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## AFRICA BUREAU SMALL COUNTRY STRATEGY

The attached documents describe the Africa Bureau's Small Country Strategy. They include (1) the action memorandum by which the Assistant Administrator for Africa approved the small country strategy on March 10, 1992; (2) the small country strategy statement; and (3) a cable advising field personnel of the new strategy. In addition to transmitting the strategy to the field, paragraphs 4 and 7 of the cable further elaborate specific program management and financial management responsibilities associated with small country programs.



U.S. AGENCY FOR  
INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT

MAR 10 1992

ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA

FROM: AAA/AFR/DP, *Margaret P. Bonner*

SUBJECT: Africa Bureau Small Country Program Strategy

Problem: You are asked to approve the attached Africa Bureau Small Country Program Strategy, as well as a series of recommendations concerning individual small country programs.

Background: The Africa Bureau Small Country Program Strategy presents a framework for accommodating U.S. interest in maintaining a development presence in countries which are of lower A.I.D. priority. It does not affect all small country programs, but only those where the Africa Bureau cannot sustain a minimum commitment of staff and resources. It explicitly recognizes that A.I.D. has limited staff resources to maintain a physical presence, yet addresses A.I.D.'s need to preserve an acceptable level of accountability without resident direct hire staff.

The strategy is based on the Africa Bureau's goal under the Development Fund for Africa of achieving development impact by concentrating resources in a limited number of priority countries. It is also meant to reduce A.I.D. vulnerability to management and accountability weaknesses in small country programs by creating a uniform, well-focused and efficient program and management framework. In addition, it responds to Congressional interest, reflected in the FY 1992 House Appropriations Committee report, in limiting the number of African countries with bilateral programs.

After holding a series of meetings and reviewing several papers in which Bureau-wide and country-specific concerns were fully vetted, Africa Bureau staff developed the attached Small Country Program Strategy and other specific recommendations concerning the A.I.D. programs in fourteen small countries.

Discussion:

Under the proposed Africa Bureau Small Country Program Strategy, U.S. assistance to indicated countries will be limited to two program types: (1) a core program and (2) a core-plus-one program, both of which entail minimal or no resident direct hire field staff.

As discussed in greater detail in the attached strategy paper, the core program includes five program options: Peace Corps Small Project Assistance (SPA), the Ambassador's Special Self-Help Fund, centrally funded/contracted short-term democracy, governance and human rights activities (Sec. 116e), training through the regional African Training for Leadership and Skills (ATLAS) project, and P.L. 480 emergency/humanitarian food aid (with no monetization). Countries with core programs will have no other regionally or centrally-funded activities. Core program options will be available for all small countries, including those with on-going A.I.D. programs and those where an A.I.D. program is being re-established after a hiatus. The number of these activities in any one country will be kept to a minimum and kept constant or reduced over time.

The core-plus-one program consists of a single grant in a single sector which will be added to the core program where additional assistance is deemed appropriate. Priority will be given to that sector for any training carried out under the core program. Any regional or centrally-funded project activities will be subject to review and approval of the management units indicated below and must be in the main sector of focus. Exceptions will be considered only on a case-by-case basis.

For each program, clear management and implementation responsibility lines will be drawn and agreed upon by the appropriate parties in advance. Decisions on program activities are the responsibility of the appropriate Africa Bureau geographic office directors. In most instances, primary management responsibility for these activities will be housed in the A.I.D./Washington geographic office, unless specifically delegated to a REDSO. Supplementary management/implementation responsibility may be housed in other A.I.D./Washington offices as appropriate (e.g., AFR/ONI, FHA/FFP). Responsibility for controller and financial management functions will be housed in A.I.D./W or in a REDSO, as agreed upon in advance. In the field, the Embassy, the Peace Corps and other non-A.I.D. entities will be responsible for implementing the activities.

The following are country-specific recommendations and their associated management units based on current plans. Programs could change slightly if circumstances warrant, such as the inclusion of short-term democracy/governance and human rights (Sec. 116e) activities as appropriate.

#### A. Core Programs

1. Comoros: U.S. assistance to Comoros will be conducted as a core program consisting of Special Self-Help and training under the ATLAS project, with management responsibility delegated from AFR/EA to REDSO/ESA. The transition to a core program will be completed when the ongoing bilateral project ends in 8/94.

2. **Equatorial Guinea:** By February 1992, U.S. assistance to Equatorial Guinea will consist of a core program, with program authority and management by AFR/CCWA. Core activities will be limited to Special Self-Help, ATLAS training and Peace Corps SPA support.

**B. Core-Plus-One Programs**

1. **Central African Republic:** By October 1992, the A.I.D. program in Central African Republic will consist of a core program plus one grant activity authorized and managed by AFR/CCWA and focused on health. Core program activities will include Peace Corps SPA support, ATLAS training, Special Self-Help, and short-term democracy, governance and human rights activities.
2. **Congo:** By October 1992, the A.I.D. program in the Congo will consist of a core program plus one ongoing grant activity focused on forest conservation and natural resources management. Program authority and management will be the responsibility of AFR/CCWA. Core program activities will include Peace Corps SPA support, ATLAS training, Special Self-Help, and short-term democracy, governance and human rights activities.
3. **Mauritius:** The current A.I.D. program in Mauritius, management of which is delegated to REDSO/ESA by AFR/EA, falls within the scope of the core-plus-one program, with Special Self-Help and human rights assistance and a project focused on training for industrial diversification which will end in 1996. ATLAS training will complement the bilateral project.
4. **Sao Tome and Principe:** By July 1992, A.I.D. assistance to Sao Tome and Principe will consist of a core program plus one grant activity authorized and managed by AFR/CCWA. All activities will focus on agriculture. The core program will include training under ATLAS and Special Self-Help assistance.
5. **Sierra Leone:** By July 1992, A.I.D. assistance to Sierra Leone will consist of a core program plus one grant activity focused on enterprise development. The program will be authorized and managed by AFR/CCWA. The core program will include ATLAS training, Special Self-Help and a PVO-implemented Title II humanitarian assistance program.

**C. Other Small Programs**

1. **Seychelles and Djibouti:** A.I.D. assistance in these two countries is limited to ESF-funded budget support, with management delegated to REDSO/ESA by AFR/EA. As these programs are essentially political rather than

developmental in nature, they are not appropriate candidates for DFA funding and assistance under the Small Country Program Strategy, with the possible exception of future human rights (Sec. 116e) assistance. They may, however, participate in the ATLAS project, which will need to be amended so that these countries can buy into the project within their ESF budgets.

2. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland: While the Small Country Program Strategy is not an appropriate framework for assistance to these countries, it has become clear that their very different circumstances require a new and innovative assistance strategy for the future. Over the next two years, transition plans will be developed for these three countries to describe a transition from the current A.I.D. program to a new type of assistance relationship which is less management-intensive. A timetable for these transitions will also be included.
3. Gabon and Mauritania: A.I.D. assistance to these countries, either bilateral or centrally-funded, is limited to Special Self-Help programs, managed by the Embassies with accounting support from REDSO/WCA.

Recommendation One: That you approve the attached Small Country Program Strategy.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

*JMS*

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

*3-10-92*

Recommendation Two: That you approve the country-specific recommendations, including (1) a core program only for Equatorial Guinea and Comoros, the former to be managed by AFR/CCWA and the latter by REDSO/ESA; (2) sector-focused core-plus-one programs for Congo, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe to be managed by AFR/CCWA, and for Mauritius, to be managed by REDSO/ESA; (3) ESF-funded training for Seychelles and Djibouti; (4) programs limited to Special Self-Help for Gabon and Mauritania; and (5) the development of appropriate transition

plans and timetables for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The number of activities in each of these programs will be kept to a minimum and kept constant or reduced over time.

Approved gms

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Date 3-10-92

SGrossman:AFR/DP/PAB:3/6/92:SMCENTRY  
with input from RHellyer:AFR/CCWA

Clearances:

LStamberg, AFR/DP (draft)	TBork, AFR/SWA (draft)
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Keith Brown, AFR/SA (draft)	CRozell, AFR/CCWA
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BKline, AFR/MRP (draft)	DLundberg, AFR/EA
RCobb, DAA/AFR <i>RC</i> 3/10/92	LDean, AFR/SA (draft)
JHicks, DAA/AFR (draft)	FFischer, REDSO/ESA (draft)
LRogers, OPS (draft)	FGilbert, REDSO, WCA (draft)
RMaushammer, POL (draft)	
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## AFRICA BUREAU SMALL COUNTRY STRATEGY

### BACKGROUND

Over the past several years, the Africa Bureau has been attempting to accommodate two paradoxical trends in the foreign assistance program. On the one hand are pressures to condense our programs due to dwindling management resources, Congressional and Agency exhortations to concentrate funds in a smaller number of countries, accountability concerns and external challenges to the efficacy of our programs. On the other hand are the pressures to expand our efforts in response to an increase in program resources for Africa, the great needs of the people of Africa, interest in maintaining a U.S. presence in as many countries as possible and the numerous special interests we have had to accommodate.

In part, the Africa Bureau has responded to these trends by devising a new way of doing business under the Development Fund for Africa (DFA). To use our resources more efficiently, we enumerated four strategic objectives to which our country program activities are geared. We plan to achieve and demonstrate results by concentrating resources in a limited number of priority countries that are most likely to use them effectively. Further, within each country, we are focusing on achieving a limited set of objectives which support the overall strategic objectives. In addition, to enhance accountability and better focus our programs, we have initiated new monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems which are beginning to bear fruit.

Despite this, the results of our efforts to concentrate resources have been inadequate. A recent Congressional staff report reveals that since the creation of the DFA, the number of African countries receiving some form of development aid from the United States has increased, and the degree to which A.I.D. concentrates development funds in Africa has declined. This is not surprising in view of the pressures to respond to important new priorities, such as the emerging democracies in Benin, Namibia, Ethiopia and Angola. However, if we are to be able to meet priority ongoing and new program requirements, we must find a way to use our management resources even more efficiently.

After holding a series of meetings and reviewing several papers in which Bureau-wide and country-specific concerns were fully vetted, the Africa Bureau has approved a strategy for small country programs which will enable us to further concentrate resources in priority countries, yet satisfy overall foreign policy requirements.

## PRINCIPLES OF THE SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGY

The Africa Bureau's Small Country Program Strategy was designed for countries of lower A.I.D. priority. It does not affect all small country programs, but only those where the Africa Bureau cannot sustain a minimum commitment of staff and resources. It can be used for countries with ongoing A.I.D. programs where the Bureau has made a conscious decision to restrict assistance, as well as for countries where renewed assistance is proposed after a hiatus in the A.I.D. program.

Under the Africa Bureau's Small Country Strategy, the overall management of U.S. assistance activities is the responsibility of the appropriate geographic office in A.I.D./Washington, unless specifically delegated to REDSO, with other A.I.D./Washington, U.S. government and private entities having implementation responsibility as agreed. Unless specifically delegated to REDSO, there is no field management of programs beyond possible REDSO responsibility for controller and financial management functions, as appropriate. To the extent possible, programs are to be implemented by a PVO, NGO or other non-A.I.D. entity, with assistance preferably provided on a grant (OPG) basis, rather than a contract.

## PROGRAM ELEMENTS UNDER THE SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGY

### Core Program

All country programs governed by this strategy have the option of including one or more of the following core program elements: Peace Corps Small Project Assistance (SPA), the Ambassador's Special Self-Help Fund, centrally-funded/contracted short-term democracy, governance and human rights activities, training and P.L. 480 Title II emergency/humanitarian program (with no monetization) as necessary. The number of activities will be kept to a minimum and kept constant or reduced over time. In each case, clear management and implementation responsibility lines are drawn and agreed upon by the appropriate parties in advance. For example, a P.L. 480 emergency/humanitarian program is likely to be implemented by a PVO and managed by the Food and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau in A.I.D./W, with concomitant responsibilities housed in the A.I.D./W geographic and financial management offices and/or the Regional Economic Development Services Offices (REDSO). A short-term democracy activity is likely to be implemented by an NGO and managed by the Embassy, with concomitant responsibilities housed in the A.I.D./W geographic office and the financial management office (FA/FM) and/or REDSO. Training will be conducted through the regional Africa Training for Leadership and Skills (ATLAS) project, which is implemented by a contractor and managed by the Africa Bureau Office of Operations and New Initiatives. Mission program authorities rest with the delegated geographic office or REDSO.

### Core-Plus-One Program

The core-plus-one program provides the option to add one more program element to certain core programs - a single bilateral activity, preferably a grant, in a single sector. Training conducted under the core program can either be an integral part of this activity or done through the ATLAS project. Priority will be given to the focus sector for any training carried out. Centrally-funded activities (through A.I.D. central bureaus and Africa Regional projects) will be limited to the focus sector and must be explicitly approved by the responsible Bureau management unit. Other activities will be considered only on an exceptional basis.

### Re-entry Program

Normally, where an A.I.D. program is being re-established after a hiatus in a country of lesser development priority where there is U.S. interest, the first option is a core program. A core-plus-one program will be considered as a second option only where justified and where the Bureau has the management capacity to undertake this increased responsibility.

### **IMPLICATIONS FOR A.I.D.**

Implementation of this small country strategy is expected to result in reduced field management time associated with these programs over the long term, thus permitting the Africa Bureau to further concentrate its management resources on higher priority activities. For example, in FY 90, the missions in Zaire and Cameroon and REDSO/WCA dedicated about 5.53 FTEs to the implementation of the programs in Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic, Congo, Sao Tome and Principe and Sierra Leone. These field staff resources will be able to be redirected once the transition period is over. In contrast, the management of these programs from A.I.D./W is expected to take approximately 2.5 FTEs; resulting in an overall savings of over 3.0 FTEs.

This strategy is also meant to reduce A.I.D. vulnerability to management and accountability weaknesses in small country programs as illustrated in a March 1990 RIG/A/Dakar audit report concerning Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea by creating a uniform, well-focused and efficient program and management framework. The small country strategy also responds to Congressional interest, reflected in the FY 1992 House Appropriations Committee report, in limiting the number of African countries with bilateral programs.


The Small Country Program strategy is based on the premise that a minimum set of field activities will be responsibly managed and overseen from A.I.D./Washington or from REDSO if specifically delegated. It assumes that the Africa Bureau and the Research and Development Bureau will cooperate in limiting and eliminating centrally-funded activities in these countries.

It also assumes the full cooperation of the A.I.D. financial management office and the REDSO accounting stations, both of which have been assured. Another important requirement to the success of this strategy is sufficient operating expenses to fund travel so that project managers are able to monitor these activities.

For the near term, it is not likely that there will be a decrease in overall staff time allotted to managing these programs. Rather, there is likely to be an increase in controller and project management time as funds are deobligated and projects and accounts are closed. In the long term, however, this strategy presents the best opportunity for the Africa Bureau to reconcile the conflicting trends in the foreign assistance program and to fulfill the objectives of the DFA.

SGrossman:AFR/DP/PAB:3/6/92:SMCNTRY  
with input from RHellyer, AFR/CCWA

Clearances:

LStamberg, AFR/DP (draft)	TBork, AFR/SWA (draft)
JGovan, AFR/DP	JWolgin, AFR/ARTS (draft)
MBonner, AFR/DP	Keith Brown, AFR/SA (draft)
CRozell, AFR/CCWA	WWeinstein, AFR/ONI (draft)
MGolden, AFR/CCWA	EKline, AFR/MRP (draft)
DLundberg, AFR/EA	RCobb, DAA/AFR, <u>RE</u> 3/10/92
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FFischer, REDSO/ESA (draft)	FGilbert, REDSO, WCA (draft)
LRogers, OPS (draft)	
RMaushammer, POL (draft)	
ESpriggs, GC/AFR (draft)	
✓ARosenberg, AF/EP 	

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AID/A-AA/AFR:JHICKS

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DAA/AFR:RCOBB  
AFR/CCWA:CROZELL {DRAFT}  
AFR/EA:DLUNDBERG {DRAFT}  
STATE/AF:WDAMERON {DRAFT}

AFR/DP/PAB:JGOVAN {DRAFT}  
AFR/CCWA:MGOLDEN {DRAFT}  
FA/FM:BRONNAFFON {DRAFT}  
STATE/AF:AROSENBURG {DRAFT}

PRIORITY MORONI, MALABO PRIORITY, LIBREVILLE PRIORITY,  
BANGUI PRIORITY, BRAZZAVILLE PRIORITY, PORT LOUIS PRIORITY,  
PRIORITY AIDAF

AIDAC NAIROBI FOR REDSO/ESA; ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/WCA

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: AFRICA BUREAU SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGY

1. SUMMARY

THIS IS A JOINT STATE/A.I.D. CABLE. IT TRANSMITS THE AFRICA BUREAU SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGY APPROVED ON MARCH 10 BY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR SCOTT SPANGLER IN CONSULTATION WITH STATE/AF. IT COMPLEMENTS THREE OTHER JOINT STATE/A.I.D. MESSAGES RECENTLY SENT TO THE FIELD DISCUSSING A REVISED SYSTEM FOR ALLOCATING DFA, DEMOCRACY/GOVERNANCE AND A.I.D. BUDGET ALLOCATIONS, AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PERFORMANCE RATINGS FOR COUNTRIES OVER 5 MILLION POPULATION. SEPTELS TO ACTION POSTS DISCUSS THE CURRENT COUNTRY-SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS OF IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY OUTLINED IN THIS CABLE.

2. THE AFRICA BUREAU SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGY DOES NOT AFFECT ALL SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAMS, BUT PRESENTS A FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOMMODATING U.S. INTEREST IN MAINTAINING A DEVELOPMENT PRESENCE IN COUNTRIES WHERE A.I.D. CANNOT SUSTAIN A MINIMUM COMMITMENT OF STAFF AND RESOURCES. IT EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZES THAT A.I.D. HAS LIMITED STAFF

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RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN A PHYSICAL PRESENCE, YET ADDRESSES A.I.D.'S NEED TO PRESERVE AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF ACCOUNTABILITY WITHOUT RESIDENT DIRECT HIRE STAFF.

3. THE STRATEGY IS BASED ON THE AFRICA BUREAU'S GOAL UNDER THE DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AFRICA OF ACHIEVING DEVELOPMENT IMPACT BY CONCENTRATING RESOURCES IN A MORE LIMITED NUMBER OF FOCUS COUNTRIES. IT IS ALSO MEANT TO REDUCE A.I.D. VULNERABILITY TO MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WEAKNESSES IN SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAMS BY CREATING A UNIFORM, WELL-FOCUSED AND EFFICIENT PROGRAM AND MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK. IN ADDITION, IT RESPONDS TO CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST, REFLECTED IN THE FY 1992 HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE REPORT, IN LIMITING THE NUMBER OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH BILATERAL PROGRAMS. THE STRATEGY AND COUNTRY-SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS WERE DEVELOPED FOLLOWING A SERIES OF MEETINGS AND THE REVIEW OF SEVERAL PAPERS IN WHICH BUREAU-WIDE AND COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CONCERNS WERE FULLY VETTED.

4. UNDER THE SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGY, AS PRESENTED BELOW IN DETAIL, U.S. ASSISTANCE TO INDICATED COUNTRIES WILL BE LIMITED TO TWO PROGRAM TYPES -- A CORE PROGRAM AND A CORE-PLUS-ONE PROGRAM -- BOTH OF WHICH ENTAIL MINIMAL OR NO RESIDENT DIRECT-HIRE FIELD STAFF. FOR EACH PROGRAM, CLEAR MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBILITY LINES WILL BE DRAWN AND AGREED UPON BY THE APPROPRIATE PARTIES IN ADVANCE. DECISIONS ON PROGRAM ACTIVITIES ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE APPROPRIATE AFRICA BUREAU GEOGRAPHIC OFFICE DIRECTORS. IN MOST INSTANCES, PRIMARY MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE ACTIVITIES WILL BE HOUSED IN THE A.I.D./WASHINGTON GEOGRAPHIC OFFICE, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DELEGATED TO A REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SERVICES OFFICE (REDSO). RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTROLLER AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS WILL BE HOUSED IN A.I.D./WASHINGTON OR IN A REDSO, AS AGREED IN ADVANCE. IN GENERAL, ACTIVITIES REQUIRING BILATERAL PROJECT ACCOUNTING OR OTHER LOCAL COST FINANCING (DIRECT HIRE FSNS AND PSCS, GRANTS TO LOCAL NGOS, ETC.) OR LOCAL CURRENCY COUNTERPART ACCOUNTING REQUIRE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE FIELD. THEREFORE, THIS STRATEGY PURPOSELY REDUCES THESE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES WHICH REQUIRE FIELD-BASED ACCOUNTING TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, BUT WILL SUPPORT THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE IMPLEMENTED THROUGH DIRECT DOLLAR GRANTS OR COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WITH U.S. INTERMEDIARIES AND CAN BE READILY ACCOUNTED FOR IN A.I.D./W.

THE TEXT OF THE APPROVED AFRICA BUREAU SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGY FOLLOWS. END SUMMARY

## AFRICA BUREAU SMALL COUNTRY STRATEGY.

## 5. BACKGROUND

OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, THE AFRICA BUREAU HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO ACCOMMODATE TWO PARADOXICAL TRENDS IN THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. ON THE ONE HAND ARE PRESSURES TO CONDENSE OUR PROGRAMS DUE TO DWINDLING MANAGEMENT RESOURCES, CONGRESSIONAL AND AGENCY EXHORTATIONS TO CONCENTRATE FUNDS IN A SMALLER NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, ACCOUNTABILITY CONCERNS AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGES TO THE EFFICACY OF OUR PROGRAMS. ON THE OTHER HAND ARE THE PRESSURES TO EXPAND OUR EFFORTS IN RESPONSE TO AN INCREASE IN PROGRAM RESOURCES FOR AFRICA, THE GREAT NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE OF AFRICA, INTEREST IN MAINTAINING A U.S. PRESENCE IN AS MANY COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE AND THE NUMEROUS SPECIAL INTERESTS WE HAVE HAD TO ACCOMMODATE.

IN PART, THE AFRICA BUREAU HAS RESPONDED TO THESE TRENDS BY DEVISING A NEW WAY OF DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AFRICA (DFA). TO USE OUR RESOURCES MORE EFFICIENTLY, WE ENUMERATED FOUR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES TO WHICH OUR COUNTRY PROGRAM ACTIVITIES ARE GEARED. WE PLAN TO ACHIEVE AND DEMONSTRATE RESULTS BY CONCENTRATING RESOURCES IN A LIMITED NUMBER OF PRIORITY COUNTRIES THAT ARE MOST LIKELY TO USE THEM EFFECTIVELY. FURTHER, WITHIN EACH COUNTRY, WE ARE FOCUSING ON ACHIEVING A LIMITED SET OF OBJECTIVES WHICH SUPPORT THE OVERALL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. IN ADDITION, TO ENHANCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND BETTER FOCUS OUR PROGRAMS, WE HAVE INITIATED NEW MONITORING, EVALUATION AND REPORTING SYSTEMS WHICH ARE BEGINNING TO BEAR FRUIT.

DESPITE THIS, THE RESULTS OF OUR EFFORTS TO CONCENTRATE RESOURCES HAVE BEEN INADEQUATE. A RECENT CONGRESSIONAL STAFF REPORT REVEALS THAT SINCE THE CREATION OF THE DFA, THE NUMBER OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES RECEIVING SOME FORM OF DEVELOPMENT AID FROM THE UNITED STATES HAS INCREASED, AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH A.I.D. CONCENTRATES DEVELOPMENT FUNDS IN AFRICA HAS DECLINED. THIS IS NOT SURPRISING IN VIEW OF THE PRESSURES TO RESPOND TO IMPORTANT NEW PRIORITIES, SUCH AS THE EMERGING DEMOCRACIES IN BENIN, NAMIBIA, ETHIOPIA AND ANGOLA. HOWEVER, IF WE ARE TO BE ABLE TO MEET PRIORITY ONGOING AND NEW PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, WE MUST FIND A WAY TO USE OUR MANAGEMENT RESOURCES EVEN MORE EFFICIENTLY.

AFTER HOLDING A SERIES OF MEETINGS AND REVIEWING SEVERAL PAPERS IN WHICH BUREAU-WIDE AND COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CONCERNS WERE FULLY VETTED, THE AFRICA BUREAU HAS APPROVED A STRATEGY FOR SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAMS WHICH ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS THESE SOMETIMES COMPETING NEEDS.

#### 6. PRINCIPLES OF THE SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGY

THE AFRICA BUREAU'S SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGY DOES NOT AFFECT ALL SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAMS, BUT ONLY THOSE WHERE THE AFRICA BUREAU CANNOT SUSTAIN A MINIMUM COMMITMENT OF STAFF AND RESOURCES. IT CAN BE USED FOR COUNTRIES WITH ONGOING A.I.D. PROGRAMS WHERE THE BUREAU HAS MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO RESTRICT ASSISTANCE, AS WELL AS FOR COUNTRIES WHERE RENEWED ASSISTANCE IS PROPOSED AFTER A HIATUS IN THE A.I.D. PROGRAM.

UNDER THE AFRICA BUREAU'S SMALL COUNTRY STRATEGY, THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT OF U.S. ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE APPROPRIATE GEOGRAPHIC OFFICE IN A.I.D./WASHINGTON, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DELEGATED TO REDSO, WITH OTHER A.I.D./WASHINGTON, U.S. GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ENTITIES HAVING IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBILITY AS AGREED. UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DELEGATED TO REDSO, THERE IS NO FIELD MANAGEMENT OF PROGRAMS BEYOND POSSIBLE REDSO RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTROLLER AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS, AS APPROPRIATE. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, PROGRAMS ARE TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY A PVO, NGO OR OTHER NON-A.I.D. ENTITY, WITH ASSISTANCE PREFERABLY PROVIDED ON A GRANT (OPG) BASIS, RATHER THAN A CONTRACT.

#### 7. PROGRAM ELEMENTS UNDER THE SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGY

##### A) CORE PROGRAM

ALL COUNTRY PROGRAMS GOVERNED BY THIS STRATEGY HAVE THE OPTION OF INCLUDING ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING CORE PROGRAM ELEMENTS: PEACE CORPS SMALL PROJECT ASSISTANCE (SPA), THE AMBASSADOR'S SPECIAL SELF-HELP FUND, HUMAN RIGHTS (LBE) ACTIVITIES, CENTRALLY-FUNDED/CONTRACTED SHORT-TERM DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE ACTIVITIES (INCLUDING SHORT-TERM ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE), TRAINING AND P.L. 480 TITLE II EMERGENCY/HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM (WITH NO MONETIZATION) AS NECESSARY. THE NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES WILL BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM AND KEPT CONSTANT OR REDUCED OVER TIME. IN EACH CASE, CLEAR MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBILITY LINES ARE DRAWN AND AGREED UPON BY THE APPROPRIATE PARTIES IN ADVANCE.

FOR EXAMPLE, A P.L. 480 EMERGENCY/HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM IS LIKELY TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY A PVO AND MANAGED BY THE FOOD AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE BUREAU IN A.I.D./W, WITH CONCOMITANT RESPONSIBILITIES HOUSED IN THE A.I.D./W GEOGRAPHIC OFFICE OR THE REDSO AND IN THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OFFICE (FA/FM). A SHORT-TERM ELECTION ASSISTANCE ACTIVITY IS LIKELY TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY AN NGO THROUGH A REGIONALLY-FUNDED MECHANISM, MANAGED BY THE AFRICA BUREAU OFFICE OF OPERATIONS AND NEW INITIATIVES (AFR/ONI) AND LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTED BY THE EMBASSY, WITH CONCOMITANT RESPONSIBILITIES HOUSED IN THE A.I.D./W GEOGRAPHIC OFFICE OR REDSO AND THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OFFICE (FA/FM). TRAINING WILL BE CONDUCTED THROUGH THE REGIONAL AFRICA TRAINING FOR LEADERSHIP AND SKILLS (ATLAS) PROJECT, WHICH IS IMPLEMENTED BY A CONTRACTOR AND MANAGED BY THE AFR/ONI, WITH CONCOMITANT RESPONSIBILITIES HOUSED IN THE A.I.D./W GEOGRAPHIC OFFICE OR REDSO AND THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OFFICE (FA/FM). PEACE CORPS AND THE A.I.D./W GEOGRAPHIC OFFICE OR REDSO WILL REVIEW AND APPROVE A SPA PROGRAM ON AN ANNUAL BASIS. THE SPA WILL BE MANAGED ENTIRELY BY PEACE CORPS. SPECIAL SELF-HELP ACTIVITIES WILL CONTINUE TO BE APPROVED/MANAGED BY THE EMBASSY. HOWEVER, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT WILL BE CENTRALIZED IN ONE OF THE TWO REDSOS. SEC. 115(E) ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBMITTED TO AND APPROVED BY A JOINT STATE/A.I.D. COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON WITH A.I.D./W GEOGRAPHIC OFFICE CONCURRENCE, MANAGED BY THE EMBASSY WITH THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PROVIDED BY A REDSO OFFICE. MISSION PROGRAM AUTHORITIES REST WITH THE DELEGATED GEOGRAPHIC OFFICE OR REDSO.

#### B) CORE-PLUS-ONE PROGRAM

THE CORE-PLUS-ONE PROGRAM PROVIDES THE OPTION TO ADD ONE MORE PROGRAM ELEMENT TO CERTAIN CORE PROGRAMS - A SINGLE ACTIVITY, PREFERABLY A GRANT, IN A SINGLE SECTOR. TRAINING CONDUCTED UNDER THE CORE PROGRAM CAN EITHER BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS ACTIVITY OR DONE THROUGH THE ATLAS PROJECT. PRIORITY WILL BE GIVEN TO THE FOCUS SECTOR FOR ANY TRAINING CARRIED OUT. CENTRALLY-FUNDED ACTIVITIES (THROUGH A.I.D. CENTRAL BUREAUS AND AFRICA REGIONAL PROJECTS) WILL BE LIMITED TO THE FOCUS SECTOR AND MUST BE EXPLICITLY APPROVED BY THE RESPONSIBLE BUREAU MANAGEMENT UNIT. OTHER ACTIVITIES WILL BE CONSIDERED ONLY ON AN EXCEPTIONAL BASIS.

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C) RE-ENTRY PROGRAM

NORMALLY, WHERE AN A.I.D. PROGRAM IS BEING RE-ESTABLISHED AFTER A HIATUS IN A COUNTRY OF LESSER DEVELOPMENT PRIORITY WHERE THERE IS U.S. INTEREST, THE FIRST OPTION IS A CORE PROGRAM. A CORE-PLUS-ONE PROGRAM WILL BE CONSIDERED AS A SECOND OPTION ONLY WHERE JUSTIFIED AND WHERE THE BUREAU HAS THE MANAGEMENT CAPACITY TO UNDERTAKE THIS INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY.

B. IMPLICATIONS FOR A.I.D.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SMALL COUNTRY STRATEGY IS EXPECTED TO RESULT IN REDUCED FIELD MANAGEMENT TIME ASSOCIATED WITH THESE PROGRAMS OVER THE LONG TERM, THUS PERMITTING THE AFRICA BUREAU TO FURTHER CONCENTRATE ITS MANAGEMENT RESOURCES ON HIGHER PRIORITY ACTIVITIES. FOR EXAMPLE, IN FY 90, THE MISSIONS IN ZAIRE AND CAMEROON AND REDSO/WCA DEDICATED ABOUT 5.53 FTES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMS IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, CONGO, SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE AND SIERRA LEONE. THESE FIELD STAFF RESOURCES WILL BE ABLE TO BE REDIRECTED ONCE THE TRANSITION PERIOD IS OVER. IN CONTRAST, THE MANAGEMENT OF THESE PROGRAMS FROM A.I.D./W IS EXPECTED TO TAKE APPROXIMATELY 2.5 FTES, RESULTING IN AN OVERALL SAVINGS OF OVER 3.0 FTES.

THIS STRATEGY IS ALSO MEANT TO REDUCE A.I.D. VULNERABILITY TO MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WEAKNESSES IN SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAMS, AS ILLUSTRATED IN A MARCH 1990 RIG/A/DAKAR AUDIT REPORT CONCERNING CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND EQUATORIAL GUINEA, BY CREATING A UNIFORM, WELL-FOCUSED AND EFFICIENT PROGRAM AND MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK. THE SMALL COUNTRY STRATEGY ALSO RESPONDS TO CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST, REFLECTED IN THE FY 1992 HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE REPORT, IN LIMITING THE NUMBER OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH BILATERAL PROGRAMS.

THE SMALL COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGY IS BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT A MINIMUM SET OF FIELD ACTIVITIES WILL BE RESPONSIBLY MANAGED AND OVERSEEN FROM A.I.D./WASHINGTON OR FROM REDSO IF SPECIFICALLY DELEGATED. IT ASSUMES THAT THE AFRICA BUREAU AND THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BUREAU WILL COOPERATE IN LIMITING AND ELIMINATING CENTRALLY-FUNDED ACTIVITIES IN THESE COUNTRIES. IT ALSO ASSUMES THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE A.I.D. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OFFICE AND

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THE REDSO ACCOUNTING STATIONS, BOTH OF WHICH HAVE BEEN ASSURED. ANOTHER IMPORTANT REQUIREMENT TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS STRATEGY IS SUFFICIENT OPERATING EXPENSES TO FUND TRAVEL SO THAT PROJECT MANAGERS ARE ABLE TO MONITOR THESE ACTIVITIES.

FOR THE NEAR TERM, IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE A DECREASE IN OVERALL STAFF TIME ALLOTTED TO MANAGING THESE PROGRAMS. RATHER, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE AN INCREASE IN CONTROLLER AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT TIME AS FUNDS ARE DEOBLIGATED AND PROJECTS AND ACCOUNTS ARE CLOSED. IN THE LONG TERM, HOWEVER, THIS STRATEGY PRESENTS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR THE AFRICA BUREAU TO RECONCILE THE CONFLICTING TRENDS IN THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND TO FULFILL THE OBJECTIVES OF THE DFA. 44

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