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Pilot Study on

**DEMOBILIZATION AND RE-INTEGRATION  
OF EX-COMBATANTS IN MOZAMBIQUE**

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Under USAID's  
Mozambique Demobilization  
and Reintegration Support  
Project (656-0235)

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Executive Summary</b>	i
<b>List of Abbreviations</b>	iv
<b>Maps</b>	vi
<b>1 Demobilisation of Combatants in the Transition to Peace in Mozambique</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Establishing the structures to monitor the demobilization and re-integration process	2
1.3 Creating conditions for troop cantonment October 1992 - November 1993	3
1.4 Cantonment of troops	10
1.5 A typology of incidents in the assembly areas	16
1.6 Demobilization of troops	20
1.7 The Mozambican DRP and the New Army	23
<b>2 Re-integration of Demobilized Combatants: The Case of Zambézia Province</b>	<b>28</b>
2.1 An Introduction to the re-integration strategy	28
2.2 Zambézia: a hazardous context	31
2.3 The profile of demobilized combatants in Zambézia	35
(a) Demobilized combatants and population	36
(b) Demobilized combatants and their families	39
(c) Demobilized combatants as farmers	42
(d) Demobilized combatants' skills and education	44
(e) Demobilized combatants' expectations	46
2.4 Provincial structures to absorb demobilized combatants	48
2.5 The Zambézian DRP	49
2.6 Re-integration of the officer class	53
<b>3 Conclusions</b>	<b>57</b>
3.1 Demobilization	57
3.2 Re-integration	58
<b>4 The Mozambican DRP: Bibliography</b>	<b>62</b>
4.1 References	62
4.2 UN (Reports of Secretary General and Resolutions of the Security Council)	66
4.3 General	67
4.4 Other sources used in this report	69

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The subject of this report is the Demobilization and Re-integration Programme (DRP) set up at part of the process of transition to peace in Mozambique, as a result of the General Peace Accord (GPA) signed in Rome on 4 October 1992 by the two contenders, the Government of Frelimo and Renamo. It is the objective of the report to assess both the extent to which the programme established in the GPA (including the perceived role of ONUMOZ, the UN mission in Mozambique) was followed and achieved, and the ways in which the DRP effectively contributed to the sustained and peaceful post-transition environment in Mozambique, which would facilitate the general election, regarded as officially marking the end of the transition to peace.

A distinction is drawn between the approaches to demobilization and re-integration on the basis that demobilization was a process to be developed according to detailed procedures as established and scheduled by the GPA with clearly identifiable beginning and end dates and affecting a delineated group of people. Re-integration, on the other hand, is seen as an open-ended process, in the sense that it tends to be merged with the socio-economic development of the country as a whole, thus going beyond the strict transition to peace controlled by the GPA. This confirmed by the fact that the period covered by the report saw the completion of the demobilization process, while the socio-economic re-integration of the ex-combatants is still at an early stage. An assessment of the role of demobilization in achieving an environment of secured peace can therefore be attempted. As to re-integration, its ill-defined nature and the fact that it is still at a preliminary stage means that this report can only provide pointers to the problems which will be faced and to its possible effects on the general peace process.

The report concludes that the demobilization process, at least in its central objective of concentration, disarming and discharging forces from the respective armies, was an unparalleled success. Since September 1994, the armies of the former belligerents can be considered as disarmed and dismantled (with the exception of some remnants who are still presenting themselves to be demobilized). However, important problems were faced and dealt with. These were: logistical (difficulties for both parties in gathering their forces in the Assembly Areas and the poor accommodation facilities the ex-combatants experienced when they got there), technical (complex registration procedures) and, particularly, political. Far from being just a matter of following what was laid down in the GPA, this process involved building up trust and reconciling the two former belligerents through complex and difficult political negotiations. This caused a delay of more than a year. The impact of this delay in the entire process was important in more than one sense. The prolonged and difficult time spent by the ex-combatants in the Assembly Areas created a lack of trust in the institutions which were controlling the process. This was translated

into a generalized demand for immediate demobilization and a refusal to join the new Mozambican army. The ex-combatants pressed for the process to be concluded quickly, reducing the capacity of the parties to control it and to use it politically. This has also meant that, on the eve of the elections, the new army is much reduced in numbers than was originally envisaged.

Regarding re-integration, the study has focused on experiences in the province of Zambezia and was based on a sample of 2,670 combatants demobilized in that province by the end of June 1994 (corresponding to around 20 per cent of the estimated total) and on 15 selected interviews. It has attempted, on the one hand, to draw a profile of this group, including the social and family context of the ex-combatants, their skills and expectations of life after demobilization. On the other hand, it discusses the possibilities of self-employment and other means of generating income.

The study found that factors such as the young age of conscription (20 years in average), the extended period spent in military service (almost 10 years on average), and the poor training received in the army have contributed to make the ex-combatants a very poorly skilled group. On the other hand, a state economy in deep crisis, a prolonged and highly destructive war, and a still-uncertain security situation, have meant that the economic recovery of the province has been slow and job opportunities scarce.

Small-scale agriculture, which it was hoped would be potentially capable of employing around half the demobilized population, is proving to be unequal to the task. The reasons for this are several: historical, because for almost 100 years small-scale agriculture has played a supplementary role to wage labour in the household economy; political, because policies regarding land tenure are yet to be clarified; infrastructural, because roads are in poor condition and landmined in some cases and the rural trade network is disrupted; and financial as credits are not available and prices to paid producers are anything but attractive. Not surprisingly, therefore, the number of ex-combatants who expressed an intention to live as farmers will probably amount to few more than a quarter of the entire demobilized population. All the interviewees considered agriculture as a supplementary activity to be carried out by their families while they themselves would try to gain income from to waged labour or petty trade.

In this very difficult context, re-integration work is not easy one in terms of both strategy definition and implementation. Despite their still very short life, it seems that is a need to make a clearer distinction between short or medium-term programmes and long-term ones.

The short and medium-term programmes are aimed at concluding the demobilization process by safeguarding a peaceful environment for the electoral and post-electoral period

and allowing time to exert its influence in weakening the cohesion of ex-combatants. Their main objective is security and the 'desmobilizados' are their target group. An example of a successful programme of this kind is the scheme by which the ex-combatants receive their compensatory subsidy for an extended period which, in the face of very few alternatives, provides the basic means of support for the 'desmobilizados' and thus has a key role in the maintenance of a relatively secure environment.

The long-term programmes pose more complex problems in their aims, definitions and target groups. They tend to go beyond the scope of security to the broader one of development. As a group facing difficulties in socio-economic re-integration, demobilized combatants do not have special needs. Much larger groups in equal need can be found as refugees in neighbouring countries and internally displaced people within Mozambique itself now heading back to their home areas. It is not clear, therefore, why the demobilized population should remain as the target group in long-term programmes. On the other hand, the example of agriculture referred to above shows that, only through policy measures could field become as attractive to the demobilized population as it is to the rest of the rural population. Similarly, the creation of jobs depends, to a great extent, on co-ordination between the several groups (the state, private entrepreneurs, NGOs and so on). As for long-term development activity which will last past the end of the transitional period, the re-integration strategy should target the rural community which will host many of the ex-combatants, strengthen institutional co-ordination and assure a smooth transition of its role to the new elected Government.

In spite of the apparent success of demobilization, which has meant that it is unlikely that the old pattern of conflict will be resumed, the poor level of re-integration achieved so far could generate a new type of conflict held by groups of ex-combatants with access to the several arms caches still waiting to be neutralized.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A/As	Assembly Areas
AMODEG	Mozambican Association of Demobilized Combatants (after Associacao Mocambicana dos Desmobilizados de Guerra)
BPD	Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento
CCF	Ceasefire Commission (after Comissao de Cessar-fogo)
CCFADM	Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambique Defence Force (after Comissao Conjunta para a Formacao das Forcas Armadas de Defesa de Mocambique)
CIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
COMPOL	Commission for the Police
CORE	Commission for the Re-integration of Demobilized Military Personnel
COREMO	Mozambican Revolutionary Committee (after Comite Revolucionario Mocambicano)
CSC	Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (after Comissao de Supervisao e Controlo)
CTNA	Centre of Non-Assembled Troops (after Centro de Tropas Nao-Acantonaveis)
DRP	Demobilization and Re-integration Process
EAR	Re-integration Support Scheme (RSS, after Esquema de Apoio a Reintegracao)
ECMEP	Road Construction and Maintenance Company (after Empresa de Construcacao e Manutencao de Estradas e Pontes)
FADM	Mozambique Defence Force (after Forcas Armadas de Defesa de Mocambique)
FAM	Mozambique's government army (after Forcas Armadas de Mocambique, also FPLM)
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front (after Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique)

GPA	General Peace Accord (also AGP, after Acordo Geral de Paz)
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
NAR	Refugees Support Nucleus (after Nucleo de Apoio aos Refugiados)
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
RENAMO	Mozambique National Resistance (after Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana)
SIR	Information Referral Services (IRS, after Servicos de Informacao e Referencia)
TKP	Training and Kits Programme
TU	ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization
UNAMI	National Union for the Independence of Mozambique (after Uniao Nacional de Mocambique Independente)
UNAMO	Mozambique National Union (after Uniao Nacional de Mocambique)
UNAR	ROMBEZIA Africal National Union (after Uniao Nacional Africana da ROMBEZIA)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNOHAC	UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

# PROVÍNCIA DA ZAMBÉZIA





# 1 DEMOBILIZATION OF COMBATANTS IN THE TRANSITION TO PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE

## 1.1 Introduction

The arrival of Aldo Ajello, the Interim Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG), in Maputo on 15 October 1992 marked the beginning of the transition process in Mozambique, which was scheduled to last for two years.<sup>1</sup> In Rome 11 days earlier, President Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama, Renamo's leader, had signed the General Peace Accord (GPA), and both parties had agreed that the transition to peace should be monitored by the UN. In accordance with this, on the same day Chissano wrote to the UN Secretary-General inviting the UN to mediate the process.<sup>2</sup> Five days later, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali submitted his first report on the Mozambican transition process to the Security Council and, on 13 October, one week after the GPA was signed, the Security Council approved the appointment of an Interim Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) to Mozambique.<sup>3</sup> On 15 October 1992, or 'E-Day' as it was called in the accord,<sup>4</sup> a series of parallel processes concerned with the implementation of the GPA started, intertwining but keeping some level of autonomy from each other. The purpose of this section is to analyse the transition period, focusing on the Demobilization and Reintegration Process (DRP), and seeking to define why it took its concrete shape as a result of the effects of the political transition process on it. This study will, therefore, cover the process of the cantonment of troops in separate Assembly Areas (AAs), their disarmament and subsequent transfer either into the new army or to civilian life (effective demobilization).

Five main stages in the transitional period can be defined:

- (a) from E-Day, 15 October 1992, when implementation of the GPA began to be implemented, to November 1993, the date on which the cantonment of troops in AAs effectively started;
- (b) from November 1993 to March 1994, when demobilization started to be undertaken;
- (c) the demobilization process, which ended in late August 1994;
- (d) the period between the conclusion of demobilization and the holding of the general election on 27 and 28 October 1994;
- (e) finally, an open-ended period which will include the continued process of re-

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<sup>1</sup>The general election which will take place in 27-28 October 1994, will end this period precisely two years after the GPA started to be implemented. Ajello was accompanied by 10 military observers headed by Lieutenant-Colonel J.P.Sinhá. *Notícias*, 16 October 1992.

<sup>2</sup>UN Security Council S/24635.

<sup>3</sup>Following the Secretary-General's report, United Nations Security Council: S/24642, 9 October 1992 ('United Nations Operation in Mozambique: Report of the Secretary-General'). For the resolution, United Nations Security Council: S/RES/782 (1992), 13 October 1992.

<sup>4</sup>'Implementation of the Agreement will begin with the cease-fire which is to come into effect on E-Day, the day on which the Agreement itself will enter into force following publication in the Official Gazette of the legal instruments adopted by the Assembly of the Republic. This is expected to take place not later than 15 October 1992'. UN Security Council S/24642, 9 October 1992, p.2.

integration of former military after the first general election, under the newly elected Government.

## 1.2 Establishing the structures to monitor the Demobilization and Reintegration Process

The main structures for regulating and monitoring this process began to be put into place from 3 November 1992, meeting what had been prescribed in the GPA as the task of the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), as mediator of the accord. On that date, the *Comissão de Supervisão e Controlo* - the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) was created to oversee the entire process at the highest level. It was to do this by assuming responsibility for providing the legal interpretation of the process, solving any disputes eventually emerging between the parties, and coordinating the activities of the Commissions which remained to be created.<sup>5</sup> These Commissions, which were authorized to work semi-autonomously, but as executive and technical bodies overseen by the CSC, included the Cease Fire Commission (CCF), the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM), and the Commission for the Re-integration of Demobilized Military Personnel (CORE).<sup>6</sup>

In parallel with the establishment of these above commissions and of ONUMOZ, the UN operation in the country began to take shape, specifically from early December. According

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<sup>5</sup>CSC is the Portuguese abbreviation of *Comissão de Supervisão e Controlo*. The CSC was chaired by the interim SRSG himself, and included head-representatives from both parties. The Government side was represented by Armando Guebuza (head of the Government delegation and Minister of Transport and Communications), Teodato Hunguana (Minister of Labour), John Kachamila (Minister of Natural Resources), Tomás Salomão (Deputy Minister of Planning), Francisco Madeira (Diplomatic Assessor of the President of the Republic), and Salvador Mtumuke, Soares de Lima and Justino N'Repo, high ranking officers of the army. Renamo was represented by Raul Domingos (Head of the Renamo Delegation and Chief of Renamo's Department of Organisation), José de Castro (Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Anselmo Victor, Lourenço Macome and Jerónimo Malagueta. Also taking part in the CSC are representatives of Italy (the state which mediated the GPA), Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States and France, as well as the Organization of African Unity and, from December, Germany. The role of the CSC was defined as: (a) to guarantee implementation of the provisions of the Agreement; (b) to guarantee respect for the timetable specified for the cease-fire and the elections; (c) to provide the authentic interpretation of the Agreement; (d) to rule on differences which may arise between the parties; (e) to guide and coordinate the activities of certain subsidiary commissions. (GPA as translated into English in UN Security Council, S/24642, 9 October 1992).

<sup>6</sup>CCFADM is the Portuguese abbreviation of *Comissão Conjunta para a Formação das Forças de Defesa e Segurança de Moçambique*, which has the role, indicated in its name, of creating the new national army, and in which the Government was initially represented by Tobias Dai and Renamo by Mateus Ngonhamo, with representatives of France, the United Kingdom and Portugal also participating; on the CCF, or *Comissão de Cessar-Fogo* Aleixo Malunga initially represented the government with Hermínio Morais representing Renamo, with representatives of Botswana, Egypt, France, Italy, Nigeria, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States; on CORE, or *Comissão de Reintegração*, Eneas Comiche, Minister of Finance, initially represented the government with Domingos Varga representing Renamo, and also representatives of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Community. Other commissions were created later, namely the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL), the National Information Commission (COMINFO), the National Commission for Territorial Administration, and the National Elections Commission (CNE).

to UN Security Council Resolution 797, ONUMOZ<sup>7</sup> was to perform a four-fold mandate: politically, it should facilitate, with impartiality, the implementation of the accord, particularly by chairing the CSC and its subordinated commissions; militarily, it should, amongst other things, monitor and verify the implementation of the cease fire, as well as the separation and cantonment, selection and demobilization of forces, including the collection and destruction of weaponry. It should also control the retreat of the Malawian and Zimbabwean contingents from the Beira, Limpopo and Nacala corridors, and supervise the disbanding of irregular, private and non-official troops; electorally, it should monitor and provide technical assistance to the process of general elections; and in the humanitarian field, it should coordinate all assistance to refugees, displaced people, demobilized soldiers and people affected by hunger, under its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, UNOHAC.<sup>8</sup>

In order to fulfil its mandate, ONUMOZ was to be provided with both military and civilian departments. The military department was to be made up of between 7,000 and 8,000 soldiers,<sup>9</sup> 350 military observers, and 42 special observers, of whom half were for the police and half for intelligence. The civilian department was to include 220 civil observers of the electoral process. ONUMOZ, mandated to monitor the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of nearly 110,000 combatants from both sides, as well as the constitution of the new national army and the re-settlement of 5 to 6 million refugees and displaced people, was estimated to cost US\$331 million (\$1 million per day, approximately) until 31 November 1993.<sup>10</sup>

### 1.3 Creating conditions for troop cantonment (October 1992 - November 1993)

According to the GPA, the termination of the armed conflict should contain four phases: the cease fire; the separation of forces, the concentration of forces, and demobilization.<sup>11</sup> The

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<sup>7</sup>ONUMOZ is what could be considered an 'hybrid acronym', formed by a first half in Portuguese (ONU, or *Organização das Nações Unidas*, for UN) and a second half in English (MOZ for Mozambique).

<sup>8</sup>UN Security Council, S/24892, 3 December 1992: 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)', p.5, empowered by UN Security Council, S/RES/797 (1992), 16 December 1992.

<sup>9</sup>Distributed as follows, according to UN Security Council S/24892, 3 December 1992: five infantry battalions to ensure continued security, particularly along the corridors; three engineer companies (supported by mine-clearing and engineering contractors) to assist in demining and road repair and in the destruction of arms and ammunition not needed by the new armed forces; one headquarters company, including a military police platoon; a military communications unit to ensure communications between all components of ONUMOZ; a military medical unit; an aviation unit for command liaison, reconnaissance, investigations, medical evacuation and re-supply; three logistic companies to perform the functions of a non-existent civilian resupply system; and a movement control company.

<sup>10</sup>See, among others, UN Department of Public Information, DPI/326, January 1993.

<sup>11</sup>GPA, Protocol VI, I.3. This was further specified in the global design of the operation, as a ceasefire 'rapidly followed by the separation of the two sides' forces and their concentration in certain designated Assembly Areas. Immediately thereafter demobilization of these troops who are not to serve in the new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) will begin and will be completed within six months of E-Day'. UN

GPA also drew up a timetable for this operation: on 15 October 1992, the installation of CCF should take place; a month later both parties would define the troops to be demobilized and the process would start; by 15 December, at least 20 per cent of the total troops should be demobilized, followed by demobilization of 20 per cent of the total troops per month until the conclusion of the process, scheduled for 15 April 1993.<sup>12</sup>

This forecast soon proved over-optimistic - the process of separation and concentration of forces turned out to be much more complicated than first thought, leading in turn to the period of cantonment itself being prolonged, and demobilization being delayed.

Although the cease fire was promptly respected, several problems combined to delay the concentration of forces, starting with the definition of the AAs themselves, a process which eventually took more than a year. As early as its session on 10 November, CCF had identified 49 AAs, of which 29 were for Government troops and 20 for Renamo forces. At the same session, the Government announced that 61,638 of its troops were to be cantoned, and Renamo announced that the number for their forces was 21,000.<sup>13</sup> But, from then on, the programme stalled, not helped by the slow arrival and installation of ONUMOZ's troops in the country. The complement of ONUMOZ personnel had increased from an initial 10 (which was already fewer than had been planned) who accompanied Ajello had, by February 1993, to only about 100, following the arrival of Major-General Lélío Gonçalves, the first military commander of ONUMOZ. It was not until May 1993 that the size of ONUMOZ was considered to be adequate.<sup>14</sup> This was after the date on which, according to the original plan, demobilization should have been concluded. Such delays in building up the UN's military observer operation did little to promote a smooth launch of the cantonment process, not least because both parties (particularly Renamo) were reluctant to proceed with it without UN security guarantees.

The main factor delaying the cantonment process was undoubtedly the lack of trust between the two parties in itself, and the extent to which this led to other delaying factors such as the logistical problems caused by the location of some AAs. The dispute over the selection and location of the AAs was caused by neither party being inclined to give a strategic advantage to their adversary. Initially, 12 centres were defined, but the selection of further areas became complicated. The first serious dispute emerged over the proposal for a Renamo camp between Bela Vista and Salamanga (Maputo province). The Government refused to agree to this, alleging that it was located near a Government battalion. By the same token, Renamo refused to agree to the installation of a Government camp at Nhapalapala (central Sofala), on

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Security Council: S/24642, 9 October 1992, 'United Nations Operation in Mozambique: Report of the Secretary-General', p.2.

<sup>12</sup>GPA, Protocol IV, 'On Military Issues', VI, 5.

<sup>13</sup>*Notícias*, 11 November 1992.

<sup>14</sup>According to *Notícias* 17 May 1993, the ONUMOZ armed forces were considered complete by this time, with the following numbers: Bangladesh (1,320), Botswana (721), Italy (1,039), Uruguay (820), Zambia (821). And India (655, logistical support), Portugal (communications), Japan (48, movement control), Argentina (36, medical unit), plus 207 unarmed military from 17 countries and 168 chief-of-staff officers.

the grounds that had been an area under Renamo influence, illegally occupied by Government troops after the GPA was signed. As to the methodology, Renamo troops refused to leave their areas for the AAs without guarantees that the protection of the areas they vacated would be assured by ONUMOZ. It took until 13 January 1993 for representatives of the Swiss cooperation, the European Community (EC), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO) to start visiting the proposed sites in order to assess their housing, sanitation, food and clothing needs, and the registration and identification of the combatants cantoned in these camps.<sup>15</sup>

By 22 January 1993, both parties had accepted Ajello's proposal of 'gradual cantoning'. Under this scheme, 49 sites would be identified in four phases using a basic principle of 'strategic equity', but also taking into account easy access and the quality of facilities. While work on improving the sites began for the first 12, Ajello foresaw the selection of a further 12 before the end of February. It should be noted that, according to the GPA, the collection of weaponry by the UN should have started in November 1992. Consequently, Ajello showed openly, for the first time, his concerns regarding the delays in the process, in spite of recognizing that both parties were trying to proceed carefully in order to prevent the opposing side from gaining any geographic and strategic advantage. Ajello was, with good reason, worried that the delays in the troop demobilization would delay the other processes included in the GPA.

By March 1993, a climate of distrust between the parties was widespread. Renamo blamed the Government for refusing to speed up the implementation of the GPA, while the Government accused Renamo of 'dilatatory manoeuvres', in particular, continuing to refuse to install its staff in Maputo so they could participate in the commissions already created, because of an alleged lack of installation facilities. Meanwhile, the slow build-up of UN troops continued to weaken confidence on the ground. Although the situation remained calm, soldiers on both sides were still armed and posed a threat to the process. Manfredo Di Camerana, the Italian ambassador, expressed his concern on 24 March 1993, blaming the bureaucracy of ONUMOZ for preventing the process being speeded up. He looked for an action plan which concentrated on more sharply defined priorities, particularly regarding troop cantonment.<sup>16</sup>

The three parties, Government, Renamo and ONUMOZ, had different views on the situation. Renamo kept trying to delay the process in pursuit of what could be considered as a 'linkage policy', whereby the cantonment of its troops was linked to reassurances from the UN that it would protect the areas left behind. By mid-March, Renamo's reservations regarding cantonment appeared also to be linked with illicit recruitment of former SNASP<sup>17</sup> members

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<sup>15</sup>*Notícias*, 14 January 1993. In parallel, the WFP announced its plans for providing food support to the camps for a minimum period of 18 months. It would provide 14,000 metric tons of food items to 120,000 people (the combatants referred to above plus around 38,000 relatives), through an emergency operation in which it would spend US\$5.8 million. *Notícias*, 8 January 1992.

<sup>16</sup>*Notícias*, 25 March 1993.

<sup>17</sup>SNASP stands for *Serviço Nacional de Segurança Popular*, the security police of the regime since independence, at this time already dismantled. See *Notícias*, 13 March 1993, in this respect.

into the police, a position reiterated in April when Dhlakama announced that he would only order Renamo troops to be cantoned after the UN police contingent was up to strength in Mozambique in order to assure territorial security.<sup>18</sup> Dhlakama also mentioned for the first time that, without the money to transform Renamo from a guerrilla movement into a political party, he would never agree to the cantoning of his troops.<sup>19</sup> In June, during the course of talks with US Assistant Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, George Moose, Dhlakama again mentioned the need to finance Renamo's transformation into a political party, adding for the first time, that, without new uniforms, his troops would not go to the camps.<sup>20</sup> Finally, Hermínio Morais, Renamo's representative at the CCF, affirmed that the cantonment of Renamo's troops would only begin after the 49 assembly camps had been identified.<sup>21</sup> Renamo's 'linkage policy', aimed at slowing down a development which the movement was not in a position to control, was perhaps most strongly expressed in an aggressive speech by Raul Domingos at the opening of the donors' conference in Maputo on 9 June.

If Renamo was trying to slow down the pace of cantonment, the Government, on the other hand, seemed to have reasons to speed it up because of growing difficulties in financing its large contingents. The Government's problem seemed to be a combination of lack of financial resources and the poor functioning of the army's financial department. In late March and early April, a special military operation was launched in the outskirts of Maputo to neutralize a mutiny of demobilized soldiers formerly linked to presidential security. Similar incidents took place in Nampula where the soldiers demanded better salaries (or merely for their existing salaries to be paid).

In order to ease the burden on the Government, but perhaps also to rehearse the procedures required in coordinating a demobilization programme under the UN umbrella, the 'proper' demobilization of Government soldiers who had been demobilized before the GPA was implemented in April and May. The ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization was to register these soldiers and send the lists of names to the Ministries of Defence and Finance which would, in turn, organize the transportation of the troops to areas of their choice and pay six months' salary as compensation (this was to be paid in two instalments: three months' immediately, plus three months' after they had returned to the areas concerned). The transportation, by air, sea or land, was to be conducted by the IOM (International Organization for Migration) under the coordination of UNOHAC. According to the Ministry of Finance the operation cost around US\$3 million.

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<sup>18</sup> *Notícias* 10 April 1993. In the same occasion Dhlakama affirmed that 'if we have today 7,000 UN soldiers here, today I shall order my forces to render their weapons and go to the cantonment areas.' By this time it was estimated that 65 percent of the ONUMOZ contingent was in place.

<sup>19</sup> The episode of the money to finance the parties filled the pages of the newspapers for some days. According to Dhlakama a secret agreement had been signed in Rome between Guebuza, Domingos and Luigi Adraza, by then the Italian General Director for cooperation, stating that US\$32 million were reserved to finance the political parties, of which 15 million would go to Renamo. Italy was the only country to subscribe to a proposal of this kind since the other countries invoked legal restrictions to refuse the financial support to political parties.

<sup>20</sup> *Notícias*, 26 June 1993.

<sup>21</sup> *Notícias*, 8 July 1993.

The interests of the parties were conflicting, however. The Government kept to its aims of securing peace at any cost and as quickly as possible, trying to win public opinion in the process. It also tried to confirm the image of Renamo as an unsophisticated movement from the bush which could hardly be envisaged as being capable of transformation into a 'civilized' political party. The April campaign aimed to expose Renamo's use of children as guerrilla combatants, and to focus attention on the 'two administrations' which had become an issue because Renamo resisted giving Government officials access to its areas. The Government campaigned hard on this issue, believing that the international community would not accept Renamo's position.

However, Renamo's position seems understandable. The *philosophy* behind the GPA was that all the protagonists should help Renamo to achieve a 'human face' while, despite this, the fact was that, as Dhlakama affirmed, 'public opinion is trying to press Renamo to demobilize its forces'. Under such pressures, Renamo hardened its position, again alleging that the Government had strengthened the police through covert recruitment and demanded a share of the control of police posts.<sup>22</sup> By July, the atmosphere between the parties was one of suspicion and confrontation. Renamo claimed the right to administer its areas and demanded to appoint some provincial governors before the peace process could be pursued. This bid grew to include in August, five provincial governorships. Dhlakama claimed:

We control our zones. It is necessary to integrate them in the state administration. But how can we accept a situation in which our zones will be submitted to a Frelimo governor?<sup>23</sup>

During this period, the difficulties ONUMOZ was having in taking the initiative, and even maintaining some level of control of events, became apparent. The fact that UN troops were arriving very slowly perhaps forced the UN into giving priority to a more 'diplomatic' approach. Ajello had to visit Maringué frequently for discussions with Dhlakama. In spite of everything, ONUMOZ kept an optimistic view of the process, trying to start with the cantonment process. Six assembly points, two in each region, north, centre, and south, became ready for occupation, and a date for this was established: 21 June 1993. Subsequently, 15 July 1993 established as the new date for the start of the same process.

From July, two important developments must be taken into account. Firstly, ONUMOZ strengthened its position as it completed its deployment; secondly, the UN Security Council hardened its position, urging the Government and Renamo to start the demobilization process immediately and calling for a new report from the Secretary General for early August. Perhaps as a result of this pressure, the first summit between Chissano and Dhlakama finally took place in Maputo on 23 August. The most significant outcome of this summit concerned the thorny issues of territorial administration and the police. On the first, Dhlakama accepted the need for just one administration over the entire territory, 'in order of the areas under Renamo control to benefit also from the state budget', as he put it. He dropped his demands to govern some provinces in favour of the creation of the post of advisor to the governor in

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<sup>22</sup> *Notícias*, 15 July 1993.

<sup>23</sup> *Notícias*, 4 August 1993.

each province. Regarding the police, both leaders agreed on the need for neutrality, and asked the UN for an international police contingent to supervise the activities of the Mozambican police and to provide technical support to COMPOL. The issue of troop cantonment did not merit a special agreement.<sup>24</sup>

Despite easing the political climate and bringing a measure of agreement over important matters, the summit did not alter the main stand of the two parties. In September, Renamo remained inflexible in maintaining its linkage policy.<sup>25</sup> Old and new obstacles were brought forward by Dhlakama. On 5 September, he said that, unless certain important steps were taken, such as the repair of roads, the elections would not take place in October 1994. Some days later, Renamo affirmed that it would not demobilize before the removal of the non-FAM armed groups in the country under Government control.<sup>26</sup> On 20 September, in Nairobi (Kenya), Dhlakama continued to raise difficulties: without the money promised by the western countries to transform Renamo into a political party, without the repatriation of all the refugees and the re-settlement of all the displaced people, the elections could not happen.<sup>27</sup> At the same time, the first signs of Renamo's open hostility towards the UN began to emerge: Dhlakama affirmed that the UN was acting on a unilateral basis in favour of the Government. A few days later, perhaps under strengthened pressure, Dhlakama disingenuously affirmed that it was not Renamo's intention to delay the elections, and that these could take place even if the conditions for demobilization were not created.<sup>28</sup> While Renamo may originally have intended only to stress the importance of the points it was raising, this new line would have led to elections while both parties were still armed, a very dangerous and, therefore, unacceptable solution, as events in Angola had demonstrated. Meanwhile, Renamo did not seem very interested in attempts to make the commissions work. In late September, the Renamo members of the CSC failed to attend an important session and all went back to their headquarters in Maringué for consultations with the leadership of the movement.<sup>29</sup>

Renamo was now becoming dangerously isolated, putting the entire peace process in jeopardy. Boutros Ghali undertook a visit to Mozambique at this juncture where he found that Renamo had many complaints to table. Boutros Ghali's visit achieved a compromise on the electoral law, the cantonment and demobilization of the regular troops, the disbanding of the irregular forces, and on the functioning of the Commissions for Police, Information and Territorial

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<sup>24</sup>*Notícias*, 24 August, 4 September 1993.

<sup>25</sup>Immediately after the summit Dhlakama affirmed that a special permit issued by Renamo was still needed particularly for the wood cutters who penetrated areas under Renamo control. The problem of the two administrations was still to be settled.

<sup>26</sup>The target were, besides the militia groups, the companies recently created for civil security, particularly in Maputo.

<sup>27</sup>*Notícias*, 15, 20, 21 September 1993.

<sup>28</sup>*Notícias*, 29 September 1993.

<sup>29</sup>*Notícias*, 30 September 1993.

Administration.<sup>30</sup>

In the wake of Boutros Ghali's visit on 22 October, the UN secured an agreement with the Government and Renamo, rescheduling the implementation of the GPA. The beginning of the cantonment process was set for 30 November, with a new timetable for the second phase - the Demobilization - to start in January 1994 and to be concluded by the end of May that year.<sup>31</sup> But, as before, the UN had little practical effect on the strategies and problems of each party on the ground. On 22 October, part of a military battalion (around 250 men), formerly designated to protect the railways in the Beira Corridor, rioted and blocked traffic for some days. Some days later, some 200 military also blocked the road at Dondo and demanded that their salaries be paid. Further north, in Tete, soldiers of the 1st battalion of the 4th brigade of motorized infantry blocked the road at Moatize, claiming four months' salary.<sup>32</sup> Commenting on these incidents, Júlio Joaquim Nimuri, President of AMODEG (the national association of the demobilized soldiers or *Associação Moçambicana dos Desmobilizados de Guerra*) warned that a return to war was possible if the Government continued to neglect those who had served it militarily.<sup>33</sup>

Renamo's interests were clearly linked with slowing down the demobilization process, since its supposed military strength was perhaps the only card it held (apart from UN reassurances) to secure what Dhlakama had demanded from the beginning, that is, the retention of some degree of territorial control, and obtaining funds for transforming his organization into a political party. Dhlakama claimed that the transformation of Renamo into a political party was a vital issue: if the leadership lost control of the movement (due to lack of funds), the democratic process could well founder. 'It is necessary to help Renamo maintain the discipline of their military and politicians until the elections'.<sup>34</sup> According to Dhlakama,

Once the procedures for supervising the police corps and for equipping the special police are implemented, Renamo will be willing to start the cantonment and demobilization of its forces and to participate in the creation of the joint army.

Despite the more cooperative attitude the movement was obliged to show in the wake of Ghali's visit to Mozambique, the old problems therefore resurfaced.

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<sup>30</sup>Notícias, 19, 21 October 1993.

<sup>31</sup>Notícias, 23 October 1993.

<sup>32</sup>Notícias, 25, 27, 29 October 1993.

<sup>33</sup>Notícias, 16 October 1993.

<sup>34</sup>Notícias, 22 November 1993.

#### 1.4 Cantonment of troops

The cantonment of troops started on 30 November against this uncompromising background. The GPA, particularly its Fourth Protocol on the military issues, provided the framework for the operation. Section 6 dealt with the social and economic re-integration of the demobilized military. It determined the creation of both the CCF and CORE. The CCF was intended to implement the demobilization process, initially planning and organizing it, and then directing and conducting it. The CCF therefore shaped the evolution of the process, particularly the first phase of cantonment and demobilization of troops from both sides in separate AAs. The camps were to have a commander from the Government or Renamo, and tight UN surveillance. ONUMOZ, working in coordination with several departments and agencies, was to equip the camps with the basic amenities, for example, UNICEF was to be responsible for water supply, WHO (and the Military Health Department of the Government in the case of Government camps) for health, and IOM for transportation of soldiers and displaced people. On arrival at the camps, the troops were to be registered, to receive identity cards and surrender their weapons, which would be kept in special stores provided with two keys, one held by the camp commander and the other with the ONUMOZ representative at the camp. After these procedures were completed, the combatants were regarded as cantoned, and the registrations sent to Maputo (weekly, in the case of Government troops, and twice per month in the case of Renamo troops). Both parties would then decide which of their men should be integrated in the new national army and which should be demobilized. Each would transfer 15,000 of its men to the new army.<sup>35</sup>

Demobilized soldiers were to be given a demobilization card, civilian clothing, food for the journey back home and three months' salary in advance, while still in the AAs, plus their full salary paid each month by the authorities of their home area or area of their choice. IOM and UNOHAC would underwrite this commitment, the former allocating US\$16 million for transportation, the latter with an anticipated expenditure of US\$50 million from a total budget of US\$90 million for the social and economic re-integration of demobilized government soldiers and their families.

There were, however, differences of opinion within the UN agencies and other donors on the way the demobilization process could best be supported. One view was that the UN should commit resources to the longer-term goal of the re-integration of the soldiers into Mozambican society. The other supported more realistic and shorter term targets, considering that their commitment should be limited to removing the immediate threat represented by a disaffected military waiting to be demobilized. The furthest this approach was prepared to go was to extend the cash compensation for some extra months, aiming to secure thereby the quickest demobilization of the greatest number of troops.

By 30 November, the rescheduled date for the beginning of troop cantonment, 36 of the 49 accommodation camps had been identified. It was, however, recognized that the opening of all of these camps at the same time would unbalance the process, which should proceed at a roughly equal rate in both armies. Following a proposal from the Technical Unit of ONUMOZ, it was agreed to start with the opening of 20 accommodation camps, 12 for

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<sup>35</sup>GPA, Protocol VI, Lii.

Government troops and 8 for Renamo's. Progress was slow due to the poor communication facilities of both parties, particularly Renamo (in contrast, ONUMOZ was able to maintain satellite communications with each centre, allowing permanent contact). Orders took time to reach the commanders and, thereafter, combatants listed for demobilization frequently had to walk for days to the camps. But, despite such difficulties, the process started on the expected date.

Further disputes soon emerged, however, regarding the number of troops accommodated in the camps leading to the first serious public dispute between the Government and ONUMOZ. The Government vigorously contested the first estimates announced by ONUMOZ. According to the Government, ONUMOZ systematically presented lower numbers for the Government troops, thus diminishing its effort.<sup>36</sup> ONUMOZ played down this charge, suggesting that the most plausible explanation in view of the numbers passing into the camps was a different understanding of the technical definition of 'accommodation'. The Government appeared to base its calculations on the numbers entered in the AAs, while ONUMOZ calculated accommodation as being achieved only after the combatants had been registered, surrendered their weapons and received their identity cards.

According to the methodology used at the AAs, a soldier was regarded as having *arrived* when he entered the camp and was reported as present by the camp commander in his daily report (Sitrep) to the ONUMOZ representative there. The next step was *confirmation*, which consisted of the soldier being individually entered in the ONUMOZ registration sheets and being given a registration number. The soldier was only considered as officially *registered* once he had filled in the registration card of the ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization. Table 1 shows the numbers of soldiers who went through these stages at the AAs in the first 20 days of the process, and shows how the application of different criteria could lead to serious discrepancies in the numbers.

**TABLE 1: Accommodated troops in the first 20 days of December**

Day	Government Troops			Renamo Troops		
	Arrived	Confirmed	Registered	Arrived	Confirmed	Registered
06	2,142	1,856	522	615	156	156
10	3,616	3,309	2,005	687	559	156
12	5,063	4,290	3,318	761	570	570
17	6,239	5,619	5,000	1,325	1,144	875
20	6,844	5,894	5,594	2,518	1,609	1,357

Source: *Notícias*, 11, 14, 18, 21 December 1993.

<sup>36</sup> *Notícias*, 4 December 1993.

If the difficulties each had to face on the ground, and which were referred to above, are excluded, it seems that there are no grounds for accusing either the Government or Renamo of deliberately delaying the process. This is supported by taking into account the numbers of soldiers each party was required to send to the 20 accommodation camps during the period, namely 25,976 combatants for the Government and 6,961 for Renamo.<sup>37</sup> Table 2, based on the *arrival* of troops into the camps (perhaps the best indicator of *intention* to canton troops) shows that both parties maintained the same level of commitment during the first week. In the second week, the Government maintained a good 'cantonment pace' (even if it was slower than the level which had been planned), while Renamo clearly reduced its momentum, presenting only 10.8 per cent against the Government's 19.4 per cent on day 12. It was at this point that the Government reacted vigorously, openly opposing plans for this phase, namely ONUMOZ's transfer of all weaponry from the AAs to regional depots, while the situation was not on track.<sup>38</sup> At a CSC meeting, Renamo promised to increase its numbers, which is effectively what happened in the third week.<sup>39</sup> By day 20, Renamo was, in its turn, ahead of the Government.

**TABLE 2: 'Cantonment pace' of both parties in December (%)**

Day	Government	Renamo
06	8.2	8.8
10	13.9	9.8
12	19.4	10.8
17	24.0	19.0
20	26.3	36.1

From 20 December the cantonment process entered its second phase with the opening of the remaining 29 accommodation areas, of which two - Dunda and Salamanga - still remained under discussion.<sup>40</sup> Two main issues prevailed in the last days of 1993 and the first of 1994: the increased delay in the cantonment of the Government's troops and the first serious logistical problems experienced in the AAs.

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<sup>37</sup>Numbers provided by Ajello in *Notícias*, 3 December 1993.

<sup>38</sup>*Notícias*, 13 December 1993.

<sup>39</sup>*Notícias*, 15 December 1993.

<sup>40</sup>Of the 27 camps considered (Salamanga and Dunda excepted), only 15 were established at this time (nine for the Government and six for Renamo), the remaining 12 (eight for the Government and four for Renamo) being approved by the CCF only in 1 February 1994. On December 17 the CSC determined Renamo's withdrawal from Salamanga and that its men should be assembled at Chinhanganine.

**TABLE 3: 'Cantonment pace' of both parties in January and February 1994<sup>41</sup>**

	Government		Renamo	
		%		%
15 Jan	8,344	13.6	5,500	26.1
01 Feb	13,197	21.6	7,392	35.1
15 Feb	23,858	39.0	10,033	47.7
18 Feb	25,055	40.9	10,113	48.1

The delays on the Government side got worse through January (in the first 15 days of that month the Government only accommodated 58 soldiers). Ajello convened a meeting of CSC to explore the reasons the Government had put forward to justify the delays.<sup>42</sup> By the end of the month, the situation had altered little, the Government maintaining that the problem was merely technical and not political. The CSC urged the Government to show more flexibility in moving its troops to the camps in order to avoid jeopardizing the next steps of the process. Only in early February did the situation really improve.

In fact, problems in the AAs themselves, particularly those concerning logistics, seem to have more serious implications than the rate of arrival of combatants. For the Government soldiers, it was not just a question of dissatisfaction with the conditions in the camps but also a matter of salaries not being paid, promises for compensation not being fulfilled, demands for salary increases, and so on. These issues, compounded by generalized indiscipline, were behind a series of mutinies which took place during this period, particularly in the North of the country. In mid-December, troops who had been accommodated left their camp at Namialo (Nampula province) and took control of the railway station and several public buildings, demanding a range of compensations. Instability became chronic along the entire Nacala corridor in January 1994 due to soldiers belonging to the Namialo camp. FAM and ONUMOZ authorities lost control of the situation.<sup>43</sup> At the same time, Mutuali (Nampula province) suffered several attacks by ex-combatants of unknown origin, though rumours blamed the Government's Cuamba-based 7th Brigade.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Percentages from totals of 61,138 and 21,000 respectively for the Government and Renamo. The divergence in percentages between tables 2 and 3 are therefore due to the different totals concerned in terms of men and camps. It must not be forgotten that on 1 February the last camps were established (except the two Renamo camps still being disputed).

<sup>42</sup>*Notícias*, 15 January 1994.

<sup>43</sup>*Domingo*, 12 December 1993; *Notícias*, 16 December 1993.

<sup>44</sup>In fact, it became very difficult to differentiate between typical protest of canted troops and mere social banditry. *Notícias*, 22, 27 January 1994.

**TABLE 4: Assembly areas by date of opening**

	30 NOV 93	20 DEC 93	01 FEB 94
<b>GOVERNMENT</b>	Lichinga (Ni) Marrupa (Ni) Montepuez (CD) Namialo (Na) Estima (T) Machaze (Mn) Caia (S) Chibabava (S) Massinga (I) Massingir (G) Moamba (Mp) Magude (Mp)	Mueda (CD) Milange (Z) Quelimane (Z) Ulongué (T) Catandica (Mn) Casa Banana (S) Rio Save (I) Mapai (G) Catembe (Mp)	Cuamba (Ni) Angoche (Na) Mocuba (Z) Tete (T) Chimoio (Mn) Nhangau (S) Chokwe (G) Boane (Mp)
<b>RENAMO</b>	Mavago (Ni) Lúrio (Na) Mohiua (Z) Chioco (T) Chiramba (S) Magunde (S) Neves (I) Chinhanguanine (Mp)	Namicunde (Ni) Chapa (CD) Quinga (Na) Muchene (T) Chipanzane (I) Changanine (G)	Mocubela (Z) Sabelua (Z) Nhamagua (Mn) Savane (S) Nhamacala (S) Tinanguanine (Mp)

Provinces: Ni = Niassa; CD = Cabo Delgado; Na = Nampula; Z = Zambézia;  
T = Tete; Mn = Manica; S = Sofala; I = Inhambane; G = Gaza; Mp = Maputo.

Source: ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization, 'Movimento de Militares nas AA'.

In the case of Renamo, which apparently had more disciplined contingents, dissatisfaction was more directly linked with the physical conditions in the camps. This was due to several factors. The first was that Renamo was, in a way, suffering from having assembled its men in the camps so promptly, in that, because the demobilization process was delayed and the first soldiers assembled in these camps did not leave, the camps became overcrowded. As early as December, even though the cantonment process had started only a few days earlier, the AA at Magunde (Sofala province) had already reached maximum capacity while Mohiua

(Zambézia province), with a maximum capacity of 600, was already hosting 834 men.

The situation worsened when Dhlakama, in the wake of a visit to some camps, vigorously protested against ONUMOZ and particularly against Ajello, threatening to abandon the camps if measures were not taken immediately. He had apparently found a situation at Chiramba (Sofala province) in which his men did not have food, allegedly because of lack of transport, while water was being transported from Beira by helicopter for the baths of ONUMOZ personnel. Dhlakama commented:

The international community made available more than 300 million US dollars to invest in this operation and I don't understand why they [Ajello and his men] still say there is no money. This is a joke. My troops are facing a hard time, their morale is low. They are psychologically destroyed.<sup>45</sup>

All this led to a series of conflicts, with the organizations concerned blaming each other. Ajello played down the conditions in the camps ('which are not supposed to be luxury hotels'), and ordered an inquiry into the situation at Chiramba. The WFP immediately blamed the lack of food at Renamo camps on the Government. It had been agreed that the WFP would supply 'dry' goods (maize, rice, beans, cooking oil, biscuits and sugar), while the Government should provide meat, fish and bread, items scarce in the Renamo camps. The Government immediately responded by arguing that it had organized a system to supply the numbers which had been planned to be at the camps, and not the numbers which were actually there - sometimes twice the planned number. In February, the situation improved considerably (Dhlakama considered then the food situation as 'almost acceptable' although a lot remained to be done regarding the poor housing conditions and lack of clothing). However, most of the causes of friction remained, namely the difficult conditions at the camps, stress provoked by the ex-combatants' immobility and inactivity,<sup>46</sup> uncertainty regarding the future, and so on. The result was a series of outbreaks of unrest which threatened to escalate rapidly to dangerous proportions.

While, in the past, the Government, Renamo and ONUMOZ had tended to play down these outbreaks as they emerged, regarding them as the result of logistical difficulties, they were now tending to blame each other. An example was the incident putting General Ngonhamo of Renamo in confrontation with the Government and ONUMOZ. Ngonhamo accused the Government of covertly training 1,000 men in Nampula.<sup>47</sup> At about the same time, Brigadier Raúl Dick denounced the alleged discovery of a Government arms cache in

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<sup>45</sup>*Notícias*, 30 December 1993.

<sup>46</sup>Only music broadcast by the UN, and particularly American music, drew an audience from the soldiers in the camps.

<sup>47</sup>Besides these 1,000 men, Nihia, the first secretary of Frelimo in Nampula and retired general of the Government army, was also accused of keeping and training a 350 men special force. After the somewhat tense days CCF, through its leader, the Italian Colonel Pier Giorgio Segala, concluded that the incident was based on a misunderstanding since the area where according to Ngonhamo the covert training activities were being held was a camp used by Government soldiers in transit to the AAs, under UN control.

Inhamízia (Sofala) at a meeting of the CCF.<sup>48</sup> The Government, in turn, referred to rumours about Renamo training a special force in Kenya.<sup>49</sup>

Despite all this, February also brought some encouraging pointers, not least a donors' conference in Maputo, which earmarked US\$20 million to extend the period during which demobilized soldiers would continue to earn their salaries from 6 to 18 months.<sup>50</sup> On 5 February, James Purcell, Director-General of IOM, announced the allocation of US\$15 million to meet the costs of transporting all demobilized soldiers from the assembly camps to their home areas.<sup>51</sup> On 12 February, the CSC decided that demobilization would start on 1 March,<sup>52</sup> and, on 18 March, the UN Security Council approved a resolution saying, amongst other things, that all UN personnel should have left Mozambique by November 1994. This new deadline contributed to kick-starting the demobilization process so that the timetable for the remaining phases of the process could be maintained.<sup>53</sup>

The date on which demobilization was to start, 1 March, became key. Until demobilization started, the camps would not be able to receive more men and, consequently, to proceed with cantonment. Even so, the situation was far from being at a standstill, since the environment at the camps was continuously worsening, threatening the security of the country. Apparently, any step forward depended on the political will of both parties and on Renamo's ability to deliver its lists of men to be demobilized.

## 1.5 A typology of incidents in the assembly areas

The numbers of mutinies in the AAs increased to the point of putting the entire process at risk. In Government camps, 6 incidents were reported in January 1994, 13 in March, and 36 in May; in Renamo camps, 12, 21 and 31 incidents were reported in the same months.<sup>54</sup> At first, these incidents tended to be sparked off by the poor facilities at the camps, particularly lack of shelter, food, and water, but they later reflected the impatience and frustration of the

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<sup>48</sup>*Notícias*, 3 February 1994.

<sup>49</sup>*Domingo*, 20 February 1994.

<sup>50</sup>*Notícias*, 1 February 1994.

<sup>51</sup>In January, Enzo Ponziani, Chief of Operations of the IOM sub-delegation at Maputo had already announced that his organization was prepared and provided with a methodology to assure the transportation of all demobilized soldiers from the camps to areas chosen by them. *Domingo*, 6 February 1994.

<sup>52</sup>*Notícias*, 14 February 1994.

<sup>53</sup>*Notícias*, 19 February 1994.

<sup>54</sup>ONUMOZ CCF Section, 'Problems/Incidents in Assembly Areas and Other Areas', updated on 9 June 1994. Of course these cannot be taken as absolute figures, depending on the criteria or what was considered as worth being reported. However, this is an excellent indication in our view and we took all incidents reported irrespectively of their gravity. All information provided in this section comes from this source unless stated otherwise.

combatants anxious to leave them - in other words - to be demobilized.

There were, however, differences of emphasis behind the incidents in the Government and Renamo camps. The problems in the Renamo camps were clearly linked to the poor facilities provided (78 per cent).<sup>55</sup> A report on the conditions at Mocubela, where at least 12 incidents were related to shortages of food and clothing, is illuminating in this respect:

ON 3 FEB 94 - The soldiers in the AA, over 750 of them, protested about the quality and quantity of food in the AA. They refuse to cook and to eat that day. They assaulted the local warehouse and stole all the food that had arrived that morning. The next day the soldiers continued their protests. [...] ON 20 MAR 94 - A large group of soldiers gathered in front of ONUMOZ team's camp. They had demanded clothing for a total of approx 300 soldiers who have not received their clothing. This group had also objected to the medical team providing medical assistance to the civilian population in the area. These soldiers had also subsequently erected road block along the Mocubela-Quelimane road. Botswana and Italian forces have been deployed to stabilize the situation.

Why did these differences develop? One reason was that the Renamo camps tended mostly to be located in areas formerly under the control of the guerrillas, and generally in places very difficult for the logistical services to reach and provide better facilities, such as water. Another was rooted in the psychology of Renamo personnel. Given the difficult conditions under which they had fought the war and the fact that, as a result of internal Renamo propaganda, they entered the camps regarding themselves as part of a winning army which had earned the benefits promised to them by their leaders, it is not surprising that conditions in the AAs were a bitter pill for them to swallow. Although the same kind of problems were also reported in the Government camps (17 per cent of the total), their causes were more diverse, not least the delay in demobilization (39 per cent) and non-payment of salaries (27 per cent). Although the problems related to poor food supplies were also a factor, at least 20 of the 29 Government camps were located near medium-sized towns where the cantoned soldiers could go to buy supplies which would improve their daily living conditions. The length of time most of these troops has spent under conscription, nearly 10 years on average, was also a major source of discontent. The incidents in the Rio Save AA illustrate how the troops demanded an end to the continuing delays and uncertainty over demobilization:

ON 26 MAY 94 - Apparently, a majority of soldiers, including officers, are planning a fresh rebellion in the AA [...]. The soldiers are still awaiting for the demobilization date and the rebellion is positive to take place if there is no demobilization in early June or at least the date is not made known before the first of June [...]. ON 27 MAY 94 - The soldiers forwarded a letter of demand to the UN Military Observers. The text of the letter is as follows: *With respect we like to know why the demob process stopped? We are here for a long time without any definite answers. For this reason we are demanding to know the exact dates for the next demob here in Rio Save. We*

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<sup>55</sup>Typology of causes used include the five main categories of: (1) delay in demobilisation; (2) salaries in arrears; (3) poor quality shelter and lack of food and water; (4) refusal to join the new army; and (5) social problems.

*demand to know the answer before 30 May 94. If Rio Save receives more soldiers between 30.05.94 and 10.06.94 and still we don't receive any answer we are not sure who we are going to kill - the Camp Commander or ONUMOZ group. We are tired and bored of staying here. If you cannot solve the problems we are going to create something against Chissano which all Mozambicans will soon know. Perhaps after this the Govt will demob us. We have the right to know our rights. We assemble in this AA with the aim of either to go home or for the new army. Why we are assembled and for what?*

The stress of being kept in the camps without knowing what the future held steadily became the main cause of incidents at the Renamo camps as well. As time went by, the reactions of both sets of troops became more and more violent. From a typology of effects,<sup>56</sup> the pattern of incidents is more often reflected in Renamo's camps as assaults to warehouses and trucks bringing in food (36 per cent). Threats against the ONUMOZ teams at the camps (29 per cent) and failure to obey the orders of the camp commander (19 per cent) were also common. In Nhamagua,

ON 20 APR 94 - At 0300 soldiers surrounded the UN camp and damaged 1 living tent and the personal effects of observers. One observer (MAJ Ferreira) was hit on his forehead with a stick and suffered minor cuts. The soldiers are requesting water and wanted to see and speak with GEN Mateus and BRIG Dick before 0800. If this is not met they will destroy the UN camp and escape into the bush. Water situation in the camp is critical. No communications with CR 10 after 1700. Inmarsat not working and impossible to speak on radio in the evenings. The AA is without communications. [...] ON 06 MAY 94 - Approximately 100 RENAMO soldiers armed with sticks were protesting. They were unhappy with the financial bursary to be paid. They tried to beat the RENAMO REP who escaped into the bush.

The breaking of the chain of command in the Government camps (28 per cent of the cases), was accompanied by hostility towards ONUMOZ observers. In Lichinga, for instance,

ON 02 MAR 94 - The Niassa Provincial Commander, his Chief of Staff and the Chief of Air Defence, who were visiting the AA, were detained by the soldiers. UN Military Observer personnel were also denied access in/out of the AA. The soldiers demanded their 8 month backdated salary for 1993. [...] ON 28 MAR 94 - About 200 soldiers surrounded the UN camp, shouting and protesting against the demobilization list prepared for the demobilization scheduled for 31 Mar 94. The protest came from the regular soldiers who said they had arrived earlier and should be demobilized earlier than those registered outside the peace accord, who arrived later. The situation turned tense when the soldiers refused entry/exit to any UN member to and from the camp. The UN team then had to promise the soldiers that a new list will be prepared by Technical Unit (TU) Maputo which will have the names of those soldiers who

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<sup>56</sup>Including as main reactions of the cantoned troops the following: (1) assault to food and clothing warehouses; (2) assault to arms deposits in the camps; (3) chain of command broken; (4) threats to the security of ONUMOZ team; (5) road-block; (6) uncontrolled acts outside the camps including assault on civilians, shops, etc.

arrived first to the AA. On this assurance the soldiers allowed movement of UN Military Observers in and out of the camp. A forces weapons collection team that had gone to collect weapons from the AA on that day was also not allowed to bring back weapons. ON 29 MAR 94 - Team visited AA and tried to convince the soldiers to an amicable settlement. The soldiers remained firm in their demand i.e. they are to be demobilized first. Soldiers threatened to break open the arms store and take out weapons. [...] ON 23 MAY 94 - At about 1000 a huge crowd of soldiers entered the AA. They entered the tents and, striking on the tables with sticks, threatened the Observers that if they were not demobilized immediately or given a firm date they would destroy the camp. After one hour they got hold of the Camp Commander and went to meet the Governor. While going to the Governor they left behind about 100 soldiers. The UN team is ready to evacuate the camp if the situation becomes unmanageable.

The cantoned Government troops also found a very effective way of making their action widely known outside the camps: that of blocking the roads (25 per cent of the cases). This was facilitated by the fact that many of the Government camps were located close to important roads, unlike the Renamo camps which were generally located further into the bush.<sup>57</sup> This occurred at Caia:

ON 06 MAY 94 - At about 0830 small groups of demob soldiers started to gather near the UN camp in a very calm manner. At about 1300 approximately forty (40) demobilized soldiers armed with knives and axes established a road block on road near the Caia. They stopped two civilian trucks and beat the drivers. One of the drivers sustained injuries. No other civilians other than the drivers were involved. Twenty three policemen were deployed there and at about 1400 they fired 20/30 rounds on the ground and air. Two canisters of tear gas were also fired into the ground. The mob then dispersed into the surrounding bushes.

As most of the Government camps were located near relatively important towns, such incidents frequently ran out of control, with the mutinying soldiers looting shops and houses, destroying property, and defying the authorities. In Cuamba,

ON 27 DEC 93 - A group of uniformed but unarmed soldiers left the AA and went to Cuamba city, looting 6/7 shops and buildings. They were joined by civilians in this activity. The soldiers demanded their December salaries. The police tried to control the situation and opened fire at about 1140. Approximately 6 people have been injured during the incident, though 4 were treated as outpatients in the hospital. The police have informed that the soldiers are planning to take out some weapons from a hiding place tonight to attack the Indian residents of Cuamba town.

From June onwards, incidents of this kind increased in number and gravity. On 10 July, Renamo combatants conducted their most dramatic action so far, blocking the Beira-Maputo road and diverting the traffic to their base at Dombe. About 500 civilians were kept as

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<sup>57</sup>Though similar methods of protest also occurred in Renamo camps, they were much less frequent (14 per cent).

hostages there for some days. These people were liberated only after the food the troops had demanded was delivered to their base.<sup>58</sup> In July, major incidents started to occur in Maputo province as well. In the most serious of these, troops from the Government's 6th tank brigade went about with two tanks and several machine-guns, firing indiscriminately, ransacking houses and shops in the Maputo satellite town of Matola-Gare.<sup>59</sup> It is worth noting that, in the cases of both Dombe and Matola-Gare, the combatants involved belonged to the category of 'non-cantonable' troops, indicating that uncontrolled mutinies were spreading out of the AAs.

## 1.6 Demobilization of troops

Demobilization started on 10 March 1994 at the Massinga Government AA, in Inhambane province, when 250 soldiers were demobilized in a ceremony directed by President Chissano. This act started the third stage of the timetable described at the beginning of this chapter, although the process of cantonment was still carried on. Stages two and three of the demobilization process thus overlapped and, in fact, greatly interfered with each other, particularly because the slow rate of demobilization had a negative impact on cantonment as the AAs became overcrowded and the social situation in them degenerated to dangerous levels.

Several factors continued to encourage rapid demobilization, not least the requirement to follow the calendar established for the entire process, which included the need to provide the new army with recruits. Difficulties also developed in keeping both sides in the camps, and there were also specific problems in supplying ONUMOZ with the lists of men to be demobilized. This was particularly the case with Renamo, whose difficulties in this respect delayed its first demobilization until 18 March, when Renamo's leader Afonso Dhlakama ordered the demobilization of 101 combatants at the Renamo camp of Neves, in Inhambane.

In April, there were different responses from the Government and Renamo. While the Government apparently maintained a slow pace of cantonment and a moderate rate of demobilization, Renamo, on the other hand, kept up a high rate of cantonment while not, in practice, demobilizing its men. The relationship between the parties, which had improved slightly with the beginning of demobilization, became tense again.

Once again, the main source of dispute was the discrepancies over the total numbers of Government troops to be demobilized. In October 1992, the Government had told ONUMOZ that a total of 61,638 men were to be cantoned, with an additional 14,480 troops considered as 'non-cantonable',<sup>60</sup> making a total of 76,118 FAM soldiers. In April 1994, the Government announced a revised figure: 49,630 men were to be cantoned, a figure that excluded 12,000 men, a significant number. The Government argued that the difference was due to several factors, particularly the inclusion of more than 13,000 men who had been

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<sup>58</sup>See, amongst others, *Notícias*, 13-14 July 1994.

<sup>59</sup>*Notícias*, 28 July 1994; *Domingo*, 31 July 1994.

<sup>60</sup>Troops left outside the camps to assure national security and the maintenance of military installations.

demobilized in 1993, before the implementation of the GPA, whose acceptance had been agreed earlier in that month.<sup>61</sup> Renamo for its part then revived its accusation that the Government was covertly transferring men to the police, particularly from its security force but also from the army.<sup>62</sup> The Government countered this with the assertion that Dhlakama's movement was hosting forces of the Malawian Young Pioneers<sup>63</sup>. In view of the slow pace of Renamo demobilization, the Government decided to suspend its own demobilization programme. This suspension lasted until 15 June. At the same time, the Government proposed new target dates for the completion of cantonment and demobilization. The deadlines of 1 June and 15 July dates established by the resolutions of the UN Security Council, were postponed to 1 July and 15 August.<sup>64</sup>

The process entered a more positive phase on 4 July. The Government announced the completion of its troop cantonment stating that only those considered as 'non-cantonable' remained outside it. After some small disputes over the figures, ONUMOZ finally accepted, on 11 July, that the process of cantonment of Government troops in the AAs was 'basically completed'.<sup>65</sup> On 12 July, Ajello declared that, except for some minor discrepancies, the Government had concluded the cantonment of its forces.

The conclusion of the cantonment process did not, however, put an end to the political tension about the control of troops. Attention started to be directed towards the control of 'non-cantonable' troops in the CTNAs (*Centros de Tropas Não Acantonáveis*). Doubts were raised over the how many there were of these. The Government, had 151 CTNAs around the country which were supposed to host 14,828 men (18,035 soldiers plus 4,625 disabled). ONUMOZ found that more than 22,660 men were hosted in the these centres. Renamo had 23 CTNAs officially hosting 6,562 people (2,345 combatants, 1,150 female troops, 2,174 child-soldiers and 893 disabled).<sup>66</sup> The Government cast doubt on these figures claiming that there had been several sightings of Renamo troops on the move in places where they were not supposed to be, particularly in the provinces of Niassa, Zambézia and Tete.

The main concern of all the parties shifted in July to the conclusion of the demobilization process. The negative factors referred to above affecting the earlier stages of the process were for the moment either removed (the difficulties in presenting the lists of men to be demobilized, apparently having been resolved) or overlooked as not deserving immediate

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<sup>61</sup>ONUMOZ, "Relatório do Presidente da Comissão de Supervisão e Controle sobre a Implementação do Acordo Geral de Paz", 22 April 1994; *Savana*, 13 May 1994. For the inclusion of the FAM soldiers demobilized before the GPA see, for instance, *Notícias*, 6 April 1994. Allocation of funds by the donor community to benefit this group was announced on 23 June and their registration initiated on 29 June. See *Notícias*, 23 June 1994; *Notícias*, 29 June 1994.

<sup>62</sup>*Notícias*, 6 April 1994.

<sup>63</sup>See Section 3.2 in this respect.

<sup>64</sup>*Notícias*, 18 May 1994, *Domingo*, 20 May 1994.

<sup>65</sup>*Notícias*, 12 July 1994.

<sup>66</sup>*Notícias*, 7 July 1994.

priority (the issues related with the re-integration of the combatants). As a result, demobilization acquired more momentum, not only because of pressures to keep to the agreed timetable but also because of the rapidly increasing number of incidents in the camps which were seen to be more and more due to the extended periods spent in them by the cantoned combatants. The sooner demobilization could be completed, the sooner the pressures in the camps would be alleviated, even if the result was transfer of discontented soldiers to other spheres.

**TABLE 5: Movement of troops in the AAs**

Movement of Troops in AAs	17 Apr94	17 May94	17 Jun94	28 Jul94
<b>GOVERNMENT</b>				
Registered	33,954	34,934	37,224	43,491
to FADM	1,171	2,326	2,512	3,194
Demobilized	10,938	15,005	18,129	27,530
Remaining at AAs	21,845	17,603	16,583	12,767
Remaining from Total*	15,676	14,696	12,406	6,139
<b>RENAMO</b>				
Registered	15,139	16,008	16,438	17,560
to FADM	791	1,962	2,191	2,735
Demobilised	561	1,656	3,123	8,393
Remaining at AAs	13,787	12,390	11,124	6,432
Remaining from Total**	4,001	3,132	2,702	1,580
<b>TOTAL</b>				
Registered	49,093	50,942	53,662	61,051
to FADM	1,962	4,288	4,703	5,929
Demobilized	11,499	16,661	21,252	35,923
Remaining in AAs	35,632	29,993	27,707	19,199
Remaining from Total***	19,677	17,828	15,108	7,719

\*From the new total for Government 'cantonable' troops of 49,630;

\*\*From total of Renamo 'cantonable' troops of 19,140;

\*\*\* From total of 'cantonable troops' of 68,770.

Sources: ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization: 'Movimento de Militares nas AA', Maputo: 20 April 1994; 15 May 1994; 20 June 1994; 29 July 1994.

**TABLE 6: Troop movements in AAs and CTNAs by 22 September 1994**

	AAs			CTNAs			Total
	Govt.	Renamo	Total	Govt.	Renamo	Total	
Checked-in	43,359	17,506	60,865	21,885	6,423	28,308	89,173
Demob.	39,048	14,010	53,058	16,028	5,624	21,652	74,710
to FADM	3,919	3,005	6,924	3,975	641	4,616	11,540
Absent	347	480	827	1,423	108	1,531	2,358

Source: ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization

### 1.7 The Mozambican DRP and the New Army

A central element in the peace process established under the GPA has been the creation of a new Mozambican army, to be known as the *Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique* (FADM), which is to replace the military of both sides, whose units, would, in the meantime, be demobilized.<sup>67</sup> If the new army could be successfully developed into a solid operational force before the October 1994 elections, this it could have an important role in stabilizing and guaranteeing the entire peace process. With the relatively large number of ex-combatants expected to be involved in this process, the formation of the new army could also significantly reduce the number of unemployed ex-combatants, thus influencing the Mozambican DRP in a favourable manner.

The issue of how many former soldiers should form the new army had become almost the only subject in the discussions preceding the signature of the GPA by the two parties. The Government favoured a larger army, while Renamo wanted a much smaller one. The reasons behind this have been the object of some speculation. For some, the Government, facing severe economic problems, was seen as needing a large army which would be capable of absorbing a significant number of the unemployed. It would also present Renamo with difficulties in producing its quota (each side had agreed to contribute half of the FADM's complement), making it more difficult for Renamo to maintain a hidden cadre of troops not required to fulfil its quota in the FADM. On the Renamo side, it has been suggested that the reason for proposing a smaller army was not only that it could then fulfil its quota while keeping military contingents outside the FADM, but also because a small army would mean that the Government would have its military power greatly reduced.<sup>68</sup> Eventually an agreement was reached whereby each party was to provide 15,000 men, in order to form a 30,000-man independent army whose main role would be to assure the territorial integrity of

<sup>67</sup>For the context of discussions conducive to agreement on military issues under the GPA see Alex Vines, 'Change and the Military in Mozambique', unpublished paper for US DIC Conference 'Change and the Military in Africa', Alconbury, UK: 6-7 May 1993.

<sup>68</sup>See this line of analysis in José Luis Cabaço, 'FADM - Aprender dos outros: e de nós' in *Domingo*, 22 May 1993.

30,000-man independent army whose main role would be to assure the territorial integrity of the country.<sup>69</sup>

Responsibility for overseeing the formation of the new army rests with the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Armed Forces or CCFADM (after *Comissão Conjunta para a Formação das Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique*), in which the Government and Renamo are represented respectively by Lieutenant-Generals Tobias Dai and Mateus Ngonhamo. The CCFADM also includes representatives from Portugal, France and the United Kingdom, under the aegis of the United Nations.<sup>70</sup>

In accordance with the provisions of the GPA, Lieutenant-Generals Lagos Lidimo, for the Government, and Mateus Ngonhamo, for Renamo, were later appointed as commanders of the FADM, under what remained as one of its important characteristics, that is, equal representation of the two parties.

The 'technical' creation of FADM started with the so-called 'Lisbon Declaration', issued at a meeting held in February 1993 at which Portugal, France and the United Kingdom confirmed specific commitments for training the new force.<sup>71</sup> The first concrete step towards developing the new army was taken by the Portuguese, who held two 30-day leadership courses in February and March 1994 for 25 officers from each side on each course. Another course was held in June and a final one is took place in September. At the end of this process, around 200 officers will have completed their training and can be expected to take up leadership roles in the FADM.<sup>72</sup>

Meanwhile, the first marine course for 40 soldiers from both sides - designed to build up the core of the future naval force - also started under the direction of the Portuguese military. In a two-and-a-half month course, a core of 11 officers and 21 sergeants were trained in this way and the ground was prepared for a second marine course.<sup>73</sup> In March, Portuguese instructors, also began training the first of three battalions (450 men each) of special *commando* forces at the Centre for Training Special Forces of Nacala, in Nampula province.

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<sup>69</sup>GPA, Protocol IV, I-ii.

<sup>70</sup>According to GPA, Protocol IV, I-iii, 1(d), 'CCFADM should draw up directives on the phasing of the establishment of the FADM structures and shall propose to CSC: the rules governing the FADM; the budget to be provided for the FADM until the new Government takes office; the criteria for selection and the selection of FADM personnel and Renamo forces for the formation of FADM; the names of the commanding officers of the main commands.' CCFADM was directed by Aldo Ajello himself until 13 May 1994, when he announced his replacement by his deputy in that forum, the Iranian Behrooz Sadry. See *Notícias*, 14 May 1994.

<sup>71</sup>In May, when the creation of the army was facing several difficulties, particularly financial, the Government sought support from the international community and obtained some guarantees from Italy. A little later, Zimbabwe also provided, upon request, some 100 military instructors, who took over part of the supervising role until then performed by British military. *Notícias*, 25 and 27 May; 11 June 1994.

<sup>72</sup>*Domingo*, 6 March, 27 March 1994; *Notícias*, 26 June - 27 July 1994.

<sup>73</sup>*Domingo*, 6 and 27 March 1994; *Notícias*, 15 and 21 May, 15 June 1994.

This course was concluded in early May.<sup>74</sup>

The French contribution was the despatch of 10 military instructors to help form the first FADM company of 100 personnel specialized in landmine clearance. A centre to develop this resource was established in Bokisso, in the outskirts of Maputo. The first four-month training course on mine clearance took around four months and was concluded on 13 July.<sup>75</sup>

However, the main training effort was directed towards the infantry that would form the bulk of the army. In March, 540 British-trained instructors from both sides were placed in the three principal FADM training centres: Dondo (Sofala), and Boane and Manhiça (Maputo) in order to train, in the first phase, 5,000 recruits from both sides. The first round of training was completed by 7 June with three battalions being formed and placed in Chokwe, Quelimane and Cuamba in the provinces of Gaza, Zambézia and Niassa respectively.<sup>76</sup> This first round of infantry training had nevertheless been subject to delays. There were difficulties in transporting the new recruits from the AAs, where they had volunteered for the FADM rather than for demobilization, to the new training camps. The late arrival of military equipment for the new armed forces, particularly uniforms supplied by Portugal, also delayed the process.<sup>77</sup> These and further problems such as the poor general education of the recruits following the training course and the lack of facilities to house the trained corps once they were ready to leave the centres, have also hindered the start of the second round of training, intended to provide a further six battalions, totalling about 4,500 men<sup>78</sup> By 16 September, only three more battalions had been announced.<sup>79</sup>

The experience of six months' work building up the new army provides some indicators towards the role it may play in the peace process. It is clear that the schedule established at the beginning of the process proved to be too optimistic. Several factors intertwined with each other, each contributing to render the formation of FADM a very intricate and unexpectedly slow process. Politically, the creation of the FADM was dependent on the complex process of achieving progressive trust between the contenders, which in turn

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<sup>74</sup>*Domingo*, 20 March 1994; *Notícias*, 4 May 1994.

<sup>75</sup>*Notícias*, 27 May, 13 and 14 July 1994. Civilian training on landmine clearance is also taking place, particularly under a package of US\$4 million allocated by USAID for this activity. In June around 100 'deminers' concluded their course in Savane, near Beira, and started work in the provinces of Sofala, Manica and Zambézia, the areas most affected by indiscriminate minelaying. A course financed by UNOHAC, also in Savane, is expected to train further 300 'deminers' until December. *Notícias*, 16 and 21 June 1994.

<sup>76</sup>*Notícias*, 8 June 1994.

<sup>77</sup>*Notícias*, 15 and 30 March; 11 and 14 April 1994.

<sup>78</sup>*Notícias*, 6 and 7 July 1994.

<sup>79</sup>*Notícias*, 10 and 17 September 1994.

determined a two-headed chain of command.<sup>80</sup> Technically, its formation depended on the collaboration of several countries, each with different systems of military organization. Sometimes the recruits were not forthcoming (due partly to delays in the submission of lists of volunteers to the UN by both parties, to transportation problems or merely to lack of volunteers). At other times, when volunteers were available there were no facilities to house the trainees. All this lowered FADM's hoped-for image as a simple and effective structure, in which the public could feel at last some pride, in its own way helping to counteract the feelings of frustration and tiredness over the war prevailing amongst the overwhelming majority of the population.

This is not to say that the need to attract volunteers and to establish a sense of pride and high standards in the new army had not been taken seriously by all the parties concerned. The living conditions offered to the troops were the subject of prolonged discussions from an early stage. In an attempt to fulfil promises made to its own combatants during the struggle, Renamo had, during the negotiations, tended to exaggerate the level of salaries paid to its military; the Government, on the other hand, over-burdened and with depleted resources, tried to keep the salaries at more modest levels. As a result of the compromise, the salaries of rank-and-file FADM soldiers will, in fact, be almost three times those paid to the FAM.<sup>81</sup> Better medical provision, improved clothing and transport allowances and food are also expected.<sup>82</sup> Nevertheless, the conditions promised for the new army have not proved to be enough to attract volunteers, either because their expectations were higher, because the extended periods spent in the AAs had increased their mistrust, or even because of a lack of information on the conditions offered.

It is only recently, in an attempt to improve volunteer numbers and to lower the level of discontent in the camps, that the CSC have sent in teams of representatives from the Government, Renamo and ONUMOZ to explain the favourable conditions offered by the army.<sup>83</sup> It is still too early to assess the success or otherwise of these efforts, but, for the time being, and in spite of repeated denials by the Government, the lack of volunteers to the new army has become increasingly evident, a shortfall which has now started to show up seriously in Renamo camps as well. It also remains unclear to what extent the two parties have been able to force recruits into the FADM, in order to fulfil their quotas. However,

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<sup>80</sup>Having the same military corps headed by two commanders, one from each side, is a very odd compromise potentially involving great risks. It is supposed to be abandoned only after the elections, with the appointment of a single chief-of-staff of the army. *Domingo*, 10 July 1994.

<sup>81</sup>Rank-and-file salaries, for instance, will increase from the 35,000,00 mt payed in FAM to 95,000,00 mt. *Domingo*, 20 March 1994.

<sup>82</sup>See, amongst others, *Domingo*, 20, 27 March 1994; *Notícias*, 24 March 1994.

<sup>83</sup>These conditions do not apply only to salaries or material offers. They also include an image of a new army in which regulations are properly established and followed, counteracting the arbitrariness which characterised relationships within FAM and amongst Renamo ranks, particularly towards the end of the war. Vivid testimonies of dictatorship-like behaviour of petty commanders in theatres of war, such as punishment without apparent causes or treatment of soldiers like private servants (to prepare the hot bath of their commanders, to find them girls in the environs, and so on), were gathered by Major Vitor Dias in 'Novo Exército, quem quer?', 22 July 1994.

mutinies, particularly since July, have reduced the room for manoeuvre of both parties to recruit by force, and volunteer enlistment into FADM has become the favoured approach.

In conclusion, the GPA's expectation of having a 30,000-strong joint army on the ground before the October elections (thus putting into practice one of the lessons allegedly drawn from the failure of the Angola peace process) will be impossible to achieve. Even the more modest target that has recently been set, that the army should be formed of at least half that number before the elections, is unlikely to be accomplished.<sup>84</sup>

The capacity of the new army to absorb members of the former belligerent parties has proved to be weaker than had been envisaged. Even if the revised numbers agreed are reached, as both the Government and Renamo continue to assert will be the case,<sup>85</sup> this level will be attained less smoothly than hoped and over a prolonged period. Indirectly, however, the further the FADM can go towards achieving a good standard of discipline and efficiency, the better it will be able to contribute to a sense of stable local environment, which would, in itself be an important step towards the re-integration of ex-combatants into society generally. FADM's stability<sup>86</sup> and efficiency is all the more vital as the former military forces became 'extinct' in August,<sup>87</sup> leaving to the new army responsibility for assuring, together with ONUMOZ, a smooth conclusion of the transition process.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>84</sup>A debate on the situation of FADM broadcasted by *Rádio Moçambique*, 15 July 1994, estimated that in late October, by the time of the elections, FADM will be about 12,000 strong. However in September, when this was written, the FADM six battalion is only 8,281 men. *Notícias*, 17 September 1994.

<sup>85</sup>The Government insisted on having the second group of 15,000 men gathered by the time of the October elections. *Notícias*, 15 June 1994.

<sup>86</sup>As late as late July, the Renamo representative at CCFADM still accused the Government of discriminating against FADM officers with a Renamo background. *Notícias*, 23 July 1994.

<sup>87</sup>*Notícias*, 16 July 1994.

<sup>88</sup>The debate has started on the sharing of roles between the army and the police, a crucial matter since the greater risks to the peace process currently seem to be coming from within the country and not from a particularly favourable regional context. However, this falls outside the ambit of this study.

## 2 RE-INTEGRATION OF DEMOBILIZED COMBATANTS: THE CASE OF ZAMBÉZIA PROVINCE

Unlike demobilization, which had practically come to an end by late August, the social and economic re-integration of demobilized combatants is an open-ended process which will last for several years at least. To illustrate the problems underlying the social and economic re-integration of the demobilized combatants, the situation in central Zambézia Province will be examined in detail. However, it is first necessary to look at the strategy used for the re-integration of demobilized soldiers.

### 2.1 An introduction to the re-integration strategy

The Commission for Re-integration (CORE) was created as part of the UN mission to consolidate the peace process, in particular by facilitating both the social and economic re-integration of demobilized soldiers.<sup>89</sup>

In addition to its central,<sup>90</sup> and regional headquarters, CORE was also represented at the provincial level. At this level, working in conjunction with the UN coordinator and representatives from the Government and Renamo, CORE was envisaged as liaising with donor countries, international organizations and national NGOs.<sup>91</sup>

CORE's mandate required it to maintain an impartial stand towards the Government and Renamo while at the same time planning and controlling the implementation of the re-integration programmes and supervising the provincial COREs. At provincial level, it was charged with ensuring that the rights of the demobilized combatants would be respected by all the concerned parties. It also tried to identify employment and training opportunities for the demobilized combatants.<sup>92</sup>

Central CORE's approach combined a 'quick action response' with 'longer term developmental programming'. The former was to start in the AAs themselves, thus assuring CORE's participation in the process from the very beginning. Short-term involvement in the camps was to include literacy training, the provision of information on employment options,

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<sup>89</sup>GPA, Protocol IV, article VI, ii, 2. d), in *Boletim da República*, Série I, No.42, 14 October 1992: 202-(11).

<sup>90</sup> See introduction to Chapter 1 for CORE's composition at the central level.

<sup>91</sup> The regional level was established as a non-structured body to allow regular discussions of provincial COREs' programmes and operations.

<sup>92</sup> UNOHAC/CORE 3, Annex 3: July 1993.

raising public health and environmental awareness, cultural and sports activities, and supplying general information on the peace process and re-integration into civilian life.

In spite of holding these 'quick action response' responsibilities, CORE's remit was defined as starting only after the combatants had been demobilized. In fact, all action within the AAs was supervised and coordinated by the CCF, while the Technical Unit for Demobilization was responsible for the coordination of transport, distribution of clothes, supplying food for travel, travel allowances and vouchers for demobilized soldiers and their dependents. The IOM was responsible for transportation. CORE's responsibility, besides the activities already mentioned, starts, therefore, once the ex-combatants and families have arrived in their area of choice.

'Longer-term developmental programming' was concerned with the economic re-integration of the ex-combatants.<sup>93</sup> Its basic assumption was that the Mozambican economy would be unlikely to provide the demobilized combatants with employment, and that family agriculture would be the most reliable sector for integrating the demobilized soldiers into stable civilian life (50 per cent of those waiting to be demobilized were regarded as inclined to follow small-scale agricultural activities). Underlying these programmes was the objective to reduce the impact of demobilization on individuals, as well as dispersing the ex-combatants throughout the districts.

Taking account of the principles mentioned above, three main programmes were defined:

- (a) the Re-integration Support Scheme (RSS, or EAR after *Esquema de Apoio à Reintegração*), conceived as an extended cash payment scheme to provide the ex-combatants with a monthly cash subsidy for 18 months, in addition to the six months' already secured by the Government;
- (b) a Training and Kits Programme, designed to provide technical and business training, as well as supplying vocational kits to a selected demobilized population; and
- (c) an Employment Policy and Identification Programme to be implemented through Information and Referral Services (IRS or SIR, after *Serviços de Informação e Referência*) created in every province.

Payments made by EAR were established in line with what the individuals had been receiving in the army, though the rank-and-file were to receive twice their previous salaries, up to a limit of 75,000 *meticals* (the national currency). EAR is administered by the United Nations

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<sup>93</sup>According to UNOHAC/CORE 5, Annex 2, February 1994.1, the work gives priority to economic issues because these are obviously the main concern of the demobilized soldiers and because 'indigenous society demonstrates great capacity for social interaction and support, and externally sponsored programmes are unlikely to improve this capacity.'

Development Programme (UNDP) through the *Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento* (BPD), which pays the ex-combatants monthly (or bi-monthly) in their areas of future residence. While not achieving re-integration in themselves, the cash allowances will do much to bridge the gap between demobilization and re-integration into civilian life, while keeping the ex-combatants as dispersed as possible, since they will be tied to the areas where the subsidy is paid.

The Training and Kits Programme (TKP, 'Management Framework for Re-integrating Demobilized Soldiers with Emphasis on Business and Skills Development') is expected to benefit a targeted group of between 4,000 and 10,000, and will also be UNDP's responsibility. The TKP, which was approved by CORE at the end of June,<sup>94</sup> is still at an early stage, and is not expected to be in full operation until October.

The third major programme, SIR, was scheduled to be implemented by IOM provincial offices. The main objective of the provincial SIRs is to provide demobilized combatants with the information they need, functioning as an advisory office. However, it also identifies provincial employment opportunities and promotes the economic and social re-integration of ex-combatants. The SIRs have the vital role of informing demobilized soldiers about the programmes they can benefit from (it is projected that about 40,000 ex-combatants should benefit from the programme),<sup>95</sup> and of advising the authorities at district level on issues which may arise during the re-integration of the demobilized soldiers. They started to offer a limited service at provincial level in early April 1994. By late May they were still extending their presence into the districts, where their function was to encourage ex-combatants to stay put in re-settlement zones.

A fourth major programme, the 'Provincial Fund for Re-integration of Demobilized Soldiers', has just been launched. Not yet in full operation, it aims to assist the social and economic re-integration of demobilized combatants in their communities

By financing quick impact projects at the grass-roots level, to be based primarily on existing institutions and activities, and intended to stimulate economic activity and to reduce social friction. The hope is that it will assist communities, particularly those

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<sup>94</sup>*Noticias*, 28 June 1994. Some programmes for professional training are being developed outside this ambit. The Italian government, for example will provide US\$1,355,000 to support 36 courses in the provinces of Maputo, Sofala and Manica, benefitting ex-combatants. *Noticias*, 14 June 1994.

<sup>95</sup>UNOHAC/Core 5, Annex 2: February 1994:6.

receiving a high proportion of ex-combatants, to absorb them peacefully.<sup>96</sup>

The Provincial Fund is has been conceived as a flexible programme with the UNOHAC director and CORE chairman having the final authority. At provincial level, CORE will coordinate all activities to be implemented by the agencies whose proposals for specific projects have been selected.<sup>97</sup>

## 2.2 **Zambézia: a hazardous context**

Zambézia has been selected as a case study on the Mozambican DRP for several reasons. Firstly, its recent war history was uniquely complex and intricate, without the dichotomy between Renamo and the Government which occurred in other provinces, a characteristic which is likely to test the bi-polarized assumption on which the Mozambican DRP is based. Secondly, the war in this region created large numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees in neighbouring countries. This provides the context for a discussion of whether the integration of former combatants merits a particular approach or should be taken as part of a re-integration effort covering broader sectors of the population. Finally, Zambézia is a rich agricultural province where the former combatants are likely to have a 'farmer' profile. This is important because the agricultural is regarded as having good potential for re-integration.

Zambézia was probably the most bitterly disputed province by the Government and Renamo, yet despite this, third forces emerged, developing grass-root initiatives towards establishing war-free zones, or more 'formal' political initiatives outside the playing field demarcated by the two main contenders.<sup>98</sup> The most prominent grass-root initiative was the 'Naparama' movement which appeared in the late 1980s. It was headed by Manuel António, who claimed to be fulfilling a divine mission of setting the people free of war, particularly of the terror exerted by Renamo. This movement<sup>99</sup> extended across southern Nampula, in northern and eastern Zambézia and, to a lesser extent, in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, by the early 1990s.

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<sup>96</sup>'Provincial Fund for the Re-integration of Demobilized Soldiers' (Summary): n/d.

<sup>97</sup>'Provincial Fund for Re-integration of Demobilized Soldiers' (draft): n/d.

<sup>98</sup>Efforts towards achieving peace secured zones were also witnessed in other areas of the country, as 'Mongói' in the south, but in a much less structured way. Particularly in Zambézia and Tete, the Jehovah's Witnesses also attempted to resist the violence exerted by the war, though in a much more passive way, appealing to a pacifist stand.

<sup>99</sup>The most detailed study of the 'Naparama' phenomenon to date is Ken Wilson's 'Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence in Mozambique', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.10, No.3, September 1992. See also Jean-Claude Legrand, 'Logique de Guerre et Dynamique de la Violence en Zambezia, 1976-1991', unpublished paper, December 1991.

Towards the end of the war, the Government forces successfully co-opted the 'Naparamas' to fight for their side.

The development of a more 'formal' political initiative outside the strict dichotomous framework of the war had its origins in colonial times, rooted not only in Frelimo's difficulties in Zambézia during the struggle for independence. Movements other than Frelimo claiming nationalist goals, such as the *Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique* (Coremo), tried to develop support in Zambézia from the mid-1960s. In 1968, the National Union for the Liberation of Rombézia (UNAR)<sup>100</sup> appeared, acting as a platform for three different interest groups: politicians from pre-existing nationalist movements now trying to re-gain influence<sup>101</sup>; Banda's Malawi, in its strategy of a 'Great Malawi' with access to the sea<sup>102</sup>; and Jorge Jardim, a Portuguese businessman who apparently had the idea of 'sacrificing' northern Mozambique to create a buffer zone between the nationalists acting from Tanzania and central Mozambique, where his main assets were located.<sup>103</sup>

These three interests survived independence. From 1976, a new movement, 'África Livre' headed by Amos Sumane, a former UNAR leader, operated in western Zambézia, apparently with the same objective of creating Rombézia. Support for this movement grew as much as a response to the rigid Frelimo policies in the area as from the support of its former mentors. By the early 1980s, the situation began to change. This was due in part to the death of Jorge Jardim and in part to an apparent improvement in relations between Mozambique and Malawi. By 1982 Gimo Phiri, heading what had remained of África Livre's forces, agreed to join forces with Renamo<sup>104</sup>, creating in Zambézia the dichotomous pattern of the war occurring in the rest of the country.

At this time Renamo developed the ability to launch an offensive in western and central Zambézia from Sofala and Malawi. This benefited from the collaboration of local armed groups, particularly those of Gimo Phiri, and conquering the small towns of Morrumbala

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<sup>100</sup>Rombézia is the territory between the Tanzanian border (Rovuma River) and the Zambeze river.

<sup>101</sup>According to Portuguese intelligence sources at the time, all members of the first UNAR direction had previously belonged to Frelimo, Coremo and Unami.

<sup>102</sup>UNAR's headquarters were located in the building of the Malawi Congress Party, Malawi's ruling party at the time, according to Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações (SCCI), 'Boletim de Difusão de Informações', no.32, 5 April 1968, in Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, Fundo de Tete, Moatize, Cx. 105.

<sup>103</sup>The fact that UNAR was not created by the colonial administration is demonstrated by the surprise its creation prompted in Portuguese intelligence reports at the time.

<sup>104</sup>See, in this respect, Alex Vines, *Renamo. Terrorism in Mozambique*. London: CSAS/James Currey/Indiana University Press, 1991:53-58. For a recent account, Gil Lauriciano (ed), 'Armed separatists re-emerge in Mozambique', *Mozambique Inview*, No.1, 8 June 1994.

district. After a weak response from Government troops in early 1983, Renamo started a major offensive which would last until 1986, sweeping Government forces from extensive areas. That Malawi needed to demonstrate a neutral stand in the eyes of its partners in the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) also acted in favour of Renamo's offensive. Some 4,000 Renamo troops appear to have been sent into Mozambique from Malawi, boosting Renamo's ability to advance towards the coast, particularly to Maganja da Costa, in an attempt to secure access to the sea other than those routes through Malawi, which had now become difficult to keep open.

In late 1986, the Government responded to this offensive with a major deployment of its military forces in Zambézia, with the support of Zimbabwean and Tanzanian troops. They recaptured the major towns lost to Renamo and, in June 1988, Renamo headquarters in Zambézia, Alfazema base, were attacked, obliging Renamo's provincial leadership to retreat to Mongola (Milange district). As a result of internal disputes regarding the leadership succession, Phiri left Renamo in 1987, taking around 500 of his troops with him. By 1988 he was fighting on the Government side; by 1990, when a small Government garrison had control of the town of Milange, Phiri's men, equipped and fed by the Government, were seen harassing Renamo forces around it.<sup>105</sup> However, although the Government forces maintained the initiative, re-taking the small district towns one after the other, they were not able to seize the rural areas as well. These became contested terrain subject to small offensives from both sides until the GPA was signed in Rome and the cease fire came into operation.<sup>106</sup>

The GPA was implemented in Zambézia, as elsewhere in the country, on the basis that it would achieve a peace settlement between two contenders, the Government and Renamo. However, it remains unclear whether, in the near future the 'third forces' referred to above will be able to influence the process or not.

For their part, the 'Naparamas' have claimed the right under the GPA to enter the AAs and to benefit from the demobilization process as regular Government troops on the grounds that they had participated in military action against Renamo.<sup>107</sup> Apparently, at least some of them were accommodated by 'informally' integrating them with Government troops to be cantoned in AAs. The 'Naparamas', by virtue of their being an irregular group and because

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<sup>105</sup> António Barros, Personal Contact, Quelimane: 30 June 1994.

<sup>106</sup> For global discussions of the war in Zambézia, which falls outside the ambit of our text, see Alex Vines, *Renamo. Terrorism in Mozambique*, London: CSAS/James Currey/Indiana University Press, 1991; William Finnegan, *A Complicated War. The harrowing of Mozambique*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992; Jean-Claude Legrand, 'Logique de Guerre et Dynamique de la Violence en Zambézia, 1976-1991', unpublished paper, December 1991.

<sup>107</sup> See, for instance, *Notícias*: 18 February 1993.

their current leader, Francisco Sabonete, does not have the charisma of his predecessor Manuel António, have been unable to maintain the cohesion needed to continue to act as a group. They are not currently reported as operational, even in places formerly influenced by them, such as Nicoadala and Namacurra. However, their interest in presenting themselves as 'demobilized' combatants might provide them with some cohesion, even if only for a short period.<sup>108</sup> The possibility of the Naparamas regaining a significant influence on events probably depends on whether or not the peace process degenerates with the corresponding increase in violence.

In contrast to the Naparamas, Gimo Phiri and the 2,000 men said to be under his command do seem to have found a role in the peace process, probably as a result of their early claims to the right to benefit from the demobilization process. They were apparently integrated as Government soldiers in the AAs of Milange and Mocuba, while Phiri now lives in Malawi, earning a Government subsidy. However, it seems that José Frederico Gonçalves, former Chief of UNAMO's Department of Organization, and Bonifácio Motivo, both close collaborators of Phiri, still claim a right to special benefits, while making veiled threats to resume some sort of armed action.<sup>109</sup>

There are also 'third forces' within Renamo's sphere of influence which could interfere in the peace process. Malawi's Young Pioneers, a para-military group formerly acting on behalf of Banda's deposed regime, is one of these. In December 1993, as a result of clashes with the Malawi army which was trying to disarm them, hundreds of Young Pioneers crossed the border into Mozambique, particularly into eastern Tete, northern Sofala and western Zambézia. While some regarded this as a result of the long rivalry between the army and the Young Pioneers, others saw in it a late attempt by Banda to maintain a reserve force in Mozambique in case the outcome of the Malawi elections put his position at risk, while at the same time, fulfilling an old promise to help Renamo to keep some forces in reserve in case the peace process in Mozambique also degenerated.<sup>110</sup> Understood to have developed close ties with Renamo in the past, the possibility of the Malawi Young Pioneers openly returning to their country as a group was much reduced by Banda's defeat in the Malawian

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<sup>108</sup>In fact, on 2 August 1994, they were capable of gathering reportedly 400 men to march from Nicoadala to Quelimane demanding subsidies as demobilized soldiers, in an event which did not yet terminate. *Radio Moçambique*, 2 August 1994.

<sup>109</sup>António Barros, Personal Contact, Quelimane: 30 June 1994. Barros affirmed that in 22, 23 and 24 June high numbers of Phiri's men were demobilized as Government soldiers in Milange, and transported to their home areas (*Radio Moçambique*, 14 July 1994). In fact, numbers in ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization, 'Movement of military in AAs', confirm the demobilization of more than 500 men between 19 June and 20 July. However, in view of the total of registered combatants of 744 by late July in that camp, either they were not so many or they were also cantoned in other Government camps as Mocuba.

<sup>110</sup>*Imparcial*: 4 July 1994.

elections on 17 May. A history of arbitrariness and brutality towards the Malawian population and the fact that the movement has been outlawed by the new government of President Bakili Muluzi is forcing them to stay in Mozambique, where they pose a threat to security, and where their precise numbers and location are unknown and uncontrolled.

In spite of the generally calm situation in Zambézia, incidents nevertheless continued to occur along one of the main road between Quelimane and Mocuba, with ambushes followed by assaults on vehicles travelling along it. These incidents occurred in two specific areas, *régulo* Digo-Diua, near Nicoadala on the way to Mocuba, and in Santos Batata, at the entrance of Mocuba resulting in a number of deaths. The aim of the ambushers was to steal food and other goods. The first batch of incidents was probably carried out by soldiers from the Government's commando battalion at Nicoadala, whose record of disturbances was notorious. Since 30 June, the situation has, however, tended to remain calm since these soldiers have been transferred and cantoned at the Quelimane-Issídua AA. Responsibility for the second set of ambushes cannot be ascribed so readily to the Government troops assembled at Mocuba because their movements are closely monitored. The same cannot, however, be said about a group of approximately 900 Renamo men stationed at Namanjavira, presumably comprised of 'non-cantonable' troops.<sup>111</sup>

It seems, therefore, that, for the time being, a 'dichotomous framework' prevails in the province, the existing tension occurring between the Government and Renamo, who apparently have been capable of controlling the 'third forces' in their respective spheres of influence. Should the peace process break down into open confrontation between the parties weakened by the cantonment of their forces, the Government and Renamo might be forced to search for support from the 'third forces'. Alternatively, these 'third forces' could progressively develop more autonomy, transforming the conflict into an even more difficult situation in which to mediate because it would no longer support the 'two-force' philosophy on which the GPA was built.

### 2.3 The profile of the demobilized combatants in Zambézia

The demobilized combatants in Zambézia are probably not very different from their counterparts elsewhere in Mozambique. However, as described above, the 'rural characteristics' of this province confer on the ex-combatants living there a distinct profile in some respects. An attempt will be made here to describe some of the broad characteristics of this particular contingent, based mainly on a sample profile of 2,670 combatants who had

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<sup>111</sup>The 300 Renamo armed men now demanding their immediate demobilization in Namanjavira are probably part of this group. *Notícias*, 26 September 1994.

been demobilized in Zambézia by 26 June 1994. This sample represents more than 20 per cent of the total combatants to be demobilized in Zambézia according to the extrapolation presented in Table 7 below, excluding, by definition, the ones who are to join the new national army, the FADM. It includes FAM Government soldiers as well as Renamo fighters, though the former are represented in much greater numbers.<sup>112</sup>

Part of this profile can be better understood by examining the social and family context of the demobilized in addition to what skills and education they have.

*(a) Demobilized combatants and the general population*

Zambézia is the province hosting the largest contingent of ex-combatants, with an estimated total of 12,679 demobilized combatants planning to establish themselves in its territory. This figure represents nearly 20 per cent of the estimated total. Table 7 shows that demobilized combatants and their families represent almost 11 per cent of the total population of Zambézia.<sup>113</sup>

The re-settlement of demobilized combatants is not, however, the only reason for population movement in Zambézia or, indeed, in the other Mozambican provinces. Ex-combatants are, in fact, a minority of the people moving across territory to re-settle themselves. The war and its aftermath have prompted the movement not only of demobilized combatants but also the return of refugees from neighbouring countries and of those displaced internally.<sup>114</sup>

The war provoked major waves of population flight in Zambézia, especially in 1985, due to Renamo's offensive, and again in the late 1980s, during the Government's counter-offensive. Many people left their home areas for the district towns, settling in huge refugee camps where Government troops could provide some level of protection, as was the case in Mocuba, where more than 100,000 people had sought refuge by late 1986.<sup>115</sup> Later on some of them followed the Government troops as they tried to recapture the most important district

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<sup>112</sup>This section is based on information about a sample of 2,670 combatants demobilised in Zambézia by 26 June 1994, in the Database of ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization, unless other sources are specifically mentioned.

<sup>113</sup>According to a February 1994 estimation of Zambezia's total population, ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization: 'Table 2: Projected Density of Demobilized Soldiers and their Dependants (for 69,000 total to be demobilized, based on first 30,839 registered in AAs)', Maputo: n/d.

<sup>114</sup>On the causes of population displacement, which falls outside the ambit of the present study see a summary account in Ken Wilson, 'Deslocados Internos, Refugiados e Repatriados de e para Moçambique' (Relatório no.1), Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme/Queen Elizabeth House/University of Oxford-ASDI, November 1992.

<sup>115</sup>Jovito Nunes, 'Peasants and Survival. A study of social organisation within displaced communities', Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme/University of Oxford-ASDI, 1992 (unpublished draft): Introduction.

headquarters. Those from the western areas, such as Milange and Morrumbala, sought refuge in Malawi in great numbers. Some stayed put, either because they were trapped in Renamo zones or because they could make alliances with Renamo which satisfied their fears.

The task of quantifying and understanding population movements in Zambézia in the current post-war scene is, therefore, a hard one, not least because this is an on-going process in which all the displaced communities are seeking to stabilize themselves, mainly by returning to their home areas. According to the estimates of the World Refugee Survey, 5.7 million persons were directly affected by the conflict between 1984 and 1993, of whom 1.7 million sought refuge in neighbouring countries and 4 million were internally displaced.<sup>116</sup> The size of the internally displaced population in Zambézia is virtually impossible to determine. According to UNHCR statistics, Zambézia is also expected to host approximately 250,000 of the 1 million returnees from Malawi - the second largest contingent after that going to Tete.<sup>117</sup>

The rate of return from Malawi is also very difficult to determine because most of the repatriation is informal, taking place outside the structures created by UNHCR or NAR (the Mozambican *Núcleo de Apoio aos Refugiados*) to facilitate this process. A NAR statistic indicated that, up to last May, 247,292 people had returned to Zambézia, mostly settling in Milange (176,082) and Morrumbala (49,537).<sup>118</sup> The numbers returning to Milange in May alone suggested a rate of almost 1,000 people per day. The high number of refugees returning to western Zambézia reflects that it was from there that they had fled to Malawi, and that this is also an area for transit through to the rest of Zambézia. Many are waiting there for onward transportation to their home areas.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>116</sup>Estimations of the total numbers of refugees and displaced persons greatly vary. Gregory W. Myers, 'Land Tenure and Re-settlement in Post-War Mozambique: capacity and individual choice', Madison: Land Tenure Center/University of Wisconsin, August 1992, for example, considers somewhat higher figures: 5 million displaced and 1 million refugees as a direct result of the war, plus an additional 1 million people displaced by the past Government villagization policy.

<sup>117</sup>In US Committee for Refugees, 'No Place Like Home: Mozambican refugees begin Africa's largest repatriation', December 1993:9,22.

<sup>118</sup>*Núcleo de Apoio aos Refugiados e Movimentos de População/Zambézia*, 'Mapa Estatístico de Maio/94', Quelimane: n/d. For reasons some of which were referred to above, these numbers must be taken as approximate. Ana Maria Canonica, coordinator of UNHCR/Zambézia (Personal Contact, Quelimane: 4 July 1994) has given round figures of 70,000 and 30,000/40,000 returned people in Milange and Morrumbala, respectively. A recent meeting of UNHCR and the governments of Malawi and Mozambique estimated that by July around 70 per cent of the Mozambican refugees in Malawi had returned to their country, mostly by their own means. *Notícias*, 28 July 1994.

<sup>119</sup>A third reason could be that people settling there have doubts about the evolution of the peace process and therefore want to be able to return to Malawi if the war is resumed.

**TABLE 7: Demobilized combatants and population in Zambézia**

Districts	Estimated Population (Feb.1994)	Demob. Destination (extrapol.)	DS + DEP	Density	
				DS+DEP % from tot.pop.	DS+DEP /1000
Alto Molócuè	127,115	821	1,379	1.0	10.8
Chinde	124,317	643	965	0.7	7.7
Gilé	128,990	286	334	0.2	2.5
Gurué	190,350	902	1,477	0.7	7.7
Ile	303,020	1,223	1,881	0.6	6.2
Inhassunge	91,622	375	575	0.6	6.2
Lugela	139,981	455	565	0.4	4.0
Maganja	231,778	652	868	0.3	3.7
Milange	255,449	893	1,185	0.4	4.6
Mocuba	139,760	1,411	2,169	1.5	15.5
Mopeia	126,844	295	355	0.2	2.7
Morrumbala	205,969	1,125	1,724	0.8	8.3
Namacurra	115,375	1,187	1,773	1.5	15.3
Namarroi	109,758	259	365	0.3	3.3
Nicoadala	344,503	1,143	1,941	0.5	5.6
Pebane	165,200	1,009	1,513	0.9	9.1
Quelimane	?	?	?	?	?
Total	2.800.031	12.679	19,069	10.6	7.0

Sources: ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization: 'Table 1: Destination of Demobilized Soldiers (for 13,784 demobilized before the peace agreement and first 30,839 registered in AAs)', Maputo: n/d.; ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization: 'Table 2: Projected Density of Demobilized Soldiers and their Dependents (for 69,000 total to be demobilized, based on first 30,839 registered in s)', Maputo: n/d.

It seems that, for many months to come, the districts in Zambézia will continue receive returnees and the internally displaced, resulting in there being twice the number of returnees and displaced people as there are demobilized soldiers. As shown in Table 7, these, together with their dependants, will make up roughly 11 per cent of the total population. Re-integration of demobilized combatants in Zambézia is therefore taking place in parallel with the re-integration of other vulnerable groups.

Given the need to re-integrate so many displaced persons overall, it could be argued that demobilized soldiers as a group do not really deserve special attention. Many other groups have an equally good claim on the limited resources being made available for re-settlement. However, demobilized soldiers must, in practice, be given priority because of their ability to maintain a measure of group cohesion which can be usefully draw on in constructing viable programmes and because of the potential threat they represent to the peace process if their re-integration into civilian life does not reach satisfactory levels. We will return to this issue later on.

*(b) Demobilized combatants and their families*

The immediate social networks of the ex-combatants is very important, not just for determining the numbers of people actually involved in the demobilization process, but also in discussing their role in re-integration. It has to do with the concept of family and the impact exerted by the war on family life.

In Mozambique, as elsewhere in Africa, the concept of family is much wider than that of the 'western assumption'. It varies by region, but generally involves lineage affiliation and extended solidarities. However, decades of colonial exploitation have exerted a firm pressure towards a family organization based on the nuclear model of husband, wife and children.<sup>120</sup>

After independence, this pressure continued to be exerted through settlement in communal villages according to the nuclear family model.<sup>121</sup> The recent war, displacing millions of

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<sup>120</sup>This pressure was political, economic, administrative and ideological, involving a policy of transforming existing political and social structures, shaping them to serve the colonial state. On the economical sphere, for instance, it involved mechanisms generally implemented by force to integrate the peasantry in the colonial and international market as organised in nuclear families, with census, taxes and labour recruitment for plantations and for neighbouring countries all conducted on a man-and-wife family basis. It was also an ideological pressure which firmly identified civilization and evolution in general with conformity to the model of the christian family. The concept of wide family ties and community mechanisms for work cooperation certainly resisted such pressures by adapting themselves to the new colonial reality with only surface change but remaining intact underneath, however, the need for economic survival based on the narrow family slowly took deeper hold.

<sup>121</sup>Detailed to the point, for instance, of conceding half the family plot to widowers or single people within the village. Further discussion of rural re-settlement schemes, though focused on Tete province, in J.P. Borges Coelho, 'Protected Villages and Communal Villages in the Mozambican Province of Tete (1968-1982): A History

Mozambicans, internally as well as to neighbouring countries, furthered this process even more. Recent field work with war refugees in Zambézia has underlined some aspects of the dissolution of 'traditional values', particularly the weakening of the role played by the family of the wife in the matrilineal family, and the increased importance of the role of the biological father.<sup>122</sup> This is not to dispute the fact that, in times of crisis, lineage solidarity also tends to be strengthened. There are many accounts indicating how, in war conditions, local people sought community solutions or those based on wider family ties to safeguard their lives.<sup>123</sup> However, the destruction of villages and the disorganization of life in the rural areas has meant that lineage solidarity has frequently broken when it was needed the most. Wider families are less flexible structures, and it was easier for smaller family units to escape the dangers of the war, with men taking only their wives and children when seeking safer places. The war exerted a powerful influence on family structures, accelerating their transformation by disorganizing an already fragile structure.<sup>124</sup>

In the post-war situation, pressures again tend to favour the dynamic leading towards the nuclear family. The emergency work undertaken by UN agencies, NGOs and the Government is based on the eventual reunion of the nuclear family and later providing support for it. The Mozambican DRP is also based on the nuclear family, on the reunion of families and their transportation to areas of their choice. Nuclear families, including those with demobilized soldiers, logically seek to assemble themselves before trying to find the rest of their relatives. Nevertheless, the re-establishment of the nuclear family as the first step towards social and economic stability is not a linear and simple process, as we will try to show next.

The average length of military service in the sample of ex-combatants in Zambézia on which we have based our study is nine years. 25 per cent of the sample had served five years, 46

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of State Re-settlement Policies, Development and War', Department of Social and Economic Studies/University of Bradford [Unpublished doctoral thesis].

<sup>122</sup>See Ivette Illas Jeichande and Paulo Fernandes: 'Um Estudo de Planificação Pós-Guerra na Perspectiva da Comunidade Rural, Distrito de Ile, Zambézia' (unpublished), Maputo: UNICEF, February 1992:47 and *passim*.

<sup>123</sup>See, amongst others, Ken Wilson, 'War, Displacement, Social Change and the Re-Creation of Community: an exploratory study in Zambézia, Mozambique', Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme/University of Oxford, 1991; Ken Wilson, 'The Socio-Economic Impact of War and Flight in Posto Derre, Morrumbala District, Zambézia', Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme/University of Oxford, 1992. One particularly notable example was referred to us by J. Born (Personal contact, Maputo 2 May 1994), of a small village from the environs of Caia, whose entire population sought refuge in the outskirts of the city of Beira, where they created a new neighbourhood which preserved the name of the former village. Now that the war has ended they apparently intend to go back to their former area and restart the village.

<sup>124</sup>See amongst recent literature on the impact of war on family structures, Mark Chingono, 'Women, War and Change in Manica Province: An ambiguous legacy' (extract from his unpublished doctoral thesis, Cambridge University, 1994).

per cent 10 years and 26 per cent 15 years. The average soldier was 20 years old when he was conscripted and is leaving the army at 29 years.<sup>125</sup> Having been incorporated in the army so early in their lives, the majority (about 64 per cent) of the demobilized combatants declared themselves to be bachelors, while only 32 per cent are recorded as being married. With very few divorced men (11 cases only reported), the remaining 4 per cent was made up of widowers, the polygamous, and so on.<sup>126</sup> However, it is frequently the case that demobilized bachelors have families to take care of. According to the figures, bachelors have on average one family dependant. However, if the 54 per cent of bachelors who have no dependants are excluded, the average rises to 2.5 dependants per bachelor with dependants. In the case of Inhassunge district, demobilized bachelors have 7.5 dependents on average, thus forming an average family size of 8 to 9 persons. Comparable considerations could be made in the case of married demobilized combatants. However, while, on average, they have two dependants, exclusion of the category of married men without dependants would raise the average number of dependants (in this case of married ex-combatants with dependants) to just 2.3.

One simple conclusion to be drawn from this is that the distinction between bachelors and married men is very tenuous, as undetermined as the pattern of the nuclear family amongst the demobilized combatants. The cause of this is that argued above: the slow transition to the nuclear family occurred in the colonial and immediate post-colonial periods, which has been consolidated by the impact of the recent war, which further imposed a pattern of 'atypical' family structures or even destroyed existing family structures.

This is the case, for example, of a demobilized combatant who returned home to find his parents dead and who has had, as a consequence, to take care of his younger brothers and sisters. Demobilized Alberto Luís Calisto's experience is very representative of an 'atypical' family in post-war conditions:

On my return, after having fulfilled my duty as soldier, I found that my father and mother had died. I have now to take care of my brothers and sisters. [...] The head of my family is dead. I am the head now. [...] I live here in Quelimane with my uncle. My brothers and sisters still live in my home

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<sup>125</sup>The average age could be misleading because the young age of many combatants is distorted by the presence of a smaller group of older soldiers from the struggle for independence. The average age is also distorted by the absence of Renamo's 'child soldiers'. Many of them were discreetly demobilized in another process by UNICEF and related NGOs such as Save the Children Fund.

<sup>126</sup>These figures need to be treated with some caution as the methodology was varied and not every soldier could be sure of his status, the inquiries often having been answered before the cantoned combatants knew about the actual situation of their families. In the case of the bachelors, it is an imprecise definition (what does it mean to be single: not officially married or not having formed a family at all?).

district, Pebane. I had to come here to try to find a job. [...] This is the only family I have. I do not have father and mother now. I am very sad for having lost my parents. At the end of my military life, as I was returning home I found that the door was closed.<sup>127</sup>

In some cases, demobilized men found support in their families. Manuel Manecas Dramessete, for instance, having nowhere to go, sought his father's help:

I have a family of my one, I am married and I have a son. My father and mother accepted me and loaned me temporarily half of their yard, where I started cultivating rice. (...) <sup>128</sup>

The broad conclusion is that family structures are, at present, very 'atypical' and seriously weakened at a time when strong family structures are obviously an important factor for the successful re-integration of the demobilized combatants. Nevertheless, the most important factor for strengthening such structures at present is the economic integration of such men. Demobilized combatants, whether single or married, have to find ways of earning income, not just to assure their subsistence but also the subsistence of their dependants. The context in which such economic integration will occur will be discussed next, beginning with the activity which most of these men intend to carry out in the near future: agriculture.

### *(c) Demobilized combatants as farmers*

According to the sample we have been using, 23 per cent of combatants in Zambézia were described as 'farmers' at the time of their conscription, a percentage which increased to 37 per cent of ex-combatants on demobilization. This constitutes by far the largest single category.<sup>129</sup> The reason for this is probably simple: in a group in which the vast majority come from rural areas, farmers are regarded as those not holding any particular skill. Not surprisingly, the percentage of potential farmers is high.

However, the optimistic estimate above (optimistic in the sense that self-employed agricultural activities should have priority in the re-integration strategy), that almost half the sample intended to be farmers in their future civilian lives could be misleading for some specific reasons. The first is concerned with the definition of 'farmer' itself. Such a term does not

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<sup>127</sup>Alberto Luís Calisto. Interview. Quelimane: 4 July 1994.

<sup>128</sup>Manuel Manecas Dramessete. Interview. Quelimane: 4 July 1994.

<sup>129</sup>ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization. 'Table 5: Projection of distribution of demobilised soldiers by wish to return to agriculture (for 69,000 total to be demobilized, based on first 30,839 registered in AAs)'. Maputo: 24 March 1994, considers a higher total figure of 46.3 percent projected as intending to develop agricultural activities in the future.

reflect the historical experience of the peasantry, particularly in Zambézia. For at least a century there has been no 'pure' peasant agriculture in the province, in the sense of agricultural production which provides all means of livelihood for a family by itself.

**TABLE 8: Demobilized combatants in Zambézia by main occupational groups**

Districts	Total	At time of Conscription			Intention at Demobilization		
		Students	Peasants	Workers	Students	Peasants	Workers
Alto Molócuè	220	97	38	21	3	86	33
Chinde	116	47	23	6	--	46	22
Gilé	125	35	29	20	--	64	22
Gurué	215	66	42	42	3	62	73
Ile	314	88	101	37	1	158	51
Inhassunge	30	21	4	2	--	4	9
Lugela	74	20	25	3	--	29	7
Maganja	130	55	25	8	--	40	28
Milange	155	50	68	12	1	81	17
Mocuba	372	155	68	51	4	123	77
Mopeia	43	9	18	1	--	26	1
Morrumbala	118	42	37	8	--	51	9
Namacurra	122	55	19	12	--	41	18
Namarroi	113	20	59	4	--	77	5
Nicoadala	153	92	21	9	1	38	27
Pebane	130	61	22	6	--	39	10
Quelimane	240	146	21	30	--	21	61
Total (Zambézia)	2,670	1,049	629	272	13	986	470

Source: ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization Database, 26 June 1994.

The impact of the war also seriously unbalanced the nuclear family itself. In the traditional household, men customarily have the role of clearing the fields for agriculture, building the house, and hunting and fishing, while women cultivate the fields and take care of the house and children. In a most direct way, the war moved families away from their lands and

separated their members. It also *aged* the families by removing men and youngsters from them and their traditional activities.<sup>130</sup> By definition, war is undertaken by young men.

The war was not the sole reason for the transformation of the traditional structure of rural households. Following independence, the lack of access to cash-generating activities encouraged young men to leave their families to seek alternative living styles, a process which assisted recruitment to Renamo.<sup>131</sup> It is difficult, at present, to believe these uprooted ex-combatants will readily return to being full-time farmers.

Agricultural activities are, therefore, probably regarded as being nothing more than just a 'safe basis' by those who do not know what to do in the future, or what they will have the opportunity to do. The intention to pursue a farmer's life was indicated by the combatants at the time they entered the AAs, located in many cases in places unfamiliar to them. Many of the demobilized combatants have started to cultivate small plots (or, more accurately, having their family members cultivate them) while seeking other opportunities. As time went by (the period spent in the AAs was, on average, much longer than was initially expected) they gained experience of the place where they were living, found local work to increment the subsidy provided and some even formed local families. In this context, agriculture is not seen as a long-term occupation but an activity to carry out while waiting for 'real' opportunities to appear. Manuel Manecas Dramessete, for instance, cited above, was very clear when he said that:

This is not a proper cultivation and I need to find some other opportunities.  
Soon I will have to go.<sup>132</sup>

The 'optimistic' numbers provided by initial assessments have therefore to be taken very cautiously.

*(d) Demobilized combatants' skills and education*

The sample under consideration here suggests that the ex-combatants' level of education is low. This is due to several factors: firstly, the colonial heritage of illiteracy and poor schooling. This deficiency was exacerbated by the destruction of many schools during the

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<sup>130</sup>See Ivette Illas Jeichande and Paulo Fernandes: 'Um Estudo de Planificação Pós-Guerra na Perspectiva da Comunidade Rural, Distrito de Ile, Zambézia' (unpublished), Maputo: UNICEF, February 1992:15-16.

<sup>131</sup>See, in this respect, Christian Geffray & Mogens Pederson, 'Sobre a guerra na província de Nampula. Elementos de análise e hipóteses sobre as determinações e consequências sócio-económicas locais', in *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos*, 4-5, January-December 1986, 311-312.

<sup>132</sup>Manuel Manecas Dramessete, Interview, Quelimane: 4 July 1994.

recent war.<sup>133</sup> Conscription to the army of those still studying also contributed to lower educational standards. Table 8 shows that, in Zambézia, by the time of call-up, 39 per cent of the total combatants were students, while the percentage of those intending to resume or to start studying after demobilization is virtually nil (13 of a total 2,670). Even if this unwillingness to resume studying is a result from the need to find employment after demobilization,<sup>134</sup> there can be no doubt that military service has been detrimental to the process of individual education. As a result, 14 per cent of the total remain illiterate, while 55 per cent hold only the primary level diploma (four school years). The percentage then steeply declines: only seven out of the total 2,670 have completed secondary level studies.<sup>135</sup>

It is possible that the army gave something to its recruits in exchange for what was taken away from them. The statistics reveal that unemployment was running at 9 per cent at the time of conscription, where virtually none were categorized as unemployed disappeared in the demobilization statistics. This is misleading because, if those joining the FADM are excluded, the demobilized combatants can be regarded as unemployed. Even so, some positive trends can be found as a result of practical skills acquired during army service, particularly those of drivers and mechanics. As a likely consequence, the percentage of drivers increased from 1 to 4 per cent, and that of mechanics was doubled, from 3 to 6 per cent. Numbers hoping to enter other professions also increased, if more modestly: construction workers (including house carpenters, masons, painters, electricians), from 6 to 7 per cent and nurses, non-existent by the time of conscription, now representing 1 per cent.<sup>136</sup>

Table 8 above illustrates the evolution of three major occupational groups, namely those of students, farmers and a third one, arbitrarily called 'workers', which includes construction workers, drivers and mechanics. Other professions such as craftsmen (including tailors, locksmiths and shoemakers), fishermen or miners showed no increase at the time of demobilization. This reflects not only the lack of training activities in these fields but also

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<sup>133</sup>In the villages, teachers were, with the political structures, privileged targets.

<sup>134</sup>Some of the people interviewed show their interest in receiving some sort of training or studying activities, provided that such activities earned them salaries.

<sup>135</sup>ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilisation, 'Table 4: Projection of distribution of demobilized soldiers by level of education (for 69,000 total to be demobilized, based on first 30,839 registered in AAs)', Maputo: 24 March 1994, presents as extrapolation for the total of demobilized combatants the following: 34.5 per cent of illiterates, 27.3 per cent holding the primary level diploma (4 years); 14.5 per cent having completed the 7th class, and 23.4 per cent with more than the 8th class.

<sup>136</sup>Indications from the database refer to manifest intention to perform a job, and not skills already in possession. However, it is considered that the will to do something generally presupposes some level of knowledge, which is still not to be acquired as revealed by the virtual absence of men intending to follow training activities. This bestows, in our view, some legitimacy on the argument.

poor employment possibilities.

(e) *Demobilized combatants' expectations*

We have discussed above some of the factors influencing what the demobilized combatants intend to do in their future civilian lives.<sup>137</sup> Obviously, one immediate option for re-integration is to join the new army. Besides assuring a certain level of continuity and providing some degree of psychological security, the conditions being offered by FADM are substantially better than those in the old Government army, not to mention Renamo's. Despite this, what prevails amongst the cantoned troops is fatigue with military life. Tomás Albino Inhassengo reflects this in saying that:

I did not join the army because I am tired of military life. This is the time for a different life to be revealed to me. It is also very dangerous for us to get used to just one way of living, the one of the army. Since I left the army in one piece, it would probably be defying luck to go back there. No! This would not be advantageous for me. I would rather try any other alternative but the army.<sup>138</sup>

A lack of confidence in the new army, which is identified with the old FAM, inhibits recruitment, and the extended periods in cantonment have also contributed to the widespread view that there is nothing 'new' about the new army.<sup>139</sup>

The second most obvious choice for employment, in the light of the ex-combatants' profile and the specific conditions of Zambézia, is agriculture. We have referred above to some of the negative factors connected with this: small-scale agriculture rarely being considered as a principle source of employment by most ex-combatants (rather a complementary occupation

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<sup>137</sup>Two comments need to be made here, in order to clarify how options are followed by ex-combatants in this respect. The first is that their perspectives about the future, rather than being simple options immediately decided from the start, take time to be *constructed*, and result from several factors of which the ones appointed above are part. The second is that, besides these factors, others also exist, determined by immediate reality or, put in another way, by how the demobilized soldier sees his chances of succeeding in re-integrating himself in civilian life. These aspects are obviously important because in the last instance they are the ones on which their options are based. It is not reasonable to expect cantoned combatants to take from the start unequivocal decisions about their future, particularly if the extended period they have spent in the army and their youthfulness by the time of conscription are taken into account. Moreover, the majority never had a professional occupation in their previous civilian life (roughly 40 per cent of the combatants from our sample were students at the time of conscription). Added to all this must be the modest training received in the army, and the poor condition of the post-war economy with the consequent difficulties in the labour market.

<sup>138</sup>Tomás Albino Inhassengo, Interview, 15 July 1994.

<sup>139</sup>Only very recently, as a result of the lack of volunteers, did CSC order a strong campaign to improve the image of FADM at the eyes of the cantoned soldiers. The results are still to be seen.

in the household, performed by 'dependants' or by themselves only in their spare time). Moreover, agriculture is unattractive at the present time for complicated social reasons. Land tenure is still a confused and unsettled issue and, given the strength of competition from the more powerful commercial farms, the prospects for small-scale agriculture are obviously doubtful. Some tracts of land are still landmined, transforming everyday agricultural work into a potentially hazardous activity. Roads are still in very poor condition and rural shops for supplying consumer goods and agricultural equipment, in addition to buying production surplus, are, to a large extent lacking, and it is proving hard to re-establish them.<sup>140</sup> The prices paid to the producer also do not make agricultural production worthwhile.<sup>141</sup> These factors, and those of the history of the province, suggest that small-scale agriculture cannot be the sole ex-combatant activity, and will probably not be the principal one. It is not surprising that all the interviewees mentioned agriculture as being subsidiary to commerce, their views well summed up by Abdul Remane Latifo:

My projects [...] first to open *machambas* [plots for cultivating] for my family to work in there. In the meantime I will be doing business: selling fish and other goods. My project is to start *machambas*, to leave the family there while I do my business. If I can manage this way, I will be living here while they stay there, at our *machamba*.<sup>142</sup>

It is possible, therefore, that the initial optimistic estimates that 50 per cent of the ex-combatants would choose agriculture, let alone the one-third suggested by our sample, will diminish to much lower percentages as alternative source of income are found.

The main problem with small-scale commerce, as viewed by many of the interviewees, is the lack of funds with which to make a start. How, for example, to buy the first stock of dried fish in Inhassunge and take it to the interior to exchange it for maize, which will in turn will be taken to sell there to buy more fish.<sup>143</sup> Many look to the possibility of receiving the monthly EAR subsidies due to them accumulated by several months. However, the EAR scheme only allows for the possibility of accumulating two months subsidy, the past and the

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<sup>140</sup>Many small shop-owners, *cantineiros*, had their shops destroyed and stocks ransacked during the war. Frequently they also lost trucks and inclusively their life. The ones remaining as well as the ones intending to start this activity, are greatly under-capitalized or still have fears about the evolution of the security situation.

<sup>141</sup>A recent attempt to raise the price of maize to the producer faced the frontal opposition of local under-capitalized merchants and agencies like WFP. The latter even threatened the Government that it would buy from neighbouring countries instead, on very doubtful grounds. In fact, the more favourable price (in terms of producers), which ended up being abandoned, was not far from the prices to the producer in the region, particularly in Zimbabwe and South Africa. See analysis in Rui Ribeiro, 'Livre concorrência? Qual livre concorrência?', *mediaFAX*, 546, 12 July 1994.

<sup>142</sup>Abdul Remane Latifo, Interview, Quelimane: 4 July 1994.

<sup>143</sup>Manuel Manecas Dramessete, Interview: Quelimane, 4 July 1994.

forthcoming one. The lack of any alternative source of capital largely prevents self-initiative and puts further pressure on the structures offering formal employment, which are clearly seen as promising the most stable way of living. The next section will therefore discuss the provincial structures offering formal jobs in Zambézia.

#### 2.4 Provincial structures to absorb demobilized combatants

Zambézia's economy is weak and, being agricultural based (needing extensive areas to be productive), was deeply affected by the war. Roughly one-half of the province is still regarded as 'Renamo zones', defined as being inaccessible to private or state post-war investment. Besides family agriculture, the major source of 'self-employment' in the province are the old plantation companies. These are being rehabilitated, notably the *Companhia da Zambézia* and *Companhia do Madal*, but also smaller ones like *Companhia do Bajone*.<sup>144</sup> Generally, the plantation companies are approaching the post-war transition period cautiously, either because their resources have been depleted by the war or because they fear a set back in the peace process and a resumption of the conflict. For the present, easier access to their fields without major security problems is an improvement, but they are still generally adopting a 'wait-and-see' attitude, cleaning and maintaining the already existing plantations but delaying investing in their assets, even if they are able to do so. Under these circumstances, the employment the plantations offer is limited and on a seasonal basis, even if the work period can be extended to eight or nine months per year.<sup>145</sup>

Industrial activity in Zambézia Province is also weak and what there is is mostly in private hands. The most important entrepreneur is Ibrahim Hassan who runs a mixed company including textiles, clothing and shoemaking units, carpentry, cooking oil, soap, food processing (particularly doughs and cookies). Another important company is Geralco, also dealing with cooking oil and soap, as subsidiaries of palm tree plantations. Fishing is an important activity, with two important joint companies, Efripel (with Japan) and Crustamoz (with Spain). Otherwise, there are only a few more industrial units, namely a couple of small flour mills and the salt-producing activities related to the Zambézia and Madal companies.<sup>146</sup> In general, all these undertakings have been slow to grow, and rely on a limited labour force with a relatively stable staff. Given this modest level of private enterprise, the process of re-integration is still heavily dependent on the state, if self-initiative by the demobilized soldiers is excluded.

In the state sector, road building and repair is crucial for the benefits it can bring towards the development of other sectors, particularly agriculture, and the number of former combatants it can potentially employ. Examples of this are seen in the building of the Namacurra-Mocuba road started in 1987 and the roads from Milange to Mocuba and Quelimane to Namacurra

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<sup>144</sup>A third major company, *Companhia do Boror* is currently facing enormous financial difficulties.

<sup>145</sup>João Forte (*Companhia da Zambézia*), Personal Contact, Quelimane: 28 June 1994; José da Murrôa (*Companhia do Bajone*), Personal Contact, Quelimane: 28 June 1994.

<sup>146</sup>Sebastiana Lúcio (Provincial Directorate of Industry and Energy), Personal Contact, Quelimane: 1 July 1994.

roads.<sup>147</sup> Other projects include the Mocubela-Pebane road (built by the Maganja da Costa brigade), the Gurué-Lioma road (built by the Gurué brigade) and the Quelimane-Chinde road (built by Mopeia brigade) and the Mocuba-Namanjavira and Nauela-Alto Molócuê roads. All these projects are labour-intensive and are being undertaken principally by brigades of 100 to 120 men with some skills, progressing at an average of 5km per month. However, ECMEP (*Empresa de Construção e Manutenção de Estradas e Pontes*) continues to debate whether to expand these brigades or contract unskilled labour from the villages as the roads progress.<sup>148</sup> ECMEP has also tried a pilot project in which *cantoneiros* (contracted men) are responsible for the maintenance of sections of road. A project of this kind is being developed on the Lugela-Mocuba road, where 30 *cantoneiros* are responsible for maintaining 1km of road each. This is necessary because sand roads need permanent maintenance, particularly during the rainy season.<sup>149</sup> The system, when involving former combatants, performs the two-fold role of providing numerous jobs and dispersing or keeping men dispersed, a tactic which should not be neglected for security reasons.

## 2.5 The Zambézian DRP

There were six AAs in Zambézia, three for Government soldiers (Milange, Mocuba and Quelimane-Issídua), and three for Renamo troops (Sabelua, Mocubela and Mohiua). The principal agents for the Zambézian re-integration process are the provincial branches of UNOHAC and IOM which, together with the representatives of the Government and Renamo, make up CORE/Zambézia.

IOM is the first organization in the chain of demobilization, taking responsibility for transporting the demobilized soldiers and their dependants from the AAs to the area where they wish to settle. IOM also: distributes seeds and tool kits as the ex-combatants depart; keeps a database; facilitates family reunion; assists vulnerable groups; and implements an information and referral service to assist the demobilized combatants in their re-integration.<sup>150</sup>

The impact of demobilization was felt in Zambézia even before the local combatants started being demobilized from their AAs. While demobilization in the other provinces started in

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<sup>147</sup>The first was concluded in 1991; the second was initiated in 1993 and will be concluded the present year; the third was initiated in 1992 and is planned to terminate in 1995. See INDER, 'Lista de Projectos Tutelados pelo INDER', Maputo: n/d.

<sup>148</sup>Paul Collier, 'Demobilization and Insecurity: A study in the economics of the transition from war to peace', Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford: August 1993:7-8, discussed, in the context of rural infrastructure building in Uganda and Ethiopia, the alternative involving 'the deployment of a small core of skilled well-paid labour which travelled with the project' against the solution of relying upon the recruitment of unskilled labour from each locality. "The advantage of this was that the unskilled labour had its own accommodation and sources of food. The use of demobilised labour would have necessitated travelling labour gangs which would have considerably increased the expense."

<sup>149</sup>Elias Marrengule (ECMEP), Personal Contact, Quelimane, 30 June 1994.

<sup>150</sup>IOM, 'Third Statistical Report', Maputo: 1 June 1994.

March, Zambézia only started demobilization in April. Therefore, from March onwards, Zambézia was already hosting demobilized combatants and their dependents from other provinces who had chosen to settle there. Table 9 shows that 986 demobilized combatants and their dependants had already entered the province by the end of March.<sup>151</sup>

**TABLE 9: Demobilized combatants and their dependants transported from other provinces to Zambézia**

Provinces of Origin	March			April			May			Total by June		
	DS	DEP	TOT	DS	DEP	TOT	DS	DEP	TOT	DS	DEP	TOT
Maputo	115	90	205	82	97	179	43	29	72	240	216	456
Inhambane	11	27	38	1	5	6	1	--	1	13	32	45
Gaza	39	57	96	1	--	1	4	6	10	44	63	107
Nampula	15	61	77	52	162	214	46	38	84	113	261	374
C. Delgado	23	38	61	24	42	66	3	4	7	50	84	134
Niassa	41	50	91	31	60	91	29	56	85	101	166	267
Sofala	138	138	276	54	102	156	170	256	426	362	496	858
Manica	12	23	35	22	38	60	52	68	120	86	129	215
Tete	45	107	107	18	46	64	37	50	87	100	158	258
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>439</b>	<b>546</b>	<b>986</b>	<b>285</b>	<b>552</b>	<b>837</b>	<b>385</b>	<b>507</b>	<b>892</b>	<b>1109</b>	<b>1605</b>	<b>2714</b>

DE = Demobilized combatants; DEP = Dependants; TOT = Total.

Sources: IOM, 'First Statistical Report', Maputo: 31 March 1994; IOM, 'Second Statistical Report', Maputo: 1 May 1994; IOM, 'Third Statistical Report', Maputo: 1 June 1994.

Local demobilization began in April at the two Government AAs at Milange and Quelimane. In May, while Milange apparently ceased demobilization, and Quelimane slightly increased the pace, Mocubela and Mohiua became the first Renamo AAs to start demobilization. IOM statistics show that a total of 1,901 combatants were demobilized in Zambézia, of whom 74 per cent (1,412) remained in the province. A further 285 brought from other provinces make a total of 1,697 demobilized combatants (3,653 with their dependants included).

While this was happening, CORE was trying put its machinery in place at provincial level. From March, the process was coordinated through bi-weekly meetings between representatives from the Government and Renamo in CORE, UNOHAC and IOM. By April, when the demobilization process was already 'producing' former combatants with specific problems, the UN established the Information and Referral Services (SIR) in Quelimane which also took part in the coordination meetings, and which was charged with providing the information the

<sup>151</sup>UNOHAC/Zambézia, '2ª Reunião da Comissão Provincial para a Reintegração dos Desmobilizados (CORE)', Quelimane: 21 March 1994, refers that "more than 200 demobilized combatants from other provinces entered Zambézia through Quelimane". UNOHAC/Zambézia, '3ª Reunião da Comissão Provincial para a Reintegração dos Desmobilizados (CORE)', Quelimane: 12 April 1994 says that it is not known how many demobilized combatants and dependants entered the province.

former combatants would need. Even at this early stage, the machinery dealing with the demobilized combatants was running a step behind events.<sup>152</sup>

**TABLE 10: Demobilized combatants and their dependants transported from the Assembly Areas**

Assembly Area	April						May					
	to Zambézia			to other Prov.			to Zambézia			to other Prov.		
	DS	DEP	TOT	DS	DEP	TOT	DS	DEP	TOT	DS	DEP	TOT
Milange	89	155	244	6	14	20	89	155	244	6	14	20
Quelimane	474	467	941	233	248	481	1182	1059	2241	394	424	818
Mocuba	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Sub-Tot/G	563	622	1185	239	262	501	1271	1214	2485	400	438	838
Mocubela	--	--	--	--	--	--	72	60	132	45	40	85
Mohiua	--	--	--	--	--	--	69	--	69	44	--	44
Sabelua	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Sub-Tot/R	--	--	--	--	--	--	141	60	201	89	40	129
Total	563	622	1185	239	262	501	1412	1274	2686	489	478	967

Sources: IOM, 'Second Statistical Report', Maputo: 1 May 1994; IOM, 'Third Statistical Report', Maputo: 1 June 1994.

Once SIR started assisting demobilized men, the main problems raised with it concerned the provision of food and issues to do with registration. Having been transferred from other provinces or having recently left the AAs, the former combatants faced bureaucratic problems regarding the transfer of their registration from the original AAs to their new home areas. There were also logistical difficulties in getting food to the demobilized combatants and their families. These issues were prominent at the CORE meetings.<sup>153</sup>

From May, the main focus of complaint from the *desmobilizados* shifted from access to food to the payment of the subsidies owed to them. As the six months' subsidy paid by the Government ended<sup>154</sup> they started facing delays in switching over to receiving the subsidy, financed by the international community and ONUMOZ, and paid through the BDP for a further 18 months. It is still too early to assess how smoothly the process of subsidy payment

<sup>152</sup>Delays in setting up SIR's offices on the ground were probably due not only to "normal" difficulties but also to disputes within the UN apparatus over its control.

<sup>153</sup>Acácio Julião (SIR/Quelimane Counsellor). Interview. Quelimane: 1 July 1994. UNOHAC/Zambézia. '3ª Reunião da Comissão Provincial para a Reintegração dos Desmobilizados (CORE)'. Quelimane: 12 April 1994. UNOHAC/Zambézia. '4ª Reunião da Comissão Provincial para a Reintegração dos Desmobilizados (CORE)'. Quelimane: 29 April 1994.

<sup>154</sup>In the AAs they received three months and when demobilized they started receiving in the areas of destination, as was already mentioned. This means that those demobilized in March were concluding that cycle.

financed by the international community and ONUMOZ, and paid through the BDP for a further 18 months. It is still too early to assess how smoothly the process of subsidy payment has worked out in practice. The first stage (the six months' paid by the Government) has just come to an end, while the second stage is still being run in. While the Counsellor of SIR/Zambézia considered that delays on the Government side were the cause of the combatants' dissatisfaction, those interviewed, considered that the first stage had worked 'very well, without problems, with the cheques being cashed at the right time, with no delays'.<sup>155</sup> The difficult transition from the first to the second stage appears to have been due not only to the complexity of the system but also to problems with the lists of the beneficiaries, worsened by the incorporation in the process of the group of FAM soldiers who had been demobilized before the GPA. This broke the routine of an already weak bureaucratic system.

The BPD pays the second-stage subsidies. It has offices in Quelimane, where the provincial head office and a further three urban branches are located, and in the towns of Mocuba, Gurué, Alto Molócuè, Pebane and Chinde, covering most of the central and eastern areas of the province. However, problems are expected in the western areas as there are no BPD branches in Mopeia, Morrumbala or Milange, distant towns with difficult access. Problems are particularly expected in the case of Milange where there is a fairly high concentration of demobilized combatants<sup>156</sup> who will be obliged to travel long distances to collect their subsidies in Mocuba and Quelimane.

Table 11 indicates a decrease in the problems related with food provision, a low interest on the part of *desmobilizados* in training activities, a still erratic percentage related to jobs, and steadily high percentages related to subsidies and the problems raised by the complexity of the process, under the label of *miscellaneous* (including lost documents and registering the transfer of place of residence).

If and when the issue of subsidies' payment is normalized, a third question will become a priority for the *desmobilizados*, that of employment. According to SIR's Counsellor, those seeking jobs are, for the present, a minority of drivers and mechanics<sup>157</sup>, but it is obvious that this will increase as the payment of subsidies comes to an end. In the first 15 days of May, this was already occurring, as shown in the data provided by SIR/Zambézia.

CORE/Zambézia's efforts towards identifying jobs have been modest, which is predictable since formal jobs are scarce in Zambézia. At its fourth meeting, in response to slow progress, CORE/Zambézia decided to form a Working Group of two people (one from the Government, one from Renamo) to accelerate identifying job opportunities. Almost two months later, the group was still struggling with a lack of the transport necessary to start its work outside Quelimane. In the meantime, employment prospects were still limited to vague promises from DPCA/ECMEP.

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<sup>155</sup>Omar Tar Omar. Interview. Quelimane: 4 July 1994.

<sup>156</sup>Milange has a branch of the *Banco de Moçambique* which will not be paying subsidies to the *desmobilizados*.

<sup>157</sup>Acácio Julião (SIR/Quelimane Counsellor). Interview. Quelimane: 1 July 1994.

**TABLE 11: Quantification of problems raised by *Desmobilizados* at SIR/Zambézia (%)**

Needs raised	17 May (58 cases)	2 June (84 cases)	21 June (81 cases)
Jobs	36	39	18
Subsidies	17	7	32
Food	16	13	5
Training	5	5	2
Transport	5	4	--
Miscellaneous	21	33	43

\*Miscellaneous covers problems related with documents and transferral of place of residence.

Sources: UNOHAC/Zambézia. '5ª Reunião da Comissão Provincial para a Reintegração dos Desmobilizados (CORE)', Quelimane: 17 May 1994; UNOHAC/Zambézia. '6ª Reunião da Comissão Provincial para a Reintegração dos Desmobilizados (CORE)', Quelimane: 2 June 1994; UNOHAC/Zambézia. '7ª Reunião da Comissão Provincial para a Reintegração dos Desmobilizados (CORE)', Quelimane: 21 June 1994.

## 2.6 Re-integration of the officer class

The discussion re-integration of ex-combatants in Zambézia has been based on the assumption that the military population from the sample used is a homogeneous one. While this is partly true, particularly if we consider that the levels of education and skills do not vary much between officers, sergeants and rank-and-file soldiers, there are important differences amongst the classes which have to be taken into account, particularly regarding expectations after demobilization. This section will discuss these differences and, at the same time, will try to compare the situation in Zambézia with that in Maputo province and the capital city of Maputo.<sup>158</sup>

Zambézia is not only a province of farmers but also one in which rank-and-file soldiers form a clear majority in the military population. The officer class, only 12 per cent in Zambézia, constitutes a much higher percentage in Maputo province, and an even higher one in the city of Maputo itself (Table 12). One reason for this is the high concentration of officers at Boane headquarters in Maputo province; in Maputo city, the FAM used to be part of the centralized state apparatus which in turn determined the concentration of most of the army's administrative services there.

Differences in the background of formal education between officers, other ranks and men were not important. Half of the officers from Maputo city in our sample, for example, had only completed the first level (six years) of schooling. However, many officers had benefitted

<sup>158</sup>Based on a sample from the ONUMOZ Technical Unit Database of 613 military demobilized in Maputo province by 26 June 1994 and 576 military demobilized in the capital city of Maputo by the same date.

from training courses, particularly abroad, in the so-called 'brother-countries'. Major Mateus Magala was one of them:

I did my military training in Cuba at the Military Academy of *Isla de la Juventud*, which I attended until 1980. I came back to the country qualified to work in armoured corps and social sciences [political indoctrination], and went to work at the political commissariat. [...] In 1985 I went abroad for the second time, to study mechanical engineering in Czechoslovakia.<sup>159</sup>

**TABLE 12: Comparison of military classes in three provinces (%)**

	Officers	Sergeants	Soldiers
Zambézia province (100%)	12.2	21.9	65.9
Maputo province (100%)	27.7	30.9	41.4
Maputo city (100%)	31.9	31.2	36.9
Average (100%)	24.0	28.0	48.0

*Source:* ONUMOS Technical Unit for Demobilization, Database: Combatants demobilized by 26 June 1994 in the provinces of Zambézia and Maputo, and in the city of Maputo.

Even if the courses attended and the qualifications gained in the army helped promotion, the fact is that many officers, such as Magala, faced serious difficulties in being re-integrated in the army with their new skills. Promotion within the army was based, to a large extent, on time spent in military service. The officers in the Maputo sample, for example, had spent an average of 15 years in the army, which is substantially more than the average nine years spent by the sample from Zambézia (which included all military classes).

The picture is, in many respects, one of a body of poorly educated officers who have spent many years in the army, where they gained some privileges through promotion. Though often better equipped to face civilian life, the officers -now about to leave the army - face re-integration with the same insecurity as the other ranks. The insecurity is increased by a greater attachment to and dependency on the military apparatus and the Government in general, and by a sense of having much more to lose and, therefore, much more to demand as compensation. Major Fernando Mabanga António, for example, said that

There is a feeling of frustration amongst the officers. Many of us expected something more, like that which the Former Combatants [from the struggle for independence] got some years ago, for example. They got their pensions and certain facilities were created for them. A special fund was established to finance some of their projects. In our case, we could make use of a same kind of mechanism, which could support those aiming at establishing small industries or commercial businesses. I am not in a desperate position myself.

<sup>159</sup>Major Mateus Magala, Interview, Maputo, 14 July 1994

but I know people [officers] that do not know how to handle their situation.<sup>160</sup>

Because of special conditions affecting the officer class, they are more demanding than the other ranks, and also more dependent on the Government.<sup>161</sup> This is probably why the large majority of those volunteering for the new army are officers, hoping to assure continued access to benefits usually conferred on their class. This is also why officers, much more than the other soldiers, tend to seek salaried work rather than self-employment as farmers, for instance (see Table 13), a view echoed by Major José Manuel:

As with everything in life one cannot lie down with nothing to do. I intend to work instead of doing business. I would rather be a worker or an official than joining the business world: because business has its advantages and disadvantages. If business goes wrong you will certainly have a hard time; but if you are an employee there is always something for you at the end of the month. This is why I find it better.<sup>162</sup>

**TABLE 13: Intended occupation after demobilization in three areas: whole combatants and officers**

Area		Total	Farmers (%)	Workers (%)
Zambézia prov.	Military	2,670 (100%)	36.9	17.6
	Officers	322 (100%)	22.6	34.2
Maputo province	Military	613 (100%)	11.2	44.5
	Officers	165 (100%)	8.4	50.3
Maputo city	Military	576 (100%)	3.6	46.0
	Officers	184 (100%)	4.3	41.3

*Source:* ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization. Database: Combatants demobilized by 26 June 1994 in the provinces of Zambézia and Maputo, and in the city of Maputo.

Given the special circumstances affecting the FAM's officers, it had been argued that their re-integration should deserve, if not priority, at least some special attention. If their needs were not met, they would be in a stronger position to threaten the peace process than the other military classes, both because of their ability to command forces and their more global

<sup>160</sup>Major Fernando Mabanga António. Interview. Maputo, 12 July 1994.

<sup>161</sup>This dependency was identified in a preliminary study, namely P.Mphoko, 'Study of the Officer Class on Demobilisation and Integration', ONUMOZ, Maputo: April 1993.

<sup>162</sup>Major José Manuel. Interview. Maputo, 15 July 1994.

view of the process.<sup>163</sup> Unskilled officers and those demanding compensation could, of course, give up waiting and withdraw from the process, becoming small autonomous warlords. However, there are also large numbers of officers who will continue to press the authorities for jobs. Some, such as Major José Manuel, see promise in the training courses which are being proposed under the Training and Skills Programme, particularly if employment will be guaranteed on completion of courses.<sup>164</sup> Many others are waiting for the loan scheme which would provide them with the capital to start some activity. Captain Jemere, for instance, formerly commander of the training centre for dogs, is currently seeking a loan to start training guard dogs.<sup>165</sup> Should there be no other alternatives, some can always join the new army in order to safeguard some of the privileges acquired in the past as officers. At present, those officers without income from other sources, receive a cash subsidy which is much greater than that which the rank-and-file soldiers receive. According to Major Manganhela from CORE, the subsidy earned by rank-and-file soldiers

...is not even sufficient to buy stakes to build their houses, let alone to start a small business or any productive activity at all.<sup>166</sup>

From this perspective, unskilled and uneducated rank-and-file combatants, either from the Government side, frustrated by long wasted years in the army, or from Renamo, deceived by the unfulfilled promises of the supposed victory, can also withdraw from the process, pushed to the limit as they are. Rather than being more 'easy to handle' than the officers in the demobilization and re-integration process, they too can re-establish a new pattern of violence in the country, under the guidance of disgruntled officers or by themselves in small groups. Because each military category has the potential to threaten security, priority should not be given to any specific group on this basis. In an environment where weapons are relatively easy to obtain, all soldiers, whether from the Government side or from Renamo, should be treated equally in the re-integration process, even if the particular characteristics of each class have to be considered. They are all part of the DRP. Unless the former combatants are accorded decent conditions either in the new FADM or in demobilization, there will be a new pattern of guerrilla-like instability. Signs of this are already discernible in the country, particularly in the provinces of Maputo and Zambézia.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>163</sup>P.Mphoko, 'Study of the Officer Class on Demobilization and Integration', ONUMOZ, Maputo: April 1993, advanced the assumption that "[Officers] emphasized that the non-availability of Government assistance (...) could lead to their frustration, which they said could be a threat to peace."

<sup>164</sup>Major José Manuel, Interview, Maputo: 15 July 1994.

<sup>165</sup>Captain Paulo G.Santos, [Side notes on the interviews held in SIR/Maputo], 15 July 1994.

<sup>166</sup>Major Manganhela, Interview, Maputo, 15 July 1994.

<sup>167</sup>While assaults never ceased in Zambézia, bearing therefore some characteristics of the previous conflict, incidents in Maputo province, particularly on the roads from Maputo to Namaacha and Ressano Garcia were resumed after an interregnum since the ceasefire.

### 3 CONCLUSIONS

#### 3.1 Demobilization

The implementation of the GPA frequently faced moments of crisis because of problems in the process of cantonment and demobilization of Government and Renamo troops. These were due to three groups of difficulty.

- (a) Logistical problems were two-fold. Poor facilities in many AAs, particularly poor water supply, lack of clothing and shortage of food, contributed to a tense and volatile environment in them. These problems also resulted from the problems both parties encountered in sending their troops into the AAs, particularly due to lack of transport. These factors delayed the cantonment timetable far beyond what was originally envisaged.
- (b) Technical problems were related to the difficulties both sides experienced in presenting lists for demobilization and integration of troops into FADM, also including problems ONUMOZ experienced in processing the data from the AAs.
- (c) Political problems were caused mainly by the lack of trust between the parties, a legacy of the war. Reconciliation, particularly in this very sensitive area of the armed forces, was (and, to a great extent, still is) something that had to be built up through a long, and, at times, very difficult, negotiation process. An overview of this two-year peace process indicates that it was in the demobilization of the combatants that the reconciliation difficulties were crystallized, reflecting the set backs and successes of the peace process.

It was also in the explosive environment experienced in the AAs that the capacity of both parties to control their men was put to a severe test. As a result, other parallel processes, such as the creation of the new army and the October elections, were seriously affected. The army, because of difficulties in finding volunteers, which is now a major cause of the delay in the establishment of the FADM and the elections because of the risk of them taking place while the new army is still a weak and uncertain protagonist. Another problem faced, also experienced to some extent in the lead-up to the 1992 elections in Angola, is the lack of a new political culture to foster a sense of unity amongst FADM soldiers, one which would help to nip new sources of mutiny in the bud and dampen any flaring up of old feelings of revenge.

Demobilization, in the strict sense, seems to have been achieved with an unprecedented level of success in comparison with other UN operations of this kind. It cantoned, disarmed and demobilized practically all the combatants of the contingents from both sides. As a result, far from being just one another stage in the timetable, the conclusion of demobilization had a very positive impact by decreasing tension and reducing the possibility of hidden agendas of military solutions for political problems.

This said, however, some serious shortcomings of the demobilization process have to be considered. One shortcoming is that, by taking far longer than was originally planned,

cantonment created serious and widespread discontent among the ex-combatants. This had a very negative affect on the peace process, in particular by creating, on the eve of the elections, an environment of widespread mutinies and very fragile security conditions. This also denigrated the image of the 'organizers' of the process (including the two parties and ONUMOZ) in the eyes of the cantoned soldiers. The battle fatigue felt by the ex-combatants also reduced the numbers of volunteers to FADM and contributed to a situation in which the new army is much weaker than it was envisaged when the 1992 GPA was signed.

Another shortcoming of the demobilization process is that it was not focused simply on the demobilization of the troops, but included other responsibilities such as the future of the arsenals in its mandate. Delays in the creation of FADM (which was to 'absorb' an important part of the weaponry) was associated with apparent UN delays in handling this important issue (either by destroying the obsolete arms or by handing them over to FADM). The result is that hundreds, and possibly thousands of arms caches remain throughout the country, representing a serious risk to stability.

Finally, demobilization is far from being an autonomous procedure. Rather it is intertwined with the social and economic re-integration of the demobilized military. In principle, problems faced by the re-integration scheme should have had a negative effect on demobilization, in the sense that the hardships faced by already demobilized combatants could act as a disincentive for these still waiting to be demobilized. But the fact is that, despite all the problems, the need to be demobilized became strongly felt among the combatants in the AAs as shown by the recent trends. This was due to tiredness with military life which was followed by an extended period confined under difficult conditions in the A/As.

However, if the negative factors connected with re-integration did not affect demobilization, the way the demobilization process has developed has had, in turn, important effects on re-integration. The extended period spent by the combatants in the AAs, in helping to build their desire to leave them at any cost, precluded the 'quick action response' programmes which were intended to be the first stage of the re-integration strategy.<sup>168</sup> In addition, the extended period spent in the camps contributed to deepen the ex-combatants' mistrust of structures like ONUMOZ, the Government and, increasingly, Renamo as well. This mistrust extended, in particular, to the scheme for the new army which was seen by the overwhelming majority as being nothing more than the old army under a new name, maintaining the same old inefficiencies and disregard for the living conditions of the soldiers. In helping to limit the numbers willing to volunteer for the FADM, the number of soldiers initially expected to be demobilized increased, thereby placing an extra burden on the re-integration process.

### 3.2 Re-integration

The first obstacle that social and economic re-integration of the ex-combatants has to face is

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<sup>168</sup>These programmes had been intended both to facilitate future ex-combatants integration into civilian life to help maintain a good level of control over the cantoned combatants. Although it is difficult to access their level of achievement, it seems that the only action undertaken by CORE which was well received at the camps was the transmission of music.

the weak economy of the country, with its limited capacity to absorb ex-combatants, and its very slow growth. In Zambézia, for example, only a very few jobs are offered in formal employment, mostly by economic agents who are themselves under-capitalized and which have reservations about investing in a not-yet stabilized community, particularly in terms of security. Compounding this problem is the fact that employers, including the Government and its local departments, tend to look at ex-combatants as potentially violent people who would be likely to disrupt the work place.

Against this background, the original strategy planned by CORE seems adequate, particularly in its principles of working with both the ex-combatants and the structures expected to absorb them,<sup>169</sup> and of giving priority to small-scale agriculture, as this sector is likely to absorb and stabilize the largest number of *desmobilizados*.

However, the perception of how far small-scale agriculture could facilitate re-integration could be based on serious misunderstandings. One is that, for several decades, small-scale agriculture has not had the capacity to guarantee by itself the subsistence of the rural family, rather it has been complemented by migrant, plantation or other waged labour. As a result, already indicated by present trends, ex-combatants are not being dispersed 'through' small-scale agriculture, rather, they are leaving their families on the fields and looking for income earning alternatives, particularly in informal commerce in the cities. In addition, the 'weakness' of small-scale agriculture as an alternative is exacerbated at present by problems such as lack of roads and rural shops, land shortages and landmines. Price policies are also unfavourable to agricultural producers.

On the other hand, the UN re-integration strategy, in developing a narrow focus on economic issues (on grounds that 'the indigenous society demonstrates great capacity for interaction and support',<sup>170</sup> thus counting on the 'self-regeneration' of the social structures), seems to have overlooked how deeply the war has disrupted rural families and that the social context has a fundamental role in organizing small-scale family-run agriculture. This assumption is incorrect because the 'indigenous society', for the moment, is far from having the balance needed to be capable of providing the social context in which small-scale agriculture can flourish. Consequently, it is necessary to improve understanding of the communities hosting the ex-combatants even if the angle on the latter should be kept. This should be done through studies focused on the impact exerted by the war at the level of the rural household, family reunion, interaction of returnees and ex-combatants in the community, and so on.

Another set of problems arises from the way the re-integration strategy has been implemented. Because the difficulties faced in its implementation were apparently minimized at the start, all the programmes of the 'longer-term developmental component' were delayed. The Training and Kits Programme has still to show its first results, and the extended cash payment scheme is currently going through the difficult transition from the six months period supported by the Government to the 18 months period supported by the international community, through UNDP. It remains to be seen how smooth this transition will be.

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<sup>169</sup> UNOHAC/CORE 3, Annex 4: July 1993.

<sup>170</sup> UNOHAC/CORE 5, Annex 2: February 1994, quoted above.

Another area of particular difficulty in the implementation process concerns the problematic programme of SIR, placed as it is at the interface between the former combatants and civilian society. The initial problem, in the case of SIR/Zambézia, was its late start, only in April 1994, when almost two thousand combatants had been already demobilized. Despite the fact that the demand for its services quickly increased, by late June SIR/Zambézia was still having to cope with such problems as a lack of power and telephones in its premises. Despite its efforts, it seems that the people appointed to run the service had insufficient training and means at their disposal to accomplish what was defined as SIR's role, particularly in dealing with ex-combatants' expressed needs and the very difficult task of finding potential employers for ex-combatants.

As a result, the initiatives taken by ex-combatants desperate to find jobs can go as far as threatening the personal security of SIR's officials themselves. Since these problems cannot be blamed on vague causes such as the weak national economy, the SIR staff, confronted with concrete *desmobilizados*' demands, have tended to pass the buck to other services (such as the civil administration, the police or BPD) by transferring requests and demands on to them while promising the *desmobilizados* eventual results. In this manner, SIR, which is supposed to inform ex-combatants of their opportunities, runs the risk of maintaining ex-combatants' expectations, or even raising them above what is available.

The weak structure of SIR and provincial CORE is also a factor in the poor level of progress in enlisting potential employers. The example of Zambézia shows how slow and timid the work achieved so far has been, and how serious the lack of coordination is in this respect. Involving potential employers in the re-integration structures remains an important objective, so much so that it should be widened to include a discussion with them of important policy-making issues favouring re-integration. For instance, the 'unpopularity' of small-scale agriculture cannot be changed just by persuasion and support of ex-combatants' initiatives. A new attitude towards agriculture requires fundamental decisions to be taken by policy-making circles on such specific issues as land tenure and distribution, price policies and rural trade, as well as progress in road building and landmine clearance. Action on these issues could make agricultural production more attractive for ex-combatants as an employment option.

Zambézia shows that private entrepreneurs such as plantation companies know very little about the re-integration efforts. Participation by the Government and Renamo representatives *in fora* like the provincial CORE does not, in itself, ameliorate the problems raised in this field, since both face serious difficulties in involving their back up structures. As a result, the Zambézia provincial plan for 1994 does not mention the demobilized combatants specifically, and no serious approach to the state structures potentially capable of employing ex-combatants has been made by CORE/Zambézia.

Problems raised by re-integration transcend the ambit of a UN peace-keeping mission. They belong to the sphere of the country's socio-economic development and can only be fully addressed through a continued effort which has to include adequate policies by the new elected Government, ones that ensure that the employment of ex-combatants, particularly in the field of agriculture, is given the necessary priority. Also necessary is good coordination of the work of the several sectors involved, namely the state, the private employers, NGOs and obviously the ex-combatants themselves. In this context the role left to the UN mission,

hose mandate is coming to its end, should be the one of assuring a smooth transfer of the programmes in course to the above mentioned sectors.

Successful demobilization assured a relatively stable environment for the elections and managed to keep the two belligerents within the framework of the peace-process established by the GPA. In this perspective, the possibility of them resuming the old animosity is declining everyday. However, the incipient results of re-integration can be behind the emergence of criminal action probably held by disgruntled *desmobilizados*.

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Maj José Manuel  
Maj Manganhela  
Maj Vítor Dias  
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