

FOSTERING COMMUNITY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWE:

**AN ASSESSMENT OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN
THE FORESTRY COMMISSION AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL PARKS AND WILD LIFE MANAGEMENT**

January 1996



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and Wild Life Management

Robert Hall and George Honadle

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Implementing Policy Change Project

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ACRONYMS

AGRITEX	Agricultural Extension Service
BSA	British South Africa Company
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources
CASS	Centre for Applied Social Science
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
DC	District Council
DNPWLM	Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management
FC	Forestry Commission
IPC	Implementing Policy Change Project
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
NCS	National Conservation Strategy
NEAP	National Environmental Action Plan
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NORAD	Norwegian Development Agency
PAC	Problem Animal Control
RDC	Rural District Council
SADC	Southern African Development Council
TFAP	Tropical Forestry Action Plan
TTL	Tribal Trust Lands
USAID	U S Agency for International Development
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
Zimtrust	Zimbabwe Trust

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I INTRODUCTION

This brief introduction sets the stage for the Zimbabwe study and provides the background of the exercise. First an overview of the IPC natural resource management studies is presented. Then the comparative framework used to develop the cases is summarized.

A THE IPC STUDIES SERIES

This case study is one in a series of studies conducted by USAID's Implementing Policy Change Project (IPC) that investigates the organizational and management issues involved in implementing policy in the environment and natural resources sector in Africa, with funding from the Africa Bureau. Previous studies in the series, several of which have been published, include an overview of implementation issues in natural resources management (Brinkerhoff and Gage 1994), an analysis of Mali's forestry policy reforms (Brinkerhoff 1995), an examination of Madagascar's experience implementing its National Environmental Action Plan or NEAP (Brinkerhoff and Yeager 1993), an assessment of The Gambia's NEAP implementation experience (Gustafson and Clifford 1994), and an analysis of Botswana's experience implementing its National Conservation Strategy (Honadle 1994).

The Zimbabwe study was undertaken in the context of the USAID Mission's overall program strategy development exercise, which includes among its strategic objectives support to natural resources management. The IPC study's task was to identify aspects of the CAMPFIRE and Forestry Commission experience with local resources management that might be applicable to a wider range of sectors. To assist in this effort, the team applied an analytic framework that is common to all the IPC case studies. That framework is the implementation template introduced below.

B A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK

The study's analytic framework uses a model that sees policy implementation outcomes as a function of three categories of variables: the problem the policy is intended to solve, the way implementation is structured and managed, and the sociopolitical and economic setting in which implementation takes place (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1989: 18-48). These variables are reflected in six conditions empirical research has shown to be associated with successful implementation:

1. The policy and its statute(s) contain clear and consistent objectives or some criteria for resolving goal conflicts.
2. The policy accurately identifies the principal factors and linkages leading to, and influencing, policy outcomes, including specification of target groups and incentives.

3 Policy implementation is structured to maximize the probability of compliance from implementing agents and target groups This includes

- assignment of implementation responsibility to a capable and sympathetic agency,
- integrated implementation structures with minimum veto points and adequate incentives for compliance
- supportive decision rules (e.g. appropriate authority and procedures)
- adequate financial resources
- access to and participation of supporters

4 Leaders and top managers possess substantial strategic management and political skills, and are committed to the policy objectives

5 The policy receives ongoing support from constituency groups and key stakeholders within a neutral or supportive legal system

6 Socioeconomic and political conditions remain sufficiently supportive and stable so that the policy is not undermined by changes in priorities conflicts and/or radical shifts in resource availability for implementation

No policy enjoys an implementation experience where all six of these conditions are fully met especially in the short-term Policy implementation always faces a suboptimal scenario where the challenge is to seek ways to increase the degree to which the conditions are achieved while recognizing that success will remain partial and elusive Because the effectiveness and ultimate impact of reform measures depend critically upon appropriate conditions and capacities for managing the implementation process policy debates must extend beyond technical content to how reforms will be put in place and applied This template is intended to help observers assess the application process in specific cases It guides the Zimbabwe study

II THE ZIMBABWE SETTING

This chapter introduces two key institutions involved in the process of local resources management in Zimbabwe the Forestry Commission and the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management¹ It also identifies important historical and environmental trends that affect that process This sets the stage for an examination of implementation experience over the past few decades

A HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS

Zimbabwe's history extends back to the iron age with the earliest cultures displaced by the Bantu-speaking migrations that began in the fifth century The ruins of Great Zimbabwe a world heritage site from which the nation takes its name date to the 11th century The Shona-speaking people were invaded by the Ndebele people early in the 19th century and in 1889 the British South Africa Company organized by Cecil Rhodes received a charter from the English crown to promote commerce and colonization in the region Rhodesia became a self-governing British colony in 1923

In 1953 Southern Rhodesia became a member of the Central African Federation along with Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) The federation broke up in 1963 and in 1965 the Rhodesian Front government under Ian Smith proclaimed a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) This declaration was rejected by the UK and the United Nations imposed sanctions against the renegade Rhodesian government This led to the establishment of a drive for economic self-sufficiency on the part of the minority-ruled state, and this dynamic became part of the legacy passed on to the independent government in 1980

After a decade of fighting against the Rhodesian Front government in a war of independence (*chimurenga*) the liberation forces of ZANU (the Zimbabwe African National Union), led by Robert Mugabe and ZAPU (the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) led by Joshua Nkomo obtained concessions in the Lancaster House accords in 1979 that led to free elections and the establishment of a majority-rule state in 1980 Mugabe a Shona was elected the first president and Nkomo an Ndebele became vice-president

Mugabe inherited a dual agrarian economy that reflected the racial division of resources in the past-- white large-scale commercial farms contrasted with a stagnant and

¹ The term Wild Life is used in Zimbabwe especially in official documents in lieu of the more common wildlife In this report the two word formulation will be used only when referring to DNPWLM, official documents and when a citation includes this form In all other cases the single word formulation will be maintained

impoverished communal sector. The centrally-guided economy was augmented with a home-grown version of Marxism. Although the new government developed initiatives to support communal farmers through the 1980s it maintained heavy food subsidies for urban consumers and maintained tight control over the movement of grain (Rukuni and Eicher 1994). Subsidies have been reduced in the 90s as part of fiscal reform efforts and smallholder agriculture has become more productive (Eicher 1995).

The dual tasks of gaining control of the government apparatus and attracting foreign investment tugged in opposite directions. The drive to consolidate power pushed the socialist-oriented regime in the direction of centralized management while the search for financing created an impetus to relax control and develop a more open market economy. Indigenization became a major thrust in both the public and private sectors. For the first decade of majority rule, the quest for control dominated as government was reoriented toward black interests, even though bastions of white control persisted. In 1991, however, the ruling ZANU party (Zimbabwe became a one-party state in 1987) officially abandoned Marxism and the government began to liberalize the economy partly due to pressure from international institutions.

Zimbabwe is less dependent on international donors than most African countries although it too has undertaken structural adjustment (see Chakaodza 1993). The nation's 11.5 million people receive only US\$37 per capita (1991) in official development assistance. It has an external debt ratio of only 54:1 (1990) whereas most countries on the continent exceed 100 (World Bank 1994). Zimbabwe's relatively high level of capacity, in terms of industrial facilities and human resources, has allowed the country to do more for itself than other African nations.

Significant mineral reserves have played a role in reducing Zimbabwe's external dependence and building its economic strength. Reserves of copper, iron, tin, nickel, cobalt, and chromium add to the diversification of the economy. Agriculture contributes only 22 percent of GDP (1992) while manufacturing and industry combined account for 60 percent (World Resources Institute 1994). A per capita income of US\$570 places Zimbabwe toward the top of the World Bank ranking of low-income countries (33rd of 42).

The Shona people have a five-to-one margin in numbers over the Ndebele ethnic group. These two groups make up most of the population. Other minority groups include Tonga, Europeans, and San. The country appears to have entered a demographic transition period marked by falling population growth rates, although factors beyond women's education and its impact on fertility may account for some of the apparent birth control successes (Thomas and Muvandi 1994). Indeed, outmigration due to the return of many expatriate South Africans is draining some talented people from the frontline states.

B THE ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION

Zimbabwe is marked by four major topographical characteristics: the eastern highlands, the middle veld in the center of the country, the southern and western lowveld, and Lake Kariba to the North. The lake is artificial, resulting from the damming of the Zambezi River at Kariba. This resulted in the transformation of habitat in the flooded area and surrounds, the provision of hydroelectric power to this region of Africa, and the creation of a water playground and fishery. The eastern highlands produce tea and coffee and harbor a remnant tropical forest. The lowveld is semi-arid and contains the majority of the national cattle herd as well as most of the gazetted national forests. About 12 percent of the country's total land area is classed as protected, either in national parks, safari areas, botanical reserves, recreational parks, or sanctuaries. Collectively, these areas are referred to as the Parks and Wildlife Estate (see Metcalfe 1994, Matiza and Crafter 1994).

Southern Africa, including Zimbabwe, has witnessed increasing frequency and severity of drought over the past three decades. Especially in the lowveld areas, water is becoming increasingly scarce. Access to it for both human and livestock use is expected to be a major issue well into the 21st century. Despite a reduced rate of population growth, aggregate population increases are putting pressure on the country's resource base. Marginal lands are coming under cultivation, and the level of competition in land use is increasing, often leading to conflicts between the needs of wildlife and agricultural producers.

Zimbabwe has extensive wildlife resources, including one of the healthiest herds of elephant in Africa. Careful management over the last three decades has allowed the population to grow, in contrast with other African nations, and has made culling necessary to maintain a healthy and viable population. This has put the government at odds with the international ivory ban and some aspects of the CITES convention (see Dobson and Poole, 1992; Dublin et al. 1995).

C THE FORESTRY COMMISSION

Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company held the right to exploit forest resources during the early Rhodesian period. The Forestry Act of 1949 assigned authority to the colonial government and provided for the establishment of a Forestry Commission (FC). The commission was created as a parastatal body in 1954, under the auspices of the Ministry of Natural Resources, and certain assets belonging to the government were transferred to the commission. The establishing act directed the commission to: (1) set aside state forests and protect private forests, trees, and forest produce; (2) control cutting and taking trees for mining purposes; (3) conserve timber resources and require afforestation of private land; (4) regulate and control trade in forest products; (5) regulate and control the burning of vegetation; and (6) engage in other activity connected to the foregoing.

This mandate evolved into programs designed to (1) provide technical services to commercial foresters (2) manage the gazetted indigenous forest reserves established in the western part of the country (3) engage in wood production by exploiting the natural forests of the eastern highlands that were under its command and (4) establish plantations in the wake of the decimation of those original eastern forests and continue to produce timber for domestic and foreign markets. It also included a safari company owned and operated by the FC.

During UDI the Commission continued to earn foreign exchange through logging and it earned further revenue as it provided wood for domestic consumption. It also continued to serve commercial farmers with woodland activities as it remained a servant to minority interests in the Rhodesian economy. Even after independence in 1980 the FC retained authority over commercial forestry including commercial activity in the communal areas.

When the transition of power from the minority to the majority occurred in 1980, the process of transforming control of government machinery began. But the Commission was not one of the priority targets for indigenization. While other organizations experienced a transition the FC remained a bastion of former Rhodesian staff and attitudes. It continued to engage in commercial forestry activities and serve large landholders at the expense of the rest of the country. Its parastatal status kept it out of the limelight as line ministries were subjected to intense scrutiny by the party and the press and to rapid indigenization. Meanwhile the need to address loss of woodlands in the Communal Areas (formerly Tribal Trust Lands) increased as population pressure increasingly stripped tree cover from some of the land (see Du Toit et al., 1984).

In 1983 with assistance from the World Bank the Forestry Commission embarked on an effort to provide services in the communal areas. The rural afforestation project was housed in a newly established Rural Afforestation Division. The strategy of this social forestry effort included

- 1 linking with AGRITEX the agricultural extension service to promote agroforestry,
- 2 establishing nurseries of exotics in rural areas to supply villagers with trees
- 3 promoting village woodlots to provide building supplies and firewood and
- 4 conducting public awareness campaigns promoting tree planting

However, this focus was not central to the mission of the Commission and the effort was plagued with problems. Management was not sensitive to the needs of communal areas and it continued to use control-oriented approaches when influence-based strategies were needed (see Honadle and Cooper 1989). The problems that surfaced because of the social

forestry initiative led to a general investigation of the FC and a turnover of senior management resulted. The first indigenous Zimbabwean director of the Commission was appointed in 1988.

The Rural Afforestation project lasted through 1988. It was followed by the creation of a division of forestry extension that carried on the link with AGRITEX but adopted some new emphases. The first of these was an abandonment of the village woodlot emphasis which experienced difficulties and its replacement with a focus on households, District Councils and individuals as clients. The second was the focus on indigenous species distribution rather than exotic promotion. The third reorientation was the treatment of communal residents as co-managers of tree resources rather than as simply the receivers of FC wisdom (see Clarke 1994). This introduced two major departures. It brought social scientists into the Forestry Commission and led to a demand-driven approach that accepted a variety of village-level models instead of a single centrally-imposed approach.

This evolution represented by the emergence of a social forestry focus was paralleled by experience with the management of the gazetted forests (see Gregerson et al 1989). Historical forces turned an emphasis on forest management into an emphasis on the management of the interaction between people and trees. Just as a burgeoning human population made the interaction between people and animals more intense and increased the competition between them for land, so too the need for fuelwood and forest products tested the sanctity of the boundaries of forest reserves.

In the early 1970s the forest reserves contained few people, scattered small groups that had little impact on the ecosystems. But during the late 70s the intensification of the war for independence resulted in the Forestry Commission staff leaving the forests and people going in both freedom fighters and villagers who saw an opportunity to move into a resource-rich setting. Thus the density went up and at independence there were many more people in the gazetted areas than before.

The Commission responded to this situation in two ways. The first and most common way was to resettle the growing population to less sensitive areas of the forest--when possible areas that were natural grazing areas and not prime locations for tree growth or wood production, and areas where a human presence posed less threat to biodiversity or threatened species of flora and fauna. The second way was unique to a single forest, the Mafungabusi Forest area.

In the 1986-87 period the army removed the squatters who had occupied the Mafungabusi Forest. But pressure to allow settlers into the forest reserve increased as population grew. In 1993 a decision was made to remove the forest from the purview of the indigenous forestry division and hand it over to the extension division to conduct an

experiment That experiment was to be an effort to co-manage the resource with the communities that surrounded the forest

As part of the co-management initiative the Department of Parks and Wildlife Management and the Centre for Applied Social Science at the University of Zimbabwe were brought in as partners People were allowed to live in designated areas of the forest but they had to abide by the rules developed collaboratively with the Forestry Commission and the participating organizations

The evolution of co-management practices in the FC reflects only part of the Commission's experience and emphasis It has been an organization with a split personality First it is divided between its state functions and its commercial functions the former emphasizes delivering technical services to the population while the latter focuses on the production of wood and wood products Second it is split between acting as a forest enterprise exploiting the forest resource and acting as a regulatory body protecting the forest resource Historically production and exploitation have received the lion's share of the financial and human resources

The enterprise mandate is carried out by three divisions the manufacturing forest products and marketing divisions The state mandate is implemented by three other divisions indigenous resources, research and development and forest extension services Providing administrative support to these operational divisions are the human resources and administration division and the finance division The remaining unit is Ngamo Safaris a hunting safari company operated by the Commission in gazetted forest areas This has recently come under the indigenous resources division All of the above are under a General Manager and Deputy General Manager The parastatal answers to a Board of Directors under the general auspices of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism

The evolution of the FC away from a command and control emphasis on trees and their separation from people toward the co-management of forest resources reflects a major reorientation And the process continues The commercial forestry functions of FC will soon be hived off and privatized, making the extension research and development and indigenous forests divisions the driving forces of the commission The current emphasis within the FC on forest resource co-management will likely continue External interest in resource co-management and in community-based natural resources management is also building Efforts are now underway by a key environmental NGO to assemble a working group of donors and NGOs in an effort to promote a community forestry emphasis based on the CAMPFIRE model

The transformation of the FC is not yet complete But this is to be expected because what is occurring is a major change It represents the nearly total redirection of a key natural resource management organization over a period of about a decade This is a dramatic shift

in the management of a public agency. And a similar change is underway in another public organization-- the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management

D THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT

The Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM) is responsible for the conservation, protection and sound management of all forms of aquatic and terrestrial indigenous animals and plants in Zimbabwe. DNPWLM is a scientific professional agency responsible for conducting research on critical aquatic and terrestrial wildlife issues and for managing the Parks and Wildlife Estate of the country. It is also a paramilitary agency with law enforcement powers and whose agents are authorized to carry arms.

The Department has approximately 2 700 employees on its payroll. The greater part of the staff is located within the Parks and Wild Life Estate, with smaller numbers in research facilities and administrative offices. Unlike some countries, there is no permanent presence of Department staff in areas that host wildlife outside the Parks. Problem Animal Control (PAC) is carried out by Parks staff upon request from local authorities. Since agents are not posted in rural districts, responses to requests are often slow, as agents travel from the nearest Department base. Rural District Councils (RDCs) are expected to pay the associated transport and subsistence costs of DNPWLM staff while they are in the area.

The inability of the Department to fulfill its conservation and management mandate in areas outside demarcated wildlife domains resulted in escalating poaching and destruction of wildlife habitat during the 1970s and 1980s. The political disruption and increasing insecurity during the 1970s as the liberation struggle moved toward independence in 1980, combined with the economic interests of white landowners in the commercial value of wildlife, led to the devolution of responsibility for the management and use of wildlife to private landowners, codified in the Parks and Wild Life Act of 1975. The granting of "Appropriate Authority" to private landowners reinforced their private property rights while providing an additional justification to some for using armed force to counter poachers. Since most wildlife habitat tended to be located in peripheral areas of the country that also served as transit points and operations sites for the liberation fighters, the battle against "poachers" sometimes took on a more political cast.

The 1975 Act was aimed clearly at providing improved access to commercial game culling and hunting revenues for commercial farmers and private landowners. The preamble to the Act states that its purpose includes "to confer privileges on owners or occupiers of alienated land as custodians of wild life, fish and plants" (Zimbabwe 1975: 5). Alienated land is defined as private land, State land as a lease or purchase agreement, and tribal trust land held in terms of an agreement of lease. The Act also took another strong step away

from the traditional concept of state control of land and wildlife resources by allowing for the creation of intensive conservation area committees that would have authority to take decisions regarding the conservation of wildlife and protected plants on private land within the conservation area. Private landowners were in essence granted the right to possess, use and dispose of wildlife resources in the same manner in which they held rights to land. The consequences born of this change in ownership over two decades ago are clear. As Marshall Murphree wrote in describing the effects of legislative changes in Zimbabwe and Namibia "[on] private land in both countries a new and flourishing wildlife industry is in place wildlife revenues have increased dramatically wildlife populations have expanded and their habitat has improved" (Murphree 1995: 2).

The original 1975 Act did not convey the same rights and privileges to small farmers on communal lands as it conferred on the mostly white private landowners. Only after independence was the Act amended and provision was made allowing the Minister to appoint a district council as the appropriate authority for wildlife over an area of Communal land (Section 95). According to Murphree "[t]he purpose of this amendment was to eliminate discrimination between farmers on private lands and communal land farmers and to extend the demonstrated economic and environmental benefits of the Act to communal land farmers" (1993: 2). While this provision in the 1982 amendment provided the legal basis for asserting authority over wildlife resources by the district, the option of granting appropriate authority status to a district council responsible for Communal areas was not exercised until November 1988 when Nyaminyami and Guruve districts were accorded authority over wildlife. This action was not formalized until the administrative decision was gazetted in 1990 (Metcalf, 1994: 166).

With independence the level of civil conflict declined and both the DNPWLM and private landowners returned to concentrate on wildlife conservation and the commercial exploitation of wildlife resources through consumptive and non-consumptive utilization. Hunting safaris, trophy concessions, photographic safaris and wildlife-based tourism became major income generators for the large private landowners and tour operators, both groups being predominantly composed of whites. The strong international linkages of tour and safari operators also restricted the economic benefits accruing to the national economy as sometimes a substantial proportion of revenues remained outside of the country.

Local indigenous communities in the Communal Lands (formerly Tribal Trust Lands), however, benefitted little from the commercial activities associated with wildlife. Indeed, since wildlife dispersal areas included communal lands, local populations frequently suffered the incursions of animals resulting in both human and crop losses. Without the means of benefitting commercially from wildlife, local people viewed wildlife principally as a threat best eliminated and secondarily as meat to enrich local diets. Since wildlife in communal areas legally belonged to the State and its agency, the DNPWLM, indigenous hunters were, by definition, "poachers" regardless of their intent in killing wild animals. With an expanding

population and finite arable land resources human settlement continued to encroach on wildlife habitat resulting in heightened conflict and competition for land and water resources. It became clear to conservationists and economic planners alike that local people must receive tangible benefits if wildlife was to continue to survive outside of protected areas.

The CAMPFIRE Concept

The idea of sharing the benefits derived from wildlife with communities emerged in DNPWLM in the 1960s and took operational form in the late 1970s. The DNPWLM coined the acronym CAMPFIRE for Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources during the development of an integrated resource management plan for the Sebungwe region. While this plan was never implemented the focus of CAMPFIRE as a vehicle for strengthening local management of natural resources was set.

The first experimental operation under CAMPFIRE was initiated in 1978 and called Operation Windfall standing for Wildlife Industries New Development for All (Murphree 1990, Murindagomo 1990). Wildlife culling in the Sebungwe region presented an opportunity to share cash from the sale of trophies, skins, and safari hunting and meat with local people in the area. The results were positive and illegal poaching in the area declined. However, this initiative took the form of a "handout" rather than involving local people in resource management decisions. Without additional inputs the incentives disappeared and the positive effects of the experiment dissipated.

It became clear that implementation of the CAMPFIRE concept would require more technical, human, and financial resources than DNPWLM commanded. Department officials were encouraged by Norman Reynolds, then Chief Economist for Economic Planning in the Ministry of Finance, to pursue community-based natural resources management initiatives. Reynolds had been impressed by community-level resource management experiences he had witnessed in India. DNPWLM began collaborating with local NGOs and social scientists from the University of Zimbabwe. Gradually, a core group of actors took responsibility for working with communities and district councils to prepare them for the tasks associated with managing wildlife and other resources.

The guiding philosophy of CAMPFIRE emerged from the concerns and commitment of a number of specialists and wildlife management practitioners in Zimbabwe. Norman Reynolds, Marshall Murphree, and Rowan Martin were involved in formulating the draft documents that eventually found wider distribution in a 1986 DNPWLM working paper. In that document, CAMPFIRE's objectives are stated as:

- (a) to initiate a program for the long-term development, management, and sustainable utilization of natural resources in the communal areas

(b) to achieve management of resources by placing custody and responsibility with the resident communities

(c) to allow communities to benefit directly from the exploitation of natural resources within communal areas and

(d) to establish the administrative and institutional structures necessary to make the program work (Martin 1986)

Implementation of CAMPFIRE was initially supported by four institutions Zimbabwe Trust (ZimTrust) the University of Zimbabwe's Center for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the DNPWLM Together they helped selected district councils to develop the institutions and technical skills required for the granting of Appropriate Authority for the management of wildlife resources Financial assistance was provided by the implementing agencies and by bilateral and multilateral donor organizations The Norwegian (NORAD) and British governments (ODA) were substantial donors from the beginning The U S Agency for International Development also contributed to the development of the CAMPFIRE program and by 1995 USAID was the largest single external funding source

In 1988 the first district council Nyaminyami was appointed as the Appropriate Authority for wildlife management It had been a four year process of capacity building By the end of 1989 a total of eleven district councils were involved with CAMPFIRE programs, and by August 1995, 25 of the nation's 57 Rural District Councils had been granted Appropriate Authority by the Minister of Environment and Tourism upon recommendation of the DNPWLM A list of participating districts is provided in Appendix A

Diversity Initiative, and Incentives

Three features both characterize and "drive" the CAMPFIRE program The first is **diversity** CAMPFIRE's advocates point out that it is less a uniform program than an assortment of 26 pilot activities While the initial interest of RDCs has tended to be in the revenues generated from wildlife consumption the path taken to assert control over the wildlife resource has varied significantly from one district to another For example some RDCs have launched their own safari companies (Tsholotsho) or hired their own professional hunter (Guruve) while others have preferred to work with established commercial operators Some RDCs have established separate management organizations with permanent staff and vehicles (Nyaminyami) while others have relied on existing council staff and minimized recurrent operating costs to manage CAMPFIRE activities

Muzarabani RDC transformed an unpopular and commercially unexciting Wilderness Area that had been carved out of communal lands largely on the initiative of commercial

farmers into a valued community resource and generator of direct financial benefits to rural inhabitants. As described in The Herald, a local Harare newspaper:

The [CAMPFIRE] programme started in the mid-1980s with the launch of the Mavhuradonha Wilderness Area. The mountain was stocked with a variety of game ranging from elephants to sabres at a cost of over \$1 million. Villagers who for years had been hunting in the mountain were reluctant at first to appreciate the Muzarabani Rural District Council's decision to bar them from hunting in the mountain and not to act against animals destroying crops. However, distribution of funds raised from safari operators and the involvement of the community in the management of the wilderness area changed people's attitudes towards the programme (The Herald, August 24, 1995, p. 7).

The benefits to people residing near the wilderness area were real and substantial. Over Z\$172 000 generated in 1994 was paid out to 12 wards in 1995. The CAMPFIRE Coordinator for the RDC estimates that over Z\$600 000 (approximately US\$70 600) will be collected by the program this year, benefitting 10 000 households in the affected wards.

The intent of the CAMPFIRE program in Muzarabani, as in many other RDCs, is to go beyond wildlife revenues and to extend the experience into the conservation and management of all natural resources. This objective is clearly stated by the CAMPFIRE coordinator in the Herald article cited above: "The idea is to involve communities in looking after all resources-- trees, soils, and rivers." Even within the wildlife area, non-consumptive revenue-generating options are also being pursued. Photographic safaris are gaining interest among CAMPFIRE programs that initially based their operations on sport hunting. Tourism revenues from accommodations provided by RDCs are also appealing to many communities, as are the jobs generated to maintain and operate fixed lodging.

Non-wildlife resource management is also of interest to communities with limited wildlife populations and potential and to those who continue to seek means of bolstering RDC revenues and local incomes. Chaminuka and Chiweshe RDCs, for example, are involved in fishing ventures. Binga and Mudzi District Councils, too, are interested in developing commercial fishing activities, while wards in Tsholotsho District have expressed interest in exploiting river sand and gravel. Mudzi district has requested appropriate authority to pursue black granite mining, and other districts are said to be discussing extending their management to other resources.

Another defining characteristic of CAMPFIRE that also contributes to its acceptability to local communities and explains in part its growing popularity is the **importance given to local initiative**. CAMPFIRE statements of principle uniformly focus on according benefits and management responsibility over natural resources to "producer communities" or more

generically to local communities impacted by the presence of wildlife or the effective use of other natural resources. One such statement puts it succinctly

Experience shows that management and decision making require institutions such as wildlife trusts or committees that permit genuine participation by individuals, families and villages. Such institutions created by the rural communities themselves help to implement Campfire's most fundamental principle that benefits go to those who pay the financial and social costs of tolerating wildlife and who therefore act as "wildlife producers" in communal lands (Zimbabwe Trust et al. 1990: 4)

Since the Parks and Wild Life Act officially recognizes only the district as an acceptable "authority" for local wildlife management, it has been necessary for the district councils to come forward with concrete proposals and demonstrated commitments to the effective management of wildlife resources before Appropriate Authority over wildlife management can be granted. Part of the demonstration of commitment involves acceptance of the guiding objectives of CAMPFIRE as laid out above. Specifically, RDCs must accept that the wards and communities that harbor wildlife and bear the greatest costs of wildlife-related damages should participate actively in both management decisions and the revenues flowing from CAMPFIRE activities. While district councils vary considerably in how they honor this commitment, the emphasis on local initiatives and local participation is clear in the CAMPFIRE principles and reinforced by both the CAMPFIRE Association and the supporting agencies.

The unique approach adopted to implement the community wildlife management program in Zimbabwe, which involves a coalition of NGOs, academic institutions and public sector agencies, directly reinforced and continues to support the primacy of local initiative and local responsibility over wildlife and other natural resources in communal areas. Local institutional capacity building is a prerequisite for consideration for Appropriate Authority, and is the focus of the assistance provided by ZimTrust in particular.

Communities, RDCs and support agencies are active learners both from their own experience and from that of others. Individual programs have undergone substantial modification and refocusing based on first-hand experience rather than from changes promulgated by central government and public sector agencies. The process for determining trophy fee levels and the effects obtained in Tsholotsho district is illustrative of the positive learning process occurring across the entities involved in the CAMPFIRE program.

In 1989, the first year that the RDC was able to engage in wildlife management decisions, the trophy fee for elephants was set at Z\$12 000 through an agreement with the existing safari operator and the RDC. The Tsholotsho CAMPFIRE Manager acknowledged that the RDC had no basis for setting the fee, nor did they have any information that would

allow them to evaluate the profitability of safari operations as a means of determining a fair and realistic return to the RDC. In 1990 the fee was raised to Z\$15 000 and in 1991 it was increased to Z\$27 000. Realizing the problems of administering fee levels without adequate market information, the council decided to issue a public tender for wildlife trophies, thereby making the procedure more competitive. The trophy fee for 1992 increased to Z\$40 000. The following year another public tender resulted in an increase to Z\$70 000 and in 1995 the trophy fee for an elephant was set at Z\$80 000.

While the increase is somewhat less dramatic when converted to US dollars (increasing from \$5 644 in 1989 to approximately \$10 000 in 1995) it is a startlingly buoyant revenue from the perspective of local (or national) public finance. The tendency for the vast majority of revenue sources, be they fees, charges or tax levies, is stagnation and non-responsiveness to local and national economic conditions. Wildlife revenues have increased primarily because authority over the revenue base, in the case of Tsholotsho trophy fee levels, was granted to the decision-making unit that had the strongest incentive to apply effective revenue generation measures. Local initiative allowed the RDC to learn from its experiences and to improve its revenue generation position.

The third feature of the CAMPFIRE approach to community-based natural resources management is the **importance given to incentives**. Both direct and indirect incentives exist for all major stakeholder groups. Local communities are the focus of the CAMPFIRE philosophy and are considered to be the central beneficiaries of both wildlife-based revenues (though this has yet to be realized in some district CAMPFIRE programs) and improved natural resources management. In some districts, CAMPFIRE revenues have been distributed in the form of cash to households in affected wards, and as food aid during times of food insecurity. Other common uses for CAMPFIRE revenue include assisting local sports teams, building local social infrastructure such as classrooms and clinics, the construction and maintenance of fences, road maintenance, and support to women's clubs.

In addition to the benefits that are procured from CAMPFIRE revenues, local communities receive other, less tangible benefits. Decision-making responsibilities increase as a function of the need to plan for the management and use of sometimes quite substantial amounts of money. Wards are not fully decentralized legal bodies and do not have a budget and legally assigned revenue bases. Many wards do not even have bank accounts. While benefit levels vary substantially among wards, some are receiving hundreds of thousands of Zimbabwean dollars in revenue annually as the fruit of participating in CAMPFIRE. Ward CAMPFIRE committees have been established at the level of the WADCO or Ward Development Committee, with subcommittees at the Village Development Committee or VIDCO level as well. Communities, with the assistance of NGOs and DNPWLM, are learning to take responsibility for a resource that had been removed from their control by the state during the colonial period.

The promise of tangible benefits has provided a strong incentive for communities to take a more active role in managing their local environment. Some have undertaken village and ward-level land use plans. Others have proposed and launched profit-making ventures. CAMPFIRE provides a structure for implementing activities, a process of technical and participatory review, and the means to finance community projects.

An overview of the benefit distribution to wards and households is provided in Tables 1 and 2 below. More detailed data are provided in Annex B. A number of clarifications should be made to assist in understanding this data. First, the benefits allocated to wards were not necessarily received as cash. Allocations could take the form of projects, infrastructure, and employment as well as cash. Generally, decisions on the use of revenues allocated to wards was left to the Ward Development Committee. However, RDCs in some districts played a dominant role in determining both the volume and the form of benefits transferred to wards. Second, the average ward dividend masks a very substantial variation in amounts received by individual wards. For example, in 1993 the range for all wards went from a low of Z\$854 to a high of Z\$460 000. Finally, the data provided cover 12 districts. However, only two districts had active CAMPFIRE programs in 1989, five in 1990, and only in 1993 were all 12 districts active.

Ward Level Benefit Distribution from CAMPFIRE Program, 1989 to 1993						
	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	Total
Number of wards benefitting	15	30	36	72	92	100
Total received all wards (Z\$)	\$379 505	\$606 209	\$1 270 418	\$3 321 810	\$5 318 620	\$10 957 576
Average ward dividend (Z\$)	\$25 300	\$20 207	\$22 686	\$46 136	\$57 811	
Total received all wards (US\$)	\$178 507	\$245 230	\$338 598	\$649 806	\$814 615	\$2 226 755
Average ward dividend (US\$)	\$11 900	\$8 174	\$6 046	\$9 025	\$8 855	
Source: WWF/Harare						

The data in Table 1 clearly illustrate the impressive growth of the CAMPFIRE program in terms of the number of wards participating, the total volume of revenues allocated to local communities at the ward level, and the resiliency of average benefit levels despite rapid increase in the number of units that shared the revenue pie. Even when the US dollar value of benefits is reviewed, the growth is striking. Despite a roughly 300 percent loss of value relative to the US dollar, average ward dividends in US dollars remained relatively stable while the number of wards increased sixfold.

In Table 2 below the average household benefit is simply the result of dividing the benefit data by the number of households. It should not be understood to represent direct cash payments made to households although a small percentage of benefits have been conveyed as cash dividends.

Table 2					
Average Household Benefit Distribution from CAMPFIRE Program, 1989 to 1993					
	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Number of households	7861	22084	52465	70311	90475
Average net benefit (Z\$)	Z\$48 28	Z\$27 45	Z\$24 21	Z\$47 24	Z\$58 79
Average net benefit (US\$)	\$22 71	\$11 10	\$6 45	\$9 24	\$9 00
Source WWF/Harare					

The data in Table 2 present a slightly different picture. While the number of wards participating in CAMPFIRE activities increased by over 600 percent, the number of households represented in participating wards increased by almost 1200 percent! This represents a remarkable expansion in the potential affected population. Assuming average family size at six persons, the population affected by CAMPFIRE activities went from less than 50 000 in 1989 to nearly 550 000 people in just five years. Despite the explosion in the number of households affected, average benefit levels doubled between 1990 and 1993 in Zimbabwe dollars and remained reasonably stable in US dollars during that same period. The combination of a low number of participating wards and households and a strong exchange rate with the US dollar created an unusually high average net benefit in the first year of the program.

Incentives are also strong for District Councils to become involved in CAMPFIRE activities. Revenue bases for RDCs are few and of modest revenue productivity. As demonstrated by the rapid growth in the number of districts applying for Appropriate Authority, RDCs recognize the benefits to be gained from managing their wildlife resources. District councils are in a privileged position to control benefit flows since the RDC is the only local body that can be empowered by law as an Appropriate Authority. Wildlife-based revenues come directly to the council and are managed by the council. While RDCs are to transfer revenues to wards and even to specific local communities that are considered to be producer communities, a significant proportion of CAMPFIRE revenues remain at the council level and play a critical part in district finances.

Although RDCs are not legally bound to distribute revenues generated from wildlife to subdistrict levels, the DNPWLM has recommended the following formula: (1) up to 35 percent of revenue may be allotted for district costs related to wildlife management activities.

(2) a minimum of 50 percent of revenues should be returned to "producer communities" in this case to wards and (3) up to 15 percent of revenues could be retained by district councils as a levy. As Murphree (1993) points out, the latter is essentially a district tax on wildlife revenues in communal lands which is not matched by similar taxes on other resources or on revenues generated from wildlife resources on private lands.

Data collected from 12 districts suggest that overall RDCs are respecting the distribution formula. While there was substantial annual variation in funds allocated for disbursement to wards, the average from 1989 to 1993 was 54 percent of revenues from the CAMPFIRE program. The five-year average allocation for management costs came to 22 percent, while councils retained on average 14 percent of total revenues (WWF/Harare unpublished data).

The tourism industry as a whole benefits from improved wildlife management, the protection of wildlife from poaching in communal areas, and the establishment of additional tourism sites and facilities. While the active involvement of RDCs and ward-level actors in the business of regulating, and profiting from, wildlife-based tourism has undoubtedly raised the costs of safari operators, these costs are generally passed on to the ultimate consumer--the trophy hunter or tourist.

Finally, the DNPWLM retains control of the technical management of wildlife through its role in the approval process for appropriate authority, the setting of hunting and Problem Animal Control (PAC) quotas, and the enforcement of wildlife regulations while discharging the burdensome responsibility of conducting anti-poaching and PAC activities in areas outside of the gazetted parks. As appropriate authority is extended to more and more districts, wildlife-based revenues have been used to hire game guards and undertake some of the tasks that previously fell to DNPWLM.

III THE POLICY INITIATIVES

This chapter traces some of the factors responsible for the transformation of forestry management and wildlife management in Zimbabwe. First the general dynamics of the reform process are identified. Then the role of the six factors in explaining what happened and how it happened is explored.

A REFORMING RECALCITRANT INSTITUTIONS

The reform of the Forestry Commission and the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management into co-management operations resulted from a unique combination of historical dynamics. The independence struggle of the Zimbabwean people imparted to them an antagonistic orientation toward organizations that had been used to deny them access to natural resources. It also eroded the legitimacy of those organizations in the post-independence period. This created a need for real reform if the organizations were to be able to continue to protect natural resources from burgeoning populations and the increased demand for access to the resources. Simultaneously eroding budgetary resources affected the ability of the organizations to perform their functions. The problems were growing and their capacities were diminishing. The old approach of patrolling and controlling was not tenable. A new strategy was needed.

Into this nexus of historical dynamics stepped creative leadership. In the FC the sequence of an interim Managing Director followed by an indigenous one introduced radical departures in thinking about the organization's mission. In DNPWLM an alliance among internal professionals and members of NGOs generated a new strategy for wildlife conservation and sustainable use. Zimbabwe's stock of human resources was high at independence and is even higher now. Local resources in the form of NGOs and the national university combined with a well-educated civil service to make institutional reform possible.

In the case of DNPWLM the CAMPFIRE effort represented a reform strategy that spread resource control outside the department. The recruitment of NGOs and District Councils as teammates established a bond between parties that were previously competitive. Wildlife management was no longer contained within a single organizational boundary.

In the case of the Forestry Commission an internal change was an important element in the reform process. That change was a new work planning system. The newly implemented five-year workplans are organized to include activity categories that include "resource sharing" and "building stakeholder ship". This represents a massive reorientation from more traditional workplans. It suggests the mission of the organization has been cast in radically new terms. Moreover the plans are actually used to judge staff performance.

Flexibility and rolling readjustment are encouraged because the plans are taken seriously (cf Hall 1995)

The reform of these institutions began as a political process reflecting a new alignment of power in independent Zimbabwe-- the majority demanded access to resources under the purview of organizations that symbolized white domination. But the reform soon became an organizational process calling for new ways of conducting routine business. And it continues. The FC will soon lose its commercial division and will become an organization focused on people-resource interactions from both regulatory and facilitative perspectives. Its workplans and personnel evaluations must reinforce the new modus operandi or it will stall. The DNPWLM is in the process of designing a trust fund and a new organizational mission. It too will need new standard operating procedures and performance criteria to succeed. But the key point is that what were recalcitrant institutions controlled by a minority have evolved into innovative organizations concerned about the majority. This is a major transformation, not an easy one to achieve. The question is what factors facilitated or hindered it?

B IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE

Each of the six elements of the study template are noted below with an elaboration of the Zimbabwe experience with institutional reform. This analysis identifies some of the reasons for the successful implementation of the course changes noted above.

1 Specification and Consistency of Objectives

The policy contains clear and consistent objectives, or some criteria for resolving goal conflicts

Public policy in Zimbabwe as elsewhere takes many forms (see Herbst 1990, Moyo, 1992). There are formal policies rendered "official" by virtue of their being incorporated into an act of Parliament, as in the case of the policy regarding management of wildlife on private lands contained in the Parks and Wild Life Act of 1975. There are also policy statements that lack full formal legitimacy for various reasons, such as the National Conservation Strategy which, though signed by the President, was never passed by Cabinet and is considered by many senior officials as non-authoritative (see Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 1987, Henley, 1990).

In the case of wildlife policy, there exists a formal policy statement endorsed by the Minister of Environment and Tourism dated 1 January 1992 and entitled "Policy for Wildlife". A key component of the policy laid out in this document is the emphasis on ensuring that local people residing in the communal lands benefit directly from wildlife. The

policy statement essentially codifies the philosophy behind CAMPFIRE and gives it the force of a formal declaration of policy. While it has been approved by the ministry and continues to reflect the policy orientation of the DNPWLM, it has not been integrated into the existing legislation by amending the relevant Act. Indeed, the Parks and Wild Life Act makes no reference to the role of local communities in protecting and managing wildlife. Section 2 of the Act mentions the RDC as a possible Appropriate Authority in Communal lands upon appointment of the Minister. Section 95 subsection (1) of this Act states "[t]he Minister may by notice in the *Gazette* appoint a rural district council to be the appropriate authority for such area of Communal Land as may be specified in such notice and may in like manner amend or revoke such notice." It is upon this slim reed that CAMPFIRE's statutory legitimacy rests.

The Policy for Wildlife, on the other hand, moves well beyond the appropriate authority of the Rural District Council to embrace the landholders in communal areas and their communities as key stakeholders in wildlife management. The policy objectives in section 3 of the Policy for Wildlife are clear:

Government will encourage the conservation of wild animals and their habitats outside the Parks and Wild Life Estate and recognises that this requires the active cooperation of rural landholders who, as wild life producers, should be the primary beneficiaries of all returns. Government wishes to ensure that the demonstrated benefits of wild life proprietorship conferred on owners and occupiers of alienated land are extended to wild life producers in communal and resettlement lands. Such proprietorship involves the right to benefit fully from and to determine the distribution of wild life income by producer communities (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1992).

The mechanism for accomplishing this is CAMPFIRE. While the central focus of wildlife policy is wildlife conservation and sustainable utilization, the concept behind CAMPFIRE is broader and encompasses community-based management of all local resources including arable land, grasslands, woodlands, mineral resources, water and wildlife. While the Department has authority only over aquatic and terrestrial wildlife, its chosen vehicle for implementing its community wildlife policy is more ambitious:

This discrepancy engenders some conflict in jurisdiction. While the first set of RDCs requesting Appropriate Authority appointment were specifically interested in harnessing the commercial value of wildlife, other RDCs are now requesting the same authority for other resource interests. Black granite mining, woodland management, and river sand are among the local resources over which RDCs are requesting Appropriate Authority. DNPWLM may recommend appointment in regards to wildlife only, and must send the local authorities to the relevant public agency regarding other resource bases. Legal provisions for devolving control over these other resources to RDCs, however, are not in place.

In some other cases policies existed but no one followed them. For example the country has a National Conservation Strategy (NCS) that was written with donor support and launched by a Presidential speech. But it was never adopted by Parliament or Cabinet and thus most observers consider it moot. Indeed there is no evidence that the NCS provides guidance for any bureaucratic or policy decisions.

The transformation of the Forestry Commission occurred in the absence of guidance from a coherent set of policies. The review of forestry practices, programs and policies undertaken by the FC in 1991-92 revealed a lack of vision. The results of this review process were later presented in a World Bank publication (Bradley and McNamara 1993). The change from a traditional extension model to the inclusion of indigenous species in the research program and the introduction of variability into the extension process resulted more from reaction to operational difficulties than from a clear policy direction. The lack of coherent policies did not hinder the learning and adaptation that was going on. Co-management evolved more as a product of muddling through and iterative organizational learning than as a response to clear policy objectives. Clarity is emerging as policies and procedures are developed and implemented that support stakeholder involvement, resource sharing and the sustainable use of gazetted forests and woodlands in communal areas.

An interesting characteristic of the Zimbabwe experience is the extent to which clear policy instructions were absent or vague, but progress was made with implementation nonetheless. Clarity of authority was key to policy implementation in the CAMPFIRE program and to co-management in the Forestry Commission. But at the same time many policy documents were not followed and everyone knew that guidance could not be obtained from those documents. What was not policy appeared to be clear to most actors, but the reverse was less so.

This fuzziness might reflect the social tension in the country. A policy that encounters high conflict and needs the cooperation of stakeholders that are at odds may benefit from some murkiness surrounding the direction of the policy. This may have fit with the radical nature of the changes occurring in independent Zimbabwe's first 15 years of existence. Clarity of objectives could induce polarization of stakeholder groups and that was just what needed to be avoided. Fuzziness, on the other hand, could help to dampen the tensions. Another possibility has to do with the nature of environmental policy objectives, many of which if elaborated in detail provoke societal and bureaucratic conflicts (Brinkerhoff and Gage, 1994).

2 Incorporation of Adequate Knowledge of Cause and Effect

The policy accurately identifies the principal factors and linkages leading to, and influencing, policy outcomes, including specification of target groups and incentives

At the core of Zimbabwe's national policy on community wildlife management is the promise of revenue generation through effective wildlife conservation and management by landholders and communities in the Communal Lands. The policy is built on the twin premises that a) wildlife resources can provide a sustainable source of economic benefits to local communities and b) economic benefits will influence attitudes and eventually behavior in ways that support the intended policy outcomes of maintaining wildlife numbers and critical habitat (see Makombe 1993 Metcalfe 1994). These premises reflect the conceptual and operational frameworks that inform community-based wildlife management across Africa (see Barrett and Arcese 1995 Bonner 1993 Brandon and Wells 1992 Gray 1993 Western and Wright 1994).

As Table 3 illustrates, the benefits derived from CAMPFIRE are overwhelmingly from consumptive use of wildlife, specifically from the hunting of large game. Quotas for elephant, kudu, sable, and buffalo, among other game animals, are established annually for each participating RDC by the DNPWLM. The RDC enters into agreements with safari operators and tour operators for tourism and hunting rights. While contract mechanisms vary, most are based on the determination of a fee for game hunting.

Year	Sport hunting	Tourism	Cropping	PAC Hides & Ivory	Other	Total
1989	694 773	60	35 910	11 256	1 700	743 699
1990	1 310 187	7 082	75 790	105 917	65 849	1 564 825
1991	2 393 713	59 657	0	78 242	379 243	2 910 855
1992	5 908 669	96 878	21 666	48 199	213 747	6 289 159
1993	9 101 816	137 730	32 833	97 858	317 971	9 688 208
TOTAL	19 409 158	301 407	166 199	341 472	978 510	21 196 746
Source: WWF/Harare						

On average, over 91 percent of CAMPFIRE revenues came from sport hunting during the first five years of implementation, while non-consumptive use, viz. tourism, constituted on average less than 1.5 percent of revenues. The sale of hides and ivory from animals killed as part of Problem Animal Control (PAC) was of roughly equal financial importance.

For communities with low population density and high wildlife populations the linkage between cause and effect or policy and behavior is clear. To maximize revenues, it is essential to maintain wildlife numbers which in turn suggests that it is important to protect habitat. Kanyurira ward in Guruve District has voluntarily decided to restrict settlement to approximately 18 sq km leaving 400 sq km as habitat for wildlife (ZimTrust, 1990). The CAMPFIRE Coordinator for Tsholotsho confirmed that some communities in his district were also limiting in-migration as a means of protecting wildlife habitat. For communities with little or no wildlife consumptive utilization is not possible and therefore the revenue generating capability of the wildlife resource plummets. Without direct financial incentives, it will be difficult to persuade communities to spare wildlife habitat from the hoe.

In one respect the targeting of benefits is hindered by the lack of appropriate legal mechanisms. While CAMPFIRE specifically views the individual landholder and the wildlife producer community as the primary targets for benefits and the key actors in assuring sustainable wildlife programs in rural areas the Parks and Wildlife Act designates the RDC as the lowest local level to which Appropriate Authority is delegated. There is no legal provision for ensuring that revenues generated from wildlife activities in a specific ward or community are returned to that ward or community. CAMPFIRE policy has been to require that RDCs demonstrate their intent to redistribute benefits but no legal means exist to enforce compliance. Murphree pointed out in 1991 that

a fundamental discrepancy remains between the law (the statutory delegation of proprietorship) and the principle (combining production management authority and benefit). The Act delegates proprietorship to the DCs. But they are not the producers or on-the-ground managers of wildlife (cited in Bradley and McNamara 1993: 181).

This "fundamental discrepancy" is not unique to the Parks and Wild Life Act. Key natural resources legislation-- the Natural Resources Act (Chapter 150), the Forest Act (Chapter 125) and the Mines and Minerals Act (Chapter 165)-- lacks provisions for meaningful local involvement either by consultation or with mandated responsibility in the management of local natural resources in Communal areas. For the larger policy objective of enhanced community-based natural resources management to become a reality, these discrepancies need to be addressed and direct authority granted to local landholders and their communities over the resources upon which they depend (see Honadle 1993, Murphree 1991-1995). In addition land tenure issues need to be taken into consideration (see Moya, 1995, Moyana, 1984).

3 Appropriate Implementation Structures and Processes

Policy implementation is structured to maximize the probability of compliance from implementing agents and target groups. This includes assignment to capable and sympathetic agencies, supportive operating procedures, sufficient financial resources, and adequate access to supporters

Policy implementation was restructured because implementing organizations did not have the clout or capacity to continue to impose compliance on a growing human population that was threatening the integrity of forests and wildlife populations. Co-management emerged from a condition of bureaucratic weakness and the realization that co-opting the rule breakers and engaging the assistance of NGOs and other allies was the only way out of the resource squeeze.

In the Forestry Commission the coexistence within the same structure of commercial and regulatory functions hindered the development of a coherent vision for the management of protected forest reserves and woodlands in communal areas. The anticipated removal of the three commercial divisions from the Commission will enhance the ability of the organization to concentrate on State functions by removing the split personality resulting from contradictory functions. This in turn will facilitate the emergence of an organizational culture consonant with its redefined mission. Revised management and work planning procedures are already in place to support the new emphasis.

The Forestry Commission experience identifies the importance of structure and process within an organization with designated statutory responsibility for implementation. But the CAMPFIRE situation is different. It highlights the importance of broadening the notion of implementing agent beyond simply the public sector agency with nominal policy authority to include a wider constellation of entities both public and non-governmental with roles in implementation.

Rather than depending on the resources and commitment of a single public agency, Zimbabwe's community wildlife policy is implemented by a network of organizations including local and international NGOs, the academic community, and the public sector agency responsible for wildlife management (see King 1994 cf Brinkerhoff, 1993). The primary implementing agencies at the outset included the University of Zimbabwe's Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS), the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Zimbabwe Trust (ZimTrust), and the DNPWLM. While these organizations remain the principal partners in implementing CAMPFIRE, they have been joined by two other NGOs-- Africa Resources Trust (ART) and Action Magazine-- and by the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD). These organizations constitute the CAMPFIRE Consultative Group and have regular coordination meetings. It is worth noting that all of the participants are considered to be national rather than international. Even WWF has a national character due to the leadership provided by Zimbabweans and the organization's clear national agenda.

In 1990 the CAMPFIRE Association of Rural Councils known simply as the CAMPFIRE Association was established to promote the interests of the rural councils that had been granted Appropriate Authority over wildlife resources. This umbrella organization has become a major stakeholder and proponent of the CAMPFIRE approach. By common agreement the consultative group decided to designate the CAMPFIRE Association as the lead agency in implementing the program. As an indication of the importance of the role assigned to the CAMPFIRE Association it was decided at a workshop in 1992 that its director would chair the monthly meetings of the CAMPFIRE Consultative Group instead of the head of DNPWLM, as had been the case previously. With time it is possible that the association will assume some or most of the functions performed by the consultative group members.

The decision to adopt a participatory network rather than a command model for implementing the community wildlife policy of DNPWLM has demonstrated a number of strengths. First the choice of implementing agents emphasized complementary skills and demonstrated commitment to the goals of the policy. The respective technical specializations of each organization is presented below with specializations for each listed in order of importance.

- (1) CASS socio-economic research community and household-level analysis,
- (2) WWF technical wildlife support aerial surveys concessions negotiation strategies, land use research
- (3) ZimTrust institution-building training, community resource management rural development,
- (4) DNPWLM establishment and monitoring of quotas technical wildlife management,
- (5) ART international education, public relations
- (6) Action Magazine public information and education
- (7) MLGRUD local government finance

While there is some overlap in organizational capabilities and roles a high degree of collaboration has been maintained. Where overlapping skills exist they have been used to reinforce implementation rather than to spark competition.

Second the network approach has allowed for the mobilization of human technical financial and political resources that would have been impossible for a single agency. The DNPWLM lacked the personnel especially staff trained in community development methods and the financial resources to implement a community wildlife program on its own. Each member of the network was able to bring both its own resources and the capacity to attract and manage funds contributed by international donor organizations. ZimTrust for example, was able to obtain substantial funding from NORAD while WWF received funding from ODA and other sources. USAID contributed substantial funds in support of actions carried out by ZimTrust WWF and CASS. Since each organization had a stake in making the CAMPFIRE approach work they also tended to get the word out both to communities and RDCs that had substantial wildlife resources and to the wider audience represented by their individual constituencies.

Finally by working in coalition with local NGOs and the University, the DNPWLM was able to lessen the high degree of suspicion and distrust by community members that would have resulted had the Department assumed sole responsibility for implementation. Local people are justifiably distrustful of public agencies that profess to be interested in helping people when their historic function has emphasized law enforcement.

Local Implementation Structures

At the district and subdistrict level a number of structures exist that allow for broad participation of local residents, technical service agents and elected officials. In most RDCs, a separate CAMPFIRE subcommittee of the Council has been established. In some cases, the CAMPFIRE program has been placed under an existing subcommittee such as the Natural Resources subcommittee.

At the ward level, there exists a WADCO CAMPFIRE committee composed of representatives of VIDCO CAMPFIRE committees the elected councillor from the Ward and traditional authorities. The latter participate either as formal members or observers of the Ward and Village CAMPFIRE committees. The CAMPFIRE program has placed substantial emphasis on building local institutional capacity both in the technical skills needed to manage wildlife conservation and utilization activities and in the decision-making and organizational skills required to ensure that wildlife management is effectively decentralized to the level of the local landholders and their communities.

Nevertheless local structures tend to become weaker and less authoritative below the district level. The relative weakness of ward and village level wildlife management institutions may be explained in part by the legal restriction that places authority at the district council level mentioned earlier. Another factor is the lack of effective governmental and administrative decentralization below the district (see for example Roe 1995). Neither

the village nor the ward have legal administrative standing. Rather, they serve as points of interest aggregation where local residents may come together to consult and discuss issues that are then communicated up the hierarchy to the RDC for deliberation and decision.

Even this function of interest aggregation may not be fulfilled fully by the WADCO/VIDCO structure. The establishment of these subdistrict entities resulted from a policy directive issued by the then Prime Minister in 1984. The VIDCO is made up of one elected representative for each 100 households, plus a representative each for youth and women's organizations. Six VIDCOs make up a ward and each ward has a WADCO. The membership of these structures intentionally avoided and indeed usurped the role of traditional leadership. VIDCO leaders and Kraalheads (traditional village leaders) often come into conflict over land tenure and resource management issues. Since many VIDCOs and WADCOs have not been reconstituted since the first elections in 1984, they often lack the democratic character required to be viewed by local people as legitimate representative institutions.

The local-level interviews conducted by the Zimbabwean Commission of Inquiry into Appropriate Agricultural Land Tenure Systems, constituted in 1993, led the Commission to conclude that "there is widespread resistance to VIDCO/WADCO structures as credible authorities over land and natural resources. The VIDCO is widely viewed as an illegitimate structure, with no credibility or respect, nor real effective power and resources to implement the said role" (Zimbabwe 1994, Vol. 1, 26). Sensitive to the issue of legitimacy of the VIDCO/WADCO structures, the CAMPFIRE program has emphasized the involvement of traditional leaders-- kraalheads, headmen, and chiefs-- in village and ward level CAMPFIRE committee meetings (Metcalf 1994, King, 1994).

Finally, there are very practical reasons for the weakness of local structures that are tied directly to the self-interest of the districts. District councils in communal areas were established in 1984 and merged with the rural councils that governed commercial farming areas in 1993. The resulting Rural District Council structure was not provided with adequate fiscal resources to contribute effectively to local social and economic development and the provision of critical public services. CAMPFIRE revenues constitute a major source of total fiscal resources in participating districts and have the additional advantage of being almost totally under the control of the RDC, without the restrictions and authorization and oversight requirements of traditional fiscal instruments such as taxes, fees, and charges. The only significant restriction faced by districts in regard to wildlife resources is the authority of DNPWLM to set hunting and PAC quotas.

Considerable mistrust of the intentions and fairness of district institutions exists at the ward and village level. This is particularly the case in wards that have not received direct transfers of revenue. Murphree cites a particularly striking remark made by a ward authority in regard to the relationship between the RDC and ward committees. He quotes this leader as

saying "Council is a thief. It takes our revenues away from us with one hand and offers nothing but food-for-work drought relief handouts with the other." Murphree goes on to conclude that "the perceived lack of return of dividends is the most important factor in negative attitudes to wildlife at the ward level. It is equally clear that access to wildlife revenues by councils is a powerful disincentive to the further devolution of proprietorship to ward levels" (Murphree 1990: 17).

Similarly, several years after the creation of the Nyaminyami district's Wildlife Management Trust, local participation in implementation, decision-making, and resource management remained minimal. "The communities themselves are not actively participating in the planning and management process and appear alienated from both the trust and the wildlife on which they depend. There is little community organization below the district-based trust's board of management" (Metcalf 1994: 176; see also Murombedzi 1992).

The self-interest of bureaucratic actors, even at the local level, is a powerful motivating force. As long as local communities lack legal standing and the authority to manage wildlife and other resources, some district councils will continue to resist the devolution of planning and management responsibilities to subdistrict entities. Fortunately, local communities are beginning to take a more assertive position relative to district and national actors. Popular sentiment and policy discussions, too, seem to be moving toward increased decentralization and local control in Zimbabwe.

4 Management Capacity and Commitment

Leaders and top managers possess sufficient strategic management and political skills, and are committed to the policy objectives

One of the greatest strengths of the CAMPFIRE implementation strategy lies in the wealth of technical, managerial, and leadership resources it can draw upon. The network approach multiplied the number of professional staff available to the program. Since each of the participating implementation agencies had its own specialty area, it was able to assume full responsibility for specific implementation tasks. The strong collaborative spirit and regular coordination meetings prevented duplication or confusion of responsibilities.

The NGOs involved in implementing CAMPFIRE are all local and employ highly experienced professional, Zimbabwean staff. Both indigenous and white Zimbabweans are involved. Furthermore, some of the NGO staff had previously worked with or for DNPWLM and had strong ties within the agency and long personal involvement in the development of a community focus for wildlife management in the country.

With the creation of the CAMPFIRE Association an important step was taken to build political support for CAMPFIRE. The Association's membership consists of RDCs that have been granted Appropriate Authority and who request to join and satisfy membership requirements. The leadership of the CAMPFIRE Association is very aware of the importance of securing and maintaining political commitment to the devolution of authority over natural resources and especially wildlife resources to producer communities.

High management capacity and commitment throughout the entire network of actors is a key contributor to the success achieved. The country's need to create a self-sufficient economy during UDI created a reservoir of self-confidence in Zimbabwe society. Although outside assistance is accepted it is also commonly rejected as evidenced by a resistance to a TFAP exercise and resistance to the preparation of a NEAP. In fact, there is resistance to outside advice in general. This is reinforced by the presence of high-capacity local institutions such as a dense population of local NGOs as well as other organizations such as CASS at the university. A wide range of institutions possess committed and skilled managers.

The checkered history of the Forestry Commission reveals that agency performance fluctuated in tandem with the skills and commitment of FC top management. The commercial operation during UDI and after reflected the proclivity of leadership to favor that function. As the state functions became ascendant new leaders were needed. Currently, the FC has much higher capacity and commitment at the division level than existed in the mid 1980s. This is reflected in the operational procedures and awareness of issues evidenced at the divisional level.

5 Stakeholder Support and the Legal System

The policy receives ongoing support from constituency groups and key stakeholders within a neutral or supportive legal system

CAMPFIRE has become the leading model for community wildlife management in Africa and has generated strong interest world-wide (see for example Peterson 1991, Barrett and Arcese 1995). Support for the concept remains strong despite some opposition and misgivings due to the central role played by consumptive utilization in generating benefits. Within Zimbabwe support has remained strong within government, in the DNPWLM among communities involved in CAMPFIRE activities and among RDCs. The expansion of the number of RDCs with Appropriate Authority status from 12 in 1993 to 25 of 57 in 1995 speaks to the continued interest among communities and RDCs in Zimbabwe.

The wildlife focus of CAMPFIRE is now being expanded to include other natural resources including woodlands, minerals and grasslands. Communities are beginning to

understand that they can generate benefits financial and other by asserting control and effectively managing the resources upon which they depend for their livelihoods

This is not to say that the policy is universally accepted or does not receive severe criticism on occasion. Some within government are not convinced that communities will manage wildlife utilization in a sustainable manner. They question whether RDCs and communities will attempt to maximize revenue generation at the expense of conservation. Others believe that local communities and households do not receive their "fair share" of benefits. They maintain that RDCs retain a disproportionate share of benefits and are not committed to applying the principle that wildlife producers should receive maximum return. Another group, mostly international and philosophically opposed to the killing of wildlife, condemns the CAMPFIRE approach as simply a means of making money off the slaughter of wildlife by primarily rich hunters from developed countries.

Despite concerns and criticisms of the CAMPFIRE approach as it is being implemented, support from key stakeholders in Zimbabwe, namely rural communities, RDCs and the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management, remains high. The CAMPFIRE concept will continue to be extended, refined and experimented with as new communities with their own resource management concerns and problems become involved. Indeed, the Forestry Commission's entry into the co-management arena with a similar array of stakeholders is evidence of stakeholder support for this type of innovation.

There is one set of stakeholders, however, that sometimes acts to drive a wedge into co-management efforts by the Forestry Commission and DNPWLM. Those stakeholders are politicians, including elected members of Parliament. During the electoral season, some politicians have been known to capitalize on people's desire to move unhindered into protected areas, either to settle or to exploit the relatively abundant natural resources in these preserves. Some politicians, sensing an advantage to be gained by siding with local people against central government institutions, use campaign rhetoric that casts the FC and National Parks as obstructionist bureaucracies determined to keep resource-poor people from underexploited areas and thereby perpetuating the legacy of the colonial and UDI periods. Such rhetoric plays well to some listeners, but it does not make cooperative efforts easier.

Of critical importance to the future of community-based natural resources management and resource co-management in Zimbabwe are changes to the legal and administrative systems that have been proposed formally to the President. If some of the key recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into Appropriate Agricultural and Land Tenure Systems are implemented, many of the factors identified in this report that have impeded the ability of communities and resource users in Communal Areas to assert their authority over local resources will have been removed. The Commission reviewed the CAMPFIRE experience and judged the program to be a "qualified success" that demonstrated what is perhaps the key recommendation of the Commission: "That is, rural communities can

own and utilise resources effectively and sustainably provided there are clear benefits to the community and that the community is empowered through local level institutions" (Zimbabwe 1994, Vol 1 43)

Specifically the Commission recommends that

- a) traditional freehold tenure over arable and residential land in communal areas be recognized and secured and that the State relinquish *de jure* ownership of such land and accords full rights to village communities
- b) the traditional village constituted under the kraalhead be recognized as the basic unit of social organization in Communal Areas and that members of a traditional village be granted formal perpetual rights over land and all resources in each village, and that
- c) administrative functions regarding land and natural resources be transferred from the VIDCO to the traditional village and that the village "Dare" (Shona) or "Inkundla" (Ndebele) be recognized as the local land water and natural resources board
- d) to ensure that traditional jurisdictions correspond to administrative boundaries ward boundaries be altered to coincide with Headmen and Chiefs' areas and that the traditional village not the VIDCO become the lowest level of local governance in Communal Areas

These recommendations will be viewed by some as radical departures from current practice, yet they are in many ways a return to the land and resource tenure systems that predated the introduction of colonial power, policies and laws. These are but a few of the far-reaching recommendations made by this presidentially-appointed Commission. While the eventual fate of the Commission's recommendations is unknown, the fact that such a body has so vigorously and painstakingly documented and made the case for local resource management suggests that the gains realized in community wildlife management and social forestry will be maintained at the very least.

6 Socioeconomic and Political Stability

Socioeconomic and political conditions remain sufficiently supportive and stable so that the policy is not undermined by changes in priorities, conflicts, and/or radical shifts in resource availability for implementation

At the present time there does not appear to be a serious threat to the policies favoring community wildlife management and social forestry, either from political or socioeconomic sources. Indeed the CAMPFIRE approach appears to be the model used in the country for

all community-based resource management issues. While some agencies such as the Forestry Commission may prefer to avoid the acronym for bureaucratic reasons, the general approach they are taking toward resource co-management and resource sharing has borrowed or at least shares the core objectives and approach from CAMPFIRE.

Regarding resource availability, while continued donor support and NGO commitment appears to be secure, many of the districts yet to join or recently joining CAMPFIRE do not have a favorable density of wildlife resources. Since revenues are most readily available from consumptive utilization, which requires a relative high availability of wildlife, these "late adopters" will face very different conditions from those of the 12 original RDCs. Other resources may benefit from the judicious stewardship that may be provided by community-based resource management, but they will not produce the windfall of cash and investment capital experienced in districts with high wildlife to population ratios.

IV CONCLUSIONS

This concluding chapter reviews the major factors associated with the policy implementation experience in community wildlife and social forestry. The lessons learned from the examination of the development and implementation of policy change are relevant to future actions in Zimbabwe and may also have significance for other countries formulating and implementing reforms in natural resources management policies.

A INGREDIENTS FOR SUCCESS: THE ZIMBABWE EXPERIENCE

The movement from state-dominated resource conservation and management policies to ones favoring increased community involvement in the management of critical local resources has been partial, sometimes hesitant, and is still incomplete. Yet most observers and participants in the process would agree that the experience to date has been largely successful. In the preceding sections we have applied an analytic framework that looked in detail at three dimensions of the policy development and implementation experience: (a) problem identification and policy formulation; (b) implementation strategy and management; and (c) the social, political, legal, and economic environment in which implementation occurs. The six conditions associated with successful implementation in the empirical literature offered useful insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the Zimbabwe experience in community wildlife and social forestry.

While the CAMPFIRE approach to community resource management is much further advanced than its corollary in forest resources management, the two sectoral experiences share a number of commonalities. Understanding these common ingredients for success may be of utility in forging future resource management decisions in these programs and in others.

First, the reorientation in policy in both DNPWLM and the Forestry Commission resulted from internal organizational decisions based on the recognition of concrete problems and was neither imposed, coerced, nor purchased by external forces. The movement toward community involvement in natural resources management was conceived and delivered by Zimbabweans, and hence there has been and remains a strong sense of ownership of the policy change effected. Although concern for effective resource management is certainly a basis for the development of the new policy orientations, they can also be seen as rational reactions of agency decision-makers to a diminished organizational capacity to perform mandated agency functions. Increased population pressure and encroachment on the Wildlife Estate and protected forests, combined with limited organizational resources (both budgetary and political) created performance problems. The agencies were no longer able to fulfill their traditional conservation missions and recognized correctly that the problem of wildlife and forest resource management extended beyond the boundaries of the gazetted areas and

fundamentally implicated the resource regimes and inhabitants of the surrounding communities

Second leadership in both agencies recognized that the traditional command and control model of policy implementation was no longer adequate or appropriate given the nature and causes of the problem and the need to base a solution on the actions of multiple actors. The solution was to go outside the organizational boundary to enlist the help of other organizations and the participation of local people and communities most involved with local resource management. The decision to broaden effective participation also co-opted potential competitors for the resource in question. Thus the magnitude of the control problem was reduced at the same time that allies were enlisted in the effort to safeguard environmental resources and control human behavior.

The management approach that was chosen to replace the command and control model was based on the sharing of authority over resources rather than the unilateral enforcement of exclusionary regulations. Both the policy implementation experiences of the FC and the DNPWLM reflect co-management practices in which implementation tasks were shared between the agencies and local communities (see Nhira and Fortmann 1991, Peterson 1991). Co-management is not the abandonment of resource management responsibility by the technical agency and its acquisition by the community. Rather, it is the development of joint responsibility and joint decision-making over that resource that is reflected in the field RDCs: community institutions and local producers become partners with public sector agencies in resource protection and sustainable use.

DNPWLM provides technical assistance to the CAMPFIRE communities while continuing to enforce wildlife regulations, for example by setting game quotas and assisting with community negotiations with safari firms, as part of its departmental activities. Likewise, the FC continues to regulate timber harvesting in the protected forests and forest concessions in Communal Areas while working with communities in developing managed systems for sustainable use of forest resources in and around selected gazetted areas.

Third, the strategy used in implementing the policy changes fully incorporated organizational learning and experimentation. No masterplan or finely detailed blueprint was developed by technical experts at the outset. Rather, in both sectors implementation proceeded with the identification of pilot activities and the careful assessment of the process and results before being extended to a wider audience. This reflective and iterative process allowed the agencies and participants to learn from their experiences and incorporate this knowledge into improved policy and program decisions.

Fourth, appropriate and meaningful incentives were established to support the policy reform objectives for all parties-- local populations and public sector personnel alike. Local communities, RDCs and households benefitted directly to varying degrees by participating in

CAMPFIRE activities. Similarly the reduction of administrative barriers and sanctions arising from unauthorized use of forest resources were of direct benefit to community members participating in co-management activities with the Forestry Commission. Rather than laboring under the threat of fines, community members were motivated to accept co-management as a means of gaining regulated access to valued grazing, fuelwood, thatch and other forest resources.

For the Department of National Parks, the establishment of local institutions for managing and protecting wildlife outside of the protected areas provided a sound alternative to personnel-intensive strategies such as increasing patrols and anti-poaching forces. Since these traditional methods of controlling the loss of wildlife were financially impossible in any case, the development of an alternative that freed rather than consumed department resources made obvious economic sense. By permitting benefit streams for RDCs and local communities, DNPWLM was able to discharge some of the costs of patrols and PAC in Communal Areas. The Forestry Commission also realized that the increased costs of protection by patrolling and enforcement activities would not significantly reduce the problems of encroachment and unmanaged resource exploitation. Thoughtful senior management enhanced the appeal of co-management by including resource sharing and stakeholder support as planning and performance evaluation criteria for FC field staff.

A fifth commonality in the implementation experiences is the existence of a sufficiently supportive institutional environment and adequate financial, technical and human resources. Despite incongruencies in the legislation, both DNPWLM and the Forestry Commission have been able to introduce a degree of effective community management of a State resource. The Parks and Wild Life Act provides for decentralized management of wildlife resources to the RDCs while the Forest Act makes no such allowance. Nevertheless, there has been sufficient political and organizational support for these initiatives to overcome the threat of legal challenges.

Both organizations have capable technical staff and have reached out to other sources of technical and material support as needed. The CAMPFIRE program in particular has benefitted from the very substantial contributions of technical and human resources from NGOs and the University and from the financial support of donor agencies. In the absence of these internal and external resources, it is unlikely that the level of success in implementation could have been obtained.

B KEY CONSIDERATIONS

Three main considerations emanate from the findings of the field study. The first involves the range of experience noted in what is often seen as a unitary model, such as CAMPFIRE. The second deals with whether activities described as local resource

management are actually examples of local-national cooperation for co-management. The third involves the need to understand the critical differences between the direct management of resources and the guidance of complex networks of actors interacting among themselves and with the resources in question.

1 Factors affecting local implementation

While the CAMPFIRE program is often perceived internationally as a unitary model of local resource management, the experience in the field reveals a very different reality. The CAMPFIRE program is remarkable not for its uniformity but for its heterogeneity. The experimental approach taken in implementation has allowed for, indeed has favored, the development of diverse CAMPFIRE initiatives that reflect the particularities of the natural resource, social, political, and economic contexts in which they must operate.

Discussions with numerous observers of the CAMPFIRE experience suggest that the differences in the appropriateness and eventually the relative success of the CAMPFIRE approach at the local level may be influenced by the following factors:

- **Community dynamics** Communal assertiveness, homogeneity, and cohesiveness combined with a relatively centralized (rather than widely dispersed) spatial pattern of settlement and a low degree of in-migration contribute to successful performance.
- **Resource to population ratio** A strong resource base relative to population size contributes to success. In areas where resources are already scarce or heavily degraded, it will be more difficult to generate the benefit streams needed to provide adequate incentives to resource users.
- **Access to resource** The ability of communities to limit habitat destruction and wildlife poaching is weakened if access is easy. Therefore, a greater distance from road infrastructure may be an advantage for the sustainable management of wildlife and forest resources, whereas it would be a disadvantage with the efficient management of agricultural resources.
- **Incentives** Appropriate and valued incentives are essential for all actors. Community members respond most favorably when there are rapid and visible benefit returns.
- **Support network** An effective network of support institutions, public, private, and including NGOs, that are capable of providing external support in a facilitative mode without mixing regulatory and support functions has proven to be of critical

importance to the success of CAMPFIRE initiatives. Support network actors must be viewed as having legitimacy as neutral facilitators in the local setting.

- **Effective local leadership with authority** Able, committed community leadership has been of signal importance to the success of co-management initiatives. Institutions and individuals must be accorded legitimacy by local people and their public sector partners if co-management activities are to receive full popular support. At the RDC level as well, leadership and legitimacy are key factors affecting local implementation.
- **Appropriate enabling environment** The CAMPFIRE approach of returning wildlife benefits to wildlife producer communities was impossible prior to the amendment of the Parks and Wild Life Act in 1982 which extended Appropriate Authority to Rural District Councils. Without this legislation, it was exceedingly difficult if not impossible to create a direct incentive for improved wildlife conservation and management by returning the benefits to local people. The special provisions made for wildlife have been extended in practice to other resource sectors despite the absence of specific legal backing. Wedging open the door for community participation in resource management is a first and necessary step. An appropriate legal framework is needed to allow the exercise of community-level decision making and resource control.

These factors have been found to explain the relative success of CAMPFIRE initiatives in different settings. They may also provide screening criteria for site selection. The specificity of conditions and heterogeneity of the resulting initiatives in community resource management also suggest that indiscriminate replication of the CAMPFIRE approach such as blanket promotion in neighboring countries such as Botswana and Zambia, may be less likely to succeed than its supporters anticipate (see Gibson and Marks, 1995; Odell et al., 1993; Mwenya et al., 1990).

The issue then involves the universality of the local resource management paradigm. CAMPFIRE and its imitators have captured the imagination of donor agencies, international NGOs, and developing country governments. In a sense, they are "trendy" representing an emerging and popular solution to the need to find effective alternatives to command and control approaches to resource management and protection (see Western and Wright, 1994). However, the Zimbabwe experience suggests that CAMPFIRE is no universal panacea. Under certain conditions it holds solid promise. If however those conditions are not present, then alternatives and/or modifications need to be sought.

2 Co-management or community-based natural resources management

A second consideration involves the difference between co-management and CBNRM. The experiences presented in this study are more accurately defined as resource co-management since both the CAMPFIRE program and the social forestry initiatives involve a sharing of authority and responsibility between the public sector agency that holds the mandate for resource conservation and management and local entities -- RDCs and communities -- whose participation is critical but not legally required for the sustainable management of the resource in question.

There has been no formal or even informal conveyance of authority over natural resources from the State to the community. Wildlife remains the property of the State just as forest resources in protected areas and in Communal Lands remain held in trust by the State. As Murphree has underscored, the relative success of local resource management initiatives and specifically of CAMPFIRE is "conditional on a continued state indulgence that it should proceed. The success is based on permission, not mandate" (Murphree, 1995: 5).

Community-based natural resources management implies that resource tenure involving the rights to hold, dispose and benefit from the use or disposal of the resource have been conferred or belong formally to the community and its member households or individuals. While public agencies may continue to maintain a regulatory function, they do not have primary management authority over the resource. Until substantive changes have been made in the legal and administrative systems governing land and resource tenure systems including the status of the village as a unit of governance, the opportunities to pursue CBNRM strategies in Zimbabwe will be limited.

Nevertheless, resource co-management offers certain advantages and safeguards that complete devolution to local entities, be they local governments, communities or landholders, may not offer. Co-management not only allows for the continued contribution of public sector agencies but requires them to provide technical and other resources as a partner institution. In areas where the State has significant interest in maintaining public control such as in critical forest and wildlife habitats, co-management allows for the development of a collaborative management system without jeopardizing long-term public interests. Finally, co-management may offer some advantages over CBNRM when there are differences between ecological boundaries and administrative jurisdictions. Co-management allows the State through the responsible public agency to play a harmonizing role across jurisdictions, thereby ensuring the consistency, compatibility and integrity of management practices.

3 Managing diffuse networks

As much as Zimbabwe is a unique case, it still is subject to the same historical pressures and changes as the rest of the developing world. One of those changes is the shift from the direct management of natural resources by trained professionals to the need for those specialists to engage in the management of the interactions between people and the resources.

This is a shift in orientation that can pit the old school of resource managers against the younger generation. For example, older foresters imbued with the enforcement ethic developed over a lifetime of policing activity often look askance at the social forestry efforts of younger staff (see for example Brinkerhoff 1995).

Another important change is the trend toward democratization and citizen empowerment. Throughout the developing world, including Africa, governance systems are being transformed in the wake of transitions to democracy. Besides the right to vote, citizens are demanding more participation in decisions affecting their lives and are calling for transparency and accountability from public officials. This trend affects resource management agencies as well in that the old command and control operating mode is challenged by resource users' assertion of their right to have a role in resource-use decisions (see Martin, 1994; Mararike 1995).

Participatory resource management policies also call for new organizational forms and processes. Rigid hierarchical institutions are yielding to more diffuse and collaborative types of human interaction. The evolution of the Forestry Commission and the advent of CAMPFIRE are examples of this transition. Resource managers must now operate in a context of networks of institutions and human interactions in implementing departmental mandates. Indeed, CAMPFIRE and the social forestry effort did not simply stumble into a network mode of operating-- they consciously embraced it and created public-private linkages as a central part of their strategies. Although this can be exciting, it can also be confusing and frustrating (see Brinkerhoff 1993). As direct control yields to influence, responsibility and accountability become shared and hard to determine on an individual basis. This makes policy implementation more uncertain than under the traditional command and control strategy.

The diffuseness of accountability is also reflected in the difficulty of isolating causal behavior in networks. The complexity and multiplicity of action and effects makes it difficult for researchers and managers to sort out what led to what and who was responsible for which outcomes. Likewise, for the actors themselves, credit is more difficult to assign or claim. Managers operating within network structures must learn to live in a participatory world of shared responsibility and collective credit, where implementation is complex and unpredictable.

B IMPLICATIONS FOR DONOR ASSISTANCE

The sudden upsurge in communities enrolling in the CAMPFIRE program has various interpretations. The demonstration effect of success is one explanation. The impact of publicity is another. A third is the perception that CAMPFIRE gives local communities

access to donor resources-- the rubric of local resource management is seen as the 'gravy train' of the 1990s

This last interpretation introduces the problem of distortions created when donor money is the incentive for reform efforts at local levels. Some observers suggest that this is not a problem: get communities involved and as their capacities grow, an appreciation for wise use of the resource will grow with it. Others fear that entry into the program with unrealistic expectations and misguided intentions will lead to its downfall. Regardless of the interpretation chosen, however, the question of appropriate ways for donors to assist local resource management arises. An overcommitment of direct financial support may cause distortions and lead to non-sustainable outcomes.

Given the network management approach of CAMPFIRE and the social forestry initiatives, donor support for the members of the implementation networks may provide a desirable option or balance to direct financing of community activities. Such assistance could be provided in two ways. There could be capacity-building assistance for individual network members; for example, the application of strategic management approaches to resource co-management policy implementation. Or a fund could be established for the network coalition as a whole, with achievement of negotiated collaboration milestones as the key to funds release. This kind of implementation assistance could help to create incentives for participatory and collaborative performance.

In addition, support needs extend outside the membership of the core network. Consciousness-raising and constituency-building among peripheral stakeholders may spell the difference between success and failure in some circumstances. For example, the earlier cited case of politicians interfering with forest co-management suggests a need to view politicians as targeted stakeholders-- candidates for appreciation training and/or lobbying. Flexible donor funding that allows proposals and follow-through to deal with recalcitrant or obstructionist stakeholders could pay high dividends.

These suggestions are a departure from the traditional approaches to generating policy change. Donors and public sector technical agencies alike tend to depend on the weight of technical arguments to make the case for policy change. Policy formulation is often seen as an internal matter that is handled by the concerned organization and then passed to political bodies, Cabinet or Parliament, for a rather *pro forma* approval. For example, the point has been made that

"In a specialised sphere such as wildlife management, the formulation of policy detail is delegated to the technical agency. Policy is therefore generated at middle management levels but is formally adopted at higher levels, and this, we believe, occurs without a thorough appreciation by the

higher government levels of the implications consequences and requirements of the policy" (Bell and Clarke 1984 471 Quoted in Murphree 1995 4)

At some point however other levels need to understand and appreciate policy so that they do not sabotage it This is a particularly complex issue when policies are implemented through extended networks of public agencies NGOs and local communities Resource co-management in Zimbabwe may have entered a stage where the pressure points are more political than technical and implementation strategies need to adapt to these circumstances For example a focus on consciousness-raising among Members of Parliament may have as much payoff as or more than direct funding of community activities The process may have come full circle-- from political to organizational to political again But even with all the uncertainties and difficulties of charting new courses and implementing new approaches Zimbabwe's positive experience offers hope to those committed to promoting co-management of natural resources in Africa

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APPENDIX A

RURAL DISTRICT COUNCILS WITH APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY

RURAL DISTRICT COUNCILS WITH APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY
August 1995

Chimanimani
Beitbridge
Binga
Bulilimangwe
Gokwe North
Chiredzi
Chipinge
Guruve
Hurungwe
Hwange
Muzarabani
Nyaminyami
Nyanga
Tsholothso
Mudzi
Rushinga
Gwanda
UMP Zvataida
Nkayi
Chaminuka
Gokwe South
Bubi
Chiweshe
Marondera
Mwenezi

APPENDIX B

DISTRIBUTION OF CAMPFIRE BENEFITS

Distribution of CAMPFIRE Benefits

Distribution of Revenues from CAMPFIRE, by District and Ward, 1989-1993										
in Zimbabwe Dollars										
District	Ward	Households	Annual Ward Dividend						TOTAL	
			1989	1990	1991	1992	1993			
BBridge	1	Chipise	775		74 000	19 347	28,921	20 984	\$143 252	
	3	Drt II	1134			20 000	29,491		\$49 491	
	6	Mtetengwe	1658					38 400	\$38 400	
	7	Maramani	721		6,000	28 176	29 722	30 848	\$94 746	
	8	Masera	387		5 000				\$5 000	
	9	Machuchut	713				8,612		\$8 612	
	Binga	4	Luba	654			8 606	66 587	61 660	\$136 853
		5	Machesu	561			8 606	66 587	61 660	\$136 853
		6	Kariangwe	723			8 606	66 587	61 660	\$136 853
7		Chinonge	846			8 606	66 587	61 660	\$136 853	
8		Kaguba	839			8 606	66,587	61 660	\$136 853	
15		Siasengwa	464			8 606	66,587	61 660	\$136 853	
16		Sinakoma	608			8 606	66,587	61 660	\$136 853	
17		Sikalenge	891			8 606	66 587	61 660	\$136 853	
19		Tyunga	761			8 606	66,587	61 660	\$136 853	
20		Nabusenga	1287			8 606	66,587	61 660	\$136 853	
21		Ngangala	883			8 606	66 587	61 660	\$136 853	
Binga		Sianzyundu	1050				13,900	29 069	\$42 969	
n w/life		Simatelele	475				13 900	29 069	\$42 969	
		Siachilaba	760				13 900	29 069	\$42 969	
		Sinamagon	1148				13 900	29,069	\$42 969	
		Lubimbi	680				13,900	29 069	\$42 969	
		Dobolo	1044				13,900	29 069	\$42 969	
		Pashu	689				13 900	29 069	\$42 969	
		Tinde	684				13 900	29,069	\$42 969	
		Saba-luban	786				13 900	29,069	\$42 969	
		Manjolo	737				13,900	29 069	\$42 969	
B'mangwe	17	Gala	800			20 606	13,959	13 929	\$48 494	
	18	Huwana	1022			20 606	13 959	13 929	\$48,494	
	19	Ndolwane	967			20 606	13,959	13,929	\$48 494	
	20	Mukulela	840			20,606	13 959	13,929	\$48 494	
	21	Madlambud	808			20,606	13 959	13 929	\$48 494	
	23	Hingwe	918			20 606	13 959	13 929	\$48 494	
	24	Bambadz	713			20 606	13 959	13 929	\$48 494	
	GazaL	29	Maheya	775		14 850	58 600	139,150	158 000	\$370 600
28		Mutandahw	1581		14 420		50 000		\$64 420	
Gokwe	1	Simchemb	1491			54 365	45 608	89 408	\$189 381	
	2	Nenyunka	1551			31,365	45 536	85 292	\$162 193	
	3	Madzivazvi	1945			35 365	53 527	83 979	\$172 871	
	4	Chireya I	3709			19,365	45 419	22 608	\$87 392	
	12	Nemangwe	1650			6 000		2 564	\$8 564	
	13	Masuka	1064			18 000		12 395	\$30 395	
	22	Jahana	916				8 919	11 880	\$20 799	
	30	Sai/Mangidi	1946			24 000	3 600	3 846	\$31 446	
	31	Sai/Sengw	1784			16 000	15 030	1 282	\$32 312	
	32	Jin	2324			2,000		854	\$2 854	
		Huchu	527			18,000			\$18 000	
Guruve	1	Chapoto	309	53,012	34 075	44,395	91 438	222 991	\$445 911	
	2	Chisunga	529	75 227	78,850	76,384	142 385	414 927	\$787 773	
	3	Neshangwe	1702		8,096	4,937	30 759		\$43 792	
	4	Chiriwo	441		8,096	1,366	55 884	100 961	\$166,307	
	5	Matsiwo A	983		8 096				\$8 096	
	6	Kanyurira	120	59 766	78 170	89 293	276 475	459,898	\$963 602	
	7	Chitsunga	1972	10 000	8,096	1 356	6,289	42 482	\$68 223	
	8	Matsiwo B	1257		8 096				\$8,096	

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Distnbution of CAMPFIRE Benefits

District	Ward	Households	Annual Ward Dividend					TOTAL
			1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	
	Neshangwe	851					33 621	\$33 621
	Neshangwe	851					707	\$707
	Mutota	1457					2 500	\$2 500
	Mutota	2624					2 500	\$2 500
Hurungwe	1 Chundu	1731				216 711	188 007	\$404 718
	2 Karuru	886				25 000	42 840	\$67 840
	3 Kazangarar	3000				68,229	104 438	\$172 667
	13 Chidamoyo	1923				8 730	28 275	\$46 262
	15 Rengwe	1542				3 257	6 000	\$61 014
	16 Dandahwa	2422				38 957	12 800	\$51 757
	7 Nyamakate	644				103 578	98 138	\$201 716
Hwange	1 Chidobe	670					12 500	\$12 500
	7 Sidinda	427					40 161	\$40 161
	8 Jambezi	635					916	\$916
	9 Kachechetr	667					1 190	\$1 190
	10 Nemanang	667					1 190	\$1 190
	Simangani	646					25 253	\$25 253
	Chikandak	549					1 750	\$1 750
Muzarabani	1 Kapembere	913					5 000	\$5 000
	2 Chadereka	851					5 000	\$5,000
	3 Hoya	1075					5 000	\$5 000
	4 Machaya	1382					5 000	\$5 000
	5 Muzarabani	1078					5 000	\$5,000
	6 Gutsa	302					5 000	\$5,000
	7 Hwatsa	1024					5,000	\$5 000
	8 Chawarura	1024					5 000	\$5 000
	9 Chiweshe	905					5 000	\$5 000
Nyami	1 Gatshe Gat	396	16,500	8,083	17 000	34,832	91 493	\$167 908
	2 Kanyati B	521	16 500	8,083	17 000	34 832	92 492	\$168 907
	3 Kanyati A	404	16 500	8,083	17 000	34,832	108 579	\$184 994
	4 Musambak	281	16 500	8,083	17 000	29,591	29 557	\$100 731
	5 Musambak	248	16 500	8,083	17,000	9,863	43 262	\$94 708
	6 Nebiri A	190	16 500	8,083	17 000	29,591	55 698	\$126 872
	7 Nebiri B	469	16,500	8 083	17 000	29,591	57 719	\$128 893
	8 Negande A	546	16,500	8 083	17 000	16 439	16 352	\$74 374
	9 Negande B	240	16 500	8,083	17 000	9 863	30 558	\$82 004
	10 Mola A	902	16,500	8,083	17 000	144,669	249 139	\$435 391
	11 Mola B	734	16 500	8,083	17 000	59,182	334 889	\$435 654
Tsholotsho	1 Ward01	658		29 025	45,850	91,250	179 462	\$345 587
	2 Ward02	950		16 875	21,250	48,750	43 333	\$130,208
	3 Ward03	895		57,376	89,250	85,630	129 065	\$361 321
	4 Ward04	593		16,875	21 250	32,500	44 983	\$115 608
	7 Ward07	978		39 150	63 180	56,666	174 243	\$333 239
	8 Ward08	1527		12,150	14 166	16,666	66 354	\$109 336
	10 Ward10	879			21 250	16,666	53 604	\$91 520
	Total count	98,759	15	30	56	72	92	
	Average ward dividend		\$25 300	\$20 207	\$22,686	\$46,136	\$57 811	
	Total devolved to wards		\$379 505	\$606,209	\$1 270 418	\$3 321,810	\$5,318 620	\$10 957 576
	Number of benefiting hhlds		7,861	22,084	52 465	70,311	90 475	
	Average benefit		\$48 28	\$27 45	\$24 21	\$47 24	\$58 79	
	Standard deviation		19,208	22,087	19 664	47,217	81 210	151 604

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APPENDIX C
PERSONS CONTACTED

PERSONS CONTACTED

NAME

AFFILIATION

HARARE

Peter Benedict	Director, USAID/Harare
Robert Armstrong	USAID
Charles Cutshall	USAID
Tony Pryor	USAID/AFR/SD/PSGE
Oliver Chapeyama	USAID
Eric Loken	USAID/REDSO/ESA
Rod de Vletter	World Bank
Francisco Pichon	World Bank
Champion Chinhoyi	Zimbabwe Trust
J Makonyere	Zimbabwe Trust
Simon Metcalfe	Zimbabwe Trust
Marshall Murphree	University of Zimbabwe, CASS
James Murombedzi	University of Zimbabwe, CASS
Calvin Nhira	University of Zimbabwe, CASS
John Makumbe	University of Zimbabwe, Pol & Admin
Mandivamba Rukuni	University of Zimbabwe, Fac of Agric
Peter Frost	University of Zimbabwe, Ecology
David Cumming	Director, WWF
Ivan Bond	Resource Economist, WWF
W Makombe	Director, National Parks and Wild Life
Cecil Machena	Dep Dir , National Parks and Wild Life
George Pangeti	Dep Dir, National Parks and Wild Life
Emmanuel Kawadza	National Parks and Wild Life
Nils Christofferson	IUCN
Pontso Mafethe	IUCN
Jens Fugl	IUCN
Tabeth Matiza-Cheuta	IUCN
Yemi Katerere	Former Gen Mgr , Forestry Commission
Peter Gondo	Forestry Commission, Extension
Bongi Sibanda	Forestry Commission, Extension
Stephen Kasere	Dep Dir , CAMPFIRE Association

BULAWAYO

C R Mutsiwegota	Director, Indigenous Forestry, Forestry Commission
J Rudzune	Forestry Commission

TSHOLOTSHO

Kembo M Tshuma District Manager, CAMPFIRE

GWAMPA

Phillip Danda Forestry Commission

LUPANE

D Ntini Asst District Administrator

GANDA CAMP

Peter Mushunje	Forest Protection Officer, Forestry Commission
Chief Dingani	Traditional Local Authority
Aron Sibanda	Chief's aide
Moses Dingani	Chief's son

HWANGE

Approximately 17 attendees at Forestry Commission, Indigenous Forestry, Matabeleland North, divisional meeting

APPENDIX D

OPTIMAL PRINCIPLES AND PRAGMATIC STRATEGIES

by

**Marshall W Murphree
Centre for Applied Social Science
University of Zimbabwe**

OPTIMAL PRINCIPLES AND PRAGMATIC STRATEGIES

Creating an Enabling Politico-Legal Environment for Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM)

Keynote Address
by

Professor M W Murphree

Conference of the Natural Resources Management Programme

SADC Technical Coordination Unit, Malawi
USAID-NRMP Regional

Chobe, Botswana
3 April 1995

Introduction

Let me start this address with an hypothesis I suggest that the mixed profile of success and failure in CBNRM in the Region owes much of its ambiguity to our strategic pragmatism in its implementation We have placed policy and practice before politics and thus have encouraged the birth of CBNRM (in its "modern" version) into a politico-legal environment which, if not hostile, is hardly a nurturing one In so doing we have put an ironic twist on the conventional approach to planned change A recent draft article on rhino conservation sent to me for review complains that "much time and money get wasted in the political battlefield trying to shape out policies that do not get implemented on the ground " We in CBNRM programmes have done the opposite We have spent a lot of time and money in implementation on the ground, leaving the outcomes of the political battlefield which surrounds it largely unresolved

Please do not misunderstand me In retrospect, I do not think that our strategy has been wrong We have grasped the essential principles, generally taken the right policy directions, and have seized the opportunities to put these into practice when they have occurred Had we not done so, community based approaches to natural resource management might well be still at a concept stage, stuck on the agenda of endless interministerial planning meetings and gathering dust on the in-trays of our respective bureaucracies But what I am suggesting is that in our initial and successful end-run around political processes we run the risk of ignoring their centrality to long-term CBNRM success Our "pragmatic strategies" may cause us to be complacent about the introduction of our "optimal principles "

The Private Land Prototype for CBNRM in Southern Africa

Let me illustrate from our history what I mean by "our end run around political processes " In Zimbabwe and Namibia the prototype for the five CBNRM principles mentioned in Steiner and Rihoy's Background Paper for this Conference was established in the mid 1990's with respect to private farms and ranches With minor differences, Namibia's Nature Conservation Ordinance (No 4 of 1974) and Zimbabwe's Parks and Wild Life Act (1975) conferred "ownership" or "custodianship" of wildlife resources on the owners of privatised land In both cases the legislation, and the policy philosophy behind it, was that the best way to conserve wildlife was to confer strong property rights over it to the people who had the greatest incentive to use it sustainably and who were best placed to manage it effectively

Let us pause to note the institutional regime thus put in place

- a) The farm owner, with fixed tenurial rights over a defined land unit, was given tenure over wildlife on that land "Tenure" implies long-term property rights and the owner's long-term rights over land were extended to long-term rights over wildlife, a critical incentive factor for using it sustainably
- b) By giving the farm owner property rights over wildlife, or ownership, the owner gained the right to decide how to use it and to benefit (or suffer) from his management decisions In academic language, "ownership" is the "placement with a person (or a group of persons) of a certain group of rights to property the rights of possession, use and disposal of worth " (Harper, 1974 18)
- c) By giving the farm owner rights to the "disposal of worth" of wildlife, he was empowered to make market decisions, rather than have these made for him by others This active producer presence is an important feature of efficient markets, reducing centre-periphery imbalances in national economies
- d) The wildlife management unit became far smaller and more efficient, a regime in which the linkages between cost and benefit, quality of input and quantity of output were immediate and transparent
- e) The balance in government's role in wildlife management shifted significantly away from regulation towards extension, with far lower budgets required

The legislation which produced these institutional changes in Zimbabwe and Namibia was passed 20 years ago The economic and ecological effects are categorical On private land in both countries a new and flourishing wildlife industry is in place, wildlife revenues have increased dramatically, wildlife populations have expanded and their habitat has improved

Applying the Prototype to Communal Lands

With this success model in hand it was a natural policy step for wildlife authorities to seek to extend it to communal lands. This, in fact, is what is being attempted in the various CBNRM programmes of the region. But the transplant of the model to communal lands is neither easy nor simple. I mention here three factors

- a) The units analogous to private farms in communal lands are not surveyed entities. They may well exist in the social and ecological geographies of local culture and traditional authority. They may appear on the administrative maps of local governance, but frequently these have little economic and ecological rationale. We are not sure of the criteria to be used in determining these units, other than that they should be small enough to provide face-to-face interaction for all members. This may in the long term be a good thing since they should be self-determined, but in the short term it makes initiation difficult.
- b) A second problem is that the analogous proprietorial unit in communal lands is far more organizationally complex than the private farm or ranch. Its membership is larger and internally differentiated. Furthermore, not only is it differentiated in terms of its membership but also in terms of categories of resources, members having specific usufruct rights over arable land but also having collective rights to the communal commons.
- c) The third and greatest problem is the tenure status of communities on communal lands. Our citizens in communal lands do not have strong property rights, i.e. "the rights of possession, use and disposal of worth."

My use of the word "strong" here is indicative of the fact that there are degrees of ownership. Ownership is never absolute. Its strength is determined by its time frame and the conditionalities attached to it. The longer its sanctioned duration, its "tenure", the stronger it will be. The fewer the conditionalities attached to it, the stronger it will be. As Alchian says, the strength of ownership "can be defined by the extent to which the owner's decision to use the resource actually determines its use" (Alchian, 1987: 1031). As inhabitants of what is technically state land, communities in communal lands do not have strong property rights in either of these dimensions. Their tenure is uncertain, their decisions on the use of resources subject to a plethora of conditionalities. As in colonial times, communal lands continue to be in various degrees the fiefdoms of state bureaucracies, political elites and their private sector entrepreneurial partners. The persistence of this condition into the modern post-colonial state is an indication that the devolution of strong property rights to communal land peoples is a fundamental allocative and political issue and that power structures at the political and economic centre are unlikely to surrender their present position easily.

Whether we want to admit it or not, CBNRM has plunged us into this political battlefield. In the technically-inspired attempt to transfer the success of strong property rights over wildlife on private land to communal land proprietorial units,

the khaki shorts ecology brigade has led us into a largely unrecognised struggle over property rights in rural Africa. Its implications are profound.

In an incisive overview of two decades of attempts to promote community forestry in Nepal, Talbott and Khadka show the parallel elsewhere:

"The tenurial rights of local peoples over natural resources and the role of the state in recognizing and supporting those rights continues to be a paramount issue of development, not only in Nepal, but throughout the developing world. The resolution of the concomitant social, economic, and political side issues may well mean the difference between sustainable development and accelerated economic and environmental impoverishment." (Talbott and Khadka, 1994: 2)

And, one might add, tenurial rights will make the difference between rural democratic representation and the continuation of perpetual adolescent status for the communal peoples of Southern Africa in national structures of governance.

Pragmatic Implementational Strategies in CBNRM: The "end-run" around politics

It is only when these three problems involved in the transference of the private land strong property rights prototype to communal lands are resolved that the "optimal principles" for CBNRM can operate. The logical framework planning approach urged on us by many donors would dictate that we should have developed CBNRM in a sequential approach involving first analysis, then policy formulation, then political endorsement, then the legislative enactments conferring strong property rights on communities, and finally implementation. We chose instead to take a simultaneous, experimental approach to all three issues. We advocated policy changes on technical grounds, capitalising on the frequent inability of governments to fully grasp the implications of advice from their technical agencies. Bell and Clarke's analysis is relevant here:

"In a specialised sphere such as wildlife management, the formulation of policy detail is delegated to the technical agency. Policy is, therefore, generated at middle management levels but is formally adopted at higher levels, and this, we believe, occurs without a thorough appreciation by the higher government levels of the implications, consequences and requirements of the policy." (Bell and Clarke, 1984: 471)

We gained broad political support for the policy by appeals to popular sentiment - was it not after all a removal of discrimination between white and black farmers? We masked the deeper political and economic implications of CBNRM by cloaking it in the ambiguous language of current development-speak, talking of "involvement," "participation," "decentralisation," "co-management" and "revenue sharing." We exploited legal and procedural niches to create revolving funds for wildlife revenues or to decentralise controls over communal land wildlife to lower

tiers of government We identified - however imperfectly - communal units of wildlife management and invested large extension resources in the development of their internal management systems And, where there has been the right combination of communal assertiveness, resource availability, supportive local bureaucratic authority and quality facilitation, we have succeeded This success is, however, conditional - conditional on the combination described above, and conditional on a continued state indulgence that it should proceed The success is based on permission, not mandate

Strategies for the Next Phase Institutionalising CBNRM in National Policies and Politics

My view should now be clear For long-term sustainability CBNRM requires a fundamental shift in national policies on tenure in communal lands The core of the matter is strong property rights for collective communal units, not only over wildlife and other natural resources, but over the land itself

I return to the Nepal Forestry paper quoted earlier The authors have this to say

"The key issue is ownership Current forestry laws clearly stipulate that community forest user groups do not have direct ownership rights to the land, only usufruct rights of management over the trees and the forest products derived from the land In short, the official policy is to "hand over" the forests, but by retaining possession of the land itself, the government is not truly "handing over" the forests at all " (Talbot and Khadka, 1994 11)

These observations apply to CBNRM in Southern Africa as well Communal proprietary units need not only strong property rights over wildlife but also the same rights over their land base and other natural resources on it for an integrated management system Until this is in place, our "optimal principles" will have an uneasy fit with the jurisdictional fragmentation that currently pertains As Metcalfe puts it,

"For as long as communal land resources are both formally state, and informally customary lands, authority and management will be compromised, and open access tendencies will thrive " (Metcalfe, 1995 8)

The creation of a new tenure category of communal land, comprised of legally titled collective and communal property right holders, separate from state and private tenure categories, would of course involve a sweeping agrarian reform To achieve it will require a process well beyond the mandate of those directly involved in CBNRM But the evolution of CBNRM in Southern Africa suggests that it has played an important role in initiating this process and it bears a responsibility for contributing further to its momentum We can no longer continue our "end-run" strategy of avoiding central political processes

Three strategic thrusts suggest themselves at this stage

- a) The arena of technical discourse on CBNRM must be broadened to include the insights and expertise of other technical line ministries responsible for agriculture and lands. Agriculture is particularly important since it is also about natural resource use, and directly converges with CBNRM interests on such topics as livestock use of the grazing commons. Indeed it could be argued that natural resource management is agriculture in the broad sense of the term. The fact that wildlife production on private land is now usually coordinated by associations linked to commercial agricultural production is not a coincidence.

The technical sponsorship of CBNRM can thus no longer be the exclusive purview of government environmental agencies if its potential is to be fully developed. Ministries involved in local governance are also clearly important. All this points to the need for greater inter-ministerial coordination in CBNRM planning and implementation.

- b) One relatively unexplored interim step towards the conferment of strong property rights on communities is the use of existing legislation on the establishment of cooperatives, turning communities into natural resource cooperatives. This approach was in fact suggested in the original planning for CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe but not pursued in implementation. The possibility deserves re-examination in our respective current legal contexts.
- c) The third, and most urgent strategic thrust now demanding attention is political advocacy for CBNRM at the political centre. By this I do not mean renewed or expanded efforts by environmental technocrats, rural development agencies, academic activists or donor enthusiasts to persuade the political power structure of the importance of CBNRM. Such efforts may have peripheral influence but if, as I have claimed, optimal conditions for CBNRM require strong tenurial rights for communities, this requires a fundamental devolution of power, one which politicians are unlikely to make unless there is a strong political reason to do so. This reason can only lie in a strong, politically potent constituency demand that this takes place.

There is only one source from which this politically salient constituency voice can arise with any potency and this is the rural resource-managing communities themselves. At this level the will and intent is present and it is one of the successes of CBNRM that it has contributed in some rural communities to a more aggressive demand for strong tenurial rights. However, this assertion of community self-interest remains largely episodic and fragmented. It needs to be coalesced into an organised and channelled advocacy. In part this can be done at parliamentary constituency levels. But it also needs to be done at national levels, with representative and effective organisations speaking on behalf of CBNRM constituencies. To my knowledge, in this region only Zimbabwe has progressed on this front through the CAMPFIRE Association. The importance of this kind of representation at this stage is critical and should be a priority for CBNRM initiatives.

in each country of the region. Without it an essential feature of long-term national CBNRM sustainability will be missing.

Conclusion

This address has suggested that our strategy of initial experimentation and implementation under existing politico-legal conditions has been pragmatically productive. We have laid the empirical basis for substantive policy and political change. It has also suggested, however, that we have now reached the stage where that experience must actively be applied in the political arena, with tenurial empowerment being the goal and the communities themselves being the principal actors.

The era of externally-derived innovation in CBNRM should be brought to an end. The era of self-determined, tenurially robust communal natural management should be brought into being. If this conference contributes to a sharper definition of what is needed to bring about this further evolution, it will be justified.

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