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IMPROVING POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION IN ZAMBIA

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Introduction

In 1991, Zambia had little to show for its 25-plus years of independence. Foreign debt was high. Foreign exchange was in short supply. Public and private savings continued their fall. The country's infrastructure was badly decayed. And real domestic production had plummeted.

A number of factors contributed to this state of affairs. Like many countries, Zambia suffered greatly during the economic rollercoaster of the 1970s. Just when world oil prices skyrocketed, producer prices for copper — Zambia's then-chief source of foreign exchange earnings — dropped. In addition, the landlocked country's ability to engage in normal regional trade was reduced by the numerous wars of independence, civil wars, boycotts, and droughts that plagued the Southern African region. These conditions notwithstanding, weaknesses in Zambia's policy decisions receive most blame for the country's decline. "While exogenous and historical factors can be partly used to explain Zambia's economic problems, policy failures compounded the devastating impact of these factors."[1] The issues these policy failures addressed ranged from exchange rates and wages, to subsidies, price controls, capital investment, and tariffs.

In October 1991, the Zambian people elected a new parliament and President in the country's first free multi-party elections since 1968. The opposition MMD (Movement for Multiparty Democracy) swept 125 of 150 National Assembly seats and garnered 76% of the presidential vote for Frederick Chiluba, its trade unionist leader. After assuming office, the Chiluba government gave assurances of a number of rights, including freedom of expression, thought, religion, press, and assembly. The new government also began to implement a new economic orientation based on free enterprise and the liberalization of industry, trade, and commerce.

Despite these moves, the government faced difficult times, with the heaviest per capita foreign debt in the world to bear, continued droughts, and vigorous claims being put it from various pressure groups, including labor unions. In addition, the government struggled to clarify internal relationships within and between ministries and to organize the president's office for effective action. This made it difficult to mobilize the civil service to take action on the important policy changes expected by the electorate and the international community.

This case study describes the assistance provided jointly through USAID's Implementing Policy Change Project and USAID/Zambia's Democratic Governance

Project to the government of Zambia to establish a Policy Analysis & Coordination (PAC) Division in its Cabinet Office. This effort was part of USAID's program to support democratization and improved governance in Zambia. At first, the technical assistance project was seen as an institutional development exercise to strengthen PAC in its ability to coordinate the formulation and implementation of national policy. Within a few months, however, it became clear that to succeed, the technical assistance needed to branch out to Ministries and the Cabinet, as well. Key to the project successfully influencing the making and implementation of government policy was not only the establishment of a Policy Analysis and Coordination Division in Cabinet Office. Also needed was the development of improved processes for developing national policy *and* well-trained civil servants — throughout government — to take responsibility for making the new system work.

The Zambian case illustrates that the equivalent of economics' "invisible hand" does not exist in public sector management. To the contrary, government agencies need to make deliberate efforts to respond to their newly defined missions, i.e., to provide the "supply" response to the broad demands of newly empowered electorates. In Zambia's policy arena, this meant creating an entity responsible for the management of policy development and implementation: the Policy Analysis and Coordination Division (PAC) in the Cabinet Office.

The following describes Zambia's efforts to establish PAC and to reform the country's process for making and implementing policy. Rather than being the invention of foreign technical experts, these new policy systems are the result of a collaboration among Zambian civil servants, high-level politicians, and a team of international consultants. Together, they evaluated the country's policy process, shared ideas for improving the system, and worked to gain support for these changes. Workshops tailored for these groups played a key role in the facilitation process.

Background

Zambia is a land-locked, Texas-sized country in southern Africa with a population of about 8 million. It is a former British colony that gained independence in 1964. Today it maintains a form of government based on Britain's Westminster style of governance. This means that major policy decisions are made by the Cabinet under the concept of collective responsibility — decisions taken by the Cabinet are considered to be "government policy." Unlike Britain, however, Zambia has no prime minister; its Cabinet is headed by the President of the country, who is also the head of the majority party in Parliament. The members of the Cabinet include the country's President, Vice President and Cabinet Ministers, who are elected members of Parliament appointed by the President to head the country's various functional Ministries.

Understanding the social, political and economic landscape of Zambia today requires a brief discussion of the influence Kenneth Kaunda[2] and his UNIP party had on the country. Like many other leaders of newly independent African countries, Kaunda established a one-party government apparatus and rejected the principles of the free market. He created a nation whose formal sector was controlled by and, increasingly, dependent on the government. Virtually all the factors of production came under government purview. Prices and marketing of major commodities were controlled by the central government. Most every enterprise — from hospitals and transportation companies to retail stores — was part of the public domain. At the outset, government's ability to provide reasonable levels of public services was made possible by the considerable profits realized from the country's copper mining industry. As copper prices began to fall in the 1970s, however, Zambia's ability to financially support the system it had created dwindled. In response, government began to make speculatory financial decisions, gambling that prices would rebound from what was hoped to be a temporary downturn in the copper market. Although copper prices never fully rebounded, year after year the government continued to spend more than it took in, resulting in rising budget deficits and growing overseas debt. By the early 1990s, the country's economy was on the verge of collapse. Government stores were sparsely stocked, private enterprise was moribund, and basic government services such as education and health care had nearly disintegrated.

The threatened economic collapse that characterized the Kaunda days highlights a number of weaknesses in the public sector:

First, formal systems for making and implementing policy were poor. Rather than benefitting from the perspective and analysis of technical experts, policy formulation and decision-making were centralized in the Office of the President and at UNIP headquarters. There decisions were based more on socialist dogma

than a careful analysis of problems or objectives and possible actions to address them.

Next, there was a "disconnect" between policy decisions and the outcomes of those decisions. No internal systems for monitoring the results of policy decisions were in place and, since the media were closely linked to the government, few independent means existed to hold the government accountable to the public.

Finally, career civil servants in the ministries were increasingly marginalized from the country's policy process. Those who did attempt to become involved in policy development quickly learned that they had overstepped their boundaries. They discovered that longevity in government service meant avoiding risk and deferring even the most routine matters upward for decision. Perhaps because career officials were not included in policy formulation and decision-making, they developed little ownership, understanding, or commitment to the implementation and follow-up of government policy decisions. The absence of compensation and recognition in the civil service for those who performed well or penalties for poor performance contributed to the environment of resignation and apathy. Demoralized, many ministries eventually became mere shells able only to trudge on with the implementation of routine matters, rather than institutions organized to develop national policies and deliver vital services.

Policy-Making in Zambia during Chiluba's Early Days

After Frederick Chiluba's election in 1991, one stated priority of the MMD government was to create a more professional civil service — one that could make a meaningful contribution to the development of national policies and one that could be counted on to efficiently implement government policy decisions. This meant developing an atmosphere where politicians and career civil servants — each with distinct roles and responsibilities — would perform as a team.

Specifically, sectoral expertise that ostensibly existed in the various ministries would be brought to bear in the development and implementation of government policy.

Chiluba's desire to establish a new, better functioning government apparatus soon collided with the realities of marshalling government machinery to accomplish this goal. Surrounded mostly by advisors and Cabinet Ministers who had prospered in the private sector, the new president quickly discovered that business experience counted for little in managing either an oversized, undertrained government bureaucracy or a fragmented, undisciplined political coalition. Further complicating the equation was the the new government's distrust of career civil servants, most of whom began their government service under Kaunda. Despite this, the Secretary to the Cabinet,[3] one of Chiluba's few advisors with extensive government experience, believed that some of the desired improvements to Zambia's policy process could be leveraged through a unit in the Cabinet Office.

USAID Assesses Democratic and Governance Processes

When countries are committed to structural change and systemic improvement in the public sector, how can we assist in ways that will be both internalized and sustained?

Leonard Joy and Sherrin Bennett[4]

In March of 1992, six months after the Chiluba government took office, USAID/Zambia commissioned an assessment of Zambia's democracy and governance processes. The purpose of this assessment was to provide guidance to USAID/Zambia and to the U.S. Embassy/Lusaka on how to best support democratization and improved governance in Zambia. The assessment team was to focus on the issues of accountability, responsiveness and public sector effectiveness, which in AID's view, were crucial to the sustainability of Zambia's political and economic experiment.[5]

The assessment concluded that in the executive branch there was, "a serious deficiency of policy analysis, integration, and management audit capacity at the Cabinet level."[6] The USAID report supported the establishment of a policy unit in the Cabinet Office to enhance Government's ability to make, coordinate, and implement policy. The rationale for developing this capability in a central location such as the Cabinet Office rather than in a functional ministry was that: a) its function and focus would not duplicate the sectoral interests of the ministries, but would instead, ensure that policy proposals reflected a national perspective; and b) because the Cabinet Office is not a line agency, its staff would be in a better position to serve as a neutral party to ensure that proper coordination in the development and implementation of government policy occurs.

Implementing Policy Change Project Technical Assistance

The result of the USAID assessment was USAID/Zambia's Democratic Governance Project, whose components included support for constitutional reform, legislative development, civic education, independent media, as well as policy coordination, the latter being the focus of this paper.

The objective of the policy coordination component was to **improve the transparency and efficiency of government's policy-making and policy implementation processes**. This could be accomplished by assisting the GRZ with the establishment of a policy-oriented division in the Cabinet Office. IPC was chosen to implement this component on the basis of its knowledge of both the management and technical aspects of successful policy formulation and implementation, and because of the Project team's familiarity with Zambia.

Although the Zambian government had requested Project assistance, the Secretary to the Cabinet was ill at ease with the prospect of foreigners being physically present in Cabinet Office. At the outset, the team was told that, for security reasons, their visits to Cabinet office would be strictly limited. Furthermore, the team would not be allowed to see any classified Cabinet papers. Over time, these restrictions were gradually relaxed, as the Secretary to the Cabinet's trust and confidence in the team increased.

The IPC assistance was envisioned as a two-phase effort. The first phase, which was geared toward institutional development, laid the groundwork for the new Policy Analysis and Coordination (PAC) Division in the Cabinet Office. Specific Project activities included: assistance in developing PAC's terms of reference and staffing pattern; assessing the PAC staff's training and equipment needs; and facilitating strategic management workshops for PAC and its key stakeholders. The second phase of technical assistance focused on positioning PAC as a legitimate and respected broker in Zambia's policy process. During this phase, government-wide systems for coordinating the formulation and implementation of government policy were also strengthened. In addition, the analytic skills of the civil servants in both the ministries and in Cabinet Office who played a crucial role in that new system were developed. Throughout the project, it was both challenging and rewarding to see civil servants expand their vision and sense of responsibility beyond the heaps of papers and forms on their desks. They began to look outward toward actions they, as civil servants, could take to bring improvements to the well being of Zambia as a whole.

The Establishment of the Policy Analysis and Coordination Division of Cabinet Office

For the first set of project activities, the Secretary to the Cabinet instructed the consultants to work closely with the head of Cabinet Office's Economics and Finance Division. He hoped that the team would learn about the existing policy process and identify problems to be overcome by the soon-to-be established PAC. The consultants held extensive interviews with each member of the Economics and Finance and Cabinet Affairs Groups in Cabinet Office. Through a participatory and iterative process, the consultants and the head of Economics and Finance Division drafted terms of reference for PAC. These were immediately accepted by the President and the Secretary to the Cabinet and paved the way for the official creation of PAC only one month later.

The next task for the technical assistance team was to help with the setup of PAC. PAC was established through the merger of two existing divisions in the Cabinet Office (Economics and Finance and Cabinet Affairs). These two divisions had been responsible for reviewing papers submitted to Cabinet and organizing Cabinet meetings. The merger of Economics and Finance and Cabinet Affairs was achieved by making the head of Economics and Finance the Permanent Secretary of PAC, and by retiring a number of Cabinet Affairs staff. Economics and Finance staff, whose previous focus was on briefing the Vice President on Cabinet business, were now required to serve the Cabinet as a whole. The resulting new division in the Cabinet Office, PAC, consisted of a permanent secretary, three chief policy change specialists, six principal policy change specialists, and administrative staff.

The IPC consultants worked closely with the new PAC staff to develop a workplan for the upcoming technical assistance and training. These plans were treated as flexible guidelines that could be adjusted as circumstances dictated — each adjustment based upon the experience of the project to date and the anticipated future needs. This flexibility on the part of the Cabinet Office, USAID, and the consulting team was necessary because the newness of PAC made it difficult to anticipate far in advance the specific technical assistance that would be needed.

Stakeholder Workshops

Workshops, both small and informal and large and formal, were used throughout the project for sharing information, discussing problems, eliciting ideas, and developing plans for future actions. For example, workshops provided first-ever opportunities for Cabinet Office staff, permanent secretaries, coordinating agencies, and eventually, the Cabinet

itself, to meet face-to-face for the express purpose of examining Zambia's policy process and PAC's, the ministries' and Cabinet's roles therein. Because workshops played such an integral role in the project, the proceedings of some of the more important ones are summarized below.

Cabinet Office Workshop

The first project-facilitated workshop brought the PAC staff face to face with counterparts from other Cabinet Office Divisions (Management Development, Administrative, and Establishment Divisions). This workshop provided a forum to discuss and come to consensus on PAC's mission and objectives. The technical assistance team presented the new draft terms of reference for PAC, which outlined its objective as, "improving the effectiveness of Government by providing the Cabinet with high-quality advice and assisting the Cabinet to coordinate and implement policies."[7] The primary means of accomplishing this objective were also outlined in PAC's terms of reference. These were to:

- Analyze policy proposals submitted to the Cabinet by ministries to assess their consistency with government policy.
- Work with the ministries to improve the quality of submissions to the Cabinet for decision.
- Serve as the secretariat to the Cabinet (preparing the minutes of Cabinet meetings and conveying the decisions of Cabinet to those responsible for implementation).
- Coordinate the implementation of Cabinet decisions, particularly when implementation is complex or involves more than one ministry.
- Monitor the implementation of Cabinet decisions.
- Liaise closely with ministries to discuss and facilitate solutions to implementation and coordination problems.

The main focus of this workshop was analysis of PAC's performance vis-à-vis its newly prescribed responsibilities. A group exercise identified PAC's key stakeholders and discussed their specific interests in PAC and their general views of the current policy process. The group then mapped and evaluated the process PAC followed to carry out its responsibilities, and identified and prioritized actions to improve its ability to achieve its objectives. The workshop participants noted that PAC, some two months after its creation, was already performing some of the functions outlined above, albeit poorly. The remaining two functions were not yet being performed by PAC. Thus, the task that lay ahead for PAC and the project team was to improve PAC's *current* performance in providing quality control of policy proposals and serving as secretariat to the Cabinet, while developing *new* processes and procedures to coordinate and monitor the implementation of Cabinet decisions.

PAC Workshop with Permanent Secretaries

The second workshop introduced PAC to the senior officials from all the ministries and provincial governments (mainly Permanent Secretaries and Deputy Permanent Secretaries).[8] In many ways, this very contentious workshop served as a "reality check" for PAC. It revealed the depth of frustration with Zambia's policy process, the thinness of experience and skills within government to improve it, and skepticism that a new organization such as PAC could credibly deal with these issues.

The group strongly recommended that a workshop be held for Cabinet itself where a variety of issues could be openly and frankly discussed and solutions found. These included *worries* that PAC would serve as a bottleneck between ministries and Cabinet if it inserted itself in the policy process; *fears* that insufficient skills and resources resided both in ministries and PAC to bring the level of policy analysis, implementation and monitoring to the desired levels; *concerns* that Cabinet Ministers were more interested in a high *quantity* of policy proposals submitted by ministries for Cabinet consideration than the *quality* of such proposals; and *despair* over the general lack of teamwork that existed within and among ministries.

Two conclusions were drawn during this workshop. The first was that PAC faced serious turf battles that could hamstring its effectiveness if it even *appeared* to be impinging on ministries' new-found responsibility to formulate and implement policy. It was therefore determined that PAC would be most effective if it presented itself as a facilitator or broker in the policy process, rather than playing a controlling role. This role would require skills not only in policy analysis, but also in facilitation and systems development.

The second conclusion reached was that improving policy making and implementation in Zambia required commitment at the top. Specifically, far-reaching changes would not come about simply because PAC

willed them to be. High-level support was also needed. Only the Cabinet possessed the power to push the policy process a level higher by demanding higher quality policy proposals and implementation from the ministries. Such improvements would also greatly depend on the support and commitment of each Ministry's Permanent Secretary to bring policy decisions to fruition. These two groups were most certainly PAC's key stakeholders.

Prioritizing Technical Assistance

Following these prelimenary workshops, the Secretary to the Cabinet requested that before PAC attempted to take on newer duties, the project first attend to improving PAC's performance of the duties for which it was already known to be responsible. Therefore, the IPC team first assisted with what appeared to be the least policy-oriented function of PAC, namely writing minutes of Cabinet meetings, before tackling the functions that related to the more policy-specific duties. While the team initially saw this request as a deviation from the Project's purpose, they eventually understood the wisdom of this strategy.

At that point in time, a great deal of PAC staff's time was consumed with attending numerous, lengthy Cabinet meetings and producing detailed minutes. The technical assistance team believed that if PAC couldn't be relieved of its secretariat functions, a way surely needed to be found to reduce the time this responsibility consumed. To do so would free up more of PAC's time and allow it to devote attention to its more strategic functions in policy formulation and implementation. Therefore, they turned attention to analyzing *why* Cabinet meetings were so long and why it was so difficult to produce acceptable minutes of those meetings.

This investigation led the technical assistance team to an interesting finding — the lengthy Cabinet meetings and the difficulty PAC experienced in producing minutes were both indicators of fundamental problems in the government's policy process, particularly:

1) Policy proposals brought before Cabinet were so poorly researched, coordinated, and written that much of the Ministers' time in Cabinet meetings was spent trying to interpret the intent of the proposals before them. The result of this was lengthy discussions that oftentimes did not address the “real” issue requiring Cabinet decisions.

2) Routine issues that were wholly within the discretion of individual Ministries were needlessly brought before the Cabinet. Civil servants, perhaps as a result of a conditioning process that extended back to the Kaunda days, were hesitant to take any action without first gaining Cabinet's approval. As a result, the Cabinet was inundated with agenda items requiring hours of discussion that could have been handled at the ministry level without Cabinet involvement.

3) Cabinet meetings were lengthened by reopened discussions of decisions taken at previous Cabinet meetings. This was owed partly to the incomplete data provided in Cabinet Memoranda. As new information relating to a policy proposal became available — sometimes weeks after a decision was taken — issues were reopened for Cabinet debate.

4) Cabinet minutes were viewed as historical documents that recorded the *manner* in which decisions were made, rather than brief records of decisions or implementation instructions that could be easily conveyed to implementing agencies. Therefore, the minutes took weeks to write and rewrite before all parties were satisfied with the product.

Clearly, improving the quality of policy proposals submitted to Cabinet, and thereby the quality of Cabinet discussions, was in PAC's interest — not only because this would shorten Cabinet meetings and the time it took to construct minutes, but more importantly, because it would assist in improving the quality of policy-making in Zambia. For Cabinet meeting minutes to become more functional documents, they needed to become shorter, clearer, and more timely.

Formulating Improvements to Zambia's Policy Process

Over the next year,[9] the project focused on assisting PAC to further analyze Zambia's policy process, and then to improve or develop new systems and procedures to strengthen the most critical weaknesses in the process. Finally, recommendations were prepared for Cabinet's consideration. During this period, three major activities took place that led to a workshop for Cabinet as a whole: 1) research and drafting of a report on effective Cabinet Offices in other countries; 2) study tours for senior PAC staff; and 3) a retreat for PAC staff to develop a set of

recommendations for improvements to Zambia's policy process. Each is briefly addressed below.

Cabinet Profiles. A member of the technical assistance team researched six Commonwealth-style governments (Australia, Botswana, Canada, Malaysia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom) that have effective systems for formulating, debating, deciding on, implementing and evaluating policies.[10] The resulting report served a number of uses.

- First, the study provided a means of comparing the efficiency and effectiveness of Zambia's policy process with that of the other countries (e.g., how often the Cabinet meets, how long the meetings last, the number of agenda items dealt with at a time, the function and use of Cabinet meeting minutes, how policy proposals are developed and implemented, etc.).

- Second, the study demonstrated that other countries grapple with many of the same issues as PAC (e.g., the quality of policy proposals intended for Cabinet's attention, balancing the interests and responsibilities of officials with those of politicians, etc.).

- Third, the research helped to determine which countries' Cabinet Offices would be the most instructive sites for senior PAC staff's study tour visits.

- Finally, and perhaps serendipidously, the profiles provided PAC staff members a basis upon which they could confidently make recommendations to Cabinet for improvements to Zambia's own system — the fact that certain ideas had been tried and had been proven effective in other settings built PAC's confidence to push similar ideas forward in Zambia.

Study Tours. The Permanent Secretary of PAC and his three Chief Policy Analysts participated in study tours to Australia and Canada (two PAC staff to Canada and two to Australia, with each group being accompanied by a member of the technical assistance team). These visits served to solidify some of the points made in the *Cabinet Profiles* report, raised issues that hadn't been previously considered, and helped the participants to formulate improvements appropriate in the Zambian context. The visits also provided an opportunity to discuss from a variety of perspectives the practical realities and challenges that other units such as PAC face.

For example, career civil servants in the Canadian Privy Council Office[11] believed that the most important aspect of PAC's job was ensuring that all policy proposals were the result of rigorous analysis. Political appointees in the Canadian government had another perspective on the PAC's role. According to those individuals, PAC could (and they wished their own Privy Council Office would) provide a more meaningful quality control function for Cabinet. That is, in addition to the need for Cabinet policy proposals to be properly researched from a technical standpoint, they believed there is an equal need to examine such proposals from a political standpoint; i.e., analysis that gives Cabinet a sense of how a given policy proposal would impact different groups within the country. Moreover, the political appointees believed that a real service PAC could provide its Cabinet would be to assist in setting and coordinating the national policy agenda for any given year.

In Australia, concepts such as policy coordination, the role of committees of officials, security of Cabinet documents, constructing Cabinet minutes, were all discussed.

While study tours have the reputation with some donor organizations as being of marginal utility, they proved to be very instructive in this case. Factors that contributed to the success included: a) thorough advance planning; b) the seriousness with which the participants approached their visits; and c) the quality, variety and candor of the persons available in both Canada and Australia to meet with the team. It was also helpful that a member of the technical assistance team accompanied each study tour. Having Cabinet Office officials and a consultant present ensured that the full range of issues was explored with their hosts.

PAC Staff Retreat. Shortly after the conclusion of the study tours, a four-day, off-site retreat was conducted for PAC staff and the technical assistance team. The objective of this meeting was to develop a set of well thought-out improvements to Zambia's policy process that would be defensible before, and accepted by, the Cabinet.

The process envisaged for the retreat was to:

- broaden the PAC staff's understanding[12] of the strengths and weaknesses in Zambia's current policy process;

- discuss what was learned from the study tours and from one year of practical experience in Zambia;

- develop recommendations to improve the process; and finally,
- review the recommendations as a group for internal consistency.

Follow-up Activities

The three activities described above were augmented by several IPC team visits to Lusaka. During these visits, the technical experts worked side by side with PAC staff at the Cabinet Office to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the government's process for developing and implementing policy. The rapport and trust between the PAC staff and the technical assistance team began to solidify during this phase of the project. This was significant because, as noted earlier, when the project began one year earlier it was questionable, for security reasons, whether the IPC team would even be allowed in the Cabinet Office building. It had also been made clear that the consulting team would never be allowed to see any Cabinet papers.

Despite the limitations put upon them, almost from the beginning, the technical experts were, in fact, permitted to spend a great deal of time in Cabinet Office. However, the team's restricted access to Cabinet documents and Cabinet Office discussions was adhered to for the first several months. This meant that they had to work with PAC on a more theoretical basis than would have ordinarily been desired. Eight months into the project, however, team members were suddenly permitted to review live policy proposals, to sit in on meetings between PAC staff and ministry representatives, and to observe and participate in PAC's post-Cabinet meetings to construct minutes. These developments greatly increased the technical experts' ability to be of assistance to PAC. The more the team was able to deal with specific and "live" issues, such as how to finance retrenchees' retirement packages, the less they were forced to frame their discussions around abstractions like the nature of policy development and implementation.

A conclusion reached during this phase of the project was that PAC could play a more constructive role in ensuring the quality of policy proposals presented to Cabinet if it participated in the policy formulation process earlier than was envisaged in its original terms of reference. Previously, it was believed that PAC's first exposure to a new policy issue would be after a ministry had drafted and submitted a policy proposal for Cabinet's attention. At that point, the belief was that PAC would review policy documents from a "national standpoint" and make recommendations for improvements. However, after investigations and discussions, PAC decided that this strategy would cast it in an adversarial role to ministries, rather than as a partner in the development of quality policy proposals.

A more constructive working relationship would be established between PAC and the line ministries if it participated early in the development of policy proposals. This early assistance would ensure that proper policy coordination and analysis would occur long before anyone became committed to one policy option or another. As a result, far fewer policy proposals would have to be turned away by Cabinet Office later on in the process for reasons of incompleteness, lack of coordination, or poor presentation of ideas. This formed the basis of the ideas PAC eventually put forth to Cabinet for approval.

Cabinet Workshop on Formulating and Implementing Policy

The workshop conducted for President Chiluba and his Cabinet Ministers in January 1995 (three years after the elections, and a year and a half after the beginning of the project) was a pivotal event in the project. This was the first time that PAC and its major client, the Cabinet, met for the express purpose of discussing policy making and implementation issues. The importance of this workshop was not lost on PAC. If the Cabinet proved to be a receptive audience, the workshop could generate the required political support to enact the changes in Zambia's policy system that PAC believed were necessary. On the other hand, should Cabinet reject PAC's efforts to make the policy process more effective, the viability of the project and government's commitment to the principles that brought it into office would be called into question. Because of the importance of this workshop, it is described in greater detail than other project activities or events.

Workshop Preparations. During the weeks leading up to the Cabinet Workshop, representatives of PAC and the technical assistance team met with a number of members of the Cabinet, including the President[13] to elicit their views on Zambia's current policy processes and to test reactions to the proposals that would eventually be brought before Cabinet as a whole. These pre-workshop meetings proved to be a good use of time. Since the upcoming workshop would last just one day, it was critical to anticipate any

issues or objections that could derail the proceedings. They accomplished that objective and also allowed the team to develop rapport with members of the Cabinet before the actual workshop. These discussions elicited a number of strong and widely held Cabinet views on various aspects of the policy process, which included:

Policy Formulation: Cabinet members believed that coordination in policy formulation was "awkward." They were unclear whether coordination was even desirable, and if so, whom should be consulted. They also believed that policy formulation had become rather parochial — policy proposals rarely reflected a "national" viewpoint. Many Ministers stated that the policy formulation process could be strengthened if all affected ministries were involved from the inception.

Policy Decision-Making: Ministers had the sense that they were being asked to make decisions in an information vacuum. It was clear to them that not much fact-finding or thought was going into the policy proposals that were brought before them. Critical information, such as objectives, the estimated cost of implementing the proposed policies, or the projected impact of the proposal on different populations within the country, was routinely omitted from policy proposals. Ministers believed that the absence of such information was detrimental to their ability to make informed decisions.

Policy Implementation: There was little confidence among Cabinet Ministers that their decisions were being implemented by their ministries. (A recent study by PAC on the implementation of Cabinet decisions validates this concern.)[14] A few acknowledged that "high profile" decisions which concerned donors, such as decontrolling maize pricing and marketing, had been implemented. However, many thought that most other policy decisions — perhaps of equal importance to Cabinet, but of less importance to the international community — didn't get implemented. The Ministers were particularly sensitive to the failure in implementation since they view their mission as translating the platform upon which they were elected into action. In the end, they knew that their effectiveness in this area could mean the difference between victory and defeat in future elections.

Policy Monitoring/Evaluation: Finally, the Cabinet Ministers were profoundly frustrated because they did not receive routine feedback on the implementation of their decisions. They had the sense that whatever energy civil servants in the ministries possessed was spent on the policy formulation process, leaving nothing in reserve for the equally important implementation and evaluation tasks. They wanted two kinds of feedback: 1) feedback regarding whether Cabinet's directives were, indeed, being carried out; and 2), information on whether the desired impact was being achieved.

As the day of the workshop approached, the question arose as to who would present PAC's recommendations to Cabinet. The technical assistance team suggested that PAC staff take on this responsibility to gain exposure and to raise Cabinet's perception of PAC.[15] In contrast, the PAC staff members viewed their own role at the workshop as silent supporters of the technical assistance team. They thought that it would be a breach of protocol for them to address Cabinet.[16] In the end, the Secretary to the Cabinet decided that the workshop presentations should be delivered by a combination of PAC staff members and the consultant team. The consultant team would present background information, and PAC would be responsible for presenting and defending the recommendations. To increase the likelihood of success, the Secretary to the Cabinet tasked the technical assistance team and the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet with preparing PAC staff members for their presentations to Cabinet.

The Cabinet Workshop. The President opened and presided over the one-day, Saturday workshop, which was attended by nearly every Cabinet member. He discarded his prepared speech and instead, affirmed the importance of a highly professional civil service that is capable of serving the present, as well as future governments. The President then stressed the need for a more efficient Cabinet system for formulating policies and again emphasized the importance of the Cabinet paying close attention to the implementation of the decisions it makes.

The first presentation of the day was delivered by a member of the technical assistance team, and consisted of a summary of the feedback received from the Ministers during the pre-workshop interviews. This strategy established that the recommendations to be presented later in the program responded to the Cabinet Ministers' own concerns.

The next presentation introduced the core principles of effective democratic governance,[17] and suggested that the principles of mission-driven, anticipatory, and participatory government should be applied in all efforts to reform government activities, including the

policy process. This was contrasted with the bureaucratic, reactive, and relatively closed system that was currently in place.

Cabinet's reaction to this presentation was one of skepticism. While in theory accepting and approving the concepts presented, the Ministers had difficulty envisioning how such a fundamental change in government operation could come about, especially, they said, given the caliber of people that currently comprise the civil service. A partial response to this was that perhaps USAID's project-funded training could be adjusted to include more training for a wider range of people, particularly civil servants in the various Ministries, to improve skills in policy analysis and implementation.

The final presentation from the technical assistance team was a summary of the study of successful Cabinet-style governments. The key point of the presentation was the positive relationship between well-researched and -written policy proposals, short and decisive Cabinet meetings, and successful policy implementation. Cabinet responded to this presentation very favorably, giving it one of the few ovations of the day.

The remainder of the workshop consisted of a series of presentations by PAC staff and discussion of the various elements of the proposed new policy process. PAC's Permanent Secretary and his three Chief Policy Analysts provided brief background information on each topic and then linked this background to the proposals for Cabinet's consideration. The Cabinet members were especially attentive and constructive during these presentations. By day's end, all of PAC's recommendations were approved (with minor modifications). These included:

(1) Having technical experts from relevant government and non-government organizations participate in **Inter-Ministerial Committees of Officials**. Working together, participants would define issues and develop policy responses to those issues. No longer would important policy proposals be the result of one or two people from a single Ministry sitting in a room drafting a document off the top of their head.

(2) A **new standard format for presenting policy proposals to Cabinet**. The new format requires the authors to more systematically analyze and present arguments in favor of their proposals. Important new elements in the Cabinet submission format included implementation and financing plans. The point was successfully made that one reason Cabinet policy decisions were not implemented was lack of attention and specificity during policy formulation to the details of implementation (timing, resources needed, organizational and individual responsibilities, etc.). Attention to such details will improve the implementability of Cabinet policy decisions.

(3) Identifying one person in each Ministry as that organization's **Cabinet Liaison Officer** (CLO).[18] CLOs would serve as "point persons" to ensure that proper coordination within their organization and between their Ministry and other organizations (Ministries and Cabinet Office) occurs.

(4) Other systemic improvements, such as **revitalizing Cabinet Committees**, and instituting systems for **briefing the President and Cabinet** on the status of policy proposals in both the formulation and implementation stages, were also approved.

(5) To PAC's relief, the proposal that **Cabinet minutes consist only of a summary of decisions** taken by Cabinet was also approved. Somewhat disappointing, however, was the hasty decision that, the minutes of the newly invigorated Cabinet Committees reflect the views of the individual committee members rather than just the conclusion reached by the committee. This decision meant that much of PAC's time would continue to be consumed in the writing of meeting minutes.

As illustrated in Figure 1 on the following page, the new, Cabinet-sanctioned policy system for Zambia is characterized by a high degree of coordination. Emphasis is given to both the technical and political aspects of proposed policies through the involvement of Inter-Ministerial Committees of Officials and Cabinet Committees. Decision making is decentralized to the Cabinet Committees, which lightens Cabinet's load while allowing each issue to receive proper discussion and consideration. Only those proposals approved in committee are forwarded to Cabinet for ratification.[19] Since resource and organizational issues of implementation are now part of the policy formulation process, questions about who is responsible for doing what, and confusion over when to implement Cabinet decisions have been minimized. Finally, feedback systems to apprise

Cabinet of the status and outcome of the implementation of its decisions have been established.

Introducing the New Systems and Procedures to the Ministries

PAC informed Cabinet that it would implement all 17 of the decisions taken at the Cabinet Workshop by June 1995 — five months after the Cabinet Workshop. The first phase of implementation was informing the affected parties of the new systems and procedures. A Cabinet Circular was written that summarized the proceedings and decisions made at the Cabinet Workshop. The Circular was signed by the President and sent to all the Permanent Secretaries in the civil service. As an immediate action item, each Ministry was asked to nominate a Cabinet Liaison Officer (CLO) and one alternate CLO from its ranks.

Next, all the Cabinet Liaison Officers and their alternates were brought together for a half-day briefing from PAC. The IPC team and the PAC staff covered the following topics: the overall new policy process; the role and responsibility of Cabinet Liaison Officers; the role and function of Inter-Ministerial Committees of Officials; and the role of Cabinet Committees in the policy process.

Building Policy Skills in Cabinet Office and in the Ministries. The next phase of the implementation

FIGURE 1. NEW GRZ POLICY PROCESS



process was much-needed skills development for both PAC staff and the new Cabinet Liaison Officers. Although most of the PAC staff and Cabinet Liaison Officers have first degrees from universities, almost none have received formal training in policy analysis and other topics that would equip them to function within the new policy process.

The first training sessions for the PAC staff and Cabinet Liaison Officers focused on the fundamentals of policy analysis. This three-day off-site course was led by a professor from Duke University who had taught policy analysis to mid-career professionals from developing countries. This training provided participants with basic skills for performing rudimentary policy analysis. Topics covered included problem identification, evaluation of various options to address the problem (including implementation issues), evaluation of stakeholder interests, and analyzing the probable impact of the chosen policy and the related tradeoffs.

Zambian case studies formed the basis of the exercises used during this training. Some participants, hoping they would be taught an objective, step-by-step process that would automatically render the "right" policy, were surprised to learn that policy development is as much art as science, involving choices based on what is important and feasible in a given situation. One other recurring point made by the participants was how they were affected by the paucity of good data available to them on which to base policy analysis. Several pointed out that the case studies contained far more data than they ever have available to them in their individual ministries. This discussion underscored the need for ministries to strengthen their statistical capacities, which would enable them to track the trends in their portfolios better. It also affirmed the need for ministries to pool whatever data they do have during the policy formulation process. The new Inter-Ministerial Committees provide the perfect venue for such exchanges.

The second training module was a three-day course in preparing Cabinet Memoranda. A senior staff member from Australia's Cabinet Office was brought to Zambia to lead the seminar. The purpose of this training was to acquaint CLOs with the new Zambian Cabinet Memorandum format (which is very similar to formats used in other Commonwealth countries) and provide practical advice on how to present the analysis required in each section of the format. This training provided participants with skills in packaging and communicating policy recommendations to a largely non-technical audience: the Cabinet.

The third training module covered principles of monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The purpose of this two-day training course was to acquaint PAC, and later CLOs, with the concepts of: setting objectives; identifying indicators of successful implementation of policy decisions; identifying activities that support achievement of stated objectives; and assigning responsibility for these tasks. PAC staff received more intensive training in M&E (including how to construct a logical framework) than the CLOs, who were introduced to the basic principles of objective setting and focusing activities toward achieving those objectives.

Each of these training courses served as an introduction to the subject matter, with some skill building. The trainers believe that more in-depth training and practical application of the principals introduced will be necessary before the participants are fully competent in these subjects.

Permanent Secretary Briefing on New Policy Process. With PAC and the Cabinet Liaison Officers all introduced to the basic competencies to function within the new policy process, the "launch" of the whole system was held. The Permanent Secretary from each Ministry attended the one-day briefing that was hosted by Cabinet Office staff and members of the consulting team. The purpose of the launch was to officially announce the new policy formulation, implementation, and monitoring/evaluation procedures and to respond to questions or comments from the Permanent Secretaries. The participants' initial reaction to the new process was one of concern. Chief among the concerns was the fear that the new process would bog down the Cabinet Memorandum-writing process and slow the rate at which Cabinet Memoranda could be presented to Cabinet. Both PAC and the technical assistance team made the point that it was preferable for Ministries to produce well thought-out policy proposals with a good chance of achieving their stated objectives, than to quickly produce a large number of poorly founded proposals. The participants were then invited to try the new process and offer ideas on how to streamline it without compromising on the quality of policy proposals presented.

The initial concern displayed by the Permanent Secretaries and resistance to accepting the new policy process was perhaps a symptom of their feeling

removed from the development of the new process. The mood of the participants became more positive and, eventually, supportive when it was pointed out that their input at an earlier PAC/Permanent Secretary workshop held one year previously had provided important input to the improvements being presented to them that day. The atmosphere became even more cordial when several participants' suggestions for streamlining the process were accepted on the spot by PAC.

Accomplishments to Date

The major accomplishment of the project to date is the newly articulated system for formulating, deciding on, implementing, and monitoring government policy. Rather than being the brainchild of a group of foreign technical experts that was foisted upon Zambia, this new process is the result of Zambian civil servants and senior politicians collaborating with consultants from the U.S., the U.K., Zambia, India, and Australia to evaluate the country's policy process, share ideas for improving the system, and together working to gain support for these changes.

Key to the future success of this effort will be the respect both the politicians (Cabinet members) and the senior civil servants demonstrate for the new process. Although it is still very early, there are signs that PAC's efforts to strengthen Zambia's policy process are taking hold:

1. Ministers are being held to the agreed process. Shortly after the Cabinet Workshop, one Minister submitted a policy proposal to PAC with the request that it be placed on Cabinet's agenda. After reviewing the proposal, PAC determined that proper coordination had not occurred in the development of the proposal and that the submission lacked the necessary focus and clarity for the Cabinet to make an informed decision. Despite this guidance, the Minister insisted that the item be placed on Cabinet's agenda. When it reached Cabinet, the Ministers were made aware of PAC's concerns. Cabinet concurred with PAC's determination and insisted that the Minister withdraw the proposal and adhere to the agreed procedures.

2. Government recognizes the need to define objectives. Recognizing the need for a coherent national policy framework, Cabinet has instructed each ministry to develop a comprehensive policy statement for each ministry's area of functional responsibility.

3. More cross-organizational coordination now occurs. PAC has convened Inter-Ministerial Committees of Officials to explore several policy issues. The committees appear to be functioning well, particularly in providing a neutral forum at which policy issues can be openly discussed among representatives of a number of functional ministries before reaching a decision on which direction to recommend government policy take.

4. PAC has become a better "policy manager." PAC's skills at facilitating and brokering policy are developing. During one of the first meetings of a newly formed Inter-Ministerial Committee of Officials (IMCO), PAC identified the data that must be generated by each of the participating organizations before any policy approach could be determined. The PAC staff are also better able to focus discussions on objectives and how to achieve them.

5. Cabinet meetings are now shorter and more focused. As a result, writing the record of those meetings takes much less PAC staff time than in the past. Cabinet meeting minutes now only feature a record of Cabinet's decision. Because they are brief and focused, Cabinet meeting minutes now require a minimal amount of time to produce and can serve as implementation instructions that are easily understood by the civil servants in the implementing agencies.

The Future

Since both PAC and Cabinet understand that implementation of the new policy system will require occasional "fine-tunings," annual strategic management workshops have been scheduled with each group. Every September for the life of the project (which ends September 1997), PAC will meet for the purpose of evaluating: a) how well the policy system is functioning; and b) how well PAC is performing in the new system. This analysis, combined with input from various stakeholders, will assist in identifying which parts of the new system are functioning well and which are not. Each December or January, the plan is to hold a workshop with Cabinet to: a) hear its assessment of the new policy process; b) assess progress toward implementing specific policy initiatives in the previous year; and c) identify new policy directions for the coming year.

Now that the new policy system is in place and means of evaluating and improving that system are being developed, it will be possible to focus more intensively

on providing additional training. Each PAC staff member has an individual training plan that was developed for him or her. In general, all require additional instruction in policy analysis and monitoring and evaluation. In addition, each is to receive training or attend conferences that will help them become more conversant with the sectoral portfolios they have been assigned to oversee. To augment the learnings gained in the classroom or from conferences, the project has arranged some on-the-job opportunities for PAC staff. Canada and Australia's Cabinet Offices were each kind enough to offer one PAC staff member a three-week attachment to view their operations first hand. Finally, plans are underway to conduct the third of the three planned study tours. This final study tour will bring one or two PAC staff to Malaysia to observe that country's Cabinet Office in action, most particularly, its systems for planning and monitoring the implementation of Cabinet decisions.

Since the success of the project depends in large part on the skills and commitment of civil servants in the Ministries, additional training of ministerial technical and managerial staff is needed. If additional resources can be obtained, training will be provided in policy analysis, organizational management, and in the development of management information systems.

During the final two years of the project, assistance also will be provided by the technical team in the formulation and implementation of key policies. This will include technical assistance provided by sectoral experts to assist in the development and implementation of important policies, as well as management interventions to ensure that some of the key organizations involved have productive working relationships and systems.

Lessons Learned

A number of lessons have been learned over the first two years of assistance to the Zambia Cabinet Office's Policy Analysis and Coordination Division. These lessons may be applicable in other contexts where government is either attempting to reform its entire policy process, or to strengthen the weak links in that process. Among the more salient lessons:

1. A complete national policy process is needed (capabilities and systems for formulating, deciding on, implementing, and monitoring/evaluating the impact of policy). Because each stage of the policy process depends on the others, it is necessary to devote time to identifying and then addressing weaknesses in the process, wherever they occur.

2. As much attention needs to be given to policy implementation as is customarily given to getting "the decision." The process of formulating policy and gaining support for policy proposals consume so much effort, that often times there appears to be little energy left to deal with the implementation of the policy decision, let alone assess the impact of past policy decisions. To a degree, this is still the case in Zambia. Old habits die hard, but training in monitoring and evaluation has been useful to focus attention on these important, post-decision activities. This phenomenon is hardly limited to developing country governments. In the past, donors, too, have focused inordinate attention on getting the "right" policy decision out of countries without considering implementation issues. This observation, the foundation upon which the Implementing Policy Change Project was originally built, still holds true today.

3. Coordinating a policy process requires the existence of both systems and skills. **Systems** are required for ensuring that each policy conceived is the product of a thorough and inclusive analytical process. Routines must also be established for putting policy decisions into action and assessing their impact. Among the necessary **skills** needed in a coordinating agency like PAC are analytic skills, such as policy analysis and monitoring/evaluation techniques. Less obvious, but equally necessary, are skills in: effectively dealing with a variety of actors at a number of levels of rank or seniority; building commitment to change; and assessing inefficiencies or weaknesses in the national policy system.

4. The implementation of new policies often requires organizations to behave differently. If organizations are expected to behave differently, so too must the people who staff them — this is often the biggest challenge. Systems are relatively easy to change. It is much more difficult to change the attitudes and behavior of those within the organizations. "Attitudes and behavior" in this context refers to changing staffs' orientation away from routine paperwork toward the accomplishment of results. This may require the development of new methods for interacting with others of both higher and lower rank within the organization; interacting with representatives of

other organizations or groups; and means of making decisions, setting organizational priorities, recognizing excellence, settling disputes, etc..

5. The implementation of even simple policies often requires the coordination and cooperation of multiple organizations. Since many organizations are not accustomed to collaborating or coordinating their actions with other organizations, this behavior needs to become part of organizations' normal operating routine.

6. Strengthening a "coordinating agency," such as PAC, may be *necessary* to improve the performance of a national policy process, but it is not *sufficient* if the agencies that hold primary responsibility for policy formulation and implementation are weak. There is an obvious difference in the potential contribution of an agency, like PAC, that coordinates the implementation of well-founded policy and one that doggedly works to implement poorly conceived policies. It is upon these grounds that considerable work has been done to improve ministries' capabilities to produce quality policy proposals. For this reason, at least a portion of training resources under this project have been programmed toward strengthening the policy analytical skills of select individuals in each Ministry.

7. It is important for coordinating agencies to understand their stakeholders. Part of the challenge for PAC in designing improvements to Zambia's policy process has been creating systems that both demonstrate an appreciation of the interests of PAC's major stakeholders (the Cabinet Ministers and the civil servants in the ministries), and gently challenge these stakeholders to a higher level of performance.

8. Senior civil servants need to be trained in organizational management. For example, Permanent Secretaries of ministries often achieve their position by virtue of either their tenure in the civil service, their knowledge of "the system," and/or their sectoral knowledge. While some people can become good managers without the benefit of formal management training, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect across-the-board improvements in the civil service to take place without some attention being given to training in effective organizational management and how to lead a change process.

9. The sequencing and timing of project events is important. It is sometimes tempting to go for the "big event" early in a project. For example, the first workshop held for the Permanent Secretaries of the ministries, was held according to the terms of the contract — some six months into the contract and four months after PAC was established. Despite this, the consensus is that this workshop may have occurred prematurely. The difficulties encountered at the Pernament Secretary workshop were mostly due to PAC "going public" before gaining a firm grounding in what needed to be said and decided. In addition, very little time preceding the Permanent Secretary Workshop was built into the project for the technical assistance staff to conduct detailed systems analysis and diagnostics. In contrast, the workshop for the Cabinet Ministers was held at an appropriate juncture in the project (over a year after the project commenced). Proper research had been conducted. Issues were identified that required attention and decision. Solid proposals were ready for presentation and discussion.

10. The principles of strategic management are useful in both policy development and implementation. Stating objectives, assessing stakeholder interests, evaluating organizational capacities, developing strategies, etc., are not actions that public sector managers may automatically turn to — even if these concepts have been presented and discussed. At least in the PAC context, strategic management seems to be more a practice skill. Creating the strategic management "state of mind" in public managers (making its application second nature or automatic) requires successive rounds of introduction to and practice in these principles.

11. Considerable patience is required when assisting in a far-reaching change process. Unless previous relationships exist, it takes time to build up trust between members of a technical assistance team and the host country managers, especially working in sensitive areas like policy making and implementation. In addition, the type of changes that have been brought about through this project, not to mention seeing those changes come to full fruition, require time. Building new relations, hearing and understanding stakeholder positions, analyzing systemic weaknesses, developing new

systems, “selling” new systems to key stakeholders, training the proper personnel in the necessary skills to make the new system work — all of these require time. However, if local ownership and sustainability are desirable, this time is a necessary investment.

ENDNOTES

[1] Gulhati, Ravi; "Impasse in Zambia"; Public Administration and Development, Vol. 11, 239-244; John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 1991.

[2] Zambia's first post-independence president, who held that office for 27 years.

[3] A strategic client and supporter of what was to become the USAID-sponsored project was (and continues to be) the Secretary to the Cabinet, A.J. Adamson. As Secretary to the Cabinet, Adamson holds the dual positions of head of the Zambian civil service and chief advisor to the President. Having been in the civil service almost continuously since colonial times, he witnessed first hand the slow deterioration in the public sector's professionalism, and now wants to oversee the process of rebuilding it into a slimmed-down, more effective organization. most get the clear impression that Adamson, who is nearing the end of his career, views the development of an effective policy process — involving professional civil servants and responsible elected officials — as the legacy he wishes to leave to Zambia.

[4] From “Process Consultation: Systemic Improvement of Public Sector Management.”

[5] USAID/Zambia, Scope of Work, “Governance and Democratization in Zambia: A Needs Assessment.”

[6] Wunsch, Bratton, and Kareithi; “Democracy and Governance in Zambia: An Assessment and Proposed

[7] Terms of Reference, Policy Analysis & Coordination Division, Office of the President, Zambia.

[8] Although Permanent Secretaries and Deputy Permanent Secretaries serve at the pleasure of the president, they are still considered part of the civil service.

[9] This period included a four-month hiatus in project activities (May-September 1994) when the Phase 1 contract ended and the Phase 2 contract began.

[10] Rielly, Catherine; Cabinet Profile Series; Implementing Policy Change Project; February 24, 1994.

[11] The Canadian equivalent of PAC.

[12] Broadening PAC's understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Zambia's policy process was believed to be necessary since over half of the people in attendance were new to PAC, having joined the unit several months after the first set of strategic management workshops were held.

[13] Approximately one third of the 23 Cabinet Ministers were interviewed. Those interviewed included a sampling of very senior and very junior Ministers, including the Ministers of Defense, Health, Water and Energy, Legal Affairs, and Youth and Sport.

[14] A 1994 study conducted by PAC concluded that roughly 75% of Cabinet decisions remain unimplemented. The primary reasons for the low implementation rate are: 1) the resources necessary to implement the proposal had not been considered/arranged; 2) implementation was found to be unfeasible due to issues/constraints that had not been considered during the policy formulation stage; and 3) proper coordination within and between implementing agencies had not occurred.

[15] Up to this point, the only exposure PAC had to Cabinet as a whole was in its capacity as note takers in Cabinet meetings.

[16] Cabinet Office staff have high regard for formality and protocol. When dealing with potential protocol issues, it is PAC's preference to err on the conservative side. The Secretary to the Cabinet serves as the final arbiter when dealing with such out-of-the- ordinary issues as outsiders and civil servants making presentations at a Cabinet meeting.

[17] Garnett, Harry; "Effective Democratic Governance;" USAID/Zambia Democratic Governance Project/Policy Coordination Component; January 9, 1995.

[18] Mindful of the pressures to reduce the size of the civil service, the duties of Cabinet Liaison Officer were to be assigned to existing ministry staff — either a Deputy Permanent Secretary or Assistant Secretary — rather than creating a special position for this function. The person identified to take on these duties was to have demonstrated ability to interact credibly with senior officials from other ministries and an interest or ability to be trained in policy analysis, the preparation of Cabinet Memoranda, etc.

[19] Emergency issues, however, are permitted to come before Cabinet without passing first through Cabinet Committees.

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