutros-Ghali outlined five policy options for the Security Council on how to protect relief operations in Somalia, with pros and cons for each. The two considered most promising were:

- ◆ a countrywide enforcement by several member States acting under Security Council authorization (Boutros-Ghali noted the U.S. had offered to "take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation"); and
- ◆ a countrywide enforcement carried out under U.N. command and control (although he also noted that the Secretariat lacked the organization and resources to command an operation of the size and urgency required by the Somali crisis, and foresaw reluctance by national contingents to take orders from the U.N. rather than from their home commands).¹¹³

While he personally preferred the latter option, Boutros-Ghali pointed out that the former was the only practical alternative, given the urgency of the situation. On December 3 the Security Council agreed, unanimously adopting Resolution 794. Invoking for the first time Article 42 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, it approved the use of force to achieve a "secure environment for humanitarian relief operations". Other countries, urged by the U.S. and U.N., "volunteered in droves to send troops to UNITAF";¹¹⁴ indeed, there were so many offers that CENTCOM had to stop processing

them after the end of December, suggesting instead that they defer their offers to the subsequent UNOSOM II phase. Central Command felt it especially important for political reasons to include in UNITAF troops from African and Arab countries. At its peak, UNITAF would have close to 37,000 troops (almost 26,000 of them American) from 24 countries deployed in the famine belt in southern and central Somalia, covering about 40 percent of the country.¹¹⁵ Japan contributed \$100 million to cover the costs of those contingents unable to pay their own way.

Operation Restore Hope Unfolds

On December 9, 1700 U.S. Marines of Operation Restore Hope landed on the beaches of Mogadishu, to be greeted by a phalanx of TV cameras, lights, and journalists and photographers of all stripes. The military had chosen this apparently incongruous mode of arrival as a precaution in case of a worst case scenario; "a single sniper shooting down a plane full of U.S. troops would have caused more grief than press reaction to the scene at the beach," explained one military officer.¹¹⁶ General Powell, confirming the political message intended by the large force, was happy to have the media presence. "I wanted the Somalis to see nasty, ugly-looking people coming ashore so they'd decide 'We'd better sit down and talk with Brother Oakley' [the U.S. special envoy and political negotiator]", he later said.¹¹⁷ The forces quickly secured the major airport, port, and road targets in Mogadishu.

Aside from the comical press scene at the beach, both international and Somali reaction to the landing was generally one of relief. James Grant, executive director of UNICEF, recalls his "exhilaration" over the event and the fact that such a decision for military intervention was made for humanitarian reasons and was also considered good politics.¹¹⁸ A long-time expatriate resident of Mogadishu and NGO director conveyed a more mixed reaction: "Troops needed to come because the leaders couldn't have taken control. Anarchy reigned and no one short of military force could have stopped it. I cried over it. I love this country very much. I knew this would create an enormous pollution of society, but there was no other political or other solution."¹¹⁹

From Mogadishu, UNITAF commanders had initially scheduled a slower advance inland in order to consolidate logistical support of their troops. But increasing attacks on food convoys and feeding points by heavily armed Somali units pushed out of Mogadishu led NGOs and others to press for a more rapid deployment throughout southern Somalia. Under this pressure, and given the immediate availability of troops from nations such as France, Italy, Canada, and Belgium, and the virtual absence of resistance, the military

speeded up their inland moves by about 2-3 weeks. Their progress was facilitated by the efforts of Oakley and others who travelled ahead of the troops and paved the way politically for their arrival through meetings with local elders and other Somali leaders. Where NGOs were not immediately available to distribute food, the military themselves brought it in to demonstrate that "troops were synonymous with relief."¹²⁰ In fact, by January 20, the Clinton inauguration date initially mooted for completion of the operation, the major transport corridors and feeding centers of the famine belt had been secured.

Despite a few incidents in which U.S. troops inadvertently seized Somalis working for U.S. and U.N. agencies, the intervention was welcomed enthusiastically by most Somalis. Relief convoys began getting through to areas where before they had been frequently attacked. The intervention sparked renewed attempts at accommodation between Aidid and Ali Mahdi, as well; having little choice under the circumstances, they signed a truce within days of the arrival of U.S. troops. In January 1993, and again more comprehensively in Addis Ababa in March, broader peace agreements were signed which included other factions, too.

Mission Creep or Mission Shrink?

The U.S. military was crystal clear that its task was limited to opening routes of communication for carrying relief supplies, and only such disarmament as was necessary to protect its troops in doing so. However, a feeling somehow persisted outside the military, including on the part of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, that significantly broader disarmament might be carried out. Indeed, disarmament had been included in the initial military mission statement until right before the executive order was issued; it was dropped then, however, at the absolute insistence of the top command who considered it both "inappropriate for a humanitarian operation" and, more importantly, "mission impossible".¹²¹ As Oakley explained, "We can't disarm New York or Washington; how could we disarm Mogadishu?" (Others suggest that in all three cities disarmament may be more a matter of will than capability.) Some observers continue to believe that the failure to disarm was a fatal limitation of UNITAF that would haunt Somalia, and the international community, long into the future.

In other ways, a certain degree of quiet mission creep could be said to have occurred. Military engineers, to the extent that time and other duties permitted, repaired roads, bridges, schools, and clinics that were not within their strict original mandate. A 4,000 member Somali police force was established, albeit unarmed and with uncertain

loyalties.¹²² Assistance was given for some refugee resettlement. A very limited amount of disarmament did in fact take place.¹²³ Reflecting the improved climate, in February 1993 a Somali-UNITAF soccer championship took place before a "happy, peaceful crowd of 30,000".¹²⁴

OFDA and the NGOs

OFDA's Disaster Response Director Bill Garvelink arrived in Mogadishu on the heels of the UNITAF landing to explore what OFDA's new role should be in the very new situation created in the country. Obviously the UNITAF intervention had changed the dynamics of OFDA work, previously focussed on coordinating the Mombasa-based airlift and relating to NGOs and U.N. agencies based in Nairobi. Suddenly it had to assume new tasks related to coordinating bilateral U.S. emergency relief efforts from Mogadishu, as well as helping NGO relations with UNITAF and filling the relative vacuum of U.N. capacity to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts on the ground.

In December, OFDA began to deploy DART staff in Mogadishu to assume these tasks. While adapting its Nairobi model of operation to the new situation, it also decided to work under the aegis of the U.N.'s Humanitarian Operations Center headed by Philip Johnston, with a view to strengthening the U.N.'s ability to take over relief coordination thereafter.¹²⁵ They also supported the U.N. with a field presence outside Mogadishu, doing so without bureaucracy or established offices or residences, but staying with NGOs wherever they travelled. By the end of UNITAF, a total of 66 DART members had been deployed in Mombasa, Nairobi, Mogadishu and in the field. Each staff member had to be flexible and self-directing in the style of a Peace Corps volunteer, an informality felt important by Ambassador Oakley as part of a larger plan to minimize the bureaucratic investment and maximize the possibility for ultimate takeover of their functions by others. OFDA staff were not expected to have Somalia expertise, the feeling being that knowledge of OFDA and U.S. Government procedures, and a healthy dose of common sense, were more important.¹²⁶ In both Mogadishu and the field, OFDA staff thus played a coordination role among NGOs and between NGOs and UNITAF leadership, working closely in Mogadishu with Colonel McPherson on General Johnston's staff (Johnston was the UNITAF commander). They coordinated joint field project assessments and, by acting as a quasi-secretariat, attempted to strengthen UNOSOM's capacity for coordinating humanitarian aid. They also deployed DART staff to the regions to monitor conditions and relief activities and facilitate liaison between NGOs and the military.

In its role as a liaison between NGOs and UNITAF leadership, OFDA staff found themselves mediating a number of NGO complaints about UNITAF military actions. Most immediate and serious was NGO opposition to the military's insistence on disarming NGO security guards before the broader society had been disarmed (which was not in the cards); this left the NGOs feeling highly vulnerable. The policy arose partly from UNITAF's belief that its forces were now there to ensure NGO security and the view among UNITAF officers that it was the NGOs' own security guards who constituted the greatest threat to relief efforts and workers.¹²⁷

OFDA and UNITAF established a civilian-military operations center (CMOC) at UNOSOM's Humanitarian Operations Center to ensure direct communication between NGOs and the military on such issues. CMOC's daily briefings included weather and security reports and convoy announcements, with opportunities following for sub-group meetings, as needed. Most NGOs appreciated these briefings, and particularly the helpfulness of military liaison officer Colonel Kevin Kennedy, although some expressed regret that the briefings focussed only on short-term security issues to the exclusion of broader humanitarian concerns with the intervention. The dialog, many felt, was in fact a one-way monolog.¹²⁸

OFDA served in an important cross-cultural role between the very different institutional cultures, languages, assumptions, approaches, and motivations of NGOs and the military, which often led to frustration and misunderstanding. Kennedy himself was in a sensitive position, having to mediate between officers such as one general who said "I can't stand the [double expletive] NGOs" and NGOs who, by military standards, seemed unbelievably freewheeling and acquiescent to relief supply diversions, excessive Somali staff pay scales, and guard misbehavior (for example, unauthorized nighttime use of official vehicles).¹²⁹ The military also found it difficult to deal with the 585 relief agency installations they found in Mogadishu alone; they determined that protecting NGO homes and offices was not feasible and not part of their mission, a position that caused much anguish and discussion among NGOs. The military was further concerned over the NGO practice of following the same daily route to feeding sites which, themselves, may not have been located in the most secure settings. In this case, the need for feeding site predictability conflicted directly with the military view that unpredictability provided greater security.¹³⁰

Older Somali NGOs, and the newer ones which began to develop during this period, were more critical of the CMOC structure, from which they felt largely excluded. Somali NGO representatives note that local groups were barred from access to the port, airport, or any U.N. buildings unless they had a yellow pass, granted only if their application was supported by two international NGOs funding them. This was seen as an

indignity perpetrated by foreigners in their country, besides giving an edge to a relatively few more established local NGOs to the detriment of others. For most Somali NGOs, CMOC was thus a vehicle through which foreigners dealt with each other on security and relief matters, without Somalis being present.¹³¹ Indeed, some NGO expatriates felt the intervention would have risked less and gained more by having Somali participants who could provide local security information from their own sources.¹³²

Political Efforts Under UNITAF

Robert Oakley had been appointed to coordinate the overall U.S. effort, fortuitously, since he and General Johnston got along particularly well. Oakley's compound soon became the place where major decisions on UNITAF military actions, as well as reporting on the status of relief efforts, took place. His early efforts to pave the way with local leaders for the introduction of UNITAF forces into their areas gradually evolved in early 1993 into assisting in rebuilding a Somali civic structure through local and regional civilian councils, as approved in the January 1993 peace agreement signed by various Somali factions. In the process Oakley inevitably was involved in larger reconciliation discussions, pragmatically deciding to cultivate close relations with the "warlords" Aidid and Ali Mahdi, even though this "may have actually elevated their status and power at a time when their authority had been ebbing. Thereafter, any attempt by UNOSOM to broaden contact with non-factional social constituencies was viewed as a plot to marginalize the faction leaders."¹³³

In these discussions, Oakley was in a delicate situation because nominally, at least, they were supposed to be led by the U.N. Secretary-General's Special Representative Kittani. But Kittani's posture toward the faction leaders was "perceived as insulting"; he insisted, for example, that they come to him, rather than his reaching out to them.¹³⁴ Added to the fact that many Somalis were still suspicious of Boutros-Ghali for his past closeness to Siad Barre (and apparently ignoring past U.S. support for Barre), they were more inclined to turn to the United States than to the U.N. for mediation.

At the regional and local levels, Oakley urged Somali elders and NGOs to form their own groups and decide their most important community priorities. He and his staff then brokered international aid resources (mostly OFDA's) to carry out specific projects in an effort to demonstrate the potential for positive developments, to build support for UNITAF, and, even as he talked with the clan-based political faction leaders, to help construct a counterweight to them.¹³⁵ U.S. NGOs asked to collaborate in these efforts were sometimes reluctant, however, particularly when they felt them too blatantly

political or unjustified in humanitarian terms.¹³⁶ They wanted to ensure their humanitarian roles were kept clearly separate from partisan politics.

Planning to Get Out

Almost as soon as the U.S. military arrived in December, they began planning how to get out. General Johnston had reported to Washington in late January that, in effect, "the war's over, we won, it's time to come home."¹³⁷ U.S. Government representatives regularly travelled to U.N. headquarters in New York to plan the transition. But the U.N. balked. Top staff cited their unpreparedness due to lack of resources, particularly given the intended vast expansion of the U.N. mandate that was to include disarmament, reconstruction, development, and nation-building activities -- activities the U.S. had steadfastly refused to undertake itself. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali dragged his feet, hoping to force the U.S.-led UNITAF to accept his view of the need for large-scale disarming of Somali factions and civilians prior to UNOSOM II taking over. Some believe he actually thought the U.S. had committed to undertake more disarmament than was the case; President Bush's press spokesman denied this on December 14, 1992, but then said in a statement open to varying interpretation, "Our mission has always been that we would collect arms as they became available and as we encountered them."¹³⁸ While frustrated U.S. officials were eager to "get rid of Somalia," U.N. officials were sure the U.S. was setting up the U.N. for failure. Not until March 1993, when the Security Council passed Resolution 814, written by the U.S. and authorizing the date for UNITAF's handover to UNOSOM II, did the U.N. seriously begin joint planning. Even then, Admiral Howe, who had arrived in Mogadishu March 17, 1993 as the Secretary-General's new special representative, pleaded in both New York and Washington for a mid-June takeover date that would allow a few more weeks to organize UNOSOM II. But the U.S. refused. While Howe points out that the date of May 4 had been fixed only as a technical accounting date when the U.N. would start paying the operational costs, it quickly became also the date for transfer of military command, notwithstanding the lack of U.N. readiness. Tensions were high between the U.S. Government and the U.N.

The Handover

UNITAF was not simply handing over to a continuation of its own operation but rather to a substantially expanded new mandate, 180 degrees different in many respects.

Security Council Resolution 814 authorized a U.N. Chapter VII/Article 42 operation to succeed UNITAF that allowed use of "all necessary means" to carry out a broad mandate ranging from disarmament to nation-building. To accomplish this extraordinarily ambitious task, rejected by the U.S. for its own forces, UNOSOM II began with less than 30 percent of its authorized 2,800 civilian staff in place -- Somalia was hardly considered a choice assignment -- and humanitarian staff were particularly lacking. UNOSOM II's planned military capability was significantly reduced from the UNITAF peak of nearly 37,000 troops to 28,000; in actuality, only 25,640 were deployed as of September 1993.¹³⁹ Only 2,900 of these were U.S. forces, the first time any U.S. forces had served under direct U.N. command, and they were for logistic support only. However, close to 14,000 other U.S. military personnel served in or near Somalia in support of UNOSOM II but under direct U.S. command and control, including a quick reaction force of 1,100 to protect U.S. troops and support UNOSOM II forces as needed.¹⁴⁰ The new UNOSOM commander, General Bir of Turkey, was in many ways an "orphan commander",¹⁴¹ faced, as he was, with the challenge of integrating a fighting force from among 28 national contingents, each reporting separately to its own home capital,¹⁴² and many so ill-equipped as to be severely endangered in the Somali context; the Pakistanis guarding the most difficult location, Mogadishu, initially lacked even flak jackets.

Some observers wondered whether Howe himself, a retired navy admiral, would prove to have the right qualifications and decisiveness for the delicate political and humanitarian tasks ahead; one official described his appointment as "the miscasting of the century."¹⁴³ There are conflicting reports as to whether Boutros-Ghali originally intended to appoint Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, a Guinean who later became Howe's deputy, but then was pressed by the U.S. to appoint an American in view of the preponderant continuing U.S. role, or whether he was himself the initiator of the American's appointment in order to "lock in U.S. participation even more."¹⁴⁴ In any case, the prospects for UNOSOM II could hardly be described as promising -- even less so in the light of reports that it would soon be tested by antagonistic Somalis. What was originally hoped to have been a "seamless transition" was to become an "unseemly" one.¹⁴⁵

UNOSOM II

Within two days of the handover to UNOSOM II came what Howe thought was the anticipated "test". Kismayu, captured in March by General Aidid's nemesis, General Morgan, was recaptured by Aidid's ally Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess. As the responsible Belgian UNOSOM troops had failed to prevent the initial Morgan takeover, Aidid

assumed UNOSOM complicity and thus lack of impartiality. Conflict arose between Aidid and UNOSOM later in May over a reconciliation conference to be held in Galcayo which each sought to prevent the other from controlling.¹⁴⁶ Aidid grew increasingly shrill in his anti-U.N. invective aired over Radio Mogadishu, the former government station which he now controlled. Under the rising verbal onslaught, both U.S. and U.N. officials, always distrustful of Aidid, came to the conclusion that, contrary to the wishes of most Somalis, he would settle for nothing less than absolute power and therefore had to be brought under control. The new U.S. special envoy, Robert Gosende, suggested to the State Department in the latter part of May that Aidid should be arrested for non-cooperation with the March 1993 Addis agreements which he and the other factional leaders had signed.¹⁴⁷

War

On June 3 General Montgomery sent a "letter of destiny"¹⁴⁸ to Admiral Howe which was to be delivered to Aidid's SNA announcing a weapons inspection, as agreed in the Addis accords, at Radio Mogadishu. Howe, told by the UNOSOM II military that his political staff had been consulted, double checked with April Glaspie, his chief political advisor at the time; (she had been seconded from the U.S. State Department to help tide him over a shortage of personnel during the transition from UNITAF).¹⁴⁹ The letter was then delivered to an SNA official who read it and said, "This means war."¹⁵⁰ Howe reports that Glaspie had approved the inspection, notes the expected routine-ness of it, but indicates he was not informed of the "This means war" response.¹⁵¹ While the inspection itself was carried out uneventfully on June 5, 24 Pakistani soldiers of UNOSOM were killed and many more injured by Somalis as they tried to leave the area, probably because of a strong belief that their real aim had been not to inspect for arms but to destroy the radio station. Although Howe declares this was not the purpose, it had apparently become known that the U.S. and U.N. were keen to put the station out of business in order to end the invectives.¹⁵² Oakley's interpretation is that the June 5 incident was a case of "spontaneous combustion" growing out of the high prevailing tensions in Mogadishu. Powell adds that it "caused spontaneous combustion in Washington to change the mission...but nobody sat back to say, 'Is this smart?'"¹⁵³

On the following day, the United Nations Security Council, vigorously supported by the U.S. Government, hastily passed Resolution 837 calling for the arrest of those responsible for killing the U.N. troops. U.N. officials were not only appalled by the carnage inflicted on the Pakistanis, but also believed that failure to react would damage U.N. credibility around the world, including in Bosnia.¹⁵⁴ The policy to go after Aidid,

the presumed perpetrator, was in part, at least, to "send a message." Although three letters were sent by UNOSOM to Aidid following the June 5 events, they led nowhere, and the last was returned unopened.¹⁵⁵ On June 12, UNOSOM counter-attacked, and the war was engaged.

The war lasted four months. In the first week, UNOSOM moved to the vast but more readily fortified U.S. Embassy compound and conducted major cordon and search operations in the SNA enclave of the city, including a U.S. Quick Reaction Force attack on Radio Mogadishu. In mid-June, UNOSOM offered a \$25,000 reward for Aidid's capture. Aidid countered by offering a \$1 million reward for taking Howe. In July, SNA forces increasingly took the initiative, to the extent that UNOSOM began speaking of them as "enemy" rather than "hostile" forces as previously. In one of UNOSOM II's most controversial moves, on July 12 it bombed without warning an SNA command center where Somali elders, some of whom were not Aidid supporters, were meeting.¹⁵⁶ Anywhere from 20 to 73 Somalis were killed, depending on whether one accepts UNOSOM or SNA figures. The attack was harshly criticized by U.S. and U.N. legal experts and by many accounts was a crucial turning point in causing many Somalis to close ranks and support Aidid's side in the war, even if they had not been enthusiastic supporters before; now there was a clear external threat, facing which (if for little else) Somali culture calls for unity. By other accounts, notably that of the U.S. Liaison Office in Mogadishu, parts of Aidid's power base were eroding as the conflict dragged on.

Over the course of the summer, SNA ambushes and firings on helicopters escalated, as did the UNOSOM effort to arrest Aidid. After two months of Howe's and Boutros-Ghali's urging that the U.S. send a contingent of elite Rangers to assist in this task, President Clinton finally agreed to do so in August on the reluctant recommendations of CENTCOM's General Joseph Hoar and Joint Chiefs Chairman Powell; they didn't think it would work but felt they "had to support the commander on the ground."¹⁵⁷

The Rangers did not enjoy an auspicious beginning, mounting their first attack on buildings occupied by staff members of UNDP and the French aid group International Action Against Hunger; their second raid, on World Concern headquarters, started with a more gracious knock on the door. When MSF was also attacked, other NGOs became fearful of unannounced attacks on their compounds, later to be somewhat reassured when CMOC and NGO representatives took Ranger commanders on an extensive tour of Mogadishu to point out all NGO residences and offices.¹⁵⁸ Subsequent Ranger forays were more successful as several leading Aidid supporters were found and jailed. But Aidid himself remained elusive to capture, at least without endangering innocent people around him in the process.

By mid-September, even the most hawkish U.S. policy-makers, including Gosende, were beginning to question the policy and wondering how to get off dead center. In Gosende's case, he realized following a brief visit to Mogadishu by Hoar that U.S. troops would not be allowed to play a leading role in Somalia, even though no one else could.¹⁵⁹ In Washington, a Senate resolution was passed requiring the President to receive Congressional authorization by November 15 if he wanted to continue deployment of U.S. forces in Somalia. The Italians overtly, and the French more quietly, had been opposed since July to the concentration on military as opposed to political approaches. The Ethiopian and Eritrean governments were also having their doubts. (Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi would soon become a significant actor in the late 1993 reconciliation negotiations between Aidid, Ali Mahdi, and other Somali factions.) Now American voices suggested restarting the political process -- effectively suspended since March -- while the Rangers, viewed with some concern by Aidid, were still in Mogadishu and could carry some deterrent clout. Some of these, and others, feared that by continuing the same level of military activity, something was bound to go wrong. And it did.

Shifting Policy

On October 3, the Rangers lost 18 men in battle after they attacked Mogadishu's Olympic Hotel in search of Aidid. Worldwide television showed a dead American being dragged through city streets and a captured American being held hostage by SNA forces. It was the Somali version of Viet-Nam's Tet offensive. The effect was electric, particularly in the U.S. where the public questioned the altered objectives of an intervention that seemed to have lost its humanitarian purpose.

On October 7, President Clinton addressed the nation and announced what appeared to be a 180-degree policy shift. In fact, Clinton had already endorsed a "two-fisted approach" that would have "opened the door" to political negotiations with Aidid while continuing the Ranger attacks to arrest him.¹⁶⁰ He had urged Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to accept this approach during personal attempts by both Secretary of State Warren Christopher (making a special trip to U.N. headquarters) and by himself, but Boutros-Ghali had demurred.¹⁶¹ Political reaction in the U.S. now forced the President to act. According to Clinton's October 7 announcement, the U.S. would withdraw from Somalia all but "a few hundred support personnel in non-combat roles" by March 31, 1994. During this "decent interval", Ambassador Oakley would be sent immediately to promote a renewed effort at political reconciliation, as would 5,300 additional troops to back up his initiatives and "let us finish leaving Somalia on our own terms and without

destroying all that two Administrations have accomplished there." While this pleased the U.S. Congress and body politic, it caused a "manic depressive" reaction in the U.S. mission in Mogadishu, understanding as they might be of U.S. political realities. The idea that the hated Aidid would be allowed to reenter the political process led some to ask whether this meant that he had only to await the U.S. departure before he resumed looting and attempting to take over Somalia.¹⁶²

At the U.N., left with no choice but to follow the U.S. lead in retreat, Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan later noted the irony that the U.S., with the most powerful and well-equipped military in the world, had become the weakest link in peacekeeping. "One has only to kill a few Americans and the U.S. leaves," he said.¹⁶³ The war, in any case, was over, and so was the experiment with Chapter VII peacemaking. In November, the Security Council passed a resolution dramatically narrowing the UNOSOM II mandate to the point of becoming "basically just to protect U.N. facilities and avoid any more casualties."¹⁶⁴ On November 16, despite efforts by Boutros-Ghali to maintain pressure on Aidid, the Security Council suspended the order authorizing his arrest and appointed a new Commission of Inquiry to investigate the June 5 incident and its aftermath. Two days later Aidid reappeared in public, and two weeks later he was flown to a peace conference in Addis Ababa in an American plane; by January 18 the last SNA detainees had been released. In February 1994, the Security Council further limited UNOSOM II's mandate and reduced its maximum troop strength to 22,000.

Oakley, meanwhile, returned to Mogadishu on October 10 in an effort to re-energize the political process that had been effectively suspended since he left Somalia the previous March. Since Aidid refused to talk to UNOSOM, there was not much that could be done by the U.N. The events of October 3, however, had been sufficiently traumatic to trigger a de facto ceasefire,¹⁶⁵ with U.S. troops instructed to "lie low" to avoid any further incidents. Consensus soon developed to extend a November 1993 humanitarian aid conference in Addis Ababa to enable political negotiations among key Somali groups from throughout the country.

The Broader Scene

The foregoing account reflects the overall international concern with Somalia during most of the period under review, particularly in mid-1993. The problem, however, was that, more than ever, all eyes were focussed on Mogadishu as opposed to the country at large. While the situation elsewhere was characterized by varying degrees of

insecurity, compared to the capital there was relative peace. An August 1993 U.S. Government inter-agency assessment team led by Ambassador David Shinn reported (over-optimistically, in the light of subsequent events) that the civil war was over, that the vast majority of Somalis either supported UNOSOM II or were ambivalent about its presence, that banditry had significantly decreased, and that emergency food programs could end due to a lack of continuing need. The team also endorsed a major outcome of the March 1993 Addis Conference, namely, the agreement to form local councils in an effort to restore political legitimacy and create a framework for both local administration and development and humanitarian programs. The team found this bottom-up approach to be sound, representing a more realistic first stage that could then be followed by efforts to establish a transitional national council.¹⁶⁶ While the latter was clearly a key objective, given the turmoil in Mogadishu and major differences between Aidid and the other, "Group of 12" factional leaders, it was equally clearly an elusive one. District and regional councils were thus a high priority for UNOSOM II. Notwithstanding woefully limited UNOSOM staffing available to assist in the formation of such councils, and serious questions over their representativeness and thus durability (some NGOs felt they could have advised on their composition, if asked),¹⁶⁷ 19 had reportedly been formed by August, 30 by September, and 52 by December.¹⁶⁸

Humanitarian Activities

By mid-1993, and except for a few needy areas, many NGOs were winding down their relief activities and shifting to rehabilitation or reconstruction activities. They had been extremely nervous about the implications of UNITAF's handover to UNOSOM II, fearing rightly, as it turned out, the consequences. Following the June 5 events and aftermath, most of them expressed considerable anger, indeed outrage, about U.N. policies and actions which crippled their humanitarian efforts and, in the eyes of many, violated human rights and the U.N.'s own principles. As one NGO worker reported, "The operation has lost its humanitarian goals; it is purely a military mission."¹⁶⁹ "Dialogue, dialogue and more dialogue," said another; "we believe there must be a process of dialogue."¹⁷⁰ Given the renewed insecurity following June 5, many NGOs cut back to skeleton expatriate staffs during this period or rotated staff between Nairobi and Somalia as the situation of the moment warranted. The U.S., meanwhile, had in March 1993 replaced OFDA in Somalia with an AID mission of fewer than five operating out of Nairobi; still heavily funded through OFDA, it continued to assist NGO projects. It also actively began to support UNOSOM II humanitarian activities and play a lead role in mobilizing the larger donor community (ostensibly DHA's role) for supplementing remaining relief activities with new reconstruction and development initiatives.

By late 1993, the humanitarian situation was very mixed. On the one hand, 1.6 million refugees and internally displaced people, plus an additional one million "highly vulnerable persons" were said by the U.S. Mission to still need help. Crop failures had occurred in some areas and flooding in others, and Somalis continued to be victims of widespread banditry and vandalism.¹⁷¹ On the other hand, some areas produced surplus harvests, and in early October, in fact, malnutrition rates in Somalia were reported to be similar to those of other Third World countries. In an article entitled "The Real News from Somalia -- and It's Good," *The Economist* reported that 1993 harvests were nearly 50 percent of normal, up from 5-10 percent in 1992.¹⁷² While the latter news was hardly cause for rejoicing, it did reflect a change from the dire levels of need that had originally drawn donors to the country. The result was a somewhat greater aversion to security risks and a greater questioning among the humanitarian relief community as to whether or why its members should remain involved in Somalia.

The U.S. Government's policy turnaround in October, the resultant return to seeking a political solution, and changes set in motion around the November-December Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa renewed among some, at least, a modicum of renewed hope for humanitarian assistance in Somalia, at least outside Mogadishu. Donors, led by the U.S., pursued at Addis a strategy that would return primary responsibility for future progress to Somalis themselves. At the political level, the Somalis were expected to reach consensus in their own way, with a continuing UNOSOM II shield to prevent any one faction from taking over militarily. At the humanitarian level, they would receive rehabilitation assistance only in those areas which were secure and able to make good use of aid; the political incentive to ensure security was clearly intended. Throughout the conference sessions and in private hallway conversations, the donors reiterated their impatience with the disarray of the Somali factions and their readiness to divert aid resources to other needy countries should the Somalis not "get their act together" very soon. Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi, host of the Addis Conference, made the same point in no uncertain terms: "...make no mistake. There is a limit to what the international community is prepared to do to help you and for how long... We are prepared to help you if you get yourselves out of the quagmire you are in. If on the other hand you insist on wallowing in that quagmire we have no qualms about turning our backs on you."¹⁷³

Donor frustrations over the effects on humanitarian priorities of the summer's U.N.-sustained warfare also led to changes in the implementation of aid programs. Humanitarian responsibilities were essentially taken from UNOSOM II and, beginning in early 1994, given to a new donor-run Somalia Aid Coordination Board (SACB) with a secretariat to be managed by UNDP.¹⁷⁴ Indeed, the donors were not the only ones concerned. UNOSOM II's small humanitarian staff had itself been upset with the U.N.'s

participation as a protagonist in Somali clan warfare. Hugh Cholomondeley, the humanitarian coordinator since March 1993, was removed from his post in December, filled with frustration. U.N. Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Eliasson was so thoroughly frustrated that he resigned in early 1994.¹⁷⁵ The experience had led many observers to question the viability of a combined humanitarian-political-military response to a humanitarian crisis.

The U.S. Prepares to Depart

By late 1993, U.S. Government planning was focussing on a second, and this time more complete, hand-over to the United Nations and, more importantly, to the Somalis themselves. After making the strong case that Somalis would have to resolve their own problems or risk future international support, Oakley left Addis as the political conference following the humanitarian conference was getting under way. Before doing so, he authorized a special U.S. Government airplane and security detail to bring General Aidid from Mogadishu to Addis to join the negotiations. This reinforced the dramatic nature (and irony and quirks) of the recent U.S. policy shift and seemed to rehabilitate Aidid in the public consciousness. But in a more positive interpretation, it merely conceded the reality that a viable political solution for Somalia would be impossible without his participation. In Addis, and later in Nairobi, the various faction leaders spent nearly four months negotiating their country's future leadership structures. During this period, the Imam of Hirab, a religious leader previously unknown outside Somalia, emerged as an extremely influential figure in rallying Hawiye elders and religious and clan leaders to the cause of peaceful reconciliation. The U.S. Government was involved in a less visible way than before, leaving the primary encouraging role to UNOSOM's Ambassador Kouyate who took over as acting special representative of the Secretary-General after Howe departed in February 1994.

With its usual efficiency, the U.S. military planned its phased reduction, as did other western governments which had decided to join in the departure by March 31, 1994. With Pakistani and Indian troops expected to form the majority of the post-March 31 UNOSOM force of 19,000, some wondered whether they alone could keep the peace, or at least that level of peace which had been known theretofore.¹⁷⁶ Concerns were raised over how to protect the remaining 27-member U.S. Liaison Office staff, who performed such embassy functions as were feasible in a Somali setting; ultimately, 54 F.A.S.T. (Fleet Antiterrorism Support Team) Marines and 4,000 offshore troops were assigned for a transitional period to protect the remaining 1,000 American diplomats, relief workers, U.S. UNOSOM II staff, and Somali-Americans.¹⁷⁷

Considerable effort was also devoted during late 1993 and early 1994 to expanding, training, and equipping a modest Somali police force recently reestablished by UNOSOM II and originally seen as "our ticket out of Somalia".¹⁷⁸ Reestablishment of a police force had been difficult, even though most Somalis and donors agreed on its importance for restoring order. Several expatriate advisers and consultants had drawn up plans for both a police force and the judicial framework within which it could operate, drawing heavily on highly regarded Somali leadership and legal precedents in the country. While many blamed the U.N. for foot dragging, funding appeared to be the main impediment; donor governments feared introducing more armed members into the society, had legal restrictions in this area (in the case of U.S. AID, growing out of Viet-Nam experience, until an exception was made for Somalia), or simply weren't prepared to provide the money needed. By January 1994, the U.S. had allotted \$25 million (plus excess equipment and transportation) for police and judicial reestablishment purposes, and Secretary of State Christopher personally wrote to other governments to urge their contributions, as well. By March 1994 twenty countries were involved, and the Somali force, though not fully armed, numbered some 8,000 nationwide.¹⁷⁹

Somalia After U.S. Withdrawal

As the last U.S. troops left on March 26, the big question was whether Somalia would revert to its previous state of anarchy or whether the negotiations would lead to a peaceful political settlement. The answer turned out to be some of each. At the very last minute, through the effective mediation of Ambassador Kouyate (reinforced by his refusal to continue paying the negotiators' hotel bills, allegedly costing \$150,000 per day¹⁸⁰), the factions agreed on March 24 to the formation by May of a national governing authority. In the event, the schedule was not met, and most observers expected slow progress in forming even a weak central government structure, with de facto regional autonomy along clan lines the most likely scenario for the near future.¹⁸¹

While fighting had essentially stopped during the long negotiating period (except for recurring problems in Kismayu), general lawlessness increased. The latter was directed especially against relief agencies, with particular attacks, allegedly by fundamentalist groups, against religious NGOs around Christmas 1993. These led NGOs, U.N. agencies, and other donors to increasingly fear for their own security and that of their activities, particularly after the U.S. and European withdrawal. Having already felt that UNOSOM II troops were insufficiently responsive to their security needs, they felt an even greater need to hire armed Somali guards for protection. Yet, labor disputes continued to be a major cause of security incidents,¹⁸² leading, in turn, to

the question of whether donors, notably the European Union (formerly the E.C.), would continue to fund the costs of such guards in the future.

In early 1994, NGOs continued to withdraw expatriate staff, relying more on local staff and on funding Somali NGOs; hundreds of the latter were establishing themselves and seeking international support (500 were registered with UNOSOM in Mogadishu alone). CARE reduced its expatriate staff from 60 at the height to 20 by April 1994; and IMC from 20 to 10; other NGOs pulled out altogether.¹⁸³ NGOs also found their resources stretched thin, with much less donor interest in Somalia and more competition from other crises in Africa and elsewhere. Meanwhile, donors continued to emphasize funding activities in secure regions, although it was not clear that they would be sufficiently disciplined to sustain this. A February 1994 attempt to put together a multi-donor team to focus aid on the agreed priority regions of Bakool and Nugal resulted in only minimal interest. It was also unclear whether aid to Mogadishu, presumably the lowest priority in terms of security but high given the thousands of displaced persons there, would be stopped. And new humanitarian problems emerged, notably a cholera outbreak that struck 5,300 people and killed an estimated 200 by early April.¹⁸⁴

As one observer analyzed the Somalia scene in March 1994, "Fifteen months ago when George Bush dispatched 25,000 U.S. Marines here, Somalia was a country with no government, no electricity, no telephones, only a few schools, and no security on the streets because of widespread banditry. Now, as the United States nears the end of its withdrawal, and after all the death and destruction by anti-tank missiles, Somalia is still a country with no government, no electricity, a few more schools, a few satellite telephones, but still no security because of widespread banditry in the streets."¹⁸⁵ As the last U.S. troops departed on March 26, looters were seen walking off with much of the equipment they had left behind. Many of them were reportedly former Somali employees of the U.S. who knew the layouts of the U.S. facilities. Remaining UNOSOM troops (from Egypt and Pakistan) chose not to intervene.

On the books as of mid-summer 1994 was a UNOSOM end-date of March 1995. "Despite the negative assessment of the political and security situations in Somalia," U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali wanted to remain active at least through this period. "Deciding to phase out [earlier]," he stated in May 1994, "would signify abandonment of [the U.N.'s] vision and [run] the risk of the country sliding back into the abyss from which it was barely rescued less than two years ago."¹⁸⁶ He was not entirely alone in thinking this. "The troops should stay longer," said one Somali; "I'm sorry, but I don't have another solution". But the pendulum of support for Somalia seemed to be swinging away. Also in May, another five UNOSOM soldiers were killed, and militia fighting heated up yet again. U.S. patience had finally worn thin, and on September 15, 1994 the

flag was lowered at the U.S. Liaison Office and its last staff members departed. The U.S. was also pressing for the withdrawal of U.N. forces, even considering a brief U.S. troop deployment to protect the U.N.'s departure. No planning was underway for a renewed famine contingency.¹⁸⁷ Would it be "deja vu all over again?"

ENDNOTES

1. John Drysdale's *What Happened to Somalia?* (London: Haan Associates, 1994) provides an excellent account by a British consultant to UNOSOM with extensive knowledge of Somalia from colonial times in British Somaliland. Other useful historical sources include: *Somalia: A Country Study*, ed. Helen Chapin Metz (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 1992 (updated 1993)); Iain M. Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa* (rev. ed.), (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988); David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987); and numerous articles by the British academic Iain M. Lewis and Somali scholars Ahmed I. Samatar, Said S. Samatar, and Hussein M. Adam.
2. Interview with Amy Nelson of the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs, Office of African Refugee Assistance, 6/3/94, Washington, D.C.
3. See the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) study *Famine in Africa: Improving Emergency Food Relief Programs*, Report No. GAO/NSIAD-86-25 (Washington, D.C.: March 1986) for details of how U.S. PL480 emergency food aid was diverted to the Somali army or sold at below-market prices to public officials close to Barre; only an estimated 12 percent of the emergency food reached the most needy. See also Michael Maren, "Manna from Heaven? Somalia Pays the Price for Years of Aid," *Village Voice*, January 19, 1993, pp. 21 ff. Many NGO staff members and government officials interviewed for this study have commented on lack of donor trust of Somalis.
4. Geo. B.N. Ayittey, "The Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution," *Policy Analysis*, No. 205, Mar.28, 1994 (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute), per p.3. See also David Rawsom, "Dealing with Disintegration: Donors and the Somali State, 1980-90" pp.298-300 for a review of donors to the Barre government. OECD statistics indicate Italy provided almost 39 percent of all bilateral foreign aid to Somalia during 1979-1991, with the U.S. and E.C. second at almost 17 percent each, and Germany third at about 11.5 percent. See also tables from ODC Report on December 3, 1993 Conference, "Conflict Resolution, Humanitarian Assistance, and Development in Somalia: Lessons Learned," which uses data from *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries*. (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, various dates); also Peter J. Schraeder, "United States Foreign Policy toward Ethiopia and Somalia,"

in *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 154-7, 161-2, 183, 186-7.

5. As late as spring 1989, the Defense Department was asking Congress for \$15 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financing and \$1.2 million for International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds for Somalia; it also sought a total of \$34.5 million (including \$20 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) and \$10.5 million in PL480 food aid. (See DOD Congressional Presentation FY 1990 Security Assistance Programs, pp. 250-1. Also *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries*.)
6. See Charles L. Gesheker, "The Death of Somalia in Historical Perspective," draft chapter for *Unity vs. Separatism in the Middle East* (eds. Mary E. Morris and Emile Sahliyah), November 12, 1993, pp. 22, 30.
7. See USGAO report *Famine in Africa, op. cit.*, documenting food aid diversions to the Somali military, calling it the worst in the history of the U.S. food aid program and a "scandal".
8. See Gesheker, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
9. Gesheker, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-3, 29-31 argues it was an exceptional departure; others argue it was a militarized extension of prior patterns of aid extraction.
10. Interview with relief contractor.
11. The higher end figure comes from *Africa Report*, Mar-Apr 1990, p.10 (cited in Geo. B.N. Ayittey, "The Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution," *Policy Analysis*, No. 205, (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, Mar. 28, 1994)). Drysdale, *op. cit.*, uses a figure of 15-20,000 (p. 138). On Jan. 20, 1990, Africa Watch estimated between 50,000 and 60,000 Somali civilians had been killed in the North between May 1988 and January 1990 during government efforts to quell rebel movements. (Africa Watch, *A Government at War with Its Own People: Testimonies about the Killings and the Conflict in the North*. New York: Africa Watch, 1990.)
12. See AID/PRD draft on "Humanitarian Relief and National Reconstruction in Somalia," March 1, 1993, p. 2.
13. Alex de Waal and Rakiye Omaar, "Sowing the Seeds of War and Famine," GreenNet wire dispatch, February 25, 1994.

14. *Somalia: A Country Study*, ed. Helen Chapin Metz (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 1992; updated 1993) estimates that as much as \$330 million annually was being remitted by overseas Somali workers, representing 15 times all Somali-based yearly wages and nearly 40 percent of total GNP. (p. 141-2) Gesheker, *op. cit.*, cites Vali Jamal's estimate that such remittances equalled 13 times Somalia's annual wage bill. See also Alex de Waal, "The Shadow Economy," *Middle East Report*, March-April 1993, pp. 25 ff. Drysdale, *op. cit.*, cites a 1985 ILO study that annual remittances equalled \$370 million.
15. Interview with then-Italian Ambassador Mario Sica, 6/16/94, Vienna (by telephone).
16. See Jan Westcott, *The Somalia Saga, 1990-1993*, Refugee Policy Group, November 1994.
17. Interview with Ambassador Bishop, 4/15/94, Washington, D.C.
18. Ambassador Bishop suggests that "the looters probably were from Mogadishu's substantial criminal population and its otherwise respectable citizenry." Even before the evacuation, "we watched as our Somali neighbors carried past our gates goods looted from the homes of Americans still inside the compound." Bishop letter to RPG, p.5. Others reported an upsurge in traffic accidents caused by drivers, drunk on stolen diplomatic liquor supplies, trying to operate stolen vehicles they had never learned to drive. See Westcott, *op. cit.*
19. Some observers suggest that some of what has been called banditry and looting represents, in fact, either a socially acceptable form of resource acquisition in the context of traditional nomadic society, or voluntary donations to local militia for protecting the group or community.
20. Drysdale, *op. cit.*, who provides an excellent review and analysis of political events throughout this period, says as many as 30,000 were killed or wounded (p. 38); Reuters (Jan. 3, 1992 Nairobi dispatch) puts the number at 20,000. Africa Watch says 14,000 were killed and 27,000 wounded between November 1991 and February 1992, many by indiscriminate shelling.
21. Reuters 10/11/91 dispatch from Nairobi.
22. Steven Hansch notes of June 11/15, 1994 .
23. Reuters 10/11/91 dispatches from Nairobi and Mogadishu.

24. Reuters 10/21/91 dispatch from Mogadishu.
25. USDA, *African Food Needs Assessment: Situation and Outlook Report, November 1991*, p. 34, as cited by Africa Watch and Physicians for Social Responsibility study "Somalia: No Mercy in Mogadishu", July 1992, p. 18.
26. AP Nairobi dispatch, 12/28/91.
27. For an excellent chronology of political, diplomatic, and military developments in Somalia during this period, see Walter Clarke, "Somalia: Background Information for Operation Restore Hope 1992-93." *SSI Special Report*. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College, December 1992.
28. Interview with John Fox, 2/7/94, Brussels.
29. See Mark Fineman, "The Oil Stakes Factor in Somalia," *Los Angeles Times*, 1/18/93, pp. 1 ff, for an extensive discussion of this issue.
30. See this study's table on U.S. aid from 1990-94 (Annex B-1), drawn from various OFDA SITREPs. The \$29.6 million included \$4.38 million from OFDA, \$5.7 million from Food For Peace, and \$19.5 million from State's Bureau of Refugee Affairs.
31. In early September, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service had moved to grant "temporary protective status" to Somalis in the U.S. who feared going back to their homeland while the civil war still raged, the first time such status was extended to a group not explicitly named in Congressional legislation.
32. See Reuters October 1991 dispatches.
33. Interview with Bill Garvelink, 4/1/94, Washington, D.C.
34. See Westcott, *op. cit.*
35. Interview with James Jonah, 1/18/94, New York. Although NGOs were generally undeterred by insurance considerations, the difficulty of obtaining war risk insurance emerged as an issue for them in 1993-94. (See Stephen G. Greene, "In Africa's Horn, Plenty of Problems," *Chronicle of Philanthropy*, 4/19/94, pp. 6,8.) Pending their ability to make satisfactory arrangements, AID in early 1994 launched a temporary indemnification program to bridge the coverage gap for NGOs working in seven high risk countries under OFDA grants.

36. Comments by MSF, SCF-U.K., and UNHCR representatives at RPG's March 22, 1994 review session in Geneva, and reflected in other NGO interviews. A number noted that NGOs felt "abandoned" by the U.N.
37. "U.N. Envoy for Somalia Resigns Post, Blames Bureaucracy," *Washington Post*, 10/30/92, p.31.
38. See ICRC annual report for 1992.
39. Interview with Geoff Loane, 12/10/93, Nairobi
40. In "Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution," Humanitarianism Across Borders Conference, Brown University, December 10-11, 1992.
41. Jonah, *op.cit.* See Annex A-5 for a comprehensive listing of U.N. Security Council resolutions and actions pertaining to Somalia.
42. See *Somalia. A Fight to the Death? Leaving Civilians at the Mercy of Terror and Starvation*. Washington, D.C.: Africa Watch, 2/13/92, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 7-9, 17. Jeffrey Clark assessed Jonah's mission as a "debacle" in *Famine in Somalia and the International Response: Collective Failure*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees Issue Paper, November 1992.
43. Interview with Ambassador Robert Oakley, 12/17/93, Washington, D.C.
44. Interviews with Brian Wannup, 4/15/94, New York (by telephone) and David Bassiouni, 12/21/93, New York.
45. Bassiouni interview, *op. cit.*
46. Different sources vary widely -- from 4 million to 7 million -- in estimating Somalia's population. Many estimates are based on extrapolations of birth and death rates from early 1980s Somalia government survey figures, themselves highly unreliable. See Steve Hansch, et.al., *op.cit.*
47. Even Alex de Waal, co-director of the London-based African Rights and a vocal critic of the UNITAF intervention, argues that earlier UN intervention could have saved many lives. (Interview, 1/26/94, London (by telephone))
48. RPG/CDC estimate; Hansch, et.al., *op.cit.*, *The Washington Post* (August 24, 1992) put the figure at about 20 percent.

49. Rebecca Katumba, "Horn of Africa: Crumbs from the aid pie," *Women's Feature Service/Nairobi dispatch*, 8/25/92.
50. Interview with Michael Toole, 1/4/94, Atlanta.
51. Loane interview, *op. cit.*
52. Interview with Hussain Dahir, 12/8/93, Baidoa.
53. Herman Cohen, "Intervention in Somalia," manuscript prepared for *Diplomatic Record*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, June 1994, p. 8.
54. Interviews with Ambassador Herman Cohen, 4/14/94, Washington, D.C.; and Ambassador Robert Houdek, 11/18/93, Washington, D.C.
55. Houdek, *op. cit.*; also John R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn in Somalia," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 1, January-February 1994. Bolton's views were influential because he was State's principal official overseeing U.S. policies relating to the U.N., and the U.S. wanted to work closely with the U.N. on Somalia.
56. Interview with State Department official.
57. Cited by Elizabeth Lindenmayer at March 15, 1994 RPG review session in Washington, D.C.
58. Interview with Jim Kunder, 2/23/94, Washington, D.C.
59. *Ibid.*
60. Quote from his opening remarks at September 16, 1992 hearing of House Africa subcommittee chaired by Dymally.
61. Interview with Dina Esposito, 1/13/94, Washington, D.C.
62. Loane interview, *op. cit.*
63. At a June 23 hearing in the House Africa Subcommittee, Rep. Howard Wolpe had similarly challenged the double standard of U.S. response to the Bosnia and Somalia crises.
64. Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

65. Written responses to interview questions to former President George Bush.
66. The Deputies Committee was composed of officials one step below Cabinet rank.
67. Kunder, *op. cit.*
68. Interviews with Andrew Natsios, 12/13/93 and 7/26/94, Washington, D.C. In March 1992, he prepared a memorandum to the Secretary of State proposing a 5,000 troop U.N. force, but the memo was stopped at the Assistant Secretary level.
69. Lutheran World Federation, "Somalia Emergency Relief -- LWF Airlift Operations (14 May through 01 November 1992)," *Somalia Update*, 11/2/92.
70. President William J. Clinton, *Report to the Congress on U.S. Policy in Somalia*, October 13, 1993, p. 11.
71. Natsios, *op. cit.*
72. Interview with Gen. Libutti, 2/14/94, Tampa.
73. OFDA staff members Ron Libby, Valerie Newsom, and Tom Frey provide detailed accounts of OFDA's on-the-ground contributions to the DOD airlift; see also various internal OFDA memoranda.
74. Project Implementation Order/Technical.
75. See Libutti briefing document. The military's initial plan had been to airdrop MREs ("meals ready to eat"), but because of dietary inappropriateness in the Somali context, OFDA Operations Director Bill Garvelink vetoed the idea.
76. Natsios believes that while the airlift actually substituted for other means of delivery, rather than adding net new food into the country, the psychological effect on traders who had been hoarding stocks was such as to cause them to release those stocks, thus causing the price decline. He argues that food prices are critically related to death rates. (Interview 8/1/94.)
77. Cohen, *op.cit.*, p. 12.
78. Garvelink memo to Kunder, September 21, 1992.
79. This is not to say that more distant areas failed to receive food, since ICRC and others' beach and land and cross-border distributions were still significant --

indeed, contributed a majority of food deliveries. Even with airlifted commodities there were exceptions: for example, CRS was able to off-load food airlifted by Lutheran World Federation to Baidoa and distribute it the same day in villages more than 75 km. away. In such cases, the short transit time translated into fewer looting or warehouse losses. (Paul Miller letter to RPG, 7/25/94.)

80. In March 1994, however, the U.S. GAO, in its report *Peace Operations: Cost of DOD Operations in Somalia*, estimated the cost at only \$20 million in incremental charges beyond what the military would have spent normally for training and maintenance during the same period -- an arguably small amount considering the number of lives saved and the cost of subsequent military operations in Somalia. (See Issues and Analysis section below.)
81. Loane interview, *op. cit.*
82. Drysdale, *op.cit.*, p. 109.
83. Interview with Ambassador Sahnoun, 3/3/94, Washington, D.C.
84. See Ray Bonner, "Why We Went," *Mother Jones*, March-April 1993, pp. 44-6, 48,58, 60, which details specific criticisms of the U.N. made publicly by Sahnoun. During the October 12, 1992 donors' meeting in Geneva, Sahnoun said that "A whole year slipped by whilst the U.N. and the international community, save for the International Red Cross and a few nongovernmental humanitarian organizations, watched Somalia descend into this hell. The damage will not be repaired." (Quoted by Bonner, p. 58) Sahnoun later noted some positive contributions made by U.N. agencies.
85. Interview with U.N. official.
86. Interview with Philip Johnston, 4/8/94, Atlanta (by telephone) regarding food distribution success and security impediments.
87. Alex De Waal interview, 1/26/94, London (by telephone).
88. Hansch, et.al., *op.cit.*
89. Sam Toussie in March 15, 1994 RPG Washington review meeting.
90. Interview with Ambassador Ismat Kittani, 1/18/94, New York. See also his Report to the Secretary-General, November 1992.

91. For a discussion of these issues, see notes of March 1994 RPG Geneva review meeting.
92. Letter from MCC Co-Secretary for Africa Eric Olfert to InterAction President Peter Davies, 11/25/92.
93. Letter from InterAction President Peter Davies to General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 11/19/92.
94. Cohen interview, *op. cit.*
95. See William J. Clinton, *op. cit.*
96. Text of Senate Concurrent Resolution 132, 102d Congress, 2d Session, August 4, 1992. The resolution passed the Senate August 3, 1992.
97. Senator Paul Simon, "A Letter to President Bush", reprinted as press release in Washington, D.C., May 16-22, 1993
98. Interview with Richard Clarke, 1/13/94, Washington, D.C.
99. A relatively full account is given in Don Oberdorfer, "Anatomy of a Decision: How Bush Made Up His Mind to Send Troops to Somalia," *International Herald Tribune*, 12/7/92, p. 5
100. Interview with General Powell, 7/5/94, Washington, D.C. (by telephone).
101. Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 12
102. Powell, *op. cit.* Also, interview with Under Secretary of Defense (previously of State) Frank Wisner, 4/20/94, Washington, D.C. (by telephone).
103. Figures provided by Central Command during 2/14/94 interviews, Tampa.
104. Powell interview, *op. cit.*
105. Cohen interview, *op. cit.*; also interview with Ambassador Robert Houdek, 11/18/93, Washington, D.C.
106. Interview with Admiral Jonathan Howe, 3/25/94, McLean, VA. Powell himself prefers the term "decisive force", noting its purpose to achieve "decisive results." Powell interview, *op. cit.*

107. Interview with Michelle Flournoy, 4/22/94, Washington, D.C.
108. Interview with Pentagon official.
109. Natsios interview, 3/10/94, Washington, D.C.
110. Powell interview, *op. cit.*
111. Howe interview, *op. cit.*
112. Bush, *op. cit.*
113. Letter dated November 29, 1992 from the U.N. Secretary-General to President of the U.N. Security Council, reproduced as U.N. Document No. S/24868 dated November 30, 1992.
114. Cohen, *op. cit.*, p.17.
115. *United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations. Information Notes.* New York: Department of Public Information, Update No. 2 (November 1993), pp. 84-5. Also *The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia* (Reference Paper) New York: U.N. Department of Public Information, June 1993, p. 7, as quoted in Glenn McDonald, "Peace Enforcement in Somalia," 2 March 1994, p. 15. The U.S. GAO study *Peace Operations. Cost of DOD Operations in Somalia* (Washington, D.C., March 1994, p. 2) puts the peak number of UNITAF troops at close to 38,000.
116. Interview with General Anthony Zinni, 2/28/94, Quantico, VA.
117. Powell interview, *op. cit.*
118. Interview with James Grant, 1/18/94, New York
119. Interview with Stefania Pace, 12/6/93, Mogadishu.
120. Zinni interview, *op. cit.*
121. Interviews with Central Command and Joint Staff, Tampa and Pentagon.
122. Comments by Ambassador David Shinn, 7/15/94
123. Heavy weapons within UNITAF's operational zones were isolated or in some cases destroyed, although many clan factions' "technicals" were moved north or to

rural areas to avoid this. (The term "technical", referring to gun-mounted vehicles often hired to protect relief workers, was shorthand for "technical assistance", the euphemism by which relief agencies justified their budget expenditures for security protection.) *The Economist*, in a 3/27/93 article, notes that "Since the American-led peacekeepers arrived in Somalia in December, they have confiscated more than 5,000 small arms, 90 heavy machine guns, and more than 1.3m rounds of ammunition plus tanks and armoured personnel carriers." Cited in Glenn McDonald, March 2, 1994, p. 15, fn. 71.

124. Robert Oakley, "Mission Accomplished in Somalia", *Washington Post*, March 1993.
125. OFDA placed its DART-Mogadishu coordinating functions under U.N. aegis to avoid creating parallel structures that would have further weakened an already weak U.N. humanitarian presence. See Garvelink and Elizabeth Lukasavich interviews.
126. Interview with Kate Farnsworth, 12/20/93, Washington, D.C.
127. Zinni interview, *op. cit.*
128. Comments by MSF's Patrick Vial at March 22, 1994 RPG Geneva review session.
129. Interview with Kevin Kennedy, 12/1/1993, Addis Ababa.
130. Zinni interview, *op. cit.*
131. Comments by various participants at 5th International Congress of Somali Studies workshop on NGO responses to the Somali crisis, December 3, 1994, especially by Abdirahman Osman Raghe.
132. Comments by MSF and SCF-U.K. representatives at March 22, 1994 RPG Geneva review session.
133. Ken Menkhaus, "Getting Out vs. Getting Through in Somalia," *Middle East Policy*, vol. III, no. I, 1994, p. 155.
134. Draft manuscript by Robert Oakley and John Hirsch, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, September 1994).

135. Garvelink comments at June 9, 1994 RPG review session; see also Valerie Newsom interview.
136. Interviews with NGO representatives.
137. Paraphrase from message sent by Johnston to Washington, D.C., 1/28/93. Johnston also indicated that major weapons systems had been destroyed or cantoned; as a percentage of the total available, however, it seems to have been minor indeed.
138. Marlin Fitzwater in Jane Perlez, "Must U.S. Strip a Land of Guns," *New York Times*, 12/15/92, p. 8, per Cohen, *op.cit.*
139. Glenn McDonald, "Casting Aside the White Man's Burden: Peace-Enforcement in Somalia." Draft paper. March 1994. p. 17, citing *UNOSOM II Weekly Review*, September 15, 1993.
140. USGAO. *Peace Operations. Cost of DOD Operations in Somalia*. March 1994. p. 2. Also, *Peace Operations. Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Somalia*, June 1994, p. 1.
141. Term used by Admiral Howe in interview.
142. The U.S. insisted on an American deputy commander for UNOSOM II, General Thomas Montgomery, who officially worked under General Bir but maintained direct command and control of U.S. Forces, most notably the Quick Reaction Force.
143. Howe's supporters in the Administration noted his previous diplomatic experience in the State Department, in NATO as a coalition leader, and his reputation as a good manager. "We didn't view Jon as only a military guy," said one former colleague, adding, however, that his military background was also useful for a Chapter VII operation that might be hard for a civilian to handle. (Interview, January 1994.)
144. John Drysdale, *op.cit.*, reports the former, p. 124-5, and Cohen, *op.cit.*, p. 20, the latter.
145. Term used by CARE staff, 1/4/94 interview, Atlanta.
146. In the event, the Galcayo peace conference was one of only two Somali peace agreements in the last four years that achieved significant results that "held".

147. Interview with Ambassador Gosende, 11/18/93.
148. So described by Drysdale, *op.cit.*, p.180.
149. Drysdale, *op. cit.*, and others, but not Glaspie, indicate that she approved the mission. Glaspie interview, 4/15/94.
150. Drysdale, *op.cit.*, p. 181.
151. Admiral Howe interview, 4/21/94, McLean, VA (by telephone).
152. Drysdale, *op.cit.*, notes "powerful evidence that, in fact, the real focus was the radio station." (p. 183) Howe and Gosende agree that the U.S. was more concerned about Radio Mogadishu than was UNOSOM II. (Howe interview, 4/21/94; Gosende interview, 5/25/94.)
153. Powell interview, *op. cit.*
154. Interview with Elizabeth Lindenmayer, 1/19/94, New York.
155. Howe interview, 4/21/94. Aidid did, however, call for an impartial inquiry into the events. The U.N. Security Council called for one on June 6, which was subsequently conducted by American University Professor Tom Farer who found Aidid responsible.
156. Drysdale, *op. cit.*, p. 203
157. Powell interview, *op. cit.*
158. Kate Farnsworth memorandum to Bill Garvelink, "Mogadishu Revisited," September 7, 1993.
159. Interview with Ambassador Gosende, 5/25/1994, Washington, D.C.
160. Clinton was reported by *The New Yorker* (10/25/93) to have been influenced to pursue a political track by former President Carter when the latter stayed at the White House for the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian accord. The "two-fisted approach" term was reportedly coined by Frank Wisner. (Richard Clarke interview, 7/28/94.)
161. Interview with Richard Clarke, 7/28/94.
162. Interviews with U.S. Liaison Office officials, December 1993, Mogadishu.

163. Interview with Kofi Annan, 1/19/94, New York.
164. Keith Richburg, *Washington Post*, "Somalia is poised for war or peace as troops plan exit," 1/27/94.
165. At the same time, according to U.S. officials, the Aidid forces were rearming, as indeed they had been ever since the UNITAF departure and resultant decline in street patrols -- not to mention due to an overall sense that UNOSOM II, with its much diminished American presence, was commensurately less fearsome.
166. Shinn mission reports, August 1993.
167. Interview with Mario Rodriguez, 12/7/93, Baidoa.
168. U.S. Liaison Office reports to Washington.
169. Patrick Vial, MSF, quoted in AP dispatch 9/29/93 by Pauline Jelinek.
170. George Somerwill, CARE, same dispatch.
171. USLO reports to Washington, 11/4/93 and 12/25/93.
172. *The Economist*, 10/9/93, p.45, as cited by Glenn McDonald, March 2, 1994, p. 27.
173. Official conference transcript of speech, November 29, 1993.
174. Under donor and especially U.S. pressure, efforts were also made to induce the World Bank to coordinate and help prepare an October 1993 study on reconstruction and development. The World Bank, however, refused to chair a February 1994 donor's meeting on Somalia on the grounds that its by-laws barred lending to countries without a recognized central government. (Interview with Peter Miovic, 1/94, Washington, D.C. (by telephone); also with Shinn, 7/18/94, Washington, D.C.) However, the Bank had made an unprecedented one-time-only \$20 million grant for emergency assistance to Somalia (see World Bank News Release No. 93/524, 10/28/92), and by 1994 was expected to become more systematically involved in reconstruction if some form of central government emerged.
175. Interviews with Hugh Cholmondeley, 1/18/94, New York, and Jan Eliasson, 1/19/94, New York.

176. See Terry Leonard, "Somalia Losing Control," Associated Press, April 2, 1994 and Richard Dowden, "Western Troops Leave Somalia," *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, vol. 6, no. 2, March-April 1994.
177. OFDA Sitrep 26, p. 2. Also USGAO, *Peace Operations: Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Somalia*, op. cit.
178. So described by Howe, 3/25/94 interview.
179. Keith Richburg, "With Economy Still Devastated, Somalia Could See New Chaos," *Washington Post*, 3/14/94. In a June 23, 1994 symposium sponsored by State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and other groups, General Hoar hinted that the immense sums being spent on Somali police trainer salaries and equipment were likely to become a major future scandal.
180. Both the negotiating process and the figure are reported in "Commentary: The Rise and Fall of a SRSB" in *Somalia News Update* from the Africa News and Information Service, May 18, 1994.
181. The June 3, 1994 *Africa Confidential* details recent U.S. Government initiatives to explore "federal" government options with various Somali clans and political factions and to de-emphasize the need for a central government.
182. Mark Wentling, "Aid Beyond the Front Lines in Somalia: An End-Of-Tour Wrap-Up." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Department of State, April 26, 1994, p. 4.
183. Stephen Greene, *op.cit.*, p. 6.
184. OFDA Sitrep 26, p. 2.
185. Richburg, *op.cit.*
186. U.N. Security Council Press Release SC/5853, 3385th Meeting, 5/31/94.
187. Richard Clarke interview, 7/28/94. See also article by Julia Preston, "The U.S. Warns U.N. on Somalia. Mission Could Be Curtailed If Clans Don't Make Peace," *Washington Post*, 5/13/94, p. A40.

ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

Emerging from the foregoing summary of the Somalia humanitarian crisis and response, three broad areas demand analysis if appropriate conclusions are to be drawn and lessons learned; these areas relate to timeliness of response, balance between humanitarian, political, and military approaches, and overall effectiveness of actions taken.

Acting in Time

Why did an estimated 240,000 Somalis have to die before the international community could adequately respond to the crisis? As countless observers have pointed out, the scale of death constitutes a searing indictment of the global conscience. The fact that similar, and even worse, disasters have been, and continue to be, taking place elsewhere in the world makes the need for an answer all the more urgent.

At one level, and in a possible Holocaust analogy, the answer is that the world did not want to know. Many individuals and organizations knew as early as mid-1991 that famine was on the horizon -- the ICRC had been a voice crying in the wilderness for months -- but the message was not acted upon. OFDA's Andrew Natsios and others held press conferences and gave congressional testimony in early 1992, but even OFDA action, absent political support, was slow in coming. The reason usually given is that the media didn't focus on it.¹ By increasingly common, if ashamed, consensus even at high levels of governments, it is nowadays the media and resultant public opinion that dictate policy and move governments to act. Emergencies take on urgency when bureaucrats receive calls from "upstairs" to "do something" if they are not to suffer embarrassment or repercussions. This is true not only of governments as they act individually, but also as they act collectively through the United Nations. And even then, as one State Department official put it, "it takes a while to crack a bureaucracy."²

While in principle it should not take media pressure -- governments should have their own principles, say some, and then seek media support -- American ambivalence about overseas involvements generates a reluctance to act without the certainty of public (via media) support. Thus, particularly where national security issues are not

immediately at stake, it is principally the media that determine whether Somalia, for example, or Sudan, or either one, will draw priority attention.

There are several reasons for the media's -- and policy-makers' -- lack of early attention to Somalia. One is that there were so many simultaneous events, crises, "distractions" in the world. The most obvious were the Gulf War and the Kurdish, Bosnian, Russian, and South African situations; less obvious but equally urgent crises included the severe drought in southern Africa and complex situations in Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia. The public and those few government decision-makers with authority to act can handle only so much at one time, while economic factors increasingly limit the media's capacity to cover the world adequately.

Another reason is editors' apparent belief that the public, to the extent interested in international issues at all, is not interested in political or civil wars, particularly since the Cold War ended. Famine evokes more interest and sympathy, and journalists have found that an actual famine -- especially when accompanied by graphic photos of emaciated, fly-covered children -- will more easily win editorial support for coverage than a predicted one. "Millions will die" is a less effective message than numbers already dead, and the greater the specificity and higher the number (whether accurate or not), the more effective in gaining coverage.³ "We want a famine," editors in essence tell their correspondents.⁴ Thus, until graphic photos of famine were available, there would be little or no media coverage. In Somalia, it was essentially the ICRC, NGOs, and then the airlift that provided on-the-ground access for the media, and most importantly for the cameramen, to capture and bring back the story.

That relief groups need to better understand how the media work and to better work with them is one of the key lessons cited by the ICRC in its analysis of the Somalia crisis. Similarly, NGOs appear to have come to a more sophisticated view that media relations must be a critical part of their mission, and that joining together in media efforts may be a more powerful way to be heard. The media have their own rhythms, cycles of coverage, and perceptions of public interests that are not always logical to understand. Reporters who take the initiative to cover a story are often frustrated when their editors, the ultimate gatekeepers, do not run it. As one NGO head put it, one's message either needs to hit a 1/16 inch bulls-eye opening, or carry so much clout that only a consortium effort, if that, has a chance to carry the weight to be heard.⁵

Media discovery of a story can cause almost as many problems as non-discovery. More than one aid agency reported significant difficulties caused by culturally inexperienced, insensitive, overly demanding, and even rude journalists who prevented them at times from effectively carrying out their humanitarian roles. The journalist

invasion which occurred beginning in the second half of 1992 also contributed to inflating local salaries and services, substantially increasing the cost of giving aid, and consequently enriching those in control of south Mogadishu (the Aidid forces) where most journalists (and other foreigners) were housed. This problem was further exacerbated by the later western military presence whose "high budget operations were a major boost to many of the commercial class much of [whose] profit was mediated through Aydeed's SNA." Their 1994 departure meant that "Aydeed's organisation is suffering from severe funding cuts."⁶

More important -- and suggesting a mutual manipulation by both media and relief agencies -- is the extent to which the sheer forcefulness and resultant impact of media coverage drove international policy in ways that were arguably counter-productive at times. For example, numbers of casualties and of people at risk were bandied about with little statistical basis or certainty. Some of these came from relief agencies with their own interests at heart. The question has been appropriately raised as to whether "journalists have allowed themselves to become dependent on food sources as news sources"⁷ and whether government policy-makers were sufficiently able to assert independence from media effects on public opinion. Furthermore, by mid-1993, the media were totally preoccupied with the "war story" in Mogadishu to the virtual exclusion of other, and sometimes more positive developments elsewhere in the country. Since the U.S. Government and United Nations were also heavily preoccupied with Mogadishu, this is not entirely surprising. Finally, no coherent attempt was made to explain to the American public the extent to which the U.S.-supported U.N. mission in Somalia had fundamentally changed from one of support for relief to support for political-military objectives (the defeat of Aidid). When eighteen American soldiers were killed on October 3, therefore, the role of the media and public opinion in precipitating U.S. departure from Somalia was just as dramatic as in shaping international entry into the country. Although President Clinton was able to argue with Congress for at least a six-month transition, from a United Nations perspective "the press helped the U.N. at the beginning, then did us in at the end."⁸

Adding to the problem of excessive media influence is the inevitable risk of distortion. This is partly exemplified by a CNN reporter who noted that his superiors had discouraged him from attending a major gathering of Somali political leaders and international donors in Addis Ababa at which progress toward a political solution was expected, for fear he might miss a skirmish in Mogadishu considered of more interest to CNN viewers.⁹ With the arrival of UNITAF, an American story-- the "boys in uniform from home" -- displaced the larger, African story of what was happening with respect to

Somalia. As a result, the whole reason for the intervention, and the basic issues involved, soon tended to be ignored or forgotten, thus undermining any basis for a responsible public input into public policy.

Preventive Diplomacy

If earlier media attention might have led to a reduced level of disaster in Somalia, is it also possible that preventive diplomacy could have brought a resolution of the fighting before mass starvation occurred? In more mundane economic terms, might a few hundred thousand dollars invested in skilled intensive diplomacy, perhaps along the lines of the U.S. role in Ethiopia at the time of the Mengistu regime's collapse, have saved some \$2 billion spent by the U.S. Government alone on the subsequent military response?¹⁰

Ambassador Oakley has suggested that if more attention had been paid to Somalia in 1991, "none of this would have happened....Of course it would be better to resolve the political issues at the outset -- but our system isn't set up for that."¹¹ Others, notably Ambassador Sahnoun, feel there were missed opportunities even earlier: in 1988, at the time of the uprising in the northwest, and in mid-1990, when an opposition "Manifesto Group" sought changes in the Barre regime, and only a limited diplomatic demarche was made.¹² In late 1990, prior to Barre's forced departure from Mogadishu, the Italians and Egyptians, as well as U.S. Ambassador Bishop, had attempted to urge negotiations between Barre and the rebels, but the efforts came to naught. In the view of the chief Italian negotiator, Ambassador Mario Sica, "intensified efforts could have helped, particularly by reaching out to Somali leaders then abroad..., although in all honesty I cannot be sure it would have changed the result."¹³ As Bishop put it, it was hard to get Barre, like any dictator, to "cooperate in his own political demise."¹⁴ It should also be noted that with most aid having been cut off after the 1988 bombing of Hargeisa, the U.S. retained virtually no leverage in the situation. "Could President Bush have gotten on the 'phone and helped?", Bishop speculated later as to whether some stronger diplomatic action might have been tried; not likely, was the conclusion.¹⁵ In any case, there were other forces in the U.S. Government, notably Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton, arguing that with the end of the Cold War Somalia was of no strategic interest to the United States.¹⁶ While this observation was directed at opposing the proposal for aid intervention, it implicitly suggested that the U.S. should not expend undue effort on a humanitarian emergency when more "important" issues around the world demanded attention.

Given the overwhelming demands on policy-makers' time and foreign assistance resources, a certain amount of triage is understandable. But the almost inevitable future financial costs of a crisis "getting out of hand" -- not to mention the human costs, which led some to characterize Bolton's position as "criminal" -- introduce a new calculus that was certainly insufficiently considered in the Somalia case.¹⁷

A related question is whether the U.S., or perhaps Italy -- with its special (albeit controversial) historical and economic relationships with Somalia -- could have retained a presence in Mogadishu to facilitate mediation efforts after Siad Barre's fall in January 1991. Some have argued that the U.S. Embassy compound could have been defended, or at least that, with effort, U.S. diplomats might have been able to engage the anti-Barre rebels in a constructive power-sharing discussion.¹⁸ Those there at the time, however, insist that the danger was so real, the chaos so complete, and the rebels so divided that it would have been impossible to negotiate. At least one Somali argues that, "prevention being better than cure," military force should have been deployed in early 1991. However, it must be recalled that this was the moment when the Gulf War was beginning, and "it was hardly the time, if there ever is a time, to insert American troops between the protagonists in one of Africa's many civil wars."¹⁹

While a number of both U.N. and U.S. officials were later involved to varying degrees in political discussions with Somalis -- significantly more with warlords than with the elders and imams whose support was critical to sustaining them -- the most significant were those undertaken by Ambassadors Sahnoun and Oakley and later Kouyate; these were the only three who seemed to have Somali respect. In a major error by Boutros-Ghali, Sahnoun was effectively fired for publicly speaking his mind about U.N. deficiencies (which, ironically, increased Somali respect for him). Oakley was effective as the U.S. President's representative; but he was unable to speak directly for the U.N., the officially responsible party in Somalia, yet distrusted by many Somalis, notably by General Aidid and his followers. Kouyate was effective in negotiating the March 1994 accords, which in some ways only reiterated what had been agreed to a year before -- and might have been agreed to earlier had Sahnoun been retained.

In truth, a number of hard-reached Somali agreements proved of no greater value than the paper on which they were printed, as Somali leaders soon ignored them and fought for military advantage on the ground. Partly for this reason, the early UNITAF period, during which the international military presence was at its height, would seem to have been an ideal time for strong diplomatic action rooted in outside military strength. But the U.S. political commitment did not match even its limited, time-bound military commitment. With the haste to turn over the whole Somalia problem to the United Nations, the U.S. dropped the ball.

A Question of Balance

Role of the Military

What is most unique to the Somalia situation is the use of military assets for humanitarian objectives in a civil conflict. While military forces had been recently involved in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, the circumstances there, following a war in which the U.S. and its allies had been victorious, were completely different. In Somalia, the U.S. entered a situation of no governing authority, no identified enemies (Aidid was singled out only later), widespread chaos, and no realistic plan for creating a durable order.

The reason cited for mounting the first U.S. military involvement in Somalia, the Operation Provide Relief airlift, was essentially intended to jump-start the aid effort by demonstrating in dramatic fashion that the U.S. was actively engaged. In this sense, it had a kind of public relations purpose, to demonstrate U.S. resolve to the international community, thus spurring, perhaps even shaming, other donors to join in helping.²⁰ At the highest levels in government, the purpose was simply "to get the job done".²¹ There was apparently no consideration of the fact that military airlifts, and particularly those of the U.S., are often less efficient and less flexible than civilian ones. This is because of the military's strict operating rules allowing fewer trips per day and significantly smaller flight loads because of the need to accommodate the military's enhanced security technology and personnel. Southern Air Transport, the company from which OFDA leased its planes to assist ICRC and WFP efforts, could haul as much, or more, with five aircraft as the Department of Defense could with fourteen. Indeed, ICRC, at one stage was "achieving the same efficiency from one civilian [plane] as up to six military."²²

There is also a financial question, since at full cost the lower capacity military flights would clearly cost considerably more than their civilian counterparts. Since the Pentagon absorbed most of the costs, however, the airlift was seen as something of a "freebie", since OFDA and the foreign aid budget were not charged. Furthermore, according to Pentagon and GAO figures, the incremental cost of the military airlift was only \$20 million beyond what otherwise would have been spent by the Defense Department anyway. At this rate, calculations suggest that the total effective U.S. Government cost was not very different from that of the ongoing civilian airlifts.²³ The issue of cost is important, however, given the fact that the later, and extremely costly, land intervention was justified in part on what was believed to be the unsustainably high cost of the airlift (as well as on its inability to "solve the famine problem".)

While some suggest that the Defense Department derived useful training benefits from the airlift, CENTCOM officers note that only limited objectives were achieved and that their budgets, in fact, were adversely affected. Furthermore, some military officers question whether U.S. combat readiness could be impaired by such a diversion of resources from war preparedness to humanitarian missions.²⁴ Non-Defense Department observers suggest that other military leaders may welcome humanitarian assignments not only for altruistic reasons, but also for maintaining strength and justifying budgets in the post-Cold War era.

In general, the airlift is considered to have been successful in that it delivered significant amounts of food -- 10-15 percent of total deliveries²⁵ -- to people in desperate need. It succeeded thanks to judicious scheduling and flight patterns, sound management, and a measure of luck -- nothing went badly wrong, as would happen later when the troops were sent. According to estimates by the Centers for Disease Control and Refugee Policy Group, some 40,000 lives were saved during August-December 1992, a significant majority presumably because of the airlift itself and its broader food price and psychological effects.²⁶ The airlift also successfully demonstrated U.S. concern and inspired at least some other donors to contribute as well.

What alternatives existed to the military airlift? Road transport was extremely difficult due to insecurity and looting. However, one could have continued to use this means, as ICRC and others did for some 80 percent of commodities delivered. They did so by negotiating security agreements with local elders, paying for protection, and/or consciously agreeing to accept higher delivery losses.²⁷ Whether an equivalent or greater amount of food would have reached those in need, the cost would presumably have been less than that of Operation Provide Relief. More cost-effective yet would have been an earlier intervention either by airlift or land. Indeed, CDC/RPG estimates suggest that while some 50,000 lives were probably saved by ICRC and NGO relief efforts during January 1991-August 1992, a majority of the 220,000 lives lost by December 1992 could have been prevented had stronger action been taken by April of that year. But this was not to be, as the tendency of policy-makers is to invest in incremental steps and hope they will work. To reiterate Oakley's words in a different context, "our system isn't set up for that."

By far the most dramatic step in "getting the job done" was Operation Restore Hope, undertaken largely out of desperation that nothing else would work to get food to those in need. Extortion at airlift landing sites was upsetting to the relief community. The fact that insecurity made it difficult to deliver airlifted food beyond an approximately 30 kilometer radius also caused concern over the fates of those living, and dying, beyond that distance. And the havoc at Mogadishu port was visible to all. The resultant uproar

from NGOs, U.N. agencies, and the media placed considerable pressure on the world community to take stronger action.

What may not have been fully assessed was the extent to which Somalia's need for outside food continued to be critical in the latter part of 1992, particularly inasmuch as mortality was declining, the outlook for local harvests was beginning to improve, and food prices were again relatively low and steady.²⁸ OFDA had "loud and clear" information to this effect from Westcott and from NGOs in Somalia, to the extent that Kunder "consciously remember[s] thinking, 'Let's consider: do we need to raise the flag of intervention higher?'"²⁹ The field reports were also discussed with at least some in the State Department, and Kunder, looking back, feels the issues got the right amount of consideration. The problem was that no precise and incontrovertible data were available and no-one could say there would be no ensuing deterioration. This lack of confidence that events were shifting, combined with the inexorable momentum for intervention based on the front page press coverage, determined subsequent events.

Absent a major increase in insecurity over the level existing just prior to the UNITAF intervention, CDC/RPG data suggest that some 10-25,000 lives may have been saved because of it.³⁰ This is a lower estimate than others advanced heretofore -- certainly compared with President Clinton's astonishing one million estimate.³¹ It also raises the question of whether policy decisions were excessively guided by relief agencies acting, consciously or unconsciously, on assumptions rooted more in institutional preoccupations with relief movements than in an objective and up-to-date analysis of amounts of food currently or imminently to be available at the December-January harvest time. As at least two commentators have observed, "Relief agencies repeatedly confuse the efficiency of their own operations with the degree to which famine is being overcome."³²

If, in fact, the figure of 10-25,000 lives saved is a realistic approximation, one might question the decision to conduct Operation Restore Hope, an operation estimated to have an incremental cost of \$1.97 billion in U.S. Defense Department expenditures and assessments for subsequent U.N. military efforts.³³ What is even more alarming is the suggestion of nearly 10,000 Somali casualties (deaths *and* wounded) caused by the combined interventions -- up to 100 killed due to UNITAF operations (against 18 UNITAF Americans who died), with an additional 1,500 killed and 6-8,000 wounded (against about 80 foreign troops, as of mid-October, 1993) under UNOSOM II.³⁴

How can one reconcile this information with the overwhelming (if not quite unanimous) initial support for the intervention?

First, the caveat about the reliability of all Somalia-related statistics should be reiterated;

Second, it must be noted that numbers of security-related casualties incurred without the international intervention are impossible to estimate;

Third, as a French NGO observer put it, the most important contribution of Operation Restore Hope was to change the *dynamique* of the situation more than to end the famine;³⁵ the operation made clear that interference with relief delivery would no longer be tolerated;

Fourth, the new psychology of the situation may have helped to spur Somalis' confidence in planting crops and other, longer-term recovery measures even beyond the areas of UNITAF troop presence. It also allowed more Somalis to stay at home rather than congregate in disease-prone feeding centers.³⁶

Whether similar results could have been obtained at lower cost, however, remains a valid question. At least one lower-cost option was considered, although not, as suggested above, very seriously. Assuming that additional action was needed, some observers favored the creation of zones of tranquility, where limited numbers of troops would ensure guns were kept out and food and seeds were distributed.³⁷ In one sense, Kenyan and Ethiopian refugee camps offered the equivalent of such zones for hundreds of thousands of Somalis. Zones within Somalia could have been serviced through smaller ports such as Kismayu and Merca, available airfields, including those still used for the airlift, and cross-border convoys. Although large U.S. military ships and equipment could not operate through these facilities, some felt other ways could have been found for a more decentralized approach. But by late 1992 the time for incrementalism was considered to have passed, and a strategy of massive intervention beginning with the toughest place in the country, Mogadishu, was chosen -- "the sledge rather than the ball-peen approach".³⁸

It would be difficult to exaggerate the astonishment both in and outside the U.S. Government when the magnitude of the troop level approved by President Bush was announced. Virtually everyone involved with Somalia supported the intervention, although many reluctantly and simply because there seemed no other solution. Some in Somalia were shocked over the lack of consultation with knowledgeable people on the scene; realistically or not, they believed in the possibility of alternatives -- for example,

prior threat -- that could have avoided the need for intervention, or a different mission that could have made the intervention more effective -- for example, by placing more emphasis on the fledgling police program which could have multiplied the foreign troops' clout and continued after their departure.³⁹ Some also foresaw seeds of disaster ahead, once such a level of militarization was introduced.⁴⁰ Many lamented -- even despaired -- at the limitations of the mission defined, particularly the failure to undertake any significant disarmament.

No element of the Somalia intervention seems to have raised as much passion, on both sides of the argument, as the issue of disarmament, or at least arms reduction. While few believed that small, hand-carried weapons could be significantly reduced in number (many of them were simply buried or removed by their owners from UNITAF troop areas), many felt that medium and certainly heavy weapons could be.⁴¹ Some of the latter were placed in cantonments during the UNITAF period, but most of these were subsequently removed as UNITAF "turned a blind eye". UNITAF's only concern was that such weapons not interfere with their own operations.⁴² Oakley later admitted that postponing disarmament created more difficulties for the subsequent UNOSOM II mission, and felt that more heavy weapons should have been rounded up during UNITAF.⁴³ He further suggests (contrary to other Defense and State Department policy-makers) that U.S. UNITAF forces "were prepared to help with additional disarmament during the transition [to UNOSOM II], had the U.N. commanders and staff arrived as expected in April. However, the U.N. Secretariat and Security Council were not working from the same timetable."⁴⁴ One option seriously considered was to encourage disarmament through the purchasing of weapons (a technique recently undertaken in the United States), if not with money, perhaps with food. While arms prices had plummeted at the time of UNITAF, the cost was still estimated as likely to "break the bank",⁴⁵ however, particularly given that replacements could only too easily flow across the borders.

U.S. military leaders are absolutely emphatic that forced (as opposed to voluntary) disarmament would have constituted a "mission impossible". They cite:

- ◆ the guerrilla warfare that would have ensued in the streets of Mogadishu and other cities "urban areas can suck up troops";⁴⁶
- ◆ the long, unpatrolled coastal and land borders through which fresh arms were constantly infiltrating;
- ◆ the people's cultural familiarity with guns (akin to Americans' reliance on cars);

- ◆ the belief that heavy weapons were no longer an issue by the time of UNITAF's departure anyway, having been rendered inoperative by lack of maintenance and parts;⁴⁷ and
- ◆ the fact that disarmament would have had to be carried out equally among all clans and factions, raising the likelihood that if, as suspected, Aidid's group was the most heavily armed, the burden would have appeared to fall overwhelmingly on him, thus undermining whatever cooperation he might have offered for political negotiations.

UNOSOM II's experience reinforces the strength of this line of reasoning, suggesting at least the possibility that an earlier U.S. disarmament effort might have caused war to break out earlier than June 1993. If disarmament were to be considered at all, the military estimated at least 45,000 troops would have been required for Mogadishu alone.⁴⁸

Against these not insubstantial considerations, the pro-disarmament group -- which includes most (admittedly non-gun-toting) Somalis interviewed -- argues the following:

- ◆ Somalis respect power and force and were so overwhelmed by the UNITAF arrival "the superpower U.S.!" "victor of the Gulf War!" that they were psychologically prepared and ready to hand over at least their big weapons;⁴⁹ when they were not asked to do so, they were confused, then further emboldened to challenge UNITAF and the U.N.;
- ◆ to defer this most difficult problem and then expect a weaker U.N. force to attempt it was unwise, at best, and doomed to failure, and thus cynical, at worst. U.N. officials feel they were led to believe the U.S. would undertake, without publicity, more disarmament than it did -- the French military did more until they were "brought back into line" -- and expressed disappointment that the U.S. seemed "obsessed" with the possibility of incurring casualties; a military intervention must be expected to take risks, they argued;
- ◆ resolving the root political problem of Somalia requires disarmament, and failure to undertake it, particularly at a time when military force could have provided an "inducement", only "froze" the situation until the foreign troops' departure, at which point the entire tragedy could be expected to repeat itself as it did, to some extent, after March 1994.

Even officials of relief agencies vehemently opposed to any form of military action found themselves privately distressed at the failure to address this key impediment to resolving the Somali problem. Impatient with the continuing festering of political and security problems following the UNITAF departure, one even wondered off-the-record whether a more assertive and durable "Panama or Grenada solution" might not have been more effective than Operation Restore Hope in resolving the problems of Somalia. In fact, the U.S. goal in UNITAF was not to resolve the problems of Somalia but only to stop the starvation.⁵⁰ As one military observer put it, "General Johnston came in politely, just for a humanitarian solution, not at the level necessary for a political solution."⁵¹ In reality, however, UNITAF did not even bring a humanitarian solution, but only a short-term humanitarian "fix". As one observer analyzed the situation, "The only way to help Somalia at the humanitarian level is to rebuild the state."⁵² But as the U.S. mission turned into a U.N. one, that became an ever more distant hope.

Role of the U.N.

The U.S.-U.N. Handover: If much was done admirably, altruistically, and efficiently to respond to the most urgent humanitarian needs of the Somali people, the shocking counterpoint is that at the highest levels of the U.S. Government no significant attention was given to an enduring *political* solution. Without this, there would be no resolution of the humanitarian crisis. Most participants in the high level meetings say they knew the U.N. was incapable of assuming the overall task in Somalia, particularly after the task was substantially broadened by the Security Council (with U.S. support) to include nation-building. High Administration officials admit to naive and wishful thinking in this regard. "We closed our eyes to reality," said one military observer.⁵³ Operation Restore Hope was thus a noble mission of mercy that saved some 10-25,000 lives, but, as many participants asked, "for what?" In a choice between mission creep and U.N. failure, the U.S. chose the latter.⁵⁴ The haste to withdraw and turn over the problem to an unprepared U.N. was, in the minds of many, unconscionable.

And yet there were understandable reasons for the U.S. Government position. The newly inaugurated Clinton Administration was not only busy getting itself organized; it also had ambitious domestic policy initiatives that it could ill afford to have overshadowed by events in Somalia (although this proved unavoidable in the end anyway). The U.S. military leadership wielded enormous influence in the White House, and its objection to fuzzy, ill-defined goals such as disarmament and nation-building were made very clear; it had not favored intervention in the first place. As early as January 1993, General Johnston had sent his "war is over, we won, it's time to come home"

message. A bizarre game of "chicken" ensued in New York, where State and Defense Department representatives attempted to hasten the U.N. leadership's willingness to take over from UNITAF. But Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and his deputies, knowing they were unprepared to take on a task of such unprecedented dimensions, delayed as much as possible for self-protection. Here was a case where both the U.S. and the U.N. had good reasons for wanting to both withdraw and delay the withdrawal, respectively. What must be bluntly described as inexcusable is the failure to have foreseen this eventuality at the beginning. Whether such foresight would have dictated against the humanitarian intervention in the first place, and whether that would have been an appropriate decision given the level of suffering, is questionable. As the leaders of Medecins Sans Frontieres, one of the most highly respected NGOs working in Somalia, put it, "La complexite va mal avec l'urgence" ("Complexity and urgency don't go well together.")⁵⁵

To some extent, it was UNITAF's very success that proved problematic. UNITAF's overwhelming force caused both the international community and Somalis to believe that the solution to their problems was at hand. Within the country there was an initial awed euphoria. This directly contradicted the limited U.S. intent merely to secure major routes for moving relief supplies, never to address the fundamental problems of the situation. Around the world, among those involved as well as among the general public, expectations conflicted with reality.

UNOSOM II: Having invested so much, the U.S. did not want to see the U.N. fail. To this end, it contributed military logistics personnel, the quick response force, a number of mid- to high-level civilian staff, a significant part of the budget, the U.S. Embassy compound itself, and later the Rangers. The U.S. also pressed for the appointment of Americans both as the Secretary-General's special representative and as deputy force commander as a way of ensuring some control over both events and the deployment of U.S. personnel. This proved to have its advantages and disadvantages.⁵⁶ But while the U.S. was "there" in UNOSOM II, its influence was not always decisive. In Washington, the level of attention also shifted downward a notch in the hierarchy; since it was no longer an exclusively U.S. operation, top level policy-makers turned more of their attention elsewhere. As one participant analogized, "UNOSOM was like a garden hose that the U.S. turned on without holding the end."⁵⁷ In some ways, the U.S. Government had the worst of both worlds: incomplete control, yet a share of the blame when things went wrong, as indeed they did.

The key turning point came on June 5, 1993 when UNOSOM II forces were ambushed after inspecting SNA arms caches at Radio Mogadishu. The conflagration erupted out of a pattern of several months of non-communication, misunderstanding, and

mutual mistrust. Certainly the U.N. had carried out no meaningful political dialogue with Aidid and his colleagues. The analysis of the U.N.-appointed independent Commission of Inquiry, reluctantly released by the U.N. in early 1994, seems well on target: There was a "lack of proper coordination" between the military and political parts of UNOSOM II, a lack of experienced civilian advisors, and a lack of time, expertise, and requisite intelligence to evaluate the situation. In hindsight, Commission members felt the U.N. should have postponed its arms search, given the prevailing tensions. At the same time, "Although UNOSOM II apparently misjudged the general situation and made some ill-advised decisions, the Commission feels that this in no way justifies the viciousness of the SNA reaction on 5 June" (which the Commission concluded was, indeed, SNA-orchestrated).⁵⁸ While finding the UNOSOM response in some ways understandable, the members also noted that it seemed to "impose" more than "assist" political solutions; the Security Council, for all the ambitiousness of the UNOSOM II mandate, had been careful to authorize only the latter. "The insistence by UNOSOM II on enforcing political arrangements previously agreed [referring to the Addis accords] but no longer accepted by all the political movements would amount to an imposition" and thus be inconsistent with the Security Council's mandate. Yet in a further reflection of the ambiguities of the situation, the Commission also reported that, "With the outrage all over the world on the attacks the Security Council could do nothing less than to authorize the arrest and detention of the perpetrators."

While the U.N. took the major heat for allowing itself to get sucked into a local war -- Admiral Howe was described by some as the third warlord of Mogadishu -- the U.S. provided a major impetus, indeed leadership, for the policy. U.S. Special Envoy Gosende had pointed even before June 5 to the need to bring Aidid to justice for his disregard of the Addis accords. He and April Glaspie (albeit deputed to UNOSOM) were most upset by Aidid's verbal provocations on Radio Mogadishu.⁵⁹ While the situations were very different, no-one seems to have considered taking the approach to the SNA that the U.N. took toward the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia -- that of holding the door open but, absent participation, proceeding without them. Like it or not, Aidid was, after all, the major liberator of Somalia from the detested Siad Barre and, as such, a major power who had to be dealt with. This seemed to be recognized more by U.S. military than by civilian leaders.⁶⁰

Aside from extreme irritation and the understandable emotional response, another reason for the U.S. taking a hard line was its interest in "aggressive multilateralism". If United Nations bowing to a local warlord was seen as already degrading for the major world body, the new Clinton Administration's idealistic hopes for the U.N. required all the stronger a response to protect the U.N.'s reputation and ability to lead in the cause of peace. The result, regrettably, was counterproductive, as many came to see the U.N. as

incapable of playing such a leadership role. It should be recognized, however, that "had early attempts to capture Aideed succeeded, the entire course of the mission, and perhaps even the course of U.N. peacekeeping in the 1990s, might well have turned out differently."⁶¹

With the admitted benefit of hindsight, Admiral Howe has suggested that a more "sensitive" policy would have been preferable during the summer of 1993.⁶² Although he notes that three letters were sent to Aidid after June 5, others note that in Somali society letters normally connote either a lack of perceived importance of their subject or an intent to threaten;⁶³ Somalia is an oral society that requires "sitting carpet", which Howe was not known for doing. Several have suggested, again in hindsight, that a strong negotiating initiative should have been attempted after the first counter-strike against the SNA on June 12; at this point, force had been met with force and the climate was probably most conducive to compromise. Although the UNOSOM II leadership detected no SNA interest in negotiation until the arrival of the more threatening Rangers in August 1993⁶⁴ -- Aidid continued to rabidly oppose the U.N., and was especially distrustful of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali -- a more neutral intermediary might well have proven effective. In fact, Aidid would later approach former President Jimmy Carter, requesting he play that role with "the United States-led mission of the United Nations"; Carter declined, deferring to the Clinton Administration. In the end, it took a combination of mutual military pressure and resultant war fatigue on both sides, culminating in the October attack and subsequent policy turnaround, to bring the war phase to a close.

To better understand the balance, or rather imbalance, between humanitarian, political, and military emphases during the period of U.N. leadership, it is important to understand the U.N.'s functioning in Somalia. Whipping boy of many, the United Nations comprises, in fact, a large number of independent agencies, each of which reports to its own executive board and a secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General. The Secretariat is overseen by the Security Council which, in turn, is composed of 15 of the 184 U.N. member governments (excluding Somalia, of course, which currently has no government). Some feel that the Security Council has been over-reaching itself in assigning to the institution, especially to the Secretariat, overwhelming tasks not only in Somalia, but elsewhere in the world (there are currently 17 U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide). As a result of all the crises, the organization has developed "indigestion" and needs to "learn not to go so fast, so deep, or so far without the resources" to do the job.⁶⁵ Furthermore, each situation is unique, and "Somalia is uniquely unique."⁶⁶

In the case of UNOSOM II, Chapter VII peace-making with Article 42 "teeth" was prescribed for the first time -- and clearly without adequate provision for member support. In some respects, without either road maps to follow or sufficient fuel, it is

hardly surprising that the road was so bumpy and that the vehicle broke down. Member support, in fact, has been an extremely difficult and constant problem. The U.S., among those most critical of U.N. shortcomings, contributed much for Somalia; yet it is also among the most egregious debtors to the U.N. as a whole.

If it was unconscionable for the U.S. to turn over its Somalia responsibilities to an ill-prepared U.N., it was also unfair to then blame the U.N. for its subsequent failures. The U.S. provided major staffing and resources for UNOSOM II and, while it could not control all of UNOSOM's activities and decisions, it provided the glue that kept the coalition together and ran the show.⁶⁷ Admiral Howe was known to make frequent late night calls to Washington. As one U.S. official put it, "There were many instances where you had something like the U.S. mission in Mogadishu lending the top American officials of UNOSOM its watch, so it could see what time of day it was and then, in turn, those officials asking their own Washington contacts if the time given them by the U.S. mission was correct."⁶⁸ The U.S. had also provided, and commanded, the Rangers in their aggressive missions to seek out Aidid and his followers. Although telling the U.N. in October 1993 it "must know when to say no",⁶⁹ President Clinton is said to have privately admitted to Congressional leaders that the U.S., too, had made mistakes.⁷⁰ In fact, the President reportedly told families of Rangers killed in the October 3 raid that "he was mystified that the raid had been tried...because Washington was shifting its policy;"⁷¹ White House officials, noting that continuing Ranger attacks were authorized by the President, suggested he had been misquoted.⁷²

The "bottom line" of the above discussion is that up to October 1993 the balance between humanitarian, political, and military approaches in Somalia became increasingly and counter-productively skewed toward the military, a phenomenon lamented as much by military as by civilian participants. Humanitarian activities continued much as before, with a number of U.S. officials being seconded to UNOSOM, but were completely overshadowed by the military emphasis. Of the roughly \$1.6 billion allocated for UNOSOM II, 90 percent was for military support. A "huge chunk" of this went to western contractors such as the American firm Brown and Root, said to earn \$200 million over two years, and to a New Zealand caterer "who supplies everything from beer to lobster for UN forces."⁷³ As *The Economist* pointed out, "For all the emphasis on security, little has been done to tackle the menace of the tens of thousands of young men with no legitimate jobs, little education, and less hope."⁷⁴ Given all this, the key question is clearly what level and type of military intervention can be usefully introduced in situations of need without its becoming counter-productive?

Effectiveness of Actions Taken

Knowing the Scene

In assessing the international community's effectiveness in Somalia, it is important to understand, first, the extent to which the major decision makers responsible for committing such massive resources understood Somali culture. Onlookers present in high level meetings indicate that the agendas of these sessions generally precluded any opportunity for working level people directly familiar with Somalia to interject their experience-based knowledge and more nuanced information and views.⁷⁵ This was particularly true when the Operation Restore Hope decision was made. While it is probably inevitable in a bureaucratic hierarchy that top decision makers cannot possibly have a close and direct understanding of every issue coming before them, and while the system is supposed to incorporate these views at earlier review levels, the effective transmission of such views is often imperfect, with resultant costs in policy making.

Somalis interviewed for this study are virtually unanimous that the international community failed to understand them and their country, failed to sufficiently consult with Somalis before making key decisions regarding their fate and well-being, and failed to draw sufficiently on the limited number of people familiar from previous experience with the country. "Americans don't understand what makes the Somalis tick," said a former Somali ambassador to the U.S.⁷⁶ U.N. officials were also seen as deficient in this regard. The independent Commission of Inquiry concluded that "many senior political advisors in UNOSOM II, especially on sensitive political issues,... were insensitive to the local culture's requirements."⁷⁷

Many non-Somalis interviewed concurred with this assessment to a greater or lesser extent. Although some effort was made by the U.S. Government to assign old Somalia hands like Oakley and Gosende, these were rare cases. Some Americans expressed frustration, for example, that fewer than a handful of the 435 returned Peace Corps volunteers who have served in Somalia have been involved in recent years in either policy or implementation. A State Department official evoked the U.S. experience in Viet-Nam, where failure to adequately understand the people and culture had tragic repercussions. In Somalia, he observed, this led to over-emphasis on dealing with the warlords -- "the guys with guns" -- to the detriment of working with other leaders; referring to General Aidid, he suggested "we thus created the monster we now deplore."⁷⁸ It also contributed to regrettable minor mistakes, such as UNITAF's dropping of leaflets which said "slave nations have come to help you"; while possibly a simple oversight,

some believed the Americans involved in producing the leaflet simply didn't trust Somalis to verify the translation.

The trust factor was clearly a major, and justifiable, issue. As noted above, international donor experience with Somalia and Somalis had been quite negative since at least the 1980s.⁷⁹ Beginning with the Ogaden war period when international refugee assistance was flagrantly exploited by many Somalis, foreign aid workers reported tough, aggressive, corrupt, devious, and manipulative behavior. Indeed, as early as 1854, foreign observers described Somalis as "a people of susceptible character and withal uncommonly hard to please... Each tribe and clan wished to rank first. None would be even second."⁸⁰ Many Somalis accept these characterizations, attributing them to the larger socio-economic patterns of their culture. Nomadic Somalis, they say, have traditionally fought along clan lines over rights to grazing lands, access to which influenced their very survival; to this end, violence has been a not uncommon part of societal mores. Some go on to explain the looting of foreign aid as understandable in the context of a raiding society, made all the easier when against a target that didn't retaliate. Aidid, apparently assuming in this light that foreigners eagerly sought to assist, once said on the radio that "We gave you [Americans] a chance to aid us, but you didn't know how to use this chance."⁸¹ Such traits explain the international reluctance to rely very heavily, if at all, on Somali views.

Another key reason for ignoring Somali views is the international community's virtually unanimous perception that Somalis place individual clan interests above the larger common good; therefore, how can they be trusted? A number of Somalis interviewed, while not denying clan loyalties -- indeed, noting these had intensified as a consequence of the crisis -- also insisted that some members of the professional class were fully able to transcend clan politics in a larger national interest. They also suggested that if the international community sought broader input, one had only to gather a number of Somalis representing different groups in the same room and look for common ground. As one United Nations official commented, saying we can't trust Somali viewpoints for this reason is like saying we can't trust Republicans or Democrats in the U.S.⁸² On the other hand, it is also true that when opinions were, on occasion, solicited within a gathering of Somalis, there were almost always as many different viewpoints as persons to express them. "I met regularly with dozens of Somalis," said one State Department official. "They agreed on virtually nothing. It was very frustrating to listen to their advice."⁸³

There were, of course, exceptions, expatriates who believed strongly in the importance of Somali consultation and involvement. When Philip Johnston briefly headed UNOSOM I's Humanitarian Operations Center, he attempted to some extent to

engage Somalis in determining humanitarian policies and priorities. His successor Hugh Cholmondeley, citing Security Council language that the international community was in Somalia to assist its people to rebuild their country, believed it important "to take the position that people of the country know best." Cholmondeley favored channeling aid through local groups, on the assumption that even where these were weak or susceptible to diversions, such losses could not be greater than those already endured.⁸⁴

Arguably the most serious failure to understand the Somalis -- or at least to translate an understanding into workable relationships with them -- was at the level of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. A Coptic patrician and former Egyptian minister of state with considerable previous experience with neighboring Somalia -- along with many of his countrymen, he was known and resented for supporting the widely hated Siad Barre -- Boutros-Ghali believed, according to confidantes, in wielding "the big stick". "I know the Somalis," he told a colleague, but whether for tactical or real reasons, he was never able to surmount their suspicions and negative feelings toward him.⁸⁵ These feelings transferred to the U.N. more broadly and caused special difficulty for UNOSOM II after the U.S.-U.N. handover. Had it been possible for a secretary-general to recuse himself from so large an issue before the U.N., this would have been an appropriate case in which to do so.

In the end, and especially during UNOSOM II, it became very difficult to communicate with Somalis simply because of security. U.S. and U.N. officials -- the latter of whom were officially the enemy of the SNA -- were largely confined to the Embassy compound and could only go out with security convoys bristling with armed guards, which were hardly conducive to spontaneous contacts or intimate chats. Somalis could meet them inside the U.S. compound, but the clearance procedure was laborious and perceived as humiliating, and those willing to meet under these circumstances were inevitably limited. A wall had literally grown up between helpers and their intended beneficiaries.

Effectiveness of Humanitarian Assistance

One of the several ironies of the Somalia crisis is that the various systems to provide early warning of food crop failures, put in place by FAO following the Ethiopian famine of 1984-85, all worked. A review of FAO reports, and of wire service accounts of these, reveals that information on the probable scale of the crisis was widely available.⁸⁶ The critical weakness was in the lack of reliable mechanisms within the foreign assistance agencies and at the United Nations to trigger earlier and more effective relief

responses. Some NGOs were comparatively quicker to respond than were governmental and multinational agencies, presumably because they had more organizational mobility and fewer bureaucratic rigidities to overcome; one cannot fail to be impressed by their dedication and efficacy. Some, however, depended on media attention and the promise of either governmental or individual donor funding to make the leap. All were distracted by the plethora of emergencies taking place in Sudan, Angola, the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and elsewhere.

The overwhelming issue facing humanitarian agencies in Somalia was security. The heroism of many of the people working with ICRC, NGOs, and U.N. agencies, as well as with bilateral aid programs, is striking. Their ability to help people and save lives in the face of no end of difficulties and threats to their own well-being is praiseworthy indeed. Some had guns put to their heads for extortion; some, indeed, were killed in the course of service to the Somali people. While expatriate humanitarian personnel were periodically withdrawn for short periods after a killing or other serious threat to security, they inevitably returned to take up the task. And their local Somali staff soldiered on despite many threats.

ICRC: ICRC was recommended by Andrew Natsios and nominated by Secretary of State Eagleburger for the Nobel Peace Prize. For the first 18 months of the crisis, it was by far the major organization helping in the country, operating on a more massive scale than at any time since World War II. Never before had ICRC attempted to feed a whole nation, nor to run a kitchens program, let alone one that served over a million people. Never before had it had to rely on a private army in order to be able to do its work. ICRC also went out of its way to bring journalists to Somalia to spread the story around the world and induce others to help. Although there is much contention around the total numbers of lives saved in Somalia, it is generally agreed that a significant proportion of the estimated 50,000 saved in 1991 and early 1992 were due to the early efforts of ICRC and its affiliate Red Crescent Societies. The latter consisted of some 500 staff plus volunteers who were responsible for about 70 percent of ICRC's efforts and constituted a unique resource available to no other international organization.⁸⁷ In total, ICRC employed some 25,000 Somalis directly, and many others indirectly.⁸⁸

The Red Cross-Red Crescent network developed ingenious methods to circumvent the variety of obstacles in its way. Its leaders and staff developed relatively low-key ways to deliver food where the U.S. Government and U.N. would later require large ports and more elaborate technical facilities. They invested in patient diplomacy where others would likely have lost all patience. Indeed, their whole mode of operation, of working in close cooperation with the Somali community, was in some contrast to that of the UNITAF-UNOSOM II period. When "the mechanical apparatus" took over, "the

fragile network of relationships with elders, community leaders, local employees and faction leaders would be replaced by soldiers of the strongest army in the world. In this respect, one can speak of a cultural gap between humanitarian and military action."⁸⁹

ICRC was criticized, however, for extensive compromising to get its food through. Although all relief agencies succumbed to extortion and paid for security, ICRC's doing so seemed more visible due to its scale of operation and more galling due to its high reputation. ICRC was also criticized for its policy of distributing high value rice, which it did because of rice's nutritional advantages and the fact it was the most widely acceptable commodity in a situation where multiple product lines of supply would have been too difficult to organize.⁹⁰ The problem was that the high value of rice made it particularly vulnerable to looting; other donors distributed primarily wheat and pulses. As one participant observed, "ICRC's choice of rice as the main staple virtually invited thievery since rice is a high value commodity in the country and normally only the wealthier 20 percent of the country consumes it. Sugar had tremendous value on the market in Kenya and was a particular target of the warlords."⁹¹

Some also criticized ICRC's policy of food kitchens which, in the words of one critic, "drew people out of the countryside and put them in camps and made them vulnerable to bandits who hung around the centers and preyed on the relief agencies."⁹² ICRC initiated the kitchens in April 1992, however, to discourage the looting so common with dry foods and as a response to the very existence of camps; where possible, it preferred to place kitchens in local communities away from camps so as not to reinforce the typical camp mentality of dependence.

NGOs: The NGOs paid a high price for saving lives in Somalia. Try as they might, they were unable to resist meeting inflated Somali demands for high house and vehicle rentals and staff salaries. The rampant insecurity forced them, in effect, to purchase security, spending considerable amounts of money on fortified houses and offices, armed guards, and rented as opposed to owned vehicles because the latter were subject to immediate theft. "The Somalis milked the humanitarian agencies for everything they could get out of them," is a comment heard over and over again, accompanied by extraordinary tales of compromises that NGOs were forced to make in the interests of continuing to help in Somalia. At the very beginning of 1991 free security had been provided to ICRC and MSF by local leaders out of hospitality for those who had come to help. By 1993, one NGO reported paying \$28,000 per month for security in Baidoa, and ICRC reportedly paid \$100,000 per week in Mogadishu.⁹³ In some cases, NGOs were faced with looting by their own Somali staff members, whether by economic necessity or otherwise. As the economic situation deteriorated, IMC and other NGOs thus found it necessary to pay "incentives" (a euphemism for salaries), although this

raised the issue of sustainability. While salaries were no doubt merited for work performed, without a government to take over the NGOs could hardly pay such recurring costs forever.⁹⁴

A more fundamental problem was the extent to which NGO efforts might, in fact, have been counterproductive. Like virtually all foreign and international organizations, NGOs based in Mogadishu established themselves almost entirely in the southern part of the city, which was Aidid territory. This was conveniently near the airport and where the most suitable housing, mostly rented out by Aidid supporters, was available. Many relief staff became close to and relied on Aidid personally for logistical and/or security assistance; he looked after them. The presumably unintentional yet easily visible result was to enrich Aidid's forces, an enrichment that was certainly channelled to at least some extent into armaments, thus exacerbating the problem the aid givers were trying to counteract.⁹⁵ MSF, which conducted a very thoughtful in-house analysis of its own role in Somalia, agonized no end over this dilemma, that is, the extent to which one should tolerate a negative by-product (strengthening a faction leader) in the interests of saving immediate lives. Others, too, noted that "the supply of weapons from one door and the supply of humanitarian aid from another, is [a] policy which saws through the branch on which we sit."⁹⁶

By late 1993 a number of NGOs had withdrawn from the country, partly because the famine had ended, but also because of the substantial costs of maintaining a minimally secure presence. Under the circumstances, it is frankly surprising that many others did not leave earlier, particularly once the famine was over, and given the likelihood that they could have used the same amount of money to help a larger number of equally needy people in other countries. Indeed, given the Somali reliance on external funding, a more coordinated donor response against looting, extortion, and insecurity might well have been effective from the very beginning. As one observer suggested, a radio announcement that relief agencies were pulling out due to uncooperative factional leaders would likely have pressured those leaders to protect the NGOs.⁹⁷ But whether because of headquarter pressures or staff proclivities, the NGOs seemed to act more from the heart than from the head. In the words of CARE's president, "If you're asking me if CARE believes in the sanctity of human life more than it fears its food being diverted, the answer is yes."⁹⁸ Or, as Oakley put it, "Stopping NGOs from helping is like stopping Newton's apple."⁹⁹ Yet indiscriminate insistence on helping is a weakness as well as a strength of the NGO community and at times had counter-productive effects in Somalia.

The lack of reliable data did not make the NGO task any easier. If there is reason to believe that the numbers of both famine deaths and lives saved were exaggerated, it is also important to re-emphasize the difficulty of collecting reliable statistics on famine

consequences, especially in a country like Somalia where even the base population figure ranged from 4 to 7 million; (based on CDC/RPG analysis, this study has assumed a population of 5 million). The difficulty is exacerbated by the extreme mobility of the population, both cross-border and internally, to seek food and safety. There is no reason to doubt that the ICRC, NGOs, and U.N. agencies were giving their best estimate of the at-risk population and extrapolating the numbers of dead and dying as best they could under the horrendous pressures of the moment. Absent more extensive data collection, however, the tendency to err on the high side can hardly be avoided by overwhelmed practitioners with a keen interest in procuring maximum resources to help the needy. Greater precision about the proximate causes of death is also needed to ensure appropriate responses. While it seems churlish to suggest an academic exercise in data collection amidst hundreds of thousands of starving people, the most effective allocation of inevitably limited resources -- including, in this case, tens of thousands of military forces -- points to its utility.¹⁰⁰

Another issue that deserves consideration is the efficacy of significant numbers of NGOs operating without prior experience or understanding of the country, and sometimes without the willingness to consult those with knowledge. The historic strength of the NGO community is its flexibility to respond quickly and appropriately in areas of need. The problem, however, is when so many come in at one time, and insist on waving their own flags (literally the case in Somalia, where flags are used for security identification) and "doing their own thing", that inefficiencies, duplications, or the introduction of ill-considered operational precedents result. Leaders of a Somali NGO in Baidoa, while highly appreciative of the expatriate NGO contribution, noted this phenomenon of "territoriality"; it was particularly marked in Baidoa which, given its "epicenter of death" publicity, was considered "the place to be" in order to attract home country donor contributions.¹⁰¹

By 1994, USAID's mission director believed "there may be too many international NGOs [over 50] working in Somalia... Yes, they are mostly there because of the well-advertised need, but they are also there because...[t]he large amount of donor funding available for Somalia was a major attraction for NGO headquarters which were out to cover their administration and overhead costs."¹⁰² Notwithstanding the hardships, there was another advantage to working in government-less Somalia in that "NGOs could set up operations as they pleased without having to deal with any official, central government entity. In such an environment, NGOs became in some areas fiefdoms unto themselves and brokers of non-negligible amounts of power."¹⁰³

The NGO "gold rush", "follow-the-funding" phenomenon can, indeed, be problematic, particularly in situations with limited absorptive capacity in the form of

local management structures. One might ask whether it effectively serves the long-term needs of famine victims or whether there should be more willingness to build on the experience and expertise of groups already established in the country -- local, as well as international -- and support their efforts. Although some observers suggest that "NGOs aren't made for coordination," a number of European groups, and some American ones as well, operated effectively in just this "combined forces" manner.¹⁰⁴

One option available to international NGOs, as well as to other donors, could have been to channel resources through local Somali groups. As critics have noted, "It can only be a lack of imagination or worse, an obtuseness that prevented UNOSOM [and other donors] from supporting actively these institutions."¹⁰⁵ The prevailing belief, however, was that "most present-day Somali NGOs are nothing more than 'businesses' and should be dealt with as such," in the words of one otherwise sympathetic long-time worker in Mogadishu.¹⁰⁶ An added reason for ignoring local NGOs was the belief that they could not be trusted to rise about clan politics, or at least would require more investigation in terms of their reliability than was possible given the urgency of the emergency. In the event, some Somali professionals continued to work on their own without salaries, living off their own savings or other indigenous resources.

A critical issue for NGOs in Somalia was how to relate to the military. It is indeed hard to imagine two more different cultures. Much has been said in the NGO community about the need to separate the humanitarian from the military (and political) in order not to compromise the integrity of the former. "We can't be seen as precursors to the Foreign Legion or the Rangers," one NGO leader insisted.¹⁰⁷ In fact, most NGOs wanted military protection but no identification with the military, a no doubt naive desire. The military, for their part, had scarcely any idea of what NGOs were, what they did, or how they did it. They were sent to Somalia exclusively to support the humanitarian effort, yet the introduction of such a large military element caused a degree of wider societal militarization that took on a counter-productive momentum of its own. Military intervention has its own logic: While troops may go in because relief agencies call for them, once there they follow commands from the military hierarchy, rather than from relief agencies. Such commands inevitably prioritize military concerns, notably protection of military personnel, over purely humanitarian objectives.¹⁰⁸

Furthermore, humanitarian interventions require a different set of military skills. While some units and individuals seemed well trained to deal with Somali civilians -- indeed, some assisted with important engineering projects, food distribution, and medical care -- others, untrained for this type of role and no doubt under the heavy pressures of the situation, committed serious human rights violations. Some military observers question whether the same troops that are trained to "kill people and break things" can be

expected to act as sensitive peacekeepers; others believe it is a matter of additional training.¹⁰⁹ A European NGO observer¹¹⁰ felt that some Italian troops, for example, demonstrated an appropriate balance of politeness and firmness toward Somalis, in contrast to the Americans who swore at them but were inconsistent in their firmness -- "missionary Rambos", as he called them. A Frenchman remarked on the massive "disproportionality of operationalizing UNITAF" compared with the humanitarian objective; "the synergy between the humanitarian and the military," he said, "finds its limit very quickly."¹¹¹

The fact that the NGOs and the military got along as well as they did in Somalia, at least during the airlift and UNITAF periods, is quite remarkable -- and instructive. Much of the credit for this probably goes to the caliber of people involved on both sides, as well as to the necessity of cooperation for survival and for keeping the relief effort going. Efforts are currently underway to incorporate learnings from Somalia and other cooperative experiences into training handbooks and courses for military personnel involved in humanitarian interventions.¹¹²

If cooperation with the military places NGOs in ambiguous and potentially compromising situations, an area of activity barely touched on in Somalia was that of direct peacemaking or conflict resolution.¹¹³ Traditionally practised in a very low-key way by Quakers and Mennonites, and more visibly recently by the Atlanta-based Carter Center, this field of comparative advantage for NGOs could have been attempted. It is admittedly highly labor-intensive, requires enormous patience, dedication, and training, and might well have only localized effects, at best. It is certainly less dramatic than delivering food or medical care, and thus less immediately conducive to fund-raising. Still, NGO mediation and reconciliation initiatives would appear to have at least some potential in mitigating some types of localized violence.

U.N. Humanitarian Agencies: According to the executive director of Human Rights Watch, "the United Nations and its various organizations have been so monstrously negligent and incompetent that they have played almost no role at all in alleviating Somalia's misery."¹¹⁴ The same source quoted a U.N. official as saying, "Somalia is the greatest failure of the United Nations in our time." While these are among the most harshly phrased criticisms, they are hardly the only ones. Again, however, it is useful to distinguish between the U.N. Secretariat, which is most often criticized, and the specialized agencies, each of which has its own performance record. In fact, the key U.N. agencies engaged in the Somalia crisis were WFP, UNICEF, and, with a relatively greater outside- than inside-Somalia focus, UNHCR. United Nations Volunteers (UNV) were also active, filling a void when more senior personnel could not be recruited. FAO, aside from its crop forecasts, was not visible in Somalia, and WHO,

while showing expenditures on behalf of Somalia, had a very low profile, especially during the early part of the crisis.

While many feel that UNDP should have been an actor, particularly given the resident representative's usual role as coordinator and senior in-country representative of the Secretary-General, it resisted involvement in so turbulent a setting, falling back on its primary development mandate for which circumstances were hardly conducive in Somalia. Although some staff regretted this stance, particularly noting the ill will it engendered, UNDP essentially forfeited playing a significant role from 1991 through 1993. If UNDP had, in fact, been active in a coordinating role, a clearcut division of labor and authority would have been needed vis-a-vis the head of UNOSOM's humanitarian division and the Secretary-General's special representative. When UNDP did begin operating a few projects in late 1992, it purposely took a low profile, partly, no doubt, from embarrassment, and partly to avoid the security problems encountered by UNICEF and WFP, thus "taking advantage of the disadvantage of being a new player on the block."¹¹⁵

UNICEF was the first U.N. agency to insist with headquarters security authorities that it be allowed to return to Somalia after Siad Barre's overthrow. It may have eventually won its plea partly because of UNICEF's unique character within the U.N. system (it is heavily funded by voluntary contributions) and partly because it is accustomed to working without exclusive reference to national (and in Somalia, non-existent) authorities. UNICEF was criticized in the early period of the crisis for weak leadership and audit problems, for sometimes taking credit for the achievements of others (albeit utilizing UNICEF resources), and for inadequate coordination (including a possibly apocryphal story of revaccinating the inhabitants of a community already vaccinated for the same disease by an NGO the day before¹¹⁶). Yet, UNICEF had the second biggest aid presence (after ICRC) for a period of eighteen months and lost three expatriate workers to violence, more than any other donor agency. UNICEF also distinguished itself for recognizing more than most relief agencies the importance of providing health, water, and sanitation assistance in addition to food aid. Like most efforts, these began regrettably late in 1992, following CDC studies showing that most deaths in Somalia were in fact attributable to measles and diarrhea (influenced by weakened resistance from malnutrition) rather than directly to starvation.

WFP was also criticized for taking credit, at times, for the achievements of others, such as declaring a major victory when "the first ship" was able to offload its cargo, whereas ICRC had been offloading food in Somalia for months previously. After a slow start, in any case, WFP was able to make considerable amounts of food available for distribution and seemed to have good working relations with its partners, notably CARE,

in undertaking in-country distribution. To meet the requirements, WFP "begged, borrowed, and stole from any available donor source",¹¹⁷ including less traditional food donors such as Saudi Arabia, North African countries, Thailand, Greece, and Spain. Among the lessons WFP feels it learned (and needed to learn) from its Somalia experience were the necessity to better train its staff in emergency programming (they have traditionally focussed more on development), to thus accelerate its procurement and transport of food, and to function in situations lacking security. In addition, noting the relative dearth of groups willing to handle large-scale food distribution in a situation as "hot" as Somalia, WFP learned it needs to enhance its own capacities to independently carry out relief activities.¹¹⁸ A first step, perhaps, in this direction was WFP's establishment of a rapid response team analogous to OFDA's DART; it was sent to Burundi in early 1994. In Somalia itself in 1994, WFP was still providing food for an estimated 300,000 internally displaced and 10,000 drought-affected Somalis, 90 percent of it, uniquely, through Somali NGOs.

The U.N.'s new Department of Humanitarian Affairs faced a special problem in that the Somalia crisis "broke" at the very moment it was born. Lacking any real budget of its own, DHA had to build up clout through moral suasion and the ability to raise funds from donors. Without this, its coordinating role would be seen as lacking teeth both among the agencies it was expected to coordinate and in the minds of the Secretariat staff and the Secretary-General himself; the latter's support was needed but not always available.¹¹⁹ DHA faced further problems in the bifurcation of its administration between New York and Geneva and its inheritance of former UNDRO (U.N. Disaster Relief Organization) staff, with little flexibility for bringing in substantial new talent from outside the system. As described by one official, DHA is "a box we put on the U.N. chart but without electricity to operate except through persuasion."¹²⁰ Its funding appeals were said by some to be "a joke", its 100-Day Plan largely an "unprioritized laundry list" of project ideas.¹²¹ As a result, no doubt, of these concerns, some in the U.N. system have expressed preference for assigning a bureaucratically more developed "lead agency" to do the major coordination (per UNHCR's role in the former Yugoslavia), leaving DHA essentially as a high level U.N.-wide emergency fund raiser. However, Under-Secretary-General Eliasson is "dead against" this idea, believing that DHA by early 1994 was overcoming some of its early growing pains and would be more capable of handling its functions in the future.¹²² Somewhat more time and effort are probably needed to fairly test his belief.

UNHCR, given its negative experience with Somali refugees in the 1970s and 1980s, was ill disposed to play a large role in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, it became a significant actor outside the country's borders where approximately 320,000 refugees in Kenya and 375,000 in Ethiopia (not to mention another 282,000 in the Middle East)

constituted roughly one-fifth of the country's likely 5 million population. These people claiming across-the-border safe haven may have represented a large proportion of those who were most insecure and at risk of dying.¹²³ In this sense, UNHCR's assistance to the Kenyan and Ethiopian refugee camps contributed significantly to the Somali humanitarian relief effort. Because its work was largely outside Somalia's borders, however, it has not been a focus of this study.

Taken together, the above-mentioned U.N. agencies constituted an important presence in Somalia, each (as with all donors) with its ups and downs, each reporting to its respective American or European headquarters and governing board (thus complicating local coordination), and, along with the U.N. Secretariat, constituting a complex bureaucratic maze. The maze was sufficiently intimidating that Philip Johnston, coming from CARE to UNOSOM, felt himself "a stranger in a system that's strange at best." When he was said to have a management style "not congruent with the U.N.'s", it was considered a compliment.¹²⁴ Under these circumstances, the U.N. agencies' accomplishments may be more surprising than the criticisms.

OFDA: OFDA's performance garners widespread praise for the quality, effectiveness, and dedication of its personnel. U.S. military observers admit to surprise that civilians were willing to work as long hours as they were. NGOs generally appreciated their supportive attitude and generally timely and efficient processing of grants, as well as their ability to serve as intermediaries with the military, a view reciprocated by the latter. ICRC leaders asserted that OFDA staff followed the Somalia situation more closely than any other donor and gave "lots of support, and no pressure". OFDA's DART model, successfully tested in northern Iraq, was considered exemplary to the extent that WFP adopted it and DHA recently used a variation of the model to do its initial needs assessment in Rwanda.

Notwithstanding the overall praise, some areas for improvement have been identified, however. One is OFDA's tendency (like other donors') to be reactive rather than proactive. While OFDA acted and advocated earlier than most, it generally tended, especially in 1991 and early 1992, to fund food delivery and health care projects presented to it rather than assessing and pressing NGOs to initiate projects responding to typical famine cycle needs such as immunizations, safe water supply, and sanitation -- critical causes of death as the crisis intensified. OFDA's preoccupation with the Mombasa airlift has been criticized for reinforcing "the perception that the main approach was going to be delivering food to people rather than focusing on monetization and economic interventions", such as employment generating activities which could have been more effective in breaking out of the famine.¹²⁵ In fact, OFDA (along with ICRC) tried to persuade NGOs and WFP to undertake monetization programs. And particularly

in the later stages, OFDA did fund a substantial number of development-oriented activities, such as seeds distribution, thus responding to concerns that relief interventions serve where possible to reinforce longer-term development success. At the same time, OFDA declined to directly fund Somali NGOs, which would have been desirable for local participation and sustainability upon the departure of foreign organizations. This latter was due to a policy requiring prior registration of local NGOs with AID, and because of related accountability as well as clan neutrality concerns.¹²⁶ While the tendency to be reactive rather than proactive can be readily explained by the sheer pressure of the situation, prior thought to a broader approach could allow OFDA to innovate in new ways for even greater impact.

A major factor in OFDA's success was widely seen to be its capable and energetic staff, most of whom were contract personnel or individuals seconded from other U.S. Government departments, but whose early leadership came from two principal managers from Washington, D.C. headquarters. Deployment of the latter lent importance, competence, and experience to the effort, but was probably unwise given competing demands for their talents in Washington and elsewhere around the world; it also led to some feeling of downgraded priority when these top officials left Somalia.¹²⁷ The turnover of OFDA staff in Somalia was generally high (as it was for most donor organizations), and a higher priority was placed on understanding of U.S. Government procedures than on understanding of Somalia. Although these factors would seem inimical to optimal effectiveness, there was no obvious evidence of this in Somalia.

Probably because of the DART's success, some observers felt the team should have stayed longer -- analogous to wishing the American military had stayed longer in order to have avoided the ensuing difficulties under UNOSOM II. But OFDA's mandate is for the "emergency room" phase of a crisis, just as UNITAF's was to secure immediate food delivery needs. The challenge, therefore, was to inspire the U.N. system with the ability to take on DART-like functions with similar dedication and efficiency. In this connection, it might be argued that OFDA should have worked more closely with the U.N. in the Mombasa airlift period, as it worked with UNOSOM's humanitarian office in Mogadishu. But the U.N. with one lone, ill-supported WFP staff member assigned to the Mombasa operation, was in no position to either learn or contribute at that stage.¹²⁸ Nor is it clear that UNOSOM in Mogadishu had sufficient institutional backing and leadership to absorb and carry forward much of the DART's dedication and efficiency.

OFDA cooperation with the European Community was strong, particularly before the airlift when Jan Westcott and E.C. Representative Trevor Walker worked extremely effectively together. This was critical in that both OFDA and the E.C. supported ICRC and the NGOs. Their cooperation minimized the possibility of significant gaps or

duplications of aid. It also allowed each major donor to fund those activities most consistent with its operating preferences, rules, and regulations.

A noteworthy aspect of OFDA's involvement in Somalia is the extent to which staff became engaged in political issues. They, like ICRC, point out that "to be apolitical, one has to be political" -- in other words, that without an understanding of the political dimensions of a situation, aid may be misused, as was certainly an ever-present danger in Somalia. During the early period in 1991, Westcott was constantly meeting with factional leaders, especially Aidid, to whom some felt she was too close, and Ali Mahdi, whose "presidential inauguration" she attended. Her knowledge served her well in at least one instance: observing a WFP representative about to sign a bill of lading for U.S.-donated food over to Ali Mahdi -- who is also a businessman -- she had the political savvy and presence of mind to prevent it from happening.¹²⁹ During Operation Restore Hope, OFDA's DART staff worked closely with Ambassador Oakley and were based, in fact, in his Mogadishu compound. While ICRC and NGO representatives felt this relationship important, some wondered how close OFDA should be to embassy politics.¹³⁰

OFDA's political role bears highlighting beyond the fact that NGOs looked to it for a comprehensive understanding of the local environment in which aid should be optimally provided -- an understanding that could benefit both NGOs themselves and the U.S. and international donor community more broadly. The larger political importance of OFDA was its virtual functioning as an advance policy-setting entity for the U.S. Government. Indeed, OFDA's policy-making seemed at times contradictory to that of the State Department and National Security Council. Where the last two resisted, in the early stages, any involvement in Somalia, OFDA was not only providing approved aid but also speaking out in Congress and in public to urge more U.S. and international activity in the country. Another way of stating the role is to say that OFDA acted when the rest of the U.S. Government refused to act. While this may have been tantamount to a conscious decision to "throw OFDA at the problem" and spare the government as a whole, it also led to an inevitable escalation of activity and the potential for OFDA making U.S. policy. As Assistant Secretary Cohen put it, commenting on OFDA's "aggressive" advocacy, "whereas the flag used to follow trade, it now follows humanitarian intervention."¹³¹

This politicization of OFDA is probably not surprising, considering that from its origins in battling the effects of natural disasters, 92 percent of its 1992 budget was spent on responding to complex (that is, political) emergencies. As former Director Natsios points out, in addition to meeting direct humanitarian needs, "diplomats now use disaster response as a preventative measure to stave off chaos in an unraveling society, as a confidence-building measure during political negotiations, to protect democratic and

economic reforms, to implement peace accords which the U.S. has mediated, to mitigate the effects of economic sanctions on the poor, where sanctions serve geopolitical ends, and to encourage a political settlement as a carrot to contending factions."¹³² What Somalia clearly demonstrates is the need for this type of responsive, flexible capacity at a grass-roots level. As Natsios also notes, government diplomats typically communicate with other governments only in elite policy circles.¹³³ In a world where nations and governments are breaking apart, however, new institutions are needed that are sensitive to popular movements and trends and can thus complement more traditional, formal means of interaction. OFDA would appear to have the flexibility, experience, and personnel to contribute to such a broadened vision of diplomacy.

Quality of Personnel

A key question in assessing humanitarian policies and programs is the extent to which success or failure results from the policies themselves, the structures and decision-making processes of the implementing institutions, or the quality of the people doing the implementing. It is abundantly clear from the Somalia crisis (and no doubt others) that people are key. A high-level review of post-Cold War peacekeeping, including the case of Somalia, notes that "the U.N. needs an advance team that understands the local culture and the political, economic, and humanitarian dimensions of the problem at hand. It must be formed around a strong personality who may eventually command the U.N. mission. Local factions tend to respond to personalities, not processes, so having the right person in charge is absolutely vital."¹³⁴ "Individuals have responsibility", noted one Somalia participant; "they can't blame the system. People died because of this."¹³⁵ Most agree that the extraordinary challenges of Somalia demanded extraordinarily capable individuals at all levels of work. Yet such people were extremely difficult to attract to Somalia. Individuals with respectable development or military backgrounds, who had performed well in other settings, were often simply the wrong individuals for the particular demands of the unique Somali situation. Some should not have been appointed.

With notable exceptions, the United Nations had particular difficulties in this regard. As explained by one senior official, the U.N. personnel system has traditionally been more dependent on connections, national quotas, regional representation, and other political considerations than on qualifications for difficult jobs. Any bureaucratic system tends to deter the most creative type of personality, precisely what was needed in a place like Somalia in particular. The harder the assignment, the higher the quality of personnel required. Perhaps this is why the more free-wheeling NGOs were able to operate as well

as they did. They and the ICRC, especially in the early phases of the crisis, fielded a number of people with dedication, commitment, and competence.

If people are critical, structures are also important. Without reference to the qualities of the various individuals concerned, the lack of authority given to the special representatives of the Secretary-General has been identified as a particular problem in Somalia; virtually all decisions had to be referred, often unnecessarily and inefficiently, to the Secretary-General or his deputies in New York.¹³⁶ Emblematic of another problem, one UNOSOM II official complained in early 1994, "I have no job description; I don't know who is my boss; I have no resources -- don't know what I'm supposed to do; and I'm really wasting a lot of money here."

Three lessons do seem to have been learned by the United Nations: first, the U.N. has now modified its security regulations to permit essential personnel to remain in hazardous situations under certain circumstances, thus responding to one cause of their 1990-91 disengagement. Second, full operational responsibility is now housed in the peacekeeping department rather than split between it and the management side of the U.N., as before. (In Bosnia, the U.N. has developed an elaborate policy coordination mechanism to avoid "bureaucratic centrifuge, separating humanitarian issues from military, from political, from financial."¹³⁷) Third, thought is also said to being given to a unified peacekeeping budget and to improving the U.N.'s operations center and intelligence capacity.

Approaches to Aid

The tendency throughout the Somalia crisis was to assume that the major need was to provide food to hungry people. This drove the entire policy of the international community, most notably the military interventions to ensure safe air and land delivery routes. While food is obviously essential, the fact of the matter is that most people in famines actually die from diseases, thus making public health programs critically important.¹³⁸ The main causes of death in Somalia were diarrheal disease and measles, both of which are easily preventable at low cost and with high efficiency, the former through oral rehydration therapy and the latter through immunization. One report concludes that "much of the infant and child mortality could have been avoided if the vaccination programmes had received higher priority at normal times or even as the conflict began as a measure of preparedness towards an impending crisis. However, commonly known preparedness measures, even when a crisis seems inevitable, does [sic] not seem to enter the priorities of humanitarian agencies."¹³⁹ While UNICEF, MSF, the

International Rescue Committee, and SCF-UK undertook some initiatives, little in the way of measles vaccinations was begun until late 1992, after the major epidemic had hit in late summer. "Relief aid in the form of timely immunizations, food safety nets, public health surveillance, could have averted 95 percent of severe malnutrition – and therefore starvation deaths, 70 percent of measles deaths, and 40 percent of other deaths. Thus 70 percent of all deaths could have been averted. 154,000 lives were lost that, from a public health viewpoint, could easily have been saved."¹⁴⁰

What seems clear in hindsight -- although the knowledge existed, in fact, from previous emergencies -- is that a broad famine intervention strategy was needed for Somalia, including not only food deliveries and emergency medical care, but also immunizations and vitamin distributions; greater mobilization of primary care workers to provide the oral rehydration and foods specifically needed by the thousands of displaced and rural malnourished; asset preservation strategies such as seeds, tools, and loans; rehabilitation and drilling of boreholes, establishment of water holding tanks at displaced camps for chlorinated water; sanitation efforts; and lab facilities that track infectious diseases and verify drug-resistant strains of infectious agents. As the Somali Red Crescent director in Baidoa put it most simply, "Why feed people if they will remain vulnerable due to inadequate water?"¹⁴¹

A rough guide to relative proportions of overall aid investments suggested by one expert is 50 percent food, 20 percent health, and 30 percent economic stabilization.¹⁴² The latter should emphasize food monetization and related employment generation initiatives, desirably including, in the case of Somalia, a mass hiring of teachers so that children could pursue education while also encouraging a greater semblance of societal normality and investment in peace. All of the above (except for the teacher initiative) were elements of the patchwork of relief agency assistance, but they were all too little, too late.

In terms of food aid itself, the relative advantages and disadvantages of different mixes and methods of delivery call for sound judgments in a setting such as Somalia's. The controversy over high value vs. lower value foods, delivered wet (prepared in feeding kitchens) vs. dry (uncooked in sacks or cans) has already been discussed as particularly relevant in encouraging or discouraging looting and making food aid more likely to reach intended beneficiaries. Food transported by ICRC trucks to feeding centers proved effective in eliminating incentives for looting, since cooked food could not be stored or usefully resold. Consumed under the eyes of Somali Red Crescent and sometimes ICRC workers, wet food distribution provided the most direct evidence that intended recipients were reached and food not diverted or resold. Differences exist, particularly between ICRC and WFP, over the types of food that should be distributed. The inclusion of high

value rice was seen by many as fueling insecurity, but ICRC felt that "it was a cereal that was accepted by any Somali anywhere in the country, irrespective of area, culture or education" and that "the purpose was to simplify the operation by saving time and facilitating the dispatching of food."¹⁴³

Centralization vs. decentralization of delivery was another key concern. Dry food was more easily dispersed and more likely to allow populations to remain in their homes and on their lands. Displacement to seek food, whether to distribution centers for dry food or to the relatively fewer food kitchens which required continued presence for meals, meant drawing people off their own lands; these would thus remain untilled when the rains returned, thereby perpetuating dependency. To avoid displacement altogether, air-drops were occasionally conducted, principally by WFP, to inaccessible areas, rendered so particularly in the rainy season. They were rare, however, being both risky and costly due to higher bagging costs, lower flight capacities to accommodate pallets, and potential losses from mis-targetting. While some feel that looting of airdrop supplies was a lesser problem because there was often no advance indication of where the food would be dropped, the lack of advance notice also implied no on-the-ground donor presence for verification of appropriate receipt; in fact, more diversion was reported than was commonly believed to have occurred.¹⁴⁴ In terms of military-escorted supplies by land, even as these gave important security for food delivery beginning in December 1992, one of their limitations was lessened flexibility to deliver food to smaller, more remote pockets of famine victims which NGOs might have previously served with small vehicles on their own; under the military regime, this was no longer possible.¹⁴⁵

Flooding and Monetization: A fundamental crisis strategy was to sufficiently flood the market with food so that prices would decrease, making food more available and discouraging looting. The airlift achieved this to a large extent by visibly increasing supplies in critically affected areas and thus easing market shortages that drove prices up. As it turned out, however, more was looted to compensate for the lower value, even as the lower prices increased people's access to food. Emblematic of the flooding is the fact that by April 1993, in at least one location, over-supplies of rice and beans were being fed to livestock.¹⁴⁶

A creative solution to both maximize the benefits of food aid and minimize looting was monetization. Requiring essentially no donor distribution responsibility, it was intended to make food available in the marketplace to those with at least minimal means to purchase it, with the understanding that the destitute would continue to receive free handouts through more traditional distribution methods or, preferably, benefit from accompanying employment programs; the latter would generate broader economic activity of benefit to the larger society.¹⁴⁷ Under monetization, imported food was sold to

Somali merchants who then became responsible for ensuring security to point of sale, in exchange for local currency used, in turn, to support other relief or reconstruction programs in the country. One problem was the availability of accurate information to determine the economically optimal moment to introduce the food without unduly distorting the market or discouraging local production (for which reason the program was essentially limited to high value items not grown in Somalia, such as sugar, pasta, and wheat flour).

OFDA, under Natsios, strongly pushed monetization in Somalia, an effort that took some doing given the newness of the idea in an emergency setting, not to mention the distaste of many for selling food amidst famine. CARE, with WFP, were the principal organizations to participate, along with IRC on a smaller scale. A first effort conducted in the northwest in October 1992 failed due to theft of the proceeds generated. Other problems included traders' purchase and immediate resale of food in neighboring countries to avoid the costs and risks of transporting it back to Somalia; and inadequate knowledge of refugee food handouts in border areas which affected local food prices and commodity markets and required careful timing of monetization efforts to avoid excessive flooding of the market. Subsequent efforts, after too many delays due to a variety of reasons, were begun in early 1993. These succeeded, with proceeds used to fund a number of NGO and related relief and reconstruction activities.¹⁴⁸ While further in-depth study is needed, it appears that monetization could have had a more dramatic impact on market prices and the economy in general, as well as on security, if it had been implemented earlier and used for mass hiring of teachers, police, and agricultural or irrigation projects.¹⁴⁹

Excessive Focus on Mogadishu: A number of observers felt that too much of the relief effort was focussed on Mogadishu and not enough on the northwest and northeast of Somalia. In the case of the latter, this was because the case for desperate need could not really be made. However, local residents and expatriates who spent significant time in the north believe the relief effort lost an opportunity by failing to invest in this more peaceful area as an anchor for spreading economic recovery and stability to other regions.¹⁵⁰ In the case of Mogadishu, it was largely a question of whether the capital was over-emphasized at the expense of the rest of the country. Certainly, Mogadishu had a high symbolic value, which only increased, as in a vicious circle, with the continuing investment there. This applied as much to relief as to political and military emphases, with the Aidid faction growing stronger as a result. Having criticized this, however, and while also noting the chicken-and-egg nature of the problem, it should be recognized that a significant segment of the Somali population fled to the Mogadishu area to escape fighting and hunger elsewhere; perhaps one in four Somalis lived there during the crisis. Site of the nation's largest port and airport, Mogadishu was

also seen as key to transporting the needed amounts of food to other parts of the south and to restarting the economy, especially through renewed livestock exports¹⁵¹ once conditions permitted. During Ambassador Sahnoun's time in Somalia, it had been suggested that UNOSOM move its headquarters to Bossaso, partly as a way to avoid being held hostage to Aidid or at least as a credible threat to him. In the end, however, this intriguing possibility was dismissed as impracticable and too radical.¹⁵²

ENDNOTES

1. Shinn interview, 11/19/93, Washington, D.C.
2. *Ibid.*
3. "Food news doesn't move people, but medical data does," according to Bill Garvelink comment at June 9, 1994 RPG Washington review session.
4. Comment by Edward Girardet at February 1994 Columbia University conference on Media and the Famine in Somalia.
5. Johnston interview, 1/4/94, Atlanta.
6. "Somalia: Aydeed's local difficulties," *Africa Confidential*, June 17, 1994. Menkhaus (*op.cit.*, p. 160) estimates that UNOSOM's presence in Mogadishu alone generated 11,000 jobs, the loss of which would plunge the city into serious financial difficulty.
7. Christopher Caldwell in "Somali Aidlords," *Mediacritic*, p.12.
8. Interview with U.N. official.
9. Interview with Jim Clancy, 11/30/93, Addis Ababa.
10. The U.S. GAO estimated in March 1994 that the Defense Department alone spent \$884.9 million in incremental costs for operations in Somalia between April 1992 and September 1993 (\$20.1 million on the DOD airlift; \$692.2 million for UNITAF; \$94.7 million for UNOSOM II; and \$77.9 million for DOD support to the UN or other countries involved in the Somalia operation). (*Peace Operations: Cost of DOD Operations in Somalia*, U.S. GAO, March 1994, p. 4.) By July 1994, Defense Department incremental costs were placed at \$1.5 billion and total U.N. assessments at \$470.2 million. ("Somalia: USG costs to date," Memorandum from U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO/PHO), July 28, 1994.)
11. Council on Foreign Relations review session, 1/14/94, and also Oakley interview, *op.cit.*

12. See Drysdale, *op.cit.*, and Walter Clarke, *op.cit.*
13. Sica interview, *op.cit.*
14. Bishop interview, *op.cit.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. A few observers later questioned whether this was indeed the U.S. Government position, noting that Somalia's geographic position close to strategic oil reserves had not changed and/or that "Washington had been worse than indifferent to Somali suffering for over a decade and was intervening to promote the Pentagon, not save Somali lives." (Stephen R. Shalom, "Reflections on Intervention," *Peace and Democracy News*, Winter 1993/4, p.5.)
17. The Bolton position was harshly criticized at a New York Council on Foreign Relations meeting 1/14/94.
18. One of those who so argued is John Marks, a former Somalia Peace Corps volunteer, a UNOSOM and then U.S. Government (OFDA) contractor, and a rare U.S. Somalia expert fluent in the language.
19. Bishop 4/13/94 letter to RPG, p. 9.
20. Natsios interview, 12/13/93.
21. Howe interview, 3/25/94.
22. Geoff Loane, "Operation Provide Relief", unpublished paper, Nairobi, 5/22/93, p. 3. Compared with other civilian alternatives, it should be noted that SAT, while known for its reliability and convenience, is an expensive carrier, charging significantly more than other companies, such as those used by Lutheran World Federation. WFP reports that SAT charges \$10,000 per day plus \$2,800 per flying hour, compared to companies flying large Russian transports for \$1,600 per flying hour and no daily charge.
23. OFDA sources place the cost of one SAT C-130 aircraft at approximately \$1 million per month; 5 planes thus cost \$5 million. Those 5 planes are said to have carried as much as 14 military planes. For purposes of this rough analysis, if the incremental cost of 14 military planes was \$20 million over approximately 6 months, tempered by the fact that the number of planes declined considerably after 4 of those months, it is estimated that, say, \$16 million of the \$20 million

was attributed to the four months, or \$4 million per month. If this is a valid ballpark approximation, the military cost of \$4 million may be compared to the civilian \$5 million for equal tonnages carried.

24. CENTCOM interviews, *op.cit.* See also Eric Schmitt, "Military's Growing Role in Relief Missions Prompts Concerns," *New York Times*, 7/31/94, p. 3.
25. ICRC 8/3/94 letter to RPG, which also indicates that 70-80 percent of food aid went through sea ports and 10 percent across the Kenyan border.
26. Hansch et. al., *op. cit.*
27. On the eve of the UNITAF intervention, UNOSOM's Charles Petri and John Marks of the U.S. had negotiated with local elders and religious leaders an arrangement whereby at a cost of one-third of each food delivery for "provision of security," two-thirds would be guaranteed to get to the intended beneficiaries. They saw this as a plausible example of a more widely workable arrangement.
28. From DeWaal and Omaar, "Can Military Intervention Be 'Humanitarian'?", *Middle East Report*, March-June 1994, p. 7, report on local harvests. Natsios is skeptical on the significance of the local harvest outlook, since at that time of year one could only foresee the lesser of the two annual crops. He also believes that food prices declined not because of any reality of additional airlift supplies -- airlift food, he suggests, only substituted for that previously delivered by other means -- but because of Somali merchants releasing their hoarded supplies, believing the airlift would glut the market. (Natsios interview, 8/1/94.)
29. Kunder interview, 7/29/94.
30. Hansch, et. al., *op. cit.*
31. Clinton, *op. cit.* A State Department staff member involved in preparing the report believes the one million figure was a hasty composite of numbers of Somalis estimated to have been saved plus those at risk developed for speech-writing purposes.
32. DeWaal/Omaar, *op.cit.*
33. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO/PHO), *op. cit.*

34. Estimates by General Anthony Zinni, based in part on figures supplied by General Aidid and considered inflated by some. However, the *International Herald Tribune*, cited by McDonald, March 2, 1994, p. 25, gives a similar number of 6-10,000 Somalis dead or wounded between June 5 and October 3, two thirds of them women and children and many from clan fighting as well as UNOSOM II operations. In fact, it is difficult to know. According to Oakley and Hirsch, *op. cit.*, UNITAF deaths were under 50. UNOSOM II casualties on October 14, 1993 stood at 81.
35. Patrick Vial at March 22, 1994 RPG Geneva review session.
36. Zinni interview, 5/27/94.
37. Fred Cuny interview, 4/19/94.
38. Interview with Colonel Perry Baltimore, 2/15/94, Washington, D.C.
39. Westcott, *op. cit.*
40. See, for example, various articles by John Paul Lederach of Eastern Mennonite College, as well as various Mennonite Central Committee and American Friends Service Committee memos at the time of the intervention. Many felt the massive nature of the U.S. military presence would only feed the strand of militarism threaded through Somalia's clan conflicts.
41. This discussion thus defines disarmament in terms of medium and heavy weapons only.
42. Oakley and Hirsch, *op. cit.*
43. Oakley interview, *op. cit.*
44. Robert Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," *JFQ Forum* (Autumn 1993), p. 54.
45. Howe interview, 3/25/94.
46. Zinni interview, 2/28/94.
47. *Ibid.*
48. CENTCOM interviews; the number is derived from the number of streets, size of area, population, and need to maintain guard after clearing.

49. One supporter of this line of thinking is Admiral Howe who stated that, "In retrospect, UNITAF should have tried some disarmament at the outset; the psychological moment was there, and it could have made substantial inroads, at least in Mogadishu where the biggest problem was." General Powell agrees one could have done "a little more disarming", but immediately adds that the exact meaning of "a little more" is very difficult to communicate to a 23-year-old soldier -- and to his parents in case he's hurt. (Howe and Powell interviews, *op. cit.*)
50. President Bush states this position clearly: "I agreed to send in troops because there was a horrible famine and due to the political and military chaos food could not be delivered. The task of the U.S.-led coalition was to allow the food to be delivered. My understanding with the U.N. Security Council was that whatever was to be done to deal with the overall political and military situation in the country would be handled by the subsequent U.N. peacekeeping force and related diplomatic activities." (Bush, *op. cit.*)
51. Interview with military liaison officer, December 1993, Mogadishu.
52. Sica interview, *op. cit.*
53. Interview with U.S. official, Mogadishu, corroborated by State Department official, Washington, D.C.
54. One State Department official tempered this assessment by suggesting that U.S. Government policy-makers didn't think the U.N. was "foreordained to fail"; they were just "skeptical". Indeed, some perhaps did believe that the U.N. had a reasonable chance to succeed and therefore invested heavily in UNOSOM II. (Comments by Ambassador David Shinn to RPG, 7/18/94.)
55. Interview with MSF staff, Paris, 2/2/94.
56. Many felt it inadvisable to appoint Americans to these positions, noting that it blurred the respective U.N. and U.S. identities. These and/or others further thought it a mistake to appoint a military man as special representative and that this might have prefigured the military thrust of UNOSOM II rather than a preferably political and/or humanitarian one. President Bush, for one, considers it a mistake to have involved U.S. combat forces in UNOSOM II.
57. Interview with UNOSOM official.

58. All citations are from the "Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel which Led to Casualties Among Them," New York, February 24, 1994, pp. 32-36 (hereinafter referred to as "Commission of Inquiry").
59. Gosende interview, 11/18/93; also Drysdale, *op.cit.*, p. 174.
60. Zinni and Flournoy interviews, *op. cit.*
61. Menkhaus, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
62. Howe interview, 3/25/94.
63. Flournoy and Sica interviews, *op.cit.*
64. Howe interview, 4/21/94.
65. Kittani, *op. cit.* Boutros-Ghali himself "agrees that the U.N.'s reactive capacity needs thorough review. Yet he says the changes will have to take place while the U.N. keeps on trying to prevent and resolve conflicts. It is like flying a plane while redesigning and repairing it, he says." ("Global Report", *Christian Science Monitor*, 6/22/94, p. 14.)
66. Kittani, *op.cit.*
67. Various interviews and U.S. Government cables, including inter-agency assessment team report.
68. Mark Wentling, "Aid Beyond the Front Lines in Somalia: An End-Of-Tour Wrap-Up." Washington, DC: U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Department of State, April 26, 1994. p. 16.
69. "Four Characters in Search of a Doctrine," *The Economist*, 10/2/93, p. 56, cited in McDonald, 3/2/94, p. 26, fn. 126 provides the full quote: "The United Nations cannot simply become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts. If the American people are to say 'yes' to peacekeeping, the U.N. must know when to say no."
70. Reported during Council on Foreign Relations meeting 1/14/94.

71. Michael Gordon, "U.S. Officers Were Divided on Somali Raid," *New York Times*, 5/13/94, p. A8.
72. Clarke interview, 7/28/94.
73. "The Muddle in Somalia," *The Economist*, 4/16/94.
74. *Ibid.*
75. State Department and AID interviews. The U.S. Defense Department's internal analysis of the Somalia crisis confirms inadequate understanding of Somali culture and society. (Flournoy, *op.cit.*)
76. Interview with former Somali Ambassador Mohamed Nur, 12/17/93, Washington, D.C.
77. Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 40.
78. Interview with State Department official, January 1994.
79. A U.S. State Department official overseeing Somali government assets in Washington, D.C. noted that, unlike any other diplomatic mission in the capital, Somali officials down to even the third secretary level drove only luxury Mercedes or BMW automobiles, raising questions about the origins of such apparent wealth.
80. Sir Richard Burton, *First Footsteps in East Africa*, 1854.
81. Interview with Rony Brauman, 2/2/94, Paris.
82. Interview with Ed Tsui, 12/21/93, New York.
83. Ambassador Shinn in March 15, 1994 RPG Washington review meeting.
84. Interview with Hugh Cholmondeley, 12/21/93.
85. Interview with U.N. official. Aidid's animosity toward Boutros-Ghali and the U.N. is attributed by two observers -- Italian Ambassador Mario Sica and then-Under-Secretary of State Frank Wisner (formerly U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, during which period he knew the Secretary-General) -- to tactical reasons; their point was that Aidid needed to find a more "acceptable" reason for opposing the U.N.'s role in Somalia, which he saw as obstructing his own drive to power.

86. Early warnings are admittedly known to be of uncertain reliability and need to be closely tracked and analyzed. In the Somalia case, however, they turned out to be quite accurate.
87. Comments by the ICRC's Paul Grossrieder at March 22, 1994 Geneva review session.
88. Observations of the Netherlands Government's Operations Review Unit draft manuscript on "Humanitarian Aid to Somalia", 5/18/94, p. 34.
89. Letter from ICRC to RPG, 8/3/94, p. 11.
90. Loane interview, 7/94.
91. Cuny 4/13/94 letter to RPG.
92. *Ibid.*
93. Interview with NGO administrator, March 1994. This 1993 cost included 178 guards hired at \$160/month to guard 2 warehouses, 30 vehicles, 7 houses, and 2 offices. The ICRC figure is cited by Richard Dowden, "Western Troops Leave Somalia," *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, March-April 1994, vol. 6, no. 2. ICRC administrators say this figure is inaccurate, and that security expenses accounted for approximately 2 percent of their budget.
94. Interview with Dawn MacRae, 11/30/93, Addis Ababa .
95. Some of the enrichment was said to be channeled into purchases of qat, a narcotic widely used in Somalia and believed by many to have contributed to its users' tendency to erratic or violent action.
96. Debarati Sapir & Hedwig Deconinck, "Somalia: The Paradox of International Humanitarian Assistance and Military Intervention," draft chapter of forthcoming book *United Nations and Civil Conflicts* (Providence, RI: Brown University, Watson Institute for International Studies), p. 26.
97. Interview with Edward Girardet, 2/3/94, Paris
98. Johnston interview, 1/4/94.
99. Comment at Council on Foreign Relations review session, 1/14/94.

100. This point is reinforced by CDC officials who note the tendency of NGOs to seem anti-data, given a curative action-oriented preference over a preventive orientation. But data is needed to determine priorities within scarce resources, as well as to ensure reliable advocacy. Comparability of data was also an issue; despite efforts to encourage NGOs and UNICEF to adopt a standardized morbidity reporting format, most NGOs resisted changing their individual procedures. (Toole interview, *op. cit.*)
101. Interview with leaders of the Somali Urban-Rural Development Organization (SURDO), 12/8/93, Baidoa.
102. Wentling, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
103. *Ibid.*
104. Interview with Geoffrey May of CRS and ELCAS (Ecumenical Liaison Committee for Assistance to Somalia), 2/4/94, Geneva.
105. Sapir & Deconinck, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
106. Comments by Steven Rifkind to RPG, 7/19/94.
107. Brauman interview, *op. cit.*
108. De Waal and Omaar, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
109. Interviews with CENTCOM staff and General Zinni, respectively, *op. cit.*
110. Interview with Dr. Willi Huber of SOS-Kinderdorf, 12/10/93, Mogadishu.
111. Interview with Rene Roudaut, 2/2/94, Paris.
112. Interview with Liz Lukasavich, 2/9/94 and her comments at RPG June 9, 1994 Washington review session.
113. See Stephen Commins, "How Macro Trends Will Affect NGO Work in the Future," *Monday Developments*, InterAction, 6/20/94.
114. Aryeh Neier quoted in testimony before the U.S. House Select Committee on Hunger in Keith Richburg, "Relief Agencies in Africa: Corrupting and Corrupted", *International Herald Tribune*, 9/22/92, p. 1.

115. Interview with Peter Schumann, 4/15/94, who served as UNDP's officer in charge and resident representative during 1992-93.
116. Incident in Doynunay village, reported by an NGO representative in Baidoa.
117. Interview with Georgia Shaver, 2/8/94, Rome.
118. Tun Myat in March 1994 memo to RPG; see also Myat's comments at March 22, 1994 RPG Geneva review session.
119. Interviews with U.N. staff.
120. Interview with Melinda Kimble, 1/7/94, Washington, D.C.
121. Cuny interview, 4/21/94, among others.
122. Eliasson interview, 1/19/94, New York.
123. Interview with Amy Nelson, 6/3/94, Washington, D.C.
124. Johnston interview, 4/8/94.
125. Cuny 4/13/94 letter to RPG.
126. Kate Farnsworth interview, 1/11/94.
127. *Ibid.*
128. Garvelink in June 9, 1994 RPG Washington review session.
129. See Westcott, *op. cit.*
130. Comment by relief agency representative.
131. Cohen interview, *op.cit.*
132. Natsios, "The Politics of Disasters", unpublished paper, March 1993.
133. Natsios interview, 3/10/94.
134. *The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and U.S. Policy in the Post-Cold War Period*, Aspen Institute Conference Report, April 1994, p. 3.
135. Interview with a UNOSOM official.

136. *Restoring Hope: The Real Lessons of Somalia for the Future of Intervention*, U.S. Institute of Peace, July 1994, p. 16.
137. *Ibid.*
138. De Waal and Omaar, *op. cit.*, p. 7, cite public health programs as "the single most important factor in saving lives".
139. Sapir and Deconinck, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
140. Hansch, et. al., *op. cit.*
141. Interview with Hussain Dahir, 12/8/93, Baidoa.
142. Cuny interview, 4/21/94.
143. Letter from ICRC to RPG, 8/3/94.
144. Comments from June 9, 1994 RPG Washington review session with OFDA staff members.
145. Patrick Vial at March 22, 1994 RPG Geneva review session.
146. Wentling interview 5/13/94, describing visit to Belet Uen in April 1993.
147. See Cuny interviews.
148. Interviews with Susan Farnsworth, 12/1/93, Addis Ababa, and CARE staff in Mogadishu, 12/3/93.
149. Natsios interview, 12/13/93. See also the issues raised by U.S. AID consultant Satish Mishra in his March and July 1993 memos to REDSO.
150. See Westcott, *op. cit.*
151. Interview with Ron Libby, 3/16/94, Washington, D.C.
152. Both Ambassador Sahnoun and U.N. officials in New York say they supported the plan, but each says the other disapproved.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Major Conclusions

The situation and policy choices faced in Somalia were sufficiently complex, and road maps sufficiently lacking in the new post-Cold War context, that conclusions must be drawn with a modicum of humility. The extent to which judgment improves with hindsight must also be admitted, as must the fact that every case is unique and that Somalia's may be "uniquely unique".

Somalia represented a new paradigm on the international scene. As one observer summarized, the "famine had its origins in the collapse of the state and the general disintegration of law and order that contributed to an economy of sustained plunder."¹ How does one bring humanitarian assistance, not to mention a peacekeeping operation, into a war-torn country absent the consent (indeed, presence) of legitimate authorities? While some thought Somalia's absence of sovereignty an advantage for humanitarian intervention, in fact it was, by definition, a disadvantage for resolving the underlying political problem -- at least as long as the international community was unprepared to establish a formal trusteeship. (UNOSOM II could be described as an informal one, but without sufficient "teeth" to be effective.) Somalia experience shows that "successful peacekeeping requires the consent or acquiescence of the local parties to the conflict... Operations with only partial local consent are bound to be more intrusive and more costly; to entail more responsibility for local affairs; and to be more difficult to complete successfully, especially if the initial commitment to intervene is only half hearted."²

A key conclusion from Somalia is that in the mix of humanitarian, political, and military initiatives, the one that lay at the heart of the problem -- the political one -- was given the shortest shrift. While the humanitarian problem is what drew international attention (finally) to the country, it was the result of political instability and civil war, without which the famine would have been more manageable or might not have even occurred. The United States Government alone spent some \$ 311 million on humanitarian aid to fight starvation and disease, and another \$ 1.97 billion for the

incremental costs of U.S. and U.N. military interventions judged necessary to ensure delivery of the humanitarian supplies (including the amount diverted to fight Aidid's forces during June-October 1993).³ By contrast, a negligible amount was invested in diplomatic efforts to solve the root political cause of the problem. This was tantamount to treating the symptom while downplaying the disease.

If the health analogy is pursued, the first response should have been to initiate preventive measures before the disease could develop or spread. Such efforts should have aimed to more actively dissuade Siad Barre from his excessive authoritarianism through extensive and early international diplomacy reinforced by a foreign assistance policy directly linked to human rights and development performance. Somalia has not been alone in reaping the consequences of inattention to development and human rights. On a worldwide basis, "between 1991 and 1993, U.N. peacekeeping expenditures grew nearly sevenfold, refugee costs rose by one-third, and development investment declined. The results are inexorable: the less spent on helping societies become healthy (politically as well as economically), the more will be needed for the violent ravages of disease."⁴

In today's post-Cold War world, more flexible opportunities exist for preventive diplomacy. While dictators such as Siad Barre rarely reform or cede power voluntarily, the Cold War competition that seemed to dictate their support is no longer a factor. Democracy is no longer automatically held hostage to geo-strategic interests at the same time it has gained in allure with the failure of the Soviet Union. In this sense, Somalia was caught in the time warp of history: its crisis was rooted in the old Cold War competitive system which, regardless of form of government and degree of concern for human rights, drew western aid as a counterweight to Soviet support of neighboring Ethiopia. By the time that aid began to be cut back in 1988, too much damage to the political and social fabric had been done by Barre's repression to stop the decline toward civil war and ultimate anarchy. Later, once Barre was overthrown, internal rivalries became so sharp, mechanisms for peaceful resolution of disputes so weak, and the incentive to negotiate thus so limited that the few agreements attempted soon fell victim to renewed fighting. While considerable feeling exists that more intensive diplomacy in 1990-91 might have limited the scale and deadliness of the crisis, it is fair to conclude that much earlier action, before or at least during 1988, would have been needed to have had any chance to prevent it.

It must be conceded that the international community cannot effectively focus on more than a handful of crises (if that) at any one time. A study concerned only with Somalia, particularly given the subsequent scale of suffering, might well be expected to

suggest that this was a most critical one deserving of pre-eminent attention. But in truth the cataclysmic changes in the ex-Soviet Union and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (a situation that could also have benefitted from more effective preventive diplomacy) were hardly less important, involving, as they did, U.S. strategic interests. Even serious humanitarian crises in countries such as Sudan, Angola, and Liberia, which received far less international attention, deserved far more. This only reinforces the necessity for "preventive care", not only to save lives earlier and at less cost, but to minimize the probabilities of too many simultaneous crises exhausting the world's ability to cope with them.

This is not to say that more aggressive international action should not have been undertaken in Somalia in 1991 and early 1992 to attempt to mitigate the early effects of violence once unleashed. Even though agreements lacked durability, the efforts of Sahnoun, Oakley, and Kouyate at least brought leaders together to talk, which reduced the levels of fighting during those periods. The international community demonstrably lacks the patience to invest heavily over long periods in a situation such as Somalia's. Yet it is possible that an intensified low-cost diplomatic investment could have been -- and might still be -- effective if sustained over typically long and drawn-out Somali negotiating timeframes, and if seriously linked to economic rewards and punishments in terms of aid given or withheld by the international community.

Although the international community should not assume excessive responsibility for everything that has gone wrong in Somalia -- Somalis are the first to note that the problem was, and is, primarily a Somali one -- it does bear some of the fault for supporting the Barre regime long after its deficiencies were glaringly obvious. In this sense, other countries, and the United Nations collectively representing them, had an obligation to help Somalis in their emergency. The obligation was moral and humanitarian, and also practical, given the refugee pressures that were in danger of overwhelming the region as a whole.

It is tragic, indeed unconscionable, that the United States, other governments, and the United Nations did not act sooner. It is also regrettable that African groups such as the Organization of African Unity were either unwilling or unable to help. Why did 1-2 million people have to leave their homes and nearly a quarter of a million have to die before an adequate response was mounted -- and, even then, only incrementally? Certainly it was no secret to governments or to the public that failed rains and civil conflict had disrupted agricultural production and transport, putting millions of Somalis at risk. Dire pronouncements had been made as early as late 1991 by NGOs and OFDA.

Not only could earlier action then have saved 154-240,000 Somali lives, but it could have helped to avert much of the larger tragedy that later enveloped the country. It could also have saved more than 100 international peacekeeper lives and most of the \$2 billion subsequently devoted to the international community's massive interventions.

The conclusion is inescapable that greater automaticity is needed in responding to early warnings with prompt preparation for a coordinated relief effort and aggressive diplomatic action to address underlying political problems. The need for this is not only humanitarian, but also political, given the dangers of instability spreading across national borders and infecting the larger area. In addition, experience has shown that international public opinion will tolerate media images of some suffering, but not of overwhelming suffering, with the result that a more costly intervention (in both human and financial terms) will ultimately be required anyway. Although experts point to the uncertain reliability of famine warnings, noting that for a complex variety of reasons situations can change, it is clear that in the Somali case action was delayed far beyond any period of uncertainty.

Once the international community became engaged, the problem in Somalia became an opposite one of sometimes ill-considered forms of response. One hesitates to criticize humanitarian organizations responding heroically to desperately needy people in urgent situations. However, sufficient international famine experience exists to suggest how to plan an optimally effective response going beyond the prevailing (and necessary) focus on emergency food and health care. The medical analogy is again relevant: preventive as well as curative care. This is particularly true in the health field, where added and earlier emphasis on measles vaccinations, oral rehydration therapy, clean water, and sanitation initiatives could have saved more lives.

Beyond this, earlier and more serious attention should have been given to an analog of the airlift's jump-starting the relief effort: an effort to jump-start the collapsed war-torn economy through employment generation activities financed with earlier food monetization and food-for-work and perhaps some cash payment activities. This could have provided gainful employment outlets for at least some of Somalia's gun-toting youths, creating an economic incentive for disarming while generating, in turn, spinoff economic effects. All this is much more complex to both conceptualize and organize, of course, than a straightforward relief effort, particularly in the chaotic conditions pertaining in Somalia. But it may well have helped to attenuate the situation as it evolved, and thus suggests a need for training relief workers in broader development and economic policy issues as these interface with relief situations.

In some respects, the enormity of the relief response actually worsened the situation. UNOSOM II's presence, not to mention that of relief and media personnel, is said to have been responsible for generating 11,000 Somali jobs. This translated into considerable economic, and ultimately military, gains which accrued largely to Aidid and the SNA and its sub-clans in south Mogadishu alone.⁵ A related and further problem was that of the unending extortion at every level and over every aspect of the effort. While some expatriates attempted by hard bargaining to lower the costs of "doing business", the impulse to give aid dominated, without much thought to who ultimately reaped the benefits or to the ultimate effects on the broader political-military situation. The Somalis understandably took advantage of this. The more aid, the more looting and extortion, and the more resources for benefitting factions. The point is central, inasmuch as donors' ongoing assistance -- however often cut-offs were threatened -- effectively fueled the fighting, creating, in this sense, disincentives to peace. The humanitarian community should not have put up with it.

Should the international assistance agencies have left under these circumstances? Probably yes. It is hard, even callous, to walk away from a people one knows need help, especially where those most likely to suffer are not those principally responsible for the situation. Yet the "tough love" option may well have proved more effective in the larger scheme of things, in mitigating the degree and/or shortening the period of suffering. As it was, relief agencies tended to depart temporarily after a particularly egregious security violation, only to return again. This no doubt eased the frayed nerves of the valiant relief workers but did nothing to send a serious message to local factions that continued outside support would depend on a commitment to respect and protect relief efforts. Even into 1994, following a donor announcement at Addis Ababa that continued aid was dependent on security guarantees, some relief agencies continued to operate on the same basis as before. If the "ultimate card" of a more definitive departure had been played by the humanitarian community early on, and publicly announced as being due to uncooperative faction leaders, it would likely have led either to improved protection allowing the continuation of aid or to an opportunity, with departure from Somalia, to channel scarce aid resources to other countries' emergencies, with arguably greater impact.

At the risk of over-simplification, one way to view the problem in Somalia is in terms of the head vs. the heart. This manifests itself at several stages and levels. At the early warning stage, available data predicted a serious food deficit, but absent a visible tug on the heartstrings of the international community, it was ignored. Even when ICRC and others began reporting actual deaths, the world did not respond until TV coverage became so horrifying and repetitious that it created an inescapable emotional impact

requiring action. Seeing death as a result of food deficit, the logical impulse from the heart was to send food. But food was not enough; a broader response that included immunizations, oral rehydration therapy, clean water, sanitation, and employment generation was needed. The U.S. Government then initiated a dramatic military airlift. This was followed by an overwhelming land force urged by a number of overwrought relief agencies, despite some indications that the worst of the famine was over and that a less overwhelming, less Mogadishu-focussed response might have been equally effective, caused less collateral damage, and been less prone to the politics and violence of Mogadishu.

Head dominated over heart in the U.S. decision not to try to solve all of Somalia's problems, but to disengage after the immediate emergency food needs were met. However, the head was not much engaged in insisting the U.N. take over and thinking it was up to the task of doing so -- with an enormously expanded (and unmeasurable) mandate to assist in nation-building. A series of errors ensued, including the June 5, 1993 incident and subsequent war with General Aidid in which the U.S. was complicit. The U.N. reaped the predictable consequences and blame for these errors, increasing General Aidid's enmity which was further exacerbated by the constant tension of the military concentration in his part of Mogadishu. Notwithstanding the superior port, airport, communications advantages, and psychological importance of Mogadishu, it would have been wiser for the international community to devise flexible ways to by-pass the capital instead of implicitly emphasizing the political and military importance of the Mogadishu faction leaders.⁶ Declaring war on Aidid, while an appropriate response to a frontal attack on U.N. personnel and defense of peacekeeping principles, should certainly have given way to a much earlier pursuit of the "two-fisted approach" that included an offer of political negotiations with him.

It was not until October 1993 that an optimal mix of head and heart was enunciated, at least by the U.S. Government: the heart conceded to an outraged American public that U.S. military involvement in Somalia would end within six months, while the head insisted on a short-term increase in troop levels and a "decent interval" to allow a major negotiating effort to solve the fundamental political problem.

Calibrating international engagements is an art. The U.S. Government veered from under-engagement in Somalia to over-engagement. It is difficult to criticize Operation Restore Hope, which was greeted with enormous relief by many observers sick of the ongoing turmoil and the suffering and insecurity it engendered. It did change the dynamic of the situation, and on its own terms it succeeded. President Bush, asked to cite

any lessons from the Somalia engagement, said, "In terms of my responsibilities for the Somalia operation, I am proud of it, and the goals we set and our success in accomplishing them. I would behave the same if I had it to do over again."⁷ Yet, while the U.S. military was right to avoid being stuck with the "Somalia tarbaby", it forced a too-rigid U.S. policy that ignored the virtual certainty of further problems after its withdrawal. With the knowledge of hindsight, and given the situation at that point, the U.S.-led operation should have been supplemented with more intensive diplomacy and perhaps extended slightly longer to insist on at least some form of Somali negotiated solution that would have allowed the international community to "declare victory" and leave. Alternatively, the massive intervention should not have taken place at all; even if the result had been 10-25,000 additional deaths, it is unclear this would have been substantially greater than occurred anyway in the months that followed -- and that are yet to follow. The hard truth may well be that "military forces... cannot be expected to solve a country's troubles; unless their deployment is connected with parallel political and humanitarian initiatives, when they withdraw the local situation will revert to what it was when they arrived."⁸

The worst of both worlds, in effect, was to turn over responsibility to the United Nations while maintaining U.S. troops at risk and involving U.S. policy-makers so intimately in the U.N. operation. Other nations look to the U.S. for leadership, yet sometimes resent its seeming to take over -- a "Catch 22" situation. Indeed, UNOSOM II was the first case where the U.S. had committed combat troops under U.N. control (albeit not under U.N. command). Given the American public's distaste for overseas military engagements and particular unwillingness to sacrifice U.S. lives, the U.S. is not considered a very reliable participant in such ventures, a point made by top-ranking U.N. officials. It is better suited to a logistics support role, at least in situations where vital interests are not threatened. The paradox of U.N. peace enforcement is that it may only be possible "where the stakes are not so high that concerned states insist on taking direct control of the operation. But in these situations, where vital interests are not threatened, governments and citizens will be loath to accept real sacrifice."⁹ As the independent Commission of Inquiry pointed out, in Somalia the mandate was larger than the resources and the will to implement it.¹⁰

One observer argues that "UNOSOM could not possibly play a neutral mediating role. To demand that it do so, or to criticize it for having failed to stay strictly neutral...is to misread the political dynamic inherent in peace enforcement under Chapter VII authority. Future U.N. forays into Chapter VII peace enforcement must take account of the potential incompatibility of mediating and peace-enforcement responsibilities."¹¹ The

key decision that must be made is to "decide in advance whether they are going to accept and work with the local powers that be, even though these people may be the ones responsible for the trouble that triggered intervention."¹²

If there is any silver lining for the United Nations in the Somalia experience, it is that its difficulties and anguish provide ample and useful lessons for the future. Clearly, as it projected itself in Somalia, the U.N. Secretariat was ill-equipped to deal with an emergency requiring speedy action. There was also little precedent or terms of reference for operating in a *peacemaking* situation. In New York, the offices of the three under-secretaries-general for peacekeeping, political affairs, and humanitarian affairs had varying levels of influence, resources, and competence, "with only minimal unifying direction from the Secretary-General".¹³ The Secretary-General had the added liability of being held in personal contempt by many Somalis.

In Somalia itself, it was difficult to know who was in charge. "Somalia illustrates the weaknesses in the UN's system of mission management, which was, at one and the same time, overly centralized and diffuse."¹⁴ In principle, the Secretary-General's Special Representative was in charge, but the military was under separate controls -- plural in the sense that each national contingent took at least some level of instruction from its home capital -- and the U.N. agencies reported to their own governing boards, as did, of course, the NGOs. The Humanitarian Operations Center lacked teeth (and staff), and the only political initiatives between those of Sahnoun and Kouyate were undertaken by the U.S. (in the person of Ambassador Oakley). Funding for UNOSOM was divided between assessed contributions for peacekeeping and voluntary contributions for humanitarian activities, with no shifting permitted between the two accounts to respond to needs of the moment. In short, both unified structures and unified budgets were lacking, contributing to unclear lines of authority, bureaucratic chaos, and budgetary (and thus operational) inflexibility.

The blame should fall not only on the U.N. organization itself, but on the member states responsible for its direction. If the larger Somali political problem had many of its roots in the super-power competition of the Cold War era, so too did countless other emerging trouble spots around the world which competed for the U.N.'s attention, and so did the U.N. itself. Kept purposely weak by the super-powers, which sought to advance their own interests and their latitude for independent action, the U.N. could hardly be expected to be suddenly strong enough to take leadership for Somalia (or anywhere else) in 1991. In the U.S. desire to pursue aggressive multilateralism, inadequate consideration was given to the need for extensive overhaul to meet the new expectations. The choices

would seem to be either to substantially strengthen the U.N. with its own immediately deployable peace force, or to refrain from further engagement in internal conflicts absent the parties' agreement to actively supporting a U.N. role. In this sense, the United Nations faces the same "tough love" conundrum as the humanitarian agencies: to try to save lives in all situations, and risk failure if conditions are not propitious; or to practise, in effect, triage, devoting limited resources to those areas where success is most likely.

The Somalia humanitarian response led to both successes and failures. Popularly viewed as an unmitigated disaster, it saved, by current estimates, a total of some 100-125,000 lives during the 1990-93 period and created a psychological opening for broader improvement.¹⁵ On an important symbolic level it demonstrated more powerfully than before that the United States, and the international community as a whole, are willing to temporarily set aside sovereignty constraints (at least in a country without a government) if necessary to respond to overwhelming human suffering. On an operational level, the response developed effective methods of providing humanitarian relief, notably including use of the military. These are not small achievements.

The failures of the Somalia response are in some ways the flip side of the successes. If an estimated 100-125,000 lives were saved, some 154-240,000 were likely lost due to the lateness of relief efforts and lost opportunities or deficiencies in implementation. The daring to sidestep sovereignty and intervene to protect humanitarian principles was countered by excessive reliance on military force and by inadequate political efforts to resolve the root problem. What was needed was the wisdom to find the right balance -- and to find it in time.

Lessons Learned

Among the scores of possible policy and operational lessons of the Somalia humanitarian crisis, a few over-arching ones stand out and merit special emphasis for the future:

- ◆ **Timely action** is essential to minimize deaths, suffering, and destruction. It is also essential to minimize the overwhelming financial burdens that must ultimately -- and, in this media age, inevitably will -- be borne by the

international community. Timely action includes not only earlier humanitarian responses, but still earlier preventive diplomacy to address underlying political stresses, as well as skillful development cooperation to help alleviate the most grievous forms of poverty which foster instability. Current systems for formulating policy and allocating budget resources -- accustomed to responding only at the acute crisis stage when Congressional, media, and public pressure becomes overwhelming -- are not set up for timely action. They must be.

- ◆ **Balanced humanitarian response** is essential. Famine situations require not only food distribution (with appropriate forms of delivery, commodity mixes, etc.), but also a more sophisticated multi-pronged relief approach that includes early attention to public health and broader economic policy interventions at appropriate times and in appropriate sequence. Sufficient literature and experience in famine relief -- including the Somali experience reported in this study -- exist to inform broader and more effective responses in the future. The key is to draw on them.

- ◆ **A clearly defined mission, appropriately balancing humanitarian, political, and military objectives**, is central to success. Adequate attention must be paid to the fundamental political problems that generally underlie humanitarian crises. While immediate famine may be halted with military means, root problems are rarely susceptible to a military (or other) "quick fix". If the U.S. and others in the international community are unable or unwilling to devote the necessary resources to complete the task, it is probably wiser not to intervene in the first place. Alternatively, intervention should be clearly and publicly limited to the "quick fix", with the discipline to enforce that limitation -- even in the face of renewed suffering and public pressure -- rather than slide into ineffective or even counterproductive halfway responses.

If the international community is prepared to stay the course, alternatives to the usual U.S. and U.N. options must be developed for political negotiations. At one level these should include the involvement of either specially constituted groups of nations as in Liberia or regional entities such as a strengthened OAU. At another level, the capabilities of

NGOs or respected non-official individuals should be drawn upon, benefitting from their flexibility compared to traditionally formal foreign ministry approaches.

Overwhelming force has highly limited, if any, applicability in political-humanitarian crises. By its sheer scale, it risks distracting attention from the political and humanitarian issues. It also seems fated to raise more hopes than its sponsors are prepared to meet, with the result that it amounts to only a momentary freezing of time, a brief respite after which the situation may too readily revert to its earlier chaos and resultant increased demoralization. Absent extraordinary transition efforts, the positive psychological effects of a change in the situation's "dynamique" may thus be undermined by negative effects upon the force's withdrawal.

- ◆ **Coordination and collaboration** are key to optimizing relief effectiveness. They are necessary both for improved and cost-effective coverage of at-risk populations and for ensuring acceptable and sustainable working conditions for relief organizations. Cooperation in negotiating and enforcing reasonable prices for rental of facilities and provision of services, including, where necessary, security arrangements, can avoid later problems. OFDA and other donors to relief agencies have an opportunity to encourage this type of cooperation through the power of the purse.

NGOs should also be more open to the possibility of collective withdrawal in situations where excessive advantage is being taken of them and their scarce humanitarian resources, not to mention where the level of physical risk is unacceptable. Concern for the welfare of the most vulnerable in the immediate local setting should not overwhelm consideration of the potentially greater humanitarian benefits of helping more people in equally needy settings elsewhere. Triage is not an unreasonable concept under such circumstances.

- ◆ **United Nations capability** is limited to the resources brought to bear by its members. The membership must thus come to grips with the U.N.'s post-Cold War opportunity to go beyond being a mere deliberating body and become a key actor for peace and development. Members must be prepared to accompany demands for action with the requisite support to

meet them, including not only financial resources, but also strong backing for streamlining cumbersome U.N. bureaucratic procedures and personnel recruitment. In short, don't demand more of the U.N. than it can deliver. And insist on what it takes to deliver.

- ◆ **Understanding of the situation** is critical before intervening and must be present at all decision-making levels. This includes understanding of both the country and its culture and of the particular famine situation. The former requires deployment of experienced and uniquely capable personnel, and the latter requires the generation and use of reliable famine data.

- ◆ **Success is achievable.** Despite negative imagery now surrounding the very name of Somalia. It is important to stress that 100-125,000 lives were saved through the efforts of many compassionate, effective, creative, indeed heroic individuals. Institutions -- non-governmental, governmental, and multilateral alike -- came to the rescue, devoting sizeable human and financial resources to assist needy Somalis. It is important not to lose sight of the positive in the haste to attribute blame or to escape from future responsibilities. One must learn from the positive as well as from the negative. And, to quote the prayer, one must have the wisdom to know the difference.

ENDNOTES

1. Menkhaus, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
2. Aspen report, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
3. U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO/PHO), *op. cit.*
4. Jessica Mathews, "Policy vs. TV", *Washington Post*, March 8, 1994, p. A19.
5. Menkhaus, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
6. Oakley points out that Mogadishu was over-emphasized by all categories of actors in Somalia: political, military, and NGOs. (Interview, 12/17/93)
7. Bush, *op. cit.*
8. Aspen report, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
9. McDonald, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
10. Commission of Inquiry, p. 41.
11. Menkhaus, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
12. Aspen report, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
13. See Oakley and Hirsch, *op. cit.*
14. Aspen report, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
15. Hansch, et. al., *op. cit.*

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|----------------|---|
| AFSC | American Friends Service Committee |
| AICF | International Action Against Hunger, a French NGO |
| AID | U.S. Agency for International Development (see USAID) |
| BRP | Bureau of Refugee Programs, U.S. Department of State |
| CARE | Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere |
| CDC | Centers for Disease Control and Prevention |
| CENTCOM | Central Command, the U.S. military structure in charge of the overall Somalia operation |
| CMOC | Civilian-military operations center, point of interface between UNITAF military forces and the relief effort |
| DART | Disaster Assistance Response Team |
| DHA | United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, established in April 1992 |
| DOD | United States Department of Defense |
| EC | European Community |
| ECHO | European Community Humanitarian Office |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| FHA | Bureau of Food and Humanitarian Aid, USAID |
| FY | Fiscal Year |
| GNP | Gross National Product |
| HOC | Humanitarian Operations Center of UNOSOM I, point of interface between U.N. and NGO efforts |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IMC | International Medical Corps |
| IRC | International Rescue Committee |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| MCC | Mennonite Central Committee |
| MSF | Mèdecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) |
| NGO | Nongovernmental Organization [a list of NGOs whose materials were used for this study is in the Bibliography] |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| OFDA | Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| RPG | Refugee Policy Group |
| SAT | Southern Air Transport, a major chartered air carrier involved in the Somalia relief effort |

| | |
|------------------|---|
| SCF-U.K. | Save the Children Fund-United Kingdom |
| SCF-U.S. | Save the Children Federation-United States |
| SNA | Somali National Alliance, group allied with Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNITAF | Unified Task Force, name for U.S.-led coalition which intervened in Somalia from Dec. 9, 1992 to May 4, 1993. |
| UNOSOM I | United Nations Operation in Somalia I (April 1992-May 4, 1993) |
| UNOSOM II | United Nations Operation in Somalia II (May 4, 1993-Present) |
| UNV | United Nations Volunteers |
| USC | United Somali Congress |
| USAID | U.S. Agency for International Development |
| USG | United States Government |
| USGAO | U.S. Government Accounting Office |
| USLO | United States Liaison Office, operating in lieu of an official U.S. embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organization |
| WVRD | World Vision Relief and Development |

ANNEXES

SOURCES

- A-1 Select Bibliography on Somalia
- A-2 List of People Interviewed

CHRONOLOGIES

- B-1 Brief Chronology of Somalia Crisis and International Responses, 1990-1994
- B-2 U.S. Congressional Action on Somalia, 1990-1994

STATISTICAL TABLES

- C-1 U.S. Government Assistance to Somalia (Non-Military)-FY 1991-1994
- C-2 U.S. AID/OFDA In-Kind Grants for Somalia Emergency FY 1991-94
- C-3 U.S. Food Commodities Going to Somalia FY 1991-1994
- C-4 U.S. Defense Department Expenditures in Somalia FY 1992-1994
- C-5 Summary of Total USG Expenditures in Somalia, April 1992 to July 1994
- C-6 Total Funding Through U.N. Agencies for Somalia, 1992-1993
- C-7 U.N. Somalia Operations: Financial Components
- C-8 Contributions by Member States to U.N. Operations in Somalia
- C-9 Select Relief Agency Spending and Activities in Somalia

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOMALIA

NB: In line with Somali practice, Somali authors are alphabetized by first name.

- Aaronson, Michael. "Interview with Michael Aaronson, Overseas Director, Save the Children Fund, UK, September 23, 1992. Unedited transcript." Interview by *Africa Recovery*. New York. September 23, 1992.
- Abdirahman Osman Raghe. "Somali NGOs: A Product of Crisis." Paper presented to the 5th International Congress of Somali Studies, Worcester, MA. December 3, 1993.
- Africa Confidential*. "Somalia: Aydeed's Local Difficulties." vol. 35, no. 12, June 17, 1994, p. 7.
- _____. "Somalia: Back to the Drawing Board." vol. 35, no. 11, June 3, 1994, pp. 6-7.
- Africa News Service*. "Tipping the Scales on International Conflicts: Media Coverage of the Wars in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, January 1991 - 1992." Chart.
- Africa Watch (AW). "Somalia, Beyond the Warlords: The Need for a Verdict on Human Rights Abuses." Washington, DC: AW, March 7, 1993.
- _____. "Press Release: Africa Watch Condemns Unreservedly the Decision of the UN Secretary-General to Dismiss Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun as Special Representative to Somalia." Washington, DC: AW, October 29, 1992.
- _____ and Physicians for Human Rights. "Somalia. No Mercy in Mogadishu. The Human Cost of the Conflict and the Struggle for Human Rights." Washington, DC: AW and Physicians for Social Change, March 26, 1992.
- _____. "Somalia. A Fight to the Death? Leaving Civilians at the Mercy of Terror and Starvation." Washington, DC: AW, February 13, 1992.
- _____. "A Government at War with Its own People: Testimonies about the Killings and the Conflict in the North." New York: AW, 1990.
- African Rights (AR). "Land Tenure, the Creation of Famine, and Prospects for Peace in Somalia." London: AR, Discussion paper no. 1, October 1993.

- _____. "The Nightmare Continues...Abuses Against Somali Refugees in Kenya." London: AR, September 1993.
- _____. "Somalia: Human Rights Abuses by the United Nations Forces." London: AR, July 1993.
- _____. "Somalia. Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment." London: AR, May 1993.
- Amnesty International. "Somalia. A Human Rights Disaster." Report No. AFR 32/01/92. London: Amnesty International, August 5, 1992.
- Arnold, S.L., and David T. Stahl. "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other than War." *Parameters*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, vol. 23, no. 4 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 4-26.
- Atkinson, Rick. "Stop Fighting or Lose Aid, Somalia's Factions Warned. US, UN Officials Urge Rebuilding Effort." *The Washington Post*. November 22, 1993.
- Ayittey, B.N. "The Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution." Washington, DC: Cato Institute, *Policy Analysis* No. 205, March 28, 1994.
- Beckington, Herbert L. "Memorandum: To Andrew Natsios. Subject: [US] AID Food and Non-Food Somalia Relief Activities. Reference: Natsios/Beckington Memorandum Dated September 1, 1992." Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, September 3, 1992.
- Beidler, Lorin. "Somali Christian Rejects Violence, Works for Peace." Akron, PA: Mennonite Central Committee News Service, August 21, 1992.
- Benthall, Jonathan. *Disasters, Relief and the Media*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1993.
- Bolton, John R. "Wrong Turn in Somalia." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 1, January-February 1994, pp. 56-66.
- _____. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State John R. Bolton before the US Congress House Select Committee on Hunger. Washington, DC: July 22, 1992.
- Bonner, Ray. "Why We Went. How the UN Turned its Back on Somalia and Subverted the Best Chance for Peace." *Mother Jones*. April/March 1993, p. 54.

- Borsotti, Marco. "The Somalia Case. A Proposed Medium Long-Term Strategy for UNDP in the Emergency Situation of the Country." Draft. Nairobi. April 1992.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. "An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping." Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. New York: United Nations. January 31, 1992.
- Branaman, Brenda. "Somalia: Chronology of Events, June 26, 1960 - October 14, 1993." *CRS Report for Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Report No. 93-926-F, October 15, 1993.
- Brilliant, Franca, Frederick Cuny, and Victor Tanner. "Operation Provide Comfort: A Study of Lessons Learned for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and US Army, Civil Affairs." Washington, DC: October 1991.
- Bruner, Edward F. "Somalia: Military Command Arrangements." CRS Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Report No. 93-959-F, November 4, 1993.
- Bryden, Matt. "Concept Paper. UNOSOM on the Offensive: Seizing the Opportunity." Paper prepared for the UNOSOM Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs. 1993.
- _____ and A.O. Raghe. "International Assistance and Recovery in Somalia." Discussion Paper. June 1994.
- Burkholder, J.R., and Ted Koontz. "The Dark Side of Responsible Love." *Gospel Herald*. March 16, 1993.
- _____. "When Armed Force Is Used to Make Relief Work Possible." *Gospel Herald*. January 12, 1993.
- Cahill, Kevin M. "A Necessary Balance." *Brown Journal of Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1993-94), pp. 7-14.
- _____, ed. *A Framework for Survival. Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters*. New York: Basic Books and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.
- Caldwell, Christopher. "Somali Aidlords." *Mediacritic*. April 1994.

Callahan, Thomas J. "Some Observations on Somalia's Past and Future." *CSIS Africa Notes*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 1994.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS). *CRS/Somalia Update* No. 31, November 12, 1993 to January 16, 1994.

_____. "CRS/Somalia Action Plan Progress Report. August 1992 - 93."

_____. "Proposal for Market Intervention Program in Somalia." Grant No. 684-92-004. 1992.

Clark, Jeffrey. "Debacle in Somalia. Famine: A Collective International Failure." *Foreign Affairs*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, vol. 72, no. 1, 1993, pp. 109-123.

_____. "Prelude to Disaster." *The Humanitarian Monitor*, vol. 1 (June 1993).

_____. "In the Aftermath of Debacle: Failure of the Collective Response in Somalia." Paper presented, on behalf of the UN Association of the USA, in Tokyo, Japan to conference, "The US, Regional Crisis Management, and the UN," March 29, 1993.

_____. "Frustration and Failure: International Response to the Somali Crisis." Presentation to Cornell University/Institute for African Development Conference on "Somalia: Human Disaster, and World Politics." Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees, October 16, 1992.

_____. "A Journey to Hell." Comments delivered at cosponsored African-American Institute and U.S. Committee for Refugees briefing, Washington, DC, September 11, 1992.

Clark, Richard. *Proceedings: The UN Peacekeeping, and US Policy in the Post-Cold War World*. Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute, vol. 9, no. 3 (Conference, April 4-9, 1994).

Clarke, Walter S. "Somalia: Background Information for Operation Restore Hope 1992-93." *SSI Special Report*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College, December 1992.

_____. "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia." *Parameters*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, vol. 23, no. 4, Winter 1993-94, pp. 42-58.

Clinton, President William J. "'The US Wishes Not to Be a Dictator'." *The Washington Post*. May 4, 1994, p. A22. [Excerpts from President Clinton's news conference of May 3, in Atlanta, GA.]

_____. "Report to the Congress on US Policy in Somalia." Washington, DC: The White House, October 13, 1993.

"Clinton's Quick and Dirty Route to a Fiasco in Somalia." *Manchester Guardian*, March 17, 1993.

Cockburn, Patrick. "Glaspie Faulted Over Somali Role. Former Iraq Envoy Accused of Mishandling Aideed." *The Independent*. September 22, 1993, p. 12.

Cohen, Herman. "Intervention in Somalia." Draft Manuscript. *Diplomatic Record*. Washington, DC: West Press, Georgetown University, June 1994.

Cohen, Michael. "Somalia: The Cynical Manipulation of Hunger." *Z Magazine*, vol. 33, November 1993.

Cohen, Roberta. "Strengthening International Protection for Internally Displaced Persons." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1994.

_____. "Human Rights Protection for Internally Displaced Persons." Washington DC: Refugee Policy Group, June 1991.

Copson, Raymond W. "Somalia: Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II." *CRS Issue Brief*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Order No. IB92131. Updated November 24, 1993.

Cornell University. Proceedings of symposium on Somalia, Human Disaster, and World Politics. Ithaca, NY: Institute for African Development. October 15-16, 1992.

Crocker, Chester A. "Peacekeeping We Can Fight For. Beyond Bluffs and Trial Balloons, Rules of Constructive Involvement." *The Washington Post*, May 8, 1994, p. C1.

Cronin, Richard P. "Somalia: Options for Congress and US Policy." *CRS Report for Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Report No. 93-914-F, October 15, 1993.

Cuny, Frederick C. "Multi-National Responses to Humanitarian Crises: A View from the Field." Dallas: Intertext Institute, October 18, 1993.

Dagne, Theodoros. "Somalia: War and Famine." *CRS Issue Brief*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Order No. IB92112. Updated September 23, 1992.

Damooei, Jamshid. "Analyzing Somalia's Past and Present Economic Constraints and Opportunities for Creating a Conducive Future Economic Environment." Paper presented to the 5th International Congress of Somali Studies, October 30, 1993, Worcester, MA.

Davies, Peter. "Memorandum: Somalia Assessment Conclusions." Washington, DC: InterAction, January 1993.

_____. "Letter to General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, from Davies, President, InterAction." Washington, DC: InterAction, November 19, 1992.

de Waal, Alex. "Somalia. The Shadow Economy." *Africa Report*, vol. 38, no. 2, March-April 1993, pp. 24-28.

_____ and Rakiya Omaar. "Can Military Intervention be 'Humanitarian'?" *Middle East Report*, March-June 1994, pp. 3-8.

_____. "Doing Harm by Doing Good? The International Relief Effort in Somalia." *Current History*, vol. 92, no. 574, May 1993, pp. 198-202.

_____. "Somalia: Adding 'Humanitarian Intervention' to the US Arsenal." *Covert Action*, vol. 44, Spring 1993, p. 4.

Dewey, Arthur E. "The Military's Role in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies." Paper presented to conference, Multilateral Responses to Humanitarian Crises, sponsored by the US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Research and Office of the Geographer. Washington, DC: October 20, 1993.

Dowden, Richard. "Western Troops Leave Somalia." *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, vol. 6 no. 2. March-April 1994.

Drysdale, John. *Whatever Happened to Somalia?* London: Haan Associates, 1994.

The Economist. "The Muddle in Somalia." *Economist* editorial, April 16, 1994.

_____. "Four Characters in Search of a Doctrine." *Economist*, October 2, 1993, p. 56.

_____. "Saving the People Who Should Not Be Starving." *Economist*, August 29, 1992, pp. 33-34.

Eliasson, Amb. Jan. "The Humanitarian Challenges for the UN: Lessons to be Learned from Bosnia and Somalia?" Address before the Foreign Policy Association. December 15, 1993, New York

_____. "Statement Read to the UN Economic and Social Council, Under Agenda Item 9, the Consideration of General Assembly Resolution 46/176 (Emergency Assistance for Humanitarian Relief and the Economic and Social Rehabilitation of Somalia)." July 21, 1992, the U.N., New York

_____. "Follow-up to Amb. Eliasson Interview [see below], October 6, 1992." Interview by *Africa Recovery*. Unofficial transcript. New York: October 6, 1992.

_____. "Interview with Amb. Jan Eliasson, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, New York, October 1, 1992. Unedited transcript." Interview by *Africa Recovery*. Unofficial transcript. New York: October 1, 1992.

Epstein, Susan B. "Somalia: Humanitarian Assistance Fact Sheet." *CRS Report for Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, Order No. 93-913-F, October 18, 1993.

Esa, Ahmed H. "Somalia's Political Misfortunes." *Somalia: A Historical, Cultural, and Political Analysis*. Barcik, Kim and Sture Normark, eds. Uppsala, Sweden: Life and Peace Institute. 1991.

Farah, Ahmed Yusuf, and I.M. Lewis. "The Roots of Reconciliation. A Summary of 'Peacemaking Endeavours of Contemporary Lineage Leaders: A Survey of

Grassroots Peace Conferences in North-West Somalia/Somaliland'." ActionAid Research Findings. London: ActionAid, December 1993.

Farer, Thomas. Testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee on "US Military Participation in UN Operations in Somalia: Roots of the Conflict with General Mohamed Farah Aideed and a Basis for Accommodation and Renewed Progress." Washington, DC: October 14, 1993.

_____. "The [Abridged] Report of an Inquiry, Conducted Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 837, into the June 5, 1993 Attack on UN Forces in Somalia." New York: U.N. Security Council, August 23, 1993. [Full report and annexes, S/26351, available at U.N. Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations, New York, Room S-3727.]

Fineman, Mark. "The Oil Stakes Factor in Somalia." *Los Angeles Times*. January 18, 1993.

Finucane, Aengus. "The Changing Roles of NGOs." Paper presented to New York symposium on "A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters." September 14-15, 1992.

"Focus - Anatomy of A Tragedy [Somalia]." Correspondents Charlayne Hunter-Gault et al. Transcript of December 2, 1992 MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour. Kansas City: Strictly Business, December 2, 1992, pp. 9-14.

Friedman, Thomas. "Good Intentions, but They Went Astray." *The New York Times*. October 11, 1993, p. 1.

Fromkin, David. "Don't Send in the Marines. Even with the Best in the World, It's not Isolationism to Avoid Quagmires." *New York Times Magazine*. February 27, 1994, p. 36.

Gallagher, Dennis, and Susan Forbes-Martin. "The Many Faces of the Somali Crisis: Humanitarian Issues in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, December 1992.

Ganzglass, Martin. "Evaluation of the Judicial, Legal, and Penal Systems of Somalia." Report funded by USAID for UNOSOM. Mogadishu: April 22, 1993.

Garvelink, William. "Memorandum: To James Kunder. Subject: Observations About the Future USG Strategy." Washington, DC: Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, September 21, 1992.

Gellman, Barton. "Somalia Hearing Examines Rejected Request for Armor. Senate Panel Revisits Ill-Fated Mogadishu Mission." *The Washington Post*, May 13, 1993, p. A40.

Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries. (Photocopied charts, updated, reproduced by Overseas Development Conference in December 3, 1993 conference report). Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Gersony, Robert. "Why Somalis Flee: Synthesis of Accounts in Northern Somalia by Somali Refugees, Displaced Persons and Others." Report for the Bureau of Refugee Programs, U.S. Department of State. Washington, DC: August 1989.

Gesheker, Charles L. "The Death of Somalia in Historical Perspective." Draft chapter for *Unity vs. Separatism in the Middle East*, ed. Mary E. Morris and Emile Sahilyeh. Stamford, CA: RAND Corporation, Middle East Study Group, November 12, 1993.

Gordon, Michael R. "US Officers Were Divided on Somali Raid." *The New York Times*. May 13, 1994, p. A8.

Greene, Stephen G. "In Africa's Horn, Plenty of Problems." *The Chronicle of Philanthropy*, April 19, 1994, p. 6.

Griffiths, Martin. "Sovereignty and Suffering." Paper presented to the Centre for Global Governance, September 27, 1993.

Grimmett, Richard F. "Somalia: Arms Deliveries." *CRS Report to Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Report No. 93-934-F, October 28, 1993.

Grunewald, Francois. "When the Rains Return...Emergencies, Food Assistance, Agricultural Rehabilitation, and Development." Paper prepared for International Committee of the Red Cross symposium, "Development: An Emergency!" Tassin-La-Demi-Lune, Grand Lyon, Switzerland, November 6, 1993.

Hansch, Steve, Scott Lillibridge, Grace Egeland, Charles Teller and Mike Toole. *Excess Mortality and the Impact of Health Interventions in the Somalia Humanitarian Emergency*. Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, August 1994.

- Harff, Barbara. "Bosnia and Somalia: Strategic, Legal, and Moral Dimensions of Humanitarian Intervention." *Philosophy and Public Policy*. MD: School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, vol. 12, no. 3/4, Summer/Fall 1992.
- Harsch, Ernest. "Somalia: Restoring Hope." *Africa Recovery Briefing Paper*, no. 7, January 15, 1993.
- Helander, Bernhard. "The Somali Family," in *Somalia: A Historical, Cultural, and Political Analysis*. Barcik, Kim, and Sture Normark, eds. Uppsala, Sweden: Life and Peace Institute, 1991.
- Hess, Stephen. "Crisis, Television, and Public Pressure." Paper presented at U.S. Department of State conference on Multilateral Responses to Humanitarian Crises, Washington, DC, October 20, 1993.
- Hill, Andrew B. "Acute Famine Still Stalks Somalia, UN Says." Reuters News Wire, March 23, 1993.
- Hillmore, Peter. "Last Throw for Somalia on a Wing and a Prayer." *The Observer*, March 21, 1993.
- Hoar, Joseph P. "Humanitarian Assistance Operations Challenges: The CENTCOM Perspective on Somalia." Manuscript draft. [1993]
- "Hope Restored in Somalia?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 91, Summer 1993, pp. 138-154.
- Humanitarian Monitor*. "Dossier: Somalia." June 1993.
- Hussein M. Adam. "Somalia: Militarism, Warlordism, or Democracy?" *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 54, 1992, pp. 11-26.
- InterAction. "Somalia: Situation Report." Various issues from 1992-93. Washington, DC: InterAction.
- _____. "Briefing on Somalia with Andrew Natsios." Washington, DC: InterAction, September 4, 1992.
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). "ICRC Activities in Somalia." Geneva. November 1993.
- _____. *1992 Annual Report*. Geneva: ICRC Publications, 1993.

_____. *1991 Annual Report*. Geneva: ICRC Publications, 1992.

Jean, Francois, ed. *Life, Death and Aid. The Medecins Sans Frontieres Report on World Crisis Intervention*. London and New York: Routledge, 1993.

Johnson-Thomas, Brian. "Grim Reaper In a Land of Plenty." *The Observer*, October 18, 1992.

Jonah, James O.C. "Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution." Presentation at conference sponsored by Humanitarianism Across Borders Program, Watson Institute for International Affairs, Brown University, December 10-11, 1992.

Kenya, Government and U.N. Assessment Mission. "[Report on] Somalia and Ethiopian Refugees in Kenya from January 19 to 27, 1992."

Kunder, James. "Memorandum: Transitions in [US] AID Somalia Program." Washington, DC: Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, April 14, 1993.

_____. "Statement as Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance before the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs." Washington, DC: February 17, 1993.

Lake, Anthony. "The Limits of Peacekeeping." *The New York Times*. Op-Ed. February 6, 1994, p. A2.

_____. "Yes to an American Role in Peacekeeping, but with Conditions." *International Herald Tribune* (reprint from *The New York Times*. 1994.)

Lalande, Serge. "Somalia: Major Issues for Future UN Peace-Keeping." Paper presented to the International Colloquium on New Dimensions of Peace-Keeping. Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, March 10-11, 1994.

Lederach, John Paul. "Mennonite Central Committee Efforts in Somalia/Somaliland: A Brief Overview." Typed manuscript. November 1993.

_____. "Ethical Dilemmas of Military Intervention in Disaster Relief, the Development of Cooperative Relationships and Implications for Long-Term Rehabilitation and Development." Typed document. June 12, 1993.

_____. "The Intervention in Somalia. What Should Have Happened. An Interview with John Paul Lederach." Interview by Joe Stork. *Middle East (MERIP) Report*. (March-April 1993), pp. 38-42.

- _____. "Toward a Sustainable Peace in Somalia." *Gospel Herald*. January 12, 1993.
- Leonard, Terry. "Somalia Losing Control." *Associated Press*. April 2, 1994.
- Lewis, Ioan M. "Making History in Somalia: Humanitarian Intervention in a Stateless Society." Unpublished essay. 1993.
- _____. "The Recent Political History of Somalia." *Somalia: An Historical, Cultural, and Political Analysis*. Barcik, Kim, and Sture Normark, eds. Uppsala, Sweden: Life and Peace Institute. 1991.
- _____. *A Modern History of Somalia*. 1965.
- Lorenz, F. M. "Law and Anarchy in Somalia." *Parameters*, US Army War College, vol. 23, no. 4 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 27-41.
- Lowery Derryck, Vivian. "Priming the Pump: Three Options for Somalia." Draft. Discussion paper no. 2, September 21, 1992.
- Lutheran World Federation. "Special Report. Emergency Operations [in] Nairobi, Kenya." 1993.
- Lyons, Terrence. "Crises on Multiple Levels: Somalia and the Horn of Africa." Draft chapter for *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal*, ed. Ahmed I. Samatar, ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming Spring 1994.)
- Makinda, Samuel M. *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia*. Boulder, CO and Covent Garden, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1993.
- _____. "Anarchy in Somalia." *Current Affairs Bulletin*, April 1992.
- Mateen, Fatimah A. "Farer Explores Lessons of Somalia." *Human Rights Brief*. Washington, DC: American University, Washington College of Law, vol. 1, no. 2, Summer 1994, p. 1.
- Maren, Michael. "Spinning Dunkirk: The Pentagon Quits Somalia." *The New Republic*, December 6, 1993, p. 18.
- _____. "Manna from Heaven? Somalia Pays the Price for Years of Aid." *Village Voice*, January 19, 1993.

McDonald, Glenn. "Peace-Enforcement in Somalia." Geneva: Cité Universitaire, March 2, 1994.

_____. "Casting Aside the White Man's Burden: Peace-Enforcement in Somalia." Geneva: Cité Universitaire, March 1994.

Menkhaus, Ken. "Getting Out vs. Getting Through: US and UN Policies in Somalia." *Middle East Policy*, no. 3 (1994), pp. 146-163.

_____, and Terrence Lyons. "What Are the Lessons To Be Learned from Somalia?" *Africa Notes*. Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, no. 144, January 1993.

Mertz, Helen Chapin, ed. *Somalia: A Country Study*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. May 1992; updated 1993.

Michaels, Marguerite. "Lemon Aid: How Somalian Relief Went Wrong." *The New Republic*. April 19, 1993, p. 16.

Milas, Seifulaziz, Abdul Mohammed and Gayle Smith. *The Challenges of Somalia and the Responsibility of UNICEF: "Opportunities for Shaping the Future."* Addis Ababa: Inter-Africa Group, September 1993.

Minear, Larry. *Humanitarianism Under Siege*. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1991.

_____. "Memorandum: Humanitarianism Under Siege in Somalia." November 1992.

_____ and Thomas Weiss. *Humanitarian Action in Times of War*. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.

Mishra, Satish. "Somalia: Finance and Economic Assessment Mission." Memorandum to U.S. Special Envoy Robert Gosende, USLO and Mark Wentling, USAID/Somalia. Nairobi: U.S. Agency for International Development, REDSO/ESA, August 30, 1993.

_____. "Follow-Up on Finance, Banking, and Economic Regeneration of Somalia." Memorandum to Amb. Robert Gosende, Mark Wentling, Adm. Jonathan Howe, and Hugh Cholmondeley. Nairobi: US Agency for International Development, REDSO/ESA, May 3, 1993.

Mullins, Lisa. "Trip Report: InterAction Assessment Trip to Southern Somalia, January 9-19, 1993." Washington, DC: InterAction.

Natsios, Andrew S. "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and US Policy." *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 1. (Winter 1994), pp. 129-144.

_____. "The Politics of Disasters." Unpublished paper. March 19, 1993.

_____. "Will Famine Return to Somalia?" *USA Today*. Opinion section. October 21, 1993, p. 11A.

_____. Interview by BBC Foreign Affairs Correspondent Peter Bailes of President Bush's Special Coordinator for Somalia Relief. September 14, 1992. [Transcript available from USAID's Bureau of External Affairs.]

_____. "Memorandum to IG Herbert L. Beckington with attachment of Somalia Sitrep 11. Subject: USAID Food and Non-Food Somalia Relief Activities." August 27, 1992.

Naureckas, James. "FAIR Research Memorandum: Media on the Somali Famine: Tragedy Made Simple." 1992.

Netherlands Foreign Ministry, Operations Review Unit. "Humanitarian Aid to Somalia," and "Case Studies." The Hague: May 18, 1994. [Confidential pending parliamentary review.]

Newsom, David D. "The Americans Who Didn't Leave Somalia." *The Christian Science Monitor*. Opinion/Essays section. April 27, 1993, p. 23.

Newsom, Valerie. "Public Opinion and US Involvement in Somalia." *US in World Affairs*, 33.583.01 (November 23, 1993).

Oakley, Robert. "What We Learned in Somalia." *The Washington Post*. March 20, 1994, p. C7.

_____. "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in New World Order: Update Somalia -- Lessons for Next Mission." General Graves Erskine Lecture: Marine Corps Command and Staff College Foundation. December 14, 1993.

_____. "An Envoy's Perspective." *JFQ Forum* (Autumn 1993), pp. 44-55.

- Oakley, Amb. Robert, and John Hirsch. "Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping." Draft manuscript [forthcoming book, fall of 1994]. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace.
- Oberdorfer, Donald. "Anatomy of a Decision: How Bush Made Up His Mind to Send Troops to Somalia." *The International Herald Tribune*. December 7, 1992.
- Ogundimu, Folu, and Jo Ellen Fair. "Before 'Hope Was Restored': News Media Portrayals of Somalia Prior to the US Intervention." Paper presented at the 36th annual meeting of the African Studies Association. December 4-7, 1993, Boston, MA.
- Olfert, Eric. "Letter to Peter Davies, InterAction President, from Mennonite Central Committee Co-Secretary for Africa." November 25, 1992.
- Omar A. Eno. "The Untold Apartheid in Somalia Imposed on Bantu/Jarar People." Paper presented to the 5th International Congress of Somali Studies. December 1993, Worcester, MA.
- Omaar, Rakiya, and Alex de Waal. "Military Intervention in Somalia: The Lessons to be Drawn." *African Rights*, Spring 1994.
- _____. "Somalia Update." *Peace and Democracy News* (Winter 1993/4).
- _____. "Somalia: See, the UN Relief System Doesn't Work." *The International Herald Tribune*, August 28, 1992.
- _____. "Somalia: At War with Itself," *Current History*, vol. 91, no. 565, May 1992, pp. 230-34.
- Organization of African Unity (OAU). Various press releases from 1992. OAU New York Office.
- Overseas Development Council (ODC). "Conflict Resolution, Humanitarian Assistance, and Development in Somalia: Lessons Learned." ODC Conference Report. Washington, DC: ODC, December 3, 1993.
- Pauling, Sharon, and John Prendergast. Letter on behalf of the Coalition for Peace in the Horn of Africa to President Bill Clinton Regarding Humanitarian Aid to Somalia. February 8, 1993. [Signatories include relevant professionals from the US, Canada, and Europe.]

Perlez, Jane. "Somalia Self-Destructs, and the World Looks on." *The New York Times*. December 29, 1991, p. E4.

_____. "Famine Threatens to Kill One-Third of Somalis." *The New York Times*, July 19, 1992.

Perrin, Pierre M. "Elementary Principals of Emergency Assistance." Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross. 1993.

Peterson, Carl M., and Daniel T. Barley. "Saving Somalia." *In These Times*. April 4, 1994, p. 28.

Pettengill, Tracey. "International Response to Famine in the post-Cold War Era: A Case Study of the Crisis in Somalia 1991-93." Senior Thesis. Dartmouth, NH: Dartmouth College, 1993.

Physicians for Human Rights, and Africa Watch. "Somalia. No Mercy in Mogadishu. The Human Cost of the Conflict and the Struggle for Human Rights." July 1992.

Prendergast, John. "'The Bones of Our Children Are Not Yet Buried': The Looming Spectre of Famine and Massive Rights Abuse in Somalia." Washington, DC: Center of Concern. January 1994.

_____. "US and UN Policy Hindering Peace in Somalia and Sudan." *Africa Report*, no. 118. November 1993.

_____. "New Approach Needed in Somalia." *Africa News*. April 1993, pp. 5-18.

_____. "This Report Update, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Kenya: Analysis of US Policy Options." Washington, DC: Center of Concern. February 26, 1993.

_____. "Give Diplomacy a Chance to Revamp Somalia." *The New York Times*. December 9, 1992.

_____. "Starving Off Hunger and Food Bandits in Somalia." *The Wall Street Journal*. September 17, 1992, p. A16.

_____. "Breakups Likely in Africa's Horn." *The Christian Science Monitor*. June 10, 1991.

Preston, Julia. "US Warns UN on Somalia. Mission Could Be Curtailed if Clans Don't Make Peace." *The Washington Post*. May 13, 1994, p. A40.

Press, Robert M. "Some Somalis Begin Trek Home." *The Christian Science Monitor*. October 27, 1992, p. 5.

Rawson, David. "Dealing with Disintegration: Donors and the Somali State, 1980-90." Paper presented to the 6th Michigan State University conference on northeast Africa, April 23-25, 1992.

_____. "US Assistance and the Somali State." Draft chapter of forthcoming book. Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute. 1993.

Raisson, Virginie, and Serge Manoncourt. "MSF (Medecins Sans Frontieres) - France en Somalie: Janvier 1991 - Mai 1993. Evaluation de la Mission. Rapport Definitif." Paris: Medecins Sans Frontieres, Fevrier 4, 1994.

Richburg, Keith B. "With Economy Still Devastated, Somalia Could See New Chaos." *The Washington Post*. March 14, 1994.

_____. "Aid Workers Under Fire in Somalia. Violence Increasing as Western Troops Prepare to Withdraw." *The Washington Post*. February 13, 1994, p. A27.

_____. "Somalia is Poised for War or Peace as Troops Plan Exit." *The Washington Post*. January 27, 1994.

_____. "UN Envoy for Somalia Resigns Post Blames Bureaucracy." *The Washington Post*. October 30, 1992.

_____. "Pest Amid Famine. In Somalia, News Crews Are on the Job and in the Way." *The Washington Post*. October 13, 1992, p. E1.

_____. "Relief Agencies in Africa: Corrupting and Corrupted." *International Herald Tribune*. September 22, 1992, p. 1.

Rudavsky, Shari. "Bush, UN Face Pressure to Aid War-Torn Somalia." *The Washington Post*. July 27, 1992.

_____. "The Hell Called Somalia." *The New York Times*. July 23, 1992.

- Sahnoun, Mohamed. "It's Difficult to Point to a Situation Where Armed Intervention Represented a Solution." Interview by Joseph Stork. *Middle East (MERIP) Report* (March-June 1994), pp. 28-33.
- _____. "Interview: Mohammed Sahnoun Reflects on His Experience Representing the UN in Somalia." Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace. 1993.
- _____. "Somalia: The Missed Opportunities." Draft manuscript [book forthcoming in late 1994]. Washington, DC: U.S. Peace Institute. 1993.
- _____. "Interview with Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia, Amb. Mohamed Sahnoun, 8 October 1992, by phone from Mogadishu. Unedited text." Unofficial transcript of interview by *Africa Recovery*, New York, October 8, 1992.
- Sapir, Debarati G. and Deconinck, Hedwig. "Somalia: The Paradox of International Humanitarian Assistance." Draft. Providence, RI: United Nations and Civil Conflicts Project, the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, March 1994.
- Scherer, Ronald. "Small Signs of Renewal in Somalia." *The Christian Science Monitor*. September 29, 1992.
- Schraeder, Peter J. "US Foreign Policy Toward Ethiopia and Somalia," in *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 114-88.
- Shalom, Stephen. "The Debate on Intervention. Arguments for and about the Anti-Interventionist Stance." *Z Magazine*. June 1994, pp. 21-34.
- Shields, Todd. "In Mogadishu's Paralyzed Port, Only Pigeons Are Moving." *The Washington Post*. December 5-6, 1992.
- Shiras, Peter. "The Lessons of Somalia." *Monday Developments*. Washington, DC: InterAction, April 11, 1994, p. 9.
- Shoumatoff, Alex. "The 'Warlord' Speaks." *The Nation*. April 4, 1994, p. 442.
- Simon, Sen. Paul. "Letter to President Bush Regarding Recent Trip to Somalia." *The Washington Post, P.S. Washington*, a weekly column. Week of May 16-22, 1993.

- Skoric, Dale. "Report on Airdrop Operation as Currently Undertaken by WFP in Somalia." September 5, 1992.
- Sloyan, Patrick J. "A Look at the Somalia Endgame. How the Warlord Outwitted Clinton's Spooks." *The Washington Post*. April 3, 1994, p. C3.
- Somali National Alliance. Statement. March 17, 1993.
- "Somalia Emergency Relief -- Lutheran World Federation's Airlift Operations, May 14, to November 1, 1992." *Somalia Update*. November 2, 1992.
- Somalia News Update*. "Commentary: The Rise and Fall of a SRSG." Africa News and Information Service [an e-mail news service]. May 18, 1994.
- Stedman, Stephen John. "The New Interventionists." *Foreign Affairs*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, vol. 72, no. 1 (1992/93), pp. 1-16.
- Stevenson, Jonathan. "Hope Restored in Somalia?" *Foreign Policy*, vol. 91, Summer 1993, pp. 138-154.
- Strobel, Warren. "Another Somalia Is Unlikely for US, Envoy Says." *The Washington Times*. December 18, 1993.
- Taylor, Wesley B. "Memorandum to Ambassador Brandon H. Grove, Jr., Director, Somalia Working Group, US Department of State. Subject: Somalia Working Group Briefings." February 22, 1993.
- Thomas, Jennifer S. "A Somalia Chronology." Defense and Foreign Policy Section, *Congressional Quarterly*. October 16, 1993, p. 2826.
- United Kingdom. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UKFCO). "Somali Clans and Their Political Role." UKFCO Research and Analysis Department Note, DD 1992/192. April 28, 1992.
- United Nations. Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA). "Information Report: Somalia." Geneva: UNDHA, various monthly issues during 1993-94.
- _____. "U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia. Covering the Period March 1, to December 31, 1993." March 11, 1994.
- _____. "Meeting Minutes: Monthly Meeting with InterAction NGOs." December 21, 1992.

_____. "Review of the 100-Day Action Programme and Beyond: Key Issues for Somalia." December 3, 1992.

_____. "Updated Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal." Special Emergency Program for the Horn of Africa. July - September 1992.

United Nations. Department of Public Information. "Press Release: Advisory Committee Recommends \$300 Million to Start Somalia Operation. Committee also Discusses Interim Offices in Former Soviet States and Peace-Keeping Reserve Fund." New York: News Coverage Service, GA/AB/2852. April 6, 1993.

_____. "Press Release: Security Council Authorizes Enforcement Action by UNOSOM II to Secure Humanitarian Relief Operations Throughout Somalia. Demands Full Compliance by All Parties with Cease-Fire, Disarmament Agreement." New York: News Coverage Service, SC/5573. March 26, 1993.

_____. "Press Release: International Donors Pledge Over \$130 Million for UN Relief and Rehabilitation Programme." New York: News Coverage Service, SOM/15, March 17, 1993.

_____. "Press Release: Adm. Jonathan Howe, US Appointed Special Representative of Secretary-General for Somalia, Effective March 9." New York: News Coverage Service, SG/A/533 BIO/2758 SOM/12. March 5, 1993.

_____. "Press Release: Security Council Committee Calls for Information on Violation of Mandatory Arms Embargo Against Somalia. Issues Appeal to Individuals and Organizations." New York: News Coverage Service, SC/5554 SOM/10. February 10, 1993.

_____. "Press Release: Fifth Committee Approves Spending of \$108 million on UN Operation in Somalia. Assembly also Asked to Authorize Commitments not Exceeding \$14 Million a Month after April Next Year." New York: News Coverage Service, GA/AB/2822. November 27, 1992.

_____. "Press Release: World Food Programme Ship Shelled in Mogadishu." New York: News Coverage Service, WFP/840. November 24, 1992.

_____. "Press Release: Fifth Committee Is Told UN Operations in Somalia Require about \$108 Million for Period Ending 30 April 1993. Members Receive Secretary-General's Report on UNOSOM Financing; ACABQ Chairman

Recommends Assembly Appropriation." New York: News Coverage Service, GA/AB/2820. November 24, 1992.

_____. "Press Release: Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations Address Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia." New York: News Coverage Service, IHA/463. October 13, 1992.

_____. "Press Release: Security Council Authorizes Deployment of Additional 3,000 Security Personnel to Facilitate Delivery of Relief Supplies in Somalia. Vote is Unanimous on Resolution 775." New York: News Coverage Service, SC/5461 (includes takes 1-2 of release). August 28, 1992.

_____. "Press Release: Security Council Authorizes UN Operation in Somalia. Asks Secretary-General to Deploy 50 Observers to Monitor Cease-Fire." New York: News Coverage Service, SC/5397 (includes takes 1-3 of release). April 24, 1992.

United Nations. Development Programme (UNDP). "Somalia Medium-Term Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Plan." UNOSOM informal donors consultation. Gigira, Kenya: UNEP. June 22, 1993.

United Nations. General Assembly (UNGA). "Financing of the UN Operation in Somalia II. Report of the Secretary-General." A/48/850. January 19, 1994.

_____. "Special Economic and Disaster Relief Assistance: Special Programmes of Economic Assistance." A/C.2/47/L.36/Rev.1. November 27, 1992.

_____. "Financing of the UN Operations in Somalia." A/47/607. November 2, 1992.

United Nations. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). "Kenya, Southern Somalia." *Information Bulletin*. Nairobi: UNHCR Public Information, May 1994.

_____. "Cross Border Operation, Southern Somalia." *Briefing Notes*. Nairobi: UNHCR Public Information. April 1994.

United Nations. International Childrens Fund. "UNICEF in Somaila. July to December 1993." Mogadishu: UNICEF-Somalia, 1994.

_____. "Situation Report — January 1994." UNICEF-Somalia, Mogadishu. 1994.

United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). *Situation Report*. Various dates, summer 1993.

_____. "Memorandum: Daily Situation Report [on Somalia]." From Adm. Jonathan Howe (Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mogadishu) to Kofi Annan (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, N.Y). April 23, 1993.

_____. "Memorandum(s): Daily Situation Report(s) [on Somalia]." From Amb. Kouyate to Kofi Annan. April 24-26, 1993.

_____. "Memorandum: Daily Situation Report [on Somalia]." From Amb. Kouyate to Amb. James Jonah. New York, April 27, 1993.

United Nations. Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (UNDPKO). "UN Peace-Keeping Operations. Information Notes." New York: UN Department of Public Information, No. DPI/1306/Rev.2, November 1993.

United Nations Radio. "The Tragedy in Somalia. Part II: Relief and Recovery." Written by Ann Marie Erb. Produced by Danielle Delalot. New York: UN Department of Public Information. *Perspective*, (transcript as broadcast) no. 41. October 7, 1992.

_____. "The Tragedy in Somalia. Part I: Guns vs. Food." Written by Ann Marie Erb. Produced by Danielle Delalot. New York: UN Department of Public Information. *Perspective* (transcript as broadcast), no. 40. September 30, 1992.

United Nations. Security Council (UNSC). "Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel which Led to Casualties Among Them." February 24, 1994.

_____. "Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 4 of Resolution 886 (1993)." S/1994/12. January 6, 1994.

_____. "Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 18 of Resolution 814 (1993)." S/26317. August 17, 1993.

_____. "Draft Resolution." S25472. March 26, 1993.

_____. "Resolution 814 (1991) Adopted by the Security Council at the 3188th Meeting, on March 26, 1993." S/RES/814 (1993). March 26, 1993.

- _____. "Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Operative Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992)." S/25354/Add.2. March 22, 1993.
- _____. "Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992)." S/25354. March 3, 1993.
- _____. "Letter Dated December 23, 1992 from the Charge d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the UN, Addressed to the President of the Security Council." S/25014. December 24, 1992.
- _____. "Letter Dated November 29, 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council." S/24868. November 30, 1992.
- _____. "Letter Dated November 24, 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council." S/24859. November 27, 1992.
- _____. "The Situation in Somalia. Report of the Secretary-General. Addendum." S/24480/Add.1. August 28, 1992.
- _____. "The Situation in Somalia. Report of the Secretary-General." S/24480. August 24, 1992.
- _____. "Addendum: The Situation in Somalia. Report of the Secretary-General. Consolidated Inter-Agency 90-Day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia." S/23829/Add.1. April 21, 1992.
- United Nations. Department of Public Information (DPI). "Reference Paper: The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia." No. 1321/Rev.1, April 30, 1993. New York: DPI, June 1993.
- United States Government. Agency for International Development (USAID). "USAID/OFDA Somalia Grants for FY 1992 & 1993." Updated by Jan Coffey. Washington, DC: USAID, October 15, 1993.
- _____. "Factsheet: Chronology of US Government Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia (as of September 1, 1993)." Washington, DC: USAID, Office of External Affairs, September 1, 1993.
- _____. "Humanitarian Relief and National Reconstruction in Somalia. Executive Summary." March 1, 1993.

_____. "Somalia: From Relief to Recovery." Nairobi: USAID Regional Economic Development Services Office/East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA). January 21, 1993.

United States Government. Army, Marine Corps, Combat Air Forces, and Navy. "Humanitarian Assistance: Multi-Service Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations." Draft of training manual, version 3. October 1993.

United States Government. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. "Markup on S.J. Res. 45. Authorizing the Use of US Armed Forces in Somalia." 103rd Cong., 1st sess. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, May 5, 1993.

_____. "The Crisis in Somalia." 102nd Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 17, 1992.

United States Government. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Africa. "Hearing: Recent Developments in Somalia." 103rd Cong., 1st sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 17, 1993.

_____. "Hearing: A Review of US Policy and Current Events in Kenya, Malawi, and Somalia." 102nd Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 23, 1992.

_____. "Markup on House Resolution (HR) 422., HR 5036, HR 5283, and HR 994. Concerning the Crisis in Somalia; to Establish a South African-American Enterprise Fund; to Preempt State and Local Sanction Measures Against Namibia; and, Liberian Relief, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction Act of 1991." 102nd Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 16, 1992.

_____. "Hearings: Current Situation in the Horn of Africa." 102nd Cong., 1st sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 14, and June 26, 1991.

United States Government. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs. "Hearing. The Horn of Africa: Changing Realities and US Response." 102nd Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 19, 1992.

_____. "Hearing. Emergency Situation in Zaire and Somalia." 102nd Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 5, 1992.

United States Government. Department of State (DOS). "Memorandum: Somalia Crisis -- the Refugee Dimension." Written by DOS Refugee Program Amb. Warren Zimmermann to Africa Bureau Amb. Robert Oakley. January 6, 1993.

United States Government. General Accounting Office (USGAO). "Peace Operations. Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Somalia." Washington, DC: USGAO, June 1994.

_____. "Peace Operations: Cost of the Department of Defense's Operations in Somalia." Washington, DC: USGAO, March 1994.

_____. "UN Peacekeeping. Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions." Washington, DC: USGAO, December 1993.

_____. "Department of Defense: Changes Needed to the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program." Washington, DC: USGAO, November 1993.

_____. "Report to the Chairman, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives: Foreign Disaster Assistance. [US]AID Has Been Responsive but Improvements Can Be Made." Washington, DC: USGAO, October 1992.

_____. "Famine in Africa: Improving Emergency Food Relief Programs." Report to the Administrator, Agency for International Development. Washington, DC: USGAO, 1986.

United States Government. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). *Somalia Situation Report (SITREP)*. Washington, DC: OFDA, various dates from mid-1992 through mid-1994.

_____. "Implementing the Addis Ababa Declaration of the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia. Plan of Action: January - June 1994." Washington DC: January 10, 1994.

_____. "Chronology of US Government Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia (as of September 1, 1993)." Washington, DC: OFDA, September 1, 1993.

_____. "Civilian/Military Involvement in International Humanitarian Interventions." Conference proceedings from symposium sponsored by Office of U.S. Foreign

Disaster Assistance (Prepared by Labat-Anderson, Inc). Washington, DC:
OFDA, May 26-27, 1993.

_____. "Draft Memorandum: DART/Mogadishu Emergency Relief Strategy."
From Bill Garvelink, OFDA/DRD, to Jim Kunder, D/OFDA. Washington, DC:
OFDA, January 1993.

_____. "US Government Relief and Rehabilitation Assistance to Northern
Somalia." Washington, DC: OFDA, November 12, 1992.

_____. *Annual Reports*. Washington, DC: OFDA, Fiscal Years 1988-1992.

United States Government. The White House. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on
Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." Presidential Decision Directive No.
25 (PDD-25). Washington, DC: The White House, May 1994.

U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP). "Special Report. Restoring Hope: The real
Lessons of Somalia for the Future of Intervention." Washington, DC:
USIP, July 1994.

_____. "Relief, Reconciliation, and Reconstruction in Somalia — Views of
Prominent Somalis." Report on study group meeting, November 18, 1992.
Washington, DC: USIP, December 8, 1992.

Visman, Emma. "Military 'Humanitarian' Intervention in Somalia." London: Save the
Children Fund-UK, December 3, 1993.

The Washington Post. "UN Envoy for Somalia Resigns Post, Blames Bureacracy."
October 30, 1993, p. 31.

_____. "Finally, Help for Somalia." Editorial. August 18, 1992.

_____. "The Sorrows of Somalia." Editorial. May 12, 1992.

Weiss, Thomas G. "Intervention: Whither the United Nations?" *The Washington
Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 1, 1993, pp. 109-128.

Wentling, Mark. "Aid Beyond the Front Lines in Somalia: An End-Of-Tour Wrap-Up."
Washington, DC: Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Department
of State, April 26, 1994.

Westcott, Jan. *The Somalia Saga, 1990-1993*. Personal account. Nairobi: January 1994.

Woollacott, Martin. "Why Rambo's Boot Has no Place on Somalia's Door." *Guardian Weekly*, December 12, 1992, p. 7.

World Bank. "Somalia. Framework for Planning of Long-Term Reconstruction and Recovery." Draft. Report of a Multi-Donor Task Force Consortium, coordinated by the World Bank, including: USAID, FAO, IMF, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, and NGOs. Washington, DC: World Bank, October 7, 1993.

Zartman, I. William. *Ripe for Resolution. Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Zenawi, Meles. Speech by Ethiopian President to December 1993 Humanitarian Aid Conference on Somalia. Official Transcript. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Zimmerman Herr, Judy, Robert Herr, and John Lapp. "Post-Cold War Challenges to the Nonviolent Movement." Paper prepared for discussion. Nyack, NY: Fellowship of Reconciliation, January 15, 1993.

PERIODICALS, NEWSPAPERS AND WIRE SERVICES

This study has drawn information from a variety of print and electronic news media and published periodical sources, including the following:

Africa Confidential (London)
Africa News
Africa News On-line Service (electronic news service)
Africa Recovery (U.N.)
Africa Report
Associated Press
Christian Science Monitor
Crosslines (Geneva)
The Economist (London)
Economist Intelligence Unit (London)
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Policy
GreenNet (electronic news service)
Horn of Africa Bulletin
The Independent (London)
International Herald Tribune
InterPress Service (electronic news service)
Los Angeles Times
Manchester Guardian (London)
Mennonite Central Committee News Service
Middle East Report
New Republic
National Catholic Reporter
New York Times
PeaceNet (electronic news service)
Reuters News Service
Somalia News Update (electronic news service)
U.N. Chronicle
UNOSOM II Weekly Review
United Press International
Village Voice
Washington Post
Womens Feature Service (electronic news service)
Z Magazine

RELIEF AGENCIES & NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to using published and unpublished materials from various agencies of the U.S. Government (especially AID, the BHR, FFP, OFDA and the Congressional Research Service), this study has drawn on annual and situation reports as well as unpublished material from the following U.N. agencies and relief and non-governmental organizations:

Africa Watch/Human Rights Watch — Washington, DC and New York
African Rights — London
Africare — Washington, DC
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) — Philadelphia
American Red Cross (ARC) — Washington, DC
CARE/USA — Atlanta
Catholic Relief Services — Baltimore
Church World Service/Lutheran World Relief (CWS/LWR) — New York and Washington, DC
European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) — Brussels
GOAL — Dublin
InterAction — Washington, DC
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) — Geneva
International Medical Corps (IMC) — Los Angeles
Inter-NGO Committee for Somalia (INCS) — London and Nairobi
International Rescue Committee (IRC) — New York
Irish Concern — Dublin
Medecins Sans Frontieres/France (MSF-France) — Paris
Medecins Sans Frontieres/Belgium (MSF-Belgium) — Brussels
Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) — Akron, OH
NGO Consortium — Mogadishu
OXFAM-UK — London
Save the Children Federation-US (SCF-US) — Westport, CT
Save the Children Fund-UK (SCF-UK) — London
SOS Kinderdorf International — [Germany]
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) — New York
United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) — Geneva and New York
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) — Geneva
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I & II) — New York and Mogadishu
World Concern — Seattle
World Food Program (WFP) — Rome
World Vision Relief & Development (WVRD) — Washington, DC and Monrovia, CA

List of People Interviewed

SOMALIA HUMANITARIAN AID STUDY
List of People Interviewed

| Name (first, last) | Position Held During Somalia Intervention | Organization |
|--------------------------|---|---|
| Ali Abdouille | Director | Int'l Committee for the Development of Peoples (CISP), Mogadish |
| Hussein M. Adam | Professor | College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA |
| Abdi Rashid Mohamed Aden | Field Director | Somalia Urban Rural Development Organization, Baidoa |
| Kwame Afriyie | Head, Desk 3, Regional Bureau for Africa | UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva |
| Jacob Akol | Director of Communications, Africa Region | World Vision Relief & Development, Nairobi |
| Thomas Alcedo | Director, Emergency Assistance Unit | CARE/USA |
| Lisa Alfred | Legislative Director, Subcommittee on African Affairs | US Senate |
| Carol Andersen | Director, Emergency Assistance | CARE/USA |
| Kofi Annan | Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping | United Nations |
| Nancy Aossey | President and Chief Executive Officer | International Medical Corps |
| Hassan Ben Baha | Representative | Catholic Relief Services, Baidoa |
| Robert Baldwin | Director, International Liaison Div., Int'l Health Program Office | US Centers for Disease Control |
| Johan Balslev | Secretary for Emergency Projects | Lutheran World Federation |
| Col. Perry Baltimore | Chief, Middle East/Africa Division | Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon |
| Pat Banks | Humanitarian Affairs Division | UNOSOM |
| Amb. Charles Baquet | US Ambassador to Djibouti | US Department of State |
| Mikel Barfod | Coordinator, Director's Office | European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), Brussels |
| Hassan Bashy | Director | Ashar Wanle Relief & Rehabilitation Agency, Baidoa |
| David Bassiouni | Director, Somalia Programs | UNICEF |
| | Humanitarian Aid Coordinator | UNOSOM I |
| Douglas Bennet | Asst Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs | US Department of State |
| Robert Berg | Consultant to UN; President | International Development Conference |
| Amb. James Bishop | US Ambassador to Somalia | US Department of State |
| Amb. Richard W. Bogosian | US Special Envoy to Somalia | US Department of State |
| Deborah Bolton | Deputy Director, Political and Military Affairs | US Department of State |
| Mrs. Zeinab Haji Boracco | Chair | Somali Women's Organization, Mogadishu |
| Ann Borseth | Senior Evaluator | US Government Accounting Office |
| Nan Borton | Director | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Jean-Herve Bradol | Desk Officer | Medecins Sans Frontieres |
| Poul Brandrup | Senior Consultant | UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva |
| Rony Brauman | President | Medecins Sans Frontieres |

List of People Interviewed

| | | |
|-------------------------|---|---|
| Matt Bryden | Consultant | Canadian Government and UNDP |
| Ciunas Bunworth | Deputy Director, Africa Division | Irish Concern |
| Brent Burkholder, MD | International Health Program Office | US Centers for Disease Control-Tech Svc's Div |
| President George Bush | Former U.S. President | United States of America (by letter) |
| Carol Capps | Director, Washington Office | Church World Service |
| Major D.P. Carr | Operations | CENTCOM |
| Robert Chase | Assistant Executive Director | UN World Food Programme |
| Hugh Cholmondeley | Humanitarian Operations Coordinator | UNOSOM II |
| Stylianos Christopoulos | Desk Officer, Somalia | European Commission Humanitarian Office, Brussels |
| James Clancy | Correspondent | Cable News Network (CNN), Mogadishu |
| Lance Clark | Chief, Special Emergency Program for the Horn of Africa | UN Dept. of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva |
| Walter Clarke | Deputy Chief of Mission | US Liaison Office, Mogadishu |
| Jeffrey Clark | Consultant | US Committee for Refugees |
| Richard Clarke | Special Assistant to the President for Global Affairs | US National Security Council |
| Richard Cobb | Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa | US Agency for International Development |
| Jan Coffey | Somalia Project Officer | US Agency for International Development |
| Herman Cohen | Assistant Secretary of State for Africa | US Department of State |
| Frederick Cole | Program Analyst, Program and Planning Evaluation | USAID, Bureau for Food & Humanitarian Assistance |
| James Collins | Office of Project Services, Africa | UN Development Programme |
| Maj. Pat Collins | Joint Task Force Liaison Officer | US Liaison Office, Mogadishu |
| Captain Kurt Conrad | Intelligence Directorate | CENTCOM |
| Amb. Frances Cook | Deputy Asst Secretary of State for Political/Military Affairs | US Department of State |
| Frederick Cuny | President, InterTect; Consultant | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Hussain Dahir | Director | Red Crescent, Baidoa |
| Jamshid Damooei | Consultant | UN Development Programme, NY |
| Peter Davies | President | InterAction |
| Peter Delahaye | Senior Internal Auditor | UNICEF |
| Alex de Waal | Co-Director | African Rights, London |
| Arthur (Gene) Dewey | Consultant | UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs |
| Thomas Dolan | DART/Nairobi Deputy Team leader | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| | Acting Assistant Director, Disaster Response Division | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| | Staff, Africa Bureau | US Agency for International Development |
| William Douglas | Regional Manager, East Africa Unit | CARE/USA |
| Jeanne Downen | Legislative Director, Subcommittee on African Affairs | US Senate |
| Adwoa Dunn-Mouton | Research Staff | Center for Naval Analysis |
| Jonathan Dworkin | Somalia Field Representative | Catholic Relief Services |
| Michael D'Adamo | Under-Secretary-General | UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs |
| Amb. Jan Eliasson | Information Officer, Horn of Africa | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Dina Esposito | | |

List of People Interviewed

| | | |
|--------------------------------|--|--|
| Amb. Robert Houdek | Deputy Asst Secretary of State for Africa | US Department of State |
| Adm. Jonathan Howe | Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General | UNOSOM II |
| Dr. Willi Huber | Regional Dir., East Africa & Chief, Emergency Support Service | SOS-Kinderdorf International, Nairobi and Mogadishu |
| Abdi Abdullahi Hussein | Program Coordinator, Mogadishu | Save the Children Federation/US |
| Cmdr. Steve Ingalsbe | Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Political & Military Affairs | US Department of State |
| Faduma Isaak | Director | Family Life Center, Baidoa |
| Mohamoud M. Issak | Deputy Director | Ashar Wanle Relief & Rehabilitation Agency, Baidoa |
| Patricia Irvin | Deputy Asst Secretary for Humanitarian and Refugee Affrs | US Department of Defense |
| Mohamoud Jama | Director | Somalia Urban Rural Development Organization, Baidoa |
| Philip Johnston | President and Chief Executive Officer | CARE/USA |
| | Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator for Somalia | UNOSOM I |
| James Jonah | Under-Secretary-General, Political Affairs. Africa & Middle East | United Nations |
| Abdi Karim | Physician | Regional Basic Health Unit, North Mogadishu |
| Anne Kellerman | International Organization Affairs | US Department of State |
| Col. Kevin Kennedy | Civilian-Military Operations Center | UNITAF |
| | Deputy Director, Humanitarian Division | UNOSOM II |
| M. A. Khan | Administrator | CARE/USA, Mogadishu |
| Beatrice Killen | Relief Worker | Irish CONCERN, Baidoa |
| Melinda Kimble | Dep. Asst. Secretary for International Organization Affairs | US Department of State |
| Amb. Ismat Kittani | Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Somalia | United Nations |
| Lt. Col. Rajesh Kochhar | Commanding Officer, Indian Army | UNOSOM II, Baidoa |
| James Kunder | Director | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| | Vice President | Save the Children Federation/US |
| Charles Lamuniere | Deputy to the Under Secretary-General | UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva |
| Lauren Landis | DART Team member, Kismayo | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| | Staff to Somalia Task Force | InterAction |
| Lt. Col. Rebecca A. Layne | Intelligence Directorate | CENTCOM |
| Jennifer Leaning, M.D. | Consultant | Physicians for Human Rights |
| John-Paul Lederach | Professor | Eastern Mennonite College |
| Andreas Lendorff | Head, Relief General Division | International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva |
| Brig.-Gen. Abucar Liban (ret.) | Independent consultant | |
| Ron Libby | DART Operations Officer, Mombasa; Team member, Baidoa | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Brig.-Gen. Frank Libutti | Commander, Joint Task Force/Operation Provide Relief | CENTCOM |
| Scott Lillibridge | Epidemiologist | US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention |
| Marc Lindenberg | Senior Vice President, Program Division | CARE/USA |
| Elizabeth Lindenmayer | Principal Officer | UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations |
| Geoff Loane | Deputy Head, East Africa Regional Delegation | International Committee of the Red Cross, Nairobi |
| Robert Loftus | Deputy Director for International Organization Affairs | US Department of State |

List of People Interviewed

| | | |
|--------------------------|---|--|
| Marc Gastellu Etchegorry | Joint Director, Operations | Medecins Sans Frontieres |
| Abdulahim Farah | Former Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs | United Nations |
| Thomas Farer | Political Advisor to Adm. Howe | UNOSOM II |
| Kate Farnsworth | DART/Mogadishu Team leader; Senior Regional Advisor for Africa, Disaster Response Div. | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Susan Farnsworth | Country Director for Somalia | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Carrol Faubert | Representative | CARE/USA |
| Michael Feldstein | Special Assistant, Office of the Deputy Administrator | UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Kenya |
| Michelle Flournoy | Principal Director for Strategy, Strategy & Requirements Div. | US Agency for Int'l Development |
| John Fox | Political Officer for Somalia | US Department of Defense |
| Thomas Fox | Chair | US Embassy , Mogadishu and Nairobi |
| George Frederick | Refugee Officer | USAID Advisory Comm. on Voluntary Foreign Aid |
| Thomas Frey | DART/Nairobi Deputy team leader | US Liaison Office, Mogadishu |
| Martin Ganzglass | Consultant on Somalia judicial and police systems | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| William Garvelink | Assistant Director for Operations; DART/Mogadishu leader Currently Deputy Director, Office of the Director | UNOSOM II |
| Thomas Getman | Director, Government Relations | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Joseph Gettier | Office of Food For Peace, Africa Division; formerly OFDA staff | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Victor Ghebali | Professor | World Vision Relief and Development, Washington, DC Office |
| Edward Girardet | Editor, Crosslines; Correspondent | US Agency for International Development |
| Amb. April Glaspie | Political Advisor | Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva |
| Ricki Gold | Somalia Desk Officer | Christian Science Monitor & MacNeil-Lehrer |
| Amb. Robert Gosende | US Special Envoy to Somalia | UNOSOM II |
| James Grant | Executive Director | USAID, Africa Bureau |
| Andrew Gray | DART member/Mogadishu | US Department of State |
| Paul Grossrieder | Deputy Director of Operations | UNICEF |
| Col. Craig D. Hackett | CCJS-Plans (Somalia) | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Anis Haider | Bureau Manager, Horn of Africa | International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva |
| David Halsted | Deputy Director, Somalia Operations Center | CENTCOM |
| Jim Harden | Water Specialist | UN World Food Programme |
| Amanda Harding | Somalia Desk Officer | US Department of State |
| Maj. Mark Haskell | Political Advisory Office | Catholic Relief Services, Baidoa |
| Mohammed el Hadi Hassan | Somalia Program Officer | European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), Brussels |
| Bernhard Helander | Assistant Professor, Department of Cultural Anthropology | CENTCOM |
| Amb. Smith Hempstone | US Ambassador to Kenya | Catholic Relief Service, Baidoa |
| Roy Herrmann | Senior Repatriation Officer | University of Uppsala, Sweden |
| John Hirsch | Political Advisor | US Department of State |
| Jack Hjelt | Deputy Mission Director | UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Addis Ababa |
| | | UNITAF |
| | | USAID, Somalia |

List of People Interviewed

| | | |
|-----------------------|--|--|
| Steve Loegering | Country Representative, Somalia | Catholic Relief Services, Nairobi |
| Thomas Longstreth | Deputy Asst. Secretary for Strategic Requirements & Resource | US Department of Defense |
| Liz Lukasavich | DART member, Mogadishu | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Terrence Lyons | Research Associate | Brookings Institution |
| Charles MacCormack | President | Save the Children Federation/US |
| Lt. Col. Bruce Mackey | DOD Military Liaison to DART/Nairobi | CENTCOM |
| Dawn MacRae | Country Director, Somalia | International Medical Corps, Nairobi |
| John Marks | Project Officer | USAID Somalia Program |
| | Humanitarian Officer | UNOSOM I |
| Major Mike Marletto | Ground Operations | CENTCOM |
| Dominique Martin | Program Director for Somalia | Medecins Sans Frontieres |
| Marino Martin | General Division for Cooperative Development | Italian Ministry of External Affairs |
| Philippe Maughan | Technical Assistant, Somalia Unit | European Union |
| Dayton Maxwell | Deputy Director | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Kim Maynard | DART Member, Belet Wayne | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Geoffrey May | Director | Catholic Relief Services, Geneva |
| | Chair | Ecumenical Liaison Committee for Assistance to Somalia, Geneva |
| John Egan McAteer | Refugee Coordinator | US Embassy, Addis Ababa |
| Richard McCall | Chief of Staff | US Agency for International Development |
| John McCallin | Coordinator, Horn of Africa | UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva |
| Peter McDermott | Senior Program Officer, Emergency Programs | UNICEF |
| Glenn McDonald | Graduate Student | Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva |
| Stevenson McIlvaine | Deputy Chief of Mission | US Liaison Office, Mogadishu |
| Johannes Mengesha | Senior Advisor | UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs |
| Kenneth Menkhaus | Political Advisor | UNOSOM II |
| Helena Meyer | Staff | Lutheran World Federation, Geneva |
| Paul Miller | Desk Officer, Africa Region; formerly Somalia country director | Catholic Relief Services |
| Lt. Col. Jason Mims | DOD Military Liaison to DART/Nairobi | CENTCOM |
| Larry Minear | Co-director, Humanitarianism and War Project | Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University |
| Peter Miovic | Lead Economist, Eastern Africa | World Bank |
| Marguerite Mitchell | Correspondent | Time Magazine |
| Tetsuo Miyabara | Project Manager | US General Accounting Office |
| Abdul Mohammed | President and Publisher | The Humanitarian Monitor/Inter-Africa Group |
| Amb. Jonathan Moore | US Rep. to ECOSOC & Alt. Rep., Special Political Affairs | US Mission to the United Nations |
| Lisa Mullins | Staff to Disaster Response Committee for Somalia | InterAction |
| Clark Murdoch | Deputy to Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning | US Department of Defense |
| Hussein Mursal | Advisor, Somalia Program | Save the Children Fund, UK |
| Tun Myat | Director, Transport & Logistics Division | UN World Food Programme, Rome |

List of People Interviewed

| | | |
|-----------------------|--|--|
| Andrew Natsios | Director Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Food & Humanitarian Affairs Vice President | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance US Agency for International Development World Vision Relief & Development, Washington, DC |
| Michael Nearing | President | Avior |
| David Neff | Director, Somalia Program | CARE/USA |
| Amy Nelson | Program Officer, Bureau of Population, Refugees & Migration | US Department of State |
| Joyce Neu | Associate Director, Conflict Resolution Programs | The Carter Center |
| Valerie Newsom | DART-Mombasa member; currently Disaster Response Officer | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Nigel Nisbet | Monetization Specialist | CARE/USA, Mogadishu |
| William Novelli | Chief Operating Officer | CARE/USA |
| Amb. Mahmoud Nur | Former Ambassador of Somalia to the US | Government of Somalia |
| Zahra Mohamed Nur | Staff | Concern, Baidoa |
| Amb. Robert Oakley | US Special Envoy to Somalia | US Department of State |
| Dee O'Connell | Deputy Program Officer for Africa | Save the Children Fund/UK |
| Stefania Pace | Country Representative, Somalia | Int'l Committee for the Development of Peoples (CISP/Italy) |
| Susan Palmer | Coordinator, Conflict Resolution Program | The Carter Center |
| Lt. Col. Frank Panter | Logistics and Section Assistant | CENTCOM |
| Basile Papadopoulos | Director, Horn of Africa Unit | European Community Development Commission, Brussels |
| Charles Petrie | Emergency Specialist, Humanitarian Affairs Division | UNOSOM II |
| David Pierce | Director, Somalia Operations Center | US Department of State |
| Joseph Ponte | DART/Nairobi Information Specialist | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Gen. Colin Powell | Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff | US Department of Defense |
| John Prendergast | Research Associate on Africa | Center of Concern |
| Betsy & Robert Press | Correspondents | Christian Science Monitor |
| Ali Abdul Rahman | President | Somalia Urban Rural Development Organization, Baidoa |
| Angela Raven-Roberts | Director, Horn of Africa, Emergency Operations | UNICEF |
| Carolyn Reynolds | Staff member, Subcommittee on African Affairs | US Senate |
| Lois Richards | Former Country Director, Somalia Mission Deputy Assistant Administrator for BHR | US Agency for International Development US Agency for International Development |
| Keith Richburg | Correspondent for East Africa | Washington Post |
| Steven Rifkind | Director, Somalia | Save the Children Fund, UK |
| Barry Rigby | Deputy Director | UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Addis Ababa |
| Iqbal Riza | Assistant Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping | United Nations |
| Mario Rodriguez | Project Director | World Vision Relief and Development |
| Marian Rose | Administrator/Finance Officer | International Medical Corps, Somalia |
| Rene Roudaut | Chef du Service, Action Humanitaire | French Foreign Ministry |
| Jean-Christophe Rufin | Counselor | Ministry of Defense, France |
| B. B. Saha | Staff | CARE/USA, Mogadishu |

List of People Interviewed

| | | |
|---------------------------|---|--|
| Amb. Mohamed Sahnoun | Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General | United Nations |
| Harald Schmid de Grunneck | Head of Div., Communications & External Resources Dept. | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| Sylvia Schollbrock | Staff | United Nations Development Programme |
| Peter Schumann | Resident Representative, Somalia | UN Development Programme |
| Darrell Sexstone | Staff | European Commission Humanitarian Office, Brussels |
| Georgia Shaver | Somalia Desk Officer | UN World Food Programme |
| Annette Sheckler | Special Assistant to the Chief Operating Officer | CARE/USA |
| Amb. David Shinn | Chair, Somalia Working Group; Dir., East Africa Office | US Department of State |
| Peter Shiras | Director, Public Policy Liaison | Catholic Relief Services |
| Amb. Mario Sica | Italian Ambassador to Somalia | Foreign Affairs Ministry of Italy |
| Gayle Smith | Consultant | US Agency for International Development, Addis Ababa |
| David Smock | Director of Grants | US Institute of Peace |
| Andrew Sokiri | Deputy Director, Regional Bureau for Africa | UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva |
| Kate Solon | Political Officer | US Liaison Office, Mogadishu |
| Julia Taft | President | InterAction |
| Jean-Daniel Tauxe | Delegate General for Africa | International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva |
| Charles Teller | Director, Food and Nutrition Division | The Pragma Corporation |
| Andrew Timpson | Programme Officer for Africa | Save the Children Fund, UK |
| Andrew Toh | Chief, Logistics Division | UN World Food Programme |
| Michael J. Toole, M.D. | Medical Epidemiologist, International Health Program Office | US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention |
| Sam Toussie | Emergency Program Officer | International Medical Corps |
| Saadia Touval | Visiting Fellow | US Institute of Peace |
| Edward Tsui | Chief, Office of the Under Secretary-General | UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs |
| Brigitte Vasset | Joint Director, Operations | Medecins Sans Frontieres |
| Patrick Vial | Country Director | Medecins Sans Frontieres |
| Peter Vroomin | Political Advisor | US Liaison Office, Mogadishu |
| Col. John Wahlquist | US Air Force Military Advisor | US Liaison Office, Mogadishu |
| Brian Wannop | Resident Representative for Somalia | UN Development Programme |
| Paul Webber | Staff | European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), Brussels |
| Willet Weeks | Director, Horn of Africa Program | Save the Children Federation/US |
| Mark Wentling | Director, Somalia Mission | US Agency for International Development |
| Jan Westcott | Somalia Emergency Aid Coordinator | Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| Jamie Wickens | Chief, Emergency Support Services | UN World Food Programme |
| Col. William Witlow | DRSA Officer for Africa, Political & Military Affairs | US Department of State |
| Amb. Frank Wisner | Under-Secretary of State for International Security Affairs | US Department of State |
| | Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy | US Department of Defense |
| Alexandras Yannis | Technical Advisor, Somalia Aid Coordination Body | European Commission |
| Maj.-Gen. Anthony Zinni | Commandant, US Marine Combat Development Command | US Marine Corps |

**BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF SOMALIA CRISIS
& INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES, 1990-1994**

| | <u>MILITARY/SECURITY</u> | <u>POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC</u> | <u>HUMANITARIAN</u> | <u>OTHER</u> |
|-------------|--|--|---|--|
| <u>1990</u> | | | | |
| Sept | Civil war spreads southward toward Mog. following failed call for national reconciliation in May | Little dipl. initiative despite July plea by Inter-Africa Group for UN to engage in shuttle diplomacy | UN withdraws staff from Mog and south (after withdrawal from NW in May) | Ethiopian govt control erodes under rebel attacks; USSR crumbles; US deploys troops in Gulf after Iraq's July 2 invasion of Kuwait |
| Nov-Dec | Civil war reaches Mog; hijackings, shootings of NGO staff become common; embassy staff begin evacuations as street warfare intensifies | | Dec. rains fail for 2nd time, reducing food harvest | |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| <u>1991</u> | | | | |
| Jan | US/other embassies, NGOs evacuate staff; Barre flees, pursued by Aidid forces | USC seizes Mog; Ali Mahdi declares self interim pres., laying ground for inter-clan conflict | MSF, ICRC pull out but quickly return; warfare in fertile south lowers food stocks | Operation Desert Storm begins, drastically cutting flow of Gulf remittances to Somalia |
| Mar-Apr | Aidid advances toward Mog to oppose Ali Mahdi | Mar. Djibouti peace conf. fails to reach agreement | USC-SPM fighting in south disrupts food harvest; Cohen declares civil strife emerg. in Somalia, allowing OFDA to respond | Operation Provide Comfort launched in No. Iraq (model for UNITAF); new unrest in Yugoslavia; cyclones in Bangladesh |
| May | | Somaliland declares indep., complicating negos; dipl. efforts by Egypt, Italy, Conference of Islamic Organizations | UN issues emerg. appeal for Afr., including Somalia | |
| June-July | Armed clashes in Juba region | June Djibouti mtg outcome rejected by USC; US Senate asks Bush to facilitate negos; July Nbi mtg chaired by Moi fails; July Djibouti mtg calls for ceasefire, interim govt | Food prod. in Juba area drops from fighting; FAO reports declining food stocks; OFDA begins emergency aid to Somalia | |
| Aug-Oct | Intensified Aidid-Ali Mahdi fighting in Mogadishu | Ali Mahdi appoints interim govt without Aidid concurrence, sharpening tensions | UN staff authorized to return to Mog in Aug. but leave in Sept-Oct after 3 local staff killed; UN issues special appeal for Horn; ICRC/Natsios warn of massive deaths | Coup attempt in USSR fails |
| Nov-Dec | Aidid launches all-out attack on Ali Mahdi forces in Mog which continues 2 months | UN, OAU renew dipl. efforts in Dec.; ICRC/Natsios criticize UN inaction | 30,000 casualties in two months strain medical facilities; UNICEF allowed to return to Mog. (1st UN agency to do so) | US launches emergency food airlift to NIS |

MILITARY/SECURITY

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC

HUMANITARIAN

1992

Jan-Mar Barre forces advance on Mog., sparking new fighting

April-May Barre forces repulsed, flee to Kenya and into exile; fighting recedes in Mog but continues elsewhere; Aidid takes Kismayu, other areas of south, isolating Ali Mahdi

June-Aug Widespread looting of food convoys in and outside Mog

Sept-Oct 500 Pak peacekeepers arrive, limited to airport; upsurge in banditry as NGOs/journalists become attractive targets; seizure of Bardera by pro-Barre forces

Nov-Dec WFP ship shelled in Mog port as looting/extortion continue to rise; Bush orders UNITAF deployment; US troops land Dec. 9, soon secure Mog & several interior towns

UN's Jonah visits Mog, makes limited progr.; Feb. Aidid/Ali Mahdi mtg in NYC lays basis for UN-brokered ceasefire signed in March.

UN Res. approves 50 peacekeeping observers and 500 security personnel to protect operations in Mog area (UNOSOM I); UNSG appoints Sahnoun to negotiate their acceptance & mediate Somali conflict

Factions agree to deploy UN observers; NYT article, Hempstone cable, Kassebaum trip ignite public/Congr. pressures to respond; UN Res. approves expanding UNOSOM to 3500 troops & 719 support personnel, to be deployed across country

Sahnoun dismissed by UNSG after publicly criticizing slow UN response; Aidid-Ali Mahdi tensions rise; USG discusses possible intervention

UNSC approves UNITAF, invoking Chapter 7 for first time in civil conflict; at Addis relief conf., Som. civil society groups urge reconciliation

Dec/Jan rains fail again; ICRC says 4 mn at risk, makes first large food aid agreement with FFP; Natsios tells Cong. Somalia is "world's worst humanitarian crisis"; UNICEF expat worker killed, sparking new NGO exodus; first UN humanitarian coordinator for Som. appointed in March; WFP & UNICEF begin airlifting suppl. food into Somalia

FAO reports Som food prod. 37% of normal; NGOs withdraw from Mog due to rising violence; factions agree at May mtg in Eth. to assist relief efforts; 1st WFP ocean shipment of food since 11/91 arrives

CDC suggests famine worst in history; Baidoa described as "epicenter of death"; Bush authorizes food airlift using US military

Oct. Geneva donor's mtg launches 100-day plan of action; NGOs boost efforts; seizure of Bardera halts relief flows in area & deaths rise

UNICEF/CDC surveys reveal third of child deaths in famine due to measles, hastening vaccination campaign; good rains and aid begin to lower mortality rates in some areas

1993

Jan-Feb Attacks on food convoys ease as UNITAF deploys further inland, confronts Barre ally near Kismayu but then allows him to occupy; violence in Mog/Kismayu rises again in Feb.

Mar-April Attacks on NGOs rise

May US hand-over to UN as UNITAF becomes UNOSOM II; Omar Jeas retakes Kismayu; pro-Aidid radio boosts anti-UN rhetoric

Somalis protest against UNSG in Mog and at Addis signing of ceasefire agreement; UN presses US to disarm Somalis by force; US efforts to plan handover to UNOSOM II delayed by UNSG

Factions sign Addis Ababa Agreement to set up Transitional Natl Council, local councils & to disarm within 90 days; UNSC Res. establishes UNOSOM II with broader mandate; planning for handover begins

UN tries to control, then prevent Aidid-initiated Galsayo peace talks; UN begins efforts to set up local/regional councils

Expat relief workers killed in Bardera, Afgoi, Bossaso, sparking new NGO concerns; at same time many new NGOs arrive to help

1993 appeal launched at Addis conf.; MSF begins withdrawal (believes relief phase over & too many compromises required); other NGOs begin rehab. efforts; OFDA leaves end April, replaced by AID mission

More people displaced by Kismayu fighting as many foreign NGOs leave

165

MILITARY/SECURITY

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC

HUMANITARIAN

June-July 24 Pakistani soldiers killed by Aidid forces; UN calls for his arrest, launches controversial attacks aimed at Aidid; high Somali casualties spark more fighting

UN reconciliation efforts suspended for next 4 months; creation of local/regional councils proceeds fitfully

NGOs denounce UN strategy as abandoning humanitarian focus, counterproductive; many join AID in evacuating Mog.; relief activities cut back in Mog. but some increase in rural areas

Aug-Sept UNOSOM/US casualties rise; US deploys Special Forces to try to capture Aidid; several UN, NGO houses raided by mistake

Ethiopian Pres. seeks reconciliation; Aidid appeals to Jimmy Carter to intercede; US Admin. begins internal questioning of UNOSOM strategy

NGO insecurity on rise in Mog. as conflict between UN and Aidid forces intensifies; many more leave

October 18 US Rangers killed following attack on Aidid forces after UN drops efforts to arrest Aidid, his forces declare ceasefire

US announces new policy despite opposition from UNSG, appoints Oakley to seek end to conflict; Ethiopian, Eritrean, Egyptian leaders launch initiatives

AID re-evacuated to Nairobi from Mog.

Nov-Dec UNOSOM troops pull back from active patrolling, adopt mainly defensive posture; US Cong. votes to pull US troops out by March 31; several other countries soon follow suit

Oakley arranges for Aidid to fly to Addis peace meeting in US plane; despite special efforts by Zenawi, peace agreement proves elusive; UN sets up Commission of Inquiry into June 5 incident & its aftermath

Attacks on expats, NGO offices slowly increase; donors create new aid structure, set new conditions on continuing assistance; 1.6 mn Somalis still displaced, 1 mn "highly vulnerable", but harvests back to 50 percent of normal

1994

Jan-Feb While some inter-clan conflicts in abeyance, fierce Feb. battles in Kismayu force many to flee

UN releases last of pro-Aidid detainees, cuts back UNOSOM mandate and maximum troop level, re-initiates reconciliation efforts by UN envoy Kouyate

NGOs withdraw expat staff as lawlessness and donor disinterest grow

Mar-April US pulls troops out of UNOSOM and Somalia; inter-clan fighting rises again

New peace talks in Addis result in agreement, which is largely not implemented by major factions, which begin to rearm

Renewed cholera outbreak, but NGOs continue to reduce expat staff

May-June Inter-clan fighting threatens UN troops, USLO in Mog; non-essential personnel evacuated; discussion of possible closure of USLO initiated

Frustrated with little progress, US pressures UNSC to renew UNOSOM II mandate only to Sept., asks UNSG to report on progress by July 30; 19 southern Somalia clans/factions sign Kismayu peace accord.

Several NGOs in Mog. re-evacuate previously returned staff to Nairobi

July UNOSOM/UN evacuate expat staff from Belet Wayne, Bosaso after attacks; WFP food convoy attacked, forced back to Mog.; Zimbabwe soldiers attacked, 2 Malaysian soldiers killed

500 clan/faction/religious leaders from Juba River regions sign Doble peace accord; UNSG recommends reduction in UNOSOM II troop levels due to lack of progress

ICRC closes Mog. offices, relocates to Nairobi, citing rash of abductions; bird swarms destroy much of bumper sorghum crop

U.S. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON SOMALIA, 1990-1994

Pre-1990

July 1988 HR For Rela Comm Foreign Relations Committee hearings on human rights abuses under Barre; US officially suspends all military aid in 1989, but DOD continues to ship military aid in pipeline at least thru mid-1989, and to argue for \$20 mn in military aid to Somalia for FY 1990.

1990

January 1 Senate Somalia declared out of compliance with Brooke amendment.

June \$20 mn in ESF funds earmarked for Somalia frozen because of human rights violations and Brooke amendment.

December 13 House/Senate OFDA staff brief Senate FR/House Select Hunger committee staff.

1991

January 22 Senate Letter to Baker expresses concern about Somalia crisis, urging US aid to relief agency efforts, esp. ICRC (signed by Kennedy, Kassebaum, Simon + 5).

February 5 HR Afr SubComm DOS/AID staff brief Subcommittee staff.

April 25 Senate Senate Res. 115 (introduced by Kassebaum, Simon, Harkin and Kennedy) urges US President to lead world-wide humanitarian efforts in Somalia and launch peace initiatives, factions to observe ceasefire to allow relief deliveries, UN to give Somalia higher priority.

May 14/June 26 Sen Afr SubComm. Hearings on "Current Situation in the Horn of Africa". Testimony by Davidow, Rosenberg and OFDA's Natsios, Sen. Kassebaum as well as BFW, USCR.

May 15 Sen For Rela Comm. Natsios and Jeff Davidow testify on Horn of Africa.

May 30 HR Afr SubComm & Select Hunger Comm Natsios, Davidow and Larry Sakers testify on War and Famine, Peace and Relief in the Horn of Africa.

June Senate Senate Res. 115 passed.

1992

January 2 Senate Senators Kassebaum and Simon *NY Times* Op-Ed "Save Somalia From Itself" urges UN to appoint full-time special envoy to initiate political negotiations, call for a ceasefire, and implement an immediate arms embargo.

| | | |
|-------------|-------------------|---|
| January 15 | House/Senate | Letter to Baker signed by 6 Senators, 5 Representatives backs appointing UN special envoy, calls for immediate ceasefire and possible creation of "neutral zones" to ensure food relief provision. |
| January 30 | House Hunger Comm | Hearing on Somalia. |
| January 31 | House/Senate | 24 Representatives/6 Senators write letters to Ali Mahdi and Aidid asking their cooperation with UN Res. 733 in backing a ceasefire and ensuring food deliveries. |
| February 5 | Sen. Afr SubComm | Asst. Sec. Cohen testifies at hearing on "Emergency Situation in Zaire and Somalia". |
| February 7 | Senate | <u>Senate Res. 258 (Simon/Kassebaum)</u> introduced, urging the UN to speed efforts to end fighting and respond to the emergency humanitarian situation. |
| February 20 | Sen. Afr SubComm | Senators Kassebaum and Simon send letters to Ali Mahdi and Aidid urging they adhere to UN-negotiated ceasefire and respect relief personnel and efforts. |
| March 12 | Senate | Senator Simon sends letter to UNSG expressing support for his efforts, noting <u>Senate Res. 258</u> and January 1992 DOS-sponsored conference of Somali expatriates. |
| March 19 | Sen Afr SubComm | Cohen calls Somalia "the most acute humanitarian tragedy in the world today" at hearing on "The Horn of Africa: Changing Realities and U.S. Response"; Natsios also testifies. |
| March 20 | House/Senate | Responding to January 15 letter to Baker, Janet Mullins/DOS says State and UN are considering proposals to flood combat zone with food; that FHA is providing resources to ICRC, CARE and other PVOs. Notes Somalia added as emergency item to OAU Addis budget meeting; joint OAU/UN/Arab League/Organization of Islamic States mission pressing factions in Mog. to agree again to a ceasefire. |
| March 24 | Sen For Rela Comm | Natsios/Cohen testify on Horn. |
| April 7 | HR Afr SubComm | Introduction of <u>House Res. 422</u> , which condemns anti-civilian violence of 2 major factions, commends OFDA's and Boutros-Ghali's efforts, urges US to back appointment of UN special envoy to Somalia to focus on relief and enhanced security for UN and relief personnel. |
| April 10 | House | Richards, Cohen, Wolf testify on Horn before 3 House committees. |
| April 21 | Senate | <u>Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act (S.985)</u> becomes PL 102-274. Citing failure of past US assistance policies, the bill urges the US to develop a new foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa which ensures real food security, and to cooperate with the UN and major donors. |
| May 18 | Senate | Senate staff delegation (Dunn-Mouton, Trenkle, Callahan) meets with Sahnoun, other UN officials in NY. |
| May 19 | Senate | <u>Senate Res. 258</u> passed. |
| May 22 | Senate | Simon calls meeting with OFDA, NGOs, Somali community leaders. |

| | | |
|--------------|----------------------|---|
| June 16 | HR Afr SubComm | Subcommittee mark-up of proposed <u>House Res. 422</u> on the crisis in Somalia. |
| June 23 | HR Afr SubComm | Hearing to review US policy and current activities in Somalia; Cohen expresses support for Sahnoun. Cong. Wolpe challenges double standard of response in Somalia and Yugoslavia. Randall Robinson notes UN asked US for \$7.5 mn to support peacekeeping efforts in Somalia; US committed only \$300,000. |
| June 25 | Sen Afr SubComm | Senator Simon declares Somalia "world's worst humanitarian tragedy" on Senate floor, citing Sahnoun's previous week report that 5000 children are dying each day. Organizes letter to AID Administrator Roskens and Cohen urging delivery of additional US aid to Somalia. |
| June 30 | House | 88 members, led by Cong. Tony Hall, sign letter to President urging Admin. to give "highest priority" to Somali humanitarian disaster. |
| | Senate | 12 Senators sign follow-up letter to AID's Roskens urging him to mobilize OFDA and other USG agencies to speed relief deliveries. |
| July 16 | Senate | Cohen responds to June 25 & 30 letters on Roskens' behalf, says DOS considering expansion of the airlift to strengthen food delivery system and Sahnoun's suggestion to send US ship to Kismayo; says some recent claims of scope of tragedy are "greatly exaggerated"; notes increasing supplies will not solve problem unless security for food distribution addressed (one reason cited for US support for UN protective force for humanitarian operations). |
| July 22 | House Hunger Comm | Hearing with Kassebaum commenting on her early July visit to Somalia with OFDA's Kunder; Asst. Sec. Bolton says DOS opposes UN deployment until after ceasefire reached. |
| July 27 | Sen Afr SubComm | Simon sends letter to UNSG praising efforts. |
| July 31 | Senate | <u>Senate Concurrent Res. 132</u> introduced by Kassebaum, Simon and 29 other Senators calls for expanded relief efforts in Somalia. |
| Aug. 4 | Senate | Janet Mullins/DOS responds to June 30 Congressional letter by reiterating most points made in Cohen's July 16 letter to Senate. |
| Aug. 7 | Senate | UNSG writes Simon thanking him for support for UN efforts in Somalia. |
| Aug. 12 | Senate | Simon and Kassebaum host ceremony marking additional \$1.27 mn AID grant to IMC for medical aid to Somalia. |
| Aug. 13-22 | Senate Govt Ops Comm | Tim Rieser, staffer to Committee chair Sen. Patrick Leahy, visits Somalia. |
| September 16 | HR Afr SubComm | Chair Mervyn Dymally holds hearing on "The Crisis and Chaos in Somalia" soon after Sept. 10 visit there; calls on Speaker to form a bipartisan task force on Somalia. Testimony by Cohen, Natsios, American Red Cross, Human Rights Watch's Burkhalter, IMC's Nancy Aossey, MSF's Dr. Rony Brauman, Fawzi Guleid of Somali Community. Dymally suggests DOS ease its ban on Members of Congress visiting Somalia. |
| September 18 | Sen Afr SubComm | Hearing on "UN Peacekeeping in Africa: Western Sahara and Somalia." |

| | | |
|--------------|--------------------|--|
| September 25 | HR Hunger Comm | Hearing on humanitarian intervention and the U.N. role. Testimony by U.N. Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Eliasson and RPG's Larry Minear and Thomas Weiss, CRS' Paul Miller and ICRC's Fred Isler. |
| October 1 | Sen Afr SubComm | <u>Senate Africa s/c hearing on Somalia</u> : Bolton, Houdek, Kunder testify on crisis and UN peacekeeping. |
| mid-Nov. | Senate | Senators Simon and Metzenbaum visit Somalia, call UNSG and Acting Secretary Eagleburger day after return. Four days later, Bush invites Senators Simon and Brown, 2 Representatives, Quayle, Powell, Cheney et al. to meet at White House to discuss options for intervention. |
| December 17 | HR For.Affrs | Hearing on "The Crisis in Somalia" and Committee mark-up of <u>Senate Joint Res. 45</u> (authorizing use of US armed forces in Somalia under War Powers Resolution). |
| 1993 | | |
| February 4 | Senate | <u>Senate Joint Res. 45</u> passes Senate; referred to House. |
| February 17 | House Afr SubComm | Hearing on "Recent Developments in Somalia." Testimony by Kunder, Houdek, Hussein Adam, UN's Gen. Rikhye. |
| March 16 | House | Cong. Gilman (NY) offers substitute for <u>Senate Joint Res. 45</u> as <u>House Joint Res. 152</u> to limit UNOSOM II to six months, saying US "has done its share". |
| March 26 | Sen Armed Srv Comm | IO/DOS Deputy Asst. Sec. Melinda Kimble responds to concerns that US troops might serve under non-US commander in UNOSOM II and estimates costs of UNOSOM II would be approx. \$1.55 bn; Amb. David Shinn notes rising security problems. |
| May 25 | House | Amends and finally adopts <u>Senate Joint Res. 45</u> authorizing US troops in Somalia for one year. Referred back to Senate for concurrence or conferencing to reconcile differences with Senate version; debate on differences continues through late July. |
| July 13 | Senate | Sen. Byrd challenges continuing US involvement in Somalia on floor, sparking lively debate in week following. |
| July 27 | House | <u>House Res. 227</u> introduced by Cong. Brown (OH), expressing sense of House that US Armed Forces should be withdrawn from Somalia as quickly as possible. |
| July 29 | Sen Afr SubComm | Peter Tarnoff/DOS and Lt. Gen. John Sheehan of JCS testify at hearing on "U.S. Policy in Somalia". |
| August 4 | House | <u>House Res. 239</u> introduced by Cong. Mica, urging President to withdraw all US Armed Forces from Somalia. |
| September 14 | Senate | Heated week-long floor debate over modified Byrd amendment to <u>S. 1298</u> defense authorization bill — asking President to seek Congressional approval by Nov. 15 for continued US troop operations in Somalia, and to submit report by |

- Oct. 15 — ends with passage of amendment and bill. (House adopts similar amendment Sept. 28).
- September 29 House House Res. 2401 (Dellums-CA) defense authorization bill passed, with Gephardt/Gilman amendment requiring President to consult Congress on Somalia policy, to report by October 15 on US goals/objectives in Somalia, and to seek Congressional authorization by Nov. 15 for US forces to remain in Somalia.
- October 15 Senate Approves Byrd amendment to H.R. 3116 defense appropriations bill suspending funding for U.S. armed forces in Somalia after March 31, 1994 unless President obtains further spending authority from Congress; amendment strictly limits US military operations to protecting US troops and bases and maintaining relief supply flows only. Also adopts Brown amendment Oct. 18 asking president to examine commitment of US forces in Somalia and investigate Oct. 3 clash.
- October 19 Sen For Rela Comm Hearing on "U.S. Policy in Somalia" with Peter Tarnoff/DOS and Defense's Walter Slocombe. Day later, holds hearing with USUN Amb. Albright on UN peacekeeping operations with special reference to Somalia.
- October 27 House House conferees on H.R. 3116 accede to Byrd Amendment.
- November 3 House/Senate House Concurrent Res. 170, introduced Oct. 22 directing President to remove all US troops from Somalia by Jan. 31, 1994, amended to set withdrawal date at March 31, 1994.

1994

- March 3 Sen Armed Srv Comm Gen. Joseph Hoar, commander of Somalia operation, testifies; decries lack of overall U.N. strategy for Somalia, urges U.S. Marines protecting USLO staff be replaced by contract security guards.
- late March Sen Armed Srv Comm Senators Levin and Warner complete investigation into secret CIA/Special Ops Command operations in Somalia after conducting interviews in Mog./Langley.
- May 12 Sen Armed Srv Comm Hearing explores possible relation of rejected request for armored reinforcements of US troops in Somalia to October Ranger deaths, also raises questions about previous Administration policy-making.
- July 21 Sen Armed Serv Comm Asst. Sec. of State George Moose testifies on rising clan violence, threats against U.S./U.N. personnel. Committee members send Clinton a letter next day urging USLO be closed, all U.S. diplomats withdrawn by Aug. 14.

Sources: Various House and Senate reports on hearings; Aaron Salamon, "Somalis Policy Issues and Questions", Oct. 24, 1993; copies of Congress-Administration correspondence provided by Congressional staff; various Congressional Research Service reports from 1992-93; various *Washington Post* articles, Reuters and AP dispatches.

U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA (Non-military) - FY1991-1994

(Figures in U.S. Dollars)

| | Agency | Amount | | Purpose |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|---|
| FY 1991 | OFDA | 4,383,427 | | Som. Coordinator; MSF/Holland, SCF/UK, UN Horn of Africa Appeal (\$3 mn) All distributed via WFP (58% wheat, 22% sorghum, 20% beans) \$7 mn for UNHCR activities in N. Som; \$3 mn for ICRC (excludes \$10 mn for UNHCR assistance to Som. refugees in Kenya/Ethiopia) |
| | Food for Peace | 5,743,700 | (12,210 MT) | |
| | DOS Bur Ref Progs* | 19,500,000 | | |
| | Total FY 1991 | \$29,627,127 | | |
| FY 1992 | OFDA | 26,126,668 | | Som. Coordinator; grants to NGOs and UNDP (\$1.4 mn) Distributed via WFP (52% of tonnage; 26% by value), ICRC, SCF, CRS Grants to ICRC, WFP, UN Emergency Program for Horn, NGOs |
| | Food for Peace/USDA | 42,373,700 | (79,883 MT) | |
| | DOS Bur Ref Progs | 26,619,521 | | |
| | Total FY 1992 | \$95,119,889 | | |
| FY 1993 | OFDA | 49,279,046 | | DART; grants to NGOs/UN/ICRC; funding for DOD airlift Distributed via WFP, ICRC, CRS, WVRD (CARE received supplies from WFP) \$12.5 mn to UNHCR; \$8.5 mn to other agencies assisting refugees \$6 mn for CARE (NGO umbrella project); \$6 mn for Som. judicial system; \$2 mn for retraining Som. police |
| | Food For Peace/USDA | 90,038,900 | (229,567 MT) | |
| | DOS Bur Ref Progs | 20,990,175 | | |
| | AID/African Affrs | 14,000,000 | | |
| | Total FY 1993 | \$174,308,121 | | |
| FY 1994 (as of 6/30/94) | OFDA | 5,411,927 | | Grants to NGOs, CDC, UN/DHA; funding of USAID/Somalia program All distributed via WFP (rice, lentils, vegetable oil, flour) Grants to UNHCR, ICRC, MSF for refugees in Kenya |
| | Food for Peace | 16,807,600 | (24,000 MT) | |
| | DOS Bur Ref Progs | 1,405,300 | | |
| | Total FY 1994 | 23,624,827 | | |
| Total U.S. Assist FY1991-94 | | \$322,679,964 | 345,660 MT | |

NOTE: These figures exclude military expenditures for Operation Restore Hope and the DOD airlift, as well as U.S. contributions to UNOSOM I and II.

* The Bureau of Refugee Programs (RP) was renamed the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) in 1994.

TOTAL EXPENDITURES FY 1991-94, BY AGENCY (as of 6/30/94)

| | |
|---------------------|-------------|
| OFDA | 85,201,068 |
| Food For Peace/USDA | 154,963,900 |
| DOS Bur Ref Progs | 68,514,996 |
| AID/African Affrs | 14,000,000 |
| | ----- |
| TOTAL | 322,679,964 |

Sources: OFDA, Somalia Situation Reports (various dates from 1991-94);
FFP Somalia Emergency Statistics FY 1991-94 (4/20/94 as corrected by Joe Gettier)

USAID/OFDA CASH & IN-KIND GRANTS FOR SOMALIA EMERGENCY, FY 1991-1994

(Figures in U.S. Dollars)

| BY TYPE OF ACTIVITY | | | | | | BY GRANTEES | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------|--------------|------------|-----------|------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|------------|-----------|------------|
| | FY 1991 | FY 1992 | FY 1993 | FY 1994 | Total | | FY 1991 | FY 1992 | FY 1993 | FY 1994 | Total |
| Agric Support/Revital | | 1,716,704 | 3,301,864 | | 5,018,568 | ADRA | | | 917,328 | | 917,328 |
| AID staffing | 61,684 | 157,957 | | 132,616 | 132,616 | Africare | | | 1,180,279 | 209,766 | 1,390,045 |
| Air support/water | | 1,392,552 | | | 1,392,552 | AICF/France | | 640,700 | 1,052,636 | 326,058 | 2,019,394 |
| Air Support | | 4,949,000 | 945,983 | | 5,894,983 | AICF/US | | | 631,629 | | 631,629 |
| Airlift (DoD) | | | 20,000,000 | | | Amer Red Cross | | 132,410 | | | 132,410 |
| Conferences | | | 312,585 | 342,585 | 655,170 | Amer Ref Commit | | | 795,114 | | 795,114 |
| Emerg Feeding | 463,846 | 999,147 | 245,066 | | 1,708,059 | Avior | | 909,000 | 109,468 | | 1,018,468 |
| Emerg Feeding/Health | 3,052,000 | 2,239,050 | 310,060 | | 5,601,110 | CARE | 463,846 | 3,833,253 | 3,948,672 | 42,301 | 8,288,072 |
| Feeding/Agr/Health | | 4,044,000 | | | 4,044,000 | CDC | | | | 87,784 | 87,784 |
| Food Dist | | 1,059,776 | 1,424,143 | | 2,483,919 | CISP/Italy | | | 474,070 | 247,550 | 721,620 |
| Food Storage | | | 62,647 | | 62,647 | Concern/Ireland | | 448,307 | 245,066 | | 693,373 |
| Funding others insts. | | 132,410 | | | 132,410 | CRS | | | 783,387 | | 783,387 |
| Health/Medical | | 1,689,986 | 7,520,446 | 1,312,797 | 10,523,229 | Feed the Children | | | 100,000 | | 100,000 |
| Health/Info systems | | | | 87,784 | 87,784 | Giersen, W. | | | 129,000 | | 129,000 |
| Livestock | | | 376,837 | | 376,837 | Goal/Ireland | | 340,500 | | | 340,500 |
| Material | | | 129,000 | | 129,000 | ICRC | | 6,140,000 | 4,000,000 | | 10,140,000 |
| Medical Drugs | | 4,359,462 | 207,492 | 178,803 | 4,745,757 | IMC | | 5,803,768 | 2,949,386 | 654,034 | 9,407,188 |
| Medic/Nutrition | 256,000 | 221,088 | 1,234,217 | 829,483 | 2,540,788 | Intertext | | | | | 22,942 |
| Mine Clearing | 525,540 | | 854,976 | | 1,380,516 | IRC | | 686,468 | 991,057 | 1,574,715 | 3,252,240 |
| Monetization | | 3,166,459 | 2,149,588 | 1,617,016 | 6,933,063 | LWR/Medic | | 318,772 | 36,774 | | 355,546 |
| Orphanage | | | 438,133 | | 438,133 | MCDI | | | 173,523 | | 173,523 |
| Police | | | | 70,095 | 70,095 | MDM/France | | | 400,000 | | 400,000 |
| Personnel | | | 114,220 | | 114,220 | MSF/Belgium | | 419,076 | 748,902 | | 1,167,978 |
| Relief/Rehab/Logist | | | 4,000,000 | | 4,000,000 | MSF/France | | 2,032,450 | 310,060 | | 2,342,510 |
| Research | | | 319,283 | 57,271 | 376,554 | MSF/Holland | 525,540 | | 854,976 | | 1,380,516 |
| Road stabilization | | | | 209,766 | 209,766 | MSF/Spain | | | 1,073,335 | | 1,073,335 |
| Seeds/Seeds & Tools | | | 1,326,372 | 247,653 | 1,574,025 | RPG | | | 319,283 | 57,271 | 376,554 |
| Training | | | 138,958 | | 138,958 | SCF/UK | 256,000 | 978,578 | 1,521,272 | 590,016 | 3,345,866 |
| UNOSOM Staffing | | | 154,306 | | 154,306 | SCF/US | | | 3,975,837 | 829,483 | 4,805,320 |
| Veterinary | | | 356,243 | | 356,243 | UNDP | | 1,452,538 | 834,200 | | 2,286,738 |
| Water/Sanitation | | 378,758 | 3,808,965 | 326,058 | 4,513,781 | UNICEF | 3,052,000 | | | | 3,052,000 |
| TOTAL | 4,359,070 | 26,506,349 * | 49,731,384 | 5,411,927 | 86,008,730 | UN/DHA | | | 312,585 | 342,585 | 655,170 |
| | | | | | | USAID | 61,684 | 157,957 | | 132,616 | 132,616 |
| | | | | | | World Concern | | 245,630 | 863,545 | 247,653 | 1,356,828 |
| | | | | | | World Vision | | 1,044,000 | | | 1,044,000 |
| | | | | | | WFP | | 900,000 | | | 900,000 |
| | | | | | | Unspecified | | | | 70,095 | 70,095 |
| | | | | | | DoD airlift expenses | | | 20,000,000 | | 20,000,000 |
| | | | | | | TOTAL | 4,359,070 | 26,506,349 * | 49,731,384 | 5,411,927 | 86,008,730 |

* Small discrepancies between FY1991-93 totals given here and those from OFDA Situation Report of June 30, 1994 (listed in previous table) are due to discrepancies among different OFDA grant lists.

Source: USAID/OFDA Somalia Grants for FY1992 & 1993 (updated 10/15/93); OFDA Somalia Situation Reports (to June 30, 1994); OFDA annual reports.

U.S. GOVERNMENT FOOD AID COMMODITIES GOING TO SOMALIA, FY 1991-1994

| Commodity | MT FY 1991 | MT FY 1992 | MT FY 1993 | MT FY1994 | Total |
|-----------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Sorghum | 2,740 | 22,664 | 41,914 | | 67,318 |
| Lentils | 2,370 | | 16,200 | | 18,570 |
| Flour | 7,100 | | | | 7,100 |
| Corn Soya Milk | | 1,016 | | | 1,016 |
| Rice | | 23,000 | 27,000 | | 50,000 |
| Oil | | 3,550 | 10,700 | | 14,250 |
| Beans | | 8,056 | 420 | | 8,476 |
| Wheat | | 18,357 | 12,000 | | 30,357 |
| Corn | | | 104,537 | | 104,537 |
| Wheat Soy Blend | | 3,240 | 1,300 | | 4,540 |
| Bulgur | | | 2,600 | | |
| Not Specified | | | 417 | 24,000 | 24,417 |
| Total | 12,210 | 79,883 | 217,088 | 24,000 | 333,181 |

COOPERATING AGENCIES DISTRIBUTING USG FOOD

| Agency | MT FY 1991 | MT FY 1992 | MT FY 1993 | MT FY 1994 | Total |
|--------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| WFP * | 12,210 | 41,597 | 148,396 | 24,000 | 226,203 |
| ICRC | | 34,270 | 44,521 | | 78,791 |
| CRS | | 3,000 | 21,587 | | 24,587 |
| SCF/US | | 1,016 | | | 1,016 |
| WVRD | | | 2,584 | | 2,584 |
| TOTAL | 12,210 | 79,883 | 217,088 | 24,000 | 333,181 |

* Significant amounts of WFP food were channeled through CARE.

Sources: OFDA, "Somalia Situation Report." (1991 to June 30, 1994).
FFP, "Somalia Emergency Statistics, FY1991-94."

U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT EXPENDITURES IN SOMALIA, FY 1992-1994

| Specific Operation | Incremental Costs (Figures in U.S. Dollars) | | | | Source of Funds (amount reimbursable) |
|--|---|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|--|
| | FY 1992 | FY 1993 | FY 1994 | TOTAL | |
| UNOSOM I/Provide Relief (4/92 - 4/93) | 9,300,000 | 10,800,000 | - | 20,100,000 | \$3.6M FY92 global disast funds, 1992-3 DOD budget (reimbursement waived by acting Sec. of State) |
| UNITAF/Operation Restore Hope (12/92 - 4/93) | 0 | 692,200,000 | - | 692,200,000 | SDI, other DOD programs, DOD 1993 budget (none reimbursable as not a U.N.-led operation) |
| UNOSOM II/Operation Continue Hope * (5/93 - 9/93) | 0 | 94,700,000 | 366,862,600 | 461,562,600 | DOD 1993 budget, funds remaining from Restore Hope (partially reimbursable) |
| DOD Assistance provided to the U.N. (12/93-9/93) ** | 0 | 75,500,000 | | 75,500,000 | DOD 1993 budget (all reimbursable by U.N.) |
| US support for other peacekeeping countries | 0 | 2,400,000 | | 2,400,000 | (None reimbursable; in-kind exchange of resources) |
| TOTAL COSTS | \$9,300,000 | \$875,600,000 | \$366,862,600 | \$1,251,762,600 | TOTAL U.S. Military Costs |

* FY94 figure is from US Army Memorandum of May 18, 1994; other figures from USGAO.

** This assistance was in the form of goods and services provided to the U.N. and participating countries, including the services of U.S. personnel involved with UNOSOM I and II and use of equipment.

Sources: USGAO. "Peace Operations: Cost of DOD Operations in Somalia." March 1994. GAO/NSIAD-94-88; U.S. Army Office of the Assistant Secretary. May 18, 1994 Memorandum. "Subject: DOD Support to Peacekeeping Operations."

SUMMARY OF TOTAL USG EXPENDITURES IN SOMALIA
April 1992 - July 1994

| Type of Expenditure | Amount (US\$) |
|---|------------------------|
| DOD Incremental Costs | 1,500,000,000 |
| Humanitarian Assistance | 311,000,000 |
| Total U.N. assessments to date (paid and unpaid) | 470,200,000 |
| ----- | |
| TOTAL COST TO U.S. | 2,281,200,000 ===== |

Source: Memorandum from John Brims, U.S. State Department Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Peacekeeping & Humanitarian Operations Office, July 28, 1994, based on data from the JCS, GAO, OSD, USAID and State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

**TOTAL FUNDING THROUGH UN AGENCIES
FOR SOMALIA
(1992-1993)**

Compiled by DHA Geneva on the basis of information provided by the respective appealing agencies.

| AGENCY | CONTRIBUTIONS 1992 (US\$) | CONTRIBUTIONS 1993 (US\$) | TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS (US\$) |
|---------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| FAO | 3,650,000 | 2,451,992 | 6,101,992 |
| UNDP | 0 | 540,000 | 540,000 |
| UNHCR | 9,255,100 | 8,041,802 | 17,296,902 |
| UNICEF | 30,099,656 | 22,310,832 | 52,410,488 |
| UNSOM | 0 | 1,284,451 | 1,284,451 |
| UNV | 1,055,555 | 1,558,156 | 2,613,711 |
| WFP | 110,422,476 | 5,049,109 | 115,471,585 |
| WHO | 3,575,081 | 2,400,000 | 5,975,081 |
| DHA | 1,430,000 | 421,839 | 1,851,839 |
| TOTAL: | \$159,487,868 | \$41,058,181 | \$200,546,049 |

UNITED NATIONS SOMALIA OPERATIONS -- FINANCIAL COMPONENTS

UNOSOM I and UNITAF Period (April 1992 - May 4, 1993)

(Thousands of U.S. Dollars)

| | UNOSOM I | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|
| | Budgeted Amount (\$) | Estimated Expenditure | Balance/ Overruns | Percent of Budget Spent |
| May 1, '92 - April 30, '93 | | | | |
| Military personnel | 42,356 | 13,305 | 29,051 | 31.41% |
| Civilian personnel | 12,559 | 7,190 | 5,369 | 57.25% |
| Premises/accomod | 25,027 | 4,721 | 20,306 | 18.86% |
| Infrastruc reprs | 160 | 24 | 136 | 15.00% |
| Transport Operations | 3,690 | 4,035 | (345) | 109.36% |
| Air Operations | 10,898 | 4,226 | 6,672 | 38.78% |
| Communications | 2,988 | 2,676 | 312 | 89.56% |
| Other Equipment | 3,576 | 2,871 | 705 | 80.29% |
| Supplies & Services | 1,347 | 2,532 | (1,185) | 187.97% |
| Air & Surface Freight | 4,155 | 194 | 3,961 | 4.67% |
| Integ Manag Info Sys | 90 | 90 | 0 | 100.00% |
| Supp acct for peackpng | 1,068 | 1,068 | (1) | 100.05% |
| Staff Assessment | 1,739 | 519 | 1,220 | 29.84% |
| TOTAL 5/1/92 - 4/30/93 | 109,652 | 43,451 | 66,201 | 39.63% |

NOTE: Several of the larger line item discrepancies are due to non-spending for the following reasons:

MILITARY PERSONNEL (31%): The UNOSOM contingent was smaller than planned. The original budget was for up to 3,500 security personnel with up to 719 personnel for logistical support.

By April 1993, only 880 troops had been deployed. This also resulted in below-budget spending on:

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL (57%)

PREMISES/ACCOM (19%)

INFRASTRUCTURE (15%)

AIR OPERATIONS (39%)

STAFF ASSESSMENT (30%)

SUPPLIES & SERVICE (188%): Budget did not provide for high costs of local security personnel.

Also, high bank charges, high cost of obtaining supplies in the area.

AIR & SURF FREIGHT (5%): Costs for transport of peacekeepers were covered by a voluntary contribution from the U.S. Also, the delay in deployment resulted in low expenditures.

Source: United Nations. June 29, 1993. Document A/47/916/Add.1.

CONTRIBUTIONS BY MEMBER STATES TO U.N. OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA

(Amounts in U.S. Dollars)

| Country | Trust Fund | | UNOSOM I | | UNOSOM II | | UNOSOM II Personnel Cntrb As of Nov, 1993 | 100 Day Plan Support | Jul-Dec 1992 SEPHA Support | 1993 Ref & Rehab Support |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|-----------------|---|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | As of January 1994 | Somali Police | Cash Contrib | Personnel Cntrb | Cash Contrib | As of Nov, 1993 | | | | |
| Antigua & Barbuda | 500 | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | | | | | | 48 | 837,532 | | | 334,008 |
| Austria | 1,000,000 | | | | | | 464,181 | | | |
| Bangladesh | | | | | | 945 | | | | |
| Belgium | | | | | | 948 | 333,340 | | | |
| Botswana | | | | | | 326 | | | | |
| Brunei | 100,000 | | | | | | | | | 100,000 |
| Canada | | | | | | 4 | 3,216,328 | 7,070,000 | | 3,757,491 |
| Chile | | | | | | | 968,606 | | | 43,616 |
| Denmark | 1,000,000 | | | | | | 1,537,637 | 1,258,668 | | 1,716,316 |
| Egypt | | | | | | 100 | | | | |
| Finland | 677,295 | | | | | | | | | |
| France | | | | | | 1,107 | 52,083 | 1,544,500 | | 89,091 |
| Germany | | | | | | 1,726 | 1,529,720 | | | 1,180,935 |
| Greece | | | | | | 102 | | | | 537,636 |
| Iceland | 50,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| India | | | | | | 4,937 | | | | |
| Indonesia | | | | | | | | | | 75,182 |
| Ireland | 115,000 | | | | | 79 | 267,561 | | | |
| Italy | | | | | | 2,576 | 11,476,000 | 3,504,827 | | 4,745,304 |
| Japan | 100,000,000 | | | | | | 12,042,519 | | | 3,742,692 |
| Korea | 2,000,000 | | | | | 252 | | 30,000 | | |
| Kuwait | | | | | | 156 | | | | |
| Luxemburg | | | | | | | 65,230 | | | |
| Malaysia | 50,000 | | | | | 871 | | | | |
| Morocco | | | | | | 1,424 | | | | |
| Nepal | | | | | | 311 | | | | |
| Netherlands | | | | | | | 4,774,348 | | | 5,951,214 |
| New Zealand | | | | | | 43 | 134,409 | | | 54,054 |
| Nigeria | | | | | | 614 | | | | |
| Norway | | 1,000,000 | | | | 130 | 103,486 | 151,040 | | 150,000 |
| Pakistan | | | | | | 5,005 | | | | |
| Philippines | 5,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| Qatar | | | | | | | 252,544 | | | |
| Romania | | | | | | 236 | | | | |
| Saudi Arabia | | | | | | 757 | | | | |
| Singapore | 25,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| Spain | | | | | | | 273,224 | | | 1,465,214 |
| Sweden | | | | | | 148 | 4,514,012 | | | 5,199,883 |
| Switzerland | | | | | | | | 481,040 | | 128,547 |
| Thailand | | | | | | | | | | 5,000 |
| Turisia | | | | | | 142 | | | | |
| Turkey | | | | | | 320 | | | | |
| U.A.E. | | | | | | 662 | | | | |
| U.K. | | | | | | | 1,694,942 | | | 282,573 |
| U.S. | | 6,000,000 | | | | 3,017 | 3,409,468 | | | 6,161,919 |
| Zimbabwe | | | | | | 958 | | | | |
| African Devel Bank | | | | | | | | | | 1,000,000 |
| OPEC | | | | | | | 1,000,000 | | | |
| World Bank | | | | | | | 16,300,000 | | | |
| Other UN | | | | | | | 47,643 | 621,060 | | |
| Not Specified/other contrib | | | | | | 340 | 9,492,001 | | | 353,135 |
| Total | 105,022,795 | 7,000,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 28,284 | 74,786,814 | 14,661,135 | | 37,073,810 |

SOURCES: U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs. February 1994. Fax.
 U.N. General Assembly. January 19, 1994. "Financing of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II." Doc. A/48/850.
 ----- June 29, 1993. "Financing of the United Nations Operation in Somalia." Doc. A/47/916/Add/1.

SELECT NGO/RELIEF AGENCY CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOMALIA RELIEF EFFORT 1990-1994*

| Organization | Financial resources committed to Somalia crisis (US\$ unless otherwise indicated) (% of overall budget) | | | | | | Involved in food delivery? | Other Activities | Collaborating agencies |
|-------------------------------|--|-------------------|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|---|--|
| | Pre-1990 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | | | |
| ADRA | 0 | 0 | 0 | (inc. w/93) | 2,184,000 | 3,727,363 | | Health, water, training, orphans, Somali NGOs | CARE, IRC WFP, ICRC |
| Africare | .5 to 1.5 mn | 400,000 | 25,000 | 25,000 | 500,000 | 1.5 mn (est.) | Logistics Advisor to NRC | Pharmaceu, wells | IMC |
| AICF/USA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 420,000 (16%) | 550,000 (17%) | | Health, sanitation | UNICEF |
| AirServe International | | | (Funding combined with Kenya program 1992-93) | | | | Transport | Air transport of relief teams & supplies; incl. to refugees in Kenya | UNICEF, Int'l NGOs |
| American Jewish World Service | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20,000 | 22,000 | 0 | | Health | DRI |
| American Refugee Comm. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 500,000 | 1,000,000 | | Medicine, health education and training | UNHCR, UNICEF OFDA |
| CARE | | 3,998,000 (3%) | 2,095,000 (1.3%) | 2,662,000 (1.4%) | 15,793,000 (7.6%) | 11,512,000 (5.8%) | Direct feeding, monetization, transport | Agric rehab, vet services; water, health, environmental sanitation | WFP, OFDA, ODA, AIDAB, EC, Aust. & Norw. govts; int'l NGOs |
| CRS | 0 | 0 | | 3,600,000 | 8,800,000 | 3,100,000 | Direct feeding, cross border | Agricultural rehab, water, nutrition, health | |
| CISP/Italy | 578,000 (25%) | 440,727 (14%) | 566,850 (17%) | 1,100,000 | 1,472,000 | 2,300,000 | Direct feeding | Medical, sanitation, animal husbandry | OFDA, Italian government Govt |
| Concern Worldwide (in Pounds) | 772,000 (2.4%) | 46,000 (0.3%) | 0 | 5,165,000 (20.3%) | 5,567,000 (23.6%) | n/a | Moneliz, feeding cntrs | Immunization, latrines schools; agric. project | |
| Direct Relief Int'l | 433,000 | 0 | 0 | 168,000 | 265,800 | 300,000 | | Medical supplies/equip. | Somali NGOs |
| Int'l Aid (Sweden) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 120,000 | 200,000 | 400,000 | Direct feeding and provide food suppl | Reconstruction of primary schools | |
| INMED | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Health | ADRA |
| International Rescue Comm. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,180,000 | 7,620,000 | 4,000,000 | During 1992 only | Health, sanit./water, vet serv.; monetization; garbage coll.; income gen. | UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, CARE, JDC, int'l & Som. NGOs |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---|---|--|
| World Vision RD | 0 | 0 | 800,000 | 1,000,000 | 3,000,000 | 2,000,000 | Direct feeding, supplies | Medical, training, inc gener, bldng | MSF, ODA, CRS, GOAL, ICRC, MSF, ODA |
| Unlarian Universalist Service Committee | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3,636 | 2,500 | Direct feeding, supplies | Medical, training, inc gener, bldng | |
| Save the Children/UK (in UK pounds) | 243,000 | 1,200,000 | 2,600,000 | 6,600,000 | 6,400,000 | 4 mn | Direct feeding;transport; feeding centers | Health, water, ag rehab; NGO coord; education, nutrition, displaced | ODA, EU, ODA, Catod UNICEF, SCF/NZ, Redd Barna, GOAL, Caritas-Switz. |
| Save the Children/US | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4,000,000 | 3,000,000 | Health posts, irrig; train; sanitation; ag rehab. | Health posts, irrig; train; sanitation; ag rehab. | OFDA, UNDP, UNICEF, MSF, ICRC |
| Oxam America | 1-3 mn | 0 | 0 | 185,000 | 377,000 | 200,000 | Provided through ICRC | Water, vocational train, equipment | Som NGOs, ICRC |
| Operation USA | 400,000 | 0 | 0 | 36,445 | 221,266 | n/a | Medical supplies & equipment | Medical supplies & equipment | IMC |
| Mercy Corps Intl | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33,331 | 0 | Medical | Medical | World Concern |

* All NGOs known to be involved in aiding Somalia were mailed a simple questionnaire; the data in this table is taken from those groups which chose to respond. ** Resources are generally listed for FY (for US groups, usually starts Oct. 1; for EC groups, generally starts Jan. 1, for SCF-UK, April 1).

NB the following groups responded but indicated they had no direct presence in Somalia: MAP International: provided medical shipments to groups on ground in Somalia; Episcopal Church/Presiding Bishops' Fund: made grants to CVS of \$136,973 in 1992 and \$417,163 in 1993 for Somalia relief